Singular Case: Debating China’s Political Economy in the European Enlightenment 9780773549166

Table of contents :
Cover
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction Judging “Schemes of Oeconomy”
1 Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age”: Ethnography and Enlightenment
2 “The Most Unscrupulous People on Earth”: The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit
3 “Your Beggarly Commerce!”: China and International Trade
4 “The Science of Princes”: China’s Constitutional Foundations
5 “Duties of the Sovereign”: Civil and Military Successes and Failures
6 “Very Ignorant Reasoners”: China’s Science and Technology
Conclusion Prospects for the “Stationary State”
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

A SINGULAR C ASE

28463_Millar.indd 1

2016-12-15 14:01:56

M c Gill-Queen’s Studies in the History of Ideas Series Editor: Philip J. Cercone   1 Problems of Cartesianism Edited by Thomas M. Lennon, John M. Nicholas, and John W. Davis

10 Consent, Coercion, and Limit: The Medieval Origins of Parliamentary Democracy Arthur P. Monahan

  2 The Development of the Idea of History in Antiquity Gerald A. Press

11 Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800: A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy Manfred Kuehn

  3 Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid: Two Common-Sense Philosophers Louise Marcil-Lacoste   4 Schiller, Hegel, and Marx: State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece Philip J. Kain   5 John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England Charles B. Schmitt   6 Beyond Liberty and Property: The Process of SelfRecognition in EighteenthCentury Political Thought J.A.W. Gunn   7 John Toland: His Methods, Manners, and Mind Stephen H. Daniel   8 Coleridge and the Inspired Word Anthony John Harding   9 The Jena System, 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics G.W.F. Hegel Translation edited by John W. Burbidge and George di Giovanni Introduction and notes by H.S. Harris

28463_Millar.indd 2

12 Paine and Cobbett: The Transatlantic Connection David A. Wilson 13 Descartes and the Enlightenment Peter A. Schouls 14 Greek Scepticism: Anti-Realist Trends in Ancient Thought Leo Groarke 15 The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought Donald Wiebe 16 Form and Transformation: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus Frederic M. Schroeder 17 From Personal Duties towards Personal Rights: Late Medieval and Early Modern Political Thought, c. 1300–c. 1650 Arthur P. Monahan 18 The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi Translated and edited by George di Giovanni

2016-12-15 14:01:56

19 Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self Arnold B. Come 20 Durkheim, Morals, and Modernity W. Watts Miller 21 The Career of Toleration: John Locke, Jonas Proast, and After Richard Vernon 22 Dialectic of Love: Platonism in Schiller’s Aesthetics David Pugh 23 History and Memory in Ancient Greece Gordon Shrimpton 24 Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self Arnold B. Come 25 Enlightenment and Conservatism in Victorian Scotland: The Career of Sir Archibald Alison Michael Michie 26 The Road to Egdon Heath: The Aesthetics of the Great in Nature Richard Bevis 27 Jena Romanticism and Its Appropriation of Jakob Böhme: Theosophy – Hagiography – Literature Paolo Mayer

28463_Millar.indd 3

28 Enlightenment and Community: Lessing, Abbt, Herder, and the Quest for a German Public Benjamin W. Redekop 29 Jacob Burckhardt and the Crisis of Modernity John R. Hinde 30 The Distant Relation: Time and Identity in SpanishAmerican Fiction Eoin S. Thomson 31 Mr Simson’s Knotty Case: Divinity, Politics, and Due Process in Early EighteenthCentury Scotland Anne Skoczylas 32 Orthodoxy and Enlightenment: George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century Jeffrey M. Suderman 33 Contemplation and Incarnation: The Theology of MarieDominique Chenu Christophe F. Potworowski 34 Democratic Legitimacy: Plural Values and Political Power F.M. Barnard 35 Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History F.M. Barnard 36 Labeling People: French Scholars on Society, Race, and Empire, 1815–1849 Martin S. Staum

2016-12-15 14:01:56

37 The Subaltern Appeal to Experience: Self-Identity, Late Modernity, and the Politics of Immediacy Craig Ireland 38 The Invention of Journalism Ethics: The Path to Objectivity and Beyond, Second Edition Stephen J.A. Ward 39 The Recovery of Wonder: The New Freedom and the Asceticism of Power Kenneth L. Schmitz 40 Reason and Self-Enactment in History and Politics: Themes and Voices of Modernity F.M. Barnard 41 The More Moderate Side of Joseph de Maistre: Views on Political Liberty and Political Economy Cara Camcastle 42 Democratic Society and Human Needs Jeff Noonan 43 The Circle of Rights Expands: Modern Political Thought after the Reformation, 1521 (Luther) to 1762 (Rousseau) Arthur P. Monahan 44 The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament Janet Ajzenstat

28463_Millar.indd 4

45 Finding Freedom: Hegel’s Philosophy and the Emancipation of Women Sara MacDonald 46 When the French Tried to Be British: Party, Opposition, and the Quest for Civil Disagreement, 1814–1848 J.A.W. Gunn 47 Under Conrad’s Eyes: The Novel as Criticism Michael John DiSanto 48 Media, Memory, and the First World War David Williams 49 An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Creating Something from Nothing Louis Groarke 50 Social and Political Bonds: A Mosaic of Contrast and Convergence F.M. Barnard 51 Archives and the Event of God: The Impact of Michel Foucault on Philosophical Theology David Galston 52 Between the Queen and the Cabby: Olympe de Gouges’s Rights of Women John R. Cole

2016-12-15 14:01:56

53 Nature and Nurture in French Social Sciences, 1859–1914 and Beyond Martin S. Staum 54 Public Passion: Rethinking the Grounds for Political Justice Rebecca Kingston 55 Rethinking the Political: The Sacred, Aesthetic Politics, and the Collège de Sociologie Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi 56 Materialist Ethics and Life-Value Jeff Noonan 57 Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Dialectical Justification of Philosophy’s First Principles Ardis B. Collins 58 The Social History of Ideas in Quebec, 1760–1896 Yvan Lamonde Translated by Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott 59 Ideas, Concepts, and Reality John W. Burbidge 60 The Enigma of Perception D.L.C. Maclachlan 61 Nietzsche’s Justice: Naturalism in Search of an Ethics Peter R. Sedgwick

28463_Millar.indd 5

62 The Idea of Liberty in Canada during the Age of Atlantic Revolutions, 1776–1838 Michel Ducharme Translated by Peter Feldstein 63 From White to Yellow: The Japanese in European Racial Thought, 1300–1735 Rotem Kowner 64 The Crisis of Modernity Augusto Del Noce Edited and translated by Carlo Lancellotti 65 Imprinting Britain: Newspapers, Sociability, and the Shaping of British North America Michael Eamon 66 The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship John von Heyking 67 War as Paradox: Clausewitz and Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics Youri Cormier 68 Network Democracy: Conservative Politics and the Violence of the Liberal Age Jared Giesbrecht 69 A Singular Case: Debating China’s Political Economy in the European Enlightenment Ashley Eva Millar

2016-12-15 14:01:56

28463_Millar.indd 6

2016-12-15 14:01:56

A SINGULAR CASE

Debating China’s Political Economy in the European Enlightenment Ashley Eva Millar

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

28463_Millar.indd 7

2016-12-15 14:01:56

©  McGill-Queen’s University Press 2017 isbn isbn isbn isbn

978-0-7735-4830-5 (cloth) 978-0-7735-4918-0 (paper) 978-0-7735-4916-6 (ePDF) 978-0-7735-4917-3 (ePUB)

Legal deposit first quarter 2017 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. This publication is based on research that has been supported in part by the University of Cape Town’s Research Committee. McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Millar, Ashley Eva, 1983–, author A singular case: debating China’s political economy in the European Enlightenment / Ashley Eva Millar. (McGill-Queen’s studies in the history of ideas; 69) Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. isbn 978-0-7735-4830-5 (cloth). – isbn 978-0-7735-4918-0 (paper). – isbn 978-0-7735-4916-6 (ePDF). – isbn 978-0-7735-4917-3 (ePUB) 1. China – Economic conditions – 18th century. 2. Enlightenment – Europe. I. Title. II. Series: McGill-Queen’s studies in the history of ideas; 69 HC427.7.M54 2017

330.951'033

C2016-906695-9 C2016-906696-7

This book was typeset by Marquis Interscript in 10 /12 New Baskerville.

28463_Millar.indd 8

2016-12-15 14:01:56

Contents

Acknowledgments xi Introduction: Judging “Schemes of Oeconomy”  3 1  Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age”: Ethnography and Enlightenment  33 2  “The Most Unscrupulous People on Earth”: The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit  71 3  “Your Beggarly Commerce!”: China and International Trade  96 4  “The Science of Princes”: China’s Constitutional Foundations  126 5  “Duties of the Sovereign”: Civil and Military Successes and Failures  152 6  “Very Ignorant Reasoners”: China’s Science and Technology  190 Conclusion: Prospects for the “Stationary State”  222 Bibliography 231 Index 251

28463_Millar.indd 9

2016-12-15 14:01:56

28463_Millar.indd 10

2016-12-15 14:01:56

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Kent Deng and Patrick O’Brien, at the London School of Economics, who first inspired my interest in early modern European and Chinese economic history. My first supervisor, Larry Epstein, guided me through the formative year of my doctoral program. Sadly, he passed away during my first year of study but he offered invaluable support and guidance as I laid the foundations for my research. Mary Morgan and the research group “How Well Do ‘Facts’ Travel?” expanded my horizons in thinking about the circulation of information. I owe a great debt to my supervisor Joan-Pau Rubiés who, with his gift for transcending disciplinary boundaries, always asked the questions that challenged me and pushed my writing forward. He has helped me navigate the academic world long after the end of my doctoral program and I am deeply grateful to him. I would also like to thank my PhD examiners, Gregory Blue and Richard Bourke, for their insightful suggestions as well as the anonymous reviewers of this book who understood the importance of the wide array of literature used in this study. I am grateful for my colleagues at the University of Cape Town, particularly my head of department, Lance Van Sittert, and my mentor Anne Mager, who gave me the space to rewrite this book. I am also thankful for all of my students, especially those in the Great Divergence seminar whose challenging questions undoubtedly helped me find my academic voice. I would like to thank McGill-Queen’s University Press for the detailed attention they gave this manuscript both in commissioning reviewers and in carefully editing my work. In particular, I owe a debt to Kate Merriman, who helped clarify my voice, and my editor, Kyla Madden, for encouraging me to step outside myself and think about how each phrase comes across to readers. Any mistakes are my own.

28463_Millar.indd 11

2016-12-15 14:01:56

xii

Acknowledgments

This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Finally, on a personal note, I am deeply grateful for my father, who encouraged me to always do what I love, and for my mother, who has endlessly believed in my academic career. I dedicate this book to my husband, Malan, who read countless drafts with sincere enthusiasm, and finally to my son Leo who came near the end of this journey and was the most pleasant of distractions through the editing phases.

28463_Millar.indd 12

2016-12-15 14:01:56

A SINGULAR C ASE

28463_Millar.indd 1

2016-12-15 14:01:56

28463_Millar.indd 2

2016-12-15 14:01:56

Introduction

Judging “Schemes of Oeconomy” If one considers the variety which is found in different countries, in the distribution of property, subordination of classes, genius of people, proceeding from the variety of forms of government, laws, and manners, one may conclude, that the political oeconomy in each must necessarily be different … It is the business of a statesman to judge of the expediency of different schemes of oeconomy … The speculative person … must do his utmost to become a citizen of the world, comparing customs, examining minutely institutions which appear alike, when in different countries they are found to produce different effects: he should examine the cause of such differences with the utmost diligence and attention. Sir James Steuart1

Sir James Steuart, often referred to as the last mercantilist, began his An inquiry into the principles of political oeconomy (1767) by emphasizing the importance of contrasting various forms of political economy. His call for the statesman and the speculative person to engage with foreign systems of political economy in concrete (rather than conjectural) terms had already been taken up by many of his contemporaries. Early modern Europeans, particularly during the Enlightenment, looked outward to foreign lands to enhance their theories of the science of humankind. At  the time of Steuart’s publication, another member of the Scottish Enlightenment had begun a project to define and explain the divergences in the economic fortunes of different countries. Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), groundbreaking as it was, also reflected the contemporary trend of drawing on descriptions of the wider world to inform theories of political economy. The Enlightenment, as an intellectually vibrant period prior to the age of global European economic supremacy, stands as a key moment for 1 Steuart, An inquiry into the principles of political oeconomy, 1: 3.

28463_Millar.indd 3

2016-12-15 14:01:56

4

A Singular Case

European assessments of foreign empires, a moment when there was scope for evaluation of different forms of social, economic, and political organization. Against the backdrop of intense examination and debate by Enlightenment philosophers over the merits and changing foundations of their own societies, there was a genuine openness toward and desire to learn from foreign systems. In the European Enlightenment, the place of the “Other” was not merely symbolic, nor was it only a rhetorical tool used to comment on European society. Rather, philosophers formed part of a larger, burgeoning culture of information that sought to empiricize theoretical arguments. Thus, to fully understand the political economy of Enlightenment philosophers, intellectual historians must extend contextualism beyond European borders toward a fuller appreciation of how the rapidly expanding world shaped Enlightenment debates. As a relatively unknown advanced civilization, the Chinese Empire held a unique place in early modern European thought, and particularly in Enlightenment Britain and France, where numerous thinkers tried to make sense of a widening world and their own place in it. Early modern authors – from missionaries and merchants to scholars and geographers – displayed great interest in understanding the nature and workings of the Chinese Empire. The motivations for this inquisitiveness varied, as did the ways in which knowledge of China was constructed and used. While European societies remained largely religious, secular interests were rapidly expanding among the intellectual and commercial elites. In particular, the study of political economy – the creation and organization of wealth in a society – emerged as a dominant concern of philosophers, polemicists, and geographers alike. These individuals eagerly debated topics of China’s political economy and began to incorporate information about its system into their theoretical debates. This book analyzes discussions of China’s commerce, government, and science by popular British and French thinkers during the Enlightenment. It asks if there was a general consensus on China’s s­ uccesses and failures and to what extent this knowledge influenced Enlightenment theories of political economy. Although many authors have addressed European views of China in the early modern period, it is striking that there is no single text whose primary aim is to evaluate views of China’s political economy in this period.2 The European Enlightenment took 2 The most notable texts include Reichwein, China and Europe; Pinot, La Chine et la formation de l’esprit philosophique en France (1640–1740); Maverick, China, a Model for Europe; Appleton, A Cycle of Cathay; Guy, The French Image of China before and after Voltaire; Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe; Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe; Dawson, The Chinese

28463_Millar.indd 4

2016-12-15 14:01:56



Introduction 5

place (not coincidentally for some3) within a rapidly changing economic environment where manufacturing was slowly rising to become a driver of economic growth and development. But it was also a world where, as Kenneth Pomeranz has argued, ecological constraints were ever-present as a reminder of the primacy of agriculture. China, a successful agrarian and commercial empire, represented the apex of an economic system that was only beginning to be supplanted by the nascent industrial age in Britain (followed by France and Germany). As a result, Europeans did not blindly assume they were economically superior to China. Intellectually, it was a time of debate and transition. There was an active interest in what could be learned from the Chinese system and a remarkable degree of agreement even among those traditionally cast as diametrically opposed. Once Enlightenment Europeans had thoroughly analyzed and debated China’s political economy, they reached a general consensus on two fundamental flaws holding it back: it suffered from an ineffectual military and the state of its science and technology revealed a stagnating civilization. Explanations for these failures ranged from Chinese culture to its institutions to its unique geographical situation. Interestingly, these are the same puzzles (and answers) that remain today within the Great Divergence debate.4 For instance, David Landes puts forward a culturalist explanation for the “Rise of the West,” Jared Diamond looks to geographic differences, while other scholars, such as R. Bin Wong and Peer Vries, point to the role of institutional variation.5 More than a decade after the explosion of the Great Divergence debate, it is time to look in detail at how contemporaries assessed the prospects of China’s economic development. As Peer Vries notes, the “debate on the causes of the Great Divergence is as old as the social sciences.”6 In fact, we can trace this history back further. Although some economic Chameleon; Mackerras, Western Images of China and Sinophiles and Sinophobes; Étiemble, L’Europe chinoise, 2 vols; Hsia, ed., The Vision of China in the English Literature of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries; Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent; Jones, The Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought; Mungello, The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800; Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge. 3 Mokyr, “The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth.” 4 The historiographic inquiry into the causes of Europe’s economic ascendance was originally referred to as the “Rise of the West.” The inquiry was reignited by Kenneth Pomeranz over a decade ago in explicitly comparative terms. The Great Divergence debate seeks to understand the divergence between China and Europe, which in the California School framework is set somewhere around 1800, shortly after the end of the Enlightenment. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. 5 Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations; Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel; Wong, China Transformed; Vries, “The California School and Beyond.” 6 Vries, “The California School and Beyond,” 731.

28463_Millar.indd 5

2016-12-15 14:01:57

6

A Singular Case

historians have used early modern descriptions of China to support their arguments, they have paid inadequate attention to the context and nuances of early modern sources. Kenneth Pomeranz, a central economic historian in this debate, argues that “China, more than any other place, … has served as the ‘other’ for the modern West’s stories about itself, from Smith and Malthus to Marx and Weber.”7 But his invocation of Smith, at least, is problematic. The Enlightenment assessment of China’s political economy was not merely as the “other” but rather reflected the important relationship between the formation of theories on moral philosophy and empirical descriptions of the wider world. This, after all, was the period when the modern social sciences began to emerge and the use of evidence in the science of human nature was imperative to the forerunners of modern economics.8 Many historians have recognized the importance of contemporary primitive peoples serving as the empirical evidence for humanity in a state of nature, but much less has been made of the importance of other advanced civilizations in the emerging theories of political economy. Smith, as we see, was not an exception to this Enlightenment tradition. The Enlightenment philosophers were keen to assess and interpret the raw data provided by eighteenth-century observers of China. Today there is still great value in learning exactly what eighteenth-century observers reported about China’s economic prospects. What did they notice? What did they debate? What forecasts did they make? Indeed, traveller accounts can add to our understanding of the history of economic thought as well as of the Great Divergence. But what has been lacking in the economic history literature is attention to the nature of the varying travellers’ descriptions and the agendas of different philosophers. For example, Pomeranz notes that the French Jesuit Jean Baptiste Du Halde was “traveling along the Grand Canal in 1696,” and “saw” the immense forests near the Grand Canal.9 The French missionary Du Halde never set foot in China and his account was published in 1735 (an earlier Jesuit traveller published another description of China in 1696). At times such lack of attention does not fundamentally undermine the reported observation, but at other times the agenda or perspective of the traveller, as well as differences between editions and translations, is crucial to understanding the empirical descriptions. One need only 7 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 25. 8 Redman, The Rise of Political Economy as a Science, 69. 9 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 234. Pomeranz’s source was one of his own earlier publications, and in the earlier book there is no reference to Du Halde’s popular ­eighteenth-century description.

28463_Millar.indd 6

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 7

think of the Physiocratically biased philosopher-traveller Pierre Poivre, who was convinced of China’s agricultural prowess and provided important information for the leading political economists of his age. Only with a thorough contextualization of these sources can we assess what information about China was accepted or contested and determine the varying ways in which Enlightenment philosophers engaged with the empirical descriptions of the wider world. This book aims to do precisely this by examining the circulation of information on key themes of China’s political economy. This book is not a history of philosophical views of China. Rather, it is a study of the construction of knowledge on China’s political economy in eighteenth-century Britain and France. As such it examines the circulation of information about China’s political economy between three main genres of sources. The first genre is popular first-hand accounts of China written by early modern travellers (missionaries, merchants, and emissaries) from several European countries – notably Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, and England – for interested audiences in Europe. The second comprises the writings of what I refer to as “geographers.” As a result of a profit-driven printing culture and popular demand, these geographies and compendiums of knowledge reflected more accessible descriptions of the wider world and were often key intermediaries for philosophers who did not have the time for or access to all the key first-hand sources. These geographers saw it as their task to organize and reframe the first-hand descriptions of the world. In Britain, many of these geographers were Grub Street “hack” writers, but they were also often people of great intelligence (if not reputation) who e­ ngaged with the travellers and philosophers writing about China. The final genre comprises the works of a number of Enlightenment philosophers who referenced China in their studies. Given the focus on political economy, the most relevant British and French philosophers were François Quesnay; Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu; Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet); Jean Jacques Rousseau; Abbé Raynal; Denis Diderot; David Hume; and Adam Smith. At times, other European philosophers such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz make important interjections into the debates.10 This book ­attempts to strike a balance in its analysis of the circulation

10 Leibniz will not feature as prominently in this book as other philosophers because most of his writing on China was unpublished correspondence and essays. See Perkins, Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light, and Cook and Rosemont, eds, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.

28463_Millar.indd 7

2016-12-15 14:01:57

8

A Singular Case

of information between these authors, but certain groups will be referenced more or less depending on the theme analyzed. Chapter 1 offers a detailed review of these sources and their relationship to one another. These three categories are fluid and some individuals traversed the boundaries between them. Broadly, these genres serve to differentiate the relationships to knowledge of China of their respective authors, as well as the contrasting agendas of the respective texts. I have selected sources based on their contemporary popularity, their influence on the development of new ideas, and their relevance to the topic of China’s political economy. This research is not intended as a comprehensive catalogue of all that was written about China’s political economy; it is a study of the most influential, iconic, and representative works that offer important discussions of the state of politics and economics in the Chinese Empire during the Enlightenment.11 The focus falls on Britain and France not only for their prominent place in the Enlightenment debates on political economy but also for their centrality in interacting with China in the eighteenth century. A study of the circulation of information on China’s political economy offers a more revealing map of knowledge than other approaches that focus on one individual or one particular group of sources because it leads to the clear identification of the most popular themes, awareness of information that was neglected by a particular group of sources or individual authors, and insight into the relationship between the ethnographic descriptions of China and the ways in which this information was reworked into broader theories. As Sophus Reinert has argued, Europeans emulated each other but they were also learning from ­foreign societies.12 There was a strong relationship between the Enlightenment – and the formation of political economy within it – and the wider world. Capsules of Enlightenment Defining the Enlightenment has taken up countless pages of academic writing in recent decades as well as in the latter part of the eighteenth century itself.13 Historians debate whether there was a single 11 For a catalogue of European views of Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, 2 vols, and Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. 3. 12 Reinert, Translating Empire. 13 For example, the famous 1783 Berlinische Monatsschrift essay prize “What Is Enlightenment?”

28463_Millar.indd 8

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 9

Enlightenment or whether it should be understood more broadly as a period that witnessed numerous smaller intellectual movements, highly dependent on local contexts. J.G.A. Pocock argues there were multiple Enlightenments, and that national contexts mattered greatly in shaping them.14 Alternatively, John Robertson asserts that we can still find an identifiable, intellectually coherent Enlightenment in the “commitment to understanding, and hence to advancing, the causes and conditions of human betterment in this world.”15 He rightly acknowledges that the Enlightenment had patriotic impulses, which led to perspectives particular to specific national contexts, but alongside this impulse was one of cosmopolitanism that encouraged philosophers to think comparatively and about humanity as a whole. The language of political economy was a central “discourse” or “field of enquiry” of Enlightenment thought.16 Robertson’s view of the Enlightenment is supported here, as we see philosophers processing information in their national contexts (for example, comparing the Chinese taxation system to France’s) but ­ above this, speaking a “universal language” aimed at a larger project of improvement. Similar to Robertson’s identification of various discourses or fields of enquiry within the singular intellectual movement, Dorinda Outram identifies “a group of capsules or flashpoints where intellectual projects changed society and government on a worldwide basis.”17 Two overlapping capsules within the broader Enlightenment are of interest here. The first is the language of political economy, which Robertson identifies. The second is the discovering of the “Other” that shaped so much Enlightenment thought and of which a great deal has recently be written. Revealing these capsules and their relationship to each other means recognizing the importance of the famed philosophers as well as the professional writers and the travellers who informed and interacted with them. This book locates these writers in an extra-European intellectual and informational landscape. The informational landscape refers to the empirical evidence that was circulating about China. Mapping out this landscape is critical to understanding the Enlightenment discourse on China. For example, as we see in chapter 6, many of Voltaire’s comments on Chinese science and technology are less incisive when read in the broader context of travel narratives and geographical compendiums.

14 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, 1: 138. 15 Robertson, The Case for Enlightenment, 28. 16 Ibid., 377. 17 Outram, The Enlightenment, 2.

28463_Millar.indd 9

2016-12-15 14:01:57

10

A Singular Case

Another contentious aspect of defining the Enlightenment concerns its chronology. Robertson clearly delineates the period from the 1730s to the 1790s.18 Apart from a few exceptions (notably Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz), the philosophical works of interest in this book can all be located within Robertson’s chronological bounds. But philosophers do not define the limits of this study of European views of China’s political economy, and each capsule of Enlightenment has its own chronological confines. For the purposes of this book, the focus is on the period between 1696 and 1776. The detailed description of China by the French Jesuit Louis Le Comte, published in 1696, provides a meaningful starting point to the period directly relevant to this study. His Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine was as controversial as it was popular and continued to be routinely referenced by late eighteenth-century geographers and philosophers. Information produced before 1696 will, at times, be of great relevance because it continued to be referenced well into the eighteenth century. The period under consideration ends with Adam Smith’s assessment of China’s political economy in The Wealth of Nations (1776). Spanning eighty years, two different genres, and diverse subject matter, the French missionary traveller and the Scottish (largely armchair) philosopher reflect diverging conclusions about the status of China’s political economy. And yet, the authors shared a common terrain from which they located their views and assessments of China. Defining China’s Political Economy From the economies of humanity in a “state of nature” to the “stagnation” of the advanced civilization of China, Europe’s engagement with the non-European other provided a significant amount of empirical evidence that shaped early theories on political economy. Political economy was very much an evolving concept and field of study in early modern Europe. As a branch of moral philosophy – the study of all human activities – political economy focused broadly on material improvement. The field was centred on production and distribution but considered as well the role of law, custom, and government in the distribution of wealth in society.19 The Greek etymology of the term “economy” (oikonomia) refers to the government of the household for the common good of the family. In the seventeenth century this definition expanded to political economy,

18 Robertson, “The Enlightenment above National Context,” 673. 19 Redman, The Rise of Political Economy as a Science, 108.

28463_Millar.indd 10

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 11

which was the government of the great family, the State. The first published use of the term is attributed to Antoine de Montchrestien’s Traicté de l’œconomie politique (1615). Montchrestien’s understanding of political economy was heavily based on the writings of Jean Bodin and reflected the latter’s mercantilist and xenophobic bias.20 By the eighteenth century, as we saw, the much more open James Steuart defined “oeconomy” as referring to a family and “political oeconomy” as referring to a state. He described political economy as both an art and a science, noting that its first purpose is to adapt to the spirit, manners, habits, and customs of people and then to “introduce a set of new and more useful institutions.” He continued, “the principal object of this science is to secure a certain fund of subsistence for all the inhabitants; to obviate every circumstance which may render it precarious; to provide every thing necessary for supplying the wants of the society, and to employ the inhabitants (supposing them to be freemen) in such a manner as naturally to create reciprocal relations and dependencies between them, so as to make their several interests lead them to supply one another with their reciprocal wants.”21 Contemporaries, such as Jean-François Féraud, agreed with Steuart’s understanding of political economy, while others such as Samuel Johnson took longer to adopt the newer definition.22 Chapters 2 through 6 address the most important aspects of political economy as they related specifically to assessing the Chinese Empire. While it would be anachronistic to entirely isolate political economy from the other branches of moral philosophy, it is possible to focus on its key themes, much as Adam Smith did in his Wealth of Nations. Theories of political economy were built on important foundations of moral philosophy. Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, addressing morality and the motivating factors behind human behaviour, provided an essential building block for Wealth of Nations. Chapter 2 examines views of the moral or behavioural foundations for China’s system of political economy. When we look closely at European debates, it is evident that China was not merely a convenient foreign model but that there was interest in understanding the causes and consequences of its reported avariciousness,

20 Fontanel, Herbert, and Samson, “The Birth of the Political Economy or the Economy in the Heart of Politics: Mercantilism,” 331–8; Montchrestien, Traicté de l’œconomie politique. 21 Steuart, An inquiry into the principles of political oeconomy, 2–3. 22 A French dictionary that repeated this definition is Féraud, Dictionaire critique de la langue française, s.v. “Économie.” Other dictionaries, by contrast, retained the restricted definition of economy as the management of a family; see, for instance, Johnson, A dictionary of the English language, s.v. “Economy.”

28463_Millar.indd 11

2016-12-15 14:01:57

12

A Singular Case

which necessitated an interplay of philosophy and empirical description. Even if potentially destructive to the moral or social fabric of society, the effects of avarice in China were seen to benefit their domestic commerce. Chapter 3 looks at one of the most controversial and shifting themes of early modern political economy, namely, foreign trade policies. China was notorious for restricting international trade. This topic, however, also encouraged self-reflection, since Europe’s own trade practices were considered highly problematic and a hindrance to the China trade. Additionally, Europeans expressed great interest in the unique circumstances that allowed the Middle Kingdom to limit its international trade. Chinese policy, while not generally praised, was largely understood as rational (perhaps even advisable) in its own context. The appreciation of the distinct characteristics of the Middle Kingdom made it difficult to relate it to universal theories. While commerce was a central element of political economy, the next two chapters address the nature of China’s government, an equally important area of concern. Chapter 4 considers the form that China’s government took. Montesquieu famously labelled it an Oriental despotism, but even for the archetypal sinophobe, the unique characteristics of the Chinese Empire (transmitted through first-hand descriptions and popular sources) enabled a level of understanding of its moderate side. China once again challenged the universal theories provided by Enlightenment philosophers. This chapter highlights an important division between philosophers who believed that China’s system of political economy was imitable and others who believed that it was distinct and irreproducible. Chapter 5 looks in more detail at particular areas of Chinese governance, following the duties of government laid out by Adam Smith, namely, defence, justice, public institutions, and taxation policies. While most of the areas were generally held in a favourable light, discussion of China’s military reveals a broad agreement that it was a fundamental weakness of their system of political economy. This is the first topic on which we are confronted with a general consensus about a critical flaw of the Chinese system. But European observers did not stop with a mere dismissal; they sought to understand the origins of the weakness as well as China’s potential to overcome it and it is in this analysis that the consensus dissipated. The final chapter examines views of China’s science and technology, a topic that for some in the eighteenth century had a more tenuous attachment to political economy. However, it was on this subject that the language about Chinese stagnation began to form. There was a remarkable degree of similarity in the negative reports on the state of China’s

28463_Millar.indd 12

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 13

speculative sciences and mechanical arts. Enlightenment observers held a broad consensus that China’s military weakness and stagnation in science and technology were inhibiting its progress. The conclusion of this book builds on the role of “progress” in representations of China as it moved from being described as stable to being assigned the label stationary, most famously by Adam Smith. While European commentators identified faults within the Chinese system, stagnation differed from regression and they did not rule out the possibility for the Chinese ­government to remedy the flaws (although prescriptions on how to do so differed). Approached through these themes, European discourses on China were clearly reflecting (and shaping) debates about Europe’s own past, present, and future – debates that formed a cornerstone of Enlightenment political economy. A potential objection to such a focused study on political economy is that it neglects important cultural dimensions, which are deemed outside the concerns of present-day economics but were inextricably linked to early modern debates. There are, nonetheless, more reasons in favour of focusing on views of political economy. First, in the field of political economy, in contrast to many other fields, writers suffered less from a culturalist or Eurocentric bias – a fact that was even acknowledged by contemporary commentators. Of course, the prejudices associated with viewing non-European nations cannot be so neatly isolated. Historians have not reached a consensus on how to characterize the racialism or racism in the Enlightenment views of non-Europeans.23 Silvia Sebastiani points out that the Chinese moved from being described in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as “whiter than Europeans” to being labelled “yellow” in the eighteenth century.24 For eighteenth-century European writers concerned with taxonomy, notably Carl Linnaeus, these shifts in  categorization are important – indeed, modern racial discourse emerged in this period. For the writers of interest here, the language of race simply does not appear in the assessment of China’s political economy. This book follows the work of Colin Kidd who argues that early modern Europeans were more concerned with “pagan Otherness” than “racial Otherness.”25 I believe this was particularly true of the Chinese case. There was significant discussion of China’s non-Christian status in explaining various aspects of its political economy, since this differentiating factor played an important role in shaping the cultural prejudices 23 For a helpful historiography of race and the Enlightenment, see Sebastiani, The Scottish Enlightenment, “Introduction.” 24 Ibid., 14. 25 Kidd, The Forging of Races, 73.

28463_Millar.indd 13

2016-12-15 14:01:57

14

A Singular Case

embedded in early modern encounters with China. Of course, a good deal of the information reported about China came from the Jesuits who had a directly religious agenda. This study addresses topics related to religion at the particular moments when they were most relevant to the subject of political economy. For example, Confucianism was an important force in Chinese government and education. To be sure, some travellers such as Admiral George Anson approached the world with a sense of innate European (or English) superiority. Whether these assumptions were religious, racial, or cultural in origin is less clear but Anson’s prejudices were as evident then as they are now. While religious, cultural, and perhaps racial prejudice undoubtedly influenced descriptions of China, assumptions about European superiority were slower to form in the realm of Chinese political economy than in others. Second, topics of political economy – particularly international trade, the role of government in society, and the increase of science and technology – were all gaining in importance throughout the eighteenth century. We can see the growth of this interest through Joan-Pau Rubiés’s discussion of the relationship between the “two distinct languages of human classification”: Christianity and civilization. The language of ­ Christianity created a “hierarchical classification of non-Europeans according to primarily moral traits, and to the perception of failure or success of the religious enterprise.”26 With the rise of the study of civilization throughout the eighteenth century, other factors beyond religion and morality became increasingly important. In particular, topics of political economy began to be used in the new hierarchical classifications of the non-European world. Unlike the language of Christianity, there was not (yet) an established norm for assessing political economy. If not expressing relativism, European authors at least avoided complete Eurocentrism, recognizing that the analysis of China required some attempts at reciprocal comparison (where both units being compared are considered departures from each other).27 Chinese deviations from European expectations were not normatively worse than European deviations from Chinese (and even European) expectations. We will see this clearly on the topic of international trade.

26 Rubiés, “Introduction: Interaction and Discourse in the Expansion of Europe,” 7. 27 Reciprocal comparison is an approach the California School has only more recently brought into the current debates on the divergence between early modern Europe and China. For more on the concept, see Austin, “Reciprocal Comparison and African History.”

28463_Millar.indd 14

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 15

Political Economy and Shifting M e ta - N a r r at i v e s Most studies of early modern European views of China have analyzed a shift from sinophilia (a strong admiration for China) to sinophobia (an aversion toward China).28 This dichotomy is not only a construction of modern historians but was also discussed at the time. For example, the English translator of Jean Baptiste Grosier’s updated version of Jean Baptiste Du Halde’s description of China openly discussed the conflicting views of China in 1788. He observed, “the learned seem to differ widely in their ideas respecting [the Chinese]. By some they have been extolled as the wisest and most enlightened of mankind; while others, perhaps equally, if not more remote from the truth, have exhibited them in the most contemptible point of view, and represented them as a despicable people, deceitful, ignorant, and superstitious, and destitute of ­every principle of human justice.”29 The pertinent question for our purposes is what, if any, value does focusing on this dichotomy during the Enlightenment add? One possible answer is the clarity it can provide in identifying bias. The first-hand sources of information about China have been deemed representative of one of these two categories, with the Jesuit missionaries seen as sinophiles and other compilers of first-hand information, such as non-Jesuit missionaries, merchants, and emissaries, labelled sinophobes. Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu and Voltaire have also be assigned positions at the opposing ends of this spectrum, with the former labelled a sinophobe and the latter a sinophile. Some historians have attempted broader categorizations of views of China along social or class lines.30 Others have taken a national approach, suggesting that intellectual interest in China survived longer in France than England.31 However, as this study demonstrates, on the topic of political economy 28 For instance, referring to Enlightenment discussion of China’s morality and political system, David Mungello claims, “there was a tension throughout the Enlightenment between sinophilia and sinophobia.” Mungello, The Great Encounter, 125. 29 Anonymous, “Translator’s Preface,” in A general description of China, ed. Jean-Baptist Grosier, iv. The French edition was published between 1777 and 1783. 30 Longxi Zhang argues that “average people in the market” admired China for its material products, and that afterward the philosophers of the Enlightenment came to admire the Confucian system of Chinese civilization. Zhang, “The Myth of the Other,” 118. 31 Reichwein, China and Europe, 151; Zhongshu, “China in the English Literature of the Eighteenth Century,” 166; Lottes, “China in European Political Thought, 1750–1850,” 71; Boxer, “Some Aspects of Western Historical Writing on the Far East, 1500–1800,” 313; Shouyi, “Daniel Defoe, China’s Severe Critic,” 297.

28463_Millar.indd 15

2016-12-15 14:01:57

16

A Singular Case

these simplified distinctions fall short. Even within the works of the ostensibly “sinophile” philosophers or travellers, we find dramatic variation in assessments. The lines can be neither simply nor clearly drawn during the Enlightenment. There is considerable disagreement on the timing of the shift from a predominantly sinophile Europe to the rise of sinophobes during the latter part of the Enlightenment.32 Several historians have identified 1760 as the year when sinophilia reached its apogee because it marks the publication of Voltaire’s sinophile approach to China in Essai sur les moeurs, as well as Oliver Goldsmith’s sinophile Chinese Letters in The Public Ledger.33 John Hobson dates the shift to sinophobia in 1780, despite noting a number of inconsistencies with such a dating.34 Indeed, most authors have qualified their arguments with the claim that the shift was not complete. While adding analytical value from a long-term perspective, the disagreements about the nature, timing, and causes of the shift in views of China suggest that the rigid juxtaposition of sinophilia and sinophobia is not always useful. When examining the particular area of political economy, categorizing one work (or decade), let alone one country, as representative of sinophilia or sinophobia is counterproductive. Indeed, posing such a sharp dichotomy serves to conceal significant instances of consensus in writings on China and neglects elements in contemporary debate that do not fit comfortably into the sinophiliasinophobia framework. Rather than study views of China through the paradigm of admiration or disdain, it is more useful to focus on a particular topic and examine the complex relationship between the provision of first-hand information and the reordering of that information into theories that sought to explain the world – a characteristically Enlightenment project. Yet, it is undisputable that, as Gregory Blue acknowledges, “a change in the balance of opinion” occurred between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries.35 There is considerable disagreement on the causes of the shift from a predominantly sinophile Europe to the rise  of sinophobia. Some point to art-historical explanations and the

32 Authors such as Mungello, The Great Encounter; Mackerras, Western Images of China; and Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing are examples of recent scholarship that address the evolution of the relationship between China and Europe over many centuries. 33 Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin, 288; Reichwein, China and Europe, 22; Chen Shouyi argues that this year marked “the culmination of English interest in Chinese culture and things Chinese.” Shouyi, “Oliver Goldsmith and His Chinese Letters,” 283. 34 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization, 197. 35 Blue, “China and Western Social Thought,” 71.

28463_Millar.indd 16

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 17

mercurial nature of fashion that led to the unpopularity of chinoiserie, while others look to the rise of more negative descriptions stemming from the increase in non-Jesuit traveller accounts over the second half of the eighteenth century.36 Explanations based on the material and economic changes of the early modern period are the most prominent. For example, Guy argues that the shift to sinophobia was connected to “the prodigious progress of European civilization”; the start of the Industrial Revolution; and the era of steam, natural science, commerce, and invention as well as moral science. As economic historians have discovered, however, dating the Industrial Revolution and assessing when it began to have a broader impact on British and other European societies is highly contentious. The current debate in global economic history between the “Eurocentrists” and “revisionists” captures the disagreement about the nature of China’s political economy and its position relative to Europe in the eighteenth century. Fernand Braudel, Eric L. Jones, and David Landes have all been accused of Eurocentrism because they argue that Europe had the preconditions for modern economic growth well before the eighteenth century.37 Others, such as Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin, have written revisionist histories that argue for the proper recognition of the wealth of China relative to Europe until around 1800.38 A decisive moment in early modern global economic history came with the publication of Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence in 2000. He reignited an empirically grounded, revisionist wave of research into the comparative economic history of early modern China and Europe and sparked great debates in the field. More recently, revisionist claims are being challenged and refined. In 2011, Pomeranz accepted that the divergence was earlier than 1800, saying he “probably did overstate the lateness and suddenness of the divergence.”39 Pomeranz argues that claims of income per person parity may still apply for 1750 and probably for 36 For the art-historical explanations, see Wright, “The Study of Chinese Civilization”; and Reichwein, China and Europe, 16. For explanations based on changes in the available information, see Guy, The French Image of China, 12; Lottes, “China in European Political Thought,” 66; and Jones, The Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought, 11. Blue, by contrast, regards both these explanations as too vague; Blue, “China and Western Social Thought,” 70–2. 37 Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century, vol. 3; E. Jones, The European Miracle; and Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. The latter two stand accused of Eurocentrism in Blaut, Eight Eurocentric Historians. 38 Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age; Amin, Eurocentrism; Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. 39 Pomeranz, “Ten Years After: Responses and Reconsiderations,” 24.

28463_Millar.indd 17

2016-12-15 14:01:57

18

A Singular Case

1700, noting that “even parity at 1700 is very different” from 1500.40 Others, like Robert Allen, maintain that a wage divergence occurred sometime in the seventeenth century.41 R. Bin Wong and Laurent ­Rosenthal argue that the most precise conclusion is that “sometime between 1450 and 1800 per capita income came to be higher in Europe than China.”42 The timing of the divergence remains hotly contested. Peter Coclanis criticized Pomeranz for not paying attention to “institutions, political-governmental, military, technological, and cultural developments that did in fact distinguish England’s path” before 1750.43 Pomeranz acknowledged the weakness of his treatment of science and technology (as well as important smaller nuances like the rate of urbanization). Since then, Joel Mokyr, Deirdre McCloskey, and Patrick O’Brien have highlighted some of the key issues around the differences in science and technology from a supply-side perspective, concentrating on cultural openness to innovation. Robert Allen, as well as Wong and Rosenthal, considers science and technology from a more traditional economics perspective, focusing on the demand side and relative factor prices (cheaper capital and more expensive labour) resulting from ­European war making and political fragmentation. While Wong and Rosenthal are part of the revisionist California School, they look at the “different circumstances” of Europe and China, arguing they are “not simply natural and geographic … but rather are produced socially and politically under diverse ecological and environmental conditions across both China and Europe.”44 They point out that “to observe that institutions are different does not necessarily mean that one set is always better than another.”45 This is a useful observation and falls more in line with Enlightenment thinking than recent economic theorizing. Economic historians can learn from early modern views of China’s economy although there are important differences between Enlightenment and current approaches. Most importantly, the work (conflicting as it may sometimes be) of economic historians over the past fifty years has dramatically refined our knowledge of China’s political economy in the early modern period.46 Debates today are grounded in evidentiary

40 Ibid. 41 Allen, “Agricultural Productivity,” 548–9. 42 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 230. 43 Coclanis, “Assessing Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: A Forum,” 12. 44 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 7. 45 Ibid., 8. 46 For more on the developments in the field of early modern Chinese economic history, see Deng, “A Critical Survey of Recent Research in Chinese Economic History.”

28463_Millar.indd 18

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 19

disputes to a greater extent than those of early modern thinkers who often had to rely on the same sources of information. Modern economic historians are also much more aware of geography. A key component of the recent debate is questioning which precise units are being compared (i.e., focusing on the Yangtze Delta vs England or China vs Western Europe, etc.). While Pomeranz has been criticized for not always holding firm to his units of comparison, during the Enlightenment the units of analysis were even more flexible. Reliable evidence was hard to come by and pieces of information were often circulated through sources; that is, what seemed like an observation about one particular place or time was actually taken from another region or period. As Pomeranz points out, it was a “messy era.” Modern assumptions about how an economy functions do not necessarily apply, and while there were “early signs of a world of unprecedented prosperity,” there was no guarantee. Pomeranz has called for a questioning of the inevitability of the Industrial Revolution; he has asked us to view the era without the lens of knowing what came after. Enlightenment thinkers had the benefit of not being anachronistic. While progress was a key Enlightenment idea, there were certainly no assumptions about England or Europe’s economic ascendancy, “nor did anyone at the time see such a world emerging.”47 Nonetheless, there are also some interesting parallels in how thinkers approached and still approach understanding Ming and Qing China’s political economy. For example, much of the recent debate centres on the difference between identifying “levels” and “trends” in Chinese economic development.48 In other words, China might have been incredibly wealthy in 1750 but in which direction was it heading? Similarly, Enlightenment thinkers debated the merits of a particular snapshot of China’s political economy relative to assessing it over a period of time (especially on the subject of science and technology). Jan de Vries, in his critique of Pomeranz, points to another similarity, namely, that of creating “equivalences” in reciprocal comparison. He accuses Pomeranz of casually assigning equivalences in areas like energy efficiency technologies, when in reality they were “simply two different things.”49 Enlightenment thinkers also struggled with this. When assessing China, many areas were just plainly distinct, and who was to determine what the implications of those differences were. This was especially true for assessing the form of its government, as we will see in chapter 4. As in economic history, advances in Chinese imperial and scientific history can also contribute to 47 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 24. 48 Allen, “Agricultural Productivity,” 529. 49 de Vries, “The Great Divergence after Ten Years,” 14.

28463_Millar.indd 19

2016-12-15 14:01:57

20

A Singular Case

understanding early modern European interactions with and views of the Middle Kingdom. As we see in chapter 3 when we discuss the myth of  Chinese isolation, the work by Peter Perdue and Laura Hostetler on  Qing colonial expansion provides an important framework for understanding the early modern context. Similarly, the work of Benjamin Elman on Chinese science and technology is useful for framing Chinese science in chapter 6. The focus of this book, however, is firmly grounded in understanding how Europeans, at a time of the formation of the social sciences, understood and learned from China’s political economy, rather than to directly contribute to understanding China’s economic, imperial, or scientific history. The debate on the merits of the revisionist arguments continues, but over the past decade it has become clear that the divergence between Western Europe and China was neither as certain nor as complete in the eighteenth century as previously assumed. Even if a precise date for the economic divergence could be set in the eighteenth century, it is unlikely that contemporaries would have recognized the moment of change. If, as Guy claims, the shift toward sinophobia – or European assumptions of their civilizational superiority – was a result of the “Rise of the West,” then this shift must have occurred more slowly over the course of the nineteenth century.50 Michael Adas has attempted a closer examination of how material culture, understood through science and technology, increasingly shaped European perceptions of non-Western people. He attributes the dismissal of China’s political economy to the rise of commerce and manufacturing in Western Europe.51 Yet, as Adas himself acknowledges, Europeans from the beginning of the Jesuit mission in China in the sixteenth century were critical of Chinese science, which draws into question its explanatory capacity for a shift in European perceptions from sinophilia to sinophobia in the second half of the eighteenth century. He also neglects the importance of military weakness in assessments of China’s political economy. Military strength was related to advances in science and technology, but most European commentators discussed the areas separately since the former was, in the early modern world, seen as more closely connected to protecting material advancement. Other historians have taken a macro-structural approach to connecting broad material change with shifting European views of China. HoFung Hung describes a general shift in the global economic balance that

50 Guy, The French Image of China, 453; McNeill, The Rise of the West. 51 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 93.

28463_Millar.indd 20

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 21

led to a decline in the estimation of China.52 Gregory Blue and Joanna Waley-Cohen consider a combination of more specific changes in their respective writings, both arguing that the decline of the Jesuit mission, the forces of industrialization, the growing disenchantment with China by European merchants, and the rise of political liberty all contributed to the devaluation of China in European eyes.53 Jeng-Guo S. Chen proposes that class consciousness explains the wellknown shift in British views of China from “one of admiration to contempt in the last decade of the eighteenth century.”54 Although the sources that Chen examines fall outside the purview of this book (focusing on texts published after Smith’s Wealth of Nations), it is nevertheless useful to engage with his argument. He maintains there was a shift around the close of the eighteenth century from focusing on stagnation to analyzing Chinese social stratification. Unfortunately, even though he acknowledges that the Jesuits did not paint China as a utopian land, he does not recognize the heterogeneity in earlier seventeenth- and ­eighteenth-century accounts. He highlights the Jesuits’ praise of Chinese agriculture and civic morality, and its tolerance and tranquility due to its “all powerful patriarchy.” He accepts that the Jesuits criticized Chinese science but argues that the criticism was compensated for by praise of its technology (he entirely neglects to point out the strong condemnations of its military defence). Chen argues that at the close of the eighteenth century, George Staunton (who was Macartney’s secretary and published his diaries about the 1792 mission in 1797 as An Authentic Account of an Embassy to China) and John Barrow (who published his description of the embassy in his 1804 Travels in China) criticized China’s military and the low level of their science and literature. By the turn of the nineteenth century, new descriptions of China “gave the British reader an Oriental land that was much more vivid, differentiated, and realistic than that of the Jesuits’ accounts”;55 of course, China was also dramatically different by this time. For example, Chen argues that early nineteenth-century observers saw “social conditions as the measure of civil society,” and lambasted the Chinese division of labour where women engaged in heavy manual labour.56 Robert Allen has argued that female real wages were likely higher than their English counterparts in the mid-seventeenth 52 Hung, “Orientalist Knowledge and Social Theories.” 53 See Blue, “China and Western Social Thought,” 70–6; and Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing, 128. 54 Chen, “The British View of Chinese Civilization,” 193. 55 Ibid., 197. 56 Ibid., 200.

28463_Millar.indd 21

2016-12-15 14:01:57

22

A Singular Case

century but fell steadily into the early nineteenth century.57 Chinese r­eality shifted dramatically from the close of the seventeenth century, when Louis Le Comte was there, to the arrival of the Macartney embassy in the 1790s. Chen attributes this shift in views on China to a heightened emphasis on class structure (due to the French and Industrial Revolutions), in particular China’s lack of a middle class and the poor social conditions of the lower classes and women. According to Chen, Marco Polo and Enlightenment philosophers focused on “high culture” but by the early nineteenth century, European thinkers were looking to the problems of Chinese society (i.e., lack of liberty, absence of a middle class, suppression of lower class, etc.).58 He also argues that over this time “the genre of representing Chinese society shifted paradigmatically from imaginative literature, such as Citizen of the World by Oliver Goldsmith, to ‘realistic’ observatory accounts.”59 This claim is difficult to substantiate; as we see throughout this book, there were active attempts to provide realistic, not just rhetorical, descriptions of China during the Enlightenment. Although Chen offers an interesting take on the shift toward a more critical view of China, he fails to acknowledge the actual changes in China over this time period and to understand the earlier attempts to realistically assess the merits and flaws of China’s system of political economy. Until more recently few historians who study European images of the Far East have tried to directly connect the implications of recent findings in economic and Chinese history to images of China’s political economy in the eighteenth century.60 In the past decade, literary and cultural studies approaches have highlighted the ambivalence over ­European views of China. Robert Markley has analyzed a growing body of scholarship on English literary culture that is rethinking a Euro­ centric Enlightenment.61 The scholars in this field all acknowledge the

57 Allen, “Agricultural Productivity,” 546. 58 Chen, “The British View of Chinese Civilization,” 203. 59 Ibid. 60 Louis Dermigny addressed early modern European views of China in the context of the economic history of the Canton trade. He argues that the idealized image of the Jesuits was gradually supplanted by the disillusioning commercial realities described by traders. Dermigny, La Chine et l’Occident. Ros Ballaster gives credence to the place of revisionist economic history in the analysis of fictions of the East and also points to the insecurity of the European narrator in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; Ballaster, Fabulous Orients, 6. Gregory Blue and Timothy Brook, “Introduction,” in Brook and Blue, China and Historical Capitalism, likewise anticipated the importance of revisionist global economic history in analyzing views of China. 61 Markley, “China and the English Enlightenment.”

28463_Millar.indd 22

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 23

important work of revisionist economic historians in helping to contextualize early modern accounts of China. For Markley, this work helps demonstrate that seventeenth-century English writers did not assume the ­supremacy of Europe. On the contrary, he sees in travel narratives, diplomatic correspondence, and geographies a “compensatory rhetoric” for what was feared to be Europe’s marginalization within an Asian-dominated world economy. Markley brings the nuances and insecurity of European voices to the fore: “If, as Frank and Pomeranz argue, there is no empirical evidence for the technological superiority and economic domination by western Europe before 1800, then seventeenth-century texts do not foreshadow an inevitable rise of modern notions of history, economics, and social theory, but register instead complex and often competing assessments of European relations with the Far East.”62 This book agrees with Markley’s general sentiment but, as we have seen, Pomeranz has had to respond to valid critiques of the Great Divergence by acknowledging that the divergence likely occurred earlier and that his analysis of science and technology was weak. Even in the Great Divergence, he accepted that Europeans had a “unique level of technological sophistication before 1800.”63 These nuances, as we will see, are important when using economic history to inform our understanding of early modern encounters. Discussions of Chinese technology differed dramatically from discussions of its commercial activity or taxation policies. These cross-disciplinary interactions are essential but economic, cultural, and intellectual history must inform one another carefully. David Porter is another example of a literary historian who takes advances in economic history into consideration. In The Chinese Taste, he describes the importance of pushing back against European diffusionism, where modernity is solely a European phenomenon. This has led to unfortunate anachronisms that project Western dominance back onto earlier periods.64 By now, the story of China’s re-emergence as a global power is well known. Porter’s study, he argues, is especially relevant because it coincides with China reclaiming “a cultural status and prestige” it last enjoyed in the eighteenth century. This is undoubtedly true, but we know China’s re-emergence has been driven by economics, and its model of political economy, then and now, diverges from many assumptions (or prescriptions) of the Western canon. Understanding China’s place in the history of Western economic thought, in a time when

62 Markley, “Riches, Power, Trade and Religion,” 496–7. 63 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 46; Pomeranz, “Ten Years After: Responses and Reconsiderations,” 21. 64 Porter, The Chinese Taste, 4.

28463_Millar.indd 23

2016-12-15 14:01:57

24

A Singular Case

economics was forming as a discipline, holds great relevance for re-­ evaluating this story. Certainly these changes within both Europe and China affected views in the long term. Yet in order to understand the role China played in Enlightenment theories of political economy, we must momentarily turn away from the longue durée. While acknowledging a shift in English attitudes toward China, Porter notes that there has still been a level of discomfort based on England’s much later status as a global power. Consequently, English responses to China are complex and reflect a “profound ambivalence.”65 Ambivalence is the most useful way to understand the Enlightenment engagement with China in terms of political economy. How we understand this ambivalence and its role in shaping ideas needs to be further explored. For example, Porter describes Thomas Percy’s relationship to China as presented in his writings. Percy finds in China “a model that is at once inspiring and unsettling.”66 While much of this ambivalence was derived from China’s unique history, it was also shaped by the tensions of using any real world case as an Enlightenment model. Ultimately, many Enlightenment thinkers determined that China could not be used as a model; it was simply too unique to transfer to a European context. Often ambivalence toward China was confronted directly in a struggle to make sense of the Middle Kingdom and its place in emerging theories of political and economic organization. Chi-Ming Yang, who also comes from the revisionist English literature perspective focusing on eighteenth-century Britain and China, discusses the use of China as an example to early modern European audiences. Yang argues, “to consider the heuristic force of an example is therefore also to consider its subtle negotiation of particular and universal: we value examples for the specificity and novelty, even as they must be severed from their original context and rendered generic in order to fulfill their communicative end.”67 While the present book uses the language of China as a “case” rather than an “example,” the message is similar. Not only must we recognize the tension between the “actual” and the “representation” (discussed below) but we must also consider the tension between the “particular and universal” associated with the use of any case. More broadly, Yang’s approach focuses on China as a performance rather than a representation. China was used as an example based on taking into consideration the audience and the desired message. This book 65 Ibid., 7. 66 Ibid., 155. 67 Yang, Performing China, 16.

28463_Millar.indd 24

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 25

agrees with Yang’s view but also allows space for a more genuine grappling with understanding China in the early modern period. Yang follows the work of Robert Markley who, she notes, dismisses the Eurocentrism of postcolonial studies and sees China as an “exemplary exception to a reductive colonizer/colonized paradigm that overstates European dominance.”68 She too usefully modifies postcolonial theory as applied to the Enlightenment era and employs the term “early modern orientalism” to describe “a structure of ambivalence resulting from the desire for East Indies markets and the encounter with their superior moral and economic example.”69 Similarly, Eugenia Zuroski Jenkins focuses on the genealogy of nineteenth-century orientalism and subjectivity. Jenkins argues that the shift in thinking about China was not one from positive to negative “but rather the chiasmatic movement of a figure that always had two valences.”70 Interested in how “Chinese things” in particular shaped English identity, Jenkins is not concerned with the circulation of information on particular aspects of Chinese social, political, and economic organization. Because she does not address the wider circulation of popular works, there are important differences in some of our findings. For example, as we see in chapter 3, Jenkins repeats simplistic versions of European writings on Chinese isolation. These authors all complicate the over-simplified sinophilia/sinophobia of a previous generation of research by scholars such as Colin Mackerras. Instead, this more recent scholarship highlights the ambivalence toward China throughout the eighteenth century. A Singular Case makes a similar argument. By looking at the transmission of ideas on political economy, it examines a particular stream of ambivalence to identify specific characteristics that were praised and criticized across a diversity of views. Although this book builds on this rising body of literature, it also differs from many of these works, which in general follow a deep reading of a select number of important English texts. Instead, this book focuses on a circulation of ideas and knowledge among popular early modern thinkers and travellers in both France and Britain. Also, by focusing specifically on the theme of political economy, it allows us to see the nuances in the debates and information about this advanced alternative system. As revisionist economic history has shown, progress happened slowly and the Enlightenment occupied a moment of transition when Europe’s future global dominance was not assured (in sharp contrast with 68 Ibid., 24. 69 Ibid., 25. 70 Jenkins, A Taste for China, 13.

28463_Millar.indd 25

2016-12-15 14:01:57

26

A Singular Case

confrontations that followed in the nineteenth century). It was an era when many European authors were interested in other civilizations’ answers to the questions they asked about political and economic organization. In fact, many Europeans, who struggled with cultural relativism (particularly as related to religion), expressed a degree of openness to  understanding the different Chinese system of political economy. Of course, China’s political economy was translated into a European framework – the Europeans were still posing the questions and not asking Chinese questions about political economy. Nonetheless, as George Rousseau and Roy Porter claim in their study of exoticism in the Enlightenment, “there was a moment of equilibrium in the eighteenth century.” The balance between Asia and Europe was reflected in Enlightenment thinkers who were “able to confront other cultures … at least as alternative versions of living.”71 This observation holds especially true when it comes to the theme of political economy. Faithful Witnesses Increasingly, historians acknowledge that empirical descriptions of foreign lands played an important role in Enlightenment thought. In projects seeking to discover the anthropological side of the Enlightenment, the focus has been on discourses that place “people in their own social and cultural contexts.”72 Of course these elements were extremely important, but we should also add the context of political economy to Enlightenment anthropology. By examining European perceptions of China’s political economy we can see how the existence of diverse systems and foreign economic contexts were crucial to emerging debates on political economy. Perceptions – defined here as the ways in which a particular subject is represented, understood, and made sense of – necessitate addressing the difficult question of the relationship between the reality and the idea. Henri Baudet articulates the division between the real and the imagined in the context of views Europeans held of non-Europeans: “There was, on the one hand, the actual physical outside world which could be put to political, economic, and strategic use; there was also the outside world onto which all identification and interpretation, all dissatisfaction and desire, all nostalgia and idealism seeking expression could be projected.”73 The friction between these two realms of reality 71 Rousseau and Porter, “Introduction,” 9. 72 See, for example, Wolff and Cipolloni, eds, The Anthropology of the Enlightenment. 73 Baudet, Paradise on Earth, 55.

28463_Millar.indd 26

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 27

and imaginary, of fact and fiction, points to a potential epistemological conflict for thinkers of the time (one could point to a similar conflict in modern economics).74 This tension is especially relevant to images of China in Europe since China was less familiar than other parts of the non-European world such as India. Historians have addressed this tension predominantly in two ways: the first posits that Chinese realities are irrelevant to any discussion of its image in Europe, while the second claims that that reality is pertinent but is ambiguous about the extent. Günther Lottes takes the most sweeping approach, claiming that Europeans took very little notice of Chinese realities.75 Walter Davis argues that for most writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, particularly those of France, “praise of some distant Utopia remained merely an instrument of social criticism … without running afoul of the censors.”76 Most historians will acknowledge that there were individuals who did care about the authenticity of their information, others who ignored inconvenient aspects of it, and still others who used China as a narrative tool when discussing topics considered controversial in Europe. For example, Gregory Blue argues that some philosophes were less interested in the actual China and uses the example of Montesquieu who partly ignored certain well-known characteristics of the Middle Kingdom, such as the imperial civil service, in order to make China fit his model.77 The category of “proto-Sinologists,” of which Leibniz was an early example, was a small minority in early modern Europe.78 However, there was a middle ground between those who discussed China for rhetorical purposes and proto-Sinologists. A large group of travellers, geographers, and philosophers united their own agendas with a concern for empirical observations. A scientific spirit did not always guide this concern with empiricism. Trying to incorporate the latest, most authoritative information was also an intellectual survival strategy as authors were consistently attacking each other’s sources and claims about China. Empirical descriptions of the Middle Kingdom circulated widely and specific pieces of information were actively challenged. China was not only a rhetorical

74 Rubiés, “Introduction,” 2; Rubiés asks this question in analyzing the relevance of new empirical reports from travel literature to the views of European “armchair cosmographers.” 75 Lottes, “China in European Political Thought,” 94n1. 76 Davis, “China, The Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment,” 523. 77 Blue, “China and Western Social Thought,” 89. 78 See Mungello, Curious Land.

28463_Millar.indd 27

2016-12-15 14:01:57

28

A Singular Case

tool that philosophers could use for their own intellectual agendas. As we will see in later chapters, when China did not fit into a theoretical model, such as that of Montesquieu’s Oriental despotism, particular “facts”79 were confronted directly. In many cases there was a tension for these thinkers between their universal theories and the uniqueness of the Chinese system as an immense, ancient, self-sufficient, agricultural civilization. But more often than not, on the subject of political economy, this tension was confronted rather than ignored. While Enlightenment philosophers, geographers, and the first-hand sources of information on China clearly had their own agendas, many actively sought (or were forced, due to the nature of Enlightenment debates) to understand the Chinese system. As Joan-Pau Rubiés has argued, the “intense interaction between direct observation and conceptual development is the key to the emergence of an early-modern discourse on non-Europeans.”80 This interaction is equally important to the development of the discourse of political economy. It is true that some scholars and geographers ignored China, preferring not to address the issues it raised.81 We can never fully recover the intention of those who wrote or neglected to write about China; however, by attending to circulation of knowledge, it is possible to identify instances of emphasis and omission in the texts, of contested “facts,” and of China’s relationship to early theories of political economy. Adam Smith serves as a good example of an Enlightenment thinker who balanced theory and ethnography. Smith, like many of his contemporaries, was skeptical about the quality of information available on China. When addressing the supposedly sophisticated level of China’s public works in The Wealth of Nations, he claimed, “The accounts of those works, however, which have been transmitted to Europe, have generally been drawn up by weak and wondering travellers; frequently by stupid and lying missionaries.” He continued, “If they had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if the accounts of them had been reported by  more faithful witnesses, they would not, perhaps appear to be so

79 Defined as “pieces of knowledge,” facts are understood as that which was perceived as a fact by the groups being studied. For more on this approach, see Howlett and Morgan, eds, How Well Do Facts Travel? 80 Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism,” 113. 81 Bossuet’s Discourse on Universal History famously did not include China as part of its universal geography (this will be discussed in chapter 2). Rousseau ignored China or  preferred not to address the issue of China where civilization and virtue were both reported. See Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire, 32; Lottes, “China in European Political Thought,” 79.

28463_Millar.indd 28

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 29

wonderful.”82 While dismissing missionaries as unfaithful was seemingly ironic, Smith argued their faith was not directed to their roles as witnesses but instead aimed at their religious agenda. During the eighteenth century, it was easy to challenge what was witnessed by accusing the observer of intentional falsehoods or inadvertent bias; Smith admitted the latter might explain the Jesuit (mis)information. The nature of the Jesuit travels in China, he contended, led to skewed observations. As was the case in France, Smith hypothesized that the Chinese maintained only the canals and roads that were “likely to be the subject of conversation at the court and in the capital,” while “all the rest [were] neglected.” Thus even if the Jesuits were acting as faithful witnesses, their particular experiences influenced the nature of their information, which attentive European observers had to consider in their assessments. This leads us to another aspect of witnessing relevant to these debates. Mary Campbell contends that travel writers gained their authority from actual observation. Studying the pre-seventeenth-century genre in particular, she argues, “The travel book is a kind of witness. Neither power nor talent gives a travel writer his or her authority, which comes only and crucially from experience.”83 Yet how important was experience to being a witness in the eighteenth century? In fact, as we will see, authority was not associated only with experience. Authors (whether travellers confined to the Chinese coast or those who never left Europe) also gained credibility and authority to assess and create “facts” on China through detailed explications of their sources. These authors were witnesses in that they attested to “facts” and provided evidence on China. In this way multiple views were incorporated into a single account, which also served to distance the account from the bias of an individual experience. This extended beyond the first-hand descriptions into the genres of geographies and philosophical works, which in their roles as circulators of knowledge on China also acted as witnesses, claiming their authority from the variety of sources that they consulted. But were the geographers and philosophers faithful witnesses to the knowledge they had access to? Turning back to Smith’s description of China’s public works, we can see that in this instance he was faithful to the evidence that was available. In spite of his skepticism about the veracity of the Jesuit information, he proceeded to offer an explanation for why the public works were, in fact, superior in China. Although he questioned the evidence on China, he still chose to engage with it because

82 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 925. 83 Campbell, The Witness and the Other World, 3.

28463_Millar.indd 29

2016-12-15 14:01:57

30

A Singular Case

there was a consistent and general agreement in a wide body of sources that Chinese public works were advanced. While there were a wide variety of approaches to empirical knowledge in these works, in general, eighteenth-century observers regarded China as an advanced civilization that could yield information on the merits and hazards of its particular system. Direct accounts about China were not motivated solely by their authors’ desire to further their own individual agendas, nor did European philosophers who discussed these accounts do so only to veil criticism of their own governments. Europeans interested in China often displayed an active desire to understand how aspects of China’s political economy could be reconciled with – and even used to improve – their own theories on the fundamental principles of  organizing a state. China was at times used as a rhetorical tool for European self-evaluation (such as when considering views of economic culture). Additionally, the interest in China’s political economy did not always manifest itself in admiration (notably on the topics of the military and science). However, in many instances (such as on taxation policies) it was seen to offer valuable lessons for the ongoing project of remodelling of European political and economic organization. At other times, such as when discussing foreign trade policy or the form of government, China’s political economy was considered essentially incommensurable; because its history, geography, and culture were thought to be unique, it was deemed impossible to derive any lessons applicable to a European setting. In other words, China was often dismissed as a useful model because it was regarded as a sui generis case that could not be worked into the universal theories of political economy typical of Enlightenment thought. In short, following Blue, the view of the Orient as a passive function, as a set of symbols open to manipulation by changing Western interests, is too simplistic.84 Indeed, China challenged, confirmed, and was made to conform to numerous, divergent Enlightenment theories. Conclusion In his essay Of Civil Liberty (1741), David Hume expressed the lack of certitude in the nascent science of human nature: “I am apt, however, to entertain a suspicion, that the world is still too young to fix many general truths in politics, which will remain true to the latest posterity. We have not as yet had experience of three thousand years; so that not only the art of reasoning is still imperfect in this science, as in all others, but we

84 Blue, “China and Western Social Thought,” 69.

28463_Millar.indd 30

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Introduction 31

even want sufficient materials upon which we can reason.”85 He followed with several examples, including how France’s commercial prowess under Louis XIV disproved the principle that “commerce can never flourish but in a free government.” Knowledge of China’s political economy also challenged many of these “general truths.” Philosophers such as Montesquieu and Quesnay were vehemently attached to their analytical systems; and yet these same philosophers made notable exceptions for the Chinese case. Joyce Oldham Appleby has argued that “The modern transformation of European society has been viewed as a process rather than a series of developments capable of leading to conclusions other than the one actually realized.”86 If we return to the Enlightenment era, we find that thinkers were actively debating the divergent paths that could and should be taken. They showed tremendous flexibility in understanding an alternative model of civilization. Enlightenment observers and thinkers did not just report the state of China’s political economy; they sought to explain the reasons behind China’s policies as well as its potential to change. At times, Europeans saw Chinese behaviour as reflecting impulses of human nature. But more often than not, it was China’s lengthy history, ­ancient culture, or its geography that revealed it to be a unique case. Commentators had varying recommendations for the best way forward, but most prescriptions for China offered a viable way for the Middle Kingdom to retain its status as one of the most advanced civilizations the world had known. In light of recent advances in global economic history that show the economic divergence between Western Europe (particularly Britain and France) and China to have occurred as late as 1800, studying contemporary views of China’s political economy gains new significance. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that Europeans did not possess sweeping assumptions of superiority in their approaches to China. Early modern Europeans have been accused of “writing China out of history” due to the challenge it posed to the idea of European exceptionalism.87 Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, David Porter argues, views of China as a viable alternative to the European model were forgotten. While this process of forgetting certainly occurred over this long time period, for an influential group of Enlightenment philosophers of political economy and popular geographers, the act of forgetting had not yet occurred. In fact, discussions of China as an alternative 85 Hume, “Of Civil Liberty” (1741), in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, 87. 86 Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England, 16. 87 Porter, “Sinicizing Early Modernity,” 305.

