Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9 9781472552310, 9780715638576

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Introduction Richard Sorabji 1.5 What is meant by principle? Aristotle (384-322 BC) here uses his survey of earlier natural philosophy in Physics 1.1-4 in order to establish what the principles (arkhai: origins or sources) are of natural change. But what is a principle? He seems to use interchangeably the terms ‘principle’, ‘element’ (stoikheion: literally: letter of the alphabet) and ‘cause’ (aition: explanatory factor). But the ancient commentators did not agree at all that they were seen as interchangeable, as Simplicius (writing after 529 AD) explained in an opening discussion at 6,31-7,19 and 10,7-12,3. Plato, we there learn, was said by Aristotle’s pupil Eudemus to have been the first to distinguish elementary principles or elements, giving the name to the matter and form (as his pupil Aristotle would call them) of natural things. According to Simplicius in a later passage (233,10-14), Plato called matter and inherent form the two elementary principles, and Simplicius comments that they are elements in the strict sense because they inhere per se in what comes to be from them. But Simplicius’ opening passage contrasts Plato’s divine intellect (the demiurge or craftsman of the universe) and his goodness as being (again in Aristotle’s terms) the efficient and final causes of natural things, and, since they are above nature, as being principles of a non-elementary sort. Eudemus agreed in requiring an element, like letters of the alphabet, to be inherent or present in (enhuparkhein) that of which it was an element, but he is said to have differed from Plato by counting only matter as an element, not inherent form. From this Simplicius dissented, but five hundred years after Eudemus, his great fellow-Aristotelian, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 205 AD), agreed that what inheres, being matter, is especially called ‘element’. This restriction of the name ‘element’ to lower principles was not universal. Proclus, for example, Simplicius’ Neoplatonist predecessor in Athens (c. 411-485 AD), used the term ‘element’ for some of the highest principles above nature in his work called Elements of Theology (stoikheiôsis theologikê). Conversely, Plato considered that some material constituents were too lowly to count as elements or principles. He said this of the set of elements that became most famous of all, after being introduced by Empedocles and accepted by Plato, Aristotle, the

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Stoics and Neoplatonists and much of the Middle Ages: earth, air, fire and water. According to Plato’s Timaeus, however, they deserve to be called neither elements nor principles, since, being corpuscles, they have as principles the triangles that make up their sides and these have further principles in their turn, 48B-C; 53C-D. To return to Aristotle’s inquiry, there seem to be two restrictions on the kind of principle he is looking for here. First, for the time being, he accepted the restriction of naming only principles that inhered in what came into being from them. This is not surprising, because Physics is literally the study of nature (phusis), and Aristotle defines nature as an internal cause of change, because natural things are distinguished from artefacts by their changing size, shape, quality, and (in the case of animals) place through internal causes, unlike artefacts which have to be acted on from without, Physics 2.1; 8.4. Aristotle postponed, as Simplicius points out, 8,6-9, till the last chapter of the Physics, 8.10, a discussion of the ultimate external cause of all motion, God, the unmoved mover. The second restriction that Aristotle seems to be accepting, as Simplicius indicates at 1.6, 208,18-19, 1.7, 216,32 and 222,13-16, 1.9, 246,12, is that he is looking not just for constituents, but for principles of change in natural bodies. His definition of ‘principle’, much stressed by Simplicius, is given at 1.5, 188a27-30. The principles must come not from each other nor from other things, and all things must come from them. The requirement that they must not come from each other is later qualified. In a sense, two of Aristotle’s principles, form and privation, do come from each other, in that one replaces the other during the course of a change. For example at 1.7, 190a21-31, Aristotle allows that cultured comes from uncultured. Simplicius at 183,32-5 takes the ban at 188a27-30 to mean only that contraries like form and privation are on the same footing, so one is not a source for the other. At 221,21ff., commenting on Aristotle’s further remark at 191a6-7, Simplicius takes his point there to be that the contrary from which the opposite contrary comes facilitates the transformation only by its absence. This is not the robust sense in which, for example, a statue comes from bronze, in which the bronze is not replaced, but remains a component of the statue. Aristotle does not go so far as to claim that a contrary’s coming to be is only accidentally from a contrary, though he does later argue for the different claim in 1.8, 191a34-b26, taken up by Simplicius from 236,14-238,5, that coming to be is only accidentally from being or from non-being. At 181,10-30, Simplicius reports the ascription by Eudorus, a Platonist of the first century BC, to Pythagoreans of certain views about principles. On one account, the Supreme One is a principle for them, whereas the lower One and the Indefinite Dyad (sometimes called the great and the small) are contraries and only elements. This is further clarified in a report on Moderatus, a Neopythagorean of the next cen-

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tury, in the commentary on ch. 7, at 230,34, who says that the second One is the Platonic Forms. 1.6 The exact number of principles non-empirically determined In 1.6, Aristotle attempts to establish by ratiocination the exact number of principles. This would seem crazy if one thinks of modern determinations of the constituents or forces constituting matter, which have to be empirically determined. Moreover, his predecessors were often trying to determine, on the basis of explanatory conjecture, what those constituents might be. Earth, air, fire and water commended themselves as constituents only insofar as they seemed to explain empirical experience. But here it is relevant that Aristotle was attempting something slightly different: the analysis of natural change in natural bodies. This was more a philosophical analysis than an empirical investigation. Aristotle first appeals to the history of philosophy, pointing out that most of his predecessors had cited contraries among their principles. He then claims rather boldly that there cannot be more than one primary pair of contraries. He reaches the conclusion that all natural change involves the passage from one contrary, the privation of form, to another, the form or its possession. But something must underlie privation and form in order to be acted on by them and in order to provide a subject that will possess in turn the contrary attributes. We need only one such underlying thing, matter, if there is only one pair of contraries. Thus (190b29-191a7, discussed in 221,20-222,28) we may seem to need three principles, matter, form and privation. But a case might be made for saying that we need only two, for form is sufficient to produce change by its presence or absence, and this discussion is continued into 1.7 and later. It turns out in the commentary on 1.9, at 245,26-30, that Simplicius considers the reduction to two principles to be Plato’s view. But already at 7,34-8,1, Simplicius, in the course of praising Aristotle as surpassing even Plato in the philosophy of nature, credits Aristotle for distinguishing matter from privation. Simplicius follows Aristotle 1.7, 190a15-17; 190b23-7; 191a1-3 and the Aristotelian Alexander in saying that matter and privation need to be distinguished in being (einai), form (eidos) and defining character (logos), even if not in number, 244,29-245,9; 247,20-1. Moreover, Aristotle is concerned at 1.9, 191b35-192a1, that the distinction of privation from matter is needed for getting clear about the merely accidental sense in which things come to be from what per se is not. This had been explained in terms of privation at 1.8, 191a34-b26. Aristotle went on to warn at 1.9, 192a1-2 that those who regard matter and privation as one in number may make the mistake of thinking them one in potentiality. Aristotle finally plumps for three principles at the end of 1.8, at 191a20.

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In 1.7, Aristotle distinguishes the matter underlying a change from the privation, which differs in being, form and logos, 190a15-17; 190b23-7; 191a1-3. When a man becomes cultured, or bronze becomes a statue, the man or statue – which underlies – endures through the change, but lack of culture – the privation – does not, 190a17-21. The examples of man and bronze are rather different, because we can say that the statue comes from bronze, but not that the cultured comes from man, 190a216. When something comes to be something, it is obvious that the first something underlies the change. But it is equally true that when a man or other substance comes into being, something underlies the change, for the human seed has to be reshaped, 190a31-b9. What matter is can be known only by analogy, from examples such as the bronze of a statue, the wood of a bed and in general what so far lacks form (morphê) to what has form, 191a7-12. Simplicius at 227,1823 cites a first-century AD Pythagorean text purporting to be by Timaeus, the speaker in Plato’s Timaeus, in order to show that this idea is the same as Plato’s claim in the Timaeus that space, the Receptacle in which Forms are mirrored, is known only by ‘bastard reasoning’, 225,22-227,22. Simplicius thinks Plato agrees with Aristotle that coming to be requires transient contraries and something enduring to underlie them. He says, for example, in the Timaeus that what possesses hot or cold or any other contrary is too fleeting to be called more than ‘such’. The words ‘this’ and ‘that’ should be reserved for the Receptacle in which the contraries appear, 223,33-224,9. Simplicius’ history of different conceptions of matter and possible sideswipe at Philoponus: a reconsideration In 227,23-233,3, Simplicius offers one of his most interesting historical surveys. It is an account of different conceptions of matter, and it has been suggested by Pantelis Golitsis1 that it might contain a concealed attack on Simplicius’ arch-rival, the Christian Philoponus, even though he is not named. I am inclined to think that Simplicius had still not read Philoponus, since his arguments seem to address only earlier figures, and are repeatedly irrelevant to Philoponus. So what I would add is that he may well have silently hoped that his attack on those figures would count against Philoponus too, but realised that he could not actually address Philoponus without reading him. In his Against Proclus, Philoponus had put forward the very striking view that ‘the three-dimensional’ (to trikhê diastaton) serves both as matter and as form for bodies. It is the prime matter, or basic subject of a body’s attributes, and also is the form which constitutes the defining characteristic of body. Insofar as a body is characterised simply as

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three-dimensional, it is being regarded in separation from any of its qualities, and Philoponus also gives to his ‘three-dimensional’ the name ‘qualityless body’.2 In earlier work, Philoponus had described qualityless body as an extension (diastêma),3 and now he calls the three-dimensional a volume (onkos).4 Golitsis points out that Simplicius had earlier named Philoponus in attacking his account of matter in his commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, which cross-references suggest5 was his earliest commentary, preceding that on the Physics. There at 135,26-136,2, he attacked Philoponus for rejecting Proclus’ view of prime matter as incorporeal and formless, and for substituting the idea that prime matter in bodies is (136,2) ‘the three-dimensional’. Philoponus had rejected Proclus’ incorporeal and formless conception of prime matter partly as being superfluous. His explicit reasons for abolishing Proclus’ extra layer are that if prime matter were incorporeal, bodies would be composed completely of the incorporeal, since their other constituent is incorporeal form.6 Secondly, the three-dimensional constitutes the actual definition of body, and so cannot fail to be body.7 Philoponus’ account of prime matter (whether or not of body) was, to my mind, a great advance, because Proclus’ alternative view of it left it, as John Locke was later to acknowledge about his successor-concept ‘material substance’, a ‘something-I-know-not-what’, whereas threedimensional volume is something perfectly familiar, that could well serve as a subject of attributes. Locke’s admission had been anticipated by Plato and Proclus themselves, when they acknowledged that their prime matter was knowable only by a ‘bastard reasoning’. The view ascribed to Philoponus in Simplicius’ earlier commentary may sound very like the view that Simplicius raises for attack here in his present commentary at 227,23-26, that prime matter is qualityless body. But in the earlier commentary Simplicius was responding to Philoponus’ Against Aristotle, and said that he had not brought himself to read Philoponus’ Against Proclus. This is a pity, since before his Against Proclus, Philoponus had still accepted Proclus’ view of prime matter as without body, form, shape or volume,8 and Simplicius’ failure to read for himself Philoponus’ new view prevents him from realising that there is a new case to answer. Simplicius ascribed the qualityless body view that he is attacking only to the Stoics and to his friend Pericles of Lydia, and there was a basis for the Stoic attribution. Philoponus, in his Against Proclus, ascribes to the Stoics the view that the three-dimensional is the first substrate of all things and matter as such, 414,3-5; cf. 410,1-3, and Plotinus had earlier ascribed to the Stoics an account of matter as qualityless body in Enneads 2.4.1, 11-14. At 227,26-228,15, Simplicius cites reasons in favour of his opponents’ view that matter is qualityless body, and for their view that that was also the opinion of Plato and Aristotle. The reasons do not seem to be those of Philoponus. From 228,17 Simplicius switches to his replies, first arguing in 228,17-229,10 that Plato and Aristotle both rejected this view

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of matter, and in 229,11-230,14 offering arguments against the view, and citing in support Plotinus, presumably Enneads 2.4.8-12 . Plotinus, besides reporting the Stoic view that prime matter is qualityless body in 2.4.1, had responded in 2.4.11 to a thesis that it is volume (onkos) and magnitude (megethos). Simplicius may have known the weaknesses of Plotinus’ opponents, but some of his replies show that he did not know what Philoponus’ new theory was. For one thing, Philoponus insists that his three-dimensional is not of a definite size or shape, like the object of Simplicius’ attack, but indefinite.9 Even if each body has a certain size and shape, his three-dimensional volume is the defining characteristic of body viewed independently of any particular size or shape. For another thing, it is not a composite of matter and form, as Simplicius urges against his opponents, but a simple volume that plays the roles of both. Nor is a volume ‘determined’ (hôrismenon) by three dimensions, as Simplicius complains; it would be better to say that in Philoponus it is three dimensions. At 230,17-33, Simplicius surprises us. He concedes after all that being spread out (ekteinesthai) in volume (onkos) and extension (diastasis) is common to all natural bodies, and that being common to all is what is required of matter. So perhaps, he says, one should posit that there are two kinds of body, one with form and logos, the other a slackening (paresis) stretching out (ektasis) and loosening (ekluesthai) of the incorporeal and intelligible nature that has no parts. But the volume and extension is not one determined (hôrismenon) by measurements (metra), and matter is not a bodily form such as measures and delimits the indefiniteness of such extension and halts its flight away from being. In my earlier treatment, Golitsis is quite right to say that I did not sufficiently stress how different is Simplicius’ talk of volume, extension and body from that of Philoponus. I did point out that Simplicius spoke of body only in a secondary sense and that in conceding extension Simplicius was led by a Neoplatonist consideration that its diffuseness is at the opposite extreme from the unity of the One.10 But the Neoplatonism is much stronger than that. Simplicius goes on at 230,34-232,6 to speak of the Neopythagorean Moderatus from the first century AD and of Porphyry’s report on him. According to this account, Plato followed the Pythagoreans in his introduction of the Receptacle or space in the Timaeus. They both called it a quantity (posotês, poson) on which the unified logos had imposed privation (sterêsis) by withholding the logoi and forms (eidê) that it could have provided. The quantity was derived from privation, loosening (paralusis), stretching (ektasis), spreading (diaspasmos) and deviation (parallaxis) from being. The term parallaxis at 231,8, 16 and 19 recurs at 250,20; 255,13; 155,31-2; 774,8.11 And 231,24-232,6, along with 255,12-16, go on to introduce further terms: turning away or aside (ektropê, paratrepesthai) and decline (hupophora). The volume (onkos) of perceptible things is here distin-

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guished from formal magnitude (eidêtikon megethos), which is a form or logos. The picture depends on the Neoplatonic idea of things processing (proodos, 231,34) into coming to be, starting from the incorporeal One and Intellect, and continuing to the last point (eskhaton), which is matter. Clearly, the Neoplatonist sense which Simplicius attaches to prime matter being extension and body is very different from that of Philoponus. But on the other hand, it is less different than Simplicius supposes, if he is really hoping to include Philoponus in his attack. For Philoponus’ three-dimensional volume and qualityless body in his Against Proclus is indefinite and unformed, as Simplicius requires, and is body only in a sense not envisaged by Simplicius, of allegedly constituting the defining characteristic of body in general, not of particular bodies with their sizes and shapes. Simplicius finally argues, 232,7-30, that not only Plato, but also Aristotle, can be seen as agreeing with the Pythagoreanising Neoplatonism that he has been favouring. For Aristotle distinguishes in Physics 4.2, 209b6-9 between a magnitude (megethos) and its extension (diastêma). The extension is what is embraced and determined by a form such as a surface and boundary, and that is what matter and the indefinite is like. In fact, however, so far from suggesting Simplicius’ conception, Aristotle’s claim does not in any way depend on the Neoplatonic idea of procession, and would actually suit Philoponus’ view perfectly well. 1.8 How to answer Parmenides’ ban on coming to be either from what is or from what is not. In 1.8, Aristotle seeks to answer Parmenides’ ban on coming to be. Parmenides had set a puzzle near the beginnings of Greek Philosophy that had proved intractable up to the time of Plato: coming to be cannot be from what is, Parmenides had argued, because what is is already there. But it also cannot be from what is not. His reason for the latter was not simply a dislike of creation out of nothing, but an insistence that to think what is not is to think nothing. Aristotle, however, provides Parmenides with his own reason, that coming to be requires an underlying substratum, so is incompatible with nothing, 191a31. Aristotle gives his main answer in 191a34-b26. Coming to be cannot be from what is not qua what is not, or as what is not (hêi). But it can be accidentally from what is not, to use the conventional translation of kata sumbebêkos, which might also be translated ‘coincidentally’. Accidentally, or coincidentally, is contrasted with per se (kath’ hauto). At 191b15, Aristotle, I think, applies the terms in two ways to his two principles of matter and privation. What coming to be is from is matter, but coincidentally it is from privation, because of the coincidental connection of matter with privation. In addition, although privation per

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se is not, coincidentally it is, because of its coincidental connection with matter, which is. Thus Parmenides’ strictures are too simple. Coming to be is impossible if it is per se from what per se is not. But it is perfectly possible from what is not if the coincidental is allowed for (191b13-17). The position can also be put in terms of coming to be from what is not qua, or as, what is not, 191b4-10, b25-6. The same goes for coming to be from what is (191b17). Coming to be is from matter which is, although coincidentally it is not, because of its coincidental connection with privation. In another sense it is from privation, which, except coincidentally, is not. Aristotle says at 191b27-9 that he could reply also in terms of the distinction between being potentially and actually, but that distinction is explained elsewhere. Probably, he would say that coming to be is from what actually is not, but potentially is, what it becomes. Simplicius argues, 238,22-239,7, that Aristotle’s distinctions are already in Plato. In Sophist at 258A-259A, Plato allows that something can not-be something else, in the sense that it is other than something else, including other than Being, but it cannot have non-being per se. Simplicius conceded that Plato is not talking about matter and privation, but rather, in his view, about Forms. But in 1.9, 242,17-28 and 245,19-23, he insists that Plato did talk about matter and privation at Timaeus 50D-51A, when he said of the Receptacle that it was without the forms (amorphon) of all those kinds that it was going to receive from somewhere, but was also omnirecipient. Being without what it can naturally receive is a case of privation, according to Simplicius. 1.9 Differences between matter and privation: how far did Plato recognise them? Aristotle starts 1.9 by saying that some people have touched on privation and matter, but make the mistake of conceding that a thing without qualification (haplôs) comes to be out of what is not, insofar as they think that Parmenides speaks correctly – that is, when Parmenides sets up this horn of a dilemma. Secondly, it appears to them that if matter and privation are one in number, they will also be merely one in potentiality. Simplicius takes ‘they’ to refer to Plato’s treatment of the Receptacle in the Timaeus as deprived of forms, 242,22-243,4. What is thought (dokei, 243,5) by the majority of commentators is that Plato is being accused of two mistakes. The second supposed mistake is treated below at 244,25. The first supposed mistake, 243,5, results in accepting a Parmenidean interpretation of ‘without qualification’. Aristotle’s paraphrase ‘without qualification comes to be from what is not’, would have been meant by Parmenides in the sense: ‘comes to be from what without qualification is not’, 243,32-3, and this is how Plato is supposed to be accused of taking ‘without qualification’, 243,6 and 12. This ambiguity on whether coming to be is unqualifiedly from what is not, or

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is from what unqualifiedly is not matches the persistent ambiguity on whether coming to be is accidentally from what is not or from what accidentally is not.12 The way Simplicius glosses Plato’s supposed mistake here is that he accepts coming to be from what is not as or qua (hêi) what is not, 243,6-7. This first supposed mistake resulted supposedly from Plato’s agreeing too readily in his Parmenides with Parmenides’ view that being is one, 243,6. This acceptance rules out the necessary distinction of merely accidental non-being and also of potential being, so that if Plato acknowledges what is not as a source of coming to be, it must be what unqualifiedly is not, 243,7-9. But Simplicius is amazed at this interpretation, 243,14-20, because in the Sophist at 245D-E Plato threatened difficulties for the Parmenidean view that being is just one. Aristotle need not have meant that the sense in which Plato committed himself to coming to be from what is not was Parmenides’ sense, 243,20-2. Simplicius at 243,26-31 cites Plato’s analysis in the Sophist of a kind of non-being entirely distinct from unqualified non-being: at 258A-B Plato says that what is not can be what is other than Being. But Simplicius conjectures that perhaps Aristotle’s criticism of Plato concerned something that he said within the very same statement. He said that what is other than Being is no less a being than Being itself. Was this perhaps, asks Simplicius, the excessive concession to Parmenides of which Aristotle complained? Parmenides had said that anything else besides (para) being is not. Plato’s concession is to insist that nonetheless what is not is, 243,22-4; 244,3-5, while rejecting Parmenides’ idea that it is nothing. If indeed this were to be right, Aristotle would not, as supposed, be accusing Plato of thinking that coming to be is from what is not in any way (pantelôs). Thus Simplicius seeks to avoid the idea that Aristotle criticised Plato on the major issues and looks for a smaller issue. But at 244,18, he expresses anxiety as to whether his defence (apologizesthai) of Plato has correctly identified the sense in which Plato allows coming to be from what is not. Aristotle’s second criticism of Plato is one already discussed above. Although he did speak of matter and privation when he spoke in his Timaeus of a formless Receptacle, he did not distinguish between matter and privation in their potentialities (dunamis, 192a1), or, as Aristotle says elsewhere, in their defining characteristics (logos), 244,28-245,19. Simplicius looks for ameliorating explanations of this omission. Plato, he says, 245,26-9, thinks the same way as Aristotle when Aristotle conceded that one could exclude privation from being a separate principle and could say that form alone produces change by its presence or absence, 1.7, 191a6-7. Further, it is a defining characteristic of elements to inhere in that of which they are elements. But privation produces coming to be by its absence, not by its inherence, 246,2-5. Again, Aristotle would agree with Plato that privation is at best an

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accidental cause, given its absence and non-inherence, 246,5-12. Finally, Aristotle was analysing change in particular, so had more reason than Plato to include an accidental cause: privation. Plato was looking for elements, and there is no such thing as an accidental element, 246,12-16. Aristotle goes on to warn that the people he is criticising do not recognise the duality of matter and privation, when they give a doublebarrelled name (as Aristotle says Plato did)13 to their matter, calling it the great and the small. Simplicius quotes a record of Plato’s associate Hermodorus, explaining that matter was called great and small because it admitted degrees of quantity, unlike the equal, the stationary or the tuned. Hermodorus further added that Plato did not regard matter as a principle, 247,30-248,20; 256,31-257,4. At 192a12, Aristotle suggests that it was easy to overlook privation, because whereas matter can seem as supportive as a mother, as it did to Plato in the Timaeus 50D; 51A, privation can seem merely destructive, 192a12-16. This brings him to differences as regards good and evil between matter and privation. Form is good and to be striven for, and there is something that naturally strives for it. The good cannot strive for itself because it has no lack, and privation cannot strive for form, because that would destroy it. So it is matter that naturally strives for form. Those censured for not distinguishing matter from privation will make something strive for its own destruction, 192a16-25. Simplicius sees Aristotle here as adding further differences between matter and privation to the many he has already introduced in censuring the failure to distinguish them, 248,23-7. It is a great difference, he says, if matter strives for form and privation is contrary to it, 250,23-5. The idea that matter is evil was of intense interest to Simplicius, as is clear from his devoting a section of his commentary on Epictetus to a discussion of evil and of the Manichaean view on it.14 He says that a Manichaean had explained one of the doctrines to him. He disliked their idea that there is a bad, as well as a good, cause of existent things, and that the bad cause desires (oregesthai) the good. In the present commentary Simplicius urges that matter and privation are both introduced by the Demiurge not as evil, but as necessary for completing the universe. Leaving it incomplete would be unworthy of the divine goodness, and such views are impious, 249,26-250,3; 256,22-8. Simplicius’ devout religious commitments here come to the fore.15 At 192a25-34, Aristotle points out that matter does not perish or come into being, except insofar as the privation in it perishes. But as potentially endowed with form, it does not perish per se, but is imperishable and ungenerable. Indeed, if matter could come to be, it would need some underlying matter from which it came to be and which inhered in it, and this matter would exist before the supposed coming to be of matter. Similarly, if it could perish, it would need some underlying matter into which it perished, and which would exist after it perished.

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Once again Simplicius sees the discussion as pointing out a further difference between privation, which perishes per se, and matter which does not, 252,21-23. He asks two final questions about matter not perishing. First, he explains that particular parcels of matter can perish, for example when water changes into steam. But there is still matter there after the change, so that in that sense matter itself has not perished, 255,17256,13. Secondly, some people ask: if matter really does not come to be or perish, will it not be a first principle in the way that God is? Here Simplicius seems to be attacking his more usual religious target, the Christians. The objection is found in Christian writers that a world or matter co-eternal with God would have the same honorific status as He. Platonists would have considered themselves immune to this objection since the analogy of light or of shadow produced contemporaneously with the sun had been supplied by Taurus in the second century AD, by Plotinus in the third, Sallustius in the fourth and Proclus in the fifth, while Augustine reports the Platonist analogy of a footprint contemporaneous with an implanted foot. None of these analogies is open to the objection that the effect would have the same honorific status as the cause. Yet as early as Basil of Caesarea in the fourth century, Christians raised a different objection to these analogies, that they provide cases of spontaneous, not willed, creation. The Platonists, however, were in no way committed to the analogy holding in such other respects.16 In this review of Simplicius’ commentary on 1.5-9, I have looked at the course of his, and of Aristotle’s arguments. For general features of his approach, I would refer to Han Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius, Duckworth, London, 2008, and especially to his discussion of Simplicius’ treatment of the unity of pagan Greek philosophical thought at pp. 84-7, 218-20. Notes 1. Pantelis Golitsis, Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote, Berlin, 2008, pp. 128-39. 2. Philoponus On Aristotle’s Physics 156,10-17, Against Proclus, 405,11; 413,6-7; 414,22; 415,2 and 4; 426,21; 442,17. Philoponus’ view is discussed in Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, London, 1988, chs 2 and 3; Frans de Haas, John Philoponus’ New Definition of Prime Matter, Leiden, 1997. 3. Philoponus in Phys. 577,13; 687,30-3; 688,30. 4. Philoponus Against Proclus 424,10 and 16; 428,8; 434,4. 5. I. Hadot, ‘La vie et l’oeuvre de Simplicius’ in her (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin, 1987, pp. 3-39, at p. 21, translated into English in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London, 1990, pp. 275-303, at p. 290 6. Against Proclus 443,6-13 and 22-3. 7. Against Proclus 414,10-17; 418,25-6; 419,3.

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8. e.g. in Cat. 83,14-17. 9. Philoponus Against Proclus 405,26; 424,10, 16 and 24. 10. Matter, Space and Motion, ch. 1, p. 20 on Simplicius’ concept of matter, ch. 2, p. 27 on Philoponus’. 11. I thank Carlos Steel for the references. 12. On the second ambiguity see notes on the lemma 191b15 at 236,13-14, on 238,8; on 242,4-10, on the lemma 191b36 at 242,15-16, on 243,12, and 32, and on 254,9. 13. Aristotle Metaphysics 1.6-7, 987b20; 26; 988a31; 26; Physics 1.4, 187a17; 3.4, 203a15; 4.2, 209b35, and W.D. Ross’ commentary on Aristotle Metaphysics 14.1, 1087b16. 14. Starting from Lemma 35 on Epictetus’ Handbook ch. 27. The most recent edition by Ilsetraut Hadot discusses it in her ch. 5, and it is translated by Tad Brennan and Charles Brittain in Simplicius: On Epictetus Handbook 27-53, in the present series, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. I thank Sebastian Gertz for drawing my attention to two further contributions on the subject by I. Hadot, ‘Die Widerlegung des Manichäismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 51, 1969, and ‘Dans quel lieu le néoplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fondé son école de mathématiques, et où a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manichéen?’, International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 1, 2007, 42-107. 15. On this see the studies by Philippe Hoffmann, ‘Aspects de la polémique de Simplicius contre Philopon’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie, Berlin, 1987; ‘Simplicius’ polemics’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, London, 1987, pp. 57-83, enlarged 2nd edn, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, suppl. vol. 103, 2010, pp. 97-123; ‘La triade Chaldaïque, erôs, alêtheia, pistis: de Proclus à Simplicius’, in A.Ph. Segonds, C. Steel (eds), Proclus et la théologie Platonicienne, Leuven, Paris 2000, pp. 459-89. 16. See Richard Sorabji, ‘Waiting for Philoponus’, in Charles Burnett, Rotraud Hansberger, Afifi al-Akiti (eds), Medieval and Arabic Thought, Warburg Studies and Texts, London, 2012, revised in his Introduction to the translation of Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus and Zacharias of Mytilene, Ammonius, in the present series.

Conventions [}] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation or the lemmata for purposes of clarity, as well as those portions of the lemmata which are not quoted by Simplicius. Angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Greek text, i.e. additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompanying notes provide further details. (}) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words and Bekker page references to the Aristotelian text. Quotations from early Greek philosophical texts in verse are printed as prose.

Abbreviations Bonitz = H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Berlin, 1870. Charlton = W. Charlton, Aristotle, Physics, Books i and ii, translated with introduction and notes, Oxford, 1970. Diels = H. Diels, Simplicii in Aristotelis physica commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 9, Berlin, 1882. DK = H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Berlin, 1903, 6th edn rev. by W. Kranz. Hardie and Gaye = R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye (trs), ‘Physics’, in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton, 1984, vol. 1. Hope = R. Hope (tr.), Aristotle’s Physics, Lincoln, 1961. Lampe = G.W.H. Lampe (ed.), A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford, 1961. LSJ = H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (rev. H.S. Jones and R. McKenzie, rev. supp. by P.G.W. Glare), Oxford, 1996. Marg = W. Marg, Timaeus Locrus: De Natura Mundi et Animae, Leiden, 1972. Ross = W.D. Ross, Aristotle’s Physics, a revised text with introduction and commentary, Oxford, 1936. SVF = H. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Stuttgart, 1903-5 Wehrli = F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, vol. 8, Eudemus von Rhodos, 2nd edn, Basel; Stuttgart, 1969. Wicksteed and Cornford = P.H. Wicksteed and F.M. Cornford, Aristotle, The Physics, with an English translation, London,1963, vol. 1.

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Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.5 Translated by Han Baltussen Chapter 5 188a19-27 All make the contraries principles [those alleging that all is one and does not move (for even Parmenides treats hot and cold as principles and addresses such things as fire and earth and there are those too [who use] the rare and the dense, as Democritus [does with] the full and the empty, [both] of which he says exists, one as being and the other as non-being.) Moreover [this is] in position, shape and order. These things are genera of opposites: of position above and below, before and behind, of shape angular and smooth, straight and round. It is thus clear] that all in some way make the contraries the principles.

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Having shown that the principle is neither one [in number] nor infinite, and concluding that those who posit many and limited [principles] speak better, such as Empedocles, he owed us an immediate indication of how many of these multiple [principles] there are. But he, passing over that [issue], shows first which [principles] there are, and does not 25 have an unreasonable approach, but shows concurrently with which ones there are, also how many [there are]. For if they are contraries, two are in any case (pantôs) at the top of the hierarchy (anôtatô). He shows that the principles are contraries, that is, the elementary foundations of physical things, firstly from the agreement (sumphônia)1 among almost all the natural philosophers, even if they disagree in other respects. For even those who say being is one and unmoved, as for 30 example Parmenides, even these [people] make the principles contraries of physical things. For even he [=Parmenides] in his [account] with regard to opinion makes ‘hot and cold’ principles. Those things he calls ‘fire’ and ‘earth’ and ‘light’ and ‘night’ or ‘darkness’. For he says after the [comments] regarding truth:2 for they have decided to name two forms one of which is not appropriate [to name], wherein lies their error; they have distinguished things opposed in shape and allocated them signs as separate from each other, here the heavenly flame of fire smooth and very soft, in every respect identical to itself, but not identical to the other; in contrast, they have also determined this by itself as opposite, the unknowing night, dense and heavy in bodily form.

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But when all things had been named light and night and things [allocated] in accordance with their powers for each everything is full alike of light and invisible night, both equal, because in neither is anything which does not have a share. If ‘nothing has no share in either’, it is made clear that (1) both things are principles and (2) that [they are] contraries.3 And those who supposed that the principle is one and in motion, such as Thales (see 23.22-3) and Anaximenes (see 24.26) making creation happen by rarefaction and compression, those too posited as contrary principles rarefaction and compression. Democritus too makes contraries principles,4 choosing the full (to plêres) and the empty (to kenon), of which he said the former exists, but the latter does not (Phys. 188a22-3). But even in the atoms5 themselves he saw contrariety. For he said that they differed by three upper level distinctions, rhusmos, diathigê, tropê – rhusmos meaning the shape, diathigê the arrangement, and tropê the position. For the [capital] A (if it were an element) differs from [capital] N by shape, the Z from the N by position, and AN from NA in arrangement.6 These are the three genera of contraries, position in terms of high and low, left and right, front and back, shape of having an angle or not and being straight or curved, and in arrangement the first and last [are] contraries. Empedocles and Anaxagoras he (i.e. Aristotle) left for the moment, the former because clearly by his own admission there is contrariety among the elements – both in respect of Strife and Love, and even with regard to combination and dissolution; for he says that coming-to-be is nothing other [than] ‘just mixing and separation of things mixed’ (B8.3 DK). As for Anaxagoras he made mention of him even earlier (Phys. 187a22-7) as positing contraries among the principles, when he presented his disagreement with Empedocles with the words ‘they differ from each other in that the latter creates a cycle of these things, the former [lets them happen] once, and he (i.e. Anaxagoras7) [makes] both the homoiomerous things and the contraries infinite, while he (i.e. Empedocles) [posits] the so-called elements’. Anaxagoras in his actual words clearly also transmits [to us] the contrarieties in [his account of] the process of coming to be, in which he says (B12 DK): ‘this rotation (perikhôrêsis) brought on separation, and from the rare separated off the dense and from the cold the hot and from the gloomy8 the bright and from the wet the dry’. Also the Pythagoreans9 posited the contraries as secondary and elementary principles not only for the physical things, but simply for all that comes after the One, which they said to be the principle of all things, and they subordinated [to the contraries] the two coordinated series (sustoikhias), which are no longer properly principles. About these Eudorus writes the following [things]:10

Translation It must be stated that the Pythagoreans said the One was the principle of all things according to their highest account, but, according to their second account, that there were two principles of the things which are brought to completion, the One and the nature contrary to that; [that] of all the things that are conceived of as contraries they list the preferable under the One, but the inferior under its contrary nature. That is why these things are not regarded as absolute principles according to these men [i.e. Pythagoreans]. For if the one is principle of the former, and the other of the latter, the principles are not universal to all as is the One.

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And again [he says]: That is why they also said that the One is in another way principle of all things, presuming that both matter and all realities have come about from it. And that is also the God high above (ton huperanô theon). Next Eudorus, describing it in more accurate terms, says that they posit 20 the One as principle and say that the elements arise from the One, but he states that they refer by many names to the elements. For he says:11 I affirm then that the followers of Pythagoras leave the One as principle of all things, but in another way introduce the highest elements as two. They call these two elements by many names. For one of them they name ordered, definite, knowable, male, odd, right, light; the contrary of that not-ordered, indefinite, unknowable, female, left, even, dark, so that because in one way the One is principle, but in another the One and the Indefinite Dyad are elements, both One[s] being alike principles, and it is clear that the One as principle of all things is quite distinct from the One opposite to the Dyad, which they also call Monad.12

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It is worth pointing out that Aristotle does not say [simply] that the contraries make up all the principles, but the things that are contrary in some way (pôs). For they do not speak of contraries in the primary sense (kuriôs), but of those things that they regard as contraries. For the void and full are not contraries, but rather they are opposed as a state and [its] privation, nor are the angular and non-angular or the straight and curved. And if one13 were to say the straight is some kind 182,1 of shape, he proved himself that there is no contrariety among shapes. But perhaps they did not posit them as contraries (enantia) in an absolute sense, but as opposites (antikeimena). And he himself, as we shall learn, saying that the contraries are principles, will posit the form and [its] privation as the principal opposition, which are contrasted not

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5 as contraries, but in some other way. So the [phrase] ‘contrary in some way’ involves differing ways of antithesis. 188a27-30 And that is reasonable. For the principles must [not come from each other nor from other things and all must come from them. And it is the primary contraries that have these features – not being derived from anything else because they are primary, and] not from each other because they are contraries.14 Having made it plausible that the principles are contraries by the 10 agreement (sumphônia) of the other [philosophers], which was from individual points, he also makes the same point generally plausible by the following deductive reasoning.15 The first contraries ‘do not come from other things nor from each other, and other things do come from them.’ Those things are principles which come neither from other things nor from each other and from which the other things come. Therefore the primary contraries are principles, and by primary contraries he 15 means the most generic. And it is clear that if something is simply primary, that thing does not originate in something else. For the primary in so far as it is primary could not come from something else. That a principle does not come from something else, is obvious then. That the principles do not come from each other, is also clear. ‘If a principle were to come out of something,’ says Plato, ‘it would not be a principle’ (Phdr. 245D). And in general if they come from each other, they are no more principles than things that come from principles. 20 Yet how do contraries not come from each other? The very opposite will be shown, that the contraries come from each other. For from black comes white and from uncultured the cultured [in a man]. Maybe they may be said to come out of each other in the sense of coming after each other, but the contrary may not come from its contrary in the manner of [what comes] from elements that endure [after the change] (as a bed is said to arise from wood), which is the strict manner of coming into 25 being from something. For it is not possible for a contrary to be the matter for its contrary. For a contrary does not receive another contrary while remaining [what it is]. That [statement] ‘the other things come from these’ is indisputably proper to the first principles; for from the principle comes what follows after the principle, if it is truly to be a principle. [The characteristic] also belongs to the contraries, because the coming to be of things after the principles happens by the occurrence of change, which, as 30 will be shown, all comes about from contrary to contrary. But how are the contraries principles, if he [Aristotle] himself in the Metaphysics claims in an inspired manner (1076a4) ‘having many rulers is not good’?16 Or are we looking for principles of physical things now and not transcendent principles but elementary, from which, as inher183,1 ent in them, things that come to be are generated, as he himself also shows further in the words ‘To say there are three elements’ (189b16).

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Physical things have their being in change, and all change comes about from something to something in relation to a shared substrate; so there could not be [just] one principle, but at least two in addition to the substrate. But maybe the first contraries are broadly characterised by not coming to be from other things nor from each other, but they are not alone in this, as things that are different but not contrary [also have this characteristic]. For not all different things are contraries, for instance if someone were to posit quantity and quality as principles: for neither [do they arise] from others if indeed [they are] principles, nor from each other if indeed both are primary in equal measure. Maybe [one could say that] quantity and quality are not primary principles, but being in a subject, which the nine categories have in common, and not being in a subject, which applies to substance (Cat. 5). For principles that are primary and of equal strength are seen in an opposition, because things that are not opposite are somehow subsumed under each other, even if their arrangement is not easily seen. That is why both those who explain the divine arrangements in a mythical way17 and those who explain them philosophically posited after the single cause of all things a dyad which is the source of every opposition. This opposition is in the divine realm somehow hidden as it is dominated18 by the union there, but becomes manifest here in a manifold way.19 My teacher Ammonius20 did not think it right to understand the phrase ‘contraries do not come from each other’ in the sense that [they do not come from each other] as from substrates and therefore enduring entities. Rather it should be understood in the same sense as the phrase ‘they do not come from other things’. For it is not possible21 to get other, more principle-like things than the primary contraries, from which these are [produced by] (sub)division, either as from genera or from wholes, or are generated as from productive (i.e. efficient) causes. For how could there be anything prior to primary principles? [In Ammonius’ view contraries are said not to come from each other] not because they do not use [the other contraries] as substrates, but rather because one cannot obtain other [principles] prior to these [contraries] from which we will say, that they come about [as something] more particular (mêrikôtera), for instance, as one could say that the compact and diffuse are prior to the hot and the cold, and prior to them the surplus and depletion,22 and to those form and privation. Hence, using this [reasoning] [Aristotle] will say more clearly in what follows ‘moreover, some contraries are prior to others, and others [again] come from things other [than themselves]23 (189a17-18), that is from more general [principles]. What is now said, that ‘contraries must not come from each other’ seems to be said in this sense, namely that it is not possible for one (of a pair of contraries) to be more primary and more general than the other, because they are contraries, as he says, that is of equal strength to each other, and the one of them does not have more [claim] than the other to the status of the principle.

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Translation 188a30-1 But it is necessary to look at how this conclusion is reached also on the basis of the reasoning.

He has shown that the contraries are principles from a [property] that belongs in common both to the primary contraries and to the principles (that was the [fact] that ‘they do not come from other things nor from 5 each other and all must come from them’ (188a27-8)). He also now wants to pass on the most important cause of the fact that the primary contraries are principles of coming-to-be (I believe he calls the cause logos). He wants to also because in the preceding reasoning the [thesis] had become known that primary contraries ‘come not from one another nor from anything else’ (that they come ‘not from anything else’ on account of the fact that they are primary, that they come ‘not from one 10 another’ on account of the fact that they are contraries). But the phrase ‘and others from these’ needed a certain causal account. Now he adds this.24 188a31-188b26 One must assume first that no chance thing (to tukhon) of all existing things is by nature able to act or undergo anything by the agency of any chance thing [nor does anything come to be out of just anything, unless you assume it is accidental; for (35) how would white come to be out of cultured, except if the cultured was accidental to the non-white or black? White comes to be out of non-white, not just out of any, but (188b1) out of black or something in between, and cultured not out of non-cultured, that is, not just out of anything lacking culture, but out of uncultured, or something in between. Nor does something get destroyed into any chance thing, for instance, the white into the cultured, except in an accidental way, (5) but [changes] into what is not white, and not into any chance thing, into black or something in between; similarly with the cultured into the uncultured, that [changes] not into a chance thing, but into uncultured or something in between, if there are such things; it is the same in all other cases, because regarding things which are not simple but (10) composite the same account holds; but this escapes us because the opposite dispositions are nameless. For it is necessary that what is joined comes out of what is not and vice versa, and that the joined is destroyed into not being joined, and this is not in a chance breaking up but destruction into its opposite. (15) There is no difference with regard to joining, arrangement or composition. It is clear that the same account holds. Whether a house or a statue or anything else, all come to be in the same way. For the house comes to be from the [components] being not compounded but separated in a particular way, and the statue becomes something that is shaped (20) out of shapelessness; so each of these things is an arrangement or a

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composition. If this is true, each thing comes to be from its contrary or is destroyed into its contrary or something in between. The things in between come out of the contraries, for instance colours from white and black; (25) so that all things generated naturally either are contraries or from contraries’.25 He presupposes (prolambanei)26 as general axioms with regard to every artificial and natural generation views credible (pista) on account of their obvious clarity, namely that each thing that is generated and destroyed in itself comes to be and is destroyed by an agent and not anything by anything at random, but by the opposite active cause and into the opposite. For not every thing acts upon every thing, but the opposite upon the opposite such as the hot on the cold, changing it from the state opposite to itself to that of itself. That applies to the productive [cause] (poioun). With regard to the generated, [he says that] the generated does not arise from the non-existent, but changes from existing [thing] to existing [thing] and that [does not occur] from anything to anything randomly, but from the opposite to the opposite, that is, due to the productive [cause]. By first making these things axioms, next assuming things that are generated and destroyed naturally, he concludes that all things [existing] naturally, whenever they are generated or destroyed in themselves, undergo this as opposites by the agency of [their] opposites. That any chance thing is not disposed to act upon any chance thing or undergo [anything] caused by any chance thing – whenever something per se causes or undergoes change – but the opposite by the opposite, we may learn thus: the productive [cause] shaping its own activity according to the form in it, places through this activity onto the substrate (i.e., that from which the generated comes) the form according to which the generated comes into being; and this [form] was present in the productive [cause], in the way that the house-builder imposes the harmony [that exists] inside him and the shape of the house on the stones, transforming their previous disposition to that present in him. But neither does the similar in form change (for it [simply] exists) nor the distinct, but capable of co-existing together (for why should white change to cultured, when both are able to co-exist?), yet those things change into each other, which are incapable of subsisting together before changing. These are not only the contraries (enantia) in the primary sense, but opposites (antikeimena) in all manner of opposition. Consequently every thing generated which did not exist beforehand, must be transformed from the earlier contrasting disposition into its opposite by the agency of the opposite to the earlier state of the changing thing [which is], however, similar to the [state] in the direction of which the change occurs; for this [change] happens out of the productive [cause]. Thus the body that was previously cold becomes hot by some kind of heat. For, he says, it is not from cultured that white comes to be per se, but from

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10 black.27 Yet nothing stops [this happening] accidentally, whenever the cultured [man] happens to be black or not white, not a chance [property], but something in-between. For the white comes to be per se out of the non-white, surely not out of white, for [in that case] it would be [white] before becoming white. Yet [it comes to be] out of non-white not because it also [comes] from the hippocentaur,28 but from what is opposed to white: this is either black or any of those in-between [shades], such as auburn or reddish or predominantly grey and gener15 ally what is ranked as black by comparison to white. And cultured comes about from non-cultured, not from a chance thing, but from what is naturally so disposed. And the cultured comes from the non-cultured; such [a state] would be the uncultured and whatever [if anything] lies between cultured and uncultured. There is a question about that which lies between virtue and vice and [between] cultured and non-cultured, where some say that what is neither this nor that lies in-between, such as what is between male and 20 female, while some [say] it is from the mixture of both, as grey is between black and white, and some again [say it is] the power with a natural [tendency] towards both.29 Similarly any chance thing does not get per se destroyed into any chance thing, but into the contrary or the in-between. And this is not only the case with regard to simple [entities] as for instance white and cultured and the like, but also with regard to 25 composite ones such as ‘a man’s house’. Each of these comes about from its opposite, not from a chance thing, but from what is naturally disposed to change to those and is destroyed into these [states], but it escapes attention because of the fact that there are no names in place for the things opposite to these such as the non-cultured or the white in the examples discussed before (ekei). One could broadly say that with regard to the composites the harmonious (hêrmosmenon) and unhar30 monised (anarmoston) are opposed.30 For the harmonious arises out of the unharmonised and the unharmonised from the harmonious, and they are destroyed into each other, not from any chance things into any chance things. Surely the harmony of a man would not change into the disharmony of the lyre, but into that of a man, nor the Dorian harmony into Lydian disharmony, but into the appropriate one.31 All these examples are not taken from the productive [cause], but 35 from the passive, which amounts to saying: that from which the generated comes to be and that into which the destroyed is destroyed. The cultured comes about from the non-cultured by the agency of Damon32 186,1 as productive [cause] and the hot from the cold by the productive agency of heat. And each of these is said to pass away in that into which they change, also by the agency of that thing. If someone should think that harmony and disharmony is said with regard to music only, it makes no difference to say the same things with regard to both arrangement and 5 composition. For the house which is a kind of composite comes about from components which are separated and not compounded, and things

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given form [come about] from what lacks form, and [as for] those who make coming-to-be consist in compounding and separation (and this is the same as speaking of compounding and separation), for them too coming-to-be and passing away are from contraries and into contraries. Consequently, to sum up the inductive reasoning, it is true to say that every thing which comes into being and which is destroyed does so either from contraries or into contraries or those in-between. The intermediates are not separated from both, but put together from both in order that, being generic cognates, they might possess a relation to either one. And [this applies to] all the things which [exist] naturally; for example, ‘animal’ obtains existence from ‘not animal’, but from such a ‘not- animal’ which is naturally disposed towards generation of an animal. It is clear that the person attending to the account will not harbour a suspicion that Aristotle is contradicting himself in that earlier he said that contraries do not arise from each other, but now [he says] that contrary comes from contrary.33 For earlier (ekei) he said that contraries do not arise from each other as from matter (given that black does not arise from pre-existing white in the same way as a bed does from wood) or rather that they do not arise from each other as from efficient causes (for contraries cannot effectively be a cause of each other); but here (entautha) [he stated] that when the contrary form goes out, its opposite [form arises] from what is underlying through the productive [cause]. So, that nothing is naturally disposed to produce any chance thing or be affected by any chance thing, let that be clear; but from where is it made clear that contraries are things naturally disposed to affect each other and be affected by each other? For soul is said to be illuminated by god, but it is not a contrary [illuminated] by its contrary; or as the empty is affected by the full so too [the soul] changes from the god-less to the god-possessed. In general, the thing that is coming into being is not what it becomes; for it would not be able to come into being. So it does come about from the sort of thing it is not, not just any thing, but [that which is] naturally disposed. The same thing is receptive of opposites by nature. The same body can receive hot and cold or black and white, and the same soul cultured and non-cultured. So when will the soul naturally change to cultured? Is it when[ever] it is cultured? Not at all. Surely whenever it is not cultured, and it is prone to become cultured. And the body, when does it become white? Is it when it is white? Certainly not. But whenever it is not white, but it is naturally disposed to become white? Certainly (†).34 For if being by nature disposed means being receptive of contraries, and it does not have that which it is said to become, it is clear that it has the thing opposite to it or the intermediate, and from that changes into what it becomes. And primarily generation is from that which is not such, but is naturally disposed to be such. That is why change is from privation to a state (hexis), already also from the contrary, in so far as it is not of the same sort and has a

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natural disposition, and in general from an opposite according to any 5 opposition. For it is not necessary that the white comes from black qua black, but from the not-white, naturally disposed to become white. That which is naturally disposed towards the white is also naturally disposed towards black, so that whenever it is not white, it is either black or the intermediate and because of that it comes from black or the intermediate. Whence something arises, into that it also perishes. 10 It is worth remarking that composition is one thing, arrangement another.35 Composition is used of things which are compounded with one another, a kind of assembly36 of given things which is well-fitted, even when no arrangement underlies it, as with [pieces of] wood whenever the person putting them together does not care what comes first or what second, if only they can be fitted together. Arrangement is said of 15 things having position (for the parts of a statue must be put in an arrangement, so that there [can be] first, second and so on); it is also said of things which do not possess position as with numbers. For the monad is positioned before the dyad. But there is neither artificial nor natural composition without arrangement. Even if he says ‘of each of these things some are an arrangement, others a composition’, he means 20 it in such a way that even a house and a statue in some respect take part in arrangement, and in another [respect] in composition, but not that the house subsists according to composition only, the statue according to arrangement only. Alexander remarked well ‘that which does not have a contrary or which is not receptive of contraries, that would be ungenerated’, adding aptly the second clause, [‘or which is not receptive 25 of contraries’], because of the individual substance, I think. For there is no contrary to that, but it is receptive of contraries. And therefore it receives not only the form, but also the privation of the form.

