Skeptical Theism 9783031342707, 9783031342714

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Praise for Skeptical Theism
Contents
1: Introduction
Preliminary Remarks
God
Is This Book Immoral? Anti-Anti-Theodicy
Summary of Chapters
2: Axiological Skeptical Theism Proved
Introduction: Different Skeptical Theisms
Axiological Skeptical Theism
The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism
Objections to the Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism
Direct Objection 1: There Likely Aren’t Unknown States of Affairs
Direct Objection 2: Equiprobability Objections
The Argument from Reasons
A Preliminary Problem
The Argument from Reasons Continued
The Argument from Actuality
Is a Sufficiently Weighty Unknown Good Likely?
Conclusion: Unknown Goods and Evils Aren’t Equiprobable
Direct Objection 3: Ekstrom’s “Good Reasons” for Rejecting ST1–3
Direct Objection 4: Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs’ Rejection of ST1–4
Direct Objection 5 Oppy’s Objection to Axiological Skeptical Theism
Indirect Objection 1: Moral (or Value) Skepticism
Indirect Objection 2: Oppy’s ‘Item’ Skepticism
Indirect Objection 3: Climenhaga’s Bayesian Objection
Conclusion
3: Deontological Skeptical Theism Proved
Introduction
Deontological Skeptical Theism
The Nature of Reasons
The Justifying and Requiring Distinction Is Not Arbitrary
Moral Dilemmas and the Asymmetry of Reasons
Agent Centered Reasons
The Default Argument for Deontological Skeptical Theism
Objections to the Default Argument for Deontological Skeptical Theism
Direct Objection 1: There Likely Aren’t Unknown Reasons
Direct Objection 2: Equiprobability Objections
Why Reality Is Biased Towards Permissibility
Is a Sufficiently Weighty Unknown Reason Likely?
Indirect Objection 1: Moral Skepticism or Paralysis
Indirect Objection 2: Climenhaga’s Objection
Indirect Objection 3: Skepticism About Theodicy and Natural Theology
Conclusion
4: Skeptical Theism and the Problems of Evil
Introduction
Arguments from Evil
Noseeum Arguments from Evil
Gratuitous Evil: What Is it?
The Noseeum Axiological Argument
God and Axiological Gratuitous Evil: Are They Compatible?
Axiological Skeptical Theism Against the Noseeum Axiological Argument
Objections to the Efficacy of Skeptical Theism: Howard-Snyder and Tooley
The Noseeum Deontological Argument
The Equiprobability Argument from Evil
A Modest Problem for the Equiprobability Argument from Evil
A Fatal Problem for the Equiprobability Argument from Evil
Objection: Deny Permissibility/Justifying Reasons
Another Fatal Problem: Structural Similarity Again
Conclusion
Humean Arguments from Evil
The Axiological Humean Argument
Draper’s Objection to STE (and Axiological Skeptical Theism)
The Deontological Humean Argument
Conclusion
5: Skeptical Theism and Other Arguments for Atheism
Introduction
The Argument from Inscrutability
The Evil-God Challenge
The Argument from Divine Hiddenness
The Logical Argument from Divine Hiddenness
The Evidential Argument from Divine Hiddenness
The Evolutionary Argument for Atheism
The Case for Atheism: What’s Left?
The Case for Theism: Weakened?
6: Skeptical Theism Defeated?
Introduction
The Nature of Defeaters
Rationality Defeaters
Rebutting Rationality Defeaters
Undercutting Rationality Defeaters
Help for Arguments from Evil?
Warrant Defeaters
Humean Defeaters
Purely Alethic Defeaters
Conclusion
7: Faithful Skeptical Theism
Introduction
Divine Revelation and Skeptical Theism
The Nature of Faith
Is Faith Rational?
Faith Is Responsive to Evidence
Faith Enables Completion of Long-Term Risky Rational Commitments
Commitment
Rational Commitment
Long-Term Risky Commitments
How Faith Enables the Completion of Long-Term Risky Rational Commitments
Faith Is Self-Justifying
On Faith that Bad Propositions Hold
Religious Faith and its Rationality
Religious Faith Is Responsive to Evidence
Religious Faith Enables the Completion of Long-Term Risky Rational Religious Commitment
Religious Commitment Is Rational
Religious Faith Is Self-Justifying
The Importance of Faith for Religion
Faithful Skeptical Theism
EVIDENCE and Faith
INSCRUTABLE and Faith
Transformative Experience, Faith, and INSCRUTABLE
Taking Stock
Conclusion
8: Theodicy and Natural Theology
Introduction
Theodicy: Two Case Studies
Felix Culpa
The Problem
The Kantian Theodicy
The Problem
Natural Theology: Two Case Studies
The Argument from Conscious Agents
The Problem
The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony
The Problem
Four Narrow Solutions
Felix Culpa: A Narrow Solution
The Kantian Theodicy: A Narrow Solution
The Argument from Conscious Agents: A Narrow Solution
The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony: A Narrow Solution
Four Metaethical Solutions
The Felix Culpa: A Metaethical Solution
The Kantian Theodicy: A Metaethical Solution
The Argument from Conscious Agents: A Metaethical Solution
The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony: A Metaethical Solution
Is the Metaethical Solution Too Narrow? Extending the Metaethical Solution to the Resemblance Solution
How to Make an Effective Argument for Atheism
9: Commonsense Problems of Evil
Introduction
Commonsense Problems of Evil
The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil
Reply 1: An Incredulous Stare
Reply 2: An Undercutting Defeater
Bergmann’s Undercutting Defeater
Conclusion
The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil
Reply 1: An Incredulous Stare
Reply 2: An Undercutting Defeater
Bergmann’s Undercutting Defeater
Conclusion
The Real Commonsense Problem of Evil
Reply 1: An Incredulous Stare
Reply 2: Undercutting Defeat
Bergmann’s Undercutting Defeater
Reply 3: Transformative Experience
Reply 4: Accepting Undefeated Evil
Conclusion
Concluding Remarks
References
Index

Citation preview

PALGRAVE FRONTIERS IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Skeptical Theism Perry Hendricks

Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion

Series Editors Yujin Nagasawa Department of Philosophy University of Birmingham Birmingham, UK Erik J. Wielenberg Department of Philosophy DePauw University Greencastle, IN, USA

Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion is a long overdue series which will provide a unique platform for the advancement of research in this area. Each book in the series aims to progress a debate in the philosophy of religion by (i) offering a novel argument to establish a strikingly original thesis, or (ii) approaching an ongoing dispute from a radically new point of view. Each title in the series contributes to this aim by utilising recent developments in empirical sciences or cutting-edge research in foundational areas of philosophy (such as metaphysics, epistemology and ethics).

Perry Hendricks

Skeptical Theism

Perry Hendricks University of Minnesota, Morris Morris, MN, USA

ISSN 2634-6176     ISSN 2634-6184 (electronic) Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion ISBN 978-3-031-34270-7    ISBN 978-3-031-34271-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

I dedicate this book to G.L.G.—Colin Patrick Mitchell. But I don’t only dedicate it to him: I also dedicate this book to my wife, Adriane, and daughters Evelina (2017), Linnea (2020), and Kajsa (2022), and my son (forthcoming). Evelina asked me if I would include her very first story she dictated to me when she was four on this dedication page. I’d be a bad dad if I said no. So here’s that story: Once upon a time, there was a girl named Evelina. She loved the 100-acre wood. Also, she loved playing with her friends. Her best friend was named Lillian. She was a great friend. When it was her birthday, she gave Lillian a Mickey Mouse Race Car. I hope she will love it. And she did. Evelina loved playing with her best friends, especially when they played with her. And when it came to long walks, she really wanted to get exercise so she could be strong like Luisa in Encanto. Her mom was named Adriane and her daddy was named Perry. Evelina was a princess ballerina princess queen. She was all of those. And she went to ballet class one day. Her first ballet class, and she loved it. This is a story written by her daddy and Evelina. Now let me continue. She loves chocolate. She also loved her bunny noodles. She loved Panera Bread. She was born in Washington, but she moved to Indiana. But then she went back to the place where she was born. The end. —Evelina Hendricks 9/12/2022

Finally, I don’t wish to dedicate this to my brothers, Cory and Reuben. Instead, I wish to throw shade their way: look, while Cory was on Season 23 of the Ultimate Fighter and Reuben has his own business, neither of them has published a book. Surely, this must move me up in the brotherly rankings!

Acknowledgments

This book is about skeptical theism and its implications and is the product of a roughly seven-year interest (obsession?) with skeptical theism. I can say with complete confidence that as of 2023, this is the best monograph on skeptical theism. Why am I so confident about this? Because— as of 2023—it’s the only monograph on skeptical theism.1 With this book, I hope to have made skeptical theism both clearer and more attractive—a sort of reverse beer goggles situation. The causal origin of my interest in skeptical theism is Hud Hudson’s paper “The Father of Lies?” For reasons I can’t remember, I read that paper around August 2016. The paper went over my head—I had no clue what was going on in it. Then maybe three or four months later, I had a drink of tequila and put on the movie Schindler’s List. While watching that movie, the basic thesis of Hudson’s paper struck me out of nowhere— I apprehended the core of skeptical theism.2 Since then, I’ve annoyed everyone—including my professors—by trying to connect skeptical theism to everything. Now that this project has come to a close, hopefully I’ll be less annoying. (But don’t hold your breath!) 1  Of course, this also means it’s the worst monograph on skeptical theism. But I’m a glass-half-full kind of guy. 2  Does this mean that if you reject the arguments I make in this book that you should have a drink of tequila, pop on Schindler’s List, and see what happens? Probably not.

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I owe thanks to quite a few people for helping me along with this project. First, thanks to Mike Bergmann, Paul Draper, Pat Kain, and Jan Cover. They have all provided valuable feedback on this project, and it would be much worse without them. I’m particularly indebted to both Mike and Paul. They have been major influences on this book (and my thinking in general), and it would be much worse without them. More specifically, I’m very grateful to Mike for guiding me along through this process, offering me extremely valuable feedback and advice and, more generally, for putting up with my shenanigans at Purdue for four years. He’s prevented me from making many errors and unwise decisions—including in the production of this book! Moreover, his work on skeptical theism is important and has been very influential on my thinking about these matters. I’m also very grateful to Paul. First and foremost, I’m grateful to Paul for an objection to one argument I used in favor skeptical theism in my dissertation. His objection was right—I’d overlooked a possibility that proved decisive against one of my arguments. I’m very glad to have been shown that this argument doesn’t work—I just wish he would have shown me before my dissertation defense!  And more generally, I owe Paul for long conversations about skeptical theism, evil,  probability, and other related issues. For better or worse—and hopefully not to his dismay— Paul was extremely influential in my formulation of skeptical theism in Chaps. 2 and 3. Thanks are also due to Chris Tweedt for providing me with comments on Chap. 9. Any errors in that chapter should be attributed to him—I take no responsibility for any there may be. I owe Parker Settecase for a discussion about Chap. 9 on his YouTube channel Parker’s Pensées. This conversation helped illuminate some issues I was mulling over and helped me make some final edits on that chapter.3 I also owe Justin Mooney for conversations about a couple of arguments related to skeptical theism. And I especially owe him for helping me see that one argument I was relying on was unsound. I’m also grateful to Religious Studies for letting  The conversation can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svdSLkD5UpA.

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me reprint some paragraphs from my forthcoming “Deontological Sceptical Theism Proved” in Chap. 3. Others who have either given me comments or that I’ve had helpful conversations4 with are: Kirk Lougheed,  Brett Lunn, Tyler McNabb, Andrew Moon, Troy Seagraves, Daniel Rubio, Philip Swenson, and Chris Tucker. Thanks also to G.L.G.—Colin Patrick Mitchell—for particularly insightful comments. And thanks to my wife, Adriane, and daughters, Evelina, Linnea, and Kajsa for supporting me throughout this process. Thanks also to Jacob Knibbe, Russell Lebedev, and Roman Moroz. Last, and definitely least, thanks to David Hromyk, Reid Bode, and Josh De Boer.

 But what about those I’ve had unhelpful conversations with about skeptical theism? I’ll forgo writing that list. 4

Praise for Skeptical Theism “Perry Hendricks raises the discussion of skeptical theism to a new level of sophistication, relying on detailed arguments to support skeptical theism instead of just intuitions and analogies. This book is a must read for anyone interested in the intellectual problem of evil.” —Paul Draper, Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University “Skeptical theism—which expresses skepticism about our ability to accurately evaluate divine permission of suffering and evil—is one of the most popular contemporary replies to the atheistic argument from evil. Perry Hendricks’ book, Skeptical Theism, is a must-read work for anyone interested in this response to the problem of evil or in atheistic arguments more generally. It is chock-full of novel and compelling reasoning, both in support of skeptical theism and in response to all of the major objections to that view to date.” —Michael Bergmann, Professor of Philosophy, Purdue University “In this book, Hendricks clarifies both the nature and plausibility of skeptical theism, a response to the problem of evil stretching back several millennia. His charitable treatment of objections, careful parsing of positions, and extension of skeptical theism to a life of faith make the book a worthwhile read.” —Justin McBrayer, Professor of Philosophy, Fort Lewis College “Perry Hendricks has done philosophers a service by filling a glaring gap in the literature. Hendricks writes a single authored monograph that is a rigorous and up to date defense of skeptical theism. For those interested in the problem of evil literature, this is a must read.” —Tyler Dalton McNabb, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Saint Francis University

Contents

1 I ntroduction  1 2 A  xiological Skeptical Theism Proved 11 3 D  eontological Skeptical Theism Proved 49 4 Skeptical Theism and the Problems of Evil 71 5 Skeptical Theism and Other Arguments for Atheism119 6 S  keptical Theism Defeated?141 7 F  aithful Skeptical Theism169 8 T  heodicy and Natural Theology203 9 Commonsense Problems of Evil235 R  eferences271 I ndex289 xiii

1 Introduction

Preliminary Remarks Evil abounds. It’s difficult to go through a single day in our world without encountering evil in some capacity, whether it be through testimony or personal experience. And our world contains many horrific instances of suffering. For example, think of the sinking of the South Korean ferry MV Sewol in 2014, resulting in the death of 250 highschool students and 306 people in total. Or think of Chris Watt murdering his wife (who was carrying his unborn child) and two young daughters in 2019. Or think of the countless animals that suffered in our evolutionary history— and the countless that suffer currently in factory farms. These are all horrific evils. Of course, there are also innumerable minor evils, such as headaches, twisted ankles, the use of endnotes instead of footnotes, and flat feet. Are these facts about horrendous and minor evils evidence against the existence of God? Does evil significantly lower the probability that God exists? Or, is evil more expected on a non-theistic hypothesis than it is on theism? A central purpose of this book is to consider questions like these. The answer I offer to all of these questions is—perhaps unsurprisingly—“No.” Why think this? I argue that skeptical theism makes it such

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4_1

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that evil, and our (alleged) inability to think of a morally justifying reason for evil, isn’t unexpected given theism, nor is it less likely on theism than other competing hypotheses. More precisely, I argue that the most popular (and plausible) arguments purporting to show that evil is evidence against the existence of God succumb to criticisms stemming from skeptical theism. What’s skeptical theism? It’s not easy to give a succinct answer. But as a start, we can think of skeptical theism as being the view that we should be skeptical about the accuracy of our axiological and deontological evaluations of the permission of evil.1 But it’s not only arguments from evil that skeptical theism undermines: I show that skeptical theism undermines a plethora of arguments for atheism, such as arguments from divine hiddenness, the evil-god challenge, arguments from inscrutability, the evolutionary argument for atheism, and different commonsense problems of evil. More generally, I argue that skeptical theism undermines all evidential arguments against theism that (roughly) depend on the perceived weight of God’s reasons for some action or on the perceived value of evil states of affairs, i.e. most arguments against theism. So, the upshot of skeptical theism is significant. Additionally, I consider other issues facing skeptical theism, such as whether it leads to excessive skepticism (it doesn’t), whether skeptical theists can use theodicy and natural theology (they can—provided they use the method I suggest), whether the commonsense problem of evil is successful (it isn’t), and whether the commonsense problem of evil evades the grasp of skeptical theism (it’s complicated). Along the way, I consider whether and how contemporary work on faith undercuts skeptical arguments against skeptical theism. That’s a brief overview of what this book covers. In the remainder of this chapter, I’m going to go over some relevant preliminary issues, such as what I’m going to understand God to be and moral anti-theodicy— the (bizarre) view that writing this book or even talking about its contents is, in some sense, immoral.

 See Chap. 2 and Chap. 3 for in-depth explanations of skeptical theism.

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God A word is in order about what I will mean by the term “God.” By “God,” I mean a perfect, and therefore maximally great, being. A perfect being, we may say, is perfectly powerful, perfectly knowledgeable, perfectly free, perfectly rational, and perfectly good. I use “perfectly powerful” and “perfectly knowledgeable” instead of the traditional terminology “omnipotent” and “omniscient” because I want to stay as neutral as possible. For example, Nagasawa (2017) suggests that God may have the maximal consistent degree of knowledge, power, and goodness. That’s consistent with God being omnipotent and omniscient, but it doesn’t entail that he is. This should neutralize other worries, such as whether God knows what it’s like to do evil or whether he has the power to do impossible actions. In the former case, if one regards it as bad that God would know what it’s like to do evil, then it’s not something a perfect being would know, and so it wouldn’t be a strike against God to lack this knowledge. Indeed, if it were bad, it would be a strike against God (a perfect being) to have this knowledge! In the latter case, it’s thought that there are certain actions that are impossible for God to do. But if they can’t be performed by God (say, because they are bad actions or they are impossible), then a perfect being wouldn’t have this kind of power, and so it wouldn’t be a strike against him not to have it. I will understand God to be perfectly free to mean that he doesn’t have any non-rational desires (Swinburne, 2010): he always acts in accord with his reasons and isn’t inclined to do otherwise. And I will understand God to be perfectly good to mean that he doesn’t do what’s morally wrong and always does what is morally right. Of course, this has been challenged recently by Murphy (2014 and 2017a): Murphy argues that God isn’t perfectly good. However, I won’t engage with Murphy’s arguments here—I’ll just register that I’m somewhat sympathetic to his view. That said, by not engaging with Murphy’s view, I’m not taking an easy way out. Quite the opposite: by assuming Murphy’s view is false, I actually make things harder on myself than I otherwise would: it’s harder to undermine arguments for atheism if God is perfectly morally good than if he’s not.

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There’s far more to say here about the nature of God, but what has been said above is sufficient for the purposes of this book: God is a perfect, and therefore maximally great, being.

Is This Book Immoral? Anti-Anti-Theodicy Some philosophers think that the project of theodicy—identifying reasons for why God permits evil—is immoral, and even that doubting the judgment of a sufferer about the all-things-considered ethical status of her suffering is immoral. This latter charge is relevant to skeptical theism, which might cast doubt on our ability to know whether certain instances of suffering are all-things-considered impermissible. (In this section, I’m using “theodicy” broadly so that it encompasses both traditional theodicy and skepticism about whether evils are impermissible.) As such, I will briefly address this charge—it would be a bummer, after all, if my writing this book turned out to be immoral! My mom taught me that if I can’t say anything nice, I shouldn’t say anything at all. I owe my mom an apology for the following discussion of moral anti-theodicy, of which I have nothing nice to say. Sorry mom! Proponents of moral anti-theodicy claim that the practice of theodicy may be in some sense harmful: it might harm those who have undergone suffering or it might be harmful to practitioners of theodicy because it might make them morally insensitive. Because practicing theodicy may lead to these harms, it’s morally wrong and should be avoided.2 Though this charge is serious, its merits aren’t. As such I’ll briefly address it below. Why think the practice of theodicy should be avoided? Griffioen says that [I]t may be morally harmful, insofar as it contributes to the vicious tendency many of us already have to ignore the suffering of others and promotes the kind of moral insensitivity and blindness mentioned above, the

 For an overview of anti-theodicy, see Betenson (2016).

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effects of which may have a negative or even re-traumatizing effect on those who actually suffer. (2018, pp. 2–3, emphasis mine)

Basically, according to Griffioen, the practice of theodicy might be harmful insofar as it might cause us to be insensitive to the suffering of others.3 As such, it should be avoided. Call this The Argument from Insensitivity. But this isn’t the only problem with theodicy. She also claims that the practice of theodicy may cause epistemic harm. She says: It may be epistemically harmful, insofar as it ignores or downplays credible sources of testimony in favor of explanations aimed at defending and protecting divine perfection at all costs, which may lead to the development of distorted beliefs and narratives about what it is and what it means to suffer. (2018, p. 3, emphasis mine)

So, according to Griffioen, the practice of theodicy may lead us to unjustly downplay the testimony of those who suffer, which is a form of epistemic harm.4 As such, the practice of theodicy should be avoided. Call this The Argument from Epistemic Harm. My response to The Argument from Insensitivity and The Argument from Epistemic Harm? In short: Oh, please. In long: let’s take these arguments in order. (If you think my short response is rude (or whatever), I can’t imagine how rude you must think it is for proponents of moral anti-­ theodicy to respond to theodicy by claiming it’s immoral!5)  Betenson illustrates the moral anti-theodicy perspective well, saying:

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[i]t would … be a moral failing for me to even attempt to change my judgment [that there is no reason that would justify God in permitting the Holocaust], to try to bring myself to see the ‘reasonableness’ of the other side of the argument, or to allow my judgment to be changed. (2019, p. 215) 4  See also her claim that: philosophical theodicy may serve to propagate a form of epistemic injustice that both fails to take seriously the testimony of certain agents as credible sources of knowledge concerning human suffering. (2018, p. 3, emphasis mine) 5  Isn’t it a convenient position that those you disagree with are immoral?

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The Argument from Insensitivity claims that by practicing theodicy we might become insensitive to the suffering of others, and that this is harmful. My reply? Sure. That’s possible. But it’s also possible that not practicing theodicy causes harm: maybe by not practicing theodicy it would lead to some people to become atheists, and maybe that would lead to some of those atheists thinking that there aren’t any moral facts, and maybe that would lead some of those who think there aren’t moral facts to not care about the suffering of others, thereby becoming completely morally insensitive. That’s a possible insensitivity caused by not practicing theodicy. How likely is that? I’m not sure. But we’re given no reason to think that’s any less likely than moral insensitivity resulting from practicing theodicy. And so even if the proponent of moral anti-theodicy is right that the practice of theodicy might cause moral insensitivity, it doesn’t follow that we shouldn’t practice theodicy. After all, not practicing theodicy might cause even more moral insensitivity. Worse yet, there’s some (defeasible) reason to think that the practice of theodicy might make us more morally sensitive: the practice of theodicy involves doing moral philosophy and thinking hard about ethics. Insofar as doing moral philosophy and thinking hard about ethics makes one more likely to be morally sensitive,6 we have defeasible reason to practice theodicy. Again, proponents of anti-theodicy give us no reason to think this isn’t the case. Still worse yet, even if practicing theodicy might result in some people becoming less morally sensitive, it would at most show that we need to be careful in how we practice theodicy: there are doubtless many ways to practice theodicy that won’t result in one becoming morally insensitive. For example, when practicing theodicy, we could remind ourselves about the very real suffering in the world and that we should work to alleviate it. This isn’t hard to do. And more generally, we can be careful to use methods that aren’t prone to cause moral insensitivity—there’s no reason to think that there aren’t such methods. And so, even if theodicy might result in moral insensitivity, it doesn’t have to be this way: we can just

 This is an empirical matter, and I’m not sure that it’s true. I float this just as a possibility, which is sufficient to undercut moral anti-theodicy. 6

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change how we practice theodicy to reduce or eliminate any threat of moral insensitivity there may be.7 The Argument from Epistemic Harm relies on the claim that the practice of theodicy may lead us to downplay the credibleness of those telling us about their suffering. My reply? Sure, that’s possible. But it’s also possible that epistemic harm follows from us not practicing theodicy: we might tend to become overly gullible, or we might harm ourselves as epistemic agents by walling off any investigation into whether there are (or could be) reasons God has for permitting evil, or we might flout a general epistemic duty to pursue truth. How likely is this? I don’t know. But, again, we’re given no reason to think it’s more likely that epistemic harm comes from practicing theodicy than comes from not practicing it. And so we have no reason to accept this The Argument from Epistemic Harm. Worse yet, while sufferers may be credible sources when telling us about their suffering, I show in Chap. 9 that it’s dubious to think they’re credible sources when making claims about whether their suffering is allthings-considered permissible or unlikely given theism. That’s just not something we can tell in virtue of undergoing the suffering. So, we just don’t have reason to accept this argument. More could be said here, but I think the basic problem is clear: these arguments for moral anti-theodicy rely on empirical claims, but proponents of these arguments give no data to back up their claims, nor do they consider potential harms that come from not practicing theodicy, nor do they consider different methods of theodicy that would make it unlikely any harm would result. Furthermore, these arguments at best merely show that we should be careful when talking about theodicy, not that we shouldn’t do it at all. In other words, they are objections to careless theodicy, not to careful theodicy. That’s fine. But in my experience, theodicies in academia are typically carefully enough talked about that these worries aren’t relevant. And if they aren’t, then we can just work to be more careful—we needn’t avoid the practice altogether. For example, it’s a good  This bears a striking similarity to how most arguments against certain markets (e.g. organ markets) are actually just arguments against certain ways of running a market (e.g. a completely unregulated organ market). See Brennan and Jaworski (2015). 7

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rule of thumb, say, to not pass out copies of Richard Swinburne’s Providence and The Problem of Evil at your local children’s hospital. That would be bad. But—so far as I can tell—no one currently practicing theodicy in academia is doing that.8 In light of all this, I conclude that there’s no good reason to think that the practice of theodicy is immoral—there’s no good reason to endorse moral anti-theodicy. And as such, I’ll proceed without a guilty conscience and without considering the pearl-clutching advocates of anti-theodicy any further.

Summary of Chapters In Chap. 1, well … I do what I did above. In Chap. 2, I explicate what I call Axiological Skeptical Theism, which is (very roughly) a skepticism about our knowledge of the value of evil states of affairs. I provide an argument in its favor (The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism), and defend it against numerous objections. In Chap. 3, I explicate what I call Deontological Skeptical Theism. Roughly, it amounts to a skepticism about our knowledge of the weight of God’s reasons for permitting evil. This kind of skeptical theism is the most important kind: in predicting God’s action, what’s important is the weight of his reasons—to focus strictly on axiological reasons (i.e. goods and evils.) is to focus only on part of his reasons, and more is needed to predict how God would act. I offer an argument in its favor (The Default Argument for Deontological Skeptical Theism), and defend it against numerous objections. Chapter 4 teases out some of the implications of both Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism: I argue that they undermine numerous arguments from evil, such as noseeum arguments from evil (both axiological and deontological), Humean arguments from  And if people are doing that (or the moral insensitivity or harm somehow trickles outside of academia), then we again need to consider the consequences of not practicing theodicy. And we’ll need to do empirical work to find out which is worse. 8

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evil (both axiological and deontological), and equiprobability arguments from evil. I consider in Chap. 5 the effects of Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism on numerous arguments for atheism, such as arguments from inscrutability, arguments from divine hiddenness, the evil-god challenge, and the evolutionary argument for atheism. I show that all of these arguments succumb to Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism. Chapter 6 considers whether Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism entail excessive skepticism, and in particular I consider whether they entail skepticism about our commonsense beliefs. In considering this issue, I first explain numerous kinds of potential defeaters. After this, I show that these skeptical theisms aren’t candidates for being a defeater for our commonsense beliefs. My task is exploratory in Chap. 7: I grant, for the sake of argument, that Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism result in skepticism about divine revelation. I then investigate what would follow from this. Using contemporary work on the nature of faith, I argue that skeptical theists may still respond to divine revelation with (rational) faith. While knowledge or even justified belief is preferable, being reduced to having rational faith in response to divine revelation isn’t untenable—it’s not reductio. And so even the worst case scenario for skeptical theism isn’t so bad. The topic I consider in Chap. 8 is that of theodicy and natural theology. I use four case studies: I consider two theodicies (The Felix Culpa and The Kantian Theodicy) and two arguments for theism (The Argument from Conscious Agents and The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony). I argue that skeptical theism poses a threat to these theodicies and arguments as they’re typically motivated, but I show two ways in which proponents of Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism can offer support for each argument. In essence, I offer a way to predict divine action in a way that doesn’t conflict with skeptical theism. (I also illustrate how this allows atheists to construct arguments for atheism that isn’t vulnerable to skeptical theism.) Finally, in Chap. 9, I consider the several versions of the so-called commonsense problem of evil. These arguments have been thought to evade

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the grasp of Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism. I argue that things aren’t so clear. But even if these arguments are immune to Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism, there are several other undercutting defeaters in play that undermine the claims made in the commonsense problem of evil.

2 Axiological Skeptical Theism Proved

Introduction: Different Skeptical Theisms The topic of this book is skeptical theism. Skeptical theism is an important position (or set of positions) that is thought to—if true—have significant implications in the philosophy of religion, in particular on the epistemic status of theism and atheism. What is skeptical theism? And what’s a skeptical theist? Broadly speaking, skeptical theists are skeptical about the ability of humans to discern, by certain methods, the probability of God permitting certain states of affairs. However, there are different types of skeptical theism. For example, Wykstra (1984) makes use of the following epistemological principle and argues that it—if true—entails that apparently gratuitous evil isn’t strong evidence for there being gratuitous evil: CORNEA: On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim ‘It appears that p’ only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is in some way discernible by her. (1984, p. 85)1  For a powerful criticism of CORNEA, see McBrayer (2009) and for a powerful response to this criticism, see Wykstra and Perrine (2012). For other defenses of CORNEA, see e.g. Perrine (2019) and (2022). 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4_2

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Alternatively, Depoe (2014, 2017, 2022) advocates for what he calls “positive skeptical theism,” which holds that the appearance of gratuitous evil is expected given theism because it’s in some sense important for our moral development and for our ability to make free decisions. Finally,2 Bergmann (2001, 2009, 2012) holds that the following four theses constitute the skeptical component of skeptical theism: ST1: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. ST2: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know of are representative of the possible evils there are. ST3: We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are representative of the entailment relations there are between possible goods and the permission of possible evils. ST4: We have no good reason for thinking that the total moral value or disvalue we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately reflects the total moral value or disvalue they really have. (Bergmann, 2012, pp. 11–12)

The purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the current skeptical theisms on offer, nor is it to consider their efficacy with respect to arguments for atheism.3 Instead, I will introduce one kind of skeptical theism— Axiological Skeptical Theism—and construct and defend an argument in its favor. After this, I will respond to numerous objections to this kind of skeptical theism, arguing that they ultimately fail. (In the next chapter, I will follow the same procedure for a different kind of skeptical theism.)

 “Finally” is not meant to indicate that these are the only types of skeptical theism on offer. Other types have been defended by Alston (1991), Cullison (2014), Hudson (2006), Dougherty and Pruss (2014), and Pruss (forthcoming), among others. For general overviews of skeptical theism, see McBrayer (2010 and n.d.) and Perrine (2023). 3  This latter task is for Chap. 4 and Chap. 5. 2

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Axiological Skeptical Theism The kind of skeptical theism I’m going to be concerned with in this chapter we may call Axiological Skeptical Theism. Axiological Skeptical Theism involves a skepticism about our knowledge of the values of the goods and evils connected to particular evils. We may state its skeptical component as follows: Axiological Skeptical Theism: For the permission of any evil we know of E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the complex state of affairs consisting of the permission of E and all the goods and evils that we know to be logically connected to it resembles, with respect to overall goodness or badness, the complex state of affairs consisting of the permission of E and all the goods and evils actually logically connected to it.

Some explanation is in order here. By “evil” and “bad” (which I will use as synonyms) I just mean disvalue, and by “good” I just mean positive value.4 By “public reason,” I mean a reason that is, in principle, equally available to everyone. All other reasons are private. For example, that a sample is random is a public reason for thinking it isn’t biased. Or, that everyone agrees about X is a public (albeit weak) reason for thinking X is true. Now, take seemings. Let’s say that if it seems that p to S, that p has the appearance of truth for S. For example, it might seem to S that a stick put halfway into a stream is bent. This is a perceptual seeming. Or, it may seem to S that 4 is greater than 2. This is an intellectual seeming. Or, it may seem to S that burning cats is morally wrong. This is a moral seeming. In all these cases, the proposition has the “feel of truth” for S (Tolhurst, 1998, pp. 298–299).5 Given this characterization of seemings, the fact that it seems to S that p won’t count as a public reason—seemings  The term “evil” is often used in a way that is stronger than just mere badness. But the issue, with respect to axiological arguments from evil (see Chap.  4, Sections “Axiological Skeptical Theism Against The Noseeum Axiological Argument” and “The Axiological Humean Argument”) is that of disvalue, so we need not delve into this here. This is also in line with Tooley’s (2021) characterization of the problem of evil as (roughly) the problem of undesirable states of affairs. 5  There’s more to say about seemings. However, this is sufficient for our purposes in this chapter. More will be said about seemings in Chap. 9, Section “Commonsense Problems of Evil”. 4

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are private in the sense that they aren’t equally available to all. This is because a seeming to S that p is more directly available to S than it is to others: S knows that it seems to her that p in virtue of having the seeming, whereas others cannot know about it this way. Or, the fact that S finds it intuitive that p won’t count as a good public reason, since S’s intuition is not equally available to all.6 More generally, we may say that private reasons are one’s own mental states, and that reasons aside from one’s own mental states are public reasons. By “we have no good reason for thinking X,” I mean that we do not currently recognize any reason as being a good one for thinking X. This qualification is important, because there is a sense in which we can have a good reason for thinking X and yet not recognize it as being a good reason for thinking X. For example, a child might see that the car in front  of her has turned on its left turn signal. That’s a good reason to think that the car will turn left, but the child doesn’t recognize it as a good reason for thinking that the car will turn left—it just looks like a blinking light to her. And so, given our understanding of ‘having good reason’, we may say that, in this case, the child has no good reason to think the car will turn left. It should be clear, then, with respect to Axiological Skeptical Theism, that we’re concerned only with good reasons that we recognize as being good reasons. Let’s call the complex state of affairs consisting of the permission of E and all the goods and evils logically connected to its permission that we know of “L,” and let’s call the complex state of affairs consisting of the permission of E and all the goods and evils actually logically connected to its permission “L*.” To say that we have no good antecedent reason to think it’s likely that L resembles L* with respect to overall goodness and badness is to say that, setting aside our beliefs about God’s existence or non-existence, we have no good reason to think it’s likely that L resembles L* with respect to overall goodness and badness. This is important because our beliefs about God’s existence or non-existence may influence whether we have a good reason to think L resembles L* with respect to  By focusing on public reasons, I don’t mean to suggest private reasons aren’t important. Indeed, private reasons are crucially important when it comes to the so-called commonsense problem of evil. In Chap. 9, I will address the commonsense problem of evil and discuss whether it is susceptible to criticisms stemming from skeptical theism. 6

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overall goodness and badness since, for example, God’s existence arguably entails that L won’t resemble L* with respect to overall goodness and badness if L has a net negative value. This is because many hold that God’s existence entails that L* has a net neutral or net positive value, in which case the theist has a simple response to arguments from evil that claim otherwise.7 (As I’ll show later (Chap. 4, Section “God and Axiological Gratuitous Evil: Are They Compatible?”), many hold that God’s existence doesn’t have this entailment, but I set aside these objections for the sake of argument. However, even if one doesn’t think God’s existence has this entailment, his existence may still influence how one thinks about the resemblance of L to L*.) Next, let’s say that a state of affairs has three possible final value positions: it may be overall evil, overall good, or overall neutral. And let’s say that L resembles L* with respect to overall goodness or badness if only if the final value position of L is the same as the final value position of L*. So, for example, suppose that L* is overall evil. We may say, then, that L* resembles L with respect to overall goodness or badness if and only if L is overall evil—if L is overall neutral or overall good, then L* doesn’t resemble L. I will be using “logical connection” in the following sense: X is logically connected to Y just in case X is necessary for Y or Y is necessary for X. For example, sacrificing one’s life for another is a good that is logically connected to one dying, which is an instance of evil. Or, free speech is a good that is logically connected to the permission of unkind speech, and unkind speech is (at times) an instance of evil. Or, forgiving another person is a good that is logically connected to having been wronged by that person, an instance of evil. Finally, for the sake of readability, I will typically shorten “the complex state of affairs consisting of the permission of E and all the goods and evils that we know to be logically connected to its permission” to “E’s perceived value.” And I will typically shorten “the complex state of affairs consisting of the permission of E and all the goods and evils actually logically connected to its permission” to “E’s actual value.” Understood in  This is a so-called G.E. Moore shift (not to be confused with a dance move) that theists may make in response to (at least some) arguments from evil (Rowe, 1979). By ruling out this response, I don’t mean to suggest that it’s unjustified. In fact, this can be a perfectly rational response. 7

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these terms, we may simplify Axiological Skeptical Theism to the following thesis: Axiological Skeptical Theism Simplified: For the permission of any evil E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that E’s perceived value resembles its actual value.

Given the above clarifications, Axiological Skeptical Theism approximates to—or, at least, is very closely related to—Bergmann’s fourth skeptical thesis (i.e. ST4)8: both make claims about whether we have good reason to think that the overall goodness and badness we perceive in a complex state of affairs resembles its actual overall goodness and badness—although Axiological Skeptical Theism restricts its claim to our good public antecedent reasons whereas ST4 makes no such restrictions. Elsewhere (Hendricks, 2019), I’ve argued that one way of understanding ST1-ST3 approximates to Axiological Skeptical Theism.9 I won’t repeat those arguments here. Instead, I’ll take it for granted that Axiological Skeptical Theism has (roughly) the same implications as Bergmann’s skeptical theism, and this means that objections to Bergmann’s skeptical theism—at least typically—will amount to objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism.10 As such, I will address several objections to Bergmann’s skeptical theism in my defense of Axiological Skeptical Theism.

 he Default Argument for Axiological T Skeptical Theism In this section, I’m going to defend what I will call The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism. I’ll show that Axiological Skeptical Theism is the default position, and it should be accepted until and unless we’ve been given reason to reject it—this just follows from the  It’s worth noting that Bergmann’s ST4 was inspired by Beaudoin (2005, p. 50).  The skeptical thesis I discuss in my (2019) piece differs slightly from how I’ve presented Axiological Skeptical Theism here, but they amount to the same thing—the only real differences are the public and antecedent clauses in Axiological Skeptical Theism. 10  I suspect that the reverse entailment also holds, but I make no commitment on that issue here. 8 9

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terminology involved. After this, I’ll consider reasons one might give for rejecting it, and show that they ultimately fail. Recall the simplified version of Axiological Skeptical Theism: Axiological Skeptical Theism Simplified: For the permission of any evil E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that E’s perceived value resembles its actual value.

The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism is this: Axiological Skeptical Theism is true definitionally until and unless we are given a good public antecedent reason for thinking it’s likely that for some evil E, its perceived value resembles its actual value. This is because we are understanding “having a good reason to think X” as meaning that we recognize a reason as being a good one for thinking X (See  Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism”). And so until and unless we’re given such a reason, we should accept Axiological Skeptical Theism—Axiological Skeptical Theism is the default position.11 This argument is extremely simple—that’s a virtue. However, the argument also shows just how simple it is to refute Axiological Skeptical Theism: provide a single good public antecedent reason for thinking it’s likely that the perceived value of some evil resembles its actual value, and Axiological Skeptical Theism has been refuted.12 Below, I will consider numerous objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism one might make, and I will argue that they all fail. And therefore, we should (continue to) endorse Axiological Skeptical Theism.13

 There is a vague similarity between my position here and Lenman’s (2000) argument against consequentialism. However, Lenman focuses on causal consequences and actions that affect identities whereas I focus on logical connections between goods and evils. And while some critics of Lenman (e.g. Mason, 2004 and Greaves, 2016) have resisted his argument by invoking the principle of indifference (explained below), I show that the principle of indifference isn’t applicable here (see below, Section “Direct Objection 2: Equiprobability Objections”). 12  Of course, this won’t refute The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism, since that argument just claims that Axiological Skeptical Theism is the default position—it doesn’t claim that there aren’t reasons to reject it despite its default status. 13  Perhaps the reader thinks that she recognizes a good public reason for thinking that there are no unknown goods or evils logically connected to E. In that case, she may have reason to reject Axiological Skeptical Theism. But those of us who aren’t aware of this reason should accept it. 11

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 bjections to the Default Argument O for Axiological Skeptical Theism So, Axiological Skeptical Theism is the default position. The next task is to consider potential good public antecedent reasons for thinking that the perceived value of some instance of evil resembles its actual value. In other words, the next task is to consider objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism. This is because one can accept The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism and yet reject Axiological Skeptical Theism—while Axiological Skeptical Theism is the default position, one might have reason to reject it after all things are considered. In this section, I will consider both objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism and objections to ST1–4. This is because, as I noted above, objections to Bergmann’s skeptical theism can be seen as objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism—at least if we understand ST1–4 as being claims about what we antecedently have good public reason to think. So, a successful objection to ST1–4 likely would amount to a successful objection to Axiological Skeptical Theism. However, ST1–4 have rarely been directly challenged—in almost all cases, objections to ST1–4 are indirect: it’s claimed that these theses entail some sort of excessive amount of skepticism, and this is why they should be rejected. This is strange: if someone claims that there is no good reason to think that p, the natural response is to identify a direct reason for thinking p. For example, the direct response to the claim that there is no good reason to avoid drinking and driving is the natural response, i.e., identifying a good direct reason to avoid drinking and driving (e.g. drinking and driving increases risk of death for the driver and others) is the natural response. To respond in the indirect way would be to claim, for example, that if you think there is no good reason to avoid drinking and driving, you are committed to some bizarre consequence, such as radical skepticism. That almost no one offers direct objections to ST1–4 suggests that there’s something to ST1–4: that almost no one tries to provide a good direct reason of the relevant sort suggests that nobody has one, and this is why so many resort to indirect skeptical objections.

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While there haven’t been many direct objections to ST1–4, there have been a couple given. I will consider the merits of these direct objections below and I will construct some of my own direct objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism. After this, I will turn my attention to indirect objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism.

 irect Objection 1: There Likely Aren’t Unknown D States of Affairs The first direct objection I’ll consider to Axiological Skeptical Theism is that we have good public antecedent reason to think that there are some instances of evil for which it is likely that there aren’t any unknown states of affairs logically connected to them. If this is the case, then we might have good public antecedent reason to think the perceived value of some evil state of affairs E resembles its actual value, in which case Axiological Skeptical Theism is false. Notice the qualification might: this qualification is needed because we would also (at the very least) need to not be in a state of doubt about our ability to accurately perceive value in states of affairs—if we were in doubt about that, then even if it were likely that there were no unknown state of affairs connected to E, we’d obviously not have a good public antecedent reason for thinking E’s perceived value resembles its actual value. Let’s set this issue aside for the moment, and assume that at the public antecedent stage, we shouldn’t be (and aren’t) in doubt about our ability to accurately perceive value in states of affairs. Do we have a good public antecedent reason for thinking that, for some evils we know of, it’s unlikely that there are unknown states of affairs connected to them? One reason that could be given is the fact that, for the permission of some particular evil E, we know of no unknown good or evil logically connected to it.14 Indeed, this is true by definition—if we know of a good or evil logically connected to E, the good or evil would (clearly enough) be known, not unknown. And this, it might be claimed, is a good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that there’s no unknown good or 14

 Paul Draper has suggested something like this objection to me.

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unknown evil logically connected to E. But the absence of seeing a logical connection doesn’t make it likely that there isn’t one—at least not for humans. This is because we (humans) aren’t good at detecting logical connections, and so we shouldn’t expect to see them. Why think this? Briefly, because of our persistent, deep, and irresolvable disagreement about matters concerning logical connections. For example, there’s persistent, deep, and irresolvable disagreement about whether there’s a logical connection between the right action and the action that produces the best consequences.15 And persistent, deep, irresolvable disagreement pervades practically every other area of inquiry with respect to logical connections. (I’m brief here since I illustrate this in greater detail below. See Section “Direct Objection 3: Ekstrom’s “Good Reasons” for Rejecting ST1-3”) So, we aren’t good at detecting logical connections, and so the fact that we don’t know of a good or evil logically connected to E isn’t good reason to think it’s likely that there is no such good or evil. Indeed, given our cognitive situation, we have no good public antecedent reason to ascribe any particular probability range to there being an unknown good or an unknown evil connected to E—the probability of that given our public antecedent reasons is inscrutable. If there are any other candidates for good public reasons to think that there isn’t an unknown state of affairs connected to E, I don’t know of them. Perhaps others do—in which case, we can evaluate them once they’re expressed.

Direct Objection 2: Equiprobability Objections While we might have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that there’s no unknown states of affairs connected to E, one might use equiprobability principles to reject Axiological Skeptical Theism.16 For example, one might claim that it’s no more likely that there’s an unknown good connected to some instance of evil E than that there’s an unknown evil connected to it. Why think this? One might invoke the principle of  E.g. Sinnott-Armstrong (2009) says “Yes” and Gill (2012) says “No.”  While I’m brief here, I discuss the principle of indifference (along with its cousins) and its prospects at more length in Chap. 4, Section “The Equiprobability Argument from Evil”. 15 16

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indifference, which holds (roughly) that absent evidence for one hypothesis over another, they are equiprobable.17 Now, for some evil E, consider the hypothesis that there’s an unknown good connected to it and the hypothesis that there’s an unknown evil connected to it. We have—the objection goes—no reason to favor one of these hypotheses over the other. Thus, the principle of indifference tells us that they are equiprobable.18 But if that’s the case, then, if we assume that there’s a non-zero probability of there being no unknown good or evil connected to E, the probability of there being an unknown good connected to E must be less than 0.5. This is because—the objection goes—an unknown evil is no less likely than an unknown good, and so if an unknown good has a probability of 0.5, then an unknown evil must have (at least) a probability of 0.5, in which case all of our probability space is taken up. But this is incompatible with ascribing a non-zero probability to there being no unknown good or unknown evil connected to E. Hence, the maximum probability of there being an unknown good connected to E is a sliver under 0.5. And this clearly conflicts with Axiological Skeptical Theism.19 Indeed, I think that this objection, which has been defended by both Draper (1989, 2013, forthcoming) and Swinburne (1998), is the most serious objection to Axiological Skeptical

 Note that the principle itself is highly controversial—if left unrestricted, it results in contradictory results. (See Chap. 4, Section “A Modest Problem for The Equiprobability Argument from Evil”). However, see Chap. 4 Section “A Modest Problem for The Equiprobability Argument from Evil” for a discussion of Huemer’s (2018) and Tooley’s (2019) restricted versions of the principle of indifference that avoid these problems—evidently, if your first name is “Michael” you’re bound to accept the principle of indifference (at least in a restricted form). 18  One might also use intrinsic probability to try to get this result as well. (I suspect this is the route Paul Draper would favor.) My arguments below will be unaffected whether one uses equiprobability principles or theses about intrinsic probability. 19  And even if the probability of there being no unknown good or evil connected to E was 0, this would still be a problem, since the maximum probability of there being a good connected to E would be 0.5. This is a problem because not all unknown goods would result in a ‘value flip’ for E—some unknown goods would have the result that the perceived value of E does resemble its actual value, meaning that the probability of there being a relevant unknown good connected to E will be less than 0.5, and this gives us reason to reject Axiological Skeptical Theism. 17

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Theism (and skeptical theism in general) on offer.20 And for that reason, it’s a shame that it’s been largely ignored.21 However, contrary to this objection, I will argue below that reality is biased in favor of good, making it such that it’s more likely that there’s an unknown good than an unknown evil connected to E, meaning that the principle of indifference is, and equiprobability principles in general are, inapplicable. And hence this objection fails.

The Argument from Reasons In this section, I’ll argue that an unknown good is, in some sense, simpler than an unknown evil, and this gives us reason to think that an unknown good is more probable than an unknown evil. How much more probable? I make no claims about that. All that’s needed for my case here is that it is in fact more probable.22 Let’s consider the probability of the following hypotheses about E: Hypothesis 1: There is an unknown good logically connected to E. Hypothesis 2: There is an unknown evil logically connected to E.

If Hypothesis 1 is simpler than Hypothesis 2, then—unless and until other, contrary evidence is given—Hypothesis 1 will be more likely (given  No, skeptical objections to skeptical theism aren’t serious—save for Hudson (2014a and 2017), because he actually does the relevant epistemological work, as opposed to just making up defeater candidates and epistemological principles on the spot. (Additionally, Climenhaga’s (forthcoming) objection (discussed below, Section “Indirect Objection 3: Climenhaga’s Bayesian Objection”) is serious and can be viewed as a skeptical objection to skeptical theism.) See Chap. 6 for a discussion of skeptical objections. 21  Bergmann (2009) briefly talks about it. 22  One might construe this as an argument for thinking that an unknown good is more intrinsically probable than an unknown evil. For work on intrinsic probability, see e.g. Miller (2018) and Swinburne (2010). See also Schindler (2022) for a study of the attitudes of natural scientists, social scientists, and philosophers towards purported theoretical virtues. Schindler found that, for natural scientists and social scientists, simplicity of a hypothesis has epistemic value: it raises their confidence in it. Philosophers, on the other hand, weren’t prone to see simplicity as epistemically valuable. 20

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our epistemic situation) than Hypothesis 2. In other words, if Hypothesis 1 is more likely than Hypothesis 2, then it’s more likely that there’s an unknown good logically connected to E than that there’s an unknown evil logically connected to E, and until and unless we’re given evidence that at least overrides this reason or undermines it, we should think that an unknown good is more likely connected to an evil than an unknown evil is. There are different aspects of simplicity: some hypotheses may be simpler in terms of fundamental entities postulated, others may be simpler in the number of symbols needed to express a formula, and so on.23 The aspect of simplicity I’ll be using in this section I’ll call modesty.24 Following Draper (2016, 2017a), we may think of the modesty of a hypothesis in terms of how much it says: the more it says, the less modest it is; the less it says, the more modest it is. So, a very precise hypothesis will, prior to consideration of other information, have a lower prior probability (since there are many ways for it to be false) than a very imprecise hypothesis (since there are few ways for it to be false). To illustrate this, suppose we’re comparing the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 3: Helga is wearing a hat. Hypothesis 4: Helga is wearing a red hat.

The hypothesis that Helga is wearing a hat is more modest than the hypothesis that Helga is wearing a red hat since it says less about the world: Hypothesis 3 makes only two claims (that there is a person Helga and that Helga is wearing a hat), whereas Hypothesis 4 makes three claims (that there is a person Hegla, that Helga is wearing a hat, and that Helga’s hat is red). And this means that it’s easier for Hypothesis 4 to be  There are different views for determining the probability of a hypothesis. Swinburne (2004) and Miller (2018) have good overviews of different views of intrinsic probability as well as discussions of different aspects of simplicity. See Draper (2016 and 2017a) for an account of intrinsic probability that consists solely of coherence and modesty. My argument should work with any views on offer here—so long as one grants some weight to simplicity when other things are equal. 24  I stress, again, that there are multiple aspects of simplicity and that this is just one way for a hypothesis to be simple. Moreover, there can be cases in which one hypothesis H1 is more modest than another hypothesis H2, and yet H2 is simpler in a different aspect of simplicity than H1. 23

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false than Hypothesis 3—there are three ways for Hypothesis 4 to be false and only two ways for Hypothesis 3 to be false—and therefore Hypothesis 3 is, prior to considering other information, more probable than Hypothesis 4.

A Preliminary Problem So, how do Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 fare with respect to simplicity? One might think that to compare Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we need to know what good and evil amount to here, and that this poses a problem: this forces us to commit to a particular view of good and evil, and whatever theory we commit ourselves to, it will doubtless be controversial. To see why this might be a problem, note that there are numerous conceptions of goodness: some neo-Platonists hold that goodness is resemblance to God (Adams, 1999), neo-Aristotelian accounts hold that goodness is determined by functioning the way that the kind of thing one is supposed to function (e.g. Page, 2021), other accounts hold that goodness is determined by functioning in the way that the kind of thing one is supposed to function and resemblance to the Platonic good (Chan, 2021), and others hold that goodness is a simple non-natural property (Moore, 1903). So, there are numerous conceptions of good. There have also been some conceptions of agential evil.25 While there have been some accounts of agential evil given, the issue is that little has been said about the nature of badness. And, arguably, providing an account of goodness is not sufficient to provide an account of badness. For example, if we accept that goodness is to fulfill the functions of one’s kind, it doesn’t necessarily follow that not fulfilling them is bad—lacking a good arguably isn’t bad, generally speaking.26 That there’s been little to no work on the nature of badness isn’t to say that no one has identified particular things that are bad.27 Indeed, agential evil is just a particular type of bad thing. But  See e.g. Garrard (1998).  For more on this point, see Kagan (2012) and Bradford (2020). Although, some may (with, to my mind, plausibility) contest this. 27  See also Rolston III (1992) for a discussion of numerous bad parts of nature and see Chignell (2021) for an overview of some views of evil. 25 26

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what’s relevant for our purposes is value and disvalue in general—we are concerned with goodness and badness. Of course, some will accept that an account of goodness is sufficient for providing an account of badness. Those who accept a neo-Platonic, neo-Aristotelian, or some combination of the two may view evil as, in some sense, derivative of good: it’s a deviation from the Good (neo-­ Platonism), a deviation from proper function (neo-Aristotelianism), or a deviation from either (Chan, 2021).28 And this would arguably make evil less simple and less likely than good, since a derivation from the good is less simple than the good—the former requires reference to both the derivation (evil) and the good whereas the latter only requires reference to the good. So, for those who hold views like those referenced above, hypotheses postulating evil will—other things equal—be less modest than a hypothesis postulating good. On the other hand, if one accepts Moore’s (1903) view of goodness and badness (i.e. they are both simple, indefinable properties), the problem may possibly be solved, since—other things held equal—it might make a hypothesis that postulates good no more likely than a hypothesis that postulates evil (since both are simple properties), and hence Hypothesis 1 is not more likely than Hypothesis 2.29 So, some of our accounts of goodness (arguably) entail that good is more likely than evil, but one (e.g. Moore’s) doesn’t—at least obviously— have this result. This fact in itself may be a promising way to support the view that reality is biased towards the good: that there are several conceptions of goodness that have the result that good is more likely than evil will support this view. However, I don’t have the space to elaborate on this argument here.30 And hence I will simply note in passing that those  This view about existence and privation is held by both Aquinas (Summa Theologiae Part 1 Question 5) and Augustine (On Christian Doctrine Book 1 Chapter 32). 29  Of course, this will require more spelling out. But this brief explanation is sufficient for our purposes. Additionally, the argument I give below in Section “The Argument from Reasons Continued” and in Section “The Argument from Actuality” may still render Hypothesis 1 more likely than Hypothesis 2 even given Moore’s view of goodness and badness. 30  I think there’s real promise to the argument that because there are several accounts of good and evil that make good simpler than evil and only—to my knowledge—one account of evil that (arguably) has the result that they are equiprobable (Moore’s view), we should think that good is simpler to postulate than evil. The thought is, roughly, that the disjunction of understandings of good and evil that have this result is more probable than the single account that doesn’t have this result. I leave this argument for others to develop further. (Of course, if we can come up with more plausible accounts of good and evil that flip things, this may go the other way.) 28

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committed to particular conceptions of good may have additional reason to think Hypothesis 1 is more likely than Hypothesis 2, and therefore prima facie reason to accept that reality is biased towards good. And those who are committed to other conceptions of good (e.g. Moore’s) may possibly have some prima facie reason to reject this view—although, this would need to be worked out in more detail. Hereafter, I will not commit to any particular conception of good or evil and will stay at a general level.

The Argument from Reasons Continued So, why should we think that Hypothesis 1 is simpler, and therefore more probable, than Hypothesis 2? We should think this because evil is—in addition to being an axiological property—a specific deontic property: that a state of affairs has disvalue (evil) is a requiring reason (for humans)31 against permitting it.32 What is a requiring reason? In the following chapter, I have a much lengthier discussion of the nature of reasons. In the meantime we may say, in brief, that a requiring reason for an action A counts in favor of ~A being impermissible—in the absence of sufficiently weighty justifying reasons, renders ~A impermissible. And what is a justifying reason? A justifying reason for an action A counts in favor of A being permissible—in the absence of a sufficiently weighty requiring reason, it renders A permissible. The fact that evil is present in a state of affairs is a requiring reason against humans permitting that state of affairs explains why these states of affairs always require (for humans) justifying reasons for permitting them.33 For example, suppose pain is evil. That permitting a state of affairs that would result in pain (an evil) always requires a justifying

 This qualification is important because it renders my claim compatible with Murphy’s (2017a) claim evil isn’t always a requiring reason for God. (I’m not here endorsing Murphy’s view—I’m just illustrating that my argument here isn’t in conflict with it.) 32  See Chap. 3, Section “The Nature of Reasons”, for more on the nature of reasons. 33  Below, for the sake of brevity, I will omit the qualification “for humans.” The reader should understand my references to evil as a requiring reason in this section to have this qualification. 31

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reason because pain (an evil) is a requiring reason against its permission. And this is true no matter how small the amount of evil is.34 In other words, that a state of affairs is disvaluable (evil) always counts in favor of our not permitting it. This is part of what it is to be disvaluable (evil): for a state of affairs to have (or be) evil is for it to be a requiring reason against its permission. However, that a state of affairs is valuable (good) is not always a requiring reason for permitting it: that a state of affairs is valuable (good) entails either that it is a justifying reason or that it is a requiring reason. This is because that a state of affairs is valuable (good) will sometimes count in favor of its permissibility (i.e. be a justifying reason) and sometimes count in favor of its prevention being impermissible (i.e. be a requiring reason). For example, that my eating a cookie would make me happy counts in favor of the permissibility of (i.e. is a justifying reason for) my eating that cookie. Alternatively, that my child eating food would help her flourish (a good) counts in favor of the impermissibility of (i.e. is a requiring reason against) preventing my child from eating. However, this means that Hypothesis 1 is more modest than Hypothesis 2: Hypothesis 1 says that good, which is a requiring reason or a justifying reason, is connected to E, whereas Hypothesis 2 says that evil, which is a requiring reason, is connected to E. To illustrate this further, suppose you were considering the hypothesis about what kind of spare tire is in the trunk of your car. And suppose that there are only two kinds of tires: Goodyear tires and Michelin tires. Now, suppose that there are two kinds of Goodyear tires: Winter Tires and All Terrain Tires. However, there is only one kind of Michelin tire: All Terrain Tires. The hypothesis that there is a Goodyear tire in the trunk is more modest than the hypothesis that there is a Michelin tire in the trunk, since it means that there is either a Winter Tire or an All Terrain Tire in the trunk. However the hypothesis that there is a Michelin tire in the trunk means that there is an All Terrain Tire in the trunk—it’s more specific, and therefore less modest. In this case, Goodyear tires are akin to good and Michelin tires are akin to evil, and since the hypothesis that  Of course, if the amount of pain (evil) is extremely small, it could be overridden by an extremely weak justifying reason. 34

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there’s a Goodyear tire in the trunk is more modest than the hypothesis that there’s a Michelin tire in the trunk, Hypothesis 1 will be more modest than Hypothesis 2. (More generally, other things being equal, a hypothesis that says that either X or Y is the case will be more likely than a hypothesis that says X is the case.) Put differently, a hypothesis that postulates a good is committed to their being a justifying or a requiring reason, whereas a hypothesis that postulates an evil is committed to there being a requiring reason. However, the latter is more precise than the former, and so it’s less probable. (How much less probable? Again, it’s not clear to me. But for my purposes all that matters is that it is, in fact, less probable—even if only by a sliver.) We may call this The Argument from Reasons.35 Perhaps one thinks that the distinction between the kinds of reasons I’m relying on is arbitrary—many of the distinctions we could make between reasons arguably won’t have my desired result—and therefore that The Argument from Reasons is irrelevant. I discuss this issue in the following Chap. 3, Section “The Justifying and Requiring Distinction Is not Arbitrary”. In the meantime, my answer to this charge, briefly, is that the distinction between justifying reasons and requiring reasons isn’t arbitrary. Rather, it describes the two basic kinds of reasons there are: there are reasons that count in favor of the permissibility of an action and reasons that count in favor of the impermissibility of an action. There’s nothing arbitrary about this distinction, it captures a real difference, it captures the relevant difference between reasons, and it’s the standard distinction made by ethicists.36 Another potential objection to The Argument from Reasons is that while there are more kinds of reasons that good can be, the total quantity of reasons that good brings with it is no more than the quantity of reasons that evil brings with it, and that this entails that reasons give Hypothesis 1 no advantage over Hypothesis 2.37 Or, in other words, it  Note too that even if evil can be a justifying reason (say, a justifying reason for an alternative action), it will still be true that it’s always a requiring reason, which will make Hypothesis 2 more precise, and therefore less probable, than Hypothesis 2. 36  According to Gert, “within the domain of morality … the justifying/requiring distinction is widely accepted and is probably the dominant view” (2012, pp. 612–613). 37  Paul Draper has suggested to me something like this objection. 35

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could be that while good has a larger quantity of kinds of reasons it brings with it than evil, that good and evil are equal in quantity of reasons simpliciter. This objection is hard to parse. An initial point against it is that it’s natural to think that, absent other information, if X has a higher quantity of kinds of stuff than Y, that one has (even if weak) reason to think that X has more stuff than Y. Moreover, suppose that you think that the fact that X has more kinds of stuff than Y is no reason at all to think that there’s more X stuff than Y stuff. That supports the following corollary thesis: the fact that X and Y have the same number of kinds of stuff isn’t good reason to think that they’re equiprobable. But if that’s the case, then it becomes more difficult to show that X and Y are in fact equiprobable: if the quantity of kinds of X and Y really don’t matter at all in determining their probability, then we are left wondering how we can determine whether they are equiprobable. And if we aren’t offered a way to do so, then we lose our grounds for claiming that they are equiprobable. So there’s a sense in which this objection shoots itself in the foot: if it’s accepted, then it makes it harder to show that an unknown good is no more unlikely than an unknown evil. However, I grant that this issue isn’t exactly clear, and that this constitutes a weakness for The Argument from Reasons.