28463_Millar.indd 31

2016-12-15 14:01:57

32

A Singular Case

system of political economy were vibrant and nuanced, engaging with empirical descriptions until at least the publication of Smith’s Wealth of Nations in 1776 and forming an essential part of Enlightenment thought. Examining how travellers interpreted the functioning of China’s political economy, how popularizers categorized this knowledge, and how philosophers let it shape their theoretical musings reveals the emergence of a broad consensus on China’s successes and failures. It also points to a tension within Enlightenment political economy that remains to today, namely that universal models lack full explanatory power. In many cases, European observers acknowledged China’s distinct features and did not force it into inflexible theories. For example, ­ Montesquieu, whose analysis of China is mostly discussed in terms of his “Sinophobia,” acknowledged many instances of Chinese exceptionality. As we will see in chapter 4, when discussing severity of penalties, he describes China as more like a republic or monarchy rather than a despotism. Montesquieu described the “singular reasons” for China’s distinct characteristics.88 Indeed, for Montesquieu and many other observers, China was a singular case that could not be replicated in Europe. With the economic return of China beginning in the 1990s, and the concurrent renewed interest in its economic development, we can learn something from the more flexible theories of political economy during the Enlightenment. Modern answers to a central question of economics – why some nations are rich and others are poor – have become increasingly inflexible. For example, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have put forth a popular institutional theory of economic development. In Why Nations Fail (2012), they dismiss China’s long-term growth potential because it does not have “inclusive political institutions.” They go to great pains to prove that China is not an exception to their theory, arguing that its recent economic progress is merely a temporary phenomenon.89 They vehemently stay attached to a theory that must apply universally. By contrast, William Easterly laments this inflexible development thinking and points to China’s recent development as a prime example of the variety of paths to economic success.90 It is indeed important to remember the nascent years of political economy, when observers and thinkers were less dogmatic about what constituted good policy and appreciated a unique Chinese path to increase the wealth of its nation.

88 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 71. Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 89. 89 Acemoglu and Robinson, “China, India and All That.” 90 Easterly, “The Ideology of Development.”

28463_Millar.indd 32

2016-12-15 14:01:57

1

Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age”: Ethnography and Enlightenment Since the world is no longer to be amused with the fabulous relations of travellers and historians, any more than with the dreams of superstition and enthusiasm; an attempt to distinguish truth from fiction, and to discover the certainty of those accounts we have received of distant nations, it is presumed, will not be unacceptable in this discerning age. Thomas Salmon1

By the eighteenth century, discussions of foreign lands grew heated, as Enlightenment scholars and geographers fervently debated the validity and implications of the flood of first-hand descriptions of the wider world. This chapter examines the sources that constructed and recycled information on China’s political economy in Enlightenment Britain and France. It does not add to or repeat the findings of the field of publication history, nor does it expand the cataloguing efforts of Donald Lach and Edwin Van Kley.2 Rather, it contextualizes the sources that are examined in subsequent chapters and explains the ways in which information about China’s political economy travelled in eighteenthcentury Europe. Rather than concentrating on the accuracy of information circulated, this book treats a “fact” as something the community being considered takes to be a “fact.” Facts themselves can be understood as “shared pieces of knowledge that hold the qualities of being autonomous, short, 1 Salmon, Modern History, 1: ix. This quotation is the first line in the introduction to the octavo edition, which was first published in 1724. 2 Feather, “The Commerce of Letters”; Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, vols 1 and 2; Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. 3.

28463_Millar.indd 33

2016-12-15 14:01:57

34

A Singular Case

specific and reliable.”3 Our question then is how did these “facts” on China travel to Europe and within the Enlightenment. Three diverse genres were involved in transmitting information on China during the early modern period: first-hand accounts, geographies and travel compendiums, and philosophical works. Through these sources, pieces of information – some more abstracted from the context of their production than others – travelled across languages, centuries, and theoretical frameworks. Over the duration of the early modern period, some “facts” were refined while others were labelled fiction. In the end, certain pieces of knowledge, in spite of the bias of their origins, remained as reliable knowledge on China. Numerous questions arise about how this information travelled: Who packaged this information for travel and why? Who was it designated for? How did new users or audiences receive, unpack, and use this information? Why was some retained and some discarded? How did personal ideologies and agendas affect the transmission of the information? If, as this book claims, ethnographical descriptions were critical to forming ideas on China’s political economy, then the social, cultural, and intellectual context in which this information travelled is of the utmost importance. Of course, the boundaries between first-hand accounts, geographies, and philosophical texts became blurred as information on China’s political economy travelled over space and time and was translated and analyzed by different authors. Although each genre is treated separately in this chapter, they greatly influenced each other and some individual authors blurred these boundaries considerably. Books such as Guillaume Thomas François Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes do not fit comfortably into a single category since it was both a popular geography and a more erudite philosophical work. More surprising, authors who never left Europe wrote some of the most trusted “first-hand” descriptions of China. The popular first-hand descriptions were written with European audiences in mind and shaped by varying agendas. Additionally, through the process of editing, travel compilations and geographies contorted the first-hand information to suit their audience, agenda, narrative, and/or editorial constraints. Philosophers drew information from the first-hand and geographical sources to shape their theories, and, at times, had to explain popularized “facts” that did not fit their theoretical arguments. Thus the connections between these three genres, consistently overlooked in previous studies, form an integral part of 3 Morgan, “Travelling Facts,” 8. My thinking on this issue was heavily shaped by my involvement in the “How Well Do ‘Facts’ Travel?” research group based in the Department of Economic History in the London School of Economics, from 2006 to 2009.

28463_Millar.indd 34

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 35

understanding any one of them, and we gain a fuller understanding of the information circulating on China’s political economy only when the sources are treated together. “Facts” associated with political economy, although hotly contested and analyzed, travelled surprisingly well. Certainly, first-hand accounts were shaped by political and religious debates in Europe. In general, European writers believed the Jesuits had a sinophile bias while the nonJesuit first-hand sources leaned more toward sinophobia. When assessing the information provided, the geographers and scholars took a stance on which group held the most authority. Even in cases where a source was met with skepticism, the information it contained was frequently circulated. This was particularly the case when it came to the subject of political economy. Contemporary authors perceived the Jesuit missionaries as having less incentive to be deceptive about aspects of China’s political economy, precisely the point made by the anonymous editor of The Chinese Traveller (1772), an English compendium based on Jesuit sources that presented a generally favourable view of China. The editor argued that the Jesuits could be trusted on secular topics: “We have no reason to distrust the fidelity of the [Jesuit missionaries] in their various relations, except where the religion or particular interest of the Jesuit order is concerned.”4 Not all observers were as convinced that Jesuit descriptions of China were observational rather than self-serving. The subject of political economy certainly stood in relation to knowledge of other aspects of China but it was a space that, in general, allowed for a more candid analysis. Many European commentators were able to separate religious dogma from secular interests in their descriptions and assessments of information on China’s political economy. Further, commercial interests actively drove the dissemination of information through, for example, new editions or translations of foreign works. From China to Europe in the Age of Discovery In the early modern world, information travelled from China to Europe through individuals with careers that varied from missionaries to merchants, from military adventurers to emissaries. Before the Age of ­Discovery, descriptions of China (or “Seres” or “Cathay” as it was then known), although limited, generally portrayed an advanced and somewhat mysterious civilization. The most influential medieval European book that revealed the world of Cathay was Marco Polo’s The Description

4 Anonymous, The Chinese Traveller, 1: iv.

28463_Millar.indd 35

2016-12-15 14:01:57

36

A Singular Case

of the World (written with Rustichello of Pisa as Livre des diversité in 1298– 99).5 Polo was clearly impressed by China, providing a description of “Cathay” under Kublai-khan as a large, organized, wealthy, and commercially bustling place. The pre-Age of Discovery approach to the East blended fantastical tales, religious and moral exoticism, self-promotion, and criticism of Western meanness in contrast to Eastern wealth.6 Although some of his information was discredited, Polo remained influential in the eighteenth century. He was defended in the modern part of the Universal History, which argued that while readers presumed much of Polo’s description was exaggerated, “the more they have become acquainted with China, the better they have been satisfied of the faithfulness of that Venetian traveller.”7 Eighteenth-century readers assessed the first-hand accounts and felt confident in their ability to discern fact from fiction, juxtaposing elements of Polo’s account with more recent descriptions in order to analyze change (or lack of change) over time in China. This chronological dimension contributed to the formation of the image of China as a stationary state. By the end of the Middle Ages, many educated Europeans increasingly expressed interest in overseas civilizations; however, it was only with the expansion of the Portuguese sea route to the coast of China in 1514 (when the Portuguese first touched the southern coast of China near Hong Kong) and the rise of the printing press (following the production of the Gutenberg Bible in 1456) that this demand for information on the Far East could be met. In the sixteenth century, Iberian travellers (both secular and religious) provided the most current information on the Chinese Empire.8 These authors represent an important step in the expansion of European knowledge of China. Their accounts were not widely read in the rest of Europe, but they greatly influenced European views of China through the synthesis offered by the Spanish

5 Moule and Pelliot, Marco Polo, 32. John Horace Parry also notes the fourteenth-­ century popularity of the travels of Odoric of Pordenone and even more famous travels of Sir John Mandeville. However, it is Marco Polo’s account that exercised the greatest influence into the early modern period. Parry, The Age of Reconnaissance, 7. 6 Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent, 17. 7 The modern part of an universal history, vols 8, 9. Travel compilers made similar arguments about Polo’s description of Cathay. Derrick, A collection of travels, thro’ various parts of the world, 1: 56–7; Harris (updated by John Campbell), Navigantium atque itinerantium bibliotheca. Or, a complete collection of voyages and travels, 1: 545. 8 Galeote Pereira (a Portuguese trader and soldier), Gaspar da Cruz (a Dominican Friar), and Martín de Rada (a Spanish Augustinian) wrote important accounts of their observations on the customs and government of the Chinese Empire. See Boxer, ed., South China in the Sixteenth Century.

28463_Millar.indd 36

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 37

Augustinian Juan González de Mendoza’s extremely popular Historia de las cosas más notables, ritos y costumbres del gran reyno de la China (1585). Written at the command of Pope Gregory XIII, Mendoza’s description of China was very influential; it was reprinted forty-six times by the end of the sixteenth century, translated into seven European languages, and read by most educated Europeans.9 Mendoza had never been to China (not for lack of trying) and he relied heavily on a mix of published and unpublished information from Galeote Pereira, the missionaries Gaspar da Cruz and Martín de Rada, Jesuit letters, João de Barros, and Chinese books; however, his work offered new (unpublished) information to the European public about China and is therefore labelled a first-hand ­description. As discussed in the introduction, Mary Campbell contends that travel writers only gained their authority from experience, yet the authors of first-hand descriptions could clearly achieve status as authoritative in other ways, such as offering previously unpublished information or even through a detailed explication of their original sources, which is what Mendoza did throughout his description. Mendoza’s Historia was a systematic assessment of the Chinese Empire, covering topics as diverse as geography, customs, religion, moral philosophy, and politics. The Augustinian did not let his religious agenda affect his discussion of secular aspects of China. In spite of Mendoza’s reliance on da Rada’s relatively critical description of China, Charles Boxer argues that Mendoza presented a view of China as an “enviable country” and initiated “what may be termed the ‘China Legend.’”10 Boxer contends that Mendoza instigated the era of sinophilia by starting to idealize the government of China, a project the Jesuits would take up in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Similarly, Donald Lach points out that Mendoza rejected de Rada’s critical attitude and followed Barros, da Cruz, and Bernardino de Escalante’s acclaim of China.11 (Escalante was another Spanish cosmographer who described China based on Barros and da Cruz.) However, once we begin to scrutinize in later chapters exactly what was written on particular subjects such as international trade and economic culture, we find that Mendoza’s description of  9 Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, 1: 744. The French translation was made by Luc de la Porte and was first published in Paris in 1588. Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, lxxxii. 10 Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, xci. 11 Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, 1: 748. Joan-Pau Rubiés points out that in his 1595 edition of Repúblicas del Mundo, the cosmographer Jerónimo  Román openly ­challenged Mendoza’s more positive interpretation of Chinese civilization and offered an  alternative interpretation of the sources, particularly da Rada. See Rubiés, “The Concept of Gentile Civilization in Missionary Discourse and Its European Reception.”

28463_Millar.indd 37

2016-12-15 14:01:57

38

A Singular Case

China was not as one-sided as it may have been on some other subjects (with perhaps the notable exception of science and technology). More importantly, even though he formed different conclusions about the Chinese empire, he still relied heavily on de Rada for particular pieces of information. “Facts” could be divorced from bias or broader theoretical analysis. While a religious authority with a religious agenda commissioned Mendoza’s account, commercial interests drove the transmission of his account to England. Robert Parke’s 1588 English translation of Mendoza’s work demonstrates the demand for information on China in order to encourage overseas trade. Richard Hakluyt commissioned the translation. Hakluyt was an English nationalist convinced of the importance of exploration and trade. The translation was published in a year of war between England and Spain, and there is a marked economic nationalism present in Parke’s introduction. His translation is dedicated to the English explorer Thomas Cavendish who, he hoped, would find a new trade route to Asia. Parke also praised the teenage King Edward VI for his encouragement of trade with the East thirty-five years earlier: “he went about the discoverie of Cathaia and China, partly of desire that the good young king had to enlarge the Christian faith, and partlie to finde out some where in those regions ample vent of the cloth of England.”12 Although Parke lists both religion and trade as motivations for expanding information on China, the rest of his dedication concentrates solely on trade. He attributed his decision to translate Mendoza’s work into English to the need for a better understanding of “the intelligence of the governement of the countrie and of the commodities of the territories and provinces.”13 From the travels of the merchant Marco Polo to the English translation of Mendoza, interest in political economy encouraged the transmission of information about China. The Many Roles of the Jesuits Beginning in the seventeenth century, Jesuit missionaries provided the most detailed information about the Chinese Empire. They have simultaneously been viewed as sinophiles, expressing excessive admiration for the Middle Kingdom, and as ethnographers, providing the proto-sinologists (or acting as proto-sinologists themselves) with the “intellectual foundations” for their studies of China.14 The key question here is to 12 Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, 2. 13 Ibid., 4. 14 Mungello, Curious Land, 14.

28463_Millar.indd 38

2016-12-15 14:01:57



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 39

what extent their agendas influenced what they reported about China’s political economy. Ignatius of Loyola founded the Society of Jesus in 1534 and Pope Paul III officially confirmed it six years later. Trade, religion, and information on China were intertwined from the earliest days of the China mission. This connection was reflected in the early Portuguese engagement in the East Indies. Portugal received the padroado (patronage) with the Jus patronatus granted by a papal bull in 1514, vesting exclusive control of European missionary, political, and economic activity in the East with the Portuguese monarchy. Missionaries travelled to China on merchant ships and resided alongside European traders on the island of Macao.15 The Portuguese control of European engagement with the East did not last long, and at the turn of the seventeenth century the Dutch and English quickly expanded their commercial interests in the area. Under these different dominating European powers, Catholic missionaries from European states such as Portugal, Italy, Spain, France, and Germany continued to travel and publish information on China. Although the Jesuits were primarily concerned with their religious mission, they did provide information relevant to understanding China’s political economy. The society prioritized missionary work alongside secular education, and thus the polymath, adventurous Jesuits were well equipped to report on the Middle Kingdom. In their unique position as the group that could understand (linguistically and culturally) both Europe and China, the Jesuits’ transmission of knowledge was central to the evolution of the connection between the two most advanced civilizations of the time. Of course, the Jesuits had their own agendas. Whether they were selfish or altruistic individuals, they were religiously motivated, nationally affiliated, political and economic actors, and at times esteemed scholars, existing in a precarious position as the bridge between the East and West. They occupied three major roles: first, they were intermediaries for the Chinese, presenting information on European civilization (especially religion and science); second, they were individuals acting in their own interests based on their own beliefs and personal motivations; and third, they were intermediaries transmitting knowledge of China back to Europe. In their role for the Europeans, their responsibilities can be further subdivided. They were agents for European states’ commercial interests in China, predominantly as translators but at times more actively

15 For more on the Jesuit travels to China and their scholarly training, see Brockey, Journey to the East.

28463_Millar.indd 39

2016-12-15 14:01:57

40

A Singular Case

involved in dealings. For instance, in 1697–98 a group of French Jesuits urged the French government to develop a chartered company for the China trade to search for alternative trade routes to those controlled by the English and Dutch.16 Second, they were agents of the Christian religion broadly, but more specifically the Roman Catholic Church and, within that, the Society of Jesus; of course, there were numerous tensions between these varying religious levels. Finally, they were promoters of Chinese culture to the European public, a particularly important task in defending their own missionary efforts. These varying positions shaped the ways in which the Jesuits transmitted information about China to Europe and the ways in which their descriptions were received. At the same time, the Jesuits were a diverse a group of individuals with varying interests and opinions. For instance, Michael Boym was interested in botany, while Adam Schall von Bell focused on astronomy. In fact, P.J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams make an oft-neglected point that the Jesuits did not speak with one voice.17 Adding to this, depending on the topic being addressed, many perspectives were evident within a single Jesuit source. Initially, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Jesuits had difficulty sharing their information because of the censorship practised by the Catholic Church and the Iberian states. The Portuguese state feared sharing its knowledge of the East and destabilizing its trade route. Giovanni Petri Maffei’s Historiarum Indicarum libri XVI (Florence, 1588) was the first systematic Jesuit work on the Eastern Missions, including China, but it was in the seventeenth century that a more detailed picture of the Middle Kingdom began to emerge. The Jesuits used their wide-ranging diplomatic and linguistic skills, religious openness, and ­scientific knowledge to gain a greater understanding of the Chinese by forming close relationships with the imperial court and literati. The arrival of the early Jesuits coincided with the peak of the Ming Dynasty’s (1368–1644) strength, allowing for syncretism between the self-assured missionaries and the confident Chinese literati. The most influential seventeenth-century Jesuit source on China was Nicolas Trigault’s publication of Matteo Ricci’s journals as De Christiana expeditione apud Sinas (1615).18 Ricci established the first Jesuit mission 16 Lach and van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe, 432. 17 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, 85. 18 This work appeared in five Latin editions (1615, 1616, 1617, 1623, and 1648), three French editions (1616, 1617, and 1618), and a German, Spanish, and Italian edition as well as having English excerpts reproduced in Samuel Purchas, Purchas, His Pilgrimes. Mungello, Curious Land, 48.

28463_Millar.indd 40

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 41

in China in 1583 and reached Peking in 1601. Trigault arrived in Macao in 1610, the year that Ricci died in Peking, and the two never met; and yet, together they produced one of the most influential first-hand descriptions of China in early modern Europe. Trigault’s contributions to Ricci’s diaries were to translate them into Latin, organize them into five books, add brief sections, and write chapters in the last two books.19 Although running fewer editions than other sources, and being the only key first-hand source not to have a full contemporary English translation, De Christiana expeditione was an extremely influential work well ­beyond the seventeenth century. Ricci-Trigault had a unique claim to authority because they lived in China for over thirty years, travelled around the empire, spoke the Chinese language, read Chinese literature, and discoursed with the people. This claim to authority, which they made clear in their publication, became prominent in the debate over the accuracy of information provided by the Jesuits relative to that provided by emissaries, merchants, and soldiers who did not have the same level of access to the Chinese court. A reading of Ricci-Trigault that focuses on topics of political economy contradicts the notion (both contemporary and modern) that Jesuit writings too highly extolled the Chinese and that non-Jesuit reports were more nuanced in their assessments. Even though Jesuits were critical of China at times, they were also strategic publicists who were keen to promote their foreign missions. There was a clear and distinct agenda in many of their published works. Alvaro Semedo’s 1642 account of China had a popularizing agenda. The Portuguese Jesuit was not a “seminal thinker” but he had deep knowledge of China’s culture, language, and society leading to the popularity of his work.20 His goal, as explained in his preface, was to condense the available information on China to what was useful or interesting to a wider European audience. Simplifying information did not necessitate a one-dimensional or biased description of China, but it certainly resulted in information easily packaged for travel to other authors and contexts. At times, Jesuit descriptions of China did not work in the best interest of

19 Due to the significant contributions of Trigault to Ricci’s writings, both authors will be referred to when discussing this text. Most contemporaries referred only to Ricci. One possible explanation for this is the shame that Trigault brought on himself by committing suicide in 1628. See Brockey, Journey to the East, 87; Mungello, Curious Land, 47. 20 Semedo’s manuscript on China (written in Portuguese) was translated into Spanish and reorganized by Manuel de Faria i Sousa under the title Imperio de la China (Madrid, 1642). From Sousa’s version it was then translated into Italian (1643), French (1645), and English (1655). Brockey, Journey to the East, 75; Mungello, Curious Land, 95 and 74.

28463_Millar.indd 41

2016-12-15 14:01:58

42

A Singular Case

the Society, and the missionaries did not shy away from conflict. The most controversial account of China produced by a Jesuit was that of Martino Martini. Martini was an Italian (and part German) Jesuit who lived in China from 1642 to 1651, and from 1658 until his death in 1661. One of his most popular books, Sinicae historiae Decas Prima (1658), recounted Chinese ancient history, leading to a greatly contested questioning of biblical chronology and stirring intense debate. It was with the broader Chinese Rites Controversy that the Jesuits experienced their most vitriolic attacks, which had an immense impact on the nature and interpretation of Jesuit sources. The controversy began in the 1630s, reached a peak in 1700, and continued into the eighteenth century. It involved the Jansenists, the Société des Missions Étrangères, the Dominicans, European intellectuals such as Leibniz, and institutions including the Sorbonne. The substance of the controversy was over the Jesuit practice of cultural accommodation. In particular, it related to the terminology the Jesuits allowed for the Chinese to refer to God and Heaven, as well as the Chinese practices of Confucian rites and ancestor worship. The Jesuits, following their policy of cultural accommodation, wanted to allow Chinese converts to maintain certain cultural rites that the missionaries did not believe interfered with their newfound Christian beliefs. By 1700 the Chinese Rites Controversy had largely shifted from Rome to Paris where Jesuit books were burned at the Sorbonne.21 The Chinese rites were eventually condemned by Rome in 1704 (confirmed in a papal bull in 1715), and the controversy a­ttached to Jesuit publications continued throughout the eighteenth century. The presentation of information on China became particularly sensitive in this European context and Jesuit sources were increasingly questioned and attacked in Europe. The Jesuits published defensive texts, notably Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (1687), a collaborative Jesuit work designed to teach Europeans about ancient Chinese moral philosophy (and ultimately its compatibility with Christianity).22 The Rites Controversy helped to create the perceived dichotomy ­between sources seen as praising China and sources viewed as criticizing it, particularly on the subject of religious customs and historical chronologies. 21 For more on the Chinese Rites Controversy, see Mungello, ed., The Chinese Rites Controversy; Rubiés, “The Concept of Cultural Dialogue and the Jesuit Method of Accommodation.” 22 Largely driven by the Flemish Jesuit Philippe Couplet, it was translated into French by Louis Cousin (1688) and from this edition to English as The Morals of Confucius, a Chinese Philosopher (1691).

28463_Millar.indd 42

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 43

Another major change to the mission occurred at the end of the seventeenth century due to a shift in the Society of Jesus away from the Iberian states and toward France. The Jesuit turn was in part to benefit from the growing tolerance of the French state with regard to their publications, as well as the increase in government support (financial and administrative). The growing influence of the French under Louis XIV (r.1643–1715) greatly altered the mission and transmission of knowledge from China to Europe. The French state enjoyed very close ties to Jesuit missionary activity and subsidized the French Jesuit mission in China. The reason for this relationship is twofold. First, under Louis XIV, “a spiritual renaissance was in progress”; and second, France was under the financial control of Jean-Baptiste Colbert who had a heightened interest in increasing the country’s international commercial prowess.23 In 1680 Louis XIV asked the Jesuits to resume their publications (which had been restricted by Pope Clement X in 1673). From 1685, when Louis XIV sent six Jesuits to China, continuing on into the early eighteenth century, the French Jesuits were responsible for increasing documentation, as well as encouraging the shift from missiological to proto-sinological reporting.24 The French missionaries increased European public interest in their mission with their publications on China accounting for almost one-third of the volume of literature published in France at the close of the seventeenth century. A final seventeenth-century change had a dramatic impact on the Jesuit descriptions of China. After the 1644 Manchu Conquest and the beginning of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), the receptive atmosphere in Peking fundamentally altered. The Chinese literati blamed the conquest on the imperial eunuchs and they saw their open spirit as straying from orthodox Confucianism, which left China vulnerable. This led the literati to embrace Sung Neo-Confucian orthodoxy and, as usually occurred after a tumultuous period in Chinese history, the core principles and values of Chinese government.25 A return to conservatism hindered the ability of the Jesuits to act openly in participating in public works such as building hospitals, leaving them with more time for writing and consequently changing the nature of information they produced.26 At the same time, the Jesuits responded to these changes by shifting their 23 Cary-Elwes, China and the Cross, 130 and 139. 24 For more on the French Jesuits and proto-sinology, see Rule, K’ung-tzu or Confucius?, 72; Mungello, Curious Land, 299; Guy, The French Image of China, 155; Landry-Deron, “Early Translations of Chinese Texts in French Jesuit Publications in Historiography,” 265. 25 Mungello, Curious Land, 18. 26 Rule, K’ung-tzu or Confucius?, 183.

28463_Millar.indd 43

2016-12-15 14:01:58

44

A Singular Case

attention away from the conservative literati toward the Chinese imperial court. Focusing attention on the Chinese emperor initially met with great success because it coincided with the early years of the reign of the Kangxi Emperor (r.1661–1722), a great supporter of the Jesuit missionaries. All three of these changes shaped Jesuit descriptions of China. The clearest example of their impact is the extremely popular description of China by the Jesuit Louis Le Comte. The Rites Controversy, the patronage of Louis XIV, and the changes within the Chinese Empire greatly influenced his account. Le Comte was one of six Jesuits sent to China by the Académie des sciences and Louis XIV in 1685 with the purpose of promoting science and French nationalism. Based on information gained during his stay in China from 1687 until 1692, Le Comte’s widely read Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine (1696) was one of the main sources for Europeans who wrote on China in the eighteenth century. In it, Le Comte revealed the tension between the French Jesuits and those who held a greater allegiance to the Portuguese Crown (notably Matteo Ricci).27 It is also one of the first descriptions of China to address the changes associated with the Manchu Conquest and the beginning of the Qing Dynasty. A key text in the Rites Controversy, the Sorbonne condemned Le Comte’s work for his proposition that China had true knowledge of God to such an extent that it could serve as a model for Europeans. The Sorbonne’s condemnation did not affect the popularity or influence of the work, and by 1700 it had gone through ten editions and was translated into English, German, and Italian.28 Mungello argues that the Sorbonne could admire the “secular achievements” of the Chinese, but could not accept the idea of emulating the pagans in the spiritual realm.29 Beyond the Catholic faculty at the Sorbonne, other readers could also distinguish religious matters from secular interests. Le Comte himself made this easier by separating secular and religious topics in Nouveaux mémoires, which consisted of letters on different aspects of the Chinese Empire. This structure differed from most first-hand descriptions of China, although numerous philosophical and literary Enlightenment sources were organized similarly. This work revealed a great deal about non-Rites Controversy issues, on topics such 27 Brockey, Journey to the East, 182–3. 28 Le Comte’s account was faithfully translated into English by an unknown, likely Grub Street, writer as Memoirs and Observations Made in a Late Journey through the Empire of China and published by Benjamin Tooke and Samuel Buckley in 1697. Mungello, Curious Land, 331. 29 Mungello, Curious Land, 338.

28463_Millar.indd 44

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 45

as China’s geography, economy, and government policies, some aspects of which were criticized, others of which were praised, thus underlining the difficulty of labelling an entire book as representative of sinophilia or sinophobia. Less direct then these three shifts but also important to shaping changing views of China were the actual changes within the Middle Kingdom. Recent research in economic history by Robert Allen has argued that China’s Yangtze Delta, the wealthiest part of the empire, reached its economic “golden age” in the seventeenth century and that its “future prospects were poor.”30 While the extent to which this shift was apparent to contemporaries is not clear, it is a striking shift that even the most ardent revisionists like Pomeranz acknowledge began somewhere around turn of the eighteenth century. Thus changes in views of China over the course of the eighteenth century can also reflect actual changes in China over this time period, an idea to which we return throughout the following chapters. Alongside Le Comte’s work, the most popular and relied upon Jesuit source of information on China for eighteenth-century geographers and philosophers was Jean-Baptiste Du Halde’s Description de la Chine (1735). While Le Comte characterized his book on China as a memoir, Du Halde set out on a different task. His goal was to provide the most comprehensive description of China ever produced. Yet, like Mendoza, he had never travelled to China, leaving him with a precarious claim to authority on the Middle Kingdom. However, he had other relevant qualifications. Du Halde had been editing works on China for decades and from 1709 until 1743 he edited the influential and popular Lettres édifiantes et curieuses (volumes 9 to 26). In the preface to his Description de la Chine, Du Halde proactively set out the reasons why he should be considered an authority on China: he had read numerous memoirs sent from China; had had conversations with the China missionaries during their stays in Europe; and had twenty-four years of correspondence with missionaries all over the empire as well as having some missionaries translate Chinese books in order to “furnish proofes to many of the facts related by [him].”31 He also described his plan to send his finished manuscript to China but then

30 Allen, “Agricultural Productivity,” 15. 31 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China (hereafter referred to as the Cave edition), vol. 1, author’s preface, iii; Du Halde, Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l’empire de la Chine (hereafter referred to as the French edition), vol.  1, preface, xvii; Du Halde, The General History of China (hereafter referred to as the Watts edition), vol. 1, preface. Note the Cave edition did not translate the author’s preface directly but the editor’s preface did relate the importance of Father Contancin’s editing of

28463_Millar.indd 45

2016-12-15 14:01:58

46

A Singular Case

fortuitously discovered a Jesuit, Father Contancin, who had lived for thirty years in China (ten years in Peking, and twenty in a variety of provinces). Contancin spent over a year in Paris reading and commenting on the work so that Du Halde was “convinced that [he] advanced nothing which is not strictly Fact.” Beyond (or even superior to) the authority of first-hand witnessing, Du Halde argued that unlike the accounts of travellers, who were limited by what they saw or experienced, his description was much more comprehensive. Du Halde’s authority was evidently convincing: he was contemporaneously viewed as a (perhaps the) central source of credible information about China for much of the eighteenth century. Du Halde highlights the ambiguity of the constructed categories of traveller, geographer, and philosopher. While they serve a useful purpose in helping trace the circulation of information at the time, Du Halde is only one of countless figures who blur these boundaries. Because of the way in which Du Halde’s Description was used at the time, I have classified it here as a traveller account, noting that in many ways it was also a compendium. Du Halde’s book was of great importance to Enlightenment philosophers as well as geographers and compilers, who relied heavily on his information about China. However, not all reviews of his book were positive. Du Halde was criticized in the Monthly Review (November 1749) and in an anonymous publication entitled An irregular dissertation, occasioned by the reading of Father Du Halde’s description of China (1740) that attacked him for being biased and never having been to China. Nonetheless, even authors such as Montesquieu, who explicitly criticized the reliability of Jesuit sources, still relied on Du Halde for information on China. His manipulation of information on China (as editor of the Lettres and author of the Description) revealed his skill as a popularizer. Du Halde knew how to appeal to the eighteenth-century European reading public and as a result his work achieved great success. The translation of Du Halde’s description of China into English demonstrates that the area of political economy was a less contentious aspect of Chinese civilization. Du Halde’s Description had two separate English translations. Richard Brookes, along with the printer John Watts, undertook the first translation, which was published as The General History of

Du Halde’s manuscript. Landry-Deron’s La preuve par la Chine. La “Description” de J.-B. Du Halde, jésuite, 1735 offers a detailed analysis of Du Halde’s description, particularly focusing on Du Halde’s mission to reconcile Catholicism and Chinese culture.

28463_Millar.indd 46

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 47

China in four quarto volumes in 1736.32 The Watts edition was (and still is) criticized for its unsatisfactory translation, although it was immediately popular and passed to a third and corrected edition in 1741. Edward Cave (the proprietor of Gentleman’s Magazine) produced a more faithful translation of Du Halde, entitled A description of the empire of China (1738–41), and published it in two folio volumes. The Irishman John Green (alias Bradock Mead) edited the Cave edition, and G.R. Crone suggests that another needy Grub Street geographer, William Guthrie (a Scotsman), also contributed to the effort.33 As we see below, these editors also wrote about China in popular geographies, demonstrating the fluidity between first-hand descriptions and popular geographies in Europe. While the Cave edition was arranged much more closely to the original French version, for the subject areas relevant to this research, the original French, the Cave, and the Watts editions all have corresponding citations (apart from a few linguistic differences on the contentious topic of despotism discussed in chapter 3) illustrating that some subjects prompted less dispute. Historians have debated the extent to which the Jesuits could address China without their religious mission dominating the portrayal. Basil Guy challenges Michèle Duchet’s assessment that the “Jesuits were ethnographers in the modern sense” since, Guy argues, their ultimate objective was the propagation of the Christian faith.34 Similarly, Arnold Rowbotham describes the Jesuit information as “Sinophile propaganda” based on “simplification, to suit their own needs.”35 Robert Markley discusses how the Jesuits balanced praise and criticism of China. He argues, “Such belated denunciations and perfunctory criticisms were trotted out by Jesuit writers to reassure European readers that the threat China posed to western notions of religious, political, and cultural supremacy

32 Very little is known about Richard Brookes apart from the fact that he compiled and  translated books on medicine, surgery, natural history, and geography and at some point travelled in both Africa and America. See Bettany, “Brookes, Richard (fl. 1721– 1763).” 33 Ibid., 268; also see Crone, “John Green. Notes on a Neglected Eighteenth Century Geographer and Cartographer,” 85–91. For more information on the background of John Green and his position as a hack writer, see Crone, “Further Notes on Bradock Mead, alias John Green, an Eighteenth Century Cartographer,” 69–70. Green made several interjecting notes into the text although it is clearly identified when the translator is speaking. 34 Guy, “Ad majorem Societatis gloriam,” 69; Duchet, Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières. 35 Rowbotham, “The Impact of Confucianism on Seventeenth Century Europe,” 224.

28463_Millar.indd 47

2016-12-15 14:01:58

48

A Singular Case

could be mitigated or contained.”36 He uses the example of Le Comte, who critiqued China’s military capabilities and stated that the French military was much stronger. Markley argues that this was “less a sober military assessment than a means of flattering the [French] King” in hopes of extending his support to the Jesuit missions. There is undoubtedly an element of this in Le Comte and other Jesuit writings. Yet, another reading acknowledges that criticisms of China’s military were substantiated and well thought out (as we see in chapter 5) as well as a useful means to shore up French support for the Jesuit mission. One must also ask why the Jesuits, if driven entirely by the need to engender support for their mission, would defend Chinese chronology, knowing it would stir controversy in Europe for the challenge it posed to the biblical history. Jesuit publications, especially after the Rites Controversy, increased in intensity and certainly were partial toward the self-preserving motivations of the mission. At the same time, on many subjects the Jesuits were concerned with presenting a nuanced image of China. Most importantly, in spite of the controversy surrounding the Jesuits, European commentators continued to rely on them as key sources of empirical evidence, especially when it came to the topic of China’s political economy. Non-Jesuit Writings on China The Jesuits, of course, were not the only sources of information for curious Europeans. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nonJesuit missionaries, emissaries, merchants, and military adventurers also produced important first-hand accounts of China. These non-Jesuit travellers had different agendas and biases although this does not necessarily mean they were more scathing of China. The Spanish Dominican friar Domingo Fernández Navarrete’s Tratados históricos, politicos, ethicos y religiosos de la Monarchia de China (1676) was one particularly influential non-Jesuit description.37 Philosophers and geographers regarded his account of China as reliable well into the eighteenth century because Navarrete studied the Chinese language and lived there from 1657 until 1673 (when he returned to Rome to discuss the question of Chinese rites). He attacked the Jesuit position in the Rites Controversy and disagreed with their assessment of Chinese religion; however, furthering 36 Markley, The Far East and the English Imagination, 195. 37 Cummins, A Question of Rites. A complete translation into English was produced for Churchill’s Collection of Voyages (1704). It was also translated into French, German, and Italian. See Mungello, Curious Land, 170. Cummins, “Fray Domingo Navarrete.”

28463_Millar.indd 48

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 49

the point that authors speak with different voices, Navarrete portrayed China’s political economy in a relatively positive light. Indeed, he could separate religious dogma from secular interests. Cited by Voltaire and Quesnay, both archetypal “sinophiles,” Navarrete’s description reflects that in spite of the perceived bias of the first-hand account, information travelled into works with diverging agendas. Merchants, emissaries, and men of war also provided first-hand descriptions of the Chinese Empire. Attempts to expand the China trade provided ambassadors from states such as Russia, the Netherlands, France, and England, as well as representatives from their respective East India Companies, with claims of their own authority in describing China. The merchants dramatically outnumbered the Jesuits. Between 1552 and 1800 there were 926 Jesuits in China; as early as 1563 there were already 700 Portuguese on the island of Macao.38 However, in spite of their larger numbers, these merchants and emissaries, unlike many Jesuits, had not mastered the Chinese language and had limited access to the Chinese literati who were responsible for educating the Jesuits on Chinese moral philosophy, literature, and science. In the seventeenth century, the non-Jesuit accounts of China were primarily Dutch, as the Netherlands took over from the Portuguese in dominating the China trade. One of the most widely cited and translated works was Johannes Nieuhof’s description of a Dutch East India Company (voc) delegation to China, which he took part in from 1655 to 1657.39 As a member of a voc embassy, Nieuhof was tasked with reporting on the economic activity he witnessed on the journey of over two thousand kilometres from Canton to Peking. Apart from the numerous anecdotes of his trip and in spite of his distinct commercial agenda, a large amount of his description of China came from the published works of the Jesuits Ricci-Trigault, Martini, and Semedo. This is a clear example of how the parenthood of information was often lost, allowing “facts” to travel more widely than they may have otherwise. If someone was skeptical of Jesuit information, the Protestant Dutchman could serve as a valued source of information, even if much of that information originally stemmed from the Jesuits.

38 Rowbotham, “The Impact of Confucianism on Seventeenth Century Europe,” 50. 39 The Dutch fort in southern Taiwan was established in 1624, and although the Dutch were anxious to trade with China, the embassies they sent to Peking in 1656, 1667, and 1685 all failed. Nieuhof’s work was translated into French in 1665, and John Ogilby translated it into English as An embassy from the East India Company (1669). It was also translated into German (1666) and Latin (1668). The account was likely made ready for press by his brother Hendrik. Wills, “Author, Publisher, Patron, World,” 395.

28463_Millar.indd 49

2016-12-15 14:01:58

50

A Singular Case

By the eighteenth century, non-missionary observers from a wider array of nationalities began to report what they found in their travels to China. The account of the Scotsman John Bell’s travels to China (as part of the Russian Izmailov embassy) in 1720 was not as influential as the diary of Laurent Lange, a Swedish emissary, which was published within Bell’s work.40 Adam Smith was a subscriber to Bell’s Travels from St Petersburg, in Russia, to diverse parts of Asia (1763) and famously referenced Lange’s description of China in his Wealth of Nations. Lange had travelled to China in 1715 and his account was published in French in 1734. Nearly thirty years later, it was published in English for the first time, where it then made its way to Smith. These sources, based on very specific, short-lived periods of travel, took decades to circulate around Europe. Lange’s and Bell’s travels took place during the reign of the Kangxi Emperor, Lange’s account was first published during the reign of the Yongzheng Emperor, and Bell’s work was published under the Qianlong Emperor. In his 1776 publication, Smith assumed that Lange’s description of Chinese foreign trade practices from 1715 remained accurate. And yet changes in China’s foreign trade policies were recorded from the Ming to the Qing dynasty and they were highly dependent on individual emperors. Jesuit information also suffered from being out of date but there were some problems in reporting about the Chinese Empire that were more prominent for the secular travellers. The most popular traveller account on China in the eighteenth century was Admiral George Anson’s A Voyage round the world (1748). Anson’s chaplain, Richard Walter, initiated the publication of the account of the voyage. Walter was with Anson on the voyage and in Canton during their first stop in China before he returned to England in 1742. Benjamin Robins, an English writer who never travelled to China, also contributed to the work, but their respective contributions cannot be disentangled.41 Walter’s widow reported that Anson took a very close interest in its writing (this is not surprising since the account paints him in glowing terms) and Glyn Williams has argued that the Voyage is “in everything except stylistic terms Anson’s own interpretation of events.”42 When discussing the book, most contemporaries referred to Anson or his chaplain. For

40 Bell, Travels from St Petersburg in Russia to diverse parts of Asia. 41 There is evidence of Robins corresponding with Voltaire about the book before its publication. He ultimately worked for the English East India Company, which Voyage was accused of disparaging. 42 Williams, The Prize of All the Oceans, 241. More information can be found on the authorship and publication of Voyage in Appendix 1 of Williams’s The Prize of All the Oceans. See also Williams, Documents Relating to Anson’s Voyage.

28463_Millar.indd 50

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 51

these reasons, Anson’s name will be used as the author of the source, although Robin’s and Walter’s contributions are noted. Anson’s account was short, unsystematic, and became the most influential eighteenth-century non-missionary description of China. He was commander of the first official British naval expedition into the Pacific and reached China in 1743. This account was limited, however, by his lack of contact with the Chinese. The narrator himself acknowledged, “we could have no communication with [the Chinese] but by signs”;43 and yet, this description of China was highly influential in Europe. Its popularity is striking: the first edition had over 1,800 advanced subscribers; by 1776 there had been fifteen editions in Britain alone; and it had been translated into French, Dutch, German, and Italian with extracts also printed in Gentleman’s Magazine. Walter Demel contends that Anson’s account must “have come as a great relief for the English” since they finally had a compatriot they could rely on for accurate information. He argues that Anson was “proof” to them that the Jesuits were lying, reflecting the Protestant distrust of Catholic information.44 This, however, does not explain why so many British sources, from philosophers to geographers, continued to rely on the Jesuit descriptions of China. ­ Similarly, Colin Mackerras argues that Anson’s work was the “first fullscale attack on the rosy images of China which the French Jesuits were pushing.”45 This claim, made by other writers such as Williams, is based, in large part, on Anson’s criticism of Chinese manufacturing, military, and fine arts, as well as his frustration in dealing with what he perceived to be immoral Chinese merchants.46 Yet Jesuit sources made similar points much earlier. It is undoubtedly true that the overall tone of Anson’s Voyage round the world was much more critical than the earlier Jesuit sources, but his account, held to be one of the strongest critiques of China during its time, did not offer any radical new evidence. Voyage round the world was not only an attack on Chinese civilization but also on English East India Company (eic) representatives whom Anson felt were unhelpful and even unpatriotic. Private documents by eic officials who were in China at the time of Anson’s arrival reveal different accounts of some of the events that transpired. As Williams points out, Anson’s arrival in China put eic officials in an awkward position since

43 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 348. 44 Demel, “China in the Political Thought of Western and Central Europe,” 47. 45 Mackerras, Western Images of China, 43. 46 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 92; see also Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent, 52–4; and Williams, The Prize of All the Oceans, xiv.

28463_Millar.indd 51

2016-12-15 14:01:58

52

A Singular Case

they knew their place in China was already fragile.47 Edward Page, the supercargo who was in Canton at the time, wrote an unpublished description of the events in “A Little Secret History” as a response to Voyage round the world. The tension between these texts parallels the differences between Anson and Page; the former a man of war, the latter a man of commerce. Robert Markley is entirely correct that “to treat Anson’s account uncritically as a reflection of eighteenth-century ‘orientalism’ … is to distort the complex situation in Canton and, however inadvertently, to  reinforce the Eurocentric biases that still govern many accounts of European-Asian relations in the eighteenth century.”48 As he notes, this does not imply that Page’s account is a “true” description of events. Indeed, some other unpublished letters and diaries corroborate aspects of the official account such as the greed of Chinese merchants (discussed in chapter 2).49 The respective presentations of events by Page, Anson, and a Chinese observer understandably reflect their different interpretations of events and the biases each held. Just as the Jesuit sources were questioned for their reliability, so too was Anson’s account. Some pointed out that he barely stepped foot in China, and of course, his bias against the eic was evident. Nonetheless, countless philosophers used his account in their assessments of China’s political economy. Unfortunately Page’s description of Anson in China was not published and thus did not form part of the Enlightenment dialogue debating Chinese economic behaviour and political economy and falls out of the purview of this book. For our purposes it is not important to determine what should have been considered a reliable source. Rather the goal is to identify the popular sources and how they were interpreted, questioned, and used by eighteenth-century thinkers The Frenchman Pierre Poivre had perhaps the greatest bias in his presentation of information on China. Poivre was extremely influential in constructing views of China’s political economy in the eighteenth century. The almost-missionary, administrator, philosopher, trader, and traveller used his time in the East to gather information on China’s ­agricultural system. Although he was too young to take missionary orders, the Society of Foreign Missions in Paris sent him to China in 1740 at the age of twenty. He eventually fell out with the missionaries in the East and undertook a career as a trader, horticulturalist, and author, travelling throughout Asia and spending time in Cochinchina, Batavia,

47 Williams, The Great South Sea, 240. 48 Markley, “Anson at Canton, 1743,” 217. 49 Williams, The Prize of All the Oceans, 199–200.

28463_Millar.indd 52

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 53

Pondicherry in the south of India, and Mauritius.50 While in China he travelled to Macao, Canton, and Tongking. His time as a member of the French East India Company gave him first-hand insight into the monopolistic trade system in the East. Throughout his time in the East he was a corresponding member of the Académie des sciences and a follower of Physiocratic doctrine. Returning to France in 1757, he began his philosophical writings and public addresses on commerce and agriculture. Two of his addresses in 1763 and 1764 were circulated in manuscript copies that reached the Physiocrats and were eventually published as Voyage d’un philosophe (1768), which was later translated into English.51 Poivre never attempted to disguise his bias or claim that his information was more accurate than others. His travel account supplied the Physiocrats, and later Adam Smith, with a great deal of inspiration and information on the East from the point of view of an agriculturalist who praised the rule of nature. More recent research into early modern Chinese agriculture shows that this was a time of great transition in the balance between China and England in particular. Robert Allen has argued that as of 1800, agricultural labour productivity in the Yangtze Delta in China was approximately 90 percent that of England; however, “in the 1600s, the Delta was ahead of [the Netherlands and England].”52 While the English had an agricultural revolution, according to Allen, Chinese labour productivity was stable. Poivre, then, was observing China during a time when the agricultural balance was shifting between England and China (although France was still behind). The first-hand descriptions, whether Jesuit or not, were shaped by their authors’ varying relationships with a changing China. The dates of their travel, exposure to court mandarins or coastal merchants, and different emperors, as well as their own interests and agendas, inevitably shaped the information they produced. Commentators in Europe were undoubtedly aware of the bias and limitations of the sources they relied on. The emissaries and merchants, whose aim was to increase trade, did not provide a great deal of unique information because they had less ability (linguistic and other) to understand the operation of the Chinese system. As we see in chapter 2, their anecdotal evidence was not extraordinary although it was often highly regarded. The Jesuits, whose main purpose was to convert the Chinese to Christianity, used their 50 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 40. 51 Ibid., 42 and 55; Maverick, “Pierre Poivre: Eighteenth Century Explorer of Southeast Asia”; see also Klump, “The Kingdom of Ponthiamas.” 52 Allen, “Agricultural Productivity,” 10.

28463_Millar.indd 53

2016-12-15 14:01:58

54

A Singular Case

predominant position as the providers of detailed information to engender support for their mission. European observers picked up on the different positions of authors and, at times, over-interpreted the influence of these biases. European observers did not dispute many of the “facts” found in these varying sources, although they actively debated the broader meanings derived from these “facts.” C u r at i n g t h e D e s c r i p t i o n s : C o m p i l at i o n s a n d G e o g r a p h i e s The genre of traveller accounts of China has a great deal in common with the compilations and geographies of the eighteenth century. Like compilations and geographies, first-hand accounts regularly pilfered from each other. A major difference between them, however, is that the latter genre benefited from the added authority of the discerning editor. True, many of the first-hand accounts were ghost written (for example, Anson) and the description of China by Du Halde certainly straddles the boundaries between the genres (as we saw in the introduction, even a modern economic historian is confused about whether he actually travelled to China), but there is no doubt that for the eighteenth-century audience, compilations and geographies had a layer of editorial discretion that made them distinct and they often served as the most important source for curious philosophers. Reader skepticism increased over the eighteenth century although it was higher for some places than others. Glyn Williams describes accounts of the South Sea where imaginary voyages found their way into standard reference works.53 This also happened in the famous case of George Psalmanazar, who claimed to be an inhabitant of the East Asian island of Formosa travelling in Europe. He published an account of his “birth land” entitled An Historical and Geographical Description of Formosa (1704), and managed to convince many people (despite the protests of the Jesuit missionaries who worked in Asia) of the veracity of his account. With his confession in 1706 that, in fact, he had never been to Asia, the ease with which the public could be deceived became acutely evident.54 Cases such as these made readers question first-hand accounts and new information 53 Williams, The Great South Sea, 72. 54 His confession did not receive much attention, and as such his reputation as a Formosan was still being defended decades later in Barclay, The universal traveller, 604. Psalmanazar, in spite of his dishonesty, managed to become one of the main contributing editors to An universal history (1736–68). Griggs, “Universal History from CounterReformation to Enlightenment.”

28463_Millar.indd 54

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 55

on foreign lands. While many of the cases that Williams describes in the South Sea are about “savage” societies, the Chinese case was quite different. The public came to actively question traveller accounts of China. For example, The Chinese Traveller pointed to the absurdity of John Albert de Mandelso’s report on China from his 1640 trip, which included descriptions of unicorns and twenty-four stone oysters.55 The popular compilations and geographies were designed to embody the “discerning age” and guard against these false reports. Travel compendiums in particular reflect the blurred boundaries between the first-hand descriptions and editors based in Europe, particularly in the seventeenth century. These collections involved translating, editing, arranging, and often publishing for the first time, traveller accounts of foreign lands. With the Age of Exploration well underway, seventeenth-century Europeans witnessed a rise in the popularity of travel compendiums. The two main English sources of information on China in late sixteenth-century and early seventeenth-century England were compiled by Richard Hakluyt and Samuel Purchas. Hakluyt, and later Purchas, provided the necessary information on products, climates, customs, and geography to the merchants developing a thriving English foreign trade.56 Much like the Jesuit desire to publish information to support their mission, Hakluyt believed his works encouraged the much needed societal support to promote exploration.57 Although these compilations supported an English national agenda, they were also of great influence to France. Melchisédec Thévenot’s travel collection, Relations de divers voyages curieux (1663), began as a translation of Hakluyt and Purchas, reflecting the circulation of knowledge between France and England in this genre.58 By the end of the seventeenth century, travel compilations provided access to an array of descriptions on China to the English and French public. The style of editing and way of reading of travel collections evolved over the course of the eighteenth century. Eighteenth-century compilers accused both Hakluyt and Purchas of a haphazard arrangement of the material. In the introductory pages of Churchill’s 1732 travel collection, 55 Anonymous, The Chinese Traveller, v. 56 Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries of the English nation (1589) and Purchas’s Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes Contayning a History of the World … (1625). 57 Parks, Richard Hakluyt and the English Voyages, 21. 58 Thévenot’s Relations was the first major travel collection to emerge from France. It included material on China gathered from Dutch, Polish, Italian, and Russian sources. Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe, 3: 410–11. It was held in the libraries of Locke, Voltaire, and Turgot. Dew, “Reading Travels in the Culture of Curiosity.”

28463_Millar.indd 55

2016-12-15 14:01:58

56

A Singular Case

Hakluyt is portrayed as having a “method of heaping together all things good and bad.” Without dismissing Hakluyt’s value, the editor wished he were more selective, or discerning, of what was “really authentick and useful.”59 Nonetheless, information continued to circulate across national boundaries, and certainly across the centuries. Compilers chose to reproduce earlier non-Jesuit first-hand accounts because Jesuit publications were already quite prominent in the French and English markets. They were searching for overlooked information that would be useful or interesting to European audiences. Alongside the editorial changes in travel compilations, the eighteenth century witnessed the growth of another type of popular publication. Joan-Pau Rubiés describes the eighteenth-century shift from Renaissance travel collections that aimed to reproduce narratives in an authentic way, to the rising popular genre that sought to impose an order on the increasing amount of information.60 Special geographies fall into the latter category, where editors often eliminated what they deemed boring or  unnecessary. The history of special geographies has  recently been the subject of a revisionist project to appreciate their contemporary relevance, rather than label them as “bibliographic dinosaurs.”61 The ­eighteenth-century geographies are heirs of the work of Sebastian Münster in Germany, Giovanni Botero in Italy, Peter Heylin in England, and Pierre Davity in France. The legacies of these early geographical thinkers included a focus on matters of state, as well as the arrangement of material under structured, themed headings. While Enlightenment philosophical thought is a staple of historical enquiry, contemporary popular geographies remain understudied. Authors and editors of these works in Europe drew information from the first-hand accounts and repackaged the material in order to present it to a wider audience. Popular sources played a particularly important role in discussions of China’s political economy. Travel compilations offered access to first-hand descriptions that were not readily available, while geographies were designed to be accurate summaries of the reliable information available on various places in the world. The changes in ways information circulated in Europe from the Renaissance through to the Enlightenment – for instance, the lifting of the Stationers’ monopoly on 59 The same was argued for Purchas’s volumes. See J. and A. Churchill, A Collection of Voyages and Travels, lxxxviii. 60 Rubiés, “From the History of Travayle to the History of Travel Collections.” 61 Downes, “The Bibliographic Dinosaurs of Georgian Geography (1714–1830).” For the revisionist historiography of the genre of early modern geography, see Mayhew, Enlightenment Geography, chapter 1; Withers, “Eighteenth-Century Geography.”

28463_Millar.indd 56

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 57

printing in England in 1695 – greatly impacted the growth of this genre. In A Social History of Knowledge, Peter Burke discusses the idea of a “knowledge explosion,” with the blossoming of print culture in sixteenth-­ century England.62 Alongside the changes in the publishing industry, an increasing amount of information about the world was travelling back to Europe where it met a rising demand for the presentation of this knowledge in a quickly digestible format. A new class of readers emerged, and the audience of the eighteenth-century geographies included dignitaries and scholars as well as those with a utilitarian interest, such as statesmen, merchants, mariners, and soldiers. Subscription lists changed over the course of the eighteenth century with fewer clergy and more merchants requesting these books.63 The prefaces of these works offer an indication of the intended audience. For instance, Herman Moll, a German-born English geographer known mostly for his cartographic efforts, argued that knowledge of the world was relevant to anyone who read and it was the subject of many daily conversations.64 There was a clear sense of the urgency and relevance of ethnographic knowledge. Special geographies existed in eighteenth-century France but it was not a prominent genre.65 Jacques Philibert Rousselot de Surgy’s description of the world, Mélanges intéressans et curieux, ou abregé d’histoire naturelle, morale, civile, et politique de l’Asie, de l’Afrique, de l’Amérique, et des terres polaires (10 vols, Paris, 1763–65), points to the importance of the genre as well as its close interaction with the first-hand accounts and philosophical works. This geography drew heavily on Du Halde and was the principal source of information for François Quesnay’s description of China, thus acting as an important bridge between first-hand and philosophical accounts. Described by Lewis Maverick as “impartial and scholarly,” de Surgy was committed to giving a full impression of China from both the favourable and unfavourable reports.66 Rousselot de

62 Burke, A Social History of Knowledge, 149. 63 Mayhew, “The Character of English Geography”; Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, 51. 64 Reinhartz, “Moll, Herman (1654?–1732)”; Moll, A system of geography, preface. 65 Anne Godlewska’s study of French geography during the Enlightenment is focused on geography as a science and looks primarily at cartographers such as Jean Baptiste Bourguignon D’Anville. There are some French sources that Godlewska does not consider as part of French geography that are directly comparable to the British genre. Godlewska, Geography Unbound. 66 It was republished in Iverdun (1764–66, 12 vols). It was this Swiss edition that Quesnay relied on. As Maverick points out, the first seven chapters of Quesnay’s “Despotisme de la Chine” were almost entirely lifted from Jacques Philibert Rousselot de Surgy. Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 126–7; J.A.G. Roberts confirms that Quesnay’s

28463_Millar.indd 57

2016-12-15 14:01:58

58

A Singular Case

Surgy took care in describing his sources in the first five pages of the fourth Paris volume. He noted the Jesuits did not address every subject and one has to keep in mind their religious bias. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that Du Halde provided the foundation for his description. He also claimed he examined Du Halde’s original sources and those which the Jesuit did not reference, including the accounts of Marco Polo, Emanuel Pinto, Navarette, Dutch travellers, Gemelli Carerra, Laurent Lange, Ysbrandt-Ides, and Admiral Anson. While eighteenthcentury geographers were rarely, if ever, diligent in direct referencing, acknowledgment (and assessment) of their sources of information was paramount to their claims of authority on a particular topic. Britain had the largest volume of eighteenth-century geographies, leading to a great diversity in content and quality. British geographers fall into two groups: Grub Street journalists and the wealthier, scholarly historians. On average in Britain six special geographies were published per decade.67 Mayhew argues that in contrast to France, these types of cheaper Grub Street publications were typically uncontroversial, as the editors rarely had distinguished intellectual reputations, and the aim of the publishers was to “compile marketable products and [they were] paid by the page, not according to the quality of the work.”68 While their accounts did not have the penetrating analysis of philosophers, the ideologies or personal convictions of several prominent editors of popular geographies contributed to the popularization of controversial debates on topics such as Chinese chronology and the veracity of first-hand sources. The evolution of Thomas Salmon’s work demonstrates how editors’ personal experiences and particular viewpoints could have a profound role in shaping geographical works. Salmon was a “typical hack writer” of Grub Street whose career progressed as he published three distinct global geographies.69 He claimed to have spent two periods as a soldier in the English East India Company, and to have lived in the West Indies. Although he was an editor, he had strong philosophical views that evolved when composing The Review of the History of England (1722), in which he argued for the royal prerogative.70 This interpretation of English history, along with his frustration with the Whig government for

Physiocratic ideas were formed before he read Rousselot de Surgy’s description of China. Roberts, “L’image de la Chine dans l’Encyclopédie,” 99. For de Surgy’s discussion of his sources, see de Surgy, Mélanges intéressans et curieux, 4: 1–5. 67 Sitwell, Four Centuries of Special Geography, 16–17. 68 Mayhew, “The Character of English Geography,” 404 and 402. 69 Ibid., 403. 70 Cooper, “Thomas Salmon (bap. 1679–d.1767).”

28463_Millar.indd 58

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 59

not supporting expansion overseas shaped his Modern History, or, The Present State of All Nations, which appeared between 1724 and 1738 (and was later translated into Dutch, German, and Italian). He maintained that he consulted over two hundred travel books but relied mostly on Le Comte for his description of China, which notably was the first section in the work. His description of the eunuchs of China as villains who undermined the emperor reflected his philosophical defence of the royal prerogative.71 Salmon’s time accompanying Anson on part of his voyage around the world (from 1739 to 1740) led him to write a new, very popular geography entitled A New Geographical and Historical Grammar (1749). This work offered a harsher criticism of the Chinese people and their supposed greed, an unsurprising result of his respect for the account of Anson’s voyage (although Salmon himself was not with Anson in China). His final grand geography, The Universal Traveller (1752–53), had a longer description of China, but in spite of his allegiance to Anson, was still primarily based on Jesuit sources. Of even greater importance to shaping views of China in the eighteenth century in both France and Britain was the popular and influential Universal History (1736–65). It was compiled by a group of editors, notably John Campbell, John Swinton, George Sale, Tobias Smollett, the infamous George Psalmanazar, and Archibald Bower.72 The subject matter of the modern part reflects an emphasis on the superiority of Europe: half the work was devoted to the history of European nations and their conquests overseas; just less than one-quarter was focused on the history of the East, with the rest being the history of Africa, America, and the southern hemisphere.73 On China the editors primarily cited Jesuit sources, claiming that their accounts have been verified: “Nor were the relations of [the Jesuits] so universally credited (especially as many of them appeared not only exaggerated, but even in a great measure romantic, at least in whatever related to religion, or their numerous conversions), till we had them, or at least a great part of them, further confirmed by persons of other nations and religions, and less liable to be

71 Salmon, Modern History, 2. 72 Abbattista, “The Business of Paternoster Row,” 5. As Abbattista notes, it is not possible to establish “how many or who the collaborators were, how the work was divided or the background of the finances” (20). The Universal History was divided into two sections known as the ancient part and the modern part. The ancient part was published in seven volumes from 1736 to 1744. The modern part was edited primarily by Tobias Smollett, John Campbell, and William Shirley and was published between 1759 and 1765. Volume 8 of the forty-four octavo volumes covered contemporary China. 73 Abbatista, “The Business of Paternoster Row,” 19.

28463_Millar.indd 59

2016-12-15 14:01:58

60

A Singular Case

suspected.”74 Again, these influential geographies held that secular subjects were less controversial topics, although this by no means implies that traveller accounts were not questioned about secular themes. More importantly, editors deemed Jesuit information reliable only once nonJesuit travellers confirmed it. The standards for reliable “facts” rapidly increased over the eighteenth century and yet the sources of information changed relatively little. Many geographers not only relied on Jesuit sources but also greatly respected them. A New general collection of voyages and travels (1745–47) was published by Thomas Astley and most likely edited by John Green. In spite of Green’s Protestant prejudices, he was a professional editor and respected the Catholic Jesuit sources.75 Green noted his sources carefully and gathered information from numerous authors, including RicciTrigault, Semedo, Martini, Gabriel de Magalhães, Nieuhof, Navarette, Le Comte, and Du Halde. The Chinese Traveller (1772), a compilation by an anonymous editor entirely focused on China, was even kinder to Jesuit sources. The editor argued that the Jesuits were the most qualified to provide information because of their “education and great erudition, their knowledge of various arts and sciences, and of the Chinese tongue; their winning address, their admittance into the court of the Emperor’s palace, their familiar intercourse with the inhabitants.”76 The Jesuits were deemed especially reliable when compared to the merchants who, the editor reasoned, “just touch upon the coast of a country, or who dwell in it for some time merely to trade there.”77 Yet, not all geographers were convinced of the trustworthiness of the Jesuit sources. William Guthrie (ironically the speculated second translator of Du Halde’s description) wrote a popular Grub Street geography entitled A new geographical, historical and commercial grammar (1770).78 He intended it to be an extension of Thomas Salmon’s A New Geographical and Historical Grammar (1749) and was keen to ensure that the volume 74 The modern part of an universal history, vols 8, 9. 75 Crone, “John Green,” 85. He was the likely editor of the English translation of Du Halde. 76 The Chinese Traveller, iv. There is very little information on this book. Charles and Edward Dilly, whose publications reflected their Whig and patriot political sympathies, published The Chinese Traveller. See Claude, “Dilly, Charles (1739–1807)” and “Dilly, Edward (1732–1779). 77 The Chinese Traveller, iv. 78 It was printed by a fellow Scotsman, John Knox, who is also said to be a significant contributor to the work. It ran twenty-one editions by 1801. Durie, “Knox, John (1720–1790).”

28463_Millar.indd 60

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 61

was not long-winded, dry, or boring. Thus, it required significant editing. A relatively short work, considering that he covered the known world, the section on China is a mere eleven pages. Guthrie questioned the bias of the Jesuit sources. “Some of those fathers were men of penetration and judgment, and had great opportunities of being informed about a century ago; but even their accounts of this empire are justly to be suspected. They had powerful enemies at the court of Rome, where they maintained their footing, only by magnifying their own labours and success, as well as the importance of the Chinese empire.”79 Despite these concerns, Du Halde was the main source for his section on China. It is clear that explicitly questioning the veracity of the sources did not prevent their use. Apart from the assessment of sources, Guthrie was also driven by a particular ideology. He moved from Scotland to London in 1730 where he was a reporter for Gentleman’s Magazine and an ally of the Whig administration. Although Mayhew describes Guthrie as a “typical hack writer,” he argues that his geography was the “most popular, and perhaps the most intellectually ambitious, of the late eighteenth-century compendia of geography.”80 A New geographical, historical and commercial grammar simplified the Scottish Enlightenment’s focus on history and politics and it presented world geography through the lens of civilizational progress.81 Guthrie’s agenda is clear in the preface where he argues for the importance of books of geography to describe the world and human action “under various stages of barbarity or refinement,” revealing what he called “Political Geography.”82 Many of these authors or editors had personal agendas that will be considered throughout this book (for instance, promoting free trade or the royal prerogative). Too often economic historians have repeated lines from popular accounts without fully contextualizing the author and finding the origins of the particular “fact.” The explicit primary functions of this genre were to assess and organize the information and present it in a digestible and understandable form. Special geographies had a particular focus on issues of political economy since their audience was a wider group of literate Europeans who had an increasing ­desire for knowledge of the world, and in particular, a civilization as advanced as China’s. 79 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, 464. 80 Mayhew, “The Character of English Geography,” 403. 81 Allan, “Guthrie, William (1708?–1770).” 82 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, iv.

28463_Millar.indd 61

2016-12-15 14:01:58

62

A Singular Case

Balancing Empiricism and Theory: Philosophical Works The reports on distant lands, whether from first-hand sources or digested through compilers or geographers, played an important role in debates over political economy in Europe. Philosophers certainly had their own perspectives on and approaches to the use of first-hand information on China. Generally, philosophers tried to fit the traveller accounts into their predetermined frameworks, models, or theories. There was a great deal of debate and selectivity when using first-hand information although any interested philosopher had to rely (directly or indirectly) on Jesuit sources. Before the eighteenth century, most intellectual interest in China was centred on religion and history.83 Many scholars and religious opponents of the Society of Jesus found common ground in rejecting the Jesuit version of Chinese religion. By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, religion and history were still the subjects that aroused the most passionate condemnations of first-hand accounts. For instance, Pierre Bayle, a French Protestant philosopher in exile, argued that the Chinese were atheists.84 Taking another view, the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz was one of the few intellectuals who supported the Jesuits in the Rites Controversy. He advocated recognizing the commonalities in the history between the East and West, and argued that the I Ching held the key to unlocking the Chinese language as the root of all global languages. In Novissima Sinica (1697), he called on Protestants to send missions to China, as the Catholics did, in order to learn from the Chinese. In his long correspondence with the Catholics Jesuits, he encouraged them to transmit more practical information about China.85 Of course, there were important and notable exceptions to the focus on religion and history. Leibniz himself was famously interested in many other aspects of Chinese civilization, including political economy.86 John Locke and Sébastien le Prestre, Seigneur de Vauban were interested in 83 The Dutch scholar Isaac Vossius and Blaise Pascal both attempted to reconcile Chinese history with the European biblical chronology (sparked by the Jesuit Martino Martini). Isaac Vossius, Dissertatio de vera aetate mundi (Hague, 1659). Pascal, Pensées [1660], Section 9, “Perpetuity.” 84 Goodman, The Republic of Letters, 14. 85 Lach, The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica, 27. 86 For more on Leibniz’s wide-ranging interest in China, see Perkins, Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light. As previously explained, Leibniz’s thinking on China does not feature prominently in this book since he had only one popular published work addressing China, namely Novissima Sinica (1697 and 1699).

28463_Millar.indd 62

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 63

China’s international trade and tax policies.87 Even before them, in the sixteenth century, Giovanni Botero inquired into the causes of Chinese wealth. Botero defies classification, as he was a political philosopher, a cosmographer, and compiler of geographical descriptions of the world. Relationi Universali (Rome, 1591–96) was his most geographical work, since it systematically assessed the known states in the world, but his philosophical side was evident in his use of knowledge of world geography to test his theories about the causes of wealth, expounded in Delle cause della grandezza delle città (1588) and Delle ragion di stato (Rome, 1589). The blend of philosophy and geography was carried into the Enlightenment in works like Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes (1770).88 In spite of the official controversy surrounding it, the book was extremely ­successful and an international bestseller running through at least fifty editions in less than twenty years, excluding the numerous extracts ­reproduced in books and pamphlets. The sources for book I (which included the chapters on China) were primarily the geographies the Universal History (largely the French edition) and Abbé Prévost’s Histoire générale. Peter Jimack notes that for the Chinese section, Raynal also likely relied on Poivre’s and Du Halde’s descriptions of China as well as the analysis of Voltaire and Montesquieu.89 The information on China was likely composed by two different philosopher/geographers. There was only one chapter dedicated to China in the 1770 and 1774 editions. Jimack ­argues that Raynal likely wrote the first “almost eulogistic account” of ­China (chapter 20), which he believes was informed by Voltaire’s Essai sur les moeurs (1756). The third edition contained a new chapter (chapter 21) on “The Present State of China according to Its Detractors,” which J­imack argues was composed by Diderot, who took

87 Locke, The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, vol. 4, “Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of Money” (first published in 1691); Sébastien le Prestre, Seigneur de Vauban (1633–1707), a precursor to the Physiocrats and later economists, wrote Dîme royale (1707), praising China’s tax system. 88 While this work had several collaborators, the most important was Denis Diderot, who is estimated to have written about one-third of the finished work in the 1781 edition. Agnan, “Diderot and the Two Indies of the French Enlightenment,” 66. The first edition was published in Amsterdam in 1770, and it was substantially edited in 1774 and further modified in 1780. The English edition, translated by J.A. Justamond, appeared as early as 1776 and was re-edited up to 1821. It was translated into several languages and made its way across the globe to North and South America. Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes, xlix. 89 Jimack, ed., A History of the Two Indies, x–xi; Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 15.