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188b26-30 Up as far as this most of the others practically have followed [our course], as we said earlier. For all speak of the opposites when, albeit without reason, they postulate the elements and what they call principles as if forced by the truth itself.37

Most of the other physicists too, practically, follow suit as far as placing the contraries among the principles. The word ‘practically’ (skhedon) he adds either to ‘most’ out of philosophical caution or to ‘they have 188,1 followed suit’, because not even those persons simply declared that contraries qua contraries are principles, but the things they actually mentioned were contraries, such as light and dark and Strife and Love and combination and dissolution and those sorts of things.38 The fact that they make affirmations without reasoning, that is without a demonstrative cause, and yet (homôs) they speak ‘as if they are being dragged by the truth itself’, is a clear demonstration of the natural truth 5 of this notion (dogma) and of the preconceived belief (pepoithêsis) according to common notions. For we have also provided the cause point-

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ing out that there is no coming-to-be of any chance thing from any chance thing, but of from the contrary. And therefore ‘things that arise naturally are either contraries or from contraries’ (188b25-6). But those [thinkers], without understanding the cause or 10 adding it, still said the same things. 188b30-189a9 But they differ from each other [by the fact that some take [contraries] that are prior, others take ones posterior, and some take ones better known according to reason, others better known according to sense perception; for some postulate as the cause of generation hot and cold, others fluid and dry, others odd and even, or strife and love; these differ from each other in the way just stated, so that they say that they are in a way the same and different: different, as is the view of most, yet the same (189a1) by analogy; they take them from the same list of coordinated opposites. Some are of general scope, others are subordinate. From this perspective they say they are the same and different, and some better and others worse, and some say they are better known according to reason, as has been said before, others according to sense perception. For the universal is known according to reason, the particular according to sense perception; for reason is directed to the universal, sense perception to the particular. For instance, the great and the small is known according to reason, the rare and dense according to sense perception. Having shown that regarding the principles there is agreement (sumphônia) among the ancient natural philosophers in making them contraries, because to many they seem to disagree with each other as each one posits something else as the principle, he also passes on their difference. And how this too leads to agreement, he shows nicely and clearly. So he makes the difference clear by saying ‘some take [contraries] that are prior in nature, others posterior in nature’ and ‘some take ones better known according to reason, others better known according to sense perception’. Or [he clarifies] by meaning the same thing with ‘prior in nature’ and ‘better known according to reason’, and again ‘posterior in nature’ and ‘better known according to sense perception’. And of the examples he added ‘the odd and even and Strife and Love’ as they are [contraries] by nature prior, and more known according to reasoning, but not via sense, as befitting the prior ones (for these are intelligible; that is why Empedocles, when speaking about Love, says ‘but look with your mind and don’t sit with your eyes astounded’), but he ascribed to the posterior things ‘the hot and cold and wet and dry’ as things posterior by nature and more known via sense. Parmenides mentions hot and cold, but regarding wet and dry Alexander says that either he said that (the very one who called them hot

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and cold), or Empedocles [did so] placing the four elements as principles next to Love and Strife. Yet Porphyry39 ascribed the view more appropriately to †Anaximenes who said ‘earth and water are all that comes to be and grows’.40 The Pythagoreans posit the even and odd as principles, in the way that Empedocles [posited] Strife and Love with the four elements. Perhaps he added the [opposites] mentioned as examples of those [things] more known by nature and by sense, but not anymore of those prior and posterior. For the more general and comprehensive must be prior, while those particular and contained more posterior.41 The things mentioned do not stand in such a relation to each other, with the result that they would not differ in that respect. Or perhaps it is because he spoke earlier about the contraries differing with regard to the prior and the posterior, when he said (187a15) ‘they generate the other things from condensation and rarefaction and create many things – these are contraries, and at a general level excess and defect, as is the great and the small according to Plato,42 unless perhaps of these [contraries] those that are intelligible and considered by reason, such as Love and Strife and odd and even, should be said to ‘contain’, because they reach all other things, whereas perceptible and material things, because they are ranked below the former and share in them, are ‘contained’. For hot and cold and dry and wet partake in Strife and Love and odd and even in respect of unification and dissolution and the combinatory and separative. For in his On Generation43 he characterises the hot as what compounds (sunkritikon) similar things by its combinatory [property] (sunkritikon). But it is not participated in by these.44 Alexander says that the more formal of these are containing, while the more material ones are contained [within them], saying that the more formal ones among these aforementioned contrarieties are hot, dry, uneven, and Love,45 but the more material ones the opposites to these. Still, he says that one group assumes the prior and containing [opposites], while the others [assume] the posterior and the contained, while no one speaks of hot and dry, nor again anyone else of cold and wet, but of opposite things together. For in this way, but not in the other, they could say that the opposites were principles, all in common having an opposed nature but differing by some being prior and others posterior. Therefore those who have put forward these opinions say ‘the same and different things’, different, as shown before, because the one says Strife and Love, the other hot and cold and others again another of the oppositions, yet also while seeming to state a differing view they say the same things, in so far as they assume things which are analogous (ta analogon). For given that there are two opposed columns, the one being stronger, in which Love and odd and excess and great and rare and hot [reside], and the other being weaker, in which the contraries of these are, they all take from the same column, from the stronger one the stronger [elements] of their own opposition, and from the weaker one the weaker elements, even if some assume the more general and con-

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taining oppositions, while others [assume] more particular and contained ones. For excess and defect contain great and small and the latter contain rare and dense and these last hot and cold. They are analogous: as excess stands to defect, so great to small and rare to dense and hot to cold. And it is clear that those who posit the prior and more comprehensive as principles speak better, while those who [posit] the contained and more immediate worse; for even though these are principles of others, they also are from principles. Those who posit the intelligible and more general and comprehensive speak of what is better known according to reason (188b32), while those who posit the perceptible and more particular and the contained speak of what is better known to sense (188b32-3), because the universal is to be grasped by reason, but the particular by sense perception. How is it that he says (189a8-9) that the great and small are general principles and according to reason, but the rare and dense of the things that are particular and according to sense? For each of these is also both general and particular. Perhaps because the rare and dense are more physical and material, just as the hot and the cold are more perceptible and because of that also particulars, but the great and small more immaterial because they are also observed in incorporeal things and therefore more universal and more known by reason.

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189a11-14 The next thing should be to say whether they [sc. the principles] are two or three or more. [For they cannot be one, because contraries are not one [thing], nor infinite [in number], because being will not be knowable, and [because] there is a single contrariety46 in any one genus and substance is one particular47 genus }48] Having set himself the task of discovering the number and identity of the principles of physical49 things50 and having set out opinions on the subject,51 which are various, he detected a single common feature of those [opinions], the inclusion of the contraries among the principles.52 Therefore, taking this general agreement as evidence (eis pistin), [and] in addition establishing it by demonstrative arguments of his own,53 he first shows what the principles are: that they are [in fact] the contraries.54 And concurrently with this it is also shown how many principles there are: that those that are contrary [to one another] are two,55 and that which underlies the contraries one (which he will add later).56 This, then, is why he has first shown what the principles are and then added their number.57 To begin with (teôs), from its having been demonstrated that the contraries are principles, he concludes once more58 that it is not possible for there to be either [just] one principle or an infinite number. That there is not [just] one he argues (sullogizesthai)59 as follows: If there is [just] one, it is not contraries. The principles are contrary [to one another].60 Therefore if there is [just] one, it is not a principle. That the principles are [indeed] contrary [to one another] has [already] been shown;61 that what is one (to hen) is not contraries he now shows by conversion: If the contraries are not one [thing], what is one [thing] is not contraries; for if a contrary is contrary to a contrary, the contraries62 would not be in one [thing]. He shows that the principles are also not infinite in number using the same argument as previously:63 If the principles are infinite in number, they themselves will be unknowable on account of being infinite in number and the things [that derive] from them will be unknowable because ‘we think that we know a thing when we have discovered its first causes and first principles and [have traced it] back to its elements’. He also employs a second argument for the principles not being

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infinite in number as follows: Substance is a single genus. In every single genus there is a single contrariety. Therefore there is a single contrariety in substance. A contrariety is between two things, the contraries. Therefore substance has two principles in its sphere (peri autên), [namely,] the contraries. Therefore the principles, since they are contrary [to one another], are not infinite in number. In relation to this last [argument] one should first ask what ‘one substance’ is and what the word ‘genus’ means here and what the single contrariety that is observed in the sphere of (peri) the genus of substance is and why it is that, having set himself the task of discovering the principles of all physical things in common, he has focussed on (paralambanein) just substance and the contrariety associated with it. For how will the contrariety associated with substance be applicable to the genera in (kata) the other categories?64 Alexander takes substance to be the enmattered form, or, rather, the composite of matter and form, which is one genus65 of substance, there being three [such genera]: matter, form and the composite. And indeed it is only in it that contrariety is observed in association with substance. For it is not the case [that it is found] in substance as a whole (pas) while in all the other categories that have contrariety there are many contrarieties. In fact in each of the genera that come under quality there is also a single contrariety, as for instance, in colour, which is a single genus, [that of] black and white, in disposition, [that of] virtue and vice, in flavour, [that of] sweet and sour, and similarly with the other [genera]. And in the same way, in the one genus of substance, the one involving (kata) enmattered and generated form, there is a single contrariety, that of form and privation.66, 67 He [sc. Alexander] says that the ‘one genus’ in question (ekeinos) is one whose division is into species and no longer into genera.68 And enmattered form too is divided into the differentiae of the species, all of them as species. And qua generated it has a single contrariety, that of form and privation. And if there is a single contrariety in ‘any one genus’ and [if] physical substance in [the realm of] generation and perishing is a single genus, there would also be a single natural contrariety in it, which would be the principle of generated substances. And when a thing has a single contrariety, and that [contrariety] is itself a principle, the principles of natural and generated (en genesei) things that belong to it would not be infinite in number.69 But if by ‘one genus’ he means enmattered substance, first, he himself said70 that there is no contrariety in substance and, second, if we were seeking the principles of substantial change alone, we should make only the contrariety in substance a principle, while if [we were seeking those] of [change] in quality and the other categories as well, it would be necessary to assume another, common, contrariety. Well, on the question of there being nothing contrary to substance, one must say that he was denying one [kind of] contrariety there, one

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10 where both [contraries] would be species,71 and proposing another [kind] here, one involving form and privation. And we know that privation is not thought to be anything that has being, since it is a kind of absence of being. So it is correct to say both that nothing is contrary to substance and that there is a single opposition (antithesis) in substance. With regard to the second [point] our master Ammonius said that ‘we 15 are seeking the principles of the existence (hupostasis) of the substances in which the other categories also have their being, as Alexander also noted when commenting on [the words] “moreover, it is impossible for there to be more than one primary contrariety, for substance is a single genus of being”.’72 For, just as being is primarily in substance and comes to the other genera secondarily from it in the manner of [other] 20 things that are [derived] from one [thing] and [relative] to one [thing],73 so too will the contrarieties in the other genera have their being from that in substance. Therefore it will be fitting to speak of form and privation firstly with reference to the contrariety in substance but in the second instance also with reference to the changes in the other categories. After all, in them too there is on the one hand form and on the other privation. 25 ‘The [words] “in any one genus” will not refer to the genus which is proximately divided into species. For the contrariety in this genus will not be primary, since it [sc. the genus] is not primary either, and the principal74 contrariety should be prior to the other contrarieties.’75 The great Syrianus, however, says: ‘Perhaps by genus he means the 30 category and [says] that it has a single contrariety because, although there are many [contrarieties], they are all reduced to one, excess and defect,76 which is understood in the appropriate way (oikeiôs) in each category. “Excess” is always the superior contrary, “defect” the inferior. So excess is one thing in quantity, another in quality, another in place 35 or posture, “for”, says Porphyry, “there are as many [kinds of] excess and defect as there are kinds of being”.’ ‘But’, he [sc. Syrianus] says, ‘one 193,1 might perhaps add “if every category admits of such an opposition”.’ Ammonius said that it is not a genus in the strict sense, whether the proximate or the highest, that is in question here (for contrariety on the part of (kata) the differentiae of neither77 of these produces generation 5 and perishing), but as, he says, Alexander also noted towards the end of his explanation of the present passage, he is here calling the single substratum78 a single genus. (It was in fact his habit to also call the nature underlying anything a genus.) So, just as a single contrariety, that of even and odd, is observed in79 number, and the [contrariety] of sweet and sour in flavour, and that of smooth and rough in surface, so 10 too is a single contrariety, that of form and formless (which [Aristotle] calls privation), observed in substance. So, just as number is different from odd and even in definition (for neither one of them80 is included in the definition of number), but in actuality it is always one or the other of them,81 and [just as] surface stands in relation to even and uneven,

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so does the nature which underlies substance stand in relation to form and formless.82 On these issues, in response to the [comments] of the most philosophic Syrianus one must say that if he understands excess and defect in the strict sense, the contrariety would belong to quantity alone; it is [only] present in the other categories because of quantity. And if, on the other hand, he is taking it in the sense of superior and inferior, how does he explain83 ‘if every category admits of it’?84 After all, there are certainly also differentiae in each [category] and in differentiae one is superior, the other inferior. And in response to our master, who also cites Alexander in his support, first, how will the contrariety of substance85 also be present in the other categories when each should have its own contrariety just as it has its own genus? If the others [derive] their being and their genus and their contrariety from substance, there would be [just] one primary genus, substance, and the primary [genera] would no longer be ten. In fact, not even being [comes to be] present in the other categories from substance, but is present in substance first and after it in the others, just as order [does] not [travel] from the first to the second but to all [members of a series] from the shared order. And how by ‘one genus’ could he mean the substratum, or matter, in this passage when he has not yet shown (as he will soon86) that there must be some third principle which underlies the contraries? Well, it is clear from what follows87 that the contrariety he intends to assume is that of form and privation. And that exists not only in substance but in every category that allows of change. Whiteness, for example, is sometimes present in a substratum, sometimes absent, and when it is present, the form of whiteness is said to be present in it, and when it is absent, privation is. And likewise for the other categories. So perhaps when he says ‘substance is one particular genus’ he is not on this occasion talking about the substance that is opposed to the other categories but about the whole being (huparxis) of that physical reality (hupostasis) which is subject to change, [and] which is our current topic and the principles of which we are seeking.88 The contrariety of form and privation is observed to be present throughout this on account of [the presence of] change. [First], having assumed that such physical, generated and enmattered being (huparxis) is, as it were, one particular genus (just as he would also say that there is one particular genus of intelligible, ungenerated, completely matterless existence (hupostasis)), he shows that the highest contrariety in such substance must be single; then, further assuming that ‘in any one genus’ the highest contrariety is single, he concluded that in this genus, the one we are currently discussing, or that of physical substance, the principal contrariety of the genus is89 also single, and on that account the principles will not be infinite in number. It should not surprise us that the word ‘substance’ is being used with

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general application (koinôs). Similarly, here [in the Physics], when he is 15 talking precisely, he will describe90 generation and perishing as a change with respect to substance, but he often also uses them in relation to quality, saying [for example] that white comes to be out of black and that black perishes into white;91 and yet in the process of black becoming white no change with respect to substance takes place but [only one] with respect to quality. That ‘in any one genus’ the first contrariety is single is clear from the 20 following. The genus indicates a commonality of nature. The commonality is either from above, and so is the cause of the differentiae, as [in the case of] substance and the other92 categories, or from below so as to receive them.93 And if it is [their] cause, it is clear that, within the range of the generation of the differentiae, it will produce two extremes that are furthest removed from one another, in other words [a pair of] contraries; and if it is a substratum, it is certainly the case that, among 25 the things that are changing in it, it will have no more than two that are, while connected,94 furthest removed from one another. This is also evident among the things themselves: in quality there is a single highest95 contrariety, like and unlike, and in quantity [there is] equal and unequal, and in the same way in substance in the general sense (koinos) there is form and privation. ‘Substance’, then, should be understood either in this way or else with reference to the substantial96 [element] (to ousiôdes) everywhere. (We 30 do, after all, say that colour and compressiveness (to sunkritikon)97 belong substantially98 (ousiôdôs) to black.)99 In this way there is in every category its own substantial element with respect to which ‘black’ or ‘three cubits long’ or ‘on the right’100 are said to come to be or perish; and yet the substance which underlies these is not said to come to be or perish when they come to be or perish but [only] to alter. So the 35 substance now in question is that in which generation and perishing [take place], [and] in which [are included] both substance in the strict 195,1 sense,101 [the kind] that is said to exist in its own right, and the existence of the accidents of such substance.102 For this103 too partakes of generation and perishing. Which kind of substance, then, is it that Alexander takes104 to be the kind involving (kata)105 enmattered form in this passage (entautha)? If it is substance in the strict sense, the kind that is opposed to the other 5 categories, the argument is defective, but if it is the kind that is said of all generated forms in common, all would be well. It seems to me that what Eudemus106 of Rhodes says also tends towards this view, albeit that too107 is obscurely expressed. It goes like this: ‘If there is a contrariety, there will be at least two things. And once it is established that the primary contraries are two [in number], 10 neither of them can be a substance, since substance is not a contrary, if indeed the physicist does not investigate everything108 – which is why he does not enumerate all the things that exist or assume common

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principles of all things but [only] of substances, and of those [only] of the corporeal ones as though [they were]109 “one particular genus”. Not just anything comes to be from just anything, but from something of the same genus, such as colour from colour, flavour from flavour, and likewise in other cases; and nor would substance come to be except from 15 substances or body except from bodies.’ In the above the [words] ‘as though [they were] one particular genus’ and ‘not just anything comes to be from just anything, but something of the same genus, such as colour from colour’, indicate that ‘substance’ is not being understood in the sense of the primary substance of the ten genera [sc. categories]. For that is not ‘as though’ a genus but really a genus. So [the substance] in question would be that which also embraces the accidents.110 189a14-17 } and because it is possible [to produce everything] out of a finite number [of principles] [and [doing so] out of a finite number, like Empedocles, is better than [doing so] out of an infinite number, for Empedocles thinks he can explain111] everything that112 Anaxagoras does with (ek) an infinite number. He provides this third argument in proof of the principles being not infinite but finite in number: Other things being equal, it is better for principles to be finite rather than infinite in number. But other things are equal. Therefore a finite number is better. The hypothetical premiss is evident from what was shown earlier. For if infinite principles are unknowable themselves and also render the things that flow from them unknowable, it is evident that a finite number is better, especially if other things are equal as far as assigning (apodoseis) causes goes. And that the causes of things coming to be [can be] assigned (apodidonai) even when they [sc. the principles] are finite in number is evident from the fact that Empedocles, even though he states that the elements are finite in number, ‘thinks that he can explain everything Anaxagoras can with an infinite number’. The above argument has another useful feature. In reply to those who would say that, while what is infinite is unknowable, it is not possible to give the causes of things coming to be on any other hypothesis,113 notwithstanding that things that come to be must come to be out of being and [only] seem to do so out of non-being;114 so even though the finite is more easily grasped, one must not on that account brush aside the truth and say something different; after all, we can’t make ourselves the creators of things that occur naturally but [only] observe them as they are – in reply, then, [as I was saying,]115 to those who say this, he cites the case of Empedocles, who says that the principles are finite in number but can explain everything that those who say they are infinite in number can.

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Translation 189a17-20 Further, some [pairs of] contraries, are prior to others, [and some, such as sweet and sour and white and black, derive from others116,] but principles must always remain.117

Alexander says that this is advanced as the second reason for its being necessary to posit a single contrariety among the principles and not an infinite number. In so far as it shows that the principle is a single contrariety it would [indeed] be the second argument, but in so far as it shows that the principles are not infinite, it is the fourth.118 The first was the one that stated that it is not possible for them to be infinite in number ‘because being will not be knowable’,119 the second was ‘there is a single contrariety in any one genus’, the third ‘that it is possible [to produce everything] from a finite number [of principles]’. When added to these, this is the fourth, and it also resolves an objection which asks: even if the contraries are principles, what prevents the contraries from being infinite in number, with many oppositions being produced? It resolves [it] by showing that all the contraries are reduced to a single opposition, the highest one.120 And at the same time it also shows that not only are the contraries not infinite in number, but the highest and principal (arkhikôtatos) ones are not more than two in number. For even though there are many contraries, ‘some [pairs of] contraries are always121 prior to others’, and some embrace [others] and some are embraced,122 and the secondary ones stem from the prior and the ones that are embraced from the ones that embrace [them]. And it is evident that these very first and embracing [contraries] will be principles; for the principles must be both primary and shared in by all things. And that the contraries are such that some embrace and others are embraced and ‘some are prior to others’ and ‘some arise from others’123 he both told [us] earlier when he said124 ‘for they take [them] from the same list125; some of the contraries embrace [others] and some are embraced’ (those that embrace [others] are prior and causes126), and has also indicated here by [his] examples, since ‘sweet and sour and white and black’ derive from earth and fire and they from hot and cold, just as some have referred these [sc. hot and cold] back to rarefaction and condensation, and them [in turn] to combination and separation.127 And Democritus too, having started from the assumption that the atoms are infinite in number, derives (gennan) their qualitative differences from their contrarieties in respect of position, shape and order128 on the assumption that these are prior to [their qualities]. After all, it is [the contrarieties] that are shared in by all things that one must take as principles. If I say that the principles are white and black, there will be principles of coloured things but no longer of colourless things such as hard and soft or sweet and sour; and sweet and sour would not be principles of things without flavour. Combination and separation, on the other hand, are shared in by all physical things, [as are] limit and unlimited and same and other, and the most widely shared of all, and

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shared in qua physical, is form and privation.129 For this reason it is better to refer the many [contrarieties] back to a single contrariety. Empedocles, at any rate, although positing two [contrarieties] in the elements, [those] of hot and cold and dry and moist, made the two culminate in a single one, that of strife and love – just as he makes it [sc. the contrariety of strife and love] culminate in a monad, that of necessity. But it [sc. necessity] [is present] as one [entity] and strife and love as two, and not just as productive [causes] but as elemental [principles] too,130 like combination and separation, to which they are equivalent.131 If, then, some contraries clearly derive from others, not all contraries will be principles. After all, the principles are primary things, and primary things [do] not [derive] from other things or from one another. So if all things are referred to a single contrariety – whether it be combination and separation or what exceeds and what is exceeded or form and privation (different people have taken different views of the primary contrariety) – it would, being a single principle, be the primary contrariety.132 But how is it that, after saying that the contraries are principles of the things that come to be and perish, he added ‘but principles must always remain’?133 Alexander for his part says that the principles are everlasting. For if they were to come to be, and if everything that comes to be perishes, the principles would perish, and consequently so too would the things that derive from the principles. And in that case generation will at some point fail, because there will be nothing from which anything can come to be. And if this is ridiculous, the principles must exist forever. He then adds Plato’s argument (apodeixis) about principles: if they were to come to be, [says Plato,] they would come to be from principles, and if that were the case, they would not be principles themselves.134 ‘Principles’, he says, ‘are, as will be shown, of two kinds. Some are pre-existent and ungenerated and numerically135 everlasting, like the creative agency (to poioun) and matter. The others are those in accordance with which generation and perishing [occur]. These are the contraries that are neither ungenerated nor numerically everlasting.’ ‘Also’, he says, ‘there are many principles, but not all of them are everlasting, only the principal ones; the proximate136 ones are perishable.137 So not every principle is everlasting. Also, some contraries are universal, some particular. The particular ones, which come to be, also perish. The universal contraries, on the other hand, under which all the other contraries [fall], and which are most generically privation and form, do not perish, for universal things are imperishable.’138 Given that this (and word for word) is what Alexander said, it would be worth asking both him and Aristotle, how is it that, given that he is assuming the proximate and elemental principles but not the productive and transcendental ones, and given that he states that contraries arise from contraries and perish into contraries, given [as I say] that he

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is positing such principles, he nevertheless says that the principles are everlasting? And yet Alexander himself says that the [factors] owing to which generation and perishing [occur], in other words the contraries, are neither ungenerated nor numerically139 everlasting! And it is clear that Aristotle was talking about principles qua contraries when he added ‘but principles must always remain’. And so even if, as he140 states, the principal (arkhikôtatos) principles are everlasting and the proximate ones perishable, there would be contrary ones among the proximate ones. And how is it that when he141 stated that the universal contraries are everlasting and the particular ones perishable,142 he did not notice that this does not only apply to universal form and privation143 but to universal white and to universal black as well, so that they too will be principles? And anyway, what does stating that the principles are everlasting contribute to proving that the principal contrariety is single? If they are everlasting they are not ipso facto two. So perhaps this too is better [understood] as our master maintains144 when he says that the [words] ‘must always remain’ do not signify everlastingness (to aïdion) or indicate that the principles under discussion are ungenerated and imperishable. For [otherwise] how will generation and perishing still occur in accordance with their changing? (Which is what is being investigated here.) Rather, [the phrase] ‘must always remain’ is included (eirêtai) because in the case of each thing that comes to be and perishes either a form or a privation, or, rather, both a form and a privation, must in every instance be found in the thing that is changing. For everything has both a form and also a privation, which is the absence of that form to which it naturally changes. A white body has the form white and the privation of black, to which it naturally changes. And this145 would be characteristic of a truly principal contrariety. And for this reason Aristotle added it146 as an explanation of why the other contrarieties are not principles if, as is the case, they do not extend through all things. For you will not find any of the more partial oppositions extending to all physical things. Not all physical things are black or white, for example, or sweet or sour, yet there is form in all of them. However, in the case of everlasting things this is all there is, while in the case of generated and perishable things along with the form there is also privation, not privation of the form itself but privation of the opposed form to which [that form] naturally changes. So the principal opposition is said to always remain even though the other oppositions do not remain, in the way that one might also say that prime (prôtistos) matter remains forever, being seen in all enmattered things, even though wood or bronze or [other] particular matters are not the same in all of them. And perhaps ‘always’ signifies not only the entirety (pantotês) of time but that of things as well, and so is used here of [being] everywhere.

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189a21-7 And since they are finite [in number], there is an argument for not making them just two. [One would have to ask how density could be of a nature to make rarity into anything, or it density. And the same goes for any other contrariety. Love does not gather up strife and make something out of it and nor does strife make something out of [love] but both of them [act on] some other third thing. And some people assume still more [such things]] out of which they construct the nature of things. Having shown that the primary contraries, which, since they are primary contraries, are two in number, are the principles of physical things, he next wants to introduce yet a third principle, the substratum for the contraries, namely matter. And in introducing it he shows by a number of arguments that the contraries do not adequately meet (mê autarkês eis) the definition of a principle, or, rather, would not be principles at all taken on their own. The first argument shows that the contraries are not principles taken on their own. Its implicit (dunamei) form is this: The principles, if they are indeed principles, produce something; the contraries, if on their own, produce nothing; therefore the contraries are not principles. That the contraries on their own do produce nothing is clear from the fact that a thing which acts, acts on something that sustains (hupomenein) the effect, as when black acts on body, but the contraries, if on their own, act on nothing. The contraries do not face up to (hupomenein) one another and white does nothing to black or love to strife. It is not strife that love collects together but the underlying elements. A thing that acts, acts on something that holds its ground (hupomenein), but one contrary does not face up to another. If that were the case, strife that holds its ground (menein)147 will be love. Rather, each of them is active around the substratum and in the measure that one of them gains control of the substratum, the other withdraws.148 To lend credence (pros pistin)149 to [the view that] the contraries also need some third [factor], he has cited the fact that some people do not provide just a single substratum for the contraries but a number. Democritus, for instance, makes [his] infinite atoms the substratum for the contraries in his system (kat’ auton), those involving (kata) shape and position and order, and Empedocles makes the four elements the substratum for strife and love. 189a27-32 In addition, one might raise this further difficulty [if another nature is not posited to underlie the contraries. For150 we do not see the contraries [constituting] the substance of anything, and a principle should not be said of some underlying thing.151 For [then] there will be a principle of a principle]; for that which underlies is a principle and is thought to be prior to that which is predicated [of it].

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Alexander divided this text into two arguments. One, [contained in the words] ‘if another nature is not posited to underlie the contraries’, runs like this: The contraries do not underlie anything; the principles do underlie [things]; therefore the contraries are not principles. The second is as follows: The principles are not [said] of an underlying thing; the contraries are [said] of an underlying thing; therefore the contraries are not principles. But perhaps the [words] ‘one might raise this further difficulty if another nature is not posited to underlie the contraries’ are not an argument (apodeixis) but the preliminary (problêma) [to one] and he adds the difficulty one could raise for those who do not posit another nature in what follows – and accordingly he has added ‘for’ [to the phrase]152 ‘for we do not see the contraries [constituting] the substance of anything’ because this is the reason for raising a difficulty for those who do not posit another nature underlying the contraries. The syllogism, I believe, goes like this: The contraries are in an underlying thing and [are] accidents; the principles are not accidents; therefore the contraries are not principles. He has taken [the premiss] that the contraries are accidents from the statement that ‘the contraries are not seen153 [to constitute] the substance of anything’; and if they are not substance, it is clear that they are accident. This is clear from the contraries not existing separately but having their existence in an underlying thing. After all, contraries are kinds of differentiae, and differentiae are differentiae of something. This is why he says ‘we do not see the contraries [constituting] the substance of anything’, on the basis that they certainly have to be ‘of’’154 something else, whatever that may be. That the principle is not [said] of an underlying thing, that is, not in an underlying thing and not an accident,155 he shows as follows: That which is [said] of an underlying thing has the underlying thing as a principle; the principle does not have a principle; therefore the principle is not [said] of an underlying thing. For if it is [said] of an underlying thing, there will be a principle of a principle; but there is no principle of a principle; nor, therefore, is that which is [said] of an underlying thing a principle. He proves the hypothetical premiss as follows: The underlying thing pre-exists that which is [said] of the underlying thing; that which pre-exists is a principle; therefore the underlying thing is a principle of that which is [said] of the underlying thing. 189a32-4 Also, we do not say that substance is contrary to substance. So how could a substance consist of non-substances? Or how could a non-substance be prior to a substance? It seems to me that he brings together three or four arguments in this passage, the first of which, which is a premiss, as it were, for what he proves in the sequel, shows that the contraries are not substances, while the two that follow prove that the contraries are not principles.

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The first goes like this: Substance does not have a contrary; a contrary has a contrary; therefore a contrary is not a substance. The second, assuming (as an affirmation by transposition156) that the contraries are not-substance (ouk ousia), and further assuming that not-substance (mê ousia) is not a cause of substance, concludes that the contraries are not causes of substance; and things that are not causes of substance would not be principles of physical substances. The third is as follows: The contraries are not prior to substance; the principles of substance are prior to substance; therefore the contraries are not principles of substance. That the contraries are not prior to substance he shows as follows: The contraries are not substance; non-substance has its existence thanks to substance and in substance; that which has its existence thanks to substance and in substance is not prior to substance. But what is the substance that he denies of the contraries? Alexander says that with [the words] ‘we do not say that substance is contrary to substance’ one should understand [the qualification] ‘qua substratum’,157 because privation is thought to be contrary to form, which is a substance – ‘unless perhaps’, he says, ‘it is more in everyday speech (koinoteron) that privation is said to be a contrary’. But I would be surprised if we were meant to construe substance as matter158 here. Matter in itself is neither a principle nor substance in the strict sense, but, if at all, at the third remove. Substance in the strict sense is the composite of matter and form, in a secondary sense, form, in a tertiary, matter. And I believe that by the same arguments one could have shown that matter in itself would not be a principle either, because it is not in itself substance and substance could not come from non-substance. And just what is meant by ‘how could a substance consist of non-substances?’ is, it seems to me, itself worthy of investigation. In fact, the elements of a substance should not be substances either. If elements pre-exist159 the thing that is composed of [those] elements, and the elements of substance were [themselves] to be substance, there would be substance before substance came to be. And, speaking generally, the elements are in no case identical to what is produced from the elements. For instance, the elements of a human being are not human beings or those of flesh flesh. Perhaps, then, matter and form, or the opposition,160 being elements of substance in the strict sense (which is composite substance), are neither of them substance on its own, but only substantial, and neither of them bodies, but only corporeal (as Eudemus161 also indicates when he refers to matter as ‘body-like’ (sômatoeidês)), and it is after coming together that they are substance and productive of substance. For this reason neither one of them on its own is substance or productive of substance. However, to the extent that matter can exist on its own, which is a property of substance, whereas the opposition invariably has its existence in something else and exists in a substra-

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tum, and on that account is further from substance, matter seems somewhat closer to meeting the definition of a substance than does the contrariety. And for this reason it was from the fact that the contraries exist in a substratum that he showed162 that they are not principles, saying that the substratum is more a principle because it pre-exists what is predicated of it. But it seems to me that the argument is still to discover the intention of the present passage. That he still wants to show by it that the contrariety does not adequately meet the definition of a principle is obvious. However, I think that it has not yet become clear from what he has said what the substance whose principles he is seeking is or how he is constructing (methodeuein) the argument. So perhaps, in seeking the elements of the composite substance, which he will tell us in what follows is substance in the strict sense,163 he is saying that the opposition of form and privation does not suffice, because, although form is in a sense substance, its contrary, privation, is in no wise substance, since substance is not contrary to substance. Accordingly, there is need of something else that will underlie [them] and thereby, along with form, create the composite; privation will not be involved but will contribute to generation and perishing. This does not show that the contraries are not in some sense principles, but that they are not principles on their own, and he shows exactly this in what follows when he says164 that the only way in which what was said earlier and what is being said now can both be true is if, in addition to the contraries, some third [entity] that underlies the contraries is hypothesised. He calls the statements he describes as such ‘difficulties’ because they stand in need of further qualification explaining that [the contraries] are not principles on their own but become principles when combined with a third [entity]. 189a34 And so if the previous argument and this one are thought to be valid, it is necessary, if both of them are to be preserved, to posit some third thing.

He has shown previously that the contraries are principles of natural things (ta phusika): this is because what comes to be does not come to be from anything random but from a contrary, and it passes away not 25 into anything random but into a contrary. Next, he introduces further arguments which leave this matter problematic and seem to show the contrary, that the contraries are not principles; his arguments show this moreover through deductive accuracy rather than by being just clever. Now he finds a way in which both the previous arguments and the subsequent ones, though they seem to contradict each other, will come 30 to the same thing. This he does by maintaining that the contraries are principles (this has been validly proved previously), but not however when taken on their own (since the arguments which deny it are also

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valid), but when accompanied by some other third thing underlying the contraries. Again he finds that the natural philosophers agree with his argument, those [philosophers] that is who posit for the contraries a single nature, and because of it maintained that the universe was a single thing, and generate everything from this – water for Thales, fire for Heraclitus, air for Anaximenes, and that which is intermediate for Diogenes. For all of these posited this single nature for the contraries, saying that other things came to be from it through combination and separation or rarefaction and condensation. He is more complimentary to those who speak of what is intermediate and adds his reason. The four elements are already involved with contrarieties: fire is hot and dry, air is warm and wet, water cold and wet, earth cold and dry. All of them are involved with contrariety, for all derive from matter and form. But that which is going to receive the contraries, and along with them is going to produce the genesis and the passing away of the things which are, must, in its own nature, be without a share in the contraries. For should it possess one of the contraries in its substance, either it will not change in itself and nothing will be from it or pass away (if its being is in one or the other of the contraries), or it will possess all the contraries together. In short, if it is involved with a contrary, it will no longer be simple but compound, for the contraries are in a substratum, so it will not even be a principle. Principles are the things from which a particular thing (touto) stems; they are not the thing itself. But if someone really wants to make one of the elements the principle, it is better to speak of air, because compared to the others air seems to have differences which are imperceptible: it will seem to be posited as something without qualities and as something having no contrariety within it per se. Of the other elements, water is more naturally able to turn into the contraries, as it easily gets warm or cold – and in particular turns into solid ice so that it seems not even to have wetness in its substance. Fire, however, has obvious contrarieties – I mean heat and dryness, and particularly heat – and fire when it stays constant (menon)165 does not naturally receive the contraries. The reason for this is its particularly active nature (to drastikon mallon) and because it is analogous to form rather than to matter.

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189b8 But all of them give shape to this one thing by means of the contraries. Introducing the one thing both through the necessary thrust of his argument and on the evidence of the other natural philosophers, he shows that not even this is self-sufficient per se, saying that not even 30 they posited the one thing on its own, but the contraries along with it, since he wants to establish the three principles as principles among them too. And he says that even they give shape to the one thing by means of the contraries; they explain the differences in the things that

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come to be in terms of the differences of the contraries, some [sc. of the philosophers] by means of rarefaction and condensation, and others by means of more and less. And those who generate other things by means of rarefaction and condensation create them by intensifying or relaxing the quality which they have. For rarefaction is relaxation, and condensation is intensification; of these, intensification comes under ‘more’ and relaxation under ‘less’, and everything is reduced to excess and defect. ‘And it seems,’ he says, that there being three principles is not an innovation of my own ‘but that this doctrine, that oneness and excess and defect are the principles of things which are, is an ancient one’ (189b11-13). Even though everyone did not use the same words, excess and defect, but some spoke of combination and separation, others of rarefaction and condensation, or the more and the less, or the great and the small, nevertheless all of these are reducible to excess and defect. And in this way at least all those who say that the principles are three are in harmony with each other. They differ in this way. The more ancient thinkers say that the two things, which are in fact the contraries, are active, whereas the one thing is passive and material, whereas some of the later thinkers say that the one is active and the two, the contraries, are passive and material. Plato seems to mean this when he makes that which acts one and calls that which is acted upon, or matter, excess and defect, and great and small, thereby too speaking of it as two things. It is clear that if he was speaking of the active cause in a strict sense as one, then this was not an element. If the form is one and matter is two, signifying things by numbers, in the Pythagorean way, then he reasonably spoke of form as one thing, since it defines and limits whatever it takes hold of, and matter as two, since it is indefinite and the cause of mass (onkos) and division and is naturally disposed towards the opposites (ta antikeimena). It must soon be noticed that even Aristotle himself reduces privation and matter to the same thing, when he says ‘the substratum is numerically one, but two in terms of form’ (190b23-4). Obviously, he too will say that the substratum is two, whereas form is one. 189b16-23 [On consideration of these and other similar arguments,] to say that the elements are three [would seem to be reasonable enough, as we have said, but to say that there are more than three seems no longer plausible. Just the one is sufficient for being acted upon, and if there are four and are two contrarieties, for each of these separately there will need to be another intermediate nature. But if they are two and can generate from each other,] one of the two contrarieties would be redundant. He has shown quite tactfully (philanthrôpôs),166 not only by means of the demonstrative force [of his arguments] but also by means of the agreement of the other philosophers, that the elemental principles of natural

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things – which he167 has not simply called principles but more precisely, for the sake of greater accuracy, elements – must be three, and he has shown before that the elements must be no more than three. For since it is necessary that there should be one substratum and two contraries distinct from the substratum (since that which is contrary does not act on that which is contrary but on the substratum which is common to them, nor does just anything come to be from just anything), if someone really wants to multiply the principles, he will add either another substratum or else another contrariety. But it is impossible to add a second substratum. For if the same nature is going to be receptive of the same things – a nature which has come to have independent existence (huphestêke) precisely to be a receptacle – the substratum will be unique and one; and if they do differ from each other, then the differences too will be forms. And they will no longer be substrata, but compound and involved with contrariety, for differences exist in contrast to each other. In short, he wants the substratum to be quite simple since it accepts change in itself. He adds also that just as the principle which produced the primary contraries was one, so also the principle which receives the lowest contraries will be one. For that which produces the primary contraries, being [ontologically] superior to them, and on that account reaching further with its generations after the bringing into being (hupostasis) of the lowest contraries, generates a single nature, an image which imitates it in a dissimilar way.168 For just as the former embraces the contraries causally, so the latter is naturally inclined towards both [of them]; and as the former is generative of the contraries, so the latter is receptive of them.169 Accordingly, the substratum must be one, being naturally suited (hikanon) to being acted upon. If someone were to suggest two contrarieties, making four contraries, either he will also posit two substrata, one for each of the contrarieties, and in this way too the substratum will no longer be one, which has in fact been shown previously [to be the case].170 And yet, either (a) any one of the two contrarieties can generate everything from either one of the substrata, and the other contrariety will be redundant (for thus there will be one contrariety); or (b) each will produce things which are separate (idia) and distinct, and the same principles will no longer be the principles of everything. And if, positing one substratum with the two contrarieties, he should claim that they can generate the things that are from the one substratrum, again either (a) each contrariety will generate different things, or (b) they will both produce the same things, and thus once again the same paradoxes will result. For if (a) they each generate different things, even if they generate them from the same substratum, the substratum will be the common principle of all things, whereas the contrarieties will no longer be common [to all things]. And if (b) they generate everything from each other, once again one of the two will be redundant, for there will be a single contrariety. If even more than two contrarieties are posited, the same paradoxical conclusions will follow,

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but to a greater extent. Aristotle has set down some of these sections of the division (diairesis) and the paradoxes which follow from them, but 30 some he has omitted, as being obvious. For example, he has set down as paradoxical that those who posit two contrarieties should also speak of two substrata on the grounds that it has already been assumed that one is sufficient for being acted on. In reply to the suggestion that the two contrarieties generate the same things, he introduces a paradox which applies across the board, whether there are one or two substrata – that 206,1 one of the two contrarieties will be redundant, and that both will be one, and that they generate the same things. The suggestion that each of the contrarieties separately (khôris) generates separate (idia) things, he does not deem worthy of mention when discussing common principles. However, Porphyry understands the phrase ‘generating from each other’ as though one of the contrarieties generates the other – for 5 example if someone were to say that loose, and dense and hot and cold are primary, and then said that what is hot comes from what is loose, and what is cold comes from what is dense because the contrariety of loose and dense will be sufficient. And if he said that they ‘were generated’ from each other, the interpretation would have some consistency. As it is he said ‘they generate from each other’.

