Singapore in the Malay World [1 ed.] 0415484103, 9780415484107

Table of contents :
Singapore in the Malay World
Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
1 Singapura
2 Remembering and forgetting
3 Competing and comparable paradigms of authoritarian nation-building
4 The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity
5 The politics of economic competition and cooperation
6 The singa and garuda: from kiasu to soft power diplomacy?
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
List of interviews
Index

Citation preview

Singapore in the Malay World

Relations between Singapore and her immediate Malay neighbours have been perennially fraught with tension and misunderstanding. In making sense of this complex relationship, Lily Rahim explores the salience of historical animosities and competitive economic pressures, and Singapore’s janus-faced security and foreign economic policy orientation and ‘regional outsider’ complex. Focusing on Singapore’s relations with Malaysia, the book also examines the Indonesian dimension in bilateral relations. It highlights the paradoxical similarities in the nation-building approaches of Singapore and Malaysia. The author reflects critically on sensitive issues such as the rhetoric and reality of meritocracy and multiracialism in Singapore, and analyses the city-state’s weak regional soft power credentials and reputation as a political laggard despite its economic achievements. Incorporating perspectives and frameworks from the disciplines of comparative politics, area studies, international relations, political economy and history, this multidisciplinary study offers groundbreaking insights into the way in which the neighbouring states of Singapore and Malaysia see themselves, each other, the region and beyond. This book will be of particular interest to keen observers of Southeast Asian politics. Lily Zubaidah Rahim is a Senior Lecturer in Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, Australia. She is a specialist in the comparative politics of Southeast Asia, with a particular research interest in the politics of identity, authoritarian governance, regionalism and reformist Islam in Southeast Asia.

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Singapore in the Malay World Building and breaching regional bridges Lily Zubaidah Rahim

First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2009 Lily Zubaidah Rahim All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Singapore in the Malay world: building and breaching regional bridges/ Lily Zubaidah Rahim. p. cm. 1. Singapore—Foreign relations—Malaysia. 2. Malaysia—Foreign relations—Singapore. I. Title. JZ1765.A57M35 2009 327.59570595–dc22 2008052777 ISBN 0-203-87610-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–48410–3 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–87610–5 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–48410–7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–87610–7 (ebk)

This book is dedicated to Singapore’s unsung heroes Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, Lim Chin Siong and Said Zahari

Contents

Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

xiv xv

1

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

1

2

Remembering and forgetting: Nusantara Malays in the Singaporean national imagination

13

Competing and comparable paradigms of authoritarian nation-building

43

4

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity

78

5

The politics of economic competition and cooperation

112

6

The singa and garuda: from kiasu to soft power diplomacy?

148

Conclusion: paradoxes and diplomatic blowbacks

179

Notes Bibliography List of interviews Index

185 208 219 220

3

Acknowledgements

This book benefitted from the encouragement of colleagues at the University of Sydney and others based in Singapore and Malaysia. Special thanks are due to Graeme Gill, Michael Barr, Carl Trocki, Mark Selden, Allan McConnell, Linda Weiss and Jomo K. Sundaram for their guidance and constructive suggestions on draft chapters. Ravi Palat’s and Garry Rodan’s multidisciplinary insights on international politics have been instrumental in shaping many aspects of this book. I have benefitted greatly from stimulating ruminations with Alfian Saat, James Gomez, Bridget Welsh, Noor Aishah Abdul Rahman, Suriani Suratman, Cherian George, Said Zahari, Tang Liang Hong, Tian Chua, Elizabeth Wong, Tan Beng Hui, Maznah Mohamad, Rose Ismail, Khoo Boo Teik and Peter King. Many politicians and civil society activists generously shared their views. Those that have had the audacity of ‘speaking truth to power’ are a source of inspiration. In the spirit of their audacity, I hope that this book helps facilitate Singapore’s journey towards a democratic multiracial society that is a force for justice and human rights in Southeast Asia and beyond. For their love and laughter, terima kasih to my mother Mawan Wajid Khan, sisters Marina, Aishah Tun and Melati Elisha, nanna Jean Godden, partner Mark John Keevers and our ‘little prince’ Bodhi Bintang. Their affirmations have reinforced the larger spiritual purpose in life. My late father’s gift of unconditional love continues to nourish and guide me through the ebbs and flows of life – terima kasih Bapak!

Abbreviations

ADB AFTA AMF APEC A*STAR ASEAN BIDA BITAC BN CARAT CDAC CIC CIQ CLOB CPF CSIS DAP DCA EAEC EAEG EDB FAX FOA FPDA FTA GIC GLC GMI GRC HDB HICOM HPH

Asian Development Bank ASEAN Free Trade Area Asian Monetary Fund Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Agency for Science, Technology and Research Association of Southeast Asian Nations Batam Industrial Development Authority Bilateral Training and Consultative Group Barisan Nasional (National Front) Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Chinese Development Assistance Council China Innovation Centre Customs, Immigration and Quarantine Central Limit Order Book Central Provident Fund Centre for Strategic and International Studies Democratic Action Party Defence Cooperation Agreement East Asian Economic Community East Asian Economic Grouping Economic Development Board Fly Asian Express Framework of Agreement Five Power Defence Agreement Free Trade Agreements Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Government Linked Company Gerakan Mansuhkan ISA (Movement to Abolish the Internal Security Act) Group Representative Constituency Housing and Development Board Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia Hutchinson Port Holdings

xvi

List of abbreviations

HRW IAEA ICJ ICT IDR IDSS IOFC IMET IMF IP ISA ISD ITLOS JI JIC JSF KL KLIA KPPU MAS MAS MCA MCP MIC MIDA MIT MNLF MNP MOE MOU MPAJA MSC MSC Nefo NEP NIE NKF NMP NRF NSTB NTT NTU NUS ODAC OIC

Human Rights Watch International Atomic Energy Agency International Court of Justice Information, Communication and Telecommunications Iskandar Development Region Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies International Offshore Financial Centre International Military Education Training International Monetary Fund Intellectual Property Internal Security Act Internal Security Department International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Jemaah Islamiah Joint Intelligence Committee Joint Strike Fighter Kuala Lumpur Kuala Lumpur International Airport Business Competition Supervisory Commission Malaysian Airlines System Monetary Authority of Singapore Malaysian Chinese Association Malayan Communist Party Malaysian Indian Congress Malaysian Industrial Development Authority Massachusetts Institute of Technology Moro National Liberation Front Malay Nationalist Party Ministry of Education Memorandum of Understanding Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army Malaysian Solidarity Convention Multimedia Super Corridor Newly Emerging Forces in Asia and Africa New Economic Policy Newly Industrialising Economy National Kidney Foundation Non-constituency Member of Parliament National Research Foundation National Science and Technology Board National Telegraph and Telecommunications Nanyang Technological University National University of Singapore Official Development Assistance and Cooperation Organisation of the Islamic Conference

List of abbreviations xvii OPEC PAP PAS PDI-P PKI PKMS PKR PLO PPKI PR PSA PTP REDI RMN RMR RSAF SAF SAFMS SAFOS SAP SBY SINDA SITTDEC SMU SPDC SSC STB SUARAM SUHAKAM Suqiu TNI UMNO UNDHR USSFTA WMD WTO ZOPFAN

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries People’s Action Party Partai Rakyat Singapura (Singapore People’s Party) Partai Se-Islam Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (Singapore Malay National Organisation) Partai Keadilan Raayat (People’s Justice Party) Palestine Liberation Organisation Peritia Penolong Kemerekaan Indonesia Pakatan Raayat (People’s Alliance) Port of Singapore Authority Port of Tanjung Pelepas Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention Royal Malaysian Navy Royal Malay Regiment Republic of Singapore Air Force Singapore Armed Forces Singapore Armed Forces Merit Scholarship Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship Special Assistance Plan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Singapore Indian Development Association South Investment Trade and Technology Data Exchange Centre Singapore Management University State Peace and Development Council South–South Commission Singapore Tourist Board Voice of Malaysians Malaysian Human Rights Commission Chinese Association Elections Appeals Committee Tentera Negara Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces) United Malay National Organisation United Nations Declaration of Human Rights US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Weapons of Mass Destruction World Trade Organisation Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

1

Singapura Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

Introduction Singapore’s ambivalent national and regional identity has been imaginatively depicted in Chua Mia Tee’s iconic painting National Language Class (see book cover). Chua’s work has drawn considerable attention for its ability to capture on canvas the ideational and identity challenges confronting Singaporean society in the late 1950s. Partially adopting a ‘back to the future’ approach, this study purports that many of the challenges confronting Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s remain relevant in the new millennium. Chua’s 1959 social realist painting is commonly interpreted as an assertion of an emerging nationalist identity, with Malay language as the social glue uniting the various ethnic communities. The painting depicts Singaporeans of different ethnicities attempting to free themselves from English, the language of their colonial masters, by learning Malay, the national language of Singapore, Malaya and the Malay World. As they sit around a round table, a symbol of equality, the Malay teacher asks his nine students two simple questions: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal? (What is your name? Where do you live?). Pregnant with political symbolism, these ostensibly simple questions capture the political dynamics of the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the Malay language was a social bridge and major medium of communication for the masses. Reflecting this nationalist zeal, many left-wing Chinese school students demanded that the study of Malay replace English in their Chinese medium schools. Nationalists such as Lim Chin Siong were in favour of recognising Malay as the national language (Rahim, 2008: 97). In preparation for merger with Malaya, the PAP government made strenuous efforts to highlight Singapore’s Malay identity. Yusof Ishak was installed as the island’s Yang di-Pertuan Negara (Head of State), and a national anthem Majullah Singapura was composed by Jubir Said in the Malay language. The state flag included the Islamic insignia of the crescent and moon. All students were required to study Malay as a second language while teachers had to pass at least Standard 1 Malay before their confirmation as teachers (Rahim, 2008: 102). Ironically, in contemporary Singapore, the elementary questions Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal? and the words of the national anthem Majullah

2

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

Singapura are not understood by most Singaporeans owing to their lack of familiarity with the national language. Indeed, many Singaporeans today are not even aware that Malay is the national language, believing that there are only four national languages.1 Lamenting the loss of Singapore’s Malay heritage, poet and playwright Alfian Saat perceptively highlights the contemporary paradox in Chua’s work by noting that the ‘painting show[s] that we have come so far in our journey as a nation that we have forgotten where we come from’.2 In many respects, Singapore’s Malay past has become almost invisible, swept aside in the official narrative of the ‘Singapore Story’ which generally begins with the arrival of the imperialist Stamford Raffles in 1819. Singapore’s pre-colonial Malay past has become relegated to the realm of myth, and is as remote to most Singaporeans as the pre-colonial history of neighbouring countries. This selective forgetting and remembering of the island’s Malay heritage goes some way towards explaining its disconnect with the regional Malay World (Nusantara).3 This historical amnesia is in keeping with the PAP government’s construction of the larger ‘Singapore Story’ which has swept aside many politically sensitive aspects of Singapore’s history. Singapore’s regional disconnect and ambivalence have been reinforced by its economic achievements which sharply contrast with most countries in Southeast Asia. These achievements have encouraged Singapore’s populace to cast their gaze away from the region and towards the more advanced industrialised economies (Thompson, 2006), with subtle encouragement from the PAP leadership. In differentiating Singapore from the region, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has referred to the predominantly Chinese city-state as the ‘Venice in the Middle Ages’, an ‘Israel in a Malay-Muslim sea’ and an ‘oasis in a desert’ (Wilairat, 1975: 45). In an October 2007 interview, Lee noted with some satisfaction that ‘We are a standing indictment of all the things that they can be doing differently . . .’ and he reminded Singaporeans of the challenges associated with Singapore’s geography: ‘Where are we? Are we in the Caribbean? . . . Are we like Hong Kong, next to China? . . . We are in Southeast Asia, in the midst of a turbulent, volatile, unsettled region.’4 In his characteristic way, Lee periodically stresses the importance for the resource poor city-state of continuing to distinguish itself from its larger and resource rich but less affluent neighbours, indirectly enjoining Singaporeans to take considerable pride in Singapore’s ‘regional other’ status. This is manifested in the PAP government’s ongoing Sinification campaign while at the same time downplaying the country’s Malay historical origins. Reflective of this celebration of difference, many observers of Singapore politics have described the city-state’s anomalous standing in the region by using terms such as ‘suffers the region’, the regional ‘odd man in’ (Devan, 2007) and appears ‘like a good house in a bad neighbourhood’ (Low, 2001: 434). Amidst the celebration of regional difference, perceptive observers have questioned whether this emphasis on Singapore’s difference is in its long-term national interest. Eminent historian Wang Gungwu reminds us that This [regional difference] seems to me to be a challenge for Singaporeans to

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

3

bear in mind because, if that difference grows between Singapore and its neighbours, would that be good for Singapore? . . . Will not Singapore feel even more isolated, when its neighbours are actually falling away from it instead of converging with it? . . . So uniqueness is something to be proud of but at the same time something to keep an eye on. (Wang, 2006: 133–134) As with other politically sensitive issues, the issue of Singapore’s anomalous regional identity has not been subjected to rigorous public debate and is generally overshadowed by its economic achievements. The city-state’s rapid ascent from Third World to First World status has been widely applauded and held up as a model for emulation to regional and Third World economies. Enthusiasm for the Singapore model, particularly by authoritarian states such as China and Vietnam, has been sustained by its ongoing economic achievements. The city-state holds the eighth largest foreign exchange reserves and has the highest foreign reserves in per capita terms, manages the world’s busiest port, is ranked as one of the freest and most globalised economies, and is repeatedly rated by Transparency International’s index on corruption as the least corrupt country in Asia. Changi International Airport and Singapore Airlines have also been classed as amongst the best in the world. In 2007, the World Bank and its private sector arm, International Finance Cooperation, rated Singapore as the best place to do business. Riding on these achievements, the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and other government agencies have energetically promoted the Singapore model of development and governance.

Understanding Singapore–Malaysia relations There is only a relatively small body of work that has critically examined the ideological underpinnings of the city-state’s foreign policy orientation (Singh, 1999; Leifer, 2000; Andrew Tan, 2004; Ganesan, 2005). This is mirrored by the lack of public debate on the foreign and security policies of the authoritarian state governed uninterruptedly by the People’s Action Party (PAP) for 50 years. There is also a notable dearth of academic publications on the mercurial nature of Singapore–Malaysia relations from a historical, multi-disciplinary and regional perspective. Academic researchers, particularly from Singapore and Malaysia, tend to focus either on the economic, political or security aspects of bilateral relations without critically analysing these dimensions in an integrated fashion. Publications by Singaporean-based researchers have focused on unresolved bilateral issues related to the water agreements (Kwa, 2002), the tumultuous merger and separation years (Lau, 1998) and bilateral relations at the start of the Abdullah Badawi administration (Swee-Hock and Kesavapany, 2006a). Other than Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs (1998; 2000), these Singaporean publications tend to gloss over many of the politically sensitive dimensions of bilateral relations. Moreover, they tendentiously adopt perspectives that are sympathetic towards the Singaporean government. Ongoing bilateral tensions have been simplistically

4

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

attributed to Malaysian ‘envy’ or to the idiosyncrasies of Mahathir Mohamad (refer to Swee-Hock and Kesavapany, 2006a), Malaysia’s long-serving Prime Minister (1981–2003). Such perspectives complement Lee’s belief that Malaysia has long been envious and somewhat irritated that despite Singapore’s miniscule size and lack of natural resources it has remained Southeast Asia’s most dynamic economy (Lee, 2000: 269). Negative portrayals of Malaysia are routinely propagated by the government friendly Straits Times (Singapore) newspaper and television stations and other local media outlets. Similarly, the city-state has been commonly projected by Malaysian politicians as arrogant, opportunistic and insensitive to its Malay neighbours despite the reliance on them for labour, water, food and other basic necessities. In Singapore, Malaysia’s ethnic-based affirmative action policies have been projected by the Singaporean leadership and the mainstream media as being without any merit. The general and specific shortcomings of Malaysia’s nation-building and governance approaches are regularly highlighted. After years of this counter criticism and finger-pointing it is hardly surprising that there exists a growing social distance between the Singaporean and Malaysian public, with each viewing the other through the prism of state constructed discourses and stereotypes.

Paradigms of authoritarian nation-building Many publications on Singapore–Malaysia relations assume that the nation-building paradigms of these states are diametrical opposites – Singapore’s purportedly based on meritocracy and multiracialism whilst Malaysia’s is underpinned by bumiputera (indigenous) rights and communal politics. Whilst acknowledging the dissimilarities, this study highlights important similarities in the nation-building approaches of these neighbouring authoritarian states. Instructively, in the 1980s and 1990s, both states were energetic champions of the now discredited Asian Values discourse which strongly critiqued liberal democracy as being culturally unsuitable for Asian societies who supposedly accord priority to economic development above political liberalisation (Rahim, 1998). The authoritarian PAP and BN (Barisan Nasional or National Front) governments have also been relatively effective in disciplining, regulating and coopting dissent. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine the contradictions between the PAP government’s rhetoric of meritocracy and multiracialism and the reality of ethnic-based social and security policies. This contradiction is arguably driven by the socio-political dynamics of Singapore’s authoritarian state, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s strongly ethnocentric worldview and the state’s subtle promotion of the PAP government as the guardian of Chinese interests in Singapore and the region. In Southeast Asia, Singapore and Malaysia most closely resemble the Northeast Asian developmental states of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Like their Northeast Asian counterparts, Southeast Asia’s hybrid developmental states possess many characteristics of state-led capitalism. This includes state agencies targeting and facilitating the rise of strategic sectors deemed necessary for

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

5

industrial and technological mobility. However, unlike the political trajectory of the Northeast Asian developmental states, the Malaysian and Singaporean hybrid developmental states have each retained their authoritarian political structures and continue to be governed by the same political party since independence. This anomaly can be partly explained by the communal political orientation of the authoritarian PAP and BN governments who have preserved the classic ‘divide and rule’ ethnic policies of British colonialism, thereby perpetuating the politics of fear and insecurity. The PAP government’s communal orientation and deep-seated insecurity stems from the bitter merger (1963–1965) experience which culminated in Singapore’s ‘expulsion’ from Malaysia. Leifer (2000: 4) attributes the PAP leadership’s culture of siege to the ‘traumatic experience of an unanticipated separation from Malaysia in August 1965 . . . represented consistently by the ruling PAP as an eviction . . . an interpretation that has become part of national folklore’. The narrative of Singapore’s unjust expulsion from Malaysia for supposedly championing a noncommunal Malaysian Malaysia and its subsequent struggle for survival has lent legitimacy to the PAP as the guardians of Singapore’s sovereignty. As a politically defining moment, the merger years continue to shape the political outlook of the PAP and, to a lesser extent, the UMNO (United Malay National Organisation) leadership. Integral to the narrative of crisis and vulnerability is the belief that the small and resource poor city-state can ill afford the luxuries associated with political pluralism, thereby justifying the persistence of authoritarian state structures. Alternatives to the PAP’s worldview and authoritarian nation-building paradigm have been projected as enhancing the risk of failure, chaos and anarchy (Barr and Trocki, 2008:7).

Economic competition and complementarity Notwithstanding the strong economic rivalry between Singapore and Malaysia, their economies remain strongly integrated. Indeed, by the early 1990s, they had become each other’s largest export market. The significant levels of bilateral trade can be strongly attributed to the high levels of intra-industry and intrafirm trade in industries such as electronics. Malaysia remains Singapore’s major investment destination with more than 1,000 Singaporean companies located there,5 and the bulk of manufacturing investments based just across the causeway in Johor. Singapore is among the top sources of foreign portfolio investors in Malaysia. Geographic proximity and the strong Singapore dollar have also encouraged Singaporeans to travel to Johor, as entertainment and other services available there are often over 50 per cent more expensive in the city-state.6 In 2002, Singaporean tourists contributed about 50 per cent of Malaysia’s total tourism revenue,7 while Malaysians were the fourth biggest group of visitors to Singapore after Indonesia, Japan and China.8 Up to 100,000 skilled Malaysian workers commute daily to Singapore for work. Singaporean investments in Johor have also been encouraged by the Abdullah Badawi administration’s promotion of the Iskandar Development

6

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

Region (IDR) and the Singapore, Johor and Riau or Sijori Growth Triangle, mooted by the Singapore government in the late 1980s. Both initiatives are premised on extending Singapore’s economic hinterland and exploiting the comparative advantage of each entity. Bilateral tensions have a tendency to improve during periods of sustained rapid economic growth, as occurred in the late 1980s and much of the 1990s. During this period of economic prosperity a series of economic, security and resource-based agreements were concluded. However, the fragile underpinnings of the ostensible warming of bilateral relations were exposed by tensions generated from the increasingly competitive nature of the neighbouring economies, particularly in the mid-1990s. Chapter 5 explores the extent to which bilateral tensions have been generated by the increasingly competitive nature of neighbouring economies moving up the technological ladder. The proactive manner by which Singapore’s state agencies and enterprises have responded to Malaysia’s attempts to narrow the citystate’s regional dominance in knowledge industries and key service sectors such as education, port and air services and ICT (Information, Communication and Telecommunications) is investigated. The chapter also examines the relationship between economic crisis and the exacerbation of bilateral tensions by analysing disputes during the 1997/1998 regional economic crisis. The long-term sustainability of promoting sophisticated knowledge industries based on intellectual creativity without qualitatively liberalising Singapore and Malaysia’s authoritarian states is also considered. Singapore has responded to competitive economic pressures from Malaysia with speed, agility and zeal. In the process of counteracting economic challenges, bilateral tensions have often spilled on to the political spheres, due in no small part to the faction driven nature of UMNO and the willingness of politicians to exploit bilateral tensions to further their ethno-nationalist credentials and political ambitions. This tendency was acknowledged by Malaysia’s former Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam in an interview with the author in 2006. Singapore’s proactiveness stems from an acute sense of vulnerability arising from its resource limitations and the steely determination to maintain its regional economic edge. This kiasu (an anxious and aggressive fear of losing out) mindset is evidenced by the determination to preserve Singapore’s status as the business and services hub in Southeast Asia. Acknowledging Singapore’s commitment to maintaining its regional economic lead, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated in April 2007, We are tiny, multiracial, multi-religious, one little red dot out of so many little dots, in the middle of Southeast Asia, we lack land, airspace, sea space, water, sometimes we also run short of sand and granite, operating in a fast changing, competitive global environment against very powerful competitors. So in this situation, what is our model? Our model is paranoid government – a government which worries all the time, which plays a crucial role in this system, is proactive, looks ahead over the horizon. Whenever people tell you not to worry, you start getting concerned.9

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

7

To its credit, the Singapore government has been an active economic pace-setter in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). It was instrumental in mooting the aforementioned Sijori Growth Triangle project and is supportive of Johor’s IDR initiative. In 2002, Goh Chok Tong initiated the ASEAN Economic Community concept – geared towards the promotion of a regional single market and the free movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labour.

The regional other: hedging with hegemons Following the failed merger experiment, Singapore’s foreign and security policy was driven by the realist quest to ensure that countervailing extra-regional powers maintain a regional security presence. This acute insecurity has led to the forging of strong ties with powerful patrons, initially Britain and since the 1970s the United States. The PAP leadership continues to view the US military presence in the region as a ‘stabilising and benign’ force that is required to maintain the regional balance of power and counter-balance the rise of China (Acharya, 2006: 143). As Singapore’s defence expenditure is among the highest in Southeast Asia, hovering at around 5 per cent of GDP, it has been able to procure the most sophisticated military hardware. It is the only country in Southeast Asia to have compulsory military service. It is well known that the US military ‘facility’ in Singapore serves as a psychological deterrent to its immediate neighbours (Rahim, 1999: 48). Yet, this US ‘facility’ has also reinforced Singapore’s ‘regional other’ status and made it an attractive target for Islamic militants in the ongoing conflict over the ‘war on terror’. To date, approximately 30 alleged Jemaah Islamiah (JI) operatives are currently detained without trial in Singapore. Moreover, Singapore’s high defence spending, sophisticated military apparatus and uncritical support for Washington’s foreign policy adventures have provoked regional insecurities and suspicions, thereby reinforcing the insecurity of the city-state even further. This security dilemma is a significant theme in this study and the focus of Chapter 4. The city-state’s close security ties with Washington were arguably a major factor in its ambivalence towards the regional bloc ASEAN during the first decade after ASEAN’s formation. This ambivalence stemmed from the PAP leadership’s fear that ASEAN could serve as a vehicle for Indonesian hegemony or even worse, a vehicle for collusion between Indonesia and Malaysia against Singapore (Leifer, 2000: 24). As a reluctant regionalist, Singapore’s early dealings with ASEAN tended to be of a symbolic nature. In view of its intimate security ties with Whitehall and Washington, Singapore’s endorsement of ASEAN’s 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) ideal was largely symbolic, as it held strong reservations regarding its usefulness. In 1972, Lee Kuan Yew reiterated the call made by Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam a year earlier for ASEAN to restrict itself to economic cooperation issues rather than venturing into the realms of regional security. Having joined ASEAN with strong reservations, Singapore’s leadership was thus far from being a true believer of the ASEAN idea (Acharya, 2006: 153). It was only after Britain’s withdrawal of bases from Singapore in the early 1970s, America’s spectacular

8

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

defeat in the Vietnam War in the mid-1970s and the growing international stature of China – all of which generated significant shifts in the regional strategic environment – that the Singapore leadership began to fully appreciate the benefits of becoming an engaged ASEAN member. In contrast to Leifer’s (2000) assertion that Singapore’s foreign and security paradigm is unique and does not provide significant insights into the conduct of small states, this study posits that significant aspects of Singapore’s ‘regional outsider’ complex are shared by other colonial settler societies such as Israel and Australia. Instructively, all three states are relatively affluent but insecure entities that are dissimilar in ethnic and economic terms from their immediate neighbours. Their insecurity complex has in no small measure contributed to a foreign and security policy that is reliant on Washington as a security patron. Not coincidentally, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) was established with the assistance of Israel – a state that has problematic relations with her larger Muslim neighbours and maintains close security relations with Washington. Just as Israel’s security forces have excluded its ethnic Arab citizens, the SAF systematically excluded Malays from ‘compulsory’ national service for much of the 1960s and 1970s and continues to practice discriminatory policies. To date, no Malay or Muslim has held senior Cabinet portfolios such as Defence, Foreign Affairs, Education, Finance and Trade. Like its Israeli counterpart, the SAF has been kept in a high state of readiness and capable of swift mobilisation. Boasting the most advanced air warfare capability in Southeast Asia, the bulk of the fighting capability of the SAF, like Israel’s, lies in its reservist forces. Like Israel, the SAF is also known to favour an aggressive preemptive strike strategy in the event of a military skirmish with its larger Muslim neighbour to the north. Singapore’s aggressive military posture and persistent build-up of hard power capabilities have reinforced regional suspicions regarding the intentions of the city-state. Its hard power capabilities have also blunted the more recent attempts at enhancing its regional soft power credentials. The nationbuilding effects and regional ramifications of Singapore’s security orientation are explored in Chapters 3 and 4.

Indonesian counter-balance Singapore’s problematic relations with Malaysia have been expediently counterbalanced by fostering close relations with Brunei and Indonesia. This hedging strategy is strongly geared towards ensuring that concurrent antagonisms with Indonesia and Malaysia are to be avoided at all costs. As such, special efforts have been made to establish personal relations with political and military elites from Indonesia and Brunei. Singapore apparently played a significant role in lobbying for Brunei’s admittance into ASEAN in 1984 and is a major foreign investor in the kingdom (Lee, 2000: 346). Brunei’s miniature size, oil based affluence and geographic encirclement by larger states has meant that the kingdom shares common security interests with Singapore. The city-state’s counter-balancing strategy has certainly not escaped the attention of Malaysia’s leaders and was raised by former

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

9

Prime Minister Mahathir during an interview with the author in August 2006. Mahathir claimed that ‘Singaporean leaders tend to treat their Indonesian counterparts much better [than their Malaysian counterparts]. They are often entertained royally in Singapore.’ Similar views were advanced during an interview with a senior policy advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister, Najib Abdul Razak in 2006. Singapore’s propensity to defer to Indonesia is evidenced by its readiness to abstain rather than vote against Indonesia in the UN after its invasion of East Timor in 1975. Moreover, Singapore established diplomatic ties with China in 1990, only after Indonesia re-established diplomatic relations with China. The city-state refrained from deploying combat troops attached to the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor following the 1999 referendum, despite the massacre of Timorese civilians by pro-Indonesian paramilitary forces. At the height of the regional financial crisis the Singapore leadership saw fit to offer the corrupt and crumbling New Order regime a US$5 billion loan to encourage it to abide by its IMF commitments. Singapore’s regional counter-balancing strategy has been maintained, albeit more problematically, in the post-New Order era. In Indonesia’s fledgling democracy, economic nationalists and policy-makers have publicly raised concerns about Singapore’s incomplete disclosure of trade statistics, lacklustre attitude towards signing an extradition treaty, insistence on conditions which impact on Indonesia’s sovereignty in the proposed bilateral defence arrangement, turning a blind eye to illegal imports from Indonesia and according limited rights to Indonesian maids working in Singapore. The glacial progress in resolving these issues has enhanced Singapore’s image as a regional opportunist resentful of Indonesia’s shift from the authoritarianism of the New Order era when bilateral arrangements were routinely negotiated in a non-transparent manner. Chapter 6 examines the checkered relations between Singapore and Indonesia from the colonial era to the current administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Comparisons are drawn between Singapore’s relations with Malaysia to highlight patterns in Singapore’s relations with neighbouring states. The structural tensions and efficacy of Singapore’s soft power10 initiatives are also analysed.

The business of diplomacy In contrast to the realist worldview shaping Singapore’s foreign and security policies, its trade policy orientation is strongly driven by economic considerations and at times is janus-faced. The decoupling of trade from foreign policy has allowed the city-state to trade with countries it does not recognise or maintain diplomatic relations (Ganesan, 2005: 17). For example, despite its robust support for the United States during the Vietnam War, Singapore continued to trade with the Vietnamese communist forces intent on unifying the country. Moreover, whilst condemning the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979 and playing a pivotal role in preventing the Vietnamese backed Cambodian regime from gaining recognition by the United Nations, Singapore continued to trade with Vietnam. Singapore is also one of the few countries where China and Taiwan have both maintained trade missions. While

10

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

extensive economic and social relations (guanxi) with Beijing have long been maintained, the Singapore Armed Forces routinely undertakes military exercises in Taiwan. Foreign Minister George Yeo has rationalised Singapore’s janus-faced diplomacy in the following way: ‘. . . we are omnidirectional. And I have said before that our best strategy, both for Singapore and for ASEAN, is to be completely promiscuous in our relationships’.11 In an address to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Academy in March 2008, President Nathan stressed that due to Singapore’s size and location in a volatile region: ‘We dealt with the business of foreign relations without sentiment, ideology or illusion’.12 Singapore has long remained Southeast Asia’s most enthusiastic champion of trade liberalisation and played an active role in promoting the trade liberalisation agenda advocated by the IMF, World Bank and the WTO. This economic diplomacy is premised on the belief of the PAP leadership that the city-state’s continued prosperity relies on the stability of the international economic system (Dent, 2002b: 153). As such, it has also been a major driver of trade liberalisation initiatives within ASEAN and between ASEAN and other regional blocs. However, the city-state’s enthusiasm for trade liberalisation has antagonised many senior policymakers in the region who, driven by economic nationalist principles, are more interested in trade facilitation than they are with trade liberalisation initiatives. For example, during the Mahathir administration, Malaysia earned a reputation for championing Third World interests and challenging Western economic and geopolitical dominance. He has consistently critiqued the inequities of economic globalisation and, following the regional financial crisis in the late 1990s, railed against the negative impacts of unrestricted capital flows. Nevertheless, the outspoken and iconoclastic Mahathir commanded a degree of respect from both industrialised and industrialising countries due in large part to Malaysia’s reputation as a modernist Muslim country that has attained impressive economic achievements. Bilateral tensions have been aggravated by Singapore’s less than robust support for Mahathir’s proposed Pan-East Asian bloc originally referred to as the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) and later the East Asian Economic Community (EAEC). Kuala Lumpur’s (KL) disappointment with the city-state was compounded by the latter’s enthusiasm for the US sponsored Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Demonstrating his opposition to APEC, Mahathir refused to attend the inaugural APEC Summit in Seattle in 1993, warning that APEC’s success would likely be at the expense of ASEAN (Ganesan, 2005: 20). Particularly irksome to KL was Singapore’s strong support for Australia and New Zealand’s inclusion in the East Asia Summit meetings, reinforcing suspicions that the citystate is inclined to act in the interest of extra-regional states intent on diluting China’s leadership within an exclusive East Asian bloc. In elaborating the theme of Singapore’s complex janus-faced business diplomacy, the study examines (Chapters 3, 4 and 6) the business practices of the state investment agency Temasek in Thailand and Indonesia and the PAP government’s covert economic and security ties with the pariah SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) regime in Myanmar.

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

11

The authority of Minister Mentor Lee Lyn Pan’s (1993) observation that ‘to write about Singapore is to write about Lee Kuan Yew’ rings true even in the early twenty-first century. Lee Kuan Yew’s lengthy tenure as Prime Minister (1959–1990, 31 years), commanding Cabinet status as Senior Minister (1990–2004, 14 years) and Minister Mentor (2004 onwards) and elevation of son Lee Hsien Loong to the Prime Ministership in 2004 have ensured that the Minister Mentor’s ideological imprint has been fundamentally preserved. Lee’s continued commanding status within the PAP government, following his horizontal shift from the Prime Ministership to Senior Minister and finally Minister Mentor, is clearly understood by the Malaysian leadership. In recognition of Lee’s continued omnipresence, particularly in foreign and security policy matters, Prime Minister Mahathir and Foreign Minister Hamid Albar had apparently sought to discuss the more sensitive bilateral issues with Lee rather than Goh Chok Tong during the latter’s tenure as Prime Minister (1990–2004).13 As Lee Kuan Yew looms large in any serious study of Singapore’s foreign and security policy, the evolution of his ideas, writings and speeches have been closely analysed in this work. Lee’s belief in racial hierarchies, elitism, eugenics convictions, realist security outlook, dismissive regard for the democratic strides and ideals in neighbouring states and unflattering assessments of indigenous Southeast Asians have repeatedly contributed to bilateral tensions. Sharp rebukes against Lee’s periodic undiplomatic gaffes from political elites in Malaysia and Indonesia have at times escalated into full-blown diplomatic rows. Unchallenged by his senior colleagues in government, the Minister Mentor continues to interpret geopolitics from the realist lens of the Cold War era. As such, Lee’s continued shaping of policy making has, in many respects, become increasingly more of a political liability rather than an asset in contemporary Singapore. Yet some observers of the Singaporean polity (Ganesan, 2005: 3) have optimistically pronounced that ‘Singapore’s foreign and security policies have moved beyond realism’ owing to its ‘more mature political identity, the maintenance of a credible deterrence strategy, and the requirements of a trading state whose prosperity is contingent on cooperative rather than competitive policy output configured in power terms’. Others (Acharya, 2008) have asserted that liberal institutionalist and constructivist approaches are relevant in understanding Singapore’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century. However, this study’s focus on Singapore’s relations with her immediate neighbours suggests that the preservation of Singapore’s authoritarian state structures, the omnipresence of Minister Mentor Lee and persistent engendering of national insecurity and fear have stifled the city-state’s qualitative shift beyond the foreign and security worldview of the latter. This perspective aligns with the proposition (Leifer, 2000; Singh, 1999) that Singapore’s foreign policy parameters have not changed in a qualitative way and are characterised more by continuity than change. Lee Kuan Yew’s successor Goh Chok Tong (1990–2004) and current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong have continued to work under the assumption that the immediate Malay and Muslim regions remain hostile to the city-state’s sovereignty

12

Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?

and economic success. In Singapore’s authoritarian state, these assumptions have not been seriously interrogated by the besieged political opposition, restricted civil society and compliant media. In contrast to the highly factionalised dynamics within Malaysia’s ruling UMNO and Indonesia’s post-New Order coalition governments, the PAP’s technocratic leadership and PAP rank and file appear not to have interrogated the premises governing Singapore’s foreign and security policy. Foreign and security paradigms that remain insulated and rarely subjected to critical scrutiny will, in the long-term, undermine the soft power capabilities of even an economically robust state such as Singapore. When the Indonesian and Malaysian leadership raised concerns about the Singapore government’s failure to consult other ASEAN states when offering military facilities to the US, the views of opposition party leaders, civil society and other autonomous Singaporean voices were not represented in the mainstream media. Other foreign and security policy issues that have impinged on regional sensitivities, but have not been subjected to rigorous public debate, include the city-state’s ongoing support of the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq (discussed in Chapter 4). Indeed, at a memorial for victims of September 11, 2001 Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong affirmed that Singapore would support the US in the ‘war on terror’ despite having ‘to manage both regional and domestic sensitivities in doing so’.14 The costs associated with the restricted evolution of Singapore’s foreign and security policy orientation and restrained civil society input into the policy making process are important themes in this study. Singapore’s relations with her neighbours are very much a manifestation of domestic authoritarian political arrangements. Has the twentieth century paradigm and worldview of the authoritarian PAP government increasingly become a major impediment to the challenges confronting Singapore in the new millennium? These challenges demand creative approaches to non-traditional security exigencies and responses to the complex socio-political pressures of developing a sophisticated knowledge economy and society. Just as importantly, it calls for the construction of regional bridges without fear and paranoia.

2

Remembering and forgetting Nusantara Malays in the Singaporean national imagination

Narratives and myths In many authoritarian states, governing elites have been able to maintain hegemony by creatively manufacturing ideological consent rather than resorting too frequently to coercive measures. Consent is effectively maintained when a set of ideas and values which constitute a coherent worldview take on the status of ‘commonsense’ reality. As this version of reality becomes universalised, alternative realities are submerged and dismissed as unviable or unrealistic. In Gramscian terms, this phenomenon is referred to as ideological hegemony (Simon, 1991; Gramsci, 1971; Lears, 1985). In Singapore’s authoritarian state, governed for nearly 50 years by the PAP, consent is strongly centred on the narrative of the PAP leadership heroically combating radicals, communalists, communists and Islamists in the anti-colonial and post-colonial struggles for political survival. This narrative also celebrates Singapore’s linear evolution from a humble fishing village to a trading post, premier regional entrepot and finally an international economic hub. Strongly centred on the deliverance of material well-being via rapid economic development, this narrative of progressive modernity is notable for the provision of economic wellbeing but without concomitant political liberties (Wee, 2003: 143–162). In Singapore’s colonial settler society, the colonial era is generally depicted in positive terms, setting Singapore apart from most post-colonial states. This is exemplified by the status of the British East India Company’s agent, Thomas Stamford Raffles, as the ‘founder’ of modern Singapore. Moreover, the contributions of ‘hardworking and enterprising’ immigrants to the transformation of modern Singapore are also celebrated. This narrative commonly treats indigenous communities in a patronising fashion, portraying them as ‘impediments to progress, a burden to be shouldered, or as a threat to national unity’ (Kratoska, 2003: 114). In a 1967 tribute to the contributions of British imperialism and Chinese immigrants to Singapore’s economic success, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew saw fit to inform his British audience that I inherited what you have left me. In a way, it was not all created by you because my great grandfather did play a subsidiary role and so did my father

14

Remembering and forgetting and so did I myself. So we have left [the statue of] Stamford Raffles standing on his pinnacle outside the Victoria Memorial Hall. But for him, Singapore would still be a mudflat. (Wee, 2003: 146)

Conspicuously absent from Lee’s narrative, characterised by selective remembering and forgetting, is Singapore’s status as a pre-colonial hub of commercial activity integral to the Sri Vijaya and Majapahit kingdoms in the Malay Archipelago (Reid, 1993). Whilst celebrating the contributions of British imperialism and immigrants in transforming the island into an international financial hub and First World economy, Singapore’s Malay origins and the contributions of indigenous Singaporeans have been downplayed. Hegemony is a dynamic process of ideological struggle in the battlefield of ideas and thus never complete (Hall, 1994), particularly in an era of intense globalisation. As such, the manufacturing of ideological consent requires periodic re-imagination and adaptation to remain relevant and maintain its common-sense status. Singapore’s economic, physical and social re-imagination has been maintained by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. At a 2004 rally to celebrate the PAP’s fiftieth anniversary as a political party, Lee stated that it was the responsibility of the PAP and every Singaporean to build a new Singapore within the ‘absolutely permanent’ framework of national fundamentals such as multiracialism and meritocracy.1 The celebration of Singapore’s renewal and rejuvenation was repeated by Lee in his 2007 National Day message. Reminding Singaporeans that as: ‘Singapore is at the heart of this rising Asia’ they could look forward to a transformed ‘new Singapore’ that is armed ‘with our own unique identity, and the can-do and never-say-die spirit of the Lion City’.2 The rhetoric of a new Singapore has been made real by the dramatic re-building of the cityscape from Sentosa Island to the central business district in the last few years. The narrative of economic success, political stability, social cohesion and physical rejuvenation assists the authoritarian state in maintaining consent and legitimacy. Until relatively recently, the PAP’s narrative has not been systematically challenged by historians, dissident political actors and other observers. Alternative narratives have long been overshadowed by the propagation of the official narrative in the media, school texts and speeches of PAP leaders. The restricted political space and limited publication outlets for alternative histories have allowed the PAP’s narrative to dominate. Alternative histories of Singapore have also been hindered by the refusal of the Singapore archives to conform to international norms by allowing classified information to be publicly available after 30 years.3 Records of the Internal Security Department remain generally closed to scholarly examination. In this restricted political context, it is unsurprising that some alternative narratives which directly challenge the PAP’s version of the Singapore Story have been published in Malaysia. They include an edited volume on the charismatic leftwing nationalist, and one time political rival of Lee Kuan Yew, Lim Chin Siong entitled Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History (Tan and K.S., 2001). A two volume memoir by Said Zahari, former head of Partai Rakyat Singapura

Remembering and forgetting 15 (Singapore People’s Party) (2001; 2007), was also published in Malaysia. Lim and Said were detained without trial under the infamous Operation Cold Store in 1963, for six and 17 years respectively. Some left nationalists who defected from the PAP into the fledgling Barisan Nasional (National Front) and then detained without trial, such as Lim Hock Siew, Fong Swee Suan and Chan Sun Win, have written their memoirs. In explaining the motivation for writing his memoirs, which rely strongly on declassified British records, Lim Hock Siew believes that there is an urgent need in countering ‘A lot of rubbish taught to our children . . . The reasons given for my arrest in 1963 are as false as George Bush’s for invading Iraq. There was no truth at all that we wanted to resort to violence’.4 Dismissing the accuracy of Lee Kuan Yew’s version of the Singapore Story as akin to reading about the fictional exploits of Harry Potter, Lim quipped, ‘I read it like I read Harry Potter. I owe it to the people of Singapore to give the other side of the story’.5 Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP have consistently led Singaporeans to believe that those detained without trial in the early 1960s were communists engaged in unconstitutional means to attain political power. Responding to the growing interest in alternative narratives which contradict the PAP’s version of events, the Minister for Home Affairs, Wong Kan Seng, issued a statement in 2006 reaffirming that those detained under the ISA in the early 1960s were not engaged in the democratic process but ‘belonged to the Communist United Front which supported the Communist Party of Malaya’.6 A book on Singapore’s tumultuous post-war history, contradicting key aspects of the PAP’s Singapore Story, edited by Australian based academics Carl Trocki and Michael Barr, have excavated and reclaimed many politically sensitive episodes that have become terra incognita (Barr and Trocki, 2008: 2). This book has paved the way for future excavations and reclamations which systematically challenge the PAP’s construction of Singapore’s past. A main pillar of the PAP narrative is Lee Kuan Yew’s two-volume memoirs instructively entitled The Singapore Story (Lee, 1998) and From First World to Third (Lee, 2000). Central themes in Lee’s Singapore Story include the expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 and acute economic challenges which confronted the ‘reluctant republic’. Deprived of the Malaysian common market, the republic’s economic and political viability as an independent political entity was seriously tested. This economic challenge was exacerbated by disruptions to trade with Indonesia as a result of the latter’s Konfrontasi campaign. Britain’s decision to withdraw its naval base only aggravated the already high unemployment rate. Engulfed in these multiple challenges, the ‘struggle for survival’ narrative has become a key ideological tool underpinning the legitimacy of the PAP leadership as guardian of Singapore’s fragile sovereignty. Singaporeans are continually reminded of the importance of being disciplined, motivated, rugged and resolute in view of the country’s Lilliputian size, lack of natural resources, narrow talent pool and delicate multiracial social fabric. Additionally, the inherent vulnerabilities associated with being a predominantly Chinese society in a predominantly Malay and Muslim region are highlighted. The larger and populous but less affluent Malay states, portrayed as irrational, envious and hostile towards Singapore, remains a central premise of the ‘struggle for

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Remembering and forgetting

survival’. The portrayal of Singapore’s location in a hostile neighbourhood is commonly featured in the mainstream press and speeches of PAP leaders. Indeed, a close reading of official security documents, speeches of PAP leaders and Lee Kuan Yew’s memoirs suggests that Singapore’s security posture is primarily directed at her Malay neighbours. In his memoirs, Lee reminds Singaporeans of the dilemma confronting the newly independent city-state in 1965: Seventy-five per cent of our population of two million were Chinese, a tiny minority in an archipelago of 30,000 islands inhabited by more than 100 million Malay or Indonesian Muslims. We were a Chinese island in a Malay sea. How could we survive in such a hostile environment? (Lee, 1998: 23) This ‘struggle for survival’ discourse continues to be propagated with just as much vigour despite Singapore’s status as the most successful economy in Southeast Asia. In a parliamentary address in April 2007, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong acknowledged the paranoid mentality of the PAP leadership: We are tiny, multiracial, multi-religious, one little red dot out of so many little dots, in the middle of Southeast Asia, we lack land, airspace, sea space, water, sometimes we also run short of sand and granite, operating in a fast changing, competitive global environment against powerful competitors. So in this situation, what is our model? Our model is paranoid government – a government which worries all the time, which plays a crucial role in this system, is proactive, looks ahead over the horizon.7 Importantly, the discourse of survivalism and paranoid governance allows the state to rationalise the high defence budget, and maintain policies such as compulsory military service and draconian detention without trial laws. This chapter examines key dominant national narratives following Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965. Paradoxically, these narratives highlight the persistence of colonial historiography as exemplified by the veneration of the British imperialist Stamford Raffles, the celebration of colonial rule and the contributions of immigrants to the success of modern Singapore. By contrast, the country’s pre-colonial Malay heritage has been downplayed. The representation of regional Malays in the construction of Singapore’s national identity is explored by examining the Machiavellian political manoeuvrings of the PAP during the tumultuous merger years and the myths surrounding the PAP’s clash of ideologies narrative. The reconstruction of Singapore’s Malay heritage and perceptions of the ‘Malay problem’ are examined in the context of Singapore’s problematic relations with neighbouring Malaysia and its regional outsider complex.

Curious celebration of colonialism Thomas Stamford Raffles is everywhere in the Singaporean national imagination. Since 2007, National Day festivities have been celebrated with great fanfare in

Remembering and forgetting 17 Marina Bay, close to where Stamford Raffles supposedly set foot on the island’s shores some 190 years ago. He is credited with spearheading the transformation of Singapore from a ‘sleepy fishing village’ into one of the world’s busiest ports and a global services hub.8 For his vision, Raffles has been formally anointed as the ‘founder’ of modern Singapore. There is a larger-than-life statue of Raffles at the mouth of the Singapore River, close to Parliament House. The inscription attributes his genius for the transformation of a ‘sleepy fishing village’ to a ‘modern metropolis’. Only a few metres away, there is another statue of Raffles in front of the Victoria Memorial Hall. Illustrative of the veneration of Stamford Raffles, many government institutions, businesses, locations, buildings and premier schools and colleges have been named after the East India Company agent. Raffles has become an exclusive brand name associated with a select clientele. The majority of Singaporeans who live in public housing estates are unlikely to celebrate their wedding anniversaries at the salubrious Raffles Hotel, fly Singapore Airlines in the comfort of Raffles Class or spend indulgent weekends at the exclusive Raffles Club. How many Singaporeans realise that the venerated Raffles spoke fluent Malay and was a serious student of the history and culture of the Malay World and keenly interested in Singapore’s ancient past? In Southeast Asia, post-colonial Singapore is unique in according the status of ‘founder’ to an agent of British imperialism responsible for the country’s colonial subjugation. In the struggle for political independence, most post-colonial states experienced a historiographical upheaval characterised by a strong rejection of colonial historiography (Lysa, 1996: 50). Specifically, the colonial era is commonly depicted as an ‘age of darkness’ and pre-colonial history portrayed as the ‘golden age’. In enjoining Indonesians to support the struggle for national independence from Dutch colonialism, Sukarno reminded the people of the glories of past kingdoms with the aim of instilling national pride: What Indonesian’s national spirit will not live when hearing the greatness of the kingdoms of Melayu and Sriwijaya, the greatness of the first Mataram, the greatness of the time of Sindok and Erlangga and Kediri and Singasari and Majapahit and Pajajaran – the greatness too of Bintaru, Banten, and Mataram under Sultan Agung . . . Whose hope and faith will not live, that a people with such a great past, must have enough strength to attain a glorious future. (Cited in Lysa, 1996: 50) Following Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965, a debate about the place of Raffles in Singapore’s historical narrative ensued. Some nationalists called for Raffles’s statue outside the Victoria Memorial Hall to be demolished and flung into the Singapore River – a symbolic response to the humiliation and exploitation wrought by British colonialism. But far from ending up in the bottom of the Singapore River, the PAP leadership decided to anoint Raffles as the founder of Singapore. To symbolise his elevated status, another larger statue of the founder was erected by the mouth of the Singapore River. Acknowledging the controversial nature of this decision, PAP Minister S. Rajaratnam noted that this was

18

Remembering and forgetting a step unprecedented in the history of anti-imperialist nationalism . . . Many of our Third World friends were completely mystified that contrary to usual practice a dyed-in-the-wool British imperialist should have been named the founder of modern Singapore . . . our decision to name Raffles the founder of Singapore is an example of the proper use of history. (Rajaratnam, 2007: 251)

How then is the veneration of Raffles and Singapore’s anomalous historiographical approach to be explained? Additionally, why has the city-state’s colonial history been carefully preserved but its pre-colonial Malay history downplayed and consigned to the status of myth? Many colonial settler societies, such as the United States and Australia have venerated colonial agents such as Christopher Columbus and Captain Cook. Similarly, in Singapore’s colonial settler society, the Englishman Raffles has been selected as a ‘neutral’ historical founding father figure. He is credited with facilitating the modernising colonial project, and with it the immigration of Chinese and Indian labourers to Singapore and the Malay States. British imperialism together with immigrant communities from China and India are projected as the main drivers responsible for the economic transformation of modern Singapore. In particular, the celebration of immigrant contributions has allowed the PAP government to mobilise the Chinese community behind state-led initiatives that promote a national identity which is strongly Chinese. It is worth noting that the Singaporean Chinese community is credited with not only contributing to Singapore’s nationalism but also the broader Pan-Chinese nationalism which helped propelled the republican revolution in China. Reflective of this linking of Singaporean nationalism to Chinese nationalism, the Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall, used by Sun as his Southeast Asian headquarters between 1900 and 1911, has been gazetted the status of a national monument (Eugene Tan, 2004b: 118–225). The twin celebration of Western colonialism and immigrant settlement is manifested in the writings of many prominent Singaporean historians and writers, speeches of PAP politicians, government publications, national songs, monuments, museums, school texts and state-sponsored documentaries. Reflecting this genre, historian Edwin Lee has attributed much of Singapore’s post-colonial economic success to British colonialism: . . . Singapore today is a country . . . where the Prime Minister sets the tone of public life as the colonial Governor once did, where the rule of law prevails . . . It is this combination of the spiritual and tangible aspects of our colonial heritage that makes it such a power for good. (Lee, 1989: 4)

Colonial historiography and the myth of Raffles In post-colonial Singapore, Stamford Raffles has acquired a symbolic significance transcending historical reality (Wake, 1975: 47). This historiographical orientation is found in the writings of many Singaporean historians and social scientists, who

Remembering and forgetting 19 have reified Raffles’s status as the ‘founding father’ and ‘guiding genius’ of Singapore’s early development. This historiographical orientation is surprising in view of Raffles’s less than flattering views towards the Chinese, Malays and other non-Westerners. His denigration of the Malays as indolent and his contempt for Islam as a ‘robber religion’ (Raffles, 1835: 94) which Malays needed to be saved from, is commonly known. Less well known in Singapore’s colonial settler society are Raffles’s perceptions of the Chinese as deceitful ‘pests’ and a scourge plaguing Malay society. For example, he pronounced the Chinese in Indonesia as a very dangerous people, and are to be remarked as a pest to the country, and that there appears to be no radical cure for this evil but their extermination from the interior . . . how apt they are on all occasions to curry favour, how ready they are to proffer assistance when there is no danger, and when they perceive that it falls in with their own interest . . . . It is, therefore, of the greatest importance to be early on our guard against this pernicious and increasing influence, which preys on the very vitals of the country, draining and exhausting it . . . In all the Malay states, the Chinese have made every effort to get into their hands the farming of the port duties, and this has generally proved the ruin of the trade. In addition to these circumstances, it should be recollected that the Chinese, from their peculiar language and manners, form a kind of separate society in every place where they settle, which gives them great advantage over every competitor in arranging monopolies of trade . . . This ascendancy of the Chinese, whether of a commercial or political nature, should be cautiously guarded against and restrained, and this perhaps cannot be better done than by bringing forward the native population of Malays and Javanese, and encouraging them in useful and industrious habit . . . . (Raffles, 1835: 82–83) In contrast to the celebratory post-colonial narratives in Singapore, Syed Hussein Alatas and C.M. Turnbull are more measured in their portrayals of Raffles. Turnbull refers to Raffles as an enigma, a man of fascinating contradictions . . . he revelled in the company of the rich, the powerful and the aristocratic . . . he could still be capable of petty meaness and deceit in his dealings with subordinates and colleagues and of gullible favouritism in advancing the futures of relatives and friends. (Turnbull, 1989: 6) She attributes Singapore’s early commercial success not primarily to Raffles but to William Farquhar for providing early Singapore the efficient administration which Raffles could not supply . . . After the bold stroke of its founding, Raffles remained almost out of touch with the settlement during the first three formative years, when the port grew and prospered under Farquhar’s careful administration. (Turnbull, 1989: 30)

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This perspective is shared by Alatas who observed that other imperial agents such as Farquhar and Crawfurd were eminently qualified to spearhead the establishment of a British post in Singapore to undermine and eventually destroy ‘the spell of Dutch monopoly’ (Raffles, 1835: 19) in the Malay Archipelago (Alatas, 1971: 19, 42, 43). Alatas’s interrogation of colonial historiography and dismissal of Raffles as little more than an ‘empire builder, the nineteenth century chauvinist, the Machiavellian imperialist’ (1971: 31) is unique for an academic based at a Singaporean university. Lamenting the elevated status of Raffles as the founder of modern Singapore, Alatas wrote, ‘As far as Singapore is concerned, the problem is the exaggeration of his so-called good qualities . . . This exaggeration reveals the naïve and docile attitude which exists towards colonial historiography . . . His role in the history of Singapore has also been exaggerated. Singapore was his last and most insignificant post . . . Raffles’ interests lay more with Sumatra than with Singapore. As far as Singapore was concerned, had Raffles not been around another man would have done the job’ (Alatas 1971: 40). It is worth noting that Singapore’s early success as a trading post was certainly not just a consequence of Raffles’s vision or Farquhar and Crawfurd’s administrative skills. Turnbull, Alatas and Trocki (1979) agree that it was not just Singapore’s location and free entrepot status, but the economic activity in the Dutch East Indies and highly developed regional trade since pre-colonial times that were the prime drivers facilitating its rapid growth in the nineteenth century.

Raffles: conspiring for control of Singapura A few years before Raffles successfully conspired with Malay chiefs to establish a British trading post in Singapore, he was involved in another court intrigue geared towards undermining the Dutch in the Sultanate of Palembang. The objective was to establish a trading post in the Sumatran islands of Banka, Billiton and adjacent islands. In letters to the Sultan of Palembang Mahmud Badruddin in 1811, Raffles gave strong encouragement to expel the Dutch from the Sultanate and sign a commercial treaty with the British. This encouragement was made real by Raffles’s gift of arms and ammunition to the Sultan. The Dutch authorities at the time believed that Raffles’s letters of ‘encouragement’ had emboldened Sultan Mahmud in 1811 to lure the Dutch Resident, 23 Europeans and their 63 Javanese employees to a boat supposedly bound for Malacca and then deliberately drown them (Alatas, 1971: 7–9). Illustrative of British imperial duplicity, when Sultan Mahmud was reluctant to comply with British demands for control of Banka, in April 1812 an expedition led by Major General Gilleslie was sent to Palembang to dethrone him and enthrone his compliant brother Ahmad Najmuddin. A treaty between Raffles and the newly installed Sultan Ahmad was signed giving the British rights to the coveted Banka, Billiton and adjacent islands. To the consternation of the British, the Dutch finally re-installed Mahmud in June 1812, after the British returned Java to the Dutch (Alatas, 1971: 9–14).

Remembering and forgetting 21 Exploiting another succession dispute in the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, following the death of Sultan Mahmud in 1812, Raffles and William Farquhar advanced British imperial interests by supporting the older sibling’s claims. Hussein was backed by the wily chief Temengong Abdul Rahman but not recognised as Sultan by the Dutch, who instead supported the younger brother Abdul Rahman. British support for Hussein was solely motivated by the goal of establishing a trading post in Singapore. Following a provisional agreement with the Temengong to set up a post, in February 1819, Raffles signed a treaty with ‘Sultan’ Hussein Mahummad Shah and the Temengong. The British East India Company was then given the right to open ‘a factory or factories’, subject to the payment of $5,000 a year to Hussein and $3,000 to the Temengong. In return, Hussein and the Temengong were not to engage in treaties with other nations or allow other nations to set up factories where the British had already maintained theirs (Wake, 1975: 58–59). The dubious legality of these Machiavellian agreements was made obvious when Hussein and Temengong Abdul Rahman, shortly after signing the treaty with the British, wrote deferential and apologetic letters to the Riau-based Sultan Abdul Rahman, the Raja Muda of Riau and the Dutch in Malacca. Hussein claimed that he had been seized by Raffles against his will and then proclaimed Sultan (Wake, 1975: 58). Aware that Raffles had created a geopolitical minefield, Governor Bannerman of Penang apparently urged Farquhar to evacuate Singapore to avoid a likely clash with the Dutch. Bannerman also assured the enraged Dutch Governor of Malacca that Raffles had impertinently acted on his own initiative in Singapore. Additionally, the British Foreign Office promptly assured the Dutch that Raffles was only an East India Company commercial representative with no authority to undertake political arrangements (Turnbull, 1989: 8–11). The Dutch had refused to recognise the legality of the British post in Singapore as it fell within their imperial sphere and the territory of Sultan Abdul Rahman of Riau-Lingga. However, with the signing of the Anglo-Dutch treaty in the latter half of 1824, clearly delineating the imperial boundaries within the Malay Archipelago, the trading post in Singapore was finally recognised. Keen to erode the power of the Sultan and the Temengong, who continued to run Singapore as a native port, the British successfully pressured them into signing another treaty in August 1824. Heavily indebted and in a weak position to resist British demands, the Sultan and Temengong were essentially forced to fully cede Singapore and the adjacent islands to the East India Company in exchange for a cash settlement. In doing so, they lost legitimate claims to political power in Singapore (Trocki, 1979: 50–51). Ironically, Hussein’s elevation to Sultan by the British in 1819 also witnessed his steady decline into debt and political irrelevance. By contrast, the ability of the Temengong Abdul Rahman and his descendants to adapt and exploit the exigencies of British imperialism led to a dramatic rise in financial and political status. Despite the 1819 treaty, the British recognised Temengong Abdul Rahman as the actual ‘ruler’ who governed in the name of Sultan Hussein. For the British, Sultan Hussein was little more than a legal necessity to further their imperial ambitions (Trocki, 1979: 47). When Hussein attempted to regain his slaves who fled Kampong Glam

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because of alleged abuse, the British authorities ignored his pleas. He was also powerless in preventing the breaching of a wall around the royal compound to allow for the construction of a public road through Kampong Glam. His excesses, incompetence and weak leadership skills diminished his standing among island Malays (Turnbull, 1989: 50). Plagued by mounting debts and family scandals, the hapless Hussein finally relocated to Malacca where he died in 1835. When his son Ali returned to Singapore in 1840, the Straits government refused to recognise his claim to the Sultanship. The coveted title of Sultan was only supported by the British when the chronically indebted Ali agreed to sign a treaty with Temengong Ibrahim in 1855, acknowledging the latter as the ruler of Johor. In return, Ali received a lump sum of $5,000 and pension of $500 per month from the Temengong and a fixed allowance from the state. In many respects, Ali’s status as Sultan was an empty honour in view of his son losing this title and the decline of his descendents to a state of less than genteel poverty in Kampong Glam (Turnbull, 1989: 51). Another major blow to the Singapore royals occurred when Sultan Hussein’s estate was declared state land in 1897 after the Court of Appeal ruled in a succession dispute that no one could claim to be the Sultan’s successor.9 With the Singapore royals exercising little influence and the Temengong centred on building his financial interests in Johor, Singapore Malays were left without a strong, independent and visionary leader with the political resources to represent their interests in the predominantly Chinese but British ruled society. This state of affairs continues to be a persistent theme plaguing the Malay community. In many respects, the deterioration of Istana Kampong Glam, until its repossession by the state in 1999, was symbolic of the general socio-economic and political malaise confronting the Singapore Malay community. The state’s restoration of Istana Kampong Glam to its former glory and its conversion into a Malay Heritage Centre has its fair share of supporters, critics and cynics. Why, one might ask, is it a Malay Heritage Centre and not a Singapore Heritage Centre, in view of Hussein and Ali’s status as the Sultans of Singapore? Singaporean poet and playwright Alfian Saat perceptively likens the ethnicisation of Singapore’s national heritage, such as the Malay Heritage Centre, as not only to a ghettoisation of culture and ethnic identity but an example of the ‘ghettoisation of the museum’.10

Forays into the ‘unknowable past’: Singapore’s pre-1819 Malay history The choice of Raffles as the sole founder of modern Singapore has been explained by former Culture and Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam in the following way: After attaining independence in 1965, there was debate as to who should be declared the founding fathers of Singapore. The debate was brought to an abrupt end when the government fixed the responsibility for this on Sir Stamford Raffles and officially declared him the founder of Singapore. (Chan and Haq, 1987: 149)

Remembering and forgetting 23 For Rajaratnam, ‘Singapore’s knowable past began in 1819 . . . so from our point of view to push a Singaporean’s awareness beyond 1819 would have been a misuse of history’ (Chan and Haq, 1987: 149). Moreover, ‘what happened before 1819 – if anything at all – has been irretrievably lost in the mists of time’ (Rajaratnam, 2007: 251). While venturing into the realms of Singapore’s ‘lost’ and ‘unverifiable’ pre1819 history is regarded a misuse of history, for those keen on investigating the construction of the national narrative, it would seem almost irresponsible not to venture into this neglected terrain. When Raffles descended onto the shores of Singapore, there were supposedly only a handful of local inhabitants living in a land without a verifiable history. This narrative has generally been promoted by Singaporean historians attached to local tertiary institutions. In rationalising Singapore’s national preoccupation with the colonial rather than pre-colonial past, Lau wrote that ‘The colonial past could not be ignored, partly because it was too long, and partly because the alternative would be to compel Singaporeans to return to a non-existent glorious indigenous Golden Age’ (Lau, 1992: 56). Dismissing the reliability of Malay/Indonesian historical records such as the seventeenth century Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals) and the Javanese Nagarakretagama of 1365, both of which attest to the existence of Singapura and Temasek, Kwa claims that ‘For the pre-1819 period, the absence of a large corpus of sources, and the unreliability of those that survived, have already been noted. The colonial period, however, has yielded a much richer store of records . . .’ (Lau, 1992: 58). In reaffirming the unreliability of pre-colonial Malay historical sources, Kwa purports that ‘Compared to the colonial records and reports on Singapore’s modern past, the textual references available for a reconstruction of Singapore’s pre-modern past are difficult to interpret’ (1985). Wong similarly dismisses the reliability of the Sejarah Melayu’s accounts by asserting that ‘Singapore was probably never the great trading city of the Malay Annals that Raffles claimed it to be’ (1991: 42). Having cast doubt on the veracity of the Sejarah Melayu, most Singaporean historians have instead selectively relied on historical Chinese and European sources when examining the origins of Singapore. For example, Arthur Lim Joo Jock purports that ‘The first real account, however of early Singapore . . . is by Wang TaYuan, a Chinese trader who travelled extensively to what the Chinese have always referred to as Nanyang . . . in the first half of the fourteenth century’ (Lim, 1991: 4). Singaporean academics are also inclined to selectively disregard the advice of British historians such as O.W. Wolters that the ‘Sejarah Melayu, provided that it is allowed to tell its story in its own way . . . seems to make a contribution to our understanding of what happened to the Malays in the second half of the fourteenth century’ (1979: 66). Consistent with Wolters’s perspective, Turnbull is of the view that Sejarah Melayu narratives ‘. . . are not mere contrived romantic fancy but grew round a kernel of solid historical truth’ (1989: 3). Others such as Leonard and Barbara Andaya have suggested that instead of being distracted by the dissimilarities in the various versions of the establishment of ancient Singapore, it would be judicious to focus on the similarities of historical accounts (Andaya and Andaya, 1982: 23).

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According to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore’s lack of historical depth constitutes a weak selling point for tourists and strengthens the case for the highly controversial promotion of casinos in the city-state. Said Lee, ‘We do not have a long history, only about 200 years . . . if we want tourists to stay for a few more days, there must be selling points. The IR [integrated resorts] will be one of our selling points’.11 The narrative of a land devoid of a pre-colonial history (Wee, 2003: 151–152) has been incorporated in the government-sponsored documentaries The Singapore Story and Homelands produced in the 1980s and 1990s. In Homelands, Malays are referred to as immigrants – a gross distortion of the genealogy of Singapore Malays from the larger Nusantara (Malay World) of which Singapore is embedded. The documentary A History of Singapore, mooted by the Singapore government but produced by Discovery Networks Asia to mark Singapore’s fortieth anniversary, exhibited the selective forgetting and remembering genre of the documentaries noted earlier. For example, pre-colonial Singapore is portrayed as little more than a swampy mudflat and sleepy fishing village renewed by British imperialism and the dynamism of immigrants. Illustrative of the PAP government’s stamp on the narrative, Lee Kuan Yew is prominently featured reiterating core aspects of the official Singapore Story. It is worth noting that the production of A History of Singapore by Discovery Networks Asia and its screening to an estimated 450 million Discovery Channel households12 constitutes a successful venture into internationalising the PAP’s narrative, and by doing so internationalising a central component of its ideological worldview. Inter alia, the narrative of a near empty mudflat devoid of a verifiable pre-colonial history has been a powerful tool in projecting Singapore as a land of immigrants. Malays have been commonly referred to as immigrants despite their recognised status as the indigenous people of Singapore in Section 152 of the constitution. At National Day parades and in national songs, all Singaporeans are referred to as immigrants from ‘faraway lands’ even though Johor and many of the Indonesians islands south of Singapore are a swim or a short sampan (boat) ride away. The concept of Singapore Malays as indigenous to the Nusantara Malay World and the salience of the regional Nusantara identity appear to be resisted. The narrative of pre-colonial Singapore as a near empty mudflat awaiting the dynamic intervention of British imperialism has persisted despite the publications of many non-Singaporean historians who appear to be more sensitive to the shortcomings of colonial historiography. In History of Singapore, Turnbull estimates that when Raffles arrived in 1819, the island boasted a population of 1,000 inhabitants – 500 Orang Kallang, 200 Orang Seletar, 150 Orang Gelam, some Orang Laut and about 20–30 from the Temengong’s household plus about the same number of Chinese (1989: 5). An authority on Singapore’s pre-colonial history based on his archaeological excavations of various sites in Singapore, Miksic describes fourteenth century Singapore as follows: ‘The picture that emerges shows a surprisingly varied society with a range of commercial activities and contacts which at least in this archaeologist’s view merit the sobriquet of urban’ (2000: 56). Miksic’s 1984 excavation

Remembering and forgetting 25 on Bukit Larangan (Forbidden Hill renamed as Fort Canning by the British), where the early Malay kings apparently lived and were buried, yielded artefacts dating from the first half of the fourteenth century. Significantly, many of these artefacts suggest that there existed small-scale craft activity commonly located in traditional Southeast Asian royal compounds (Miksic, 2000: 60). A keramat (shrine) in this area is the only reminder of Singapore’s pre-colonial civilisation. This is believed to be the burial site of Iskandar Shah, one of the last ancient Malay kings of Singapore. He appears in the Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals) and Chinese Ming Annals as the ruler who established Melaka in the fifteenth century (Miksic, 2000: 57). Excavations during 1994/1995 on the left bank of the Singapore River uncovered the existence of pre-colonial artefacts undisturbed for 500 years. The artefacts, which included coins, suggest there was commercial activity in this area. Similarly, the 1998 excavations near the mouth of the Singapore River yielded pre-colonial artefacts which included Chinese and Dutch coins. Historical artefacts discovered in public works on the Padang area, along Hill Street suggest that these were ‘urban’ type areas in the fourteenth century (Miksic, 2000: 58). Piecing together the artefacts, Miksic concludes that Singapore was not simply an outpost dependent on tapping long-distance maritime trade passing by its shores. It was also an importer of raw materials and exporter or at least producer and consumer of finished artefacts . . . Its existence and characters were determined by a range of economic pursuits . . . These traits portray 14th century Singapore as a representative of a category of settlement which was emerging more or less simultaneously in Asia and Europe: the economically generated city. (Miksic, 2000: 60) Raffles and British colonial administrators such as John Crawfurd recognised the existence of ancient Singapore. Armed with knowledge of the region’s history based on his understanding of the Sejarah Melayu, Raffles was impressed by the sophistication of ancient Singapore, known as Temasek, and observed that ‘The lines of the old city, and its defences can still be traced . . .’. Crawfurd carefully documented the remains of Temasek such as the ancient ruins of building foundations and worship sites at Bukit Larangan (1967). Other tangible evidence of ancient Singapore included a 10 feet high and 10 feet wide stone which was inscribed with a Majapahit script commemorating the capture and sacking of Temasek at the close of the fourteenth century.13

Clash of communalisms: merger, separation and beyond The merger years (1963–1965) constitute a politically defining episode that has shaped the mindset of the PAP leadership. Kwa poetically notes that the merger years ‘continues to haunt them and their vision for Singapore, like Hamlet’s ghost haunts and drives the tragedy of Hamlet’ (2007: 170). Lee Kwan Yew has acknowledged that the rapid build-up of the SAF after separation was strongly

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motivated by fear of a Malaysian instigated coup (Lee, 1998: 22–27). He has also acknowledged that following separation, it took him a long time before he could cross the causeway to Johor.14 Lee only re-visited Malaysia in his capacity as Senior Minister in August 2000. The UMNO leadership have been deeply offended by Lee’s observation in his memoirs that ‘The PAP leaders were not like the politicians in Malaya. Singapore ministers were not pleasure-loving, nor did they seek to enrich themselves’ (Lee, 1998, 656). They have accused Lee of tarnishing the reputation of former Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and UMNO Secretary General Jaafar Albar. In particular, Lee’s claim that UMNO leaders instigated the 1964 riots in Singapore ‘to teach the PAP a lesson for taking part in the [1964] Malayan election and regain the Malay ground they had lost in the 1963 Singapore election’ and claims that Goh Keng Swee had recalled that ‘Razak was involved in it and it was clearly his intention to remove Mr. Lee from office. That was the purpose of Albar’s campaign’ (Lee, 1998: 565–569) deeply offended the UMNO leadership. Retaliating against Lee’s interpretation of the merger years, the Malaysian government in 1998 banned the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) from flying over Malaysian airspace. Many, if not most, Singaporean publications on the merger years have portrayed the PAP leadership as heroic champions of multiracialism and equal rights, ideals which supposedly clashed with UMNO’s communal politics. Relying on declassified British, Australian, New Zealand15 and United States government documents and classified police reports kept at Singapore’s Internal Security Department, the Singaporean historian Albert Lau’s account of the merger years generally corresponds with the PAP narrative. Lau wrote, The basic problem lay in the historical consciousness of the Malays, that Malaya was primarily a Malay country and that the non-Malays, who had settled there under British rule, were in Malaya on sufferance and were not entitled to citizenship rights except on Malay terms. (1998: 280) Not surprisingly, Lau’s book received extensive coverage in the Singapore papers when it was initially published in 1998.16 In keeping with the portrayal of the PAP leadership as heroic casualties of Malay communalism, Lee Kuan Yew in an address to university students in February 2003 reminisced that the first generation PAP leadership had selflessly abandoned an otherwise comfortable life to challenge ‘. . . an unfair political system . . . We did not cop out. We fought for our rights as a people and we were expelled from Malaysia’.17 The impact of this narrative on the legitimacy of the PAP’s multiracial credentials cannot be under-estimated. The first volume of Lee’s memoir is strongly centred on the merger and separation years – a key pillar of the PAP’s Singapore Story. In keeping with Lee’s ‘black and white’ interpretation of the Singapore Story – communists versus nationalists, progressive versus reactionary forces, modernisers versus feudalists – his narrative portrays the PAP as progressive nationalists intent on challenging UMNO’s feudal style communal politics. In other words, the PAP stood for a democratic and

Remembering and forgetting 27 multiracial Malaysian Malaysia based on equal rights in contrast to UMNO’s communal Malay dominated Malaysia. In contrast to official and mainstream Singaporean perspectives on the merger and separation narrative, non-Singaporean scholars such as Bellows have strongly attributed separation to the PAP’s Machiavellian political ambitions (Bellows, 1970). When it was obvious that the UMNO leadership would not accept the PAP into the Alliance coalition, particularly after the PAP’s dismal performance in the 1964 Federal elections, Lee began to aggressively issue statements such as ‘alternative arrangements’ and proposed that the predominantly non-Malay states such as Singapore, Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak be partitioned from Malaysia. That the separation agreement was negotiated between the Alliance leadership and core PAP leaders in July 1965, whilst the British, Australian and New Zealand governments were deliberately kept in the dark ostensibly to forestall their possible intervention against separation, does lend credence to Bellow’s breakaway theory.18 Mohamed Nordin Sopiee’s political miscalculation theory posits that Lee Kuan Yew may have believed that references by the UMNO leadership to taking draconian action against him were a ploy to scare the PAP into abandoning its Malaysian Malaysia campaign (1974). Not taking KL’s innuendos seriously, the PAP leadership used terms such as ‘alternative arrangement’ to counter-scare KL into accepting the PAP into the Alliance coalition government. In keeping with the political miscalculation theory, Minchin believes that Lee was positioning the PAP as the alternative government for a time when ‘the future unfolded and proved too daunting for the Alliance, Singapore would be ready and waiting to resume its rightful place, at the centre of Malaysia and the region’ (1989: 126). Thus, while the Alliance leadership saw Singapore as only one small state out of many others in the Federation, PAP leaders instead believed that Singapore was an important catalyst in Malaysia’s political and economic development and should be treated on equal terms with KL (Bellows, 1970: 57). Belying this inflated sense of importance, Lee declared in December 1964 that ‘our business is to educate everybody in Malaysia’ (Sopiee, 1974: 215). The political miscalculation theory is supported by Barr’s view that separation stemmed from Lee and the PAP leadership’s limited understanding and sensitivity of Malay political culture and history. Barr attributes this myopia to Lee’s limited social contact with Malays in the Chinese dominated island and a lack of conscious attachment to his own Peranakan culture (1997: 7). Similarly, Abdullah Ahmad believes that the PAP leadership’s political miscalculation stemmed from having ‘operated in an essentially Chinese state and was more accustomed to confrontational politics and the airing of differences in the open. Singapore was, and remained, a “foreign body”, virtually a foreign state, in the Federation’ (1985: 87). Adding substance to the political miscalculation theory, Patrick Keith, Deputy Director of External Affairs during the merger years, suggests that Lee’s combative, legalistic, janus-faced opportunism offended Tunku Abdul Rahman. After Lee broke his repeated assurances to Tunku that the PAP would not contest in the 1964 elections, Tunku deeply distrusted Lee, perceiving him little more that a

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Remembering and forgetting calculating machine who appeared to have no genuine appreciation for trust and loyalty among friends. Tunku saw Lee as a man who kept a friend only as long as this was useful and then discarded him when the friendship no longer brought results, or worse, had become a political liability. In Singapore he had used the communists in his climb to power, but once safely ensconced, he had them incarcerated. (Keith, 2005: 49–50)

Lee’s communal politicking was demonstrated by his frequent references to the racial percentages in Malaysia and his relish in highlighting the numerical minority status of Malays (39 per cent compared to the 61 per cent non-Malay population) in the Federation of Malaysia (Keith 2005: 66). Keith wrote, What was the point of reminding the Malays they now made up only 39 per cent of the population of Malaysia? Outnumbered in their own land . . . The constant harping on these figures appeared to be a deliberate move to frighten the Malays. (2005: 151) Lee was also prone to publicly highlighting the glory of Chinese civilisation whilst denigrating Malay historical achievements during visits to the West. During a tour of Australia and New Zealand in May 1965, Lee’s statements about the bleak future of Southeast Asia because of the easy going and undisciplined indigenous people of the region angered the UMNO leadership (Minchin, 1986: 148). They were convinced that Lee was a Chinese chauvinist despite his multiracial rhetoric. The clash of competing communalisms between the PAP and UMNO contradicts the PAP’s narrative that it was expelled from Malaysia for challenging UMNO’s communal ideology.