28463_Millar.indd 63

2016-12-15 14:01:58

64

A Singular Case

up the view of Montesquieu presented in De L’esprit des lois (1748).90 Sankar Muthu agrees that Diderot authored the second chapter on China but believes he wrote it in order to “present a broader range of views that readers could peruse in order to make a better informed set of judgments about the nature of Chinese society.”91 It is remarkable that Diderot and Raynal presented the two views on China in such a straightforward way, and it reflects their desire to not merely use discussion of China to suit an individual philosophical agenda, but rather present a more nuanced discussion of the Middle Kingdom. Most Enlightenment philosophers were more directed in their discussion of China’s political economy. In Enlightenment France, the Physiocrats (“physiocracy” meaning government or rule of nature) were the most famous and influential group of authors writing on political economy. The Physiocrats believed in the primacy of agriculture over trade and industry, a view particularly expressed in François Quesnay’s Tableau économique (1759). In his “Despotisme de la Chine” (1767), Quesnay argued that China operated on natural law.92 The Physiocratic interest in China was not solely as an abstract model, as Elizabeth Fox Genovese has suggested. Rather, China provided an essential real-world example of their ideal system.93 Quesnay’s use of a variety of first-hand sources, including Du Halde, Gemelli Carreri, George Anson, Mendes Pinto, the Dutch travellers, and Navarette – largely digested through the work of Rousselot de Surgy’s Mélanges interéssans et curieux (1763–65) – reflects his desire to offer a reliable assessment of China. Of course, if China was the empirical case closest to Quesnay’s idealized system, one must consider why he did not spend more time reading first-hand descriptions. A possible explanation is that the Physiocrat found de Surgy’s meticulous discussion of his own sources and that his time was better spent reading an already edited and digested description of China. The information about China, already filtered through de Surgy, was then unpacked through Quesnay’s Physiocratic filter. Unlike Quesnay, Montesquieu engaged more directly in the controversy and disagreement surrounding the veracity of the information provided by various first-hand accounts. His De l’esprit des lois (1748) is crucial

90 Jimack, ed., A History of the Two Indies, 9. Jimack argues the same view in Histoire philosophique et politique, 14. 91 Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire, 82. 92 Quesnay’s “Despotisme de la Chine” was published in four consecutive installments of the Physiocratic journal Ephémérides du citoyen in the spring of 1767. Quesnay’s publication was provocative and sparked a public debate. 93 Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 11.

28463_Millar.indd 64

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 65

for understanding the rising criticism of China’s system of political economy. His analysis of the evidence on China was inconsistent. In a published letter to Abbé Count de Guasco, written in 1755, Montesquieu describes the dispute he had with Jean-Jacques d’Ortous de Mairan over the different presentations of China. The editor of the English edition of Montesquieu’s works, published in 1777, describes the disagreement: “These two learned gentlemen did not agree in some points relating to the Chinese, in the favour of whom Mr. de Mairan declared, on the ­authority of Father Paranin, a Jesuit’s letter, of whose veracity M. de Montesquieu doubted not a little. As soon as the voyage of Admiral Anson appeared, Montesquieu triumphantly exclaimed ‘I had always said that the Chinese were not such very honest men, as the missionary Jesuits would fain make us to believe them through the channel of their edifying letters.’”94 Despite Montesquieu’s argument about the bias of the Jesuit sources, in the following paragraph he directly referenced a Jesuit source to support his view of the despotic nature of the Chinese government. In fact, he cited Du Halde several times on topics ranging from the Chinese gain in trade from sugar, the origins of the Chinese work ethic, their views on luxury, and the corruption of former dynasties. Recognizing the contradiction, Montesquieu sought to explain it. First, he suggested that the missionaries might have been too obtuse to clearly understand the nature of China: “Might our missionaries have been deceived by an appearance of order?” He then posited a more general maxim in defence of his use of the Jesuit sources: “In fine, there is frequently some kind of truth even in errors themselves.”95 Even vehement critics of the Jesuits still relied on them for information. Other philosophers actively defended the Jesuits’ credentials for ­describing China to interested Europeans. Voltaire, who famously attacked the Catholic Church, was a great supporter of the most popular Jesuit sources (including works by Ricci-Trigault, Semedo, Kircher, Le Comte, Du Halde, Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, and Le Gobien). In his Dictionnaire philosophique (1764), he expressed his frustration with how the debate on the authority of the Jesuits connected to the way in which their information on China was used. He mocked the logic of the ancient part of the Universal History, which attacked Chinese chronology simply because it originated in Jesuit sources: “The compilers of a 94 Montesquieu, The Complete Works of M. De Montesquieu, Familiar Letters, Letter lvii (written Paris, 1755), editor’s footnote. The letter describes the dispute between Mairan and Montesquieu. The editor is the only source for this story that I have found. 95 Ibid.

28463_Millar.indd 65

2016-12-15 14:01:58

66

A Singular Case

universal history, printed in England, have also shown a disposition to divest the Chinese of their antiquity, because the Jesuits were the first who made the world acquainted with China. This is unquestionably a very satisfactory reason for saying to a whole nation – ‘You are liars.’”96 Voltaire’s view of China evolved over time and he was influenced by the criticism directed at the Middle Kingdom, especially that by his personal correspondent Cornelius de Pauw. De Pauw was a Dutch philosopher, naturalist, geographer, and diplomat at the court of Frederick of Prussia. While best known for his expertise on America, his description of China in Recherches philosophiques sur les Égyptiens et les Chinois (1774) was read not only by Voltaire but also by Raynal and Smith.97 As Basil Guy argues, de Pauw “undertook [the work] to controvert the Jesuits and their machine de guerre, China, not from a factual, but from a rational, logical argument.”98 Voltaire, in Lettres chinoises (1774), dedicated to de Pauw, concluded that de Pauw excessively criticized China while conceding that he himself had shown it too much admiration.99 De Pauw’s criticisms were indeed extensive and he is one of the few philosophers to maintain a steadily dismissive attitude toward the Jesuit sources on China as well as China’s political economy, although his analysis was rather simplified. In the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume and Adam Smith had very different approaches to using evidence in their discussions of China. Hume, who sought to explain why China became “stationary” and Europe was “dynamic” in his “Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1741), did not refer to any first-hand or geographical sources. He described the exceptionality of the Chinese case (based on geography, population, and culture), and vaguely indicated that his understanding was based on sources that held detailed knowledge of China.100 Hume was not concerned with using empirical evidence to support his claims, but it is likely he knew a great deal about the Chinese Empire. Apart from access to the popular sources, Hume spent time with Jesuit scholars at the Royal College of La Flèche in France from 1735 to 1737.101 He was evidently not worried that his claims about China could be undermined or challenged through the use of contradicting empirical evidence.

 96 Voltaire, “Cannibals to Falsity of Human Virtue,” Philosophical Dictionary, 4: 81.  97 Browning, “Cornelius de Pauw and Exiled Jesuits,” 293.  98 Guy, “Ad majorem Societatis gloriam,” 77.  99 Voltaire, Lettres chinoises, indiennes et tartares, 53. 100 Hume, “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1741), in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, 3: 136. 101 Gopnik, “Could David Hume Have Known about Buddhism?”

28463_Millar.indd 66

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 67

By contrast, Adam Smith was more direct in his use of empirical evidence. Perhaps this difference is a result of Smith’s recognizing the debates over the veracity of first-hand accounts. Hume’s essay was published before Anson’s supposedly controversial description of China and before the comments by Voltaire and Montesquieu on the reliability of the Jesuit sources. Smith’s engagement with ethnography is much clearer than Hume’s. Christian Marouby’s study of Adam Smith’s use of ethnographic sources in developing his theories of economic progress finds his use of information to be highly questionable and selective.102 Similarly, Roy Campbell and Andrew Skinner describe Adam Smith’s “use of history” as of secondary importance: “he worked from the system to the facts not from the facts to the system.”103 There is no doubt that Smith’s knowledge of China was subordinated to his overarching theory, but that need not imply that first-hand descriptions did not shape many of his ideas. Adam Smith’s library and his use of sources reveal the importance of reconstructing the circulation of information on China by examining the first-hand, geographical, and philosophical sources. Smith relied on several explicit and implicit first-hand sources when he referred to the “accounts of travellers” in China.104 He cited Marco Polo and Pierre Poivre (although not directly when discussing China). He also referenced the voyage of Laurent Lange in his discussion of Chinese trade. His library catalogue demonstrates that he had access to the descriptions of China from Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations, the Churchill brothers’ Collection of Voyages, and de Pauw’s description of  China.105 His travels from 1764 to 1767 introduced him to the Physiocrats, and his library contained the volumes of Ephémérides du citoyen that included Quesnay’s “Despotisme de la Chine” (1767). These sources and his discussions of China show that his approach to describing China was certainly empirical. His conclusions about the Middle Kingdom were based on the knowledge available combined with his theoretical beliefs. For example, he did not address the state of China’s science because this topic was not of essential importance to his system, reflecting the centrality of his theory framing his interest in China. While he ultimately labelled China a stationary state, he also offered several recommendations on how it could begin to improve based on the 102 See Marouby, “Adam Smith and the Anthropology of the Enlightenment.” 103 Campbell and Skinner, “Preface to Adam Smith’s An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.” 104 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 101. 105 Mizuta, Adam Smith’s Library. See also Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, table of corresponding passages.

28463_Millar.indd 67

2016-12-15 14:01:58

68

A Singular Case

ethnographic descriptions and analyses he had read. Smith’s discussion of China was entirely focused on political economy, he accounted for the views and arguments (both positive and negative) that came before him, and he worked the Chinese Empire into a schema of civilization that was to last throughout the nineteenth century. Of course, not all philosophers were interested in empirical evidence. Some Enlightenment philosophers used China as a means to further their domestic agenda. This was particularly the case in the literary works of the Enlightenment. Those sources are not addressed in this study because most were not interested in understanding China’s political economy. From Jean Baptiste Boyer D’Argens’s Lettres chinoises, Horace Walpole’s Letters from Xo Ho, and Oliver Goldsmith’s The Citizen of the World (1762), China was a literary tool to reflect and comment on domestic European affairs. Some authors, such as Goldsmith, relied on first-hand descriptions such as those of Le Comte and Du Halde, as well as other sources such as Voltaire’s Essai sur les moeurs; but, as Chen Shouyi argues, Goldsmith’s “chief purpose is to enlighten or satirize England … and not to exalt or interpret China.”106 It is possible to differentiate these Enlightenment writers from those who engaged with ethnographic descriptions of China to enhance their theories and imbue them with greater veracity. Other cases are less clear. Authoring hundreds of works ranging from religious to social to political pamphlets, pioneering journalistic writing and the novel in England, Daniel Defoe is an example of a figure that defies classification. His most famous publication, Robinson Crusoe (1719), and the two sequels in 1719 and 1720, as well as The Complete English Tradesman (1726), all contain revealing analysis of China. Defoe was less interested in China on its own terms than in using it as a means to criticize the East India Company, English trade policies, French absolutism, and so on.107 His agenda as a mercantilist and bullionist (who believed importing Chinese luxuries was useful to the Chinese and the eic but detrimental to England) is well known. He found it difficult to allow any praise to be given to the Middle Kingdom; even their production of porcelain was attributed to their natural setting rather than

106 Shouyi, “Oliver Goldsmith and His Chinese Letters,” 285 and 292. 107 Nonetheless, Defoe did not base his criticisms on his imagination, but instead relied on his extensive knowledge of primary accounts of China, especially Le Comte’s Memoirs. Starr, “Defoe and China,” 443, and Markley, The Far East, 195; La Grand, A Spectacular Failure, 177.

28463_Millar.indd 68

2016-12-15 14:01:58



Travelling Knowledge in the “Discerning Age” 69

workmanship.108 Yet, we know that Defoe read Louis Le Comte (he ­ entions him in the second sequel to Robinson Crusoe published in 1720) m and among other traveller literature, his library contained Athanase Kircher’s China Illustrate (1667), who relied on Trigault and Ricci. Defoe’s library also contained the Churchill brothers’ 1704 travel compendium. Defoe commented on and criticized China in fictional and non-fictional works relying on his own ideas as well as his reading of early modern travellers and popular geographers. Defoe is the perfect reminder that constructed categories, whether sinophile or sinophobe, traveller or philosopher, can only be loosely ­applied. These categories can be useful tools to help us see how information circulated but they should not be taken as absolute. While acknowledging the importance of China’s observed reality to the European Enlightenment and appreciating that what we know now about early modern China’s political economy can be informative, it is not the purpose of this book to distinguish fact from fiction. The point, rather, is to unpack the views held about China’s political economy by those involved in the burgeoning social sciences in France and Britain – from the ethnographers to the popularizers to the philosophers and all the characters that blur these categories. Conclusion From Serica to Cathay to China, early modern Europeans were interested in many facets of Chinese civilization. The first-hand, geographical, and philosophical sources across Britain and France allow us to reconstruct knowledge of China’s political economy in the eighteenth century. The three groups of sources reflect the common themes and perspectives in debates on China’s political economy, and point to the role of the Chinese system in shaping Enlightenment theories. The first-hand sources of information, namely the missionaries, merchants, men of war, and emissaries, all had varying motivations and loyalties when constructing and transmitting information about China’s political economy. On the receiving end, the expanding role of geographers led to the arrangement and consolidation of the first-hand sources. These sources were largely driven by matters of political economy and thus showed particular concern for the subject. More broadly, European philosophers who included China in their writings showed an interest in

108 Starr, “Defoe and China,” 437.

28463_Millar.indd 69

2016-12-15 14:01:58

70

A Singular Case

understanding the Middle Kingdom, although they manipulated the available information to fit their arguments and analytical frameworks. It is from and between these three broad contexts that the knowledge of China’s political economy was formed. “Facts” travelled for different reasons and it is clear they managed to overcome the rhetoric of distrust often associated with their carriers. This was accomplished because European audiences explicitly confronted the veracity of the information they read. These interactions indicate a serious attempt to engage in ethnographic analysis to enhance Enlightenment debates. For a core group of important thinkers the information on China provided by “faithful witnesses” formed a key component of their philosophical inquiries. By looking at particular themes of political economy in the following chapters, we can see how some “facts” were used to enhance broader theories, how others were directly attacked, and how many remained challenges.

28463_Millar.indd 70

2016-12-15 14:01:58

2

“The Most Unscrupulous People on Earth”: The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit In an era when Europeans – from philosophers to politicians and merchants to peasants – were confronting a rapidly expanding commercial world, questions of morality in economic activity were of the utmost interest. Long before the field of economic anthropology became a ground for disagreement between culturalists, substantivists, and formalists, the moral philosophers of the Enlightenment debated the place of culture and the role of human nature in commercial relations. As a branch of moral philosophy, political economy was imbued with questions of morality from its inception. Indeed, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) was logically dependent on the theoretical and ethical foundations of social interaction expounded in his book on moral philosophy, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). China occupied a unique position in Enlightenment debates on morality as thinkers struggled to reconcile traditional moral paradigms with a growing commercial society. As a highly developed civilization with expansive domestic commerce (discussed in the following chapter), China offered an example of the prioritization of self-interest and the ability of moral philosophy to control avarice. In spite of the praise that some writers lavished on Confucianism and China’s perfection of the moral sciences, the system appeared to fall short of actually controlling what the Europeans characterized as the “immoral” inclinations of the Chinese people. The first-hand descriptions of China reflected the friction between an ideal morality (represented by Confucian moral philosophy) and practical morality (seen in the anecdotes of immoral behaviour by Chinese merchants and mandarins). This paralleled a tension within Europe where an increasingly commercialized society confronted first the morality of Christianity and then the moral philosophy of the ivory towers; but this parallel was not always recognized. Many commentators

28463_Millar.indd 71

2016-12-15 14:01:58

72

A Singular Case

held China to a higher standard as a result of the panegyrics of the Jesuits on Confucian morality. Montesquieu dedicated an entire chapter to describing this tension in China. The philosophe was distinctive for his direct approach to addressing this well-known issue, which many observers and commentators acknowledged in some way. His chapter on this topic, entitled “Explanation of a Paradox Relating to the Chinese,” sought to answer why “the Chinese, whose life is entirely directed by rites, are nevertheless the most unscrupulous people on earth. This appears chiefly in commerce, which has never been able to inspire in them the good faith natural to it.”1 Montesquieu recognized a struggle between the ideal (rites) and the reality on the ground (unscrupulous people). In particular, he mentioned the reported problems of inaccurate weighing in trading deals, claiming that each Chinese merchant carried with him a heavy, light, and accurate set of scales depending on whether he was buying, selling, or trying to get a real measure. Montesquieu also alluded to the notion that commerce was naturally honest and good (doux commerce) – a debate that was raging in Europe at the time. This topic touched on critical questions facing Enlightenment thinkers: Could the two worlds of idealized morality and commercial realities be reconciled in China and, if so, what lessons could this offer for Europe? Was this type of supposedly immoral behaviour a consequence of, asset to, or hindrance to commercial activity? China confirmed the tension between practical and ideal morality but the answer it provided to the second question was the clearest; there was a strong relationship between avaricious, self-interested behaviour and a flourishing commercial society. The behavioural and moral foundations of what was to become the modern capitalist system were conceived, debated, and analyzed at this moment in history. While some thinkers like Daniel Defoe worked out the fine lines between immorality and trading lies, others such as Adam Smith subtly argued for acceptance of the positive effects of self-interest in commercial societies. These advances in thought were to change the public acceptability of self-interest and redefine established morality; hence they were necessarily slow to evolve. This dynamic eighteenth-­ century environment both created and confronted the growing ethnographic information on morality in Chinese commerce. Interestingly, there was a parallel struggle in late imperial China (1550– 1930). Richard Lufrano, in his study of mid-level Chinese merchant

1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 321. Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, 108.

28463_Millar.indd 72

2016-12-15 14:01:58



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 73

manuals, highlights the “dilemma of attaining economic success while remaining socially respectable.”2 Like England, China was ­becoming an increasingly commercialized society, and rapid population growth was providing new opportunities as well as challenges for its growing merchant class. However, while there may have been some similarities, Lufrano emphasizes that merchant culture in China was distinct and can only be understood in its particular Chinese context. Nonetheless, it is an interesting parallel, and worth asking if any of our early modern observers picked up on it. Scholarship on self-interest and avarice during the Enlightenment has primarily focused on the philosophical dimensions of the debate.3 This approach neglects the role of the wider world in filtering into the conversations. When China was addressed, it was not merely a convenient foreign model. There was also interest in understanding the causes and consequences of self-interest in the Middle Kingdom. As a result, the debate was not only theoretical but also deeply ethnographical. China’s heathen status was mentioned as an explanation for its supposed avariciousness, as was a presumed universal predisposition for avarice. But two other proffered explanations were closely connected to the empirical descriptions of China; namely, China was unique because of its history and geography, and it was a large and extremely diverse empire so any generalizations could not hold. European commentators sought to understand, rationalize, and contextualize the accounts of Chinese avarice and morality. While the Chinese were criticized for immorality in their commercial actions, this disapproval did not lead to a general dismissal of their system of political economy, especially because that flaw was also observed in Europe. Further, commentators argued, the presence of self-interest generally had positive effects for the Chinese system of political economy. European Conceptions of Commercial Morality Many Enlightenment thinkers recognized the tension between ideal morality and its practical application, particularly when it came to commercial activity.4 The question of how to tame the passions of human nature (such as avarice, sloth, ferocity, and ambition) rose in importance as the 2 Lufrano, Honorable Merchants, 1. 3 See Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests; Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith. 4 See Hont and Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations,” 11–12. They situate Smith as seeking to define a “realistic account of moral sentiments.”

28463_Millar.indd 73

2016-12-15 14:01:59

74

A Singular Case

role of religion as a controlling force in society declined. One part of the debate over taming the passions occurred between philosophers like Francis Hutcheson, who still believed in some form of natural morality (or innate “moral sense”), and thinkers in the Hobbesian tradition such as Mandeville and Hume, who believed that morality was a human creation used to control natural self-interest. Mandeville pointed out the importance of the vice of avarice in British society, as well as the hypocrisy of those who tried to downplay it. In his Fable of the Bees (1714), the members of the beehive (representing England) that were accused of deceit included lawyers, physicians, priests, soldiers, kings, and merchants. Mandeville quipped, “for there was not a Bee, but would/Get more, I won’t say, than he should;/But than he dared to let them know,/ That pay’d for’t.”5 In the beehive, then, the buyer would sell his product or service for as much as possible, without considering what was fair from a disinterested perspective (perhaps not a surprising tenet from our modern viewpoint). This approach to commercial transactions was explicitly confronted in the case of China. The French Physiocrat François Quesnay commented on Chinese behaviour in a section entitled “Commerce Viewed as Serving Agriculture” (repeating almost verbatim a section of Rousselot de Surgy’s Mélanges intéressans et curieux [1763–65]6). He acknowledged the “one blemish in their commerce,” namely, “the lack of good faith,” and described their desire to sell as dearly as possible. Quesnay repeated a ­particular Chinese maxim that circulated in numerous first-hand and geographical sources: the seller should ask for the greatest price for his good or service and if the buyer is ignorant enough to pay this, it is not the merchant who deceives, but rather the buyer who deceives themselves.7 Recent research into Chinese commercial culture confirms this maxim. Richard Lufrano describes how it was seen as a sort of personal or moral failure if a Ming or Qing merchant fell victim to a crime. He quotes from a 1792 Chinese merchant manual: “When [boastful people] make a mistake, they blame others or heaven rather than themselves. They do not realize that heaven [only] gives wealth and prestige to those who are able to establish and manage business themselves.”8

5 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 67. The poem was first published in 1705 and the Fable was published in several editions beginning in 1714. 6 The section on China in Jacques Philibert Rousselot de Surgy’s work relied heavily on Du Halde. 7 For example, see The Chinese Traveller, 191. 8 Lufrano, Honorable Merchants, 51.

28463_Millar.indd 74

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 75

This maxim of seeking the greatest price is also akin to Mandeville’s description of the avaricious merchants in England. For Mandeville, the “root of evil avarice” was the “wheel, that turn’d the trade.”9 In fact, he believed that any “populous, rich and extended kingdom” required avarice. China, of course, was a very populous, rich, and extended empire and so would have necessarily suffered from the vice so closely associated with economic wealth. Clearly, this was not only a European problem. These questions on commercial morality were central to Enlightenment debates. Rousseau tackled this topic in Discourse on Inequality (1754) by arguing that civilization was a corrupting force. According to Rousseau, the introduction of property led to inequality and injustice. Smith criticized Rousseau’s denunciation of civilization although he was deeply challenged and inspired by it. He entered the debate mid-century with his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), arguing that both natural and constructed moral traits were present in society. Underpinning Smith’s thought on human relationships was the idea of sympathy, a concept that dated back to the Stoics and was popular in theories of human relationships during the Enlightenment. Smith believed in the controversial notion of a largely artificial morality, but he sought to distinguish himself from the contentious writings of Hobbes and Mandeville, who argued that morality was merely a form of self-love. As Hirschman points out, Smith “blunted the edge of Mandeville’s shocking paradox by substituting for ‘passion’ and ‘vice’ such bland terms as ‘advantage’ or ‘interest.’”10 Smith argued that two forces developed morality in individuals: one is the social mirror, which appeals to an individual’s self-love, since they desire approval; and the other is a more ambiguous force – the impartial spectator.11 The concept of the impartial spectator allowed Smith to bridge Mandeville and Hutcheson by arguing that a more natural force was partially responsible for morality. With the repositioning of avarice as a form of self-interest, the view that commercial behaviour could be natural and innocuous began to anchor itself in European thought. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith also made the leap to collapse the passions back together after thinkers had earlier tried to isolate and harness avarice from other passions. As Hirschman describes the move, “By holding that ambition, the lust for power, and the desire for respect can all be satisfied by economic improvement, Smith undercut the idea that passion can be pitted against passion, or the interests against the

 9 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 68 and 69. 10 Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 19. 11 See Raphael, The Impartial Spectator, for more on Smith’s moral philosophy.

28463_Millar.indd 75

2016-12-15 14:01:59

76

A Singular Case

passions.”12 However, as we see below, Smith did argue that commerce is detrimental to the “martial” or “heroic” spirit. For many commentators, avarice was a necessary component of commerce; but this need not mean that the vice should be completely unharnessed, particularly because trust was a crucial factor of early modern transactions. One way to control avarice was to define a code of acceptable and unacceptable merchant behaviour. An important text in this field of moral merchant manuals was Daniel Defoe’s The Complete English Tradesman (1725), a paradigmatic work in a growing genre that articulated the code of conduct for merchants within a framework of national economic advancement.13 Defoe was an intriguing character whose work bridged the popularizing and philosophical genres: he was a businessman who went bankrupt several times and had a keen understanding of the emerging credit economy; a political activist who was involved in the government and arrested for libel; a journalist who edited The Review and was criticized as a hack writer; and, most famously, the literary author of Robinson Crusoe, which touched on the genre of popular travel literature.14 In The Complete English Tradesman – described as one of his “most passionate and personal books” – Defoe laid out the “difference between an honest man, and an honest tradesman” and defined the boundaries beyond which a tradesman cannot wander if he wants to retain the epithet “honest.”15 While the tradesman could not cheat or defraud, Defoe did allow him some moral latitude. These liberties, such as “the liberty of asking more than he will take” so as to allow a “reasonable profit,” if taken “within bounds,” should allow the tradesman to be regarded in society as an honest man.16 Defoe distinguished between unacceptable, immoral lying and “trading lies” that were connected to self-interest but were increasingly acceptable in society because they were necessary for economic improvement. Although “trading lies” were to be avoided, Defoe argued, this was not always possible. One should be honest in their foundations but within reasonable expectations: “Custom indeed has driven us beyond the limits of our morals in many things, which trade makes necessary, and which we cannot now avoid; so that if we must pretend to go back to the literal sense of the command … why

12 Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 10. 13 This was a pan-European genre with common sensibilities across Western Europe. See Rabuzzi, “Eighteenth-Century Commercial Mentalities.” In 1734, Samuel Richardson published an even more popular book in this genre, Apprentice’s Vade Mecum. 14 Backscheider, “Defoe, Daniel (1660?–1731).” 15 Ibid.; Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman, 274. 16 Ibid., 276.

28463_Millar.indd 76

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 77

then it is impossible for tradesmen to be Christians, and we must unhinge all business.”17 Here, Defoe separated practical norms from ethical ideals. However, not every immoral act committed by a merchant or tradesman was acceptable in Defoe’s scheme. There were customary frauds that were not justifiable, such as falsifying money, which Defoe noted was widely prevalent during the reign of King William of Orange, when “people were daily upon the catch to cheat and surprise one another, if they could.”18 The debate over the relationship between utility and honesty was present much earlier in relation to the role of the statesman, but it was now being firmly applied to commercial activity.19 There were clearly problems with fraud in England before, during, and after Defoe’s time, which were widely known. However, there were no clear rules on where the line between utility and honesty was to be drawn. The boundaries between avarice, fraud, immorality, and self-interest were fluid, as Defoe’s “trading lies” indicates. It was clear that Christian moral boundaries needed to be pushed in order to achieve economic success. While thinkers like Defoe worked out the fine lines between immorality and trading lies, other philosophers such as Adam Smith subtly argued for acceptance of the positive effects of self-interest in commercial societies in universal and abstract terms. These advances in thought were to change the public acceptability of self-interest and redefine established morality, and hence they were necessarily slow to evolve. It was this dynamic eighteenth-century environment that confronted the growing ethnographic information on morality in Chinese commerce. In this context, the descriptions of China do not present it as exceptionally immoral, and yet scholars such as Montesquieu still wrote about the Middle Kingdom as the land containing “the most unscrupulous people on earth.” What was it about the described Chinese behaviour that caused such vitriolic reactions in Europe? Yang describes the transition from established aristocratic ideals of honour and civic virtue to “competing bourgeois virtues of exchange and sociability.”20 She argues that by “straddling the line between virtue and vice [China] exposed the constructedness of the boundary so scrutinized by Mandeville and others.”21 In fact, this was typical of many themes of Enlightenment political economy. China represented a diversity of characteristics, so 17 Ibid., 284–5. 18 Ibid., 293. 19 For the role of the statesman, see van Miert, Humanism in an Age of Science, 281–2. 20 Yang, Performing China, 9. 21 Ibid., 10.

28463_Millar.indd 77

2016-12-15 14:01:59

78

A Singular Case

much so that it confused the neat models that Enlightenment philosophers created. This book explores how different thinkers dealt with conflicting information and characteristics, in the process shaping their understanding and use of China as well as the modern social sciences. What room was there for ethnography in these debates of commerce and morality? If we turn back to the earlier, sixteenth-century Iberian reports on China, we find they did not address Confucian ideology ­directly, but they did comment on practical Chinese morality. Friar Gaspar da Cruz’s early description of Chinese commercial life was not very positive. He characterized the merchants as “commonly false and liars” who deceive buyers because “they have no conscience which reproaches them.”22 But a more complex portrayal of Chinese commercial morality emerged in the seventeenth-century Jesuit accounts. R e p o r t s o n C h i n e s e C o m m e r c i a l B e h av i o u r One might reasonably assume that secular authors were more sympathetic toward self-interest in commercial interactions than missionaries; however, if the personal motivations of observers are kept in mind, it would also be logical that merchants and men of war were frustrated by  their dealings with Chinese traders. Jesuit missionaries might have praised Chinese morality in order to engender support for their mission by presenting the Middle Kingdom as a civilization only waiting to learn the word of God. If any of these assumptions holds, the first-hand descriptions would be expected to present a one-dimensional view of Chinese morality. However, contrary to expectation, the observers gave a nuanced view of Chinese morality and economic behaviour that was ­remarkably similar across authors. The Jesuits were the first Europeans to gain sufficient access to China to grapple with Chinese moral philosophy and Confucianism. RicciTrigault described the ancient Confucian philosophy of China and held that the “only one of the higher philosophical sciences with which the Chinese have become acquainted is that of moral philosophy,” however imperfect.23 The Jesuits described the Chinese emphasis on politeness as a cardinal virtue, even when it came to commerce: “with [the Chinese], respect and deference and consideration in business transactions constitute the foundation of urbanity.”24 And yet, only two chapters after discussing China’s cardinal virtues, Ricci-Trigault discussed the common 22 Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, 130. 23 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, xviii. 24 Ibid., 59.

28463_Millar.indd 78

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 79

fraud of fortune tellers.25 In fact, when addressing the history of the Jesuit mission in China, Ricci-Trigault relayed numerous accounts that painted the Chinese as immoral swindlers who often tried to cheat the Jesuits in business transactions and falsified credit when the opportunity arose.26 It was not only common people who were deemed avaricious. This label was also assigned to members of the Chinese government (mandarins) who were well trained in Confucian teachings from the state examinations.27 By the end of the seventeenth century, the Jesuit reports had grown even more censorious on the topic of immorality in daily interactions while they continued to praise Confucian ideal morality. Father Le Comte’s 1696 account of China described how Confucius “resolved to preach up a severe morality, to prevail upon men to condemn riches and worldly pleasures and esteem temperance, justice, and other virtues.”28 He also, however, reported that the Chinese people ignored this Confucian precept. More importantly, Le Comte argued, disregarding the moral stricture made them successful commercially: “there is no nation under the sun, that is more fit for commerce and traffick, and understand them better: One can hardly believe how far their tricks and craftiness proceed when they are to insinuate into mens affections to manage a fair opportunity to improve the overtures that are offered: the desire of getting torments them continually, and makes them discover a thousand ways of gaining, that would not naturally come into their head.”29 He concluded that the “trade and commerce, that is carried on every where, is the soul of the people, and the primum mobile of all their actions.” This obsession with gain, according to Le Comte, led “[the Chinese to] falsifie almost every thing they vend.” Embedded within the descriptions of Chinese deception came an image of bustling commercial spirit. Rather than being destructive, “trading lies,” if kept within loosely defined bounds, were closely associated with bustling commercial activity. Thus, prior to the theories of Mandeville and Smith, there was already some credence given to the expansion of moral boundaries for commercial success. One area of commercial activity perceived as particularly fraught with deceit was credit. Credit was the lifeblood of early modern transactions 25 Ibid., 83–4. 26 Ibid., 351. 27 Ibid., 83–4, 343, and 359. 28 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 201. Accurately translated from the original French, see Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 1: 330. 29 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 237. Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 1: 401.

28463_Millar.indd 79

2016-12-15 14:01:59

80

A Singular Case

and associated with it was the key component of trust.30 Le Comte, like Ricci-Trigault before him, warned readers that one must have “sureties” when lending to the Chinese because they do not keep their promises. The borrowers build up their credit with small amounts, he argued, and then steal a larger amount later.31 And yet, in spite of these problems relating to trust, observers painted a picture of Chinese commerce as flourishing, indicating that engagement with foreigners distorted incentives and enforcement structures. By the mid-eighteenth century, with the backdrop of changes in European philosophical approaches to commercial morality, Du Halde was more tempered in his judgment. He argued that the Chinese “are not so deceitful and knavish as P. Le Comte represents them,” although he did not ignore the evidence of Chinese avarice.32 Du Halde, like the earlier Jesuits, described a world where the Chinese were driven to trade and controlled by their self-interest. He argued that interest is the grand foible of the Chinese … When they have any gain in view, they employ all their cunning, artfully to insinuate themselves into the favour of the persons, who may forward their business … Interest is the spring of all their actions; for when the least profit offers, they despise all difficulties, and undertake the most painful journeys to procure it. In a word, this puts them in continual motion, fills the streets, the rivers, and the high roads with infinite numbers of people, who pass and repass, and are always in action.

Like Le Comte, he recognized that the abundant commercial activity of the Chinese was a direct result of their perceived self-interest but he was much less critical of it. Interest was not admired or reproached; more simply, it was a motivating force that had consequences. Du Halde, who never travelled to China himself, was informed by changing philosophical views reflecting multi-directional influences shaping discussions of China. Like the earlier Jesuits, Du Halde argued that the Chinese system of moral philosophy tried to temper self-interest. He described the instructions given by the mandarins to the people on the first and fifteenth of every month. The orders reminded the people of all classes that they had moral obligations: “that you are never to be allow’d to … seek to enrich 30 See Muldrew, “Interpreting the Market,” 169. 31 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 237. Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 1: 403. 32 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 279, Watt’s edition, 2: 132, French edition, 2: 77.

28463_Millar.indd 80

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 81

your self at the expence of others.”33 Du Halde realized that, as in Europe, ideals did not determine reality. When discussing the behaviour of government officials, he argued, “But among so great a number there are always some, who, placing their happiness in the pleasures and enjoyments of this life, do not often scruple to sacrifice the most sacred laws of reason and justice to their private interest.”34 The Jesuits presented a detailed and often critical view of Chinese morality and depicted the tension between theory and practice,35 and we can, then, see some awareness of the growing tension in China that Lufrano identified. The Jesuit line of thinking parallels studies of Chinese merchant culture that see a clear opposition between Confucian thought and pragmatic merchant behaviour; Lufrano, on the other hand, argues that Confucianism and commercial culture were not incompatible.36 Yet, it is those travellers who went to China with secular interests who are thought to have “added the shadows” to the adulatory accounts of the Jesuits.37 In fact, they offered little more insight or criticism on this topic than their religious counterparts. They rarely addressed Confucian moral philosophy in any detail, in large part because they did not have the skills or access to do so. The omission of praise for the ideal system of morality contributed to the impression that these secular authors were especially critical of China. Some secular travellers, such as Johannes Nieuhof, did briefly discuss Confucius. While acknowledging the virtue and integrity of his teachings, Nieuhof ultimately dismissed his relevance because his philosophy was not put into practice.38 Nieuhof had first-hand knowledge of commercial behaviour in China from his journey to Peking, but his description was no more severe than those provided by the Jesuits. He warned his European readers that if they planned on trading in China, they 33 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China. Cave edition, 1: 255, Watt’s edition, 2: 56, French edition, 2: 34. 34 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 257; Watt’s edition, 2: 61, French edition, 2: 37. 35 The religious antagonists to the Jesuits painted a similar picture. For example, the Dominican Domingo Navarrete, notable for his anti-Jesuit stance in the Rites Controversy, recognized the tension between Confucian codes and the impetus for self-interest. He also mentioned the rise of commerce in France, highlighting a commonality between Europe and China. Navarrete’s account was translated into English and published in Churchill, A Collection of Voyages and Travels, 1: 60 and 127. 36 Lufrano, Honorable Merchants, introduction. 37 Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe, 1568. 38 Nieuhof, An Embassy from the East-India Company, 154. Nieuhof’s discussions of Confucius were direct excerpts from earlier Jesuit works by Ricci-Trigault and Anthanius Kircher.

28463_Millar.indd 81

2016-12-15 14:01:59

82

A Singular Case

“must always have a pair of scales about [them]” because the Chinese “are so nimble and deceitful in their balancing, that you had need of Argus’s Eyes [one hundred eyes] when you buy any thing of them.”39 One such Chinese fraud, he reported, was to stuff pigs with valueless materials to increase their weight and selling price. But Nieuhof offered no greater criticism or insight into the behaviour of Chinese merchants than the Jesuits did. Perhaps, then, it was only in the eighteenth century that the real distinction in secular sources is evident. Commentators from Montesquieu to modern historians identify a turning point in views of China with the mid-eighteenth-century description by Admiral George Anson. His assault on the Chinese character in Voyage round the World (1748) became infamous. Michael Adas describes how “Anson accused the Chinese of greed, deceit, dishonesty, and outright thievery.”40 Indeed, Anson claimed self-interest had a boundless influence in China and the people had a “strong attachment to lucre.”41 He also argued “it [would be] endless to recount all the artifices, extortions and frauds which were practiced on the commodore and his people, by this interested race.” His anecdotes of Chinese fraud, such as the attempt to falsify weights, were strikingly similar to the earlier Jesuit and merchant reports. The commodore tried to find a Chinese captain to guide his ships to Macao by offering money, which he believed was “a most alluring bait for Chinese of all ranks and professions.”42 This was not exactly a scathing indictment but it did indicate a preconceived notion of Chinese greed, perhaps gathered from encounters with Chinese merchants in foreign ports, and likely garnered from earlier sources. At least one contemporary geographer recognized the similarities between the Jesuit and secular descriptions of the immoral behaviour of Chinese merchants. D. Fenning and J. Collyer’s A New System of Geography (1764–65) gave examples of fraudulent behaviour by the Chinese and commented on the first-hand sources of this information: “these accounts of the dishonesty of the Chinese in general, are selected from the writings of the missionaries who had long lived in the country, and perfectly agree with the treatment commodore Anson received in the river of Canton.”43 This is a clear example of a geography undertaking the task of assessing and comparing first-hand descriptions of China. For the most part, these nuanced descriptions travelled back to Europe, where 39 Nieuhof, An Embassy from the East-India Company, 76. 40 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 91. 41 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 364 and 397. 42 Ibid., 348. 43 Fenning, Collyer, et al., A New System of Geography, 1: 33.

28463_Millar.indd 82

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 83

geographies largely emphasized the prevalence of self-interest in China and the many frauds that were committed against foreigners. Surprisingly, given the similarities in the Jesuit and commodore’s descriptions of Chinese avariciousness, Anson directly attacked the Jesuit portrayal of Chinese morality: we are told by many of the missionaries … the morality and justice taught and practiced by [the Chinese] are most exemplary: So that from the description given by some of these good fathers, one should be induced to believe, that the whole Empire was a well-governed affectionate family, where the only contests were, who should exert the most humanity and social virtue. But our preceding relation of the behaviour of the magistrates, merchants and tradesmen at Canton sufficiently refutes these Jesuitical fictions.44

Anson juxtaposed his own view of China to those of the Jesuits without acknowledging that the latter also argued for a discord between ideal Confucian morality and day-to-day commercial behaviour. It was Anson himself who set up the false dichotomy between his own and the Jesuits’ information. Although Anson did not discuss Confucianism directly, he did comment on the relevance of China’s system of moral philosophy. He believed that the Confucian principles described by the Jesuits (his only access to Confucian philosophy) were “immaterial” and neglected “discussing the proper criterion of human actions, and regulating the general conduct of mankind to one another.”45 He maintained that China’s ideal morality (the philosophy of Confucius) was completely divorced from the practical morality of everyday life, whereas the Jesuits argued that together they reflected an important tension the Chinese, too, had to confront. Europeans did not receive one-dimensional assessments of Chinese commercial morality. First-hand sources pointed to the paradox that Montesquieu would eventually address. More importantly, the Jesuits made an important connection between avaricious behaviour and commercial success, making China an empirical example of later philosophical arguments in favour of self-interest. 44 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 413. 45 Ibid. This in turn was reflected in popular geographies. Salmon’s The Universal Traveller, written after he had taken part in a section of Anson’s voyage around the world, cited Anson and Walter when describing Chinese greed. Judging from missionary accounts, he concluded that the Chinese moral system contains ridiculous attachments to frivolous points, rather than proper criteria of human actions. Salmon, The Universal Traveller, 1: 22.

28463_Millar.indd 83

2016-12-15 14:01:59

84

A Singular Case

E n l i g h t e n m e n t E x p l a n at i o n s f o r C h i n e s e   “ A va r i c e ” The information available on China enhanced the ability of Europeans to analyze the root causes of self-interest in a commercial society. There were two approaches to understanding the origins of what Europeans characterized as Chinese avarice. The first took a broadly philosophical angle, while the second relied much more on ethnographical descriptions. Commentators often turned to both approaches to explain what they saw as the Chinese paradox. Human Nature and Religion The missionaries believed avarice, as one of the seven deadly sins, afflicted all people. When Ricci-Trigault discussed thieves and robbers in China, they commented, “the lure of gold to human avarice had been so great.”46 Avarice was human, not just European and not just Chinese. Le Comte made this point explicitly when he claimed that with regard to avaricious behaviour, the Chinese resembled the Europeans. He argued for seeing the immorality of Europeans by relating an anecdote of a French woman who tried to commit fraud by pretending to be from China.47 In the eighteenth century, Du Halde made this connection even more direct when, after he described an example of a Chinese fraudster, he commented, “in reality it is said, that some Europeans have taught them their trade.”48 In this view, the supposedly immoral Chinese traders, as well as self-interested Europeans, all needed to improve themselves. Surprisingly, in sections of Voyage round the World, Anson takes a view similar to the Jesuits on avarice as part of human nature. While discussing what he perceived as corruption and greed in the Chinese government, Anson described how the mandarins were “composed of the same fragile materials with the rest of mankind.”49 For all his criticism of what he saw as Chinese immoral behaviour, he did not believe it was endemic to China. Even more surprising were indications of self-awareness that pointed to the “fragile materials” of the commodore himself. 46 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 343 47 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 129; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 1: 213 and 220–6. 48 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 279, Watts edition, 2: 132, French edition, 2: 77. 49 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 363.

28463_Millar.indd 84

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 85

For instance, there were examples of Anson’s own untrustworthiness as he broke his word when dealing with the Chinese. The travel account described how the Chinese “revered the Commodore’s power … yet suspected his morals, and had considered him rather as a lawless ­ freebooter.”50 Indeed, through all his criticisms of Chinese morality and behaviour, Anson was aware of the same problems in his own society. A point of contention in discussions of China’s supposed immorality was the way in which China compared to European societies in terms of curbing the negative human vices. Leibniz was a philosopher who believed the Chinese system offered superior control. In the preface to Novissima Sinica (1699), Leibniz expounded the belief that avarice was a part of human nature. He claimed, “man is a wolf to man”; this line was used by Thomas Hobbes in De cive (1651) to refer to the inherent selfishness of human beings.51 The Chinese, according to the German philosopher, unsurprisingly possessed this quality of human nature: “To be sure, they are not lacking in avarice, lust or ambition.” In this respect, the Chinese were the same as the Europeans and, Leibniz remarked, “everything is done just as it is here. Hence the Chinese do not attain to full and complete virtue.” He supported the Jesuit cause in the Rites Controversy, and argued that Confucianism was a state cult rather than a religion (although he maintained the Chinese were deists not atheists).52 Leibniz believed the Chinese could not attain full virtue without Christian teachings, but this did not mean that Christians lacked vices. The Chinese needed European missionaries to show them revealed religion, but he was impressed with China’s natural theology, which he thought had a lot to offer European societies: “they surpass us (though it is almost shameful to confess this) in practical philosophy, that is, in the precepts of ethics and politics adapted to the present life and use of morals.” The Chinese “temper the bitter fruits of vice, and though they cannot tear out the roots of sin in human nature, they are apparently able to control many of the burgeoning growths of evil.”53 Leibniz’ argument is similar to the Jesuits who praised the Confucian system of morality as a secular moral compass, but understood that it could not temper all avarice and immorality. Leibniz’s view travelled to seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England to the Deists, who had liberal interpretations of scriptures. In 1730, Mathew Tindal referred to China as support for the idea that 50 Ibid., 389. 51 Lach, The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica, 70. 52 Ching and Oxtoby, Moral Enlightenemnt; Perkins, Leibniz and China. 53 Lach, The Preface to Leibniz, 69–70.

28463_Millar.indd 85

2016-12-15 14:01:59

86

A Singular Case

Christians are not morally perfect in relation to the rest of world. He described Leibniz’s comparison of Christians with “Infidels of China,” where he gave the latter preference in relation to “all moral virtues.” Tindal then turned to a first-hand account: referencing Navarette, he noted, “It is God’s special Providence, that the Chinese did not know what is done in Christendom, for if they did, there woul’d be never a man among them, but woul’d spit in our faces.”54 Tindal’s discussion of China, however, is superficial because he did not acknowledge the numerous descriptions of immorality found in the first-hand sources. He used China to attack Eurocentrism in debates over moral philosophy, but in the process reduced China to a one-dimensional antithesis to European immorality. While ethnographic information was important to the formation of views of China’s – and as a consequence Europe’s – system of political economy, there certainly were individuals, like Tindal, who were not as interested in ethnographic accuracy. For the most part, discussions of avarice in relation to human nature relied on authors’ belief systems and less on what they observed or read about China. For example, in Philosophical Dictionary (1764), Voltaire articulated his view that avarice was a flaw of human nature and there was nothing unique about such behaviour in China. Just as in Europe, the Chinese succumbed to the pull of their self-interest. Voltaire praised the antiquity and erudition of the Chinese civilization and admired China’s system of government and meritocracy. Yet, he added, “we must confess, that the common people, guided by the bonzes, are equally knavish with our own; that everything is sold enormously dear to foreigners, as among ourselves.”55 Thus, from the early Jesuit accounts through to Voltaire, commentators sought to contextualize anecdotes of Chinese behaviour by reflecting on human nature as part of an explanation for Chinese avarice. For some, if avarice was a human vice, then one way it could be controlled was through the morality imposed by religion. The religious check on immorality was the least tenable in the eighteenth century as Europeans recognized that their own Christian countries experienced similar problems. Nonetheless, one of the most predictable explanations for Chinese commercial behaviour was that they were not Christians. 54 Tindal (published anonymously), Christianity as Old as Creation, 371–2. 55 Voltaire, “China,” 4: 94. In the original French, Voltaire writes, “mais on doit avouer que le petit peuple gouverné par des bonzes, est aussi fripon que le notre, qu’on y vend tout sort cher aux étrangers, ainsi que chez nous.” “Fripon” was translated as “knavish” in the eighteenth-century context, and at the time the adjective form was used to describe someone who was dishonest with money. See Voltaire, “De La Chine,” 158.

28463_Millar.indd 86

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 87

This argument was widely used before the Enlightenment and regained prevalence in the nineteenth century. Descriptions of this kind also furthered the Jesuit cause of supporting a mission in China to save the Chinese from barbarous behaviour. For instance, Ricci-Trigault described practices in China, such as selling children into slavery and infanticide, which they argued the Chinese considered “quite morally correct.” The conclusion was that “this people is really to be pitied rather than censured, and the deeper one finds them involved in the darkness of ignorance, the more earnest one should be in praying for their salvation.”56 Le Comte was more explicit in his connection between Christianity and morality. He described how among the Christian Chinese, “religion hath reformed the evil inclinations of nature.”57 Le Comte, however, also argued that earlier in its history, China was “wiser, more sincere, and honest, less corrupted than they are at present. Virtue, which they cultivated with so much care, which contributed infinitely to model their reason, made them at that time the wisest people of the  universe.”58 He thus implied that virtue was attainable without Christianity. For the Jesuit, the Confucian ethical codes served a similar purpose. The Jesuits, like most European commentators, were unconvinced that conversion to Christianity alone would resolve the problem of acquisitiveness they identified in Chinese society. A notable eighteenth-century writer who addressed the question of Chinese avarice directly in relation to their pagan status was Thomas Percy, a Church of Ireland bishop. David Porter contends that Percy offered the most nuanced understanding of China of any British armchair writer of his century, and describes the numerous instances of ambivalence over China in Percy’s writings.59 In 1761, Percy, who relied on numerous first-hand accounts including Le Comte, Du Halde, and Anson for his assessment of China, described the Chinese “love of gain” as a predominant characteristic of the people. Citing Montesquieu, he speculated on the causes for such avariciousness: “The populousness of their country, and the frequency of famines, renders their very lives precarious without great industry and great attention to private gain.”60 However, this theorizing on the origins of avarice did not reveal his argument as to why the Chinese could not control their supposed acquisitiveness. As Porter argues, it was more important for Percy to oppose 56 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 85–6. 57 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 238; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 1: 405. 58 Ibid., 239; Ibid., 409. 59 Porter, The Chinese Taste in Eighteenth-Century England, 159. 60 Percy, Hau Kiou Choaun or the Pleasing History, 2: 166.

28463_Millar.indd 87

2016-12-15 14:01:59

88

A Singular Case

Chinese merchant behaviour to the ideal of the “honest English merchant.” To explain this, Percy argued that where there is “no check from conscience, we must not wonder that general dishonesty and corruption prevail too.” He believed people naturally try to circumvent human laws and “the great deficiency of the Chinese laws, [is] that they are not supported by higher sanctions, than what affect temporal hopes and fears.”61 In this comment Percy, who was reaffirming his Christianity to his readers, was referring to China’s lack of belief in the afterlife. However, he did not manage to explain incidences of fraud, greed, or immorality present in England, and his argument, pointing to religion, was increasingly out of touch with the avant-garde philosophers of the Enlightenment. For most, religion was not a sufficient explanation for reported Chinese avariciousness. Peculiarities of the Chinese Case Another way to address and explain Chinese immorality was to turn more closely to the ethnographical descriptions and explain China’s commercial culture by contextualizing immorality to particular areas of Chinese commerce. Apart from the friction between ideal and practical morality, first-hand sources also addressed the variation among a population as large as that of China. Ricci-Trigault claimed some magistrates were moral and showed “no signs of avarice.”62 Similarly, Le Comte described the honest mandarins he encountered when he first arrived in China. He also noted that when the Jesuits offered a gift to the commissioner of the customhouse, the official protested that he would not accept any gifts from the Europeans since it could be considered immoral bribing.63 Du Halde argued that the fraud and self-interest were largely restricted to a select group of low-level traders: “This knavish wit is found chiefly among the vulgar, who have recourse to a thousand tricks to adulterate every thing they sell.”64 Further, “they seldom practice these tricks on any but strangers; and in other places [distant from the sea-coast] the Chinese themselves will hardly believe them.” These descriptions implied that the issue was one of class and location rather than endemic to Chinese culture or society. Nieuhof (a non-Jesuit traveller) also differentiated between groups who were ethical and immoral. He presented the 61 Ibid., 168. 62 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 394. 63 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 238; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 1: 405–6. 64 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 280; Watts edition, 2: 133; French edition, 1: 78.

28463_Millar.indd 88

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 89

Chinese as of “an affable and peaceable disposition, addicted to husbandry,” whereas the Tartar (Manchu invaders) “delights in nothing so much as hunting, being very cunning and deceitful.”65 The Chinese appeared as good-natured agriculturalists, and the coastal merchants were argued to be more like the so-called brutish, invading Tartars. Even the notoriously critical Anson described an honourable, honest mandarin (the Regency of Canton) with whom he met. Recognizing a potential flaw in generalizations about the morality of the Chinese – namely, that he was isolated to the coast of the great empire – Anson attempted to explain his assumptions. He acknowledged that “observations made at Canton only, a place situated in the corner of the Empire, are very imperfect materials on which to found any general conclusions, yet as those who have opportunities of examining the inner parts of the country, have been evidently influenced by very ridiculous prepossessions.”66 Anson hoped that his narrative would be acceptable to readers despite the acknowledged generalizations that he made because of the bias of the Jesuit accounts. These explanations or justifications of Chinese commercial behaviour travelled to European philosophical descriptions where they were adapted into broader philosophical agendas. Quesnay connected the size and efficiency of China’s domestic trade with Chinese self-interest, which, he noted, “is the dominating passion of the Chinese people.”67 Quesnay, no longer following de Surgy, inserted his own speculations on the reasons behind the self-interested and supposedly immoral behaviour associated with Chinese commerce. He criticized the travellers for giving the impression that Chinese falsifications were committed with impunity, which would be ironic in a country known for its strictness and rites (acknowledging Montesquieu’s paradox). The Physiocrat believed that travellers “have certainly confounded the business carried on with Europeans in the port of Canton,” where “both sides cheat one another,” with the commerce that occurs between subjects of the empire. Quesnay argued that the Chinese government had to tolerate fraudulent practices in particular areas “because it is difficult to discipline foreigners three thousand leagues from home, who disappear as soon as they have sold their merchandise.”68 Because he expounded the prioritization of agriculture over foreign trade, Quesnay believed there were many examples of “­nations that have been corrupted by the contamination of foreign 65 Nieuhof, An Embassy from the East-India Company, 250. 66 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 411. 67 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 209; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 604. 68 Ibid., 210–11.

28463_Millar.indd 89

2016-12-15 14:01:59

90

A Singular Case

commerce”: China happens to be the most corrupted because it is the most skilled in its fraud. These immoral practices, however, could not be present in the domestic Chinese trade, he argued, because nothing would be gained and it would make daily commerce “almost impossible.” He believed “this is even more inconceivable in a nation so civilized as China, where at all times good faith and rectitude in commerce have been noteworthy; this is one of the principal subjects of the ethics of Confucius, the ethics which amount to law in this empire.” Quesnay emphasized the practical role of reputation as a check on immoral behaviour.69 While he hinted at the common human nature of immorality and the role of Confucianism in checking behaviour, the core of his argument focused on the variation within China and the corrupting effects of foreign commerce on the Chinese coast, tying to his broader agenda of promoting agriculture. Like Quesnay, numerous other sources acknowledged the variation in moral behaviour between the domestic and foreign (or the interior and coastal) trades in China. For instance, the modern part of the Universal History argued that the Chinese are “arrant cheats” with foreigners as with each other, but later noted there are many instances among them “of honest and fair dealing, and open and generous usage … even of fidelity, incapable of being corrupted.”70 In both of the 1770 and 1774 editions of Histoire des deux Indes, Raynal praised the honour and virtue of the people in China. However, in the 1774 edition, he qualified his assessment: If this picture of the manners of the Chinese should be different from that drawn by other writers, it is not, perhaps, impossible to reconcile opinions so seemingly contradictory. China may be considered in two distinct points of view. If we study the inhabitants as they appear in the sea-ports, and great towns, we shall be disgusted at their cowardice, knavery and avarice: but in the other parts of the empire, particularly in the country, we shall find their manners domestic, social and patriotic.71

69 For Smith’s discussion of reputation as a check on commercial behaviour, see Hont and Ignatieff, Wealth and Virtue, 13. 70 The modern part of an universal history, 8: 238 and 250. Salmon repeats this latter phrase almost verbatim. Salmon, Modern History, 1: 120. Fenning and Collyer make a similar point about the honest men scattered throughout the empire, Fenning and Collyer, A New System of Geography, 1: 33. 71 Raynal, A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies (hereafter referred to as the Justamond edition), 1: 103; Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique (hereafter referred to as the French edition), 113.

28463_Millar.indd 90

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 91

There was a clear argument drawn from first-hand accounts that Chinese morality varied based on class and geographical location. In Essai sur les moeurs (1756), Voltaire also addressed the range of commercial behaviours in China. Questioning Anson’s condemnation of Chinese immorality, he repeated the commodore’s self-assessment of his observations: “But are we to judge of the government of a great nation from the behaviour of the populace in a sea-port town?”72 He also added a pointed rhetorical question: “what would the Chinese say of us, if they had been cast away upon our coasts, at the time when the laws of European nations confiscated shipwrecked effects, and custom permitted the murder of the proprietors?” Voltaire was in all likelihood referring to jus naufragii (right of shipwreck), a medieval custom that allowed people to seize the property (as well as persons) of shipwrecks if they discovered them. This practice continued into early modern Europe, being fully abolished by the French only in 1681. We find similar comments in the unpublished annotations of Anson’s Voyage by James Naish, one of the East India Company supercargos who was in China at the time. He noted that the “dregs of the people” are present in every country.73 Thus Voltaire and others saw the relativity (over geography and time) of defining morality in commercial actions. In reality, Lufrano’s study of Chinese merchant culture confirms this line of reasoning. He describes the importance of personal relationships to mid-level merchants, which would explain why behaviour with foreigners would have been drastically different.74 In the parlance of modern economic history, Enlightenment thinkers were pointing to a distinction between “particularized” trust and “generalized” trust.75 The former type of trust occurs between individuals with known characteristics or affiliations, whereas the latter occurs between strangers. In effect, contemporary observers argued that European knowledge of Chinese commercial behaviour occurred only at the generalized level and behaviour was likely different in particularized relationships. Apart from differentiating within China, several observers argued that China’s unique geography and political system explained its commercial behaviour. Anson looked to China’s politics to find an explanation that connected with the Enlightenment debate over the taming of passions in society. China’s only claim to a better morality, he argued, was “founded, 72 Voltaire, An Essay on Universal History, 1: 17–18. Accurately translated from the original French, see Voltaire, “Essai sur les moeurs,” 79. 73 Williams, The Prize of All the Oceans, 199. 74 Lufrano, Honorable Merchants, 179. 75 Ogilvie, “The Use and Abuse of Trust.”

28463_Millar.indd 91

2016-12-15 14:01:59

92

A Singular Case

not on their integrity or beneficence, but solely on the affected evenness of their demeanour, and their constant attention to suppress all symptoms of passion and violence.” In short, the Chinese were more restrained. However, he believed that this suppression encouraged “hypocrisy and fraud,” which could be just as harmful to “the general interests of mankind” as “impetuosity and vehemence of temper,” since the latter qualities still allowed for “sincerity, benevolence [and] resolution.” Anson noted, “it has been often observed by those who have attended to the nature of mankind, that it is difficult to curb the more robust and violent passions, without augmenting at the same time, the force of the selfish ones: So that the timidity, dissimulation, and dishonesty of the Chinese, may, in some sort, be owing to the composure, and external decency, so universally prevailing in that Empire.”76 In other words, curbing the passion of violence in Chinese society (China was known for avoiding foreign expansion and warfare) led to an increase in the passion of avarice. Anson’s argument demonstrates that philosophers influenced the construction of first-hand accounts and makes the philosophical point that all societies have to engage in trade-offs that can be universalized.77 Hirschman describes how this line of reasoning was present in Enlightenment debates. Some thinkers, like Jean-François Melon, distinguished clearly between “doux” commerce motivated by interest, and heroic virtues or violent passions that were motivated by glory.78 Adam Smith saw a similar trade-off. He argued that one of the disadvantages of  the “commercial spirit” was that the “heroic spirit is almost utterly extinguished.”79 Anson’s speculation about the forces acting on the Chinese character in Voyage round the World was carried through to Smith. Although we cannot be sure whether it was Benjamin Robins or Richard Walter, or perhaps the conjecture of the commodore himself, which is responsible for these comments, they reveal an important connection between the European intellectual context and the empirical evidence gathered by the first-hand observers of China. On the other hand, Anson also reflected on the difficulty of understanding the customs of another culture. Describing an anecdote of a Chinese merchant taking advantage of Anson and his crew, he noted 76 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 413–14. Repeated in Salmon, The Universal Traveller, 22. 77 Anson’s explanation for Chinese avarice was akin to philosophical discussions on countervailing passions. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 28. 78 Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 64 and 80. 79 Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, vol. 5, chapter “Of Police.”

28463_Millar.indd 92

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 93

that “it might be expected that some satisfactory account should be given of the motives of the Chinese for this faithless procedure,” and observed, “it may perhaps be impossible for a European, ignorant of the customs and manners of that nation to be fully apprized of the real incitements to this behaviour.”80 He believed that “it may be safely concluded, that the Chinese had some interest in thus amusing the commodore, yet it  may not be easy to assign the individual views by which they were influenced.”81 Beyond recognizing similarities between Europe and China, Anson understood that he could not comprehend some behaviour, especially since he had a relatively cursory interaction with the Chinese. Not all observed commercial behaviour could be explained, understood, or rationalized. Montesquieu, who directly referred to Anson’s descriptions of China to support his view of Chinese immorality, also maintained that the ­Chinese case was unique. He used the subject to further his theory of climatic determinism, which itself was built on thinkers such as Giovanni Botero. The reason for the inconsistency between the Chinese people being guided by rites and their immoral behaviour, he argued, stemmed from the insecure nature of Chinese subsistence. Discussing the natural mixture of virtue and vices in the Chinese character, Montesquieu cited Du Halde and argued that “the precariousness of their lives [Montesquieu’s Footnote: Because of the nature of the climate and the terrain] makes them so prodigiously active and so excessively desirous of gain that no commercial nation can trust them.”82 As a result of the climate, intense labour and industry were needed to maintain the population: “Necessity and perhaps the nature of the climate have given all the Chinese an unthinkable avidity for gain, and the laws have not dreamed of checking it. Everything has been prohibited if it is a question of acquisition by violence; everything has been permitted if it is a matter of obtaining by artifice or by industry.”83 Montesquieu distinguished between something acquired by violence and something obtained by artifice or by industry. This differentiation is particularly interesting if we recall Anson’s argument that suppressing violence might be worse for the general interests of humanity since it encouraged hypocrisy and fraud. Montesquieu, however, did not believe that the Chinese were worse off for their practices of artifice. In fact, he concluded his section with a remarkable relativity: “Therefore, let us not compare the morality of China 80 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 332. 81 Ibid., 393. 82 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 313; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, 100–1. 83 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 321; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, 108.

28463_Millar.indd 93

2016-12-15 14:01:59

94

A Singular Case

with that of Europe. Everyone in China has had to be attentive to what was useful to him; if the rascal has watched over his interests, he who is duped has had to think of his own. In Lacedaemonia, stealing was permitted; in China, deceit is permitted.” Montesquieu resolved the paradox he described between Chinese ideal and practical morality and in the process he, surprisingly, came to the defence of the Chinese morality.84 Further, like the Jesuits before him, he argued that Chinese self-­interest actually greatly assisted their commercial success. When discussing the unique mixture of virtues and vices in the characters of the Spanish and the Chinese, he argued that unlike the Spaniards, whose faithfulness and laziness made them poor in commercial affairs, the Chinese desire for gain (and resulting untrustworthiness) led them to keep their successful Japan trade away from the Europeans. He concluded from these observations that “not all political vices are moral vices and that not all moral vices are political vices, and those who make laws that run counter to the general spirit should not be ignorant of this.”85 By distinguishing between politics and morality, Montesquieu again points to a gulf between practical issues of political economy and what Anson referred to as “immaterial points.” China might be attacked for immorality but the effect it had on its system of political economy was actually positive. Conclusion In 1977, Albert Hirschman asked, “How did commercial banking, and similar money-making pursuits become honorable at some point in the modern age after having stood condemned or despised as greed, love of  lucre, and avarice for centuries past?”86 This transformation was a European intellectual and social phenomenon; however, the present study of European views of Chinese commercial morality (or immorality) demonstrates the important role that discussions and empirical descriptions of a non-European civilization had in debates on self-interest. When it came to commercial activity, there was a malleable and evolving view of morality in eighteenth-century Europe. The descriptions of Chinese avarice reached a European environment that was struggling to identify its own practical commercial behaviour, as seen through merchant manuals and a changing social hierarchy where commerce was gaining ground over agriculture (or the interests of the landed nobility). 84 See also Pereira, Montesquieu et la Chine, 227. 85 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 314; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, 101. 86 Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 9.

28463_Millar.indd 94

2016-12-15 14:01:59



The Paradox of China’s Commercial Spirit 95

On a theoretical plane, moral philosophers of the Enlightenment speculated on the nature of avarice in their own societies. Adam Smith transformed this vice into a more innocuous form of self-interest, which over time became an acceptable theoretical position to ease the tension with practical morality. But important questions were being debated, foremost of which was whether avariciousness was a hindrance to or key component of economic success. In the Chinese case, the answer was clear, there was seen to be a definite link between self-interest and commercial aptitude. Understanding the nature and origins of Chinese self-interest helped thinkers grapple with the role of avarice in any society. Knowledge of China was not necessary for the group of answers that pointed to the commonalities of human nature and human vices (although it did support their universal applicability). Some proposed that the pagan status of the Chinese contributed to their immorality, but this argument could not get far since Europeans were aware of vice present within Christian countries. Another set of explanations was more directly connected to the empirical descriptions of China. First, variation within the country indicated that acquisitiveness might not always have been an issue beyond certain interactions. Second, nature, education, culture, and geography were all given as explanations for the supposedly greedy behaviour of the Chinese traders. These discussions reflected the European struggle to understand the relationship between distinct social mores and the new economic order. The insecurity in the European voice was present in the position that pointed out that the Chinese might also find fault with European commercial practices. China was an empire struggling with the same problems of an advanced civilization as France and Britain. While China was criticized for immoral commercial practices, the effects of these practices on their system of political economy were generally seen as positive (in terms of increasing economic activity and wealth). As an advanced commercial civilization, China played an important part in the Enlightenment’s struggle to deal with the theme of moral philosophy in an expanding commercial world. As we see in the next chapter, the result of the great force of self-interest was a flourishing domestic commerce.

28463_Millar.indd 95

2016-12-15 14:01:59

3

“Your Beggarly Commerce!”: China and International Trade International trade was of central importance to Enlightenment conceptions of wealth. As Daniel Defoe – the famed champion of the merchant class – wrote in 1726, “the rising greatness of the British nation is not owing to war and conquests, to enlarging its dominion by the sword, or subjecting the people of other countries to our power; but it is all owing to trade, to the encrease of our commerce at home, and extending it abroad.”1 European philosophers, popular geographers, and merchants hotly debated policies of international trade. As we saw in the previous chapter, Europeans largely agreed that the Chinese were a self-interested, highly commercialized people; presumably, then, they would be active traders, perhaps even fierce competitors to Europeans on the international stage. Yet, first-hand accounts had made it all too clear that when it came to foreign trade, the Chinese were hesitant, even prohibitive. Was it that a conservative government restricted a highly self-interested and commercial people? Early descriptions of the Chinese, including those by the Jesuits, depicted an arrogant nation that believed it was at the centre of the world. Ricci-Trigault concluded, “[Chinese] pride, it would seem, arises from an ignorance of the existence of higher things and from the fact that they find themselves far superior to the barbarous nations by which they are surrounded.”2 Or, as the geographer Thomas Salmon proclaimed in his popular compendium, they looked upon “the rest of mankind as little better than brutes.”3 This claim was supported by the knowledge that the Chinese had access to the compass before Europeans and yet explored little by

1 Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman, 382–3. 2 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 23. 3 Salmon, Modern History, 1: 18.

28463_Millar.indd 96

2016-12-15 14:01:59



China and International Trade 97

comparison. No lesser authority than Adam Smith succinctly expressed this view of China: The Chinese have little respect for foreign trade. Your beggarly commerce! was the language in which the Mandarins of Pekin used to talk to Mr. de Lange, the Russian envoy, concerning it. Except with Japan, the Chinese carry on, themselves, and in their own bottoms, little or no foreign trade; and it is only into one or two ports of their kingdom that they even admit the ships of foreign nations. Foreign trade therefore is, in China, every way confined within a much narrower circle than that to which it would naturally extend itself, if more freedom was allowed to it, either in their own ships, or in those of foreign nations.4

Smith, famed for his promotion of international trade and his firm belief that it sustains and increases the wealth of a nation, was unsurprisingly critical of Chinese foreign trade policies. The natural progress of opulence, for Smith, entailed moving from agriculture to commerce, the  latter deeply connected to international trade. By contrast, some Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire or Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi (following Christian Wolff) saw a focus on domestic economic growth as a wise form of self-preservation.5 In a similar vein, the Physiocrats believed agriculture should form the core of a society’s wealth. Commercial activity could take place but it should be of secondary importance. From another perspective, Daniel Defoe, as a mercantilist and bullionist, argued that importing Chinese luxuries was good for the Chinese and the East India Company but destructive to England. He believed trade was of the utmost importance to civilization and China’s lack of conformity to European ideals of trade and, ironically, its simultaneous threat as a competitor (crowding out the English woollen industry with its silk fabrics) contributed to his vitriolic dislike of the Middle Kingdom. These Enlightenment thinkers confronted the challenging, conflicting case of China within their respective ideological frameworks. China was simultaneously impervious and a threat. It evidently had a thriving domestic commercial sector, and yet it deliberately limited foreign trade. Could this agrarian civilization be considered a commercial society? Even more pertinent, could it attain the status of a wealthy advanced economy with minimal international trade? Another set of questions was

4 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 864–5. 5 See Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 35.

28463_Millar.indd 97

2016-12-15 14:01:59

98

A Singular Case

raised by China’s low wages. As Istvan Hont has discussed, the Chinese case was relevant to the rich country-poor country debate over the possibility of an inevitable decline of high-wage, wealthy nations. How did China, a low-wage, but hardly poor, economy sit as a potential threat to European competitors? In these debates we see the ambivalence in descriptions about Chinese policies as well as the use of China as a mirror for European self-reflection. China once again emerged as an outlier that, for most commentators, could not be imitated in a European setting. Thinkers differed in their assessments of China’s potential, and while Smith and the Physiocrats had diverging prescriptions for China’s ­future, their assessments of its foreign trade policies were remarkably ­nuanced and even relativist. Based on the evidence of the first-hand travellers, reported through the popular geographies, the philosophical consensus was that China was a unique real-world case. It enjoyed similar benefits to a commercialized society that traded internationally (including specialization of production) even though a large domestic trade drove this commercialization. Europeans sought to understand China’s motivations and unique ability to restrict trade. They went beyond the simplified ideas that the Chinese were arrogant and disdained foreigners, or as David Landes more recently put it, they “lacked range, focus, and above all, curiosity.”6 Instead, early modern sources had a complex understanding of Chinese foreign trade practices and policies. Further, an assessment of the limits to an international China trade inevitably cast an eye on the European side of the relationship. Political problems, national rivalries, and monolithic state monopolies emanating from Europe were hindrances to any potential trading relationship. Europeans identified clear and understandable reasons that explained how China was able to acquire wealth with a limited foreign trade. Concurrent with this image was the view held by many (but not all) that China would benefit from expanding its international trade. This position was supported by that country’s history of fluctuating trade policies, which indicated that increasing foreign trade was indeed possible. The knowledge that China opened up to foreign trade with the transition from the Ming to the Qing Dynasty encouraged a view of their system of political economy as mutable. For European observers and commentators – even that champion of free trade Adam Smith – China’s approach to domestic and foreign commerce certainly had room for

6 Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, 96.