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189b22 Moreover, it is impossible for there to be multiple primary contrarieties.

He has shown that, should someone posit for himself two primary contrarieties, either he will posit also two matters, or if there is one matter, the second of the contrarieties will be redundant. He now shows the very thing that he said previously, that it is also impossible for the primary contrarieties to be more than one. His reasoning in the present case is as follows. 15 ‘Substance is one particular genus of being’171 (189b23-4); ‘in a single genus there is a single contrariety’ (189b26). So, in substance there is a single contrariety. But substance is primary among the other genera. The contrariety in the primary genus is primary among the contrarieties in the other genera; accordingly, the contrariety in substance is the primary of the contrarieties in the other genera. And the contrarieties in the other genera would have the same relationship towards the 20 contrariety in substance as the genera themselves have towards substance. Therefore, if they derive their being from substance, their contrarieties will also derive their being from the [primary] contrariety in substance: so they are secondary and dependent on it. So the primary contrariety in substance is single, and is itself a principle,172 since the principles of substance are also the subject of our inquiry. So our 25 argument has quite plausibly reduced all the contrarieties to [the contrariety between] form and privation, since this is what is especially distinctive of substance, and coming to be and passing away is accom-

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plished with respect to this contrariety. If someone should assume more than one contrariety in the principles, he would say that some of the principles were primary and some secondary. Since they thus belong to the same kind, they will differ in that one is prior to another. Indeed, if substance were a common genus, the contrariety of substance would be most generic (genikôtatê). His [Aristotle’s] remark that ‘all contrarieties seem to be reducible to a single contrariety’ (189b26-7) is convincingly based either on the clarity of the facts and173 also on the evidence of the natural philosophers, who all posit that the primary contrariety is one, or on his own teaching, which reduces all the oppositions to form and privation. Indeed, according to him, the principles immediately concerned with coming to be are two contrarieties, heat and cold, dryness and wetness, as he has shown in the second book of the De Generatione (cf. 331aff.). Since these too can be reduced to a single contrariety – the condition of having [these qualities] and the privation of them – therefore the principal contrariety according to him is one. This is how Alexander even now has explained the passage. He understands the comment ‘in a single genus there is always a single contrariety’ to refer to the contrariety immediately concerned with coming to be.174 For white and black is the contrariety immediately concerned with colour rather than with quality. ‘Quality,’ he says, ‘either does not have a contrariety immediately concerned with it, or, if it does have one, white and black will be included under it, and similarly the other contrarieties in quality.’ Porphyry, however, understands matter as substance and speaks of one primary contrariety with regard to it: for, substance is a genus, and in every genus there is one primary contrariety. He says the following: ‘In every genus there is a single primary contrariety. Substance is a genus. Therefore, there is a single contrariety with regard to it also. Matter is substance. Accordingly, there is a single primary contrariety with regard to it too; if there are more than one, they will differ in that one is prior to another, not in genus. “For there is only ever a single contrariety in a single genus.” ’ It is better in my opinion to take the passage in the latter sense,175 rather than to understand it as referring to the general contrariety between substance and the other genera. For to say that the contrarieties in the other genera are dependent on the contrariety of substance, because of the fact that the genera themselves derive their being from substance, seems to me unconvincing. For the other contrarieties are subsumed by the primary contrariety in the sense that the primary contrariety can be predicated of the others. For every excess and lack, sameness and difference, or whatever else might be said to be the primary contrariety [can be predicated of the others] but the other genera are not substances. The fact that they have being in their substance means that they are not substances. It is perhaps better to understand ‘substance’ and ‘one genus’ (189b23-4, cited at 206,14-15) as every created being that is common to the ten genera. For this reason, the contrariety immediately

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concerned with them is common to the ten genera, I mean possession and privation. But it is also possible to understand [‘substance’ and ‘one 30 genus’] as matter, since everything created and enmattered is bound up with it [matter], not however in the sense that matter is properly speaking substance. For neither intelligible nor perceptible substance is matter: the former is completely without matter and the latter – what is properly speaking created substance – is subject to coming to be and passing away. That which comes to be and passes away needs some substratum (hupokeimenou) and matter, as we shall see subsequently. 35 To create a matter for matter is illogical.176 208,1

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189b27 That the number of elements is neither one, nor more than two or three is clear. [But which of these is the case, as we said, is very perplexing. Let me discuss first coming to be in general, for it is natural to consider first what is common to everything, and] subsequently to consider the distinctive features of individual cases. Having shown that there must be a single contrariety in the principles and some substratum for contraries, he concludes that ‘the number of elements is neither one’, since there are contraries and a substratum for the contraries, nor however are they ‘more than two or three’. For the substratum is a single thing and the contraries are not more than two. Whether the principles are two or three (this is the reference of ‘as we said’) deserves investigation. If the contraries are taken as a single principle, there would be two principles, matter and the contraries. If the contraries are taken as two, then the principles are three. It is preferable, because of privation, for the ambiguity to be left, rather than that privation should be apparently the same as matter, or if it is not the same, a principle only accidentally. The question is whether there are two principles, form and matter, or three, if privation is also added, or whether in one sense there are two and in one sense three, which in fact will appear to be the truth. These after all are the subsequent subjects of his discussions. And in this matter there is much difficulty, whether the contraries are principles in a similar way, or whether one is a principle per se and the other is only accidentally a principle. Furthermore, concluding these arguments, he [Aristotle] goes on (190b29): ‘Thus in one sense we have to say that there are two principles, and in another that there are three; and in one sense that they are the contraries and in another sense not.’ Since he proposed to discover the principles of things which come to be starting particularly from change and the process of coming to be; and since, among the things which come to be, those which come to be in respect of an accidental attribute (kata ti tôn sumbebêkotôn) have substance as an obvious substratum, while those which come to be in a substantial sense (kat’ousian) less obviously have the substratum: it was for this reason

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that he initially made the account about genesis in a quite general manner, and, having introduced examples of change in respect of an accidental attribute, he subsequently distinguishes this from coming to be in a substantial sense, and shows the need for the substratum in that case, and how privation relates to it. He made his point rather generally, 25 also because he applied it not only to natural coming to be, but also to that induced by skill; such is the coming to be of the educated man. At the beginning of his work (cf. 184a23ff.), he said that, for us, the consideration of general and unspecific points was prior to the consideration of distinctive points. From what has been said here, it is clear 30 that what were in that passage referred to as universal points (after which he said ‘one should proceed to the particular details’) were the general and unspecific points, which are more knowable to us.

Departures from Diels’ Text 191,3 192,18 193,3

Changing to enantion (after heni) to ta enantia. Changing to auto to tou ontos. Changing hopoterou to oudeterou, as suggested by Diels in the apparatus. 194,12 Changing heni to estin. 194,21 Deleting deka. 194,27 Changing anô to anôtatô. 195,1 Changing ousia to ousiâi. 195,19 Changing de an legoito to oun legoit’ an. 195,20 Changing hôsper to hosaper. 196,7 Punctuating with a dash rather than a full stop after auta. 196,16 Changing hoti mêde epistêton on to hoti ouk epistêton to on estai. 196,30 Adding gar after men. 196,25-35 Punctuating kai hoti men } diakrisin as one sentence. 198,13 Deleting têi.

Bibliography Ackrill, J.L. (tr.), Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford, 1963. Baltussen, H., Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius, London, 2008. Barnes, J., S. Bobzien, K. Flannery and K. Ierodiakonou, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 1.1-7, introduction, translation and notes, London and Ithaca NY, 1990. Bossier, F., ‘Le problème des lemmes du De caelo dans la traduction latine du commentaire In De caelo de Simplicius’, in Les problèmes posés par l’édition critique des textes anciens et médiévaux (ed. H. Jacqueline), Louvain, 1992. Charlton, W., Aristotle, Physics, Books i and ii, translated with introduction and notes, Oxford, 1970. Dillon, J., The Middle Platonists, London, 1996. Golitsis, P., Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d’Aristote, Berlin and New York, 2008. Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, 1962-81, vol. 2. Hankinson, R.J., ‘Philosophy of science’, in J. Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Cambridge, 1995. Hardie, R.P. and R.K. Gaye (trs), ‘Physics’, in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton, 1984, vol. 1. Hope, R. (tr.), Aristotle’s Physics, Lincoln, 1961. Huby, P. and C.C.W. Taylor (trs), Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.3-4, London, 2011. Lampe, G.W.H. (ed.), A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford, 1961. McKirahan, R. (tr.), Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 8.6-10, London and Ithaca NY, 2001. Owen, G.E.L., ‘Logic and metaphysics in some earlier works of Aristotle’, in J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds), Articles on Aristotle: 3. Metaphysics, London, 1979. Ross, W.D., Aristotle’s Physics, a revised text with introduction and commentary, Oxford, 1936. Ross, W.D. (tr.) ‘Metaphysics’, in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton, 1984, vol. 2. Urmson, J.O. (tr.), Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 3, notes by Peter Lautner, London and Ithaca NY, 2002. Wehrli, F., Die Schule des Aristoteles, vol. 8, Eudemus von Rhodos, 2nd edn, Basel; Stuttgart, 1969. Wicksteed, P.H and F.M. Cornford, Aristotle, The Physics, with an English translation, London, 1963, vol. 1.

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Notes to 1.5-6 1. Simplicius is here alluding to a level of agreement which is stretching Aristotle’s comment on this point considerably (see Introduction). See in Phys. 21,14 where the supposed agreement among early Greek philosophers is first mentioned (cf. Rachel Barney and Stephen Menn’s forthcoming translation of in Phys 1.1-2) and pushed further than the text supports. 2. Parmenides famously postulated an approach to the world which divides it into the Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming (see 28B7/8 DK18, and compare 239,9-240,4; cf. 145,1-146,25; 38,30-39,9 with notes in Barney/Menn [previous note]). 3. The next section contains close paraphrases of Aristotle’s text. 4. See 67A6 DK = Arist. Metaph. 1.4, 67A37 = Simpl. in DC 295,1-3; 242,18-20. 5. Translates atomois, literally ‘indivisibles’. The feminine plural form is unusual. 6. When rotated anti-clockwise, capital N (in Greek) becomes Z. Note how the order of the three points changes in the paraphrase (a, c, b) compared to Democritus (a, b, c). 7. The rearrangement (chiastic: Empedocles-Anaxagoras, Anaxagoras-Empedocles) may be Simplicius’, as is clear from the views expressed. 8. For ‘gloom’, Zopheros (181,5), see also Hesiod Th. 814 of Chaos; Chrysippus, SVF 2.140 (LSJ). 9. This is the first mention of Pythagoreans, who in Aristotle do not appear until 203a4. Why here? Perhaps, as Rist thinks (‘The Neoplatonic One and Plato’s Parmenides’, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 93, 1962: 389-401), because Eudorus gives a neo-Pythagorean interpretation. Yet, as Harold Tarrant has pointed out to me, if anything Eudorus should be giving an Academic/Platonic explanation. Did Eudorus introduce the topos of explaining how the Pythagoreans can fit in here in spite of their being (according to him) monists? 10. On Eudorus, a Platonist of the first century BC, see Dillon 1996 (ch. 3.2 and pp. 126-7) and Rist, TAPA 1962: 391-9. Also (with emphasis on this passage): M. Bonazzi, ‘Eudoro di Alessandria alle origini del Platonismo imperiale’, in M. Bonazzi and V. Celluprica (eds), L’ Eredità Platonica. Studi sul Platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo, Milan, 2005, 117-60. My translation of this passage leans heavily on that of Bonazzi, ‘Eudorus of Alexandria and Early Imperial Platonism’, in R. Sorabji and R. Sharples (eds), Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC-200 AD (BICS suppl., 2007,vol. 94.2), 365-77, but is deliberately more literal. 11. This quotation shows how closely Simplicius is paraphrasing, picking up on sustoikhia in Aristotle at 189a1; the details of these ‘coordinated pairs’ are found in Metaph. 986a20-b1.

54

Notes to pages 19-21

12. The One is viewed as distinct (qua singular primary principle) from the One qua the Dyad’s opposite. The origin of this theory is not, as claimed, ancient Pythagoreanism, but goes back to the early Academy, see Bonazzi’s illuminating clarification on the background of Eudorus’ account (2007: 368ff.). See 230,34-231,1, where the first-century AD Neopythagorean Moderatus ascribes to the Pythagoreans the view that the second One is the Platonic Forms. 13. Reading tis with Diels in his app. crit. (‘fortasse schema tis’). 14. The lemma announces that it covers three lines (188a27-30) and the next lemma starts at 188a30. Sometimes a lemma will do more than that: the divisions are often added to the mss later and may create artificial sections (see Bossier 1992: 368-70; cf. Barnes 1990: 8 n. 58). 15. The commentators have a tendency to make Aristotle’s arguments match his theoretical views on formal reasoning (for dialectic see Simpl. in Phys. 47,22; in DC 523,25-7; Alexander in Metaph. 174,3 Hayduck): here the persuasiveness is shored up by clarifying how in fact his approach is both inductive (kata meros, line 10) and deductive (sullogismou, line 11). 16. Aristotle’s use of the phrase in Metaph. 1076a4 (noted by Diels in his app. crit.), couched in a political metaphor, signifies that many principles would be ‘bad management’ of reality (ta onta ou bouletai politeusthai kakôs, cf. Arist. Pol. 1292a13). Note however how the original quotation continues with ‘let there be one head’ (= Iliad 2.204), the partial adjective –koiranos occurs also in Aeschylus Fr. 238. In Simplicius the phrase already occurred at 87,10; 148,20 and will occur again at 250,26; 256,22; 1254,13. 17. It is not clear who the mythical writers are. 18. Perhaps reading kratoumenês. 19. ‘Here’ and ‘there’ make reference to the sensible and intelligible realms respectively. The use of these terms tends to be more frequent when Simplicius discusses the views of Proclus and his teachers Ammonius and Damascius (Corollaries on Time and Place, tr. by J.O. Urmson, London, 1992: 67). Since Ammonius is mentioned in the next section, it is quite possible that Simplicius is already making use of Ammonius’ views and terms here. It is not clear whether access to Eudorus is direct or via Ammonius. 20. Ammonius, son of Hermeias (fifth century AD) taught in Alexandria. Among his surviving works are commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagogê, on the Categories and on the De Interpretatione. The word for ‘teacher’ (kathêgemôn) implies personal and spiritual guidance (cf. Simpl. in DC 462,20). 21. Translates the participle form enon, from enesti; for this meaning, cf. LSJ s.v. 22. Huperokhê and elleipsis may be Ammonius’ terms, see Commentary on Porph. Isagoge 16.13 (both terms); cf. Commentary on Aristotle On Interpretation 41,6; 101,22; 166,10 (second term only). 23. Evidently, Simplicius read the later passage at Aristotle 1.6, 189a17-18 (like our sources EV, but unlike Ross, who reads allêlôn) as saying allôn, and meaning that primary contraries and principles do not come from things other than themselves. By contrast, 183,18 and 31 reveal, Simplicius and his teacher Ammonius read the present passage of Aristotle at 1.5, 188a27-30 as banning contraries coming ex allêllôn (‘from each other’). But, as the Introduction explains, that involves difficulties, since e.g. at 1.7, 190a21-31, Aristotle allows that cultured comes from uncultured. Ammonius wanted to reinterpret the ban on contraries coming from each other in the light of allôn at 189a17-18 as meaning that e.g. primary contraries and principles do not come from some prior pair of contraries, as hot and cold might come from compact and diffuse. Simplicius at 183,32-5, by contrast, takes 188a27-30 to mean only that contrar-

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ies like hot and cold are on the same footing, so one is not a source for the other. This fits with Aristotle’s recognition that cultured can come from uncultured, with the qualification that Ammonius finds inadequate at 183,18-20, that the contrary it comes from does not endure through the transformation, which means, as Simplicius’ sequel goes on to stress, that the contrary they come from facilitates the transformation only by its absence, which is what Aristotle suggests at 1.7, 191a6-7. 24. What follows is clearly intended as a lemma (note the heôs tou in line 13), but it was not separated out typographically in Diels’ text. The quotation in the text is lacking in F and indicates that this is a lemma which has been inserted later; its unusual length seems to support this interpretation (cf. n. 14 above). 25. For Aristotle’s views on ‘chance’, tukhê, see Phys. 2.4-6. 26. This may pick up on lêpteon in Arist. Phys. 188a31-2. Again Simplicius is formalising the argument by distinguishing between general and particular premises and presuppositions (see above n. 15). 27. Cf. Arist. Phys.188b1-6. 28. Refers to a discussion of mythical, non-existing, creatures. 29. See Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200 BC-600 AD: A Sourcebook, vol. 2, Physics, ch. 21 (ii), and vol. 3, Logic, ch. 3 (l), on whether there are degrees between total virtue and total vice, which the Stoics denied, or only degrees of participation in virtue and vice, as some Platonists said. If there are no degrees, Stoic moral progress is still possible, but the analogy would be not with progressing in philosophical acumen as a philosophy student, but with progressing towards a doctorate in philosophy, which is not achieved in any degree until the end. It is Aristotle who said that an intermediate temperature is suited to becoming hot or cold, On the Soul 2.12, 424a1-10. He also recognised odd and even as contraries that allowed no intermediate degrees between them, Metaph. 10.4, 1055b24, unlike dark and light. It was again Aristotle who defined intermediate shades of colour as mixtures of the darkest and the brightest, On Sense Perception, ch. 3. Both ideas are critically discussed by Plotinus Enneads 6.3.20, who questions whether contraries without intermediates would fit Aristotle’s favoured definition of contraries as being in the same range, but maximally distant from each other. The editor thanks Carlos Steel for the Plotinus reference and for his reminder on the relevance of Aristotle. 30. Cf. Plato, Rep. 554e where hêrmosmenê is said of the soul in the sense of ‘in harmony with itself’. 31. The three musical scales used in ancient Greece were Dorian, Lydian, and mixed (mixo-Lydian). 32. ‘Damon’, a sophist and theoretician of music, fifth-fourth century BC. Cf. Plato, Rep. IV, 424c, Laches 180c-d, 197d. 33. It is to be expected that the Platonist tradition would think of this possible objection, given the close parallel at Phaedo 103a-c. 34. Carlos Steel has kindly suggested that the Aldine has a probable reading for the crux at line 36 (†hoti): dêlonoti which is the opposite of oudamôs in line 35 – thus balancing the two rhetorical questions (lines 32-4). Diels notes that some mss have different variations here and the words that follow are omitted in some (ei oun DE, omisit F). 35. Here follows a more detailed explanation of the terms already used in 186,4-8. 36. Translates plêsiasmos, cf. Arist. Rhet. 1382a32. 37. This section is to cover 188b26-30. 38. Simplicius indicates that some mentioned the contraries as principles

56

Notes to pages 28-30

explicitly, others expressed the view implicitly by their de facto list of principles. These sets of primary constituents of the universe belong to Parmenides (light and dark; cf. 188.29 and earlier), Empedocles (Strife and Love, cf. 188,25-7 and earlier), Anaxagoras (combination and dissolution, cf. 168,28, 178,14). 39. Porphyry and Alexander often occur close together. 40. Diels ad loc. suggests it should probably be ‘Xenophanes’, as in Philoponus in Phys. 127,26 (= B29 DK), who also quotes from Porphyry. Anaximenes wrote in prose and is unlikely to be responsible for a quotation in hexameters. 41. Here Simplicius rephrases the distinction in Neoplatonic terms, which express a hierarchical model of concepts from the general to the specific (cf. 180,19 anôtatô; 181,10 anôtatô Eudorus; 182,14 ta genikôtata; 183,28 merikôtera etc.). 42. Plato called the second of his two principles which, along with the One, generated everything, not only the ‘Dyad’, but also the ‘great and the small’. The name, mentioned in the last lemma from Aristotle, means that it had no definite quantity. For Aristotle’s ascription of the term to Plato, see Introduction. 43. Arist. GCB.2, 329b26-9. 44. The notion of participation brought in here (and above on Empedocles) by Simplicius is rephrasing in Neoplatonic terms. 45. The question is whether the particular selected halves do have something in common; in formal terms philia can be seen as a force that combines things. 46. Comparison with 189b22-7 suggests that this means a single primary contrariety to which other contrarieties can in some sense be reduced (cf. Ross’s note on this passage) and it becomes apparent that Ammonius (192,26-8), Syrianus (192,30-1) and Simplicius himself (194,6-13, 18ff.) all believed that this is so. It is perhaps a little surprising that Simplicius doesn’t comment on Aristotle’s failure to make this clear. 47. Or ‘one such’. 48. In the manuscripts of Simplicius the lemma extends to 189a20 but only 189a11-14 are discussed and 189a14-20 reappear divided between the next two lemmata. Diels follows the manuscripts in his text and draws attention to the situation in the apparatus, but I have only translated the text that Simplicius actually discusses. 49. I sometimes render phusikos ‘physical’, sometimes ‘natural’. In favour of ‘physical’ is the title Physics and the fact that Simplicius uses sômatikos (‘corporeal’ or ‘bodily’) to gloss phusikos at 2,9 and at 3,14-15, in favour of ‘natural’ the standard rendering of phusis by ‘nature’, and I opt for whichever seems to work best in the context. 50. A reasonable inference not only from the content of Book 1 but from the statement with which Aristotle concludes it: ‘So let it thus have been determined for us that there are principles and what they are and how many in number’ (192b2-3). (This is by no means the only place where Simplicius echoes the language of this passage.) 51. In Chapters 2-4. 52. cf. 188a19. 53. At 1318,10-15 Simplicius tells us that ‘it is Aristotle’s habit to introduce the testimonies of his predecessors as agreeing with his demonstrations, in order on the one hand to teach and compel his readers through his demonstrations, and on the other to make the belief more certain in his hearers through the testimonies; he does not employ the testimony of predecessors as demonstrations, as is the habit of more recent writers’ (tr. R. McKirahan, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 8.6-10, London, 2001). Although in the present passage the

Notes to pages 30-31

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testimonies prepare the way for demonstration rather than confirm it, the later passage spells out Simplicius’ view of the evidentiary value of such testimony for Aristotle and helps fix the range of meaning of such phrases as eis pistin here and pros pistin at 199,22. 54. In Chapter 5, the ‘general agreement’ being highlighted at the beginning (say 188a19-27) and end (188b26-189a10) of the chapter with Aristotle’s arguments (which, as 182,9-11 shows, Simplicius would have start at 188a27) sandwiched in the middle. 55. This is explained by 179,25-6: by showing (in Chapter 5) that the principles are contraries he implicitly shows that they are two in number, ‘for if they are contrary [to one another], the highest [of them] will certainly be two in number’. (The whole of the present paragraph is worth comparing with the similar summary of progress at 179,22-9.) 56. 189a21-191a21 is largely taken up with this topic. 57. The commentators are much concerned with appropriate sequence. When Aristotle plunges straight into the matter of the number of principles at 184b15, Simplicius writes: ‘The proper sequence (akolouthos) would be to first ask whether there are principles of physical things at all and then what they are and how many there are’ (20,29-30), which perhaps suggests that the issue of identity should come before that of number. However he evidently thought that having introduced the issue of number he should have resolved it before considering that of identity and at 179,22-6 writes: ‘Having shown that there is neither one principle nor an infinite number, and having concluded that those who posit [principles that are] multiple but limited [in number], like Empedocles, speak better, he should have immediately indicated the number of these multiple [principles]. However, neglecting to do so, he first indicates what they are, not [indeed] without reason but because along with what they are it is also shown how many there are.’ Here he gives much the same explanation for Aristotle’s order of attack but incorporates a reference to the substratum. (For an explanation of Aristotle’s actual procedure, see Richard Sorabji’s remarks in the section of the Introduction to this volume which relates to 1.6.) 58. Perhaps the idea is that by (implicitly) showing that the principles are two in Chapter 5 (cf. n. 55) he has (again implicitly) shown that they are neither one nor infinite in number. 59. It is often pointed out (see, for example, R.J. Hankinson, ‘Philosophy of science’, in J. Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Cambridge, 1995, p. 113) that if Aristotle had adopted the procedures he recommends in the Posterior Analytics, his scientific works would largely consist of chains of syllogisms but not a single formal syllogism is to be found in them. Perhaps it is out of a desire to remedy this that Simplicius not infrequently formalises Aristotle’s arguments, often (as here) writing as though the resulting syllogism were Aristotle’s own. The practice was evidently already present in Alexander (see, for example, 199,31-200,3; 384,3-9; 529,29-530,3; 703,2-6). 60. ‘Contraries’ (enantia) would be better than ‘contrary’ (enantiai) and perhaps one should emend the text. 61. In Chapter 5. 62. Changing to enantion (after heni) to ta enantia at 191,3. 63. At 187b7-13, although the quotation at the end of the present paragraph, which replaces a similar remark there, is of 184a12-14. 64. For a good brief discussion of the Aristotelian categories, including the translation of their Greek names, see J.L. Ackrill (tr.), Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford, 1963, pp. 77-81. Those mentioned in the present discussion, with my translations, some of which differ from Ackrill’s, are ousia

58

Notes to pages 31-32

(‘substance’), poiotês or poion (‘quality’), posotês or poson (‘quantity’), pou (‘place’), keisthai (‘posture’). 65. ‘Kind’ would work better for genos here, but on balance it seems better to stick with ‘genus’ throughout. 66. It is a little awkward that while the analogy of the other categories might suggest that we should not expect to find a single primary contrariety at the category level in substance, it would also seem to suggest that there should be one in each ‘genus’ of substance, and that is not the case. 67. Although Ross can reasonably argue that ‘} the whole substance of book i, if we eliminate incidental digressions, is the establishment of matter, form and privation as the factors involved in all change’ (p. 24), form and privation are not actually introduced until the next chapter. 68. sc. the one above the infimae species. 69. This is an awkward sentence to translate, and in the interest of comprehensibility I have resorted to a degree of paraphrase. 70. The reference here is to Cat. 3b24-7 (cf. the mention of species in line 9 below), but compare the similar statements at 189a32-3 and 225b10-11. 71. cf. Cat. 3b26-8, where individuals as well as species are cited. 72. 189b22-4. I have changed to auto (192,18) to tou ontos, the reading of the manuscripts of the Physics. I see from Ross’s apparatus that Diels somewhere suggested adding kai (‘and’) before to auto, which would give something like ‘for substance is one and the same genus’, but I don’t see that even that helps much. Was to auto, or even esti to auto, originally a marginal comment drawing attention to the fact that hê ousia hen ti genos repeats the same phrase at 189a14? I do see from Ross’s apparatus that the Arabic and Latin traditions have neither tou ontos nor to auto and that Philoponus may not have read either esti tou ontos or esti to auto. That would of course cast doubt on the text of the Physics, and it is perhaps significant that tou ontos is not present at 189a14. (to auto is also the reading when the same passage is cited at 206,15.) 73. A favourite concept of Aristotle’s. A passage from the Metaphysics will show how it works: ‘Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing in the sense that it possesses it, another in the sense that it is naturally adapted to it, another in the sense that it is a function of the medical art’ (1003a34-b2, tr. W.D. Ross in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton, 1984, vol. 2). A classic discussion of what is often referred to as the theory of ‘focal meaning’ is G.E.L. Owen, ‘Logic and metaphysics in some earlier works of Aristotle’, in J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds), Articles on Aristotle: 3. Metaphysics, London, 1979, pp. 13-32. 74. Perhaps arkhikos, which I translate ‘principal’, also conveys the idea ‘which constitutes the principle (arkhê)’ in passages like this. 75. This last paragraph appears to be a response to Alexander (cf. 191,28-9 above). 76. Although Aristotle does say at 187a12ff. and 189a34ff. that the contrarieties in the systems of some earlier thinkers (Plato is mentioned and Charlton (p. 63) suggests Thales, Anaximenes and Heraclitus) may be viewed as instances of excess and defect, his own preferred primary opposites will prove to be form and privation, as Alexander (191,30-1), Ammonius (192,21-3) and Simplicius himself (193,33-4) all recognise in the current context. (At 183,24-6, in a passage deriving from Ammonius, we find the ascending hierarchy hot and cold, dense and rare, excess and defect, form and privation.) Without any

Notes to pages 32-34

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context it is difficult to see why Syrianus singled out excess and defect; perhaps it was because form and privation has not yet been introduced. 77. Changing hopoterou to oudeterou at 193,3, as suggested by Diels in the apparatus. 78. sc. matter, as Simplicius points out at 193,31. 79. Throughout this sentence ‘in’ renders peri. 80. Or perhaps, ‘nothing that has to do with these’. 81. Literally, ‘always with one or the other of these’. 82. The sentence is awkwardly constructed and the singling out of surface is a little surprising and, although I have done my best with it as it stands, I suspect something has gone wrong. Perhaps the words ‘and [just as] surface stands in relation to evenness and unevenness’ are an interpolation – or perhaps something has dropped out before them. 83. For this sense of the verb, see Lampe ephistêmi 5. 84. cf. 192,35-193,1. 85. sc. the contrariety that occurs in substance. 86. 189a33ff. 87. In I.7, especially 190b23ff. 88. At this point the translation of ousia becomes difficult. Hitherto under this lemma it has been (for the most part at least) used to refer to the first of the Aristotelian categories and ‘substance’ has done the job. In what follows, however, it sometimes refers to that and sometimes (as foreshadowed in this sentence) to the whole of physical reality, in which case ‘being’ is probably the best rendering. Rather than switch between ‘substance’ and ‘being’, at times in the same sentence, I have decided, despite occasional awkwardness, to keep to ‘substance’ throughout. 89. Changing heni to estin at 194,12; heni looks like a scribal, editorial or printing error occasioned by the occurrence of heni two lines earlier. (eni would be a neater correction, but elsewhere in Simplicius it occurs only in quotations.) 90. At 190a32-3. 91. At 188a36-b6, for example. 92. Deleting deka (‘ten’) after loipai (‘other’) at 194,21. (There is, however, a variant text and Simplicius may have written something rather different.) 93. sc. the differentiae. 94. I’m not sure that ‘while connected’ is reasonable for prosekhôs. 95. Changing anô at 194,27 to anôtatô; cf. 193,3; 194,7.11; 196,21.23. 96. I have preferred ‘substantial’ and ‘substantially’ to ‘essential’ and ‘essentially’ for ousiôdês and ousiôdôs in the translation (even though ‘essentially’ at least would work better) to bring out the connection with ‘substance’ (ousia), which is essential to the argument. 97. Black was said to ‘compress’ the eye or vision and white to ‘divide’ or ‘dilate’ it (cf. 119,25; 123,23; 272,32-273,1). 98. Colour is a genus and compressiveness a differentia, both of which are predicated ‘essentially’. 99. The (tacit) argument seems to go something like this. If something can belong ousiôdôs to black, which is in the category of quality, it must have (an) ousia, and if this is true of black, it will be true of items in all the categories other than ousia and to ousiôdes will indeed be found everywhere. 100. Items in the categories of quality, quantity and relation respectively. 101. sc. substances. 102. Changing ousia to ousiâi at 195,1. 103. sc. the existence of the accidents. 104. cf. 191,18-19.

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105. cf. 191,27. 106. 195,6-15 = fr. 47 Wehrli. 107. sc. ‘as is Alexander’s position’, I think. 108. The implication seems to be that if investigation extended beyond the physical world the situation might be different. 109. Lines 18-19 suggest some such rendering of hoion. 110. Reading oun legoit’ an with a and F rather than de an legoito with D, E and Diels at 195,19. 111. Modern translators take a different view of apodidonai (‘explain’) – Wicksteed and Cornford have ‘get’, Hope, ‘derive’, Hardie and Gaye, ‘obtain’, Charlton, ‘do’ – but Simplicius’ commentary at 25ff. suggests that he took it this way. 112. Translating hosaper, which Simplicius reads in his paraphrase of this passage at 196,1 (and which is also what Ross prints), rather than hôsper, the reading of the manuscripts. 113. sc. the hypothesis of an infinite number of principles. 114. Which might prima facie seem to limit the number of their causes. 115. Punctuating with a dash rather than a full stop after auta at 196,7. 116. As 197,16 shows, and as Ross duly reports in his apparatus, Simplicius read allôn (‘from others’) rather than allêlôn here, but if allêlôn is understood in the way that Ross suggests in his note to 189a17-20 the sense is much the same. 117. For ‘must always remain’ as a rendering of aei dei menein, see the note at 197,23. 118. The three earlier ‘proofs’ are at 189a12-17. Alexander’s first ‘reason’ will be ‘there is a single contrariety in any one genus and substance is one particular genus’ (189a13-14). Actually, although the context does indeed suggest that this should be a further argument for a finite number of principles, it isn’t at all clear how it is meant to work. Simplicius (probably following Alexander) focuses on the idea that some pairs of contraries are prior to others and sees it as implying a hierarchy with a single supreme contrariety at the top; far from being infinite in number, the principles will be just two. This has the disadvantages of implying a higher than usual degree of obliquity on Aristotle’s part and of (implausibly, I think) making the words ‘but principles must always remain’ a separate and unrelated statement. Perhaps Aristotle’s intention is simply to drive a wedge between low-level contraries, which, numerically if not generically, come to be and pass away, and the principles, which persist through all change. The principles will then be a subset of the contraries and therefore (on Aristotle’s understanding of infinity) be unable to be infinite in number even if the total number of contraries is infinite. 119. hoti mêde epistêton on at 196,16 is clearly unsatisfactory. In the apparatus Diels suggests supplying to before on but that is hardly enough. When Simplicius goes on to give the second and third reasons, he quotes Aristotle’s text verbatim, so, for purposes of translation, I have assumed he did so here and translated hoti ouk epistêton to on estai, but there are clearly other possibilities. 120. Actually, as Simplicius recognises at 198,14-16, Aristotle’s argument only seems to show that not all contraries can be principles and still leaves room for an indefinitely large number that are. 121. ‘Always’ is not present in the transmitted text of Aristotle. 122. As the next paragraph makes clear, this notion of embracing contraries derives from 189a1-2. 123. See the textual note on this phrase in the lemma. 124. 189a1-2 (I have restored gar after men in the quotation). 125. A sustoikhia is a list or table of co-ordinated pairs, such as the list of ten

Notes to pages 36-37

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that Aristotle attributes to certain Pythagoreans at Metaph. 986a22ff. In that list the earlier pairs (limit, unlimited; odd, even; one, plurality) are arguably of wider application, or ‘more embracing’, than many at least of the later ones. 126. And so the statements that ‘some are prior to others’ and that ‘some arise from others’ were also adumbrated. 127. I would punctuate 25-35 (kai hoti men } diakrisin) as one sentence. 128. cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 985b10-19. 129. Form and privation are also described as the most wide-ranging of the contrarieties at 259,10, but it is strange that he should say that the other three contrarieties are ‘shared in by all physical things’ and then go on to say that form and privation are the ‘most widely shared of all’. Perhaps kai hôs phusikon koinon (‘and shared in qua physical’) restricts the range of pantôn koinotaton (‘the most widely shared of all’), the point being that there are equally wideranging contrarieties, but form and privation are the widest ranging of a purely physical nature. (Of the contrarieties mentioned here, limited and unlimited and same and other certainly do range beyond the physical world, and combination and separation occur in the world of forms, although a different terminology is normally used to describe them.) 130. cf. 465,10-13: ‘For if this [sc. the unlimited] is posited as a principle it serves the purpose of a principle that is not only material but also efficient and final, which Anaxagoras attributes to intellect, Empedocles to love and strife and to necessity’ (tr. J.O. Urmson, Simplicius on Aristotle’s Physics 3, Ithaca, 2002; bracketed supplement mine), where it is presumably necessity that is the final principle. For strife and love as both productive causes and elementary principles, cf. 25,27-26,4. 131. Or perhaps (and rather more literally), ‘of equivalent power’. The point is that Necessity is not really relevant to a discussion of the primary contrariety whereas strife and love are. On this rather shadowy personification in Empedocles, see W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Cambridge, 1962-81, vol. 2, pp. 163-4. These lines (10-15) are translated in H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius, London, 2008, p. 165. Baltussen suggests that some of the vocabulary points to the influence of Damascius on Simplicius’ formulation here. 132. Or, ‘it would be the primary contrariety [and] be the sole principle’. 133. The force of aei dei menein (189a19-20), which I translate ‘must always remain’, is not entirely clear. In what follows Alexander argues that it means that the primary principles neither come to be nor perish but are everlasting (aïdious; 197,23) and exist forever (aei einai; 197,27). Simplicius on the other hand, following his master (in this case Ammonius, as I argue in the note at 198,17), rejects this interpretation and argues that the phrase means that the primary contrariety, unlike other contrarieties, is omnipresent and persists or remains rather than coming and going as they do. Interestingly, there is a similar divide among modern interpreters. Ross (‘be permanent’ in his note ad loc.; ‘must be eternal’ in his Analysis) and, I think, Charlton (‘ought to be constant’) understand the phrase in much the same way as Alexander, while the translations of Hardie and Gaye (‘must always remain principles’) and Hope (‘must always remain [first principles]’) favour an interpretation more like that of Simplicius. (My own (rather unhelpful) rendering, ‘must always remain’, is meant to be compatible with either interpretation.) 134. The reference is to Phdr. 245D, which is also cited at 182,17-18, 234,12-13 and 464,27-9. 135. sc. individually and not just specifically.

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Notes to pages 37-41

136. sc. those lowest in the hierarchy and most immediately involved in the constitution and functioning of the physical world. 137. It would be interesting to know how Alexander squared this talk of perishable principles with the apparently unqualified statements earlier in the paragraph. 138. It is difficult to be sure how best to distribute the quotation marks in this last paragraph. 139. sc. individually. 140. sc. Alexander. 141. Still Alexander, I think. 142. The argument would be smoother without the words ‘and the particular ones perishable’ (ta de kathekasta phtharta). 143. Omitting têi at 198,13 with F. 144. The explanation that follows is essentially the one that Philoponus opts for (in Phys. 134,2-12) after rejecting (ibid. 133,26-134,2) three alternatives (cf. 134,4-8 there with 198,35-199,1 here, both of which develop an analogy between the relationship of the primary contrariety to other contrarieties and that of prime matter to particular matters), which strongly suggests that the master here is Ammonius and that Philoponus is following him there. 145. sc. being present in every change. 146. sc. the phrase ‘must always remain’. 147. sc. if strife were to expose itself to the action of love rather than withdraw from the substratum, it would itself become love. 148. The picture is that of a battlefield (the substratum) on which the combatants (the contraries) never come directly to grips but advance and retreat by turns. The metaphor (if that is what it is) goes back at least to Plato’s Phaedo (102D7-E4; 104C7-9). 149. For the meaning of such phrases in Simplicius, see the note at 190,26. 150. It would be better to leave this gar (‘for’) untranslated and punctuate with a colon, but its presence is important to Simplicius’ argument at 200,3-9. 151. ‘Said of some underlying thing’ works better for kath’ hupokeimenou here, I think, than either ‘said of some subject’ (in line with the usual rendering of the phrase at Cat. 1a20ff.) or ‘said of some substratum’, and for consistency’s sake I have also used ‘in an underlying thing’ rather than ‘in a substratum’ for en hupokeimenôi in the commentary on this text. 152. I think something must have dropped out after prosethêken at 200,7, perhaps no more than the article tôi. 153. Simplicius has changed the grammatical form of the verb in the quotation to fit the construction of the sentence. 154. sc. predicated of. 155. An explanation of this equivalence can be found at 75,30-76,7. 156. sc. the second argument takes (as foreshadowed at 28) the conclusion of the first (‘a contrary is not a substance’) and transposes it to the affirmative proposition ‘the contraries are not-substance’. The switch from ouk ousia at 28 to mê ousia 32-201,1 is a little surprising, but perhaps the explanation for it is that the former results from the transposition whereas hê mê ousia is a normally formed noun phrase. On ‘affirmation by transposition’, and the similar move there, see P. Huby and C.C.W. Taylor, Simplicius on Aristotle, Physics 1.3-4, London, 2011, note to 105,11. 157. I’m a little uneasy about ‘qua substratum’ as a rendering of têi kata to hupokeimenon but I think it catches the intention of the phrase. 158. ‘Matter’ takes up Alexander’s ‘substratum’. 159. Diels suggests that the verb should be optative rather than indicative,

Notes to pages 41-48

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but the two protases are on a different footing, the first being tantamount to: ‘If [as is the case] }’. 160. i.e. the opposition, or contrariety, of matter and form. 161. 201,23-8 = fr. 48 Wehrli. 162. cf. 201,5-7. 163. Perhaps this could be derived from 190a31-3 in conjunction with 190b10-11. 164. 189a34-b1. 165. Diels conjectures monon (alone) instead of menon. He might be right. 166. The alternative reading philosophôs in a and F ‘in a philosophical way’ may well be right. It is difficult to make sense of philanthrôpôs. 167. Reading ekalesen with E, a reading suspected by Diels. 168. The primary opposites for Neoplatonists are Limit and the Unlimited. The principle which produces them is the One and the principle that receives them is matter. In other words, the One is directly and solely responsible for the production of matter. See Proclus Elements of Theology 57 with Dodds’s notes. Matter is ‘dissimilarly similar’ to the One, because though the One and matter are at opposite ends of the scale of existence, they are both absolutely simple. See further Proclus in Parm. 639,2-3 and 645,3-5 (Steel). 169. The Greek is odd in this sentence. Simplicius uses hautê and ekeinê in the normal way to mean ‘former’ and ‘latter’ in the first half of the sentence. In the second half he uses the same words in the reverse sense. I have translated the sentence to make some philosophical sense of it, by translating ekeinê and autê to mean ‘former’ and ‘latter’ respectively in the second half of the sentence. 170. Simplicius does not go on to set down the second half of this disjunction. One might expect him to say: ‘Or he will posit one substratum }’. 171. Reading tou ontos as in the text of Aristotle 189b23-4. 172. Deleting hê, which might be due to dittography. 173. Reading kai before ek along with a. 174. Reading tês with E F geneseôs. 175. i.e. as referring to matter rather than to the complete compound of matter and form. 176. i.e. if he were talking of matter, rather than of perceptible substance as coming to be and passing away, then matter would (irrationally) need matter.

