Selling Strategic Defense: Interests, Ideologies, and the Arms Race 9781685851484

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Tables and Figures
Acknowledgments
1 Gambling with Extinction
2 Defending Against the Unthinkable: Strategic Defense from 1945 to 1975
3 Promoting the Prohibited: The Aftermath of the ABM Treaty
4 The Evolving Hedge: BMD During the Carter Administration
5 From Hedge to Pledge: Reagan's Decree for Strategic Defense
6 Rethinking the Military-Industrial Complex: The Case of Strategic Defense
Appendix: BMD and Related Funding (1962-1987)
List of Acronyms
References
Index
About the Book and the Author

Citation preview

Selling Strategic Defense

Selling Strategic Defense Interests, Ideologies, and the Arms Race Erik K. Pratt

Lynne Rienner Publishers

• Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1990 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th St., Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU ©1990 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Pratt, Erik K. Selling strategic defense: interests, ideologies, and the arms race / by Erik K. Pratt. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-55587-190-9 1. Ballistic missile defenses—United States—History. 2. United States—Military policy. 3. United States—Politics and government—1945- . 4. Arms race—United States—History—20th century. 5. United States—Armed Forces—Procurement—History—20th century. I. Title. UG743.P7 1990 358'.1754'0973—dc20 89-24351 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

For Vickie and Nikki forever

Contents

List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgments

ix xi

1

Gambling with Extinction

1

2

Defending Against the Unthinkable: Strategic Defense from 1945 to 1975

9

3 4 5 6

Promoting the Prohibited: The Aftermath of the ABM Treaty

31

The Evolving Hedge: BMD During the Carter Administration

53

From Hedge to Pledge: Reagan's Decree for Strategic Defense

87

Rethinking the Military-Industrial Complex: The Case of Strategic Defense

Appendix: BMD and Related Funding (1962-1987) List of Acronyms References Index About the Book and the Author

vii

119 141 145 149 167 177

Tables and Figures

Tables 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2

DOD HEL Funding, Fiscal Years 1978-1981 and Prior DOD Funding for Particle Beam Weaponry, Fiscal Years 1978-1980 and Prior Top 12 BMD Contractors, Fiscal Years 1969 and 1980 Comparison of Requested and Actual Funding for STP, Fiscal Years 1982-1984 Stakes of the Top 25 BMD Contractors According to BMD Function

59 59 75 90 99

Figures 6.1 6.2

Official and Shadow BMD Programs BMD Policy-Planning Networks

ix

122 126

Acknowledgments

Over the several years of researching and writing this book I have become indebted to many individuals and organizations. I wish to thank all of those individuals, many of whom desired to remain anonymous, who took the time to talk about the issues presented in this book. Special thanks go to Herbert York, who set aside many hours to discuss with me his personal insights and observations of the arms race. As a greatly revised doctoral dissertation, this work has profited enormously from the comments and guidance of my doctoral committee: Mel Gurtov, Ron Chilcote, and Victor Magagna. All contributed helpful suggestions and support throughout the long process of moving from prospectus to final product. Their varied approaches complemented one another and I am indebted to each and every one of them. I especially wish to thank Mel Gurtov, who, as chair, provided exhaustive criticism and fruitful direction. I deeply appreciate the support provided to me by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) through a multiyear fellowship. IGCC's support went well beyond the financial resources necessary for pursuing this research. The biannual IGCC fellow's conferences served as an intellectually inspiring environment and exposed my work to the views and commentary of many diverse scholars. Many thanks must also go to the president and staff of the Federation of American Scientists, whose offices were home while I pursued my research in Washington, D.C. Thanks go to my father for his help with some of the figures and index. Moreover, his example surely helped ingrain in me a quest for knowledge that led to my current profession. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to my wife and daughter for their unending support, and their love, which makes it all worthwhile. Erik K.Pratt

xi

1

Gambling with Extinction

Like the Hobbesian "kings and persons of sovereign authority," the United States and Soviet Union find themselves "in a state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war."1 The nuclear posturing that has occurred since World War II has often been made in the nature of a gambit—a risky move designed to gain advantage for one side or the other. These gambits have produced a world that now risks extinction. For the first time in the history of humankind, we have the power to extinguish our own existence. 2 Neither side in this nuclear antagonism desires such an outcome. Yet the gambits continue. In March 1983, President Ronald. Reagan made a gambit in the form of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). SDI calls for intensive research into ballistic missile defense (BMD), as well as defenses against other means of nuclear attack. The end goal, according to Reagan, is to replace the current U.S. nuclear strategy based primarily on offensive weapons with a strategy based primarily on defensive weapons.3 Other rationales and motivations have been put forward in support of and in opposition to SDI. However, regardless of the rationale, SDI is the latest move on the nuclear gameboard. For their part, the Soviets are also actively pursuing research into new technologies for BMD. What is most striking about the current initiative is that it was proposed less than a dozen years after the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which in article 5, section 1, clearly restricted further development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses: "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, spacebased, or mobile land-based." 4 As with any legal document, the treaty has gray areas that are open to interpretation. Yet Reagan's proposal to pursue what has been dubbed Star Wars is an obvious rejection of a basic premise set forth in the preamble to the treaty—that anti-ballistic missile (ABM) limitations are considered "a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons."5 1

2

Selling Strategic

Defense

The initial question, then, that I attempt to answer is this: Why did a president of the United States initiate a major scientific and technological effort—the size of eight Manhattan Projects—to develop technologies and capabilities expressly prohibited by an arms control treaty that had been in force for only a decade? In pursuit of answers, I examine the postwar history of U.S. strategic defense policy. In the first four decades of the nuclear age, interest in building defenses against nuclear attack has waxed and waned among members of the defense community. In general, U.S. strategic defense policy reflects a continuing research effort punctuated by periodic flirtations with deployment. What accounts for this erratic program development? It is my contention that a large part of the unevenness stems from political factors, such as bureaucratic politics, informal networks, and executive prerogatives. Other forces (e.g., technological and economic considerations) have also shaped this policy. Indeed, many factors are intertwined, and to understand the influence of one in isolation from the others is, in my opinion, impossible and misguided. Nevertheless, uncovering the politics of strategic defense remains the primary purpose of this book. Other factors are discussed and evaluated, but my main focus is on illuminating the political processes underlying the uneven development of strategic defenses in the United States. However, in the search for answers to the initial inquiry, other questions abound. Was Reagan's decision to pursue Star Wars really that extraordinary? How are decisions concerning force structure and strategy made in the United States? The national security decisionmaking process is often opaque—and intentionally so. What analytical tools may be applied in this study to help reveal this political process? Before I proceed to an examination of U.S. strategic defense policy, I lay out in this chapter the key analytical questions and construct a novel framework for analysis by drawing on the insights of previous observers of the weapons acquisition process. A simplistic view of the national decisionmaking process is that decisions on foreign and military policy are the product of a unitary national actor. The unitary national actor model asserts that weapons systems selected "are the result of national strategic choice." This "prevailing simplification" of the weapons acquisition process was described by Graham Allison and Frederic Morris as the following process: "[G]overnmental leaders select specific weapons and total force posture on the basis of precise calculations about national objectives, perceived threats, and strategic doctrine within the constraints of technology and budget."6 Past studies of the development of new weapons systems have shown the unitary actor model to be insufficient for explaining why a particular weapons system and force posture were developed.7 Still, this model tells us something about how we are taught to think about the weapons acquisition process and how rationales for weapons systems need to be structured in order

Gambling

with

Extinction

3

to gain legitimacy. Choosing a weapons system because T R W wants to make a profit, or because the army wants a strategic mission, is reasoning unlikely to gain widespread acceptance. Regardless of underlying motivations, public rationales for weapons systems will be structured in a way to reflect the "prevailing simplification." One major drawback to the national actor model is its apparent failure to explain the political and technological forces behind the range of weapons systems under development and why certain weapons systems are selected for deployment while others are not. John Foster, director of Defense Research and Engineering, described two forces driving research and development (R&D) activities. The first involves "new possibilities" drawn from the fields of science and technology that should be exploited. The second force is generated by "possible threats" the United States must be prepared for, which are often "not something the enemy has done, but something we have thought of ourselves that he might do." 8 Foster's observation (as well as those of others) indicates that there is a great deal of imprecision in weapons choices, resulting in a potentially vast range of possibilities to pursue. However, not all conceivable weapons are researched or built, which raises two relevant questions. First, what other forces tend to delimit R & D ? Second, how do preferred weapons systems emerge from the pack? Another factor leading to the indeterminacy of a nation's force requirements pertains to the subjective evaluation of an opponent's existing and future forces. Governments have reasons to exaggerate or to minimize their force structure, and intelligence estimates are based on approximations and projections that have a wide range between the low and the high ends. Inflated projections of an opponent's forces, such as the "bomber gap," the "missile gap," and the " A B M gap," illustrate how threat analysis may be used in politically useful ways. However, if force projections are so arbitrary, why has there not been greater use of this technique to further parochial interests? This query compels further study. Moreover, there is no way of arriving at a totally objective analysis of U.S. force requirements, an evaluation necessarily based on various assumptions and guesses. The subjectivity, including ideological bias, of estimates regarding force requirements is exacerbated when the topic is nuclear forces. For one thing, no nuclear war has occurred that could serve as a basis for calculations. The attempt to prevent nuclear war through deterrence is also grounded in a highly subjective analysis of an opponent's intentions and calculus for war, resulting in a great disparity among defense analysts concerning the level of forces necessary for an effective deterrent. Although these force requirements are often presented in some pseudoscientific w a y — t h e result of some lengthy calculation—they inevitably reflect various assumptions buried within the writings of strategic thinkers in the postwar period.9 Thus, another question addressed in this book is why certain strategic policies, especially those emphasizing offensive

4

Selling

Strategic

Defense

weaponry, have persisted in the postwar period while others have failed to gain government support. I attempt to answer these questions by going beyond the unitary actor model of national security decisionmaking and examining the political, social, and economic interests underlying the selection of particular weapons systems. The objective is to demonstrate how individuals and organizations develop a commitment to bringing a weapons system to fruition. At the decisionmaking level of analysis, on the one hand, bureaucratic politics provides a useful framework for probing particular choices among competing weapons systems, but it is less helpful in explaining defense policy in general. On the other hand, elite analysis may help reveal the philosophical consensus behind policy decisions, but may neglect the organizational context in which such decisions are made. In an attempt to bridge this gap, I focus on defense policy elites through a network analysis. Weapons choices involve more than the formal decisionmaking procedures set forth in government regulations. The formal process shows only the flow of paper—not the flow of ideas, money, and people, nor how formal procedures are often bypassed for one purpose or another. A more complete view of the defense policy formation process must include the broader network of influential individuals, both in and out of governmental positions, who make up what may be termed a defense policy network. An examination of this network will reveal actual and/or potential elite interactions both inside and outside of organizational structures. I assume the process involves a complex interaction between the two levels leading to three possible outcomes: Elite interests (1) dominate organizational interests, 10 (2) orchestrate organizational interests, 11 or (3) subordinate to organizational interests. 12 My premise is that this defense policy network shapes the content of the weapons acquisition process (e.g., which issues reach the official agenda and which do not), helps determine who participates, and influences the relative "political capacities, ideas, and demands" of various participants in the process. 13 The longevity of the BMD issue would appear to make a network analysis especially useful because over the course of the BMD debate, certain individuals and groups are bound to acquire and build stakes in the development of BMD. The army desires a strategic mission. Program managers are eager for promotion. Scientists and engineers worry about future funding for their research and long to see their creation recognized as valuable. And contractors look toward future growth and profit. However, parochial interests alone cannot account for the enormous amounts of public funding the issue has sustained over the last forty years. Private interests are important, but of greater analytical consequence is the convergence of these private interests with public policy interests. Because conflicting belief systems and competing strategic premises can produce varying perceptions of the public interest, another goal of this book

Gambling with

Extinction

5

is to study the conditions under which public and private interests converge and assess the impact of this vortex on the armament process. In accordance with this aim, my study incorporates a concept I call weapons sponsorship, which I define as the utilization of resources by individuals and groups for the promotion of a particular weapons system. Weapons sponsors are the "pushers" and "pullers" in the armament process— they link demand and supply. Weapons sponsorship shows how diverse but compatible interests are combined and/or coordinated to sell favored weapons systems to the U.S. government and public. It also reveals how competing strategic premises and ideologies influence weapons decisions. Influential champions of BMD are placed within the framework of weapons sponsorship in order to analyze the nature of elite interaction concerning the promotion of strategic defense and the possible functions of this network. Where did new initiatives in strategic defense come from? Who sponsored these initiatives and why? How successful were these proposals? Who within the system opposed them? How does a better understanding of the politics involved in these earlier initiatives add to an understanding of the current BMD proposal as well as related issues, such as arms control and the nuclear arms race? Other questions may be posed at the outset to guide this analysis. For instance: Are there any social factors facilitating cohesion and/or policy coordination? Are there any shared political-economic interests? Are there any shared images or mind-sets among these sponsors? Do sponsors of BMD represent a functional coalition? Do factions exist within this coalition? Are there any factors that represent serious points of cleavage? Do power alignments occur? What mechanisms bring them about? How durable are these coalitions? Is the nature of interactions predominantly competitive or cooperative? What levels of rivalry exist? Is there a coherent overall strategy for the coalition? What types of power resources are controlled by this policy network? What monetary resources do they control? Where does the money flow? For what? How? For whom? How are new members recruited? Can someone be blackballed? Is there control over the media? If so, how is this control effected? What kind of influence do these individuals possess? Ballistic missile defense provides an interesting case study of the defense policy process. Conceptually, defending against nuclear attack is a simple idea. Yet technologically, strategically, and politically, it has been a difficult proposition to sell in the nuclear age. From a militaristic perspective, a strategy of defense would require preparations sufficient to prevent damage from attack or at least limit it to "acceptable" levels. This is the defense problem, broadly defined—a problem greatly exacerbated by the nuclear revolution. In the past, defense could rely on a strategy of attrition to overcome an offense. The British air defense during the Battle of Britain could be considered successful by knocking down 10 percent of the attacking aircraft. 14 In succeeding sorties, the British air

6

Selling Strategic

Defense

defense forces were able to wear down the German Luftwaffe. Although devastating, the destruction inflicted by the Luftwaffe through repeated forays using conventional weapons cannot compare with the damage today's nuclear weapons could inflict. In short, adherence to past strategy in today's world of more than 60,000 nuclear weapons has become tantamount to national suicide. Even a defense 99 percent effective in destroying delivery vehicles would still leave hundreds of millions dead and hundreds of the world's largest cities devastated. And according to some theories of nuclear winter, 1 percent of the existing nuclear arsenals could trigger global devastation.15 No wonder that preventing such an event rather than preparing for it has dominated strategic debates in the nuclear age. Defense preparations may well save lives in case such a war occurs, but it is an obvious point that the most lives will be saved if such a war is prevented. The human mind can conceive of many schemes for defending against nuclear attack. We might be able to build impenetrable force fields over entire continents or construct vast cities deep underground. Perhaps we could develop giant "ray guns" that would sweep the skies and destroy nuclear weapons before they reached their targets, or maybe we could deploy "surgical" weapons, accurate enough to destroy nuclear weapons before they could be launched. Suppose we could evacuate, disperse, and/or shelter vast numbers of people. Some people believe all we need is "enough shovels" to survive a nuclear war.16 However, many of the schemes imaginable are impractical, ineffective, or pure fantasy. Some, like the ability to destroy enemy weapons before they are launched, are already part of the superpowers' force structures and may actually precipitate the use of such weapons in a time of crisis.17 In thinking about defense, we must temper our imagination with physical, social, political, and economic realities. Of course, these realities are themselves subject to much speculation and controversy: Is nuclear war survivable? What is meant by "survivable"? If there are survivors, would they envy the dead? These questions cannot be answered objectively. Reactions will differ according to speculations about the various uncertainties involved. Many plausible scenarios can be constructed, but how reasonable they appear will depend to a large degree on an individual's underlying assumptions and belief system. From my perspective, the question of survivability appears misplaced. It seems somewhat akin to questions of triage—concerned with lifeboat ethics rather than with disaster prevention. But faced with the tangible reality that nuclear weapons exist and are controlled by antagonistic nation-states, it is not unreasonable for a person to ask: "Can we defend against a nuclear attack?" Nor, in a world of ever-changing technology, should it be considered unusual to hear this recurring question: "If we could not defend ourselves in the past, can we now, or in the future?" Several scholarly studies have been written concerning the efforts to

Gambling

with

Extinction

7

deploy a missile defense in the 1960s. Some of these studies have focused on the role of interservice rivalry and attempts to establish civilian control.18 Others have assessed the role of scientists,19 technological imperatives,20 and Congress. 21 By applying an elite network analysis to the political history of BMD in the United States, I hope to advance and update understanding of this recurring issue. The BMD issue also reflects a struggle among competing strategic premises (e.g., some strategies emphasize offense, others defense) and illustrates the tensions arising from the decisionmaking process itself. Studying the BMD debate over time is an aid to understanding the dynamics underlying the nuclear arms race. Still another reason for concentrating on strategic defense is that it represents a major contemporary policy issue requiring accurate and informed public debate. Strategic implications aside, if the proponents get their way, Star Wars will absorb tens of billions of dollars in the research phase alone; deployment of a full-scale system could cost well over $1 trillion. Understanding the politics behind strategic defense will help all citizens reach a more informed opinion on this issue. However, because Star Wars embodies a radical shift in postwar U.S. strategy the ability to generalize from my case study may be quite limited. Still, there are many questions concerning any particular arms competition that are pertinent.. For instance: Why these force requirements and not those? Why this weapons system and not that one? Why weapons instead of hospitals, schools, housing, or cathedrals? This study may also raise implications for various models of arms races and strategies for arms control. For example, does elite interaction in my case study reflect the challenge/response thesis articulated by Herbert York? 22 Did a kind of "technological creep" accompany the growth in support for BMD? 23 Did the strategies of BMD proponents incorporate the idea of a technological imperative? 24 Does politics play a greater role than technology in driving an arms race? 25 Does this study provide any insight into the linkages between the internal and external factors of an arms race? 26 How are changes in international tensions viewed and/or generated by a policy elite? How are external tensions incorporated into their strategies? What role does the action/reaction thesis play in this process? What are the implications of this study for achieving workable arms control? It is my assertion that a systematic analytical study of weapons sponsorship will foster better understanding of the strategies and motivations that have led to recurring nuclear gambits. Such gambits lead us ever more in a "race to oblivion."27 The survival of the species is a matter of global concern and requires our immediate attention. Awareness of how new weapons schemes are sold may help us reduce the risk of extinction posed by the existence of an increasingly accurate and dispersed nuclear arsenal.