28463_Millar.indd 98

2016-12-15 14:01:59



China and International Trade 99

improvement (as did European practices) but it was not a fundamental, intrinsic flaw of the Chinese system. Scholars who have looked at this topic more recently, including those from the revisionist literary and cultural studies approach that generally acknowledges the ambivalence in European views of China, have tended to see the discourse on China’s trade obstructionism as undermining China’s legitimacy over the eighteenth century. For example, Eugenia Zuroski Jenkins describes how late seventeenth- and early eighteenthcentury European writings repeated the “mythology of Chinese insularity” even after the Kangxi Emperor opened Canton in 1685.7 Referencing one “typical example” from John Ogilby’s Atlas Chinensis (1671), she argues, “recognition of this curious ‘fact’ of the Chinese character not only implies but generates the comparative cosmopolitanism of the European reader.”8 Jenkins is correct that this description was prevalent and that it enabled European writers to see themselves as globally minded. However, the narrative was situated within a much wider discussion that complicates too simplified a reading of Chinese trade policies. Similarly, Porter paints an interesting picture of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British views of Chinese trade. He describes the importance of the commercialist ideal of free circulation and how it “informs the vast majority of trade-related accounts of China” published in eighteenth-century England, ultimately undermining China’s legitimacy.9 Porter’s focus is quite different from the one taken here. By including earlier Enlightenment thinkers and incorporating some from France, who were not all as absorbed with ideas of free circulation, as well as those that questioned whether Europe itself was even close to achieving free trade, a broader picture emerges. It is also necessary to consider earlier travellers and commentators who were trying to unpack Chinese trade policies that were shifting over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus, while Porter’s description is enlightening for the late eighteenth-century British context, there is a wider story that needs to be unravelled. Europe and the China Trade Europeans oscillated between optimism and disappointment in their discussion of the China trade. On the one hand, there was an air of hope for the potential riches that the China trade could generate. The reports 7 Jenkins, A Taste for China, 229n71. 8 Ibid., 44. 9 Porter, Ideographia, 207.

28463_Millar.indd 99

2016-12-15 14:01:59

100

A Singular Case

of the grand scale of the Chinese Empire and its significant wealth came to represent a tangible El Dorado able to satiate the European appetite for commercial profits. As the English merchant Joshua Gee declared in 1767, “the greatest empires, and the vastest numbers of people are found in the part of the world called Asia.”10 European states and merchants were determined to benefit from these opportunities. Johannes Nieuhof’s seventeenth-century description of the numerous Dutch attempts to develop a free trade with China reflects their resolve: “From the time that the Netherlanders had commerce with their ships into several parts of India, they continually sought unto the people of China to trade with them.”11 On the other hand, China was a reluctant partner that resisted the majority of Europe’s trade overtures. The narrative of early modern Chinese isolation persists today. As John Hobson recently quipped, the inward turn during the Ming Dynasty has been labelled “China’s great leap backward.”12 Proponents of this view maintain that China’s decline relative to Europe began in 1434 when the Emperor Xuande, following the “Confucian traditions” of his father, the Emperor Hongxi, imposed restrictions on foreign trade and navigation.13 According to this narrative, by the end of the eighteenth century Europeans recognized the limitations of the Chinese system of political economy, particularly with regard to international trade. Adam Smith’s promotion of the free market in 1776 and the 1793 failed British Embassy to China under Lord Macartney led to a dominant image of an arrogant China, resistant to the progress of the modernizing world.14 Frustration with Chinese policies of isolation, however, dated as far back as Ancient Rome and was not a result of the rising European faith 10 Gee, The Trade and navigation of Great Britain considered, 58. 11 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 20. 12 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization, 62. 13 While the narrative of China’s “great leap backward” includes resistance to foreign trade and foreign navigation and exploration, this chapter concentrates only on the former. 14 For example, David Porter describes the eighteenth-century encounter between the Europeans and the Chinese, where the former believed in the importance of international trade and the latter strictly limited international commerce, leading to “a widespread perception among British observers that an unnatural tendency toward blockage and obstructionism was an integral, defining feature of Chinese society as a whole.” Porter, “A Peculiar but Uninteresting Nation: China and the Discourse of Commerce in Eighteenth Century England”; James Hevia points to the historiographical tradition (from EuroAmerica as well as China) of viewing the early modern trade relationship between China and Europe as a clash between tradition and modernity. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, 242; Joanna Waley-Cohen argues that the wave of sinophilia in Europe ended, in part,

28463_Millar.indd 100

2016-12-15 14:01:59



China and International Trade 101

in the mutual benefits of free trade, expressed most famously by Smith. Ancient Romans wrote about a place known as Serica (believed to refer to the northeastern part of modern day China). In the year 77, Pliny the Elder claimed, “The Seres are of inoffensive manners, but, bearing a strong resemblance therein to all savage nations, they shun all intercourse with the rest of mankind, and await the approach of those who wish to traffic with them.”15 This history was not lost on eighteenthcentury commentators, as a popular compendium about China, The Chinese Traveller (1772), addressed the antiquity of the view of Chinese isolation: “It is remarkable that the manners of the modern differ not much from those of the antient Chinese … [Pliny] says that the Chinese … like wild animals industriously shun any communication with strangers … They are at this day courteous and gentle, but will not suffer merchants of other nations to penetrate into their country.”16 The ­editors presented the image that Chinese policies had remained unchanged for centuries. Europeans argued that these restrictive policies continued into the early modern world. In 1517, Tomé Pires led the first official embassy from a European state (Portugal) to China. The reality of China’s foreign policy quickly moderated the Portuguese enthusiasm when, after their long journey, the emissaries were not granted an audience with the emperor. However, this Chinese rebuff was not a result of China’s ancient isolationist maxims. Rather, it was a direct consequence of the Portuguese conquering Malacca (a tributary state of the Chinese) and their thieving and disruptive behaviour around Canton.17 China sentenced Pires to death because of the actions of his compatriots, and he took his own life in prison. The repetition of this archetypal embassy by the English, French, Dutch, and Russians, despite continuing failures to gain significant trade concessions, demonstrated the European determination to expand trade with China.18 because of the shift in views on the China trade, particularly that “the restrictive Canton system of trade went directly against the free world market advocated by Adam Smith in 1776.” Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing, 92–9 and 128. 15 Pliny the Elder, The Natural History, 2036–7. 16 The Chinese Traveller, 1: v. 17 Wills, Embassies and Illusions, 19. 18 Between 1655 and 1795 there were approximately seventeen Western missions that reached the emperor (six from Russia, four from Portugal, three or four from Holland, three from the Papacy, and one from Britain). Fairbank, “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West,” 148–9. For more information on failed trade negotiations, see Markley, The Far East and the English Imagination 1600–1730, chapter 3, and Wills, Embassies and Illusions.

28463_Millar.indd 101

2016-12-15 14:01:59

102

A Singular Case

The failure of early modern European trade missions reflected China’s ability to resist foreign overtures. Unlike other parts of the world, threats of violence were insufficient to achieve the European desire for open trade with China. Rather, Chinese trade concessions were erratic and highly dependent on the emperor. The Chinese, according to John Wills Jr, never had anything resembling “a coherent or effective foreign policy.”19 Wills lists three primary reasons for this discord between the Europeans and Chinese in trade negotiations: first, Chinese culturalism degraded the study of foreigners; second, limited contact meant there was little opportunity to build real knowledge of foreign areas; finally, the tributary system’s focus on ceremony kept relations superficial, where appearance mattered more than reality. He argues that the Chinese government pushed trade away from the central administrative area to the coast in order to maintain the “illusion” that their tributary system was intact. Meanwhile, the Europeans were holding on to the “illusion” that the Chinese would increase their foreign trade. These inconsistencies were increasingly difficult for Europeans to understand as they rationalized international trade as ordained, a belief they tried to pass on to the Chinese. For example, Nieuhof recounted a letter sent from the general of Batavia to the emperor of China outlining the European explanation for trade based on God’s division of things necessary and convenient for life across the globe.20 By the eighteenth century, such thinkers as Defoe and Smith began to expand the legitimization of international trade ­beyond the dictates of divine Providence to the original principles of ­human nature. From these perspectives, it is not surprising that European emissaries in China were frustrated and confused by the Chinese refusal to adapt to  European customs and trade practices. Indeed, seventeenth- and ­eighteenth-century travel accounts written by secular authors revealed the practical problems in the encounter between European and Chinese ­customs. Nieuhof, for instance, described the confrontation between European and Chinese expectations. In an excerpt from the decree of the Chinese emperor on the Holland trade, he noted the Chinese comments on how the Hollanders and Muscovites “will not submit themselves to those ceremonies of reverence accustom’d in this palace. They are novices, and ignorant in affairs, and obstinate in refusing to accommodate themselves to the customs of the country.”21 Well before the famed confrontation between Lord Macartney and the Qianlong Emperor, the 19 Wills, Embassies and Illusions, 20–38. 20 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 310. 21 Ibid., 316.

28463_Millar.indd 102

2016-12-15 14:01:59



China and International Trade 103

European-China trade experienced numerous impasses. Admiral Anson’s 1743 experience in Canton also reflected significant differences in expectations and customs. Although he was a man of war, not a merchant, to the Chinese the distinction was negligible. Chinese custom dictated all ships that enter Chinese ports must pay duties. During his first stop in China in 1743, Anson, as a man of war, refused to pay duties for his engagement at Canton (as was customary among European states).22 He was eventually given permission to refit the Centurion. Ultimately, the Chinese desire that the commodore leave their port led them to acquiesce to his refusal to pay a duty. When Anson returned to Canton a few months later, there was no further discussion of “harbour dues.” Glyn Williams notes that Anson had not set a precedent because the next British man of war that arrived in 1764 did have to pay duties.23 Another moment of cultural misunderstanding took place on Anson’s second trip to China. After his capture of a Spanish galleon, he released his Spanish prisoners to the Chinese. As Williams points out, Anson did not realize that the Chinese would interpret this as submissive; he did not release them as a sign of deference to the emperor but rather to ease the burden of caring for the prisoners, who would have been cumbersome to his journey home.24 Anson’s presence in China, and his differing agenda from the other Europeans there, caused significant tensions. As discussed in chapter 1, he especially caused strife for the East India Company and the strain between eic representatives and the commodore was apparent in the writings on both sides.25 A similar strain was present in the earlier voyage of the emissary Lorenz (Laurent or Laurence) Lange, the source Smith cited concerning China’s disdain for foreign commerce. The Swedish explorer joined a Russian envoy led by Leon Vasilievitch Ismailoff sent by Peter the Great to China from 1719 to 1721. The account of his time in Peking was popularized by another member of the party, the Scottish physician John Bell, who published his Travels from St Petersburg in Russia to diverse parts of Asia in Glasgow in 1763. The mission was tasked not only with encouraging trade but also explaining to China that Russia’s military expansion in Siberia should not be seen as an act of aggression. Taken as a whole, Lange’s account severely condemned China’s foreign trade practices. He described problems from corrupt officials to imperial edicts limiting trade; it is clear that Chinese policies were seen as problematic. However, 22 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 354. 23 Williams, The Prize of All the Oceans, 157. 24 Ibid., 180. 25 Williams, The Great South Sea, 240.

28463_Millar.indd 103

2016-12-15 14:01:59

104

A Singular Case

Lange also detailed how the Kangxi Emperor explicitly told the Russians that he would not engage in commerce with them, or entertain negotiations about commerce “until all the disturbances on the frontiers were entirely adjusted.”26 Kangxi was referring to several problems near the Russia-China border, most notably the issue of a group of 700 Chinese deserters who settled in Russia and whom the Chinese wanted Peter the Great to return to them. After a lengthy back and forth during Lange’s stay in Peking, the emperor finally ordered him to leave China and return to Russia. Lange protested and requested an alternate route home to which, on 14 May 1722, the Chinese council reportedly replied, “That they expected to have been freed from their importuning the council about their beggarly commerce, after they had been told so often, that the council would not embarrass themselves any more about affairs that were only beneficial to the Russes; and that, of course, they had only to return by the way they came.”27 As Lange himself noted, what was at stake was “peace or war between the two nations,” indicating the issues extended far beyond trade negotiations. In fact, Bell claimed that had the Kangxi Emperor not died at the end of 1722, Peter the Great would surely have attacked China. In other words, political disputes and issues at the border between China and Russia explained the setbacks in trade negotiations. As with the Pires embassy 200 years earlier, these incidents were not simple cultural misunderstandings; rather, they were complex episodes of international relations. Were these realities simply lost on Smith and other eighteenth-century commentators? By scratching beneath the surface, we find that, in fact, the European discussions of China’s foreign trade were quite nuanced. A European Problem? China’s policies were not solely responsible for limiting the China trade. The East Asian trade was hindered by European national rivalries, particularly between the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and English. As Istvan Hont argues, “jealousy of trade” emerged “when success in international trade became a matter of the military and political survival of nations.”28 During the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch began to make their presence in East Asia felt. Unlike the Spanish and Portuguese, the Protestant Dutch (and later the English) were not as concerned with spreading Christianity, but focused their efforts largely on commerce. 26 Lange, “Journal of Mr. De Lange,” 289. 27 Ibid., 293–5. 28 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 5.

28463_Millar.indd 104

2016-12-15 14:01:59



China and International Trade 105

The Dutch East India Company (voc), formed in 1602, was chartered with the control of the Dutch trade east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of Magellan, putting it in direct conflict with the Portuguese declared monopoly of Asian trade. As such, the voc was given state-like powers including having the authority to engage in warfare.29 This led to several voc attacks on the Portuguese establishment at Macao. Ultimately, the Dutch gained a monopoly in the Japan trade and increased their presence in East Asia throughout the seventeenth century. By 1685, with the opening of Canton to foreign commerce, the English also began to assert their standing in the China trade. The divided London and English East India companies formally united in 1708 giving the British a strong position in the East Indian trade. The descriptions of European observers left no doubt that nationalism shaped international trade with China in particular and the East Indies in general. In 1665, Nieuhof publicized the tension between the Dutch and the Portuguese in the Far East in his Het gezantschap der Neêrlandtsche Oost-Indische Compagnie (1665).30 He was part of a mission from 1655 to 1657 led by a Dutch merchant, Frederick Schedel, who was sent by the Chief Council of New Batavia to China to verify recent changes in China’s foreign policy. In his account, Nieuhof argued that the mission to negotiate a freer trade with the Chinese government was doomed from the start because the Portuguese at Macao and the Catholic Jesuits in Peking had portrayed the Protestant Dutch as people without a country who “got their livings by stealth and piracy” and who sought to plunder the Chinese Empire.31 According to Nieuhof, these Portuguese told the new Manchu leaders that previous Chinese emperors would not engage with the Dutch since they were seen “as the ruine and plague of that Empire.” He also accused the Portuguese of bribing the Jesuits and the Chinese to ensure that the Dutch trade demands were not met. Descriptions of how the Portuguese stifled Dutch efforts are prevalent throughout Nieuhof’s account and this information travelled into the eighteenth century. For example, Raynal reminded his readers how in 1607 the Dutch tried to open up the China trade but “The Portuguese found means, by bribery, and the intrigues of their missionaries, to get the Hollanders excluded.”32

29 Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe, 45. 30 Before the end of the seventeenth century there were six Dutch editions, three German, two English (London, 1669 and 1673), one Latin, and one French (Leyden, 1665). See Lach and Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe, 484. 31 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 22–4 and 112. 32 Raynal, A Philosophical and Political History, Justamond edition, 246, French edition, 160.

28463_Millar.indd 105

2016-12-15 14:01:59

106

A Singular Case

It became evident to European commentators, through these sources, that the “jealousy of trade” between European countries mired trading relationships with China. Englishmen expressed similar frustrations over conflicts with the Portuguese and Dutch. Direct conflicts such as the 1623 Amboyna massacre of twenty men, ten of whom were members of the British East India Company, by agents of the voc undoubtedly contributed to the tone of tracts on the East India trade. Geographers, polemicists, and philosophers complained about the problems that arose from these national rivalries. The competitiveness led to a mistrust of information circulating in Europe about the trade: “The difficulty of trading with the Chineses in their own Country, is not so difficult as the Portingals and Hollanders would perswade the World for their own advantage.”33 The anonymous author of this tract on the East India Company argued that, despite the hindrances by the Portuguese and the misleading reports on China, the English have traded in Canton with great success. As Douglas Irwin explains, at the close of the sixteenth century the concept of “free trade” represented a challenge to the control of guilds and governments granting monopolies or special privileges to select merchants.34 Promoting “freedom to trade” was not about protesting government restrictions on domestic or foreign commerce in the form of tariffs, subsidies, prohibitions, etc. (which came later); rather, it was about allowing excluded merchants to participate in trade activities. Indeed, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were complaints that the largest problem on the European side of the China trade was not the competition between European countries but the lack of competition between companies, a result of the rising power of the European East India companies. Many authors argued against the monopolies of chartered companies and for the freedom to trade for individual merchants. A public letter addressed to the aldermen of the City of London in 1754 attacked the notion that free merchants did not have the capacity to carry on the East India trade in the same manner as the East India Company. The anonymous author argued, “every one knows, that the trade to China may be carried on from Britain directly, as it is from Sweden, and that, without a Company the same may be done from all other parts.”35 Indeed, the high level of country trade (regional

33 The East-India trade, 8. 34 Irwin, Against the Tide, 47. 35 Letters relating to the East India Company, 24. This work has been dubiously attributed to John Campbell (one of the editors of An Universal History).

28463_Millar.indd 106

2016-12-15 14:01:59



China and International Trade 107

trade that took place in the East Indies) conducted by free European merchants proved their ability to be successful.36 A clear case of Europeans influencing the trade was the decision about which Chinese ports were open to European trade. In 1776 Smith ­argued that Chinese policies were a major hindrance to international trade because they limited entry of foreign ships to only one or two ports. However, earlier merchants claimed that it was in fact the large monopolistic European East India companies that made this decision, not the Chinese government. Joshua Gee, an English merchant who wrote The Trade and navigation of Great Britain considered (1729) – a work that made him famous and went through many editions including a French translation in 1750 – argued that the English East India Company was at fault for limiting the China trade, and in particular, the number of ports at which international trade was conducted.37 He believed that the sales of British woollen goods would be higher in the colder, northern Chinese provinces, but the English captains chose to stay at Canton. According to Gee, private traders knew better: “when private traders had liberty to go to China, they were of another opinion; they went to those places where they could get most money.”38 In reality, both Gee and Smith were correct. As Gee argued, the English East India Company did abandon their factories at the ports of Amoy and Chusan in 1707 and 1710 respectively because of the favourable possibilities of trade at Canton. This was well before the 1757 official Chinese restriction of foreign trade to Canton.39 There were valid reasons for the decision of the company, as a popular dictionary of trade in the eighteenth century written by Richard Rolt pointed out: the “inducement which the European merchants have to frequent Canton” in comparison to Amoy, namely that “whole fleets may be freighted in a short time there, and are not in danger of being delayed til the monsoon

36 Somers, A third collection of scarce and valuable tracts, on the most interesting and entertaining subjects, 3: 212. Most tracts in this collection were collected from the library of Lord John Somers. 37 Groenewegen, “Gee, Joshua (1667–1730).” 38 Gee, The Trade and navigation of Great Britain considered, 29; Dalrymple, A plan for extending the commerce of this kingdom and of the East-India Company, also described the high demand for wool in China being limited by the trade at Canton, which was far from the colder areas of the empire. 39 See Pritchard, The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750–1800 (1936), reprinted in Tuck, ed., Britain and the China Trade, 1635–1842, 5: 114. Also Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 163. Pritchard and Van Dyke describe how foreigners chose this port themselves before the official Chinese restriction.

28463_Millar.indd 107

2016-12-15 14:02:00

108

A Singular Case

sets in.”40 By the time Smith published his magnum opus in 1776, the Chinese had formally limited the ports that were accessible to foreigners. In actuality then, both the Europeans and the Chinese played a role in dictating the limitations of the China trade. Before Smith, David Hume had already pointed out those European actions that hindered the China trade. In 1752, he argued that both natural and artificial obstacles to the trade were reflected in the varying prices of gold and silver in England and in China, which, if there were no obstacles, would have been equal. Hume blamed “the immense distance of China, together with the monopolies of our India companies, obstructing the communication.”41 Taking Hume’s latter point further, Smith famously attacked the monopolistic European trading system. If, as he believed, “rich and civilized nations can always exchange to a much greater value with one another than with savages and barbarians,” Smith had to explain how Europe has “derived much less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies from that with America.”42 To answer this puzzle, he did not turn to China’s disdain for Europe’s “beggarly commerce” but rather blamed the fact that the “Portuguese monopolized the East India trade to themselves for about a century” and when the Dutch began in the seventeenth century to expand in that area, “they vested their whole East India commerce in an exclusive company.” He continued on: “The English, French, Swedes, and Danes have all followed their example, so that no great nation in Europe has ever yet had the benefit of a free commerce to the East Indies. No other reason need by assigned why it has never been so advantageous as the trade to America, which, between almost every nation of Europe and its own colonies, is free to all its subjects.”43 Of course, “no other reason” was somewhat disingenuous since elsewhere Smith articulated other reasons emanating from the Chinese side that constricted the foreign trade. Nonetheless, he also attributed responsibility to the European system of national monopolies. The context in which blame was apportioned to China and to Europe clarifies his position. Smith examined different systems of political economy in book 4 of the Wealth of Nations. In the context of the nature of the mercantile system (chapter 1), he attacked the monopolistic practices of European 40 Rolt, A new dictionary of trade and commerce, 130. 41 Hume, “Of the Balance of Trade,” in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, 3: 353. 42 Other factors Smith mentioned included the disadvantages to slave labour over free labour, which acted against the success of North America, and the role of the English constitution governing the North American colonies as benefiting their development. 43 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 564.

28463_Millar.indd 108

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China and International Trade 109

trading companies. And in the context of examining the nature of agricultural systems (chapter 9), he criticized China’s reluctance to foreign trade. Smith’s dismissal of China’s foreign trade practices becomes less incisive when seen as part of broader assessments of different systems of political economy. To him, both the mercantile and agricultural systems were imperfect when it came to foreign trade. Understanding Chinese Trade Policy Smith used China as representative of the agricultural system of political economy, and yet, at the same time, he argued that its foreign trade practices were shaped by unique circumstances. China’s geography deterred it from foreign trade because it was surrounded by “wandering savages and poor barbarians.” As a result of its relatively impoverished neighbours, he claimed, the Chinese looked upon foreign trade “in the ­utmost contempt.”44 However, the Chinese were at the same time remarkable because the particular nature of their domestic economy enabled them to achieve a high level of wealth without significant foreign trade. Smith argued, “the great extent of the empire of China, the vast multitude of its inhabitants, the variety of climate, and consequently of productions in its different provinces, and the easy communication by means of water carriage between the greater part of them render the home market of that country of so great extent, as to be alone sufficient to support very great manufactures, and to admit of very considerable subdivisions of labour.”45 The scale, diversity, and geographical features of China allowed for significant specialization of production. From the Scottish philosopher this was a great compliment indeed, as he asserted in The Wealth of Nations that the division of labour was crucial for economic growth. Smith drew his argument from earlier sources that reported that China’s large domestic trade made their empire self-sufficient, thus reducing their need to engage in international commerce. In the sixteenth century, Mendoza popularized Gaspar da Cruz’s claim that “the great plenty and riches of the country doth this, that it can sustain itself alone.”46 He described how China’s isolation from international trade was possible because as “one of the greatest and best kingdoms of the world … they have need of none other nation for that they have sufficient of all things necessarie to the mainteining of human life.”47 44 Ibid., 623. 45 Ibid., 865–6. 46 Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, 112. 47 Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, 69–70.

28463_Millar.indd 109

2016-12-15 14:02:00

110

A Singular Case

Mendoza took da Cruz’s argument further by directly comparing the scale of trade in China with the size of European trade. The reports about the activity on China’s rivers and canals astonished him: “In my opinion it might be said with greater truth and without fear of exaggeration, that there are as many boats in this kingdom as can be counted up in all the rest of the world.”48 Mendoza, who had never been to  China himself, admitted the comparison was based on reports he  read. Nonetheless, these early modern sources demonstrate how ­China’s ­exceptional circumstances explained its deviation from European expectations. Seventeenth-century sources confirmed the large scale of China’s domestic trade. Ricci-Trigault agreed there were as many boats in China as in all the rest of the world; however, they qualified this statement by arguing that it was only true if counting boats travelling on fresh water, since the Chinese have far fewer seafaring ships than Europe.49 Unlike most other subjects, where the missionaries were the most informed Europeans, on the topic of international trade secular observers offered many original and insightful observations. Nieuhof, purser of the voc embassy to China, was tasked with observing the economy of the towns and villages he passed through on the journey from Canton to Peking. He described the great trade he saw in detail, concluding, “it seems as if all the shipping in the world were harbor’d there: but ‘tis no wonder, considering the situation of the rivers that run through this country.”50 In fact, China’s distinct geography was often used to explain the success of its unique system of political economy. By the eighteenth century, Du Halde, the Jesuit armchair ethnographer, popularized the view that China’s reluctance to engage in foreign commerce must be connected to an understanding of its internal strength and history: “As the Inhabitants find within themselves every thing that is necessary for the conveniences and pleasures of life; so judging their native soil sufficient to supply all their wants, they have ever affected to carry on no commerce with the rest of mankind.”51 He argued that this led the Chinese to believe they were “masters of the whole world” and that everyone outside China was barbarous. Chinese arrogance should be understood in relation to their self-sufficiency. Du Halde controversially stated the vastness of China’s domestic trade: “The 48 Ibid., 12–13. 49 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 13. 50 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 69. 51 Du Halde, A Description of the Empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 334, Watts edition, 2: 296, French edition, 2: 204.

28463_Millar.indd 110

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China and International Trade 111

inland trade of China is so great, that the commerce of all Europe is not to be compar’d therewith.” Made during a period of rapid expansion of European trade, this bold assertion was repeated numerous times in popular compendiums.52 Other mainstream sources restated the idea of Chinese self-sufficiency but did not make the controversial comparison to the European trade. In De l’esprit des lois (1748), Montesquieu attacked Du Halde’s comparison and considered it irrelevant. He argued, “Europe has reached such a high degree of power that nothing in history is comparable to it.” Immediately after asserting European power and dominance, he felt the need to challenge Du Halde’s contention about the relative size of China’s domestic trade, since this claim undermined European supremacy. He maintained that China’s internal commerce might be larger than Europe’s, but European foreign trade was, in fact, much greater.53 Some popular geographies recounted the disagreement between Du Halde and Montesquieu about the relative size of China’s domestic trade.54 By 1776, Smith moderated his assessment of the size of China’s domestic trade, claiming it was “perhaps, in extent, not much more inferior to the market of all the different countries of  Europe put together.”55 By the end of the eighteenth century, with European commerce rapidly expanding, even the tempered claim that China’s domestic market was near the size of all of Europe’s internal commerce was complimentary of the Chinese system. Du Halde’s most influential assertion on China’s domestic trade was that each province acted like a separate “kingdom” that specialized in particular products and exchanged with their neighbours.56 The Jesuit portrayed China’s self-sufficiency as allowing for diversification of production. This idea was picked up by numerous popular sources. For example, the modern part of the Universal History described how the Chinese “chiefly [relied] on” their domestic trade, where each province was like a state or kingdom that had specialty goods and easy transportation to traffic them.57 While the editors were not going to go as far as Du Halde and claim that China’s internal trade was larger than Europe’s trade, they did popularize the point that Smith was to make decades later 52 For instance, a direct quotation can be found in The Chinese Traveller, 189; Lambert, A collection of curious observations on the manners, customs, usages, different languages, government, 2: 386. 53 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 393; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, 71. 54 See, for example, Fenning and Collyer et al., A New System of Geography, 1: 61. 55 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 866. 56 Du Halde, A description of the Empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 334, Watts edition, 2: 296, French edition, 2: 204. 57 The modern part of an universal history, 8: 239.

28463_Millar.indd 111

2016-12-15 14:02:00

112

A Singular Case

in The Wealth of Nations. China’s specialization of production, low domestic transportation costs (discussed further in chapter 5), and the grand scale of domestic trade were well-known, positive characteristics of its political economy. European observers and commentators appreciated and admired China’s unusual ability to garner significant wealth from domestic commerce. As theories of freer international trade continued to rise in prominence in the eighteenth century, China’s ability to maintain a relatively high level of wealth while heavily restricting foreign trade required an explanation. Europeans often discussed the exceptionality of China to explain why it did not fit their theories and assumptions. The Chinese system of political economy allowed for significant specialization of production in its domestic economy. In the case of foreign trade, the Middle Kingdom offered a different model for growth, where growth depended almost entirely on domestic consumption and production. Peter Coclanis, however, has struck a more realistic balance in his assessment of China’s trade policies in the eighteenth century. Citing the work of Anthony Reid and Deepak Lal, he notes it is important to not overstate Chinese isolation, at the same time recognizing that the Chinese did not exploit Southeast Asia the way that Europe did the Americas.58 It would be misleading, however, to think that the Chinese government did not have expansionist interests. Although it was not fully appreciated by our early modern European sources, from 1660 to 1760 the Qing Empire doubled in size. The government used different strategies, including playing on cultural ties with Inner Asia, spreading Confucian principles, and learning about early modern mapping technologies introduced by the Jesuits. This was no easy feat, and Peter Perdue has studied how the Qing succeeded in eliminating the Mongol threat when no previous dynasty could. It was not inevitable that the Qing would come to rule the Mongol regions: there were many obstacles including the “vast distances, barren deserts, and low-yielding lands of the frontier.”59 Perdue extolls the importance of Central Eurasia and the interaction between the Chinese, Russians, and Zhungars in this region; this history is largely omitted from discussion of Chinese “isolationism” and military prowess. Europeans, living as they were in a seafaring world where the frontier was across the oceans rather than along the ancient Silk Road, neglected to understand the importance of Central Asia to the Qing Empire. Perdue also notes that by the seventeenth century,

58 Coclanis, “Assessing Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: A Forum,” 12. 59 Perdue, China Marches West, 303.

28463_Millar.indd 112

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China and International Trade 113

boundaries in Western Europe were more established, so the difference between “domestic and foreign goals could be sharply separated.”60 In China, this was not the case, with the result that the expansion of China’s “domestic” trade also includes the expansion of the empire. By the mideighteenth century, expansion ceased being the primary task of Qing rulers. Thus, even if it was not widely recognized by the Europeans, the early Qing Empire “was not an isolated, stable, united ‘Oriental empire’ but an evolving state structure engaged in mobilization for expansionist warfare.”61 R e c o m m e n dat i o n s Given China’s unique situation, the question before Enlightenment theorists was what policies should the Chinese follow in the future. Should they increase their exposure to international trade or continue to develop and specialize within their domestic economy? The answer to this question depended more on individual philosophical leanings than on any direct empirical evidence reported on China. In the seventeenth century, many European observers appreciated China’s policy of limiting international trade. The expansion of European interests overseas, concurrent with wars, revolutions, and the spread of disease, reminded early modern observers of lessons from ­Ancient Rome and highlighted the risks of overexpansion. European countries were in the midst of massive exploration and expansion, which caused anxiety for those who felt governments were overextending themselves. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Edward Gibbon chronicled this notion of internal decay from an ever-expanding empire in his influential Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776). In this light, for some, China’s restraint was admirable. One of the early Iberian accounts of China by Gaspar da Cruz described how the Chinese had had a larger empire earlier in their history, ruling over Malacca, Siam, and Champa in Southeast Asia. He explained their motivations for contracting this empire: “the King of China, seeing that his kingdom went to decay, and was in danger by their seeking to conquer many other foreign countries, he withdrew himself with his men to his own kingdom.”62 60 Ibid., 422. 61 Ibid., 527. 62 Boxer, South China, 67; similarly, Navarrete was an early seventeenth-century source that explicitly commended the limitations on international relations as “a good piece of  policy,” adding “the same might be done in other kingdoms.” Navarrete in J. and A. Churchill, A Collection of Voyages and Travels, 1: 60–1.

28463_Millar.indd 113

2016-12-15 14:02:00

114

A Singular Case

These early descriptions travelled back to a European audience, many of whom agreed that the Chinese policy was wise. Giovanni Botero explained China’s motivations for restricting foreign interactions as a strategy of self-preservation: “Strangers are not admitted to enter into the kingdome, lest their customes and conversation should breed alteration in manners, or innovation in the state.”63 The Chinese, he argued, were “more ready and fit to defend, then offend, to preserve rather than increase,” an indirect criticism of European states’ expansionary policies. For Botero, a cautious approach that focused on self-preservation should be greatly admired. By the eighteenth century, a few European philosophers and geographers still rationalized China’s guarded approach toward international relations. For instance, Raynal reminded his readers of the problems of the Sino-Portuguese relationship during the time of Tomé Pires; under those circumstances, he asked, what incentive did the Chinese have to expand their foreign relations?64 Similarly, the geographer Thomas Salmon, in his Modern History, explained that the Chinese restrictions at the harbour of Nanking were a result of its having been besieged by a pirate, which showed the Chinese “how much the place was expos’d to insults from abroad” and led them to “remove the trade to other towns which were more secure.”65 In a later work, he argued, the Chinese restricted the Europeans to the port of Canton because they witnessed the Dutch deposing Indian princes and usurping dominions, and “they know that their forces are not equal to European Armies.”66 Indeed, even Adam Smith supported the British Navigation Acts, contravening free trade, by arguing “defence … is of much more importance than opulence.”67 Nonetheless, the bulk of thinking had turned toward the new world of global expansion and trade. Concurrent with this understanding of Chinese restrictions on foreign trade (beyond simple arrogance or disdain for foreigners) was the acknowledgment that in the existing trade between China and Europe, China maintained a formidable position. In fact, Europeans actively 63 Botero, Relations, of the most famous kingdoms and common-weales through the World, 596 and 598. This excerpt was accurately translated from the original Italian: see Botero, Delle Relationi Universali, part 2, 66. 64 Although in the final edition these paragraphs were found in chapter 21 (for which Diderot is credited), the paragraphs in question were also in earlier editions and are attributed to Raynal. Raynal, A philosophical and political history, Justamond edition, 105–6; Raynal, French edition, 123–4. 65 Salmon, Modern History, 10. 66 Salmon, Universal Traveller, 1: 18. 67 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 583.

28463_Millar.indd 114

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China and International Trade 115

debated whether this commerce hindered or helped expand the wealth of their own countries. From 1699 to 1751 silver made up an estimated 90 percent of British exports to China.68 In exchange for the silver, the English primarily received luxury goods such as porcelain, silk, and tea. The China trade was large enough that it allowed for the development of a much-studied chinoiserie trend in Europe. Although antithetical to the idea that China was isolating itself from significant European trade, the  commerce with China occasioned debate over the implications of the massive influx of Chinese luxury goods in exchange for European precious metals. In the seventeenth century, the diverse group of economic writers often referred to as the “mercantilists” debated contending theories of international trade.69 Adam Smith painted mercantilists as seeing gold and silver as wealth and highlighting the importance of a favourable balance of trade.70 Some nineteenth-century commentators, following Adam Smith, maintained the mercantilists were united by a belief in the balance-of-trade theory and bullionism (the view that wealth is defined by the quantity precious metals). Bullionists viewed the outward flow of silver in terms of the export of wealth (an idea that originated in earlier Spanish debates). In their view, the China trade was negative for Europe and positive for China because Chinese luxury items were bought in exchange for European precious metals, which they believed should be held as reserves.71 These bullionists called for a diversification of products for exchange in the China trade. In this framework of trade as a ­zero-sum game, China was the winner while Europeans were clearly losing. By the end of the seventeenth century there were dozens of mercantilist publications that argued that concern over a negative balance of trade was outmoded, did not consider gold and silver to have intrinsic value, and instead maintained that unrestricted trade was the way to prosperity. The varying views of the intrinsic value of money fundamentally shaped the balance of trade debate, and the nature and implications of the global silver trade were hotly contested then, as they still

68 Morse, Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834, 1: 307–13. 69 See Coleman, “Mercantilism Revisited,” for a review of the historiographical problems surrounding the study of mercantilism. More recently, see Stern and Wennerlind, eds, Mercantilism Reimagined. 70 See Smith, The Wealth of Nations, book 4, chapter 1, “Of the Principle of the Commercial or Mercantile System.” 71 Irwin, Against the Tide, 35 and 38.

28463_Millar.indd 115

2016-12-15 14:02:00

116

A Singular Case

are today. Flynn and Giráldez argue that the conventional way to view sixteenth- and seventeenth-century monetary relations prioritizes European demand for Asian products, and sees Asian consumers as “inward-­ looking” and less “adventuresome,” thus not interested in European goods. Therefore, Europeans responded to the balance of payments deficit by sending “cash monies” to Asia. This picture attributes the silver trade to European demand. Flynn and Giráldez take a less Eurocentric approach. They do not see silver as “passive balancing items” and point out the importance of differentiating various monetary substances in the early modern period so that the result is not an imbalance of trade, but rather “just trade.”72 They argue that a great deal of gold flowed to Europe from China between the 1540s and 1640. Further, silver gravitated toward China when it was double the price there than elsewhere, particularly after the Ming Dynasty accepted it as the central currency when they established that taxes should be paid in silver in the 1570s Single-Whip Tax Reform. Flynn and Giráldez conclude, “rather than depicting the flow of silver to China as a passive effect of disequilibrium in non-monetary trade, therefore, it is better to recognize that disequilibrium within the silver market itself was an active cause of global trade.”73 They argue that once the price of silver equalized in China, trade declined. Debates over these findings are ongoing. William Atwell argues that direct exchange of Chinese gold for foreign silver became a “very minor element in China’s overall foreign trade.”74 Additionally, the value of silver fell relative to gold but both gold and silver rose relative to copper prior to the fall of the Ming Dynasty. Kent Deng’s 2008 article highlights the disagreements over the silver trade. He argues that China’s demand for silver was smaller than has been estimated and certainly not insatiable.75 It is not within the scope of this book to discuss these debates in great detail, but they do reflect the complicated nature of this trading relationship. Of course, in the early modern context one’s position within this trade would greatly shape one’s interpretation. David Porter has recently contended that the Chinese disinterest in British wool and tin meant the English East India Company was “forced, at considerable political peril, to finance its purchases of tea, silks, and porcelain with silver bullion.”76 72 73 74 75 76

28463_Millar.indd 116

Flynn and Giráldez, “Globalization Began in 1571,” 214. Ibid., 216. Atwell, “Another Look at Silver Imports into China, ca. 1635–1644,” 476. Deng, “Miracle or Mirage?” Porter, “Monstrous Beauty,” 400.

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China and International Trade 117

Porter also highlights the “unfavorable arrangements” for the eic in the China trade. Because the Chinese absorbed only a small number of European manufactured goods (such as clocks, etc.), this description is undoubtedly true. But the analysis can be reframed to emphasize the exchange of goods at a profit (if we are to believe early modern sources and Flynn and Giráldez) and that the China trade was not just a bilateral exchange since the goods were often re-exported in exchange for specie or other goods. Contemporary observers were certainly divided over how to view the exchange of silver for manufactured goods. Porter’s assessment of the “complex range of responses” to Chinese goods compared to goods from elsewhere is most helpful, even though it does not resolve the silver debate.77 Many eighteenth-century observers believed there were significant arbitrage profits from the silver trade to China because silver was commonly exchanged for gold. For example, the popular geography A new general collection of voyages and travels (1745–47) described the large profits derived from exchanging precious metals. In fact, it was argued the trade between China and England was so substantial that goods such as “cloths, crystals, swords, clocks, striking-watches, repeating-clocks, telescopes, looking-glasses, etc” had become as cheap in China as they were in Europe so the only item to trade to China to gain an advantage would be silver in exchange for gold.78 If bullion is seen as a commodity, as recent revisionist economic historians have argued, then one need not worry what specific goods were exchanged because all trade has positive outcomes. Alarm at the European drainage of specie for Chinese manufactures began to die down by the eighteenth century.79 Most commentators ­recognized that the bilateral China trade was actually part of a broader international exchange network. For instance, a 1743 geographical compendium by Joseph Randall, a schoolteacher and agriculturalist, demonstrates awareness that trade was not bilateral and deficits should not be considered in isolation from the global system. Describing the East Indies trade, he argued that British exports to China, India, and Persia,

77 Ibid., 401. 78 A new general collection of voyages and travels, 4: 125. 79 The drainage of specie to China did not concern Adam Smith either, because the staunch anti-mercantilist viewed silver as a commodity. He argued that there were two consequences of the annual exportation of silver to the East Indies: first, plate was somewhat more expensive in Europe, and second, coined silver rose in value. However, Smith maintained that these consequences were “too insignificant to deserve any part of the public attention.” Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 565.

28463_Millar.indd 117

2016-12-15 14:02:00

118

A Singular Case

which included bullion, clothes, and several other items, were exchanged for china-ware, tea, cabinets, and other luxury items, “of which, ‘tis supposed, as much is re-exported to foreign nations, as repays all the bullion carried to these places, and a considerable balance besides.”80 Discussion of global trading linkages reveals the integral part that China played in the international trade system. Indeed, theories on foreign trade evolved over the course of the eighteenth century toward a view of the mutual benefits of freer international trade. Not everyone agreed. In 1732 Richard Cantillon, an Irish author, argued for the maintenance of a favourable balance of trade, which to him meant exporting manufactured products.81 He believed that the East India trade was profitable to the Dutch Republic, at the expense of the rest of Europe, because the Dutch traded the Eastern goods to Germany, Italy, Spain, and the New World in return for money, which they sent to the Indies to buy more goods. While his view of the balance of trade became less prevalent in the eighteenth century, Cantillon was an early commentator on the global dimensions of trade networks and the important place the East Indies held within them. Indeed, there was an increasing shift to thinkers who focused on the global nature of trade rather than the bilateral drainage of specie. They pointed out that the China trade was part of a broader international exchange network. Joshua Gee argued that although a great amount of bullion is sent to Asia, they “sell to foreigners as many of the said commodities as repay for all the bullion shipped out, and leave with us beside a very considerable ballance upon that trade.”82 Montesquieu also recognized the multiple centres involved in the global exchange of silver: “The consequence of the discovery of America was to link Asia and Africa to Europe. America furnished Europe with the material for its commerce in that vast part of Asia called the East Indies. Silver, that metal so useful to commerce as a sign, was also the basis for the greatest commerce of the universe as a commodity. Finally, voyages to Africa ­became necessary; they furnished men to work the mines and land of America.”83 While Montesquieu believed Europe was the master orchestrating this cycle, the place of the East Indies, and especially China as the prime absorber of silver, which was a commodity, reflected its recognized place in global trade. 80 Randall, A System of Geography, 344. 81 Cantillon, Essai sur la nature du commerce en général, part 3, chapter 1, “Of Foreign Trade.” 82 Gee, The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered, 26. 83 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 392; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 4, 71.

28463_Millar.indd 118

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China and International Trade 119

By the second half of the eighteenth century, the modern concept of free trade – lack of intervention by governments on trading activities – had taken hold. Led by David Hume, a new perspective on international trade emerged. Hume’s essays “Of the Balance of Trade” (1752) and “Of the Jealousy of Trade” (1758) expounded a view of foreign trade where prices were naturally balanced and attacked the mercantilist zero-sum game view where benefits accrued in one country meant losses in another.84 The intellectual tide had turned toward free trade, so much so that the French Physiocrats directly confronted these ideas rather than earlier bullionist assumptions. Focused on demonstrating the supremacy of agriculture, the Physiocrats saw free foreign trade as useful only for the export of domestic agricultural products.85 In a section entitled “Commerce Viewed as Serving Agriculture” in “Despotisme de la Chine” (1767), Quesnay used China as a model to attack the belief that “nations must trade with foreigners in order to grow rich in money.” 86 Commerce was necessary, he argued, but it was dependent on agriculture. Quesnay repeated Du Halde’s assertion (via Rousselot de Surgy) that China’s internal trade was greater than Europe’s and that each province specialized in particular products, making commerce between them necessary so they did not lapse into poverty. “The greatest opulence possible,” the Physiocrat believed, “consists in the greatest consumption possible,” which “has its source within the territory of every nation” [emphasis added].87 Quesnay differentiated between China’s domestic commerce (driven by consumption) and the commerce of merchants (often extended afar). He believed that “foreign commerce is perhaps more injurious than favourable to the prosperity of the nations that devote themselves to it” and only serves to profit the merchant class and encourage “frivolities which support an injurious luxury.” Quesnay could not find a nation attached to foreign commerce that, apart from its traders, “provides examples of prosperity.” The Chinese system, according to the Physiocrat, represented the Natural Order and so he praised their elevation of domestic trade above foreign commerce. China’s system was natural and therefore replicable, meaning that all countries should prioritize domestic agriculture over foreign trade. He praised China’s restrictions on foreign trade, predicting that it would continue to growth wealthy without any changes to its international trade policies. 84 Berdell, “Innovation and Trade”; Hont, Jealousy of Trade. 85 Bloomfield, “The Foreign Trade Doctrines of the Physiocrats,” 716. 86 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 208. Accurately translated from the original French, see Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 603. 87 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 208–11.

28463_Millar.indd 119

2016-12-15 14:02:00

120

A Singular Case

While the Physiocrats argued that China should be used as a universal model, in the infamous “rich-country poor-country debate,” China once again emerged as an outlier. The philosophical controversy centred on whether poor countries with their lower wages would inevitably overtake rich countries with higher wages by producing cheaper manufactures.88 For most participants, the fate of poorer Scotland relative to richer England was at stake. It was a time of intense competition and the English Parliament had already begun to impose tariffs against cheaper and better quality Indian cotton textile imports produced by lower-wage workers in the seventeenth century.89 Interestingly, as Istvan Hont points out, David Hume chose to use the example of China rather than India when discussing the threat of Asian goods. In a private letter to fellow Scotsman James Oswald, Hume argued that China could easily “undersell” highwage European countries, but luckily for countries like England, distance and high import taxes raised the overall cost of Chinese goods.90 If it were not for these barriers, the Chinese goods would flood the European markets until wages equalized and, following this, the price of goods. Hume extrapolated this case to the overall advantage of lowwage countries. Smith, as we saw earlier, agreed that Chinese goods would be cheaper if not for artificial and natural obstacles in the trade. However, he differed from Hume that this supported the potential of Scotland to catch up to England due to the former’s lower wages. China, Smith pointed out, was wealthy and should not be labelled a poor country. Chinese wages were low for a very different set of reasons than they were in other countries (like Scotland); China was a “stationary state” with massive population growth and government monetary interventions that kept the purchasing power of Chinese labourers relatively high. This was a unique situation and not comparable to the Scottish case. Poor European countries, lacking in skills, division of labour, and productivity, were not a similar threat to their richer neighbours. Due to its unique circumstances in terms of wages and self-sufficiency, China had managed to develop without a large foreign trade, but for Smith, this system was not only irreproducible in non-Chinese contexts; it was also ultimately detrimental to China. The supposed stagnation 88 See Irwin, Against the Tide, chapter 10, and Hont, Jealousy of Trade, introduction. These debates remained isolated in the philosophical community and the first-hand sources of information and popular geographies had little to contribute on the empirical side. 89 Marks, The Origins of the Modern World, 81. 90 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 66.

28463_Millar.indd 120

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China and International Trade 121

China was experiencing, in part due to not pursuing greater foreign trade, was easily remedied. Immediately following his discussion of China’s unique domestic economy, Smith argued that “a more extensive foreign trade … could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China, and to improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing industry.” He also claimed that foreign trade would have other positive externalities such as developing Chinese navigation, technology transfer, and “other improvements of art and industry.”91 It was possible to understand China’s reasons and respect its ability to limit foreign trade, and still believe that increasing foreign trade was in its interest and indeed realizable. Smith had good reason to believe such changes were possible. His central source on Chinese trade negotiations, Lange, portrayed the chaotic diplomacy between the Russian embassy and the Chinese court at Peking. Lange revealed the difficulties, confusions, and contradictions in engaging with Chinese officials; implied that there was a disjuncture between the Emperor and his mandarins, and even among the Chinese officials themselves; and that far from a government abiding by ancient maxims, the Chinese frequently changed their international trading arrangements. As an example, Lange recounted the story of a commissary – a representative of the new French East India monopolistic trading company – trying to dispatch a ship full of goods from Canton but being met with corruption and excessive duties. Elsewhere, Lange commented that he was “very glad to learn that the court had also begun to enter into a trade, which they had before looked upon as so contemptible a thing with them … [and] that, since his majesty had given such authentic marks of the esteem he had for commerce.”92 In fact, he noted numerous times the substantial trade that took place at Canton where European merchants made considerable profits. Lange was not the first to note the fluctuations in Chinese practices. From knowledge of active Chinese encouragement of foreign trade to the numerous ways in which Europeans and Chinese merchants could exchange goods without formal permission, eighteenth-century observers realized that while the China trade was restricted, the country was never completely isolated. Further, China was dynamic, with policies shifting over time. During the Ming Dynasty, European sources described how Chinese foreign trade occurred under the guise of tribute, a context that gave the Chinese a dominant position in the exchange. For instance,

91 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 866. 92 Lange, “Journal of Mr. De Lange,” 487.

28463_Millar.indd 121

2016-12-15 14:02:00

122

A Singular Case

Olfert Dapper explained that foreign ambassadors (or Turks, Tartars, and Mongols posing as ambassadors) often brought tribute to the Chinese emperor as a pretence so they could engage in trade.93 He reported that when they presented cheap gifts to the emperor as a gesture, they tended to get at least twice the value in return. These practices were of little use to the Europeans since they sent relatively few embassies, and those they sent certainly were not going to submit to tributary status. Nonetheless, the anecdotes pointed to the flexibility built in to Chinese trade practices (even if not represented in official policies). With the transition from the Ming to Qing Dynasty in 1644, first-hand descriptions of China reported the government’s active encouragement of international trade. Louis Le Comte’s Nouveaux mémoires (1696) was one of the first works to explain the effect that dynastic change had on China’s foreign trade. He described the tenth “principle maxim” of Qing policy: “to encourage trade as much as possible thro’ the whole empire … [and] to increase commerce, foreigners have been permitted to come into the ports of China, a thing till lately never known.”94 Around the same time, Nieuhof reported that the new emperor “proclaim’d a free trade in the city of Canton to all foreign people.”95 In fact, he reported that the Canton viceroys “jug’d, that the Holland merchants would bring great advantage and profit to the inhabitants of China, in regard that through the mutual commerce of these people, the defects of the country would be supply’d, and what was superfluous would be exported, which must necessarily very much advance the trade thereof, and increase the revenues of the country.” Some Chinese officials evidently believed in the mutual benefit of trade. In 1664, Chinese viceroys consented to free trade with the Dutch, allowed the merchant Frederick Schedel to erect a factory, and gave some of his companions leave to stay at Canton. However, soon after, a commissioner from Peking arrived and dissuaded the Chinese officials from these overtures, claiming “it was one thing to grant a port to a foreign people and another to allow a constant habitation.” Nonetheless, the Chinese under the Qing Dynasty reportedly believed foreign trade with the Europeans was valuable. In spite of the setbacks, two years after Schedel’s trip, Nieuhof was still impressed that in Canton ships arrived from “all quarters of the world with all manners of goods, wherewith they make a considerable gain.”96 93 Dapper, Atlas Chinensis, 1–2. Note that the title page misattributes the original Dutch work to Arnoldus Montanus. 94 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 290; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 73. 95 Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 20–3. 96 Ibid., 36.

28463_Millar.indd 122

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China and International Trade 123

By the eighteenth century, Du Halde reiterated these changes in Chinese policy and pointed out that trade had been opened to all nations, but added the qualifications that it was only the port of Canton that was open to Europeans, and then only at certain times of the year, and even then Europeans had to anchor outside the port.97 In spite of these limitations, a belief remained that China offered new opportunities for trade. Even the reported sinophobe Admiral Anson alluded to significant European trade with China. He described Canton as “frequented by European ships” and identified an established European presence in China, such as the English supercargoes and the resident Portuguese at Macao with whom he consulted.98 Even if official policies were problematic, Europeans were well aware that policies did not always dictate reality and subterfuge trade existed. Richard Rolt, in a dictionary on trade and commerce, described the advantages of trading silver in China in exchange for gold, noting, “the exportation of gold is prohibited in China; but the magistrates, notwithstanding, will privately sell it to the Europeans.”99 There was a consensus in the eighteenth-century popular sources that China was expanding its foreign trade allowances and that this was a positive and wise development. For example, in the Universal Traveller (1735), Patrick Barclay noted “in former times [the Chinese] exported in their own bottoms, not allowing any foreigner to enter their ports. But now they are grown wiser, and allow a free trade, as other nations do.”100 Others such as B. Le Stourgeon, in A compleat universal history (1732–38), pointed out the importance of foreign trade to the Qing: “The Chinese carry on a very great Trade with the Europeans, it being one of their State Maxims to encourage trading as much as possible, both at home and abroad; and as all their political maxims are calculated for the peace and plenty of their country, they would be soon reduc’d to great extremities, if their trade should once fail.”101 He described how China changed from a highly restricted foreign trade to a policy where Qing mandarins were required to facilitate trade and “frequently furnish merchants with

97 Du Halde, A description of the Empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 335, Watt’s edition, 2: 302, French edition, 2: 208. 98 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 353. 99 Rolt, A New Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, 130. 100 Barclay, The universal traveller, 614. Similarly, in Modern History, Thomas Salmon wrote that the Chinese “admit everyone into their ports, and carry merchandise out of China themselves.” Salmon, Modern History, 21. 101 Le Stourgeon, A compleat universal history, 29.

28463_Millar.indd 123

2016-12-15 14:02:00

124

A Singular Case

sums of money to improve to the best advantage.” Thus, the changes in China’s policy were widely acknowledged in European sources. European observers and commentators recognized that China was not as absolutely chained to their ancient maxims as previously supposed. The changes in the China trade under the Qing Dynasty indicated that government policies were flexible. While this recognition was unimportant for someone like Quesnay who thought Chinese policies need not change, it was an important part of Smith’s discussion of China as having the potential to progress (something we come back to in the conclusion of this book). Porter argues that the “period’s belief in the universal appeal of trade” preserved the hope and expectation that China would change course and spurred on the British trade missions of the end of the eighteenth and into the early nineteenth centuries.102 Conclusion By the end of the eighteenth century some Europeans still looked for ways to expand the China trade. Alexander Dalrymple – a Scottish-born East India Company traveller and researcher who spent time in Canton tirelessly trying to develop a more open international commerce – argued in 1769 that the China trade should be moved from Canton to Balambangan Island, near Borneo, where the duties would be less and trade would be freer.103 He pointed out this was also in the interest of the Chinese merchants who could be freed from the Hong merchant monopoly under which they had to pay to preserve their privileges. In a neutral land, both the British and Chinese merchants would benefit from independence from their respective governments. This perspective allies the interests of the British and Chinese governments against British and Chinese merchants. It also reflects creative and open-minded economic thinking about different institutional frameworks that allow for freer trade to exist. Dalrymple’s suggestion exposes how the linear narrative – that Europeans entered the modern world with Smith’s promotion of the free market, while the Chinese stagnated due to their isolationism – fails to capture the various agendas and nuanced views of eighteenthcentury observers. Others, however, especially as time wore on, saw little chance of engaging in a productive trade with China. After the failed Macartney Embassy at the close of the eighteenth century (beyond the scope of this book), optimism declined. 102 Porter, Ideographia, 203. 103 Cook, “Dalrymple, Alexander (1737–1808)”; Dalrymple, A plan for extending the commerce of this kingdom, 13–16, and 96.

28463_Millar.indd 124

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China and International Trade 125

The comments in geographical, philosophical, and traveller accounts available in Europe indicate a well-rounded and complex understanding of China’s policy toward foreign trade. Chinese policies were not stagnant, and shifted over time. However, these accounts also saw European policies as deserving blame for the problematic trading relationship. China flew in the face of Smith’s models of wealth and development since it could allow for a division of labour based on a thriving domestic economy. While Chinese policies were understood and Europeans were self-castigating, recommendations for how China might go forward varied based purely on theoretical assumptions about political economy. Quesnay believed the Chinese system followed the natural order, and so they should retain the limits on foreign trade. Smith, on the other hand, acknowledged the unique features of the empire but was still convinced of the added benefits to China expanding its foreign trade. The reports on China indicated that change was certainly a possible outcome because Chinese policies fluctuated and were not dictated by rigid custom. The narrative of Chinese isolation was not a post-Enlightenment construction, but reflects only part of a wider context of the early modern discussion on the China trade. We have also seen European commentators and observers who understood China’s unique ability to gain wealth from domestic trade; who did not assume the superiority of their trading policies; and who recognized China’s integral place in the early modern world. Most observers and commentators agreed that China had room to improve its international trade policies. Yet, the policies themselves were not sufficient to lead to a widespread dismissal of its system of political economy, or to doubt about its potential to amass significant wealth. While China’s policies and practices in domestic and foreign commerce could be improved, they were not widely considered fundamental flaws of the Chinese system.

28463_Millar.indd 125

2016-12-15 14:02:00

4

“The Science of Princes”: China’s Constitutional Foundations In 1688, François Bernier, the physician philosopher-traveller, published part of his translation of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (1687). The original text was a collaborative effort by Jesuits to teach Europeans about ancient Chinese moral philosophy (and ultimately its compatibility with Christianity).1 The subtitle to Bernier’s French translation, “La science des princes,” not only reflects the high esteem in which Confucius was held, but also the attempts by interested Europeans to connect Chinese philosophy to the rising intellectual pursuit in Europe of a science of ­human nature and society, and in particular, a science of government.2 Confucianism, for Bernier, was not a speculative philosophy but rather, when merged with politics, a concrete science that could be used to educate young princes throughout the world. Bernier believed the Confucian system should be judged by what the Chinese empire had achieved, and given the country’s wealth and large population, the moral philosophy was clearly successful. This proved that centralized authority had merits, even if the system was defective in France under Louis XIV. Bernier’s conclusion underlines one of the most significant tensions in the intellectual debates of early modern Europe, namely the 1 Largely driven by the Flemish Jesuit Philippe Couplet, Confucius Sinarum Philosophus was translated into French by Louis Cousin (1688) and from this edition into English as The Morals of Confucius, a Chinese Philosopher (1691). Written to defend the Jesuit position in the Rites Controversy, the original Latin text was a translation of and commentary on three of the four Confucian books. This work was extremely popular in Europe, influencing thinkers such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Confucius Sinarum Philosophus was (and is) viewed as sinophile propaganda, based in large part on its publication during a particularly difficult period of the Rites Controversy. 2 The translation project was completed but only partially published by the time of Bernier’s death. The introduction was published in the Journal des sçavans in 1688. Pinot, La Chine et la formation de l’esprit philosophique en France (1640–1740), 377–84.

28463_Millar.indd 126

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China’s Constitutional Foundations 127

relationship between theory and application. If the application of centralized authority tended to corruption in France, could it have had positive or different outcomes in the Chinese case? Enlightenment discussions of China’s government revealed two images of China: one despotic and one moderate. China was often admired for its antiquity, the wisdom of its maxims, the uniformity of its laws, the virtue of its administrators, and the regularity and order it maintained. Reacting against this image of moderate China, philosophers such as Montesquieu decried it as a bastion of fear and oppression; it was an infamous example of the pejorative label “oriental despotism.” Critics pointed to China’s problems of state such as civil or foreign wars, the injustice of princes, and the avarice of mandarins. R. Bin Wong and JeanLaurent Rosenthal have recently described this divide in Enlightenment thinking about the Chinese government, although, they note, Montesquieu described China as “enlightened despotism,” which is not quite accurate.3 The tension between moderate and despotic China cannot be neatly divided along the lines of different sources. In fact, “sinophile” Jesuits such as Louis Le Comte addressed tyrannical powers in the ­Chinese government and “sinophobes” like Montesquieu considered China’s more moderate checks and balances. In other words, the same source could recognize that China had both moderate and despotic qualities. As a result, the central question became whether the empirical descriptions of China could be reconciled with the political systems of  European philosophers, or whether China’s system was genuinely unique. More broadly, how did empirical descriptions and particular case studies shape the theoretical debates of the Enlightenment? This chapter examines views of China’s form of government and asks in what ways European observers and commentators approached, accepted, and criticized its model of government. Chapter 5 will also address China’s government, but specifically as it related to the realities of day-to-day operations (governance) and China’s economic success. These two themes certainly interacted (particularly with regard to property rights) but due to the complexity of the subject, I consider constitutional issues in detail before addressing the practices of government as they related to political economy. This chapter begins by discussing the evolution of the theory of oriental despotism and its pre-Enlightenment relationship to China. The extent to which descriptions of China posed a challenge to Enlightenment theories of government is addressed in the second section. Here, the debate between Montesquieu and the

3 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 169 and 7.

28463_Millar.indd 127

2016-12-15 14:02:00

128

A Singular Case

French Physiocrat François Quesnay reveals the dual imaging of China as both despotic and moderate. It will be shown that most Enlightenment philosophers took great care to reconcile first-hand descriptions of China with their theoretical models, concluding that the Chinese system struck a unique balance between centralized authority and moderation. While some, notably Montesquieu, believed this balance could not be reproduced outside China, Quesnay viewed the system as the expression of natural law that should and could be replicated in all states, including Europe. The final section addresses the unique structural, moral, and internal checks and balances in the Chinese constitution that reflected the moderate elements of the Middle Kingdom. Oriental Despotism When considering eighteenth-century views of China’s government, the European theory of oriental despotism inevitably arises. This theory evolved in relation to the states of the Near East. It is evident from the first-hand, geographical, and philosophical sources that China never fit neatly into this category. As a result, early modern debates about Chinese despotism were closely linked to the empirical evidence available about its system of government. European discussions of eastern despotism were fundamentally shaped by European politics and in particular by the contrasting political trajectories of France and England. The absolute monarchy of Louis  XIV in late seventeenth-century France centralized the government, eliminated feudalism, reformed the army and finances, and created a uniform law that limited the role of the parlements, all of which curbed the power of the aristocracy. It was a militaristic government that fought several wars, which were exacerbated by famines and ultimately led to the deaths of millions. Louis XIV’s power over the church and aristocracy increased during his reign, and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which threatened Protestants with exile, led to fear of his tyrannical tendencies. By contrast with the “gloire” but also the “tyranny” of Louis XIV, the reign of Louis XV from 1715 to 1774 (including the régence by Philippe d’Orléans) was less dramatic but more scandalous. The king became extremely unpopular for his private luxuries and for losing French colonies. He maintained the central power of the monarchy; meanwhile, popular demand for reform rose. During the same period, England’s political history witnessed dramatic fluctuations. The turbulent seventeenth century witnessed the Exclusion Crisis, the Restoration, and the Glorious Revolution and

28463_Millar.indd 128

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China’s Constitutional Foundations 129

ultimately led to a constitutional monarchy restrained by the House of Commons. The factional politics between the Tories (who endorsed a strong monarchy to counterbalance the power of parliament) and the Whigs (who supported constitutional monarchism and the role of aristocratic families, and eventually wealthy merchants, in government) influenced many writers of early modern England. France, therefore, represented an absolute monarchy where, as David Hume stressed, “law, custom and religion concur”;4 and England was an example of a mixed monarchy – as Hume described it neither wholly monarchical nor wholly republican – where debates ensued over whether, and in which way, the delicate balance between powers could be maintained. Within this context, the theory of oriental despotism first expounded by Aristotle in reference to Persia re-emerged with new life. The definition of despotism was consistent from Aristotle through to the Enlightenment: it was a legal and hereditary regime (thus distinguishable from tyranny), and located in an oriental setting.5 Joan-Pau Rubiés’s examination of oriental despotism from Botero to Montesquieu points to the interplay between theory and empirical evidence in early modern Europe.6 Over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, first-hand descriptions of the Near East were used to enhance and modify the definition of despotism. Not enough was known about China’s government in this period (especially compared to Mughal India, the Ottoman Empire, and the Persian state) for it to have shaped the theory itself, and the Middle Kingdom was often discussed in terms of its exceptionality rather than as a typical case. When China’s system of government was discussed in the sixteenth century, its internal contradictions and exceptionality stood out. For

4 Hume, “Of the Liberty of the Press” [1741], in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, 3: 9. This is particularly interesting because of the similarity to Montesquieu’s description of how the Chinese “confused religion, laws, mores and manners.” Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 318; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, 105. In fact, Hume and Montesquieu agreed on numerous points. For more on Montesquieu’s relationship to the Scottish Enlightenment, see Moore, “Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment,” 178–95. 5 Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism,” 115. Venturi, “Oriental Despotism,” 133–42. 6 Others have noted moments of important confluence between ethnographic descriptions of Asia and the development (or criticism) of the concept of oriental despotism. However, these focus on particular figures, notably, Abraham-Hyacinthe AnquetilDuperron, who travelled to Asia and criticized Montesquieu’s use of first-hand reports and theory of despotism by referring to India, Persia, and Turkey. Venturi, “Oriental Despotism,” 136–8.

28463_Millar.indd 129

2016-12-15 14:02:00

130

A Singular Case

example, Juan González de Mendoza offered a complex portrayal.7 In some ways, according to the Augustinian, the Chinese were more like slaves than free people, particularly in relation to the importance of ­personal service, the insecurity of property rights, and the corruption of  governors.8 However, Mendoza also depicted Chinese emperors throughout history as a mixture of tyrants and benevolent leaders. The image of the people as slaves supported the notion of Chinese despotism, but the discussion of the behaviour of individual emperors indicated a tyranny that was not systematic. Descriptions of the complexities of the Chinese state, such as Mendoza’s, began to influence theorists of oriental despotism. This influence is seen most clearly in Giovanni Botero’s Relationi Universali (Rome, 1591–96). As Rubiés has pointed out, the Italian geographer/ philosopher used empirical evidence to refine the Aristotelian definition of oriental despotism.9 In particular, he concentrated on the importance of geography (in terms of size and climate) in leading to despotism in Asia. Botero argued that the large Asian empires were, in fact, weaker than those of Europe and pointed to the “excessive, counterproductive concentration of authority and revenues” without structural limitations.10 According to Botero, despotic governments did not care for their subjects. However, China was a notable exception. Although it was despotic, lacked a nobility, and the emperor controlled the movements of the people, Botero believed justice, good policy, and industry flourished and China was ultimately very well governed with peace as its aim.11 Thus, the two sides of China’s government appeared in the development of the theory of oriental despotism. Botero’s momentous sixteenth-century study of despotism recognized that the Chinese system did not comfortably meet all the criteria of a despotic model.   7 His characterization of the Chinese government focused on the operation of the system rather than the theoretical intricacies of the system. This is not surprising given that Mendoza relied on sources that lacked access to Chinese intellectuals who could have informed them about China’s governing principles.  8 Mendoza, The Historie of … China, 73 and 82.   9 Botero’s use of Mendoza, Barros, Maffei, Michele Ruggiero, and the Jesuit letters is evinced by his repetition of the information and names of Chinese cities discussed in Della cause della grandezza e magnificenza della città. Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, 2: 238 and 245. 10 Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism,” 126. 11 Note, however, that the English and French translations decided to avoid the Italian despotico for the terms “absolute” and “tyrannical.” Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism,” 124. Botero, Relations, of the most famous kingdoms, 596–7. Apart from the term despotico, this discussion was accurately translated from the original Italian. See Botero, Delle Relationi Universali, part 2, 65.

28463_Millar.indd 130

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China’s Constitutional Foundations 131

C h i n e s e D e s p o t i s m i n E n l i g h t e n m e n t D e bat e s As the idea of oriental despotism solidified, European observers continuously debated whether China fit into this category. The variations between the original French and two English translations of the popular Description de la Chine (1735) by the French Jesuit Jean Baptiste Du Halde clearly illustrate this disagreement. In a section on the authority of the Chinese emperor, the original French edition used the term monarchique when referring to the state of China: “Il n’y a jamais eu d’état plus monarchique que celui de le Chine: l’empereur a une autorité absolue & à en juger par les apparences, c’est une espèce de Divinité.”12 The 1736 John Watts translation used the term “absolute” when discussing China’s monarchy: “There is no monarchy more absolute than that of China. The Emperor has an absolute authority, and the respect which is paid to him is a kind of adoration.”13 Finally, in the 1742 Edward Cave edition, held to be the more accurate translation, the editor added the term “despotic” in addition to referring to a monarchy: “There is no government whose monarchy is more despotic than that of China. The emperor is vested with absolute authority, and to appearance is a kind of Divinity.”14 China was increasingly labelled despotic rather than monarchical but the extent to which it resembled the abstract type of despotism, or other oriental models such as Mughal India, was fiercely debated. Because the theory of oriental despotism was not defined in direct relation to China, evidence had to be selected to fit the idea or the label had to be adapted to fit the existing information on China. These concerns would continue to burden those philosophers of the Enlightenment who grappled with understanding and classifying the Chinese government. By the eighteenth century, empirical information on China increased and the relationship between scholarly theory and first-hand descriptions became even more pivotal to discussion of the Chinese government. This was especially difficult since sources of information presented contrasting labels, as we saw in the case of Du Halde’s description. Although numerous authors, notably Montesquieu, continued to label China despotic, nearly all commentators struggled to reconcile the many unique elements of the Chinese system. Quesnay defended the Chinese system of government against Montesquieu’s criticisms, and believed that China, operating on the basis of natural law, was replicable. However, even the Physiocrat addressed empirical evidence that questioned the 12 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, French edition, 2: 156. 13 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Watts edition, 2: 12. 14 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 241.