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English-Greek Glossary to 1.5-6 Compiled by Sebastian Gertz. absence: apousia absolute: sunolon, to accident: sumbebêkos accidentally: kata sumbebêkos accuracy: akribeia act (on): poiein active: poiêtikos active nature: drastikon, to add: prostithenai, epagein admit: epidekhesthai advance (v.): epagein affirmation: kataphasis agree: sumphônein agreement: sumphônia allow of: dekhesthai alone: monos also show: prosapodeiknunai alter: alloioun always: pantôs angular: gegôniômenos antithesis: antithesis anything at random: tukhon, to apply to: huparkhein argue: sullogizesthai argument: epikheirêma, logos, sullogismos, apodeixis, epikheirêsis arise: ginesthai artificial: tekhnikos ask: zêtein, legein assembly: plêsiasmos assign: apodidonai assigning: apodosis assume: lambanein at a general level: katholou at the top of the hierarchy: anôtatô atom: atomos be: huparkhein

be absent: apeinai be acted upon: paskhein be active: energein be affected: paskhein be applicable to: epharmozein be destroyed: phtheiresthai be equivalent: isodunamein be fitting: harmozein be generated: ginesthai be in error: planasthai be in harmony: sumphônein be involved: enuparkhein be just clever: sophizesthai be necessary: dei be of equal strength: isosthenein be opposed: antikeisthai be passive: paskhein be possible: endekhesthai be present: huparkhein, pareinai be removed: diistanai be thought: dokein be transcendental: exairein become: ginesthai being (n.): einai, to; huparxis, hupostasis; on, to belief: pepoithêsis believe: oiesthai belong: huparkhein black: melas body: sôma body-like: sômatoeidês both be true: sunalêtheuein bring to completion: apoteleioun bringing into being: hupostasis broadly: pantôs bronze: khalkos brush aside: parienai by demonstrative arguments: apodeiktikôs

66

English-Greek Glossary to 1.5-6

call (v.): kalein can (v.): dunasthai category: katêgoria causal: aitiôdês cause (n.): aitia, aition certainly: pantôs chance thing: tukhon, to change (v.): metaballein change (n.): metabolê changing: metabolê cite: paratithenai cite in support: marturesthai co-exist: sunuparkhein cold (adj.): psukhros collect together: sunagein colour (v.): khrôizein colour (n.): khrôma colourless: akhrômatos column: sustoikhia combination: sunkrisis combinatory: sunkritikos combine with: suntattein come about: ginesthai come to: ephêkein come to be: ginesthai come to have independent existence: huphistanai come to the same thing: sumphônein come together: sunerkhesthai coming to be: genesis comment on: exêgeisthai common (adj.): koinos common feature: koinotês, homologêma commonality: koinotês compact: puk(i)nos completely: pantelôs composed of, produced from, elements: stoikheiôtos composite: sunthetos compound: sunthetos compounding: sunkrisis compression: puknôsis compressiveness: sunkritikon, to conclude: sunagein condensation: puknotês, puknôsis construct (v.): kataskeuazein, methodeuein contained: periekhomenos contrariety: enantiotês, enantiôsis contrary (adj. ): enantios contrary (n.): enantion contrasting: antikeimenos

contribute: suntelein coordinated series: sustoikhia corporeal: sômatikos create: poiein creation: genesis creative agency: poioun, to creator: poiêtês credence: pistis cycle (n.): periodos deductive: sullogistikos deductive reasoning: sullogismos defect: elleipsis defective: ellipês definition: logos demonstrative: apodeiktikos dense: puk(i)nos deny: apophaskein, anairein depletion: elleipsis derive: ginesthai, gennan describe in more accurate terms: akribologeisthai detect: enoran difference: diaphora differentia: diaphora difficulty: aporia diffuse: manos disagree: diaphônein disagreement: diaphora discover: heuriskein, gnôrizein disposition: diathesis, hexis dissolution: diakrisis distinction: diaphora distinctive: idios divide (v.): diairein division: diairesis, tomê do: poiein dyad: duas easily grasped: eusunoptos effect (n.): peisis effectively causing (effectively be a cause): poiêtikos efficient (cause): poiêtikos element: stoikheion elemental: stoikheiôdês elementary: stoikheiôdês elementary (foundation): stoikheiôdês embrace (v.): periekhein empty: kenos end: telos endure: hupomenein enmattered: enulos

English-Greek Glossary to 1.5-6 entirety: pantotês enumerate: arithmein equal (adj.): isos establish in addition: proskataskeuazein even: artios, homalos everlasting: aïdios evidence: pistis example: paradeigma exceed: huperekhein excess: huperokhê exist: huphistanai existence: hupostasis explain: deiknunai, apodidonai explanation: exêgêsis, aitia express: erein extend: ekteinein, khôrein extreme (n.): akron face up to: hupomenein fail: epileipein find: heuriskein finite: peperasmenos first: prôtos flavour: khumos flesh: sarx focus on: paralambanein form (n.): eidos formless: aneideos from above: anôthen from below: katôthen full: plêrês further assume: proslambanein further qualification: prosdiorismos general: katholikos, katholou generally: katholou, holôs generate: gennan generated: genêtos generation: apogennêsis, genesis generic: genikos generic(ally) cognate: sungenês genesis: genesis genus: genos give: apodidonai give shape to: skhêmatizein gloomy: zopheros great (as epithet of Syrianus): megas ground: hupomenein hard: sklêros have to: opheilein having an angle: gegôniômenos

having many rulers: polukoiraniê heavenly: aitherios heavy: embrithês high above: huperanô highest: anôtatô hold one’s ground: hupomenein, menein homoiomerous: homoiomerês hot: thermos human being: anthrôpos hypothesise: hupotithenai immediately concerned with: prosekhês imperceptible: anaisthêtos imperishable: aphthartos implicit: dunamei impossible: adunatos in a dissimilar way: anomoiôs in a manifold way: polueidôs in actuality: energeiâi in an absolute sense: kuriôs in any case: pantôs in-between, the: to metaxu in common: koinôs in contrast: kat’ antithesin in every instance: pantôs in general: holôs in itself: kat’ auto in proof: deiktikos in question: legein in short: holôs in the appropriate way: oikeiôs in the general sense: koinos in the primary sense: kuriôs in the strict sense: kuriôs in themselves: kath’ hauta include: paralambanein inclusion: tithenai, to indefinite: aoristos indicate: dêloun, sêmainein, endeiknunai indisputably: anamphilektôs individual points: kata meros, ta inductive reasoning: epagôgê inferior: katadeesteros, phaulos infinite: apeiros inhere: enuparkhein intelligible: noêtos intensify: epiteinein intention: skopos introduce: eisagein invariably: pantôs

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68

English-Greek Glossary to 1.5-6

investigate: skopein investigation: zêtêsis invisible: aphantos it would be necessary to assume: lêpteon its own: oikeios just: monos just anything: tukhon, to know: eidenai, ginôskein knowable: epistêtos like (adj.): homoios limit (v.): perainein limit (n.): peras list (n.): sustoikhia loose: araios love (n.): philia maintain: diorthoun make: poiein, tithenai make culminate: sunkoruphoun mass: onkos master (n.): kathêgemôn material: hulikos matter (n.): hulê matterless: aülos mean: sêmainein, legein, erein monad: monas more comprehensive: periektikôteros more formal: eidikôteros more general: holikôteros more immaterial: aüloteros more immediate: prosekhesteros more in everyday speech: koinoteron more particular: merikôteros more primary: arkhoeidesteros more principle-like: arkhoeidesteros most generically: genikôtata must: dei name: prosêgoria natural: euphuês, autophuês, phusikos naturally: phusei naturally suited: hikanos nature: phusis necessity: anankê need: dein non-being: mê on note (v.): ephistanai notice (v.): ephistanai notion: ennoia

number: arithmos numerically: kat’ arithmon objection: enstasis observe: theôrein occur: sunistanai odd: perittos of equal strength: isosthenês of the same genus: homogenês on one’s (its) own: monos on the right: dexios on their own: kath’ hauta one: heis One, the: to hen one must say: rhêteon one or other: heteros only: monos only just: monon opinion: doxa oppose to: antidiairein opposite: antikeimenos, antios, enantion opposites: ta antikeimena opposition: antithesis order (n.): taxis other (n.): heteron, to owe: opheilein partake of: metekhein partial: merikos particular: kathekasta, merikos pass away: phtheiresthai passage: rhêton passing away: phthora passive: pathêtikos per se: kath’ heauto, kat’ auto perish: phtheiresthai perishable: phthartos perishing: phthora philosophical: philosophos physical: phusikos physicist: phusikos, ho place (the category): pou posit: hupotithenai, tithenai position (n.): thesis possible: dunatos posterior: husteros posture (the category): keisthai predicate (v.): katêgorein pre-exist: proüparkhein, huparkhein preferable: asteios preliminary: problêma premiss: sunêmmenon, lêmma prevent: kôluein

English-Greek Glossary to 1.5-6 primary: prôtos prime: prôtistos principal: arkhikos principle: arkhê prior: proteros privation: sterêsis produce: poiein, parekhein, propherein, paragein productive: poiêtikos, apodotikos properly: kuriôs propose: tithenai prove: deiknunai provide: komizein proximate: prosekhês proximately: prosekhôs qualitative: kata poiotêta quality: poiotês; poion, to quantity: poson, to; posotês raise (a difficulty): aporein range: platos rare: araios, manos rarefaction: manôsis, manotês reach: phthanein realities: onta, ta reality: hupostasis really: holôs reason: aitia reasoning: sullogismos receive: hupodekhesthai receptacle: hupodokhê receptive: dektikos refer: legein, anapherein refer to: kalein relax: anienai remain: menein, diamenein, hupomenein render: poiein resolve: luein ridiculous: atopos rotation: perikhôrêsis rough: trakhus run: sunagein same (n.): tauton say: eipein, phanai, erein, legein, apophainesthai secondary: deuteros see: horan seem: dokein sense (n.): ennoia separate (adj.): idios

69

separate (v.): apokrinesthai separation: diallaxis, diakrisis separative: diakritikos set oneself a task: protithesthai set out: proballesthai shape (n.): skhêma, demas shared: koinos shared (in): koinos should: opheilein, dei should be understood: akousteon show (v.): deiknunai show concurrently: sunapodeiknunai sign: sêma signify: sêmainein, dêloun simple: haplous simply: haplôs smooth: êpios, leios soft: elaphros, malakos something in between: metaxu, to sour: pikros speak: legein species: eidos stand in need: deisthai start from an assumption: hupotithenai state (n.): hexis state (v.): legein, eipein, phanai stem: ginesthai strife: neikos subsequent: prosekhês subsist: huphistanai substance: ousia substantial: ousiôdês substantially: ousiôdôs substratum: hupokeimenon, to subject (n.): hupokeimenon, to subsumed under each other: hupallêlos superior: kreittôn surface: epiphaneia surplus: huperokhê surprise (v.): thaumazein sustain: hupomenein sweet: glukus syllogism: sullogismos take: lambanein, apodekhesthai, prolambanein take to be: akouein talk: dialegesthai talk precisely: akribologein tend: pheresthai text: rhêton

70

English-Greek Glossary to 1.5-6

that which is intermediate: to metaxu that which is random: to tukhon thing: pragma things: onta, ta things that exist: onta, ta think: oiesthai, nomizein three cubits long: tripêkhus time: khronos transcendent: exêirêmenos transposition: metathesis truth: alêthes, to undergo (change): paskhein underlie: hupokeisthai understand: lambanein, ephistanein, prosupakouein, akouein unequal: anisos ungenerated: agenêtos unification: henôsis union: henôsis universal: koinos universal, the: to katholou universe, the: to pan unknowable: agnôstos

unknowing: adaês unlike: anomoios unlimited: apeiros unmoved: akinêtos upper level: anôtatô use (v.): khrêsthai, legein useful: khrêsimos very first: prôtistos vice: kakia view (n.): epibolê, ennoia virtue: aretê wet (adj.): dieros, hugros what is underlying: hupokeimenon, to white: leukos whiteness: leukotês whole: holos with general application: koinôs without flavour: akhumos without qualities: apoios wood: xulon word: onoma, lexis

Greek-English Index to 1.5-6 Compiled by Michael Atkinson (1.5); Michael Share and Michael Atkinson (1.6). ‘Other tr[anslation]’ or ‘paraphrase used’ indicates that there is no easy one-toone correspondence between the Greek and the English. adaês, unknowing, 180,7 adunatos, impossible, 192,17 agenêtos, ungenerated, 187,24; 194,9; 197,30.32; 198,8.18 agnôstos, unknowable, 191,5.6; 195,26.27; 196,3 aïdios, everlasting, 197,23.30.32.33; 198,6.8.10.12.15.16.32 aitherios, heavenly, 180,4 aitia, cause, 194,20.22; 195,28.29; 196,3; 201,1; reason, 196,12; 200,8; 203,6; explanation, 198,27; other tr., 191,15 aitiôdês, causal, 184,10 aition, cause, 191,7; 196,32; 201,1.2 akhrômatos, colourless, 197,5 akhumos, without flavour, 197,6 akinêtos, unmoved, 179,29 akouein, to take to be, 191,19; 195,4; to understand, 193,17 akousteon, should be understood, 194,29 akribeia, accuracy, 202,27 akribologein, to talk precisely, 194,15 akribologeisthai, to describe in more accurate terms, 181,20 akron, extreme (n.), 194,23 alêthes, to, truth, 196,6 alloioun, to alter, 194,34 anairein, to deny, 192,9 anaisthêtos, imperceptible, 203,18 anamphilektôs, indisputably, 182,26 anankê, necessity, 197,13 anapherein, to refer, 196,35

aneideos, formless, 193,10.15 anienai, to relax, 203,35 anisos, unequal, 194,28 anômalos, unequal, 193,14 anomoios, unlike, 194,27 anomoiôs, in a dissimilar way, 205,12 anôtatô, at the top of the hierarchy, 179,27; upper level, 180,19; highest, 181,9.23; 193,3; 194,7.11.21.23.27 (27 by emendation); 196,21.23 anôthen, from above, 194,20 anthrôpos, human being, 201,22 antidiairein, to oppose to, 194,3; 195,4 antikeimenos, opposite, 181,29; 182,2 etc.; contrasting, 185,5 antikeisthai, be opposed, 198,33; 202,9; ta antikeimena, opposites, 185,4; 204,19 antios, opposite, 180,7 antithesis, antithesis, 182,6; opposition, 183,11.14; 192,12; 193,1; 196,20.21; 198,29.34.35; 201,24.30; 202,8; kat’ antithesin, in contrast, 205,6 aoristos, indefinite, 181,26; 204,18 apeinai, to be absent, 193,37; 194,1 apeiros, infinite, 179,22; 181,1; 190,32; 191,4.5.6.9.12; 192,2; 194,13; 195,21.22.24.26; 196,1.3.9.13.14.16.19.22; 197,1; 199,24; unlimited, 197,8 aphantos, invisible, 180,11

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Greek-English Index to 1.5-6

aphthartos, imperishable, 198,1.19 apodeiktikos, demonstrative, 188,5; 204,26 apodeiktikôs, by demonstrative arguments, 190,27 apodeixis, argument, 197,27; 200,5 apodekhesthai, to take, 193,20 apodidonai, to assign, 195,29; to explain, 196,1.9; to give, 196,4 apodosis, assigning, 195,28 apodotikos, productive, 201,27.28 apogennêsis, generation, 194,23; 205,10 apoios, without qualities, 203,18 apokrinesthai, to separate, 181,4 apophainesthai, to say, 192,4 apophaskein, to deny, 201,8 aporein, to raise (a difficulty), 199,28; 200,4.6.8 aporia, difficulty, 200,5; 202,17 apoteleioun, to bring to completion, 181,12 apousia, absence, 192,11; 198,24 araios, rare, 181,4; loose, 206,5 aretê, virtue, 191,25 arithmein, to enumerate, 195,11 arithmos, number, 193,7.11.12; kat’ arithmon, numerically, 197,30; 198,8 arkhê, principle, 179,22; 180,32; 190,22.23, etc. arkhikos, principal, 192,27; 194,12; 196,23; 197,33; 198,10.15.26.34 arkhoeidesteros, more principle-like, 183,21; more primary, 183,32 artios, even, 193,8.11 asteios, preferable, 181,14 atomos, atom, 180,18; 197,1; 199,24 atopos, ridiculous, 197,26 aülos, matterless, 194,9 aüloteros, more immaterial, 190,18 autarkês, (paraphrase used), 199,9; 202,4 autophuês, natural, 188,3 dei, should, must, to be necessary, 192,6; 193,32; 194,7; 196,4.6.11.12.27; 197,3.23.26; 198,10.18.21; 201,9; 201,19 deiknunai, to show, 190,27.30.31; 191,1.4; 193,32; 194,7; 196,14.20; 197,29; 199.6.8.11; 200,18.28;

201,5.15; 202,1.4.13; to prove, 198,15; 200,21; to explain, 202,18 deiktikos, in proof, 195,22 dein, to need, 199,23 deisthai, to stand in need, 202,17 dekhesthai, to allow of, 193,35 dektikos, receptive, 186,30.31.36; 204,2 dêloun, to indicate, 198,19; 201,26; to signify, 199,2 demas, shape, 180,3 deuteros, secondary, 181,8 dexios, on the right, 194,32 diairein, to divide, 191,29; 192,25; 199,31 diairesis, division, 204,19; 205,28 diakrisis, dissolution, 180,28; 189,16; separation, 186,7; 188,3; 196,35; 197,7.15.18; 203,4 diakritikos, separative, 189,18 dialegesthai, to talk, 198,9 diallaxis, separation, 180,30 diamenein, to remain, 198,34.35.36 diaphônein, to disagree, 179,29 diaphora, distinction, 180,19; disagreement, 180,32; differentia, 191,30; 193,3.21; 194,21.23; 200,14.15; difference, 197,1; 203,18 diathesis, disposition, 184,34; 185,5 dieros, wet, 181,5 diistanai, to be removed, 194,23.25 diorthoun, to maintain, 198,17 dokein, to be thought, 192,11; 199,29; 201,10; to seem, 195,7; 196,5; 200,27; 201,18; 202,3 doxa, opinion, 179,31; 190,24 drastikon, to, active nature, 203,24 duas, dyad, 181,28.29 etc. dunamei, implicit, 199,12 dunasthai, can, 201,29 dunatos, possible, 196,3; can, 202,15 eidenai, to know, 192,10 eidikôteros, more formal, 189,19 eidos, form, 182,4; 191,19; 203,9; 204,16 etc.; species, 191,28.29.30; 192,9.25 einai, to, being, 183,2; 203,13 etc. eipein, to say, 194,9; 196,2.30; 197,4.22; 198,2; 202,1; to state, 198,16; other tr., 198,24 eisagein, to introduce, 199,7.8

Greek-English Index to 1.5-6 ekteinein, to extend, 198,30 elaphros, soft, 180,5 elleipsis, depletion, 183,26; defect, 189,11; 192,31.33.35; 193,17; 204,2; 207,24 etc. ellipês, defective, 195,5 embrithês, heavy, 180,7 enantion, contrary (n.), 180,23.31; 181,1; 190,25.26, etc.; opposite, 182,20 enantios, contrary (adj.), 179,27; 182,5; 190,28.33; 191,1.3.12; 192,8.12; 198,11; 200,24; 201,9.10; 202,10 enantiôsis, contrariety, 180,18.26; 182,1.3; 191,10-198,18 passim; 201,29; 202,5; 204,25 etc. enantiotês, contrariety, 181,2 ; 195,8; 197,2; 203,6 etc. endeiknunai, to indicate, 196,32 endekhesthai, to be possible, 195,20; 196,17 energeiâi, in actuality, 193,13 energein, to be active, 199,21 enkratês, (paraphrase used) 199,21 ennoia, sense, 183,20; notion, 188,4; view, 195,7 enoran, to detect, 190,24 enstasis, objection, 196,18 enulos, enmattered, 191,19.27.29; 192,4; 194,8; 195,3; 198,36; 207,30 enuparkhein, to be involved, 202,12; to inhere, 182,33 epagein, to advance, 196,12; to add, 197,23; 198,9.27; 200,6 epagôgê, inductive reasoning, 186,9 epharmozein, to be applicable to, 191,17 ephêkein, to come to, 192,19 ephistanai, to note, 192,16; 193,5; to notice, 198,12 ephistanein, to understand, 193,20 epibolê, view, 197,19 epidekhesthai, to admit, 193,1.20 epikheirêma, argument, 191,4.8; 196,2; 199,9.11; 201,15 epikheirêsis, argument, 196,15 epileipein, to fail, 197,25 êpios, smooth, 180,5 epiphaneia, surface, 193,9.13 epistêtos, knowable, 196,16 epiteinein, to intensify, 203,35

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erein, to say, 201,11; 202,6.17; to express, 195,7; to mean, 201,18 euphuês, natural, 203,20 eusunoptos, easily grasped, 196,5 exairein, to be transcendental, 198,4 exêgeisthai, to comment on, 192,16 exêgêsis, explanation, 193,5 exêirêmenos, transcendent, 182,32 gegôniômenos, having an angle, 180,24; angular, 181,34 genesis, creation, 180,15; genesis, 203,10; generation, 184,15; 191,32; coming to be, 180,29; 181,2; 182,24; 192,19; 193,4; 194,14.35; 195,2; 197,26.31; 198,7.20; 202,12; 206,26 etc.; other tr., 192,3 genêtos, generated, 191,27.30; 192,1; 194,8; 195,5; 198,32 genikos, generic, 182,14; 206,30 genikôtata, most generically, 197,36 gennan, to generate, 203,1; 205,18; to derive, 197,2 genos, genus, 180,22; 191,9-196,17 passim; 206,15 etc. ginesthai, to come to be, 194,16.34; 195,13.14.16.29; 196,4.7; 197,16.22.24.26.28.35; 198,22; 201,21; 202,23; to become, 202,19; arise, 182,23; 196,29; 198,5; to derive, 196,33; to stem, 196,25; to come about, 182,30; to be generated, 182,23; 183,23; 184,13 etc.; other tr., 199,21; 202,7 ginôskein, to know, 191,6 glukus, sweet, 191,25; 193,8; 196,32; 197,5.6; 198,30 gnôrizein, to discover, 191,7 haplôs, simply, 182,15; 188,1 haplous, simple, 203,14 etc. harmozein, to be fitting, 192,22 heis, one, 190,25, etc.; aph’ henos kai pros hen, [derived] from one [thing] and [relative] to one [thing], 192,20 hen, to, the One, 181,8.12, etc. henôsis, union, 183,16; unification, 189,16 heteros, one or other, 203,13; to heteron, other (n.), 197,8

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heuriskein, to discover, 190,23; 191,16; to find, 198,22.30 hexis, state, 181,33; 184,20; disposition, 187,3; 191,25 hikanos, naturally suited, 205,14 holikôteros, more general, 189,6; 190,1.10 holos, whole, 194,3 holôs, in general, generally, 182,18; 185,15 etc.; in short, 203,14; really, 203,16 homalos, even, 193,14 homogenês, of the same genus, 195,13.17 homoiomerês, homoiomerous, 181,1 homoios, like, 194,27 homologêma, common feature, 190,26 horan, to see, 198,36; 200,7.12.15 hugros, wet, 203,7 hulê, matter, 181,18; 182,25; 191,19.20; 193,31; 197,31; 198,35.37; 199,8; 201,12.14.15.23.27.29; 203,9, etc. hulikos, material, 204,11 hupallêlos, subsumed under each other, 183,12 huparkhein, to be present, 193,19.24.27.37; to pre-exist, 186,19; to be, 203,11; 194,6; to belong, 184,4; 194,30; to apply to, 198,13 huparxis, being, 194,4.8 huperanô, high above, 181,19 huperekhein, to exceed, 197,19 huperokhê, surplus, 183,26; excess, 189,10; 192,31.32.33; 193,7; 204,2; 207,24 etc. huphistanai, to exist, 193,35; 194,35; to subsist, 187,22; to come to have independent existence, 204,3 hupodekhesthai, to receive, 194,22 hupodokhê, receptacle, 204,3 hupokeisthai, to underlie, 190,29; 193,6, etc.; to hupokeimenon, substrate, 183,3.4.19.24; substratum, 193,6.31.36; 194,24; 199,8.21.22.24; 201,10.31.32; 202,1; 202,32 etc.; what is underlying, 186,22 hupomenein, to sustain, 199,15; to face up to, 199,16; to hold one’s

ground, 199,19; to endure, 182,22; 183,20 etc.; to remain, 182,25 hupostasis, existence, 192,15; 194,10; 195,1; reality, 194,3; bringing into being, 205,11 hupotithenai, to start from an assumption, 197,1; to posit, 197,11; 199,32; 200,4.6.8; 203,1 etc.; to hypothesize, 202,16; other tr., 196,3; 197,3 husteros, posterior, 188,18 idios, separate, 205,19; 206,2; distinctive, 206,26 etc. isodunamein, to be equivalent, 197,15 isos, equal, 194,27 isosthenein, to be of equal strength, 183,33 isosthenês, of equal strength, 183,11 kakia, vice, 191,25 kalein, to call, 193,5.7.10; 202,17; to refer to, 201,26 kat’ auto, per se, 184,28; 185,9 etc.; in itself, 184,16; 203,12 katadeesteros, inferior, 192,33; 193,19.22 kata meros, ta, individual points, 182,10 kataphasis, affirmation, 200,32 kataskeuazein, to construct, 199,5 katêgorein, to predicate, 199,29; 202,2; 207,23 katêgoria, category, 191,17.23; 192,7.16.23.29.31; 193,1.18.20.35; 194,1.3.21.31; 195,4 kathêgemôn, master, 192,14; 193,22; 198,17 kathekasta, particular, 190,12.14; 197,35; 198,12 kath’ hauta, in themselves, 184,25; on their own, 202,30 kath’ heauto, per se, 203,19; 203,29; 207,14 katholikos, general, 183,30.32; 184,14 katholou, generally, 182,10; at a general level, 189,10; general, 190,13; to katholou, the

Greek-English Index to 1.5-6 universal, 190,12; 197,35; 198,1.11.13.14 katôthen, from below, 194,21 keisthai, to, posture (the category), 192,34 kenos, empty, 180,17 khalkos, bronze, 198,37 khôrein, to extend, 198,28 khrêsimos, useful, 196,2 khrêsthai, to use, 191,4; 194,16 khrôizein, to colour, 197,4 khrôma, colour, 191,24; 194,30; 195,13.17 khronos, time, 199,1 khumos, flavour, 191,25; 193,8 koinos, common, 190,26; 192,8; 195,11; shared (in), 193,29; 196,27; 197,3.7.8.9; 201,11; in the general sense, 194,28; universal, 181,16; shared, 183,3 koinôs, in common, 191,15; 195,5; with general application, 194,14; koinoteron, more in everyday speech, 201,11 koinotês, common feature, 190,25; commonality, 194,20 kôluein, to prevent, 196,19 komizein, to provide, 195,22 kreittôn, superior, 192,32; 193,19.21 kuriôs, properly, 181,9; in an absolute sense, 182,2; in the primary sense, 181,31; 185,3; in the strict sense, 193,17; 194,35; 195,4; 201,13.14.24; 202,7; 204,15 lambanein, to take, 190,26; 199,10.12; to understand, 192,32; 195,17; to assume, 195,12; 198,3; 200,31 legein, to say, 190,21; 192,3, etc.; to state, 195,30; 196,15; 198,12; to speak, 192,22; to refer, 192,25; to mean, 192,30; 193,31; to use, 194,14; 199,2; to ask, 196,19; to be in question, 194,34; 195,19 leios, smooth, 193,9 lêmma, premiss, 200,28 lêpteon, it would be necessary to assume, 192,7 leukos, white, 191,25; 194,16.17.18; 196,33; 197,4; 198,14.25.30; 199,17 leukotês, whiteness, 193,36.37

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lexis, (paraphrase used) 198,2; word, 181,2 logos, definition, 193,11.12; 201,29; 202,5; argument, 195,5.22; 199,5.9; 202,3.6; other tr., 192,23; 194,4; 198,19; 201,13 luein, to resolve, 196,18.20 malakos, soft, 197,5 manos, diffuse, 183,25; rare, 189,33 etc. manôsis, rarefaction, 180,15; 196,34; 203,4; 204,1 manotês, rarefaction, 189,10; 203,33 marturesthai, to cite in support, 193,22 mê on, non-being, 196,5 megas, (as epithet of Syrianus) great, 192,29 melas, black, 191,25; 194,16.17.30.32; 196,33; 197,4; 198,14.26.30; 199,15.17 menein, to remain, 196,11; 197,23; 198,10.18.21; to hold one’s ground, 199,20 merikos, partial, 198,29; particular, 183,28; 189,6 etc.; 198,37 metaballein, to change, 184,33; 194,25; 198,23.24.26.34; 203,12 etc. metabolê, change, 182,28.29 etc.; 192,5.23; 193,36; 194,4.6.15.18; changing, 198,20 metathesis, transposition, 200,32 metaxu, to, something in between, 185,11; the in-between, 185,22; the (that which is) intermediate, 203,3 etc. metekhein, to partake of, 195,2 methodeuein, to construct, 202,6 monas, monad, 181,29; 187,17 etc. monos, just, 191,16; 199,23; only, 191,21; 192,6; alone, 192,5; 193,17; 197,14; on one’s (its) own, 199,23; 201,25; other tr., 198,32; monon, only, just, 196,22; 197,14; 198,12; 199,1.4 neikos, strife, 197,12.13; 199,17.18.20.26 noêtos, intelligible, 188,24 etc.; nomizein, to think, 202,6

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oiesthai, to think, 191,6; to believe, 200,9; 201,15 oikeios, its own, 193,24.25; other tr., 193,18 oikeiôs, in the appropriate way, 192,32 on, being, 179,29; 192,11.18.35; 193,27; 196,4 onkos, mass, 204,19 onoma, word, 191,14; 194,14 onta, ta, realities, 181,18; things that exist, 195,11; the things which are, 203,10 etc.; things, 199,5 opheilein, to owe, 179,23; should, 192,27; 193,24; to have to, 200,16 orthôs, (paraphrase used), 192,11 ousia, substance, 191,9-195,17 passim; 200,7-202,10 passim; 203,12 etc. ousiôdês, substantial, 194,29.31; 201,25 ousiôdôs, substantially, 194,30 pan, to, the universe, 203,1 pantelôs, completely, 194,9 pantôs, always, 193,13; certainly, 193,21; 194,24; 200,16; in every instance, 198,22; invariably, 201,31; in any case, 179,26; broadly, 183,5 pantotês, entirety, 199,1 paradeigma, example, 196,32 paragein, to produce, 205,9 paralambanein, to focus on, 191,17; to include, 193,12 paratithenai, to cite, 196,8; 199,23 pareinai, to be present, 193,28.36.37 parekhein, to produce, 194,23 parienai, to brush aside, 196,6 paskhein, to undergo (change)184,27.28; to be passive, 185,35; to be affected, 186,25.27; to be acted upon, 204,13 pathêtikos, passive, 204,11 peisis, effect, 199,15 pepoithêsis, belief, 188,5 perainein, to limit, 179,23; peperasmenos, finite, 195,20.22.23.25.27.29.30; 196,5.8.17; 199,4 peras, limit, 197,7

periekhein, to embrace, 195,19; 196,24.25.26.28.31 periekhomenos, contained, 189,7 etc. periektikôteros, more comprehensive, 189,6; 190,7.10 perikhôrêsis, rotation,181,3 periodos, cycle, 180,33 perittos, odd, 193,8.12 phanai, say, 191,28; 192,29.34.35; 193,4; 196,12; 197,24.29.32; 198,8; 200,15.24; 201,9.11; 202,9; state, 198,10 phaulos, inferior, 181,14 pheresthai, to tend, 195,7 philia, love, 197,12.14; 199,17.18.20.27 philosophos, philosophical, 193,16 phthanein, to reach, 205,10 phthartos, perishable, 197,34; 198,11.12.32 phtheiresthai, to perish, 187,9; 194,17.32.33.34; 197,22.24.35; 198,1.5.22; to be destroyed, 185,21 etc.; to pass away, 202,24 etc. phthora, perishing, 191,32; 193,4; 194,15.35; 195,2; 197,31; 198,7.20; 202,12; passing away,186,8; 203,10 phuein, (paraphrase used), 198,25.26.34 phusikos, physical, 179,28; 181,7; 182,31; 190,23; 191,15.32; 194,3.8.12; 197,7.8; 198,29.31; 199,6; 201,2; natural, 187,18; 192,1.3; 202,23; ho phusikos, physicist, 195,10; hoi phusikoi, the natural philosophers, 202,33; physicists, 187,32 phusis, nature, 193,6.14; 194,20; 199,5.32; 200,5.6.9; 202,33 etc.; phusei, naturally, 196,7 pikros, sour, 191,26; 193,8; 196,33; 197,6; 198,31 pistis, evidence, 190,26; credence, 199,22 planasthai, to be in error, 180,1 platos, range, 194,22 plêrês, full, 180,17 plêsiasmos, assembly 187,11 poiein, to produce, 193,4; 199,12.13.14; to render, 195,27; to make, 199,4; to act (on),

Greek-English Index to 1.5-6 199,15.16.19; to do, 199,17; to create, 202,11; other tr., 193,33; to poioun, creative agency, 197,30 poiêtês, creator, 196,6 poiêtikos, productive, 183,22; 197,14; 198,4; active, 184,18; 204,10; efficient (cause), 186,20; effectively causing (effectively be a cause), 186,21 poion, to, quality, 192,7.33; 194,27 poiotês, quality, 191,24; 194,16.18; kata poiotêta, qualitative, 197,1 polueidôs, in a manifold way, 183,16 polukoiraniê, having many rulers, 182,31 poson, to, quantity, 192,33; 194,27 posotês, quantity, 193,18.19 pou, place (the category), 192,34 pragma, thing, 198,29; 199,2 proballesthai, to set out, 190,24 problêma, preliminary, 200,5 prolambanein, to take, 200,11 propherein, to produce, 196,20 prosapodeiknunai, to also show, 196,21 prosdiorismos, further qualification, 202,17 prosêgoria, name, 181,24 prosekhês, subsequent, 202,28; immediately concerned with, 206,3 etc.; proximate, 197,33; 198,3.11 prosekhesteros, more immediate,190,8 prosekhôs, proximately, 192,25; 193,2; other tr., 194,25 proskataskeuazein, to establish in addition, 190,27 proslambanein, to further assume, 194,10; 200,32 prostithenai, to add, 190,29.30; 197,27; 200,7 prosupakouein, to understand, 201,9 proteros, prior, 188,17; 197,2; 199,29; 200,25; 201,3.4.5.7 prôtistos, very first, 196,26; prime, 198,36 protithesthai, to set oneself a task, 190,23; 191,16 prôtos, first, 191,7.8; 193,29; 194,19; primary, 192,17.26.27; 193,26.27;

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195,9.18; 196,27; 197,17.20; 199,6.7 proüparkhein, to pre-exist, 197,30; 200,22; 201,19; 202,2 psukhros, cold, 196,34; 197,11 puk(i)nos, compact, 183,25; dense, 180,7 etc. puknôsis, compression, 180,15; condensation, 196,34; 203,4; 204,1 puknotês, condensation, 203,34.35 rhêteon, one must say, 193,16 rhêton, passage, 193,5; 202,4; text, 199,31 sarx, flesh, 201,33 sêma, sign, 180,3 sêmainein, to mean, 191,13; to indicate, 194,20; 195,17; to signify, 198,18 skhêma, shape, 197,2; 199,25 skhêmatizein, to give shape to, 203,32 sklêros, hard, 197,5 skopein, to investigate, 195,11 skopos, intention, 202,3 sôma, body, 195,15; 198,25; 199,15; 201,25 sômatikos, corporeal, 195,12; 201,26 sômatoeidês, body-like, 201,26 sophizesthai, to be just clever, 202,27 sterêsis, privation, 181,33; 191,28.31; 192,10.21.24; 193,11.34; 194,1.5.28; 197,9.19; 198,1.13.22.23.24.25.33; 201,10.11; 202,8.10.12; 203,20; 206,25 etc. stoikheiôdês, elementary (foundation), 179,28; elementary, 181,8; 182,33; elemental, 197,14; 198,4; 204,28 stoikheion, element, 180,21.27; 181,20; 198,8; 195,30; 197,10; 199,18.26; 201,19.20.21.22; 202,8; 203,6 etc. stoikheiôtos, composed of, produced from, elements, 201,20.22 sullogismos, argument, 199,31; 200,27; syllogism, 200,9; deductive reasoning, 182,11; reasoning, 184,7 sullogistikos, deductive, 202,27

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sullogizesthai, to argue, 190,32; other tr., 199,12 sumbebêkos, accident, 195,1.19; 200,10.11.13.17; kata sumbebêkos, accidentally, 185,9; 208,11 sumphônein, to come to the same thing, 202,29; to agree, 202,33; to be in harmony 204,9 sumphônia, agreement, 179,28; 182,9 etc. sunagein, to conclude, 190,31; 194,11; 201,1; to collect together, 199,18; to run, 199,32 sunalêtheuein, to both be true, 202,15 sunapodeiknunai, to show concurrently, 179,26; 190,28 sunêmmenon, premiss, 195,25; 200,21 sunerkhesthai, to come together, 201,27 sungenês, generic(ally) cognate, 186,12 sunistanai, to occur, 196,7 sunkoruphoun, to make culminate, 197,12 sunkrisis, compounding, 186,7; combination, 180,28; 187,3; 196,35; 197,7.15.18; 203,4 sunkritikos, combinatory, 189,17.18; to sunkritikon, compressiveness, 194,30 sunolon, to, absolute, 181,15 suntattein, to combine with, 202,18 suntelein, to contribute, 198,15 sunthetos, composite, 185,24.28 etc.; 191,19.21; 201,14.24; 202,7.11; compound, 203,15; 205,5

sunuparkhein, to co-exist together, 184,35; to subsist together, 185,2 sustoikhia, coordinated series, 181,9; column, 189,32.34; list, 196,30 tauton, same (n.), 197,8 taxis, order, 193,29,30 tekhnikos, artificial, 184,15; 187,18 telos, end, 193,5 thaumazein, to surprise, 194,13; 201,11 theasthai, (paraphrase used), 197,20 theôrein, to observe, 191,15.22; 193,7.10; 194.6; 196,7 thermos, hot, 196,34; 197,11 thesis, position, 197,2; 199,26 tithenai, to make, 190,25; 192,6; to propose, 192,10; to posit, 196,13; to tithenai, inclusion, 198,6 tomê, division, 191,28 trakhus, rough, 193,9 tripêkhus, three cubits long, 194,32 tukhon, to, chance thing, 184,12.13 etc.; anything at random, 184,17.23; that which is random, 202,24; just anything, 195,13.16; 204,32 xulon, wood, 198,37 zêtein, to ask, 191,13; 198,3; to seek, 192,5.15; 194,5; 202,6.8; to discover, 202,3 zêtêsis, investigation, 201,17 zopheros, gloomy, 181,5

Subject Index to 1.5-6 Compiled by Michael Atkinson and Michael Share affirmation by transposition 200,32 Alexander 191,18; 192,16; 193,4.23; 195,3; 196,12; 197,23; 198,2.7; 199,31; 201,8 formalised Aristotle’s arguments n.59 interpretation of and comments on 189b25-6 ‘in a single genus there is always a single contrariety’ 207,7-12 on contraries quoted in 187,23-4 on Empedocles 188,29-31 on everlasting (transcendental) v. generated (proximate) principles 197,23-198,1 remarks about the contraries: hot, dry, uneven, and love 189,19ff. Ammonius 192,14; 193,1.22; 198,17; nn.19-20, 23, 46, 76, 133, 144 exposition of the phrase ‘contraries do not come from each other’ 183,18ff. Anaxagoras 195,21; 196,1; n.130 on contraries 180,26ff.; quoted 181,3-6 Anaximenes n.76 air 203,2 on contraries and principles 180,14-16; quoted 189,1 (see n.38) Aristotle passim demonstrative argument in n.53 discussion of De Generatione 331a16ff. 207,3-12 doctrine of three principles 204,3 evidentiary value of work of earlier thinkers in n.53 failure to use syllogisms in scientific works n.59 on 188a26 181,31

on focal meaning n.73 privation, substratum and form 204,20-3 quotation of Metaph. 1076a4 (‘having many rulers is not good’) 182,31 quotation of Phys.189b16 183,1 quotation of Phys.189a17-18 183,29-30 remarks in GC 329b26-9 189,17-18 views on the theory that there are two contrarieties 205,28-206,3 see also categories (Aristotelian) arrangement, see under composition being 193,25-194,13 a single genus 194,6-7 in all categories 194,30-195,2 intelligible being 194,9-10 categories (Aristotelian) 191,17-195,18; n.64 other categories don’t derive being from substance 193,25-30 each has a substantial element 194,30-2 individual categories: quality 191,24; 192,7.33; 194,16.18; 197,1; n.64, 100; primary contrariety is like and unlike 194,26-7 individual categories: quantity 193,18.19; 192,33; n.64, 100; primary contrariety is excess and defect 193,17-18; is equal and unequal 194,27-8 individual categories: relation n.100 individual categories: posture 192,34; n.64 individual categories: place 192,34; n.64

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see also substance change 184,18ff. change takes place from something dissimilar but naturally disposed to change 186,29; 187,2ff. commentators concerned with proper sequence n.57 composition differences between composition and arrangement 187,10ff. consensus evidentiary value of 199,22-7; n.53 contraries all contraries reducible to excess and defect 204,8 all things come to be or are destroyed from contraries or into contraries or things in between, 186,8ff. are accidents 200,9-10 are differentiae 200,14-15 as a single nature 203,3ff. as principles 190,23-191,3; 202,23 battle over substratum n.148 cannot be principles on own 199,8-10 cannot effectively be a cause of each other 186,20 combination and separation 204,6 contraries as active or passive 204,10ff. distinguished from opposites (antikeimena) 182,1ff.; 185,3-4 excess and defect 204,2 form a hierarchy 196,27-35; n.76 great and small 204,7 in a substratum 203,15 individual pairs: combination and separation 196,35; 197,7.15.18; dense and rare n.76; dry and moist 197,11; equal and unequal 194,27; even and odd 193,8.11; even and uneven 193,14; form and formless 193,10.15; hard and soft 197,5; hot and cold 196,34; 197,11; n.76; like and unlike 194,27; limit and unlimited 197,7; love and strife 197,12.13; 199,17.18.20.26; nn.85, 102; rarefaction and condensation 196,34; 203,33; 204,7; same and other 197,8; smooth and rough

193,9; superior and inferior 193,19.21; sweet and sour 191,25; 193,8; 196,32; 197,5.6; 198,30; white and black 191,25; 194,16.17.18; 196,33; 197,4; 198,14.25.30; 199,17; more and less 203,34; 204,7 naturally disposed to affect or be affected by each other 186,24ff. not all things which are different are contraries 183,6ff. not principles 200,1-3.31-201,4 not principles when taken on their own 202,30-1 not substance(s) 200,11-17.28-31 ‘of equal strength’ with each other 183,33-4 one primary pair 199,6-7 primary and lowest contraries 205,9ff. (see n.23) primary contraries are the principles of coming to be 184,6 sense in which contraries come to be from each other 182,20ff.; 186,15ff. some universal and imperishable, some particular and perishable 197,29-198,1 two contraries distinct from the substratum 204,31 what comes to be comes to be from a contrary 202,24 whether the contraries are principles in a similar way 208,15ff. see also form and privation; matter and form; excess and defect contrariety 191,10-198,18 passim; 201,29; 202,5 all contrarieties reduced to form and privation 206,24-5; 207,2-3 a single contrariety in substance 206,15ff. contrarieties in other genera not dependent on that in substance 207,20ff. contrariety of possession and privation common to the ten genera 207,28-9 contrariety in substance a principle 206,23 form and privation the principal contrariety 182,3-4

Subject Index to 1.5-6 one primary contrariety in each genus 191,8-193,15; n. 46 there can only be a single contrariety 205,15ff. the primary contrariety can be predicated of the others 207,23 Damascius n.131 Damon 185,36 (see n.32) Democritus atoms infinite in number 196,35-197,1 atoms substratum for contraries 199,24-6 contraries as principles 180,16ff. derivation of qualities 197,1-3 differentiae 191,29-30; 193,3-4.20-23; 194,20-4 Diogenes the intermediate 203,3 division (diairesis) in 189b16-23 205,28ff. dyad 183,13-17 elements (the four) air 203,7; air as a principle 203,17; without quality 203,18; no opposition within it 203,19 all elements derived from matter and form 203,9 earth 203,8 fire 203,7; its particularly active nature 203,24 involved with oppositions 203,6-9 water 203,8; naturally able to turn into the contraries, 203,20 Empedocles 179,23; 195,30; 196,8; 199,26 four elements as principles 188,30-1; (along with love and strife) 189,2-3 four elements as substratum for love and strife 199,17-18 necessity 197,13; n.131 on contrariety 180,25-30; 188,25-8 on love and strife 197,10-13; n.130; their equivalence to combination and separation 197,15 Eudemus 195,6; 201,26 on subject matter of physics 195,10-15 Eudorus (see n.10) on Pythagoreanism quoted 181,10ff.17ff.22ff. excess and defect 192,29-193,1; n.76

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substance and genus as matter 207,29ff. see also matter and form matter and form elements of composite substance 201,13-14 not corporeal 201,25-6 not strictly principles 201,32-202,2 not substances 201,23-5 nihil ex nihilo 196,4-5 opposites (antikeimena) change from opposites to opposites 184,14ff.; 185,4ff. opposition in the divine realm somehow hidden 183,15-16 ousia translation of n.88 Parmenides (hot and cold as principles) 179,29ff.; 188,28-9; quoted 180,1-13 perishing, see generation and perishing Philoponus nn.72, 144 philosophers (phusikoi/phusiologoi) 202,33ff.; 203,28; 204,27; 207,1 believe in three principles 203,28-31 believe that the primary contrariety is single 207,1-2 most agree that the principles are contraries 179,28-9; 187,31-2; 188,13ff. those who posit the prior and comprehensive (oppositions) as principles speak better 190,6ff. see also under individual philosophers phusikos, translation of n.49 Plato on contraries n. 148 on principles 197,27-9 quotation of Phdr.245D1-2 182,17-18 Plato’s view of form as one thing and matter as two 204,12ff. Porphyry 192,34 ascribes to Anaximenes remarks about wet and dry (as principles) 188,32-189,1 doctrine that there is only a single contrariety in a single genus 207,12ff. interpretation of the phrase

(189b21) ‘generating from each other’ 206,3-8 principles 190,21-202,19 passim a single contrariety in the principles 206,26ff. as three 202,29ff.; 203,31; oneness, excess and defect, 204,4-5; doctrine of three principles not an Aristotelian innovation 204,3-4 called ‘elements’ (elemental principles) 204,29 cannot be principle of a principal 200,20 contrariety in substance a principle 206,23 defined 182,12-13 discussion of whether there are two or three principles 208,6ff. general and particular principles 190,9ff. include the (primary) contrarieties 190,24-5; 196,12-15.18-27; 199,6-7 include the substratum 190,28-9; 199,7-8; 202,1 not identical with what is produced from them 201,19-22 not infinite in number 190,32; 190,20-5; 191,3-12 not just one 190,30-191,3; n.58 number of 190,21-3.27-30; 196,12-14 only primary contrariety a principle 197,15-21 permanence 196,11; 197,22-7; 198,2-23 primary contraries are principles 182,13 primary principles 183,9ff. shared in by all things 197,3-9; 198,21-30 ungenerated (transcendental) v. generated (proximate) 197,29-198,1 privation whether privation is a principle 208,12-13 see also form and privation Pythagoreans on principles 181,7ff.; 189,2 their table of opposites n.125 use of numerical terms 204,16 species 191,28-30; 192,9

Subject Index to 1.5-6 substance = all being 194,1-18 a single genus 190,21; 191,9.18-28, 194,1-4; so contains a single (primary) contrariety 191,9-10.26-8.31-192,1; which is form and privation 191,31 contrariety in 206,16ff.; other contrarieties dependent on contrariety in substance 206,22 does not give being to other categories 193,25-33 meaning 201,7-37 no contrariety in 192,4; not a contrary, 195,10 substance not composed of substance 201,18-21 substance not contrary to substance 200,24; 201,9-17; 202,10 the primary genus 206,16 three genera of: matter, form, the composite 191,18-21; 201,14-15 substratum accepts change in itself 205,7 as active 204,11-12 as passive and material 204,11 as principle 190,28-9; 199,7-8; 202,1

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as ‘single genus’ 193,5-6 fought over by contraries n.148 impossibility of there being more than one substratum 205,1ff. = matter 193,31; 199,7-8; n.78 must be without a share in the contraries 203,9ff. necessity of a single substratum 204,30-2 not self-sufficient per se 203,29 not strictly a principle 201,12-13 not strictly substance 201,12-13 substance the substratum of those things which come to be in respect of an accidental attribute 208,19ff. substratum also necessary for things which come to be in a substantial sense 208,24ff. substratum as receptacle 205,3 third thing underlying the contraries 202,32; 208,5 Syrianus 192,29; 193,16; n.46 Thales n.76 on principles 180,14 water 203,2

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Memorial Notice This second half of the book is the last of the ten and a half volumes translated for the series by Ian Mueller. As the third of the volumes published posthumously, it is the only one that he did not live to revise. But with the help of outstanding comments by Donald Russell, James Wilberding and Michael Atkinson, the general editor was able to supply a revision. For an extensive appreciation of Ian Mueller’s work, see Stephen Menn ‘In memoriam Ian Mueller’, Aestimatio 7, 2010, pp. 193-228.