8

Selling

Strategic

Defense

Notes 1. Hobbes, Leviathan, or Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, p. 86. 2. For an eloquent description of this condition, see Schell, The Abolition. 3. See Reagan, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, pp. 442-448, especially pp. 4 4 7 ^ 4 8 . 4. "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," p. 140. 5. Ibid., p. 139. 6. Allison and Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control," p. 103. 7. See, for example, Allison and Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control"; Ball, Politics and Force Levels; Halperin, National Security Policymaking. 8. Quoted in Allison and Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control," p. 120. 9. For illustrations of how force levels are subjectively determined, see Ball, Politics and Force Levels-, Stubbing, The Defense Game; and Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945. 10. See Domhoff, The Powers That Be. 11. See Dolbeare and Edelman, American Politics: Policies, Power, and Change. 12. See Allison, Essence of Decision. 13. This structuralist approach is similar to what Theda Skocpol calls the "Tocquevillian" view of the state. See Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back in. Quoted phrase is found on page 21. 14. See Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, pp. 76, 104. 15. See, for example, Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe," pp. 257-292. 16. See Scheer, With Enough Shovels, specifically the comments of T. K. Jones. 17. See, for example, Aldridge, The Counterforce Syndrome. 18. Jayne, The ABM Debate. 19. Cahn, Eggheads and Warheads. 20. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy. 21. Stoffer, Congressional Defense Policy-Making and the Arms Control Community. 22. York, "ABM, MIRV, and the Arms Race," p. 257. 23. Shapely, "Technology Creep and the Arms Race," pp. 289-292. 24. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy. 25. Stein, From H-Bomb to Star Wars. 26. See Russet, "International Interactions and Processes." 27. York, Herbert F., Race to Oblivion.

2

Defending Against the Unthinkable: Strategic Defense from 1945 to 1972 From 1945 through 1972, the dream of an effective defense against atomic attack foundered on an air defense system circumvented by the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and an ABM system technologically ineffective and politically unworkable. Also during this period, many individuals and groups within the defense community reversed their position on the issue: Many early advocates of strategic defense later opposed such efforts; many of those who during the 1950s disagreed with increasing U.S. efforts in strategic defense came to embrace this strategy in the 1960s and beyond. Underlying this volte-face were shifting perceptions of how strategic defense related to arms control and the arms race. On the one hand, for many of those concerned with controlling the arms race, missile defenses were transformed from a contribution into an obstacle to arms control. On the other hand, those whose primary concern was with maintaining U.S. strategic superiority over the Soviet Union increasingly came to see strategic defense as contributing to rather than detracting from this effort. U.S. attempts to intercept ballistic missiles may be traced to 1946, when the Stillwill Board, an army study group meeting in that year, recommended increased efforts aimed at developing a missile defense.1 In the same year, the army air force began two studies, Projects Thumper and Wizard, to assess the feasibility of intercepting a rocket similar to the German V-2 used in World War II. General Electric was the prime contractor for Thumper; the University of Michigan was awarded the contract for Wizard. Both studies viewed an effective missile defense as being beyond current technological capabilities, but were more optimistic regarding technological developments that might eventually provide some level of defense, particularly against the longer-range ballistic missiles.2 According to one report, the GE study noted that the only defense currently available was to "prevent launching,"3 a point that would strike a responsive chord among air force officers beginning to apply the tenets of air supremacy to the nuclear age and reflective of a more general assumption held by U.S. armed forces that "the best defense is a good offense."4 Besides these generally pessimistic reports on the feasibility of BMD, 9

10

Selling Strategic

Defense

many in the defense community saw the ICBM as still a long way off. They believed the primary means of delivering an atomic attack would remain the long-range bomber for quite some time.5 As a consequence, the major focus of army and (after becoming a separate service in 1947) air force defense programs of the late 1940s and early 1950s focused on air defense and early warning of an attack. Indeed, Project Thumper was integrated into Project Wizard in 1949, which in turn was phased into the Bomarc project in 1950.6 Missile defense continued to be studied indirectly through many of these research projects concerned with air defense.7 In terms of concept and strategy, the air defense mission has many similarities to BMD. In addition, many of the early BMD programs evolved directly out of air defense research. An analysis of these early efforts for an active defense against nuclear attack reveals some of the reasons why coalitions of strategic defense advocates shifted over time.

Post-World War II Continental Air Defense Separated from other major military powers by large oceans, the United States emerged from two world wars with its civilian population and industrial capacity virtually unscathed. However, the development of longrange delivery vehicles for aerial bombardment, coupled with the certainty that the U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons would not last forever, ensured that a future world war would not leave the continental United States untouched. One strategy for dealing with this new reality was set forth in Survival in the Air Age? The President's Air Policy Commission recommended a peacetime force that "will protect to the greatest extent possible our air space as well as our water approaches and hold out to anyone who thinks of attacking us the prospect of a counterattack of the utmost violence."9 This "new strategic concept" was heavily influenced by the writings of Brigadier General Giulio Douhet, who deemphasized the aerial battle and emphasized destroying enemy aircraft at their bases.10 Active defenses were seen as necessary for the security of the United States, but the most effective defense in the air age was, according to the adherents of the commission's report, a good offense.11 The detonation of an atomic device by the Soviets in August 1949 generated increased concern among U.S. government officials and military planners regarding the growing potential of the Soviets to launch an atomic attack on the continental United States. In order to formulate a response to this new development, President Harry Truman called for a "reexamination of [U.S.] objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans."12 The consequent report of the National Security Council (NSC), designated NSC 68, called, inter alia, for an immense rearmament to

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

11

meet the threat of massive atomic attack on the United States. 13 Included among the report's recommendations was a provision to construct an "adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada." 14 However, defenses were clearly given a role subordinate to offensive striking power.1S The Soviet bomb triggered another study that focused specifically on air defense. At the request of its Science Advisory Board, the air force established the Air Defense Systems Engineering Committee (ADSEC).16 George Valley chaired ADSEC and acquired enthusiasm for the air defense mission. The follow-on studies to ADSEC (Project Charles and Project Lincoln) were attributable largely to the efforts of Valley and those of another MIT scientist, A. G. Hill.17 All three military branches were already developing air defense forces, including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and all-weather interceptor aircraft, but a major problem for the continental air defense (CONAD) mission was early detection of an attack and the effective integration of the various components of the active defense forces. Responding to NSC 68's recommendations and the ADSEC report, the air force sponsored a study in 1951 to address this and other problems pertinent to CONAD. The study, known as Project Charles, was composed by several prominent scientists and academicians. Many of them were connected with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where much of the U.S. work on radar and air defense, both during and after the war, had been performed, and also where a new computer, code-named Whirlwind, had been developed largely under navy funding. 18 Whirlwind was seen by many Project Charles participants as the key to an effective air defense system, providing real-time processing of detection, tracking, and target assignment data, a development that would eventually lead to the SAGE (Semi-Automated Ground Environment) program. 19 Project Charles led to the establishment of Lincoln Laboratory, an air force-sponsored research center administered by MIT, as well as a series of summer studies in the early 1950s concerned with the problems of strategic defense.20 Members of the 1952 summer study group were optimistic about the potential of new technologies for air defense that they believed might result in a system of substantially greater effectiveness than the one currently available. Several billion dollars over the next few years would be required to implement the group's recommendations, which meant an increase in the defense budget or a reduction in appropriations for other military programs. 21 When air force officials refused to forward the group's report on to the NSC, undaunted members passed it on to the National Security Resources Board, which in turn presented the report to the NSC. The study's recommendations sparked a debate in the final months of the Truman administration, prompting further study by the NSC and a civilian committee established to review the summer study's findings. The incoming

12

Selling Strategic

Defense

Eisenhower administration set up its own reviews of the summer study report. Overall, these evaluations of the air defense problem appear to have resulted in acquainting people with the issue and shaping elite opinion on it. 22 The controversy dragged on through the summer of 1953, but in the wake of the Soviet detonation of a primitive thermonuclear device in August, resistance to a major air defense initiative weakened, prompting the Eisenhower administration to move forward on a major decision regarding CON AD. 2 3 NSC 162, adopted in October 1953, called for a far-reaching program initiative. After NSC 162, the air defense forces of the three services were integrated under the Continental Defense Command, and a major CONAD system was constructed. It consisted of far-flung radar nets for early warning, all-weather interceptors, and SAMs, all of which were integrated through a computerized command and control network known as SAGE. At its peak in 1957, U.S. expenditures on CONAD were nearly $10 billion (measured in 1986 dollars). 24 SAGE became operational in 1958— just in time to be overflown by the ICBM. Because the network consisted of only a small number of computing centers, which were highly vulnerable to nuclear attack, a few ICBMs could knock out the "brains" for the entire CONAD system. The full system was never completed as initially planned, and U.S. expenditures on CONAD rapidly declined after 1958, leveling off around 1965 at a relatively modest level. 25 Follow-on programs have continued in air defense, but these are mostly aimed at missions other than CONAD. 26 Despite the system's vulnerability, it is still curious that after investing substantial sums in CONAD in the 1950s, the government allowed the system to decay. Unlike many other military systems, CONAD showed little staying power. True, the system was vulnerable to countermeasures, had a limited effectiveness, was quite costly, and competed with alternative techniques for limiting damage from attack (e.g., counterforce). But similar claims have not, for example, produced a corresponding deterioration in the navy's support for aircraft carriers. Consistent with my argument that elite choice in regard to defense policy is not simply a matter of assessing technological and cost-effectiveness criteria—it encompasses a more complex process involving various political, economic, and strategic interests—an assessment of air defense sponsorship should provide clearer understanding of why a more substantial CONAD system was not maintained. Air Defense

Sponsorship

Air defense became a major concern for all three services during World War II. The navy's concern, stemming from the kamikaze attacks on ships in the Pacific, focused on ship defense. The navy's R&D efforts in defensive

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

13

technologies have at times prompted proposals for BMD, but ship defense remains the primary focus of this work.27 The air force's concern with air defense was twofold, reflecting the multiple missions of that service branch. On the one hand, the air force was charged with the mission of maintaining control of the air and was thus concerned with techniques for intercepting and defeating aerial attacks. On the other hand, the air force was charged—indeed imbued—with the air offensive mission, 2 8 and although air defense is one of its major concerns, the perspective is offensive: to penetrate such defenses. Therefore, it was not unusual for the general attitude of the air force toward strategic defense to be somewhat ambivalent. 29 CONAD was in direct conflict with the basic assumption underlying the air offensive mission (i.e., the "bomber always gets through"). 30 Within this context, it was in the air force's primary interest to argue that CONAD could achieve only limited effectiveness and was highly susceptible to offensive countermeasures. The air force has continued to fund research on air defenses, but often with an eye toward penetration. This research has frequently provided many of the technological arguments that have helped defeat subsequent proposals for strategic defense deployment. Integral air defense aims at countering the air threat that shadows the troops, a continuing concern of the army since aircraft were introduced to the battlefield. Although the army has been the most consistent of the three services in its support for strategic defense, attention to the battlefield, especially the European theater, dominates the army's weapons research and tends to shape army attitudes on air defense. 31 Continued jurisdictional disputes between the army and the air force over "point" (e.g., protecting geographically confined targets, such as an airfield) and "area" (e.g., protecting geographically dispersed targets, such as cities) defense missions, coupled with range limitations on army weapons systems, have tended to reinforce this emphasis on the battlefield. But tradition undoubtedly has a lot to do with the army's attitude in this area.32 This brief overview is not to suggest that the three services cared little about CONAD; rather, other service concerns took precedence. As summed up by a "high officer of the Air Defense Command" in the early 1950s: "It was our policy to attempt to protect our striking force, but it was not really our policy to attempt to protect this country, for that is so big a job that it would interfere with our retaliatory capabilities." (Emphasis added.) 33

The failure of CONAD to receive priority sponsorship within any of the military services is also a product of many other factors, including the failure of a major bomber threat to materialize, the difficulty of the mission, and the vulnerability of the system to attack. But no less a factor is the historical subordination of continental defense within the services.34 The structure and experience of U.S. armed forces, at least since the Civil War, has led to an emphasis on projecting military power beyond the nation's boundaries,

14

Selling

Strategic

Defense

sometimes in order to extend those boundaries. 35 This imperialist legacy contributed to the services' somewhat unenthusiastic sponsorship of CONAD and facilitated the dominance of offensive striking power and forward-based strategies in U.S. nuclear force structure. The principal sponsors of an expanded initiative in CONAD were the scientists involved in Project Lincoln, not the military services. Undoubtedly, a major motivation for many of these CONAD sponsors was an attempt to prevent war and to save lives should it occur. But the Lincoln scientists were also expressing their personal interest and knowledge of the technologies involved. 36 Some also acknowledged certain organizational interests; for example, James Killian, president of MIT at the time, expressed his interest in making "MIT a world center in the field of electronics."37 Being sponsored by the air force created some conflicting interests for the new laboratory. Lincoln Laboratory furnished the air force with its own think tank devoted primarily to the problems of air defense. But as noted previously, many top officials in the air force were unreceptive, if not antagonistic, to major initiatives in the area of CONAD. This sentiment was reinforced by another air force think tank, Project Rand, which had produced a 1948 report highly critical of CONAD. 38 Lacking positive response from official channels, the program's sponsors were forced to bypass the air force in order to spur decisive action from the executive office. Several of the scientists connected with Project Lincoln believed the U.S. deterrent was overly reliant on the nuclear air offensive and saw their work as offering a possible alternative.39 Many of these scientists were also connected with Project Vista. Both projects were seen by proponents of air power as an attack on the "victory-through-air-power thesis."40 J. Robert Oppenheimer played an important role in both studies and also chaired a special State Department Advisory Committee on Disarmament in April 1952, 41 which called for expansion of the CONAD program. 42 Oppenheimer maintained that such efforts would push back the "time when the Soviet Union can be confident of destroying the productive power of America" and would serve as a "defensive deterrent." 43 Perhaps more important from the standpoint of an alternative to the air offensive, however, was Oppenheimer's contention that defenses may complement nuclear arms control by providing an additional measure of insurance against cheating under a disarmament regime.44 A similar argument was voiced by proponents of strategic defense in later years and provided a major rationale for the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative thirty years later. But of even greater interest to this study is that some influential scientists concerned with controlling the rapidly expanding arms race—Gilpin calls them the "finite-containment school" 45 —viewed strategic defense at this time as a complement to arms control. As time passed, many of these scientists came

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

15

to view strategic defenses as exacerbating the arms race and supported banning them as a step toward effective arms control. Other arguments were also voiced by Lincoln scientists in support of C O N A D . For instance, some were concerned that the imminent Soviet capability for attacking the United States with nuclear weapons would weaken U.S. ability to extend deterrence to its allies. C O N A D was seen as a way of providing some level of protection for U.S. targets and would thus restore some measure of credibility to the U.S. threat.46 However, the reasoning that strategic defenses would complement arms control is what helped gain the support of a large segment of the scientific community. Not all sponsors of C O N A D were looking for an alternative to a nuclear strategy based primarily on the air offensive. Sponsors of greater military spending across the board, such as the supporters of NSC 68, could agree to a major C O N A D initiative as part of a more extensive force structure for "graduated deterrence" and "war fighting." But these sponsors were also concerned about U.S. ability to sustain high levels of military spending indefinitely, 47 and their support for C O N A D was thus tempered by the fear that such defenses might create pressure to decrease military spending after the system was constructed. Essentially, several powerful elite groups in the early 1950s believed major strategic defenses might have undesirable side-effects. The military feared that extensive defenses would produce a "Maginot Line" mentality that would weaken public support for continued high levels of military expenditures. In contrast to the claims of some C O N A D supporters that defenses would help extend nuclear deterrence to U.S. allies in Europe, many in the foreign policy establishment worried that extensive defenses might bolster "Fortress America" sentiments, facilitating a return to isolationism.48 The interests of these two powerful groups converged, along with technological, economic, and bureaucratic factors, in rejecting a major system of air defenses for the continental United States. Within the complex milieu of competing military missions and strategies that comprise the defense policy environment, the sponsorship by the Lincoln scientists and by those interested in controlling an accelerating arms race was a critical factor in placing a major C O N A D initiative on the government's agenda. Although Oppenheimer was removed from his governmental posts in 1954, the mid-1950s were years of ascension for those scientists sympathetic to this cause, 49 and their concerns assisted in maintaining support within the Eisenhower administration for strategic defense. But this enthusiasm was not transferred to the services that retained operational control over the system, and they continued to give priority to missions other than C O N A D . Lack of an enthusiastic service sponsor, coupled with the distraction of a new and more ominous threat from ICBMs, left C O N A D without strong support during budget battles in the years ahead. For the most part, sponsors of C O N A D lacked a long-term commitment to

16

Selling

Strategic

Defense

the mission. Even before the launch of Sputnik, the focus of strategic defense shifted to BMD.

Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955-1972 By 1955, the feasibility of intercontinental ballistic missiles was all but demonstrated. The Technological Capabilities Panel, chaired by James Killian, recommended that the air force's ICBM program be given the "highest priority" 50 and advocated establishment of "a strong, balanced program of theoretical and experimental investigations of the interception and destruction of ballistic missiles." 51 A major concern of this panel was reflected in the title of its report, Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack. The memory of Pearl Harbor, still fresh in many American minds, encouraged a preoccupation with surprise attack among the general public, defense analysts, and particularly President Dwight Eisenhower, who believed that the Soviet Union, being a closed society, held a particular advantage for launching such a clandestine attack.52 This preoccupation with surprise attack was reflected in U.S. force structure, intelligence-gathering technology, and arms control proposals throughout Eisenhower's administration. The fear of a nuclear Pearl Harbor was greatly heightened after the Sputnik I and Sputnik II launchings in 1957, which demonstrated the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear weapons over intercontinental distances. This was the context in which a renewed concern with BMD developed. In 1955, the army awarded a contract to Bell Laboratories, the prime contractor for the army's Nike-Hercules, to study the feasibility of defending against a ballistic missile attack. The report, completed in September 1956 and much more positive than Project Thumper's assessment ten years earlier, claimed that several new technologies now made defense against such a threat feasible.53 Western Electric, with its subsidiary Bell Laboratories, received the prime contract to develop a ballistic missile defense using a modified Nike-Hercules interceptor missile dubbed Nike-Zeus. Douglas Aircraft, missile engineer for the Nike program, was to produce the new missile.54 The year after Nike-Zeus was initiated, the army began requesting additional funds for advanced procurement of items requiring long lead times in order to expedite deployment of a nationwide ABM. Congress refused to appropriate the requested funds in what was to be the first of many defeats for the Nike-Zeus program.55 In 1958, the Logan experiment tested the concept of using X-ray radiation from a nuclear explosion as the kill mechanism for an exoatmospheric interceptor.56 This would provide an ABM interceptor with a substantial kill radius, easing the difficulty of "hitting a bullet with a bullet." Also underway in the late 1950s were studies aimed at developing an