The Argument from Actuality So much for The Argument from Reasons. Do we have other reasons for thinking Hypothesis 1 is more likely than Hypothesis 2? Fortunately, we do—and it is a much more straightforward argument, which we may call The Argument from Actuality. The Argument from Actuality claims that all actual states of affairs have (to some degree) value.38 Or, in other words, all actual states of affairs are to some degree good. Of course, this doesn’t mean that all actual states of affairs are good all-things-considered or that  I leave open whether the value is intrinsic or extrinsic—this issue doesn’t matter for my purposes. Note also that Davison (2012) defends the view that all states of affairs have intrinsic value. However, this argument is secondary for him. His primary argument is that all concrete things have intrinsic value. 38

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there aren’t evil states of affairs. For example, the state of affairs consisting of someone being tortured is evil. But that doesn’t mean that there’s no value at all in it—it just means that this value is overwhelmed by its disvalue.39 Why think that all actual states of affairs are (to some degree) valuable? Actual states of affairs are valuable because being actual is good—there is value in being actual.40 Here’s one way to think about it. Suppose that we’re considering two non-actual states of affairs, S and S*, and that these states of affairs are as similar as possible and equal in terms of value. Now suppose that S* becomes actual whereas S is non-actual. Clearly, S* will be more valuable than S—that it is actual makes it better. Or, put differently, while truth is plausibly thought to add value to propositions (Hudson, 2014a, p. 182),41 we can think of actuality as adding value to states of affairs.42 Again, this doesn’t mean that S* is overall good. But it does mean it has some goodness.43 To sloganize this argument: it’s (at least somewhat) good to be. Another way to think about the value of being actual is this: a maximally great being—if it is truly maximally great—would exist. If it didn’t exist, that would be a strike against its greatness.44 And anything that resembles a maximally great being has value in light of (but not necessarily because of) this resemblance—it’s good to resemble (be like) a maximally great being. However, being actual is one way to resemble a  Indeed, states of affairs consisting of someone being tortured have some value in virtue of them containing a person (i.e. the one being tortured). 40  Indeed, Aquinas takes this view, saying that “For all existing things, insofar as they exist, are good, since being of a thing is itself good, and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses” (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia 20, 2). 41  Swinburne (2001, p. 185) makes a similar point about beliefs and truth. 42  If being true adds value to a proposition, does being false add disvalue to a proposition? That is, if truth is a good property for a proposition to have, is falsity a bad or evil property for a proposition to have? In brief, No. While truth adds value to propositions, falsity doesn’t add disvalue to them. Instead, that a proposition is false will just mean that it lacks value it would have if it were true. 43  Maybe you think that actuality is external to a state of affairs and therefore by definition only makes states of affairs extrinsically valuable. Fortunately, we need not delve into this issue here, since actual states of affairs having extrinsic value is sufficient for the purposes of The Argument from Actuality. Nothing significant hinges on this. 44  This isn’t to endorse an ontological argument. This is just a point about greatness, value, and actuality. 39

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maximally great being, and so being actual has (at least some) value. Again, if a maximally great being has a property, it can’t be bad and, indeed, must be good. And so something else having that property will also be good.45 And hence we have another reason to think that being actual is (to some degree) good. So what’s the upshot here? The upshot is that any hypothesis committed to the existence of evil will be committed to the existence of good: if there is an unknown evil logically connected to some evil state of affairs E—as Hypothesis 2 claims—then there is also good connected to it, because to say that there’s an unknown evil connected to E entails that there’s an unknown actual state of affairs connected to E. And that—as we saw above—means that there is good that is connected to E in addition to the unknown evil connected to it. However, a hypothesis committed to the existence of an unknown good connected to E—as Hypothesis 1 is committed—isn’t committed to there being evil (disvalue), since states of affairs don’t always contain disvalue. For example, the state of affairs consisting of God alone existing has no disvalue (evil) in it. So, we have an important asymmetry between good and evil: all actual states of affairs have at least some good, but it’s not the case that all actual states of affairs have at least some evil. But this means that any hypothesis that there’s an unknown evil connected to E is committed to there being two different kinds of axiological properties (i.e. good and evil), whereas any hypothesis that there’s an unknown good connected to E is only committed to the existence of one kind of axiological property (i.e. good). And this means that Hypothesis 1 is simpler than Hypothesis 246: it postulates fewer kinds of axiological properties connected to E. And—assuming that the simplicity of a hypothesis is a contributing factor to its probability47—this means that Hypothesis 1 is more probable than Hypothesis 2, which means that we have good reason to think that reality is biased

 This isn’t to commit to divine command theory or anything like it.  Clearly, this kind of simplicity differs from the kind talked about in The Argument from Reasons: here the simplicity is with respect to properties postulated, whereas there the concern was with modesty. 47  Since the two hypotheses will be identical except with respect to axiological properties, the hypothesis with only a single kind of axiological property will be simpler. 45 46

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toward the good, and therefore that the principle of difference, and equiprobability principles in general, are inapplicable.48

Is a Sufficiently Weighty Unknown Good Likely? But perhaps we’re not out of the water yet here. Perhaps one might argue that while we have no good public antecedent reason to think that there’s no unknown good or unknown evil connected to E, that we have good public antecedent reason for thinking that it’s less likely that a sufficiently weighty unknown good is connected to E than that an unknown evil is.49 For example, suppose that some instance of evil has a perceived value of, say, −150. In that case, a sufficiently weighty good must have at least a value of 150. But this means that, in some sense, there are less unknown goods that would result in E having a non-negative value than there are unknown evils and unknown goods that wouldn’t result in E having a non-negative value. This is because both unknown goods that have a value of less than 150 and unknown evils will result in E remaining negative, making it such that the perceived value of E would resemble its actual value, but only unknown goods with a value that is 150 or greater would make it such that the perceived value of E doesn’t resemble it’s actual value.50 Unfortunately, it’s just not clear how this argument is going to work. We’ve already seen that an unknown good and an unknown evil aren’t equiprobable and we’ve seen that reality is biased toward the good. From here, it’s just not clear how this argument is supposed to go. Perhaps someone can work this out, but I can’t see how it can be done. Indeed, given just our public antecedent reasons, the probability of there being an unknown good (sufficiently weighty or otherwise) connected to E and the probability of there being an unknown evil connected to E are both inscrutable—although, we know that an unknown good is more likely than an unknown evil. And so this objection won’t work.  Note too that this argument—The Argument from Actuality—will have the result that Hypothesis 1 is intrinsically more probable than Hypothesis 2. 49  I owe this objection to Paul Draper. 50  See Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism” for what resemblance of value consists of. 48

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Conclusion: Unknown Goods and Evils Aren’t Equiprobable In summary, contrary to Swinburne’s and Draper’s contention, it’s false that an unknown good is no more likely than an unknown evil. Indeed, reality is biased towards the good. I provided two arguments in favor of this view: The Argument from Reasons and The Argument from Actuality. These arguments give us good public antecedent reason for thinking that it’s more likely that an unknown good is logically connected to some instance of evil than that an unknown evil is logically connected to it.51 And this means that we should accept that reality is biased towards the good until and unless we’re given reason for thinking that it’s false that an unknown good is more likely than an unknown evil to be logically connected to some instance of evil. And, furthermore, this reason must outweigh or undercut our reasons for thinking reality is biased towards the good (i.e. The Argument from Reasons and The Argument from Actuality). But this is no easy (or enviable) task. Moreover, my arguments cut off the most plausible routes for denying this thesis: they prevent one from using intrinsic probability or the principle of indifference (and equiprobability principles in general) to argue that the probability of there being an unknown good logically connected to some instance of evil is equal to (or no more likely than) the probability that an unknown evil is logically connected to it.52 And so this equiprobability objection— the most powerful objection to skeptical theism on the market—doesn’t undermine Axiological Skeptical Theism.

 Again, I’ve not claimed how much more likely an unknown good is. For my purposes, all I need is that it’s in fact more likely—even if only by a sliver. 52  Or, at least, they make it more difficult to do so. 51

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 irect Objection 3: Ekstrom’s “Good Reasons” D for Rejecting ST1–353 Ekstrom flatly denies ST1–354: she claims that we do, in fact, have good reason to think that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their entailment relations is representative. She says that The good reason is that we are not only observant beings—witnesses to history, as well as to the goods and evils in the present—and imaginative moral beings—ones who can conceive of a wide array of ways of acting to the benefit and harm of ourselves and others—but also intelligent persons who think enormously hard about ethical principles, moral dilemmas, and questions about what positive ends could not be brought about in any better way and who make decision concerning how to act in light of considerations of right and wrong, good, and evil. (2021, p. 115)

So, her (supposed) good reason to think that the goods, evils, and entailment relations between the permission of goods and evils that we recognize are representative is that we are observant, imaginative with respect to morality, generally intelligent, and we have thought hard about ethical principles (etc.). But this doesn’t show that ST1–3 are false. While it may be true that humans are intelligent and have thought hard about ethical principles, moral dilemmas, and how to bring about positive ends, that doesn’t give us good reason to think our knowledge of goods, evils, and entailment relations between their permission is representative—that would only be true if we had good reason to think that these properties of ours (being imaginative with respect to morality, generally intelligent, etc.) make it likely that we would have representative knowledge of the relevant sort. But that will only be true if we aren’t cognitively limited in important ways. However, we know that we are cognitively limited in important ways here: we know that we aren’t terribly great in thinking about morality. For example, there is rampant, deep, and irresolvable disagreement about moral issues: does a woman’s right to autonomy  This section draws from my (2021a).  She focuses mainly on ST1–3 (2021b, p. 112), but her criticism could likely be applied to ST4.

53 54

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outweigh the right of the baby to live?55 Would free will justify God in allowing evil?56 Is euthanasia permissible?57 Different philosophers provide different answers to these questions, and there’s no clear way to settle these disputes. Indeed, these disputes will almost certainly never be settled—they are irresolvable. Moreover, we know that we are limited with respect to evaluation of the long-term causal consequences of actions (e.g. Durston, 2000; Lenman, 2000). And it’s even clearer that we’re limited with respect to logical connections between states of affairs since there is rampant, deep, and irresolvable disagreement about logical connections. For example, is there a necessary connection between brain events and mental events?58 Is there a necessary connection between free will and indeterministic worlds?59 Is there a necessary connection between epistemic justification and a subject being aware of her source of justification?60 Again, different philosophers provide different answers to these questions, and there’s no clear way to settle these disputes. And, again, these disputes will almost certainly never be settled—they are irresolvable. So, while we do think hard about these issues and we are observant and morally imaginative, this is not good reason to think that the goods, evils, and entailment relations we know of are representative—the fact is that we know we’re limited in important ways when it comes to thinking about moral issues and about necessary connections. Rampant, deep, and irresolvable disagreement makes this clear. And so Ekstrom hasn’t provided us with a good reason for rejecting ST1–3. Ekstrom’s second purported good reason for thinking that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their entailment relations is less clear. She says: Furthermore, if God exists, then God, too, is a personal moral agent and we are like God in being personal and intelligent moral agents. We are the sort of beings who are able to discern value, construct mathematical proofs … put a man on the moon … and fight for justice. I recognize that  E.g. Thomson (1971) says “Yes” and Schouten (2017) says “No.”  E.g. Plantinga (1974) says “Yes” and Ekstrom (2021) says “No.” 57  E.g. Young (2007) says “Yes” and Gorsuch (2006) says “No.” 58  E.g. Papineau (2002) says “Yes” and Swinburne (2013) says “No.” 59  E.g. van Inwagen (1983) says “Yes” and Dennett (1984) says “No.” 60  E.g. Bonjour (1985) says “Yes” and Bergmann (2006) says “No.” 55 56

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some of these abilities … are not strictly relevant to the matter of the goods and evils we know of, and the entailment relations between goods and the permissions of evils we know of, being representative of the goods, evils, and relations there are, but they do support trust in our own minds rather than deep skepticism about our abilities to reason, which include our ability to reason clearly concerning whether some evil is or is not necessary for the promotion of a greater good. (2021, p. 115)

This purported good reason is puzzling. On one reading of the passage, it’s not given as a good reason simpliciter but as a good reason for certain kinds of theists: if God exists and we are created in his image,61 then we have reason to think our knowledge of goods, evils, and their entailment relations is representative, says Ekstrom on this reading. But note that this objection wouldn’t be relevant to Axiological Skeptical Theism, since its claims are about what our good public antecedent reasons are, and these reasons will rule out considerations involving God—after all, the theist can use her beliefs about God to derive the conclusion that all evils are connected to greater goods (or the prevention of evils equally bad or worse),62 and since we don’t know what these goods (or evils) are, we don’t have good reason to think that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their entailment relations is representative.63 But even if ST1–3 are understood without reference to good public antecedent reason, it is extremely difficult to take Ekstrom’s argument seriously. First, this is because the abilities Ekstrom cites don’t undermine the fact that we know that we are limited with respect to our knowledge of (logical and causal) consequences of actions and with respect to our knowledge of logical connections between states of affairs. Second, while Christian and Jewish theists will accept that we’re made in God’s image, they will add on to this that we are cognitively limited, that our world is  Here, I’m assuming that Ekstrom is thinking that we were made like God in the sense that we are made in his image. If she doesn’t have this in mind, it’s not clear what her comment about our likeness to God is supposed to mean. 62  Again, assuming that God’s existence requires this—though, again, it’s not clear that his existence actually does require this. 63  This is on the assumption that we don’t know the reason God allows the evil in question. If we do, then the theist will hold her knowledge of goods, evils, and entailment relations is representative. 61

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a fallen world, and we have been corrupted in important ways by sin. Moreover, it simply doesn’t follow that being made in God’s image or his likeness entails having a representative knowledge of goods, evils, and their entailment relations: no traditional understanding of what it is to be made in God’s image or likeness has this entailment,64 and Ekstrom provides no reason at all to think being made in God’s image or likeness has this entailment. So, while we can have some general confidence in our cognitive abilities, on this view, we should not put too much confidence in them, and being made in God’s image doesn’t change this. And so for Christian and Jewish theists—and that’s who she appears to have in mind with this objection—Ekstrom’s objection especially won’t have any bite. On a different reading of this passage, Ekstrom is basically reiterating her first “good reason:” we are able to do pretty impressive things (such as construct mathematical proofs), and this supports the view that our moral knowledge (with respect to goods, evils, and entailment relations) is representative, since our minds are in some sense impressive. But this purported good reason fails for the same reason her first purported good reason fails: we know that we are limited with respect to our knowledge of morality on account of rampant, deep, and irresolvable moral disagreement as well as our limited access to the (logical and causal) consequences of actions. This is compatible with our being able to trust our minds with numerous other tasks—it’s just to say that one method of figuring out the total value of an action isn’t a good one. So, neither of Ekstrom’s purported good reasons for thinking that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their entailment relations is representative are actually good reasons. She has provided no good reason to reject ST1–3, and so no good reason to reject Axiological Skeptical Theism.

 Philo, Iraneaus, Augustine, and Aquinas thought of being made in God’s likeness or image as having the power of reason (Simango, 2016, pp. 172–176). Alternatively, Martin Luther thought of being made in God’s likeness or image as consisting of will, intellect, and righteousness upon conversion, and John Calvin sees it as consisting of righteousness and true holiness (Simango, 2016, pp. 176–178). 64

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 irect Objection 4: Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs’ D Rejection of ST1–4 Benton Hawthrone, and Isaacs (2016) have offered direct objections to ST1–4. They begin by noting (rightly) that the truth of ST1–4 depends on what property is relevant with respect to representativeness—we need to know what property it is about goods (etc.) that we have no good reason to think is representative.65 To understand their criticism, it’s important to note that Bergmann identifies that property as the property “of figuring in a (potentially) God-justifying reason for permitting the inscrutable evils we see around us” (Bergmann, 2012, p. 12). With this in mind, they say that [T]he question of whether or not the possible goods we know about are representative of the possible goods there are amounts to the question of whether or not any unknown good justifies God in allowing horrendous evils. But the question of whether any unknown good justifies God in allowing horrendous evils is what motivated our investigations into representativeness in the first place! Bergmann’s talk of the representativeness of goods amounts not to a solution but to a repackaging of the original problem. (2016, pp. 21–22)

Elsewhere (Hendricks, 2019), I’ve argued that this objection fails if we dig further into what the property of “figuring in a (potentially) God-­ justifying reason” amounts to: if we understand that property to be about value, then this objection dissolves. Note too that this objection will not cut ice with respect to Axiological Skeptical Theism, since Axiological Skeptical Theism is not about whether there is “any unknown good” that justifies God in allowing evil. Instead, it’s about whether the perceived value of the permission of some evil resembles its actual value. This is not simply repackaging the original problem. Indeed, this is very clear when we consider the kinds of arguments that Axiological Skeptical Theism targets: it targets arguments that make use of an inductive inference from  While they only discuss ST1 explicitly, their criticism is relevant to ST1–4, and I will talk about it as being directed toward ST1–4. 65

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the perceived value of the goods connected to the permission of some instance of evil to the actual value of the goods connected to the permission of said instance of evil.66 Whether the perceived value of the goods connected to the permission of some instance of evil resembles its actual value is relevant to that, and is not simply restating the issue. And so this criticism doesn’t threaten Axiological Skeptical Theism. A second criticism of Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs is that the scope of ST1–4 is narrow. They ask: So who is this “we” to which Bergmann alludes? The “we” of ST1[-4] cannot include theists who think they have an adequate theodicy to explain the existence of evil. Once you believe that we know of a good which justifies God in allowing evil, the question of whether unknown goods contain the same relative frequency of God justifying goods becomes entirely otiose. The “we” of ST1[-4] also cannot include atheists who think that the evidential problem of evil gives strong reason to disbelieve that there is a God. By believing that the evidential problem of evil is serious such atheists must both believe that they don’t know of any good which defuses the problem and that it is not plausible that an unknown good defuses the problem. So who is the “we” of ST1[-4]? Having excluded non-skeptical theists and non-skeptical atheists, it must be populated by various shades of skeptics. But ST1[-4] is supposed to provide an argument for Bergmann’s skeptical stance; it shouldn’t simply be Bergmann’s skeptical stance. But it is.” (2016, p. 22)

Basically, Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs think that theists who endorse theodicy can’t accept ST1–4, since they must affirm that the goods we know of are representative with respect to figuring into a God-justifying reason (because they hold that they do know of such reason), and that atheists who think evidential arguments from evil are powerful also can’t accept ST1–4. Elsewhere (Hendricks, 2019), I’ve argued that you can endorse both theodicy and ST1–4, and that atheists who endorse evidential arguments from evil can endorse ST1–4.67 Instead of rehearsing those arguments here, I’ll simply note that Axiological Skeptical Theism is not  I’m brief here since I discuss the applications of Axiological Skeptical Theism with respect to arguments from evil at length in Chap. 4. 67  I also argue that skeptical theists can make use of theodicy (and natural theology) in Chap. 8. 66

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susceptible to the problem raised by Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs. This is because of the antecedent clause: Axiological Skeptical Theism sets aside our beliefs about God’s existence (or non-existence). This enables those who endorse theodicy to accept Axiological Skeptical Theism—they can say that while antecedently we have no good public reason to think that the perceived value of the permission of some evil state of affairs resembles its actual value, that all-things-considered (and so non-antecedently) we do have such reason. Additionally, while those who find e.g. Rowe’s (1979) evidential argument from evil powerful cannot endorse Axiological Skeptical Theism, I’ve offered independent reason to affirm it: I’ve defended The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism which—if sound—shows that everyone should endorse Axiological Skeptical Theism until and unless we’re given reason to reject it. And this means that it challenges their affirmation of evidential arguments from evil: friends of Rowe’s argument (and other arguments from evil) must offer a response to my argument or provide independent reason for affirming evidential arguments from evil. They cannot (rationally) dismiss Axiological Skeptical Theism by merely noting that it’s inconsistent with their position. And so Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaac’s objections to ST1–4 are not successful, and their objections don’t threaten Axiological Skeptical Theism.

 irect Objection 5 Oppy’s Objection to Axiological D Skeptical Theism Graham Oppy (MS) thinks that, for some evils, we have good public antecedent reason to think that there aren’t unknown goods connected to them.68 He argues as follows: [The b]est naturalistic theories do without hidden Gods, hidden goods, and hidden evils. [The b]est naturalistic theories suppose that there are no evaluatively inscrutable items. Sure, there are countless items of which we have no knowledge; and, a fortiori, those items are not open to our evalua Oppy is targeting a previous iteration of Axiological Skeptical Theism found in Hendricks (2020b) that is phrased slightly differently. But his objections, if successful, would apply to both. 68

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tive assessment. Sure, too, there are countless items of which we have knowledge, but where, for reasons of complexity, we are unable to make accurate evaluative assessments. But, in the case of items that are familiar to us, we are fully apprised of the kinds of goods and evils that are relevant to their evaluative assessment. By the lights of [the] best naturalistic theories, we can be entirely confident that there are no occult goods that could justify anyone’s permission of the Holocaust, or the rape and torture of infants—and, of course, by the lights of [the] best naturalistic theories, we can also be entirely confident that there are no goods known to us that could justify anyone’s permission of those things. … Although we have only incomplete knowledge of items that bear on the evaluation of any given item, we have more or less complete knowledge of the kinds of goods and evils that those items can possess, and hence more or less complete knowledge of the kind of bearing that those items could have on the evaluation of the given item. The inscrutability of items—e.g. those that lie sufficiently far in the future of our light cone, or those [that] currently lie outside our light cone—has no consequences for the evaluative scrutability of current, near to hand, items. (Unpublished: n.p.)

A couple of comments on these passages of Oppy’s are in order. First, Oppy’s claim that “we can be entirely confident that there are no occult goods that could justify anyone’s permission of the Holocaust,” is irrelevant: Axiological Skeptical Theism requires nothing occult. There’s nothing “occult” about an unknown good or unknown evil, and a good (or the prevention of an evil) wouldn’t be “occult” because it’s connected to the Holocaust and outweighs it. For example, suppose that the occurrence of the Holocaust was necessary for the prevention of several Holocausts. If that were the case, then there would be an outweighing good for the Holocaust (the good being the prevention of a greater evil), and there’d be nothing “occult” about it. And so it’s not clear what the charge of “occultness” is doing here. Second, Oppy says we have (more or less) complete knowledge of the kinds of goods and evils that items can possess and this provides us with (more or less) complete knowledge of the kind of bearing these goods could have on the evaluation of the given item. What’s crucial here is what Oppy means by kinds of goods and evils. Does “kind” denote a

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particular family of goods? For example, happiness, pleasure, and love are (in some sense) a family of goods connected to one’s well-being. Or, does it denote a particular range of value that goods can have that are connected? For example, for some evil E, happiness can be connected to it, but only within the range of value 1–10, pleasure can be connected to E, but only within the range of value 10–15, and so on. On either understanding of this, it won’t  undermine Axiological Skeptical Theism. Take the first understanding. If ‘kind’ denotes a particular family of goods (and evils), this doesn’t tell us about their value. For example, some cases of happiness are more valuable than others, some cases of sadness are worse than others, and so on. But if we can’t assess the likely value of such goods, then this is no objection to Axiological Skeptical Theism. Or suppose that we take the second understanding, and take ‘kind’ to denote a particular range of value. For this to challenge Axiological Skeptical Theism, one must endorse either that (1) the value of any unknown goods (and evils) is not additive or that (2) for some particular evil that we know which, given the connections we know about, has a large negative value, there is good reason to think it’s likely that there aren’t many unknown goods connected to it and the kinds of goods that can be connected to it fall within a sufficiently low value range. It’s hard to see how one could muster enough support to endorse either (1) or (2). And until such support has been mustered, Oppy’s objections are unsuccessful. So, neither of Oppy’s objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism are successful. In this section, I’ve considered (the relatively few) direct objections that have been given to Axiological Skeptical Theism. I’ve argued that none of them are successful. In light of this, I will consider indirect objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism to see if they fare any better.

Indirect Objection 1: Moral (or Value) Skepticism While there are not many direct objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism, there are numerous indirect objections that have been put forth: it’s been argued that it (Axiological Skeptical Theism) entails, for example, skepticism about divine revelation (e.g. Erik Wielenberg, 2010,

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2014; Hudson, 2014b, 2017), external world skepticism (e.g.  Law, 2017), and moral skepticism (e.g. Maitzen, 2013, 2014). I don’t intend to address all of these objections here. Indeed, I think they’ve been sufficiently dealt with elsewhere.69 However, I will briefly address one version of the argument that is—though still indirect—more direct than these, namely William Hasker’s objection to ST1–4. Hasker claims that if one accepts ST1–4, then she can’t know or be confident that any action of hers (e.g. giving to charity) makes the world a better place all-things-considered. He says that Bergmann [on his view] has no idea whatsoever—and the rest of us ought to have no idea whatsoever—as to whether states of affairs that are prima facie good tend on the whole to be good all-things-considered. (2010, p. 27)

and later he says that we ordinarily suppose that, when we see a good state of affairs with no discernable evil entailments, it is very likely that the state of affairs in ­question really is good all-things-considered; and similarly for egregiously evil states of affairs that, so far as we can tell, are not logically required for goods that are commensurate in their value with the evils. (2010, p. 24)

Basically, Hasker thinks that ST1–4 entail that we can’t know that some state of affairs that is prima facie good is all things considered good. Hasker takes this to be a radical, unattractive consequence of ST1–4. Several comments are in order here. First, in my view, this isn’t radical at all. This is just the sober truth—or, at least, it’s the sober truth if we understand ST1–4 to be claims about what our antecedent good public reasons are. Of course for any prima facie good state of affairs we know of, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely all-things-­ considered good—that involves information that we just don’t have public antecedent access to. Indeed, I think Hasker’s assumption that we  For responses to the objection that Axiological Skeptical Theism entails skepticism about divine revelation see Hendricks (2020c), for responses to the objection that Axiological Skeptical Theism entails moral skepticism, see Bergmann (2012), Hendricks (2021b), and Howard-Snyder (2009), and for responses to the objection that Axiological Skeptical Theism entails external world skepticism, see Bergmann (2012) and Hendricks (2020c) and (2021b). 69

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normally think it’s very likely that a prima facie good action we perform is all-things-considered good is false; we—or, at least, I—don’t normally think that.70 Of course, I think it’s generally true that we have knowledge of the local connections between states of affairs, and I concede that (probably) most people think they are doing what’s best when local (and easily observable) effects are taken into account. But that’s a far cry from having knowledge of whether causing some state of affairs is all-things-­ considered good. And second, as Anderson (2012) illustrates, ST1–4 (as well as Axiological Skeptical Theism) makes claims about the all-things-­ considered value of the permission of evil, it makes no claims about the evil state of affairs simpliciter. So, ST1–4 entail that we can’t make inferences from the perceived value of the permission of some evil state of affairs to its all-things-considered value, but that doesn’t mean we can’t make such inferences about the evil state of affairs itself. (Of course, as I mentioned above, I think that we actually can’t make these judgments about the all-things-considered value of an evil state of affairs simpliciter based on its perceived value. My point here is that ST1–4 don’t themselves rule out that possibility.) Hasker thinks that this view has other unattractive implications. He says that those who endorse ST1–4 must abandon the aim of maximizing the good and minimizing the bad … because … no information is available [by way of an inductive inference] concerning the all-things-considered goodness or badness of any state of affairs whatsoever. (2010, p. 29, emphasis original)

I don’t see this implication as radical or as departing from the common view. No doubt some see things this way (e.g. Hasker), but this strikes me as wrongheaded: the facts on the ground are that we don’t know how to globally maximize good and minimize bad—locally, we can say a lot more, but with respect to total connections between states of affairs, our knowledge of goods and evils and their connections states of affairs doesn’t warrant any (even probabilistic) conclusion about whether a state  Note that even if this view of how we think about prima facie good states of affairs is rejected, my other points still undermine Hasker’s argument. 70

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of affairs is all things considered good or bad. This—in my view—is the sober truth (e.g. Durston, 2000; Lenman, 2000). Maybe there are other ways to know this, but one way that we can’t is based on an inference from our knowledge of goods connected to a state of affairs. Moreover, since Axiological Skeptical Theism pertains to our good public antecedent reasons, one might accept Axiological Skeptical Theism and hold these implications to only apply publically and antecedently: when all things are considered, one might hold that we know that our good actions tend to be good (e.g. because one thinks God exists and would order the universe in such a way). Finally, as I pointed out above, ST1–4 (and Axiological Skeptical Theism) makes a claim about our knowledge of the value of permitting an evil state of affairs, not the evil state of affairs itself. And this leaves open the possibility that we can have knowledge about how to maximize the good and minimize the bad. (Again, I reject this view. The point is that ST1–4 don’t themselves entail this.) And so this indirect objection doesn’t cut ice; it doesn’t give us reason to reject ST1–4, and so it doesn’t give us reason to reject Axiological Skeptical Theism. While there’s more to say here, I’m brief because something similar to this matter will be discussed in Chap. 6.71

Indirect Objection 2: Oppy’s ‘Item’ Skepticism Another indirect objection to Axiological Skeptical Theism is found in Graham Oppy’s work (2020 and Unpublished). Oppy takes an “item” to be “anything that is up for evaluative assessment. Items might be events, or states of affairs, or actions, or objects, or something else besides.” (Unpublished: n.p.) He thinks that the reasoning behind Axiological Skeptical Theism supports the following thesis: SCEPTICISM*: We have no good [public antecedent] reason to think that the goods and evils that we know are connected to some item are represen-

 For a similar argument argument Hasker’s, see Rutledge (2017a). My response to Hasker equally applies to Rutledge. 71

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tative, in respect to value, of the actual goods and evils that are connected to that item. (Unpublished: n.p.)72

However, continues Oppy, [O]nce we have noted this point, there are new arguments that we can construct making use of SCEPTICISM*. Pick any actual item I. Consider the hypothesis that God would be required to prevent I on evaluative grounds. Given SCEPTICISM*, it is hard to see how we can have good reason to reject the hypothesis that there is an evil E such that God would be required to prevent I in order to prevent E. If we are taking seriously the hypothesis that there are unknown goods attached to the Holocaust that allow God to permit it, we should also be taking seriously the hypothesis that there are unknown evils, attached to other items, of such magnitude that God would be required to prevent those items in order to prevent the unknown evils. However, it must be that, if there is an item I that God would be required to prevent in order to prevent some evil E, then God does not exist. So, given SCEPTICISM*, it is hard to see how we could have good reason to reject the hypothesis that God does not exist. And, if we do not have good reason to reject the hypothesis that God does not exist, then, at most, we shall be agnostic on the question whether God exists. (Oppy, n.d. Unpublished: n.p.)

I’m happy to concede the truth of SCEPTICISM*. However, since SCEPTICISM* is meant to parallel Axiological Skeptical Theism, it will only undermine certain types of ‘noseeum inferences’—inferences from our knowledge of the goods and evils connected to some item to a conclusion about the goods and evils actually connected to said item—and few of our beliefs about the value of items are based on such inferences.73 For example, take the following ‘item’: the event consisting of my eating an apple one year from today. Next, consider the hypothesis that in order to prevent some horrendous evil E, God would have to prevent me from  Note, again, that Oppy is interacting with a prior iteration of Axiological Skeptical Theism. However, the current iteration approximates to it, and the same considerations for and against it will apply here. I have added “antecedent” and “public” into the thesis so it’s more clearly parallel to Axiological Skeptical Theism. 73  These inferences are discussed at greater length in Chap. 4, Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism Against The Noseeum Axiological Argument”. 72

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eating the apple. Oppy says that if we have to “take seriously” the hypothesis that there’s a greater good connected to some horrendous evil, that we should “take seriously” the hypothesis that there’s some horrendous evil connected to my eating the apple. If by “take seriously” Oppy means that we concede that we have no antecedent good public reason to think that either hypothesis is false, then his analysis is right: we should “take seriously” both hypotheses. However, once the theist goes beyond her antecedent knowledge, she’ll have good reason to think that these items aren’t connected to evils that are incompatible with God’s existence. This is because she knows (or reasonably takes herself to know) that these items exist and that God exists, which allows her to infer74 that there aren’t any unknown evils preventing God from permitting these items.75 But at the antecedent stage, agnosticism is the proper attitude.76 (One brief caveat is in order here: above I argued that reality is biased toward good. If I’m right, this enables us to construct a kind of equiprobability argument against any event being overall bad. And this means that even at the public antecedent stage, Oppy’s argument fails.)  Moreover, one may have private reasons for thinking that these items aren’t connected to unknown evils that would prevent God from permitting them. If one has such reasons, then—provided they are good reasons—she may justifiedly believe that there are no such evils connected to these items. For example, one might (claim to) know through intuition that there are no such evils.77 Thus, Oppy’s criticisms here isn’t successful: while SCEPTICISM* is right, it doesn’t have the disastrous consequences he thinks it does.

 Note: obviously, this inference isn’t a noseeum inference.  This is a bit more complicated than I’m letting on here—it assumes that God’s existence is incompatible with axiologically gratuitous evil. See Chap. 4, Section “Gratuitous Evil: What Is It?” and Section “Draper’s Objection to STE (And Axiological Skeptical Theism)” for more on this. 76  For the atheist, even after the antecedent stage, agnosticism will typically be the proper attitude. That’s because nothing in her background knowledge tells her whether innocuous “items” (such as the one mentioned above) are connected to evils incompatible with God’s existence. 77  I’m not claiming that this intuition would in fact be justified. I note it just to illustrate a possible way in which one might respond to Oppy’s argument. In fact, for reasons discussed in Chap. 9, I think an intuition like that would be unjustified. 74 75

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Indirect Objection 3: Climenhaga’s Bayesian Objection Climenhaga (forthcoming) argues that certain kinds of skeptical theism lead to agnosticism. Basically, he argues that if the probability of evil is inscrutable given theism, then the probability of theism will be inscrutable given evil. And since evil is part of our background knowledge, this means we should be agnostic about whether God exists—an obvious problem for theists!78 But notice that I’ve not claimed that Axiological Skeptical Theism renders the probability of evil (or anything) inscrutable simpliciter. My points have been restricted to probabilities given our public antecedent reasons—this doesn’t rule out assigning a non-inscrutable probability to evil (or anything). Instead, it just rules out doing so just given our public antecedent reasons.79 Indeed, in Chap. 8, Section “How to Make an Effective Argument for Atheism”, I’ll illustrate one way to predict God’s actions that isn’t threatened by Axiological Skeptical Theism. And so while Climenhaga’s argument might threaten some kinds of skeptical theism, it doesn’t threaten Axiological Skeptical Theism.

Conclusion In this chapter, I’ve laid out The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism, and have considered numerous (direct and indirect) objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism. None of them are successful. And this means that we all—theist or atheist—should accept Axiological Skeptical Theism until and unless we’re given reason to reject it. Wrapping up, I l want to briefly note (and will reiterate in the future) that Axiological Skeptical Theism is the less important kind of skeptical theism discussed in this book. The most important kind of skeptical theism—Deontological Skeptical Theism—will be defended in the following chapter.

 This won’t necessarily be a problem for agnostics.  More specifically, it rules out doing so by way of a noseeum inference.

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Introduction1 In the previous chapter, I defended (and argued in favor of ) Axiological Skeptical Theism. However, Axiological Skeptical Theism isn’t the most important kind of skeptical theism. This is because Axiological Skeptical Theism is a thesis strictly about our knowledge of the value of different states of affairs. But it’s dubious (to say the least) to hold that God’s actions can be predicted by an analysis exclusively of value. Rather, we need to look at God’s reasons for action in order to predict how God will act. And it’s dubious to think that God’s reasons and their weight are exclusively correlated with value. Think about humans: what we have the strongest reason to do isn’t necessarily tied to what has the most value. To use a common example, suppose I promise to meet you for lunch tomorrow and that keeping my promise will produce 1000 units of value. But suppose that—for whatever reason—breaking my promise to you will produce 1000.1 units of value. In that case, I should still keep my promise to you. That is, even though breaking my promise to you produces more value, my reasons for  Some paragraphs from this chapter are reprinted with permission from my (Hendricks, forthcoming). Thanks to Religious Studies for allowing me to reprint parts of this article. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4_3

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keeping my promise are stronger than my reasons for breaking it, and because of this I should keep my promise. If God found himself in this situation, the same would hold for him: he would have more reason to keep his promise than to break it even though breaking it would produce more value. More generally, since God is a perfect being, he will act in accord with the weight of his reasons—he won’t do something if his reasons for not doing it are stronger. And so to predict how God will act, we need to look at the weight of God’s reasons for different actions, and this won’t necessarily track the value of each action. A skeptical theism that pertains to the weight of God’s reasons, therefore, is the most important (and consequential) kind. It’s this kind of skeptical theism that I will argue in favor of in this chapter. But if Axiological Skeptical Theism isn’t the most important kind of skeptical theism, why do I talk about it at all? For several reasons. First, I think we have good reason to accept Axiological Skeptical Theism—The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism is successful, and there aren’t any good reasons to reject it. Second, Axiological Skeptical Theism appears to be the most popular kind of skeptical theism on offer—at least on my reading of the literature. And if it’s the most popular skeptical theism on offer, it’s worth exploring.2 And third, many arguments against theism make use of axiological premises (see the next two chapters) and, as such, will be undermined by Axiological Skeptical Theism. Those three reasons, I think, make it worthwhile to devote (and continue to devote) space to Axiological Skeptical Theism. However, the reader should keep in mind that it is of secondary importance: in predicting how God would act, it’s crucial that we know his reasons and their weight for action—knowing the value involved isn’t enough. With that in mind, the structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I’ll introduce and explain what I will call Deontological Skeptical Theism. Then, I’ll defend an argument in favor of Deontological Skeptical Theism.  I suspect this is largely due to the influence of William Rowe’s evidential argument from evil: his argument is axiological in nature, which resulted in axiological responses to his argument, and this resulted in defenses of axiological kinds of skeptical theism. But this isn’t the time to point fingers—accusing Rowe in print is one thing, but pointing fingers is another. 2

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After that, I’ll consider numerous reasons for rejecting it, arguing that they all fail. I conclude, therefore, that we should accept Deontological Skeptical Theism until and unless we’re given reason to reject it.

Deontological Skeptical Theism In this chapter, I’m going to consider Deontological Skeptical Theism. Deontological Skeptical Theism involves a skepticism about the weight of reasons God has in favor of (or against) permitting some state of affairs. We may state its skeptical component as follows: Deontological Skeptical Theism: For any evil state of affairs we know of E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the known weight of justifying and requiring reasons God has in favor of (or against) permitting E resembles the actual weight of God’s justifying and requiring reasons in favor of (or against) permitting E.

Here, “public reason” carries with it the same meaning it has in Axiological Skeptical Theism: it’s a reason that’s in principle equally accessible to all—it’s not one’s own mental state, such as one’s intuition, seeming, or belief.3 By “we have no good reason for thinking X,” I again mean that we do not currently recognize any reason as being a good one for thinking X.4 And “good antecedent reason” should be understood in the same way outlined in the previous chapter: it’s a good reason that sets aside our beliefs about God’s existence or non-existence. Again, this is because one’s beliefs about God will influence whether she has a good reason to think the known weight of God’s justifying and requiring reasons likely resembles their actual weight. For example, theists may hold that for any instance of evil that, given what we know, is weighted in favor of impermissibility, we have good reason to think that the known  Again, this isn’t to say that private reasons—one’s own intuitions, seemings, or beliefs—are unimportant. Indeed, Chap. 9 is devoted to this issue within the context of commonsense problems of evil. 4  For a more detailed explanation of my terminology here, see Chap. 2, Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism”. 3

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weight of God’s justifying and requiring reasons5 doesn’t resemble the actual weight of God’s justifying and requiring reasons, since God’s existence entails that all such evils are permissible—God wouldn’t permit something that’s impermissible, after all. Hereafter, for the sake of brevity and for ease of readability, I will often forgo distinguishing justifying reasons and requiring reasons and simply speak of reasons. For example, I might speak of God’s reasons for performing X. In these cases, “reasons” should be understood to denote both justifying and requiring reasons. The focus of Deontological Skeptical Theism is on God’s reasons as opposed to reasons simpliciter, since reasons for you or me might not be reasons for God, and vice versa. For example, Murphy (2014, 2017a) argues that ensuring human well-being may be a requiring reason for you or I to act but not a requiring reason for God to act.6 Moreover, as Anderson (2012, p. 36) points out, God’s position (if he exists) as creator makes it such that he will have different reasons for acting than his creation. For example, God has a reason (even if very weak) to refrain from interfering with his creation, thereby permitting his creation to bring itself from chaos to order. This is because creation bringing itself from chaos to order is a (even if very weak) good. However, created beings have no such reason, since they are part of creation: their bringing about order is part of creation bringing itself from chaos to order. Or, God has a reason (even if weak) to refrain from constantly interfering with his creation in order to show respect to his creation’s autonomy, whereas created beings have no such reason—they are part of creation and so their actions won’t interfere with creation being autonomous (to a degree) in relation to God. Or, God has a reason to take care of his creation because he is responsible for its existence, whereas his creation doesn’t have this reason, since (clearly enough) it (creation) isn’t responsible for its existence. And so it should be clear that our reasons and God’s reasons will differ. For the sake of readability, I will typically shorten “we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the known weight of justifying and requiring reasons God has in favor of (or against) permitting  The nature of requiring and justifying reasons will be explained below, in Section “The Nature of Reasons”. 6  I’m not defending Murphy’s position here. My point is just to illustrate one way in which God’s reasons may differ from our reasons. 5

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E” to “we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons.” And I will typically shorten “the actual weight of God’s justifying and requiring reasons in favor (or against) permitting E” to “the actual weight of his reasons.” Understood in these terms, we may simplify Deontological Skeptical Theism to the following thesis: Deontological Skeptical Theism Simplified: For the permission of any evil E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons.

Finally, we may say that there are two possible final deontological positions with respect to the weight of God’s reasons for permitting a state of affairs: overall impermissible or overall permissible. And if the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting E resembles the actual weight of his reasons, then the perceived position of the weight of God’s reasons is the final deontological position. For example, if the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting E is overall impermissible, then the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons if and only if overall impermissible is the final deontological position with respect to the weight of God’s reasons for permitting E. If the final deontological position is overall permissible, then there is no such resemblance.

The Nature of Reasons Reasons play a central role in Deontological Skeptical Theism. But what are they exactly? Reasons, in general, may be understood to be considerations in favor of, or against, some action (e.g. Scanlon, 2000). There are different kinds of reasons: there are requiring reasons and justifying reasons.7 When an action has a requiring reason against it, we may say that it has “requiring weight” against it, and how weighty it is depends on how strong the reason is. Similarly, when an action has a justifying reason for  For persuasive arguments for thinking there are both justifying reasons and requiring reasons, see Gert (2016) and Tucker (2017, 2022, forthcoming). 7

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it, we may say that it has “justifying weight” for it, and how weighty it is depends on how strong the reason is. A requiring reason for A is a consideration in favor of the impermissibility of ~A, and—as we’ll see below (Section “Moral Dilemmas and The Asymmetry of Reasons”)—also a consideration in favor of the permissibility of A. And we may say that if ~A is impermissible, then A is required.8 For example, that my kids are hungry is a requiring reason for my feeding them—it makes it such that, in the absence of a sufficiently weighty justifying reason for not feeding them, it is impermissible for me to not feed them.9 A justifying reason for A is a consideration in favor of the permissibility of A: in the absence of a sufficiently weighty requiring reason against A, it renders A permissible. That is, a justifying reason for A counts in favor of its permissibility. For example, that eating cake would taste good is a justifying reason for my eating cake, but it isn’t a requiring reason for me eating cake: it pushes my act of eating cake towards being permissible, but it doesn’t push my eating cake towards being required. Or, suppose that by risking serious harm and running into a burning building you could save a dog from perishing in the flames. That you could save the dog is a justifying reason for risking harm to yourself, but it isn’t a requiring reason for risking such harm (Gert, 2012, p. 612). Or suppose that a grenade lands in the middle of a group of soldiers. A soldier, S, could jump on the grenade, saving her fellow soldiers but taking her own life. That jumping on the grenade would take S’s own life is a justifying reason for her not jumping on it, but it isn’t a requiring reason for her not jumping on it (Tucker, forthocming). And so, for any pair of potential actions A and ~A, there will (potentially) be requiring reasons for A, requiring reasons for ~A, justifying reasons for A, and justifying reasons for ~A.10  Some use “required” to mean both that it’s permissible and that alternatives are impermissible, e.g. Tucker (forthcoming) and Portmore (2011). Here, I’m using it only to mean that the alternatives are impermissible. 9  And, as mentioned above, it will also make it permissible for me to feed them, absent a sufficiently weighty requiring reason for not feeding them. 10  I focus on cases in which only A and ~A are options. But everything I have said and will say works for multiple option cases. Additionally, Tucker (forthcoming) identifies 8 sorts of weights. But the additional 4 he identifies are functionally equivalent to the 4 I’ve identified here, and they won’t make a difference for the argument I give. 8

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Whether A is permissible or impermissible is a function of the requiring reasons against it and the justifying reasons in favor of it: if the requiring reasons against A outweigh the justifying reasons for A, then A is impermissible. If not, then not.11 Finally, the default status of an act will be permissibility: if there are no requiring reasons against the permissibility of A, then A will be permissible.12

The Justifying and Requiring Distinction Is Not Arbitrary Perhaps one thinks that the distinction between the kinds of reasons I’m relying on is arbitrary—there are many different distinctions we could make between reasons, and this particular distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons isn’t important. However, the above discussion should make clear that this isn’t arbitrary: some reasons really do push an act towards being permissible (but not being required) and some reasons really do push an action towards being required. And these are the basic kinds of reasons: reasons (as we’re understanding them) are considerations in favor of or against some action. Considerations in favor of or against an action are of two kinds: considerations in favor of its permissibility (but not its being required) and considerations in favor of it being required. And so there’s nothing arbitrary about this distinction: it captures real kinds of reasons, and it captures the relevant difference between reasons—an act will be made permissible in virtue of the weight of its requiring and justifying reasons.13  While I make use of something like Tucker’s (2022) model of weighing reasons here, my argument below is compatible with any view that admits the difference between justifying and requiring reasons, and arguably even models that don’t admit this difference. Notably, that there’s a distinction between justifying and requiring reasons is the dominant view (Gert, 2012). 12  There are two possible explanations of this. First,  and plausibly, we may simply hold that an action is impermissible only if there is a requiring reason against it. Thus, if there isn’t a requiring reason against an action, then it’s permissible. Alternatively, and less plausibly, we may think that for an action to be permissible, it must have a justifying reason in its favor—even if there are no requiring reasons against it. If this is the case, then the fact that there aren’t requiring reasons against an action is a justifying reason for it. Either way, an action will be permissible in the absence of requiring reasons against it. Permissibility is, then, the default position. 13  Of course, some have given different names to the distinction (e.g. Schmidt (forthcoming) essentially takes justifying reasons to be non-moral reasons and requiring reasons to be moral reasons) and there is some dispute about whether this is the right distinction to make. For example, 11

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Moral Dilemmas and the Asymmetry of Reasons It should be clear that this view about reasons allows for the conceptual possibility of equal reason cases or moral dilemmas.14 That is, since whether an action A is permissible is a function of the weight of its justifying reasons against its requiring reasons, it’s conceptually possible that we have cases in which the requiring reasons against A outweigh the justifying reasons for A—in which case A is impermissible—and the requiring reasons against ~A outweigh the justifying reasons for ~A—in which case ~A is impermissible. But this leads to trouble: if A is impermissible, then we’re required to refrain from A. However, if ~A is impermissible, then we’re required to refrain from ~A. And that means that we’re required both to do A and to do ~A. But surely if we’re required to A then A must be permissible—we can’t be required to perform an action and required not to perform it.15 What could be more clear than that? Indeed, the standard view is that there aren’t moral dilemmas like this—you can’t be required both to A and required to ~A. Or, in other words, both A and ~A can’t be impermissible. Put differently, the issue is this: if whether A is permissible is a function of the weight of its reasons—and I have assumed that it is—it’s at least conceptually possible for there to be cases in which the reasons stack up in a way that renders A impermissible and ~A impermissible. That’s clear enough. Indeed, one popular example of this is taken from the book Sophie’s Choice.16 Basically (and very roughly), during the Holocaust, a mother is brought to a concentration camp with her two children and is told she may only keep one—the other will be sent to die in the gas chambers. If she doesn’t make a choice, then both will be sent to the gas chambers. For each of Sophie’s children, she has requiring reasons not to Portmore (2012) suggests that we should distinguish between perfect and imperfect reasons— although, he doesn’t argue that there aren’t justifying and requiring reasons. I won’t enter this dispute here, aside from saying this: I think it’s clear that some reasons really count in favor of an act being permissible (but not required) and that other reasons really count in favor of an act being required. And as mentioned prior, this is the majority position with respect to moral reasons. (Gert, 2012, See also Gert (2014) for a response to Portmore (2012).) 14  More exactly, it allows for moral prohibition dilemmas. 15  This line of thought can be found in Conee (1982). 16  Styron (1979). Or, if you’re uncultured swine like me, taken from the film by the same name.

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send them to their death, and these requiring reasons (we may suppose) outweigh any justifying reasons she might have for doing so. And so it seems that for Sophie it is impermissible for her—she is required not to—send either child to the gas chambers. In other words, all actions available to her are impermissible, and she has found herself in a moral dilemma. How should we think about apparently problematic cases, like Sophie’s Choice? The standard view is that if we find ourselves in a moral dilemma— if we are required to A and to ~A—then both A and ~A are permissible.17 In other words, if our first-order reasons have it such that both A and ~A are impermissible, then a second-order justifying reason renders both of them permissible (Conee, 1982, p. 92). So, if one’s first-order reasons are equal in the sense that all available actions are impermissible, then a second-­order reason makes it such that each action is permissible. This makes sense: of course Sophie didn’t do something impermissible in making her choice—there was no alternative action available. So, rejecting moral dilemmas is not a radical position. Indeed, in addition to the rejection of moral dilemmas being the standard view, it’s just implausible to think that there are moral dilemmas:18 it’s implausible to think that one can be required (or that it is impermissible) to perform A and required (or that it is impermissible) to perform ~A.19 So, what’s the upshot here? The upshot is this: requiring reasons for A not only push ~A towards impermissibility, they also push A towards permissibility. This is because a requiring reason for A will push ~A  Here, I’m not advocating any decision procedure—that would no doubt be controversial. My point, instead, is just about that an action rendered impermissible by our first-order reasons can be rendered permissible by a second-order reason in equal weight cases. (See Bagnoli (2006) for (albeit unpersuasive) reasons one might object to a randomized decision procedure in these scenarios.) 18  See McConnell (2018) for an overview of moral dilemmas. For the pro-moral dilemmas side, see e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong (1987) and van Fraassen (1973). For the anti-moral dilemmas side, see e.g. Conee (1982), McConnell (1978), and Rinard (2018). 19  Some philosophers suggest that moral guilt can offer support to the view that there are moral dilemmas. For example, in the Sophie’s choice case discussed above, Sophie might feel guilty no matter what she does, which suggests that both actions are impermissible—she shouldn’t feel guilty if she did something that was permissible. I won’t delve into this issue here, aside from saying that any guilt Sophie feels in that case would be irrational. For discussions of this issue, see e.g. Marcus (1980), Williams (1976), and van Fraassen (1973). And see Conee (1982) for more on the guilt objection. 17

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towards impermissibility which in effect pushes A towards permissibility: if A is rendered impermissible due to requiring reasons in favor of ~A outweighing the justifying reasons for A, then reasons that push ~A towards impermissibility also push us closer to a moral dilemma with respect to A and ~A. But, as we saw above, if our first-order reasons have it that both A and ~A are impermissible, then both become permissible. So, the fact that requiring reasons for A push us towards a moral dilemma means that it pushes A towards permissibility. Hence, requiring reasons for A push it towards permissibility in addition to pushing ~A towards impermissibility.

Agent Centered Reasons There is a standard distinction drawn between agent neutral reasons, which (roughly) apply to all agents in all situations, and agent centered reasons—sometimes called agent relative reasons—which (roughly) apply to only some agents in some situations, often due to some relational factor (e.g. I have a reason to give my daughter food because she’s my daughter, whereas you have no such reason). Some agent centered reasons can be seen as restrictions for the agent that make it such that she shouldn’t maximize the good (e.g. I shouldn’t lie even if doing so would prevent two other people from lying). Other agent centered reasons are the agent’s self-interested reasons, such as reasons that would benefit the agent or would promote the agent’s own projects. There are also autonomy-based agent centered reasons, such as the fact that an action is in line with the agent’s own desires, that the agent wants to perform the action, and so on.20 These latter two kinds of agent centered reasons (i.e. reasons of self-­ interest and autonomy-based reasons) have justifying weight but they don’t have requiring weight—or, in other words, they are justifying reasons but not requiring reasons for an agent. That performing A is in line with my self interests pushes A towards permissibility, but it doesn’t push it towards being required. Or, that performing A is an act of my autonomy is a justifying reason for performing  For a general overview, see Ridge (2017).

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it, but it isn’t a requiring reason for performing it. For example, the fact that I want to eat a McChicken (an autonomy-based reason) is a justifying reason for eating it, but it isn’t a requiring reason for it. And the fact that it would taste good (a self-interested reason) is a justifying reason for eating it, but not a requiring reason for eating it. Or, the fact that saving you would result in my death is a (self-interested) justifying reason for my not saving you, but it isn’t a requiring reason for my not saving you. And the fact that I want to save you is a(n autonomy-based) justifying reason for saving you, but not a requiring reason for saving you. Or, the fact that selling you drugs would make me extremely rich is a (self-interested) justifying reason for me doing so, but it isn’t a requiring reason for my doing so. And the fact that I want to sell you drugs is a(n autonomy-based) justifying reason for selling them to you, but not a requiring reason for doing so. And so on. My interest in agent centered reasons is exclusively with agent centered reasons of self-interest and autonomy-based agent centered reasons.21 These two kinds of reasons are default justifying reasons for agents to act: that an act is in line with an agent’s self-interest (e.g. it benefits me) always count in favor of the permissibility of an action, and that an act is (or would be) the result of an autonomous decision always counts in favor of the permissibility of performing it. Since these reasons always count in favor of whatever action I want to perform, they are, in effect, default justifying reasons for actions—they count in favor of the permission of an act automatically.22 Finally, note that the strength of these justifying reasons will vary depending one what they are: my self-interested reasons for preserving my life are stronger—have more justifying weight—than my self-interested reasons for eating a cookie, and my autonomy-based reasons for choosing who to marry are stronger than my autonomy-based reasons for choosing what shirt to wear.

 Perhaps autonomy-based agent centered reasons can be subsumed under agent-centered reasons of self-interest, or vice versa. Whether or not this can be done makes no difference for my purposes. 22  Crucially, there aren’t default requiring reasons against all actions. 21

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 he Default Argument for Deontological T Skeptical Theism Recall the simplified version of Deontological Skeptical Theism: Deontological Skeptical Theism Simplified: For the permission of any evil E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons.

The Default Argument for Deontological Skeptical Theism has the same structure as The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism, and it goes like this: Deontological Skeptical Theism is true definitionally until and unless we are given a good public antecedent reason for thinking it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting E resembles the actual weight of his reasons for permitting E. This is because, again, we are understanding “having a good reason to think X” as meaning that we currently recognize a reason as being a good one for thinking X (Section “Deontological Skeptical Theism”). Therefore, until and unless we’re given such a reason, we should accept Deontological Skeptical Theism—Deontological Skeptical Theism is the default position. This argument is extremely simple. And it shows just how simple it is to refute Deontological Skeptical Theism: provide a single good public antecedent reason for thinking it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons, and Deontological Skeptical Theism will have been shown to be false.23 Below, I will consider numerous objections one might raise to Deontological Skeptical Theism, and I will argue that they all fail.

 Of course, this won’t refute The Default Argument for Deontological Skeptical Theism, since that argument just claims that Deontological Skeptical Theism is the default position—it doesn’t claim that there aren’t reasons to reject it despite its default status. 23

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 bjections to the Default Argument O for Deontological Skeptical Theism Now that I’ve stated The Default Argument for Deontological Skeptical Theism, the next step is to consider objections to the argument. But there really can’t be objections to the argument: the argument, in essence, is just to point out that Deontological Skeptical Theism is by definition the default position—we should accept Deontological Skeptical Theism until and unless we’re given a reason for rejecting it. Obviously, then, one can accept the argument I gave and yet reject Deontological Skeptical Theism: I’ve only shown that we should hold Deontological Skeptical Theism until and unless we’re given reason to reject it—I’ve not argued that there is no reason to reject it. As such, I will consider both direct and indirect objections to Deontological Skeptical Theism in this section: if these objections are successful, then, although Deontological Skeptical Theism is the default position, we should ultimately reject it. However, I will argue that all of the examined objections fail. And, therefore, we should all accept Deontological Skeptical Theism—or, we should accept it until and unless a successful objection is put forth.

 irect Objection 1: There Likely Aren’t D Unknown Reasons The first direct objection I’ll consider is the claim that for some evil E, it’s likely that there aren’t any unknown reasons God has for permitting E. If that’s the case—and we have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the perceived weight of God’s reasons—then we would have good public antecedent reason for thinking that the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons, in which case Deontological Skeptical Theism is false. Why think that God likely doesn’t have any unknown reasons? Perhaps one thinks that our lack of knowledge of such a reason makes it likely that there is no such reason. Of course, this depends on the view that we likely would know (and recognize) all of God’s reasons. But that’s a dubious assumption to make: perhaps we’re good at detecting our reasons for

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action, but that doesn’t entail that we’re good at detecting God’s reasons. Indeed, the fact that we don’t have exhaustive knowledge of God’s reasons is enough to show that we have no good reason to think it’s likely that God has no unknown reason for permitting some evil. To see this, first note that there have been numerous examples of reasons put forth. For example, W.D. Ross (2002) lists several moral reasons, what he calls prima facie duties, that can be in favor of or against an action: duties of fidelity, duties of reparation, duties of gratitude, duties of non-maleficence, duties of self-improvement, and duties of justice (Ross, 2002, p. 21).24 Others have cited God’s commands as reasons for (or against) an action (e.g. Adams, 1999). Darwall (2006) considers second personal reasons, which rely on authority or accountability relations between persons. Other reasons include special obligations like a father’s or mother’s obligation to care for his or her child and the right of autonomy (Thomson, 1971). But note that these are all accounts of reasons that apply to humans— they don’t necessarily tell us about what reasons (if any) apply to God. And we’re not told that God likely would have no reasons beyond these ones. In fact, some think God is not (at least necessarily) morally perfect—human well-being does not (necessarily) provide him with a requiring reason for action (Murphy, 2014, 2017a). And others (Anderson, 2012) have pointed out that since God is creator, he will have different reasons than his creation (e.g. humans). For example—to repeat a point from Section “Deontological Skeptical Theism”—whereas God has reason (even if weak) to allow his creation to bring itself into order, we (humans) have no such reason, since we are part of his creation. So, there’s some reason to doubt that all our reasons apply to God25 and we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that God’s reasons we know of are exhaustive of his actual reasons. This supports the view that we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that there are no unknown reasons God has for (or against) permitting certain states of affairs: if we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking that our knowledge of God’s reasons is exhaustive, then of  See Markosian (2009) for a plausible development of Ross’s view.  See Ekstrom (2019) for a response to Murphy.

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course we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking there likely aren’t unknown reasons for God permitting E—if we allow that God has unknown reasons and we don’t know anything significant about them, then we can’t say that these unknown reasons likely don’t favor (or disfavor) him permitting E.26 And, more generally, the fact (if it is a fact) that we have a good grasp of our reasons just isn’t a good indicator of whether we have a good grasp of God’s reasons, since our reasons and God’s reasons differ. And so, we may say that we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that God has no unknown reason for permitting E. Indeed, there’s no good public antecedent reason to ascribe any range of probability to God having an unknown reason for permitting or preventing E— the probability of that is inscrutable.

