Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 5 9781472552358, 9780715627655

Simplicius, the greatest surviving ancient authority on Aristotle's Physics, lived in the sixth century A. D. He pr

192 48 1MB

English Pages [199] Year 1992

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD FILE

Polecaj historie

Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 5
 9781472552358, 9780715627655

Citation preview

Introduction I Peter Lautner The subject of Book 5 of Aristotle’s Physics is the nature of change (kinêsis) and transformation (metabolê), their difference and seat, as well as the related concepts ‘together’, ‘separate’, ‘contact’, ‘in between’, ‘contiguous’, ‘next’ and ‘continuous’. Change differs from transformation insofar as the term is restricted to signifying nonsubstantial change. This is because the termini of change are contraries or intermediaries and substance has no contraries. Change thus occurs in respect of three categories only: quality, quantity and place. This restriction differs from what we find in Book 3 where Aristotle claims that there are as many kinds of change as there are categories (200b26ff., 201b10-13) though he qualifies this view by saying that things in transformation (to metaballon) are transformed always in respect of substance, quality, quantity and place (200b33; 201a2-8, cf. also 5.2, 226a23; 7.2, 243a36, 40ff.; 8.7, 260a27ff., b30ff.). As for the seat of change, he locates it not in the changer or the form but in the thing itself. In his commentary, Simplicius is about to explain the alleged difference between these books and points out that in Book 3 Aristotle used the word ‘change’ in a wider sense, which is the same as transformation (801,5ff.), while here he uses it to mean particular types of transformation. Change then stands to transformation as a species to a genus. The problem with this classification arises from the Aristotelian definition according to which change is actualisation of a potentiality (Physics 3.1, 200b28-201a2; b5-7). Aristotle himself does not include into the definition any restriction as to what kind of actualisation can be termed as change. This lack of further qualification may have urged Theophrastus to state explicitly that change occurs in every category (as reported in Simplicius’ in Phys. 412,34413,9; 860,19-861,4.19-26; in Cat. 435,27-31). Simplicius criticizes Theophrastus for having as yet distinguished neither change in the strict sense and transformation nor incidental change and change as such (861,24-6). The distinction between change and transformation on the one hand and between change as such and accidental change on the other may have been taken to be interrelated since, e.g.,

2

Introduction

alteration may involve change as such while change in position may not.1 As a touchstone, Simplicius points to relational change and agrees with Eudemus who claims that transformations of disposition (diathesis) come about by another type of change (860,9-10, 861.5ff.). Simplicius himself adds (837,5ff.) that relations both come to be and change, but only incidentally. For if relations do not exist at all as such, but are incidental attributes of other things regarded in their mutual relationships, they both come to be incidentally and change incidentally. The possibility was raised by Aristotle as well (224b25ff.), but in contrast to him Simplicius does not dismiss it. As we know it also from his commentary, relational change remained a matter of dispute in the Peripatetic tradition throughout. He refers (in Phys. 409,26-32; 437,1-6) to Alexander of Aphrodisias who endorsed the view that the Aristotelian definition covers the category of relatives as well but at the same time rejects the possibility of change in the category of time (830,7ff.) and in this way seems to have occupied a middle position between Theophrastus and those who thought that this definition of change applies only to the categories of quality, quantity and place. Furthermore, Simplicius also makes mention of Themistius (in Phys. 437,11-13), who was heavily influenced by the Peripatetic tradition and denied change to the relatives while claiming that transformation from potentiality to actuality takes place all at once (athroôs), which means that transformation is instantaneous. This is confirmed by Themistius’ in Phys. (75,11ff. CAG V,2) too, where we find that change in position is not gradual (kat’ oligon) but timeless (akhronôs). The example is that, when I am moving to the left, the tree does not come to be on the right of me gradually but instantaneously, for even if I move to the left it is with regard to place only that I undergo a change, not with regard to the relation (75,14-17). This is because, he says, actuality in respect of relation does not preserve the potential. When discussing Themistius’ view, Philoponus contrasts this loss of potential to the way in which actuality with regard to transformation preserves what is potential in the alteration (in Phys. 368,18-25 CAG XVI). Philoponus’ aim is, of course, to make an Aristotelian point in locating change in the thing itself, not in the changer (369,25-374,26). At the same time – and not independently from what Themistius said – Simplicius reports, and sides with, an approach which aimed at modifying Aristotle’s notion from a different point of view. He accepts (807,3ff.) Strato’s view that change is not only in what changes but also in the termini (‘that from which’ and ‘that to which’), 1 R. Sorabji has pointed out that for Theophrastus the loss of place is just like relational change, which does not involve substantial change of the thing itself, cf. his Matter, Space and Motion, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1988, p. 198.

Introduction

3

though in a different way in each case. For the substrate changes as in transformation, which means that it does not come to be or perish. The termini, on the other hand, are subject to substantial change; the one as being destroyed, the other as coming to be.2 Although Strato probably was speaking about qualitative change only, his remarks may have been tacitly contested by Themistius, who points to alteration where, in contrast to relational change, the potential is preserved by the actuality. If the termini of the changes are states then we can understand this preservation so that the initial state has survived in a way in the state to which the thing has changed. As for the examination of concepts such as ‘contiguous’, ‘next’ and ‘continuous’, it may be useful to emphasize that – unlike what we find in Book 6 – the analysis of ‘continuous’ is not a geometrical but rather a conceptual one which includes definition and delineation from other concepts that have similar meanings. Simplicius informs us about an objection to Aristotle’s notion by Eudemus (879,18) which fits in with this feature of exposition. Eudemus considers himself to improve his master’s view by considering the organically fused (to sumphues) as more unified than the continuous, and thinking that organic fusion is proper to natural things. For him, this is conceptually first and a principle.3 Simplicius’ criticism is directed not straight against such a placement of organic fusion, but rather against the implication allegedly drawn by Eudemus, that organic fusion is constituted out of the other types. Simplicius points out that touch is not included in the continuous, for things will no longer be continuous at that part when they are touching. Touching must precede continuity and so organic fusion as well. But it is not possible that in all cases between which there is touch organic fusion should already have come about. The examples are the stone touching wood and the cloak touching body. Simplicius’ commentary deals also with the status of this book within the Physics and is our main source for the arrangement of its books. But as treating the place Book 5 occupies in the Physics should also involve a discussion of the partition of Aristotle’s treatise, he has some remarks about the previous attempts to tackle this problem. The most usual arrangement seems to have been to distinguish the first five books, entitled ‘Physics’ (802,10; 923,8; 924,5) or ‘On Nature’ (923,13-14) or ‘On [First] Principles’ (4,14; 801,13-14; 1126,8-10), and the last three, headed ‘On Change’ (4,15; 801,15; 802,10.12; 923,8; 924,6.14; 1233,32; 1358,8). The division may go back to Andronicus of Rhodes (first century B.C., cf. 923,5-9), who edited Aristotle’s survived works, or perhaps to Theophrastus (923,10ff. = Test. 157 2 3

Fr. 72 (Wehrli); see also my n. 15 to the translation. Fr. 96 (Wehrli).

4

Introduction

(FHSG)).4 The only exception may have been Porphyry who is said (802,7-13) to attach Book 5 to the last three books, though his reasons for doing so are unknown. Simplicius himself assumes (867,22-868,7) that by having no particular subject-matter, the book provides only supplementary material to Book 3 where change and transformation are examined in full length. As a further witness for the intermediary position this book occupies, we may add that in containing a short examination of the continuum it is linked to Book 6 as well. Furthermore, the text also contains an evidence for the relative date of the in Phys. In the lectio at 858,8-861,28, Simplicius discusses Aristotle’s reasons for assuming that there is no change in other categories than quality, quantity and place. In doing so he sets out and criticizes the early Peripatetic interpretations that aim at a certain modification of this view. One of these explanations is offered by Theophrastus (860,21-3 = 153C (FHSG)) who in his Physics Book 1 says that with regard to change it is not difficult to provide and state the universal and common account, that it is an incomplete activity of what is potentially as such in each genus of the categories. Simplicius quotes this very same passage at his in Cat. 435,28-31 (= 153A (FHSG)) and introduces it by mentioning that he tried to say something against those defences of Aristotle’s position in his commentary on Physics 5.5 The reference is doubtless to 858,8-861,28, which implies that in Cat. – this part of it at least – was composed after the relevant passage of in Phys.6 II J.O. Urmson This is a translation of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle Physics Book 5. The Greek text used is that edited by H. Diels in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca vol. X, Berlin 1885, except for a few small emendations as listed. The commentary discusses Aristotle’s text in short passages, each indicated in a lemma containing only the first few and last words. For the convenience of the reader the translation 4 For further details, see W.D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1936, pp. 1-7; P. Moraux, Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Bd. I. Berlin and N.Y. 1973, pp. 115-16; H. Diels, ‘Zur Textgeschichte der Aristotelischen Physik’, Abhandlungen der Kgl. Pr. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (1882) Phis.-hist. Kl. I., reprinted in W. Burkert (ed.), Hermann Diels. Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte der antiken Philosophie, Hildesheim 1969, pp. 199-238, esp. 236-8. 5 pros men ekeinous tous apologismous epeirathên ti legein en tais eis ekeinên tên pragmateian skholais. 6 On the relative date of these commentaries, cf. also I. Hadot in her edition of Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète, Leiden 1996, p.5 n.11.

Introduction

5

renders the whole of these passages; the terminology used conforms to that in the translation of the commentary, and where Simplicius’ text differs, or appears to differ, from the received text, Simplicius’ text is translated. Consistency in translation has been for the most part maintained at some expense to English idiom; for example, melas is always translated ‘black’ and leukos ‘white’, so that there are references to men being black and white where ‘fair’ and ‘dark’ would be more natural. A note on the translation of the key terms metabolê and kinêsis follows. metabolê and kinêsis Usually in non-philosophical Greek, and often in philosophical Greek, it is appropriate to translate metabolê as ‘change’ and kinêsis as ‘motion’. But Aristotle, though he often uses kinêsis in its everyday sense of motion, very often uses it to mean change or process in general, so that, as Simplicius points out in the commentary, his use of kinêsis is then indistinguishable from his use of metabolê, but in Book 5 of his Physics Aristotle is bent on distinguishing the two; metabolê, he says, is the more general term, covering both the coming to be of a substance which replaces one that ceases to be and also change of quality, quantity and place in a persistent substance which exists both before and after the change. Change in these last three ways alone is the definition of kinêsis, which is thus a species of metabolê, of which the other species is the coming and the ceasing to be of a substance. It is clear that in a commentary that follows Aristotle’s usage we cannot translate both terms as ‘change’. ‘Change’ is in fact inappropriate for metabolê since, as Aristotle insists, when, for example, a seed develops into a plant it ceases to exist as the substance ‘seed’. It does not persist and change, it ceases to exist; similarly a plant does not change by coming into existence from the seed. ‘Motion’ is also impossible as a translation for kinêsis in this context since motion is just one of the three kinds of change: those of quality, quantity and place, which are the species of kinêsis. This use of the words is no doubt somewhat stipulative. Plato agrees in calling all these three kinds of change kinêsis (Theaet. 181C-D), but, as Simplicius points out (821,14), in the Laws he calls metabolê a species of kinêsis. Any translation will therefore also be somewhat artificial. In this translation metabolê is normally translated as ‘transformation’, and its verbal form metaballein is translated as ‘to transform’, ‘to be transformed’, ‘to become different’ or ‘to turn into’. One can say that the seed is transformed into a plant and that a new hair-style transforms a face; but at times the artificiality is obvious. ‘Change’ seems entirely appropriate for kinêsis; but where

6

Introduction

Aristotle is clearly talking about change of place exclusively in a non-technical sense ‘motion’ is sometimes used. Aristotle has also technical terms for kinds of change; when motion is alone in question he says either ‘change of place’ or else phora, which is here translated as ‘travel’. I wish to thank Professor Sorabji, Dr. Rob Wisnovsky, Dr. Sylvia Berryman and others whose names I do not know for the many improvements they have made to the translation.

Textual Emendations 821,31-2 828,18 854,2-3 864,31 867,12-13 872,2-3 886,5 886,17 904,23 906,17 915,16 917,25

Deleting tên energeian tou nou eipein as dittography Reading nôdon instead of noson Reading kineitai hê kinêsis kai gignetai hê genesis instead of kineitai kai hê kinêsis ginetai hê genesis Reading epidekhomenas instead of epidekhomenai Omitting sterêseôs where the text reads ti de êremia, hoti sterêseôs akinêsia Reading tôn emmesôn enantiôn rather than tôn emmesôn enantiôseôn Reading Diels’s conjecture tês phthoras at the lacuna Reading en heni with C rather than hen einai Reading gignomenêi for gignomenê Reading theôroumenêi instead of theôroumenê Reading tôi histasthai instead of to histasthai Translating ei pêi êremei ê eti menei, following Diels

Simplicius On Aristotle Physics 5 Translation

The Commentary of the Philosopher Simplicius on Book E of Aristotle’s Physics, which is the Fifth In the third book of this work he has taught about change in its widest sense, which is the same as transformation, and has used the words change and transformation for it without distinction. Now he wishes to distinguish them and to show that transformation is more general and more universal, while change is more particular than transformation and is under transformation as a species of a genus, since, as he will show, coming to be and ceasing to be are transformations but not changes. Having distinguished change from transformation, he also finally sets out the species of change proper, and this discussion is reasonably linked to the general one on transformation1 and is continuous with it, even if that of the infinite, place, void and time was interposed. Therefore Aristotle and his associates count the fifth book also as belonging to the First Principles of Natural Science,2 just as they are accustomed to call the following three books On Change. For after the division of change as of quantity and quality and the category of place he adds in these books theorems about nature, giving instruction concerning certain matters which are themselves generally also consequent on and connected with natural objects which exist in place and change their place: what is simultaneity, what is separateness, what is touching, what is being in between, what is succession, what is being adjacent, what is continuity, and to what kind of thing each of these naturally appertains, and what is one change in all the senses of the word ‘one’. ‘One’ has three senses – one in genus, one in species and one in number. Finally, he adds which kind of change is contrary to which change and to which absence of change. I am surprised at the much regarded philosopher Porphyry, how, in his synopsis of this fifth book, although he gives an admirable account of the partition of the eight books, saying that all call the five Physics and the three On Change, he still goes on to say in the text itself that from Book 5 to Book 8 there is a succession of four that are concerned with change and are separately headed ‘On Change’.3

801,1

5

10

15

802,1

5

10

12

Translation

15

20

25

803,1

5

224a21 Everything that is transformed (metaballei) is so [(1) incidentally, as when we say that the musical is walking, because what is walking is incidentally musical; (2) when something is transformed in some aspect of itself it is said to be transformed without qualification, as when things are so described on account of a part; for the body is cured because the eye or the chest is cured, and these are parts of the whole body. (3) There is what changes (kineitai) neither incidentally nor in some aspect of itself, but by itself primarily changing. And this is what changes as such, which is different for different forms of change, such as what may be altered, and within alteration what can be cured is different from what can be heated. It is the same in the case of what initiates change. For one thing initiates change incidentally, another in part with some bit of itself,] another as such and primarily [as it is the physician who cures but the hand strikes].4 With the project of showing that change is more particular than transformation, he first distinguishes the varieties of transformation, calling one incidental as ‘when we say that the musical is walking’ because the man who is incidentally a musician walks qua man, and when we say that the sailor stationary in the ship is moving because the ship, to which the sailor is in a way incidental, is moving and is transformed qua ship.5 He says that we say that those things also are transformed which are so in part, as when we say that the body is being cured because the eye or chest, which are parts of it, are being cured, or we say that the man is moving because his hand is moving. There is a third kind of transformation when what changes does so neither incidentally nor in part but both pre-eminently and not because something else is changing, and this is primary and opposed to the incidental. Also what changes as such does so as a whole, which is distinct from doing so in part. ‘And this is what changes as such’ or which is transformed as such. For the discussion is still about transformation, even if the examples be of changes. By having described both the incidental and the partial he thus introduces the ‘as such’, because he establishes this by their elimination. He also adds that, while there are many different species of transformation, in all of them there are these three different varieties of transformation that have been mentioned. For each species of transformation in some respect will exhibit the differences mentioned, such as the alterable by alteration. But since there are many species of alteration and there are the three varieties in each,

Translation

13

he added ‘and within alteration what can be cured or what can be heated’. For it is possible to be cured and be heated both incidentally and in part and as such. For water is heated as such, sweet water incidentally, and in part when, as a part of a gallon of water is being heated, we say that the gallon is being heated. Having said about what is changed that there are these three different varieties for each sort, he adds that in the case of what initiates change there are these three different varieties, and clearly in every species here also. For a musician incidentally cures when the healer as such, the physician, happens to be a musician; and the pouring in of cold water sometimes incidentally heats, when it supervenes on heat within; also he who turns the mill with his hand initiates change also through a part. But that initiates change as such which does so neither incidentally nor through a part, but primarily as such. Thus he contrasted what is as such with the incidental and the primary with that through a part, according to Alexander,6 or perhaps each to both. For what is as such is opposed both to the incidental and to that through a part, since that is not through the whole of itself; similarly also primarily is opposed not only to through a part but also to the incidental, because that does not cause change primarily, but through being incidental to that which primarily does so. himself makes clear that he applied ‘both’ to each in what follows when he applied ‘first’ to both, when he says7 ‘since there is something which first initiates change and something that is so changed’. But Alexander says that ‘first’ refers to the as such; ‘for’, he says, ‘the first itself initiates change and does not do so through a part nor incidentally’. So it is clear that he himself thinks that the first is opposed to both, to that through a part and to that which is incidental; however, I do not think that that which is thus first as not causing change through a part necessarily does not do so incidentally. For the musician who cures does not do so with a part, since the physician is not a part of the musician, but does so incidentally. For if one were to say that the physician was a part of the musical physician one would be compelled, when a musical physician cures, to say that he does not do so as such, but through a part. 224a34 Since there is something which first initiates change, [something that is so changed, and that in which – the time – and, in addition, that from which and that to which (for every change is from something to something; for that which is first changed, that to which and that from which are different, as are the wood, heat and cold. For of these, one is what is changed, one to which and one from which); but this being so, it is clear

10

15

20

25

804,1

5

10

14

Translation that the change is in the wood not in the form]; for neither form nor place nor magnitude changes or is changed.

15

20

25

805,1

5

10

15

Having distinguished transformation as such from that which is incidental and that through a part in the case of both what is changed and what initiates change, he selected that which is as such and primary for the articulation of the species of transformation, since all scientific and demonstrative knowledge is a conclusion from what is as such. But before setting out the species of transformation and of change he first shows what change is in. For since change is not one among things that are self-subsistent but among things that have their being in something else,8 then if it is not first clear in what it is, then neither could its nature be known nor its species distinguished. But before that he shows what are the ingredients of change, i.e. what must definitely exist if there is change and transformation, so that one must seek change in one of these. He himself regards these as obvious, which is why he uses a consequential connective. Also the necessity of the argument is evident. For since change or transformation is some active affection9 of what is changed, there must be that which is affected, and what affects it must be immediately connected with it. For what is affected is related to what affects it and referred to it. Since there is transformation which shows one thing after another, it will always exhibit as well that from which and that to which, since in the case of local motion that from which and that to which are different, being opposite places, and other things in the case of other sorts of change. But since there is everywhere a prior and a posterior, and since there is succession of bodies also (for it is of these that we are now speaking), both time and place must necessarily be introduced. For every change is in time, as he proved in the previous book,10 and every body is in a place. He has given the names of ‘the what’ to that which is changed, of ‘that from which’ to that from which the change starts, of ‘that to which’ to what the change is to, and he has said that that from which and that to which are other than what is changed, as the cold from which it changes and the hot to which it changes are other than the wood, and he establishes their difference from their different names. When he said that what was changed was other, he added ‘first’, to make it clear that it was the thing changed as such. For it is in the case of this that it is true that it is other than that from which, while in the case of things said to be changed incidentally, nothing prevents what is changed from being the same as that from which: for example, when one says that the white has changed when what happens to be white is changed, and its change will be from a white thing. For then what is changed and that from which become the same. But also what initiates change as such is other than what is changed as such; for

Translation

15

nothing prevents what initiates change and the thing changed being the same incidentally, as the steersman in moving his boat moves himself with it and the physician when he heals himself. Having distinguished these from each other he adds ‘but it is clear that the change is in the wood’, i.e. in the thing changed. Whether the text thus reads ‘but it is clear’ or ‘it is indeed clear’,11 I think both follow consecutively on ‘since there is something that initiates change’ and on what follows. For since the aforementioned must exist if there is change, it is clear that change is not in any other of the aforementioned, but in what is changed. For form or magnitude or place or generally that into which what is changed changes neither initiates the change nor is changed, but is something other than each of these. But Alexander says that if the text read ‘it is indeed’, this would follow from the foregoing; but if it read ‘but it is’, he says that having by ‘if’ stated what must be if there is to be change – the changer, the thing changed, time, that from which and that to which, and that the changer and the changed and that to which are different and separated – he is adding something about change itself and says that this, for which the above are needed, is in the thing changed.12 For it is not self-sufficient, since no affection is self-sufficient, nor is it in the changer, because that is actual and cannot be transformed in so far as it initiates change, whereas change is a transformation. Also that in which it is is transformed through it; but change is not in the place, both because place as such is unchangeable and because place is one thing and that which changes place another, in which the change should be. But also the change is not in that from which, because that from which it started would not change, but that which is in it. But now in reverse, that which is in it does not change, but that from which it started does. But change would also not be in that to which, since that going towards it will have changed before it starts to be changing, and since it will change and be at rest in the same respect. For in so far as it is changing it will be changing; in so far as it has come to its goal it will be at rest. But since change occurs not only in quality, which he calls alteration in form, and does not occur through coming to be and ceasing to be, which might be said to be the most central transformations in form, but changes occur also in place, such as locomotion (phora), and in quantity, like growth and diminution, for this reason after that in form he added these also, saying ‘nor place nor magnitude’. For as form – in the case of things changing in form – is neither the cause of change nor the thing changed, so neither is place in the case of change of place nor quantity in the case of change of quantity. He demonstrated also in the third book of this work, where he especially teaches in what change occurs, that change is not in what initiates the change.13 There he demonstrated that it is not in time, since time

20

25

806,1

5

10

15

20

25

16

30 807,1

5

10

Translation

is the number of change.14 So three candidates remain, that which is changed, that from which and that to which. That is why he concentrates on them in investigating in what change occurs. But, he says, form, place and magnitude neither cause change nor are changed, clearly by that particular change by which that which is transformed into it is changed. For that which is altering changes by alteration; but the form, to which that which is altering is being changed, such as whiteness, is not made white. But nor does the form into which that which is coming to be is transformed come to be through such a coming to be. However, that comes to be that did not exist before. And I think that Strato is right to say that change is not only in what is changed but also in that from which and that to which, but in a different way in each case.15 For, he says, the substrate changes as in transformation, but that from which and that to which do so, the one as being destroyed, the other as coming to be. But if some forms are said to initiate change as soul changes a living thing and weight a stone, he is not now seeking the cause of change, such as are the soul and weight, but that in which the change is. But weight does not change pre-eminently but incidentally, like the sailor in his ship. The definition of change is sufficient to prove that it is in what changes and not in anything else. For change was said to be the actuality of the changeable.16 224b6 But there is the changer and the thing changed [and that to which it changes; for the transformation is named rather as that to which than that from which. That is why ceasing to be into not-being also is a transformation; and yet what ceases to be is in transformation from being, and coming to be is into being, even though it is from not-being. So what change is has already been stated. But forms and affections and place, into which what changes changes, are unchanging, such as knowledge and heat. However, one might raise the question whether affections are changes and whiteness an affection; for there will be a transformation into change. But perhaps whiteness is not a change,] but whitening is.

15

20

He has shown that there must be five things if there is to be change – the changed, the changer, time and that from which and that to which – and change is in the changed and in none of the others; now he takes three of the five as what will be useful to him in the discussion to come next – the changer, the changed and that to which the change is, leaving aside time as being irrelevant. He himself explains why he has omitted that from which while including that to which. For he says that the transformation gets its name rather from that to which there is transformation than from that from which the

Translation

17

transformation occurs. For we call ceasing to be transformation into not-being and coming to be that into being; and yet ceasing to be is from being and coming to be from not-being. But nonetheless they are named rather from the end. Alteration makes this particularly clear as having its name from that to which. For that which goes towards whiteness is said to be whitened and what towards heat to be heated. And thus ceasing to be has been named rather from not-being and coming to be from being. He reminds us of the definition of change which was given in Book 3 and shows by it that change is in the changing. For if ‘change is the actuality of the changeable qua changeable’17 and actuality, which is a form18 or activity, is in that of which it is the actuality, it is clear that change is in what changes, and neither in the form, since transformation is into form, as in things that come to be, nor in the affection, as in things that are altered, nor in place as in things in local motion, since the former are the things in which the change is, but forms and affections and place, into which the change occurs, are unchanging, as has been proved.19 He also supports this through the example of knowledge and heat. For if these are the things changing, the things which are turning into them are no longer being changed, and things that have come to be in them will not be at rest, but will be changed. He has said that forms and affections and place and clearly quantity also, into which changing things change, are unchanging and then raises a problem about this account as follows: if whiteness is an affection, and an affection is a change, the transformation to an affection will be into a change through a change, and the change is no longer in the thing changing alone but also in that into which the change is. But if so, what is changing into the affection will either still be changing even after transformation, since its transformation has been into a change, or, when it has come to be in the change, it will no longer be changing. He solves this problem abruptly by objecting to the major premiss which says that affections are changes. For, he says, not whiteness but whitening is a change, i.e. the white colour which is the affection is not the change but the whitening is, which is the transformation to the white colour. So the thing affected, such as the thing being whitened, is changed, but not the white colour. But perhaps the problem arises from the ambiguity of ‘affection’ since we call both the end of being affected the affection, which is the white colour, and also the being affected itself, such as the whitening, and he solved the problem by exhibiting the ambiguity. For the premisses did not take the same middle term, but the minor called the white colour an affection, taking the end of the process of being affected, to which the change was, but the major called the affection a change,

25

808,1

5

10

15

20

25

18

Translation

counting as an affection the transformation in being affected, such as being whitened. 809,1

5

10

15

20

25

30

224b16 There is for these also both the incidental [and what is through a part, and what is through something else and what is primary and not through anything else; e.g. what is becoming white becomes what is thinking incidentally, since thinking is incidental to colour, or becomes coloured because white is a part of colour – and comes to be in Europe because Athens is a part of Europe; but it becomes a white colour as such. It is clear how it changes as such, and how incidentally, and how through something else, and how by being itself first, in the case of both the changer and the changed, and that change is not in the form but in what is changed] and actively changeable. He has shown that is in the changed and not in any other of the concomitants of change, and next he says what he earlier showed in the case of the changer and the changed, that some of these are incidental, some through a part and some as such and primarily, and now he says that this distinction extends also to the other concomitants of change – that in which, that from which and that to which. For it is these three that he referred to when he said ‘there is for these also’. But he proved this about that in which, which is time, in his discussion of time.20 But having set out to discuss the two he discusses one, the transformation to which of affection or form or place. For what is being transformed into white, which is becoming white, becomes what is thinking incidentally. For the white thing happened to think. What is said to become of different colour does so through a part, ‘because white is a part of colour’; for species also are in a way parts of the genus. But when what is becoming white is said to be transformed into white, it is so not incidentally but as such, and not through a part but primarily. Similarly what is transformed in regard to place, as it goes to Athens, is transformed into what thinks incidentally. For thinking happened at Athens incidentally, to Europe through a part, since Athens is a part of Europe; but it goes to Athens as such and primarily. It is possible to say the same about that from which, even if he omitted to do so. For what is transformed from white is so incidentally from a thinker, through a part from colour, but as such from white. Finally he sums up the whole argument by which he showed what are the concomitants of change, and that in them all there is the as such and primarily, and also the incidental and that through a part, and that change is in what is changed and not in the form, in which it seemed more likely to be than in the others; for it is not in the changer, nor in the place, since these are unchanging, still less in that

Translation

19

from which. He says that it is clear that change is in the thing changing. But he subsumed the thing changing into the actively changeable in order to remind us of the definition of change.21 For if change is the actuality of the changeable, what is changing is the actively changeable.

810,1

224b26 Let us set aside incidental transformation. [For it happens in everything and always and between everything. But what is not incidental does not occur in all, but in contraries and their intermediates and in contradiction. This can be confirmed from inspection. There is transformation from the intermediate, for it treats the intermediate as the contrary to each extreme. For intermediates are extremes in a way. Therefore this is said to be in a way contrary to them and they to it, as the middle note is high in relation to the lowest and low in relation to the highest; and the grey is white in relation to the black] and black in relation to the white. He has shown that the as such and the incidental occur in the cases both of the changer and of the changing. These he selected from the concomitants of change as useful to the discussion following. But he discards what is incidentally in something, in which he included that through a part, as without limit and indefinite. He shows that this is so by ‘it happens in everything and always and between everything’. It is ‘in everything’ because there is incidental transformation in the ten categories.22 For through what changes being substance, and all the other categories being incidental to substance,23 we can say that each of them is changing when their substrate is changing as such. Also ‘between everything’, either because it is possible to predicate initiating and undergoing change of all things whether changing or unchanging when we predicate incidentally, as of the soul. For though the soul is unchanging of its own nature it can be said to change incidentally.24 Or ‘between everything’ may replace ‘into everything’. For one may speak of the incidental transformation of the white into the musical and of the sweet into the above. One should understand ‘in everything’ and ‘between everything’ as applying to natural objects, in the case of which incidental change is possible. For what is superior to nature, such as the primary initiators of change, are not only unchanging as such but will be shown not even to suffer change incidentally. ‘Always’ might mean that it is possible thus to predicate change even when something is not changing that can change incidentally itself by being in something changing, like the person at rest in a ship that is sailing; or that it is so even of the no longer existing. For it is possible to say that Socrates who no longer exists is changing

5

10

15

20

25

20

30 811,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

when the body and the matter which once belonged to Socrates is changing; for what was incidentally Socrates is changing. So if the incidental is thus without limit and indefinite, and there is no scientific knowledge about the unlimited and indefinite, he reasonably proposes to omit incidental transformation, but selects that which is not incidental, as not being ‘in everything and always and between everything’ in common, but in the definite. For this is ‘in contraries and their intermediates and in contradiction’, i.e. is predicated of opposites, intermediates and their contradictories. He obtains confirmation that all transformation comes about through one of these inductively; for whichever one may bring forward, he will show that it occurs in one of these ways. Argument will also show the necessity of this. For there is no transformation of anything into the same, nor from like to like – for what would be the need for transformation? But it is always either from contrary to contrary or from the intermediate or generally from what is not of the same sort, which is what is via contradiction. These things are proved also in the first book of this work25 when he set out the opposing principles, having previously proved that transformation is not from anything whatever. Having said that transformation occurs also from intermediates, he added the explanation of this, that it occurs from the intermediate as from an extreme. And again he added the explanation of this, that the intermediate has the relation of an opposite to each of the extremes: for ‘the middle note is high in relation to the lowest and low in relation to the highest; and the grey is white in relation to the black, black in relation to the white’. For if the intermediate arises through mixture and composition of contraries, as grey from white and black and the luke-warm from hot and cold, or in any similar species, that which is in transformation from the intermediate does not transform through its community with and participation in that into which it is transformed, since nothing transforms into what it is, but in so far as it is something other than that. But the intermediate will be other than one of the extremes to the extent that it shares in its contrary. So it was truly said that transformation from an intermediate occurs as from a contrary. For if grey is mixed from white and black it is transformed into white through the black in it, since this is contrary to white; conversely into black through the white in it. 224b35 Every transformation (metabolê) is from something into something, [as its name also shows; for being ‘meta’ something indicates both a prior and a posterior. So what is transformed might be so in four different ways. For it is either from substrate

Translation

21

to substrate, or from substrate into what is not substrate, or from what is not substrate into substrate, or from what is not substrate into what is not substrate.26 I call substrate that which is referred to in an affirmation. So from what has been said there are necessarily three transformations, from substrate to substrate, from substrate to not substrate and from not substrate to substrate. For the transformation from not substrate to not substrate does not occur, since there is no antithesis; for there are no contraries] and no contradiction. Having set aside incidental transformation and introduced that which is as such, he proposes to find all kinds of transformation, having first noted that ‘every transformation is from something into something’, which he reminds us is obvious even from the word ‘metabolê’; for it implies one thing after (meta) another. The ‘meta’ means that something is prior in it and something posterior. Having noted this, he finally discovers by division all forms of transformation without omission. For since every transformation is from something into something, he says that every transformation is either from substrate into substrate or from what is not substrate into substrate, or from what is not substrate into substrate or from what is not substrate into what is not substrate. For apart from these types one cannot find another combination of that from something into something. He showed what ‘substrate’ signified to him by saying ‘I call substrate that which is referred to in an affirmation’, so that we should not think that substrate is substance alone, but that it is quality also and quantity and all that is referred to in an affirmation.27 ‘Affirmation’ refers not to that which is signified by an affirmative proposition, but to that which has no negative part, like man and white and everything similar. For it is these that he called affirmative, being simple and without composition. For they call negative words with a negative part, like ‘not-man’. But substrate is that existent which is referred to by an affirmative, because what is not substrate is the non-existent which is signified by a negation. This is reasonable; for all transformation is either from a contrary to contrary or from what is not such-and-such to what is such-and-such or what is not such-and-such. The opposites are referred to as affirmative, for both sorts exist. So for this reason transformation either from existent into existent or from contrary to contrary is called from substrate into substrate, but that from what is not such-and-such, i.e. the non-existent, and that into what is not such-and-such, the one from not-substrate to substrate, i.e. from negative to affirmative, and that from substrate to not-substrate, both come about through negation of what is and what is not. Therefore also the fourth, which is from not-substrate into not-sub-

30 812,1

5

10

15

20

25 813,1

22

5

10

15

Translation

strate, even if it was included in the complete list of combinations, is not a transformation as such, since it is indefinite. For what is transformed from not being white to not being hot has an indefinite transformation, unless the hot should chance to be black, but such things are not contraries as such, since they are not referred to by an affirmative, nor are they opposed by contradiction, since both are negative. It was shown next that every transformation is between opposites and those things that are opposite by contradiction. And even if he said that there are four types of transformation he does not mean that there is transformation in all the segments of the division, but that every transformation is included in this division. For one of the four, that from not-substrate to not-substrate, is not a transformation. But Eudemus says that even privations are like substrates.28 For being blind and being that which has not sight do not mean the same, nor do being bald and being hairless. So he says that those sorts are also substrates, but not in the way that affirmatives are. 225a12 So the transformation from not-substrate [into substrate through contradiction is coming to be, that which is simply so is simple coming to be, that which is in a certain respect in that respect. For instance, that from the not-white to the white is coming to be in that respect. But that from simple not being into being is simply coming to be, through which we say that things simply come to be and not that they become something. But that from substrate into not-substrate is ceasing to be, simply from being into not-being, in a certain respect into its opposed negation,] as was said in the case of coming to be.

20

25

30 814,1

Having cast aside the worthless combination from not-substrate to not-substrate, since it is neither of contraries nor of contradictories, he finally subsumes the three under the forms of transformation. So first, he says that that ‘from not-substrate into substrate through contradiction’ is coming to be, rightly including ‘through contradiction’. For transformation is not from the not-white to sweet, unless it be incidentally, but it is necessary that all transformation which is as such from not-substrate to substrate be by contradiction. But since ‘coming to be’ has two uses, one simply, one of a sort, simple coming to be is said of existents, when the transformation is simply from not existing to existing. Coming to be of a sort is in the other cases when something is transformed from not being of a sort into its contradictory. For example, the coming to be of a white man from a not white man is not simple nor the coming to be of an existent. For it is also not from simple not-being. By ‘simply not being’ he does not mean what never is in any way, since nothing comes to be from what is not in that way, but what does not actually exist but is capable of existing.

Translation

23

For what simply is not is what is not a particular thing, and what is not a particular thing is what does not actually exist. How, then, is the coming to be of existents29 also not from what is not a particular thing but from what is something else, like the coming to be of white, but from what simply is not – at least if there is never matter as such but always with some form and in actuality?30 For man also, and the fig, come to be from seed. But the seed is not only potentially man but is also actually seed, like the not-white from which the white comes to be. So how is an existent from what simply is not but the white from what is not of a certain sort? They resolve this question by saying that existence does not come from a contrary but from privation, for existence has no contrary,31 but white is from black or from the intermediate treated as black. So in the way that privation is different from being contrary, in that way that which is now called the simply not being, from which the existent comes to be, differs from not being of a certain sort, from which the coming to be of other sorts comes about. The latter is not called coming to be simply but coming to be something. So far as it is from what is not a particular thing, that too is coming to be; in so far as it is from what is a particular thing and contrary, it is alteration. Also they offer a more naturally connected solution, saying that the transformation into existence comes about without the activity of a continuing substrate, of which we can affirm that this particular thing is what causes the transformation. For in the case of coming into existence the substrate itself becomes something different at different times, like the seed. That is why also the transformation into existence from what is not is called simple, but the transformations into contrary attributes actually have some substrate which remains the same, which comes to have the contraries and of which alteration is predicated, as a man becomes black while remaining a man or this body, and does not become something else, as does the seed which does not remain seed, but, continually becoming something else, is transformed into a man. Aspasius makes a good contribution towards the distinction of simple coming to be from becoming of some sort, namely that simple coming to be is stated without attribution.32 For a man is said to have come to be, and a horse, but white needs attribution; for a man is white. Having stated of transformation from not-substrate to substrate that this is simple coming to be, he next speaks of its opposite, from substrate into not-substrate. He says that this transformation is ceasing to be, simply when it is from existence into not being, of a sort when it is into the opposed negative. For the transformation from sweet into not being white is not a definite ceasing to be, as is that into its own negation, the not sweet, as he said in the case of coming to be, through contradiction. For it is the same thing to say ‘through

5

10

15

20

25

30 815,1

5

10

24

15

Translation

contradiction’ and ‘into its opposed negation’. But if ceasing to be is the transformation from being to not being, but every transformation is from the potential into the actual, what is will be potential and what is not will be actual. Or also that which is transformed from being to not being, in so far as what is is potentially what is not and naturally becomes what is not, in that way what is actual turns into not being so. 225a20 Now if ‘not-being’ has many senses [and neither that through composition or division nor the potential is capable of change, which are the opposite of what actually simply is (for the not-white or not-good may nonetheless change incidentally, for a man might be the not-white, but by no means what is simply not-so-and-so), it is impossible for what does not exist to change, and, this being so, impossible for coming to be to be a change. For what does not exist is coming to be. For however true it may be that things come to be incidentally, still it is true to say that not-being holds of what is simply coming to be. The same holds of being at rest. These difficulties arise, and others if everything that changes is in place, while what is not is not in place; for it ought to be somewhere. Nor, indeed, is ceasing to be a change, for either change or rest may be contrary to change,] and ceasing to be is contrary to coming to be.

20

25

816,1

5

The project is to show that neither coming to be nor ceasing to be is a change. But since coming to be has been said to be a transformation from not-being into being and ceasing to be a transformation from being to not-being, and ‘not-being’ has many senses, he first lists its senses. And finally he proves that what is said not to be in a way that is suited to coming and ceasing to be cannot be in change. For he has dismissed that which is not in such a way as never to be in any way as of no account, while he divided that which does not exist in some way into three sorts. For that is said not to be which (1) is false, as it is that through composition or division; for it either puts together what are not together, like the statement that Leukon has horns, or it divides the undivided, like the statement that Aristoxenus is not a musician.33 ‘Composition and division’ is used basically of bodies, but metaphorically of what is or is not the case, i.e. of affirmation and denial; for affirmation is composition and denial is division. In these, what is not so is said to be false or true – for assertions include these. (2) Also what is potentially but not actually, which is opposed to what actually is, which is said simply not to be because of its opposition to what simply is. For what is potential is opposed to what is actual, as in general is that which is not yet to what is already. The transformation from what is not in this way into its opposite, which is, was

Translation

25

found to be simple coming to be simply. (3) That also is said not to be which is not some particular thing, but is actually something else such as what is not hot but is actually a body; in regard to this the persisting thing that is not hot becomes hot by transformation. This is why he called this transformation a sort of coming to be and of a kind, but not simple coming to be. The primary coming to be was found to be from simply not being in the case of existents, which is simple coming to be and simply coming to be, since the transformation was from not being to the opposed being in actuality. For of things that are not which, while not being, are altogether capable of being, that which simply is not is what is opposed to that which simply is. But that simply is that actually is, so that also which simply is not is the potential. So, having exhibited the division into these three of that which does not exist in some way, he says that (1) ‘neither that which is not through composition and division’, i.e. the false by affirmation and negation, changes; for no false statement or belief changes when it is turned into a truth, as he proved in the Categories.34 For these do not always reverse their status through some transformation in themselves, but often when some other things change. For he who formerly falsely believed and said that Socrates is seated when he happens to be standing will be speaking the truth when he stands up, when neither the belief nor the statement becomes different, but the state of affairs does. So says that (1) neither that which is through composition or division can change, since it does not generally become different as such, but becomes so when something else becomes different nor (2) that which is not through potentiality, i.e. what is not as potential, which is opposed to what actually is. He says that this also cannot change, because change, even if an incomplete activity, still is an activity of a sort. What changes must change as something actually existent and a particular thing and as continuing to exist. What is thus said not to exist is actually nothing existent. For neither does the seed that remains seed turn into a plant or animal, as a man, while remaining a man, changes with regard to some of his attributes when he turns white from not being white and from not being good into being good. That is why things that are altering may be said to change and not to be transformed, since something actually remaining is active in the change. By the inclusion of the third case of not being, by which ‘coming to be of a sort’ was mentioned, he showed the difference between coming to be of a sort and simply coming to be, and made clear the explanation why what is simply coming to be and is transformed into being is not said to be changing, but the other sorts of transformation are called changes. For when something is actually of a sort, such as a man, but is not of another sort, such as not white, that which actually is – the

10

15

20

25

30 817,1

5

10

26

15

20

25

30

818,1

5

10

15

Translation

man – cannot change as such by the potential to be white, since the man continues to exist, but can change in his attribute. That is why he also says that this is changing incidentally, i.e. attributively, by an unusual use of the word. For the transformation from not white to white is as such, but not incidental, but he called it incidental because what was not in this way, as not white, was incidental to the actually existent. But if that which is not in this way is changing, that which simply is not, i.e. what actually does not exist nor remains, would neither change as such nor incidentally. For it does not change qua not existing, nor by actually being something else that remains the same, as was the man who was the not-white. So if what is not in this way cannot change, but the transformation from that which was not in this way – which was called simply not-being – into simply and actually being was coming to be, it is impossible for coming to be to be change. For what is coming to be is what is not, though clearly not what is, but what is changes, if change is a sort of activity. Therefore one must take notice that there is altogether no change when things are transformed into being, because there is not in them something which actually is to actuate the change, but in their case there is only transformation towards coming to be. But in transformations of quality or quantity or place, or generally save in cases of existence, there is a change in what actually persists, like the man who is changing, but there is coming to be of the white from the not white, and as a whole there is alteration. Similarly in the other cases. For this reason coming to be is not change, because there is not something persisting that is changing actually, like what is altering, and increasing, and in local motion. For the persisting man is becoming white, while the not-white in him does not persist, as does the man, but is being transformed into white. So the not-white does not change, but it becomes white. So coming to be is not a change. Having said that what is not, from which there is coming to be, does not change but comes to be – for he says that what is not comes to be – he explains what he meant by what is not coming to be: it is not that which is not as such that comes to be, but that which happens not to be. For matter and generally the potential from which what comes to be comes to be is not that which is not as such, but it happens not to be, such as a privation, which does not persist in the coming to be.35 Except in so far as what is coming to be, through privation, is not that which it is coming to be, ‘it is true to say that not-being holds of what is simply coming to be’. For what is simply becoming, such as the matter of a man, that has nothing that actually persists, subsists as a whole through the potentiality and privation of man; but the man who is becoming white becomes white while the man actually persists. So, if it is true to say that what is coming to be is what is not,

Translation

27

because there is nothing in actuality, while what is not in actuality does not change, coming to be could not be a change. But Alexander states also another interpretation of what is before us, as follows: coming to be incidentally belongs to what simply is not, i.e. to the potential, from which what comes to be comes to be, since that comes to be which happens not to be simply, but changing does not belong to it incidentally, since it does not even exist; but if it does, change belongs to that which is not that is the opposite of what is of a sort, which is not that which simply is not, but that which is not a particular thing, of which coming to be of a sort is predicated. And it is this that is incidental. For it is not qua not being, but qua being something else; for what is changing must exist. For change is the activity of what is. So he took as a sign that what is coming to be is not changing that not being belongs to it.36 But Aspasius explains this text as follows: ‘Having’, he says, ‘stated that what is coming to be is what is not, since this is contentious – for one might say not that what is coming to be is what is not, but is from what is not – for that reason he says that even if we go so far as to agree that what is not is said to come to be incidentally and not in the full sense, still its converse is true, that what is coming to be is what is not. For it would not be coming to be if it already existed. So since what is coming to be is not, and what is not does not change, that which comes to be does not change nor could coming to be be a change.’37 Similarly, says, remaining unchanged does not belong to things that are coming to be simply. For a thing’s remaining unchanged is a privation of that which naturally changes. A thing naturally changes, so that what cannot change cannot remain unchanged.38 For both are activities of an existent. So he has shown from the fact that not being belongs to what is coming to be, that that which is coming to be neither remains unchanged nor changes, since both of these are activities of what exists. He next shows the same by another argument in which he says that an absurdity follows for those who say that what is coming to be is changing, since it is what is not. For, if ‘everything that changes is in place’, as he will show as he proceeds, but ‘what is not is not in place’ as such, then that which is not does not change, the argument being couched in the second figure.39 That what is coming to be is what is not was previously called to mind; that what is not is not in place he concisely showed by ‘for it ought to be somewhere’. But if it is somewhere it is clear that it also exists and exists actually. For what potentially exists neither simply exists nor is somewhere. So it is also possible to conclude in the first figure as follows: what is coming to be is what is not in actuality; what is not in actuality is not in place as such; what is not in place does not change; so what comes to be does not change; so coming to be is not change.40 It is also possible to make the same argument hypotheti-

20

25

30 819,1

5

10

15

20

28

25

820,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

cally. He concisely shows that ‘ceasing to be is not a change’ also, having first taken it that either change or changelessness is contrary to change. So, since ceasing to be is contrary to coming to be, if ceasing to be is a change then coming to be must be either a change or changelessness. So, if coming to be has been shown to be neither of these, it is clear that ceasing to be is neither a change nor changelessness. For coming to be would once again be a change, since ceasing to be is contrary to it. He has now said more ordinarily that changelessness was the contrary of change instead of the opposite, since he is about to prove that it is the privation of change. 225a33 Since every change is a kind of transformation [and there are the three sorts of transformation stated, and of these, those by coming and ceasing to be are not changes, and these are those which are through contradiction, of necessity the transformation from substrate to substrate is the only kind of change. But substrates are either contraries or intermediate, for even privation may be taken to be a contrary, and it is denoted by affirmative terms, such as] naked, white41 and black. He has divided transformation into four kinds, from substrate to substrate, from not substrate to substrate, from substrate to not substrate, and also that from not substrate to not substrate. Having set aside this last combination as unreal, he showed that neither of two of the transformations was a change, neither that from not substrate to substrate, which was coming to be, nor that from substrate to not substrate, which was ceasing to be. And next he adds that ‘since every change is a kind of transformation’, for in it we observe one thing after another, and the transformations were shown to be three in all, of which two are through negation, and these that were coming to be and ceasing to be were not changes, it was necessary that the remaining transformation, that from substrate to substrate, should be the only one that was change. But substrates from which and into which the transformations occur are either contraries or intermediate. He said that intermediates also turn into the extremes as contraries. But, since there is also transformation from privation, one might inquire whether such a transformation is from substrate to substrate or is through negation. He says that it is as from a substrate. For, he says, privation may be taken to be a contrary. But if it is a contrary it clearly is denoted by an affirmative term; he previously said that a substrate was denoted by a affirmative term.42 So privation is a substrate and that which is turning from privation to possession does so as from substrate to substrate. Why, then, is coming to be also not from privation? And then why is it not also from a substrate? Is it that, in the way that the potential is of

Translation

29

two kinds, one in relation to existence, one to incidental attribute, so privation also is either of existence or of incidental attribute? Then that of the attribute, because this is in an existent, has a great share in being and is denoted by an affirmative term and is a substrate and that in which there is the privation can change, like what is ill or uneducated or naked. But privation of existence, since it drops out of existence, has also dropped out of being, and is denoted by a negative term. Clearly now being, existence43 and that which is in actuality are being referred to, and not that sort of being of which privation also and potentiality and matter partake. He took ‘naked’ as an example of privation being denoted by an affirmative term, and added ‘white’ and ‘black’, showing that as those are denoted by an affirmative term, so also is being naked. Perhaps he pointed to something else also by this, that contraries that come to be from each other do not come merely as if from contraries but also as if from negatives; for white comes to be from black because black is not white; also, however, as if from a privation. For a body that for a time is black has the absence of white, while of a nature to receive it also. Privation is nothing other than the absence of what is of a nature to be present. But being naked is not an example of privation proper. For that does not sometimes return to possession in the way that being naked does to having clothes on.44 So Aristotle thus says that change is a sort of transformation, while transformation is wider than change, since he says that coming and ceasing to be are transformations but not changes. But Plato seems to say the opposite, that change is wider than transformation. For he mentions that transformations are the same transformations as Aristotle does, while wishing them to be changes as well. For in the tenth book of the Laws45 he includes coming and ceasing to be among natural changes. He also calls the activity of the intellect a change, likening the reflexive activity of the intellect to the motion of a ‘rounded ball’.46 While there seems to be such a great difference between them, I wonder whether the discrepancy is merely verbal.47 For each similarly counts transformation in the whole area of things that are altered temporally, but Plato supposed that all departure from being was change, and reasonably called all transformations changes, and yet he did not hesitate to call the activities that are without transformation and always the same and in the same state changes because of the procession of the activity from being.48 For activity is a departure from being which strives to return again into being. But Aristotle is philosophizing in a way more suited to the majority of people, and, seeking to avoid their misunderstandings, he was careful not to call change the activity of the intellect that is without transformation, or, as he more grandly said, a reality.49 For he who hears the word ‘change’ at once thinks of transformation and

25

30 821,1

5

10

15

20

25

30

30

822,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 823,1

Translation

suspects that what changes is liable to affection and immediately associates time with change. But he saw a difference among transformations, in so far as some are of a thing transformed that is actually existent when the transformation occurs and which persists, such as alteration and growth and diminution and transformation of place. For in all those transformations what is transformed, such as a man becoming white or growing or walking, becomes different in those respects while being actually a man and persisting. But some transformations are not from what actually is but from what is potentially, which does not persist but always becomes different at different times, and they are completed as is the coming to be of a man from seed, which has its existence in being potentially a man but in actuality is nothing. This is shown by the fact that it does not remain in the form of a seed, as things do that are complete and actually exist, but becomes something different at different times until it reaches actuality. So, having seen this difference among transformations, that those from the potential into the actual, and from what in this way is not into what is in this way are more passive, even if there is something in them that is active to a slight degree – for the potential is especially passive, but the transformations from things already actually existing and capable of being active themselves exist and are passive, but their activity is clearer; since, then, change, although a kind of transformation and affection of what is changing, nevertheless seems to be some activity of it – incomplete because it is mixed up with much passivity, but nonetheless an activity – for that reason he calls those transformations that are active changes, but the passive only transformations, having their character chiefly from their affection, even if they also have some slight element of activity.50 I wonder at the wisdom of him who chose the nomenclature so that it shows that being transformed into something, though it sounds active, is nonetheless an affection. So if Plato accepts the word ‘change’ as meaning something different, calling change the departure from being of what is in any way whatsoever, but Aristotle, in accordance with the common understandings of words, gives the name ‘change’ to the activity of transformation51 but to neither the activity of intellect, which is altogether without transformation, nor to that transformation which is more or less merely passive and contains the slightest or no active element, if this is so I think that the difference is verbal and not substantial, since Plato also would say that the change of the intellect – as unchanging – was without transformation and would accept the distinction of transformations which was made so delicately. And Aristotle would acknowledge the activity of the intellect, since he says that ‘in essence it is activity’,52 and if someone granted him that the common man was capable of

Translation

31

conceiving of a change that was without transformation and atemporal, I do not think that he would demur from calling the activity of the intellect a change. But it is dear to me to think thus about men who held both each other and wisdom dear. They call Aristotle to account for expelling coming and ceasing to be from among changes on the ground that what is changing is in place, while that which is not – from which it starts and at which it terminates – is not in place. They say that he is wrong to take matter to be the not-being from which is coming to be, and for that reason to say that coming to be is not in place. For coming to be is concerned neither with prime matter nor with what is simply body. For body does not come to be qua body as he himself proved in On the Heavens;53 rather, what comes and ceases to be is a body of a certain sort, and all such is in place. Therefore, they say, the premiss that says that that which is not, from which there is coming to be, is not in place is false. But one must, I think, reply to this that he was calling neither prime matter nor what is simply body that which is not, from which there is coming to be, when he said that it was not in a place, but the potential qua potential. For as that is not actual which has being potentially, so it is not actually in a place. ‘It would be somewhere’,54 he says. For if it were actually in place it would also actually exist. They say that if we were also to take that which simply is not, we would compel him to say that coming to be was also a change because of the definition of change. For if what simply is not is potentially that which it is becoming, and the road from the potential to the actual is change, as he himself defines it,55 then the road from what simply is not into being actually what it was potentially is change. So, if that is coming to be, the result is plain. The second argument is of such a kind according also to this presentation of the text, and, I think, it turns out to be more easily rebutted than the first. For the definition of change that was given in Book 3 was of transformation. Until now he used indifferently the words ‘change’ and ‘transformation’, accepting the potential as indeterminate. But now he has divided it into what simply is not and what is not a certain thing, and in accordance with that division he distinguished change from coming and ceasing to be. What comes next, which says that not all change is transformation, since intellect changes by a change that is without transformation and timeless, proceeds hypothetically and is overturned as the hypothesis is shaken. For Aristotle, as has been said, in accordance with common opinion treats all change as transformation and temporal, and does not think fit to call the activity of the intellect change, lest he who hears it should at once imagine that this activity is transformation and in time. But, Plato, even if he says that intellect, soul and natural bodies change, attributes change to each of these with a different

5

10

15

20

25

824,1

5

32 10

15

20

25

825,1

5

10

15

Translation

significance in each case, since, while saying that intellect also changes in a way, he states that the soul is self-moving in essence.56 For if everything that changes changes either by itself or by something else, which is what Plato held even before Aristotle, and what changes itself is prior to what is changed by something else, intellect should be self-moving in itself even before the soul. But he regarded the change in the intellect under the aspect of its first departure into actuality from that which is true being,57 but regarded the self-movement of the soul with regard to its separation from itself and the split within it, by which it came to be self-generated.58 For I think that living and existing through itself belong to the intellect also.59 But he himself saw natural change with a prior and posterior in time as transformation, as did Aristotle, except that Plato thought fit to call all natural transformations changes, while Aristotle emulated his leader in this, calling all natural transformations changes in the Categories60 and in this work up until now, for he gave a definition of transformation in Book 3 as being change,61 but when he found the difference in transformations that has been stated he separated change from coming and ceasing to be. But, if it seems fit, because of those who are troubled by the difference between change and transformation, let us try to speak more clearly about them, even if the account becomes rather long. For since of things that are some are substances, some attributes, it is clear that some transformations will be into substances, some into attributes. Also of the potential or that which is not, from which the transformation comes about, some is towards substance potentially and corresponds to substance, some is towards attribute. But, in both cases alike, in so far as it is from not being to being, such transformation is coming to be. For what formerly is not but later is has this feature through coming to be, but transformation into existence is simply coming to be, as if a man comes to be from what is not man, for substantial existence is basic, while that into an attribute, as from not white to white, is coming to be of a sort, since an attribute, which is being of a sort, is not self-subsistent, but wholly an offshoot of substantial existence. But each kind of coming to be, in so far as being from not being to being, is transformation and, vice versa, the contrary ceasing to be has the property which coming to be has.62 Since, again, of those things that are potential from which there is transformation, that which naturally receives attributes is a persistent substance through its substrate, complete in itself and actual and not completing any other substance with its attribute; for example, a man who is being transformed from black to white, or from shorter to taller or from above to below, when he altogether possesses the contrary of that into which the substrate existent is being transformed. For if it is into white, being previously black or having one of

Translation

33

the intermediate colours, that is how he is transformed to white, and similarly in the other cases. But what is potential with regard to existence, such as what is not air, from which transformation into air comes about, even if it be water or body without qualities, still the water does not persist in the transformation into air and the body without qualities contributes to each kind of being and is not even the contrary of that into which the transformation is in that which is potentially existent. For it is not something contrary in substance, since again both are in need of a substance which in turn receives the contraries. And even if it is common to both the kinds of transformation that they are from what is not to what is and from the potential to the actual, still a difference between them can be seen which is worth stating: the one is of some substrate which is complete and persistent, and starts from one of its attributes which does not contribute to its being and which is transformed from contrary to contrary. But the other is not from anything such but from what is incomplete as potential in relation to existence, and goes from what is not in that way into what exists, and from privation to form, the contrary form into which there is the transformation not being present with the privation, as is the case with attributes. For there was no persisting existent, but privation, the potentiality of matter and matter itself. For even if the body without qualities remain, still this also is material and lacking actuality until it partakes of qualities.63 Also that which is potential and that which is not is related to the composite form64 as is also prime matter. For the composite is from this as it is from that. For this does not have the relation to the substantial qualities that man has to white. So we can see that the difference between these transformations is considerable, as is clear from what has been said. It is worth considering why he says that transformation through contradiction is coming to be and that from the contrary is change. For that through contradiction is also a departure from not being into being or vice versa and seems in its turn to be a change, and that to the contrary, that which formerly was not but later is, seems to be coming to be. So with what significance does he assign the different names to the different things? Is it because change seems to be some active transformation? So nothing changes except what can be active and that is active which is actual. But the complete form is actual; so even if it has something incomplete and potential in virtue of which it is transformed, still, in so far as it is active, it exists in actuality. But coming to be is a transformation into an existent and into existence of that which is altogether incomplete and is not substrate.65 This is viewed through its potential rather than its actual aspect. So for this reason the transformation from the contrary or the intermediate into the contrary, in other words from substrate into substrate,

20

25

826,1

5

10

15

20

34

25

30

827,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

since its being underlies the contraries – because it is a transformation of existence and of something that actually is, such as a man – is a change and not a coming to be. For a man does not come to be when he turns black or walks, for the man who has become black is not a kind of being, but a being with an attribute. Therefore such a transformation, being an activity, is called a change. But what is incomplete and potential and which does not yet exist, even if it undergoes the transformation into existence, does so as coming to be a thing and a reality, but not as being actually a reality, as the man is transformed from black to white. For such a transformation is not into a form or into being, which is why it is not coming to be. But it is also a transformation of a complete thing; therefore it is actuality and change. This is why Aristotle insisted that what is not does not change (for it is not active, for what is active must be altogether existent), and that activity is lost together with existence, so that it is also introduced with it. And yet we think that that thing exists, as Plato bears witness,66 which can act and be acted on. At any rate, what is not, since it proceeds into being and reality, may be said to come to be, but not to change. Aristotle also took as a sign of its incompleteness that it was not in a place.67 For that which is already complete and is able to be active, as a physical thing and complete with its qualities, is either light or heavy and always either above or below, and he himself says that everything in place is either light or heavy.68 But what is incomplete and not existent, whether it be matter or body without qualities to which you refer, with its potentiality or privation, is not in place since it has neither lightness nor heaviness. But if change is an affection of what changes, but is said nonetheless to be an activity, why should not the coming to be of what comes to be, which is an affection, be said also to be an activity and therefore a change? Or should coming to be not be said to be altogether an affection, since according to him an affection is supposed to be a disposition of what is? At any rate he says in what follows, writing about quality, ‘I call a quality not that which is part of the essence, for the differentia is also a quality, but the affective, with regard to which a thing is said to be affected or unaffected’.69 For as that which does not exist cannot change, so also it cannot be affected. But if somebody insisted on coming to be also being an affection, that would be an affection in a different sense and it would not amount to the same thing as change. Further, one might see the difference between change and coming to be from this: that which changes, being altogether an existent, we thus assert to change as such. For a man walks and becomes white while remaining a man. But what is coming to be, since it itself as a whole and as such is subject to the transformation, does not persist. There is a very obvious indication of this. For we say that that is

Translation

35

changing which soon will have changed, and that that has changed which a little before was changing, taking both to be the same persistent thing. But in the case of coming to be it is not thus. For that which is coming to be is not that which has come to be. For air is becoming water, but air is not what has become water, and it is in no way water. For, as I have often said, it has been transformed in the whole of itself and not in some respect. So in coming to be there is nothing permanent. So what would one say when air is transformed into water? Did not the air become water by turning its warm quality into cold while the moist remains, and the body without quality and perhaps many other things? Perhaps if, having lost its warm quality and received the cold instead, the air remained nonetheless air, sometimes becoming warm, sometimes cold, as no doubt it does in summer and winter, that transformation would not be into existence, nor is such an occurrence coming to be, but alteration. But if the loss of warmth were substantial the air which lost it would not remain. So neither existence nor form persists, but rather the incomplete, the potential and what is not, from which there is coming to be. But I do not think that even the moisture of the air persists in the transformation into water, except through affinity, since the moisture of air is different in form from that of water. An indication that there does not remain some persistent existent in coming to be, but there does in change, is that there is coming to be through the contradiction between being and not being, but change is from contrary to contrary. Some persisting existent must underlie these, capable in part of receiving contraries or intermediates or the privation opposed to the incidental attribute, such as being unmusical or toothless70 and nakedness. Since these are present together with a persisting existent they have an affirmative name and, in a way, a form. But the privation of being is to be altogether non-existent. I think that one might see the difference between coming to be and change in this way, which is other than but akin to the proposals of Aristotle. For he says that every transformation always involves one thing being after another,71 but some which he saw as occurring all at once and timelessly and without an extended existence72 he would call coming to be because they are from not being into being and ceasing to be because from being into not being, but he would not call them changes because every change is extended and temporal. But he says that form is acquired and lost atemporally,73 and if it seems that some time is spent in coming to be, that is not a measure of coming to be, but of change of the forms that are changing and altering during the coming to be, and it is on their many-formed turning and alteration that the form supervenes all at once. Therefore change has its being in coming to be, and there is a coming to be of change, because what on each occasion is, has come to be from the extension

30 828,1

5

10

15

20

25

30

36 829,1

5

10

15

Translation

that is the change. But there is no coming to be of coming to be, as he himself shows,74 nor is there change of change. However, if coming to be were extended as change is, and there was a continual succession into being, it would have had its being in becoming and there would have been a coming to be of coming to be. But if, in explaining the common name of metabolê (transformation), he says that ‘being meta something indicates something after and so both a prior and a posterior’,75 how will not all transformation seem to have a prior and posterior and so extension in time, and therefore coming to be as well? Perhaps that from which there is coming to be, such as the seed, exists in the prior time, and at the later time that into which exists, such as a man, and what is in between is time, but this time is not that of the form, for it does not yet exist since it is added timelessly, but of what is prior to the form and the substrates of the form, on which it flowers.76 And if you were to regard each of these, such as flesh and bone and sinew, as coming to be, you would say that the coming to be of each was all at once. But if you were to regard them not as acquiring some other form but in regard to their affective qualities as being heated, that will be alteration and not coming to be. 225b5 So if the categories are divided [into substance, quality, place, relation, quantity] and action-or-passion .