Saving Premier Lee and the PAP An independent Singapore had long been viewed by the PAP leadership as little more than a political joke. As Malaya was Singapore’s natural economic hinterland, it was believed that the island would not survive on its own. Merger was expected to create a larger market which would attract foreign capital and encourage KL to cooperate rather than compete with Singapore’s economy upon the creation of a common market (Lee, 1961: 5). This strong merger sentiment was clearly expressed in the congratulatory message sent to the Federal government by the Singapore Legislative Assembly on the day of Malaysia’s independence on 21 August, 1957. Inter alia, the message emphasised the ‘. . . prime interest of both peoples to merge into a single political unit within which, as one people with one outlook and purpose, all may share the joys and fruits of the happy state of Merdeka’ (Wilairat, 1975: 3). Whitehall was also keen for Singapore to join the Federation and had conveyed to KL in no uncertain terms that the island would not be granted independence unless its internal security was managed by KL (Bellows,

Remembering and forgetting 29 1970: 13). Recalling the pressure on KL to include Singapore in the Federation, Tunku wrote I can reveal now that I only accepted Singapore because of Britain’s unequivocal stand, which was that unless we could take Singapore in they would not relinquish their hold on the island colony . . . So it is evident I had no choice. (1977: 119) Following the PAP’s resounding defeat in the 1961 Hong Lim and Anson byelections, mass defections of ‘leftists’ from the party and the formation of the Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front) in July 1961 left the PAP government teetering on the brink of political collapse. The PAP had lost 70 per cent of its members and 35 of its 51 branches to the splinter party and retained only a razor thin majority of 26 out of 51 seats in the Assembly. By June 1962, this majority had dissipated with the defection of yet another PAP MP to the Barisan Socialis (Clutterback, 1985: 154). The PAP government was propped up in the Legislative Assembly with the support of three UMNO, four pro-Alliance and one independent assemblyman (Ahmad, 1985: 89). Fearing that the PAP was loosing its grip on government, and with it the possibility of communist control of Singapore through constitutional means, merger was perceived by KL and Whitehall as a viable means of pre-empting a potential Cuba at Malaysia’s doorstep (Chan, 1971: 6). To strengthen the merger option, the PAP leadership shrewdly exploited the communal sensitivities of the UMNO leadership. For example, a 1960 PAP policy statement cautioned that an independent Singapore would exacerbate ethnic tensions as it would become ‘an increasingly Chinese city with Chinese from the Federation and perhaps some from Indonesia’ congregating towards the island and transforming it into an Israel in Southeast Asia (Ahmad, 1985: 89). The PAP’s political footing was secured by the Internal Security Council’s sweeping arrests of 111 ‘leftists’, code named Operation Cold Store, in February 1963. The detainees included half of the Barisan Socialis Central Executive Committee and other political activists from the left-wing Partai Rakyat Singapura (Singapore People’s Party). Further arrests of Barisan Socialis assemblymen and Nanyang University students and the dissolution of radical organisations occurred shortly after merger in September and October 1963. These security sweeps further eroded the political clout of the Barisan Socialis and other left-wing activists. Were it not for these timely interventions by the colonial authorities and KL, it is highly questionable whether the PAP would have been able to successfully maintain its tenuous hold on government in the pre-merger period (George, 1974: 23).

Clash of communalisms and the road to separation Well before Singapore’s inclusion in the Federation of Malaysia, there were clear signals that the PAP’s long-term political ambitions extended to the mainland. A 1962 article in the PAP’s journal Petir boldly charted the party’s options by asserting that

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Remembering and forgetting There are two possible courses open to us. One course is to establish our Party branches throughout Malaysia . . . The second course is to seek alliance with friends, not only in the Federation, but also in the Borneo territories. This second course may well be more easily fulfilled.19

Lee Kuan Yew’s insistence that he keep the title of Prime Minister even though his counterparts held the designation of Chief Minister signalled that Lee and the PAP leadership did not see the island as just another state in the Federation and the PAP as a state-based political party. The PAP’s political ambitions and inflated sense of importance were demonstrated by Lee’s provocative declaration of political independence from the British on 31 August 1963, without consulting Britain or KL, even though the agreed date for Malaysia’s independence was 16 September (Leifer, 2000: 29). Lee’s pronouncement that Singapore would be the trustee of the central government’s powers until 16 September20 was perceived by KL as an outrageous act of political impertinence. While the Alliance government registered its objection to Lee’s declaration of independence to Whitehall21 and managed to persuade the latter to pronounce Singapore’s declaration of independence unconstitutional (Boyce, 1965: 91), elements within UMNO seriously questioned the advisability of proceeding with the formation of Malaysia. UMNO stalwart Jaafar Albar cautioned his colleagues that If this is to be the attitude of our new friends who join the Malaysia family, I feel the Government should reconsider its decision to form Malaysia . . . . Now our new friends have attacked and stabbed it before it has been formed. I am afraid we will face more difficulties and problems from our new friends than our enemies. (Cited in Fletcher, 1969: 8) Tantamount to a political slap-in-the-face for its unilateral proclamation of independence, Tunku announced that only two politicians from Sabah and Sarawak would be appointed to the Federal Cabinet, shortly after Malaysia’s formal inauguration (Cheah, 2002: 99). The PAP’s exclusion at the Federal level was the political cost of its Machiavellian manoeuvrings. Relations between KL and Singapore deteriorated shortly after the merger when it became increasingly transparent that Lee and his colleagues were not content with their secondary status as one of 13 state governments in the Malaysian Federation. Buoyed by the PAP’s electoral successes in the island’s Assembly elections held just five days after the merger,22 Lee signalled the PAP’s desire to be included in the Alliance coalition by proposing that some PAP leaders be invited into the Federal Cabinet. This proposition was promptly scuttled by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) who identified it as little more than a PAP ploy to displace it in the Alliance coalition. In the event, the MCA leadership threatened that if the PAP joined the Alliance, the party would withdraw from the coalition (Bellows, 1970: 53). Berating the MCA whilst attempting to curry favour with UMNO, Lee declared that

Remembering and forgetting 31 The MCA is afraid that if we work together with UMNO, they will be finished in the towns . . . We want UMNO to win the elections for there is no alternative Government as tolerant and stable as the one led by UMNO. It is my belief that the Tengku and Tun Abdul Razak will work with us, not today or next month but in terms of decades. (Cited in Bellows, 1970: 53) Portraying the PAP as a more compatible partner to UMNO compared to the MCA, which it projected as a party of urban ‘haves’, Lee argued, I do not know how long this curious partnership between a party of ‘have-nots’ [UMNO] in the rural areas with a party of the ‘haves’ [MCA] in the urban areas will go on . . . ultimately a party of the ‘have-nots’ in the rural areas will find its kindred soul in the part of the ‘have-nots’ [PAP] in the urban areas.23 Lee’s contempt for MCA leaders such as Tan Siew Sin was barely concealed. Despite his own Peranakan heritage, Lee saw MCA leaders such as Tan as embodying the shortcomings of Peranakan Chinese. Lee wrote, The tragedy of Tan was the tragedy of that whole generation of Straits born Chinese. They did not understand that the rules were different in an independent Malaya . . . They were therefore determined to consolidate their hold on power . . . Tan was totally insensitive to this, as were most Straits born Chinese. (1998: 549) Lee’s contempt for Tan was reciprocated – the latter firmly believed that Lee’s politicking was racially driven despite the PAP’s multiracial rhetoric. Tan saw Lee’s challenge of Malay special rights as calculated to attract stronger Chinese support for the PAP (Keith, 2005: 147). Following Lee’s repeated attempts to court Tunku into accepting the PAP into the Alliance coalition, the MCA leader warned Tunku of Lee’s ‘extraordinary capacity for ditching friends’ (Keith, 2005: 148). Tan declared, ‘He [Lee] tramples on those underneath him but licks the boots of those above him’ (Keith, 2005: 148). Notwithstanding Lee’s pre-merger ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with Tunku that the PAP would not participate in Federal politics (Chan, 1971: 10), the PAP ran candidates in 11 Federal and 15 Assembly seats in predominantly urban based Chinese constituencies with the aim of trouncing the MCA in the April 1964 Federal elections. The PAP leadership hoped to prove to the UMNO leadership that the MCA was made up of ‘politically unintelligent and insensitive men’ (Fletcher, 1969: 35) who lacked solid Chinese electoral support. By contrast, PAP leaders saw themselves as better equipped to assist UMNO in navigating the perilous and uncharted political waters of the Malaysia project (Fletcher, 1969: 35). To downplay Lee’s pre-merger ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with Tunku, Deputy Prime Minister Toh Chin Chye and S. Rajaratnam announced the PAP’s intention of participating in the Federal elections, on 1 March, 1964, when Lee was

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conveniently on a tour of Africa. Toh stated that the PAP would contest in a token number of seats and boldly anticipated that in five years the party would be ‘a force to be reckoned with in Malaysia’ (Fletcher, 1969: 2). Yet, far from trouncing the MCA, the PAP performed disastrously, winning only one Federal seat from the Barisan Socialis and was solidly defeated by the MCA in six constituencies.24 Far from being a spent force, the MCA garnered 27 seats, 9 more than the 1959 elections (Sopiee, 1974: 193). Not known for scathing assessments of his former employer, Alex Josey acknowledged that Lee had badly miscalculated the PAP’s electoral prospects in the 1964 elections and misjudged the electoral magnetism of Tunku amongst the urban Chinese. They regarded him as a Malaysian leader who was multiracial in orientation and able to contain the religious zealots in the opposition Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (Josey, 1995: 202). The PAP’s electoral gamble served to dissipate what little remained of the political trust with the Alliance, prompting Chan Heng Chee to observe that the decision to participate in the April 1964 elections ‘. . . was the most significant political event between 1963–1965 with far-reaching consequences that culminated in the separation of Singapore from Malaysia’ (Fletcher, 1969: 8). Moreover, this disastrous political gamble served to strengthen UMNO–MCA ties, both deeply suspicious towards the political ambitions of Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP leadership (Ahmad, 1985: 89). Notwithstanding its humiliating performance in the 1964 elections, the PAP leadership persisted in its campaign to be included in the Alliance coalition. Representations were made to the Australian and New Zealand governments to win support for PAP membership in the Federal Cabinet. At Lee’s instigation, the British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home also urged Tunku to form a coalition with the PAP following the race riots in Singapore later that year (Sopiee, 1974: 195). Immediately after the July and September 1964 race riots in Singapore, which claimed 22 deaths and caused nearly 500 injuries, relations between KL and Singapore stabilised momentarily, with both parties agreeing to refrain from discussing sensitive issues. According to Tun Abdul Razak, during this period of truce, Lee resorted to every possible strategy to join the Alliance in a coalition by urging ‘. . . the Tengku and I to take the PAP into the Alliance government. It was said that only in this way [could] communal harmony be ensured. We rejected his request outright’ (Suryanarayan, 1969: 11). In an attempt to appease the UMNO leadership, Lee called for special assistance to Malays and pronounced that ‘. . . the indigenous people . . . need and deserve the assistance and cooperation of the other races in Malaysia . . .’ (Sopiee, 1974: 195). Additionally, Lee made another short-lived pledge not to expand the PAP’s activities beyond the island (Sopiee, 1974: 195). Recognising that the PAP’s inclusion into the Alliance coalition had failed by early 1965, the PAP leadership began to aggressively challenge UMNO and the Alliance coalition. Lee provocatively pronounced in May 1965 that ‘If we must make trouble, let us have it now instead of waiting for another five or 10 years. If we find that Malaysia cannot work now, then we can make alternative arrangements’ (Fletcher, 1969: 51). Inter alia, the Alliance coalition was denounced for being a Malay dominated communal party system that was detrimental to Malaysia’s

Remembering and forgetting 33 long-term social cohesion. Reminiscent of the Malaysia–Singapore water dispute publications nearly 40 years later, Singapore’s Ministry of Culture produced a series of publications on the dangers of the communal political system in Malaysia in addition to translating and distributing the anti-PAP statements of UMNO leaders such as Jaafar Albar (Suryanarayan, 1969: 27). The PAP directly challenged the Alliance government with its own coalition of ostensibly non-communal based parties from the Peninsula and West Malaysia under the auspices of the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC). The PAP’s alignment with other Malaysian political parties would make it problematic for KL to suppress the PAP as it would also have to act against the other MSC parties. Inaugurated in May 1965, the five political parties25 comprising the MSC began championing for a Malaysian Malaysia based on ‘. . . educating and encouraging the various races in Malaysia to seek political affiliation not on the basis of race and religion but on the basis of common political ideologies’ and where ‘. . . the state is not identified with the supremacy, well-being and the interests of any one particular community or race’ (Fletcher, 1969: 58). Malay special status was challenged by questioning the indigenous status of the community. Exposing his poor understanding of the atavistic internal migration within the Malay World, Lee claimed in a speech in May 1965 that According to history, Malays began to migrate to Malaysia in noticeable numbers only 700 years ago . . . . Therefore it is wrong and illogical for a particular racial group to think that they are more justified to be called Malaysians and that the others can become Malaysians through their favour. (Cited in Fletcher, 1969: 58) Questioning the constitutionality of Malay rights and privileges, Lee claimed ‘When we joined Malaysia, we never agreed to Malay rule . . . This is all bunkum . . . We never agreed to it’ (Josey, 1995: 266). This was perceived by hard-liners within UMNO such as Jaafar Albar as a dishonest challenge to the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the Malay community.26 Others such as Mahathir Mohamad, then an UMNO backbencher, pronounced that ‘behind the veneer of noncommunalism’, the PAP used the ‘most rabid form of communalism yet practiced’ (Suryanarayan, 1969: 33). Tunku has noted that Lee’s May speech was the final ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ (1977: 120). Whilst professing the promotion of a non-communal Malaysian Malaysia, the target audience and support base for the PAP-led MSC came largely from the Chinese and other non-Malay communities. MSC pronouncements were laden with aggressive ethnic connotations of a ‘40–40–20 distribution’ (40 per cent Malays, 40 per cent Chinese and 20 per cent others) and references to the 60 per cent inevitably combining against the oppressive 40 per cent. Many in UMNO questioned the integrity of Lee and the PAP leadership’s multiracial credentials particularly when Lee acknowledged that in the Malaysian political context A Chinese communal party, however well organised, must always fail. For out of 104 seats in Parliament in Malaya, a Chinese communal party can only win

34

Remembering and forgetting twenty seats . . . So those who advise the Chinese to assert themselves politically through a Chinese communal party are giving wrong and dangerous advice. (Cited in Josey, 1995: 237)

Based on this logic, it was in the PAP’s interest to champion a multiracial Malaysian Malaysia. In assessing the impact of the PAP-led Malaysian Malaysia campaign, Bellows observed: ‘Tragically, the MSC became only a slightly more subtle form of communalism than that preached by the Malay ultras . . . eroding what confidence and trust the various communities had in one another’ (1970: 64). Indeed, by mid-1965, racial tensions were so explosive that foreign observers in Malaysia believed that any prolongation of the friction between KL and Singapore would have resulted in bloodshed (Fletcher, 1969: 66).

Rallying foreign support When Lee Kuan Yew criticised the Federal government’s communal political system and oppression of ethnic minorities during his tours to the West, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia Tun Razak felt justified in accusing Lee of attempting to ‘blacken the image of the central government’ and extending the PAP’s Malaysian Malaysia campaign into the international arena.27 Lee’s relations with Western leaders were strongly calculated towards rallying them behind the PAP in its political tussle with the Alliance government. In his memoirs, Lee admits that he felt a sense of relief when the British Labour Party, whose leadership he had established good relations with, won the 1964 elections. ‘My position had improved. The Tunku would have to deal with a British Labour government that would not be sympathetic to feudal chiefs who put down a democratic loyal opposition that abjured violence’ (Lee, 1998: 577). Lee has also admitted that he ‘worked on’ Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies as he ‘carried weight with the Tunku’ (Lee, 1998: 595) and ‘Unlike Harold Wilson, he was a conservative and has always supported the Tunku’ (Lee, 1998: 595). During a February/March 1965 tour of Australia and New Zealand, Lee astutely cultivated the support of senior political elites, the media and the wider public to enhance the PAP’s international support base.28 Lee acknowledged that he deliberately ‘left New Zealanders and Australians in no doubt that we needed and valued their help, that they were right to help us, and that together, we could succeed’ (Lee, 1998: 597). Just before Singapore’s separation, Lee remarked that the strategy of rallying foreign support was meant to caution KL against taking draconian action against the PAP leadership: ‘They know that if they crush us by undemocratic means there will be uproar in Britain, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere . . .’ (Lau, 1998: 241). Despite Lee’s political manoeuvrings in the international arena during the merger years, opposition politicians and civil society activists in contemporary Singapore have been denounced for partaking in similar strategies. The PAP’s resounding success in the July 1965 Hong Lim by-elections29 represented another significant turning-point in its tumultuous relations with KL. Now

Remembering and forgetting 35 that the PAP was firmly in control of the island and radical political activists politically neutralised, the original rationale for Singapore’s entry into the larger Federation merger – that is saving the PAP – became redundant. Recognising that the PAP faced no hope of being included in the Alliance government, by mid-1965, Lee and a core of PAP leaders negotiated Singapore’s departure from the Federation. Singapore was declared an independent state on 9 August, 1965 after a brief but tumultuous 23 months in Malaysia.30 With Singapore’s separation, Lee’s ambitions for the PAP becoming a major political force in the Federation31 were demolished. Deprived of the larger Malaysian political stage, Singapore’s separation was not surprisingly a ‘moment of anguish’ for the ambitious Lee Kuan Yew, who had been out-manoeuvred by the ‘communal tiger’ and whose grand ambitions were irredeemably contained.

Cultural separation from the Nusantara Singapore’s first Prime Minister (1959–1990) and current Minister Mentor, Lee Kuan Yew, has a track record for making numerous derogatory statements about Malays. For example, shortly after Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965, Lee pronounced the absence of historical artefacts of civilisational importance in the Malay World, in the presence of a visiting Indian dignitary. We are really ancient peoples stranded in the part of the world which the ancient Hindus used to pass by . . . and they went on to Java and they built Borobudur. There are no ruins because there wasn’t anything worth building on until they discovered rubber and tin. And that’s where my great-grandfather came in. And that’s where I am now. Having built this Singapore, we are determined to keep it. (Cited in Josey, 1995: 291) In an interview with the BBC in 1984, Lee described indigenous Southeast Asians as ‘a jolly people, they sing, they dance, [characteristics which are] unsettling on the local [Chinese] population’.32 In his memoirs, Lee attributed the solidarity of fellow Malay students at Raffles College to their supposed fear of Chinese cultural and biological superiority and the associated feeling of being threatened, a fear of being overwhelmed by the more energetic and hardworking Chinese and Indian immigrants . . . the Malays were the owners of the land, yet seemed to be in danger of being displaced from top positions by recent arrivals, who were smarter, more competitive and more determined. (Lee, 1998: 41–42) Regional Malays’ perceptions of the island as an arrogant overseas Chinese enclave have in part been fuelled by Lee’s characterisation of Singapore’s status in Southeast Asia as akin to a ‘Venice in the Middle Ages’, a ‘Shining Beacon in the midst of darkness’, an ‘oasis in a desert’, and an ‘Israel in a Malay-Muslim sea’ (Wilairat, 1975: 45).

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Lee’s eugenics belief in racial hierarchies and view that the various races possess inherent racial capabilities have reinforced the ‘othering’ of Singapore Malays and rationalised their persisting socio-economic marginality relative to the dominant Chinese community. Their marginality is commonly accepted as biologically predetermined and thus inevitable. As such, Malays have been encouraged not to measure their socio-economic and educational progress against that of other ethnic communities but against their own past progress. As nature rather than nurture is thought to be the principal determining factor of professional achievement and material success, the goal of narrowing the socio-economic gaps between the races, and to a lesser extent classes, is deemed unrealistic as it defies the ‘natural givens’ of life (Rahim, 2001a: 55). The perception of Malays as a deficient biological and cultural community and a burden on Singapore’s economic dynamism continues to be reinforced not only by the speeches of PAP leaders but by the regular diet of articles in the local newspapers about the disproportionately high Malay drug addiction, delinquency and divorce rates. The supposedly dysfunctional nature of many Malay families was highlighted by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in his August 2005 National Day rally speech. Out of 18 paragraphs in the speech in Malay, seven paragraphs focused on the issue of dysfunctional Malay families.33 In particular, the supposed Malay dysfunctional family was attributed to the younger than average Malay bride, relative to Chinese and Indian brides.34 Concurring with his son’s understanding of the persisting Malay socio-economic marginality, Minister Mentor Lee counselled the Malay community to address this problem of young brides in the following patronising terms: It’s going to take the community effort, counselling and a good dose of reality . . . Surely we can get it down to 6 per cent, make some effort. In 10 years, you might get it down to 3 per cent. You might even do better than the Chinese. It can be done but needs community effort.35 In their discussion of Malay families and young brides, Lee Senior and Junior exposed their ideological bias by failing to even consider whether these dysfunctional families and young brides tend to come from less educated and lowersocio-economic backgrounds. Indeed, it could well be argued that Chinese and Indian families from similarly disadvantaged backgrounds also exhibit similar social problems. Aside from whether one agrees with the perspectives of the Prime Minister and Minister Mentor, these high profile media speeches have served to reinforce public perceptions of Malays as a problematic community and that they have only themselves to blame for their failings.

Diffident and defiant Malays Echoing Lee and the PAP leadership’s cultural deficit perspectives, PAP Malay leaders have consistently counselled Malays to ‘work hard’, ‘help yourself’, ‘change your outlook’, ‘study hard, be ‘more competitive’, not to be held back by

Remembering and forgetting 37 ‘stale ideas’, ‘adapt to the needs of the new era’,36 be ‘self reliant’ and avoid selfimposed ‘barriers and shadows’.37 As the problem has been diagnosed as lying in the deficient cultural values of Malays, they have been repeatedly advised not to expect a narrowing in the inter-ethnic socio-economic gap. Instead they are encouraged to measure their progress only against their own past. Reminiscent of the UMNO leadership’s 1990s promotion of the Malaysian Melayu Baru (the New Malay) and the PAP leadership’s cultural deficit discourse, Minister Yaacob Ibrahim in 2002 called on Singapore Malays to stop looking back and start moving forward by ‘remaking’ the Malay community towards a new orientation. He described the New Malay as creative, confident, self-reliant, not held back by ‘barriers and shadows’, instilled with a culture of excellence and at home in the Singapore setting yet rooted in Malay identity and Islamic values.38 PAP Malay MPs have generally refrained from adopting dissenting positions that stray from the general party line. This cautiousness has been fuelled by the experiences of past PAP Malay MPs who, having assertively articulated Malay concerns or questioned politically sensitive government policies, have had their political careers prematurely short-circuited or have failed to climb far up the PAP hierarchy. This timorous stance has not only disappointed the Malay community but also provoked Straits Times columnist Chua Lee Hoong to boldly counsel Malays in positions of authority to ‘speak their minds’ on sensitive issues like race, discrimination and religious practices even though they are discouraged from doing so by the PAP.39 Alarmed by the weak Malay community confidence in PAP Malay MPs to assertively represent their concerns in public, Chua wrote that In the eyes of the Malay or Muslim ground, its MPs are not as effective as they would wish. When the tudung issue broke out, for instance, the parents involved preferred to seek the counsel of family and friends rather than of ‘official’ leaders.40 In contrast to the timorous orientation of Malay MPs, their Chinese and Indian counterparts have publicly demonstrated a greater willingness to advance positions that directly contradict the PAP government’s policy stance. They include sensitive issues such as the SAP schools and ethnic self-help groups.41 For example, MP Tan Cheng Bok is widely respected for having the courage to question the propriety of SAP schools on the multiracial fabric of society and the problems confronting Malays and other low income Singaporeans in the workforce. In January 2003, PAP parliamentarian K. Shanmugam boldly discussed the shortcomings of meritocracy in forging meaningful inter-ethnic relations in view of the prevailing perception of Malay and Muslim Singaporeans as being less able, which has in turn made them feel that they are not adequately respected by the larger society. To address this potentially destabilising multi-ethnic social environment and ‘cut terrorists from their potential base’ Shanmugam has called for some form of affirmative action policy to facilitate the entry of more Malays into important positions

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within the larger society.42 Shanmugan courageously repeated his heretical views during the 2006 election campaign. The reluctance of PAP Malay MPs to publicly challenge public policies and contentious beliefs of the PAP leadership can also be attributed to their less than influential position within the PAP hierarchy. To date, Malays have persistently held relatively unimportant portfolios in Cabinet. No Malay has ever held the Education, Finance, Foreign Affairs or Defence portfolios. They have been assigned to the Social Welfare, Sports, Environment, Community Affairs and Muslim Affairs portfolios. Armed with a PhD in Engineering from an Ivy League American University, the former academic from the National University of Singapore, Yaacob Ibrahim, arguably possesses the coveted technocratic abilities to take on such key portfolios but remains the Minister for the Environment and Water Resources. Similarly, former Cabinet Minister Ahmad Mattar, who possessed a PhD in Physics, progressed no further than the Environment portfolio when he retired from public office. Significantly, no Malay has held the office of the President since the first President Yusof Ishak. Malay organisations, opposition politicians and individuals who have dared to question the propriety of the PAP government’s domestic and foreign policies and exposed the contradiction between the rhetoric and reality of multiracialism and meritocracy have been accused of being ethnic chauvinists, religious extremists or of harbouring a sinister agenda. Dissenting voices within the Malay community have rarely been allowed space to articulate their views in the mainstream media or within Malay community organisations that are directly or indirectly led by PAP Malay MPs or closely aligned to the PAP government. In 2002, Malay community organisation Fateha.com and its spokesperson Zulfikar Shariff were roundly denounced for discussing politically sensitive issues such as Malay discrimination in the workforce, campaigning to preserve madrasahs, petitioning against the no-tudung (headscarf) policy for Muslim school girls and claiming that the PAP government was insensitive to the concerns of the Malay and Muslim communities. In a BBC interview, Zulfikar asserted that the PAP government’s close alignment with the US and insensitivity to Malay and Muslim concerns had contributed to some members within the Malay and Muslim communities supporting militant organisations such as JI. Challenging the PAP government’s one-dimensional portrayal of the alleged Muslim JI activists as solely driven by religious extremism and questioning the propriety of Singapore’s close security ties with Washington, Zulfikar purported that the existence of militant Islamists ‘. . . signals a deeper problem. The motivation for the act seems to be the US army in Singapore’.43 Criminal defamation proceedings were filed against Zulfikar when he, via the website Fateha.com, raised the issue of nepotism after the appointment of then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s wife Ho Ching as CEO of Temasek Holdings. Expecting the coercive force of the PAP’s authoritarian state repression after his computer was seized and he was subject to police interrogation (Rodan, 2003: 516), Zulfikar sought political asylum in Australia, claiming that he would not receive a fair hearing in the Singapore courts.44

Remembering and forgetting 39

Sinification and the status of the national language After more than 40 years of independence and nation-building, Singaporeans continue to identify themselves primarily in terms of their ethnicity rather than their nationality. This can be attributed to the Sinification of the city-state and the ethnically segmented social environment. Inter-ethnic interaction has remained largely superficial and laden with ethnic stereotyping – the ethnic communities remaining ‘the other’ to one another (Kwok and Ali, 2002: 120). Illustrative of the strongly Sinicised social environment, most non-Malays do not speak the national language (Malay) or know the meaning of the national anthem Majullah Singapura. As such, many Singaporeans do not sing the national anthem when it is being played during formal occasions. The national language is alien to most Singaporeans because Chinese students must study Mandarin as their mother-tongue language even though Malay and Indian students are allowed to study Mandarin. The MOE (Ministry of Education) has not revealed the actual figures of Malay and Indian students studying Mandarin because of its political sensitivity but the anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a significant number of ethnic minorities who have pragmatically chosen to study Mandarin to enhance their job opportunities. In the increasingly Sinicised city-state, there is little incentive for Singaporeans to learn the national language despite it being the most widely spoken language in Southeast Asia. The devaluation of the national language can also be attributed to the association of Malay as the language of the subordinate Indonesian maid, humble postman, office cleaner and dispatch rider and less affluent neighbouring countries to the immediate north and south. Reflective of the anaemic social, economic and cultural capital associated with learning the national language, there has been a significant decline in the proportion of Malay street and district names. Developers of private housing estates and residents have petitioned for the change of Malay street names, claiming that they are confusing and prejudicial to the dignity of residents. In the late 1960s, the Street-Naming Advisory Committee was directed to stop naming streets after flowers, fruits and animals in Malay and avoid the use of Jalan in favour of Road (Kong and Yeoh, 2003: 119–123). Lorongs had been renamed Avenue, Rise, Drive and View. Jurong Town Corporation had apparently lobbied the Street-Naming Committee for more Chinese street names as most investors in Jurong are Chinese. The 1980s witnessed a significant increase in the number of Mandarin (hanyu pinyin or a Mandarin system of romanising Chinese characters) street and place names even though this met with some public resistance (Kong and Yeoh, 2003: 126). In contrast to the declining stature of the national language, Lee Kuan Yew and others in the PAP leadership have continually reminded the Chinese community of the economic value of Mandarin and its role in transmitting the rich and ancient Chinese cultural tradition. In addition to engendering pride and identification with their cultural heritage, Singaporean Chinese have also been enjoined to study Mandarin as a means of establishing close social networks (guanxi) with the rapidly industrialising mainland Chinese state. Acknowledging his role as the

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architect behind the elevation of Mandarin and the SAP (Special Assistance Plan) schools, Lee wrote in his memoirs that I decided that the time was right to encourage our Chinese to use Mandarin instead of dialects . . . I launched a ‘Speak Mandarin’ campaign for a month every year . . . . I decided to preserve the best nine of the Chinese schools under a special assistance plan, or SAP . . . The SAP schools succeeded in retaining the formality, discipline and social courtesies of traditional Chinese schools. The ethos in these schools was, and still is, superior to that of the English language schools, which tended to be more slack in these matters. (Lee, 2000: 179, my emphasis) Mirroring Lee Kuan Yew’s views on the importance of Mandarin, Minister George Yeo pronounced that ‘Without this cultural inheritance, Singapore could not have progressed the way it has and would not be able to survive a major crisis’ (Andrew Tan, 2004: 180). The constant salutation of Chinese culture and language has seldom been extended to the Malay and Indian communities. Yet, despite the three decades of Speak Mandarin Campaigns, generous funding of the mono-ethnic SAP schools, the imposition of a bilingual education policy which compels the Chinese students but not their Malay and Indian counterparts to study their mother-tongue and the rising economic clout of China, interest in Mandarin particularly by younger Singaporean Chinese remains problematic. Various studies have suggested that younger Chinese tend to study the language to pass exams and then hardly use it. Moreover, about 25 per cent of ethnic Chinese, aged 17 to 29, polled in 2004, did not think it was necessary for Singaporean Chinese to speak Mandarin at all. Another poll found that 23 per cent of Chinese were not fluent in the language.45 Verifying the less than resounding success of the Singapore government’s top-down approach to promoting Mandarin, language expert from the School of Languages and Literature, University of Xuzho, Yang Hong Qing purported that Malaysians tend to be more proficient in Mandarin because they are more emotionally and intellectually enthusiastic about it. By contrast, Mandarin standards have apparently been slipping in the city-state despite government campaigns and scholarships.46 Consistent with this lack of enthusiasm for Mandarin, thousands of Singaporeans, who have refused to subject their children to studying a ‘mother-tongue’ that neither they nor their children were familiar with, have emigrated overseas. So concerned was Minister Mentor Lee about the less than enthusiastic interest in Mandarin, particularly amongst the well-educated, that in a parliamentary speech in late 2004, two hours was spent berating Chinese parents to use Mandarin at home so as to give their children a good head start in the language. To rejuvenate interest in Mandarin, the government has introduced a more flexible Chinese language curriculum in schools.47 The lavish attention and resources invested in the promotion of Mandarin has generated uneasiness, particularly within the ethnic minority communities who are inclined to perceive it as a form of linguistic favouritism. Even though Mandarin,

Remembering and forgetting 41 Malay and Tamil are the recognised official languages, and Malay the national language, Mandarin has been elevated above the other languages. This linguistic and cultural favouritism has not only undermined the multiracial fabric of Singaporean society but also generated a level of insecurity and defensiveness within ethnic minority communities (Eugene Tan, 2004c: 73).

Conclusion Typical of many colonial settler societies, Singapore’s rich pre-colonial Malay past has been downplayed, dismissed as fictitious and devalued. By contrast, the narrative of the city-state as an immigrant society founded by British colonialism and driven by the cultural dynamism of the Chinese has been systematically promoted. This narrative serves to obfuscate the indigenous status of Malays even though it is clearly recognised in Section 152 of the Singapore Constitution. The obfuscation of Malay indigeniety and Singapore’s pre-Malay history serves to blur the city-state’s Malay origins in the consciousness of Singaporeans. This historical obfuscation and selective forgetting does not bode well for the maturation of city-state’s national and Nusantara regional identities, both of which are intertwined. The merger years have been simplistically portrayed as a failed experiment arising from the ideological clash between the PAP’s progressive multiracialism and UMNO’s regressive communalism. By contrast, revisionist narratives purport that Singapore’s separation from Malaysia are more akin to a clash of communal forces between UMNO and the PAP. Having successfully outwitted the ‘communist tiger’ to power in Singapore, the PAP leadership erroneously believed that it possessed the political clout and capability to successfully ride the Malaysian ‘communal tiger’ once the island was included in the Federation of Malaysia. However, the PAP’s abrasive attempt to be included in the Alliance coalition was repeatedly rebuffed and became increasingly improbable after its ill-conceived Malaysian Malaysia campaign. In particular, the Malaysian Malaysia campaign demonstrated the PAP leadership’s poor understanding of the social complexities driving Malaysian political culture. In pointing out the campaign’s failure to address Malay economic insecurities, despite aggressively demanding equal political status for non-Malays, Tunku wrote: ‘What the Malays had the Chinese wanted a share of but what the Chinese had they wanted to keep to themselves’ (Ahmad, 1985: 94). Without the assistance of the British authorities, the ‘communal tiger’ proved more difficult to out-manoeuvre than the ‘communist tiger’, particularly when communal strategies were employed to ostensibly challenge communalism. The multiracial rhetoric of the PAP’s Malaysian Malaysia was not followed through in independent Singapore. This was starkly evident by the exclusion of Malays from national service and their persistent socio-educational marginality. Their unofficial exlusion from compulsory national service and continued discrimination in the SAF contributed to the perception of Malays as potentially disloyal to Singapore. Malay remained the national language but is of limited economic value compared to English, the language of administration and medium of instruction in most schools, and Chinese, the language of commerce. By the late 1970s, Mandarin

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was systematically promoted by the state as part of a broader shift towards Sinification. The city-state’s economic achievements have contributed to an attitude of regional exceptionalism, triumphalism and ambivalent regional identification. Thompson’s 2003–2005 survey of National University of Singapore student perceptions found that Singapore was seen as being apart of rather than a part of Southeast Asia. This ‘active ambivalence’ has no doubt been encouraged further by the ‘pre-eminence of economic developmentalism as a raison d’etre of the nationstate of Singapore’ (Thompson, 2006: 184–185). This active ambivalence has led to Singaporeans looking more strongly to the ‘West’ rather than ‘East’ in imagining a future direction for the country. Additionally, they associate more closely with the United States, Australia, France and Japan than with any other Southeast Asian country. While Singapore is described as ‘small’, ‘clean’, ’rich’, ‘multiracial’, and ‘developed’, the Southeast Asian region is described as ‘poor’, ‘underdeveloped’, ‘developing’, ‘backward’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘big’ (Thompson, 2006: 193). Instructively, the primary descriptor for Malaysia was ‘Malay’ and ‘Muslim’ and Indonesia ‘big’ and ‘Muslim’. A Straits Times survey in 2005 also found that only 3 out of 24 Singaporean teenagers could name the countries in ASEAN48 – highlighting the city-state’s ‘in the region but not of the region’ complex.

3

Competing and comparable paradigms of authoritarian nation-building

The politics of balas dendam Metaphors have been commonly employed to interpret the capricious relations between the neighbouring states of Singapore and Malaysia. The commonly used metaphors of a divorced couple, insecure lovers and rival siblings (abang–adik) highlight the connected past, present and future destiny of countries that are historically, physically, economically and socially intertwined. This intertwining is exemplified by the fact that each day thousands of Malaysians and Singaporeans cross national boundaries for work and leisure. Ethnic tensions in one country have had spill-over effects, the economic performance of one impact the other and electoral challenges to one government are likely to ripple across the causeway. Indeed, their respective national narratives of multiracialism in Singapore and bumiputera-ism (indigenous rights) in Malaysia exhibit striking similarities. Both narratives promote a national identity rooted strongly in ethnic identification and state policies which favour the political and cultural dominance of the ethnic majority community. These paradoxical similarities have prompted some observers to invoke the mirror-image metaphor when characterising the nature of Singapore–Malaysia relations. The brief but tumultuous merger years have been commonly referred to by politicians on both sides of the causeway as akin to a failed marriage. As is typical of failed marriages, the divorcees periodically indulge in blaming the other for the break-up in balas dendam1 fashion, while at other times harbouring fleeting thoughts of reconciliation. The emotional baggage of the merger years (akin to marriage) and political separation (akin to divorce) is particularly evident in the statements and actions of veteran UMNO and PAP leaders such as Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew, protagonists during the merger years but whose relationship remained problematic in the post-merger years. Lee acknowledged in 1989 that after the unpleasant events of the merger, it took him a long time before he could cross the causeway to Johor.2 Invoking the divorced couple metaphor at a 1998 National Day rally speech, then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong spoke of how Malaysia and Singapore were once ‘. . . married, found irreconcilable differences, broke up and went their separate ways’.3 Belying a deep-seated resentment towards the UMNO leadership for their

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treatment of the PAP during the merger years, in a chapter of his memoirs provocatively entitled Talak, Talak, Talak, Lee Kuan Yew portrayed Singapore as the helpless and aggrieved wife who was arbitrarily divorced by her Malaysian husband for daring to exert her marital rights. Lee wrote, Under Malay-Muslim custom, a husband but not the wife, can declare ‘Talak’ (I divorce thee) and the woman is divorced . . . . The three readings in the two chambers of parliament were the three talaks with which Malaysia divorced Singapore. The partners – predominantly Malay in Malaya, and predominantly Chinese in Singapore – had not been compatible. Their union had been marred by increasing conjugal strife over whether the new Federation should be a truly multiracial society, or one dominated by the Malays. (Lee, 1998: 14) In a conciliatory mood amidst the glow of deepening bilateral economic cooperation following the appointment of Abdullah Badawi to the Prime Ministership, then International Trade Minister Datuk Rafidah Aziz in 2004 jokingly teased her Singaporean counterpart George Yeo that ‘Now it is contingent on us . . . [to] get married again’.4 The metaphor of a divorced couple could be invoked to explain KL’s ambiguous relationship with Singapore Malays – the product of a brief union and bitter divorce. Despite one parent living across the causeway, the child’s welfare remains a source of concern. Periodically, the separated parent sees fit to voice disapproval against the treatment and upbringing of the Singaporean child. This goes some way towards explaining the statements by UMNO leaders such as Abdullah Badawi, who in his capacity as Foreign Minister in 1989 noted that Malaysians would feel ‘hurt and suspicious’ if policies in Singapore were perceived to be detrimental to Singapore Malays.5 Unnerved by Abdullah Badawi’s statement, then Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam asserted that Abdullah had in effect pronounced that Singapore–Malaysia relations were strongly conditional on how the PAP government treated Singapore Malays and that KL had taken on ‘. . . some measure of responsibility for safeguarding the dignity and well-being of Singapore Malays’.6 Employing the idiom of the insecure lover, Malaysian political commentator Tunku Abdul Aziz has interpreted the chronically tense bilateral relations in the following way: ‘To us, Singapore appears to behave too much like an insecure lover, forever demanding to know how much she is loved’.7 Others such as Singapore’s Minister George Yeo have likened bilateral relations to that of inseparable Siamese twins who ‘. . . share a common umbilical cord’.8 Similarly, Abdullah Badawi has compared Singapore–Malaysia relations to ‘neighbours living in semi-detached houses, sharing a common wall and roof’ (Badawi, 1990: 10). The metaphor of feuding family members has also been employed by Lee Kuan Yew to explain the roller-coaster relationship between the neighbouring states. In his memoirs, Lee complained that the Malaysian leadership was not in the habit

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of dealing with Singapore as a sovereign nation, preferring an asymmetrical abang–adik (elder brother–younger brother) relationship with the Singaporean adik expected to give way to abang’s demands. Lee forewarned that Singapore would not partake in this asymmetrical relationship when it had legitimate interests to defend (Lee, 2000: 280). Thus, despite the initial warming of bilateral relations following Abdullah Badawi’s elevation to the Prime Ministership, PAP Minister Ng Eng Hen in 2007 reminded Singaporeans that bilateral relations should not be based on abang–adik terms. ‘I’m bigger brother, you’re smaller brother, so smaller brother should pay greater respects to bigger brother. I don’t think that’s a strong basis to start any relationship’.9 Lee’s characterisation of bilateral relations in abang–adik terms stems from the tendency of Malaysian leaders to resort to asymmetrical kin metaphors. For example, Malaysia has been referred to as the parent or older sibling, duty bound to teach the clever but biadab (prodigal) child (Singapore) a few lessons in good manners. Former Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad did not hesitate to remind the PAP leadership of the island’s Lilliputian landmass during a visit to Johor in February 2003: ‘In Singapore, there are roads but when shifting into fourth gear, you fall into the sea because it is not big . . . So we want to give them the opportunity to change into fourth gear on our roads’.10 In a similar vein, former Indonesian President B.J. Habibie saw it fit to remind the Singaporean leadership of the city-state’s miniscule size by referring to it as ‘little red dot’. Habibie’s stinging comments were apparently provoked by Lee Kuan Yew questioning his suitability for the office of the Presidency. Lee Kuan Yew’s provocative claim in 2003 that Singapore Malays are more multiracial than their ethnic counterparts across the causeway is indicative of his enduring balas dendam complex. Lee attributed the differences between Malaysian and Singaporean Malays to the different education systems and different social structures that have made for different social relations between the races . . . I know that the policies we are following open the most doors to the people who want to make the effort and get there.11 Recounting his observations of the different attitudes between the Malays from Singapore and those from across the causeway, when he was a student at the Raffles College in Singapore, Lee claimed that the latter were ‘more race conscious and mixed more among themselves than with the Chinese, Indian and other students’.12 He claimed that following Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, ‘The Singapore Malays accepted me as a fellow citizen . . . the Malayan Malays did not. To them I was an orang tumpangan, a lodger’.13 Lee Kuan Yew’s balas dendam complex appears to have been passed down to his son Lee Hsien Loong. Shortly after his appointment as Prime Minister, the younger Lee attributed Singapore’s separation from Malaysia to the PAP’s noble struggle for racial equality against Malay dominance. Recounting the PAP narrative, Lee Hsien Loong asserted that,

46

Competing and comparable paradigms After Singapore joined Malaysia, the PAP government of Singapore fought strenuously for a Malaysian Malaysia in which all races would be treated equally . . . We fought against those who sought to preserve the system of Malay dominance and racial politics . . . The differences proved to be irreconcilable. They led to racial riots, and finally separation and independence in 1965. After independence, the PAP leadership claimed that they were determined to safeguard the minority communities in Singapore. They vowed never to allow the minorities to be treated in the way that Singaporeans had experienced as a minority in Malaysia.14

This chapter attempts to explain the tenuous nature of Singapore–Malaysia relations by critically interrogating their nation-building and governance paradigms. Despite postulations of superiority and difference, the nation-building paradigms of the neighbouring authoritarian states reveal myriad similarities. Just as the Malaysian polity has systematically promoted its Malay character, the Singaporean polity has promoted its Chineseness. In both states, cultural policies are based on the separate development of the main ethnic communities. At the same time, each state has strongly developed a national identity based on negative images of the other stemming strongly from the tumultuous experiences of the merger years. Bilateral tensions thus stem not so much from the differences but key similarities in the communal political calculations, ethno-nationalist dictates and authoritarian nation-building approaches of political elites in neighbouring states.

Communalism and the politics of one-upmanship Having challenged the special rights and status of bumiputeras during the merger years, the PAP government was expected to follow through with its Malaysian Malaysia rhetoric by establishing a democratic and multiracial Singaporean Singapore where all ethnic communities would be treated on equal terms. In this multiracial society, nationality rather than ethnicity would be the defining feature of national identity. During the merger years, the PAP leadership repeatedly railed against the lack of democratic space for free debate within and beyond the Malaysian parliament. In a parliamentary address in November 1964, Lee protested that any person who challenged the Alliance worldview and proposed new ideas faced a barrage of ‘vilification and vituperation’ (Keith, 2005: 114). Casting the PAP as a champion of democratic ideals, Lee pronounced that the time had come to ask if the Malaysian government believed in an open society where people could test their opinions in open encounters (Keith, 2005: 114). In the immediate post-merger period, the split between the right and left factions within the PAP meant that the PAP government was strongly reliant on the support of the English-educated, Malays and Indians. The predominantly English-educated PAP leadership maintained a tenuous relationship with the Chinese-educated who were inclined to support left-wing parties such as the Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front). This multiracial rhetoric suited the PAP state government (Rahim, 2001a: 241), providing it with a non-communal gloss of Weberian rationality. While

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English continued as the language of administration, Malay remained the national language and the special constitutional status of Malays as the indigenous community remained intact. Despite its tenuous relations with the Chinese-educated, the PAP remained a predominantly Chinese-based political party that required the long-term support of the Chinese community to maintain its hold on government. The Chinese were not only numerically dominant in the city-state but following separation became a dominant majority in all electoral constituencies as a result of urban resettlement and gerrymandering policies. By the late 1980s, these policies effectively gutted traditional Malay electoral strongholds and with it the political backbone of the Malay community (Rahim, 2001a). Dismissing the non-communal rhetoric of the PAP as a veiled form of communalism, Mahathir Mohamad noted in his first book The Malay Dilemma that, ‘some non-Malays see the removal of racial politics as a means to enhance the position of their own race . . . the so called non-communal parties are merely fronts for some of the most blatant racial politics’.15 UMNO leaders such as Mahathir have purported that genuine multiracialism and sustainable national unity could only be secured when a level playing field exists between the various races after ‘taking the various races through protected stages to the point where all races are equal in all respects . . . Equality has to be established first for race loyalties to disappear and integration to take place’ (Mohamad, 1970: 177–178). According to this logic, genuine multiracialism, sustainable national unity and social stability required the state to implement policies geared towards narrowing the socio-economic disparities between ethnic communities. The newly elected Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi in September 2004, reiterated the Malaysian government’s commitment to narrowing those socio-economic disparities in order to address ethnic tensions.16 However, this focus on narrowing inter-ethnic economic disparities has downplayed the growing intra-ethnic disparities within the Malay community and the intractable economic marginality of the Indian community. In contrast to the Malaysian government’s focus on narrowing the inter-ethnic gaps, the PAP has rejected the need for the state to implement redistributive policies on the grounds that the ‘playing field’ was already level in Singapore’s supposedly meritocratic and multiracial society. This discourse glosses over systemic structural, historical and institutional factors that have contributed to inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic socio-economic disparities. While success and failure has been individualised, the persisting relative socio-economic marginality of Malays has been culturalised. In Singapore’s supposed meritocratic society, those that lag behind are generally reminded that they have only themselves to blame. Contradictions in the PAP government’s multiracial rhetoric became more obvious when Chinese language and culture were overtly championed from the late 1970s. This shift reflected Lee Kuan Yew’s preference for a Sinocentric version of multiracialism whose logical extension is Chinese chauvinism (Barr, 2000: 137). It is worth noting that the promotion of Chinese culture coincided with China’s economic liberalisation and with it greater economic opportunities for the predominantly Chinese city-state. To be sure, Lee’s capitalisation of the city-state’s

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Chineseness, preservation of its long-standing status as the regional hub of the Overseas Chinese Business Networks and continued affirmation of its Confucian cultural heritage, is reflective of a calculative communal mindset. This primordial clannishness was evidenced by Lee’s brazen pronouncement that people were generally more inclined to ‘share their last bag of rice . . . [with] those whom they instinctively and culturally feel an obligation because they are members of one’s clan, so to speak’.17 Comparing the supposedly chaotic way by which Southeast Asian states have dealt with national crises, and the Chinese state and society’s effective response to the 2008 earthquake, Lee attributed the difference to ‘The Confucian habits of communitarian solidarity and mutual help’.18 By the early 1980s, the establishment of ethnic-based welfare bodies such as Mendaki, CDAC (Chinese Development Assistance Council) and SINDA (Singapore Indian Development Association), based on encouraging the various ethnic community to assist the socially disadvantaged within their own ethnic communities, ironically resembled Malaysia’s paradigm of communal welfarism (Rahim, 2001a: 232–246). These ethnic-based welfare organisations are funded by their respective ethnic communities. The state deducts up to $2 each month from the monthly social security savings of each working Singaporean (Chua, 2007: 919). Instructively, this system does not allow Singaporeans to contribute across ethnic boundaries. It also avoids the focus on any class and structural factors that contribute to poverty. This communal policy shift reflected the general push towards an ethnic compartmentalisation of society and the promotion of an ethniccentred Singaporean identity. Working within this communal welfare paradigm, PAP Malay MPs increasingly assumed a high public profile in articulating the socio-economic and educational concerns of the Malay community in parliament and community-based organisations such as Mendaki. This welfare paradigm complemented the view that the relative socio-economic marginality of Malays is a Malay rather than a national problem as it stemmed from the community’s supposedly deficient cultural make-up. Barr has observed that the promotion of helping those from the same ethnic community reflected ‘how successfully he [Lee] has moulded Singapore society in the image of his own prejudices’ (Barr, 2003: 80). By the 1980s, issues related to ethnicity were largely addressed within the conceptual and institutional framework of ethnicity rather than class. This ethnic silo approach resembles the communal politiking of UMNO, MCA and MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) politicians from Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition government. The communalisation of public policy in Singapore was reinforced by the introduction of ethnic housing quotas in 1989. The quotas ensured that Malays did not constitute more than 20 per cent of the total population in any constituency and 22 per cent of the total population in any public housing block. The Chinese quota was 80 per cent in a constituency and 87 per cent in a public housing block. These residential housing quotas ensured the numerical dominance of the Chinese in all public housing estates (Rahim, 2001a: 76). Moreover, the implementation of an immigration policy geared towards ‘maintaining the ethnic balance’, in the early 1980s, ensured that the Chinese remain a numerical majority. Introduced in 1988,

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the steady expansion of the Group Representative Constituency (GRC) electoral system,19 purportedly to guarantee that ethnic minorities are fairly represented in parliament, has ensured that the Chinese remain a permanent majority in parliament (Chua, 2007: 917). The GRC system has also significantly reduced the possibility that important parliamentary positions such as Prime Minister will be held by a non-Chinese (Chua, 2007: 918). This is consistent with Lee’s pronouncement in the early 1990s that Singaporeans were not ready for an Indian Prime Minister. No referendum on the ethnic residential quotas and GRC electoral system has been held despite their radical restructuring and communalisation of public policy and the electoral system. It is unlikely that such initiatives would be allowed to be implemented in the more plural Malaysian political system where opposition parties are better represented in parliament and civil society is more energetic. Despite the overt shift towards a Sinicised Singapore, the PAP government continues to profess that its nation-building paradigm is dissimilar to the communal approaches of the Barisan Nasional government. Ongoing bilateral tensions have been attributed to the different nation-building paradigms – Singapore’s multiracialism versus Malaysia’s communalism. Reflecting this stance, Lee Kuan Yew has consistently reminded Singaporeans that the root cause of the recurring problems in Singapore–Malaysia relations is our diametrically different approaches to the problems facing our two multiracial societies. Singapore set out to become a multiracial society of equal citizens, where opportunities are equal and a person’s contribution is recognised and rewarded on merit regardless of race, language, culture or religion. In spite of our meagre natural resources, we succeeded, and our policies have benefited all our citizens, including our Malays . . . This is not what Malaysia’s leaders thought would happen when they asked us to leave in 1965. (Lee, 2000: 288) The PAP’s ‘our nation-building model is superior to yours’ mentality attributes the tenuous bilateral relations to Malaysian envy of Singapore’s considerable economic achievements. Lee claimed in his memoirs that Mahathir Mohamad admitted during a visit to Singapore in 1981 that Johoreans were jealous of the prosperous city-state. Lee wrote, ‘In a matter-of-fact way, Mahathir said that there was resentment among Malaysia’s Malays against Singapore as a prosperous Chinese city, just as they resented the Chinese in the Malaysian towns’ (Lee, 2000: 277). A few pages later he reiterated that ‘Antipathy for and envy of Singapore always tempted Malay leaders to seek popularity with their Malay grassroots by hitting out at Singapore’ (Lee, 2000: 279). Consistent with Lee’s Malay envy hypothesis, Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP) and post-NEP policies geared towards narrowing the socio-economic disparity between the Malay and Chinese communities have been projected by the PAP leadership and the mainstream Singaporean media as an unmitigated policy failure and a manifestation of anti-Chinese communalism.

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Competing and comparable paradigms

On the other hand, Malaysian political elites are inclined to view the intractable relative socio-economic marginality of Singapore Malays as indicative of the PAP government’s dereliction of its constitutional responsibilities – providing further justification for the continuance of ethnic-based affirmative action policies geared towards narrowing inter-ethnic economic disparities. The persistent economic and political marginalisation of the Singapore Malays has been exploited by the UMNO leadership to remind Malaysian Malays that without political power and state support they would suffer the fate of their Singaporean brethren. Reminding the PAP leadership of the significance of the Singapore Malay marginalisation on the Malaysian psyche, UMNO stalwart Abdullah Ahmad informed a Singaporean audience in 1986 that, ‘The Malays must be dominant in Malaysia as the Chinese are politically dominant in Singapore . . . The Malay obsession with political dominance is conditioned in no small measure by what has happened to the Malay minority in Singapore’ (Das, 1998: 1–10). This pattern of competitive oneupmanship between KL and Singapore has been summarised by Mahathir in the following way: Singapore, smarting from the indignity of separation, never missed an opportunity to run down Malaysia as a feudal state, spendthrift, inefficient and dominated by people unfit to govern . . . In retaliation, Malaysia with characteristic inefficiency, tried to point out the lack of true democracy in Singapore, the one-party system which it practiced, and the absolute dominance of the Chinese in Singapore. (Mohamad, 1970: 183)

Ethno-nationalism and the roots of Malay angst Singapore and Malaysia’s common colonial heritage, characterised by the Furnivallian plural society where the ethnic communities ‘mixed but did not combine’ has spawned divisive ethno-nationalist sentiments which continue to resonate in the post-colonial era. Tunku Abdul Rahman had characterised the Malayan nation as comprising the various ethnic communities with the Malay community representing the dominant core (Cheah, 2002: 6). Historians such as Cheah Boon Kheng have suggested that Tunku’s administration adopted a strongly multicultural approach towards social policies without publicly acknowledging this reality (Cheah, 2005: 102). However, after the 1969 riots, aggressive ethno-nationalism as manifested in slogans such as ketuanan Melayu (Malay dominance) and implicit in terms such as bumiputera-ism, were systematically institutionalised with the implementation of the NEP and its policy progines. These affirmative action policies were primarily geared towards strengthening the socio-economic interests of the bumiputera community – believed to be an effective antidote to ethnic tension. Mahathir Mohamad’s enunciation of the ‘true nationalist’ aptly captures UMNO’s ethno-nationalist sentiment that is strongly driven by the goal of promoting an economically vibrant Malay community and the emergence of an industrialised Malaysian nation standing tall in the international community of nation-states.

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True nationalists are those who work so that their race can progress and will be capable of competing successfully with the advanced nations. True nationalists are people who are respected because they hail from a successful race . . . True nationalists are those who ensure that their race gains respect and emulation of others due to their excellent achievement. (Cited in Embong, 2001: 158) The UMNO leadership’s preoccupation with maintaining Malay unity and narrowing the inter-ethnic economic gap can be attributed to the belief that Malay disunity not only allowed Western colonial powers to colonise the Malays but also diminish their economic power with the influx of immigrants who eventually competed with Malays for political power (Lee Kam Hing, 2005: 169–170). This Malay dread of foreign domination stems back to the takeover of the Malacca Sultanate by the Portugese in 1511 and subsequent Dutch and British colonisation. Malay insecurities were compounded further by their numerical minority status by the mid-twentieth century and memories of the predominantly Chinese Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army’s (MPAJA) two week reign of terror against those who had supposedly collaborated with the Japanese (Jeshurun, 1999: 228–229). The success of Malay nationalists in pressuring the British to abandon the 1946 Malayan Union proposal, which threatened to erode the remaining vestiges of Malay kingship and sovereignty, represented a politically defining moment for Malay nationalism. This episode highlighted the importance of remaining vigilant lest Malays lose their special status as indigenous Malaysians. In contrast to the Malayan Union proposal, the 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement recognised Malay special rights, thereby strengthening the foundations of Malay ethno-nationalism. The compelling lessons of colonialism, numerical decline, economic marginalisation and political turbulence in the immediate post-colonial era go some way towards explaining the defensive mindset of the UMNO leadership and many within the larger Malay community. It is worth noting that Malaysia’s Prime Ministers have without exception begun their careers as exclusivist Malay nationalists but evolved into inclusive multi-ethnic nationalists, having to pragmatically compromise and accommodate the interests of the various ethnic communities. This trajectory has allowed the President of UMNO and Prime Minister of the country to evolve from being the leader of a Malay-based party to that of a multi-ethnic state. Cheah maintains that Malay nationalism’s aggressive force will always be kept in check by the forces of multiethnic Malaysian nationalism: ‘Like a yo-yo, the nation-building process will vacillate between these two forces, displaying both Malay and multi-ethnic features. Whenever either force weakens, the other is strengthened’ (Cheah, 2005: 109–110). The tendency to evolve, transform and vacillate is strongly driven by UMNO’s electoral reliance on non-Malays and other component parties in the Barisan Nasional coalition. This reliance has been compounded further by the UMNO, PAS (Partai Se-Islam Malaysia or Islamic Party of Malaysia) and more recently PKR (Partai Keadilan Raayat or People’s Justice Party) tussles for Malay electoral support and the periodic leadership challenges within UMNO.20

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Mahathir Mohamad’s political evolution, from a Malay nationalist to a Malaysian nationalist, conforms to that of his predecessors. Commonly regarded as an ultra-ethno-nationalist in the 1960s and 1970s, Mahathir’s pragmatism and nationalist economic vision for the country led to a policy shift towards meritocratic principles and cultural liberalism from the late 1980s. English was systematically elevated even though this ruffled the feathers of vernacular language lobby groups. Committed to Malaysia’s Vision 2020 goal of attaining industrialised country status, the promotion of knowledge-based industries and the English language was deemed crucial in realising this ambitious objective. In promulgating the Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian Nation) concept in 1991, in conjunction with Vision 2020, Mahathir implicitly acknowledged that a cohesive and robust Malaysian national identity had yet to emerge even after 40 years of independence. Importantly, Bangsa Malaysia was an attempt to include non-bumiputeras as partners in the quest to build a cohesive, modern and industrialised society based on ‘full and fair partnership’, and ‘a sense of common and shared destiny’ rooted in a Malaysian rather than Malay identity (Cheah, 2005: 93). Not surprisingly, the Bangsa Malaysia concept has been warmly received by non-Malays, prompting Chinese social organisations such as Suqiu (Chinese Association Elections Appeals Committee) to urge Mahathir to ‘walk the talk’ by removing policies which discriminate against non-bumiputeras. However, ethnic-based preferential policies have remained, as the overturning of bumiputera privileges would necessitate a reconfiguration of UMNO’s ethnic-based identity and communal politics (Cheah, 2005: 94). Bangsa Malaysia thus remains an ideal that has been received with considerable unease by the UMNO leadership and rank-and-file. It also sits uneasily with the ethnic-based political framework of the major parties in the Barisan Nasional coalition government. Expressing the concerns of many within UMNO, Johor Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) Ghani Othman in 2006 decried that the Bangsa Malaysia concept ‘is seen as a threat to the Malays and the special position provided for them in the Constitution’.21

Modern Singapore: a relic of Western imperialism in the Nusantara? Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP leadership’s balas dendam and seige mentality complex suggest that they are acutely sensitive to the city-state’s status as an anomalous colonial settler society in the Nusantara (Malay World). Malaysian perceptions of Singapore as a relic of imperial cunning and the by-product of PAP political manoeuvring during the merger years is demonstrated by periodic references to the city-state’s historical Tanah Melayu (Malay Land) status and its geographic position within the womb of the Nusantara. The imperial scheming and appropriation of Singapore by Stamford Raffles was noted by Mahathir Mohamad in The Malay Dilemma in the following way: Singapore belonged to Johore until the Englishman Stamford Raffles installed a puppet sultan, and obtained a dubious concession. The puppet was later

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dropped when his usefulness was over. The main reason for the British takeover of Singapore was the weakness of the state of Johore. It had nothing to do with legality. (Mohamad, 1970: 182) For Mahathir, the predominantly Chinese Singapore remains an anomalous legacy of imperialist cunning: ‘In the Malay archipelago, Singapore stands out like a sore thumb’. (Mohamad, 1970: 187) The enduring Malaysian angst with initially losing Singapore to British imperialists and then to the Chinese dominated PAP government in 1965 was articulated in a March 2000 Utusan Malaysia editorial on the territorial dispute over the lighthouse Pedra Branca (referred to by Malaysians as Pulau Batu Putih). ‘Remember how the British seized the territory that belonged to the Johor-Riau Sultanate from the hands of the Malays . . . Malaysia will be, bit by bit, bought and controlled by Singapore as its sovereign territory. We have compromised enough’.22 This enduring Malaysian psyche of territorial loss was aptly surmised by former Malaysian Political Secretary, Noor Azam, in a February 2003 issue of Berita Minggu reminding Malays that they not ‘commit the same kind of political mistake of surrendering our rights to others’.23 Invoking the theme of territorial loss and colonial trickery, the Batu Putih territorial dispute with Singapore has been projected as critical to the protection of Malay dignity. Thus when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) awarded Pedra Branca to Singapore in May 2008, the Malaysian government and public’s response reflected the deep-seated angst with the continued dismemberment of the historical Tanah Melayu (Malay Land). This Malaysian angst was reinforced further when the ICJ in its ruling noted that it was not in dispute that the Johor Sultanate had since 1512 established itself as a sovereign state with a territorial domain that included a considerable part of the Malay peninsula, and the islands and islets in the area of the Straits of Singapore where Pedra Branca is located. The ICJ ruling noted that whilst the Johor Sultanate had the original title to Pedra Branca, this sovereignty over territory could lapse if the contemporary Malaysian state fails to conduct a titre de souverain (conduct that confers title on the party responsible) or engage in concrete manifestation of the display of territorial sovereignty.24 According to this legalistic logic, Malaysia had lost Pedra Branca because it had failed to respond to the conduct of Singapore and its colonial predecessor on the rocky islet.25 Malaysia’s failure in responding to Singapore’s activities at Pedra Branca at appropriate times has been denounced by some Malaysians as indicative of their government’s dereliction in safeguarding national territory. Opposition party PAS Information Chief in Johor, Mazlan Alimin, has criticised the UMNO leadership for failing to respond to Singapore’s construction of buildings and a lighthouse on the islet.26 Similarly, PKR leader Anwar Ibrahim has urged Malaysians to ‘express anger and regret at their carelessness and protest to the UMNO and BN-led government and Attorney-General’.27 The ongoing bilateral water supply dispute (discussed in Chapter 5) has been shaped by the Malaysian perception of being unfairly burdened by colonial water

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agreements which guarantee cheap Malaysian water supplies to Singapore and whose legality has been secured by the 1965 Separation Agreement. This sentiment has been buttressed by the perception of Singapore as a parasitic relic of colonialism that continues to burden Malaysia with its pedantic and legalistic intransigence when negotiating contentious bilateral issues. Articulating this sentiment, then Editor-in-Chief of the New Straits Times Abdullah Ahmad, wrote in July 2003 that, For good or ill, Singapore is a product of imperialism, and Malaysia’s relations with it continue to be dogged by the unequal treaties and arrangements . . . . If relations are to go forward and overcome the past, these treaties and arrangements must be replaced by contemporary versions that strike a fair balance between the interests of the two independent and sovereign nations. Probably the most stubborn and unequal of these arrangements are the water agreements . . . The truth is that Singapore wants to continue to gain lavishly from what was a substantial concession at the time of separation.28 Arguing for the replacement of the causeway linking the neighbouring states with a new bridge as a ‘concrete’ means of extricating the legacy of British colonialism, Johor’s Mentri Besar Abdul Ghani Othman stated in December 2004: The colonial government was good at using tricks to benefit from the colonies. They built the causeway to develop Singapore and benefited from it . . . . The causeway has restricted the development of Johor, as all ships cannot use the Johor Strait but have to go round Singapore. And for this reason, ‘Tun Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal to build a bridge to replace the causeway is commendable. It shows that we are beginning to make efforts to fight for what we are entitled to’.29 Simply put, the causeway’s replacement with a new bridge would not only allow vessels to pass through the Johor Strait but just as importantly right historical wrongs.

Communal social engineering: constructing the Melayu and China Baru Since the early 1990s, Mahathir Mohamad and the UMNO leadership have advocated the nurturing of a Melayu Baru (New Malay) that is disciplined, competent, sophisticated, modern, entrepreneurial, able to meet contemporary economic and social challenges and capable of global achievements (Khoo, 1995: 335). In particular, the transformed Melayu Baru is one that is strongly engaged in business and the corporate professions and represents a shining beacon for other Malays in Malaysia and the region. For Mahathir, the ‘Malay dilemma’ could be effectively resolved by inculcating the Melayu Baru traits within the Malay community (Embong, 2001: 158–160). Across the causeway, the PAP leadership, encouraged by the cultural and eugenics obsession of Lee Kuan Yew, has sought to re-tribalise the Singaporean Chinese.

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Lee’s China Baru (New Chinese) are enjoined to speak Mandarin instead of dialects, and to appreciate Confucian philosophy and other aspects of Chinese ‘high’ culture so as to avoid becoming a culturally hybridised community. Lee has argued that proficiency in Mandarin would contribute towards the Chinese community’s internal homogenisation and facilitate their access to ‘the wider world of Mandarin speakers and workers beyond Singapore’ (Wee, 2002: 145). To be sure, Mandarin was expected to not only provide the Chinese with cultural ballast but also unify this ethnic community, traditionally divided along dialect lines. This preference for cultural homogenisation represents a denial and rejection of the hybridised cultural inheritance, such as Peranakan identity, within the Chinese community. In other words, Chinese identity and culture has been conflated with knowledge of Mandarin. Importantly, the promotion of cultural homogenisation represents a renunciation of the blending of Malay, Chinese and Indian culture championed by the PAP leadership during the pre-merger and merger years (Barr, 2000: 140). Culture has thus been socially engineered and re-engineered by political elites who act as the implicit and explicit cultural guardians of their respective ethnic communities. This close regulation of cultural identity has, according to Cherian George, subjected identity ‘. . . to regulation and remaking, rather than being allowed their natural expression and evolution. This has had the effect of damming and realigning the traditional tributaries into people’s culture’ (2000: 174). Singapore’s China Baru are expected to be led by a cultural elite endowed with a deep understanding of Chinese language, history, literature and traditions stemming from their education in the prestigious mono-ethnic SAP schools where English and Mandarin are taught as first languages. To nurture their Chinese identity, SAP schools are endowed with a Chinese social and cultural environment which includes Chinese gardens, windows shaped like plum blossoms, and Chinese orchestra and drama exchange programmes with China and Taiwan. In Singapore’s purportedly meritocratic educational system, SAP students have benefitted from the PAP’s elitist educational policies which have given them special consideration for pre-university scholarships and the granting of two ‘O’ level bonus points when they apply to enter junior college.30 By contrast, equivalent SAP schools for Malay and Indian students have not been established in the ostensibly multiracial polity. The Chinese cultural elite are poised to become language teachers, writers, community leaders, senior bureaucrats, Members of Parliament, Cabinet Ministers and other future ‘movers and shakers’ expected to chart the future course of the citystate. An alumnus of the SAP Catholic High School, and enthusiastic supporter of the central role of the cultural elite in the nation-building project, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has pronounced that The Chinese cultural elite are an important source of strength for our multiracial and multi-religious society. Their group instincts, political and social values and social cohesion complement the different spirit and outlook of English educated Singaporeans . . . So the Chinese elite in Singapore must

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Competing and comparable paradigms develop, and help Chinese culture to play its rightful role in shaping our cosmopolitan society and knowledge economy of the twenty-first century. (Cited in Eugene Tan, 2004a: 178–179)

It is worth noting that the state’s promotion of Chinese high culture and Mandarin has been keenly supported by the influential Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations and the Singapore Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In recent years, they have established the S$15 million Chinese Language and Culture Fund (Chua, 2007: 923).