28463_Millar.indd 131

2016-12-15 14:02:00

132

A Singular Case

merits of the Chinese system. The debates over China’s government reflect – but extend beyond – the boundaries of sinophile and sinophobe because both despotic and moderate images of China were present in the same texts. Enlightenment commentators demonstrated a genuine engagement with the empirical descriptions of China, even if at times this interest was a necessity in order to penetrate debates rather than a personal desire to understand the Middle Kingdom. Further, as we saw with the case of Du Halde, labels for China within the first-hand accounts were certainly not consistent. Montesquieu opposed the centralizing force of Louis XIV and defended the French nobility.15 He was concerned about the potential for a monarchy to degenerate into despotism, in France in particular, and it was this concern that led to his vehement attack on despotism.16 Montesquieu needed the theory of oriental despotism in order to discuss the threats of centralized monarchical power; but it would be a mistake to over-interpret this agenda and assume that Montesquieu was not concerned with case studies and empirical reports. His famous assessment of the Chinese government brings two relevant themes to light. First, his use of the empirical evidence on China provided by the first-hand accounts was paradigmatic of the oscillation between selectivity and genuine engagement with the available information. There is great debate about the extent to which Montesquieu united empirical evidence with theoretical models, and how he did so.17 Regardless of Montesquieu’s personal estimate of the validity of his “ideal types,” he evidently felt it necessary to cite prominent first-hand sources and engage with the information they provided. He knew that his detractors would use the same 15 Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism,” 118. Franco Venturi addresses the close relationship between the concept of despotism in seventeenth-century France and the absolutism of King Louis XIV. Venturi, “Oriental Despotism,” 133. Melvin Richter also describes the concept of Oriental despotism being driven by images of Louis XIV as a “Grand Seigneur or Oriental despot” in the eighteenth century. However, Richter argues that Montesquieu “transcended the mere interests of his class” and his “theory of despotism served nobler purposes than the rationalization of prejudices of a privileged caste.” Richter, “Despotism,” 8. For more on Montesquieu’s background, see Shackleton, Montesquieu: A Critical Biography. 16 Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism,” 163. 17 Ibid., 162. Melvin Richter has argued that Montesquieu’s use of evidence was “highly selective,” demonstrating “how Europocentric he remained in his view of the world.” He argues that Montesquieu ignored Jesuit evidence when it did not support his theories and instead turned to the testimony of traders. Richter, The Political Theory of Montesquieu, 72 and 84. Richter argues elsewhere that Montesquieu’s concept of despotism was always meant as an “ideal type” and was not expected to be “empirically embodied in all its aspects.” Richter, “Despotism,” 9.

28463_Millar.indd 132

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China’s Constitutional Foundations 133

material to rebut his arguments. Given Montesquieu’s desire (or need) to connect the empirical evidence to his theories on government, the case of China proved to be a thorn in his side.18 In De l’esprit des lois, Montesquieu made various efforts to explain how China fit into his philosophical system, recognizing the major objections it posed to his arguments. Second, Montesquieu’s endeavour to fit China into his ideal type of despotism revealed the uniqueness of China’s government. Montesquieu’s understanding of despotism has been widely studied. David Young argues that the philosophe formed his ideas about despotism based on a selective reading of the travel literature on Turkey and Persia.19 Earlier, E. Carcassone maintained that Montesquieu used knowledge of the Near East to formulate his theory of despotism. Then, as an afterthought, Montesquieu tried to label China despotic, but had to modify his original position because of the information provided by the Jesuits.20 Jacques Pereira’s recent study of Montesquieu’s use of China highlights three difficulties China posed to Montesquieu’s theories: first, it was a challenge to his typology of government; second, it offered an alternative monarchical model to the French system (whereas Montesquieu wanted to improve and imitate England’s constitutional model); and, finally, the Chinese system undermined Montesquieu’s much-esteemed noble privileges and parlements in France.21 Pereira argues that Montesquieu used Du Halde to discredit the presence of honour in China, relied on Anson to attack the presence of virtue (discussed in chapter 2), and finally looked to the letters of the Jesuit Dominique Parrenin to argue that the government existed through fear.22 As Pereira points out, modern historians such as Muriel Dodds and René Étiemble, along with Montesquieu’s contemporaries Voltaire and Quesnay, have highlighted the contradictions, manipulation of evidence, and errors in Montesquieu’s assessment of the government of China.23 What follows here is not a catalogue of the unsatisfactory elements in  Montesquieu’s writings, but rather an alternative explanation for how he  engaged with the Chinese Empire. Pereira questions 18 Walter Demel also notes, “It is well known how difficult it was for Montesquieu to force China into his system of three forms of government.” Demel, “China in the Political Thought of Western and Central Europe, 1570–1750,” 53. 19 Young, “Montesquieu’s View of Despotism and His Use of Travel Literature,” 392–405. 20 Carcassone, “La Chine dans l’Esprit des lois,” 193–205. 21 Pereira, Montesquieu et la Chine, part 3, esp. 256–7 and 272. 22 Ibid., 264–6. 23 Ibid., 267. Dodds, Les Récits de voyages, sources de l’Esprit des lois de Montesquieu; Étiemble, L’Europe chinoise.

28463_Millar.indd 133

2016-12-15 14:02:00

134

A Singular Case

Montesquieu’s motive in addressing China. Did he want to demonstrate that China was not as idyllic as the missionaries claimed, or did he want to save his system by proving it was despotic? There was an alternative way for Montesquieu to protect the integrity of his system. While he ultimately labelled China despotic, the critical assessment he gave the Middle Kingdom was that it was unique. And, more importantly, this characterization was in accordance with the majority of empirical accounts. Montesquieu’s attempt to deal with the challenge the Chinese government posed to his theory led him to question the accuracy of the missionary evidence. He did not accuse the Jesuits of malicious lies, but speculated that the missionaries deceived themselves. However, he ultimately concluded, “there is often something true even in errors” and “particular and perhaps unique circumstances may make it so that the Chinese government is not as corrupt as it should be.”24 In jumping from questioning the Jesuits’ evidence to admitting that their descriptions of China’s good governance might have some validity Montesquieu reveals his tentative treatment of descriptions of China and the balance he struck between prioritizing his theoretical model of government and the empirical evidence that contradicted it. In book eight, chapter 21 of De l’esprit des lois, Montesquieu’s battle with China took centre stage as he attempted to “answer an objection that may be raised about all [he] has said to this point.” The missionaries’ claim that a mix of fear, honour, and virtue governed China posed a significant threat to his schematic distinction where republics were based on virtue, monarchies on honour, and despotisms on fear. His response again oscillated between using evidence to attack the Jesuit position and questioning the evidence itself. In the first instance he asked, “how one can speak of honour among peoples who can be made to do nothing without beatings?”25 Here, he cited the Jesuit Jean Baptiste Du Halde,

24 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 127; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 143. 25 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 127; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 143. There has been significant discussion about Montesquieu’s use of this particular piece of information, for example, by Carcassone, “La Chine dans l’Esprit des lois”; Pereira, Montesquieu et la Chine, 263; Dodds, Les Récits de voyages, 150. Dodds argues Montesquieu relied on the sinophile Jesuits and sinophobes Anson and Lange, and that drawing on these diverging sources led to contradictions in Esprit. However, as we have seen the Jesuit sources also reflected a tension between moderation and despotism. Volphillhac-Auger, “On the Proper Use of the Stick,” 81–92. Volphillac-Auger critiques Dodd’s view of Montesquieu, in particular her reading of Montesquieu’s “idea of despotism” and his alleged deliberate misreading of the primary sources. Volphillac-Auger also faults Dodds for not finding Du Halde’s reference to the cudgel but does not herself identify the origins

28463_Millar.indd 134

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China’s Constitutional Foundations 135

and claimed, “the stick governs China.” This piece of information can be traced back to Alvaro Semedo’s The history of that great and renowned monarchy of China (1655).26 In a chapter entitled “Of the prisons, sentences and punishments of the Chinesses,” Semedo described the Japanese claim that “they cannot governe without Catana [the Sword] … so it may be said of the Chinesses, that without Bambu, that is, the cudgel or Baston, with which they use to beat men, it is not possible they should be ruled.”27 Semedo also remarked that the bastinado was administered to people of diverse social status and that magistrates even ordered the beating of mandarins, a point that would be particularly offensive to Montesquieu, himself a nobleman. However, Semedo’s discussion of the bastinado occurred in a section on justice, not governance. Du Halde repeated Semedo’s description of the importance of the bastinado in a section on prisons and punishments for criminals. But his phrasing was a bit more forceful about the importance of the bastinado in government: “commonly in China all punishments, except pecuniary ones, begin and end with the bastonado, in so much that it may be said that the Chinese governments subsists by the exercise of the battoon.”28 Du Halde drew the connection between the system of government and the bastinado in passing, but notably not in his lengthy section describing the government. Thus Montesquieu clearly stretched this point, and an eighteenthcentury reader would only have to turn to the widely consulted Du Halde to recognize this.29 Even Thomas Salmon’s popular geography Modern History referred to the bastinado as a common punishment for crimes only, indicating that the context presented in the first-hand sources was easily understood.30 Montesquieu’s claim would have been insufficient for contemporaries to dismiss the Chinese government as despotic and his use of evidence here is highly questionable. of this idea in the work of Alvaro Semedo. While she accurately defends Montesquieu’s honest approach to the sources, her view of Montesquieu’s engagement with the Chinese model does not satisfactorily account for his struggle to engage the Chinese system. 26 Brook, Bourgon, and Blue, Death by a Thousand Cuts, 158. 27 Semedo, The history of that great and renowned monarchy of China, 142. 28 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 312; Watts edition, 2: 229; French edition, 2: 134. In the original French: “qu’on peut dire que le Gouvernement chinois ne subsiste guéres que par ‘exercise du bâton.’” 29 Arnold Rowbotham argues that this information was not actually found in Du Halde and speculates that Montesquieu received it in conversation with the excommunicated Jesuit Figurist Jean François Foucquet in Rome in 1729. Rowbotham also argues that Montesquieu’s confusion about the Chinese was a result of a conflict in the evidence he received from Foucquet and read in Du Halde. See Rowbotham, “China in the Esprit des Lois: Montesquieu and Mgr. Foucquet,” 357–8. 30 Salmon, Modern History, 33.

28463_Millar.indd 135

2016-12-15 14:02:00

136

A Singular Case

Montesquieu’s categorization was also challenged by Jesuit descriptions of honour in China. The philosophe argued that honour could not be present in a despotic state because when the people were all equally “slaves, one can prefer oneself to nothing.”31 And yet, in other sections of his work, Montesquieu implied that there were aspects of the Chinese system that involved honour. In a chapter entitled “A Good Custom in China,” Montesquieu described the practice where the emperor performed a ritual ploughing ceremony to open the cultivation of the fields, in honour of agricultural activities. He argued this was an admirable tradition because it involved the emperor rewarding the “plowman who has most distinguished himself in his profession; [the emperor] makes him a mandarin of the eighth order.”32 In the following chapter Montesquieu described how this custom should be followed in southern Europe where people are “so impressed by the point of honour, it would be well to give prizes to the plowmen who had best cultivated their lands.” He therefore connected the Chinese practice of rewarding the ploughmen to the existence of honour. And yet, he still concluded that China was ruled by fear. The absence of an intermediate power was another criterion of despotism Montesquieu turned to in order to label China despotic. In fact, Walter Demel speculates it was more precisely the absence of an intermediate power with a name of its own that led Montesquieu to describe China as despotic.33 In monarchies, Montesquieu argued, the nobility constituted this power and operated on the basis of honour. He maintained that a “monarchical government assumes … preeminences, ranks, and even a hereditary nobility.”34 There were some indications that a type of hereditary nobility existed in China. For instance, Du Halde saw the noble order as comprising “princes of blood, the dukes, earls, mandarins of learning and arms, those that have been mandarins formerly, but are not so at present, and the literati, who by their studies … are aspiring to the magistracy and dignities of the empire.”35 A key difference was that this influential noble class was not hereditary. There certainly was a class of individuals who checked the power of government. Firsthand accounts reported the Chinese maxim that a meritocratically based, non-hereditary nobility was the most beneficial to their system of 31 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 27; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 49. 32 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 238; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 3, 28. 33 Demel, “China in the Political Thought of Western and Central Europe,” 56. 34 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 27; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 48. 35 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 241; Watts edition, 2: 12; French edition, 2: 10.

28463_Millar.indd 136

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China’s Constitutional Foundations 137

political economy. This type of intermediate power offered several advantages: it grew trade; it increased revenues because no estates were tax free and no person was exempt from poll-money; powerful families could not usurp the authority of the emperor; and the people were subjects as opposed to “many little kings,” and thus the emperor was obeyed.36 Some European observers reacted positively to the nonhereditary ­nature of nobility in China. The philosopher-traveller Pierre Poivre, the son of a wealthy silk merchant, described how China’s ancient laws and government had made it “sensible that all mankind are born equal, all brothers, all noble. Their language has not even hitherto invented a term for expressing this pretended distinction of birth.”37 Montesquieu, however, foresaw problems in this system. Because the status of mandarin was dependent on the state and lacked an independent institutional or legal structure, this class could not represent society against the state. The central issue for Montesquieu was the protection of liberty. Yet elsewhere, Montesquieu indicated that China did have a useful check to control the emperor, namely the Chinese people. The argument to which Montesquieu most often resorted to address the problems posed to his analysis by the Chinese government was that in important respects China was unique and thus inimitable, making it largely irrelevant when it did not fit his schema. For example, he saw China’s relative lack of corruption as a distinct characteristic. While he used geography to argue that large states should be despotic (as Botero did) because they require quick, decisive action, Montesquieu held that China’s climate, which resulted in a large population, made it unique: “In this country causes drawn mostly from the physical aspect, climate, have been able to force the moral causes and, in a way, to perform prodigies.”38 Ultimately, for Montesquieu the people would “triumph over tyranny” in China because bad governments were immediately checked by them. Unlike European princes, who feared the afterlife, a Chinese emperor “[knew] that, if his government is not good, he will lose his empire and life.” The idea that popular rebellion could act as a check on tyranny in China extended beyond Montesquieu and will be discussed further below. Apart from rebellion, Montesquieu believed 36 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 249; Watts edition, 2: 35; French edition, 2: 28. 37 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 153. Translated accurately from the original French. Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 123. 38 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 127–8; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 144.

28463_Millar.indd 137

2016-12-15 14:02:00

138

A Singular Case

China’s large population acted as a check on bad government through the priorities it necessitated. Both the people and the government had to concentrate on subsistence, making it in everyone’s interest to be able to work “without fear of being frustrated for his pains.” According to Montesquieu, another exceptionality of the Chinese case related to the severity of penalties. Chinese authors observed that in their empire the harsher the punishments, the closer the people came to revolution. Montesquieu remarked “that China, in this respect, is a case of a republic or a monarchy.”39 And again, when describing how censors were not needed in despotic governments, he added, “the example of China seems to be an exception to this rule, but in the course of this work we shall see the singular reasons for its establishment there.”40 China was evidently a fluid and singular case that, while labelled despotic, repeatedly diverged from the ideal type of despotism that Montesquieu described. A final example of China’s uniqueness related to Montesquieu’s description of the pattern of Chinese dynasties: they all started off well but then degenerated. “Virtue, care and vigilance are necessary for China; they were present at the beginning of the dynasties and missing at the end.”41 Initially, emperors remembered the previous revolution caused by the corrupting force of luxury and thus they preserved the virtue that led them to the throne. However, “after these first three or four princes, corruption, laziness, and delights master their successors” and ultimately there was a revolution and a new dynasty replaced the old. China thus moved from monarchy to despotism in cycles.42 Le Comte described this cyclical pattern of dynastic corruption earlier in his widely read Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine (1696). He claimed that when the emperor was “full of violence and passion,” his mandarins followed suit, the system disintegrated, people formed together into armies, and the public peace was disturbed.43 Montesquieu picked up on this notion, first introduced by a supposedly “sinophile” Jesuit, indicating that he did not simply ignore the evidence on China. In fact, Montesquieu engaged with it to the extent that he implicitly admitted that China did not fit neatly into his categorizations, but instead travelled through them.

39 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 82; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 99. 40 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 71; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 89. 41 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 103; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 119. 42 He used the dynasties of the Jin and Sui as examples of when a monarchy was ruined. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 116–17; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 132. 43 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 257; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 17.

28463_Millar.indd 138

2016-12-15 14:02:00



China’s Constitutional Foundations 139

Nevertheless, for Montesquieu, theory triumphed over the problems the Chinese case posed. He concluded his section on China with a general attack on the concept of legal despotism: “Some have wanted to have laws to reign along with despotism, but whatever is joined to despotism no longer has force. Therefore, China is a despotic state whose principle is fear.”44 Acknowledging the descriptions of the numerous rules in China that moderated power (discussed below), he still considered the Chinese system more despotic than monarchical. Montesquieu’s discussion of China has been widely studied and opposing conclusions have resulted.45 In particular, historians have debated the extent to which and how Montesquieu united empirical evidence and theoretical models. Several historians have argued that Montesquieu’s inconsistencies can be traced back to different images of China presented in the missionary and secular first-hand sources. For example, Melvin Richter has argued that Montesquieu ignored Jesuit evidence when it did not support his theories, and instead turned to the testimony of traders. Thus, his use of evidence was “highly selective,” demonstrating “how Europocentric he remained in his view of the world.”46 Similarly, Muriel Dodds argues that Montesquieu relied on the sinophile Jesuits and sinophobes Anson and Lange, and that drawing on these diverging sources led to contradictions in Esprit.47 While Montesquieu did refer to the descriptions by secular travellers George Anson and Laurent Lange, he clearly relied on the Jesuits for most of his arguments on China and even

44 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 116–17; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 132. Montesquieu added that Chinese despotism “arms itself with its chains and becomes still more terrible.” The chains refer to the laws that moderate the government. Quesnay quipped about Montesquieu’s conclusion, “The author attempted to terminate his case with vigor, but the vigor is found only in the style; for we do not understand, and he could hardly have understood himself, what he meant by these words.” Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 247. 45 See Rubiés, “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism..” In his work on SinoWestern relations, René Étiemble interpreted Montesquieu as a cryptosinophile but as Brook, Bourgon, and Blue argue, this is not an especially convincing interpretation because Montesquieu’s contemporaries read him differently. However, they do note that Montesquieu considered Chinese despotism to be moderated. Brook, Bourgon, Blue, Death by a Thousand Cuts, 279. 46 Richter, The Political Theory of Montesquieu, 72 and 84. Richter argues elsewhere that Montesquieu’s concept of despotism was always meant as an “ideal type” and was not expected to be “empirically embodied in all its aspects.” Richter, “Despotism,” 9. Similarly, Reichwein believes Montesquieu was most interested in making China fit his own dogmas and so relied “only on the reports of traders.” Reichwein, China and Europe, 94. 47 See note 25. Dodds, Les Récits de voyages, 150; Volphillhac-Auger, “On the Proper Use of the Stick,” 81–92.

28463_Millar.indd 139

2016-12-15 14:02:00

140

A Singular Case

admitted that there must be some truth in their descriptions of China’s admirable government. Additionally, the Jesuit sources themselves reflected both the moderate and despotic elements in China’s political system. Another explanation of Montesquieu’s decision to label China despotic was his contempt for how the Chinese treated aristocrats.48 He was a defender of the nobility. Thus, China’s meritocratic intermediate class along with the subsequent equality of punishment for this class offended his sensibilities. Günther Lottes convincingly contends that China’s case posed the greatest threat to Montesquieu’s system because it merged absolutism and rationalism. Because of the country’s large population, the Chinese government was a unique paternal despotism that had to focus on tranquility and agriculture, leaving no room for liberty.49 This perspective reflects the importance of Chinese singularity, which was a critical aspect in the dismissal of the Chinese system of political economy: China could not act as a universal model. Montesquieu did not label China despotic because China was part of the Orient, but because it was clearly not a republic (which many first-hand sources noted the Chinese had never heard of 50) nor, more importantly, was it a constitutional monarchy like England. Thus, according to his schema, it had to be despotic. Montesquieu, while admitting exceptionalities, did not want to highlight a system whose delicate balance was simply not replicable in a European context. China’s large population distinguished it from France (and any other state in the world) and thus while China was a uniquely functional system it was not reproducible and could never be a universal model of government. Nonetheless, Montesquieu’s contemporaries did not passively accept his labelling of the Chinese government. François Quesnay launched a vehement attack on the idea that China was despotic.51 In fact, he devoted a relatively lengthy section of his “Despotisme de la Chine” (1767) 48 Brook, Bourgon, Blue, Death by a Thousand Cuts, 163. 49 Lottes, “China in European Political Thought, 1750–1850,” 78. 50 The modern part of an universal history cited Nieuhof and Le Comte in a discussion of the Chinese view of the Dutch state as a republic that “appeared to them rather as a monster with many heads, the spurious offspring of lawless ambition and stubbornness, begotten and bred, as they supposed, in times of anarchy and confusion.” They wondered how it “could possibly subsist without some sovereign power to curb and suppress the one and steer and govern the other” (8: 140). 51 A source that also directly attacked Montesquieu, and whom Quesnay heavily relied on, was Rousselot de Surgy, Mélanges intéressans et curieux, specifically volume 5, 80, which argued that China did not fit into Montesquieu’s system of despotism. For instance, on pages 168–9 the battoon is referred to as part of the penal, not government, system.

28463_Millar.indd 140

2016-12-15 14:02:01



China’s Constitutional Foundations 141

to attacking the “Assertions of M. de Montesquieu.”52 Quesnay’s welldocumented interest in China led the Marquis de Mirabeau, the cofounder of the school of Physiocracy, to describe him as the “venerable Confucius of Europe.”53 Quesnay defended the Chinese system of government against Montesquieu’s criticisms, arguing that China, operating on the basis of natural law, offered a distinct but replicable system. However, even the Physiocrat was forced to address empirical evidence that questioned his interpretation of the Chinese system. Like Montesquieu, Quesnay was concerned with reconciling descriptions of the world with his theoretical models. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese points out that while half of Quesnay’s library consisted of his medical collection, the remainder largely comprised dictionaries, geographies, and histories, demonstrating his interest in the empirical evidence of the wider world.54 The Physiocrats also had a clear intellectual agenda of praising the natural benefits of a strong agricultural economic system. The differentiation between tyrannical despotism and legal despotism (where the monarch or emperor ruled according to natural laws) was essential to understanding the nature of Chinese government. Unlike Montesquieu, Quesnay firmly believed legal despotism was an ideal, imitable model of government that encouraged a healthy political economy. Quesnay was not as disapproving as Montesquieu on the subject of the bastinado. In fact, the Physiocrat was a critic of hereditary aristocracy and appreciated the Chinese egalitarian system of punishments. He claimed that contrary to Montesquieu’s argument that the Chinese lived in fear, these beatings were only lightly administered55 and he relegated the bastinado to its proper realm – the justice system – by asking, “Is there any government without penal laws?”56 Quesnay’s reference to the fact that the original description of the bastinado did not occur in a general account of the Chinese government indicates he paid close attention to the first-hand accounts. Quesnay also questioned Montesquieu’s claim that unlike princes in Europe, who are afraid of the ramifications of their bad behaviour in the

Rousselot de Surgy concluded that, for numerous reasons, “nous portent à regarder ­l’Empereur de la Chine, moins comme un despote absolu que comme un monarque en qui reside une autorité très-étendue, mais tempérée par les loix,” 177. 52 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 247 and 239. 53 Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, 19. 54 Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 96. 55 Brook, Bourgon, Blue, Death by a Thousand Cuts, 165. 56 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 239; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 622.

28463_Millar.indd 141

2016-12-15 14:02:01

142

A Singular Case

afterlife, the concerns of the emperor of China were more temporal. First, Quesnay pondered why Montesquieu was suddenly concerned with the role of the afterlife in controlling human behaviour, as his work was on the topic of human laws. The second and more pointed comment by Quesnay questioned why Montesquieu would not believe that the fear of losing kingdom and life would be the most effective check on tyrannical despotism. He asked, “Would the counter-weights, which [Montesquieu] would like to establish, be so much more powerful and more compatible with the permanent solidity of good government?”57 Quesnay was unnecessarily critical on this point because Montesquieu (and others, as we will see below) did recognize the importance of China’s large population as a check on government. The Physiocrat considered Montesquieu’s greatest failure to be seeing all despotisms as tyrannical and absolute. In other words, Montesquieu was too closely wedded to his theoretical structure, which led him to inaccurate characterizations of real world examples. However, Quesnay had his own guiding theoretical precepts. For instance, when discussing China he claimed, “a large population can accumulate only under a good government, for bad governments destroy wealth and men.”58 Like Montesquieu, Quesnay had great difficulty balancing his theory with contradictory empirical information about China. One of his less convincing ways to resolve this tension was making the distinction between the Chinese constitution and the practical administration of its government. In response to Montesquieu’s criticism of Chinese infanticide, Quesnay argued that it was not the result of the constitution of the government, but was instead a problem of action. He argued that in a well-governed kingdom, the only way to prevent overpopulation was to establish colonies, and on this issue “one may find in the administration of the government and in the inhabitants of China a clearly reprehensible fault.”59 In effect, Quesnay admitted to admiring the Chinese system in theory but understood the problems it presented in practice. 57 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 245; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 625. 58 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 244; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 625. 59 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 262; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 635. Quesnay drew the idea that colonies prevent overpopulation from Jean-François Melon’s Essai politique sur le commerce (1734), which also encouraged agricultural economies. Melon claimed that the Chinese did not follow their ideal theories of government in practice and he was much more critical than Quesnay. Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 34 and 130. The 1761 edition of Melon’s Essai included an extra seven chapters added to the original 1734 edition in 1736. Mélon asked, “Quelle nation n’a pas un legislateur religieux ou philosophe, d’une morale aussi salutaire que celle de Confucius et aussi mal observée?” Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce, nouvelle édition, 389.

28463_Millar.indd 142

2016-12-15 14:02:01



China’s Constitutional Foundations 143

Both Quesnay and Montesquieu prioritized their theoretical ideals, but both also concerned themselves with the empirical case of China, and its notable exceptions. Quesnay believed the Chinese system was replicable (although it is unclear to what extent), while Montesquieu’s label of China as despotic was replete with exceptional elements that meant its government was in effect inimitable. The notion of a moderate Chinese government was alluded to by Montesquieu, explicitly argued by Quesnay, and based on the information provided by the first-hand sources of information on China. The debate about Chinese despotism persisted into the end of the eighteenth century.60 And yet perceived Chinese despotism did not affect views of its economic potential or wealth. Alongside the broad idea of Chinese despotism were first-hand descriptions, geographical summaries, and philosophical acknowledgments of a number of distinct provisions embedded into the system that ensured that it functioned in a moderate manner. T h e M o d e r at e C h a r ac t e r of the Chinese Constitution From Montesquieu’s and Quesnay’s principal conclusions about the Chinese government two distinct images of China appear, one despotic and one moderate. Rather than being contradictory, these two labels are consistent with the descriptions given by the first-hand accounts. For ­example, Le Comte referred to these two sides of Chinese government. He described how the “unbounded authority which the laws give the Emperor, and a necessity which the same laws lay upon him to use that authority with moderation and discretion, are the two props which have for so many ages supported this great brick of the Chinese monarchy.”61 The emperor was treated as the Son of Heaven, whose sacred commands were respected and obeyed. Le Comte discussed six examples that signified the supreme authority of the emperor: his power in assigning bureaucratic and administrative posts, the extent of his revenue, his right

60 For example, Cornelius de Pauw’s Recherches philosophiques sur les Égyptiens et les Chinois (1774) referred to China’s government as viciously despotic, like other Asian governments, keeping the notion of oriental despotism firmly alive. De Pauw also discussed the bastinado as reflecting fear in Chinese society. He often compared China to other eastern states such as Persia and Turkey. De Pauw, Philosophical dissertations on the Egyptians and Chinese, 1: 292. Accurately translated from the original French. De Pauw, Recherches philosophiques sur les Égyptiens et les Chinois, 2: 425. 61 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 243–52; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 4–17.

28463_Millar.indd 143

2016-12-15 14:02:01

144

A Singular Case

to make peace and war, his liberty in choosing his successor, his dominion over dead subjects, and his power to change the Chinese language (as opposed to the power of custom in shaping it). However, in spite of all these powers, “so many are the provisions, and so wise the precautions which the laws have prescribed to prevent them, that a prince must be wholly insensible of his own reputation, and even interest, as well as of the publick good, who continues long in the abuse of his authority.” Here we have an image of moderate China. Early modern observers and commentators disagreed about the language to express this form of government – from tyranny to despotism, from enlightened to absolute – but even Montesquieu and Le Comte agreed that while the Chinese emperor enjoyed absolute authority, there were moral, structural, and legal provisions in place that enabled Chinese civilization to achieve a delicate balance in government. A Structural Check Whether opposing, supporting, or qualifying the idea of Chinese despotism, numerous sources described a unique check on the Chinese government, namely the role of insurrection. In Hume’s essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1741), he described the “extensive despotism of a barbarous monarchy.” His opposition between barbarous monarchy and a civilized monarchy gave rise to the question of how to situate China in this schema. Hume argued that although the Chinese government was a pure monarchy, “it is not, properly speaking, absolute.”62 This was a result of its geographic isolation and therefore, for Hume, a lack of military discipline (discussed further in chapter 5) in combination with its large population. As descriptions of Chinese history clearly showed, “the sword, therefore, may properly be said to be always in the hands of the people, which is a sufficient restraint upon the monarch, and obliges him to lay his mandarins or governors of provinces under the restraint of general laws, in order to prevent those rebellions, which we learn from history to have been so frequent and dangerous in that government.” This led Hume to speculate, in a footnote, that “perhaps, a pure monarchy of this kind, were it fitted for defence against foreign enemies, would be the best of all governments, as having both the tranquillity attending kingly power, and the moderation and liberty of popular ­

62 Hume, “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” [1741], in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, 3: 122n13.

28463_Millar.indd 144

2016-12-15 14:02:01



China’s Constitutional Foundations 145

assemblies.” Hume’s relegation of this observation to a footnote is revealing. If this were the recipe for the “best of all governments” then why would he not give it a more prominent place? Hume argued that China’s geographic isolation and large population led to this unique circumstance, which did not exist anywhere else in the world. As we saw above, both Montesquieu and Quesnay discussed the idea of China’s population as a check on government. This idea was also present in numerous other first-hand, philosophical, and geographical sources that addressed the uniqueness of the Chinese system.63 Moral Checks Beyond the check of the people – a result of China’s unique geographic situation – the most notable anchoring force for the Chinese system of government that underpinned public peace was Confucianism.64 Ever since the publication of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus in 1687, Europeans were aware of the role and impact of the philosophy of Confucius in China. Many of the fundamental Confucian principles made their way into analysis and discussion of the Chinese government. The view that Confucianism provided the basic principles of morality and governance led to an image of a stable Chinese system. From Adam Smith’s arguments about the importance of civic education to Quesnay’s emphasis on the importance of educating “the thinking part of the people” about government, philosophers agreed that morality should be viewed as part of the science of government. While having the proper structural checks and balances in place was necessary, an embedded morality must also govern. Attention was drawn to three particular moral constraints: the respect children pay their parents, the veneration which all pay the emperor and his officers, and the “mutual humility and courtesy of all people.”65 63 The hazard of rebellion in China was discussed in The modern part of an universal history, which cited Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Martini, Le Comte, and Du Halde. The modern part of an universal history, 8: 142. Étienne de Silhouette, who eventually became controller-general of France, made an argument similar to Hume’s in Idée générale du gouvernement det de la morale des Chinois (1731). Silhouette argued that the authority of the Chinese emperor was “despotique” but controlled by concern for his reputation and interests, since he could not abuse his power for long due to the laws and the threat of revolution. De Silhouette, Idée générale du gouvernement det de la morale des Chinois. 64 For a discussion of the influential and important role of the relationship of Confucianism and the West, see Mungello, Curious Land. 65 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 279; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 56. This was repeated in The Chinese Traveller, 1: 92 and 106.

28463_Millar.indd 145

2016-12-15 14:02:01

146

A Singular Case

These tenets reflected a wider approach to morality regulating society. Melvin Richter points out that the Greek etymology of the term “despot” is despótēs, which refers either to the head of a family, or the master of slaves.66 The origin of this term had particular resonance for China. The ancient Chinese lawgivers asserted the maxim that kings were the fathers of the people, not masters to slaves. In 1696, the Spanish Dominican friar Domingo Fernández Navarrete described the emperor as the father of the empire and then compared this principle to the late fifth- and early sixth-century Ostrogoth King Theodorick’s adage, “The prince is the publick and common father.”67 The paternal care of the Chinese emperor resulted in constant inquiring into the state of his people so that, when a calamity occurred, the emperor was aware and accordingly deprived himself of pleasures to suffer along with his subjects. Similarly, Du Halde noted the ready obedience of the people who venerated the mandarins like parents, in part because they were taught to and in part because the mandarins treated them well. This allowed the mandarins to govern easily since their orders were obeyed.68 Du Halde also described how the daily Peking Gazette enabled this constraint to operate on a practical level: it reported the names of mandarins who lost their offices and the reasons for their dismissal (for instance, negligence in gathering the emperor’s tribute, or squandering it), as well as the names of those who were promoted and the reasons for their promotion.69 Connected to the role of reputation in controlling the negative passions of the emperor was the practice of having a select group of men write the history of an emperor’s reign and daily actions. These men kept their writings sealed until the entire dynastic line died and then the information was published.70 This type of constraint by such a highly regarded spectator in China – history – took Smith’s impartial spectator a step further. China’s distinct history enabled a consistent morality based on Confucianism to emerge, which acted as a check on government and thus constituted a unique feature of the Chinese system.

66 Richter, “Despotism,” 2: 2. 67 Theodorick was also known as “the people’s king.” He was king of the Ostrogoths, ruler of Italy, regent of the Visogoths, and viceroy of the Eastern Roman Empire. Churchill, A Collection of Voyages and Travels, 1: 22. 68 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 252; Watts edition, 2: 46; French edition, 2: 34–5. 69 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 260. Watts edition, 2: 70. French edition, 2: 50. 70 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 255; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 20.

28463_Millar.indd 146

2016-12-15 14:02:01



China’s Constitutional Foundations 147

Internal Checks Finally, constitutional checks existed to control the negative passions of the imperial administration. These checks, built into the system, led to praise for China’s model of government. For example, Le Comte cited the ability of mandarins (and the wider public) to lodge formal complaints as an essential and remarkable check on executive power. He listed several examples supporting the principle of mandarins telling the emperor of his faults. One was the case of an officer of the court telling the emperor that he left the palace too often and stayed too long abroad in Tartary. At times these complaints were heeded, at other times ignored or punished.71 Le Comte added that if the mandarin was correct in his criticism and the emperor punished him for it, the mandarin became a public martyr. Similarly, the people had the power to protest their situation through the channels of government. Any citizen could petition the emperor for the removal of a mandarin if they could prove they were mistreated.72 Further, mandarins were to be accessible to hear complaints from the people under their care. But as Le Comte noted, these checks could be difficult to enforce in practice since mandarins were often at great distances from the centre of the empire. Therefore, the emperor dispatched trusted spies to monitor the behaviour of the provincial mandarins. The risks of decentralized power were mitigated by active monitoring. According to the editors of the modern part of An universal history, the emperor’s engagement with and care for the people distinguished him from “other Eastern monarchs” because, although some claimed he indulged in pleasure and lived with concubines, he was in fact constantly occupied with the welfare of his state.73 China’s ten principal maxims of good policy, which were expounded by Le Comte and repeated in most popular geographies that described the Middle Kingdom, also demonstrated the concern for the welfare of the state.74 The key principles cited included the following: (1) never give someone office in his own province; (2) keep the children of the mandarins at court to ensure their fathers perform their duties; (3) prevent money from affecting the outcome of the justice system by allowing the emperor to appoint a new judge to a case if he believes the 71 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 254; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 19–20. 72 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 261; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 28. 73 The modern part of an universal history, 8: 144; Salmon, Modern History, 25, made the same point. 74 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 279–91; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 56–74.

28463_Millar.indd 147

2016-12-15 14:02:01

148

A Singular Case

sentence was not appropriate; (4) bestow offices based on merit; (5) never allow the nobility to become hereditary. Numerous anecdotes were provided in the Jesuit publications, and repeated in the popular geographies, to support the claim that these maxims were in fact practised in China. Le Comte recounted a story about an emperor who, while on a journey, crossed the path of a peasant. The peasant told the emperor that a Tartar mandarin had taken away his only son and left him without any help. In response, the emperor gave the mandarin’s office to the peasant and executed the mandarin involved.75 This story not only revealed the swiftness of justice, but also the level of accountability present in China. Another example about the consequences of corruption stemmed from Le Comte’s own time in China. When he was in Peking it was discovered that three colaos, who, he noted, were equivalent to ministers of state, had taken bribes. Upon learning this, the emperor took their salaries, ordered them to retire, and condemned one to guard the palace gates with other common soldiers.76 This story reflected the equality with which the intermediate class was punished. These individual anecdotes were significant for seemingly uniting China’s precepts of government with its practice. However, others argued that there was a tension between China’s formal laws and their practical application. The view that the Chinese government was perfect in theory but not in practice is reminiscent of the praise of Chinese moral theory and criticism of its practical morality. For example, Le Comte noted that tyranny and oppression in China stemmed from the “princes own wildness, which neither the voice of nature, nor the laws of God can ever countenance.”77 Thomas Percy, the English proto-sinologist and author of Hao Kiou Choaun (1761), discussed the gap in the Chinese government between theory and practice: “If we examine the Chinese government in theory, nothing seems better calculated for the good and happiness of the people; if in practice we shall no where find them more pillaged by the great.”78 Laws could not successfully check the greed of magistrates because “after all, as the Chinese laws are merely political institutions, and are backed by no sanctions of future rewards and punishments, though they may influence the exterior, they will not affect the heart, and therefore will rather create an appearance of virtue, than the reality.” Percy claimed that Anson was  mistaken in seeing only the corruption of the Chinese and thus 75 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 262; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 30–1. 76 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 245; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 6. 77 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 243; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 4. 78 Percy, Hau Kiou Choaun, 166–9.

28463_Millar.indd 148

2016-12-15 14:02:01



China’s Constitutional Foundations 149

conceived a poor opinion of their laws while the editors of The modern part of an universal history were mistaken in believing in the excellence of the Chinese laws and thinking their corruption was only partial and recent. Indeed, Percy claimed, “that grand source of corruption, a strong desire of gain, must always have prevailed in a country so circumstanced as China: nor was it in the power of any laws merely human to prevent its effects.” Thomas Salmon, the English geographer who travelled on part of Anson’s voyage, also saw a tension between formal laws and their practical application. He described the government of China as a monarchy whose corruption was comparable to “a certain European nation” (referring to Britain), where their laws were good but hardly put into execution.79 He concluded, “Upon the whole, the Chinese seem to be a nation of exquisite hypocrites; and, like some other pretenders, while they carry a fair outside are guilty of all manner of fraud, vice and extortion.” Salmon blamed the emperor’s ministers for hiding lower level corruption from the emperor. He believed this was also a problematic practice in Europe. When the emperor was made aware of corruption, he could punish it severely. Salmon was most critical of the eunuchs that surrounded the monarch, whom he blamed for the fall of the Ming Dynasty (citing Adam Schall von Bell), since he believed they had “then the principal share in the administration” just as the princes of Europe must rely on advisers.80 Salmon’s Tory political position, his belief in the royal prerogative and the importance of a balanced constitution, were quite evident in these critiques. Governments were threatened by the excess power of any element of the system. Indeed, he saw the English constitution “as an impossible balancing act which is always being pushed towards the extremes of tyranny by self-interested parties who wish to monopolize power.”81 In his argument about the difficulty of ensuring the successful functioning of the balanced mixed monarchy, Salmon drew a close connection between the situations of the English mixed monarchy and Chinese government, in contrast to that of the French absolutist state. In the view of many Enlightenment thinkers, all existing political systems were flawed. These commentators sought to identify their weakest links and best elements. Overall, the Chinese system was presented as a 79 Salmon, Modern History, 26–7. 80 The modern part of an universal history followed Salmon’s comparison of China to England by pointing out differences between theory and practice. The modern part of an universal history, 8: 149. 81 Mayhew, Enlightenment Geography, 136.

28463_Millar.indd 149

2016-12-15 14:02:01

150

A Singular Case

balance between absolutist impulses and structural, moral, and internal checks designed to control the negative aspects of such a centralized and potentially despotic power. As the editors of the popular geography The modern part of an universal history argued, some of China’s “excellent monarchs had the peace and welfare of their subjects at heart, but also how tender they were of wounding the antient constitution of the empire by too despotic a use of their power and authority; for one may plainly see, that it was chiefly owing to this strict observance of the fundamentals of their government, that the Chinese have been able to preserve it in such wealth and splendour during so long a series of ages; and still continue to do, even under a foreign yoke.”82 The checks identified by early modern observers are similar to those discussed by Rosenthal and Wong more recently. In particular, they argue that tax revolts were common, that “beliefs about the diversion of revenue into the pockets of corrupt officials” could lead to unrest, and that these actions were important checks on the non-representative Chinese government. They also acknowledge the role of Confucian ideology as “providing simple and relatively persuasive rules.”83 Conclusion As we saw in the introduction, David Hume hesitated to “fix many general truths in politics.”84 Montesquieu and Quesnay, both strongly attached to their own theories, nevertheless made notable exceptions from their “general truths” for the Chinese case. A more fundamental difference beyond their different labels for the Chinese government was Montesquieu’s view that China’s unique system was inimitable and Quesnay’s belief in the universal applicability of the natural law followed in China. The two philosophers used the empirical descriptions to support their distinct views, but both also engaged, to varying levels of success and honesty, with the evidence that contradicted their theories. The Chinese government endured many labels, but the greatest apparent contradiction was between the concepts of Chinese despotism and Chinese moderation. Even the most manifest critics found it difficult to dismiss China on the basis of its system of government. Turning back to the guiding question that began this book, namely, what did Europeans see as China’s future prospects with regard to political economy, it is evident there was no consensus that the nature of China’s 82 The modern part of an universal history, 8: 166–8. 83 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 195 and 197. 84 Hume, “Of Civil Liberty,” in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, 3: 87.

28463_Millar.indd 150

2016-12-15 14:02:01



China’s Constitutional Foundations 151

government and its unique brand of “despotism” sufficiently threatened the wealth and success of the state although there was an understanding that the Chinese system was unique. Economic historians have more recently begun to appreciate the distinct nature of China’s system of governance. Peer Vries highlights the turn toward seeing Chinese policies as “agrarian paternalism.” As we see in the next chapter, the governance system involved taxing lightly and not interfering at the local level – the Physiocrats’ “laissez-faire” in action. Vries recognizes that early modern Europeans did not simply subscribe to the idea of China as despotic; many admired their meritocratic system. But the nuance was lost over the course of the nineteenth century.85 After a lengthy history of scholars dismissing China as absolutist and despotic, Vries argues, the tide is turning and we are seeing scholarship that concludes that the Chinese state was “less oppressive and less opposed to economic development” than previously assumed. Rosenthal and Wong have gone further in unpacking exactly how the distinctive system functioned, arguing it was more conducive to extensive, Smithian growth in the pre-Industrial Revolution period. These findings are not dissimilar to those of our early modern observers. This chapter has shown how eighteenth-century European observers and commentators approached the Chinese principles and model of government. While there was much to both admire and criticize in the Chinese political system, many deemed the system viable because of the peculiar nature of the Chinese Empire. In particular, geography had gifted China with a large population, and its longevity had ingrained it with a unique system of morality based on Confucian ethics that dictated its particular political maxims. The longevity of the Chinese system was viewed as a testament to its success. As Le Comte commented, “the plan of their government was not a whit less perfect in its cradle, than it is now after the experience and tryal of four thousand years.”86 European analysis of China’s constitutional structure was conflicted by the co-existing images of despotism and moderation, which led to a formulation of Chinese government as a sui generis case. Therefore, a closer analysis of the practice (rather than the form) of China’s government is required to assess the role of government in China’s political economy.

85 Vries, State, Economy, and the Great Divergence. 86 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 242; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 4.

28463_Millar.indd 151

2016-12-15 14:02:01

5

“Duties of the Sovereign”: Civil and Military Successes and Failures Enlightenment assessments of the nature of China’s political economy included discussion of the practical duties of the government alongside its broader constitutional structure. One of the critical questions of the European Enlightenment concerned the relationship between the advancement of civilization and military strength. A fear of increasing “effeminacy” associated with civilized states pervaded the French and Scottish Enlightenments. In essence, this debate reflected a tension between whether government should give priority to civil or military affairs. It was in this perceived trade-off where the cracks in the Chinese model of political economy began to appear. William Guthrie, a Scottish geographer heavily influenced by the philosophy of his compatriots, claimed that while the Chinese land army included five million men, most of them were directly employed in collecting revenue, preserving canals and roads, and maintaining the public peace (all civil duties). He concluded, “Though this [ancient] system preserved the public tranquillity, for an incredible number of years, yet it had a fundamental effect that often convulsed and at last proved fatal to the state, because the same attention was not paid to the military as the civil duties.”1 The lesson was clear: all efforts of good government would be wasted if the government lacked the capacity to protect its people. A strong military was critically important to the survival and success of early modern European states. As Richard Bean argues, “War, preparation for war, and the payments to debts from previous wars were more important than the sum of all other types of expenditure combined.”2 Obviously, military strength was connected to the success of the system of

1 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, 468–9. 2 Bean, “War and the Birth of the Nation State,” 216.

28463_Millar.indd 152

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 153

political economy because it protected the state’s wealth. Even Adam Smith supported the British Navigation Acts contravening free trade by arguing, “defence … is of much more importance than opulence.”3 Indeed, the Scottish Enlightenment, led by Smith, placed the issue of defence in the realm of political economy and moral philosophy. In book 5, chapter 1 of The Wealth of Nations, Smith identified three duties of government: defence, the administration of justice, and the provision of public works and institutions.4 In the following chapter he examined how these duties should be funded, specifically considering the government’s taxation policies. Finding the balance between opulence and defence was a challenge for advancing commercial states. Thus far we have considered European assessments of China’s commercial behaviour, foreign trade policies, and government. While the Enlightenment discussion of these subjects contained a fair degree of criticism of China, these objections did not constitute a uniform dismissal of China’s potential to remain a wealthy and prosperous civilization. The European analysis of China’s civil duties was in a similar vein. The justice system (especially the enforcement of property rights), commercial institutions (particularly national infrastructure), and taxation policies were all believed to have room for improvement but were not seen as leaving the Chinese Empire in a fundamentally vulnerable position. However, in the discussion of the military duties of government, the criticism of the Chinese model was more evident and widespread. Nearly every observer and commentator, save a notable few, deemed military weakness to be the single greatest failure of the Chinese government and a critical threat to its system of political economy. The Cost of Defence The first and most important duty of government, according to Smith and other eighteenth-century philosophers, was “protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies.”5 The weight given to military prowess is understandable given the history of

3 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 583. 4 It was not only Adam Smith who found these categories useful and important. Earlier François Quesnay enumerated the constitutive laws of nations based on people’s natural rights: the laws of distributive justice, armies to assure the protection of the nation, and the establishment of public revenue to provide the funds for security, good order, and prosperity; he neglected to prioritize only public works and institutions. Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 265; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 637. 5 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 879.

28463_Millar.indd 153

2016-12-15 14:02:01

154

A Singular Case

early modern Europeans. Europe suffered through numerous wars including the immensely destructive Thirty Years War (1618–48) as well as  several wars of the eighteenth century, notably the War of Spanish Succession (1701–14), the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), the Seven Years War (1754–63), and numerous domestic conflicts. The size and nature of early modern European armies changed from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries and states (and the commentators who lived within them) were cognizant of the significance of military strength.6 Precise figures for early modern militaries are very difficult to compute, and although numbers fluctuated greatly across countries and between periods of wartime and peace, armies of 20,000 to 120,000 were the norm in European conflicts of the eighteenth century.7 The immense size of China’s military was one of its most commonly reported characteristics. Descriptions of China, from the sixteenth-­ century accounts of the Augustinians Juan González de Mendoza and Martín de Rada to the reports given by the Jesuits Louis Le Comte and Jean Baptiste Du Halde in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, estimated China’s infantry at 700,000 to nearly 6,000,000.8 The discrepancies in the numbers in these sources were due in part to the varying aspects of China’s military they addressed (for instance, a standing army 6 Historians still contest the extent to which European states underwent a military revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution Debate; Brewer, The Sinews of Power; Black, European Warfare, 1660–1815. Specific figures are discussed below. 7 Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe, 27. At the time of the Seven Years War (1756–63), the average annual personnel of the British navy and army was 167,476 (although this number certainly overestimates the actual number of people on the ground). The peacetime standing army shortly after the Seven Years War averaged about 45,000. Brewer, The Sinews of Power, 29–30. By the end of the seventeenth century, France had the largest European army, totalling 420,000 soldiers on paper. By the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48), France’s military was reportedly 390,000, and during peacetime it fell to 160,000. Lynn, A Giant of the Grand Siècle, 32 and 55. Military historians have extensively debated the issues around these “paper” numbers but here they serve as an indication of the relative size of the European military systems. Notably, from the time of Matteo Ricci to that of Smith near the end of the eighteenth century, the size of both the British and French militaries grew dramatically. For instance, from 1680 to 1780 the British army and navy trebled in size. See Brewer, Sinews of Power, 29–30. 8 Mendoza claimed the infantry was 5,846,500 strong. Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, 91; Martín de Rada listed 4,178,000 for the infantry. Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, 272; Louis Le Comte noted there were one million men stationed on the Great Wall of China. Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 285; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 65; Jean Baptiste Du Halde claimed there were 700,000 soldiers dispersed in the provinces. Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 261; Watts edition, 2: 75; French edition, 2: 45.

28463_Millar.indd 154

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 155

in ­comparison to the potential size of a conscripted army). These numbers also reflected dramatic shifts in China’s actual military structure over the early modern period and in particular the changes affected by the Manchu Conquest. For instance, the system changed with the end of the hereditary military system by the 1570s and the rise of a paid army.9 By the eighteenth century, popular geographies reported figures for Chinese infantry of nearly 1,000,000.10 The best knowledge we now have indicates a total army size of 800,000 to 900,000 in the eighteenth century, although the Chinese army is difficult to measure given the non-professional element within its forces.11 Notwithstanding the variations in these figures, it was apparent that they dwarfed those of the European states. Although China’s military clearly outnumbered the European militaries, first-hand observers – from members of different missionary orders, merchants, and emissaries to military men – all agreed that the Middle Kingdom lagged far behind Europe in terms of military capacity. The earliest sixteenth-century accounts reflect the low estimation of China’s military strength. For example, in 1576 Francisco de Sande, the governor of the Philippines, formally proposed to attack China. He assumed, as the Portuguese prisoners in China did, that two to three thousand men could accomplish this because the Europeans would initiate a revolt among the Chinese people against the Ming government. While plans for an invasion of China never took hold in early modern Europe, they indicate the low esteem for China’s military capacities. However, the strongest European critiques of China’s military capacity emerged around 1644. The Manchu Conquest, which ended the Ming Dynasty and created the Qing Dynasty, was one of the most significant events in the formation of early modern European views of China. Nearly every European observer viewed the triumph of “barbarians” over a civilized empire as an embarrassing failure and clear evidence of a fundamental flaw in the Chinese system. The Ming and Qing governments were seen as so weak that they had to rely on the Jesuits Adam Schall von Bell and Ferdinand Verbiest to help them build European cannons. The Chinese use of Jesuits, as well as secular Portuguese and Dutchmen, to

 9 Lorge, War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China 900–1795, 128. 10 Fenning and Collyer reported 770,000 soldiers held in constant pay and almost 565,000 horses to remount the cavalry. Fenning and Collyer, A New System of Geography, 51. The editors of the English Universal History cited Magaillan, Le Comte, Navarrete, Gemel, and Martini and reported that 902,054 soldiers guarded the frontier. The modern part of an universal history, 8: 12. 11 Vries, “Public Finance in China and Britain in the Long Eighteenth Century,” 28.

28463_Millar.indd 155

2016-12-15 14:02:01

156

A Singular Case

help construct and operate artillery was seen as demonstrating the superiority of European military skill.12 By the mid-eighteenth century, it was widely recognized that the Chinese had mastered the use of artillery long before Europe – an observation made earlier by Mendoza; however, most agreed that despite this early advantage, China had failed to develop this technology and thus had fallen far behind Europe.13 (The next chapter deals with the subjects of science and technology in detail.) The Europeans concluded that the Chinese had not prioritized the development of military technology. The question they were left to ask was why. The origins of the Manchu Conquest were relatively clear. The Jesuits offered a nuanced analysis, painting a picture that included the internal decay of the Ming Dynasty alongside numerous localized military struggles. Martino Martini produced the first detailed description of the Manchu Conquest in 1654. De bello tartarico told the story of the corruption of core Chinese principles contributing to the decline of the Ming Dynasty.14 Echoing the contemporary Chinese view, he argued that the mismanagement of Manchu and Mongol relations by the court of the Wanli Emperor, the broader alienation of officials, the famine, and the avarice of the emperor, “who exhausted the people by imposts and taxes,” all explained the fall of the Ming Dynasty.15 There were important domestic failures that explained the vulnerability of the government; however, the question remained why the Chinese could not fight off petty invaders at their borders. China’s supposed weak military enabled an internal rebellion to grow, which in turn opened the gates of Peking to the Manchu invaders. Certainly, the Europeans saw complacency as a problem for the Chinese. China’s geography discouraged international relations. It was protected by the sea and mountains, and of course, the infamous Great Wall, which also supposedly contributed to the isolation of the empire. The modern part of an universal history argued that the Chinese overestimated the degree of protection provided by the Great Wall. The wall did not stop the Manchus, “which sufficiently shews the shortness of human 12 This was reported by Martini. Martini’s Bellum Tartaricum was included in the translation by Thomas Henshaw frs of Álvaro Semedo’s The history of that great and renowned monarchy of China, 261. 13 Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, 1: 129. 14 Du Halde repeated this view in the eighteenth century. Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 238; Watts edition, 2: 3; French edition, 2: 3. 15 Martini, Bellum Tartaricum, for Martini’s discussion of the mismanagement of the Manchu relations (257), his speculation that the war was punishment for the Chinese persecution of Christians (260), and his discussion of the internal problems of the Ming Dynasty (269).

28463_Millar.indd 156

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 157

forecast; since it was their too great confidence in these, and some other advantages we are going to mention, that lulled them into that state of luxury and indolence which made them fall so easy a prey into the hands of their warlike neighbours, when they least thought of it, or were least able to make head against them.”16 European commentators argued that the Chinese army had little practice fighting and soon grew careless and inattentive. By contrast, the British and Dutch East India Companies represented the economic and military interests of their respective countries far from home. The forward-looking, vigilant European states were accustomed to battle and provided a striking contrast with the supposedly present- or backward-minded Chinese. As we see below, it was a struggle to retain a sense of reciprocal comparison in European writings about China in this area of drastically different state engagements. Europeans observers drew an even more germane contrast between the Chinese and the Manchus or Tartars who overthrew them. The idea of the Manchus as warlike barbarians meeting the civilized and “effeminate” Chinese persisted throughout the eighteenth century. Thomas Salmon’s Modern History (1727) described those Manchus who did not live at the court as “neither so effeminate [n]or luxurious as their more southern neighbours, nor do they apply themselves to traffick near so much; hunting, horsemanship, and other manly exercises take up great part of their time.”17 Salmon implied that the effeminate nature of the Chinese was connected to their commercial activity, something Smith would argue decades later. The Manchus were less civilized and consequently seen as more masculine and warlike. Voltaire in Essai sur les moeurs (1756) also claimed that the Manchus had characteristics that distinguished them from the Chinese. He raised the often-asked question of how a group of barbarians could conquer a civilized state. The Chinese, he noted, had much more sophisticated artillery. The Europeans had easily conquered the natives in the Americas, reflecting the obvious assumption that civilization should triumph over savagery. Voltaire concluded that this historical pattern “shews the superior genius of northern over southern nations.”18 Thus he elevated the Manchu barbarians above the American savages, and used the Manchu

16 The modern part of an universal history, 8: 11. The editors repeated Du Halde’s view that the Chinese army was unequal to European armies in courage and discipline and soldiers were “easily put into disorder, and routed.” Directly from Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 261; Watts edition, 2: 75; French edition, 2: 45. This was repeated in The modern part of an universal history, 8: 151. 17 Salmon, Modern History, 1: 44. 18 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, 3: 324–9; Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, 600–2.

28463_Millar.indd 157

2016-12-15 14:02:01

158

A Singular Case

conquest as evidence supporting geographic or climatic explanations for military strength. He described the war between the Manchu and the Ming Dynasty as more primitive than wars in Europe and concluded that “Strength of body was what determined the victory: And the Tartars, accustomed to lie in the open fields, must naturally have the advantage over a people used to a more delicate life.” The delicate life of the Chinese and lack of caution regarding the savages to the north led to their defeat. Voltaire extrapolated from the Chinese case: “The same effeminacy which ruined Persia and India, produced a revolution in China in the last century, more complete than that of Jenghiz-chan and his grandson.” Voltaire built on this notion of effeminate behaviour and connected it to a broader concept of “Asiatic pride.”19 As Dena Goodman points out, Voltaire had a similar tendency to equate civilization with femininity in France. In fact, “The French Enlightenment was built on the complementarity of ‘feminine’ sensibility and ‘masculine’ reason, on the compensation of female selflessness for male ego.”20 Voltaire argued the regency Anne of Austria in the 1640s made France “the most civilized and sociable country on earth.” So while Voltaire was seemingly dismissive of the Chinese feminine civility, the picture is more complicated when we consider his broader arguments. Of course, after 1644 it was the supposedly warlike Tartars that came to rule China. Would their military disposition infect the Chinese empire, strengthening it against future attacks? Guthrie, the Scottish geographer, believed there were potential advantages to the Chinese military as a result of the dynastic change and in 1770 claimed that China was “a far more powerful empire, than it was before its conquest by the eastern Tartars in 1644”21 because the first Manchu emperor blended the Manchus and the Chinese together. As we saw in chapter 3, the early Qing dynasty was, in contrast to what the Europeans might have believed, a time of large-scale conquest and territorial expansion. Because of the many geographic obstacles, it was not inevitable that the Qing would come to rule the Mongol regions. By 1724 the Qing Empire conquered Kokonor (Qinghai), which was under Koshot Mongol control. It was undoubtedly a military defeat but Perdue also stresses the Qing “provisions for military security, economic development, and administrative reform [which] were designed to ensure that Kokonor, formerly an autonomous territory ruled by Mongolian tribes, 19 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, 3: 327; Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, 601. Voltaire’s concept of “Asiatic pride” is worth further study. 20 Goodman, The Republic of Letters, 9. 21 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, 469.

28463_Millar.indd 158

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 159

would become a permanent part of the Qing realm.”22 Military strategies and improved logistics were used to ensure supply lines to the steppe and diplomacy with the Russians constrained the Zunghar’s options.23 There were also important differences between and strategies employed by various Qing emperors. For example, the Qianlong Emperor (r.1735– 96) saw that “military victories legitimated Manchu rule and served to ‘stiffen the sinews’ of flaccid Chinese subjects who objected to the costs of war.”24 As Perdue characterizes it, the Qing Empire was “an evolving state structure engaged in mobilization for expansionist warfare.”25 As discussed in chapter 3, part of the reason the Europeans did not address this expansion was lack of information as well as blurring of the boundaries of the domestic and foreign in China. Nonetheless, after the mideighteenth century, there were no autonomous, strong rivals beyond Qing control and expansion ceased being the primary task of Qing rulers. Perdue dates the divergence from Western Europe at this point, noting the Qing became more complacent. There are some parallels to the comments of contemporary observers: namely, the Qing dynasty was more militaristic in the early period than from the mid-eighteenth ­century onward. Guthrie also noted the danger that the Manchus could lose their skills by the “disuse of arms.”26 Indeed, by the eighteenth century, most observers of China believed the Tartars had fully assimilated to what they characterized as the weak and uncourageous Chinese culture. Du Halde invoked the oft-repeated view that the Chinese effeminate character infected the “Tartar disposition” in the aftermath of the Manchu ­ Conquest.27 China’s military weakness remained a key descriptor of its civilization throughout the eighteenth century. Europeans proposed that a major lesson could be learned from Chinese history: peace and tranquillity can render governments vulnerable. The principle of bravery present in Europe did not exist in the Chinese Empire, something the Jesuit traveller Le Comte attributed directly to their high level of civilization: “The Chinese are always talking to their children of gravity, policy, law, and government; they always set

22 Perdue, China Marches West, 310. 23 Ibid., 523. 24 Ibid., 442. 25 Ibid., 527. 26 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, 469. 27 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 261; Watts edition, 2: 75; French edition, 2: 45.

28463_Millar.indd 159

2016-12-15 14:02:01

160

A Singular Case

books and letters in their view, but never a sword into their hands.”28 Du Halde, like Le Comte earlier, attributed this supposed flaw directly to China’s high level of learning: “the esteem that they have for learning preferable to every thing else, the dependence that the soldiers have upon men of letters, the education that is given to youth … is not capable of giving men a warlike genius.”29 Thus, several Jesuits explained the weakness of the Chinese character by arguing that there was a relationship between education and military weakness. This reflected in part the Jesuit agenda of allaying European concerns and securing their position in the Middle Kingdom, but it was also an identification of the vulnerability of the Chinese Empire. These first-hand descriptions were influenced by and in turn fed into a classic Enlightenment debate about the trade-off between civil and military duties; only a select few thinkers were able to assess China’s military capabilities based on its own context rather than compared to some European benchmark. In the first pages of the 1697 preface to Novissima Sinica, Leibniz compared Chinese and European civilization. He concluded that when it came to military science, the Chinese “despise everything which creates or nourishes ferocity in men”; in short, they are “averse to war.”30 The Chinese were inferior to the Europeans in the military sciences “not so much out of ignorance as by deliberation.” This distinction was important and had implications for assessing the effects of military weakness. For Leibniz the Chinese decision not to prioritize military affairs was deeply problematic: “even the good must cultivate the arts of war, so that evil may not gain power over everything.” But for others, such as Abbé Raynal, the fact that an invasion and dynastic change had such a small impact on Chinese government indicated they did not need to prioritize military affairs. He agreed that because the Chinese valued “reason and reflection” they left “no room for that enthusiasm, which constitutes the hero and the warrior.”31 Raynal differed, however, from the majority of his contemporaries by not regarding this as problematic. Instead, he highlighted the sinicization of the 28 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 309; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 103. 29 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 261; Watts edition, 2: 75; French edition, 2: 45. 30 Lach, The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica, 69. 31 Raynal, A philosophical and political history, 104; Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 113. This line was absent from the 1770 edition but present from 1774 onward. In the 1770 edition Raynal argued the Chinese had countless militia but lacked tactics and skill. Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 634. Raynal made several changes to his description of China in the 1774 edition due to his reading of new works on China such as that by Cornelius de Pauw.

28463_Millar.indd 160

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 161

Manchus: “When a nation has found the art of subduing its conquerors by its manners, it has no occasion to overcome its enemies by force of arms.”32 This was possible because of the formidable numbers of the Han Chinese relative to conquerors. Montesquieu also admitted this point as a “property peculiar to the government of China,” arguing that because religion, laws, mores, and manners were united in China, anyone who conquered China would adapt to Chinese practices.33 However, Raynal’s belief that military conquest was not a threat to the Chinese Empire was not widely held, for what country would choose to endure a violent dynastic change rather than build up its defences? To Rousseau, the revolution provided fodder for his argument about the ill consequences of civilization. In his 1750 essay on the question “Has the restoration of the arts and sciences had a purifying effect upon morals?” Rousseau turned to China. He described China as an “immense land where Letters are honored and lead to the foremost dignities of State” and concluded that “If the sciences purified morals, if they taught men to shed their blood for the fatherland, if they animated courage; the peoples of China should be wise, free, and invincible.”34 And yet, he found the Chinese to be avaricious and corrupt. Above all, he argued that “neither the enlightenment of the ministers, nor the presumed wisdom of the laws, nor the large number of inhabitants of this vast empire have been able to protect it from the yoke of the ignorant and coarse Tartar.” Of the Chinese, he asked, “what use have all its scholars been?” He deemed China’s civil pursuits useless in the face of the purest test of a nation – whether it can defend itself. Here, China became the Athens to Rousseau’s idealized Sparta. Smith moderated Rousseau’s point. He did not believe the Manchu Conquest was solely a result of the progress of the arts and sciences. However, he did see a connection between high levels of commerce and military weakness. In his lectures on jurisprudence, he made a general argument about the “universal experience” of minds being enervated by “cultivating arts and commerce.”35 He posed this as an explanation for global events as diverse as the Scots taking possession of parts of England in 1745, the European penetration of India, and the Manchu defeat of

32 Raynal, A philosophical and political history, 105; Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 114. This line was absent from the 1770 edition but present from 1774 onward. 33 From this he concluded that Christianity could never be established in China. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 318–19. Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, 105–6. 34 Rousseau, The Discourses and other early political writings, 135; Rousseau, Discours sur les sciences et les arts, 11. 35 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 541.

28463_Millar.indd 161

2016-12-15 14:02:01

162

A Singular Case

China. These instances demonstrated the “disadvantages of a commercial spirit.” In The Wealth of Nations, Smith described how a rich state is more likely to be attacked, and “unless the state takes some new measures for the public defence, the natural habits of the people render them altogether incapable of defending themselves.”36 The government must either mandate regular military drills for its populace or establish a standing army in order to effectively defend itself. Smith was touching on a broader debate with Adam Ferguson about the role of militias in comparison to standing armies. China’s supposed failures on this front and the lessons they offered were nearly unanimously recognized. The weakness was seen as partially a result of China’s achievements. For these thinkers, the state had to choose to focus extra attention on military affairs, something that was evidently not a priority for the Chinese government. Enlightenment thinkers connected wealth and civilization to military power but they did so in ways that differed from more recent scholars. Vries describes the shift in historiography from the arguments that pointed out the destructiveness of war and that Britain grew in spite of its fiscal-militarism to more recent arguments that see war as an important economic activity (as important as agriculture and foreign trade).37 For example, John Brewer’s examination of the importance of the British fiscal-military state in Sinews of Power (1989) and Giovanni Arrighi’s point that national debt due to war contributed to the development of British financial capitalism have emphasized the importance of military activity for economic development.38 Rosenthal and Wong argue the contribution of competition and war to modern economic growth was important but unintentional: “For centuries, China’s peaceable empire was more prosperous and more stable than Europe’s warring polities. But war, which offered to those who lived through it little more than misery (and even less to those who perished), also produced a series of distortions that pushed Europe towards urbanization and capital-using technologies several centuries before 1700.”39 Eighteenth-century thinkers had different notions of civilization and development beyond economic growth (the focus of modern economic historians). For example, to Leibniz these were issues of good and evil. Smith connected wealth and military strength by arguing a rich state was more prone to attack and must defend itself, but his argument about the relationship between military 36 Ibid., 698. 37 Vries, State, Economy, and the Great Divergence, “Introduction.” 38 See Brewer, Sinews of Power; Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century. 39 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 228.

28463_Millar.indd 162

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 163

weakness and increased commerce is at odds with recent scholarship which sees the important connection between military activity and economic growth. One philosopher who stood on his own on China’s military weakness was Quesnay. He minimized the relevance of China’s lack of military strength by arguing that war should be rare “since a good government excludes all senseless pretexts for war.”40 Realizing that war occurred, however, he differentiated between making war and defending one’s land. Quesnay, like his contemporaries, believed “defense assured by force … must always be a principal object of a competent government.”41 Natural laws “assure the success of agriculture, and it is agriculture that is the source of wealth that satisfies the needs of men and supports the armies necessary for their security.” The Physiocrat thus placed agriculture at the root of defence. However, China was reported to have had successful agriculture alongside a weak military. Once again Quesnay faced evidence in the case of China that contradicted his theory of political economy. When he described China’s military forces, he did not refer to the Manchu Conquest and instead focused on the bureaucratic structure and the number of forces (following Du Halde, listed at 760,000), and claimed that all the soldiers were “quite adequately maintained” and “discipline is very well observed.”42 Nearly every word of Quesnay’s section on China’s military came from Rousselot de Surgy’s Mélanges intéressans section on the state of the military.43 However, China’s military weakness was well known and de Surgy, as well as Quesnay, must have been aware of these criticisms either from first-hand accounts, geographies, or his fellow philosophers. On the topic of the military, even Quesnay could not muster a strong defence of his idealized model. By the end of the eighteenth century, the French Jesuit Jean-Joseph Marie Amiot had translated Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and added a great deal to the European understanding of China’s military.44 However, these developments were not sufficient to overturn the predominant view of China’s military weakness, which became even more pronounced in the early nineteenth century. A focus on quality over quantity became critical to dismissing the potential of the Chinese Empire and the accomplishments of its government. For as Voltaire argued, China’s brilliant 40 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 301; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 658. 41 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 285; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 648. 42 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 176–7; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 584. 43 de Surgy, Mélanges intéressans et curieux, 5: 203–7. 44 For more on this topic, see Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing.