20

25

830,1

5

He has divided transformation into coming and ceasing to be and change, and he has shown that transformation of substance is coming and ceasing to be, transformation in respect of attributes change; he has further divided coming to be and ceasing to be into simply doing so and doing so into a sort. Finally he proposes to divide change as well, making its division through the categories; for there will be as many species of change as there are categories in which it can be shown that there is change. Since change was transformation from substrate into substrate and from contrary into contrary, he sets out seven categories in which there might seem to be change – substance, quality, place, relation, quantity, action and passion,77 and shows that in four of these there is no change; so he has left it in three of them, quality, quantity and place. So there are altogether three kinds of change in the genus. In the listing of the categories he has omitted time, position and possession, since it is very obvious that there is no change in these, according to Alexander, because there is no contrariety in them – for there is none in position, nor possession, nor time; but change is from a contrary and to a contrary, while position and possession look more like rest than like change. But since there appears to be some contrariety in time of the past to the future and the younger and the older, Alexander tries hard to show with many proofs that there is no

Translation

37

change in time. He says: ‘for all change involves time and is in time, but nothing changes into a time. For as nothing changes into change, so also not into time. For there is a time of a change. For if some change is into time, it either changes from not having a time to having it, or, having one, from one to another. But that which is changing from not having a time into having it, would be in a time before being in a time; for if it changes in order to acquire a time, and time accompanies all change, it must already be in time, since it is also in change. Also it is coming to be and not change which is from not-substrate to substrate. But’, he says, ‘it will not even change from one time to another; for there will be some intervening time between that from which and that to which that will accompany the change. So while not yet in another time, if it is changing into it, it must be in another which is the time taken by the change. Also change is from contrary to contrary, but a time is not contrary to a time. Also in general, if all transformation is either from contrary or from contradictory, things changing into time will also change thus. But they cannot change from the contradictory, for it was proved that it is not possible to change from not-time into time, for they will be in time before they are in time; but not from contraries either, since there is no contrariety in time. Further’, he says, ‘what is changing into time is changing into the measure of change, but where there is the measure there is what is measured; so at the same time it will change into change. And Aristotle will show that there is no change to change, because there is not even change of change. Also’, he says, ‘from substrate to substrate78 **** but has its being in becoming. But if ’, he says, ‘what was denoted by an affirmative term were a substrate, time would also thus be a substrate.’79 Some also add to the argument that there is no change affecting time, that those things that can change can also remain unchanged.80 For it is possible both to change and to remain unchanged in quality, quantity and place. So if it is not possible to remain unchanged with regard to time, since time as it goes on is always different, so it is also not possible to change with regard to time. Also a thing remaining at rest exchanges its time in a way, as he himself showed previously.81 I think that one could also prove that there is no contrariety in time as follows: contraries naturally transform into each other, not merely one of them into the other. But in time and things in time, what seem to be contraries are the past and the future and the younger and the older, of which the past turns into the future, but the future not into the past, while the younger turns into the older but not the older into the younger. So these cannot be contraries and, if not these, it is not possible to find another contrariety in time. On these matters one should note that even if there is not contrariety proper in time, still there is opposition of a kind, and transformation from past to future

10

15

20

25

30 831,1

5

10

15

38

20

25

30 832,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

is from substrate to substrate antithetically, and likewise that from the younger to the older. For the existence of an animal or plant or generally of anything corporeal or incorporeal persists as it becomes different in time, just as in quality, quantity and place. But it is clear that what transforms through time will not change from not having a time to having one, but from one time to another, just as in the case of quality and quantity. For as what changes from black to white does so through colour, though no definite one, so what grows from the height of a child to that of a man does so through height, but no definite one, and there is no oddity for what does not yet have the colour to which it changes to have another all the same, and for what has not yet the height to which it is changing to have nonetheless another height, and for what is not yet in the place to which it is in transit to be in a place through which it is in transit; thus what is changing from one time to another but not yet being in that to which it is changing would be in another time within the change.82 Also I think that there is nothing odd about this that Alexander adduced. But against there being no remaining temporally unchanged, it must be said that just as each thing is said to be in time, by viewing time as a period, such as an hour, a day, a month and a year, in that way it is possible for something to remain temporally unchanged and to change from one period to another. However ‘position’ (thesis) seems to contain some contrariety, so that the term ‘posture’ (keisthai) derived from it does so as well. For standing is contrary to sitting and prone to supine,83 and he himself appears to set out some contrariety in ‘possession’; for, he says, ‘even privation may be taken to be a contrary and nakedness is denoted by an affirmative term ’.84 Being naked is a privation of being clothed and possessing a cloak. But perhaps he omitted here these three categories, time, position and possession, for the same reason that he omitted instruction about them in the Categories, contenting himself with the mere outline of what was signified. The reason is that these are trivial; for in the categories substance gives being to the substrate and provides its whole existence.85 That is why transformation in substance is coming and ceasing to be. Of the others, some give some disposition to the underlying substrate, others are merely relational and trivial. For Aristotle seems to see even time as insignificant in a way, since he does not seem to say that it is a cause of coming to be but to make it responsible only for ceasing to be, and for that not centrally, but, he says, when we do not see another cause.86 But he sees much potentiality in place, since, as he himself says,87 travel upwards is the coming to be of fire. That is why natural bodies of their own nature seek their own places. Both position and possession seem to impart no disposition to bodies that is worthy of mention. That is perhaps why both

Translation

39

then and now Aristotle omitted them through their triviality. But he reasonably thought relation worth remembering since it includes all kinds of connection. But the reason why Aristotle omitted these three in giving his list is not worth a long investigation. What is worth great effort is to inquire in which categories there is change and, before that, whether Aristotle denies only change of certain of the categories, or transformation also. So we shall inquire into this, following what Aristotle says.

25 833,1

225b7  there must be three kinds of change, [that of quality, that of quantity and that of place.

But there is no change in substance,] since nothing that exists is contrary to substance.88 Having set out the categories worthy of mention, he says that in three of them there is change – in quality and quantity and place. He first proves that in the other categories there is no change – neither in substance, nor in relation, nor in action and passion, and then that there is change in those three that were mentioned. He proves that there is not change in substance, from the fact that change is transformation from a contrary to a contrary, while there is nothing that is contrary to substance. For if there were anything contrary to it, the transformation into substance would be accomplished from an opposite; for among things where there are contraries transformations come about from them and to them. So if the transformation into substance comes about not from a contrary substance but from privation, and that from substance again not into substance but into privation and ceasing to be – for there is no contrary to man as there is to white – if, then, change is between opposites, but substance is not among opposites, there is no change in substance. For transformation into substance does not come about from substrate to substrate nor from what is actually a particular persisting thing, but by contradiction. For substance and this particular thing come from what is not this particular thing, as he proved in the first book of this work,89 where he says that substance comes from privation, even if he in more ordinary language says there that privation is contrary to form. So if privation is absence and not-being, while not-being is not substance nor denoted by an affirmative term, it is clear that a substance does not come to be from a contrary substance. But if someone sees the seed from which man comes as a substance, and says that transformation into a substance comes about from a sub-

5

10

15

20

25

40

30 834,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

stance and thinks that therefore there is change in substance, he does not realize that man does not come from seed in so far as seed is a substance but in that it is potentially a man, i.e. from the privation of man and from not being. So if anybody says that such a transformation is change, what will be that which changes in it that actually exists and persists? It will neither be a man, since he does not exist but is coming to be, nor the seed, since it is not preserved. But the matter that underlies the seed is that which potentially exists but actually is not, and this cannot change. If change is from contrary to contrary, but seed is not contrary to what is coming to be, the transformation from seed cannot be a change. But somebody might inquire how it is that fire and water are not substances contrary to each other, so that there will be a substance contrary to a substance. If this is so, how will the transformation into each other of fire and water, which is from contrary into contrary, not be a change, so that there will be change in substance? Perhaps we should say that in water and fire there are some contrary qualities, cold to hot, and wet to dry, in which alone the being of fire does not consist, but also in lightness and brightness, in regard to which earth will seem more contrary to fire. The form of fire consists in all these qualities and the substance that underlies the qualities.90 So nothing is simply contrary to fire, even if the qualities of fire and water are contrary to each other. And, even if one were to concede that fire and water are contraries, their transformation into each other would not be a change. For what will it be that is changing, when water turns into fire? Neither the water, since it is ceasing to be, nor the fire, since it does not yet exist, but what has been changed after the change, that must be what is changing. But one should notice that, from what has now been said, he is denying change of the other categories but not transformation. For coming and ceasing to be are transformation in the category of substance. 225b11 Nor is there change in relation; for it is possible [when one thing is transformed for it to be true that the other is in no way transformed,] so that their change is incidental. ‘Next he shows that there is no change as such in the category of relation; for it is not through their own transformation that relationships between things are always in flux, but, when they themselves undergo no change but other things do, relationships vary from time to time, so that it is not through their own change that there is transformation in relationship. For things that change as such must themselves be transformed, as are things altering, growing and travelling. But what was formerly on the right comes to be on the left when something else moves, and the same thing without transforma-

Translation

41

tion becomes greater and less, double and half, so that the same account is sometimes true and sometimes false as the situation varies. If, then, something becomes different in relation without changing, transformation in relation is not a change, unless incidentally. For that is transformed as such to the right of which this happened to be, and so this comes to be on the left instead of the right. Those things also which are changing as such and through their own change exchange their relation to each other either do so by changing their place, like what comes to be on the left instead of the right, or their quality, as what becomes like from unlike, or in quantity like what becomes equal instead of unequal.’ Thus exchange of relationship comes to be in accordance with the change of the terms in a certain respect. This is what Alexander excellently wrote about relation in clarifying what Aristotle said. One should perhaps notice first whether Aristotle denies only that there is change in relationship, or also transformation, as he seems to when he says: ‘For it is possible when one thing is transformed for it to be true that the other is in no way transformed’, unless, of course, one were to say that he now used the word ‘transform’ instead of ‘change’. He shows that this is so next, exchanging ‘transform’ for ‘change’, when he says ‘so that their change is incidental.’ For when another thing is changing as such, either in place or in quality or in quantity, something seems itself to be transformed. But transformation in those respects is change. Second,91 perhaps the category of relation has no proper subjectmatter, but is merely how things are in substance, quality, quantity and the other categories, and holds of both the things that are so situated with regard to each other; and so when one changes it causes the other also to change, not incidentally but as such, because the relationship that continues to hold for both changes, just as when one end of a single rod moves the other moves with it. In that way also when that which was formerly on the right changes its place the relationship changes. And each becomes different through the relationship, what was formerly on the right coming to be on the left and what was on the left on the right. For even if what was formerly on the left remained unchanged in place, still the relationship through which it was on the left changed and became different in its pattern. So one should pay attention not merely to what is in the relationship but to the relationship itself, whether one should say that it changes as such or incidentally. For it seems to be quite clear that if the relationship changes as such, those things also that are in the relationship exhibit a change with regard to the relationship as such.92 It also makes some difference that the relationship is transformed sometimes by a change in the thing itself and sometimes by a change in the other term. But first, also when both are changing,

835,1

5

10

15

20

25

836,1

5

42 10

15

20

25

837,1

5

10

15

Translation

their relationship becomes different, as equality becomes double and half when of two triads a unit is subtracted from one and added to the other. Both in their case and those in which the relationship is exchanged when one becomes different – the relationship of both being one, and this when it is changed by one or both – how is it that both are not changed as such, since they change in a single relationship? And if the relationship which earlier did not exist at all were later to come to be when the transformation is in substance, as when a child is born one man becomes a father and the other a son, the coming to be of the relationship would be simple, and when one or both perished the relationship would simply cease to be. But if the relationship which did not previously exist were to arise in another category, that is coming to be of a sort and, again, ceasing to be of a sort. But if the substrates were to become different in their relationship, taking over one relationship from another, as from on the right to on the left or from unlike to like or from unequal to equal, and thus from one contrary to another, the substrate remaining unchanged, it seems that such a transformation is a change in relationship, i.e. the category of relation. In general, if there is some contrariety in the category of relation, as we heard him saying in the Categories93 that ‘there is also contrariety in relations, as excellence is contrary to badness and knowledge to ignorance’, and there is also some substance underlying the things in relation which persists in the transformation from contrary to contrary, as does the soul in these examples, why do we not call a transformation of such a kind change? For the transformation from being on the right to left is also from substrate to substrate, for it is from a body to a body. Similarly that from knowledge to ignorance; for it is from soul to soul, and the substrates, the soul with knowledge and the ignorant one, are contrary. So, then, these are the points that one may set out in opposition to the argument. But perhaps relations both come to be and change, but not as such but incidentally. This he himself admitted when he said ‘so that their change is incidental’. For if relations do not exist at all as such, but are incidental attributes of other things regarded as in their mutual relationships, they both come to be incidentally and change incidentally. For he who says that relationships94 come to be or change as such is like one who says that the incidental is as such. So Aristotle left incidental change and transformation as indefinite when he said ‘let us set aside incidental transformation. For it happens in everything and always and between everything’.95 In seeking transformation as such he reasonably said that it does not occur in relations, even if relationships in the category of relation come and cease to be. But, as he himself made clear in Book 7,96 such relationships come

Translation

43

and cease to be ‘when some things are altered between which they happen primarily to be’. This sort of thing is incidental. 225b13 Nor in the agent and the affected, [nor of changed and changer, because there is no change of change nor coming to be of coming to be, nor in general transformation of transformation. For first, there might be change of change in two ways, (1) as of a substance, as a man is changed when he turns black from white – does change thus grow hot or cold or change its place or grow or diminish? That is impossible, for the transformation is not of any substances. (2) By some other substance being transformed from transformation into another form. But that also is impossible except incidentally; for change itself is transformation from one form to another, as a man changes from disease to health. Similarly with coming and ceasing to be, except in so far as these are into states opposed in one way, change in another. So something is simultaneously transformed from health to disease and from this very transformation to another. Now it is clear that when it becomes diseased it was transformed into another transformation of some sort (for it can remain unchanged) and not into any chance transformation, and this will be from one thing to another, so that getting well will be its opposite. But this is so incidentally, as something transforms from recollection to forgetting because] that in which it occurs transforms sometimes to knowledge, sometimes health.97 He next proves that there is also no change in action-and-passion, transposing action and passion into the agent and the affected. For if there is change in action-and-passion it will be through the transformation of the agent and the affected in this category, just as there is change of quality because of the transformation of a body with qualities with respect to its qualities. There might be transformation of the agent in respect of his action when the agent is transformed from one activity to another, and of the affected by transformation from having one affection to having another. ‘He added’, says Alexander, ‘ “nor of any changed and changer” to show that the issue before him is more universal. For acting is subordinate to making change and being affected to being changed.’98 But if that is true and acting and being affected are subordinate to changing and being changed, and changing and being changed to transforming and being transformed, then I think that all should inquire why in the ten categories he ranked acting and being affected as more universal, but not changing and being changed nor especially transforming and being transformed. So perhaps acting and being

20

25

30 838,1

5

44

10

15

20

25

839,1

5

10

15

Translation

affected is more universal than these; for both to be at rest and to maintain internal coherence are cases of action but not of changing and transforming. If this is so, he did not link action and passion with changing and being changed as with the more universal, but reversed them according to his hypothesis; for he who says that there is change in the agent and the affected thus means it as of the changer and the changed. And, if one accepts that view, he superfluously proves that there is change ‘nor of any changed and changer’, i.e. that change does not change, whether it be that change by which the changer causes change or that by which the changed is changed. For it is clear both that the changer causes change by change and the changed is changed through change and that the change is in what is affected and changed, as he himself proved. So, then, he is not saying that the affected in which there is the change is not changed, but that these things do not exhibit change in that their change is changed, which he also made clear by ‘because there is no change of change’. For if there is no change of change, neither the change of the changer nor that of the change would change. So he spoke of the agent and the affected not as substances, for these do change, but as equivalent to acting and being affected, which are categories,99 i.e. he took agent and the affected as equivalent to agency and affection, since the agent is an agent through agency and the affected is affected through affection. He showed that this is not true only of change but also of the coming to be that is opposed to change and of transformation that encompasses them both when he said ‘nor coming to be of coming to be nor, in general, transformation of transformation’.100 So he has shown that he who says that there is change in action and affection says that there is change of change, since the agent makes change through agency and the affected is affected through affection, while agency and affection are kinds of change. Finally he shows through two arguments that there is no change of change. Thus there will be no change in acting and being affected. Of these two arguments the first is based on a necessary division as follows: if there is change of change, then either change is some substrate, itself changing through some form of change as we say that there is a change in a man when he is transformed in quality or quantity or place; if so, then change will be in such a transformation as becoming hot or growing, or some other transformation, so that there be a change of change. But now change is not a substrate, for it is not said to become hot or cold, for these are properties of substances. But change is not a substance but has its being in what is changed as in a substrate and a substance.101 So if there is not change of change in that way it remains that, if it occurs at all, it does so as follows: change being in the substrate, the substrate is transformed from one change to another as we say that something is transformed from becoming

Translation

45

white to becoming black, since what is substrate to these, such as a man, is transformed from one of them to another. But, he says, it is not possible to say that there is change of change in that way either, since it is another substrate that is transformed from one change to another, clearly from one form to another, unless one is speaking of the incidental. He himself will say how there can be transformation from change to change incidentally; for when someone is said to be transformed from forgetting to recollecting the transformation seems to be from change to change. For recollecting and forgetting are kinds of change, but the change of change seems to be incidental because it is he who happened to forget who is transformed into recollecting. It is the same with him who is transformed from being ill into being healthy, for he said ‘from disease to health’ as if from change to change. ‘Into another form’102 was well added, and he himself provided the explanation, when he said ‘for change itself is transformation from one form to another’.103 This is the case not only with change but also with coming to be and ceasing to be. For in their case too the transformation is from one form to another. For every transformation is from opposite to opposite, save that coming and ceasing to be are to opposites as through contradiction, but change is into opposites as contraries. That is what he means by ‘in so far as these’, i.e. coming and ceasing to be, ‘are into states opposed in one way’, i.e. through contradiction, ‘change in another’, i.e. into contraries.104 He also showed by the example that all transformation comes about from one form to another when he said ‘as a man changes from disease to health’. For as it is in this respect that that from which and that to which are different, so, if something were to change from change to change, that from which will be different from that to which. For even the transformation from slower change into faster is perhaps from opposed to opposed form, and perhaps is not from change to change. For that into the same is one. The increase comes about from the intermediate and as from departure and rest. For the slow change is through an admixture of rest and is related to the fast as is grey to white. Incidentally, then, there can be a change of change, when the substrate is transformed from one change to another, but is impossible as such. He himself also adduced the consequent oddity when he said ‘so something is simultaneously transformed from health to disease and from this very transformation to another’. For if this transformation or change from health to disease were said itself to change, that which is changing from health to disease at the same time suffers this other change, and from this too is transformed into another change, like becoming white, given that change changes. So it would at once be transformed to disease and into that which is the

20

25

30 840,1

5

10

15

20

46 25

841,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

completion of the transformation into which it turned from the transformation from health from disease, just like transformation to white. So when it was in disease, it clearly would have simultaneously suffered transformation into disease and into something else to which the change was, into which the previous change was transformed. But since it was not determined into what sort the transformation was, he therefore says ‘when it becomes diseased it was transformed into another transformation of some sort’. For what is transformed could both be transformed and remain at rest, having ceased from transformation.105 But when it is said to change from change to change it must have been transformed into a change of some sort and not this time into rest. So what is transformed from change to change, while clearly changing with that change from which it is said to be transformed, will also be changing with another change, into which it is said to be transformed from that. For as that which is transformed from white to black, while still in a way in a white state, is being transformed from that and has an element of it until it finally completes the transformation from it, so, if something is in change from a change to a change, while still being in that change from which it is said to be transformed and to be changing in respect to this change, it at the same time will be changing through that change into which it is being transformed. Further, when it has been transformed into the other, in his words ‘when it becomes diseased’, then it will have been transformed into something of some sort. So the first oddity is that something will change simultaneously into many different things, then that it will be simultaneously in many things, the third that if change is transformation from contrary into contrary and something is transformed from a change into a change, it is clear that it would be transformed from the change from contrary into contrary into that from contrary into contrary; for those are the contrary changes. So as that which is transformed from colour to colour is not so from any into any but from contrary into contrary, so that which is transformed from change to change is not so into any change whatsoever but into the contrary; for this would be that which was from contrary to contrary. This will be even more so in the case of change, since to be changed is to be transformed from contrary to contrary. So the result will be even more odd than the previous ones; for something will change not merely simultaneously into many different things, but even into opposites, and it will not merely be simultaneously in many things but also in contraries. For in that it is in change, which is becoming healthy, it would be transformed from disease to health; in so far as it is in transformation from that change into another that is contrary to it – for it is not into any whatsoever – at the same time as it is transformed into health in becoming healthy through this same transformation, it will be so into transfor-

Translation

47

mation into disease which is the contrary of health, if the change is changed as such. But since what is changing into something, even if it were to come to be in that state into which it was changing, when it ceases from this change it will at once be in those into which it was simultaneously changing through both the changes; and these will be disease and health. So that which is changing from change to change will be at once healthy and diseased and, generally, in contrary states. Aristotle himself indicated that change would be into many different things at once by ‘so something is simultaneously transformed from health to disease and from this very transformation to another. Now it is clear that when it becomes diseased it was transformed into another transformation of some sort.’ He indicated the simultaneous change to contraries and being at once in contrary changes by ‘and not into any chance transformation, and this will be from one to another, so that getting well will be its opposite’. Why, then, is there not transformation from recollecting into forgetting and also from being diseased into being healthy? So if these are changes and contraries, why would there not be transformation of transformation and change of change? Answering this objection, he says that the transformation from change to change is not as such but incidental, that he who happened to recollect forgets again. For if as he recollected he forgot while recollecting, there would thus be a transformation from change to change. For memory, while remaining, would have had to change into forgetting; for what is changing remains what it is while changing and is not in the same state as what is coming to be. Since it is universally necessary that what has changed should stop at that into which it has changed if it is going to suffer the contrary change again, and he who was recollecting stopped when he had recollected, then he would forget in that sense, if at all. So we commonly call both changes coming about in turn to the same person ‘from this to that’. He showed how there is incidental transformation from recollection to forgetting by saying that that to which these come about in turn, i.e. the man or the soul, is transformed in respect of these. So if it is necessary that change should either be a substrate or be in a substrate, but neither is a substrate nor can change as being in a substrate, there could not be change of change in any way. I think that it is worth while to take note in these matters that he does not deny all transformation of change, but only change.106 For that transformation from health to sickness, and from this very transformation into another, are simultaneous, which he adduced as an absurdity, follows from it being a change that is changing. For the subject is changed while remaining what it is. So if being sick is changed into its opposite, being healthy, it remains what it is while being transformed to its opposite, so that the same thing would at

842,1

5

10

15

20

25

843,1

5

10

48

15

Translation

once be sick and healthy. But this absurdity does not follow for coming to be. For a thing does not come to be while remaining what it is, as it changes while remaining what it is; for coming to be is not from being into being, but from not being into being, and from not being a substrate into being a substrate. But even if coming to be is from not being to being, if someone were to say that this transformation is being transformed since what is transformed also is transformed from opposite to opposite, then it at once is transformed from not being to being and from being to not being, so that it ceases to be by coming to be. 225b33 Also there will be an infinite regress [if there is to be transformation of transformation and coming to be of coming to be. For it is necessary that the former should exist if the latter is to do so. For example, if simple coming to be was coming to be at some time, so also what was coming to be was coming to be, so that thus what was simply coming to be did not yet exist, but what was coming to be was already coming to be, and that again was coming to be at some time, so that it was not yet coming to be coming to be. But since there is no first term of an infinite regress, there will be no first term and no successor to it;] so that nothing can come to be or change or be transformed.

20

25

844,1

5

Having shown that there is no change of change, i.e. that change does not change, he goes on to show that the problem is more universal, because there is no transformation of transformation whatsoever. In order to show that he is not now using ‘transformation’ as equivalent to ‘change’, but has assigned the name to general transformation in the strict sense, to which both change and coming to be and ceasing to be are subordinate, he added also coming to be of coming to be. He proves this by reductio ad absurdum, using the following reasoning: if there is change of change or coming to be of coming to be or, generally, transformation of transformation, then there is no change nor coming to be nor transformation in general. If these do not exist then nothing can change nor come to be nor be transformed in general; and if not these, there will be no things changing nor transformed. And it is very obvious that these latter statements are absurd and impossible and, because of them, the former also, from which they follow, if they follow, that is the existence of change of change, coming to be of coming to be and transformation of transformation. He proves the conclusion through two middle terms. For if there is coming to be of coming to be or transformation of transformation, there is necessarily a progression to infinity; but if this is so there will be neither a first nor a last term; so there will be neither coming to be nor transformation. That the progression must be to infinity if

Translation

49

there is transformation of transformation he proves from the fact that if there is generally transformation of transformation, it will not merely be of that cited but also of that from which the transformation to this came about, and yet another of that, and always it will be necessary to take some previously existing transformation of that already taken, and, this being so, always to go on to infinity always taking another prior to another, and if that is so what comes next will also follow. For if there is no first transformation, there could not be the one after it, nor the one after that nor another, right to the last; so if there is transformation of transformation there will be no transformation. He himself continues the argument with respect to the case of coming to be, rather relying in thought on the special case of transformation than the general. Also the absurdity about nothing coming to be is more obvious; for it follows from this that nothing generated exists, which is plainly absurd. However, still a further absurdity is revealed through this demonstration, that coming to be, though non-existent, already exists. Since there is variation in the text in this area Alexander also wrote out the clearer one which runs as follows: ‘for example, if simple coming to be was coming to be at some time, so also what was coming to be was coming to be, so that it did not already exist.’107 Also he interprets ‘simple coming to be’ as that conceived without what is coming to be, concerning which we are inquiring whether it comes to be. So if this coming to be was coming to be at some time, and what is coming to be is coming to be for the while and does not yet exist – for it is not possible for what is coming to be not to be coming to be – the coming to be already existed when not yet existing; for it could not come to be if there was no coming to be. Alexander also knows of this addition to the foregoing: ‘but as coming to be, it was already something coming to be’. This supplies the absurdity correlative to the absurdity stated (that coming to be already exists when it does not yet exist), which is that coming to be is still coming to be, i.e. does not yet exist, when it already exists. He also added another text which runs as follows: ‘so it was not yet coming to be simply, although it was already coming to be something’. This would be saying that simple coming to be was coming to be when there was already some particular coming to be, for that through which simple coming to be was coming to be was a coming to be which already existed. This text is contained in many copies. But perhaps it should be interpreted as follows: if coming to be were coming to be, simple coming to be did not yet exist since it was coming to be, but there was already something coming to be, i.e. but also another thing which was suffering coming to be together with coming to be, so that the whole is something coming to be, as a man is something coming

10

15

20

25

30 845,1

5

50

10

15

20

25

846,1

5

10

15

Translation

to be. So if coming to be were coming to be it would not be coming to be simply but one among things coming to be. Having added these proofs among the absurdities, he next adds how coming to be will progress to infinity and how it will be annihilated, if there is coming to be of coming to be. For if coming to be comes about through coming to be, and this coming to be in its turn through coming to be, and likewise every coming to be through coming to be – for one cannot say why this one comes to be but this coming to be by which it comes to be does not itself come to be – if, then, this is the case, there must be an infinite regress by taking one coming to be prior to another coming to be. ‘But’, he says, ‘there is no first term of an infinite regress’. For to everything taken it is possible to take something prior. But, he says, if there is no first, nor is there what comes next, and therefore not what is after that. So that that last term from which the argument started does not exist. But Aspasius says:108 ‘If what is written were “for example, if simple coming to be was coming to be at some time, and also what was coming to be was coming to be, so that it did not already exist simply but as coming to be, but was now something coming to be”, what will be being proved by this text will be only what he premised, that there will be an infinite progression of becoming. For if the coming to be comes about (but that which comes into existence is simply coming to be), and if what is coming to be is coming to be, it will not yet be simply coming to be. For it is not coming into existence, but into becoming.109 In its turn, that from which what is coming to be is coming to be must be a something coming to be and so on to infinity. Also’, he says, ‘this text harmonizes better with the argument about change, for in the case of change infinity is proved only in the same way, if there is change of change.’ This, then, is what was said by Aristotle and his commentators on these matters. It is worth considering, as I think, how it is that, in the case of infinite regress, if, as Aristotle said, there is no first term neither is there one that follows it. If this is so, if there is coming to be before coming to be110 and transformation before transformation ad infinitum, there will be no coming to be nor transformation. For this statement seems to abolish the infinite procession of things coming and ceasing to be which Aristotle can clearly be seen to support.111 For he proves its existence and discovers its causes in On coming and ceasing to be, both material, efficient and final. And it is he himself who says in the second book of that work that ‘the god completed the whole in the only remaining way by making coming to be perpetual’;112 ‘perpetual’ means ‘ad infinitum’. Also in the third book of this work, while abolishing actual infinity he admits that there are infinite progressions in magnitude and in number, which he seems to abolish in the present discussion.113 If I should ask about some individual

Translation

51

what Aristotle himself asks about coming to be, e.g. if it is necessary for there to be a father of this father or man, and a father of him, and so ad infinitum, and, since ‘there is no first term in an infinite regress’, but, as he says, if no first term then there will be no successor, then neither this father nor this man will exist nor, in general, any father or man according to this proposition, since there must be a father before every father and a man before every man. ‘For man and the sun generate a man’,114 as he himself says. So if similarly coming to be precedes coming to be, and he abolished coming to be for the reason that there will be a necessary procession to infinity and, as he says ‘there is no first term in an infinite regress, so that there will be no successor’, by this reasoning every procession to infinity will be abolished. However, as I said, having abolished the other sorts of infinity involving actuality, which assert infinity together with number or magnitude, he left only that sort of infinity which signifies infinite progression; he says thus ‘for in general the infinite exists by one thing always being taken after another, and what is taken is always finite but there is always another and another, like a day and a contest, whose being has not come about as substance but is always limited in coming or ceasing to be, but always different’.115 He says that there is such an infinity in the cases of both time and men.116 It is clear that it also holds of everything coming to be and in the division of magnitudes. But in all of these there is no first term. For there is always a time before a time and a man before a man. Why does not coming to be, even if it is always by one thing after another and there is no first term, still exist by infinite progression? For perhaps infinite progression is necessarily inferred by the argument, as is there not being a first term in the case of such infinities; for there is a term prior to any that is taken. I do not know how ‘if there is no first term there is no successor’ can seem to be true. For in an infinite procession there is no first nor last term, but there is both a predecessor and a successor of any given term. Therefore nothing prevents there being a father before a father and a man before a man even to infinity, and in that way one might say that there is a coming to be before a coming to be, taking there to be a father and a coming to be of ourselves even if there be no first father and no first coming to be. For terms neighbouring any given term never give out. For also in cases where one supposes there to be an infinite number of predecessors of a given term in actuality, e.g. that there are infinitely many fathers of this father in actuality, i.e. all existing at once, it is true that such a father cannot have come to be; for an infinity cannot be traversed. But in the case of infinite series, where all the infinity of terms does not exist together but a given term is always finite and stands at the limit of its predecessors,

20

25

30 847,1

5

10

15

20

52

25

30 848,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

always one after another and for that reason there is an infinite series, in such cases neither the prior term nor the progression is abolished, even if its causes proceed to infinity taken one before another. For they are limited by the present term, as are his paternal or human causes by Socrates. So for this reason, even if there is one man before another or one father before another ad infinitum and one cannot take a first term, still, Socrates is not abolished as father or as man, since the causes to him are limited. Where, however, Aristotle abolishes the existence of that which is said to succeed such terms where there is an actual infinity, i.e. where all the preceding causes exist, the argument is correct.117 But let it remain that there is no coming to be of coming to be and change of change and generally transformation of transformation as proved by the preceding arguments and about to be proved by Aristotle in those that come next. My inquiry has now been about the argument about infinite series, whether it rightly assumed that if there is no first term of an infinite series there can be no successor, on which followed the argument that if there is coming to be of coming to be there is no coming to be. For if there is coming to be of coming to be there must be an infinite progression. If that is so, he says, there is no first term and therefore no successor, and so not the proposed case of coming to be. But this argument contended feebly, whether advertently or inadvertently, because what Aristotle says – that in the case of infinite series there is no first term and so no successor – is not said of all infinite series, but of those now supposed to proceed to infinity, coming to be and transformation. For if, he says, simple coming to be, which is not coming to be of coming to be but of something else such as a man, if this came to be at some time, as those say who posit a coming to be of coming to be, something coming to be would be coming to be. But since coming to be has its being in coming to be, if coming to be were to come to be, something coming to be is coming to be and it is not yet something coming to be. For what is coming to be is not yet what it is becoming, and it is clear the coming to be of this also was coming to be and did not yet exist. For it already has coming to be, but it does not yet have being what it is coming to be, that is, something coming to be. And if this proceeds to infinity, and it is in general not possible to find a first term in the case of all infinities, since each term is after another, and in their case also individually, since none that are taken are what they are said to be (for coming to be does not exist, but is coming to be, if there is coming to be of coming to be); if, then, there is no particular coming to be at all from which it is possible to start, there will not be a successor, i.e. there will not be another coming to be that comes next because there is no coming to be before it through which it will come to be. For both the coming to be before it was coming to be and that which was coming

Translation

53

to be already possessed coming to be, since coming to be has its being in coming to be but not being yet what it was coming to be, i.e. coming to be.118 Nor do the succeeding comings to be exist, since they are supposed to come to be, but there is no preceding coming to be of them according to those who say that there is coming to be of coming to be. That is why he inferred the absurdity that there is no coming to be nor changing nor transformation, which follows for those who suppose coming to be of coming to be and transformation of transformation ad infinitum. But anyone positing a man before man to infinity does not fall into this absurdity. For even if there is no first man, still every man you take already exists, so as to be able to beget a man and not a becoming-man, in the way that coming to be was still something coming to be and not existing. 226a6 Also contrary change [and resting, and also coming and ceasing to be are of the same thing, so that what is coming to be coming to be is ceasing to be when it is119 coming to be coming to be. For it is coming to be neither at once nor later.] For what is ceasing to be must exist. He also proves by another argument that there is not coming to be of coming to be, reducing it to the absurdity that what is coming to be is ceasing to be when it is coming to be. Being changed by contrary changes at the same time is thus absurd. He proves this by presupposing as an axiom that contrary changes are of the same thing, obviously not that both occur at once nor that both are completely natural, but that what undergoes some change is capable of the contrary change. He also presupposes that what is liable to some change is also liable to the opposed rest.120 For these are true of alteration and growth and travel and ceasing to be and coming to be. So if there is coming to be of coming to be, so that coming to be is something that comes to be, it is clear that it will also be something that ceases to be. For coming and ceasing to be are of the same thing. So when does this that is coming to be – which is coming to be – cease to be? For it does not at the beginning of coming to be, which he called ‘coming to be at once’, since it would not yet be coming to be, nor later after coming to be when everything that ceases to be ceases to be. For coming to be that exists as coming to be and after coming to be exists no longer, would not then cease to be. For what is ceasing to be must exist in order to cease to be, while coming to be after coming to be no longer exists, just as change no longer exists after what undergoes the change has made the change. So, if coming to be does not cease to be immediately as it comes to be, nor later after having come to be, it must necessarily cease to be when it is coming to be. For Socrates, when he ceased to come to be and had already come to be, would then

30

849,1

5

10

15

20

25

54

30 850,1

5

10

15

20

25

30

Translation

be ceasing to be. But coming to be, if it comes to be, would no longer exist when it had come to be, so that it would not cease to be then. ‘For what is ceasing to be must exist.’ So, if coming to be is something coming to be, then when it is coming to be something that is coming to be, then it ceases to be. This is the absurdity that the same thing is at once coming to be and ceasing to be. For if coming to be comes to be, it is clear that it also ceases to be because of the presupposition that contrary changes are of the same thing. Aristotle exhibited the absurdity in the case of coming to be briefly. But if coming to be is the coming to be of something, then what is coming to be will then be ceasing to be, such as Socrates or anything else that comes to be, in which cases the absurdity of the same thing coming and ceasing to be at once is yet more obvious, since coming to be and ceasing to be are abolished. Another conclusion from what has been said emerges. For if coming to be does not cease to be immediately on starting nor later after having come to be, since when starting it does not yet exist and when it has come to be it is no longer coming to be, nor would it, however, also cease to be when it was coming to be, in order that it might not at once undergo contrary changes, it is clear that it never ceases to be. But if it does not cease to be, nor does it come to be, because of the presupposition which says that the contrary change is of the same thing. But it was by making use of this supposition also that the contrary change is of the same thing and therefore that coming and ceasing to be are of the same thing that he proved the above; but what aid did that other presupposition121 that rest was also of the same thing provide him with? The commentators well say that through rest he showed that the same argument fitted change as well.122 For if change changes, while what changes in some way is suited to remain unchanged in a way opposed to the change, it is clear that change will remain unchanged while being a change, which is absurd. Still more absurd is it that it will at once change and remain unchanged; for if what is at rest must exist, like what is ceasing to be, but a change as it is beginning does not yet exist while when it has ceased it no longer exists, but it has its being in changing, if it were to change it would clearly change and remain unchanged at once. Also from the other axiom which says that contrary changes are of the same thing, the absurdity will be brought about in the case of change too. For if change exists solely in change, as does coming to be in coming to be, and neither before nor afterwards, if change changes it will at once undergo the contrary changes when it changes into the contrary while remaining what it was. Since coming to be was shown neither to come to be nor to cease to be, I think it is necessary – if it was shown not just about simply coming to be but also about particular cases such as the coming to be Socrates that they neither came nor ceased to be – to inquire once

Translation

55

again what sort of things they were, given that it is necessary that everything that exists in any way be either among everlasting things or among those that come to be and cease to be. So if the birth of Socrates through which Socrates came to be is not among everlasting objects, it must be among those that come and cease to be. Also, in general, if his coming to be first did not exist, later existed, and again does not exist, how are we not to say that it came to be and ceased to be? So perhaps it is necessary that there should be transformation also in the case of particular coming to be, since it first does not exist, later exists and again does not exist, and if its existence is temporally measurable. Aristotle, however, will soon say that their transformations are also incidental; for the substrate is transformed as such, but transformation is so incidentally, since it is in that which is transformed as such. But perhaps it is necessary that the transformation which comes to be and ceases to be should be transformed as such, while the problem arises from lack of vocabulary. For when we have distinguished the transformations of things into two or three types, change and coming to be and ceasing to be, we no longer have appropriate words for the transformations of transformations which come to be in another way. For Socrates exists with a totally different kind of existence from that of the transformation of Socrates, and so the transformations of both of these are different in their whole nature. Also, if there were special names for the transformations of coming to be and of ceasing to be, perhaps the absurdities mentioned would not have resulted. For coming to be was not something coming to be or ceasing to be, but its transformations into being and not being are of some other sort. I confirm this also from the case of change; for if we say that change changes or remains unchanged we fall into absurdities, but we do not decline to say that it comes and ceases to be. Surely we all say that change has its being in coming and ceasing to be, and perhaps this will soon be seen to be the opinion of Aristotle also, when he says that there is transformation of change, but will not allow it to be called change. ‘For,’ he says, ‘the coming to be of learning will not be learning.’123 But perhaps what was concluded as absurd – that if there is coming to be of coming to be, then coming to be will at once come to be and cease to be, since it ceases to be while coming to be and neither at the beginning not at the end – is not absurd in the case of such things as have their being in coming to be and ceasing to be. For both a day and a contest, although they are ceasing to be, do not do so at the beginning, since they do not then yet exist and what is ceasing to be must exist, nor at the end, since then they no longer exist, but ceasing to be accompanies coming to be as well. This is true also of change, just like time, even if for them the account of coming to be and ceasing to be differs, but you will see each part you take coming to be. For if

851,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 852,1

5

56

10

15

20

25

853,1

5

10

Translation

a part of change or time that previously was coming about later ceases to be like a house, there must be a time in between in which it is neither coming to be nor ceasing to be but exists and halts in its being.124 However, in the case of change and time and everything that has its being in becoming, one cannot find a halt. But it seems in some remarkable way that in such cases the three, coming to be, existing and ceasing to be, are mixed together. For this also will be manifest in every part of such things through which it both seems to exist – through the measure of existence it receives – and also to come and cease to be through this mixture of coming and ceasing to be. This is not through such as are distanced from each other in their nature, as contrary and unable to co-exist, or in time, so that one is earlier, the other later. This mixed thing is Plato’s object that is coming to be and perishing, but never truly exists.125 For what appears in it together with coming and ceasing to be is an image of that which truly exists.126 But perhaps even if this mixed nature through which what is coming to be simultaneously ceases to be is also in things that exist, Aristotle’s conclusion will be no less absurd, if coming to be came to be and change changed. For since the transformation is into the contrary, coming to be itself will be ceasing to be and changing will be remaining unchanged. But there should be further study of what Aristotle also admits. We shall later hear from his own mouth that Aristotle agrees that there can be incidental transformation of transformation. But it must be further examined whether there is transformation as such in some other way. The argument that comes next, which is, I think, more suitable as a proof than that at present before us, is as follows.127 226a10 Also matter must support both what comes to be [and what is transformed. What will it be? As what alters is body or soul, what is it that becomes change or coming to be? And again, into what are they changing?] For it must be the change or coming to be of this from that to this. This argument is common to all kinds of transformation also. For since everything coming to be comes from some substrate and some matter, which becomes what it comes to be by receiving the form, and since coming to be is said to come to be and transformation to be transformed, if there is coming to be of coming to be and generally transformation of transformation there will be some substrate from which will be the coming to be and the transformation. Just as when a fire is coming to be some matter underlies it from which it comes to be, and bronze underlies the statue, and a body or soul underlies an alteration, so also for what comes to be. And this is so not only for what simply comes to be but also for particular coming to be and

Translation

57

change and, in general, transformation. It was for this that he used the illustration of alteration. For if there were no substrate, nothing would come to be. So if coming to be comes to be, and coming to be is something that comes to be, then it is altogether necessary that there should be a matter for this that comes to be, which comes to be by participation in the form of coming to be. And if change changes, there will be some substrate which, through the change, is changing from this to that, i.e. from one form to another, by being transformed into which the substrate in what comes to be and in what changes becomes coming to be and change, just as when something is whitened its subject, which is being transformed through whitening, is transformed to white. So if what is becoming change or coming to be must be some substrate in addition to change and coming to be, what is this, in the way that ‘what alters is body or soul’, that is something beyond alteration? So if it is change that is changed and coming to be that comes to be, there will no substrate as matter, which is absurd and impossible, if it is necessary that some matter underlie what changes and what comes to be. This, then, is one absurdity that he deduced concisely through ‘what then will be’ the underlying matter, ‘as what alters is body or soul’, another through the need for there to be something else beyond them into which things that change change. For example, if a body is whitened there is something, whiteness, beyond the body, into which the body changes, but there is nothing in the things under consideration beyond themselves. For if change changes and128 coming to be comes to be, what else will there be beyond change and coming to be into which change changes and coming to be comes to be, in the way that whiteness and knowledge are something beside body and soul into which body and soul change? So if in their case there is nothing other into which, but there always needs to be in the case of a thing changing and coming to be, it is clear that neither does change change nor does coming to be come to be. So that is the second absurdity arising from the necessity in the case of things changing that there be something into which they change and which they come to be, as well as that from which they change and from which they come to be, while, if someone were to say that change changes and coming to be comes to be, he would not be able to say into what change changes and what coming to be comes to be other than themselves, just as before we were not be able to say what they came from. The above is so, if what was written is ‘for the change or coming to be of this from this into that must be something’. But Alexander sets out another text that reads ‘the change from this to that not be a change’129 and explains it as follows: if change is something changing, but what is changing is one thing, that in respect of which there is change another, such as a body and becoming white, it is clear that

15

20

25 854,1

5

10

15

58 20

25

Translation

the change of change from this to that will not be a change, so that it is not true that change changes. Themistius seems to accept this reading.130 But Alexander well objects that the former reading is more appropriate to the present issue, since Aristotle proves next this conclusion that change is not change.131 Also this should be said, that this argument is constructed on the necessity of there being that from which and that to which in the case of things changing and coming to be. But if someone were to say that change changes and coming to be comes to be, he would be able to provide for them neither that from which nor that to which. 226a14 How can they also be both at the same time? [For the coming to be of learning will not be learning, so that there is neither coming to be of coming to be,] nor some coming to be of something.

30 855,1

5

10

15

20

I think that this is the fifth argument to prove that there is no coming to be of coming to be nor change of change. This is also a reductio ad absurdum. For if there is coming to be of coming to be and change of change, then neither can the change of change be change nor can the coming to be of coming to be be coming to be. He proves it by a similar juxtaposition. For as the coming to be of learning is not learning – for there would be learning before it came to be – so there also is not coming to be of coming to be. For if coming to be is something that is coming to be, then, since there is coming to be of coming to be, but what is coming to be does not yet exist, the coming to be of coming to be that is coming to be cannot be coming to be. Also, if what is altering is one thing and its alteration another, and that which is learning is one thing and its learning another, and thus what is coming to be is one thing and its coming to be another, if coming to be is that which is coming to be, the coming to be of coming to be will not be coming to be. Nor will the change of change be change. That is why, at the beginning of the proof, he said ‘How can they also be both at the same time’ or ‘At the same time also how will they be both’; for both readings are found, and both mean the same. For, he is saying, how will what is called change of change be change, or coming to be of coming to be be coming to be? He added ‘nor some coming to be of something’ lest someone should think that there is no coming to be of a universal coming to be, since that too must be a universal, while two universals cannot be identical, and since there is no coming to be of universals, as he himself said in the first book of On coming and ceasing to be,132 but nothing prevents the coming to be of some coming to be. He therefore refuted this as well. For what is coming to be simply is one thing in genus and species and its coming to be another. It is worth noting, as I said earlier,133 that Aristotle also says that

Translation

59

there is transformation of change, but holds that it is coming to be and not change, when he says ‘for the coming to be of learning will not be learning. For learning is change.’ Thus he holds that its transformation is coming to be and not learning. There is always some transformation of some coming to be, through which it proceeds into being or not being. But one should not call these transformations coming to be nor ceasing to be because of the absurdities stated; but just as these transformations are of things different in genus, such as a man or a horse, so one must assign their transformations to a different genus: for one must call by the general name things that have no special one.

25

856,1

226a16 Also, if there are three species of change, [both the underlying nature and that into which they are changing will have to be one of these, as for example] travel must either be altered or travel. He well said hypothetically ‘if there are three species of change’; for the issue was to prove that there is change only in the three categories of quality, quantity and place, and neither in the others, nor in action and passion, because there is not change of change, which both the preceding arguments and that now before us established. So, since some special problem has arisen about the non-existence of change of change, he proves it on the hypothesis that there are three species of change, while adding that it is necessary that every changing thing should change within one of these species of change. Therefore the nature that is the subject of the discussion, which is the change which we say is changing, is also either alteration or travel or quantitative transformation. But it is not only the change which we say is changing that underlies the change through which we say it is changing that must be one of these, but also that into which they change; for each of these is either a quality, a quantity or a place. For it will be into white, or into being bigger, or being above, or into something of the sort. This being so, taking the necessary to be common to all he concluded that it was necessary that travel, if this should be the change which we say is changing, must either be altered or travel or be transformed in quantity. And this seems laughable, that travel should become white or grow hot or travel, and it is impossible. 226a19 In general, since everything that changes changes [in three ways, either incidentally or in part or as such, transformation could be transformed only incidentally, as if he who is being cured were to run or learn.] But we set aside incidental change long ago.

5

10

15

20

60 25

857,1

5

10

15

20

25

858,1

5

Translation

He has shown that it is impossible for there to be change of change or coming to be of coming to be as such, or, in general, transformation of transformation by many arguments. Now he adds that of three things that are called change, as they were earlier distinguished, either that which is as such or that which is in part or the incidental, only incidentally can there be a change of change and a coming to be of coming to be and generally transformation of transformation, when ‘he who is being cured were to run or learn’.134 But this, I think, is not, as Alexander says, because he is cured by such a change; for he is not transformed from the latter into the former. It is clear that he did not include running as the cause of the cure but as some chance change, since, first, he did not suppose that the runner was being cured but that he who was being cured was running; second, since he added ‘or learn’. For he surely is not also cured by learning, but, even if there were change of change, the transformation would not have been from one to the other, but the one would have been present with the other, so that the change would be as such. But he might say that there was incidental change of change when such a change as being cured occurred to him who was being cured and also another change which was running or learning, so that the change through being cured incidentally was running or learning, because he who happened to be being cured, such as Socrates, was running or learning. One should know that some copies have the reading ‘transformation could be transformed only incidentally, as if one who was being cured should run or learn’.135 Others read ‘transformation could be transformed only incidentally, if someone who has been running happens to be healthy, as if he who is being cured were to run or learn’. Alexander knows this reading also. Even if that be the reading, I do not think that it means that running became the cause of his health, but that both happened to the same man. And I think that it was to make this clear that Aristotle added ‘or learn’.136 For learning does not seem to be a cause of health as does running, but he included running as some change, just as he did learning. So it is only incidentally that there can be change of change, and neither as such, as was previously shown, nor in part.137 For as alteration would not travel as a whole, so also would it not travel in part. So if it is only incidentally, while the incidental was cast out as irrelevant to scientific knowledge, one could conclude that there is no change of change. From this it is clear that there is not change in action and passion, which required to be proved. But he constructed the argument only for the case of the affected, because there is an activity which is single in that which is affected, derived from what acts.

Translation

61

226a23 Since there is no change in the category of substance nor in relation [nor in action and passion, it remains that it is only in those of quality, quantity and place.] For there is contrariety in each of these. His project was to prove that change is not in all the categories, but only in three, quality, quantity and place, and he proved that it is not in those of substance, relation and action and passion, because these themselves are certain changes and there is no change of change as such. This he proved by many proofs and he now finally concludes that since there is not change in the other categories it remains that it is only in those of quality, quantity and place, and he adds the explanation why there is change in these, saying ‘for there is contrariety in each of these’. For change is transformation from contrary to contrary. So if there is contrariety in the category of relation, as he himself made clear in the Categories when he said ‘contrariety occurs also in relations’,138 nothing prevents there being change in that category also. For there also what is changing is a substance, and it changes through relationship as it does in quality and quantity and the category of place. For there also substance is the persisting changing thing in those. Qualities themselves and quantities and travel in place come to be and cease to be rather than change. For they do not persist, which is required in changing things, whereas the underlying substance persists in their transformation and is said to change. The subject might also change in the category of action and passion,139 even if action and affection do not themselves change, but come to be and cease to be and in that way are transformed. Action and passion are opposites as are things related. That is why they are both present together and often are transformed into each other. For air moistened by water moistens the earth and when heated by fire heats it, and in the rest of the categories I think that the underlying substance might be said to change. For it does so in time from past to future, even if these are not strictly contraries, since what is past is transformed into what is future, but what is in the future does not do so into what is past. Also in position the contrariety of standing to sitting and the prone to the supine may be seen. Also there is nothing absurd in the underlying substance changing also by these oppositions while itself persisting. Even in state there is a sort of transformation of the substrate from the privation which is denoted by a positive name into having, as from being naked to having a cloak. This Aristotle himself used as an example of a positive privation when making clear the transformations by change when he said ‘and even privation may be taken as a contrary’.140 Being naked and white and black are positively denoted.

10

15

20

25

859,1

5

10

15

62

20

25

30 860,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

But perhaps Aristotle regarded change as being transformation of the subject in its condition and so denied it in all categories that were relational and weak and did nothing observable to the condition of the subject. For posture and state seem to imbue the substrate with no permanent condition. For what difference does it make to a body whether it lies prone or supine and has a ring on or not?141 Time also seems to have been regarded as insignificant. That is why he in no way says that it is the cause of coming to be but of ceasing to be alone, and of that only because he sees no other cause. Relationship to something is similar, which, I think, is why he indicated the reason why there is not change in categories of relationship as being that it did not affect the subject’s disposition, saying ‘for it is possible when one thing is transformed for it to be true that the other is in no way transformed’142 i.e. is not affected as neither losing nor taking on any disposition. This he showed to hold of all the categories of relationship through the one category of relation. For quality and quantity and transformation in them affect and dispose the underlying substances in different ways at different times. Similarly, place also has no chance power according to him, since he regards the travel of the elements to their own places as generation.143 But he does not allow that there is change in action and passion, because they are changes and there is no change of change, even if there be coming to be and ceasing to be of it. There is no coming to be of coming to be, even if it is a transformation; rather, there is not even transformation of transformation, even if it is a different kind of transformation through which transformation from not being to being proceeds, and from being to not being. So perhaps it is because of these differences that Aristotle denies that there is change in the categories mentioned, while acknowledging that there is by all means transformation in them, except for the eternal.144 But Eudemus in his Physics paraphrases Aristotle’s statements and says that ‘in relation there is no change except the incidental’ and adds the explanation, saying: ‘for the two-foot becomes and is the unchanging double of anything whatsoever that becomes a foot long’. Having said that the same applies to other relations he added ‘everything changes in time’, showing,145 I think, in another way that change is of substrates and is with regard to their states, but in another way than to their dispositions, as also in another way than with regard to existence, which the Peripatetics did not think right to call change but coming to be and ceasing to be, because what is transformed does not persist. Theophrastus, however, in the first book of his Physics says that change can be observed in each genus of the categories and writes as follows: ‘With regard to change it is not difficult to provide and state the universal and common account, that it is an incomplete activity

Translation

63

of what is potentially as such in each genus of the categories.’ Now he seems to call all transformation in common change. For also the definition which says that it is the actualization of the potential as such is not of change in the strict sense but also of coming and ceasing to be and all transformation whatsoever.146 That is why a little further on Theophrastus says ‘one must inquire about changes, whether some are comings to be and others like activities of a sort’.147 But it is very evident that there must always be transformation of substrates also in the relational categories according to their relations, if, indeed, the relations of existents are not everlasting in respect to these categories. So if existents are transformed as such, they must be transformed either through coming and ceasing to be or by change, since these varieties of transformation are handed down by Aristotle by division. But we should not say that a man is coming to be when he puts on a ring or is transformed with regard to some other state; so he must change through such transformations. But Eudemus said that transformations of disposition come about by another type of change and not the above.148 For even Aristotle himself as he goes on says that loss is contrary to gain and thinks it right to call these transformations, saying ‘therefore coming to be is contrary to ceasing to be and loss to gain’.149 But these are transformations, not changes. But if somebody wishes that there should not be change at all in these categories, transformation must be divided no longer only into coming and ceasing to be and change, but another species must be added which fits with transformations in state, so that the transformation from not-substrate to substrate will be coming to be, that from substrate to not-substrate ceasing to be; but the remaining one from substrate to substrate must be divided into that with regard to disposition, which Aristotle thinks fit to call change, and that with regard to state, which he refuses to call a change since it exhibits no difference in the substrate, but which he also calls transformation because there is no specific name for the kind. And I think it true to say that as he does not think fit to say that things which change in part change as such, but includes them with things that change incidentally, still more he should not say that those things change as such which are transformed with regard to state and those that are so when other things change. But the inquiry was about things that change as such, so that even if Theophrastus says that there is change in all the categories, he spoke without making a distinction, having as yet distinguished neither change within transformation, nor what is as such from the incidental.150 But these matters may be investigated further still, if they seem worthy of inquiry because of the aberrations of the commentators about them. But we must go on to what comes next.

25

30

861,1

5

10

15

20

25

64 862,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation 226a26 So let change of quality be alteration, [for that is the general name linked with it. I call a quality not that which is part of the essence, for the differentia is also a quality, but the affective, with regard to which a thing is said to be affected or unaffected. Quantitative change has no common name, but severally is growth and decrease – that to complete magnitude growth, that from it diminution. Change of place has neither a common nor a specific name, but let it be called by the common name of travel. However, things are properly said to travel only when it is not in the power of things that are in transformation of place to stop] and when they do not change their place by themselves.151

Having separated off the categories in which there should be change as such, he finally teaches about quality and quantity and place, which kind of change is in each of these genera and what their differences are, and he includes their names. Then he teaches that change of quality is called by the common name of alteration. But since essential differences are also called qualities, such as being rational and neighing,152 as are the so-called affective qualities153 such as warmths and drynesses, according to which we say that things are affected or unaffected, he well makes the distinction that we think it right to call transformation in respect of these qualities change as well and call it alteration. For transformation in respect of essential differences is not called change but coming and ceasing to be. Therefore it is not alteration either but rather otherness,154 since what comes to be appears to be other (allo) and not altering (alloion), and it is not change, since nothing underlying that actually remains the same in transformation from rational to non-rational or, generally, from contrary to contrary. But differences that are constitutive155 of form are called qualities although they are essential, because they define of what sort a substance is. He himself seems to bestow the name ‘alteration’ on change in quality, but no common name yet refers to quantitative transformation in the way that ‘alteration’ does to qualitative change. In the former case change to complete magnitude is called growth, and that from complete magnitude diminution. By this he showed also what the contrariety in quantity is, that it is the complete magnitude in each kind that naturally grows and the incomplete. But qualitative transformation had a common name, quantitative special names. But change of place has, he says, no name in either way. For there is no common name for change of place, nor special ones for each kind. He himself called it by the common name of travel, or else found it so called, but he shows that it is not properly so called since only

Translation

65

those things are properly said to travel that are inanimate, both those moving naturally and those doing so forcibly. Animate things, however, have the soul as principle of moving and remaining stationary in themselves, and we do not properly say that they travel, but only those things which neither move themselves in place nor are capable of stopping when they are moving. At this point Eudemus adds that all changes and transformations are named from their destination rather than their origin, growth to being big, diminution to being small; in alteration there is learning and becoming well, and in those of place to Athens and to Corinth rather than the reverse.156

30 863,1

5

226b1 But transformation within the same form [is alteration to the more or the less; for it is change either from or to a contrary, either simply or in a way. For change towards the less will be called transformation to the contrary, but change towards the more rather from the contrary to the state itself. For there is no difference between being transformed simply and in a way, except in the way that the contraries must be present; more and less are the presence of the contrary to a greater or lesser degree.] From the above it is clear that these three alone are changes. He has said that the common name of qualitative change is alteration, that quantitative change has no common name, growth and diminution their own special names, but change of place has no common and no special names. But since things being transformed in quality sometimes are transformed from one form to another, as from black to white, sometimes retain the same form but are transformed to more or less of it, he notes well that transformation to more or less within the same form is alteration, and in this case there is no need to look for another name. That this is so he shows from the fact that every change has been proved to come about from contrary to contrary, either simply or in a way. That ‘in a way’ comes about from the intermediate through increase in the same species. It was proved also that transformation either from the intermediate or to the intermediate was from a contrary and to a contrary. So if the white that is becoming less white is transformed to the intermediate as to its contrary, it is clear that it is transformed as if to black. For the less white becomes such by admixture of black. Therefore the change proceeding towards the less will be said to be transformed towards its contrary, and to the more when it becomes more white, as the less white is transformed from the contrary to itself, which is white, in so far as the intermediate state was black. So if changes to the less and the more are so as changes to and from the intermediate, and the intermediate is also in a way a contrary, so change to the less and to

10

15

20

25

66 864,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 865,1

5

Translation

the more is likewise called alteration as being in a way from contrary to contrary, just like the change to the simply contrary, black itself and that from black. For it makes no difference to being called alteration whether it is transformed in a way or simply, i.e. to and from the intermediates or to and from the extremes. Having said that it makes no difference whether it is transformed in a way or simply, he added for safety that in the case of transformation in a way the opposites must be present in a way. For the intermediate to and from which there is transformation in a way is not simply contrary to each of the extremes but is contrary in a way and in a way not contrary, because of which it is not simply contrary. And since this intermediate is in a way contrary, in a way not, and sometimes has more or less of the contrary, it comes about that the transformation to and from this are more or less. So if the nature of the more and less is through the intermediate, then, as one would expect, the change towards the intermediate makes what changes less in the same species, that from the intermediate more. So Alexander and Themistius believe that more and less were taken by Aristotle to occur only in qualitative transformation, perhaps because more and less are properties of quality.157 But Porphyry says ‘since there is more and less in every kind of change, for there is both increase and decrease in change of place and in growth and diminution and in alteration, he is inquiring into what genus change in respect of more and less should be placed, and he says that transformation in the same species towards more or less is alteration; for the species of change in which it occurs is qualitative.’158 Having said this he himself explains what Aristotle said about qualitative change. It is likely that Porphyry came to this opinion because Aristotle nowhere indicated that he was investigating the more and less in only qualitative change. But if more and less seem to be properties of quality, one must recognize that the constitutive differences159 of every species are a sort of quality, including the differences of quantity both complete and incomplete and intermediate, and of place the differences of above and below and their intermediate. So with regard to differences that admit160 the more and less they themselves are said to alter, and contraries and intermediates are seen both in quantity in respect of completeness and incompleteness and in place in respect of above and below, perhaps being present themselves through their own characteristic quality.161 After saying these things Aristotle finally concludes by saying that it is clear from what has been said that these are the only three kinds of change – in quality, in quantity and in place.