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Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.7-9 Translated by Ian Mueller 189b27-31 So that there is neither one element nor are the elements more than two or three [is evident. But as we have said, [deciding] which of these alternatives holds involves great difficulty. Chapter 7 So let us state our view in this way, first discussing coming to be in general. For the natural way to proceed is first to discuss common features] and then to investigate the specific features of each thing. Having shown that there must be one contrariety among the principles and a substratum underlying the contrarieties, he concludes that there is neither one element – since there are contraries and a substratum underlying them – nor, however, are the elements more than two or three; for the substratum is one and the contraries are not more than two. But it is worth investigating whether there are in fact two or three principles, (this is what the words ‘as we have said’ refer to). For if the contraries are taken as a single principle, there would be two principles, matter and the contraries, but if the contraries are taken as two, there are three principles. It is better [to say there are two] because1 ‘privation’ is ambiguous and is either thought to be the same as matter or, even if they are different, privation is a principle in an accidental sense. So the difficulty is whether there are two principles, form and matter, or whether there are three, privation being added, or whether they are two in a way and three in a way – and the last will be seen to be true. These are the difficulties which he articulates next. And the great perplexity is about whether contraries are principles in the same way or whether one is a principle per se, the other in an accidental sense. And in concluding this discussion he says, ‘Therefore there is a way in which one should say there are two principles and a way in which one should say there are three. And there is a way in which one should say the principles are contraries } and a way in which one should not say this’.2 Since he had proposed to find the principles of what comes to be by considering change and coming to be, but of the things which come to be those which come to be with respect to some attribute have substance as an obvious substratum, but those which come to be with respect to

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substance have a substratum which is less obvious; therefore, having first discussed coming to be generally and setting out examples of change with respect to some attribute, he then distinguishes coming to 25 be with respect to substance from this and shows that in this case a substratum is also necessary, and also how privation is related to it. He says this discussion is more general, because he invokes not just natural coming to be but also the coming to be due to art – the coming to be of the musical is an example. He has said3 at the very beginning of this treatise that the study of what is common and general is prior for us to 30 the study of specifics. And it is also clear from what is said here that what he there called universals, from which he said one should proceed to the particulars, were the common and general things which are better known to us. 209,1

189b32-190a31 We say that one thing comes to be from another, different things from different things, [meaning both simple things and composites. By this I mean the following. It is possible for human to come to be musical, and it is possible for not musical to come to be musical or for not musical human to come to be musical human. I call what comes to be human and not musical, simple and I call what they come to be, musical, simple.4 And I call what comes to be and what it comes to be, composite when we say that not musical human comes to be musical human. Of these things some are not only said to come to be this, but also to come to be from that, for example to come to be musical from not musical, but this is not so in every case: for musical does not come to be from human, but human comes to be musical. Of the simple things which come to be we say that some things which come to be endure, and others do not endure. For human endures and exists when human comes to be musical, but not musical and unmusical do not endure either simply or in composition. (190a13) Having made these distinctions, it is possible, if one investigates in the way we are describing, to grasp on the basis of all the things which come to be that there must always be a substratum, namely what comes to be, and even if this is one in number nevertheless it is not one in form. (By ‘in form’ and ‘in logos’ I mean the same thing.) For being human and being unmusical are not the same thing, and one endures but the other does not endure. (190a18) And what is not an opposite endures (since human endures), but not musical and unmusical do not endure; nor does what is composed of both, for example, unmusical human. We speak of something coming to be from something (and not this coming to be something) more in the case of what does not endure; for example we say that musical comes to be from unmusical but not that musical comes to be from human. However, we sometimes speak the same

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way in the case of things which endure; for we say that statue comes to be from bronze but not that bronze comes to be statue. However, what comes to be from an opposite which does not endure is spoken of in both ways, and we say both this comes to be from that and that comes to be this;] for we say both that musical comes to be from unmusical and that unmusical becomes musical. And so it is the same in the case of a composite, since it is from unmusical human that unmusical human too is said to come to be musical. Next, he proposes to find the nature of the substratum in a clearer way, although he has already successfully found what this nature is and confirmed it. However, he is also now presenting to us the difference between privation and substratum, first arguing on the basis of different forms of expression and then on the basis of the very nature of real things. He pursues the argument in the following way. Of coming to be and change generally, some is simple, and some is composite. Simple coming to be occurs when we say human comes to be musical, taking human as what comes to be, musical as what it comes to be, or when we say that unmusical comes to be musical. Composite coming to be occurs when we say that not musical human comes to be musical human. I think that with these examples Aristotle is indicating for a start what is common to substratum and privation; for human is a substratum, unmusical a privation, and we say that both come to be what the form is (hoper to eidos) in the same way, and that he proceeds next to present the differences, and again first the difference based on what we say. He says,5 ‘Of these things, unmusical and such things are not only said to come to be this particular thing, as unmusical is said to become musical, but also to come to be from this, for example to come to be musical from not musical’. But it is not the same with human and in general things of this kind, since we do not say that musical comes to be from human, but that human comes to be musical. And this difference is found in the way we speak. A second difference is on the basis of real things: of things which come to be what the form is, some come to be while enduring (human endures when human comes to be musical), but some depart (unmusical does not endure [when] musical [comes to be]). (190a13) The following things have been distinguished: that things are said to come to be in two ways, either as simple things or as composites, and that things that come to be differ both in the way they are described and in terms of enduring or not enduring. From all these things it is possible to grasp that there must always be a substratum, namely what comes to be, that is, either that from which we say there is coming to be, for example, unmusical, or the thing said to come to be, for example, human; and even if these are one in number (because one of them [for example, unmusical] cannot exist on its own), they are different in logos, since human and unmusical are not the same [in logos].

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(198a18) And next he applies what he said to substratum and privation. And first he sets out the difference between them in terms of real things, saying that what endures is the substratum and what departs is the privation, finding this difference to be the most important and obviously providing the explanation [of the difference between substratum and privation]. For because the substratum is not contrary to the form, it endures when the form enters. But because the privation is opposite to and incompatible with the form, it always departs when the form enters. Next he brings in the difference related to language, associating the cases in which we speak both of this coming to be and of coming to be from this with privation, and those in which we only speak of this coming to be with substratum. But if we sometimes speak of coming to be from this in the case of a substratum, as when we say that statue comes to be from bronze, we no longer also say of the same thing that this comes to be; for we do not say that bronze comes to be statue. Consequently, if in the case of a privation we speak of both this coming to be and coming to be from this, but we only say the latter in the case of a substratum, privation and substratum also differ from one another in this respect also. If it is necessary to make the distinction in a general way, [we can say the following.] To speak of coming to be from this is more appropriate in the case of what does not endure, that is, the privation, since ‘comes to be from this’ can also mean ‘comes to be after this’. However, ‘this comes to be that’ is more suitable to what endures, since something which endures must come to be what it comes to be. And indeed when we say that unmusical comes to be musical we are speaking with reference to a substratum. For what we say applies to a substratum since unmusicality itself does not become musical, but the substratum of unmusicality, insofar as it possesses unmusicality, does become musical. In the same way too, when we say that statue comes to be from bronze, we speak with respect to what in the bronze is the (nameless) privation of statue. For since coming to be is from privation, when we are at a loss for a name for the privation, we signify it by means of the substratum because the privation exists in the substratum. And the same is true both with simple things and with composites. For in the case of composites the substratum together with the privation, for example, unmusical human, does not endure [when] the substratum with the form, that is musical human, [comes to be], because musical is opposite to unmusical. And indeed we also say that unmusical human comes to be musical human from unmusical human. This is the general sense of what Aristotle is saying. As for the details, he says that what comes to be is the substratum and the privation, for example, human and unmusical, what something comes to be is the form, for example musical. And when he says that what comes to be is a substratum, he does not mean that matter alone is now a substratum, but rather the whole of what comes to be, which includes

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both matter and privation. He says that even if this thing which comes to be is one in number (since the substratum and the privation coincide in one thing because the privation cannot exist on its own), nevertheless they are different in form. Since in the case of substratum and privation one does not speak of differing in form in the strict sense (matter being completely without form, and privation being the absence of form) he quickly changes ‘not one in form’ to ‘different in logos’ when he says, ‘By “in form” and “in logos” I mean the same thing’. For the logos of human and of unmusical are not the same. It will be clear to us as we proceed that privation also belongs to matter and belongs to it as an attribute, but let it also be said now. For if privation did not belong [to matter] there would be no coming to be, since coming to be is from what is not so and so but is naturally constituted to be so and so. But if privation did not belong to matter as an attribute but per se, the substratum would perish when the privation was lost since the being of the substratum would involve being deprived. But if the substratum were potentially, and potentiality lies in privation, why isn’t the substratum privation because of its own logos? Or do we say that it is a substratum actually, for this at least it does not have potentially? But it has accidentally the capacity to participate in forms, so that equally the privation of forms which it is going to receive will be accidental to it. What attaches to it is the capacity to share in forms, so that being deprived of the forms which it is going to receive would be an attribute of it. Alexander says, When substratum is taken as the matter of something, then it involves privation; but when the substratum is taken on its own, it does not involve privation.

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However, Boethus6 said: Because it is without shape (amorphos), matter is said to be without form (aneideos). For matter seems to be called matter with respect to its future, and when it receives a form, it is no longer called matter, but substratum; for it is said to be a substratum for something because the thing is already in it. But perhaps it is called matter as last (eskhatê) [matter], and substratum in relation to form, whether it already possesses the form or is going 20 to receive it. However, Alexander says, Matter is qualityless in terms of its own logos, not in the sense of being deprived of quality (for privation is a quality), but in the sense that it is characterised negatively, since just as it is receptive of form, so it is receptive of privation.

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Against this statement of Alexander, one might object first of all that if privation is a quality and quality is a kind of form, and there is a 25 privation for every form which comes to be, there will be a privation of a privation; but if a privation is an absence, there will also be an absence of an absence, and so on to infinity. Furthermore, if, just as matter can receive form it can also receive privation, when the form is present the matter will have a privation of a privation. So either form is a privation of a privation, which is absurd, or there will be some other privation 30 existing together with the form. And, since every privation is opposite to a form, what form will be opposite to that privation? So perhaps [we should distinguish two kinds of privation]. One is the privation of the Categories which is opposite to possession (hexis), as blindness is opposed to vision. Such a privation does not revert to the opposite condition and share somehow in the quality and itself also become tinged with the form of which it is said to be the privation. Aristotle said the following about this kind of privation:7 35 212,1

In the case of privation and possession it is impossible for each to change into the other. For there is a change from possession to privation, but change from privation to possession is impossible. For a person who has become blind does not recover his sight8 again; nor does a person who is bald regain his hair; nor does a toothless person grow teeth again.9

Another kind of privation is the one which is opposite to a form and does 5 revert to it so that coming to be and perishing comes about in terms of the change of these two into one another. And this privation exists after the form[‘s arrival] since it is a ‘disabling’ (pêrôsis) of the form, and it is to be found both prior to and after the form as an absence of the form, though with a suitability for it. Consequently [with this kind of privation] there will not be a privation of a privation, but only form and privation, the latter being a certain absence of form. And when the form is present the privation is not present. Nor is the absence of the 10 privation present as another privation. For privation is absence of form but not of privation. And the form can be said to be present or absent, but the presence [of form] cannot be said to be present or absent, as if there could be a further presence of presence. And similarly with 15 absence; for when some things are connected and then separated from each other, we do not say that there is a separation of a separation. 190a31-b1 Coming to be is spoken of in several ways. [In some cases we say not that something comes to be but that it comes to be some particular thing (tode ti). And only substances are said to come to be without qualification. But in the other cases it is evident that there must be a substratum, namely what comes to be.10 For

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something comes to be of a certain size or quality or related to something else or at a certain time11 or place, with some substratum underlying because only substance is not said of another substratum,] but all other things are said of substance. He has proposed to find the substratum in all cases of coming to be and to present the difference between it and the privation. And, having started from the easier cases (for the coming to be of attributes which takes place with substance as a substratum is relatively clear), he next turns to showing that also in the case of substance there must be some underlying substratum and a privation both for the coming to be and for the perishing of substance. And first he indicates that ‘coming to be is spoken of in several ways’ and in as many ways as there are kinds of things which come to be. In the case of the nine categories [other than substance], we do not say that something comes to be without qualification, but that it comes to be some particular thing. For [in the case of these categories] we do not say that the underlying substance comes to be without qualification, but that it comes to be white or three feet long or to the right. But in the case of a substance such as human we say human comes to be, not comes to be some particular thing. The reason for this is that because substance exists on its own it comes to be on its own, but, since other things have their being in substance, substance is said to come to be with respect to them, but not in the sense of coming to be without qualification or on its own. And so in the case of other things it is evident that, when coming to be comes about, there must be a substratum, namely what comes to be.12 For there must always be the thing which is said to come to be some particular thing, for example, white or three feet long because all the attributes exist in an underlying substance. But because, unlike other things, substance does not exist in a substratum, the substratum of coming to be and perishing in its case is not evident in the same way. 190b1-9 That both substance13 [and whatever other14 unqualified existents there are come to be from some substratum will be evident if we investigate. For there is always something which underlies from which what comes to be [comes to be]; for example, plants and animals come to be from seed. (190b5) Of things which come to be without qualification some, such as statue, come to be by change of shape, others, such as things which grow, by addition, others, such as a herm coming to be from stone, by subtraction, others, such as house, by putting things together, others,] such as things which turn materially,15 by qualitative change. It is clear that the other categories which are in substance as a substratum come to be and perish having substance directly as a substratum.

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And substance itself which comes to be and in general anything which is distinct from those previously mentioned cases16 which we refer to as ‘some particular thing’ are without qualification and are not some particular thing – that is, they are substances and not attributes. And, even if they do not have their being in a substratum, they always contain in themselves something which underlies as a substratum with respect to them, in which they have their coming to be and perishing. He proves this first by induction: there is some substratum for all cases of coming to be, such as the seed in the case of plants and animals, since plants and animals come to be when seed endures and at the same time alters. (190b5) Alexander says that after the induction Aristotle uses a universal demonstration and proves that in all the modes of coming to be what comes to be comes to be from a substratum and, in proving that this holds universally, proves that it holds of substance, at least if substance comes to be by one of the modes Aristotle sets out. And therefore he [Alexander] understands ‘things which come to be without qualification’ as ‘things which come to be in every and any way’, so that Aristotle is again recurring to the common modes of coming to be, among which he includes substantial coming to be. ‘For’, Alexander says, ‘substantial coming to be is also classed under qualitative change’, and perhaps his meaning would be not that substantial coming to be is qualitative change but that it does not occur without qualitative change. So Alexander. And it seems that the great Syrianus17 also accepts this kind of exegesis. But perhaps this division is of the kinds of things which come to be substantially. For the shape is the form and substance of a statue, not a quality of it. For if a statue comes to be from a sphere, the form comes to be a different one and not just differently qualified. And if alteration in the strict sense, which is change of quality with the substratum remaining the same, were to include the other forms [of coming to be], how would it include the change18 of the substratum which is substantial? And how could it be reasonable for Aristotle, after having taken care of the other kinds of coming to be, to return to them again? And if he were doing this, why did he not include all the kinds of coming to be which he mentioned previously19 in his enumeration? For before he mentioned relation, time, and place. However, the exegete20 accepts that the present division is also exhaustive. So perhaps here too by ‘things which come to be without qualification’ Aristotle means things which come to be in the strict sense and with respect to substance. For earlier21 he said that only substances come to be without qualification whereas other things do not come to be without qualification – they come to be some particular thing. And with this interpretation the doctrine is coherent because after the inductive confirmation based on seed it adds the necessity, derived from the division, that not only attributes come to be from substratum and

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privation (as was proved earlier), but so do substances themselves. And the division would be the following. Of the things which come to be as substances, some come to be as simples, some as composites. Composites, such as a house, come to be by putting things together. Of the simples some come to be in their depth, some on their surface; the latter come to be by change of shape (for when a statue comes to be from a sphere, there is also substantial coming to be), and of the former, some come to be as a whole (as a human comes to be when seed is altered), others with respect to a part; and of the latter some come to be by addition (as do things which grow), some by subtraction (as do things which diminish) – for growth and diminution are particular kinds of coming to be and perishing. And notice that here Aristotle does not take alteration as just change22 with respect to a quality, but as change with respect to the turning of the matter, as when seed changes to plants and animals; coming to be with respect to substance comes about in terms of this kind of turning. But if Aristotle were enumerating the kinds of change, why did he not include change of place? And why did he distinguish change of shape from alteration? In investigating why Aristotle has posited change of shape and alteration as two kinds of change (for if shape is also a quality,23 change of shape is also alteration), Alexander says that the being24 of alteration is not simple: Rather what is changed in shape has its coming to be in the exchange in order and position of the substratum, but that which is altered exchanges some quality and affection, but nothing of the substratum, insofar as it is a substratum, is transformed in alteration. Only change with respect to affective qualities is properly speaking alteration.

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But if this is correct why does Alexander say25 that coming to be in the strict sense is also classed under alteration? For change with respect to affective qualities should not be coming to be in the strict sense. 190b9-17 That all things which come to be in this way come to be from substrata is evident, [and so it is clear from what has been said that everything which comes to be is always composite, and what comes to be (gignomenon) is one thing and what comes to be this (ho touto gignetai)26 is another, and this in two ways: either a substratum or an opposite. I say that unmusical is an opposite, human the underlying substratum, and lacking shape, lacking form, and lacking order are opposites,] while bronze, stone, or gold is a substratum. If everything which comes to be in the strict sense comes to be in one of these modes and what comes to be in one of these modes comes to be

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215,1 from a substratum, it is clear that everything which comes to be in the strict sense comes to be from a substratum. That each of the things mentioned comes to be from a substratum will be clear to us if we examine the matter. For in the case of what is changed in shape there is something which is changed in shape, and in the case of what comes to be by subtraction there is something from which there is subtraction, 5 and in the case of addition there is something to which there is an addition, and in the case of putting things together, there are things which are put together, and in the case of alteration there must be something which alters. So if there is a substratum in every case of coming to be, both substantial and with respect to an attribute, and there is also something27 which supervenes on the substratum, it is clear that everything which comes to be is a composite of two things: [i] what 10 comes to be, that is, the form, such as musical (and again he chooses this example as clearer, and it perhaps also provides a hint that he is again speaking in general about all coming to be); and [ii] what it comes to be – this is twofold, the substratum and the opposite of the form, since we say both that human and unmusical have come to be musical. Here, in contrast with before, Aristotle calls the form ‘what comes to be’ (gino15 menon) and the matter and the privation ‘what comes to be [something]’ (ho ginetai), thereby indicating, I think, that it is possible to speak in either way. Having set out unmusical and human as examples of what comes to be comes to be from, he does not give an example of what comes to be, because this is clear from [the example of] the opposite. And so he calls the privation an opposite, it being obvious that musical is the 20 opposite of unmusical. He sets out the examples of these things in order to distinguish privation from substratum. 190b17-23 It is evident then that since there are causes and principles of natural things [from which they primarily are or28 have come to be (not in an accidental sense, but each thing as what it is said to be in substance), everything comes to be from a substratum and from form (morphê). For musical human is composed from human and musical in a way (since you can resolve the logoi29 into their logoi).] So it is clear that what comes to be comes to be from these things. He has proved that every composite which comes to be is a compound of 25 what comes to be and what it comes to be, that is, a compound of the form and the substratum. Using this he next proves30 that what comes to be and what it comes to be are principles and elements and that they are in a way two and in a way three. He argues as follows. Every natural thing which comes to be is composed per se and primarily from substra30 tum and form. What is composed per se and not in an accidental sense, and primarily from substratum and form, has the substratum and the form as principles; for musical human is directly composed of human

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and musical and so is also resolved into them. However, since the substratum is one in number but two in form and logos, and of these one, matter, is per se, the other, the privation, is in an accidental sense, it follows that in one way the principles are two – if one takes the elements31 which can be counted and inhere per se in the composite and from which the composite is composed primarily, per se, and not in an accidental sense – and in another way three – if one also takes the privation as a principle and element on the grounds that it was in the substratum before the composite came to be. And the composite would not have come to be if this thing32 had not previously departed; for human being would not come to be musical if it had not been unmusical previously and unmusical had not withdrawn. Consequently all natural things have elements and principles, two per se, form and matter, and in an accidental sense privation in addition, because it attaches to the matter, which has been proved to be a cause per se; but accidental causes are 33 [causes] in the strict sense. This, then, is the general sense of what Aristotle is saying. It should be signalled that Aristotle is also applying the terms ‘cause’ and ‘principle’ to matter when he says, ‘since there are causes and principles of natural things’. The words ‘from which they primarily are or have come to be’, etc. indicate that the discussion is seeking the elemental principles from which all natural things are when they are and have come to be when they have come to be. For things are from that from which they have come to be and they have come to be from that which they are; and here we are taking ‘form’ in a substantial, not an accidental, sense, that is, we are talking about being or having come to be from the things which fill out34 the substance of what comes to be. For the things from which something has come to be in this sense are its principles and causes in the strict sense. He adds this also because of privation; for what comes to be is also said to come to be from the contrary which does not inhere. But it comes to be in an accidental sense from this and not in the sense that this is in its substance and fills out its being. The phrase ‘each thing as what it is said to be in substance (190b19)’ is similar to what is said about homonymous expressions in the Categories:35 ‘the logos of the substance corresponding to the name is different’. For each thing is composed, as if from elements, of those things which fill out the substance of each thing spoken of in the respect in which it is spoken of. He says, ‘musical human is composed from human and musical in a way’ because it is not put together in the way that things like bricks and stones, which are completely separated and exist as individual things, are put together [to make a wall]. Therefore things like musical human are not resolved in the way those things are, but their resolution is into logoi and definitions, and so their composition is from these. It should be understood that it is one thing to seek the principles and

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elements of natural things from which, as primary ingredients, they are per se and not in an accidental sense, and another to seek the principles of change. For in terms of the first investigation privation would be a cause in an accidental sense, since it does not inhere, but in terms of the second it would be a cause per se. For just as form is a cause of change into being, so privation is a cause of change into not being. And privation is a cause of coming to be both by its presence (since what comes to be so and so must come to be from what is not so and so), and by its absence (since form supervenes when it departs). 217,1

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190b23-9 The substratum is one in number, [but two in form. For human and gold and, in general, matter can be counted, because it is more a particular thing, and what comes to be does not come to be from it in an accidental sense. But privation and contrariety are accidental. But form is one, for example, ordering or musical or any of the other things] which are predicated in this way. Here again he is describing the common features of matter and privation and their difference. For, insofar as privation exists together with matter before the form supervenes and is considered together with matter as a substratum, the substratum composed of form and matter is one in number. But insofar as matter, such as human or gold in the reshaping of gold objects,36 endures and can be pointed to and called some particular thing (for the necklace is a gold necklace and the ring is a gold ring) and since matter always inheres per se in the composite, it can also be counted; for what exists per se and can be pointed to can be counted in the strict sense. And human and gold, individual things which are also substrata, can be counted directly, and each of them is a particular thing. But since he adds to ‘human and gold’ the phrase ‘and, in general, matter’, but prime matter is no longer countable in the way human is and is not a this (since separated from form, it cannot be pointed to), for this reason he adds ‘rather’ to ‘a particular thing’.37 For matter is not a this without qualification, but it is a this insofar as it works together with the composite toward making it a particular thing, for example, one having come to be or being perceptible while itself enduring and being preserved in the [composite]. Aristotle indicates this with the words ‘and what comes to be does not come to be from it in an accidental sense’. And in general matter is countable and a particular thing because it exists in the compound, since, even if it is less countable than form is, it is still more countable than privation is. Indeed privation does not inhere in what comes to be in the way that form and matter do, so that what comes to be would not be said to have come to be from privation primarily and per se. But the composite is not a particular thing because of privation either, since privation does not endure and since it is only an absence, so that it is neither countable nor a particular thing. For privation is like a

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kind of negation, although it differs in some respects from negation. A negation cannot be counted and it is not a particular thing because it is indefinite. However, a privation differs from a negation because it also indicates the thing in which it is. Unmusical does not exist in everything but only in human. And if privation is not an independent cause, it is a 30 cause accidentally because it attaches to matter, which is a cause per se. For privation is not a being per se; rather it is a being in an accidental sense because it is an absence of form in what is naturally constituted to have the form. Accordingly the substratum is one in number, even if it is two in logos. And form is one of the elements which fill out the composite. And so it has become clear on the basis of what has been said, in what sense the principles can be said to be two and in what sense 35 three. In this connection it is worth pointing out how Aristotle has here written consistently with what Plato said about matter in the Timaeus. 218,1 For Plato has written,38 One should only refer to that in which these things are always appearing to come to be and from which in turn they vanish by using the words ‘this’ and ‘that’, and a little later,39 If someone were moulding every shape out of gold and never stopped transforming each one into all the others, and someone pointed to one of them and asked ‘What is it?’, in truth by far the safest thing would be to say that it is gold.

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Since ‘particular thing’ seems to be used sometimes of what endures and can be pointed to, and at other times of what exists on its own and is not in and does not belong to something else (and the composite is of this sort), here, in agreement with Plato, Aristotle applies ‘particular thing’ 10 to what endures, but a little later40 he will use it of what is complete and composite, and deny it of matter. 190b29-191a3 Therefore there is a way in which one should say that there are41 two principles [and a way in which one should say that there are three. And there is a way in which one should say the principles are contraries, such as musical and unmusical, hot and cold, tuned and untuned, and a way in which one should not say this, since it is impossible for contraries to be acted on by one another. This [difficulty] is also resolved because the substratum is different since it is not a contrary. Consequently in a way there are not more principles than contraries, but they are, so to speak, two in number, but not entirely two because they are different in

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being, but rather three. For to be human and to be unmusical are different and so are] to be lacking shape and to be bronze. 15 He has said that it is a great difficulty whether there are two principles or three and shown in what way there are two and in what way three. Concluding his discussion he says, ‘Therefore, there is a way in which one should say that there are two principles and a way in which one should say that there are three’, two if one takes the principles in the strict sense, substratum and form, but three if one takes in addition to the two the thing which is a principle in an accidental sense, privation. 20 He adds another way in which it is possible to say that there are two principles in one way and three in another. For there are two if one says that the contraries form and privation are principles on the grounds that coming to be and perishing come about because of the change of these two into one another. But there is a way in which it is impossible to say there are two since it is impossible for contraries to be acted on by one another and be entities existing on their own (kath’ heauta); for 25 they do not endure the presence of nor accept each other nor does a contrary (hoper to enantion) become what the other is. How then can other things be from contraries, if contraries are not acted upon by one another in any way? This difficulty is resolved by positing as a third principle substratum in which contraries will be able to act on one another; for this is not one of the contraries but it does endure42 the 30 presence of each of them. And in this way there are no longer still two principles, but three. And so in this way too it is true to say that there are in a way two principles and in a way three. And again it is possible to say alternatively that ‘there are not more principles than contraries’. For the principles in the strict sense, substratum and form, are equal in number to the contraries, of which there are two. And so again there are two principles in a way, but not entirely 35 two because even if the substratum is one in number it is two in logos; 219,1 for it is one thing as logos of matter, another as logos of privation, even if these things are thought to be one in number. And here it seems that Aristotle wishes to describe in multiple ways how it is possible to say that there are in one sense two principles and in another sense three. He said first43 that if they are taken per se there 5 are two, but if one adds the accidental principle there are three; then44 that taken as the contraries there are two, but three when they are taken together with the substratum; and then45 as equal in number to the contraries there are two, but, since one of the contraries is divisible in two in logos, there are three. Alexander says,

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different in number are separated in their own individual substances. Or perhaps, having said that they are two ‘in a way’, he adds the ‘way’ by saying ‘but they are, so to speak, two in number’; for matter together with privation is one in number, and form is one, but they are three because privation is different in logos from matter. And Alexander points out that He is now speaking in a rather ordinary way in saying that privation is contrary to form. For privation is opposite to form, but in the way that change is opposite to rest: how this is opposite he has said in the fifth book of this treatise,46 viz. that rest is opposite to change as a privation; for rest is an absence of change and nothing else, but rest does not apply to everything, but only to things which are naturally constituted to change. 191a3-5 How many principles of natural things which come to be there are [and in what way there are that many has been said. And it is clear that there must be a substratum for contraries] and the contraries must be two.

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He says quite accurately that the principles of ‘natural things which come to be’47 have been found. For he has not found the principles of absolutely everything which comes to be. For these are not the principles of choice. Nor has he found the principles of all natural things. For he has not found the principles of divine and everlasting things like 25 heavenly things, since these are natural because they are in motion, but they do not come to be because they have been proved everlasting; therefore the principles given do not apply to them. For there is no privation in heavenly things, which are eternal, nor is there this kind of matter, since there is not the kind of change on the basis of which matter was introduced. And so he himself writes the following in book 8 of the Metaphysics:48 Since ‘cause’49 has several senses, when one50 seeks the cause, one should state all the possible causes. For example, what is the material cause of human? The menstrual fluid? What is the moving cause? The seed? What is the formal cause? The essence. What is the51 final cause? The end. (But perhaps these two are the same.) And one should state the most proximate causes. What is the matter? [We must not say]52 fire or earth, but the specific matter. It is necessary to search in this way in the case of natural substance which comes to be if one is going to search correctly, since the causes53 are these and this many, and it is necessary to know the causes. There is a different story in the case of natural but

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everlasting substances. For perhaps some do not have matter or not this kind of matter, but only matter which can change place. And there is no matter for things which are natural but are not substance, but rather the substratum is the substance. And a little later he says:54

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Nor do all things have matter, but only those things which come to be and change into one another do. But things which are or are not without changing do not have matter. But even if the principles given are elemental in character, and principles of this kind are principles of composites, while the heavenly body is demonstrated to be simple, being made of a different, fifth substance which is alien to coming to be, it cannot have elemental principles.55 However, if these things are true, why did we say56 that the concern of the treatise is the properties which are common to all natural things if, although heavenly things are natural, their principles are not the ones which have just been demonstrated? And why did he entitle the treatise simply Physics unless these principles are also the principles of heavenly things insofar as they change? (The moon changes in its phases, and all heavenly things change by changing place, and in this respect they share in privation and in a substratum, the changing body.) Aristotle agrees with this. And in general if we say that all things are natural insofar as they have a nature, and nature is a principle of change and rest (as we will learn),57 and all change is a kind of alteration (as we will also learn),58 it is clear that what is completely unalterable, insofar as it is unalterable, cannot be said to be natural without qualification. Consequently, even if he calls heavenly things natural, he does so with respect to change of place, not substantial change. And so, heavenly things are not included here in terms of their substance, but they will be included in the discussion of change with respect to their change of place, on the basis of which they are proved to be natural; and they will be included both with respect to the common form of change of place and with respect to their circular form of motion, which is the crowning point of all discussions of change. Consequently these are the common principles of all natural things, but they apply to things which come to be and perish, both with respect to substance and with respect to the other attributes relative to which changes occur, whereas they apply to eternal things with respect to change of place; and they apply to natural things without qualification insofar as they are natural, which is to say insofar as they contain a principle of change and alteration – not all change, since the change involved in choice is irrelevant, but natural change, that is, bodily change; for nature is a certain corporeal principle of change and rest, both change of place and the other changes.

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However, since both privation and substratum are clearer in cases of coming to be and perishing because of the variety of kinds of change, he directs most of his discussion at these things and gives his examples in 5 terms of them, as if he also thought that the aim of the treatise was these things. For it is not just here that he says that he has found the principles of ‘natural things which come to be’, he also does so in the second book:59 Since60 our study is for the sake of knowledge and we do not think we know a thing before we have grasped why it is – that is, grasped its first cause, it is clear that we must do the same thing in the case of coming to be and perishing and every natural change in order that, knowing their principles, we can try to reduce each thing that comes to be61 [to them].62

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Having said that there are three principles, substratum and contraries, he points out again that it is also possible to say two and not necessary to say three. For if privation is nothing but the absence of a form in what is naturally constituted to have the form, someone might say that form is sufficient to make something exist by its presence and to make 25 something not exist and to produce privation and perishing by its absence, the form making something exist per se and making it not exist in an accidental sense. For what produces something by its absence produces it in an accidental sense, unless someone thinks it right to say the same things in the case of privation, since it too seems to produce perishing per se by its presence and coming to be in an accidental sense by its absence. Perhaps one should say that privation is nothing other 30 than absence. But how could there be an absence of an absence? There could be an absence of something which is and has a primary existence, but not an absence of an absence, since otherwise it would be necessary to go to infinity seeking one absence after another. Nor is it reasonable to look for a presence of a presence. So insofar as there is an absence of 222,1 form it is possible to say that the form by its absence is the cause in an

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accidental sense of perishing. But the absence of form is privation. And so privation is a cause in an accidental sense. It differs from other accidental causes not only because it is said to be a cause insofar as it is attached to matter, which is a cause per se, but also because nothing would come to be from matter without privation.65 For it is necessary that privation precede coming to be in order that coming to be so and so be from what is not so and so but is of a nature to be so and so, and that it make way for the form, since the form would not supervene unless the privation departed. The other causes which are said to be accidental do not contribute anything at all to what comes to be. For when we say that musical is cause in an accidental sense of white, it is not necessary that musical either exist before white or that it depart when white enters; rather these things can also co-exist. And perhaps it is one thing to seek the elemental principles of natural things as natural and another to seek the elemental principles of natural things as changing. According to the first way [as a principle of natural things as natural], privation would be a cause in an accidental sense (because it doesn’t inhere) but according to the second [as a principle of natural things as changing], it would be per se. For just as form is a cause of the change into existing, so too privation is a cause of the change into not existing. Or perhaps privation is also a per se cause of the change into existing, since change is not from just anything but from what is not so and so but is of a nature to be so and so, which is to say, from what has the privation. Therefore Alexander says that the words ‘since one of the contraries [will be] sufficient to produce change by its absence or presence’ indicate that privation is not a nature or form, but rather the absence of what something is naturally constituted to be, and this absence is not in the nature of the substratum; for [the substratum] does not have not having the form in [its] nature, since if it did it would not be possible for it to take on the form. But also the substratum does not have the form in its nature. But this is different from having not having the form in [its] nature. For in general nothing can have come to be if it can have its own privation in its own logos.66 What Aristotle says here perfectly expresses the views of the Platonists because Plato also makes the substratum not two but one, even if he refers to it with opposite terms when he calls it great and small67 – he does this because he does not want privation to be considered to be in some reality because of [the substratum’s] receptivity of opposites. And it is clear that Aristotle too does not assign privation reality in the primary sense, since he calls it an absence of form in what is naturally constituted to have it, but he distinguishes it in logos from matter even if it is not distinct in number, because coming to be comes about because of opposites. But Plato assigns being naturally constituted to be such and such to matter in terms of its own nature; he considers it to be and calls it an omnirecipient and refers to it as space and says it is a seat for everything which comes to be; for he says in the Timaeus that it is a

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‘certain invisible form without shape and an omnirecipient’,68 and again he says, ‘And a third kind is that of space which always is and does not admit perishing; it provides a seat for everything which comes to be’.69 Furthermore, form is sufficient for coming to be and perishing by its presence and absence. Therefore Plato posits two elemental principles, 10 matter and form-in-matter. And he says the composite comes to be from these as inherent principles. This is like Aristotle, but Plato gives the elements in the strict sense, that is the things from which, as inherent per se, what comes to be comes to be – of this kind are matter and form. But Aristotle also adds something accidental as70 an element, namely 15 privation. In the same way in the case of the efficient cause Plato gives us the authoritative efficient cause, demiurgic mind, whereas Aristotle adds nature to this (something which Plato placed among the instrumental causes because it changes other things while it is itself changed by a cause) and also accidental causes, such as chance and spontaneity. 20 But Plato also adds the cause ‘from which the form proceeds into the matter’ [saying] that it proceeds from the paradigm by means of the efficient cause. Thus he says in the Timaeus:71 For the moment one should conceive three kinds of thing: what comes to be; that in which it comes to be; and that by resembling which what comes to be develops. And it is appropriate to compare the recipient to the mother, that from which to the father, and the nature which is between these to the offspring. And Aristotle introduced matter on the basis of the fact that what comes to be comes to be from contraries, but contraries cannot act on each other nor be acted on by each other on their own (for he believes it is necessary that what is acted on be acted on while enduring but contraries do not endure the presence of each other); and furthermore he introduced it on the basis of the fact that contraries do not satisfy the definition of principle, since they are accidents and not substances; for there is no contrariety in [the category of ] substance,72 and accidents need some substratum in order to exist. I think these are the most important points in what Aristotle has said. Plato himself also introduced matter on the basis of the change of what comes to be, the change always requiring that it occur with a common substratum since nothing which changes endures; and he also called the changing things contraries. For, having said that each thing which comes to be, such as fire or water, can no more be called fire or water than anything else which comes to be from it because these things flee and do not submit to ‘the words “that” and “this” } and any other expression which indicates that they are stable beings’,73 he adds:74 One should only refer to that in which these things are }75 appearing to come to be and from which in turn they vanish by

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using the words ‘this’ and ‘that’, but anything which is hot or white or any other contrary and all that is composed from these things should in no case be referred to with these terms. 10 You see then that Plato himself also says that coming to be is from contraries, that the contraries do not endure, and that because of this there is need of an enduring substratum. He has added the words ‘or anything which is composed from these things’ because it is not just hot and dry which come to be, so do fire itself and in general the substances which are composed of contraries on the basis of the change of contra15 rieties. For air comes to be from water, which is cold and moist, when cold changes into warm, and again when moist changes into dry, fire comes to be. And human comes to be from seed. And in these cases it is not easy to specify the contrary qualities the change of which from one to another makes substance come to be from substance. And that is why 20 Aristotle invoked the general antithesis of form and privation; for hot comes to be from cold, but it is also true to say that it comes to be from not hot. Plato adds another, most authoritative reason why there must always be some substratum underlying forms which come to be. Having demonstrated first that the intelligible form, which is archetypal, paradigmatic, and independent, is one thing, while the perceptible form, 25 which has the nature of an image and is therefore a likeness of something else, is another, he reasonably infers that this will always be in a substratum which is different from it and is made like [the form]. For a likeness and image does not exist on its own; rather it exists in the thing which has been made into a likeness and image, that is, the substratum. But perhaps it would be better to hear Plato’s beautiful words themselves:76 30

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This being the way things are, it ought to be agreed that there is one thing which has an unchanging form; it does not come to be, and it is not destroyed; it77 does not receive anything else from elsewhere, nor does it go into anything else somewhere; it is invisible and imperceptible in any other way, and it is assigned to understanding (noêsis) to apprehend it. A second thing has the same name as the first and is similar to it; it is perceptible, it comes to be, it is always tossed about, and it comes to be in some place and again disappears from there; it is grasped by opinion together with perception. And a third kind is that of space which always is and does not admit perishing; it provides a seat for everything which comes to be,78 and it is barely an object of belief but is grasped independently of perception by a certain bastard reasoning; in regarding it we are as in a dream and we say that it is necessary that what is79 be somewhere in some place and occupy some space and what is neither on earth nor anywhere in heaven

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is nothing. Because we dream in this way we are unable to wake up and distinguish all these things and others akin to them – even in the case of the reality (phusis) which does not sleep and genuinely exists – and to speak the truth: because this very thing in which an image has come to be does not belong to the image itself, but rather the image is a picture of something else and always in motion, it is fitting that it come to be in something else and either cling to existence (ousia) in some manner or be nothing whatsoever; but what really is is supported by the precisely true account according to which, as long as they are two different things, neither will ever come to be in the other in such a way that they are simultaneously one and the same and two.

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It is worth pointing out that according to this causal account of matter, 15 heavenly forms are also in matter in a way, since they are also likenesses of intelligible paradigms. Consequently in their accounts of the elements Plato and Aristotle say practically nothing discordant except that Plato has added an additional reason why there must also always 20 be a substratum.80 But let us go on to what comes next. 191a7-18 The underlying matter81 is known by analogy. [For it is to substance and the particular thing and what is as bronze is to statue or wood to bed, or as [matter and]82 the shapeless before it has taken on shape is to any of the other things which have shape. So this is one principle, but it is not one or a being in the way a particular thing is. Another is the logos,83 and further the contrary of this, privation. It was said previously in what way these are two things and in what way they are more than two. We said first that only contraries are principles, but later that it is necessary that something else underlie and that there be three principles.] The examples of matter which have been given are human, seed, and the like. And since, even if they played the role of matter in relation to things which come to be, they themselves were nevertheless also certain forms, everyone would like to learn what the matter underlying forms 25 is in and of itself. For let seed be the matter of human, and, say, blood the matter of seed, food and drink the matter of blood, the four elements the matter of food and drink. Since these things also change into one another in terms of contrary qualities, they themselves also certainly need some common substratum which has no qualities in its own nature, since qualities are forms, and indeed forms which are opposites. 30 So if all apprehension which comes by way of impact84 is of circumscribed things which have some character and are defined by quality 226,1 and form, and if also the substratum underlying forms and qualities must be completely qualityless and formless (‘For if’, as Plato says,85 ‘it were similar to any of the things entering it, then whenever the contrar-

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ies of that thing or what is of an entirely86 different nature entered, on receiving them, it would make a bad likeness because it displayed its 5 own appearance as well’), how then would such a thing be apprehensible?87 Aristotle says, by analogy with other things. For the first matter in natural things is to substance and what is ‘as bronze is to statue or wood to bed or the shapeless before it has taken on shape is to any other artificially produced thing which has shape’. It is good that Aristotle 10 takes his example from artificially produced things, since in such cases what is shapeless comes first in time and is seen on its own. And substances underlie other things, and matter underlies substance and therefore underlies all the other things. But it underlies substance and the composite per se, the other things in an accidental sense. Therefore Aristotle says in this way88 ‘it is to substance and the particular thing 15 (that is the compound which is substance in the strict sense) as’ because matter is not yet a particular thing, even if it is more so than privation. It is also worth pointing out that Plato, who views matter in terms of enduring, assigns it more of a particular character, as he indicates in connection with the reshaping of gold objects89 and when he says,90 20

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By using the words ‘this’ and ‘that’ one should refer only to that in which these things are }91 appearing to come to be and from which in turn they vanish }. But Aristotle, who views the particular thing in terms of form (morphê) gives [the term] to forms. After the words ‘the particular thing’ Aristotle adds ‘and what is’, that is, he is saying ‘as matter is to all that is’, of which some things are substances and some are attributes, some are particular things in a primary way, others have particularity through that.92 Plato calls this apprehension by analogy ‘bastard reasoning’93 because it does not come from the impact of forms but from the stripping away94 and negating of forms; and reasoning sees matter with its eyes shut as it were. And understanding of matter is not understanding (noêsis) but rather non-understanding (anoia95); therefore our picture (phantasma) of it is bastard and not genuine. For just as we apprehend what is above the first Form not by any impact of forms, but – having learned that the Forms are not first from the very nature of Forms, which is distinct and requires the unified and the One to be before it – apprehend what is above Form by the negation of Forms (and this negation does not cast us altogether into the undefined but into the cause of the Form and what dwells above the bounds of Form), so also, having seen that the last forms are image-like and change into each other and therefore need a substratum naturally capable of receiving each of the opposites in turn, we proceed to the notion of matter by a negation of the forms which leads us to the receptacle. And if in seeking for matter we suppose it to be a particular thing distinctively different from other things, we have stumbled on something else, but not matter,

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since matter has no difference relative to anything since every difference is a formal quality. Consequently apprehension (gnôsis) of matter is rather non-apprehension (agnôsia) since the things which change with matter as subject, being the last forms, receive the last kind of apprehension, perceptual apprehension. Therefore, Plato, pointing out that matter does not strike us with impact, says matter is grasped independent of perception, so that he is indicating that just as matter is grasped by a ‘bastard reasoning’ so too it is grasped by a bastard perception. But matter’s being apprehended96 by a bastard reasoning and the insight (epibolê) into it by negation and the [insight] from whatever cause may arise are drawn from things in first philosophy. But Aristotle’s words ‘by analogy’ preserve the measures of the apprehension of the elements of natural things which are appropriate for the natural philosopher. For just as it belongs to grammar to know the generalities about the twenty-four elements [i.e. letters of the alphabet] and literature (mousikê) teaches the precise apprehension of them, so too the first philosopher will teach about the natural elements. Therefore in a little while he refers the study of form to him.97 However, it should be understood that Aristotle borrowed the term ‘by analogy’ from the Pythagorean Timaeus, just as Plato borrowed ‘graspable by a bastard reason’ from him. For in his own work the Pythagorean Timaeus says,98 ‘Matter [is apprehended] by a bastard reasoning because99 it has never been understood by direct observation, but [it is apprehended] by analogy’. 100 But since some people (and not just indifferent philosophers) say that both according to Aristotle and according to Plato the very first matter is qualityless body – and these include the Stoics among the ancients and Pericles of Lydia101 among moderns, it would be well to investigate this opinion. For102 both Aristotle and Plato, who introduce the matter of changing things as prior to103 the change think that hot/cold/dry/moist are the qualities of the elements. These qualities have body as common substratum, and they change with it as subject. And so body would be first matter. Furthermore, if there were some other substratum underlying body, then, since coming to be is from contraries, there would have to be some opposite to body so that the opposites could change with the common substratum as subject. [But there is no such opposite.] Furthermore, we say that what endures in any change is matter. But qualityless body endures, since there is nothing into which body might perish. That Plato also says that the direct substratum of the qualities of the four elements, that is qualityless body, is matter is clear from the following passages:104 The nurse of coming to be, being made watery and fiery and receiving the shapes of earth and air },

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and105 When he was undertaking the arranging of the universe, at first fire and water and earth and air had some traces of themselves but were altogether disposed in the way that is likely for anything from which god is absent; these things being in this condition at that time, the god first gave them shape with forms and numbers. Now if the demiurge first put the forms of the elements into matter, and 10 qualityless body is the common substratum of these, qualityless body will be matter. But according to Aristotle also, qualityless body should be thought to be the first substratum and matter. For if body enters into matter and departs from it like any other form, it is clear that, before body entered into matter and after it departed, the privation of body, that is, incor15 poreality, would have matter as subject. And there would be a natural incorporeal substance. But Aristotle does not think this, since he frequently says clearly that natural things are bodies and have bodies as their subject.106 107 However, that Plato does not think that body is the first substratum (which we call matter) should be clear from the fact that he also assumed his planes to be, as it were, the elements of body, presumably 20 as being more fundamental. And so he writes in the Timaeus:108 It is, I think clear to everyone that fire and earth and water and and air are bodies, but every form of a body also has depth, and depth necessarily is bounded by plane surface. And also according to Plato body is three-dimensional – that is what is 25 meant by ‘also has depth’. Such a thing is essentially connected with number and figure, especially if the whole of body109 is limited, as both Plato and Aristotle think it is. But they say that matter in itself does not have any of these things, except when it participates in form and then it is given shape ‘by forms and numbers’. That Aristotle too does not think that the first substratum is body he 30 makes clear when he says110 ‘for111 there is the same matter for a great and a small body’. For the matter of body could not be body, and if the same thing underlies both great and small it would not be either great or small. But body, and especially limited body, is of a certain size. And 229,1 the same body could not be great and small in itself112 at the same time. In general body is grasped by logos and apprehended by impact.113 But Plato says that matter ‘is grasped by a bastard reasoning’. And Aristotle and before him the Pythagorean Timaeus114 say it is grasped 5 only by analogy. So body cannot be first matter. And in the fourth book of this treatise Aristotle means to say (bouletai) that the matter of a magnitude is a certain indefinite extension

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which is made determinate by eidetic magnitude. At least he says,115 ‘so that place would seem to be the form (eidos kai morphê) of each thing by which the magnitude and the matter of the magnitude is defined’. Since magnitude is eidetic as well [as being material], after he said ‘magnitude’ he added ‘and the matter of the magnitude’, meaning the 10 same as the ‘magnitude’.116 Furthermore, for one looking at the problem in and of itself it would seem impossible that first matter be qualityless body, as Plotinus has also demonstrated.117 For if no natural form belongs substantially to the matter which underlies all natural things, it is clear that neither shape nor magnitude will belong to it, since they are forms. And, if, indeed, it 15 is a body, it will have shape and magnitude and it will not be simple but a composite of form and matter. But matter is simple. So you might also syllogise it the following ways: In itself matter has neither magnitude nor shape nor number; but body in itself does have magnitude and shape and number; therefore matter is not body. Matter is not a composite of matter and form; but body is a composite of matter and form.