Maintaining Chinese dominance While the electoral clout of Malays in Malaysia has been strengthened by the longstanding policy of according rural Malay voters greater electoral weight, thereby allowing them to play a crucial role in determining the outcome of Federal elections,31 the electoral clout of Singaporean Malays has been systematically diluted by the urban resettlement schemes of the 1960s and 1970s, imposition of the residential housing quotas and the GRC electoral system noted above. While these policies have been rationalised by appropriating the rhetoric of multiracialism, they have effectively ensured that the Malay community, who have traditionally supported opposition parties, cannot determine the electoral outcome of any constituency. These furtive electoral reforms have not only clipped the electoral wings of Malay-based parties in Singapore such as the PKMS (Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura) but other opposition parties such as the Workers’ Party and the Singapore Democratic Party.32 These opposition parties have generally been sympathetic in their understanding of Malay community concerns. Having ensured that the Chinese remain numerically dominant in all constituencies, it is politically expedient for the PAP leadership to be sensitive to their concerns. Attributing the PAP’s drop in electoral support in the 1991 elections to the neglect of Chinese ‘heartlanders’ (public housing dwellers), Lee Kuan Yew suggested that Chinese-educated politicians be accorded more prominence in the future. The party has thus been careful to field candidates who are acceptable to the Chinese-educated or have Chinese dialect proficiency. Notwithstanding its multiracial rhetoric, the PAP operates along communal lines, and like the Barisan Nasional coalition, is effectively made up of entities representing the various ethnic communities. Just as Malay numerical dominance in Malaysia has been reinforced by the influx of a large number of Indonesian and Filipino migrants, Chinese numerical dominance in Singapore has been buttressed by the steady influx of Chinese from Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and other parts of the world. Importantly, these Chinese immigrants have offset the relatively low fertility levels of the local Chinese, compared to Malays and Indians, high emigration rates of well-educated Chinese and the aging Singaporean society. Chinese immigrants have helped boost the population to 4.6 million in 2007 and are expected to help increase Singapore’s population to 6.5 million in two decades. Even though non-Chinese immigrants are

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expected to have the skills required for Singapore’s knowledge economy, semi-skilled Chinese immigrants have been offered residency and citizenship status. They are commonly found working in coffee shops, shopping malls, supermarkets, gas stations, construction sites, hawker centres and as bus drivers.33 These semi-skilled Chinese immigrants are resented particularly by semi-skilled Singaporean workers who feel undermined in the labour market. This insecurity has been reinforced by data which estimate that 60 per cent of new jobs in 2007 went to foreigners.34 Mirroring the disproportionate representation of Malays in the senior ranks of the Malaysian bureaucracy and military, senior personnel in Singapore’s supposedly multiracial and meritocratic bureaucracy, government-linked companies, statutory bodies and armed forces are predominantly Chinese. Of the 70 most senior officers (colonels and higher) in 1999, only one was non-Chinese (Huxley, 2000: 114–115). By 2003, nine out of ten professional SAF personnel were Chinese with the critical appointments held by Chinese.35 This stands in stark contrast to the 1980s, when the SAF was more ethnically representative at the senior officer level. As these non-Chinese officers retired, they were replaced by Chinese officers (Huxley, 2000: 115). Worthington’s pioneering study of the core executive in contemporary Singapore highlighted the gross under-representation of non-Chinese at the centre of government and policy making.36 Of the 78 core executives in statutory boards and GLCs in 1998, only 7 (9 per cent) were non-Chinese. The lone Malay was PAP Member of Parliament Ahmad Mohamed Megad (Worthington, 2003: 215–217). Similarly, Ahmad Megad was also identified as the only Malay out of the 122 members of Singapore’s core executive in 1998 (Worthington, 2003: 222–223). Of the top 30 GLCs, only two (6.7 per cent) were chaired by non-Chinese in 1991 (Worthington, 2003: 222–223). Within the PAP government, Malays are poorly represented in the Cabinet and tend to hold relatively junior portfolios such as Social Affairs, Community Development and Sport, Environment and Muslim Affairs. Under the present political framework, it is inconceivable that a Malay would be appointed to pivotal portfolios in Defence, Finance, Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs or Education in the foreseeable future. Similarly, MCA politicians in the National Front government no longer hold the coveted Finance portfolio since the resignation of Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister following the 1969 race riots. Just as the loyalty of the Chinese in Malaysia has been questioned, Singapore Malays are commonly perceived as being ‘caught permanently in the vice of split loyalties between the Singapore nation and the larger Malay World’ (Chua, 2007: 917). The vocal opposition by several Malaysian and Singapore Malay organisations to the state visit of Israel’s President Chaim Herzog in 1986 was perceived as evidence of their split loyalty and served to vindicate the discriminatory policies against Malays in the SAF (Rahim, 2001a: 106–107). This perception of dubious Malay loyalty has been accorded greater strength since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and detention without trial arrests of alleged Malay and Muslim militants in Singapore.

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Singapore’s unique status as the only Chinese dominated state in Southeast Asia, with limited landmass, reliance on neighbours for basic necessities such as water and food, and mercurial relations with neighbouring Malay states, have engendered an acute insecurity complex. When placed within the historical context of antiChinese sentiment and persecution in Southeast Asia, this insecurity is not altogether surprising. In post-colonial Southeast Asia, socio-economic and political tensions have often morphed into an anti-Chinese fervour, as manifested in the antiChinese riots in Jakarta in 1994 and 1998. Having been treated as ‘outsiders’ by colonial and post-colonial authorities, many Chinese in Singapore and the wider region suffer from a psychosis of regional insecurity. Acknowledging Singapore’s role as a sanctuary for the regional Chinese, Lee Kuan Yew claimed that Singapore is the only country in Southeast Asia where the overseas Chinese can hold their heads high (Rahim, 1999: 45). As noted above, the pro-Chinese immigration policy allows relatively easy residence entry of Chinese from Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Northeast Asia and Western countries into Singapore. The city-state’s status as the centre of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia has been bolstered by numerous initiatives such as hosting the secretariat of the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention and status as an important centre for Sinic studies with the establishment of the Chinese Heritage Centre at the Nanyang Technological University since the mid-1990s (Eugene Tan, 2004a: 187). Regional Chinese business groups such as Indonesia’s Lippo Group generously donated S$21 million to the National University of Singapore Business School in 2007. Also in that year, Hong Kong business magnate Li Ka Sheng donated S$100 million to the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.37 Because of the PAP government’s refusal to sign an extradition treaty with Indonesia, the city-state remains an attractive financial sanctuary for regional and Indonesian business tycoons avoiding anti-corruption proceedings in postSuharto Indonesia. Indonesian Corruption Watch believes that Indonesians embezzlers of state and private national banks have deposited billions of their ill-gotten wealth in Singaporean banks. Encouraged by Singapore’s absence of stringent money laundering laws, Malaysian, Indonesia and Burmese tycoons, many of Chinese descent, have long parked their considerable assets in Singaporean banks. Singaporean Chinese insecurity has been bolstered by the PAP leadership’s belief that Indonesia to the south and Malaysia to the north have not fully accepted the city-state’s sovereign status. Not surprisingly, the PAP leadership described the republic in metaphoric terms as a valuable ‘nut situated in a nutcracker’ (Singh, 1999: 275) shortly after separation. This insecurity complex did not recede with the end of the Cold War, owing to the belief that the city-state’s potential sources of regional military conflict with neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia remained constant. If anything, the cessation of the Cold War evoked greater insecurity as it undermined the rationale for continued US military presence in East Asia.

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Geopolitics of communal scapegoating: invoking the fear of re-merger Politicians across the causeway have periodically accused the other of resorting to communal scapegoating tactics to deflect public attention during periods of economic downturn, political tension and electoral pressure. Admitting to a Singaporean audience in 1989 that scapegoating antics were commonly staged by Malaysian politicians, Abdullah Badawi stated that an anti-Singapore or Singapore–Malaysia issue bandwagon, is a very popular one across there. I do not know what it is here but across the causeway, up north, it is very popular, and the government is always under severe strain when it happens. (Badawi, 1990: 30) This frank admission only reinforced the perception of PAP politicians who have long accused their Malaysian counterparts of resorting to communal scapegoating. Tense bilateral relations during the regional economic recession in the late 1990s was attributed by PAP MP Peh Chin Hua to Malaysia using ‘Singapore as the bogeyman and [in doing so] divert attention from the real problem that the country is facing . . . this will serve to strengthen his [Mahathir’s] seemingly weakened position and cover his mistakes’.38 At the same time, the PAP appears not to be immune from the geopolitics of scapegoating. As discussed in Chapter 2, the PAP’s launching of the Malaysian Malaysia campaign during the merger years and its challenge of the special status of bumiputera Malaysians were prompted by its disastrous electoral performance in the 1964 Federal elections. As such, the Malaysian Malaysia campaign is in many respects a calculated strategy to exploit the communal sentiments and insecurities of non-Malays under the guise of promoting ethnic equality. Following Lee Kuan Yew’s 1996 pronouncement that Singapore could only be re-merged with Malaysia if it adopted meritocratic policies, Mahathir accused Lee of using Malaysia as a bogeyman to scare the predominantly Chinese population into supporting the PAP in the 1997 elections. Whatever the motives for Lee’s re-merger statement, it had the effect of arousing Singaporean insecurities by reminding the Singapore Chinese of their vulnerability in a predominantly Malay-Muslim region. These deep-seated insecurities were borne out in a June 1996 Singapore Straits Times survey which suggested that 6 out of 10 Singaporeans were against the idea of re-merger with Malaysia, fearing that they would be reduced to second class citizens (Rahim, 1999: 44). Later that year, Prime Minister Goh warned Singaporeans in a National Day speech that ‘If Singapore falters we will have no option but to ask Malaysia to take us back. Such a merger will be on Malaysia’s terms’ (Collins, 2000: 200). Malaysian academic Rustam Sani has charged the PAP leadership with constructing a historical narrative which allows it to ‘play the Malaysia bogey card’ and cultivate a ‘holocaust’ mentality by periodically reminding the predominantly Chinese populace

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of the need to rally behind the PAP government. The alternative of rallying behind the PAP government is ‘re-absorption into the Malaysian entity’ based on Malay dominance.39 The spectre of threat, instability and vulnerability arising from Singapore’s location within the Malay World was again raised by Lee Kuan Yew in a 2004 National Day speech to his Tanjong Pagar constituents: But your generation has also gone through some rough passages – the Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 2001; pressure from Indonesia under President BJ Habibie who in 1999 warned us we are a ‘little red dot’; and several difficult years with Malaysia under Dr Mahathir Mohamad. And you suffered the shock of Jemaah Islamiah suicide bombers in Singapore in December 2001 . . . You have been toughened by setbacks.40 At a September 2006 forum on ‘Good Governance’, attended by international policy-makers and businessmen, and held in conjunction with the IMF/World Bank Summit in Singapore, Lee once again raised the Malaysian threat spectre when confronted by embarrassing questions about the city-state’s restricted political environment in contrast to other small but affluent democracies. Lee claimed that countries such as Denmark and New Zealand were able to practice democracy because ‘They’ve got a different physical, economic, geographic and strategic base. Their neighbours are different’.41 By contrast, Singapore had to stand up to its larger and less friendly Malaysian and Indonesian neighbours who are anti-Chinese and systematically marginalised their ethnic Chinese: My neighbours both have problems with the Chinese. They are successful, they’re hardworking and therefore they are systematically marginalised, even in education . . . And they want Singapore, to put it simply, to be like their Chinese, compliant. So everytime we say ‘no’ to some scheme to knock down the Causeway and build a bridge, he says, ‘Oh, you are not cooperative, you are only thinking of yourself’ . . . But you need a government that will be able to not only have the gumption but also the skill to say no in a very quiet, polite way that doesn’t provoke them into doing something silly.42 According to this communal logic, Singapore’s unfriendly regional environment justified the maintenance of a one-party dominant state. The alternative is considered to be a weak coalition government that ‘will hamper us in defining our national interest’.43 As Singapore could not afford to become a plural democracy because of its anti-Chinese neighbours, Lee purported that ‘our problem really is how to get the electorate sufficiently wise and sophisticated to understanding that these are the limits’.44 Speculation abounds about the primary motive for Lee’s controversial comments about Singapore’s Malay neighbours. Seah Chiang Nee is of the view that Lee’s message was ‘targeted at the younger generation of Singaporeans, reminding them that being citizens of a small country will sometimes mean being subjected

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to irrational demands’.45 It would appear that Lee was deliberately invoking the spectre of regional irrationality and racism to highlight the perception of Singapore as the smaller but affluent predominantly Chinese island governed by rational meritocrats. Having raised the regional threat spectre, the image of Lee and the PAP leadership as guardians of Chinese interests in Singapore and the immediate region is tacitly underlined. Could there be other motives driving Lee’s invocation of the geopolitics of communalism and fear? The PAP’s relatively weak performance in the May 2006 elections is a factor that should be seriously considered. The PAP’s close to 10 per cent drop in electoral support from 75 per cent in 2001 to 66.6 per cent in 2006 has undoubtedly rattled the leadership and exposed the widening cracks in the PAP’s electoral support base despite pork-barreling cash advances to the electorate prior to the elections. This pork-barreling was arguably intended to placate Singaporean concerns about widening income disparities and narrowing prospects for social mobility. A United Nations study has ranked Singapore 105th in the world in terms of income inequality.46 Even before the new millennium, the lowest 20 per cent of non-retiree households experienced a decline in household incomes (Tan, 2008: 21).47 In 2007, the proportion of Singaporeans earning less than S$1,000 a month was 18 per cent.48 There is a growing public perception that the technocratic PAP leadership and their family members have become arrogant elitists who have lost empathy for the concerns of the masses. Having been coopted from the senior ranks of the bureaucracy, military or corporate sectors, most PAP politicians lack political acumen or communication skills. Warning his colleagues of the dangers of ‘snobbery within our society’, PAP MP Sim Boon Ann opined, The perception exists that Singapore is a society bifurcated between the elites and the commoners, the scholars and the normal streams, the gifted and the ordinary, the [public housing] dwellers and the private property owner, the rich and the poor.49 Affirming this perception of PAP elitism, former civil servant Ngiam Tang Dow commented that as most of the current younger ministers are from well-to-do families they are inclined not to be sensitive to the impact of government policies on struggling families.50 Public perceptions of the PAP leadership’s elitism and arrogance have been fuelled by the extraordinarily high ministerial salaries which have since the 1990s been pegged at two-thirds of the median salary of the highest earning professionals in Singapore. This pegging formula has resulted in Singapore’s ministers being the highest paid in the world. In 2008 the Prime Minister’s yearly salary was raised to S$3.7 million, astoundingly, more than five times that of the President of the United States of America.51 Amidst strong public disapproval of the exceptionally high ministerial salaries and disquiet with the widening income disparities, the geopolitics of fear was again invoked by Lee Kuan Yew in October 2007. He pronounced that Malaysia could be as economically successful as Singapore

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Competing and comparable paradigms If they would just educate the Chinese and Indian, use them and treat them as their citizens, they can equal us and even do better than us and we would be happy to rejoin them . . . We are a standing indictment of all the things that they can be doing differently.52

On this occasion the Malaysian government did not react to Lee’s latest round of unneighbourly taunts, relying instead on other sources to respond.53

Technocratic governance Singapore’s state institutions are supposedly administered according to the principles of meritocracy and led by the most competent who constitute a natural aristocracy of talent. The public are continually reminded that the nation’s best hope for continued success lies in leadership by the talented (Tan, 2007: 293). Shortly after assuming the Prime Ministership in 2004, Lee Hsien Loong proudly affirmed that the country would continue to be governed along the principles of multiracialism and meritocracy: A person’s advancement in Singapore depends on his ability and contributions, not on his family connections, social circle, race or religion. We offer full and equal opportunities to all . . . The government will provide space and opportunities for all Singaporeans and treat all races equally.54 In Singapore’s authoritarian state where academic achievements are highly valued, economic indicators closely monitored and political stability prized, the distinction between the political and administrative leadership has been blurred. Indicative of the blurring, senior bureaucrats possess the same level of authority as Cabinet Ministers and afforded comparable salary scales.55 The blurred distinction between the political and administrative leadership is reflected in the cooptation of many PAP Ministers from the senior bureaucracy and armed forces. Rewarded with prestigious government scholarships because of their stellar academic achievements, ascendency in the bureaucracy, the SAF and the PAP hierarchy is generally meteoric. In 2005, 12 out of 19 Cabinet Ministers were former government scholars coopted from the senior ranks of the bureaucracy.56 Owing to their limited exposure to the rough and tumble of politics, the PAP leadership is made up largely of mobilised technocrats who are not expected to fundamentally challenge the conservative ideological and political ground-rules established by Lee Kuan Yew and the first generation leadership. This technocratic conformity has no doubt been reinforced by their national service officer training and induction at the Civil Service College or the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute.57 As Barr notes, ‘the political elite regenerates itself from the administrative elite, where it finds people already socialised into its technocratic mind’ (2006: 4). As former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and many other senior PAP Ministers conform to this technocratic mould, they are more inclined to operate within the political dictates and ground-rules set by and safeguarded by Minister Mentor Lee.

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Due to their limited political engagement prior to their cooptation into the PAP, most Cabinet Ministers do not possess an independent political base in the larger community or within the PAP. This limited political experience and technocratic compliance has been described as a form of ‘intellectual and ideological inbreeding’ stemming from the PAP leadership’s inclination to recruit those who are like themselves and reject others who do not fit in the PAP technocratic mould (Ho, 2003: 46). Not surprisingly, Lee’s successor Gok Chok Tong (1990–2004) is generally perceived as having represented continuity rather than change in terms of policy and strategic political direction. A former government scholar and senior civil servant, Goh’s apprenticeship mentality was demonstrated by his remark upon assuming the Prime Ministership in 1990 that Lee had left a shoe too big for a successor to fill (Ho, 2003: 77). Similarly, in a 1994 interview, Goh referred to Lee as a ‘stern father’ who sets the house rules for the ‘family’ (Ho, 2003: 56). By the late 1990s, Goh frankly admitted his preference for continuity over change. I was not out to change the whole system. When I took over from Mr Lee, I was very clear that I would continue with most of his policies . . . The system will remain the same, because it’s a system which has worked for us.58 This admission is in line with Lee Kuan Yew’s reluctance to permit qualitative changes to the system of governance he helped create. We have structured the system such that a competent group that gets in will find a machine that works . . . Don’t tinker with it . . . My ambition, having created this Singapore, is to preserve the system that produces the answers we must have as a society to survive.59 Despite the technocratic orientation of most PAP Ministers, some have made attempts to revise unpopular policies associated with Lee Kuan Yew. As Minister of Education in the mid-1980s, Tony Tan revised the eugenics-inspired school registration scheme which favoured graduate mothers. Surprising many, Tan acknowledged the mistake in implementing this unpopular policy. I don’t believe that we never make mistakes, that government is infallible. From time to time, we make errors in policy and administration . . . and where it won’t be morally right to continue, we should examine policies and if necessary, I think we should be honest about it. (Cited in Barr, 2003: 88) Contradicting Lee Kuan Yew’s stringent promotion of the ‘mother-tongue’ in the education system, Tan demonstrated a willingness to think outside of the ‘Lee paradigm’ by publicly stating that mastery of the ‘mother-tongue’ was less important than mastery of English. During his tenure as Education Minister there was some flexibility in the implementation of the bilingual policy (Barr, 2003: 90). Since the 1990s, there has also been a gradual shift away from Lee’s hard-line position

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against welfarism. Wider political space has been provided for the nurturing of a non-confrontational civil society with some NGO activists coopted as Nonconstituency Members of Parliament (NMP). In step with this widening but controlled political space, former critics of the PAP government, such as Raymond Lim and Vivian Balakrishnan, have been coopted into the PAP. Yet despite tinkering with the more unpopular and outdated policies, the PAP leadership has preserved the core beliefs and values of the party (Barr, 2003: 87). More than 15 years after leaving the Prime Ministership, Minister Mentor Lee continues to maintain a sage-like status within the PAP, effectively restricting party factionalism and any jockeying for positions within the front-bench. Reaffirming his role in determining leadership transition, Lee boasted in 2006 that From 1980, I prepared a new team. By 1990, that new team had worked with me for over 10, 15 years so that they knew exactly what must be done, how it should be done, and I stayed on to help them.60 Following the PAP’s drop in electoral support by nearly 10 per cent in the 2006 elections, Lee announced that he would remain in Cabinet as long as he was fit and able to serve the country. At a forum in 2008, he underlined the imperative of policy continuity by noting that ‘a failed succession means all you have done will be undone’.61 For Lee, a good succession was ‘a gradual change in style and tone . . . not necessarily a change in the objectives of the government’.62 Lee’s position in Cabinet facilitates access to politically sensitive official documents and close links with the Internal Security Department – ensuring that authoritarian state structures he helped construct remain intact (Barr, 2006: 9). Far from edging to the political sidelines, the aging Minister Mentor has been actively involved in ‘selling’ unpopular government policies, particularly after the PAP’s lacklustre showing in the 2006 elections. Perhaps Lee’s active policy engagement is a response to the inability of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and his technocratic ministers to connect with the masses, and to articulate and effectively ‘sell’ the more unpopular policies. Ironically the active stance of Minister Mentor Lee may have blunted the political skills of the technocratic PAP leadership who operate under his domineering shadow. But how effective has Lee been in ‘selling’ unpopular policies to the public? Some political observers suggest that Lee’s past ability to persuade younger generation Singaporeans of the need for unpopular policies may have lost much of its shine. Articulating this view, veteran journalist Seah Chiang Nee noted that: ‘Unlike their parents, the post-1965 generation has no firsthand experience of the chaotic past of the 1960s and 1970s and of the role Lee had played to modernise the nation. They do not feel beholden to him’.63

A meritocratic society? Singapore’s purported system of meritocratic and multiracial governance has come under critical scrutiny, particularly by researchers based outside Singapore. Rahim

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(2001a), Rodan (2005) and Worthington (2003) and Barr (2006) have argued that rather than being governed by the dictates of impartial rationality, the PAP’s system of governance is strongly ideological, elitist and marked by distinct social, gender, ethnic and class biases. Barr contends that the system of governance is highly personalised and lacks transparency: ‘Patronage or sponsorship by a powerful person is a vitally important element in the rise of anyone in the Singapore political and administrative elite’ (2006: 6). In addition to impressive paper qualifications, being plugged into a patronage network is vitally important in ascending the ranks of Singapore’s ‘meritocratic’ system. Mirroring the career trajectory of younger brother Lee Hsien Yang in the GLC Singtel and wife Ho Ching in Temasek Holdings, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s meteoric rise in the SAF and the PAP government is testament to the importance of patronage networks – a characteristic of authoritarian states. Yet when international journals, such as the International Herald Tribune and Bloomberg, raised the issue of nepotism in the meteoric rise of Lee Hsien Loong and Ho Ching, they have been successfully sued by the PAP leadership in the Singapore courts.64 Due to these well-publicised law-suits which have uniformly favoured the PAP litigants, the issue of nepotism has never been seriously discussed in Singapore. Yet meritocratic governance continues to be projected as a key difference between the PAP and its counterpart across the causeway. In his memoirs, Lee boldly pronounced that ‘PAP leaders were not like the politicians in Malaya . . . . Singapore ministers were not pleasure-loving, nor did they seek to enrich themselves’ (Lee, 2000: 656–657). Singaporeans are consistently fed a diet of reports in the local newspapers about discrimination in the Malaysian education system, cultural favouritism, Islamic conservatism, nepotism and corruption – all of which are reported to operate from the lowest to the highest levels of Malaysian society. Consistent with this portrayal, articles highlighting ethnic minority discrimination, and the negative effects of affirmative action, particularly on the Chinese community, are regularly featured in the local newspapers.65 These negative portrayals of Malaysia appear to have been uncritically received, particularly by the thousands of Malaysian and Indonesian Chinese who have taken up residency status in the city-state. In particular, these Malaysian immigrants are inclined to resent the Malaysian state’s ethnic-based redistributive policies, having been disadvantaged by such policies and migrated in search of better opportunities. Their enhanced social standing in the Chinese dominated city-state may have overshadowed concerns about the less salubrious aspects of Singapore’s authoritarian state. As such, they are also inclined to uncritically accept the PAP’s rhetoric of meritocracy and multiracialism. The significant number of Chinese PAP MPs born in Malaysia and Indonesia66 are likely to be unsympathetic to the implementation of policy measures geared towards narrowing the socio-economic and educational gap between the ethnic communities. The heroic status of Lee to many Malaysian Chinese, particularly after the implementation of Malaysia’s New Economic Policy in 1970, has been insightfully observed by Minchin: ‘Lee became a savior figure in the eyes of many Chinese Malaysians when they realised they no longer had effective political representation from the partnership of the MCA

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and the Tunku’ (Minchin, 1986: 168). As the actual numbers and proportion of Chinese immigrants has not been revealed, ethnic minorities are inclined to suspect that the Chinese percentage of the population is likely to have increased given the goal of increasing Singapore’s population to six million. Instructively, data highlighting Chinese over-representation in the bureaucracy, GLCs, statutory boards, the SAF, and the over-representation of Chinese recipients for the most prestigious scholarships such as the President’s and SAF Scholarship, is not publicly discussed and is generally sidestepped by the Singapore media. In the purportedly meritocratic society, there has only been one non-Chinese President’s scholar between 1987 and 2005. Up to 2005, 98 per cent of recipients of the Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship (SAFOS) have been Chinese. Moreover, there has never been a Malay SAFOS recipient. Similarly, up to 2005, 97 per cent of Singapore Armed Forces Merit Scholarship (SAFMS) winners were Chinese. It was only in 2004 that a Malay received the SAFMS.67 Barr has pondered on how this gross non-Chinese under-representation of prestigious government scholarships should be interpreted.68 Are Malays and Indians not as intelligent and diligent as the Chinese? Discrimination is hard to prove particularly in a society that is supposedly based on the meritocratic ideals that success will be rewarded to the diligent and clever. Complaints of discrimination cannot be readily addressed as the state has not established an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Anti-Discrimination Board or Ombudsman’s Office to safeguard Singapore’s multiracial and meritocratic credentials. Inconsistencies associated with the myth of Singapore’s meritocratic and multiracial society are exemplified by the selection process for government scholarships which allows space for discrimination as these awards are based not solely on exam results. For example, extra-curricular activities, ‘character’ and performance in an interview are considered.69 These subjective variables have been incorporated, in non-transparent fashion, for successful entry into Faculties such as Medicine at the University of Singapore. As such, ethnic minorities with near perfect ‘A’ level scores, but rejected a place in sought after degrees such as Medicine, are inclined to suspect that they have been discriminated against in the interview process but do not have hard evidence to support these suspicions. It is worth noting that there were enrolment restrictments on the number of women allowed into the Faculty of Medicine from 1997 to 2002, on the grounds that women tend to withdraw from the medical profession after marriage (Barr, 2008: 406). In the context of Singapore’s globalised economy, the practice of ‘meritocracy’ has also witnessed greater rewards for the well-educated and widening socioeconomic disparities as highly skilled professionals command First World salaries while semi-skilled workers compete with low wage workers from the region (Tan, 2008: 21). The meritocratic gloss has also been tarnished by the education system’s policy of early streaming which has led to disproportionate representation of socially disadvantaged students in the non-academic and slower academic streams.70

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UMNO and the PAP: divergent internal dynamics While comparisons between the nation-building and economic and corporate governance approaches of Singapore and Malaysia are regularly discussed in their respective national media, comparisons between the internal political dynamics of the PAP and UMNO, the political trajectory of politicians from the governing parties, and the authoritarian structures of the two countries have been downplayed. Many UMNO front-benchers, like their PAP counterparts, began their careers in the bureaucracy. However, unlike their PAP counterparts, climbing up the party ranks necessitated the building of a political support base from within the party rank and file and jockeying for party positions. This intra-party jockeying is imperative even for the sons of former Prime Ministers and senior politicians such as Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak and Education Minister Hishammuddin Hussein Onn. Having navigated through the hurly-burly of politics, UMNO politicians become seasoned in their chosen craft. The intense politicking within UMNO over policy and the dispensation of patronage resources and rents have in no small measure contributed to the rise of factions and periodic challenges against the incumbent UMNO president. Ambitious UMNO politicians have even used their influence in the media to expose the transgressions of their opponents in the party (Gomez and Sundaram, 1999: 256). As early as 1951, UMNO splintered following differences over the ethnic composition of the party and a breakaway faction led by the party’s first President, Onn Jaafar, formed the multi-ethnic Independence of Malaya Party. In more recent times, UMNO breakaway parties (the now defunct Semangat and Keadilan Raayat parties) were formed following the mid-1980s and late 1990s recessions. Rooted in a multiracial platform and membership and opposed to ethnic-based affirmative action policies, Keadilan Raakyat represents the greatest political threat to UMNO and the BN coalition. UMNO’s intra-party jockeying, tradition of factionalism and periodic challenges to the party leadership stands in sharp contrast to the deferential and feudal political culture of the PAP with Lee Kuan Yew at the helm. In contrast to former UMNO Prime Ministers who have aired their political views and grievances from the sidelines, resigned from the party in protest or passed into political obscurity, Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew retains a seat in the Cabinet as the Minister Mentor. Likening himself to the all important goalkeeper in the PAP leadership team, Lee has declared that he ‘should not wait till the ball gets into the penalty areas. That’s dangerous. Keep it outside the penalty area’ (Oei, 2005: Prologue). Lee’s status as Minister Mentor is indicative of his supervisory responsibilities over the Cabinet and status as the ‘power behind the throne’. Symbolic of his primacy in Cabinet, Lee continues to sit in the same office he occupied in the Istana when he was Prime Minister. He has repeatedly referred to Goh Chok Tong as ‘my Prime Minister’ and reminded foreign observers that ‘I have stepped aside, not stepped down’ (Wolcott, 2003: 81). Instead of retaining his stated ‘goalkeeping’ function in government, Lee appears to have taken on other pivotal roles, particularly after the PAP’s less than resounding electoral performance in the 2006 elections and the lacklustre

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performance of son Lee Hsien Loong as Prime Minister. Appealing to Singaporeans to be patient with his son’s limitations, the Minister Mentor claimed in late November 2006 that it would take two to three terms as Prime Minister to master the art of governance.71 For one that is generally quick to denounce and dismiss the less adept and who promotes Singapore as a meritocratic society, Lee’s willingness to excuse the limitations of son Lee Hsien Loong may be indicative of the entrenched ‘relative democracy’ dominated by the Lee family and trusted associates. In contrast to Lee Kuan Yew’s unrivalled status within the PAP, Mahathir’s post-Prime Ministerial attempts at challenging the policy direction of the Abdullah Badawi administration appears to have been less than effective. Humiliatingly rejected by Kedah’s Kubang Pasu UMNO division members to represent them at the November 2006 UMNO General Assembly, Mahathir may now be lamenting that he had not created Lee’s Cabinet position of Minister Mentor before his retirement. In contrast to the largely ceremonial nature of PAP congresses, the annual UMNO General Assembly is often dramatised by fiery speeches geared towards strengthening factional interests, shifting policy direction or advancing individual political ambitions. At the 2005 UMNO General Assembly, the newly implemented meritocratic university entrance policy was criticised by various delegates who instead called for a New National Agenda geared towards a revival of the New Economic Policy. The introduction of meritocracy for university entrance in 2003 was alleged to have denied placements for 65 per cent of Malay students who passed their secondary school exams. Ethno-nationalists’ concerns were stoked further by the cut in funding for Malays to embark on further studies both in Malaysia and abroad from the late 1990s and decision to reduce the number of students it sponsors in local private universities.72 Demanding the scaling back of meritocracy, ‘Young Turks’ such as UMNO Youth Deputy Khairy Jamaluddin claimed that the implementation of a New National Agenda and the NEP’s revival represented a ‘last push’ which would enable the Malays to ‘catch-up with the other races before 2020’.73 Under some pressure but unwilling to roll-back university entrance policies based on meritocracy, Abdullah Badawi urged Malays to compete on the basis of merit. However, whilst acknowledging that Malays still needed help in some areas, he declared that past handouts of projects and licences to Malays were over.74 While PAP Prime Ministers have never been publicly challenged by senior colleagues,75 the same cannot be said of UMNO and other component parties in the Barisan Nasional coalition. At the 2006 UMNO General Assembly, Abdullah Badawi was pressured into defending his record as Prime Minister to dispel criticisms of his leadership skills and economic management abilities. Addressing his critics and supporters of former Prime Minister Mahathir, Abdullah pointedly warned that he would accept constructive criticism but not those that were out to ‘shame’ his administration and ‘spread slander’.76 Indicative of his waning clout, Abdullah’s advice to UMNO delegates to tone down the political rhetoric on Malay rights and Islam in his opening address to the 2006 General Assembly was all but ignored. Instead Education Minister and UMNO Youth head Hishamuddin

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Hussein infamously unsheathed, raised and kissed the keris (traditional Malay sword) to thunderous applause. Reiterating Hishammudin’s warning to nonMalays to stop criticising the special rights and privileges of bumiputeras, Malacca delegate Hasnoor Hussein threatened that ‘UMNO is willing to risk lives and bathe in blood to defend race and religion. Don’t play with fire. If they mess with our rights, we will mess with theirs’.77 In many respects, the racially charged 2006 UMNO General Assembly was a reaction to a year of public debate on politically sensitive issues such as the propriety of maintaining ethnic-based redistributive policies and safeguarding the religious rights of Muslims who wish to leave the faith. In this tense political environment, politicians in government and from the opposition benches are prone to exploit the racial and religious card for political ends. The relatively poor performance of UMNO and other BN component parties in the 2008 elections triggered a stronger push within UMNO for Abdullah’s resignation as the factional divisions within UMNO jockeyed for power. Echoing pre-election calls for Abdullah to resign, UMNO MP and son of Mahathir Mohamad, Mukriz Mahathir, urged the Prime Minister to step down. Former Deputy Prime Minister Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah has called for new UMNO leadership while UMNO Vice-President Mahyuddin Yassin publicly noted that it was time for Abdullah to name his successor and hand over power.78 Even after Abdullah named Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak as his successor in May 2008 and stated that he will step down from the UMNO Presidency by 2009, intra-party jockeying persisted.

Cooperative impulses of authoritarian states Diplomatic tensions between KL and Singapore have rarely been pushed to extremes despite provocation by the media, civil society and undiplomatic statements periodically made by UMNO politicians and Lee Kuan Yew. The jockeying for power within UMNO has meant that the bilateral relations between neighbouring states have become a valuable arena for the politically ambitious to enhance their Malay or Malaysian nationalist credentials. As such, sensitive foreign policy matters such as Singapore’s usage of Malaysian airspace have been subjected to heated debate at the state, federal and party levels. In many of these episodes, senior UMNO leaders may have restrained their own comments but at times refrained from reigning in the provocative statements of other UMNO politicians and youth leaders in recognition that they may have articulated sentiments within UMNO and the larger society (Milne and Mauzy, 1990: 42). That diplomatic spats with Singapore have rarely been pushed to extremes may be indicative of the Malaysian leadership’s perception of the city-state as little more than a periodic irritant and thus inclined to pragmatically downplay bilateral tensions in favour of pursuing broader economic goals and global concerns (Nathan, 2002: 387). Reassuring his Singaporean audience during a visit in 1989, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi counselled: ‘The leadership knows how far it should allow any mobilisation of popular support behind a communal issue . . . We

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have a long-established tradition of going behind closed doors to consult, bargain and compromise on divisive issues’ (Badawi, 1990: 16). Reiterating the pragmatic approach of the BN government more than 10 years later, then Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar noted in a speech to the American Malaysian Chamber of Commerce in 2003 that, We understand only too well that we cannot choose our neighbours. As neighbours, we have to learn to live and work together which is in all our common interests. It is the challenging task of my Ministry to manage these relations so that the region remains attractive, in every sense of the word, to the outside world, especially the business community.79 Notwithstanding the testy relations between neighbouring states, there have been robust levels of cooperation in the realms of security and intelligence gathering dating back to the campaign against communist forces in the 1950s. Indeed, Lee Kuan Yew admitted in his memoirs that after the May 1969 riots: ‘We [the PAP] were fearful that the Tunku and all his moderates would be displaced by the ultras’ but also bragged that: ‘He [Tunku] needed us to help keep the Chinese in Malaysia reassured and quiescent. Our influence from the Malaysia days still prevailed’ (Lee, 2000: 266). Lee claimed that during Prime Minister Razak’s visit to Singapore in 1973, he sought Lee’s assistance in strengthening Malaysian Chinese support for the BN coalition: ‘He [Razak], was uneasy and concerned about his Chinese support in Malaysia and the lack of support for the MCA in the next election and asked if I could help . . .’ (Lee, 2000: 270). Taking credit for the ISA detention of influential and supposedly pro-communist Malays across both sides of the causeway, Lee has claimed that during Prime Minister Hussein Onn’s visit to Singapore in 1976 he expressed concerns to the Malaysian leader about Malay communist infiltration in the Malaysian media and UMNO. Not long after Onn’s visit, the Singapore government added substance to Lee’s allegations by publicising the ‘confession’ of ISA detainee Hussein Jahidin, a Singaporean Berita Harian editor, that senior Malaysian journalist Samad Ismail and former PAP founding leader, among other senior Malaysian newspapermen, were communists (Lee, 2000: 272). These allegations were exploited by prominent elements within UMNO who were apparently motivated by different reasons but intent on initiating a witch-hunt to politically demolish Tun Razak’s left-wing protégés (Khoo, 2003: 177). Exploiting these divisions within UMNO, Hussein Onn’s visit to Singapore provided Lee with the opportunity to demolish former PAP Malay leaders such as Samad Ismail and Samani Amin who held senior positions in Malaysian newspapers and were closely linked to Razak’s ‘inner circle’. In particular, Samani’s attempts to bring international attention to the prolonged ISA detention of Said Zahari, and Amnesty International’s elevation of Said as a prisoner of conscience, led Lee to believe that these former PAP stalwarts were waging a propaganda campaign against the PAP. Lee believed that political elements in KL were engaged in shadowy political conspiracies against the PAP government and were instrumental in the plot to expel the PAP from the

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Socialist International in 1976. Threatened by these conspiracy theories, Lee was determined to stop Samad and Samani from souring bilateral relations by demolishing their standing within UMNO and establishment circles. To that effect, the intra-UMNO leadership tension and close ties with the ambitious Malaysian Home Minister Ghazali Shafie provided Lee with the opportunity to execute his plan of action. Pleased with the Malaysian government’s swift clampdown against ‘communists’ following the ‘confession’ of Singaporean ISA detainee Hussein Jahidin, Lee noted in his memoirs that ‘The Malaysian Special Branch arrested Samad and his Kuala Lumpur group. Hussein Onn had the courage to act against a procommunist Malaysian intelligentsia’ (Khoo, 2003: 272). Contradicting Lee’s account, Abdullah Ahmad, another detainee in the 1976 ISA arrests and Razak protege, has attributed Hussein Onn’s actions to the Machiavellian manipulation of senior UMNO leaders whom he naively trusted (Ahmad, 2004: 27). Since the mid-1970s ISA arrests, active bilateral sharing of intelligence has been maintained and reinforced in the lead up to and during the 1987 ISA detention of alleged Marxists and others accused of undermining national security in both countries. Similarly, close intelligence cooperation has occurred since the ISA arrests of alleged militants associated with the Islamist Jemaah Islamiah network. Since the end of the Cold War, the PAP and BN leadership have justified the continued existence of the detention without trial laws such as the ISA as a tool to act against those who commit acts deemed prejudicial to national security. Since the ‘war on terror’, scores of individuals have been detained under the ISA. Inter alia, ISA detainees have spoken of various forms of mental and physical torture, including acute sleep deprivation, being forced to strip naked, slapped and beaten during interrogation and questioned uninterruptedly for hours in a freezing room. Importantly, the ISA infringes the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR). Article 9 states that ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’; Article 10 notes that ‘Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him’; Article 11 affirms that ‘Everyone with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence’. In Malaysia, a national campaign for the abolition of the ISA has been spearheaded by various human rights organisations such as SUARAM (Voice of Malaysians) and Gerakan Mansuhkan ISA (GMI, Movement to Abolish the Internal Security Act). The National Human Rights organisation SUHAKAM (Malaysian Human Rights Commission) has urged the government to review and abolish the ISA.80 By contrast, in Singapore, where political restrictions are arguably tighter, no such campaign exists. Lee Kuan Yew has publicly noted that PAS’s commitment in establishing an Islamic state governed by an Islamic constitution based on shariah law would be problematic for Singapore.81 Indeed, the avowedly secular Lee has praised Mahathir Mohamad for his modernist Islamic orientation and consistent promotion of science and technology as a pillar of Malaysia’s industrial advancement.

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Competing and comparable paradigms He had pushed the Malays towards science and technology and away from obscurantism. He had the courage to say in public that a lady doctor using a pencil to examine a male patient (which the Muslim religious leaders wanted) was not the way to treat patients . . . He had educated younger Malays, opened up their minds with the vision of a future based on science and technology . . . The majority of Malays and all the Chinese and Indians in Malaysia want this future, not a turn towards extreme Islamic practices. (Lee, 2000: 290)

Expressing the PAP leadership’s satisfaction with the BN’s landslide electoral success in 2004, PAP MP R. Ravindran (Marine Parade GRC) announced that Malaysian Muslims have strongly rejected PAS’s fundamental brand of Islam and that ‘UMNO’s progressive Islamic path is a good model for Muslims in the region’.82 Abdullah Badawi’s pronouncement at the 2006 UMNO General Assembly that ‘Islam Hadhari is not a blank cheque to bring about [Islamic] conservative revivalism in this country’,83 was no doubt music to the ears of the PAP leadership. The rising political fortunes of PAS and battering of the BN by the major opposition parties (PAS, PKR or Partai Keadilan Raayat and the DAP or Democratic Action Party) in the coalition pact Pakatan Raayat (People’s Alliance) in the 2008 elections must have been deeply unsettling for the PAP leadership. The Pakatan Raayat coalition is now in control of four state governments, of which two (Penang and Selangor) are the most economically dynamic in the Federation. The PAP leadership is undoubtedly concerned by the commitment of former Deputy Prime Minister, PKR and Pakatan Raayat leader Anwar Ibrahim to abolish the International Security Act (ISA) and address the politicisation of the judiciary – political tools commonly utilised by authoritarian regimes. Anwar and many opposition politicians have themselves been subjected to repeated legal suits. The Singapore government is undoubtedly concerned by the Malaysian government’s review of detention without trial legislation in response to civil society pressure for the abolition of the ISA.84 The impact of Malaysia’s emboldened civil society and fledgling two-party political system on Singaporeans living under a one-party dominant authoritarian state remains unclear. Ironically, the widened political space under Abdullah Badawi, where politically sensitive issues such as ethnic relations, nepotism, corruption, ethnic-based affirmative action policies, communal politics and detention without trial laws have been publicly debated, undermined the credibility of the BN. After years of Mahathir’s authoritarian style of governance, the Abdullah administration was not equipped to deal effectively with the eruption of pent-up dissent from various quarters. This phenomenon is characteristic of the political instability in post-authoritarian states, such as Thailand and Indonesia and the former Soviet republics. There is no reason to believe that Singapore’s political trajectory in a post-Lee Kuan Yew era will be much different. Reeling from the BN’s drubbing by both the Malay and non-Malay electorate in the 2008 elections, the more visionary elements within UMNO’s leadership

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recognise that the communal political paradigm has lost its public appeal and requires major renovation. Echoing the multi-ethnic vision of UMNO’s first leader Onn bin Jaafar in the 1950s, former BN Deputy Prime Minister Tengku Razaleigh has called for UMNO to be transformed into a multi-ethnic party. He has also courageously acknowledged that UMNO’s legitimacy could only be redeemed if the ‘bad, corrupt, uncultured, immoral and unwise’ people in leadership positions were removed.85 Razaleigh has acknowledged that the BN’s ethnic-based preferential policies, whilst narrowing the inter-ethnic income gap and creating a confident Malay middle class, had been abused by an elaborate system of money and patronage politics parading in the name of Malay rights. Ironically, this sizeable Malay professional and middle class, having benefitted from the BN’s preferential policies, is less supportive of UMNO’s communal Malay rights rhetoric, recognising that this tired slogan has stunted the growth of a cohesive multi-ethnic nation.

Kinks in the governance armour The PAP’s governance armour has been somewhat dented by the National Kidney Foundation (NKF) scandal which erupted in 2005. Inter alia, it exposed the government’s failure to properly supervise Singapore’s largest charity – riddled with corruption, poor accountability and transparency. Two years earlier, it took the PAP government more than a month before it systematically responded to the SARS epidemic following the initial outbreak in March 2003. During this period of inaction there were no clear contingency plans to deal with the epidemic even though 65 people had been infected in the first two weeks of the outbreak. Free ambulances to transport suspected SARS victims to hospital were supplied only in the fifth week (Barr, 2008: 408). Singapore’s reputation as Southeast Asia’s medical hub has also been tarnished by having the worst doctor-to-patient ratio in the developed world – 1:640 in 2005 and 1:652 in 2007. The ratio of hospital beds to population has worsened from 1:229 in 1960 to 1:278 in 2005 (Barr, 2008: 409–411). Singapore’s healthcare system is difficult to assess because of its nontransparent data source and method of calculating health expenditure (Barr, 2008: 401). The World Bank’s 2006 report on governance has rated Singapore poorly in categories such as ‘voice and accountability’, which measures factors such as civil society participation.86 The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC, chaired by Lee Kuan Yew) and Temasek Holdings (headed by Ho Ching, who is Lee’s daughter-in-law and wife of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong) have also come under critical scrutiny for lack of accountability and transparency in managing more than US$200 billion of public assets. Temasek publicly revealed its accounts for the first time in 2004, however, it continues not to disclose the amount of funds managed by its internal fund management arm Fullerton Fund Management and third-party fund managers.87 In 2006, Lee Hsien Loong revealed for the first time data that indicated that the GIC attained an annual return of 5.3 per cent since its formation in 1981. However, this disclosure fell far short of the IMF’s 2005 recommendation that the Singapore government publish the ‘GIC’s aggregate

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assets, broad elements of its portfolio, and its overall returns’ to enhance investor confidence.88 The GIC, Temasek and other statutory bodies are still not subject to parliamentary scrutiny (Rodan, 2004b: 55). Since the GIC’s investments into Wall Street banks UBS, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch in early 2008, it has been subjected to considerable criticism over its lack of transparency. To placate these concerns, GIC Deputy Chairman Tony Tan has assured the market that the GIC planned to become more transparent to preempt proscriptive policies by governments in the United States and Europe against sovereign wealth funds from Asia and the Middle East. ‘The greater danger is that if this is not addressed directly, then some form of financial protectionism will arise and barriers will be raised to hinder the flow of funds’.89 However, Tan’s assurances have been contradicted by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s stout defence of the poor transparency of sovereign funds such as the GIC: ‘Our funds are accountable to the government. I would not believe that transparency is everything’.90 The PAP government has come under even greater pressure to make GICs more accountable in the wake of Temasek Holdings’ controversial 2006 takeover of Shin Corp. Inter alia, this takeover precipitated the ouster of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin later that year. The Thai public disapproved of the way by which Temasek bought 49 per cent of Shin Corp and then surreptitiously gained 96 per cent of the conglomerate on the Thai stock market allegedly through nominee Thai companies Cedar Holdings and Aspen Holdings. Temasek and its ‘partners’ were expected to face fines of up to US$2 billion or risk having its assets seized if found to have purposefully breached Thailand’s licensing laws which limit foreign shareholdings.91 Lambasting the Singapore government’s ‘see no evil’ approach towards the Shin Corp deal, despite convincing evidence of business malpractice, Thai academic Thitinan Pongsudhirak opined, ‘For the Lee family to feign ignorance and maintain their self-rightenous high-ground is disingeuous. It does a disservice to Temasek’s intention to navigate a way out of the commercial quagmire’.92 By 2007, the Thai government’s investigation of Temasek had lost much of its momentum due to concerns about the impact of such a probe on other foreign investors.93 Importantly, other Chief Executive Officers embroiled in Temasek and Shin Corp’s purportedly illegal business activity would probably have been sacked or promptly resigned. But Temasek’s Chief Executive Ho Ching had retained her position despite Temasek’s poor business judgement and Shin Corp’s value dropping by US$2 billion six months after Temasek’s purchase.94 When Lee Kuan Yew was asked whether he would initiate any institutional changes to improve accountability of the GIC, Temasek, GLCs and other public agencies, he claimed that this was unnecessary as there were sufficient checks and balances in the system which ‘exists on the basis of integrity’.95 Rodan (2004b) and Tan (2008) have cautioned against the propriety of technocratic and authoritarian governance built upon the faith of ‘wise men’ rather than ‘wise institutions’ (Tan, 2008: 19). Inter alia, Tan asserts that the ‘wise men’ approach to governance generates ‘a false sense of security and a general feeling that there is no need to keep a watchful eye on the daily

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business of government. Such conditions open the way to serious mistakes and corrupt practices in the future’ (2008: 16). The issue of political restrictions in the city-state was raised during the 2006 World Bank Summit and the 2007 International Bar Association conference held in Singapore. Inter alia, the PAP government was criticised for undermining the independence of the press and judiciary and silencing dissent. Opposition politician Chee Soon Juan drew applause at the World Bank Summit when he spoke of his six arrests and imprisonments, mainly for speaking in public without a permit.96 Timothy Cooper, from the Washington-based human rights group, Worldrights, pointedly asked the PAP leadership why political defendants in Singapore had never won libel suits brought by the PAP against them. Singapore’s poor press ranking (146 out of 168) in 2006 by the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders was also raised. Responding to these criticisms, Lee Kuan Yew claimed that press restrictions were in place because politically sensitive issues of race, language and religion had to be handled sensitively: ‘A multi-racial, multi-religious society is always prone to conflicts’.97 Lee also alleged that defamation suits have been taken against those who impute dishonesty so as to ensure that the ‘people of Singapore do not equate their political leaders with second-hand car salesmen’ and to differentiate Singapore from neighbouring countries where money politics was a way of life.98 The latter explanation has become a characteristic response particularly when political restrictions in Singapore are queried by the international community. This response is obviously offensive to Singapore’s neighbours. Just as the Malaysian judiciary has been subjected to executive interference, concerns about the independence of Singapore’s judiciary have been repeatedly expressed by the International Commission of Jurists, the International Bar Association, Amnesty International, Canada’s Lawyers Rights Watch and opposition politicians and dissidents. Singapore’s former Solicitor General and political exile, Francis Seow, has observed that in commercial cases, the Singaporean judiciary may be relied upon to administer justice but in political cases there is a ‘single facility bending over backwards to render decisions favourable to the Singapore government and its leaders’ (Seow, 2006: xv). A 2008 report by the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute expressed concerns over the independence of Singapore’s courts in cases that involve members of the ruling PAP (International Bar Association, 2008). Instructively, no PAP politician has ever lost a defamation suit against an opposition politician and Lee Kuan Yew is reputedly the most successful litigant in the world. Amnesty International and the Canadian Lawyers Rights Watch maintain that the ‘use of libel laws and the awarding of damages, which are not clearly in proportion to the harm suffered by the victim, run the risk of having a serious chilling effect on the freedom of expression in Singapore’.99 The bankruptcy of opposition politicians J.B. Jeyaretnam (former Workers’ Party Secretary General), Tang Liang Hong (Workers’ Party candidate in the 1997 elections) and Chee Soon Juan (Singapore Democratic Party, Secretary General) following defamation suits by PAP politicians, has certainly had a chilling effect on political expression. These suits have reinforced the political culture of fear and sent a clear message to Singaporeans that dissenting politics is dangerous business.

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Conclusion Whilst dissimilar in many respects, the national-building approaches of Singapore and Malaysia’s authoritarian states share many similarities, particularly in the maintenance of Chinese dominance (ketuanan China) in Singapore and Malay dominance (ketuanan Melayu) in Malaysia. The covert and overt forms of communal politics have alienated ethnic minorities and undermined long-term national cohesion. After decades of nation-building, ethnic interaction has remained largely superficial and laden with negative ethnic stereotypes. The ketuanan Melayu system in Malaysia has been counter-balanced by the dominant economic position and political potency of the Chinese community. By contrast, the Malay community in Singapore has remained economically and politically marginal. Malaysia’s vibrant civil society and energetic opposition parties have provided minorities with the platform to assertively articulate their concerns in the public arena. As the 2008 elections in Malaysia demonstrate, ethnic minorities have effectively used their electoral clout in urban areas to support opposition parties that challenge UMNO’s Malay special rights agenda. By contrast, Singapore’s residential quota system has ensured that the ethnic minorities remain geographically dispersed and thus cannot determine the electoral outcome of any constituency. The GRC system has also undermined the electoral clout of opposition parties who have consistently failed to win any GRC seats since its implementation in the late 1980s. The rhetoric of multiracialism has paradoxically been appropriated to justify the ethnic residential system and the GRC despite its reinforcement of communal politics. In Southeast Asia’s most dynamic economy, the legal harassment and financial ruination of opposition politicians has cultivated a culture of diffidence. Malaysia’s political culture of defiance has energised opposition parties such as the DAP, PKR, PAS and civil society actors such as Aliran, Malaysiakini, SUARAM and SUHAKAM (Malaysian Human Rights Commission). They have served as an outlet for subaltern voices and articulate alternative nation-building perspectives that challenge the communal paradigm of the BN government. IntraUMNO divisions and tensions, generated in part by political and business rivalries, have also contributed to the widening democratic space. Malaysia’s relatively robust culture of public debate, daring opposition party leadership and spirited civil society have placed immense pressure on the communal and authoritarian political structures of the BN dominated state. The ability of the multiracial opposition Pakatan Raayat in depriving the communal BN coalition of their two-thirds parliamentary majority and winning control of five state governments in the 2008 elections represents a critical juncture in Malaysia’s political trajectory. This critical juncture is no doubt nervously watched by the authoritarian PAP government intent on prolonging its 50 years of uninterrupted rule in the city state. In Singapore’s tightly centralised system of governance dominated by Lee Kuan Yew, the press remains compliant, civil society restrained and the culture of fear prevails. Public debate of politically sensitive issues is restricted to closed-door and tightly regulated discussions. Thus, when Lee made his controversial remarks in

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September 2006 about Malaysian Chinese being marginal in Malaysia and Indonesia, a debate raged in Malaysia. By contrast, Lee’s callous remarks and subsequent apology raised little more than a whimper in Singapore. In contrast to the discredited ketuanan Melayu paradigm in Malaysia, ketuanan China in Singapore has been subjected to less scrutiny as it operates under the banner and rhetoric of multiracialism and meritocracy. The restricted democratic space for opposition parties and civil society in Singapore has meant that politically sensitive issues such as the persisting socio-economic marginality of the Malays, discrimination in the workforce and the Sinicisation of the city-state are rarely publicly debated. In particular, the persistent socio-economic marginality and electoral diminution of Malays via policies such as the ethnic residential quotas renders hollow the ideology of multiracialism and meritocracy, conflicts with Article 152 of Singapore’s constitution100 and constitutes a major fault-line in Singapore’s authoritarian nation-building paradigm. Despite the rhetoric of meritocracy and multiracialism, the PAP’s ketuanan China paradigm is inherently communal and has rendered ethnic relations superficial. Malays are expected to accept their relative marginality whilst dissenting voices within the community coopted, disparaged or dismissed. Importantly, the Sinicisation of Singapore has reinforced its ‘regional other’ complex, restricted its ability to effectively engage with its Malay neighbours and promote regional-building initiatives commensurate with its economic clout. While the Singaporean government may have been adroit in promoting regional economic initiatives, it has been less innovative in promoting regional security and geopolitical cohesion, areas that are vitally important in strengthening a cohesive ASEAN identity. This is a key undercurrent in Singapore’s regional dilemma. The Malaysian and Singaporean experience demonstrate clearly that nationbuilding is an ongoing and protracted process that remains an unfinished project as the nation-state requires periodic reimagination to remain relevant. This reimagination takes on new dimensions in accordance to the political agenda of the political elites, pressure from civil society and the economic challenges confronting the nation-state and the wider global community. As Malaysia and Singapore ascend the technological and industrial ladder and develop a sophisticated knowledge economy, the communal and authoritarian nation-building paradigm has come under increasing pressure. The reconfiguration of the nation-building paradigm in Southeast Asia’s most successful economies will substantially impact each other and the region as a whole.

4

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity

Fear is the most powerful enemy of reason . . . fear itself can quickly become a selfperpetuating and freewheeling force that drains the national will and weakens national character. (Al Gore, 2007: 23–24)

Insecurity and national identity Singapore’s national identity has been strongly shaped by a crisis discourse centred on the struggle for survival and security. This discourse is geared towards reminding Singaporeans of the vulnerabilities associated with being a predominantly Chinese city-state surrounded by larger, densely populated, resource rich and potentially hostile Malay states. The acrimonious nature of Singapore’s merger and separation from Malaysia, continued reliance on neighbouring countries for even the most basic of necessities such as water and food, experience of Indonesia’s lowintensity Konfrontasi military campaign1 and communal riots in the 1950s and 1960s, and persistence of regional ethno-nationalist sentiments have contributed to the PAP leadership’s acute insecurity. These factors have, according to Deck, ‘created a near paranoid cluster of communal security attitudes in Singapore’ (Deck, 1999: 251). Driven by these insecurities, survival has become a ‘one word political slogan’ that has underpinned the PAP’s reading of Singapore’s many national challenges (Deck, 1999: 251; Chan, 1971: 48). The survival discourse is particularly convenient for the authoritarian PAP government as it represents an effective means of rallying the masses behind a nationalist rhetoric that rationalises high levels of defence spending and compulsory military service. The unspoken but deep-seated fear of the more than 230 million Malays in the immediate region has been very effective in maintaining the culture of insecurity and shepherding the predominantly Chinese populace into line. In many respects, the security and sovereignty of the city-state have been subtly conflated with the continued political longevity of the authoritarian PAP government – implicit guardians of a Chinese dominated Singapore. Consistent with the relatively large number of former military personnel in the civil service and PAP front bench and the persistence of compulsory military service, Singapore’s national identity is strongly tied to maintaining the status of

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 79 the SAF as the most technologically sophisticated military establishment in Southeast Asia. Official National Day parades are routinely spearheaded by a procession of military and security services personnel, followed by other national movements deemed integral to the city-state’s national identity. In the 2007 National Day parade, the PAP fielded a marching contingent displaying party flags but the same right was not extended to opposition parties.2 An army museum was opened in 2007 with the aim of documenting the development of the army since independence and visually narrating the stories of young men who have served their country by their participation in compulsory military service.3 Not depicted in the narrative is the systematic exclusion of Malay men from military service and who continue to face institutionalised discrimination in the SAF. Singapore, like other colonial settler societies, remains uneasy with the historical dispossession of indigenous land and insecure with the settler society’s geographic distance from the ‘mother country’ (Burke, 2001: 261). In many of these societies, national identity is based on the representation of danger (Lawrence, 2006: 43) and a deep-seated distrust of neighbouring countries. The denial of indigenous traditional ownership of the land is supported by the reconstruction of a national history that reflects the triumphalist historical narrative of the colonial settler society. In keeping with this triumphalist narrative, Singapore’s pre-colonial Malay history has been trivialised whilst the economic contributions of British colonialism and that of extra-regional immigrants have been celebrated. The strategic culture of many colonial settler societies is strongly tinged by a tendency to ‘perceive a threat where none exists, or, if one exists, to inflate its capacity to harm’ (Hage, 2003: 49). Believing that they cannot defend themselves against regional threats, a ‘great and powerful’ patron is relied upon to deter possible incursions of regional ‘others’. In return for this protection, the military adventures of the patron and its global strategic interests are often uncritically supported (Cheeseman, 1999: 273). Driven by a fear of being swamped by the national and regional ‘other’, immigration policies have been tailored to preserve the numerical preponderance of the dominant immigrant community. Singapore’s immigration policy of maintaining the numerical dominance of the Chinese community, the White Australia Policy and Israel’s open-door policy to the Jewish diaspora are reflective of the deep-seated fear of losing numerical dominance and being engulfed by the ‘other’. Distrust and fear of the ‘other’ allows politicians to shore up their political base and rationalise controversial policies that reinforce the politics of fear. They recognise that when fear dominates, rational analysis is blurred and unpopular or controversial policies are more readily tolerated without critical examination. In this environment of fear, the ability of the majority to empathise with the concerns of the ‘other’ is diminished, leading to profound deafness and blindness to the genuine grievances of the latter (Ramadan, 2006: 12). To deflect public attention and maintain social control, peddlers of fear are inclined to promote negative stories about the domestic, regional and extra-regional ‘other’. Thus isolated incidents related to the ‘other’ have been repeated and projected in the mainstream media as an alarming trend without serious analysis. Carmen Lawrence has observed how the

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exploitation of inherently racist and irrational fears by the conservative Howard government led to a misdiagnosis of Australian national security – paradoxically channelling a disproportionate misdirection of resources to programmes and policies which have delivered minimal benefits to national security (Lawrence, 2006: 3). The ‘war on terror’ has also presented fear mongers with the opportunity to revitalise the discourse of threat and the politics of fear. Not all colonial settler societies exhibit an insecure strategic culture and strong reliance on a ‘great and powerful’ patron to guarantee their national security. New Zealand and Canada have long adopted independent foreign and security policies, exemplified by their opposition to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In Australia, the Keating and Rudd Labor governments made significant progress in strengthening socio-cultural and security ties with neighbouring Asia-Pacific countries. They recognise that deepening geopolitical and economic relations are reinforced by a deepening of socio-cultural ties. In coming to terms with the country’s history of indigenous dispossession and discrimination, in 2008 the Australian and Canadian governments issued a national apology to the indigenous community. In an act of moral rectitude, courage and leadership, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, on behalf of the Australian government, declared: We apologise for the laws and policies of successive Parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on those our fellow Australians . . . We take this first step by acknowledging the past and laying claim to a future . . . where we harness the determination of all Australians, indigenous and non-indigenous, to close the gap that lies between us in life expectancy, educational achievement and economic opportunity.4 This chapter highlights the significance of historical and socio-political factors in shaping Singapore’s national identity, strategic culture and security policies. It examines the dangers of ethnocentricism in shaping security policies and producing negative and exaggerated perceptions of the national and regional ‘other’. These perceptions have arguably contributed to a Singaporean national identity that is rooted in the culture of fear, paranoia and insecurity – a culture engendered and exploited by the authoritarian PAP government. This goes some way towards explaining why Singapore remains the only country in Southeast Asia to have compulsory military service, spends more than any other regional country in per capita terms on defence, uncritically supported the US in its invasion of Iraq, remains deeply embedded in the US security umbrella and suffers from a regional soft power deficit despite its myriad economic achievements.

Insecurity and the realist worldview of an authoritarian state Insecurity remains the core theme of the realist school of international relations and is the main driver of Singapore’s security policies. In keeping with this worldview, security is strongly understood in national rather than international or human

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 81 security terms. Strongly framed within state-centric terms, realist notions of security are premised on the insecurity of other states (Burke, 2001: 240). As military strength is perceived as pivotal in determining a state’s leverage in the international community, hard power becomes not only an instrument but an end in itself (Burke, 2001: 242). As international relations is thought of in anarchic terms and characterised by aggressive competition, states are expected to prepare for war and engage in regional balancing with great powers to guarantee their security (Emmerson, 2005: 4). The dominance of the realist worldview in Southeast Asia has meant that concepts such as regional human security and autonomous regional security remain highly problematic due to the focus on the engagement of great or big powers (Jayasuriya, 1994: 415). It is also worth noting that the realist subordination of ethical considerations has meant that questions such as: is it right? is it just? is it in the interest of humankind? are deemed irrelevant. This ethical vacuum has allowed the PAP leadership to collude with notoriously corrupt and repressive regimes such as the Suharto New Order and Burmese SPDC regimes, particularly if bilateral relations are thought to benefit the economic and strategic interests of the Singaporean state. Indeed, the former long-serving Prime Minister and current Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew has acknowledged that he provided economic and geostrategic advice to Burma’s Generals Ne Win, Khin Nyunt and Than Shwe (Lee, 2000: 361–362). The Singapore leadership’s propensity to maintain close economic relations with authoritarian governments irrespective of their political legitimacy and human rights record explains its defence of the pariah Burmese military regime in international forums. Thaung Htun, Representative for UN Affairs of Burma’s government-in-exile, attributes the Singapore government’s attempt to water down a UN General Assembly resolution castigating the military regime for its violent crackdown on pro-democracy activists in 1988 to its considerable business connections: ‘Singapore is defending its investments at the diplomatic level, using its efforts at the UN level to promote its business links’ (Kean and Bernstein, 1998: 334). Benefiting from being one of the first countries to resume relations with the Burmese military regime after its bloody crackdown which left thousands dead, detained and displaced, Singapore became Burma’s largest trading partner and foreign investor in the 1990s. The non-government organisation Burma Campaign UK has listed 10 Singapore firms on its ‘dirty list’ of companies engaged in business with Burma.5 In the 1990s, more than half of Singapore’s investments in Burma were purportedly in partnership with Burma’s heroin boss Lo Hsing Han, head of the conglomerate Asia World (Kean and Bernstein, 1998: 331). The Singapore GIC chaired by Lee Kuan Yew has purportedly invested in the Myanmar Fund, controlled by none other than Lo and his son Steven Law.6 The GIC also co-invested with Asia World in the Traders and Shangri-La Hotels in Rangoon.7 Lo and his son have been able to set up businesses in Singapore despite Lo’s record as a convicted drug trafficker. He was arrested in 1973, sentenced to death but pardoned by the Burmese military regime. Upon his release in 1980, Lo not only resumed his business activities in Burma but also served as advisor on ethnic affairs to General Khin Nyunt. This is

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unsurprising in view of the SPDC regime’s reliance on the resources of drug barons such as Lo for its financial survival (Kean and Bernstein, 1998: 331). Despite being denied a visa to the United States due to suspicions of drug trafficking, Law has been allowed to travel in and out of Singapore (Kean and Bernstein, 1998: 332). This is ironic in view of Singapore’s reputation as the ‘execution capital’ of the world. The city-state’s record for having the highest execution rate in the world is due in part to the government’s tough stance on drug traffickers.8 Paradoxically, convicted drug barons and their associates have been allowed to enter the city-state and set up businesses while small time drug couriers and addicts are mercilessly executed by hanging (Rahim, 2004: 16–17). SPDC generals and Burmese drug barons have purportedly exploited Singapore’s bank secrecy laws to engage in money laundering activities and used the city-state as a financial haven and a commercial window to the world. In the early 1990s, the Burmese military regime allegedly laundered US$400 million through Singapore banks to purchase Chinese arms. Tay Za, currently the wealthiest man in Burma, has offices in Singapore.9 The PAP government’s close economic tie with the SPDC military regime is matched by an equally intimate security relationship. The Singapore government has allegedly sold guns, rockets, armoured personnel carriers and grenade launchers to the military regime. The arms were supplied by Allied Ordinance, a subsidiary of Chartered Industries, which is an arm of the state conglomerate Singapore Technologies. Singaporean companies have also provided computers and communications equipment to Burma’s defence ministry and army. Skilled in the science of surveillance, the Singapore government has trained hundreds of the SPDC’s notorious secret police and about 5,000 SPDC officials through the Singapore Cooperation Program.10 It has provided equipment for the establishment of a cyber war centre geared towards monitoring dissident activity. Built with the assistance of Singapore Technologies, the cyber war centre is purportedly involved in monitoring and recording foreign and domestic telecommunications such as satellite telephone conversations of Burmese dissident groups.11

Realist technocracy The realist foreign policy and security perspectives of the PAP leadership have been preserved by the omnipresence of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew in Cabinet and the elevation of son Lee Hsien Loong to the Prime Ministership. Lee Hsien Loong served in the SAF for 13 years and attained the rank of Brigadier General and Chief of Staff when he retired from the military to run for public office in 1984, at the age of 32. Elected as an MP in the 1984 elections, he was promptly elevated to the position of Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence a year later. The following year, the ‘meritorious’ younger Lee was installed as a Minister for Trade and Industry, Deputy Prime Minister in 1990 and Prime Minister in 2004. The PAP leadership’s realist worldview has also been preserved by the steady injection of active and reservist SAF officers into key administrative, statutory

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 83 board, diplomatic and political positions and councils of higher learning. This process has been facilitated by programmes such as the dual-career scheme for SAF scholars which, from the early 1980s, allow President’s and SAF scholars to be seconded to positions in the civil service or statutory boards. When retiring from the SAF, the scholars are also commonly appointed to senior positions in the public sector (Huxley, 1993: 7). This phenomenon has prompted Huxley to assert that by the early 1990s, Singapore’s administrative state had evolved into a military administrative state (1993: 19). The career trajectory of the ‘Mindef Mafia’ (Deck, 1999: 253), which includes former Chief of Staff Brigadier General Tan Chin Tiong12 and Lee Kuan Yew’s sons Brigadier Generals (Reservist) Lee Hsien Loong and Lee Hsien Yang, is indicative of the trend towards ‘militarising’ the bureaucracy, government-linked companies and the executive. In step with their colleagues in the Ministries of Defence and Home Affairs, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are also steeped in the realist worldview of the PAP leadership. Understanding international relations as being driven by a state of perpetual tension or conflict between sovereign states, Singapore’s first and long-serving Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam is known to have subscribed to the adage, ‘Each nation for itself” (Koh and Acharya, 2003: xvii). Former Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan is on record for characterising international relations as resembling ‘a Hobbessian state of nature, where each is pitted against all’ (Koh and Acharya, 2003: xvii). Acknowledging that Singaporean diplomats are strongly imbued with realist notions of international relations, senior diplomat Tommy Koh lamented that they have generally been indoctrinated by the theories of the realist school. They believe that the weight and influence of a country in the world are dependent upon a number of objective indices such as size of country, population, military and economy. (Koh and Acharya, 2003: 237) The realist worldview of Minister Mentor Lee, Prime Minister Lee and their military trained Cabinet colleagues have remained uncontested due in part to the technocratic orientation of most PAP Ministers. Many have been coopted into the PAP from the civil service without much political experience in the PAP or active engagement with civil society. In Singapore’s authoritarian state, where opposition parties are weak and poorly represented in parliament, civil society emasculated and the public depoliticised, security related issues are ‘taboo subjects in parliament and are often cloaked by a veil of secrecy’ (Ganesan, 2001: 581). These issues are commonly perceived by the public as the preserve of the government and have generally gone unchallenged. Jayasuriya (1994: 417) has attributed the lack of serious public debate on foreign and security policies to the unwillingness of Singapore based academics and policy institutes to directly challenge the PAP government. Research centres have been characterised as lacking genuine independence and unwilling to assume the role of intellectual agenda setters. Ideas for regional innovation are thought to primarily

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emanate from the bureaucracy or the Cabinet, leaving policy institutes in the role of ‘cheer leaders for government policy . . . [who] march to the beat of the state drum’ (Jayasuriya, 1994: 417). Jayasuriya has accused them of ‘being highly responsive to the interests of the Singaporean state’ and functioning ‘as an interlocutor for the Singaporean state’s regional discourse’ (1994: 417). In the same vein, Jones and Smith (2002: 100) assert that Singapore based security studies scholars are akin to ‘scholar bureaucrats’ who are aligned with the state and thus reluctant to speak truth to power.