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

17

enhanced radiation or neutron warhead that could be used on endoatmospheric A B M interceptors. This work was one impetus for third-generation nuclear weapons: The atomic bomb marked the first generation, the H-bomb the second. These new weapons were designed to produce specific effects. 57 A proclaimed advance in a particular third-generation weapon, the X-ray laser, played a major role in the gestation of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative in the early 1980s. Some in the defense community felt using such "nukes to kill nukes" would make A B M s practical; others remained unconvinced. Many scientists had watched as advances in missilery rendered their hard work in air defense obsolete. In addition, the thermonuclear revolution increased the destructiveness of nuclear weapons dramatically as well as their availability—they were no longer the scarce commodities they once were in the immediate postwar period. Horrific visions of a future war in which a few dozen of the world's major cities would be destroyed by atomic attack were replaced by the nightmarish specter of whole nations rendered "smoking, radiating ruins."58 Faced with continued claims that security would be found only in higher levels of armament, many defense policymakers were convinced that a greater degree of self-restraint in the armament process was called for, coupled with the necessity of finding alternative solutions (i.e., non-weapon) to the nation's—and the world's—security problems.59 The experience with weapons programs in the early 1950s convinced many in the defense community of the need to overcome bureaucratic interests, especially in critical technological areas such as missile defense and space.60 This was one of the major motivations behind the establishment of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ( D A R P A , also referred to as A R P A ) in 1958. Initially, all missile defense R & D was placed under DARPA's jurisdiction, including Nike-Zeus. However, because it was already at an advanced stage of development, D A R P A director Roy Johnson and chief scientist Herbert York recommended that Nike-Zeus be transferred back to the army.61 That accomplished, D A R P A was left with a major R & D effort in future technologies that would provide the next generation of missile defense (Nike-Zeus being the first) and ensure that no technological stone was left unturned. D A R P A ' s work in this area was funded through a program known as Project Defender. Many of the more exotic concepts for intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles currently envisioned in the Star Wars program of the 1980s had their gestation in DARPA's Defender program. Boost-phase intercept, using satellite-borne interceptor rockets, evolved from earlier concepts such as S P A D (space patrol active defense) and B A M B I (ballistic missile boost intercept).62 According to one account, satellite-bome A B M interceptors were but one variation of a theory for orbiting offensive weapons in space being studied under the acronym N A B S (nuclear-armed bombardment satellites). These concepts stemmed from proposals made by German scientist Walter

18

Selling Strategic

Defense

Dornberger shortly after he came to the United States to work for the air force. 63 The extent to which DARPA scanned the technological horizon is exemplified by the GLIPAR (Guide Line Identification Program for AntiMissile Research) project, which studied such unorthodox technologies for BMD as anti-gravity, anti-matter, and force fields.64 Rockets propel their payloads at tremendous speeds (14,000-17,000 miles per hour for ICBMs) but nowhere near the speed of light. It was thus recognized early on that futuristic weapons directing their energies at a target at or near the speed of light could provide for a more effective BMD than could a system limited to the accelerations attainable through rocket propulsion. One of these concepts was the laser (light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation). Laser research has received continued support from DARPA since its founding and was initially funded under Defender. First seen as a long-term research program, interest in high-energy laser weapons increased in the late 1960s when the invention of the gasdynamic laser boosted energy output substantially.65 The concept of using a particle beam for BMD also had its origins in Project Defender. Research on particle beams had been going on in the United States as well as in other countries since the 1930s. By the late 1950s, some members in the defense community decided the time was right to actively study the weapons applications of this technology, specifically for BMD. 66 Code-named Seesaw, this project studied the use of a charged-particle beam for endoatmospheric destruction of reentry vehicles. Seesaw was funded through DARPA until 1973.67 The research continued in the 1970s as a navy-sponsored program studying the use of a charged-particle beam as a shipboard anti-missile defense designated Chair Heritage.68 By 1963, Project Defender was redirected away from exotic technologies and more toward building technical data and expertise to assess technological prospects and propose modifications to the army's BMD program.69 Defender was transferred to the army's BMD R&D program in 1968, and although some BMD work (e.g., on directed energy weapons) continued in DARPA under the Strategic Technology Office, a specific program in missile defense, which accounted for 40-50 percent of DARPA's budget in the 1960s, was removed from its control.70 The technological competence developed through DARPA's Project Defender, however, created an alternate technical community versed in the problems of missile defense but remaining outside of the parochial interests of a particular military service. Also part of this alternate community were several members of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), as well as many members of Jason, a scientific advisory group composed mostly of university-connected scientists.71 This community of BMD experts would play an influential role in decisions concerning missile defense. 72 As discussed earlier, the defense community's interest in the defense problem is Janus-faced, with one face turned toward developing effective

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

19

defenses, the other toward penetrating them. The offensive concern prompted many studies in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For example, the Reentry Body Identification Group (RBIG), headed by William Bradley, was set up in November 1957 to advise U.S. missile designers about the possibility of the Soviets developing a successful missile defense. The group looked at both sides of the offense/defense equation and identified many of the potential challenges that an effective defense would have to deal with, including multiple warheads to saturate the defense.73 Such studies placed a tremendous burden on B M D proponents: Not only would they have to argue that a B M D system was feasible against currently deployed missiles, they would also have to show that the system would be effective in the face of potential countermeasures. 74 Thus, almost from its inception, B M D faced strong challenges, supported by an influential segment of the technical community, as to its ultimate feasibility. Meanwhile, the army's attempt to deploy a strategic defense continued to encounter difficulty. In the early 1960s, Nike-Zeus, faced with growing opposition and technical objections, began what was to be the first of many metamorphoses for the ground-based missile interceptor program. Denied a go-ahead to deploy Nike-Zeus, army officials were directed by the Department of Defense ( D O D ) to begin designing a new program incorporating a new high-acceleration endoatmospheric interceptor (Sprint), along with improvements in radar technology (specifically phased array radars) and higher-speed computers. The new program was named Nike-X in January 1963.75 However, objections to A B M deployment continued to grow. A n influential indictment of A B M s and strategic defense in general came in the form of a series of studies sponsored by OSD (office of the secretary of defense) known as the "damage-limiting" studies. According to these studies, overseen by General Glenn Kent in 1964, attempts to limit damage through defensive measures (e.g., ABMs, bomber defenses, and civil defense) were not only extremely expensive but were not cost-effective at the margin. Even an attempt to protect approximately 50 percent of U.S. industry and about 60 percent of the population would require the United States to spend $3.20 for every $1.00 the Soviets added to their offenses. When counterforce targeting was added to the calculus, the result was still a losing proposition for the damage-limiting strategy.76 In any event, a defensive system intended as an area defense would require a large investment in civil defense, which by this time had become a political dead letter.77 The damage-limiting studies furnished the opponents of A B M deployment with a convincing and rigorous argument questioning the cost-effectiveness of an A B M deployment and connected such deployments with arms race instability (i.e., defensive deployments would likely breed additional offensive forces in response). Kent's studies had impact two decades later, as evidenced by one of the criteria outlined by Paul Nitze—that a defensive system must be "cost effective at the margin."78

20

Selling

Strategic

Defense

Having experienced increasing demands from the Strategic Air Command ( S A C ) for more missiles to penetrate a possible nationwide Soviet A B M , and supported by the Kent studies, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara became convinced that the deployment of an A B M system by either side would lead to an increase in the other side's offensive forces. The army had incorporated the Sprint interceptor and the phased array radar and by the mid1960s was again pressing for funds to begin construction on proposed A B M sites. In another attempt to head o f f deployment, McNamara convinced President Lyndon Johnson to propose to the Soviets a mutual ban on A B M deployment.79 In the summer of 1967, McNamara got his chance to persuade the Soviets that it would be in the mutual interest of the United States and the Soviet Union to forgo the deployment of ABMs. In a meeting at Glassboro, N e w Jersey, McNamara explained his position to Aleksei Kosygin, the Soviet premier. In spite of the secretary's efforts, Kosygin left Glassboro unconvinced: Defensive missiles threatened no one, he argued; the first priority was to reduce offensive weapons.80 Although the attempt to gain an agreement at Glassboro failed, the seed was planted, and within five years, a treaty limiting A B M deployment was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Soviets were building an A B M system around Moscow, the Republicans were beginning to raise the issue of an " A B M gap," and an election year was just around the corner. Faced with what seemed to be an inevitable deployment, McNamara attempted to minimize the potential damage by proposing a limited deployment.81 Initially, Nike-X was planned as an area defense, similar to Nike-Zeus. Selected sites were to be protected first, with eventual buildup to a nationwide system. But the enormous cost and questionable effectiveness of such a nationwide defense had caused trouble for B M D proponents in the past. In the early 1960s, the idea of a limited deployment began to gain attention from B M D proponents.82 The incipient Chinese nuclear program and the possibility that China would have an I C B M capability by the mid1970s provided a rationale for deploying an A B M of limited effectiveness. 83 Such schemes were referred to as "light" or "thin" area defense systems, opposed to "heavy" or "thick" defenses designed to absorb a massive attack. The result of all this was another metamorphosis for the ground-based A B M : Nike-X became Sentinel—a "light" area defense system. Using the Spartan (exoatmospheric) and Sprint (endoatmospheric) ground-based interceptors developed during the Nike program, Sentinel was to incorporate seventeen sites for the purpose of defending against an unsophisticated I C B M attack from the Chinese (or possibly an accidental launch). On the one hand, McNamara and a few other individuals hoped such a light area defense might stave off demands for more extensive A B M deployments. On the other hand, A B M proponents saw it as a first step toward a larger anti-Soviet system.84 In the public arena, many influential scientists challenged the Sentinel

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

21

decision as being ineffective and a waste of public funds.85 In addition, the initial preparation of Sentinel sites aroused widespread public opposition over the prospect of having "bombs in the backyard."86 Congressional criticism of Sentinel also began to mount. By April 1969, the army's A B M program had been transformed once more. After his inauguration, President Richard Nixon suspended work on Sentinel and commissioned a study of A B M deployment options. This review led him to propose a new system, called Safeguard, which gave first priority to protecting U.S. land-based retaliatory forces. Other multifunctional roles, such as light area defense, were to be incorporated in later phases. After widespread public debate and heated battles in the Congress, Safeguard received official approval to begin site development, but only by the narrowest of margins in the Senate (51-50).87 The Nixon administration also continued discussions with the Soviets on ways to limit strategic arms, including ABMs. 88 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ( S A L T ) produced an interim agreement in 1972 on offensive arms and a treaty restricting the deployment of ABMs to no more than two sites in either nation, with no more than 100 single-warhead interceptors per site. (This provision was later amended in a 1974 protocol to a single site in each country.) The A B M Treaty further restricted development, testing, and deployment of A B M systems or components, not permanently fixed and land-based.89 Agreed Statement "D" of the treaty subjected " A B M systems based on other physical principles" to "discussion in accordance with Article XIII [the Standing Consultative Committee] and agreement in accordance with Article XIV [amendments and review] of the Treaty."90 During these negotiations, Safeguard was transformed once more: This time it became a bargaining chip. Technical objections to the system, voiced by prominent scientists, had become too powerful in the eyes of a skeptical Congress, and several key senators decided to support Safeguard only after pleas were made on behalf of U.S. negotiators in Geneva.91 Construction at the Safeguard site in Grand Forks, North Dakota, was allowed to be completed. But in October 1975, less than a year after the site became operational, Congress cut off funding for continued operation, the launchers were dismantled, and command of the large perimeter acquisition radar was transferred to NORAD (North American Air Defense Command).92 BMD

Sponsorship

The primary sponsor of BMD during this period was the U.S. Army. Faced with a continuing jurisdictional dispute with the air force, the army has fought interservice battles in order to gain and maintain a major role in strategic defense. In 1956, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson split the missile defense role, granting the army "point" defense and the air force "area"

22

Selling

Strategic

Defense

defense against ballistic missile attack,93 a decision somewhat modified early in 1958 by his successor, Neil McElroy, who granted the army sole development of an ABM system at that time. The air force remained primarily responsible for early warning of ballistic missile attack.94 The long range of the Nike-Zeus interceptor provided the system with some capability for area defense; thus McElroy's decision extended the army's claim for an area defense role in strategic defense. Over the next decade, the army's ABM system was whittled down to what amounted to a point defense of hardened missile silos. However, the actions of army officials during this period reflect a strong desire to erect a defensive system with an area defense capability.95 The army was very active in promoting its ABM system within the executive branch, on Capitol Hill, and to the general public. A major propaganda effort, orchestrated by Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor and Sentinel program manager Lt. General Alfred Starbird, aimed at selling the Sentinel ABM to the U.S. public. Two memos, one by Resor and one by Starbird, outlining a massive public affairs campaign were sent to Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford in September 1968. The campaign included such activities as increased press releases, pictures, and film clips to the mass media; tours of Sentinel facilities for media executives, journalists, and civic leaders; distribution of information kits; stepped-up briefings by Sentinel representatives to local media personnel and congressmen from areas impacted by the program; and solicitation of scientists supportive of the program to write articles to counteract the criticism of prominent scientist opponents.96 A widespread public outcry followed the disclosure of the two memos by the Washington Post in February 1969, prompting new Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to denounce the propaganda campaign for ABM. However, many of the activities outlined in the memos continued.97 In the early competition with the army for an initial ABM deployment, the air force was at a disadvantage because of the relatively underdeveloped designs proposed by the contractor teams involved in its Project Wizard (with the exception of the Bell/Douglas team, which submitted essentially a copy of the Nike-Zeus system).98 In addition, a determined effort on the part of the Eisenhower administration to remove critical technology from interservice rivalry led to most of the air force's R&D programs in BMD being placed under the purview of DARPA's Project Defender.99 Periodically, the air force proposed a more advanced ABM system based on intercepting missiles at an early stage in their flight trajectory, but these efforts appear to have been only half-hearted. 100 Relegated to an auxiliary role, and consistent with the ambivalent attitude of the air force toward air defense dating to the early 1950s, air force officials feared that a massive ABM system might provide the basis for a departure from a strategy based on the nuclear offensive. Reinforcing this suspicion was the threat ABMs posed for certain air force programs. According to Morton Halperin, the air force "clearly preferred that

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

23

the funds for missile defense be used by the Air Force to develop new hard rock silos or mobile systems."101 In the compass of strategic defense, the navy has concentrated more on A S W (anti-submarine warfare) than on ABMs. Although the navy in the late1950s did propose an upgrade of its Talos ship defense system as a firstgeneration A B M system that could be quickly deployed, it lost out to the army's Nike-Zeus program.102 By the mid-1960s, the navy appeared content with an auxiliary role in BMD, perhaps by furnishing sea-based platfoims as part of an extended area defense based on the army's land-based ABM. 103 As was the case for air defense, the navy's primary focus in missile defense R & D was on the threat posed to large battle fleets. By 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the army's position on early deployment of an ABM. The basis of this cooperation appears to have been, in part, an effort to present a united front to Secretary of Defense McNamara—the three services would support each other's preferred programs. An additional factor was that the aimy's planned system offered a future role for the navy and did not directly challenge air force strategic programs.104

Major BMD

Contractors

Major defense firms are always interested in moving a new weapons system out of the R & D stage and into production—the real profit comes from "bending tin." At least 23 companies in 16 states had a major financial interest in Safeguard.105 In addition, the Pentagon estimated that altogether 3,000 to 6,000 companies were involved in the development and production of Safeguard.106 Besides financial interests, several major A B M contractors had other reasons for deploying the ABM. A T & T (whose subsidiary, Western Electric, was the primary contractor for Safeguard) was interested in blocking antitrust suits aimed at splitting up the company.107 A concern with maintaining a vigorous R & D establishment in technologies seen by some as critical to national security was also voiced within the defense industry.108 Many of the major A B M contractors contributed to the Citizens' Committee for Peace and Security, a pro-ABM lobby run by William J. Casey (later appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Reagan administration).109 Three major A B M contractors—Motorola, General Electric, and Lockheed—were members of the American Security Council (ASC), which distributed more than 20,000 copies of a pro-ABM booklet and ran a massive direct-mail campaign in support of the A B M . Robert Gavin, chairman and chief executive officer of Motorola at the time, chaired the ASC's national strategy committee.110 During the deployment debate of the late 1960s, defense-related think tanks that had worked on the A B M "were used both overtly and covertly by the Pentagon and A B M supporters in Congress to supply testimony, memos,

24

Selling Strategic Defense

and . . . briefings" supporting ABM. 111 One such think tank was the Stanford Research Institute (SRI). A major R&D contractor for the army's ABM system, SRI held over $2 million in contracts in fiscal year 1969 alone. 112 One of its sections was set up to perform "Rand-like operations research" for the army.113 Another important pro-ABM think tank was the Hudson Institute. Heavily dependent on defense contracts, Hudson maintained a close relationship with the aimy and supported many of the army's claims for a larger strategic role. During the public controversy surrounding the deployment of Safeguard, Hudson produced an edited book compiling the arguments of various ABM supporters to counter a similar book published by ABM opponents. 114 At the time, Hudson was under contract with the army for a secret study of the strategic implications of ABM, an arrangement that led Senator Edward Kennedy to charge that the book was at least partially funded through the Pentagon.115 Herman Kahn, Hudson's most prominent founder, was deeply concerned with the defense problem and consistently promoted increased efforts in passive and active defense. According to Paul Dickson, Kahn was given an office in the Pentagon in early 1970 "where he could sit and help plot the Administration's strategy in winning acceptance for new ABM deployments."116 Perhaps the most tenacious proponent of BMD at Hudson was Donald Brennan, another of its founders. Brennan was active in the arms control movement in the late 1950s and edited Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, a book he liked to refer to as the "bible of arms control."117 Initially supportive of efforts to limit ABM deployment through bilateral negotiations, Brennan did a volte-face after a visit to the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. He returned to the United States convinced that the Soviets were going ahead with an extensive ABM system of their own. What began as a conviction that the United States would be unable to convince the Soviet Union to agree to a mutual ban on ABM deployment evolved into an almost messianic faith in the necessity of active defenses, and Brennan campaigned ardently for the ABM throughout the 1960s and beyond. One of his most notable contributions to the debate was the appropriate acronym MAD (mutual assured destruction), which he coined by combining the terms "mutual destruction," a descriptive phrase for the inevitable result of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and "assured destruction," a fundamental precept of offensive deterrent strategy. The MAD construct was intended to burlesque the idea that abstaining from active defenses was somehow stabilizing.118 Another ardent advocate of the ABM with connections to both Hudson and Rand was Albert Wohlstetter. A defense analyst concerned with ensuring SAC invulnerability, Wohlstetter advocated ABMs for the defense of Minuteman silos. Along with Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, he formed the

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

25

Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy in 1969 to campaign for Safeguard.119 Other scientists who in the 1950s generally opposed an increased emphasis on defensive techniques, such as Edward Teller, supported A B M deployment in the 1960s. T o be fair, it should be mentioned that this switch was more apparent than real. The earlier debate over the expansion of C O N A D was, as noted earlier, framed in the context of providing an alternative to the predominant reliance on the strategic offensive and an infinite arms race. Opposition to an expansion of C O N A D was not so much a fundamental objection to active defenses as it was a cautious fear that their expansion would distract attention from more pressing defense needs.120

ABMs and Arms Control The proposed deployments for an A B M system in the 1960s posed many faces: "thick" area defense, "thin" area defense, point defense, and bargaining chip. Was Safeguard intended to protect I C B M s from attack as the administration proposed? Was it the first step toward the "thick" defense the army wanted? Or was it just a bargaining chip? In the late 1960s, it could be any and all of these, an ambiguity that allowed B M D proponents from a variety of interests and perspectives to coalesce. Yet on another level, beyond the public rationales and justifications for and against the new weapons system, the A B M became symbolic of a more fundamental schism within the defense community.121 On one side of this schism were (and still are) those who believe national security requires more emphasis on non-military measures. On the other side were (and are) those who believe national security is based foremost on military power and requires the utmost vigilance. The gap between some opponents was narrow, between others quite wide, but the schism ran deep for all. In general, those opposing A B M deployment lined up on the former side of this schism; A B M proponents were arrayed along the latter side. In contrast to C O N A D , B M D had an unambivalent service sponsor. Although limited in scope, Safeguard could have provided the army with operational experience in missile defense and a budgetary foothold from which to expand the system in later years. However, this time the dominant view in the arms control community was that missile defenses would complicate rather than complement arms control. In an ironic twist from some of the arms control proposals of the 1950s, prohibiting rather than building strategic defenses became the way to further the interests of arms control, a perspective that prevailed when in 1972 the A B M Treaty was ratified. As it did with C O N A D , the United States built a missile defense system

26

Selling

Strategic

Defense

and then allowed it to decay soon after it became operational. Strategic defense sponsors continued to press for missile defenses incoiporating new technologies, but these proponents now were burdened with overcoming a bilateral treaty banning any further extension of such programs. Besides the technological challenges and cost-effectiveness arguments BMD proponents faced in the past, they now had to justify scrapping what was generally perceived as a major achievement in strategic arms control.