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Furthermore, if matter is body it will have some magnitude of its own, and the demiurge would not bring forth all the forms from himself based on his own volition, nor would nature bring them forth based on the demiurgic principles it contains, but the demiurge and nature would necessarily be subservient to the magnitude of matter. Furthermore, if matter has magnitude it also has shape, in virtue of its own essential character, but this is not only absurd, because shape is form and quality, but also because matter would be intractable for receiving every shape if it had been mastered by one determinate shape. Furthermore, the form which enters matter brings with it everything which is proper [to form], and so brings magnitude; for the magnitude of a man is one thing, that of a bird or a bird of a certain kind another. Therefore magnitude and size are not proper to matter; therefore matter is not body. Furthermore, if matter were body it would have a certain size and have a magnitude. But having a size is one thing, size is another, and having a magnitude is one thing, magnitude itself another; size and magnitude are simple, incorporeal forms, but what participates in them are composites. So if matter were body it would

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be a composite and not simple and not an element. But if these things are absurd, one ought to say that when size is participated in by matter it gives a magnitude which did not inhere in the matter before, just as when quality is participated in it makes what previously was without quality a qualified thing. And furthermore, it is also possible to say that matter is either the potentiality for all forms or it is something which contains potentiality in itself and is beyond potentiality. But how could body be potentially incorporeal? But this would be necessary if, indeed, matter is also receptive of the forms of incorporeals. But if it is said that matter is potentially incorporeal, one should understand that the word ‘incorporeal’ does not indicate that it is some definite entity but is rather the denial of body. But perhaps it is possible to say that matter does not receive the incorporeal form first but through the intermediary of body. Furthermore, body is composed of genus and differentiae, since it is three-dimensional substance. However such a thing is a form, but it is not matter. Furthermore, body is logically opposed (antidiêirêtai) to incorporeal qualities, but matter is related in the same way to all things. Furthermore, body is determined by three dimensions, but matter is completely indeterminate.

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These arguments being introduced on both sides in this way, it is obvious that what underlies forms must not be form; and so if body were form, what underlies would not be body.

But I think that it is among the most obvious things that what belongs in common to all natural and perceptible things as natural and perceptible must be matter. But what is common to all of them is being 20 extended in bulk (onkos) and dimension (diastasis). And so, as Aristotle says,118 ‘the science of nature } deals with bodies and magnitudes (megethê) and their119 properties’. So perhaps one should posit that there are two kinds of body:120 one exists in terms of form and logos and is determined by121 three dimensions, the other exists as a slackening (paresis) and extending (ektasis) and indefiniteness of the incorporeal, partless, and intelligible nature; 25 this second is not determined formally by three dimensions, but it is slackened everywhere and loosened (ekluesthai), and it flows from every direction from being into not being. And perhaps it should be posited that matter is this sort of extension (diastasis),122 but not the corporeal form, which already is a measure and delimitation123 of the infinity and

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indefiniteness of this kind of extension and which puts a stop to its flight from being. For it is worth pointing out that it is appropriate that matter be that by which material things are distinguished from immaterial ones,124 and they are distinguished by bulk and extension and divisibility and such things, not the extension, divisibility, etc. which are determined with respect to measures, but those which are without measure and indefinite and capable of being determined by formal measures. As Moderatus125 also recounts, among the Greeks the Pythagoreans and after them Plato seem to be the first to have had this conception of matter. For [Plato] following (kata) the Pythagoreans proclaims the first One above Being and all substance, and he says that the second One, which is what really is and is intelligible, is the Forms, and he says that the third, the domain of Soul, participates in the One and the Forms, and that the final nature after this, which is that of perceptibles, does not even participate [in them], but it is ordered in terms of reflection (emphasis) of these things, the matter in perceptibles being a shadowreflection of the not being which is first in quantity (poson) and being even further below and derivative of this [not being]. Porphyry, who sets out these views of Moderatus in the second book of On Soul, has written that ‘As Plato says somewhere,126 the unified logos, wanting to bring about the coming to be of things from itself, found room for127 the quantity (posotês) of all things by privation of itself, depriving quantity of its own128 logoi and forms. He129 called this thing formless, indivisible, and shapeless quantity, but [said it is] receptive of form, shape, division, quality, everything of this kind. He130 says that Plato seems to have predicated many words of this quantity, “omnirecipient”131 and “formless”132 and “invisible”,133 and said it shares in a most perplexing way in the intelligible134 and is barely graspable by a bastard reasoning135 and all sorts of things like this. He136 says that this quantity and this form, which is understood by privation of the unified logos which embraces all the logoi of existing things in itself, are paradigms of the matter of bodies, which itself, he said, was also called quantity (poson) by the Pythagoreans and Plato, not quantity as form but quantity which is derived from (kata) privation and loosening (paralusis) and extending (ektasis) and spreading out (diaspasmos) [and exists] because of deviation (parallaxis)137 from being, for which reason matter is also thought to be evil since it flees away from the good. And it is apprehended by it [the good] and is not allowed to escape determination, its extension receiving the logos of eidetic magnitude and being determined by it, its spreading-out being given form by numerical discrimination.’ So, according to this account, matter is nothing other than the deviation (parallaxis) of perceptible forms in relation to intelligible things, which have turned away from there138 and move down toward not being. For it is clear that the bulk which is proper to perceptible things is one thing and eidetic magnitude another, and that the disper-

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sion of perceptible forms is one thing, numerical discrimination another, because eidetic magnitude and numerical discrimination are logoi and forms without extension or parts (for the logos of the three-foot magnitude and the logos of three are without extension and partless and incorporeal), but these [the bulk and dispersion which are proper to perceptible] are without logos, and they are corporeal and divisible and descend into bulk and dispersion because of their procession into coming to be and what comes last, that is to say, into matter. For what is last is always a residual sediment (hupostathmê) and really matter. And so the Egyptians also said that the residual sediment of primal life, which they referred to symbolically as water, is matter, since it is a kind of slime (ilus). And matter is a kind of space (khôra) for perceptible things which come to be, not existing as any determinate form but as a condition (katastêma) of their existence, just as what is partless and without extension and immaterial and genuinely existent and so on is a condition of the intelligible nature, all the forms existing both here and there, but there immaterially, here materially – which is the same as to say that there they exist indivisibly and truly, here divisibly and like shadows, and so too each form here is extended with material extension. But how can these things be harmonised with Aristotle and Plato, who think that matter is a substratum for contrariety? Or does what other people say about matter really reduce [it] to the last body? (For there is nothing opposite to body.) And in this way it will not only be the heavenly body which neither comes to be nor perishes, but also sublunary body, whereas the conception just expressed also preserves the corporeal extension of sublunary things, an extension which comes to be and perishes with the form which has extension (e.g., with human or horse.) Or is it the case that when what comes to be is substance, the change also occurs with the material deviation as subject, a deviation which endures forever? For attributes change with substances as subject, but substances change with what the Pythagoreans call quantity (poson) as subject, and they change either with respect to privation or with the deviation from being as subject, which is to say, with extension and material mass as subject. For air comes to be from water not just because there is a change of qualities but also because there is a change in eidetic magnitude, since the magnitude is different before and after the change. And the smaller [magnitude] is not a part of the greater but each is a determinate form, even though material extension endures139 before and after the change. For [the air and water] are both material in the same way and divisible in the same way and perceptible and have the same matter. For the differences [between the two] are seen in their forms. That Aristotle himself has the same sort of conception of matter as the Pythagoreans do, namely the conception of it in terms of extension and indefinite quantity, can be learned from what is said in the fourth book of this treatise, where he says,140

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Insofar as place is thought to be the extension (diastêma) of a magnitude (megethos) it will be thought to be matter.141 For this is different from the magnitude; it is what is contained by and determined by the form as by a surface and limit. Matter and what is indeterminate are this sort of thing. I do not know how all those people who claim to understand matter either in terms of Being as the worst of the forms142 or in terms of the One as the echo of the first One143 can be correct. For when the One or Being is considered as nothing but One or Being they are in the strict sense and primarily what they are said [to be]. But matter is what is last and it departs from Being and much more from the One, and it exists in deviation and turning away in relation to Being, because, on account of the generative powers of Being, it was necessary that there should also be a reflection of them. But I have prolonged this discussion too much because of the dominant conception of matter, which is not pleasing to me.144 As far as the text is concerned,145 the words ‘another is hê ho logos’ mean that one146 other principle is that related to logos and form, but it produces unclarity because of the hê added to the ho logos, a feminine article combined with the masculine ho logos. However hê is not coordinated with the phrase ho logos, but with arkhê and so the words are equivalent to saying ‘another is the [principle] related to logos’ or better ‘another principle is the logos and form’. As Alexander says, the words are also written in some texts without the hê, perhaps because some people took it away because of the unclarity, even though with hê the expression is more old-fashioned.

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191a18 [The difference between the contraries is evident on the basis of what has now been said,] as is how the principles are related to one another, and what the substratum is. He says how the principles (or contraries) are related, that one is the absence of the other, and what the substratum is, that it is what is grasped by analogy and has no contrary. He has stated the difference 15 between them, that one thing is what something comes to be, another is what comes to be, and another is from what it comes to be,147 and that matter endures and inheres in what comes to be, but the privation does not. And it is clear from everything which has been said that, according to Aristotle, privation is not a natural entity (phusis), but an absence of something in what is naturally constituted to be such an entity. And so when privation is said to be an attribute of matter, it is not said to be so 20 in the way a form is, but in the way that not being in the agora is an attribute of me. But if a privation is like this, one might reasonably ask under what category it can be ordered. Now if form is substance, privation will also be substance, since if one of a pair of opposites falls

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under a category, so does the other – however, not in the way that contraries fall under the same genus since these both are something, 25 but because the privations of some things are in the same genera as they are. For even privations have forms in a way, and are characterised on the basis of [corresponding] forms. Therefore, Aristotle, with this in view, says,148 ‘For privation is also form in a way’.

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191a19-22 But it is not yet clear whether form or substratum is substance. [But it is clear that there are three principles, in what way there are three, and in what sense they are principles. Let how many principles there are and what they are, be investigated on the basis of these things.]

In the book on the ten categories149 Aristotle divides substance into 234,1 primary substance and secondary, that is, into individual substance and specific and generic substance. But Archytas150 divides substance into matter, form, and composite. And in the Metaphysics Aristotle follows him and he himself thinks it is more precise to divide substance in three;151 and he says that in the case of things which come to be, the composite is most of all substance, and secondarily the form and matter 5 from which the composite is composed. Of these [two], he says that matter is more substance in terms of being everlasting and a substratum; but he thinks that form is more substance insofar as the being of each thing, which is relative to the form in terms of which it is of its own nature different from other things, is concerned. Aristotle [merely] indicates this comparison now, being contented in the discussion of 10 natural principles with stating how many principles there are and what they are. Alexander asks, But if form perishes in what way is it a principle, since a principle is thought to be imperishable? As Plato says,152 ‘If a principle is destroyed, it will not come to be from anything, nor will anything come to be from it’. Alexander resolves the difficulty by saying, 15

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Not every principle of things which come to be and perish can be imperishable, since this is not true of an elemental principle. [Furthermore, if every principle were imperishable,] there would no longer be coming to be and perishing. However, there must be some imperishable principle, even though all principles cannot be perishable. And even if form is perishable in number, it is at least imperishable in form. For there is always hot and cold, although they are not always the same in number; for [if they were], there would be no coming to be in things.

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Now this is a reasonable statement; however, Plato in the Phaedrus does not say that the elemental principle of bodies relating to form doesn’t come to be, but rather that the principle and root of motion,153 (that is, what is self-moving) and in general the primary creative particularity (idiotêta) in each thing, doesn’t come to be; and this is a principle but it is not elemental. Alexander adds this: And perhaps form does not perish. For what comes to be perishes, but neither matter nor form come to be; rather the composite of them does. And so this is also what perishes. Consequently the principles do not perish. But even if they do not perish that does not mean that form, taken numerically, is everlasting. For the composite does perish, but its perishing occurs because the form is cast off.

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It seems that Alexander has spoken from the point of view of the study of nature, but what he says gives rise to the following difficulty. Why 30 should something which formerly did not exist, but later does, not be said to come to be? And why should something which formerly existed but later does not, not be said to perish? And why, when we say that the composite perishes because it casts off the form which is not preserved and does not exist after it is cast off but rather departs into not being, should not [the form]154 be said to perish (since the form because of 235,1 which the composite was destroyed is not separate)? And why, if form does not perish, is it not everlasting? But I think it would be better not to get too sophisticated.155 We also say that the particular form involved in coming to be is perishable and that the composite perishes with respect to the form. For there is no necessity to hypothesise that the elemental principles of perishable things are imperishable, nor need we, 5 for fear of the proposition that there are some things which perish into not being, therefore say that things which exist now, but then again do not exist, are imperishable. For these things do not simply perish into not being, but there is always some other form which succeeds the destruction of the perishing form. Chapter 8 191a23-31 We will next say156 that the difficulties of earlier thinkers are dissolved only in this way. [For the first philosophers were seeking the truth and the nature of things, but, driven by inexperience, they turned aside into another path, as it were, and they said that nothing either comes to be or perishes because it is necessary that what comes to be come to be either from what is or from what is not, but it is impossible that it come to be from either of these, since it is impossible that what is come to be (since it

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already is) or that anything come to be from what is not,] since it is necessary157 that something underlie as a substratum. He proves that it is right to have posited privation among the principles in addition to matter on the basis of the fact that some of the earlier 15 philosophers who did not understand privation, being defeated by a certain difficulty, did away with coming to be and perishing and fell into other absurdities. He calls first philosophers not only those who were first chronologically, but also those who first sought the truth [on philosophical principles]. But he is not now speaking about all of them, but about those who did away with coming to be. These are divided into two – or rather three. Some158 of them said that being is one thing, and 20 that this does not come to be; others, such as Anaximander and Anaxagoras, said that there are many things, but they are separated out [from one thing], being inherent [in it] and thus did away with coming to be; and others, such as Democritus and Empedocles, produced coming to be by the combining and separation of the first elements. He says that there is no coming to be ‘but only mixture and dissolution of what has been mixed’.159 Aristotle says that these people did away with coming to be because 25 they were constrained by a difficulty which they were not able to resolve, but it is resolved when the principles of natural things are hypothesised to be such as we have hypothesised them to be. Having first set down the difficulty by which these people were driven from the path which leads to truth and did away with coming to be, and having set down the absurd consequence of the difficulty, he then adds the solution. The difficulty is this: 30

What comes to be must come to be from what is or from what is not. So if both of these are impossible there cannot be coming to be. But it is clear that both are impossible. For what is cannot come to be from what is (since then what is would be already before coming to be), nor from what is not (because there would have to be something from which it came to be, and in general what is not is nothing).160

236,1 Such is the difficulty. Aristotle adds the further consequence: (191a31-4) And thus, [magnifying] the further consequences, [they said that there are not several things but only the one itself.] [So] these people accepted this view for the reasons stated.161 Some people, as they seem,162 were defeated by the difficulty163 into which they were led by the conception of being and not being which 5 acknowledges that only what is in the strict sense is and only what is not in the strict sense is not. And the difficulty developed into the next

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apparent consequence, which is – as Melissus and Parmenides, calling what is other than (para) being not being, said – that the one and being are identical. For if there are many things it is clear that they are different from one another and their differences will be something other than being. But if there is something other than being, it is either a being or a non-being, but what is other than being cannot be either a being or 10 a non-being. [Aristotle] adds that it also occurred to them on the basis of the difficulty that one and being are identical, something which occurred to them as more absurd than that there is no coming to be. 191a34-b26164 But we say that in one way coming to be from what is or from what is not, or what is or what is not165 doing something or undergoing something or coming to be some particular thing or other, are no different than a doctor doing or undergoing something or being or coming to be something from being a doctor. Consequently since this has two senses, it is clear that so do ‘from what is’ and ‘what is acts’ or ‘what is undergoes something’. Now a doctor builds a house not as a doctor but as a housebuilder, and he comes to be pale not as a doctor but as dark. But he practices medicine or ceases to be a doctor as a doctor. Since we speak in the strictest sense when we say that a doctor does something or undergoes something or comes to be something from being a doctor if he undergoes something or does something or comes to be something as a doctor, it is clear that the phrase ‘come to be from what is not’ means ‘comes to be from what is not as what it is not’. But those people who did not make this distinction gave up, and because they were unaware of the distinction they were also so ignorant that they thought that nothing else comes to be or is and they did away with all coming to be. And we ourselves say that nothing comes to be without qualification from what is not, but that things do come to be from what is not in a way, viz. in an accidental sense (kata sumbebêkos);166 for some things come to be from privation, which per se (kath’ hauto) is not and does not inhere [in the result], but this causes surprise and it is thought to be impossible that something comes to be from what is not. (191b17) Likewise we say that what is does not come to be from what is – except in an accidental sense. And this comes to be in the same way as animal comes to be from animal and an animal of a particular sort comes to be from an animal of a particular sort, for example, if dog comes to be from horse.167 For dog does not come to be only from an animal of a particular sort but also from animal, but not as animal; for this exists already. But if something is going to come to be an animal and not in an accidental sense, it will not be from animal. And if a being of a particular sort is going to come to be, it is not from what is; nor is it from what is not; for we have

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said that ‘to come to be from what is not’ means ‘to come to be from what is not as what is not’. 15 The earlier thinkers did away with coming to be on the grounds that what is cannot come to be either from what is or from what is not. Aristotle himself solves the difficulty by making a distinction and showing that what comes to be must come to be from both what is and what is not, that is, from what in a way is and what in a way is not. It is possible to speak [of being or not being] in two different ways, since these things differ either in terms of per se and accidentally, or in terms 20 of potentially and actually. Now those who said that there cannot be coming to be either from what is or from what is not, said that what is is the same thing as what comes to be (since they say that [what comes to be from what is] already is), and they said that what is not is that which is not in any way. For they say that that from which [something comes to be] is. And in fact it is not possible for what comes to be to come to be either from what is or from what is not in this sense. 25 However, if someone says that what comes to be comes to be not per se but in an accidental sense from privation, which is not a being, but is included in the principles (for what comes to be comes to be from privation not by the privation’s inhering but by its not inhering), then he is saying that what comes to be comes to be a being not per se but in an accidental sense from what per se is not. So what is does not come to be from matter insofar as matter is a being; it comes to be from it in an 30 accidental sense because it is an attribute of matter not to be the being which comes to be, since the privation of this being which comes to be is present in the matter. Consequently, what is, insofar as it is, comes into being neither from what is, nor insofar as it is; rather it comes to be in an accidental sense from what is. And a particular being comes to be from a particular being. And so in this way coming to be is not per se either from what is or from what is not, but it is from them in an 237,1 accidental sense; and it is from what in a way is and what in a way is not. For matter is, but is not what it is becoming. However, Aristotle transfers the discussion to what is clearer and more universal, and in this way dissolves the difficulty. For, he says, ‘comes to be from what is’ is equivalent to ‘what is comes to be’ and ‘comes to be from what is not’ is equivalent to ‘what is not comes to be’. 5 For to say that musical comes to be from unmusical is the same as to say that unmusical comes to be musical. Then he adds in a more universal way in which these things are also included ‘or what is or what is not doing something or undergoing something’. For doing something or undergoing something is more general than undergoing on its own, and coming to be some particular thing or other is more general than 10 coming to be in the strict sense, since what comes to be pale or walking or anything else whatsoever is included in this.168 These then, he says, [are cases of] being or not being coming to be from being or not being, or

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doing or undergoing. Explaining these things by an example, he says they are no different from ‘a doctor doing or undergoing something or something being or coming to be from a doctor’. And so he says that these things have two senses because they are among the things which have more than one sense. And he first shows the doubleness in the case of the doctor, and then transfers the discussion to what is not and what is. For a doctor is said to do something or undergo something either insofar as he is a doctor or in an accidental sense. He acts insofar as he is a doctor when he practices medicine and gives care, and he undergoes something insofar as he is a doctor when he ceases to be a doctor; but he acts in an accidental sense when he builds a house because being a housebuilder is an accident of a doctor, and he undergoes something in an accidental sense when he comes to be pale from being dark because being dark is an accident of a doctor. And it is clear that we say that a doctor acts or undergoes in the strict sense when he acts or undergoes insofar as he is a doctor. And so in the same way too something is said to come to be from what is not in two ways. For it comes to be from what is not either insofar as it is not or in an accidental sense because not being, that is, privation, is an accident of that from which it comes to be, for example, matter; for what comes to be does not come to be [such and such] from just anything, but from what is not such and such but is of a nature to be such and such. And it is clear that just as in the case of the doctor we say that he acts or undergoes in the strict sense when he acts or undergoes insofar as he is a doctor, so too in the case of what is not we say that something comes to be from what is not in the strict sense when it is taken [to come to be] insofar as it is what is not. Now the ancients took what is not unequivocally in the strict sense and insofar as it is not; and, not distinguishing what is not per se and as what is not from what is not in an accidental sense, they gave up on the idea that something could come to be either from what is or from what is not. And because they were unaware of [the distinction between] the per se and the accidental they also did not understand other things, with the result that they thought that nothing comes to be since nothing comes from what is not as what is not, because there must be something from which [what comes to be comes to be]. And it is clear that nothing comes to be from what is as what is, since what is already is. And furthermore they mistakenly thought that nothing else is, but rather that being is one, since nothing comes to be from what is. But we accept that nothing comes to be from what is not without qualification, that is, insofar as it is not, but we say that things come to be from what is not in an accidental sense; for something does come to be from matter insofar as privation, which per se is not, inheres in it. Alexander approves this interpretation which divides what is not into what is not – that is, is not in the strict sense – and what is not in an accidental sense. But he adds another interpretation:169

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For on the basis of what is said someone could also understand that ‘is not’ has a uniform meaning when it is said of what is not in the strict sense and as not being. But it is possible to speak of coming to be from what is not in two ways: either per se or in an accidental sense. For we also say that there is coming to be from privation, which is per se not being, but in an accidental sense. For it is not because the privation inheres in what comes to be that there is coming to be, but because it does not inhere. But if something comes to be per se from things, those things inhere in what comes to be.

15 And it is clear that even if privation is said to not-be per se, nevertheless it has a kind of reality (hupostasis). For if it were not in any sense whatsoever, nothing would come to be from it even in an accidental sense. Consequently the words, ‘we ourselves say that nothing comes to be from what is not without qualification’ should be understood in two senses: as meaning either that nothing comes to be from what is not without qualification or that nothing comes to be in the strict sense and 20 without qualification from what is not. For something comes to be from something in the strict sense and without qualification when it comes to be from something which endures, and it is in this way that those people thought that what comes to be must come to be from something which is not and inheres in what comes to be. But this is impossible. It is clear from what is demonstrated in the Sophist170 that Plato knew before Aristotle that ‘is not’ has two senses. He added to this: 25

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When we had demonstrated that the nature of the Other (thateron) is and is chopped up among all beings in relation to one another, we dared to say that what is not really is exactly this: each part of the nature of the Other being contrary to Being. ‘Indeed it seems to me171 that we have spoken entirely correctly’. So let no one172 say that when we dare to say that what is not is, we are speaking about the contrary of Being. For in the case of any contrary of it we long ago said good-bye to [the question] whether it is or is not and whether there is an account of it or absolutely no account. But in the case of what we have just said what is not is, let someone either refute us and persuade us that we do not speak correctly or, as long as he is unable to do this, he should say what we do.

And the distinction made by Plato is also between being in one way and not being in another and between not being per se and being in an 5 accidental sense (because of being an accident of what is). However, not being as otherness is distinct (diapherei) from not being as privation insofar as the former concerns forms in relation to one another, but the latter also coexists with matter. (191b17) Aristotle says, ‘Likewise we say that what is cannot come to

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be from what is’ insofar as it is (since then being would already be before it had come to be), but nothing prevents a being even of a particular sort from coming to be from what is in an accidental sense. For the person who says that animal comes to be from animal does not say that it comes to be from it as animal, since the animal, changing as animal, would not change into animal. But neither would the animal which comes to be, if it came to be insofar as it is an animal, come to be from animal, but rather173 from seed. But if something came to be insofar as it is an animal of a particular sort, and it came to be from an animal to which being an animal was attached, and when the animal changed something came to be to which being an animal also belonged,174 this would be a case of animal coming to be from animal in an accidental sense. For it is not the case that insofar as an animal changes into an animal it changes as animal; rather insofar as it is an animal of a particular sort it makes the change into an animal of another sort. For example, if dog were to come to be from horse – or rather wasps from horse or bees from bull (‘since horses are the source of wasps and bulls of bees’),175 animal would be said to come to be from animal, but not insofar as it is animal but in an accidental sense. For from one animal of a particular sort which changes in this case [there comes to be] an animal of another particular sort which is not but comes to be. Being animals belongs to both that which changes and that which comes to be, so that in an accidental sense animal comes to be from animal. For the discussion does not concern the efficient cause, but rather the material cause, and in this case176 it is not possible for horse to be the matter for horse. However, when animal comes to be from seed it no longer comes to be from animal in an accidental sense, but only from not animal. In this way, then, even if a being of a particular sort were to come into being not accidentally but per se, it would come into being from not being. The text is also written ‘for example, if a dog or a horse [comes to be]’, [the text meaning] ‘even if an animal of a particular sort were to come to be from an animal of a particular sort, for example a dog from a dog or a horse from a horse, it does not come to be as dog or horse, but as a particular dog or horse’. But if something were going to come to be insofar as it is animal and not in an accidental sense, it would not come to be from animal but from not animal, e.g., from seed, and if it came to be as body it would not come to be from body but from not body. And so if a being of a particular sort is going to come to be per se and not in an accidental sense, it would not come to be from what is, but it would not come to be from what is not either – insofar as it is not (this has already been proved). So if what is as what is does not come to be from what is or from what is not, what is as what is does not come to be at all, nor of things that come to be is their coming to be as things which come to be, but as fire or as air. So perhaps the earlier people also spoke in this way and mean that no being as being comes to be or perishes; for beings are forms, such as human and white, but none of these come to be, only individuals do.

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191b26-7 Furthermore we do not do away with [the principle] that everything is or is not. (191b27) [This is one way.] Since it has been proved that what comes to be does not come to be either from what is without qualification or from what is not, but rather comes to be from what at the same time is and is not, it certainly should be noticed 15 why, by saying that the same thing (that from which we say what comes to be comes to be) is and is not, we do not do away with the axiom of contradiction or why, by saying that what comes to be comes to be from something, we are not forced to say that it comes to be either from what is or from what is not. And so he says that we do not do away with [the axiom of contradiction]. For we are not saying that something is and is not with reference to the same thing; rather we are saying that coming to be is from 20 what is per se and is not in an accidental sense; for matter is like this. It is possible, however, that he says ‘we do not do away with [the principle] that everything is or is not’ to indicate that we do not reject the division which says that everything which comes to be comes to be either from what is or what is not (since we know that either ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is true of everything), but also that, while bearing witness to this, 25 we at the same time preserve coming to be and perishing by distinguishing what is or is not per se from what is or is not in an accidental sense. (191b27) And so the difficulty can be solved in one way. Next he adds another way in which it can be solved. 191b27-9 Another way [of solving the difficulty is to say] that it is possible to speak about the same things [in terms of potentiality and in terms of actuality.] But this distinction has been made elsewhere with greater precision. 30 He said a little while ago177 that ‘in one way coming to be from what is or what is not } is no different than a doctor doing or undergoing something’, these spoken of in two ways, per se and in an accidental 241,1 sense. And, and having concluded by saying ‘this is one way’ of solving the difficulty, he next adduces the other way, which is that it is possible to speak about what is potentially and what is actually, and similarly with what is not. Now when we say that what comes to be comes to be from what is, we mean that what is actually comes to be from what is potentially; for it cannot come to be from what is actually since this 5 already is. Conversely when we say that what comes to be comes to be from what is not, we mean that it comes to be from what is not actually, and not being actually does not preclude being potentially. For nothing can come to be from what is not potentially, as from an element, since the thing from which what comes to be comes to be must be of a nature [to be it]. And things which come to be come to be from what is potentially and is not actually.

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In this way the difficulty of earlier people which insists that some- 10 thing cannot come to be either from what is or from what is not is solved. For a thing comes to be from what is potentially but is not actually, since matter is potentially what it comes to be, but not actually. And this distinction is grasped from matter, since matter is what potentially is but actually is not what it comes to be. The reason why matter has this nature is privation, which is an absence of so and so in what is of a 15 nature to be so and so. And because privation is an absence it makes [what it is in] not be actually, and it furnishes being potentially because it is in something which is of a nature to be so and so. The distinction between what is potentiality and actuality has been made more completely in book 9 of the Metaphysics.178 191b30-3 Thus, as we said, the difficulties because of which they felt compelled to do away with some of the things which have been mentioned have been resolved. [It was as a result of this that our predecessors turned so far from the road which leads to coming to be and perishing and, in general, to change.] I think that Alexander passed over this short passage without explaining it. But the great Syrianus179 says that these people do away with ‘some of the things which have been mentioned’ because of the difficulty since, in doing away with coming to be because of the difficulty, they also do away with matter and privation, and these are some of the principles which have been mentioned. For, in doing away with coming to be because of the difficulty, they say that beings exist before [coming to be] or that being is one, and in consequence there is neither matter nor privation from which the things which come to be could come to be. And that these things are what he means by ‘some of the things which have been mentioned’ is made clear by what is added next. But perhaps it is possible to understand ‘some of the things which have been mentioned’ not as the principles (for people who in this way speak of what is being altered [do away with all, not some of the principles], but as the things which have been said about nature, including coming to be and perishing. For they seem to do away with these things directly, being hampered by the difficulty stating that what comes to be comes to be either from what is or from what is not and showing that each alternative is impossible. But the understanding of privation and of the per se and the accidental and potentiality and actuality have solved this difficulty and provided room for the coming to be and perishing which those people did away with. These things are also made clear by what is said next. 191b33-4 For seeing this nature (phusis) would have dissolved all their ignorance.

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5 He says that seeing privation contains the solution of all the difficulty in the discussion. For if that which is by accident also is not because of privation, he has solved the difficulty by these two concepts. For privation is by accident, because it is an accident of what is, and again matter is not by accident, because privation (which per se is not), is an accident of it and at the same time [matter] is potentially because of privation.180 10 This is the interpretation of Alexander. But perhaps by ‘this very nature’ Aristotle does not just mean the nature of privation, but also the nature of matter (and, in proceeding, Alexander himself also points this out) and indeed also the nature of the per se and accidental and the nature of the potential and actual about which he was speaking next. Chapter 9 15

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191b35-192a1 Some other people have touched on this nature but not in a sufficient way. [For first they accept that something can come to be, without qualification, from what is not,181] and that that [part] was correct in Parmenides’ formulation [of his dilemma].182 Whether it is seeing the nature of privation and matter which would have removed all the difficulties, or that of per se and accident, and potentiality and actuality, or indeed both of these (because one depends on the other), it is this which, he tells, some failed to touch on at all – those who make being one and those who say that everything exists in actuality before coming to be and in general those who do away with coming to be183 – but others did touch on it but not in a sufficient way. And with these last words he seems to be referring to Plato. For Plato seems in a way to touch on both matter and privation in the Timaeus because he means that matter is not among actually existing things, when he says that the substratum of the forms would not be ‘well prepared unless it were without the form of all those things which it is going to receive from somewhere’.184 For what is of a nature to receive something and not to receive it, but does not have it, would rightly be said to be deprived of it. And Plato is clearly the first person to distinguish potential and actual and per se and accidental and being in one way and not being in another, as was said earlier.185 For in the other cases too Plato made distinctions among things said with several senses, as Eudemus also bears witness in his Physics when he says, ‘By bringing in the notion of ambiguity Plato solved many difficulties concerning things’.186 In these ways then Plato too would be touching on this sort of nature. However, he is thought not to have grasped it sufficiently in two respects,187 one insofar as he accepts Parmenides’ statement that being is one. For on this principle [Plato] makes coming to be be from what without qualification is not and is not as not being. For, if being is one, it is not possible for there to be anything further (allo) which is per se

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and in an accidental sense is not, or is potentially but actually is not, and from which can come things that come to be. For everything which is not that188 is not without qualification. For what is other than being 10 is a non-being, and what is a non-being is nothing. Only that is a being, and so, in praising Parmenides as saying that being is one, Plato himself is obviously making coming to be be from what without qualification is not.189 This is the way in which practically all commentators have interpreted our text as saying that Plato accepts Parmenides’ statement that being is one. And this amazes me. For it is clear that in the Sophist Plato 15 gives many arguments objecting to Parmenides’ doctrine which asserts that being is one. And the arguments were introduced earlier in the discussion of Parmenides.190 But let me set out the conclusion of the arguments now to aid in their recall. It goes as follows:191 And a myriad of further (alla) [questions], each involving infinitely many difficulties will present themselves to the person who says that being is either two things or just one.

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Nor does Aristotle say that the people [mentioned] accept that [something] comes to be without qualification from what is not inasmuch as they accept that Parmenides speaks correctly.192 So perhaps Aristotle is instead challenging their acceptance of Parmenides’ minor premiss which says that what is anything else besides (para) being is not, and thereby their agreement that what is not is. For [Plato] says that what 25 is other than (heteron) beautiful, since it is something else besides beautiful, is not beautiful, and he says that what is other than large, since it is something else besides large, is not large. And, having added further (alla) things of this sort, he says,193 Therefore it seems that the opposition to one another of the nature of a portion of the other and the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no less a being194 (if it is permitted to call it that) than being itself. And it does not signify what is contrary to being itself, but only this much: what is other than being itself. – That is most clear. – What then shall we call it? – It is clear that this is, indeed, the not-being which we were seeking because of the sophist.

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However, it is clear that Parmenides, considering what without qualification is not, does away with not being when he says,195 For this will never prevail: that things which are not are. But you must keep your thought away from this path of enquiry. However, Plato, considering what is not in the sense of what is other,

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accepted [Parmenides’] minor premiss, but he rejected the major, the 5 one which says that what is not is nothing. But if indeed this were to be correct, Aristotle would not now be censuring Plato for saying that coming to be is from what is not in any way, because of accepting that Parmenides speaks correctly. For Plato, too, does not accept that what is not in any way is, and this is even more true of Parmenides. So perhaps we are forced to say that Plato accepted Parmenides’ 10 expression [formulated in his dilemma] that what is not is. For even if he accepted the minor premiss, the one saying that what is something else besides being is not, he did not do so as if Parmenides posited what is not. For [Parmenides] says that what is not is nothing. And in general in the Sophist, while arguing against Parmenides for doing away with not being without making distinctions, [Plato] himself brings in not-being. In order to prevent interpreters from giving irrelevant explanations, 15 let us say briefly that Aristotle is now referring to the things said by Plato in the dialogue Parmenides, in which Plato seems to be amazed by Parmenides’ hypothesis and demonstration that being is one. But it is clear that by looking at it in various positions he shows that that one being is many. Now I have written these things because I am disconcerted by 20 puzzlement. But if someone can give a more appropriate defence of the sense in which Plato says that coming to be is from what is not, because he accepts that Parmenides speaks correctly, he will prevail as a friend, not a foe. 192a1 And then they think that if [this nature] is one in number it is also only one196 in potentiality. But these are two very different things. Having stated one way in which even those who have touched on the 25 nature being discussed have not grasped it sufficiently, he now adds the other. In this connection Alexander says,

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On the basis of what he has now said it has become clear that when Aristotle said197 ‘some other people have touched on this nature’ he was referring to matter and not privation. For when he says that they think that just as it is one in number so it is one in potentiality, he is speaking about matter, since privation is not one in number. Or perhaps the first words ‘some other people have touched on this nature’ refer to privation, but what he is saying now refers to matter, which they assume has privation in its own nature. And so they thought that just as the pair [of matter and privation] is one in number so they are also one in logos and potentiality and not divided in logos in the way that we say matter and privation are different in logos.

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It should be said against Alexander that it is better to interpret ‘this nature’ in both the previous and the present passage as referring to the underlying nature from which there is coming to be, and this is matter together with privation. That Aristotle is speaking about the same thing in both passages is made clear by the continuity of the text. But matter 5 by itself is not one in number and two in logos, matter together with privation is. If Aristotle is thinking of Plato when he says that they do not distinguish in logos between matter and privation, he means by this that Plato teaches that there are two elements, matter and form, but he adds the cause that transcends these two, being at once both a paradig- 10 matic and an efficient cause. For he says this in the Timaeus:198 This being the way things are, it ought to be agreed that there is one thing which has in an unchanging way form that does not come to be, and is not destroyed; that199 does not receive anything else from elsewhere and does not go into anything else anywhere; it is invisible and more generally imperceptible, and it is assigned to noêsis to apprehend it. A second thing has the same name as the first and is similar to it; it is perceptible,200 it is always tossed about, and it comes to be in some place and again disappears from there; it is grasped by opinion together with perception. And a third kind is that of space which always is and does not admit perishing; it provides a seat for everything which comes to be,201 and it is barely an object of belief but is grasped independently of perception by a certain bastard reasoning. But Plato makes clear that he knows that privation is connected with matter, privation being the absence of the forms which are naturally constituted to come to be in the matter, by calling matter omnirecipient,202 a term which is appropriate for what is of a nature to receive all things, and by saying that it is without any of the forms which it is going to receive,203 a description which indicates the absence of forms. But Plato did not think it right to posit privation and what is not in the sense of being a privation among the elements, because it is present only by the absence of what is constituted by nature to be present and does not introduce anything else along with itself. So Plato himself is satisfied with form alone since it is capable of providing for coming to be and perishing by its presence and absence. And Aristotle agrees with this since he said a little earlier,204 ‘One of the contraries is sufficient to produce change by its absence and presence. However, [Plato does allow as an element] non-being in the sense of what is other, as directly introducing some being. After all, since motion is not what sameness is, it is not the same, but it is a being. Plato in the Sophist counted this kind of being/non-being among the forms when he said,205 ‘So even non-being unchangingly was and is non-being, being

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counted as one form among the many which are’. Plato did not count privation among the elements not only for the reasons given but also because elements must inhere in what they are elements of; but priva5 tion produces coming to be by its absence, not its presence, and also because elements must be causes per se; but if privation is a cause it is so in an accidental sense. Conversely, one might criticise the one who seeks the elemental principles of natural things while including privation among them. And [Aristotle] himself agrees that privation is a cause not by inhering but by not inhering, and it is not a cause per se 10 but in an accidental sense, if it is a cause at all.206 Because Plato was seeking the per se causes, the causes in the strict sense which are elemental and inhere, it was reasonable for him not to include privation. But because Aristotle was seeking the causes of change it was also reasonable for him to include privation as something else differing from matter itself in logos. For nothing prevents one from speaking about a 15 cause in an accidental sense, but it is not easy to form a picture of an element in an accidental sense since an element must inhere and fill out per se what it is an element of. 192a3-12 For we say that matter and privation are different,207 [and of these one, matter, is not in an accidental sense, but privation is not in itself, and the one, matter, is almost substance in a way, the other is in no way substance. (192a6) However, they call what is not the great and the small208 in the same way, either both together or each of them separately. So this kind of triad and that one are completely different. For they proceeded up to [seeing that] there must be some underlying nature, but they make that nature single. For even if someone makes it a dyad by calling it great and small, he is still doing the same thing] since he overlooks the other nature. Setting out the difference between his own view of matter and privation 20 and Plato’s, he says ‘we say that matter and privation are different in logos’.209 And of these, matter is non-being in an accidental sense, he says, because privation accidentally belongs to it and privation is nonbeing per se. And again, matter is ‘almost substance in a way’, but privation is ‘in no way’ substance. This is true, he says, because compos25 ite substance is substance in the strict and primary sense; and so, therefore, are its parts; consequently, since matter is a part of substance which inheres, it would be almost substance in itself, because it fills out what is strictly substance; but since privation is only an absence, it is far from substance. Furthermore, if composite substance is substance in the strict and primary sense and form is so in a secondary sense, but 30 matter is what receives form, matter would be almost substance, but since privation is an absence of form it would also be far from substance in this respect. Furthermore,210 substance is said by [Aristotle] with

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respect to a substratum, and matter too is a substratum in a way, even if, as part of the composite, something is taken which does not belong to a substratum in the strict sense. Therefore matter is almost substance. Furthermore, if the definition of substance which says that substance is what is the same and one in number and receives contraries211 also applies to matter, matter would also be substance (or rather it would be almost substance because in itself it is not one in number). But also since nothing is contrary to it, which has also been stated212 to be a proprium of substance, [and] has been said of substance with respect to its being a substratum, it also applies to matter since matter is also a substratum. And it is clear that matter comes to be non-being in an accidental sense since it participates in privation whereas privation is a being in an accidental sense because it exists in matter. And this is Aristotle’s view of matter and privation. (192a6) But Plato does not call that which is not yet what it is coming to be, that is, the thing from which there is coming to be, matter and privation; rather he calls it great and small,213 and predicates either both together or each separately of it. Whichever is the case, it is not true according to Plato that matter is the great and privation the small or vice versa; rather matter is both. So Aristotle’s kind of triad of elements, which says that the contraries are form and privation and that matter is the substratum common to both, is completely different from Plato’s, which says that the form is one thing and the substratum is two, the great and the small. Consequently most people agree with us214 that there is a nature which underlies and from which there is coming to be, even if some use one name for it and others use two names which refer to one and the same thing. But they disagree with us because they do not distinguish privation from substratum in logos; for even if someone uses two words for the substratum in the way that the person who speaks of the great and small does, nevertheless he uses them as applying to one thing, matter, and overlooks the nature of privation, so that he is doing the same thing as those who use one term and he is overlooking privation in the same way. Alexander says, ‘Here again it is clear that the words215 “Some other people have touched on this nature” refer to matter. For if he says that they overlooked privation, they did not touch on it’. And then he makes the good judgment that ‘It would also be possible to say these things even if they did not overlook privation completely but they failed to determine that privation is a certain nature that belongs to matter’. Since Aristotle frequently216 mentions that Plato calls matter great and small, one ought to know that Porphyry reports that Dercyllides217 in the eleventh book of his The Philosophy of Plato, the book in which he discusses matter, quotes a text of Hermodorus,218 the associate of Plato, from his work on Plato. From this text it is clear that Plato hypothesised matter in terms of these [the unlimited and indefinite] and explained matter on the basis of the unlimited and indefinite, which also

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248,1 take on the more and the less, which themselves include the great and the small. For [Hermodorus] says [Plato] says that of things which are, some, such as human and horse, are in themselves, some are in relation to other things, and of these, some are in relation to contraries, as good is to bad, others are in relation to something [or other], and of these some are definite, others indefinite. 5 Then he adds,

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And all those which are described as great in relation to small possess the more and less. For it is by the more that they are greater and smaller, going on without limit,219 and likewise too broader and narrower, heavier and lighter, and everything which is expressed this way will go on without limit. But things which are described in the way the equal and the stationary and the tuned are do not possess the more and the less but rather the contraries of these do, since one unequal is more unequal than another, one moving thing is more moving than another, and one out-of-tune thing is more out-of-tune than another. Consequently † all of the paired items – both of them – have received the more and the less, which excludes the single [unpaired] element.220 Consequently221 such a thing, being unstable and formless and infinite and a not-being, is described by denying being, and to such a thing neither principle nor substance is appropriate, but it is driven into confusion. For [Plato] makes clear that just as in one way what acts (to poioun) is the cause in the strict sense and distinctively, so too it is a principle. But matter is not a principle, and therefore also it was said by those around Plato that there is one principle.