Translation

67

226b10 That is unchanging (1) which is wholly incapable of change, [in the way that a sound is invisible, (2) which scarcely changes in a long time or begins to do so slowly, which is called hard to change, and (3) which naturally changes and can change, but is not changing when, where and how it naturally does, and this alone I call the rest162 of things unchanging. For rest is contrary to change,] and so it must be privation in that receptive of change. He has distinguished change from coming and ceasing to be, and defined it as being as such the transformation of contrary into contrary, while the substrate transformed persists; he has also shown in which of the kinds of things that there are there is change and in which there is not; so it followed that he should speak of rest, which is opposed to change as being its privation. But turning to the more universal he speaks of being unchanging, under which he includes rest. He divides the unchanging into four, saying that the strictly unchanging is that which by its nature never changes. As an example of the strictly not by nature he added that sound is said to be invisible. For it is not of the nature of sound to be seen. The celestial poles are also unchanging in this way as not changed by nature, but these at least, even if they are unchanging as such still do so incidentally through being in something moving.163 Those things are most strictly unchanging that are substances in every way separate from bodies. For these are of a nature never to change even incidentally. More incorrectly, that which is moving, but slowly, is said to be unchanging, since it completes a short distance in a long time, so that to perception it seems not to change at all or only minutely, as the fixed stars seem to be unchanging in their motion to their ascendants164 since they move only one degree in a hundred years. That also is said to be unchanging which begins to change slowly and is scarcely different from that which is slow in change, in the way that we call those who slowly and scarcely begin to be angry angerless. The fourth kind of unchangingness denoted he says is that ‘which naturally changes and can change but is not changing when it naturally does’ and can change, and he calls this kind of changelessness alone ‘rest’, circumscribing it exactly. For rest is the changelessness of what is of a nature to change, not utter changelessness but then when it can change. For the whelp is of a nature to see, but not immediately on birth. So it would not then be said to be at rest with regard to sight; for neither would it be said to be blind as deprived of sight; for rest from change is also a privation. But even if something were not to move where it was not of a nature to do so, as pedestrian things in the air, it would not be said to be at rest, because it is not of a nature to move there.

10

15

20

25

30 866,1

5

68

10

15

20

25

30 867,1

5

Translation

But if something does not change even when it is of a nature to change, then it is said to rest; for birds rest with regard to flight, pedestrian things with regard to walking or crawling, underwater creatures to swimming. But pedestrian things would not be said to be at rest with regard to flight, nor other things correspondingly, since they naturally are from birth incapable of moving in that way. We must inquire into things that do not change when they are not of a nature to change, in the way that a new-born whelp cannot see. Under what species of changelessness will it then be classified? For it will not be under things wholly unreceptive of change, nor things that obviously change, nor those that are of a nature to change then but are not changing, but either under those slow to start, or under another species of the unchanging, which only sometimes is of a nature not to change, sometimes of a nature both to change and not to change. Alexander says that ‘unchanging’ does not suit things not yet of a nature to change, but ‘not changing’. For ‘rest is the contrary of change’ was said less technically, because sometimes he says that even privation is a contrary and is denoted by a positive term like ‘naked’.165 That is why he also added ‘so it must be privation in that receptive of change’. For he often switches between ‘contraries’ and ‘privation’; indeed even in the case of what are agreed to be contraries he calls the inferior privation of the better, as black of white and the cold of heat. Conversely, he calls things opposed by privation contraries, when he is not speaking accurately about the species of opposition, just as now he says that rest is the contrary of change. But perhaps he was using ‘contrary’ as the equivalent of ‘contradictory’.166 But why is rest the privation of change, but change not the privation of rest? Is it because nature is pre-eminently the cause of change, which is an activity, but privations are the absence of states and activities? Also rest is not active stability, for stability is also activity and a species on a level with change, while rest is not an activity, but only the absence of change. For rest is not the sort of privation that e.g. blindness is. For the latter sort are not mere absence of activities but also of states and are unnatural dispositions of a substance. That is why they do not convert167 to being receptive of change as does rest which is a privation. 226b16 So it is clear from what has been said what change is and what rest is, [and how many sorts of transformation there are and which sorts are changes.]

10

Finally he sums up the whole problem of distinguishing change from the other transformations and of separating off the categories in which there is change, and indicating how rest is related to change. He has stated what change is, saying that it is the transformation

Translation

69

from a contrary to a contrary, while the substrate persists and is in transformation. As to what rest is, that it is the changelessness168 of what is of a nature to change, when it is, where it is and in the way that it is of such a nature. As to how many transformations there are, that they all are processions from the potential to the actual while the potential persists, and of these, those are changes which are from contrary to contrary, as has been said, but the others which are contradictories are coming to be and ceasing to be. For he earlier concluded that change is in the three categories of quality, quantity and place, when he said169 ‘it is clear from this that these three alone are changes’.

15

226b18 After the above, let us say what is to be together170 and separate [and what it is to touch and what to be between and what to be next and contiguous and continuous] and in which kinds each of these naturally occurs. As the first five books of the Physics had the aim of giving instruction about the principles of nature and what is co-present in common to all natural things, this fifth book completed the account of transformation. For in the third book he then stated what was common to all transformation, calling it change; here, resuming the discussion, he divided the genus transformation into the species belonging to it, and proved that change was one of these. He also stated in what respect it differed from other kinds of transformation and in what kinds of things it was suited to exist. After that he gives instruction about certain other things which themselves are in common co-present with natural things which exist in place. It seems to me that what is here said about transformations supplements what was said in the third book about change, and what will next be said follows on the account of place which he put together at the beginning of the fourth book. This fulfils a need, in part with regard to what will be said in the three books171 about change, in part to show that there is no continuity between things without parts. That is why right at the beginning of the sixth book he opens the discussion about these as having been expounded, saying ‘Since172 there is continuity, touching and being next’. It is clear straight away from ‘together’ that he calls them to mind as being useful to the natural scientist. For in the Categories, where the discussion was about the significative sounds, while dividing the senses of ‘together’, which had many senses,173 he said that some things were together in time, some as reciprocating each other and neither being the cause of the existence of the other, some as being coordinate species of the same genus. Here he recalls none of

20

25

868,1 5

10

15

70

20

Translation

these, but he now sets out what things are said to be together in place. For being together in place is an important feature of natural bodies. He also thinks fit to inquire ‘in which kinds each of these naturally occurs’, which will be made clear by the definition of each. He will himself also show that being together, separate, touching, adjacent, continuous and between is observed among things that have a position, while being next is also found among things without position, such as numbers. 226b21 I say that those things are together in place [which are in one primary place,] separate those that are in a different one.

25

30 869,1

5

10

15

20

He says that those things are together in place ‘which are in one primary place’. So we must distinguish what is one place and which is primary. According to Alexander, ‘It is one when it is not discrete but continuous, through those things which are said to be together in place being continuous with each other, like the parts of a continuous thing. For it is not that two or more bodies are in numerically one and the same place when said to be together, so as to permeate each other; for he has proved that that is impossible in the previous book.174 Rather it is that those that are not discrete nor bounded by their own surface also have no place of their own. For the boundary of the container which contains things so united with each other is one and continuous.’175 Thus Alexander understands one place as being that which is continuous, and he considers that things together in place are continuous. However, things that are together are further apart than those that are touching, and the touching than the continuous, as we shall learn. How then can things together be continuous? But ‘one place’ should be used of things called together in place, that which immediately contains them as discrete being the city, if they are in a city, and the wall if they are within a wall. ‘Primary’ is added to indicate the immediate place of their own of things said to be together in a place. For it is these things which are strictly together in a place, since more loosely things are said to be together in a place both if in the same house, in the same theatre, in the same city and in the universe. But the place of those things said to be together in that way is neither strictly one nor immediate and their own, since it has many other things in it. But the primary and strict place is that which immediately contains that which is said to be ‘at home’ as in its place. For that is what he himself taught in the previous book.176 In the case of things that are roughly said to be together in a place, as in a house or a city, because the house or the city is taken as one and the immediate place, even if not strictly, they are for that reason also said loosely to be together. For ‘together’ suggests a collection, and it collects together things separate either

Translation

71

accurately or more roughly, accurately when ‘the same’ is used to mean what is accurately the one and immediate place, more roughly when different things are contained by one in which they are said to be together, such as a house or a city. Things are more strictly said to be together when in the lesser place said to be the same. For things in the same house are more strictly said to be together than those in the same city, and those in the same room than those in the same house and those in a part of it than those in the room; and simply those in the first individual same place which does not also contain other solid bodies, even if there is air between them, and even if they are not continuous nor touching, those are what are strictly together. Eudemus says that this is especially true of things that are mixed together, but not even of these in the strictest sense. For two bodies cannot be together in one individual place. But, he says, one should seek for accuracy according to the concept. But according to need and what is sufficient and what is approximate everything may be said to be together.177 Things are also said to be together in time when at the same individual time, which clearly is both one and immediate. ‘Separate’ is clear from ‘together’. For things that are in places and times apart from each other are the ones that are separate from each other, both in place and in time.

25

870,1

5

226b23 [I say] that those things touch whose extremities are together. At this point Alexander well inquires in which sense he says that the extremities are together, since ‘extremities’ has two senses, denoting either parts of those things of which they are extremities or their limits. I do not know why he continues as follows: ‘If he is speaking of them as parts, these are not together; for those things were to be together which were in one primary place, i.e. continuous. But the parts of discrete and touching bodies are not in one primary place, for they are neither continuous with each other nor do they fit together in all their own parts, but the bodies themselves are touching each other. So’, he says, ‘does he call the extremities the surfaces and limits of bodies at which they touch? But he says that these are incidentally together and in the same place. For as the surface of one of the touching bodies is incidentally in a place because the body of which it is a limit is in the place, so also the surfaces of both the bodies at which they touch each other are in a place incidentally, and both will be in the place where one of them then was. For they fit together by the bodies’ touching. He can’, he says, ‘be saying “together” now as equivalent to “fit with each other”; for things that fit with each other are also together. So those things are touching each other whose limits fit with each other and are thus together; for “together” was

10

15

20

25

72

871,1

5

10

15

Translation

used before not simply but as with the addition of “in place”, and this’, he says, ‘has a sense different from “together”.’ In this passage Alexander is defending his own explanation of ‘together’, in which he said that things were together that were continuous. So he justly raises the problem how the limits of things touching could be together, and he is compelled to introduce another sense of ‘together’, that of ‘fitting with each other’.178 This is not a different sense but refers to different things. For the former ‘together’ referred to bodies in one place which immediately contained them, even, I think, if there were also other things contained by the same place (for these also were together with the aforementioned); but he says that when things touch it is not only the bodies themselves that are contained by one place, even if discrete, but also their surfaces would be touching each other and in one place, in the way that a surface can be in a place. For touching is a progression179 from being together to continuity and unification. For when things that are surrounded by one adjacent place approach each other, so that their surfaces touch each other and are made to be in one place, fitting together through having no depth, then they are said to be touching each other, as if the two surfaces became one when they became continuous. It is clear that this is the case also from the fact that things touching are always together, but things that are together do not always touch as well.180 226b23 Those things are between at which what is transformed naturally arrives first [or into which an extreme naturally is transformed when being transformed continuously. Being between involves at least three terms; for the contrary is the extremity in transformation. A thing changes continuously which intermits nothing or the minimum of the subject-matter or181 of time – for nothing prevents intermission in time and the lowest note to speak immediately after the highest – but of the subject-matter in which the change occurs. This is clear in the case of transformations of place and in the other kinds of transformation. That is contrary in place which is furthest away in a straight line; for the shortest line is limited] and what is limited is a measure.

20

Of that which is between in change he says that that is between which is intermediate to that from which what is transformed is transformed and that into which it finally is transformed. Therefore he also indicated this by ‘at which what is transformed arrives first’ or that ‘into which an extreme naturally is transformed when being transformed continuously’. It is also clear from its name that what is between (metaxu) has that from which and that to which on each side of it. For it is that which through itself transfers (metaxon) what

Translation

73

moves from the one to the other. That is why it ‘involves at least three terms’. For it is impossible for there to be something between without something on each side. He said ‘involves at least three’ because there can also be more things taken intermediate between others. However, the extremes are two, that from which and that to which, which are contraries with a mean; for natural change occurs from a contrary and to a contrary.182 For if the extreme of a transformation at which the transformation ends is a contrary, but the contrary is contrary to a contrary, then also the first from which the transformation starts is a contrary. What is between of contraries naturally in place is the mean between above and below;183 in quality it is the mean in each contrariety between contraries184 with a mean; in quantity the mean between complete and incomplete magnitude, from which and to which what grows and diminishes is transformed while remaining preserved; for the natural magnitudes of each kind of thing are determined. What are in other ways said to be between others are not strictly between, but are so called from their likeness to these. ‘What naturally is transformed continuously’ shows the necessity of what is between, in respect of which change occurs, being like in species to those things between which it is. For it is then changing continuously with no gap, or little, with regard to what it is changing to nor in its manner of change. These are from contrary to contrary. For something that has moved upwards naturally may move forcibly back from there to below; but above will not on that account be between below, from which and to which what is moving has moved. For both are not natural, nor are they continuous. It is clear that some contraries have no mean, some do, and that what is between is between contraries with a mean. Having said that that is between into which that which is naturally and continuously changing first can change or into which the extreme does, and what an extreme is – that it is a contrary – he continues by saying what this continuity is. For since transformation admits two sorts of continuity – the one chronological, the other in subject-matter – which transformation may display, such as alteration or growth or travel, and each is continuous so as to intermit nothing or very little – from time chronologically, from subject-matter in subject-matter – he says that there is no need for chronological continuity for what is transformed to arrive at the stage between before reaching the limit. For he said ‘of the subject-matter or time’ as equivalent to ‘the subject-matter rather than time’; for even if there is a gap in time of walking, so that the walker, having rested, walks again, there is nothing to prevent him coming to the centre point of the walk and the given length; also it is possible to be transformed from contrary to contrary immediately, without intermission of time but continuously,

25

30

872,1

5

10

15

20

25

30

74 873,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 874,1

5

Translation

as if somebody who has struck the highest note immediately transfers to the lowest.185 So continuity of time does not contribute to being thus between, but that of the substrate does; if the transformation is of place, the continuity of the place itself and the change of place. For if the transformation is continuous in those respects it is impossible that what is changing should not first arrive at the intermediate point and then at the extremity. And if it is not continuous in this way, but should contain some big gaps, it will not invariably arrive at what is between before the limit. ‘Nothing prevents intermission’ and ‘for the lowest note to speak immediately after the highest’ are announced in ancient form.186 Having said that that which changes continuously with this kind of continuity is that which intermits nothing or the minimum of the subject-matter, rather than of time, since there is no need of time, he made this clear by saying that when there is intermission in time nothing prevents the change being through what is between and also that when there is no intermission, nothing prevents the transition from contrary to contrary not being through what is between. Having shown from both of these that there is no need of chronological continuity for change to be through something between, he added ‘but that of the subject-matter in which the change occurs’, so that there is no, or a minimum of, intermission. If one takes the minimum intermission in its proportion to the whole change, if it is small in its intermission in that ratio, and the goal of the matter remains one, as if someone walking from Athens to the Piraeus should pause for a moment to tie his shoe, it does not break up the continuity. But if there is not the single goal of arriving at the Piraeus and one were also to turn off from the road to buy some necessities, that change will not any longer be continuous. And things which happen in the middle of a plan, if they become protracted, break up the continuity of the change, as if in playing the harp we are compelled to fit a new string when one has broken. But if the plan does not remain one even a short interruption breaks the continuity, as if someone at the same time as going down to the Piraeus had the intention of holding a conversation with somebody by the way. Having said what sort of continuity ‘being between’ needs, that it is in relation to the subject-matter, he also speaks of the contrary into which what is transformed is transformed as an extreme through what is between, saying what it is and where it is to be found. Also he says that the contrary in place is that ‘which is furthest away in a straight line’; for it is necessary for contraries to be furthest apart. But the addition of ‘in a straight line’ makes ‘furthest’ definite and measured. For a straight line is definite, and everything is measured by what is definite. For since a straight line is the shortest of those lines that have the same limits, and the least is definite (for that is

Translation

75

what he means by ‘limited’) and what is definite is measured, then ‘furthest in a straight line’ will be measured and definite, so that ‘furthest’ is used strictly. For the line to the same limits as the straight that is curved is indefinite and has a different measure at different times, one being more bent, another less. So if one were to judge the distance between the limits with a curved line, it is possible for the limits of a longer curve that is more curved to be nearer together than those of a shorter one, and those that are separated by a longer line will be nearer than those by a shorter.187 In general, the straight line to the same limits is one and therefore definite. But the curved are many and indefinite. It seems likely that contraries first appeared in place and were then transferred to the other cases. That is why the sketch of contraries is as being furthest apart. So those that are most separated from each other in place are like contraries in place, if they are truly to be apart by a definite maximum. For a maximum is determined and the least must have its distance in a straight line.

10

15

20

226b34 That is next which, after the beginning and distinguished by [position or form or something similar, has nothing between that is of the same kind and to which it is next after. I mean for example a line after a line or a unit after a unit or a house after a house. But nothing prevents something different being in between. For what is next must be next to and after something. For one is not next after two, nor the first day of the month next after the second,] but vice versa. What is next is next to something which relatively to it is a beginning. For what is after the beginning, being of the same genus, or rather of the same species as the beginning, is next to the beginning when nothing of the same genus or species is between it and the beginning, as the second house is next to the first house when there is not another house between them. Also the beginning is of what comes next, and ‘next’ itself has many meanings, for it may be in position, or order, or form, or affection, or time, or coming to be, or number, or anything similar: in position, when things are somewhere, as if we were to draw several lines or take several houses or cities; in order, as in the introduction to the narration and that to the argument;188 in species, as if we were to take each of the colours in succession beginning with white up to black, whether these are seven in number or more (Aristotle lists them in On the Senses189); in affection, if we think of the transformation from cold en route to the luke warm, the tepid, the hot and the boiling; in time, when we name the first day and the second, third, etc. days of the months;190 in coming to be, when in the case of animals we say that the heart is first formed and then perhaps

25

875,1

5

76 10

15

20

25

30 876,1

5

10

15

Translation

the lungs, then the spleen, then the kidneys, and in the case of plants the root, then the crown, then the stem191 and so on; in number, when we recite ‘one, two, three’ in turn. Of beginnings, some are natural such as in the case of number; for one is naturally prior to two and two to three; also in the case of the coming to be of animals and plants. It is also so with species, as in the case of colours. But the beginnings in the case of affections, as stated with reference to cold and white, will have a second and so on as we define them, whether we begin with the cold or with the boiling hot, and among colours whether we begin from white or from black; in the case of time, the prior is naturally prior in the case of things flowing and things coming to be; but what we treat as beginnings of the year, at the summer solstice like the Athenians, or in the autumnal equinox as in what is now called Asia, or in the winter solstice like the Romans, or in the vernal equinox like the Arabs and the inhabitants of Damascus, and beginnings of the month, whether people say it is at full moon or new moon, these will be conventional.192 With regard to things in place, when there is some order of objects present, and when they are in a straight line whether of logs or columns, the extremities at each end will be beginnings, but that one of the extremities will be the beginning, and so on, as we decide. But in the case of houses in cities there are no longer any extremities, but which we start from is left to us, and it is totally conventional whether the perimeter be circular, rectangular or whatever. In more or less the same way, which comes next is determined by convention also in the case of cities. When these distinctions have been made, the predominant one is that what comes next must be of the same kind, but ‘of the same kind’ is rather widely embracing. For if we were to say that male children were standing next to each other we should say that the homogeneity was of children. But if we were to mix in some men the homogeneity would be of males, and, if some women also, of humans. If we were to add also brute beasts, we should say that they were of the same kind as animals, and so on. In each case the homogeneity is closer or wider. For if everything were seats they would be homogeneous qua seats, if also chairs qua professorial thrones,193 if also beds qua resting-places, for they have no name for their common character. If some things not of the same kind come between some things in sequence it must not be thought that this happens in the case of all sequences; for it is not so in the case of numerical sequences, nor the chronological, nor things in transformation of species or affection. But in the case of things coming to be, as in the case of the heart and the lungs, there are things generated between that are of a different kind, such as veins, since what comes next are taken to be among interior organs. It is clear that in the case of things that have a natural beginning their successors are also by nature such and one cannot

Translation

77

reverse their order; for two is next after one, but one is not next after two. In the case of sequences by convention the sequence will depend on the definition of the beginning, as we define cold as the beginning or the boiling-hot. Themistius adds that strictly things of the same species are next, house to house and line to line, but things not of the same species are often said to be next to each other. ‘For the contest is next to the procession and the temple of the nymphs to the gymnasium.’194 It should be known that while many copies have ‘That is next which is after the beginning either in position or in form’, Alexander writes ‘which is after the beginning alone’, adding ‘alone’, and he explains that ‘alone’ shows that the beginning is not always taken in the strict sense, but however the beginning be taken, whether by convention or by nature, that which is next follows it. He next said ‘line or lines between the next line or a unit or units between the unit’, because it is possible for one or many lines to be next to the first line. Also one unit to the first unit, and many.195

20

25

877,1

227a6 That is contiguous which is next and touches. Having said what it is to be touching and next, he adds what it is to be contiguous, because that is contiguous which is at once next and touching. For neither does being next suffice for being contiguous – for numbers are said to be next to each other but are not said to be contiguous to each other, nor is touching alone sufficient for being contiguous. For a tunic touches the body, but, since it is not next after, is not said to be contiguous to it. But if a house is next to a house they are contiguous if they touch each other, and so with links of a chain. For things contiguous must be of the same kind and must have nothing between them either of the same or of a different kind. That is why they are not only next but also touching. For everything that is contiguous is also next, but not everything that is next is contiguous, unless it has a position and is touching. Therefore the second day of the month is not strictly said to be contiguous with the first nor that which becomes black from white to be contiguous to the white, because these do not have a position, nor do they both persist, since when it is the second, the first day no longer exists, and when it has become black the white has gone. Those things that neither have a position nor persist cannot both touch, and what do not touch could not be contiguous. But if someone were to put down a white body and touching it a grey and touching that a black, nothing prevents them from being contiguous. In the case of liquids some flow together and do not adjoin each other, but olive oil and water could be said to be contiguous.

5

10

15

20

78

Translation 227a7 Since all transformation is between opposites, [and opposites are contraries and contradictories, but there is no mean of a contradiction,] it is plain that what is between will be between contraries.

25

878,1

5

10

He has already said what ‘what is between’ is, that it is ‘that at which everything transformed naturally arrives first’196 before reaching the extreme, and he added that the extreme of a transformation is a contrary; so he adds what follows from this and proves that ‘what is between’ is between contraries. He proves it as follows: what is between is in a transformation; every transformation is from an opposite to an opposite; every transformation from an opposite is either from a contradictory or from a contrary – for even privation is a contrary in a way, as he himself said,197 and some relatives are contrary. So if transformation between opposites is by coming and ceasing to be198 and there is nothing between coming and ceasing to be, because what is between is between existents and both the extremes do not exist in the case of coming and ceasing to be, but in coming to be there is only that to which and in ceasing to be only that from which (for the others are not subjects but are referred to negatively), it is necessary that things between should be between contraries. He does not say that they are between all contraries, since some contraries have no mean,199 but that they are in the class of contraries. 227a10 The continuous (sunekhes) is what is as the contiguous, [but I say that it is continuous when the limit of each becomes one and the same with the things they touch and, as the name signifies, are held together (sunekhtai). This cannot be so when the extremes are two. When this has been defined it is clear that continuity is between such things from which one naturally comes about through their contact. The whole will be one in the way that the continuous becomes one, whether by nailing, glueing, touching or organic fusion. It is clear that being next after is primary; for what touches must be next, but not all that is next need touch. This is why being next is found in the conceptually prior, e.g. in numbers, but not touch. Again, if continuous, things must touch, but they are not already continuous if they touch. For the extremes need not be one, if they be together, but if they are one they must be together as well. So natural union is last in generation; for the extremes must touch if they are to become organically united, but not all things that touch are organically united; and when things do not touch it is

Translation

79

clear that they do not unite organically. So if there be a point and a unit that are separate, as they say, the unit and the point cannot be the same thing. For the latter are able to touch, while units can be successive, and something may be between the latter, since every line is between points, but not necessarily between the former, for there is not between one and two. So it has been said what being together is and being separate, and what touching is, and being between and being next, and contiguous and continuous,] and to what sort of things each belongs. Just as being contiguous arises from being next and touching, so continuity arises from being contiguous, when the touch of things contiguous becomes unification. This happens when the limits of things touching, once two, become one by organic union. For then they do not remain touching. But things that are going to touch each other must be continuous; for they must have parts, since things without parts will not touch each other. So ‘it is clear that continuity is between such things from which one naturally comes about through their contact’. Some things naturally become one by organic fusion, like grafted plants, some by touch and fitting together, like a ship. Of the latter the cause of their being one is something more than touch, less than organic union, as of water and air. For when these are dispersed their parts are no less unified and retain the same nature as the whole. Other things are one by tying, like a bundle of twigs, some by weaving like a cloak, some by fitting together of parts like a chain, some by stitching like shoes, some by glueing like a papyrus roll, some by fusion like a milk and honey drink, some by such a composition as a pile, some by organization like an army, some by conjunction like non-simple propositions. But a chariot and horses becomes one through a complex of ways. The body and the wheels become one by being joined together, while what makes the two one with each other must be some sort of composition. But the cause of the union of the horses with each other and the body is by yoking together. But every system is a composition. There are also other complex ways of constructing a unity. But Aristotle noticed four, saying that the continuous became one ‘with a nail, or glue, or by touch or organic fusion’. He calls the continuous a unity which has ascended and is supercontinuous and the cause of continuity.200 For what is continuous is also one, but not all that is one is continuous; for a ship and a cloak and a house are each one but not continuous. He says that for the thinking it is clear that being next is prior to touching and touching to being continuous. ‘For what touches must be next, but not all that is next need touch.’ Therefore being next is found in things conceptually prior. For numbers are prior and senior

15

20

25

30 879,1

5

10

80

15

20

25

30

880,1

5

10

15

Translation

to magnitudes, and there is succession in them; for two is the successor of one. But units do not touch. But numbers and units are prior to bodies and magnitudes not in existence but conceptually. That is why continuity is for thought last in coming to be. For units are primary, and there is succession among them, but when they take on a position touching is added to them, and, when touching is organically fused, continuity, and beyond that there is nothing. Eudemus, however, saw the organically fused as more unified than the continuous, and said that this was proper to natural things. ‘This’, he said, ‘is conceptually first and a principle. For on this follows continuity, being contiguous and being next. But organic fusion comes last in generation.’201 Clearly he says that this is first in account as constituted out of the others. But Aristotle said that being next was conceptually prior to touching as more general and simpler and uniting and inclusive. So continuity is last in generation. So if things be continuous they must of necessity touch. He is not saying that the continuous when it is continuous is touching; for it will no longer be continuous at that part when it is touching; he is saying that when it has become continuous there must for many reasons have previously been touch. But if some things were touching it is not necessary to conceive of them as continuous as well, so that where there is not touch there is also no fusion or continuity between them, since touching must precede continuity. But it is not possible that in all cases in between which there is touch fusion should already come about. For a stone touches wood and a cloak touches a living being, but these are not organically fused into a unity. So if it is true that being next and touching are not the same nor are they present in the same things, it will be concluded as a corollary of this that even if a line and a unit were separate from things, as certain people suppose who say that the subject-matter of mathematics is not abstracted,202 a point and a unit would not be the same thing, as some have thought, even if each is without parts and a principle of quantity, since points have a position, since they may touch as points, but units are in succession. Since, then, the same things do not touch and succeed, a point and a unit cannot be the same thing. Points touch each other not as such, since they have no parts and things that touch must have parts, but because he said ‘touch’ as equivalent to ‘fit with’, for a point placed with a point makes a point.203 That is how Alexander understood him.204 Or rather it is because lines touch at points. But he does not demonstrate the difference between a point and a unit only by the difference between touch and succession, but also from being in between, since something may be between some points and not others. For there is nothing between two points that coincide with one another, but a line or lines may be between those that do

Translation

81

not coincide. For there need not be a line between these, but there may be, since points may be supposed as such and not as the limits of lines in a body. But there is nothing between units; for there can be nothing between one and two. For he said ‘not necessary that between’ as equivalent to ‘necessary that not in between’. For numbers, as the Pythagoreans say, are separated from each other by a void and have nothing between them.205 It should be known that there are two readings in the books, in some ‘every line is between points’, in some ‘a point is between every line’.206 The commentators know that the first of these is clearer. For every finite line is between two points which determine its limits. There may also not be a line between them, when points are conceived of on their own by those who suppose them to be separate.207 The other reading, unless it is corrupt, would follow on what had already been said. For, having said of points that there can be something between some of them, he added ‘a point is between every line’. For if there can be a point between every line that divides it and, again, each of the lines on each side of the point may be divided by a point, it is true that there can be something between the points at either one of the extremes and the middle – a line, since it is something that exists – and another line between the middle and the other extreme. Also this reading which says ‘a point is between every line’ may contain something else, that it is not only in the case of the finite line that it is true that there can be something between the points, but also in the case of the infinite line. For it is possible to divide this also with a point and to show, as has been said, that there can be lines between the points. Having spoken about each of the matters proposed he finally concluded the discussion by recalling in order what was said of all, the definition of each and among what sorts of things they belonged. For it was said that all the others belonged to those things that had a position, but succession also to things that have no position, since it is observed among numbers.

227b3 ‘One change’ has many senses; [for we use ‘one’ in many senses. Things are one in genus according to the table of categories; for all kinds of travel are one in genus, but alteration is different from travel in genus. They are one in species when one in genus and in the same infima species. For example, there are differences of colour; therefore becoming black and becoming white are different in species, so all growing white will be the same in species as all growing white, and all growing black to

20

25

30 881,1 5

10

15

82

Translation growing black. But there will not be differences of whiteness as well, which is why growing white is one in species with all growing white. But if there are things which are at once genera and species, it is clear that in a way they will be one in species, but not simply one in species; for example learning, if scientific knowledge is a species of apprehension] but the genus of the sciences.

20

25

30

882,1

5

10

15

After what had already been said about change, in which he distinguished change from coming and ceasing to be and stated in which categories change occurred, it followed naturally to add what will now be said about change, what one change is and that, since ‘one’ has three senses – of being one in genus or species or numerically – as distinguished also elsewhere,208 so ‘one change’ will have many senses. It will be shown what it is to be one in genus, what in species, what numerically, which is strictly being one. But, since what is one is continuous and what is continuous is one, it was necessary first to recognize what continuity is, so that we may be able to recognize it in the case of change. Since the continuous is something contiguous, while the contiguous is what is next and touching, and such things must be together, while being between is studied at the same time as these, instruction about these was reasonably given before what will now be said. However, this very problem of showing what one change is is very central to the investigation of nature. This will be clear from what is said about it, which will contribute what is most relevant to the goal of all natural science. For from this will be shown what the one and continual motion of the universe is, that it is circular travel, and what immediately causes this motion, that it is the unchanging and indivisible and everlasting cause.209 But for now he says that one change is spoken of in three senses, as is also one, in genus, species or number. So a change that is generically one is one in the same category; for example, every case of travel is generically one with every other case of travel, for they are all in the category of place which is a single genus. Also alteration with alteration; for they are in the category of quality. Similarly growth with growth and diminution with diminution; for all are in the category of quantity. So, if changes are different in genus, change is not predicated of the many changes as a common genus, so that the definition of change was not as of a single genus and a single nature. Many changes are one in species, when, being in the same genus and the same category, they are also in the same species in the same genus, which species is indivisible and not divided into species. For example all cases of growing white are one in genus, since they are colours and qualities, and also one in species; but

Translation

83

growing black and growing white are the same in genus, but different in species. Having said that growing white and growing black are differences of colour in change, and that therefore growing white and black are different in species, while a case of growing white is the same in species as another growing white and growing black as growing black, he added ‘but there will not be differences of whiteness, which is why growing white is in a way one in species with all growing white’. He may be saying that there are specific differences of colour, since colour is not an indivisible species, being itself divided into species, white and black, but there are not specific differences of whiteness, because whiteness, like man, is an indivisible species. That is why, he says, growing white is in a way one in species with growing white. Sometimes ‘in a way’ is added because of the problem which is about to be adduced about change that is one in species.210 It should be known that some books do not contain the words ‘there are not differences of whiteness; which is why growing white is in a way one in species with all growing white’, and the commentators appear to pass it by.211 He has said that a change is one in species when it is one in indivisible species212 since there are some species, which nothing prevents from being the genus of other species – because there are no indivisible species – in the way that birds are a species of animal and a genus of certain species, such as the eagle and the hawk. He then says that changes in such species are not simply the same in species, since they are divided into different species, such as white and black; but they are such in a way, since they are in the same species even if not an indivisible species. As an example of such subordinate species he gave scientific knowledge, which is a species of apprehension, i.e. of cognition, but the genus of the particular sciences, geometry, arithmetic, music, medicine, etc. So if learning is the acquisition of knowledge and a change in relation to knowledge, as in a way scientific knowledge is a single species, since it was divided from the genus cognition, but it is not simply one, because it is not an indivisible species, so similarly will learning be, since it is a change and the acquisition of knowledge. 227b14 Someone might raise the problem whether change is one in species [when the same thing is transformed from the same thing to the same thing, as when one point is so from this place to that again and again. If so circular motion will be the same as straight and rolling as walking. Or is the ‘that in which’ of each different in species because the motion is different and the circular different from straight in species?] So change is thus one in genus and species.213

20

25

30 883,1

5

10

15

84

20

25

884,1

5

10

15

Translation

Having said that a change is one in species which is effected within the same species, he raises the problem whether one should say that there is a single specific change when the same thing is changed from the same place to the same place again and again, taking a moving point and, as a change one in species, that from the same place to the same place. He goes on to say that if one were to say that this change was one in species, circular motion would be the same in species as straight. For the same thing can sometimes move from the same place to the same place in a straight line, sometimes in a circle, and circular motion will be the same in species as straight214 and likewise rolling the same as walking. He solves the problem by claiming to make it clear that a change is one in species when the species with regard to which215 or, as he himself says, ‘in which’, it occurs is an indivisible species; but if this is different in each case, that the change is different in each case. But the circular is other in species than the straight, whether the ‘that in which’ the change occurs be taken as a straight and a circular line or the manner in which the change occurs, like rolling and walking. And that is probably what ‘that in which the motion occurs’ means. For rolling and walking can both occur in a straight line, and they will not differ in substrate. Aristotle appears to exhibit the manner of the change – calling circular and straight ‘motion’ and the circular and the straight ‘species of change’ – but not to presuppose lines. But this problem and solution appears to be brought with a view to a more exact definition of a change that is one in species, by which he shows that a species that is one in such a way that it is subordinate and able to be itself divided into species does not make a change that is one in species. For if one were to say that that species by which the same thing changes from the same place to the same place again and again was strictly a single species, he would likewise say that circular motion and that in a straight line are strictly one species. But, since this species of change is not indivisible but divided into these, they will be in a way the same in species, but they are not the same without qualification.216 227b21 A single change without qualification is that which is one in existence and in number. [Which is such is clear if we divide them up. For there are three things in number with regard to which we speak of change, what it is that changes, in what it does so and when. I say that it is necessary that there should be something changing, such as a man or gold, and that this must change in something, as in place or in affection, and in time. For everything changes in time. Of these, being one in genus or species depends on what the change is in, but being adjacent depends on time and being one without qualification

Translation

85

on all these. For it must be one and indivisible in subject matter, like the species, and in time, as when the time is one without a gap, and what changes must be one, not incidentally, as if the white becomes black and Coriscus walks, since Coriscus and a white thing are one, but incidentally so. Nor must it be general; for it might be that two men become cured in the same way, say of ophthalmia; but this is not one, but one in species. But if Socrates were to be altered by the same specific alteration at different times over again, if what has ceased to be can come to be again numerically the same thing, this also would be one and the same,] otherwise it would be the same but not one. He has said what the generically one change is, and what the specifically one, both strictly and what in a way is and in a way is not. Finally he says what a numerically single change is, which he calls one without qualification, strictly and in existence. For that is strictly one that is numerically one, since what is one in genus and in species is rather many than one. He says that change is numerically one which has each of the three things with regard to which there is change as numerically one, for in each of the three the numerically one can come to be. And there are three things with regard to which there is change: the changing thing itself, such as Socrates; the respect or the form of the change which the changing thing undergoes, i.e. walking; the time when, at which the changing thing changes. For everything changed is changed in time. Of these three, the respect in which there is change as such points to the change that is one in genus or species. For circular motion is the same in genus as motion in a straight line, since the straight is also the same in genus as the circular; for both are lines. But all motion in a straight line is the same in species, as is all circular motion, since also all that is straight is the same in species as all that is straight, and every circle as every circle. Continuous time as such makes different changes to be adjacent, whether the thing changing be the same or different, if there is no temporal break. However, when both what changes is numerically one and the same, such as Socrates, and the form of the change is one, such as walking, and the time is one and continuous, like a day, then the change becomes numerically one. How time is taken to be one, even though it is extended, he showed by ‘without a gap’ – for a time that is continuous and without gaps is said to be one; how the changing thing is numerically one he showed as being that which is not taken as incidentally so. For when Coriscus turns black and walks, being himself numerically one, he seems to change in two ways at once. But being one is incidental to the white Coriscus, since Coriscus is incidentally white. That is why the changes are two, even though they occur in a continuous time, for the thing changing also

20

25

30 885,1

5

10

86 15

20

25

30

886,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

is not one as such but was taken incidentally. For Coriscus does not change in both ways in the same respect, but each of them in different respects, as if two things were changing. For Coriscus grows black in respect of being white, but walks in respect of being a pedestrian, being this as such, but white incidentally. The respect in which the change occurs in such cases not only is not one numerically but not even in species or in genus, since to grow black is to alter, but to walk is to travel. Having said that what is changing must not be one as incidentally so, he adds that also the respect in which the change occurs must be one in the sense of being individual and numerically one and not general and one in species but not in number, as is the curing perhaps of diseased eyes; ‘for it might be that two men become cured in the same way, say of ophthalmia’. Such a change is one and the same in species but not in number, taken as general. Having said that in the case of the strictly single change, both what changes must be one as such but not incidentally, and the respect in which there is change must be one as individual but not as general, he adds that the time must be one in continuity, as if Socrates were to learn to write in a continuous time; for that is a single change, because the time is one. It is strictly one through its continuity and not numerically, as is the subject. But Eudemus says that alteration and travel also have their unity in the way that time has it. ‘For’, he says, ‘neither alteration nor travel persists, but, like time, they flow and continually become different. So this is to be counted as one in species and not in number.’217 Aristotle, however, says that if, after its cessation218 it were to resume at another time the same change that it lost, one should not call this still one in number, but rather the same in species. Also he exhibited the necessity of the account by the supposition of an impossibility. For then the change consisting in the earlier learning and the change in the resumption of the knowledge after its forgetting would be one in number, if it were possible for what had ceased to come to be again the same in number. But if that is impossible, it is also impossible for a change which occurs at different times to be numerically one. But that proposal is more fitting to the recurrence of the Stoics;219 for they say that the same ‘I’ will come to be again by recurrence, and reasonably inquire whether I am one in number now and then, through being the same in substance, but am different by the assignment into one and another world-creation. There is one change without qualification when the thing changing is one in number as such, the respect in which it changes is in one category,220 being individual and not general, and the time is continuous and without gaps. If there is no concurrence of these, the change can be one in species but no longer strictly one in number.

Translation

87

228a6 There is a problem similar to the above [which is whether health and conditions and affections in general are one in existence in bodies. For their possessors can be seen to change and flow. For if health at dawn and now are one and the same, why should they not be when one regains health after a gap, and this and the former would be one in number? For the account is the same, except that it differs in so far that if they are two in number for that very reason the activities will be so also. For there is numerically one activity of the numerically one. But if the disposition is one, one would not perhaps think that the activity was also; for when one stops walking the walking no longer exists, but will when one walks again. But if it is one and the same, it should be possible for one and the same thing to cease and exist many times.] These problems are outside our present inquiry. He has said that when there is a temporal gap a change would not be numerically one, unless what ceased and came to be were one in species or in number, and he has shown that this is impossible by ‘unless it is possible for what has ceased to be to again come to be as numerically one’. Wishing to set out a certain problem which seems to show that nothing prevents a change which is ceasing to be and one coming to be from being numerically one, he shifts the problem from changes to dispositions, as the argument from them is more plausible. He makes use of the saying of Heraclitus that says that everything flows and is never the same, and he says that if health from dawn till dusk is numerically one in continuous time, even though bodies, dispositions and affections are all flowing, as Heraclitus says,221 why should it not be said that one has gained numerically the same health also when after a gap, i.e. illness, one becomes healthy? For Socrates, when he returns from abroad, is one and the same as he was before going abroad, and his health and knowledge seem to be the same of the same person, just as beds that are taken to pieces and reassembled are the same, even if they are reassembled after being many times taken to pieces. Or perhaps the beds are the same but their assemblies and takings to pieces are not numerically the same. So if the condition is one, even with a temporal gap, why is not the change also or the activity which results from the disposition one? But what can be said of dispositions can also be said of affections, that if the fever is one or the ophthalmia is one in the time from dawn to dusk, why are they not one even with a temporal gap? If these are numerically identical, why not also changes? Having said this he emphasizes, regarding the transition from activities to dispositions,

25

887,1

5

10

15

88

20

25

888,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

that there is some difference between activities on the one hand and dispositions and affections. For if an activity is one then the disposition and, yet prior, the subject must be one. For numerically one activity is of numerically one disposition, and the subject of a numerically one disposition is one. But the reverse is not true as well. For there is no need for the disposition of the numerically one subject to be one, nor, if there is one disposition, need there be one activity. For the one subject can have many dispositions and one disposition may lead to many activities with temporal intervals between them, so that the activity is multiplied. It fits to say the same about affections as about dispositions. For each is a condition of soul and body, but an affection is a condition which is more easily lost, while a disposition is stable. But, if the disposition or the affection is the same, how is not the change also and the activity from the same disposition one and the same, even if it occurs at intervals? For it would be possible for the same to cease and to exist many times, which was earlier denied.222 So, he says, these problems are outside the present inquiry and the whole business about change. For to inquire about dispositions and affections, in what way they are one and in what ways not, and whether an intermittent disposition which recurs again and again has unity in the same way as one that remains but, because its subject is in flux, seems to alter as if it were numerically different and in a continually different subject, these inquiries that touch on first and second subject and seek for what is permanent when matter is in flux belong to another field of discussion. They also touch on the difficult problems about growth, what is the permanent in that which is throughout being transformed and growing. For what increases does not do so somewhat as a wine-skin is blown up, nor persists like a skin, while distending and growing in volume; but how it happens is hard to understand and he gives an account of it in On coming and ceasing to be.223 Therefore he sets aside all these issues as foreign to the discussion of change. So much, then, concerning the whole conception of the discussion. But in the text, ‘If they are two for that very reason’, announced with brevity, created unclarity. It means that the same account fits both dispositions and changes except in so far as the account of dispositions is different from that of changes, because if the dispositions that arise with an interval are two, for that very reason the activities and changes resulting from the disposition are two, which is elliptical in the account. He proves this from its converse. For as, when there is numerically one activity which recurs again and again, it is necessary that the recurring dispositions should be one, so if the dispositions be two then the activities also must be two. For if the activity is one then the disposition is one and, still more, the subject must be one. He

Translation

89

added why it is necessary: ‘for there is numerically one activity of the numerically one’ agent, whether it be a disposition, a power or the subject. He has said that, if the dispositions be two, for that very reason the activities will also be two, and to prove this he set beside it the converse, which is also in itself useful for the project and says that the numerically one activity is so from the numerically one disposition, and in this way he has shown the similarity to each other of the accounts of a disposition and an activity. Then he adds the difference through which he also set forth the similarity. For if, he says, the disposition is one, one would not perhaps think that the activity must also be one, as it was found necessary that if the activity be one the disposition must also be one. For from the same disposition there can be either one activity or many. That is why he said that it would not seem to be single to anybody, because there can be many. For when one stops walking, the walking will no longer exist, but when one walks again it will exist since the disposition to walk is one. Alexander says that there exists another version of this saying which runs: ‘If there be thus two in number, it is necessary that the dispositions should be also. For there is one activity of what is one in number.’224 He understands ‘if there be thus two in number’ not as referring to the disposition but to the subject of the disposition, which, because of the continuous flux does not remain one in number, and for this reason it is necessary that the dispositions should also be many in number. For the numerically one disposition is of numerically one subject. As the subject is to the disposition, so is the disposition to the activity. For there is one disposition of one activity, but there can be many activities of one disposition, which are separated by lapses of time. 228a20 But since every change is continuous [it is necessary that that which is one without qualification should also be continuous, since it is divisible throughout, and that if continuous it should be one. For not every one could be continuous with every one, since no other chance thing would be with any chance thing, but those whose extremities are one. Some things have no extremities, of others they are different in species and equivocally named; for how could the extremities of a line and a walk touch or be one? So they need to be contiguous. Some changes may be contiguous even if they are not the same in species or genus, for after running, one may at once become feverish, and like a relay race with torches travel may be contiguous but not continuous. For it is settled that continuity is between things whose extremities are one. So changes are contiguous and next

30 889,1

5

10

15

90

Translation to each other because time is continuous; but the continuous is so by changes being so. And that is so when the extremities of both become one. So the change that is continuous without qualification and one must be identical in species, of one thing and at one time; in time in order that no pause may intervene, for a thing must be at rest in the intervening time, so that there are many changes, not one, where there is rest in between, so that if some motion is interrupted by stopping it is neither one nor continuous. It is interrupted if there is time in between. When change is not one in species, even if there is no interruption the time is one, the time is one but the change is different in species. For what is one must be also one in species, but this need not be one without qualification.] So it has been stated what a single change without qualification is.

20

25

30 890,1

5

10

Having demonstrated what a single change is from the three matters with which change is concerned – the changing thing, the respect in which there is change and its time, of which each must be numerically one as its nature dictates if the change is to be one in the strict sense – he adds other things as well which belong as such to a single change, of which the first is that a single change is continuous. He demonstrates this from the fact that every change whatsoever that one takes, even if it be the part of a change, is each naturally continuous, not because every change is continuous with every change, but because each is in itself. If this is true, because every change must be divisible – which he brought in a little after the beginning, ‘for the divisible is continuous’225 – of necessity that change which has been shown to be one without qualification must be continuous with itself, since it is one, as must each part of a change. And if it is continuous it is one, so the two are convertible. That the numerically single change is that which is continuous and that it is impossible for those that do not thus make a single change to be continuous he proved by ‘for not every one could be continuous with every one’. For neither are those that are the same in species continuous with each other, nor those so in genus. Still less could those in different genera be continuous. For not every change can be continuous with every change, e.g. walking with growing white or learning. For if it were possible, what was continuous would not be one in number. For neither those one in species nor those in genus, still less those different in these ways, are one in number. However, he himself shows that not every change is continuous with every change, even if they were to be continuous in time, by the fact that no other chance thing is continuous with any chance thing, even if they happen to be of the same species. For not every body is so with every body, nor surfaces, nor lines, even at the same time. But those among things become continuous with each

Translation

91

other whose extremities can become one. But some things do not have extremities, such as indivisible units, which is why they do not generate continuity, while some have extremities, but in species are both different and called extremities or limits in different senses, which is obvious in the case of disparate things; for the limit of a line is one thing, that of a walk another. It is also true of change. For growing white has one and growing hot another. Also there is a different limit of your growing white and of mine; and in me one of hair and another of skin. Therefore there could not be a continuous change consisting of these. But, he says, ‘clearly changes may be contiguous that are not the same in species nor in genus; for after running, one may at once become feverish’. These are contiguous not by touching, as being contiguous was previously defined226 for the case of things with a position, for there is no touching in these cases, but by the time being continuous. For he said that contiguous changes could be judged also by continuity of time, as those identical in genus or in species by the identity of the matter of the change.227 So even if, after running, someone were at once to become feverish with no time having elapsed in between, the changes are not continuous. For their extremities are different in species, so that they cannot become one.228 And we agreed that those things were continuous of which the extremities were one. The limits of these things are called limits in different senses and, as they do not share in the same nature, they could not become fused into one. But it is clear in these cases. But even in the case of changes of the same species whose limits are of the same species, they would not create continuity unless they became fused together, as in the case of your and my becoming white, even if they occurred in a continuous time, because the continuous and numerically one must be one in species, but what is one in species need not be numerically one. But in the case of the travel of the torch which is handed on to each other by the runners as they are passing on, the commentators say that the course of the runners seems to be one and continuous229 since it is the same in species, but that it is not strictly one nor continuous because what is moving is not the same. But, they say, it also is contiguous. For the extremities of the motions are not one, but for each of the runners there is their own limit to their course and the limit of the course that has come to an end and is not the start for the next runner; such motions are contiguous because the time in which they occur is continuous, though the motions themselves are not continuous. But perhaps Aristotle says not that it is the motion of the runners which seems to be one that is contiguous but not continuous, but that it is the travel of the torch which seems to be one, since it is of a single thing that travels and because of the continuity of its shining, which is itself not one and continuous but contiguous. For the course of many could not be one

15

20

25

30 891,1

5

10

15

92 20

25

30 892,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

since there are many runners, but the travel of the torch which is one and has its brilliance continuously seems to be one but is not itself one, because its limits are determined and it is interrupted by being stationary at the transfer. But I found that there are two versions of this passage, one being ‘like a relay race with torches (lampas) which comes to be through travel by passing on, which is not continuous’, the other ‘like a relay race with torches travel may be adjacent, but not continuous’.230 In each lampas appears to mean not the torch but the shining and the course of the light. For, he says, the motions would be contiguous, both those not the same in species and those that are, such as the lampas, i.e. the course of the lampas. For he called the motion lampas as that in the same species, as when speaking earlier about that which was not in the same one. He says ‘for after running, one may become feverish’. Perhaps he is recalling the torch-race in Piraeus at the festival of Bendis, about which Plato says at the beginning of the Republic ‘there will be a torch-race on horseback for the goddess’. Explaining what happens he says ‘they will hand on little torches to each other, contending with horses’.231 He says that therefore such changes are contiguous but not continuous. For those are continuous whose extremities are one. So if they are continuous they are also contiguous. For, he says, the continuous is something that is contiguous. They are also next; for if they are contiguous they are also next, since he said that the contiguous was that which was next and touching. But this applies to things that have a position. But changes that are contiguous to each other immediately become continuous as well when their limits are interconnected because the time that measures the change is also continuous. For changes that are next to each other, so as to have no time in between which would be generically the same as those at each side, become not next but continuous. For, being without parts, they do not touch but fit together and become one and make the whole continuous. The same holds in the case of change. So if time is the measure of change, and change becomes one because of time and time because of change and each through itself through having the extremes of its parts running together into one, if these things are so, it was well said at the beginning232 that it is necessary that that change which is one and continuous without qualification must have these three each one in number – the species of the matter of the change, the object changing and the time. For it must be one in time in order that changelessness may not intervene; for there would not be two or more times unless there was changelessness in between. For, if there were not changelessness in between, times, like change, would be continuous with each other, but if there is changelessness in between, changes will become many – some on each side of the changelessness

Translation

93

– and the times three, the one that measures the changelessness and those that measure the changes on each side of the changelessness. So he has the potential argument: a change containing many times is interrupted by a stop; that interrupted by a stop is not one (this premiss he placed first). And the conclusion is evident that a change containing many times is not one. If this is true, then its converse by negation is true, that one change is measured by one time. But the change that is not one in species, even if it occurs in a continuous time, cannot be one in number, even if the changing thing is one. As ‘after running, one may at once become feverish’. For the extremities of such changes do not become one. For a change is other in species if it is in respect of what differs in species; so that these are still more different in number. For if a change is one in number the species of the change must also be the same. But if the form is one the change is not universally one, unless the thing changing is also one and the time continuous and one. For that is what is called ‘one change’ without qualification. It is also clear that the rider that ‘if a change is one it is continuous’ applies only to that which is numerically one and one in the strict sense, not to that which is one in genus or in species.233 It is worth noticing how of necessity the teaching about the next and the contiguous and the continuous was brought in prior to the proof about the single change, since by them it was shown what a single and continuous change was and which were next and contiguous.

25

30 893,1

5

10

228b11 A complete change is also said to be one, [whether it be in genus or in species or in existence, just as in other cases being complete and whole pertains to unity. But sometimes a change is said to be one even if it is incomplete,] provided that it is continuous. He adds another, second property of a single change. ‘Complete’ applies not only to the numerically one, which is strictly one, but also to that which is said to be one in genus and in species. For he says that we call a change one more strictly when it is also complete, whether the one taken is so in genus or in species or numerically, which he called ‘in existence’.234 For change of place from one place to another is generic, and when this becomes complete, i.e. when what is moving arrives at that towards which it was tending and the change becomes complete, then we say that it is one. Change from below to above and from above to below is one in species; numerically, that of this fire and this clod. So also when each of these becomes complete, then it is strictly one. For those changes that are numerically many in their genus and species become one in genus and in species. For

15

20

25

94

894,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 895,1

Translation

those from one place to another are one in that way, and those from above to below are all one, and likewise those from below to above. And each are more one if they are complete than if they are incomplete. For if we call each thing one with regard to its existence and to its species – ‘Socrates is one’, ‘man is one’, ‘living thing is one’ – when the species of each of these has not yet been settled but is incomplete, then, as the species has not yet been settled, so also the unity in form and character, because of which each is called one, has not either. For just as we do not say that something exists when it is coming to be and it is incomplete in its being, so also it is not possible to call it one. For we do also call something incomplete one, as we call a seed one and an embryo one, but not as being one man, but as that which it is completely, a single seed because a complete seed, and an embryo likewise. In general the incomplete is potential, but what is potentially something can become many things and not this alone. It is clear that the numerically single change becomes more strictly one when, in addition to those three requirements already mentioned, it possesses completeness as well. Alexander say that in this he is following in the steps of the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, who regarded unity as the best and assigned it to the complete and whole, and for that reason said that it was a principle, since even in common usage unity was predicated of things that were complete and whole.235 It is probable that both Aristotle and Alexander had their eye on what was said in the second hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides, where, having proved that the one is a whole because it was complete as well, he proves that it has a beginning, mean points and an end, reasoning that those things characterized by completeness had these. In conclusion he says of the whole ‘and that is a whole which is one, and has parts’,236 and of the complete ‘so, then, if it is a whole, will it not have a beginning and a mean point and an end, or can it be a whole without these three things?’237 Aristotle adds that a change is more strictly one if it is continuous when it is also complete. And even the incomplete is also said to be numerically one and the same, provided only that it is continuous. But one should notice that he says that continuity is suited only to the numerically single change, which he also says is strictly one, but he says that those that are one in genus and those one in species have a share in completeness, because they do not share in continuity since they are divided into their own manifolds, which are not continuous with each other. For neither are the many men continuous with each other, from whom and among whom is the single man, nor animals. But each species and genus is complete through reception238 of its own character. For even if it be common and not individual, still it has its own completeness by its determinate form.239

Translation

95

228b15 Apart from those mentioned, a uniform change is said to be one in another way. [For in a way the non-uniform does not seem to be one, but rather the uniform, such as the straight line. For what is non-uniform is divided. The difference appears to be one of more and less. Every change is either uniform or not; for a thing may alter uniformly or travel in a uniform path, as in a circle or a straight line, and the same applies to coming and ceasing to be. Non-uniformity is a difference (1) in the course in which a thing moves; for it is impossible for a motion to be uniform if through a non-uniform magnitude, such as motion over a bent line or a spiral or any other magnitude such that any random part will not fit with any other random part. (2) Another is neither in the subject nor the time nor the goal but in the manner. For it is sometimes differentiated by being fast and slow; when the speed is constant the motion is uniform, when not it is non-uniform. That is why speed and slowness are neither species nor specific differences of change, because they accompany all specific differences. So neither are heaviness and lightness in motion to the same place, e.g. of earth to itself or fire to itself. So the non-uniform is one by being continuous, but less so, as happens in the case of interrupted travel; but the less is always a mixture with the contrary. But, if every single change can be both uniform and non-uniform, contiguous ones of different species would not be one and the same. For how could a change be uniform which consisted of an alteration and travel?] For they would have to fit together. Thirdly, he adds this third feature of one change, that it is uniform, which can be present both in generic and in specific and numerical cases, just as its opposite, non-uniformity, can. Everywhere, ceteris paribus, a uniform change seems to be more a single one than one that is non-uniform, because the non-uniform seems to be divided in a way through the differences constituting the non-uniformity. He first says what a uniform and what a non-uniform change is. As an example of the uniform he introduced the straight line, according to Alexander because all the parts of a motion in a straight course are similar and all fit together, as do those of a straight line along which such a motion occurs. He says: ‘the same holds of the circle and motion in a circle. For this also is uniform because the curvature of a circular line is everywhere the same. But bent lines are non-uniform, as are those whose curvature is not the same, so that each portion will coincide with each, and motions also in such directions.’ But perhaps ‘such as the straight’ does not refer to motion in a straight line, but he is saying that every uniform change, in every species of change, is

5

10

15

20

96

25

30 896,1

5

10

15

20

25

Translation

like a straight line, not just in travel but also in alteration and in growth. For that is uniform because every part will coincide with each. So every change – whether in a straight line or a circle or through alteration or through growth – that is uniform is like a straight line. For it is possible to move non-uniformly even in a straight line, when the change itself has not the character of a straight line, so that each part is like to each. ‘He says that the uniform differs from the non-uniform by being more or less’, according to Alexander, ‘because the uniform is more single than the nonuniform, and the latter less than the former. For both are continuous.’240 But perhaps by ‘more’ and ‘less’ he does not now mean it ‘in respect to being one’ but in respect to the species in which they are. For if the uniform and non-uniform are in a straight line or a circle, the uniform is more straight and circular than the non-uniform. If it is in respect to growing white or growing hot, it is because the uniform is more becoming white or becoming hot than the non-uniform, and likewise in respect to growth. That is why he added that being uniform or not is found in every kind of change. But if they differ by being more or less in the same species, their difference will not be in species. For in the same species the less is such by admixture of the contrary, as the less white is so by admixture of black and similarly in other cases. Having said that there is uniformity or its absence in every change, for a thing may alter uniformly, he also added ‘and may travel a uniform path’ or ‘in a uniform course’, as Alexander and Porphyry write, ‘such as a circle or a straight line.’241 For since it is impossible for something to travel uniformly if it does not travel in its uniform travel on a uniform course, he added examples from the courses that it might take by saying ‘like a circle or a straight line’. For there can even in these be non-uniform travel, whereas the uniform occurs in nothing but a uniform course. Having said what uniform change is, that it is one and has similar parts, like a straight line, and what a non-uniform change is, that it is one divided into many, and having stated their difference, that it is not one of species but of more and less, he finally says what the differences of non-uniform change are and through which and how many causes a change becomes non-uniform. For these matters also belong to the account of change. For one cause arises from the subject-matter, e.g. from a line being bent. For it is impossible for a uniform change to occur in a non-uniform course, as is also a spiral.242 In general it is a matter of magnitude, where any part whatsoever will not fit together with any other chance part, even if the change in regard to it is continuous. One must inquire whether also in the case of alteration the change will be uniform or non-uniform according to the subject-matter. For what the place in which what is travelling travels is in the case of

Translation

97

travelling things, quality is that in the case of alteration. Everything that is qualitatively transformed is so from contrary to contrary, becoming black or becoming white. But no part of growing white or growing black can fit together with another part, not because it does not persist but not even conceptually, since no part will be like any other part; rather, it will be as with a day. But in the case of growth and diminution, since the transformations are in magnitude, they seem to be in a straight line and uniform. But perhaps there is another non-uniformity with regard to what grows, if growth should stop for a time in the absence of nourishment and at times should even be transformed into ceasing to be, as in illnesses. For then the growth will be non-uniform, just as if diminution should be greater and less from time to time. Also a non-uniformity in the orderly progression of a quality will be a qualitative non-uniformity. If a thing should grow now more intensely hot and again less so, its nonuniformity will be in the quality of the subject-matter of the change. Another non-uniformity in all kinds of change is that in speed or slowness and in time in general. This non-uniformity in strict change is neither a matter of the course in which the changing thing changes, like the previously mentioned, which is what he means by ‘where’, nor of the time not being one and continuous, which is what he means by ‘when’, nor of the terminus to which the transformation proceeds, such as upwards or downwards, black or white, great or small. For it is possible when all these are the same and alike, the course, the time, the terminus, for the change to be non-uniform through the manner of the change and how it occurs, if the change is sometimes fast, sometimes slow. For then the change becomes non-uniform, as it is uniform when the change is all alike. For sometimes, he says, the non-uniformity is not in the aforementioned matters, but is determined by quickness and slowness. Having said that there is a sort of uniformity and non-uniformity arising from the speed and slowness of the thing moving, he adds that these, i.e. speed and slowness, are not species of change nor are speed and slowness differences with regard to species, by which uniform and non-uniform changes differ from each other. He demonstrates this from the fact that there is speed and slowness in all the species of change; for it is possible to travel and alter and grow in both ways. But that which occurs in all species is not divided off from those in which it occurs. For what is divided off from something ought to be outside it. But indeed speed and slowness are not also species of some one of the species of change; for the species of something cannot be also a species of that which is divided off from it. That is the explanation why also male and female are not species of animal; for they are within virtually all the species of animal. So they cannot be divided off from them, such as the footed, the aquatic and the winged,

897,1

5

10

15

20

25

898,1

5

98

10

15

20

25

30

899,1

5

10

Translation

so that there will be male and female in addition to them. For they are within them, nor are they species of one of them, e.g. of the footed; for they are present also in the rest.243 But it is not possible for there to be the same species of different genera. That is why man and woman are not species of human, because they are also within species divided off from humans; for man and woman have their difference by being male and female. Lightness and heaviness are different from each other in species, but speed and slowness are activities within each of these potentialities.244 For the light travels upwards faster and slower as does the heavy downwards; for the heavier travels faster, the less heavy slower.245 So as the heavier and the less heavy do not differ specifically from each other in their tendency, so also the activities consequent on these potentialities, speed and slowness, are not specific differences of actual motion. For they remain within the same species, sometimes that of fire, when it moves faster or slower, sometimes within that of earth. For lightness and heaviness which remain within the same species, when we say that some fire is lighter, some heavier, are not specific differences, since fire does not differ from fire in species, nor earth from earth. But nor does the individual clod differ from itself in species even if it moves faster to its own place. So one should understand that he does not now say that speed and slowness differ from each other in species when viewed as non-uniformities. For they occur within the same species as more and less. But more and less are in the same species and do not constitute a specific difference. For these are observed in all the species of change in which there is also non-uniformity. But if there be a kind of speed and slowness that is not viewed as within the same species nor distinguished as more and less, as when we say that the horse is swift and the tortoise slow, birds fast and land animals slow, such speed and slowness are not in all the species of things that change their place, nor both in one, nor do they occur as more and less, unless, indeed, even in these species slowness is through decrease in speed, and they contain more and less speed, being named comparatively.246 For the horse, even if it is faster than a tortoise, is slower than a bird; and if they occur in one or another species of animal, still they are within the one species of change, that of travel. There is the same sort of difference also within alteration; for one sort of thing gets hot faster, another slower. But none the less there is here too a more and less of what is the same species of change. Having said that a uniform change is one, and more so than the non-uniform because of likeness, he says that the non-uniform is also one through being continuous, if it be continuous but non-uniform. For it was established for us that the continuous was one, just as the one is also continuous. But sometimes the non-uniform is continuous.