Realist notions of sovereignty The PAP leadership’s realist worldview has encouraged it to aggressively confront neighbouring countries particularly when Singapore’s sovereignty is thought to be at stake. This stance is fuelled by the barely concealed belief that the larger MalayMuslim states of Indonesia to the south and Malaysia to the north have not fully accepted the predominantly Chinese city-state’s sovereign status (Leifer, 2000: 2) and are envious of its economic success. The assumption is that without a formidable defence capability, Singapore would be at the mercy of her Malay neighbours. Reflecting this view, a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bilahari Kausikan observed that, All too often, they focus on the fact that the majority of our population is Chinese and project upon us their own attitudes towards their Chinese populations. Sometimes our very success, our existence as a successful sovereign, independent, multiracial and meritocratic country is seen as a challenge to, or an implicit criticism of, other systems. Often the key issue is not what we do, it is what we are.13 Coloured by these views, even seemingly innocuous actions of Singapore’s neighbours have been interpreted in a threatening light. Indicative of this realist paranoia, shortly after Singapore’s separation, the PAP leadership described the republic in metaphoric terms as a ‘valuable nut situated in a nut-cracker’ (Singh, 1999: 275). T.S. George contends that the PAP leadership’s acute insecurity stems from the apparent willingness of some senior UMNO politicians during the tumultuous merger years to arrest Lee for acting against the national interest.14 This goes some way towards explaining the PAP government’s request for the Malaysian security forces, located in Singapore since 1952, to vacate its barracks. In the ensuing tense bilateral exchange, the PAP government denied that Malaysia possessed the right to the bases in Singapore. Yet Article 5(3) of the Separation Agreement clearly states that The Government of Singapore will afford the Government of Malaysia the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities used by the military forces within Singapore and will permit the Government of Malaysia to make

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 85 use of these bases and facilities as the Government of Malaysia may consider necessary for the purpose of external defence. (Chan, 1971: 38) With separation in 1965, the Malaysian government had paid rental, revised in 1972 and 1974, for the location of its security forces in the Woodlands naval base. However, when the rental was revised from S$1.9 million to S$6.1 million per year in 1991, negotiations broke down after the Malaysian government accused its Singaporean counterpart of pressuring the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) to relocate despite Article 5 of the 1965 Separation Agreement recognising the RMN base in Woodlands (Singh, 1999: 200). The RMN finally relocated in 1997 to Tanjung Penggelih in Johor amidst allegations by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad that the PAP government had repeatedly raised the rental to repossess the Woodlands naval base – indicative of its bad faith. Mahathir pronounced that the RMN had the right to stay put under the Separation Agreement.15 This point was reiterated to the author during an interview in Kuala Lumpur with Mahathir Mohamad in 2006. The Singapore government has consistently advocated in international and regional forums that the violation of territorial sovereignty is an unacceptable conduct of international relations – a position rooted in the understanding that Singapore’s sovereignty would not be guaranteed if such violations were condoned by the international community. Thus when Vietnam occupied Cambodia in 1979, ostensibly to oust the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime, Singapore led a vigorous ASEAN diplomatic campaign in the UN to condemn this occupation. The ethics of colluding with the genocidal Khmer Rouge in order to challenge the legitimacy of the Vietnamese backed Heng Samrin regime was secondary to the preoccupation with preserving the PAP leadership’s realist notions of state sovereignty. Rationalising the PAP government’s collusion with the Khmer Rouge, Singapore’s former Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan remarked, The moral issue troubles many of us. But there were other issues at play. Who has the right to determine that a government or regime is evil and ought to be overthrown. The people of the country or some outside power? We held and still hold the view that it is the responsibility of a people to determine who and how they should be governed and that no foreign state has the right to determine what or which is a good government in another state. (Dhanabalan, 2005: 42) The idea that it is the responsibility of a terrorised and subjugated citizenry to be in a position to determine who and how they should be governed constitutes a major leap in logic. It is based on overlooking the Khmer Rouge’s murderous record of systematically eliminating millions and depriving Cambodians of their basic political and civil rights.

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Singapore and the regional security dilemma The security dilemma in international relations literature commonly refers to states suspicious of the actions and policies of other states even though the intention of these states may in fact be benign. Suspicions can escalate into an arms race, or even war, particularly when states exhibit offensive postures by purchasing weapons with an offensive capability (Jervis, 1976) or shrouds its military equipment, organisation and capabilities in secrecy. This posture may be driven by the realist belief that the security of a state requires the insecurity of other states. In this environment, an arms race is often triggered off as states enhance their military capability to keep up with others believed to possess a more formidable military capability. In this classic security dilemma situation, states become more insecure despite their arms accumulation as the threatening image of other states becomes reinforced.16 Lee Kuan Yew has acknowledged in his memoirs that the rapid build-up of the SAF after separation in 1965 was strongly motivated by the fear of a Malaysian instigated coup against the city-state. Lee believed that there were senior elements within UMNO who deeply resented the PAP leadership and were capable of instigating military action against the city-state: We had to deter and, if need be, prevent any wild move by the Malay ultras in Kuala Lumpur to instigate a coup by the Malaysian forces in Singapore and reverse the independence we had acquired . . . If anything were to happen to Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak would become Prime Minister and he could be made to reverse the Tunku’s decision by strong-minded ultra leaders . . . The best deterrent to any Malaysian plan to regain control over Singapore was their knowledge that even if they could subdue our armed forces, they would have to keep down a whole people well trained in the use of arms and explosives ... other powerful Malay leaders, like Syed Ja’afar Albar who so strongly opposed separation that he resigned as secretary-general of UMNO, might persuade Brigadier Alsagoff it was his patriotic duty to reverse separation . . . Keng Swee as defence minister worked feverishly to build-up some defence capability. (2000: 22–27) Indicative of the PAP leadership’s acute Singapore’s insecurity complex, a high five to six per cent of Singapore’s GDP and 30 per cent of the total government expenditure is spent on defence – more than any other country in Southeast Asia.17 The citystate is one of the most militarised states in the world, with only Israel and Qatar spending more on defence in per capita terms.18 Singapore’s status as one of the most densely defended states in the world (Huxley, 2000: xx) is compounded by the SAF’s technological edge over its regional counterparts. The SAF’s status as the most technologically sophisticated airforce in Southeast Asia is exemplified by the ability of its fighter aircraft to strike a target of up to 1,000 miles from a runway and its possession of sophisticated air-borne radar systems for early warning (Leifer, 2000: 3).

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 87 Singapore’s neighbours are no doubt also concerned by its technological edge in crucial areas such as armour, medium range artillery, combat aircraft and missileequipped naval craft. In many respects, Singapore’s technological prowess is driven by the need to compensate for its lack of strategic depth. The SAF’s reliance on conscripts and reservists is offset by their extended period of intensive compulsory military service and re-training (Huxley, 2000: 30). Compulsory national service ensures that up to 10 per cent of the Singaporean citizenry are directly associated with the military19 and provides the SAF with a highly skilled standing force of approximately 59,000 troops (da Cunha, 1999: 454) and 300,000 reservists20 who are called up for brief periods of training each year. In a constant state of national military preparedness, fuel, water and food rationing exercises are periodically held, roads can be used as emergency runways, air-raid systems have been installed, food stockpiles maintained and a civilian bomb-shelter programme in place. Notwithstanding the PAP government’s projection of Singapore as the Switzerland of Southeast Asia, the republic’s formidable military capability is closer to that of Israel. Both have surpassed their neighbours in terms of the volume of firepower, technical skill, level of unit operational readiness and technological advantage. Instructively, the commitment to maintain Singapore’s military edge over her neighbours did not recede with the conclusion of the Cold War in the late 1980s. This can be attributed to the belief that the city-state’s potential sources of military conflict – Malaysia and to a lesser extent Indonesia – remained constant. If anything else, the cessation of the Cold War evoked greater insecurity as the primary rationale for a US military presence in East Asia had weakened (Singh, 1999: 283). In keeping with this enhanced insecurity, arms purchases from the US were stepped up.21 While other Southeast Asian states were pressured by the 1997 regional economic crisis to reduce their defence budgets, Singapore increased its defence spending significantly. In the financial year 1998–1999, and the following two years, its defence budget increased by 13 per cent (Huxley, 2000: 27). When other regional states had put on hold or cancelled their plans to modernise their military, Singapore took delivery of offensive F-16 fighters and 30 planes in 1998 (Collins, 2000: 104–105). Why the increased military expenditure at a time of regional demilitarisation and economic pressure? In addition to the deep-seated insecurity complex of the PAP leadership, Collins suggests that Singapore’s enhanced militarisation was precipitated by a heightened sense of insecurity stemming from the unexpected ouster of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the rise of political Islam in Malaysia (2000: 105). By 2000, regional militaries resumed their defence spending to pre-1998 levels,22 fuelled in part by the need to narrow Singapore’s lead in sophisticated weaponry. Thailand purchased F-16s and Indonesia acquired Russian fighters.23 Instructively, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia also expressed interest in acquiring diesel-electric submarines after Singapore acquired four refurbished Swedish diesel submarines in 2000 (da Cunha, 2001: 6). Raising the security concerns of neighbouring countries, Singapore’s airforce superiority was strengthened further

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when it signed the US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) development programme in February 2003,24 rendering the republic the only Asian country to participate in the program. Regional security concerns were aroused by the establishment of a new air base in Changi which houses 20 of the RSAF’s most technologically sophisticated jets such as the F-16, B-52 and Fighting Falcon. These jets have enhanced capabilities like long-range fuel tanks, improved ground-mapping capabilities and an advanced targeting pod.25 In 2005, 12 offensive F-15 fighters, which included advanced air-to-air missiles and satellite guided bombs, were purchased from the Americans. Particularly unsettling for neighbouring states was that these acquisitions provided Singapore with intermediate range anti-aircraft capability and ensured inter-operability with US forces in joint operations.26 The SAF has since the mid-1980s moved from a ‘poison shrimp’ deterrence posture based on territorial defence to developing offensive oriented conventional capabilities. With these offensive capabilities, the SAF has the capacity to strike more than two hundred or more miles into enemy territory in coordinated groundair operations with naval support for logistical systems (Deck, 1999: 250). This can be followed by the swift formation of beachheads in the adversary’s territory (Deck, 1999: 250). This preemptive strike strategy is based on emasculating perceived aggressors in accordance with the logic that attack is the best form of deterrence. According to Deck, the strategic culture of the SAF and its preemptive strike strategy is premised on the questionable belief that ‘equates fear with respect in subregional politics; they believe that the will and capacity to project power beyond their borders induces respectful fear in all potential adversaries’ (Deck, 1999: 256). To augment this preemptive strike strategy, the SAF has apparently developed sufficient resilience to absorb the adversary’s first strike (Huxley, 2000: 57). The veil of secrecy surrounding details of the city-state’s military acquisition, organisation and capabilities have undoubtedly fuelled the suspicions of neighbouring countries and escalated the security dilemma. It is difficult to ascertain the actual number of Singapore’s combat aircraft as many of them are stationed overseas and thus not readily accounted for (Emmerson, 1996: 58). This secrecy is consistent with the tight control on information pertaining to security, defence and other issues. Reflecting this culture of secrecy, there is a dearth of detailed and coherent official information on the SAF released to the public (Huxley, 2000: xxi). Since the ‘war on terror’, Singapore and other Southeast Asian states have steadily increased their defence allocations,27 fuelling a ‘slow-motion’ arms race – whereby one country’s arms acquisition precipitates other countries to acquire arms (da Cunha, 2001: 5). Southeast Asia’s security tensions and arms race can also be attributed to the failure in resolving long-standing regional territorial disputes and economic competition between regional states. Unlike other regional blocs such as the EU, ASEAN has yet to establish a regional arms register that requires reporting of current weapons holdings and domestic production. As such, the exchange of defence information among ASEAN states has been minimal.28 The lack of exchange in regional defence information and ongoing expansion of military arsenals can be attributed to the long-standing bilateral tensions between ASEAN states such as Thailand and Burma and Singapore and Malaysia

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 89 (da Cunha, 2001: 5). It is worth noting that Southeast Asia’s regional arms race mirrors the broader East Asian arms build-up ostensibly fuelled by China and Japan’s shift towards a more outward defence posture.29

Suspicious neighbours: the Singapore–Malaysia security counter-balance Tim Huxley has asserted that tensions between Singapore and Malaysia constitute one of ‘. . . the most sensitive and unstable relationships between any pair of ASEAN members’ (Huxley, 2000: 45). One manifestation of the deep-seated tension between Singapore and Malaysia is their competitive arms build-up. As noted above, Singapore’s military build-up in the post-separation period has been rationalised as a means of pre-empting a possible Malaysian military action, purportedly favoured by anti-PAP elements in UMNO who deeply resented the PAP leadership’s political machinations during the merger years.30 Typifying the classic security dilemma, Malaysia’s arms build-up has been fuelled by Singapore’s aggressive preemptive strike option of invading neighbouring Johor in the event of a serious bilateral military conflict (Lee, 2000: 40). Beneath the semblance of military cooperation via defence agreements such as the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), deep-seated suspicions persist. For example, during a jointFPDA military exercise in 1970, the Malaysian government refused to allow Singapore tanks to cross the causeway (George, 1974: 171). Unneighbourly suspicions have been fuelled by alleged SAF intrusions into Malaysian land and airspace. For example, in October 1987, the Malaysian government claimed that an SAF assault boat had intruded into a riverine area in Johor and accused the SAF of provocatively sending its soldiers into Malaysian territory on routine training exercises (Huxley, 2000: 45). Two years later, the Malaysian government detained nine spies accused of selling military secrets to Singapore. Instructively, this was not the first time that Malaysia had arrested spies allegedly working for the Singapore government (Huxley, 2000: 46). Rebuking Singapore for its alleged spying activity, Malaysia suspended all bilateral military exercises with Singapore in 1990. In the same year, Malaysia closed its airspace to aircraft from the Singapore Flying College and Singapore Flying Club following claims that they had conducted photographic reconnaissance over ‘strategic’ locations in Malaysia (Huxley, 2000: 46). It is worth noting that in early 1996, Australian intelligence officials alleged that Singaporean agents were engaged in covertly collecting intelligence on Australian military capabilities. Shortly after these embarrassing allegations, the RSAF’s advanced flying training operation in Australia was relocated to France (Huxley, 2000: 200). The intrusions of Singaporean military aircraft into Malaysian airspace without authorisation have been perceived by Malaysian officials as a deliberate taunt by the Singaporean leadership emboldened by the belief that with US military facilities in Singapore, KL is not in a position to retaliate.31 Yet in September 1998, Malaysia did retaliate days after Singapore attempted to terminate the Malaysian Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) checkpoint

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in Tanjong Pagar by revoking permission for the RSAF to use its airspace in South Johor. To underscore its dissatisfaction with Singapore’s handling of the CIQ issue, permission for the RSAF to conduct navigational training over airspace in West Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak was also terminated (Nathan, 2002: 45). The annual Singapore–Malaysia Defence Forum, Semangat Bersatu joint army exercise and Malpura joint naval exercise were also called off in the late 1990s (Huxley, 2000: 213). Emmerson has observed that the near doubling of Singapore’s airforce between 1977 and 1984 had probably spurred Malaysia to rapidly expand its airforce (1996: 58). When Singapore purchased the AIM-120C advanced medium-range air missiles in 2000,32 Malaysia purchased the Jemas air-defence system and Astros guided missile.33 Shortly after Singapore’s purchase of the Sea Serpent-class submarine, Malaysia acquired an attack submarine.34 The SAF is ahead of the MAF in most aspects of military capability since the early 1990s and its military equipment procurement initiatives are geared towards maintaining this technological edge. The SAF countered Malaysia’s comparative advantage in artillery by acquiring in 2001 US Apache attack helicopters that are effective against tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and multiple-launch rocket systems. To counter Singapore’s attempt to blunt Malaysia’s artillery leverage, the latter announced its intention to procure several surface-to-air missile batteries in 2001.35 Between 2002 and 2003, Malaysia spent billions of dollars modernising its military hardware with new fighter jets, helicopters, weapons systems and submarines.36 Malaysia’s arms acquisitions has in no small measure been shaped by the knowledge that in any military encounter with Singapore, the SAF is likely to adopt a preemptive strike strategy by utilising its superior air-power to capture part of Johor (Huxley, 2001: 208). The SAF’s preemptive strike strategy is strongly shaped by Singapore’s Second World War experience which clearly demonstrated that the narrow Straits of Johor does not serve as an effective barrier to an invading force from the north. From Johor, the adversary is able to cut off water supplies and shell the city-state which would be unable to effectively defend itself once the adversary had secured part of the island due in no small measure to its lack of strategic depth. It is an open secret that Singapore’s preemptive strike strategy has long been played out in SAF staff college simulation exercises. These exercises include devastating the Malaysian Air Force on the ground before mounting further air-strikes; SAF commandoes securing Johor Bahru and the second link bridge; amphibious landings to position the SAF’s elite Twenty First Division on Johor’s coast and seizing a zone approximately 80 km into Johor to secure Singapore’s water pumping stations at Skudai and Kota Tinggi. However, the success of this military operation would require Indonesia to remain neutral – a less than certain presumption in a post-Suharto Indonesia where relations with Singapore has been problematic. A second front would be made possibly by Brunei or Thailand allowing the RSAF to use their airbases (Huxley, 2000: 59–63). A major flaw with Singapore’s preemptive strike strategy is that a relatively minor dispute with Malaysia could potentially escalate into a full blown military

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 91 conflict. The SAF’s strategy of pre-empting a potentially devastating first strike is strongly premised on the city-state’s lack of strategic depth and need to preserve its water supplies in Johor. Thus, a minor dispute such as a Singaporean naval vessel firing warning shots at a Malaysian vessel in contested territorial waters could inadvertently trigger a serious crisis. Even though Singapore’s preemptive strike strategy is geared towards compelling neighbouring states to treat the city-state with circumspection (Huxley, 2000: 63), it may well have aggravated the arms race between Singapore and Malaysia and contributed to the militarisation of Johor – ironically making a military conflict between both states more probable. Malaysian military vigilance in Johor has also been fuelled by the claims of Johor’s former Chief Minister, Mahyuddin Yassin Said that in the 1990s, Lee Kuan Yew threatened war with Malaysia if the city-state’s water supply from Johor was cut off.37 Reiterating these concerns, retired Malaysian Army General Zaini Mohamed has suggested that an escalating water dispute could well lead to military conflict due in no small part to Singapore’s offensive preemptive strike strategy.38 Demonstrating that KL has not taken Singapore’s preemptive strike policy lightly, Johor’s defences have been buttressed by the building of two large military bases from the late 1990s and a commando training camp built near Mersing in 2001 (da Cunha, 2001: 14).

The racialised security apparatus It is an open secret that Singapore Malays have been excluded from full integration into the structure of the SAF. The exclusion of Malays from ‘compulsory’ national service for much of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and continued discrimination in the SAF despite the official rhetoric of the socially integrative nature of national service, can be attributed to the perception that Malaysia and to a lesser extent Indonesia are Singapore’s most likely military adversaries. To be sure, the ethno-nationalist strategic culture39 of the PAP leadership has not escaped political elites from Malaysia and Indonesia. Determined to overturn the dominance of Malays in the military forces after separation from Malaysia, recruitment of Malays into the SAF was virtually halted after 1967, even though Malays made up 80 per cent of volunteers in the armed services. Malay officers and non-commissioned officers were systematically transferred from field command to logistics and support sections while others were retired or shut off from promotion (Huxley, 2000: 102–103). Walsh has observed that the PAP leadership’s distrust and fear of Malays led it to ‘sacrifice virtually all the experience and professionalism that had been built up before 1965 in exchange for a Chinese dominated military’ (2007: 273). The paranoid distrust of Malays is demonstrated by the reliance of the SAF’s intelligence services on ethnic Chinese proficient in Malay, rather than Malay personnel, to analyse Malay newspapers (Walsh, 2007: 273). Since independence, Malay participation in sensitive areas in the SAF such as armoury and tank units, front-line combat infantry and the airforce have been restricted (Mutalib, 2002: 43). Continued discrimination of Malays in the more

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‘sensitive’ wings of the SAF such as the air force was rationalised by Lee Kuan Yew in 1999 in the following way: If for instance you put a Malay officer who’s very religious and who has family ties in Malaysia in charge of a machine gun unit, that is a very tricky business . . . If today the Prime Minister doesn’t think about this, we could have tragedy.40 Driven by this paranoid geostrategic mindset, the first Malay air-force pilot was only appointed in 1992 and the first Malay fighter pilot in 2003.41 Reminding Singaporeans of the potential security risk posed by Malays, Lee has stated that ‘. . . our concerns about conflicting realities are real. We know of at least one case where foreign intelligence agencies approached one of our senior officers because he was Malay’.42 The geostrategic calculation underpinning this paranoid outlook was evident by Lee’s assertion that If there’s an enormous disturbance in Malaysia, we are going to be affected. If there’s an enormous disturbance in Indonesia, especially in Batam, the Riau Islands, we are going to be affected. It’s a fact of life. We have to face the real world and the real world is unfair and unkind. It cannot be helped.43 In regional terms, the PAP government’s long-standing policy of restricting opportunities for Malays in the SAF has had the effect of signalling to the city-state’s Malay neighbours that they remain the most serious military threat to its sovereignty – hardly the recipe for nurturing regional goodwill. The SAF’s discriminatory policy serves to reinforce regional suspicions that the PAP leadership has nurtured a society that suffers from a siege mentality and is ‘out of place’ in the Malay World. Not surprisingly, these discriminatory policies have engendered Malay resentment and alienation with their second class status in a supposedly meritocratic society. They have also engendered the public perception that Malay loyalty to the country is suspect, thereby fuelling latent inter-ethnic tensions. Without doubt, the perception of dubious Malay loyalty to the country has been reinforced by the alleged discovery of a militant JI network in Singapore. To be sure, compulsory military service was introduced in part from the awareness that the Chinese are traditionally disdainful of military service.44 Without compulsory military service, the Singapore government would have faced major challenges in building a sizeable reserve army, leaving it reliant on a predominantly Malay military force (Walsh, 2007: 275). Why then have Malays traditionally identified with and participated in the military establishment? Jeshurun purports that Malays have, from the era of pre-colonial Malay kingdoms, accorded high status to human qualities such as bravery and the willingness to fight and die in defence of their land. This is demonstrated by the strong collective memory of the Royal Malay Regiment (RMR) who selflessly fought the Japanese in the Battle of Singapore in February 1942 (Jeshurun, 1999: 233). The RMR’s fierce resistance against the Japanese has become folklore in Malaysia, but instructively is less well known in Singapore.

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 93 The SAF’s system of training and promotion based on the rapid elevation of the predominantly Chinese SAF scholar officers45 may have undermined the structural foundations and efficacy of the SAF in combat. Scholar officers make up a disproportionately higher percentage of senior officers, reaching the rank of major, lieutenant colonel or full colonel in only eight years. This process of fast-tracking, uncommon in other military establishments, has allowed operationally inexperienced scholar officers to be promoted ahead of the more experienced non-graduate regular officers (Walsh, 2007: 269–270). Yet Singapore’s senior military officers are also one of the most highly paid military officers in the world despite their lack of operational experience (da Cunha, 1999: 457). The fast-tracking of operationally inexperienced scholar officers has prompted Walsh to question the ability of such senior officers to lead in a conflict against battle-hardened troops (2007: 268). In geostrategic terms, there is a strong case to be made for terminating discriminatory policies against Malays in the SAF and promoting an ethnically representative military at the senior officer level. Stronger Malay representation, particularly at the senior levels, could assist in tempering regional perceptions that the discriminatory practices against Malays in the SAF is reflective of a Chinese dominated city-state that is distrustful of its neighbours. Regional resentment against the PAP government’s discriminatory policies was clearly highlighted in 1999 when Indonesian President B.J. Habibie accused the Singapore government of being racist, pointing to its discriminatory policies against Malays in the SAF. A substantial number of senior Malay officers would help promote cross-cultural sensitivity within the predominantly Chinese SAF senior officer corps (Walsh, 2007: 276). An ethnically diverse SAF officer corp could well strengthen domestic security needs and assist in the efficacy of Singapore’s regional peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (Walsh, 2007: 273). In many respects, the full integration of Malays into the SAF constitutes a barometer of Singapore’s genuine regional integration and status as a genuinely meritocratic and multiracial society.

Siege mentality states in collusion Singapore suffers from the reputation of being the Israel of Southeast Asia. Both are strongly driven by a fear and distrust of the national and regional ‘other’. Engulfed by this siege mentality, both states have relied on the US as their ‘great and powerful’ patron, built up a military arsenal that is second to none in the region and institutionalised a total defence strategy46 which discriminates against full Muslim participation in the military. Lacking in strategic depth due to their limited size, their military establishment is offensive in orientation and geared towards a preemptive strike against those assuming ‘threatening proportions’. This strategy is based on waging war in enemy territory. Like Israel, Singapore’s settler society has not strongly identified, in sociocultural terms, with the immediate region. Just as Israel is more strongly culturally enmeshed with Europe and the Western world, Singaporeans have been strongly encouraged to identify, in cultural terms, with Northeast Asians. Notwithstanding the realities of geography, these colonial settler societies do not see themselves as

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part of the region and exhibit an ‘in the region but not of the region’ mentality. Sharing similar worldviews and security concerns, the colonial settler societies of Singapore and Israel are not surprisingly ‘natural allies’ embedded in the US security umbrella. While Singapore’s very close relationship with the US may have caused some unease in KL and Jakarta, her close ties with Israel has generated considerable resentment particularly amongst Muslims in the region. Like Israel, Singapore’s technological and industrial sophistication, formidable military capacity and close ties with the United States have enabled it to assume a status beyond its restricted land area and population base. This status is underpinned by Israel’s proven and Singapore’s potential ability to inflict damage out of proportion to its size in a military conflict with neighbours. Singapore’s close relations with Israel can be profitably understood within the context of Singapore’s post-separation attempts to build a defence establishment. In particular, when India, Egypt and Switzerland declined Singapore’s request for assistance to build up its fledgling armed forces, Israel was forthcoming. This must have greatly pleased Lee Kuan Yew and Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee who were most impressed by Israel’s ability to overpower her larger Muslim neighbours in several wars. The parallel threat perceptions of both colonial settler societies has been acknowledged by former PAP Minister Othman Wok in the following way: ‘Israel was not a big country and was surrounded by hostile neighbours. We were in a similar position’ (2000: 205). By the end of 1965, an Israeli military delegation headed by General Ya’akov Elazari arrived in Singapore to model the SAF on the Israeli Defence Force.47 Just as Israeli military advisers and their families based in Singapore posed as Mexicans, Singaporean officials visiting Israel assumed a fictitious identity.48 Not surprisingly, Israel’s role in building up Singapore’s military establishment aroused regional suspicions. For example, in a meeting with Lee Kuan Yew in the early 1970s, Indonesian General Sumitro, Commander of the Internal Security Department, had apparently asked why the Singapore government had engaged Israeli military advisers and instructors. Recounting this meeting, Singapore’s former ambassador to Indonesia wrote, ‘He (Sumitro) feared that Singapore would develop similar policies to Israel’s in Southeast Asia’ (Lee Khoon Choy, 2005: 80). In line with the Israeli security model, the SAF has been transformed from a small force of regulars and volunteer reservists into a citizen force based on compulsory national conscription and reservist service (Huxley, 2000: 11). Selected senior military personnel have apparently been sent to Israel for training. Reminiscent of Israel’s policy of excluding Palestinians from ‘compulsory’ conscription, Singaporean Muslims were excluded from ‘compulsory’ military service for more than a decade. The Israeli stamp on the broader Singaporean polity was demonstrated by the appointment of Israeli advisers in the formative years of the National Trade Union Congress and the National Youth Training Institute.49 Indicative of their close strategic cooperation, most of Israel’s arms sales to Singapore are in the form of joint military ventures with Singapore financing much of Israel’s research and development and arms exports to it. Singapore has

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 95 purchased Israeli anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and until a few years ago, Singapore was the Israeli defence industry’s largest customer50 of arms and weapons systems.51 Both countries have cooperated in the development and manufacture of military hardware such as the Spike anti-tank missile.52 They have jointly developed surveillance and intelligence gathering satellites, with Israel providing the technology and Singapore the funds. Inter alia, this project will enable Singapore to develop its own space programme.53 Following the Israeli military model, Singapore has fused commercial and strategic concerns, with the setting up of Chartered Industries in 1967 and subsequent evolution into Singapore Technologies (Kwok, 1999: 58). Israel’s and Singapore’s cutting-edge arms industries have enabled both countries to maintain their military superiority over Muslim neighbours. Regional apprehensions towards Singapore’s intimate ties with Israel were evident when the Singapore government invited Israeli President Chaim Herzog to the republic in 1986. Weeks before the arrival of Herzog, Muslim organisations mobilised against the visit. Despite Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei’s deliberate refusal to establish diplomatic ties with Israel, Herzog’s visit to Singapore, without prior consultation with neighbouring countries, revealed the PAP leadership’s lack of diplomatic sensitivity. Regional tensions were aggravated further when the Filipino government, in a gesture of regional sensitivity, hastily cancelled Herzog’s visit to the Philippines (Nair, 1997: 229). When it was clear that the PAP government was intent on following through with Herzog’s visit despite regional pressure, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei registered their protest by recalling their heads of mission from the city-state during Herzog’s visit to Singapore in November 1986. Angered by the visit, Singapore was denounced as a ‘second Israel’ in the Malaysian Malay language dailies (Nair, 1997: 227). The virulent regional protests constituted the lowest point in Singapore’s relations with her neighbours since 1965 (Singh, 1999: 214). These protests were fuelled by regional perceptions that the Singaporean leadership valued its diplomatic relations and extensive military links with Israel over her neighbours. Reiterating these concerns, Malaysia’s Deputy Defence Minister Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan in 1999 urged the Singapore government to be more sensitive to Malaysia’s concerns about its military cooperation with Israel (Andrew Tan, 2004: 51). Relations with Israelis have shaped the city-state’s foreign policy orientation on Palestinian self-determination and the Middle East in general. Lee Kuan Yew has frankly acknowledged that when the 1967 Arab–Israeli war broke out, Singapore was keen to appease Israel. . . . we were relieved the Israelis were not defeated or our SAF would have lost confidence in their Israeli instructors. When the UN General Assembly was debating the resolution to condemn Israel . . . Keng Swee saw me to press Raja to direct our UN delegate not to vote in favour of the resolution or the Israeli’s would leave . . . We had to stand up for the right of small nations to exist . . . We abstained and the Israelis did not leave. (Lee, 2000: 43)

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This pro-Israeli outlook goes some way towards explaining the PAP’s disinterest in the plight of Palestinians and close ties with Zionist leaning neo-conservatives in Washington. In sharp contrast to the Singapore government’s intimate security and economic relations with Israel, the Malaysian government has been consistently critical of Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank and treatment of the Palestinians. Indeed, Malaysia’s trade with Israel was terminated with the passage of the 1977 Customs Prohibition Act. Parallels between the marginal status of Malays during the colonial era and the ongoing plight of the Palestinians have been drawn by Mahathir Mohamad, noting that Britain’s willingness to jeopardise the birthright of Malays in colonial Malaya were akin to its policies in Palestine (Leifer, 1988: 345). When Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981, Islam became a major component in Malaysia’s foreign policy.54 Mahathir fully supported the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and under his watch Malaysia attained the distinction of being the only Southeast Asian country to accord full diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Mahathir also raised the Palestinian question on every appropriate occasion at the UN (Saravanamuttu, 2004: 312). UN Resolutions 238 and 242, which called for withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, were strongly endorsed by Malaysia. It continues to lobby energetically in the UN for Israel to abide by UN resolutions, champion Palestinian self-determination and has contributed significant financial support and other forms of humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees. Broadening the discourse on terrorism to include state terrorism, Mahathir defined terrorism as an act of violence committed against civilians by both state and non-state actors. This definition of terrorism would require Western governments to condemn both Islamic suicide bombers as well as Israeli security forces targeting Palestinian civilians (Nesadurai, 2006: 190). A United Nations sponsored conference on the question of Palestine was held in Kuala Lumpur in the early 1980s (Saravanamuttu, 2004: 207–208). Malaysia’s standing within the Muslim World was elevated when it joined the Islamic Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1972 and hosted the fifth OIC Summit in KL in 1974 (Nair, 1997: 64). More recently, Malaysia has played a pivotal role in providing greater focus to the OIC through its chairmanship of the organisation. At the 2003 OIC Summit, in Malaysia’s administrative capital Putrajaya, sensitive issues such as the lack of development in Muslim societies and the extensive influence of the Israeli lobby in the West were openly discussed by Mahathir Mohamad.55

Realist realignments: from Whitehall to Washington During the merger years, the PAP leadership maintained close security ties with the West56 whilst appearing to be keen advocates of the non-aligned movement. Despite its janus-faced stance, it saw fit to chastise KL for not aligning more closely with the Afro-Asian camp, failing to establish relations with communist states, identifying with imperialist powers and supporting US involvement in the Vietnam

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 97 War (Fletcher, 1969: 68). This duplicitous stance was strongly driven by the Indonesian government’s success in excluding Malaya from the 1961 Belgrade Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and the 1964 Cairo Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. The PAP leadership believed that unless KL made greater efforts to counter Indonesia’s projection of Malaysia as a neo-colonialist creation, Malaysia would eventually be reduced to pariah status in the Afro-Asian community. In foreboding tones, Lee warned the Alliance leadership in the Malaysian parliament that ‘External Affairs are a matter of life and death. Isolation from the growing body of Afro-Asian opinion and identification with imperialist and colonialist nations must in the end mean death’ (Wilairat, 1975: 18). In keeping with its rhetoric during the merger years, a non-aligned foreign policy stance was briefly maintained following Singapore’s independence in 1965. For example, among the first to be informed of Singapore’s independence were non-aligned heavyweights such as Egypt’s Nasser, India’s Shastri and Cambodia’s Sihanouk. To defuse Afro-Asian suspicions about British military bases in Singapore, Lee made the outlandish assertion that when the British eventually terminated their defence commitment to Singapore, he would prefer the Russians rather than the US as a replacement (Wilairat, 1975: 40). The republic’s nonaligned credentials were bolstered when Lee claimed that the CIA had surreptitiously obtained classified information from a Singaporean intelligence official in 1965.57 Chan has suggested that the PAP leadership’s anti-American rhetoric, which included the threat of entering into a defence arrangement with the Soviets, was little more than a Machiavellian ploy to pressure the British to maintain their bases in the republic (Chan, 1971: 44). This calculated ruse was acknowledged by Lee in his memoirs in the following way: ‘The Russian move had given me a card to play. I hoped the Americans would encourage the Australians to remain in Singapore’ (Lee, 2000: 517). Despite its non-aligned rhetoric, the PAP leadership remained eager for the British to maintain Singapore as its regional military headquarters and preserve its bases in the city-state. Thus, when Whitehall announced its intention to withdraw East of Suez in 1967 and its bases from Singapore by 1971, the PAP leadership’s Afro-Asian rhetoric was swiftly discarded in recognition that the non-aligned rhetoric offered few economic benefits (George, 1974: 165). Henceforth, an unequivocal pro-Western and US stance was adopted (Wilairat, 1975: 42). With the imminent British withdrawal east of Suez, the PAP leadership enthusiastically courted and encouraged the US to maintain a visible security presence in East Asia in the belief that as a benign hegemon,58 it would contribute to the stability of the region. US bases in the Philippines were thought to have stymied Soviet military expansionism, contained Vietnamese aggression and checked the growth of regional powers such as China during the Cold War. Thus, during a visit to Washington in October 1967, Lee pledged full support of the US military offensive in Vietnam (Wilairat, 1975: 42). Impressed by Lee’s unabashed support for the unpopular military intervention in Vietnam, President Johnson described Lee as ‘a patriot, a brilliant political leader and statesman of the New Asia’ (George, 1974: 164).

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Courting Washington as a defence partner to ensure ‘overwhelming power on our side’,59 the Singapore government provided logistical assistance to US naval operations for its military intervention in Indochina. In mid-1966 Singapore was offered as a rest and recreation base for US troops. As anticipated, this pro-US stance reaped economic benefits (Chan, 1971: 45). Singapore exported manufactured weapons to Vietnam (George, 1974: 165) and served as a ship-repair base for the US Navy (Wilairat, 1975: 70). By the 1970s, the city-state was the third largest exporter to South Vietnam. At the same time, the US had also become Singapore’s main defence equipment supplier. Indicative of the city-state’s location firmly in the US security orbit, by 1978 the US Navy was provided with access to Tengah Air Base for long-range patrol flights over the Indian Ocean (Huxley, 2000: 208). This pro-Western security stance enhanced Singapore’s status as an attractive foreign investment site, crucial for the city-state’s rapid industrialisation. Singapore’s position as a regional manufacturing base for multinational corporations was also expected to strengthen the commitment of Western economic interests to its security (Wilairat, 1975: 45). The strategic and economic benefits associated with embedding Singapore within the US orbit was acknowledged by former Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam in the following way: ‘Though we want all powers to be present in Asia, we are closer to and feel safer with the Americans than with others. We make no bones about this . . . They can provide much more for our economic well-being . . .’ (Chan and Haq, 1987: 493). Importantly, the close security relationship with the US was strongly premised on the need to pre-empt neighbouring countries from taking advantage of the city-state’s vulnerability of being entirely surrounded by Malaysian and Indonesian territorial waters and having no access to the high seas other than through neighbouring waters (Huxley, 2000: 31). Belying this realist calculation Lee remarked in 1966 that ‘in the last resort it is power which decides what happens and, therefore, it behoves us to ensure that we always have overwhelming power on our side’ (Leifer, 2000: 5). The PAP leadership’s coveting of a ‘great and powerful’ patron has been reinforced by the periodic military assaults upon smaller states by larger neighbours. They include Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1975, Vietnam’s incursion into Cambodia in 1978 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In these military conflicts, the Singapore government consistently registered its disapproval at various multilateral forums. For instance, the 1976 UN General Assembly resolution condemning Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor was opposed by every regional ASEAN state except Singapore.60 Singapore was also actively engaged in the campaign to deny international recognition to the Vietnamese backed Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia in multilateral bodies such as the United Nations. The invasion of East Timor and Cambodia by larger neighbouring states strongly reinforced the PAP leadership’s belief that the regional balance of power should not be in the hands of regional states (Leifer, 2000: 83). An externally guaranteed regional balance of power would effectively stymie Malaysia and Indonesia from dominating the archipelago region. The preference for an externally guaranteed regional balance of power explains the PAP leadership’s initial lukewarm response towards earlier regional initiatives such as ASEAN in 1967 and ZOPFAN in 1971.

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 99 ZOPFAN’s non-aligned ideal was only accorded lip-service support by the PAP government. By contrast, the 1971 FPDA which ties Britain, Australia and New Zealand to the security of Singapore and Malaysia has been enthusiastically supported.61 Inter alia, the FPDA has provided a multilateral forum for Singaporean and Malaysian armed forces to exercise on a regular basis. The PAP leadership’s preference for an externally guaranteed regional balance of power also explains its lack of enthusiasm for ASEAN’s more recent shift towards a security community. The commitment to maintaining a US security presence in Southeast Asia was clearly demonstrated when it offered to host US military facilities following the expiration of their military bases in the Philippines in the late 1980s. The only other ASEAN state to closely subscribe to the Singaporean position of preferring an externally guaranteed balance of power in the region is Thailand. By contrast, Indonesia and Malaysia are inclined to support a regionally guaranteed balance of power managed by regional states (Emmerson, 1996: 70).

All the way with the USA Relations between the PAP leadership and the more hawkish Republican Presidents such as Reagan, Bush Senior and Bush Junior have been particularly close. In 1981, Reagan sought Lee Kuan Yew’s counsel about selling new generation aircraft to Taiwan. Lee was asked to convey a message to Chiang Kai Shek not to press the US for high-tech weapons at a time when US relations with China were sensitive. Again, in 1985, Lee was requested by Reagan to cajole Chiang into remaining in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) after Taiwan’s designation had changed to Taipei following the PRC’s admittance into the ADB (Lee, 2000: 528–533). Lee has also taken credit for playing a pivotal role in urging Reagan to terminate US support for Marcos when the latter had lost its legitimacy following the 1986 elections (Lee, 2000: 535). Relations with Bush Senior were also robust, with Lee apparently conveying messages on behalf of the White House to the PRC President Yang Shangkun (Lee, 2000: 540). In recognition of his consistent support of American security interests and rapport with the conservative Republican leadership, the Nixon Centre in 1996 awarded Lee the ‘Architect of the Next Century’ (Chan, 2005: 115). Rodan and Hewison purport that close relations with the neo-conservatives in the George W. Bush administration stems from their appreciation of ‘the role of certain authoritarian leaders in fighting a common enemy, as they did in the Cold War, but also their promotion of core values of social conservatism’ (Rodan and Hewison, 2006: 106). Reiterating the value of Singapore’s close relations with Washington, in 2005 the newly appointed Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong described the US as a decisive and benign influence in the region . . . Neither China nor India can perform this security role of the US in Asia for many years to come . . . Singapore has consistently supported a strong US presence in the region . . . We also support the war in Iraq . . . That is why we deployed ships, aircraft and

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In contrast to Republican administrations, relations with Democrat Presidents and liberal institutionalists in Washington, who accord greater weight to multilateralism and issues pertaining to democracy and human rights, have been more problematic.63 Yet, bilateral relations with Republican administrations have also periodically been strained when the PAP government’s authoritarian crackdowns directly impinge on the political sensitivities of Washington. For example, when the Singapore government expelled E. Mason Hendrikson, Political Counsellor from the US embassy, in May 1988 for supposedly interfering in ‘domestic politics’, because of his contacts with opposition politicians, the George H.W. Bush administration retorted that consultations with opposition leaders constituted normal diplomatic practice. In a stern warning, the State Department publicly called for the issue to be brought to a close or accept the consequences of permanent damage in bilateral relations (Deck, 1999: 260). Following this warning, the PAP government fell into line – there were obviously larger issues at stake. Singapore’s role in preserving Washington’s military presence in Southeast Asia led to the signing of a 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) allowing the US expanded use of facilities to service its military aircraft at Payar Lebar Airport and naval vessels at Sembawang Wharves. Initially established in 1969, the US Naval Office in Singapore, based at Clifford Pier, was expanded. The US Air Force also established the 497th Tactical Fighter Training Squadron at Singapore’s Payar Lebar Air Base to support visiting detachments (Huxley, 2000: 209). The relocation of the US Southeast Asian logistics base, vital for coordinating supplies to the US Seventh Fleet, to Singapore was facilitated by the signing of another MOU in 1992. Consistent with this upgraded security relationship, a small number of US officers were appointed to posts within the SAF in the early 1990s (Huxley, 2000: 210). By the late 1990s, US aircraft and warships were given access to the upgraded Changi Naval Base. In effect, Singapore had become the hub for a series of bilateral exercises between the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet and its Southeast Asian partners (Huxley, 2000: 210) and is an important link in the US security chain in East Asia – strongly premised on containing China. Huxley has observed that the increasingly intimate security relationship between Singapore and the US is tantamount to a quasi-alliance despite the absence of a mutual defence treaty obliging the US to defend Singapore (Huxley, 2000: 208). Singapore’s hosting of US military and naval forces without consulting her immediate neighbours generated considerable regional uneasiness, particularly since the 1990 MOU lacked transparency, due in part to its classified status.64 That the hosting of US facilities contradicts the ZOPFAN ideal of transforming Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality was of some concern to Singapore’s neighbours. Sensitive to this contradiction, Minister of State for Finance and Foreign Affairs George Yeo affirmed in October 1989 that ‘Singapore endorses the ASEAN consensus to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) over the long term. However, it also recognises that until this

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 101 is achieved, a continued US presence in Southeast Asia is desirable’.65 Reminding her neighbours that Singapore was not offering a military base to the US, Lee Kuan Yew stressed in October 1989 that the republic was only extending facilities.66 However, as the operational difference between facilities and bases has never been publicly defined, explained or debated, regional perceptions of Singapore hosting a de facto US base remain. So as not to be out-manoeuvred by Singapore’s close alliance with the US, the Malaysian and Indonesian government, have pragmatically extended limited facilities to the US military. From the 1990s, repair facilities were extended to US warships and warplanes at Lumut, near KL, and Surabaya in Indonesia. Soon, low-key arrangements for US warships and planes were made in other ASEAN states. Malaysia participates in annual bilateral military exercises with the US, code named Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), and has extended military jungle warfare training to the latter (Sothy, 2003: 380). In 1991, Malaysia announced its willingness to expand the range, visits and repairs for US warships and planes and for the first time acknowledged the existence of the hitherto secretive 1984 US–Malaysian Bilateral Training and Consultative Group (BITAC) (Emmerson, 1996: 76). Defence Minister Najib Abdul Razak has acknowledged that Malaysia was keen ‘to see a fair degree of American military presence in the region’ because of its ‘salutary countervailing effect’ (Emmerson, 1996: 77) in terms of China’s potential hegemony on regional security. Close intelligence and security cooperation with the US was demonstrated by Malaysia’s assistance in the capture of Kuwaiti Wali Khan Amin, allegedly involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The US has also extended military aid in the form of Foreign Military Sales Credits for defence purchases and the International Military Education Training programme (IMET) for Malaysia’s senior defence personnel (Sothy, 2003: 380). As a modern and rapidly industrialising Muslim dominated country, and thus a model for other Muslim countries, Malaysia is a valuable ally to Washington and an important player in the protracted ‘war on terror’ particularly in Southeast Asia. Malaysia’s soft power credentials are demonstrated by its robust Chairmanship of the OIC from 2003–2006, brokering role between Muslim separatists in Southern Philippines and the central government in Manila, and influence with Muslim secessionists in southern Thailand. In recognition of Malaysia’s soft power credentials, a counter-terrorism centre in KL is jointly facilitated by the American and Malaysian governments (Nesadurai, 2006: 192).

Uncritical support for the Iraq War Singapore’s reputation as Washington’s staunchest ally in Southeast Asia has been buttressed by its unreserved support for the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq which invoked radically divergent policy responses in Southeast Asia. Supporters of the US-led invasion include Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand while Malaysia and Indonesia have been more circumspect. In contrast to these disparate regional positions, Southeast Asian states were generally supportive of

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the UN endorsed Gulf War coalition formed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. As discussed earlier, the Singapore government’s accommodation of US security interests in Southeast Asia has been strongly driven by an acute insecurity complex. This insecurity has contributed to an almost obsessive compulsion in maintaining a formidable military capability that is not only second to none in the region, but also shielded by the US security umbrella. Perceived as a benign presence in the Asia-Pacific, Lee Kuan Yew has regaled the United States for being ‘. . . the most benign of all the great powers, certainly less heavy-handed than any emerging great power’ (Lee, 2000: 554). Guided by a realist worldview that interprets international politics as a ceaseless Darwinist competition between states for power, the patronage of a great powerful nation is believed to offer an optimum insurance policy for the city-state. Inter alia, the premium paid for this US security protection is an uncritical support of US military adventures.67 Moreover, Changi Naval Base has been particularly useful to Washington’s security interests, as it is the only military facility in Southeast Asia that can accommodate American aircraft carriers.68 Singaporean intelligence agencies have worked energetically with the US in procuring and disseminating intelligence on alleged regional militants and are thought to have rendered suspects for detention in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. Not surprisingly, the Singapore government’s uncritical support for the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and cooperation with the US in the ‘war on terror’ has been viewed with suspicion by some of its neighbours.

Supporting the fictitious case for invasion The hastiness with which the US-led invasion of Iraq was executed, even before the UN weapons inspection team had completed their investigations into the existence of Iraq’s WMD capability, coupled with the spurious Al Qaeda–Iraq link, invoked global suspicions about Washington’s underlying motives for the invasion. Speculations on the underlying motives include the promotion of US geostrategic interests and control of Iraq’s considerable oil reserves (Rubin, 2003: 48). Indeed, the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head El Baredie concluded in a report to the UN Security Council just before the invasion that: ‘We have to date found no evidence or plausible indications of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq’.69 These suspicions were stimulated further by the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report entitled ‘International Terrorism: War With Iraq’, released in February 2003. Inter alia, the report asserted that the threat of terrorism would be made worse by military action against Iraq due in no small measure to the lack of evidence in supporting the claim that Saddam Hussein planned to use chemical or biological weapons in terrorist attacks or planned to pass them to Al Qaeda.70 Others claim that the analysis by US intelligence agencies was skewed by political pressure and worst case analysis, and was strongly influenced by Iraqi exiles desperate for US intervention.71 In any event, Iraq’s attempts at complying with UN

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 103 Resolution 1441 from late 2002 by allowing UN inspectors unfettered access to suspected WMD sites, cooperation in destroying dozens of Al Samoud missiles, and allowing key scientists to be interviewed, had scarcely any effect in deterring Washington’s determination to go to war (Rubin, 2003: 52). This view has since been reiterated by the claims of former senior White House staffers, such as National Security advisor Dick Clarke, Press Secretary James McClelland and prominent investigative reporter Bob Woodward that President Bush, VicePresident Dick Cheney and other neo-conservatives were single-minded in their determination to invade Iraq after the twin tower attacks on September 11, 2001 (Woodward, 2004). Apparently within hours of the September 11, 2001 attack, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld was attempting to link Saddam Hussein with the attack. President Bush was also intent on linking Saddam Hussein’s regime with Al Qaeda when there was no credible evidence to support this view (Gore, 2007: 108). It has now become clear that virtually all the arguments the Bush administration assembled to justify the invasion of Iraq were based on falsehoods constructed by a campaign of mass deception. As Nobel Laureate and former American VicePresident Al Gore lamented: ‘We were told by the president that [war] was his last choice. But it is now clear that it was always his first preference’ (Gore, 2007: 104). The evidence that the invasion of Iraq was based on the Bush administration’s determination to control scarce oil resources in the Middle East is compelling. Washington, through its influence on post-Saddam Iraqi governments, will now be able to exert greater pressure on OPEC. By 2007, the US backed Iraqi government had enacted legislation giving US and British oil companies a dominant role in exploiting Iraq’s formerly nationalised oil reserves (Gore, 2007: 119). Mirroring the global civil society mobilisation against the invasion of Iraq, protest rallies in many Southeast Asian cities were as large as their counterparts around the world.72 In Kuala Lumpur, more than 150,000 Malaysians gathered at a February 2003 peace rally organised by UMNO youth and addressed by Prime Minister Mahathir.73 The Malaysian government saw the US-led invasion of Iraq as undermining key norms on sovereignty rights in international politics (Nesadurai, 2006: 190). Malaysian anti-war sentiments were matched by numerous rallies in Indonesia in the lead up to and after the illegal invasion of Iraq. In a March 2003 rally in Jakarta, more than 200,000 protestors, including senior politicians, gathered outside the US embassy.74 Speaker of Parliament Rais lambasted the US as a ‘ring leader of terrorists’ while Vice-President Hamzah Haq accused the US of possessing the world’s worst human rights record and being the ‘king of terrorists’. Reflecting the intensity of public anger against Iraq’s invasion, President Megawati felt compelled to condemn the invasion in the strongest of terms. On March 20, 2003 she affirmed that her government . . . strongly deplores the unilateral action taken by the Government of the United States of America and its allies, who have decided to go to war against Iraq . . . military force against Iraq based on a unilateral decision constitutes an act of aggression which is in contravention of international law.75

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Megawati’s stance reflected the apprehension of many Indonesians that the US-led invasion of Iraq would endanger the lives of Iraqi civilians, who had already suffered enormously under the more than decade old economic sanctions. Notwithstanding the Philippines government’s support for the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’, large protest rallies, often transformed into ‘prayer rallies’, were supported by various segments of Filipino society ranging from Church leaders, social activists, middle-class urbanites and concerned housewives. At a March 2003 ‘prayer rally’ attended by 50,000 in Manila, Cardinal Jaime Sin condemned the impending war for being illegal under the UN Charter and immoral under Christian principles. He urged President Arroyo to remain ‘a faithful daughter of the Church’ by declaring the Philippines neutral in the war on Iraq.76 Similarly antiwar protests were held in Thailand, with politicians such as Thai Senator Kraisak Choohaven expressing concern that the Thai government was drifting from its neutral foreign policy stance.77 While civil society in Jakarta, Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok was galvanised by major anti-war demonstrations, and several demonstrations held even in authoritarian China,78 Singapore was conspicuous for being one of the few countries in the world where the case for Iraq’s invasion was not publicly debated and anti-war rallies conspicuously absent. In Southeast Asia’s most affluent country but governed by an authoritarian state, four Muslim civil society organisations courageously issued a joint statement urging the PAP government to oppose the invasion or abstain from supporting any military attacks on Iraq.79 The PAP government’s characteristic intolerance of even peaceful anti-war sentiments was demonstrated when two Muslim women waving anti-war placards outside the US embassy on 15 February, 2003 were promptly detained and questioned by police.80 Four others who were supposedly carrying anti-war placards in a carrier bag were also detained. Embarrassed by the Singapore government’s draconian response to peaceful anti-war demonstrators, US Ambassador Franklin Lavin remarked, I don’t see why a group of people who want to stand in front of my Embassy and tell me they don’t agree with a policy of my country should not be able to do so. The right of peaceful expression of opinion is an important element of a successful society. (Rodan, 2004a: 494) It is worth noting that the PAP government’s uncritical support for the Iraq war runs counter to the anti-war position of the major opposition parties and a large majority of Singaporeans who, via various polls, registered their opposition to the invasion of Iraq.81 Many Singaporeans also believe that the city-state’s hosting of naval facilities to the US and support for the invasion of Iraq have undermined national security and rendered the city-state a terrorist target.82 Responding to domestic criticism of the PAP government’s support for the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the Foreign Minister’s Press Secretary Tan Lian Choo pronounced that

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 105 the government is not embarrassed by . . . the so called ‘glaring failure’ of the Americans to find WMD. We have taken a strong, principled and consistent position on Iraq based on Singapore’s national interests. Singaporeans cannot afford to strike postures fashionable with the oppositionist media in America and Britain at the expense of the security of Singaporeans . . . A small nation in terrorist infested Southeast Asia does not have this luxury of libertarian posturing.83 Tan’s exaggerated portrayal of Southeast Asia as being infested with terrorists served to aggravate further the city-state’s fragile relations with neighbouring Muslim countries. Chastising Tan for ‘indulging in wild exaggeration’ in claiming that Southeast Asia was infested with terrorists, opposition politician J.B. Jeyaretnam argued that the risk of global terrorism had only increased with the invasion of Iraq.84 The strong anti-Iraq war sentiment in the Asia-Pacific was clearly evident during President Bush’s Asia-Pacific tour in October 2003.85 In a closed-door discussion with Indonesian policy-makers and community and religious leaders in Bali, Bush was apparently criticised for using terms like ‘crusade’ in describing the US-led ‘war on terror’. He was also informed that the manner by which the war was waged had alienated Muslims.86 To placate Indonesian anger with the invasion of Iraq, the beleaguered President pledged to channel US$157 million to improve educational facilities in religious boarding schools in Indonesia.87 Bush’s Australian visit was similarly embarrassing particularly after he was heckled in parliament by Green Party Senators who questioned the right of the US to assume the status of the world’s sheriff.88 Recognising the anti-Iraq war sentiment of the Malaysian government and society, the White House was astute enough to bypass this important Muslim country during Bush’s AsiaPacific tour. Daily media images of violence and bloodshed in Palestine and Iraq, coupled with UN impotence in the face of US unilateralism, has accorded some weight to the postulations of militant Islamist groupings that there is no other route to defend the ummah (global Muslim community) other than through jihad (holy war). US disregard for the dictates of international law, as exemplified by the invasion of Iraq without UN approval and tacit support for Israel’s punitive actions against Palestinians have reinforced the jihadi sentiment. Capitalising on Muslim anger against the US-led invasion of Iraq in an attempt to enhance his jihadi credentials, convicted Bali bomber Amrozi pronounced in March 2003 that the US invasion of Iraq had vindicated his involvement in the Bali bombings.89 Ironically, the stature of radical Islamist cleric Abu Bakar Bashir has been boosted somewhat by the US-led occupation of Iraq. Upon his re-arrest on terrorism charges after serving an 18 month prison sentence in early May 2004, hundreds of Indonesians protested on the streets of Jakarta.

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Short-term benefits and long-term costs In solidarity with the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, Singapore not only provided the US military with access to its naval facilities but in July 2003 sent a team of 32 police officers to Baghdad ostensibly to train Iraqi police. After President Bush’s 1 October, 2003 stop-over in Singapore, the PAP government announced that Singapore would be sending 192 troops to Iraq on a two month mission to help re-build the country. Singapore has also committed itself to sending naval ships to perform logistical tasks such as replenishing the supplies of other naval vessels operating in the Persian Gulf, conducting patrols and helicopter missions and assisting coalition countries inspect ships leaving Iraq.90 The city-state’s status as the third largest oil trading centre in the world and the region’s oil trading hub suggests that it has an enormous stake in safeguarding oil supplies from the Middle East.91 Rewarding the Singaporean government for its support of Iraq’s invasion, the much coveted US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) was sealed in August 2003. Since the USSFTA came into force in January 2004, bilateral trade had increased by 12.6 per cent in 2006.92 With 1,300 US firms in Singapore, of which 330 have based their regional headquarters in the city-state, the FTA is expected to make the city-state even more attractive to US investment, particularly the sought after value-added investments.93 It is worth noting that Singapore is the second largest Asian investor in the US after Japan (Pang, 2007: 19). Appreciative of Singapore’s unflinching support since the Iraq invasion, the Bush administration announced that it would issue to Singapore radar-guided missiles for its F-16 fighter planes which were previously refused to Malaysia.94 A Strategic Framework Agreement on Security and Defence to expand cooperation in counter-terrorism, joint-military exercises and defence technology has been signed.95 Other tangible rewards for supporting the US in Iraq include the establishment of training facilities for the SAF in the US, delivery of state-of-the-art military hardware supplied only to the closest allies of the US and a Framework of Agreement (FOA), announced during President Bush’s visit to Singapore in October 2003. The FOA is expected to enhance defence and security ties between both nations by the network of multilateral joint military exercises, policy dialogues and exchanges of defence technology. A joint research facility to fight emerging infectious diseases and bio-terrorism threats named the Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention (REDI) Centre is to be established in Singapore. Despite the worsening security conditions in post-Saddam Iraq, the Singapore government sent military personnel, transport planes and support ships to Iraq without prior public debate on the propriety of this commitment. To be sure, the Singapore government’s unequivocal support for the US-led invasion of Iraq has placed greater strain on its relations with neighbouring Muslim countries, reinforcing perceptions of the city-state as a satellite of the United States. Lee Kuan Yew’s assertion in April 2004 that the US is the only country capable of combating terrorism96 was challenged by Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar. He

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 107 reminded the Singaporean government that it could not effectively overcome terrorism by relying strongly on the US and should instead concentrate on regional and international initiatives. Raising the spectre of Singapore’s seige mentality in a Muslim region, the Malaysian daily Berita Harian cautioned that, Singapore’s policy of over-dependence on the US in overcoming the issue of terrorism has raised suspicions and questions . . . concurring and cooperating with Israel in many areas, including military and developing intelligence gathering satellites, all Singapore’s actions raise suspicions. Its sincerity in establishing regional ties is also questioned.97 Regional perceptions of the PAP government as a satellite of the US were reinforced when Goh Chok Tong, during talks in Lisbon with Spanish leaders in December 2003, urged small countries to support the US-led occupation in Iraq.98 Taking issue with Goh’s statement, Malaysia’s ex-army intelligence chief Abdul Rashid Raja Badiozama argued that small countries should not send their troops to Iraq as this would only give the US legitimacy for its illegal invasion of Iraq despite the failure to find weapons of mass destruction.99 Singapore–Malaysia relations have been strained further by the Singapore leadership’s invitation to the United States to patrol the Straits of Malacca without even consulting Malaysia or Indonesia beforehand. This invitation was issued despite an agreement in the early 1990s between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia to participate in joint anti-piracy operations and maintain maritime safety in the Straits of Malacca (da Cunha, 2002: 142). The Indonesian and Malaysian governments were opposed to the US patrolling the Straits on the grounds that it would only make the region more susceptible to terrorist threats following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. Rebuking the Singaporean leadership over the issue in mid-May 2004, Hamid cautioned ‘If one kampong leader wants to impose his own view, that will be the end of ASEAN consensus . . . It is not for you to just invite a third country to protect the Straits’.100 The Singapore government’s fear of attacks by Al Qaeda and other regional militant groups101 against ships in the Straits of Malacca may be exaggerated. For example, the risk of a transiting ship being attacked was less than 0.1 per cent in 2003.102 Regional tensions were tempered somewhat by a new regional maritime security initiative, the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols Malacca Straits (MALSINDO), launched by the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean armed forces (Rodan and Hewison, 2006a: 112).

Soft power deficit and vulnerability in the war on terror Since late 2001, more than 30 Singaporeans have been detained under detention without trial laws and accused of being operatives for the militant regional JI network. Singaporeans have been fed with a steady diet of information by the mainstream press that these supposed JI detainees are guilty of the serious allegations against them, without the benefit of defending themselves in a court of law. Thus, when 15 suspected JI activists were arrested in December 2001 and accused of

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planning to bomb US linked targets in Singapore, most Singaporeans appear to have gone along with this unproven narrative. By contrast, the 1987 detention without trial of 22 alleged Marxists was met with considerable public scepticism. Some held vigils in churches, questioned the existence of the ISA and called for the detainees to be charged in an open court. These examples of public resistance were not replicated in the post-2001 ISA arrests.103 The few organisations that called for an open trial for the alleged JI operatives include the human rights body Think Centre and Muslim community organisation Fateha. Fateha came under severe government censure when its leadership asserted that the ISA detainees may have been motivated by the Singapore government’s close alignment with Washington and Israel104 and by the localised socio-economic and political grievances of the Singapore Malay community. This view has been supported by Sean Walsh who postulates that discrimination against Malays in the SAF has contributed to Malay perceptions of their second-class status, a reality which JI has exploited (Walsh, 2007: 274). The salience of localised Muslim grievances has been acknowledged by Workers’ Party MP, Low Thia Khiang, and somewhat surprisingly, PAP MP Shanmugan, in a 2003 parliamentary debate. Low stated that some Muslims felt discriminated against, their religion suppressed and that they were marginalised in society.105 Straits Times journalist Tan Tarn How has also contradicted the PAP leadership’s dismissal of localised socio-economic and political grievances in motivating the alleged JI detainees. He has pointed out that the Singaporean JI detainees were in reality more socially marginal than official statements suggest, as 19 of the 31 detainees possessed lower than O-level education. Tan asked, what needs to be done to redress the situation for the Malays if indeed they are being marginalised and discriminated against? The onus so far has largely been placed on Muslims . . . But if their spiritual fervour is an effect rather than a cause of their marginalisation, then surely society at large needs to change in tandem with the Muslims to improve their situation.106 Yet, Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan Seng has continued to deny the significance of localised Muslim socio-economic and political grievances in Singapore’s supposedly meritocratic society. Dismissing the gravity of Low, Shanmugan and Tan’s concerns, Wong pronounced that ‘the important thing is that in our society, if the person has a genuine problem, he has effective avenues for redress’.107 The PAP leadership’s denial of the significance of localised grievances, global Muslim resentment towards US foreign policy in the Middle East and the significance of socio-political factors motivating Islamic militants is consistent with other governments who have uncritically supported the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. These governments have encouraged their citizens to fear militants rather than understand the root causes driving Islamic militants. Inter alia, this focus on fear allows them to persist with security oriented approaches in the ‘war on terror’. It also serves to justify the passage of draconian legislation and deflect Washington’s human rights violations in Guantanamo Bay and Iraq. In effect, the lack of serious

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 109 analysis of the root causes of terrorism disentangles the position of Western governments in supporting Islamic militants such as Osama bin Laden to repel the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s and deflects the significance of national policies in fuelling the rise of Islamic radicalism. Carmen Lawrence aptly observes that When people are made to feel threatened, they tend to simplify, and in this reduced psychological state, they regress, splitting the world into binaries; safe and threatening, good and evil, life and death . . . Partitioning the world into two contending apocalyptic forces adds nothing to our capacity to respond effectively to terrorism . . . We are encouraged to believe that we are confronting dark forces whose motivation is beyond understanding. (Lawrence, 2006: 96) The disastrous US-led invasion of Iraq and failure to stall the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan suggests that the ‘war on terror’ cannot be won principally by relying on hard power. This approach is akin to ‘trying to eliminate a cloud of mosquitoes with a machine gun’ (Lawrence, 2006: 80). Until early 2008, the PAP government had been relatively effective in projecting Singapore’s image as Washington’s most effective Southeast Asian security partner in the ‘war on terror’, with Lee Kuan Yew even accusing the Indonesian government of being lacklustre in its efforts to detain radical clerics and JI activists in the period leading up to and following the 2003 Bali bombings. However, this image suffered a major blow following the escape of alleged JI operative Mas Selamat Kastari from the high security Whitley Detention Centre in February 27, 2008. But how did Mas Selamat escape from a facility guarded by Nepalese Gurkha guards, enclosed by high fences and barbed wire and monitored by closed-circuit television surveillance cameras around its perimeter? Mas Selamat’s daring escape suggests that security in the high-tech detention centre and the wider authoritarian city-state may not be as efficiently managed as commonly believed. The failure to capture Mas Selamat despite unleashing the largest manhunt in Singapore’s history and massive rewards for information leading to his capture suggests that the PAP government has failed to purge the local militant Islamist network. This failure is all the more surprising in view of the existence of draconian detention without trial laws, passage of new security laws, extensive security apparatus, state-of-the-art intelligence technology and public surveillance in the authoritarian state. Since the ‘war on terror’, new agencies such as the Homefront Security Office and the Joint Counter Terrorism Centre have been established ostensibly to improve inter-agency coordination (Rodan and Hewison, 2006a: 111). Mas Selamat’s relatively easy escape from a toilet window has exposed gaping holes not only in the extensive web of state security agencies, but also flaws in its soft power intelligence capability. Can these flaws be attributed to an over-reliance on hard power, such as draconian laws, and a secretive intelligence and security apparatus that is distrusted and feared by the citizenry? Have the intelligence and security agencies in the authoritarian state been so politicised that their ability to engage in independent national security, as

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distinct from regime security, assessments been compromised? Would a better understanding of the JI network have been attained if Mas Selamat and other JI detainees had been tried in an open court rather than subjected to the routine of interrogation and associated mental and physical torture as a means of extracting information? Have draconian crackdowns under the ISA and incarceration of alleged JI operatives only driven other local Islamic militants into ‘hibernation’ but likely to re-surface, particularly if localised grievances are not seriously addressed? Importantly, Mas Selamat’s escape appears to have jolted the Singaporean public out of its slumber, particularly in relation to the security policies of the PAP government. The escape has precipitated some public discussion on the security approaches of the authoritarian state, its support of the US-led invasion and disastrous occupation of Iraq, hosting of US facilities in the city-state and covert military ties with Israel as rendering Singapore a target of Islamic militants in the ‘war on terror’. The naming of Singapore as an Al Qaeda target by captured Al Qaeda operative Khalid Sheikh Mohamed108 has raised questions about the propriety of the PAP government’s security paradigm reliant on an uncritical support for the military adventures of its ‘great and powerful’ patron.

Conclusion The PAP government’s security paradigm has been driven strongly by fear – of communists during the Cold War, communalists in the 1960s and 1970s, radical Islamists in the ‘war on terror’ and a pervasive fear of the national and regional ‘other’. This security paradigm has allowed the PAP government to construct a national identity based on a distrust of Singapore and regional Malays, maintain a military expenditure that is unrivalled in Southeast Asia and preserve draconian legislation that has buttressed the apparatus of the authoritarian state. In this security paradigm, human security considerations, such as ‘freedom from fear’ have been sidelined by the existence of draconian laws which deprive citizens of basic political and civil rights. Ironically, Singapore’s combat preparedness, formidable military arsenal, determination to maintain its military edge over her neighbours and intimate security ties with Washington and Israel have had the effect of enhancing regional insecurities, contributed to a regional arms race and exacerbated the city-state’s regional outsider status. This security approach is not in Singapore’s long-term interest particularly when its military (hard power) edge over its neighbours diminishes. The PAP’s security paradigm based on perpetuating a culture of fear has been instrumental in forging close security relations with the US. However, many Singaporeans are increasingly aware that the hosting of US naval facilities and support for the invasion of Iraq have undermined national security and rendered the city-state more vulnerable to terrorist attack. Moreover, relations with neighbouring Muslim countries have been undermined by regional perceptions of the city-state as an uncritical ally of Washington. Singapore’s close security relations with Washington could also undermine future ties with China in the event of

The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 111 a deterioration in Sino-US relations. Indeed, the old security paradigm based on a ‘great and powerful’ patron may no longer be relevant in the post-Cold War era characterised by a proliferation of non-traditional security threats. Despite these pressures, the PAP government continued to support the Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East. Lee Kuan Yew has urged President Bush and senior White House officials in October 2006 to ‘stay the course’ in Iraq – supposedly to stabilise the country and transform the Middle East. Yet, would Lee allow Washington to similarly transform the political landscape in Singapore? Invoking the other disastrous US military adventure in Vietnam which resulted in the deaths of millions of Vietnamese and US soldiers and civilians, Lee has maintained that the Vietnam War had brought ‘collateral benefits’ to Asia as it supposedly ‘created the conditions that enabled non-Communist East Asia to follow Japan’s path and develop into the four dragons, followed by the four tigers’.109 The PAP leadership’s apparent difficulty in heeding the lessons of Washington’s failed adventure in Vietnam and disastrous invasion of Iraq highlights the need for a new security paradigm. This new paradigm would require greater incorporation of human security considerations and cognisance of the silences, exclusions and blind-spots of the traditional security paradigm premised on a reliance on hard power. The quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan and failures in the ‘war on terror’ highlight the need for an alternative security paradigm based on connecting ‘our’ security to the security of ‘others’. Narrow perspectives of the national interest, as determined by the values and interests of political elites, have contributed to an insecure regional and global environment. These narrow conceptions of national security and sovereignty fail to seriously consider the importance of ethical engagement which transcends state boundaries (Burke, 2001: xiv). Normative ideals of justice, diversity, sustainable development, the demilitarisation of security and democratising security policy processes are in keeping with a more holistic vision of security. This alternative and holistic vision of security requires the exploration and interrogation of important aspects of national identity. For colonial settler societies, it involves reappraising who we think we are, rethinking the place of the indigenous community in the national imagination, reinterpreting the history of colonialism and nationalism and understanding the historical and political dynamics fuelling fears of the national and regional ‘other’. It also requires the coming to terms with the geopolitics of location in shaping national identity.