Direct Objection 2: Equiprobability Objections Perhaps one is tempted to use an equiprobability principle, such as the principle of indifference, to object to Deontological Skeptical Theism. According to the principle of indifference, roughly, if we have no reason to think one hypothesis is more likely than another, they are equiprobable.27 And so, one might argue that for some evil E, we have no reason to think it’s more likely that there’s an unknown reason in favor of God permitting E than that there’s an unknown reason against God permitting E. With the principle of indifference, we can conclude from this that an unknown reason for God to permit E and an unknown reason against God permitting E are equiprobable. Now, suppose there’s a non-zero probability that there are no unknown reasons for God permitting or preventing E. This entails that the maximum probability of there being an unknown reason in favor of God permitting E is a sliver less than 0.5. This is because if an unknown reason  If it’s unlikely that there’s an unknown reason, then it must be likely that our knowledge of God’s reasons is exhaustive, since to say that is to say something about all God’s reasons for some action. 27  The principle of indifference is, of course, subject to counterexamples, and needs to be qualified to avoid them. I won’t delve further into this issue here, since I talk about the principle of indifference (and other equiprobability principles) in more depth in Chap. 4, Section “The Equiprobability Argument from Evil”. 26

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for God permitting E and an unknown reason against him permitting E are equiprobable, if one has a probability of 0.5 the other will too, and that uses up all of our probability space. But that would rule out what we assumed above, which is that there’s a non-zero probability of there being no unknown reasons for God preventing or permitting E. And so the probability of these hypotheses must be less than 0.5. However, if the probability of there being an unknown reason for Got permitting E is less than 0.5, then we have a good reason to reject Deontological Skeptical Theism. As with Axiological Skeptical Theism, I think that this sort of objection is the most serious one that can be leveled against Deontological Skeptical Theism. However, I will show that—contrary to this objection—it’s more likely that there’s an unknown reason for God permitting E than that there’s an unknown reason against his permitting E. Or, in other words, reality is biased in favor of permissibility. The upshot of this is that equiprobability objections are inapplicable and can’t get off the ground unless and until we’re given either (a) a reason to reject the argument I give below or (b) a reason that overrides the argument I give below.

Why Reality Is Biased Towards Permissibility So, why should we think reality is biased towards permissibility? That is, why should we think that we have good public antecedent reason to think it’s more likely that God has an unknown reason for permitting some instance of evil than that he has an unknown reason against permitting it? There are several reasons that we should think this. The first reason that we should think reality is biased towards permissibility is due to the nature of reasons. As we saw above in Section “The Nature of Reasons” and Section “Moral Dilemmas and The Asymmetry of Reasons”, there are two kinds of reasons that count in favor of God permitting an instance of evil and only one kind of reason that counts against God permitting an instance of evil. So, take the permission of some evil E. There can be (1) justifying reasons for God permitting E, (2) requiring reasons for God permitting E, (3) justifying reasons for God permitting ~E, and (4) requiring reasons against God permitting E. (1) obviously counts in favor of God permitting E. (2) also counts in favor of

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God permitting E: a reason that pushes E towards being required also pushes E and ~E toward a moral dilemma, and therefore pushes E toward being permissible (see, again Section “Moral Dilemmas and The Asymmetry of Reasons”). And so we have two kinds of reasons that count in favor of God permitting E. (4) obviously counts against God’s permitting E. However, (3) doesn’t count against God’s permitting E: it counts in favor of God permitting ~E, but it doesn’t push E towards being impermissible for God. And this means that there are more kinds of reasons that push E towards permissibility than that push it towards impermissibility. And this makes it more likely that there’s an unknown reason in favor of God permitting E than that there’s an unknown reason against God permitting E—it’s a bias in favor of permissibility.28 Second, as we saw in Section “Agent Centered Reasons”, there are default justifying reasons in favor of every action: there’s always a justifying reason for performing an act in virtue of self-interested agent centered reasons, such as the agent desiring to perform an action, and autonomy-­ based agent centered reasons, such as the agent actually wanting to perform the action.29 And this means that for any act, there is (at least) some default justifying weight for an agent to perform it. This is another case in which reality is biased towards permissibility. Third, as I pointed out in Section “The Nature of Reasons”, the default status of an act will be permissible: if there are no requiring reasons against the permissibility of A, then A will be permissible. This is because of the fact that A is impermissible only if there’s a requiring reason against it and no sufficiently weighty justifying reason in its favor. In other words, a requiring reason against A is a necessary condition for A being impermissible. And so, if there is no such reason, it will be permissible. That actions start out as permissible is an explicit bias towards permissibility in the known realm of reasons, and this gives us at least some reason to think this bias extends toward the realm of unknown reasons. (How much reason does it give us? I’m not sure. But as long as there’s even a  Perhaps one thinks that my distinction between requiring and justifying reasons is arbitrary, and therefore that this argument has no force. This issue has already been addressed—see above, Section “Is A Sufficiently Weighty Unknown Reason Likely?” 29  Obviously, this doesn’t always make the act justified. But the agent’s desires always count as a justifying reason for performing the act. 28

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sliver of bias towards permissibility, equiprobability principles will be inapplicable.) Fourth, that there can’t be  moral dilemmas is a clear bias in reality towards permissibility. Or, in other words, that reality can’t be such that one is both required to A and ~A is an explicit bias towards permissibility. And hence we have another example of reality being biased toward permissibility. So, there are several reasons to think that reality is biased towards permissibility: (a) there are more kinds of reasons in favor of the permissibility of an action than there are against it, (b) there are default justifying reasons in favor of an action’s permission, (c) the default status of an action is permissibility, and (d) there can’t be moral dilemmas. Moreover, these come from relatively standard views in ethics—to reject them is to go against the grain here. None of this suggests that it’s overwhelmingly more likely that there’s an unknown reason for God permitting E than an unknown reason for him preventing E. But this strong of a claim isn’t needed for the purposes of this section, since all that’s required to break the equiprobability objection is that there is, in fact, a bias (even if only a sliver of bias!) in favor of permission.30 This is because equiprobability principles (obviously) rely on our not having any (even weak) reason  to favor one of the relevant hypotheses over the others. Moreover, until and unless these above reasons are undermined or overwhelmed by reasons to think that reality is biased towards impermissibility, it will be true that we have reason to think that an unknown reason for God permitting E is more likely than an unknown reason against God permitting E, rendering equiprobability principles inapplicable and equiprobability based objections irrelevant.

Is a Sufficiently Weighty Unknown Reason Likely?31 Perhaps one would concede my above point but respond by arguing that we have good public antecedent reason for thinking it’s less likely that  Put differently: this doesn’t mean that reality is highly biased towards permissibility. I make no claim about how biased reality is here. I just note that it is, in fact, biased towards permissibility— even if only by a sliver. 31  I owe this objection—like its cousin discussed in the previous chapter—to Paul Draper. 30

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there’s a sufficiently weighty unknown reason for God permitting E than that there’s an unknown reason against God permitting E or that there’s an insufficiently weighty unknown reason for God permitting E. For example, suppose that the perceived weight of God for or against permitting some instance of evil E is −100. In that case, a sufficiently weighty unknown reason for God must have at least a value of 100—anything less, and E will remain impermissible. But this means that in some sense—the objection goes—there are less unknown reasons for God that would render E permissible than there are unknown reasons that would leave E impermissible. And this gives us some reason to think that the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons, and so we have reason to reject Deontological Skeptical Theism. But—as with the axiological version of this objection in Chap. 2 Section “Is A Sufficiently Weighty Unknown Good Likely?”—it’s just not clear how this argument is going to work. We’ve already seen that an unknown reason for God permitting E and an unknown reason for him preventing E aren’t equiprobable and we’ve seen that reality is biased towards permissibility. And from here, it’s just not clear how this argument is supposed to go. Indeed, given just our public antecedent reasons, the probability of there being an unknown reason for God permitting E and the probability of there being an unknown reason for him preventing E are both inscrutable—although, we know that an unknown reason in favor of E’s permission is more likely than an unknown reason against it. So, this objection can’t get off the ground.

Indirect Objection 1: Moral Skepticism or Paralysis The prior two objections I considered were direct: they purported to identify a public antecedent reason for thinking the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting some evil E resembles the actual weight of God’s reasons for permitting E. Below, I will consider two indirect objections to Deontological Skeptical Theism. These objections are indirect because they purport to identify some undesirable consequence that results from Deontological Skeptical Theism, and this—the objections go—give us reason to reject it.

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The first indirect objection I will consider—one that is bound to occur—claims that Deontological Skeptical Theism entails an excessive amount of moral skepticism or paralysis: if we accept it, then we have no grasp of our actual moral reasons and so have no clue how we should act. Or, in other words, if we have no good public antecedent reason to think that the weight of our reasons for performing some action resembles the actual weight of our reasons for performing it, then we have no real grasp of moral reasons, and we should be morally paralyzed. But we do, in fact, have a grasp of our actual moral reasons. And so we have reason to reject Deontological Skeptical Theism. What are we to make of this charge of moral skepticism or paralysis? Briefly, this objection is misguided: Deontological Skeptical Theism is about God’s requiring and justifying reasons, not our requiring and justifying reasons—that we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting of some state of affairs A resembles the actual weight of God’s reasons for permitting A doesn’t entail that for some other action A* open to us, that we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the perceived weight of our reasons that we know of in favor of (or against) A* resembles the actual weight of our reasons in favor of (or against) A*. And so, Deontological Skeptical Theism doesn’t (at least in itself ) result in moral skepticism or moral paralysis.

Indirect Objection 2: Climenhaga’s Objection A second indirect objection one might raise is a version of Climenhaga’s (forthcoming) objection we considered in the previous chapter. He (Climenhaga) argues that certain kinds of skeptical theism lead to agnosticism. This is because (roughly) if the probability of evil is inscrutable given theism, then the probability of theism will be inscrutable given evil. Since evil is part of our background knowledge, this means we should be agnostic about whether God exists. This is clearly a problem for theists. However, I’ve not claimed that Deontological Skeptical Theism has the result that the probability of evil (or anything) is inscrutable simpliciter. My points have been restricted to the probabilities given our public

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antecedent reasons. This, of course, doesn’t rule out assigning a non-­ inscrutable probability to evil (or anything): it just rules out doing so just given our public antecedent reasons, which happens to rule out the most common arguments for atheism.32 Indeed, in Chap. 8, Section “How to Make an Effective Argument for Atheism”, I’ll show how one can predict God’s actions that isn’t threatened by Deontological Skeptical Theism. And so while Climenhaga’s argument might threaten some kinds of skeptical theism, it doesn’t threaten Deontological Skeptical Theism.

Indirect Objection 3: Skepticism About Theodicy and Natural Theology A third indirect objection that might be made is that Deontological Skeptical Theism prevents us from predicting how God will act—since God will act in line with his reasons and we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting some state of affairs A resembles the actual weight of his reasons for permitting A, this means that we can’t predict whether God will permit A. But this threatens both the practice of theodicy—identifying reasons for why God allows evil—and natural theology—using facts about the natural world or reason to provide evidence for God’s existence. What should we make of this charge? With respect to this issue, I will punt: this is a complex issue that will be discussed at length in Chap. 8. In that chapter, I argue that this charge ultimately fails. But if I’m wrong and it doesn’t fail, then so much the worse for natural theology and theodicy: it’s (I think) pretty clear that we should accept Deontological Skeptical Theism, and it’s less clear that some theodicy is successful or that some piece of natural theology is. That said, it’s worth mentioning from the outset that this objection, if successful, wouldn’t undue all natural theology. For example, modal cosmological arguments (e.g. Pruss & Rasmussen, 2018), modal ontological arguments (e.g. Plantinga, 1974), the Kalam cosmological argument (e.g. Craig, 2000), contingency arguments (e.g. Gale & Pruss, 1999), moral arguments (e.g. Adams, 1987; 32

 More specifically, it rules out doing so by way of a noseeum inference.

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Layman, 2002), and so on do not rely on an analysis of God’s reasons for action and so are not threatened by Deontological Skeptical Theism.33 And so, even if Deontological Skeptical Theism undermines some natural theology, it doesn’t do away with it completely or, perhaps, even mostly.

Conclusion In this chapter, I’ve explained The Default Argument for Deontological Skeptical Theism, which shows that we should accept Deontological Skeptical Theism until and unless we’re given reason to reject it. I considered numerous objections and argued that none are successful. In light of this, we should all accept Deontological Skeptical Theism—or, at least, we should continue to accept it until and unless we’re given reason to reject it.

 This isn’t to say that all of these arguments are successful. Instead, my point is that they aren’t even candidates for being undermined by skeptical theism. 33

4 Skeptical Theism and the Problems of Evil

Introduction In the previous two chapters, I explained and argued in favor of both Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism. Additionally, I addressed direct and indirect objections to these views, arguing that they are unsuccessful. Since my arguments in favor (and defenses of ) these views don’t rely on belief in God, we should all—theists, agnostics, and atheists alike—endorse Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism.1 But this is only significant if these theses have a substantial upshot. So, in this chapter, I will consider part of the upshot of these views: I will outline part of the scope of Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism, showing that they undermine certain popular kinds of arguments from evil. More specifically, I consider both axiological and deontological versions of different arguments from evil, and argue that they are undermined by Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism. Now, to be clear, I regard axiological arguments from evil (or for atheism more generally)  It’s worth noting that one can accept Deontological Skeptical Theism without accepting Axiological Skeptical Theism. While the positions and arguments for the positions are structurally similar, the former does not entail the latter. (That said, it looks to me that Axiological Skeptical Theism entails Deontological Skeptical Theism. Why that’s so should be fairly clear, so we need not bore ourselves with the details here.) 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4_4

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in any form as non-starters: as I noted previously (Chap. 3, Section “Introduction”), to predict God’s actions, we need to know about  his reasons and their weight. However, axiological versions of arguments from evil (or for atheism more generally) focus only on one particular subset of God’s reasons for action: value-based ones. And so axiological arguments can’t get off the ground—their focus is too narrow.

Arguments from Evil Arguments from evil purport to show that some known fact about evil renders God’s existence prima facie improbable or that it’s at least strong evidence against theism. Below I will outline several different arguments from evil and show how (or whether) Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism affect them.

Noseeum Arguments from Evil Noseeum arguments from evil purport to show that it’s probable that there’s gratuitous evil, and that this makes it probable that God doesn’t exist. In this section, I will explain two kinds of noseeum arguments from evil: The Noseeum Axiological Argument from Evil and The Noseeum Deontological Argument from Evil and illustrate the effect that Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism have on them. Rowe (e.g. Rowe, 1979, 1996) is the most well-known defender of noseeum arguments from evil, and as such I will primarily interact with his work on them.2 In noseeum arguments from evil, “gratuitous evil” plays a starring role. As such, a brief detour is required here: we must first consider the nature of gratuitous evil before we can properly evaluate noseeum arguments from evil, and it’s to this issue I now turn.

 Ekstrom (2021) makes use of noseeum arguments from evil. I focus on Rowe because Ekstrom’s arguments don’t improve on Rowe’s version. 2

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Gratuitous Evil: What Is it? There are different views about what it means for an evil to be gratuitous. In this section, I’ll outline two ways of thinking about gratuity that are relevant for this chapter: axiological gratuity and deontological gratuity. Let’s start with axiological gratuity. An evil E is axiologically gratuitous if (and only if ) it is false that permitting E is required to produce a greater good (or set of goods) or required to prevent an evil (or set of evils) equally bad or worse.3 In other words, if the permission of an evil is required for the production of a greater good (or set of goods) or the prevention of an equally bad or worse evil (or set of evils), it’s not axiologically gratuitous. In all other cases, it’s axiologically gratuitous. Put differently yet again, if the permission of an evil is a net positive—that is, permitting it was required to achieve a good (or set of goods) that outweighs it or prevent an evil (or set of evils) that equals or outweighs it— it’s not axiologically gratuitous. In all other cases, it’s axiologically gratuitous.4 Deontological gratuity, on the other hand, doesn’t pertain exclusively to value. For non-consequentialist views of morality,5 whether an action is obligatory, prohibited, or permissible is not solely determined by the value of its consequences.6 For example, suppose that lying is bad. And suppose that by lying, Samantha could prevent five of her friends from lying. Samantha still shouldn’t—is still obligated not to—lie. And this is true even though it would produce better (indeed, 5 times better!) consequences if she does.7 Instead, deontological gratuity is determined by the weight of reasons, which doesn’t necessarily track value production. To illustrate deontological gratuity, I will briefly rehash the nature of reasons here.8  See e.g. (Rowe, 1979, p. 336).  This is the standard way of understanding axiological gratuity in the literature on the problem of evil. 5  For a nice overview of non-consequentialism, see Kamm (2013). 6  Portmore (2007) persuasively argues that most traditional non-consequentialist theories can be consequentialized. I ignore this complication for ease of exposition. 7  I take this example from Mooney (2019). 8  For a more detailed discussion, see Chap. 3. 3 4

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Reasons come in different flavors. We can think of reasons as considerations in favor of something. But we may further distinguish between the kinds of weight reasons have: some reasons have justifying weight—they count in favor of the permissibility of the action. These are justifying reasons. For example, a justifying reason for A counts in favor of the permissibility of A. Other reasons have requiring weight—they count in favor of an action being impermissible.9 These are requiring reasons. For example, a requiring reason for A counts in favor of the impermissibility of ~A. Chris Tucker (forthcoming-b) succinctly illustrates the difference between justifying and requiring reasons: A consideration has justifying weight for φ iff the consideration makes it permissible to φ in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing reasons (more precisely: sufficiently weighty requiring weight for ~φ). The fact that eating this cookie will make me happy has justifying weight insofar as it is a consideration that pushes eating the cookie toward permissibility. A consideration has requiring weight for φ iff it makes ~φ-ing impermissible in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing reasons (more precisely: sufficiently weighty justifying weight for ~φ). If stopping the car is the only way to avoid killing one of the children playing in the street, then you have a reason for stopping that has requiring weight, a reason that pushes not stopping toward impermissibility. (forthcoming-­b, n.p.)

So, there are justifying reasons, which count in favor of the permissibility of an action, and there are requiring reasons, which count in favor of the impermissibility of an action.10 And, in order to discover whether an action A is permissible, we need to weigh the justifying reasons for A against the requiring reasons against A. As such, whether an evil is deontologically gratuitous for God is a function of the weight of God’s requiring and justifying reasons: if God’s requiring reasons for some action ~A outweigh his justifying reasons for A’s permission, then permitting A is  I’m simplifying here, since I argued in Chap. 3 that requiring reasons both push an act towards being required and towards being permissible. This isn’t relevant for my purposes in this section. 10  Of course, again, as I showed in Chap. 3, requiring reasons also count in favor of the permissibility of an action. I omit this detail in the following discussion for the sake of simplicity. Nothing is lost with this simplification. 9

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deontologically gratuitous. In all other cases—in cases in which the justifying reasons for A are at least equal to the requiring reasons for ~A—A is justified or permissible. In other words, an evil E is deontologically gratuitous if (and only if ) the requiring reasons for God to prevent E outweigh his justifying reasons for permitting E. As will be shown below, noseeum arguments from evil traditionally rely on the notion of axiological gratuity. However, noseeum arguments in the same spirit can be made by using deontological gratuity. As such, I will consider both versions of noseeum arguments from evil below.

The Noseeum Axiological Argument Rowe’s argument from evil—as traditionally stated—makes use of the concept of axiological gratuity. Rowe argues, in effect, there are some evils that are such that we don’t currently recognize a greater good (or the prevention of an equal or greater evil) that is logically connected to them. And, therefore, these evils are probably axiologically gratuitous, and therefore God probably doesn’t exist. Call this argument “The Noseeum Axiological Argument.” Let’s say that a God-justifying reason for permitting an evil E is either (1) a greater good (or set of goods) that required E (or something equally bad or worse) or (2) the prevention of something equally bad or worse than E that required E. In other words, an evil for which there is no God-justifying reason for its permission is axiologically gratuitous. We may state The Noseeum Axiological Argument as follows: (1) For some actual evil E we know of, we don’t recognize any God-­ justifying reason for permitting E. (2) Therefore, probably, there are no God-justifying reasons for permitting E. (3) Therefore, probably, E is axiologically gratuitous. (4) Necessarily, if God exists, he would not permit axiologically gratuitous evil. (5) Therefore, probably, God does not exist.11  I have taken this general formulation (making a few minor adjustments) from Bergmann (2012, p. 11). 11

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What are we to make of this argument? Premise (1) is one that many are willing to grant—though, of course, those who endorse a theodicy that purports to explain all instances of evil will reject it. In essence, the idea is that there is some evil E such that we don’t recognize any greater good (or set of goods)12 for which E’s existence (or the permission of E’s existence) was required and we recognize no equally bad or worse evil (or set of evils)13 that E’s existence (or the permission of E’s existence) was required to prevent. From this (purported) fact, it’s inferred that, probably, there is no such greater good produced and no equally bad or worse evil which was prevented by the permission of E—there is no God-­justifying reason for the permission of E. This inference—from our lack of recognition of a God-justifying reason to the conclusion that there probably is no such reason—has been dubbed a noseeum inference: we don’t see (“no see”) any God-justifying reasons, so they probably aren’t there (Wykstra, 1996). It is this inference that skeptical theists of all stripes reject. Before considering the justificatory status of this inference, it’s worth considering the other premises and sub-conclusions that underlie The Noseeum Axiological Argument. (3) will be accepted by everyone—it’s a definitional truth that follows from (2). The conclusion, (5), follows from (1)–(4). And this leaves us with premise (4): what are we to make of this claim? Is it true that God’s existence is incompatible with axiologically gratuitous evil? Rowe thinks so. His support for this view? Intuition. He says that—hold on to your hats here—“it seems to me that it is true.” (Rowe, 1996, p. 3) Let’s call this “Rowe’s Assumption.” We may state it as follows: Rowe’s Assumption: Necessarily, if God exists, there’s no axiologically gratuitous evil.

In order to weigh the merits of premise (4), I will take a brief detour and examine Rowe’s Assumption, considering whether it’s true and whether skeptical theists should endorse it.  Hereafter, I will take “greater good” to refer both to a singular greater good and to a set of goods that is collectively greater than the evil in question. 13  Hereafter, I will take “equally bad or worse evil” to refer both to a singular equally bad or worse evil and to a set of evils that is collectively equally as bad or worse than the evil in question. 12

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God and Axiological Gratuitous Evil: Are They Compatible? The first thing to note about Rowe’s Assumption is, again, that its support is found in (only) intuition. One issue with this is that it will only cut ice for those who share this intuition; those who lack it will not be able to make use of, and will not be vulnerable to, The Noseeum Axiological Argument. Fortunately for Rowe, this intuition seems to be relatively widespread: many philosophers operate with this understanding,14 and one can get the impression it’s the standard position in the literature on God and the permission of evil. However, it’s worth noting that a growing number of philosophers have come to reject the view that God’s existence is incompatible with axiologically gratuitous evil. For example, van Inwagen argues that God’s existence is compatible with axiologically gratuitous evil.15 He suggests that the underlying motivation for Rowe’s thesis is something like the following moral principle: MORAL PRINCIPLE: If one is in a position to prevent some evil, one should not allow that evil to occur—not unless allowing it to occur would result in some good that would outweigh it or preventing it would result in some other evil at least as bad. (van Inwagen, 2006, p. 100) Since God is morally perfect and is able to (i.e. has the required knowledge and power to) prevent any given evil, he will—on account of MORAL PRINCIPLE—not permit axiologically gratuitous evil. To cast doubt on this principle, van Inwagen makes use of a story involving (purported) ontological vagueness. The story goes (roughly) like this. Spending a day in jail is evil. And, we may suppose, the only good that comes from a person spending time in jail is that it deters others from committing similar crimes.16 So, when a judge sentences a  E.g., William Alston (1991), Michael Bergmann (2012), Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996), Hud Hudson (2014a), Stephen Maitzen (2014) 15  See also e.g. William Hasker (2008) and Justin Mooney (2019). 16  That there may be other goods that come from a person being in jail is irrelevant for van Inwagen’s purposes. 14

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convict to jail, she should not give a sentence that is any day longer than needed to cause the desired deterrence effect. Let’s suppose a judge is deciding how long to sentence a convicted robber to jail. She eventually lands on a 3650 day (10 year) sentence. After sentencing the robber, her (the robber’s) lawyer files an appeal to have her client’s sentence reduced: she argues that 3649 days in jail would have the same deterrence effect as 3650 days—no one who is deterred from robbing others by a potential 3650  day sentence will not be deterred by a potential 3649  day sentence—and since deterrence (we have supposed) is the only good that comes from a jail sentence, this means that the judge’s sentence violates MORAL PRINCIPLE and results in axiologically gratuitous evil. So, if the judge is good, she (the judge) should reduce her client’s sentence. The judge agrees and reduces the robber’s sentence to 3649 days. After hearing the new sentence for her client, the lawyer files another appeal with the judge to get her client’s sentence reduced: she argues that her client should only have to serve a 3648 day sentence since that would cause the same deterrence as a 3649 day sentence (no one deterred by a potential 3649  day sentence will not be deterred by a 3648  day sentence), and hence the judge’s current sentence violates MORAL PRINCIPLE and results in axiologically gratuitous evil. Since the judge is good, she again agrees to reduce the robber’s sentence. This problem is generalizable: [i]t would seem that if a threatened punishment of n days in prison has a certain power to deter [robbery], n - 1 days spent in prison will have a power to deter [robbery] that is not significantly less. (van Inwagen, 2006, p. 101)

So, for any sentence the judge hands down, she could achieve the same desired effect by handing down a sentence that is 1 day less. But eventually this means that the judge will sentence the robber to 0 days in jail: since a potential sentence of 0 days in jail has the same deterrence effect on (prospective) robbers as a potential sentence of 1  day (i.e. neither have any deterrence effect), the judge should sentence the robber to 0 days in jail.17  If the reader is having trouble seeing this, she can imagine that jail sentences are handed down in seconds. Surely, if a potential punishment of n seconds in jail has a certain deterrence effect, a sentence of n-1 second in jail will have the same deterrence effect. If the reader is still unconvinced, that’s fine: the point of this section, as I clarify below, is not to argue for the truth of van Inwagen’s thesis. 17

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So, if MORAL PRINCIPLE is true, then the judge in the above story should hand down a 0 day sentence. But this isn’t right, and hence MORAL PRINCIPLE is false. That is, the judge must draw a line somewhere in her sentencing: no matter how many days she sentences the robber to, she could have achieved the same deterrence effect with a lesser sentence, but she still has to hand down some sentence to get the deterrence effect she’s aiming for. And hence the judge must make a (somewhat) arbitrary choice in sentencing the robber, resulting in a violation of MORAL PRINCIPLE and producing axiologically gratuitous evil, and she has not acted wrongly in doing so. Similarly, if God’s purpose for allowing evil involves ontological vagueness, then he cannot avoid allowing gratuitous evil, and since MORAL PRINCIPLE is false, he will not be morally impugned for allowing it. But if that’s the case, then God may allow axiologically gratuitous evil— God’s existence is compatible with axiologically gratuitous evil. Van Inwagen suggests that God’s purpose for allowing evil might be to illustrate how bad our world is when we are separated from him. But, he claims, for any amount of evil that God allows that would illustrate this, he could have allowed less. However—like the judge in the above story— he had to draw the line somewhere and so he must make a (somewhat) arbitrary choice. Again, since MORAL PRINCIPLE is false, God cannot be faulted for this—or, at least, if he can be faulted for it, the grounds for fault are different. Of course, van Inwagen does not claim that this is the actual reason God allows evil, nor does he claim to have definitively shown that there is (or can be) ontological vagueness. Rather, he claims that we cannot rule these out, and that this is sufficient for his purposes. My point of explaining van Inwagen’s argument is not to defend it— although, I think he’s right. Instead, I want to illustrate why one might reject Rowe’s Assumption. Additionally, this helps us get more clarity about skeptical theism in general: while skeptical theists of all stripes argue that belief that an evil is gratuitous is unjustified if supported only by a noseeum inference, this is compatible with being agnostic about whether there is axiologically gratuitous evil, or even believing that there is axiologically gratuitous evil—so long as this belief isn’t based on a noseeum inference. More specifically, one can endorse Axiological Skeptical Theism and/or Deontological Skeptical Theism while withholding judgment about

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whether there is, or even believing that there is, axiologically gratuitous evil. And so we shouldn’t equate skeptical theism in general with the denial that there is axiologically gratuitous evil—while some skeptical theists may deny that there is such evil, it’s neither forced on them by their skeptical theism, nor is it forced on them by their theism simpliciter. Nor should we think of skeptical theists as claiming that there is some good that outweighs apparently axiologically gratuitous evils, but we just don’t know it. Finally, it’s worth briefly mentioning that anyone not inclined towards a consequentialist view of ethics has strong grounds for rejecting Rowe’s Assumption: non-consequentialists recognize that the right action isn’t always the one that has the best axiological consequences.18 For example, in some cases, one is obligated to keep a promise—it’s right to keep one’s promise—even when breaking it would produce better axiological consequences. Indeed, keeping a promise may be the right thing to do even when it produces negative axiological consequences. And so the right action isn’t necessarily the one that has the best axiological consequences or even has positive axiological consequences. And hence it’s dubious to suppose that God can’t allow axiologically gratuitous evil—God may have reasons that make it such that the right action is to permit axiologically gratuitous evil.19 This completes our detour into the debate about the compatibility of God’s existence with axiologically gratuitous evil and premise (4) of The Noseeum Axiological Argument. The main upshot here is that there’s some reason to doubt Rowe’s Assumption, and that skeptical theists aren’t committed to the absence of axiologically gratuitous evil.20

 xiological Skeptical Theism Against the Noseeum A Axiological Argument So much for axiologically gratuitous evil. We can now consider the noseeum inference that The Noseeum Axiological Argument relies on, i.e. the inference from premise (1) to (2). Again, this is an inference  Again, Portmore (2007) shows how one can consequentialize basically any non-consequentialist ethical theory. I ignore this complication here for the sake of simplicity—it doesn’t affect my point. 19  See Mooney (2019) for a good discussion of issues relevant to this. 20  For good discussions of whether God’s existence is compatible with gratuitous evil, see Howard-­ Snyder and Howard-Snyder (1999) and Kraay (2016a, 2016b). 18

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that skeptical theists of all stripes reject. There’s much that’s disputed about skeptical theism in general, and Axiological Skeptical Theism in particular. However, what isn’t disputed is that if Axiological Skeptical Theism is true, then it undermines noseeum inferences akin to those used in The Noseeum Axiological Argument—almost no one objects to that.21 What underlies this is the view that when one comes to see that she has no good reason to think it’s likely that the sample she is inferring from resembles the population as a whole, she acquires an undercutting defeater for her inference—it gives her reason to doubt that her inference is truth-tracking, and once she doubts her inference is truthtracking, beliefs based on her inference acquire an undercutting defeater.22 In other words, if one comes to see that there’s no good reason to think it’s likely the sample she’s inferring from is representative or resembles the population at large, then she should doubt any inferences based on her sample, and once she comes to doubt the inferences based on her sample, she acquires an undercutting defeater for her beliefs based on inductive inferences involving the sample, rendering such beliefs unjustified.23 An example will help illuminate why this is so.24 Suppose that Mary conducted a study that showed that some drug D cured cancer in the patients who participated in the study. And suppose further that Mary inferred from the fact that D cured the patients who participated in her study that D would probably cure all cancer patients. However, suppose that Mary did not give any indication of the steps she took to ensure that her sample of cancer patients used in her study resembles (or is representative of ) all cancer patients. And suppose further that when pressed in person, Mary did not produce any good reason for thinking that her sample of cancer patients likely resembles or is representative of the total population of cancer patients—she gave no reason for thinking her  Howard-Snyder (2014) and Tooley (2019) express some hesitancy about this, which I consider below. 22  There’s much more to say about the nature of undercutting defeaters. I’m brief here since they will be discussed extensively in Chap. 6, and this short explanation is sufficient for current purposes. 23  Indeed, Rowe (1996, p. 267) thinks that without a good reason to think one’s sample is representative or resembles the population at large, the argument is “inadequate” and “weak.” 24  I take this story from Hendricks (2020b). 21

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sample likely resembles the total population even when pressed to do so. In such a case, one should not accept the conclusion of her inference: while her conclusion might be correct, one should doubt that her inference is truth-indicative. And once one comes to doubt that an inference is truth-indicative, she acquires an undercutting defeater for any beliefs based on the inference. Of course, a sample of a population can resemble (or be representative of ) the whole population in some respects but not in others. For example, the sample population consisting of me sitting in this room resembles the human race at large with respect to the property of having a heart: I have a heart, and every member of the whole population of humans has a heart. However, this sample (i.e. me) doesn’t resemble the population at large with respect to eye color: I have only one eye color (blue), and the population at large has multiple eye colors (green, brown, blue, etc.). So, what’s crucial here is identifying the property that’s relevant with respect to resemblance (or representativeness). With respect to The Noseeum Axiological Argument, the relevant type of resemblance (or representativeness) is the overall goodness or badness of some instance of evil and its logical connections. This is because the argument is claiming that, probably, some instance of evil is not outweighed by a greater good (or prevention of a greater evil)—it’s a net negative. So, obviously, overall goodness and badness is crucial to this inference—whether or not an evil is outweighed by greater good or results in the prevention of a worse evil depends on whether it is overall good or overall bad. However, Axiological Skeptical Theism (obviously) comes into play here. Recall Axiological Skeptical Theism and Axiological Skeptical Theism Simplified: Axiological Skeptical Theism: For the permission of any evil we know of E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the complex state of affairs consisting of the permission of E and all the goods and evils that we know to be logically connected to it resembles, with respect to overall goodness or badness, the complex state of affairs consisting of of the permission of E and all the goods and evils actually logically connected to it.

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Axiological Skeptical Theism Simplified: For the permission of any evil E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that E’s perceived value resembles its actual value.

Axiological Skeptical Theism clearly, indeed definitionally, entails that we have no good public antecedent reason to think that the goodness or badness we know that comes from an evil likely resembles its actual overall goodness or badness. And hence, the noseeum inference used in The Noseeum Axiological Argument—the inference from premise (1) to (2)—is undermined, and its conclusion is unjustified. Again, this is something that’s accepted by nearly everyone: nearly all objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism claim that it is false, not that it doesn’t undermine The Noseeum Axiological Argument. So, this is one significant upshot of Axiological Skeptical Theism. Indeed, Draper (2013, forthcoming)—no friend of skeptical theism— suggests that skeptical theism, and in particular Axiological Skeptical Theism,25 “is a serious challenge to all noseeum arguments from evil” (2013: 102) because it supports the thesis that Thesis 1: We have no good [public antecedent]26 reason to believe that the hypothesis that there is no potentially God justifying reason for producing or permitting horrific evil or evil in great abundance is a more likely explanation of our inability to think of one than the hypothesis that there is such a reason but it is beyond our ken. (2013, p. 101)

And Thesis 1 supports Thesis 2: We should not infer [from our public antecedent reasons]27 that there is no potentially God justifying reason for producing or permitting horrific evil or evil in great abundance from our failure to find one. (2013, p. 101)  Draper singles out Bergmann’s version of skeptical theism. However, again, I take Axiological Skeptical Theism to approximate Bergmann’s skeptical theism. 26  I’ve added the “public antecedent” qualifier to fit Draper’s point with Axiological Skeptical Theism. 27  Again, I add this qualifier to fit Draper’s point with Axiological Skeptical Theism. 25

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And obviously Thesis 2 undermines the noseeum inference from premise (1) to (2): if we shouldn’t infer that there’s no potentially God-justifying reason for permitting some evil from our failure to think of one, then we shouldn’t infer (2) from premise (1). Draper’s support claim is right: if we, per Axiological Skeptical Theism, have no good public antecedent reason for thinking the perceived value of some evil (and its logical connections) resembles its actual value, then we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking that the perceived value of the evil—its apparent axiological gratuity—is best explained by it being axiologically gratuitous. Again, this spells trouble for the noseeum inference used in The Noseeum Axiological Argument, and so spells trouble for the argument itself. While Axiological Skeptical Theism means that we shouldn’t infer (2) from premise (1), it’s worth noting that there may be other reasons one could have for affirming (2). Of course, such reasons would have to be such that they don’t conflict with Thesis 1, Thesis 2, and Axiological Skeptical Theism. For example, perhaps one could appeal to intuition to justify (2). This is an issue I’ll consider in Chap. 9, but note for the meantime that Axiological Skeptical Theism explicitly allows there to be such reasons: one’s own intuition isn’t a public reason—it’s a private reason— so Axiological Skeptical Theism doesn’t deny that this could hold for some persons. Since this issue will be discussed extensively in Chap. 9, I simply note that elsewhere (Hendricks, 2018a, p. 350) I’ve argued that there probably aren’t any such people—when we really spell out what axiological gratuity amounts to, there are probably few (if any) people who find it intuitive to think that some evil is axiologically gratuitous. And so this fact likely doesn’t have a significant impact; the scope of Axiological Skeptical Theism hasn’t been significantly narrowed by this concession. Moreover, as I argue in Chap. 9, this intuition—if anyone actually has it—is subject to an undercutting defeater. So even if some people have this intuition, it won’t help justify one in believing (2). In this section, I’ve outlined how Axiological Skeptical Theism undermines The Noseeum Axiological Argument. Since, I’ve argued, we should all (theist, agnostic, and atheist) accept Axiological Skeptical Theism, it follows that The Noseeum Axiological Argument is without teeth: we should reject The Noseeum Axiological Argument.

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Objections to the Efficacy of Skeptical Theism: Howard-Snyder and Tooley I noted earlier that almost no one denies that Axiological Skeptical Theism, if true, undermines noseeum inferences like those used in The Noseeum Axiological Argument. However, Tooley (2019) and HowardSnyder (2014) are notable exceptions: each has expressed hesitancy about this matter. Let’s consider these in turn. Tooley claims that the above approach to induction is circular. He says that this approach to inductive reasoning…cannot possibly be sound. Suppose that indeed an inference from information about the distribution of some property F within a sample S from some population P to a conclusion about the distribution of property F within population P as a whole is not justified unless one knows that sample S is a representative sample with respect to property F within population P. If we then define a representative sample…as one where the distribution within sample S approximates the distribution within the population P, then we are in a circle, and inductive inferences from a sample to a population can never be justified. (2019, pp. 32–33)

But the story involving Mary above illustrates how this approach isn’t circular. The idea isn’t that you have to know that your sample is representative or that Mary must know her sample of cancer patients resembles all cancer patients to make a justified inference. Instead, the idea is that when one sees that she has no good reason to think it’s likely her sample resembles the population as a whole (or see that she has no good reason to think her sample is representative), she should doubt inferences made from her sample, and once she doubts inferences made from her sample, she acquires an undercutting defeater for her beliefs based on such inferences. This clearly doesn’t entail knowing that the sample is representative or resembles the general population, and there’s nothing circular about it. Hence, Tooley’s objection fails. Howard-Snyder (2014) suggests the view that the noseeum inference in The Noseeum Axiological Argument is undermined by Axiological Skeptical Theism appears to rest on a false principle, namely the principle that

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We should believe something on the basis of something else only if we have good reason for thinking that the latter is a truth conducive basis for believing the former. (2014, p. 297)

Howard-Snyder rightly notes that this principle entails undesirable consequences. For example, we often hold beliefs on the basis of experiences and we don’t consciously think that those experiences are truth-conducive with respect to those beliefs. But those beliefs are still justified or rational (or whatever). And since this principle entails they aren’t justified or rational (or whatever), this principle is false. And since this principle is false, Axiological Skeptical Theism doesn’t undermine The Noseeum Axiological Argument. Fortunately, my characterization of how Axiological Skeptical Theism undermines The Noseeum Axiological Argument doesn’t rely on the principle mentioned above. Rather, the thought is this. Suppose that one comes to hold B on the basis of an inference from a fact about a sample population to a conclusion about the target population. If she then sees that she has no good reason to think it’s likely that her sample population resembles the target population in the relevant way, she should doubt the inference. And once she comes to doubt the inference, she acquires an undercutting defeater for any beliefs based on the inference. For example, in the case involving Mary above, she inferred that her drug would cure all cancer patients from the fact that her drug cured her sample of cancer patients. However, if Mary comes to see that she has no good reason to think it’s likely that her sample resembles the target population (in this case, all cancer patients), she should doubt the inference, and once she comes to doubt the inference, she acquires an undercutting defeater for any beliefs based on the inference. So, I don’t claim that for any belief based on another belief (or experience) that one must have good reason to think it’s likely that that belief (or experience) is truth-conducive. Instead, the point is that when one comes to see that she has no such reason upon reflection, she should doubt it, and once she doubts the inference, she acquires an undercutting defeater for beliefs based on the inference. (Just think: if Mary really didn’t, couldn’t, or refused to produce a good reason for thinking her sample resembles the target population, shouldn’t you doubt her

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inference? Wouldn’t it be wild not to? And once you come to doubt her inference, you acquire a defeater for any beliefs based on the inference.)

The Noseeum Deontological Argument So, The Noseeum Axiological Argument fails. But we can restate the argument in deontological terms that makes it (at least not obviously) vulnerable to Axiological Skeptical Theism. Recall the nature of reasons for an action and how they are weighed: an evil E is deontologically gratuitous if (and only if ) the requiring reasons for God to prevent E outweigh his justifying reasons for permitting E. Stated deontologically, the noseeum argument from evil claims that for some instance of evil E, God’s recognized requiring reasons for ~E outweigh his recognized justifying reasons for E, and that we don’t recognize any justifying reasons that would outweigh the known requiring reasons for ~E. Therefore, probably, there are no such reasons, and therefore, probably, God doesn’t exist. More formally, we may state the argument as follows: (6) For some actual evil E we know of, God’s recognized requiring reasons for ~E outweigh his recognized justifying reasons for E. (7) Therefore, probably, there are no sufficiently weighty justifying reasons for permitting E. (8) Therefore, probably, E is deontologically gratuitous. (9) Necessarily, if God exists, he would not permit deontologically gratuitous evil.

(10) Therefore, probably, God does not exist. Call this The Noseeum Deontological Argument. What are we to make of this argument? Its conclusion, (10), follows from (6)–(9). Premise (6) will be granted by anyone who does not claim to have a full-­ fledged theodicy—a theodicy that accounts for all instances of evil. (8) follows definitionally from (7) and so will be accepted by everyone. What about premise (9)? Should we accept it? Above, I noted that there is disagreement about whether God would permit axiologically gratuitous

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evil, and explained some reasons for thinking that God could permit such evil. But it doesn’t appear that similar reasoning would apply to deontologically gratuitous evil: the weight of reasons isn’t susceptible to issues stemming from ontological vagueness.28 This leaves us with the inference from premise (6) to (7). This is a noseeum inference, and skeptical theists of all stripes will reject it. Why should we reject the inference from premise (6) to (7)? Recall Deontological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism Simplified: Deontological Skeptical Theism: For any evil state of affairs we know of E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the known weight of justifying and requiring reasons God has in favor of (or against) permitting E resembles the actual weight of God’s justifying and requiring reasons in favor (or against) permitting E. Deontological Skeptical Theism Simplified: For the permission of any evil E, we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons.  Perhaps one thinks there are other reasons one might reject premise (9). For example, one might endorse Mark Murphy’s (2014, 2017a) argument that God, though absolutely perfect, is not necessarily morally perfect. Roughly, this is because absolute freedom conflicts with absolute moral perfection, and so absolute moral perfection must go. But this won’t challenge premise (9). Indeed, God would be irrational for acting against what he has most reason to do, and so he wouldn’t commit a deontologically gratuitous act. For a discussion of Murphy’s arguments, see the contributions of Draper (2017b), Irwin (2017), and Wielenberg (2017) for a symposium of Murphy’s book in Religious Studies. And see Murphy (2017b) for a response to these criticisms. 28

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It should be clear that Deontological Skeptical Theism undermines the inference from premise (6) to (7): if we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for the permission of E resembles the actual weight of his reasons for permitting E, then of course we can’t justifiedly infer the actual weight of God’s reasons from the perceived weight of his reasons. In this case, the relevant manner of resemblance is the weight of God’s reasons for permission of the relevant evil. But Deontological Skeptical Theism entails that we don’t have a good public antecedent reason to think the sample population resembles the whole in this manner, and so Deontological Skeptical Theism renders the inference unjustified.29 In other words, Deontological Skeptical Theism provides an undercutting defeater for the inference from premise (6) to (7), rendering (7) unjustified.30 Finally, lightly modified, the theses advocated by Draper above (Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism Against The Noseeum Axiological Argument”) support the view that Deontological Skeptical Theism undermines this version of Rowe’s argument: Thesis 1*: We have no good public antecedent reason to believe that the hypothesis that there is no justifying reason for producing or permitting horrific evil or evil in great abundance is a more likely explanation of our inability to think of one than the hypothesis that there is such a reason but it is beyond our ken.

And Thesis 1* supports Thesis 2*: We should not infer [from our public antecedent reasons] that there is no justifying reason for producing or permitting horrific evil or evil in great abundance from our failure to find one.  Indeed, Axiological Skeptical Theism might threaten this inference as well: if one takes value to be justifying reason in favor of the permissibility of an action and disvalue to be a requiring reason in favor of the impermissibility of an action, it’s hard to accept this inference. This is because if E is logically connected to an extremely valuable state of affairs or the prevention of an extremely disvaluable state of affairs, it may render it permissible or even its absence impermissible. However, if we have no good public antecedent reason to think that the overall goodness and badness of the evil that we know resembles its overall goodness or badness, then we have no good public antecedent reason to think that it’s not extremely valuable overall—so valuable that it’s permissible or even that its omission is impermissible. 30  See Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism Against The Noseeum Axiological Argument” for more on this point about undercutting defeaters. And see Chap. 6 for more on the nature of defeaters. 29

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The inference from premise (6) to (7), however, clearly conflicts with Thesis 2*, and so should be rejected. And so there are several reasons for thinking that Deontological Skeptical Theism undermines The Noseeum Deontological Argument. Finally, it’s worth noting that while Deontological Skeptical Theism renders unjustified the inference to (7) from premise (6), there may be other ways to affirm (7). Of course, such reasons would have to be ones that don’t conflict with Thesis 1*, Thesis 2*, and Deontological Skeptical Theism. However, it’s not clear what such reasons would be. Perhaps one could appeal to intuition here, but that will run afoul for the same reasons given with respect to The Noseeum Axiological Argument and intuition (see Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism Against The Noseeum Axiological Argument”): briefly, it’s dubious to think anyone has this intuition, and even if one did, it would be subject to a defeater for the reasons laid out in Chap. 9. Above, I’ve argued that Axiological Skeptical Theism undermines The Noseeum Axiological Argument, and that Deontological Skeptical Theism undermines The Noseeum Deontological Argument. But these are not the only arguments from evil on offer. Below, I will consider the effect of Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism on equiprobability arguments from evil and Humean arguments from evil.

The Equiprobability Argument from Evil Michael Tooley (Tooley, 2012, 2019, 2021, forthcoming; Plantinga & Tooley, 2008) has defended what I will call The Equiprobability Argument from Evil, which—and this will surprise no one—makes use of equiprobability principles to argue that the existence of a certain kind of evil makes the existence of God improbable. In this section, I will explain The Equiprobability Argument from Evil and show that it doesn’t evade the grasp of Deontological Skeptical Theism. Take a particular action A. Let’s say that a rightmaking property R for A is a property such that if A has R and A has no other morally significant properties, then A is obligatory. Conversely, a wrongmaking property W for A is a property such that if A has W and no other morally significant properties, then A is impermissible (Tooley, 2019, p. 53). And if A is

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impermissible, then we may say that ~A is obligatory.31 Next, let’s say that A is prima facie impermissible if, judged from only A’s known32 ­wrongmaking and rightmaking properties, it’s impermissible. Alternatively, let’s say that A is all things considered impermissible if, judged from all of A’s wrongmaking and rightmaking properties,33 it’s impermissible. Conversely, A is prima facie obligatory if, judged from only A’s known wrongmaking and rightmaking properties, it’s obligatory.34 And A is all things considered obligatory if, judged from all the wrongmaking and rightmaking properties that A has, it’s obligatory. Finally, to measure wrongmaking and rightmaking properties, we may say that wrongmaking properties have a negative value, and how great the negative value is depends on how weighty the wrongmaking property is. And rightmaking properties, let’s say, have a positive value, and how great the positive value is depends on how weighty the rightmaking property is. Thus, if for some action A, its known wrongmaking and rightmaking properties are such that it has a value ≥ 0, then it’s prima facie obligatory. However, if all the wrongmaking and rightmaking properties connected to A—known and unknown—result in it having a value of < 0, then it is all things considered impermissible.35 The Equiprobability Argument from Evil purports to show that from a single instance of a prima facie impermissible action A for God—such as the act of permitting the state of affairs that consists of the Lisbon earthquake—it follows that the probability God exists is less than 0.5.36 We may state the argument as follows:

 Notice how this clashes with the way I’ve spoken about obligation and permission in Chap. 3. I’m adopting Tooley’s phrasing here since it’s his argument. 32  In this section, I’ll follow Tooley and speak of “known” rightmaking and wrongmaking properties. However, it would be better to speak of recognized rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, since there may be known rightmaking properties and wrongmaking properties that we don’t recognize as such. And for Tooley’s argument, it’s recognized rightmaking and wrongmaking properties that matter. 33  i.e. S’s known and unknown wrongmaking and rightmaking properties. 34  Tooley talks about what should be done, meaning he’s thinking in terms of obligation. I discuss this in more detail below. 35  I assume here that rightmaking and wrongmaking properties can be weighed against each other. This assumption is made by Tooley and is crucial for his argument. 36  Tooley goes further and tries to show that given the existence of numerous prima facie evil actions, that the existence of God is extremely unlikely. I won’t address that argument; the same objections I raise to this argument apply to his other argument. 31

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(11) For some prima facie impermissible action A for God, we know of no sufficiently weighty rightmaking property that renders it obligatory. (12) Therefore, probably, there is no sufficiently weighty rightmaking property that renders A all things considered obligatory. (13) Therefore, probably, A is all things considered impermissible. (14) Therefore, probably, God doesn’t exist. The inference from (13) to (14) is unobjectionable: God wouldn’t act in a way that is all things considered impermissible. For the sake of argument, we may accept the inference from (12) to (13)—if A is prima facie impermissible and there probably is no sufficiently weighty rightmaking property that renders A all things considered obligatory, then A is probably all things considered impermissible.37 And premise (11) will be granted by anyone who doesn’t endorse a theodicy that encompasses all evil. This leaves the inference from premise (11) to (12). This inference is where trouble arises: it’s the type of inference that’s vulnerable to skeptical theism, and in particular vulnerable to Deontological Skeptical Theism. Whereas Deontological Skeptical Theism claims that we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons in favor (or against) some action resembles the actual weight of his reasons, the inference from premise (11) to (12) entails that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting E likely does resemble the actual weight of his reasons. How does The Equiprobability Argument from Evil get around this problem? As follows. Let’s say that given the known rightmaking and wrongmaking properties connected to some prima facie impermissible action A of God’s (e.g. permitting the Lisbon earthquake), that it has a value of -n. We can now consider the following possibilities: (1) There is an unknown rightmaking property (or set of properties) connected to A that is ≥ n and there are no unknown wrongmaking properties connected to the A. (2) There is an unknown wrongmaking property (or set of properties) connected to the A that is ≥ n and there are no unknown rightmaking properties connected to the A.  In my restatement of The Equiprobability Argument from Evil, we will see that this inference should be rejected and the argument needs to be reformulated. 37

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If (1) holds, then A is all things considered permissible. If (2) holds, then A is all things considered impermissible. However, in addition to (1) and (2), there will also be cases where, although some collection of relevant unknown rightmaking properties outweighs a collection of relevant unknown wrongmaking properties, the collection of relevant unknown rightmaking properties does not outweigh the combination of the collection of relevant unknown wrongmaking properties with the known wrongmaking properties. (Tooley, 2019, p. 61)

In other words, there will be possible cases in which there are unknown rightmaking properties that are ≥ n, but, due to the existence of known and unknown wrongmaking properties, the total weight of A still comes out in the negative, i.e. is all things considered impermissible. We may state this possibility as follows: (3) There is an unknown rightmaking property (or set of properties) connected to A that is ≥ n and there is a known (or unknown) wrongmaking property (or set of properties) with a value such that A is all things considered impermissible. Finally, there will be the possibility that there are no unknown rightmaking or wrongmaking properties connected to A, which we may state as follows: (4) There are no unknown rightmaking or wrongmaking properties connected to A. Tooley argues that (1) and (2) are equiprobable and that (3) and (4) have a non-zero probability. Since (2) and (3) have the result that the A is all things considered impermissible, it follows that the probability that God exists is less than 0.5 (Tooley, 2019, pp. 61–62)—(1) and (2) must have a probability less than 0.5, since they are equiprobable and there are alternative possibilities (i.e. (3) and (4)) that have a non-zero probability. But if (1) has a probability of less than 0.5, then—since all the other possibilities entail that A is all things considered impermissible—the

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probability that God exists will be less than 0.5. So, if Tooley’s right and (1) and (2) are equiprobable and (3) and (4) have a non-zero probability, then The Equiprobability Argument from Evil evades the grasp of Deontological Skeptical Theism: it justifies the inference from premise (11) to (12). Indeed, not only does it evade the grasp of Deontological Skeptical theism, it renders it false. This is because the purported equiprobability and non-exhaustive nature of (1) and (2) provide us with good public antecedent reason to think that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting some evil resembles the actual weight of his reasons. So, this equiprobability claim is crucial: if (1) and (2) are equiprobable, then the inference from premise (11) to (12) goes through, and Deontological Skeptical Theism is false. And if (1) and (2) aren’t equiprobable, then Deontological Skeptical Theism undermines the inference from premise (11) to (12). Why should we think (1) and (2) are equiprobable? One principle it might be tempting to invoke here is the principle of indifference, which holds that, roughly, absent evidence in favor of one hypothesis over its alternatives, the hypotheses under consideration are equiprobable. But the principle of indifference, when lacking qualification, falls prey to counterexamples. For instance, suppose that a factory produces cubes that are between 1 and 3 feet in side length. Suppose that a cube is selected at random. According to the principle of indifference, the probability its length will be between 1 and 2 is 0.5. But now suppose we are considering the area of a randomly selected cube produced from this factory. What’s the probability of the area of the cube being between 1 and 4 square feet? The range of square feet for a cube produced at this factory is between 1 and 9 square feet. The range between 1 and 4 square feet covers 3/8 of the full range of cubes produced by the factory. Since we have no other relevant information, the principle of indifference tells us that the probability of the cube being between 1 and 4 square feet is 3/8. However, to be between 1 and 4 square feet is the same as being between 1 and 2 feet in length. This is a problem: the principle of indifference tells us both that the probability of a randomly selected cube being between 1 and 2 feet is 0.5 and 3/8. Something’s gone wrong here; the principle of

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indifference must be rejected unless it’s properly qualified.38 This is what leads Tooley to make use of the following more specific equiprobability principles: Equiprobability Principle 1: If properties F and G belong to a family of properties, where a family of properties is a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive properties, all either basic properties or else structurally the same at every level, then the a priori probability that x has property F is equal to the a priori probability that x has property G. Equiprobability Principle 2: If x and y are any two nonoverlapping individuals, and F is any property that involves no reference to either individual x or individual y, then the a priori probability that x has property F is equal to the a priori probability that y has property F.39 (Tooley, 2019, p. 50) Tooley argues that these principles entail that rightmaking properties and wrongmaking properties are equiprobable, and therefore that (1) and (2) are equiprobable. Why should we accept these equiprobability principles? Because, Tooley says, they are needed to solve the problem of induction: without them, induction lacks justification.40 This is a controversial claim, but I’ll grant these principles for the sake of argument to see where they take us.41 In the next section, I’ll illustrate some problems that arise in applying them to (1) and (2).  This example is discussed in van Fraassen (1989) and in Hájek (2019).  In a previous iteration of this argument, Tooley used a less specific principle that held that “[a]ny two state descriptions that differ only by a permutation of properties belonging to a family of properties are equally likely.” (Plantinga and Tooley, 2008, p. 239). 40  Tooley doesn’t provide details on how these principles serve to justify induction, but see Huemer (2018, pp. 183–191) for an explanation of how a restricted version of the principle of indifference can provide justification for induction. 41  See Henderson (2020) for an overview of solutions to the problem of induction, some of which don’t rely on equiprobability principles. 38 39

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 Modest Problem for the Equiprobability Argument A from Evil If we assume that rightmaking properties and wrongmaking properties are familial—they are mutually exclusive and a subset (proper or otherwise) of a set of properties that are jointly exhaustive and all basic or else structurally the same at every level—then Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2 will ensure the equiprobability of (1) and (2) and the soundness of the inference from premise (11) to (12), which entails that the probability God exists is less than 0.5. A crucial question, then, is whether rightmaking and wrongmaking properties actually are familial. More specifically, with respect to the prima facie impermissible action A for God referred to by premise (11), we’ve supposed that it has a value of -n. This means that, in order for A to be all things considered obligatory, there must be (at least) an unknown rightmaking property with the value of n connected to A, call it R. So then the issue for this case is whether a rightmaking property42 with a value of n and a wrongmaking property with the value -n, call it W, are familial: if they are familial then, since there are other possibilities with non-zero probabilities (such as those described in (3) and (4)), the probability that A is all things considered impermissible will be less than 0.5.43 This is absolutely crucial for The Equiprobability Argument from Evil—if R and W are familial (and we accept his equiprobability principles), then Tooley’s inference is sound. If not, then not—or, at least, it won’t be sound for the reason he gives. This is why it’s extremely surprising to find that Tooley doesn’t offer any support for R and W being familial—he leaves a crucial premise of The Equiprobability Argument from Evil completely without justification. However, without good reason to think that they are familial, the right attitude is agnosticism: if we have no good reason to think R and W are familial, then we should withhold judgment about the matter. This itself is sufficient to render The Equiprobability Argument from Evil toothless:  I use the singular “property” here and elsewhere for the sake of simplicity. A conjunction of rightmaking properties with the value of n would also do the trick. 43  More generally, for any prima facie evil action, the question will be whether a rightmaking property sufficiently weighty to render that state of affairs permissible and an equally weighty wrongmaking property are familial. 42

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if we have no good reason to think that R and W are familial, then we have no good reason to think that Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2 apply to (1) and (2), which undergird the inference from premise (11) to (12). And this means that the inference remains vulnerable to Deontological Skeptical Theism. This problem isn’t insurmountable—one could respond by arguing that R and W are, in fact, familial. But the problem remains until this has been done. And this means that The Equiprobability Argument From Evil doesn’t currently have any force—although it could acquire force in the future.

 Fatal Problem for the Equiprobability Argument A from Evil So, what should we think here? Are R and W familial? Recall that R and W will be familial if and only if they are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, and both either basic properties or else structurally the same at every level. No explanation is given for what Tooley means by “structurally the same at every level.” However, he does provide the following illustration of familiality: [C]onsider the family of fully determinate color properties. Equiprobability Principle 1 then says that if F and G are any two completely determinate colors, the probability, given no further information, that some particular object x has property F is equal to the probability that x has property G. (Tooley, 2019, p. 50)

So fully determinate color properties are familial: they are mutually exclusive, exhaustive, equally basic, and structurally the same at every level. So, suppose (falsely) that red, yellow, and blue are the only fully determinate colors that there are. And suppose that we’re at The Ball Factory, which produces balls that are either red, yellow, or blue. Suppose further that we’re at the end of the factory line waiting for the next ball to come out, and that our only information is that it will be either red, yellow, or blue—we don’t know anything about the distribution of colors among the balls. Since red, yellow, and blue are familial, we may use Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2 to deduce

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that the probability of the next ball being red is the same as the probability of it being yellow, and that the probability of the next ball being yellow is the same as the probability of it being blue: they are all equiprobable. But suppose that we were instead considering whether the next ball will be red R or either yellow or blue (Y or B). In other words, suppose that we’re comparing Pr(R) with Pr(Y or B). Very clearly, R and (Y or B) aren’t familial (or equiprobable), since (Y or B) covers more logical space than R. Since R and (Y or B) are mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and equally basic, it must be that they aren’t structurally similar: that (Y or B) ranges over more properties than R means that they aren’t structurally similar, and therefore not familial.44 And so two sets of properties won’t be structurally similar if one contains more properties than the other. (Of course, there may be other factors that render structurally dissimilar, as I will detail later in Section “Another Fatal Problem: Structural Similarity Again”.) Below, I will show that rightmaking properties and wrongmaking properties aren’t exhaustive, and that when we make them exhaustive, they aren’t structurally similar in the same way that R and (Y or B) aren’t structurally similar, meaning that Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2 aren’t applicable. Tooley characterizes rightmaking and wrongmaking properties as follows: As regards morally significant properties of actions, let us say that a property is a rightmaking property if an action’s possessing that property, and no other morally significant property, entails that one should perform the action, and that a property is a wrongmaking property if an action’s ­possessing that property, and no other morally significant property, entails that one should not perform the action. (Tooley, 2019, p. 53, emphasis mine)

Rightmaking properties, on this view, are properties that count in favor of an action being required—they make it such that you should perform it if they aren’t outweighed by wrongmaking properties. And wrongmaking properties are properties that count in favor of an action A being  Nothing changes if one thinks that R and (Y or B) are structurally similar and that the real issue is that they aren’t equally basic. The objections I give will still hold—they’d just need to be rephrased to talk about basicality instead of structural similarity.