Translation

99

If it be none the less continuous it is less one than is the uniform; but if it is less and the less is in every case through mixture of the contrary, the non-uniform must have an element of multiplicity in it.247 But the way in which it is less, as happens in the case of interrupted travel, is the same as that which happens in the case of travel that is on an interrupted route. For every case of travel on such a route is non-uniform and less uniform and one. Having said that even some non-uniform change is continuous and one, like that on an interrupted route, even if it is less continuous, he adds which non-uniform changes cannot be continuous and one. He says that even adjacent changes, if they should not be the same in species, could not be one and continuous. He demonstrates this, making use from what had been previously said of the fact that the change that is one and continuous, like one upwards or one downwards or growing white or growing hot or growth or diminution, can be both uniform and non-uniform, and he also takes it that a change composed of unlike species, e.g. alteration and travel, could not be uniform. He draws the conclusion in the second figure (which he also placed in the middle) that changes that are not adjacent in species could not be one and continuous. Of the premisses, he placed first the major which says that every change that is one and continuous can be both uniform and non-uniform, last the minor which says ‘how could a change be uniform which consisted of alteration and travel?’, taking this type of question to be equivalent to a negation.248 He also added the explanation: ‘for they would have to fit together’. For that is uniform whose parts can fit together with each other. It is not only that a uniform change cannot consist of different species, but it cannot be non-uniform in such a way as to be one and continuous. For the non-uniform change was said to be less one, but the less is through admixture of the contrary, the non-uniform not being of a different kind altogether and foreign but retaining its share in the same species. For the grey is less white by admixture not of travel but of black. So the non-uniform with continuity in the same species or genus allows more or less. Therefore that consisting of different species of change will not even be non-uniform so as to be continuous and one.

229a7 It must be determined what sort of change [is contrary to what sort of change, and in the same way about rest. It must first be determined whether the change from something is contrary to the change to it, e.g. whether change from health is contrary to change to health, as coming to be and ceasing to be

15

20

25

900,1

5

10

15

100

Translation

seem to be, or whether that from contraries, e.g. that from health to that from sickness, or that to contraries, e.g. that to health to that to sickness, or that from a contrary to that to a contrary, e.g. that from health to that to sickness, or that from contrary to contrary to that from contrary to contrary, e.g. that from health to sickness to that from sickness to health. For it must be so in one or more of these ways.] For they cannot be opposed in any other way.

20

25

30 901,1

5

10

15

To the problems stated about change and transformation he adds as necessary ‘what sort of change is contrary to what sort of change’.249 He will also inquire about changelessness (monê) or rest (êremia)250 in the same way. The question is a necessary one. By it are demonstrated natural changes and the contrariety of elements to each other, and what comes to be from what and most other facts of natural science. But since change is transformation from something to something and from contrary to contrary, he sets out the ways in which it is possible for two changes to be contrary and distinguishes which among them are contrary changes. But since he declared that things transformed from one thing to another could ‘not be opposed in any other ways’ than those stated, one must try to discover them by division,251 which he himself clearly uses. So, since transformation is from something to something, i.e. from contrary to contrary, of necessity the contrary changes will have their character either from one of the two or from the two contraries. So either both the changes will have their character252 from the same one thing when one of them is from it, the other to it, as is the transformation from sickness to that to sickness or that from health to that to health, which is the way coming to be and ceasing to be seem to be opposed. For coming to be is transformation into existence, ceasing to be transformation from existence. So the change to the same thing is contrary to that from the same thing. For the transformation from something would not provide even a semblance of contrariety to that from the same, nor that to something to that to the same. Or else each will be characterized from each, and that in three ways; (1) from the contrary, as is that from health to that from sickness; (2) to the contrary, as is that to health to that to sickness; (3) when one is from the contrary, the other to the contrary, as is that from health to that to sickness. Or both will have their character from both, both containing that from which and that to which in opposite ways, when each is from contrary to contrary; for example that from health to sickness to that from sickness to health. Having thus made a division he added that it is necessary that one of these ways should be that by which change is contrary to change, or several of them, because the opposed transformations could not be opposed in any other way.

Translation

101

229a16 The change from a contrary is not contrary to a change to a contrary, [e.g. that from health to that to sickness; for they are one and the same. However their essence is not the same, just as it is not the same to be transformed from health and to be transformed to sickness. Nor is that from contrary contrary to that from contrary; for that from contrary and that to contrary or an intermediate occur together. But we shall say more about this later, though transformation to a contrary might seem to be more the cause of the contrariety than that from the contrary, for the latter is the loss of a contrariety, the former its gain. Also a transformation is named as that to which rather than as that from which, as becoming healthy is that to health, sickening that to sickness. There remain transformation to contraries and that to contraries from contraries. Perhaps then it happens that those to contraries are also from contraries, but perhaps their essence is not the same, I mean that to health and that from sickness and that from health and that to sickness. But since transformation is different from change, change being the transformation from one substrate to another, the change from contrary to contrary is contrary to that from contrary to contrary, as that from health to sickness is to that from sickness to health. It is also clear from induction which changes seem to be contrary. For falling sick is to becoming healthy, and being informed to being deceived, not by itself; for they are towards contraries and, like knowledge, it is possible to receive deception either from yourself or from another. And travel up is contrary to travel down, (these are contrary in length), and that to right to that to left, (these are contrary in width), and that forwards to that backwards, for these too are contraries. But that to an opposite only is not change but transformation,] as to become white not from something. Having thus obtained the oppositions by division without omissions, he finally examines each of them and will show what sorts are contrary changes. First he shows that the change from a contrary is not contrary to that to a contrary, e.g. that from health and that to sickness; for they are one and the same. For if the change from contrary to contrary should be that from health to sickness, then so inevitably it is also that to sickness from health. So they are one and neither contrary nor more than one. But, he says, there is not the same account of that from contrary as there is of that to contrary, because that from contrary reveals that from which the transformation occurs, that to the contrary that to which it occurs. Also by each

20

25

102

902,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 903,1

Translation

expression one of the contraries is made more prominent and the other is incidentally disclosed. For that reason he said ‘as it is not the same to be transformed from health and to be transformed to sickness’. For each does not signify the same thing, through at one place determining that from which, at another that to which. So universally changing from a contrary does not signify the same as changing to a contrary. The second opposition he examines is that of a change from a contrary to that from a contrary, which, since it is of changes from contraries seems to be contrary, but does not include contrary changes, since every change contains not only that from which but also that to which. For what is changing from health shows whence the change begins but does not exhibit the change. He himself first shows that this is the same as what mentions both. ‘For that from contrary and that to contrary or an intermediate occur together’, and to the latter as to a contrary. So the opposition is that of change from contrary to contrary, in which alone he will show253 as he goes on is there a contrariety of changes, which is why he now postpones it. Clearly it is the same with the opposition of change to contrary to change to contrary; for that to a contrary is always from a contrary. So once again the same opposition occurs: that of change from contrary to contrary to that of change from contrary to contrary. But if one thus barely takes the opposition of change from contrary to change from contrary on its own in accordance with the division, without also reasoning that they are also to contraries, and, again, that of change to a contrary to that from change to contrary without thinking those changes to contraries are always changes from contraries, transformations which come about into a contrary will seem more to be contrary than those from a contrary, because the gaining of contraries has a greater contrariety than the loss of contraries. For those that lose contraries seem through that to cease from their contrariety, while those that acquire them seem to be more contrary. Also the transformation into a contrary is characterized by the gaining of contraries, but that from contraries by their loss. Moreover changes and transformations seem to be characterized more by that into which things turn and not by that from which they turn, as has already been said earlier. For we say that what is moving to sickness is sickening and what is moving towards health is becoming healthy. Having said that changes into contraries were better candidates for being contraries than changes from contraries, and having marked them off still more because those from contraries contained a release from contraries, he finally inquires about those into contraries whether they are themselves contraries, and also about those from contraries into contraries. For these, he says, are the combinations that remain of changes in which contrary changes can occur, since254

Translation

103

also the first according to the division remains, that from and to the same thing. For nothing has as yet been said about this. He will show that this opposition is not included in change. Of changes into contraries he says that it happens that those that occur into contraries are also from contraries, just as he said the same also of those from contraries, having then added that those into contraries are more nearly contrary than those from contraries. He says that even if it happens that those into contraries are also from contraries, so that a change into a contrary is the same as that from a contrary to a contrary – for that which is transformed into health is at the same time transformed from sickness – still the essence and account of transformation into health and transformation from sickness are not the same. For this reason these changes are also not contrary, since they lack that from which in addition to that to which, as he will say as he proceeds.255 So, having proved that in none of the oppositions mentioned is there contrariety of changes, he next shows that of the remaining two, that from itself to itself and that from contrary to contrary, it is the latter that contains a contrariety of changes. He shows this by beginning from the explanation of it. For since change differed from transformation in that it was from substrate to substrate and from contrary to contrary, and the contrary is a substrate, reasonably the change from contrary to contrary is itself contrary to a change from contrary to contrary. For transformations are both from substrates to non-substrates and from non-substrates to substrates, as in the cases of ceasing to be and coming to be. But changes are from substrates into substrates and from contraries into contraries. That the above is the case he also confirmed by induction. For having taken changes that are agreed to be contrary, becoming sick and becoming healthy, he finds that these are from contraries to contraries. He says that it is the same in the case of learning and being deceived by another. He adds ‘by another’ perhaps because he who deceives himself may not be transformed from another belief and may not have held a true belief before about the topic but have held a false belief about it right from the beginning. Such a man, however, is not transformed from contrary to contrary. But he who is misled by another is misled to the opposite, turning from truth to falsehood. That is what Alexander says. But perhaps as he who learns is sometimes led from falsehood to truth, but sometimes has no thought about the topic whether false or true and then acquires knowledge about it, so also he who is deceived either is transformed from truth to falsity or straightway acquires a false belief from the deceiver. But since these, learning and discovering, are two, the one providing knowledge from without, the other from within, the opposite of being informed is deception by another, of discovery self-deception. So he

5

10

15

20

25

30 904,1

5

104

10

15

20

25

905,1

5

Translation

reasonably opposed to being informed not simply deception but deception by another, not as being in all cases transposed from truth to falsity but transposed from not having into having a false belief, whether he who is deceived chanced before to have had a true belief on the topic or had no opinion whatsoever. The opposition of being informed to deception by another is the opposition of the change from ignorance to knowledge to that from knowledge to ignorance.256 He adds a third confirmation from the contrarieties in travel that the changes from contraries to contraries are contraries. For we say that travel upwards is contrary to travel downwards as in length; that to right and that to left are contrary as in width and those forwards and backwards are so as in depth. Having shown also by induction that contrary changes are those which take place from contraries to contraries, he again adds a note saying that what is said to be a change only to contraries but does not include that from contraries is not a change but a transformation, because one substrate shows only that to which but not yet that from which. And that must be present in a change taking place257 from substrate to substrate. For to become white as such signifies a transformation which is a coming to be but not a change, because that from which is not added to it also in the text, since it is clear that white comes from black. 229b11 In the case of things that have no contrary, [the transformation from them is contrary to the transformation to them. That is why coming to be is contrary to ceasing to be and loss to gain. These are transformations but not changes. One must assign changes into intermediates, in cases where there is an intermediate between contraries, as being in a way into contraries. The change treats the intermediate as a contrary, in whichever direction the transformation may be; e.g. from grey to white as if from black; from white to grey as if to black; and from black to grey as if it were white. For the mean is so-called with regard to each of the extremes,] as was also said earlier. [Thus a change contrary to a change is one so related as that from contrary to contrary to that from contrary to contrary.]258 What seems also to be one remaining opposition, which he placed first in the list made by division, was omitted: that from the same thing to that into the same thing. So he also says of this that just as those into contraries which did not have that from which as an opposite were transformations but not changes, so both that from the same thing and that to the same thing have only one substrate which is the same thing, both that from which and that to which, but, since they omit what is contrary to it, they are contrary transformations but not

Translation

105

changes. For change is from contrary to contrary, but being from the same thing to the same thing fits ceasing and coming to be; for from what ceasing to be is a transformation, to that coming to be is an approach.259 Also from what there is coming to be into that there is ceasing to be. There is the same relation between loss and gain. For the loss is contrary to the gain of one and the same thing. For of what there is loss, of that there is gain, and of what there is gain, of that there is loss. Having earlier said that ‘that from a contrary and that to a contrary or an intermediate occur together’,260 he now shows that also those to an intermediate and from intermediates are as if from and to contraries because the intermediate has the function of an extreme towards each of the extremes. For intermediates consist of a mixture of contraries, as was said earlier.261 That is why change treats the intermediate as a contrary, in whichever direction the transformation may be. For example, in a transformation from grey, when it is transformed into white it treats the grey as black, and also when it is transformed from white to grey. But when the transformation is from grey to black or from black to grey, then it treats the grey as white. So those changes also to an intermediate and from an intermediate are to be counted as contrary.

10

15

20

229b23. But since change seems to be contrary not only to change [but also to rest, this must be analyzed. For, without qualification, change is contrary to change; but rest also, since it is a privation and a privation is also said to be in a way a contrary, is opposed to it, but one sort to another of the same sort, e.g. that in place to that in place. But this is now said without qualification; for is motion from a place or to a place opposed to rest there? It is indeed clear that since change involves two substrates, rest in a place is opposed to motion from it to its contrary, rest in the contrary place to motion from the contrary to that place. But these rests are also at the same time contrary to each other; for it is absurd if changes are contrary but opposed rests are not. But there are rests in opposites; for example, rest in sickness is so to rest in health. But it is contrary to the change from health to sickness, for it is nonsense for it to be contrary to change from sickness to health. For the change to that in which it remains is rather coming to rest, or at any rate this comes about together with the change, and it must be one or the other that is contrary. For rest in whiteness is not] contrary to that in health.

25

106 906,1

5

10

15

20

25

30

907,1

Translation

He has shown what sorts of change are contrary to each other. But since rest also is opposed to change and seems to be contrary to it, he inquires also about rest, first how rest is opposed without qualification to change, then also what kind of rest is opposed to what kind of change, since there is rest both before and after change. He also says that change is strictly contrary to change, for both are forms and they are transformed into each other; but rest is opposed to change, but is opposed rather as a privation and not as being strictly contrary, because it is also itself not some form as change is, but only absence of change. But he says that ‘a privation is said to be in a way a contrary’; in general every privation, in so far as it is opposed to a form or disposition or activity; but this opposition seems to be a contrariety.262 But this privation in the form of rest has another feature through which it might be called contrary rather than other privations. For things possessing the other privations are not transformed into dispositions or forms – for a corpse or a blind man is not transformed into living or seeing – but things at rest naturally sometimes change again. For rest is the changelessness of what naturally changes. Also this privation is like to the privation of matter which is seen263 in its suitability to receive form, of which it is also true that ‘privation is also said to be in a way a contrary’. For, since coming to be is from an opposite, those things of a nature to be transformed have this suitability264 through the contrariety within them. Next he inquires which sort of rest is opposed to which sort of change, in accordance with this mean opposition of what are strictly called privations and their opposites, through which rest is opposed to change; and first he says that rest in a certain genus is contrary to change within the same genus. He exemplified this with one genus of change, saying ‘that in place to that in place’. For it is clear that there is the same account also in the case of other changes, I mean alteration and growth. For qualitative rest is not contrary to change of place, but that of place is to that of place. Also rest in alteration is contrary to change in alteration and that in quantity to that in quantity. But it is not sufficient to say this, that rest in place is opposed to change of place and generally those in the same genus to each other; for that is said without qualification and in general terms.265 For there are many ways of moving and resting according to each dimension of place. For motion in length266 is that up and that down, and rest is above and also below. So we must inquire what sort of rest is, in these cases, opposed to what kind of change. He says that since change is from substrate to substrate (for this is what ‘involves two substrates’ means; for it is from contrary to contrary, by which change differs from coming and ceasing to be), types of rest are contrary to changes from some kind to its contrary in the way that rest in being below or in being white

Translation

107

are to the change from below to above or that from white to black. Again, rest in being above or in being black is contrary to the change from being above to below or that from black to white. So, universally, rest in that from which the change comes about is contrary to the change from it, but not to the change to it. For it is necessary that that from which something flees should be naturally contrary to it, while that to which it departs is akin to it. But, he says, since it is absurd that changes should be contrary to each other but rests should not, one must know that also such cases of rest are contrary to each other which are in contrary places or have contrary qualities or quantities; e.g. rest above is contrary to that below and rest in being white to that in being black and that in health to that in sickness. But rest in health is opposed to change to sickness, as was said earlier;267 for it is absurd for it to be so to that from sickness to health. Also he now adds the obvious explanation: for, he says, a natural change is towards that in which what is changing naturally rests, having that rest as its goal and, occurring because of it, change is in a way the genesis of rest and is a coming to rest. So there is the greatest affinity between the change to that in which it will come to rest and the rest in it. But if it is akin it is not contrary. For one cannot say that what comes to be is contrary to its coming to be or a privation of it. So if rest in something is also the goal of a thing’s changing to it, how could it be contrary to it or a privation of it? So if it is necessary that either rest in that from which or in that to which be contrary to a change (for clearly rest from one genus will not be contrary to change in another genus), and if it is impossible that changes to something should be contrary to each other, it is necessary that rest in that from which should be contrary to change from the same thing. For also, if the change from this is natural to the thing changing, rest in it will be contrary to its nature. But what is unnatural is contrary to the natural. But, if someone raises the problem how, if one thing is contrary to one thing, both change and rest are contrary to change and, likewise, both rest and change are said to be contrary to rest, one must say that rest and change are not strictly contraries, but that such rest is also not privation, such as in the Categories268 he spoke of as not returning to the form; but rest and change appear to be opposed to each other in a form intermediate between privation and contrariety. 230a7 In the case of things that have no contrary, [transformation from is opposed to that to the same thing, but is not a change269 e.g. that from being to being, and they have no rest but untransformability (ametablêsia). If there were something as substrate, its untransformability in being would be contrary

5

10

15

20

25

30 908,1

5

108

Translation

to untransformability in not being. But if what is not is not something, one might raise the problem to what untransformability in being was contrary, and whether it is rest. If that is so, either not all rest is contrary to change, or coming and ceasing to be are changes. It is clear that it cannot be called rest, if these are not also changes, but something like it and untransformability. It will be contrary either to nothing or to untransformability in what is not or to ceasing to be; for this is from it,] as coming to be is to it.

10

15

20

25

30 909,1

5

Having said that rest in one of two contraries is contrary to the change from it, he inquires whether in the case of transformations which do not come about from contrary to contrary and are therefore not changes, as was said of coming and ceasing to be,270 there is some rest for these transformations contrary to that from itself to itself. For these were the transformations which were opposed as coming and ceasing to be. For ceasing to be is that from being, coming to be that into being. Either there is no rest opposed to these, because these are not counted as changes but only transformations, while rest is opposed to change. Why, then, is rest in the form not a limit to coming to be, as rest below is to the change from above to below? Or is there such, but it is not to be called rest but rather untransformability, because absence of change is called rest, that of transformation its absence? Let it be called untransformability.271 But to what untransformability and to which transformation is this untransformability contrary? Perhaps if that which is not is some substrate, as is matter, untransformability in being will be contrary to untransformability in not being and to the change from being, but if what is not is not something, he says, one might raise the problem to what untransformability untransformability in being is contrary, and one might raise the problem whether one should call untransformability in being rest, because of the ensuing absurdities. For if one were to call untransformability in being rest in the case of coming and ceasing to be, one of two things must result: (1) either not all rest will be contrary to change, since untransformability in being as rest is opposed to the transformation from being. But this is not change, as was proved earlier,272 because it is not from substrate to substrate; (2) or, if all rest is opposed to change, then ceasing to be will also be a change and coming to be likewise. But it has been proved that these are not changes. So in order that neither of these absurdities should result, remaining (monê) in being is not to be called rest (êremia), but it is to be said to be something like rest.273 Also it is to be called untransformability, being a privation not of change but of transformation. But this untransformability in being is either contrary to nothing, for rest and not untransformability was held to have a contrary, or, if it is

Translation

109

contrary to something, it is contrary either to untransformability in not being, if what is not is something, or to ceasing to be, which is transformation from being. For it will be opposed to this as to a transformation even if what is not is not something, which is why he thus said ‘to that in what is not or to ceasing to be’. For this ceasing to be, he says, is from this untransformability in being itself, but coming to be is the route to that untransformability. For that which was demonstrated in the case of change holds in the case of untransformability. For the untransformability in that from which there is transformation is opposed to the transformation from it, but not to that to it. So untransformability in being is opposed to ceasing to be as to a transformation, whereas it is to untransformability in what is not to which untransformability in coming to be and in being is opposed, if what is not should be something. But there are three readings at the beginning of this text. One is ‘In the case of things that have no contrary, transformation from is opposed to that to the same thing, but is not a change’. Another is ‘In the case of things that have no contraries, their transformation is opposed’ and so on with the same meaning as that of the previous reading. There is also a third as follows: ‘In the case of things that have no contraries, whose opposed transformation is of that from the same thing to that to the same thing, but is not a change.’ This is the one that Alexander prefers. He says, ‘For he is speaking in order to show of what things there is not change but untransformability, but not in order to demonstrate that such transformations are not changes and are not opposed to each other as changes, but as transformations; for that has already been demonstrated.’274 230a18 One may raise the problem [why in transformation of place there are those that are natural and unnatural and rests and changes, but not in the other transformations; e.g. alteration is not sometimes natural and sometimes unnatural; for becoming healthy is no more natural or unnatural than becoming sick, nor becoming white than becoming black. It is the same in the case of growth and diminution, for these are not opposed to each other as natural and unnatural, nor is growth to growth. There is the same account of coming and ceasing to be; for coming to be is not natural and ceasing to be unnatural (growing old is natural), nor do we see some coming to be that is natural, some unnatural. Or, if what is forced is unnatural, would forced ceasing to be be contrary to natural ceasing to be as being unnatural? Are, then, some cases of coming to be forced and not ordained, to which the natural are contrary, and are growths and diminutions forced, like the speedy maturing of those on

10

15

20

25

910,1

110

Translation

rich foods or crops which mature quickly and are not planted out? But how in the case of alteration? In the same way? For some might be forced, some natural, e.g. as when people recover not on critical days, others on critical days. For the former will be altered unnaturally, the latter naturally. Cases of ceasing to be will surely be contrary to each other, not to cases of coming to be. And what is to prevent opposition in manner? For it would be so if one ceasing to be were pleasant, the other unpleasant. So ceasing to be is not opposed to ceasing to be without qualification,] but in so far as one is like this, the other like that.

5

10

15

20

25

911,1

He has said which changes and rests are contrary to which changes and rests, in both cases natural ones. He has said that change is opposed to change when it is of that from contrary to that from contrary, change to rest when it is from something to rest in the same. But since not only natural changes are opposed to natural changes, such as that from below to above of fire to that from above to below of earth, but also the unnatural change of the same thing to that which is natural, as the change upwards from below of earth to that from above to below, he intends to speak about these oppositions as well. But first he raises the problem why in transformation of place there are both changes and rests, both natural and unnatural. For, for earth the change downwards is natural, rest that in the below, unnatural is the change to above and rest in the above, and in the case of the other simple bodies and simple changes the account is the same, at least in the case of change of place. But in the case of alteration and transformation of quantity the same opposition of the natural to the unnatural no longer seems to be observed. For becoming white is no more natural or unnatural than becoming black for bodies nor becoming healthy than becoming sick. For the bodies of living things seem to be equally receptive of both of them. The same account holds of growth and diminution. For neither is growth natural, diminution unnatural, nor vice versa; but nor does growth seem to be opposed to growth, so that one is natural, the other unnatural. The same applies to the other transformations, coming to be and ceasing to be. For neither is one of them natural, coming to be, nor the other unnatural, ceasing to be. For old age, which is a transformation from being towards not being and a ceasing to be, also seems itself to be natural. Nor does coming to be seem to be thus opposed to coming to be, so that one of them is natural, the other unnatural. Having raised this problem, he concedes that both the opposed, such as becoming white and becoming black, growth and diminution and coming to be and ceasing to be, are natural. For both the opposites in place, above and below, are natural, if each for a different thing. But that within the same species such as ceasing to be or coming to

Translation

111

be or growth some changes are natural, some unnatural, he demonstrates by the fact that the forced is observed in them all, and what is forced is contrary to nature. So forced ceasing to be is contrary to natural ceasing to be. But in the case of ceasing to be, force is clear; but also there are cases of coming to be which are forced and do not occur according to the laws of nature, which he called ‘not fated’, when some things give birth before a ripe age. The commentators take this as a sign that the Peripatetics assign the fated to the natural,275 since he called changes that were forced and unnatural ‘not fated’. He also says that some cases of growth are unnatural, like the speedy maturing of those on rich foods who might beget also unnaturally and forcibly, and crops that take quickly through heat and grow in the so-called gardens of Adonis276 before taking root and being planted the soil. And in the case of alteration both the natural and the unnatural are found. For those who recover from sickness in the critical days are altered naturally and securely, those who do not do so unnaturally and insecurely. Having said that coming to be is contrary to coming to be and ceasing to be to ceasing to be, he added that ‘cases of ceasing to be will be contrary to each other’. But if that is so, since coming to be is also opposed to ceasing to be, there will be two things contrary to one; for both coming to be and ceasing to be will be contrary to ceasing to be. Similarly both coming to be and ceasing to be will be contrary to coming to be, if indeed coming to be is opposed to coming to be. He briefly indicated this objection by ‘cases of ceasing to be will be contrary to each other’ when taken in that way, ‘and not to coming to be’; so if also to coming to be, two will be contrary to one.277 He answers the objection by saying that nothing prevents ceasing to be from being in a way contrary to ceasing to be, not qua ceasing to be, but in so far as one is natural, the other unnatural, as happens in cases of ceasing to be. So two are not contrary to one, since qua ceasing to be it is contrary only to coming to be, but qua ceasing to be naturally it is contrary to that unnaturally. In the same way if one chanced to be pleasant, the other unpleasant, there would be a sort of opposition between them in that way. 230b10 So in general changes and rests are contrary [in the way stated, as is that upward to that downward; for these are contrarieties of place. Fire travels on an upward path by its nature, earth on a downward one, and their paths are contrary. But fire travels upwards by its nature, downwards contrarily to its nature, and its natural travel is contrary to its unnatural travel. It is the same with rests; for rest above is contrary to motion from above downwards. That rest is unnatural in the

5

10

15

20

25

30

912,1

112

Translation

case of earth, but that motion natural. So the unnatural rest is contrary to the natural change of the same thing. That is the way in which the change of the same thing is contrary;] for one of them will be natural, that up or that down, the other unnatural.

5

10

15

20

25 913,1

5

He has demonstrated that contrariety of the natural to the unnatural occurs in the case of changes; he next demonstrates that the natural and unnatural changes are not contrary in any other type of contrariety beyond that already stated to occur in changes, but it is the same sort of contrariety. For when it is the same thing that is undergoing contrary changes, i.e. those from contraries and those to contraries, as the one of them is natural to it, then the other will be unnatural. ‘Fire travels on an upward path by its nature, earth on a downward one’; these paths are surely contrary. But fire moves upwards by its nature, but downwards unnaturally, and its natural path is contrary to that which is unnatural, because they are from contraries and to contraries. It is the same with their rests; for rest above is contrary to motion downwards from above. For earth, rest above is unnatural, motion downwards natural. So the unnatural rest is contrary to the change of the same thing, for also the change of the same thing is as well. For a motion that is contrary to the natural motion of each of the elements is unnatural for the same one. But since that from which something moves is either natural or unnatural, and its rest in the latter place is opposed to its motion from it, it is clear that for simple bodies rests in such places from which they naturally move are themselves unnatural. So their unnatural rests and remainings278 are contrary to their natural motions. In some copies after the end of this section which says: ‘for one of them will be natural, that up or that down, the other unnatural’ the following is added: ‘but universally and primarily these strictly belong’. The commentators also know that this is added in some of them.279 He would be saying that these, natural and unnatural changes, strictly belong to the simple among natural bodies, and to all and primarily in their change of, and rest in, place. The natural and the unnatural exist also in the other kinds of change themselves, as he said, but not strictly nor primarily, but in a sense transferred from the former. It seems that after ‘but universally and primarily these strictly belong’ ‘to these simple bodies’ is missing,280 about which bodies he spoke technically of the natural and unnatural in their travel up and down. 230b21 There is a problem whether there is a beginning of every case of rest [that is not everlasting, and whether this is a case of coming to a stop. When something rests unnaturally, as earth

Translation

113

does above, there must be a beginning; for when it was travelling up by force it stopped. But what comes to a stop seems to travel ever faster, what travels by force does the contrary. So such a thing will be at rest without coming to be at rest. Also coming to a stop seems either to be entirely travelling to a thing’s own place,] or to happen simultaneously with it. He now raises the problem whether there is a beginning of every case of rest, or not. For it is impossible that there should not be a beginning of every case of rest. He briefly indicated the explanation by saying ‘that is not everlasting’. For rest is the privation of change in what sometimes changes, and rest in the case of what sometimes changes is not everlasting, since it sometimes changes. But what is not everlasting has come to be, what has come to be came to be, and what comes to be has a beginning. For it is said to come to be with reference to its beginning, as what is changing is said to change with reference to its change. He started by saying that rest was not everlasting because things that exist either exist for ever or exist sometimes, and things that exist sometimes are things that come to be. So having indicated the necessity of every case of rest having a beginning, he added that the coming to be of rest is coming to a stop, which just is coming to rest; for to be at rest is to have stopped, and coming to a stop is the beginning of having stopped, as changing is of having changed. Finally, he adduces the problem which tries to refute there being a beginning of every case of rest by demonstrating that forced rest does not have a beginning, since it does not include coming to a stop. For if the forced rest above and being stationary above of earth by force were to have a beginning, it would include coming forcibly to a stop, i.e. travelling forcibly to being stationary. So if forced travel to being stationary cannot involve coming to a stop, it is clear that there could not be a coming to be of forced rest. That coming to a stop does not occur forcibly he proves by power as follows: what is coming to a stop is travelling naturally to that place in which it will be stationary; what is travelling naturally to a place in which it will be stationary moves faster as it gets nearer to it, being powered ever more by that place. So the conclusion of this argument is that what is stopping, i.e. travelling towards being stationary, moves faster as it approaches the place in which it will be stationary.281 By the further assumption, therefore, of another premise which says that what is travelling forcibly does not move faster towards the place in which it will be stationary by force, but even slower, the conclusion is reached immediately in the second figure that what is travelling by force is not coming to a stop, i.e. has not an impulse to be stationary;282 and from this it follows that what is forcibly coming to rest is not coming to be at rest, since it does not include coming to a stop and coming to

10

15

20

25

30

914,1

5

114

10

15

20

25

30 915,1

5

10

Translation

rest. So what is forcibly at rest will be at rest without beginning to be at rest. So there is not a coming to be of every case of rest since there is not in the case of forced rest. Next, he seems to adduce another argument by saying ‘also coming to a stop seems to be strictly said of what is natural, etc.’, but I think that by this he rather indicates what holds the previous argument together. For that argument concluded that coming to a stop could not characterize forcible travel, but could that which is naturally moving to being stationary. For coming to a stop suits that which has an impulse and a goal283 to be stationary, as does coming to rest that which is seeking to be at rest, and becoming white that seeking to be white. Having said also that ‘coming to a stop seems to be strictly predicated of what is naturally going to its own place, and not of that moving unnaturally’, he added – if, as Alexander says, this is in the text – ‘or to be so entirely’. ‘This,’ he says, ‘that “coming to a stop seems to be so entirely”284 would mean that this travel to its own place to which it belongs would be by the activity of each of the natural bodies. For it is at once something that has come to be and actually is and it straightway moves to its own place, seeking for its perfection there, unless something impedes it, which, he says, indicates that coming to a stop is predicated of and holds of that which is said to be natural motion.’ So Alexander, touching, I think, on what I am about to say. Perhaps ‘or to be so entirely’ is linked to ‘is predicated’ – that coming to a stop seems to be predicated strictly. So perhaps it is not merely predicated of but is entirely so of what is natural, lest ‘coming to a stop is predicated’ be dismissed as a linguistic convention; rather, coming to a stop strictly is travel to its own place. Or if coming to a stop has its connotation from the stationariness which it seeks, travel from motion, coming to a stop is not said to be the same without qualification as travel to its own place, but happens simultaneously. Or coming to a stop happens when a thing happens to be travelling to its own place. This is what said himself a little earlier in these words ‘for change to it is rather coming to rest, or at any rate this comes about together with the change’.285 So if it is absurd that something should be at rest without coming to be at rest, which he put forward, and absurd because what has come about must first come about, one must say that ‘come to a stop’ has two meanings, strictly when natural, while by transference or homonymously when unnatural. Perhaps that is why when he said that ‘come to a stop’ was predicated of the natural he added ‘strictly’. For in fact that which is going towards being stationary is said to be coming to a stop as what is going towards rest is said to be coming to rest, but what is moving forcibly is not moving towards being stationary; at any rate, if a clod should cease from its forced motion upwards, it would travel downwards at once, unless something should forcibly control it. For rest is

Translation

115

forced when it is forcibly controlled, just as motion is forced when something forcibly moves it. So even if coming to a stop is not strictly said to precede forced rest, still, because it has come to rest, becoming so must precede this, and something like coming to a stop.286 What about it? Is not the argument sophistic and based on the ambiguity of ‘come to a stop’? Or perhaps, having set the problem in this sophistic way, he solved it by distinguishing the strict sense of ‘come to a stop’, having shown that what is travelling forcibly would not strictly be said to come to a stop. But by loose use287 nothing prevents saying that what travels forcibly itself comes to a stop at a forced stopping point, because something precedes forced rest, which is analogous to strictly coming to a stop, which precedes natural rest, which was present in natural motion. Otherwise, as I said, natural motion probably has in itself a coming to a stop also which is an urge to be stationary, while that which is unnatural does not at all have in it a coming to a stop since what moves unnaturally has not an urge to be stationary. For what travelled by force would not stay unless it were restrained by force. Except that, since it is impossible for something at rest somewhere by force not to have travelled by force to that place in which it forcibly rests – since what travels naturally travels to its natural place in which it naturally rests – forced travel leads to forced rest as natural travel leads to natural rest. And in that way, even if inaccurately, even that which travels forcibly could be said to come to a stop, when it is about to be forcibly at rest. But what travels naturally is strictly said to come to a stop, because it aims at being stationary.288 But since everybody adduces as an axiom that things travelling naturally travel faster near their own places289 and provide a plausible explanation by saying that they have greater power when they are close to the whole of their own kind, since they are there more perfected in form,290 while others say that the mass of the intervening air hinders things moving up and down until, as they approach their own places, the interval decreases,291 and since few add the confirmation of the fact that things travelling naturally move faster near their own places, is so, perhaps there is nothing against making a note of the evidences stated by the natural philosopher Strato. For in his On Motion, having said that what is moving traverses the last part of its journey in the shortest time, he adds: ‘It is plain that this happens in cases of things travelling by their weight through the air. For when water is pouring down from pots, if one watches its course from a high place, it clearly flows continuously higher up, but lower down it falls scattered to the floor. So if it did not always travel faster in the later place, this would never happen to it.’292 By ‘this’ he means the tearing off from the continuous which occurs nearer the floor. He also provides another piece of evidence, saying ‘If one lets go a stone or

15

20

25

30 916,1

5

10

15

20

116

25

30

917,1

5

10

15

20

Translation

something else weighty, having lifted it as much as a finger’s length high from the earth, it will make a scarcely visible impact on the earth, but if one lets it go from above, having lifted it a yard or even more, it will make a strong impact. And’, he says, ‘there is no other cause of the impact; for it has no greater weight, nor has what is moving become greater, nor does it strike a bigger place, nor is it being pushed by more, but it is travelling faster. These and many other things happen for this reason.’ This evidence shows, I think, that when raised a little from the earth as when still in the earth, a thing is not easily moved, but when moving from afar towards its own place it continually has a greater force towards it. Aspasius brought the book to an end at this point.293 230b28 There is a problem if rest in a place [is contrary to motion thence. For when something is changing from this and, losing it, it still seems to have what it is losing, so that if this rest itself is contrary to change from it to the contrary, both contraries will be present together, if it is in a way at rest or still remains. But as a whole, part of it is as before the change, part that into which it is changing. For that reason change is still more contrary to change than is rest. So the account of change and rest has been given, how each is one] and which is contrary to which.294 Earlier he has said that rest in something is opposed to change from it to the contrary, and rest in the contrary to change from the contrary to it. Now he raises a problem about this and says that if rest in this place is contrary to motion from it, as was said earlier,295 then since that which is beginning to move thence is also still there, but when it is there it is at rest (for that is what it is for it to be there) it results that the same thing is at rest and changing with a rest and change that are contrary to each other. For change to something is not contrary to rest in it; therefore he did not construct the argument about them. But it is impossible for contraries to occur about the same thing. But he shows that what is beginning to change from something is still there by an argument that says that when something is moving part of it is there from whence it moves, part there whither it is moving. As, if we considered something white which was turning black but was not yet completely blackened, it would remain having still a trace of white and to that extent resting in whiteness, so also change of place, still having a trace of its condition in rest, would be said not to have completely lost that rest. He solves the problem by saying that nothing absurd arises from the argument, even if there be contraries involving the same thing, not in the same respect, but in different respects. For the same thing can be white and black in

Translation

117

different parts, which happens also in the case of something beginning to move; for it does not rest and move in the same respect, but in different respects. For part of it is there, part no longer; since what is moving is not without parts. For it will be demonstrated, since nothing without parts moves, that it is nothing absurd if a thing should be in contrary conditions in different respects. He has briefly indicated this by saying ‘If it is in a way at rest or still remains’,296 i.e. if it is in one respect at rest or remains in a respect, and concludes that rest is not strictly a contrary to change; for it is rather a privation, but strictly change is contrary to change – that from contrary to contrary to that from contrary to contrary, as was said earlier.297 For in those sorts of changes it does not arise that the same thing is in contrary conditions. 231a2 So the account of change and rest has been given, how each is one and which is contrary to which. It has been said how change is one, but not, however, how rest is one. But he appears to treat this too as already stated, because it is clear from what was said about change how rest also is one. For if rest is the privation of change in what naturally changes, it is clear that rest will be said to be one in as many senses as change is said to be one. So this also will be one in genus, or in species, or in number and existence. This is the end of the book in some copies; in others also what will be said next is added, of which neither did Porphyry choose to make a synopsis nor Themistius a paraphrase. But Alexander, having pointed out that it is not included in some copies, nevertheless expounds it.298

25

918,1

5

10

15

231a5 Someone might raise a problem also about coming to a stop, [if there is a stop opposed to every unnatural rest. For it will be absurd if there is not; for a thing will remain at rest, though forcibly. So that something will be at rest not permanently without becoming so. But it is clear that there will be; for as something may change unnaturally,] so it may be at rest unnaturally. Perhaps this is not a chance addition, which says the same as what was previously said299 where he seems to refute coming to rest in the case of things moving unnaturally and resting unnaturally. Earlier300 he supported this by reduction to the impossible, when he concluded that if there is no coming to a stop in the case of things forcibly moving and forcibly resting, something will be at rest without coming to be at rest, since in such cases he seemed to deny coming to a stop of things moving forcibly by means of ‘what comes to a stop travels ever

20

118 25

919,1

5

10

15

Translation

faster when near to its own place, but what travels by force does the contrary’ and by means of ‘coming to a stop is predicated in the case of something going naturally to its own place’. But as he wishes, as it appears, to strengthen the problem in regard to each, for that reason he now resumed one side of the problem which shows that also in the cases of forced change and of the forced rest opposed to it, there must be a coming to a stop. For, if not, and if something remains at rest forcibly, something ‘will be at rest not permanently without becoming so’. As he said earlier, ‘so something will be at rest without coming to be at rest’.301 But now he added to ‘being at rest’ its being so not permanently, I think superfluously; for if something is at rest which naturally changes, it will not be everlasting rest. But, he says, it is clear that something will be at rest forcibly; for as something changes unnaturally, so it rests unnaturally. So the syllogism will be of the second mode of hypotheticals as follows:302 if a thing remains at rest forcibly, as I shall show, if there is no coming to a stop in its case as in the case of things changing naturally, ‘something will be at rest not permanently without becoming so’. So if that is impossible there will be coming to a stop in the case of things forcibly remaining at rest. That things do remain at rest forcibly and unnaturally is clear from the fact that things do change forcibly. But the unnatural rest is not strictly opposed to unnatural change. For what was opposed to unnatural change such as upward travel of earth was not its unnatural rest above, but its natural remaining below. But those seem to me more accurate who do not accept this text, which says the same thing as was said earlier in a different way, as being added later by some persons.303 231a10 But as some things are subject to both natural and unnatural motion, [as for fire motion upwards is natural, that downwards unnatural, is the latter contrary to it or that of earth? For this moves downwards naturally. Or is it clear that both are contrary, but not in the same way, but the latter is contrary since the motion of fire is natural, while the upward travel of fire is contrary to that downwards as of what is natural to what is unnatural. It is the same also with rests. But perhaps change is the opposite of rest in a way. So the account of change and rest has been given, how each is one and which is contrary to which.]

20

What is said is: since the natural motion of fire is upwards, its motion downwards unnatural, while for earth motion downwards is natural, that upwards unnatural, will the unnatural motion downwards of fire itself be contrary to its natural motion, or will it be the natural motion downwards of earth? He judges that both are contraries, but not in

Translation

119

the same way, but the natural downwards motion of earth will be contrary to the natural motion of fire as being both natural, but the unnatural motion of fire will be so to its natural motion as is the unnatural to the natural. This passage is added superfluously, as it has been said more succinctly as follows:304 ‘Fire travels naturally upwards, earth downwards and their courses are contrary. But fire travels upwards naturally, downwards unnaturally. And what is natural to it is contrary to what is unnatural.’ That it is added superfluously is shown by the same epilogue being added to it as well which says: ‘so the account of change and rest has been given, how each is one and which is contrary to which’.305

25

920,1

* After the analysis of this book part by part, I think it well to record its main chapters concisely and, so far as possible, without omissions. He set out at the beginning to divide transformation into change and the species of change, and also coming to be and ceasing to be. He first demonstrates that things transformed are so in three ways, either incidentally or in part or as such and primarily, in order to make their division. He then demonstrates that not only things being transformed and changed but also those bringing about transformation and change are divided in these three ways. Next, that while there must be five constituents if there is to be change – that which causes change, that which undergoes change, time, and finally that from which and that to which the change occurs – the change is in the thing that changes and in none of the others; he proves the same thing from the definition of change. Then, that the form into which what is coming to be changes, the affection into which what is altering changes and the place to which what is travelling moves are unchanging as also the magnitude to which what grows increases and in general that to which change occurs. About this he raises a problem as follows: if whiteness is an affection and an affection is a change, the transformation to an affection will be to a change through a change, and change will be not only in what changes but also in that to which it changes. He solves the problem by the ambiguity of ‘affection’, since both white and becoming white are called affections, but white is not a change while becoming white is. Having shown previously that both what changes and what initiates change are so called in three ways, he adds that the triad is also found elsewhere – in that to which and that from which and that in which, i.e. time – the incidental, that in respect to another and that which is primarily and as such. Thus he sets aside transformation that is incidental and in respect to another as common to all and indefinite, and demon-

5

10

15

20

25

120

921,1

5

10

15

20

25

30 922,1

Translation

strates the differences of transformation in that kind which is determined as being in itself and primary and fitting for knowledge, dividing them into three. He names that between contraries, that between intermediates regarded as contraries and that by negation. Having shown what transformation is between, he next shows in how many ways it occurs, carrying the argument forward by division. For everything that is transformed is either transformed from substrate to substrate, i.e. from an existent to an existent, or from a substrate to what is not a substrate, i.e. from existent to non-existent, or the reverse, or, finally from non-substrate to non-substrate, which is incoherent, for nothing is transformed from non-existence to nonexistence. Those from substrate to non-substrate and from non-substrate to substrate are respectively coming to be and ceasing to be, which are not changes. Only that from substrate to substrate is change. But the substrates are either contraries or intermediates; concerning them he inquires in which of the categories change occurs, and shows that it is in quality, quantity and place, but neither in substance, nor in relation, nor in action and passion, since there is no change of change, nor coming to be of coming to be, nor generally transformation of transformation. These points he proves in many ways. Next, he shows that change in quality has a common name which is ‘alteration’, but quantitative change has not but is severally ‘growth’ and ‘diminution’, while travel has neither a particular nor a common name. For travel (phora) is predicated only of things changing like inanimates. Also that more and less is alteration in all the categories. After these demonstrations he next divides the unchanging into four, that which is wholly incapable of change, that which in a long time scarcely changes, that which begins to change slowly and that which naturally is able to change but not changing when, where and how it naturally does, since he says that ‘rest’ (êremein) is used only of the unchanging. Having said this about change and unchangingness, he finally distinguishes what are ‘together’, ‘separate’, ‘touching’, ‘between’, ‘next’, ‘contiguous’ and ‘continuous’, and between what kinds of thing each of these naturally arises. To these he adds among what things ‘being between’ occurs. Having prefaced the above as useful to the following arguments, he shows that change is said to be one in three ways, either in genus or in species or in number. And also that what is numerically one is most strictly so, which contains numerically one each of the three with which change is concerned, the thing changing, the form in relation to which it is changing and the time in which it changes. He adds that the numerically single change is also continuous and that both the change one in genus, that one in species and

Translation

121

that one in number are more completely one when they are complete, and that the change single in genus or in species is then said to be one when it is complete, while the numerically one is one even if not complete, but is said to be one only if continuous. Next, that a single change should also be uniform; for the uniform change is more so than the non-uniform, and that being fast and slow are not species of change, since they occur in all the species of change. Finally, he divides the oppositions of changes, and distinguishes that by contrariety from the rest. And then he inquires which kind of change is contrary to which, and which rests to each other. He adds that contrariety in regard to the natural and the unnatural occurs in change and rest in the same way as between natural ones. Also he raises the problem whether coming to a stop precedes also unnatural rest and argues on both sides. He also adds another problem, how, if rest in one place is contrary to motion thence, as was said, but what is moving seems to be at rest, both contraries do not occur at once. He also included the solution to the problem, that the contraries are not so in the same respect, but the object rests in one way, is moving in another.

5

10

15

Notes Abbreviations ANRW CAG CLCAG D-K FHSG LSJ RE SVF

Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Corpus Latinum Commentarium in Aristotelem Graecorum H. Diels (ed.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 6th ed., rev. by W. Kranz, Berlin 1952 W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby, R. Sharples and D. Gutas (eds), Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, New York 1992 H.G. Liddell, R. Scott & H.S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon 9th ed., Oxford 1940 Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft H. von Arnim (ed.), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta

All the notes are by Peter Lautner unless otherwise indicated by the translator’s initials (J.O.U.). 1. Transformation and the infinite were discussed in Book 3, place, the void and time in Book 4. For a general discussion of the relation of Book 5 to earlier and later books see the Introduction to Ross’s edition of Aristotle’s Physics. (J.O.U.) 2. Simplicius tackles the way in which the Physics was divided also in 867,22868,5, for which see n. 171. At 1126,8-10 he mentions this division again and says that the treatise containing the first five books was entitled On principles (peri arkhôn) or, simply, Physics. We do not know whether Aristotle himself arranged his lectures in this way, though Simplicius claims (in Phys. 923,16-924,12) that he himself used such a division. But this organisation of the matter treated in the Physics can be traced back to Theophrastus (Test. 137/2-3 (FHSG)). Simplicius attributes this division to Andronicus of Rhodes, the editor of Aristotle’s works as we know them (in Phys. 923,7-9), and to Adrastus, Peripatetic philosopher of the second century A.D. (in Phys. 4,11-16), and refers (in Phys. 924,13-14) to Damas, the biographer of Eudemus, who was speaking about ta peri kinêseôs tria, and also to Theophrastus. For details see P. Moraux, Aristotelismus bei den Griechen vol. 1, Berlin and N.Y. 1973, 115-16, who thinks that Simplicius took this information – directly or, more plausibly, indirectly through Andronicus – from the correspondence between Theophrastus and Eudemus, and from the biography of Eudemus written by Damas. It is this correspondence in virtue of which we know of Physics 5 that immediately after Aristotle’s death there were several copies in circulation and some of them were considered false (hêmartêmenon antigraphon, at 923,11 = Eudemus fr. 6 (Wehrli) = Theophrastus Test. 157 (FHSG)). W.D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1936, intr. pp. 1-7, is sceptical as to whether Theophrastus (ap. Simplicium in Phys. 923,9-16 = Test. 157 (FHSG)) alludes to this division. But other testimonies of Theophrastus may justify Simplicius’ report: cf. also n. 147.

124

Notes to pp. 11-14

3. This testimony of Porphyry has been registered as 159F by A. Smith (ed.), Porphyrius. Fragmenta. Stuttgart and Leipzig 1993, who refers (p. 58) to Themistius’ in DA 16,19-31 as a parallel. Another reference is to Philoponus in Phys. 2,15-17 CAG XVI, who accepts the division proposed by Porphyry. The passage has been examined by F. Romano, Porfirio e la fisica aristotelica, Catania 1985, 45-7, 53-6, and translated on p. 113, who refers to Simplicius in de Caelo 226,19-23 where we find the same division, now attributed to Aristotle himself. Here Simplicius refers to de Caelo 1.5, 272a28-9 where Aristotle makes mention of his books on change (ta peri kinêseôs). The core of the problem may be sought in the status of Book 5 itself. Simplicius says (867,22-868,7) that by having no particular subject it only gives supplementary material to Book 3. See also n. 171. Another question is whether Porphyry wrote a synopsis of the Physics at all, and if he did, what this term means. Besides the occurrence of the noun at 802,8, sunopsizein turns up at 918,13 too – and in connection with Porphyry nowhere else. In the Index nominum to Simplicius’ in Phys., Diels assumes that Porphyry wrote a synopsis of the Physics (p. 1453), but this view has been questioned by Romano (pp. 54-6) establishing that the term itself is not adequate to signify a commentary and that Porphyry wrote a commentary on the first four books of the Physics, but left only a compendium on the fifth one and nothing on Books 6-8. Doubts concerning Diels’s assumption have been raised also by P. Moraux, ‘Porphyre, commentateur de la Physique d’Aristote’, in Aristotelica. Mélanges offerts à Marcel De Corte, Brussels and Liège 1985, 227-41, esp. p. 236. Porphyry’s selection of books for comment is linked to the arrangement of the books of the Physics by the commentators, including Porphyry himself. The fragments of the treatise Porphyry wrote on the Physics, as reported by Simplicius in the earlier books of his commentary, confirm Romano’s claim because both the extent and scope of these texts exceed what we can require of a compendium. 4. The lemma in the Greek text always gives only opening and closing phrases. For the convenience of the reader a translation of the whole text is given. Where the text used by Simplicius appears to vary from the received text of Aristotle the former is translated. (J.O.U.) 5. The example may be taken from, e.g. de Anima 2.1, 413a8 where Aristotle says that soul is related to body as a sailor to his boat, implying also that it is by moving the body alone that soul can be in motion. Cf. also 807,10. 6. Just like the other references to Alexander, this text too may have been taken from his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, now lost but quoted many times by the late Neoplatonist commentators, especially by Simplicius. For further information on this commentary see R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and innovation’, ANRW 2, 36.2, 1176-243, esp. 1185. Excerpts have now been discovered from the later books of the original commentary of Alexander and are being edited by Marwan Rashed. They suggest that Simplicius’ reports are not always accurate. See Marwan Rashed, ‘A new text of Alexander on the soul’s motion?’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle and After, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supp. vol., 1996. 7. 224a34, and see the next lemma. 8. Elsewhere, Simplicius refers to Plato who calls all sensible and bodily beings ‘generated’. They are therefore not self-subsistent (oute  huphistanein heauto dunatai, 1154,14-15; reference is to the Timaeus 27D6-28A1), but need God who brings them about and maintains them (1145,28-9). 9. energêtikon pathos. Later, at 822,18-21, Simplicius distinguishes two kinds of transformations: active transformations are called changes, the passive ones are bare transformations which however bear some slight mark of activity. The first group contains changes of things already actually existing and capable of being

Notes to pp. 14-19

125

active, the second covers transformations of a potentially existing thing into an actually existing, e.g. the generation of man from seed since the seed does not persist during the transformation, but becomes something different at different times. The term is used rarely but it also turns up in the de Anima commentary contentiously attributed to Simplicius (213,27 CAG XI). 10. Physics 4.11, 218b21ff. 11. In Greek hê de kinêsis and hê dê kinêsis. (J.O.U.) Ross prefers dê. H. Bonitz, Aristotelische Studien, Vienna 1862-67, repr. Hildesheim 1969, 126-28, justifies dê by pointing to similar structures in Aristotle (e.g. Poetics 2, 1448a1-9). He discusses the interpretations of Simplicius and Alexander as well. 12. The point made by Alexander may be that by accepting de and thus opposing the whole clause beginning with hê de kinêsis to the previous clause we start to investigate a new subject and emphasise that change is in things changed. 13. 3.3, 202a13-b22. 14. 4.11, 219b1-12. 15. fr. 72 (Wehrli). In his commentary, following G. Rodier (La physique de Straton de Lampsaque, Paris 1890, 61), Wehrli (Die Schule des Aristoteles vol. 5. Straton von Lampsakos, 2nd ed., Basel and Stuttgart 1969, 63) thinks the emphasis is on qualitative change and by disputing that change takes place only in what is changed Strato gave up Aristotle’s concept of form along with his whole teleology. This view seems to be exaggerated since by ex hou and eis ho Strato did not necessarily mean forms which were in motion in this way, but rather states from which and into which a thing changes, which therefore are capable of passing away and coming to be, though they undergo these changes in a way different from that of the thing in change. Furthermore, even if these terms pertain to the form, Strato did not dissent from Aristotle who had also accepted that form undergoes a certain change, but it does so incidentally and not per se (224b16-26), as has been pointed out by L. Repici, La natura e l’anima. Saggi su Stratone di Lampsaco, Torino 1988, 38-9, who does not see the divergence between Strato and Aristotle in this matter as being so great as was supposed earlier. 16. e.g. 202a14. (J.O.U.) 17. 3.2, 202a7-8. 18. An example of actuality as form is that for Aristotle the soul is form as well as actuality of a kind (entelekheia tis, de Anima 1.1, 402a26). The author of the de Anima commentary which is – contentiously – attributed by the MSS to Simplicius explicitly claims (11,3 CAG XI) that the first and clearest actuality is the form, an instance of which is the soul. 19. See the previous lectio. They cannot change in the proper sense of the term, but only incidentally. 20. Phys. 4.12, 221a19ff, and see also Simplicius’ explanation at his in Phys. 739,7ff. CAG IX. 21. See 808,1. 22. Simplicius’ explanation differs from Ross’s by taking hapasi at b27 as a reference to all of the categories while Ross (op. cit. 615) thinks it stands for the termini of the change per accidens that are not necessarily either contraries or contradictories. At first glance, the difficulty of Simplicius’ explanation lies in Aristotle’s concept of change according to which change occurs in four categories: substance, quantity, quality and place. This concept however does not rule out that e.g. quantitative change can involve an incidental change in relation. Growing up, I may become taller than my father, although when I was a baby he was taller than me. Simplicius treats the problem in detail at 834,22ff. stating that change in

126

Notes to pp. 19-23

relation is incidental only, but nevertheless there is some change in the category of relation. 23. Because a substance as such may equally well have any quality, quantity, etc. predicated of it. (J.O.U.) 24. The human soul is in motion per accidens, in virtue of the body it moves and inheres, cf. de Anima 1.3, 406b5-407a2. 25. 1.5, 188a31-b16. He sets out the opposing principles at b16-30. 26. Ross reads ê ouk ex hupokeimenou eis mê hupokeimenon. Simplicius in the commentary reads ê ex oukh hupokeimenou eis oukh hupokeimenon. There are other minor differences. (J.O.U.) 27. ‘Substrate’ translates hupokeimenon, ‘substance’ ousia. The statement that affirmation is what does not contain a negative part is never claimed explicitly by Aristotle, but is implied in Cat. 12b4-11. Simplicius returns to the subject at 826.26ff. 28. Eudemus fr. 92 (Wehrli). The problem is whether a negative statement (e.g. ‘he does not have sight’) can or cannot be replaced by a positive one (‘he is blind’), and vice versa. If so, we should admit that the change from not-substrate to not-substrate is transformation, though of a different kind. Wehrli (Die Schule des Aristoteles vol. 8, 2nd ed., Basel and Stuttgart 1969, 106, refers to fr. 29 (ap. Galen, de sophismatis, in Opera Omnia, vol. 14, pp. 590, 593 (Kühn)) and fr. 61 (ap. Simplicium in Phys. 439,17ff.) as passages treating the same linguistic phenomenon. 29. ‘Existents’ translates ousia (in the singular) and Simplicius refers to the coming to be of substance. 30. Here Simplicius may attribute to Aristotle the view that there is no such entity as a prime matter, deprived of all attributes and underlying all kinds of change. The issue was a matter of controversy: Simplicius himself accepts that there is prime matter but regards it as extension. Thus he endows it with quantitative marks: see in Phys. 229,6-7; 230,19-20.24-7.30-3; 232,24-5; 537,13-14; 623,14-20. For further references and discussion see R. Sorabji, ‘Simplicius: prime matter as extension’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius. Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie. Berlin and N.Y. 1987, 148-65, incorporated into his Matter, Space and Motion, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1988, 3-23; Frans de Haas, John Philoponus on Matter, Ph.D. Diss., Leiden 1995, to be published by Brill, Leiden 1997. 31. ‘They resolve’ (luousi, cf. also 814,19) might refer to the ‘we say’ (legomen, 225a17) in Aristotle’s text, not to a particular school other than the Peripatetics. ‘Existence’ translates ousia and the allusion is to the Categories 5, 3b24-32 where Aristotle says that substance (ousia) has no contrary. 32. The paraphrase may be taken directly or indirectly from his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. On Aspasius, Peripatetic of the second century A.D. and author of a surviving commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (CAG XIX – Simplicius says at his in Phys. 131,14 that he was the very first commentator on Aristotle’s Ethics), and on his interpretation of the Physics, see P. Moraux, op. cit., vol. 2, Berlin and N.Y. 1984, 235-39 (with a list of Aspasius’ readings which are different from the Vulgata version of the Physics on p. 239), although there he fails to mention this passage. This paraphrase may however clarify Aspasius’ explanation of Physics 5.1, 225b33-226a4, which is reported also by Simplicius, in Phys. 845,19-846,1. For details see n. 108. In general, Simplicius’ knowledge of Aspasius may be derivative, for whenever he cites or paraphrases Aspasius he does it almost exclusively (exceptions being 646,4ff., 958,8ff., and this paraphrase) in a context where Alexander of Aphrodisias’ views on the same subject are also examined. Thus he may have been familiar with Aspasius’ work from quotations in Alexander’s lost com-

Notes to pp. 24-27

127

mentary on the Physics, as has been observed by R.W. Sharples, ‘The school of Alexander?’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1990, 83-113, esp. p. 88n.35, and Diels’s note to the entry ‘Aspasius’ in the index nominum to Simplicius’ in Phys. p. 1441. On Aspasius see also Fr. Becchi, ‘Aspasio, commentatore di Aristotele’, ANRW 2 36.7, 5365-96, though he concentrates on the in EN. On the connection between Aspasius and Middle Platonism see P.L. Donini, Tre studi sull’ aristotelismo nel II sec. d.C., Torino 1974, 98-125, esp. 124-5. 33. Aristoxenus of Tarentum (born between 375-60 B.C.), disciple of Aristotle and musical theorist. Fragments of his works have been collected by F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles vol. 2, 2nd ed., Basel 1967. For a short overview of his oeuvre, see F. Wehrli’s entry to the RE supp. 11, 336-43. 34. 5, 4a21-b13. Here he says that it is by the change of the facts that a true statement becomes false or a false one true, and not because it itself undergoes a change. 35. The example Simplicius gives as an illustration is that that which simply is not (to kath’ hauto mê on) may be the particular matter of each existent thing. It seems that the basic matter which is sometimes called by Neoplatonists not-being (to mê on) is said only to happen not to be (hô sumbebêke to mê on) because it underlies the process of coming to be. If it were simply non-existent then we could not describe it as underlying substantial change. Here Simplicius dissents from some of his Neoplatonist predecessors, but remains faithful to Aristotle who conceived of matter in terms of change. This matter may or may not be called prime matter in the traditional sense of the term, but it differs from the matter of a man, such as flesh and bones which is subject to simple coming into being. 36. In contrast to Simplicius, Alexander seems to consider the potential – and perhaps the matter as well – as that which simply is not. The last sentence of the report, which says that not-being (to mê on) belongs to what is coming to be may be the conclusion drawn by Simplicius himself, for Alexander may have hesitated to make such a clearly Platonist point. For him as a Peripatetic, the application of the verb to be in the previous sentence must occur in the same sense as the one in the last sentence of the quotation. 37. For this passage in Aspasius see P. Moraux, op. cit., vol. 2, 237. The weakness of this explanation, pointed out by both Simplicius and Alexander, is that it seems to disregard Aristotle’s statement according to which what is not is said to come to be incidentally. Thus the conversion made by Aspasius is sound only if we pay attention to this restriction. 38. êremia, the word used in this passage, is used only of what can change. The changelessness of what cannot change is called monê. (J.O.U.) 39. This is in Camestres: Every A is B No C is B No A is C 40. It is strange that Simplicius calls this an argument in the first figure since he very informally supplies three premises. Formally we should have: Syllogism 1. What is not in actuality is what is not in place What is becoming is what is not in actuality What is becoming is what is not in place. Syllogism 2. What is not in place does not change What is becoming is what is not in place What is becoming does not change.