5

The politics of economic competition and cooperation

Kiasu1 and ‘catch-up’ mindsets Far from easing tensions between the PAP and UMNO leadership, Singapore’s separation from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965 heralded a reconfigured set of tensions and misunderstandings. Having blamed the other for the splintering of the Federation, PAP and UMNO politicians were determined to prove the superiority of their respective nation-building paradigms. This reciprocal balas dendam mindset appears to be an enduring feature in Singapore–Malaysia relations, most prominently highlighted during the Mahathir administration (1981–2004)2 and in the public pronouncements of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew. As discussed in Chapter 3, Malaysia’s balas dendam mindset stems from an ethno-nationalist belief of having been dispossessed in their ‘home’ (di-rampas segalanya di-rumah sendiri) by the British and immigrant communities (Baharuddin, 1997: 245). British neglect of Malaya’s industrial development whilst Singapore thrived as a regional entrepot, reinforced this defensive Malay ethno-nationalist sentiment. Following the 1969 race riots and the New Economic Policy, this sentiment was strongly geared towards rectifying (merampas kembali) the economic dominance of foreign investors and immigrants. Particularly for the ‘Young Turks’ in UMNO in the 1970s, the importance of developing Malaysia’s industrial modernisation to equal and eventually supercede the predominantly Chinese island of Singapore aligns with the NEP objective of narrowing Malaysia’s ethnic economic disparity. The Malaysian leadership’s preoccupation with sidestepping Singapore’s entrepot services was clearly apparent in Mahathir Mohamad’s seminal work The Malay Dilemma, published in the early 1970s. Attributing Singapore’s economic growth to its strategic location and entrepot function, Mahathir wrote, The growth and importance of Singapore has been due in part to its strategic position . . . It is at the intersection of the sea routes to the East and the West, the South and North . . . the dominant geographical location of Singapore will not remain for long so far as Malayasia is concerned. Thus, use of Singapore as a Malaysian port will depend then not on geographical factors, but on policy. (Mohamad, 1970: 183)3

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 113 Singapore’s historical function as an entrepot has long been resented by her neighbours who are inclined to view the island as parasitically profiting from the movement of goods in the region. During the colonial period, the island served as an entrepot for primary commodities such as tin, rubber and petroleum. As the regional entrepot trade grew, regional financial institutions and other commercial operations were established in Singapore. In the post-colonial era, Singapore continued to serve as an entrepot for ports such as Penang and Klang in Malaysia and Medan and Surabaya in Indonesia (Regnier, 1990: 43). Singapore’s re-export of Malaysian products had prompted a Malaysian Finance Minister in Tunku Abdul Rahman’s administration to dismiss Singapore as little more than a ‘relic of the colonial past’ (Lee, 2000: 268). Since the 1970s, the Malaysian and Thai governments have explored the possibility of cutting a canal and building oil pipelines through the narrow landmass that separates the northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca from the South China Sea. If pursued, this proposal would undermine the services of established regional ports such as Singapore.4 In 1971, the Malaysian government prohibited imports from the PRC which had passed through Singapore (Regnier, 1990: 151) and in the following year announced that only goods shipped in from Malaysian ports could qualify for exemption from import tax. From 1977, the government ruled that exports from Johor to East Malaysia were to be shipped from Pasir Gudang port rather than Singapore (Lee, 2000: 273). The preoccupation with reducing Malaysia’s dependence on Singapore as a re-export centre for Malaysian goods was accorded greater attention when Mahathir became Prime Minister in 1981. By 1984, a levy was imposed on cargo trucks to Singapore in order to increase cargo shipment through Port Klang. The Malaysian government also reduced its import duty on numerous foodstuffs provided they were imported directly from the country of origin into Malaysia (Lee, 2000: 279). Ambitious initiatives were also adopted to challenge Singapore’s long-standing status as the region’s financial hub. By 1990, an International Offshore Financial Centre (IOFC) was established in Sabah for foreign banks that were granted offshore banking licences by the central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia. Plans were also devised to establish an International Stock Exchange and Monetary Exchange in Labuan and to use the IOFC to provide expertise in Islamic offshore financial products. The KL Options and Futures Exchange and the Malaysian Monetary Exchange were operational in the mid-1990s. Additionally, the Employees Provident Fund, the country’s largest superannuation fund, was allowed greater scope to participate in the capital market. The KL Stock Exchange’s operations were also liberalised with a view to expanding the securities industry (Khoo, 2003: 41). By the late 1980s, Mahathir’s and the UMNO leadership’s preoccupation with counteracting the economic advances of Malaysian Chinese and the predominantly Chinese neighouring state Singapore had been overshadowed somewhat by a preoccupation with challenging Western economic dominance. In contrast to many Third World elites succumbing to the dictates of the neo-liberal economic agenda, Mahathir acquired a formidable reputation for his iconoclastic views

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(Saravanamuttu, 2004: 307). In championing the rights and aspirations of developing economies, he fearlessly criticised industrialised economies for subjecting the Third World to economic bullying and manipulation (Khoo, 1995: 59). Advocating a more equitable international economic order in a speech to the 41st UN General Assembly in 1988, Mahathir remarked, . . . 15 years after the call for the New International Economic Order was made, we continue to find ourselves enmeshed inextricably in external debts, frustrated by extensive and growing protectionism, bedevilled by fluctuations of commodity prices in favour of the developed countries of the North, and tossed about by volatile interest and exchange rates. (Liow, 2001: 145) Mahathir had actively championed the interests of the Third World via platforms such as the G-15 group of developing countries, which he helped to establish. Formed in 1989, the G-15 is strongly geared towards promoting South–South cooperation and improving the terms of trade between developed and developing economies. Mahathir was also instrumental in establishing the South–South Commission (SSC) in the mid-1980s. Additionally, the South Investment Trade and Technology Data Exchange Centre (SITTDEC) was established to provide advice to small and medium sized industries from developing economies with Malaysia contributing 50 per cent of its operating costs during its first three years (Nossal and Stubbs, 1997: 152). In line with Mahathir’s commitment to promote South–South economic ties, Malaysian companies were given incentives to invest in African countries, Latin America and Central Asia. Even in his last months as Prime Minister, Mahathir continued to issue statements which reinforced his status as a champion of developing economies. Urging industrialised countries to assist industrialising economies at the Kuala Lumpur World Peace Conference in August 2003, Mahathir suggested that the former pay special levies to reduce global poverty and combat terrorism. At the conference, he repeated his appeal for democratic reforms within the United Nations.5 In exposing the contradictions inherent in the neo-liberal globalisation agenda, Mahathir noted at the 2001 Emirates International Forum in Dubai that the Western vision of globalisation selectively encouraged capital but not labour to move without borders.6 Concerned with the challenges wrought by economic globalisation, Mahathir’s economic nationalist project took on a Pan-East Asian orientation with the proposed formation of the visionary EAEG in the late 1980s (Saravanamuttu, 2004: 309). Washington’s objection to the EAEG only reinforced Mahathir’s commitment to ‘Look East’. It is worth noting at this juncture that the ASEAN Plus Three grouping is in effect Mahathir’s EAEG in a different guise. Like many other city-states constrained by a lack of natural resources and limited population base, Singapore’s globalised economy is strongly trade dependent. Not surprisingly, the city state has remained an ardent advocate of free trade and positioned itself as a key node in the regional and global economy. This positioning has allowed Singapore to remain valuable to the West as a commercial centre and

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 115 strategic asset. Acknowledging the deliberate intermeshing of Singapore’s economic and security concerns, S. Rajaratnam noted in 1966 that, ‘We are valuable in war as a strategic asset. We are valuable in peace as a great commercial centre’ (Deck, 1999: 248). Owing to the intermeshing of these economic and security imperatives, Singapore’s economic interests have been more tightly aligned to the industrialised West than the industrialising countries in Southeast Asia. As such, alliance building with less developed regional economies remains relatively shallow and primarily driven by Singapore’s economic interests. Thus, despite its status as an industrialised economy with significant national reserves, Singapore’s Official Development Assistance and Cooperation (ODAC) with less developed economies remains relatively weak and centred on technical and non-financial assistance. The city-state’s ODAC per GDP ratio is 0.0001 per cent, lower than either South Korea or Taiwan (Dent, 2002a: 88–94). Its educational scholarship schemes to students from less developed economies has drawn criticism for creaming ‘talent’ by allowing scholarship students to apply for residency status upon the completion of their studies. Additionally, the Singapore government has been criticised for not offering more financial aid commensurate with its financial capacity. In sharp contrast to its hard power capacity, Singapore’s soft power credentials in Southeast Asia and the Third World remain relatively tenuous. This chapter examines the relationship between bilateral economic and diplomatic tensions and the increasingly competitive nature of the neighbouring Singapore and Malaysian economies – particularly as they each move up the industrial and technological ladder. These tensions have been exacerbated by the strong economic and ethno-nationalist sentiments of Malaysian policy elites intent on narrowing the economic gap with Singapore. A closer examination of the diplomatic fallout arising from their increasingly competitive economies is undertaken by analysing the promotion of knowledge intensive industries, disagreements over the price of raw water that Johor supplies to Singapore and the proposed IDR project in Johor. A comparative study of the Singapore and Malaysian hybrid developmental states and their divergent responses to the 1997 regional financial crisis and approaches to the neo-liberal agenda is undertaken. The chapter will then consider the long-term prospects of strengthening bilateral relations.

Southeast Asia’s hybrid developmental states Inspired by the economic nationalist strategies of the Northeast Asian developmental states, by the mid-1980s Mahathir launched a ‘Look East’ policy, enjoining Malaysians to turn East rather than West for technology, investment, trade and ideas. Malaysia’s promotion of heavy industries was modelled on the strategic targeting policies of the Japanese and South Korean developmental states. The ‘Look East’ initiative is reflective of an economic nationalist vision of transforming Malaysia into a Newly Industrialising Economy (NIE) (Sundaram, 1990: 21). As Khoo notes, ‘Conceptually, Mahathir’s development program can be regarded as a nationalist project driven by capitalist impulses or a capitalist project imbued with

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nationalist aspirations’ (2003: 5). Importantly, the interventionist orientation of the Northeast Asian developmental state model complements UMNO’s aim of promoting a dynamic bumiputera commercial and industrial community, advancing the redistributive policy agenda of the New Economic Policy and achieving industrialised status. Just as the nascent Japanese developmental state had ‘picked winners’ that eventually evolved into zaibatsus and then keiretsus (industrial groupings), Mahathir distributed rents to indigenous businesses thought capable of generating wealth and eventually becoming internationally competitive. However, many of those ‘picked winners’ were close associates of UMNO politicians, such as then Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin, and were largely engaged in services and non-tradeable speculative business activities that were badly affected by the late 1990s regional crisis. Gomez believes that these well-connected rentiers were not rigorously disciplined as the manufacturing sector continues to be strongly driven by foreign capital and small to medium scale enterprises that are predominantly Chinese owned (Gomez, 2002: 10). It is also worth noting that many of the leading Chinese and Indian business conglomerates that emerged since the 1980s were closely linked to senior Malay politicians (Gomez, 2002: 83–96). Suffice to say, the 1997 regional economic crisis exposed the inherent weaknesses associated with Malaysia’s hybrid developmental state trajectory. In Southeast Asia, Singapore and Malaysia come closest to resembling the Northeast Asian developmental states, where the state has played a pivotal role in facilitating industrial and technological upgrading. Pilot agencies such as Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB), the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) and the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) have nurtured the growth of targeted industries deemed critical for industrial mobility. While the EDB helped finance Jurong Shipyard, the Ministry of Finance held sizeable stakes in Singapore Airlines, Singapore Technologies and Temasek Holdings. Similarly, Malaysia’s HICOM was tasked with coordinating the development of heavy industries from the mid-1980s. Unlike the other Northeast Asian developmental states, the Singaporean state did not initially nurture the international competitiveness of local private enterprises. Instead, the Singaporean state favoured the promotion of efficient state-owned and controlled enterprises and MNCs as the major locomotive for industrial growth. MNCs appeared content to have state enterprises as reliable corporate partners (Low, 2001: 419). Many Malaysian state enterprises have not been as efficiently managed with a high 50 per cent in the red in the 1980s (Khoo, 2003: 189). Moreover, privatisation of these state enterprises to politically connected businesses was generally conducted in a non-transparent manner. As noted earlier, many of these businesses operated not in internationally competitive industries which rely on technological innovation but in primary commodity production, resource-based industries, banking, construction, property and real estate, gaming, tourism, transport, utilities and services and selected import-substituting industries (Khoo, 2003: 43). Relying strongly on state protection and patronage, many of these businesses did not evolve into enterprising keiretsus but remained rentier capitalists.

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 117 Just as the promotion of Malay entrepreneurs and conglomerates was a deliberate strategy of the UMNO leadership to shore up its political base after the 1969 riots, the PAP government’s initial neglect of local private capital was driven strongly by political considerations. As some prominent Chinese entrepreneurs such as Tan Lark Sye supported left-wing nationalists from the opposition Barisan Nasionalis in the early 1960s, the predominantly English educated PAP leadership was distrustful of their political intentions.7 As such, the government did not develop an ideology that gave pride of place to local firms or look to the local private sector as a central object of policy or patronage (Haggard and Low, 2002: 310). Closer relations with local private capital were only fostered in a systematic manner after the mid-1980s recession. At any rate, state investment agencies such as Temasek Holdings continue to dominate the economy with the latter controlling stakes in seven out of 10 of Singapore’s largest companies. State enterprises, statutory boards and GLCs account for 60 per cent of the economy while MNCs control 80 per cent of manufacturing (Tan, 2003: 31). The absence of a robust and independent local private sector has left unchallenged the PAP’s economic governance paradigm. It is also generally acknowledged that the entrepreneurial spirit is much stronger in Hong Kong and Taiwan where the state’s grip on the economy is not as penetrating.8 It is worth noting that GLCs have provided opportunities for the political and bureaucratic elite and others connected to the PAP leadership to advance their careers and entrench bases of power. Lee Hsien Yang, son of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew and brother of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, was appointed head of Singtel in 1995 after joining the organisation only a year earlier – fanning allegations of nepotism and politicisation of GLCs. Lee Hsien Loong’s wife, Ho Ching, headed Singapore Technologies and was Temasek Holdings CEO for two years after Temasek’s financially disastrous and legally questionable Shin Corp purchase in 2006. The politicisation of GLCs has prompted Haggard and Low to enquire ‘Has Singapore come to have its own “GLC problem”, a kind of “political business” within the state sector itself?’ (2002: 317). Robison et al. assert that GLCs are central to the maintenance of power relations in the PAP authoritarian developmental state (2005: 179). The failed regional merger and acquisition bids by Singaporean GLCs, particularly in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand, underscores its ‘image problem’ (Rahim, 2001b: 207–232). Temasek’s disastrous takeover of Thailand’s Shin Corp and its legal challenges in Indonesia indicate that regional governments and civil society actors remain apprehensive about the control of strategic national assets by non-transparent GLCs under the direct or indirect control of Singapore’s authoritarian government. Mirroring the Australian public’s disquiet over Singtel’s acquisition of Optus in 2001, there appeared to be some unhappiness over Singapore Power’s 2007 bid for the power and gas distribution assets of Perth-based Alinta. Ironically, the success of this bid would mean that Singaporean state entities and GLCs own more commercial assets in Australia than the Australian Federal government. In highlighting this irony, Philip Bowring observed,

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The politics of economic competition and cooperation Needless to say, no Australian company, let alone a government-run one, would likely be permitted to take control of similar Singaporean assets. While Temasek is selling some local assets, no one doubts the determination of the state to control the commanding heights of the Singapore domestic economy.9

Questioning the propriety of the Singaporean acquisitions, prominent Australian columnist Stephen Mayne is of the view that Australians feel ‘uneasy about this phenomenon, especially given the secretive, autocratic and undemocratic tendencies of the Singapore government’.10 Whilst mirroring significant aspects of the Northeast Asian developmental states, Singapore’s development model is also strongly eclectic, pragmatically borrowing from the experiences of other small but successful resource poor states. Acknowledging the eclectic nature of Singapore’s economic trajectory, Lee Kuan Yew opined, ‘we borrowed in an eclectic fashion, elements of what Hong Kong was doing, what Switzerland was doing and what Israel was doing, and we improvised’ (Huff, 1994: 40). This pragmatism is exemplified by the shift from a strong reliance on manufacturing to the nurturing of sophisticated knowledge industries and services. In his National Day address in August 2007, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong declared, ‘Within a decade, our city and our whole country will be completely transformed. The world is taking notice. It will be a new Singapore, but with our own unique identity, and the can-do spirit of the Lion City’.11 Notwithstanding these policy shifts, it is worth noting Rodan’s prescient reminder that this shift is representative of the Singaporean state venturing into ‘a new phase of state capitalism rather than retreating from it’ (2006b: 138). Thus, even though the Singaporean developmental state has openly embraced aspects of globalisation and economic liberalism, re-regulation rather than deregulation has prevailed. As such, the state continues to play a pivotal role in the construction of markets and the engagement with globalisation, with the interests of the PAP strongly tied to the stable of state enterprises and GLCs. While the Northeast Asian developmental states of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have liberalised their political systems, Singapore has remained an authoritarian one-party dominant state since independence. Not surprisingly, the Singaporean model of economic liberalisation, without substantial political liberalisation, is appealing to rapidly industrialising, but authoritarian states such as Vietnam and China whose political legitimacy is strongly performance based. Thailand, under the disgraced former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was keen on emulating the Singapore political model. To promote Singapore’s model of authoritarian ‘good governance’ to other industrialising states, the Economic Development Bank has set up a consulting body (Schein, 1996: 1). Jurong Town Corporation’s subsidiary Ascendas has been busy building industrial parks in China, India and Vietnam while other state agencies are engaged in exporting expertise to build or upgrade new ports, airports and housing estates in China, India, the Middle East and Central America.12 Former Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee was commissioned as a consultant for the coastal regions of China and appointed to various advisory positions in the 1980s (Kwok, 1999: 49). The

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 119 Vietnamese government appointed Lee Kuan Yew as an economic and political adviser in the 1990s. In 1996, Temasek Holdings established an Industrial Park in Vietnam. Temasek’s investments in China are estimated at US$4.6 billion in 2006. It has a 5 per cent stake in the Bank of China, 5 per cent stake in Shanghai’s China Minsheng Banking Corp and a 5.1 per cent stake in the China Construction Bank.13 Singaporean state agencies and private companies are currently engaged in developing education, food and lifestyle services, healthcare, infrastructure, environmental and other modern services in Szechuan Province, purportedly China’s next growth engine.14 The Chinese and Vietnamese governments have apparently expressed keen interest in studying the Singapore government’s policing of the internet (Rodan, 1998).

Economic challenge and response: 1990s By the mid-1990s, KL’s attempts to circumvent Singapore’s services were accorded greater structural and institutional depth by the Wawasan (Vision) 2020 strategy of catapulting Malaysia to fully industrialised status by 2020. Wawasan 2020 is also integral to the nationalist ‘Malaysia Boleh’ (Malaysia Can-Do) slogan of enjoining Malaysians to step-up to the country’s major economic challenges and by doing so enable Malaysia to play an influential role in the international arena. To achieve the ambitious goal of industrial leapfrogging, the country’s technological and industrial base was systematically upgraded by modernising its seaports, airports, educational infrastructure, transport networks and promoting the production of higher valueadded manufactured goods, information technology and financial services.15 Wawasan 2020’s objective of industrial catch-up has generated tensions with neighbouring Singapore – ahead in the industrial and technological ladder yet fiercely committed to maintaining its competitive edge. In his last budget speech in September 2003, Mahathir accused the Singaporean government of being unwilling to adopt a prosper-thy-neighbour policy owing to its determination to stay ahead in the economic race.16 These allegations gained currency when Lee Kuan Yew pronounced at the Global Entrepolis Forum in October 2004 that the city-state intended to maintain its advanced position, even though it was ‘10 to 20 years ahead’ of neighbouring countries. This was to be achieved by a range of measures centred on maintaining Singapore’s quality of human resources.17 Belying his characteristic superciliousness, Lee pronounced, ‘You can build infrastructure, but you can’t change the quality of the people quickly’. Pointing to English language proficiency as a major leverage Singapore enjoys over its neighbours, Lee quipped that by contrast, Malaysian schools were only just ‘going back to English’.18 The PAP leadership’s determination to preserve the city-state’s technological and industrial edge over her larger and resource rich neighbours can be attributed to a kiasu mindset that is underpinned by paranoid governance. For example, in a parliamentary address in April 2007, the younger Lee acknowledged: We are tiny, multiracial, multireligious, one little red dot out of so many little dots, in the middle of Southeast Asia, we lack land, airspace, sea space, water,

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The politics of economic competition and cooperation sometimes we also run short of sand and granite, operating in a fast changing, competitive global environment against very powerful competitors. So in this situation, what is our model? Our model is paranoid government – a government which worries all the time, which plays a crucial role in this system, is proactive, looks ahead over the horizon. Whenever people tell you not to worry, you start getting concerned.19

This distant horizon paranoia had been reinforced by the determination of the Abdullah Badawi administration to promote Malaysia as a complimentary and competitive trade and investment site to Singapore. In particular, the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–2010) seeks to upgrade human and physical infrastructure required for a knowledge economy. In short, the contending catch-up and kiasu mindsets have prevailed.

1997 regional economic crisis: tensions unravel The 1997 regional economic crisis precipitated a downward spiral in economic and diplomatic relations amidst Malaysian allegations against Singapore of economic opportunism and adopting beggar-thy-neighbour policies. These allegations were fuelled by the exodus of Malaysian currency (Ringgit) to Singapore. Within months of the initial financial crisis in mid-1997, approximately RM20 billion was transferred by Malaysians to banks and finance companies in Singapore offering higher interest rates.20 KL alleged that the depreciating Ringgit was undermined further by the existence in Singapore of the offshore Ringgit and Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) markets which enabled the trading in Malaysian shares from Singapore. According to the Malaysian daily Utusan Melayu, CLOB constituted sufficient proof that the Singapore government, by ‘allowing illicit transactions of shares in its backyard, wanted to squeeze maximum benefit from an illegal activity’.21 The imposition of capital controls by the Malaysian government in September 1998 effectively terminated CLOB’s trading of Malaysian shares in Singapore. Bilateral relations deteriorated further when the Malaysian government, financially strapped by the crisis, attempted to raise US$4 billion in Singapore after it faced difficulties raising funds in the international capital markets, due in part to currency control measures instituted in 1998. After five separate meetings between Goh Chok Tong and Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian leadership in December 1998 called off further negotiations when it rejected the Singaporean precondition that Malaysia continue to supply water to Singapore beyond 2061, upon the expiration of one of the water agreements. Resenting the inclusion of preconditions before any financial assistance would be considered, the Malaysian leadership viewed this as further confirmation of the PAP leadership’s calculative ‘fair weather friend’ mentality – not to be relied upon for help in hard times. Articulating the Malaysian leadership’s perception that their Singaporean counterparts were attempting to opportunistically squeeze as much out of Malaysia when it was at its most vulnerable, Johor’s outspoken Mentri Besar Abdul Ghani Othman remarked,

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 121 We sympathise with our neighbours who are facing the economic turmoil like us. We take the position not to take advantage of them . . . In this spirit, I would like to remind our neighbours, especially Singapore, not to take advantage of us.22 Capturing Mahathir’s irritation with the Singaporean leadership’s calculative approach, Kwa Chong Guan observed, ‘He [Mahathir] saw our treatment of Malaysia as a personal affront to him and this transformed his earlier pragmatism into an attitude of personal confrontation’.23 Irritated further by Singapore’s less than timely insistence in mid-1998 that Malaysia move its CIQ facilities from Tanjong Pagar to Woodlands, ostensibly to facilitate the repossession of much of Malaysia’s railway land in the city-state,24 the Malaysian government retaliated by suspending its participation in the FPDA exercises scheduled for October 1998. Automatic flyover rights for Singaporean military aircraft in Malaysian airspace were cancelled the following month. This was followed by the issuance of threats against Singaporean aircraft infringing Malaysian airspace (Huxley, 2000: 49). The vastly different interpretations of the regional financial and economic crisis inflamed the already tense relations between Malaysia and Singapore. Mahathir blamed the financial crisis on the activities of ‘rogue speculators’ and foreign hedge-fund traders and called on the international community to ban the trading of currencies (Nesadurai, 2000: 86). He also accused the IMF and World Bank of being Western dominated institutions used to pressure East Asian states to ‘force open their economies and allow domination by more powerful nations’ (Mohamad, 1999: 61), thereby dismantling their statist development strategies. The Malaysian government’s policy counter-offensive was strongly designed to mitigate the influence of external economic forces and retain a degree of national policy autonomy (Beeson, 2000: 335). The Malaysian government’s unorthodox imposition of capital controls, coupled with other fiscal and monetary measures, ensured that the country avoided the IMF’s rescue package. As the IMF’s stringent conditionalities and prescriptions have had a far from benign effect in neighbouring Indonesia and Thailand, Malaysia’s capital controls received qualified support from mainstream economists such as Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz. These capital controls contributed to a surge in the stock market and the return of offshore funds following the banning of Ringgit trading outside of Malaysia. The reduction of interest rates and directive to banks to be more flexible in their lending policies succeeded in increasing liquidity (Gomez, 2002: 104). Jomo K. Sundaram has observed that Malaysia’s 1998 recovery package ‘was probably too late, flawed, biased’. Yet he also noted that ‘the package’s basically counter-cyclical thrust . . . and the capital flow management emphasis (reversing the earlier commitment to capital account convertibility, considered sacred by economic orthodoxy) were basically correct’ (2004: 258). Moreover, Khoo is of the view that the policies of ‘recapitalisation, rescue and reflation allowed the economy to avert a collapse – without IMF intervention’ (2003: 54). Malaysia’s unorthodox economic policies resonated with many

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policy-makers and civil society actors in the region who remained cynical of the IMF’s structural adjustment programmes and the role of the Western dominated money-market in triggering the regional financial crisis. Of particular concern to the UMNO leadership was the potential for IMF conditionalities in dismantling its ethnic-based redistributive policy and restrictions on foreign equity ownership in ‘key’ economic sectors deemed to be of strategic national interest. Importantly, liberalising foreign participation in these ‘key’ sectors would have restricted future opportunities for wealth transfer and the nurturing of Malaysian corporations expected to eventually evolve into world class exporters able to compete with global corporations (Nesadurai, 2000: 73–105). However, as noted above, many of these ‘nurtured’ corporations remained internationally uncompetitive and concentrated in the services and other non-tradeable sectors such as property, construction and infrastructure. Many politically connected business groups had also been controversially bailed-out by the government using public funds during the regional economic crisis. Inter alia, these bail-outs aggravated the already serious policy tensions within the UMNO leadership, culminating in the subsequent sacking and detention of Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. In contrast to KL’s unorthodox policy measures, the Singaporean leadership appeared to uncritically support the IMF’s ‘one size fits all’ prescriptions. For example, the PAP leadership attempted to cajole former President Suharto to implement the IMF’s loan conditions by imprudently offering the corrupt and close-to-collapsed regime a US$5 billion loan.25 As an iconoclast, Mahathir must have been dismayed when the PAP leadership expressed scepticism with Japan’s proposal to create an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to respond more effectively to future regional crises. Their scepticism was no doubt prompted by the recognition that the AMF proposal would threaten the IMF’s multilateral competence and undermine confidence in the existing global financial order (Dent, 2002b: 154). Bilateral relations were aggravated further by Singapore’s lukewarm response to the Malaysian proposal for ASEAN states to use regional currencies instead of the appreciated US dollar.26 Accentuating the city-state’s opportunistic kiasu image, Singaporean traders were prevented from buying up cheap essential groceries in Johor with the passage of the 1998 Control and Supplies Act.27 So frosty were bilateral relations that Mahathir declined to meet with Lee Kuan Yew when they were attending a seminar in Tokyo in June 2000.28 While the financial crisis sapped regional enthusiasm for trade liberalisation, the Singaporean government remained actively committed to the trade liberalisation agenda associated with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).29 Singapore’s quick succession of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States initially provoked overt censure from regional states for failing to consult with them and potentially derailing the already fragile ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) process. In particular, regional states were concerned that countries in an FTA relationship with Singapore would now be able to gain ‘backdoor entry’ into ASEAN markets without reciprocal benefits accruing to the region. Belying the Singaporean leadership’s cavalier attitude towards the concerns of

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 123 neighbouring countries besieged by economic and political crisis, then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong pronounced in January 2001 that as foreign investors had ‘written off’ Southeast Asia except Singapore, the city-state needed to differentiate itself from the region to remain attractive to foreign investors. In a similar vein, Prime Minister Goh saw fit to remind Singapore’s less industrialised neighbours that they should metaphorically encourage those ‘who can run faster, to run faster’.30 Bilateral relations were aggravated by the Malaysian leadership’s perception of the 2004 USSFTA – the first between the United States and an Asian state. Inter alia, the USSFTA was interpreted as a reward for Singapore granting the United States military ‘facilities’ (Pang, 2007: 3), abetting US foreign and security policies and the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003. Indeed, US facilities in Singapore have provided a staging ground for its military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. A further source of concern was the signing of the 2005 US-Singapore Security Cooperation Agreement, the details of which are sketchy and not subject to public debate or discussion (Pang, 2007: 21). Singapore’s ability to navigate through and recover from the regional crisis much more effectively than her neighbours has been attributed to proactive measures adopted before the crisis, coupled with an extensive policy reform agenda. For example, a capital gains tax was introduced in the mid-1990s to moderate the steep appreciation of property prices (Chew, 2006: 10). While many Southeast Asian states had liberally deregulated their financial sectors without according much attention to strengthening their supervisory mechanisms, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) set about strengthening its supervisory and regulatory capacities (Dent, 2001: 12). The PAP government had also pursued conservative fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies which dampened speculative pressure against the Singapore dollar (Haggard and Low, 2002: 320). Richie’s comparative study of post-crisis reforms in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore found that in Thailand and Malaysia ‘the rhetoric for reform was high [but] actual reform was much less, and then largely located in the public sector’ (2005: 294). While Singapore’s reform efforts focused on increasing specialisation and coordination within the bureaucracy, private sector participation in policy and institutional reform was also enhanced. By contrast, Malaysia’s centralised but fragmented bureaucracy tended to limit private sector participation in the consultation process to a narrow group of favoured entrepreneurs. Moreover, the emphasis was on ‘bricks and mortar’ style infrastructure investment without substantive institutional reform (Richie, 2005: 278–279). Importantly, the regional crisis reinforced the PAP government’s understanding that the city-state’s mid-range technological sophistication would not insulate it from the fluctuations of the regional and global economy. The hollowing out of its manufacturing sector, with many electronic manufacturers such as General Electric and Philips relocating to cheaper production sites, necessitated an economic restructuring geared towards promoting the services sector as a source of future employment creation (Pang, 2007: 18). It was thus unsurprising that the USSFTA focused on promoting the service sector. As the regional crisis highlighted the limitations of Singapore’s regionalisation strategy, a stronger embrace of globalisation was undertaken with characteristic

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vigour. Business costs were reduced by cutting employers’ contributions to the compulsory savings scheme and wage reductions negotiated through the National Wages Council (Dent, 2002b: 66). Singaporean firms were strongly encouraged to build world-class companies through strategic alliances or mergers with other global players (Rodan, 2006b: 149). To realise these ambitious goals, the commitment to upgrade the island’s technological capacity by investing in research and development and education and training was energetically renewed. Additionally, reforms to the financial sector and other economic sectors were undertaken amidst the rhetoric of transparency. However, Rodan has observed that the bulk of financial reforms have been geared towards improving disclosures of the private sector, while GLCs remain relatively non-transparent (Rodan, 2005: 49). Dissatified with this selective approach, international financial agencies have repeatedly urged Temasek Holdings and other GLCs to be more transparent. In many respects, Singapore’s ability to effectively implement reforms following the regional economic crisis was assisted by the relatively depoliticised and less than confident middle and local business class coupled with an underdeveloped civil society, ironically much stronger in less affluent neighbouring countries of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. As support for the neo-liberal agenda has rarely extended beyond technocratic elites and sections of the private sector in these countries, resistance to structural reforms have been more coordinated (Robison et al., 2005: 176–192). It is also worth noting that the post-regional crisis reform measures in Singapore did not disrupt the key features of Singapore’s developmental state – paternalism, political authoritarianism and elitism – all of which have reproduced the hegemony of the PAP (Robison et al., 2005: 178). Despite the limited transparency of state agencies and GLCs, Singapore’s financial reform initiatives have reaped significant dividends – demonstrated by the near doubling of private banks operating in Singapore between 2000 and 2006. In 2006, foreign funds managed in Singapore reached US$200 billion.31 Reflective of this trend, the World Wealth Report, compiled by Merrill Lynch and the Capgemini Group, revealed that the number of high net worth individuals based in Singapore had increased by more than 21 per cent in 2006 – constituting the world’s sharpest increase. Singapore is now home to more than 67,000 millionaires,32 many of them Indonesian Chinese. The strength of Singapore’s financial services sector is demonstrated by its reputation as Asia’s budding Switzerland.33 However, like Switzerland, it has begun to assume a reputation as a regional centre for money laundering, amidst allegations that billions in ill-gotten Indonesian, Filipino and Burmese wealth have been parked in banks based in the city-state. Suffice to say, this reputation has served to reinforce Singapore’s opportunistic kiasu image in the region.

Competing for information, communications and technology hub status Launched in 1995, Wawasan 2020 was strongly driven by the realisation that Malaysia could no longer compete with other low-wage economies based on labour intensive manufacturing and thus needed to move up the technological and

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 125 value-added ladder. The transformation of Malaysia to industrialised nation status was to be facilitated by targeting knowledge intensive industries and services such as aerospace, microelectronics, biotechnology, Information, Communication and Telecommunications (ICT), education and tourism. In particular, ICT was expected to serve as an important engine of growth in Malaysia’s industrial leapfrogging. To facilitate this leapfrogging, the ambitious Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) project was launched in 1996. Stretching 50 km south of the KL City Centre, the MSC was designated as a high-tech zone that would be connected to the global multimedia network and complemented by ‘smart cities’ such as Cyberjaya and Putrajaya. While Mesdaq was created as a bourse for technology stocks, the Multimedia Development Corporation Venture Capital assisted in capitalising ICT companies.34 MSC status companies obtain a 100 per cent tax holiday for up to a decade and are thereafter offered a 100 per cent investment tax allowance, no restrictions on capital sourcing, profit repatriation or ownership nationality and are allowed to liberally employ foreign knowledge workers (Cook, 2004: 14). By attracting leading ICT firms, a competitive cluster of Malaysian multimedia companies is expected to become world class in time, thereby allowing the country to further develop into a test-bed for innovation, research and other cutting-edge multimedia developments required for a knowledge economy. Leading ICT companies that have located to the MSC include Microsoft, Ericsson and NTT (National Telegraph and Telecommunications). Those that have set up their regional centre in Cyberjaya, not just as test-beds for new technology but also to serve regional customers, include HSBC, Royal Dutch Shell, NTT, Unisys, Ericsson and BMW. Indeed HSBC’s regional group service centre in Cyberjaya performs functions such as loan approvals and credit facilities for its offices in Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong and the United States.35 By 2006, the MSC had attracted 1800 companies, including 500 international companies.36 Significantly, many leading multinational companies such as Shell Oil have opted for the MSC as their regional headquarters over Singapore because of lower costs and the Ringgit’s competitive exchange rate despite Singapore’s superior infrastructure and human capital support. Morale was boosted further by South Korea’s decision to select Malaysia as its regional IT partner in its Cyber Korea 21 Project.37 The progress of Malaysia’s MSC has been closely monitored by the city-state, having targeted knowledge industries such as ICT more than a decade before the MSC was conceived. For example, the mid-1980s National Information Technology Plan clearly enunciated the benefits of gaining competitive advantage by developing advanced ICT infrastructure. By 1989, the Singapore Software Centre was established to assist the development and relocation of ICT firms to Singapore. To transform the city-state into a ‘Global Info-Communication Technology Capital’ by 2020, communications infrastructure has since the 1980s been systematically upgraded to retain its reputation of offering the best ICT infrastructure in Southeast Asia. Science Parks and Hotspots, a belt of 10 ‘Technopreneur Centres’ with over 400 companies in the ICT industry, was established to build up a critical mass of high-tech businesses and industries. This has

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been augmented by the clustering of research laboratories or Technology Corridors near university campuses so as to attract research and development facilities to Singapore. Generous R&D deductions including a S$1billion Technopreneur Development Fund operated by the state’s Infocomm Development Agency have been extended to knowledge industries. In many respects, ICT’s limited demand for labour and space complements the city-state’s high density and high employment status. However, compared to Singapore, Malaysia’s less restrictive media environment has contributed to lively and politically sophisticated discussions of local and international politics on the internet. Influential websites such as Malaysiakini engage in investigative reporting and analyse politically sensitive topics which the mainstream print media tend to shy away from. Adding stature to Malaysia’s ICT hub status, Al-Jazeera has selected Kuala Lumpur as one of its regional broadcasting centres. Malaysia has developed a niche in outsourcing rather than in software development as originally anticipated. This can be attributed to the limited number of research scientists and engineers, 93 per 100,000 population, even less than China’s 454 per 100,000 population (Cook, 2004: 13). Malaysia’s outsourcing niche status suggests that many MSC status firms have not invested heavily in R&D (Cook, 2004: 15), thus retarding the development and transfer of high technology required to assist local industries catch-up with the West, Japan and other industrialised East Asian economies such as Singapore.38 Singapore’s reputation for possessing outstanding ICT infrastructure has been reinforced by its number one ranking in the 2003 Global Information Technology Economy Index (compared to Malaysia’s ranking of 19) and the World Economic Forum’s 2003 Global Information Technology Report ranking of Singapore as second best in the world (Cook, 2004: 9). Singapore’s usage of 50.8 computers per 100 inhabitants in 2001 is impressive when compared to Malaysia’s usage of 12.6 computers per 100 inhabitants. More than one half of Singapore’s population uses the internet (higher than the OECD) while it is one third for Malaysia (Corey and Wilson, 2005: 308–309). The city-state’s impressive ICT infrastructure has been buttressed by its record of having the highest R&D investment in Southeast Asia (Cook, 2004: 10). Software development also soaks up three-quarters of R&D spending in Singapore’s ICT industry. Not surprisingly, this impressive track record and conducive business environment has encouraged global heavyweights such as Sybase & Borland to more readily invest in their Singaporean R&D centres (Cook, 2004: 11). Singapore’s English and Mandarin speaking workforce, impressive technological infrastructure and close links between universities and industry, has allowed it to capitalise on China’s rapidly growing ICT market and add substance to the perception of being the ‘natural’ choice for partnerships with ICT companies headquartered in Hong Kong’s Cyberport.39 In October 2003, the China Innovation Centre (CIC), which is geared towards promoting the innovative capacities and development of more than 20,000 Chinese firms, chose Singapore as its base of operations. Undoubtedly, the CIC has strengthened Singapore’s position as a key supplier of ICT expertise to China (Cook, 2004: 8).

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Vying for regional transhipment and air-hub status By the mid- to late-1990s, plans were underway to establish Johor as a multi-modal regional transportation and logistics hub equipped with a full range of facilities and services to directly compete with Singapore. The region from Geylang Patah to Senai was to be transformed into a super-corridor offering transportation logistics, bunkering and related services with the axis of this southern super-corridor centred on the Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP) and Senai Airport. Additionally, a power plant, petrochemical plant, an expressway and railway line linking PTP to Senai airport and other related industries and services are planned. A new administrative capital for Johor, Nusajaya, has been envisioned for the southern super-corridor.40 Rapid advances in transportation technology have enabled many Southeast Asian ports to reorganise their operations and infrastructure. Malaysian ports, particularly from the 1980s, have enhanced their international competitiveness by lowering port charges, upgrading infrastructure, improving efficiency and imposing additional levies on cargoes leaving and entering Singapore. As a consequence, Port Klang rather than Singapore is increasingly used to ship cargo from Penang.41 The trend towards very large ships calling on fewer ports has meant that larger ports with deep channels, developed dock rail connections and extensive storage facilities have a competitive edge. This trend has enabled transhipment hub ports to attract cargo away from regional feeder ports. Not surprisingly, considerable improvements in infrastructure and efficiency have occurred in regional ports such as the port of Singapore and PTP in Johor, to make them more attractive to international shipping lines. Of particular concern to the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) was the ability of PTP to seriously challenge its port business not long after its opening in 1999 and rise from an obscure one hundred and eighth to twenty-second place in the global container rankings.42 Boasting 2.5 km of wharves (with another 10 km planned), handling charges that are about half that of the PSA and offering shipping lines their own wharves (compared to PSA’s timeshare style contracts) PTP was able to successfully lure the world’s largest shipping line Maersk Sealand (until then PSA’s largest client) and Evergreen Marine (PSA’s third largest client) away from PSA in 2003. Maersk Sealand’s decision to move to PTP was prompted by PSA’s repeated refusal to grant it permission to run its own terminal43 to allow for greater flexibility in scheduling and cost-cutting. BMW has also relocated its Asian regional spare-parts centre from Singapore to PTP in 2004 whilst maintaining its regional corporate headquarters in Singapore.44 To stem the outflow of business to PTP and boost PSA’s status as a premier regional shipping and transhipment hub,45 a management reshuffle was initiated in 2003. Additionally, PSA became structured into geographical units rather than divided according to business function and its non-core business shed.46 Handling charges were also trimmed at the cost of worker retrenchments. In an effort to win new business for PSA, five new berths have been constructed and another six to ten are being planned.47 Shipping lines in Singapore now have the option of operating their own berths. PSA’s rejuvenation and ongoing dynamism can be strongly attributed to its

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overseas acquisitions and ventures. Its overseas port networks have apparently been pivotal in keeping PSA relevant to the rapid changes in world shipping. These acquisitions have been warmly received by its shipping line clients as it provides them with greater opportunities to work with the PSA around the world. It also reduces administrative procedures and allows cargo to move faster and with ease.48 By 2007, PSA boasted 26 projects in 15 countries across Europe, South Asia and East Asia. This has assisted the PSA to maintain Singapore’s status as the world’s busiest port since 2005. In 2007, it was in second place, behind Hong Kong’s Hutchinson Port Holdings (HPH) in terms of global port groups.49 The rivalry between PTP and PSA is akin to the competition between Malaysia’s KL International Airport (KLIA), and to a lesser extent Senai International Airport, with Singapore’s Changi International Airport. While KLIA offers low-priced landing fees and other incentives to encourage airlines to shift their regional headquarters from Singapore,50 Senai Airport hopes to become a regional cargo hub based on its connectivity to the Port of Pasir Gudang, PTP and KLIA.51 In particular, Senai Airport intends to lure 20 per cent of air-cargo business away from Changi within a decade and is targeting a five-fold increase in passenger traffic over the next few years.52 Inter alia, the increase in passenger traffic was to be facilitated by regular MAS and Air Asia flight services. Malaysia’s budget airliner, Air Asia, is expected to offer shuttle flights between KL and Senai that are a quarter of the price of the Singapore–KL shuttle.53 Air Asia’s ambition of running budget shuttle flights between KL and Senai was sabotaged – in kiasu fashion – by the Singapore government’s refusal to permit direct bus services from the island to Senai. The Malaysian operator of a direct bus service carrying MAS passengers from Singapore to Senai Airport had been prevented from transporting Air Asia’s passengers from Singapore to Senai54 so as to prevent Changi International Airport losing passengers to Senai. This kiasu insecurity has no doubt been enhanced by the threat from new long-range aircraft that will enable airlines to bypass Singapore altogether or opt for other regional airhubs such as KL and Bangkok.55 It is worth noting that Air Asia’s reputation as the most successful low-cost carrier in Southeast Asia has certainly been pivotal to Malaysia experiencing a boom in air-traffic growth. In addition to Air Asia’s subsidiary Fly Asian Express (FAX) being allowed to fly certain domestic routes, the Malaysian and Thailand governments have allowed Air Asia to commence international flights.56 Singapore’s regional premier airhub status was threatened somewhat by the 2003 decision of Emirates to fly non-stop between Dubai and Australia, bypassing Changi. Additionally, Bangkok has overtaken Singapore as East Asia’s third biggest airhub after Tokyo’s Haneda International Airport and Hong Kong’s Chep Lap Kok International Airport.57 Insecurities were enhanced when between 2006 and 2007, four carriers (Air New Zealand, Finnair, Scandinavian Airlines and Gulf Air) decided to pull out of Changi. Between 2001 and 2006, average passenger growth at Changi was only 4.9 per cent, compared to 7.4 per cent at Hong Kong’s Chek Lap Kok, 7.8 per cent at Bangkok and 22.6 per cent at Dubai Airport. Changi has also lost numerous senior management personnel to its rivals.58

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 129 Reinforcing the Singapore government’s commitment to reinvigorate Changi’s regional airhub status in the face of challenges from rival air-hubs, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew declared in 2004 that ‘My job is to see that Singapore’s position as an air-hub is not lost’.59 To boost Changi Airport’s regional air-hub status, from 2004 airlines that bring extra travellers to Changi Airport have been given cash rewards, with S$40 million set aside for this scheme. Among other perks, carriers have been offered a 15 per cent discount on landing fees.60 In countering the competition from regional budget carriers such as Air Asia, Singapore Airlines launched the budget carrier Tiger Airways. The 2004 open-skies agreement signed with Brunei and Thailand, which allows unlimited flights between the three countries have greatly benefitted Tiger Airways. Inter alia, its reach to Thai tourist destinations such as Bangkok, Chiangmai and Phuket has been significantly expanded.61 Recognising that SIA’s past success was strongly reliant on hubbing all its Pan-Asian flights through Singapore, SIA has strengthened its foothold in China – one of the fastest growing aviation markets. In 2007, SIA made a successful US$920 million bid for a 24 per cent stake in the Shanghai-based China Eastern Airlines. SIA and Temasek’s Dahlia Investments also hold a 49 per cent stake in the Chinese cargo carrier Great Wall Airlines.62 To facilitate its competitiveness, Changi was corporatised in 2007 and a third terminal was opened in early 2008. The new terminal is expected to double Changi’s air-traffic. SIA’s acquisition of the largest passenger jet, the double-decker Airbus 380, is also poised to give Changi a boost in the stiff competition for premier air-hub status in Southeast Asia.63 To date, Singapore has the most liberalised aviation sector in ASEAN with air travel related services contributing to as much as 9.2 per cent of its GDP.64

Betting on biotechnology Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB) has targeted biotechnology and biomedical sciences as knowledge industries with tremendous growth potential and as a means of diversifying Singapore’s economy away from trade and traditional manufacturing. The targeting of biotechnology has been encouraged by the absence of lobby groups strongly opposed to genetic engineering and the lack of ethical and moral debates associated with biotechnology (Lai, 2004: 457). The National Science and Technology Board (NSTB), renamed the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR) has generously funded the establishment of research institutes in the biopharmaceutical industry while the MOE funds biotechnology research at universities and facilitates the growth of technology transfer centres for applied research and incubator functions. Opened in 2003, a Science Park located near the National University of Singapore (NUS), commonly referred to as Biopolis, houses five biomedical research institutes as well as biomedical start-ups and support services in legal and patent matters (Lai, 2004: 460). In addition to hiring prominent foreign scientists and educating local researchers at top foreign universities, the flow of scientists into the industry has been facilitated by the introduction of biomedical studies in schools and post-secondary institutions. Life sciences have also been incorporated into school

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subjects. A College of Life Sciences offering degree programmes has been established at the Nanyang Technological University (Lai, 2004: 461). To establish Singapore as a mecca for top talents in technology and knowledge industries, the National Research Foundation (NRF) was created in early 2006. With S$5 billion at its disposal and headed by former Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan, the high-powered NRF is tasked with coordinating the research activities of various government agencies and sectors deemed strategic. In addition to the biomedical sciences, research areas that will be supported by the NRF include environmental and water technologies and interactive and digital media. A conducive research environment has no doubt been assisted by Singapore’s reputation for protecting Intellectual Property (IP). The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy has ranked Singapore the most IP protective country in Asia (Ooi, 2006). A study by the NUS Entrepreneurship Centre found that between 1996 and 2004, Singapore ranked second in Asia in the technological impact index. The index measures the proportion of patents that are ‘high impact’ or among the top 5 per cent of the most highly cited patents in their respective technology class. However, the study also found that a large proportion of patents invented in Singapore are owned by foreign entities and individuals. Between 2001 and 2005, 53.1 per cent of patents were foreign-owned, compared with 4 per cent in Japan and 9.9 per cent in South Korea.65 Like Malaysia, the development of biotechnology in Singapore has been hampered by the lack of qualified scientists and venture capitalists. Additionally, the major motor of biotechnology continues to emanate from global corporations and GLCs rather than local private capital. According to Tsui-Auch, this can be attributed to the EDB favouring foreign global companies over local start-ups in its disbursement of funding. This partiality has apparently remained despite the fact that few foreign companies are strongly engaged in applied research and tend to focus on manufacturing or downstream research and development. The EDB has also purportedly favoured its own spin-offs and those of global corporations over private local start-ups (Lai, 2004: 466–471). Additionally, A*STAR has been criticised for adopting a ‘scatter-shot’ approach to drug research by Lee Wei Ling, daughter of the commanding Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew. She has called for greater focus on a few key areas such as the development of drugs for hepatitis-B.66 More ominously, a 2006 report by the World Bank purported that Singapore had only a 50 per cent chance of succeeding as a biotechnology research hub because it did not have an entrepreneurial culture or strong links between universities and business. The report also criticised Singapore’s dependence on a ‘footloose’ group of top scientists.67 However, it should be acknowledged that biotechnology research has a reputation for being a risky area of investment, with more than half of biotechnology companies in the United States merging or closing shop. It also requires substantial financial support and a long gestation period before products can be commercialised (Hew, 2006: 272).

Education and the knowledge economy In contrast to the electrical and electronics industry, which initially fuelled the rapid economic development of Malaysia, Singapore and other leading East Asian

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 131 economies, knowledge industries are greatly facilitated by a technically competent English speaking workforce and the availability of high quality telecommunications infrastructure. However, as noted earlier, knowledge industries require relatively long gestation periods before their benefits can be fully reaped. While Malaysia’s ICT infrastructure is impressive in and around the MSC, the infrastructure beyond the confines of cities such as Putrajaya, KL and Penang is far from optimal. Furthermore, despite the Malaysian government’s impressive educational expenditure which is among the highest in Southeast Asia, over 70 per cent of the nation’s primary schools purportedly lack computer facilities and nearly 10 per cent lack adequate connections for water and electricity. Malaysia’s ICT infrastructure is thus not evenly spread in human capital investment terms.68 A study by Cisco Systems found that Malaysia suffered from a skilled worker shortfall of 4,200 in 2006, with projections of a rise to 8,100 in 2009.69 Recognising that the relatively weak standard of English language skills undermines business competitiveness in the global arena, the Malaysian government has promoted English as part of the larger restructuring of the education system. In the last decade of the Mahathir administration, controversial education reforms such as the teaching of Maths and Science in English, the gradual erosion of the quota system for admissions into public universities and the privatisation of higher education were instituted despite considerable resistance from various quarters (Lee, 2004: 437). Those opposing the teaching of Maths and Science in English come from the Malay language and Chinese education lobby. Confronted by the influential Malay language lobby’s inclination to view the promotion of English as an attempt to downgrade the importance of the Malay language, Education Minister Hishammuddin Hussein advised ‘As a trading nation, our children’s competence in English is a survival skill’.70 Another strong proponent of the promotion of English, International Trade Minister Rafidah Aziz, reminded the Malay language lobby that mastering the English language ‘does not make one less Malay or less Malaysian’.71 These education reforms have been strongly endorsed by the Malay elite and middle class (Lee, 2004: 443). With the passage of the 1996 Private Higher Educational Institutions Act, courses are allowed to be taught in English without the approval of the Education Minister. Inter alia, the Act has enabled private colleges affiliated with foreign universities to conduct their programmes in English and encouraged local private universities to broaden English language usage in their courses (Lee, 2004: 441). By 1999, all students intending to study in public institutions of higher learning have to sit for the Malaysian University English Test. The compulsory teaching in English of Maths and Science from 2003 has been rationalised as a means of exposing Malaysians to cutting-edge technological and scientific advances (Lee, 2004: 442). The Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–2010) has allocated RM26 billion to the education sector with a view to revamping the education system and producing students with skills sought by industry and targeted sectors such as biotechnology. Referred to as Biovalley, Malaysia’s ambitious biotechnology project is based on a cluster of biotechnology research institutions, universities and biotechnology companies – akin to Singapore’s biotechnology cluster Biopolis (Hew, 2006: 272). The Ninth

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Malaysia Plan has also projected an increase in the number of Maths and Science teachers and an improvement in the quality of rural schools. To attract non-Malay students back to the national schools, Mandarin and Tamil classes are now offered at the primary level.72 In Singapore, investment in education has long been recognised as vital to the resource poor city-state’s economic survival and competitiveness in the global economy. Singaporeans are strongly encouraged to embark in post-secondary studies and to continually re-skill to remain ‘marketable’ and to keep pace with the needs of the rapidly changing economy. To accommodate the needs of the knowledge economy and the growing demand for university education, 30 per cent of the local student cohort is expected to receive university education, compared to 23 per cent in 2007.73 In addition to the three publicly funded universities (NUS, NTU and SMU), a fourth university is planned.

Striving for regional education hub status The elevation of the English language is integral to the promotion of Malaysia as a regional education hub with the targeting of higher education as a lucrative service sector export.74 The marketing and expansion of private tertiary institutions is geared not only towards attracting overseas students to Malaysia but also serves to limit the brain drain problem. Moreover, it assists in curbing the outflow of up to RM2 billion annually, arising from expenses incurred by Malaysian students studying overseas. Efforts at encouraging the private sector to play an active role in providing higher education have been relatively successful. For example, 16 private universities were established by 2001. Additionally, the number of private colleges more than quadrupled from 152 in 1992 to 666 in 2001 (Lee, 2004: 444). The promotion of education services as an export sector has been supported further by the staging of Malaysian Universities Expos in Thailand, China, Indonesia and Brunei (Welch, 2004: 33). Malaysian education bureaus can also be found in China, Indonesia, Vietnam, West Asia and South Africa to more effectively compete with countries such as Singapore also promoting themselves as a regional educational hub. Reputable Western universities have been encouraged to engage in twinning relationships with local private colleges or establish campuses in Malaysia. For example, the renowned Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) is offering a postgraduate programme in Malaysia that is less expensive than its Boston campus.75 Australian universities such as Monash University and Curtin University of Technology, and the British University of Nottingham, have established branch campuses in Malaysia. To maintain Malaysia’s reputation for delivering quality education, the Higher Education Ministry has forewarned tertiary institutions that in addition to developing a ranking system, those that do not offer quality teaching standards and facilities will be closed down.76 To make Malaysia more attractive to foreign students, those from targeted countries are not only allowed to bring their families to Malaysia, they are also exempted from studying subjects such as the Malay language while their visa payments have

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 133 been reduced.77 The overseas student population has increased from 20,000 in 2001 to 32,000 in 2003 and is expected to rise further to 50,000 by 2010.78 These tertiary education initiatives have placed Malaysia as a fledgling regional competitor to Singapore for the lucrative overseas student market. To be sure, Singapore’s edge over Malaysia as a regional education hub is due in no small measure to its consistent promotion of English as a first language since independence. Mother-tongue languages have been primarily taught as a second language in schools. The high level of English medium instruction at Singaporean tertiary institutions and long-standing practice of offering scholarships to students from the region have undoubtedly enhanced Singapore’s reputation as a regional education hub. Towards these ends, the EDB, in conjunction with the Singapore Tourism Board, International Enterprise and the Ministry of Education, have initiated a campaign called ‘Singapore Education’ to attract 150,00 foreign students by 2015. This is expected to create 22,000 jobs and boost the education sector’s GDP contribution from 1.9 to 5 per cent. In 2007, there were 80,000 foreign students, drawn strongly from China, Malaysia and Indonesia.79 Singapore’s reputation as an education hub has been buttressed by premier tertiary institutions such as the French Business School INSEAD and the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business establishing branch campuses and twinning programmes in Singapore. The University of Nevada (Las Vegas) offers Hospitality Management studies while Digpen Institute of Technology offers Digital Media studies. Other premier international tertiary institutions in collaboration with Singaporean institutions include Georgia Tech, Johns Hopkins, MIT, Stanford, Cornell, Wharton, UCLA’s Anderson School, New York University, Karolinska Institute (Stockholm), Technical University (Denmark) and King’s College (London). Partnerships have also been forged with the renowned Indian Institute of Technology, S.P. Jain Centre of Management, Shanghai’s Jiao Tong University and Waseda University.80 Not all these twinning ventures have thrived. In 2006, the Johns Hopkins University Research Centre in Singapore, the first of its kind outside of the United States, closed after setting up shop for nearly a decade. The Singapore government body A*STAR claimed that the Johns Hopkins facility in Singapore failed to meet its research and education targets and to attract top scientists to Singapore despite receiving US$52 million in funding since 1998. However, Johns Hopkins alleged that it was the Singapore government that failed to meet its financial and educational obligations.81 In 2007, the University of New South Wales Asia closed its doors after only four months in Singapore claiming that the initial intake of 150 students was less than half the anticipated number, thereby rendering it financially unviable. This decision constitutes a serious blow to Singapore’s goal of becoming the region’s ‘global schoolhouse’ and realising the ambitious target of attracting 150,000 foreign students by 2015.82 An earlier blow to Singapore’s education hub ambitions was Warwick University’s decision to turn down the Singapore government’s offer of establishing a branch campus, citing the restrictive intellectual and academic environment as a deciding factor. This then begs the question: does the

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restrictive political environment in Singapore’s authoritarian state constitute a serious impediment to the building of a sophisticated knowledge society required to complement the knowledge economy? To instil intellectual creativity, concerted attempts have been undertaken to restructure Singapore’s education system to complement the promotion of knowledge industries. There is a greater emphasis on non-exam oriented group projects and a de-emphasis on rote-style learning and loosening up of the early streaming system at the primary and secondary school levels. At the tertiary level, intellectual creativity has been given a metaphoric ‘shot in the arm’ by initiatives such as the Singapore Management University designating creative thinking a compulsory core university subject for its students regardless of their degree. However, the efficacy of nurturing intellectual creativity in a politically censorial environment remains an issue that is the subject of considerable discussion (Rahim, 2001b: 207–232).

Tourism, arts and entertainment hubs Capitalising on its relatively secure socio-political environment, numerous tourist resorts, regional air-hub aspirations and the competitive value of the Ringgit, Malaysia has been energetically promoted as a tourist and shopping destination particularly from the late 1990s. This strategy has proven to be quite successful, as evidenced by the extra 150,000 to 200,000 tourists visiting Malaysia a year. By 2002, shopping revenues provided Malaysia with 20 per cent of its total tourism revenue.83 In 2003, Malaysia was crowned ‘Asia’s new shopping paradise’ by the Asian Wall Street Journal on the weight of surveys which suggested that KL was the best value-for-money tourist destination compared to other destinations in East Asia and Oceania. At present, tourism is the second largest foreign exchange earner after manufacturing. Significantly, 80 per cent of tourists to Malaysia are from East Asia, with Singaporeans making up 60 per cent of regional tourists.84 Riding the wave of the tourism bonanza, the Johor state government has developed an international convention centre called Persada Johor in Kampung Pahang. Johor is expected to attract some of Singapore’s thriving convention business85 with the promotion of the state’s tourist attractions such as island resorts86 and proximity to historical sites and cities such as KL and Singapore. In response to the decline in tourism’s contribution to Singapore’s GDP from 6.1 per cent in 1993 to 3 per cent in 2002,87 the Economic Review Committee in 2002 recommended the development of a ‘creative cluster’ made up of the arts and cultural sector, the design sector and the generic media industry. Singapore’s status as the new Asian ‘Creative Hub’ of the twenty-first century is expected to facilitate the island’s long-term economic prosperity (Lee and Lim, 2004: 150). The arts is also expected to enhance Singapore’s attraction as a tourist destination, improve the quality of life, enhance the productivity of workers and importantly make the city-state more attractive to foreign professionals and skilled workers required for the growth of knowledge industries. Highlighting the functional importance of the arts, then Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, acknowledged in the early 1990s that

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 135 we need the arts to help make us a centre for brain services. We want talent from all over the world to meet here, to work here and to live here. They must enjoy being here – the people, the food, the music, the cosmopolitan air. We cannot work the magic without the arts. (Cited in Kong, 2000: 415) Immigration policies have been liberalised to grant permanent resident status to artists, art historians, reviewers, valuers and others that can help ‘work the magic’. To encourage tourists to stay beyond an overnight transit and promote Singapore’s cultural depth, traditional cultural districts such as Chinatown, Singapore River, Little India and Kampong Glam have been revitalised. Singapore’s status as the ‘global city for the arts’, has been invigorated by the Singapore History Museum, the Singapore Art Museum and the Asian Civilisations Museum. Cultural extravaganzas include the Singapore River Hong Bow to welcome the Lunar New Year and the Chingay Festival. An architecturally striking cultural venue called The Esplanade aspires to be the Singaporean equivalent of the Sydney Opera House.88 To nurture a local arts community, the National Arts Council has provided financial support to artists and schools offering art programmes. Prominent art schools include the Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts and the Lasalle-SIA College of the Arts. The Yong Siew Tong Conservatory of Music has also been established at the National University of Singapore. Singapore’s tourism agencies have both capitalised on and countered the popularity of competing regional tourist destinations that are cheaper and have more to offer in terms of cultural vibrance and natural beauty. One such strategy is the promotion of the multi-ethnic city-state as an ‘Instant Asia’ and ‘Shopping Paradise’. Consistent with the promotion of the island as an ‘Instant Asia’, ethnic residential and shopping clusters such as Little India, Chinatown and Geylang Serai are prominently featured in tourist promotional advertisements. Its status as a regional shopping hub has been resurrected by the yearly Singapore Fashion Festival and numerous exhibitions, fashion parties and retail promotions.89 High profile international events such as the World Economic Forum Asia Roundtable, the Shangri-la Dialogue for Defence Ministers and Security Officials, the 117th International Olympic Committee Meeting and the IMF and World Bank Annual Meeting have been hosted in Singapore. Willing to jettison the city-state’s straight-laced persona in order to bolster the tourism industry, casino resorts to rival Malaysia’s Genting Highlands are under construction despite strong public opposition.90 Proponents of the casino in Sentosa Island assert that it is likely to boost GDP by S$500 million and recoup some of the S$1.8–2 billion that is purportedly lost yearly from the national economy as a result of Singaporeans gambling in Genting, cruise ships and at other regional casinos.91 Set to open in 2010, the two casino resorts are expected to create an extra 100,000 direct and indirect jobs, double the number of tourists to 17 million a year, and transform Singapore into a world class tourist destination.92 Singapore’s straight-laced reputation has also been tempered by the 2006 Global Brand Index which ranked the city-state second only to Italy in offering a lively

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nightlife. To be sure, the vibrant entertainment scene is closely related to the lucrative economic benefits of promoting Singapore as a ‘fun’ holiday destination. The ‘fun’ image was displayed in the 2003 National Day celebrations at the Kallang Stadium where the well-known gay entertainer Kumar, exquisitely attired in a colourful sari, took centre-stage in the festivities in full spectacle of the bemused audience which included PAP politicians and the aging Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew. In an obvious attempt at exorcising the city-state’s authoritarian and staid image, several younger generation PAP parliamentarians participated in the 2007 annual Chingay street parade festivities. Attired in stylish pants, bright T-shirts, chains and bopping to hip-hop music, they were cheered on by the somewhat bemused and bewildered onlookers not quite sure what to make of the hitherto prudish PAP persona. To add to the island’s buzz and boost its tourism profile further, Singapore began hosting the Formula One Grand Prix from 2008, an event successfully hosted by Malaysia since 1999. The success of Singapore’s stature as a vibrant arts, culture and entertainment hub, which thrives on a creative social and intellectual environment, is less than certain in view of the island’s censorious and restrictive political environment characterised by the suppression of civil society. Lee and Lim have observed that the ‘lack of political openness, or the steering of people away from political discussion is problematic for the cultivation of creativity’ as it creates ‘a censorious climate of fear . . . that prevents people from “thinking outside the box” and “creating” revolutionary ideas’ (Lee and Lim, 2004: 154). Additionally, whether the narrowly functionalist motives for promoting ‘creative industries’, as demonstrated by the emphasis on economic inducements rather than the intrinsic value of the arts and culture, is able to qualitatively engender social creativity is questionable (Lee and Lim, 2004: 158).

Film and digital media hub In the last few years, the Singapore Arts Festival and the Singapore Film Festival have gained a reputation for promoting themes that are inventive. In line with the promotion of Singapore as a regional hub for the global media industry, in the late 1990s the Ministry of Information and the Arts established the Singapore Film Commission with S$2.5 million worth of grants for scholarships and seed funding for film projects (Kong, 2000: 416). The EDB has allocated S$500 million to develop the digital media industry between 2006 and 2010 (Kong, 2000: 416). Additionally, the Singapore Tourist Board (STB) has established a Film-in-Singapore scheme for foreign film makers where the STB has offered to pay half the costs of film production in Singapore. It also offers advice on locations and coordinates with other local agencies to facilitate smooth film production. The EDB has also sought to bring movie production companies from Europe, the US, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Australia to set up facilities such as film laboratories, movie studios, production and post-production services (Kong, 2000: 416). To date, international media production companies such as Lucas Film Animation and Electronic Arts have set up studios in Singapore

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 137 to produce digital animated content for films, television and games (Ooi, 2006: 6). To support the growth of this industry, the US computer animation and technology school DigiPen Institute of Technology has established a campus in Singapore. Moreover, New York University’s famed Tish School of Arts has set up its first overseas campus in Singapore.93

Impediments to closer economic cooperation: stalled water negotiations Singapore’s vulnerability as a sovereign city-state has been compounded by its dependence on neighbouring countries for the most basic necessities such as drinking water. The city-state receives about half of its daily consumption of water from the Malaysian state of Johor (Kwa, 2002: 4) – a contentious political and security issue particularly after its separation from Malaysia in 1965. The first water agreement, signed in 1927 between the Singapore City Council and the Sultan of Johor, allowed Singapore to draw water from Johor’s Sungei Pulai absolutely free of charge. A second agreement, signed in 1961, gave Singapore the right to draw water from Gunong Pulai, Pontian Reservoirs and the Tebrau and Skudai Rivers for 3 Malaysian sen for every 1,000 gallons. In return, Singapore would supply Johor with purified water at a rate of 50 Malaysian sen for every 1,000 gallons. The island would also pay a yearly rent of S$5 an acre for the land reserved for its waterworks in Johor. This 50 year agreement expires in 2011 but includes a right of review 25 years from its signing – that is from 1986. Another agreement, signed in 1962 and valid for 99 years, gave Singapore the right to draw up to a maximum of 250 million gallons of water a day from the Johor River at a rate of 3 sen per 1,000 gallons with a right of review after 25 years – that is from 1987. The Separation Agreement in 1965 guaranteed that the 1961 and 1962 Water Agreements would be honoured (Ministry of Information Telecommunication and Arts, 2003). In 1990, another water agreement was signed allowing Singapore to draw more than the 250 million gallons per day with the building of a dam across Sungai Linggui. RM320 million was paid to the Johor state as compensation for the land used to build the dam.94 Indicative of the importance the Singaporean leadership attached to the issue of securing water supplies, the 1990 Water Agreement was signed just before Lee Kuan Yew relinquished his Prime Ministership. Various elements within UMNO have long been dissatisfied with the water agreements signed with Singapore, deeming the price of water sold to Singapore as unfair and exploitative – at 3 sen per 1,000 gallons. These voices of dissent became more vociferous after many areas in Malaysia experienced severe water shortages from the early 1990s with water rationing periodically imposed in some Malaysian states. Malaysian public officials have called for prioritising the nation’s water needs before considering Singapore’s requirements. They argue that the country’s demand for water will only intensify with population growth and satisfying the requirements of water intensive industries such as semiconductors – an

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industry that is a significant contributor to the Malaysian economy. Moreover, Johor’s water requirements can only be expected to increase as the state’s population is expected to grow from six to seven million by 2016 (Long, 2001: 525). Spurred on by these Malaysian concerns, the Singapore government expeditiously negotiated and signed a water agreement with Indonesian water authorities to pursue a joint water project in Riau Province in the early 1990s.95 When Singapore–Malaysia relations deteriorated sharply after the outbreak of the 1997 regional economic crisis, prospects for an amicable resolution of the water negotiations and other outstanding issues became uncertain. In an attempt to break this impasse, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew made a much publicised visit to KL in August 2001 to resolve outstanding issues such as water supply to Singapore, relocation of Malaysia’s CIQ facilities from Tanjong Pagar, use of Malaysian airspace, withdrawal of Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings by Malaysians and the replacement of the causeway with a bridge. Concerned by the divisions within UMNO precipitated by Anwar’s sacking and incarceration, the support for conservative Islamist opposition party PAS and the potentially tenuous negotiating position of Singapore in a post-Mahathir Malaysia, Lee’s negotiating stance was uncharacteristically conciliatory. In response to Malaysia’s request for the new price of water to be set at 60 sen per 1,000 gallons, Lee’s counter-offer was 45 sen per 1,000 gallons.96 Working on the assumption that the issue had been resolved, both leaders decided to leave bureaucrats from both sides to work out the final agreed price and the amount of raw and treated water that Malaysia would supply.97 The adage that the devil is in the details rang true when negotiations stalled after the Malaysian side insisted that the price of 60 sen per 1,000 gallons of water should be back-dated to 1986 and 1987. They also insisted that from 2007 to 2011, the price of water should increase to RM3 and from 2011 the price would be negotiated yearly for inflation. However, by September 2002, their proposed price had been raised further to RM6.25 per 1,000 gallons (Ministry of Information Telecommunication and Arts, 2003: 8). Discussions finally collapsed when the Malaysian negotiators announced that talks for future water supplies would only take place in 2059. In effect, the Malaysian government had decided to take the water price revision out of the package of unresolved bilateral issues – to be discussed on its own. Exasperated by Malaysia’s shifting of the goal posts and perceived lackadaisical approach towards past agreements, the Singapore Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar, in a February 2003 parliamentary address, accused the Malaysian government of violating the Separation Agreement: It is not a matter of money . . . The significance of the water price, to both countries, is Singapore’s existence as a sovereign nation separate from Malaysia . . . Both countries have to honour the terms of the agreements and the guarantee in the Separation Agreement . . . any variation of the Water Agreements without the consent of both governments will be a breach of the Separation Agreement.98

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 139 In a similar vein, the 2003 Singapore Ministry of Information document ‘Water Talks: If Only It Could’ claimed that ‘For Singapore, the key issue is not how much we pay, but how any price revision is arrived at. The revision cannot be unilateral. It must be in accordance with the terms of the water agreements’ (Ministry of Information Telecommunication and Arts, 2003: 10). Retreating to its characteristic legalistic stance, the Singapore government maintained that the 1961 and 1962 Water Agreements provide only for a price review immediately after 25 years, or in 1986 and 1987. According to this logic, Malaysia had lost its legal right to increase the price of water by not exercising this right in 1986 and 1987. KL promptly disputed this interpretation of the 1961 and 1962 Water Agreements, arguing that it could legally review the price of water any time ‘after’ 1986 and 1987.99 Bilateral relations degenerated to an all time low in mid-2003 after the Singapore government publicly released private correspondence between Prime Minister Mahathir and Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and published a booklet, which also included sensitive private correspondence. Entitled ‘Water Talks: If Only It Could’,100 the booklet was distributed to foreign missions in Singapore, selected Malaysians and made readily available to the public. Objecting to the unconventional release of private correspondence between heads of government as an act of bad faith, Mahathir complained bitterly: ‘We don’t make public letters and correspondence. We strictly follow international practice, which says that you don’t release private letters and correspondence’.101 Expressing the Malaysian government’s outrage over the ethics of publishing private correspondence between senior public officials, a New Straits Times editorial opined, ‘Certainly, it is not within accepted norms to make official correspondence and diplomatic exchanges public . . . bringing to the fore yet again its lack of ethics’.102 Accusing the Singapore government of tarnishing Malaysia’s international reputation, the Malaysian government retaliated by publishing its own booklet and ran full page advertisements in major Malaysian newspapers and the Asian Wall Street Journal.103 In particular, the booklet and advertisements uniformly highlighted the absurdity of Singapore’s continued purchase of 3 sen per 1,000 gallons of water. In response, the Singapore government placed advertisements in five Malaysian newspapers and the Asian Wall Street Journal. In the to-and-fro of claims and counter-claims, the historical balas dendam syndrome of the leadership from neighbouring states was not only reinforced but intensified.