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impermissible—they make it such that you should refrain from performing A if they aren’t outweighed by rightmaking properties. Notice that the relevant properties for Tooley are morally significant properties. However, Tooley’s definition of rightmaking and wrongmaking properties leaves out an important morally significant property: permissibility-­ making properties. Permissibility-making properties count in favor of the permissibility of an action: they push it toward being permissible, not toward being required or impermissible. For example, that taking a nap would make me happy counts in favor of the permissibility of my taking a nap, but it doesn’t count in favor of my being required to nap. Or, that eating chocolate cake would taste good counts in favor of the permissibility of my eating chocolate cake, but it doesn’t count in favor of my being required to eat the cake. So, there are three kinds of morally significant properties: rightmaking properties, wrongmaking properties, and permissibility-­making properties. What are rightmaking, wrongmaking, and permissibility-making properties? They are reasons—at least given Tooley’s view of them.45 Recall again that reasons are considerations in favor of, or against, some action (Chap. 3, Section “The Nature of Reasons”). There are different types of reasons for an action A: there are requiring reasons and justifying reasons. A requiring reason for A is a consideration in favor of the impermissibility of ~A. A requiring reason against A is a consideration in favor of A being impermissible. A justifying reason for A is a consideration in favor of the permissibility of A—it just counts in favor of the permissibility of A, it doesn’t count in favor of it being obligatory. Tucker succinctly illustrates the distinction between justifying and requiring reasons: A consideration has justifying weight [i.e. is a justifying reason] for φ iff the consideration makes it permissible to φ in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing reasons … The fact that eating this cookie will make me happy has justifying weight [i.e. is a justifying reason] insofar as it is a consideration that pushes eating the cookie toward permissibility. A  My identification of these properties with reasons isn’t crucial for my argument. So long as one accepts that there are permissibility-making properties, my argument holds. And my comments about justifying reasons (explained below) equally apply to permissibility-making properties even if one doesn’t identify one with the other. 45

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consideration has requiring weight [i.e. is a requiring reason] for φ iff it makes ~φ-ing impermissible in the absence of sufficiently weighty countervailing reasons. … If stopping the car is the only way to avoid killing one of the children playing in the street, then you have a reason for stopping that has requiring weight [i.e. a requiring reason], a reason that pushes not stopping toward impermissibility. (Tucker, forthcoming-b, n.p.)

So, since eating cookies would make me happy pushes the act of my eating them towards being permissible but not towards it being required, it’s a justifying reason for my eating them, but it isn’t a requiring reason for me eating them. In other words, that eating cookies would make me happy pushes my act of eating cookies towards being permissible, but it doesn’t push my eating cookies towards being required—it doesn’t push my not eating cookies towards impermissibility. This should all be familiar by now. So, for any potential pair of actions A and ~A, there are four kinds of reasons: (1) requiring reasons for A, (2) justifying reasons for A, (3) requiring reasons for ~A, and (4) justifying reasons for ~A. However, of these four kinds of reasons, one doesn’t push A towards permissibility or impermissibility (i.e. (4)),46 one is a reason against the permission of A (i.e. (3)), and two are in favor of A’s permission (i.e. (1) and (2)): as we saw previously in Chap. 3, Section “Moral Dilemmas and The Asymmetry of Reasons”, requiring reasons for A push an A towards permissibility in addition to pushing it towards being required, i.e. push ~A towards impermissibility. So, for an action A, there are only three kinds of relevant reasons: (1), (2), and (3), two of which count in favor of A’s permissibility and only one of which counts against A’s permissibility (i.e. (3)). To put this in Tooley’s terminology: for any potential pair of actions A and ~A, there are four kinds of morally significant properties: (1*) rightmaking properties for A, (2*) wrongmaking properties for A, and (3*) permissibility-making properties for A, and (4*) permissibility-making properties for ~A. However, of these four kinds of morally significant properties, one property doesn’t push A towards being permissible or impermissible (i.e. (4*)) one property pushes A towards impermissibility  (4) just pushes ~A towards permissibility.

46

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(i.e. (2*)), and two push A towards permissibility (i.e. (1*) and (3*)).47 And so there are four kinds of morally relevant properties for a pair of actions A and ~A, but only three kinds of relevant morally significant properties for A: (1*), (2*), and (3*). However, while two kinds of relevant morally significant properties count in favor of A’s permissibility, only one kind (i.e. (3*)) counts against A’s permissibility.48 It should be clear, then, that rightmaking and wrongmaking properties aren’t familial: they aren’t exhaustive of morally significant properties. This is because, again, there are also permissibility-making properties. Permissibility making properties just are justifying reasons: justifying reasons count in favor of the permissibility of an action—they don’t count in favor of it being required or impermissible. So, if there is a justifying reason for A and there aren’t any other morally relevant properties, then A is permissible. And hence the class of morally significant properties for a particular action contains rightmaking properties (requiring reasons for A), wrongmaking properties (requiring reasons against A), and permissibility making properties (justifying reasons for A). Since both rightmaking properties and permissibility-making properties push an act towards permissibility, let’s call them “permissibility+ properties.” And since wrongmaking properties (and only wrongmaking properties) push an act towards impermissibility, we may call them “impermissibility properties.” It should be clear that what matters for Tooley’s argument is impermissibility properties and permissibility+ properties: of interest for The Equiprobability Argument from Evil are properties that push an act towards permissibility and properties that push an act towards impermissibility, and permissibility+ properties include all morally significant properties that push an action towards permissibility, while impermissibility properties include all morally significant properties that push an action towards impermissibility. But this leads us to a 47  This is because, again, rightmaking properties push A towards permissibility since they push it towards being required—if there’s a rightmaking property for A and A has no other morally significant properties, then A is required and permissible. 48  Again, if you reject the identification of rightmaking properties for X with requiring reasons for X, of wrongmaking properties for X with requiring reasons against X, and of permissibility-making properties for X with justifying reasons for X, then my argument should be read without reference to reasons: what I have to say in favor of justifying reasons can be equally said in favor of permissibility-­making properties.

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problem: impermissibility properties and permissibility+ properties very clearly aren’t familial: they aren’t structurally similar since permissibility+ properties range over more properties than impermissibility properties do—they take up more logical space. This is because, again, permissibility+ properties include both rightmaking properties and permissibility-­ making properties but impermissibility properties include only wrongmaking properties. So, in the same way that R and (Y or B) in The Ball Factory example above aren’t structurally similar, and therefore aren’t familial, and therefore aren’t equiprobable, impermissibility properties and permissibility+ properties aren’t structurally similar, and therefore aren’t familial, and therefore aren’t equiprobable. And this undermines The Equiprobability Argument from Evil: the equiprobability principles aren’t applicable to impermissibility and permissibility+ properties, meaning that it cannot use these principles to support its conclusion. At this point, it might be tempting to consider rightmaking properties and permissibility-making properties individually to avoid the above problem. Doing this means that we must restate The Equiprobability Argument from Evil, since rightmaking and wrongmaking properties aren’t exhaustive and therefore aren’t equiprobable. We may restate it as follows: (15) For some prima facie impermissible action A for God, we know of no sufficiently weighty rightmaking properties or permissibility-making properties that render it permissible. (16) Therefore, probably, there are no sufficiently weighty rightmaking properties or permissibility-making properties that render A all things considered permissible. (17) Therefore, probably, A is all things considered impermissible. (18) Therefore, probably, God doesn’t exist. Recall that Tooley supported the inference from premise (11) to (12) by applying Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2 to four possibilities: (1) There is an unknown rightmaking property (or set of properties) connected to A that is ≥ n and there are no unknown wrongmaking properties connected to the A.

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(2) There is an unknown wrongmaking property (or set of properties) connected to the A that is ≥ n and there are no unknown rightmaking properties connected to the A. (3) There is an unknown rightmaking property (or set of properties) connected to A that is ≥ n and there is a known (or unknown) wrongmaking property (or set of properties) with a value such that A is all things considered impermissible. (4) There are no unknown rightmaking or wrongmaking properties ­connected to A. Since (3) and (4) have non-zero probabilities and (1) and (2) (he claims) are equiprobable, the probability that A is permissible is less than 0.5. But we’ve just seen that rightmaking and wrongmaking properties aren’t exhaustive and so aren’t familial, and so we cannot use Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2 here to support the inference from premise (15) to (16). This is because they don’t take into account permissibility-making properties. As such, we must add in the following possibility to our list: (5) There is an unknown permissibility making property (or set of properties) connected to A that is ≥ n and there are no unknown wrongmaking properties connected to the A. Given the addition of (4),49 it no longer necessarily follows that the probability that A is permissible is less than 0.5. For while (2) results in A being impermissible, (1) and (5) result in it being permissible. And this means that merely granting a non-zero probability to (3) and (4) won’t be enough to render the probability of A being permissible less than 0.5. This is because—assuming, for the sake of argument, that (1), (2), and (5) are familial—Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability  I could greatly expand the list of possibilities here since I’m adding in a third variable. However, since the end result is obvious, I bypass this tedious task: that there are now two properties that count in favor of the permission of an action and only one property that counts against its permission clearly entails that properties that count against the permission of an action (i.e. wrongmaking properties) aren’t equiprobable with properties that count in favor of its permission (i.e. rightmaking properties and permissibility-making properties), and that the probability lines up in favor of properties that count towards its permission. 49

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Principle 2 allow us (at most) to say that (1), (2), and (5) are equiprobable. And since (1) and (5) render A permissible and (2) renders A impermissible, the probability of A being permissible could be as high as a sliver below 2/3.50 Therefore, in order to render the probability of A being permissible as less than 0.5, it must be shown that (3) and (4) have a sufficiently high probability. But this will require a substantial philosophical argument—it won’t just follow from their having a non-zero probability. And this problem won’t be fixed simply by appealing to a different equiprobability principle. For example, suppose that one endorses an explanationist view of the principle of indifference, which holds that when making use of the principle of indifference, we should assign equal probabilities across the partition at the most explanatorily basic level (e.g. Huemer, 2009  and Climenhaga, 2020). Even given the explanationist view of the principle of indifference, (1), (2), and (5) will (arguably) be equiprobable (since (arguably) none is more explanatorily basic than the others), leading to the same result we saw above: since only (2) renders A impermissible and (1) and (5) render it permissible, it follows that it must be shown that the probability of (3) and (4) are sufficiently high to reduce the probability of the permissibility of A to less than 0.5. And, again, this is a substantial task that requires more than their (i.e. (3) and (4)) having a non-zero probability. Perhaps this can be done. But it is nevertheless something that needs to be done to save The Equiprobability Argument from Evil.51 So, if we frame The Equiprobability Argument from Evil in terms of impermissibility properties and permissibility+ properties, then Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2 don’t come into play, since permissibility+ properties and impermissibility properties aren’t familial. And if we break down permissibility+ properties into rightmaking properties and permissibility-making properties, then it no longer follows from simply applying Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2 that the probability that A is permissible is  It must be at least a sliver below 2/3 since we’re assuming that (3) and (4) have a non-zero probability. 51  This same problem will plague Swinburne’s restricted principle of indifference, in which restricts its application to hypotheses that are equal in simplicity and modesty (Swinburne, 2001, pp. 116–119). 50

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less than 0.5. Either way, The Equiprobability Argument from Evil is no longer successful—it is in need of repair if it is to avoid the grasp of Deontological Skeptical Theism.

Objection: Deny Permissibility/Justifying Reasons Perhaps one would object to the claim that there are justifying reasons (or permissibility-making properties): all reasons, so the objection goes, are requiring reasons.52 But if that’s the case, then rightmaking and wrongmaking properties may well be familial: they are exhaustive, and (arguably) meet the rest of the relevant requirements for familiality. This move, if made, would circumvent the issue that I raised above. My argument is dissolved if there aren’t justifying reasons (or permissibility-­ making properties)—although, it would still leave the “modest problem” intact. It would still be true that we’ve been given no good reason to think that rightmaking and wrongmaking properties are familial. If one pursues this route to save The Equiprobability Argument From Evil from Deontological Skeptical Theism, however, it will come at a steep  cost: that there aren’t justifying reasons—reasons that push an act towards being permissible but not required—is hard to swallow. For example, that eating a cookie would make me happy doesn’t seem to count in favor at all of it being obligatory or required that I eat the cookie, but it does seem to count in favor of the act being permissible.53 Moreover, Gert (2016) and Tucker (2017, 2022, forthcoming) provide persuasive arguments for thinking there are both justifying and requiring reasons. Indeed, Gert (2012) notes that the dominant view is that there is a distinction between justifying reasons and requiring reasons.  And so this objection comes at the cost of plausibility (it denies that there are justifying reasons) and popularity (most accept that there are justifying reasons). So, this objection both narrows the scope of The Equiprobability Argument from Evil to those who reject justifying reasons, and it makes  Again, if one rejects the identification of justifying reasons with permissibility-making properties, then this can be rephrased as denying that there are permissibility-making properties. 53  Of course, this reason can be outweighed by other reasons. The point is that it counts at least a little toward the act being permissible. 52

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the argument (even more) contentious. My purpose here is not to refute the claim that there are no justifying reasons (or permissibility-making properties). Instead, I just note the cost that comes from this move.

Another Fatal Problem: Structural Similarity Again A final issue I will raise here is whether rightmaking, wrongmaking, and permissibility-making properties are familial. Since they are exhaustive of the basic moral properties, it’s tempting to think that they’re familial. Indeed, I’ve acted as if they were familial above, when arguing that applying Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2 make it such that the probability of that some prima facie impermissible action is all things considered impermissible could be as high as a sliver below 2/3. However, I will drop this act here. This is because the temptation to think rightmaking, wrongmaking, and permissibility-making properties are familial quickly dissolves when we notice how different permissibility-­ making properties are from rightmaking and wrongmaking properties: permissibility-making properties (or justifying reasons) for an action A push A towards being permissible, but rightmaking (and wrongmaking) properties (or requiring reasons) for A push ~A towards impermissibility and A towards permissibility. These are radically different things: making an act such that we mustn’t do it (i.e. making it impermissible) is an radically different category than making an act such that we may do it (i.e. making it permissible). The difference between impermissibility and permissibility is sharp, and the difference between the reasons that make an action impermissible or permissible is sharp. This radical dissimilarity between requiring and justifying reasons means that they aren’t structurally similar and therefore—at least if we accept Equiprobability Principle 1—that they aren’t familial and that they therefore aren’t equiprobable— or, at least, this will be the case on any plausible understanding of “structural similarity.”54 That is, if two properties are structurally similar, you’d expect them to do similar things. But rightmaking and wrongmaking  Or, again, at least, Tooley has some serious explaining to do to show that they are structurally similar and familial. 54

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properties do radically different things than permissibility-­making properties, and so aren’t structurally similar, and hence aren’t familial, and hence aren’t equiprobable—or, at least, they won’t be if we accept Equiprobability Principle 1.55 Furthermore, since rightmaking properties for A push ~A towards being impermissible and push A towards being permissible56 and permissibility-making properties only push an act towards being permissible, it’s clear as day that they aren’t structurally similar. While they both push an act towards permissibility, one also pushes an act towards being impermissible. So, they have a different structure—they are structurally dissimilar, and therefore not familial, and therefore not equiprobable. However, all of this means that we can’t use Equiprobability Principle 1 or Equiprobability Principle 2 at all on rightmaking, wrongmaking, and permissibility-making properties. And this completely dissolves the Equiprobability Argument from Evil which (obviously enough) makes use of equiprobability principles: it leaves us without a path—or, at least, without a path involving equiprobability principles—for ascribing a probability to there being unknown and sufficiently weighty rightmaking, wrongmaking, and permissibility-making properties connected known evils. And hence we have another fatal problem for The Equiprobabilty Argument from Evil.

Conclusion In summary, The Equiprobability Argument from Evil offers a way to circumvent (and refute) Deontological Skeptical Theism. However, I have shown that (1) we are given no reason to think that rightmaking and wrongmaking properties are familial, which itself is sufficient to undercut The Equiprobability Argument from Evil and make it vulnerable to Deontological Skeptical Theism, (2) the nature of reasons provides us with strong reason to reject The Equiprobability Argument From Evil:  Or, if they are equiprobable, it’s not due to Equiprobability Principle 1 and Equiprobability Principle 2. 56  See the discussion above. 55

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rightmaking properties and wrongmaking properties aren’t exhaustive and so aren’t familial. And making them familial comes at the cost of the argument itself. And (3), we’ve seen that rightmaking, wrongmaking, and permissibility-making properties aren’t structurally similar and so aren’t familial and therefore aren’t equiprobable—at least by Tooley’s criteria. In other words, Deontological Skeptical Theism, and skeptical theism in general, prevents us from “noseeum inferring” that a prima facie impermissible action is all things considered impermissible. One objection to the argument is to deny that there are justifying reasons. This objection, however, comes at a steep price: it’s just implausible to deny that there are justifying reasons—there are persuasive arguments for thinking there are such reasons—and the dominant position holds that there are justifying reasons. Therefore, The Equiprobability Argument from Evil, though initially powerful, is in critical condition and unable to avoid the grasp of Deontological Skeptical Theism.

Humean Arguments from Evil Humean arguments from evil purport to show that some fact about evil is more likely given a non-theistic hypothesis of some sort than it is given theism, and this means that this fact is evidence against theism. I will consider two versions of Humean arguments: an axiological version whose defense relies on what God-justifying reasons57 God has for ­permitting the distribution of pain and pleasure we find in our world— call it The Axiological Humean Argument—and a deontological version whose defense relies on the weight of God’s reasons for permitting the distribution of pain and pleasure that we find in our world—call it The Deontological Humean Argument. Let’s consider these in turn.

57  Recall that a God-justifying reason for God’s permission of an evil E is either a greater good (or set of goods) connected to God’s permission of E or the prevention of an evil (or set of evils) equally bad or worse. So, while I talk of God-justifying reasons, the focus is on goods, evils, their connections, and their values which is why Axiological Skeptical Theism is relevant—deontological considerations do not come into play here. (Though, see Section “The Deontological Humean Argument” for a deontological formulation of the argument.)

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The Axiological Humean Argument Consider one non-theistic hypothesis—The Hypothesis of Indifference: The Hypothesis of Indifference: neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons. (Draper, 2013, p. 103)

The Hypothesis of Indifference is, clearly, incompatible with theism (T) since—on the traditional understanding of T—God, a non-human person, created sentient beings on earth (among other things). So, if T is true then The Hypothesis of Indifference is false, and vice versa. Let “O” stand for our observations about pain and pleasure and the testimony on which our knowledge of pain and pleasure is based. And, in this context, let the antecedent*58 probability of X given Y be the likelihood of X given Y independent of our knowledge of X. Draper (1989, 2013, forthcoming) argues that, antecedently*, O is many times more likely given The Hypothesis of Indifference than it is given T. And since, he argues, there’s no significant difference between the intrinsic probability of T and the intrinsic probability of The Hypothesis of Indifference, we have strong evidence against T. Let’s abbreviate this conclusion as follows: C: Pr(O/Hypothesis of Indifference) >! Pr(O/T)

This is the conclusion of The Axiological Humean Argument. And so, obviously, if C is undermined then the argument is undermined. Bergmann (2009) has argued that ST1–4 undermine C. In essence, he argues that we can only affirm C if we can say that the probability of there being a God-justifying reason for permitting O is not high given T—in other words, we can only affirm C if we can say that Pr(O/T) is not high. But, he argues, ST1–4 entail that we are ‘in the dark’59 about the  I add an asterisk to “antecedent*” since the way Draper defines the term is different from the way I define it (see Chap. 3, Section “The Nature of Reasons”). 59  I’m reticent to use this ‘in the dark’ language here. I’ve argued elsewhere (Hendricks, 2021b) that although skeptical theists and their opponents often use this language, they shouldn’t since it’s misleading or false. Indeed, this ‘in the dark phrase’ (and its annoying cousin: ‘for all we know’) has led to a slew of objections to skeptical theism that are misguided because they rely on it for a premise. That said, I will continue to use the phrase here since both Bergmann and Draper use it. 58

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probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O, and so we’re ‘in the dark’ about Pr(O/T), and this means that we have lost our grounds for affirming C and The Axiological Humean Argument is undermined. This is because, briefly, if we can’t say what Pr(O/T) is, then we can’t say that O is more likely given another competing hypothesis. Draper (2013) replies to Bergmann’s objection, arguing that he (Bergmann) focuses on all things considered probability instead of antecedent* probability, and antecedent* probability is what’s needed to undermine his (Draper’s) argument. And when Bergmann’s argument is rephrased in terms of antecedent* probability, claims Draper, it fails. This is because [i]f God is justified in producing a world in which O is true, then most likely God is justified and capable of producing many similar worlds in which O is false as well; and even taking into account our background knowledge, there is no good [antecedent*] reason to believe that, of all these alternatives, worlds in which O is true are particularly likely. (Draper, 2013, p. 104)

Basically, Draper’s point is that if the antecedent* probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O is high, it doesn’t follow that O is antecedently* likely given T. This is because there being a high antecedent* probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O given T just tells us that O is likely permissible. However, there are presumably a great many alternatives to O that are also permissible—or, at least, we have no good reason to think that there aren’t alternatives to O that are permissible. And so Bergmann’s objection, even if correct, wouldn’t do the work that it needs to do to undermine The Axiological Humean Argument. Draper considers another reformulation of Bergmann’s argument. On this version, the argument claims that if the antecedent* probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O is high, then Pr(O/T) is approximately as high (or higher) than Pr(O/Hypothesis of Indifference). However, since ST1–4 make it such that we are ‘completely in the dark’ about the antecedent* probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O, we are ‘completely in the dark’ about whether Pr(O/T) is approximately as high (or higher) than Pr(O/Hypothesis of Indifference). Since C states that Pr(O/Hypothesis of Indifference) >! Pr(O/T), this means

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that—if Bergmann’s rephrased argument is correct—C is undermined, and The Axiological Humean Argument is also undermined (Draper, 2013, p. 105).60 Draper claims there are two issues with Bergmann’s rephrased objection. The first issue is whether ST1–4 make it such that we are ‘completely in the dark’ about whether the antecedent* probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O is high. And the second is whether ST1–4 are true. Draper’s response to the first issue renders the second issue irrelevant: he argues that ST1–4 don’t make it such that we are ‘completely in the dark’ about whether the antecedent* probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O is high. The details of his reasoning aren’t important here. Instead, what’s important is the thesis Draper suggests would actually undermine his argument. While he doesn’t think the skepticism of ST1–4 is enough to undermine C, he tells us what thesis he thinks is skeptical enough that it would undermine C, which he states as follows: STE: We have no good [public antecedent] reason to believe that prima facie non-instrumental badness is positively correlated with ultima facie non-instrumental badness; no good [public antecedent] reason to believe that prima facie non-­instrumental goodness is positively correlated with ultima facie non-instrumental ­goodness; and no good [public antecedent] reason to believe that prima facie non-instrumental value-neutrality is positively correlated with ultima facie non-instrumental value-neutrality. (Draper, 2013, p. 109) Since STE—at least, according to Draper—undermine’s C, this means that we can rephrase Bergmann’s argument against The Axiological Humean Argument one last time to this: if the antecedent* probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O is high, then Pr(O/T) is approximately as high (or higher) than Pr(O/Hypothesis of Indifference). However, since STE makes it such that we are ‘completely in the dark’  I’m simplifying the argument here, and slightly rephrasing things. For example, Draper considers a skeptical thesis similar to, but distinct from ST1–4. 60

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about the antecedent* probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O, we are ‘completely in the dark’ about whether Pr(O/T) is approximately as high (or higher) than Pr(O/Hypothesis of Indifference). Since C states that Pr(O/Hypothesis of Indifference) >! Pr(O/T), this means that C is undermined, and The Axiological Humean Argument is therefore undermined. The only difference between this and the prior iteration of this argument is that ST1–4 has been replaced with STE. So, we may rephrase the two issues Draper considered above. The first issue is whether the truth of STE makes it such that we are ‘completely in the dark’ about whether the antecedent* probability of there being a God-justifying reason for O is high. And the second issue is whether STE is true. Given the above description, it should be clear what Draper’s stance on the first issue is: he thinks STE, if true, undermines C and therefore undermines The Axiological Humean Argument. As for the second issue, he thinks STE is false. Here, I won’t defend STE—aside from noting that Axiological Skeptical Theism offers support for its truth. This is because if Axiological Skeptical Theism is true, it makes it such that at least one of the theses of which STE is composed of is true—if we really have no good public antecedent reason for thinking that the perceived value of an evil state of affairs E resembles, with respect to overall goodness and badness, its actual value, then it must at least be true either that (1) we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking that prima facie non-­ instrumental goodness is positively correlated with ultima facie non-­ instrumental goodness, or (2) we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking that prima facie non-instrumentaal badness is positively correlated with ultima facie non-instrumental badness, or (3) we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking that prima facie value neutrality is positively correlated with ultima facie non-instrumental value neutrality. If none of these theses hold, then Axiological Skeptical Theism is false. For if all three of those theses are false (i.e. if we have good public reason to think that prima facie non-instrumental goods are positively correlated with ultima facie non-instrumental goods, etc.), then it’s clear that we do have good public antecedent reason for thinking that the perceived value of E resembles, with respect to overall goodness or badness,

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the actual value of E—namely, our good public antecedent reason is that these positive correlations hold.61 So, Axiological Skeptical Theism offers support for STE. More importantly, it also has the same effect as STE. This is because what makes it such that STE undermines C is that it prevents us from thinking that the goodness and badness we perceive in O resembles its actual goodness or badness. But Axiological Skeptical Theism does this too: O is a complex state of affairs consisting of evil and goods and evils logically connected to it. So, per Axiological Skeptical Theism, we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking that perceived goodness and badness of O resembles its overall goodness or badness. But this means that we are ‘completely in the dark’ about Pr(O/T), and so ‘completely in the dark’ about the truth of C. Thus, if STE undermines C, so does Axiological Skeptical Theism. This brings us back to the second issue raised above: do STE and Axiological Skeptical Theism undermine The Axiological Humean Argument? According to Draper, the answer is “Yes.” My own answer is this: “It depends.” I say this because Axiological Skeptical Theism (and Deontological Skeptical Theism) only undermine noseeum inferences,62 and, moreover, they arguably won’t undermine views one holds based on private reasons. However, it could be that one’s value assignment to Pr(O/T) is due to private reasons, such as intuition (or direct insight, or whatever), in which case The Axiological Humean Argument arguably won’t be undermined by Axiological Skeptical Theism. So, while Axiological Skeptical Theism may undermine The Axiological Humean Argument for some, it won’t necessarily do so for all. However, those who appeal to private reasons for assigning a value to Pr(O/T) aren’t out of the woods yet: in Chap. 9, I cast doubt on the ability of our private reasons to track values. Indeed, I think the reasons given there positively undermine any value assignment one might give to Pr(O/T) based on intuition that isn’t taking into account antecedent reasons (in my sense of the term). And so while some proponents of The Axiological Humean Argument  Since Axiological Skeptical Theism only entails that at least one component of STE is true, it cannot be said to entail it full stop. 62  Indeed, Dougherty (2008) and Tucker (2014) both argue that skeptical theism is incomplete because it only undermines these inferences. See Hendricks (2018a) for a response to this worry. 61

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may not succumb to Axiological Skeptical Theism, they will, in all likelihood, fall prey to the undercutting defeaters outlined in Chap. 9.

Draper’s Objection to STE (and Axiological Skeptical Theism) Draper levels two objections against STE and therefore Axiological Skeptical Theism. One is a reiteration Hasker’s (2010) claim that Axiological Skeptical Theism makes it such that “we never have good reason to believe we are making the world a better place [overall] when we eliminate some prima facie evil or when we produce some prima facie good” (Draper, 2013, p.  110). This issue was addressed previously in Chap. 2: if we’re talking about all things considered skepticism, then this objection is a non-starter, since Axiological Skeptical Theism is a thesis about our public antecedent good reasons, not about our all things considered good reasons—one can accept Axiological Skeptical Theism while saying we have all things considered good reason to think that we make the world a better place when we eliminate a prima facie evil or produce a prima facie good. And so this objection doesn’t cut ice. Draper’s second objection makes a similar move to the objection given in Chap. 2. He says that it is no more likely that there are unknown greater goods that entail the prima facie evils with which we are familiar than that there are unknown greater evils that entail those evils. Further, it is actually less likely that there are such goods than that there are either unknown greater evils or unknown lesser evils that entail those evils, and much less likely that there are such goods than that there are either unknown greater evils or unknown lesser evils or only unknown lesser goods that entail those evils. Moreover, these inequalities are obviously greater for greater prima facie evils and greater for complex prima facie evils that consist of an abundance of diverse evils. Thus, contrary to what [STE] asserts, we have very good reason to believe that prima facie non-instrumental badness is positively correlated with ultima facie non-instrumental badness in the case of many of the evils reported by O. (Draper, 2013, p. 110)

If Draper is right here, then both Axiological Skeptical Theism and STE are false. However, it’s not clear that he’s right: it’s not clear why we

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should accept this position, or the reasoning lurking behind it. He could appeal to some principles of equiprobability or intrinsic probability to support his position. However, we’ve seen that such principles won’t be of use: The Argument from Reasons showed that postulating a good is more modest than postulating an evil (Chap. 2, Section “The Argument from Reasons”) and The Argument from Actuality showed that postulating a good is simpler than postulating an evil (Chap. 2 Section “The Argument from Actuality”).63 And this means that we have (at least) two reasons for thinking that it’s more likely that unknown goods entail the prima facie evils we’re familiar with. And this will undermine any use of intrinsic probability or other equiprobability principles to support Draper’s claim. And so to defend this objection, Draper will need to address these arguments. So, at the very least, there is much more work to do for this objection to Axiological Skeptical Theism be successful: at the very least, it has to either be shown that The Argument from Reasons fails or that The Argument from Actuality fails. And for a complete defense, it would need to be shown that good and evil are equiprobable (or that an unknown good is at least no more likely than an unknown evil). However, this will involve discussing the nature of good and evil. And it’s no guarantee that once we take a close look at their natures, that they will be equiprobable.64

The Deontological Humean Argument We saw above that Axiological Skeptical Theism undermines (for some) The Axiological Humean Argument. Does Deontological Skeptical Theism have anything to say about that argument? Insofar as good and evil are moral reasons for God, it may undermine The Axiological  Perhaps Draper could appeal to a different equiprobability principle. The issue here is that any plausible principle won’t apply if good and evil are asymmetric, and as we saw above (see Section “The Equiprobability Argument from Evil”)—and will see below—there’s no good reason to think good and evil aren’t asymmetric and some reason to think they are. And the same result will obtain if he appeals to intrinsic probability. 64  This objection is similar to that raised in Chap. 2, Section “Is A Sufficiently Weighty Unknown Good Likely?”, and it faces the problems outlined there. 63

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Humean Argument, since it claims that we have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons. But let’s set this issue aside and frame The Axiological Humean Argument deontologically. Suppose we argue that given the perceived weight of God’s reasons against O, that Pr(O/The Hypothesis of Indifference) is antecedently* many times greater than Pr(O/T). We may say then that: C*: Pr(O/T) !< Pr(O/The Hypothesis of Indifference)

C* means that we have strong evidence against T. Call this The Deontological Humean Argument. In the same way that Axiological Skeptical Theism threatens C, Deontological Skeptical Theism threatens C*—at least according to Draper. This is because, again, we can only affirm C* if we have good reason to think that Pr(O/T) isn’t high. So, the question is whether Deontological Skeptical Theism is skeptical enough to prevent us from saying Pr(O/T) isn’t high. To see whether it is—at least by Draper’s standards—we can state STE in deontological terms: STE*: We have no good public antecedent reason to believe that prima facie weight of God’s requiring reasons is positively correlated with ultima facie weight of God’s requiring reasons; and no good public antecedent reason to believe that prima facie weight of God’s justifying reasons is positively correlated with ultima facie weight of God’s justifying reasons. The difference between STE and STE* is just that talk of goodness and badness has been replaced with talk of requiring reasons and justifying reasons. Those are what’s relevant to determining Pr(O/T): if God’s justifying reasons for O outweigh his requiring reasons for ~O, then O will be permissible. If not, then not. And conversely, if God’s requiring reasons for O outweigh his justifying reasons for ~O, then O will be required for God. If not, then not. I will not defend STE* here—aside from noting that Deontological Skeptical Theism offers support for its truth. This is because if Deontological Skeptical Theism is true, then it entails that at least one of

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the two theses of which STE* is composed is true—if, for any evil state of affairs E we know of, we really have no good public antecedent reason for thinking it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons in favor of its permission resembles the actual weight of his reasons, then it must at least be true that we either have no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the prima facie weight of God’s requiring reasons is positively correlated with ultima facie weight of God’s requiring reasons or no good public antecedent reason to believe that prima facie weight of God’s justifying reasons is positively correlated with ultima facie weight of God’s justifying reasons. Indeed, if neither of these theses hold, then it’s clear that we do have good public antecedent reason for thinking that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for (or against) E resembles the actual weight of his reasons. Hence, Deontological Skeptical Theism offers support for STE*. More importantly, Deontological Skeptical Theism also has the same effect as STE*. This is because what makes it such that STE* undermines C* is that it prevents us from thinking that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for (or against) O resembles the actual weight of his reasons. But Deontological Skeptical Theism does this too: it claims that we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for (or against) O resembles the weight of his actual reasons. And this means that we are ‘completely in the dark’ about Pr(O/T), and so we are ‘completely in the dark’ about the truth of C*. Thus, if STE* undermines C*, so does Deontological Skeptical Theism, and it (Deontological Skeptical Theism) threatens The Deontological Humean Argument—at least for those who affirm C* on the basis of a noseeum inference.65 Perhaps one would object to STE* and Deontological Skeptical Theism with the same method suggested in the previous section (and akin to the objection given in Chap. 3, Section “Is A Sufficiently Weighty Unknown Reason Likely?”): by making use of intrinsic probability or equiprobability principles. This objection, however, will fail due to the arguments I gave in Chap. 3 for thinking that it’s more likely that there’s unknown reasons in favor of God’s permitting some action than there are unknown reasons against its permission. And so for this objection to be sustained, 65

 See Section “The Axiological Humean Argument” for why this qualification is necessary.

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these arguments need to be addressed. And unless and until this has been done, this is not a threat to Deontological Skeptical Theism. And so The Deontological Humean Argument fares no better than The Axiological Humean Argument: it’s undermined for those who accept C* on the basis of a noseeum inference. Again, one might cite private reasons to support C* in an effort to circumvent Deontological Skeptical Theism. However, this will be of little hope to proponents of The Deontological Humean Argument: in Chap. 9, I show that beliefs about the weight of God’s reasons based on private reasons are subject to undercutting defeaters.

Conclusion Much territory has been covered in this chapter. I argued that Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism have a wide scope with respect to arguments from evil: they undermine The Noseeum Axiological Argument, The Noseeum Deontological Argument, The Equiprobability Argument from Evil, The Axiological Humean Argument, and The Deontological Humean Argument.66 And so Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism have a significant negative effect on the epistemic status of atheism.

 This list is not meant to be exhaustive. There are no doubt other arguments from evil which Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism will have an effect on. 66

5 Skeptical Theism and Other Arguments for Atheism

Introduction In Chap. 4, I argued that Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism undermine axiological and deontological noseeum arguments from evil, equiprobability arguments from evil, and axiological and deontological Humean arguments from evil. However, the effects of these skeptical theisms aren’t limited to arguments from evil—they have a wide ranging consequences, and greatly reduce the epistemic status of atheism. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the implications of Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism with respect to arguments for atheism that aren’t properly classified as arguments from evil. Since I discussed the way these skeptical theisms work at length previously (see Chap. 4, Section ”Axiological Skeptical Theism Against The Noseeum Axiological Argument”), I’ll be far briefer in this chapter in dispatching arguments—I’ll content myself to merely note that an argument has a structure that’s vulnerable to criticisms stemming from Axiological Skeptical Theism or Deontological Skeptical Theism and leave it at that. The reader should be able to tie together any loose ends.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4_5

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Finally, for the remainder of this book, I will take “skeptical theism” to encompass both Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism, and I will take a skeptical theist to be an adherent of one (or both) of these positions—although, I will at times single out one or the other when it is relevant. Additionally, I will occasionally use “skeptical theism” in a more inclusive way that refers to all positions that adopt the label ‘skeptical theism’. When I do this, I’ll make it clear by noting that the issue applies to skeptical theism in general or that it applies to skeptical theists of all stripes.

The Argument from Inscrutability Say that an evil is axiologically inscrutable if and only if we recognize no outweighing good that’s logically connected to it. And say that an outweighing good can either be a good (or set of goods) that outweighs the evil E or the evasion of an evil (or set of evils) that’s equally bad or worse than E. Next, let’s say that an evil is deontologically inscrutable if and only if we recognize no reason (or set of reasons) that would justify God in permitting it. Recently, some have made use of a parent-child analogy to argue that God wouldn’t permit axiologically or deontologically inscrutable unless he provided his comforting presence to those undergoing such evils (e.g. Dougherty, 2012; Rutledge, 2017a; Wielenberg, 2015).1 This is because if a loving parent had to allow their child to undergo an instance of suffering, he or she would ensure that the child knows that there is a reason for it2—or, if they couldn’t do that, he or she would at least be present to provide comfort to the child. And if loving human parents would do that, then God would at least do that.  Interestingly, some skeptical theists (e.g. Wykstra, 1996) have a parent-child analogy in support of skeptical theism. 2  Dougherty suggests that 1

[o]ne’s not understanding why one’s suffering is occurring is a constituent, perhaps the key constituent, of one’s overall suffering which makes it almost unbearable at times. (2012, p. 21)

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Wielenberg states the issue this way: one might think that if a loving parent is unable for some reason to explain to her child the point of the suffering, she will at least try to comfort her child with her presence or let her child know that there is a good reason for the suffering (even if she cannot explain what that reason is). Yet the plain fact is that human beings routinely endorse prolonged and intense suffering that seems to them to be [axiologically or deontologically] gratuitous while at the same time feeling that God has abandoned them or never existed in the first place... (2015, p. 307)

From this, Wielenberg formulates an argument against Christian theism. Since it relies on the notion of axiologically or deontologically inscrutable evil, we may call it The Argument from Inscrutability, and we may state it as follows3: (1) A loving parent would never permit her children to experience prolonged, intense, and axiologically or deontologically inscrutable evil unless she provided them with her comforting presence. (2) If the Christian God exists, then the God-human relationship is relevantly like the parent-child relationship. (3) So, if the Christian God exists, then he never permits humans to experience axiologically or deontologically inscrutable evil without his comforting presence if he can avoid doing so (from (1) and (2)). (4) But if the Christan God exists, then he does permit his children to experience axiologically and deontologically inscrutable evil without his comforting presence when he could avoid doing so. (5) Therefore, the Christan God does not exist (from (3) and (4)).4 Premises (1) and (2)—by Wielenberg’s admission—only make (3) probable. However, he says that the stronger the analogy between God and loving parent, the stronger the support premises (1) and (2) provide for (3). And why should we think premise (4) is true? Wielenberg (2015, pp.  308–309) seems to just think it’s clear that God is capable of  He calls it “The argument from apparently gratuitous suffering and abandonment.”  I’ve lightly modified Wielenberg’s argument from (2015, p. 307) using my terminology.

3 4

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providing his comforting presence to anyone suffering axiologically and deontologically inscrutable evil. He says: while loving parents often do things for reasons their children don’t understand … there is nothing in our knowledge of the parent-child relationship to support the claim that parents could find themselves justified in permitting their children to experience [axiologically or deontologically inscrutable evil without their comforting presence] (and be motivated to act by such justification) and that there is much in our knowledge of that relationship to support the claim that loving parents simply do not treat their children in such a way. (2015, pp. 309–310)

This fact is supposed to render The Argument from Inscrutability immune to skeptical theism: since it relies on how we know loving parents treat their children, we need not rely on a noseeum inference—we can see that (4) is true on account of our knowledge of human parent-­ child relationships. DePoe (2017, p.  92) agrees that this argument is immune to skeptical theism—he thinks it has “no response” to the argument.5 So, we have some agreement between Dougherty, DePoe, and Wielenberg on this matter. Basically, since we know how loving parents act and we know that there’s axiologically and deontologically inscrutable evil that happens in the absence of God’s comforting presence, we have (at least some) evidence against Christian theism and, more generally, we have evidence against any kind of theism that takes God to be similar to a loving parent. And skeptical theism has nothing to say about any of this. The—or, at least, one—problem with Dougherty, DePoe, and Wielenberg’s view is that they’ve misstated what we know. They claim that what we know is that loving parents would never permit their children to suffer axiologically or deontologically inscrutable evil without their comforting presence. But that isn’t what we know. What we actually know is this: loving parents would not permit their children to suffer axiologically or deontologically inscrutable evil without their comforting presence unless they had good reason to do so. I take this to be fairly clear.  While DePoe agrees that this argument is immune to skeptical theism, he argues that his version of skeptical theism—positive skeptical theism (e.g. 2014)—undermines The Argument from Inscrutability. 5

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After all, if a loving parent had a good reason to allow her child to suffer axiologically or deontologically inscrutable evil, she would do it—at least, she would if the good reason were strong enough. For the sake of simplicity, I’ll take a “good reason” here to be either (a) an axiological reason, i.e. a reason involving goods or the evasion of evils logically connected to a child suffering an inscrutable evil without their parent’s comforting presence or (b) a deontological reason, i.e. a reason (or set of reasons) for parents permitting their child to suffer an inscrutable evil without their loving presence. In light of what we actually know, recall premise (4) of The Argument from Inscrutability: (4) But if the Christan God exists, then he does permit his children to experience axiologically and deontologically inscrutable evil without his comforting presence when He could avoid doing so. Given the point above, we need to shore up some support for premise (4)—we need to be given good reason for thinking that God could avoid permitting his children from experiencing deontologically or axiologically inscrutable evil without his loving presence. There are (at least) two ways to support premise (4). The first way would be to invoke private reasons: one could claim, for example, that it’s intuitive that premise (4) is true. I concede that skeptical theism doesn’t directly conflict with this type of support for premise (4): skeptical theism is about public reasons, not private reasons. I’ll just register my skepticism that anyone has this intuition, and note that those who do have this intuition have a defeater for it due to considerations discussed in Chap. 9. A second way to support premise (4) would be to make the following sort of inference: 4.1. We recognize no (axiological or deontological) reason why God couldn’t avoid permitting his children to experience inscrutable evil without his comforting presence. 4.2. Therefore, probably, there is no such reason.

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And this would get us (close enough to) premise (4). However, the inference from subpremise (4.1) to (4.2) is precisely the type of inference that’s undermined by skeptical theism: it’s an inference from our lack of knowledge of a good (axiological or deontological) reason to there being no such reason. So, unless there’s a different way to support premise (4) that doesn’t make use of private reasons or an inference like the above one, The Argument from Inscrutability has no bite: it succumbs to skeptical theism.

The Evil-God Challenge Law (2010) defends the so-called evil-god challenge. One way of understanding the evil-god challenge is as a challenge to theists to show that God is good, as opposed to evil. After all, thinks Law, many arguments for theism (e.g. cosmological arguments) support only the existence of a necessary, omniscient, and omnipotent being—they don’t tell us about the moral character of God. So, theists need to provide us with a good reason for thinking that God is good and not evil. This version of the evil-god challenge isn’t of interest for this chapter.6 Another way of understanding the evil-god challenge is as follows.7 Say that maltheism is the view that there exists a perfectly powerful, perfectly knowledgeable, and wholly evil being, and call this being “evil-god.” And say that theism is the view that there exists a perfectly powerful, perfectly knowledgeable, and perfectly good being, and call this being “God.” The problem of evil is a problem for theists: it’s (roughly) the problem of reconciling the existence of evil (its amount, character, pattern, etc.) with the existence of God. However, there is a parallel problem for maltheists: the problem of good. The problem of good is (roughly) the problem of reconciling the existence of good (its amount, character, pattern, etc.) with the existence of evil-god. The problem of good and the problem of evil, thinks Law, are on a par with respect to evidential strength.  For responses to this version, see Hendricks (2023 and the appendix of 2018b), Lougheed (2020), Page and Baker-Hytch (2020), Wilson (2021). And for discussions (and defenses) of this version, see Collins (2019) and Lancaster-Thomas (2018a, 2018b, 2020). 7  This version is the one I take to be the most natural understanding of the evil-god challenge. 6

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This is (at least partly) because, Law argues, most theodicies given in response to the problem of evil can be reversed and used to defend evil-­ god in response to the problem of good. For example, suppose the theist says God permits evil because he wanted to create free creatures, and he wanted to do this because good choices made by free creatures are better than ones made by non-free creatures. However, such creatures—if they’re truly free—must be permitted to perform evil. And this explains why there’s (at least some) evil. The maltheist can say with equal plausibility that evil-god permits good because evil-god wanted to create free creatures, and he wanted to do this because evil choices made by free creatures are worse than ones made by non-free creatures. However, such creatures—if they’re truly free—must be permitted to perform good. And this explains why there is (at least some) good. The same kind of move can be made, Law thinks, for most other theodicies. However, this means that the strength of the problem of good and the strength of the problem of evil are roughly symmetric: the maltheist’s answer to the problem of good is just as plausible as the theists answer to the problem of evil.8 Next, Law claims that the most popular arguments in favor of theism equally support maltheism. For example, if the kalam cosmological argument(e.g. Craig, 2000) is successful, it only tells us that the universe has a cause of its existence—it doesn’t tell us about the moral character of the being that caused its existence. Indeed, for all the kalam cosmological argument has to say, whatever caused the existence of the universe could be good or evil. And this means that this argument equally supports theism and maltheism. And, thinks Law, this will be the case for most arguments given for theism. That is, most arguments given for theism will equally support maltheism. While this view strikes me as dubious, let’s grant it for the sake of argument. In light of this, we can think of theism and maltheism as being on an evidential par: the problem of good and the problem of evil are roughly equally strong (since theodicies work just as well for theism as they do maltheism) and arguments for the existence of God provide roughly equal support the existence of evil-god. So, theism and maltheism are  This seems to me to be clearly false, but I’ll grant it for the sake of argument.

8

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roughly equally reasonable. Following Law, let’s call this The Symmetry Thesis. Herein lies the problem for theism: when we’re presented with the evil-god hypothesis, most of us immediately dismiss it as absurd, typically because we consider the problem of good decisive. (Law, 2010, p. 357)

So, according to Law, most of us think that known facts about good are decisive evidence against the existence of evil-god.9 However, if The Symmetry Thesis holds and belief in God and belief in evil-god are roughly equally reasonable—and for the sake of argument I’ll grant they are—then the fact that the problem of good is decisive evidence against evil-god’s existence means that the problem of evil is decisive evidence against God’s existence. The problem posed by the evil-god challenge should now be clear: if—as Law claims—the problem of good is decisive against maltheism and theism and maltheism are roughly equally reasonable (i.e. The Symmetry Thesis holds), then the problem of evil is decisive evidence against theism. With all of the above in mind, we can simplify the evil-god challenge10 as follows: (6) If the problem of good renders belief in evil-god unreasonable, then the problem of evil renders belief in God unreasonable. (7) The problem of good renders belief in evil-god unreasonable. (8) Therefore, the problem of evil renders belief in God unreasonable. What are we to make of this argument? The argument is clearly valid, and by granting The Symmetry Thesis I’ve granted premise (6). This leaves just one premise left: premise (7). While Law briefly discusses the problem of good (2010, p. 356), he doesn’t lay out a clear statement of it.  How does he know how most people react when presented with the evil-god hypothesis? Was there a study run on this? Or is Law somehow intuiting—in a manner similar to Professor Xavier— how most people would react to the question? Unfortunately, we’re not told. I suspect Law is saying that this is the case due to convenience. For my part, I know of no one who thinks that good is strong—let alone decisive—evidence against maltheism. 10  Or, rather, the version of the evil-god challenge under consideration here. 9

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However, in order to consider premise (7), we need to think seriously about the problem of good and how it might go. In light of this, I will lay out an axiological version of the problem of good, mirroring The Noseeum Axiological Argument discussed in Chap. 4. Let’s say that a good is negatively axiologically gratuitous11 if and only if it’s not logically connected to an evil (or set of evils) that outweighs it or the prevention of a good (or set of goods) that is equally valuable or better.12 And let’s say that an evil-god-justifying reason for permitting a good G is either (1) a greater evil (or set of evils) that required G (or something equally good or better) or (2) the prevention of something equally valuable or better than G that required G. In other words, a good for which there is no evil-god-justifying reason for its permission is negatively axiologically gratuitous. We may then offer the following argument from good against the existence of evil-god: (9)  For some actual good G we know of, we recognize no evil­god-­justifying reason for permitting it. (10)  Therefore, probably, there is no evil-god-justifying reason for permitting G. (11) Therefore, probably, G is negatively axiologically gratuitous. (12) Necessarily, if evil-god exists, he would not permit negatively ­axiologically gratuitous good. (13) Therefore, probably, evil-god does not exist. With one qualification made below, it should be clear that the inference from premise (9) to (10) is undermined by skeptical theism, and in particular Axiological Skeptical Theism: it’s making an inference from the perceived value of a state of affairs to its actual value. And while Axiological Skeptical Theism only makes claims about evils that we know of, it clearly also applies to goods that we know of. And this means that the inference from premise (9) to (10) is undermined. And this same result will hold for other versions of the problem of good that one considers: if we  I add this “negatively” qualification to distinguish this notion of gratuity from the notion of axiological gratuity discussed in Chap. 4, Section “Gratuitous Evil: What Is It?” 12  This is meant to parallel the notion of axiologically gratuitous evil. See Chap. 4, Section “Gratuitous Evil: What is it?” 11

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consider an evil-god version of The Equiprobability Argument (Chap. 4, Section “The Equiprobability Argument from Evil”) or an evil-god version of The Noseeum Deontological Argument (Chap. 4, Section “The Noseeum Deontological Argument”), the same result will hold: skeptical theism will undermine them. In other words, skeptical theism equally undermines arguments from good and arguments from evil. However, this means that premise (7) of the evil-god challenge is false—or, at least, Law’s reason for thinking maltheism is unreasonable is a bad reason13— and therefore, the challenge gives us no good reason to think that belief in God is unreasonable. I mentioned above that one qualification is in order here. The qualification I have in mind is this: if one pushes an equiprobability objection to this skeptical theist response to the problem of good, then—if one buys the arguments I made in Chap. 2 and Chap. 3—she may have reason to think that skeptical theism doesn’t undermine the problem of good. To see why, recall that I argued both that reality is biased toward the good (Chap. 2, Section “Direct Objection 2: Equiprobability Objections”) and that reality is biased towards permissibility (Chap. 3, Section “Direct Objection 2: Equiprobability Objections”). If I’m right on these matters, then the skeptical theist’s response to the problem of good is undermined: if reality is biased towards the good (or permissibility), then there’s reason to think it’s more likely than not that a prima facie good state of affairs is all things considered good, and this spells trouble for maltheism.14 However, if this is the case—if skeptical theism doesn’t undermine the problem of good—then the evil-god challenge fails for a different reason. Namely, it fails because the problem of good and the problem of evil aren’t equally strong: skeptical theism undermines the problem of evil but it doesn’t undermine the problem of good. And that means that premise (6) is false and the evil-god challenge fails. Why do I note this only as a qualification? Because, as I said in Chap. 2 and Chap. 3, while equiprobability objections to skeptical theism are  I think there are good reasons for rejecting maltheism. But the problem of good isn’t one of them.  Briefly, this is because an unknown evil will be less likely than an unknown good, since reality is biased towards good. And from this one can run an argument similar to the one considered in Chap. 2, Section “Is A Sufficiently Weighty Unknown Good Likely?” While I rejected that objection in Chap. 2, my reasons for rejecting it clearly won’t apply here.. 13 14

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by far the most serious objections on offer, barely anyone pays attention to them. So, if you don’t buy these equiprobability objections, then my initial response here should show that skeptical theism renders premise (7) false. And if you do buy equiprobability objections and my response to them, then premise (6) is false. Either way, the evil-god challenge fails.

The Argument from Divine Hiddenness That some people lack belief in God has been cited as evidence for atheism. Arguments that make use of a claim like this are called arguments from divine hiddenness. In this section, I will detail both logical and evidential versions of the argument from divine hiddenness and will show that both succumb to criticisms stemming from skeptical theism.

The Logical Argument from Divine Hiddenness While the argument doesn’t originate with him,15 Schellenberg (1993, 2015, 2016) has argued recently and persistently (albeit unconvincingly) that non-resistant non-belief—the existence of finite creatures who lack belief in God but aren’t resistant to being in a relationship with him—is incompatible with God’s existence, and since there are such people, it follows that God doesn’t exist. Why does Schellenberg think God’s existence is incompatible with non-resistant non-belief? Because of his view of the nature of perfect love. Since God is perfectly loving towards his creatures, he would seek the greatest good for each individual.16 What is each individual’s greatest good? Having a relationship with God, says Schellenberg. However, to be in a relationship with God requires at least believing that God exists. So,

 Nietzche (1982) (quoted in Rea, 2011) expresses a version of the argument from divine hiddenness. 16  He says, “perfect love. … is here taken to be the best, the greatest, the deepest love that could possibly be realized in God. it’s ultimate love.” (Schellenberg, 2015, p. 39) 15

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necessarily, God would ensure that there’s no non-resistant non-belief.17 But there’s at least some non-resistant non-belief. And, therefore, God doesn’t exist. We may state this argument more formally as follows: (14) Necessarily, if God exists, then God is perfectly loving toward such finite persons as there may be. (15) Necessarily, if God is perfectly loving outward such finite persons as

there may be, then for any capable finite person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a positively meaningful and conscious relationship (a personal relationship) with S at t. (16) Necessarily, if God exists, then for any capable finite person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a personal relationship with S at t. (17) Necessarily, if for any capable finite person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a personal relationship with S at t, then for any capable finite person S and time t, it is not the case that S is at t non-resistantly in a state of non-belief in relation to the proposition that God exists.

(18) Necessarily, if God exists, then for any capable finite person S and time t, it is not the case that S is at t non-resistantly in a state of non-belief in relation to the proposition that God exists. (19) There is at least one capable finite person S and time t such that S is or was at t non-resistantly in a state of non-belief in relation to the proposition that God exists. (20) It is not the case that God exists. (Schellenberg, 2016) Several of these premises are contentious. For example, some have argued that we aren’t in any position to think that there is (even probably) non-resistant non-belief (e.g. Henry, 2008; Macdonald, 2021). And others have argued that one need not believe God exists in order to have a relationship with him (e.g. Cullison, 2010a; Lebens, 2022). Additionally, it might be doubted that our greatest good is having a relationship with God (Draper, forthcoming)—although, I suspect most theists will grant  It’s worth noting here that while Schellenberg doesn’t think it’s epistemically possible that God’s existence is incompatible with non-resistant non-belief, he thinks it’s epistemically possible that true belief alone is sufficient for knowledge (2013, p. 44). This is wild. If one really thinks it’s epistemically possible that true belief alone is sufficient for knowledge, how could she claim it’s not epistemically possible that God’s existence is incompatible with non-resistant non-belief? The skepticism of the former is so wild that it’s hard to see how it wouldn’t apply to the much more contentious latter issue. 17

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Schellenberg this point. However, I’ll bypass these worries and grant, for the sake of argument, that Schellenberg is right on all three accounts—I grant that there’s non-resistant non-belief, that belief is required for there to be a relationship with God, and that each individual’s greatest good is having a relationship with God. What I will contest is that God’s perfect love necessarily rules out non-resistant non-belief.18 While an individual’s greatest good may be having a relationship with God, it could nevertheless be that God has reasons that are sufficiently weighty to make it such that he is required (or that he would be justified) to permit non-resistant non-belief, i.e. forgo bringing about an individual’s greatest good. And if God has such reasons, he could still be perfectly loving. In brief, this is because being perfectly loving isn’t the same as being maximally loving. Hudson nicely illuminates this distinction: to love perfectly is for one’s love to be in the right proportion to the object of one’s love, everything considered—loving to the degree that matches the degree of worthiness to be loved.19

So, to love another perfectly isn’t necessarily to love her to the maximal degree. What matters is loving someone to the degree to which they’re worthy of love. To illustrate this distinction in a concrete way, consider the following: Ship Wreck: A Captain, call him Crunch, took his ship on a voyage with his two daughters and his two dogs. The engine of Captain Crunch’s ship began to fail and he put out an S.O.S.. Captain Crunch receives a quick response from his S.O.S.: a ship is on its way to provide aid. Unfortunately, he’s told that it will take 3 weeks for the ship to arrive. Worse yet, aside from dog food, the only food that Captain Crunch had stored on the ship were berries, and these berries (but not the dog food) were swept off the ship by a large wave. This leaves Captain Crunch and his daughters without food. And without food, they will not be able to survive until the rescue ship arrives. There is one option available: he and his daughters could  Some doubt that God is perfectly loving, in which case this issue won’t arise in the first place. See Murphy (2017a)). 19  Comments made in personal correspondence quoted in Howard-Snyder and Green (2016: n.p.) 18

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kill and eat his dogs. This would enable them to survive until help arrives. After considering the situation for some time, Captain Crunch decides to kill his dogs so that he and his daughters may survive.20

Here’s the crucial question: in Ship Wreck, has Captain Crunch been less than perfectly loving toward his dogs? No. Indeed, if he didn’t kill his dogs to enable him and his daughters to survive, he wouldn’t have been perfectly loving toward them: he would have been too loving toward his dogs.21 Or, in other words, Captain Crunch’s reasons favor him saving himself and his daughters and killing his dogs: he had reasons for not maximally loving his dogs. So, a perfect love for something is to afford it the proper amount of love. And a proper amount of love isn’t necessarily a maximal amount of love. Put in terms of reasons: if one has sufficiently weighty reasons for not maximally loving a creature, then to maximally love that creature isn’t to perfectly love it. This, however, means that premise (15) and (17) are false: while being in a relationship with God may be a creature’s greatest good, God loving a creature perfectly might involve him not maximally loving it, and so might involve him not providing it with its greatest good (i.e. a relationship with him). So, there are cases when one can love something too much—being perfectly loving towards X can mean being less than maximally loving towards X. If one has sufficiently weighty reasons to refrain from being maximally loving, then to be perfectly loving isn’t to be maximally loving. But this has implications for non-resistant non-belief and theism. Here’s why. Suppose that God has a sufficiently weighty reason for not being maximally loving towards us. That is, suppose that God being perfectly loving toward us isn’t for him to be maximally loving toward us.22 The proponent of the Logical Argument from Divine Hiddenness must claim that God (at least) probably doesn’t have such a reason. How could one motivate this view? One way would be to hold that one can just see, perhaps through intuition, that God has no such reasons. However, this intuition—if  This story isn’t significantly different from Hudson’s (2017) story.  Alternatively, perhaps when one overvalues the dogs, she isn’t loving the dogs enough: she treats the dogs as more than they are or should be, which isn’t loving them enough. 22  What would this reason look like? I don’t know. But my lack of an example isn’t a concern here. The point is that whether there’s such a reason is something that must be addressed. 20 21

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anyone actually has it—would be undermined due to issues I raise in Chap. 9. An alternative way is to mimic noseeum arguments from evil (see Chap. 4, Section “Noseeum Arguments from Evil”): we can infer from the fact that we recognize no sufficiently weighty reasons for God to not be maximally loving towards his creatures to the conclusion that there probably aren’t such reasons. However, this inference is undermined by skeptical theism, and in particular Deontological Skeptical Theism. And so we have two possible responses to this issue here, neither of which work. Therefore, The Logical Argument from Divine Hiddenness fails.

The Evidential Argument from Divine Hiddenness So, the logical argument from divine hiddenness fails. However, the evidential version of the argument from divine hiddenness poses more of a challenge—it’s far more of a serious threat to theism than the logical version. The Evidential Argument from Divine Hiddenness claims not that non-resistant non-belief is incompatible with God’s existence. Instead, it claims (far more plausibly) that it’s evidence against his existence. The argument takes different forms (e.g. Anderson, 2021; Anderson & Russell, forthcoming; Leon & Rasmussen, 2019; Oppy, 2013; Maitzen, 2006). However, we may state it generically as follows. The greatest good for finite creatures is to be in a relationship with God. And God’s being perfectly loving towards all finite creatures makes it such that he would probably ensure that all such creatures who are not resistant toward being in a relationship with him satisfy the necessary conditions for being in a relationship with him. One such condition is believing that he exists. Therefore, God would at least probably ensure that there aren’t non-­ resistant non-believers—it’s unlikely, given theism, that there are non-­ resistant non-believers. Naturalism, let’s say, is the view that God (or anything at all like God) doesn’t exist. Naturalism, as such, is incompatible with theism. However, that there is non-resistant non-belief isn’t unlikely given naturalism. Indeed, non-resistant non-belief is far more likely given naturalism than theism.23 And this means that non-resistant  Strictly speaking, this argument only needs non-resistant non-belief to be higher on naturalism than on theism. It doesn’t need the claim that non-resistant non-belief is unlikely given theism or that it’s likely on naturalism. 23

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non-belief is strong evidence against theism. Call this The Evidential Argument from Divine Hiddenness. The conclusion of The Evidential Argument from Divine Hiddenness is that the probability of non-resistant non-belief (NRNB) is far greater given naturalism (N) than given theism (T). We may state this as follows: The Probability Claim: Pr(NRNB/T)!< Pr(NRNB/N).