128

Notes to pp. 28-29

This can be regarded as a first figure syllogism in Barbara followed by one in Celarent. (J.O.U.) 41. Ross reads nôdon, toothless, vice leukon, white, at 225b5, from the parallel passage at Metaph. 1068a7, which makes better sense. (J.O.U.) Ross follows H. Bonitz who (op. cit. pp. 35-7 of the reprint edition) says that for Aristotle white, unlike black, never means privation, but a positive state (cf. Cat. 10, 12b33), and refers to a parallel passage in Metaph. 11.11, 1068a7 where we find nôdon. As for ‘naked’ (gumnon), this is the only occurrence of the word illustrating privation and because of palaeographical similarities he suggests that either tuphlon (‘blind’, in Bessarion’s translation we have caecum) or psukhron (‘cold’) was in the original text. Both terms are used many times by Aristotle to exemplify privation. 42. 225a6-7, cf. also 812,11-12. 43. ‘Existence’ translates ousia which could be rendered also as substance, and ‘that which is in actuality’ to en entelekheiai, referring to any kind of being in actuality. 44. What Simplicius objects to is that naked cannot be called privation properly. For Aristotle himself claims that privation is in a way form (Physics 2.1, 193b19-20) and Simplicius connects privation to nature (in Phys. 280,10-281,10) and being naked or having clothes do not necessarily belong to characteristics that are by nature. At 828,17 Simplicius calls gumnon an incidental attribute (sumbebêkos) which – just like other attributes – is present along with the persisting substance (ousia) and for this reason it has an affirmative name (kataphatikôs legetai) and is enformed (eidopoieitai). He returns to the subject briefly at 859,12-15, and uses the term kataphasei again. 45. 893B1-899B11. 46. 898B1. 47. What comes next is an example of a practice which the late Neoplatonists, especially Simplicius introduced, following Porphyry (see P. Hadot, ‘L’harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d’Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Categories’, in Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e Occidente, Rome 1974, 31-74; English version in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1990, 125-41, and H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’, Phronesis 21 (1976), 64-87, repr. with an addendum in R. Sorabji (ed.), op. cit., 305-25; R. Sorabji, ‘The ancient commentators on Aristotle’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), op. cit., 1-30, esp. 3-4, and I. Hadot’s commentary on Simplicius in Cat. 7,23-32 in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories, fasc. 1, Leiden 1990, 123-31). By getting great support from Iamblichus, who taught that Plato and Aristotle were in harmony concerning the theory of Ideas (ap. Elian in Cat. 123,2-3 CAG XVIII,1) they claimed that Plato and Aristotle had taught the same and the differences between their doctrines were verbal only. Accordingly, the duty of the commentator is to reveal the harmony between Plato and Aristotle, which exists in most matters, as stated explicitly by Simplicius (with reference to Ammonius at in Phys. 1360,28-31, and in de Caelo 640,27-32 CAG VII; in Cat. 7,23-32 CAG VIII, cf. also in de Caelo 378,20-1; Simplicius(?) in DA 245,12 CAG XI), though this task was not always performed and especially not by each of the late Neoplatonists. More recently, it has been pointed out that even Aristotle’s criticism of some doctrines of Plato was consciously included in this scheme: see F. Romano, ‘La défense de Platon contre Aristote par les néoplatoniciens’, in M. Dixsaut (ed.), Contre Platon. Tome I. Le platonisme dévoilé, Paris 1993, 175-97. 48. The wording is Neoplatonic. Along with rest (monê) and reversion (epistrophê), procession (proödos) belongs to the basic triad in Proclus (El. Theol., props. 25-39), see further n. 58 below, and the commentary by E.R. Dodds, Proclus: The

Notes to pp. 29-32

129

Elements of Theology, Oxford 1933, 2nd ed. 1963, 213-23. Departure (ekstasis) occurs in a similar context in Aristotle’s de Anima 1.3, 406b12, and Simplicius repeats this view at 822,24; 824,15; 826,12, and see also his in de Caelo 95,14; 96,20 (with reference to Plato). The term ‘always the same’ (to hôsautôs ekhon) is borrowed from Plato (e.g. Phaedrus 78D, 110D; Sophist 248B – connected with being (ousia)). 49. Deleting tên energeian tou nou eipein at 821,31-2 as dittography. (J.O.U.) Simplicius may be thinking of Metaph. 12.7, where Aristotle speaks of the intellect (nous) as a recipient of reality (ousia, 1072b21-2) and also as an eternal, unmoved reality separated from perceptible things (1073a3), as well as of ch. 9 which implies that intellect is the best substance (aristê ousia, 1074b20). 50. See also 804,25ff. where Simplicius introduces his concept of change as an active affection. energêtikon pathos occurs also in the de Anima commentary contentiously attributed to Simplicius (213,27) where the author claims that it is upon this kind of affection that pure sensitive activity and judgement (krisis) arise. For the term cf. also n. 9. 51. Simplicius uses the same expression (metabolikê energeia) when referring to Aristotle and his associates at 428,10-11. 52. de Anima 3.5, 430a18, cf. Metaph. 12.7, 1072b27-9; 9, 1074b15-35. The MSS of Aristotle give the dative form of energeia (activity), but this text, Simplicius’ in de Caelo (279,21-2 CAG VII), the Latin text of Philoponus’ in DA 3.4-9 (‘substantia ens actus’, cf. de intellectu 57,74 (Verbeke) CLCAG 3) Sophonias’ paraphrase of the de Anima (126,30 CAG XXIII,1) and the de Anima commentary contentiously attributed by all its manuscripts to Simplicius put the nominative form (243,8.37 CAG XI), which has been accepted by modern editors (Bekker, Torstrik, Trendelenburg, Ross, Jannone) as well. 53. de Caelo 3.2, 301b31. In his commentary on this work Simplicius clearly connects it with the elements (esp. 598,7ff. CAG VII) 54. 225a32, explained in the previous lectio. 55. Physics 3.1, 201a10-11. 56. Phaedrus 245C5-8. 57. This is a far cry from Plato’s views as we know them from the dialogues. Instead, we are dealing with an Athenian Neoplatonist doctrine according to which the intellect emanates from Being (to on) which is its source and ground, superior to it, and is being in the proper sense of the word (ontôs on). What may be of further interest is that here Simplicius does not identify the One and the intellect, which was once claimed to be a characteristic mark of the Alexandrian Neoplatonists. This was K. Praechter’s view (‘Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus’, in Genethliakon C. Robert, Berlin 1910, 103-56) but it has been refuted by I. Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin. Hiéroclès et Simplicius, Paris 1978, esp. pp. 115-16. She has also pointed out that Simplicius’ theology stands very close to that of his contemporary Damascius, the last head of the Neoplatonic school at Athens: see op. cit., pp. 47-65 and ‘Le système théologique de Simplicius dans son commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète’, in P. Hadot (ed.), Le néoplatonisme, Paris 1971, 265-79, and most recently in Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète, intr. et éd. crit. par I. Hadot, Leiden 1996, 62-8. Cf. also Damascius in Philebum 105,1 (Westerink). 58. Accordingly, the soul passes its way first by processing out (proödos) of its original state and then being at rest (monê) and finally returning (epistrophê) to itself or its source which is within. This triadic scheme was fully elaborated by Proclus (El. Theol. props. 25-39). During procession it projects ‘lives’ (zôiai) from itself, that is, different life-functions such as vegetative and sensitive ‘lives’. Thus

130

Notes to pp. 32-35

we can say that the soul is separated from itself, because it left its true self; furthermore, it can be said to be self-generated because it projects life from itself and creates the human soul. By duplication, Simplicius may refer either to the World-Soul and the human souls existing in virtue of the former, or to the World-Soul and nature (phusis) which emanated from the World-Soul, though sometimes they are taken to be the same. For further details, see the de Anima commentary which is contentiously attributed to Simplicius, but was written certainly in that period and reflects the views of the Athenian Neoplatonists, e.g. 3,29-4,11; 8,35-9,14 CAG XI. 59. ‘Living through itself ’ (autozôn) occurs in the de Anima commentary contentiously attributed to Simplicius, 29,15; 246,24; 287,34 CAG XI as well, but see also e.g. Plotinus 3.8.8.12; Proclus, El. Theol. prop. 189; Damascius de Principiis 156,20 (= 11 108,7 (W.-C.)), 178,23 (= 11 136,1), 177,1 (= 11 141,8); in Parm. 145,27 (Ruelle) and, connected to the soul, Hermeias in Phaedr. 109,17 (Couvreur). 60. Simplicius refers to Parmenides 162C2 and Cat. 14, 15a13. 61. 3.1, 201a10-11. 62. The translation of this passage – and the following ones as well – is difficult because the term ousia is used sometimes as meaning existent or existence, sometimes as meaning substance. Simplicius applies it once in the sense it has in the Categories, that is to mean substance in contrast to the attributes, once in the more general sense of existent or existence, and even as reality (826,30), which was exploited also by the Neoplatonists many times. To make things more difficult, though it otherwise means substrate, hupokeimenon is also used here in the sense of substance. 63. This reflects not only what Aristotle said of matter in the Metaphysics (7.3, 1029a8-35) and Physics (1.8, 192a3-34; 2.1, 192b3-8; 3.6, 207a21-2; 4.9, 217b9-10) but also Plotinus’ view (2.4.5). It may be important to have in mind that in his commentary on Physics 193a3-34 Simplicius emphasises that Plato did not call that from which generation comes about matter (esp. 247,10ff.) although he was well aware of all of its characteristics. 64. Composite form (suntheton eidos) refers to the form linked to the matter: see Simplicius in Cat. 78,13-14; 334,26; in Cael. 98,3; 166,26. 65. ‘Substrate’ translates here ousia, but at line 23 (‘from substrate to substrate’) hupokeimenon. 66. Simplicius makes here a rather general statement which fits not only Plato but many other philosophers too. In Plato, see Sophist 247D9-E4 and 248C4-6 – this latter is ascribed to the ‘Friends of Forms’. 67. 225a31-2. 68. See 205a25-6. This is connected to the Aristotelian theory that every body has its own place and naturally moves towards and rests in its proper place: light bodies move up, the heavy ones down, cf. Physics 4.5, 212b29ff. 69. 226a27-9, cf. Metaph. 5.14, 1020a33-b2. ‘Essence’ translates ousia here, the first category. Ousia is not predicated of anything, but everything belonging to other categories is predicated of it. 70. Reading nôdon instead of noson. See Phys. 225b5 and note ad loc. (J.O.U.) 71. 5.1, 225a1; 6.4, 234b10-11; 6.10, 241a27; 7.2, 252b10. 72. In this passage, ‘extended’ and ‘extension’ translate paratasis or en paratasei, a term used never by Aristotle but frequently by Simplicius to signify the extension – and duration – of time and processes: see P. Hoffmann, ‘Paratasis. De la description aspectuelle des verbes grecques à la définition du temps dans le néoplatonisme tardif ’, REG 96 (1983), 1-26. Simplicius defines time as measure of the extension of being (metron tês tou einai parataseôs) and Hoffmann draws

Notes to pp. 35-37

131

attention to the origin of the term paratasis which was invented by the grammarians to signify the durative aspects of verbs, as contrasted to their ‘perfect’ tense. In the Appendice he also gives a list of passages in Simplicius where the definition is to be found. Plotinus also uses it when defining time at Enn. 3.7.8, 55-6, cf. 1.5.7, 23-8. 73. Form is acquired instantaneously, that is in the present instant. Aristotle says that certain forms such as white do not undergo the processes of coming to be and ceasing to be and in this way they may be called eternal (Metaph. 7.15, 1039b26; 8.3, 1043b14; 8.5, 1044b21). For further references see R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1983, 11n.5. 74. 5.2, 225b13, 225b15-226a19, a33. 75. 225a2. (J.O.U.) 76. The term ‘flowers’ (epanthei) and its cognates may come from the Chaldaic Oracles and are frequent in Proclus when referring to an entity (e.g. the soul) as an upshot of another one (e.g. the intellect). For details and references, see C. Guerard, ‘L’hyparxis de l’âme et la fleur de l’intellect dans la mystagogie de Proclus’, J. Pépin & H.D. Saffrey (eds), Proclus. Lecteur et interprète des ancients, Paris 1987, 335-49. It recurs in Hermeias’ in Phaedr. 182,23 (Couvreur) as well. In Simplicius, the term does not seem to require such a dependence: cf. 616,8, and also Simplicius(?) in DA 168,22. 77. The end of the lemma reads to poiein ê paskhein – action or passion – which is usually treated as a single category. But at 829,26-7 the commentary reads to poiein kai paskhein – action and passion. Unless they are treated as two categories, Simplicius has listed only six. (J.O.U.) Action and passion are coupled together as forming one category (Metaph. 5.7, 1017a26; 11.12, 1068a8-10); see also the further evidence for it in Ross’s commentary ad loc. Simplicius treats poiein and paskhein as a single category at 858,26 but instead of paskhein he uses peisis, which sometimes has a slightly different, more specialized meaning. In the context of the late Neoplatonic psychology, it refers to the result of the reception of the forms of the things sensed. The appearance of this term is a later development; Aristotle never used it. See also n. 139. 78. There is a lacuna here of which it is difficult to supply the sense. (J.O.U.) 79. The first sentence of the quotation contradicts Simplicius’ claim because what Alexander tries to establish is not that there is no change in time (en khronôi; he claims that every change is in time, cf. Quaestiones 1.22, 35,19 (Bruns)), but that there is no change into time (eis khronon). Later (830,16) he says only that there is no change from one time to another. In his treatise preserved in Arabic and Latin (which is based on the Arabic) he strengthens this view: cf. R. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time’, Phronesis 27 (1982), 58-81. Accordingly, time itself does not have coming to be and being (cf. 95,32 (Théry), p. 65 in Sharples’ paper) and what comes to be comes to be in time (96,39ff. (Théry), p. 66 in Sharples). 80. That time is not change was stated by Aristotle in 4.10, 218b18, and as a sign of it he claims that continuity of change does not does not involve the continuity of the time occupied in changing – there can be pauses, even though every intermediate position is traversed (226b27-30). For the view that time is the movement of the universe was traditionally attributed – at least by the Peripatetics – to Plato (cf. Plato Timaeus 39D1, although Simplicius disputes this interpretation at his in Phys. 702,33ff.), and the identification of time and movement simpliciter was ascribed to a group of the Pythagoreans (cf. Simplicius in Phys. 700,22). Those who opposed these views by saying that things that change can also be at rest are to be looked for among the followers of Aristotle who says (Physics 5.6, 229b23ff.) that rest (êremia) is the privation of movement insofar as it is opposed to movement (antikeitai, see also 5.2, 226a7 and Simplicius’ comments on it at 849,12-14,

132

Notes to pp. 37-39

850,15ff.); bodies moving naturally in one direction can be at rest by force. Although criticizing Aristotle’s definition of time, Strato of Lampsacus says that time serves to measure both movement and rest (frr. 78, 79a-c (Wehrli)) and is number of the before and after in movement as well as in rest (fr. 77 = Simplicius in Phys. 789,15-18). Following the objection by Eudemus fr. 83 (Wehrli) (= Simplicius in Phys. 702,1-19), Iamblichus too refutes the view that time is identical with motion; rather, it is prior to motion (in Tim. fr. 62 (Dillon) = Simplicius in Phys. 702,19-24) and transcendent to the sensible world (in Tim. fr. 63 = Simplicius in Phys. 793,27). Simplicius does not say that the view objected to is held by Plato and the Pythagoreans, but drawing on Simplicius’ report (epêgagen in the sense of ‘added’ or ‘contributed to’ at 702,21) we may surmise that he was clear that the targets of Eudemus’ criticism were Plato and Pythagoreans. 81. Aristotle proves that the now that divides past and present cannot be always the same or always changing at 4.10, 218a3-25. 82. In Alexander’s argument, the notion of intervening time between the two limits within which the thing changes is devoted to ruling out the possibility of change from one time into another. Accordingly, Alexander seems to accept that which Simplicius thinks he does not accept; that there is an intervening time. 83. These are standard examples of predicates falling under the category of posture – keisthai – which, like possession – ekhein – Aristotle excluded from being termini of change, as containing no contrariety. (J.O.U.) 84. 225b2. 85. According to the Categories, substance (ousia) underlies (hupokeisthai) other predicates (2b15, 37) and because the substrate (hupokeimenon) in a way also underlies the things that are, Aristotle is hesitating whether it is to be called substance (Metaph. 7.2). Transformations in substance are called coming to be and passing away in Metaph. 8.1, 1042a33, 12.2, 1069b9; GC 1.4, 319b33-320a2. 86. Physics 4.12, 221b1-2; 13, 222b19-26 where Aristotle says that time is the cause of passing away, and only incidentally of coming to be and existing, and even what we are accustomed to call passing away by time is rather only incidental to time. 87. Diels refers to Physics 4.8, 214b14 which is not quite right since here Aristotle does not make mention of moving upwards as coming to be of fire. Aristotle seems never to make such a statement. However, moving upwards is considered as a natural (and so perhaps essential) property of fire (4.8, 214b11-28; 7.4, 254b7-255a10) without which, then, fire does not exist. 88. In modern editions of Aristotle chapter 2 begins at ‘But there is no change’. Simplicius sees no natural break at this point. (J.O.U.) 89. 1.8, 191b15. (J.O.U.) According to Aristotle, things come into being from what incidentally is not-being, i.e. from their privation which is not inherent (enuparkhontos) in them. On the other hand, he adds (b17ff.) that e.g. a dog comes into being not out of animal qua animal, but out of an animal, and if a particular animal comes into being not incidentally, then it will not be from being, nor yet from not being as such. The reason why Simplicius insists that a substance does not come to be from a contrary substance is that for him the main point in generation may be the transmission of form which is the agent. The form, however, is a common predicate for things like parents and offspring (‘man begets man’, as Aristotle says e.g. in Metaph. 12.4, 1070b34, 5, 1071a20-1; Physics 2.2, 194b13; see also GC 2.10, 336a31-2, b6-7, b17) which nevertheless can have individual differences. The role of forms and universals as predicates has been examined in A.C. Lloyd, ‘Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic’, Phronesis 1 (1955-6), 58-72, 14660, and id., The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1991, 49-53, 62-8, who refers to

Notes to pp. 40-45

133

Simplicius in Cat. 82,35-83,20 when pointing out (p. 67) that there were three kinds of universal: (1) the transcendent which makes, e.g., animality for animals, (2) the animal which exists only in individual animals, and (3), the universal which is posterior, existing in our minds when we subtract all differences that modify animality in the outside world. For a similar view see also Philoponus in An. Post. 435,28-35 CAG XIII,3; Simplicius(?) in DA 124,9ff. CAG XI. 90. The view that fire and water are substances contrary to each other because their qualities are contraries may get some support from GC 2.3, 330b3-5, 331a3-6, where these elements are said to be made up of these basic qualities (hot, cold, dry, wet) and Aristotle is not here speaking about an underlying matter of fire which would be supposed to bear these qualities. 91. The link between relation and change has been investigated by C. Luna in the appendix of her ‘La relation chez Simplicius’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius. Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin and N.Y. 1987, 113-48. She thinks Simplicius elsewhere accepts the existence of transformation in relation, and that this transformation is natural (metaballei  pephuke), as is expressed most clearly in 409,12-32 (cf. also in Cat. 171,26; 172,4-5). Furthermore, she points out that Aristotle has different approaches to the problem simultaneously. See also n. 141. 92. Simplicius takes up this point again at 859,16. 93. 7, 6b25. (J.O.U.) Quoted also in almost the same context at 409,14-15. 94. ‘Relationship’ translates skhesis; a term used to signify not only logical relation but position, posture and state as well. It is frequently used in contrast to diathesis and then alludes to passing conditions. For this reason, C. Luna op. cit., 143 elucidates this difference by translating skhesis as ‘disposition instable et extrinsèque’ and diathesis as ‘disposition stable et intrinsèque’ but her references (859,18ff.; 860,2-3) do not necessitate such a sharp contradiction. For further explanation, see n. 141. 95. 224b26. (J.O.U.) 96. It seems that Simplicius quotes this passage as if it were a lemma since the first part of the sentence is at 8.3, 246b15, the second at line 17. 97. In reading this obscure and tortuous passage one must remember that Aristotle intends to be expounding an absurdity arising from supposing that there can be change of change and transformation of transformation. (J.O.U.) 98. Alexander’s interpretation is opposed not only by Simplicius, but by Ross as well who says (op. cit., 621) that the term ‘changer’ (kinoun) must be narrower than ‘agent’ (poioun) since an agent may act on a patient by bringing it into rest – and in this way he repeats Simplicius’ argument. 99. Here Simplicius seems to make sharp distinction between substance (ousia) and – the other – categories, which is not quite alien to Aristotle. If we have in mind the special role substance plays within the categories insofar as other attributes appear in the substance which is viewed as a particular unity (tode ti), then the distinction has some justification. 100. Repeated by Aristotle in Metaph. 11.12, 1068a15, by Simplicius at in Phys. 409,7-9; 1076,29-30. 101. In this passage, ‘substance’ translates ousia, ‘substrate’ hupokeimenon. 102. eidos – form – is omitted from some codices of the Physics and from the equivalent passage in the Metaphysics. At 840.9 the word is omitted from some codices of Simplicius. The text will then simply read ‘from one thing to another’. (J.O.U.) 103. In interpreting eidos at 225b22 as form Simplicius sides with Philoponus (in Phys. 789,31-33 CAG XVII) but their views are objected to by Ross (op. cit. 621) claiming that their proposal ‘is not a natural interpretation’ of the text. He renders

134

Notes to pp. 45-50

it as ‘into another mode of being’, and supposes Aristotle to be expressing himself more generally. Now, it seems that the two different interpretations do not exclude each other. In Simplicius, generation and corruption are also covered by this statement and involve receiving new form – although not necessarily a form in the sense of species, but form as a bundle of properties. And if form is conceived as a bundle of properties forming a unique collection in each case (as it is, see in Cat. 229,17-18, where the principle of individuation is treated, and for further references A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1991, p. 46), then any kind of qualitative or quantitative change is at the same time change in form as well. Simplicius illustrates it at 840,8-9 by the man who changes from disease to health. Change in the mode of being should include these kinds of change too. 104. Contrary differences are within the same genus, while contradictories are not. In Cat. 10, 11b17ff. contrary difference is said to be one of the species of antikeimenon, but in An. Pr. 1.17, 36b40; 2.15, 63b28-35, 64a32 the distinction is more clear cut. 105. Simplicius draws attention to the difficulty inherent when one accepts that change from e.g. sickness to health is also a change from one change into another. But change can be followed by rest as well. 106. In what follows, Simplicius is about to point out that the absurdity coming from the notion of change of change does not follow for coming to be for this is from not being into being. By ‘from not being a substrate into being a substrate’ he wants to allude to what he said earlier referring to 225a14-17; that generation is more basic and underlies further changes. 107. The variety of readings is abundant. Alexander reads hôste oupô ên êdê (‘so that it did not already exist’), Aspasius puts hôste oupô ên ginomenon haplôs, alla ginomenon êdê (‘so that it did not already exist when coming about simply but it was already coming to be’), Alexander knows of an alla ginomenon ên ginomenon êdê (‘but as coming to be, it was already coming to be’), and another hôste  alla ti ginomenon êdê (‘so  it was already coming to be something’), let alone the modern editors (for whom see Ross, op. cit., ad loc.). Simplicius says that the last version is contained in many copies. Furthermore he assumes that Alexander was familiar with the addition we find in Aspasius and we may suppose that Alexander mentions this version in the commentary without accepting it as a genuine reading. The interpretation of the passage turns on the meaning of haplê genesis translated here as ‘simple coming to be’. Alexander distinguished it from the generation of something. See also Ross, op. cit., p. 623. As a general feature of the text, it is interesting to notice that in this commentary Simplicius goes into details of different readings of Aristotle’s text and he does it always by referring to Alexander’s commentary. See C. Luna’s commentary in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories, fasc. 3, Leiden 1990, 112; she contrasts this practice to that followed by Simplicius in his in Cat. 108. The testimony of Aspasius is mentioned by P. Moraux, op. cit. vol. 2, 237. Aspasius links simple coming to be to the generation of substance (see 814,29-30 and n. 32). If generation comes to be and if what comes to be is what comes to be (to gignomenon gignomenon esti), then we cannot speak of this thing as coming to be without qualification. This is not a generation of substance (ousia), which is generation as such, but we are dealing with a process whereby something which already exists takes on new properties. In Diels’s edition, however, we have ‘simply becoming’ (to haplôs ginomenon at 845,25). But simple becoming cannot be contrasted to substance because at 814,29-30 Aspasius explicitly states that simple coming to be (haplê genesis) is said of generation without further attributes, that is to say, of the generation of a substance (e.g. that of a man or a horse). To get the

Notes to pp. 50-53

135

contrast required by Aspasius’ line of thought we should delete haplôs at 845,25 and read with C (Cod. Laurent. 85,5, eleventh century) [to] ginomenon. 109. ‘Becoming’ translates ginomenon, a participle signifying the thing to come about, and not genesis which would signify the process. 110. ‘Coming to be before [coming to be]’ translates progenesis. The term is otherwise unknown and it may well be that instead of progeneseôs the text had pro geneseôs originally. The guess may be reinforced by pro metabolês to be found in the same line, as well as by pro geneseôs at 847,14. 111. Difficulties of this sort with Aristotle’s account of infinity were raised by Christians who defended the doctrine of creation against Aristotle’s doctrine of eternity of the world. See C. Wildberg, Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1987, in this series. (J.O.U.) His other work on the same subject, now targeting Proclus, also contains some references to Aristotle’s arguments (H. Rabe (ed.), de Aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, Leipzig 1903). See also W. Wieland, ‘Die Ewigkeit der Welt (der Streit zwischen Joannes Philoponus und Simplicius)’, in D. Heinrich, W. Schulz, K.H. Volkmannn-Schluck (eds), Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken. Festschrift für H.-G. Gadamer, Tübingen 1960, 291-316; J. Verbeke, ‘Some later Neoplatonic views on divine creation and the eternity of the world’, in D.J. O’Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, Norfolk 1982, 45-53, notes on pp. 241-4; R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1983, chs. 13-14 and id., Matter, Space and Motion, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1988, ch. 15, and more recently, K. Verrycken, De vroegere Philoponos. Een studie van het alexandrijnse neoplatonisme, Brussels 1994, 232-55 and F.A.J. de Haas, John Philoponus on Matter. Towards a Metaphysics of Creation, Ph.D. diss., Leiden 1995, to be published by E.J. Brill in the series ‘Philosophia Antiqua’ in 1997. 112. 2.10, 336b31. (J.O.U.) 113. Physics 3.6, 206a9-b27. Contrary to Simplicius’ claim, it does not seem that here Aristotle is at odds with his own views expounded earlier in Book 3, for what he says here is only that there is no actual infinite regress; actual because we are concerned with generation. He accepts this view in Book 3 too. 114. 2.2, 194b13, see also GC 2.10, 336a31-2, b6-7, b17; Metaph. 12.4, 1070b34; 5, 1071a20. 115. 3.6, 206a27-9, 31-3. The MSS offer different versions which are discussed by Ross, op. cit. pp. 555-6. Simplicius here omits the lines 29a-31 which we find in Ross’s edition, saying that (495,8-17) they were omitted by many MSS and also Alexander was familiar with this omission. 116. By using the word ‘men’ Aristotle (206b2) and Simplicius are speaking about mankind in the case of which each member perishes but the succession of members never reaches the end because for Aristotle the natural species are eternal, and the same holds true of the successive portions of time as well. 117. That is, Aristotle’s argument is correct with the qualification that the causes are limited by the present term, e.g. his paternal and human causes by Socrates. It is not said of all kinds of series, but only of those – generation and transformation – that are supposed to go to infinity. 118. The being (to einai) of coming to be is the process of coming to be (to ginesthai), and not the thing which comes about in the process of coming to be. The reason for adding ‘i.e. coming to be’ (genesis) is not quite clear. Perhaps one could understand it as an emphasis on the process of coming to be, for nouns ending with -sis usually – or originally – refer to a process. Thus we should take it as meaning ‘that is to say/since [it is a process of] coming to be’. See also 851,22-3.

136

Notes to pp. 53-58

119. Simplicius quotes hotan ginêtai at 849,8 and 29; Ross has hotan genêtai at 226a8. (J.O.U.) 120. Opposed rest is taken by Simplicius to mean contrary to movement, not as contrary to another rest – in another place in the world – which is Philoponus’ solution (in Phys. CAG XVII). Ross sides with Simplicius. 121. ‘presupposition’ translates here proaxiôthen. The verb proaxiousthai (or proaxioun) is not charted in LSJ. See in Cael. 177,23; 225,4; 620,26; in Phys. 184,24. 122. Simplicius may refer to some Peripatetics. At least, Themistius (in Phys. 198,9-10 CAG V,2) claims that all that happens to the movement happens to rest as well. 123. 226a15. (J.O.U.) 124. ‘halts in’ translates hestêke kata, a term which here signifies unchanged existence, but in other texts of the late Neoplatonists it can refer to an instantaneous way of being and functioning as well. See esp. the commentary on the de Anima which was contentiously attributed to Simplicius (CAG XI). 125. Plato Timaeus 27D6-28A2 and also a far reminiscence to his Philebus 126Cff. where things of this world are said to be a mixture of the defining limit (form?) and the indefinite (a kind of matter?). 126. ‘Image’ translates here eikôn, ‘appears’ emphainomenon. Plato frequently uses this latter term and its cognates to signify appearances which are mirrorings of something which is prior to them, cf. Timaeus 46A5, 61C7, 65C3, 71B8; Rep. 3,402B6; Alc. 2,141A7; Theaet. 206D2. See also the pseudo-Platonic Definitions 413E5, 414E2-3, and Theophrastus’ Sens. 27. Plotinus also takes over this term, e.g. 1.8.8; 3.6.17; 4.3.18, and, in his wake, the late Neoplatonists use it abundantly. On the other hand, the usage of the term reminds us of the Neoplatonic theory according to which in order to become suitable for receiving the form things must previously take in the appearance (emphasis) of it, cf. Simplicius(?) in DA 56,25ff.; 63,23; 67,25; 76,26-7. 127. The fault Simplicius sees in Aristotle’s argument is that its conclusion is not absurd in the case of such things as have their being in coming to be and passing away. For explanation see 851,30ff. 128. Reading kineitai hê kinêsis kai gignetai hê genesis at 854,2-3 instead of kineitai kai hê kinêsis ginetai hê genesis. (J.O.U.) H. Bonitz, op. cit., 215-16 (= pp. 33-4 in the reprint edition) reads the same. 129. At 226a13 the lemma reads dei gar einai tên toude ek toude eis tode kinêsin ê genesin; at 854,14 the text of Simplicius reads dei gar einai ti tên toude ek toude eis tode kinêsin ê genesin. Ross has dei gar einai [ti] tên toude ek toude eis tode kinêsin [kai mê kinêsin] ê genesin. Simplicius has expounded the text as at 854,14, not as in the lemma. (J.O.U.) Alexander reads then ek toude eis tode kinêsin mê kinêsin, and in the excerpts of Philoponus’ in Phys. 5-8, we find the paraphrase dei en têi ginomenêi genesei ê kinoumenêi kinêsei einai men ti to hupokeimenon, einai de ti kai to ex hou pros tôi eis ho (‘and even in the coming to be generation and the moving movement there has to be something that is the substrate and something which is also the out of which (to ex hou) in addition to the into which (pros tôi eis ho)’, 791,4-5 CAG XVII). 130. It deserves attention that Simplicius says Themistius only seems to accept it. The reason for this caution is that at his in Phys. 171,9-10 (CAG V,2) he says ‘therefore it is at the same time change and not change’ (hôst’ hama te kinêsis, kai ou kinêsis) and this does not fit in with the next arguments, that coming to be of learning will not be learning. Rather, this paraphrase may point to the previous arguments against change of change where, at 225a16ff., Aristotle distinguishes two senses in which we can speak about change of change; in one sense it is possible,

Notes to pp. 58-62

137

but in another sense impossible. And the text of Themistius’ paraphrase is also doubtful because Schenkl reads kinêsin in both places and the clause is followed by a lacuna in his edition. 131. 225a15-16. 132. The reference is not obvious. Diels suggests tentatively 319a13. (J.O.U.) Instead of Diels’s proposal, 1.8, 322a16ff. may be much better since there he says that what comes to be is not the animal as universal. 133. 853,15ff. 134. Aristotle demonstrated it at 225b23-33, and see also the qualifications by Simplicius at 843,4-16. 135. We have no other evidence for this version, but it fits Alexander’s explanation very well. 136. Simplicius is not quite clear here. Why cannot the physician’s knowledge or learning be a cause of his/her health? Aristotle’s argument does not rule out that this learning causes health incidentally; though he does not include running and learning as cause simpliciter of the cure, but he does not necessarily regard them as chance changes, as Simplicius takes him to mean. Alexander’s point might be that running can be the cause of cure, but not cause in the principal sense. 137. 225b23, 226a19-20. 138. 7, 6b15. (J.O.U.) 139. Action and passion seem to be treated here and at 860,2 as constituting a single category: for further details see n. 77. The use of peisis at 858,26 (but not in 858,25 and 859,1) instead of paskhein is a later development, Aristotle never uses it. One of the first occurrences of this term is in Sextus Empiricus, AM 7,384, and Plotinus uses it excessively (e.g. 1.4.5.12; 3.1.4.7; 3.6.9.33, 19.9; 4.4.31.2; 5.9.10.8; 6.1.19.12), just like the later Neoplatonists. 140. 225b3. (J.O.U.) The term ‘positive privation’ (sterêsis kataphatikê at 859,13) means that a negative attribute is denoted by a separate word (e.g. bald), and not by a negation of the positive attribute (e.g. not having hair). In this sense, the privation is affirmative. It is doubtful whether white can be included in this scheme for this does not signify privation. For textual and other problems see also n. 41 and 44. 141. ‘Condition’ translates diathesis, ‘posture’ to keisthai, ‘state’ to ekhein. Talking of relative (skhetikos, see also 860,29-30) and weak categories, Simplicius alludes to all categories except substance, quantity, quality and place. According to him, the other six categories do not contribute to the condition of the subject. It is hard to decide what condition means in the present case. If it means something essential or inner, as C. Luna seems to suggest (op. cit. in n. 91, 143-5), as contrasted to skhesis which would hint at something outer, then one could ask for the reason why a quality like the colour of the eyes as a qualitative feature contributes to the intrinsic nature of the man, but that which she or he does or suffers does not. Another point to have in mind is the term deusopoios (translated as ‘permanent’ in 859,19-20). This word means dyeing, staining or colouring and Simplicius may have come across the adjective in Plato’s Republic (429E1 and, connected with opinion (doxa), 430A3) and also in Damascius in Parm. 285,5 (Ruelle). He employs it – in adverbial form – also in his in Cat. 253,29. The reference is then not necessarily to an inner structure but rather to a prominent and characteristic feature which may or may not be stable, while by skhesis – paralleled to to keisthai and to ekhein – the commentator alludes to something faint and uncharacteristic. At 860,15-16 skhesis and hupokeimenon (substrate) are paralleled to each other and distinguished from diathesis, which does not suggest that the former is simply unstable and extrinsic, as C. Luna thinks. Furthermore,

138

Notes to pp. 62-63

another term, hexis, is clearly distinguished from pathos at 887,11ff. and the distinction shows that hexis must refer to a stable, more constant state while pathos alludes to temporary affections such as fever. At 887,27-8 hexis happens to be contrasted to diathesis; the former is said to be permanent (monimos), but the latter is called a pathos that can be easily lost. But if so, it cannot be claimed that in the passage referred to by Luna diathesis signifies stable and intrinsic nature. Thus change is denied in respect of relation not because skhesis would be peripheral. See also nn. 91 and 94. 142. 221b11-12. 143. Natural place releases the proper motion of the elements and, consequently, that of the bodies that are made up of these elements, cf. GC 2.3, 330b31ff., 8, 334b32ff. For further references see R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, London 1988, 186-7. 144. By eternal categories Simplicius may mean predicates referring to eternal features of eternal things, like things in the supralunary world, and also – in some cases – to the Ideas. This latter possibility may be indicated by the use of aïdios (eternal) that usually – but not always – signifies timeless existence. According to Iamblichus’ intellective theory, the definition of each category applies more fully to the eternal world of Ideas than to the sensible world. See P. Hadot, ‘The Harmony of Plotinus and Aristotle according to Porphyry’, translated in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1990, 125-40, from the French in Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente, Rome 1974, 31-47. 145. Eudemus fr. 93a (Wehrli). Accordingly, Eudemus thinks that relation must be stable and unchanging and by saying that everything changes in time he hints at the eternal nature of the relations (see also the use of pantê pantôs, ‘anything whatsoever’). It takes time to change (fr. 59 = Simplicius, in Phys. 411,15-18) and to be never the same. In his comments (op. cit., in n. 26) Wehrli also points to fr. 59 as a parallel passage where the same statement is to be found. The reference there is to the second book of Eudemus’ Physics. See also n. 147. 146. Physics 3.1, 201a1011. 147. Theophrastus fr. 153C (FHSG). The debate between Theophrastus and Eudemus is evidenced also in Simplicius’ in Phys. 412,31-413,9 (Theophrastus 153B (FHSG) and Eudemus fr. 59 (Wehrli)). While assuming that there is change in the category of time, Eudemus seems to deny change in the category of relation. Theophrastus (153B) admits that there is no change of what is in relation according to a ratio (kata logon) – and this is the example given by Eudemus – but he claims that there is change of what is in relation according to a potentiality (kata dunamin) – the example may be the relation of agent to patient and vice versa (see n. 2 in FHSG vol. 1, p. 311). The passage is briefly discussed by P. Steinmetz, Die Physik des Theophrast von Eresos, Bad Homburg 1964, 152-4 (who thinks Simplicius may have misconstrued Theophrastus) and by R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1988, 198. Elsewhere (153A-B) the reference is to Theophrastus’ de Motu, Books 2-3, but this work can be included in his Physics that was organized to deal with the principles of nature and change first and then with problems concerning the soul, which also belong to the realm of physics, as he believed. See also n. 2. 148. Eudemus fr. 93b (Wehrli). If change belongs to the realm of states (skheseis) and substrates, and generation to that of the substances (ousiai, see 860,15-19) then for Eudemus, dispositional transformation differs from change of state by being restricted to transformations in quality, quantity and perhaps place, in which he clearly contradicts Aristotle, as is obvious also to Simplicius, see 861,9-19. 149. 5, 229b12. (J.O.U.) 150. The testimony belongs to 153C in FHSG.

Notes to pp. 64-67

139

151. This idiomatic truth about the word phora does not apply to ‘travel’. (J.O.U.) 152. Simplicius has in mind what Aristotle was saying in Metaph. 5.14, 1020a33-5. See also Ross, op. cit., ad loc. 153. Affective qualities are mentioned in Metaph. 5.14, 1020b8-12 and treated in the Categories 9a28-10a11. 154. ‘Otherness’ translates allotês here: the usual term heterotês is used also by Simplicius in this commentary. LSJ is familiar with this occurrence of allotês only. 155. On constitutive (sustatikos) difference, see n. 159. 156. Eudemus fr. 94 (Wehrli) repeats Aristotle here. For a similar statement in the Physics, Wehrli (op. cit., p. 107 n. 26) refers to 5.5, 229a23-7. 157. See Themistius’ in Phys. 172,4-12 (CAG V,2), followed also by Ross, op. cit., p.625. But Themistius says only that change in respect of more and less is to be observed mostly (mallon) in alteration. Alexander applies this principle to the uniformity and non-uniformity of change as well, which he considers as qualities of change, see 895,27ff. and n. 240. 158. Porphyry 160F (Smith) = fr. 46 (Romano). In his explanation of 226b1-2, then, Porphyry falsely claims that here Aristotle simply did not envisage the possibility of change in respect of more or less in other categories. Later on, at 229a2-3, Aristotle makes mention of interrupted travel which therefore can be called travel in a secondary, derivative sense. 159. For this statement, Simplicius may have got some support from Aristotle’s Metaphysics 5.5, 1020a33ff. where we are told that quality is in one way said of the differences of substance, such as two-footed (animal) of the man. In this account, quality seems to exceed even the broad limits described in the Categories. But a much greater role was assigned to qualities in Plotinus who regarded them as, along with matter, the basic constituents of Aristotle’s sensible world. In his criticism of Aristotle’s scheme of the categories he tried to reduce all the accidental features into qualities and called Aristotle’s sensible substance a conglomerate of qualities and matter (sumphorêsis poiotêtôn kai hulês, 6.3,8, 19-20; see also 1.4.6.8 and for a general treatment of the whole topic, 2.6). For a convincing interpretation see K. Wurm, Substanz und Qualität. Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation der plotinischen Traktate VI 1, 2 und 3, Berlin and N.Y. 1973, 250-62. Moreover, constitutive (sustatikai) differences are differences in genus, species and common nature, which separate things at different levels and sometimes belong to the definition. They are distinguished from divisive (diairetikai) differences that are at the same level of division and distinguish co-ordinate species. See also Philoponus, in Phys. 76,18 CAG XVI. Simplicius(?) (in DA 83,2-5 CAG XI) employs it in a different sense. For another, slightly different distinction between divisive or constitutive differences, see also Ammonius, in Porphyrii Isagogen 118,11-18 (CAG IV,3). Accordingly, divisive or completive (sumplêrôtikai) differences are between species within one genus while constitutive differences pertain to the genera. The distinction itself may come from Porphyry, Isagogê 10,5-21 (CAG IV,1). Boethius translates the terms as divisiva and constitutiva respectively: cf. 36,5ff. (CAG IV,1). 160. Reading epidekhomenas instead of epidekhomenai at 864,31. (J.O.U.) 161. Characteristic (kharaktêristikê) quality refers to a quality which inheres (enuparkhei) in the object and determines its form. Therefore the term is used in the meaning of essential quality as well. At his in Cat. 103,31-3 Simplicius says that the difference which defines the essence (ousia) of the genus seems to inform it and characterize the substance (ousia) with regard to the quality. 162. êremein: êremia is opposed to the monê of what cannot change. (J.O.U.) 163. The sphere of the fixed stars that circles around the earth. (J.O.U.)

140

Notes to pp. 67-71

Simplicius seems to follow Aristotle rather than Plato who says in the Timaeus 40B9-C1 that the earth rotates around the pole that stretches through all (peri ton dia pantos polon). For Aristotle, see de Caelo 2.2, 285b9-21; Meteorologica 2.5, 362a33. In his in de Caelo, Simplicius keeps the Platonic meaning of the term (532,6.12) when clearly referring to Plato. He discusses the term polos in the lemma to 285b8-28 (390,1-393,38). 164. ‘Ascendent’ translates anatolê used in the sense of rising point of any celestial body including the Sun (hence its meaning of east) and also the point where the eastern horizon cuts the zodiac, cf. Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos 1.6. Simplicius examines it briefly at in his in de Caelo 418,19ff.; 420,29-34 and mentions it at in Phys. 389,8-10; 134,1; 643,35; 135,7.10. For the early material concerning this issue see T. Heath, Aristarchus of Samos, Oxford 1913. 165. Aristotle claims it in 225b3-5. 166. The difference between contraries and contradictories is discussed by Aristotle in the Categories chs. 10-11. 167. ‘Converts to’ translates anakampei, a term used to signify the reversion of a thing to its source and that is on a level with epistrephein. It occurs also 821,10. The doctrine recurs in Damascius who (in Phaed. 1, 234,5-6 (Westerink)) also claims that after undergoing privation nothing converts to possession. Cf. 2, 64,6, 15-16. 168. The text reads ti de êremia, hoti sterêseôs akinêsia tou pephukotos kineisthai  ‘rest is the changelessness of privation of what is of a nature to change’. Diels conjectures sterêsis tou dektikou tês kinêseôs ê hote after hoti. The translation merely omits sterêseôs. (J.O.U.) Diels’s conjecture has some support in the text of the Physics. 169. 226b8. (J.O.U.) 170. hama; often best translated as ‘simultaneous’ or ‘at once’. But often, as here, used with a spatial significance. (J.O.U.) 171. The three books are 6, 7 and 8 which we said (801,12) formed a section of the Physics distinct from that formed by the first five books. (J.O.U.) Because here Simplicius claims that by carrying only some supplementary material to Book 3, Book 5 lacks its own particular subject and this may lie at the bottom of the troubles which concern the arrangement of the books of the Physics. For if Book 5 has no peculiar subject then it could be claimed that it serves only to recapitulate the main points which were useful for treating change which is the subject of Books 6-8 entitled by ancient commentators On change (Peri kinêseôs). See also n. 2. 172. epei; Ross reads ei and does not give Simplicius’ reading in his apparatus. (J.O.U.) The passage in question is at 231a21 that belongs to Book 6 ch. 1., and see the apparatus criticus in Ross’s edition with commentary (referred to in n. 2 above) there. 173. Cat. 13, 14b24. (J.O.U.) The term sêmantikê phônê is used by Aristotle in de Int. 16a19 and occurs many times in the late Neoplatonic discussions of the Categories and de Interpretatione. 174. 4.6, 213b20. (J.O.U.) 175. In the fourth book the place of a thing was defined as being the inner limit of its container. (J.O.U.) See 4.2, 209a31-b1, 4, 212a14-21. Alexander may have relied on the Categories 5a8-14, where Aristotle speaks of place as a continuum and justifies that by pointing out that the parts of a body occupy a place and for this reason the place occupied by the whole body must contain parts sharing the same limit. Therefore, just like the body, place too must be continuous. 176. 4.2, 210a5. 177. Eudemus fr. 95 (Wehrli). Aristotle too denies that two bodies could be in the same place at the same time, cf. Phys. 4.1, 209a6-7. Wehrli (op. cit., p. 107 n.

Notes to pp. 72-73

141

26) thinks that in distinguishing between terms in the strict sense (to akribes) and terms according what is sufficient (hikanon), Eudemus displays his interest in linguistic phenomena. On the other hand, Eudemus takes the view that total interpenetration is impossible even in the case of mixtures, which might be a reflection on early Stoic doctrines, which allowed total interpenetration in blended mixtures. The term kekramenoi (cognate of krasis, used rarely by Aristotle, e.g. GC 1.10, 328a8-9, but later a Stoic term for blend or blending) may indicate this. Eudemus may have felt the need to rectify Aristotle’s notion of ‘together’ (hama) which – at first sight – leaves some room for the view that two things can be together in place. 178. In Alexander’s explanation surfaces and limits are together and in the same place only incidentally and the surface itself is in place only incidentally too. In emphasizing that only those things can be together that are continuous, he relies on the concept of mixture which implies that some mixtures (such as that of wine and water) can constitute a continuous unit. See Aristotle, GC 1.5, 321b1-2 (to sunolon migma); 6, 322b8ff.; 10, 327a30ff., 328a5-15 (esp. 10-11: to mikhthen homoiomeres), b22. Furthermore, because Aristotle introduced the concept of ‘together’ as involved in the definition of touching, to avoid admitting interpenetration Alexander introduced a second sense of ‘together’, that of ‘fitting with each other’ (to epharmozon) which does not imply spatial overlap. Later on, in 880,9-10, he is said to assume that Aristotle used the term ‘touching’ as a substitute for ‘fitting with each other’. Simplicius uses the term epharmogê in the same context, and perhaps for the same reason, at 587,32-4, cf. also in de Caelo 60,8; 184,21; 574,7; in Cat. 378,6. The term epharmozei was used also in psychological contexts by Alexander (de Anima 68,8-13, CAG suppl. 2,1; Quaestiones 3.9, 97,7-12 CAG suppl. 2,2). In the commentary contentiously attributed to Simplicius it is used to signify the appropriate contact between the concepts (logoi) projected by the soul and the forms of outer things: cf. 126,11 CAG XI. 179. ‘Progression’ translates here propodismos. Originally, in arithmetical works, the term referred to a progression of numbers from the one (cf. Moderatus ap. Stobaeum Anth. I 8; Theo of Smyrna p. 18 (Hiller)) but in Damascius it comes to mean progression from a higher principle, cf. de Princ. 117,3; 145,17; 149,27; 240,17 (Ruelle) = 2 48,25; 90,20; 97,10-11; 3 36,1 (Westerink-Combès); in Parm. 72,28; 89,5; 90,19 (Ruelle), and in Phaed. 1 247,9 (Westerink). Simplicius uses it in a similar sense at 34,8 and 887,7 as well: cf. his in de Caelo 32,20; 36,31; 93,15 (‘from the one’ (monas)); 491,24. The first Neoplatonist who employed it may have been Iamblichus, probably in his in Cat., cited by Simplicius in Cat. 117,20. 180. Given that touching is said to be between being together on one hand and continuity and unification on the other, Simplicius thinks that being together does not necessarily involve touching, since being together means only being in the same primary place where – accordingly – two things can exist nearby. This notion of primary place, however, seems to contradict the passage at Physics 4.2, 209a33-b1 where Aristotle says that primary place is the peculiar place (idios topos) ‘which surrounds only you and nothing else’ (hos periekhei ouden pleon ê se). 181. It is clear from 872,25 that Simplicius read tou pragmatos ê tou khronou, not tou pragmatos mê tou khronou as in the received text. (J.O.U.) See also 873,11. Diels says that Themistius also reads ê at his in Phys. 172,27 CAG V,2, but Schenkl puts here mête and his apparatus does not show any other readings in the MSS. 182. cf. Physics 3.5, 205a6-7, see also 6.5, 236b2ff. 183. Above and below, not to right and left nor in front and behind, because the natural place of an element is determined by its distance from the centre of the earth. (J.O.U.)

142

Notes to pp. 73-77

184. The text reads tôn emmesôn enantiôseôn. The translation is rather of tôn emmesôn enantiôn. Cf. enantia emmesa at 871,28. (J.O.U.) 185. In this way, the movement will not be continuous even if there is no temporal interruption between striking the highest note and then striking the lowest. This is an illustration of Aristotle’s statement that chronological continuity is irrelevant to the continuity of change. It is the subject matter in which change takes place that matters. See also 873,10ff. To signify subject matter Aristotle has the word pragma (for a similar use Ross points to 227b28) while Simplicius uses hupokeimenon which is rather ambiguous here given that the term usually refers to the substrate, though metaphorically it can allude also to the distance to be traversed during the change. See also 873,10ff. 186. It is hard to understand this last sentence. outhen in the Greek is a later form than ouden, and instruments were said to speak (phtheggesthai) in the ancient world as commonly as nowadays. What did Simplicius find old-fashioned? (J.O.U.) He might have found, if not necessarily old-fashioned but archaic (arkhaioprepôs), the sense in which the verb phtheggesthai had been used. Originally it means ‘to utter a sound’ (Il. 11,603; 21,341) and later it came to mean also ‘to utter’, ‘to call by name’ or simply ‘to name’. Aristotle uses it in the original sense in which it was used also by Homer. 187. Simplicius’ explanation is in line with Ross’s, for which see op. cit., p. 628. 188. Terms referring to the regular constructions of Greek forensic speeches. (J.O.U.) 189. Diels points to 3, 439b18, but the passage where Aristotle lists colours is in fact 4, 442a17-30. These basic colours are black, grey, red, purple, green, blue and white, the rest being a mixture of them. Simplicius’ hesitation concerning the number of colours may issue from Aristotle’s remark that grey can only be a variant of black (l.18). 190. ‘etc.’ translates tas ephexês. This is rather odd and the emendation suggested by M. Tardieu (‘Les calendriers en usage à Harrân d’après les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d’Aristote’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius. Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin and N.Y. 1987, 40-61, esp. p. 40 n. 3) gives a better sense. He prefers to read ta ephexês or rather tas hexês (cf. ta hexês in 1.11). 191. According to LSJ’s definitions of premnon and stelekhos the stem would come to be before the crown, which is implausible. (J.O.U.) 192. M. Tardieu (op. cit., n. 190) points out that all of these calendars were in use in Harrân, including the Attic one, which is a result of the Macedonian conquest. He takes it as evidence for Simplicius writing this commentary at Harrân. But reservations have been formulated by P. Foulkes, ‘Where was Simplicius?’, in JHS 112 (1992), 143, and S. van Riet, ‘À propos de la biographie de Simplicius’, in Revue philosophique de Louvain 89 (1991), 506-14. Their objections have been dealt with by I. Hadot, Simplicius. Commmentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète, Leiden 1996, pp. 9-10 n. 4, pp. 32-6. 193. Perhaps Simplicius is thinking of a lecture room with ordinary seats (bathra) for the students and the kathedra for the professor. Hence ex cathedra! (J.O.U.) 194. This slightly ironical remark is made also by Themistius, in Phys. 355,3. It is not quite clear why he felt justified to give these examples for both the temple and the gymnasium are buildings and both contest and procession take place in time. In the former example the unity in species seems to be taken for granted. 195. It appears that Simplicius read grammê grammês ê monas monados, omitting ê grammai and ê monades, and the text of Aristotle in the lemma is given

Notes to pp. 78-80

143

with this omission. Ross reads the text ascribed to Alexander by Simplicius. (J.O.U.) And he does not make mention of the other reading. 196. 226b27. 197. 225b3. 198. ‘Transformation between opposites’ translates hê kata antiphasin metabolê. In Simplicius, antiphasis usually refers to contradictories (in Phys. 967,28-9; 1020,12; 1155,28; in Cat. 19,11; 44,21). In Aristotle, the term is used to signify a contradictory pair of propositions (Cat. 10, 13a37-b35; Int. 6, 17a25-33; 13, 22a34; An. Pr. 1.15, 34b28-9; An. Post. 2.2, 72a11-12). Chrysippus took transformation between opposites to mean an argument such as: either A or not-A. But not A. Therefore not-A (SVF 2, 261, p. 87,43-88,2 = Alexander of Aphrodisias in An. Pr. 19,3ff. CAG II,1). See also pseudo(?)-Alexander of Aphrodisias in SE 81,35; 103,16 CAG II,3. 199. Things between are needed to make change continuous. It is not ruled out, however, that transformation takes place between states having no intermediary state, such as death, for there is no intermediary state between life and death, or between striking a high note and then immediately striking the lowest one, in which case the intermediary notes have been left out. See also 872,16-873,10. The whole issue is closely connected to the contrariety of changes, treated by Aristotle in ch. 5. For Simplicius’ explanation see esp. the lemmata at 901,19-909,28. 200. This remark fits in with the Neoplatonic scheme of emanation and participation, but is never claimed by Aristotle. It seems that this is the only place where the term hupersunekhes (‘supercontinuous’ – a way of forging words, which is typical of the Athenian Neoplatonists) occurs and refers to the source of continuity from which things acquire their own continuity, both temporal and spatial, while the source cannot be involved in spatio-temporal existence. 201. Eudemus fr. 96 (Wehrli). Wehrli, op. cit., p. 107 n. 26 draws attention to the fact that Eudemus takes organic unity (to sumphues) to be an independent idea while Aristotle regards it as a synonym for continuous. What Simplicius objects to is however not only this innovation but also the rank of touching and being next in this line, for, according to Aristotle, being next is more general, simpler, uniting and inclusive. 202. These are the Platonists and Pythagoreans whose views were discussed by Aristotle in Metaph. 13.1-3. They considered numbers as separate entities existing in their own right. It is to be noted that despite attempts to reconcile the views of Aristotle and Plato, Aristotle’s theory of abstraction was rejected by the late Athenian Neoplatonists who – in the wake of Iamblichus – put forward a projectionist doctrine according to which mathematical objects are concepts (logoi) in the mind (dianoia, discursive intellect) and images of them are projected into the geometer’s imagination. These images are perfect embodiments of mathematical concepts and definitions since they are derived from these very concepts or forms. But they are only images and the true subject matter of geometry is, e.g., the logos of the triangle which underlies those images. For details and further references see I. Mueller, ‘Aristotle’s doctrine of abstraction in the commentators’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1990, 463-80. In this respect these commentators seem to dissent also from the views proposed by Plato and the Old Academy, as we know them from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Books 13-14. 203. ‘Point’ translates here sêmeion, a term used also by Euclid in the Elements in the same sense, but some lines above (580,5.6.7.8) we find stigmê, which Aristotle used many times. Simplicius seems to take them as interchangeable. Philoponus connects the use of stigmê to the Pythagoreans: see his in Phys. 792,26-793,3. 204. For the passage in Aristotle (227a29) see Ross’s note in op. cit., ad loc. This

144

Notes to pp. 81-86

emphasis of Alexander on the equivalence of touch and coincidence (or fitting together, epharmozein) is based on his assumption of a second meaning of the term ‘together’, which is in fact this ‘fitting together’. See also n. 178. 205. See the report on the Pythagorean doctrines in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 13.4, 1078b22ff.; 6, 1080a38ff.; 1080b16-22; 8, 1083b8ff.; 14.3, 1090a17ff.; 1090b15ff. 206. 227a31. The first reading has been accepted by Ross and there is no trace of the other one in the surviving MSS. 207. i.e. not abstracted from the limits of the bodies, as Aristotle held. (J.O.U.) These are the Pythagoreans above: see n. 203. 208. Most obviously in Book 4, chapter 6 of the Metaphysics. (J.O.U.) See also 10.1, 1052b15, and ch. 2. 209. This has been used as an evidence for the existence of the prime mover in Book 8. 210. The reading is mentioned by Ross in the apparatus but there is no other trace of it in the MSS. 211. Simplicius quotes leukotêtos de ouk estai at 882,22. At 882,29 he quotes leukotêtos de ouk esti. Ross reads leukotêtos d’ouketi. At both points Simplicius continues: dio pôs eidei; Ross reads dio tô eidei. Simplicius reads leukansis leukansei without adding pasê at 882,23 and 882,30. (J.O.U.) It is not clear why Diels accepts estai at 882,22 and esti at 29 since the text must have had the same reading in both places, given that they refer to one and the same passage of the Physics. For other details see Ross’s commentary ad loc. 212. See 882,14-15. 213. mia kinêsis houtôs. Ross reads kinêsis mia houtôs. (J.O.U.) And he does not make mention of Simplicius’ reading, although this seems to be supported by Philoponus (in Phys. 793,28-9) too. 214. This is not exactly what Aristotle says. The phrase tôi eidei has been taken from Themistius’ paraphrase (kat’ eidos at in Phys. 174,27 CAG V,2), as Diels has pointed out. 215. This sentence is taken from Themistius’ in Phys. 174,28-9, as Diels has pointed out. 216. Simplicius points out that Aristotle’s definition of change (as one in species) is not in line with the view expounded here, that circular and straight motion are specifically different. He tries to solve the query by supposing that linear and circular motion constitute the sub-species of the change. 217. Eudemus fr. 97 (Wehrli). By claiming that time as well as alteration and travel cannot be counted as one in number, Eudemus seems to reject any possibility of movement being numerically one. For being numerically one requires one time, and if time cannot be the same but continually becomes different, then any chance for a numerically identical movement will be ruled out. What may require some qualification, however, is whether time as one in species can or cannot be a ground for a motion which is numerically one. Simplicius touches the problem at 872,16873,9 and following Aristotle he admits that motion can be continuous even if the time in which it takes place is not continuous. This is a much stronger claim since it maintains the continuity of movement even in the case of the discontinuity of time in which the whole change occurs. In what follows, however, Simplicius is ready to accept that a kind of resuming signals that the change is not one numerically, but it is quite clear (although the text is corrupt) that this resuming covers the case of having a short rest while walking from Piraeus to Athens, for later he adds that to be numerically identical a movement needs continuous time, and time without a break (886,18). The problem is examined by Alexander of Aphrodisias as well: cf. Quaest. 1.14, 23,7ff.; 1.23 (Bruns). For further references

Notes to pp. 86-92

145

see R. Sharples’s n. 237 to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestiones 1.1-2.15, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1992, 78. 218. Reading Diels’s conjecture tês phthoras at the lacuna in 886,5. (J.O.U.) 219. SVF 2 627. It may be useful to have in mind that according to this text the Stoics clearly debated whether in this case we can speak of the numerically same person: see R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1982, 119 n. 32., and id., Time, Creation and the Continuum, London and Ithaca N.Y. 1983, 183-4. 220. Reading en heni with C. The text has hen einai with most MSS, which is impossible. (J.O.U.) We have two ways of explaining the passage. Either it can be a reference to change in quantity, quality, place or substance, and in that case eidê katêgorias means kinds of categories, or we can understand this expression as referring to any particular change which can be subsumed under the four categories above. 221. This passage is not included in D-K, but for parallels see e.g. Heraclitus B 12 and 91. 222. It seems that the problem of numerical identity is linked to the distinction between dispositions (hexeis) on one hand and conditions (diatheseis) and affections (pathê) on the other. If there is change in respect of affection or condition then the thing that has changed can remain identical with the thing going to change. But if the change concerns disposition then there will no longer be numerical identity. Moreover, if the dispositions are two the activities also must be two. 223. Aristotle devotes GC Book 1, ch. 5 to this subject. 224. This reading of Alexander is not examined in Ross’s commentary, though registered in the apparatus. Simplicius’ interpretation is not necessarily so unsatisfactory as Ross claims (op. cit., p. 631) for by keeping hexeis at 228a14 and taking ei men duo, di’ auto touto (‘if they are two for that very reason’) at 228a13 to refer to dispositions too (and the rest of the argument on activities and changes resulting from dispositions is elliptical), Simplicius (as well as Philoponus in Phys. 794,10ff.) admits that dispositional change involves change in activity (energeia), but not necessarily vice versa. In Alexander’s interpretation, the reference to substrates (of change, as well as of disposition) seems to avoid supposing an elliptical structure in the sentence and at the same time it gives a sound argument. 225. to gar diaireton sunekhes. This is translated as printed. But whereas Aristotle frequently says that every change is continuous and that everything continuous is divisible, I can find no place where he makes the false assertion that everything divisible is continuous. One may divide a discontinuous pile of bricks into two. Also this falsehood is not needed here. Did Simplicius write, or mean to write, diaireton gar to sunekhes? (J.O.U.) 226. 227a6: That is contiguous which is next and touches. 227. ‘Matter of change’ translates kath’ ho kinountai and here may signify not so much the underlying matter of change as the categorial frames in which the change takes place. 228. Extremities are the limits: points, lines and – in the case of time – moments. 229. Philoponus (in Phys. 794,25-6) and Themistius (in Phys. 176,16-17) side with Simplicius whose remarks may get support from some Peripatetic writings as well. 230. hoion hê lampas ek diadokhês phoras genomenê, sunekhous de ou, and hoion hê lampas ek diadokhês phora ekhomenê, sunekhês de ou. The latter has been translated in the lemma as more probable. The Greek word lampas can mean simply ‘torch’, or, as here, ‘torch-race’. (J.O.U.) 231. Rep. 1, 328A2-5.