Water agreements: relic of colonialism? To better understand Malaysia’s hardball negotiating stance, it is worth considering the historical context of earlier water agreements and the perception of the citystate as a parasitic relic of Western imperialism. Many UMNO leaders view bilateral relations as being unfairly dictated by antiquated treaties and arrangements designed by the British in anticipation of the resource poor island’s eventual entry into the Federation. Articulating this view, then New Straits Times Editor-inChief Abdullah Ahmad wrote,

140

The politics of economic competition and cooperation For good or ill, Singapore is a product of imperialism, and Malaysia’s relations with it continue to be dogged by the unequal treaties and arrangements (that constitute an uneasy umbilical cord between the two countries). If relations are to move forward and overcome the past, these treaties and arrangements must be replaced by contemporary versions that strike a fair balance between the interests of the two independent and sovereign nations. Probably the most stubborn and unequal of these arrangements are the water agreements . . . If Malaysia had lost the right to review the price of water, why did Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew come to Kuala Lumpur to negotiate the price of water? . . . The truth is that Singapore wants to continue to gain lavishly from what was a substantial concession at the time of separation.104

The Malaysian leadership has repeatedly highlighted the RM8 per 1,000 gallons Hong Kong pays to China for water as evidence of the absurdity of the 3 sen per 1,000 gallons Singapore pays to Malaysia. However, Singaporean leaders have been quick to counter the Hong Kong price model as irrelevant on the grounds that China bears the infrastructural and operational costs of supplying water to Hong Kong. Unlike China, Singapore has borne maintenance costs such as the building of pipelines and dams.105 The Malaysian government’s position on water pricing became more intransigent when Johor became self-sufficient in treated water in 2004 and thus no longer reliant on Singapore. The Federal government’s new responsibility over water management from the states in 2005 signals its designation of water as a national asset with geopolitical, economic and security dimensions.106 Since the acrimonious scrapping of the causeway reconstruction project in 2006, after the Singapore government insisted on bundling the issue to the sale of sand, bilateral water talks have been stalled.107

In defence of water Malaysia’s hardball stance on water negotiations with Singapore has presumably been influenced by its long-standing resentment towards Singapore’s preemptive military action should Malaysia cease to supply water. Lee frankly acknowledged this military strategy when Singapore’s dramatic military build-up was queried by Mahathir during a visit to Singapore in 1978. As Lee recalled in his memoirs, I replied equally directly that we feared that at some time or other there could be a random act of madness like cutting off our water supplies which they had publicly threatened whenever there were differences between us . . . . If water shortage became urgent, in an emergency, we would have to go in forcibly if need be, to repair damaged pipes and machinery and restore the water flows. I was putting my cards on the table. (Lee, 2000: 276) Confirming Lee’s threats of military retaliation, former Johor Mentri Besar Mahyuddin Yassin revealed that during the water negotiations Lee Kuan Yew

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 141 threatened to take military action if Singapore’s water supply from Johor was terminated.108 As discussed in Chapter 4, this military retaliation entails securing Singapore’s water supplies by taking over some reservoirs and water treatment plants in Johor (Huxley, 2000: 249). This strategy is also driven by the historical lessons of the Second World War – whereby the fall of Singapore to the Japanese was hastened by the limited water supplies after the British blew up the causeway and with it the water pipes from Johor to Singapore (Kong, 2002: 25). Placing the issue of Singapore’s military retaliation within a broader security context, Huxley has noted that water is fundamental to Singapore’s survivability and its denial would effectively shut down the Singaporean economy: ‘Singapore’s neighbours understand only too well that any direct interference with its vital interests (such as water supply) would court a military response’ (Huxley, 2000: 249). Lee’s claim that the Singapore government has been provoked into adopting its security approach is better understood when placed within the context of repeated Malaysian threats to cut off Johor’s water supplies to Singapore during periods of diplomatic tension. Malaysia’s water leverage over Singapore has long been recognised in political and diplomatic circles, prompting then British High Commissioner to KL, Anthony Head, to notify Canberra just after separation that: ‘Tunku said that if Singapore’s foreign policy was prejudicial to Malaysia’s interests, they [Malaysia] could always bring pressure to bear on them [Singapore] by threatening to turn off the water in Johore’.109 Indeed, at the height of regional protests over the controversial visit to Singapore of the Israeli President in 1986, Malaysian politicians, UMNO youth leaders, and opposition officials called for the termination of water supplies to Singapore (Huxley, 2000: 210). When Mahathir railed against Singapore’s insistence that Malaysia’s CIQ services be relocated from Tanjong Pagar at a rally in Johor Baru in 1998, he pointed out the irony of Malaysian customs officers being ‘asked to leave Singapore while we supply them water’. The crowd responded angrily with chants of ‘Cut, Cut, Cut’.110 Similar threats of cutting water supplies to Singapore were made at an UMNO rally in early 2001. To mitigate Malaysia’s leveraging of water in bilateral negotiations and reduce Singapore’s resource vulnerability, initiatives geared towards desecuritising the water issue have made considerable progress. They include optimising domestic water yields from MacRitchie, Pierce and Seletar Reservoirs; implementing conservation measures such as the use of low capacity flushing cisterns; pricing mechanisms; public education; and developing alternative water supplies, recycling waste water and desalination (Long, 2001: 504–532). Half of Singapore’s total land area has been turned into catchment areas for the collection of storm water while all Housing and Development Board (HDB) New Towns are constructed with a complex storm water collection system. Recycled water from treated sewage effluent, called NEWater, is supplied to industrial facilities such as water intensive wafer fabrication plants (Lim, 2002: 62). By 2010, Singapore is expected to complete its construction of desalination and waste-water recycling plants which will help meet much of its domestic water requirements (Long, 2001: 509). Encouraged by these achievements, the Singapore government has indicated that it will not renew the

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first water agreement which expires in 2011. When the second water agreement expires in 2061, Singapore is expected to be self-sufficient in water.111 By then, water is not expected to be a major national insecurity issue.

Zig-zagging towards closer cooperation? Bilateral relations between Singapore and Malaysia moved swiftly towards greater economic cooperation shortly after Abdullah Badawi became Prime Minister in October 2003. Both governments have pragmatically placed the more problematic outstanding issues such as water negotiations, airspace rights of the Singapore airforce, and the fate of Malaysian railway land in Singapore on the backburner in order to focus on less contentious areas. On a visit to Singapore in October 2003, Abdullah Badawi suggested that bilateral ties could be improved ‘by getting some things resolved rather than [putting] everything . . . in that one package and nothing [gets] resolved . . . so we have to pluck some low-hanging fruits before the ‘musang’ (civet cat) comes and takes them away’ (Kesavapany, 2006: 277–278). Acknowledging the pragmatic turn in bilateral relations, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar suggested in July 2004 that ‘There has been a lot of self-restraint on both sides in trying not to bring up issues that may create misunderstanding’112 and that the improved relationship would benefit the region as ‘. . . we can contribute so much more to ASEAN than we are doing individually’.113 Illustrative of the warming of bilateral relations, Malaysian Trade and Industry Minister Rafidah Aziz noted during a July 2004 visit to Singapore that cooperation between both countries was required in view of the growing competition for foreign investment from China and India. She counselled both sides to ‘. . . cherish the long established links without having this excess baggage to carry into this generation . . . [and joked that] . . . Now it is contingent on us . . . [to] get married again’.114 Responding positively to suggestions of ridding excess baggage and rekindling past nuptial arrangements, Rafidah’s Singapore counterpart George Yeo acknowledged that, ‘There is strong political will to improve bilateral relations, especially bilateral economic relations’.115 Adding substance to the rhetoric, a joint RM10 million fund was established to allow for companies from both sides to embark on joint international trade missions, with the first joint mission travelling to Indonesia in August 2004.116 Following Rafidah and Yeo’s meeting, officials from the GIC engaged in discussions with their counterparts from Khazanah Nasional for possible cooperation and joint investments in overseas markets such as China and Indonesia.117 In keeping with this spirit of cooperation, the earlier economic nationalist goal of transforming Malaysia into a regional financial centre by allowing offshore banks and financial companies operating in Labuan, Sabah to establish marketing services in Johor Baru118 have been downplayed. However, Malaysia and Singapore continue to covet the status of regional hub for Islamic banking services with the aim of tapping into the growing multi-billion dollar Islamic banking market. Following the MAS granting approval for banks to offer a form of Islamic financing called Murabaha, in 2005 Singapore was made a full member of the Islamic

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 143 Financial Services Board, an international body that sets regulatory standards for the industry.119 To boost the trading volumes for Southeast Asia’s biggest bourses, the Singapore and KL Stock Exchanges have formed cross-trading arrangements. This would allow investors in Singapore and Malaysia to trade electronically in shares listed on each other’s markets. As Malaysian equities accounted for up to half of Singapore’s Stock Exchange turnover in the 1990s, this new arrangement is expected to further stimulate its trading volume.120 Trade cooperation was accorded priority during Lee Hsien Loong’s first visit to Putrajaya as Prime Minister in October 2004. Prime Ministers Lee and Abdullah expressed strong support for strengthening bilateral cooperation in emerging markets such as China, Indonesia, India and Bangladesh; exploring tourism and airtransportation cooperation; and jointly fighting epidemics.121 Shortly after, a tourist development fund of S$2 billion was established to promote both countries as a joint-tourist destination. A Singapore–Malaysia Third Country Business Development Fund worth RM10 million was formed to encourage Singaporean and Malaysian firms to undertake joint feasibility studies for projects in third countries. In early 2005, MAS, SIA and SilkAir allowed the cross-selling of seats to customers wishing to fly to selected Malaysian destinations in Sabah, Sarawak, Penang and Kedah (Kesavapany, 2006: 283–284). There has been a significant shift in the Malaysian government’s long-standing approach of restricting Singapore government acquisitions in ‘sensitive’ industries such as banks and telecommunications. In March 2004, Singapore’s state investment company Temasek Holdings was allowed to take a 5 per cent interest in Malaysia’s largest listed company Telekom Malaysia. By January 2005, an MOU was signed to waive the testing of telecommunications equipment traded between both countries. Inter alia, the price of some models of telecommunications equipment is expected to significantly fall.122 In mid-2004, GIC Real Estate Pte Ltd bought a 70 per cent stake in JB City Square and a 5 per cent stake in Garmuda Berhad, one of Malaysia’s largest construction companies (Kesavapany, 2006: 282). Later that year, Malaysia’s Bank Negara (Central Bank) approved Temasek’s bid to buy up to 30 per cent of Malaysian Plantations, effectively making it a shareholder of the Alliance Bank as the latter is owned by Malaysian Plantations. This marks the first time ever that a Singaporean state company has been permitted to control a substantial stake in a Malaysian financial institution.123 In late 2004, Temasek subsidiary Mapletree Capital Management (MCM) formalised its joint venture with Malaysian Investment Bank to form Malaysia’s first private institutional real estate fund called CIMB-Mapletree Management. This tie-up is expected to assist MCM’s profile as a major property fund manager in the region.124 Between 2004 and 2006, Temasek Holdings and GIC accounted for two-thirds of Singapore’s investment in Malaysia (Kesavapany, 2006: 282). Malaysian acquisitions of Singaporean assets have also been significant since the warming in bilateral relations. For example, Malaysian conglomerate Sime Darby acquired a 29.9 per cent stake in Singaporean shipbuilding company Jaya Holdings. Malaysian shipping company MISC bought into American Eagle

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Tankers, a company belonging to Singapore’s Neptune Orient Lines. In early 2005, the Scomi Group acquired marine assets of Singaporean shipping company Chuan Hup Holdings. Malaysian Investment Bank bought a major stake in Singapore’s leading stockbroker GK Goh. In mid-2005, Malaysian state investment arm, Khazanah Malaysia, teamed up with Telekom Malaysia to buy a 24 per cent stake in Singapore’s Mobile One Ltd (Kesavapany, 2006: 282–283). Notably, the successful bid of the Malaysian-based company Genting International and Star Cruises Consortium for the lucrative integrated resort and casino in Singapore’s Sentosa Island in 2006 represented a major ‘shot-in-the-arm’ for bilateral relations. The S$5.2 billion project was the biggest Malaysian investment in Singapore. Another clear indication that bilateral relations have stabilised is the ongoing negotiation between officials from PTP and PSA to pool their comparative advantages, the former in cost advantage and land bank and the latter in its connectivity and port management. This is a clear indication of a shift towards a relationship based on strategic alliance.125 In keeping with the flurry of bilateral agreements, the Singaporean and Malaysian governments agreed to cooperate in seeking an amicable solution to the protracted land reclamation dispute following the completion of two expert reports instigated by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in November 2004.126 By 2005, negotiators for both sides issued a statement that an agreement on the reclamation dispute had been reached without revealing specific details.127 The statement affirmed that the two countries agreed that the Straits constituted ‘a shared water body’, recognised a common interest in cooperating to ensure the safety of navigation and held a common interest in protecting the environment.128 Exchange of information would be undertaken through regular talks between the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, the Johor Port Authority and the Joint Committee on the Environment. At any rate, this ‘settlement’ has effectively stopped both parties from pursuing arbitration proceedings through ITLOS. To promote relations, the Education Ministries of both states have initiated programmes to bring together secondary school students in joint activities such as adventure and information technology camps. After a hiatus of seven years, joint television productions have been resumed. In April 2005, Singapore’s MediaCorp and Radio Televisyen Malaysia held a Muzika Ekstravagenza in Singapore (Kesavapany, 2006: 278). A Singapore Consulate has been opened in Johor in anticipation of Singapore’s involvement in the IDR project. The strengthening of bilateral relations, as demonstrated by the rebuilding of comprehensive channels of cooperation at the government to government level, has rekindled underlying sentiments favouring greater economic cooperation and eventual re-merger. Instructively, this simmering re-merger issue is commonly discussed in website chatrooms129 and periodically raised by economists, academics and politicians.

Iskandar development region: deepening economic integration? The economic transformation of southern Johor had been seized upon by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi to rebut critics that his administration lacked the mega

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 145 projects and vision required to re-energise the economy back to its pre-1997 dynamism. In many respects, IDR’s 2,217 sq. km zone, stretching northwards from the southernmost tip of Johor, was for Abdullah Badawi what the Multimedia Super Corridor represented to Mahathir Mohamad.130 Others have referred to the IDR as ‘Abdullah’s Langkawi’, akin to Mahathir’s pet project of developing Langkawi Island from a sleepy hollow to a tourist magnet. Purportedly the country’s biggest project, the IDR is to include a new administrative centre for Johor, new industrial zones, a waterfront development and luxury residential areas. Prominently earmarked under the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–2010), southern Johor is set to become a metropolis in the footsteps of China’s Shenzhen – with the targeting of industries in ICT, education, medicine, marine technology, tourism and other services.131 Acknowledging that southern Johor’s infrastructural improvements are strongly geared towards attracting investments from Singapore, where land and labour costs are higher, the state’s Chief Minister Abdul Ghani Othman boasted in 2005 that ‘because of our strategic location, Johor today has what it takes to compete with Singapore’.132 In November 2006, Abdullah formally christened the economic development zone of southern Johor with promises that the Federal Government, together with the state investment arm Khazanah Nasional, the Employers Provident Fund and the private sector, would invest in the IDR. Of particular interest to Singapore are the conciliatory statements of Johor’s outspoken Chief Minister Ghani Othman, arguably motivated by the calculation that the IDR’s success will be strongly assisted by huge injections of foreign investment. This conciliatory mood stems from the recognition that foreign investment has not returned to Malaysia in a significant way after the regional economic crisis – due in no small measure to the allure of China and misgivings arising from the limited post-crisis economic reforms (Case, 2005: 306). With these realities at hand, Johor’s Chief Minister has enjoined Singaporeans to invest in the IDR and envisions the project in win-win terms: ‘There’s a relationship of complementarity between the two, of growth centre and hinterland, I accept that . . . like Shenzhen and Hong Kong, the IDR and Singapore will feed off each other, to our mutual prosperity’.133 Responding positively to these overtures, Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo has called for Singaporeans and Malaysians to work together on the IDR on the basis of mutual respect and benefit.134 In particular, Johor provides the small and resource poor city-state with the opportunity of an economic hinterland to sustain its economic dynamism. However, many UMNO Johoreans are unhappy not just with the anticipated strong Singaporean participation in the IDR but also the proposed liberalisation of rules governing foreign investment, seeing the latter as an attack on Malay special rights. Seizing on this issue, as part of his larger political campaign against Abdullah Badawi, Mahathir has joined forces with disgruntled UMNO Johor politicians. Recasting the issue in neo-colonial terms and evoking deep-seated Malay insecurities of economic and political subordination, the former Prime Minister warned that if the community was not vigilant, Malays would be sidelined by the IDR: ‘If we give more land to Singapore, one day we would lose south Johor

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just like we lost Singapore’.135 Yet under Mahathir’s watch, foreign investment rules had been relaxed for the Multimedia Super Corridor.136

Conclusion Economic and ethno-nationalist sentiments held by policy elites in Malaysia and Singapore have in no small measure contributed to the enduring roller-coaster nature of bilateral relations. Since merger and separation, both countries have exhibited an almost obsessive tendency to compete in economic terms – Singapore intent on staying ahead in the regional economic race and Malaysia determined to not only catch up with Singapore but attain industrial economy status by 2020. As the economic gap between the neighbouring states narrows, bilateral tensions have become intense – particularly with the promulgation of ambitious goals such as Wawasan 2020 and projects such as the Multimedia Super Corridor, Kuala Lumpur International Airport and Port of Tanjung Pelepas. These competitive economic tensions have been aggravated further by Singapore’s reliance on cheap Malaysian water supplies. To be sure, Singapore’s natural resource needs are likely to intensify with disclosures that the city-state’s population will increase to six million. The geo-economics of Singapore’s mounting resource demands on neighbouring countries and its detrimental environmental and social effects, at the national and regional levels, is beyond the scope of this study, but certainly worthy of further investigation. Yet as the warming in bilateral relations during the Abdullah Badawi administration demonstrates, economic competition between neighbouring states can also be tempered by cooperative economic measures and deepening bilateral investments. Indeed, the strengthening links between business elites and GLCs across the causeway have ensured that they remain each other’s top trade and investment partners. However, despite the thawing of bilateral relations, many issues remain unresolved – the price of water sold to Singapore, ongoing restrictions on the sale of sand to Singapore, banning of Singapore military access to Malaysian airspace and a stalemate in the status of Malaysian railway land in Singapore. Both countries share the reputation of being Southeast Asia’s highest economic achievers – a status attributed to their hybrid developmental states committed to continuous industrial and technological upgrading and building a knowledge economy. Moreover, both countries remain authoritarian states that ironically lag politically behind the less industrialised, but fledgling democracies of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. It would appear that Malaysia and Singapore have much more in common than they care to acknowledge. Has the negative historical baggage of the tumultuous merger and separation years become a less potent factor in shaping contemporary bilateral relations with the ascendency of younger generation political leaders in the PAP and BN not directly associated with those historical disputes? To be sure, the continued exploitation of communal politics on both sides of the causeway has ensured that the historical baggage from the merger years, as manifested in the balas dendam complex, remains potent. Moreover, the omnipotence of Lee Kuan Yew and his son

The politics of economic competition and cooperation 147 Lee Hsien Loong in Singapore arguably present a structural impediment to a qualitative shift in bilateral relations. In addition to their historical baggage and a tendency towards adopting legalistic approaches when conducting bilateral relations, the Lees are utterly committed towards maintaining Singapore’s edge in the regional economic race. In particular, their commitment to maintaining and widening Singapore’s economic lead has reinforced the PAP government’s image as selfishly engaging in kiasu economics and diplomacy – in contrast to Malaysia’s reputation as a champion of developing economies. Singapore’s status as the economic hub of the Chinese diaspora has also had an unsettling effect on elements within the UMNO elite who are strongly driven by ethno-nationalist sentiments. In an era characterised by the intensification of globalisation, will pragmatism prevail in strongly shaping future bilateral relations? Barring a serious political or economic crisis, recent diplomatic trajectories suggests that pragmatic economic considerations will continue to hold sway. The Malaysian and Singaporean leadership both recognise that globalisation has not only raised new challenges but also widened the prospects of developing regional economic alliances with Northeast, South and West Asia in the interest of ASEAN. Lee Kuan Yew reminded his Malaysian audience during a visit to KL in August 2000 that ‘With Southeast Asia in disarray and Northeast Asia pulling ahead, Malaysia and Singapore are in a position, together with the other original ASEAN members, to help restore ASEAN’s standing as an economic partner of the G-7 countries . . . In ASEAN, only Malaysia and Singapore are prepared for the New Economy’.137 Echoing these sentiments six years later, then Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak urged Malaysian and Singaporean businesses to join forces to venture offshore in view of the competition from countries such as China and India in the increasingly competitive global economy: ‘But if we choose to remain aloof, to go it alone, we risk being torn apart by the competition . . . . Whether we like it or not, our two countries are joined at the hip’.138 The dictates of globalisation suggests that an expedient ‘give-and-take’ approach between regional states may well become a matter of economic necessity, rendering profound the adage that geography is destiny.

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The singa and garuda From kiasu to soft power diplomacy?

Of amity and enmity Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have been referred to as Southeast Asia’s security (Emmerson, 1996: 82), economic and intellectual core that are critical to the resilience of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Alagappa (1991: 17–22) and Andrew Tan (2004) purport that as security perspectives in the Malay World are intertwined, they cannot be analysed without reference to these states. The strong economic links between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore reinforces the concept of a core within ASEAN (Stubbs, 1992). Relations between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore contain cross-currents of amity and enmity – with the potential for serious conflict if not carefully managed. Hegemonic impulses, hostilities and insecurities have been fuelled by the huge disparity in size, resource endowments and economic achievements between the states. In particular, Indonesia’s status as the largest and most populous country in Southeast Asia has instilled its leaders with a sense of manifest destiny in regional leadership terms. As such, President Sukarno considered Indonesia as not only the pre-eminent force in the Southeast Asian region but a ‘lighthouse’ among the Newly Emerging Forces (Nefo) in Asia and Africa (Suryadinata, 1996: 8). In many respects, Indonesia’s hosting of the historic Bandung Conference in 1955 symbolised its ‘lighthouse’ ambitions. Indonesia’s leadership pretensions were acted out in her Konfrontasi campaign from 1964–1965. The campaign involved low intensity attacks in the form of sabotage operations and terrorist attacks against Singapore and Malaysia by Indonesian commandoes. These operations were justified on the grounds that the Malaysian Federation was hatched as a neo-colonial ploy to protect British geostrategic and economic interests. The retention of British military facilities in Singapore and the extension of the 1957 Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement, which incorporated all of the territories in the Malaysian Federation (Andrew Tan, 2004: 130), confirmed Indonesian suspicions that the British were intent on a policy of encirclement geared towards undermining Nefo states such as Indonesia. On the other hand, the experiences of Konfrontasi led Malaysia and Singapore to harbour apprehensions towards the populous and politically volatile Indonesia, justifying the continued existence of the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), formalised in 1971 after the withdrawal of British forces from Singapore.1

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 149 As elaborated in Chapter 4, Singapore’s ethnic complexion, location and diminutive size have contributed to its siege mentality and encirclement complex. This complex has been reinforced by the deep-seated regional ethno-nationalist sentiments which have on numerous occasions been expressed in anti-Chinese terms. Exclusive Pan-Malay regional consciousness has been articulated in the short-lived ethnic-based confederation Malphilindo (an acronym for Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia) mooted by the Philippines in 1963 and supported by Indonesia. This proposed regional confederation of Malay states, reminiscent of the Melayu Raya2 ideal of the colonial era, was geared towards promoting greater consultation on regional issues and encouraging regional states to promote an autonomous regional order. In explaining Indonesia’s support for the regional confederation, Dewi Fortuna Anwar reminds us that, ‘Through Malphilindo, Indonesia therefore, tried to spread its free and active [bebas aktif] foreign policy doctrine into the region’ (Anwar, 1992: 6). It is worth noting that the proposed confederation was also implicitly driven by concerns over the loyalty and economic dominance of Chinese in the region. Expressing his fear of regional Malay states acting in unison, Lee denounced Malphilindo as a ‘racialist conspiracy’ to undermine the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia (Suryanarayan, 1969: 86). In addition to the tumultuous merger years, Singapore’s exclusion from negotiations between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur to bring Konfrontasi to a close intensified the fear of encirclement. Lee Kuan Yew had apparently sought assurance from Tunku Abdul Rahman that Malaysia and Indonesia would not turn against Singapore (Regnier, 1990: 146). Lee’s paranoia of Malay encirclement was exposed shortly after independence when he announced that ‘Our long-term survival demands that there is no government in Malaysia that goes with Indonesia. Life would be very difficult if I found myself between Malaysia and Indonesia’ (Leifer, 2000: 58). The PAP leadership’s encirclement complex has rendered imperative the avoidance of concurrent tensions with its immediate neighbours to the north and south. Thus, any warming of relations between Indonesia and Malaysia is closely monitored and viewed with considerable trepidation (Leifer, 2000: 5). Explaining the PAP leadership’s angst, Chan noted that for the PAP, ‘the threat to Singapore’s survival comes not from a belligerent Indonesia or a hostile Malaysia but from a possible union of all the Malay peoples in the region’ (Chan, 1971). This chapter examines the mercurial trajectory of Singapore–Indonesia relations, from the reservoir of social capital accrued during Indonesia’s nationalist struggle for independence to the tenuous relations during the Sukarno presidency and the generally cordial ties during the current Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) administration. Bilateral relations during the authoritarian New Order regime are examined in the context of the personal rapport between Lee Kuan Yew and Suharto. Confronted by its troubled relations with Malaysia, the Singapore government appeared willing to play the junior partner to Indonesia as long as its economic and security interests and resource needs were safeguarded. However, in the more transparent political environment of the post-New Order era bilateral

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tensions have re-emerged – fuelled by the long-held apprehensions associated with Singapore’s reliance on Indonesia’s natural resources and labour. These tensions have been complicated further by the reluctance of the authoritarian Singaporean government to conduct bilateral relations in accordance to the dictates of Indonesia’s assertive legislative assembly, energetic civil society and probing media. Lastly, the parallels between Singapore’s mercurial relations with her larger, more strongly pluralistic and resource rich neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, are considered.

Singapura: in and of the Nusantara The city-state’s preoccupation with Malay encirclement is ironic in view of its historical embeddedness within the Malay World. In the pre-colonial era, Singapore was integral to kingdoms within the Malay World such as Sri Vijaya, Majapahit and, just prior to Singapore’s colonisation, Johor-Riau. In the decades preceding and following the Second World War, Singapore was not only the region’s cosmopolitan financial hub and entrepot but had attained a reputation as a veritable hotbed of left-wing anti-colonial activity in the Malay Archipelago. Radical Indonesian nationalists such as Tan Malaka, Raden Semaun, Alimin, Musso and Winata visited Singapore on numerous occasions and, after the failed strikes in Semarang and Surabaya in 1925, designated Singapore their operational base. Indeed, it was in Singapore that Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) leaders Alimin, Musso and Subakat planned the 1926/1927 anti-colonial rebellions in Java and Sumatra. Tan Malaka is believed to have assisted in the formation of the left-wing Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) in 1945 (Cheah, 2003: 279). Journalists and writers were also attracted to the island’s reputation as a literary, publishing and theatrical centre in the Nusantara (Malay World). In addition to literature, theatrical performances and bangsawan (Malay opera) were highly politicised during the pre-war and post-war period. In Singapore, a well-known theatrical group Bolero, led by Indonesian political fugitive Bakhtiar, propagated anti-colonial themes in plays that were symbolically performed at the Istana Kampong Glam. As performance arts became one of the last refuges for anti-colonial activity after the war, Sandiwara (theatrical) companies became the propaganda arms of the radical MNP with its leader Ahmad Boestamam directing plays that depicted the Indonesian independence struggle in heroic terms (Harper, 1999: 290). Caught up in this politicised social environment, actors in vogue such as P. Ramlee performed in films with an overt social message, boldly declaring ‘My art is not for money, my art is for society’ (Harper, 1999: 290). Left Malay nationalists were strongly influenced by the Indonesian anti-colonial nationalist movements and supportive of the Melayu and Indonesia Raya (or Greater Indonesia) ideal. This ideal was premised on the political union of Indonesia with Malaya in accordance with the expansive territorial reach of precolonial and pre-Islamic kingdoms such as Sri Vijaya and Majapahit.3 Importantly, the ideal was also supported by leading Indonesian nationalists such as A.H. Nasution and Muhammad Yamin who were keen to incorporate the Malay

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 151 Peninsula into the struggle for an independent Indonesian nation-state. In his notable Pancasila speech delivered on 1 June, 1945, Sukarno referred to Sri Vijaya and Majapahit, which included Malaya, Singapore, Borneo and the Dutch East Indies, as the atavistic ‘united Indonesian states’ (Suryadinata, 1996: 6). Farish Noor has insightfully commented on the significance of the Melayu and Indonesia Raya ideal as representing not only a nostalgic return to the past but just as importantly encapsulating ‘the traumatic manner in which the Indo–Malay World had been torn apart by treaties and pacts agreed upon by foreign powers that had descended upon Malay people and their homeland’.4 In the ‘European ruled Chinese city’ (Turnbull, 1977: 100) of Singapore, where Malay insecurity was amplified by their rapidly declining numerical and socio-economic status, the Melayu and Indonesia Raya ideal was widely supported. Fired up by the Melayu and Indonesia Raya ideal, hundreds of Malay youth were alleged to have been recruited to serve in the Republican Army in Sumatra and Java. Prominent Sumatran born community leader and medical practitioner in Singapore Gaus Mahyuddin was instrumental in forming the short-lived Peritia Penolong Kemerekaan Indonesia (PPKI or Committee of Supporters of Indonesian Independence) geared towards supporting the Indonesian nationalist struggle.5 Other well-known local personalities supportive of the republican struggle included Saadon bin Jubir, who was a member of the Singapore Legislative Council, and Samad Ismail, Deputy Editor of the newspaper Utusan Melayu. In the course of his pro-republican activities, which involved smuggling arms and foodstuffs to Indonesia, Samad developed personal relations with senior republican leaders such as Adam Malik, Sutan Sjahrir, Agoes Salim and A.K. Ghani. Chinese traders from Singapore were also readily drawn into the lucrative smuggling trade with Indonesian nationalists. Indeed, Singapore’s multifaceted role in the republican struggle contributed to its reputation as the ‘third front’ in the Indonesian revolution (Yong, 2003: 1). Indonesian nationalists operating from Singapore and Malaya were strongly supported by local Malays. Senior British administrators were also inclined to turn a blind eye to the clandestine activities of these Indonesian nationalists and their local supporters (Suryono, 1992). The republican government was allowed to maintain a diplomatic mission and establish trading agencies despite Dutch opposition. Illustrative of the tacit British support for the republican cause, Indonesian nationalist leader Sutan Sjahrir stayed in Singapore for two weeks as Lord Killearn’s guest and then traveled to Australia in the company of a British diplomat.6 It was not uncommon for customs and immigration officials to be lax with undocumented republican agents entering Singapore. Once in Singapore, these agents were able to easily disperse unnoticed within the local Malay community. Robust support for the republican anti-colonial struggle was clearly demonstrated when 30,000 Malays greeted the republican Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir at the Singapore airport while he was on his way back to Jakarta from a visit to India (Yong, 2003: 78). In Singapore, regular assaults were directed against Dutch soldiers when they ventured out of their military barracks. Dockyard workers apparently refused to service Dutch ships berthed in Singapore wharves (Yong,

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2003: 58–61). Malay dailies such as the Singapore-based Utusan Melayu were overtly supportive of the Indonesian struggle for independence and by the mid1940s no longer referred to Indonesian republican forces as pengganis (terrorists) (Hassan, 1987: 11). Instructively, Utusan’s symbol on its front page was the clenched fist, similar to those in Indonesian nationalist papers.

Rocky relations: the Sukarno years Indonesia’s relationship with Singapore and Malaysia during Sukarno’s presidency (1945–1965) was strongly coloured by the perception of the Alliance and the PAP governments as conservative neo-colonial entities beholden to Western interests. This perception was shaped by the Indonesian nationalists having to struggle for independence in contrast to their counterparts to the north who were thought to have been virtually handed theirs on a ‘silver platter’. The intentions of the Malayan leadership was also deemed suspect because of the sanctuary given to Indonesian secessionist rebels in Malaya in the late 1950s.7 As Sukarno became increasingly estranged from the West, the Konfrontasi campaign, based on small-scale guerilla warfare tactics, was carried out in Malaya and Singapore. Jakarta’s irreverent attitude towards the British colonial authorities and Malayan political elites was encouraged further by Singapore’s regional entrepot function which included the illegal trading of Indonesian primary commodities. The smuggling of primary commodities by Chinese traders based in Singapore and tolerated by the British authorities, angered Jakarta (Poulgrain, 1998: 65). As Singapore was perceived as little more than a centre of illicit trade that had become prosperous at the expense of Indonesia, trade restrictions geared towards undermining Singapore’s entrepot role were imposed. The island was also perceived as a cultural, educational and economic centre of regional overseas Chinese thereby making it more difficult for the Indonesian government to assimilate its own Chinese community (Lee, 1993: 315). So ingrained were the negative perceptions of Singapore that initial attempts by the PAP leadership to foster better relations with Jakarta proved ineffectual. These attempts include Lee Kuan Yew’s 1960 goodwill mission to Jakarta, principally intended to assure Sukarno that the PAP government was committed to securing Indonesia’s security and supporting her claim to West Irian. Despite these benevolent intentions, the Singaporean delegation was treated shabbily. Recounting the humiliating episode, Lee Khoon Choy, a member of the Singaporean delegation and later Singapore’s ambassador to Indonesia wrote, We waited at least 20 minutes in the lounge of the President’s office before Sukarno appeared . . . Less than half an hour later, he arose, posed for a group picture, bade us farewell and returned to his office. It seemed to me that Sukarno was arrogantly accepting our presence as homage from a small country. (Lee, 1988: 60)

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 153 The Indonesian leadership’s resentment against Singapore profiteering from the smuggling of Indonesian natural resources was expressed by Foreign Minister Subandrio during a brief visit to Singapore in 1963. Subandrio apparently pronounced to Lee Kuan Yew, ‘Look at the tall buildings in Singapore. They are all built with Indonesian money, stolen from Indonesians through smuggling. But never mind, one day Indonesia will come here and look after this country and put things right’ (Lee, 2000: 295). Yet these slights did not dampen Lee’s determination to improve bilateral relations. There was too much at stake, particularly in economic and security terms. A Singaporean trade and cultural office in Jakarta was opened in August 1961. The following year, 30 volunteers were sent to support Indonesia’s campaign to incorporate West Irian into the republic (Wilairat, 1975: 8). These Singaporean measures stood in contrast to the Malaysian leadership’s less than supportive stance towards Indonesia’s West Irian campaign.

Reordering bilateral relations: the New Order years Even with the termination of Indonesia’s Konfrontasi campaign and the elevation of Suharto to the Presidency, Singapore–Indonesia relations remained problematic. This was due in large part to the 1967 execution of two Indonesian marines convicted of murdering three civilians who died from wounds inflicted by the bombing of an office building in Singapore. Suharto, together with Tunku Abdul Rahman and other regional leaders, had unsuccessfully appealed to the Singaporean government for clemency (George, 1974: 173). In particular, Suharto felt incensed by the intransigence of the Singaporean leadership after working hard at bringing diplomatic relations to an even keel following Konfrontasi (Lee, 1993: 253). Just as the intransigent attitude of the PAP leadership towards the execution of the marines had perplexed regional leaders, Lee was similarly perplexed by Suharto’s personal affront. He had apparently believed that Suharto’s appeal for clemency was primarily driven by political formality.8 As with the Malaysian leadership during the merger years, Lee had misread the political calculations of the Indonesian leadership. The PAP leadership’s repeated intransigence in the face of high-level diplomatic pleas for clemency is premised on the belief that if it yielded to pressure by larger neighbours, the city-state would be subjected to future bullying. This premise was frankly acknowledged by Lee in his memoirs: If we yielded, then the rule of law not only within Singapore but between our neighbours and Singapore would become meaningless as we would always be open to pressure . . . then our neighbours, whether Indonesia or Malaysia, could walk over us with impunity after 1971. (Lee, 2000: 37) 1971 refers to the year when the British announced that they would be withdrawing their military base, leaving Singapore without a formidable foreign security guarantor.

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Following the execution of the Indonesian marine commandos, bilateral relations nose-dived. The Singapore embassy in Jakarta was ransacked, anti-Singapore rallies held and demands for retaliation erupted from various sections of Indonesian society. Moreover, the Indonesian Navy saw fit to hold exercises off Singapore’s coast (George, 1974: 173). The sudden incapacitation of Singapore’s ambassador from a heart attack after his residence was ransacked dramatised the total collapse in bilateral diplomatic relations. Anti-Singapore protests degenerated into antiChinese riots in Surabaya in Java and Djambi in Sumatra (Lee, 2000: 297). Notorious for his absences during periods of intense diplomatic tension with neighbouring countries, Lee ‘happened’ to be in Tokyo during the execution of the Indonesian marines. Reminiscent of Kuala Lumpur’s economic nationalist initiatives to override Singapore’s entrepot services, Jakarta also attempted to reduce its reliance on Singapore’s entrepot and other economic activities. Located only 20 km south of Singapore, Batam Island was developed as a logistics centre for foreign oil companies. By 1971, Batam was designated as an entrepot and industrial area (Anwar, 1994: 167). Not long after, the Indonesian government moved its warehouses from Singapore to Batam and began to rely less on Singaporean oil refineries by building its own facilities (Anwar, 1994: 294). Paralleling Malaysia’s concern with the city-state’s rapid militarisation, relations with Indonesia were strained by its choice of the Israeli military model. Importantly, the adoption of the Israeli model provocatively implied that the relationship between the predominantly Chinese island and her larger neighbours was akin to Israel’s tempestuous relations with her Muslim neighbours (George, 1974: 170). These concerns were conveyed by Suharto’s senior advisor General Sumitro during a visit to Singapore in 1970. Recounting Sumitro’s concerns, former Singaporean ambassador to Indonesia Lee Khoon Choy wrote that, Sumitro also wanted to know why Singapore had engaged Israeli military advisers and instructors. He said he gathered information that Singapore’s position was the same as that of Israel in the Middle East. He also expressed the concern that Singapore would develop into a country like Israel with similar policies in Southeast Asia. (Lee, 1993: 253) Driven by geostrategic and economic considerations, the PAP leadership was determined to foster closer relations with their Indonesian counterparts. When Singapore’s ambassador Lee Khoon Choy advised Lee that an effective way of forging warmer personal relations with Suharto was to place flowers on the graves of the executed marines, the pragmatic Prime Minister Lee did just that.9 Attired in batik during his official visit to Indonesia in May 1973, Lee placed wreaths on the graves of the marines at the Kalibata memorial for national heroes. This symbolic display of atonement had according to Ambassador Lee Khoon Choy, ‘won over many Indonesians hearts and was the key to the turning point of better relations between the two countries’ (Lee, 1993: 271). The warming of bilateral relations

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 155 was demonstrated by Suharto’s official visit to Singapore in August 1974. Greeted with a 21 gun salute and a 400 man military guard of honour, Suharto’s relations with Lee henceforth moved from strength to strength.

Invasion of East Timor: janus-faced diplomacy A kink in the otherwise strengthening bilateral relations occurred after Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975. Fearing that the city-state could be ‘Timorised’ by larger neighbours, Singapore abstained from the December 1975 United Nations resolution deploring Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor and demanding that it withdraw its forces without delay. Singapore’s abstention stood in stark contrast to the compliant stance of other ASEAN states towards Indonesia. Mindful that a ‘second chill’ had descended on Singapore–Indonesia relations (Lee, 2000: 304), Lee took great pains to explain Singapore’s UN abstention to Suharto during his 1976 visit to the city-state. Lee wrote, ‘I said Singapore would not put obstacles in the way of Indonesia’s day-to-day relations with Timor, we accepted Timor as part of Indonesia, but we could not publicly endorse its invasion and occupation’ as it would ‘send the world a wrong signal about our security’ (Lee, 2000: 304). Yet when the invasion of East Timor was debated once again at the UN in 1976, Singapore voted with the other ASEAN states in opposing the resolution calling for Indonesia’s withdrawal.10 To ensure that the ‘second chill’ in bilateral relations dissipated, Lee provided Suharto with the long sought after bilateral trade statistics to assist the Indonesia government in curtailing smuggling activities. However, these trade figures were provided on an unofficial basis and on condition that they remained confidential (Lee, 2000: 304). It is worth noting that Suharto’s willingness to establish closer ties with Singapore was in part driven by a belief widely held by the Indonesian leadership that an economically robust and independent Singapore could discourage Southeast Asian Chinese from remaining loyal to either Beijing or Taipei. Prolongation of this divided loyalty was perceived to be a source of instability for the countries in which the Chinese resided. A Singapore Chinese population that was primarily loyal to Singapore was viewed as a good model for Chinese communities in Southeast Asia (Lee, 1993: 249). To reinforce Jakarta’s preference for the Singapore Chinese political orientation, the Singapore government was careful to establish formal diplomatic ties with the PRC only after Indonesia had done so.

Triangular crosscurrents Singapore’s close relations with Jakarta during the New Order years were strongly driven by the need to counter-balance its capricious relations with Malaysia. Improved relations also served to relieve the PAP leadership’s encirclement complex based on concurrent antagonisms with Indonesia and Malaysia (Leifer, 2000: 5). Relations between the Singaporean and Indonesian armed forces during this period were apparently very close (Sebastian, 2005: 102). In his memoirs, Lee claimed that the PAP leadership and the Indonesian military elite shared similar views on key

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issues (Lee, 2000: 300). From 1974, biennial joint naval and air exercises and regular exchanges between officer cadet and staff colleges were instituted (Sebastian, 2005: 214–215). Singapore became the only foreign country to be granted a military presence, and by 1988 was allowed to maintain training facilities and an air weapons range at Siabu in Sumatra (Huxley, 2000: 214). In return, the Indonesian military was granted access to Singapore’s state-of-the-art military technology (Suryadinata, 1996: 10). An air combat manoeuvring range was also built with Israeli technical assistance at Siabu in 1994. Singapore had also undertaken infrastructural improvements at Pekan Baru air base to enable longer term Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) training deployments. By 1997, 7000 hectares on the island of Belitung was leased to the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to be used as a helicopter training base. Annual talks on regional security have also been held between Indonesian and Singaporean defence ministries from 1997 (Suryadinata, 1996: 214). The consolidation of security ties between Singapore and Jakarta during the Suharto era was a source of disquiet in Kuala Lumpur and perceived as a strategic manoeuvre against it. Despite Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur’s parallel geostrategic perception of Vietnam as a bulwark against a resurgent China, prior to its invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and a common enthusiasm for ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) bilateral tensions persisted. While the Indonesian government was inclined to see ZOPFAN as an instrument to demonstrate to the major powers that Southeast Asian states did not need major powers guarantees, the Malaysian government believed that ZOPFAN could only be achieved through the guarantee of major powers.11 Bilateral tensions can also be partly attributed to Malaysia’s considerable economic achievements, which by the 1980s had surpassed Indonesia. This placed pressure on Indonesia’s regional leadership credentials. Territorial disputes off the Sulawesi Sea and the large number of illegal Indonesian workers in Malaysia exacerbated tensions. Having provided sanctuary to secessionist Indonesian rebels in the late 1950s, the presence of Acehnese refugees in Malaysia has been suspiciously viewed by Jakarta as evidence of Malaysia’s tacit support for the Acehnese secessionist struggle. Suharto’s forays on to the international stage were to some extent geared towards counter-balancing Mahathir Mohamad’s relatively successful projection as the intellectual spokesperson of the Third and Muslim Worlds. Jakarta hosted two informal meetings in 1988 which attempted to unify the Cambodian factions as a prelude to UN intervention in Cambodia. When Indonesia held the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1992, Suharto called for a restructuring of the UN Security Council to better reflect the international community (Murphy, 2005: 257). In the 1990s, Indonesia hosted talks between China and ASEAN over claims to the Spratly Islands and brokered negotiations between the Filipino government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which resulted in an agreement in 1996 (Ganesan, 2005: 82). The rivalry between Mahathir and Suharto was evidenced by Indonesia’s lacklustre support for Mahathir’s ‘Asians-only’ East Asian Economic Grouping first mooted in 1990. Suharto was unwilling to antagonise Washington and continued to support APEC, a regional bloc conceived by Australia and Japan and strongly

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 157 supported by the United States. The Indonesian government, in concert with other ASEAN states eventually accepted the establishment of Mahathir’s proposal in 1991 but only as a forum (East Asian Economic Caucus) within the ambit of APEC rather than an independent economic bloc. In contrast to Malaysia’s ‘Asian only’ approach towards incipient East Asian groupings, the Indonesian and Singaporean governments successfully lobbied for the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the East Asian Summit in 2005. The ability of Malaysia’s ethnic redistributive programmes in narrowing the income disparity between the Malay and Chinese communities and fostering the rise of a sizeable Malay middle and professional class has inspired secular and Islamist oriented elements dissatisfied by the disproportionate economic clout of the Indonesian Chinese community. During the New Order era, Muslim intellectuals such as the late Nurcholish Madjid and Abdulrahman Wahid expressed support for state initiated programmes to promote the rise of a strong pribumi middle and business class (Uhlin, 1993: 528). Recognising the attraction of Malaysia’s redistributive policies within Indonesia’s intellectual circles, Mahathir Mohamad suggested that it was in Indonesia’s interest to initiate a Malaysian style wealth redistribution programme to address the country’s socio-economic tensions.12 The Malaysian redistributive model appeared more attractive especially after the 1998 anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia. Mahathir’s ambitious economic nationalist strategy of state-led industrial targetting geared towards promoting Malaysia’s technological and industrial ascendancy continues to be a source of inspiration for Indonesian policymakers. Close bilateral ties between Singapore and Jakarta has provided the latter with the levers to play Singapore off against Malaysia. For example, Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Benny Moerdani, declared in 1987 that a special relationship existed between Indonesia and Malaysia and that Indonesia would provide military assistance to Malaysia if it were attacked (Anwar, 1994: 145). Thus when Malaysia and Indonesia carried out their largest ever bilateral military exercise, code-named Malindo Darsasa in the state of Johor in August 1991, the Singapore leadership was visibly unnerved (Huxley, 2000: 46). Held virtually at the city-state’s doorstep, and close to its National Day celebrations, the Singapore leadership’s encirclement complex was evidenced by its decision to stage a large-scale military mobilisation exercise (Huxley, 2000: 46). With the termination of Konfrontasi, Indonesian teachers and academics were invited to teach in Malaysian schools and the National University of Malaysia. Symbolic of the atavistic cultural ties between Malaysians and Indonesians, in 1972 the Malay language and Bahasa Indonesia were harmonised by a common spelling system (Suryadinata, 1996: 69). During his tenure as President, Habibie described the close relations between Indonesia and Malaysia as tantamount to ‘one breath, one racial group’ (Murphy, 2005: 263). The high regard post-New Order leaders have for Mahathir was demonstrated by Megawati’s emotional tribute to him at the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali. Megawati applauded Mahathir for having ‘worked the hardest to articulate ASEAN’s vision of itself’ and having ‘strong and informed views’.13 Reiterating

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the cultural and ethnic ties between Malaysians and Indonesians at the 7th Bugis Merchants Meeting in Makassar in November 2005, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak pronounced, ‘Since we come from the same race and the same blood flows in our veins, it is imperative for us to find common ground to resolve all our differences’.14 Najib referred to Indonesia and Malaysia as the backbone of ASEAN in view of their unique geopolitical attributes.15 Periodic cultural and ethnic affirmations by Indonesian and Malaysian leaders have no doubt been closely monitored by the PAP leadership.

Lee Kuan Yew and Suharto: chemistry between autocrats The personal rapport between Lee Kuan Yew and Suharto can be attributed to their neo-feudal worldview, anti-communist sentiments during the Cold War, realist calculations, close relations with the West and Machiavellian political cunning. Both rose to power with the support of Western governments who were keen on bolstering the political standing of anti-communist leaders during the Cold War. Lee’s political ascendency corresponded with the diminution of communist and socialist political activists who were detained without trial in security operations. As discussed in Chapter 3, the British colonial authorities and Alliance leadership repeatedly intervened to ensure the political survival of Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Similarly, Suharto’s dramatic elevation to the Presidency was facilitated by the 1965 military coup which led to the ouster of Sukarno’s left-leaning government and the elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). It was also accompanied by the organised massacre of thousands of suspected communist supporters and sympathisers. Western insecurities were undoubtedly aroused by the grassroots popularity of the PKI in the post-war decades, the communist advances in Indochina and the potential loss of control over the critically important sea-lane in the Straits of Malacca. Driven by these considerations, Whitehall and Washington energetically channelled their resources towards supporting anti-communist political leaders such as Lee and Suharto. The staunchly anti-communist Lee and Suharto were supportive of Washington’s ill-fated Vietnam War campaign. They accused the PRC of supporting the Malayan Communist Party’s (MCP) guerrilla campaign in Malaya and Singapore and abetting the PKI’s supposed coup attempt in 1965. Gratified by the collapse of the left-leaning Sukarno government, Washington provided the Suharto New Order regime with more grants and credits than any other Southeast Asian country. In addition to being a major supplier of arms, many Indonesian officers received military training in the US (Anwar, 1994: 281–283). Firmly embedded in the Western geostrategic orbit during the Cold War, Lee and Suharto downgraded relations with communist and socialist states. In the post-Cold War era, both authoritarian governments continued to remain closely aligned to US strategic interests (Wanandi, 2005: 127). Lee appeared to be at ease with Suharto’s nominal Muslim (abangan) orientation and practise of Javanese customary culture (kebatinan) rooted in pre-Islamic

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 159 mystical beliefs. In contrast to the Malaysian leadership, Islam was not a major factor driving Indonesian foreign policy during much of the Suharto regime (Suryadinata, 1996: 16). For example, despite the lobbying of Foreign Minister Adam Malik, the PLO was not allowed to establish an office in Jakarta on the grounds that it would have a radicalising impact on Muslims in the country (Suryadinata, 1996: 160). The Indonesian government had apparently refused to sign the Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in the early 1970s, on the grounds that Indonesia was not an Islamic state.16 Suharto’s elevation of the quasi-secular Pancasila national ideology as the philosophical basis of all mass organisations in the mid-1980s must have heartened the secular oriented Lee. Strongly influenced by Javanese feudal and mystical beliefs, Suharto likened himself to a Javanese ruler who was entitled to monopolise and eliminate other centres of power (Elson, 2001: 301). Similarly, Lee is steeped in feudal neo-Confucian values and has remolded the technocratic PAP leadership in accordance with the traditional Chinese model of the technocratic scholar leader. Like Suharto, Lee has been quick to identify, eliminate or undermine potential centres of power in the PAP, bureaucracy and civil society. Steeped in their feudal and authoritarian worldview, Lee and Suharto distrusted the masses and were inclined to treat them like children requiring close supervision. Elson writes that for Suharto, the masses ‘were like a shiftless mob, they could attain their true humanity only if they were brought into a state of malleable passivity by strong and focused leadership – the kind that he himself provided’ (Elson, 2001: 303). Typical of authoritarian leaders, Lee and Suharto acted vindictively against their political opponents with a view to sending a clear signal to the wider society of the consequences for non-compliance. Those that have not complied with the dictates of the authoritarian state have suffered from political persecution, professional and financial ruin and judicial harassment. The militarisation of Indonesia’s bureaucracy and polity, and entrenchment of their dual functions (dwifungi) during the New Order regime, was mirrored by the influx of senior military personnel into the elite ranks of the Singaporean bureaucracy, government-linked companies and the PAP front-bench from the early 1980s. Quick to identify and seize regional opportunities, Singapore’s political and military elite astutely established close relations with influential abangan (nominal Muslim) and Christian Indonesian military officers such as Ali Murtopo and Benny Murdani and the think-tank, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Singapore’s former ambassador to Indonesia, Mushahid Ali, has acknowledged that Armed Forces Chief Benny Murdani was a close friend of the Embassy and a good friend of Singapore. He opened Indonesian airspace, sea and land to the Singapore Armed Forces for training exercises, while looking to our Air Force and Navy to be Indonesia’s eyes and ears as well. (Ali, 2005: 138) Like Suharto, these abangan and Christian senior military officers were deeply suspicious of Islamic groups. It is commonly believed that in the 1970s Suharto was

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more inclined to heed the advice of Murtopo, Murdani and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on foreign policy matters. The CSIS are also thought to have been in a position to overide the judgement of officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on various issues (Suryadinata, 1996: 42–47). Like the PAP, which sees itself as a national movement rather than a political party, Suharto’s political party Golkar moved beyond the status of a political party and was transformed into a corporatist federation of the various segments within Indonesian society which included labourers, farmers, public servants, the military and other professionals. Suharto, like the development oriented Lee, was accorded the status of Bapak Indonesia (father of modern Indonesia) due to his prioritisation of modernising the Indonesian economy (Anwar, 1994: 279). He was greatly impressed with Singapore’s economic achievements, valued Singapore’s considerable investments in Batam and Bintan and strengthened bilateral military ties. After Sukarno’s anti-Western stance, Lee must have been relieved by Suharto’s pro-Western development focus. He has generously attributed Indonesian and Southeast Asian stability and development to Suharto. In 1986, Lee pronounced that Indonesia’s concentration during the past twenty years, on economic development and social upliftment, would not have been, had he not succeeded Sukarno. His policies made it possible for ASEAN to become an organisation for constructive and cooperative relationships between members, and for the solidarity of its members in meeting external problems. (Cited in Desker, 1987: 32) Having overtly championed the cultural, economic and political rights of non-bumiputera Malaysians during the merger years, the PAP leadership has projected independent Singapore as a multiracial society where all Singaporeans enjoy equal rights. Indeed, periodic barbs have been made about the superiority of Singapore’s multiracial nation-building model compared to Malaysia’s emphasis on bumiputera special rights and redistributive programmes geared towards narrowing the interethnic gap. Yet, Lee had refrained from criticising the assimilationist policies and severe discrimination endured by the Indonesian Chinese and ethnic minorities during the New Order years. Objections were not raised following the massacre of approximately 500,000 alleged communist party supporters and 2,000 Indonesian Chinese soon after the 1965 coup. Assimilationist and discriminatory policies against Indonesian Chinese during the New Order years included the banning of Chinese schools, pressure on Chinese to adopt Indonesian names, and prohibition of Chinese characters, religious observances and cultural forms in public.17 To obtain permits or official documents, Chinese Indonesians had to show proof of citizenship even though this did not apply to indigenous Indonesians. Special codes were added to their identity cards which identified them as Chinese (Bertrand, 2004: 64-66). Suharto craftily promoted the rise of selected Indonesian Chinese conglomerates such as the Salim Group, in part because they did not threaten his hegemony owing

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 161 to their negligible political base. Inter alia, they were granted lucrative monopoly rights, licences and enjoyed favoured treatment in the form of loans at preferential rates by state banks (Bresnan, 2005: 212). The patron–client relationship of Sino-Indonesian conglomerate groups (commonly referred to as cukongs) with the Suharto family had contributed to this community purportedly controlling about 70 per cent of the corporate sector during the New Order years. By the 1990s, out of the 25 largest family business groups, 21 were in the hands of Sino-Indonesians (Bresnan, 2005: 210). Yet Suharto and elements within the military saw fit to instigate anti-Chinese sentiment when it was politically expedient to do so. For example, after the outbreak of the 1997 financial crisis, Suharto and senior members of the Indonesian armed forces recklessly accused the already besieged Chinese of triggering the financial crisis. There is evidence to suggest that the anti-Chinese riots in May 1998, which tragically resulted in many Chinese killed, raped and properties destroyed, were orchestrated by provocateurs linked to senior members of the Indonesian armed forces (Bertrand, 2004: 68). Lee initially rejected the idea that Indonesia’s economic crisis had much to do with the systemic corruption and cronyism of the Suharto regime, preferring to attribute the crisis to the weak institutional capacity of the Indonesian central bank, fragile financial system and over-borrowing in the last five years of the regime.18 He has since refined his diagnosis of the Indonesian economic and political crisis, redirecting the blame at the feet of Suharto’s children. Recalling his December 1997 advice to Suharto’s daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (aka Tutut) to terminate her siblings’ economic interests so as to restore market confidence, Lee wrote, I strongly urged her and her siblings to understand that international fund managers had focused on the economic privileges the President’s children were enjoying; during this period of crisis, it was best if they withdrew completely from the market and did not engage in any new projects. (Lee, 2000: 311) Lee has conveniently ignored Suharto’s role in personally approving loans by state banks and using state enterprises as a source of extra-budgetary funds. Also ignored were state contracts, licences and monopolies which Suharto channeled to his children’s firms (Bresnan, 2005: 119). In 2004, Transparency International rated Suharto the biggest embezzler of public funds in the world and estimated his total misappropriations to be between US$15 billion and US$35 billion (Bresnan, 2005: 195). Despite these revelations, Lee has preferred to draw attention to the high levels of economic growth during Suharto’s reign: ‘Suharto, for all his faults, brought 8 to 10 per cent growth annually. He probably wasted 3 to 5 per cent on his cronies, friends and family, but the country was moving ahead’.19 Describing Suharto’s unceremonious ouster as ‘an immense personal tragedy’, the fallen autocrat has been regaled for turning ‘an impoverished Indonesia of 1965 into an emerging tiger economy’.20 In reality, Suharto’s legacy has been tainted by dysfunctional state institutions, an incompetent and corrupt judiciary and bureaucracy, the politicisation of

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Islam, poor investment in human capital and infrastructure and serious human rights abuses. Far from transforming Indonesia into a dynamic tiger economy, much of the high economic growth during the New Order era can be attributed to the rapacious and unsustainable exploitation of Indonesia’s natural resources. The oil and timber industries were grossly mismanaged, leaving much of the revenues from these export sectors channelled in the bank accounts of the Suharto family, their cronies and corrupt state officials.21 Determined to extend to his old associate the honour of a respected elder statesman, Lee was the first foreign dignitary to visit Suharto as he lay dying in a Jakarta hospital in January 2008. In his condolence letter, Lee was moved to write that ‘I have no doubt that history will accord Pak Suharto a place of honour in Indonesia’s history when his life’s work is studied in calm perspective’.22

Difficult dealings with fledgling democrats: the post-New Order era Having cultivated close relations with the authoritarian New Order elite, relations with leaders from opposition parties and non-government organisations were accorded low priority. As such, leader of the opposition party Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P), Megawati Sukarnoputri, was barred from attending a Foreign Correspondents Association forum in Singapore in 1999. This paradigm of bilateral relations between authoritarian governments did not prepare the PAP leadership for the nuanced diplomatic skills required for the pluralistic and more transparent political system in post-Suharto Indonesia. Even before Suharto’s ouster, bilateral relations were severely tested when in early 1998 Lee Kuan Yew questioned B.J. Habibie’s suitability for the position of Vice-President, on the grounds that the financial markets were not supportive of his appointment. Habibie’s ire was aggravated when the Singaporean government delayed its congratulatory message when he was appointed to the Presidency in May 1998. By contrast, neighbouring countries were prompt in conveying their congratulatory messages. Registering his displeasure with the PAP leadership, the city-state was left out of Habibie’s inaugural tour as President. In an interview with the Asian Wall Street Journal, President Habibie declared that ‘a friend in need is a friend indeed. I don’t have that feeling from Singapore. I have that feeling from the US, from Japan, Australia, mainland China, from Malaysia, from Europe, Germany’ (Ganesan, 2005: 93). Habibie also accused Lee of being ‘pro-active in the negative direction’ and chastised the Singapore government for failing to fully ‘accept that it was an integral part of the region’ (Ganesan, 2005: 93). Disparaging Singapore’s size and by implication its significance, Habibie pointed to a regional map and pronounced, ‘All the green is Indonesia. And that red dot is Singapore’.23 Some months later Habibie denounced the Singaporean government as the ‘real racists’ because of its discriminatory practices against Malays in senior positions in the Singapore Armed Forces (Leifer, 2000: 143). But why did Lee intervene in Indonesia’s domestic affairs by publicly disparaging Suharto’s choice of Habibie as Vice-President? Was Lee emboldened by

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 163 Washington’s disapproval of Habibie’s grandiose high-tech economic nationalist programmes when he was Technology Minister? Aware that the US Treasury had threatened to cut off aid to Indonesia if Habibie wase appointed President (Murphy, 2005: 258), Lee was uneasy with Habibie’s economic nationalist policy orientation which included creating competitive advantage for Indonesia in high technology and value-added industries. As a minister in the Suharto government, Habibie was keen to reduce trade dependence on Singapore by moving Indonesia’s warehouses from Singapore to Batam and setting up oil refineries on the Indonesian island. Used to dealing with the less than intellectually savvy Suharto, Lee must have anticipated that the doctorate in aeronautical engineering was less susceptible to manipulation (Singh, 1999: 271). Lee is also thought to have been uncomfortable with Habibie’s Islamic intellectual leanings, which he simplistically equated with anti-Chinese and therefore antiSingaporean sentiments (Singh, 1999: 270). The secular minded Lee was uneasy with Habibie and others in the New Order regime ‘Islamising’ Indonesia. By the early 1990s, the rise to prominence of Muslim organisations such as the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals and the increased presence of Muslim activists in the Indonesian parliament must have unnerved Lee. Habibie was popular among modernist Muslims who supported his economic nationalist agenda of industrial leapfrogging and his revival of the country’s bebas aktif foreign policy orientation (Amir, 2007: 94–99). In any event, Lee’s suspicion that Habibie was anti-Chinese proved to be baseless paranoia. Following the mid-1998 riots against the Chinese community, Habibie’s government abolished discriminatory policies and practices implemented by the New Order regime. In September 1998, Habibie issued Presidential Instruction No. 26 which eliminated all forms of state instituted discrimination against ethnic minorities (Bertrand, 2004: 70). Lee must have also been concerned by the initiatives of the Minister of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises, Adi Sasono, in promoting pribumi (indigenous) businesses and other redistributive policies geared towards addressing inter-ethnic economic equity. Reminiscent of Malaysia’s social redistributive policies, this policy agenda was anathema to Lee. The Habibie administration’s economic nationalist ambitions of hastening Indonesia’s rise up the technological ladder, thereby narrowing the economic gap with Singapore, was also a source of concern. Assertions by Adi Sasono that the asymmetrical bilateral economic relationship had led to ‘a greater part of the added value of the economic process in Indonesia being enjoyed by Singapore which has the advantage of superior trade and financial capabilities’ reinforced these apprehensions (Singh, 1999: 272). Typical of many other economic nationalists in post-New Order administrations, Adi resented the Singapore government’s commitment to retaining the city-state’s technological and economic lead in the region. Revealing a lack of appreciation for these economic nationalist ideals, redistributive socio-economic initiatives and non-discriminatory ethnic policies of the Habibie administration, Lee scornfully alleged that He [Habibie] was against the Chinese Indonesians and by extension against Singapore with its Chinese majority. He wanted to treat us as he did his

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This statement suggests that Lee is unable to appreciate or understand the complex political and social dynamics in the more transparent and democratic Indonesian polity of the post-Suharto era. Jolted by the realisation that bilateral relations had rested on weak foundations and that the city-state needed to cultivate ties with aspiring presidential contenders and other political and civil society actors in Indonesia’s fledgling democracy, the previously rebuffed PDI-P leader Megawati Sukarnoputri was invited to Singapore in March 1999. Whilst there, she met with senior Singaporean officials. In the same year, leader of the National Awakening Party Abdulrahman Wahid, leader of the National Mandate Party Amien Rais, and Golkar heavyweights Akbar Tanjung and Marzuki Darusman were invited to speak at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS). When Abdulrahman Wahid (aka Gus Dur) was sworn in as Indonesia’s fourth President in October 1999, the Singapore government sent its congratulatory message the very same day. Indicative of the improved bilateral relations, Gus Dur briefly visited Singapore just weeks after assuming the Presidency and invited Lee Kuan Yew to participate in an international advisory team geared towards facilitating Indonesia’s economic recovery. However, the thawing in relations all but dissipated when Lee commented during a visit to Australia in November 2000 that Indonesians felt ‘deep disappointment’ in their elites and predicted that it would not be long before President Wahid stepped down from office.24 The Singaporean leadership had apparently lost confidence in Gus Dur’s mercurial policy pronouncements formulated without adequate consultation with policy-makers, opposition policitians and the business community.25 Angered further by Lee’s dismissal of his suggestion that Papua New Guinea and East Timor be admitted into the regional body at the ASEAN Informal Summit in November 2000, Wahid lashed out against the Singapore government for failing to inform other ASEAN states before it offered naval facilities to the US in the late 1980s. He accused the Singapore government of possessing a weak regional identity and arrogantly underestimating Malays.26 Deliberately arousing the PAP leadership’s paranoia of Malay states colluding against Singapore, Gus Dur declared in a speech at the Indonesian embassy in Singapore that ‘So far, the only person who has been critical of Singapore is Mahathir. Now Mahathir has a new friend’.27 He ended his speech by suggesting the possibility of Indonesia and Malaysia cutting off water supplies to Singapore and accused the Singapore government of manipulating neighbouring countries.28 ‘Now, we have been manipulated by Singapore. If we withhold the water supply, Singapore won’t have any more water . . . Our interests should come first. The interests of other people should come second’.29 Defending Gus Dur’s criticisms of the Singaporean leadership, the Indonesian

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 165 daily paper Kompas accused the Singapore government of double standards with regard to corruption and arrogance: We often hear the country [Singapore] has double standards. It would not raise its voice against corruption, collusion or nepotism, as long as this benefits Singapore. If they [corruption] do not benefit them, then Singapore goes along in lodging complaints. We also sense the view that Singapore looks down on Indonesia and the Malays.30 The daily paper Republika also criticised the Singapore government’s footdragging in signing the extradition treaty and accused Lee of behaving irresponsibly by predicting that President Wahid was about to resign: . . . the neighbouring country refused to sign an extradition treaty with the Republic and to declare bilateral trade figures. This was believed to be because of Singapore’s interest in protecting fugitive Chinese conglomerates and many goods smuggled from Indonesia . . . Lee Kuan Yew is seen as the leader of overseas Chinese, who control the economy in the Asia-Pacific. That means his comments can influence many Chinese businessmen, including those in Indonesia.31 Relations nose-dived when Lee Kuan Yew remarked in early 2002 that Singapore remained at risk from a terrorist attack because Islamist extremist cells were still at large in Indonesia.32 Lee provocatively repeated these claims at a security conference in May 2002, alleging that the immediate threat to the region came from Islamic militant networks in Indonesia.33 Lee reasserted these claims at a forum to Singaporean university students in January 2005 and also suggested that Indonesia’s ‘war on terror’ was hamstrung because it did not have Singapore’s detention without trial laws.34 Lee’s statements revealed an insensitivity towards the constraints confronting President Megawati’s coalition government in apprehending suspected Islamists – in particular the impropriety of instituting undemocratic detention without trial in Indonesia’s fledgling democracy. Having stifled Singapore’s opposition parties and civil society, the PAP leadership appears not to appreciate the significance of Indonesia’s empowered civil society and powerful opposition parties. Having endured the New Order regime, Indonesians are acutely sensitive to the possibility of governments in office manipulating anti-terror legislation to suppress and intimidate critics. Reminding unspecified neighbouring countries who are unable to come to terms with Indonesia’s fledgling democracy, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda stated that ‘Rapid changes in various fields have taken place here since 1999 . . . There is now also the legislature, the press and civil society calling us to account. In my opinion, a number of neighbouring countries still fail to understand this’.35 Placing Lee’s comments within the context of Singapore’s close security alliance with Washington, opposition politician Amien Rais accused Lee of acting ‘like the mouthpiece of President Bush’.36 Similarly, the journal Tempo alleged that the Singapore government ‘has been diligently making use of America’s anger against radical Islamic groups . . . .’37

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Bilateral undercurrents Notwithstanding the close relations between the Singaporean and Indonesian elite during the New Order years, elements within the Indonesian military elite remained critical of the Singapore government’s offer of military facilities to the United States in 198938 as it contradicts Indonesia’s bebas aktif foreign and security principle. As noted earlier, the bebas aktif principle is based on the premise that there should be ‘regional solutions for regional problems’ based on a cooperative regional security system. Indicative of the enduring (bebas aktif) spirit within Indonesian elite and intellectual circles, President Wahid proposed the formation of a new Asian coalition, led by Indonesia, China and India, to counter the dominance of the West in the international community (Sukma, 2004: 3). Typical of relations between authoritarian states, close ties during the New Order years were restricted to the Singaporean and Indonesian political, military, administrative and business elite. As such, ties at the socio-cultural, civil society and peopleto-people levels were neglected. This narrowly based bilateral relationship has been justified by Lee on the grounds that the Singapore government wished to ‘avoid misunderstanding with the president [Suharto] and his aides’ (Lee, 2000: 325). Having focused on the security and economic aspects of the bilateral leadership, a range of politically sensitive and unresolved issues such as the Singaporean leadership’s limited disclosure of trade figures, purported tolerance for the illegal imports of sand and reluctance to sign an extradition treaty were perilously ‘swept under the carpet’. Many Indonesians likened the PAP government to economic cukongs39 who are primarily interested in exploiting Indonesia’s natural resources. Much like Suharto’s cukongs, the PAP government is perceived as willing to opportunistically appease a corrupt and authoritarian regime as long as they stood to gain economically. Indonesian perceptions of the Singapore government’s narrow economic agenda were reinforced by its conditional financial support after the outbreak of the 1997/1998 regional economic crisis. Between late 1997 and early 1998, Goh Chok Tong had apparently visited the beleaguered Suharto on three separate occasions to coax him into accepting the IMF’s conditional assistance programme (Huxley, 2000: 53). In keeping with the Singaporean leadership’s close ties with Suharto, Goh took on the role of key intermediary between the IMF and the Indonesian government.40 During these visits, Goh had apparently offered the Indonesian government US$5 billion in soft loans to supplement the proposed IMF assistance programme. However, the magnanimous image of the Singapore leadership was swiftly deflated when the Singaporean Finance Minister, Richard Hu, clarified that the loan offer of US$5 billion could only be drawn out in tranches of US$1 billion and that a commercial interest rate had to be repaid within five years. These stringent conditions for a neighbouring country engulfed in crisis only reinforced the perception of Singapore as little more than a ‘fair-weather friend’ (Sebastian, 2005: 106–107). Resentment against Singapore’s conditional assistance was noted by Indonesian political commentator Jusuf Wanandi in the following terms: ‘It seems some Indonesian leaders, in government and the private sector, believe the Singapore government is not really committed to assisting Indonesia’.41

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Haven for economic criminals Singapore’s self-interested image has been reinforced by the ability of economic criminals associated with the New Order regime to launder billions of dollars through Singapore based banks. One of the largest Sino-Indonesian conglomerates, the Salim Group, was reputed to have shifted some of its operations and funds to a Singapore listed company at the height of the financial crisis in 1997/1998.42 The reluctance of the Singaporean government to restrict the Indonesian capital flight into Singapore after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997, despite representations from the Indonesian government, reinforced the perception of Singaporean self-interest.43 The city-state’s reputation as a money laundering hub has been buttressed by the attainment of Singaporean citizenship and residency status by Indonesian economic criminals wanted by the Indonesian authorities.44 It has been estimated that 200 Indonesians who owe billions to the Indonesian government have been hiding out in Singapore since 1998.45 Singapore’s reputation as a ‘major money-laundering country’ was noted in a 2004 US State Department Report.46 A former senior economist for Morgan Stanley Asia, Andy Xie, alleged in early 2007 that ‘Much of the success of Singapore is due to it becoming a money laundering centre for corrupt business people and officials’.47 Wealthy Indonesians living in Singapore are estimated to possess a combined total worth of US$87 billion.48 They have become the largest foreign buyers of high-end homes, exceeding traditional buyers from Malaysia and Hong Kong.49 The Singapore government’s long-standing reluctance to sign an extradition treaty has allowed Indonesian economic criminals based in Singapore from having to face corruption and money laundering charges in Indonesia. One excuse for not signing an extradition treaty with Indonesia was that Singapore’s British commonlaw legal system is incompatible with the Indonesian legal system which is based on the continental European system. However, this reasoning has been discredited by the fact that several former British colonies who have maintained the British common-law legal system, such as Malaysia, Australia and Hong Kong, have been willing to sign extradition treaties with Indonesia. In the spirit of neighbourliness, Thailand, the Philippines and China have also signed extradition treaties with Indonesia.50 Impatient with Singapore’s reluctance to sign an extradition treaty, outspoken former National Assembly Chairman Amien Rais has charged that ‘Singapore wants to protect Indonesian corrupters who have fled to that country so that it would be quite a surprise if there is to be an extradition treaty’.51 Similarly, former Justice and Human Rights Minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra accused the Singapore government of being uncooperative in dealing with money laundering.52

Kiasu eye to smuggling Following an agreement with the Suharto New Order regime in 1974, the Singapore government did not publish bilateral trade figures (Rodan, 2005: 51–52). Suffice to say, this confidentiality suited the Suharto government as the publication of the twoway trade figures would have exposed senior Indonesians officials who had been

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profiting from goods smuggled to Singapore.53 Smuggling activities were also driven by Indonesia’s high tariff on imports and exports and tolerance for unsustainable and illegal logging which led to a considerable amount of timber and plywood being illegally exported.54 The Singapore government apparently preferred to keep illicit trade, particularly sand mining, out of the public record.55 In the more transparent environment of the post-Suharto era, the Singapore government has been under pressure from Indonesian officials to publicly and comprehensively reveal bilateral trade figures. Concerned that smuggling has undermined Indonesia’s economic development, senior government officials have threatened the Singaporean government that if the bilateral trade figures are not revealed in accordance with international standards, Indonesia’s shipping business would move to Malaysia.56 Then Industry and Trade Minister Rini Soewandi threatened to take the matter to international bodies. Challenging Singapore’s reputation for possessing high standards in trade practices and governance,57 Rini requested, in a June 2003 letter to her Singaporean counterpart George Yeo, that Singapore’s bilateral trade figures should include appropriate and detailed information that was in accordance with internationally recognised standards.58 Caught back-footed by Rini’s serious allegations of turning a blind eye to smuggling and other improprieties, the Singapore government broke diplomatic convention by selectively publishing Rini’s letter to Yeo and Yeo’s reply to it in the Straits Times.59 Embarrassed by Rini’s allegations of poor Singaporean transparency, a comprehensive set of trade statistics with Indonesia was published for the first time in more than 30 years in 2004. The Singapore government also promised that bilateral trade figures released from 2006 would not only include direct trade statistics but also goods that are re-exported by both countries.60 However, critics allege that Singapore’s bilateral trade statistics continue to conceal activities such as the illegal importation of sand from the Riau islands.61

Rapacious appropriation of Riau’s resources Purportedly the biggest dredging exercise in the world, Singapore’s extensive reclamation project has since the 1960s expanded its landmass by 15 per cent and added 10,000 hectares or 100 sq. km to its original 580 sq. km.62 This land reclamation project has been made possible by imports of sand from Malaysia and from the neighbouring Riau islands of Indonesia. The massive sand exports from Riau to Singapore have not been acknowledged by official Singaporean trade statistics presumably due to their illegal nature.63 The extensive nature of sand dredging in the Riau islands has had an adverse impact on its ecological integrity and socio-economic fabric. Sand dredging has severely damaged Riau’s coral reefs, which are an important breeding ground for fish. The Indonesian Centre for Forestry has claimed that in 2001, more than 400,000 hectares of seabed had been damaged by sand mining, with parts of the seabed in Riau excavated to a depth of more than 10 metres. Moreover, a Sumatran based environmental group Kaliptro has found the worst affected beaches on Kandur and Moro Islands had lost 35 metres in width.64 With the depletion of fish

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 169 stocks caused by sand dredging, the livelihoods of local fishermen and their families have been adversely affected. For example, a significant number of fishermen’s children have dropped out of school due to the dire financial status of their parents.65 In sheer frustration, fishermen have lashed out against the environmental vandalism of sand-mining companies and the poor environmental regulation by state agencies by burning government offices in March 2001 and seizing a dredge, the Khersones 170, which had allegedly destroyed their nets.66 To placate irate fishermen, the Riau provincial government has initiated compensation payments financed jointly by sand-mining companies. Additionally, the Indonesian government has also introduced licence and vessel monitoring of sandmining and a zoning plan. Mining companies are now required to formulate plans for conservation and restoration of coastal and oceanic ecosystems. These policies appear to have limited positive effects due to the continued activity of illegal mining companies. In July 2002, seven illegal dredges were detained by two Indonesian warships. Despite the total ban on sea sand-mining exports by the central government in early 2003, illegal sand mining by dredging companies has continued in large part due to the strong demand arising from Singapore’s reclamation activities.67 Marine Affairs Minister, Rokhim Damhuri, has alleged that in 2002 up to 300 million cubic metres of sand were smuggled out of Indonesia, mostly for the Singapore market. The Singapore government’s response to criticism of illegal Indonesian sand exports to the city-state has been to claim that as illegal imports of sand are handled by contractors, this illegal trading activity is not their responsibility. Adopting a hardline stance on the export of sand, the Indonesian Navy in 2007 detained 13 vessels thought to be smuggling sand to Singapore.68 The Singaporean government has responded by accusing the Indonesian government of using the ban on sand exports to pressure it into signing an extradition treaty.69 The alleged use of Batam as a depository for banned toxic by-products from polluting industries in Singapore has provoked Indonesians to protest at national and international venues. When a Singaporean firm was found to have dumped tons of hazardous waste, deceptively described as ‘organic waste’, on Batam in July 2004, the Indonesian government reported the incident to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention on Transboundary Waste Control in Geneva. Galvanised by allegations of Singaporean dumping of toxic waste, rowdy demonstrations were held outside the Singaporean embassy in Jakarta in 2005.70 After prolonged negotiations, the Singaporean authorities agreed to the return of the toxic waste only after Indonesia dropped its original allegation that Singapore had breached the Basel Convention which disallows the export of hazardous material.71 Notwithstanding these astute manoeuvrings, Singapore’s standing has been tarnished by its reputation of engaging in toxic waste dumping. To make way for the construction of reservoirs in Bintan that service Singapore’s fresh water needs, six villages consisting of more than 2,000 families were relocated.72 Another Riau island, Bulan, provides 50 per cent of Singapore’s demand for pork and supplies chicken to its KFC outlets. Ironically, Bulan exports orchids to Singapore even though it is the city-state’s national flower.73 In addition

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to industrial estates managed by Singaporean interests, the Riau islands also serve as a cheap tourist destination for Singaporeans. Approximately 80 per cent of Batam’s tourists are Singaporeans.74

Riau: Singapore’s economic hinterland Impressed by Singapore’s industrial achievements, Suharto’s New Order regime invited the Singapore government to assist with the development of Batam, just 30 minutes by ferry from Singapore (Suryadinata, 1996: 76). Investments were encouraged by the implementation of the Singapore–Johor–Riau (Sijori) SubRegional Growth Zone, mooted by Goh Chok Tong in the late 1980s. The GLC Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation, in a joint venture with the SinoIndonesian Salim Group, developed a 500 hectare industrial park in Batam. Owing to its significant investments in Batam, by 1992 Singapore became the fourth largest investor in Indonesia, after the US, Japan and Hong Kong (Leifer, 2000: 76). On the eve of the 1997 regional economic crisis, Singapore boasted more than S$4 billion worth of investments while Singaporean banks registered S$4 billion in loans to Indonesia (Leifer, 2000: 144). Symbolic of the economic hinterland status of the Riau islands, Singapore’s 2003 FTA with the United States permits high-technology products made in Batam and Bintan but assembled in Singapore to be exported to the US duty-free. This provision in the Singapore–US FTA is expected to encourage more firms based in Singapore to relocate parts of their operations to Batam and Bintan.75 The significant levels of Singaporean foreign investment, trade and tourism in Batam and Bintan islands have effectively transformed these islands into Singapore’s hinterland. Not surprisingly, dispossessed and marginalised islanders in Bintan and Batam have targetted Singaporean economic interests and their Sino-Indonesian business partners such as the Salim Group. In 2000, a dispute between dispossessed locals and developers of a tourist resort prompted the former to cut off energy supplies to the Bintan Industrial Park managed by the Singaporean GLC Sembawang Corp Industries (Huxley, 2000: 69). Dispossessed locals have also stormed a Singaporean owned tourist resort,76 demanding the promised 100 rupiah per sq. metre for their appropriated land. They were finally expelled by Indonesian security services. Batam’s attraction as an investment site has also been dampened by the fact that the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA), established in 1971, is no longer the only relevant authority for investors on the island. As a result of decentralisation initiatives in the post-Suharto period, Batam’s elected municipal government has assumed a wide range of authority and introduced new levies. As such, investors are confronted with double taxation and overlapping of policies by BIDA and the municipal government. Decentralisation policies have contributed to a 34 per cent decline in new foreign investment in 2005.77 Notwithstanding these myriad challenges, the Singapore and Indonesian governments signed an economic agreement in 2006 to establish a special economic zone (SEZ) to revitalise the Riau islands of Batam, Bintan and Karimun.78

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Kiasu business practices Defying the general downward trend in foreign investment into Indonesia after the 1997 economic crisis, Singaporean investments scaled up in order to capitalise on the opportunities presented by the privatisation of state assets and sale of companies bankrupted or badly affected by the crisis. In early 2000, the Singapore government released US$500 million for GLCs to invest in Indonesia. Additionally, a US$400 million lending facility for private companies to invest in Indonesia was also set up.79 In step with these incentives, Singapore’s Cycle and Carriage Group bought 35 per cent of the car manufacturer Astra International in 2001. In addition to its 40 per cent interest in Bukaka, a fixed-line monopoly in East Indonesia, Singapore Telecommunications (Singtel) paid more than US$1 billion for a 35 per cent stake in the leading mobile phone operator, Telekomunikasi Selular (Telkomsel) in 2002. In the same year, ST Telemedia, a Singapore Technologies subsidiary, bought 42 per cent of Indonesia’s second largest mobile carrier Indosat for US$650 million.80 Temasek Holdings paid almost US$400 million for a 51 per cent stake in Bank Danamon, Indonesia’s fourth largest bank in 2003. Singapore’s post-crisis investment spree in Indonesia led to its status as the largest investor in 2002 and third largest in 2003.81 By 2005, Singapore became Indonesia’s fifth largest trading partner.82 A Memorandum of Understanding, signed in 2005, enabled Singaporean carriers SIA, Valuair and SilkAir to expand their operations in Jakarta and Bali. In return, Indonesian carriers were able to pick up passengers from Singapore to other destinations in Asia.83 In the same year, a bilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement granting preferential treatment was also signed.84 As discussed above, economic nationalist sentiments have long been held by Indonesian policy-makers. These sentiments are predicated on Article 35 of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution which rationalises state economic intervention: The economy shall be organised as a common endeavour based on the principle of the family. Branches of the production which are important for the state and which control the lives of large numbers of the people shall be controlled by the state. The land and water and the natural resources therein shall be controlled by the state and utilised for the maximum prosperity of the people. (Cited in Bresnan, 2005: 197) The economic nationalist sentiment is strongly held not only within left-wing circles but also by small and medium sized enterprises and modernist Muslim organisations. Habibie’s nationalist ambition of developing the industrial base of Batam and Bintan and the targetting of high-tech and knowledge intensive industries were broadly supported by the public. Similarly, the trade liberalisation agenda of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), implemented in 2002, has been cynically received by many nonstate actors. Anti-AFTA groups have called on the government to focus on tackling domestic economic problems rather than promote trade liberalisation. There is a widely held belief that AFTA will disproportionately benefit local conglomerates with the resources to compete in the scheme (Chandra, 2004: 165).