28463_Millar.indd 163

2016-12-15 14:02:01

164

A Singular Case

laws were set back by “a most terrible catastrophe”: they could not defend their empire.45 For Enlightenment philosophers, China became an example by which to analyze the implications of state priorities and the potential trade-offs between various government agendas. In spite of the positive assessments in other categories of administration, only a few utopian admirers of peace (notably Raynal) saw the potential for the Chinese government to progress without greater military strength. The place of the military should not be underestimated in answering the central question of this book: perceived military weakness was a critically important area for Enlightenment dismissals of China’s model of political economy. The Cost of Justice If the Chinese government had clearly failed in its military duties, had it fulfilled its civil duties, as the Enlightenment theoretical trade-off suggested? According to Smith, the second duty of the sovereign was the protection of members of society by establishing “an exact administration of justice.”46 Justice and security were fundamental to Smith’s model of improvement as far back as his Edinburgh lectures.47 In particular, private property was the foundation for the advancement of civilization and pivotal to the provision of security. As he argued in a 1766 lecture, “Property and civil government very much depend on one another.”48 Enlightenment sources contain relatively little information about or discussion of Chinese property rights, probably due to the incommensurability of European and Chinese conceptions of property rights. Property rights in early modern Europe varied dramatically, but both France and England prioritized their reform. In England, the fiscal crises of the seventeenth century and subsequent insecurity of property due to the threat of expropriation by the monarch led to a rejection of absolutism and focus on securing property rights.49 The Inclosure Acts of the mid-eighteenth century accelerated the privatization of property by 45 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, 3: 325; Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, 600. 46 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 708. 47 Phillipson, Adam Smith, 116. 48 Smith, Lectures On Jurisprudence, part 1, of Justice. 49 Economic historians continue to debate the timing of secure property rights. Douglass North and Barry Weingast attribute property rights to the Glorious Revolution, whereas Gregory Clark argues that property rights existed by at least 1600 and perhaps earlier, even under autocratic and dictatorial regimes. See North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment” and Clark, “The Political Foundations of Modern Economic Growth.”

28463_Millar.indd 164

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 165

enclosing open fields and commons, but by this time individual property was already secured from seizure by the monarch. In France, the complex legal system led to mass confusion about property rights. Most French villages had communal property over which individuals, the community, and the seigneur had conflicting rights. Judicial reform under Louis XIV revised the criminal code and appeal system and limited judicial abuses but could not resolve the complex issue of property. The inherent contradiction of law, customary rights, and feudal privileges led to endless lawsuits.50 Early modern European philosophers addressed the topics of justice, property rights, and natural law in relation to each other. Thomas Horne has pointed out that two developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made the philosophical analysis of property an ­imperative: the voyages of discovery (leading to questions about ownership of newly discovered lands and rights over oceans) and the struggle between absolutist rulers and representative institutions.51 Horne ­describes the close relationship between the intellectual history of property rights and changing agendas of political economy (such as mercantilism, representative institutions, and economic growth) in Britain from the seventeenth to early nineteenth century. China endured similar struggles in reforming property rights, but did not articulate them in a comparable way. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the recent scholarship on property rights and contract law in early modern China, it should be noted that there was information that the missionaries might have drawn on in their reports back to Europe about China. Anne Osborne argues that the changes occurring from the mid-seventeenth century through the eighteenth century “made the determination of rights to property an urgent matter” in China.52 Indeed, the Manchu Conquest left vast stretches of productive land uncultivated, and the eighteenth-century push to settle new frontier lands increased the need for understanding property rights. As Thomas Buoye points out, China’s population more than doubled in the eighteenth century creating new pressures on land that often resulted in either legal disputes or violence.53 The policies of the Chinese emperors toward land changed over time. Jonathan Ocko describes the different approaches of various emperors: “they broke up large landholdings, required partible inheritance, ordered regular redistribution of land, 50 See Collins, The State in Early Modern France, 114. 51 Horne, Property Rights and Poverty, 9. 52 Osborne, “Property, Taxes and State Protection of Rights,” 120. 53 Buoye, “Litigation, Legitimacy and Lethal Violence,” 95.

28463_Millar.indd 165

2016-12-15 14:02:01

166

A Singular Case

and implanted cadastral surveys to ensure that all land under cultivation was also susceptible to taxation.”54 In spite of this evident concern on the part of the Chinese government, “no land law of the sort that we find in Europe ever developed,” nor did any argument similar to Locke’s articulation of private property and liberty arise. Further, “though contracts were an integral part of daily life, a law of contract did not arise.”55 These historians argue that although a rights-based discourse did not exist in China, this did not reflect the absence of rights,56 and Peer Vries has argued that the most recent research concludes that property rights do not explain industrialization.57 The first-hand descriptions of China reported relatively little on the subject of security of property rights, and the modest amount of information received about the status of property often occurred in passing remarks. For instance, when discussing the power of the Chinese emperor, Le Comte noted that “every one be perfect master of his estate, and enjoys his lands free from disturbance and molestation.” However, he added that the emperor could impose any amount of taxes depending on the necessities of the state.58 Du Halde described how civil cases “which merely regard private property, are determin’d by the great officers of the provinces,” indicating that court cases about property rights were fairly common. An interesting addition on this subject is found in the second English translation of Du Halde, published by Edward Cave in 1738. While the original French and the Watts edition of 1736 both described how everyone in China had the right to be judged by a court tribunal, the Cave edition added a footnote about the implications of this piece of information.59 “Such is the monarchy of China: where, the people are more free, from being in the most profound subjection; and where, the most despotic power in the prince is reconciled, with the most perfect liberty and property of the subject. A paradox not to be solved on this side of the globe.” As discussed in chapter 1, John Green was likely the editor of this edition. Green used the discussion of court tribunals as an opportunity to proclaim China a  moderate monarchy with secured property. Du Halde himself did not  comment on the security of property. In fact, relatively few

54 Ocko, “The Missing Metaphor,” 179. 55 Ibid. 56 See also Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 82. 57 Vries, State, Economy and the Great Divergence, “Introduction.” 58 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 248; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 11. 59 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 313; Watts edition, 2: 234; French edition, 2: 161.

28463_Millar.indd 166

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 167

seventeenth- and eighteenth-century descriptions concerned themselves with this subject. One possible reason for this paucity of information was China’s unique history and particularly its lack of feudal roots. Furthermore, the Jesuits had access to Confucian insights on governmental practices, where there was not the same style of discourse on property rights as in European philosophical circles. Fortunately for curious philosophers, Pierre Poivre travelled to China. Poivre dedicated nearly the entire section on China in his Voyages d’un philosophe (1768) to its agriculture and fiscal policies. Property rights, along with a simplified taxation structure, were key pillars of a successful agricultural system, and so Poivre commented extensively on these topics. There is no doubt of the high esteem in which Poivre held agriculture, its relationship to security of person and property, and its impact on the general wealth of the empire. He praised the Chinese government because it did not neglect “to secure to the labourers that liberty, property, and indulgence which are the great springs for the improvement of agriculture.”60 He described how the Chinese “quietly enjoy their private possessions” as well as those that are indivisible by their nature (such as canals). According to Poivre those who bought a field or received it by inheritance became the “lord and master” of that land. The lands are as free as the people; no feudal services, and no fines of alienation; none of those men interested in the misfortunes of the public; none of those farmers who never amass more exorbitant fortunes … none of that destructive possession, brought forth in the delirium of the feudal system, under whose auspices thousands of processes arise, which drag the labourer from his plough into the dark and perilous mazes of chicane, and thereby rob him, while protecting his rights, of that time which would have been usefully employed in the general service of the human race.61

In a later section, Poivre compared the agriculture of Africa and the rest of Asia to that of China. He pointed to Malabar “without property subjected to the tyrannical government of the Moguls,” Siam “under the cruel sceptre of the despote,” and the Malais “fettered by their feudal laws,” where the land may be fertile but the laws crushing to the pursuit of agriculture.62 Poivre clearly believed that liberty and the right of property were tied to successful cultivation, and lauded the absence of feudalism in China. He concluded his book by imploring kings to follow 60 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 161; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 129. 61 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 162; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 129–30. 62 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 166; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 133.

28463_Millar.indd 167

2016-12-15 14:02:01

168

A Singular Case

the example of China, which cultivated every part of its land, and which because of its “liberty, [and] their unmolested right of property” established a flourishing agricultural empire.63 In line with the tone and style of his book, Poivre did not cite direct evidence or examples supporting his claim of the security of property in China. He did, however, relate what he saw to be the most convincing evidence for China’s agricultural success: there was no other way that China could support such a large population; and a flourishing agriculture could exist only under the right conditions of governance and law, which for Poivre included private property. Although he spent time in China, he ultimately relied on his theoretical beliefs in order to support the notion that China had secure property rights, thus earning his title as a philosopher traveller. Indeed, many of the philosophical discussions about China’s property rights focused on the desirability of the Chinese agricultural system. The Physiocrats believed that China’s prioritization of agriculture, and the consequent security of property rights, could and should be replicated in Europe. In contrast to many philosophers, notably Montesquieu and Rousseau, the Physiocrats argued that property was the basis of freedom and stemmed from natural law. Relying extensively on Poivre, Quesnay’s “Despotisme de la Chine” extolled the security of property in the Chinese Empire.64 Explaining why a Chinese peasant was content with his rice and tea in the evening after toiling in the fields all day, Quesnay pointed to the fact that the peasant “has his liberty and property assured; there is no chance of his being despoiled by arbitrary impositions … Men are very hardworking, wherever they are assured the benefits of their labor.”65 In a section entitled “Ownership of Property,”66 he added, “The ownership of wealth is quite secure in China” and the right of property “is extended even to slaves or bonded domestics.” These observations illustrated “the extent of the right of inheritance and the security of the right of property in this empire.”67 Quesnay’s agenda called for the prioritization of a land-based economy over commerce or manufacturing, and, once again, China served that agenda. Nonetheless, other

63 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 173; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 137. 64 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 44. 65 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 170; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 580. It is highly likely that Quesnay received this impression of Chinese property from Poivre since neither Mélanges intéressans nor the French edition of Du Halde made this claim. 66 The original French title was “La propriété des biens,” but Maverick translated this as the “ownership of wealth.” Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 203; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 599. 67 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 204; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 600.

28463_Millar.indd 168

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 169

philosophers, such as Raynal, also relied on Poivre in arguing that in China property was secured from feudal expropriation.68 Like Quesnay, Smith relied on Poivre for his discussion of Chinese property rights, which he again directly connected to its agricultural system. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith distinguished between natural rights (such as personal liberty and protection of one’s body) and acquired rights, which included property. In this respect, he moved away from the argument supported by the Physiocrats that placed property among natural rights. In describing the evolution of civilization from hunters and gathers in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith noted “Till there be property there can be no government, the very end of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich from the poor” [emphasis added].69 Smith followed Poivre in arguing that “in China, the great ambition of every man is to get possession of some little bit of land, either in property or in lease; and leases are there said to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be sufficiently secured to the lessees.”70 However, elsewhere Smith alluded to the lack of security of the property of the poorer classes because of corruption. Although he did not acknowledge a direct source, he may have relied on numerous Jesuit and non-Jesuit descriptions of Chinese corruption. The insecurity of the lower class, Smith argued, hindered Chinese growth: “In a country too, where, though the rich or the owners of large capitals enjoy a good deal of security, the poor or the owners of small capitals enjoy scarce any, but are liable, under the pretence of justice, to be pillaged and plundered at any time by the inferior mandarins, the quantity of stock employed in all the different branches of business transacted within it, can never be equal to what the nature and extent of that business might admit.” Thus Smith also believed that economic growth was dependent on defending the poor from the rich. Whether at the hands of the sovereign or inferior mandarins or the rich, unjust expropriation of private property was detrimental to the system. So for Smith, Chinese corruption limited the extent of its economic transactions. We now know that Smith, in part due to the paucity of information from European travellers, underestimated China’s security of property. Another set of philosophical concerns asked what property rights could add to the debate on Chinese despotism. In 1756, several years before Poivre gave his public lecture, Voltaire argued that under a despotic government the prince could, “consistently with law, strip a private 68 Raynal, A philosophical and political history, Justamond edition, 1: 89; French edition, 105. 69 Smith, Lectures On Jurisprudence, 404. 70 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 680.

28463_Millar.indd 169

2016-12-15 14:02:01

170

A Singular Case

citizen of his property, or life, without form of justice, or any other reason than his will. Now, if ever there was a government, where the life, honour, and estate of the subject are secured, it is that of China.”71 Just as revealing as Voltaire’s mention of Chinese property rights was the absence of discussion of Chinese property rights in Montesquieu. He avoided the subject altogether, perhaps because the information available did not fit his theory that despotisms suffered from weak property rights. When he referred to the connection between despotism and weak property rights directly, he used the examples of Turkey and Bantam.72 Arguments in favour of the security of Chinese property rights were limited by a lack of empirical evidence. Most of the descriptions dealing with this topic offered only vague generalizations. While observers could assess the military from the numbers recorded in Chinese books, or from the outcome of the Manchu conquest, or report on the canal systems from their interior travels, they did not have the same ability to understand Chinese property rights. One explanation is the confusion with regard to property rights within Europe. For example, Montesquieu notes how problematic French property rights were, especially because his noble background led him to support certain feudal privileges. He argued that laws were more complicated in a monarchical system, particularly when it came to property established by hereditary rights.73 Another explanation is the lack of discourse on property rights among the Chinese literati. Geographers and philosophers did not have much information to debate or evaluate and were relatively superficial in their analysis. Although knowledge of Chinese corruption led to questions about the security of property rights, this was still insufficient to dismiss the Chinese model of political economy because not enough information was garnered on the ways in which rights were threatened, secured, or enforced. However, Smith saw the existence of corruption in China as a notable flaw within the Chinese system of security and justice. Commercial Institutions Smith’s third expense and duty of government was “that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works” that are advantageous to society but do not offer enough profit to induce private 71 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, 3: 324; Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, 600. 72 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 61–2; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 80–1. 73 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 72–3; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 90–2.

28463_Millar.indd 170

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 171

agents.74 Smith divided this duty into two main parts: the first involved facilitating and promoting commerce; and the second was education. Education will be addressed in chapter 6, as it relates closely to the development (or lack thereof) of science and technology in China. The subject of facilitating and promoting domestic commerce is particularly interesting because there was general agreement among sources that the Chinese government was extremely efficient in undertaking this responsibility. However, Smith himself was quite skeptical about what governments would and could achieve in this arena. In The Wealth of Nations, he argued that the provision of commercial infrastructure should largely fall on the local users of the infrastructure. For Smith, China’s exceptionality in this area was an important phenomenon to explain away. First-hand descriptions of China’s infrastructure and provision of public goods were nearly unanimous in their praise. This parallels conclusions by some economic historians, such as Rosenthal and Wong, that China’s provision of public goods was far superior to that of European governments.75 Others, like Vries, point to Qing Chinese government officials who complained that more funds were needed to invest in infrastructure. Vries argues that describing Qing China as a “welfare state” is pushing the revisionist agenda too far.76 Le Comte described China’s efficient, centralized, and disciplined control of infrastructure maintenance. He noted that, for governors, ensuring the quality of the roads “concerns their fortunes but sometimes their life.”77 He told a story about a village of the third rank in the province of Shanxi (Shan-hsi), where the governor had just hung himself in despair because he did not have enough time to repair a road on which the Emperor was going to travel. Most other observers also noted the ease with which one could travel on the main roads of China since they were well kept, safe, and had regular lodges along the major routes.78 Poivre was notably less impressed by China’s public roads, which he deemed far inferior to Europe’s. In the 1770 edition of Histoire des deux Indes, Raynal praised “the beauty of the roads” in China.79 However in the 1774 edition, he removed this line. It is likely that Raynal received some criticism from the readers of his first edition for his praise of

74 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 916. 75 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 197. 76 Vries, State, Economy and the Great Divergence, chapters 1 and 2. 77 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 307; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 99. 78 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 265; Watts edition, 2: 87; French edition, 2: 51. 79 Raynal, Histoire des deux Indes, 631.

28463_Millar.indd 171

2016-12-15 14:02:01

172

A Singular Case

Chinese roads, and thus removed it, but kept the information about the canal system because that was widely held to be true. These adaptations reveal the responsiveness of philosophers to generally accepted empirical “facts.” Nevertheless, Poivre (and his followers) noted that the low quality of roads was unproblematic because water transport was a cheaper and more efficient method of transporting goods.80 Indeed, Chinese canals received by far the most praise. Sources from missionaries to emissaries described the valuable canals that spread across the empire.81 Some canals were used for transportation while others were dug for irrigation. Poivre expressed his amazement at the extensive canal system, which allowed for the transportation of goods “with great ease, and small expence.”82 An even greater benefit, according to Poivre, was that the canals were public and thus not controlled for the benefit of a few.83 The Grand Canal, which was renovated by the Ming dynasty between 1411 and 1415, epitomized the relationship between public works and the Chinese economy. As Salmon described, “Europe we are assured has nothing to boast of comparable to this.”84 The Grand Canal, he reported, ran from Canton to Peking making it 1,200 miles long (with one day’s interruption from a mountain). To compare, the innovative Canal du Midi connecting the Atlantic to the Mediterranean (constructed in France in 1681), was merely 150 miles long. However, while the scale of Chinese canals was impressive, Salmon claimed that their technology was not as advanced as Europe’s because they did not have the use of floodgates. Nonetheless, the Chinese canal system was widely admired. Not surprisingly Quesnay, again following de Surgy, offered praise for the ease of trafficking goods in China as a result of their navigable canals.85 Smith was the only major commentator to express skepticism about the quality of China’s public works. After addressing the advantage of private interest controlling highways and canals, he confronted the case of China’s public works. Smith noted that provincial governors were judged according to how well they maintained such works. Although this was the practice in several governments of Asia, it was particularly so in 80 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 142; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 114–15. 81 For example, see Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 325; Watts edition, 2: 272; French edition, 2: 156; Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 182. Anson did not describe the interior canals because he remained in Canton. 82 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 141; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 113–14. 83 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 161; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 129. 84 Salmon, Modern History, 5. 85 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 223–4; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 612–13; Rousselot de Surgy, Mélanges, 5: 227–8.

28463_Millar.indd 172

2016-12-15 14:02:01



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 173

China “where the high roads, and still more the navigable canals, it is pretended, exceed very much every thing of the same kind which is known in Europe.” Smith doubted the veracity of the information provided by what he described as “weak and wondering travelers” and “stupid and lying missionaries.” He pointed to Bernier’s reports on Indostan, which demonstrated how such descriptions have been exaggerated before. He hypothesized that China, like France, maintained the canals and roads that were “likely to be the subject of conversation at the court and in the capital,” while “all the rest [were] neglected.”86 For Smith the main puzzle was why the Chinese government would be incentivized to invest in, and be successful at maintaining, public works. In early modern England, public works existed but on an ad hoc basis, driven by the private rather than the public sector. A national canal system emerged in the eighteenth century, highlighted by the completion of the Bridgewater canal in 1760. These canals were created at the ­impulse of landlords wanting to extend the market of their estates, the owners of family businesses, farmers needing supplies, and a rising demand for coal. Landlords used their clout to influence Parliament, which ultimately passed numerous ordinances supporting these projects. Several sources provided the financing of these canals, including capital derived from rents, income borrowed from friends, and, increasingly, joint stock enterprises, where most of the capital was raised in the locality that the project was designed to serve.87 The administration of roads in England used to be assigned to various local public bodies; however, in the eighteenth century, the maintenance costs were transferred to the users of the roads through the formation of turnpike trusts, meaning that tolls were paid for use of the roads. This model was so successful that, in a few generations, England established a national road network. The English Parliament occasionally contributed to works of public utility, such as giving money to rebuild London Bridge in 1757. However, “generally its functions were to regulate rather than to initiate.”88 Thus, infrastructure development in England was encouraged by private profit, a formula that Smith supported. French infrastructure received much more support from the government in the seventeenth century than in the eighteenth century. In the late seventeenth century, the internal minister Jean Baptiste Colbert centralized the responsibility for the maintenance of roads. The project was relatively successful, but after Colbert died, the central control was 86 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 925–6. 87 Ashton, An Economic History of England, 74–83. 88 Ibid., 83.

28463_Millar.indd 173

2016-12-15 14:02:02

174

A Singular Case

relaxed until a reorganization of the budget and training occurred in the 1740s. While these changes significantly improved passenger traffic, the movement of freight was still lethargic, something Adam Smith commented on. France also had a large-scale canal project long before the “canal era” began in England. The Canal du Midi required great funds, engineering, and innovation. The work began as an initiative by an estate owner, Pierre Paul Riquet, who dreamt of an efficient way to market his produce. Riquet received support from Colbert, and about half of the funds for the project were derived from the central government, the rest from the local estates and Riquet personally. However, the completion of this project did not initiate a canal age comparable to that which characterized the construction of the Bridgewater canal in England. While England transported its goods on water and roads at a ratio of 50:50, France’s ratio was 1:10.89 Transportation costs are much lower on water; therefore, England enjoyed the benefits of the lower costs. So it was the English model, driven by private interest and effort, that was the most efficient in Europe. Therefore China posed somewhat of a puzzle. Why was the government better incentivized to manage infrastructure there? Smith connected the nature of China’s agricultural system to taxation and subsequently to public works. It was “natural” for Chinese emperors to support agriculture because their yearly revenue depended on it. Because government revenue was collected from the land, he argued, the executive power had the incentive to maintain the high roads and the navigable canals in order to facilitate the marketing of produce. In China, and several other governments of Asia, the revenue was gathered from land tax or rent, which rises or falls with the rise and fall of the annual produce of the land … The great interest of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue, is in such countries necessarily and immediately connected with the cultivation of the land, with the greatness of its produce, and with the value of its produce. But in order to render that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it is necessary to procure to it as extensive a market as possible, and consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and the least expensive communication between all the different parts of the country; which can be done only by means of the best roads and the best navigable canals.90

89 Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory, 8, 23–5; Mukerji, Impossible Engineering, 85–6. 90 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 926.

28463_Millar.indd 174

2016-12-15 14:02:02



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 175

China was contrasted to Europe, where the revenue of the sovereign was not primarily from land tax or rent, and the dependency on the land was “neither so immediate, nor so evident.” The European sovereign had little interest in promoting and increasing the produce of the land and maintaining good roads and canals to help market produce. Smith described how it was the church in Europe that, like the Chinese government, was supported by a land tax proportioned to the produce of the land, not to the rent. However, because the tithe of the church in Europe was divided into such small portions, the church did not have the same interest as the Chinese state in maintaining good roads and canals. He concluded that while it might be true that in some parts of Asia “this department of the public police is very properly managed by the executive power there is not the least probability that, during the present state of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power in any part of Europe.” Once again, the Chinese case was deemed unique. Most observers and commentators agreed that China had a well-developed public infrastructure, particularly with regard to its canal system, but this was a result of its geographically large, distinct, land-based economy. Economic historians have increasingly recognized the importance of public goods for the Chinese government in helping it maintain social order, particularly in a context where the majority of security threats came from within the empire.91 Taxes Adam Smith carefully considered where the funds for duties of government should be derived from. He argued that the funds for defence and for the subsistence of the sovereign should come from the general revenue, whereas those for justice should arise from fees and those for infrastructure should be based on the local beneficiaries of a project (as often occurred in the joint-stock ventures in England); the funds for roads in particular and for education could be derived either from the general revenue or from local budgets or tolls. These concerns led Smith to the second chapter of his fifth book, the “sources of the general or public revenue of the society.” These funds were divided into those that belong to the sovereign (or commonwealth) – primarily revenue from land – and those that derived from taxes (on rent, profit, or wages). These taxes, he argued, should be proportional, certain, convenient, and efficiently

91 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 174.

28463_Millar.indd 175

2016-12-15 14:02:02

176

A Singular Case

collected.92 This topic was of the utmost importance, for without sufficient revenues and their proper management, the aforementioned duties of government could not be fulfilled. China was largely admired for the scale and efficiency of its revenue collection and yet there was seen to be room for improvement. Scale of Revenue As noted in previous chapters, Europeans recognized China’s sizeable population and considered it to be a unique feature of the empire. Before the rise of Malthusian concerns, population size was typically associated with national wealth. Navarrete cited Proverbs 14:28 when he discussed China’s population: “In the multitude of the people is the honour of the king.”93 A large population demonstrated the ability of the country to feed a considerable number of people, thereby attesting to a successful agricultural system. It also meant that the government could collect revenue from a substantial tax base. Specific information on the size of China’s population spread to Europe in the sixteenth century through Mendoza, who estimated that there were over 35 million taxpayers in the empire.94 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (before and after the Manchu Conquest), Jesuits and emissaries reported on the number of China’s taxpaying men (excluding soldiers, eunuchs, women, children, and those who do not pay taxes) within the range of 58 and 59 million.95 French and British geographers and philosophers questioned the information and often relied on out-dated figures. The author of An irregular dissertation (a text devoted to attacking Du Halde’s work) challenged the validity of the calculation of China’s population. The author used Du Halde’s statistic on the number of families in China (rounding the

92 Ibid., 1042–6. 93 Churchill, A Collection of Voyages and Travels, 1: 21. 94 Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom, 80–1. 95 Ricci, citing a Chinese book from 1579, listed the adult population subject to taxes as 58,550,801. Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 9; Semedo followed this number. Semedo, The history of that great and renowned monarchy of China, 3; Nieuhof listed the sum of families as 10,128,067 and the sum of fighting men as 58,916,783. Nieuhof, An embassy from the East-India Company, 404; Gabriel de Magalhães claimed there were 59,788,364. Magalhães, A new history of China, 40; Du Halde claimed that 58,000,000 formerly paid the tribute but by the beginning of reign of Kangxi Emperor there were 11,052,872 families and 59,788,364 men able to bear arms. Magalhães gave the same figures decades earlier but Du Halde did not cite him. Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 244; Watts edition, 2: 20; French edition, 2: 14–15.

28463_Millar.indd 176

2016-12-15 14:02:02



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 177

number to 11 million) but questioned the assumption that the number of families in China had the same implications as it would in Europe (impacting the number one would multiply against the families to get a total population).96 He argued there were 64 million fighting men in China, and calculated that this meant there was a total of 256 million people in the empire.97 Another popular compendium compiled by William Guthrie also demonstrated a skeptical view of China’s population. In a short paragraph on “the population and inhabitants” of China, he argued that by the best accounts, the population of China is not less than 50 million. He also commented on the other, higher, numbers available: “Most of those accounts are exaggerated, and persons, who visit China without any view of becoming authors, are greatly disappointed in their mighty expectations.”98 Paradoxically, in a description disputing the veracity of sources, the author does not cite his own sources for the fact of China’s population being less than 50 million. The debate and desire for exactness intensified over time. Cornelius de Pauw, a consistent critic of the Jesuit sources, exclaimed, “the population of China, which as shall now appear, has been prodigiously exaggerated.” He noted the inconsistency in the reports on China’s population, where authors “even vary in their calculations as far as one hundred millions … All the details we possess on this subject have been written at random. Father du Halde gives Pekin three millions of inhabitants: Father le Comte admits only two millions; and Father Gaubil expresses himself in so vague a manner, that nothing can be concluded from his accounts.”99 De Pauw is clearly neglecting the fact that these Jesuits were writing about different times and that this might explain differences in their figures. He accepted that there may be 82 million people in China (noting that this “most probably is exaggerated”), but argued that “China has still much less people, in proportion to its size, than Germany.”100 In spite of the disagreements about the specific number of inhabitants, there was broad acceptance that China was extremely large. The actual population of China oscillated over the Ming dynasty and historians still disagree on the total population, but Timothy Brook argues the

 96 An irregular dissertation, occasioned by the reading of Father Du Halde’s description of China, 46.  97 Ibid., 50.  98 Guthrie, A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar, 465.  99 de Pauw, Philosophical dissertations on the Egyptians and Chinese, 72, 75, and 76. 100 Ibid, 84.

28463_Millar.indd 177

2016-12-15 14:02:02

178

A Singular Case

most reliable estimate for China’s population in 1600 is 150 million.101 Due to epidemics as well as the Manchu invasion, the population dropped by the beginning of the Qing dynasty before increasing dramatically in the eighteenth century, surpassing 300 million by the end of the century. By comparison, the population of England and Wales in 1650 was 5.6 million and by 1750 it had reached 6.1 million (7.4 million including Scotland). Even France, which in the eighteenth century was the most heavily populated country in Europe and the third largest in the world (after China and India), was dwarfed by the Chinese figures. In 1650, France had an estimated population of 21 million and by 1750 it reached 25 million.102 These comparisons were understood as early as the sixteenth century. Botero acknowledged the lack of certainty about China’s population before estimating it at around 70 million. He directly compared China to Italy (with its population of 9 million), Germany (with the Swiss Confederacy and Dutch Republic totalling 15 million), and England (with its much smaller population of 3 million), demonstrating the remarkable size of the Chinese Empire.103 To infer fiscal wealth from population size was a common leap at the time. Here, too, the first-hand accounts from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reported varying figures. Ricci-Trigault claimed that the revenue from tax returns, impost, and other tribute exceeded 150 million pounds a year.104 Le Comte, as recent economic historians have also noted, pointed out the difficulty in calculating the revenue of the empire since it was collected partially in specie and partially in goods (such as rice, corn, salt, silks, cloths, varnish, and other commodities). Basing his assessments on the officers and their books, he estimated the ordinary revenues to be 120,600,000 pounds, “at least.”105 Despite the inconsistent figures, it was agreed that the scale of China’s revenue was enormous. Le Comte estimated the government received 22 million taels collected in silver. His estimates, at least for the taxes received in specie, appear to be accurate. In 1642, the largest year of their silver collection in revenue, the Ming government collected 23 million taels of 101 Timothy Brook points out three different figures reached by three distinct a­ pproaches to determining China’s population in 1600 – 66 million, 150 million, and 230 million – and argues it is most useful to follow China’s population as being 150 million. Brook, The Troubled Empire, 45. 102 Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory, 42–3. 103 Botero, Relations, of the most famous kingdoms, 595; Botero, Delle Relationi Universali, part 2, 64–5. 104 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 46. 105 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 249; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 13.

28463_Millar.indd 178

2016-12-15 14:02:02



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 179

silver.106 Again, by comparison of absolute size, these figures dramatically exceeded their European counterparts. For example, in England the average annual tax revenue during the Nine Years’ War (1688–97) was 3,640,000 pounds (double the state’s tax income before the Glorious Revolution). By 1775 the total net tax income had steadily increased and was over 12 million pounds per annum, and reached just less than 20 million pounds by the end of the eighteenth century. Yet, given the size of the Chinese empire, Peer Vries argues it is striking how low China’s revenue was compared to that of Britain’s central government, especially when a large part of the Chinese revenue stayed in provincial hands.107 He estimates that the Qing tax revenue collected in 1753 was four times the tax revenue of Britain’s central government, meaning that Britain collected the equivalent of 25 percent of China’s tax income when its population was only 3 percent the size (he determines that per capita British inhabitants paid twenty times as much as Chinese inhabitants).108 Debin Ma makes a similar point about official fiscal revenue in per capita terms amounting to under 1.5 days’ wages of an urban unskilled worker in China compared to thirteen days of unskilled wages earnings in Britain.109 There was some disagreement in the early modern period over the relevance of the comparison of state revenue. At the end of the sixteenth century, Botero maintained that the Chinese revenues amount to 120 million of gold, “which value … may seeme impossible to him that shall make an estimate of the states of Europe with the kingdom of China.”110 Salmon, however, directly challenged the first-hand descriptions. He questioned the accuracy of Le Comte’s figure because England’s revenue during the War of Spanish Succession was nearly half as much as the Chinese; and after the war, in full peace, English revenue was only about one-fourth of the Chinese. Considering how much smaller England was than China, Salmon argued it was “not easily conceived” how the Chinese could fund their civil bureaucracy and five million soldiers with a relatively low amount of revenue.111 Vries argues that one 106 von Glahn, “Comment on Arbitrage, China, and World Trade in the Early Modern Period,” 365–7. 107 Vries, “Public Finance in China and Britain in the Long Eighteeenth Century,” 20. See also Brewer, Sinews of Power, 88 and 89. 108 Vries, State, Economy and the Great Divergence, chapter 1. 109 Ma, “State Capacity and Great Divergence, the Case of Qing China (1644–1911).” 110 Botero, Relations, of the most famous kingdoms, 599; Botero, Delle Relationi Universali, part 2, 67. 111 Salmon, Modern History, 1: 30.

28463_Millar.indd 179

2016-12-15 14:02:02

180

A Singular Case

way the Chinese managed to keep taxes low was by not building up their military or funding a strong navy. England, on the other hand, was not only steadily increasing its taxation over the early modern period, but also accumulating debt to fund more government spending (primarily to finance war). At its height of war and conquest, the Qing spent 50 percent of its government revenue on war while European states were spending about 80 to 90 percent.112 These were clearly two very different government policies. By the eighteenth century there were some early Malthusian concerns about overpopulation in China. For instance, in between his descriptions of Chinese spices and trees, Du Halde argued, “Notwithstanding this great plenty it is however true, though a kind of a paradox, that the most rich and flourishing empire in the world is in effect poor enough; for the land, though so very extensive and fruitful, hardly suffices to support its inhabitants.” European travellers argued that poverty caused infanticide and the selling of children as slaves, leading Du Halde to speculate “that to live comfortably they have need of a country as large again.”113 Montesquieu, relying on Du Halde in his discussion of luxury in China, noted, “women are so fertile and humankind multiplies so fast that the fields, even heavily cultivated, scarcely suffice to produce enough food for the inhabitants.”114 Similarly, Quesnay identified Chinese overpopulation as a fundamental flaw in its system of political economy, arguing “However great that empire may be, it is too crowded for the multitude that inhabit it.” Quesnay criticized the common European belief that a “large population is the source of wealth,” arguing instead, “population exceeds wealth everywhere.”115 Repeating Du Halde’s descriptions of infanticide and slavery (again, through de Surgy), Quesnay argued where population exceeds wealth to the extent that it did in China, terrible acts of inhumanity become common. However, he did not attribute Chinese poverty to inequality in the distribution of property. Instead, he made the general claim, “Population always exceeds wealth in both good and bad governments.”116 In Quesnay’s view, to prevent overcrowding in a well-governed nation there was “no other recourse but that of colonies.” According to him, this imperfection of the

112 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 181–2. 113 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave, 1: 318; Watts edition, 2: 250; French edition, 2: 145. 114 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 102; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 1, 118. 115 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 168. 116 Ibid.

28463_Millar.indd 180

2016-12-15 14:02:02



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 181

Chinese system could be fairly easily corrected by a policy of expanding into uninhabited territory. China would then embody his ideal model of political economy. Tax Policies Interest in the Chinese tax system stemmed not only from the vast scale of its revenue but also from the reported ease with which the taxes were set, collected, and spent. Le Comte argued that China’s taxation system was the institution that most contributed to “keeping up peace and order.”117 While these reports certainly differ from the understanding of early modern China’s fiscal system we have today, at the time there was little active challenge of these “facts.”118 Observers deemed the Chinese government to have a just tax policy, which contributed to the ease with which taxes were collected. Mendoza noted that even though China was very rich, Chinese taxation rates were lower than in Europe.119 Navarrete provided insight into the Chinese philosophy behind taxation. He cited Emperor T’ai Tsung from the Tang Dynasty, who argued, “It is but reasonable to lay a burden upon him that has strength to bear it; but it is a madness to place the weight upon him that is not able to carry himself. The Chinese oblige all persons, from two and twenty to sixty years of age, to pay taxes, supposing they are not able to bear that burden either before or after … To take a morsel of bread from him that has but two to feed four mouths, is not sheering, but devouring the sheep and what good can it do the sovereign but breed ill blood.”120 In principle, then, Chinese taxes were light and proportional, thus preserving harmony in the empire. Set against the eighteenth-century debates over taxation in Europe and its colonies, public acceptance of taxes was greatly admired.121 French philosophers-cum-administrators showed significant interest in the Chinese tax system because it was a simple land-tax model that imposed a payment of between one-tenth and one-thirtieth of the value produced by a piece of land. At the time, the French monarchy determined tax rates on a local basis all over the country, creating a

117 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 307–8; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 99. 118 Due to a systemic breakdown in the rural fiscal policy during the Ming period, the entire system was reformed. G. Skinner and Baker, eds, The City in Late Imperial China. 119 Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, 82. 120 Churchill, A Collection of Voyages and Travels, 1: 103. 121 Hughes, “The Concept of Taxation and the Age of Enlightenment.”

28463_Millar.indd 181

2016-12-15 14:02:02

182

A Singular Case

fragmented taxation system.122 After the French famine in 1693, Louis XIV implemented the capitation, the first direct tax on all subjects. In 1707, frustrated by the inefficiency and complications of the French taxation system, Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban argued for the utility of a simplified royal tithe in Dîme Royale. Famed as a military engineer, Vauban was frustrated by the inefficiency and complications of the Colbert taxation system. He noted that a simplified tax was not a new idea, and was mentioned 3000 years earlier in the scriptures, as well as in profane history, which “tells us, that the greatest states of the world used it to very good purpose” – the Greek and Roman emperors. Currently the king of Spain in America, the Great Mogul, “and the King of China do use it over all their vast Empires.”123 The English translator noted in the preface that Vauban’s motivations for writing this work stemmed from love of his country and his access to information that led to a realization “about how both prince and people were cheated by those who have the management of publick money. An evil not peculiar to France, nor confined to arbitrary governments.” The translator concluded that the “reasonable remedy” to ensure the King was “rich and powerful” while the subjects were “happy” was to introduce proportional taxation to all subjects regardless of “rank, quality, or condition.”124 The taxes should remain between one-tenth and one-twentieth depending on the needs of the government. Vauban proposed a tax “laid upon all the fruits of the earth, on one hand; and on all that produces yearly incomes on the other.”125 It was a system less liable to corruption and employed fewer hands to collect it and a lower cost. He also recommended an annual census for France and suggested a way to achieve this was to “divide all the people into decuries, as the Chinese do.”126 Although dismissed by French officials at the time (because it was written without royal permission), Vauban’s taxation policy was very influential on the later Physiocrats. In 1710, the War of Spanish Succession led to another universal tax, the dixième. However, it varied from de Vauban’s suggestion because it did not involve taxation in kind (also a pillar of the Chinese system) and it did not replace the existing taxes (it was additional tax to support the

122 For more on French fiscal policy, see Kwass, Privileges and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France. 123 Vauban, A project for a royal tythe: or, general tax, Vauban’s preface, viii. 124 Ibid., preface by the English translator. 125 Ibid., Vauban’s preface, viii. 126 Ibid., 159.

28463_Millar.indd 182

2016-12-15 14:02:02



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 183

war effort).127 This differed greatly from China, where, observers note, the emperor was allowed to implement new taxes but rarely invoked this power.128 In fact, Le Comte pointed out that more often the emperor exempted “every year one or two provinces from bearing their proportion in the tax, especially if any of them have suffered thro’ the sickness of the people, or if the lands thro’ unreasonable weather have not yielded so good an encrease as usual.”129 Du Halde concurred, writing that the emperor very rarely raised new taxes and “there is scarcely a year he does not remit the whole tribute to some province, if it happens to be afflicted with any kind of calamity.”130 Extraordinary resource mobilization in Europe was primarily for military expenditures, whereas in China it was largely for major public works projects, particularly for water control and grain storage. In eighteenth-century France, tax collection was still uneven and abused. The historic influence of privilege continued, and many nobles and clergy did not pay the taille, the direct tax, which largely fell on the peasantry. Great regional variation also continued. Writing in 1767, Quesnay deemed China’s tax burden fair, at least in theory. He remarked that Vauban’s argument for a principle tax of one-tenth of the agricultural harvest and industrial production was remarkably similar to the practice in China. However, Quesnay argued that it should not be the total value that was taxed, but rather the net product (the rent paid by the farmer to the landlord).131 He described how in China no land was exempt from the tax, and if a tax was extracted from farmers, the cost of farming was subtracted from the charge. Natural law dictated that taxes could only be drawn from the soil itself and not from people because “man by himself is bare of riches.” Taxes should also not come from wages that were needed for subsistence. Quesnay believed that workers could not pay for both subsistence and taxes since the cost of labour would have to be raised without production increasing.132 He argued that the Chinese followed these fundamental principles, reasoning that the Chinese personal tax on labour could not contribute to the public revenue because it would reduce cultivation of the land and violate natural law.

127 McCollim, Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege, 192. 128 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 47. 129 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 248; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 11. 130 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 244; Watts edition, 2: 21; French edition, 2: 15. 131 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 120. 132 Ibid., 291; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 652.

28463_Millar.indd 183

2016-12-15 14:02:02

184

A Singular Case

However, the Chinese system was not perfect. In a section entitled “Taxes other than on land,” Quesnay addressed the “irregular taxes” in China. By this he meant customs duties, tolls, and the poll tax. He believed that if these “allegations [of irregular taxes in China] have foundation,” then “the state is not sufficiently enlightened as to its true interests; for in an empire, the wealth of which springs from the soil, such impositions are destructive to taxation itself and to the revenues of the nation.” To the économiste this was “indisputably demonstrated by mathematics.”133 Although Quesnay believed these irregular taxes were the “seed of a devastation,” he did not think they would destroy the empire because they were moderate and fixed. He also noted that the defect was one of ­administration, not of government (going back to his line of argument discussed in chapter 4). The fault “may be corrected without involving any change in the constitution of that empire.” Once again, he criticized the improper application of his ideal model. Other philosophers agreed with Quesnay that minimal and simplified taxation was beneficial to agricultural production. For instance, Raynal, following Poivre, commented that in China “the smallness of the taxes is still a farther encouragement to agriculture.” 134 China’s taxes were generally held to be easy to collect because of the efficient survey of lands and census of families, as well as the competence of the officials in charge of tax collection. All estates were measured, families registered, and what the emperor excised on goods or taxed on persons was publicly known. Those who did not pay did not lose their estates by confiscation because that would punish an innocent family. Instead, the first-hand accounts noted that the individual was imprisoned until they paid. Apart from imprisonment, other punishments for failure to pay taxes included being beaten or being forced to billet the poor or aged. All these different punishments were designed to avoid seizing goods.135 After the taxes were collected, the mandarins gave an account to a general officer of the province who then reported to the responsible court in Peking. A particular point of admiration, for some, was the nature of the individuals involved in collecting the taxes, especially when contrasted with the situation in France. There the process of tax collection was privatized 133 Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 260; Quesnay, “Despotisme de la Chine,” 634. 134 Raynal, A philosophical and political history, 93; Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 106. By the 1776 edition, he also added information on duties paid in seaports, personal tribute, and the dixième au centième. 135 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 244; Watts edition, 2: 21; French edition, 2: 15.

28463_Millar.indd 184

2016-12-15 14:02:02



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 185

and led to intense corruption. The French state inefficiently extracted more revenues from its populace as its national debt continued to rise.136 Le Comte argued that unlike France, “they are not troubled in China with such swarms of officers and commissioners.”137 Everyone paid their taxes to the mandarins or governors of the third rank (although tax farming was common in China). Poivre, like Le Comte before him, was particularly impressed by the payment system for taxes. He highlighted this point when he wrote that the Chinese pay taxes “not to avaricious farmers-generals, but to honest magistrates, their proper and natural governors.”138 However, other observers reported significant low-level corruption in tax collection. Navarrete claimed the mandarins abused their power and stole from the subjects.139 Once again, Cornelius de Pauw was especially critical in his description of Chinese taxation and picked up on the negative reports. He argued, “in all despotic states, the revenues of the sovereigns are much less than we are tempted to believe.” In China, this was a result of the disorder introduced by the eunuchs into the state finances. He also, however, described the efforts of the Manchus to reform the treasury but noted again the corrupting force of the eunuchs who “dreamed of nothing but imposts.”140 De Pauw evidently believed the ideal system of taxation meant little in the face of the greed of the eunuchs. Adam Smith, who was aware of de Pauw’s work, listed four general maxims for taxation: they should be equal (meaning taxes are proportionally determined), certain and not arbitrary, convenient to be paid, and economically collected.141 While evidence on China’s taxes indicated they were certain, convenient, and collected economically, Smith doubted their equality. He argued that taxes that were proportioned to the produce rather than the rent were unequal. Distinct agricultural situations meant different percentages were needed to replace employed capital. In other words, the ratio of produce to expense varied. Chinese taxes were reportedly proportioned to produce: “In China, the principal revenue of the sovereign consists in a tenth part of the produce of all the lands of the empire. This tenth part, however, is estimated so very

136 See Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450–1789. 137 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 307–8; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 99. 138 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 164; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 131. 139 Ibid., 27 and 28. 140 de Pauw, Philosophical dissertations, 308. 141 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1043–4.

28463_Millar.indd 185

2016-12-15 14:02:02

186

A Singular Case

moderately, that, in many provinces, it is said not to exceed a thirtieth part of the ordinary produce.”142 Smith drew this piece of information from Poivre who noted that in regions with poor soils, taxes amounted to  around one-thirtieth part of the produce.143 Smith compared China’s policies to tax rates elsewhere, noting that the land tax paid to the “Mahometan government of Bengal” (before it was dominated by English East India Company) and that paid in ancient Egypt were both approximately one-fifth part of the produce. This demonstrated to him a very low tax burden on Chinese peasants, which in theory Smith supported. Britain, along with the Netherlands, had the highest taxes in Europe, and much greater than Qing China. British taxes were, however, collected extremely efficiently and with little corruption.144 Smith cautioned that payment in kind rather than in money was more liable to manipulation and fraud. This again points to  the differences between China and Europe, especially in regard to Europe’s overwhelmingly money-based economies. Both de Pauw and Smith cautioned about the potential for corruption in China. Indeed, recent research has confirmed that corruption in tax collection was far more prevalent in China than in Britain, but as Vries notes, “efficiency of tax collecting was quite high considering the difficult circumstances.”145 While Vries points out the inefficiency in the whole system due to corruption and money being paid to officials directly, Rosenthal and Wong argue that “Chinese political economy, particularly its fiscal regime, had more positive direct consequences for economic growth than did European fiscal regimes before the Industrial Revolution.”146 The emperor was not a “predatory despot.” He provided public goods with moderate taxes allowing for expansive Smithian growth of the agrarian and commercial sectors. Clearly, economic historians are not in agreement over the overall efficiency of the fiscal system, but we can determine that Smith’s observations and concerns were not unfounded. In spite of the disagreement over tax collection, descriptions about spending government revenue contradicted the notion that an absolute despot controlled China. In fact, one of the reasons given for the ease with which Chinese taxes were collected was that the people knew they would benefit from state spending. For example, Botero argued the Chinese system should be admired for two reasons. First, taxes were paid 142 Ibid., 1059. 143 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 163; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 131. 144 Vries, “Public Finance in China and Britain,” 7. 145 Ibid., 20. 146 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 205.

28463_Millar.indd 186

2016-12-15 14:02:02



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 187

not only in coin but also in kind, which can then be redistributed to those in need. And second, the “people receive againe by those expences as much as they laid out in the beginning of the years.”147 Ricci-Trigault explained that the emperor was not solely responsible for deciding how to spend government income. They commented on the misconception that the revenue collected from the Chinese public went directly into the Imperial Exchequer so the emperor could use it as he pleased. Instead, the silver “is placed in the public treasure, and the returns paid in rice are placed in the warehouses belonging to the government.”148 Firsthand accounts described the Chinese system of public treasuries and rice warehouses that ensured the revenue was spent in the best interest of the empire, and not just the emperor.149 The people of China knew that when there was scarcity, the stored grain was open to the public. The Emperor could offer rewards only from his private fortune, not from the public revenue. As a result of this conservation of funds, the size of the national budget was extremely large and the national treasury paid for public buildings, palaces, prisons, fortresses, and war supplies. The Peking Gazette transmitted information about the public works that revenue was spent on. As discussed in the previous chapter, this daily paper related the expenses of the Chinese government and in particular described the public works. Observers from missionaries to merchants, as well as geographers and philosophers, were also aware of the imperial court called Houpo or Hopu, which was deemed equivalent to the Treasury Department and handled tax collection, public debts, negotiation of loans, and other financial transactions.150 The revenue was disbursed in provinces to pay for pensions (especially for maintaining the poor), salaries of the mandarins and soldiers, public buildings, and structures necessary to facilitate commerce.151 This clarity in spending was seen as conducive to easy tax collection. Eighteenth-century commentators demonstrated great interest in how China organized revenue collection. There was much that was admired regarding China’s large (absolute) amount of revenue; low rate of taxation; and the consistency, efficiency, and theory of their tax policies.

147 Botero, Relations, of the most famous kingdoms, 600; Botero, Delle Relationi Universali, part 2, 68. 148 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 46. 149 Ibid., 47; Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 258; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 24; Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 164–5; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 132. 150 Ibid.; Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 258; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 24. 151 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 245; Watts edition, 2: 22. French edition, 2: 16.

28463_Millar.indd 187

2016-12-15 14:02:02

188

A Singular Case

Most, however, also agreed that elements of the Chinese system could be reformed to create even better conditions. Many philosophers, such as Quesnay, believed that even if China was not the perfect model of taxation, it was the closest approximation, and thus lessons could be learned from the Middle Kingdom. Adam Smith, however, articulated a fundamental difference of the Chinese tax system, based on an agricultural economy that collected a portion of its taxes in kind, in comparison to Europe’s increasingly money-based political economies. Once again, China was a singular case. Smith pointed out a key difference that Peer Vries also describes in his work on Britain and China. Vries refers to Chinese policies as “agrarian paternalist.” The system saw, them taxing lightly and not interfering at the local level (the Physiocrats’ ideal “laissez-faire” in action). Smith also commented that this system increased the risk of corruption and that China’s taxes were unequal and thus not ideal. Conclusion Assessed on the execution of its duties of government, China’s priorities and circumstances were identified as unique. One clear and unrelenting failure of the Chinese state was its ineffectual military, particularly acute with the Manchu Conquest. Some commentators believed that the masculine force of the Manchus now in power could help develop China’s military strength, yet they also recognized the tendency in China for the conquerors to adopt the manners of the conquered. While Raynal attempted to justify China’s passive stance, most observers and commentators agreed that China was vulnerable because of its lack of military strength. Quesnay, needing to preserve his model of political economy, ignored the implications of what others deemed a key state failure. This vulnerability was to haunt the Chinese empire in the nineteenth century, but even without such foresight, eighteenth-century observers were aware of this fatal flaw. When it came to property rights, commercial institutions, and revenue, China was not viewed as perfect – then again no existing state was; but none of the criticisms led to a comprehensive dismissal of its system of political economy. Its legal system was seen as functioning and fair, with property secured. The idea of corruption loomed, as it did when it came to assessing the form of China’s government and revenue. The restricted information on this topic, however, ensured it never became a defining feature of China’s system of political economy. It was widely held that the Chinese government provided useful commercial

28463_Millar.indd 188

2016-12-15 14:02:02



Civil and Military Successes and Failures 189

infrastructure. However, like China’s trade policy, the commercial infrastructure was seen to be a feature of its unique circumstances. China’s agricultural base, according to Smith, was an incentive for the government to provide a good system of infrastructure to transport goods. Finally, China’s revenue was considered large, effectively collected, and responsibly spent. While Quesnay admitted that China’s taxes might be imperfect and Smith argued that they were unequal and vulnerable to corruption, these were points that could be improved. Unlike its military failures, they were not considered fatal flaws in the Chinese system of political economy.

28463_Millar.indd 189

2016-12-15 14:02:02

6

“Very Ignorant Reasoners”: China’s Science and Technology Alongside a general consensus that China’s military was fundamentally inadequate was another – that China’s science and technology were also deficient. Voltaire, a noted “sinophile,” was very critical of China’s scientific achievements: “It is sufficiently known, that they are, at the present day, what we all were three hundred years ago, very ignorant reasoners. The most learned Chinese is like one of the learned of Europe in the fifteenth century, in possession of his Aristotle.”1 Of course, the dismissal of Chinese “sciences” was largely selective and emphasized fields in which Europeans were making dramatic advances. As we see later in this chapter, Voltaire judged that in certain areas, which he deemed part of “the necessary arts of life” like morality, political economy, and agriculture, the Chinese were actually much more advanced. These fields, however, were separated out from the central assessments of Chinese science and the vast majority of interested Europeans agreed that on the whole, the Chinese were inferior in science and most technologies. Enlightenment commentators disagreed on the causes and implications of this inferiority and on China’s potential to change. More importantly, the view that Chinese science and technology had either stagnated or declined since the transformative inventions of gunpowder, printing, and the compass gained wider currency over this period. Indeed, it was in the realm of science and technology that the concept of the Chinese Empire as stagnant or retrogressive developed. This parallels one of the attacks on the revisionist California School economic historians who emphasize China’s scientific and technological knowledge. Peer Vries argues that Pomeranz’s work “underestimates the differences in dynamism

1 Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 83; Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique, 151.

28463_Millar.indd 190

2016-12-15 14:02:02



China’s Science and Technology 191

that existed between technological culture and practices in the West and the East in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.”2 Enlightenment thinkers disagreed over the relationship between science and technology as well as their connection to material progress. Nonetheless, as David Spadafora argues, for eighteenth-century British audiences (and arguably French as well), there was a sense that knowledge production was a cumulative process.3 Even if science was not always directly connected to material advancement, there was a broader understanding that it reflected the progress of society and led to unintended advances. As John Barrow’s A New and Universal Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences (1751) proclaimed, adding to scientific knowledge will “produce many new advantages to society,” even if they cannot be specified.4 Of course, if knowledge was cumulative, as Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning (1605) argued, it follows that “those who live later will inevitably have more of it than their predecessors.”5 In Europe the “moderns” clearly knew more than the “ancients.” This was not thought to be the case with the Chinese. That Europeans built and improved upon the knowledge of the ancients made them far less impressed with China’s original contributions to knowledge. Many argued that especially if the Chinese were the inventors of printing, the compass, and gunpowder, it is remarkable they did not improve upon that knowledge. Given the general consensus on the problems of Chinese science and technology, attention shifted toward understanding their causes and implications. Several explanations were proffered with varying implications for China’s potential to improve. For some, there was a trade-off between good government and the progress of science; the advantages the Chinese had in the former outweighed the negatives in the latter. For most others, China needed to change in order to advance, and contact with Europeans offered the optimal opportunity to do so. The Enlightenment view of China’s science and technology reveals the importance of a less measurable force influencing the progress of civilization, and one that pointed to what was deemed a fundamental weakness of the Middle Kingdom. Science and technology were not always viewed as a defining feature of a successful civilization, particularly during the early modern period. Many Enlightenment thinkers recognized that dynamism was an important feature in a civilization, particularly as it related to sustaining 2 Vries, “Are Coal and Colonies Really Crucial?” 416. 3 Spadafora, The Idea of Progress, 21. 4 Barrow, A New and Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, 32. 5 Spadafora, The Idea of Progress, 22.

28463_Millar.indd 191

2016-12-15 14:02:02

192

A Singular Case

progress. It was the trajectory more than the current state of China’s science and technology that was disappointing to most European observers. While the Industrial Revolution was not necessarily foreseeable by the end of the eighteenth century, European thinkers recognized the importance of rapid advancements in knowledge. As we see below, some drew a closer connection than others between the esoteric pursuit of scientific progress and broader material advancement. Meanwhile, in China, as Benjamin Elman points out, the connection between state power and scientific advancement did not occur until the nineteenth century. In the period considered here, the Chinese were also unaware that such a connection may have been drawn in Europe; instead, they were presented with the Jesuit emphasis on the connection between science and the Church.6 T h e S tat u s o f S c i e n c e a n d T e c h n o l o g y There was a great deal of fluidity and uncertainty associated with the concept of science during the Enlightenment. For example, the title page of John Barrow’s A New and Universal Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences (1751) contained a list of fifty-eight categories within the arts and sciences, including agriculture, anatomy, commerce, ethics, geometry, handicrafts, maritime and military affairs, mechanics, merchandise, navigation, and rhetoric. A wide range of subjects was encompassed under these two headings. In several eighteenth-century British and French dictionaries, the definition for art was “a science; as, the liberal arts” (generally referring to grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, music, geo­ metry, and astronomy), although the definition also included mechanical arts. Science, on the other hand, was often defined broadly as knowledge.7 Nevertheless, there were also differences between the categories we now refer to as science and technology but which in the eighteenth century can better be understood as the distinct realms of science (including the liberal arts) and the mechanical arts. This is most clearly seen in Denis Diderot’s entry on “Art” in the Encyclopédie, which, due to its importance, was published separately in 1751 before the first volume of the Encyclopédie was published. In this article Diderot differentiated

6 Elman, A Cultural History of Modern Science in China, 7. 7 For examples of these types of definitions, see Johnson, A dictionary of the English language, vol. 1, image 161 and vol. 2, image 603, and Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (4th ed., 1762), 109.

28463_Millar.indd 192

2016-12-15 14:02:02



China’s Science and Technology 193

between “science” and “art.” The former was contemplative or created by the mind, whereas the latter led to action and was created by the hand.8 First-hand descriptions of China shed light on how science and technology were practically organized. In general, these descriptions, like those of Ricci-Trigault, separated discussion of the liberal arts and sciences (including moral philosophy, medicine, and a discussion of the examination system) from the mechanical arts (including architecture, printing, musical instruments, fans, instruments for measuring time, etc.).9 “Science,” to them, clearly had a more speculative and less practical focus. The subtopics within these categories were not fixed but they give a general impression of the division between the speculative sciences and the mechanical arts. For the purposes of this chapter I adapt the terminology by referring to the speculative sciences as science and the mechanical arts as technology. While some scholars such as Margaret Jacob, James Ferguson, and Spadafora argue that the categories of science and technology cannot be usefully applied to the eighteenth century, the contemporary distinction when it came to assessing China’s capabilities is certainly clear and if understood to refer to the division laid out above, the terminology, in this context, is indeed useful.10 Deirdre McCloskey makes a similar point, that science and technology must be considered distinct from one another since technological achievements have occurred without science.11 While there was an evident distinction between science and technology in the eighteenth century, thinkers often disagreed on the relationship between them. In part 2 of his Fable of the Bees (1729), Bernard Mandeville argued, “They are very seldom the same Sort of People, those that invent Arts, and Improvements in them, and those that enquire into the Reason of Things.”12 Speculative people, he maintained, were not the best inventors. Certainly, the importance of science to technological developments and to economic gains was not as evident as it would be a  century later, at the height of the Industrial Revolution, but even Mandeville’s contemporaries generally disagreed with his assessment. In his 1751 article, Diderot argued there was an important relationship between “speculation” and “practice.” He believed more praise and

 8 Diderot (ascribed by Jacques Proust), “Art,”  in Diderot and D’Alembert, eds, Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 1: 713–17.   9 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, chapters 4 and 5. 10 Jacob, Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West; Ferguson, “Review: Machines as the Measure of Men by Michael Adas”; Spadafora, The Idea of Progress, 34. 11 McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity, 357. 12 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, Kaye edition, 2: 144.

28463_Millar.indd 193

2016-12-15 14:02:02

194

A Singular Case

attention had been paid to the former than the latter so, following Francis Bacon, considered it important to emphasize the role of the mechanical arts. In his essay “Of Refinement in the Arts” (1752), David Hume similarly argued that progress in science, technology, and industry were intertwined. “The same age, which produces great philosophers and politicians, renowned generals and poets, usually abounds with skilful weavers, and ship-carpenters. We cannot reasonably expect, that a piece of woollen cloth will be wrought to perfection in any nation, which is ignorant of astronomy, or where ethics are neglected … Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked together by an indissoluble chain.”13 While allowing Mandeville’s claim that perhaps they were not the same people, he argues that there was a connection between science and technology since they co-existed within the same age and nation.14 While George Campbell, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher and minister, disagreed with Hume’s assessment of miracles, he agreed with the connection between science and technology. In The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) he argued, “all art is founded in science, and the science is of little value which does not serve as a foundation to some beneficial art.”15 He listed several examples of such relationships including that between abstract mathematics and land surveying or accountancy, and between natural philosophy and navigation and architecture. He maintained there was a “natural relation between the sciences and the arts, like that which subsists between the parent and the offspring.”16 The relationship could be broken; for example, with imitation one need not understand the scientific principles from which the object or process is derived. However, with imitation one should not expect improvement. This was particularly significant in the Chinese case, because the Middle Kingdom was renowned for its ability to imitate foreign goods and its supposed inability to improve on its inventions. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith also hinted at a general connection between science and economic development. He described one of the advantages of the division of labour as the encouragement of machinery

13 Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts” [1752], in The Philosophical Works of David Hume, 3: 305. 14 Note that the connection between science and technology in early modern Europe is still debated today. Allen sides with Mandeville, while Joel Mokyr sides with Hume. Allen, The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective; Mokyr, “The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth.” 15 G. Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 1. 16 Ibid., 2.

28463_Millar.indd 194

2016-12-15 14:02:02



China’s Science and Technology 195

invented by workers and by “those who are called philosophers or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects.”17 Like Hume, Smith recognized a relationship between scientific and technological innovation and economic progress. However, this idea was still in its infancy. When he discussed science in a section on education, he gave it a more reserved terrain, arguing that one of the chief uses of science was as an “antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition.”18 The status of science in eighteenth-century Europe was rapidly changing and it was becoming increasingly institutionalized in universities and academies.19 However, many still questioned the esoteric qualities and utility of science. Projects such as the creation of the Encyclopédie by Diderot and D’Alembert (who aimed to expose guild secrets) demonstrated the practical value of spreading knowledge of science and technology. And yet, as with Adam Smith, for many thinkers scientific advancement was associated with overcoming superstitions associated with religion rather than material improvement. The study of the history of science in the eighteenth century has lagged behind that of other periods. For decades it was neglected, wedged as it was between the “Scientific Revolution” and the Industrial Revolution.20 Until recently, historians of science did not appreciate the eighteenth-century writers who thought they were living in age of rapid change. Along with a greater examination of eighteenth-century science there has been a move led by thinkers such as Margaret C. Jacob to “pry science out of the pristine sanctuary reserved for it by a previous generation of historians.” Along with Joel Mokyr (who differs from Jacob in seeing this as a European phenomenon rather than just a British story), she aims to integrate science with industrialization (entrepreneurs and engineers). Jacob argues, “from at least as early as the mid-seventeenth century, British science came wrapped in an ideology that encouraged material prosperity.”21 Elman, like Jacob, points out the differences between the status of science in France and Britain. He argues that while

17 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 18. 18 Ibid., 1005. This was the same context in which Cornelius de Pauw discussed Chinese science. De Pauw, Philosophical dissertations, 2: 208. Similarly, Quesnay had earlier argued that there was too much superstition in China because the speculative sciences were neglected. Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 190. 19 Yeo, “Classifying the Sciences,” 4: 241. 20 Clark, Golinski, and Schaffer, “Introduction,” 12. 21 Jacob, Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West, 4.

28463_Millar.indd 195

2016-12-15 14:02:02

196

A Singular Case

Diderot and d’Alembert encouraged studying mechanics, this came into popular effect only after the French Revolution. Before that, the French monarchy drove the pursuit of science, whereas in Britain it was more privatized.22 McCloskey, on the other hand, remains unconvinced that science, as in theoretical science, had much to do with industrialization in Britain.23 Once again, we see a stark division in the economic history literature. But what did eighteenth-century thinkers make of the role of science? As Dorinda Outram has succinctly argued, “the intellectual status of ­science was contested, its institutional organisations often weak, and certainly thin on the ground, and the nature of its relations with the economy and with government often tenuous.”24 Nonetheless, science and technology clearly reflected the trajectory of a civilization. By the mideighteenth century, Michael Adas maintains, “scientific and technological gauges” dominated European assessments of foreign civilizations.25 Domination is perhaps an overstatement. Europeans debated the implications of weaknesses in science and as we will see, a few even dismissed its overall importance. Nonetheless, the general consensus was that China would benefit from developing its science and technology and this could be facilitated by more contact with Europeans. More important was how discussion of science and technology led to the imposition of the scale of progress on China. On the grand map of the world, China was civilized, as was Europe. What began to distinguish China from Europe, as discussed in the conclusion, was its lack of forward momentum, its lack of progress. Science may not have always been as directly connected to economic development as Hume implied but it was widely seen as an integral part of the growth of a civilization. China’s Strengths and Weaknesses By the eighteenth century there was little confusion or controversy in Europe about the status of China’s science and technology. Interested Europeans agreed from an early stage that the Chinese were inferior to Europe in the speculative sciences, and equal or slightly inferior in most of the mechanical arts. Before the Jesuits arrived in Peking, there was scant information available on Chinese science. Mendoza exemplifies this earlier period, when Europeans were still able to lavish praise on 22 Elman, A Cultural History of Modern Science in China, 95. 23 McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity, 362. 24 Outram, The Enlightenment, 94. 25 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 3.

28463_Millar.indd 196

2016-12-15 14:02:02



China’s Science and Technology 197

China’s invention of the printing press, gunpowder, and the compass (Francis Bacon’s trinity of transformative inventions). Mendoza discussed China’s invention of printing 500 years before Europeans, and in the process dismissed the “vulgar opinion” that Johannes Gutenberg invented printing in 1458. The Spaniard concluded that the Chinese were “great inventors of things.”26 However, another Spanish cosmographer disagreed with Mendoza’s interpretation of the earlier missionary sources, in particular the account of the Augustinian traveller Martín de Rada. As Joan-Pau Rubiés has pointed out, in the 1595 edition of Repúblicas del Mundo, Jerónimo Román followed da Rada’s critique of Chinese science and technology more closely.27 He argued that their knowledge of printing was also known by the ancient Greeks and Romans, their artillery was poor, and their understanding of the sciences quite limited, although he reserved praise for some of their manufactures, notably porcelain, which he had seen in Lisbon. Nonetheless, Mendoza’s account was translated into English and travelled much more widely than Román’s. Once the Jesuits reached the Chinese court, the perceived gulf between European and Chinese science and technology grew dramatically. From the early Jesuit encounters, science and technology were key pillars in converting the Chinese and gaining their acceptance. Combined with the strategies of cultural accommodation and the top-down approach to conversion, the use of Western science and technology to gain the trust and interest of the Chinese was an explicit tool of the Christian missionaries. Jesuit education was characterized by its comprehensiveness, and many Jesuit missionaries were selected for the China mission based particularly on their training in natural philosophy. However, the Jesuit relationship to science was complicated by their connection to the Roman Catholic Church and they did not always present the most up to date scientific discoveries from Europe. As agents of the Catholic Church, an institution that often felt threatened by scientific advances and was coming to terms with the place of science in what was previously a dominantly theological world, the Jesuits were – and had to be – religious missionaries before scientists. For instance, they did not report the heliocentric theory of the universe until 1760 (it was banned by the Church until 1757).28 Over the course of the eighteenth century, European ­sciences presented in China were increasingly outmoded; after 1723, 26 Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, 131 and 32. 27 Rubiés, “The Concept of Gentile Civilization in Missionary Discourse,” 337–8. 28 Wayley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing, 108. For more on the Jesuit education system, and in particular the place of science, see to Brockey, Journey to the East, 215–17. See also Standaert, ed., Handbook of Christianity in China, and Hsia, Sojourners in a Strange Land.

28463_Millar.indd 197

2016-12-15 14:02:02

198

A Singular Case

European advances in mathematics were not transmitted to China until the end of the First Opium War.29 The Jesuits, loyal Aristotelians, presented the out-dated information based on Cartesian thinking rather than transmitting the rising Newtonian science or experimental physics and mechanics.30 As Elman points out, while most date Chinese imperial arrogance from the 1793 Macartney mission, “the deterioration in scientific understanding” should be dated from the first Jesuits in China.31 Regardless of their efforts to respect the Church’s stance on science, the Jesuit involvement in Chinese science was controversial in Europe and contributed to the Rites Controversy. European observers were scornful of several Jesuit activities in China. For instance, the calendar given to the Chinese was used to predict lucky and unlucky days, contradicting the Christian religion and seen as pagan. Further, Ricci’s geographic contribution to China – a 1584 map of the world produced for the Chinese court – placed China, not Europe, at the centre of the world. Finally, the missionaries assisted in the production of artillery for a foreign empire. Johann Adam Schall von Bell made over 500 cannons for the Ming dynasty and Ferdinand Verbiest produced more than half of the cannons made under the entire Kangxi reign.32 Elman describes how Jesuit influence started to decline in China and Europe by 1705 (with the papal announcement to the Chinese that the papacy no longer supported the Jesuit policy of accommodation), and by 1720 the Kangxi Emperor understood that the missionaries did not represent the most powerful group in Europe, and that the Catholic Church was weak in comparison to the growing states of France and England.33 The Emperor wanted to balance out the Jesuit influence on Chinese science (in particular, mathematical astronomy) and so promoted Chinese literati education in “natural studies, mathematics and medicine.”34 This led to an increase in the standing of native scholars like Mei Wending, a mathematician who challenged the Jesuits. At the beginning of the Jesuit mission, Matteo Ricci exemplified the usefulness of combining science and technology with the Christianizing mission. During his pioneering trip to Peking, he was captured and

29 Elman, A Cultural History of Modern Science in China, 38. 30 Elman, On Their Own Terms, 185–7. 31 Ibid., 189. 32 For more detailed information on the Jesuit experience in China, particularly with regard to science and technology, see Inkster, ed., Technology in China. 33 Elman, On Their Own Terms, 165. 34 Elman, A Cultural History of Modern Science in China, 36.