So, should we endorse The Probability Claim? That depends on what God’s reasons are: if he has strong reasons for, say, letting humans help each other come to have a relationship with him (e.g. Swinburne, 1998; Crummett, 2015) that aren’t outweighed by countervailing reasons, then it won’t be unlikely given theism. And, more generally, if he has sufficiently strong reasons for permitting (or causing) NRNB, it (NRNB) won’t be unlikely given theism. So, what should we think of God’s reasons with respect to permitting non-resistant non-belief? According to Deontological Skeptical Theism, we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking it’s likely that the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons. This will prevent any inferences from the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting NRNB to the actual weight of God’s reasons for permitting NRNB. And this means that to support The Probability Claim, we will need to appeal to private reasons, such as intuition—if we don’t appeal to private reasons, then we’re left without reason for affirming The Probability Claim, and The Evidential Argument from Divine Hiddenness flounders. However, private reasons can’t be plausibly invoked here for the reasons given in Chap. 9. And this leaves us without a clear way forward with respect to The Probability Claim. So, the Evidential Argument from Divine Hiddenness is no more successful than The Logical Argument from Divine Hiddenness. That is, it’s not successful at all.

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The Evolutionary Argument for Atheism Many have thought that evolution poses a problem for theism (e.g. Dennett, 2006; Kitcher, 2007). The most plausible statement of this problem can be found in Draper (1998): he argues that evolution is evidence against theism. Call this The Evolutionary Argument for Atheism. The Evolutionary Argument for Atheism is concerned with general evolution, which Draper takes to include the following: “the genealogical thesis,” [which] asserts that evolution did in fact occur— complex life did evolve from relatively simple life. Specifically, it is the view that all multicellular organisms and all (relatively) complex unicellular organisms on earth (both present and past) are the (more or less) gradually modified descendents of a small number of relatively simple unicellular organisms. The second thesis, which I will call “the genetic thesis,” addresses the issue of how evolution occurred. It states that all evolutionary change in populations of complex organisms either is or is the result of trans-­ generational genetic change (or, to be more precise, trans-generational change in nucleic acids). (1998, p. 316)

Understood as such, evolution may be contrasted with Darwinism, which holds that natural selection operating on random genetic mutation is the principle mechanism driving evolutionary change. (Draper, 1998, p. 316)

So, what’s the problem that evolution poses to religion? He says that [Antecedently*], evolution is much more probable on the assumption that naturalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true. (Draper, 1998, p. 317)

For Draper, the antecedent*24 probability of evolution is, essentially, the probability of evolution independent of the observations and  As with the previous chapter, I add an asterisk after “antecedent” to emphasize the difference between Draper’s use of the term and mine within the context of skeptical theism. For the remainder of this section, unless stated otherwise, all talk of probability should be understood as antecedent* probability as defined above. 24

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testimony that constitutes our evidence for evolution (1998, p. 317).25 With that in mind, let’s call theism T, naturalism N, and evolution E. Draper’s argues that the following is true: Draper’s Conclusion: Pr(E/N) >! Pr(E/T)

Draper’s conclusion entails that evolution is strong evidence against theism—it’s far more likely on N, a competing hypothesis, than it is on theism. Why should we affirm Draper’s Conclusion? Say that special creationism S is the thesis that at least some relatively complex living things were independently created by a supernatural person. Because E entails ~S, it follows that Draper’s Conclusion is true if and only if the following is true: Draper’s Probability Claim: Pr(~S/N) x Pr(E/~S&N) >! Pr(~S/T) x Pr(E/~S&T).

So Draper tries to show that Draper’s Conclusion is true by showing that Draper’s Probability Claim is true. In other words, he tries to show that special creationism is [antecedently*] much more likely to be false on naturalism than on theism and … even on the assumption that special creationism is false, evolution is still [antecedently*] at least as likely to be true on naturalism as it is on theism. (1998, p. 317)

And why should we think this? One reason, Draper says, is that God could have created living things in different ways—he didn’t have to use evolution. For example, he could have created each species individually. And, moreover, there don’t appear to be any reasons for God to use

 For more on Draper’s notion of antecedent probability, see Chap. 4, Section “Humean Arguments from Evil”. 25

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evolution as opposed to special creation. So, we should affirm Draper’s Probability Claim and therefore we should affirm Draper’s Conclusion. There’s a lot to say about this argument, but I’ll limit myself to two points.26 First, how valuable S is may have a serious influence on how likely we think S is given T. However, Axiological Skeptical Theism prevents us from making inferences about S’s actual value from its perceived value. And so—insofar as judgments about the value of S are crucial to making judgments about Pr(~S/T)—we won’t be able to make a judgment about Draper’s Probability Claim, which means we can’t make a judgment about Draper’s Conclusion, which means that The Evolutionary Argument for Atheism isn’t successful—it doesn’t show us that evolution is evidence against theism. A bigger issue for The Evolutionary Argument for Atheism is that the probability of S, and therefore Pr(~S/T) will be a function of the weight of God’s reasons for S. So, what should we think about God’s reasons for S? Unfortunately, Deontological Skeptical Theism prevents us from making inferences about the weight of God’s reasons for S from the perceived weight of his reasons, meaning that we don’t have a good public antecedent (in my sense of the term) reason for ascribing a probability to S. One might be tempted to appeal to private reasons to circumvent this issue, but this would run into the problems I outline in Chap. 9. And this leaves us without reason to affirm Draper’s Probability Claim, which leaves us without reason to affirm Draper’s Conclusion, which means The Evolutionary Argument for Atheism fails—skeptical theism renders it unmotivated.

 Let me register, from the start, however, that how we think about Pr(E/T) will be largely influenced by how good E is. Indeed, without knowing how good E is, it’s hard to make a judgment of Pr(E/T). Moreover, there’s some (defeasible) reason to think that E is good—worlds in which S (and hence ~E) hold are worlds in which God must (at least) periodically intervene. But some have thought that God’s intervention in this way would be far less good than if he brought things about by way of E. For example, Howard-Snyder (2017) is sympathetic to something like this view, which he says was espoused by Leibniz. 26

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The Case for Atheism: What’s Left? So, skeptical theism has a wide scope: in addition to undermining numerous arguments from evil (see Chap. 4), it undermines the other most popular arguments for atheism. Indeed, we may make a more general point here: skeptical theism undermines all arguments for atheism that depend on an inference from the perceived value of states of affairs to the actual value or on an inference from the perceived weight of God’s reasons to the actual weight of his reasons. Or, in other words, skeptical theism undermines most arguments for atheism currently on offer. So, skeptical theism has a serious impact on the epistemic status of atheism: it eliminates its strongest sources of evidence.27 However, that isn’t the end of the matter. First, there are other arguments for atheism that in principle aren’t vulnerable to skeptical theism. For example, the low priors argument for atheism (Draper, 2017a)28 and arguments from contradictory or incoherent divine properties (e.g. Martin, 1992).29 So, the case for atheism isn’t eliminated entirely by skeptical theism—although, it is greatly weakened. And second, it may be possible to restate these arguments in ways that aren’t vulnerable to skeptical theism. Indeed, I lay out a strategy for atheists to reconstruct arguments against theism in such a way in Chap. 8, Section “How to Make an Effective Argument for Atheism”. While it’s possible to refashion these arguments in a way that’s immune to skeptical theism, the prospects don’t look great to me. However, I’ll leave it to others to consider this issue in more depth.

 Indeed, as I note in Chap. 3, arguments that don’t make reference to the actual weight of God’s reasons and merely make reference to the value of different states of affairs are non-starters: we need to know the weight of God’s reasons to predict how he will act. And so axiological arguments can be thrown out from the start—it’s the deontological ones that matter. 28  But see Miller (2018), Wilson (2020), and Poston (2020) for views that challenge Draper’s argument. 29  See Nagasawa (2017) for a sweeping response to these worries. Numerous responses have been given to other purportedly contradictory divine properties, e.g., Plantinga (1974), and Swinburne (1993). 27

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The Case for Theism: Weakened? In this chapter, I’ve focused on the effects of skeptical theism on arguments for atheism, and argued that the case for atheism is greatly weakened. But doesn’t the same thing go for theism? That is, if skeptical theism undermines arguments for atheism, doesn’t it also undermine arguments for theism? Short answer: Yes. For example, fine-tuning arguments for theism that rely on an inference from the perceived value of humans to their actual value will fall prey to Axiological Skeptical Theism. And this will be the case for all theistic arguments that rely on this kind of inference. However, in Chap. 8, I provide a model for constructing arguments for (and against) theism that don’t fall prey to skeptical theism. And so, while skeptical theism undermines some arguments for theism, it doesn’t undermine all of them, and those that are undermined may be able to be restated by using the method I develop in Chap. 8. Indeed, the arguments I consider in Chap. 8 for theism are, I think, strong evidence for theism—stronger than any evidence for atheism currently on offer.

6 Skeptical Theism Defeated?

Introduction In Chap. 2 and Chap. 3, I argued that both Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism are true, and considered both direct and indirect objections to them. Direct objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism purport to identify a good public antecedent reason for thinking that the perceived value of a complex evil state of affairs resembles its actual value. In the same vein, direct objections to Deontological Skeptical Theism purport to identify a good public antecedent reason for thinking that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting some state of affairs resembles the weight of his actual reasons. Indirect objections to Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism, on the other hand, claim that a bizarre consequence results from accepting either of these positions, and as such, they should be rejected. The bizarre purported consequence of Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological skeptical Theism is some sort of excessive skepticism: accepting either position, it’s claimed, leads to external world skepticism or moral skepticism. In Chap. 2 and Chap. 3, I briefly considered some of these indirect objections. However, I didn’t consider what appears to be the most popular indirect objection, which is that these positions provide one with a defeater for her commonsense beliefs, and that this results in skepticism © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4_6

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about our commonsense beliefs. In this chapter, I will address this charge at length. For the purposes of this chapter, I will take our commonsense beliefs to encompass those obvious truths that we take ourselves to know, such as truths of our simple perceptual, memory, introspective, mathematical, elementary logical, and moral beliefs.1 If our commonsense beliefs aren’t (at least necessarily) defeated by Axiological Skeptical Theism and Deontological Skeptical Theism, then we will have shown that these positions don’t entail skepticism without bound, let alone excessive skepticism.2

The Nature of Defeaters The charge against skeptical theism in this chapter is that it provides one with a defeater for her commonsense beliefs. To make sense of this charge, we must first get a grasp of the nature of defeaters. It’s to this subject that I now turn. Say that “warrant” is that property (whatever it is) that, when enough of it is had, turns mere true belief into knowledge.3 A defeater D for a belief B, very roughly, is a belief4 that one comes to hold that makes it such that one should (at least) give up B or that makes it such that B has become unwarranted.5 Of course, defeaters can have defeaters themselves—defeater defeaters. For example, D might be a defeater for S’s belief B, rendering it such that B is unwarranted for S. However, S might come to hold another belief D* that makes it such that she should (at  I take this list of commonsense beliefs from Bergmann (2012, p. 10)  It has also been argued that Axiological Skeptical Theism entails skepticism about beliefs based solely on divine revelation (Wielenberg, 2010 and Hudson, 2014a). I have addressed these objections elsewhere (Hendricks, 2020c) and so I will not address them here. That said, much of what I say in this chapter will be applicable to these objections. 3  This follows Plantinga’s (1993) conception of warrant. 4  Bergmann (2006, pp. 155–156) suggests that experiences can also be defeaters. For the sake of simplicity, I will pass over this complication—although, nothing hinges on this point. 5  Whether a defeater makes it such that S should (at least) give up her belief B or it makes it such that B has lost its warrant depends on what kind of defeater it is. Below I will go into more detail about the nature of defeaters. It’s also worth mentioning that having a defeater for B entails that B has lost its warrant, but that B has lost its warrant doesn’t entail that S should give it up. See the distinction between rationality defeaters (Section “Rationality Defeaters”) and warrant defeaters (Section “Warrant Defeaters”) below. 1 2

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least) give up D. In this case, D is a defeater for B and D* is a defeater for D. D defeats B, but then D* comes along and defeats D, restoring B’s warrant for S.6 However, I will set these complications aside and will simply speak of defeaters and not undefeated defeaters. In other words, I will understand a defeater to be an undefeated defeater.7 This rough characterization of defeaters should make clear that there are different kinds of defeaters—not all defeaters are alike. Below, I will distinguish several kinds of defeaters and illustrate how they function. More specifically, I will distinguish between and explain rationality defeaters, warrant defeaters, Humean defeaters, and purely alethic defeaters. First, we can distinguish between rationality defeaters and warrant defeaters. If S has a rationality defeater for her belief B, then it’s irrational for her to hold B. That is, if S’s belief B1 is a rationality defeater for her belief B2, then S cannot continue to rationally hold B2.8 For example, suppose that Sally and Carrissa are driving down the highway. Sally notices a structure that appears to be a barn and forms the belief that’s a barn, call it B1. And suppose that her belief is true: what she sees really is a barn. But suppose that shortly after Sally forms B1, Carrissa tells her 6  There are also defeater deflectors. Suppose that S believes B and D and that if S holds B and D alone, that D is a defeater for B. But suppose that S also believes F, and that F makes it such that D doesn’t apply to S and therefore doesn’t defeat B. In that case, F is a defeater deflector for S with respect to D. For example, suppose that Sally is going to introduce her friend Sarah to her other friend Samantha. Sally tells Sarah that Samantha’s middle name is Joan, resulting in Sarah forming the belief that Samantha’s middle name is Joan, call it B. Sally also tells Sarah that Samantha, for reasons unbeknownst to her, lies to others about her middle name—she tells people that her middle name is Shannon. This results in Sarah forming the belief that Samantha lies to others about her middle name, call it F. Later, Sarah meets Samantha, who introduces herself and tells her (Sarah) that her middle name is Shannon. This results in Sarah forming the belief that Samantha said that her middle name is Shannon, call it D. Were it not for Sarah’s belief F, D would defeater her belief B. However, in this case, Sarah’s belief F deflects D from defeating her belief B: it’s not that F overrides D’s defeating force; rather, it’s that F prevents D from ever defeating B. 7  Another complication worth mentioning in brief is that there can be full defeaters and partial defeaters. If a belief D is a full defeater for a belief B, then D causes B to be unwarranted. Alternatively, if D is only a partial defeater for B, then it merely reduces the amount of warrant B has (Bergmann, 2006, p. 155). In this chapter, I’m only concerned with full defeaters, and I will understand “defeater” to mean “full defeater.” 8  It’s worth noting that if S’s belief B1 is a rationality defeater for her belief B2, that B1—at least arguably, see Plantinga, 2000, pp.  364–366 and Bergmann, 2006, pp.  164–166—need not be rational. That is, irrational beliefs can be rationality defeaters. For example, if I irrationally believe that I will win the lottery, this defeats my other (rational) belief that I probably didn’t win the lottery.

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that they have just entered Fake Barn County—a county whose residents have erected 10 fake barns for every real barn in a poorly thought out attempt to scare away city folk. (City folk are scared of barns, after all.) Sally then forms the belief I’m in Fake Barn County, call it B2. Her newly acquired belief about her location, i.e. B2, is a rationality defeater for her belief B1: it makes it irrational for her to continue to hold B1— even if it (B1) is true. Rationality defeaters are also warrant defeaters. This means that if S has a rationality defeater for B, then B is not only irrational for S, it is also unwarranted—even if true. Rationality defeaters may be further subdivided into two groups: undercutting defeaters and rebutting defeaters. Basically, if S has an undercutting defeater for her belief B, then S has lost her grounds for thinking B is true. This means that S should withhold belief—she should not hold or reject B. For example, suppose that Patty and her sister Selma are taking a tour of a widget factory. Patty looks down the factory line, sees a bunch of widgets that appear red, and forms the belief those are red widgets, call it B1. Shortly after Patty forms this belief, Selma gestures up to the ceiling, pointing out that there are large red lights directly above the factory line. In response to this, Patty forms the belief that the widgets appear red isn’t truth-tracking, call it B2. This means that she should give up her belief that the widgets are red—while it’s possible they’re red, her grounds for belief have been eliminated and her belief is no longer warranted: she has an undercutting defeater for her belief that the widgets are red.9 Alternatively, S has a rebutting defeater for her belief B if she has reason to reject or disbelieve B. For example, suppose that Beatrice tells Amanda that she (Beatrice) has a dog named Bork. In response to Beatrice’s  Importantly, that the widgets will appear red whether or not they are red is not what functions as an undercutting defeater for Sally. If that were sufficient for undercutting defeat, then nearly all of our beliefs are defeated. This is because there are skeptical scenarios in which I hold all the beliefs I do now but I have been systemically deceived and they are false. For example, if I’m a brain in a vat that scientists have toyed with to make it such that I believe I’m out in the world acting as I normally do, then I will hold all the beliefs I currently do. This means that whether or not I’m a brain in a vat, I will believe I’m not a brain in a vat. But this doesn’t provide me with an undercutting defeater for thinking that I’m not a brain in a vat! The difference between this and the widget case is that in the widget case, we regard the grounds of our belief (i.e. the appearance of the widgets as red) as not tracking the truth, whereas in the brain in a vat case, we don’t regard the grounds of our beliefs as not tracking truth. (Although, if we did, then we would acquire an undercutting defeater for our beliefs.) 9

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testimony, Amanda forms the corresponding belief Beatrice has a dog named Bork, call it B1. Soon after, Amanda’s trusted friend Colleen tells her (Amanda) that Beatrice is lying—she doesn’t actually own a dog, she just wants people to think she owns a dog so that they will want to be friends with her (people like dogs, after all). In response to Colleen’s testimony, Amanda forms the belief Beatrice lied to me about owning a dog, call it B2. This belief (B2), provides Amanda with a rebutting defeater for her belief B1: it gives her reason to think B1 is false. Second, there are warrant defeaters. In contrast to rationality defeaters, warrant defeaters need not defeat one’s rationality: if S has a warrant defeater for her belief B, then B lacks warrant on account of some fact obtaining, but S can still be rational in holding it.10 For example, consider again the case of Sally and Carrissa driving down the highway. Sally sees a structure that appears to be a barn and forms the belief that’s a barn, call it B, and her belief is true. Now suppose that Carrissa remains silent this time about Fake Barn County—perhaps she’s too tired to inform Sally that they’re in Fake Barn County or perhaps she doesn’t realize they’ve entered Fake Barn County. Whatever the reason for Carrissa’s silence, Sally does not come to believe that she’s in Fake Barn County, and continues to hold her belief B. Her belief is perfectly rational for her to hold. However—despite its truth—her belief lacks warrant due to a fact about her environment: given certain facts about her environment, her belief ’s truth is merely accidental. In other words, because there are far more fake barns in Fake Barn County than there are real barns (a fact about her environment), Sally’s belief is merely accidentally true, and this means that her belief ’s warrant is defeated.11 In the above example, it’s a fact about Sally’s environment (i.e. that she’s in Fake Barn Country) that defeats her warrant for her belief. Indeed, Plantinga (2011, pp. 166–167) suggests that warrant defeaters ordinarily arise from facts  Although, as Plantinga (2011, p. 167) points out, becoming aware of the fact that one has a warrant defeater typically provides one with a rationality defeater. 11  Of course, only some types of accident function as a warrant defeater. For example, suppose I accidentally take a drink out of your cup and find out that you’re drinking vodka instead of water. It’s only by accident that I believe this, but my belief is not unwarranted in virtue of this fact. For more on what types of accident preclude knowledge or justification, see Engel (1992) and (Engel, n.d.). 10

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about one’s environment. However, we may say more generally that if S has a pure warrant defeater—a warrant defeater that doesn’t arise from a rationality defeater—for her belief B, then some fact makes it such that one of the external conditions—conditions that aren’t internal to her— for warrant has not been satisfied. For example, proper functionalists hold that a necessary condition for warrant is that the belief was formed by a properly functioning cognitive faculty (e.g. Boyce & Plantinga, 2012 and McNabb, 2018). And so for the case of the proper functionalist, that S’s belief B wasn’t produced by a properly functioning cognitive faculty (i.e. it was produced by a malfunctioning cognitive faculty) is a warrant defeater for B. Reliablists, on the other hand, hold that S’s belief is warranted only if it was produced in a reliable manner (e.g. Goldman, 1986). And so for the case of the reliablist, the fact that S’s belief wasn’t produced in a reliable manner would function as a warrant defeater for her belief. Explanationists, alternatively, hold that S’s belief is warranted only if the belief is held because it’s true (e.g. Bogardus & Perrin, 2022). And so for the explanationist, that S’s belief isn’t held because of its truth would function as a warrant defeater for her belief. And so on. There are (at least) two other types of defeaters that are relevant to criticisms of skeptical theism. First, there are purely alethic defeaters (Plantinga, 2000, p.  363 and Plantinga, 2002, p.  209) which depend (roughly) on what a properly functioning agent would believe. In Plantinga’s words: D is a purely [alethic] defeater of B for S at t if (1) S’s noetic structure N at t includes B and S comes to believe D at t, and (2) any person S* (a) whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the relevant respects, (b) who is such that the bit of the design plan governing the sustaining of B in her noetic structure is successfully aimed at truth (i.e., at the maximization of true belief and the minimization of false belief ) and nothing more, (c) whose noetic structure is N and includes B, and (d) who comes to believe D but nothing else independent of or stronger than D, would withhold B (or believe it less strongly). (Plantinga, 2000, p. 363)

Basically, the idea is this: D is a purely alethic defeater for S’s belief B if any person that believed B whose truth-aimed cognitive faculties were (in

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the relevant way) functioning properly would, after coming to hold D, abandon B. For example, suppose that you come to be diagnosed with a rare disease and your prospects aren’t good: your doctor tells you that your disease is terminal and that you have 3 months to live. However, you find yourself being optimistic about your prospects: you believe that you’ll live for at least 6 months. Suppose that this optimism is the result of proper functioning cognitive faculties operating (solely) in a way to increase your odds of survival: that you believe you’ll live longer makes it more likely that you will, in fact, survive, and that is the (sole) reason that you hold this belief. Since your optimism is produced by a process that isn’t aimed at truth, you have a purely alethic defeater for your belief— any person whose truth aimed cognitive faculties who believes that they have a terminal disease and that their doctor12 has given them 3 months to live would (at the very least) withhold belief about whether they will be alive in 6 months. Next, there are Humean defeaters (Plantinga, 2002, pp. 210–211),13 in which S cannot help but hold B (and S realizes this about herself ), while at the same time, in moments of reflection, she thinks B is unlikely to be true or she has no idea how likely it is to be true—the probability of its truth, she thinks, is inscrutable.14 Humean defeaters, then, are a kind of rationality defeater: if S holds B and yet, in moments of reflection, thinks that B is unlikely to be true or that the probability of B’s truth is inscrutable, then it’s irrational for her to continue to hold B. For example, suppose that Sally is convinced by arguments for solipsism or that she has no idea how likely solipsism is to be true. She won’t be able to shake herself of her belief that there are other conscious creatures that exist, and so will continue to hold beliefs about these other creatures. However, when she reflects on the matter, she will come to see that her beliefs about the mental states of other humans are unlikely to be true or that she has no idea

 I’m assuming here that the doctor is known to be trustworthy.  Proper function plays a crucial role in Plantinga’s conception of Humean defeat. I have, in effect, ‘de-proper functionalized’ Humean defeat to make it palatable to non-proper functionalists. The motivation behind the proper functionalized version of Humean defeat and my version remains the same. 14  I’ve added on the “or believes that she has no idea how likely it is to be true” clause here. 12 13

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how likely they are to be true. In such a case, Sally’s beliefs about the mental states of others have a Humean defeater. So, there are rationality defeaters, which can be further subdivided into undercutting defeaters and rebutting defeaters, and there are warrant defeaters, purely alethic defeaters, and Humean defeaters. And though these defeaters are distinct, they aren’t exclusive—one can have, for example, a defeater that is both a rebutting defeater and a warrant defeater. Or, one can have both a Humean defeat and a purely alethic defeater for a belief. And so on. Below, I will consider whether skeptical theism carries with it any of these defeaters.15

Rationality Defeaters Recall that an undercutting defeater for a belief B makes it such that one should give up B—it’s a reason to withhold belief in B but not a reason to reject B. A rebutting defeater for B, however, makes it such that one should believe ~B. In this section, I will consider whether skeptical theism provides one with an undercutting or a rebutting defeater for one’s commonsense beliefs.

Rebutting Rationality Defeaters Does skeptical theism provide one with reason to think one’s commonsense beliefs are false? That is, does skeptical theism provide one with a rebutting defeater for her commonsense beliefs? Briefly, No. There is no plausible route from Axiological Skeptical Theism or Deontological Skeptical Theism to a rebutting defeater. Indeed, this holds for skeptical theism in general, and no one has claimed otherwise. This is because, in general, skeptical theism is a thesis (or set of theses) that is held to undermine certain types of inferences about whether there’s gratuitous evil. Undermining an inference, however, doesn’t give us good reason to think that the conclusion of the inference is false: it just tells us that the  There is, of course, more to say about defeaters. For important discussions of defeaters, see Bergmann (2005 and 2006, pp.  153–168), Moon (2023), Plantinga (unpublished, 2000, and 2011, pp. 163–167), and Sudduth (n.d.). 15

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inference isn’t good grounds for thinking the conclusion  is true. This point can be generalized about skeptical theism: it undermines certain types of inferences. So, if it undermines anything with respect to our commonsense beliefs, it’s going to undermine particular types of inferences—noseeum inferences (see Chap. 4)—in support for there being no good that would justify God in deceiving us about our commonsense beliefs (Axiological Skeptical Theism) or in support of God not having any outweighing requiring reason for not deceiving us about our commonsense beliefs (Deontological Skeptical Theism).16 But undermining inferences like these doesn’t give skeptical theists reason to think that their commonsense beliefs are false—it just shows that certain arguments in favor of their truth are unsuccessful. Thus, there’s no reason to think that skeptical theists have a rebutting defeater for their commonsense beliefs.17 But perhaps this is too quick. For example, suppose that Bonnie holds the belief that it’s reasonable to trust our cognitive faculties, call it B, and suppose further that B is a part of our commonsense beliefs.18 If that’s the case, then if Bonnie comes to acquire an undercutting defeater for her other commonsense beliefs aside from B, then it seems that she also acquires a rebutting defeater for B, which is, ex hypothesi, a commonsense belief. This is because having an undercutting defeater for her commonsense beliefs aside from B gives her reason not to trust her cognitive faculties, which is in direct conflict with B. And this means that skeptical theism threatens at least some of one’s commonsense beliefs with a rebutting defeater, namely, skeptical theism threatens B with a rebutting defeater. 16  I’m brief here since I discuss the effects of skeptical theism in Chap. 4 and in this chapter below (See Section “Undercutting Rationality Defeaters”). 17  Skeptical theism does provide rebutting defeaters for some beliefs—but these are uninteresting for the purposes of this chapter. For example, Axiological Skeptical Theism provides one with a rebutting defeater for her belief that she has good public antecedent reason to think that the value she perceives in some complex evil state of affairs resembles its actual value. And this result can be generalized: every particular type of skeptical theism provides a rebutting defeater for the belief that that type of skeptical theism is false. Again, for the purposes of this chapter, this is uninteresting. And even for purposes outside of the scope of this chapter, this is uninteresting! 18  I’m not convinced that B counts as a commonsense belief. But I will set this issue aside for the sake of argument.

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In response to this, I’ll just note that, in my view, having an undercutting defeater for one’s commonsense beliefs aside from B would provide one with an undercutting, not rebutting, defeater for B. However, if one rejects my view of this matter, it will be of little consequence: if she thinks that an undercutting defeater for one’s commonsense beliefs aside from B provides her with a rebutting defeater for B, then she can view the threats of undercutting defeat for one’s commonsense beliefs below as also being threats of rebutting defeat for B. In that case my arguments against skeptical theism providing one with an undercutting defeater for her commonsense beliefs can be seen as arguments against skeptical theism providing one with a rebutting defeater for B. In other words, even if one thinks that B is a commonsense belief and that skeptical theism threatens it with a rebutting defeater, it won’t impact the arguments I give below. Instead, it just shows that if my arguments below are unsuccessful, then skeptical theism provides one with a rebutting defeater for B.

Undercutting Rationality Defeaters While there are no published reasons for thinking that skeptical theism provides its adherents with a rebutting defeater for their commonsense beliefs, many have argued that skeptical theism provides its adherents with an undercutting defeater for their commonsense beliefs. For example, Law states the worry as follows: doesn’t skeptical theism generate a rationality defeater for beliefs regarding the external world and past? Given that it appears to me both that I ate toast for breakfast this morning and that there is an orange on the table in front of me, it is presumably reasonable for me to believe I ate toast for breakfast and that there is an orange before me. But if I now learn that, (i) God exists, and (ii) for all I know, there is a God-justifying reason for God to deceive me about these things, then, runs the objection, I can no longer reasonably believe I had toast for breakfast or that there is an orange there. For skeptical theism blocks any attempt to justify the belief that there are unlikely to be such God-justifying reasons by means of a noseeum infer-

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ence: ‘I can’t think of a good reason why God would deceive me in that way, therefore there probably is no such reason.’ But then skeptical theism would seem to have the consequence that, for all I know, God does indeed have a good reason to deceive me in this way and is deceiving me for that reason. Just as learning about that defect-revealing light provides me with a rationality defeater for my belief that the widgets are red—I should be skeptical about whether or not the widgets are red—so learning that (i) and (ii) generates a rationality defeater for my beliefs about the external world and past—I should be skeptical about the external world and the past. (Law, 2017, pp. 62–63)

While the commonsense beliefs of skeptical theists might still amount to knowledge, the fact that they have a rationality defeater for these beliefs, thinks Law, renders them (at least) unreasonable.19 There are several points to make with respect to Law’s argument in this passage. First, (i) isn’t of use for Axiological Skeptical Theists or Deontological Skeptical Theists, since these theses are about our good antecedent reasons, which set aside our beliefs about God’s existence (or lack-there-of ). Second, it’s not clear that skeptical theists of any stripe should grant (ii), and I’ve argued elsewhere (Hendricks, 2021a) that, absent some positive argument for thinking this, they shouldn’t affirm it. Since (i) and (ii) undergird Law’s argument for skeptical theists having an undercutting defeater for their commonsense beliefs, his argument cannot get off the ground. And third, recall that Law says that skeptical theism blocks any attempt to justify the belief that there are unlikely to be such God-justifying reasons by means of a noseeum inference … But then skeptical theism would seem to have the consequence that, for all I know, God does indeed have a good reason to deceive me in this way and is deceiving me for that reason.

This is another misstep. Skeptical theism does block noseeum inferences to justify one’s belief that there probably aren’t God-justifying reasons for mass deception, but that doesn’t mean that there aren’t other ways one can have a justified belief about this matter. For example, one might 19

 Here, he’s playing off of Aarnio’s (2010) conception of unreasonable knowledge.

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acquire such justification through intuition, divine revelation, and so on—or, at least, skeptical theism doesn’t explicitly rule out these moves. Thus, more work needs to be done here for Law to establish that skeptical theists have an undercutting defeater for their commonsense beliefs. While Law’s objection rests on several mistakes, this style of objection is common—albeit, not spelled out in as much detail.20 In light of this, I will use the understanding of undercutting defeaters laid out above to try to build up this objection into a serious—or, at least, more serious—threat to skeptical theism. Recall that skeptical theism only undermines noseeum inferences.21 This means that, in order for skeptical theism to undermine one’s commonsense beliefs, they must be based on a noseeum inference from the perceived value of a state of affairs (or of the perceived weight of God’s reasons) to the actual value of that state of affairs (or to the actual weight of God’s reasons).22 If they are based in this manner, then such beliefs would acquire an undercutting defeater from skeptical theism: skeptical theism would eliminate our grounds for holding our commonsense beliefs, meaning that we should give up our commonsense beliefs. Are our commonsense beliefs based on noseeum inferences? In my experience, this is not the case. And this (defeasibly) suggests that the scope of this threat isn’t wide: it doesn’t apply to many (if any) skeptical theists— though, this is an empirical matter, so this could be shown to be wrong in the future.23  See for example Gale (1996), Russell (2018), Street (2014), and Wielenberg (2010). Hudson (Hudson, 2014b. 2017) has, in my view, the most (or perhaps only) serious skeptical objection to skeptical theism. (Well, let me qualify this, since Climenhaga (forthcoming) has produced a good skeptical challenge to skeptical theism.) His argument, however, doesn’t claim that skeptical theists have an undercutting defeater for their belief. Instead, he argues that skeptical theists cannot satisfy the reductionist conditions for testimonial knowledge and so cannot claim to have knowledge based on divine revelation. See Hendricks (2020c) or a discussion of his argument. 21  See Chap. 4, Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism Against The Noseeum Axiological Argument”. 22  This qualification is important since skeptical theism doesn’t undermine all noseeum inferences. For example, it doesn’t undermine the noseeum inference “I don’t see any elephants in my refrigerator, therefore, probably, there are no elephants in my refrigerator.” 23  Of course, there are numerous unconscious brain events that occur prior to our conscious experience. But noseeum inferences are conscious processes, so citing unconscious brain events will not be relevant here. (Sometimes we talk about non-conscious things (e.g. computers, brains), inferring. This language is not to be understood in the manner in which we infer. See e.g. Tallis, 1999). 20

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But perhaps this objection can be pushed further. Perhaps the thought is this. If one accepts Axiological Skeptical Theism, then she holds that she has no good public antecedent reason to think that the value she perceives in some evil state of affairs resembles its actual value. Now, suppose she realizes that if the complex state of affairs consisting of her commonsense beliefs being true and all of the goods and evils logically connected to it is, in actuality, overall evil, then God would not permit it (because it would be axiologically gratuitous evil),24 meaning that her commonsense beliefs would be false. This would mean that the source of her commonsense beliefs would be untrustworthy, and she has lost her grounds for holding them. What’s the probability that the complex state of affairs consisting of her commonsense beliefs being true and all the goods and evils logically connected to it is not overall evil? (Hereafter, I will abbreviate this as “the truth of her commonsense beliefs.”) Or, more to the point, is the truth of her commonsense beliefs overall evil? Given that God would not permit the truth of her commonsense beliefs if it’s overall evil, this amounts to asking whether the source of her commonsense beliefs is trustworthy: if the truth of her commonsense beliefs is overall evil, they won’t be trustworthy; if it isn’t overall evil, then they may well be. This might spell trouble for the adherent of Axiological Skeptical Theism: if she can’t affirm that her commonsense beliefs are (at least probably) reliably formed or that they are (at least probably) truth-­ indicative, then she acquires an undercutting defeater for her commonsense beliefs. This is because merely withholding belief in the trustworthiness (or truth-indicativeness) of the source of one’s belief is sufficient to generate an undercutting defeater. Bergmann states the issue this way: If you are considering whether the actual basis of your belief that p is indicative of p’s truth and you find yourself resisting the belief that it is (because you have considered the matter and you have no idea whether it supports p or not), that seems to undercut your justification for believing p in the same way as if you believed outright that the actual basis for your belief that p did not indicate p’s truth. And for reasons similar to those discussed  See Chap. 4, Section “God and Axiological Gratuitous Evil: Are They Compatible?” for a discussion of axiological gratuitous evil and its relation to theism.

24

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above in connection with believing that your belief that p is unreliably formed, this result holds even if your attitude of uncertainty about whether your belief that p is formed in a reliable way is unjustified. (Bergmann, 2005, pp. 426–427)

While Bergmann speaks of justification, his comments equally apply to warrant: withholding belief about whether the source of one’s belief is reliable (or truth-indicative) renders one’s beliefs produced by that source unwarranted. To illustrate this concretely, suppose that your friend tells you that she had ice cream for breakfast. In response to her testimony, you form the belief that your friend, in fact, had ice cream for breakfast. But suppose that you now consider whether your friend is a reliable testifier with respect to breakfast related questions, and you find yourself resistant to an affirmative answer—you don’t disbelieve that she’s a reliable testifier, but you withhold belief that she is. If that’s the case, then you’ve acquired an undercutting defeater for your belief that your friend had ice cream for breakfast: your uncertainty about the reliability of the source of your belief renders it (your belief about your friend’s breakfast choice) defeated and therefore unwarranted.25 With this in mind, if the adherent of Axiological Skeptical Theism considers the probability that the truth of her commonsense beliefs is overall evil (or the probability that God is deceiving her about her commonsense beliefs in general) and she is resistant to the answer that the probability is low, then she acquires an undercutting defeater for her commonsense beliefs. So, the worry here is that the adherent of Axiological Skeptical Theism can’t say that the probability of the truth of her commonsense beliefs being overall evil is low (or that the probability of God deceiving her about her commonsense beliefs is low), and thus she acquires an undercutting defeater for her commonsense beliefs. So, how is the adherent of Axiological Skeptical Theism to respond to this worry? The only way she can avoid this issue is if she can provide some good reason for thinking it’s likely that the truth of her commonsense beliefs is not overall evil. But her Axiological Skeptical Theism  Of course, it doesn’t follow from this that for every belief that one has, that she needs to have a higher-level belief about the reliability of its source. See Bergmann (2005 and 2006). 25

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entails that she has no good public antecedent reason to think it’s likely that the value she perceives in her commonsense beliefs being true resembles the actual value of her commonsense beliefs being true, meaning that she can’t cite the apparent positive value of the truth of her commonsense beliefs as good reason for thinking their truth isn’t overall evil. That is clearly a barrier for her thinking that her commonsense beliefs being true is not overall evil. This barrier, however, has holes built into it. After all, Axiological Skeptical Theism only makes claims about what one has good public antecedent reason to think. This explicitly leaves open the possibility that one has private or theistic (non-antecedent) reasons to think that her commonsense beliefs being true is not overall evil. With respect to private reasons, the adherent of Axiological Skeptical Theism might use intuition as the basis for her belief that the truth of her commonsense beliefs is not overall evil. In other words, she might have the intuition that the truth of her commonsense beliefs isn’t overall evil. Or perhaps it seems, in the phenomenal conservative sense, that that state of affairs isn’t overall evil. This might provide her with reason for thinking that the probability of the truth of her commonsense beliefs being overall evil is low. Unfortunately, this sort of response invoking private reasons will run into problems I discuss in Chap. 9, and because of that it doesn’t appear to be a promising response to this issue. Alternatively, and more plausibly, theistic reasons—non-antecedent reasons—could also play a role. For example, if the theistic adherent of Axiological Skeptical Theism reasonably believes that God exists and that God would not cause mass deception, then she has good reason to think that the truth of her commonsense beliefs is not overall evil—if that state of affairs were overall evil, God would not allow it, and so she may regard the truth of her commonsense beliefs being overall evil as having a low probability. Why would she think that God would not permit mass deception? Perhaps because she reasonably takes herself to know that no possible world contained in the set of best possible worlds contains mass deception and God must create from the set of best possible worlds. Or, more plausibly, perhaps she reasonably takes herself to know that permitting mass deception would be an imperfection on God’s part. Or, even more plausibly, perhaps she reasonably adheres to a religion in which

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being made in God’s image (understood to mean that we (humans) are knowers) is a component, which rules out mass deception, meaning that it rules out the falsity of her commonsense beliefs. This is  latter-most response is, I think, an extremely plausible response to this issue. And I develop it at length below in Section “Warrant Defeaters”. Alternatively, perhaps the Axiological Skeptical Theist reasonably takes her commonsense beliefs to amount to knowledge (Bergmann, 2012) and that God would not permit a state of affairs that is overall evil (i.e. axiologically gratuitous evil). From this, she can know that the truth of her commonsense beliefs isn’t overall evil and that she isn’t being deceived about them—if it were, then God would be permitting axiologically gratuitous evil. But he can’t do that. And hence she can hold that it is very likely that the truth of her commonsense beliefs isn’t overall evil.26 So, there are numerous ways, with varied degrees of plausibility, in which an adherent of Axiological Skeptical Theism might consistently provide good reason to think that the truth of her commonsense beliefs likely isn’t overall evil. However, since there are ways for adherents of Axiological Skeptical Theism to reject the idea that their commonsense beliefs being true is overall evil, it follows that adherents of Axiological Skeptical Theism don’t necessarily acquire an undercutting defeater for their commonsense beliefs. This same issue can be raised against adherents of Deontological Skeptical Theism. One might claim that if the weight of God’s reasons against the permission of the truth of one’s commonsense beliefs is greater than the weight of God’s reasons in favor of permitting their truth, then one’s commonsense beliefs won’t be true (since that would be impermissible for God). If one sees that this is the case and withholds belief about whether (or disbelieves that) God’s reasons for permitting the truth of our commonsense beliefs likely outweigh his reasons against permitting their truth, then she will acquire an undercutting defeater for her commonsense beliefs. However, Deontological Skeptical Theism entails that she has no good public antecedent reason for thinking it’s likely that the  It’s also worth reiterating a point from Chap. 4: there’s good reason to think that God’s existence is compatible with axiologically gratuitous evil, in which case it won’t matter whether the truth of one’s commonsense beliefs is overall evil. 26

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perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons. And this blocks her from citing the perceived weight of God’s reasons as a reason for thinking it’s likely that God’s reasons for permitting the truth of her commonsense beliefs outweigh his reasons against permitting their truth. Again, this is clearly a barrier for the adherent of Deontological Skeptical Theism to affirm that the probability of God deceiving her about her commonsense beliefs is low. However, again, there are holes built into this barrier. And so, in response to this issue, the adherent of Deontological Skeptical Theism has the same moves available that the adherent of Axiological Skeptical Theism made. That is, she may cite good private reasons for thinking that the perceived weight of God’s reasons in favor of permitting the truth of our commonsense beliefs outweigh his reasons against permitting their truth—perhaps by appealing to intuition or seemings. However, again, this doesn’t look like a promising response due to issues raised in Chap. 9. More plausibly, she can cite good theistic (non-antecedent) reasons for thinking that God’s reasons for permitting the truth of her commonsense beliefs likely outweigh his reasons against permitting their truth. For example, if she reasonably takes her commonsense beliefs to amount to knowledge and reasonably takes herself to know that God exists and that God would not permit an impermissible state of affairs, then she has good theistic reason for thinking that the reasons in favor of permitting the truth of her commonsense beliefs likely outweigh the reasons against them. Furthermore, she might think that God’s reasons for ensuring the truth of her commonsense beliefs—that is, God’s reasons against allowing mass deception—outweigh any reasons he has for permitting the falsity of her commonsense beliefs: perhaps it’s simply impermissible for God to deceive us in such a manner. This would allow her to infer that the probability of God permitting the falsity of her commonsense beliefs is low, thereby staving off undercutting defeat. Or, far more plausibly, perhaps she adheres to a religion of which being made in God’s image is a component, which rules out mass deception, meaning that it renders the falsity of her commonsense beliefs unlikely. This latter-most response is, I think, an extremely plausible response to this issue. Finally, Bergmann points out that

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for all the things we commonsensically know to be true, we know that God (if God exists) didn’t have an all-things-considered good reason to make them false. (2012, p. 15)

This, of course, holds for those who endorse Deontological Skeptical Theism: one who endorses Deontological Skeptical Theism and who reasonably takes her commonsense beliefs to be true can deduce that God doesn’t have sufficiently weighty reason (in Bergmann’s words: an all-­ things-­considered good reason) for deceiving her about her commonsense beliefs. And this means that it’s unlikely that one’s commonsense beliefs are false. The upshot here is, therefore, that adherents of skeptical theism don’t necessarily acquire an undercutting defeater for their commonsense beliefs—if they acquire an undercutting defeater, it’s not in virtue of their skeptical theism.

Help for Arguments from Evil? It may seem that my above move involving an appeal to private reasons comes at a great cost: if the skeptical theist can help herself to private reasons for thinking that the the truth of her commonsense beliefs isn’t overall evil (Axiological Skeptical Theism) or to private reasons for thinking that God’s reasons for permitting the truth of her commonsense beliefs outweigh his reasons against permitting them (Deontological Skeptical Theism), then one can appeal to private reasons for thinking that there is axiologically or deontologically gratuitous evil.27 And, if she thinks that these types of evil are incompatible with God’s existence, this will give her reason to reject theism.28 My response to this, in brief, is agreement: I readily grant this possibility—and this is precisely the move that proponents of the so-called commonsense problem of evil make. Unfortunately, this sort of move—using  See Chap. 4, Section “Gratuitous Evil: What Is It?” for a discussion of axiological and deontological gratuity. 28  Or perhaps one could use private reasons for affirming (Axiological or Deontological) Humean arguments from evil, see Chap. 4, Section “Humean Arguments from Evil”. 27

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private reasons (e.g. intuitions or seemings) to justify belief in axiologically gratuitous evil or deontologically gratuitous evil—isn’t plausible, as I illustrate in Chap. 9. So I won’t address this issue here, beyond noting that the issues I raise in Chap. 9 will be applicable to those who invoke private reasons in support of thinking that there is axiologically or deontologically gratuitous evil.

Warrant Defeaters Recall that a subject acquires a warrant defeater in cases in which some fact makes it such that a condition for warrant isn’t met for her belief.29 For example, if some fact makes it such that S’s belief that p was produced in an unfavorable epistemic environment, such as the example in Fake Barn County given above, then her belief has a warrant defeater and, even if true, it isn’t warranted and doesn’t amount to knowledge. More generally, S has a warrant defeater for her belief if there is some fact that makes it such that at least one necessary external condition for warrant isn’t met. And we may say that S has a pure warrant defeater in cases in which some fact makes it such that a condition for warrant isn’t met for her belief, where that fact isn’t that she has a rationality defeater.30 Does skeptical theism carry with it a pure warrant defeater? As far as I can tell, no one has argued that it does. Instead, the focus has almost exclusively been on whether skeptical theism carries with it an undercutting defeater. Perhaps this is because there’s no clear route from skeptical theism to pure warrant defeat: it’s not at all clear how skeptical theism would result in e.g. (a) one’s commonsense beliefs being formed unreliably (a la reliablism), (b) one’s commonsense beliefs being formed by malfunctioning cognitive faculties (a la proper functionalism), (c) one’s commonsense beliefs being held not because they are true (a la  Put differently: if the fact wasn’t, in fact, a fact, all the conditions for warrant would obtain for S’s belief. 30  As I pointed out above (Section “The Nature of Defeaters”), if S has a rationality defeater for her belief, then she also has a warrant defeater for her belief. This means that those who argue that skeptical theism results in one’s commonsense beliefs having a rationality defeater would, in effect, be arguing that skeptical theism results in one’s commonsense beliefs having a warrant defeater. 29

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explanationism), or (d) one being situated in an inappropriate epistemic environment. And so on. In other words, it’s not at all clear how skeptical theism is (or entails) a fact that makes it such that some condition for warrant isn’t met. Thus, pure warrant defeat does not appear to be a serious threat for skeptical theists: no one has argued that skeptical theists have pure warrant defeaters for their commonsense beliefs, and it’s not clear how such an argument would go. But we may go further than this. Not only is there no serious threat of pure warrant defeat for skeptical theists: there is good reason, if Christian theism is true, to think that our commonsense beliefs are warranted and hence do not have a warrant defeater, pure or otherwise. This would mean that skeptical theists that reasonably endorse Christian theism would have positive reason for thinking that their commonsense beliefs are warranted. Moreover, since rationality defeat entails warrant defeat, the argument I give below gives Christian skeptical theists a positive reason to reject purported rationality defeaters. Plantinga (2000) argues that if theism is true, then belief in God is probably warranted. In his words: [I]f theistic belief is true, then it seems likely that it does have warrant. If it is true, then there is, indeed, such a person as God, a person who has created us in his image (so that we resemble him, among other things, in having the capacity for knowledge), who loves us, who desires that we know and love him, and who is such that it is our end and good to know and love him. But if these things are so, then he would of course intend that we be able to be aware of his presence and to know something about him. And if that is so, the natural thing to think is that he created us in such a way that we would come to hold such true beliefs as that there is such a person as God, that he is our creator, that we owe him obedience and worship, that he is worthy of worship, that he loves us, and so on. And if that is so, then the natural thing to think is that the cognitive processes that do produce belief in God are aimed by their designer at producing that belief. But then the belief in question will be produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth: it will therefore have warrant. (Plantinga, 2000, pp. 189–190)

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Moon (2017) has argued that skeptical theism is in tension with Plantinga’s argument—he thinks that adherents of skeptical theism cannot consistently make some of the inferences Plantinga makes. However, he claims, Plantinga’s argument can be revised and stated in a way that’s not in tension with skeptical theism. In particular, he argues that one can run Plantinga’s argument in terms of Christian theism: if Christian theism is true, Moon argues, then belief in God is probably warranted, and this can be affirmed even by adherents of skeptical theism. This is because (roughly) it’s part of the Christian story that God has provided us with a way to form warranted beliefs about him. The details of his argument aren’t important here. What is important is his revision—it provides the Christian skeptical theist with a way to make a positive case for her commonsense beliefs being warranted. This is because, in the same way that conditionalizing the probability of belief in God being warranted on Christian theism (as opposed to bare theism) enables skeptical theists to hold that belief in God is probably warranted, the Christian skeptical theist can, by conditionalizing on Christian theism (as opposed to bare theism), hold that our commonsense beliefs are probably warranted. Here’s how. According to the Christian (and Jewish) story, God created us in his image to have dominion on the earth (Genesis 1–2, especially 1: 26).31 But having been made in God’s image to have dominion over the earth makes it likely that we know a good deal about the world32—or, at least, it makes it likely that our commonsense beliefs about the world are warranted.33 Moreover, given the Christian story, humans are guilty of  These points, of course, don’t require a literal reading of the creation story in Genesis.  The qualification that we are made in God’s image (at least in part) to have dominion over the Earth is important. This is because one can have dominion over the Earth, in some sense, without having true beliefs at all. Think, for example, of Plantinga’s (2011) Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Part of what drives his argument is that true beliefs aren’t necessary for survival—we can navigate the world and even thrive with mostly false beliefs. However, being made in God’s image to have dominion over the world rules this out—being made in God’s image involves being a ‘knower’, which rules out being radically deceived with respect to our commonsense beliefs. 33  One might doubt that belief is needed to have dominion over the world: perhaps, instead, having justified or warranted credences about the objects of our commonsense beliefs. If this is the case, little has been lost: having justified or warranted credences about the objects of our commonsense beliefs is hardly a step down from our commonsense beliefs amounting to knowledge. Alternatively, one might think that being made in God’s image involves having beliefs, not mere credences. If that’s the case, then one can sidestep this issue. (For my part, I’m not confident that this sidestepping is successful.) 31 32

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sin (Romans 3: 23). The conception of sin in Christian thought is complex, but we may say that it at least involves doing what one knows she shouldn’t do. Indeed, Timpe provides the following analysis of sin in Christian thought: “[w] e sin … if we knowingly do that which we know we ought not, and if we knowingly do not do that which we know we ought.” (Timpe, 2021: n.p.)34 Thus, on the Christian view of sin, we knowingly perform the wrong actions, which suggests that we know a good deal about morality—at least enough that makes it such that our commonsense moral beliefs will be warranted. Finally, being made in the image of God has traditionally been thought of as having the power of reason.35 Having the power of reason, of course, means that (at least) our commonsense beliefs about elementary logic and mathematics will probably be warranted. So, at the very least, given Christian theism,36 our commonsense beliefs about the external world, our commonsense moral beliefs, and our commonsense beliefs arrived at by way of reason (e.g. elementary logical and mathematical beliefs) are probably warranted. Since these three sets of beliefs comprise (or, at least, nearly comprise) what I have called our ‘commonsense beliefs’, we may say that given that Christian theism is true, our commonsense beliefs (or, at least, nearly all of them) are probably warranted.37 As such, adherents of skeptical theism that reasonably endorse Christian theism have positive reason for thinking it’s likely that their commonsense beliefs are warranted and therefore do not have a warrant defeater, pure or otherwise. Moreover, since rationality defeat entails warrant defeat, this means that Christian skeptical theists have  Additionally, Groenhout characterizes sin as “the deliberate choice of a lesser good in preference to a greater, chosen in spite of and against the loving, creative, and wholly good will of God.” (Groenhout, 2006, p. 135), quoted in Timpe (2021). See also Anderson (2009) for an overview of views of sin in Christian thought. 35  This is the view of the matter of Philo, Iraneaus, Augustine, and Aquinas. See Simango (2016) for an overview. 36  I suspect that basically the same points I make in this section about Christiaintiy will hold for Judaism. 37  Of course, according to the Christian story, humans are also fallen creatures. However, that we are fallen creatures doesn’t make it such that our commonsense beliefs lack warrant: that we are fallen creatures tells us about our wickedness (and perhaps about our knowledge of God), not about our cognitive situation with respect to commonsense beliefs. (For more on the noetic effects of sin, see Plantinga, 2000, pp. 199–240.) 34

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another positive reason for rejecting purported rationality defeaters. So, for skeptical theists that reasonably endorse Christian theism, it’s not just that we have no good reason to think our commonsense beliefs have a warrant defeater. Rather we have good reason to think that they are warranted. And, furthermore, this provides one with good reason to think that her commonsense beliefs aren’t subject to a rationality defeater. Undermining this reason requires undermining the reasonability of one’s Christian belief—no small task.38 Of course, not all of the issues discussed above are equally central to Christian theism: while being guilty of sin and being made in the image of God are clearly central doctrines of Christianity, being made in the image of God to have dominion over the Earth isn’t central. It’s a (very) commonly held belief for Christians, but it isn’t a fundamental doctrine in the sense that it isn’t central to the truth of Christianity. And this means that Christian theism offers less support for the view that our beliefs about the external world than it does for our moral beliefs and our commonsense beliefs arrived at by way of reason. As such, Christian theism doesn’t provide equal support for all of our commonsense beliefs, but it provides support nonetheless.39

Humean Defeaters Recall that when S has a Humean defeater for her belief B, she cannot help but hold B, but, in times of reflection, S think B is unlikely to be true or she thinks that the probability of B’s truth is inscrutable. For example, suppose that Sally finds herself believing that the Seahawks will win the Superbowl in the upcoming season, and she is unable to shake herself of this belief. However, in moments of reflection, she finds herself believing that it is unlikely that this belief is true, due to some recent moves they have made with their roster. Or perhaps she finds herself believing that the probability of the Seahawks winning the Superbowl is inscrutable, since she hasn’t paid attention to football for several years  One issue I have not addressed here is whether skeptical theism is compatible with Christian theism. There is, to my knowledge, no serious reason for thinking that there is any tension between these views, and so I will not address this issue any further outside of noting their obvious compatibility. 39  I’m especially indebted to Paul Draper for comments and discussions about my argument in this section. 38

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and knows nothing about the team. In either case, Sally has a Humean defeater for her belief. Can the skeptical theist be said to have a Humean defeater for her commonsense beliefs? Perhaps one could argue that skeptical theism results in a Humean defeater since skeptical theists will regard as inscrutable the probability that God has sufficiently strong reasons for deceiving them about their commonsense beliefs (Deontological Skeptical Theists) or about whether the truth of their commonsense beliefs is overall evil (Axiological Skeptical Theists).40 However, it should be clear that adherents of skeptical theism won’t necessarily believe that their commonsense beliefs are unlikely to be true or have an inscrutable probability of being true. For example, again, one might invoke theistic (non-­antecedent) reasons for thinking it’s likely that God doesn’t have such reasons or for thinking that it’s likely that the truth of one’s commonsense beliefs isn’t overall evil. More generally, the skeptical theist might simply not have these beliefs (i.e. she just might not believe that it’s unlikely that her commonsense beliefs are true or that their truth has an inscrutable probability), meaning that she doesn’t have a Humean defeater. But perhaps the thought is that at least some skeptical theists—in times of reflection on their knowledge of the weight of God’s reasons (Deontological Skeptical Theists) or the overall goodness or badness of states of affairs (Axiological Skeptical Theists)—find themselves thinking it’s unlikely that their commonsense beliefs are truth-indicative or find the probability of the truth of their commonsense beliefs to be inscrutable. I concede that if a skeptical theist finds herself in this situation, then she acquires a Humean defeater. However, whether (and if so, how many) skeptical theists have a Humean defeater is an empirical matter—it depends on whether skeptical theists actually find themselves in moments of reflection to be doubting their commonsense beliefs or finding the probability of their commonsense beliefs being true to be inscrutable. For my part, I know of few skeptical theists in this position—to my

 This thought may be what underlies objections that rely on the claim that skeptical theists are “in the dark” about God’s reasons (or whatever), e.g. Hudson (2017, pp. 55–71). Again, see Hendricks (2021b) for why skeptical theists need not hold that we are in the dark about God’s reasons. 40

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knowledge, not many skeptical theists suffer from Humean defeat.41 And I know of no good argument for thinking skeptical theists epistemically should have Humean defeaters. In summary, while it’s possible for a skeptical theist to acquire a Humean defeater for her commonsense beliefs, nothing forces this defeater on her. And, moreover, it’s an empirical matter how many skeptical theists have a Humean defeater, and anecdotally, it does not seem to be at all common.

Purely Alethic Defeaters Does skeptical theism threaten one with a purely alethic defeater? Recall that D is a purely alethic defeater for S’s belief B if any person that believed B whose truth-aimed cognitive faculties were (in the relevant way) functioning properly would, after coming to hold D, abandon B. So, in essence, when it comes to purely alethic defeat for our commonsense beliefs, the issue is whether any properly functioning skeptical theist would abandon their commonsense beliefs. Does skeptical theism lead to purely alethic defeat with respect to commonsense beliefs? It’s extremely difficult to see how a plausible argument for this would go. Here’s why. First, it’s extremely difficult to show that one has a purely alethic defeater for her belief: it’s difficult to show how a properly functioning human would respond to a belief. In other words, it’s difficult to show how a properly functioning human would cognitively respond to endorsing skeptical theism—at least with respect to commonsense beliefs. Indeed, it’s not clear at all how any case could proceed here without begging the question. After all, skeptical theists might hold that their design plan with respect to their commonsense beliefs is truth-indicative. It’s not clear how one could show that this isn’t

 Some of Hudson’s (2014a, 2017) arguments seem (at times) to push the idea that skeptical theism provides one with a Humean defeater for her commonsense beliefs.

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the case.42 And second, as we saw above, if Christian theism is true, then our commonsense beliefs are probably warranted. But, of course, this would mean that if Christian theism is true, then properly functioning skeptical theists would probably not abandon their commonsense beliefs when coming to hold skeptical theism, and so skeptical theists probably wouldn’t have a purely alethic defeater for their commonsense beliefs. And this means that skeptical theists who reasonably endorse Christianity have positive reason for thinking that their commonsense beliefs don’t have a purely alethic defeater. So, in brief, it’s hard to see how a case can be made for skeptical theists having a purely alethic defeater for their commonsense beliefs, and Christian skeptical theists have positive reason for thinking that they have no such defeater.

Conclusion Skeptical objections to skeptical theism abound. In this chapter, I addressed whether skeptical theism provides one with a defeater for her commonsense beliefs. In considering this matter, I went over the nature of a variety of defeaters that we might have for our commonsense beliefs: (undercutting and rebutting) rationality defeaters, warrant defeaters, Humean defeaters, and purely alethic defeaters. I argued that none of these defeaters are (at least necessarily) entailed by skeptical theism. And so skeptical theism doesn’t entail that our commonsense beliefs have a defeater. Of course, one might claim that this doesn’t get skeptical theists out of the woods: while the skeptical theist’s commonsense beliefs don’t succumb to excessive skepticism, other non-commonsense beliefs might not  Perhaps one’s inclined to say that this same charge of begging the question holds for the belief that our commonsense beliefs are truth-indicative. Indeed, Alston (1993) argues that there are no non-circular ways of justifying the belief that our sense perception is reliable. First, even if right, this wouldn’t show that skeptical theists have a purely alethic defeater for their commonsense beliefs. Instead, it would just show that they lack a positive case for not having a purely alethic defeater. But that’s a far cry from showing that they actually have a purely alethic defeater. And second, as detailed above, the skeptical theist can use Christian theism in support of their not having a purely alethic defeater for their commonsense beliefs. 42

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be so fortunate. For example, perhaps skeptical theism poses a threat to more abstract beliefs, such as our philosophical beliefs. It’s true that beliefs that aren’t commonsense have not been vindicated in this chapter—I focused exclusively on commonsense beliefs—but suffice it to say that prospects for using skeptical theism to undermine other beliefs isn’t promising.

7 Faithful Skeptical Theism

Introduction In the previous chapter, I argued that skeptical theism doesn’t threaten our commonsense beliefs with a defeater. In this chapter, I want to consider the charge that skeptical theism threatens our beliefs based on divine revelation. In my view, attempts to show that skeptical theism undermines our beliefs based on divine revelation are no more successful than attempts to show that skeptical theism defeats our commonsense beliefs. Indeed, I think all the same points I made in the previous chapter about defeat and our commonsense beliefs can be made with respect to defeat and our beliefs based on divine revelation. That said, I think that these objections—objections that claim that skeptical theism undermines our beliefs based on divine revelation—are one of the strongest objections on offer against skeptical theism, and in particular Hudson’s (Hudson, 2014b, 2017) statement of them.1 As such, I will use this chapter to explore what would follow if skeptical theism really does undermine our beliefs based on divine revelation.  Briefly, this is because Hudson’s arguments make use of a standard epistemological view (i.e. reductionism about testimonial justification or knowledge) to make his case—he isn’t just making up his epistemology as he goes, as so many critics of skeptical theism do. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4_7

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So, suppose that critics of skeptical theism are right on this point: skeptical theism undermines our beliefs based on divine revelation. What follows from this? Ultimately, I argue that even if critics of skeptical theism are right—and I don’t think they are—skeptical theists can nevertheless have rational faith in response to divine revelation. Since faith—not knowledge or belief—is crucial in response to divine testimony, even if critics of skeptical theism are right, the cost of skeptical theism is not intolerable.2 Why do I focus on our beliefs based on divine revelation and not our commonsense beliefs? I do this because I think that skeptical theism poses far more of a threat to our beliefs based on divine revelation than it does to our commonsense beliefs. However, I suspect that many of the points I make in this chapter can also be made with respect to our commonsense beliefs.