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Economic nationalist sentiments fuelled local opposition to the 41.9 per cent stake of PT Indonesia Satellite Corp (Indosat) by Temasek subsidiary Singapore Technologies in 2002. This represented the largest sale of an Indonesian state asset to a foreign entity since the 1997 financial crisis. Islamist politicians such as former Vice-President Hamzah Haz called for improved efficiency of state enterprises rather than their sale, while Amien Rais, former Chairperson of the People’s Consultative Assembly, described the sale of state enterprises as tantamount to selling Indonesia to foreigners and reducing it to ‘a nation of collies’ (Bresnan, 2005: 197). Singapore’s reputation suffered a battering when the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) ruled in November 2007 that Temasek and its linked companies had violated Indonesia’s anti-monopoly law through its crossownership of Indosat and Telkomsel. KPPU also alleged that Temasek’s linked companies were involved in price-fixing. Under the country’s anti-monopoly law, no company is allowed to own two or more companies in the same sector with a market share of more than 50 per cent. Yet, Indosat and Telkomsel jointly control more than 80 per cent of Indonesia’s mobile phone market.85 Assessing Temasek’s appeal against the KPPU decision, a Jakarta district court upheld the KPPU ruling in May 2008. As Temasek has been found in violation of Indonesia’s antimonopoly law, its stake in Indosat or Telkomsel will have to be divested within two years. As with the Thai ruling against Temasek’s irregular business practice following its purchase of Shin Corp (discussed in Chapter 3), there has been minimal public debate in Singapore despite the court’s ruling against Temasek’s antimonopolistic business practices in Indonesia.

Denial of basic rights for maids Typical of developed economies afflicted with acute labour shortages, Singapore employs thousands of foreign workers in construction, domestic service and other sectors reliant on poorly paid and low-skilled workers. Most Indonesian workers in Singapore make up a large proportion of the 150,000 strong domestic maids working under harsh terms of employment. Out of the 147 domestic maids who have died from workplace accidents or suicide between 1999 and 2003, 94 were Indonesian nationals.86 These deaths have prompted the Indonesian Manpower Minister Jacob Nuwa Wea to accuse the Singapore government of not adequately protecting the rights of foreign maids.87 Concerns have been reinforced by claims that the Indonesian embassy in Singapore receives 50 complaints a day from maids. The Philippines embassy and Sri Lankan High Commission apparently receive 40–80 complaints a month from their nationals working as maids.88 Maids that have been charged with murdering their employer have uniformly alleged that they were physically and verbally abused over a prolonged period of time.89 The 2005 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) entitled ‘Maid to Order: Ending Abuses Against Migrant Domestic Workers in Singapore’ (Human Rights Watch, 2005), found that maid abuse in Singapore was related to weak policy and legal safeguards for foreign maids.90 The HRW report criticised the exclusion of

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 173 foreign maids from the Employment Act particularly since the Act governs all other workers, including foreign construction workers. The Employment of Foreign Workers Act has been faulted for failing to provide legal protection such as a weekly day off, placing a maximum limit on working hours and regulating salary deductions. The Executive Director of HRW has urged the Singapore government to use Hong Kong as a model where foreign maids are included under its main labour laws, thereby according them a weekly rest day, minimum wage and public holidays.91 Inter alia, the 2005 HRW report purported that maids in Singapore suffer from abuses such as physical and verbal aggression, threats, restrictions on movement, abuse by agents, exorbitant debt repayments and long working hours. Rejecting the HRW recommendations of a weekly day off for maids, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Manpower Hawazi Daipi claimed that ‘Prescribing minimum employment terms and conditions will inevitably lead to rigidities and inconvenience for many households’, particularly those with the elderly and infirm who require constant attention.92 This logic begs the question: As many Hong Kong households also have elderly and infirm members but have been able to absorb the ‘inconvenience’ of giving their maids a weekly day off, why are Singaporean households unable to be as flexible? Or is this Singaporean rigidity a characteristic of the Singaporean Asian Values once so energetically championed by the PAP leadership? The convenient disregard for ethical values when it comes to foreign maids has been aptly surmised by Straits Times journalist Ong Soh Chin in the following way: We have become a First World Country with Third World morals . . .. We travel the world and declare smugly that Singapore is the best . . . But this smugness blinds us to the glaring faults in our own national character, making us veer towards the arrogant isolationist attitudes of little emperors in our middle kingdom.93

Towards soft power diplomacy? The SBY administration Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong was the first head of government to visit Indonesia after SBY assumed the Presidency in October 2004. Reciprocating Lee’s goodwill gesture, SBY visited Singapore, after his first stop in Malaysia, during an inaugural Presidential tour in February 2005. Also in that year, the Indonesian President was invited to deliver the 25th Singapore Lecture at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.94 It is worth noting that in 2005 alone, Lee Hsien Loong and SBY met on at least four occasions.95 In that year, a naval cooperation agreement was signed to better monitor the Straits of Malacca against piracy and terrorism and exchange information more efficiently.96 Coming at the heels of testy bilateral relations during the Habibie and Wahid administrations, the Singaporean government was keen to improve relations in view of the city-state’s growing economic interests in Indonesia and the importance of maintaining close security relations with Southeast Asia’s biggest nation-state. The Singapore government has generally responded to regional natural disasters

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by extending support to requests for aid on conditional terms. However, when the tsunami struck Aceh in December 2004, its response was speedy and magnanimous. Indeed, Singapore was one of the first countries to assist Aceh after the tsunami, sending three warships, 1000 SAF personnel, and hundreds of civilian personnel from the Singapore Red Cross and other non-government organisations. To date, this has become Singapore’s largest relief operation. Inter alia, the SAF provided land and air transport in Meulaboh, helped move personnel and supplies and built seven helicopter landing ports.97 To its credit, the Singapore government played a pivotal role in organising a Special ASEAN Leaders Summit on Earthquake and Tsunamis in Jakarta, shortly after the disaster. With 26 countries and the major international agencies in attendance, a commitment was made at the Summit to set up a tsunami early warning system in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Highlighting its commitment to the reconstruction of Aceh, the Singapore government pledged to build a 150 bed hospital in Banda Aceh, a school and pier in Meulaboh98 and to provide S$21 million in financial aid.99 As part of the Aceh-Singapore Technical Assistance Programme, approximately 200 Acehnese healthcare professionals were trained at Singaporean hospitals in 2006.100 When an earthquake struck towns in and around Jogjakarta in May 2006, Singaporean Armed Forces personnel were among the first to arrive with aid and medical support. Singaporean medical and rescue workers promptly set up a field hospital in the town of Bantul, the worst hit area.101 Singapore demonstrated once again that it could be relied upon in times of crisis. The benefits derived from improved bilateral relations during SBY’s administration have been wide ranging. In security terms, the natural disasters in Aceh and Jogjakarta have provided the SAF with the opportunity to test its capabilities in a real-life crisis situation.102 Singapore’s role in initiating the January 2005 Summit in Jakarta has also placed its firms in a competitive position to bid for lucrative infrastructure contracts to rebuild Aceh.103 Trade and investment is expected to grow with the signing of a bilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement in 2005 (Yudhoyono, 2005: 13). Another manifestation of the deepening bilateral relations was the establishment in 2005 of the Indonesia–Singapore Friendship Association geared towards promoting student exchange and training programmes. Indonesian ambassador to Singapore Mohamad Slamet Hidayat confirmed that the Association would help facilitate greater people-to-people contact thereby addressing the limited cultural understanding between Indonesians and Singaporeans.104 Suffice to say, this statement is truly ironic in view of the large numbers of Indonesian maids working and living with Singaporean families. The signing of the bilateral Education Memorandum of Understanding in 2005 will enable students and teachers from 15 primary schools in Singapore to not only experience school life in Indonesia but also host their Indonesian counterparts. At the tertiary level, joint university research will be undertaken coupled with the offer of 20 doctoral research scholarships for Indonesians to study at the National University of Singapore and the Nanyang Technological University.105

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Kiasu diplomacy and the perpetuation of structural tensions Nostalgic for the return of past relations with Indonesian military leaders who negotiated covert agreements with foreign countries without ratification by the legislative assembly or scrutiny from a probing media and energetic civil society, Lee Kuan Yew appears not to have fully appreciated the reduced influence of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) in post-New Order Indonesia. In his characteristically frank way, Lee pronounced at the 2002 Asia Security Conference that It’s [the TNI] mission since the founding of the state is to keep Indonesia secular . . . Despite all its shortcomings, the Indonesian military is still led by a nationalist, not an Islamic, officer corp. It is one of the few national institutions capable of holding together a sprawling country facing centrifugal pressures.106 Having commended the TNI for its nationalist and secular credentials, Lee called on the US government to ‘re-engage the TNI and help it to reform itself’ to counterbalance Muslim politicians vying for the support of conservative Islamists in the lead up to the 2004 Presidential elections.107 These statements were repeated a few months later in an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review in December 2002 when he pronounced that ‘The only effective Pan-Indonesian institution that’s secular and nationalist is the TNI’.108 Lee’s controversial statements on the unifying role of the TNI provoked a torrent of criticism from Indonesian politicians, Muslim leaders, civil society actors and the media. Nahdatul Ulama leader Solahuddin Wahid suggested that ‘Lee is either paranoid or wants to please the United States in its international campaign against terrorism’.109 Similarly, the Indonesian daily Media Indonesia alleged that ‘Mr. Lee seems to suffer not only from paranoia but also a seniority syndrome, which makes him feel as if he is entitled to interfere in other country’s affairs’.110 Media Indonesia also criticised Lee’s call for Washington to work more closely with the TNI as tantamount to pitting Islam against the TNI.111 Importantly, Lee’s statements revealed a poor understanding of the moderate character of mainstream Indonesian Islam and a lack of appreciation of the resurgence of democratic ideals following decades of authoritarian rule supported by the TNI. He appears unperturbed that elements within the TNI remain a potential obstacle to further democratic reform and continue to rely on corrupt and repressive New Order values and practices (Clear, 2005: 181–183). Indeed, the statements of senior PAP Ministers such as Wong Kan Seng dismissing the ideals of democracy, human rights and press freedom in post-New Order Indonesia as ‘hollow abstractions’112 have only served to undermine the city-state’s soft power credentials. Bilateral relations have also been set back by the refusal of Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR) in late 2007 to ratify the bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA), signed in Bali in February 2007. This rejection was based on the opposition of the House of Representatives to the Singaporean government’s insistence on packaging the DCA with the extradition treaty – believing that

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packaging the two agreements was detrimental to Indonesia’s national interest.113 Having dragged its feet on signing an extradition treaty to enable the Indonesian government to pursue Indonesian economic criminals who have sought refuge in Singapore, the Singapore government only agreed to negotiate an extradition treaty if it was packaged with a DCA. In return for Singapore acceding to the extradition treaty, this kiasu package approach would provide Singapore’s Armed Forces liberal access to Indonesia’s land, sea and airspace to conduct exercises.114 The House of Representatives also objected to the DCA on the grounds that the Singaporean intention to hold military exercises in the South China Sea for 15 days a month was excessive and should be limited to only four to six times a year.115 One of the most sensitive aspects of the DCA was the inclusion of a third party in Singapore’s military training.116 To maintain the country’s national sovereignty, the House of Representatives has insisted that it give prior consent each time Singapore brings a third party to its military training exercises.117 Angered by the refusal of the House of Representatives to ratify the DCA, Lee Kuan Yew lashed out against the country’s post-New Order political system, political parties and the media during a visit to Indonesia in July 2007. Criticising the system of direct presidential elections, Lee suggested that the New Order’s authoritarian system which allowed for the House of Representatives to elect the President ‘in a way made sense . . . . Because whoever has the majority in the House of Representatives, that group elects the President, so they will support the President’s policy’.118 In his typical paternalistic style, Lee then took the liberty of advising Indonesians of the benefits of reverting back to the New Order system of indirect Presidential elections ‘to make (the Indonesian system) functional, whoever commands the majority in the DPR actually should be in charge of the government’.119 Angered by Lee’s unsolicited pontifications, House of Representatives Speaker Agung Laksono noted that ‘Lee’s visit to Jakarta will not change the DPR’s attitude’.120 The Speaker also claimed that he rejected an invitation by Mr. Lee for a meeting.121 Less restrained in his criticism of Lee, parliamentarian Andreas Pereira (PDI-P) dismissed Lee as someone out of touch with the more democratic Indonesian political environment: ‘Wake up, Mr. Lee. Presentday Indonesia is much more democratic and open than during the era when the two of you (Mr. Lee and former Indonesian President Suharto) could make bilateral agreement on your own’.122 Reverting to his characteristic Malay paranoia, Lee attributed the House of Representatives rejection of the DCA not to its conduct of due diligence in protecting the national interest but to the anti-Chinese sentiments of Indonesians: ‘The fundamental problem is that they consider us a small country that should oblige. They consider us also majority Chinese and they want us to be as accommodating as their Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia’.123

Conclusion Singapore’s relations with Indonesia have been mercurial – characterised by tension during the left-nationalist Sukarno regime, intimate during the authoritarian New Order military dominated regime and problematic in the more democratic

The singa and garuda: From kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 177 and transparent post-New Order polity where agreements and treaties with foreign governments are rigorously scrutinised by the House of Representatives, media and robust civil society. In sharp contrast to the close relations between Lee and Suharto, relations with post-New Order Indonesian Presidents such as B.J. Habibie and Abdulrahman Wahid have been problematic. However, bilateral relations with the taciturn Megawati remained cordial and have stabilised during SBY’s administration. In addition to promoting Singapore’s economic and geostrategic interests, Indonesia’s enhanced regional and international stature since President Susilo’s elevation to the Presidency has made it critical for the PAP leadership to deepen ties with Jakarta. The PAP is sensitive to SBY’s prominent stature in Washington – arguably higher than any Indonesian leader since Suharto.124 Washington has been keen to project Indonesia as the most populous Muslim country, the third largest democracy, a model Muslim dominated state that has been effective in subduing Islamist militants, and a major player in regional affairs. Then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pronounced during a visit to Indonesia in March 2006 that Washington was inclined to ‘look to Indonesia – as the region’s largest country, a founding member of ASEAN and a rising democracy – to play a leadership role in Southeast Asia and in the dynamic changing East Asia’.125 SBY’s stature within the international Muslim community appears to rival that of his Malaysian counterpart particularly after Indonesia hosted the Fifth Summit of the Developing 8 (D-8) in Bali in May 2006. The grouping of predominantly Muslim countries discussed ways to boost trade relations among members and catch up with the industrialised countries. Underlining his stature as a leader of a moderate Muslim country, SBY called on Muslim countries to oppose terrorism by striving towards ‘global justice, peace and prosperity . . . peacefully, skillfully and wisely’.126 Even though bilateral relations between Singapore and Indonesia improved during the Megawati and SBY administrations, long-standing structural tensions remain. These include Singapore’s heavy reliance on Indonesia’s natural resources, some of which have been purportedly illegally obtained, Singaporean firms engaging in monopolistic business practices and the status of Riau Province as Singapore’s economic hinterland. Bilateral economic relations typify that of First World–Third World relations and are thus viewed by many Indonesian economic nationalists as unacceptably exploitative. The asymmetrical nature of bilateral relations has been aggravated by the Singapore government’s tardiness in signing an extradition treaty due in large part to the billions allegedly deposited in Singapore banks by Indonesian economic criminals. The issue of Riau’s environmental damage caused by illegal sand mining for export to Singapore and the shabby treatment of Indonesian maids in Singapore have not helped matters. Goh Chok Tong’s intermediary role for the IMF during the regional financial crisis has reinforced the perception of the city-state as aligned to the interests of Washington and other industrialised economies. Washington has been accused of meddling in Indonesia’s domestic affairs and destabilising the Habibie government by delaying the IMF’s economic bailout to Indonesia in mid-1998 (Sukma,

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2003: 86). The IMF’s austerity prescriptions for Indonesia have been roundly criticised even by mainstream economists such as Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz and prominent Indonesian economists as entrapping the country into further economic debt and crisis (Bresnan, 2005: 224–226). Not surprisingly, when the IMF’s second three-year programme expired in late 2003, Indonesian officials responded to widespread calls to terminate the country’s relationship with the IMF by negotiating the cessation of loans with the body (Murphy, 2005: 288). Singapore’s hosting of US naval facilities without regional consultation and uncritical support of the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq has only reinforced perceptions of the citystate as a ‘regional other’. Instructively, many of these bilateral tensions exist between Singapore and her other neighbour Malaysia. The democratic strides made by Indonesians following the ousting of Suharto have become a source of national pride. At the same time, the Singaporean model predicated on the pursuit of economic development at the expense of political rights and civil liberties is viewed with scepticism. Parallels have been drawn between the Singapore and Suharto paradigms of authoritarian governance. These sentiments were expressed in a Jakarta Post editorial on the 2006 Singaporean elections: The way the Singaporean government has controlled media reports of the country’s general election process, including the government’s harsh treatment of opposition parties, the restrictions on freedom of speech and threats of heavy penalties during the campaign, may remind many Indonesians of similar experiences they had during the Soeharto era.127 Thus while Singapore may be striding ahead of its immediate neighbours in economic terms, it is commonly perceived as a political laggard that lacks the soft power to wield significant influence in Indonesia and the region.

Conclusion Paradoxes and diplomatic blowbacks

The mercurial relations between Singapore and Malaysia have been perceptively likened to that of ‘estranged siblings – quick to bicker but slow to fight’ (Emmerson, 1996: 80) and as a ‘foreign policy of crisis management’ (Singh, 1999: 263). More than 40 years after the bitter separation of Singapore from Malaysia, bilateral relations remain troubled and have occasionally deteriorated into vitriolic exchanges that have included references to war. This relationship of barely repressed tension between Southeast Asia’s most successful economies has had wider regional ramifications, including the blunting of ASEAN’s efficacy. In recognition of these adverse regional effects, Prime Ministers Abdullah Badawi and Lee Hsien Loong called for the resolution of outstanding bilateral differences to enhance ASEAN solidarity and economic competitiveness.1 Yet, can bilateral relations be expected to qualitatively improve when politicians from the tumultuous merger years, who are steeped in the balas dendam mindset, remain influential in government? Lee Kuan Yew continues to play a key role in shaping the direction of Singapore–Malaysia relations according to the bitter experiences of the merger years. Believing that UMNO had successfully undermined the PAP’s 1964 electoral campaign and derailed its Malaysian Malaysia campaign by exploiting Chinese disunity, Lee observed in his memoirs that ‘The Tunku wanted the Chinese in small pockets, disunited if possible, disorganised and easy for the Malays to handle’.2 Guided by his interpretation of the merger years, Lee has attempted to promote Chinese cultural homogeneity and cohesion by sponsoring the promotion of Mandarin and Confucianism and implementing policies which ensure that the Chinese remain numerically dominant. Ethnic residential quotas have also ensured that the Chinese are electorally dominant in every constituency while the GRC system has effectively undermined the electoral clout of opposition parties that have traditionally been more sensitive to the concerns of ethnic minorities. Can bilateral relations qualitatively improve when the PAP and BN governments continue to engage in overt and covert forms of communal politics at the domestic and bilateral levels? Paradoxically, Singapore and Malaysia each construct their national identity in critical opposition to each other. In accordance with this inverted logic, Malaysia’s ethnic-based affirmative action policies have been projected by the PAP government as diametrically different to Singapore’s supposedly

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meritocratic and multiracial society. Yet, as postulated in Chapter 3, the nationbuilding paradigms of the authoritarian states of Singapore and Malaysia possess more similarities than is acknowledged by the PAP and BN leadership. To what extent are the deep-seated bilateral tensions between these neighbouring states a function of their asymmetrical status in the international arena? Singapore is generally considered a small power in contrast to Malaysia’s status as a middle-power (Ping, 2005). Womack (2006) has observed that smaller states are prone to paranoia and over-attention to the complexities in bilateral relations, while the larger state is inclined to make errors due to insufficient attention. Consequently, misperceptions abound. As the larger state is disinclined to accept the smaller state as an equal, bilateral relations tend to remain dysfunctional irrespective of how much their interests intersect. In this way, misinterpretations of the neighbouring country’s intentions and actions will persist. Paranoia, dysfunctionality, errors of over-attention and under-attention – these are recurring themes in this study of Singapore–Malaysia relations. Paradoxically, Singapore’s authoritarian state suffers from an image problem in Southeast Asia despite its reputation of being one of the most successful economies in the world and status as the region’s most dynamic economy. Inter alia, the Singapore government is commonly perceived as arrogant, self-serving, calculative and inclined to look down on the less affluent neighbouring countries. Leifer has perceptively observed that there has been a recurrent tendency on the part of some of its political leaders to address the region in a didactic manner which has been resented . . . Such resentments tend to be stored up so that when an episode of some tension arises . . . the measure of fury directed at Singapore has seemed to be out of all proportion to the presumed offense. (2003: 23–24) The PAP leadership has sought to offset the city-state’s beleaguered regional image by forging close security ties with Washington and ensuring that its security apparatus is second to none in Southeast Asia. Emboldened by its close security relations with Washington, the PAP leadership remains prone to aggressive posturing and is ‘inclined towards games of chicken and bluff’ (Deck, 1999: 254), at times pulling back just on the brink of a serious confrontation with neighbouring countries. During periods of diplomatic tension with neighbouring countries, the PAP government has often been unwilling to compromise or make concessions, lest it is seen as susceptible to caving in to pressure. This aggressive posturing, a classic Lee Kuan Yew trait, is ironic in view of the city-state’s reliance on its neighbours for the most basic necessities such as reclamation land, water, labour and food supplies. Exploiting this resource vulnerability, the Malaysian and Indonesian governments have periodically utilised their arsenal of resource ‘carrots and sticks’ against the city-state during periods of diplomatic tension. The maturation of regional soft power through skilful diplomacy has in many respects been inhibited by a preference for cultivating close security relations

Paradoxes and diplomatic blowbacks 181 with Washington as exemplified by the hosting of US facilities in Singapore. Yet paradoxically, Singapore’s uncritical security relations with its ‘great and powerful patron’ contradicts the PAP government’s obsession with maintaining the city-state’s sovereignty as this relationship has restricted its policy autonomy in international security and foreign policy matters. This is exemplified by the PAP government’s uncritical support for the failed US military intervention in Iraq. Singapore’s image problem was starkly demonstrated when its sporting contingent was unceremoniously booed during the 1997 Commonwealth Games and 2001 Southeast Asian Games in Kuala Lumpur. In both years, bilateral tensions were complicated by domestic, economic and political challenges that were arguably deflected by scapegoating the neighbour. This took the form of allegations and counter-allegations of ethnic minority marginalisation in both states. In 2006, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s effigy was burned in Bangkok following allegations that the Singapore government’s investment company, Temasek, had engaged in dubious business practices when it purchased Shin Corp from Thaksin Shinawatra’s corruption tainted family. Warning of the dangers in adopting Singapore’s authoritarian model of governance, a 2006 editorial in the Thai daily newspaper The Nation opined: It is hellishly difficult to be a lover of democracy in Singapore. When independent thinking Singaporeans speak their minds, they must be ready to face dire consequences, as the government under the People’s Action Party will bring out its full arsenal of repressive measures to try to beat them into submission . . . It is interesting that our discredited Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is an avid student of Lee’s political thought and methods. Thaksin has said on several occasions that he wanted to turn Thailand into several Singapore’s. We must not allow that to happen.3 The Singapore government’s reluctance in signing an extradition treaty with Indonesia without expediently packaging it to the proposed defence cooperation agreement, denial of basic labour rights to Indonesian maids in Singapore, rapacious appropriation of Indonesia’s natural resources and Temasek’s monopolistic business practices in Indonesia’s telecommunications sector have reinforced perceptions of the city-state as calculative, exploitative and unethical. Temasek and its stable of GLCs have been viewed suspiciously by neighbouring countries as being driven by an agenda of controlling strategic sectors in the region.4 None other than Lee Kuan Yew has acknowledged Singapore’s limited soft power capabilities in promoting economic cooperation in Southeast Asia. Singapore has long urged a greater emphasis on economic cooperation to supplement political cooperation. Our efforts had not been successful. Suggestions from Singapore for greater economic cooperation were regarded with suspicion by other ASEAN countries . . . . they feared that we would benefit disproportionately . . . To avoid lingering suspicions about Singapore’s

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Paradoxes and diplomatic blowbacks motives, I advised Prime Minister Goh to get [the Thai Prime Minister] Anand to take the lead to push for an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). (Lee, 2000: 382–383)

Singapore’s relations with states in the Asia-Pacific region have also been tenuous. Complaining of Singapore’s ‘arrogance’ and ‘air of superiority’, the former PRC ambassador to Singapore, Chen Bioluin, accused Singaporeans of lauding their English language skills and global outlook over Chinese mainlanders.5 Moreover, the PAP government’s characteristic pattern of janus-faced diplomacy – close relations with Washington and Taiwan whilst maintaining cordial relations with China – has not been overlooked by policy-makers in Beijing. Lee Kuan Yew’s racist reference to Australians as the ‘white trash of Asia’ has not been forgotten by Australian policy-makers and media. For example, the Australian media has seen fit to periodically remind the public of Lee’s unflattering view of Australians. In particular, the execution of repentant small-time Australian drug courier Nguyen Tuong Van in December 2005, despite pleas from the Australian government, the EU, Vatican, Amnesty International and other anti-capital punishment campaigners, while convicted drug barons and their associates have been allowed to enter the city-state and set up businesses, have exposed the Singapore government to criticisms of double standards and hypocrisy. Paradoxically, the authoritarian city-state’s soft power credentials are more strongly appreciated within conservative political circles in the West – prompting Singaporean foreign policy experts to pronounce that the city-state ‘punches above its weight’ and possesses a sterling brand name. A senior diplomat has boasted that ‘Singapore may be a flyweight nation-state in terms of its geography and size of population, but it carries a lot of weight when it mounts the scales of economic, communication, intellectual and diplomatic power’ (Koh, 2003: 179). Yet, it is worth noting that Singapore’s authoritarian state would have been subjected to greater international criticism had it not been useful to the strategic economic interests of Washington and foreign multinational corporations headquartered in Singapore. Indeed, the PAP government is probably anticipating that the liberal institutionalist Obama administration will subject it, along with other authoritarian governments, to greater critical scrutiny. Signs of a less cosy relationship with Washington have already been sounded by the departing US ambassador to Singapore Frank Lavin in October 2005. Just hours before flying out of Singapore, Lavin ruminated that Singapore has flourished over the past 40 years, but is a twentieth century [political] model adequate for the twenty first century? . . . Remaking its economy is, in a sense, the easy decision. Shaping a political system to reflect the needs and aspirations of its citizens is more difficult and more sensitive . . . In my view, governments will pay an increasing price for not allowing full participation of their citizens.6 The American ambassador admitted that he was ‘embarrassed’ when the Singaporean police asked him if he wanted to press charges against six demonstrators protesting peacefully against the Iraq war in front of the US embassy in 2003.7

Paradoxes and diplomatic blowbacks 183 Lavin’s undiplomatic parting shot was a great source of embarrassment to the PAP leadership. In the last few years, the PAP leadership’s unrelenting legal suits against opposition politicians and the international media have been subjected to greater scrutiny by the international community and agencies such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International Bar Association and Lawyers Rights Watch. In October 2008, HRW and Amnesty International criticised Singapore’s High Court judgement against the leader of the Singapore Democratic Party, Chee Soon Juan. Inter alia, the High Court ordered Chee to pay US$416,000 to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew for defamation. The decision has been derided for being yet another example of how the judiciary has been used to squash political dissent.8 Other opposition politicians that have been bankrupted include the late Workers’ Party chief J.B. Jeyaretnam. The PAP leadership has also sued Bloomberg, The Economist, International Herald Tribune, Far Eastern Economic Review and the Wall Street Journal for their critical articles on the city-state, a style of reporting that is generally expected of the media in democracies. More than 40 years after merger and Konfrontasi, Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP leadership continue to view Singapore’s closest neighbours as the country’s primary security threat. In response to this perceived security threat, the city-state has built and maintained a defence capability that is unrivalled in Southeast Asia. Paradoxically, Singapore’s formidable security apparatus has generated regional insecurities and reinforced its ‘regional other’ image. Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee’s caution in 1978 against arming the republic ‘to the teeth’ in order to prevent ‘an arms race in our part of the world’ (Huxley, 2000: 67) appears to have been ignored by Lee Kuan Yew and the technocratic PAP leadership. While Singapore’s sophisticated military industrial complex may have greatly assisted the SAF in its operational capabilities and in broadening its technological base, it has also contributed to a regional arms race and deepened the insecurity of the city-state. Problematically, this spiralling arms race between neighbouring states in Southeast Asia has not only enhanced regional insecurities but channelled vital state funds away from social services such as education and health. In the long term, Singapore’s current military edge will narrow as neighbouring economies industrialise and ascend the technological ladder. This scenario has occurred in the Middle East, where Israel’s garrison state policies have fuelled a regional arms race and heightened regional instability. Ironically, Singapore’s economic success has allowed it to acquire formidable hard power capabilities which have eroded its soft power capabilities. The PAP leadership’s preoccupation with hard power has been at the expense of developing an independent foreign and security policy that is regionally centred. As such, the efficacy of the PAP government’s more recent attempts at promoting Singapore’s soft power via institutions such as the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and other policy initiatives has been blunted. Singapore’s model of development has been viewed cynically due to its reputation as a regional political laggard when compared with the political advances of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and even Malaysia – where

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opposition parties and civil society are far more energetic and institutions such as Human Rights Commissions and Constitutional Courts have been established. Singapore’s security is most effectively secured by anchoring it to soft power diplomacy that is underpinned by a stronger sense of regional identity. This soft power diplomacy requires genuine domestic debate on foreign policy and security issues. Yet, genuine debate and discussion on Singapore’s national and regional identity cannot realistically occur without greater political space to creatively chart a new course for the city-state. Rather than fear and paranoia, this new course could be empowered by hope and idealism and the honouring of Singapore’s atavistic Malay heritage whilst celebrating its multicultural and democratic social fabric.9 In this new course, the challenges related to politics, geography, history and identity are confidently and honestly addressed, and the symbolism underpinning the questions posed by Chua Mia Tee’s painting: ‘Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal?’ valued and appreciated.

Notes

1 Singapura: Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal? 1 Ong Soh Chin, ‘Who are You? Where Do You Live?’, Straits Times, 19 August, 2006. 2 Ibid. 3 Nusantara is a trans-archipelagic term that corresponds historically to the Indonesian and Malay sphere of influence. It includes the territories of the pre-colonial Sri Vijaya, Majapahit and Johor-Riau and Malacca Kingdoms. This sphere includes contemporary Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, southern Philippines and Southern Thailand. Refer to Timothy P. Bernard (ed.), Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Boundaries, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004. 4 Interview with Tom Plate, 9 October, 2007. Online Available at http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp? parentid=79541. 5 Straits Times Interactive, 26 August, 1998. 6 Pang Gek Choo, ‘Mixed Signals from Johor’s Chief Minister’, Straits Times, 15 November, 1997. 7 Chua Lee Hong, ‘Interdependence at the Heart of Water Issue’, Straits Times Interactive, 4 September, 2002. 8 Reme Ahmad, ‘Singapore Launches Tourism Blitz in Malaysia’, Straits Times, 1 August, 2003. 9 ‘Its Not About Pay, Its About Securing Bright Future’, Straits Times, 12 April, 2007. 10 In this study, soft power refers to a country’s cultural and ideological appeal which can assist it in influencing the policies and orientation of other states in the international community. For states with or without traditional resources such as land, arms and capital, soft power is vitally important in pursuing the national interest. Soft power is also based on the attraction of ideas and the ability of influencing the policy agenda of other states. See Joseph Nye, 2004. 11 ‘Making Things Crystal Clear’, Straits Times, 1 July, 2005. 12 S.R. Nathan, ‘Pragmatic But Never Passive’, Straits Times Interactive, 12 March, 2008. 13 New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 13 August, 2000. 14 Straits Times, 24 September, 2001. 2 Remembering and forgetting: Nusantara Malays in the Singaporean national imagination 1 Laurel Teo, ‘Make Small S’pore a Great Nation’, Straits Times, 6 December, 2004. 2 Lee Hsien Loong, ‘Let’s Help Transform Singapore’, Straits Times, 9 August, 2007 3 Peh Shing Hui and Goh Chin Lian, ‘Framing the S’pore Story With Many Different Voices’, Straits Times, 4 August, 2007. 4 Peh Shing Hui and Goh Chin Lian, ‘Framing the S’pore Story With Many Different Voices’, Straits Times, 4 August, 2007.

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5 Ibid. 6 Cited in Hong Lysa. The Continuing Saga of the Singapore Story’, Cited in

(Accessed 4 May, 2007.) 7 ‘Its Not Just About Pay, Its About Securing Bright Future’, Straits Times, 12 April, 2007. 8 Liaw Wy-Cin, ‘Bay Watch’, Straits Times, 10 August, 2007. 9 Ahmad Osman, ‘Descendants of Sultan Petition PM’, Straits Times Interactive, 3 May, 1999. 10 Alfian Saat, Istana Kampong Glam, Online Available at . 11 ‘Bouncing Back and Staying Two Steps Ahead’, Straits Times Interactive, 2 February, 2007. 12 Lynn Lee, ‘Swamp to Lion City-Discovery Doing Series’, Straits Times, 5 February, 2005. 13 Astonishingly, the badly eroded stone was blown up in 1843. However, one piece of this historic stone is located in the National Museum of Singapore. 14 Straits Times, 18 October, 1989. 15 It is worth noting that diplomats from Australia and New Zealand based in the Federation tended to be more supportive of the PAP in its frequent clashes with the Alliance government. 16 ‘Why Did Merger Fail’, Straits Times, 5 July, 1998; ‘PAP’s Entry Into 1964 Polls Rouses Fears in KL’, Straits Times, 5 July, 1998. 17 Lydia Lim, ‘SM Lee Presents Young Singaporeans with Stark Choice’, Straits Times, 19 February, 2003. 18 In the weeks leading up to separation, Singapore’s Minister of Law, Edward Barker, presented a paper to the Federal government which contained a draft agreement for separation. 19 Petir, June–July 1962, 1. 20 Lee boldly declared that ‘All Federal powers over defence and external affairs will from today till September 16 be reposed in our yang Di-Pertuan Negara [Head of State]. We will look upon ourselves as trustees for the Central Government of Malaysia in these 15 days’. Cited in Nancy McHenry Fletcher, 1969, p. 27. 21 Angered by Lee’s unilateral declaration of independence, Minister Duncan Sandys noted in a letter to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that . . . this act of public defiance towards Britain and Malaya has no doubt helped to strengthen the public image of himself which he wishes to create . . . Therefore, if we were to humiliate him publicly, he would, I believe, retaliate with further acts of defiance of one kind or another . . . But unless I mistake his character, he will bluff, bully and blackmail up to the eleventh hour. Quoted in Lee Kuan Yew, From First World to Third: The Singapore Story, 2000, p. 502. 22 The PAP won 37 seats and 47 per cent of the vote and captured Anson from David Marshall. By contrast, the Barisan Socialis won 13 seats and 33 per cent of the vote. The Alliance polled a disappointing 8 per cent of the vote and lost all their seven seats to the PAP. Refer to Richard Clutterback, 1985, p. 161. 23 Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 5, No. 21, December 1963, Col. 2953. 24 The PAP defeated the Socialist Front candidate by a narrow margin of 808 votes in Bangsar. Refer to V. Suryanarayan, 1969, 17. 25 They include the United Democratic Party and the People’s Progressive Party from the Peninsula, the Sarawak United Party and Party Machinda from East Malaysia and the PAP of Singapore. 26 Lee also noted that his ancestors went back 100 years in Singapore and ridiculed the idea that Malays of the Malay Archipelago are indigenous to Malaysia. Incensed by Lee’s

Notes

27 28 29 30

31

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remarks, UMNO Secretary General Jaafar Albar accused Lee of racism and insulting Malays. ‘To say that the Malays are like the other races in this country and that they have no extra right in calling this country their homeland is an insult to the Malay race. It is as if Harry Lee was saying that the Malays were also vagrants, finding shelter in this country’. Cited in Nancy McHenry Fletcher, 1969, pp. 62–63. Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 11, No. 3, June 1965, Col. 996. The PAP leadership initiated plans to set up a government in exile in Cambodia owing to its close ties with Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Refer to Michael Leifer, 2000, 52. The PAP garnered 58.9 per cent of the vote. Refer to Chan Heng Chee, 1971, p. 21. The political tensions and loss of goodwill between Singapore and KL spilled over to the economic sphere. Inter alia, friction arose from the Federal government’s intention to increase Singapore’s 40 per cent contribution of her revenue collection to KL arising from the increased national defence expenditure and ballooning federal deficit as a result of Indonesia’s Konfrontasi campaign. Tensions were aggravated further by KL’s insistence on the closure of the Bank of China in Singapore even though this would adversely affect the island’s trade with mainland China. Pressure on Singapore to support KL’s boycott of South African imports, disagreements over the British quota for textile products from Singapore and Malaysia and the PAP’s allegation that the central government had persisted with its approach of industrial competition with Singapore even after merger served to magnify political tensions. When asked by a Times of London journalist in 12 August, 1965 whether he harboured ambitions of becoming a future Prime Minister of Malaysia, Lee admitted, One day, perhaps, but not for a very long time. We want to bring the races and the states together. It takes time, for the thing to happen. And we were quite prepared to help them in a secondary capacity. But they didn’t want it, p. 287. Cited in Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew: The Crucial Years, 1995, p. 287

32 Interview with BBC World Service radio programme, ‘People of the Pacific Century’, BBC, 1984. 33 Mafoot Simon, ‘Remain Positive About Negative Numbers’, Straits Times Interactive, 3 September, 2005. 34 Lee Hsien Loong claimed that 18 per cent of Malay brides were below the age of 21, compared to 9 per cent for Indians and 3 per cent for Chinese. See ‘MM Lee to Malays: Bring Number of Teen Marriages Down’, Sunday Times, 29 August, 2005. 35 Ibid. 36 Refer to Suriani Suratman, Problematic Singapore Malays: The Making of a Portrayal, Seminar Paper No. 36, Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, 2004/2005. 37 ‘New Malays Can Step Up the Pace to Excellence’, Straits Times, 19 April, 2002. 38 Ahmad Osman, ‘Yaacob’s Challenge to Malays’, Straits Times, 3 May, 2002. 39 Refer to Chua Lee Hoong, ‘Muslim Leaders Must Be Seen to Speak Their Minds’, Straits Times, 6 February, 2002. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 ‘MP Makes Bold Proposal to Help Local Muslims’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 20 January, 2003. 43 ‘Muslim Group Attacks Government Support for US’, Straits Times, 19 January, 2002. 44 For Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff’s account of his journey from Malay activist to exile, please refer to Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff, ‘Fateha.com: Challenging Control Over Malay/Muslim Voices in Singapore’, in Steven Gan, James Gomez and Uwe Johannen (eds), Asian Cyberactivism: Freedom of Expression and Media Censorship (Bangkok: Friedrich Nuemann Foundation, 2004), pp. 318–358. 45 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Boost for Chinese Language’, The Star (Malaysia), 19 December, 2004.

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46 ‘Malaysians Better Than Singaporeans in Chinese’, Straits Times Interactive, 1 October, 2005. 47 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Boost for Chinese Language’, The Star (Malaysia), 19 December, 2004. 48 Liaw Wy-Cin, ‘What’s ASEAN? Most Teens Don’t Know’, Straits Times, 11 July, 2005. 3 Competing and comparable paradigms of authoritarian nation-building 1 Balas dendam is a Malay expression which refers to the bearing of a grudge or acting in retribution for past slights and injuries suffered. 2 [Straits Times, 18 October, 1989.] 3 PM Goh, ‘Absurd to Say Singapore is Sabotaging Malaysia’, Straits Times Interactive, 26 August, 1998. 4 ‘Malaysia, Singapore Try to Put History Behind Them’, Associated Press (Singapore), 2 July, 2004. 5 Straits Times, 8 July, 1995. 6 Ibid. 7 Tunku Abdul Aziz, ‘S’pore is Simply a Neighbour Too Far’, New Straits Times, 18 October, 2006. 8 ‘Politicians Try to Calm Trade Jitters Over Malaysia–Singapore Row’, Agence France Presse (Kuala Lumpur), 16 April, 2002. 9 ‘Government Helps Overseas Singaporeans to Keep in Touch’, Channel News Asia (Singapore), 21 July, 2007. 10 ‘Laughter and Applause as Mahathir Takes Digs at Singapore’, Straits Times Interactive, 15 February, 2003. 11 Laurel Teo, ‘So Close, Yet So Different’, Sunday Times (Singapore), 28 September, 2003. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Lee Hsien Loong, ‘An Equal Footing for All Races in Singapore’, Straits Times, 31 January, 2005. 15 A whole chapter in Mahathir Mohamad’s controversial The Malay Dilemma is focused on the alleged covert communalism of ostensibly non-communal parties such as the PAP. See Mahathir Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma (Petaling Jaya: Federal Publications, 1970). 16 ‘Abdullah’s Delicate Racial Balancing Act’, Straits Times Interactive, 22 September, 2004. 17 Straits Times, Weekly Overseas Edition, 18 January, 1992. 18 ‘MM Lee Says Giving Subsidies Will Not Solve Singapore’s Problems’, Channel News Asia (Singapore), 26 May, 2008. 19 The GRC system is based on the merging of a number of electoral constituencies to form a larger electoral unit. The highest aggregate votes from the component constituencies within a GRC wins the entire GRC. There were initially only three GRCs but by 2006, nine GRCs were created. At present, there are only nine single seat constituencies. 20 PAS has rejected the Malay nationalism advocated by UMNO. It promotes a Malay identity based on an Islamic identity that transcends ethnicity and is committed towards promoting an Islamic rather than a Malay state. 21 Carolyn Hong, ‘Johor UMNO Criticises Idea of Malaysian Race’, Straits Times Interactive, 8 November, 2006. 22 Editorial, Utusan Malaysia, 5 March, 2000. 23 Cited in ‘Big Mistake to Drive Singapore Out of Malaysia’, Straits Times Interactive, 19 February, 2003.

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24 ‘How ICJ Arrived at its Decision’, Straits Times, 24 May, 2008. 25 The ICJ ruled that the four types of activities engaged in by Singapore as tantamount to conduct a titre de souverain included: i) The investigation of shipwrecks that took place in Pedra Branca’s territorial waters; ii) Granting of permission by Singapore to Malaysian officials to visit the island and survey the waters surrounding it; iii) The installation of military communications equipment on the island in 1977; and iv) The proposed reclamation plans to extend the islet. In all these activities, Malaysia failed to respond to the conduct of Singapore and its colonial predecessor. Ibid. 26 Carolyn Hong, ‘Malaysian MPs Slam Govt For Losing Pedra Branca’, Straits Times, 27 May, 2008 27 Ibid. 28 Abdullah Ahmad, ‘Two Neighbours in Contrast’, Reprinted in Straits Times, 19 July, 2003. 29 ‘Causeway a ‘Colonial Remnant’, Straits Times, 18 December, 2004. 30 Michael Barr, ‘The Charade of Meritocracy’, Far Eastern Economic Review, October, 2006. Peranakan can be loosely referred to as Southeast Asian Chinese communities who have assimilated indigenous Southeast Asian culture. 31 Despite the mid-1990s constituency delineation exercise which reduced the size of rural constituencies, in 1999, Malays made up 56.7 per cent of the total number of registered voters in the peninsula but 68 per cent of peninsula seats have Malay majorities. See Francis Loh, ‘Towards a New Politics of Fragmentation and Contestation’, in Francis Loh and Johan Saravanamuttu (eds), New Politics in Malaysia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 254. 32 For a detailed analysis of these politically inspired electoral reforms, refer to Lily Zubaidah Rahim, 2001, pp. 82–114. 33 Shu-Ching Jean Chen, ‘Singapore’s Unloved Chinese Labor Boom’, Forbes (Singapore), 9 May, 2008. 34 Ibid. 35 Azmi Hassan, ‘Best Personnel for Defence, Regardless of Race’, Straits Times, 25 September, 2003. 36 Worthington defined the core executive as those who are at the centre of government and policy making. See Ross Worthington, Governance in Singapore (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 4. 37 Maria Almenoar, ‘NUS Business School Gets $21m from Lippo Group’, Straits Times, 2 August, 2007. 38 Straits Times, 2 August, 1998. 39 Rustam Sani, ‘Why S’pore, KL Ties Will Stay Volatile’, Straits Times, 18 July, 1998. 40 ‘If MM were in his 20s now . . .’, Straits Times Interactive, 21 August, 2004. 41 Clarence Chang, ‘MM Lee on ensuring S’pore’s Future as a Special Red Dot’, New Paper (Singapore), 17 September, 2006. 42 Lynn Lee, ‘Do Critics Know the S’pore Political System, Asks MM Lee’, Straits Times Interactive, 16 September, 2006. 43 Geert De Clercq, ‘S’pore Leader to Malaysia: “Sorry” for Race Comments’, Reuters (Singapore), 2 October, 2006. 44 Clarence Chang, ‘MM Lee on Ensuring S’pore’s Future as Special Red Dot’, New Paper (Singapore), 17 September, 2006. 45 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Why Did He Say It’, Straits Times Interactive, 3 October, 2006. 46 John Burton, ‘Tax Proposals Add to Worries Over Great Divide’, Financial Times (UK), 15 November, 2006. 47 Alex Au, ‘Mixing Welfare and Elitism in Singapore’, Asia Times (Singapore), 23 November, 2006. 48 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘The Different Faces of Singapore’, The Star (Malaysia), 12 April, 2008.

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49 Alex Au, ‘Mixing Welfare and Elitism in Singapore’, Asia Times (Singapore), 23 November, 2006. 50 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Speaking Out For the Silent Majority’, The Star (Malaysia), 31 May, 2008. 51 Kevin Lim, ‘Politicians to Get Big Pay Hike in 2008’, Reuters (Singapore), 13 December, 2007. 52 ‘Lee Snr Criticises Malaysia for Affirmative Action Policy’, Associated Press (Singapore), 11 October, 2007. 53 An article from the Malaysian paper China Press responded by pointing out that Singapore’s ‘democracy is still at the foetal stage . . . Nevertheless, it is very effective to use the “merger theory” to frighten Singaporeans who are trapped in air-conditioned living but are feeling unhappy’. See Zhen Zhi Quan, ‘A View From Malaysia’, Straits Times, 24 October, 2007 54 Lee Hsien Loong, ‘An Equal Footing for All Races in Singapore’, Straits Times, 31 January, 2005. 55 Michael Barr, ‘The Charade of Meritocracy’, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 2006. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Cited from Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 December, 1998. 59 Clarence Chang, ‘MM Lee on ensuring S’pore’s Future as a Special Red Dot’, New Paper (Singapore), 17 September, 2006. 60 ‘The New Team’s Work’, Straits Times, 14 February, 2006. 61 Clarissa Oon, ‘Mark of a Good Political Succession’, Straits Times, 2 April, 2008. 62 Ibid. 63 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Kuan Yew in the Spotlight’, The Star (Malaysia), 28 April, 2007. 64 Garry Rodan, ‘Singapore’s Founding Myth vs Freedom’, Far Eastern Economic Review, October, 2006. 65 For example, see Carolyn Hong, ‘Leaders Come to Rescue of Top Students’, Straits Times Interactive, 11 June, 2005; Jean Chua, ‘KL Minister Says Sorry for Tourists Bad Experiences’, Straits Times, 9 December, 2005; Leslie Lopez, ‘Race Rhetoric is Part of UMNO Politics’, Straits Times Interactive, 17 November, 2006. 66 In the late 1980s, about half of Singapore’s Cabinet Ministers were from Malaysia. See Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Malaysia–Singapore Relations, Institute of Policy Studies Lecture No.2 (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1990), p. 10. 67 Michael Barr, ‘The Charade of Meritocracy’, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 2006. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Refer to Lily Zubaidah Rahim (2001). 71 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Stepping Out of the Shadow’, The Star (Malaysia), 12 November, 2006. 72 Leslie Lau, ‘Thousands of Malays Miss Cut for Universities’, Straits Times, 15 July, 2005. 73 ‘New National Agenda, A Last Push for a Level Playing Field’, Bernama (Kuala Lumpur), 13 August, 2005. 74 Reme Ahmad, ‘Don’t Make an Issue of Help for Malays: Abdullah’, Sunday Times (Singapore), 24 July, 2005. 75 Appointed as President in 1981, Devan Nair resigned within three years. He accused Lee of creating a repressive regime and being an elitist who demeaned Indians and Malays. The official explanation for Nair’s sudden resignation was alcoholism, however, he is commonly thought to have been pressured to resign because of his disenchantment with government policies. President Ong Teng Chong also clashed with the Cabinet over interpretations of the President’s powers to scrutinise records of the

Notes

76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

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nation’s financial reserves. Former Deputy Prime Minister Toh Chin Chye left government in 1988 under a cloud of tension. Since his resignation, he has criticised population policies and the government’s role in business. Lamenting Singapore’s apathetic populace, Toh opined, ‘They are too fearful to speak out even over the most routine disagreement. How can ideas flow? How can you have a great country’. Cited in Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Governing in New Era – A Different Cup of Tea’, The Star (Malaysia), 18 December, 2005. Reme Ahmad, ‘Abdullah Defends Record at UMNO Meeting’, Straits Times Interactive, 16 November, 2006. Reme Ahmad, ‘Racial Tensions Spark Concerns’, Straits Times Interactive, 25 November, 2006. ‘Muhyuddin Urges Abdullah to Set Date for Handover’, Straits Times Interactive, 28 May, 2008. Speech by Syed Hamid Albar to the American Malaysian Chamber of Commerce, ‘Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Perspectives With Particular Reference to Malaysia–US Relations’, 8 May, 2003, p. 4. Press Statement, Gerakan Mansuhkan ISA (GMI), ‘What is the Meaning of the 50 Years of Independence if the State Still Uses the ISA?’, 1 August, 2007. Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 September, 2001. Asad Latif, ‘What BN’s Victory Means for Singapore’, Straits Times Interactive, 29 March, 2004. Reme Ahmad, ‘Abdullah Defends Record at UMNO Meeting’, Straits Times Interactive, 16 November, 2006. ‘Malaysia Will Review But Won’t Repeal ISA’, Straits Times, 24 May, 2008. Carolyn Hong, ‘Making UMNO Relevant to All Races’, Straits Times Interactive, 5 April, 2008. However, Singapore was rated highly for government effectiveness and regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption and political stability. Cited in Lynn Lee, ‘Do Critics Know the S’pore Political System, Asks MM Lee’, Straits Times Interactive, 16 September, 2006. ‘State Owned Pain’, Wall Street Journal, 6 August, 2007. Cited in John Burton, ‘Singapore Defends Financial Secrecy’, Financial Times (UK), 10 November, 2006. Peter Larsen and Martin Dickson, ‘Singapore Fund Promises Greater Transparency’, Financial Times (Davos), 28 January, 2008. Mark Kleinman, ‘Singapore PM, Transparency Isn’t Everything’, Telegraph (UK), 27 January, 2008. John Burton, ‘Singapore Defends Financial Secrecy’, Financial Times (UK), 10 November, 2006. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, ‘Doing a Thaksin Deepens Singapore’s Culpability’, Bangkok Post, 13 November, 2006. Amy Kazmin, ‘Singapore’s Temasek Plans to Cut its Stake in Thailand’s Shin Corp’, Financial Times (London), 18 June, 2008. Eric Ellis, ‘Madam Ho’s Temasek Still in the Firing Line After Thai Coup’, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 September, 2006. Sebastian Tong, ‘Statesman Lee Defends Temasek’s Shin Deal’, Reuters (Singapore), 3 November, 2006. ‘S’pore’s Legal System Attacked at Lawyers Meeting’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 19 October, 2007. ‘Lee Snr Dismisses Low Press Freedom Ranking for Singapore’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 15 October, 2007. Ibid. ‘Singapore: International Trial Observer to Attend Court of Appeal as Former Opposition Leader J.B. Jeyaretnam Faces Possible Expulsion From Parliament’,

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Amnesty International and the Lawyers Rights Watch, Canada, 20 July, 2001. Available at www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details. (Accessed 5 December, 2005.) 100 It shall be the deliberate and conscious policy of the Government of Singapore at all times to recognise the special position of the Malays who are the indigenous people of the land and who are in most need of assistance and accordingly, it shall be the responsibility of the Government of Singapore to protect, support, foster, and promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social, and cultural interests, and the Malay language (Section 152, Singapore Constitution). 4 The frightened country and the geopolitics of insecurity 1 Indonesia’s President Sukarno believed that the Federation of Malaysia was a neocolonial plot for British imperialism. In retaliation, Indonesia embarked on a campaign referred to as Konfrontasi with Indonesian commandos committing numerous acts of sabotage in Malaysia and Singapore. 2 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Filled With Passion’, The Star (Malaysia), 13 August, 2007. 3 David Boey, ‘Spirit, Commitment of NS Men is the SAF’s Best Weapon: PM’, Straits Times, 28 September, 2007. (Accessed 14 February, 2008.) 4 ‘The Nation Apologises’, 13 February, 2008, Online Available at http://www. newmatilda.com/print/2875. (Accessed 14 February, 2008.) 5 They include three Singaporean banks and the Government-Linked Company (GLC) Keppel Corporation. See Ed Cropley, ‘Singapore Distancing Itself From MyanmarAnalysts’, Reuters (Bangkok), 30 October, 2007. 6 Connie Levett, ‘Tough on Drugs, Soft on Drug Lords’, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 November, 2005. 7 Neil Lawrence, ‘Singapore Shrug’, The Irrawaddy, 1 August, 2002. Online Available at http://www.irrawaddy.org. (Accessed 20 December, 2007.) 8 Since 1991, Singapore has executed 400 people. See Baradan Kuppusamy, ‘Death Penalty Stand at UN Leaves Many Angered’, Inter Press Service (KL), 3 December, 2007. 9 General Than Shwe’s son apparently sits on the board of Tay Za’s company Htoo Trading. Refer to Thomas Bell, ‘Activists Attack ASEAN Over Inaction on Burma’, Telegraph (London), 22 November, 2007. 10 ALTSEAN Burma, Press Release, ‘ASEAN Should Stop Passing the Buck on Burma’, 25 October, 2007. 11 Eric Ellis, ‘Singapore a Friend Indeed to Burma’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 October, 2007. 12 Tan Chin Tiong was appointed as the Second Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1982 and by 1986 elevated to the position of Permanent Secretary, thereby exercising control over the police, civil defence force and the Internal Security Department (ISD). After a decade in Home Affairs, he was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as one of the two Permanent Secretaries and in 2003 was catapulted to ASEAN’s Secretary General. See Tim Huxley, 2000, p. 234. 13 Bilahari Kausikan, ‘Small State’s Big Challenge to Stay Vital’, Straits Times, 2 September, 2005. 14 The PAP leadership had supposedly prepared plans to set up a government in exile in Cambodia should the UMNO leadership arrest Lee. See T.S. George, Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore (London: Andre Deutch, 1974), p. 81. 15 New Straits Times, 14 March, 1997. 16 It is worth noting that this security dilemma framework is not only used by realist interpretations of international relations but also by those who work within the framework of critical security studies. 17 By contrast, Thailand spends 1.5 per cent, Malaysia 2.1 per cent and Indonesia 1.7 per cent of their GDP on defence. See ‘Despite Small Size, Peace and Prosperity, Singapore is Heavily Armed’, Associated Press (Singapore), 22 August, 2000.

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18 Jake Lloyd-Smith, ‘Sharp Claws’, South China Morning Post, 14 January, 2003. 19 National service includes two and a half years of full time military duty and thereafter 13 years of annual training. 20 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘NS Rumblings on the Rise’, The Star (Malaysia), 17 March, 2007. 21 Between 1994–2001, the US sold US$5 billion worth of military goods and services to Singapore. Some of these offensive oriented military hardware include F-16s, Chinook helicopters, AH-64D Apache assault helicopters, Harpoon missiles for maritime patrol aircraft, air-to-air missiles, laser-guided missile launchers and Hydra 70 rocket torpedoes. Singapore has also leased military bases in Arizona and Texas and contracted pilot training services from the US Air Force and weapons manufacturer. 22 Shawn Crispin, ‘Arms: On Their Marks’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 October, 2000. 23 Ibid. 24 Under the agreement, Singapore will participate in the System Design and Development Phase of the F-35 which is the world’s most advanced multi-role fighter. ‘Singapore Signs Up for F-35 Stealth Fighter Program’, AFP, February 22, 2003. 25 Alexis Hooi, ‘New Home for the Formidable F-16s’, Straits Times, 30 November, 2004. 26 ‘Pentagon Announces Possible Sale to S’pore of Munitions for F-15 Fighters’, Agence France Presse (Washington), 22 August, 2005. 27 In 2003/2004, Singapore’s defence spending climbed by a further 0.6 per cent. ‘Prepare for War If You Want Peace: Defence Chiefs’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 14 March, 2003. 28 Shawn Crispin, ‘Arms: On Their Marks’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 October, 2000. 29 They include the introduction of a new generation of fighter airplanes capable of inflight refuelling and two new classes of nuclear submarines. Shawn Crispin, ‘Arms: On Their Marks’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 October, 2000. 30 Lee wrote in his autobiography that . . . other powerful Malay leaders, like Syed Ja’afar Albar who so strongly opposed to separation that he resigned as secretary-general of UMNO, might persuade Brigadier Alsagoff it was his patriotic duty to reverse separation. The brigadier with his brigade could have captured me and all my ministers without difficulty . . . Keng Swee as defence minister worked feverishly to build-up some defence capability.

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40

See Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965–2000 (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings, 2000), p. 31. M.G.G. Pillai, ‘One Sided Bilateral Agreement’. Online Available at http://www.malaysiakini.com. (Accessed 11 February, 2005.) Ian Stewart, ‘Arms Deals Signal Threat to Stability’, South China Morning Post, 30 September, 2000. Azmi Hassan, ‘Best Personnel For Defence, Regardless of Race’, Straits Times, 25 September, 2003. Ibid. Ibid. ‘KL Signs $220m deal for 11 Army Choppers’, Straits Times, 4 October, 2003. Kimina Lyall, ‘Political Islamism Rattles the Region’, The Australian, 16 April, 2002. Reme Ahmad, ‘Water Dispute Can Lead to War: Ex-General’, Straits Times, 4 February, 2002. Allan Macmillan et al. refer to strategic culture as a ‘distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as geopolitical setting, history and political culture’. See Ken Booth and Russell Trood (eds), 1999, p. 11. Sunday Times, 19 September, 1999.

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41 Ho Ka Wee, ‘Childhood Dream to Fly Comes True’, Sunday Times (Singapore), 7 September, 2003. 42 Cited in Amit Baruah, ‘Lee Sr Warns Malays Against Race Based Politics’, The Hindu (New Delhi), 6 March, 2001. 43 Ibid. 44 An old Chinese expression capturing the community’s disdain for military service is as follows: ‘One never uses good iron to make nails; good sons do not become soldiers’. 45 Scholar officers refer to SAF officers who are recipients of prestigious SAF scholarships based on their outstanding performance in the ‘A’ level exams. 46 Enunciated in 1984, the total defence strategy provides a comprehensive approach towards maintaining national security and encompasses non-military aspects of defence. They include psychological defence, social defence, economic defence and civil defence. 47 Amnon Barzilai, ‘Israel Set Up Singapore’s Army, Former Officers Reveal’, Haaretz (Israel), 15 July, 2004. 48 Former PAP Minister Othman Wok has acknowledged that on a covert visit to Israel in 1970, he took on a fictitous name and was introduced as a journalist from Thailand. See Othman Wok, 2000, p. 204. 49 David Hawkins, ‘New Singapore’, World Survey, No. 38, February 1972, p. 3. 50 Caroline Gluck, ‘America’s Irreplaceable Ally’, Jerusalem Post, 16 June, 2005. 51 Amnon Barzilai, ‘Israel Set Up Singapore’s Army, Former Officers Reveal’, Haaretz (Israel), 19 October, 2000. 52 The Spike missile can be fired from either helicopter or tanks and is light enough to be used by infantry troops. Amnon Barzilai, ‘Israel Set Up Singapore’s Army, Former Officers Reveal’, Haaretz (Israel), 19 October, 2000. 53 ‘Uneasy About Singapore’s Spy Satellite Deal’, New Straits Times, 26 July, 2000. 54 Prior to that, Malaysia’s foreign policy had been strongly anti-communist and proWestern in the 1960s and non-aligned in the 1970s. 55 Brendan Pereira, ‘Warmer US Ties Won’t See Mahathir Hold His Tongue’, Straits Times Interactive, 11 May, 2002. 56 The island’s geographic location as a regional intelligence centre and status as a ‘diplomatic window’ by many foreign states who opened consulates and commissions that were staffed with senior diplomatic personnel nurtured the international orientation of Singaporean politicians and political activists. Their sensitivity to international developments and experience in international diplomacy was reinforced further by the relatively easy access to diplomatic missions and existence of local organisations that had established strong ties with foreign political organisations such as the Kuomintang, socialist and communist movements in Europe and Asia. See K. Wilairat, 1975, pp. 1–2. 57 It is worth noting that Singapore’s non-aligned stance was initiated not by the PAP but by the island’s first Chief Minister David Marshall who energetically championed the non-aligned movement following his election to government in 1955. Marshall’s enthusiasm for the non-aligned movement was evidenced by his issuing of numerous statements supporting anti-colonial movements and Third World principles and leading goodwill missions to Indonesia in 1955 and the PRC in 1956. See. K. Wilairat, 1975, p. 3. 58 Lee Kuan Yew has referred to the United States as the most generous and benign colonial power in Asia. He has also asserted that such traits were lacking in the Japanese. Straits Times, 8 June, 1996. 59 Lee Kuan Yew, Quoted in The Mirror (Singapore), 7 November, Vol. 2, No. 45, 1966, p. 5. 60 Singapore eventually succumbed to ASEAN’s position of supporting Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. 61 The FPDA provides for the three extra-regional powers to consult one another in the

Notes

62 63 64

65 66 67

68 69

70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

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event of a threat to the security of Singapore and Malaysia. See Derek da Cunha, ‘Defence and Security: Evolving Threat Perceptions’, in Derek da Cunha (ed.), Singapore in the New Millenium: Challenges Facing the City-State (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), p. 142. Lee Hsien Loong, ‘Engaging a New Asia’, Straits Times, 14 July, 2005. The Clinton administration did request Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong to advise Suharto to accept the IMF’s prescriptions on managing the chaotic Indonesian economy following the 1997 regional financial crisis. The MOU was classified presumably because it contained sensitive information. US officials have declined to comment on whether the pact includes references to nuclear weapons or if the US had ever stored nuclear weapons in Singapore. Responding to queries from opposition parliamentarian J.B. Jeyaretnam and Nominated Member of Parliament Simon Tay about the nuclear weapons of US ships docked in Singapore, Minister David Lim claimed that no nuclear weapons were stored in Singapore. However, in a January 2001 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists it was alleged that the British kept nuclear weapons at its bases in Singapore during the Cold War without informing the Singapore public. Refer to ‘Singapore Says it Dosen’t Store Nuclear Weapons’, Associated Press (Singapore), 7 March, 2001. Straits Times, 12 November, 1987. Straits Times, 7 October, 1989. As noted above, the PAP leadership’s realist predisposition towards colluding with the major powers was evidenced during the turbulent merger years in the early 1960s, when Lee and the PAP leadership assiduously courted Britain, Australia and New Zealand to enhance its political leverage against the Federal government. The Singapore government had also staunchly supported the failed US military involvement in Vietnam. Agence France Presse (Singapore), ‘Singapore Makes Facilities Available to US Forces, Steps Up Security’, 21 March, 2003. During his defection to Jordon in the mid-1990s, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law General Kamal Hussein informed UN weapons inspector Rolf Ekeus that Iraq had destroyed its WMD programmes. At one time, Kamal Hussein was involved in Iraq’s WMD programmes. Refer to Marian Wilkinson, ‘The Forged Intelligence Reports that Helped to Unleash War’, Sydney Morning Herald, 21–22 June, 2003. Tom Allard and Peter Fray, ‘Australia Was Told; War Will Fuel Terror’, Sydney Morning Herald, 13–14 September, 2003. Andrew Wilkie, ‘A Lack of Intelligence’, Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May–1 June, 2003. By contrast, the US-led military action against Iraq in 1991 received broad international support for helping to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi aggression. Reme Ahmad, ‘Massive Rally Backs KL Anti-War Message’, Straits Times, 24 February, 2003. ‘Hundreds of Thousands Rally in Jakarta Against the Iraq War’, Jakarta Post, 31 March, 2003. Quoted in David Jenkins, ‘Ignoring Regional Problems and Living Dangerously’, Sydney Morning Herald, 12–13 April, 2003. Marco Garrido, ‘Catholic Church Rallies Filipinos Against War’, LA Times, 25 March, 2003. Nirmal Ghosh, ‘Defence and Trade Ties Get a Big Boost’, Straits Times, 24 October, 2003. Inter alia, China is particularly concerned about the US doctrine of preemptive strike. These organisations were the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Association (Pergas); Perdaus, Muhammadiyah and the Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies. See Tan Tarn How, ‘Minority vs National Views’, Straits Times, 15 September, 2002.