Notes 1. See Jayne, The ABM Debate, p. 29. 2. See Peck and Sherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process, pp. 660-662; Jayne, The ABM Debate, pp. 28-30; Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense, pp. 17-20. 3. Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 17. 4. For examples, see Herken, Counsels of War, and Huntington, The Common Defense, especially pp. 327-328. 5. See Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men, pp. 83-87; Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 9. 6. See Peck and Sherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process, pp. 660661.

7. See memorandum from J. R. Zacharias to A. G Hill (June 13, 1952). 8. Report by the President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age, p. 10. Hereafter referred to as the Finletter Report. 9. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 10. For a description of Douhet's theory of air power and its influence, see Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, chap. 3. 11. For the subordinate role of air defense in the Finletter Report, see especially p. 20. 12. "A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950," April 7, 1950, National Security Council series 68 (NSC 68), reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume 1 National Security Affairs: Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1977:235-293. Hereafter referred to as NSC 68. 13. See NSC 68, pp. 287-292. 14. Ibid., p. 283. 15. For example, see ibid., pp. 282-283. 16. ADSEC is discussed in York, The Advisors, pp. 114-115. 17. Project Charles, videocassette; see also Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 329. 18.Project Charles. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid.; also Huntington, The Common Defense, pp. 329-330. 21. See Huntington, The Common Defense, p. 329. 22. See ibid., pp. 330-333 for more on NSC 141 and the Kelly Committee. 23. See ibid., p. 333, and note 100. 24. York, Does Strategic Defense Breed Offense? p. 15. 25. Ibid. See also Herken, Counsels of War, especially pp. 74, 114-117, for additional criticisms of SAGE.

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

27

26. For example, see the discussion of AWACs in Stubbing, The Defense Game, pp. 74-76. 27. For examples, see memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan 1956-1966, dated 3/28/58; and Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: JCS 2245/45-CADOP 56-66, dated 3/27/58. See also the later discussion of beam weapon research. 28. See the preceding discussion of the Finletter Report. Also see Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age; and Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," pp. 3 71. 29. Huntington makes this point in The Common Defense, p. 328. 30. Ibid. 31. This argument is less applicable to missile defense where the majority of funds for R&D has been sought for and awarded under the strategic mission. However, service attitudes toward missile defense are discussed later. 32. For example, see Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation. 33. Paraphrased in Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," p. 531. 34. See Huntington, The Common Defense, pp. 326-328. 35. For examples, see Williams, Empire as a Way of Life; and Huntington, The Common Defense, pp. 327-328. 36. Project Charles. 37. Ibid. 38. See Herken, Counsels of War, p. 75. 39. See Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, especially chap. 4. 40. See Herken, Counsels of War, p. 67. 41. See Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, pp. 125-129; also Herken, Counsels of War, p. 67. 42. Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," pp. 533-535. 43. Ibid., p. 534. 44. Ibid., pp. 534-535. 45. See Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, pp. 98102.

46. See Project Charles; also Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," p. 534. 47. See, for example, NSC 68, pp. 284-287, 290. Also Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, pp. 102-107. 48. See, for example, NSC 68, pp. 279-281. 49. For the ascendancy of the finite-containment school, see Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, pp. 176-177. See also Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower. 50. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 76. 51. Ibid., p. 77. 52. Ibid., pp. 68, 70. 53. Jayne, The ABM Debate, pp. 30-32. 54. See Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy, p. 27. 55. Jayne, The ABM Debate, pp. 50-57. 56. Interview with Gerald Johnson, 5/12/87. 57. For examples, see Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, pp. 282-284; Taylor, "Endless Generations of Nuclear Weapons" pp. 12-15.

28

Selling Strategic Defense

58. For example, see Zacharias's comment in Project Charles. See also Rosenberg, "A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours," p. 11. 59. For examples, see Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, especially chaps. 3 and 6; Herken, Counsels of War, pp. 116-120; and York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace, chap. 9. 60. Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 19581974, p. 1-7. 61. Interview with Dr. Herbert F. York, 7/2/87. 62. Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 19581974, pp. 111-56—111-59; and Jayne, The ABM Debate, pp. 140-141. 63. See Manno, Arming the Heavens, pp. 13, 47. 64. Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 19581974, pp. III-56-III-59; and Jayne, The ABM Debate, pp. 140-141. 65. Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 19581974, pp. 111-58, and VIII-34-VIII-37. 66. Ibid., pp. IX-31-IX-34; also interview with R. Bruce Miller, 10/5/87. 67. Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 19581974, pp. IX-31-IX-34. 68. Interview with Richard L. Garwin, 2/1/88. 69. Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 19581974, pp. V-22-V-28. 70. Ibid., p. VIII-29-VIII-37. 71. For examples, see President's Science Advisory Committee, Report of the AICBM Panel, p. 15; and Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, pp. 111-51, and IV-33-IV-36. 72. Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 19581974, especially pp. 1-10, and V-28-V-30; Jayne, The ABM Debate, p. 54. 73. Memorandum from William E. Bradley to Dr. James Killian, subject: "Effectiveness of the Nike-Zeus System Against ICBM Attack," October 29, 1958. For a published account of these findings, see Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 343-344. Also Greenwood, Making the MIRV, especially pp. 4, 142-143. 74. For an example of this debate and the army's frustration with such a requirement, see Jayne, The ABM Debate, especially pp. 55-57. 75. See ibid., pp. 171-177; and Norris, "Anti-Missile Plan Altered Under Budget," p. A l . 76. Interview with Glenn Kent, 4/13/87. For a summary of these studies and their influence, see Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 320-324. 77. See Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 307-314. 78. See Nitze, "On the Road to a More Stable Peace," p. 2. 79. See Halperin, National Security Policy-making, chap. 5, especially pp. 130-131. 80. Ibid., p. 131; also see Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 94-95. 81. See Halperin, National Security Policy-making, chap. 5; also Herken, Counsels of War, pp. 194-199. 82. See Jayne, The ABM Debate, pp. 254-256. 83. Ibid., pp. 261-263. 84. For an analysis of these views, See Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, chap. 1. 85. For example, see Garwin and Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems," pp. 21-31. 86. See Herken, Counsels of War, pp. 232, 236. 87. For the congressional debate, see Senate Armed Services Committee,

Defending

Against

the

Unthinkable

29

Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1970. For an analysis of the debate within the scientific community, see Cahn, Eggheads and Warheads. For a summary of the Safeguard decision, see Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, chap. 24. 88. For the history of these negotiations, see Newhouse, Cold Dawn; and Smith, Doubletalk. 89. "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," pp. 139-147, hereafter referred to as the ABM Treaty. 90. Ibid., Agreed Statement D. 91. Interview with Jeremy Stone, 4/17/87. See also Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 187-188. 92. See Schwartz, "Past and Present: the Historical Legacy." 93. Jayne, The ABM Debate, p. 35. 94. Ibid., p. 47. 95. For examples, see Halperin, National Security Policy-making, chap. 5; Lapp, "A Biography of the ABM," pp. 125-126; interview with Harold Agnew, 9/30/87. The other services also supported the "thick" system. See especially Halperin, National Security Policy-making, pp. 116-117. 96. See Fulbright, The Pentagon Propaganda Machine, pp. 1-16. 97. See Geyelin, "Bid by Resor to Sell Public on ABM Told," pp. A l A l l ; Fulbright, The Pentagon Propaganda Machine, p. 10. 98. See Jayne, The ABM Debate, pp. 32-53. 99. See Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, pp. 111-49—111-58, IV-21-IV-23, V-28. 100. See, for example, London, "Safeguard: Is There a Choice?" p. 54. 101. Halperin, National Security Policy-making, p. 117. 102. See memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject JCS 2245/45CADOP 56-66, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (March 27, 1958), and Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: JCS 2245/45-CADOP 56-66, dated 3/27/58. 103. London, "Safeguard: Is There a Choice?" p. 54; and Halperin, National Security Policy-making, pp. 116. 104. See Halperin, National Security Policy-making, pp. 116-117; also Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 79-80. 105. See "Battle over ABM Switches to Nation's Grassroots," pp. 845851. Besides the 22 firms listed in Congressional Quarterly, Hughes was also a major ABM contractor. See Lapp, "A Biography of ABM," p. 128. 106. "Battle over ABM Switches to Nation's Grassroots," p. 849. 107. See Halperin, National Security Policy-making, p. 139, note 8. 108. Ibid., pp. 117-118, and note 8. 109. Lens, The Military-Industrial Complex, pp. 51-52. 110. See "Battle over ABM Switches to the Nation's Grassroots," p. 850; Lens, The Military-Industrial Complex, p. 50; Miller, "The Making of a Majority: The Senate and the ABM," p. 65. 111. See Dickson, Think Tanks, p. 159. 112. "Battle over ABM Switches to the Nation's Grassroots," p. 848. 113. Dickson, Think Tanks, p. 208. 114. Hoist and Schneider, Why ABM. The other book was Chayes and Wiesner, ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System. 115. See Lens, The Military-Industrial Complex, pp.50-51.

30

Selling Strategic Defense

116. Dickson, Think Tanks, p. 116. 117. See Herken, Counsels of War, p. 190. 118. Interview with Jeremy Stone, 4/17/87. See also ibid., p. 248. 119. "Battle over ABM Switches to the Nation's Grassroots," p. 850. See also Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, especially pp. 387-388. 120. York, Race to Oblivion, pp. 188-212; and Herken, Counsels of War, p. 233. 121. See Cahn, Eggheads and Warheads, p. 11; also Wohlstetter, Good Guys, Bad Guys and the ABM, p. 2240.

3

Promoting the Prohibited: The Aftermath of the ABM Treaty

The final years of the Nixon/Ford administration were dramatic and often tumultuous. A long and controversial war was brought to an ignominious end. A botched attempt to bug the Democratic headquarters at the Watergate Hotel led to the disgrace and eventual resignation of a president. Democrats swept the midterm elections, bringing a flood of first-year congressmen to Washington. The U.S. economy suffered from stubborn stagflation. On the international scene, a war in the Middle East threatened to involve the United States and the Soviet Union in a direct clash. On other diplomatic fronts, however, the cold war had experienced a definite thaw, and Sino-U.S. relations entered a new era of rapprochement. In such a climate, BMD proponents would have been hard pressed to solicit funds for a major BMD initiative even had a U.S.-Soviet treaty restricting ABM development and deployment not been signed and ratified. As it was, the sponsors of BMD were placed in a position of promoting the prohibited. The ABM Treaty allowed both sides to complete and/or maintain the one site for which each country had already spent considerable funds. Although both parties were initially entitled to build a second site, this option was eliminated by mutual agreement in a 1974 protocol. 1 Restrictions on the number (100) and type (single-warhead, no reloadable launchers) of interceptors provided assurance that neither party's site could be developed into a militarily significant system. Even if the radars could be made invulnerable to attack and unaffected by nuclear detonations, and even if the system worked perfectly and achieved a 100 percent kill ratio—both truly unrealistic assumptions—the "cost" to the offense would be only 100 warheads destroyed. In a world in which both the United States and Soviet Union possessed thousands of warheads, the destruction of 100, from a military standpoint, would be virtually meaningless.2 Moreover, both parties agreed that the ABM Treaty should be of "unlimited duration." Either side could withdraw from the treaty anytime its "supreme interests" were deemed jeopardized by the treaty's provisions, provided the withdrawing party notified the other side of its intention six months in advance.3 31

32

Selling Strategic

Defense

The treaty advanced the argument that by precluding the deployment of significant missile defenses, the ABM Treaty would complement future arms control measures and perhaps lead toward disarmament. This connection to a larger goal was made clear in the preamble to the treaty: [ E f f e c t i v e measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons . . . [and] would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms. . . . 4

For BMD sponsors like Donald Brennan, this was the most contentious part of the treaty and utterly MAD. The Impact of the ABM Treaty on BMD Programs The day President Nixon signed the SALT agreements in Moscow, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird by memo directed the secretary of the army to take "certain immediate actions." Among these were • Suspend all A B M R&D programs which are prohibited by the A B M Treaty. . . . • Initiate planning to (a) cancel the 12-site Safeguard Program and (b) deploy an A B M defense of the N C A [National Command Authority] at Washington, D.C. within the provisions of the A B M Treaty, on the fastest reasonable schedule. . . . • Continue the Safeguard deployment at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, as planned. 5

The memorandum also stated that further actions will be required "at the time of the exchange of instruments of ratification." 6 In August 1972, after considerable debate, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to advise ratification of the ABM Treaty.7 The NCA site was controversial from the start, and it was dubious whether Congress would ever have approved funding it. Even Senator Henry Jackson, an ardent supporter of ABM, was opposed to the NCA site.8 The issue became moot when the 1974 protocol to the ABM Treaty limited each party to a single ABM site.9 The ABM Treaty allowed for modernization of each country's ABM site as long as this improvement did not violate any treaty provisions.10 The treaty anticipated there would be gray areas for interpretation. Foreseen and unforeseen advances in technology would undoubtedly raise questions as to what kinds of future ABM components would be allowed. To

Promoting

the

Prohibited

33

deal with this inevitability, the treaty called for the establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to resolve such issues. 11 The treaty could also be amended under the provisions of article 14. The ABM Treaty restricted research and development on BMD systems other than fixed land-based missile defenses. 12 Similarly limited were capabilities for rapid reloading of ABM launchers or boosting multiple interceptors with a single booster.13 Not all research on such technology was prohibited. Paper studies and laboratory development could continue, but once a proscribed technology reached a stage where testing would be observable through "national technical means" (a euphemism for spy satellites and surveillance techniques), further development was banned. This interpretation, which is consistent with article 12 of the ABM Treaty, was clarified in testimony given by representatives of the Nixon administration during congressional hearings regarding ratification. Gerard Smith, chief negotiator for the U.S. SALT delegation, described the stage at which development would be prohibited: The obligation not to develop such systems, devices or warheads would be applicable only to that stage of development which follows laboratory development and testing. The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. 14

The traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty applies these restrictions on development to ABM systems and components "based on other physical principles," a phrase denoting such exotic technologies as lasers and particle beams. 15 For example, a ground-based laser of a "permanent fixed type" could be developed and tested at a designated ABM test site, but could not be deployed under the traditional interpretation of the treaty. Research on sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased ABM systems or components, regardless of whether the technology involved is considered conventional or exotic, could not go beyond laboratory testing. The ABM Treaty had little immediate impact on the army's BMD R&D program. The advanced BMD program received $3 million less in appropriations in fiscal year 1973 than in 1972, but the reduction was largely because of a general appropriations cut.16 Anticipated program changes helped to soften the impact on the army's advanced BMD program. According to its chief of R&D, Dr. J. B. Gilstein, the administration had kept him "fairly well informed" on SALT and he "attuned" his program to what he anticipated would be the final outcome. The only "surprise" to Gilstein was the limitation on multiple-warhead interceptors. 17 Such work had begun at DARPA in the early 1960s (with the terminal defense project known as

34

Selling

Strategic

Defense

A R P A T ) and continued at the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency with a multiple-warhead version of the HIT (homing intercept technology) program.18 HIT continued to receive funding, albeit without that portion of the program involving multiple warheads.19 The A B M Treaty's impact would have been greater had the army been developing alternative basing systems. What work was being done on seabased, air-based, and space-based systems (now prohibited from advanced development) was performed largely by the navy and air force. However, none of this work had advanced much beyond paper studies, and most of these projects had been discontinued by the mid to late 1960s. Over the years, sponsors of spaced-based systems such as B A M B I attempted to resurrect the concept, but these attempts made little headway and apparently ranked low on the priority lists of top air force officials. 20 One of the basic arguments used against Safeguard was that it was a system designed as an area defense but was essentially deployed as a point defense.21 T o counter this criticism, the Site Defense System (SDS) program (formerly Hardsite) was initiated in 1971 as a prototype demonstration program.22 Arguably, a system such as SDS, designed for defense of hardened sites, would be cheaper and more effective than an area defense system adapted for a point defense mission. After the A B M Treaty, the original SDS design was modified to shorten the time it would take to deploy the system.23 These design changes were described as a necessary hedge in case the Soviets tried to "breakout" of the treaty.24 However, these plans must have appeared to the Soviets as preparations by the United States to abrogate the agreement. Indirect effects of the A B M Treaty are more difficult to assess. As long as the treaty was in force, any significant A B M deployment was precluded—a major disincentive for both industry and the military services to invest heavily in this area because the chances for large profits and promotions were less likely to evolve out of B M D programs. In addition, the prohibition on deployment made it more difficult for the B M D program to compete with R & D funding for other strategic programs. Given the slim chances for a system deployment, the U.S. Congress was not likely to invest heavily in defensive "insurance." This sentiment was exemplified by the Senate Armed Services Committee R & D subcommittee's 1974 (fiscal year) recommendation accepting a continued B M D R & D program as an "insurance policy" but clearly stating that the "major emphasis in research and development for support of the strategic mission should be placed on the strategic offensive capability."25 Nevertheless, aside from a few disruptions, R & D funding for B M D was stabilized at roughly historical levels for the remainder of the 1970s.26 Congress made its sentiments felt in other ways.

Promoting

the

35

Prohibited

Congressional Guidance In addition to the repercussions of the A B M Treaty, congressional directives during this period forced some major reorientations within the army's B M D program. Even after Nixon's Safeguard decision in 1969, the army continued to devote considerable resources toward advanced technologies for "thin" or "light" area defense. In fiscal year 1974, the aimy requested $42.4 million for Light Area Defense ( L A D ) , an amount representing more than 40 percent of the army's advanced B M D program.27 The Senate Armed Services Committee ( S A S C ) denied the request and instructed the army to terminate the L A D program. The committee pointed out that it had examined the value of L A D three years earlier (two years before the A B M Treaty) and concluded: Present circumstances do not justify a diversion of our resources from the primary task of defending the deterrent to the less urgent objective of providing a defense against the evolving Chinese Communist threat. Whether the development of a thin area defense is a wise response to a future Chinese nuclear capability remains to be demonstrated.28 According to the committee, this conclusion was just as valid in 1973.29 Besides, deployment of such a system was now precluded by the A B M Treaty. Senator Thomas J. Mclntyre, chairman of the SASC's subcommittee on R & D , called the program "provocative and escalatory" in v i e w o f the S A L T agreements.30 The congressional action represented a substantial reduction from the funding levels historically

granted f o r advanced B M D

technology

development, but the next year's funding was restored to the previous norm after assurances were given as to the suspension o f L A D . 3 1 During Senate hearings, a discussion o f the army's fiscal year 1975 request led to the following exchange between Senator Mclntyre and Lt. General Walter Leber, Safeguard's system manager: Senator Mclntyre: . . . I want to make sure that you are out of the light area defense business. That is what the Congress directed you to do. General Leber: I want to say to you we are out of the light area— Senator Mclntyre: Good, stay out.32 A t least officially, the army was for the time being out of the L A D business. However, many o f the tasks previously assigned to L A D were allowed to continue under new, redefined missions.33 The army's fiscal year 1974 request for SDS was cut by roughly onethird in order to slow the pace o f the program. 34 In the congressional guidance for the following fiscal year, the army was directed to reorient the

36

Selling Strategic

Defense

program from a prototype demonstration to an advanced technology program. 35 Senators expressed some reluctance to expend nearly a billion dollars "just to demonstrate a system that could not be deployed."36 Because the ABM Treaty was of "unlimited duration," there was no magical date when a BMD system might be constructed. With near-term deployment unlikely, congressional guidance stressed a more balanced development of BMD subsystems and components to avoid becoming wedded to a particular system design.37 The prohibition on prototyping was also intended to stave off the inevitable pressures for deployment that occur once a weapon system reaches an advanced stage of development.38 Confronted with treaty limitations and congressional directives, the army put its BMD program through another metamorphosis. The previous chapter described how the program evolved from a thick area defense, to a thin area defense, to a point defense, and finally to a bargaining chip. Now the program was being described as a hedge—providing a deterrent and response to a Soviet abrogation of the ABM Treaty while at the same time affording U.S. decisionmakers the option of fielding an upgraded ABM system should they perceive escaping the treaty's restrictions to be in the U.S. national interest.