Divine Revelation and Skeptical Theism Take some instance of purported divine revelation: DIVINE REVELATION: God will forgive all who repent for their sins. DIVINE REVELATION, if known at all, is known by only way of divine testimony.3 More generally, many theists take themselves to have ample knowledge on the basis of divine testimony. For example, many theists think that we can come to know certain things about God or the world by reading scripture, or perhaps (à la Plantinga, 2000, 2015) through the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Let’s say that a belief is undermined if it loses its justification or warrant. In other words, a belief is undermined if it’s defeated. Critics of  If one rejects this view and thinks that knowledge and belief—not faith—are what is important in response to divine testimony, then she may take my thesis as a conditional: if faith, not belief or knowledge, is what is important in response to divine testimony, then the cost of skeptical theism is not intolerable. 3  All references to divine revelation, divine testimony, God’s testimony, etc. should be understood as being such that their content can be known only through revelation or testimony. 2

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skeptical theism argue that if skeptical theism is true, then claims to knowledge of DIVINE REVELATION, or any other proposition known by divine testimony, are undermined.4 To understand how skeptical theism (allegedly) undermines beliefs based on divine testimony, we must take a (very) brief detour into the epistemology of testimony. There are two main positions in the epistemology of testimony: reductionism and non-reductionism. Reductionists (e.g. Fricker, 1994) hold that for S to know p on the basis of R’s testimony, S must have, in addition to the speaker’s good-quality testimony,5 good reason to think that R’s testimony is reliable with respect to p. Non-reductionists (e.g. Plantinga, 1993) deny this: they hold that S can know p on the basis of R’s good-quality testimony even if she doesn’t have good reason to trust R with respect to p—beliefs based on testimony are treated as innocent until we are given reason to doubt them.6 Put differently, reductionists hold that testimonial knowledge requires something in addition to the speaker’s good-quality testimony, and non-reductionists deny this. While there’s much more to say here about the epistemology of testimony, these brief remarks are sufficient for the purposes of this chapter.7 On the reductionist view—the argument goes—skeptical theism undermines knowledge claims to DIVINE REVELATION by removing or preventing one from acquiring the (allegedly) required good reason to trust God’s testimony with respect to DIVINE REVELATION. And on the non-reductionist view, the argument goes, skeptical theism provides a defeater that undermines knowledge claims to DIVINE REVELATION by giving us evidence against, or reason to doubt, DIVINE REVELATION. I will consider these arguments in turn.

 At times, I signal out DIVINE REVELATION being undermined by skeptical theism. However— as should be clear—the idea behind this objection to skeptical theism is that all beliefs based on divine testimony are undermined, not just DIVINE REVELATION. 5  What counts as “good-quality testimony” will vary. Some might think that testimony is good-­ quality if its speaker is reliable with respect to her testimony. Others might think that to be good-­ quality testimony, the testifier must also believe it (e.g. Lackey, 2006). 6  See Greco (2020)) for an extremely powerful argument for non-reductionism. 7  For a good overview of the epistemology of testimony, see Lackey and Sosa (2006). 4

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Representing the reductionist criticism of skeptical theism is Hudson (2014b, 2017). In considering how he—a skeptical theist—can acquire good reason to trust God with respect to his testimony, he asks: But how shall I—with my skeptical-theist hands securely tied behind my back—provide myself with … assurance in the case involving God? I am not relevantly similar to the source of revelation [to be assured that he is a reliable testifier in this case]. I am not well-positioned to get good evidence from perception, memory, induction, and the like relevant to a judgment of reliability on this occasion … And I am a hopeless judge of what is at stake—cosmically speaking—if I and my fellows are not deceived in some comprehensive, irresistible, and undetectable fashion. Indeed, I am quite utterly in the dark on that matter…. (Hudson, 2014b, pp. 160–161)

Because of this—because he is unable to acquire good reason to trust God’s testimony—it just follows for the reductionist that beliefs predicated on divine revelation do not amount to knowledge. Hudson’s thought, roughly, is that we are extremely different from God and extremely ignorant about goods, evils, and their entailment relations in the cosmic sense. And because of this, we are unable to acquire good reason to trust God with respect to his testimony that DIVINE REVELATION—we are just too different from God and too ignorant about goods and evils to acquire good reasons to trust him. And this means that we are clueless about whether some instance of divine testimony is true: it renders the probability of God’s trustworthiness about DIVINE REVELATION inscrutable and this means that we should not believe DIVINE REVELATION and certainly do not know it.8 Representing the non-reductionist criticism of skeptical theism is Erik Wielenberg (2010, 2014).9 He argues that (1) divine deception is possible and (2) passages in Scripture suggest that divine deception has happened in the past. When we conjoin (1) and (2) with skeptical theism, we run into trouble: we must treat it as a real, serious possibility that we have  Again, while I speak just of God’s testimony that DIVINE REVELATION here, the issues raised (and the solutions provided) apply to all instances of divine testimony. 9  See also Law (2015a) for a defense of this argument. 8

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been deceived about DIVINE REVELATION. This is because we cannot rule out that there is a great good that comes about from such deception and God (according to Scripture) has deceived humans in the past. And this gives us strong enough evidence for God deceiving us about DIVINE REVELATION that we should doubt it: we have undefeated evidence against God’s being trustworthy with respect to DIVINE REVELATION, and this undermines our claim to know DIVINE REVELATION (Wielenberg, 2014, pp. 244–248). In Wielenberg’s words, [in] the case of God, His track record with respect to what the future holds is decidedly mixed. Consequently, His testimony … does not enable us to [have knowledge]. (Wielenberg, 2014, p. 248)

So whether the skeptical theist is a reductionist or a non-reductionist, her claim to knowledge on the basis of divine testimony is undermined. It should be clear that the issues raised by Hudson and Wielenberg are distinct: Hudson argues in effect that skeptical theism makes the trustworthiness of God’s testimony inscrutable: we are not able to tell at all— we are ‘in the dark’ about—how likely it is that God is telling the truth. And so the probability of the truth of DIVINE REVELATION is inscrutable and we don’t have knowledge of it. We may put Hudson’s thesis as follows: INSCRUTABLE: For any instance of divine testimony, the probability of it being true is inscrutable. Alternatively, Wielenberg argues that we have evidence against the truth of DIVINE REVELATION: the fact that God can deceive and has deceived is evidence—makes it more likely—that God’s testimony is deceptive, and skeptical theism makes it such that we cannot defeat or otherwise defuse this evidence. We may put Wielenberg’s thesis as follows: EVIDENCE: For any instance of divine testimony, we have evidence against its truth.

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For the sake of argument, I grant both INSCRUTABLE and EVIDENCE, and that they undermine our claims to knowledge on the basis of divine testimony. (To be clear, I don’t think that these theses are true.) However, before considering where these claims lead us, we must take another detour—this time through the nature of faith.

The Nature of Faith In this section, I will provide a general overview of the nature of faith, settling on a broad view that can accommodate a variety of positions on the matter. After this, I will argue that there are (at least) three senses in which faith is rational, and that religious faith in particular is rational. In Section “Faithful Skeptical Theism”, it will be shown that this understanding of religious faith defangs INSCRUTABLE and EVIDENCE. There’s propositional faith and there is relational faith. Propositional faith is characterized by statements like “I have faith that such and such is the case” whereas relational faith is characterized by statements like “I have faith in such and such a person.” Put simply, propositional faith is between a person and a proposition, and relational faith is between two (or more) persons. In this chapter, I’m exclusively concerned with propositional faith.10 Faith may be further divided into doxastic and non-doxastic views. Doxastic views see belief as essential to faith: on this view, if S has faith that p, S (at least) believes p (e.g. Mugg, 2016). Non-doxastic views deny this: they hold that S can have faith that p even if S does not believe p (e.g. Howard-Snyder, 2016b, 2018; McKaughan, 2018). I will not enter the dispute between doxasticists and non-doxacistists here, but I will choose a side: I will assume the non-doxastic approach to faith is correct—faith does not entail belief.11  That said, much of what I say can be used for relational faith as well.  Those who hold to a doxastic view of faith can take my arguments in this chapter as conditional: if faith is non-doxastic, then skeptical theists don’t lose much by conceding INSCRUTABLE and EVIDENCE. From the outset, this doesn’t limit the scope of my argument (to be offered in the next section) terribly much, since non-doxasticism appears to be the dominant position. Indeed, as Bishop (2016) says “[t]here may, then, be an emerging consensus amongst proponents of venture models that faith, at its core, consists in suitably motivated persistent practical commitment ‘beyond the evidence’ to the positively evaluated truth of foundational faith-claims which may, but need not, actually be believed to be true” (2016: n.p.). 10 11

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So belief is not an essential component of faith. What is essential to it? What is faith? There are several components to faith.12 First, if S has faith that p, then S must have a positive evaluation of p’s being true: she must regard p as something that would be good or desirable—it wouldn’t make sense to say that you have faith that you will lose the lottery, for example. Second, if S has faith that p, then S must have a sufficiently positive cognitive attitude toward p. While this positive attitude need not be belief, it cannot be merely ascribing a non-zero probability to the truth of p.13 What might serve as a positive cognitive attitude other than belief? Howard-Snyder (2013b) suggests assuming.14 Assuming is complex and difficult to analyze, but one essential part of it can be easily understood: when one assumes that p, one takes a stand on the truth of p, or acts on the assumption that p (Howard-Snyder, 2013b, pp. 366–367). To illustrate this consider a patient about to undergo a risky surgery. The surgery is necessary for her survival, but it has only a 20% success rate. Because of the low probability of survival, the patient doesn’t believe (or perhaps even accept) that she will survive. However, she assumes she will: she makes plans for after surgery, picking out what meal to celebrate with, what friends to call, and so on. In short, she acts on the assumption that she will survive. Third, if S has faith that p, she must have a positive conative orientation toward p, meaning that she must want or desire that p. Fourth, and crucially, faith is resilient: it doesn’t evaporate at the first sign of trouble. For example, suppose that S has faith that his wife loves him. But suppose that S is told by a friend that his wife was seen having lunch with another man. S’s faith that his wife loves him will not immediately evaporate here: it will persist through this challenge—at least, until he acquires sufficiently strong evidence against the object of his faith.15  In what follows, I draw heavily from Howard-Snyder (2013b)—the conditions of faith and some examples are taken from that piece. 13  Jackson (2021) argues that while hope that p is compatible with Pr(p) being very low, faith that p is not. 14  Another possible non-belief positive cognitive attitude is acceptance. See Alston (1996). 15  Another possible component of faith is that if S has faith that p, then she must be willing to take a risk on p without looking for additional evidence: if S has faith that his wife is telling the truth, then he does not immediately go on the hunt for evidence of her truthfulness (Buchak, 2017, p. 117). 12

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With all of that in mind, I’ll follow Howard-Snyder and McKaughen’s (2020) more succinct characterization of faith: For S to have faith that p is (1) for S to care with positive valence that p and to have a positive cognitive attitude towards p, and, as a result, (2) for S to be disposed to rely on p’s being true, with resilience in the face of evidential or non-evidential challenges to doing so. (2020, p. 27)16

This account fits well with the characterization that I have offered above: (1) covers the first, second, and third components of faith, and (2) covers the fourth component. Additionally, it is sufficiently generic that it can accommodate a variety of perspectives on faith: it doesn’t say how positive the valence must be, it doesn’t specify the positive cognitive attitude required, and so on. And so this conception of faith should have a relatively wide appeal.17

Is Faith Rational? So much for the nature of faith. What about its rationality? When, if ever, is faith rational? There are (at least) three senses in which faith can be rational. The first sense in which faith is rational is epistemic (Section “Faith is Responsive to Evidence”). The second and third senses (Section “Faith Enables Completion of Long-term Risky Rational Commitments” and Section “Faith is Self-Justifying”) in which faith is rational are practical. Which sense of rationality is in play is always made clear by the context, and so I’ll forgo the qualifications “epistemic” and “practical” and just refer to faith’s rationality.

 To be clear, this conception of faith is the fruit of Howard-Snyder and McKaughen’s analysis of Buchak’s work on faith. 17  While I will be working with this conception of faith, my argument could work on other conceptions, e.g. Tweedt (forthcoming). 16

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Faith Is Responsive to Evidence First, faith is rational because it’s responsive to evidence. For example, suppose one has faith that p and believes that p. If she acquires strong enough evidence for ~p, she should downgrade her positive cognitive attitude toward p, e.g. by ceasing to believe p and instead merely assuming that p. Or suppose that S has faith that p and then acquires decisive evidence for ~p. In such a case, S should give up her faith that p. More generally, if S has faith that p and acquires evidence that ~p, the strength of her cognitive attitude (whether it be belief, assuming, acceptance, etc.) toward p should be reduced. (And conversely, if S has faith that p and acquires evidence in favor of p, the strength of her cognitive attitude toward p should be increased.) So, faith isn’t a fortress that is impenetrable by evidence. Indeed, it is responsive to evidence. Insofar as it’s rational to be responsive to evidence, faith is rational.

 aith Enables Completion of Long-Term Risky F Rational Commitments18 Second, faith is rational because it makes the completion of long-term risky rational commitments possible. What are long-term risky rational commitments? Let’s start with the commitment.

Commitment Commitments come in (at least) two different types: commitments to act and commitments to have certain mental states (e.g. to believe something). In this chapter, I’ll be exclusively concerned with commitments to act, and all references to commitment should be understood as such. Why focus exclusively on commitments to act? First, because while faith—as understood above (Section “The Nature of Faith”)—does involve certain mental states (e.g. a positive cognitive attitude) it doesn’t involve a commitment to such mental states. Instead, per condition (2), 18

 The following largely follows Buchak (2014, 2017).

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the commitment aspect of faith involves committing to act: faith that p involves resilient reliance on p’s being true. But relying on p’s being true is not committing to have certain mental states so much as it is committing to act a certain way. Second, and less importantly, commitments to have certain mental states do not appear to be nearly as common as commitments to act, and so it makes sense to focus on commitments to act. So much for commitment. How should we understand the three aspects of commitment listed above. That is, how should we understand long-term, risky, and rational in the context of commitments? Let’s start with the rational aspect.

Rational Commitment Whether a commitment is rational is a function of three components: (1) the probability the commitment will be completed (or successful), (2) how good the completion (or success) of the commitment would be in comparison to how good it would have been to not make the commitment at all, and (3) how bad not completing (or being unsuccessful in) the commitment would be in comparison to how bad it would have been to not make a commitment at all.19 With respect to (1), how high the probability of success must be for the commitment to be rational depends on (2) and (3). To illustrate this, consider the following: FROZEN LAKE 1: It is the middle of winter and very cold. You’re on your way home from work when your car breaks down. Fortunately, you’re dressed warm and can walk the remaining mile comfortably. As you begin to walk, you notice that the lake is frozen. If you walk across the lake, you will make it home 10 minutes earlier. The ice is reasonably thick, and the probability of the ice not breaking underneath you is .9.  My points and examples could be put in terms of expected utility. However, for ease of read and the sake of brevity, I stick to intuitive examples for my illustrations and avoid explicitly bringing into play decision theory. For an overview of the matter, see Briggs (2014). 19

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Now consider a commitment you could make here: you could commit to walking over the lake. The probability your commitment will be successful is 0.9,20 but it would not be a rational commitment: the bad that comes from your commitment being unsuccessful (i.e. falling into the frozen lake and likely dying) in comparison to the bad that comes from not making a commitment at all (i.e. getting home 10 minutes later) far outweighs the good that comes from success (i.e. getting home 10 minutes earlier) in comparison to the good that comes from not making any commitment (i.e. safety). In other words, this commitment carries too much risk and not enough reward for it to be rational—and this is true even though the probability of success is high. Now consider a different case: FROZEN LAKE 2: It is the middle of winter and very cold. You’re on your way home from work when your car breaks down. Fortunately, you’re dressed warm and can walk the remaining mile comfortably. As you begin to walk, you notice one of your children playing on the far end of a nearby lake. You see the ice crack and your child fall in. The probability that the ice will not break underneath you if you run across the lake is .9 (the section you would cross, unlike the section your child was playing on, is rather thick), and if it doesn’t crack, you will be able to save your child. If you run around the lake, it will take far more time, and you will not be able to save your child. In FROZEN LAKE 2, committing to running across the lake is clearly rational: the good (i.e. saving your child) that comes from success in comparison to the good that comes from not making a commitment (i.e. your own safety) is so valuable that it makes it rational in spite of the the bad the comes from an unsuccessful commitment (i.e. your child dying  I’m oversimplifying here, since factors other than the ice will (at least partially) determine the probability that your commitment will be successful. 20

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and your falling into the lake) in comparison to the bad that comes from not making any commitment at all (i.e. your child dying) involved. Indeed, the most significant bad that comes from an unsuccessful commitment will happen if you make no commitment at all (i.e. your child will die if your commitment is unsuccessful and if you make no commitment at all), and so the bad that comes from an unsuccessful commitment in comparison to making no commitment at all is not as high as it initially seems. Put differently, this commitment carries a large reward with a comparatively small risk, and that makes it rational to take the risk. Of course, the commitment in FROZEN LAKE 2 can be rendered irrational by sufficiently lowering the probability of success. For example, suppose that the probability of completing the commitment is, say, 0.0001. In that case, the commitment is not rational: there’s such a small chance of success that it doesn’t matter that the good that comes with success (i.e. saving your child) in comparison to the good that comes from making no commitment (i.e. your safety) greatly outweighs the bad that comes with failure (i.e. falling into the lake and your child dying) in comparison to the bad of making no commitment (i.e. your child dying). But suppose that the probability of success was instead 0.3, would that render the commitment rational? Yes—if this commitment carries with it nearly a 1/3 chance of saving your child’s life, it’s rational. Now suppose instead that the probability of success is 0.05. Is the commitment still rational? It’s difficult to tell. Fortunately, this problem will not plague the project of this chapter. The relevant commitment considered later will clearly be rational, so that we are lacking a formula of this sort will not be an issue. Now that we have a grasp of what makes a commitment rational, we may move onto the final two aspects of commitment that are of interest: long-term riskiness.

Long-Term Risky Commitments What makes a commitment long-term and risky? Long-term commitments—and this will surprise no one—are commitments extended over some significant period of time. And such commitments are risky if one

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can expect to acquire counterevidence for—evidence against—one’s commitments being completed (Buchak, 2017). So, a long-term risky commitment is a commitment that extends over a significant period of time and is such that you can expect to acquire evidence that it will be unsuccessful. For example, the commitment to becoming a medical doctor is a long-term risky commitment: it takes years of school, and throughout one’s schooling she can expect to acquire evidence that she will not make it through (e.g. she can expect to perform poorly on a test or assignment at some point).

How Faith Enables the Completion of Long-Term Risky Rational Commitments Above, we saw that a commitment is a commitment to act, and that whether a commitment is rational is a function of three factors: the probability of completing it, how good it would be to complete it in comparison to how good it would be to make no commitment at all, and how bad it would be to fail to complete it in comparison to how bad it would be to make no commitment at all. Next, we saw that a commitment is long-­ term and risky if it extends over a significant period of time and it is such that we can expect to acquire evidence against the success of our commitment. With this in mind, we can finally consider how faith can enable the completion of long-term risky rational commitments. Of course, it will be clear that faith will enable both the completion of rational commitments and the completion of irrational commitments. However, irrational commitments aren’t of interest here, because faith that is used to enable the completion of an irrational commitment is (clearly enough) not rational. For example, in FROZEN LAKE 1, if one has faith that she would complete her commitment, it doesn’t count in favor of her faith being rational. Her faith may be rational for other reasons, but that it enables one to complete an irrational commitment doesn’t make it rational. As such, I’m only interested in rational commitments, and, unless qualified, all references to commitments should be understood as references to rational commitments.

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So, how does faith enable the completion of long-term risky commitments? Its resilience is key. Because of its resilience, faith allows one to remain steadfast in the face of the ever-changing winds of evidence (Buchak, 2014, 2017): it allows you to keep your commitment even when the evidence turns against you. If you always act on the best evidence you have at that time, then it will be extremely unlikely that you will complete long-term risky commitments. This is because long-term risky commitments, by their very nature, make it likely that you will acquire counterevidence. And if you have committed to always acting on your best evidence at that time then, in the face of counterevidence, you should abandon your commitment. Again, since counterevidence is expected in long-term risky commitments, this means that—if you always act on your best evidence at that time—it’s expected that you will not complete such commitments: it’s expected that you will abandon them prior to completion. However, faith allows us the chance to keep such commitments. So, the resilience of our faith allows us to maintain steadfast in our commitment even in the face of counterevidence (Buchak, 2017, pp. 124–125),21 and this makes faith rational.

Faith Is Self-Justifying The third sense in which faith is rational is that it is, in certain cases, self-­ justifying. When faith that p is self-justifying, having faith that p makes p more likely. Illustrating this point, Jackson provides the following example: [C]onsider two people who are about to marry but realize that, statistically, divorce is likely. They nonetheless have faith that their marriage will last, and this faith makes it more likely that their marriage will last. This enables them to sincerely commit to marriage based on their faith in themselves and each other, because the fact that they have this faith makes their commitment more likely to stick. (Jackson, 2020, p. 87)

 Of course, if one discovers decisive evidence against her long-term risky commitment, she should abandon it. 21

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The idea here is relatively straightforward: faith that their marriage will last is rational because it makes it more likely their marriage will last. What is less clear is what propositions are candidates for this type of rational faith. To continue with Jackson’s marriage example, suppose A and B have committed to each other to be married. It’s clear enough that it’s rational for A to have faith that. (4) My marriage to B will be successful. However, we should not limit the propositions in which it is rational for A to have faith to (4)—there are other propositions that also make it more likely that his marriage with B will succeed. For example: (5) B is telling the truth that p.22 (6) B wants what’s best for me. (7) B loves me. (5)–(7) are all such that if A has faith that they hold, it increases the likelihood of his long-term risky commitment—his marriage—being successful. Indeed, if A didn’t have faith that the propositions expressed by (5)–(7) hold, then it’s much less likely his marriage with B would succeed. For example, if B knew that A didn’t have faith that her testimony is reliable, it’s less likely that she would stay married to A. So, we should understand faith that (5)–(7) hold as being rational on account of their making it more likely that A’s marriage will succeed. Indeed, this will hold true for any proposition that underlies A’s commitment to marry B: propositions that are crucial to—underlie—a successful marriage are such that it is rational for A to have faith that they hold. More generally, we may say that for a rational commitment C, it’s rational to have faith that one will complete C and rational to have faith that the propositions that underlie C hold. And we may take a proposition p to underlie C just

22

 (5) should be understood to apply to any sincere-appearing instance of testimony by B.

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in case it’s such that, if the subject who is committed to C had faith that p, it would make C’s success more likely.23

On Faith that Bad Propositions Hold One question that might be raised here is whether faith that p is rational in virtue of its self-justification if p is bad.24 For example, suppose one had faith that the following proposition is true: (8) Everyone in the world will hate everyone in the world all the time. Having faith that (8) is self-justifying because it makes it more likely. But does this make faith that (8) rational? One might be inclined to think not: (8) is bad and it’s not rational to have faith that bad things hold, and so faith that (8) cannot be rational in virtue of its self-justification. This objection is wrong-headed: of course it’s rational to do things that make the object of one’s faith more likely if it (the object of faith) is bad. For example, it is rational for a bank robber to have faith that her bank robbery will be successful, since that will make the success of her robbery more likely.25 And this is true even though robbing a bank is bad. What’s crucial for faith to be rational in virtue of self-justification is not that the object of one’s faith is actually good. Instead, what’s crucial is that one has a positive evaluation of the object of one’s faith (in this case, (8) and that one actually wants or desires the object of one’s faith (see Section “The Nature of Faith”). Even if p is actually bad, faith that p is rational in virtue of self-justification if one has a positive evaluation of p’s truth and wants

 Certainty that p is incompatible with faith that p. So, it’s implicit here that the subject lacks certainty in these propositions. Some hold that faith and knowledge are incompatible. This is dubious to me. However, those who hold this view may then hold that the subject does not have knowledge of the relevant propositions. 24  This issue was originally raised to me by Mike Bergmann. 25  Another way to think about it is with examples that do not involve faith: it’s rational for a bank robber to bring a gun with her because it makes it more likely that her bank robbery will be successful. If this action that makes it more likely that a bad goal can be achieved is rational, then the same should hold for faith: in cases in which p is bad, faith that p can still be rational insofar as it’s self-justifying. 23

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p to be true.26 Similarly, if someone has a positive evaluation of (8) and wants (8) to hold, then having faith that (8) is rational insofar as it makes it more likely. All that said, even if one rejects my argument here, it will not matter much. For the object of faith that is of concern in this chapter is something good. So this objection will not be applicable to the moves I make below.

Religious Faith and its Rationality We now have a grasp of faith and its rationality: faith is rational in that it’s responsive to evidence, enables the completion of long-term risky commitments, and is self-justifying. But what about faith pertaining to propositions related to God or faith that religious commitments will be successful? In other words, what about religious faith?27 Is religious faith rational? In this section, I will argue that religious faith is rational in all three senses of rationality mentioned above.

Religious Faith Is Responsive to Evidence Like all faith, religious faith is responsive to evidence: when one acquires evidence against her religious faith, her positive cognitive attitude should decrease. Or, if the evidence against her religious faith is decisive, it (her religious faith) should be abandoned. Or, if she acquires evidence for her religious faith, her positive cognitive attitude should increase. And so on. So, religious faith is rational in that it’s responsive to evidence.

 There are other important aspects of faith. I focus on these two aspects because they are the relevant ones. 27  There’s more to say here on what characterizes religious faith. However, since I will identify particular objects of religious faith below (i.e. religious commitment and propositions about divine testimony), I won’t spend more time characterizing religious faith. 26

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 eligious Faith Enables the Completion of Long-Term Risky R Rational Religious Commitment We saw above (Section “How Faith Enables the Completion of Long-­ Term Risky Rational Commitments”) that faith enables the completion of long-term risky commitments. We also saw that insofar as the commitment is rational, faith is rational. The same points hold for religious faith: religious faith enables the completion of long-term risky religious commitments. And religious faith is rational if the long-term risky religious commitment that it enables is rational. So, to know whether religious faith is rational in this sense, we need to know more about the nature of religious commitment. It’s to this issue I now turn.

Religious Commitment Is Rational What’s the long-term commitment with respect to religion? I will understand the commitment of religion—or at least one major component of it—to be to have union and communion with God. That is, religious commitment is a commitment to aligning one’s will with God’s and having communion with him. This includes, for example, loving what God loves, hating what he hates, obeying his commands, and so on. This commitment is long-term and risky: throughout one’s religious commitment, she can expect to acquire evidence against the success of her commitment. For example, she might encounter evidence for atheism, or she might go through periods of apathy about religious commitment, and so on. So, religious commitment is a long-term risky commitment. Thus, religious faith—faith that religious commitment will be successful—will enable this commitment to be completed. Is religious commitment rational?28 As we saw above (Section “Rational Commitment”), whether a commitment is rational is a function of (1) the probability the commitment will be completed (or successful), (2) how good the completion (or success) of the commitment would be in  An alternative and perhaps shorter answer here involves showing that if a version of Pascal’s wager is successful that religious commitment is rational. For recent defenses of Pascal’s wager, see e.g. Jackson (2023a, forthcoming-b, 2023c). 28

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comparison to how good it would have been to not make the commitment at all, and (3) how bad not completing (or being unsuccessful in) the commitment would be in comparison to how bad it would have been to not make a commitment at all. So, to find out whether religious commitment is rational, we need to know the values of religious commitment with respect to (1), (2), and (3). I will address these in reverse order. How bad would it be for one to have an unsuccessful religious commitment? Very bad. It would be quite bad for one to commit to have union and communion with God and be unsuccessful. However, the stakes here are less high than they seem, for if one does not make a commitment to union and communion with God, then she will also not have it (i.e. if one has union and communion with God then she will be committed to it). So, whether your religious commitment fails or you do not make a religious commitment at all, you will end up with the same bad state of affairs: lacking union and communion with God. And so an unsuccessful religious commitment is not very bad in comparison to not making a commitment at all. What about (2)? How good would it be if religious commitment is successful? Clearly, it’s very good if one’s religious commitment is successful. Indeed, this seems to be something that both atheists and theists can agree on: many theists (e.g. Stump, 2010) and atheists (e.g. Schellenberg, 1993, 2015) think that union and communion with God is the greatest good for humans. And, as we saw above, this good does not obtain without religious commitment: if one has union and communion with God, then she will have made a religious commitment. Thus, the good that comes from a successful religious commitment in comparison to the good that comes from not making a commitment at all is huge. So, completing your religious commitment is very good in comparison to not making a commitment, and not completing it’s not very bad in comparison to not making a commitment. This brings us, finally, to (1): how probable is it that religious commitment will be successful? The probability here will in a large part be determined by the probability that God exists: if the probability of God’s existence is, say, 0.05, then it’s very improbable that one’s religious commitment will be successful. Fortunately, we can avoid the murky (and

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much disputed) waters of the probability of God’s existence.29 This is because the anti-skeptical theist arguments considered in this chapter don’t question God’s existence: they are intended to show that skeptical theism entails skepticism about divine testimony, not that God doesn’t exist or that it’s unlikely that God exists. In other words, these arguments aren’t supposed to show theism is false and do not rely on the supposition that it’s (or probably is) false, so making the assumption that God exists or that it’s not extremely improbable that God exists is not problematic within this context. Moreover, these criticisms are supposed to work even for those who rationally believe God exists: they’re meant to show that skeptical theists that believe God exists should be skeptical about divine revelation. So, again, in this context, the probability of the existence of God is not being scrutinized, and it’s fair game to assume that he exists or that it’s not extremely improbable that he exists.30 Unfortunately, we’re not out of the woods yet. For we still need to know how probable it is that religious commitment will be successful given that God exists. I will offer two answers to this—one ambitious and one conciliatory. First the ambitious answer. I think that we can ascribe a moderately high probability of success to religious commitment given that God exists by using the method I lay out for predicting God’s action in Chap. 8.31 Moreover, anyone who thinks that the argument from divine hiddenness has any merit (see Chap. 5) is committed to the view that, if God exists, those who are committed to having union and communion with God will have it. But for my purposes, we need not even hold that the probability of God ensuring the success of religious commitment is moderately high. So, to appease those skeptical that God would respond to religious commitment in this way, I’ll hold merely that the probability of a

 For a case for the existence of God being very probable, see Swinburne (2004). For a case for the existence of God being very improbable, see Mackie (1983). 30  To put the point differently: an argument for the improbability of the existence of God is far removed from the content (or obvious entailments) of Hudson’s and Wielenberg’s arguments. 31  Of course, more details are needed in order to show that we can do this in a way that’s friendly to skeptical theism. See Chap. 8 for a sketch of how to do this. 29

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successful religious commitment given God’s existence is 0.3. This generous reduction of probability will still suffice for my purposes: even if the probability of a successful religious commitment is 0.3, religious commitment will turn out rational. To see why, recall FROZEN LAKE 2: FROZEN LAKE 2: It is the middle of winter and very cold. You’re on your way home from work when your car breaks down. Fortunately, you’re dressed warm and can walk the remaining mile comfortably. As you begin to walk, you notice one of your children playing on the far end of a nearby lake. You see the ice crack and your child fall in. The probability that the ice will not break underneath you if you run across the lake is .9 (the section you would cross, unlike the section your child was playing on, is rather thick), and if it doesn’t crack, you will be able to save your child. If you run around the lake, it will take far more time, and you will not be able to save your child. And recall that even if we reduce the probability of success in FROZEN LAKE 2 to 0.3, that it’s still rational to commit to crossing the ice to save your child. Since the good that accompanies a successful religious commitment (in comparison to making no commitment) is far greater than that of the good that accompanies saving your child (in comparison to making no commitment) and the bads that come from an unsuccessful religious commitment (in comparison to making no commitment at all) and an unsuccessful commitment to walk over the ice (in comparison to making no commitment at all) are equal (i.e. the bad of an unsuccessful religious commitment comes about also if you make no commitment (see above) and the bad of an unsuccessful attempt to cross the ice to save your child comes about also if you make no commitment (see Section “Rational Commitment”)), religious commitment is on even stronger rational grounds than the commitment involved in our modified FROZEN LAKE 2. That is, since in both religious commitment and our reduced probability version of FROZEN LAKE 2, the probability of

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success is the same and the bad that comes from an unsuccessful commitment obtains even when you do not make the commitment, the only relevant difference is that the good that accompanies a successful religious commitment (in comparison to making no commitment) is greater than the good that accompanies a successful commitment with respect to FROZEN LAKE 2 (in comparison to making no commitment). And so since the latter commitment is rational, the former is as well. So much for my ambitious answer. What about my conciliatory answer? Here, I offer a conciliatory answer for those who claim that a skeptical theist cannot make probabilistic claims about whether God would ensure that those seeking to have union and communion with him would be successful. In other words, one might claim that while it’s permissible to assume the existence of God, it’s impermissible for the skeptical theist to judge that the probability of God acting a certain way (in this case, that the probability of God ensuring the success of religious commitment is 0.3), since these anti-skeptical theist arguments purport to undermine our views about what God would do. Therefore—the objection goes—the skeptical theist must regard the probability of a successful religious commitment to be inscrutable. I think this objection is wrongheaded—I think skeptical theists can make probabilistic judgments about God’s actions (see Chap. 8)—but I won’t contest this here. Instead, for the sake of argument, I grant its truth and its entailment that the probability of a successful religious commitment given that God exists is inscrutable. I make this grant partially because of my generous nature, but mostly because my point isn’t threatened by it: even if the probability of a successful religious commitment given that God exists is inscrutable, religious commitment is still rational. To see why, suppose that in FROZEN LAKE 2 the probability of the success is inscrutable instead of 0.9. In that case, it’s still clear that the commitment is rational: saving your child is so valuable that it’s rational to make the commitment even though the probability of success is inscrutable. Since a successful religious commitment is even more valuable than completing one’s commitment in FROZEN LAKE 2, it too will be rational.32  Of course, some positions taken in decision theory will not have this result. However, I think that this is clearly the right result, and that this counts against positions in decision theory that suggest otherwise. 32

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So, religious commitment—whether the probability of its success given God’s existence is as low as 0.3 or inscrutable—is rational. And this means that religious faith is rational since it enables the completion of religious commitment.

Religious Faith Is Self-Justifying Suppose that someone claiming to be engaged in this commitment—the commitment to having union and communion with God—said that she lacked faith in God’s testimony. This would make little sense: commitment to union and communion with God requires that one has faith in response to God’s testimony. If you wish to have union with another person—to align your will with theirs—lacking faith in their testimony is counterproductive. Put differently, it’s difficult, to say the least, to unify one’s will with another’s and have communion with them if you lack faith in their testimony. (How in union would a husband and wife be if one lacked faith in the other’s testimony?) So, propositions about divine testimony underlie a commitment to union and communion with God. And so God’s testimony is a rational object of faith: faith in response to God’s testimony will be self-justifying because it makes it more likely that one will have union and communion with him. In other words, faith in response to God’s testimony33 makes it more likely that one will keep or complete her commitment to union and communion with him.34 So, religious faith is rational in all three senses discussed above. First, it is—like all faith—responsive to evidence. Second, it allows one to complete a long-term risky rational commitment, namely religious commitment. And third, religious faith is rational in it makes union and communion with God more likely: it’s self-justifying.

 I will understand faith in response to divine testimony to be faith that God is a reliable testifier or that his particular testimony is true. 34  A simple proof of this: Pr(union and communion with God/faith in response to his testimony) > Pr(union and communion with God/lacking faith in response to his testimony). The truth of this is illustrated by the fact that this holds for any relationship: Pr(union and communion with X/faith in response to X’s testimony) > Pr(union and communion with X/lack of faith in response to X’s testimony). 33

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The Importance of Faith for Religion So, religious faith can be rational. Is religious faith important? McKaughan (2018) argues that faith, as opposed to belief, is essential to Christianity. He says that a life-orienting response and commitment to remaining engaged in a relationship centered upon God is crucial for Christianity. (McKaughan, 2018, p. 202)35

McKaughan’s point seems right—it’s faith, not belief or even knowledge, that’s essential with respect to one’s religious commitment. A similar point holds for divine testimony: what’s crucial with respect to divine testimony is not knowledge. What matters is that we respond in faith to it. To see why it is faith that’s essential, consider an analogous case: suppose a husband commits to having union and communion with his wife, and that his wife tells him that p. With respect to the husband’s commitment, what’s crucial here? Is it knowledge that p, or is it faith that p? It’s faith that matters: if the husband knows p, he might still, for example, act defiantly toward p. And this would be damaging to his commitment to union and communion with his wife. But if he has faith that p, he cannot act in defiance toward p: when one has faith that p, one relies on p’s truth (see Section “The Nature of Faith”), which means that one at least doesn’t act in defiance of p. That the husband at least doesn’t act in defiance of his wife’s testimony is crucial for his commitment, and this doesn’t require knowledge nor does knowledge entail it. In other words, knowledge that p does not guarantee acting in line with (i.e. not in defiance of ) p, but faith that p does. And so faith in response to spousal testimony is crucial to union and communion of the husband with his wife. As things are with spousal testimony, so they are with divine testimony. Faith in response to divine testimony is crucial while knowledge is not: one can lose knowledge based on divine testimony and retain her religious commitment, but she cannot lose faith in God’s testimony and retain her  This exemplifies the trust-loyalty model of faith advocated in Howard-Snyder and McKaughen (2020). 35

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religious commitment.36 And in this sense faith, not knowledge, is crucial to religion. For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that this holds for all religions, and will therefore treat faith—not belief or knowledge or anything else—as the crucial aspect of religion simpliciter.37

Faithful Skeptical Theism So far, I’ve granted the truth of INSCRUTABLE and EVIDENCE, and that they preclude knowledge on the basis of divine testimony, I’ve assumed a non-doxastic view of faith, argued that religious faith is (or, can be) rational, and that faith, not knowledge, is crucial in response to divine testimony. What follows from this? I’ll argue that faith renders conceding INSCRUTABLE and EVIDENCE not an intolerable cost: since faith is rational and is what’s crucial to religion—not belief or knowledge—and faith (I’ll show) is compatible with INSCRUTABLE and EVIDENCE, the skeptical theist’s position is not untenable.38

EVIDENCE and Faith Recall EVIDENCE and INSCRUTABLE: EVIDENCE: For any instance of divine testimony, we have evidence against its truth. INSCRUTABLE: For any instance of divine testimony, the probability of it being true is inscrutable.

 Of course, if one became certain that God was a reliable testifier (or whatever), then she could retain her religious commitment while not having faith in response to divine testimony, since faith that p entails that one isn’t certain that p. For the purposes of this chapter, we can set cases like this aside. 37  Anecdotally, this seems to be the case: religious people treat their faith as crucial, not knowledge of particular propositions. 38  Obviously, the skeptical theist has lost something: going from knowledge to non-knowledge about religious matters is indeed a cost. More on this later. 36

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EVIDENCE tells us that we have counterevidence against any instance of divine testimony. Of course, not just any counterevidence to divine testimony precludes knowledge: the counterevidence must be sufficiently strong. Wielenberg and other advocates of EVIDENCE do not tell us precisely how strong our counterevidence is supposed to be. However, it seems that the counterevidence, for it to do the work needed, should reduce the probability of the truth of some instance of divine testimony to 0.5.39 While there’s wiggle room here, I’ll grant that if p has a probability of 0.5 for S, then S doesn’t know p and she ought to give up her belief. So, because of EVIDENCE, skeptical theists don’t have knowledge on the basis of divine revelation and shouldn’t hold any beliefs based on it. What’s a skeptical theist to do? While it’s no doubt a cost for the skeptical theist to give up claims to knowledge on the basis of divine revelation, things aren’t as bad as they initially seem. This is because what’s important in response to divine testimony is faith, and faith doesn’t require knowledge or even belief. Indeed, since religious commitment is long-term and risky, we should expect to acquire counterevidence. So, the skeptical theist should—or, at least, may—retain her faith in response to EVIDENCE. Since it’s faith—not belief or knowledge—that’s essential to religion she hasn’t lost anything essential in granting EVIDENCE: faith in response to God’s testimony is what matters, not knowledge. So, even if critics of skeptical theism are right and EVIDENCE true, the skeptical theist hasn’t lost what’s most important for her religious commitment: she’s not lost her faith. Perhaps one would object that I’m painting too rosy of a picture for the skeptical theist here. What I have left out, the objector continues, is that the skeptical theist has lost rationality: she has traded rationality for faith, and this is a significant cost. In other words, the skeptical theist who retains faith in response to God’s testimony in light of EVIDENCE is irrational. And this is a serious cost. The thought behind this objection is right: if the skeptical theist can retain her faith only at the cost of rationality, that is a high cost and she shouldn’t be willing to pay it. But the  For my purposes here, it could render the probability much lower than 0.5, since faith that p is compatible with Pr(p) being low. Although, again, it’s not compatible with Pr(p) being extremely low. See again Jackson (2021). 39

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objection isn’t right: the skeptical theist’s faith is rational in the three senses outlined above. First, it’s rational because it’s responsive to evidence: the skeptical theist adjusts her positive cognitive attitude toward God’s testimony in response to EVIDENCE. Second, her faith is rational because it enables her to complete her long-term and risky religious commitment. And third, her faith in response to God’s testimony is rational because it’s self-justifying: it makes it more likely that she will have union and communion with God. And so this charge of irrationality is bankrupt. Of course, if one gets decisive evidence against the object of her faith (in this case, God’s testimony), then she should abandon it and it wouldn’t be rational to keep it. However, no proponent of EVIDENCE has argued that this is the case for skeptical theists: EVIDENCE is held to lower the probability of God’s testimony being true, undermine claims to knowledge about divine testimony, and make it such that one shouldn’t believe divine testimony. But it’s never been held to be decisive evidence against some instance of divine testimony, nor has it been held to render its probability of being true extremely low—so low that faith wouldn’t be rational. Nor is it clear to me how this could be done. And so a faithful response to divine testimony in light of EVIDENCE doesn’t cost the skeptical theist her rationality.

INSCRUTABLE and Faith So much for EVIDENCE. What about INSCRUTABLE? How should a skeptical theist respond to INSCRUTABLE? The same way that she should respond to EVIDENCE: by faith. That is, the skeptical theist that accepts INSCRUTABLE should give up her claims to knowledge and her beliefs based on divine testimony,40 but she can nevertheless continue to have faith in response to it. And this is for roughly the same reasons that she should remain faithful in response to EVIDENCE: INSCRUTABLE, like EVIDENCE, doesn’t render the probability of the truth of some instance of divine testimony low enough to render faith irrational. Indeed, the skeptical theist that accepts INSCRUTABLE can still  Here, I’m gifting the critic of skeptical theism the thesis that INSCRUTABLE entails that skeptical theists should give up their beliefs about divine testimony. That this is true isn’t exactly clear to me.

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rationally respond in faith to divine testimony, since, again, her faith is responsive to evidence, makes completion of her religious commitment possible, and is self-justifying.41 So, insofar as faith, not knowledge, is crucial to religion, the skeptical theist is not reduced to an untenable position by INSCRUTABLE. This response works only if faith is compatible with INSCRUTABLE.  Above, we saw that faith is compatible with EVIDENCE.  However, things are more complicated with INSCRUTABLE than they are with EVIDENCE: the literature on faith is saturated with how to respond to counterevidence—evidence that lowers the probability of the truth of the object of one’s faith. The consensus is that one can have faith even if the truth of the object of her faith is improbable—just so long as it’s not extremely improbable. (e.g. Jackson, 2021; Buchak, 2017; Howard-Snyder, 2013b),42 and this means that faith is compatible with EVIDENCE.43 INSCRUTABLE, however, isn’t counterevidence: it doesn’t lower the probability of anything. Rather, it precludes one from ascribing a probability to the truth of any instance of divine testimony: it makes it such that we aren’t able to ascribe a probability to its truth. For example, suppose that the skeptical theist ascribes a probability of 0.95 to an instance of divine testimony. Once she accepts INSCRUTABLE, she no longer ascribes the truth of that testimony the probability of 0.95. Not because the probability is lowered, but because she ascribes no probability at all to it: she has no clue whether it’s very low, low, middling, high, very high, or anywhere in between these positions. Given this understanding, is faith compatible with INSCRUTABLE? The issue here isn’t as straightforward as it is with EVIDENCE, and more work needs to be done to answer this question—work I shall take up immediately below. One way to consider this issue is to compare INSCRUTABLE with EVIDENCE and see whether it is, epistemically speaking, stronger than,  I’m brief here since this will be for the same reasons faith is rational for a skeptical theist that accepts EVIDENCE. 42  Though, see Pruss (2002) for a challenge to this view. 43  When I speak of faith being compatible with EVIDENCE or INSCRUTABLE, I mean rational faith. One could have faith that p even if p has an extremely low probability. But her faith wouldn’t be rational. That isn’t the type of faith I am interested in. 41

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equal to, or weaker than EVIDENCE.  If it’s equal to or weaker than EVIDENCE, then the skeptical theist will be in the clear. However, if INSCRUTABLE is stronger, then it’s (at least possibly) a threat to the rationality of faith. So, which (if either) is stronger: EVIDENCE or INSCRUTABLE? Consider the following examples: LOTTERY 1: Sally has bet her life that she will win the lottery. She’s confident because she has rigged the lottery, making the probability of her ticket being drawn .9. Unfortunately, Sally’s friend, Sarah, also rigged the lottery in her (Sarah’s) favor. Sally finds out about Sarah’s gimmick and performs the relevant calculation to see how likely it is that she’ll win given Sarah’s gimmick. Given what Sarah has done, the probability of Sally winning is now .5. LOTTERY 2: Sally has bet her life that she will win the lottery. She’s confident, because she has rigged the lottery, making the probability of her ticket being drawn .9. Unfortunately, Sally is hit by some stray radiation and forgets how likely it is that she’ll win the lottery. In fact, she has no clue how likely it is: the probability of her winning is now inscrutable to her—it could be very likely, very unlikely, or a middling probability that she will win, and she has no idea which category is right. LOTTERY 1 is a case in which something like EVIDENCE holds and LOTTERY 2 is a case in which something like INSCRUTABLE holds. So, which is stronger? Which is worse for Sally? Is it worse to go from 0.9 to 0.5 or is it worse to go from 0.9 to the probability being inscrutable? There’s a temptation to think that LOTTERY 1 is better. I suspect that the seductive nature of this is due to a knowledge bias: since we know the probability of her winning, we know how she should act in this case. This stands in stark opposition to the anxiety that comes with not knowing at all what the probability of Sally winning is, which occurs in LOTTERY 2. In that case, we have no clue how likely it is that Sally will win the lottery and have no clue how confident she should be or how she should act. But this knowledge bias should be rejected: that one scenario is more

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conducive to anxiety isn’t good reason to thinkit’s epistemically worse in the relevant sense. In fact, it’s extremely difficult to judge these cases. The appropriate response, it seems to me, is agnosticism about whether LOTTERY 1 (and hence EVIDENCE) is epistemically better or worse than LOTTERY 2 (and hence INSCRUTABLE). In light of the unfruitfulness of the comparison strategy, we need to look elsewhere to determine if INSCRUTABLE prevents the skeptical theist from having faith. A more promising strategy is to consider particular cases in which INSCRUTABLE holds and see whether rational faith is possible in such cases. If it is, then rational faith is compatible with INSCRUTABLE, and skeptical theists may rationally have faith in response to divine testimony while accepting INSCRUTABLE. Consider the following example: COLLEGE 1: Sally decides to go to college to become a medical doctor. Halfway through, she acquires evidence that she will not complete her commitment to become a doctor. In COLLEGE 1, EVIDENCE holds. And, as with our other case involving EVIDENCE, it’s clear that faith is possible here: Sally can have faith that she’ll succeed in her commitment to becoming a medical doctor in COLLEGE 1. And such faith is rational in that it’s responsive to evidence, will enable her to complete her long-term and risky commitment, and is self-justifying. But consider another case: COLLEGE 2: Sally decides to go to college to become a medical doctor. She knows that there’s a test that she must pass in order to become a medical doctor and that whether she passes this test will be decided by the flip of a coin: heads  she passes  and tails she fails and flunks out of medical school. Finally, she knows that this coin is not a normal coin: the probability it will come up heads is inscrutable. In COLLEGE 2, INSCRUTABLE holds. Can Sally have rational faith in this example? Because of an external factor (i.e. the coin flip), Sally’s

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situation in COLLEGE 2 is in some sense worse than in COLLEGE 1.44 Nevertheless, it’s clear that Sally can have faith that she will complete her degree: despite her success being inscrutable, it’s no doubt possible for her to have faith that she’ll complete her degree. And it will be rational for the same reasons other instances of faith are rational: it’s responsive to evidence, will enable her to complete her long-term risky commitment, and it’s self-justifying. And this means that one can have faith, and be rational in doing so, even if the truth of the object of her faith has an inscrutable probability. Thus, one can have faith in response to God’s testimony even if she accepts INSCRUTABLE.

Transformative Experience, Faith, and INSCRUTABLE Another way to illustrate the compatibility of rational faith and INSCRUTABLE is by making use of transformative experience. Transformative experiences are (roughly) experiences that are unlike experiences that one has had before which, additionally, change one’s core preferences. For example, suppose that you’re given the opportunity to become a vampire—an immortal creature that has incredible strength, and speed, and which drinks blood to survive and will die if exposed to sunlight. Should you take this opportunity to become a vampire?45 To make a rational choice about the matter, you need to be sufficiently informed. And being sufficiently informed requires (in part) knowing whether you would prefer a vampire future or a human future. But there are two problems with this. First, you don’t know what it’s like to be a vampire—being a vampire is radically different from being a human (so I’m told), and you don’t know at all what it would be like. Since you don’t know what a vampire future is like, you can’t compare it with a human future. And second, to become a vampire involves altering your core  In every long-term commitment we have, there will be external factors that can prevent us from completing it. For example, if your long-term commitment is to finish college, being killed by a lightning strike would prevent you from successfully completing your commitment. But, of course, this doesn’t mean you cannot have rational faith that you will finish college. And so the fact that an external force plays a role is not sufficient to rule out rational faith in COLLEGE 2. 45  I’m borrowing the example of becoming a vampire and the particular problems that come with it from Paul (2014, pp. 1–5). 44

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preferences in ways that you don’t know. But this means that even if you knew what being a vampire is like, you couldn’t make a rational choice about whether to become one, since you don’t know whether you would prefer a vampire future to a human future—that depends on what your preferences would be as a vampire, but you don’t know what they would be. In short, becoming a vampire is a transformative experience, and, as such, it makes it difficult to make a rational decision about whether to become a vampire.46 Another example of transformative experiences is marriage (Paul, 2014, pp. 94–97). Suppose A is deciding whether to marry B. Part of this decision making process is going to involve comparing whether A would prefer marrying B to not marrying B, which, in part, depends on whether A would prefer a future with B or a future without B. However, marriage lasts many years, and involves many unforeseen events: after A marries B, B might develop a disease that requires A to care for B. Or perhaps A will take up a radically different career than her current one. Or perhaps A will become unexpectedly pregnant. Or worst of all, perhaps A will acquire a taste for the dreaded H’s: Heidegger and Hegel.  All of these will be unknown and unforeseeable from A’s perspective when she’s deciding whether to marry B. Furthermore, core preferences change over time in ways that cannot be predicted—one’s core preferences today might radically differ from her core preferences 15 years from now. And so both aspects of transformative experience hold for marriage: A doesn’t know what a future with B looks like and A doesn’t know how her preferences will change during her marriage, and so she cannot compare it to a future that doesn’t involve marrying B.47 Now, suppose A decides to marry B. Given that marriage is a transformative experience, the probability of A and B’s marriage being successful is inscrutable: the success of their marriage depends (largely) on their core preferences and how they respond to unforeseen events, but they each have no clue how their core preferences will change or what unforeseen events will come their way. However, despite the inscrutability of the success of her marriage, it’s no doubt rational for A to have faith that her  For more on transformative experience, see e.g. Briggs (2015) and Pettigrew (2015).  For a longer defense of marriage as a transformative experience, see Paul (2014, pp. 94–97).

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marriage with B will be successful. Indeed, it would be irrational for A to marry B and not have faith that their marriage will be successful, since it would make it less likely that their marriage would work out. So, transformative experience provides us with another way to illustrate that faith in one’s commitment is compatible with the probability of success being inscrutable, and so rational faith in response to divine testimony is compatible with INSCRUTABLE.

Taking Stock Time to take stock. We’ve seen that faith that p is compatible with having evidence against the object of one’s faith, and that such faith can be rational—i.e. rational faith is compatible with EVIDENCE. We also saw one can have faith that p even if p’s probability is inscrutable, and that such faith can be rational—i.e. rational faith is compatible with INSCRUTABLE. The upshot of this is significant: skeptical theists can concede both EVIDENCE and INSCRUTABLE while rationally maintaining faith in response to divine testimony. More concretely, a skeptical theist can accept that the probability of an instance of divine testimony being true is inscrutable or has counterevidence while rationally retaining her faith that God is a reliable testifier. And since faith is what’s important in response to divine testimony—not belief or knowledge—this means that even if the skeptical theist concedes EVIDENCE and INSCRUTABLE, she hasn’t lost anything essential with respect to God’s testimony. A natural objection here is that while skeptical theists can have rational religious faith, it’s nevertheless costly for the skeptical theist to give up her beliefs and claims to knowledge about divine revelation. While it’s true that it’s a cost in giving up one’s belief and knowledge claims about divine revelation—going from knowledge to non-knowledge is doubtless a cost—it’s not overly burdensome: it doesn’t render skeptical theism untenable  in the way that e.g. external world skepticism would. The skeptical theist is deprived of knowledge on the basis of divine revelation. And while this is indeed a cost, it’s not too expensive—even for a cheap, big nosed dutchman like me. So if faith in response to God’s testimony

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can be preserved—and I have argued it can be—then what matters with respect to God’s testimony has been preserved. Moreover, this represents the absolute worst case scenario for skeptical theists: I have granted EVIDENCE and INSCRUTABLE merely to see where they lead us—I don’t think skeptical theists actually need to (or should) grant them. Indeed, I think they’re false. And we’ve seen that the place they lead is not what it’s been chalked up to be: while it’s not ideal—losing knowledge is never ideal—it’s not devastating either: it certainly isn’t a reductio of skeptical theism.

Conclusion A lot of territory has been covered in this chapter. First, we considered objections to skeptical theism that claim that skeptical theists must give up beliefs based on, and knowledge claims to, divine revelation. These objections were granted for the sake of argument to see where they lead. I argued that they don’t lead to a devastating place: faith in response to divine testimony, not knowledge, is crucial for religion. And the skeptical theist can have faith in response to divine testimony and be rational in doing so. Thus, divine deception objections to skeptical theism lack significant force: even if right, their consequences aren’t so bad.

8 Theodicy and Natural Theology

Introduction In Chap. 6 I defended skeptical theism against the charge of excessive skepticism: I argued that skeptical theism doesn’t provide one’s commonsense beliefs with a defeater. However, even if I’m right on this point, it might still be that there are other unwelcome consequences of skeptical theism. For example, it might be argued that skeptical theism substantially weakens the project of natural theology (e.g. Richard Gale, 1996) or that skeptical theism is incompatible with (or otherwise unfriendly to) theodicy (e.g. Scott Coley, 2015).1 Generally, the worry may be stated like this: skeptical theism seems to make it such that we can’t predict whether God would allow certain evil states of affairs—it prevents us from ‘noseeum inferencing’ our way to the conclusion that permitting an evil state of affairs is (probably) axiologically gratuitous (Axiological Skeptical Theism) and from ‘noseeum inferencing’ our way to the conclusion that the permission of some state of affairs is probably deontologically gratuitous (Deontological Skeptical Theism). But if skeptical theism prevents us from thinking that evil states of affairs are  While he doesn’t develop this thought in detail, Rutledge (2017a, pp. 9, and 9–10 footnote 12) suggests that one cannot consistently endorse skeptical theism and theodicy. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4_8

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axiologically or deontologically gratuitous,2 then—so the objection goes—consistency demands that it also undermines our ability to predict that God would act in certain ways in order to realize certain good states of affairs, and this undermines the skeptical theist’s ability to make use of theodicy and natural theology. This is because the project of theodicy involves identifying particularly valuable goods or weighty reasons that explain why God permits evil and the project of natural theology involves identifying particularly valuable goods or weighty reasons that allow us to predict how God would act. And, clearly, both of these projects involve predicting the ways that God will act. Both projects, therefore, appear to be undermined by skeptical theism. In this chapter, I will consider in more detail whether skeptical theism is consistent with the projects of theodicy and natural theology. First, I’ll consider two particular theodicies and explain the problem skeptical theism poses to them. After this, I will consider two pieces of natural theology and explain the problem skeptical theism poses to them. I will provide a narrow solution to each problem that makes use of private reasons. These solutions are narrow since they rely on intuition (a private reason), and therefore only apply to those who have the necessary intuition.3 Moreover, I doubt that they’re ultimately successful—they are likely undermined by skeptical theism in the same way that commonsense problems of evil are undermined (see Chap. 9). After this, I provide a metaethical (or resemblance) solution to each problem, which can provide more robust (at least partial) support for (certain) theodicies and (certain pieces of ) natural theology in a way that is not in tension with skeptical theism. Finally, I conclude with a brief reflection on how the metaethical (or resemblance) solutions I offer provide us with a way forward with respect to arguments for atheism: it illustrates a different, and more plausible way to formulate arguments against the existence of God.

 For a discussion of axiological gratuity and deontological gratuity, Chap. 4, Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism Against The Noseeum Axiological Argument” and “The Noseeum Deontological Argument”. 3  Although not all narrow solutions are equal: some narrow solutions may have a wide application. See Section “The Argument from Conscious Agents: A Narrow Solution”. 2

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Theodicy: Two Case Studies Numerous theodicies have been proposed in an attempt to explain why, if God exists, our world contains the evil that it does in the way that it does (e.g. its distribution and intensity). However, it might be thought that the project of theodicy—identifying the actual reasons why God permits evil—is in tension with skeptical theism: some theodicies—axiological theodicies—claim that God would permit some states of affairs involving evil because they are sufficiently valuable (e.g. Collins, 2013; Dougherty, 2014; Swinburne, 1998). But Axiological Skeptical Theism prevents us from making judgements about the overall value of states of affairs based on their perceived value, and this includes the states of affairs cited by proponents of theodicy. Other theodicies—deontological theodicies—claim that God has sufficiently weighty reasons that require him to permit evil (e.g. Mooney, 2019, 2022; Reitan, 2014). But Deontological Skeptical Theism prevents us from making judgments about the overall weight of God’s reasons based on the perceived weight of his reasons. And so skeptical theism spells trouble for both axiological and deontological theodicies. In this section, I’ll consider one axiological theodicy and one deontological theodicy, and illustrate the threat skeptical theism poses to both.

Felix Culpa Theodicies purport to identify the reason(s) that God permits evil. Typically, the reason given is that the permission of evil is required in order for there to be some greater good.4 Call these axiological theodicies. Axiological theodicies are the norm with respect to theodicy: almost always, greater goods are appealed to in order to explain why God allows evil.5 In this section, I’ll consider a particular axiological theodicy: the Felix Culpa.

 I’m taking “greater good” to encompass both positive goods and the evasion of evils.  See e.g. Dougherty (2014), Plantinga (2004), Rasmussen and Leon (2020), and Stump (2010).

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When used in the service of theodicy, the Felix Culpa purports to explain evil by appealing to features that are in the best possible worlds.6 The best possible worlds are (at least typically) discussed axiologically: the best possible worlds are those with the highest amount of value. Let’s say that worlds that contain incarnation and atonement are worlds in which God becomes incarnate as a human and sacrifices his life to atone for the sin of his creation and, in effect, save his creation.7 According to proponents of the Felix Culpa theodicy, the best possible worlds include incarnation and atonement.8 Plantinga states the issue this way: consider the splendid and gracious marvel of incarnation and atonement. I believe that the great goodness of this state of affairs, like that of the divine existence itself, makes its value incommensurable with the value of states of affairs involving creaturely good and bad. Thus the value of incarnation and atonement cannot be matched by any aggregate of creaturely goods. No matter how many excellent creatures there are in a world, no matter how rich and beautiful and sinless their lives, the aggregated value of their lives would not match that of incarnation and atonement; any world with incarnation and atonement would be better yet. And no matter how much evil, how much sin and suffering a world contains, the aggregated badness would be outweighed by the goodness of incarnation and atonement, outweighed in such a way that the world in question is very good. In this sense, therefore, any world with incarnation and atonement is of infinite value by virtue of containing two goods of infinite value: the existence of God and incarnation and atonement. Under this assumption, there will be a certain level of excellence or goodness, among possible worlds, such that all the worlds at that level or above contain incarnation and atonement. (2004, p. 10)  I’m simplifying things: there is debate over whether there is a single, best possible world or a set of best possible worlds (see Plantinga (1974) and Rubio (2020) for an argument for the latter view) and about whether God must create the best possible world (see Adams, 1972). In this chapter, I will assume that there is no single best possible world and that, instead, there is a set of best possible worlds. I will also assume that God must create from this set. 7  There’s much more to say here about the nature of incarnation and atonement that I cannot say here. On the incarnation and atonement, it’s hard to do better than Anselm’s (2008) satisfaction view. For a general overview of theories of atonement, see Craig (2018) and (2020). 8  Plantinga considers weaker and stronger versions of his argument. I focus on the stronger version here. 6

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In other words, incarnation and atonement are so valuable that all the best possible worlds contain them. However, for there to be atonement, there must be evil: for humans to be in need of atonement, it must be the case that humans have sinned and are now no longer right with God.9 Thus, we have our explanation for thinking that the best possible worlds contain evil: it’s required for incarnation and atonement. And since the best possible worlds contain incarnation and atonement, they also contain evil. This explains why our world contains evil: since God (if he exists) created our world and (we have assumed) God must create one of the best possible worlds and the best possible worlds contain incarnation and atonement, then our world must contain evil. Hence, our world (if God exists) must contain evil.