However, we will need [to address] a little later222 the fact that matter is not a principle according to Plato, but it has, I think, become clear 20 from these words in what way Plato called matter great and small and a not-being. 192a13-16 The [nature] which endures is a concomitant cause (sunaitia) with the form223 of things which come to be, in the way a mother is. (192a14) [But the other part of the contrariety may often appear to someone who focuses his attention on its production of what is evil not to exist at all.] In censuring the failure to distinguish matter from privation, he has already described many differences between matter and privation, ar-

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guing on the basis of real things and on the basis of customary ways of speaking. And now he adds another difference between them by saying that matter is a cause that, like a mother, endures in the company of the form for those things that come to be. For, like a mother, it furnishes the matter for what comes to be, and it is a receptacle for the form which comes to it from the father of universal things (hola).224 And that is why Plato calls225 it ‘mother’ on one occasion and ‘space’ on another. And you could also say that matter is analogous to a mother insofar as it provides extension and division for forms, just as mothers provide extension and division for the father’s seeds and offspring and nourish them and cause them to grow to a greater size. And that is why Plato also calls matter a ‘nurse’.226 (192a14) And such is the matter which is the cause of being. But privation, which Aristotle has called ‘the other part of the contrariety’, will not seem to be a being at all to someone who focuses on its production of evil and destruction, since privation is the absence of the form by which each thing has its being and goodness. For what is absence other than not-being and the destruction of being?227 And so privation does not endure in the composite, whereas matter does endure, since if form is present how can its absence endure?228 Alexander says,

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Privation is also a cause of evil things. For even if matter is thought to be a cause of evil things, it is so because of privation [which makes it] unable to receive the good order of eternal things. But even if privation is said to be an evil thing, matter together with 15 privation is not an evil thing in the sense that it has a substance which is evil or in the way that those who say that the [principle] of evil is an ungenerated principle opposed to the good.229 For if the privation ever counts as a thing,230 matter and privation are derived from god and get their existence from the good, and they furnish much that is valuable to the creation, and they are good and have the least share among good things. Good things and not evil ones are last; but the things which the 20 philosophers call necessities, which are not desired for preference, such as medical bleeding and cauterising, get their existence because of something good which would not come to be apart from them. For such things are not preferred goods (since no one would choose them in and of themselves), but they are not evil either, since they are accepted for the sake of health, which is good, and they furnish so much which is 25 useful for the valuable things which are such that they cannot come to exist apart from them. Matter and privation are introduced by the demiurge not as evil things but as necessities which contribute to the completeness of the universe. For matter and privation contribute directly to the existence of the things which come to be and perish, matter by being a substratum

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30 for change, privation by being a cause of change itself. But the things which come to be and perish are a part of the sublunary universe, and if they did not exist the cosmos would be incomplete. For, as Plato also says,231 ‘if these things did not come to be, heaven would be incomplete’, containing only primary and intermediate things. And along with such 35 a great portion of the universe not coming into being – a portion that is everlasting with respect to its ensembles,232 but that with respect to its parts exists only as long as they are able to exist – the most divine things in the cosmos would have been the last, sterile and basically matter. But this is not worthy of the divine goodness, which must introduce not only 250,1 primary and intermediate goods but also last ones and whatever aims at good things. Let this be said by us on account of those men who saddle the ancients with their own impious views. Next Aristotle proves that, even if some people think that privation does not exist because it is an absence, it nevertheless does exist and 5 has a reality and is different from matter in logos. 192a16-25 For we say that, although there is something divine and good and to be striven for, [there is something which is contrary to it and something which by its own nature strives and wishes for it. But it follows for them that the contrary wishes to perish. However, the form cannot strive for itself because it does not lack anything, nor can the contrary strive for the form, since contraries destroy one another. Rather this is the matter [which strives for form], in the way female strives for male and ugly for beautiful,] except that matter is neither ugly nor female, unless accidentally. Having given the difference between matter and privation, he now gives 10 it in terms of the relation of both to form. For form is ‘divine and good and to be striven for’, and matter by its own nature strives for it. But privation is contrary (hupenantion) [to form] and would not strive for its own destruction. And if he means the first form, the separate one which he also calls nous and first cause, to be ‘divine and good and to be striven for’, everything with a natural constitution really strives for this since 15 everything is constructed by nature itself, which is also a divine cause, in such a way that each thing strives for assimilation to the first form in accordance with its own capacity. For the proper perfection for these things is assimilation, and stability in form is perfection for composite things, and for matter it is the participation in the form toward which 20 it has an inclination and for which it is suitable. Or perhaps it is not suitable because it is a certain deviation (parallaxis) and turning away (paratropê)233 from form, but nevertheless it is dependent on form and preserved by its co-ordination with form. And so it is also said to strive for form; for wish (orexis) exists in things with soul, but what is in natural things without soul is striving (ephesis).

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Now if matter strives for form and privation is contrary to form, the difference between the two will be great. But how is privation contrary to the first form since nothing is contrary to it (as Aristotle says,234 ‘The rule of many is not good’) and since everything which exists in any way strives for it? For if privation were anything at all it too would strive for it. But there isn’t a privation of the first form either since privation is the absence of what is of a nature to be present and is only observed in the case of forms which change. [And so] either privation would be said to be contrary to the first form insofar as it is contrary to the form which enters because of striving for the first form, or Aristotle is calling ‘divine and good and to be striven for’ that form which enters matter because it exists as an offspring of the divine part; since in this respect too matter strives for the first form, and this is that for which it has the potentiality and toward which it is naturally constituted. And the privation is opposed to this form. But if, Aristotle says, one is going to distinguish matter from privation in number as well as logos, he will clearly discover that matter is what strives for form, but the privation [is] the contrary of form. But if someone were to reduce matter and privation to the same thing, he would end up saying that matter strives for its own destruction because it strives for the presence of form. For to every contrary the presence of its contrary is destruction. But it is not at all permitted (themis) for something to strive for its own destruction. And so a contrary does not strive for its contrary either, which is what would happen if matter was the same as privation. Nor does form strive for itself, since everything strives for that which it lacks, but nothing lacks itself. If then nothing strives for either what it has (since it does not lack this) or its contrary (since the contrary is destructive of it), it is clear that what strives for form is neither form nor privation; rather it is matter which is different from each of the contraries and strives for the form in the way that female strives for male, that is, in the way that what is lacking and indefinite strives for the self-sufficient. For those who say that matter is a mother and a nurse, [though] disputing about matter, actually have the same235 conception of it. The striving is for something which is appropriate and not for a contrary, as it would be if matter were a privation or the same as privation. But matter strives for form in the way in which the ugly strives for beauty. And not even in this case is the striving for a contrary. For the ugly strives for beauty not as ugliness or as per se ugly (since then it would strive for its own destruction) but because ugliness attaches to it, ugliness which is the privation of beauty but is related appropriately to beauty. If matter were the privation of beauty, it would not strive for beauty, and if matter were the same as privation, it would not be preserved in the taking on of some form. But if someone were to say that privation is always essentially connected with matter because even if matter participates in some form it is always deprived of some other one, it should be realised that no privation

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30 is essentially connected with matter, since matter is of a nature to participate in every form. In general if someone were to say that one privation is essentially connected with matter, he would be saying that every privation is connected with it with the result that, regardless of which form is present to it, its substance is destroyed since the privation if that form [is also destroyed]. But if someone were to say that even when there is participation in a form, the privation of that form is still essentially connected with the matter because matter’s being lies in its 252,1 being without form, he is not sticking to the meaning of ‘privation’. For the otherness in terms of which form is immaterial is one thing, the absence of form, which cannot coexist with its presence, is another. But it has also been proved in another way that neither privation nor form strives for form and that the substratum, which is both naturally 5 constituted to participate in form and to be ordered by it,236 is what strives for form; and from this it has also been inferred that privation is different from matter. But privation should not be counted among elemental principles for this reason, since an element is an inherent principle, but an inherent principle does not produce something by its absence. But in what way is matter female in an accidental sense, given 10 that by its logos it lacks form, wishes for it, and receives it; and given that matter is a cause of form being spatially and temporally extended? The answer is that because of the absence [of form] matter is in need and wishes, since if it were always to participate in form (as heavenly things do), it would neither be in need nor wish but would rather be one nature essentially connected forever with both [matter and form]. 15

192a25-9 There is a way in which this perishes and comes to be, and a way in which it does not. [For as ‘that in which’, this perishes per se since what perishes, the privation, is in this. But in terms of potentiality, it is not per se,] but it must not perish or come to be.

He has proved that matter exists and what it is like and by what kind of apprehension it is grasped and that it differs from privation even if it seems to be indistinguishable from it. And next he proves that it is 20 imperishable in itself although it perishes in an accidental sense, on account of the fact that what attaches to it as an accident, that is, privation, perishes per se. This is also a difference between matter and privation, insofar as matter perishes in an accidental sense, but privation perishes per se. Aristotle calls what attaches to matter as an accident ‘that in which’ instead of ‘what is in matter’; since being in something is the nature of an accident. And strictly speaking ‘that in 25 which’ indicates the substratum (since that in which something is [viz. the substratum] and that which is in that thing [viz. the accident] are distinct). But he misapplies ‘that in which’ to what is in a substratum. He says ‘in terms of its potentiality’237 instead of saying ‘in terms of its nature [matter] does not perish per se’ because for matter being matter

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is being potentially; for matter is given substance with respect to being potential. If this is correct, then also when the form is actually present the potentiality of the matter remains, and this potentiality does not ever change into an actuality, so that matter does not perish since it is given substance by its potentiality. So matter is not qualitatively changed, but receives form while remaining what it is. But if this is correct, it is more appropriate to say that the composite is form in matter than to say that it is from matter and form. But if the form is attached to the matter and also is perishable, why does he not say that matter is perishable in an accidental sense in this respect, rather than saying that it is perishable because privation, which perishes, is in matter? Well in the first place form and privation do not inhere in matter in the same way, but the one as form in matter produces together with matter the composite substance, form becoming a part of the substance together with matter. And in this way form differs from what exists in substance as an accident; for an accident together with substance does not produce any composite, and the privation in matter is in matter as a substratum without producing together with matter any substance or becoming a part of a composite substance. Therefore privation, but not form, is said to attach to matter as an accident. And the perishing of privation is applied to matter too in an accidental sense, but it is not applied to form. For matter shows itself most of all when form perishes. But matter is concealed when privation perishes and a form comes to be. Indeed, matter even seems to perish. But perhaps it is because Aristotle has derived his view of matter from its potentiality and the privation in this potentiality that he says that in terms of ‘that in which’, that is in terms of privation, matter perishes per se, but in terms of potentiality it does not perish or come to be. But if the expression ‘that in which’ is understood as applying to matter, then in this way I think the expression becomes more congruent, because matter perishes per se in terms of privation, but is ungenerated and imperishable in terms of its potentiality. For Aristotle did not say that matter perishes in an accidental sense, but that it perishes per se as privation and neither comes to be nor perishes as potentiality. However, the commentators say that matter perishes in an accidental sense because what is in it, the privation, perishes, just as they think we say that a bottle perishes when the wine in it perishes. However, who would say that the bottle perished when the wine perished? But even if Aristotle has spoken at length in distinguishing matter from privation, it is possible that he has used those discussions looking at matter most of all in terms of potentiality. However, we will next see how he proves that matter does not perish or come to be with respect to potentiality.

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192a29-34 For if it comes to be,238 there must be a first something which underlies [from which it comes to be and which inheres. But this is the very nature [we are talking about] so that it will be before there is coming to be, since I call matter the first substratum for each thing, from which something comes to be with it inhering not in an accidental sense. And if it perishes it will ultimately arrive at this,] so that it will have perished before it has perished. 30 He has tacitly assumed four clear axioms to start and used two of them to prove that matter does not come to be and two to prove that it does not perish. The first two are that what comes to be comes to be from some first substratum and that what comes to be is not yet what it is coming to be. And the remaining two are similar to these: everything which perishes perishes into that from which it first comes to be, and 35 when what perishes is perishing it has not yet perished. In addition to 254,1 these things he also assumes the definition of matter as an axiom. From these things he first proves that matter does not come to be in the following way. Everything which comes to be comes to be from a first substratum which inheres per se, but what something comes to be from as a first [substratum] inhering per se is matter. So if matter comes to 5 be, it comes to be from pre-existing matter, and therefore the matter is before it has come to be. But if it has been judged to be impossible that what comes to be is before it has come to be, it is clear that the antecedent (‘matter comes to be’) is impossible. And these things have been inferred from the other previously assumed axioms and especially from the definition of matter. Aristotle says ‘from which something comes to be with it inhering not 10 in an accidental sense’ to bring out the contrast with privation. For even if what comes to be is said to come to be from privation, it does not come to be with privation inhering, nor does it come to be from privation per se; rather it does so in an accidental sense.239 For what comes to be is said to come to be from privation because privation is absent. Alexander says,

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Or the words ‘not in an accidental sense’ are added because the attributes of the substratum also inhere in what comes to be; for example, the colour which is an attribute of bronze inheres in the statue, but it belongs in an accidental sense, not per se. Therefore the colour is not the matter of the statue, nor does it contribute anything toward the being of the statue.240

Having proved that matter does not come to be, he next proves that it does not perish either. For everything which perishes is not said to perish by being dissolved into not-being but by being dissolved into that 20 inherent thing from which it first came to be not in an accidental sense,

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that is, into matter. So if matter perishes it is dissolved into the sort of thing which it itself is, and what will result from this perishing will be matter. But matter is what was there before the perishing. Therefore 25 matter will have perished before it has perished. Consequently, if matter comes to be, the sort of nature which it itself is must underlie for the coming to be of matter, and so matter will be before it comes to be. And if matter perishes, it must perish into the sort of thing which it itself is, and it will have perished before it has perished. Aristotle has also taken over the idea that matter does not perish from Plato and the Pythagoreans. At least Plato’s Timaeus says,241 And a third kind242 is that of space which always is and does not admit perishing; it provides a seat for everything which comes to be,243 and it is barely an object of belief but is grasped independently of perception by a certain bastard reasoning.

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And Aristotle’s whole demonstration depends on the axiom of the study of nature which says that nothing comes to be from what absolutely is not or perishes into what absolutely is not. Aristotle confirmed this axiom at the beginning when he proved244 that what comes to be comes to be from a contrary and perishes into a contrary, [and that] there has 255,1 to be some substratum for the contraries which is in a way and is not in a way and from which, as first per se inhering thing, what comes to be comes to be. However, as was said before,245 Plato proves in a different way that what comes to be comes to be from a substratum. For since 5 what comes to be is an image of what is, and since that which is likened is likened to it by participation in likening derived from the paradigm – where what participates is distinct from what is participated in – then it is participation by which the image is made like. It follows that that which participates is [the substratum] in which and from which the image (which is what comes to be) comes to be. For at any rate Plato 10 says in the Timaeus:246 For the present one should conceive three kinds: that which comes to be, what it comes to be in, and that from which what comes to be emerges. And if what I said previously247 is true, this [substratum] is the turning away (ektropê), and deviation (parallaxis) from being and the decline (hupophora) into non-being, which participation in being then checks and brings to a standstill as much as possible, thereby producing an 15 image of genuine being in place of genuine non-being, which [the substratum] would have had when it had declined completely into non-being. The [participation thereby] makes it [instead] non-genuine being. But in what sense does matter not come to be or perish? Is it because of its being common [to everything]?248 But this also applies to the forms,

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since the commonality of any form is not destroyed out of the universe, 20 but there is always human and horse and white and virtue and each of the other forms because the commonality of each of them endures. But does matter not come to be or perish in the case of individual matter, so that my matter – not insofar as it is matter (since that relates to the commonality) but insofar as it is my matter and matter of such and such a sort – does not come to be or perish? And why wouldn’t my matter have no purpose when my form perished, since it cannot be the matter of 25 another insofar as it is my matter? And why won’t matter be really better and more substantial than the forms if individual matter endures while individual forms perish? Perhaps then matter in itself is not individualised, but it is individualised by individual forms just as it is shaped by forms. For individuals which are different in number are made multiple by divisions and differences in their attributes. But 30 division and number and attributes are not specific features of matter, but rather of forms. Therefore this common deviation from being, or what matter is, does not come to be or perish. But the [particular] deviation and matter249 of this sort, which is eventually checked by form 256,1 and individualised, is what comes to be and perishes just like individual form. For even if someone says that matter is the first body,250 that too is imperishable in the manner of a commonality. For the body of water together with the qualities of water changes into a body of air and the qualities of air, but it does not do so as body (since it does not change 5 with respect to body), but it changes as such a sort of body into such a sort of body. So since matter insofar as it is matter has only the commonality, for this reason being ungenerated and imperishable are fitting to matter. And Aristotle’s demonstration that matter does not come to be or perish remains unshaken. For some matter comes to be from some matter. And the matter of air comes to be from that of water, 10 and it is not the matter of air before it has come to be (for it was the matter of water and perished into the matter of air251), and the matter of air did not perish before it had perished, since it was not the matter of water before water had come to be. But since particular matter is determined by form, Aristotle says that matter does not come to be or perish without making any differentiations. Some people say: but if matter does not come to be or perish, is it not 15 also a first principle in the way god is,252 since if it were produced from god, it would come to be? However Aristotle makes clear that he is not claiming that what does not depend on a cause does not come to be, but rather that what does not come to be starting at some point in time does not come to be when he proves in the last part of this treatise253 that motion does not come to be or perish, even though he says that every20 thing which moves is moved by something. In addition, Aristotle would say that the commonalities of the forms similarly do not come to be so that254 he would be saying that there are many first principles. However, he is the person who proclaims that the rule of many is not good.255

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In general Aristotle hypothesises matter as an elemental principle which is not in opposition to the efficient or final cause since matter also strives for adornment derived from those causes as female strives for male and ugly for beautiful.256 Those who disagree257 and say that 25 matter is evil and posit it as a principle opposed to the good set it up as an opposing efficient principle. Accordingly they teach that coming to be is from it and they talk frivolously about its command and its deliberations and its triumph with respect to the good. However Plato in the Timaeus gives the causes in the strict sense and the concomitant causes 30 of the construction of the cosmos, and he groups matter with the concomitant causes and says that it is imperishable just like the whole cosmos. On the other hand, according to Dercyllides’ account, Hermodorus, the friend of Plato, in his book on Plato, in which he describes among other things Plato’s views on matter, shows that he did not think it right to call matter a first principle. I will set down the conclusion of what Hermodorus said:258 Consequently such a thing, being unstable and formless and unlimited and a not-being, is described by denying being, and [nothing] having to do with principle or substance attaches259 to such a thing; rather what attaches to it is going on with a certain confusion.260 For [Plato] makes clear that just as in one way what acts (to poioun) is the cause in the strict sense and distinctively,261 so too it is a principle. But matter is not a principle, and therefore262 also it was said by those around Plato that there would be one principle.263

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192a34-b1 As far as the formal principle is concerned [it is the task of first philosophy to make a precise determination on whether it is one or many and what it is or they are. So let these matters be set aside until the appropriate occasion. About natural and perishable forms] we shall speak in what we prove later.

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Since he has spoken about the material principle and said that there must be inhering some primary substratum from which each thing comes to be per se and not in an accidental sense, and that matter is different from privation, and that it does not come to be or perish, it would be in order for him to speak next about the formal principle. For 10 this would be the next thing for a person who has said that there are three elemental principles, matter, privation, and form, and explained two of them. However, matter has its own first realisation (hupostasis) in this world and is an element of everything which comes to be. But one kind of form is first and genuinely a principle, and in other places he calls this mind and good and first cause which is both efficient and final 15 cause, and he says that it is both one and many;264 for multiplicity must come into existence after the one mind and because of them there are

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also bodies which move in a circle. Another kind of form is natural and perishable, and this is an element and proximate cause of the things which come to be and perish. And it is clear that the former is the first and separate formal principle in the strict sense, from which form in our world has its being. Because of this ‘it is the task of first philosophy (that is to say, of the subject which is above physics and which he himself calls metaphysics) to make a precise determination on whether’ the formal principle in the strict sense, which is separate and intelligible and unmoving is one or many or – what is truer – whether it is one and many and ‘what it is or they are’, namely actualities which are immaterial, intelligible, and complete in substance in every way. He says ‘we will discuss later the forms which are natural and perishable’ and in general seen in motion and change; these are elemental principles which are proximate formal causes of natural things. This is the form which inheres in natural things as an element, to which privation is opposite, and from which matter and all physical things are constructed. And the composite is dissolved into these two things, matter, which also endures, and form, which does not. He speaks about this sort of form in the next book, considering it in two ways: he considers it in terms of nature, which he will present as a proximate efficient cause (and for this reason – as well as for other reasons which will be described then – even in the next book he restricts the discussion of form); and he also considers this sort of form in terms of its being ‘spread over’ (ephaplôthen) matter. And again he also reduces the two [kinds of forms] into one in terms of the elemental form of natural things, which is what the present treatise is enquiring about most of all. And perhaps it is possible to say that he is speaking now about the elemental formal principle and not the separate one. For it is not the task of the natural philosopher (phusiologos) to present the elements of natural things with precision; rather it is the task of the first philosopher, just as it is the task of the first natural philosopher, not the medical specialist, to present the theory of the four elements [with precision]. However, it is the task of the natural philosopher to speak about natural forms, not as forms in general but as forms which come to be and perish. And, indeed, he will speak about these things in On Coming to be and Perishing, things which he says he will ‘prove later’ because they have a place after the present treatise. The former exegesis265 is better because Aristotle is considering the efficient cause of heaven. But since some people think that Aristotle does not speak about the efficient cause of the universe but only the final cause and they believe that this is the opinion of Alexander, I think it is necessary that they listen to what Alexander, the most authentic of the interpreters of Aristotle, says in this connection, namely this: The first cause would also be an efficient cause. For Aristotle says in the Metaphysics that what is moved by it is the fifth body, and

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it moves the other things which come to be and perish. And so the first cause is an efficient cause. But insofar as everything achieves its own perfection by aiming at this (as will also be said a little later) and insofar as ‘it causes motion by being loved’266 (as he has again said in the Metaphysics) the first cause would also be the goal and the cause ‘for the sake of which’; for what is wished for is this sort of thing.

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You see clearly how Alexander presents in what respect Aristotle hypothesises mind as an efficient cause and in what respect he hypothesises it as a final cause! 25 192b2-4 [Let us have determined in this way] that there are principles, what they are and how many they are in number. [And let us speak again beginning from another starting point.] He seems to have accepted that there are principles of natural things as clear, and thereby preserved the suitable limits for the natural philosopher, and, having determined what they are and how many there are, he affirms that there are principles and closes the first book at this 30 point.

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Notes to 1.7-9 1. Reading: to tên for tên, D.A.R. (Donald Russell) 2. 1.7, 190b29-32 (218,13). 3. Simplicius refers to the first chapter of the Physics, from which he closely paraphrases 184a23-4. 4. Aristotle here and at 190b13 introduces a way of speaking in which to gignomenon (‘what comes to be’) refers to the subject x of a sentence of the form ‘x comes to be y’; and ho gignetai (‘what [something] comes to be’) refers to the complement y. Unfortunately he does not stick to this formulation uniformly, as Simplicius points out at 215,14-15, regarding 190b12, where ho gignetai stands for ‘what comes to be [something]’. 5. Simplicius gives a fairly close paraphrase of 190a5-7. 6. On Boethus, a Peripatetic and Aristotelian commentator of the first century BC, see P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, Berlin, 1973, pp. 143-79, R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Richard Sorabji and Robert W. Sharples (eds), Greek and Roman Philosophy, 100 BC-200 AD, 2 vols, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, London, suppl. vol. 94, 2007, and Michael Griffin, Aristotle’s Categories in the Early Roman Empire, Oxford University Press (forthcoming). 7. Categories 10, 13a31-6. 8. Of the available readings, Diels prints aneblepsen where L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber de Intepretatione, Oxford, 1949, has eblepsen. 9. Diels prints a palin omitted by Minio-Paluello (1949). 10. Simplicius gives a close paraphrase of this sentence with additions at 212,32-3, but replaces hupokeisthai ti to gignomenon with hupokeisthai to ti gignomenon. The formulation is difficult in any case, and I have chosen to ignore the difference. 11. Ross brackets kai pote against all mss. Simplicius makes clear that he has the words at 213,33-4. 12. See the note on the lemma. 13. The lemma has a singular where Ross prints a plural. 14. Ross brackets alla on the ground that substances are the only unqualified existents. Simplicius clearly read alla, although he cannot explain what Aristotle has in mind; see n. 16. 15. Like sour milk, or vinegar. 16. ta proteron eirêmena, i.e., the non-substantial categories. Simplicius clearly has no idea about what, if anything, Aristotle has in mind. 17. Fifth-century Neoplatonist, mentioned at 192,29, 193,16 above and 241,22 below. 18. katatropê, not otherwise found and not in LSJ. 19. See the preceding lemma. 20. Presumably Alexander.

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21. In the preceding lemma. 22. Reading monên metabolên with D rather than the monon ê metabolên printed by Diels. 23. cf. Categories 8, 10a11-16. 24. Inserting einai with F and the Aldine. 25. cf. 213,21-2. 26. cf. 190a3 (209,2) with the note and Simplicius’ remark at 215,14-16. 27. Reading ti for to. 28. Ross prints kai. Simplicius cites with ê at 216,13; see Ross’s apparatus ad loc. 29. Ross, following H. Diels, Zur Textgeschichte der Aristotelischen Physik, Berlin, 1883, p. 9, n.1, brackets tous logous; for his reasons see his note ad 190b22-3. 30. In this lemma and the next four. 31. Reading stoikheia with E, instead of stoikheiôi, D.A.R. 32. The privation. 33. Reading ou, D.A.R. Sorabji has argued that this denial is absent from Aristotle Physics 2.5, but present in Metaphysics 6.3: Necessity, Cause and Blame, London, 1980, ch. 1, although the examples of accidental cause in these chapters do not include privation. 34. The idea of attributes that fill out (sumplêroun) the being of a thing is found in comments on Aristotle long before the Neoplatonists, e.g. Lucius, Nicostratus and Alexander. For example, see Frans de Haas, John Philoponus’ New Definition of Prime Matter, Leiden, 1997, pp. 201-9. 35. 1, 1a1-6. The next sentence is obscurely expressed, but seems to say no more than that a substance is composed of its elements. 36. cf. Timaeus 50A5-B6, partly quoted below at 218,4-7. 37. Simplicius has tode gar ti to mallon, where Ross prints tode gar ti mallon. 38. 49E7-50A2, which is quoted again at 226,19-22, and more of which is quoted at 224,5-9. 39. 50A5-B3. 40. cf. 197a7-12 (225,21) with Simplicius’ commentary, especially at 226,1422. 41. The lemma omits an einai found in our texts of Aristotle, but Simplicius has it in citations at 208,17 and 218,17. 42. Diels substitutes a future tense for the present of the mss. 43. See 190b17-23 (215,22) and 190b23-9 (217,1) with Simplicius’ commentary. 44. 190b29-191a3 (218,13). 45. In the present lemma. 46. 5.6, 229b23-7. Alexander is here taking the opposite of a thing as everything other than it, the contrary as something antithetical to it. On this understanding the privation of cultured would be uncultured, but uncultured only applies to things capable of being cultured; e.g., it does not apply to dogs. In the same way rest is the privation of change, but only things capable of changing can be said to be at rest. 47. Simplicius substitutes en genesei for Aristotle’s peri genesin. 48. 8. 4, 1044a32-b9. 49. Simplicius has to aition where Aristotle has ta aitia. 50. Simplicius has de where Aristotle has dê. 51. Simplicius has a to not in our texts of Aristotle. 52. ‘We must not say’ is understood, in order to explain the accusative, gên. 53. Simplicius has ta gar where Aristotle has eiper ara.

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54. 8. 5, 1044b27-9. 55. Simplicius’ formulation is perhaps misleading here since be believes that the heaven is a form/matter compound; see 225,14-20 and more importantly 133,24-8 of the commentary on De Caelo (CAG 7); Simplicius is only in a position to claim that in the case of heaven these principles are not principles of coming to be since heaven does not come to be. But here, at the point where they need to be distinguished, ‘alteration’ has been used for metabolê and its cognates. 56. cf. 3,13-15 in the prologue to this commentary. 57. In Physics 2,1. 58. Simplicius says here that all kinêsis is a kind of metabolê; cf., e.g., Physics 5.1, 225a34. Such statements make sense when kinêsis is translated ‘motion’, but here and elsewhere Simplicius, like Aristotle, uses kinêsis and metabolê interchangeably (see Bonitz, 391b26-48). I have nearly always translated metabolê as ‘change’ and usually translated kinêsis the same way. 59. 2. 3, 194b17-23. 60. Simplicius has epeidê instead of epei gar. 61. Simplicius has ginomenôn where Aristotle has zêtoumenôn. 62. Simplicius omits the words eis autas from his quotation. 63. 2.7, 198a30-1. 64. Simplicius supplies an estin, not in our text of Aristotle. 65. In other words, privation is less a kata sumbebêkos cause than other kata sumbebêkos causes. 66. I paraphrase these last remarks as, ‘The privation (not having the form) is not included in the nature (i.e., essence or logos) of the substratum, since then the substratum could not come to have the form. The substratum also does not have the form in its nature, but that does not mean its nature includes not having the form.’ 67. See below 246,17 - 248,20 with the notes. 68. 51A8. 69. 52A8-B2, part of a passage which is quoted more extensively at 224,29225,14, 245,11-19, and 254,28-31. At 223,8 Simplicius has genesthai where our texts of Plato have genesin; similarly at 225,3, 245,28, and 254,30. 70. Reading hôs, a suggestion of Diels to replace the ei which he prints. 71. 50C6-D2. 72. cf. Categories 5, 3b24-7. 73. Timaeus 49E2-4. 74. Timaeus 49E7-50A4, quoted in part at 218, 2-4 and again at 226,19-22. 75. Simplicius omits an aei found in our mss. of the Timaeus, but he has it at 218,2. 76. Timaeus 52A1-D1. Simplicius quotes the first part of this passage again at 245,11-19 and parts of it at 223,8-9 and 254,28-31. 77. Simplicius has auto eisdekhomenon where our texts of Plato have eis heauto eisdekhomenon; similarly at 245,13. 78. Simplicius has genesthai where our texts of Plato have genesin; similarly at 245,28 and in briefer quotations at 225,3 and 254,30. 79. Simplicius omits an ‘everything’ which is in our text of Plato. 80. Namely that images require something to exist in. 81. Diels prints ‘matter’. Our texts of Aristotle and Themistius’ paraphrase (CAG 5.1, 29,13) and the Aldine have ‘nature’. It is clear from the commentary that Simplicius takes for granted that Aristotle is talking about matter. 82. Ross, following H. Diels, Zur Textgeschichte der Aristotelischen Physik, Berlin, 1883, p. 5 brackets these problematic words on the grounds that they do not occur in Simplicius’ citation of the sentence at 226,6-9.

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83. Aristotle’s meaning is not in doubt, but the received text as it stands, mia de hê ho logos, is problematic; see 232,3-10 and Ross (who emends hê to hês) ad loc. 84. epereisis. It is interesting that Simplicius relies on a basically Stoic epistemology to argue that prime matter cannot be apprehended. For criticism of the Stoic theory see Alexander, Mant. 130,13-134,27. At 299,25-7 of the commentary on book 2 Simplicius asserts that enmattered form (but not matter itself) are apprehended by epereisis. 85. Timaeus 50E1-4, describing the Receptacle. 86. Simplicius omits a to found in our texts of Plato. 87. Reading a question mark after gnôston in line 5, not in line 6, D.A.R. 88. Read eipen. 89. Diels’ full stop in line 19 should be a comma. 90. Timaeus 49E7-50A2, quoted previously at 218,2-4 and more fully at 224,5-9. 91. Simplicius omits an aei found in our mss. of the Timaeus; he does the same thing at 224,6, but he has the aei at 218,2. 92. That is, substances are particular on their own (‘in the primary sense’) and attributes become particular by being attached to substances. 93. In the next lines Simplicius reflects on and quotes words from Timaeus 52A1-D1, which he has quoted in full at 224,29-225,14. 94. anagumnôsis, a word not found elsewhere. 95. See Peter Lautner, ‘Plato’s account of diseases of the soul in Timaeus 86B1-87B9’, Apeiron 44, 2011, pp. 21-39, for anoia as Plato’s most general word for diseases of the soul, amathia as the resulting cognitive state, and mania as adding a phenomenal character. 96. Diels prints gnôstên with D and E, where F and the Aldine have the more Platonic lêptên. 97. At 1.9, 192a36. Reading ekeinon of the Aldine, commended by Diels, rather than the ekeino of D, E, and F, which Diels prints. 98. Timaeus Locrus (Marg), 120,1-3. 99. Diels prints tôi where Marg prints dia to; for the text here see Marg (1972), p. 109 n. 2. 100. 227,23-233,3 rejects the view that matter is three-dimensional body without qualities, and substitutes Simplicius’ own view that matter is only body, and only extension, in the very different sense of an indeterminate dispersion and divergence away from the indivisible unity of the incorporeal world. See Introduction. This makes his conception of matter different from that of his arch-rival, the Christian Philoponus, in his Against Proclus, where three-dimensional extension serves both as the prime matter, or basic substratum, of the attributes in bodies, and as the defining form of bodies. On the other hand, if Simplicius wishes silently to attack the conception of his rival, it is argued in the Introduction that he does not know Philoponus’ position and has not recognised that his opponent is closer to him than he supposes. For Philoponus’ prime matter is not, as he says, ‘determined by’ three dimensions, but simply is three dimensions, and it has no determinate size or shape, but awaits the imposition of such determinate forms. 227,23-228,20 is translated as item 17.f.6 in Sorabji (2004), v. 2; other texts translated in the vicinity are 229,5-7, 230,17-23, and 232,21-30; 232,7-13 is translated as 23.c.3. 101. The person who is addressed by Proclus in the Platonic Theology (H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink, Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne, vol. 1, Paris, 1968, 1.1, 5.6-7) as his dearest friend. Proclus also mentions him at 872,15 (C. Steel, A. Gribomont, P. d’Hoine, Procli in Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria,

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Tomus II, Oxford, 2009) of his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. And in his life of Proclus (H.D. Saffrey and A.-P. Segonds, Marinus: Proclus our Sur le bonheur, Paris, 2001, 29.16-19) Marinus says that Proclus took Pericles with him to the Athenian Asclepion in a successful attempt to cure a sick child. 102. We now get a series of arguments for the idea that first matter is qualityless body. 103. Read protera instead of prôta apo, D.A.R. 104. Timaeus 52D4-6. 105. Timaeus 53A9-B5. 106. cf. Cael. 298b3-4 where Aristotle says that all natural substances either are bodies or are meta sômatôn kai megethôn. 107. Now arguments against the claim that first matter is qualityless body. 108. 53C5-8. 109. That is, the whole corporeal universe. 110. Physics 4.9, 217a26-7. 111. Simplicius has a gar where Ross prints a de. 112. As opposed to ‘in relation to other things’. 113. cf. 225,30-226,1 with the note. 114. See 227,18-22. 115. 4. 2, 209b2-4. 116. That is, the kai offers a gloss, not an addition. cf. Simplicius’ commentary on this passage at 536,24-30. 117. cf. Ennead 2.4, especially 8-12. 118. De Caelo 1.1, 268a1-2. 119. Simplicius has esti where our texts of Aristotle have ousa. 120. Here starts Simplicius’ own view, that matter is extension and body only in a very different sense. 121. If this is an attack on Philoponus Against Proclus, it misrepresents his view. See Introduction. 122. Read a comma here, not a full stop. 123. Again, Philoponus’ matter is not a measure which delimits. See Introduction. 124. Again, a comma instead of a full stop. 125. On Moderatus, a Neopythagorean perhaps of the first century AD, see R. Goulet, ed., Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, and J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, London, 1977, pp. 344-51. 230,34-231,24 is Porphyry fr. 236F (Smith); 230,34-231,5 is translated into English by Dillon (p. 347), and in remainder is translated as item 17.f.3 of R. Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD. A Sourcebook, vol. 2: Physics, London, 2005. There is a German translation of the whole fragment with commentary in H. Dörrie, M. Baltes, Der Platonismus in der Antike, vol. 4, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1996, pp. 176-9 and 477-85. 126. It is not clear where. Diels says ‘cf. Tim. p. 48 sqq.’, Baltes, in H.Dörrie, M. Baltes, Der Platonismus in der Antike, vol. 4, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1996, p. 177) refers (with a question mark) to lines in the Timaeus between 28A and 30A. 127. ekhôrêse; see Baltes 1996, pp. 481-2. 128. i.e., the logos’ own. 129. Plato? 130. Porphyry? 131. Timaeus 51A7. 132. aneideon. The word is not used by Plato, but cf. 211,16 (Boethus), 226,1-2, and 251,34.

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133. Timaeus 52A3. 134. cf. Timaeus 51A8-b1. 135. cf. Timaeus 52B2. 136. Porphyry? 137. The Neoplatonist view of Porphyry and Simplicius, remote from Aristotle’s, that matter is the deviation (parallaxis), turning away (ektropê, paratropê) and decline (hupophora) of perceptible form from being and from intelligible things to non-being, is given here at 230,23-6 and repeated at 231,8-26; 250,20; 255,12-16; 255,31-2; 774,8. 255,13-16 explains that participation in being halts the decline, so as to produce an image of being with an intermediate status, that of non-genuine being. These intermediates are material things consisting of matter and Aristotelian form. [The editor thanks Carlos Steel for information.] 138. i.e., the intelligible world. 139. Diels indicates corruption here. The de is puzzling, and the word ekmenousês (ekmenô) is not otherwise attested. D.A.R. points out that hupomenousês would match 233.17. 140. 4. 2, 209b6-9. See Simplicius discussion of this passage, especially 537,22-538,14. 141. Simplicius has tautiei hê hulê doxei where our texts of Aristotle have just hê hulê. 142. These are two views not so far discussed, although 230,15-16 has attacked the first idea that what underlies forms can itself be form. The editor thanks Dirk Baltzly for suggesting that this might be Simplicius’ description of the fourth and lowest category that Proclus ascribes to some unnamed ‘ancients’ in his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus I, 233,2 (cf. II, 128,1ff.). The noetic realm really has being; soul does not really have being; sensibles do not really not have being; Matter really does not have being. This might be seen as still describing matter ‘in terms of being’, but treating it as the worst of the forms. 143. This is the position of Damascius, an older contemporary of Simplicius and one of his teachers; see his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (L.G. Westerink and J. Combès, Damascius: Commentaire du Parménide de Platon, tome IV, Paris, 2003), 72,3-6 and 117,4-7, to which Carlos Steel adds Damascius On First Principles 1.26 14; 68 22. 144. Here ends Simplicius’ substitution of his own view of matter for the view, introduced at 227,23, that it is three-dimensional body without qualities. 145. With this paragraph see the third note on the lemma 191a17-18. 146. The mian of E, F, and the Aldine is preferable to the mia of D printed by Diels. 147. A comma would be better here than a full stop. 148. cf. 2.1, 193b19-20. 149. Categories 5, 2a11-19. 150. Simplicius relies on a pseudonymous work ascribed to the fourthcentury Pythagorean Archytas. He quotes the passage he has in mind here in his commentary on the Categories (CAG 8), 91,15-17 (= Thesleff (1965), 24,1719). 151. At Metaphysics 7.3, 1029a1-3 Aristotle divides the substratum (just said to be one of four candidates for being substance) into matter, form, the compound of them. In the next lines Simplicius gives his own summary account of the positions Aristotle takes in book 7. 152. Phaedrus 245D4-6. 153. cf. 245C9. 154. Inserted from the Aldine by Diels.