Complementary Technology With BMD so delimited, there was little incentive for the other services to scramble for a piece of the action. Related research in areas of more direct interest to the air force and navy could continue unaffected by the treaty provided such systems were not given "ABM capability."39 Many such programs allowed technologies relevant to BMD applications to advance. The air force continued to develop advanced techniques for early detection and tracking of long-range ballistic missiles. For example, funding for SBSS (space-based surveillance system) began in the early 1970s, and the SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) radar warning system got started in 1975.40 The ABM Treaty did place restrictions on the number, location, and power of ABM-compatible radars, but it was not intended to restrict the development of more advanced early warning systems.41 A heightened interest in the survivability of space-based systems surfaced in the early 1970s. The military was becoming increasingly dependent on space-based systems for surveillance, communication, navigation, and guidance. With the adoption of plans for "limited nuclear options" by the Nixon administration,42 the survivability of what the military refers to as C 3 I (command, control, communication, and intelligence) systems became increasingly important. To this end, the air force increased R&D funds for more survivable systems and satellite defenses.43 In addition, the air force pursued the development of anti-satellite

Promoting

the

Prohibited

37

(ASAT) weapons, both as a deterrent to their use against U.S. satellites as well as to provide an operational capability for destroying an opponent's space-based systems in the event of some future conflict.44 Intercepting and destroying a satellite or a ballistic missile reentry vehicle (RV) in mid flight share some similar technological requirements. Because of this compatibility, much of the air force's ASAT program developed under joint sponsorship with the army as it pursued advanced BMD. The HIT technology and the HOE (homing overlay experiment) programs, for example, evolved out of attempts to develop a non-nuclear ABM and eventually led to the development of an ASAT weapon launched from an air force F-15 jet fighter.45 Potential ASAT applications sparked initial air force interest in the army's concept for a space-based neutral-particle beam (NPB) weapon (White Horse) and for high-energy lasers based on the ground and/or in space.46 Part of the work performed under the air force's ABRES (advanced ballistic reentry systems) project also had implications for BMD (e.g., aids to penetrate defenses, missile phenomenology, and maneuverable RVs). However, ABRES addressed the offense/defense interaction primarily from the standpoint of penetration capability.47 The sinking of the Israeli destroyer Elath by the Egyptians in 1967 with a Soviet-supplied Styx anti-ship missile generated renewed interest within the navy for ship defense.48 The Aegis fleet defense system, developed during the 1970s, was designed around guided-missile carriers or destroyers sporting powerful phased array radars and a battery of anti-missile missiles.49 As a ship defense system, Aegis did not violate the ABM Treaty, but the navy could not test the system in an "ABM mode."50 Nonetheless, the program complemented other defensive missions. By the mid-1970s, all the services and DARPA were investing significant funds in the development of DEWs (directed energy weapons) for anti-missile defense. As discussed in Chapter 2, many of these programs emerged out of work begun under Project Defender. Although aimed at a variety of defensive missions, this research cultivated a technological infrastructure for DEWs that became an important component of BMD sponsorship in the late 1970s and early 1980s, thus contributing to a technological push.

Foundations of Star Wars Technology Project Seesaw was the first major U.S. effort in designing a charged-particle beam (CPB) weapon for BMD. By the end of the 1960s, Seesaw was in trouble. Lawrence O'Neill chaired the study that concluded Seesaw would not work as then configured.51 After the review, John Foster, director of Defense Research and Engineering, wanted to kill the program, but it lumbered along at DARPA while the services carried on their own

38

Selling

Strategic

Defense

evaluations of the technology.52 A review conducted for the air force found no current applications for the technology, a conclusion not very popular among the technological enthusiasts within the air force. 53 In contrast to aircraft, ships might possibly hold the large accelerators necessary for a chargedparticle beam weapon.54 Program evaluators also felt that the weapon's range would be shorter than previously anticipated, though it might still be effective against a cruise missile attack.55 These assessments prompted the navy to adopt Seesaw and carry on the work. The new program, known as Chair Heritage, redirected the research toward defending ships from a missile attack. The Pentagon was also funding particle beam research for inertial confinement fusion ( I C F ) and for simulating nuclear weapon effects. Although ICF may eventually lead to a breakthrough in the production of fusion energy, the military's interest in the technology stemmed from an interest in testing the effects of nuclear radiation on military equipment as well as the technology's future potential as a weapon. 56 Besides the possibility of a beam weapon, military researchers were studying ways of propelling the plasma produced in ICF—a kind of plasma toipedo.57 However tantalizing a charged-particle beam weapon may be to a military futurist, in a resource-scarce environment there was little incentive to invest large sums of money in the technology until researchers could demonstrate that a particle beam would travel in a straight line for a significant distance in the atmosphere.58 Industry was also reluctant to get involved in charged-particle beam weaponry, and the work developed mostly at the weapons laboratories. Compared with lasers, there remained only small funding for charged-particle beam weapons. Ballistic missile defense has remained a long-term goal of military laser research since the early days of D A R P A ' s Project Defender. Formed following the transfer of Defender, the Strategic Technology Office ( S T O ) became the organizational umbrella under which exotic technologies were studied for their potential applications to strategic defensive as well as offensive missions.59 Among the many different projects STO was working on in the early 1970s, high-energy lasers (HELs) were the center of attraction, at least in terms of "visibility and popular appeal."60 The laser work had not stimulated much excitement until a major breakthrough was achieved facilitating the generation of much higher energy levels. In the mid1960s, a team of scientists at A V C O Everett Research Laboratory put several ideas together to come up with the gas-dynamic laser (GDL). 6 1 Although the GDL provided the initial successes in HELs, a conference of experts at a meeting in Palm Beach, Florida, late in 1969 decided that the HEL program should shift its emphasis "to newer and potentially more promising concepts (electrical and chemical lasers)." For some D A R P A scientists, this decision was regarded as a "fundamental watershed in the high power laser field."62

Promoting the Prohibited

39

One of the scientists heavily involved with this work, Edward Gerry, left AVCO in 1972 to head DARPA's HEL program. 63 Shortly thereafter, Defense Research and Engineering established an HEL review group to help coordinate its HEL activity with the three services and DARPA. 64 The breakthrough achieved at AVCO, along with other developments in HEL research in the late 1960s, created a sense of urgency about the program (code-named Eighth Card). The intrigue and highly secretive status of the program kindled "dormant Service interest in the technology."65 The air force jumped to an early lead over the other services in laser technology. In fiscal year 1968, the Air Force Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, was designated the "Pentagon's principal test facility" and DARPA's chief agent for HELs.66 Funding for the air force's HEL program, originally scheduled at $2 million for 1969 (fiscal year), jumped to more than $40 million by 1972. During the same period, total Defense Department HEL spending soared from around $11 million to more than $70 million.67 By the early 1970s, each of the services yearned for its own demonstration laser. The army (with some funding from the marine corps) placed an electric discharge laser (EDL) in an armored personnel carrier called the MTU (mobile test unit). The navy chose a chemical laser for its FDM (fleet demonstration model). And the air force put a GDL on a modified KC 135 tanker aircraft for its airborne laser laboratory (ALL).68 Defense industry interest was also sparked. The rapid growth in HEL funding led to a scramble by defense industries to get in on the ground floor of this new technology. Growing desire among the services and defense industry to move HELs beyond the laboratory converged with the need to justify ever-increasing costs of laser programs, shifting the focus of the research away from the long-term goals of Project Defender (i.e., BMD) toward more near-term applications (e.g., integral air defense, ship defense, and bomber defense).69 However, in these near-term applications, HELs faced stiff competition from more conventional and cost-effective, technologies.70 For some scientists working on HELs, the tri-service lasers were growing more expensive at the same time they were losing some excitement.71 By the mid-1970s, the focus began to shift back to Defender's goals, helped along by advances in chemical lasers, which it appeared would scale nicely to necessary power levels and which DARPA began to emphasize basing in space.72

BMD Sponsorship 1973-1976 Except for the possibility of building an ABM defense around Washington, D.C., BMD deployment was not an issue during the early to mid-1970s. Even if put on an accelerated time schedule, SDS would not have been ready

40

Selling

Strategic

Defense

to deploy until 1977.73 The debates surrounding BMD during this period focused on the R&D program. Administration officials voiced various rationales for continuing it, which essentially consisted of the following: 1. 2.

3. 4.

To maintain a technological lead in ABM technology to provide an incentive for Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty To explore the defensive potential of new technologies in order to (a) understand intelligence gathered on Soviet activity in this area; (b) develop countermeasures to ensure penetration of possible Soviet defenses; and (c) prevent technological surprise To provide a quick response in case the Soviets abrogate the ABM Treaty To provide U.S. decisionmakers with the option to deploy a BMD system should there be (a) technological breakthroughs making defensive systems more attractive or (b) a change in the perceived "threat" requiring a defensive response74

Such rationales were general enough to support a wide range of R&D funding levels and directions, issues that could provoke some dispute even though there was little disagreement over the prudence of continuing some kind of R&D program in the area of BMD. However, such issues were less clear-cut than were the deployment controversies of the late 1960s and tended to blur distinctions between BMD proponents and opponents. Still, BMD sponsors generally strove to expand the program in mission, funding, and level of development. Despite the army's primary interest in BMD, army officials supported the ABM Treaty, at least publicly. General Bruce Palmer, then acting chief of staff, testified that army (and Joint Chiefs of Staff) support of the ABM Treaty was based on the perceived need to get an agreement limiting offensive strategic weapons. The ABM Treaty was seen as a necessary prerequisite for the Interim Agreement on offensive arms. Taken together, the agreements would "slow the Soviet strategic force deployment momentum, and thereby enhance our [U.S.] retaliatory capability as well as maintain the strategic balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union."75 Along with the other Joint Chiefs, the army conditioned its support of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on three assurances: • A Broad Range of Intelligence Capabilities and Operations to Verify Soviet Compliance in a Strategic Arms Limitation Environment. . . . • Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Programs. . . . • Vigorous Research and Development Programs. 76

For the army, these assurances meant (1) the deployment and operation of two ABM sites (one at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and the proposed site

Promoting

the

Prohibited

41

around Washington, D.C.); (2) the development of a rapidly deployable system for the defense of land-based ICBMs (SDS); and (3) a "vigorous" program in BMD R&D, including technologies for area defense. In the four years following the treaty, a protocol to it eliminated the second ABM site, and operation of the Grand Forks site was discontinued by Congress. Congressional directives limited the advanced development of a system for rapid deployment and directed that a dedicated program in LAD be eliminated. This record illustrates the difficulty army officials faced in promoting the prohibited. The army was forced, in effect, into selling treaty insurance. Future ABM systems were conditioned on abrogation or amendment of the ABM Treaty. Reduced funding and prohibitions on future ABM deployments had an impact on the BMD program's standing within the army, as reflected in the army's decision not to continue its previous practice of assigning a three-star general to administer the program. 77 This interregnum lasted more than a decade (August 1974-July 1985), during which time the program was directed by one- and two-star generals. The reinstitution of lieutenant general grade to command the army's BMD efforts did not occur until more than two years after President Reagan's Star Wars speech. During this period, some consideration was given to transferring the BMD program to the air force. A joint army/air force study conducted late in 1974 concluded that "there was merit from a roles and missions viewpoint to consider that BMD be transferred to the air force and be part of the air force's technology program." 78 However, the soon-to-be-operational Safeguard site helped derail, for the time being, further consideration of the proposal.79 A transfer would have left the program in a situation similar to that of the air defense program in the 1950s, with the primary service sponsor ambivalent about the implications of the technology. In general, the air force and navy supported the army's BMD programs in exchange for reciprocal support for their strategic programs. As part of the united Joint Chiefs of Staff support for the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the air force sought assurances for a new strategic bomber (the B-l) and the navy sought similar assurances for their underwater long-range missile system (ULMS or Trident). 80 For these services, treaty insurance meant modernizing U.S. strategic offensive forces. Although not promoting BMD per se, many related technologies, as previously described, were advanced by the other services. The navy acted as a convenient sponsor for the charged-particle beam technology after it lost its previous sponsor (DARPA). The air force's interest in techniques for attacking and defending objects in outer space inevitably drew comparisons with missile defense. HELs were still a long way from weapons applications, and the triservice laser program diverted attention away from Defender's goals.

42

Selling Strategic

Defense

However, DARPA coordinated much of the inter-service laser work, and the Strategic Technology Office (STO) remained concerned with the potential effect of HELs on the strategic balance.81 For many scientists connected with DARPA's laser program, an underlying goal was to prevent a Sputnik-type event—a technological surprise in a strategically significant technology. Although many scientists viewed the argument as something of a red herring, preventing a technological surprise and achieving a technological surprise are opposite sides of the same coin.82 Laser research was pursued not only as a form of preventive medicine but also for its potential opportunities. Both goals may be fundamental motivations for undertaking extensive research programs along technological horizons. Corporate

Sponsors

As BMD funding receded, corporate involvement in strategic defense declined. Still, most of the major ABM contractors of the late 1960s maintained significant BMD R&D contracts. Of the twelve major Safeguard contractors listed in 1969, eleven were listed as principal contractors for some part of the army's BMD program in 1975.83 Western Electric, along with its subsidiary Bell Laboratories, reduced its profile in BMD following the ABM Treaty. Having been the prime contractor for the army's ABM systems since 1958, Western Electric continued as a major contractor for BMD advanced computer architecture, discrimination techniques, and radar development. However, Western Electric did not play a major role in SDS, considered at the time to be the follow-on program to Safeguard. Instead, McDonnell Douglas, part of the ABM program since Nike-Zeus, became the prime contractor for SDS. By the mid-1970s, McDonnell Douglas held a broader base in BMD technology than any other BMD contractor. The company had major contracts in both systems technology and advanced technology for the army's BMD program. There was also considerable corporate crossover in the field of HELs. Fifteen of the forty-one corporations listed as principal or major BMD contractors in 1975 by the army's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) were also working on laser weaponry. Two of these companies, McDonnell Douglas and Hughes, studied potential BMD applications of HELs. Rockwell and Lockheed, both BMD contractors, received contracts to study the space-based lasers (SBLs).84 Treaty

Discontents

In concert with the promotion of particular technologies with BMD applications, strategic defense was boosted indirectly by attacks directed against the ABM Treaty and SALT. Although discontent with the SALT

Promoting

the

Prohibited

43

agreements among individuals and groups involved more than a frustration over ABM limitations, the strategic defense mission benefited nonetheless. BMD sponsors who supported the ABM Treaty did so conditionally and with considerable reticence. For example, Edward Teller, a longtime advocate of strategic defenses, testified in favor of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement. But his support was based on an alarming view of the Soviet strategic buildup and on pessimism concerning the U.S. government's commitment to redress what he saw as a grave imbalance in strategic forces. In short, because he did not foresee the U.S. government appropriating an additional $10-15 billion per year for a buildup of U.S. strategic forces, the agreements were the next best thing for slowing what he viewed as a growing imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union.85 However, not all BMD proponents of the 1960s accepted this reasoning—many opposed ratification. The American Security Council, a strong supporter of ABM deployment, lobbied against ratification of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement. Letters were sent to ASC members urging them to write their senators and recommend they not advise ratification.86 Testifying against ratification, Donald Brennan summed up his reservations: "The proposed ABM Treaty does the wrong thing well and the Interim Agreement does the right things badly."87 Brennan advocated building up active defenses while reducing strategic offensive arms through negotiations. In his testimony and his writing, Brennan bemoaned what he saw as the predominance of a MAD philosophy within the U.S. strategic community and the institutionalization of that philosophy through the ABM Treaty.88 As previously outlined, the treaty's preamble identifies two premises underlying the reasoning of ABM opponents. First, unlimited deployment of ABMs would make it difficult to reduce strategic offensive arms. This premise was based on the assumption that each side would strive to maintain an ability to penetrate an opponent's defense and wreak destruction—and one way to ensure penetration was to build more weapons in order to saturate the defense. Thus, proponents of the treaty argued that limitations on ABMs would help stabilize the arms race.89 The second premise followed from the first: Limiting ABMs would increase the assurance that each party would be able to wreak destruction on the other, even if an initial strike substantially reduced the strategic forces of one side. Treaty patrons stressed that this mutual hostage relationship would help stabilize crisis situations because neither side could hope to substantially reduce its own damage by striking first. This mutual hostage relationship is what Donald Brennan cleverly described as mutual assured destruction (MAD) during the ABM deployment debate. However, to describe the ABM Treaty as the triumph of strategists wedded to a MAD idea is not only unfair but misguided. It would be more appropriate to say that the treaty was a victory for those who saw, tragically,

44

Selling

Strategic

Defense

no technological solution to the current situation in whcih nuclear weapons hold hundreds of millions of people hostage.90 Actually, there were many reasons for supporting the ABM Treaty, including technical, political, and economic considerations. To consider a single line of argument as the main factor leading to the successful negotiation and ratification of the ABM Treaty is, in my judgment, an oversimplification. The stability arguments were reasonable and fit well with what many perceived as an inescapable situation (at least inescapable through technological means), but these did not tell the whole story. Yet these premises raised a red flag to BMD proponents and became the target for attacks by those discontented with the treaty. Most of the people at Rand saw the ABM Treaty as "nuts." 91 Rand analysts generally viewed active defenses as a good thing and discredited the idea that MAD was inherently stabilizing. Fred Ikl6, a long-time analyst for Rand, articulated this attack on MAD in a 1971 book and an article published in the January 1973 issue of Foreign Affairs.92 The twin themes running through his writing are (1) wars may start without a rational calculation of the outcome and (2) given this, it is imperative to obtain the means for stopping wars once they have started. Ikl6's logic led to a rejection of MAD as the sole strategy for preserving the peace—this would only prevent rational wars. Ikl6 admonished the proponents of MAD for basing their strategy on a single "barbaric" act. He also pointed out that there was a psychological effect on the populations resulting from the presence of a constant threat of annihilation. 93 Ikld's alternative strategy was based on the ability to fight a nuclear war. He proposed more flexible targeting of nuclear forces and moving away from the idea of a massive retaliation strike. Implicit within his limited nuclear war strategy were the assumptions that such a strategy was less provocative than MAD and that such a war could be controlled. The first of these assumptions—and his thesis in general—attacked something of a straw man, because MAD was viewed by many not as a preferred strategy but as an unavoidable condition of current and foreseeable technology. In addition, U.S. nuclear targeting policy has, at least since 1950, contained some mix of assured destruction and damage-limiting criteria. The perception of change was one of degree and tended to be overstated in public pronouncements on the issue. 94 The second assumption was internally inconsistent with his argument against total reliance on MAD. That is, if we cannot count on national leaders to always act "rationally" in the face of massive retaliation, how can we rely on them to act "rationally" in the midst of a nuclear war? Nonetheless, Ikl6's thesis was very influential among conservatives and helped publicize the reasoning behind nuclear warfighting strategies. Several hawkish senators were influenced by Ikl6's writings, and I kid himself served as a consultant to the SASC's subcommittee on arms control chaired by Senator Henry Jackson. 95 Conservative newspapers such as the Wall Street