28463_Millar.indd 198

2016-12-15 14:02:02



China’s Science and Technology 199

imprisoned. The Wanli Emperor released the Jesuit in exchange for a European clock and a painting. Ricci proceeded to entertain the Chinese court by demonstrating that the sun is larger than the earth and the moon smaller, explaining the law of gravity, and revealing to them a map of the earth. He noted, “once this new knowledge became known to a few, it was not long before it found its way into the academies of the learned class.”35 With the assistance of Xu Guangqi (the highest level Christian convert and influential Imperial Grand Secretary), Ricci translated Euclid’s Elements of Geometry. Xu Guangqi also translated Western Irrigation Methods, and built three telescopes just twenty-one years after the European invention. Ricci-Trigault tried to impart to the European readership the importance of science to the Christian mission: “Whoever may think that ethics, physics and mathematics are not important in the work of the Church, is unacquainted with the taste of the Chinese, who are slow to take a salutary spiritual potion, unless it be seasoned with an intellectual flavoring.” The Jesuits argued that “the reasoning demanded in the study of mathematics” helped the missionaries awaken some Chinese to the absurdity of idol worshipping.36 From the outset of the Jesuit engagement with Peking, the Chinese court oscillated between acceptance and rejection of Western science and technology. The internal decay of the Ming encouraged a restoration of orthodoxy and the expulsion of the missionaries in 1617. However, the Manchu incursions that began in 1618 led the Chinese to invite the missionaries back to assist in the construction of cannons. It is not surprising that the Chinese were willing to learn from these Christian interlopers when it suited their needs. The Chinese had a tradition of allowing foreigners to contribute to their scientific inquiries. Indian astronomers were present in the Chinese court during the Tang Dynasty (618–907) and Persian and Central Asian astronomers were appointed to the Imperial Bureau of Astronomy during the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368). While the Ming Dynasty had its own distinct agenda and relationship with foreigners, Europeans held on to the knowledge that outsiders had earlier been able to contribute to scientific inquiry in the Middle Kingdom. For example, Ricci-Trigault described the astrological instruments that were found in Peking and their belief that the foreigners who designed them had some knowledge of European astronomical science.37

35 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 326. 36 Ibid., 325 and 328. 37 Ibid., 331.

28463_Millar.indd 199

2016-12-15 14:02:02

200

A Singular Case

It was the newly arrived Christians who dominated a competition sponsored by the court in 1629 to predict an eclipse. When the Jesuit Johann Adam Schall von Bell presented a new calendar to the Qing court, he was appointed the director of the Astronomical Bureau in 1645. Although this provoked a conservative reaction from the Chinese court, Schall – along with Ferdinand Verbiest – designed new astronomical instruments and served as tutors to the young Kangxi Emperor. As discussed below, China’s willingness to learn science from foreigners became an important aspect of discussions about the possibility for China to improve upon its scientific knowledge. The Jesuit dismissal of Chinese science is not surprising given their mission. By presenting European knowledge as more advanced, it followed that other European revelations should be seen as superior, namely Christianity. Why Adas would argue that merchants and commanders like Laurent Lange and George Anson “were the first to broach many of the criticisms that would be directed against China in the era of indus­ trialization” is puzzling.38 This is simply not true: Adas himself acknowledges that the Jesuits criticized Chinese science before the accounts of Lange and Anson were written. In fact, science is an area where the lines between sinophiles and sinophobes were most blurred. When the Jesuits were criticized for extolling Chinese science, it was largely with regard to the specific area of moral philosophy. While moral philosophy was not categorized as one of the liberal arts, it was often included in sections that addressed Chinese science and learning. There was little doubt about the Jesuits’ negative assessments of the other speculative sciences. Ricci-Trigault reported that through Confucius, moral philosophy was the only one of the “higher philosophical sciences” that the Chinese knew, and even then they suffered from many errors.39 They argued that the Chinese had no logic and that their ethics were a confused set of maxims. Some progress in medicine, astronomy, and the branches of mathematics was acknowledged, but, they argued, despite their proficiency in arithmetic and geometry, these fields were in a state of confusion.40 It is worth noting that Elman has argued that half of the so-called

38 As discussed in chapter 1, the account here referred to as authored by Anson in fact involved the contributions of two other authors, Richard Walter and Benjamin Robins, but since their respective contributions cannot be disentangled, the work is referred to here as authored by Anson. Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 177. 39 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 30. 40 Ibid., 32.

28463_Millar.indd 200

2016-12-15 14:02:02



China’s Science and Technology 201

absurdities of Chinese science that Ricci described were based on a misreading of Chinese scientific understanding.41 The Jesuit missionaries gathered and reported on a significant amount of information about Chinese science. Europeans were more aware of Chinese natural philosophy through the translation efforts of Jesuits such as Matteo Ricci than they were of India, for example, which, Adas argues, led them to be especially critical.42 There was certainly nuance in the assessment of China’s science and technology, with particular areas being lauded and others dismissed. Of course, Europeans were extolling the importance of the areas in which they had made the most progress relative to the Chinese. Descriptions of technology varied to a great extent, and reports often praised China’s skill and techniques of production while criticizing their perceived inability to invent. RicciTrigault, for example, claimed that the Chinese had most of the mechanical arts because of the encouragement they received from their abundant raw materials and talent for trading. But even on this topic, the Jesuits criticized the quality of their goods: because “these people are accustomed to live sparingly, the Chinese craftsman does not strive to reach a perfection of workmanship in the object he creates.”43 They denigrated Chinese architecture, painting, music, and instruments for keeping time and measurements. Moderate praise was reserved for Chinese printing (which was necessarily different from European techniques because of the Chinese language). Noting the similarity between European and Chinese tables, chairs, and beds, they concluded, “In the practice of the arts and the crafts we have mentioned, the Chinese are certainly different from all other people, but for the most part their practice of the other arts and sciences is quite the same as our own, despite the great distance that separates them from our civilization.”44 Semedo’s description of Chinese manufactures was kinder than Ricci-Trigault’s, although he also believed that European manufactures and mechanical arts were superior (apart from lacquer goods).45 Already by the end of the seventeenth century, Leibniz succinctly synthesized the Jesuit information in the preface to his Novissima Sinica (1699). He argued that when it came to the industrial and useful arts, the Chinese and Europeans were, “all things considered,” equals and

41 Elman, On Their Own Terms, 117. 42 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 54. 43 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 19. 44 Ibid., 25. 45 Semedo, The history of that great and renowned monarchy of China, 27.

28463_Millar.indd 201

2016-12-15 14:02:02

202

A Singular Case

could learn from each other.46 However, in the speculative or contemplative sciences, particularly in the fields that “are abstracted by the mind from the material,” Europeans are their superiors. The Chinese were superior in “practical philosophy,” referring to ethics and politics. The Chinese held the advantage in one category and the Europeans in another. How, then, to understand the relative importance of these areas? Adas argues that technological achievements were “far less important than scientific advance in shaping European attitudes toward African and Asian societies” because the dramatic changes in production and communication were not evident until the Industrial Revolution.47 However, with particular attention to the Chinese case, contemporary sources did not prioritize either science or technology. In fact, technology was a significant element in descriptions of China. One particular example epitomizes the relevance of Chinese technology as it related to assessing their civilization. Semedo’s chapter on the “nature, wit and inclination” of the Chinese described their ingenious mechanics and manufactures. He argued that although many denigrated the Chinese as barbarians, it was simply not the case, as “the fame and manufactures of China are sufficient to teach …; it being now many years that we have heard the one; and seen the other.”48 As Semedo acknowledged, the first-hand accounts were not the only sources of information on Chinese technology. The nature and extent of Chinese manufactures that notoriously flooded European markets leading to the fad of chinoiserie revealed a great deal about their technology. As Maxine Berg points out, in spite of the criticisms, Chinese manufactured goods “were imported on a significant scale and sought out by merchants and consumers for their quality, diversity, design and adaptability to market and fashion changes, and all of this at affordable prices.”49 She identifies the tension between admiration for Chinese (and Indian) commodities and the “Orientalist descriptions” of the static techniques used to produce them. That these goods were produced with a sophisticated division of labour was largely left out of the traveller accounts.50 Travellers like Le Comte described the mechanics of porcelain manufacturing but not the actual production process. The notable exception was the Jesuit François Xavier d’Entrecolles’s early eighteenth-century description of porcelain production in the 46 Lach, The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica, 68–9. 47 Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 77. 48 Semedo, The history of that great and renowned monarchy of China, 27–8. 49 Berg, “In Pursuit of Luxury,” 108–9. 50 Ibid., 123 and 130.

28463_Millar.indd 202

2016-12-15 14:02:02



China’s Science and Technology 203

Lettres édifiantes (1702–76). D’Entrecolles was in China from 1698 to 1741. He had connections at the court and, as Du Halde pointed out in his repetition of D’Entrecolles’s account, he had Chinese converts who worked as artisans in the porcelain factories at Jingdezhen. In letters from 1712 and 1722, D’Entrecolles described the specialization involved in porcelain manufacturing.51 Building on D’Entrecolles, Du Halde described the factories (which he referred to as “vast pent-houses”) where the labourers worked and lived.52 He described how each piece of China-ware passed through twenty sets of hands before it reached the furnace and perhaps as many as seventy by the time it was complete. Speculating about why profits were lower than in previous times, Du Halde (still relying on D’Entrecolles) argued that provisions were expensive, particularly as local wood sources were exhausted and the profits were divided among too many people. Further, the workmen, he claimed, were not as skilful as they previously had been and the mandarins’ avarice had grown so that they took a larger share of the profits. By the eighteenth century, the mysteries of porcelain production were already starting to be unravelled as European production commenced. By the end of the century, Europeans were less enamoured with Chinese manufactured goods. Chinese manufactures were clearly related to their mechanical arts, and thus it was technology more than science that was connected to impressions of their national wealth. But, if many Enlightenment thinkers recognized the utility of scientific knowledge to the useful and necessary arts, how did they reconcile China’s relatively advanced manufactures with its backward science? A large part of the explanation was China’s ability to imitate. Le Comte argued the Chinese were better at manufactures and the mechanical arts (although not as good as Europeans) than science,53 emphasizing the view that they were better imitators than inventors. The Chinese imitated European glass, watches, pistols, and bombs. While he did acknowledge China’s three major inventions (gunpowder, printing, and the compass), these were not sufficient to continue to label them admirable inventors because they had not been 51 D’Entrecolle’s description travelled into several important European commercial dictionaries including the Encyclopédie. But even with acknowledgment of the division of labour, Europeans did not believe the production was based on principles (i.e., not connected to science). Ibid., 122. Sullivan, The Arts of China, 264. 52 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 338–53; Watts edition, 2: 334–80; French edition, 2: 177–205. 53 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 231; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 1: 382–3. Navarrete also argued the Chinese were better at imitation. Churchill, A collection of voyages and Travels, 1: 58.

28463_Millar.indd 203

2016-12-15 14:02:02

204

A Singular Case

improved upon for many years. Du Halde’s analysis of China in the eighteenth century confirmed the view that Chinese inventions were “not so good as that of [European] Mechanicks,” but he also argued “they can imitate exactly enough any pattern that is brought them out of Europe.”54 Imitation was seen to bypass the relationship between underlying scientific principles and technological advancement; consequently there were fewer opportunities for improvement. Even Anson’s critique of China’s science and technology, according to Adas a watershed moment, offered little more scathing analysis than the Jesuits already had. The commodore knew nothing of their sciences and his criticism of China’s manufacturing abilities was not unique. In fact, at one point he even praised the Chinese as “a very ingenious and industrious people,” which he claimed was demonstrated by the “great number of curious manufactures which are established amongst them, and which are eagerly sought for by the most distant nations.”55 Nonetheless, their skill in the handicraft arts is “of a second rate kind”; their manufactures were inferior compared to similar goods made in Japan and in many areas “incapable of rivalling the mechanic dexterity of the Europeans.” Anson concluded that China’s “principal excellency seems to be imitation and they accordingly labour under that poverty of genius, which constantly attends all servile imitators.” He later attacked their ability to imitate European clocks, watches, and firearms because they could not understand the whole product (or the underlying principles behind the manufactured goods).56 Even those who praised elements of Chinese technology criticized the supposed limits to improvement due to the detachment from underlying scientific principles. When describing China’s “learning, arts, sciences, languages, &c.,” the editors of the modern part of An universal history (1759) argued for a middle ground in reports, concluding the missionaries praised the Chinese too much whereas other writers “unjustly undervalued” them.57 They agreed that Europeans were superior in the “liberal sciences.” They reflected the nuance present in the first-hand accounts and reserved some praise for Chinese manufactures. Following Anson, they noted Chinese lacquer-ware was not as good as that of Japan, and the porcelain was of a lower quality than that recently produced in 54 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 277; Watts edition, 2: 124; French edition, 2: 72. 55 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 411. 56 Ibid., 412. 57 The modern part of an universal history, 8: 179. See chapter 1 for more on the editors of this work and the difficulty of disentangling their contributions.

28463_Millar.indd 204

2016-12-15 14:02:02



China’s Science and Technology 205

Saxony. One area that received consistent praise was China’s advanced agricultural practice (particularly with regard to fertilizers and irrigation techniques), which they argued exceeded Europe.58 Indeed, descriptions of China often pointed to the extensive cultivation of the land, including the difficult mountain regions. This cultivation was supported by the comprehensive irrigation and transportation provided by the canal systems. Le Comte, describing the wonder of China’s canals, remarked that it is hard to believe “that men so ignorant in the principles of physicks, and the art of levelling, could bring such a work as that to perfection.”59 Describing the movement between locks, Le Comte noted that the Chinese relied on brute force rather than advanced technology. Du Halde provided more detailed technical information about Chinese agricultural practices. Like others, he described the tremendous labour involved. The attention given to agriculture in China, he observed, was enabled by the prioritization of husbandmen over mechanics and merchants, a point Smith would later return to.60 The famed ploughing ceremony by the emperor in spring, described in most traveller accounts, demonstrated the depth of this esteem for agriculture. The Chinese, Du Halde argued, were obsessed with what was useful and therefore committed to farming food rather than wasting vast tracts of land on the cultivation of wine (as was said to take place in France). Of course, dedication was not the only factor helping Chinese agriculture. He described particular Chinese techniques such as mixing lime in the water to act as a fertilizer and insecticide and the use of buffaloes to pull ploughs. He even noted their use of a hydraulic engine to move water for their mountain terraces, although he described the machine as “of a very simple kind.” Poivre, who was inclined toward Physiocratic thought, should have been the traveller to produce the most detailed information on China’s agricultural practices. He described the immense number of inhabitants in the empire and then questioned if “the Chinese possess any secret of multiplying the grain and provisions necessary for the nourishment of mankind?”61 Yet his observations of their practices of manuring, ploughing, and sowing led him to believe that the advantage stemmed not from technological superiority or agricultural scientific knowledge, but rather from the hard labour committed to agriculture as a result of cultural 58 Ibid., 243–4 and 9–10. 59 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 105–6; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 1: 183. 60 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 1: 272; Watts edition, 2: 108; French edition, 2: 64. 61 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 133; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 108.

28463_Millar.indd 205

2016-12-15 14:02:02

206

A Singular Case

norms. There were, of course, other differences from European agriculture – for example, the use of urine as fertilizer, the use of canals for irrigation, and the creation of terraces to cultivate even steep mountain terrain – but he argued these practices only necessitated hard labour and perhaps the use of “a simple portable machine.” Poivre concluded, “agriculture flourishes in China more than in any other nation in the world: yet it is not to any process peculiar to their labour, it is not to the form of their plough, or their method of sowing, that this happy state, and the abundance attendant on it, is to be attributed”; instead it was promoted by the form of their government and the labour of their people.62 While he argued that Europeans could learn from China’s dedication to agriculture, there was no discussion of what Europeans could learn from its agricultural technology or science. While it may not have always (or even often) trickled down to the average farmer, eighteenth-century Europe witnessed a growth in scientific interest in agriculture.63 The editors of An universal history highlighted the lack of such a connection between the high sciences and agricultural practices in China. In a section generally praising China’s agricultural practices, they commented, in a footnote, on the potential for China to improve even further: “if those who wrote on the subject of agriculture among them, had been more versed in physics and natural philosophy, they might have still made much greater improvements in that so useful and necessary art.”64 The editors clearly believed in the relationship between natural philosophy (or science) and the useful arts (or technology). China’s agriculture, along with its manufactures, was seen as being held back by its lack of scientific spirit. The editors of An universal history also addressed the declining rate of scientific advancement in China. They recognized China’s early inventions such as gunpowder, but like Salmon who observed that the Chinese never made the best use of the compass, they claimed the Chinese used gunpowder mostly for fireworks. They compared this to the Europeans who only recently received scientific knowledge from the Greeks and Romans and “have so far outstripped not only them, but the Chinese, within the compass of two or three centuries.”65 Thus, they too concluded that while China may have developed earlier, it became stagnant while Europe rapidly progressed. As Rousselot de Surgy argued in his Mélanges intéressans, the Chinese had what was necessary for life but no 62 Poivre, The travels of a philosopher, 150; Poivre, Voyages d’un philosophe, 120–1. 63 Fussell, “Science and Practice in Eighteenth-Century British Agriculture.” 64 Ibid., 217. 65 Ibid., 152 and 179.

28463_Millar.indd 206

2016-12-15 14:02:03



China’s Science and Technology 207

more. While their industry and imitation were sufficient, their capacity for invention was not comparable to the Europeans, and they naturally reached a ceiling of development.66 Mendoza’s praise of Chinese inventions in the sixteenth century was untenable by the eighteenth century. On the whole, China’s manufactures and mechanical arts received moderate praise, while their advancements in the speculative sciences were almost entirely dismissed (with a few minor exceptions). French and British commentators highlighted their own superiority in particular fields like astronomy where Europeans were making dramatic advances, while downplaying the importance of areas such as agricultural technologies where China was equal or ahead. Their assessments were also most frequently given in direct comparison to Europe. When China was compared to other places, their science and technology were discussed more positively. For example, when Voltaire described Chinese instruments, he argued they were not as good as European instruments, but they were much better than those from the rest of Asia.67 Europeans also acknowledged China’s invention of the compass, printing, and gunpowder, but commented on their lack of improvement, indicating Chinese stagnation. The puzzling question for Europeans was why. E u r o p e a n E x p l a n at i o n s f o r C h i n e s e “ S ta g n at i o n ” Joseph Needham famously formulated a puzzle about Chinese science in the 1950s and 1960s: why, when China had once led the world in science (which itself was a revisionist view in Needham’s era), did it eventually fall behind the West?68 Needham’s puzzle has encouraged continuing research on the progression of Chinese science and technology; however, this was not the first time in history that someone from the West had wondered about the relative stagnation of Chinese science. Europeans during the Enlightenment asked why an advanced civilization such as China, which had a much longer history than Europe, had fallen behind

66 Later he argued that even their imitations were not flawless. Rousselot de Surgy, Mélanges intéressans, 5: 62 and 104. For de Surgy’s influence on Quesnay, see Maverick, China, a Model for Europe, 190. 67 Ibid. 68 Some, such as Francesca Bray, argue that the Needham question is problematic for imposing modern values and categories anachronistically and for being framed as a negative (i.e., what went wrong?) rather than understanding technology’s individual role in Chinese history. Bray, “Towards a Critical History of Non-Western Technology,” in Brook and Blue, China and Historical Capitalism, 163.

28463_Millar.indd 207

2016-12-15 14:02:03

208

A Singular Case

in these areas. The root causes of the problem spoke very much to the potential (or lack thereof) of China to change and progress. The Chinese, Le Comte argued, lacked a “spirit of penetration and nicety, so necessary to those who addict themselves to the research of nature.”69 That they lacked this “spirit of penetration” was in part attributed to the Chinese tendency to look to the past, to tradition, rather than forward to the future. This depiction of the Chinese character was contrasted with that of Europeans as motivated by a progressive outlook. Unless, as Du Halde commented, the Manchu disposition altered the Chinese norm (unlikely since in China’s history the conquerors eventually assimilated to the conquered), the development of Chinese sciences would continue to be hindered by their character. The resort to lambasting the Chinese character, however, was recognized as vague and was transformed into a critique of China’s government and, most importantly, its education system. China’s bureaucratic structure of rewarding members of society based on an examination system that prioritized Confucian learning, it was argued, had limited the possibility for education in other areas. Its civil service system was a culturally and historically embedded part of Chinese society. On the other hand, as Rachel Ramsey points out, the Chinese education system was radically different from the patronage system and limited bureaucracy that existed in England,70 and first-hand accounts described the benefits of the Chinese system. For instance, the system fought the potential regionalism that existed in the immense empire and allowed for a dream of social mobility. However, the Chinese education system was largely believed to act against scientific advancement rather than promote it. The role of Chinese education in hindering science was already being debated in the sixteenth century, a debate once again reflected in the disagreement between Mendoza and Román. Based on de Rada’s account and an assessment of Chinese printed books on the sciences, Román argued that their education system excluded proper instruction in the sciences.71 Mendoza maintained that the Chinese education system included areas other than moral philosophy and described how the

69 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 221; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 357. 70 Ramsey, “China and the Ideal of Order in John Webb’s An History Essay,” 499. Ramsey also points out the recent research by Benjamin Elman that demonstrates that China was not a true meritocratic system. For more, see Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China, 248. 71 For de Rada’s original description, see Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, 295–6. For more on Román’s account, see Rubiés, “The Concept of Gentile Civilization in Missionary Discourse and Its European Reception,” 338.

28463_Millar.indd 208

2016-12-15 14:02:03



China’s Science and Technology 209

emperor paid for colleges in every city where students were taught literacy and arithmetic, and “studie naturall or morall philosophie, astrologie, lawes of the countrie, or any other curious science.”72 The critique of China’s education system having a negative impact on development of the sciences began in earnest with Ricci-Trigault. In a  section “Concerning the Liberal Arts, the Sciences, and the Use of Academic Degrees Among the Chinese,” Ricci-Trigault pointed out discrepancies between various reports about Chinese education, particularly with regard to its universality, noting there were no publically financed education institutions. Like Mendoza, they acknowledged other fields of interest, but they left no doubt that moral philosophy dominated. They admitted that there were specialist exams for different fields such as the military, mathematics, and medicine; however, mandarins who specialized in moral philosophy assessed these exams, which they considered an  “inefficient method.”73 As more detailed information about China spread, it was established that the education system elevated moral philosophy far above medicine or mathematics. The most serious problem identified was not that courses on other subjects were unavailable but that the prestige associated with philosophy was much higher than in other areas. Someone would study such areas as mathematics or medicine only if their family affairs or “mediocrity of talent” forced them to do so. In contrast, Ricci-Trigault claimed that students were attracted to moral philosophy “by the hope of the glory and rewards attached to it.”74 The Jesuits recognized China’s relatively sophisticated higher education system and networks of learning. In a letter on the “character of the wit and temper of the Chineses,” Le Comte noted the empire’s numerous libraries, universities, doctors, and observatories. One would assume from these institutions that the Chinese would be “perfectly well verst in all sorts of sciences, that they have a vast reach, invention, and a genius for every thing.” However, even though they have rewarded the learned for four thousand years, he concluded, “they have not had one single man, of great achievements in the speculative science: they have discovered all these precious mines, without troubling themselves to dig for them.”75 The Chinese were fond of education, just not the kind that promoted speculative sciences. The argument that there were no incentives to study science and no significant learned figures in the field increased in prominence in the 72 Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, 97 and 122. 73 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 41. 74 Ibid., 32. 75 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 221; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 1: 356.

28463_Millar.indd 209

2016-12-15 14:02:03

210

A Singular Case

eighteenth century. In China, Du Halde claimed, there were neither great men of speculative science to admire nor any encouragement to move forward. A major hindrance, even for those who might make promising advances, was the lack of incentives – “no reward to expect for their labour.”76 Du Halde saw no financial or honorific benefit to applying oneself to the speculative sciences. Rousselot de Surgy added that this was made worse by the well-known “fact” that the Chinese were motivated by financial reward (as discussed in chapter 2). As a result, he was not surprised that the Chinese studied only what was most practical for career advancement.77 Confucian moral philosophy was recognized as a fundamental pillar of the Chinese system of political economy, meaning that significant shifts would be required to suddenly prioritize the development of scientific fields of inquiry. Why would the Chinese education system have evolved in such a way? Here we find a complementary explanation; according to some Enlightenment thinkers (and modern economic historians) geography was an important contributing factor. Whereas European scientific and technological innovation progressed in part due to competition between countries, China could maintain its supposed arrogance because it was not exposed to competitors on a regional level; it was geographically isolated. Economic historians, too, have argued that competition helps explain the high levels of innovation in Britain and, for some, Europe more widely. As David Landes argued many years ago, European science and technology benefited from the division of the continent into nationstates rather than a large, united empire. He held that “science was an asset of state” in this competition.78 More recently, economic historians have struck more of a balance. For example, Rosenthal and Wong argue, “the economic advantages to be realized from competing states came late and were unintended.”79 They agree that competition helps explain the adoption of capital-intensive methods of production in Britain but also acknowledge that the costs of political competition have also been very high. War was destructive. Ricci-Trigault observed China in a moment when it was only beginning to learn about European science and technology and argued that the Chinese were primitive in the arts because they had limited contact 76 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 2: 124; Watts edition, 3: 64; French edition, 3: 264. 77 Rousselot de Surgy, Mélanges intéressans, 5: 37–8. 78 Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, 31. See also Pattberg, “Conquest, Domination and Control,” 9. 79 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond Divergence, 217 and 229.

28463_Millar.indd 210

2016-12-15 14:02:03



China’s Science and Technology 211

with foreign nations, “which would undoubtedly have been most helpful to them in making progress in this respect.”80 Of course, this assessment provided a perfect opening for the Jesuits to act as the intermediaries between the Chinese and advanced European knowledge. But problematically, as Le Comte later asserted, their isolation led the Chinese to believe they were “the most intelligent nation in the world.”81 By the eighteenth century, Du Halde agreed: the central reason for the low level of China’s speculative sciences was that “there is nothing within or without the Empire to stir up their emulation.”82 Du Halde believed that states could encourage each other to improve their sciences through competition. In 1727, Salmon, drawing on Ricci-Trigault, observed that the Chinese were ingenious and explained their weakness in the speculative sciences as due to their separation “so far from the rest of the learned world, and conversing with none but people so much inferior to themselves.”83 Salmon added his own arguments about the implications of being geographically removed from other advanced civilizations: “There cannot be a greater misfortune happen to any man or nation, than the being instructed only in one set of notions, and never meeting with opposition or contradiction.” In fact, considering that China was obviously the superior civilization in Asia, it was quite remarkable and showed “a wonderful tractable disposition that they should submit to be taught and instructed by the Europeans.” To Salmon, the willingness of the Chinese to learn from the Jesuits indicated their ingenuity and offered hope that they could improve their science and technology. After his travels with Anson, Salmon shifted his position and blamed a lack of scientific progress in China on the character of the Chinese people.84 The editors of The modern part of an universal history made similar arguments similar to Salmon’s in his earlier geography, Modern History. They cited the Jesuits to support their view that the state of science in China could not be explained by a “want of genius and capacity.” They accepted the geographical explanation, noting that the Chinese were “debarred the benefit of travelling and corresponding with other learned nations of the world; so that, all things considered, it ought to be rather

80 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 22. Magalhães also blamed China’s isolation for hindering their science and technology. Magalhães, A new history of China, 88. 81 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 220; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 356. 82 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 2: 124; Watts edition, 3: 64; French edition, 3: 264. 83 Salmon, Modern History, 1: 21. 84 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 412; Salmon, The Universal Traveller, 1: 21.

28463_Millar.indd 211

2016-12-15 14:02:03

212

A Singular Case

a wonder that they had made so great a progress.”85 They addressed an important element of the isolation. Unlike Salmon, who saw China’s geographic limits as unfortunate, the editors of An universal history pointed to the official prohibition on free foreign travel. In their view, the Chinese state, not just its natural situation, must shoulder part of the blame for isolation. Still, like the younger Salmon, they offered hope for improvement, commending the Chinese for accepting to be taught “by a people of whom they had scarcely heard before.” If China’s supposed stagnation in the sciences was attributed to their geographic isolation, the editors proposed this could be remedied by greater interaction with the civilized Europeans. This argument, a useful one for the Jesuits who were actively involved in Chinese science in the capital, offered the possibility for improvement in science and technology. The state, however, must cooperate. The central question for European observers was whether the Chinese were actually willing to learn from foreigners. Early accounts by Jesuits such as Semedo indicated the Chinese were not only willing but excellent absorbers of European knowledge.86 Ricci-Trigault reported that the Chinese “possess the ingenuous trait of preferring that which comes from without to that which they possess themselves, once they realize the superior quality of the foreign product.”87 When the Chinese were proven wrong, they could admit it and learn from their mistakes. In fact, they concluded, “their pride, it would seem, arises from an ignorance of the existence of higher things and from the fact that they find themselves far superior to the barbarous nations by which they are surrounded.” This characterization was supported by knowledge of the role that Muslim astronomers had played in Chinese history. Marco Polo described the astrologers of “Kanabalu” [Beijing] as “Christians, Saracens, and Cathaians,” who used astronomical instruments “likely introduced by the Muslims.”88 The view of Chinese openness to foreign ideas fluctuated, as did the fate of the missionaries stationed in China, over the early modern period. Du Halde offered an example of China’s stubbornness when he ­described the response of the Chinese mandarins to Verbiest’s demonstration of the inaccuracies of their calendar: “The Mandarins … could not bear with patience that the Chinese astronomy should be abolish’d, and that of Europe introduced.” The Chinese, according to Du Halde, 85 The modern part of an universal history, 8: 180. 86 Semedo, The history of that great and renowned monarchy of China, 242. 87 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 22. 88 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, 133.

28463_Millar.indd 212

2016-12-15 14:02:03



China’s Science and Technology 213

concluded it was better to follow a somewhat defective calendar than to  reform it.89 He noted, however, that during the Qing Dynasty the Manchu mandarins did not share the Ming Chinese unwillingness to learn from the foreigners, and wanted to work with the missionaries, perhaps a result of their lack of connection to Chinese history. This indicated that there might be hope for a shift in attitudes toward science along with the dynastic change. It is important to point out the different approaches to science and technology within China, in particular between the Ming and the Qing as well as among the Chinese literati. Elman notes that during the Ming Dynasty, some Chinese literati considered morality more important than formal knowledge, while others disagreed and promoted scientific inquiry.90 Although the “increasing commercialization” during the late Ming period caused anxiety among the more conservative literati, Elman has challenged the idea that the Chinese were not open to European sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.91 A tradition of interest in natural phenomena had been revived in the sixteenth century, before the arrival of the Europeans, and led the Chinese to accept some European knowledge in both periods.92 For example, there was an important connection between Qing empire building and Jesuit surveying techniques, an area in which the Chinese recognized a need for European scientific practices.93 After the Manchu Dynasty took Taiwan, the emperors shifted their focus from sea to land. They studied the Chinese borders with Russia and the Zunghars in Central Asia. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Manchu had more than doubled the size of Ming China. Elman argues that while Chinese scholars could not reconceptualize foreign lands because they lacked Newtownian mechanics, they did “combine evidential research methods with data collection and organization to make new advances.”94 Thus, the Chinese achieved geographical knowledge locally through adoption of European practices. Still, some acceptance does not mean they would prioritize European knowledge over their own goals. For example, as Elman argues, there

89 Du Halde, A description of the empire of China, Cave edition, 2: 137; Watts edition, 3: 105; French edition, 2: 287. 90 Elman, A Cultural History of Modern Science in China, 15. 91 Elman, On Their Own Terms, xxxii. 92 Elman, A Cultural History of Modern Science in China, 25. 93 Ibid., 44. See also Perdue, “Boundaries, Maps, and Movement” and Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise. 94 Elman, A Cultural History of Modern Science in China, 49.

28463_Millar.indd 213

2016-12-15 14:02:03

214

A Singular Case

was “no domestic incentive to go beyond the immediate needs of the Qing calendar.”95 Denis Diderot, in his Encyclopédie article on the philosophy of the Chinese, built on the conflicting Jesuit reports about the volatile nature of Chinese openness to foreign science. He described how the Kangxi Emperor learned science, philosophy, mathematics, anatomy, astronomy, and mechanics from the Jesuits. However, Kangxi’s son, the Yongzheng Emperor, did not follow his father in this regard. Clearly, attitudes fluctuated not only between dynasties but also between emperors. More fundamentally, Diderot disagreed with the view that Chinese openness to learn from the Jesuits was a positive trait. He argued that the high estimation in which the Chinese held the Jesuits (who were not scientific experts) was evidence of China’s lack of knowledge of mechanics, astronomy, and mathematics.96 Indeed, Diderot, directly citing Le Comte, offered a much more scathing explanation for what he saw as China’s lack of progress in the sciences. Recognizing the view that China’s isolation was, at least in part, to blame, Diderot argued that if they had been better men, their philosophers would have broken any barriers to learning; they would have been unable to stay still. Building on Montesquieu’s assessment of “Laws in Relation to the Nature of the Climate,” Diderot held that the general spirit of the East was quiet and lazy; they were more interested in preserving what was already established, especially when compared to the West. Diderot forcefully maintained that the Chinese could have overcome their isolation had it been in their character. Instead, a uniform government with durable laws drove China to stagnation. While this was stabilizing for government, the sciences and arts require “a curiosity that never tires of searching.” Because China lacked this curiosity, even though it was an older civilization, Europe overtook it. Geography, then, was not to blame for Chinese isolation. Instead Diderot pointed to something innate in the Chinese character. As mentioned at the start of the chapter, Voltaire was critical of Chinese scientific accomplishments. In the Essai sur les moeurs (1756), he explained the different abilities of the Chinese: “It seems as if nature had given to this species of men, so different from ours, organs formed for discovering all at once whatever was necessary for them, and incapable of going any further.”97 J.G.A. Pocock assigned Voltaire’s dismissal of 95 Ibid., 39. 96 Diderot, “Chinois, Philosophie des” in Diderot and D’Alembert, Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 3: 347. 97 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, 1: 16; Voltaire, “Essai sur les moeurs,” 78.

28463_Millar.indd 214

2016-12-15 14:02:03



China’s Science and Technology 215

Chinese science to a racial dimension in his work.98 He situates Voltaire’s discussion of Chinese science within an internalist agenda. However, Pocock’s analysis reveals some of the problems associated with deep reading relating to Voltaire’s own agenda. It is more enlightening to see  how Voltaire’s description related to existing knowledge of China. Voltaire did not leave the explanation for China’s weak sciences at their different “organs.” He offered two more direct explanations, pointing away from race as an explanation. First, he blamed the immense cultural “respect they have for whatever has been transmitted to them by their ancestors”; thus, they did not question ancient knowledge in order to move it forward. By the time of writing the Philosophical Dictionary (1764), Voltaire strengthened his view that China’s lengthy history and reverence for tradition was a significant impediment to their progress.99 The Chinese were disposed to look back to tradition in contrast to Enlightenment priorities to move beyond the knowledge of the ancients. Second, Voltaire pointed to “the nature of their [written] language, the first principle of all human knowledge,” which he described as difficult to communicate with and very time consuming to learn.100 Speculations about the effects of China’s written language on scientific developments began in the sixteenth century. De Rada argued that their system of characters was “barbarous and difficult” and although he discussed science immediately after this, he did not directly connect the two. Others such as da Cruz took a more positive approach, noting the ability of people of different dialects to communicate through written language.101 Mendoza had a lengthy section on writing and education, admitting that it required a great deal of time to master and that “it is  a  kinde of language that is better understood in writing then in speaking.”102 Ricci-Trigault first speculated that China’s scientific development was hindered by their complex language. The Jesuits agreed with Mendoza that there were frequent misunderstandings in conversations, adding that spoken Chinese was the most “equivocal” language.103 In a section  98 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, 115–16.  99 Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 83; Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique, 151. 100 Voltaire, An essay on universal history, 1: 17; Voltaire, “Essai sur les moeurs,” 78–9. Early modern European debates about the Chinese language were extensive. They related to issues of chronology, history, and religion. However, this section focuses on the issue of language as it related to the development of science and technology. 101 Boxer, South China in the Sixteenth Century, (de Rada, 295), (da Cruz, 162). 102 Mendoza, The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, 121. 103 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 28 and 29.

28463_Millar.indd 215

2016-12-15 14:02:03

216

A Singular Case

on the sciences and academics, Ricci-Trigault argued that learning the language (particularly in its written form) consumed a great deal of time “that might have been spent in the acquisition of more profitable knowledge.” Nonetheless, China’s written language had the advantage of allowing different nations in the region to communicate with each other. Porter offers a helpful contextualization of Chinese language in the turmoil of seventeenth-century Europe. Europeans saw in China’s written language order and peace, particularly for its continuity over space and time.104 They identified a trade off: the written language offered moral advantages because of the necessary commitment to studying, but it was an impediment to the flourishing of the sciences. Thus, on balance, these early observers admired this “social institution of writing” for the order it helped create105 At the end of the seventeenth century, two important China Jesuits publicly disagreed about the Chinese language. Gabriel de Magalhães, who lived in China from 1640 until his death in 1677, argued that because the language was learned by memory and had a relatively small vocabulary, it took only one year to grasp, thus making it easier to learn than Greek or Latin. He therefore concluded that it was not responsible for the stagnation of the Chinese sciences.106 He cited as further evidence the numerous books authored by the Jesuits in Chinese that indicated the ease of learning the language. Eight years later Le Comte’s description of China explicitly challenged Magalhães’s claim: “I cannot tell whether some missionaries had not better have labour’d in the mines than to have apply’d themselves for several years to this labour, one of the hardest and most discouraging that one can experience in matter of study.”107 Driven in part by his own exasperation with the language, he questioned Magalhães’s claim that Chinese was easier to learn than all the languages in Europe. Following Ricci-Trigault, Le Comte saw a direct connection between China’s weakness in science and its language. The Chinese, he argued, spent a great deal of their time studying Chinese characters, not leaving any time for other scientific enquiries. Education in China was defined by literacy, not by more esoteric pursuits. Learning Chinese characters, he added, was not a good use of time because it was a mindless activity, unlike “the sciences of Europe, which, in fatiguing,

104 Porter, Ideographia, 18. 105 Ibid., 39. 106 Magalhães, A new history of China, 77–8; translated accurately from the French. See Magalhães, Nouvelle relation de la Chine, 97. 107 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 182; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 300.

28463_Millar.indd 216

2016-12-15 14:02:03



China’s Science and Technology 217

do not cease to captivate the spirit with delight.”108 Porter is correct in holding that Le Comte set the tone for eighteenth-century attitudes to Chinese writing by pointing out the difficulties of learning to write and claiming the system had no redeeming qualities.109 By the time of Anson’s account in 1748, two widely read Jesuits reports by Ricci-Trigault and Le Comte had already put forth the argument that China’s language hindered its science.110 Anson followed them, proclaiming that the written Chinese language was “too great for human memory.” This explanation, however, did not account for the early inventions and advances of the Chinese, of which Europeans were well aware, and therefore could not be the only factor explaining scientific progress (or lack thereof). Anson attended to this criticism, adding that the written Chinese language inhibited the transmission of information over space and time (what Mokyr would refer to as increasing the access costs of knowledge transfer).111 When it came to language and Chinese science and technology, there could be progress, stagnation, or regression over time. The Chinese language might allow for bursts of invention, he maintained, but it lacked the ability to sustain these efflorescences. If, as these descriptions argued, a major explanation for the lack of scientific and technological advance was linguistic, then there was little hope for improvement. Unless the Chinese completely reconstructed their language and created an alphabet, a great amount of time would always be spent in the study of the written language. Popular geographies like The modern part of an universal history and philosophers such as Voltaire and Raynal mentioned the role of language in hindering the progress of the sciences, but none relied on it as the sole or even primary explanation for China’s stagnation. More importantly, for Voltaire, Chinese supposed failings in science, while certainly concerning, were far outweighed by their superior abilities in moral philosophy. He did not, as Adas argues, view science as the distinguishing feature of an admirable civilization. Voltaire’s comments 108 Le Comte, Memoirs and Observations, 188; Le Comte, Nouveaux mémoires, 2: 309. 109 Porter, Ideographia, 73. 110 Not all Jesuits believed the Chinese language was a hindrance. For example, the Jesuit Dominique Parrenin rejected the suggestion by Jean Baptiste Dortours de Mairan, the director of the Académie des sciences, that language explained China’s lack of scientific progress. Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men, 85. Patrick O’Brien has pointed out that most historians now agree that the Chinese language was not an impediment to the advancement of abstract science and technology. O’Brien, “The Needham Question Updated.” 111 Anson, A Voyage round the world, 413.

28463_Millar.indd 217

2016-12-15 14:02:03

218

A Singular Case

on the “necessary arts of life” demonstrate his nuanced view: “But it is possible to be a very bad natural philosopher, and at the same time an excellent moralist. It is, in fact, in morality, in political economy, in agriculture, in the necessary arts of life, that the Chinese have made such advances towards perfection. All the rest they have been taught by us: in these we might well submit to become their disciples.”112 To Voltaire, morality, political economy, and agriculture were the “necessary arts of life.” As Peter Jimack has argued, Voltaire’s discussion of China influenced Raynal’s chapter on the Middle Kingdom in the first two editions of Histoire des deux Indes (1770 and 1774).113 Like other philosophers, Raynal acknowledged that in China “improvements” based on complicated theories were not as advanced as one would expect from an ancient, active, and hardworking people.114 However, he believed “this riddle is not inexplicable” and offered several explanations for the relative stagnation of the Chinese sciences. First, he turned to the Chinese language, which “requires a long and laborious study,” and to their rites and ceremonies, which occupy a person’s life and memory. Next, the Chinese were “too much taken up in the pursuit of what is useful, they have no opportunity of launching out into the extensive regions of imagination.” Finally, the Chinese had “an excessive, veneration for antiquity, [which made] them the slaves of whatever is established.” He concluded that it took the Chinese centuries to bring anything to perfection; thus, descriptions of China’s arts and sciences from Marco Polo’s time were not dramatically different from accounts of the eighteenth century. In the 1774 edition of Histoire des deux Indes, Raynal added another paragraph explaining “the low state of learning, and the fine arts in China,” which he attributed to “the very perfection of its government.”115 He granted that the Chinese system prioritized the study of law above all else and hence, learning concentrated on the regulation of manners and the public welfare. However, he went further in explaining the focus 112 Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 83; Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique, 151. For “natural philosopher” Voltaire used the term “physician.” 113 As discussed in chapter 1, Raynal is the likely author of chapter 20 on China in the 1770 and 1774 editions, while Diderot authored the second, more negative view of China, in the 1780 edition. This book focuses on the first two editions. For more, see Jimack, A History of the Two Indies, 9. 114 Raynal, A philosphical and political history, 1: 103; Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 113. Present in all editions. 115 Raynal, A philosphical and political history, 1: 104; Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique, 113. In the original French he referred to “l’imperfection des letters & des beauxarts” and used the word “science” to refer to the time it takes an individual to “understand” the duties he owes to the public.

28463_Millar.indd 218

2016-12-15 14:02:03



China’s Science and Technology 219

of the Chinese education system. China’s unique political economy led to it be “exceedingly populous, and [require] a constant attention in its learned members to make subsistence keep an equal pace with population.” As a result of this focus, “the speculative and ornamental parts of science cannot be expected to arrive at that height of splendor they have attained in Europe.” Raynal did not believe that the sciences had a direct impact on maintaining the subsistence of the country. He concluded that the Chinese learned the arts of luxury and vanity from the Europeans, but were superior to Europeans in the science of good government, or “the study how to increase, not how to diminish the number of inhabitants.” Raynal thus formulated a choice between good political economy and scientific advancement, and believed that the Chinese had selected correctly, connecting his view of China to that of Leibniz one century earlier. There was a host of different explanations for China’s scientific weakness. From language to geography to its character or education and, even more broadly, to the goals of its society, thinkers grappled then, as they do today, to understand the nature of scientific inquiry in Ming and Qing China. Some commentators chose to point out several of these factors, while others tried to narrow down their argument to a central issue such as Chinese isolation. What is interesting for our purposes is to contemplate the unique implications of each explanation for China’s progress. For example, if isolation was the problem, this could be easily remedied. If the character of the state or the people was the issue, this would be harder to change. Some scholars, such as Adam Smith, did not address China’s science and technology directly. He mentioned China’s prioritization of the agricultural labourer over the artificer, compared to Europe where the condition of the artificer was superior to that of the labourer.116 In Europe, yeomen “are regarded as an inferior rank of people, even to the better sort of tradesmen and mechanics, … and to the great merchants and master manufacturers.”117 The difference, for Smith, resulted from China’s elevation of agriculture, and indicated its lack of attention to inventing and developing products; but he never discussed this directly in relation to stagnation. As we will see, Smith had different explanations for China’s stationary status. Shortly after the period we focus on in this book, a new perspective was put forth that is worth mentioning. Geroge Staunton, who was on

116 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 31. 117 Ibid., 501.

28463_Millar.indd 219

2016-12-15 14:02:03

220

A Singular Case

George Macartney’s famed 1792–93 British mission to China, published his thoughts as An Authentic Account of an Embassy to China (1797). The Chinese, according to Staunton, focused too much on morals and literature over military concerns; by the end of the eighteenth century, this was hardly an original observation. Staunton, however, did make an interesting contribution to understanding Chinese science. He attributed what he saw as a low level of science and literature to the lack of a “leisure class.” This view differs from the earlier perspectives that saw elite education in China focusing on morals rather than military or scientific learning. Conclusion Early modern European observers of China concluded that, on the whole, China lagged behind Europe in science and technology. While they praised China’s manufacturing capabilities, they lambasted its ­scientific knowledge. The perceived scientific and technological gap ­between Europe and China increased from Mendoza’s praise in the sixteenth century to the criticism of Le Comte and Leibniz in the seventeenth century. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the negative descriptions remained relatively stable. First-hand observers expressed some optimism in their reports that China might be willing to learn from the Europeans. Nonetheless, considering their early invention of printing, gunpowder, and the compass, it was evident to the Europeans that Chinese science had stagnated. Voltaire grew increasingly critical of China’s science, but even in his earlier writings he disparaged the Chinese for what he saw as their lack of progress in science. In his dedication of L’Orphelin de la Chine (1755) to his friend the statesman, soldier, and member of the Académie française, Le duc de Richelieu, Voltaire noted, “The Chinese, like the other Asiatics, have stopt at the first elements of poetry, eloquence, physicks, astronomy, painting, known by them so long before us. They began all things so much sooner than all other people, never afterwards to make any progress in them.”118 European confidence stemmed from their advancement on the knowledge of the ancients. Their assessment of Chinese science was less concerned with what the Chinese had achieved and more focused on their potential for further improvement. The most important elements of assessing science were the trajectory

118 Voltaire, The Orphan of China, xi–xii; Voltaire, L’Orphelin de la Chine, 6.

28463_Millar.indd 220

2016-12-15 14:02:03



China’s Science and Technology 221

and speed of knowledge accumulation. On this front, in the estimation of European observers, the Chinese were clearly lacking. If China’s limitations stemmed from intrinsic qualities like their system of writing or their character, then scientific progress was unlikely and limits to China’s advancement were clearly in place. However, for many commentators, China’s central hindrance was its relative isolation from other civilized nations, in which case a greater openness to learning from Europeans would help remedy the problem. Raynal argued that focusing on science would limit their ability to maintain or increase their population, but for most others, if the Chinese could advance in the speculative sciences, they would certainly improve in the mechanical arts and arguably other areas like agriculture. European observers did not yet know of Schumpeterian intensive growth based on innovation119 but, nonetheless, the overall consensus was that science and technology were increasingly important determinants of progress and the Chinese needed to act quickly to remedy their significant flaws in these areas.

119 Named after Joseph Schumpeter, a twentieth-century economist, Schumpeterian growth refers to the “creative destruction” of improving innovations that displace previous technologies and sustain economic growth.

28463_Millar.indd 221

2016-12-15 14:02:03

Conclusion

Prospects for the “Stationary State”

The Enlightenment is often characterized by the formation of sweeping social theories that created the foundations for modern social sciences. This study has uncovered the challenge that China’s exceptionality posed to Europe’s political economists in the eighteenth century. Acknowledging China as a singular case reflects Enlightenment thinkers’ openness to learning and adapting their theories. Today, economists are more dogmatic, and yet the rise of China continues to pose a serious problem to theoretical frameworks, including new institutional economics. In 2003, Donald Clarke wrote about “The China Problem,” referring to the puzzle that China’s recent economic growth has posed to institutional economics because of its weak property rights and contract enforcement. In response to this problem, Clarke poses three possible solutions: the theory is right and observations regarding China are wrong; China would have grown more with a different set of institutions, and it might stall because of its institutional failings; finally, the institutional theory is just wrong.1 As we have seen, a similar “China Problem” was present in eighteenth-century analysis. Philosophers resolved this problem in different ways. At times, they challenged observations about China, while in other instances they questioned the soundness of each other’s theories. Smith accepted that China was often an exception to particular theories; however, he also argued that China would have benefited from different institutions. This flexibility from the founding father of economics is important to remember in our current analysis. In his article “World Too Complex for One-SizeFits-All Models,” the economist Dani Rodrik argues, “successful reforms do not travel well” because they must be dependent on distinct

1 Clarke, “Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis.”

28463_Millar.indd 222

2016-12-15 14:02:03



Conclusion 223

local conditions, something ­eighteenth-century philosophers understood well.2 Enlightenment thinkers recognized how local context matters and how outliers must be addressed. This study began by invoking Sir James Steuart’s argument that the duty of the speculative person and the statesman was to “judge of the expediency of different schemes of oeconomy.”3 We have seen the various ways in which early modern Europeans, from first-hand observers to geographers and philosophers, actively engaged in the assessment of a foreign system of political economy. On the whole, thinkers relied on the “faithful witnesses” to provide empirical materials that could inform their broader theories. China was of particular interest because of its status as a relatively advanced civilization – in many ways offering to Enlightenment observers a captivating mirror against which to measure advances in their own countries. In evaluating China’s system of political economy, Europeans analyzed and debated specific elements of their own commercial culture, geographic situation, political institutions, and scientific thinking. In the process, they demonstrated concern for understanding the lessons offered by China’s system of political economy and reconciling them with their new, grand theories. This study has identified the French and British use of the non-European world in the Enlightenment project of improving the welfare of states. We have seen the ability of “facts” to cross boundaries and theoretical frameworks, and an ability to transcend religious dogma and focus on secular interests. For example, as discussed in chapter 4, Montesquieu had to grapple with the information that made China exceptional and did not fit neatly into his “despotic” category. His acknowledgment that China was “an exception to the rule” demonstrates that he took the information available on the Middle Kingdom seriously. Similarly, Raynal refined his praise for Chinese roads in later editions, indicating the seriousness with which authors and readers took recycling detailed information. Others, like Poivre, might disagree that the quality of roads was a  serious issue but they nonetheless accepted the widely held “fact.” Information travelled from Catholic Jesuits and was used by anti-religious philosophers like Voltaire, who went so far as to defend the missionary order. By examining European views on five themes of political economy, the different ways in which China was incorporated into Enlightenment discussions became apparent. Discussion of China’s commercial culture

2 Rodrik, “World Too Complex for One-Size-Fits-All Models,” 73–4. 3 Steuart, An inquiry into the principles of political oeconomy, 3.

28463_Millar.indd 223

2016-12-15 14:02:03

224

A Singular Case

revealed the struggle of Enlightenment authors to bring moral philosophy in line with the rapidly growing commercial world. Analysis of the first-hand reports revealed both criticism of the supposedly insatiable greed of the Chinese and praise for their system of moral philosophy, often within the same sources, bringing into question the application of the sinophilia-sinophobia dichotomy in this context. On the topic of commercial culture, China provided a useful case with which to examine the implications of boundless self-interest in society. Discussion of Chinese acquisitiveness led to self-reflection and to the recognition of a similar problem of avarice in European societies. The Chinese case led Europeans to conclude that avarice enhanced commercial prowess, even if it simultaneously damaged the social fabric. China’s commercial inclinations were also connected to an appreciation for its vast internal trade, a feature unique to this empire. China’s size and geographic situation enabled its domestic trade to sustain a relatively diversified and specialized economic system. Numerous observers, notably Adam Smith, argued that if China expanded its foreign commerce, its economic situation would improve. This belief was similar to contemporary claims about how European countries needed to improve their own commercial policies, and therefore was not a criticism uniquely directed at the Chinese system. Europeans recognized that China’s foreign trade policies were flexible and, as late as Smith’s Wealth of Nations, there was a belief that they could change and allow increased foreign commerce. While seen as problematic, China’s approach to commercial activity did not lead to a comprehensive dismissal of its system in the eyes of Enlightenment observers, largely because it enjoyed a uniquely large and flourishing domestic economy. Assessments of China’s government varied to a greater extent. When it came to constitutional structure, China was often simultaneously described as despotic and moderate. Most Enlightenment commentators agreed that its form of government was the unique result of its geography and longevity, which enabled the Confucian system to become engrained in Chinese culture. Quesnay was a notable exception: he believed that China’s system of legal despotism was reproducible, and thus could serve as a universal model. The dual image of the Chinese government as moderate and despotic made it difficult for Enlightenment commentators to draw conclusions about the effects of the Chinese form of government on their system of political economy. In general, philosophers argued that the unique checks and balances in Chinese government mitigated the destructiveness of its despotic tendencies. To gain insight into the Enlightenment’s understandings of the effect of China’s government on its political economy, it was necessary to

28463_Millar.indd 224

2016-12-15 14:02:03



Conclusion 225

examine the practicalities of governance. The first-hand reports did not provide detailed information on Chinese property rights but, in general, held that they were secure. Adam Smith criticized the insecurity of property of the poorer classes, but attributed this to corruption rather than to a systemic flaw in the constitutional structure. The corruption of the Chinese mandarins was certainly seen as problematic, but, as discussed in chapter 4, Europeans described the numerous checks and balances in the system that sought to curb this form of abuse. The assessment of China’s public institutions was, on the whole, extremely positive. While there was some debate about the nature of Chinese roads, observers and commentators agreed that goods were easily transported throughout the empire via the extensive canal system. Smith’s explanation for China’s success in this area, namely its agricultural system and the extent of its empire, pointed to yet another area where China was deemed a unique case. On the topic of revenue, Europeans agreed that China was wealthy, and that its taxes were moderate and efficiently collected. Some, such as Quesnay, noted imperfections of China’s policies, particularly with regard to the imposition of irregular taxes, but believed that these could be modified with relative ease. The discussion of China’s military did not, however, result in a similarly hopeful conclusion. In fact, most Europeans identified China’s ineffectual defence as a fundamental weakness of its system of political economy. Raynal tried to rationalize the supposed deficiency, while Quesnay ignored it, revealing the extent to which Europeans saw China’s military weakness as a significant vulnerability that could not be easily resolved. What use was wealth if it could not be defended? The second major weakness of the Chinese system, according to the Europeans, was the lack of development of science and technology. Scientific advancement had a tenuous but growing connection to political economy in eighteenth-century Britain and France. Commentators also recognized the importance of technological progress, which led to publications such as the Encyclopédie. Europeans generally argued that China’s failure to prioritize the development of the mechanical arts and speculative sciences in their education system (and in their society more generally) was a fundamental flaw. Many observers and philosophers contended that China’s comparatively low level of science and technology was connected to core Chinese principles, and these could not be altered easily. It is remarkable how long it has taken for our thinking about early modern China to return to some of these findings. As we have seen throughout this book, revisionist economic history has added nuance to the image of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Chinese economy.

28463_Millar.indd 225

2016-12-15 14:02:03

226

A Singular Case

Ideas that were once part of Enlightenment views of China have re-entered economic history debates; for example, understanding that China’s foreign trade was not simply isolationist, that there was a gap between official policy and real world actions, or that its “despotic” government was perhaps a more nuanced form of agrarian paternalism. To be sure, economic historians, like Enlightenment philosophers, are not in agreement in their assessments. There are still depictions of China as an oriental despotism, along with those that see the government’s policies as agrarian paternalism. Similarly, there are those that believe Britain’s move toward laissez faire explains industrialization and those that point to the contrary forces of the fiscal-military state. Like their eighteenthcentury counterparts, these scholars are working on refining the same body of “facts” to support their contradicting frameworks. The assessments of various elements of China’s system of political economy demonstrate the openness of Europeans to learn from the experiences of another advanced civilization. At times, China was useful for encouraging self-reflection, as when Europeans addressed China’s commercial behaviour. At other times, namely, in discussions of taxation policies, China offered valuable policies that Europeans might be able to adopt. However, as we have seen with our discussion of China’s military and science, Europeans also believed the Chinese system of political economy suffered from significant flaws. Additionally, Europeans often saw China as a singular case because of its history, geography, and culture, which, as a result, did not fit easily into the universal models created by Enlightenment philosophers. Whereas Europeans once admired China’s historical stability, the obstinacy of China’s customs became the focus of some of the strongest critiques. Porter also describes the shift in interpretation of Chinese antiquity from admirably stable to stagnant over the course of the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.4 European progress (both the idea and the economic phenomenon) emerged slowly over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.5 In The Great Map of Mankind, P.J. Marshall and 4 Porter, Ideographia, 181–2. 5 For more on progress, see Heffernan, “On Geography and Progress: Turgot’s Plan d’un ouvrage sur la géographie politique (1751)”; Spadafora, The Idea of Progress; Bury, The Idea of Progress. Most historians who address the role of progress in European views of China look to the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Arthur Wright maintains that the growth of the idea of progress from the late eighteenth century coincided with the rise of Europe’s power and prosperity, which led Europeans “to categorize the histories of nonEuropean peoples” and differentiate their own progressive history from the despotic Orient. Wright, “The Study of Chinese Civilization,” 241; David Jones removes causality between the rise of progress and the rejection of China, and instead argues they rose in

28463_Millar.indd 226

2016-12-15 14:02:03



Conclusion 227

Glyndwr Williams centralize the role of progress in shaping European views of the non-European world. They describe the process whereby Europeans throughout the eighteenth century moved from curiosity about the non-European world to a belief that Europeans were needed to improve it. And yet, Marshall and Williams’s assessment of China, relying heavily on the work of Donald Lach for the seventeenth century, concludes that eighteenth-century English observers began their inquiries on Asia “with comfortable assumptions of superiority.”6 This might have been the case in their religious approach to China, but it was less certain for the economic approach. This book has revealed the important nuances in discussions of China’s political economy that reflect insecurity in the voice of European observers and commentators. Anthony Pagden has argued convincingly that, in Enlightenment thinking, the place of China was not very different from that of Tahiti. He argues, “the simple savage and the overly refined Oriental despot had this in common: neither had chosen to participate in what Diderot called a ‘regard for the general will of the species.’”7 In very different contexts, they were both confined by “customs” and “habits,” they were not cosmopolitan, and time had stood still in their societies. To the Enlightenment sensibility, China was even more culpable because it actively chose to reject what came from the outside. The Middle Kingdom served as a warning against complacency, where the leaders had stopped the state in the final stage of development from savagery to civilization, which would have been to move beyond their own community. While the rise of the idea of progress in Europe certainly impacted European hierarchies of civilization, this was not a predominant paradigm for assessing China’s political economy until the end of the eighteenth century. The notion of progress as applied to China is most emblematically embodied in Smith’s labelling of the Middle Kingdom as stationary. However, there was much more in his discussion of China than this label implies. In Smith’s view China was unquestionably a wealthy country: “China has been long one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous tandem in the nineteenth century, noting how China’s transformation from an admired model to “the sick man of the east” encouraged European reflection on progress. Jones, The Image of China, 76; Gregory Blue and Timothy Brook assert that by the end of the eighteenth century, China was increasingly seen as stationary, and “Chinese historical stagnation became a cliché over the following century, a cliché that European social theory mobilized to develop its understanding of capitalism.” Brook and Blue, China and Historical Capitalism, 4. 6 Marshall and Williams, The Great Map of Mankind, 25. 7 Pagden, The Enlightenment and Why It Still Matters, 292.

28463_Millar.indd 227

2016-12-15 14:02:03

228

A Singular Case

countries in the world.” At the same time, “The poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far surpasses that of the most beggarly nations in Europe.”8 While the first-hand accounts differed on some subjects, Smith argued, travellers agreed on the low wages of labour and the difficulty of raising a family in China. The wages of labour and profits of stock were low in China, he explained, because it had been stationary for several centuries (at least since Marco Polo’s visit). Chinese towns were not deserted, their lands not neglected, and they maintained the same annual labour: thus, unlike Bengal, China was not retrogressing. He also noted that China was not improving, as were many countries in Europe.9 Smith surmised that China “acquired that full complement of riches which the nature of its laws and institutions permit it to acquire.” Pointing to China’s “laws and institutions,” showed that its stationary status was, by no means, a historical imperative. Smith believed “this complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate and situation might admit of.”10 Here, Smith was, like his modern day institutionalist counterparts, prescriptive. He specifically pointed out that China should change its policies to increase foreign commerce and enhance the security of the poorer class. Other obstacles to the success of the Chinese system were harder to overcome, including the hindrance of being surrounded by “wandering savages and poor barbarians.”11 Nevertheless, their situation could improve and thus the standard of living for their labouring class could as well. Other Enlightenment writers debated whether China had the capacity to address the weaknesses in its system. The Chinese, as self-interested, industrious, and self-sufficient people with a uniquely balanced and responsible government, possessed many elements that Europeans admired; however, the weak military and stagnation in the arts and sciences were significant failures of their system. While the government could modify taxation and foreign trade policies, improving their ineffectual military would require changing the priorities of the state, while developing their arts and sciences would likely necessitate either altering their language or the structural foundations of their bureaucracy or, even more challenging, their culture. As new institutional economics holds, institutions are stubborn and do not change easily. Montesquieu argued that the Chinese confused religion, laws, mores, and manners, which to him meant that they were  8 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 101 and 102.  9 Ibid., 258. 10 Ibid., 132. 11 Ibid., 623.

28463_Millar.indd 228

2016-12-15 14:02:03



Conclusion 229

immutable.12 A few others, such as Quesnay, believed in the transformability of any state toward natural law. For him, China could eliminate its irregular taxes and encourage foreign settlements, in the process perfecting its system. An alternative to seeing Montesquieu as a sinophobe and Quesnay as a sinophile, is to see the former as someone who labelled China as immutable and irreproducible and the latter as believing that China was changeable and imitable. For many writers, a major hindrance to adopting the Chinese system as a universal model was that only specific elements could be imitated elsewhere. Only the Physiocrats (and those who followed their philosophy such as Poivre and Raynal) believed that the entire Chinese system was replicable. China also required motivation to change its system, which European observers and commentators noted they might lack. Today economists assume that all civilizations desire the same goal. When describing Chinese architecture, Ricci-Trigault remarked, “When they set about building, they seem to gauge things by the span of human life, building for themselves rather than for posterity. Whereas, Europeans in accordance with the urge of their civilization seem to strive for the eternal.”13 Ricci-Trigault’s view of the contrast between the Chinese as focused on the present and Europeans as looking forward is exemplary of the portrayal of China’s distinct priorities. China’s elevation of agriculture combined with the prime motivation of public tranquillity differed greatly from the increasing significance of commerce and manufacturing, as well as expansionary enterprises, in early modern Britain and France. Yang also focuses on the shift in Britain where “the world of credit and speculation was oriented toward the future, and agrarian wealth toward the past.” Here, “the eighteenth-century individual searched for a vocabulary and for tropes to bridge the change and manage the uncertainty.”14 Yang points out Pocock’s focus on the internalized British struggle with this change. However, as Yang aptly notes, foreign entities – namely China – also played an important role: “China’s Eastern empire encapsulated the widespread ambivalence towards social change.”15 Throughout this book, I have tried to emphasize China’s important role in mediating this transition. China’s place in this process is complicated because the Middle Kingdom was not solely representative of agrarian values but was also understood as a strong commercial 12 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 318–19; Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, part 3, 105. 13 Ricci and Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, 19. 14 Yang, Performing China, 9. 15 Ibid., 10.

28463_Millar.indd 229

2016-12-15 14:02:03

230

A Singular Case

empire. This left China in a more ambiguous position in European thinking than if it were just a strong agrarian civilization. By the time Smith’s The Wealth of Nations was published, philosophers were still piecing together aspects of existing political economies to formulate their ideal models. The rise of progress played a crucial role in constructing hierarchies of civilization. In particular, Smith’s labelling of China as stationary in contrast to the improving states of Europe was an important moment in European assessments of China. However, in the eighteenth century there was more flexibility in accepting different models of political economy. The most likely alternative system to the one emerging in the British context was comprehensively considered through systematic assessments of China’s commercial behaviour, trade policies, constitutional structure, duties of government, and arts and sciences. While China held many advantages, Europeans, whether labelled sinophiles or sinophobes, and throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century, considered its military and scientific weakness to be problematic elements of its system. This was an early recognition of two of the main factors that contributed to the unravelling of the Qing Dynasty in the following century.

28463_Millar.indd 230

2016-12-15 14:02:03

Bibliography

Abbattista, Guido. “The Business of Paternoster Row: Towards a Publishing History of the Universal History (1736–65).” Publishing History 17 (1985): 5–50. Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. “China, India and All That.” Why Nations Fail Blog (2 November 2012). http://whynationsfail.com/ blog/2012/11/2/china-india-and-all-that.html, last accessed 1 June 2016. Adas, Michael. Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western Dominance. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1989. Agnan, Sunil. “Diderot and the Two Indies of the French Enlightenment.” In Wolff and Cipolloni, The Anthropology of the Enlightenment, 65–84. Allan, David. “Guthrie, William (1708?–1770).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Online Edition. Allen, Robert C. “Agricultural Productivity and Rural Incomes in England and the Yangtze Delta, c. 1620–c. 1820.” The Economic History Review 62, no. 3 (August 2009): 525–50. – “Agricultural Productivity and Rural Incomes in England and the Yangtze Delta, c. 1620–c. 1820” (2006). http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/allen/ unpublished/yangtze.pdf, last accessed 1 June 2016. – The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Amin, Samir. Eurocentrism. Translated by Russel Moore. London: Zed Books, 1989. Anson, George. A Voyage round the world … Compiled from the Papers …[of] Anson, and published under his direction by Richard Walter … London: Printed for the author by John and Paul Knapton in Ludgate-Street, 1748. Appleby, Joyce Oldham. Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. Appleton, William. A Cycle of Cathay: The Chinese Vogue in England during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.

28463_Millar.indd 231

2016-12-15 14:02:03

232

Bibliography

Arrighi, Giovanni. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times. London: Verso, 1994. Ashton, T.S. An Economic History of England: The Eighteenth Century. Oxon: Routledge, 2006. Atwell, William S. “Another Look at Silver Imports into China, ca. 1635–1644.” Journal of World History 16, no. 4 (December 2005): 467–89. Austin, Gareth. “Reciprocal Comparison and African History: Tackling Conceptual Eurocentrism in the Study of Africa’s Economic Past.” African Studies Review 50, no. 3 (December 2007): 1–28. Backscheider, Paula R. “Defoe, Daniel (1660?–1731).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Ballaster, Ros. Fabulous Orients: Fictions of the East in England 1662–1785. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Barclay, Patrick. The universal traveller: or, a complete account of the most remarkable voyages and travels of eminent men … London: Printed for J. Purser, T. Read, and S. Hester, 1735. Barker, Hanna. “Bell, John (1745–1831).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Barrow, John. A New and Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences. London: Printed for John Hinton, 1751. Baudet, Henri. Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of NonEuropean Man. Translated by Elizabeth Wentholt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Bean, Richard. “War and the Birth of the Nation State.” The Journal of Economic History 33, no. 1 (March 1973): 203–21. Bell, John. A New Catalogue of Bell’s Circulating Library, consisting of above fifty thousand volumes. London: Printed for John Bell, 1778. – Travels from St Petersburg in Russia to diverse parts of Asia. 2 vols. Glasgow: Printed by Robert and Andrew Foulis, 1763. Berdell, John F. “Innovation and Trade: David Hume and the Case for Freer Trade.” History of Political Economy 28, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 107–26. Berg, Maxine. “In Pursuit of Luxury: Global History and British Consumer Goods in the Eighteenth Century.” Past and Present 182, no. 1 (February 2004): 85–142. Bettany, G.T. “Brookes, Richard (fl. 1721–1763).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Black, Jeremy. European Warfare, 1660–1815. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. Blanning, Tim. The Pursuit of Glory: Europe 1648–1815. London: Penguin Books, 2008. Blaut, J.M. Eight Eurocentric Historians. New York: The Guilford Press, 2000. Bloomfield, Arthur I. “The Foreign Trade Doctrines of the Physiocrats.” The American Economic Review 28, no. 4 (December 1938): 716–34.

28463_Millar.indd 232

2016-12-15 14:02:03



Bibliography 233

Blue, Gregory. “China and Western Social Thought.” In Brook and Blue, China and Historical Capitalism, 57–109. Botero, Giovanni. Delle cause della grandezza e magnificenza della città. Rome: n.p., 1588. – Della ragion di stato. Venetia: Appresso I Gioliti, 1589. – Delle Relationi Universali. Venetia: Nicolò Polo, 1602. – Relations, of the most famous kingdoms and common-weales through the world … 4th ed. London: Printed by John Haveland, 1630. Boxer, Charles R. “Some Aspects of Western Historical Writing on the Far East, 1500–1800.” In Historians of China and Japan, edited by W.G. Beasley and E.G. Pulleyblank, 115–134. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. – ed., South China in the Sixteenth Century: Being the Narratives of Galeote Pereira, Fr. Gaspar da Cruz, O.P., Fr. Martin de Rada, O.E.S.A. Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2004. Braudel, Fernand. Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century. Vol. 3, The Perspective of the World. Translated by Sian Reynolds. London: Phoenix Press, 2002. Bray, Franesca. “Towards a Critical History of Non-Western Technology.” In Brook and Blue, China and Historical Capitalism, 158–209. Brewer, John. The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1783. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988. Brockey, Liam. Journey to the East: The Jesuit Mission to China 1579–1724. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Brook, Timothy. The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010. Brook, Timothy, and Gregory Blue. “Introduction.” In Brook and Blue, China and Historical Capitalism. – eds. China and Historical Capitalism: Genealogies of Sinological Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Brook, Timothy, Jérome Bourgon, and Gregory Blue. Death by a Thousand Cuts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008. Browning, John D. “Cornelius de Pauw and Exiled Jesuits: The Development of Nationalism in Spanish America.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 11, no. 3 (Spring 1978): 289–307. Buoye, Thomas. “Litigation, Legitimacy and Lethal Violence: Why Country Courts Failed to Prevent Violent Disputes over Property in EighteenthCentury China.” In Zelin, Ocko, and Gardella, Contract and Property in Early Modern China, 94–119. Burke, Peter. A Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenburg to Diderot. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002. Bury, J.B. The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth. London: Dover Publications, 1920.