146

Notes to pp. 92-98

232. 889,19ff. 233. For a similar argumentation see 1043,6-27. 234. ‘In existence’ translates ousian and refers to the substance which is in this case an individual entity, as contrasted to the species or genus, and the same holds for 893,29 as well. 235. In the case of the Platonists we should think of the One (to hen) contrasted to the indefinite duality (hê aoristos duas), and they claimed that the theory had issued from Plato. The testimonies hinting at this view have been collected in the appendix of H. Krämer, Platone e i fondamenti della metafisica, Milano 1982. At 151,12ff. and 499,4ff. Simplicius thinks this was Plato’s view and connects it to the Pythagoreans at 151,10ff. See also 431,6ff., now relying on Eudemus fr. 60 (Wehrli). On the other hand, at 181,22-30 Simplicius quotes Eudorus, possibly the Platonist of Alexandria in the first century B.C. (Test. 5 (Mazzarelli)), who says that the Pythagoreans took the same view. As regards Alexander, he is well aware of this doctrine, see his in Metaph. 53,3-4; 56,18-22; 58,27-59,9 (with reference to Eudorus = Test. 2 (Mazzarelli)); 59,19-27; 60,16-20; 85,16-25; 87,11-13; 203,38-204,1; 228,13-15. 236. Parmenides 142D9-10. 237. Parmenides 145A7-9. 238. The term apolêpsis (‘reception’) is also used – in a similar context, as reception of the complete one – at 278,6-9. 239. Form (eidos) now refers to unity according to species (eidos). Simplicius makes use of the ambiguity of the term. 240. According to Simplicius at 864,15-17 Alexander claims that more or less were taken by Aristotle to occur in qualitative transformation. This, Simplicius adds, may be because more and less are peculiar to quality. Here Alexander may regard the difference between uniform and non-uniform change in terms of more or less because he takes uniformity and non-uniformity as qualities of change. Simplicius’ attempt to modify this view is at 897,5ff. 241. Porphyry 161F (Smith) = Test. 47 (Romano). He and Alexander read eph’ homalôi while the copy Simplicius had puts eph’ homalou. In the clause ‘such ’ Simplicius follows the reading of Alexander and Porphyry. 242. Simplicius treats every kind of spiral as non-uniform. But the cylindrical spiral is uniform, for any of its parts fits upon any other, as was demonstrated by Apollonius of Perga. See Ross’s note to 228b24 in op. cit., p. 633. Simplicius seems to be unaware of this. Or perhaps he treats uniformity not in terms of fitting one part upon another, but in thinking of the homogeneity of the route which covers the circle and the straight only. In contrast to this passage, we find at in de Caelo 13,24-7 that Simplicius is familiar with the cylindrical spiral as ‘having all of its parts fitting upon each other equally’ (pan morion autês panti isôi epharmozei); see also 14,10-16. Both passages contain references to Xenarchus. This divergence may be helpful in finding evidence for the relative date of in Phys. and in de Caelo. 243. We are dealing here with two kinds of classification; the one is into genera and species, the other (the one into male and female) is the diairetical method used by Plato, e.g. in the Sophist. 244. Simplicius does not mean that heavy and light potatoes are different in species. He means that light elements – fire and air – are differentiated from heavy elements – water and earth – by weight, whereas speed and slowness may be exhibited by any element as it travels to its natural place. (J.O.U.) 245. A fundamental error as a principle of mechanics, though empirically true of most bodies falling through the air. (J.O.U.) Philoponus slightly dissents from

Notes to pp. 98-106

147

Simplicius in saying that bodies are falling with nearly the same speed: cf. his in Phys. 678,4-684,10, esp. 679,1ff. CAG XVII. 246. ‘Comparatively’ translates kata sunkrisin; a term referring to a procedure whereby a meaning which fits one of the contraries is applied to the counterpart which it does not fit perfectly, cf. 35,11-14. Simplicius uses the term in a somewhat different sense at his in Cat. 145,4; 282,25; 285,33; 288,16; 336,6; 419,6. 247. This is less because of the admixture of non-uniformity; and this involves multiplicity due to the different changes the non-uniform change contains by being interrupted. 248. In this way we have a syllogism in Camestres: Every A is B No C is B No A is C 249. poia kinêsis poiai kinêsei enantia at 900,19. At 229a7 Ross has poia kinêsis enantia kinêsei. It is not clear whether Simplicius is paraphrasing or whether he has a different reading. (J.O.U.) 250. Aristotle wrote monês. Simplicius uses this word only of the unchanging world of pure being. He always uses êremia of the absence of change in the world of becoming. (J.O.U.) Simplicius explicitly makes this distinction at 23,13-14 (when explaining Xenophanes) and at 909,3-4 when saying that monê in being is not to be called êremia. But this distinction is not maintained throughout this work. 251. ‘Division’, diairesis, refers to the Platonic method of division, the use of which was rejected in a different context at 898,4ff. 252. To have character is to have form or a particular type of being. Simplicius clarifies it when claiming that the form is the kharaktêr of each thing in respect of which they subsist and are said to be what they are: cf. 289,5-6. 253. This belongs to the same lemma and Simplicius explains it at 903,13ff. 254. ‘Since’, epei, is surprising here; one might have expected ‘although’, kaiper. (J.O.U.) 255. Simplicius will explain it at 904,18ff. 256. agnoia, here translated as usually as ‘ignorance’, covers false belief as well as true ignorance or lack of information. This causes difficulty in the interpretation of the metaphysics of Plato’s Republic. (J.O.U.) 257. Reading gignomenêi at 904,23. gignomenê must be a misprint. (J.O.U.) 258. This last sentence is omitted from the lemma and is not discussed, whether inadvertently or because it was omitted from his text of Aristotle. (J.O.U.) Ross does not mention the omission but Themistius also seems to be unfamiliar with this sentence: see his in Phys. 178,1-2. 259. The clause ‘for from  approach’ is an almost literally repetition of what Themistius says in his in Phys. 177,28-9, which is evidence for Simplicius’ thorough knowledge of Themistius’ work. 260. 229a21. (J.O.U.) 261. This reference is not to Aristotle’s Physics 5.1, 224b29ff., as Diels assumed, but to Simplicius’ own explanation at 811,13-27 where both krasis and mixis occur as terms for mixture. The examples in lines 21-3 clearly show this. 262. Accordingly, this opposition between rest and change implies that these features belong to different genera. 263. Reading theôroumenêi; Diels has theôroumenê. (J.O.U.) 264. ‘Suitability’ translates epitêdeiotês. See also e.g. 222,32; 287,13; 289,12; 400,37; 426,26; 465,21; 643,16; 1138,18; 1358,22. The term is used here to signify an inherent but not necessarily realised capacity of these things. For other senses see E.R. Dodds (ed.), Proclus: The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1963, 344-5. The

148

Notes to pp. 106-113

term might have originated in the Megarian school: see R.B. Todd, ‘Epitêdeiotês in philosophical literature: Towards an analysis’, Acta Classica 15 (1972), 25-35. 265. ‘In general terms’ translates holoskherôs. Simplicius uses the term interchangeably with koinos at 265,5. Elsewhere (17,14-15), to emphasize the overall and sketchy knowledge that the new-born children possess, he says that their knowledge is confused and holoskherês. See also in Cat. 5,1; 60,22; 92,23; 214,5-6 (used parallel to ‘introductory way’); 299,35. 266. kata mêkos; as opposed to sideways motion which is motion in breadth. (J.O.U.) 267. This is a reference to the lemma, 230a2-4. 268. Cat. 10, 12b22ff. See also Simplicius in Cat. 397,31-399,8. 269. For the reading here see 909,18ff.. Simplicius accepts the first of the three readings there noted. (J.O.U.) 270. See 905,3ff., and 906,34ff. 271. ‘Untransformability’ translates ametablêsia. The term turns up in 230a10 and gained importance in the late Neoplatonists like Damascius ap. Simplicium in Phys. 775,24-5; in Phaedonem 1 465,5 (Westerink); Philoponus in Phys. 797,12; 903,6. 272. 5.1, 224b35-225a10. 273. This is an explicit distinction of the two terms signifying two entirely different states: see also n. 250. 274. Aristotle proves it at 229a31ff., and therefore Alexander’s emphasis on the things of which there is no change but untransformability is plausible. His interpretation rests on the reading of hôn (‘whose’) instead of toutôn (‘their’); a variant which is at least palaeographically not to be excluded. 275. By ‘commentators’ (exêgêtai) Simplicius may be referring to Themistius’ in Phys. 179,1 which does assign fate (heimarmenê) to the things according to nature (to kata phusin), and see also Philoponus’ in Phys. 797,28-30 CAG XVII. Among the Peripatetics referred to the best known example is Alexander, who in his de Fato 169,18-20 (Bruns) (=8,28-30 (Thillet)) draws the conclusion that what is fated is in accordance with nature and what is in accordance with nature is fated. For further explanation see R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate, London 1983, 129-30. 276. Grown hydroponically in pots in warm conditions and thus forced for the time of mourning for Adonis. (J.O.U.) cf. 1212,18. And Simplicius may have in mind the Phaedrus 276B. For further references, see Ross’s commentary ad loc. in op. cit., p. 637. 277. Diels includes the last clause in the quotation and has no other punctuation before ‘he answers’. (J.O.U.) 278. monai te kai êremiai. It is not clear whether the coupling of the two words usually treated in this work as synonyms is significant. Monê cannot be used in its narrower sense of eternal changelessness. (J.O.U.) Neither can it be used to signify one of the three stages of beings, which were described by Proclus as procession (proödos) – rest (monê) – reversion (epistrophê). 279. The addition is unknown to Themistius, but Philoponus seems to be familiar with it: cf. his in Phys. 798,4-5. See also Ross’s commentary ad loc. 280. Philoponus may have proposed the same explanation by adding tois stoikheiois (‘to the elements’) at his in Phys. 798,5. 281. This is in Barbara. 282. The second figure is of the form PM, SM, SP. In the present case P is what is stopping, M is moving faster, S is travelling forcibly. Since the minor premiss is negative the conclusion is negative. (J.O.U.) Camestres.

Notes to pp. 114-115

149

283. ‘Impulse’ translates hormê. At 265,14-15 Simplicius defines it as primarily the inner principle of motion. ‘Goal’ translates skopos; a term hard to translate in the late Neoplatonic context, but here its meaning is close to ‘intention’. 284. The text Simplicius had is definitely different from the one edited by Ross who thinks (op. cit., p. 638) that Simplicius (and the MSS E and H) preserved an alternative version of the sentence published in his edition. This is however not necessarily the case in the sense of its being a parallel because in Simplicius’ version we find the conclusion drawn from the previous premisses. Thus this sentence should be inserted after eti (230b26) into our text of the Physics. Furthermore, it seems that Alexander too had the same text as Simplicius. His addition of ‘or to be so entirely’ (ê holôs einai, accepted by Ross) shows that he was familiar also with the reading preferred by Ross. 285. 230a4. 286. Reading tôi histasthai instead of to histasthai at 915,16. Some MSS read tô. (J.O.U.) 287. ‘By loose use’ translates katakhrêstikôs. The term signifies not only loose or incorrect use but also a deliberate misuse of a term to represent a meaning for which there is no proper term, cf. D. Runia, ‘Naming and knowing: themes in Philonic theology with special reference to the de mutatione nominum’, in R. van den Brook, T. Baarda and J. Mansfeld (eds), Knowledge of God in the GraecoRoman World, Leiden 1988, 91-6. His views were criticized and discussed with reference to the later Platonic tradition by J. Whittaker, ‘Catachresis and negative theology’, in S. Gersh and C. Kannengiesser (eds), Platonism in Late Antiquity, Notre Dame Ind. 1992, 61-83. Simplicius employs the term to mean loose use also at 865,22. 288. This perhaps over-literally translated passage refers primarily to the motion up and down of the elements. Natural motion of an element is, as such, vertical motion up or down to its proper level. So natural motion has itself coming to stop, i.e. is by definition something that will end in the element being stationary unless forcibly moved. Forced motion is away from the proper level of the element so that when the force ceases the element will not remain stationary but will revert to natural motion to its proper place unless prevented by force. (J.O.U.) 289. See also Philoponus, in Phys. 798,25-799,2; 860,2-5. 290. Philoponus is close to this view at his in Phys. 798,25. Simplicius presents it as Aristotle’s view at 913,30-31. In his in de Caelo 72,18ff. he attributes to the Platonists (with reference to Timaeus 62D-E, 63B-D) the view that the elements have weight even when they are at rest in their natural place. At 70,5-7 he also quotes Themistius claiming that the elements which are not in their proper place have greater impulse (rhopê). He took this passage from Themistius’ paraphrase of the de Caelo of which the Greek original has been lost, but we find roughly the same in the Latin translation by Zerahjah ben Isaac, 230,24-25 CAG V,4. The notion that in approaching their natural places things are also being perfected in form may be a later, Neoplatonist addition. 291. From what follows it seems that this is a Peripatetic doctrine, though there is no explicit evidence for it. 292. Diels continues the quotation to the end of the next sentence. (J.O.U.) Wehrli also prints the whole sentence as a testimony for Strato’s views (Strato fr. 73 (Wehrli)), but it has not been analysed by H. Gottschalk in his ‘Strato of Lampsacus: Some Texts’, Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, Literary and Historical Section 11 (1965) 95-182, p. 139. Wehrli (op. cit., p. 63) thinks that Simplicius misunderstands Strato because he uses the example of drops only as an evidence for bodies travelling faster near their own natural

150

Notes to pp. 116-119

places while in Strato it might have aetiological import, perhaps that smaller drops pass through the air quicker than the bigger ones. It seems however that his example (a reference to Hero’s Pneumatica 1 p. 24,20 (Schmidt) = Strato fr. 65b (Wehrli)) does not prove this claim, for the passage referred to deals with Strato’s theory of void; for a detailed explanation of the testimony, cf. Gottschalk, op. cit., pp. 154-5. 293. This passage on Aspasius remained unnoticed by P. Moraux, op. cit., Bd. 2, 1984, pp. 235-9, where he treats Aspasius’ remarks on the Physics. 294. This sentence recurs as a new lemma at 918,4, which would seem a more appropriate place for it. (J.O.U.) 295. 229b25ff. 296. This is textually difficult. I have translated ei pêi êremei ê eti menei, which is a conjectural emendation by Diels. Ross reads ê pêi êremei, ei eti menei selectively from various MSS. In Ross’s text a new sentence begins ‘Is it perhaps at rest ?’ I follow Diels also in the lemma. (J.O.U.) 297. 229b23. Aristotle uses the term haplôs, ‘without qualification’, instead of kuriôs, ‘strictly’. 298. The reference to Porphyry is registered by A. Smith, op. cit., as 162F (= Test. 48 (Romano)). On the problem of Porphyry’s alleged synopsis, see n. 3. The last excerpt of Philoponus’ in Phys. 5 explains the passage at 230b26. As will be clear, Simplicius also thinks that the last part of this passage is a later, superfluous addition. 299. 230a18ff. 300. 230b24ff. 301. 230b25-6. 302. Aristotle had only scattered remarks on hypothetical syllogisms when discussing arguments ex hypothesi. It is Theophrastus who offers a more elaborate account on them, as reported by Alexander of Aphrodisias in An. Pr. 326,20ff. Our syllogism is: if A then C; if C then not B; therefore if A then not B. 303. These remarks cannot apply to the whole passage because at 919,18 Simplicius claims that this is not a chance addition, but applies only to the clause ‘something will be at rest not permanently without becoming so’. 304. 230b12. 305. 231a2. The lemma at 918,4-5 gives a slightly different version insofar as the word oun is left out there.

Appendix The Commentators* The 15,000 pages of the Ancient Greek Commentaries on Aristotle are the largest corpus of Ancient Greek philosophy that has not been translated into English or other European languages. The standard edition (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, or CAG) was produced by Hermann Diels as general editor under the auspices of the Prussian Academy in Berlin. Arrangements have now been made to translate at least a large proportion of this corpus, along with some other Greek and Latin commentaries not included in the Berlin edition, and some closely related non-commentary works by the commentators. The works are not just commentaries on Aristotle, although they are invaluable in that capacity too. One of the ways of doing philosophy between A.D. 200 and 600, when the most important items were produced, was by writing commentaries. The works therefore represent the thought of the Peripatetic and Neoplatonist schools, as well as expounding Aristotle. Furthermore, they embed fragments from all periods of Ancient Greek philosophical thought: this is how many of the Presocratic fragments were assembled, for example. Thus they provide a panorama of every period of Ancient Greek philosophy. The philosophy of the period from A.D. 200 to 600 has not yet been intensively explored by philosophers in English-speaking countries, yet it is full of interest for physics, metaphysics, logic, psychology, ethics and religion. The contrast with the study of the Presocratics is striking. Initially the incomplete Presocratic fragments might well have seemed less promising, but their interest is now widely known, thanks to the philological and philosophical effort that has been concentrated upon them. The incomparably vaster corpus which preserved so many of those fragments offers at least as much interest, but is still relatively little known. The commentaries represent a missing link in the history of philosophy: the Latin-speaking Middle Ages obtained their knowledge of Aristotle at least partly through the medium of the commentaries. Without an appreciation of this, mediaeval interpretations of Aristotle will not be understood. Again, the ancient commentaries are the unsuspected source of ideas which have been thought, wrongly, to originate in the later mediaeval period. It has been supposed, for example, that Bonaventure in the thirteenth century invented the ingenious arguments based on the concept of infinity which attempt to prove the Christian view that the universe had a beginning. In fact, Bonaventure is merely repeating arguments devised * Reprinted from the Editor’s General Introduction to the series in Christian Wildberg, Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, London and Ithaca, N.Y., 1987.

152

Appendix: The Commentators

by the commentator Philoponus 700 years earlier and preserved in the meantime by the Arabs. Bonaventure even uses Philoponus’ original examples. Again, the introduction of impetus theory into dynamics, which has been called a scientific revolution, has been held to be an independent invention of the Latin West, even if it was earlier discovered by the Arabs or their predecessors. But recent work has traced a plausible route by which it could have passed from Philoponus, via the Arabs, to the West. The new availability of the commentaries in the sixteenth century, thanks to printing and to fresh Latin translations, helped to fuel the Renaissance break from Aristotelian science. For the commentators record not only Aristotle’s theories, but also rival ones, while Philoponus as a Christian devises rival theories of his own and accordingly is mentioned in Galileo’s early works more frequently than Plato.1 It is not only for their philosophy that the works are of interest. Historians will find information about the history of schools, their methods of teaching and writing and the practices of an oral tradition.2 Linguists will find the indexes and translations an aid for studying the development of word meanings, almost wholly uncharted in Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon, and for checking shifts in grammatical usage. Given the wide range of interests to which the volumes will appeal, the aim is to produce readable translations, and to avoid so far as possible presupposing any knowledge of Greek. Notes will explain points of meaning, give cross-references to other works, and suggest alternative interpretations of the text where the translator does not have a clear preference. The introduction to each volume will include an explanation why the work was chosen for translation: none will be chosen simply because it is there. Two of the Greek texts are currently being re-edited – those of Simplicius in Physica and in de Caelo – and new readings will be exploited by 1. See Fritz Zimmermann, ‘Philoponus’ impetus theory in the Arabic tradition’; Charles Schmitt, ‘Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics in the sixteenth century’, and Richard Sorabji, ‘John Philoponus’, in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987). 2. See e.g. Karl Praechter, ‘Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 18 (1909), 516-38 (translated into English in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1990); M. Plezia, de Commentariis Isagogicis (Cracow 1947); M. Richard, ‘Apo Phônês’, Byzantion 20 (1950), 191-222; É. Evrard, L’Ecole d’Olympiodore et la composition du commentaire à la physique de Jean Philopon, Diss. (Liège 1957); L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962) (new revised edition, translated into French, Collection Budé; part of the revised introduction, in English, is included in Aristotle Transformed); A.-J. Festugière, ‘Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus’, Museum Helveticum 20 (1963), 77-100, repr. in his Études (1971), 551-74; P. Hadot, ‘Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l’antiquité’, Museum Helveticum 36 (1979), 201-23; I. Hadot, ‘La division néoplatonicienne des écrits d’Aristote’, in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung (Paul Moraux gewidmet), vol. 2 (Berlin 1986); I. Hadot, ‘Les introductions aux commentaires exégétiques chez les auteurs néoplatoniciens et les auteurs chrétiens’, in M. Tardieu (ed.), Les règles de l’interprétation (Paris 1987), 99-119. These topics are treated, and a bibliography supplied, in Aristotle Transformed.

Appendix: The Commentators

153

translators as they become available. Each volume will also contain a list of proposed emendations to the standard text. Indexes will be of more uniform extent as between volumes than is the case with the Berlin edition, and there will be three of them: an English-Greek glossary, a Greek-English index, and a subject index. The commentaries fall into three main groups. The first group is by authors in the Aristotelian tradition up to the fourth century A.D. This includes the earliest extant commentary, that by Aspasius in the first half of the second century A.D. on the Nicomachean Ethics. The anonymous commentary on Books 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics, in CAG vol. 20, is derived from Adrastus, a generation later.3 The commentaries by Alexander of Aphrodisias (appointed to his chair between A.D. 198 and 209) represent the fullest flowering of the Aristotelian tradition. To his successors Alexander was The Commentator par excellence. To give but one example (not from a commentary) of his skill at defending and elaborating Aristotle’s views, one might refer to his defence of Aristotle’s claim that space is finite against the objection that an edge of space is conceptually problematic.4 Themistius (fl. late 340s to 384 or 385) saw himself as the inventor of paraphrase, wrongly thinking that the job of commentary was completed.5 In fact, the Neoplatonists were to introduce new dimensions into commentary. Themistius’ own relation to the Neoplatonist as opposed to the Aristotelian tradition is a matter of controversy,6 but it would be agreed that his commentaries show far less bias than the full-blown Neoplatonist ones. They are also far more informative than the designation ‘paraphrase’ might suggest, and it has been estimated that Philoponus’ Physics commentary draws silently on Themistius six hundred times.7 The pseudo-Alexandrian commentary on Metaphysics 6-14, of unknown

3. Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford 1978), 37, n.3: Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, vol. 2 (Berlin 1984), 323-30. 4. Alexander, Quaestiones 3.12, discussed in my Matter, Space and Motion (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1988). For Alexander see R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation’, in W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, part 2 Principat, vol. 36.2, Philosophie und Wissenschaften (1987). 5. Themistius in An. Post. 1,2-12. See H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Photius on Themistius (Cod. 74): did Themistius write commentaries on Aristotle?’, Hermes 107 (1979), 168-82. 6. For different views, see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Themistius, the last Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle?’, in Glen W. Bowersock, Walter Burkert, Michael C.J. Putnam, Arktouros, Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M.W. Knox (Berlin and N.Y., 1979), 391-400; E.P. Mahoney, ‘Themistius and the agent intellect in James of Viterbo and other thirteenthcentury philosophers: (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate)’, Augustiniana 23 (1973), 422-67, at 428-31; id., ‘Neoplatonism, the Greek commentators and Renaissance Aristotelianism’, in D.J. O’Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (Albany N.Y. 1982), 169-77 and 264-82, esp. n. 1, 264-6; Robert Todd, introduction to translation of Themistius in DA 3.4-8, in Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect, trans. Frederick M. Schroeder and Robert B. Todd (Toronto 1990). 7. H. Vitelli, CAG 17, p. 992, s.v. Themistius.

154

Appendix: The Commentators

authorship, has been placed by some in the same group of commentaries as being earlier than the fifth century.8 By far the largest group of extant commentaries is that of the Neoplatonists up to the sixth century A.D. Nearly all the major Neoplatonists, apart from Plotinus (the founder of Neoplatonism), wrote commentaries on Aristotle, although those of Iamblichus (c. 250–c. 325) survive only in fragments, and those of three Athenians, Plutarchus (died 432), his pupil Proclus (410–485) and the Athenian Damascius (c. 462–after 538), are lost.9 As a result of these losses, most of the extant Neoplatonist commentaries come from the late fifth and the sixth centuries and a good proportion from Alexandria. There are commentaries by Plotinus’ disciple and editor Porphyry (232–309), by Iamblichus’ pupil Dexippus (c. 330), by Proclus’ teacher Syrianus (died c. 437), by Proclus’ pupil Ammonius (435/445– 517/526), by Ammonius’ three pupils Philoponus (c. 490 to 570s), Simplicius (wrote after 532, probably after 538) and Asclepius (sixth century), by Ammonius’ next but one successor Olympiodorus (495/505–after 565), by Elias (fl. 541?), by David (second half of the sixth century, or beginning of the seventh) and by Stephanus (took the chair in Constantinople c. 610). Further, a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics has been ascribed to Heliodorus of Prusa, an unknown pre-fourteenth-century figure, and there is a commentary by Simplicius’ colleague Priscian of Lydia on Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus. Of these commentators some of the last were Christians (Philoponus, Elias, David and Stephanus), but they were Christians writing in the Neoplatonist tradition, as was also Boethius who produced a number of commentaries in Latin before his death in 525 or 526. The third group comes from a much later period in Byzantium. The Berlin edition includes only three out of more than a dozen commentators described in Hunger’s Byzantinisches Handbuch.10 The two most important are Eustratius (1050/1060–c.1120), and Michael of Ephesus. It has been suggested that these two belong to a circle organised by the princess 8. The similarities to Syrianus (died c. 437) have suggested to some that it predates Syrianus (most recently Leonardo Tarán, review of Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus, vol.1 in Gnomon 46 (1981), 721-50 at 750), to others that it draws on him (most recently P. Thillet, in the Budé edition of Alexander de Fato, p. lvii). Praechter ascribed it to Michael of Ephesus (eleventh or twelfth century), in his review of CAG 22.2, in Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeiger 168 (1906), 861-907. 9. The Iamblichus fragments are collected in Greek by Bent Dalsgaard Larsen, Jamblique de Chalcis, Exégète et Philosophe (Aarhus 1972), vol. 2. Most are taken from Simplicius, and will accordingly be translated in due course. The evidence on Damascius’ commentaries is given in L.G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, vol. 2, Damascius (Amsterdam 1977), 11-12; on Proclus’ in L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962), xii, n. 22; on Plutarchus’ in H.M. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’, Phronesis 21 (1976), 75. 10. Herbert Hunger, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, vol. 1 (= Byzantinisches Handbuch, part 5, vol. 1) (Munich 1978), 25-41. See also B.N. Tatakis, La Philosophie Byzantine (Paris 1949).

Appendix: The Commentators

155

Anna Comnena in the twelfth century, and accordingly the completion of Michael’s commentaries has been redated from 1040 to 1138.11 His commentaries include areas where gaps had been left. Not all of these gapfillers are extant, but we have commentaries on the neglected biological works, on the Sophistici Elenchi, and a small fragment of one on the Politics. The lost Rhetoric commentary had a few antecedents, but the Rhetoric too had been comparatively neglected. Another product of this period may have been the composite commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (CAG 20) by various hands, including Eustratius and Michael, along with some earlier commentators, and an improvisation for Book 7. Whereas Michael follows Alexander and the conventional Aristotelian tradition, Eustratius’ commentary introduces Platonist, Christian and anti-Islamic elements.12 The composite commentary was to be translated into Latin in the next century by Robert Grosseteste in England. But Latin translations of various logical commentaries were made from the Greek still earlier by James of Venice (fl. c. 1130), a contemporary of Michael of Ephesus, who may have known him in Constantinople. And later in that century other commentaries and works by commentators were being translated from Arabic versions by Gerard of Cremona (died 1187).13 So the twelfth century resumed the transmission which had been interrupted at Boethius’ death in the sixth century. The Neoplatonist commentaries of the main group were initiated by Porphyry. His master Plotinus had discussed Aristotle, but in a very independent way, devoting three whole treatises (Enneads 6.1-3) to attacking Aristotle’s classification of the things in the universe into categories. These categories took no account of Plato’s world of Ideas, were inferior to Plato’s classifications in the Sophist and could anyhow be collapsed, some 11. R. Browning, ‘An unpublished funeral oration on Anna Comnena’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society n.s. 8 (1962), 1-12, esp. 6-7. 12. R. Browning, op. cit. H.D.P. Mercken, The Greek Commentaries of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Grosseteste, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI 1 (Leiden 1973), ch. 1, ‘The compilation of Greek commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’. Sten Ebbesen, ‘Anonymi Aurelianensis I Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos’, Cahiers de l’Institut Moyen Age Grecque et Latin 34 (1979), ‘Boethius, Jacobus Veneticus, Michael Ephesius and ‘‘Alexander’’ ’, pp. v-xiii; id., Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, 3 parts, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, vol. 7 (Leiden 1981); A. Preus, Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus on the Movement and Progression of Animals (Hildesheim 1981), introduction. 13. For Grosseteste, see Mercken as in n. 12. For James of Venice, see Ebbesen as in n. 12, and L. Minio-Paluello, ‘Jacobus Veneticus Grecus’, Traditio 8 (1952), 265-304; id., ‘Giacomo Veneto e l’Aristotelismo Latino’, in Pertusi (ed.), Venezia e l’Oriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento (Florence 1966), 53-74, both reprinted in his Opuscula (1972). For Gerard of Cremona, see M. Steinschneider, Die europäischen Übersetzungen aus dem arabischen bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts (repr. Graz 1956); E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London 1955), 235-6 and more generally 181-246. For the translators in general, see Bernard G. Dod, ‘Aristoteles Latinus’, in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds), The Cambridge History of Latin Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge 1982).

156

Appendix: The Commentators

of them into others. Porphyry replied that Aristotle’s categories could apply perfectly well to the world of intelligibles and he took them as in general defensible.14 He wrote two commentaries on the Categories, one lost, and an introduction to it, the Isagôgê, as well as commentaries, now lost, on a number of other Aristotelian works. This proved decisive in making Aristotle a necessary subject for Neoplatonist lectures and commentary. Proclus, who was an exceptionally quick student, is said to have taken two years over his Aristotle studies, which were called the Lesser Mysteries, and which preceded the Greater Mysteries of Plato.15 By the time of Ammonius, the commentaries reflect a teaching curriculum which begins with Porphyry’s Isagôgê and Aristotle’s Categories, and is explicitly said to have as its final goal a (mystical) ascent to the supreme Neoplatonist deity, the One.16 The curriculum would have progressed from Aristotle to Plato, and would have culminated in Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides. The latter was read as being about the One, and both works were established in this place in the curriculum at least by the time of Iamblichus, if not earlier.17 Before Porphyry, it had been undecided how far a Platonist should accept Aristotle’s scheme of categories. But now the proposition began to gain force that there was a harmony between Plato and Aristotle on most things.18 Not for the only time in the history of philosophy, a perfectly crazy proposition proved philosophically fruitful. The views of Plato and of Aristotle had both to be transmuted into a new Neoplatonist philosophy in order to exhibit the supposed harmony. Iamblichus denied that Aristotle contradicted Plato on the theory of Ideas.19 This was too much for Syrianus and his pupil Proclus. While accepting harmony in many areas,20 they could see that there was disagreement on this issue and also on the issue of whether God was causally responsible for the existence of the ordered 14. See P. Hadot, ‘L’harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d’Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Catégories’, in Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Rome 1974), 31-47; A.C. Lloyd, ‘Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic’, Phronesis 1 (1955-6), 58-79 and 146-60. 15. Marinus, Life of Proclus ch. 13, 157,41 (Boissonade). 16. The introductions to the Isagôgê by Ammonius, Elias and David, and to the Categories by Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Elias are discussed by L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena and I. Hadot, ‘Les Introductions’, see n. 2 above. 17. Proclus in Alcibiadem 1 p. 11 (Creuzer); Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena, ch. 26, 12f. For the Neoplatonist curriculum see Westerink, Festugière, P. Hadot and I. Hadot in n. 2. 18. See e.g. P. Hadot (1974), as in n. 14 above; H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’, Phronesis 21 (1976), 64-87; H.A. Davidson, ‘The principle that a finite body can contain only finite power’, in S. Stein and R. Loewe (eds), Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History presented to A. Altmann (Alabama 1979), 75-92; Carlos Steel, ‘Proclus et Aristotle’, Proceedings of the Congrès Proclus held in Paris 1985, J. Pépin and H.D. Saffrey (eds), Proclus, lecteur et interprète des anciens (Paris 1987), 213-25; Koenraad Verrycken, God en Wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van Ioannes Philoponus, Ph.D. Diss. (Louvain 1985). 19. Iamblichus ap. Elian in Cat. 123,1-3. 20. Syrianus in Metaph. 80,4-7; Proclus in Tim. 1.6,21-7,16.

Appendix: The Commentators

157

physical cosmos, which Aristotle denied. But even on these issues, Proclus’ pupil Ammonius was to claim harmony, and, though the debate was not clear cut,21 his claim was on the whole to prevail. Aristotle, he maintained, accepted Plato’s Ideas,22 at least in the form of principles (logoi) in the divine intellect, and these principles were in turn causally responsible for the beginningless existence of the physical universe. Ammonius wrote a whole book to show that Aristotle’s God was thus an efficent cause, and though the book is lost, some of its principal arguments are preserved by Simplicius.23 This tradition helped to make it possible for Aquinas to claim Aristotle’s God as a Creator, albeit not in the sense of giving the universe a beginning, but in the sense of being causally responsible for its beginningless existence.24 Thus what started as a desire to harmonise Aristotle with Plato finished by making Aristotle safe for Christianity. In Simplicius, who goes further than anyone,25 it is a formally stated duty of the commentator to display the harmony of Plato and Aristotle in most things.26 Philoponus, who with his independent mind had thought better of his earlier belief in harmony, is castigated by Simplicius for neglecting this duty.27 The idea of harmony was extended beyond Plato and Aristotle to Plato and the Presocratics. Plato’s pupils Speusippus and Xenocrates saw Plato as being in the Pythagorean tradition.28 From the third to first centuries B.C., pseudo-Pythagorean writings present Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines as if they were the ideas of Pythagoras and his pupils,29 and these forgeries were later taken by the Neoplatonists as genuine. Plotinus saw the Presocratics as precursors of his own views,30 but Iamblichus went far beyond him by writing ten volumes on Pythagorean philosophy.31 Thereafter Proclus sought to unify the whole of Greek 21. Asclepius sometimes accepts Syranius’ interpretation (in Metaph. 433,9-436,6); which is, however, qualified, since Syrianus thinks Aristotle is realy committed willy-nilly to much of Plato’s view (in Metaph. 117,25-118,11; ap. Asclepium in Metaph. 433,16; 450,22); Philoponus repents of his early claim that Plato is not the target of Aristotle’s attack, and accepts that Plato is rightly attacked for treating ideas as independent entities outside the divine Intellect (in DA 37,18-31; in Phys. 225,4-226,11; contra Procl. 26,24-32,13; in An. Post. 242,14-243,25). 22. Asclepius in Metaph. from the voice of (i.e. from the lectures of) Ammonius 69,17-21; 71,28; cf. Zacharias Ammonius, Patrologia Graeca vol. 85 col. 952 (Colonna). 23. Simplicius in Phys. 1361,11-1363,12. See H.A. Davidson; Carlos Steel; Koenraad Verrycken in n. 18 above. 24. See Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1988), ch. 15. 25. See e.g. H.J. Blumenthal in n. 18 above. 26. Simplicius in Cat. 7,23-32. 27. Simplicius in Cael. 84,11-14; 159,2-9. On Philoponus’ volte face see n. 21 above. 28. See e.g. Walter Burkert, Weisheit und Wissenschaft (Nürnberg 1962), translated as Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge Mass. 1972), 83-96. 29. See Holger Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period (Åbo 1961); Thomas Alexander Szlezák, Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien, Peripatoi vol. 4 (Berlin and New York 1972). 30. Plotinus e.g. 4.8.1; 5.1.8 (10-27); 5.1.9. 31. See Dominic O’Meara, Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford 1989).

158

Appendix: The Commentators

philosophy by presenting it as a continuous clarification of divine revelation32 and Simplicius argued for the same general unity in order to rebut Christian charges of contradictions in pagan philosophy.33 Later Neoplatonist commentaries tend to reflect their origin in a teaching curriculum:34 from the time of Philoponus, the discussion is often divided up into lectures, which are subdivided into studies of doctrine and of text. A general account of Aristotle’s philosophy is prefixed to the Categories commentaries and divided, according to a formula of Proclus,35 into ten questions. It is here that commentators explain the eventual purpose of studying Aristotle (ascent to the One) and state (if they do) the requirement of displaying the harmony of Plato and Aristotle. After the ten-point introduction to Aristotle, the Categories is given a six-point introduction, whose antecedents go back earlier than Neoplatonism, and which requires the commentator to find a unitary theme or scope (skopos) for the treatise. The arrangements for late commentaries on Plato are similar. Since the Plato commentaries form part of a single curriculum they should be studied alongside those on Aristotle. Here the situation is easier, not only because the extant corpus is very much smaller, but also because it has been comparatively well served by French and English translators.36 Given the theological motive of the curriculum and the pressure to harmonise Plato with Aristotle, it can be seen how these commentaries are a major source for Neoplatonist ideas. This in turn means that it is not safe to extract from them the fragments of the Presocratics, or of other authors, without making allowance for the Neoplatonist background against which the fragments were originally selected for discussion. For different reasons, analogous warnings apply to fragments preserved by the preNeoplatonist commentator Alexander.37 It will be another advantage of the present translations that they will make it easier to check the distorting effect of a commentator’s background. Although the Neoplatonist commentators conflate the views of Aristotle

32. See Christian Guérard, ‘Parménide d’Elée selon les Néoplatoniciens’, forthcoming. 33. Simplicius in Phys. 28,32-29,5; 640,12-18. Such thinkers as Epicurus and the Sceptics, however, were not subject to harmonisation. 34. See the literature in n. 2 above. 35. ap. Elian in Cat. 107,24-6. 36. English: Calcidius in Tim. (parts by van Winden; den Boeft); Iamblichus fragments (Dillon); Proclus in Tim. (Thomas Taylor); Proclus in Parm. (Dillon); Proclus in Parm., end of 7th book, from the Latin (Klibansky, Labowsky, Anscombe); Proclus in Alcib. 1 (O’Neill); Olympiodorus and Damascius in Phaedonem (Westerink); Damascius in Philebum (Westerink); Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Westerink). See also extracts in Thomas Taylor, The Works of Plato, 5 vols. (1804). French: Proclus in Tim. and in Rempublicam (Festugière); in Parm. (Chaignet); Anon. in Parm (P. Hadot); Damascius in Parm. (Chaignet). 37. For Alexander’s treatment of the Stoics, see Robert B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics (Leiden 1976), 24-9.

Appendix: The Commentators

159

with those of Neoplatonism, Philoponus alludes to a certain convention when he quotes Plutarchus expressing disapproval of Alexander for expounding his own philosophical doctrines in a commentary on Aristotle.38 But this does not stop Philoponus from later inserting into his own commentaries on the Physics and Meteorology his arguments in favour of the Christian view of Creation. Of course, the commentators also wrote independent works of their own, in which their views are expressed independently of the exegesis of Aristotle. Some of these independent works will be included in the present series of translations. The distorting Neoplatonist context does not prevent the commentaries from being incomparable guides to Aristotle. The introductions to Aristotle’s philosophy insist that commentators must have a minutely detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus, and this they certainly have. Commentators are also enjoined neither to accept nor reject what Aristotle says too readily, but to consider it in depth and without partiality. The commentaries draw one’s attention to hundreds of phrases, sentences and ideas in Aristotle, which one could easily have passed over, however often one read him. The scholar who makes the right allowance for the distorting context will learn far more about Aristotle than he would be likely to on his own. The relations of Neoplatonist commentators to the Christians were subtle. Porphyry wrote a treatise explicitly against the Christians in 15 books, but an order to burn it was issued in 448, and later Neoplatonists were more circumspect. Among the last commentators in the main group, we have noted several Christians. Of these the most important were Boethius and Philoponus. It was Boethius’ programme to transmit Greek learning to Latin-speakers. By the time of his premature death by execution, he had provided Latin translations of Aristotle’s logical works, together with commentaries in Latin but in the Neoplatonist style on Porphyry’s Isagôgê and on Aristotle’s Categories and de Interpretatione, and interpretations of the Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistici Elenchi. The interruption of his work meant that knowledge of Aristotle among Latin-speakers was confined for many centuries to the logical works. Philoponus is important both for his proofs of the Creation and for his progressive replacement of Aristotelian science with rival theories, which were taken up at first by the Arabs and came fully into their own in the West only in the sixteenth century. Recent work has rejected the idea that in Alexandria the Neoplatonists compromised with Christian monotheism by collapsing the distinction between their two highest deities, the One and the Intellect. Simplicius (who left Alexandria for Athens) and the Alexandrians Ammonius and

38. Philoponus in DA 21,20-3.

160

Appendix: The Commentators

Asclepius appear to have acknowledged their beliefs quite openly, as later did the Alexandrian Olympiodorus, despite the presence of Christian students in their classes.39 The teaching of Simplicius in Athens and that of the whole pagan Neoplatonist school there was stopped by the Christian Emperor Justinian in 529. This was the very year in which the Christian Philoponus in Alexandria issued his proofs of Creation against the earlier Athenian Neoplatonist Proclus. Archaeological evidence has been offered that, after their temporary stay in Ctesiphon (in present-day Iraq), the Athenian Neoplatonists did not return to their house in Athens, and further evidence has been offered that Simplicius went to Harran (Carrhae), in present-day Turkey near the Iraq border.40 Wherever he went, his commentaries are a treasurehouse of information about the preceding thousand years of Greek philosophy, information which he painstakingly recorded after the closure in Athens, and which would otherwise have been lost. He had every reason to feel bitter about Christianity, and in fact he sees it and Philoponus, its representative, as irreverent. They deny the divinity of the heavens and prefer the physical relics of dead martyrs.41 His own commentaries by contrast culminate in devout prayers. Two collections of articles by various hands have been published, to make the work of the commentators better known. The first is devoted to Philoponus;42 the second is about the commentators in general, and goes into greater detail on some of the issues briefly mentioned here.43

39. For Simplicius, see I. Hadot, Le Problème du Néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius (Paris 1978); for Ammonius and Asclepius, Koenraad Verrycken, God en wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van Ioannes Philoponus, Ph.D. Diss. (Louvain 1985); for Olympiodorus, L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962). 40. Alison Frantz, ‘Pagan philosophers in Christian Athens’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 119 (1975), 29-38; M. Tardieu, ‘Témoins orientaux du Premier Alcibiade à Harran et à Nag ‘Hammadi’, Journal Asiatique 274 (1986); id., ‘Les calendriers en usage à Harran d’après les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d’Aristote’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin 1987), 40-57; id., Coutumes nautiques mésopotamiennes chez Simplicius, in preparation. The opposing view that Simplicius returned to Athens is most fully argued by Alan Cameron, ‘The last day of the Academy at Athens’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 195, n.s. 15 (1969), 7-29. 41. Simplicius in Cael. 26,4-7; 70,16-18; 90,1-18; 370,29-371,4. See on his whole attitude Philippe Hoffmann, ‘Simplicius’ polemics’, in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987). 42. Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987). 43. Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1990). The lists of texts and previous translations of the commentaries included in Wildberg, Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World (pp. 12ff.) are not included here. The list of translations should be augmented by: F.L.S. Bridgman, Heliodorus (?) in Ethica Nicomachea, London 1807. I am grateful for comments to Henry Blumenthal, Victor Caston, I. Hadot, Paul Mercken, Alain Segonds, Robert Sharples, Robert Todd, L.G. Westerink and Christian Wildberg.

English-Greek Glossary absurdity: atopon account: logos action: to poiein, poiêsis activity: energeia, energêtikon actuality: entelekheia adjacent: ekhomenon affection: pathos, peisis affinity: oikeiotês, sungeneia affirmation: kataphasis agent: to poioun air: aêr all at once: athroos alteration: alloiôsis ambiguity: homônumia animal: zôon animate: empsukhos argument: epikheirêma, epikheirêsis, logos articulation: diarthrôsis to ascend: anabainein atemporal: akhronos attribute: sumbebêkos axiom: axiôma beginning: arkhê being: ousia, to einai, to on belief: doxa body: sôma category: katêgoria cause: aitia, aition ceasing to be: phthora change: kinêsis changelessness: akinêsia, monê characteristic: kharaktêristikos circular motion: kuklophoria cognition: gnôsis colour: khrôma coming to be: genesis commentary: hupomnêma completeness: teleiotês conception: ennoia

conclusion: sunêmmenon confirmation: pistis connection: sumplokê consequential: parasunaktikos contact: sunaphê contiguous: ekhomenon continuous: sunekhês, to sunekhon contradiction: antiphasis contrariety: enantiôsis, enantiotês contrary: enantios convention: thesis converse: antistrephon, antistrophos copy: antigraphos deception: apatê to define: aphorizein, horizein definite: hôrismenos definition: diorismos, horismos to demonstrate: deiknunai demonstration: apodeixis demonstrative: apodeiktikos difference: diaphora, heterotês, tropê diminution: meiôsis, phthisis discrete: diêrêmenos disease: nosos disposition: hexis, diathesis distance: diastêma, diastasis to distinguish: diakrinein to divide: diairein division: diairesis earth: gê end: peras, telos essence: ousia eternal: aidios exchange: allagê existence: huparxis, hupostasis, ousia, to einai, to on explanation: aitia, aition, exêgêsis extreme: akron fated: heimarmenê

162

English-Greek Glossary

finite: peperasmenon fire: pur to fit: epharmozein, harmottein flux: rhusis forced: biaios forgetting: lêthê form: eidos fusion: krasis future: mellon general: holikos, koinos genus: genos geometry: geometria goal: skopos, telos god: theos growth: auxêsis health: hugieia hypothesis: hupothesis ignorance: agnoia inanimate: apsukhos incidental: kata sumbebêkos incomplete: atelês incorporeal: asômatos increase: epitasis indefinite: aoristos indeterminate: adioristos indication: tekmêrion individual: atomos indivisible: atomos, adiairetos induction: epagôgê infinity: apeiron, apeiria inquiry: zêtêma, zêtêsis instruction: didaskalia intellect: nous intermediate: to metaxu intermission: dialeimma investigation: theôria knowledge: epistêmê, gnôsis learning: mathêsis limit: peras line: grammê linguistic: lektikos magnitude: megethos, to tosonde man: anthrôpos matter: hulê to mean: sêmainein measure: metron

memory: mnêmê mixture: mixis motion: kinêsis multiplicity: plêthos name: onoma narration: diêgêsis nature: phusis negation: apophasis next (to): ephexês, prosekhôs non-rational: alogos non-uniform: anômalos not-being: to mê on, to mê einai number: arithmos opinion: doxa opposite: antikeimenos opposition: antithesis order: taxis organic fusion: prosphusis, sumphusis organisation: suntaxis otherness: allotês part: meros, morion participation: methexis particular: merikos, tode (ti), tode on passion: to paskhein passive: pathêtikos past: parelêluthos perception: aisthêsis perfection: teleiotês permanent: deusopoios perpetual: endelekhês to persist: hupomenein place: to pou, topos position: to keisthai, thesis possession: hexis potentiality: dunamis power: dunamis premiss: protasis principle: arkhê privation: sterêsis problem: aporia progression: to ienai, proodos, propodismos proportion: analogia to prove: apodeiknunai, deiknunai quality: to poion, poiotês quantity: to poson, posotês rational: logikos

English-Greek Glossary reception: apolêpsis receptive: dektikos recollection: anamnêsis reduction: anagôgê relation: pros ti, skhesis relationship: skhesis rest: êremia, êremêsis, monê science: epistêmê seed: sperma self-generated: autogenêtos self-moving: autokinêtos sense: sêmainomenon, sêmasia separate: khôris, khôristos separation: diakrisis to show: deiknunai, dêloun simple: haplos simultaneity: to hama soul: psukhê species: eidos straight: euthus subject: hupokeimenon subject-matter: hupokeimenon, pragma, to eph’ hou subordinate: hupallêlos substance: hupokeimenon, ousia substrate: hupokeimenon sufficient: autarkês suitability: epitêdeiotês surface: epiphaneia syllogism: sullogismos synopsis: sunopsis system: sustêma

temporal: enkhronos tendency: rhopê text: graphê, lexis thing: pragma, to on thinking: noêsis thought: dianoia, epinoia time: khronos, to pote timeless: akhronos to touch: haptesthai together: to hama transformation: metabolê transition: metabasis travel: phora true: alêthês unchanging: akinêtos uniform: homalês unit: monas unity: hen, henôsis universal: katholikos, katholou universe: kosmos unreal: asustatos untransformability: ametablêsia void: kenon water: hudôr weight: baros, barutês without omissions: aparaleiptos without qualities: apoios word: onoma world-creation: kosmopoia

163

Greek-English Index abathês, having no depth, 870,12 abebaiôs, insecurely, 911,18 adiaphorôs, without distinction, 801,4 adiairetos, indivisible, 890,14 adiexitêtos, cannot be traversed, 847,20 adokimos, worthless, 813,19 adranês, of no account, 815,24 insignificant, 832,16; 859,21 adioristos, indeterminate, 823,28 adioristôs, indifferently, 823,27 without making distinctions, 861,24 to adunaton, impossibility, 886,7 aêr, air, 825,19.21; 827,28.29; 828,1.2.5.8.11.12; 859,2; 866,6; 869,28; 878,22; 916,8.15 agathos, good, 817,3; 894,13 agnoein, to be ignorant, 837,3 agnoia, ignorance, 836,27; 837,2; 904,13.14 agôn, contest, 846,31; 852,1; 876,20 argument, 875,2 aïdios, eternal, 860,9 everlasting, 860,30; 882,5; 919,4 aisthêsis, perception, 865,24 aitiasthai, to make responsible, 832,18 aition/aitia, cause, 807,8; 811,13.15; 832,17.19; 846,8; 847,24.26.29.30; 857,3.24; 858,14; 859,22.23.24; 866,29; 868,14; 878,21.30; 879,5; 882,5; 916,24 explanation, 817,8; 839,29; 960,11; 898,4; 900,7; 903,17; 907,17; 913,11; 916,5 reason, 832,10.12.26 akatonomastos, having no name, 876,8 akhronos, atemporal, 823,2 timeless, 824,2 timelessly, 828,24

akhronôs, timelessly, 829,10 atemporally, 828,27 akinêsia, being unchanging, 865,14 changelessness, 865,31; 866,1; 867,13; 892,20.21.22.23.24.25; 906,15; 921,24 akinêtos, unchangeable, 806,8 unchanging, 808,7.12; 809,29; 810,15.22; 860,12; 865,7.18.20.22.25.26.29; 866,13.15.17; 882,4; 920,17; 921,20.24 unchanged, 836,2 unmoving, 810,16 akolouthein, to follow, 833,1; 843,10; 844,12; 848,5; 851,18; 868,5; 876,26; 877,27; 880,30; 881,20 to be consequent, 898,18 akolouthôs, consecutively, 805,22 it followed that, 865,12 akouein, to understand, 810,20; 869,5; 880,10; 889,9 to hear, 821,31; 824,6; 836,25; 852,24 to akribes, accuracy, 870,3 akribologein, to speak accurately, 866,25 akribôs, exactly, 865,31 accurately, 869,21.22.23 akron, extreme, 811,15.23; 820,15; 864,4.8; 871,27; 878,6; 881,5.7; 905,17 extremity, 870,9.10.11.17; 875,25.27 akurôs, inaccurately, 816,1 alêtheia, truth, 904,2 alêthês, true, 805,11; 816,2.20; 818,11.15.32; 835,1; 838,1.25; 847,19; 849,15; 854,20; 861,19; 879,34; 881,5; 887,21; 889,26; 892,29.30; 903,29.32; 904,3.4.9.10; 906,17 so, 838,8

Greek-English Index alêtheuein, to speak the truth, 876,24 to be true, 835,14; 859,26; 881,9 alêthôs, rightly, 848,4 allagê, exchange, 835,9 allattein, to exchange, 831,5 to alter, 888,7 alloiôsis, alteration, 803,7.8; 806,17.30; 807,26; 814,28; 817,30; 822,1; 828,7.30; 829,14; 849,14; 853,9.12.22; 855,8; 856,14; 857,28; 862,1.7.11.13.18.20; 863,6.10.16; 864,1.3.20.22; 872,20; 882,9; 886,2; 895,21.24; 896,24.26; 897,7; 899,7.28; 900,5; 906,25.27.28; 910,19; 911,15; 921,16.19 alloiôtos, alterable, 803,7 what alters, 853,21.26 alloioun, to alter, 862,14 alloiousthai, to alter, 806,30; 807,1; 808,3; 814,25; 817,4.32; 828,29; 834,26; 837,17; 855,7; 856,4.20; 864,31; 885,21; 896,8; 897,28; 911,17; 920,16 allotês, otherness, 862,13 alogos, non-rational, 862,15 brute, 876,5 absurd, 907,17 ameibein, to exchange, 835,6; 836,12 amenênos, trivial, 832,12.16.28 weak, 859,18 amerês, (thing) without parts, 868,8; 878,17; 880,4; 892,12; 917,23 having no parts, 880,8 indivisible, 882,4 amesos, having no mean, 878,10 ametablêsia, untransformability, 908,18.19.20.22.24.26.27.29; 909,5.6.7.8.12.13.14.15.16.26 ametablêtos, cannot be transformed, 806,6 without transformation, 821,24.29; 822,26.29; 823,2; 824,2 amousia, being unmusical, 828,18 amousos, uneducated, 820,28 amphisbêtêsimos, contentious, 818,29 anabainein, to ascend, 879,5 anaballesthai, to postpone, 802,13 anagein, to link, 838,9 to clarify, 866,12 anagôgê, reduction, 918,21 anairein, to annihilate, 845,11

165

to abolish, 846,6.13.15.23; 847,23.28.31; 850,6 to refute, 855,20; 913,22; 918,19 anairesis, elimination, 803,3 anakampein, to return, 821,10 to convert to, 867,4 analêpsis, acquisition, 883,10.14 resumption, 886,9 analogia, proportion, 873,18 analogon, something like, 915,16 analogous, 915,22 anamignunai, to mix, 876,4 anamimnêskesthai, to recollect, 842,13.18.19.23.26 anamnêsis, recollection, 839,23.24 anankazein, to compel, 804,8; 823,19; 871,2; 873,26 to show the necessity, 811,7 anankê, necessity, 804,25; 886,7; 913,18 necessary, 888,26 must be, 819,23 passim anapalin, reverse, 887,21 anastrephein, to reverse, 876,15 anatolê, ascendent, 865,25 anatrephesthai, to be overturned, 824,3 andrias, statue, 883,9 anenergêtos, lacking actuality, 826,5 anepidektos, unreceptive, 866,13 anepitêdeios, irrelevant, 858,1 anesis, decrease, 864,19 aneuriskein, to discover, 846,9; 900,28 anômalia, non-uniformity, 897,3.8.9.10.12.21.23; 898,26.30 to anômalon, non-uniformity, 895,8 anômalos, non-uniform, 895,9.10.11.27.28.31; 896,1.2.13.16.18.19.21.24; 897,5.18.19.27; 899,11.12.13.14.17.19.20.21.27; 900,4.9.10.13.15; 922,7 anomoeidês, not of the same kind, 876,10.13; 900,11 different in species, 890,28 anomogenês, of a different kind, 876,13; 877,12 in different genera, 890,4 anônumos, having no name, 862,26 anthrôpinos, human, 847,26 anthrôpoi, people, 821,28