Promoting

the Prohibited

45

Journal published editorials supporting Ikl6's thesis, questioning the sanity of what was described as a strategic policy of "mutual genocide." 96 After the resignation of Gerard Smith, Fred Ikl6 was appointed director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), ushering in a purge of that agency. 97 By depicting the ABM Treaty as the institutionalization of MAD, the treaty's critics were able to attack its premises in the hope of weakening support for the treaty and redirecting national strategy in their direction. In addition, the critics expressed skepticism concerning Soviet acceptance of the MAD philosophy. According to Brennan: "For whatever combination of reasons, the Soviets have now either accepted the MAD philosophy or are pretending to." 98 In his annual report, outgoing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also questioned Soviet motivations for signing the ABM Treaty. It has become equally plausible to believe that the Soviets have never really agreed to this [MAD philosophy], and that they entered the A B M Treaty either because of severe resource constraints or because they feared that, without an agreement, U.S. technology over the near term would give us a continuing and even growing advantage in this form of defense. 9 9

To support his hypothesis, Rumsfeld cited the Soviet civil defense program. Indeed, allegations of an extensive Soviet civil defense program were being increasingly cited by treaty discontents as evidence that the Soviet Union was preparing to "fight and win a nuclear war." 100 Charges of cheating aside, a prohibition on active defenses was bound to focus attention on passive defenses. The ABM Treaty was not intended to restrict such preparations, and both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to develop these techniques for the defense of their strategic forces, government officials, and populations. The relative disparity of U.S. and Soviet civil defense programs is the source of considerable debate. 101 But treaty discontents were generally proclaiming a civil defense "gap." Some went so far as to state that 98 percent of the Soviet population could survive an all-out U.S. nuclear strike. 102 The foundation for such claims (e.g., Soviet manuals for hastily constructed shelters of doors and dirt) were the source of some ridicule in the early 1980s when the primary author of these claims, T. K. Jones, was deputy undersecretary of defense for strategic and theater nuclear forces. 1 0 3 Still, claims of gaps between U.S. and Soviet force structures have been a recurring tactic in U.S. defense politics and are used to incite public support for specific weapons systems and increased defense spending in general. 104 There was nothing new in viewing civil defense preparations as provocative. Now, however, treaty discontents portrayed the Soviet programs as proof that Soviet leaders rejected the underlying premises of the ABM

46

Selling

Strategic

Defense

Treaty and were pursuing a war-winning strategy. This was essentially the argument of Team B, a group of "outside experts" convened in 1976 by then CIA Director George Bush to "reevaluate" intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union's global strategy.105 Team B members were deliberately selected for their more "pessimistic views of Soviet plans" than held by those who felt Soviet intentions were to achieve "rough parity" with the United States.106 Team B's revised estimate was described by a "top-level military intelligence officer" as flatly stating that "the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces."107 According to General Daniel Graham, Team B based its reappraisal on "two catalytic factors." The first was a CIA estimate published in October 1976 that placed Soviet defense spending at 11 to 13 percent of Soviet GNP instead of the 6 to 8 percent previously estimated. The second factor was the "discovery of a very important [Soviet] civil defense effort." 108 The first factor Graham referred to was actually no cause for alarm. As the October 1976 CIA report had stated, the new estimate "does not mean that the impact of defense programs on the Soviet economy has increased—only that our appreciation of this impact has changed." What the CIA analysts found was that Soviet defense industry was less efficient than previously thought.109 As Arthur Macy Cox quipped: "What should have been cause for jubilation became the inspiration for misguided alarm."110 The Soviet civil defense program, although reportedly larger than its U.S. counterpart, was widely disputed as to its effectiveness in a nuclear war.111 Effectiveness aside, the purpose of the Team B report was to change U.S. perceptions of Soviet strategic intentions. The Soviet civil defense program was used as an example of a reputed distinction between U.S. and Soviet strategic attitudes. As Richard Pipes, chairman of Team B, argued: "Nothing illustrates better the fundamental differences between the two strategic doctrines than their [Soviet] attitudes to defense against a nuclear attack."112 Team B's connection to BMD sponsorship, past and present, is remarkable. The seven outsiders consisted of Richard Pipes (chair), Paul Nitze, Foy Kohler, William Van Cleave, Gen. Daniel Graham (ret. USA), Thomas Wolfe, and Gen. John Vogt, Jr. (ret. USA). Four government officials were also involved with the group: Maj. Gen. George Keegan, Brig. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Paul D. Wolfowitz (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), and Seymour Weiss (State Department). According to the New York Times report, General Keegan, repeatedly at odds with the CIA's estimates, instigated the formation of Team B. As chief of air force intelligence, General Keegan became convinced the Soviets were "preparing for offensive war against the United States," leading him to oppose the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on offensive arms. 113 Also, in the year following Team B's réévaluation, Keegan raised public alarm over an alleged "beam gap" through his public allegations of Soviet advances in particle

Promoting

the

Prohibited

47

beam weaponry for use as a missile defense. General Graham in the early 1980s headed a BMD study and campaign known as High Frontier. General Welch was the author of the "Logan report" that proclaimed the solution to missile defense back in 1958. Pipes, Nitze, Kohler, Van Cleave, and Weiss became members of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), formed in the year following Team B's report. The committee campaigned against the SALT treaties and advocated, among other things, greater U.S. efforts in active and passive defenses.114

Selling Insurance and Sowing Discontent As the Nixon/Ford administration came to a close, near-term prospects for BMD looked bleak. After an investment of nearly $6 billion, the ABM site at Grand Forks was placed in mothballs. BMD sponsors were reduced to selling insurance and sowing discontent. Congress, however, was more inclined to buy offensive rather than defensive treaty insurance. Nevertheless, the U.S. government continued to hedge its bets by sustaining a moderate BMD R&D program. The army's hopes for a prepackaged ABM system waiting in the wings had been dashed in congressional committee rooms. For the near term, the primary focus of the army's program clearly was now point defense. And the army's main selling point was an insurance policy that would pay off should the Soviets abrogate the ABM Treaty or should changes in the strategic environment create an imperative for the United States to do so. Those people unhappy with the SALT process were busy promoting such an imperative. They held an alarming view of the Soviet Union and the strategic environment and were working with some success at shaping U.S. policy. Détente was not yet dead, but the coalitions that would preside at its wake were already forming. On another front, just when it appeared that the army was settling down to the more prosaic mission of point defense, a technological push was developing. The nuclear arms race had produced an enormous military R&D infrastructure that continued to generate new concepts and technologies. The search for renewed or increased funding, as well as other parochial interests, spurred advocates of these new technologies to seek out military problems in need of their preferred solution. Not so coincidentally, treaty critics were presenting BMD as an unsolved mission in search of a solution.

Notes 1. See "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," hereafter referred to as the ABM Treaty.

48

Selling Strategic

Defense

2. Preferential employment would enhance the effectiveness of a treatylimited ABM, but such an enhancement does not change this basic argument. Cf. Report of the DSB Task Force on U.S. BMD, p. 28. 3. See article 15 of the ABM Treaty. 4. Preamble to the ABM Treaty. 5. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (May 26, 1972), reprinted in SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization, p. 1862. 6. Ibid. 7. The vote was 88 for, 2 against. 8. See, for example, Senator Jackson's comments in the Congressional Record, June 5, 1975, p. 17417. 9. Although signed July 3, 1974, the protocol did not officially enter into force until May 24, 1976. See "Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems." 10. See article 7 of the ABM Treaty. 11. See article 13 of the ABM Treaty. 12. See article 5 of the ABM Treaty. 13. See Agreed Statement "E" of the ABM Treaty. 14. Testimony before the SASC, Hearings on the Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, p. 377. 15. See Agreed Statement "D" of the ABM Treaty. This interpretation was hotly contested by the Reagan administration beginning in 1985. However, the preponderance of evidence supports the traditional interpretation. See Nunn, "Interpretation of the ABM Treaty," especially p. 32. 16. See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization, p. 1869. 17. See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization, p. 1902. 18. For ARPAT see Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, p. V-19. For a discussion of the multiple-warhead HIT, see SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization, p. 1863. 19. See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization, p. 1863. 20. See Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, pp. 111-49—111-59, and IV-21-IV-24; and interview with Jack Ruina, 1/18/88. 21. For example, see the Congressional Record, August 6, 1970, pp. 27723-27733. 22. Easley, et al., "Net Technical Assessment of Soviet and U.S. ABM Programs." 23. See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization, p. 3417. 24. See, for example, Senate Report No. 94-146, SASC, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976, p. 17. 25. See Senate Report No. 93-385, SASC, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, pp. 33-35. 26. See the appendix to this book. 27. See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization, p. 1870. 28. See Senate Report No. 93-385, SASC, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, p. 35.

Promoting

the

Prohibited

49

29. Ibid. 30. Quoted in Getier, "Senate Panel Cuts B-l Fund, Bars New ABM," p. A2. 31. See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization, p. 3420; See also Appendix A. 32.See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization, p. 3430. 33. For example, HIT and SOFT, formerly under LAD, continued under the Advanced Technology Program. See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization, pp. 1911-1913. 34. See Senate Report No. 93-385, SASC, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, pp. 32-33. The report cut $70 million, but $10 million was restored. 35. Conference Report 93-1212, House of Representatives, Committee of Conference, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, pp. 31; also Senate Report 93-884, SASC, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975, pp. 40-41. 36. See Senate Report 93-884, SASC, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975, p. 41. 37. See Conference Report 93-1212, House of Representatives, Committee of Conference, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975, p. 31; SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization, especially pp. 3435-3437; and SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1976, especially pp. 3265-3268. 38. Interview with John E. Pike, 1/8/88. 39. See article 6 (a) of the ABM Treaty. 40. See the Congressional Record, April 4, 1985, p. E1445. 41. See ABM Treaty, articles 3, 4, 6, and Agreed Statement "F". Also interview with Herbert York, 1/7/87. 42. See Pringle and Arkin, S.I.O.P., pp. 177-183. See also Herken, Counsels of War, pp. 260-269. 43. Ibid. Pringle and Arkin and Herken. Also see Stares, Space Weapons and U.S. Strategy, chap. 8. 44. For the development of ASATs, see Stares, Space Weapons and U.S. Strategy, chap. 8; Manno, Arming the Heavens', and Karas, The New High Ground. 45. Joint funding for this program was described in Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1970, p. 819. 46. NPB interest based on interview with R. B. Miller, 10/5/87. For a discussion of early interest in laser ASATs, see Klass, "Current Systems Still More Cost-Effective," pp. 53-59. 47. See SASC, Fiscal Year 1976 and July-September 1976 Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, pp. 2038-2039. 48. Interview with Richard Garwin, 2/1/88. 49. See Jane's Fighting Ships 1985-86, p. 660. 50. For a description of what might constitute such testing, see Unilateral Statement "B" attached to the ABM Treaty. 51. Off-the-record interview with a government scientist, 10/7/87. 52. Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 19581974, p. IX-33. 53. Off-the-record interview with a government scientist, 10/7/87. 54. Ibid.

50

Selling Strategic

Defense

55. Interview with Wolfgang Panofsky, 3/14/88. 56. See Hecht, Beam Weapons, chap. 7, especially pp. 146-151. 57. Interview with Juventino R. Garcia, director, Office of Public Affairs, AFWL, 10/5/87. 58. Interview with R. B. Miller, 10/5/87. 59. See Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, p. IX-27. 60. Ibid., p. IX-27. 61. Off-the-record interview with a government scientist, 10/7/87. See also Klass, "Power Boost Key to Feasibility," pp. 32-33. 62. Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 19581974, p. VIII-37. 63. Klass, "Power Boost Key to Feasibility," pp. 32-33. 64. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1975, p. 570. 65. See Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, p. VIII-35. 66. Klass, "Research Nears Application Level," p. 14. 67. Ibid., pp. 12, 14. 68. See Klass, "Advanced Weaponry Research Intensifies," pp. 34-39; and Hecht, Beam Weapons, pp. 27-30. 69. Off-the-record interview with a government scientist, 10/7/87. Also see Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, p. IX-30. 70. See Klass, "Current Systems Still More Cost-Effective," p. 53. 71. Off-the-record interview with a government scientist, 10/7/87. 72. Ibid.; see also Klass, "Current Systems Still More Cost-Effective," p. 58. 73. For the initial schedule, see Easley, et al., "Net Technical Assessment," p. 5. The schedule in 1975, after delays and congressional reorientation, planned for technology validation to be completed in 1979. See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1976, p. 3267. 74. See, for example, Schlesinger, Report of the Secretary of Defense, p. 11-45; Rumsfeld, Report of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 88-89; Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1975, p. 116. Also see Pike, The Strategic Defense Initiative Budget and Program, p. 25. 75. See SASC, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, p. 464. 76. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements, pp. 69-70. 77. See Currie-McDaniel, The U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command, p. 16.

78. See SASC Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1976, p. 3262. 79. See ibid., pp. 3262-3263. 80. See the testimony of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer and Melvin Laird before U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, pp. 60-71; and McWilliams, "Gold-braided Blackmail," pp. 4-5. 81. See Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, p. IX-30; and testimony of Stephen Lukasik before the House Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1974, pp. 927-930.

Promoting the Prohibited

51

82. See Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, pp. X-17-X-20. 83. For comparison, see "Battle over ABM Switches to Nation's Grassroots,: p. 847; and SASC, Fiscal Year 1976, Part 6, pp. 3272-3275. 84. See SASC, Fiscal Year 1976, Part 6, pp. 3272-3275. See also Pratt, Weapons Sponsorship, appendix B. 85. See Dr. Teller's testimony in House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, pp. 92-116; and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, pp. 219-226. 86. See Levine, "Anticommunist Group Lobbies to Keep U.S. a Military Superpower," p. 1. 87. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, p. 186. 88. See ibid., p. 188. Also see Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," pp. 685-692; Brennan, "Strategic Alternatives I," p. 31; and Brennan, "Strategic Alternatives II," p. 33. 89. Besides the language of the ABM Treaty's preamble, see Robert McNamara's speech announcing the go-ahead for Sentinel. Excerpted in Halperin, National Security Policy-making, pp. 111-113. 90. See, for example, Ruina, "ABM Revisited: Promise or Peril?" p. 63. 91. Telephone interview with James Digby, 2/3/87. 92. See Ikl6, Every War Must End-, and Ikl6, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" pp. 267-285. 93. See Ikle, "Can Deterrence Last Out the Century?" pp. 281-282. 94. Interview with Glenn Kent 4/13/87. 95. See Clarke, Politics of Arms Control, p. 45. 96. "Mutual Genocide?" Wall Street Journal (January 11, 1973). 97. See Clarke, Politics of Arms Control, chap. 4. 98. Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," p. 690. 99. Rumsfeld, Annual Defense Department Report FY78, pp. 63-64. 100. See Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," pp. 21-35. Also see Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan"; and Scheer, With Enough Shovels, especially chap. 8. 101. See Scheer, With Enough Shovels. 102. Testimony of T. K. Jones before the Joint Committee on Defense Production, November 17, 1976, reported in ibid., pp. 138-139. 103. Ibid., especially chap. 2. 104. See, for example, Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88, p. 9; and Corthright and Borosage, "The Russians Are Coming," pp. 205-208. 105. For reports and discussion concerning Team B, see Binder, "New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms," pp. AI, A14; Pipes, "Strategic Superiority," p. E15; Marder, "Carter to Inherit Intense Dispute on Soviet Intentions," pp. A l , A4; Scheer, With Enough shovels, chap. 5; and Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, pp. 197-210. 106. See Binder, "New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms," p. A14. 107. Ibid., p. A l . 108. See Marder, "Carter to Inherit Intense Dispute on Soviet Intentions," p. A4. 109. Quoted in Cox, "The CIA's Tragic Error," pp. 21-22. 110. Ibid., p. 22.

52

Selling

Strategic

Defense

111. See, for example, Scheer, With Enough Shovels, especially chaps. 2 and 5; also Cox, "The CIA's Tragic Error," p. 21. 112. Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," p. 33. 113. Binder, "New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms," p. A14. See also Scheer, With Enough Shovels, chap. 5. 114. For crossover membership, see Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, p. 199; Tyroler, Alerting America, pp. ix-xi. For strategic defense advocacy, see pp. 55-59, 65, 135, and passim in Tyroler.