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155. huperattikizein, ‘being too Attic’, which LSJ explains as meaning here a ‘metaphor of excessive subtlety in philosophy’. 156. Diels printes legomen, Ross legômen. 157. Heiberg’s lemma has dei. Ross prints dein, following H. Bonitz, Aristotelische Studien, Wien, 1862, p. 223) and two citations by Simplicius (1140,24 and 1144,7). 158. Parmenides and Melissus. 159. Simplicius quotes Empedocles (DK31B8.3). For the numerous citations of this line, including four by Simplicius, see M.R. Wright, Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, New Haven, 1981, p. 99. 160. Moving Diels’ right parenthesis from behind hou to behind esti. 161. In Diels’ edition this lemma corresponds to the words ‘From “and thus magnifying the further consequences” up to “so these people accepted this view for the reasons stated”’ inserted in the text. 162. Simplicius again shows his faith in the wisdom of his forebears. 163. Delete comma after tines. 164. Here, unusually, Diels includes the number of the last line of the lemma. 165. I have translated these words as Simplicius cites them at 237,5, but he paraphrases in a different way at 237,11-12. Ross prints ê to mê on ê to on; see his apparatus at 191a35. 166. As pointed out in the introduction, Aristotle here in 191b15 applies each of the contrasted terms ‘accidentally’ and ‘per se’ to something different. His main question in 191a34-b26, discussed by Simplicius from 236,14 to 238,5, is about coming to be from what is or from what is not, and whether some coming to be is only accidentally from these, in the sense that it is from them not as what is, or as what is not. The second question, which is relevant to but distinct from the first, is whether what is and what is not have their being and non-being accidentally or per se. Alexander and Simplicius have the same two applications. See the Introduction and notes, besides the present one on 236,13-14, those on 238,8; 242,4-10, the lemma 191b36 at 242,15-16, 243,12, and 32, and 254,9. 167. Ross emends the text to say ‘dog comes to be from dog or horse from horse’. For Simplicius’ attempt to deal with the passage see 239,18-19 and 28-30. 168. i.e. doing or undergoing is more general than just undergoing, and coming to be some particular thing or other is more general than coming to be pale. 169. At 238, 4-8, the argument is about coming to be from what accidentally is not. At 238,11-12, it is about coming to be’s being accidentally from what per se is not, so that here the accidental/per se distinction is applied twice over. The application to being recurs at 242,4-10; the application to coming from something at 254,10-12; 254,19-20; 257,6-7. See Introduction and notes on the lemma 191b15 at 236,13-14, on 242,4-10, on the lemma 191b36 at 242,15-16, on 243,12, and 32, and on 254,9. 170. cf. 258A11ff. Simplicius goes on to quote 258D7-259A4, where he takes Plato to be ascribing to a Form not being in the sense of being other than a different Form. In 238,22-239,7; 242,17ff.; 245,19ff., Simplicius argues that Plato anticipates Aristotle in distinguishing not-being per se, which cannot belong to a Form, from being other, which can. He also claims that Plato anticipates the idea of being accidentally, which Aristotle applies to privation because of its accidental association with matter to which he ascribes being. According to Simplicius at 245,19ff. below, Plato was aware not only of matter, which in the Timaeus he called the Receptacle or space, but also of privation, because he said that the Receptacle was omnirecipient (Timaeus 51A7), and

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Notes to pages 122-127

without any of the Forms it was going to receive (51D7-E1). But Simplicius, following Alexander (cited 244,32-245,2 as interpreting Aristotle 192a1), offered the qualification that Plato did not distinguish in logos between matter and privation. See further the Introduction above. 171. Diels prints a capital letter to mark this sentence as an interpretation (by Theaetetus) of the Stranger’s speech, even though Simplicius omits the explicit ‘O Stranger’, found in modern texts of Plato. 172. The mss. of Simplicius omit a tis which is found in the mss. of Plato and the Aldine. 173. Reading ê with D, E, and the Aldine rather than the hêi of F (‘as from seed’) printed by Diels. 174. This is apparently a description of an animal coming to be an animal of another kind. 175. Nicander Theriaca 741. (The editor thanks Donald Russell for this reference.) 176. Whereas a horse is the efficient cause of the horse that it generates. 177. At 191a34-191b1. 178. cf. Ross ad 191b29. 179. See the note on 213,24. 180. Diels marks the preceding words (242,4-10) as a quotation of Alexander. This looks like the first of two ideas ascribed to Alexander in 238,2-14 above. Simplicius there held and ascribed to Alexander the view that matter is, and insofar as privation accidentally inheres in it, also accidentally is not. 181. Aristotle here at Physics 1.9, 191b35-192a8, says that some believers in the great and small (who must be Platonists) follow Parmenides too closely and make the wrong concessions. See Introduction on what those concessions are and on the ambiguity between coming to be without qualification from what is not, and coming to be from what without qualification is not. For this last ambiguity see also the notes on the lemma 191b15 at 236,13-14, on 238,8; 242,4-10, 243,12, and 32, and 254,9. Simplicius at 243,9-20 resists the common interpretation of Plato as following Parmenides in recognising only unqualified being and not being, since in the Sophist Plato makes many of the necessary distinctions. Aristotle too is said at 243,20ff. not to have been ascribing to Plato unqualified coming to be from what is not in Parmenides’ sense, although Simplicius allows at 243,4ff. that Plato did not make all the necessary distinctions and confesses himself puzzled about Plato at 244,18ff. 182. This is doubly guarded: see Introduction. It is part of what some people (evidently Platonists) claim, and it was not a claim of Parmenides, but merely one alternative formulated as a dilemma, but not endorsed, by him. 183. cf. 241,24-7. 184. Timaeus 50D7-E1. 185. cf. 239,3-5, although there Simplicius does not mention the distinction between potential and actual. 186. 242,28-243,3 are Eudemus text 37b (Wehrli). This last sentence occurs also in a quotation of Eudemus by Simplicius at 98,1 (accepting Wehrli’s editorial emendation) and is incorporated in Eudemus text 37a. 187. Note that in this paragraph Simplicius is giving an interpretation of Plato which he does not accept, and that he takes up the other ‘respect’ in the next lemma at 244,22. 188. i.e., the one being. 189. See Introduction for the difference between the concession that Simplicius thinks wrongly attributed to Plato, that coming to be is from what without qualification is not, and Aristotle’s formula at 191b35 that coming to be

Notes to pages 127-131

153

is without qualification from what is not. See also notes on the lemma 191b15 at 236,13-14, on 238,8; on 242,4-10, on the lemma 191b36 at 242,15-16, on 243,32, and on 254,9. 190. See 89,4-90,20. 191. Sophist 245D12-E2. 192. Evidently not at any rate in the sense intended by Parmenides: see Introduction. 193. Sophist 258A11-B8. 194. Plato has ousia. The ousa in Diels may be a scribal error rather than Simplicius’ misquotation. 195. DK28B7, 1-2. Plato quotes these lines twice in the Sophist, at 237A8-9 and 258D2-3. See again Introduction for the difference between Parmenides’ coming to be from what without qualification is not, and Aristotle’s formula at 191b35 of coming to be without qualification from what is not. 196. Diels prints mian einai monon, Ross mia monon einai. 197. In the previous lemma. 198. 52A1-B3, a passage previously cited at 224,29-225,4. 199. Simplicius has auto eisdekhomenon where our texts of Plato have eis heauto eisdekhomenon; similarly at 224,30. 200. Simplicius omits a genêton, which found in our texts of Plato, but he has it at 224,33. 201. Simplicius has genesthai where our texts of Plato have genesin; similarly at 225,3 and in briefer quotations at 223,8 and 254,30. 202. cf. Timaeus 51a7. The word is associated with Plato by Aristotle at De Caelo 3.8, 306b19 and On Coming to be and Perishing 2.1, 329a14. 203. A virtual quotation of Timaeus 51D7-E1. 204. 1.7, 191a6-7 (221,20). Here Simplicius writes esti where our texts of Aristotle have estai. 205. Sophist 258C2-4. 206. Read: eiper an at the end of the preceding sentence. (The editor thanks James Wilberding for this suggestion.) 207. The lemma has einai phamen, but Simplicius has phamen einai, the text printed by Aristotle, at 246,21. 208. On the great and the small in Plato, see the note on 189,12. 209. ‘In logos’ is drawn from Aristotle’s ‘in being, form and logos’ at 190a1517; 190b23-27; 191a1-3 by Alexander and Simplicius at 244,32-245,9, and 247,20-1. 210. This sentence is difficult. I have tried to read hup’ with E for the ap’ printed by Diels. 211. cf. Categories 5, 4a10-11, where Aristotle calls this characterisation malista idion of substance. 212. cf. Categories 5, 3b24-5, where not having a contrary is said to be a feature of substance, but not a proprium. 213. See again note on 189,12. 214. Simplicius appears to speak as an Aristotelian here, but the formulation may only be intended to explain Aristotle’s position. 215. 191b35 (242,15). 216. For references see Bonitz, 448a23-34 and 599a55-9. 217. On Dercyllides (c. 100 BC-100 AD) see Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques. 218. On Hermodorus, a member of Plato’s Academy, see J. Dillon, The Heirs of Plato, Oxford, 2003, pp. 198-204; the ancient texts relating to Hermodorus

154

Notes to pages 132-138

are edited and translated into Italian with commentary in M. Isnardi Parente, Senocrate-Ermodoro: Frammenti, Naples, 1981. 219. The text here is probably corrupt, as Diels notes. The translation follows his suggestion: hôs tôi mallon einai. 220. Again Diels notes that the text is corrupt here. The single element is the equal, the stationary, or the tuned. Presumably Hermodorus means that, e.g., all cases of inequality vary in degree around a single case of equality. Gaiser’s replacement of Diels’ dedegmenon with dedektai helps (in K. Gaiser, Platons Ungeschriebene Lehre, Stuttgart, 1963, p.496) as does Zeller’s deletion of autôn (cf. apparatus ad loc. in Diels). 221. Simplicius repeats with some variation the remainder of this quotation at 256,35-257,4; for the text see the notes on that passage. 222. 256,31-257,4. 223. Diels prints tês morphês with D, E, F, where Ross prints têi morphêi. Diels notes that the Aldine has têi morphêi; For tês morphês Ross cites only the lemma here in Simplicius and the corresponding lemma in Philoponus’ commentary on the Physics (CAG 16). 224. The Demiurge or creator of Plato’s Timaeus is distinguished by Proclus on the Timaeus I, 310,15-24 from a lower demiurgic triad by his creation of universal, as opposed to particular things: see Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD, vol. 2 Physics, p. 170, with translation at ch. 8 (f) 8. 225. Timaeus 50D3; Plato calls it space at 52B1. 226. At Timaeus 49A7 and 52D5. 227. Diels’ full stop should be a question mark. 228. Again a question mark is needed. 229. In his reply to Alexander’s suggestion that privation is a cause of evil, Simplicius extends his attack to the Manicheans, who believed in a principle of evil. For his knowledge of the Manichaeans, see H. Dörrie, M. Baltes (eds), Der Platonismus in der Antike, vol. 4, p. 154, with n. 1, citing also Asclepius in Metaph. 292,27ff.; Proclus Platonic Theology 1.18, p. 87,22 S-W. The Manicheans are mentioned again by Simplicius at 256,25 below. Simplicius knows more about them and argues against them at greater length in his commentary on Epictetus’ Handbook. See I. Hadot, ‘Die Widerlegung des Manichäismus im Epiktetkommentar des Simplikios’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 51, 1969, and ‘Dans quel lieu le néoplatonicien Simplicius a-t-il fondé son école de mathématiques, et où a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manichéen?’, International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 1, 2007, 42-107. The editor thanks Sebastian Gertz for the information in this note. Simplicius’ attack on the idea that privation or matter are evil runs from 249,12 to 250,3 and is resumed at 256,22 to 31. 230. Read with E: ei ti pote estin hautê, and cf. 250,27-8 below. The comma should be moved from before to after hautê. 231. Simplicius gives a close paraphrase of Timaeus 41B8-9. 232. That is, the great masses of earth, water, fire, and air. 233. 250,20. See 231,26 with note, for matter as deviation from being. 234. Metaphysics 12.10, 1076a4 (quoting Iliad 2.204). 235. Reading the tên of the Aldine for the toiautên of D and E printed by Diels. 236. Read: hup’ for ap’. 237. Simplicius inserts a tên which is not printed by Ross. 238. Diels prints the present tense where Ross and the Aldine have the imperfect.

Notes to pages 138-140

155

239. Simplicius here (and presumably at 254,19-20 and 257,6-7) takes ‘not in an accidental sense’ at Aristotle’s 192a32 to go with ‘come to be from’. Simplicius thinks the contrast is that something comes to be from privation only accidentally, because the privation becomes absent, unlike the bronze when a statue comes to be. Alexander, in the following comment at 254,13-14, takes ‘accidentally’ to go with ‘inhere’, and takes the contrast to be that the bronze’s colour inheres only accidentally in the statue. For earlier ambiguities on what is qualified by ‘accidentally’ and ‘per se’ see Introduction and notes on the lemma 191b15 at 236,13-14, on 238,8; on 242,4-10, on the lemma 191b36 at 242,15-16, and on 243,12, and 32. 240. Quotation marks should be inserted here in Diels’ text. 241. Timaeus 52A8-B3, lines previously quoted in a larger context at 225,1-4 and 245,17-19, part also being quoted at 223,8-9. 242. Here Diels inserts a to not printed by Rivaud, but he does not do so at 223,7, 225,2, or 225,17 (where it is found in F). 243. Simplicius has genesthai where our texts of Plato have genesin; similarly at 223,8, 225,3, and 245,18. 244. cf. 1.5, 188b21-6 and 1.7, 191a3-7. 245. cf. 224,21-8. 246. 50C6-D2. 247. See 231,20 with note for matter as deviation from being, and for participation in being as halting decline so that composites of matter and form have an intermediate status above total non-being. 248. 255,17-18 ‘common’: Simplicius in Cat. 82,35-83,20 is happy to say that there are common features caused among individuals by a Platonic Form. But, following Proclus in Parmenidem 880,3-11, he gives Platonic reasons for denying that the Form is a common nature. It is only common as a cause. See Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD, London, 2004, vol. 2 Physics, pp. 129-31. The same denial that the Platonist Form is a universal is found in Plotinus by Riccardo Chiaradonna, ‘Plotino e la teoria degli universali. Enn. 6.3 [44]9’, in C. Vincenza, Cristina d’Ancona (eds), Aristotle e i suoi esegetici neoplatonici, Bibliopolis, Naples, 2004, 1-35. 249. See again 231,26 with note. 250. Clearly the three-dimensional or qualityless body. 251. Delete: tou hudatos hê (Wilberding). 252. The objection is found in Christian writers that a world or matter co-eternal with God would have the same honorific status as God. Platonists would have considered themselves immune to this objection since the analogy of light or of shadow produced contemporaneously with the sun had been supplied by Taurus in the second century AD, by Plotinus in the third, Sallustius in the fourth and Proclus in the fifth, while Augustine reports the Platonist analogy of a footprint contemporaneous with an implanted foot. None of these analogies is open to the objection that the effect would have the same honorific status as the cause. Yet as early as Basil of Caesarea in the fourth century, Christians raised a different objection to these analogies, that they provide cases of spontaneous, not willed, creation. See Richard Sorabji, ‘Waiting for Philoponus’, in Charles Burnett, Rotraud Hansberger, Afifi al-Akiti (eds), Medieval and Arabic Thought, Warburg Studies and Texts, London, forthcoming. 253. In Book 8: motion does not come to be or perish, 8.1; everything which moves is moved by something 8.4. 254. On the assumptions made by the people invoked at the beginning of this paragraph. 255. cf. 250,26 with the note.

156

Notes to pages 141-143

256. cf. 192a23 (250,7). 257. See note on 249,16. 258. What follows is a close variant of 248,13-18. 259. Simplicius has the third person singular here and the infinitive at 248,14. 260. The comma and period in 257,1 should be interchanges as they are in 248,25. 261. Here Simplicius has diapheron, whereas at 248,16 he has diapheronti. 262. Reading the dio of 248,17 rather than the ho printed here by Diels. 263. Here Diels prints eiê, whereas at 248,18 he prints hê. 264. Unlike the Neoplatonic One, which is only one. 265. About the ‘separate formal principle’ of 258,5? 266. Metaphysics 12.7, 1072b3.

English-Greek Glossary to 1.7-9 Compiled by Sebastian Gertz absence: apousia absolutely: haplôs accident: sumbebêkos accidental: kata sumbebêkos accrue: epiginesthai actuality: energeia, to energeiai, actually: energeiai addition: prosthesis adornment: kosmos affection: pathos affective: pathêtikos alien: ekphulos alter: alloioun alteration: alloiôsis alternatively: allôs antecedent, the: to hêgoumenon appearance: opsis apply to: huparkhein apply: prosarmottein apprehended: gnôstos apprehensible: gnôstos apprehension: gnôsis approve: enkrinein argument: epikheirêma arranging: kosmeisthai artificially produced: tekhnêtos as (with respect to) an attribute: kata sumbebêkos as individual things: idiai, kat’idia assimilation: homoiôsis associate (v.): prosarmottein assume as an axiom beforehand: proaxiousthai attach/be attached: sumbainein attribute (n.): sumbebêkos authentic: gnêsios authoritative: kuriôs be: huparkhein

be a substrate/substratum: hupokeisthai be acted upon: paskhein be an accident: sumbainein be below: hupobainein be essentially connected with: sunousiousthai be given substance: ousiousthai be logically opposed to: antidiaireisthai be made like: aphomoiousthai be opposite to: antikeisthai be ordered: kosmeisthai bear witness to: têrein being common to everything: koinotês being counted: enarithmos being the domain of soul: psukhikos being (n.): to einai belong (to): huparkhein beyond: epekeina bodily: sômatikos bulk: onkos by making a distinction: diôrismenôs can be counted: arithmêtos causal account: aitiologia cause (n.): aitia, aition challenge (v.): episkêptein change of shape: metaskhêmatisis change shape: metaskhêmatizein change (n.): metabolê, kinêsis, katatropê characterised negatively: en apophasei choice: proairesis choose: prokheirizesthai circumscribe: perigraphein coexist: sunuparkhein coherent: akolouthos combining: sunkrisis

158

English-Greek Glossary to 1.7-9

come to be: epiginesthai coming to be: genesis common features of, the koinônia commonality: to koinon; koinotês complete (adj.): teleios composite: sunthetos composite, the: to sunamphoteron conception: ennoia, huponoia concomitant: sunaitios condition: katastêma confirmation: pistis confusion: akrisia congruent: katallêlos consequence: sumbainon, to consistent: akolouthos continuity: sunekheia contradiction: antiphasis contrariety: enantiotês contrary: enantios contrast (n.): antidiastolê co-ordination: parupostasis cosmos : kosmos criticise: euthunein decline (n.): hupophora demiurge: dêmiourgos demiurgic: dêmiourgikos denial: apophasis denying: kata apophasin depart from: apoginesthai depart: existasthai determinate: aphôrismenos (plural) determination: horos deviation: parallaxis, paratropê differentiae: ta diaphora differently qualified: alloios dimension: diastasis direct observation: euthuôria direct (adj.): prosekhôs directly: prosekhôs disabling: pêrôsis discordant: diaphônos discrimination: diakrisis dispersion: diaspasmos dissolution: diallaxis distinction: diorismos distinctively: aphôrismenôs divisibility: merismos division: diairesis due to art: tekhnikos echo (n.): apêkhêma efficient: poiêtikos

elemental: stoikheiôdês endure: hupomenein ensemble: holotês enter (into): enginesthai entity: phusis enumeration: aparithmêsis equal in number: isarithmos essence: to ti ên einai eternal: aidios everlasting: aidios examine: prokheirizesthai exchange (n.): allagê exhaustive: aparaleiptos exist: huphistanai exist before: prouparkhein exist in actuality before coming to be: prouparkhein existence: hupostasis expression: hermeneia extend: diistanai extending: ektasis extension: diastasis, diastêma fill out: sumplêroun final: telikos find room for: khôrein for a start: teôs form (n.): eidos formally: eidêtikôs formless: amorphos, aneideos fundamental: arkhoeidês generalities: ta holoskherestera generic: genikos genus: genos get existence: huphistanai get too sophisticated: huperattikizein give form to: eidopoiein give shape to: metaskhêmatizein give up on the idea: aphistanai have accidentally: sumbainein having a size: posos heavenly: ouranios human: anthrôpos image: eikasia image-like: eikonikos immaterial: aulos impact: epereisis imperishable: aphthartos in a primary way: proêgoumenôs in a strict sense: kuriôs

English-Greek Glossary to 1.7-9 in an accidental sense: kata sumbebêkos in another way: allôs in every and any way: katholou kai kathapax in general: katholou in matter: enulos in opposition to: antixous in the primary sense: proêgoumenos include: periekhein incompatible: asunaktos incorporeal: asômatos indefinite: aoristos independent: auto eph’heautou huparkhon independently of perception: met’anaisthêsias individual: atomos, idios individualise: atomoun indivisible: adiairetos indivisibly: ameristôs induction: epagôgê infer: sunagein inhere: enuparkhein insight: epibolê instrumental: organikos intelligible: noêtos intermediate: mesos intractable: dusergos involved in choice: proairetikos kind of: hopoiosoun kind (n.): genos, tropos letter of the alphabet: stoikheion like shadows: skioeidôs likeness: homoiôma loosening: paralusis magnitude: megethos make distinctions: diastellesthai make way for: existasthai material: enulos, hulikos matter (n.): hulê measures: metra menstrual fluid: ta katamênia mind (n.): nous misapply: katakhrêsthai mode: tropos more generally: allôs musical: mousikos nameless: anônumos

159

natural: phusikos nature: phusis negation: apophasis non-apprehension: agnôsia non-understanding: anoia not in any sense whatsoever: to mêdamêi mêdamôs notion: ennoia notion of ambiguity, the: to disson object of belief: pistos of an image: eikonikos of the study of nature: phusikos (from the point of view) of the study of nature: phusikôs omnirecipient: pandekhês on its own: kath’hauto, kath’heauto opinion: doxa opposite to: antixous opposition: antithesis Other, the: thateron pair, the: to sunamphoteron pair of items: suzugia participate: koinônein participation: methexis particular: atomos, merikos particular thing, a: to tode ti particularity: idiotês particularity: tode ti particulars, the: ta kathekasta per se: kath’hauto, kath’heauto perceptual: aisthêtikos perfection: teleiotês perishing: phthora phase: phôtismos picture (n.): phantasma possession: hexis potentiality: to dunamei potentially: dunamei precede: prouparkhein predicate: katêgorein pre-exist: prouparkhein premiss: protasis presence: parousia primary: proêgoumenos, prôtourgos primary ingredients: ta prôtôs enuparkhonta principle: arkhê, stoikheion privation: sterêsis procession: proodos proper: oikeios properties: ta parakolouthounta

160

English-Greek Glossary to 1.7-9

property: pathos proprium, a: idion providing division: diairetikos providing extension: diastatikos proximate: prosekhês pursue (an argument): metakheirizesthai putting things together: sunthesis qualified: poios qualitative change: alloiôsis quality: poiotês qualityless: apoios quantity: posotês; to poson quote: paragraphein real thing: pragma realisation: hupostasis reality: hupostasis, phusis reasoning: logismos receptacle: to hupodektikon receptive: dektikos receptivity: epitêdeiotês reduce: anagein reflection: emphasis reject: athetein, enistasthai relation: skhesis remaining the same: atreptos resemble: aphomoiousthai reshaping: metaplasis residual sediment: hupostathmê revert: anakamptein satisfying (the definition of): autarkhês seat: hedra self-moving: autokinêtos self-sufficient: autarkhês sense (n.): ennoia separate out: ekkrinein separate (adj.): khôristos separation: diakrisis, khôrismos shadow-reflection: skiasma shapeless: askhêmatistos short passage: rhêseidion simple: haplous size: onkos, posotês; to poson slackening: paresis space: khôra specific: eidikos, idios

spontaneous: automatos spreading out: diaspasmos stability: stasis stable: monimos striking: antitupos stripping away: anagumnôsis submit to: hupomenein substance: ousia substantial: ousiôdês subtraction: aphairesis (the) substratum: [to] hupokeimenon suitability: epitêdeiotês supervene: epiginesthai syllogise: sullogizesthai tacitly assume: prolambanein that transcends: exêirêmenos three-dimensional: trihkêi diastaton transform: metaplattein turning away: ektropê, parektropê turning: tropê unalterable: ametablêtos undefined: aoristos undergo: paskhein underlie: hupokeisthai understand: ennoein understanding: noêsis unified: heniaios, hênômenos universal: katholikos, katholou universal things: ta hola unlimited: apeiros unmusical: amousos way: tropos what (a thing) is an element of: to stoikheiôton what is common to: koinônia what is other: heterotês what is valuable: khreia what is wished for: to orekton which comes to be: genêtos which moves in a circle: kuklophorêtikos without extension: adiastatos without form: amorphous, aneideos without making distinctions: adioristôs without qualification: haplôs

Greek-English Index to 1.7-9 Compiled by Michael Atkinson adiairetos, indivisible, 231,10 adiastatos, without extension, 231,30; 232,2 adioristôs, without making distinctions, 244,13 agnôsia, non-apprehension, 227,5 aidios, eternal, 219,24; everlasting, 234,6 aisthêtikos, perceptual, 227,7 aitia, cause, 216,10 aitiologia, causal account, 225,15 aition, cause, 216,9; 217,29 etc. akolouthos, coherent, 214,2; consistent, 217,36 akrisia, confusion, 248,15; 257,1 allagê, exchange, 214,22 alloios, differently qualified, 213,27 alloiôsis, qualitative change, 213,21; alteration, 213,28 etc. alloioun, to alter, 213,14 etc. allôs, alternatively, 218,32; more generally, 245,14; in another way, 252,4 ameristôs, indivisibly, 232,5 ametablêtos, unalterable, 220,24 amorphos, without form, 245,22; formless, 248,13 amousos, unmusical, 209,12 etc. anagein, to reduce, 221,11 anagumnôsis, stripping away, 226,27 anaisthêsia; met’anaisthêsias, independently of perception, 225,3; 227,8 etc. anakamptein, to revert, 211,32; 212,4 aneideos, without form, 210,36; 211,16; 251,34; formless, 226,2 anoia, non-understanding, 226,28

anônumos, nameless, 210,19 anthrôpos, human, 209,10 etc. antidiaireisthai, to be logically opposed to, 230,13 antidiastolê, contrast, 254,9 antikeisthai, to be opposite to, 210,3.25; 211,31 etc. antiphasis, contradiction, 240,16 antithesis, opposition, 243,28 antitupos, striking, 227,9 antixous, opposite to, 249,16; in opposition to, 256,23 aoristos, indefinite, 217,27 etc.; undefined, 226,34 aparaleiptos, exhaustive, 213,34 aparithmêsis, enumeration, 213,33 apeiros, unlimited, 247,35 apêkhêma, echo, 232,31 aphairesis, subtraction, 214,12 etc. aphistanai, to give up on the idea, 237, 32 aphomoiousthai, to resemble, 223, 24; to be made like, 224,26 aphôrismenos, determinate, 232,1.21; aphôrismenôs, distinctively, 227,3 aphthartos, imperishable, 234,12.15 etc. apoginesthai, to depart from, 228,13.14 apoios, qualityless, 211,20; 226,2 etc. apophasis, negation, 217,26; denial, 230,8; en apohasei, characterised negatively, 211,22; kata apophasin, denying, 248,14 apousia, absence, 211,1.26; 212,7.9 etc.

162

Greek-English Index to 1.7-9

arithmêtos, can be counted, 217,11.13.14 arkhê, principle, 208,19 etc. arkhoeidês, fundamental, 228,19 askhêmatistos, shapeless, 231,10 asômatos, incorporeal, 228,15 asunaktos, incompatible, 210,3 athetein, to reject, 240,22 atomos, individual, 217,12; 234,1 etc.; particular, 235,3 atomoun, to individualise, 255,28.33 atreptos, remaining the same, 213,29 aulos, immaterial, 230,30; 252,2 autarkhês, satisfying (the definition of), 223,31; self-sufficient, 251,17 autokinêtos, self-moving, 234,22 automatos, spontaneous, 223,20 dektikos, receptive, 211,23 dêmiourgikos, demiurgic, 223,17 dêmiourgos, demiurge, 228,9 etc. diairesis, division, 213,25; 214,3.5 etc. diairetikos, providing division.249,3 diakrisis, discrimination, 231,24.29; separation, 235,21 diallaxis, dissolution, 235,23 diaphônos, discordant, 225,17 diaphora, ta, differentiae, 230,11 diaspasmos, spreading out, 231,20.24; dispersion, 231,28 diastasis, extension, 229,6; 230,26 etc.; dimension, 230,14.20 diastatikos, providing extension, 249,2 diastellesthai, to make distinctions, 243,1 diastêma, extension, 232,27 diistanai, to extend, 232,6 diôrismenôs, by making a distinction, 236,16 diorismos, distinction, 241,13 disson, to, the notion of ambiguity, 243,3 doxa, opinion, 225,1 dunamei, potentially, 211,9; 236,19; to dunamei, potentiality, 211.9 etc. dusergos, intractable, 229,26 eidikos, specific, 234,1 eidopoiein, to give form to, 231,24; 233,26

eidos, form, 219,9, etc.; eidêtikôs, formally, 230,25 eikasia, image, 224,27 eikonikos, of an image, 224,24; image-like, 226,36 einai, to, being, 211,8 etc. ekkrinein, separate out, 235,19 ekphulos, alien, 220,12 ektasis, extending, 230,23 ektropê, turning away, 255,13 emphasis, reflection, 231,3; 233,1 enantios, contrary, 210,2 etc. enantiotês, contrariety, 232,8 enarithmos, being counted, 246,1 energeia, actuality, 257,23; energeiai, actually, 211,10; 236,20 etc.; to energeiai, actuality, 252,30 enginesthai, to enter (into), 228,12.13; 250,32 enistasthai, to reject, 244,4 enkrinein, to approve, 238,6 ennoein, to understand, 235,13 ennoia, sense, 210,28; 216,10; notion, 227,1; conception, 232,12 enulos, in-matter, 223,11 etc.; material, 230,30 enuparkhein, to inhere, 216,1.20 etc.; ta prôtôs enuparkhonta, primary ingredients, 216,31 epagôgê, induction, 213,12.15 epekeina, beyond, 230,5 epereisis, impact, 225,30; 226,26 etc. epibolê, insight, 227,11 epiginesthai, to supervene, 215,8; 217,5 etc.; to come to be, 218,2; to accrue, 253,11 epikheirêma, argument, 243,16 episkêptein, to challenge, 243,22 epitêdeiotês, suitability, 212,8; receptivity, 222,32 euthunein, to criticise, 246,7 euthuôria, direct observation, 227,21 exêirêmenos, that transcends, 245,10 existasthai, to depart, 209,24.34; 210,4 etc.; to make way for, 222,8 genesis, coming to be, 208,19; 209,9 etc. genêtos, which comes to be, 211,25 etc. genikos, generic, 234,1 genos, kind, 223,7; genus, 230,11 etc.

Greek-English Index to 1.7-9 gnêsios, authentic 258,16 gnôsis, apprehension, 225,31; 227,6 etc. gnôstos, apprehensible, 226,5; apprehended, 229,2 haplous, simple, 209,10; haplôs, without qualification, 212,26 etc.; absolutely, 219,23 hedra, seat, 223,5; 225,2 hêgoumenon, to, the antecedent, 254,6 heniaios, unified, 231,7.16 hênômenos, unified, 226,32 hermeneia, expression, 233,10 heterotês, what is other, 245,30 hexis, possession, 211,32 etc. hola, ta, universal things, 249,1 holoskherestera, ta, generalities, 227,15 holotês, ensemble, 249,35 homoiôma, likeness, 224,25 etc. homoiôsis, assimilation, 250,17 hopoiosoun, kind of, 238,15 horos, (plural) determination, 231,22 hulê, matter, 210,31 etc. hulikos, material, 239,24 huparkhein, to be, 210, 2; to belong (to), 211,4.5.7 etc.; to apply to 247,2; auto eph’heautou huparkhon, independent, 224,24 huperattikizein, to get too sophisticated, 235,3 huphistanai, to exist, 209,31; 210,35 etc.; to get existence, 249,18 hupobainein, to be below, 231,5 hupodektikon, to, receptacle, 227,2 hupokeisthai, to be a substrate/substratum, 209,28; 210,30.31 etc.; to underlie, 212,34 etc.; (to) hupokeimenon, (the) substratum, 208,21; 209,5 etc. hupomenein, to endure, 209,23 etc.; to submit to, 224,4 huponoia, conception, 230,34 hupophora, decline, 255,13 hupostasis, existence, 221,31; 232,1; reality, 223,1; 238,16; realisation, 257,13 hupostathmê, residual sediment, 231,34.36

163

idios, individual, 219,10; specific, 220,2; idion, a proprium, 247,4; idiai, kat’idia, as individual things, 219,9; 216,28 idiotês, particularity, 234,23 isarithmos, equal in number, 218,32; 219,6 katakhrêsthai, to misapply, 252,26 katallêlos, congruent, 253,15 katamênia, ta, menstrual fluid, 219,31 katastêma, condition, 232,1 katatropê, change, 213,29 katêgorein, to predicate, 231,13; 247,12 kathekasta, ta, the particulars, 208,30 kath’hauto, kath heauto, per se, 211,7; 215,28 etc.; on its own, 209,31; 211,14 etc. katholikos, universal, 213,15 katholou, universal, 208,30; 213,17; in general, 222,26; katholou kai kathapax, in every and any way, 213,19-20 khôra, space, 223,5.7 etc. khôrein, to find room for, 231,9 khôrismos, separation, 212,15 khôristos, separate, 235,1; 250,13 khreia, what is valuable, 249,18 kinêsis, change, 220,19 etc. (see note 58) koinon, to, commonality, 256,6 koinônein, to participate, 211,12 koinônia, what is common to, 209,14, the common features of, 217,3 koinotês, being common to everything, 255,17; commonality, 255,18.20 etc. kosmos, cosmos, 249, 34, 256, 29.31; adornment, 256,24; kosmeisthai, to be ordererd, 231,4; 252,5; the arranging, 228, 5 kuklophorêtikos, which moves in a circle, 257,17 kuriôs, in a strict sense, 210,35; authoritative, 223,17 logismos, reasoning, 225,3; 226,26

164

Greek-English Index to 1.7-9

mêdamêi mêdamôs, to, not in any sense whatsoever, 238,16 megethos, magnitude, 229,6.7 etc. merikos, particular, 214,13 merismos, divisibility, 230,31 mesos, intermediate, 221,14 metabolê, change, 208,18; 209,10 etc. metakheirizesthai, to pursue (an argument), 209,9 metaplasis, reshaping, 217,8; 226,19 metaplattein, to transform, 218,5 metaskhêmatisis, change of shape, 214,8 metaskhêmatizein, to change shape, 214,221; to give shape to, 228,28 methexis, participation, 250,19; 255,6 metra, measures, 230,31.33 monimos, stable, 224,5 mousikos, musical, 208,2; 209,22 etc. noêsis, understanding, 224,32; 226,28 noêtos, intelligible, 224,23 etc. nous, mind, 223,17 oikeios, proper, 229,28.30 etc. onkos, bulk, 230,19.30 etc.; size, 249,5 opsis, appearance, 226,5 orekton, to, what is wished for, 258,24 organikos, instrumental, 223,18 ouranios, heavenly, 219,25 etc. ousia, substance, 208,21 etc. ousiôdês, substantial, 214,9; 215,7 etc. ousiousthai, to be given substance, 252,29 pandekhês, omnirecipient, 223,4; 231,13; 245,21 paragraphein, to quote, 247,33 parakolouthounta, ta, properties, 220,14 parallaxis, deviation, 231,20; 232,14.17 etc. paralusis, loosening, 231,19 paratropê, deviation, 250,20 parektropê, turning away, 232,35 paresis, slackening, 230, 23 parousia, presence, 212,13 parupostasis, co-ordination, 250,21

paskhein, to be acted upon, 218,24.27 etc.; 237,7 pathos, affection, 214,23; property, 230,21; pathêtikos, affective, 214,25.27 periekhein, to include, 220,27; 221,14 perigraphein, to circumscribe, 225,31 pêrôsis, disabling, 212,6 phantasma, picture, 226,29 phôtismos, phase, 220,18 phthora, perishing, 212,6 etc. phusikos, natural, 215,28 etc.; of the study of nature, 254,32; phusikôs, (from the point of view) of the study of nature, 234,29 phusis, nature, 209,5 etc.; reality, 225,7; entity, 230,8 pistis, confirmation, 214,3 pistos, an object of belief, 245,19 poiêtikos, efficient, 223,17; etc. poios, qualified, 230,3 poiotês, quality, 211,21; 213,26 etc. posos, having a size, 229,31 etc.; poson, to, size, 229,30; quantity, 231,19 posotês, size, 229,32; quantity, 231,15 pragma, real thing, 209,8.23.33 proairesis, choice, 219,23 proairetikos, involved in choice, 220,35 proaxiousthai, to assume as an axiom beforehand, 254,8 proêgoumenos, primary, 221,31; in the primary sense, 222,33; proêgoumenôs, in a primary way, 226,24 prokheirizesthai, to examine, 215,2; to choose, 215,10 prolambanein, to tacitly assume, 253,30 proodos, procession, 231,34 prosarmottein, to apply, 209,32; to associate, 210,6 prosekhês, proximate, 257,18; prosekhôs, directly, 213,7; 215,32 etc.; direct, 228,2 prosthesis, addition, 214,11 etc. protasis, premiss, 243,23 prôtourgos, primary, 234,22 prouparkhein, to precede, 222,7; to

Greek-English Index to 1.7-9 exist before, 222,11; to exist in actuality before coming to be, 242,21; to pre-exist, 254,5 psukhikos, being the domain of soul, 231,2 rhêseidion, short passage, 241,21 skhesis, relation, 250,10 skiasma, shadow-reflection, 231,5 skioeidôs, like shadows, 232,5 sômatikos, bodily, 221,1 stasis, stability, 250,18 sterêsis, privation, 208,25; 209,7 etc. stoikheiôdês, elemental, 216,13 etc. stoikheion, principle, 215,27 etc.; letter of the alphabet, 227,15 stoikheiôton, to, what (a thing) is an element of, 246,4.16 sullogizesthai, syllogise, 229,17 sumbainein, to have accidentally, 211,11; to be an accident, 237,19; to attach/be attached, 216,8; 222,5; 252,34; to sumbainon, consequence, 236,1 sumbebêkos, attribute, 211,14; 212,20 etc.; accident, 223,32; kata sumbebêkos, as (with respect to) an attribute, 208,20; 211,6; in an accidental sense, 215,29; 216,2 etc.; accidental, 216,9 sumplêroun, to fill out, 216,17.21 etc.

165

sunagein, to infer, 252,6 sunaitios, concomitant, 256,29.30 sunamphoteron, to, the composite, 217,17; 226,13; the pair, 244,33 sunekheia, continuity, 245,5 sunkrisis, combining, 235,21 sunousiousthai, to be essentially connected with, 251,27.29.30 etc. sunthesis, putting things together, 214,7 etc. sunthetos, composite, 209,10, etc. sunuparkhein, to coexist, 239,7 suzugia, pair of items, 248,12 tekhnêtos, artificially produced, 226,7.9 tekhnikos, due to art, 208,27 teleios, complete, 218,11 teleiotês, perfection, 250,17 telikos, final, 256,23; 257,15 teôs, for a start, 209,14 têrein, to bear witness to, 240,24 thateron, the Other, 238,24 to ti ên einai, essence, 219,32 tode ti, a particular thing, 217,8.13.17 etc.; to tode ti, particularity, 226,25 trikhêi diastaton, three dimensional, 228,23; 230,11 tropê, turning, 214,15 tropos, mode, 213,17.19.21 etc.; kind, 214,19; way, 215,35 etc.

Subject Index to Simplicius 1.7-9 Compiled by Michael Atkinson Alexander on privation and substratum 211,13-15 on matter, refuted by Simplicius, 211,20ff. on the coming to be of substance 213,15ff. on the being of alteration 214,18ff. on matter, form and privation according to Aristotle (189b29-191a3) 219,7ff.; 222,22ff. on the text of Phys. 191a13 233,8-10 on how form is a principle 234,11ff. on whether form perishes 234,23ff. on coming to be from what is not 238,6ff. failed to comment on 191b30-3 241,21 on privation 242,5ff. commentary on 191b35 (on matter and privation) 244,26-245,2; 247,25-9 Alexander’s views on 191b35 criticised 245,2-7 on matter as the cause of evil 249,12-14 commentary on 192a32 ‘not in an accidental sense’ 254,13-17 on efficient and final causes 258,17-24 Anaxagoras did away with coming to be 235,20 Anaximander did away with coming to be 235,20 Archytas divides substance into matter, form and composite 234,1-2

Aristotle Cael. 268a1-2 (science of nature deals with bodies) 230,20-1 Cat. 1a1-6 (homonymous expressions) 216,23-6 Cat. 2a11-19 (on substance) 233,31-234,1 Cat. 13a31ff. (privation) 211,31ff. Phys. 193b19-20 (privation as form), quoted on 191a18-19, 233,27 Phys. (book 2) 194b17-23; 198a30-1 (principles of natural things) 221,7-18 Phys. (book 4) 209b2-4 (matter of magnitude) 229,5-10 Phys. (book 4) 209b6-9 (matter as extension and indefinite quantity) 232,25-30 Phys. (book 4) 217a26-7 (the first substratum is not body) 228,28-229,1 Metaph. 1029a1-3 (substance divided into three) 234,2ff. Metaph. 1044a32-b9, b27-9 (on causes and matter) 219,29-220,10 Metaph. 1076a4 ‘the rule of many is not good’ 250,26; 256,21-2 Metaph. Book 9 (see n.178) (on potentiality and actuality) 241,17-18 body two kinds of body 230,21ff. Boethus on matter and substratum 211,15-18 coming to be (change) with respect to substance 208,24ff. simple and composite 209,9-14

Subject Index to Simplicius 1.7-9 types of coming to be 212,23ff. all cases of coming to be require a substratum 213,13 substantial coming to be 213,15ff. all cases of coming to be are composite 215,8ff. coming to be from what is and what is not 236,14ff. coming to be from what is not in two senses 237,22ff. the ancients failed to distinguish these two senses 237,29ff. coming to be from what is in an accidental sense 239,8ff. the coming to be of particular beings 239,28ff. theory of coming to be preserves the ‘axiom of contradiction’ 240,13ff. coming to be from what is actually and potentially 241,1ff. composite (to suntheton) in relation to form and privation 252,32ff. dissolved into matter and form 257,31-3 contraries as principles 218,21ff. Democritus on coming to be 235,20-2 Dercyllides quotes Hermodorus on matter 247,31ff.; 256,34-257,4 divine and heavenly things the principles of divine things 219,24ff. the heavenly body does not have elemental principles 220,11-13 as ‘natural’ things (phusika) 220,13ff. division (diairesis) of substantial coming to be 214,5ff. that everything which comes to be comes to be from either from what is or what is not 240,22-3 Egyptians on matter 231,35ff. elements paired with principles 215,26-7 must inhere in what they are elements of 246,15-16 Empedocles on coming to be 235,22-3

167

Eudemus on Plato and ambiguity 243,2-3 form defined as that which comes to be 215,9 on whether form is perishable 234,33ff. the first form (nous) 250,13-14; 257,13-15 two sorts of form distinguished 257,19-20; 258,13ff. Hermodorus quoted to explain Plato’s views on matter 248,2-18; 256,35-257,4 matter and privation – see under privation not a ‘this’ without qualification 217,16ff. apprehension of matter is non-apprehension 227,5ff. as qualityless body, arguments for 227,23ff.; arguments against 228,17ff. arguments that matter is not body 229,17ff. matter does not have magnitude 229,27ff. matter the potentiality for all forms 230,3ff. matter a sort of (non-corporeal) extension (diastasis) 230,26ff. matter distinguishes material things from immaterial ones 230,29-33 matter as deviation from being 231,20; 255,13 (see n. 137) matter as evil 231,21; 249,14ff. matter as residual sediment (hupostathmê) 231,34-7 incorrect views about matter 232,30ff. matter as substance 234,5-6; as ‘almost substance’ 246,23ff. matter as potentially but not actually what it comes to be 241,11ff.; matter and potentiality 252,29-31; 253,11ff. matter as ‘maternal’ cause 248,26-7 matter and privation as necessary for the completion (teleiotês) of the universe 249,26ff. matter strives for form 250,23; 251,14ff.

168

Subject Index to Simplicius 1.7-9

imperishable in itself, unlike privation, 252,19ff.; 254,17-26 matter does not come to be 254,1ff.; 255,17ff. common and individual matter 255,21ff. matter not a first principle in the way god is 256,14ff. matter, according to Plato, a concomitant cause of the cosmos 256,28-31 Melissus the one and being are identical 236,6-7 Moderatus quotes Pythagoreans and Plato on matter 230,36ff. One, the apprehension of by negation 226,29ff. Parmenides the one and being are identical 236,6-7; 243,5-6.14 his minor premiss (that what is anything else besides being is not) 243,23-4 does away with not being 243,31-244,2 Pericles of Lydia on first matter as qualityless body 227,25 Plato Phdr. 245C9 on the elemental principle 234,20-3 Phdr. 245D4-6 quoted by Alexander 234,12-13 Soph. 245D12-E2 on difficulties with the theory that being is just one or two 243,15-20 Soph. 258A11-B8 on otherness 243,24-31 Soph. 258C2-4 non-being among the forms 245,31-246,2 Soph. 258D71ff. on the different senses of ‘is not’ 238,22ff. Tim. 28A-30A Moderatus on matter, quoted by Porphyry, 230,35ff. Tim. 41B8-9 on the completeness of the cosmos, paraphrased in 249,32ff. Tim. 49A7 and 52D5 matter called ‘nurse’ 249,5

Tim. 49E7-50A2 on matter 218,2-4 Tim. 50A5-B3 on matter 218,4ff. Tim. 50C6-D2 what comes to be is a likeness of its source 255,10-12 Tim. 50D3 matter called ‘mother’ 249,1ff. Tim. 50D7-E1 on matter and privation 242,22ff. Tim. 50E1-4 as an illustration of the formlessness of the substratum 226,2-5 Tim. 51A7 matter omnirecipient 245,21 Tim. 52A1-D1 on the apprehension of matter 226,25ff. Tim. 52A8-B3 that matter does not perish 254,28-31 Tim. 52B1 matter called ‘space’ 249,2 Tim. 52D4-6 and 53A9-B5 cited as evidence for qualityless body as matter 228,1ff. Tim. 53C5-8 body is not the first substratum (matter) 228,17ff. Tim. 51A7; ibid. 52A3; cf. ibid. 51A8-B1; ibid. 52B2 referred to by Porphyry 231,12ff. on matter, substratum, and the elements in Tim. 49E2-4; ibid. 49E7-50A2; ibid. 50C6-D2; ibid. 51A8-B2; ibid. 52A1-D1 223,3-225,20; cf. 245,11-19 agrees with Aristotle on the substratum 222,29ff. Plato the first to distinguish between potential and actual, per se and accidental, and the different senses of being 242,28-30 apparent criticisms of Plato for accepting that being is one 243,3ff. accepts Parmenides’ minor premiss (see under Parmenides), but rejects the major premiss (what is not is nothing) 244,3-5 Plato, Parmenides and the dialogue Parmenides 244,3-21 knows about privation but does not include it among the elements 245,19ff.; 246,2-6 meaning of ‘great and small’ in Plato 247,10ff.

Subject Index to Simplicius 1.7-9 Plotinus matter is not qualityless body cf. Enn. 2,4,8-12 229,11-12 Porphyry quotes Moderatus and Plato on matter 231,5ff. says Plato and Pythagoreans called matter quantity 231,18ff. refers to Dercyllides who quotes Hermodorus (on matter) 247,31ff. principle principles are what comes to be and what it comes to be 215,26ff. in one sense two and in another three 215,34ff.; 218,15ff. relation between principles of natural things and the principles of change 216,30ff. form as a principle 257,10ff. privation (see also substratum and matter) opposite to and incompatible with the form 210,3-4 does not endure 210,12 an accident of matter 211,3-5 privation and form 211,29ff.; 221,22ff.; privation the contrary of form 251,6 as accidental cause 216,32ff.; 217,29ff.; 222,3ff.; 246,4-10 privation and matter 217,3ff.; 233,16-17; 246,19ff. privation and negation 217,25ff. privation falls under the same category as form 233,21ff. privation has a kind of reality (hupostasis) 238,14-16 privation as producer of evil 249,7 privation and matter in relation to form 250,9ff. privation, unlike matter, perishes per se 252,29-23

169

Pythagoreans on matter 230,34ff.; 231,18ff. have the same conception of matter as Aristotle 232,24ff. like Plato, believe that matter does not perish 254,27-8 Stoics on first matter as qualityless body 227,23ff. substance substratum and privation required for the coming to be and perishing of substance 212,21-3 matter is almost substance 246,23ff. substratum defined 209,28ff. similarities with privation and differences from it 209,14ff.33ff.; 210,4ff.; 211,9ff. not contrary to the form 210,2-3 the substratum of substance is not clear 213,1-3 one in number 217,6; but two in logos 217,32-3; 218,35 as principle 218,27ff. must be completely qualityless and formless 226,2 knowledge of the substratum by analogy 225,22ff. the great and the small, according to Plato 247,17 strives for form 252,4-6 Syrianus accepts Alexander’s exegesis of substantial coming to be 213,24-5 comments on the ancient theory that there is no coming to be 241,22ff. Timaeus the Pythagorean Plato and Aristotle both borrowed phrases from him 227,18-22