166

Greek-English Index

anthrôpos, man, 802,18.24; 812,15.18; 813,30; 814,7.9.26.28.30; 815,1; 817,1.10.12.29; 818,1.2.12.14; 822,2.3.6.7; 823,1; 825,6.14; 826,9.24.25.26.30; 827,22; 829,9; 833,15.24.26.27.28; 839,8.18; 840,9; 842,28; 845,8; 846,17.19.20.21.22; 847,3.5.13.27.29; 848,14.32; 849,1.2.3; 856,1; 861,2; 882,26; 885,26; 894,1.6.30; 895,1; 898,10.11 human, 876,4 antidiairesthai, to be coordinate, 868,15 to be divided off, 898,1.4.6.10 antidiatattein, to set out in opposition, 837,4 antigraphos, copy, 844,4; 876,22; 912,24; 918,12.14 antikeimenos, opposite, 813,9; 815,4.7.10; 816,13.15; 819,27; 840,2.3.4.6.13; 843,9.14.18; 850,19; 877,23.29; 878,1; 895,8.32; 905,5; 911,1 opposed, 828,17; 838,26; 849,14; 866,24; 901,3.16; 908,13.14; 909,17.19.21.24; 910,28; 918,29 contrary, 825,11 contradictory, 866,27 antikeisthai, to be opposed, 802,27; 803,23; 804,4; 813,7; 816,4.28; 865,13; 906,1.2.3.6.9.20.22.29.34; 907,15.16.31; 908,4.15.29; 909,1.9.14.15.17; 910,6.21.26; 911,20.23; 912,19; 917,4; 919,11.12 to be opposite, 818,23; 858,27; 904,6 antiphasis, contradiction, 811,3.4.10.29; 813,8.22.23.25; 815,9.10; 826,11.12; 828,14; 833,19; 840,4.6 negation, 813,5; 820,11.17; 921,2 apo antiphaseôs, contradictory, 878,2 en antiphasei, contradictory, 813,20 ex antiphaseôs, contradictory, 830,21.22 kata antiphasin, vice versa, 825,10 contradictory, 867,16; 878,3 antiphaskein, to correspond, 825,3

antiphatikôs, by contradiction, 813,7 antistrephein, to be convertible, 889,30 antistrephon, converse, 848,32 correlative, 844,29 antistrophos, converse, 898,22, 29; 892,30 antithesis, opposition, 816,5; 831,15; 859,10; 866,25; 901,19; 902,5.12.15; 903,5.14; 904,12.13; 905,3; 906,10.21; 910,9.15; 911,3; 922,9 kata antithesin, antithetically, 831,17 antitithenai, to contrast, 803,21 to oppose, 900,17.26; 901,16; 904,9 aoratos, invisible, 865,17 aorgêtos, angerless, 865,28 aoristos, indefinite, 810,8.29.30; 813,4; 837,12; 874,9.15; 920,28 apagôgê eis atopon, reductio ad absurdum, 843,24 apagoreuein, to deny, 860,7 apallagê, release, 902,31 apangellein, to announce, 873,7; 888,17 aparaleiptos, without omission, 812,5; 901,19 complete, 813,3 aparaleiptôs, without omission, 920,5 aparallaktôs, in a different way, 919,15 aparithmein, to list, 815,21 to give a list, 832,26 to place in the list, 905,3 aparithmêsis, listing, 829,29 apatasthai, to be deceived, 903,27.28; 904,3.5.12 apatê, deception, 904,8 apathês, not subject to affection, 827,17 unaffected, 862,10 apeikazein, to liken, 821,19 apeiria, infinity, 845,28 apeiron, infinite (series), 802,12; 843,18; 846,7.14.18.30; 847,7.11.17.21; 848,4.5.7.10.11; 881,10 infinitely, 847,18 unlimited, 810,29.30 without limit, 810,8

Greek-English Index infinity, 844,4.6.11; 845,10.15.22.26; 846,14.24.26.27.28.29; 847,2.9.20.23.24.26.29; 848,12.20; 849,1 ep’ apeiron, ad infinitum, 846,5.12; 847,26; 848,32 epi tôn apeirôn, infinite regress, 845,16; 846,3.24 aphairein, to subtract, 836,11 ex aphaireseôs, abstracted, 880,3 aphistanai, to start, 806,10.12 aphixis, arriving, 872,24; 873,22 aphôrismenos, special, 844,15 determinate, 895,3 aphorizein, to separate off, 862,3; 867,9 to define, 862,17; 865,10; 890,23 to distinguish, 898,32 aplanês, fixed, 865,25 apoballein, to lose, 828,4.8.9; 859,27; 902,22; 917,17 to cease, 886,5 apobolê, loss, 861,7.8; 902,21.25; 905,12.13.14 apodeiknunai, to prove, 809,9; 819,28; 823,10; 856,6; 858,12; 865,28; 869,1; 877,28; 894,18; 903,13; 921,15 to show, 919,7 apodeiktikos, demonstrative, 804,16 apodeixis, demonstration, 844,19 proof, 893,10 apodekhesthai, to accept, 822,30; 854,20; 909,25 apodidonai, to give, 808,30 to provide, 854,27, passim apoginesthai, to be lost, 828,27 apogignôskein, to deny, 888,2 apoios, without qualities, 825,20.21; 826,5; 827,9 apokrinein, to cast aside, 813,19 to set aside, 820,6 to mark off, 902,30 apolambanein, to settle, 894,2 apoleipein, to decrease, 916,9 apolêpsis, reception, 895,2 apollusthai, to perish, 852,17 aponemein, to assign, 894,14 apophainein, to declare, 900,26 apophantikos logos, assertion, 816,3 apophaskein, to deny, 832,28;

167

834,18; 835,12; 843,5; 859,17; 918,23 apophasis, negation, 812,26; 815,9.10; 816,19; 900,6 denial, 816,1, 2 negative, 813,7; 815,7; 821,5 apophasei, by a negative term, 820,29 negatively, 878,8 apophatikos, negative, 812,15.17 aporein, to raise a problem, 871,1; 883,15.18; 907,30; 908,24.25; 910,1.9.28; 913,10; 917,5; 918,16; 922,14 to set the problem, 915,18 aporia, problem, 808,12.18.25; 851,11; 882,28; 883,25; 884,7; 886,21.22.26.28; 888,3; 913,8.21; 917,1.18; 918,22; 910,18.21; 922,16.18 aporhêma, problem, 888,11 aposkeuazein, to discard, 810,8 to set aside, 811,30; 888,15; 920,28 apospan, to tear off, 916,19 apousia, absence, 820,7.8; 833,22; 866,30; 867,1.2; 906,8; 908,18 apsukhos, inanimate, 862,30 apsukhôs, like an inanimate, 921,18 aretê, excellence, 836,26 arithmêtikê, arithmetic, 883,9 arithmos, number, 802,6.25; 846,14.28; 868,22; 874,29; 875,11.12; 877,6; 879,11.13; 880,22; 881,16.24.26; 882,6; 884,16; 885,24.27; 886,4.6.8.14.16; 887,6; 889,8.9.10.11.12; 890,6.8; 892,13.32; 893,2.3; 918,11; 921,29 tôi arithmôi, numerically, 884,21.22.23; 885,20.24.33; 886,23.24.26.28; 887,6.11.20; 888,22.26.27.30.31; 889,13.21; 891,4.6; 893,25; 921,30; 922,2 kat’ arithmon, numerically, 868,29; 885,5.7.11; 886,11.20; 887,3.8.15; 888,8; 889,31; 893,7.16.19.23; 894,9.25.26; 922,1 numerical, 876,11; 895,7 in number, 922,3 arkhaioprepôs, in ancient form, 873,7 arkhê, principle, 811,11; 863,1; 867,23; 879,20; 880,4; 894,14

168

Greek-English Index

beginning, 851,29; 852,1; 868,5; 874,21.23.24.25.27; 875,12.15.20.23.26; 876,17.18.23.24.25.26; 889,27; 892,17; 894,18.21; 903,30; 909,18; 920,6 birth, 866,10 start, 891,12 en arkhêi, at the beginning, 849,18 arkhesthai, to start, 848,23; 850,8.9; 866,15; 875,27 to begin, 850,21; 855,11; 865,27.28; 875,17; 902,8; 903,17; 917,6.11.21; 921,22 to open, 868,8 arnêtikos, negative, 812,17 arrên, male, 876,2; 898,5.7.11 artan, to link, 801,11 asapheia, unclarity, 888,17 askos, wine-skin, 888,12.13 asômatos, incorporeal, 831,18 asphalôs, for safety, 864,6 astêr, star, 865,25 asunthetos, without composition, 812,16 asustatos, unreal, 820,6 incoherent, 921,7 ateleia, incompleteness, 827,5 atelês, incomplete, 816,29; 822,17; 825,29; 826,18.28; 827,9; 828,19; 860,22; 862,23; 864,29; 872,4; 893,28; 894,2.5.6.8.24 to atelês, incompleteness, 865,1 athroos, all at once, 828,23; 829,12 athroôs, all at once, 828,30 atomos, individual, 846,16; 869,27; 870,2.5; 885,23.30; 886,17; 895,2; 898,24 indivisible, 882,15.24.26; 883,1.3.7.13.26; 884,13 atopon, absurdity, 819,10; 843,7.10; 844,16.18.28.29; 845,9; 848,30; 849,2.8.29; 850,3.6.25; 851,18.21; 853,24; 854,8; 855,28; 908,26; 909,3 oddity, 831,25; 840,19; 841,12 apagei eis atopon, reductio ad absurdum, 854,30 atopos, odd, 831,30; 841,23 absurd, 843,29; 850,20; 851,27.30; 852,20; 853,23; 859,9; 907,11; 915,5.6; 917,18.24

autarkês, sufficient, 877,7 authupostatos, existing through itself, 824,17 autogenêtos, self-generated, 824,16 autokinêtos, self-moving, 824,10.13 autophuôs, of its own nature, 832,20 autozôon, living through itself, 824,17 auxanesthai, to increase, 818,1; 888,11 to grow, 822,3; 831,24; 834,26; 839,10; 862,23; 872,4; 888,11; 897,3.29; 911,14; 920,17 auxêsis, growth, 806,19; 822,1; 849,14; 862,21; 863,5.11; 864,19; 872,21; 882,10; 895,22.24; 896,3; 897,2.4.6; 899,26; 906,25; 910,19.20.21.29; 911,3.12; 921,17 auxomenos, growth, 888,10 axiologos, worth stating, 825,26 worthy of mention, 833,5 axiôma, axiom, 849,10; 850,24; 916,5 supposition, 850,13 prolêphthen axiôma, presupposition, 850,1.12 badisis, walk, 866,8; 872,27.28; 883,25; 884,2.4.26; 885,6; 889,6; 890,5.17 badistikos, pedestrian, 885,18 badizein, to walk, 802,18.19; 822,3; 826,26; 827,22; 872,27; 873,20; 885,11.18.21; 889,5.6 baros, weight, 916,21.25 barus, low, 811,17 heavy, 827,7.8 weight, 916,15 barutês, weight, 807,7.8.9; 827,10 heaviness, 898,12.21 bathos, depth, 904,18 bathros, seat, 876,7 bebaiôs, securely, 911,17 bebaioun, to support, 846,8 biâi, forcibly, 862,30; 871,12; 911,13; 914,1.5.6; 915,11.13.14.15.28.29; 916,1; 918,22.23.25.29; 919,4.7.9.10 forcible, 914,11 by force, 913,24; 914,3 forced, 915,12 biaios, forced, 911,5.6.11; 913,23.24.26.27.28; 914,7; 915,13.14.30.31; 918,28

Greek-English Index biaiôs, forcibly, 913,25; 915,20.21; 916,1 biazesthai, to insist, 827,18 biblion, book, 801,3.13; 802,8.9.11; 807,29; 823,26; 837,16; 857,15; 867,22.24; 868,3.5.6.8; 869,1.17; 880,24; 882,29; 916,31; 918,12; 920,4 bôlos, clod, 893,24; 915,12 boulesthai, to wish, 801,6; 821,16; 861,9 to allow, 860,2 bradeôs, slowly, 865,23.26.28 bradunein, to be slow, 865,27 bradus, slow, 840,12.15; 898,14.15.20.32.33; 899,5.8; 922,8 bradutês, slowness, 897,16.22.24.25.26.28; 898,3.13.21.26.31; 899,1.3 brakhutaton, to a slight degree, 822,13 dapanan, to spend, 828,28 deigma, example, 895,11 deiknunai, to show, 801,6.9; 802,16; 804,18; 807,15.30; 809,3.4.25; 810,9.23; 813,7; 815,18; 819,7.10.12.21.24; 820,6.10; 821,2; 829,1.19.23.27; 830,7.27; 831,6.7; 834,22; 837,30; 839,1.4; 840,8; 843,20.21; 850,30.32; 856,25; 857,27; 862,22.29; 863,18; 865,11; 868,7.19; 873,14; 881,11.26.32; 882,3; 884,10; 886,27; 888,31; 890,8; 893,11; 901,20; 902,9.12; 903,4.14; 904,18; 905,16.26; 915,19; 917,12; 918,28; 920,23; 921,2.12.15.29 to establish, 805,9 to expound, 868,8 to prove, 805,5; 807,11; 808,7; 811,10; 815,21; 816,20; 830,22; 833,6.10.20; 837,21; 838,12.17; 843,24; 844,4.7; 845,21.28; 846,8; 848,2.3; 849,7.9; 850,15; 854,23.29; 855,2; 856,10; 858,4.8.9; 863,18.20; 877,28; 888,22; 890,1; 894,18; 908,30; 909,2.10.12.28; 920,14 to demonstrate, 806,24.25; 880,14; 889,19.23; 897,27; 899,24; 900,21;

169

909,13.26.28; 911,5; 912,3.4; 920,7; 921,20 dekhesthai, to receive, 821,8; 825,24; 853,5 dektikos, receptive (of change), 865,8; 866,21; 867,4; 910,18 dêlôtikos, refers to, 804,2 shows, 872,7; 876,25 dêloun, to make clear, 803,27; 805,11; 807,25; 858,17; 859,13; 868,19; 873,12; 882,1 to disclose, 901,28 to show, 804,28; 812,11; 817,7; 822,8; 835,16; 838,27; 842,27; 885,10; 902,8; 904,22; 920,1 to refer to, 812,11.13.19.22; 813,6; 878,8 to imply, 812,2 to mean, 846,12; 907,2 to indicate, 829,5 to denote, 820,19.20.26.29; 821,1.3; 830,30; 832,7; 833,23; 859,11.14; 866,20 dêlousthai, to be, 822,22 desmos, tying, 878,24 deusopoios, permanent, 859,19 diadokhê, passing on, 891,6.24.25 transfer, 891,22 diadromê, course, 891,27.28 diairein, to divide, 810,3; 815,20.27; 823,28; 829,16.18.22; 861,11.15; 865,15; 868,12; 881,3.4.11; 882,15.24; 883,5.12; 884,10.14; 894,29; 895,10; 896,16; 920,6.11.29. 921,21; 922,9 to make a division, 901,14 diêirêsthai, to be discrete, 869,2 to diairesthai, division, 815,28 diairesis, division, 801,16; 813,10.11; 815,25; 816,2.18.25; 823,29; 839,6; 847,4; 861,1; 900,28; 901,19; 902,16; 903,3; 905,4; 920,9; 921,3 partition, 802,9 distinction, 809,27 diairetos, divisible, 889,26.27 diakeimenos, having the character, 895,26 diakrinein, to distinguish, 804,13; 824,1; 865,9; 866,8; 868,26; 881,20; 900,25; 922,10 to make a distinction, 822,30 diakrisis, distinction, 815,29

170

Greek-English Index

separation, 824,16 dialambanein, to interrupt, 891,21; 892,26.27 dialeimma, gap, 873,6 lap, 889,16 intermission, 873,17.19 interval, 887,25; 888,1.20 dialeipein, to have a gap, 872,9.26; 885,4.8.9; 886,18.23; 887,5.12.15 to have an intermission, 872,29; 873,8.12.13.17 to intermit, 873,11; 888,5 dialuein, to disperse, 878,22 to take to pieces, 887,10 to solve, 915,18 dialusis, taking to pieces, 887,11 dianoia, thought, 844,16 diapherein, to be different, 814,14; 826,15; 840,10.11; 841,13.23.24; 842,5.6; 851,16; 852,4; 886,15; 890,7.15; 898,9.12; 900,14 to differ, 867,28; 884,4; 895,27; 896,5; 897,26; 898,17.23.24.26; 903,18; 907,3 to make a difference, 859,20; 864,3.5 diaphônia, discrepancy, 831,21 diaphora, variety, 802,17; 803,5.6.7.14; 860,32 kind, 802,24 difference, 817,7; 821,20.33; 822,10.28.30; 824,24.26; 825,26; 826,10; 827,11; 28; 828,22; 836,8; 860,7; 862,5.7.12.17; 864,28.29.31; 880,13; 882,19.23.25; 887,17; 889,1; 895,10; 896,10.16.18; 897,25; 898,12.19.23.29; 899,7; 920,29 diaphoron, variation, 844,20 diaphoros, different, 869,23; 882,18.20.23; 883,6; 885,3.4; 900,9 kata diaphthoran, corrupt, 880,30 diarthrôsis, articulation, 804,15 analysis, 920,4 diarthroun, to describe, 803,2 to distinguish, 921,25 diaspan, to break up, 873,24 to scatter, 916,17 diastasis, distance, 874,11.20 dimension, 906,31 diastatos, extended, 885,8 diastêma, distance, 865,23 diateinein, to insist, 826,33

diathesis, disposition, 827,14; 832,22; 859,27; 860,16; 861,6.15; 867,3 condition, 859,17.20; 887,27.28; 917,17 diatithenai, to affect the condition, 859,18 to affect the disposition, 859,25 to dispose, 859,30 didaskalia, instruction, 832,11; 881,30 teaching, 893,10 didaskein, to teach, 801,3; 806,24; 862,4; 869,17 to give instruction, 802,1; 867,24.29 to explain, 807,21 diêgêsis, narration, 875,2 diêirêmenos, discrete, 868,27; 869,8; 870,14; 871,7 diistanai, to separate, 824,25; 874,13 to be apart, 869,6; 870,7; 874,19 to distinguish, 851,12 to be distanced, 852,14 to stand next to, 876,2 diorismos, exhibiting, 808,25 definition, 884,8 diorizein, to distinguish, 801,6.9; 802,17; 804,21; 805,20; 856,27; 861,25; 881,24 to make clear, 837,16; 883,25 to determine, 891,21; 897,21; 900,16 to make a distinction, 862,10; 876,1 diploês, split, 824,16 dokêsis, semblance, 901,6 doxa, belief, 816,20.24; 804,28.29 opinion, 824,4 doxazein, to have a belief, 904,11 to have an opinion, 904,12 duas, two, 875,11; 880,20 dunamis, potentiality, 832,19; 898,14.17 power, 859,31; 888,27 kata dunamin, potentiality, 816,27 dunamei, potential, 892,26; 894,8 potentially, 814,8; 815,14; 816,5; 819,16; 822,5.7; 823,16.20.22; 825,2.23; 833,27; 834,1; 860,22; 894,8 to dunamei, potential, 815,12; 816,3.16.28; 818,8.19; 820,24; 822,11.13; 823,15.28; 825,11.19.25.29; 826,6.18.21.28; 828,10; 860,25; 867,14.15

Greek-English Index potentiality, 818,13; 820,31; 826,4; 827,10 dunamousthai, to be powered, 913,31 to have power, 916,6 to have force, 916,30 duskatanoêtos, hard to understand, 888,13 duskherainein, to be troubled, 824,26 duskinêtos, not easily moved, 916,29 duslutos, difficult, 888,11 eidopoieisthai, to have form, 818,19 eidos, species, 801,8.10; 802,6; 803,4.6.7; 804,16.17.21.28.30; 809,15; 811,20; 855,20; 856,3.5.11.12; 861,12; 864,13.21.23.28; 866,12.15.25.31; 867,27; 875,14; 876,11; 882,6.13.14.15.17.18.21. 22.24.27.28.30; 883,1.2.3.4.5.6.7.12.13. 15.16.17.18.20.21.22.24.26; 884,1.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.18. 21.25.28; 885,1.2.20.24.27; 886,4.6.17.19.24; 890,2.6.15.21.26; 891,5.28.29; 892,18.31; 893,2.3.4.8.17.22.25.26.29; 894,1.2.27; 895,1.3.21.30; 896,5.6.17; 897,25.27.29; 898,2.3.4.5.9.10.12.17.19.22.23.24. 26.27.28.29.31; 899,1.6.10.23.27; 900,1.9.12.14; 918,11; 920,7.15; 921,29; 922,3.4.8.9 sort, 803,19.27; 812,22 kind, 851,15 form, 804,11; 805,25; 806,16.18.20.21.28.30; 807,1.7; 808,2.3.4.6.11; 809,11.28; 813,21; 814,7; 822,8; 826,2.7.18.31; 828,9.12.27.29.30; 829,9.10.13.24; 833,22; 834,10; 839,8.20.28.30; 840,1.9.13; 853,5.16; 862,16; 863,8.13.14.16.20; 874,28; 875,2; 876,23; 881,24.25; 884,6; 906,5.7.9.13.17; 908,3.4.16; 911,3; 916,7; 921,31 kat’ eidos, specific, 882,23.25; 895,7; 898,29 eikôn, image, 852,17

171

einai to einai, being, 804,19; 828,31; 829,3; 830,29; 839,13; 846,31; 848,16.19.27; 850,23; 851,23.30; 852,8.11; 855,26; 860,6; existence, 827,1; 828,24; 844,1; 868,14 to on, being, 807,24.28; 815,12.13.19.20; 820,26.29.30; 821,23.28; 822,24; 826,13; 827,4; 828,14.25; 829,3; 908,13.22.23.24.25.28.29; 909,4.6.9.11.16; existence, 826,1.29; 852,12; 901,4.5; 921,7; existent, 812,18; thing, 819,6; 824,29; 852,19; 865,12; 867,29; 881,14; 890,11; what is/exists, 813,1; 819,7; 826,1; 827,14; 828,32; 881,6; 913,14.16.17; 915,9 to ontôs on, true being, 824,14; what truly exists, 852,17.18 to mê einai, not being, 855,26; 860,5.6 to mê on, not-being, 807,23.24.28; 814,14.23; 815,6.13.15.16.19.20.21; 816,13.14.15; 818,11; 819,8; 823,7; 826,13; 828,14.25.26; 833,22.28; 909,8.10.17; non-existence, 921,7; non-existent, 812,19.24; that which does not exist, 827,17; what is not, 813,1; 818,5.6.7.9.28.30; 819,1.2(to ouk on).12.14; 823,6.13.29; 826,1.6.33; 827,3; 828,10; 908,21.22.23 eiôthein, to be accustomed, 801,15 eisagein, to introduce, 871,2 ekbainein, to be foreign, 900,11 ekballein, to expel, 823,5 to cast out, 858,1 ekdekhesthai, to accept, 822,23 ekhein, to have a relationship, 834,24 to be a relation, 905,12 to have, passim to hôsautôs ekhousa, to be in the same state, 821,25 to ekhein, possession, 830,1.3.4; 832,6.10 state, 859,10.19 ekhesthai, to be contiguous, 877,7.8.9.10.20.22 to ekhomenon, successor, 847,10.12.16; 848,5.8.11.24

172

Greek-English Index

adjacent, 802,3; 868,20; 899,22; 900,1 contiguous, 877,3.4.5.11.13; 878,11.13.14; 879,20; 881,28.29; 890,20.22.23.25; 891,13.15.27; 892,4.5.6.7.8; 893,10.12; 921,26 eklegein, to select, 811,1 ekphanôs, observable, 859,18 ekphora, expression, 901,27 ekpiptein, to drop out, 820,29 ekstasis, departure, 821,23.26; 822,24; 824,15; 826,12; 840,15 ekteinesthai, to extend, 809,7 ektithesthai, to set out, 829,25; 833,5; 868,26; 900,24 elleipein, to be elliptical, 888,21 to be missing, 913,4 embruon, embryo, 894,6.8 emmesos, with a mean, 871,28; 872,2.15 emphainein, to exhibit, 861,17; 902,9 emphainesthai, to emerge, 850,7 to appear, 852,18 empodizein, to impede, 914,22 to hinder, 916,8 empoiein, to impart, 832,22 to imbue, 859,20 empsukhos, animate, 862,30 enantios, contrary, 802,7; 811,3.4.9.14.16.19.23.24.26; 813,6.8.20; 814,12.13.17.24.25; 815,17; 819,26.27; 820,14.15.18.19; 821,4.5; 825,16.22.23.25.28; 829,25; 830,4.19.20.21.24; 831,7.9.13; 832,5.7; 833,4.10.11.12.14.16.17.22.23; 834,2.4.5.6.10.12.13; 836,22.23.26.28; 837,3; 840,4.7; 841,14.15.16.18.20.22.24.25.29; 842,4.9.10; 849,5.9.10.12; 850,1.10.13.14.25.28; 852,15.21; 858,15.16; 859,6.14; 861,7.8; 862,16; 863,18,21.22.25.29; 864,1.6.8.9.10; 865,1.10; 866,18.19.22.25.26; 867,11.16; 871,28.29.30.31; 872,1.10.14.15.18.29.30; 873,14.30; 874,1.2.15.16.18; 877.24.27.28; 878,2.3.8.9.10; 896,6.27; 899,16; 900,11.19.24.25.29.30;

901,8.9.10.12.17.20.21.22.24. 25.26.27; 902,3.4.5.6.10.11.12.14.15.16.17. 18.19.20.21.23.24.25.29.30.31; 903,1.2.6.7.8.9.10.12.15.18.19.20. 23.25.26.28.31; 904,15.16.17.19.20.21; 905,1.5.8.9.15.16.17.18.19.23.24. 25.26; 906,1.4.7.8.18.21.23; 907,2.4.5.7.8.10.12.13.24.25.26. 27.29.30; 908,1.6.8.9.10.11.20.22.24.28; 909,6.7.8.19.21.23; 910,3.4.5; 911,6.18.19.21.24.25.26.28.29; 912,1.6.7.8.10.12.13.14.16.17.22; 917,1.2.3.4.5.9.10.11.19.24.27; 917,1.2.3.5.25; 920,2; 921,1.11; 922,11.16.18.19 opposite, 805,1 opposing, 811,11 enantiôs ekhei, is contrary, 905,13 enantiôsis, contrariety, 830,3.6.24; 831,7.14.15; 832,4.6; 836,24; 858,7.15.16; 862,22; 872,2.3; 900,22; 901,7; 902,13.21.23; 903,14.16; 904,14; 906,19; 912,3.4.6; 922,13 enantiotês, contrariety, 836,25; 858,18; 859,7; 906,10; 908,4 enantiousthai, to be contrary, 901,15 enapoblêtos, easily lost, 887,28 enapolutos, easily rebutted, 823,25 enargês, obvious, 804,23; 812,2; 907,14 enargôs, plainly, 844,18 to endedusthai, being clothed, 832,9 endeiknunai, to exhibit, 816,17; 850,3; 886,7 to show, 819,15; 850,17; 859,29; 860,15; 866,25 to indicate, 859,24; 911,23; 913,11.18; 917,25 to point to, 821,3 to make clear, 857,23 to refer to, 895,20 endelekhês, perpetual, 846,12 endêlos, visible, 916,22 energeia, activity, 808,2; 816,29.30; 818,26; 819,7.9; 820,30; 821,18.19.25.26.27.29.30; 822,16.26.31; 823,1.3; 824,5.15; 826,27.32; 827,12.13; 858,5;

Greek-English Index 860,22.28; 866,29.30; 867,1.2; 887,12.16.17.18.20.23.24.26.29; 888,21.23.24.26.28.30.32; 889,2.3.4.9.14.15; 898,13.18; 906,10; 914,19 kat’ energeian, actual, 823,16.17.18 in actuality, 847,17.18 actively, 809,2.31; 810,2 actually, 814,4; 818,15.16 energeiâi, actual, 806,5; 815,12.13.15; 816,6; 823,21.22; 826,17.19.21 actually, 814,3.7.9.20; 816,4.8.9.16.28.30.32; 819,16; 821,33; 822,3.5.14; 826,24.30; 833,18.29; 834,1; 862,15; 914,21 in actuality, 822,7 to energeiâi, actuality, 819,18; 822,10 energein, to be active, 817,4; 822,14; 826,17.19.33; 827,1.6 to actuate, 817,26 to energein, activity, 897,25 energêtikon, activity, 822,21 active element, 822,28 energêtikos, active, 804,26; 822,19; 826,16 actual, 898,19 energos, actual, 825,13 energoun, agent, 888,27 enginesthai, to recur, 888,6 eniautos, year, 832,2; 875,20 enkhronos, temporal, 824,5 ennoein, to think (of), 821,31; 902,19 to have a thought of, 904,3 to conceive, 823,2 to realize, 833,26 ennoia, opinion, 864,25 conception, 888,16 connotation, 914,30 ennoia ekhein, to suggest, 869,21 ennoiâi, conceptually, 896,29 enstasis, objection, 842,16; 911,23.25 entelekheia, actuality, 807,12; 808,1.2; 810,1; 860,24 entornos, rounded, 821,19 enudron, underwater creature, 866,8 aquatic, 898,6 enuparkhein, to be one’s own, 865,3 epagein, to add, 803,4.8.14; 805,20; 820,9; 821,1; 831,1; 843,23; 857,5.23; 860,14; 870,12; 873,16;

173

881,2.23; 882,22.28.30; 885,23; 888,26; 896,3.9; 897,24; 899,29; 900,7; 901,14; 904,15; 914,17; 916,14; 920,1.18; 922,1.16 to adduce, 831,30; 840,19; 843,7; 913,21; 914,8 to infer, 847,8; 848,30 to introduce, 803,3 to bring, 884,8 to provide, 839,29 to put forward, 915,6 to raise (a problem), 808,12 to conclude, 856,19 epagesthai, to follow, 805,22 epagôgê, induction, 903,24; 904,18 ek epagôgês, inductively, 811,5 epanthein, to flower, 829,11 epêgmenon, conclusion, 852,21 epereidesthai, to rely on, 844,16 ephaptein, to touch on, 888,8.10 epharmozein, to fit together/fit with, 861,13; 870,16.23.24.25.26; 871,12; 880,9; 892,12; 895,5.14.18.23; 896,22.28; 900,7.8 to coincide with, 880,16.17 to epharmozon, fitting with each other, 871,2 (to) ephexês, (in) succession, 802,2; 879,12.15; 880,6.13; 881,16 being next, 868,10.21; 874,19.21.27; 876,15.26; 877,3.4.5.13; 878,13; 879,8.9.10.21.34; 881,29; 892,6.7.10.11; 893,10.12; 921,26 succeeds, 880,7 to ephexês, thing in sequence, 876,2.9.10 successor, 876,15 sequence, 876,17 ephistanai, to pay attention, 836,4 to consider, 846,3 to object, 854,21 to note, 863,15 to epiballon, received, 852,12 epideiknunai, to point to, 884,28 to demonstrate, 920,29 epidekhesthai, to admit, 864,31 epidiairein, to divide further, 829,20 epiginesthai, to supervene, 828,30 to be added, 879,16 epigraptein, to head (a book), 802,13 epikheirein, to argue, 922,15 epikheirêma, argument, 823,25;

174

Greek-English Index

839,4.5; 848,2; 852,26; 853,3; 854,24.29; 856,9.26; 914,8; 915,17 proof, 855,11 epikheirêsis, argument, 819,10; 849,7 epikheiresthai, to be an argument, 887,1 epikrinein, to judge, 919,22 epilanthanesthai, to forget, 839,26; 842,13.18.19.24.27 epilogos, epilogue, 920,1 epimenein, to remain, 822,8 epinoeisthai, to conceive, 879,29 epinoia, thought, 879,14 epiphaneia, surface, 869,2; 870,17.21; 871,7.8.11.13; 890,11 episêmainesthai, to add a note, 904,20 to point out, 918,14 episkeptein, to consider, 826,12 epistanai, to take notice, 817,24 to take note, 843,4 to notice, 834,17; 835,12; 893,3; 894,25 to note, 831,14; 855,21 to understand, 898,25 to have knowledge, 837,3 epistêmê, (scientific) knowledge, 808,8; 810,30; 836,26; 837,2.10; 854,4; 858,2; 883,8.11.13; 886,9; 887,8; 904,3.6; 920,28 science, 881,19; 883,9 epistêmonikos, scientific, 804,16 episumbainein, to supervene, 803,18 to be incidental attribute, 837,8 epitasis, increase, 840,14; 863,20; 864,19 epitêdeiotês, suitability, 906,16.19 epiteinein, to do intensely, 897,9 epiteleisthai, to be, 821,34 to become, 822,6 to come to be, 828,15 to be accomplished, 833,12 to be effected, 883,17 ereidein, to strive, 821,27 êremein, to be stationary, 802,20 to rest, 915,29, 30; 917,21; 918,20.22; 921,23; 922,17.19 to be at rest, 806,14; 808,10; 810,25; 866,3.6.8.10; 906,14; 907,1.8.21; 913,20; 914,5; 915,5.6.15; 916,2; 917,7.8.25.26; 918,17; 919,1.2.3.5.8 to remain at rest, 841,1

to remain unchanged, 819,4.6.8; 831,2.3.4.5.31; 832,2; 850,19.20.21.24; 851,21; 852,23 êremêsis, rest, 844,14; 850,15; 907,20; 915,3; 917,27 êremia, absence of change, 802,7 rest, 830,5; 840,16.17; 841,3; 850,19; 965,13.14.31; 866,1.5.19.26.27.28.30.31; 867,2.4.10.12; 900,20; 905,26; 906,2.3.5.11.15.20.22.23.26.29. 31.33.34; 907,7.8.11.12.13.15.19.23.25. 26.27.29.31; 908,1.2.4.8.11.14.15.17.19.25.26. 28.29; 909,1.4.6.13.26; 910,3; 912,1.22; 913,2.8.10.11.12.13.17.18.19.22.23. 24.27; 914,7; 915,10.13.23; 917,5.9.16.17; 918,4.6.8.9.10.28; 919,4; 920,2; 922,11.12.13 remaining unchanged, 819,5 changelessness, 819,22.24.25.27 êremizein, to be at rest, 838,7 to come to rest, 913,20; 914,6.14 erôtêsis, proposition, 846,20 question, 900,6 etos, year, 865,26 euthunein, to call to account for, 823,5 euthuphoria, motion in a straight line, 883,22.24; 884,6.13.29.30 euthus, straight (line), 871,1.3.4.4.7.9.14.19; 883,23.28; 884,4.7.29; 885,1.2; 895,12.13.14.19.22.23.24.25.26.31; 896,1.10.13.15; 897,2 exallagê, traverse, 916,13 exallattesthai, to alter, 821,22 to traverse, 916,14 exanuein, to complete, 865,23 exêgeisthai, to explain, 818,5.28; 829,4; 844,23; 854,17; 864,24; 876,24 to expound, 918,15 to interpret, 845,5 exêgêsis, interpretation, 818,8 explanation, 870,29 exêgêtês, commentator, 846,2; 850,16; 861,27; 880,26; 882,30; 891,7; 911,9; 912,26 exousia ekhein, to be capable, 863,3

Greek-English Index gê, earth, 834,10; 859,3; 898,21.24; 910,7.8.11; 912,10; 916,22.29; 919,13.20.22.23.27 clod, 898,24 soil, 911,15 to gegrammenon, reading, 855,13; 857,21; 880,30 what is in the text, 914,17 genesis, coming to be, 801,8; 806,17; 807,2.23.24; 813,18.22.26.27.30; 814,1.5.15.16.17; 815,4.9.17.18.19.22; 816,7.10.11.12; 817,6.7.22.23; 818,4.5.10.17.24; 819,3.20.23.24.26; 820,8.12; 821,13.17; 822,6; 823,5.7.8.10.13.15.19.23; 824,1.25; 825,5.6.8.9.10; 826,11.14.25.32; 827,12.14.21.27.30; 828,10.22.28.29.31.32; 829,3.14.18.19.20; 830,15; 832,14.17.20; 834,19; 836,17.19; 838,26.27; 840,1.3.5; 843,10.13.24.25.26; 844,2.3.4.5.15.19.21.23.24.26.28.30; 845,2.3.5.6.7.8.10.11.12.13.14.15. 20.23; 846,5.9.12.15.23; 847,1.3.6.14.15; 848,1.6.7.8.13.15.16.18.23.24.25. 26.27.28.29.30.32; 849,4.7.15.16.18.20.22.24.27.28.30; 850,3.4.7.27.30; 851,1.5.12.17.18.26.27; 853,2.4.6.7.1.13.14.17.20.21.22; 854,3.4.7.10.12.15.26.29; 855,1.2.4.5.6.7.9.14.15.16.18.19.21. 22.24.25.26.27; 856,25.29; 859,22; 860,1.3.4.18.26.28.31; 861,8.11.13; 862,12; 865,9; 867,17; 874,28; 875,8.13; 876,12; 878,4.6; 879,14; 881,21 901,3.4; 903,22; 904,29; 905,10.11; 906,18; 907,3.19.22; 908,6.10.12.16.27; 909,2.12.16; 910,22.23.26.29; 911,3.18.20.21.22.25.28; 913,10.11.15.18.19.24.27; 914,7; 915,16; 920,7; 921,9.14 generation, 860,1 kata genesin, in generation, 879,21.24 genêtos, generated, 844,17 gennan, to generate, 846,22

175

to give birth, 911,9 to beget, 911,13 genos, genus, 801,8; 802,6; 809,15; 829,29; 855,20.28; 856,1; 860,20.23; 862,5; 864,21; 865,12; 867,27.29; 868,15; 881,18.23,25; 882,6.8.11.12.14.15.17; 883,3.9.12; 884,18.21.28.30; 885,20; 890,3.7.26; 893,8.17.18.19.25.26; 894,27; 895,1; 898,9; 900,14; 906,23; 907,26; 918,11; 921,29; 922,2.4 category, 810,11 class, 878,10 kind, 861,18; 867,29 genei, generically, 882,7.8 kata genos, generic, 895,7 geometria, geometry, 883,9 gignôskein, to know, 804,20 to recognise, 864,28 to ginesthai, coming to be, 828,31; 848,16.26.27; 849,17.18.19.20.21.22.24.26.30; 851,22.28.29; 852,3.4.9 becoming, 829,3; 830,29 glukus, sweet, 803,11; 810,19; 813,23; 815,7.9 gnôrizein, to recognise, 881,28 gnôsis, knowledge, 804,16; 904,13.14 cognition, 883,9.12 gomphos, nail, 879,3 gorgôs, abruptly, 808,18 grammatikê, writing, 885,31 grammê, line, 874,5.13.29; 876,19.27.28; 877,1; 880,12.17.18.19.25.27.28; 881,2.3.4.6.7.8.9.12; 884,1.7.30; 890,11.17; 895,14.17.20 graphê, text, 844,20.30; 845,4.27; 854,16.21; 857,15.20 version, 889,7 reading, 880,24; 881,8; 909,18 passage, 891,23 graptein, to read, 805,21.28.29 to write, 835,11; 844,21; 845,19; 854,14; 860,21; 876,23; 896,10 to draw, 875,1 gumnazein, to contend, 848,9 gumnos, naked, 820,1.28; 821,1.3.10; 828,18; 832,7; 859,12.15; 866,20 gunê, woman, 876,4; 898,10.11

176

Greek-English Index

hairein, to choose, 918,14 halusis, chain, 877,10; 878,25 to hama, simultaneity, 802,3 (to be) together, 867,20; 868,11.12.13.17.19.28.30; 869,5.7.8.10.11.12.20.29; 870,6.24.27.28.29; 871,2.3.9; 881,29; 921,25 hama einai, to be together, 868,23.25; 871,15 haphê, touching, 870,24; 879,16.28.30.31; 890,24 touch, 878,14.20.22; 879,4.12.27 haplos, simple, 812,16; 816,7; 844,21.23; 845,2.3.20; 848,13; 878,28; 879,24; 910,13; 914,20.27 haplôs, simple, 813,26.30; 814,1.23.30; 815,4; 816,11.12 without qualification, 884,15.16.20; 886,16; 889,18.28; 892,17; 893,6; 906,30; 915,1 simply, 813,27; 814,1.3.4.14.16.23; 815,6; 816,4.5.7.13.15.16; 817,7.17.21.22; 818,12.19.23; 819,4.16; 823,9.14.18.20.22.29; 825,6; 829,21; 834,12; 836,17.18; 845,1.5.9.23.25; 850,31; 853,10; 855,20; 863,19; 864,2.4.5.7.9; 866,2; 869,27; 870,27; 883,12 haptesthai, to touch, 868,20; 869,6.29; 870,9.12.14.17.18.20.22.25; 871,1.10.12.14.15; 877,3.5.7.8.10.12.13.18.19.20; 878,13.15.16.18; 879,8.9.10.15.23.25.26.29.32; 880,5.7.8.9.11.13; 881,29; 890,23; 892,7.12; 914,24 to haptesthai, touching, 802,3; 879,34; 921,25 haptomenon, touching, 868,9 harmottein, to fit, 850,17; 886,12; 887,26 to suit, 866,18 to kath’ hauto, what is/the as such, 803,3, 22; 804,1.9; 809,7; 810,5; 861,20.25 passim self-sufficient, 806,4.5 heirmarmenê, fated, 911,8.10.11 heirmos, law, 911,8 hêlios, sun, 846,22 helix, spiral, 896,21

hêmera, day, 832,2; 846,31; 851,30; 885,7; 897,1; 911,16 to hen, one, 802,5.6; 879,12; 881,23; 882,6; 884,23; 885,17; 893,8.13.15.17; 894,28 unity, 879,2.5; 886,1; 888,5; 894,3 henôsis, unification, 871,9; 878,14 unity, 879,33 hênousthai, to be united, 869,4 to be unified, 878,23; 879,18 hepesthai, to follow, 805,28; 819,10; 843,7; 844,1.17; 848,31; 879,20; 914,4 to ensue, 808,26 to succeed, 847,31 hepomenon, consequent, 840,19 hermêneuein, to explain, 892,2 herpsis, crawling, 866,9 heterophulos, disparate, 890,16 heterotês, difference, 805,10 heuresis, discovery, 904,7 heuriskein, to show, 811,6 to discover, 812,5; 904,5 to find, 815,10; 884,24; 831,13; 855,13; 862,28; 891,23; 904,26; 911,16 hexis, possession, 820,21; 821,10 having, 859,11 disposition, 887,1.4.11.13.17.18.19. 20.22.24.26.28.29; 888,4.6.18.19.20.21.23.24.25. 27.28.31.32; 889,1.3.4.7.9.10.11.12.13.14.15; 906,10.13 state, 866,29; 867,3 himation, cloak, 832,9; 859,12; 878,24; 879,6.32 hippos, horse, 815,1; 856,1; 879,1; 892,2.3; 898,32; 899,4 histanai kata, to halt at, 852,8 histasthai, to stop, 842,22, 24; 862,3; 897,4; 913,20.24.25.26.32 to remain/be stationary, 863,1; 913,32.33; 914,2.12.13; 915,25.26 to come to a stop, 913,19.21.23.25.26.27.28; 914,4.5.8.11.13.15.18.23.26.28.29; 915,1.2.7.9.10.14.16.17.19.20.21. 22.24.27; 916,1.2; 918,16.19.24.29; 919,7.9; 922,15 historein, to give an account, 802,9

Greek-English Index to ho, ‘the what’, 805,6 aph’ ho, from which, 872,13 to eis ho, that into/to which, 804,29; 805,1.7; 806,1.2.27; 807,4.6.17.19.22.26; 809,8.11; 825,16.22; 829,8; 830,17; 840,10.11.27; 853,6.9.25.27; 871,19.23.28; 878,7; 901,12.26; 902,2.8.26; 903,12; 904,22; 905,8; 907,10.25.27; 920,13.18.24; terminus to which, 897,15.18; destination, 863,5 to en hô, that in which, 806,6; 809,7.9; 820,27; 884,1.3.25; 920,25 eph’ hou, to which, 808,27; 872,13; with regard to what, 872,10 to eph’ hou, subject matter, 896,20.25; 897,13; course, 897,17 to ex hou, that from which, 804,28; 805,1.6.7.12.13.16; 806,1.9.26; 807,4.6.16.20.22; 809,8.22.30; 829,7; 830,17; 840,10.11; 854,25.27; 871,19.23 28; 878,7; 901,11.26; 902,2.7.26; 903,13; 904,22.25; 905,5.7; 907,25; 920,13.25; origin, 863,5 kath’ ho, in the manner of which, 872,10; respect in which, 886,17; 889,20 to kath’ ho, the matter of (a change), 890,26 hodos, road, 823,21.22; 873,22.28 route, 875,6; 909,12 holikos, general, 879,23 holoklêros, whole, 994,14 to holon, the whole, 846,12 holoskherôs, in general terms, 906,30 holotês, whole, 916,7 homalês, uniform, 895,5.6.9.11.12.16.20.22.24.28.31; 896,1.2.9.11.14.15.21.24; 897,3.20.26; 899,11.15.26.28; 900,4.5.7.8; 922,6.7 homalôs, uniformly, 896,8.11 uniform, 896,4 homalotês, uniformity, 897,23 homoeidês, like in species, 872,8 of the same species, 874,24.25; 876,19.20; 890,10; 891,1.2.8 homogenês, of the same genus, 874,24.25; 906,30 of the same kind, 876,1.2; 877,11

177

homogeneous, 876,7 generically the same, 892,11 to homogenês, homogeneity, 876,4.5.6 homoiomerês, having similar parts, 896,15 homoiotês, likeness, 872,7; 899,12 similarity, 888,31; 889,1 homologein, to acknowledge, 822,31 to agree, 866,21 homônumia, ambiguity, 808,23.25; 915,17; 920,21 homônumôs, in different senses, 890,15.29 homonymously, 915,8 hôra, hour, 832,2 horan, to see, 825,26; 826,10; 832,16.18.19; 833,24; 859,23; 865,18; 866,12; 906,14 to observe, 910,15; 911,5 idein, to know, 844,27; 857,15; 870,12; 880,26; 882,28; 907,12; 912,16 horasis, sight, 866,3 hôrismenos, definite, 811,2; 815,8; 831,23; 874,3.4.6.8.14 determined, 840,28 horismos, definition, 807,11.29; 823,26; 860,24; 882,12; 920,15 horizein, to define, 823,21; 875,16; 876,17.18 to determine, 872,4; 880,28; 902,3; 920,28 horman, to start, 845,19 hormê, impulse, 914,4.13 horos, term, 808,26; 844,3 definition, 810,1; 823,20; 824,23 to hôs, how it occurs, 897,19 hudôr, water, 803,10.11.12; 825,20; 827,28.29; 828,1.3.11.12; 834,5.6.7.13.14.15; 859,2; 877,22; 878,22; 916,16 hugieia, health, 837,20; 839,27; 840,9.20.21.22.25; 841,26.27.29; 842,3.4.7; 843,6; 857,22.24; 887,3.8; 901,3.8.9.10.13.21.23.24; 902,1.9.28; 903,10.11; 905,25; 907,14.15.16 hugiansis, getting well, 842,12 becoming well, 863,6 cure, 857,3; 885,25 being cured, 857,10; 885,26 hugiantos, can be cured, 803,8

178

Greek-English Index

hugiazein, to cure, 803,15 hugiazesthai, to be healthy, 839,27; 842,14; 843,9.10 to become healthy, 841,25.28; 887,6; 902,28; 903,25; 910,17 to be cured, 802,22.23; 803,9; 857,1.2.4.5.6.10.12.13.17.19; 885,26 hugrainesthai, to be moistened, 859,2.3 hugros, moist, 828,3.10.12 wet, 834,8 ta hugra, liquids, 877,21 huios, son, 836,17 hulê, matter, 810,27; 814,6; 818,12; 820,31; 823,8.9.14; 826,4.7; 827,9; 833,31; 853,1.5, 8.14.23.24.25; 888,10; 906,16 hulikos, material, 826,5; 846,9 hupallattein, to switch, 866,21 hupallêlos, subordinate, 883,7; 884,9 huparkhein, to appertain, 802,4 to happen to, 857,22 to come about to, 842,27 to be a feature, 868,17 to apply, 810,20 to be true of, 870,1 to belong to, 818,22.23.27; 819,4.8; 878,12; 881,15.16; 889,22; 912,25; 913,1.5 to be the case, 845,29 to be in, 836,25 to be, 804,17; 813,5; 852,26; 853,14; 862,3; 880,5.6.7.11; 884,24; 886,17; 888,30 to be present, 857,8; 864,7; 880,1; 895,6.7 to hold of, 818,11; 859,28 to occur, 810,5; 837,14; 857,10.11; 858,17; 867,21; 868,13; 881,22; 912,5; 921,27; 922,18 to exist, 844,18 to kath’ hauto huparkhon, self-subsistent, 825,8 to huparkhon, constituent, 920,12 huparxis, existence, 802,2 hupatê, lowest (note), 811,16; 872,30; 873,8 hupeinai, to support, 853,1 hupersunekhês, supercontinuous, 879,5 huphesis, decrease, 899,3

huphistanai, to be subsistent, 804,19 to be, 878,5 to subsist, 818,14 to occur, 898,28; 899,2.6 to come to be, 824,16 to hold of, 835,23 to exist, 847,19.21.30; 850,33; 878,6 to stand at, 847,22 hupoballein, to subsume, 813,21 hupodeiknunai, to indicate, 867,9 hupodekhesthai, to receive, 828,16 hupographê, outline, 832,11 sketch, 874,16 hupokeimenon, substrate, 807,5; 812,6.7.8.9.10.11.12.18.19.23. 24.25.26; 813,1.2.12.13.15.17.19.20.22.23.25; 820,3.4.5.7.8.13.14.17.18.22.23.27; 825,12.16; 826,23; 829,11.24; 830,15.28.29.30; 831,16; 832,13; 833,17.18; 836,20.23; 837,1.3.9; 839,7.11.13.15.17.19; 840,18; 843,1.2.12.13; 851,8; 853,5.7.12.15.17.18.19.23.25; 859,11.18; 860,15.29; 861,17; 867,12; 873,2; 884,5; 903,17.18.21.22.23; 904,22.23; 905,7; 907,1.2; 908,21.30; 909,1; 921,4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11 subject-matter, 835,21; 872,20.23; 880,3 subject, 856,13; 858,26; 859,16.17.25; 878,8; 886,1; 887,19.21.22.23; 888,7.8.9.25.27; 889,11.13 the given, 872,28 hupokeimenê ousia, substrate, 810,13 hupokeisthai, to underlie, 826,23; 828,16; 832,15; 833,31; 834,11; 836,27; 853,8.9.24; 856,15; 858,24; 859,4.9.30; 862,14 to be supposed, 848,29 hupolambanein, to regard, 894,13 hupolêpsis, apprehension, 883,8 hupomenein, to continue, 815,20; 816,9 to persist, 817,29.32; 818,1.2.13.14; 821,34; 822,3.5; 825,12.20.27; 826,3.5; 827,24.26; 828,1.3.9.11.13.16.18; 831,18; 833,18.30; 836,27; 858,21.23.25;

Greek-English Index 859,10; 860,18; 865,11; 867,12; 877,16; 886,2; 896,29 to remain, 817,4.18; 843,8 hupomnêma, commentary, 801,2 hupopteuein, to suspect, 821,32 huporrhein, to flow, 886,3 hupostasis, existence, 847,31; 851,6.15; 879,13 exists, 867,29 en hupostasei, exists, 815,24; 816,17 hupostrephein, to return, 908,3 hupothesis, hypothesis, 824,3; 838,10; 894,17 supposition, 886,7 proposal, 828,21 ex hupotheseôs, hypothetically, 824,3; 856,5 hupothetikos, hypothetical, 919,6 hupothetikôs, hypothetically, 819,20 hupotithenai, to suppose, 821,23; 847,17; 848,12.32; 857,5; 880,2.19.29 to presuppose, 884,7 hupotithesthai, presuppose to be (true) on the hypothesis, 856,10 iatreuein, to heal, 803,16; 804,6.7; 805,8 iatrikê, medicine, 883,10 iatros, physician, 803,16; 804,7.8.9; 805,9 idikôs, individually, 848,21 idion, property, 825,10; 864,17.27; 893,15 idios, severally, 921,17 particular, 921,18 proper, 835,22; 839,12; 879,19 of its own, 869,2 special, 851,17; 856,2.9; 862,25.27; 863,11.12 to ienai, progression, 848,7 isotês, equality, 836,10 kakia, badness, 836,26 kalein, to call, 801,15; 802,10; 812,16.17; 816,11; 817,15; 821,26; 822,19.24.26; 823,3; 824,6.20.22; 828,25; 856,2; 860,17; 861,8.16.17.19; 862,7.9.11.28.29; 864,1; 865,31; 866,25; 891,25; 891,29; 893,19; 908,17.20; 909,4.5; 911,14

179

kardia, heart, 875,9; 876,12 kataballein, to establish, 856,9 katakhrêstikos, incorrect, 865,22 katakhrêstikôs, by loose use, 915,20 katakhusis, pouring, 803,18 katakolouthein, to follow, 894,13 katantan, to reach, 822,10 kataphasis, affirmation, 812,11.13.14.16.18.22.26; 816,1 kataphasei, by an affirmative term, 820,19.26; 821,1.3; 830,29; 832,7; 833,23 positively, 859,15 by a positive name, 859,11; 866,20 kataphatikos, affirmative, 812,14 positive, 859,13 kataphatikôs legesthai, to have an affirmative name, 828,19 katarithmein, to list, 875,4 katataxis, assignment, 886,15 katêgorein, to predicate, 810,14.15.26; 814,25; 818,24; 882,11; 894,15 to affirm, 845,21 katêgoria, category, 801,17; 829,16.22.23.29; 83212.27; 803,1.5.7; 837,21.23; 836,19; 838,4.23; 856,6; 858,8.13.17.20; 859,4.17.25.28.29; 860,8.20.23.29; 861,10.24; 862,3; 867,9.17; 881,21; 882,7.8.14; 886,17; 921,11 kathedra, professional throne, 876,7 kathêgemôn, leader, 824,22 katholikos, universal, 801,6; 857,29; 838,4.6.8; 843,20; 865,14 katholou, universally, 842,22; 902,3; 907,7; 912,25 universal, 155,16.17; 860,21 to keisthai, position, 830,1.3.4; 832,9.21; 859,7 posture, 832,4; 859.19 keklasmenê, bent, 895,17; 869,20.21 interrupted, 899,17.18 kenon, void, 801,13; 880,22 kephalaion, main chapter, 920,5 kerannusthai, to be mixed, 869,29 khalkos, bronze, 853,9 kharaktêr, character, 894,3; 895,2 kharaktêristikos, characteristic, 865,3 kharaktêrizesthai, to have its character, 822,20; 900,30

180

Greek-English Index

to be characterized, 894,19; 901,7; 902,24.25 kheir, hand, 802,24; 803,19 khelônê, tortoise, 898,33; 899,5 khôrein, to permeate, 868,30 khôrion, area, 844,20 to khôris, separateness, 802,3 separate, 868,20.24; 870,6.7; 921,25 khôristos, separate, 865,21; 880,2.29 khôrizein, to be distinct, 802,28 to separate, 806,2; 869,21; 874,17; 880,23 khrasthai, to use, 801,5; 817,14; 835,16; 853,12; 900,28 to make use, 887,1 to treat, 905,19.21.22 khreia, need, 868,6; 870,3; 872,24; 873,11.15.29 aid, 850,16 necessity, 873,23 khrêmetistikos, neighing, 862,8 khrêsimos, useful, 921,28 khrêsis, usage, 894,25 khrôma, colour, 809,14.15.24; 825,17; 831,24.25.26; 841,17; 875,3.14.17; 882,16.19.23.24 khronos, time, 801,13; 805,4; 806,1.25.26; 807,16.19; 809,9.10; 821,32; 824,6.18; 828,28; 829,6.7.8.9; 830,3.5.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.16. 17.18.19.20.21.23.24.25.30; 831,1.4.5.7.8.9.14.19.20.21.28. 29.30.31; 832,1.16; 847,2.5; 852,4.6.8.15; 859,5.21; 860,14; 865,23; 868,13; 870,5.7.8; 872,22.25.26.29; 873,1.11.12.15; 874,28; 875,7.18; 884,27; 885,3.4.6.8.9.31.32.33; 886,1.3.5.11.18.23; 817,4.12.14; 889,16.20; 890,9.11.24.25; 891,3.13; 892,10.11.14.15.19.20.21.22.24.26. 29.30.31; 893,5; 897,12.14.17; 916,14; 920,13.25; 921,21; 922,1 khronôi, temporally, 851,6 en khronôi, temporal, 828,26 apo khronou, chronological, 872,19 kata khronon, temporally, 821,22 chronological, 872,23; 876,11 tou khronou, temporal, 887,15.25

kinein, to initiate change, 803,14.19.20.28; 804,2.3.11.14; 805,16.17.23; 806,6.23.28; 807,7; 840,15; 920,23 to make change, 837,30; 839,2 to cause change, 803,26; 804,5.6; 806,28; 838,14.15; 920,12 to bring about change, 920,11 to cause motion, 882,4 to move, 805,18; 915,14 to change, 838,2.5.7.9; 862,2; 863,3 to be a cause of change, 806,21 kineisthai, to change, 802,2.25.26.28; 806,9.10.11.12.13.14.21; 807,5.11.30; 808,3.6.11.14.16.17; 809,30.31; 810,2.6.12.13.14.17.22.23.24.26. 27.28; 816,19.20.22.29.30.31; 817,2.3.9.12.13.17.19.21.29.32; 818,3.5.16.21.22.26; 819,2.5.6.8.10.19.20; 822,16; 823,6; 824,7.10.11.12; 826,16.33; 827,4.11.17.22.25.26; 828,29; 830,9.11.12.13.16.18.21.23.25.26; 831,2.3.5.20.22.23.25.29; 832,3; 833,29; 834,1.15.17.24.27; 835,2.5.7.18.24.26.27.28; 836,3.5.6.8.9.14.15; 837,5.9.10; 838,13.21; 839,7; 840,11.21.22.24; 841,2.4.10.13.19.22.29; 842,1.2.5.6.9.20.21.22.23.25; 843,2.7.8.11.18.27.28; 849,9.11.23; 850,10.18.21.23.24.26.27.28.29; 851,20; 852,21.22; 853,15.16.17.22.24.27; 854,1.2.5.7,9.10.11.17.20.24.26; 856,13.15.16.23; 857,8.9; 858,19.21.23.24.25.26; 859,4.9; 860,14; 861,3.19.20.21.23.24.25.26; 862,30; 863,1.3.28; 864,14; 865,7.16.19..20.22.23.24.26.27.29. 30.31; 866,1.5.7.11.14.16.17.18; 867,13; 871,24; 872,9.10.11.12.13.16; 873,4.16; 883,18.19.23; 884,12.25.26.27; 885,4.5.10.12.14.15.17.22.29; 886,16.17; 889,20; 890,26; 891,9; 892,19.32; 893,5.21; 895,25; 897,13.19; 899,1; 902,8; 906,14.15; 907,23.28; 913,13.14.16.21; 917,8.12; 918,19.23; 919,4.5.11;

Greek-English Index 920,10.12.15.16.20.23; 921,19.21.22.23.31; 922,1.17.19 to be changed, 803,13; 804,1.14.26; 805,6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.15.16.18. 21.25.26.27; 806,1.4.26.28.29.30; 807,4.13.16.17.19; 808,10.11; 809,3.5.28; 837,29; 838,1.2.5.9.11.12.14.15.16.17. 18.20; 839,13; to move, 802,20.21.24; 810,17; 897,23; 898,20.25; 912,11.21; 913,31.33; 914,12; 915,11.26; 916,8.10.14.25.29; 917,7.13.23.24 to be in change, 815,23; to undergo change, 810,15; 850,11; 912,7 to kineisthai, change, 810,21; 848,31 kinêsis, change, 801,3.5.9.11.16; 802,5.6.7.10.12.16; 803,2; 804,18.22.23.25; 805,1.4.15.20.22.24.28.29; 806,1.3.6.7.9.10.12.13.14.16.18. 23.25.26.27.29; 807,3.8.9.11.12.15.16.17.19.20. 29.30; 808,1.3.6.7.13.14.15.17.19.20.21. 28; 809,3.7.26.27.30; 810,1.2.6; 815,19; 816,29; 817,5.23.24.25.26.29.31; 818,4.17.26; 819,3.20.21.22.23.25.26.28; 820,1.7.9.12.13; 821,12.13.14.15.16.18.22.24.26. 31.32; 822,16.19.23.24.26.30; 823,2.3.6.19.21.23.27.29; 824,1.2.4.5.9.14.18.21.23.25.26; 826,12.13.16.24.27.32; 827,11.13.20.21; 828,22.26.29.31.32; 829,1.19.20.22.24.26.27.28; 830,2.4.5.8.10.11.14.15.17.19.25. 26.27.28; 831,1.30; 832,28; 833,3.6.7.9.10.17.25.28; 834,2.3.7.14.16.18.21.22.25; 835,3.6.9.16.17.18.20; 836,7.23.29; 837,7.12.21.23; 838,10.13.15.16.17.18.19.20.25.26; 839,1.2.4.5.7.8.10.11.12.14.15.16. 19.20.22.23.24.25.28.29.30; 840,7.11.12.13.14.15.17.18.21.23. 24.27.28; 841,2.3.4.8.9.11.14.15.17.19.21.25.