4

The Evolving Hedge: BMD During the Carter Administration

During the Carter administration, the ABM Treaty continued to constrain BMD R&D and serve as a barrier to a significant BMD deployment. However, the dynamics of the armament process creates internal pressures for expansion. The treaty could moderate the pressures building within the military-industrial complex for BMD deployment, but could not, by itself, eliminate them. Regardless of real or perceived changes in an opponent's force structure, continued R&D in missile defense and related technologies creates a supply-side push for new arms. Likewise, new demands may be the result of new personnel, new thinking, and/or new technological possibilities. The BMD program during the late 1970s continued to be justified as treaty insurance and a hedge furnishing U.S. policymakers with an option to deploy a ballistic missile defense in short order. Yet this hedge was maturing, incorporating new technologies and concepts for intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles. Most of these changes were evolutionary in nature, but some new technologies, if they could be effectively developed, could only be described as revolutionary. U.S. BMD Programs 1977-1980 Pentagon spending for R&D on strategic defense in the latter half of the 1970s hovered around $1 billion annually, measured in constant 1982 dollars.1 Army strategic defense programs (primarily BMD) accounted for between 44 and 56 percent of total Department of Defense (DOD) strategic defense spending. The majority of funds dedicated to BMD research was split between the System Technology Program (STP) and the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), both under the army's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). ATP continued the work begun at the army's ABMDA and DARPA's Project Defender before that; its purpose was to advance the state-of-the-art in BMD technology. In contrast, STP was set up following the congressionally mandated reorientation of SDS to work on system integration of BMD component technologies. The justification for 53

54

Selling Strategic

Defense

this dual approach was that STP would take advances developed in ATP and integrate them into a workable BMD system, thereby reducing the lead time necessary to deploy an advanced BMD system if U.S. policymakers should so choose. This balanced program was aimed at two of the oft-stated objectives of the U.S. BMD program in the 1970s: (1) maintaining a technological lead over the Soviet Union in BMD technology and (2) providing the option for a rapidly deployable BMD system.2 In 1977, BMD program manager Brigadier General John Jones convinced the Senate Armed Services Committee to recommend stabilizing ATP and STP "at a consistent level of real purchasing power in future years." 3 However, by 1980 these guidelines began to break down. STP was provided with a real growth increase for fiscal year 1981 to accelerate the LoADS (low-altitude defense system) program.4 Moreover, only 30 percent of ATP's fiscal year 1981 funds were forlong-teim technologies.5 This shift in emphasis stemmed from advances in site defense technology and a return to concepts of layered defense. The SDS being developed in the early 1970s was supposed to provide the option to deploy an active defense of the U.S. Minuteman ICBM force in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Not only was this option not exercised; congressional limits were placed on the level of development that this program could achieve. In fiscal year 1977, SDS still represented the majority of funds for STP. By fiscal year 1979, the site defense program was being phased out and the follow-on programs accounted for the bulk of STP funds. 6 BMD program manager Major General Grayson Tate stated in 1980 that "the majority of BMD effort is applicable either directly or indirectly to layered defense."7 The follow-on programs for site defense were initially justified as "growth options" and "upgrades" to SDS.8 As these programs developed, specific rationales were attached to them. For example, the army's LoADS (pronounced "low-ads") became an insurance policy for MX in case the Soviet threat to U.S. land-based ICBMs proceeded to grow unconstrained. The layered defense system (LDS) became an option to protect "softer" targets, such as SAC bases and command and control centers, and fixed ICBMs.9 LoADS, considered to be the next generation BMD system for defending land-based ICBMs, dealt with technologies for engaging attacking RVs at altitudes below 30,000 feet. The relatively close range intercept of LoADS would be ineffective for defending unprotected targets or as an area defense. As part of this program, some innovative designs for such engagement were being studied; one proposal was to use many small rockets to create a barrier screen. 10 However, the bulk of LoADS funding focused on a modification, albeit a radical one, to SDS.11 Some of the proposed changes (e.g., mobility and deceptive basing) posed compliance problems for the ABM Treaty. However, the army insisted that LoADS was a "pre-prototype" program and no final basing mode had been selected. Besides, many components of a

The Evolving

Hedge

55

mobile system could be tested in a fixed land-based mode. It was acknowledged that in order to deploy a mobile LoADS, the ABM Treaty would have to be amended.12 The site defense program of the early 1970s concentrated on intercepting RVs within the earth's atmosphere (endoatmospheric). There was no role for a long-range interceptor like Safeguard's Spartan. SDS, if fully developed, would incorporate a modified version of Safeguard's shorter-range interceptor (Sprint), dubbed Sprint II. In the late 1970s, the twin interceptor design of the Nike-X/Sentinel/Safeguard systems reappeared in the form of a layered defense concept. The exoatmospheric layer (above 300,000 feet) was dubbed "overlay," the endoatmospheric layer (below 150,000 feet) "underlay." A third tier consisting of LoADS, operating in relatively low altitudes (below 30,000 feet), could be incorporated in a layered defense design, but LoADS was being promoted primarily as an option for defending the air force's experimental missile, the MX. 13 The concept of a layered defense was nothing new to military tactics or strategic defense. Work on an exoatmospheric, or midcourse, interceptor goes back to the Nike-Zeus. In the early 1970s, such work continued, first as part of the LAD program, then, after that program's cancellation, under ATP. 14 Cognizant of congressional sentiment toward LAD the army officially deemphasized the area defense capability of this work. When testifying before Congress, BMD program managers were careful to define such work as aiding terminal defenses by thinning the attacking force (i.e., the layered defense concept) and providing some additional capability for defense of unprotected military targets. 15 By 1980, this taboo on discussing LAD roles had been removed. LDS was touted as the prime candidate for "multimission" defense roles and "protection against Nth country attacks"16—in other words, LAD. Another major initiative in the army's BMD program in the latter half of the 1970s was the pursuit of a non-nuclear kill (NNK) interceptor. The difficulty with "hitting a bullet with a bullet" had prompted the army to place nuclear warheads on the early-generation ABM interceptors to provide for wider kill radii. But nuclear-tipped interceptors created many problems for the defense establishment. For example, citizens' concerns over having "bombs in the backyard" helped to spur widespread public protests against deployment of Sentinel. The system's radars were also vulnerable to blackout generated from the explosion of one of its own interceptors, and the quick response needed for defense posed problems for obtaining nuclear release authority. Furthermore, a non-nuclear interceptor would not have to compete for fission fuel with other offensive weapons programs. 17 Because the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibited nuclear detonations in all environments except underground, a non-nuclear ABM would have the additional capability of being tested in an operational mode. The quest for an NNK interceptor led the army to commission Vought Corp. in the mid-1960s to study HIT. 18 The ABM Treaty restricted the

56

Selling

Strategic

Defense

development, testing, and deployment of ABM interceptor rockets with multiple warheads, so officially the HIT program dropped designs incorporating multiple interceptors on a single booster after the treaty was ratified. However, the multiple-warhead concept continued to be considered by some BMD supporters as a cost-effective way for an NNK interceptor to deal with MERVs (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles). For example, in September 1979, a secret report of the Defense Science Board's Task Force on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense stated that multiple NNK warheads were an "attractive strategy, but will require a change to the ABM treaty."19 Development, fabrication, and testing of a "pre-prototype" exoatmospheric NNK interceptor was carried out under HOE. Initiated in fiscal year 1977, HOE accounted for over 30 percent of the funding for STP by fiscal year 1980.20 The army's fiscal year 1981 budget request slotted 46 percent of STP for HOE, with an additional 39 percent of ATP going for exoatmospheric defense.21 The army's BMD program during the late 1970s did not lack critics. One of the most conceited attacks came from the General Accounting Office. In a report to Congress September 1, 1978, the GAO recommended that the Department of Defense stop or suspend system concept work (i.e., SDS and upgrades, LoADS for mobile ICBMs, and LDS) because "1) requirements for this system-oriented work have not been defined and 2) serious technological problems must be solved first." 22 These concerns were reiterated in a March 1979 letter to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown from J. H. Stolarow (director of the GAO) arguing that "until the MX program uncertainty is eliminated and the need for an active MX defense is established," work on an active MX defense should be stopped.23 In response, the aimy, along with the DOD, argued that such work was not a prototype aimed at a specific system design. Rather, the efforts focused on "subsystems and components" in order to understand certain problems involved in system integration and reduce the lead time to deployment should U.S. policymakers exercise the option to deploy an active defense. 24 Nevertheless, a considerable amount of the program funding was going toward system engineering development.25 Another GAO report criticized the LoADS program as "not being designed to meet the responsive threat." 26 The report did acknowledge that "LoAD, if it can be developed to operate effectively, appears to be an economical way of assuring MX's survivability against threat levels exceeding the constraints of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II Treaty." 27 However, the projected "threat levels" (i.e., potential attacking RVs) where LoADS became an economical option were so great as to be highly improbable. As William J. Perry, then undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, testified, the stage at which BMD becomes cost-effective for defending MX occurs only "in a virtually incredible all-out arms race in which arms limitations had long since gone by the boards." (Emphasis added.)28

The Evolving

Hedge

57

Credibility aside, Perry went on to offer his lackluster support for continued work in this area. 29 Other DOD components, such as the air force and Joint Chiefs of Staff, officially supported the army's BMD program too. Yet many defense officials questioned the necessity of an active defense, especially if it threatened their own prized programs. 30 Aside from providing an option against such nightmarish threats, an active U.S. BMD program was seen by many within the government as an incentive for the Soviets to adhere to the ABM Treaty and engage in further arms control agreements. 31 This reiterated justification reflects a common circularity in U.S. discourse related to arms acquisition and arms control. More than being just a bargaining chip, the pursuit of new armament is said to demonstrate a nation's resolve to maintain a technological lead. Moreover, this conviction is enhanced by a belief that technological advantage will somehow force the opposing nation into arms control. But the logic is circular: In a competitive environment, arms may stimulate arms races as well as arms control. Another rationale—to provide a quick response to Soviet abrogation of the ABM Treaty—gave the army and the defense industry the justification for pushing successive BMD concepts to advanced levels of development with the view of being ready to move into full-scale engineering development and deployment if the opportunity should arise. Such advanced development inevitably increased the political pressure to proceed to production and deployment. With congressional resistance weakening, the army's BMD program returned to multifunctional systems that could be justified as point or area defenses. The configuration of SDS in the early 1970s made it difficult for BMD opponents to claim (as they had in the 1960s) that the army was attempting to slip a "thick" area defense in the back door. The return of layered defense again raised questions as to the program's ultimate purpose.

Seeing Star Wars In 1977, Americans flocked to movie theaters to see Star Wars, a film depicting a fictional struggle between an evil empire and a rebel alliance. The rebels' challenge in this episode was to destroy the empire's newly constructed "death star," a space-based battle station with the power to destroy a planet. Meanwhile, in the military laboratories of the United States and the Soviet Union, designs and technology for orbiting battle stations were being actively developed. Although less grandiose than the fictional death star, the parallel was picked up by the popular media. "Death beams" and warfare in space, which used to be popularly referred to as Buck Rogers weaponry, increasingly was labeled "Star Wars." Ten years had passed since the first high-energy laser was demonstrated

58

Selling

Strategic

Defense

by AVCO scientists. During that time, the Department of Defense spent nearly $1 billion in pursuit of HEL weapons. This figure does not include HEL funding through other government agencies, such as the DOE and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as well as independent R&D funding by defense contractors. In fiscal year 1980, the DOE was spending approximately $200 million on laser research; NASA funding ran another $6 million.32 HEL funding for fiscal years 1978 through 1981 and for prior years is provided in Table 4.1. The bulk of DOD funding continued to come from the air force, although its fiscal predominance in the field was being challenged by the early 1980s by DARPA. In fiscal year 1981, for example, the air force and DARPA each accounted for roughly a third of the HEL budget; the army and navy together made up the final third. However, because many of DARPA's contracts are coordinated and/or administered largely by the services, the agency's challenge was more apparent than real. The shift also reflected a transition away from an emphasis on tactical HEL applications (e.g., the tri-service lasers) toward strategic applications, especially spacebased lasers for space defense. Funding for particle beam weaponry was minuscule in comparison with DOD's HEL funding. (See Table 4.2.) However, as with HEL funding, it is hazardous to attribute a particular level of effort based on Pentagon funding alone. Accelerator technology was funded for a variety of purposes, and other government agencies supported research into many areas of this technology, sometimes under joint sponsorship with the DOD. 33 And Pentagon officials continually attempted to get DOE to fund more research in this area.34 Taken together (HELs and particle beams), funding for directed energy weapons continued to increase in the latter half of the 1970s, albeit at a much slower rate than early in the decade. The temporary dip in HEL funding for fiscal year 1981 marked a transition toward greater centralization and guidance. Earlier programs were winding down, and new candidate technologies were being emphasized. 35 Nevertheless, by fiscal year 1980, total funding of $224.7 million for DOD directed energy weapons (DEWs) was comparable to the combined dedicated BMD budget (STP and ATP) of $234.4 million.36 Both programs (DEW and BMD) were primed for funding increases in the early 1980s. BMD program managers in the late-1970s recognized the potential of DEWs to revolutionize BMD; they at the same time acknowledged the high risk nature of the technology. 37 A thorough understanding of the BMD potential of DEWs was also considered necessary for assessing the Soviet program in this area.38 In view of these factors, the army's BMDO continued to fund DEWs at relatively modest levels (5.5 percent of ATP, 2.7 percent of ATP and STP in fiscal year 1980). The BMD Advanced Technology Center funded exploratory studies in particle beam technology and various types of lasers, including free-electron lasers (FELs). 39 This nominal investment

The Evolving Hedge

Table 4.1

59

D O D HEL Funding, Fiscal Years 1978-1981 and Prior (Current dollars, in millions)

Agency

Prior

FY78

FY79

FY80

FY81

Army

40.2

13.7

17.3

20.3

18.8

Navy

216.9

33.2

33.8

35.3

38.3

USAF

362.1

87.4

100.9

91.2

70.6

DARPA

208.1

23.3

30.8

48.8

64.0

Total

927.3

157.6

182.8

195.6

191.7

Sources: Figures for fiscal year 1978, fiscal year 1979, and prior from U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Laser Technology—Development and Applications, p. 86. Fiscal year 1980 and fiscal year 1981 figures are from U.S. Comptroller General, DOD's Space-Based Laser Program—Potential, Progress, and Problems, p. 5.

Table 4 2

D O D Funding for Particle Beam Weaponry, Fiscal Years 1978-1980 and Prior (Current dollars, in millions)

Project (Agency)

Prior

FY78

FY79

FY80 a

Seesaw (DARPA) Chair Heritage (Navy 74-78, DARPA 79+) White Horse (Army ATC) Autoresonant Accelerator (Army ATC) Radlacb (USAF)

27.0 14.1

7.1

12.0

24.0

2.3

2.0

2.0

2.4

2.1

1.8

2.3

1.7

0.5

0.8

0.9

1.0

Total

46.0

11.7

17.2

29.1

Source: HASC, Department of Defense Authorization For Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, p. 2764. a Requested 15 Jointly sponsored by DOE's Sandia Laboratory and the Air Force Weapons Laboratory. Only air force funding is shown.

allowed the BMDO to concentrate funds on more near-term technologies while maintaining a hedge against the chance of a breakthrough in DEW technologies. The army was also able to keep abreast of developments by actively monitoring DEW programs funded by other services and government agencies.40 The army's BMD Advanced Technology Center was interested in these technologies not just as a potential means for replacing the ABM interceptor

60

Selling

Strategic

Defense

but also for their ability to substitute for other components of the B M D mission, such as sensors.41 Nevertheless, the major focus was on the possible use of D E W s to intercept and destroy missiles (or missile components) in flight. T o this end, the B M D Advanced Technology Center supported and monitored HEL programs studying the laser effects on various materials, especially those used in the construction of I C B M reentry vehicles.42 Research on laser vulnerability effects provided an interesting twist in the evolution of the technology. Some of the laser work in the mid-1960s that led to the breakthrough at A V C O was commissioned to test the designs of warheads by simulating the high temperatures involved in reentry. A similar development occurred in particle beam technology, with some of the early work at Sandia National Laboratory designed to simulate warhead vulnerability to high-energy radiation effects.43 As advances were attained, the devices creating the simulations began to look like plausible weapons. By far the largest effort in developing a space-based HEL weapon was D A R P A ' s work under the space defense program. D A R P A ' s HEL effort concentrated on developing the key technologies for a space-based laser weapon system. The program, known as the Space Laser Triad, was divided into three parts: Project Alpha would develop the space-based laser. The large optics needed for focusing the laser beam would be developed under L O D E (large optics demonstration experiment). The precise pointing and tracking technology required would be developed under Talon Gold. 44 Both the army and air force were interested in an HEL device—the army for the B M D implications, the air force for the possibilities for space defense (i.e., AS A T technology). Charged-particle beam weapons for endoatmospheric applications still had to demonstrate that a beam could be stably propagated through the atmosphere. The experimental test accelerator ( E T A ) and the advanced test accelerator ( A T A ) , funded under Chair Heritage and built at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, would have to demonstrate this capability before charged-particle beam weapons could claim a larger share of the D E W budget. This was not the case for neutral-particle beams. By the mid-1970s, scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory ( L A N L ) had demonstrated the feasibility of propagating a neutral-particle beam in a straight line in space.45 After Los Alamos scientists in 1974 briefed D A R P A on this development, agency officials in effect informed the army that it should be interested.46 Picking up the cue, the B M D Advanced Technology Center began funding the neutral-particle beam work at Los Alamos under a new program initially called Sipapu, later renamed White Horse.47 The other major particle beam program supported by B M D funds was the autoresonant accelerator ( A R A ) , developed by Austin Research Associates. The goal of the project was to demonstrate the feasibility of producing a high-energy proton beam for endoatmospheric weapons applications.48

The Evolving

Hedge

61

Although some other work was proceeding in this area, it was not focused toward military applications. By linking its work to the controversy surrounding the claim that the Soviets were on the verge of deploying a beam weapon, Austin Research won a higher level of funding than did other similar programs.49 As D E W research developed, an interdepartmental struggle ensued over management control of the various D O D programs. Under pressure from Congress, the DOD in early 1979 established the Office of Directed Energy Technology within the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology. 50 Dr. Richard J. Airey, the new office's first head, had a background in HELs and had previously worked in the field at A V C O and the Naval Research Center.51 The office was intended to provide guidance to the various D E W programs funded through the DOD. Congress also mandated that the D O D budget requests for DEWs be consolidated by fiscal year 1981.52 In the same year, Congress gave D A R P A primary responsibility for developing the technology for space-based lasers and particle beam weapons.53 Although the army's B M D particle beam programs (White Horse and A R A ) were transferred to D A R P A , the army continued to serve as the agent for D A R P A in monitoring and contracting the work. 54 Similarly, the navy remained involved with the charged-particle beam program, with the other services monitoring its progress for potential applications to their missions.55 The official reason given for the transfer of management control was that a mission-oriented focus was not warranted at the time.56 However, another possible factor was the perception by particle beam advocates that the navy was not giving the program enough emphasis and that some senior navy officials were downright antagonistic toward it.57 Other proponents of the program worried that DARPA's earlier experience with Seesaw had soured officials on charged-particle beam weapons and that D A R P A and D O D officials would cut funding for particle beam programs.58 Some also claimed that those in charge of the particle beam work were mostly "laser people." 59 When D A R P A did try to cut back the particle beam program, the services stepped in to save their pet projects.60 Congress showed its support for the technology by adding an additional $8.3 million to the administration's fiscal year 1981 request for charged-particle beam research, with particular emphasis placed on the A R A and the navy's pulsed power project.61 Exotic technologies may be alluring, but they lack an institutionalized base and thus their political fortunes are less assured than those for traditional programs. An odd mix of motivations and potential applications supports these novel technologies in their struggle to sustain funding. As previously noted, many of the DEW programs were at the level of exploratory research and aimed at developing component technologies rather than at designing a weapon specifically for a particular mission. Nevertheless, one scientist with a long history in defense matters maintains

62

Selling Strategic

Defense

that even exploratory research is constrained by some idea of what the final application might be: "You don't go looking at how to build a ninety-foot ladder without some idea as to why ninety feet and not one hundred feet or fifty feet." 62 In the early stages of research, potential applications might best be described as a "laundry list." Another scientist involved with the work on particle beams explained: There was an idea—either charged-particle beams or neutral-particle beams—and what were possible applications. There were lists of what were possible applications. And really that was about all they were. In the case of charged-particle beams, that may be a little harsh. The navy had thought quite a bit about theirs. The ASAT versus B M D for NPB? Both were discussed, and I don't think you could say that one had more power or prestige than the other. 63

Additionally, not all those involved in this research were motivated primarily by potential weapons applications. According to Edward Knapp, who pioneered the early work on neutral-particle beams at Los Alamos, his group was initially oriented toward medical applications, such as radiation for the treatment of cancer, with some work on fusion development.64 Another scientist involved with the program saw the motivation as more generic: Robert Jameson felt the Accelerator Technology Division (the name eventually given to Knapp's group) was set up to build accelerators for anyone needing them—the main motivation was to build a better accelerator. To do this the scientists were willing to tackle all kinds of projects.65 Reflecting on the search for sustained funding, another scientist with a long history in laser research noted: "All new technologies have a crowd of people following behind with a stack of view graphs saying that X will solve Y. You just have to fill in the blanks." 66 The audience and the political climate may dictate whether one application may provide a better funding opportunity than another. In the weapons acquisition process, as in life, some opportunities just happen, others are made. To sustain their pet projects, weapons sponsors must be prepared for the former while attempting the latter.