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80 Their hardly radical placards read, ‘Don’t attack Iraq’ and ‘War is not healthy for children and other living things’. See ‘Two Women Stage Brief Protest Outside US Embassy’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 15 February, 2003. 81 A survey by the Straits Times found that 74 per cent of Singaporeans opposed the war. Refer to Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Protest Cuts Across Race and Religion’, The Star (Malaysia), 23 March, 2003. 82 Felix Soh, ‘Singapore’s No Less Safe Today: Envoy’, Straits Times Interactive, 16 January, 2002. 83 Straits Times, Forum, 11 June, 2003. 84 J.B. Jeyaretnam, Press Statement, ‘Singapore Supports US’, 18 June, 2003. Online Available at http:\\www. thinkcentre.org/article.cfm. (Accessed 20 July, 2003.) 85 Ibid. 86 Derwin Pereira and Dewi Asmarani, ‘Bush Takes Anti-Terror Message to Indonesia’, Straits Times, 23 October, 2003. 87 Dewi Asmarani, ‘Muslim Leaders Impressed After the Meeting’, Straits Times, 24 October, 2003. 88 ‘Bush Puzzled and Distressed by Asian Suspicions’, Straits Times, 25 October, 2003. 89 ‘Iraq War Shows I Was Right: Bali Bomber’, Straits Times Interactive, 27 March, 2003. 90 Goh Chin Lian, ‘SAF Sending 192 Servicemen to Iraq’, Straits Times, 28 October, 2003. 91 Singapore’s status as an oil trading hub has been reinforced by Caltex shifting its global headquarters from Texas to Singapore. Linda Low, ‘The Limits of a City State: Or Are There?’, in Derek da Cunha (ed.), op. cit., p. 18. 92 Eugene Low, ‘US Keen to Boost ASEAN Trade Via S’pore’, Straits Times Interactive, 3 April, 2006. 93 Roger Mitton, ‘FTA Clears Final Hurdle’, Straits Times, 2 August, 2003. 94 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Malaysia, June 2003, p. 19. 95 Chua Mui Hoong, ‘US, Singapore on Track in Forging Security Accord’, Straits Times Interactive, 6 May, 2004. 96 This claim was reiterated by Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar in April 2004. Without so much as mentioning the United Nations, he noted that only the US had the capability to lead the war on terror. Refer to Neo Hui Min, ‘Singapore Offers Support for US on Iraq’, Straits Times Interactive, 16 April, 2004. 97 Quoted in Reme Ahmad, ‘Another Daily Slams SM Lee’s Remarks on Terrorism’, Straits Times Interactive, 16 May, 2003. 98 Agence France Presse (Lisbon), ‘US Allies in Iraq Must Stay On to Ensure Terrorism is Defeated: Singapore’, 2 December, 2003. 99 Reme Ahmad, ‘Ex-General Questions Call By PM Goh to Back US in Iraq’, Straits Times Interactive, 8 December, 2003. 100 Agence France Presse (KL), ‘Malaysia Rejects US Patrols in Malacca Straits, Raps Singapore’, 27 April, 2004. 101 ‘Singapore Can’t Invite US to Patrol Straits: KL’, Straits Times Interactive, 12 May, 2004. 102 Stefan Eklof, ‘Piracy: A Critical Perspective’, International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) Newsletter, No. 36, March 2005, p. 12. 103 Tan Tarn How, ‘Suspected Terrorists Deserve An Open Trial’, Straits Times, 27 January, 2003. 104 Ibid. 105 ‘Malays Do Not Feel Marginalised’, Straits Times, 22 January, 2003. 106 Tan Tarn How, ‘Don’t Fear Mildly Heretical Questions in Our Minds’, Straits Times, 21 January, 2003. 107 ‘Singapore Not Perfect, But Don’t Cast JI Men As Victims’, Straits Times, 23 January, 2003.

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108 Gillian Wong, ‘Singapore Says Sorry After Terror Group Leader Escapes’, Associated Press (Singapore), 28 February, 2008. 109 Derwin Pereira, ‘Security Issues the Focus of MM Lee’s Talks in US’, Straits Times, 19 October, 2006. 5 The politics of economic competition and cooperation 1 Kiasu is a Chinese word to describe a selfish anxiety disorder based on an obsessive fear of losing out to others. 2 Balas dendam is a Malay term which refers to the bearing of a grudge and acting in retribution for perceived past slights and injuries incurred. 3 Shortly after separation, the Malaysian government unilaterally terminated the currency inter-changeability pact, separated the joint stock exchange and rubber market, restricted log exports to Singapore and denied Singaporean access to jungle warfare training facilities in Johor. Bilateral tensions were aggravated further by Singapore’s floating of the dollar, imposition of more elaborate restrictions on Malaysian cars entering the island and attempt to appropriate the initials of the former Malaysia-Singapore Airlines (MSA) with the launching of its own national carrier. See Michael Leifer, 2000, p. 71. 4 The Straits of Malacca is often considered an important ‘energy artery’ with the International Energy Agency forecasting that by 2030, the Straits will be carrying 24 million barrels of oil per day or 37 per cent of the global oil trade. Michael Richardson, ‘Malaysia’s Oil Pipeline Challenge’, Straits Times Interactive, 4 June, 2007. 5 ‘Tax Rich Nations to Help Poor: Mahathir’, Sunday Times (Singapore), 10 August, 2003. 6 ‘Some Nations Need ‘Good’ Dictators, Says Mahathir’, Straits Times, 27 April, 2001. 7 Manuel Castells has observed that state intervention in Singapore is ‘fundamentally a political process aimed at implementing a political strategy toward the fulfilment of some overiding political goals’. See Manuel Castells, ‘The Developmental City State in an Open World Economy: The Singapore Experience’, Berkeley Roundtable in the International Economy, Paper No. 3, (Berkeley: University of California, 1988). 8 Yoolim Lee, ‘Singapore Falls Behind Hong Kong in Fight to Diversify Economy’, Bloomberg (Singapore), 14 March, 2007. 9 Philip Bowring, ‘Such Good Friends, For Now’, Asia Sentinel, 25 July, 2007. Online Available at http://asiasentinel.com. (Accessed 20 August, 2007.) 10 Ibid. 11 Paul Jacob, ‘Growth Forecast Raised to 7–8 per cent’, Straits Times, 9 August, 2007. 12 Ngiam Tong Dow, ‘Musings of a Singapore Administrator’, Straits Times, 8 September, 2007. 13 ‘Temasek Invests US$4.6 billion in China’, Asia Times (Beijing), 7 March, 2006. 14 In 2006, Singapore was the fourth biggest investor in Sichuan. See Jessica Chean, ‘S’pore Set to Play Key Role in Sichuan’s Growth’, Straits Times, 8 September, 2007. 15 Labuan was established as an Offshore Financial Centre in 1993 with a view to providing financial services to the region. 16 Leslie Lau, ‘Budget Speech Takes Aim at Singapore’s Accusations’, Straits Times, 13 September, 2003. 17 Tor Ching Li, ‘To Keep Singapore Ahead: Quality Population is Key’, Today (Singapore), 14 October, 2004. 18 Ibid. 19 ‘Its Not Just About Pay, Its About Securing Bright Future’, Straits Times, 12 April, 2007. 20 Straits Times, 7 April, 1998. 21 ‘Time for Malaysia to Issue Ultimatum to Singapore’, reprinted in Sunday Times (Singapore), 19 March, 2000.

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22 Brendan Pereira, ‘We Don’t Want to be Enemies With You’, Straits Times, 5 August, 1998. 23 Lydia Lim and Laurel Teo, ‘Dr. M: Singapore’s Friend or Foe’, Straits Times, 25 October, 2003. 24 In 1918, the British granted Malayan Railway (Keretapi Tanah Melayu) a 999 year lease to 217 hectares of railway land in Singapore. 25 It is worth noting that the Singapore government’s uncritical support of the IMF during the regional crisis is likely to have contributed to the IMF’s decision to establish a Regional Training Institute in Singapore in 1998 – significantly the only one in the Asia-Pacific region. R. Vellor, ‘IMF Chief Lauds Singapore’s Loan Offer to Indonesia’, Straits Times, 15 November, 1997. 26 Ian Stewart, ‘Mutual Fear Put Rivalry on Sideline’, The Australian, 18 February, 1998. 27 Under the Act, anyone leaving Malaysia with more than two kilograms of sugar and cooking oil and two tins of sweetened condensed milk would be penalised. Straits Times, 13 January, 1998. 28 Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July, 2000. 29 AFTA aimed to reduce tariffs to between 0–5 per cent by 2003 for the more industrialised ASEAN economies. 30 Chua Lee Hong, ‘Striking the Right Balance on Trade Pacts’, Sunday Times, 26 November, 2000. 31 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Gambles that May Well Pay Off’, The Star (Malaysia), 17 December, 2006. 32 Julia Clerk, ‘Sharpening the Competitive Edge’, International Herald Tribune, 9 August, 2007. 33 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Gambles that May Well Pay Off’, The Star (Malaysia), 17 December, 2006. 34 The MSC was officially launched by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in August 1996. 35 Matthew Phan, ‘2 Cities Rivalling Singapore as Processing Hub’, Straits Times, 30 July, 2003. 36 ‘KL Needs to Take MSC Global, Says Abdullah’, Straits Times Interactive, 19 May, 2007. 37 Computimes, 31 August, 2000, p. 2. 38 Denis Hew, ‘Malaysia’s Economy at Crossroads’, Straits Times, 3 February, 2005. 39 Computimes, 31 August, 2002, p. 2. 40 Straits Times Interactive, 27 March, 2003. 41 Business Times (Singapore), 24 October, 1996. 42 Eric Ellis, ‘A Shot Across Singapore’s Bow’, Fortune, 13 May, 2002. 43 Maersk Sealand has a sizeable 30 per cent stake in PTP. ‘Singapore Losing Out to its More Enterprising Neighbour’, Business Times (KL), 22 January, 2003. 44 Eric Ellis, ‘Asian Rivalry Turns Into a Ship Flight’, The Australian, 3 June, 2002. 45 In 2004, PSA was ranked the world’s #2 container terminal operator, handling 28.7 million standard sized containers, with Hong Kong holding the #1 rank. Lee Su Shyan, ‘PSA Offers $130m for Stake in HK Terminal Operator’, Straits Times Interactive, 4 November, 2004. 46 ‘Port Operator PSA Corp to Cut 800 Jobs’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 17 February, 2003. 47 ‘If MM Lee Were in His 20s Now . . .’, Straits Times, 21 August, 2004. 48 Nicholas Fong, ‘PSA Sails into Global Markets’, Sunday Times (Singapore), 12 August, 2007. 49 Ibid. 50 KLIA remains the cheapest airport in Asia, followed by Changi. 51 Germany’s Hochtief Airport Management has been employed to develop Senai

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56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

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Airport. Lim Kim Chew, ‘Johor Gears Up for Port Battle’, Straits Times Interactive, 17 March, 2002. Joseph Edwin, ‘Senai Airport Eyes Singapore’s Cargo Business’, Dow Jones Newswires (KL), 30 September, 2003. Karamjit Kaur, ‘Air Asia’s Long and Winding Road to Senai’, Straits Times, 13 October, 2003. About 6 out of 10 Air Asia bookings from Senai Airport to KLIA are made by Singaporeans. See Goh Chin Lian, ‘Air Asia Boss Raps Singapore Over Bus Link to Senai’, Straits Times, 23 October, 2003. Indicative of the tight competition between Malaysia and Singapore for regional airhub status, economic nationalist sentiments have transcended the professed commitment to liberalise the airline industry. In 2005, the Malaysian government rejected Singapore Airlines’ request for more of the lucrative KL–Singapore shuttle flights ahead of ASEAN’s ‘open-skies’ policy to be implemented in 2008. Indeed the ASEAN ‘openskies’ policy has been perceived by the Malaysian government as disproportionately benefitting Singapore as Singapore will remain one destination but Singapore Airlines, and its sister airline SilkAir, will be able to fly to KL and other destinations in Malaysia. Edward Russell, ‘Prying Open ASEAN’s Skies’, Asia Times Online, 6 July, 2007, Online Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/. (Accessed 21 August, 2007.) Jason Szep, ‘Singapore Air-Hub Faces New Rivals’, Reuters (Singapore), 21 January, 2004. Karamjit Kaur, ‘Navigating the Headwinds’, Straits Times, 6 September, 2007. Rebecca Lee, ‘Air-hub Status More Important Than SIA Profits’, Straits Times Interactive, 7 January, 2004. Fees at KLIA are 28 per cent less than Changi Airport for Boeing 747-400. Karamjit Kaur, ‘$40m Boost for Changi’s Air Hub Status’, Straits Times, 31 October, 2003. Edward Russell, ‘Prying Open ASEAN’s Skies’, Asia Times Online, 6 July, 2007, Online Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/. Karamjit Kaur, ‘Buoyant News for Passengers’, Straits Times, 28 September, 2007. Karamjit Kaur, ‘MM: T3 May Give S’pore an Edge But Race is Ceaseless’, Straits Times, 23 October, 2007. Edward Russell, ‘Prying Open ASEAN’s Skies’, Asia Times Online, 6 July, 2007, Online Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/. (Accessed 18 July, 2007.) Daniel Buenas, ‘S’pore Patents are Tops in Asia-Pac: Study’, Business Times (Singapore), 22 August, 2006. John Burton, ‘S’pore’s Elite in Biomedical Project Row’, Financial Times (London), 15 February, 2007. Ibid. Louise Branson, ‘Singapore Tops in Globalisation’, Straits Times, 10 January, 2001. The Cisco Systems study is entitled, ‘Staffing Asia-Pacific’s Growing Networking Infrastructure: Are Organisations in for a Challenge?’, Cited in ‘Malaysia Faces Shortage of Skilled IT Workers’, Straits Times Interactive, 9 December, 2006. John Newland, ‘Asia Goes Back to School to Learn English’, Straits Times Interactive, 16 August, 2004. Ibid. Reme Ahmad, ‘$10.1 billion Revamp for Malaysia’s Education System’, Straits Times Interactive, 18 January, 2007. Conrad Tan, ‘Fourth University as Education Takes Centre Stage’, Business Times (Singapore), 20 August, 2007. The growing global market for higher education is estimated at US$30 billion annually and has been vigorously promoted by industrialised English speaking countries. Anthony Welch, Educational Services in Southeast Asia, Building Institutional Capacity in Asia Report Booklet No. 7 (Sydney: Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, 2004), p. 6.

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75 ‘Malaysia Wants Top Foreign Universities To Set Up Shop’, Straits Times Interactive, 7 October, 2004. 76 ‘KL Gets Tough on Tertiary Colleges’, Straits Times, 29 November, 2004. 77 Brendan Pereira, ‘Malaysia Wants to Become Education Centre’, Straits Times Interactive, 22 May, 2003. 78 ‘KL All Out to Compete With Singapore for Students’, Straits Times Interactive, 29 May, 2003. 79 Julia Clerk, ‘Demand for International Education Forecast to Quadruple’, International Herald Tribune, 9 August, 2007. 80 Ibid. 81 ‘Johns Hopkins Singapore Research Facility to Close Within a Year’, Associated Press (Singapore), 25 July, 2006. 82 A 2004 survey by the Straits Times found that students believed that the UNSW Asia fees were too high. See ‘What EDB Says Now’, Straits Times, 24 May, 2007. 83 Carolyn Hong, ‘Malaysia Keen on Joint Tourism Drive With S’pore’, Straits Times Interactive, 30 December, 2006 84 Ibid. 85 Singapore Expo is the largest convention centre in Asia. 86 ‘Johor Eyes Convention Market With New Centre’, Straits Times Interactive, 4 November, 2004. 87 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Gambles That May Well Pay Off’, The Star (Malaysia), 17 December, 2006. 88 The Esplanade boasts an impressive 2,000 seat theatre, 1,800 seat concert hall and other smaller venues. 89 Lionel Seah, ‘Singapore as Shopping Hub’, Straits Times Interactive, 11 March, 2005. 90 Critics purport that the proposed casino could worsen the rapidly increasing rate of gambling addiction and ruin poor families. ‘Jump in Gambling As Singapore Mulls First Casino: Report’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 15 November, 2004. 91 Joyce Teo, ‘Casino Resort May Boost GDP, Says Economist’, Straits Times Interactive, 18 November, 2004. 92 Seah Chiang Nee, ‘Projects Winning Grudging Acceptance’, The Star (Malaysia), 19 June, 2006. 93 Julia Clerk, ‘Fusionopolis Area Houses IT, Communications and Digital Media’, 9 August, International Herald Tribune, 2007. 94 Straits Times, 25 November, 1990. 95 This project involves the construction of dams and reservoirs in the Sungei Kampar Basin, the Indragiri River Basin and a delta zone between the two basins and the laying of pipelines linking these water resources to Singapore. See Joey Long, ‘Desecuritising the Water Issue in Singapore–Malaysia Relations’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2001, 516. 96 Mahathir assured that Singapore’s water supply would be guaranteed beyond 2061 and restored Singapore’s Air Force use of Malaysian airspace. Lee agreed that the causeway would be replaced with a bridge after 2007, allow Malaysians to withdraw from their CPF after their employment in Singapore and stated that KL would be given 12 parcels of land in compensation for the removal of Malaysian CIQ in Tanjong Pagar. See Jake Lloyd-Smith, ‘Wily Operators Resolve Neighbors Long-Running Disputes’, South China Morning Post, 5 September, 2001. 97 S. Jayasankaran, ‘Malaysia and Singapore: Moving On’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 September, 2001. 98 S. Jayakumar, ‘At Stake: Our Very Existence as a Nation’, Straits Times Interactive, 6 February, 2003. 99 ‘Treaties Allow for Changes But . . .’, Straits Times Interactive, 4 February, 2003.

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100 The MITA booklet is largely based on a compilation of Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar’s statements in Parliament on the issue as well as documents, exchanges of diplomatic correspondence and notes. 101 Ramlan Said, ‘Dr. M Not Confident of Water Pact’, New Straits Times (Malaysia), 2 July, 2003. 102 ‘Bad Faith in Bad Press’, Editorial, New Straits Times (Malaysia), 29 July, 2003. 103 See Leslie Lau, ‘KL’s Water Ads Accuse Singapore of Making Profits’, Straits Times Interactive, 14 July, 2003. 104 Abdullah Ahmad, ‘Two Neighbors in Contrast’, Reprinted in Straits Times, 19 July, 2003. 105 Salbiah Said, ‘Water Talks: The Onus is on Singapore’, Bernama News Agency (Singapore), 7 October, 2002. 106 Carolyn Hong, ‘Federal Water Control Won’t Hit S’pore Supply’, Straits Times, 18 January, 2005. 107 Lim Meng Hua, ‘A Question About Water’, Straits Times Interactive, 15 February, 2007. 108 Yang Razali Kassim, ‘Ending Singapore-KL Hydro-Politics’, Business Times (Singapore), 1 August, 2002. 109 Australian Archives, A1838/33 3006/10/4. 110 Ven Screenwasan, ‘Don’t Take Our Goodness for Granted, Mahathir Tells Singapore’, Business Times (Singapore), 5 August, 1998. 111 Carolyn Hong, ‘Federal Water Control Won’t Hit S’pore Supply’, Straits Times, 18 January, 2005. 112 Quak Hiang Whai, ‘New Era in Singapore–Malaysia Ties’, Business Times (Singapore), 29 July, 2004. 113 Ibid. 114 ‘Malaysia, Singapore Try to Put History Behind Them’, Associated Press (Singapore), 2 July, 2004. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Quak Hiang Whai, ‘New Era in Singapore–Malaysia Ties’, Business Times (Singapore), 29 July, 2004. 118 ‘Johor Hails Offshore Banking Plan’, Straits Times, 15 September, 2003. 119 Conrad Raj, ‘Lawyer Starts Islamic Banking Legal Service’, Business Times (Singapore), 28 November, 2005. 120 John Burton, ‘Singapore and Malaysia Exchanges Plan Link’, Financial Times, 20 June, 2004. 121 Reme Ahmad, ‘Media Hails PM Lee’s Talks With Abdullah’, Straits Times Interactive, 7 October, 2004. 122 The MOU was signed only five months after both countries agreed to work towards it. See Alfred Siew, ‘Singapore and KL Ink Telecoms Pact’, Straits Times, 29 January, 2005. 123 S. Jayasankaran, ‘Friends Reunited’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 March, 2004. 124 CIMB Chief Executive is Nazir Razak (brother of the Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak). ‘Singapore’s Temasek in Property Fund Tie-Up With CIMB’, Online Available at Malaysiakini at http://www.malaysiakini.com. (Accessed 12 November, 2004.) 125 Brendan Pereira, ‘KL Will Not Oppose Port Tie-Up With Singapore’, Straits Times, 15 August, 2003. 126 ‘Singapore, Malaysia Study Expert’s Reports on Reclamation Dispute’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 8 November, 2004. 127 Professor Tommy Koh, leading the Singapore team, claimed that cooperation was so good that if they could have sung a duet, they would have. Koh attributed ‘the good atmosphere prevailing between our two governments’ in assisting negotiations. See Lydia Lim, ‘S’pore, KL to Settle Dispute’, Straits Times, 14 January, 2005.

202

Notes

128 ‘Malaysia, Singapore Declare Truce in Dredging Row’, Reuters (KL), 14 January, 2005. 129 Trish Saywell, ‘Thinking the Unthinkable’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 July, 2002. 130 Ooi Kee Beng, ‘Johor Project and Nation-Building’, Straits Times Interactive, 15 November, 2006. 131 ‘New Projects Will Put Johor on World Map, Says Abdullah’, Straits Times Interactive, 31 July, 2006. 132 ‘Johor Set to Compete With S’pore’, Straits Times, 19 January, 2005. 133 S. Jayasankaran, ‘Getting the Johor Project Off the Ground’, Business Times (Singapore), 2007. 134 Leslie Lau, ‘Make Johor Trips Easier for Singaporeans: Envoy’, Straits Times, 2 April, 2007. 135 Cited in S. Jayasankaran,’Getting the Johor Project Off the Ground’, Business Times (Singapore), 4 April, 2007. 136 S. Jayasankara, ‘Getting the Johor Project Off the Ground’, Business Times (Singapore), 4 April, 2007. 137 Business Times (Singapore), 17 August, 2000. 138 ‘Malaysia Seeks to Ease Rivalry, Deepen Cooperation With S’pore’, Associated Press (Kuala Lumpur), 7 November, 2007. 6 The singa and garuda: from kiasu to soft power diplomacy? 1 The FPDA provides for consultations among Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia and New Zealand in the event of an external attack on any of the parties. 2 The Melayu Raya ideal, held by many left Malay nationalists, was premised on the political union of Indonesia and Malaya in accordance with the expansive territorial reach of pre-colonial and pre-Islamic kingdoms such as Sri Vijaya and Majapahit. 3 Left Malay nationalist Ibrahim Yaacob extolled that ‘The aim of Melayu Raya is the same as Indonesia Raya which is the aspiration of the Malay nationalist movement, that is to revive again the heritage of Sri Vijaya, which is the common unity of the bangsa [race]’. Ibrahim Yaacob, Nusa dan Bangsa Melayu (Jakarta: N.V. lma’ariff, 1951), p. 65. 4 Farish Noor, ‘Fine Young Calibans: Broken Dreams of Melayu Raya’, Online Available at http://www. Malaysiakini.com. (Accessed 13 January, 2002.) 5 The PPKI organised mass meetings and collected medicine for the Republican forces. It was disbanded when the colonial authorities in Singapore refused its application for registration. See Yong Mun Cheong, The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore Connection 1945–1949 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), p. 76. 6 Killearn was the Special Commissioner for Southeast Asia. See Yong Mun Cheong, 2003, p. 57. 7 In the late 1950s, the Indonesian secessionist representatives were based in Singapore. At the height of the secessionist rebellion in 1958, the US Pacific Fleet was based in Singapore and CIA pilot Allen Pope was captured in Ambon after his plane crashed. See Greg Poulgrain, 1998, p. 185. 8 This was conveyed by Lee to Indonesian General Sumitro in 1972. See Lee Khoon Choy, 1993, p. 255. 9 Lee Kuan Yew had apparently asked Singapore’s ambassador to Indonesia Lee Khoon Choy, ‘How can I make Suharto happy? How can I befriend him?’. See Lee Khoon Choy, 1993, p. 18. 10 Suharto had apparently sent a cable to Lee Kuan Yew expressing his appreciation of Singapore’s belated support for Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor. Refer to Leo Suryadinata, 1996, p. 57. 11 The Singapore government was sceptical of the desirability of ZOPFAN believing that

Notes

12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26

203

regional stability should be the responsibility of the major powers. See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 1994, pp. 179–180. Straits Times, 22 July, 1998. Lydia Lim, ‘Megawati Cries While Bidding Farewell to Mahathir’, Straits Times, 8 October, 2003. ‘Najib to Jakarta: We Must Stay as Best Friends’, Straits Times Interactive, 14 November, 2005. Ibid. It was only after the rise of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that Suharto began to see Middle Eastern states as important to Indonesia’s development goals. See Ann Marie Murphy, ‘Indonesia and the World’, in John Bresnan (ed.), 2005, p. 272. The state recognised religions are Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Straits Times, 15 June, 1998. Lee Kuan Yew, ‘Looking Ahead to the Future’, Asiaweek, 14 May, 1999. Ibid. John Roosa, ‘Suharto: June 1921–January 1927’, Inside Indonesia, Vol. 91, January/March, 2008. Channel News Asia.com, 30 January, 2008. Online Available at http://www. channelnewsasia.com. Cited in Straits Times, 5 August, 1998. ‘Alwi Defends Gus Dur’s Emotional Outburst at SM’, Straits Times, 29 November, 2000. Commenting on the improved bilateral relations after Gus Dur’s ouster, Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan stated, ‘We do not have to worry about new announcements every other day from the palace’. See Derwin Pereira, ‘S’pore-Jakarta Ties on Firmer Ground’, Straits Times Interactive, 21 August, 2002. In an address to Indonesians at the Indonesian embassy in Singapore, Gus Dur complained that When Singapore set up a defence pact with New Zealand and Australia, they did not tell us anything. They also did not tell Indonesia and Malaysia when Singapore opened up a port to service US Navy ships . . . We can do well without Singapore because basically Singaporeans underestimate the Malays. They think that we do not exist . . . From my meeting with Lee Kuan Yew, it has also become clear that Singapore is only looking to reap profits from its relations with its neighbours. See ‘Why Gus Dur is Not Happy With Singapore’, Straits Times, 27 November, 2000.

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

‘Why Gus Dur is Not Happy With Singapore’, Straits Times, 27 November, 2000. John McBeth, ‘Family Feud’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 December, 2000. Straits Times, 27 November, 2008. Editorial, Kompas (Jakarta), 27 November, 2000. Editorial, Republika (Jakarta), 29 November, 2000. Bantarto Bandoro, ‘SM’s Remarks A Stimulus for Combatting Terrorism’, Straits Times Interactive, 28 February, 2002. ‘Muslim Militants Plotting to Topple Southeast Asian Governments: Lee Sr’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 30 May, 2002. ‘Internal Security Act Would Help Indonesia Fight Terrorism: Lee Snr’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 1 February, 2005. ‘Singapore’s Belated Wake-Up to Reality’, Online Available at http://laksamana.net. (Accessed 29 January, 2004.) Derwin Pereira, ‘Indonesia Should Rethink Conspiracy Theory’, Straits Times Interactive, 23 February, 2002.

204

Notes

37 Ibid. 38 Suharto is alleged to have said that he had no objection as long as they were not military bases. See Suryadinata, 1996, p. 77. 39 Cukong refers to wealthy Indonesian Chinese businessmen whose business empire is strongly reliant on concessions gained by their close ties with Indonesian political elites. 40 Ben Dolven, ‘Singapore: Final Exam’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July, 1998. 41 Jusuf Wanandi, ‘Lee’s Memoirs Shed Light on Indonesia–Singapore Relations’, Jakarta Post, 20 December, 2000. 42 Louise Williams, ‘Scapegoats’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 January, 1998. 43 In his memoirs, Lee acknowledges that Suharto’s daughter Siti Hediati Hariyadi (aka Titiek), during a visit to Singapore in January 1998 to raise US dollar bonds and stabilise the rupiah, expressed concerns to Lee about Singaporean bankers encouraging Indonesians to park their finances in Singapore. She sought Lee’s assistance in stopping this financial outflow into Singapore. Lee’s response was to advise that market confidence would only be restored if her father implemented the IMF prescribed reforms. See Lee Kuan Yew, 2000, p. 312. 44 It has been estimated that US$20 billion left Indonesia shortly after the crisis in 1997. Part of it was parked in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Straits Times, 29 June, 1998. 45 Asia Sentinel, ‘In Singapore’s Gears’, 6 March 2007, Online Available at http:// asiasentinel.com. (Accessed 10 June, 2007.) 46 ‘Singapore Defends Anti-Money Laundering Efforts Following US Report’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 19 October, 2004. 47 Cited in Asia Sentinel, ‘In Singapore’s Gears’, 6 March 2007, Online Available at http://asiasentinel.com. (Accessed 16 May, 2007.) 48 ‘Singapore to Only Extradite Indonesians if Defence Deal’, Reuters (Singapore), 21 May, 2007. 49 In 2005, foreign nationals, including permanent residents, accounted for 44 per cent of transactions in the high-end property market where properties cost between S$1 million and S$5 million. See ‘Indonesians Main Buyers of Singapore Apartments’, Jakarta Post, 18 May, 2006. 50 Adianto Simamora, ‘S’pore-Jakarta Ties Warm . . . But Outstanding Issues Remain’, Straits Times, 31 December, 2005. 51 ‘S’pore Protecting Graft Suspects Says Top Politician’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 4 March, 2004. 52 ‘S’pore’s Belated Wake-Up to Reality’, Cited in Laksamana.net, Online Available at http://laksamana.net. (Accessed 29 January, 2004.) 53 Editorial, Jakarta Post, 12 June, 2003. 54 Vikram Khanna, ‘Indonesia Trade Data-Time to Air the True Story’, Business Times, 8 July, 2003. 55 ‘Release of Letters by Singapore Unethical Says Daily’, Straits Times Interactive, 9 July, 2003. 56 Vikram Khanna, ‘Indonesia Trade Data-Time to Air the True Story’, Business Times (Singapore), 8 July, 2003. 57 Warren Fernandez, ‘Jakarta Charges Unfounded’, Straits Times Interactive, 8 July, 2003. 58 ‘B.G. Yeo: Jakarta Given Info. For Last 29 Years’, Straits Times Interactive, 8 July, 2003. 59 Ibid. 60 Li Xueying, ‘Full Figures of Trade With Indonesia to be Published’, Straits Times Interactive, 19 November, 2005. 61 ‘Singapore’s Belated Wake-Up to Reality’, 29 January, 2004, Online Available on http://laksamana.net. (Accessed 3 February, 2004.)

Notes 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

205

Matthew Moore, ‘Losing Ground’, Sydney Morning Herald, 13 September, 2003. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 40. ‘S’pore Disappointed With Comment About Sand Export Ban’, Jakarta Post (Jakarta), 21 February, 2007. ‘Sand Ban Not Related to S’pore-Indonesia Talks’, Reuters (Jakarta), 21 February, 2007. ‘Singapore Disappointed Over Demonstration at its Jakarta Embassy’, Jakarta Post, (Singapore), 24 March, 2005. Muninggar Sri Saraswati, ‘Singapore Allows Return of Waste’, Jakarta Post, 14 May, 2005. Freek Colombijn, ‘Chicks and Chicken: Singapore’s Expansion to Riau’, International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) Newsletter, No. 31, July 2003, p. 10. Ibid. ‘Men Seek Liasons on Neighbouring Indon Island: Report’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 9 March, 2003. Jake Lloyd-Smith, ‘Singapore Talks Up Investment Linkages With Indonesia’, South China Morning Post, 30 January, 2003. Freek Colombijn, ‘Chicks and Chicken: Singapore’s Expansion to Riau’, IIAS Newsletter, No. 31, July 2003. Nankyung Choi, ‘Batam’s Lessons for New Economic Zones’, Straits Times, 27 April, 2006. Chua Lee Hoong, ‘New Sand, Anyone?’, Straits Times Interactive, 12 February, 2007. Iain Ferguson, ‘Tensions Dim Glory for Goh’, Financial Review (Australia), 2 December, 2000. Eric Ellis, ‘Good Morning Indonesia’, Fortune (Singapore), 23 June, 2003. Shefali Rekhi, ‘Jakarta Minister Woo’s S’pore Investors’, Straits Times Interactive, 8 December, 2004. Azhar Ghani, ‘MM Lee in Jakarta for Official Visit’, Straits Times Interactive, 20 February, 2006. Straits Times Interactive, ‘S’pore, Indonesia Ink Pact for More Air Links’, 9 August, 2005. ‘Yudhoyono Vows to Curb Red Tape, Corruption’, Straits Times Interactive, 17 February, 2005. John Aglionby, ‘Temasek Faces Price-Fix Probe’, Financial Times (London), 24 May, 2007; Salim Osman, ‘Govt Failed to Curb Temasek Dominance, Says Watchdog’, Straits Times, 27 November, 2007. This adds up to 21 foreign maid deaths a year or two a month. See Ong Soh Chin, ‘A Maid to Order Society Won’t Do’, Straits Times, 9 December, 2005. ‘Indonesian Minister Criticises S’pore Over Treatment of Maids’, Agence France Presse (Jakarta), 27 January, 2004. Arlina Arshad, ‘HK Hailed as Model for Maid Laws’, Straits Times, 7 December, 2005. Elena Ching, ‘Boss Treated Me Like Animal’, Straits Times Interactive, 5 April, 2005. The HRW report was based on interviews with more than 100 maids, government officials and employment agents. Ibid. ‘S’pore Rules Out Mandatory Day Off for Maids’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 9 March, 2006. Ong Soh Chin, ‘A Maid to Order Society Won’t Do’, Straits Times, 9 December, 2005. The Singapore Lecture series provides a platform for world leaders to share their insights on strategic and global issues. See Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia:

206

95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114

115 116 117

118

Notes The Challenge of Change, The Singapore Lecture, 16 February, 2005, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005). Azhar Ghani, ‘MM Lee in Jakarta for Official Visit’, Straits Times Interactive, 20 February, 2006. ‘S’pore, Indonesian Navies Launch Radar Surveillance for S’pore Strait’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 27 May, 2005. David Boey, ‘SAF Played Key Role in Providing Transport, Says UN’, Straits Times, 22 January, 2005. Derwin Pereira, ‘S’pore Committed to Indonesia For Long-Term’, Straits Times, 3 February, 2005. Lydia Lim, ‘HELP: Why S’pore Reached Out’, Straits Times, 15 January, 2005. Ibid. Tanya Fong, ‘Yudhoyono Thanks SAF Team in Person’, Straits Times Interactive, 1 June, 2006. Ibid. Derwin Pereira, ‘S’pore Committed to Indonesia for Long-Term’, Straits Times, 3 February, 2005. ‘Indonesia–Singapore People Ties Get Boost’, Straits Times Interactive, 5 April, 2005. Since 1992, Singapore has trained more than 2,000 Indonesian officials under the Singapore Cooperation Programme. Under the 2000 Initiative for ASEAN Integration, Singapore offers scholarships to Indonesian undergraduates at Singaporean universities. See Azhar Ghani, ‘S’pore, Indonesia Ink Education Pact’, Straits Times Interactive, 25 June, 2005. Sonia Kolenikov, ‘Indonesia Stability Crucial to Security’, United Press International (Singapore), 31 May, 2002. Ibid. Lee Kuan Yew, ‘What Went Wrong?’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 December, 2002. Devi Asmarani, ‘Indonesians Upset at SM Lee’s Remarks’, Straits Times Interactive, 6 June, 2002. Ibid. Ibid. Mark Baker, ‘Minister Warns Freedom is Dangerous’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 August, 2001. Titis Setyaningtyas, ‘Indonesia and Singapore’s Defence Cooperation Agreement Cancelled’, Tempo, 5 February, 2005. It is worth noting that the Indonesian government had in 2003 frozen defence cooperation with the Singapore government in retaliation for its refusal to sign an extradition treaty. The effect of this freeze was compounded by the banning of marine sand used for reclamation works in Singapore in that year. The Singapore government has alleged that Indonesia’s blanket banning of sand exports in 2007 was primarily geared towards putting pressure on them to sign an extradition treaty. See Bill Guerin, ‘Indonesia Seeks Lost Trillions in Singapore’, Asia Times (Jakarta), 2 May, 2007; Richard Lloyd Parry, ‘Singapore Accused of Land Grab as Islands Disappear By Boatload’, The Times (London), 17 March, 2007. ‘S’pore Holding Up Defence Pact, Indonesia Says’, Reuters (Jakarta), 11 June, 2007. Airforce training in Pekan Baru, Riau, naval training in the South China Sea and army training in Baturaja, South Sumatra. Indonesian officials believe that the third party is likely to be the United States. See Abdul Khalik, ‘Indonesia May Let Third Party Join Singapore Training’, Jakarta Post (Jakarta), 24 February, 2007; Salim Osman, ‘Jakarta Official Lists Issues in Defence Talks With S’pore’, Straits Times Interactive, 24 February, 2007. Azhar Ghani, ‘Jakarta’s Bind a Result of Charter Changes: MM’, Straits Times, 28 July 2007.

Notes 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127

207

‘Indonesian Media Speculates on Purpose of Visit’, Straits Times, 28 July, 2007. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Azhar Ghani, ‘Political Theatre Affecting S’pore-Jakarta Ties: MM’, Straits Times, 28 July, 2007. ‘Rice Praises Indonesia’s Moderation Amid Islamic Protest’, Straits Times Interactive, 14 March, 2006. ‘US Looks to Indonesia for Leadership’, Straits Times Interactive, 16 March, 2006. ‘Muslim States Urged to Catch Up With Rest of World’, Straits Times Interactive, 13 May, 2006. Editorial, Jakarta Post (Jakarta), 5 May, 2006.

Conclusion 1 Abdullah Badawi noted that ‘We do not want to be two countries which are having problems within ASEAN, we want ASEAN to be strong. A good market and economically as a group, very competitive’. Refer to Straits Times, Editorial, ‘A Positive Outcome’, 14 January, 2004. 2 Cited in Petir (Singapore), September/October, 1998, 27. 3 ‘Show of Dissent in Singapore’, Editorial, The Nation (Bangkok), 12 May, 2006. 4 Salil Tripathi, ‘Temasek: The Perils of Being Singaporean’, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2006. 5 ‘Arrogant Singaporeans Should Be More Humble: Former Chinese Envoy’, Agence France Presse (Singapore), 20 November, 2003. 6 Frank Lavin, ‘Foreign Policy: No Islands Anymore’, Straits Times Interactive, 17 October, 2005. 7 John Buton, ‘US Envoy Slaps Singapore Over Freedom of Speech’, Financial Times, (London), 12 October, 2005. 8 ‘Rights Group Criticises S’pore Defamation Suits’, Associated Press (Singapore), 17 October, 2008. 9 Huxley has noted that officers selected for the prestigious SAF scholarships tend to be largely Chinese males. Policy making decisions in the Ministry of Defence are also dominated by serving and retired officers (Huxley, 1993: 10–14).

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List of interviews

Najib Tun Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, 28 April, 2006, Putrajaya, Malaysia. Musa Hitam, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, 25 August, 2006, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Mahathir Mohamad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, 24 August, 2006, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Index

abang–adik terms 43, 45, 164 Abdul Aziz, Tunku 44 Abdul Rahman, Tunku 21, 27–8, 50, 57, 86, 113, 149, 153 Abdul Razak, Tun 9, 26, 31, 32, 34, 67, 69, 70, 86, 101, 147, 158, 201 n. 124 Abdullah Ahmad 27, 50, 54, 71, 139 Abdullah Badawi 3, 5, 44, 45, 47, 59, 68, 69, 70, 72, 115, 120, 142–6, 179 Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan 95 Abdulrahman Wahid (aka Gus Dur) 157, 164, 177, 203 n. 25, 203 n. 26 Abu Bakar Bashir 105–6 Aceh-Singapore Technical Assistance Programme 174 Afghanistan, Soviet occupation 105, 109 Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR) 129, 130, 133 Agoes Salim 151 Agung Laksono 176 Ahmad Boestamam 150 Ahmad Mattar 38 Ahmad Mohamed Megad 57 Ahmad Najmuddin, Sultan 20 Air Asia 128, 129 Air New Zealand 128 air transport 127–9 Akbar Tanjung 164 Al Qaeda 102, 103, 107, 109, 110 Alatas, Syed Hussein 19, 20 Alfian Saat 2 Ali, Sultan 22 Ali Imron 105 Ali Murtopo 159, 160 Alimin 150 Alinta 117 Aliran 76 Al-Jazeera 126 Allen Pope 202 n. 7

Allied Ordinance 82 Alsagoff, Brigadier 86, 193 n. 30 American Eagle Tankers 143–4 Amien Rais 164, 165, 167, 172 Amnesty International 70, 75, 182, 183 Amrozi (Bali bomber) 105 Anand, Prime Minister 182 Anglo–Malayan Defence Agreement (1957) 148 Anson by-elections (1961) 29 Anti-Discrimination Board 66 Anwar Ibrahim 53, 72, 122 Arab–Israeli war (1967) 95 Arroyo, President 104 Ascendas 118 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 7, 8, 10, 88, 99, 122, 142, 147, 148, 160, 179; ‘open-skies’ policy 129, 199 n. 55; Summit (Bali, 2003) 157 ASEAN Economic Community 7 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 122, 171, 182, 198 n. 29 ASEAN Plus Three grouping 114 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 10, 122 Asia Security Conference (2002) 175 Asia World 81 Asian Civilisations Museum 135 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 99 Asian financial crisis 60 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 122 Aspen Holdings 74 Association of Southeast Asian Nations see ASEAN Astra International 171 Bahasa Indonesia 157 Bakhtiar 150

Index Balakrishnan, Vivian 64 balas dendam 43–6, 112, 139, 179, 188 n. 1, 197 n. 2 Bali bombings (2003) 105, 109 Bandung Conference (1955) 148 Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian Nation) 52 Bank Danamon 171 Bank Negara Malaysia 113, 143 Bank of China 119 Bannerman, Governor of Penang 21 Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition 48, 49, 51, 56, 68 Barisan Nasional (National Front) governments 4, 5, 15, 71 Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front) 29, 46 Barker, Edward 186 n. 18 Barr, Michael 15, 27, 48 Basel Convention on Transboundary Waste Control in Geneva 169 Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA) 170 Bellows, Thomas 34 Berita Minggu 53 Bilateral Training and Consultative Group (BITAC) 101 bin Laden, Osama 109 Bintan Industrial Park 170 Biopolis 129, 131 biotechnology 125, 129–30, 131 Biovalley 131 Bloomberg 6, 183 BMW 125 Bolero 150 British East India Company 21 Bukaka 171 bumiputera (indigenous) rights 4, 43, 50, 52 Burma Campaign UK 81 Bush, George H.W. administration 99, 100 Bush, George W. 15, 99, 103, 105, 106, 111, 165 Cambodia, Vietnamese invasion 9, 85, 98 Canadian Lawyers Rights Watch 75 Capgemini Group 124 capital gains tax 123 Cedar Holdings 74 Central Limit Order Book (CLOB) markets 120 Central Provident Fund (CPF) 138 Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies 195 n. 79 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 159, 160

221

Chan Heng Chee 32 Chan Sun Win 15 Changi International Airport (Singapore) 3, 128, 129 Changi Naval Base 100, 102 Chartered Industries 82, 95 Cheah Boon Kheng 50 Chee Soon Juan 75, 183 Chen Bioluin 182 Cheney, Dick 103 Chep Lap Kok International Airport (Hong Kong) 128 Chiang Kai Shek 99 China Baru 54–6 China Construction Bank 119 China Eastern Airlines 129 China Innovation Centre (CIC) 126 China Minsheng Banking Corp 119 Chingay Festival 135 Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) 48 Chinese Heritage Centre 58 Chinese immigrants 56–8 Chinese Ming Annals 25 Chua 2 Chua Lee Hoong 37 Chua Mia Tee: National Language Class 1–2; Siapa nama kamu? Di-mana awak tinggal? 184 Chuan Hup Holdings 144 CIA 97 CIMB-Mapletree Management 143 Citigroup 74 Clarke, Dick 103 Clinton, Bill, administration 195 n. 63 Cold War 58, 87, 110 colonialism 16–20 Columbus, Christopher 18 Commonwealth Games (1997) 181 communalism 46–50 Communist United Front 15 Conference of Non-Aligned Countries: Belgrade, 1961 97; Cairo, 1964 97 Control and Supplies Act (1998) 122 Cook, Captain 18 Cooper, Timothy 75 Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) 101 corruption 3 Crawfurd, John 20, 25 cukong 204 n. 39 Cultural Singapore River Hong Bow 135 Curtin University of Technology 132 Customs Prohibition Act (1977) 96

222

Index

Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) 89–90, 121, 138, 141, 200 n. 96 Cyberport (Hong Kong) 126 Cycle and Carriage Group 171 Daim Zainuddin 116 Darusman, Marzuki 164 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) 175, 176 defence expenditure 7, 86–8, 187 n. 30, 192 n. 17, 193 n. 27 Democratic Action Party (DAP) 72, 76 Dewi Fortuna Anwar 149 Developing 8 (D-8) (Fifth Summit, Bali, May 2006) 177 Dhanabalan, S. 83, 85 DigiPen Institute of Technology 133, 137 digital media 136–7 diplomacy 9–11 Discovery Channel 24 Discovery Networks Asia 24 divorce 44 Douglas-Home, Alec 32 drug trafficking 81–2 East Asian Economic Community (EAEC) 10 East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) 10, 114 East Asian Summit (2005) 157 East India Company 21 East Timor, Indonesian invasion of 9, 98, 155 Economic Development Bank 118 Economic Development Board (EDB) 116, 129, 130, 133, 136 Economist, The 183 education 125, 130–2, 132–4 Education Memorandum of Understanding in 2005 174 educational scholarship schemes 115 Ekeus, Rolf 195 n. 69 El Baredie 102 Electronic Arts 136 Emirates International Forum (Dubai, 2001) 114 Employees Provident Fund 113, 145 Employment of Foreign Workers Act 173 English language 131, 132, 133 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 66 Ericsson 125 ethnic housing quotas 48 ethno-nationalism 50–2

European Union 88, 182 Evergreen Marine 127 Far Eastern Economic Review 183 Farquhar, William 19, 20, 21 Fateha 38, 108 Federation of Malaya Agreement (1948) 51 Filipino migrants 56 film 136–7 Financial Services Board 143 Finnair 128 Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) 89, 99, 121, 148, 194 n. 61, 202 n. 1 Fly Asian Express (FAX) 128 Fong Swee Suan 15 Framework of Agreement (FOA) 106 Free Trade Agreements (FTA) 122 Fullerton Fund Management 73 G-15 114 gambling addiction 200 n. 90 Garmuda Berhad 143 Gaus Mahyuddin 151 General Electric 123 Genting International 144 George, Cherian 55 Gerakan Mansuhkan ISA (GMI, Movement to Abolish the Internal Security Act) 71 Ghani, A.K. 151 Ghani Othman, Abdul 52, 54, 120, 145 Ghazali Shafie 71 Gilleslie, Major General 20 GK Goh 144 Global Brand Index (2006) 135 Global Entrepolis Forum (October 2004) 119 ‘Global Info-Communication Technology Capital’ 125 Global Information Technology Economy Index (2003) 126 Goh Chok Tong 7, 11, 12, 43, 59, 62, 63, 67, 107, 120, 123, 166, 170, 177, 182, 195 n. 63 Goh Keng Swee 26, 94, 118, 183 Golkar 160 Gore, Al 78, 103 Government Linked Company (GLC) 65, 124, 143, 170 Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) 73, 74, 81 Great Wall Airlines 129 Group Representative Constituency (GRC) electoral system 49, 56, 76, 188 n. 19

Index Guantanamo Bay detention centre 102, 108 Gulf Air 128 Gulf War coalition 192 Gus Dur see Abdulrahman Wahid Habibie, B.J. 45, 60, 93, 157, 162, 163, 171, 173, 177 Hamid Albar, Syed 11, 106–7 Hamzah Haq 103 Hamzah Haz 172 Haneda International Airport (Tokyo) 128 Hasnoor Hussein 69 Hassan Wirayuda 165 Hawazi Daipi 173 Head, Anthony 141 healthcare system 73 ‘heartlanders’ (public housing dwellers) 56 Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) 116 hegemony 7–8, 14 Hendrikson, E. Mason 100 Heng Samrin regime 85, 98 Herzog, Chaim 57, 95 Hishammuddin Hussein Onn 67, 68, 69, 131 History of Singapore, A 24 history, Singapore, pre-1819 22–5 Ho Ching 38, 65, 73, 74, 117 Homefront Security Office 109 Homelands 24 Hong Lim by-elections: 1961 29; 1965 34 Housing and Development Board (HDB) 141 Howard government (Australia) 80 HSBC 125 Htoo Trading 192 n. 9 Hu, Richard 166 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 172, 183 Hussein, General Kamal 195 n. 69 Hussein Jahidin 70, 71 Hussein Mahummad Shah, Sultan 21–2 Hussein Onn 70, 71 Hussein, Saddam 102, 103, 195 n. 69 Hutchinson Port Holdings (HPH) 128 Ibrahim Yaacob 202 n. 3 Ibrahim, Anwar 122 ideological hegemony 13 immigration policy 80 Independence of Malaya Party 67 Indian Institute of Technology 133

223

Indonesia Raya (or Greater Indonesia) ideal 150 Indonesia Satellite Corp (Indosat) 171, 172 Indonesia–Singapore Friendship Association 174 Indonesian migrants 56 Indonesian Centre for Forestry 168 Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 150, 158 Indonesian Constitution (1945) 171 Indonesian Corruption Watch 58 Indosat 171, 172 Infocomm Development Agency 126 Information, Communication and Telecommunications (ICT) 124–7 Initiative for ASEAN Integration (2000) 206 n. 105 INSEAD 133 Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) 164 Intellectual Property (IP) 130 Internal Security Act (ISA) 15, 71 Internal Security Council 29 Internal Security Department (ISD) 14, 26, 64 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 102 International Bar Association 75, 183 International Commission of Jurists 75 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 53, 189 n. 25 International Energy Agency 197 n. 4 International Enterprise 133 International Finance Cooperation 3 International Herald Tribune 65, 183 International Military Education Training (IMET) 101 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 9, 10, 60, 121, 122, 166, 177, 178, 195 n. 63, 198 n. 25 International Monetary Fund and World Bank Annual Meeting 60, 135 International Offshore Financial Centre (IOFC) 113 International Olympic Committee Meeting, 117th 135 International Security Act (ISA) 72 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 144 Investment Guarantee Agreement 171, 174 Iraq, US invasion of 12, 15, 80, 101–2, 105, 106, 178 Iskandar Development Region (IDR) 5–6, 7, 144–6

224

Index

Iskandar Shah 25 Jaafar Albar 26, 30, 33, 187 n. 26 Jaya Holdings 143 Jayakumar, S. 138, 196 n. 96, 201 n. 100 JB City Square 143 Jemaah Islamiah (JI) 7, 38, 60, 71, 108 Jeyaretnam, J.B. 75, 105, 183, 195 n. 64 Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 133 jihad (holy war) 105 Jock, Arthur Lim Joo 23 Johns Hopkins University Research Centre, Singapore 133 Johnson, Lyndon B. 97 Johor, Sultan of 137 Johor Port Authority 144 Joint Committee on the Environment 144 Joint Counter Terrorism Centre 109 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC): ‘International Terrorism: War With Iraq’ 102 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 88 Josey, Alex 32 Jubir Said 1 judiciary 75 Jurong Shipyard 116 Jurong Town Corporation 118 Kaliptro 168 Keadilan Raayat 67 Keating 80 (Australia) 80 kebatinan (Javanese customary culture) 158 keiretsus 116 Keith, Patrick 27 Keng Swee 86, 95, 193 n. 30 Keppel Corporation 192 n. 5 ketuanan China in Singapore 76, 77 ketuanan Melayu in Malaysia 76, 77 Khairy Jamaluddin 68 Khalid Sheikh Mohamed 110 Khazanah Malaysia 144 Khazanah Nasional 142, 145 Khin Nyunt, General 81 Khmer Rouge regime 85 kiasu mindset 6, 112–15, 167–8, 171–2, 175–6, 197 n. 1 Killearn, Lord 151, 202 n. 6 Koh, Tommy 83, 201 n. 127 Konfrontasi 15, 78, 148, 149, 153, 157, 192 n. 1, 187 n. 30 KPPU (Business Competition Supervisory Commission) 172

Kraisak Choohaven 104 Krugman, Paul 121 Kuala Lumpur (KL) 27, 89, 91 Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) 128, 146 Kuala Lumpur Options and Futures Exchange 113 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 143 Kumar 136 Kuwait, invasion by Iraq (1990) 98, 102 Kwa, Chong Guan 25, 121 Langkawi project 145 Lasalle-SIA College of the Arts 135 Lau, Albert 23, 26 Lavin, Franklin 104, 182–3 Law, Steven 81 Lawyers Rights Watch 183 Lee Hsien Loong 6, 11, 14, 16, 24, 27–9, 31–3, 35, 36, 38, 45, 46, 55, 62, 64, 65, 68, 73, 74, 82, 83, 97, 99, 115, 117, 118, 123, 141, 143, 147, 155, 173, 177, 179, 181, 183, 186 n. 20, 186–7 n. 26, 187 n. 34, 204 n. 43 Lee Hsien Yang 65, 83, 117 Lee Khoon Choy 152, 154 Lee Kuan Yew 2, 3–4, 7, 11–16, 24–7, 30, 32, 34, 35–6, 39, 40, 43, 44–9, 52, 54, 56, 58–63, 67, 69–71, 73–7, 81–3, 86, 91, 92, 94, 95, 99, 101, 102, 106, 109, 111, 112, 117–19, 122, 129, 130, 136–40, 146, 147, 149, 152, 153, 158–62, 163–6, 175, 176, 179–83, 194 n. 58, 195 n. 63, 202 n. 9, 202 n. 10; From First World to Third 15; Singapore Story, The 15 Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy 3, 58, 183 Lee Wei Ling 130 Lee, Edwin 18 Li Ka Sheng 58 Lim Chin Siong 1, 14 Lim, David 195 n. 64 Lim Hock Siew 15 Lim, Raymond 64 Lippo Group 58 Lo Hsing Han 81, 82 Low Thia Khiang 108 Lucas Film Animation 136 Macmillan, Harold 186 n. 21 madrasahs 38 Maersk Sealand 127, 198 n. 43 Mahathir Mohamad 4, 9, 10, 11, 33, 43, 45, 49, 50, 52–4, 59, 60, 68, 69, 71–2,

Index 85, 96, 97, 103, 112–14, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 131, 139, 140, 141, 145, 146, 156, 157, 164, 198 n. 34; ‘Look East’ policy 115; Malay Dilemma, The 47, 52, 112 Mahmud Badruddin, Sultan of Palembang 20, 21 Mahyuddin Yassin Said 69, 91, 140 maids, denial of basic rights 172–3 Majapahit kingdom 14 ‘Malay dilemma’ 54 Malay language 1, 41, 157 Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) 150 Malayan Communist Party (MCP) 158 Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) 51 Malayan Railway (Keretapi Tanah Melayu) 198 n. 24 ‘Malaysia Boleh’ (Malaysia Can-Do) 119 Malaysia Plan, Ninth (2006–2010) 120, 131–2, 145 Malaysiakini 76, 126 Malaysian Airlines System (MAS) 128, 143 Malaysian Alliance Bank 143 Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 30–1, 48 Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) 48 Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) 116 Malaysian Investment Bank 144 Malaysian Monetary Exchange 113 Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) 33, 34 Malaysian Universities Expos 132 Malaysian University English Test 131 Malaysia’s trade with Israel 96 Malaysia-Singapore Airlines (MSA) 197 n. 3 Malik, Adam 151, 159 Malindo Darsasa military exercise 157 Malphilindo 149 Malpura joint naval exercise 90 Mandarin language 41, 55 Mapletree Capital Management Pte Ltd 143 Marcos, Ferdinand 99 Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore 144 Marshall, David 186 n. 22, 194 n. 57 Mas Selamat Kastari 109–10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 132 Mazlan Alimin 53

225

McClelland, James 103 MCM 143 MediaCorp 144 Megawati Sukarnoputri 103, 104, 157, 162, 164, 165, 177 Melayu 54–6 Melayu Baru (New Malay) 37, 54 Melayu Raya ideal 149, 150, 202 n. 2, 202 n. 3 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 100, 143, 171, 195 n. 64, 201 n. 122 Mendaki 48 Menzies, Robert 34 merger years (1963–1965) 25–8 ‘meritocracy’ 66, 68, 77 Merrill Lynch 74, 124 Microsoft 125 Miksic 24 military exercises 10 military goods and services 193 n. 21, n. 22 military regime 82 military service 7 ‘Mindef Mafia’ 83 Ministry of Education (MOE) 129 Ministry of Finance 116 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 160 MISC 143 Mobile One Ltd 144 Moerdani, General Benny 157 Monash University 132 Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 123 money laundering activities 82 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 156 Muklas (Bali bomber) 195 Mukriz Mahathir 69 Multimedia Development Corporation Venture Capital 125 Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) project 125, 131, 145, 146, 198 n. 34 Muhammadiyah 195 n. 79 Murabaha 142 Murdani, Benny 159, 160 Musa Hitam 6 Mushahid Ali 159 Musso 150 Myanmar Fund 81 Nagarakretagama (1365) 23 Nair, Devan 190 n. 75 Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts 135 Nanyang Technological University (NTU) 58, 130, 174

226

Index

Nasser, Gamal Abdel 97 Nasution, A.H. 150 Nathan, President 10 national anthem (Majullah Singapura) 1–2, 39 National Arts Council 135 national identity 78–80 National Information Technology Plan 125 National Kidney Foundation (NKF) scandal 73 national language 39–42 National Research Foundation (NRF) 130 National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) 129 national service 193 n. 19 National Telegraph and Telecommunications (NTT) 125 National University of Malaysia 157 National University of Singapore (NUS) 58, 129, 174 National Wages Council 124 Nazir Razak 201 n. 124 Ne Win, General 81 Neptune Orient Lines 144 New Economic Policy (NEP) (Malaysia) 49, 50, 65, 68, 112, 116 New International Economic Order 114 New National Agenda 68 New Order regime 81, 149, 153–5, 170 New York University Tish School of Arts 137 NEWater 141 Newly Emerging Forces in Asia and Africa (Nefo) 148 Newly Industrialising Economy (NIE) 115 Ng Eng Hen 45 Ngiam Tang Dow 61 Nguyen Tuong Van 182 Nusantara 150–2 Nixon Centre 99 Non-Constituency Members of Parliament (NMP) 64 Noor Azam 53 Nordin Sopiee, Mohamed 27 no-tudung (headscarf) policy for Muslim school girls 38 Nurcholish Madjid 157 NUS Entrepreneurship Centre 130 Nusantara (Malay World) 24, 35–6, 150 Nuwa Wea, Jacob 172 Official Development Assistance and Cooperation (ODAC) 115

Ombudsman’s Office 66 Ong Soh Chin 173 Ong Teng Chong 190 n. 75 Onn bin Jaafar 67, 73 Operation Cold Store (1963) 15, 29 Optus 117 Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Charter of 159 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 96 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 103, 203 n. 16 Othman Wok 94, 194 n. 48 Overseas Chinese Business Networks 48 Pakatan Raayat (People’s Alliance) (PR) 72, 76 Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 96, 159 Pan-Malayan Islamic Party 32 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle) (PDI-P) 162, 176 Partai Komunis Indonesia see Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) Partai Rakyat Singapura (Singapore People’s Party) 14, 29 Partai Se-Islam Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia) (PAS) 51, 72, 76, 188 n. 20 Partai Keadilan Raayat (PKR; People’s Justice Party) 51, 72, 76 Party Machinda (East Malaysia) 186 n. 25 Pedra Branca (Pulau Batu Putih) 53 Peh Chin Hua 59 Penolong Kemerekaan Indonesia (PPKI or Committee of Supporters of Indonesian Independence) 151 People’s Action Party (PAP) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 32, 33, 38, 41, 44, 46, 47, 49, 61, 67–9, 71, 78, 83, 117, 122, 179, 186 n. 25 People’s Action Party Malay 36 People’s Progressive Party from the Peninsula 186 n. 25 Peranakan culture 27, 55 Perdaus 195 n. 79 Pereira, Andreas 176 Pergas 195 n. 79 Peritia Penolong Kemerekaan Indonesia (PPKI) 151, 202 n. 5 Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (Singapore Malay National Organisation) (PKMS) 56

Index Petir 29 Philips 123 Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 130 political miscalculation theory 27 population 56 Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) 127–8, 144, 198 n. 45 Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP) 127, 128, 144, 146 President’s Scholarship 66 Private Higher Educational Institutions Act (1996) 131 pro-Chinese immigration policy 58 Pulau Batu Putih 53 Putra, Tunku 29, 33 racialised security apparatus 91–3 Raden Semaun 150 Radio Televisyen Malaysia 144 Raffles, Thomas Stamford 2, 13–14, 16–22, 24, 25, 52 Rafidah Aziz 44, 131, 142 Rais 103 Raja 95 Rajaratnam, S. 7, 17, 22–3, 31, 44, 83, 98, 115 Ramlee, P. 150 Ravindran, R. 72 Razak 70 Razaleigh, Tengku Hamzah 73 Reagan, Ronald 99 Real Estate Pte Ltd 143 realist notions of sovereignty 84–5 Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention (REDI) Centre 106 regional financial crisis (1997) 115, 116, 120–4, 172 re-merger 59–62 Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) 26, 88, 89, 90 residential housing quotas 56, 76 Riau 168–71 Rice, Condoleezza 177 Rini Soewandi 168 riots: (1950s) 78; (1964) 26, 32; (1969) 50, 57, 70, 112, 117; (1971) 154; (1994) 58; (1998) 58, 163 Rokhim Damhuri 169 Royal Dutch Shell 125 Royal Malay Regiment (RMR) 92 Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) 85 Rudd, Kevin 80 Rumsfeld, Donald 103

227

Rustam Sani 59 S.P. Jain Centre of Management 133 Saadon bin Jubir 151 Saat, Alfian 22 Sachs, Jeffrey 178 Said Zahari 14, 15, 70 Salim Group 160, 170 Samad Ismail 70, 71, 151 Samani Amin 70, 71 sand exports 169, 206 n. 114 Sandiwara (theatrical) companies 150 Sandys, Duncan 186 n. 21 Sarawak United Party 186 n. 25 SARS epidemic 73 Sasono, Adi 163 Scandinavian Airlines 128 scholarships 66, 115, 207 n. 9 school registration scheme 63 Scomi Group 144 Seah Chiang Nee 60, 64 security dilemma 86–9 Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals) 23, 25 Semangat Bersatu joint army exercise 90 Semangat party 67 Sembawang Corp Industries 170 Senai International Airport 127, 128 Sentosa Island 14, 135, 144 Seow, Francis 75 Separation Agreement (1965) 54, 85, 137, 138 September 11, 2001 12, 57, 103 Shangri-la Dialogue for Defence Ministers and Security Officials 135 Shangri-La Hotels in Rangoon 81 Shanmugam, K. 37, 38, 108 Shastri 97 Shell Oil 125 Shenzhen 145 Shin Corp 74, 117, 172, 181 SIA 129, 143, 171 Sihanouk, Prince Norodom 97, 187 n. 28 Sijori Growth Triangle project 7 SilkAir 143, 171 Sim Boon Ann 61 Sime Darby 143 Sin, Cardinal Jaime 104 Singapore Airlines 3, 116, 129 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) 8, 10, 79, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90–3, 100, 156, 162, 174, 183; scholarships 66, 207 n. 9 Singapore Armed Forces Merit Scholarship (SAFMS) 66

228

Index

Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship (SAFOS) 66 Singapore Art Museum 135 Singapore Arts Festival 136 Singapore Chamber of Commerce and Industry 56 Singapore Cooperation Program 82, 206 n. 105 Singapore Democratic Party 56 ‘Singapore Education’ 133 Singapore Expo 200 n. 85 Singapore Fashion Festival 135 Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations 56 Singapore Film Commission 136 Singapore Film Festival 136 Singapore Flying Club 89 Singapore Flying College 89 Singapore History Museum 135 Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA) 48 Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Association (Pergas) 195 n. 79 Singapore Management University (SMU) 134 Singapore Ministry of Information: ‘Water Talks: If Only It Could’ (2003) 139 Singapore Power 117 Singapore Red Cross 174 Singapore Software Centre 125 Singapore Stock Exchange 143 Singapore Story 15, 24, 26 Singapore Technologies 82, 95, 116, 117, 170, 171, 172 Singapore Telecommunications (Singtel) 171 Singapore Tourist Board (STB) 133, 136 Singapore–Israel relations 92–5 Singapore–Johor–Riau (Sijori) SubRegional Growth Zone 6, 7, 170 Singapore–Malaysia Defence Forum 90 Singapore–Malaysia relations 3–4, 89–91 Singapore–Malaysia Third Country Business Development Fund 143 Singtel 65, 117 Sinicisation 77 Sinification 39–42 Sino-Indonesian conglomerate groups (cukongs) 161 Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (aka Tutut) 161 Siti Hediati Hariyadi (aka Titiek) 204 n. 43 Slamet Hidayat, Mohamad 174 smuggling 167–8 Socialist International 71

soft power 107–10, 148–78, 182, 183, 184, 185 n. 10 Solahuddin Wahid 175 South Investment Trade and Technology Data Exchange Centre (SITTDEC) 114 Southeast Asian Games (Kuala Lumpur, 2001) 181 South–South Commission (SSC) 114 Speak Mandarin Campaigns 40 Special Assistance Plan (SAP) 40 special economic zone (SEZ) 170 Sri Vijaya 14, 151, 202 n. 3 ST Telemedia 171 Star Cruises Consortium 144 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 10, 81, 82 Stiglitz, Joseph 121, 178 Strategic Framework Agreement on Security and Defence 106 Suaram (Voice of Malaysians) 71, 76 Subakat 150 Subandrio 153 Suhakam (Malaysian Human Rights Commission) 71, 76 Suharto 45, 149, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158–62, 164, 166, 176, 177, 178, 195 n. 63, 202 n. 10, 203 n. 16, 204 n. 38, 204 n. 43 Sukarno 17, 148, 149, 151–3, 158, 160, 176, 192 n. 1 Sumitro, General 94, 154 Sun 18 Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall 18 Suqiu (Chinese Association Elections Appeals Committee) 52 Susilo, President 177 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) 9, 149, 173–5, 177 Sutan Sjahrir 151 Sybase & Borland 126 Syed Hamid Albar 70, 142 Syed Ja’afar Albar 86, 193 n. 30 Taliban 109 Tamil language 41 Tan Cheng Bok 37 Tan Chin Tiong 83, 192 n. 12 Tan Lark Sye 117 Tan Lian Choo 104–5 Tan Malaka 150 Tan Siew Sin 31 Tan Tarn How 108 Tan, Tony 63, 74, 130, 203 n. 25 Tanah Melayu (Malay Land) status 52, 53

Index Tang Liang Hong 75 Tay, Simon 195 n. 64 Tay Za 82, 192 n. 9 technocratic governance 62–4 technological impact index 130 ‘Technopreneur Centres’ 125 Technopreneur Development Fund 126 Telekom Malaysia 143, 144 Telekomunikasi Selular (Telkomsel) 171, 172 Temasek Holdings 10, 23, 25, 38, 65, 73, 74, 116, 117, 118, 119, 124, 143, 171, 172, 181; Dahlia Investments 129 Tay Za 82, 192 n. 9 Temengong Abdul Rahman see Hussein, Sultan Temengong Ibrahim 21 Tentera Negara Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces) (TNI) 175 terrorism 96 Thaksin Shinawatra 74, 118, 181 Than Shwe, General 81, 192 n. 9 Thaung Htun 81 Think Centre 108 Thitinan Pongsudhirak 74 Thompson 42 Tiger Airways 129 Titiek see Siti Hediati Hariyadi Toh Chin Chye 31, 32, 190–1 n. 75 tourism 125, 134–6 transhipment 127–9 Transparency International 161 Trilateral Coordinated Patrols Malacca Straits (MALSINDO) 107 Trocki, Carl 15 tsunami (2004) 174 tudung issue 37 Turnbull, C.M. 19, 23 Tutut see Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana UBS 74 United Nations Resolution: 238 96; 242 96; 1441 103 United Nations Security Council 102, 156 Unisys 125 United Democratic Party 186 n. 25 United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) 5, 6, 12, 26–7, 28, 30, 31, 41, 50, 51, 52, 67–9, 71, 86, 89, 112, 113, 116, 117, 137, 138, 139, 145, 147, 179 United Malay National Organisation Youth 68 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) 71

229

United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor 9 University of New South Wales Asia 133 US military facilities 100 US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) 106, 123 US–Singapore Security Cooperation Agreement (2005) 123 Utusan Malaysia editorial 53 Valuair 171 Vatican 182 Vietnam War 8, 9, 96–7, 111 Vision 2020 (Malaysia) 52, 119, 124, 146 Wahid 164, 165, 166, 173 Wali Khan Amin 101 Wall Street Journal 183 Walsh, Sean 108 Wanandi, Jusuf 166 Wang Gungwu 2 Wang Ta-Yuan 23 ‘war on terror’ 12, 71, 80, 88, 105, 107–10, 178 Warwick University 133 Waseda University 133 Water Agreements (1961, 1962) 137–40 water supply dispute 53–4, 140–2 Wawasan (Vision) 2020 strategy 52, 119, 124, 146 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) 102, 103, 105 Wilson, Harold 34 Winata 150 Wolters, O.W. 23 Wong Kan Seng 15, 108, 175 Woodlands naval base 85 Woodward, Bob 103 Workers’ Party 56 World Bank 3, 10, 121, 130 World Bank Summit (2006) 75 World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention 58 World Economic Forum Asia Roundtable 135 World Economic Forum: Global Information Technology Report (2003) 126 World Peace Conference (Kuala Lumpur, August 2003) 114 World Trade Center bombing (1993) 101 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 10, 122

230

Index

World Wealth Report 124 Worldrights 75 Xie, Andy 167 Yaacob Ibrahim 37, 38 Ya’akov Elazari, General 94 Yamin, Muhammad 150 Yang Hong Qing 40 Yang Shangkun 99 Yeo, George 10, 40, 44, 100, 134, 142, 145, 168

Yong Siew Tong Conservatory of National University of Singapore 135 ‘Young Turks’ 68, 112 Yusril Ihza Mahendra 167 Yusof Ishak 1, 38 zaibatsus 116 Zaini Mohamed, General 91 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 7, 99, 100, 101, 156, 202 n. 11 Zulfikar Shariff 38