181

26.29; 842,2.4.5.14.15.16.19.23; 843,1.3.5.7.19.23.25.26; 844,2; 845,27.28; 846,1; 848,1; 849,5.9.10.12.13.23; 850,1.11.18.20.22.25.26; 851,12; 852,4.6.8.21; 853,2.11.15.18.20.22; 854,2.3.4.7.10.11.15.16.17.18.19.20. 22.23.26.30; 855,1.2.11.14.22.23; 856,3.5.6.8.10.11.12.13.14.15.20. 25.27.29; 857,2.4.7.9.10.11.12.26; 858,2.3.8.10.11.13.14.15.18; 859,13.16; 860,2.3.7.11.15.17.20.21.24.25.27. 32; 861,5.10.15.16.24.25; 862,1.3.5.6.11.12.14.18.21.25.26; 863,4.10.18.22.23; 864,1.13.18.21.23.24.26; 865,5.9.12.13.25.27; 866,5.13.19.23.24.25; 867,1.4.6.9.10.11.15.17.19.26.27; 868,3.7; 871,18.29; 872,8; 873,3.16.18.23; 881,18.20.21.22.23.24.28.32; 882,3.5.7.11.12.13.19; 883,1.5.15.16.17.18.20.21.26.28; 884,1.2.3.5.7.9.10.14.16.17.18.23. 24.27; 885,3.6.16.19.23.28.30.32; 886,8.11.16.19.23.27.28; 887,12.16.29; 888,4.15.18.19.21; 889,17.19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.28. 29.30; 890,1.4.5.8.9.17.20.21.25.27; 891,2.8.10.13.14.15.16.27; 892,4.8.10.14.15.18.23.23.25.28.30. 31; 893,1.3.4.6.7.9.11.15.18.20.22; 894,10.23.26; 895,4.6.11.13.14.16.19.20.21.23; 896,4.8.15.18.19.21.23.24.25; 897,10.11.12.18.20.25.27.28; 898,2; 899,6.9.16.20.22.23.25; 900,2.3.10.15.16.18.19.21.23.25.26. 30; 901,1.15.20.22; 902,6.7.8.9.13; 903,2.5.14.16.17.20.22.25; 904,13.15.19.21.23.25; 905,9.19.23.24.26; 906,2.3.4.6.7.8.20.22.23.24.25. 27.29.31.32.34; 907,1.3.6.8.9.11.15.18.20.26.28. 29.31; 908,1.2.5.9.10.14.15.17.18.28.30; 909,1.2.5.7.20.24.27; 910,3.4.5.10.11.12.13; 911,4.11; 912,1.4.5.6.7; 913,2.12.16;

182

Greek-English Index

917,3.9.16.27; 918,1.2.4.6.7.9.10.28; 919,11.17.19; 920,2.7.12.13.14.15.19.20; 921,10.12.14.16.19.20.24.31; 922,2.3.4.6.7.8.11.13.17 motion, 891,29; 912,14.15.16.20.22; 914,23.30; 915,4.5.12.14.23.24; 917,6.21.22 kinêtos, changeable, 807,12; 808,1; 809,2.31; 810,1.2 capable of change, 849,12 to kinoun, changer, 806,1.5; 807,13.16.19; 809,4.29; 810,6; 837,29; 838,11.12.14.15.20 initiator of change, 810,21 koinônein, to have community, 811,21 to share, 890,30 koinos, general, 801,6.11; 843,23; 844,16; 856,2; 885,24.28.30; 886,18 loose, 869,11.20 ordinary, 833,21 common, 811,2; 822,28; 853,3; 856,18; 860,21; 862,6.19.24.26.28; 863,10.11.12; 867,23.25; 876,9; 882,15; 894,15; 895,2; 920,27; 921,16.17.18 koinôs, in the widest sense, 801,4 in general, 830,20; 848,20; 906,9 generally, 802,1 in common, 860,24; 868,1 kollê, glue, 879,4 kôluein, to prevent, 805,13; 847,13; 855,18; 858,18; 872,27; 873,8.12.13; 877,20; 882,2; 886,27; 911,26; 915,20 to be against, 916,12 kosmopoia, world-creation, 886,15 kosmos, universe, 869,13; 882,3 kouphos, light, 827,7.8 kouphotês, lightness, 827,10; 834,9; 898,12.21 krasis, composition, 811,18 fusion, 878,26 kratein, to be predominant, 876,1 to control, 415,13 kratunein, to strengthen, 918,27 krinein, to judge, 874,10; 890,25 krisimos, critical, 911,16.18 kubernêtês, steersman, 805,18

kuklophoria, circular travel, 882,3 circular motion, 883,21.24; 885,1 kulisis, rolling, 883,25; 884,2.3 kuriôs, proper, 801,10; 821,9; 831,15 properly, 862,29; 863,2 central, 806,17 centrally, 832,18 strictly, 859,5; 865,15.16.20; 869,11.14.15.20.24.26.29; 870,1; 872,6; 874,8; 876,19; 877,15; 884,12.13.18.20; 885,27.33; 886,20; 891,9; 893,16.17.25; 894,11.23.26; 906,4.7.21; 908,1; 912,25.27; 913,3.5; 914,9.26.28; 915,7.9.15.20.22; 916,2; 917,27; 918,1; 919,12 in the full sense, 818,31 in the strict sense, 843,22; 860,25; 876,25; 889,21; 893,7; 915,19 basically, 815,28 basic, 825,6 strict, 897,12 lampas, torch, 891,16.19.24.25.26.28.29.31; 892,1.2 lamprotês, brightness, 834,9 lathôn, advertently, 848,9 lankhanein, to be suited, 867,29 lektikos, linguistic, 914,27 lêpsis, gain, 851,7.9; 905,12.13.14 gaining, 902,21.24 leptôs, delicately, 822,30 lêthê, forgetting, 839,23.24; 842,20; 886,9 leukainesthai, to be made white, 807,1 to be whitened, 808,22; 853,18.27 to become white, 809,12.16; 818,1.14.15; 822,2; 827,23; 839,16; 856,21; 896,18; 910,16; 914,14.15 leukansis, whitening, 807,13; 808,20.21.25.29; 853,18 becoming white, 840,23; 854,18; 896,1.2; 910,28; 920,22.23 growing white, 882,16.17.19.20.21.22.23.27.30; 890,5.17.18; 891,3; 896,28; 899,26 leukos, white, 805,14.15; 807,1; 808,20.21.22.24; 809,11.13.15.16.23.25; 810,4.18; 811,17.18.19.25.26.27; 812,15;

Greek-English Index 813,4.23.29.30; 814,6.9.10.13; 815,1.2.8; 816,2.11.14.15.16.20.30; 818,2.3; 820,2; 821,2.5.6.7; 825,7.15.17.18; 826,9.30; 831,22; 833,16; 840,16.26; 841,6.7; 853,19; 854,1; 856,17; 859,15; 863,14.21.22.26.27; 866,23; 875,3.15.18; 877,15.17.19; 882,25; 883,6; 885,13.17.18; 896,7; 897,16; 900,12; 904,24.26; 905,20.21.22; 907,5.7.14; 917,14.15.20; 920,22 to leukon, whiteness, 854,1.4; 917,15 leukotês, whiteness, 807,27; 808,13.19; 882,22.25.26.29; 920,18 lexis, text, 802,12; 818,28; 823,24; 845,22; 888,17; 904,25; 909,18; 919,15 point, 916,31 passage, 919,26 lithos, stone, 807,8; 879,32; 916,21 logikos, rational, 862,8.15 logos, discussion, 801,11.12; 803,1; 807,18; 809,10; 810,7; 856,13; 867,26; 868,9.12; 881,13 mention, 832,22 function, 905,18 concept, 870,3 saying, 887,2 problem, 915,18 statement, 816,19.24; 846,6 relation, 811,16 argument, 804,25; 809,25; 811,7; 819,13; 837,4; 844,15.19.27; 847,8.32; 848,4.9.18; 850,18; 858,4; 913,32; 914,10 account, 808,13; 824,27; 835,1; 852,4; 860,21; 867,25; 868,5; 879,22; 886,7; 888,18.19.21.32; 896,20; 901,25; 906,26; 910,14.19; 917,10.12.18; 921,3.29 what we are speaking about, 805,3 logôi, conceptually, 879,10.14.23 kata logon, conceptually, 879,19 logon ekhei, relatively, 874,23 luein, to solve, 808,17.26; 883,25; 917,17; 920,21 to answer, 842,16; 911,25 to resolve, 814,11 to break, 873,27 lusis, solution, 884,8; 922,18

183

manthanein, to learn, 855,8; 857,1.6.10.13.14.17.23.24.25; 869,7.31; 903,27; 904,1.5.12 marturein, to bear witness, 827,3 mathêmata, mathematics, 880,3 mathêsis, learning, 851,25.26; 855,4.8.23.24.25; 857,5.6; 863,6; 883,10; 886,8; 890,5; 904,7.8 megethos, magnitude, 805,26; 806,28; 846,14.28; 847,4; 862,21.23; 872,3.5; 879,11.13; 896,22; 897,2; 920,16 height, 831,24.26 meiôsis, diminution, 806,11; 822,1; 862,21; 863,6.12; 882,10; 910,20.29; 921,17 meiousthai, to diminish, 872,3; 899,26 mêkos, length, 904,16; 906,32 melainesthai, to become black, 814,26; 839,17; 896,27; 910,16 to turn black, 826,25.26; 885,11.17.20; 917,14 to blacken, 917,15 melansis, growing black, 882,17.20.21; 896,28 becoming black, 910,29 melas, black, 810,4; 811,17.18,19.25.26.27; 813,5; 814,13; 820,2; 821,2.5.6.7; 825,14.17; 826,30; 831,22; 841,6; 859,15; 863,14.23.24.27; 864,2; 866,23; 875,4.18; 877,15.17.20; 882,25; 883,6; 896,7; 897,16; 900,13; 904,26; 905,21.22; 907,5.6.7.14; 917,20 mellon, future, 830,6; 831,9.10.11.16; 859,5.6.7 menein, to remain, 814,25.26.27; 817,1.20; 828,2.5.8; 835,25; 836,2.23; 842,20.21; 843,8.11; 848,3; 850,28; 862,15; 873,19.26; 878,16; 888,6.9; 889,19.22; 917,15.26; 918,29; 919,7.9.10 to be permanent, 888,11 to retain, 863,14 to persist, 888,12 mên, month, 832,2; 875,22 mênuein, to reveal, 901,26 mênutikos, indicates, 869,10 merikos, particular, 801,7; 802,16; 851,4

184

Greek-English Index

meristos, has parts, 878,17; 880,9 meros, part, 802,22.23.26; 803,10.11.18.21; 804,4.8.10.14; 809,6.14.15.20.24.27; 810,8; 852,5.6.11; 857,27.28; 861,19; 868,29; 869,27; 870,11.13; 879,27; 889,24.29; 892,16; 896,22.28; 897,1; 917,20; 920,4 side, 918,27 kata meros, partial, 803,3 para meros, in turn, 825,24; 842,25.28 in part, 828,16 metabainein, to transfer, 873,1 metaballein, to be transformed, passim to bring about transformation, 920,10 to become, 837,19 to turn into, 831,12; 834,15 to transpose, 837,22 to become different, 802,14.21.22; 806,7.29; 807,2.5.22; 808,16.17; 809,11.12.13.16.17.18.19.23.24; 810,18; 811,8.20.21.22.26; 813,4.9.29; 814,21.28; 815,13.15; 816,10.20.24.26.27.32; 817,3.4.25; 818,2; 820,15.21.22; 821,34; 822,2.4.22; 825,15.16.18.29; 826,18.30; 827,30; 828,2; 834,28; 835,4.14.15.19.28; 837,24.25.27.28; 838,3.5; 839,8.10.15.17.18.22.23; 840,18.19.23.24.25.26.27.28.29; 841,1.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.14.16. 17.18.19.20.26.28.29; 842,7.8.13.26.28; 843,5.9.14.15.16.18.27.29; 851,7.8.9.19; 852,24; 853,7.17.19; 856,21; 857,3.16.18; 858,27; 859,2.6.26.27; 860,18.31.32; 861,3.22; 862,15; 863,13.22.23.25.26; 864,3.5; 865,11; 867,12; 871,9.21.22; 872,4.7.24.30; 873,30.31; 877,26; 888,11; 896,27; 897,5; 900,27; 902,1; 903,10.29.31; 904,4; 905,11.20; 906,5.12.13; 909,14; 920,8.10; 921,4.8 metablêtos, is transformed, 803,1 metabolê, transformation, 801,4.5.7.8.9.10.11; 802,16.17.25;

803,1.4.5.6; 804,13.15.17.22.25.28; 806,6.18; 807,21.23; 808,4.14.21.29; 809,11; 810,3.9.11; 811,1.5.8.12.13.24.28.30; 812,1.2.3.5.6.20; 813,3.5.8.10.11.12.21.24.25.28; 814,20.23.24; 815,3.5.8.11; 816,7.11.14.21; 817,9.15.22.28; 820,1.3.7.9.11.12.14.16.17; 821,12.13.14.15.21.24; 822,1.2.4.10.14.16.19.27.30; 823,2.6.28; 824,5.6.19.21.24.27; 825,1.2.4.6.10.11.19.21.22.25; 835,3.13.15.19; 836,16.28.29; 837,12.13; 838,27.28; 839,10.24.30; 840,2.8.20.21.25; 841,2.14.22.28; 842,8.15.17.19; 843,4.6.14.20.21.22.26; 844,2.4.6.7.9.10.12.14.15; 846,5.6; 848,2.12.32; 851,4.10.13.15.16.17.24; 852,22.23; 853,3.4.6.7.11; 855,24.26.28; 856,1.14.26.29; 857,7.16.18; 858,16; 859,10.13.16.30; 860,4.5.8.24.26.28; 861,1.3.6.7.9.10.12.13.18.22.25; 862,11.12.19.24; 863,4.8.15.16.21.24; 864,6.7.11.16.22; 865,10; 867,9.11.14.24.25.27.28; 868,8; 871,30.31; 872,19.20; 873,3.4; 875,6; 877,23.27.29; 878,1.4; 897,2.15; 900,18.24.29; 901,2.4.16.23.26; 902,20.24.25; 903,17.20; 904,21.24; 905,6.8; 908,9.11.12.15.20.29; 909,5,9.14.15.19.21.23.27.28; 910,10.15.22.24; 920,6.9.19.27; 921,2.15 metabolikos, of transformation, 822,25 metagein, to transfer, 871,24; 874,16 to lead, 904,2 to shift, 886,28 to reverse, 838,9 metalambanein, to subsume, 809,31 to receive, 828,4 to exchange, 835,16 kata metaphoran, metaphorically, 815,29 in a transferred sense, 913,4

Greek-English Index metaphorikôs, by transference, 915,8 metapiptein, to reverse, 816,21 to be in flux, 834,23 to vary, 835,1 metatithenai, to transpose, 904,9 to metaxu, intermediate, 811,3.4.9.14.15.18.20.23.24; 814,13; 820,14.15; 825,17; 826,22; 828,17; 829,9; 840,14; 863,19.20.22.27.28.29; 864,4.7.9.12.13.14.29.30; 865,1.8; 902,11; 905,15.16.17.18.19.23; 916,9; 921,1.11 (in) between, 802,3; 852,7; 860,20; 871,16.18.22.26.27.31; 872,8.12.16; 873,2.5.6.13.16.24.29.31; 877,24.28.29; 878,5.9; 880,14.15.16.17.18.20.21.22.23.28; 881,2.3.6.8.10.30; 921,26.28 intervening, 830,17 meteinai, to have a share, 894,28 metekhein, to (have) participation, 811,21 to share, 811,24; 900,12 to partake, 820,31; 826,6 methexis, participation, 853,14 methistanai, to turn, 903,32 to transpose, 904,10 metrein, to measure, 830,26; 874,3.4.7; 892,10.30 to be measurable, 851,6 metriôs, feebly, 848,9 metron, measure, 828,28; 830,25.26; 852,12; 871,17; 874,9; 892,14.24 mignunai, to mix, 811,25; 852,10 miktos, mixed, 852,16.19 mixis, mixture, 811,18; 852,13; 899,16; 905,18 admixture, 840,15; 863,24; 896,6.7; 900,10.13 mnêmê, remembering, 832,24 memory, 842,20 mnêmên poieisthai, to call to mind, 868,10 mnêmoneuein, to recollect, 839,26 to recall, 868,16 moira, degree, 865,26 monas, one, 836,11; 875,11; 880,20 unit, 876,27.28; 877,1; 879,12.13.15; 880,2.4.6.7.14; 890,14 monê, changelessness, 900,20

185

rest, 908,16.17; 910,5.10.11.12; 912,14.15.16.19.20.21; 917,1.4.10; 919,12.13; 922,15.16 remaining, 909,4 monimos, stable, 897,28 morion, part, 803,20.25; 804,3.5.6; 812,15.17; 856,28; 870,16; 878,23.25; 894,20; 895,13.18.22.26; 900,8; 920,9 morphê, form, 894,3 mousikê, music, 883,10 mousikos, musical, 802,18.19; 803,15.17; 804,6.7.8.9; 810,18 musician, 815,27 naus, boat, 805,18 ship, 802,20; 807,10; 810,25; 878,21 nekros, corpse, 906,13 neogenês, new-born, 866,12 nephros, kidney, 875,10 nêtê, highest (sound), 811,17; 873,1.9 neuron, sinew, 829,12 nêxis, swimming, 866,9 nôdos, toothless, 828,18 noein, to think, 809,13.20; 823,4; 848,9; 875,7 to conceive, 844,23; 890,29 to consider, 917,14 to nooumenon, what thinks, 809,12.18.24 noêsis, thinking, 879,8 nosazesthai, to be ill, 839,27; 887,6 to become sick, 903,25; 910,17 to be diseased, 842,14; 885,25 to be sick, 843,8.10 to sicken, 902,27 nosos, disease, 839,27; 840,9.20.21.22.24.25.26; 841,26.29; 842,3.4.7; 843,6 illness, 897,5 sickness, 901,2.3.9.11.13.22.23.24; 902,1.28; 903,10.12; 907,15.16; 911,17 nosoun, to be ill, 820,28 to become diseased, 820,29; 841,11; 842,8 noumênia, (the first) day of the month, 875,7; 877,14.17 nous, intellect, 821,18.19.29.30; 822,26.29; 823,3; 824,2.5.7.9.13.14.17

186

Greek-English Index

oikeios, own, 815,8; 827,7; 832,21; 834,23.25; 835,6; 860,1; 869,2.10.15; 870,16; 891,11; 894,29; 895,2.3; 898,25; 914,16.20.21; 916,4.6.9.11.30; 918,24.26 appropriate, 851,14; 854,22 central, 881,32 specific, 861,18 akin to, 907,10.21 belonging to, 867,27; 896,19 oikeiôs, akin to, 828,21 oikeiotês, affinity, 907,20 oikêma, room, 869,26.27 oikhesthai, to be gone, 877,17 oikia, house, 852,6; 869,18.19.24.25.26; 874,26.27; 875,1.27; 876,19; 877,9; 879,7 oknein, to hesitate, 823,25 oligokhronios, short, 873,26 onkousthai, to grow in volume, 888,13 onoma, word, 801,5; 812,3.17; 817,14; 822,23.25; 823,27; 835,15; 851,14.16 name, 805,6.9; 807,26; 826,15; 829,4; 843,22; 856,2; 861,18; 862,6.18.19.26; 863,10.17; 871,23; 921,16 onomata, vocabulary, 851,10 tôn onomatôn, verbal, 821,21 peri onomatos, verbal, 822,28 onomatothetês, who chose the nomenclature, 822,21 onomazein, to call, 817,9; 821,18; 851,25; 862,11; 867,26 to name, 875,8 onomazesthai, to get a name, 807,22 to be named, 807,25.28 ônomasmenon, name, 862,24 ophthalmia, ophthalmia, 885,26; 887,14 ophthalmos, eye, 802,23; 885,25 opsis, sight, 813,14; 866,4 opsei lambanein, to see, 852,5 orgizesthai, to be angry, 865,28 orneon, bird, 866,9; 883,3 oston, bone, 829,12 ôthein, to push, 916,26 en ouranôi, celestial, 865,18 ousia, substance, 810,11.12; 812,12; 824,29; 825,1.2.3.23.28; 829,19.26;

832,13; 833,4.7.9.11.12.13.14.17.19.20.21. 23.24.26.27; 834,4.5.7.11.19; 835,22; 836,16.27; 838,21; 839,14; 847,1; 858,6.10.11.21.24; 859,49; 862,17; 865,21; 867,3; 886,14; 921,13 reality, 821,30; 826,29.30; 827,4 substantial existence, 825,7.9 object, 839,12.13 substrate, 810,13; 826,20; 832,15 existence, 814,12.13.20.21.23; 815,6; 817,29; 820,24.25.28.30; 825,5.17; 826,20.24; 828,7.9; 831,17; 845,23.25; 860,17; 884,16.20; 893,19.29; 918,11 existent, 813,27.30; 814,5.10.15; 816,12; 820,26; 825,12.14.17.22.23; 826,3; 828,16.18; 860,30.31 being, 817,8.25; 821,27; 825,28; 826,23.26.27.31; 828,19; 894,5 essence, 823,1; 824,10; 827,16; 862,17 ousiôdês, substantial, 826,8; 828,8 essential, 862,7, 12 ousioun, to give being, 832,13 ousiousthai, to have existence, 822,7 to have being, 823,16 oxus, high, 811,16 paidion, child, 836,16 pais, child, 876,2.3 pakhulôs, roughly, 869,18 pakhuteron, more roughly, 869,21.23 palingenesia, recurrence, 886,12.13 panselênos, full moon, 875,23 paradeigma, example, 803,1; 808,8; 821,1.9; 836,28; 840,8; 859,13; 865,16; 883,7 illustration, 853,11 paradromê, aberration, 861,27 paragein, to mislead, 903,31 paraginesthai, to be acquired, 828,27 to be added, 829,10 paragraptein, to make a note, 916,12 paraitein, to decline, 851,22 parakoê, misunderstanding, 821,28 parakolouthein, to be consequent, 802,1 to accompany, 830,14.17 to be co-present, 867,23; 868,1

Greek-English Index paralambanein, to apply, 803,27 to include, 807,20; 813,3; 897,3.25 paraleipein, to leave aside, 807,19 to omit, 807,21; 809,22; 832,10.11.23.26; 905,8 paraphrazein, to paraphrase, 860,10; 918,14 paraphuomenon, offshoot, 825,9 parasunaktikos, consequential, 804,24 paratasis, extension, 828,32; 829,2.6 en paratasei, extended, 828,24.26 parateinesthai, to prepare, 810,30 parathesis, inclusion, 817,6 juxtaposition, 855,3 paratrekhein, to pass by, 882,31 parelêluthos, past, 830,6; 831,9.10.11.16; 859,5.6.7 parêllagmenôs, correspondingly, 861,10 paremballein, to interpose, 801,13 parendeiknunai, to indicate, 864,26 paristanai, to establish, 803,4 parônumos, derived (term), 832,4 paskhein, to be affected, 804,26.27; 808,22.29; 827,17.18; 828,6; 837,19.22.24.27.31; 838,2.4.6.8.10.16.22.25; 839,5; 858,4.5; 862,9 to have affection, 837,28 to undergo (transformation), 826,28.29 to be acted on, 827,3 to suffer, 825,7 to paskhein, passion, 829,17.27; 823,8; 837,21.22.23; 838,21.22.23; 839,1; 856,8; 858,3.10.25; 859,1; 860,2 to paskhon, affected, 838,21.23.24; 839,2 patêr, father, 836,17; 846,16.17.19.20.21; 847,13.15.18.19.27.28 pathêtikos, passive, 822,12.13.15.19 affective, 827,16; 829,14; 862,8 pathêtos, liable to affection, 821,31 pathos, affection, 804,25; 806,5; 808,4.6.11.13.16.23.24.27.28; 809,11; 822,16.20.22; 827,11.12.13.14.18; 874,28; 875,5.15; 876,12; 887,4.13.18.26.27.29; 888,4;

187

920,16.19.21.22 passivity, 822,8 patrikos, paternal, 847,26 pauesthai, to cease (from), 841,1; 872,2; 849,26; 850,21; 902,22; 915,11 to recover (from), 911,17 pêi, in a way, 863,19.29; 864,3.5.7.8.9.10; 922,19 peirasthai, to try, 824,27; 913,22 peisis, affection, 808,24; 838,23.25; 839,3.4; 858,26 process of being affected, 808,27 pelazein, to approach, 871,11 peperasmenon, finite, 846,30; 847,21; 881,9 limited, 847,1; 871,17 peras, end, 808,27; 835,26; 875,26; 918,12 limit, 847,22; 870,11.18.21.26; 871,1; 872,25; 874,5.9.11.13; 878,15; 880,20.22; 890,16.17.18.30; 891,2.11.12.21; 892,9; 908,16 boundary, 869,3 extremity, 873,7; 890,28.29 perasthai, to be limited, 847,25; 874,6 to be finite, 880,27 peratôsthai, to be limited, 847,29 to bring to an end, 916,31 periagês, curvature, 895,16 periagesthai, to have curvature, 895,18 to be misled, 903,32 periekhein, to include, 813,11; 902,7 to surround, 871,10 to bind, 869,2 to encompass, 838,27 to contain, 869,3.9.16.24.28; 871,4.5.7 periekhon, container, 869,3 perigraptein, to circumscribe, 866,1 perilambanein, to include, 922,18 perilêptikos, includes, 832,24 ek periousia, superfluously, 838,12 periphereia, curved (line), 874,11.14 circular, 884,29 peripherês, curved, 874,9.10 circular, 883,28; 884,1.6 peripiptein, to fall into, 849,1; 851,21 perittôs, superfluously, 919,3 pezon, pedestrian thing, 866,6.9

188

Greek-English Index

footed, 898,6.8 phalakron, bald, 813,14 phaneroun, to make clear, 817,8 phantazesthai, to imagine, 824,7 to be manifest, 852,11 pheresthai, to be in local motion, 808,5; 818,1 to travel, 834,26; 856,4.22; 857,28; 863,2; 885,22; 891,17; 896,9.11.25.26; 897,28; 898,15; 912,9; 913,25.28.30.32; 914,1.2.3.11.23.29.30; 915,1.3.12.20.21.29.30; 916,1.2.4.5.10.15.16.19.26; 918,19; 919,26; 920,17 to pheresthai, travel, 856,20 philokalôs, admirable, 802,9 philosophein, to philosophize, 821,28 philosophos, philosopher, 802,7 phônê, sound, 868,12 phora, local motion, 804,29 travel, 832,20; 849,14; 856,3.14.19.21; 858,22; 860,2; 872,21; 882,7.8; 886,2.3; 891,6.16.20.24.25; 895,21; 896,11.13; 899,7.18.28; 900,6.12; 904,14.16; 913,6.26; 915,31; 919,28; 921,18 locomotion, 806,19 path, 912,10.11 phôs, light, 891,27 phtheiresthai, to be destroyed, 807,6 to cease to be, 807,27; 823,11; 834,15; 837,15.16; 843,16; 846,7; 849,6.8.16.17.20.21.22.24.25.26.27. 28.29.30; 850,1.5.6.8.10.11.22.30.32.34; 851,2.3.10.18.21.22.28.30; 852,1.2.3.4.6.7.13.20.22; 858,22.27; 886,9.24.25.27; 888,2 to be perished, 836,17 phthisis, diminution, 864,20; 897,2.6; 910,19 phthora, ceasing to be, 801,8; 806,16; 815,6.8.11.18.20.22; 819,21.23.25.27; 820,9.12; 821,13.17; 823,5.7; 824,1.25; 825,10; 828,25; 829,18.19.21; 832,14.17; 833,15; 834,19; 836,18.20; 840,1.3.5; 843,23; 846,9; 847,1; 849,15; 850,7.14; 851,12.17; 852,11.14.18; 855,27;

859,22; 860,3.18.26.32; 861,8.11.14; 862,13; 865,9; 867,17; 878,4.5.6.7; 881,21; 901,4.5; 903,22; 905,10.11.12; 907,3; 908,11.13.27; 909,1.9.11.15; 910,23.24.25.29; 911,3.6.19.20.21.22.24.26.27.28.29; 920,7; 921,9 destruction, 807,22, 23 phuein, to take (of plants), 911,14 pephuke, (is) naturally, 802,4; 815,14; 819,5; 821,7.8; 825,12; 831,7; 862,23; 865,29.30; 866,11; 867,21; 868,18; 871,16; 877,25; 878,19; 906,15; 918,9; 910,3; 921,22.23.27; can be, 871,8; 872,17; is capable of, 828,16; is suited, 850,19; is of a nature, 865,21; 866,1.2.5.6.7.14.16.17; 867,13.14; is by nature, 865,16.17.19 phulattein, to avoid, 821,29 to defend, 870,29 to retain, 900,12 phusikos, about nature, 801,17 of nature, 867,23; 881,32 natural, 802,1; 821,17; 824,8.18.20.21; 832,21; 867,23; 868,1.17; 882,2; 900,21; 913,1; 914,19 physical, 827,6 to phusikon, natural object/thing, 810,20; 879,19 ho phusikos, natural scientist, 868,10 natural philosopher, 916,12 phusikôs, naturally, 872,1 phusiologia, natural science, 900,23 phusis, nature, 804,20; 840,17.21; 851,16; 852,14.19; 856,13; 864,12; 866,29; 878,24; 882,13; 890,30; 911,8 phusei, naturally, 862,30; 875,12.19; 919,27.28; by nature, 876,15.26; 912,10; natural, 875,12; 876,14.15 kata phusin, natural, 849,11; 872,5.11.13; 907,17.18.28.30; 910,4.6.10.11.15.16.21.23.25.27.29; 911,2.4.10.15.27.29; 912,2.3.5.9.11.12.15.17.19.20.22. 27; 913,3.6.28.29; 914,9.16.23.27; 915,7.9.22.23.24.29.30.31; 916,2.5.10;

Greek-English Index 919,17.19.20.21.22.23.24; 922,12.14; naturally, 871,22; 872,16; 889,25; 907,10; 914,12; 918,25; 919,8 para phusin, unnatural, 867,3; 907,30; 910,7.10.12.15.17.20.22.24.27; 911,4.5.11.12.13.18.27.29; 912,2.3.6.9.12.15.16.18.19.21.27; 913,3.6; 914,17; 915,8.24.25.26; 919,5.11.12.17.20.21.22.24.29; 922,13.15; contrary to nature, 907,19; unnaturally, 918,17.19.20; 919,10.28 phuton, plant, 817,1; 831,18; 875,10.14; 878,20 pisteuein, to support, 808,7 to confirm, 903,24 pistis, confirmation, 811,5; 904,13; 916,10 pithanos, plausible, 887,1 plêgê, impact, 916,22.24 plêthos, manifold, 894,29 men, 916,7 multiplicity, 899,16 plêthunesthai, to be multiplied, 887,25 pleonakhôs/pollakhôs legesthai, to have many senses/meanings, 815,16.20; 868,12; 874,27; 881,18 plêres apodidonai, to supplement, 868,4 plôtêr, sailor, 807,10 pneumôn, lung, 875,9; 877,13 poiein, to affect, 804,27 to construct, 854,24; 858,4; 917,10 to cause, 835,24 to act, 827,3; 838,1.4.8.22; 839,5; 858,5 to create, 888,18 to make, 829,22; 838,19; 864,13; 880,10; 884,10; 885,3; 890,1 to beget, 835,7 to do, 835,7 logon poieisthai, to discuss, 809,10 pistin poiein, to obtain confirmation, 811,5 metabolên poiein, to be transformed, 863,15 mnêmên poieisthai, to call to mind, 868,10 to poiein, action, 829,16.26; 833,8;

189

837,21.22.23.24.27.30; 838,7; 839,1; 856,7; 858,3.10.25; 859,1; 860,2; 921,3 poiêsis, agency, 838,23.24; 839,2.3 action, 858,26 poiêtikos, efficient, 846,10 to poion, quality, 810,16; 812,13; 827,15.16.26.28; 831,3; 833,6; 837,25; 839,9; 856,7.16; 858,9.13; 859,29; 862,1.4.18.24; 864,17; 865,5; 867,18; 896,27; 906,26 sort, 862,17; 881,14 kata poion, qualitative, 863,10; 864,16.24; 921,16 poiotês, quality, 806,16; 817,27; 826,6.8; 827,7; 828,2; 829,14; 831,19.22; 834,8.11.12; 835,7.18.22; 837,25; 858,20.21; 862,9.10.16.20; 863,13; 864,22.26.27.28; 865,3; 872,2; 882,9.16; 896,26; 897,8; 907,13; 921,12 kata poiotêta, qualitative, 897,10 to poioun, agent, 837,19.26; 838,10.21.23.24; 839,2 polis, city, 869,9.13.18.19.24.26; 875,1.27.30 polos, pole, 865,18 polueidês, many-formed, 828,30 polueidôs, in many ways, 921,15 polukhous, widely embracing, 876,2 polukhronios, protracted, 873,22 porisma, corollary, 880,1 porizein, to provide, 904,6 to poson, quantity, 801,6; 806,19.22.23; 808,12; 812,13; 829,26.28; 831,3; 833,6; 839,9; 856,7.17.20; 858,9.13; 859,29; 862,4.22.25; 864,29; 865,1.6; 867,18; 872,3; 880,4; 906,28; 910,15; 921,12 kata poson, quantitative, 856,14; 863,11; 921,17 posotês, quantity, 817,23; 831,19.22; 835,8.19.22; 858,20.21; 862,19; 882,10; 907,13 to pote, time, 830,1; 832,9 ‘when’, 897,15 to pou, place, 801,17; 829,26.28; 833,6; 856,7.17; 858,9.13.20; 862,4; 864,30; 867,18; 882,8; 921,13

190

Greek-English Index

‘where’, 897,14 pragma, object, 802,1 thing, 826,15; 851,11; 867,23; 868,2; 880,2 subject-matter, 872,25.26; 873,11.16.18.19.30 state of affairs, 816,25 situation, 835,1 peri pragmatos, substantial, 822,28 pragmateia, work, 801,3; 806,24; 811,11; 824,23; 833,20; 846,11.13; 888,14 book, 802,12 discussion, 888,10.15 business, 888,4 proagein, to continue, 844,15 to proagein, progression, 845,22 proaxioun, to be a presupposition, 850,15 proballesthai, to be cited, 844,8 problêma, problem, 843,20; 856,10; 867,8; 881,31; 900,18 question, 900,21 proêgeisthai, to precede, 846,23; 847,30; 879,31; 915,21.23; 922,15 to lead, 915,30 to proêgeisthai, predecessor, 847,17 prominent, 901,27 proêgoumenôs, pre-eminently, 802,26; 807,9; 866,28 especially, 806,24 progenesis, coming to be before, 846,5 (?) proginôskein, to recognize first, 881,27 proienai, to proceed, 824,3; 827,4; 847,24; 855,27; 860,6; 903,13 to go on, 844,11; 861,7 to proienai, progression, 844,4 procession, 846,23 prokeimenon, issue before (someone), 837,30 present issue, 854,22 project, 888,30 present term, 847,25 topic, 903,29; 904,2.11 thing under consideration, 854,2 prokheirizein, to bring forward, 811,6 to introduce, 812,1 to examine, 901,20; 902,5 prolambanein, to note (first), 812,1.5

to presuppose, 849,10.13 prolêpsis, understanding, 822,25 proödos, procession, 821,26; 846,7.26 progression, 844,6; 847,24 proöimion, introduction, 875,2 prophanês, evident, 804,24 proparalambanein, to bring in prior, 893,9 propodismos, progression, 871,9; 897,7 pros ti, (category of) relation, 829,26; 833,8; 834,20.22.23.25; 834,2.3.6.10.21; 836,24.26; 837,5.8.14.15; 858,6.10.16.18; 859,1.24.29; 860,10.14; 921,13 relative, 878,3 prosanaphainesthai, to be revealed, 844,18 prosapodeiknunai, to prove precisely, 841,11 prosekhês, immediate, 869,14.19.22; 870,6; 871,10 prosekhôs, next, 813,7 immediately, 869,8.16; 871,4; 882,4; 914,3 immediate, 869,10 prosendeiknusthai, to add, 845,9 proskeimenon, addition, 844,27 proskhrasthai, to make use, 850,14 proslambanein, to take on, 859,28 to acquire, 902,23 proslambanesthai, to be a further assumption, 913,33 proslogizein, to reason also, 902,17 prosphuês, naturally connected, 814,19 suitable, 852,26 prosphusis, organic fusion, 879,4 prosthêkê, attribution, 815,1 prosthesis, attribution, 814,30 prostithenai, to add, 801,17; 802,6; 836,11; 837,28 protasis, premiss, 808,18.26; 823,12; 892,28; 900,2; 914,1 proposition, 812,14; 878,28 prothesis, plan, 873,23.26 protithenai, to propose, 812,1; 848,8 to have the intention, 873,28 prôtôs, primarily, 803,22.24.26; 809,6.17.21.27, passim primary, 804,15; 810,21 prouparkhein, to be prior, 824,12

Greek-English Index to exist previously, 844,10 to precede, 848,29; 915,15.16 to be a predecessor, 847,22 prouphistanai, to be previously, 879,28 pseudodokeisthai, to hold false beliefs, 903,30; 904,10 pseudos, false, 815,25; 816,2.19.20; 823,2; 835,1; 903,32; 904,4.9 psophos, sound, 865,17.18 psukhê, soul, 807,7.9; 810,16; 824,7.13.15; 836,29; 837,2.3; 842,28; 853,9.21.26; 854,5; 863,1; 887,27 psukhesthai, to become cold, 839,12 psukhros, cold, 803,17; 805,8; 811,20; 828,2.6; 834,8; 866,24; 875,5.15.17; 876,18 ptênos, winged, 898,7 bird, 898,33; 899,5 ptêsis, flight, 866,8.10 pur, fire, 832,20; 834,6.7.9.10.12.13.15.16; 853,8; 859.3; 893,23; 898,20.22.23; 910,6; 912,10.11; 919,19.21.24.27 rhabdos, rod, 835,26 rhein, to flow, 875,19; 897,2.25; 916,17 to be in flux, 888,6.9 rhêsis, section, 912,23 to rhêton, saying, 882,29; 889,7 rhopê, tendency, 898,17 rhusis, flux, 889,11 saleuein, to shake, 824,3 saphênizein, to clarify, 835,11 sarx, flesh, 829,12 sêmainein, to refer to, 809,8; 812,11.14.20 to take as a sign, 911,9 to exemplify, 906,24 to show, 885,8; 909,25 to mean, 810,23; 812,4; 840,5; 850,13; 868,23; 874,6; 884,3; 897,13.15; 909,22; 914,18 to indicate, 842,6.10; 871,20 to signify, 812,10; 846,27.28; 902,2; 904,24 sêmainomenon, sense, 802,5; 827,19; 861,13; 870,28; 871,2 meaning, 822,23

191

denoted, 865,29 significance, 824,8 what is signified, 832,12 sêmasia, sense, 815,21 significance, 826,15 semnon, grandly, 821,30 sêmnon, sign, 827,5 point, 880,10.11.14 skepsis, inquiry, 866,22; 888,3 skhêma, figure, 819,13.17; 900,1.6; 914,3 skhesis, relation, 832,24; 835,6.22.23; 860,30.31 relationship, 835,9.25.28; 836,1.3.4.5.6.7.9.10.13.15.18.19.20. 24; 837,8.15.17; 858,20; 859,24 state, 860,16; 861,12.21 skhetikos, relational, 832,15; 859,18.25.28; 860,29 skopimos, relevant, 882,2 skopos, aim, 867,22 goal, 873,13.21; 907,18; 914,13 sôma, body, 802,22; 805,3.5; 810,27; 814,26; 815,29; 816,9; 821,7; 823,10.11.14; 824,8; 825,20.21; 826,5; 827,9; 832,21.22; 837,1.2.25; 853,9.21.26.27; 854,1.5.18; 859,20; 865,21; 868,17.30; 869,29; 870,2.15.17.20.21.24; 871,3.6; 877,8.19; 879,13; 880,19; 887,4.27; 890,11; 910,13.17.18; 912,20; 913,1.6; 914,19 something corporeal, 831,18 sophia, wisdom, 822,21; 823,4 sophistikos, sophistic, 915,17 sophistikôs, in a sophistic way, 915,18 sôros, pile, 878,27 sôzesthai, to continue, 816,31 to be preserved, 833,31; 872,4 to retain, 878,23 sperma, seed, 814,8.9.22.27; 816,32; 822,6.8; 829,8; 833,24.26.27.31; 834,2.3; 894,6.7 speudein, to tend, 893,21 to seek, 914,21.30 to be an urge, 915,25.26 sphaira, ball, 821,19 splên, spleen, 875,10 spoudazein, to try hard, 830,7 spoudê, effort, 832,27

192

Greek-English Index

stasis, halt, 852,9 being stationary, 891,21; 915,10.11; 916,3 stability, 866,30.31 stationariness, 914,29 stop, 892,26.27 stereisthai, to be deprived, 866,4 stereos, solid, 869,28 sterêsis, privation, 813,13; 814,12.14; 818,9.10.21; 819,5.28; 820,16.19.20.21.22.24.27.30; 821,1.8.9; 826,1.2.4; 827,10; 818,17.20; 832,7.9; 833,14.15.21.22.28; 859,11.13.14; 865,8.13; 866,4.19.22.23.24.27.28.29; 867,1.4.12; 878,2; 906,6.8.9.10.12.16.17.21; 907,23.24; 908,2.4; 909,5; 913,12; 917,27; 918,8 stigmê, point, 880,2.4.5.7.8.15.16.19.25.26.27.29; 881,1.2.3.4.5.9.10.11.12; 883,20 stoikheion, element, 860,1; 900,22; 912,17 strongulos, circular, 875,29 sukê, fig, 814,8 sullambanein, to include, 810,8 sullêpsis, period, 832,1 sullogizein, to make an argument, 819,21 to use reasoning, 843,25 to have an argument, 892,25 to reason, 894,19 sullogismos, syllogism, 919,6 sumbainein, to be incidentally, 802,19; 803,26; 809,13; 810,28; 885,13 to arise, 917,18; 918,2 to chance, 911,30 to be incidental, 810,12; 817,17 to happen to, 803,16; 805,14; 809,19; 818,7.9.20; 835,4; 839,25; 857,13.19; 873,24; 876,10; 899,17.18; 903,5.8; 911,27; 913,9; 915,2.4; 916,19.27 to occur, 902,10; 905,15; 917,11 to come to have, 814,25 to hold, 892,14 to (be a) result, 841,22; 908,28; 909,3; 917,8 to apply, 860,14

to sumbainon, result, 823,24 sumbebêkos, attribute, 814,24; 817,2; 820,24.25; 824,29; 825,1.3.7.8.12.14.27; 826,3.27; 826,3.27; 829,20 incidental attribute, 828,17 kata sumbebêkos, incidental, 802,17.27; 803,2.9.11.16.17.19.21.23.25; 804,13; 809,1.5.12.27; 810,3.5.7.9.11.19.29; 811,1.30; 817,15.16; 818,25; 839,21.25; 851,7; 852,24; 856,23.28; 857,9.11; 858,1; 860,11; 861,25; 920,25.27; incidentally, 802,25; 804,3.4.6.7; 805,12.17; 807,10; 809,16.19.23; 810,15.17.22.24; 813,24; 817,13.19; 818,20.21.31; 836,5; 837,6.9; 839,21; 840,17; 851,8; 856,28; 857,12.15.17.26; 858,1; 861,20; 865,20.21; 870,19.20.22; 885,10.12.15.19.22.29; 901,28; 920,8; attributively, 817,13 summetros, suited, 821,28 summignunai, to mix up, 822,18 sumperainein, to sum up, 809,25; 867,8 to conclude, 858,12; 865,4; 867,18; 881,13; 894,20 to put together, 868,5 sumperasma, conclusion, 850,7; 854,22; 892,28; 899,28; 913,31 sumphônos, harmonizes, 845,27 sumphuein, to be organically fused, 879,16 to become fused, 891,1.2 sumphuês, organically fused, 879,18.21.33 sumphusis, (organic) fusion, 878,20.22; 879,30.32 sumplêrôtikos, contributes, 825,21 sumplêroun, to complete, 825,13; 827,7; 846,11 to contribute, 825,28 sumplokê, combination, 812,10; 813,3.19; 820,6 sumpropherein, to add, 904,21 sumptôma, thing (which happens), 916,27 sunagein, to collect, 869,21 to bring about, 850,26 to reach a conclusion, 804,17; 914,3

Greek-English Index to couch, 819,13 to draw (a conclusion), 899,28 to conclude, 819,17; 851,27; 858,2; 880,1; 914,10; 918,21 to deduce, 853,25 sunagôgon, collection, 869,20 sunakolouthein, to accompany, 852,3 sunaleiphesthai, to be interconnected, 892,9 sunanairein, to reciprocate, 868,13 to unite, 879,24 sunanaireisthai, to be lost, 827,1 sunanapherein, to associate, 821,32 sunaphê, contact, 878,19 sunaptein, to touch, 871,8.11 sunarithmein, to count as belonging to, 801,15 to include, 821,18 sunarmogê, fitting together, 878,20 sunarmosis, yoking together, 878,29 sundesmos, connective, 804,24 conjunction, 878,27 sundiairein, to assign, 826,15 sundromein, to concur, 886,19 sunedreuein, to be ingredient, 804,21 suneinai, to be present with, 826,2 suneisagesthai, to be connected, 804,27 to be introduced, 805,4 sunekheia, continuity, 871,9; 873,15.21.25.27; 879,29.30; 885,31.33; 890,25; 891,2.17; 900,13 (to en hautôi) sunekhein, to maintain internal coherence, 838,7 sunekhês, continuous, 801,12; 868,27.28; 869,3.5.7.28; 870,14.15; 871,1; 872,21; 873,4.5.23; 878,11.14.17; 879,6.7.9.18.25.26.27; 881,26.27.28; 882,3; 885,2.6.8.14.32; 886,18; 887,3; 889,11.17.23.25.27.29.30; 890,1.2.3.5.6.9.12.14.20.24.27.29; 891.3.4.8.9.13.14.15.18.20.24.25; 892,4.5.9.10.12.13.15.18.31; 893,5.7.10.11.14; 894,23.25.29.30; 895,29; 896,23; 897,14; 899,12.13.14.15.19.20.21.22.24.25; 900,2.3.9.15; 916,20; 921,26; 922,2.6

193

sunekhes, continuously, 872,29; 916,17 to sunekhes, continuity, 802,4; 868,7.9; 872,18.19.23; 873,1.10.29; 878,18; 879,5.14.16.20.25; 894,28 continuous, 868,20 sunekhizesthai, to become continuous, 871,13; 892,22 to sunekhon, continuous, 879,4 sunekhôs, continuously, 871,22; 872,7.9.14.16; 873,10 sunektikos, holds together, 914,10 sunêmmenon, conclusion, 844,3 sunemphainein, to exhibit, 804,29 sunepipheresthai, to be introduced together, 827,2 to be inclusive, 879,24 sunêtheia, convention, 914,28 en sunêtheiâi, commonly, 842,25 sunêthôs, usual, 817,14 sungeneia, affinity, 828,11 sungenês, of the sort, 856,18 sunistanai, to form, 875,9 to constitute, 879,22 to support, 918,20 to compose, 899,27 sunkeisthai, to consist of, 900,5; 905,28 sunkheisthai, to flow together, 877,21 sunkhôrein, to agree, 818,31 to allow, 851,25 to accept, 838,11 to concede, 834,13 to acknowledge, 860,8 to admit, 837,6; 846,15; 852,23 sunkinein, to move with, 805,18; 835,27 kata sunkrisin, comparatively, 899,4 sunopsis, synopsis, 802,8 sunopsizein, to make synopsis, 918,13 suntattein, to include, 861,21 suntaxis, organisation, 878,27 suntelein, to contribute, 873,1; 882,2 suntheôrein, to study at the same time as, 881,30 sunthesis, composition, 815,25; 816,1.18.25; 818,26.30; 879,2 assembly, 887,11 sunthetos, composite, 826,7.8 suntithenai, to put together, 815,26

194

Greek-English Index

to place with, 880,10 to reassemble, 887,10 to suntithenai, composition, 825,28 suntomôs, concisely, 819,15.21; 835,25; 920,5 succintly, 919,26 suntrekhein, to run together, 892,16 sunuparkhein, to be concomitant, 809,4.7.26; 810,6 to be present together, 828,18; 859,1 to coexist, 852,15 sustasis, constructing, 879,2 sustatikos, constitutive, 862,16; 864,28 sustêma, system, 879,2 sustoikhos, is on a level with, 866,31 suzeuxis, yoking together, 879,1 suzugia, combination, 903,2 takheôs, fast, 897,19 takhos, speed, 899,3 takhus, fast, 840,12.16; 898,13.16.20.22; 921,8 takhutês, speed, 897,11.24.26.28; 898,3.13.25.30.33 quickness, 897,21 tattein, to rank, 838,4 to include, 865,15 tetagmenon, orderly, 897,7 tautotês, identical, 890,26 taxis, order, 874,28; 875,1.24; 881,14 tekhnologein, to speak technically, 913,7 tekmairesthai, to confirm, 851,19 tekmêrion, sign, 818,26 evidence, 916,12.21.28 indication, 827,24; 828,12 to teleion, completeness, 865,1; 894,19.27 teleios, complete, 822,9; 825,13.27; 826,18.32; 827,6; 862,10.21.23; 864,29; 872,3; 893,13.15.18.20.21.24; 894,7.10.15.18.21.24; 895,1; 922,4.5 teleiotês, completeness, 895,3 perfection, 914,22 teleioun, to perfect, 916,7 teleôs, completely, 917,14.17 teleutaios, last, 820,6; 879,14.21 teleutan, to end, 870,30 teleutê, end, 894,22

telikos, final, 840,10 telos, goal, 806,15; 882,1; 907,23.24 completion, 840,25 end, 807,25; 808,24; 851,29; 852,2; 894,18; 912,23; 919,18 epi telei, finally, 802,6 tetragônos, rectangular, 875,29 thaumasiôs, in a remarkable way, 852,10 thaumazein, to be surprised, 802,7 to wonder, 821,20; 822,21 theasthai, to see, 821,33; 822,11; 824,19; 828,24; 879,18 to regard, 824,15; 859,17.22 theatron, theatre, 869,13 thêlus, female, 898,5.6.11 theôrein, to observe, 820,10; 860,20; 868,21; 881,17 to view, 826,21; 898,27.31 to see, 865,2; 906,17 to regard, 829,12; 837,9 to watch, 916,17 theôrêma, theorem, 801,17 theôria, investigation, 881,32 theos, god, 846,12 goddess, 892,2 thermainein, to heat, 803,17 thermainesthai, to be heated, 803,9.10.12; 807,27; 829,14; 859,3 to become hot, 839,10.12 to grow hot, 856,22; 897,9 to get hot, 899,8 thermansis, growing hot, 890,18; 899,26 becoming hot, 896,1, 2 thermantos, able to be heated, 803,9 thermê, heat, 911,3 to thermon, heat, 866,24 thermos, hot, 805,9; 811,20; 813,4.5; 816,9.10; 834,8; 875,6 warm, 828,2.4.5 thermotês, heat, 803,18; 807,27 warmth, 828,8; 862,9 thesis, position, 832,3; 868,21; 874,28.29; 876,23; 877,14.16.18; 879,15; 880,5; 881,15.16; 890,23; 892,8 pattern, 836,3 convention, 875,30 thesei, conventional, 875,23.28 by convention, 876,17.26 thôrax, chest, 802,23

Greek-English Index thrix, hair, 813,14 tiktesthai, to be born, 866,3 tmêma, segment, 813,10 tode (ti), particular thing, 833,18.19.20 tode mê on, that which is not a particular thing, 818,24 topikos, of place, 906,31; 917,16 topos, place, 801,12; 802,2; 804,12; 805,1.4.5.26; 806,7.8.9.18.20.22.28; 808,5.6.11; 809,11.18.29; 817,23; 819,12.15.19; 822,1; 823,6.12.13.15.17; 827,5.8.11; 831,3.27.28; 832,19.21; 835,5.18.28; 836,2; 839,9; 858,22; 859,31; 860,1; 862,3.7.12; 864,19; 865,6; 868,4.16.17.23.25.26.28; 869,3.4.8.10.11.12.14.16.17.18.19. 22; 870,2.7.8.14.15.19.20.21.27; 871,4.5.7.8.10.11; 872,1; 873,2.3; 874,1.11.15.18; 875,24; 893,20; 896,25; 898,25; 899,1; 906,24.27.29; 907,13; 910,14; 911,1; 913,1.29.30.31.33; 914,2.16.21.29; 915,1.3.29.30; 916,4.9.11.13.16.18.26.30; 918,24.26; 920,16 to tosonde, magnitude, 804,12; 806,20 tranês, clear, 822,15 trekhein, to run, 857,1.3.4.5.10.14.17.19.20.21.24. 25; 891,7.8.11.12.15 trepein, to affect, 859,27.30 trias, three, 875,11 tropê, difference, 861,17 winter/summer solstice, 875,20.22 equinox, 875,20.21 trophê, nourishment, 897,4 tropos, way, 802,20; 807,5; 843,3; 846,1.11; 851,13; 852,25; 860,13.15.16.17; 861,5; 878,28; 879,2; 882,2; 884,5; 900,24.27; 901,14; 907,19; 920,11; 921,3.14 sort, 899,7; 912,6

195

how, 888,13 mode, 919,6 type, 812,9; 912,4 manner, 897,18 tunkhanein, to happen, 837,17, passim to be by chance, 918,18 to tukhon, anything whatever, 811,12; 841,27 any (chance), 841,18.19; 842,10; 857,4; 859,31; 890,10; 896,22.23 tuphlos, blind, 813,14; 866,4; 906,13 tuphlotês, blindness, 867,2 xêros, dry, 834,8 xêrotês, dryness, 862,9 xulon, wood, 805,8.21; 879,32 log, 875,25 zêloun, to emulate, 824,22 zên, to live, 906,14 zêtein, to seek, 804,23; 807,8; 837,14; 870,3; 888,9 to examine, 852,25 to look for, 863,17 to investigate, 806,27; 861,26; 864,27 to inquire, 820,16; 832,27.28; 833,1; 834,4; 838,3; 844,23; 850,30; 860,27; 864,20; 866,11; 868,17; 870,10; 886,13; 888,4; 896,23; 900,19; 902,31; 906,1.20.34; 908,9; 921,11; 922,10 zêtêma, proposal, 886,12 inquiry, 888,8; 900,20 zêtêsis, question, 814,11 investigation, 832,25 inquiry, 848,4; 861,23.31 zôon, living thing, 807,7; 817,1; 894,1; 910,18 living being, 879,33 animal, 831,18; 875,8.14; 883,3; 898,5; 899,6 beast, 876,5

Index of Names Adonis, 911,14 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 803,22; 804,1; 805,27; 818,18; 830,2.7; 831,31; 835,10; 837,29; 844,20.27; 854,15.21; 857,1.20; 864,15; 866,17; 868,27; 869,4; 870,10.29; 876,23; 880,11; 889,8; 894,12.16; 895,12.28; 896,9; 904,1; 914,17.24; 918,14 Aristotle, 801,14; 821,12.16.28; 822,25.31; 823,5; 824,4.11.19.21; 826,32; 827,5; 828,21; 830,27; 832,17.23.26; 833,1.2; 835,11; 837,11; 842,5; 846,1.2.4.8; 847,31; 848,3.10; 850,3; 851,6.23; 852,20.23; 854,23; 857,23; 859,12.16; 860,7.10; 861,1.7.16; 864,16.24.25; 875,5; 879,3.22; 884,5; 886,4; 891,16; 894,16.23 his associates, 801,14 Aspasius, 814,29; 818,27; 845,19; 916,30 Athenians, 875,20 Athens, 809,19.20.21; 873,20

Coriscus, 885,11.13.16.17 Eudemus, 813,13; 860,9; 861,5; 870,1; 879,18; 886,1 Eurôpê, 809,20.21 Heraclitus, 887,1.5 Peripatetics (school of Aristotle), 860,18; 911,10 Piraeus, 873, 20.22.27; 891,31 Plato, 821,14.23; 822,23.29; 224,7.11.20; 827,3; 852,17; 892,1; 894,16 Platonics, 894,12 Porphyry, 802,8; 864,25; 896,10; 918,13 Pythagoreans, 880,22; 894,12 Socrates, 810,26.27.28; 816,23; 847,25.28; 849,25; 850,5.32.34; 851,1.14.15; 857,13; 884,25; 885,5.31; 887,7; 894,1 Stoics, 886,12 Strato of Lampsacus, 808,3; 916,12 Themistius, 854,20; 864,15; 876,18; 918,13 Theophrastus, 860,19.27; 861,23

Subject Index action, there is no change in this category, 833,7ff.; 837,21ff. activity of the intellect, 821,29ff. and hexis, 88,16ff. actuality, either form or activity, 838,2 in the definition of change, 860,24-5 affection, a kind of disposition (diathesis), 827,14; 887,27ff. both ‘white’ and ‘becoming white’ are said to be affection, 920,21ff. alteration, general account, 862,1ff. natural and unnatural, 911,15 atemporal, change of the intellect, 823,2; 824,2 coming to be, 828,24ff. attribute, contrasted to ousia, 824,29ff. being next, is of the same kind, 874,23ff. general account, 874,23-877,2 between/intermediate, general account, 871,16-874,20 and touch, 880,13ff. body, two bodies cannot be at once in the same individual place, 870,2-3 touching, 870,10ff. simple, 917,18ff. ceasing to be, not change, 819,21ff. contraries, 911,6ff. change, (incomplete) activity, 816,29ff.; 818,26; 819,7; 827,11ff. and transformation, 801,4ff.; 824,20ff.; 860,24 not in form and affection, 808,3ff. change of change, 848,1ff. its species, 856,5ff. contraries, 900,18ff. quantitative change has no commmon name, 863,10 indivisible in species, 883,1ff.

coming to be, not of body in an unqualified sense, 823,9ff. simple coming to be, 844,21ff. there is no coming to be of coming to be, 848,1ff. is rest coming to be?, 913,10ff. contact, and continuous, 878,19-20 contiguous, general account, 877,2ff. but not by touching, 890,20ff. continuous, general account, 878,11ff. time, 890,24ff. and non uniform change, 899,11ff. transformation involves it in two ways, 872,19-20 and touch, 879,25ff. contrary, and contradictory, 811,3-4; 813,8ff.; 833,19ff.; 840,4-7. in change, 900,18ff. in rest and change, 912,7ff.; 917,1ff. diminution, Eudemus’ contribution, 863,4-7 discrete and touching bodies, 870,14ff. disposition (hexis), in contrast to affection, a stable diathesis, 887,28 another contrast to diathesis, 860,16-17 distance, of limits, 874,11ff. division, of change, 801,16ff. of transformation, 813,10-16; 861,1 negation is division, 816,2 and composition, 816,18ff. and contrary changes, 901,19 essence, constitutive differences, 862,16-17 self-moving soul, 824,10 eternal, skhesis, 860,30 coupled with unchanging and without parts, 882,5

198

Subject Index

‘exchange’ in Alexander’s interpretation, 835,9 extension of being, 828,24ff. extreme, and between, 811,15ff. and touching, 870,9ff. fate, Peripatetic concept of it, 911,8ff. finite, in coming and ceasing to be, 847,1 fitting, Alexander’s notion, 871,2 forced, change, 910,27ff. rest, 918,18ff. form, and qualitative change, 806,16ff. complete form, 826,18ff. of change, 839,8ff. and transformation, 863,13ff. and examination of contrary changes, 906,4ff. genus, and species, 809,15ff. generic unity, 881,23ff.; 893,15ff. rests different in genus are not contraries, 907,25-6 growth, and continuous, 872,20ff. and uniform change, 897,2ff. impulse, and travelling by force, 914,4 and goal, 914,13 incidental, and as such, 802,16ff. change and transformation, 809,4ff. indefinite, and infinite, 810,8 incidental change, 837,12 individual, and coming to be, 846,16ff. individual time, 870,2-8 one in the sense of being individual, 885,23ff. infinity, infinite regress, 844,2ff. intellect, its change, 821,18ff. difference between the views of Aristotle and Plato, 824,3ff. intermediate, general account, 871,16ff. and contraries, 811,3ff. and continuous, 880,14ff. limit, in touch, 870,10ff. and changes of the same kind, 891,1ff. matter, and simple not being, 814,6ff. which comes to be simply, 818,12ff. in change, 853,1ff.

privation, 906,15ff. mixture, of coming and ceasing to be, 852,13-14 of the contrary, 900,10-11 motion, up and down, 912,14ff. and coming to stop, 915,15ff. name, common name, 862,6ff.; 863,10 and between, 871,22ff. nature, according to and against it, 910,4ff. underlying, 856,13 next, general account, 874,21ff. and continuous, 879,8ff. number, numerical unity, 881,24ff.; 884,19ff.; 885,27ff.; 893,15ff. and hexis, 889,5ff. order, next, 874,28; 875,1ff. organic fusion, like plants, 878,20ff. and continuity, 879,18ff. passion, no change and transformation, 837,21ff.; 858,2ff. place, first, 870,14-15 local motion and rest, 913,1ff. and together, 878,16ff. position, omission of it, 830,1ff.; 832,9ff. contrariety according to it, 859,7ff. possession (hexis, to ekhein), transformation from privation to it, 820,21 and change, 830,1ff. privation, and not being, 819,9ff. and transformation, 820,16ff.; 826,1ff. expressed in positive term, 859,11 quality, substantial, 826,2-3 affective, 829,14; 862,8 quantity, quantitative channge has no common name, 863,10ff. reductio ad absurdum, 898,20-1 relation, and change, 834,20ff.; 858,6ff.; 921,13 rest, is it coming to be, 913,10ff. as goal, 907,23-4 soul, its motion, 824,7ff. alteration, 853,9ff.

Subject Index diathesis of the body and of it, 887,27 substance, and transformation, 824,28ff. there is no change in it, 833,5ff.; 858,6ff. unity in number and substance, 886,14ff. substrate, of the change, 812,6ff.; 820,3ff. passim.

and continuous change, 885,2ff. touch, general account, 870,9ff. and contiguous, 877,3ff. and continuous, 878,12ff. and next, 892,7ff. transformation, components of the term, 812,4ff. in diathesis, 861,5ff. incidental and as such, 802,16ff. its division, 813,19ff.

tendency, and specific difference, 898,17 time, there is no contrary in it, 830,3ff. and change, 852,4ff.

uniform change, 895,5ff. untransformability, distinguished from rest, 908,18ff.

199