Th  e Problem So, proponents of the Felix Culpa Theodicy claim that the best possible worlds include incarnation and atonement, and this explains why our world contains evil. But why should we think this? Why should we think that the best possible worlds include incarnation and atonement? Plantinga provides the following motivation: It is hard to imagine what God could do that is in fact comparable to incarnation and atonement; but perhaps this is just a limitation of our imagination. But since this is so hard to imagine, I propose that we ignore those possible worlds, if there are any, in which God does not arrange for incarnation and atonement, but does something else of comparable excellence. (2004, p. 10)

It should be clear that the move Plantinga makes here is in tension with skeptical theism: Axiological Skeptical Theism undermines inferences from the perceived value of a state of affairs to its actual value. And Plantinga seems to be making this kind of move: he’s inferring from the perceived value of incarnation and atonement to the conclusion that it is  In other words, one cannot be ‘not right with God’ without sin; to be without sin is to be right with God. 9

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so valuable that no other states of affairs approach it in terms of value.10 Again, this is precisely the type of inference that skeptical theism undermines. And as such, skeptical theism, and in particular Axiological Skeptical Theism, undermines Plantinga’s support for The Felix Culpa: skeptical theists cannot endorse the Felix Culpa—at least for the reasons that Plantinga gives.

The Kantian Theodicy In contrast to axiological theodicies, there are deontological theodicies. Whereas axiological theodicies appeal strictly to value, deontological theodicies appeal (at least partly) to non-axiological reasons God might have for permitting evil. Indeed, Reitan (2014) suggests that axiological theodicies go wrong in ignoring the deontological reasons God has, or might have, for permitting evil—they ignore a host of reasons God has that are relevant to explaining evil.11 One such reason is God’s requiring reason12 to respect our efficacious freedom, i.e. to not intervene in ways that preclude or interfere with our having efficacious freedom.13 Importantly, this requiring reason doesn’t preclude all intervention. Reitan says that while such respect needn’t entail that one can never intervene to prevent the exercise of free choice or neutralize its most pernicious consequences, it may mean one cannot pursue a pattern of intervention that strips its target of efficacious freedom altogether—or of efficacious freedom beyond a certain truncated scope. (2014, p. 194)

This respect requirement can be stated in principle form as follows:

 This is discussed in detail by Hudson (2018).  In particular, he expresses dissatisfaction with Swinburne’s (1998) ignoring of God’s (possibly) requiring reasons in favor of permitting evil. 12  Recall that a requiring reason for X is a reason that counts in favor of the impermissibility of ~X. See Chap. 3, Section “The Nature of Reasons”. 13  Reitan notes that this requirement, or something very much like it, can be found in Kant’s ‘formula of humanity’. I won’t hold it against him that his theodicy has roots in Kant. 10 11

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The Freedom Principle14: It is strictly morally impermissible to act towards human agents in such a way that they come to exist in a state in which they possess no efficacious freedom with respect to a range of human activity in which their capacities and the limitations of physical law would otherwise afford some measure of efficacious freedom. (2014, p. 196)

And this requiring reason also applies to horrendous evils: [it] rules out complete removal of efficacious freedom with respect to horror-­perpetration—in other words, with respect to certain kinds of actions that fall within the scope of our terrestrial human capacities. (2014, p. 195)

This is, roughly, because ruling out horrendous evils would involve God either reducing our capacities with respect to action or hovering over us at every moment, systematically prepared to thwart us should we use our capacities in certain horrific ways (ways that the laws of nature make possible). (2014, p. 195)

But both of these options violate The Freedom Principle: either way of acting eliminates efficacious freedom, and therefore conflicts with God’s requiring reason for non-intervention. The second principle needed for Reitan’s deontological theodicy, call it The Kantian Theodicy, is The Non-Arbitrariness Principle, which Reitan states as follows: The Non-Arbitrariness Principle: One cannot legitimately draw arbitrary lines such that cases on one side are treated differently from relevantly identical cases on the other. (2014, p. 197)

According to The Non-Arbitrariness Principle, one cannot treat similar cases differently. So, for example, if I intervene to prevent Sammy from hitting Sarah, I must also intervene to prevent Sarah from hitting  This is my name for the principle, not Reitan’s. It took all of my strength not to call it The America Principle. 14

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Sammy. And with respect to God, if he must intervene in order to prevent Sammy from causing a horrendous evil, then he must intervene in order to prevent Sarah from causing a horrendous evil, and, in fact, he must intervene in order to prevent all cases of horrendous evil. The same, of course, goes for non-horrendous evil: if there are cases in which God must intervene in order to prevent some instance of non-horrendous evil, then he must intervene in all similar cases to prevent non-horrendous evil.15 But this has the result that God would, if he intervenes to prevent horrendous or non-horrendous evil, violate The Freedom Principle: he wouldn’t be respecting human efficacious freedom with this type of systematic intervention. So, God has requiring reasons for permitting evil— horrendous and otherwise—and thus we have our explanation for why God permits evil.16

The Problem So, according to proponents of The Kantian Theodicy, God has requiring reasons in favor of permitting efficacious freedom, and this entails the permission of evil, even horrendous evil. Conjoined with The Non-­ Arbitrariness Principle, this means that God cannot systematically intervene to prevent evil. This claim, however, seems to be in tension with skeptical theism, and in particular Deontological Skeptical Theism. After all, according to Deontological Skeptical Theism, we have no good public antecedent reason for thinking the perceived weight of God’s reasons in favor of permitting some evil state of affairs resembles the weight of his actual reasons for permission. However, according to The Kantian Theodicy, we know that the perceived weight of God’s reasons for permitting evil resembles the actual weight of his reasons—if it doesn’t, then this doesn’t explain why God allows evil. And so the perceived weight of  One might worry here that this is too quick: there could be relevant differences between horrendous evil that make it such that there are ways for God to non-arbitrarily treat different horrendous evils in different ways. (Paul Draper drew my attention to this problem.) This is, I think, a significant worry for The Kantian Theodicy—it likely means that it doesn’t explain all horrendous evil. However, it isn’t my purpose to defend this theodicy here, so I won’t say more on this matter. 16  And note too that this theodicy doesn’t (at least obviously) explain why there’s natural evil in the world. 15

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God’s reasons must resemble the actual weight of God’s reasons—at least with respect to The Freedom Principle and The Non-Arbitrariness Principle. And hence we have a conflict with skeptical theism, and in particular with Deontological Skeptical Theism.

Natural Theology: Two Case Studies Natural theology is, roughly, the practice of providing evidence or arguments for the existence of God. Numerous arguments have been given for the existence of God. Some of these arguments claim that some fact about the world entails God’s existence: propositions entail the existence of God (Keller, 2018), moral obligation entails the existence of God (Adams, 1987), that there is a possible explanation of the world entails the existence of God (Gale & Pruss, 1999), that a maximally great being is possible entails that God exists (Nagasawa, 2017), and so on. These types of arguments aren’t candidates for being in conflict with skeptical theism: the only arguments that are candidates for being undermined by skeptical theism are arguments that make claims about how God would (at least probably) act on the basis of the perceived value of some state of affairs or the perceived weight of God’s reasons for acting that way, and the above arguments don’t make such claims. Of course, there are numerous arguments that depend on claims about the value of particular states of affairs or on the weight of God’s reasons for producing certain states of affairs, such as fine-tuning arguments (e.g. Collins, 2009), arguments for the resurrection of Jesus (e.g. Swinburne, 2003; Licona, 2010; Wright, 2003), nomological arguments (e.g. Hildebrand & Metcalf, 2022), arguments from moral knowledge (e.g. Swenson & Cummett, 2020), arguments from consciousness (e.g. Page, 2020), and the argument from psychophysical harmony (Crummett & Cutter, forthcoming). In this section, I’ll consider just the two latter-most arguments: I will consider Page’s (2020) argument from consciousness and Crummett and Cutter’s (forthcoming) argument from psychophysical harmony.

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The Argument from Conscious Agents There are several arguments that claim that some fact about consciousness is evidence for theism. However, in this section, I will consider only Page’s (2020) argument that consciousness is evidence for theism, which I shall refer to as The Argument From Conscious Agents.17 If a fact F is evidence for a hypothesis H, then Pr(F/H) > Pr(F/~H). In other words, F is evidence for H if F is more likely given H’s truth than given H’s falsity. And F is evidence for a hypothesis H1 over another incompatible hypothesis H2 if and only if Pr(F/H1) > Pr(F/H2).18 Theism (T), again, is the view that God, a maximally great (and therefore perfect) being, exists.19 Atheism (A), let’s say, is just the thesis that there is no maximally great being.20 Clearly, T and A are contradictory: both can’t be true. Let’s say that conscious agents are creatures that are conscious and are able to deliberate and act on the basis of reasons.21 Since we know that conscious agents exist, we can consider whether their existence is more likely given T or A.22 While Page argues that Pr(conscious agents/T) is greater than Pr(conscious agents/A), and therefore that the existence of conscious agents is evidence for theism over atheism, he thinks that this isn’t the most fruitful comparison to make. A more fruitful comparison, he argues, is to add in the existence of our laws of nature (L) to our background knowledge, and compare Pr(conscious agents/T&L) and Pr(conscious agents/A&L). By adding L to our background knowledge,  E.g. Moreland (2009) and Swinburne (2015). I use Page’s version because I find it most persuasive. 18  For a good introduction on how to think about evidence with respect to theism and atheism, see Manley (forthcoming). 19  See Chap. 1 for a discussion of how I’m using the term “God.” 20  Page’s (2020) definition of atheism is stronger than this is. I use this weaker definition for the sake of convenience. 21  My focus on conscious agents differs only slightly with Page’s formulation of The Argument from Conscious Agents. 22  Of course, if conscious agents are evidence for T over A, it doesn’t follow that T is probably true. For that, we’d need to take into account all other evidence and the prior probability of theism and atheism—issues I won’t address here. See Draper (2016) and (2017a), for reasons to think that theism’s prior probability is very low. See Wilson (2020) for reason to doubt Draper’s argument. And see Miller (2018), Poston (2020), and Swinburne (2004) for arguments that theism’s prior probability isn’t very low. 17

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the existence of conscious agents becomes even stronger evidence for T over A. This is because, Page says, One of the possibilities that lowered the probability of God’s creating consciousness is that God might not create anything at all. On the atheist side, one of the possibilities that raised the likelihood of consciousness is the possible existence of different atheistic worlds where consciousness was easily produced. The revamped version of my argument attempts to remove both possibilities. It does this by asking what the probability of consciousness is given theism/atheism and certain facts that we know about the world, namely our worldly laws of nature [L]. With this addition of [L] we rule out both the possibility of God’s existing on His own, since He has created something, namely [L], and the many atheist worlds in which their laws of nature bring about consciousness easily and regularly. (2020, p. 340)

In other words, if we include L in our background knowledge, then we’ve eliminated one of God’s best reasons for refraining from creating conscious agents and we’ve eliminated one good reason for thinking the existence of conscious agents is likely given A. And this results in the probability of conscious agents given T increasing and the probability of conscious agents given A decreasing. Indeed, this suggests that Pr(conscious agents/T&L) is high and that Pr(conscious agents/A&L) is low, and therefore that the existence of conscious agents is strong evidence for theism over atheism. Why should we think that Pr(conscious agents/T&L) is high? Because, says Page, God has numerous good reasons for creating conscious agents: perhaps God wants to have relationships with creatures (perhaps his perfect love causes him to want this interaction),23 or perhaps God wants to share his knowledge with creatures, or perhaps he wants to share the greatness of existence with others, or perhaps God, if he creates, must create from the set of best possible worlds, and most of the best possible worlds contain conscious agents (due to their immense value).24 These are  This reason would require subsequent explanation from Trinitarian Christians, but it could plausibly be held that God might want to have relationships with other, non-divine beings. 24  Most of these goods are taken from Page (2020, pp. 341–342). However, I’ve put my own spin on some of the goods he cites. 23

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all very good reasons for God to create conscious agents (if he creates at all), and therefore it makes the existence of conscious agents likely, given our laws of nature, if God exists. So Pr(conscious agents/T&L) is high. The next step Page takes is to argue that Pr(conscious agents/A&L) is low.25 Why think it’s low? His reasons are empirical: the way our world is makes it difficult to create conscious agents. He says that despite our continual trying, unable to intentionally produce anything close to consciousness by manipulating matter, arranging and rearranging it into certain forms. We might be able to fix or replace aspects of brains, which is at least linked in some way to consciousness, but this is far from bringing about materialist consciousness from non-conscious material. (2020, p. 345)

In other words, despite our best efforts, we aren’t able to produce conscious agents—outside, of course, of the typical reproductive process. And, in fact, our world has existed for billions of years, but the only conscious agents that we know of exist on one planet (Earth), and we are in many ways fortunate that there are conscious agents on our planet: evolution could have gone numerous ways in producing creatures that didn’t result in the existence of conscious agents. And appeals to the adaptivity of conscious deliberation won’t help here, claims Page (2020, p.  346): adaptive behavior requires only sufficiently good computation, not conscious deliberation. Thus, there appear to be numerous barriers to the existence of conscious agents given our laws of nature, and this means that Pr(conscious agents/A&L) is low. There’s more to say here, but the idea behind The Argument from Conscious Agents should be clear: Pr(conscious agents/T&L) is much higher than Pr(conscious agents/A&L), and therefore the existence of conscious agents is strong evidence for theism over atheism. And note that this is the case no matter what theory of consciousness is true: Pr(conscious agents/T&L) will be high whether materialism, dualism, or

 Strictly speaking, it just has to be less than Pr(conscious agents/T&L).

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panpsychism is true,26 since God’s reasons for creating conscious agents remain no matter which theory is true. And Pr(conscious agents/A&L) will be low whether materialism, dualism, or panpsychism is true, since none of these theories raises the probability of there being conscious agents—none of these theories makes it likely that, given (A&L), there are conscious agents (Page, 2020, pp. 344–353).27 Therefore, the existence of conscious agents is strong evidence for theism over atheism.

Th  e Problem The problem with The Argument from Conscious Agents lies with the claim that Pr(conscious agents/T&L) is high. Skeptical theism provides a barrier for our affirming this claim—it prevents us from inferring from our knowledge of the perceived value of conscious agents to their actual value (Axiological Skeptical Theism). But then it’s difficult to see how we can justify this claim—it’s hard to see how skeptical theists can consistently claim that the goods that come from conscious agents that Page cites render Pr(conscious agents/T&L) high since skeptical theism, and in particular Axiological Skeptical Theism, prevents us from thinking that the perceived value of states of affairs including conscious agents resembles its actual value.

The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony Crummett and Cutter (forthcoming) have developed an argument for theism from psychophysical harmony. The argument, roughly, is that phenomenal states are correlated with physical states in a way that is more likely on theism than on atheism. More exactly, let’s characterize psychophysical harmony as follows:  Of course, these aren’t exhaustive of all positions one can take with respect to consciousness.  True, if panpsychism is correct, then everything is (in some sense) fundamentally conscious. But that’s a far cry from there existing conscious agents. Indeed, if panpsychism holds in our world, then the same considerations hold with respect to conscious agents: they are hard to produce even if consciousness is fundamental. 26 27

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Psychophysical Harmony: States of consciousness are related to each other, and to physical states, in strikingly harmonious ways—ways that seem extremely lucky, or involve many striking apparent coincidences. (forthcoming: n.p.)

There are different kinds of psychophysical harmony. Crummett and Cutter discuss normative harmony and semantic harmony, and they consider several kinds of normative and semantic harmony. I’ll limit myself here to just a brief discussion of one kind of normative harmony, namely, hedonic harmony. For the initial statement of the argument, let’s assume dualism (mental states aren’t physical states) and causal completeness (roughly, all human behavior and brain events have a sufficient physical cause).28 When a human organism is subject to a damaging stimulus, it results in a certain brain state B, and B results in the organism seeking to avoid or eliminate this kind of stimuli in the future. Conveniently, the psychophysical laws have it such that the phenomenal state of pain is correlated with B, and pain gives one a reason to avoid or eliminate this kind of stimuli. But, given causal completeness and dualism, any phenomenal state could have been correlated with B, the vast majority of which wouldn’t give one a reason to avoid damaging stimulus. For example, if pleasure or the experience of warmness or the experience of tasting chocolate milk were correlated with B, it wouldn’t give one a reason to avoid damaging stimuli. But if pleasure or the experience of warmness, or the experience of tasting chocolate milk were correlated with B, then we wouldn’t be acting harmoniously when avoiding (or seeking to eliminate) damaging stimuli, in the sense that we wouldn’t be acting on the basis of good reason to avoid B. To be clear, the claim here isn’t that we can’t explain why there’s a mechanism that results in B. That can be explained evolutionarily. Rather, it’s the fact that a particular phenomenal state—pain—is correlated with B, and this phenomenal state provides one with a reason for avoiding damaging stimuli. Moreover, Crummett and Cutter point out, while evolution can explain why B obtains in humans when they undergo damaging stimuli, it can’t explain the psychophysical law that has pain  These assumptions aren’t essential to the argument, as we’ll see below.

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correlated with B: evolution can’t affect the psychophysical laws, but it can select for adaptive behavior.29 And so this harmonious connection between pain (or some other relevant reason-giving phenomenal state) and damaging stimuli is extremely unlikely—at least if we’re assuming atheism. Indeed, this point about harmony can be made for various other phenomenal and physical states, Crummett and Cutter argue, making the known psychophysical harmony extraordinarily unlikely given atheism. If theism is true, on the other hand, then psychophysical harmony isn’t extremely unlikely. Crummett and Cutter say: Given the value of psychophysical harmony, it’s not terribly unlikely that God would create a world whose laws are fine-tuned for psychophysical harmony. (Crummett & Cutter, forthcoming: n.p.)

So, given the value of psychophysical harmony, it at least isn’t terribly unlikely that there’s psychophysical harmony given theism. And, given that psychophysical harmony is extraordinarily unlikely given atheism, this gives us strong evidence for theism over atheism.30 While the initial statement of The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony assumes dualism and causal completeness, it should work on basically any plausible  theory of mind. For example, if interactionist dualism is true, psychophysical harmony is still unlikely: there are many possible ways for phenomenal states and physical states to interact, and the fact that they interact doesn’t make it likely that pain will be correlated with B—there’s no guarantee that the causal mechanism for avoiding damaging stimuli is pain and  not one of the many other possible  How is this different from Plantinga’s (e.g. 2002, 2011) Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism? Briefly, the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism targets beliefs while The Argument From Psychophysical Harmony targets phenomenal states. While I think the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism is basically successful, I think it’s far more plausible to claim that evolution would select for true beliefs than that it would select for harmonious phenomenal states. Indeed, there’s no merit at all to the latter claim. And this means that The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony is on far more stable footing than the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. 30  There’s far more to say here—again, Crummett and Cutter go over several other kinds of psychophysical harmony, which make psychophysical harmony even less likely given atheism—but this is sufficient for our purposes. 29

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phenomenal states.31 And physicalism won’t help either: even if we accept a physicalist view of mind, it’s still true that there are many epistemically possible phenomenal states that B could have been correlated with. That is, if we hold that phenomenal states are identical to (or supervene on) physical states (or even functional states), there’s no reason to think it’s more likely that pain would be associated with B than, say, pleasure, or the experience of warmness, or any other phenomenal state—that depends on what the psychophysical laws are. And, again, this will be true for numerous other correlations between phenomenal states and physical states, making this correlation even more unlikely. And so physicalism doesn’t solve the problem. So, whether dualism or physicalism is true, whether there’s causal completeness or not, psychophysical harmony is extraordinarily unlikely—at least if we assume that theism is false.32 However, psychophysical harmony isn’t extremely unlikely if theism is true. And hence psychophysical harmony is strong evidence for theism.33

The Problem The problem with The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony is that it makes a probability assessment based on the perceived value of psychophysical harmony: it claims that, due to the value of individuals who display psychophysical harmony, it isn’t terribly unlikely that God would ensure that there is such harmony. But this clearly conflicts with Axiological Skeptical Theism, which prevents us from thinking that the perceived value of psychophysical harmony resembles the actual value of psychophysical harmony—at least if we’re only taking into account our public antecedent reasons. And so this way of motivating The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony isn’t compatible with skeptical theism.  Again, evolution won’t matter here since we’re talking about the psychophysical laws, which evolution doesn’t affect. (More generally, evolution doesn’t affect the laws of nature.) 32  Crummett and Cutter talk about theism and theism adjacent hypotheses. For the sake of simplicity, I focus only on the former. 33  It’s noteworthy that this argument can be seen to build off of The Argument from Conscious Agents: if conscious agents provide evidence for theism over atheism, the existence of psychophysically harmonious conscious agents is even more evidence for theism. 31

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Four Narrow Solutions So, skeptical theism poses a problem for the Felix Culpa, The Kantian Theodicy, The Argument from Conscious Agents, and The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony. What’s a skeptical theist to do? In this section, I’ll outline four narrow solutions to these problems that skeptical theists may use. These solutions are narrow since they appeal directly to intuition. While I have no problems with appeals to intuition, it’s nevertheless not an ideal situation to be in—it’s (at least usually) better to provide independent reason for endorsing a view, since this doesn’t limit the scope of its application to those who happen to share the necessary intuition. Moreover, appeals to intuition with respect to these arguments run into other problems, namely, they will be undermined due to the issues I discuss in Chap.9. And so these narrow solutions are, in my view, ultimately unsuccessful.

Felix Culpa: A Narrow Solution The problem with the Felix Culpa is to show, in a way that’s consistent with skeptical theism, that the best possible worlds contain incarnation and atonement. This, however, poses a problem for skeptical theists: skeptical theists, and in particular adherents of Axiological Skeptical Theism, hold that we have no good public reason for thinking that the perceived value of some complex state of affairs resembles its actual value. But then how can we claim that the incarnation and atonement are so valuable that they are in all the best possible worlds? One move left open by skeptical theism is the use of private reasons—reasons that appeal to one’s own mental states.34 This move is left open because skeptical theism explicitly makes no claims about private reasons. So, one response the skeptical theist can make is to claim that we have good private reason to think that the value of incarnation and atonement is so great that all the best possible worlds contain it: it’s intuitive that the value of incarnation

34

 For more on private reasons, see Chap. 2, Section “Axiological Skeptical Theism”.

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and atonement is as great as the Felix Culpa claims, and this provides justification for the relevant value judgment. This solves the problem that skeptical theism poses to the Felix Culpa— but it’s not an ideal solution for two reasons. First, it’s a narrow solution because it probably doesn’t have a wide scope of application: only those who find it intuitive to think that the value of incarnation and atonement is so great that the best possible worlds contain it can make use of this response. And the number of people who have this intuition is likely very small. However, an ideal theodicy will have wide appeal: it will be a plausible explanation of evil for a substantial number of persons. And second, it’s in danger of defeat, and in particular Humean defeat. Recall that one acquires a Humean defeater for a belief B if she holds B yet, in times of reflection, she thinks either that B is unlikely to be true or that the probability of B’s being true is inscrutable.35 It’s not implausible to think that someone who holds that the best possible worlds contain incarnation and atonement would acquire a Humean defeater for her belief: the sheer lack of popularity of this view can plausibly result in one thinking her belief about the value of incarnation and atonement is unlikely to be true. After all, the only philosopher on record (that I’m aware of ) affirming the value judgment of the Felix Culpa is Plantinga (2004). And while finding oneself in Plantinga’s company is almost always a good thing, the small number of people who share this value  assessment is deeply concerning.36 Indeed, one must think that nearly everyone in the history of the world who has considered this issue is wrong. But is it really plausible to think that, with the exception of a small handful of philosophers, everyone in the history of the world who disagrees is just not truly appreciating the value of incarnation and atonement? It’s hard to avoid a negative answer to this question. Consider a different case: suppose that you and your two friends think that Mount Baker is the most beautiful mountain in the world, but no one else shares this judgment. Is it really plausible to think that everyone else is wrong on this matter and have not truly appreciated the value of Mount Baker? It’s hard to avoid a negative answer to this  For more on Humean defeaters, see Chap. 6, Section “Humean Defeaters”.  Indeed, I find myself in something like this predicament: I share Plantinga’s assessment about the value of incarnation and atonement and cannot shake myself of this belief, but the fact that so few others agree with me on this causes me to think my assessment is unlikely to be true. 35 36

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question. And those who find themselves drawn toward a negative answer with respect to these questions will likely have (at least) a Humean defeater for their belief about the value of the incarnation and atonement. And since that belief undergirds the Felix Culpa, they will have a Humean defeater for their affirmation of the Felix Culpa. Of course, the massive unpopularity of the value judgment that undergirds the Felix Culpa doesn’t entail that its adherents have a Humean defeater—but it (Humean defeat) is a threat nevertheless.37

The Kantian Theodicy: A Narrow Solution Recall the tension between The Kantian Theodicy and skeptical theism: to claim that God permits evil because of The Freedom Principle and The Non-Arbitrariness Principle is to claim that the perceived weight of God’s reasons (namely, the prior mentioned principles) for allowing evil resembles the actual weight of his reasons. But this, of course, is in tension with skeptical theism, and in particular Deontological Skeptical Theism. The narrow solution here is to invoke private reasons, and in particular intuition, for thinking that the perceived weight of God’s reasons resembles the actual weight of his reasons: the advocate of The Kantian Theodicy will claim that it’s intuitive that The Freedom Principle and The Non-­ Arbitrariness Principle are such weighty reasons that they prohibit God from violating them. While this is a narrow solution, it’s a little different, and perhaps more plausible, than the narrow solution with respect to the Felix Culpa. This is because the skeptical theist might claim that it’s intuitive that The Freedom Principle and The Non-Arbitrariness Principle are absolute requiring reasons for God, and this means that God must permit evil that results from efficacious freedom, come what may. Indeed, this is precisely what Reitan argues. He says that The Freedom Principle and The Non-­Arbitrariness

37  Moreover, my arguments in Chap. 9 likely undermine private reasons one might invoke to support the Felix Culpa.

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Principle cannot be overruled by other considerations (2014, p. 203).38 As such, this means that we have a ready explanation of why God permits evil: he has sufficiently weighty, indeed absolute, requiring reasons for doing so. This puts God in an interesting position: his hands are tied with respect to wicked human choices and the evil they produce: the best he can do is suffer with us during the evil and make things better in the end (Reitan, 2014, p. 199); God must wait and weep (2014, p. 203). I say that this narrow solution is on better grounds than the narrow solution for the Felix Culpa because, first, that The Freedom Principle and The Non-Arbitrariness Principle are absolute reasons for God can be plausibly thought to be more widespread than the relevant intuition about the value of incarnation and atonement. And second, one of the only ways that we can know about whether a reason is absolute is through intuition,39 so there’s little else that can be demanded of the defender of The Kantian Theodicy here. However, though this narrow solution has some plausibility to it, it’s still not ideal: the intuition that The Freedom Principle and The Non-Arbitrariness Principle are absolute reasons for God is probably not terribly widespread.40 As such, this limits the scope of this theodicy. A more pressing problem for invoking private reasons in support of The Kantian Theodicy  is that such reasons are threatened with defeat on account of the arguments I offer in Chap. 9. As such, the use of private reasons in support of The Kantian Theodicy isn’t terribly promising.  Why think that these requiring reasons of God’s are absolute? Reitan reasons as follows: The idea that complete removal of efficacious freedom is strictly prohibited, regardless of the good outcomes, will strike many if not most as prima facie plausible. Affording some opportunity to act in ways that matter may be necessary to show respect for human dignity. Many if not most of us see our capacity for deliberative agency and our ability to make choices for good or ill as so central to who we are as human beings that to be deprived of efficacious freedom altogether would amount to being denied a fully actualized human life. One is rendered not merely useless but insignificant. This, we might say, can never be justified, no matter what good may come of it. (2014, pp. 194–195) 38

 It’s possible that one learns of an absolute duty through divine revelation. However, this seems an unlikely explanation of why anyone endorses The Freedom Principle or the Non-Arbitrariness Principle. 40  Indeed, I don’t find this intuitive at all, and, in fact, think that it’s false that these are absolute requiring reasons for God. Though, again, the relevant intuitions here are probably more widespread than the relevant intuitions about the value of incarnation and atonement. 39

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 he Argument from Conscious Agents: T A Narrow Solution The problem with The Argument from Conscious Agents is to show why God is likely to create conscious agents given our laws of nature. A narrow solution here, again, is to use private reasons. For example, one might claim that the proposition ‘conscious agents are so valuable that God will probably create them’ is intuitive. Or perhaps one would claim that the proposition ‘the best possible worlds contain conscious agents’ is intuitive. If either of these are the case, then we have grounds for thinking that God would (at least probably) create conscious agents, and The Argument from Conscious Agents is up and running. However, this too is a narrow solution: it will only appeal to those who have the relevant intuition, and it provides no way forward for those who lack the needed intuition. That said, while I think this is a narrow solution, it seems that this approach might have relatively wide appeal: that conscious agents are better than non-conscious agents seems to be widely held, and that worlds that contain conscious agents are better than worlds without conscious agents may also be widely held.41 Indeed, it wouldn’t be at all surprising if there is a widespread intuition that the value of conscious agents is so great that all (or most of ) the best possible worlds contain conscious agents. However, again, this is doubtless a limitation for The Argument from Conscious Agents—one would like to provide independent reason for thinking that God is likely to create conscious agents given our laws of nature, for without independent reason for thinking this, there’s no way forward for those who lack the relevant intuition. Moreover, I think that the considerations I raise in Chap. 9 will undermine any intuition about this matter, meaning that, ultimately, this narrow solution is unsuccessful.

41

 For example, Adams (1999, pp. 118–119) seems to hold this view.

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 he Argument from Psychophysical Harmony: T A Narrow Solution The problem with The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony, again, is that it makes a probability assessment based on the perceived value of psychophysical harmony, and this conflicts with Axiological Skeptical Theism. A narrow solution—like the narrow solutions given above—appeals to private reasons to justify this probability assessment. That is, one might claim that it seems that the value of psychophysical harmony is such that it isn’t terribly unlikely given theism. It might be that this intuition is widespread, meaning that this narrow solution has a relatively wide application. But it’s nevertheless limited by its reliance on private reasons. Moreover, this intuition is likely subject to the defeaters discussed in the following chapter, meaning that it shouldn’t be used by anyone.

Four Metaethical Solutions In the previous section, I outlined four narrow solutions to the problems that skeptical theism poses to the Felix Culpa, The Kantian Theodicy, The Argument from Conscious Agents, and The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony. In this section, I will use metaethics to offer independent support for these positions. The metaethical solution I will offer in this section makes use of Adams (1999) theistic conception of the Good—although, crucially, I will show below that it’s not limited to only those who share this view. Indeed, my solution will work for (nearly) everyone, including those who reject Adams’ metaethics, as I illustrate below. One part of metaethics concerns the nature of goodness. One theistic view of the matter (Adams, 1999) identifies goodness with God: God is the Good. On this view, the Good is that which is worthy of love or admiration (1999, p.  13)—what Adam’s calls excellence. Of course,

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goodness (or excellence) isn’t restricted to moral goodness. It also covers aesthetic goodness. Adams says that: God is the exemplar or standard of a goodness that includes much more than moral virtue. Among the Platonic roles inherited by God … is that of Beauty itself. (1999, p. 14)

So God is the Good, and the Good covers both moral goodness and aesthetic goodness. Additionally, and crucially, God is a person or at least like a person in important ways (Adams, 1999, p. 14)—he is (at least) a conscious agent that’s able to act on the basis of reasons. So, we may say that the Good has moral, aesthetic, and person (or person-like) properties. On this theistic conception of the good, things are good insofar as they resemble God: God is the standard of goodness, to which other good things must in some measure conform, but never perfectly conform. (Adams, 1999, p. 29)

And what does resemblance to God consist of? It may consist in a common property shared between the excellent characteristic, thing, or action and God. But this need not be the case. For example, excellence in cooking—being a good cook—resembles God, but that doesn’t make God a cook. Rather, the resemblance here is of cooking to divine creativity (Adams, 1999, p. 30). Thus, excellence in X-ing may resemble God in the sense that God has the property of X, or it may resemble God in the sense that it is an instance of some more general property of God. We may say, then, that a mountain is beautiful since it resembles God’s beauty, a person is good since she resembles God’s conscious agency, and so on. Of course, there’s more to say here. However, this brief description of a theistic understanding of the Good is sufficient for the purposes of this chapter. Below, I will argue that this theistic conception of the Good offers (at least a partial) solution to the problems skeptical theism poses to the Felix Culpa, The Kantian Theodicy, The Argument from Conscious Agents, and The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony.

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The Felix Culpa: A Metaethical Solution So, things, characteristics, and actions are good insofar as they resemble God. God—at least according to a popular view—is perfectly loving.42 Thus, one way for a thing, characteristic, or action to be good is if it resembles God’s love. Moreover, again, we have assumed that God must create from the set of best possible worlds (see above, Section “Felix Culpa”). And this provides us with a skeptical theism-friendly and independent reason for endorsing the Felix Culpa. Here’s how. The Felix Culpa, recall, claims that the best possible worlds contain incarnation and atonement, and therefore must contain evil. What worlds with created beings exemplify God’s perfect love? The defender of the Felix Culpa may hold that only worlds that contain incarnation and atonement do. After all, “Greater love has no one than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.” (John 15: 13)43 That is, the defender of the Felix Culpa may claim that the worlds with created beings in which God’s love is best exemplified involve God becoming incarnate and laying down his life as atonement for his creatures. At a more general level, the point is that worlds in which God lays down his life as atonement express his perfect love more than other worlds in which he doesn’t do so: the greatest expression of love is in laying down one’s life for another. The only way for God to do this for his creatures is to become incarnate and atone for their sins. So, these worlds will resemble or express the Good better than worlds without incarnation and atonement, and this provides some reason to think that the best possible worlds will all include incarnation and atonement—if they don’t, they wouldn’t express God’s perfect love. Of course, even with this statement, the Felix Culpa still invites questions: is it really an expression of perfect love to allow so much evil in order  Murphy (2017a) rejects this view. As such, what I say in this section will not be applicable to those who endorse Murphy’s view of God. 43  Romans 5: 7–8 suggests that an even greater love would be for God to lay down his life for those who have mistreated him: “Very rarely will anyone die for a righteous person, though for a good person someone might possibly dare to die. But God demonstrates his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us.” This could be understood to be a subset of “friends’‘referred to in John 15: 13, in which case we could say that S laying down her life for her friends who have mistreated her is a greater love than S laying down her life for her friends who haven’t mistreated her. Thanks to Mike Bergmann for help on this point here. 42

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to save another? And, importantly, one might ask if laying down one’s life for another really is the best expression of love. Or perhaps one thinks it would be wrong for God to intentionally arrange a world in a manner that brings about sinful behavior so that he can become incarnate and atone for our sins.44 These issues, of course, are in need of being addressed. However, they are different than the problem posed to the Felix Culpa by skeptical theism: this move isn’t inferring from the perceived value of incarnation and atonement to its actual value. Instead, it’s making an inference from one aspect of God’s character (being perfectly loving) conjoined with a metaethical view (God as the Good) and a judgment about how perfect love would be expressed toward created beings. This is a conceptual move that needn’t make use of an inference from the perceived value of incarnation and atonement to its actual value: from the concept of love, we are concluding that it is best expressed by incarnation and atonement.45 Of course, this defense may ultimately make use of intuition: one might find it intuitive that perfect love is expressed by laying down one’s life for another, for example. However, it’s nevertheless true that this is a much more plausible judgment to make, since it doesn’t rely on a judgment about possible values simpliciter: it’s reliance on a conceptual analysis of perfect love is an advantage over Plantinga’s defense of the Felix Culpa.

The Kantian Theodicy: A Metaethical Solution So much for the Felix Culpa. What about The Kantian Theodicy? The narrow solution to the problems posed by skeptical theism was to claim it’s intuitive that The Freedom Principle and The Non-Arbitrariness Principle are absolute requiring reasons for God. But, as we saw above, this response faces several problems. Theistic metaethics, however, may provide a way to partially support the existence of these reasons as absolute. Here’s how. One attribute of God is perfect freedom. And if God creates free creatures, they will be good insofar as they resemble him. However, this suggests that if God creates free creatures, he would not  This is akin to the Munchausen by proxy syndrome worry that Plantinga discusses.  Contrast this with Plantinga’s case for the Felix Culpa which simply asks the reader to consider the value of incarnation and proceed from there. 44 45

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significantly encroach on their freedom, for this would involve him actively causing them to cease resembling him in important ways. But God would never do that—he would never actively cause creatures to resemble him less by “hovering over them” or by reducing their abilities for action. This follows from the concept of God (perfectly free), a theistic view of ethics (God as the Good), and the view that ‘hovering’ or reducing creature abilities results in creatures being less free, and this provides some (although not decisive) independent reason for thinking that The Freedom Principle is absolute.46 As such, this provides some support for The Kantian Theodicy that is perfectly consistent with skeptical theism. Of course, there’s more work to do for the defender of this theodicy: I cannot see, for example, how this solution helps with respect to The Non-Arbitrariness Principle.47 But this metaethical solution nevertheless offers some independent support for The Kantian Theodicy.

 he Argument from Conscious Agents: T A Metaethical Solution The problem with The Argument from Conscious Agents is to show that God is likely to produce conscious agents in a way that is consistent with skeptical theism. Once again, metaethics offers a way forward here. This is because God is a person or at least person-like: he is able to act on the basis of reasons, which involves being a conscious agent. This gives us  One might think that God could have a reason to hinder human freedom in order to promote human freedom, and that God’s true requiring reason (instead of The Freedom Principle) is something like: do not interfere with efficacious freedom unless it produces more efficacious freedom. But if this (or something like this) is how the requiring reason is to be understood, then we must make judgments about the weight of God’s reasons in order to know whether this principle justifies God in permitting evil, and this comparative judgment threatens to bring us back into conflict with Deontological Skeptical Theism. However, this requiring reason should not be understood in this manner, for this principle allows for cases in which God is required to directly cause something to resemble himself less (so that it may resemble himself more ultimately). But this seems like the sort of thing God can’t do, no matter the consequences: it’s perverse and contrary to God’s nature to cause things to resemble him less (which in effect is to cause things to be less good). In other words, God can’t cause something to resemble himself less even if it will result in that thing resembling him more in the long run—this is (perhaps) an absolute requiring reason for God. 47  In fact, I suspect that this principle is false for reasons considered in Chap. 4, Section “God and Axiological Gratuitous Evil: Are They Compatible?”. 46

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another aspect of resemblance to consider: resemblance to God as a conscious agent. And this is a property that one may only resemble God by sharing: one cannot resemble a conscious agent in any significant sense without being a conscious agent.48 So, any world lacking conscious agents will be a world that lacks resemblance to God in one very important way49—since one can only resemble God with respect to being a person if she is a conscious agent, the only way for this good to be expressed is for there to be conscious agents. And this suggests that if God creates, he very likely would create conscious agents: he would very likely create things that resemble him in this way. Indeed, the best possible worlds will contain things that resemble God in all important ways—worlds that contain things that resemble God in all important respects will be far better than worlds that contain things that resemble him only in some possible important ways. So, worlds that include conscious agents will be far better than ones that don’t, and therefore the best possible worlds will include conscious agents. Therefore, if God creates, he will likely create conscious agents. And thus, we may say that Pr(conscious agents/T&L) is high. Again, this judgment is rooted in conceptual analysis: we can see from the concept of God (that he’s a conscious agent) and theistic metaethics (God is the Good) that the best possible worlds contain conscious agents, and therefore that Pr(conscious agents/T&L) is high. Since this was the only part of The Argument from Conscious Agents that was in principle vulnerable to skeptical theism, this shows that skeptical theists can endorse this argument and provide independent support for a key premise of it.

 Plausibly, this is one the greatest ways in which one can resemble God: being a conscious agent is, perhaps, the closest way that one can resemble God—a conscious agent will always resemble God more than anything that isn’t a conscious agent. 49  Indeed, anecdotally our judgments about conscious agents are clear: anecdotally, we regard animate objects as always better than inanimate objects, and conscious agents as always better than non-conscious ones (this is why we would sacrifice a painting or a worm to save a person). van Inwagen (2006) says something similar in his justification for thinking that God is a person. 48

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 he Argument from Psychophysical Harmony: T A Metaethical Solution The problem with The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony is to show that it isn’t at least terribly unlikely that God would ensure that his creatures are harmonious in a way that’s consistent with skeptical theism. Again, metaethics can offer a way forward here. God—a perfect being— isn’t irrational: he acts in line with his reasons. Indeed, to not do so would be a clear imperfection. And this gives us another aspect of resemblance to consider: resemblance to God as a rational being. This is a property that one may only resemble God by sharing: there isn’t a serious sense in which one can resemble a rational being and yet not be rational. However, lacking psychophysical harmony is a significant kind of irrationality. And so creatures that lack psychophysical harmony won’t resemble God in an important way.50 Conversely, creatures that are psychophysically harmonious resemble God in an important way.51 And this means that, if God creates conscious beings, it isn’t at least terribly unlikely that God would ensure they are psychophysically harmonious.52 This reasoning isn’t vulnerable to skeptical theism: we can see from conceptual analysis (God as a perfect, and therefore rational, being) and theistic metaethics (God as the Good) that it isn’t terribly unlikely that God would create psychophysically harmonious agents (since such agents would resemble him in an important way). So, there’s a plausible route for skeptical theists to motivate The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony. This same strategy can be used with respect to other pieces of natural theology that are thought to be vulnerable to skeptical theism. For example, one might think that Swinburne’s (Swinburne, 2004) argument for  A similar point could be made about the chaotic nature involved in a lack of psychophysical harmony: since God isn’t chaotic, it at least isn’t terribly unlikely that God’s creatures wouldn’t be chaotic. 51  Of course, one might be irrational despite having psychophysical harmony. This just means that psychophysical harmony is a necessary condition for rationality (and therefore resembling God with respect to rationality). 52  Indeed, one might think that it’s very likely that if God creatures conscious agents, he would ensure that they’re psychophysically harmonious. 50

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the resurrection of Jesus is vulnerable to skeptical theism, since it involves numerous judgments about what God is likely to do. One way to support the argument, then, is to show that the resurrection of Jesus expresses a property of God in some important way (perhaps for reasons similar to those expressed in Section “The Felix Culpa: A Metaethical Solution”, or perhaps (more plausibly) due to reasons pertaining to what atonement requires). Whether this can be worked out, I don’t know. But this provides a possible way forward for skeptical theists—or, a way forward beyond intuition. Perhaps similar things can be said for other pieces of natural theology—I leave this issue for others to develop.

Is the Metaethical Solution Too Narrow? Extending the Metaethical Solution to the Resemblance Solution One might be tempted to dismiss my defense of both theodicy and natural theology because it relies on a particular and unpopular metaethical position: my defense relies on the conception of God as the Good, and it therefore will have a narrow scope of appeal. Of course, there are numerous other metaethical positions one can take. At the most basic level, there are moral realists and moral anti-realists. The latter think that there are no (stance indepedent) moral properties, and claims about morality either are non-cognitive (e.g. Ayer, 1946) or are false (e.g. Mackie, 1977). The former hold that there are moral properties, and that these properties are either natural (e.g. Boyd, 1988) or non-natural (e.g. Huemer, 2005).53 Non-naturalists hold that there are evaluative and non-evaluative properties, and the former are non-natural while the latter are natural. Conversely, naturalists hold that both evaluative and non-evaluative properties are, in some sense, natural. Now, by identifying God with the Good, we have endorsed a type of non-naturalism.54 However, there are other types of non-naturalism, such as the intuitionism of Ross (2002) or Huemer (2005). So, we have numerous views about metaethics, and the  Huemer refers to his view as intuitionism as opposed to non-naturalism.  Although, interestingly, on Huemer’s view of the matter, divine command theory about obligation—the view that what makes an action right or wrong depends on what God commands—is a type of subjectivism, which is a type of naturalism.

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conjunction of adherents of the views that aren’t in line with the theistic view of the Good that I’ve been using is far more vast than the number of adherents of this view. This suggests that the approach I’ve taken is of little use: few will accept the premises I’ve made use of here. And so my defense has a very narrow scope. This dismissal is too quick. This is because whether or not one believes that God exists, and whether or not one believes that God would be the Good, it’s nevertheless true that if God—a maximally great being—exists, then things would be good if they resemble God. After all, God (if he exists) is a maximally great being, so there cannot be something else that it’s better to resemble (if there were, then that would be the maximally great being): no matter one’s metaethical view, we should all accept that the more that something resembles a maximally great being, the better it is.55 In other words, if one accepts this view, then she will hold that things, characteristics, and actions will be good insofar as (but not because) they resemble God. And this means that all the reasons I gave above in support of the Felix Culpa, The Kantian Theodicy, The Argument from Conscious Agents, and The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony kick in. Therefore, one who accepts a different account of metaethics than the one I have used here can make use of the same skeptical theist-friendly reasoning I have used above to endorse the view that God, being perfectly loving, would probably create a world in which he displays his perfect love (Felix Culpa), or that he would probably create creatures that resemble himself with respect to efficacious freedom (The Kantian Theodicy), or that he would probably create creatures that resemble him with respect to conscious agency (The Argument from Conscious Agents), or that it at least isn’t terribly unlikely that he would create creatures that resemble himself with respect to rationality (The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony). As such, the reasoning outlined here isn’t limited to theists or those who accept a theistic view of the nature of goodness—it’s limited to those who accept the view that God, if he exists, is a maximally great being and that therefore resemblance to God, if he exists, is a good-­ making property. This view is likely to have wide support.  And,  Indeed, one might even accept that if God exists, then he is the Good since he is maximally great. But such a strong position isn’t needed for my point here. 55

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moreover, denying this view is implausible. Of course, this isn’t exactly a metaethical solution anymore: it doesn’t rely on any claims about what explains or grounds ethical facts. Instead, it relies on the notion of resemblance to a maximally great being. Nevertheless, this is basically the same move I made in my metaethical solution. To acknowledge this difference, we can call this extended solution The Resemblance Solution. Again, one might still dispute parts of these theodicies—e.g. one might dispute whether the Felix Culpa exemplifies the best form of love—but these disputes will not make use of skeptical theism: the will revolve around conceptual issues (e.g. what would most closely resembles God). Thus, my metaethical solution and its cousin The Resemblance Solution are likely to have a wide scope and are not limited to those who accept a theistic conception of goodness. And this provides a skeptical theism-­ friendly way of doing natural theology and theodicy. Finally, it’s worth noting that The Resemblance Solution and the metaethical solution only work if we can identify great-making properties. I take some great making properties to be rather clear: being a conscious agent and being rational, for example, are clear great making properties. So are power and knowledge. However, it’s not always clear whether a property is a great making property. As such, theodicies and pieces of natural theology will have a more difficult time using the metaethical solution and The Resemblance Solution if they aren’t supported by a clear great-making property.

 ow to Make an Effective Argument H for Atheism Above, I argued that skeptical theists can make use of metaethics (or The Resemblance Solution) to provide independent support for particular theodicies and particular pieces of natural theology. This, however, suggests a way to construct arguments against theism: we can refashion (or create new) arguments for atheism that make this conceptual move about resemblance. For example, one might refashion arguments from horrendous evils in this way. So, instead of talking about horrendous evils as evils that make it seem that one’s life isn’t worth living (e.g. Adams, 2000),

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we can talk about evils that are opposed to the Good—that stand in opposition to God. Then we might argue that God wouldn’t permit things to stand in opposition to him, and therefore that we have reason to think that God doesn’t exist. Since these involve conceptual claims about what resemblance to God amounts to, these arguments won’t be vulnerable to skeptical theism. However, it opens up other avenues for criticism: perhaps, for example, one might argue that God creating creatures that resemble him with respect to freedom entails that they may perform acts that are in opposition to him. Of course, this argument and response mirrors traditional arguments from horrendous evils (e.g. Adams, 2000) and a traditional free will theodicy (e.g. Swinburne, 1998). The difference, however, is that the argument and response proceed on conceptual grounds instead of relying on the perceived value of certain actions. This change isn’t merely verbal: it offers a way for atheistic arguments to avoid criticisms stemming from skeptical theism. Since framing atheistic arguments in terms of resemblance enables them to avoid criticisms stemming from skeptical theism, this suggests that this is an avenue that may be worth pursuing.56

 For my part, I’m not optimistic about the prospects of running an atheistic argument this way. But it’s far more plausible to frame arguments for atheism this way than the traditional way. 56

9 Commonsense Problems of Evil

Introduction In Chap. 4, I argued that skeptical theism undermines numerous arguments from evil. However, while it undermines many arguments from evil, I don’t claim (and haven’t argued) that skeptical theism undermines all arguments from evil—though, it does undermine the most plausible arguments from evil. Indeed, in Chap. 8 I suggested one way to run an argument from evil that’s immune to skeptical theism.1 In this chapter, I’ll consider a different argument from evil that’s purportedly immune to skeptical theism: the so-called commonsense problem of evil. I start by evaluating two versions of the commonsense problem of evil: The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil and The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil. I show that neither of these arguments provide justification for atheism. After this, I develop a novel commonsense problem of evil: The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil. While this version of the commonsense problem of evil is more plausible than alternative versions considered, I argue that it nevertheless fails.

 While I think the argument suggested evades the grasp of skeptical theism, I don’t think it’s ultimately successful. 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4_9

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Commonsense Problems of Evil In Chap. 4, I considered numerous arguments from evil, and showed that they are undermined by considerations stemming from skeptical theism. Crucially, these arguments relied on public reasons as opposed to private reasons. Public reasons, recall, are reasons that are, in principle, equally accessible to everyone. For example, that a sample is random is a public reason, that Mount Baker is in Washington is a public reason, and that most people believe that Earth isn’t flat is a public reason.2 Private reasons, by contrast, aren’t in principle equally accessible to all: they are one’s own mental states, such as one’s own intuitions, seemings, or beliefs.3 Since arguments from evil that rely on public reasons succumb to skeptical theism, perhaps private reasons can offer a way forward for arguments from evil: by using private reasons as justification for contentious premises, the threat of skeptical theism may be avoided. This is precisely what so-called commonsense problems of evil try to do: they invoke private reasons in a way that (allegedly) nullifies the threat of skeptical theism. Generally speaking, commonsense problems of evil make use of commonsense epistemology and commonsense justification (explained below) to justify the claim that some actual instance of evil is incompatible with God’s existence. In this section, I’ll consider how these arguments fare, and in particular, I’ll examine two commonsense problems of evil: The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil and The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil.4 Prior to considering these arguments, a word about “commonsense epistemology” and “commonsense justification” is in order. In Chap. 6, I talked about our commonsense beliefs and characterized them as those obvious truths that we take ourselves to know, such as the contents of our simple perceptual, memory, introspective, mathematical, elementary logical, and moral beliefs. However, in the context of commonsense problems of evil, commonsense epistemology and commonsense justification  The public reason here is the fact that most people believe something. It isn’t itself a belief—that would make it a private reason. 3  See Chap. 2. 4  The name ‘commonsense problem of evil’ stems from Dougherty (2008). However, there are several arguments that can be accurately described as commonsense problems of evil that predate Dougherty (2008), e.g. Draper (1991), Gellman (1992), and Plantinga (2000, p. 484). 2

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are importantly different than commonsense beliefs. In this context, “commonsense epistemology” is to be understood as phenomenal conservatism, and “commonsense justification” is to be understood as phenomenal conservative justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, if it seems to S that p, then S has (at least some) prima facie justification for believing p (provided S lacks defeaters for her seeming).5 What does it mean for it to seem to S that p? There are different perspectives on this matter:6 some hold that seemings are beliefs, others hold that they are inclinations to believe, and others hold that a seeming is an experience with propositional content that has forcefulness or a presentational feel, i.e. it recommends itself as true (McAllister, 2018, p. 2082). For the purposes of this chapter, I will take the latter most view: a seeming has a presentational feel—it’s an experience with propositional content that presents itself as revealing to us what reality is like.7 Why hold this view? Briefly, because none of the other options hold water.8 Let’s start with the belief view. A seeming can’t be a belief, since it can seem to one that p even if one doesn’t believe that p. For example, consider a perceptual illusion: it might seem to me that a stick is bent in the water even though I believe it’s just an illusion. Next, a seeming can’t be an inclination to believe since it can seem to one that p even if one isn’t inclined to believe p. Consider again the stick example: a stick in water will seem bent to me, but since I know it’s an illusion, I’m not inclined at all to believe it’s bent (Huemer, 2007, n.d.). Moreover, we may be inclined to believe things that don’t seem to be true. For example, I may be inclined to believe p because I want p to be true, although p doesn’t seem to be true, e.g. I might be inclined to believe the horse I bet on will win its race because I want it to win, and this could be so even if it doesn’t seem to me as though it will

 See e.g. Huemer (2007 and n.d.).  See Tucker (2013a) and Huemer (n.d.) for a good overview of the matter. 7  See Tolhurst (1998, pp. 298–299) who suggests that seemings have a feel of truth and Tucker (2010, p. 530) who says that seemings feel as though they recommend the truth of the content. And see Bergmann (2021) Chap. 7 for a thorough explanation and overview of seemings. 8  Below, I briefly go over some arguments against alternatives. See McAllister (2018) and Cullison (2010b) for a slew of arguments for the experience view and against competing views. (McAllister also considers a position that I don’t consider here, namely, the ‘taking evidence’ view.) 5 6

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win. And so this leaves us with the experience view of seemings.9 On this view, unsurprisingly, seemings are experiences with a presentational feel, such as intellectual seemings (often called intuitions), ethical seemings, memory seemings, perceptual seemings, and so on (Huemer, n.d.). Moreover, seemings are held to (at least typically) have propositional content: it can seem to S that p. So, a seeming that p is an experience with a presentational feel, and the content of seemings has a broad range (e.g. there are ethical seemings, perceptual seemings, and intellectual seemings). There’s much more to say about seemings and phenomenal conservatism, but these brief comments will suffice for the purposes of this chapter.10 Now that we have a grasp of commonsense epistemology and commonsense justification, we can consider how it can be used to pose different commonsense problems of evil. In the following section, I’ll consider how it comes into play in two kinds of commonsense problems of evil: The Axiological Commonsense Problem from Evil and The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil.

The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil Recall that an evil is axiologically gratuitous if and only if it’s false that permitting E is required to produce a greater good (or set of goods) or required to prevent an equally bad or worse evil (or set of evils) (see Chap. 4, Section “Gratuitous Evil: What Is It?”). Given commonsense epistemology and this notion of axiological gratuity, we can construct an argument for atheism that’s immune to skeptical theism. Here’s how. First, suppose that God’s existence is incompatible with axiologically gratuitous evil.11 And second, suppose (as I will later contest) that there are some persons to whom it seems that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil. We may then construct the following argument:  There’s more to say here, but my purpose isn’t to provide a full-fledged defense of the experience view of seemings. Instead, I content myself with these brief remarks to indicate its plausibility. Again, see McAllister (2018, 2023) and Cullison (2010b) for a fuller (and, to my mind, persuasive) defense of this view. 10  For more an overview of issues pertaining to phenomenal conservatism, see Huemer (n.d.) and Tucker (2013b). 11  Again, this thesis is contested by some, e.g. Hasker (2008), Mooney (2019), and van Inwagen (2006), and in my view this thesis is clearly false. For why one might reject this thesis, see Chap. 4, Section “God and Axiological Gratuitous Evil: Are They Compatible?” 9

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( 1) Necessarily, if God exists, there’s no axiologically gratuitous evil. (2) There is axiologically gratuitous evil. (3) Therefore, God doesn’t exist. Premise (1) follows from the first assumption we made above, and (3) follows from premises (1) and (2). This leaves just premise (2). Why should we think it’s true? The proponent of The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil won’t say that everyone should accept it. Instead, she’ll say that some persons have commonsense justification for affirming premise (2): some evils, she claims, seem axiologically gratuitous to some persons.12 And while this doesn’t mean that everyone should endorse premise (2) or that everyone has commonsense justification for premise (2), it does show that there are some persons who have justification for it, and therefore justification for rejecting theism. As we’ve understood it, commonsense justification is non-inferential: S gets commonsense justification for believing p just by it seeming to her that p (and lacking defeaters for her seeming)—no inference is required. And therefore this justification is immune to skeptical theism—since skeptical theism only undermines particular kinds of inferences, it doesn’t threaten premises supported by commonsense justification, such as premise (2).13 And thus those who have the relevant seemings may make use of The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil to reject theism.

 Dougherty (2008) can be interpreted in this manner. However, he can also be interpreted in the manner given below, Section “The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil”. 13  Tweedt (2015) has an ingenious argument for thinking that one kind of skeptical theism (a kind that uses a revised CORNEA principle) will undermine commonsense problems of evil. Since this type of skeptical theism isn’t under consideration for this book, I won’t comment on Tweedt’s argument aside from this: his argument is persuasive and, I think, shows that if the revised version of CORNEA is accepted and it’s relevant to our evaluations of evil, then it undermines all three commonsense problems of evil under consideration in this chapter. My only concern is that the reasons given for thinking that the revised version of CORNEA (and the original version) are relevant to our evaluations of evil are weak: we’re told that God’s reasons are inscrutable, that we are “in the dark’‘about his reasons, and that God’s ways our higher than our own. I think that more of an argument for these claims is needed than what has been given. That said, I suspect the arguments I gave in Chap. 2 and Chap. 3 for skeptical theism may support thinking that the revised version of CORNEA holds for our evaluations of evil. And so it may be that the advocate of CORNEA (revised or otherwise) may appeal to The Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism and The Default Argument for Deontological Skeptical Theism to support her view and to contest commonsense problems of evil. 12

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What are we to make of this argument? One thing to note is its modesty: the proponent of The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil doesn’t claim that everyone should endorse premise (2)—instead, it’s just that some persons are prima facie justified in affirming it. While this is a virtue for the argument, it has several vices, two of which I will outline below.

Reply 1: An Incredulous Stare14 Consider the following particularly horrendous evil15: There was a little girl of five who was hated by her father and mother, ‘most worthy and respectable people, of good education and breeding’… This poor child of five was subjected to every possible torture by those cultivated parents. They beat her, thrashed her, kicked her for no reason till her body was one bruise. Then, they went to greater refinements of cruelty—shut her up in the cold and frost all night in a privy, and because she didn’t ask to be taken up at night (as though a child of five sleeping its angelic, sound sleep could be trained to wake and ask), they smeared her face and filled her mouth with excrement, and it was her mother, her mother did this. And that mother could sleep, hearing the poor child’s groans! (Dostoevsky, 2009, pp. 302–303)16

Take the suffering of the little girl described here. Is there anyone who has commonsense justification for believing it to be axiologically gratuitous? I doubt it. The suffering described in this story is indeed horrendous and terrible. However, propositions asserting an evil to be axiologically gratuitous just aren’t the type of propositions we’re likely to have seemings about. And this becomes especially clear when we’re explicit about what axiological gratuity amounts to: for the little girl’s suffering to seem axiologically gratuitous would be for it to seem that there’s no greater good  (or set of goods) produced by it and there is no evil (or set of  This section bears some resemblance to comments I make in Hendricks (2018a, p. 350).  It’s not clear to me whether this case is supposed to be fictional or not. 16  This particular example was brought to my attention by Justin Mooney. 14 15

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evils) equally bad or worse prevented by it. But that’s not the sort of thing we typically have seemings about. Indeed, if someone actually claimed that to have commonsense justification for thinking it’s axiologically gratuitous—if she claimed it seemed to her to be axiologically gratuitous— the right response, I think, is an incredulous stare. This isn’t to deny that there are people who believe that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil. Of course there are such people—I’m not denying anyone’s belief, I’m denying a seeming. And while the suffering of the little girl is horrible and while it no doubt seems horrible, it’s dubious to think that it seems axiologically gratuitous to anyone. It might seem to us, for example, that a stick is bent in the water or that an injury was very painful, but it would be unusual (to say the least!) to have a seeming about whether an event produces greater goods or prevents evils equally bad or worse. In other words, when we spell out what it seeming that an evil is axiologically gratuitous amounts to, it would be to have a seeming that among all the known and unknown possible goods and evils and all the known and unknown possible logical connections between them, there’s no combination that would make the evil in question prevent a worse evil (or set of evils) or bring about a greater good (or set of goods).17 But that’s a wild seeming to have. That would be akin to someone claiming that it seemed to her that Mount Baker is the tallest mountain in Washington upon seeing it and not having surveyed the other mountains (or areas that mountains might be) in Washington: while Mount Baker is no doubt tall, it’s dubious to think it seems to someone that there aren’t any taller mountains in Washington prior to surveying the other mountains in Washington and areas in Washington where there might be mountains.18 Indeed, it’s far more likely that if someone claimed that it seemed that Mount Baker is the tallest Mountain in Washington, what she actually means is that it seems very tall. Or, suppose a woman tore her  I owe most of the wording of this sentence to Mike Bergmann.  Perhaps if one had a small 3-D model of Washington set out before her and she could see all of Washington’s mountains and their heights, she might say it seems to her that Mount Rainier is the tallest mountain in Washington. This is plausible because in observing the 3-D model, one is able to survey all mountains and areas in which mountains might be, and she can see that Mount Rainier is taller than the rest. Obviously, that’s not how things are with respect to goods, evils, and their connections. 17 18

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ACL and is discussing the pain she endured from the tear. If she claimed that tearing her ACL seemed to be the worst possible pain, what she likely means is that it seems that tearing an ACL is extremely painful. Similar considerations apply to those who claim that the suffering of the little girl described above (or other horrendous evils) seems axiologically gratuitous: what the person means is that the evil seems extremely bad. (Or perhaps she means that it doesn’t seem—she lacks a seeming—that there’s a good (or set of goods) that comes from it or that it was required to prevent an equally bad or worse evil (or set of evils). This too is a plausible interpretation.) Indeed, I think that once we spell out what axiological gratuity amounts to, there’s no real temptation to say that any evils seem axiologically gratuitous. And if one responds to my interpretation of her statement by claiming that it really does seem to her that some evil is axiologically gratuitous, I would reply with another incredulous stare.