28463_Millar.indd 233

2016-12-15 14:02:03

234

Bibliography

Campbell, George. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. 2 vols. London: W. Strahan, 1776. Campbell, Mary B. The Witness and the Other World: Exotic European Travel Writing, 400–1600. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. Campbell, Roy Harold, and Andrew S. Skinner. “Preface to Adam Smith’s An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.” In The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981. Cantillon, Richard. Essai sur la nature du commerce en général. Translated by Henry Higgs. London: Frank Cass and Co., 1959. Carcassone, E. “La Chine dans l’Esprit des lois.” Revue d’histoire littéraire de la France 31 (1924): 193–205. Cary-Elwes, Columba. China and the Cross: Studies in Missionary History. New York: Longmans, Green, 1975. Chen, Jeng-Guo S. “The British View of Chinese Civilization and the Emergence of Class Consciousness.” The Eighteenth Century 45, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 193–205. Chen, Shouyi. “Daniel Defoe, China’s Severe Critic.” In Hsia, The Vision of China in the English Literature of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 215–48. – “Oliver Goldsmith and His Chinese Letters.” In Hsia, The Vision of China in the English Literature of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 283–300. The Chinese Traveller. 2 vols. London: Printed by E. and C. Dilly, 1772. Ching, Julia, and Willard G. Oxtoby. Moral Enlightenment: Leibniz and Wolff on China. Steyler Verlag: Institut Monumenta Serica, 1992. Churchill, J. and A. A Collection of Voyages and Travels. 6 vols. London: Printed by assignment for Churchill, 1732. Clark, Gregory. “The Political Foundations of Modern Economic Growth: England, 1540–1800.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 26, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 563–88. Clark, William, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer, “Introduction.” In Sciences in Enlightened Europe, edited by William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Clarke, Donald C. “Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem.” American Journal of Comparative Law 51 (2003): 89–111. Claude, J.J. “Dilly, Charles (1739–1807)” and “Dilly, Edward (1732–1779).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Coclanis, Peter A. “Assessing Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: A Forum.” Historically Speaking 12, no. 4 (September 2011): 10–12. Coleman, D.C. “Mercantilism Revisited.” The Historical Journal 23, no. 4 (1980): 773–91 Collins, James B. The State in Early Modern France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

28463_Millar.indd 234

2016-12-15 14:02:03



Bibliography 235

Cook, Andrew S. “Dalrymple, Alexander (1737–1808).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Cook, Daniel J., and Henry Rosemont Jr, eds. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Writings on China. Chicago: Open Court, 1994. Cooper, Thomas. “Thomas Salmon (bap. 1679–d.1767).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University, May 2006. Online Edition. Crone, G.R. “John Green. Notes on a Neglected Eighteenth-Century Geographer and Cartographer.” Imago Mundi 6 (1949): 85–91. – and T. Jeffreys. “Further Notes on Bradock Mead, alias John Green, an Eighteenth Century Cartographer.” Imago Mundi 8, no. 1 (1951): 69–70. Cummins, J.S. “Fray Domingo Navarrete: A Source for Quesnay.” Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 36, no. 1 (January 1959): 37–50. – A Question of Rites: Friar Domingo Navarrete and the Jesuits in China. Cambridge: Scholar Press 1993 Dalrymple, Alexander. A plan for extending the commerce of this kingdom and of the East-India-Company. London: Printed by J. Nourse and T. Payne, 1769. Dapper, Olfert. Atlas Chinensis: Being a second part of a relation of remarkable passages in two embassies from the East-India Company of the United Provinces to the Viceory of Singlamong and General Taising Lipovi and to Konchi, Emperor of China and East-Tartary … Translated by John Ogilby. London: Printed by Tho. Johnson, 1671. Darnton, R. The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History. New York: Vintage, 1984. Davis, Walter W. “China, the Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment.” Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 4 (October–December 1983): 523–48. Dawson, Raymond. The Chinese Chameleon: An Analysis of European Conceptions of Chinese Civilisation. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Defoe, Daniel. The Complete English Tradesman. London: Printed for Charles Rivington, 1726. Demel, Walter. “China in the Political Thought of Western and Central Europe, 1570–1750.” In China and Europe: Images and Influences in Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, edited by Thomas H.C. Lee, 45–64. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991. Deng, Kent. “A Critical Survey of Recent Research in Chinese Economic History.” The Economic History Review 53, no. 1 (February 2000): 1–28. – “Miracle or Mirage? Foreign Silver, China’s Economy and Globalization from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries.” Pacific Economic Review 13, no. 3 (2008): 352–3. de Pauw, Cornelius. Philosophical dissertations on the Egyptians and Chinese. Translated by Capt. J. Thomson. 2 vols. London: Printed for T. Chapman, 1795.

28463_Millar.indd 235

2016-12-15 14:02:03

236

Bibliography

– Recherches philosophiques sur les Égyptiens et les Chinois. In Oeuvres philosophiques de Pauw. Paris: J.F. Bastien, 1794. Dermigny, Louis. La Chine et l’Occident: le commerce à Canton au XVIIIe siècle, 1719–1833. Paris: sevpen, 1964. Derrick, Samuel. A collection of travels, thro’ various parts of the world; but more particularly, thro’ Tartary, China, Turkey, Persia, and the East-Indies. 2 vols. London: Printed for John Wilkie, 1762. de Surgy, Jacques Philibert Rousselot. Mélanges intéressans et curieux ou abregé d’histoire naturelle, morale, civile, et politique de l’Asie, de l’Afrique, de l’Amérique, et des terres polaires. 10 vols. Paris: Chez Durand and La Combe, 1763–66. de Vries, Jan. “The Great Divergence after Ten Years: Justly Celebrated yet Hard to Believe.” Historically Speaking 12, no. 4 (September 2011): 13–15. Dew, Nicholas. “Reading Travels in the Culture of Curiosity: Thévenot’s Collection of Voyages.” Journal of Early Modern History 10, no. 1–2 (2006): 39–59. Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Dictionnaire de l’Académie française. 4th ed. Paris : Chez B. Brunet, 1762. Diderot, Denis (ascribed by Jacques Proust). “Art.” In The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project. Translated by Nelly S. Hoyt and Thomas Cassirer. Ann Arbor: MPublishing, University of Michigan Library, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.139. Diderot, Denis, and Jean le Rond D’Alembert, eds. Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers. Edited by Robert Morrissey. University of Chicago: artfl Encyclopédie Projet, Spring 2010 Edition. Dodds, Muriel. Les Récits de voyages, sources de l’Esprit des lois de Montesquieu. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1929. Downes, Alan. “The Bibliographic Dinosaurs of Georgian Geography (1714– 1830).” The Geographical Journal 137, no. 3 (September 1971): 379–87. Duchet, Michèle. Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des lumières. Paris: Albin Michel, 1995. Du Halde, Jean Baptiste. A description of the empire of China … 2 vols. London: Printed by T. Gardner for Edward Cave, 1738 [referred to as the Cave edition]. – Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l’empire de la Chine. 4 vols. Paris: Chez P.G. Le Mercier, 1735 [referred to as the French edition]. – The General History of China: Containing a Geographical, Historical, Chronological, Political and Physical Description of the Empire of China. Translated by Richard Brookes. 4 vols. London: Printed by and for John Watts, 1736 [referred to as the Watts edition].

28463_Millar.indd 236

2016-12-15 14:02:03



Bibliography 237

Durie, Alastair J. “Knox, John (1720–1790).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press, 2008. Online edition. Easterly, William. “The Ideology of Development.” Foreign Policy 161 (July/ August 2007): 30–5. The East-India trade. n.p., 1641? The Making of the Modern World, Thomson Gale, University of London Research Library Services. Elman, Benjamin. A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. – A Cultural History of Modern Science in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006. – On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. Eltis, David. The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe. London: I.B. Tauris, 1998. Étiemble, René. L’Europe chinoise. 2 vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1988. Fairbank, J.K. “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West.” The Far Eastern Quarterly 1, no. 2 (February 1942): 129–49. Fan, T. Cunzhong. “Dr Johnson and Chinese Culture.” In Hsia, The Vision of China in the English Literature of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 263–82. Feather, John. “The Commerce of Letters: The Study of the EighteenthCentury Book Trade.” “The Printed Word in the Eighteenth Century,” ed. Raymond Birn. Special Issue, Eighteenth-Century Studies 17, no. 4 (Summer 1984): 405–24. Fenning, D., J. Collyer, et al. A New System of Geography. 2 vols. London: Printed for S. Crowder, 1764–65. Féraud, Jean-François. “Économie.” Dictionaire critique de la langue française. Marseille: Jean Mossey, 1787–88. Ferguson, James. “Review: Machines as the Measure of Men by Michael Adas.” American Anthropologist 93, no. 1 (1991): 220–30. Flynn, Dennis O., and Arturo Giráldez. “Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth Century.” Journal of World History 13, no. 2 (2002): 391–427. – “Globalization Began in 1571.” In Globalization and Global History, edited by B.K. Gills and W.R. Thompson, 232–47. London: Routledge, 2006. Fontanel, Jacques, Jean-Paul Herbert, and Ivan Samson. “The Birth of the Political Economy or the Economy in the Heart of Politics: Mercantilism.” Defence and Peace Economics 19, no. 5 (October 2008): 331–8. Force, Pierre. Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth. The Origins of Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth-Century France. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976.

28463_Millar.indd 237

2016-12-15 14:02:03

238

Bibliography

Frank, Andre Gunder. ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. California: University of California Press, 1998. Fussell, G.E. “Science and Practice in Eighteenth-Century British Agriculture.” Agricultural History 43, no. 1 (January 1969): 7–18. Gee, Joshua. The Trade and navigation of Great Britain considered … By a Merchant. London: Printed for J. Almon, 1767. Godlewska, Anne. Geography Unbound: French Geographic Science from Cassini to Humboldt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Goodman, Dena. The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. Gopnik, Alison. “Could David Hume Have Known about Buddhism? Charles François Dolu, the Royal College of La Flèche, and the Global Jesuit Intellectual Network.” Hume Studies 35, no. 1&2 (2009): 5–28. Griggs, Tamara. “Universal History from Counter-Reformation to Enlightenment.” Modern Intellectual History 4, no. 2 (2007): 219–47. Groenewegen, Peter. “Gee, Joshua (1667–1730).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Grosier, Jean-Baptist, ed. A general description of China … Translator unknown. London: Printed by G.G. and J. Robinson, 1788. Guthrie, William. A new geographical, historical, and commercial grammar; and present state of the several kingdoms of the world … London: Printed for J. Knox, 1770. Guy, Basil. The French Image of China before and after Voltaire. Geneva: Institut et Musée Voltaire, 1963. – “Ad majorem Societatis gloriam: Jesuit Perspectives on Chinese Mores in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” In Exoticism in the Enlightenment, edited by G.S. Rousseau and Roy Porter, 66–85. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. Hakluyt, Richard. Principal Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries of the English nation. 3 vols. London: G. Bishop, R. Newberie & R. Barker, 1589. Harris, John, and updated by John Campbell. Navigantium atque itinerantium bibliotheca. Or, a complete collection of voyages and travels … London: n.p., 1744–48. Heckscher, Eli F. Mercantilism. Edited by Ernst F. Söderlund. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955. Heffernan, Michael. “On Geography and Progress: Turgot’s Plan d’un ouvrage sur la géographie politique (1751) and the Origins of Modern Progressive Thought.” Political Geography 13, no. 4 (1994): 328–43. Hevia, James L. Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995. Hillemann, Ulrike. Asian Empire and British Knowledge: China and the Networks of British Imperial Expansion. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

28463_Millar.indd 238

2016-12-15 14:02:03



Bibliography 239

Hirschman, Albert. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. Hobson, John M. The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Hoffman, Phillipe, and Kathryn Norberg. Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450–1789. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Hont, Istvan. Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005. Hont, Istvan, and Michael Ignatieff. “Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: An Introductory Essay.” In Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, 1–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Horne, Thomas A. Property Rights and Poverty: Political Argument in Britain, 1605– 1834. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990. Hostetler, Laura. Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. Howlett, Peter, and Mary S. Morgan, eds. How Well Do Facts Travel? The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Hsia, Adrian. Sojourners in a Strange Land: Jesuits and Their Scientific Missions in Late Imperial China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. – ed. The Vision of China in the English Literature of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1998. Hughes, Jane Frecknall. “The Concept of Taxation and the Age of Enlightenment.” In Studies in the History of Tax Law, vol. 2, edited by John Tiley, 253–86. Portland and Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007. Hume, David. The Philosophical Works of David Hume. 4 vols. Edinburgh: Printed for Adam Black and William Tait, 1826. Hung, Ho-Fung. “Orientalist Knowledge and Social Theories: China and the European Conceptions of East-West Differences from 1600 to 1900.” Sociological Theory 21, no. 3 (September 2003): 254–80. Inkster, Ian, ed. “Technology in China.” Special Edition, History of Technology 29 (December 2009). An irregular dissertation, occasioned by the reading of Father Du Halde’s description of China. Which may be read at any time. London: Printed for J. Roberts, 1740. Irwin, Douglas. Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Jacob, Margaret C. Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Jenkins, Eugenia Zuroski. A Taste for China: English Subjectivity and the Prehistory of Orientalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

28463_Millar.indd 239

2016-12-15 14:02:03

240

Bibliography

Jimack, Peter, ed. A History of the Two Indies: A Translated Selection of Writings from Raynal’s Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements des Européens dans les Deux Indes. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2006. Johnson, Samuel. A dictionary of the English language. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: Printed by W. Strahan, for J. and P. Knapton et al., 1755–56. Jones, David Martin. The Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Jones, Eric L. The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Kidd, Colin. The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600–2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Kingston, Rebecca E., ed. Montesquieu and His Legacy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. Klump, Rainer. “The Kingdom of Ponthiamas – a Physiocratic Model State in Indochina: A Note on the International Exchange of Economic Thought and of Concepts for Economic Reforms in the 18th Century.” In Political Events and Economic Ideas, edited by Ingo Barens, Volker Caspari, and Bertram Schefold, 173–86. Cornwall: MPG Books Ltd, 2004. Kwass, Michael. Privileges and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. La Grand, Virginia. A Spectacular Failure: Robinson Crusoe I, II, III. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012. Lach, Donald. The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica: Commentary, Translation, Text. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1957. – Asia in the Making of Europe. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965–70. Lach, Donald, and Edwin J. van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe. Vol. 3. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993. Lambert, Claude François. A collection of curious observations on the manners, customs, usages, different languages, government … Translated by John Dunn. 2 vols. London: Printed for John Dunn, 1750. Landes, David. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1998. – The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Landry-Deron, Isabelle. La preuve par la Chine. La “Description” de J.-B. Du Halde, jésuite, 1735. Paris: Éditions de l’École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2002. – “Early Translations of Chinese Texts in French Jesuit Publications in Historiography.” In Encounters and Dialogues: Changing Perspectives on ChineseWestern Exchanges from the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, edited by Xiaoxin

28463_Millar.indd 240

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Bibliography 241

Wu, 265–76. Sankt Augustin: Monumenta Serica Institute and The Ricci Institute of Chinese Western Cultural History at the University of San Francisco, 2005. Lange, Laurent. “Journal of Mr. De Lange.” In Travels from St Petersburgh in Russia to various parts of Asia, edited by John Bell. Edinburgh: Printed for William Creech, 1806. Le Comte, Louis. Memoirs and Observations Typographical, Physical, Mathematical, Mechanical, Natural, Civil, and Ecclesiastical, Made in a Late Journey through the Empire of China. Translated from the Paris edition. London: Printed for B. Tooke and Sam Buckley, 1697. – Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Paris: Chez Jean Anisson, 1697. Le Stourgeon, B. A compleat universal history, of the several empires, kingdoms, states &c. throughout the known world … London: Printed by Benjamin Baddam, 1732–38. Letters relating to the East India Company. London: Printed for W. Owen, 1754. Locke, John. The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes. 12th ed. 9 vols. London: Rivington, 1824. Lorge, Peter. War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China 900–1795. Routledge: London, 2005. Lottes, Günther. “China in European Political Thought, 1750–1850.” In China and Europe: Images and Influences in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, edited by Thomas H.C. Lee, 65–98. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1991. Lufrano, Richard. Honorable Merchants: Commerce and Self-Cultivation in Late Imperial China. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997. Lynn, John A. Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610–1715. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Ma, Debin. “State Capacity and Great Divergence: The Case of Qing China (1644–1911).” Eurasian Geography and Economics 54, no. 5–6 (2013): 484–99. Mackerras, Colin. Sinophiles and Sinophobes: Western Views of China: An Anthology. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2000. – Western Images of China. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989 Magalhães, Gabriel de. A new history of China containing a description of the most considerable particulars of that vast empire … done out of French. London: Printed for Thomas Newborough, 1668. – Nouvelle relation de la Chine. Paris: Chez Claude Barbin, 1688. Mandeville, Bernard. The Fable of the Bees. Edited by Phillip Harth. London: Penguin Books, 1989. – The Fable of the Bees. 2 vols. With a commentary critical, historical, and explanatory by F.B. Kaye. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988. Markley, Robert. “Anson at Canton, 1743: Obligation, Exchange, and Ritual in Edward Page’s ‘Secret History.’” In The Culture of the Gift in Eighteenth-Century

28463_Millar.indd 241

2016-12-15 14:02:04

242

Bibliography

England, edited by Linda Zionkowski and Cynthia Klekar, 215–33. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. – “China and the English Enlightenment: Literature, Aesthetics, and Commerce.” Literature Compass 11, no. 8 (2014): 517–27. – The Far East and English Imagination 1600–1730. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. – “Riches, Power, Trade and Religion: The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600–1720.” Renaissance Studies 17, no. 3 (2003): 433–55. Marks, Robert. The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century. 2nd ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007. Marouby, Christian. “Adam Smith and the Anthropology of the Enlightenment: The ‘Ethnographic’ Sources of Economic Progress.” In Wolff and Cipolloni, The Anthropology of the Enlightenment, 85–102. Marshall, P.J., and Glyndwr Williams. The Great Map of Mankind: Perceptions of New Worlds in the Age of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982. Martini, Martino. Bellum Tartaricum, or The conquest of the great and most renowned empire of China … London: John Crook, 1654. Maverick, Lewis A. China, a Model for Europe. San Antonio: Paul Anderson Company 1946 – “Pierre Poivre: Eighteenth Century Explorer of Southeast Asia.” Pacific Historical Review 10, no. 2 (1941): 165–177. Mayhew, Robert. “The Character of English Geography c. 1660–1800: A Textual Approach.” Journal of Historical Geography 24, no. 4 (1998): 385–412. – Enlightenment Geography: The Political Languages of British Geography, 1650– 1850. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000. McCloskey, Deirdre. Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. McCollim, Gary. Louis XIV’s Assault on Privilege: Nicolas Desmaretz and the Tax on Wealth. New York: University of Rochester Press, 2012. McNeill, William H. The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. Meek, Ronald L. The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and Translations. London: Ruskin House, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1962. Melon, Jean-François. Essai politique sur le commerce, nouvelle édition. n.p.: n.p., 1761. Mendoza, Juan Gonzales de. The history of the great and mighty kingdom of China, and the situation thereof. Translated by R. Parke. London: Printed by I. Wolfe for Edward White, 1588. Reprint, George Staunton, ed. London: Reprinted for the Hakluyt Society, 1853. Facsimile reprint of the 1853 edition by Elibron Classics, 2005.

28463_Millar.indd 242

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Bibliography 243

Miert, Dirk van. Humanism in an Age of Science: The Amsterdam Athenaeum in the Golden Age, 1632–1704. Translated by Michiel Wielema with Anthony OssaRichardson. Leiden: Brill, 2009. Mizuta, Hiroshi. Adam Smith’s Library: A Supplement to Bonar’s Catalogue with a Checklist of the Whole Library. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1967. The modern part of an universal history … 44 vols. London: Printed for S. Richardson et al., 1759. Mokyr, Joel. “The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth.” The Journal of Economic History 65, no. 2 (June 2005): 285–351. Moll, Herman. A system of geography … London: Printed for Timothy Childe, 1701. Montchrestien, Antoine de. Traicté de l’œconomie politique. Edited by François Billacois. Genève: Librairie Droz, 1999. Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de. The Complete Works of M. De Montesquieu. Translated by T. Evans. London: Printed for T. Evans and W. Davis, 1777. – De l’esprit des lois. Geneva: Barillot et fils 1748. Édition électronique par JeanMarie Tremblay. – The Spirit of the Laws. Edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Moore, James. “Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment.” In Kingston, Montesquieu and His Legacy, 178–95. Morgan, Mary S. “Travelling Facts.” In How Well Do Facts Travel? The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge, edited by Peter Howlett and Mary S. Morgan, 3–42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Morse, H.B. Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635–1834. Volume 1 of 4. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926–29. Moule, A.C., and P. Pelliot. Marco Polo: The Description of the World. London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd, 1938. Mukerji, Chandra. Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the Canal du Midi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. Muldrew, Craig. “Interpreting the Market: The Ethics of Credit and Community Relat­ions in Early Modern England.” Social History 18, no. 2 (May 1993): 163–83. Mungello, D.E. Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989. – The Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005. – ed. The Chinese Rites Controversy: Its History and Meaning. Nettetal, Germany: Steyler, 1994. Muthu, Sankar. Enlightenment against Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. A new general collection of voyages and travels. John Green (probable editor). 4 vols. London: Printed for T. Astley, 1745–47.

28463_Millar.indd 243

2016-12-15 14:02:04

244

Bibliography

Nieuhof, Johannes. An embassy from the East-India Company of the United Provinces. Translated by John Ogilby. 2nd ed. London: Printed by John Ogilby, 1673. North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in SeventeenthCentury England.” The Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (December 1989): 803–32. O’Brien, Patrick K. “The Needham Question Updated: A Historiographical Survey and Elaboration.” “Chinese Technological History: The Great Divergence,” edited by Kent Deng and Jerry Liu. Special Edition, History of Technology 29 (December 2009): 70–86. Ocko, Jonathan. “The Missing Metaphor: Applying Western Legal Scholarship to the Study of Contract and Property in Early Modern China.” In Zelin, Ocko, and Gardella, Contract and Property in Early Modern China, 178–208. Ogilvie, Sheilagh. “The Use and Abuse of Trust: Social Capital and Its Deployment by Early Modern Guilds.” cesifo Working Paper No. 1302 (October 2004). Osborne, Anne. “Property, Taxes and State Protection of Rights.” In Zelin, Ocko, and Gardella, Contract and Property in Early Modern China, 120–58. Outram, Dorinda. The Enlightenment. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pagden, Anthony. The Enlightenment, and Why It Still Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Parks, George Bruner. Richard Hakluyt and the English Voyages. New York: American Geographical Society, 1928. Parry, John Horace. The Age of Reconnaissance. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1963. Pascal, Blaise. Pensées. Translated by W.F. Trotter. Digireads Publishing, 2005. Pattberg, Philipp. “Conquest, Domination and Control: Europe’s Mastery of Nature in Historic Perspective.” Journal of Political Ecology 14 (2007): 1–9. Percy, Thomas. Hau Kiou Choaun or the pleasing history… 4 vols. London: Printed for R. and J. Dodsley, 1761. Perdue, Peter C. “Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia.” The International History Review 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 263–86. – China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005. Pereira, Jacques. Montesquieu et la Chine. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008. Perkins, Franklin. Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Phillipson, Nicholas. Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life. London: Penguin Books, 2010. Pinot, Virgile. La Chine et la formation de l’esprit philosophique en France (1640– 1740). Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1932.

28463_Millar.indd 244

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Bibliography 245

Pliny the Elder, The Natural History. Edited by John Bostock and H.T. Riley. Tufts University, Perseus Digital Library. Pocock, J.G.A. Barbarism and Religion. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Poivre, Pierre. The travels of a philosopher. Being observations on the customs, manners, arts … of several nations in Asia and Africa. Translated from the French … London: Printed for T. Becket and Co., 1769. – Voyages d’un philosophe. Yverdon: n.p., 1768. Polo, Marco. The Travels of Marco Polo. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997. Pomeranz, Kenneth. The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. – “Ten Years After: Responses and Reconsiderations.” Historically Speaking 12, no. 4 (September 2011): 20–5. Porter, David. The Chinese Taste in Eighteenth-Century England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. – Ideographia: The Chinese Cypher in Early Modern Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. – “Monstrous Beauty: Eighteenth-Century Fashion and the Aesthetics of the Chinese Taste.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 35, no. 3 (2002): 395–411. – “A Peculiar but Uninteresting Nation: China and the Discourse of Commerce in Eighteenth-Century England.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 33, no. 2 (1999–2000): 181–99. – “Sinicizing Early Modernity: The Imperatives of Historical Cosmopolitanism.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 3 (2010): 299–306. Pritchard, E.H. The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750–1800 (1936). Reprinted in Britain and the China Trade, 1635–1842, Vol. 5, edited by Patrick Tuck. 10 vols. London: Routledge, 1999. Purchas, Samuel. Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas, His Pilgrimes Contayning a History of the World … London: Henrie Fetherstone, 1625. Qian, Zhongshu. “China in the English Literature of the Eighteenth Century.” In Hsia, The Vision of China in the English Literature of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 117–214. Quesnay, François. “Despotisme de la Chine.” In Oeuvres économiques et philosophiques, edited by Auguste Oncken. Paris: Jules Peelman and Co., 1888. Rabuzzi, Daniel A. “Eighteenth-Century Commercial Mentalities as Reflected and Projected in Business Handbooks.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 29, no. 2 (1995–96): 169–89. Ramsey, Rachel. “China and the Ideal of Order in John Webb’s An History Essay … ” Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 3 (2001): 483–503. Randall, Joseph. A system of geography; or, a dissertation on the creation and various phenomena of the terraqueous globe … London: Printed for Joseph Lord, 1744.

28463_Millar.indd 245

2016-12-15 14:02:04

246

Bibliography

Raphael, D.D. The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas-François. Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes. Edited by Anthony Strugnell et al. Vol. 1, books 1–4. Paris: Centre international d’étude du XVIIIe siècle and Ferney-Voltaire, 2010 [referred to as the French edition]. – A philosophical and political history of the settlements and trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies. Translated by J. Justamond. 4 vols. London: Printed for T. Cadell, 1776 [referred to as the Justamond edition]. Redman, Deborah A. The Rise of Political Economy as a Science. Cambridge: mit Press, 1997. Reichwein, Adolf. China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic Contacts in the Eighteenth Century. Translated by J.C. Powell. London: Kegan, 1925. Reinert, Sophus A. Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. Reinhartz, Dennis. “Moll, Herman (1654?–1732)” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, January 2008. Online Edition. Ricci, Matteo, and Nicolas Trigault. China in the Sixteenth Century: the journals of Matthew Ricci: 1583–1610 [The compilation by N. Trigault]. Translated by Louis J. Gallagher. New York: Random House, 1953. Richardson, Samuel. Apprentice’s Vade Mecum. London: Printed for T. Cooper, 1734. Richter, Melvin. “Despotism.” In Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 2. 7 vols. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973. – The Political Theory of Montesquieu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Roberts, J.A.G. “L’image de la Chine dans l’Encyclopédie.” Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie 22 (1997): 87–108. Robertson, John. The Case for Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680–1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. – “The Enlightenment above National Context: Political Economy in Eighteenth-Century Scotland and Naples.” The Historical Journal 40, no. 3 (September 1997): 667–97. Rodrik, Dani. “World Too Complex for One-Size-Fits-All Models.” post-autistic economics review 44 (December 2007): 73–4. Rogers, Clifford J. “The Military Revolution in History and Historiography.” In The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, edited by Clifford J. Rogers, 1–12. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995. Rolt, Richard. A new dictionary of trade and commerce, compiled from the information of the most eminent merchants, and from the works of the best writers … London: Printed for T. Osborne and J. Shipton et al., 1756.

28463_Millar.indd 246

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Bibliography 247

Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, and R. Bin Wong. Before and beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. Rousseau, G.S., and Roy Porter. “Introduction.” In Exoticism in the Enlightenment, edited by G.S. Rousseau and Roy Porter. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discours sur les sciences et les arts. 1750. Édition électronique par Jean-Marie Tremblay. – The Discourses and other early political writings. Edited by Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Rowbotham, Arnold H. “China in the Esprit des Lois: Montesquieu and Mgr. Foucquet.” Comparative Literature 2 (1950): 354–9. – “The Impact of Confucianism on Seventeenth Century Europe.” The Far Eastern Quarterly 4 (1944–45): 224–42. – Missionary and Mandarin: The Jesuits at the Court of China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942. Rubiés, Joan-Pau. “The Concept of Cultural Dialogue and the Jesuit Method of Accommodation: Between Idolatry and Civilization.” Archivum historicum societatis iesu 74, no. 147 (2005): 237–80. – “The Concept of Gentile Civilization in Missionary Discourse and Its European Reception: Mexico, Perú, and China in the Repúblicas del Mundo by Jéronimo Román (1575–1595).” In Missions d’évangélisation et circulation des savoirs XVIe–XVIIIe siècle, ed. Charlotte de Castelnau-L’Estoile, Marie-Lucie Copete, Aliocha Maldavsky, Inès G. Županov, 289–328. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2010. – “From the History of Travayle to the History of Travel Collections: The Rise of an Early Modern Genre.” In Richard Hakluyt: His Times, Life, Legacy, edited by Daniel Carey and Clare Howitt. Ashgate and the Hakluyt Society, forthcoming. – “Introduction: Interaction and Discourse in the Expansion of Europe.” In Shifting Cultures: Interaction and Discourse in the Expansion of Europe, edited by Henriette Bugge and Joan-Pau Rubiés. Munster: Lit, 1995. – “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu.” Journal of Early Modern History 9, no. 1 (2005): 109–80. Rule, Paul A. K’ung-tzu or Confucius? The Jesuit Interpretation of Confucianism. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986. Salmon, Thomas. Modern History. 3 vols. London: Printed for M. Bettesworth et al., 1739. – The Universal Traveller. 3 vols. London: Printed for Richard Baldwin, 1752. Schlatter, Richard. Private Property: The History of an Idea. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1951. Sebastiani, Silvia. The Scottish Enlightenment: Race, Gender, and the Limits of Progress. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

28463_Millar.indd 247

2016-12-15 14:02:04

248

Bibliography

Semedo, Alvaro. The history of that great and renowned monarchy of China. London: Printed for E. Tyler and John Cook, 1655. Shackleton, Robert. Montesquieu: A Critical Biography. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Silhouette, Étienne de. Idée générale du gouvernement det de la morale des Chinois. n.p.: n.p., 1731. Sitwell, O.F.G. Four Centuries of Special Geography. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993. Skinner, George William, and Hugh D.R. Baker, eds. The City in Late Imperial China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977. Smith, Adam. Lectures On Jurisprudence. Edited by R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein. Vol. 5, Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982. – The Wealth of Nations. Edited by Edwin Cannan. New York: Bantam Dell, 2003. Somers, Lord. A third collection of scarce and valuable tracts, on the most interesting and entertaining subjects … 4 vols. London: Printed for F. Cogan, 1751. Sousa, Manuel de Faria i. Imperio de la China. Madrid, 1642. Spadafora, David. The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. Spence, Jonathan. The Chan’s Great Continent: China in Western Minds. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. Standaert, Nicholas, ed. Handbook of Christianity in China: Volume One (635– 1800). Leiden: Brill, 2001. Starr, G.A. “Defoe and China.” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43, no. 4 (Summer 2010): 434–54 Stern, Philip J., and Carl Wennerlind, eds, Mercantilism Reimagined. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Steuart, Sir James. An inquiry into the principles of political oeconomy: being an essay on the science of domestic policy in free nations. 2 vols. London: Printed for A. Millar and T. Cadell, 1767. Sullivan, Michael. The Arts of China. 4th ed. Berkley: University of California Press, 1999. Thévenot, Melchisédec. Relations de divers voyages curieux. Paris: Chez André Cramoisy, 1696. Tindal, Mathew [published anonymously]. Christianity as Old as Creation: Or, the Gospel, A Republication of the Religion of Nature. 2nd ed. London [Amsterdam?]: n.p., 1731. Van Dyke, Paul A. The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700– 1845. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005. Vauban, Sébastien le Prestre, Seigneur de. Dîme royale. Paris: n.p., 1707. – A project for a royal tythe: or, general tax. London: n.p., 1708.

28463_Millar.indd 248

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Bibliography 249

Venturi, Franco. “Oriental Despotism.” Journal of the History of Ideas 24, no. 1 (1963): 133–42. Volphillhac-Auger, Catherine. “On the Proper Use of the Stick: The Spirit of the Laws and the Chinese Empire.” In Kingston, Montesquieu and His Legacy, 81–92. Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet). “Cannibals to Falsity of Human Virtue.” Philosophical Dictionary, in The Works of Voltaire: A Contemporary Version. Translated by William Flemming. 21 vols. New York: E.R. DuMont, 1901. – “China.” Philosophical Dictionary, in Flemming, The Works of Voltaire. – “De La Chine.” Dictionnaire philosophique. Vol. 2, Oeuvres de Voltaire, edited by Adrien-Jean-Quentin Beuchot. 28 vols. Paris: Garnier Frère, 1878. – “Essai sur les moeurs.” In Oeuvres Complètes de Voltaire, Vol. 3. Paris: Perrotin, 1846. – An essay on universal history … written in French, by M. De Voltaire … Translated by Mr Nugent. 4 vols. Edinburgh: Printed for J. Balfour et al., 1777. – Lettres chinoises, indiennes et tartares. À Monsieur Paw. Genève: n.p., 1776. – The Orphan of China. Translated by Arthur Murphy. Dublin: William Smith, 1756. – L’Orphelin de la Chine. Paris: Michel Lambert, 1755. – The Works of Voltaire: A Contemporary Version. Translated by William Flemming. 21 vols. New York: E.R. DuMont, 1901. von Glahn, Richard. “Comment on Arbitrage, China, and World Trade in the Early Modern Period.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 39, no. 3 (1996): 365–7. Vossius, Isaac. Dissertatio de vera aetate mundi. The Hague: Adriani Vlacq, 1659. Vries, Peer. “The California School and Beyond: How to Study the Great Divergence?” History Compass 8, no. 7 (2010): 730–51. – “Are Coal and Colonies really Crucial? Kenneth Pomeranz and the Great Divergence.” Journal of World History 12, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 407–46.  – “Public Finance in China and Britain in the Long Eighteenth Century.” Working Papers 167/12. The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 2012. – State, Economy, and the Great Divergence: Britain and China, 1680s–1850s. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. Waley-Cohen, Joanna. The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. Wells, Edward. A Treatise of antient and present geography … Oxford: Printed at the Theater, 1701. Williams, Glyndwr. Documents Relating to Anson’s Voyage. London: Navy Records Society, 1967. – The Great South Sea: English Voyages and Encounters, 1570–1750. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997.

28463_Millar.indd 249

2016-12-15 14:02:04

250

Bibliography

– The Prize of All the Oceans: The Triumph and Tragedy of Anson’s Voyage round the World. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999. Wills Jr, John E. “Author, Publisher, Patron, World: A Case Study of Old Books and Global Consciousness.” Journal of Early Modern History 13 (2009): 375–433. – Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K’ang-hsi. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1984. Withers, Charles W.J. “Eighteenth-Century Geography: Texts, Practices, Sites.” Progress in Human Geography 30, no. 6 (2006): 711–29. Wolff, Larry, and Marco Cipolloni, eds. The Anthropology of the Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. Wong, R. Bin. China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience. New York: Cornell University Press, 1997. Wright, Arthur F. “The Study of Chinese Civilization.” Journal of the History of Ideas 21, no. 2 (April–June 1960): 233–55. Yang, Chi-ming. Performing China: Virtue, Commerce, and Orientalism in EighteenthCentury England, 1660–1760. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011. Yeo, Richard. “Classifying the Sciences.” In The Cambridge History of Science, edited by Roy Porter. 7 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Young, David. “Montesquieu’s View of Despotism and His Use of Travel Literature.” The Review of Politics 40, no. 3 (July 1978): 392–405. Zelin, Madeleine, Jonathan K. Ocko, and Robert Gardella, eds. Contract and Property in Early Modern China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. Zhang, Longxi. “The Myth of the Other: China in the Eyes of the West.” Critical Inquiry 15, no. 1 (Autumn 1988): 108–31.

28463_Millar.indd 250

2016-12-15 14:02:04

Index

Acemoglu, Daron, 32 Adas, Michael, 20, 82, 196, 200 agriculture: in China, 53, 167, 205–6; in comparative perspective, 167–8; fiscal policies and, 167–8; Physiocrats on, 97; property rights and, 167 Allen, Robert, 18, 21, 45, 53 Amboyna massacre, 106 Amin, Samir, 17 Amiot, Jean-Joseph Marie, 163 Anson, George: on Chinese commercial behaviour, 92–3; on Chinese language, 217; on Chinese science and technology, 200, 204; criticism of East India Company, 51–2; description of Canton, 103, 123; explanation of Chinese morality, 82, 83, 84–5, 91–2; on honest mandarins, 89; military career, 103; personal views, 14; travel account, 50–1, 200n38; A Voyage round the world, 50–1 Argens, Jean-Baptiste de Boyer, 68 Aristotle, 129 Arrighi, Giovanni, 162 Astley, Thomas, 60 Atwell, William, 116

28463_Millar.indd 251

Bacon, Francis: The Advancement of Learning, 191 Balambangan Island, 124 balance of trade debate, 115–16, 119 Ballaster, Ros, 22n60 Barclay, Patrick, 123 Barros, João de, 37 Barrow, John: Travels in China, 21 Baudet, Henri, 26 Bayle, Pierre, 62 Bell, John: Travels from St Petersburg in Russia to diverse parts of Asia, 50, 103 Berg, Maxine, 202 Bernier, François, 126 Blue, Gregory, 16, 21, 27, 227n5 Bodin, Jean, 11 Bossuet, Jacques-Bénigne: Discourse on Universal History, 28n81 Botero, Giovanni: on causes of Chinese wealth, 63; on China’s trade, 114; on Chinese revenue, 179; on oriental despotism, 130; on population of China, 178; Relationi Universali, 63, 130; sources of information, 130n9; on taxation, 186–7 Bower, Archibald, 59 Boym, Michael, 40

2016-12-15 14:02:04

252

Index

Braudel, Fernand, 17 Brewer, John, 162 Brook, Timothy, 177, 178n101, 227n5 Brookes, Richard, 46, 47n32 Buckley, Samuel, 44n28 Buoye, Thomas, 165 Burke, Peter: A Social History of Knowledge, 57 Campbell, George: The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 194 Campbell, John, 59, 59n72 Campbell, Mary, 29, 37 Cantillon, Richard, 118 Canton: descriptions, 103, 123; foreign commerce in, 105, 107; free trade, 122; opening of, 99 Carcassone, E., 133 Cave, Edward, 47 Cavendish, Thomas, 38 Chen, Jeng-Guo S., 21–2 Chen, Shouyi, 68 China: agriculture, 53, 167, 205–6; army, 152, 154, 154n8; canals, 172; comparison to Europe, 100; currency, 116; discovery of sea route to, 36; Dutch merchants in, 49n39; economic development, 5, 19, 32; enlightened despotism, 127; European views of, 4, 6, 7, 15n30, 32, 36–7, 45, 222; foreign trade policies, 98, 100; geographic descriptions, 7; as global power, reemergence, 23; imperial court, 187; infrastructure, 171–2; international relations, 156–7; isolation policy, 20, 100–1, 102; Jesuits missionaries, 14, 15, 41; labour relations, 53, 120; land policy, 165–6; legal system, 188; Manchu Conquest, 43, 156, 156n15; merchants, 49, 73; morality, discussion of, 15n28,

28463_Millar.indd 252

71, 80–1, 87, 88–9; nobility, 136–7, 140; non-Christian status of, 13–14; population, 176–7, 177–8, 180; poverty, 180; property rights, 165–6, 170; public works, 172–3; punishments for criminals, 125; revenue collection, 176; science and technology, 12–13, 20, 202; social conditions, 21–2; Sung NeoConfucian orthodoxy, 43; system of punishments, 138, 141; taxation, 116, 167, 174, 183, 184; taxpayers, 176–7, 176n95; trade with England, 115; travel accounts, 6, 7, 15–16; as universal model, 120; Western missions to, 101, 101n18. See also Ming Dynasty; Qing Dynasty “China Problem, The” (Clarke), 222 China’s government: accountability of, 148; “agrarian paternalism,” 151; civil duties of, 152, 153, 164–71; control of provincial mandarins, 147; corruption, 148, 149; criticism of, 153; despotic label, 127, 131, 132, 140, 143–4, 150–1; Enlightenment philosophers on, 127–8, 149–50, 151; internal checks, 147–50; maxims of good policy, 147–8; military duties of, 153–64; moderate images of, 127, 132, 143–4, 150–1; moral checks, 145–6; popular checks, 137–8, 145, 145n63; sources of information on, 131; status of emperor, 143–4, 146, 147; structural checks, 144–5. See also oriental despotism China’s military: artillery, 156; comparison to European armies, 157n16; infantry, 154n8, 155; lack of practice, 157; Manchu Conquest and, 155; potential advantages, 158; rise of paid army, 155, 155n10; size

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Index 253

of, 154–5, 154n8; tactics and skills, 160n31; technology, 156; weakness of, 159, 160 China’s political economy: commercial culture, 223–4; contemporary observations of, 6–7; definition, 10–14; economic historians on, 18–19; European view of, 4, 5, 30–2, 223–4, 226; focus on present, 229; foreign trade policies, 12, 97–8, 224; government and, 12, 224–5; idea of progress, 226–7, 226n5, 230; internal trade, 224; limitations of, 5, 100; military’s role in, 225; moral foundations for, 11; motivations for change, 228–9; primary sources, 7–8, 33–4; property rights, 225; public institutions, 225; revisionist economic history and image of, 225–6; science and technology, 225; social change and, 229–30; as sui generis case, 30; weaknesses of, 225, 228; wealth acquisition, 98–9 China trade: advance of domestic, 109–10, 112; balance of, 115–16; with England, 116, 117; vs European trade, 110; gold and silver, 116, 117; Hong merchant monopoly, 124; impact of geography on, 109; limits of international, 113; mercantilists and bullionists view of, 115; Physiocrats on, 119–20; price of goods, 120; scale of, 109–10; selfsufficiency, 111; Western views of, 99–104, 109–11, 113, 114, 117, 124–5. See also international trade Chinese avarice: Christian perspective, 87–8; in different geographic areas, 88–9, 90; European explanations for, 84, 94–

28463_Millar.indd 253

5; as part of human nature, 84–6; passion for violence and, 92 Chinese commercial behaviour: cheating and fraud, 79, 82–3; Christian explanation for, 86–7; Confucian morality and, 83; criticism of, 95; in domestic and foreign trade, 89–90; effect of climate on, 93; European reports on, 78–84; geographical perspective, 91–2; greed, 79, 83n45; importance of personal relations, 91; Jesuit reports on, 78–9; moral values and, 74–5, 77–8; paganism of society and, 95; political perspective, 91–2; self-interest, 80–1; variations of, 89–90, 95 Chinese Rites Controversy, 42, 44, 62, 198 Chinese “stagnation,” explanations for: barriers of language and communication, 215–17, 217n110; Chinese character, 214; education system, 208–10; European perspectives, 220–1; geographical isolation, 211–12; lack of competition, 210–11; lack of curiosity, 208, 214; lack of leisure class, 220; Needham’s puzzle, 207; rejection of foreign ideas, 212–13 Chinese Taste, The (Porter), 23 Chinese Traveller, The, 35, 55, 60, 101 Citizen of the World (Goldsmith), 22 Clark, Gregory, 164n49 Clarke, Donald, 222 Coclanis, Peter, 18, 112 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 43, 173, 182 Collyer, J., 82 commercial banking, 94 commercial morality: European conceptions of, 73–8; portrayal of Chinese, 78, 80, 83, 94

2016-12-15 14:02:04

254

Index

compendiums. See travel compendiums compilations, 34, 54, 55, 56 Confucianism: in government and education, role of, 14; principles of morality, 79, 83, 85, 145; as science, 126; as state cult, 85 Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (The Morals of Confucius, a Chinese Philosopher), 42, 126, 126n1 Couplet, Philippe, 42n22, 126n1 Crone, G.R., 47 Cruz, Gaspar da, 36n8, 37, 78, 109, 113, 215 Dalrymple, Alexander, 124 Dapper, Olfert, 122 Davis, Walter, 27 Davity, Pierre, 56 De Christiana expeditione apud Sinas (Ricci), 40–1, 40n18 Defoe, Daniel: The Complete English Tradesman, 68, 76; on ethical ideals vs practical norms, 76–7; on frauds, 77; on honest man vs honest tradesman, 76; on immorality vs trading lies, 72; interest in China, 68–9, 68n107; on international trade, 96, 97; personality of, 76; Robinson Crusoe, 68, 76 De L’esprit des lois (The Spirit of the Laws), 136–8, 139, 139n44 Demel, Walter, 51, 136 Deng, Kent, 116 Dermigny, Louis, 22n60 Description de la Chine (The General History of China), 45–7, 45n31 despotism: absence of intermediate power, 136; French absolutism and concept of, 132n15; Montesquieu on, 133, 136; origin of the term, 146; tyrannical vs legal, 141

28463_Millar.indd 254

Diamond, Jared, 5 Diderot, Denis, 7, 63, 63n88, 64, 192–4, 214 Dodds, Muriel, 133, 139 Duchet, Michèle, 47 Du Halde, Jean-Baptiste: on agriculture, 205; armchair writer, 6; authority of, 46; on China’s infantry, 154; on Chinese inventions, 204; Description de la Chine (The General History of China), 45–6; on despotism, 131; English translation of works of, 166; on moral constraints of government, 146; on morality, 80–1, 84, 88; on noble class, 136; on population of China, 176–7, 176n95; on porcelain production, 203; on poverty, 180; on property rights, 166–7; on punishment for criminals, 135; sources of information, 58; on speculative science in China, 210; on stubbornness of Chinese, 212– 13; on trade policy, 110–11, 119, 123 Dutch East India Company (voc), 105 Easterly, William, 32 Edict of Nantes: revocation of, 128 education system of China, 208–9, 210 Edward VI, King of England, 38 Elman, Benjamin, 20, 192, 198, 200–1, 213 embassy from the East India Company, An (Nieuhof), 49n39 England: agricultural revolution, 53; army, 154n7; canals, 173, 174; commercial transportation, 174; export to China, 115, 117–18; form of government, 128–9, 149; Grub Street publications, 58; population, 177; public works, 173; revenue, 179; vs Scotland, 120; tariffs on

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Index 255

foreign goods, 120; taxation, 179, 180. See also Great Britain English East India Company (eic), 51–2, 106, 107, 116–17 Enlightenment: capsules of, 8–10; characteristic of intellectual life, 222; chronological framework, 10; circulation of information, 56–7; concept of science, 192; discourse of political economy, 9, 14; economic environment, 4–5; interest in non-European civilizations, 3–4, 25–6; “knowledge explosion,” 57; new class of readers, 57; perception of China, 227; racism, 13; scholarly debates on, 8–9; theories of government, 127–8 Entrecolles, François Xavier d’, 202–3 Escalante, Bernardino de, 37 Étiemble, René, 133, 139n45 eunuchs, 149, 185 Europe: armies, 154; idea of progress, 226n5; land tax, 175; sources of revenue, 175; spending on war, 180; trading system, 108–9; wars and conflicts, 154 European discourses on China: ambivalent views, 24, 25; China as advanced civilization, 30, 31; class perspective, 22; economic perspective, 22n60, 23; English identity and, 25; Eurocentrism, 22–3; imaginative literature, 22; primary sources, 21, 27–9; problem of perceptions, 26–7; realistic accounts, 22; revisionist perspective, 24; role of direct observations, 21–2, 28; shift from sinophilia to sinophobia, 15 facts: definition and interpretation of, 33–4

28463_Millar.indd 255

Fenning, D., 82 Féraud, Jean-François, 11 Ferguson, Adam, 162 Ferguson, James, 193 first-hand accounts, 34, 37, 40–1 Flynn, Dennis, 116 foreign trade. See international trade Foucquet, Jean François, 135n29 Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth, 64, 141 France: absolute monarchy, 128; Canal du Midi, 172, 174; population, 178; property rights, 165, 170; public infrastructure, 173–4; size of army, 154n7; tax system, 181–2, 183, 184–5; transportation of goods, 174 Frank, Andre Gunder, 17 free trade: concept of, 106, 119; prospect of development, 124 Gee, Joshua, 100, 118; The Trade and navigation of Great Britain considered, 107 Gentleman’s Magazine, 61 geographies, 7, 34, 54, 57–8. See also special geographies Gibbon, Edward: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 113 Giráldez, Arturo, 116 global economic history: divergence between Europe and China, 31; Eurocentrists vs revisionists debate, 17–18 Godlewska, Anne, 57n65 Goldsmith, Oliver: Chinese Letters, 16; The Citizen of the World, 22, 68 Goodman, Dena, 158 Great Britain: financial capitalism, 162; Inclosure Acts, 164–5; Navigation Acts, 114, 153; taxation, 186. See also England Great Divergence debate, 5–6, 5n4

2016-12-15 14:02:04

256

Index

Green, John, 47, 60, 166 Gregory XIII, Pope, 37 Grosier, Jean Baptiste, 15 Grub Street writers, 7, 44n28, 47, 58, 60 Guthrie, William, 47, 60, 61, 152, 177 Guy, Basil, 17, 20, 47, 66 Hakluyt, Richard, 38, 55–6 Hevia, James, 100n14 Heylin, Peter, 56 Hirschman, Albert, 75, 92, 94 Histoire des deux Indes (History of the two Indias), 63–4 Historical and Geographical Description of Formosa, An (Psalmanazar), 54 Hobbes, Thomas: De cive, 85 Hobson, John, 16, 100 Hongxi, Emperor of China, 100 Hont, Istvan, 98, 104, 120 Horne, Thomas, 165 Hostetler, Laura, 20 Hume, David: on art of reasoning, 30–1; on Asian goods, 120; on barbarous vs civilized monarchy, 144; Of Civil Liberty, 30; comparison to Montesquieu, 129n4; education, 66; on English monarchy, 129; on international trade, 119; on morality, 74; on nature of Chinese monarchy, 144–5; on obstacles to foreign trade, 108; “Of Refinement in the Arts,” 194; “Of the Balance of Trade,” 119; “Of the Jealousy of Trade,” 119; “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” 66, 144; on progress in science, 194; use of evidence by, 66 Hung, Ho-fung, 20 Hutcheson, Francis, 74, 75 Ignatius of Loyola, Saint, 39 Imperial Bureau of Astronomy, 199

28463_Millar.indd 256

information on China: audiences, 70; faithful witnesses, 28–9; genres, 7–8, 34–5, 69. See also compilations; first-hand accounts; geographies; philosophical works; travel compendiums international trade: Chinese policy toward, 96, 105, 107–8, 122, 125; competition of European powers, 104–8; Hume on, 119; mercantilists’ view of, 115 Irwin, Douglas, 106 Ismailoff, Leon Vasilievitch, 103 Jacob, Margaret, 193, 195 Jenkins, Eugenia Zuroski, 25, 99 Jesuit descriptions of China: bias of, 35, 38, 53–4, 58, 61; on Chinese character, 78–9, 81, 96, 160; on Chinese language, 216, 217n110; on Chinese science, 196–8, 200, 201; Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, 42; critique of education system, 209; on population, 177; as primary sources, 14, 39, 60–1; question of reliability, 42, 47–8, 51, 52, 60; vs secular descriptions, 82 Jesuits: decline of influence of, 198; French state and, 43; knowledge sharing, 40; missions in China, 41, 43–4, 49; modern scholars on, 47–8; as promoters of Chinese culture, 40; publishing activity, 43; religious agenda, 39, 40; residence in Macao, 39 Jimack, Peter, 63, 218 Johnson, Samuel, 11 Jones, Eric L., 17 Justi, Johann Heinrich Gottlob von, 97 Kangxi, Emperor of China, 44, 104, 198, 214

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Index 257

Kidd, Colin, 13 Kircher, Athanase, 69 knowledge production, 191 Knox, John, 60n78 Kokonor (Qinghai): Qing conquest of, 158 Lach, Donald, 33, 37, 227 Landes, David, 5, 17, 121, 210 Lange, Laurent, 50, 103–4, 200 Le Comte, Louis: on Chinese avarice, 84; on Chinese education, 159–60, 209; on Chinese government, 143– 4, 151; on Chinese infrastructure, 171; on Chinese language, 216–17; on Chinese military, 154; on Chinese morality, 79–80, 87; on corruption, 138; description of canals, 205; on honest mandarins, 88; Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine, 10, 44, 122, 138; on porcelain manufacturing, 202; on principles of good policy, 147–8; on “spirit of penetration,” 208; on taxation and revenue, 166, 178, 185 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: on Chinese philosophy, 85; on Chinese vs European civilization, 160, 201– 2; on Confucianism, 85; Novissima Sinica, 62, 62n86, 85, 160, 201; as proto-Sinologist, 27; support of Jesuits, 62; writing on China, 7n10 Le Stourgeon, B.: A compleat universal history, 123 Linnaeus, Carl, 13 “Little Secret History, A” (Page), 52 Locke, John, 62 Lottes, Günther, 27, 140 Louis XIV, King of France, 43, 128, 132n15, 182 Louis XV, King of France, 128

28463_Millar.indd 257

Lufrano, Richard, 72, 73, 74, 91 Ma, Debin, 179 Macartney, George, 100, 102–3 Macartney embassy to China, 21–2 Mackerras, Colin, 25, 51 Magalhães, Gabriel de, 216 Mairan, Jean Jacques d’ Ortous de, 65 Malacca: Portuguese conquest of, 101 Manchus: assimilation of, 159, 160–1; conquest of China, 156, 158, 165; description of, 157 Mandelso, John Albert de, 55 Mandeville, Bernard, 193, 194; Fable of the Bees, 74, 75 Mandeville, John, 36n5 Markley, Robert, 22–3, 47, 48, 52 Marouby, Christian, 67 Marshall, P.J., 40, 226 Martini, Martino, 156; Sinicae historiae Decas Prima, 42 Maverick, Lewis, 57 Mayhew, Robert, 61 McCloskey, Deirdre, 18, 193, 196 Melon, Jean-François, 92, 142n59 Mendoza, Juan González de: armchair writer, 37; on China’s trade policy, 109–10; on Chinese inventions, 196–7; on Chinese military, 154; on education system, 208–9; Historia de las cosas más notables, ritos y costumbres del gran reyno de la China, 37–8; on oriental despotism, 130, 130n7; sources of information, 37; on taxation, 181 mercantilists, 115 Ming Dynasty: arrival of Jesuits, 40; fall of, 149, 156, 158; foreign trade, 121–2; renovation of Grand Canal, 172; revenue collection, 178–9; state of science, 199, 213; tributary system, 122

2016-12-15 14:02:04

258

Index

Mirabeau, Marquis de, 141 Modern History, or, The Present State of All Nations (Salmon), 59, 135 modern part of an universal history, The, 150, 204 Mokyr, Joel, 18, 195 Moll, Herman, 57 Montchrestien, Antoine de: Traicté de l’oeconomie politique, 11 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron de: on Chinese trade, 72, 111; on Chinese vs European morality, 94; on climate of China, 137; comparison to Hume, 129n4; criticism of, 139, 141–2; De L’esprit des lois (The Spirit of the Laws), 64–5, 133, 134; on despotism, 131, 133–4, 136, 139n46, 140, 143; dispute with de Mairan, 65; on distinct characteristics of China, 32; on European dominance, 111; on French property rights, 170; on global exchange of silver, 118; on government of China, 127, 133–7, 140, 150; on Jesuit accounts, 65; on Manchu conquest of China, 161; on moral principles of Chinese, 72, 77, 93–4; on nature of commerce, 72; on oriental despotism, 12, 28, 133; on overpopulation, 180; on ploughing ceremony, 136; on political and moral vices, 94; on popular check of government, 137–8; selective approach to facts, 27; on severity of penalties in China, 138; sources of information, 93, 133, 134–5, 134n25, 135n29, 139–40; use of empirical evidence by, 132–3, 132n17 morality: practical applications of, 73–4; principles of, 145–6. See also commercial morality

28463_Millar.indd 258

Mungello, David, 15n28 Münster, Sebastian, 56 Muthu, Sankar, 64 Naish, James, 91 Navarrete, Domingo Fernández, 48–9, 81n35, 113n62, 146, 181 Needham, Joseph, 207 Netherlanders: Chinese view of, 140n50; conflict with Portugal, 105–6; presence in Asia, 104–5; profit of East India trade, 118; tax rates, 186; trade with China, 100 New and Universal Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences, A (Barrow), 191, 192 new general collection of voyages and travels, A, 60, 117 new geographical, historical and commercial grammar, A (Guthrie), 60–1, 60n78 New Geographical and Historical Grammar, A (Salmon), 59, 60 New System of Geography, A (Fenning and Collyer), 82 Nieuhof, Johannes: on Chinese morality, 88–9; on commercial behaviour in China, 81–2; on Confucius, 81; on Dutch-Portuguese conflicts, 105; on European trade with China, 100, 102, 122; Het gezantschap der Neêrlandtsche OostIndische Compagnie, 105; journey to Peking, 49, 110 non-Jesuit writings on China: on agriculture, 53; authors of, 49; bias of, 53; on Chinese morality, 81; Dutch works, 49, 49n39; on foreign trade policies, 50; influence of, 48–9, 51; vs Jesuit writing, 82; on political economy, 49; popularity of, 50–1; question of reliability of, 52; sources for, 49, 50

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Index 259

North, Douglass, 164n49 Nouveaux mémoires sur l’état présent de la Chine (Memoirs and Observations Made in a Late Journey through the Empire of China), 44–5 O’Brien, Patrick, 18, 217n110 Ocko, Jonathan, 165 Ogilby, John, 49n39, 99 oriental despotism, 128–30, 129n6 Osborne, Anne, 165 Oswald, James, 120 Outram, Dorinda, 9, 196 Pagden, Anthony, 227 Page, Edward, 52 Parke, Robert, 38 Parrenin, Dominique, 133, 217n110 Parry, John Horace, 36n5 Pascal, Blaise, 62n83 Paul III, Pope, 39 Pauw, Cornelius de, 66, 143n60, 177, 185, 186 Percy, Thomas, 24, 87–8, 148, 149 Perdue, Peter, 20, 112, 158, 159 Pereira, Galeote, 36n8, 37 Pereira, Jacques, 133 Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia, 103, 104 philosophical works, 34, 62–3, 65, 66, 68, 69–70 Physiocrats, 64, 97, 119 Pires, Tomé, 101 Pliny, the Elder, 101 Pocock, J.G.A., 9, 214–15 Poivre, Pierre: on agricultural practices, 167–8, 205–6; on canals, 172; on equality, 137; on fiscal policies, 167–8, 185; life and travels, 52–3; on roads in China, 172; on security of property, 168; Voyage d’un philosophe, 53

28463_Millar.indd 259

political economy: California School, 14n27, 18; comparative approach, 19; definition, 10–11; economic historians’ contribution to, 18–19; Eurocentrists vs revisionists, 17–18; macro-structural approach, 20–1; rich-country poor-country debate, 120; Steuart on, 3; theories of, 11 Polo, Marco, 36, 36n5, 212; The Description of the World, 35–6 Pomeranz, Kenneth: criticism of, 18, 19, 23, 190–1; Great Divergence debate, 6, 17, 23; on rise of the West, 5, 5n4 porcelain production, 202–3 Porter, David: on British trade in China, 116–17; on Chinese language, 216; The Chinese Taste, 23–4; on international commerce, 100n14; on Percy’s work on China, 87; on universal appeal of trade, 124; on views of China in Europe, 31, 99 Porter, Roy, 26 Portugal, 39, 40, 101, 105–6 Prévost, Antoine-François: Histoire générale, 63 progress: in China, 227–8, 230; idea of, 226–7 property rights: agriculture and, 167, 168; in China, 165–6, 170; in England and France, 164–5; industrialization and, 166; origin of, 164n49; in philosophical works, 165, 169–70; security of property, 166–7, 168–9, 170 proto-Sinologists, 27–8 Psalmanazar, George, 54, 54n54, 59 public infrastructure: advantages of, 189; canals, 172, 173; funds for, 175; maintenance of, 171, 173; quality of public works, 172–3; roads, 171–2 Purchas, Samuel, 55

2016-12-15 14:02:04

260

Index

Qianlong, Emperor of China, 50, 102, 159 Qing Dynasty: corruption, 121; creation of, 43, 155; diplomacy, 121, 159; expansionism, 112–13, 158; Mongol threat, 112; spending on war, 180; state of science and technology, 213; trade policy, 122, 124 Quesnay, François: on China’s government, 128, 131, 143; on China’s military, 163; on China’s tax system, 183–4, 188, 189; on Chinese behaviour, 74, 89–90; on Chinese political economy, 229; on Chinese trade, 124; criticism of Montesquieu, 139n44, 141–2; debates on Chinese despotism, 140–1, 143, 224; “Despotisme de la Chine,” 57n66, 64; library of, 141; on natural rights, 153n4; Physiocratic ideas of, 57–8n66, 64; praise of Chinese canals, 172; on prevention of overpopulation, 142, 142n59; on punishment in China, 141; on security of property, 168–9; sources of information, 57, 64, 163; Tableau économique, 64; on universality of natural law, 150; on wealth of nations, 119, 180–1 Rada, Martín de, 36n8, 37, 154, 197, 215 Ramsey, Rachel, 208 Randall, Joseph, 117 Raynal, abbé (Guillaume-ThomasFrançois): on benefits of learning, 218–19; on China’s taxation, 184; on Chinese philosophy, 218; on Chinese science, 221; on conquest of China, 160–1; Histoire des deux Indes, 34, 63; on roads in China,

28463_Millar.indd 260

171–2, 223; on virtue of Chinese, 90 Reinert, Sophus, 8 Relations de divers voyages curieux (Thévenot), 55, 55n58 Review of the History of England, The (Salmon), 58–9 Ricci, Matteo: on China’s taxation, 178, 187; on Chinese avarice, 84, 87; on Chinese education, 209; on Chinese focus on present, 229; on Chinese language, 215–16; on Chinese morality, 78–80, 88; on Chinese pride, 96; De Christiana expeditione apud Sinas, 40–1, 40n18; imprisonment of, 198–9; map of China, 198; on science and technology in China, 199, 201; translation of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, 199. See also Trigault, Nicolas Richter, Melvin, 132n15, 132n17, 139, 139n46, 146 Riquet, Pierre Paul, 174 Robertson, John, 9, 10 Robins, Benjamin, 50, 50n41, 92 Robinson, James, 32 Rodrik, Dani, 222 Rolt, Richard, 107, 123 Román, Jerónimo, 37n11, 197, 209 Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 18, 127, 151, 162, 186 Rousseau, George, 26 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 7, 28n81, 161; Discourse on Inequality, 75 Rousselot de Surgy, Jacques-Philibert, 57–8, 64, 140n51, 206–7, 210 Rowbotham, Arnold, 47, 135n29 Rubiés, Joan-Pau, 14, 28, 37n11, 56, 129 Russo-Chinese relations, 103–4 Sale, George, 59 Salmon, Thomas: on arrogance

2016-12-15 14:02:04



Index 261

of Chinese, 96; assessment of England’s revenue, 179; on China’s stagnation, 211–12; description of Manchu, 157; on laws and their applications, 149; life and works of, 58–9; Modern History, 114, 157; on Nanking trade, 114; on punishment for criminals, 135; The Review of the History of England, 58; on scientific progress, 211; sources of information, 59; on technology, 206; on truth and fiction in travel accounts, 33 Schall von Bell, Johann Adam, 40, 155, 198, 200 Schedel, Frederick, 105, 122 science and technology: as attribute of civilization, 191–2, 196; comparison of European and Chinese, 201–2, 206; definitions of science, 192; in early modern Europe, 195–6; link to economic development, 194, 194n14, 195; philosophical debates on status of, 192–6; science vs art, 192–3 science and technology in China: agricultural practices, 205–6; comparison to European, 201–2, 206; criticism of, 201, 204, 206–7; decline of, 206–7; description of technology, 202; different approaches to, 199, 213; education system and, 208–9; Enlightenment commentators on, 190–1, 207; geographical knowledge, 213–14; imitation, 203–4; inventions, 191, 197, 203; Jesuits’ contribution to, 196–201; lack of progress, 211; manufactured goods, 202; modern scholars on, 193; moral philosophy, 200; Muslim astronomers, 212; Needham’s puzzle, 207; organization and categories of,

28463_Millar.indd 261

193; strengths and weaknesses, 191, 196–207, 201, 219–20; translations of Western books, 199 Sebastiani, Silvia, 13 Semedo, Alvaro, 41, 135, 201, 202 Seven Years War, 154, 154n7 Shirley, William, 59n72 Sino-European commercial encounters, 100n14 sinophilia and sinophobia, 16–17, 20, 100n14 Sino-Portuguese relations, 114 Smith, Adam: on agricultural system in China, 109, 219; An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 3, 10, 11, 32, 71; on China’s commercial infrastructure, 171; on China’s tax system, 185–6, 188, 189; on Chinese trade, 97, 120–1; on commercial spirit, 92; concept of impartial spectator, 75; criticism of accounts on China, 28–9; on duties of government, 12, 153, 164, 170–1; on economic growth, 169; on international trade, 97; library of, 67; maxims for taxation, 185; on mercantilists, 115; on natural vs acquired rights, 169; on passion, 75–6; on political economy, 10, 108–9; on positive effects of selfinterest, 77; on progress of China, 227–8; on property rights, 169, 225; on public works in China, 28, 172–3; research method, 67–8; on science and technology, 194–5; on silver trade, 117n79; on slave labour vs free labour, 108n42; sources of information, 50, 67, 169; support of Navigation Act, 114, 153; on taxation and revenue, 175–6; The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 11, 71, 75; use of empirical evidence, 66, 67–8; on

2016-12-15 14:02:04

262

Index

vulnerability of rich states, 162; on wealth and military strength, 162–3 Smollett, Tobias, 59, 59n72 Society of Jesus, 39 Sousa, Manuel de Faria i, 41n20 Spadafora, David, 191, 193 special geographies, 56, 57–8, 60, 61 Staunton, George, 219; An Authentic Account of an Embassy to China, 21, 220 Steuart, James, 11, 223; An inquiry into the principles of political oeconomy, 3 Sun, Tzu: The Art of War, 163 Swinton, John, 59 T’ai Tsung, Emperor of China, 181 Tang Dynasty, 199 taxation: in France, 181–2, 183; maxims for, 185; wars and, 182 taxation in China: age of taxpayers, 181; benefits of, 181, 183; in comparative perspective, 186; corruption, 185, 186; inequalities in, 185; labour and, 183; landtax model, 181, 183; revenue collection, 176–81, 184, 187–8; revenue spending, 187; sources of revenue, 174, 175–6; taxpayers, 176–7, 176n95; vulnerability of, 189 Theodorick, king of Ostrogoth, 146 Thévenot, Melchisédec, 55 Tindal, Mathew, 85–6 Tooke, Benjamin, 44n28 Tory, Salmon, 149 travel compendiums, 35–8, 55–6, 58 travel compilations. See compilations Travels from St Petersburg, in Russia, to diverse parts of Asia (Bell), 50 Trigault, Nicolas, 40, 41, 41n19, 187 Universal History, The, 59–60, 59n72. See also The modern part of an universal history,

28463_Millar.indd 262

Universal Traveller, The (Salmon), 59, 83n45 Van Kley, Edwin, 33 Vauban, Sébastien le Prestre de, 62, 182–3 Venturi, Franco, 132n15 Verbiest, Ferdinand, 155, 198, 200 Voltaire: characteristic of civilization, 158; on China’s military, 163–4; on Chinese avarice, 86; on Chinese commercial behaviour, 91; Dictionnaire philosophique (Philosophical Dictionary), 65, 86; on economic growth, 97; Essai sur les moeurs, 16, 63, 91, 157; on Jesuit sources of information, 65–6; on jus naufragii (right of shipwreck), 91; on Manchu conquest of China, 157–8; on moral philosophy, 218; on property rights, 169–70; on science in China, 9, 190, 214, 215, 217–18, 220 Vossius, Isaac, 62n83 Voyage round the world, A (Anson), 50–1, 50n41, 52, 82 Vries, Jan de, 19 Vries, Peer: on “agrarian paternalism,” 151; on Chinese infrastructure, 171; criticism of Pomeranz, 190–1; on property rights, 166; on role of institutions, 5; on taxation, 179–80, 188; on wealth and military power, 162 Waley-Cohen, Joanna, 21, 100n14 Walpole, Horace, 68 Walter, Richard, 50, 92 Wanli, Emperor of China, 156, 199 war: economy and, 162; government spending on, 180

2016-12-15 14:02:04

War of Spanish Succession, 182 Watts, John, 46 Wealth of Nations, The (Smith), 3, 10, 11, 32, 71 Weingast, Barry, 164n49 Why Nations Fail (Acemoglu and Robinson), 32 Williams, Glyndwr, 40, 50, 51, 54, 55, 103, 227 Wills, John, Jr, 102 Wong, Roy Bin, 5, 18, 127, 151, 162, 186

28463_Millar.indd 263

Index 263 “World Too Complex for One-SizeFits-All Models” (Rodrik), 222–3 Wright, Arthur, 226n5 Xu, Guangqi, 199 Xuande, Emperor of China, 100 Yang, Chi-ming, 24–5, 77, 229 Yongzheng, Emperor of China, 50, 214 Young, David, 133 Zhang, Longxi, 15n30

2016-12-15 14:02:04

28463_Millar.indd 264

2016-12-15 14:02:04