Reply 2: An Undercutting Defeater To my complete surprise, my incredulous stare isn’t popular: in the face of my expressed skepticism, people have protested and claimed that it truly seems to them that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil.19 For better or worse, these protests haven’t made my stare any less incredulous—my skepticism remains. However, in light of this apparent stalemate, it would be ideal to go beyond the incredulous stare in addressing purported commonsense justification for thinking there’s axiologically gratuitous evil. Can we go beyond the incredulous stare? I think we can: I will argue below that even if it seems to S that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil, there is an undercutting defeater for S’s seemings she has about there being axiologically gratuitous evil. An undercutting defeater for S’s belief B, recall, occurs when S loses her grounds for believing B. For example, if S has reason to think that faculty that produced her belief is unreliable,  Indeed, some theists claim that there is evil that seems axiologically gratuitous to some persons e.g. Dougherty (2008, 2014, and 2016), McAllister (2020), and Tucker (2014). On the non-theistic side, see e.g. Wielenberg (2015, p. 302). 19

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then she has an undercutting defeater for that belief. The same goes for seemings: if S loses her grounds for trusting her seeming, then she has acquired an undercutting defeater for it. For example, if she has reason to think her seeming that p isn’t reliable, then she has acquired an undercutting defeater for her seeming.20 Why should we think that seemings about axiologically gratuitous evil have an undercutting defeater? Because we have reason to doubt that our seemings are reliable with respect to identifying axiologically gratuitous evil. And why think this? That is, why should we doubt that our seemings are reliable with respect to axiologically gratuitous evil? Recall that an evil is axiologically gratuitous if (and only if ) there’s no good (or set of goods) connected to it that outweighs it or if it wasn’t required to prevent an evil (or set of evils) that’s equally bad or worse. So, when determining whether an evil is axiologically gratuitous, we need to know whether there is an outweighing good (or set of goods) connected to said evil or whether it (the evil) was required to prevent an equally bad or worse evil (or set of evils). However, this is not the sort of thing that our seemings track: whether an evil is axiologically gratuitous depends on the set of states of affairs (goods) connected to it and the of set of states of affairs connected to the prevention of the evil,21 and it’s difficult to see just what states of affairs are connected to some instance of evil. Indeed, connections between states of affairs are notoriously difficult to discern. To pick just one of many possible examples: there’s much dispute about whether there are necessary connections between states of affairs involving brain events and states of affairs involving mental events.22 Furthermore, to know whether an evil is axiologically gratuitous, we need to know whether the set of states of affairs (goods or the prevention of evil) connected to the evil outweighs it. But this is not something we can know immediately: this involves tallying up the values of numerous states of affairs and seeing  For more on undercutting defeaters, see Chap. 6, Section “The Nature of Defeaters”.  This is important because if the prevention of the evil would have resulted in a worse evil, then the evil was, obviously enough, required for the prevention of a worse evil. 22  For more examples of intractable disputes about necessary connections, see Chap. 2. 20 21

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what falls out.23 Again, this just isn’t the thing that our seemings are good at tracking—you might as well claim that your seeming that the number of stars is even is reliable. And so we have reason to doubt that our seemings are reliable with respect to identifying axiologically gratuitous evil. However, if we have reason to doubt that our seemings are reliable with respect to axiologically gratuitous evil, then we acquire an undercutting defeater for these seemings: the prima facie justification they would otherwise provide one for affirming premise (2) has been defeated. Hence, even if it seems to some persons that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil—and I doubt it does—there’s an undercutting defeater for these seemings, and therefore they don’t provide prima facie justification for premise (2). Indeed, this undercutting defeater is part of what lies behind my incredulous stare: given how obvious the undercutting defeater is for seemings about axiologically gratuitous evil, it’s hard to believe anyone would have them!24 To sum up the problem: it’s highly dubious to suppose that our seemings are able to see through the maze of connections between evils and the set of good and evil states of affairs (known and unknown) they logically entail in such a way that they reliably indicate whether the evil is outweighed. In other words, seemings likely aren’t able to tally the goods and evils logically connected to an evil in a way that indicates whether the evil is outweighed (especially given that some of the goods, evils, values thereof, and logical connections between them may well be beyond our ken and that we are generally bad at recognizing logical connections). And so we have reason to doubt that our seemings are reliable with respect to identifying axiologically gratuitous evil. Hence, we have an undercutting defeater for our seemings about gratuitous evil (if any there be), undermining any commonsense justification we had for them. And so The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil is no problem at all.  Alternatively, one could compare the value of the set of states of affairs produced by permitting the evil with the value of the set of states of affairs that would result from preventing the evil. However, this is, again, not the type of thing we’re good at doing: it’s hard enough to identify all the logical entailments of an evil let alone all the logical entailments of the (counterfactual) prevention of the evil, and then hold each before one’s mind and compare the values. 24  Or, at least, it’s hard to believe anyone would have them and claim that they offer any justification at all for thinking that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil. 23

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Bergmann’s Undercutting Defeater In the prior section, I argued that those to whom it seems that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil (if any there be) have an undercutting defeater for their belief. However, there are other reasons for thinking our seemings about axiologically gratuitous evil are defeated. For example, Bergmann (2012, pp. 23–24) argues that any commonsense justification one might have for thinking that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil is defeated. This is because, he says, it seems to us that the following propositions are true:25 P1: For every instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred, there are possible states of affairs that are significantly worse than it or possible states of affairs that are outweighing greater goods. P2: For every instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred, although it is an intrinsically bad state of affairs, it is not intrinsically wrong to permit it, regardless of the consequences. (Bergmann, 2012, p. 24)

Now, consider the following proposition: P3: There is some instance of horrific suffering H that we know to have occurred, and it produced no greater good nor was it required to prevent an evil equally bad or worse.

If it seems to someone that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil, then P3 seems to be true—P3 is just what it would be for there to be axiologically gratuitous evil. If in addition to P3, P1 and P2 seem true to S, then for S’s seeming about P3 to be reasonable, it must also seem to her that the following proposition is true: P4: There couldn’t possibly be entailment relations between H and possible goods and the prevention of possible evils that result in H being outweighed (by goods or the prevention of evils).  Bergmann speaks of intuitions as opposed to seemings. But intuitions can just be seen as intellectual seemings for our purposes.

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This is necessary because once it’s admitted that it seems that H can be outweighed (as P1 and P2 entail), we need some assurance that it isn’t in fact outweighed. And P4 will do the trick here: if it seems that there aren’t the sorts of entailment relations referred to in P4, then the seeming that P3 is true will be reasonable, since although it’s possible that there are goods and evils that would outweigh H, it justifies the view that none are in fact connected to H in the right way to do so. So, P1 and P2 results in P3’s commonsense justification being defeated, and P4 is needed to stave off defeat.26 The problem, Bergmann says, is that P4 doesn’t seem to be true, and that a ‘healthy appreciation’ of skeptical theism should lead us to see we’re “in the dark”27 about the relevant entailment relations referred to in P4. And so it turns out that skeptical theism does play a role in undermining The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil. What are we to make of this? Bergmann, I think, is mostly right: he’s right that P4 seeming true is needed to stave off defeat for P3 from P1 and P2 seeming true. And he’s right, I think, that P4 doesn’t seem true to anyone.28 However, contrary to Bergmann, I suspect that those who claim that P3 seems true will claim that P4 seems true. Of course, Bergmann says that if S appreciates skeptical theism (and in particular Axiological Skeptical Theism), then she should think that we’re largely “in the dark” about H’s relevant entailment relations. But even if we accept this, it might continue to seem to S that P4 is true—much like a stick in water seems bent even though we know it isn’t. Presumably Bergmann would (rightly) say that if P4 continues to seem true to S after she realizes that she’s “in the dark” about H’s relevant entailment relations, that S has a defeater for her seeming that P4 is true—if she truly thinks she’s “in the dark” about the relevant entailment relations, she should doubt the reliability of her seeming, giving her an undercutting  In effect, P1 and P2 seeming true are an undercutting defeater for the seeming that P3, and P4 seeming true would be a defeater-deflector for P3. See Chap. 6 for more on defeaters and defeater-deflectors. 27  Again, I think all of this “in the dark” language is misleading, see Hendricks (2021b). However, when discussing Bergmann-style defeaters for commonsense problems of evil, I will continue to use the phrase—though, I will also continue to use scare quotes to indicate my dislike of the phrase and its potentially misleading nature. 28  This move is akin to the incredulous stare I advocated above. 26

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defeater for it (her seeming). And so the continual seeming that P4 is true doesn’t stave off defeat or provide justification for P3. However, this leaves the door open for one to deny that a healthy appreciation of skeptical theism should lead one to think that she’s “in the dark” about H’s relevant entailment relations. And it’s here that we reach a stalemate: if someone really claims that it seems that P1-P4 seem true to her and she really claims that she has a healthy appreciation of skeptical theism but doesn’t think it threatens her seemings with respect to P4, then there’s nothing more to say here. But how many proponents of The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil would make this move? I suspect not many. And those few who do reside in this group will have to grapple with the issues raised above (Section “Reply 1: An Incredulous Stare” and Section “Reply 2: An Undercutting Defeater”).29 So while there’s an escape route for the proponent of The Axiological Commosense Problem of Evil, it isn’t a route that’s likely to be well traveled.

C  onclusion In summary, The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil faces (at least) three problems. First, it’s dubious that it seems to anyone that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil. Second, we have reason to doubt that our seemings reliably track axiological connections between an evil and the goods and evils it’s logically connected to. And third, Bergmann’s argument plausibly results in one having a defeater for her seeming that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil.30

 Another option would be for the proponent of The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil to argue that skeptical theism is false. However, this would require them to address the arguments given in Chap. 2 and Chap. 3—no small task. And, importantly, it would amount to an admission that The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil doesn’t bypass skeptical theism. Indeed, it would then rely on a rejection of skeptical theism. 30  There are other proposed defeaters as well, e.g. Matheson (2014). However, see Dougherty (2014) for a response to Matheson, and see Rutledge (2017) for a plausible development of the thought lurking behind Matheson’s view. See also Howard-Snyder’s (2015) incisive commentary. 29

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The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil So much for The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil. Let’s now consider a different commonsense problem of evil. Recall that an evil is deontologically gratuitous for God if and only if God’s requiring reasons for some action ~A outweigh his justifying reasons for A’s permission (Chap. 4, Section “Gratuitous Evil: What Is It?”). With commonsense epistemology and this notion of deontological gratuity in mind, we can construct an argument for atheism that’s immune to skeptical theism— call it The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil. Here’s how. First, suppose that God’s existence is incompatible with deontologically gratuitous evil. Second, suppose (as I will later contest) that there are some persons to whom it seems that there is deontologically gratuitous evil. We may then construct the following argument: (4) Necessarily, God’s existence is incompatible with deontologically gratuitous evil. (5) There’s deontologically gratuitous evil. (6) Therefore, God doesn’t exist. Premise (4–6) follows from the first assumption we made above, and (6) follows from premises (4) and (5). This leaves premise (5). Why should we think premise (5) is true? The proponent of this argument won’t claim that everyone should think premise (5) is true. Instead, she’ll claim that there are some evils that seem deontologically gratuitous to some persons, and this gives those persons commonsense justification for affirming premise (5). And this means that those persons can justifiedly conclude (6) from premises (4) and (5). Since this justification is from commonsense epistemology, it’s non-inferential and therefore immune to skeptical theism. And, therefore, those who have commonsense justification for premise (5) can make use of The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil to reject theism.31  I take Gellman (2017) to be an argument along these lines—I interpret his talk of “irredeemable evils” to approximate to deontologically gratuitous evils. And I take my responses below to apply to his argument. See also Mooney (2017) for consideration of an argument along these lines. 31

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What are we to make of this argument? Like The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil, one thing it has going for it is its modesty: it doesn’t claim that everyone should endorse premise (5). Instead, it simply claims that there are some persons who—due to commonsense epistemology—have prima facie justification for affirming it. While this is a virtue of the argument, I will argue that it has several critical vices.

Reply 1: An Incredulous Stare Consider again the case of the horrendous suffering of the little girl mentioned in Dostoevsky’s novel mentioned above. Is her suffering a candidate for having commonsense justification for thinking it’s deontologically gratuitous? I doubt it. Certain facts about the little girl’s suffering likely provide God with strong requiring reasons against permitting it. For example, that this is extremely harmful to her is likely a requiring reason for God against permitting her suffering. However, for the suffering of the little girl to be deontologically gratuitous it must be such that there are no sufficiently weighty justifying reasons for God that render her suffering permissible. But this doesn’t seem like a candidate for commonsense justification: once we unpack what deontological gratuity amounts to, it’s dubious to think it seems to anyone that there’s deontologically gratuitous evil—to say it seems that the evil is deontologically gratuitous is to say that it seems that there aren’t any justifying reasons for God to permit the evil that could possibly outweigh his requiring reasons against its permission. But that’s a wild seeming to have—or, at least, it’s wild to have without having knowledge of all God’s reasons and their weight. And if someone actually claimed to have commonsense justification for thinking it’s deontologically gratuitous, the right response, I think, is an incredulous stare. Like my incredulous stare with respect to claims about it seeming that there’s axiologically gratuitous evil, I don’t mean to deny that there are people who believe there’s deontologically gratuitous evil; I’m not denying anyone’s belief, I’m denying a seeming. The suffering of the little girl described by Dostoevsky is awful, and while it no doubt seems horrible, it’s dubious to think that it seems deontologically gratuitous to anyone.

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Why am I skeptical here? I’m skeptical because whether an evil is deontologically gratuitous is a function of the weight of God’s reasons for and against its permission. And it’s dubious to think that our seemings can or do tally up the weight of God’s reasons. To recycle an example used above: it would be akin to someone seeing Mount Baker and claiming that it seems to her that it’s the tallest mountain in Washington despite having not surveyed the other mountains in Washington or the other areas mountains could be in Washington. Again, that person most likely means that Mount Baker seems like a very tall mountain, not that it seems that it’s the tallest mountain in Washington. Similarly, for the person who claims that some instance of evil seems deontologically gratuitous, she most likely means something like: “it seems like there are very strong reasons against God permitting this suffering.”32 But, of course, this wouldn’t be for it to seem that the evil is deontologically gratuitous— that would require it also seeming that there aren’t justifying reasons for God that outweigh the requiring reasons. And if one responds to this interpretation by claiming that some evil really does seem deontologically gratuitous to her, my response is simple: an incredulous stare.

Reply 2: An Undercutting Defeater I expect that my incredulous stare about claims of deontological gratuity will be about as popular as my incredulous stare about claims of axiological gratuity. As such, it’s worth considering if we can go beyond skepticism in addressing The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil. Can we go beyond an incredulous stare with this argument? I think we can. This is because the same issue that plagues claims to commonsense justification about axiologically gratuitous evil also plagues claims to commonsense justification about deontologically gratuitous evil: we have reason to doubt that our seemings are reliable with respect to deontologically gratuitous evil, and this provides us with an undercutting defeater for any seemings we may have about deontologically gratuitous evil. What drives this claim is the same thing that drives the claim  Or perhaps she means that it doesn’t seem to her that God has a justifying reason for permitting it.

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that there’s an undercutting defeater for our seemings about axiologically gratuitous evil: whether an evil is deontologically gratuitous is a function of the weight of God’s reasons for and against permitting the evil. However, to determine this, we need to tally up God’s reasons, weigh them against each other, and see where the scale comes out. Again, this is just not the sort of thing our seemings track. Perhaps our seemings are reliable with respect to determining whether an evil is deontologically gratuitous for humans. But it’s implausible to think they would be with respect to God’s reasons: God’s reasons are different than ours (see Chap. 3, Section “Deontological Skeptical Theism”) and some likely more complex than ours (much like our reasons are different and some are likely more complex than a dog’s), which casts doubt on the ability of our seemings to track them. And this provides us with an undercutting defeater for any commonsense justification we would have from seemings about deontologically gratuitous evil. And this means that The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil is no problem at all.

Bergmann’s Undercutting Defeater Above, I explained how Bergmann seeks to undermine The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil. However, his argument against seemings about axiological gratuity can be equally applied to seemings about deontological gratuity. Here’s how. First, we need to amend P1 and P2 to: P1*: For every reason against the permission of an instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred, there are possible reasons that are significantly stronger than it. P2*: For every reason against the permission of an instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred, although it is an intrinsically bad state of affairs, there are no absolute requiring reasons against permitting it.

Now, we need to amend P3 to:

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P3*: There is some instance of horrific suffering H that we know to have occurred, and God has requiring reasons against permitting it and no justifying reasons that outweigh these requiring reasons.

P3* is just what it would be for there to be deontologically gratuitous evil, so if it seems to someone that there’s deontologically gratuitous evil, then it seems that P3* is true. If P1*, P2*, and P3* seem true to S, then for S’s seeming about P3* to be reasonable, it must also seem to her that the following amended proposition is true: P4*: There couldn’t possibly be justifying reasons for God permitting H that outweigh his requiring reasons against permitting H.

That P4* seems true is necessary because once it’s been admitted that it seems that the reasons against permitting H can be outweighed, we need assurance that these reasons aren’t in fact outweighed. And P4* would do the trick here. However, Bergmann’s points about P1–4 seem to hold equally for P1*-P4*. First, P1* and P2* likely seem true to most persons. Second, it’s dubious that P4* seems true to anyone. However, if P4* doesn’t seem true to one, then even if it seems to her that P3* is true, her commonsense justification will be defeated for the reasons given above. Furthermore, if Bergmann is right that a healthy appreciation of skeptical theism should convince one that she’s “in the dark” about H’s relevant entailment relations, then a healthy appreciation of skeptical theism (and in particular Deontological Skeptical Theism) should convince one that she’s “in the dark” about God’s justifying reasons for H. And if one is truly “in the dark” about God’s justifying reasons for H, then her seeming that H is deontologically gratuitous has an undercutting defeater.33 However, if the proponent of this argument responds that she healthily appreciates skeptical theism and yet is not convinced she’s “in the dark” about God’s justifying reasons, then we have hit a stalemate. However, I suspect that this escape route will likely not be well traveled. And those  Again, one can avoid this issue by arguing that skeptical theism (and in particular Deontological Skeptical Theism) is false. However, this would involve addressing the argument I gave in Chap. 3, which is no small task, and this would be to concede that The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil relies on a rejection of skeptical theism. 33

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who do make use of it will have to address the issues raised above. So while there is an escape route for some advocates of The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil, taking this route leads to its own set of problems.

C  onclusion In summary, then, there are multiple problems facing The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil. First, it’s dubious to think that any evil seems deontologically gratuitous to anyone. Second, we have reason to think our seemings with respect to deontological gratuity aren’t reliable, and this provides us with an undercutting defeater for these seemings (if any there be). And third, that it doesn’t seem that P4* is true defeats any commonsense justification we would have for P3*.

The Real Commonsense Problem of Evil So, The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil and The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil fail. There is, however, a more promising—or, at least, a different—commonsense problem of evil left to consider, which I will call The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil. Consider organic wholes. For the purposes of this chapter, an organic whole is composed of parts but not identical to them. We can individually consider the parts of an organic whole but we may also consider it as an organic whole. For example, we can consider the parts of a human (e.g. the brain, the eyes, etc.), but we can also consider the human as a whole organism. Furthermore, the value of a whole may differ from the value of the sum of its parts (Moore, 1903). For example, a painting is composed of drops of paint, and each drop of paint has some value. However, the painting itself will exceed the value of the sum of the drops of paint of which it is composed—at least if it’s a good painting. This view of organic wholes and parts can be applied to lives: in the same way that the value of a painting may differ from the sum of the value of its parts, the value of a person’s life as a whole may differ from the sum of the

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value of its parts. This means that it’s not necessarily true that adding an instance of evil to S’s life makes S, as a whole, worse off: just as adding an ugly stroke of paint doesn’t necessarily make a painting as a whole worse,34 adding an instance of evil to one’s life does not necessarily make one’s life on the whole worse. Indeed, it’s possible that the addition of an evil to someone’s life makes her life on the whole better.35 In cases in which the addition of an evil to S’s life makes her life better on the whole, the evil is said to be defeated. In all other cases, the evil is undefeated.36 With the notion of organic wholes, parts, and defeat outlined above, we are able to generate a new commonsense problem of evil—The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil. Here’s how. First, assume that God’s existence is incompatible with undefeated evil: since God (arguably) would be perfectly loving toward all his creatures, this means that he (arguably) would not allow them to undergo evil if it did not make them better on the whole.37 Next, recall that on our understanding of defeat, if there’s an evil E in S’s life,38 whether or not E is outweighed by a good counterpart, if S’s life is not better as a whole because of E, it’s undefeated. So, to defeat an evil, the sufferer’s life as a whole must be  For example, suppose that there was a painting of a child painting a picture. In order to accurately reflect the child’s painting ability, the painting made by the child within the artist’s painting will be bad (unless, of course, the painting is of one of my children—their paintings are objectively beautiful), and it will involve ugly strokes (to simulate the ugly strokes a child (that isn’t mine) would make). However, these ugly strokes contribute to the beauty of the painting as a whole.  Leibniz (1989, p. 153) makes a similar point, saying that although a portion of a painting may be ugly, when we take into account the whole painting, it contributes to its beauty. Thanks to Jan Cover for helping me on this point. 35  Conversely, it’s also true that adding an instance of good to someone’s life might make them worse off on the whole. It is easy to illustrate this with an aesthetic example. Conjure up the most beautiful image of Homer Simpson that you can. That image is good; it has positive value. However, if you were to add this image to the Mona Lisa, it would no doubt make the painting worse. (Or so I’m told by those classier than me—I see little beauty in the Mona Lisa (or any painting), but it’s (apparently) beautiful. I’m just too unsophisticated to recognize it.) 36  See Adams (1999), Chisholm (1991), and Dougherty (2014) for discussions of this. 37  This is a big assumption to make, and I will challenge it below in Section “Reply 4: Accepting Undefeated Evil”. See Adams (1999) and Stump (2010) for a good exposition of a view similar to this. Although, note that Adams claims only that God wouldn’t allow undefeated horrendous evils—evils which make one’s life seem not worth living—whereas this argument is about all evils. 38  We may understand this phrase in a broad sense: an evil is “in” S’s life if S either undergoes the evil or else is affected by it in a negative manner (e.g. by knowing about it). 34

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better with it. How do we know whether an evil is defeated? Adams (1999, p. 167) and Dougherty (2014, p. 115) hold that if an evil E is defeated, then the person who suffered E would not—if they are prudentially rational—wish it away. This fits naturally with the view of defeat that we have been discussing: if E is defeated for S, it makes her life better and so it wouldn’t make sense for S to wish it away. Another way to put this—a way that I will use hereafter—is that if E is defeated for S, then S accepts E. This is because if S accepts E, then she judges it to be worth it; it’s not something she would wish away. With all this in mind, we can state The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil as follows: (7) Necessarily, if God exists, there’s no undefeated evil. (8) There is undefeated evil. (9) Therefore, God doesn’t exist. Above, we assumed premise (7) is true, and (9) follows from premises (7) and (8). And this leaves only premise (8) remaining. Why should we think premise (8) is true? First, note that the proponent of this argument won’t claim that everyone should endorse premise (8). Next, recall that if an evil E is defeated for S, then S accepts E. This is where commonsense epistemology comes into play: one can have commonsense justification for thinking that she would not accept some evil she suffered. For example, when one considers an instance of evil she has suffered, it might seem to her that she would not accept it—no matter what. And this seeming— provided there’s no defeater for it—justifies her in thinking that she wouldn’t accept it. And this means that those persons to whom it seems that there is undefeated evil have prima facie commonsense justification for affirming premise (8), and therefore have reason to reject theism. In other words, the existence of evil of which it seems to the sufferer that she would not accept justifies her in thinking it’s undefeated, and so justifies her in rejecting theism: she has commonsense justification for atheism.39

 It’s also possible that one has commonsense justification for thinking that some sufferer would never accept her suffering. I focus on cases in which the sufferer is said to have commonsense justification since they are far more plausible. 39

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This is the real commonsense problem of evil; this is the real threat that commonsense justification poses to theistic belief.40

Reply 1: An Incredulous Stare To both The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil and The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil, I responded with skepticism: I said that those who claim that an evil seems axiologically or deontologically gratuitous are confused and I don’t believe that anyone has these seemings. Is a similar skepticism appropriate here? Initially, perhaps not: in response to some evils, one might initially think that the claim that it seems to someone that they don’t (and won’t, and wouldn’t) accept some evil is semi-plausible. For example, initially, it might strike one as semi-plausible to think that it might seem to a mother who loses a child that she would never accept this evil. Indeed, one might think that having seemings about what one would accept might be somewhat ordinary. Given this, my initial response to claims about it seeming that an evil is undefeated was a semi-credulous stare—initially, I didn’t regard it as entirely implausible to think that it seems to some people that there’s undefeated evil. Notice the “initially” qualifications above. I add these qualifications here because my skepticism about this has steadily increased: when I wrote the first draft of what would become this chapter, I titled this section “A Credulous Stare” and talked about how it’s plausible to think that for some persons, it seems that, for some evil they have experienced, they  Perhaps one wonders how this version of the commonsense problem of evil differs from the problem of horrendous evils discussed by Adams (1999). Horrendous evils are those whose participation gives one reason to doubt her life could be worth living (Adams, 1999, p. 26), and Adams considers the challenge they pose to theism. There are (at least) three distinguishing factors between Adams’ argument and The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil. First, this argument relies on commonsense epistemology whereas Adams’ doesn’t. Second, this argument is broader than Adams, since an evil need not be horrendous in Adams’ sense of the term in order to have commonsense justification for it being undefeated. And third, Adams’ response to the problem of horrendous evils doesn’t solve the commonsense problem of evil whereas it (arguably) solves the problem of horrendous evils: she tells a story in which everyone eventually accepts the evil they experienced, but this doesn’t undermine one’s commonsense justification for thinking there is undefeated evil. 40

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wouldn’t accept it. However, after talking through this idea with others and thinking about it more, I changed the title to “A (Semi-)Credulous Stare,” and expressed a limited skepticism about whether it’s plausible to think it seems to anyone that they wouldn’t accept some instance of evil. However, my skepticism has recently increased further: I now think it’s dubious that it seems to anyone that there’s evil that they wouldn’t accept. This is because I’ve come to realize that one needs to have a grasp of the goods, evils, their connections to some instance of evil in order to know whether she’d accept it and she needs to know the weight of God’s reasons for permitting the evil—after all, if God had extremely weighty reasons for permitting S to undergo some evil, she might accept it.41 However— for the reasons given above—these would be really strange things to have seemings about: they are complex propositions that involve both tallying the goods and evils connected to some instance of evil and weighing God’s reasons for permitting the evil. So, I’m skeptical that anyone has these seemings.42

Reply 2: Undercutting Defeat In response to apparent undefeated evil, some have tried to show that there isn’t undefeated evil—or, at least, that it hasn’t been shown that there’s undefeated evil. If these responses are successful, then they would undermine commonsense justification for premise (8). Why should we think that there’s no undefeated evil? Adams suggests that [F]rom the vantage point of heavenly beatitude, human victims of horrors will recognize those experience as points of identification with the crucified  A conversation with Parker Settecase on his YouTube channel Parker’s Pensées helped me see this.  Some think that an incredulous stare here might be morally suspect. For example, Crummett says that contradicting the victim’s judgment (even if we’re not impolitic enough to tell them we’ve done so) represents a potentially problematic refusal to trust their interpretation of their sufferings and how those sufferings fit into the narrative of their life. (Crummett, 2017, p. 90) However, I don’t share Crummett’s view here—I don’t think skepticism is morally wrong in this case, at least if it’s expressed carefully and in the proper context (such as in a book on the problem of evil). Moreover, this skepticism is compatible with holding that someone believes that they wouldn’t accept some instance of evil: the skepticism, again, is about a seeming. 41 42

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God, and will not wish them away from their life histories. (Adams, 1999, p. 167)

And Dougherty (2014, pp. 115–117) suggests that God uses his middle knowledge to ensure that only those creatures who would accept the suffering they undergo are created. So, according to Adams and Dougherty, all evil will eventually be defeated. These suggestions are fine and well. But they don’t defeat one’s commonsense justification for thinking she would not accept some evil—they are possibilities, yes, but they don’t give one reason to doubt the reliability of her seemings with respect to acceptance or non-acceptance of evil. That’s a tall task which neither Adams nor Dougherty attempt. And thus commonsense justification for thinking there’s undefeated evil remains intact; it isn’t undermined by Adams’ or Dougherty’s reply. A natural move here is to mimic the above arguments given for seemings about axiological and deontological gratuity having undercutting defeaters. However, providing an undercutting defeater for The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil is tougher than it is with respect to axiological and deontological versions of the commonsense problem of evil. This is because the advocate of The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil might maintain with semi-plausibility that we have no reason to doubt our seemings are reliable with respect to undefeated evil—whether an evil is undefeated, one might claim, doesn’t involve tallying the weight of reasons or the value of the goods and evils connected to some evil. For example, it seems to many that we would accept the suffering that comes with receiving a flu shot, and so we get flu shots. Alternatively, there are some things that it seems that we will never accept. For example, it might seem to a mother that she would never accept the death of her young child—no matter what. Indeed, what a person accepts or would accept—the proponent of this argument continues—appears to be the thing that our seemings can track: what we would accept depends on our values, goals, and psychology, and we have good enough (though imperfect) access to these things for our seemings to be reliable on this matter. And so, the proponent of The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil claims, we don’t (at least obviously) have reason to doubt our seemings with respect to undefeated evil: for some

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evils, whether we would accept them is something that our seemings can track—or, more modestly, it’s not something that we have reason to doubt that our seemings track.43 And so commonsense justification for thinking there’s undefeated evil is not defeated. But this reply to the threat of undercutting defeat is too quick. For suppose that S undergoes an evil E that she doesn’t accept. Suppose further that unbeknownst to S, E is either (a) connected to an extremely valuable good or to the prevention of an extremely terrible evil or (b) there is an extremely strong justifying (or requiring) reason for God to permit it. While S might not currently accept E, if she were aware that (a) or (b) was the case, she might accept it. For example, suppose that S’s undergoing E was required to avoid something as bad as, say, 10 Holocausts. If S had that information, perhaps she would accept E. Or suppose that God had an extraordinarily strong reason for permitting S to suffer E. If S were to be aware of this reason, she may accept E. If we allow these possibilities, this means that whether one accepts an evil depends on its total value or on God’s reasons in favor of permitting it. And if that’s the case, then skeptical theism will come into play:44 it will make it difficult for one to justifiedly hold that she would not accept an evil, and the only way to avoid it would be to argue either that (1) God doesn’t have sufficiently weighty reasons and (2) that there aren’t sufficiently valuable (or disvaluable) logical consequences of her undergoing the evil. However, if she uses public reasons to motivate (1) and (2), then she’ll be vulnerable to skeptical theism, meaning that this route is a dead end. In light of this, one might instead invoke private reasons in favor of (1) and (2). For example, she might claim that it seems that there’s no sufficiently weighty good connected to an evil she underwent. But this move will conflict with some other plausible views, such as P4 and P4*, and will succumb to the undercutting defeaters laid out above, making it 43  A good (fictional) example of this can be found in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (2002), in which Ivan considers the evils of the world and (essentially) says that he will not accept them and would reject God for allowing this suffering even if it led to greater harmony: it is too high a price to pay. 44  Barring one using private reasons for ruling out these possibilities.

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untenable. So, while The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil initially seemed immune to undercutting defeat, things aren’t so clear: if we allow that evils might be accepted due to extreme consequences or extremely strong justifying reasons of God (and, to be clear, we should allow this), it lets skeptical theism back in the door. And the only way to avoid skeptical theism is to take another controversial route that has its own set of difficult problems (i.e. relying on private reasons). I conclude, therefore, that The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil initially fares better than the other commonsense problems of evil considered on this matter. However, when pressed further, it ultimately succumbs to undercutting defeat.

Bergmann’s Undercutting Defeater In addition to the trouble with defeaters outlined above, The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil appears to be susceptible to a Bergmann-style defeater. To consider whether it is, we need to revise P1-P4 again to: P1**: For every instance of evil that we know to have occurred, there are possible instances of evil that are significantly worse, possible instances of good that are significantly better, and possible justifying reasons that are significantly stronger than those reasons against allowing the evil to occur. P2**: For every instance of evil that we know to have occurred, although terrible, it is not the case that it’s impossible that anyone who has undergone such evil would eventually accept it.

Now, we need to amend P3 to: P3**: There is some instance of evil H that we know to have occurred, and S would not ever accept H.

P3** is just what it would be for there to be undefeated evil, so if it seems to someone that there’s undefeated evil, then it seems that P3** is true. However, if P1**, P2**, and P3** seem true to S, then for S’s seeming

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about P3** to be reasonable, it must also seem to her that the following proposition is true: P4**: There couldn’t possibly be consequences (e.g. the production of significant outweighing goods or the prevention of significant outweighing evils) or a sufficiently strong reason for God to permit H that would result in the sufferer of H accepting H.

For the seeming that P3** to be reasonable, it’s necessary for P4** to seem true, since once it’s been admitted that it seems that it’s possible that there are significantly better goods than H, significantly worse evils than H, and sufficiently strong reasons for God to permit H, and that if these possibilities are actual they may result in the victim of H accepting it, we need assurance that these goods, evils, and reasons don’t actually come into play with respect to H. And P4** would suffice for these purposes; it would cut off those escape hatches from The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil. However, Bergmann’s points about P1–4 seem to hold equally for P1**-P4**: P1** and P2** seem true and P4** doesn’t seem true. Therefore, even if it seems to one that P3** is true, it won’t be reasonable—it will have an undercutting defeater. There are (at least) two reasons one might think that this objection is too quick. First, I suspect that—although they strike me as clearly true— some will say that P1** and P2** don’t seem true to them. And second, I suspect that some will say that P4** seems true to them, thereby rendering reasonable the seeming that P3** is true (if they in fact have this seeming). Indeed, those of which P3** seems true are those who will likely say that P4** seems true.45 However, an appeal to P4** seeming true isn’t likely to be fruitful, since the issues raised above  and in the issues raised below provide one with a defeater for her seeming. So, if one

 Of course, I argued above that we have an undercutting defeater for our seemings about undefeated evil. One might think that this undercutting defeater provides a defeater for any seemings we have about P4**. I think that it clearly does. However, in this section I’m considering whether there’s a different, independent undercutting defeater for our seemings about undefeated evil.

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can avoid a Bergmann-style defeater here, it comes at the cost of acquiring a different undercutting defeater.46

Reply 3: Transformative Experience Imagine you’re given the choice to become a vampire: one of your friends has become a vampire, and she asks if you’d like her to make you into a vampire too. If you become a vampire, you’ll develop an insatiable thirst for blood, you’ll become much faster and stronger, and you’ll become immortal. What should you do?47 Paul (2014) argues that this situation presents a puzzle: she argues that if we want to choose the action with the greatest expected value, that we’re in trouble here. This is because becoming a vampire is a transformative experience, and—setting her own solution aside—we cannot ascribe an expected value to an outcome that involves a transformative experience. What does it mean for an experience to be transformative? There are (at least) two ways for an experience to be transformative.48 First, it can be epistemically transformative, in the sense that it provides you with completely new information—information that was entirely unknown to you. For example, suppose that there was a new color discovered, Shmed, and that it looked nothing at all like any of the colors we know. Seeing Shmed would be a transformative experience, since it would give you completely new information, and this experience was the only way to learn this information: no amount of testimony would suffice.49 That is, you can only know what Shmed is like by experiencing it. However, if you don’t know what the experience is like, then you aren’t able to ascribe a value to  I have no idea why anyone would trust a seeming that P4** is true—that’s a wild thing to think that your seemings reliably track. 47  I borrow this example and question from Paul (2014, pp. 1–5). 48  See Paul (2014, p. 17). 49  This, of course, bears some resemblance to Jackson’s (1982) argument for property dualism, in which you’re asked to consider whether Mary—a neuroscientist who knew all the physical facts about roses who was raised in a black and white room and who had never seen any colors before— would learn something new when seeing a rose for the first time. My argument (and point) isn’t affected by how one evaluates Jackson’s argument, so those scared of dualism of any sort need not be spooked. They may rest easy in their physicalist cocoons. 46

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it. A second way for an experience to be transformative is if it would radically change your preferences in ways that you aren’t aware—it can be preferentially transformative.50 For example, if you become a vampire, your food preferences would radically change: you would come to prefer blood and hate ordinary food, and you don’t know at all what having that preference would be like. Or if you were the victim of a serious assault, it may radically change your preferences (Paul, 2014, p. 16)—you may no longer prefer being outdoors to indoors, etc. And if you don’t know how your preferences will be changed or what it’s like to have these new preferences, you can’t make judgments about expected value, since the value of an experience depends on your preferences. So much for transformative experience. My purpose here isn’t to defend Paul’s take on the matter in general.51 Instead, I want to suggest that there is one particular experience that we should all accept as being transformative in the above sense: meeting God.52 Suppose that God exists and that after dying one “meets” God. Meeting God, we may suppose, involves God informing us of all relevant facts about our lives and the roles we played in our world, his plan for us (if there was any), and so on. Meeting God is a transformative experience in both senses described above: we can’t know what it’s like to meet God unless we’ve had this experience.53 Indeed, if there’s anything to be gleaned from the mystics (e.g. Teresa of Avila, 2008), it’s that the experience of God (if he exists) is not something adequately portrayed through testimony. Moreover, meeting God (in this sense) would transform one’s preferences: one’s preferences, no doubt, would come to align—or come more closely into alignment— with God’s; we all would, if we had the relevant knowledge, (arguably) seek to align our wills and preferences with those of a maximally  Paul (2014, p. 17) calls these experiences personally transformative.  For some critical discussion of whether transformative experience poses as big of a problem as Paul thinks, see e.g. Chan (2016) and Fraser (2018). 52  I dislike this phrase very much. However, I couldn’t think of a better phrase to use, so the reader will have to suffer through it. (One idea was to call it ‘afterlife conversion’, but that didn’t strike me as good phrase either.) 53  Relatedly, see De Cruz (2018) and Blanchard and Paul (2021) for a discussion about religious conversion and transformative experience. And see Kidd and Carel (forthcoming) for a discussion of horrendous suffering can be a transformative experience. 50 51

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great being (i.e. God). And this means that meeting God is a transformative experience epistemically and preferentially. So, meeting God is a transformative experience. How does this affect The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil? As follows. Recall that The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil relied on the notion of defeat: an evil is defeated if and only if the sufferer of the evil accepts it. The acceptance, of course, need not be immediate: what matters is that the evil is accepted in the end. And clearly whether one accepts an evil depends on her preferences. Indeed, if one prefers suffering an evil to not suffering it, then she will have accepted it. Now, suppose theism is true, and that upon death we all meet God. In this case, “the end” will be when one meets God, at which point they are given full disclosure of their place in the universe, the effects of their actions, and so on. However, again, meeting God is a transformative experience epistemically and preferentially: it provides one with new information and radically alters one’s preferences in ways that she didn’t know would be altered. But, of course, this means that if God exists, then we can’t say how likely it is that an evil is defeated: even if it seems now to a person that she wouldn’t accept an evil, upon meeting God her preferences will change in ways that she doesn’t know and she will gain knowledge of God by experiencing him. And this prevents her from saying that she wouldn’t (or probably wouldn’t) accept an evil—to claim that, she’d have to know something significant about how her preferences would be altered by meeting God. But she doesn’t know anything significant about that. And this undermines The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil: we have reason to doubt that our seemings can see through transformative experience, and this means that we have reason to doubt their reliability with respect to detecting undefeated evil. And so any commonsense justification for thinking there is undefeated evil is defeated.

Reply 4: Accepting Undefeated Evil Premise (7)—which states that God’s existence is incompatible with undefeated evil—has merely been assumed to this point. But is there any reason we should accept it? Adams suggests that in order for God to value

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individuals as persons—something which a perfectly loving God would do—he would have to defeat all horrendous evils (i.e. evils which make our lives seem like they’ve lost meaning). She says: God’s goodness to human individuals would require that God guarantee each a life that was a great good to him/her on the whole by balancing off serious evils. To value the individual qua person, God would have to go further to defeat any horrendous evil in which s/he participated by giving it positive meaning through organic unity and a great enough good within the context of his/her life. (Adams, 1999, p. 31)54

Before proceeding, it’s worth emphasizing that Adams’ point is about horrendous evils, whereas premise (7) is about evil simpliciter. However, the arguments I suggest below should be effective even on Adams’ less strict requirement.55 So, what should we make of Adams’ thought here? Adams is right in a weak sense: God’s perfect goodness may provide some reason to think that God wouldn’t allow undefeated evil.56 However, there are (at least) three reasons to doubt that God must defeat all evil. First, as Hasker (2008) points out, if it were true that God wouldn’t permit undefeated evil, it threatens to undermine moral motivation. This is because if every evil will eventually be defeated, then undergoing evil doesn’t actually make one’s life worse, and this will be true no matter how bad the evil is—this just follows from what it is for an evil to be defeated. But if suffering an evil doesn’t make the victim worse off, is there any reason that we should intervene?57 It appears not—or, atleast, one of our most powerful reasons for intervening to prevent or stop evils has been removed. However, if one’s view of defeat undermines moral motivation, it suggests that something may be wrong with it. And this gives us reason to doubt premise (7).

 Compare to Stump’s (2010) demanding requirement, which holds that suffering must produce a greater good for the sufferer. This view faces the same issues I raise in here for Adams’ view. 55  Her requirement is less strict since it doesn’t require all evil to be defeated—only horrendous ones need to be defeated. 56  Again, she focuses on horrendous evil whereas my focus is on evil simpliciter. 57  See Crummett (2017) for a development Hasker’s criticism and of Adams view in response to this developed criticism. 54

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Of course, this isn’t a knockdown reason for rejecting this view. After all, there may be other reasons to intervene to prevent evil, aside from that they make their sufferer worse off. Perhaps we should intervene to prevent evil because we have requiring reasons to do so, and these requiring reasons don’t pertain to the welfare of the sufferer. For example, perhaps we should prevent evil because we have requiring reasons to respect individual autonomy, and one person inflicting evil on another violates that autonomy.58 While I doubt that non-welfare autonomy-based requiring reasons explain why we should prevent evil, this nevertheless shows that there are ways to stay morally motivated—there are reasons to do the moral action—while accepting that there’s no undefeated evil. There’s more to say here, but it should be clear that moral motivation is at least a problem in need of being addressed by those who endorse premise (7). Second, suppose that S undergoes an evil E. Suppose further that E is required either for an exceptionally great good or for the prevention of an exceptionally worse evil. If that’s the case, then it seems that God need not defeat E: at times, we must make sacrifices for others, and this sacrifice could be suffering an undefeated evil. This—suffering for the sake of others without a payout—isn’t foreign to us: the involuntary mother waking up to feed her child at 3:00 in the morning suffers but her suffering isn’t necessarily defeated; she may not accept the suffering, although it produces a greater good (i.e. nourishment of the child) and is in line with her requiring reason for feeding her child. And yet this undefeated evil doesn’t seem to be a problem for theism: if the involuntary mother doesn’t accept her suffering, it was (arguably) fine for God to permit it. Of course, usual examples of suffering for others are about one suffering evil and not horrendous evil. However, I see no reason why one shouldn’t undergo a horrendous undefeated evil in order to prevent other horrendous evils. For example, if the only way to avoid another Holocaust was for me to be tortured to death, I should (probably) be tortured to death, and it wouldn’t be a strike against anyone’s (even God’s) goodness for permitting me to undergo this evil even if I wouldn’t accept it. Of course, God would probably have to reward those who suffer horrendous  Or perhaps one endorses a kind of divine command theory and holds that God has commanded us to prevent evil. 58

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undefeated evils for the sake of greater goods, the prevention of worse evils, or due to him having weighty reasons for permitting such evils, and he would no doubt heal wounds created by them, but none of this requires him defeating these evils.59 Third, suppose that we understand Adams’ view as there being a requiring reason for God to defeat horrendous evil: that a person suffers a horrendous evil counts as a requiring reason against God permitting it.60 Unless this reason is an absolute requiring reason for God, it’s possible that it will be outweighed by his justifying reasons. However—so far as I can see—there’s no reason to think that defeating a horrendous evil is an absolute requiring reason for God—it’s plausibly thought to be a requiring reason for God, but there’s no reason to go beyond that. For example, suppose that Sally endured the Holocaust, and that in the end the evil she experienced was nearly defeated—in the end, she was a little worse off given her horrendous suffering and is very close to accepting (but doesn’t accept) the evil. And suppose that completely defeating Sally’s suffering would result in God permitting numerous others to suffer undefeated horrendous evils as bad as enduring the Holocaust. In that case, it’s unobjectionable for God to leave Sally’s horrendous evil undefeated: that allowing her to undergo the evil prevents numerous others from undergoing similarly horrendous evils is a sufficiently weighty justifying reason for him permitting Sally’s suffering. But perhaps this is too quick. Perhaps one thinks that in virtue of the nature of horrendous evils—that they make it seem as though one’s life has lost its meaning—God has an absolute requiring reason for defeating them. Unfortunately, this view doesn’t hold water since, as Crummett (2017) points out, our lives can have meaning restored even if an evil is undefeated. He says: 59  Of course, God may defeat the evil, perhaps by using rewards. For example, Adams (1999) suggests that God might thank one who suffers for helping him achieve his plans and show gratitude which in turn defeats the evil. Or perhaps suffering allows you to share in God’s life in some important way that you otherwise couldn’t. These could be conceived of as rewards for suffering that also defeat evil. This, however, doesn’t conflict with my point that God may reward one for undergoing some instance of evil and that this reward doesn’t defeat the evil for her. 60  Of course, Murphy (2017b) argues that there are no such reasons. So this won’t be granted by all parties.

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there are many things God can do to restore meaning to our lives other than defeat horrors: he can give us wondrous new goods (including ones only available because of the horror’s possibility), heal the psychological wounds we suffered, and bring about reconciliation and justice. (Crummett, 2017, p. 95)

So, since there are ways for God to restore meaning without defeating horrendous evil, it casts doubt on God having an absolute requiring reason for preventing horrendous undefeated evil. And so this provides us with more reason for rejecting premise (7). Of course, if it’s intuitive to one that God’s requiring reason for preventing horrendous undefeated evil is absolute, she’ll reject this line of reasoning. I have no complaints with someone who cites this—I’ll just register that (a) the above discussion strongly suggests this principle is false, (b) I lack this intuition, (c) I suspect most others lack this intuition, and (d) this intuition may be subject to the defeaters discussed above. 

Conclusion In summary, The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil initially fares better than the other commonsense problems of evil considered in at least one category. However, it nevertheless fails. First, it’s dubious to think that it seems to anyone that there’s undefeated evil. Second, it suffers from undercutting defeat in the same way that the other commonsense problems of evil do. Third, it’s subject to a Bergmann-style defeater. Fourth, transformative experience threatens it with defeat. And fifth, we have reason to doubt that God’s existence is incompatible with undefeated evil.

Concluding Remarks In this chapter, I’ve considered commonsense problems of evil, which purportedly evade the grasp of skeptical theism. In particular, I’ve considered The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil, The Deontological

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Commonsense Problem of Evil, and The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil. I’ve claimed that it doesn’t seem to anyone that there’s axiologically or deontologically gratuitous evil, and that even if it did, there’s an undercutting defeater for such seemings. And this means that The Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil and The Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil fail. Next, I showed that The Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil is subject to the same problems: it’s dubious to think that it seems to anyone that there’s undefeated evil. Moreover, I also argued that these seemings—if any there be—are subject to undercutting defeaters and that they are defeated on account of transformative experience. Finally, I argued that God’s existence is compatible with undefeated evil, meaning that seemings about there being undefeated evil don’t justify a rejection of theism.61 And so all three commonsense problems of evil fail. How does the future of commonsense problems of evil look? In my view, bleak: I don’t see a plausible way forward with respect to commonsense problems of evil.

 Perhaps one could formulate the argument probabilistically, and say that God probably wouldn’t allow undefeated evil or that the existence of undefeated evil is more likely given atheism than theism, and so seemings about there being undefeated evil provide evidence against theism. This is an argument that could be made. However, once spelled out fully, I suspect it will be vulnerable to skeptical theism and/or Bergmann-style defeat.

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Index1

A

Adams, Marilyn, 233, 234 Adams, Robert, 24, 62, 69, 206n6, 211, 224, 225, 254n37, 255, 256n40, 257, 258, 264, 265, 265n54, 265n57, 267, 267n59 Agent-centered reasons, 58–59, 59n21, 65 Antecedent reasons, 13, 14, 16–20, 32, 33, 36, 40, 43, 45, 48, 51–53, 60–64, 66–69, 82–84, 88, 89, 89n29, 92, 94, 110–113, 116, 117, 134, 141, 149n17, 151, 153, 155, 156, 210, 218 Anti-theodicy, 2, 4–8 Argument from Conscious Agents, 9, 212–215, 218n33, 219, 223–225, 228–229, 232

Argument from inscrutability, 2, 9, 120–124 Argument from Psychophysical Harmony, 9, 211, 215–219, 224, 225, 230–232 Axiological Commonsense Problem of Evil, 235, 236, 238–249, 251, 253, 256, 268, 269 Axiological gratuity, 73, 73n4, 75, 84, 127n11, 204n2, 238, 240, 242, 250, 251 The Axiological Humean Argument, 13n4, 107–113, 115, 117 Axiologically inscrutable, 120, 123

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 P. Hendricks, Skeptical Theism, Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34271-4

289

290 Index

Axiological Skeptical Theism, 8–51, 64, 71, 71n1, 72, 79–84, 87, 89n29, 90, 108n57, 112–116, 113n61, 118–120, 118n66, 127, 137, 139, 141, 142, 142n2, 148, 149, 149n17, 153–158, 203, 205, 207, 208, 215, 218, 219, 224, 246 B

Benton, Matthew, 38–40 Bergmann, Michael, xi, 12, 16, 16n8, 18, 38, 39, 43, 43n69, 75n11, 77n14, 83n25, 109–111, 109n59, 142n4, 143n7, 143n8, 153, 154, 156–158, 184n24, 226n43, 241n17, 245–247, 251–253, 260–262 Buchak, Lara, 175n15, 181, 182, 196 C

Christian theism, 121, 122, 160–163, 163n38, 166, 166n42 Climenhaga, Nevin, 22n20, 48, 68–69, 104, 152n20 Commonsense beliefs, 9, 141, 142, 142n1, 148–167, 149n18, 156n26, 159n30, 161n32, 161n33, 162n37, 165n41, 166n42, 169, 170, 203, 236, 237 Commonsense Problem of Undefeated Evil, 235, 254,

255, 256n40, 258, 260, 261, 264, 268, 269 Consequentialism, 17n11 CORNEA, 11, 239n13 D

Default Argument for Axiological Skeptical Theism, 8, 16–48, 17n12, 50, 60, 239n13 Default Argument for Deontological Skeptical Theism, 8, 60–70, 239n13 Defeaters, 9, 10, 22n20, 81, 81n22, 82, 82n25, 85, 89, 90, 114, 118, 123, 141–166, 169, 171, 203, 224, 237, 239, 242–247, 247n30, 250–253, 255, 258–262, 261n45, 268, 269 Deontological Commonsense Problem of Evil, 235, 236, 238, 239n12, 248–253, 256, 268–269 Deontological gratuity, 73, 75, 204n2, 248–251, 253, 258 The Deontological Humean Argument, 107n58, 108, 115–117, 119 Deontologically inscrutable, 120–123 Deontological Skeptical Theism, 8–10, 48–72, 71n1, 79, 88–90, 92, 94, 97, 105, 107, 108, 113, 115–120, 118n66, 133, 134, 137, 141, 142, 148, 149, 156–158, 203, 205, 210, 211, 221, 228n46, 251, 252, 252n33

 Index 

DePoe, John, 12, 122, 122n5 Divine deception, 172, 202 Divine hiddenness, 2, 9, 129–134, 188 Dougherty, Trent, 12n2, 120, 120n2, 122, 205, 236n4, 239n12, 242n19, 255, 258 Draper, Paul, xi, 19n14, 21, 21n18, 23, 23n23, 28n37, 33, 47n75, 66n31, 83, 83n25, 83n26, 83n27, 84, 89, 109–116, 109n58, 109n59, 111n60, 135–138, 135n24, 163n39, 210n15, 236n4 E

Ekstrom, Laura, 20, 34–37, 72n2 Equiprobability Argument from Evil, 20n16, 90–108, 115n63, 118, 128 Equiprobability principles, 20, 21n18, 22, 32, 33, 63, 63n27, 66, 90, 95–98, 95n41, 102–104, 106, 107, 107n55, 115, 115n63, 117 Evil-god challenge, 2, 9, 124–129 Evolutionary argument for atheism, 2, 9, 135–137 Explanationism, 160 F

Faith, xi, 2, 9, 170, 170n2, 174–202 Felix Culpa, 9, 205–208, 219–222, 221n37, 224–227, 227n45, 232, 233

291

G

God’s reasons, 2, 8, 49, 50, 52, 52n6, 53, 60–63, 63n26, 67–70, 72, 88, 89, 92, 94, 108, 116–118, 134, 137, 138, 138n27, 141, 152, 156–158, 164, 164n40, 205, 210, 211, 215, 221, 228n46, 239n13, 249–251, 257, 259 H

Hasker, William, 43, 44, 44n70, 114, 238n11, 265, 265n57 Hawthorne, John, 38–40 Howard-Snyder, Daniel, 43n69, 174–176, 175n12, 176n16, 196, 247n30 Hudson, Hud, 12n2, 30, 42, 77n14, 131, 142n2, 152n20, 164n40, 165n41, 169, 169n1, 172, 173, 188n30, 208n10 Huemer, Michael, 21n17, 104, 231, 231n53, 231n54, 237, 238 Humean defeaters, 143, 147, 148, 163–166, 220, 221 I

Impermissible, 4, 26, 27, 52–58, 54n8, 55n12, 57n17, 57n19, 65, 67, 74, 88n30, 89–92, 95, 98–103, 105–107, 156, 157, 190, 209 Incredulous stare, 240–242, 244, 246n28, 249–250, 256–257, 257n42 Intrinsic probability, 21n18, 33, 109, 115, 115n63, 117

292 Index

Intuition, xi, 14, 47, 47n77, 51, 51n3, 76, 77, 84, 90, 113, 123, 132, 134, 152, 155, 157, 159, 204, 219–224, 222n40, 227, 231, 236, 238, 245n25, 268 Isaacs, Yooav, 38–40

N

J

O

Jackson, Elizabeth, 175n13, 182, 183, 196 Justifying reasons, 2, 26–28, 27n34, 28n35, 52–59, 52n5, 53n7, 55n12, 55n13, 64–66, 65n28, 65n29, 68, 74, 75, 83–87, 89, 89n29, 99–101, 99n45, 101n48, 105–106, 108, 116, 117, 248–250, 250n32, 252, 260, 267 K

Kantian Theodicy, 9, 208–211, 219, 221–222, 224, 225, 227–228, 232 M

Moon, Andrew, 161 Mooney, Justin, 205, 238n11, 240n16, 248n31 Moral dilemmas, 34, 56–58, 65 Murphy, Mark, 3, 26n31, 52, 52n6, 62, 88n28, 226n42, 267n60

Nagasawa, Yujin, 3, 138n29, 211 Nature of good and evil, 115 Noseeum Axiological Argument from Evil, 72 Noseeum Deontological Argument from Evil, 72

Ontological argument, 30n44, 69 Oppy, Graham, 40–42, 45–47, 47n77, 133 P

Permissible, 7, 26, 35, 52–58, 54n8, 54n9, 55n12, 56n13, 57n17, 57n19, 65, 67, 73–75, 74n9, 88n30, 92, 95n44, 98–106, 100n48, 104n54, 109, 116, 190, 249 Perrine, Timothy, 11n1, 12n2 Phenomenal conservatism, 237, 238, 238n10 Plantinga, Alvin, 69, 90, 95n39, 138n29, 142n3, 143n8, 145–147, 145n10, 147n13, 160, 161, 161n32, 170, 171, 206–208, 206n6, 206n8, 217n29, 220, 220n36, 227, 227n44, 227n45, 236n4 Portmore, Doug, 54n8, 55n13, 73n6, 80n18, 56n13 Principle of indifference, 17n11, 20–22, 20n16, 21n17, 33, 63, 63n27, 94, 95, 95n40, 104, 104n51

 Index 

Private reasons, 14, 14n6, 47, 51n3, 84, 113, 118, 123, 124, 134, 137, 155, 157–159, 158n28, 204, 219, 221, 221n37, 223, 224, 236, 236n2, 259, 259n44, 260 Public reasons, 13, 14, 14n6, 17n13, 18, 20, 40, 43, 47, 51, 84, 112, 123, 219, 236, 236n2, 259 Purely alethic defeaters, 143, 146–148, 165–166 R

Rationality defeaters, 142n5, 143–160, 143n8, 145n10, 159n30, 163, 166 Reasons, 2, 12, 49, 120, 141, 171, 204, 236 Rebutting defeaters, 144, 145, 148–150, 149n17 Requiring reasons, 26–28, 26n31, 26n33, 28n35, 51–59, 53n7, 54n9, 55n11, 55n12, 55n13, 56n13, 62, 64, 65, 74, 74n9, 74n10, 75, 87, 88, 89n29, 99–101, 101n48, 105, 106, 116, 117, 149, 208–210, 208n11, 208n12, 221, 222, 222n38, 222n40, 227, 228n46, 248–252, 259, 266–268 Rightmaking properties, 90–93, 91n32, 91n33, 95, 96, 96n42, 96n43, 98–104, 101n47, 101n48, 103n49, 107, 108

293

Rowe, William, 15n7, 40, 50n2, 72, 72n2, 75–77, 79, 80, 81n23, 89 Rutledge, Jonathan, 120, 203n1, 247n30 S

Schellenberg, J.L., 129–131, 129n16, 130n17, 187 Seemings, 13, 13n5, 14, 51, 51n3, 157, 159, 236–247, 237n7, 238n9, 245n25, 246n26, 249–253, 255–261, 257n42, 261n45, 262n46, 264, 269, 269n61 Simplicity, 22n22, 23, 23n23, 23n24, 24, 31, 31n46, 74n10, 80n18, 96n42, 104n51, 123, 142n4, 193, 218n32 ST4, 12, 16, 16n8, 34n54 ST1-3, 20, 34–37 ST1-4, 18, 19, 38–40, 43–45, 109–112, 111n60 Stump, Eleonore, 187, 254n37, 265n54 Swinburne, Richard, 3, 8, 21, 22n22, 23n23, 30n41, 33, 104n51, 134, 138n29, 205, 208n11, 211, 212n17, 230, 234 T

Tooley, Michael, 13n4, 90, 91n31, 91n32, 91n34, 91n35, 91n36, 93–102, 95n39, 95n40, 106n54, 108 Transformative experience, 199–201, 261–264, 268, 269

294 Index

Tucker, Chris, 54, 54n8, 54n10, 55n11, 74, 99, 100, 105, 237n7, 242n19 Tweedt, Chris, 176n17, 239n13 U

Undefeated evil, 254–260, 256n40, 261n45, 264–269, 269n61 V

Van Inwagen, Peter, 77–79, 77n16, 78n17, 229n49, 238n11

W

Warrant defeaters, 142n5, 143–146, 145n10, 145n11, 148, 156, 159–163, 166 Wielenberg, Erik, 42, 120–122, 121n4, 142n2, 152n20, 172, 173, 188n30, 194 Wrongmaking properties, 90–93, 91n32, 91n35, 95, 96, 96n43, 98–103, 101n48, 103n49, 105–108 Wykstra, Stephen, 11, 76, 120n1