The Lure of Space It has long been recognized that a space-based BMD system that could intercept attacking ICBMs while they were still in their boost phase would give the defense a great advantage. Besides creating an additional layer of defenses, such a system offers enormous advantages in an era of MIRVs by destroying a missile before it has released its multiple warheads—an achievement that nets the defender the elimination of ten or more warheads,

The Evolving

Hedge

63

as well as perhaps hundreds of decoys designed to saturate later defenses. However, such concepts had in the past faced practical limitations.67 In the mid- to late 1970s, military interests and technological limitations converged to concentrate attention on basing DEWs in space. Increasing military reliance on space-based assets, planning for limited nuclear war, and Soviet testing of an anti-satellite device induced the air force and many defense analysts to call for quicker development of space defenses and ASAT weapons. In addition, the space shuttle would soon be operational and would bring with it new possibilities for the militarization of space.68 Transmitting the energy generated by a beam weapon to a target— commonly referred to as "propagation"—has been a major obstacle for the development of an effective DEW. Within the earth's atmosphere, a laser beam may be attenuated from a variety of atmospheric processes (such as thermal blooming) and turbulence. 69 The vacuum of space would ease the problem of transmitting thermal energy over long distances. For these as well as other reasons,70 Pentagon officials began seriously to study orbiting laser weapons. Propagation was an even greater problem for charged-particle beam weapons. Even in the vacuum of space, charged-particle beams would not propagate in a straight line because of the earth's magnetic forces. In contrast, a neutral-particle beam (NPB) could theoretically travel great distances in space and deposit its energy within a target. 71 Thus, the White Horse program aimed at basing an NPB weapon in space. The prospect of easing or eliminating the propagation problem gave rise to the possibility for a near-term deployment of a space-based HEL or NPB weapon. However, space basing would be no panacea for DEWs—in fact it creates more problems than it solves. Launching heavy payloads into orbit is quite costly. Such systems would have to require little maintenance over long periods of time. Space-based systems could be easily tracked, making them tempting targets at the onset of a battle. Many active and passive countermeasures could be developed that may prove to be more cost-effective than compensatory actions by the defense. 72 Still, the increasing military interest in space, coupled with a natural environment for transmitting energy over long distances, helped focus DEW research on the heavens.

The Soviet Connection Perhaps the atomic bomb's greatest legacy to the arms race is the perpetuation of the belief in a "winning weapon." 73 The dynamism of this legacy rests in both fear and hope: the fear that "they" will discover the winning weapon first, and the hope that "we" will. These emotions are exacerbated by a powerful anti-Soviet ideology among many members of the defense community.

64

Selling

Strategic

Defense

One persistent rationale for preserving a well-funded U.S. BMD program following the ABM Treaty was to facilitate intelligence on what the Soviets were up to in the same area. Researchers in BMD-related technologies maintained close contact with the intelligence community. As explained by General Jones, BMD program manager (August 1976-October 1977): "We [BMDO] have interfaced very closely with the Missile Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, in attempting to understand what the Soviets are doing, by making available to MIA and DIA our technology and the approaches we are taking."74 Indeed, the army's BMDO and MIA are both located in Huntsville, Alabama. Technologists also participate in literature reviews of Soviet research. One forum for this involvement is the Foreign Applied Sciences Assessment Center (FASAC), operated by Science Applications International Corporation in McLean, Virginia. FASAC gathers information on Soviet research, translates the material, and provides it to technical experts for review.75 Another interconnection involves the science advisory structure of the Pentagon, where scientists from the defense community sit on boards called upon to review technical intelligence. A relevant example of this interaction was the Defense Science Board Task Force on Soviet Missile Defense that met in 1978.76 Incorporating scientists into the intelligence review process may assuage or exacerbate fears. The result of the review is often ambiguous enough to allow more subjective factors (e.g., ideological inclinations) to play a major role in the assessment—or the assessment of the assessment. 77 Some are consoled by what they find, others alarmed, but the close contact between the scientific community and the intelligence community nevertheless provides a source of ideas. The development of U.S. particle beam weapons programs provides several examples of the exchange of ideas between competitors in a high-tech arms race. There had been long-standing international cooperation and interchange on high-energy physics research in the postwar period,78 with Soviet and U.S. scientists often visiting the facilities in each other's countries and having few doors barred to them.79 The Soviets had done a lot of research in particle beam technology, a great deal of which had been published. 8 0 However, the competitive and distrustful environment surrounding the arms race gave discoveries an ominous pallor. What U.S. scientists learned about certain aspects of Soviet particle beam research spurred or spawned research in the development of at least three of the major U.S. particle beam projects: White Horse, RADLAC, and ARA. White

Horse

A space-based NPB weapon required technological advances in several component technologies to determine feasibility. The mid-1970s brought some-

The Evolving

Hedge

65

thing of a revolution in high-energy ion sources (a necessary component of a particle accelerator), much of it driven by work done in the Soviet Union by a Soviet scientist, V. G. Dudnikov.81 The Soviet connection was also critical in developing another component technology for the White Horse project. While attending a conference in Canada, Edward Knapp (director of the Accelerator Technology Division at Los Alamos, the group developing the space-based NPB weapon for the army) met a Czech scientist who had been educated in the Soviet Union and who later defected to Canada. He expressed his desire to work in the United States and Knapp was able to offer him a one-year appointment at LANL. While at Los Alamos, the Czech mentioned some work the Soviets were doing on a concept using a radio frequency quadrupole (RFQ) for accelerating and focusing ions as it injects them into the main accelerator. The concept, if proved feasible, would be much simpler, smaller, and less costly than the injectors then being used. 82 These characteristics were crucial for a space-based system. Many at the lab questioned whether what he was saying was possible. Still, according to Robert Jameson, a scientist with the Accelerator Technology Division, the Los Alamos group was really primed for something new. After a briefing by the Czech scientist, Jameson felt there must be something to the claim. Jameson pressed the Czech, who actually had only one paper on the topic, and then followed up with a literature search that uncovered more material. Three years later the LANL team put a beam through an RFQ in a proof-ofprinciple experiment.83 The Soviets were quite sensitive about the U.S. scientists capitalizing on their work. Knapp was not allowed into the Soviet Union for several years, and when Jameson went back for a visit, he was denied access to areas he had previously visited. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, there was little scientific exchange occurring anyway. RADLAC The discovery by a U.S. scientist of Soviet work in pulsed power accelerator technology led to a new direction for it in the United States and raised concerns within certain elements of the intelligence community as to the possibility the Soviets were developing a beam weapon.84 The prospect of producing energetic electron beams was well known by the mid-1960s.85 At that time, the military became interested in simulating the effects on RVs of high levels of radiation, like those that might be produced from a nuclear tipped ABM.86 Programs were initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission (later the Department of Energy) and the Department of Defense. One result of this work was the Hermes II device built at Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico. In 1972, scientists at Sandia proposed "the application of pulsed power drivers to ICF" (inertial confinement fusion—imploding fusion pellets for

66

Selling Strategic

Defense

energy applications).87 This proposal eventually led to the development at Sandia of the particle beam fusion accelerators (PBFAI and II). While working on this technology, Gerald Yonas, director of pulsed energy sciences at Sandia National Laboratory (1972-1984), stumbled onto some papers in the open literature revealing that Soviet scientists were developing a new use for pulse power technology. A 1974 paper by A. I. Pavlovskiy described the concept of the Pavlovskiy radio pulsar.88 This is the way one Sandia scientist described the discovery of Pavlovskiy's work: Essentially what they [the Soviets] had done is to develop similar pulse power technology to what Sandia had done for fusion, but what he [Pavlovskiy] had done was connect the pulse power modules in series. So instead of delivering a lot of current to a fusion pellet, he was delivering a lot of voltage to electrons. And Gerry [Yonas] asked himself, essentially, what in the world could this be for? And it looked like it was probably defensive applications of directed energy research.89

The discovery of Pavlovskiy's work definitely opened some eyes in the intelligence community, but it also stimulated new interest among scientists working in the field and sparked new military interest in particle beam weapons. Under a collaborative program between Sandia National Laboratory and the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, U.S. scientists began developing a radio linear induction accelerator based upon the earlier work on pulsed power modules, but the new configuration called for the modules to be connected in series. The program became known as RADLAC. Its second generation, RADLACII, was used in 1985 in experiments at the AFWL Directed Energy Experimental Range, south of Albuquerque, to test the propagation of an electron beam in the atmosphere—a critical achievement for assessing potential defensive applications.90 Autoresonant

Accelerator

(ARA)

A major factor in funding the ARA project was the need to support certain claims made about what the Soviets were doing in this area. In the early 1970s, General George Keegan, chief of USAF intelligence, came to believe that the Soviets were on the verge of building a charged-particle beam weapon for BMD. His specific claims—about a particular Soviet site at Semipalatinsk and the near-term deployment of such a beam weapon—were widely disputed in the defense and intelligence communities.91 According to one account, two of Keegan's principal supporters were Steve Williams, an interpreter for the USAF Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson AFB, and William Drummond, a physicist at the University of Texas.92 One of the component technologies the Soviets would have had to solve in order to corroborate Keegan's claims involved the development of an

The Evolving Hedge

67

efficient collective accelerator necessary to accelerate subatomic particles to high velocities. Drummond and another scientist, W. L. Sloan, convinced the Texas defense establishment that they had the solution to what the Soviets were doing at Semipalatinsk (referred to as "PNUTS," possible nuclear underground test site).93 Austin Research Associates, a private company with which Drummond and Sloan were associated, received a proof-of-principle contract to demonstrate the feasibility of the ARA concept. William Perry Clements, Jr., governor of Texas (1979-1983) and a former deputy secretary of defense (1973-1977), played an important role in keeping the program going.94 Clements was quite proud that Texas scientists had solved the PNUTS mystery. Coincidentally, Sloan happened to have been in Clements's scout troop when Clements was a troop leader many years before. After hearing Sloan was involved in the ARA work, the governor was adamant about seeing the effort continued.95 The project eventually ran into some problems and subsequently died in the early 1980s. According to one scientist familiar with the controversy, the work at Austin Research Associates had no apparent link to PNUTS. 96 Nevertheless, by making that connection, Sloan and Drummond were able to get a higher level of funding than were other similar programs.97 These three examples illustrate the complex dynamics of a high-tech arms race involving the clandestine and open interchange of ideas between competitors. The various applications, both military and non-military, of many new technologies make the intentions underlying a competitor's research ambiguous—a confusion that may spur new research aimed at supporting rival claims regarding the end use of an opponent's research. Of course, many military scientists are also motivated by patriotism, convinced that their work might be critical for the security of their nation. But the issue here is that in an antagonistic competition like an arms race, the tendency of one side to perform a worst-case analysis of the other side's actions may provide a funding opportunity for research not supported elsewhere. In addition, covert and overt technological interchange between opponents may be a source of innovation for many scientists. Interconnections between the intelligence and technical communities act as a source of new ideas and provide an additional dynamic to a technological arms race. On the one hand, this dynamic relationship stimulates hope. On the other hand, such discoveries may often induce fear. BMD sponsors played on both of these emotions in promoting exotic BMD schemes in the late 1970s.

Gaps and Gangs: Sponsoring Exotic BMD Force comparisons between adversaries are inevitable in an arms race. However, such comparisons often resort to static measures of force structure

68

Selling

Strategic

Defense

that do not necessarily reflect military advantage,98 an ambiguity that allows the data to serve particular interests. Proponents of a greater defense effort are likely to emphasize weapons "gaps" that show the other side in the lead. Proclamations of gaps stem from parochial as well as patriotic motives, and opportunities and anxieties intermix in this political process. The late 1970s was no exception to claims of weapons gaps, among them the "ASAT gap," the "civil defense gap," and the "heavy-missile gap." These gaps were not irrelevant to the promotion of BMD—they were linked through assessments of vulnerability, similar technology, and/or strategy— but the most significant gap in the BMD context was the "beam gap." The Beam

Gap

As mentioned previously, chief of USAF intelligence General Keegan became alarmed in the early 1970s about the possibility that the Soviets were ahead in the race to develop a charged-particle beam weapon. If successful, the weapon would be used, according to Keegan, "to destroy ballistic missiles in flight for an ultimate defense of the Soviet Union against U.S. Missile retaliatory capability." 99 By his own account, "a young Air Force civilian scientist" made him aware of the possibility the Soviets were working on such a strategic weapon. 100 Together with a group of "young physicists," Keegan began gathering evidence to support his theory, and he spent much of his last two years in USAF intelligence trying to convince the rest of the intelligence community about PNUTS. The acronym referred to the site near Semipalatinsk and meant possible nuclear underground test site.101 Keegan's PNUTS theory involved the explosion of a small nuclear device to generate a giant electrical pulse that in turn would be used to produce electron beams with very high current levels.102 Few in the intelligence and scientific communities doubted that the Soviets were actively pursuing work in exotic technologies with possible defensive uses. However, many took issue with the specific claims Keegan made concerning the purpose of a particular research site located near Semipalatinsk. Additionally, there was strong disagreement over Keegan's claim that the Soviets were "twenty years" ahead of the United States in this technology.103 Within the government, the PNUTS theory was rejected by the Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the Munitions Panel of the Air Force Science Advisory Board, and the CIA's Nuclear Intelligence Panel, among others.104 According to two scientists who served on more than one of these reviews, the evidence was either too weak or too ambiguous to support Keegan's claim.105 Keegan and his supporters asserted that many of these scientists rejected his theory simply because they refused to believe that the Soviets could succeed where they had failed.106 However, Keegan and his group could be accused of similar arrogance—

The Evolving

Hedge

69

conviction that they were right and the others wrong caused them to go outside normal channels. After his retirement in January 1977, Keegan joined fellow Team B members William Van Cleave and General Daniel Graham (USA ret.) as a member of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength (an organization formed by the American Security Council to coordinate a campaign against SALT). 1 0 7 In March of that year, speaking to a gathering of journalists under the auspices of the American Security Council, Keegan went public with his P N U T S theory. 108 Less than two months later, Aviation Week & Space Technology ran a special story concerning Keegan's claims that touched off a storm of public debate in the national media. By circumventing normal channels and selling his theory to his "old boy network," Keegan ended up polarizing the intelligence and defense science communities. 109 Ten years after Keegan went public with his theory, the mention of PNUTS was still raising some hackles. For the true believers, the development of beam weapons portends the obsolescence of the current nuclear arsenals.110 From a nationalistic perspective, this prospect appears both threatening and heartening. Keegan's campaign focused on the threatening aspects—the fear that the other side will develop "it" first. Meanwhile, another group of "Beams for B M D " proponents campaigned on the opposite theme—the hope the United States could achieve such a breakthrough first and establish a "Pax Americana" on earth.

The Gang of Four In the fall of 1977, Maxwell W. Hunter II, an aeronautical engineer at Lockheed where much of the early conceptual work on space-based lasers was being performed, wrote a short paper titled "Strategic Dynamics and SpaceLaser Weaponry."111 Hunter's study concentrated on what he perceived as the revolutionary potential for space-based lasers, although he did mention the possibility of using particle beams as well. Like many B M D supporters, Hunter derided the concept of M A D , claiming that its adoption by the United States led to actions continually ensuring that "we are, and are known to be, defenseless." He described this approach as a static strategy heedless of the dynamic that technological advances impose on strategy (hence his title).112 Hunter claimed that advances in laser technology and space transportation offered the only "potentially decisive" new strategic concept to come along in decades.113 He went on to assert that space-based lasers "can stop a full-scale ballistic missile attack with little damage to the defended area for a reasonable cost." 114 But for him the implications of lasers in space went well beyond "merely" BMD: If such weapons could be developed to penetrate the atmosphere, they could be applied in tactical situations "throughout the globe," creating a "Pax Americana, with an effectiveness and flexibility never dreamed of in the centuries of Pax Brittannia [sic]."115

70

Selling

Strategic

Defense

Hunter sent his paper to "a few key defense planners and federal officials," but little happened excepting a "small sensation." 116 Hunter suspected his vision would engender bureaucratic resistance because spacebased lasers would render many current weapons systems obsolete. 117 Curiously, the political reaction in Washington was not sparked by Hunter's vision of American empire; rather, his proposal challenged entrenched bureaucratic interests—other weapons systems were first in line. According to one account, H. Alan Pike, at the time deputy director of the HEL space defense program at DARPA, wanted to speed things up.118 He got together with Angelo Codevilla, then a staffer on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and an aide to Senator Malcolm Wallop (RWyoming) who served on the Intelligence Committee. Together they rounded up Maxwell Hunter of Lockheed, Gerald Oulette of Draper Laboratories, Joseph Miller of TRW, and Norbert Schnog of Perkin Elmer. Each of these four was an expert in a particular component technology needed to put together a space-based laser: Miller in chemical lasers; Schnog, optics; Oulette, controls; and Hunter, system engineering. They went to work and put together a system that could conceivably be put up in a relatively short time (4-8 years).119 These four then went to Capitol Hill to lobby for their proposal. Senator Wallop and Angelo Codevilla made arrangements for Hunter and his group to brief senators and their staff. On December 11, 1979, a practice briefing was set up with about ten congressional aides and five senators attending.120 The following day, a senators-only briefing was held. According to Codevilla, of the fifteen senators in attendance, several reacted favorably.121 Direct marketing on the Hill without the concurrence of the military services is frowned upon at the Department of Defense. Across the river at the Pentagon, the group quickly became known as the Gang of Four. Reaction to the gang's presentation started immediately. But the worst was yet to come. According to one account, the Gang of Four stepped "into a mine field" when it briefed two army generals from BMDO. Upset over these civilians "poaching on their turf," the generals, according to Hunter, "tried to kiU all four of us." 122 Although they had acted as private citizens and not representatives of the corporations with which they were affiliated, pressure was put on top executives of these firms to muzzle the Gang of Four.123 William A. Davis, Jr., deputy program manager of BMD, was reported to have pressured the president of Lockheed, Robert Fuhrman, to put the squeeze on Hunter. Davis felt that the gang's presentation could threaten then current BMD programs such as HOE, of which Lockheed was the prime contractor. According to one participant, Davis even threatened Fuhrman with cancellation of contracts.124 Oulette left Draper Lab under similar pressure. 125 Miller, who had been moving up fast at TRW, in the words of one scientist, "got stalled."126 The counterattack was not just "back-room" pressure. As one scientist

The Evolving Hedge

71

quipped, the Gang of Four episode prompted "a study a year until it was put back in the box." 127 Seymour Zeiberg, then deputy undersecretary of defense for research and engineering (strategic and space systems), commissioned Victor Reis to study the space laser BMD concept. The study was highly critical of the gang's proposal. 128 In October 1980, the Senate Armed Services Committee requested the secretary of defense to produce a report on space-based lasers. 129 On March 5, 1981, the Defense Science Board was commissioned to review the draft of the "DOD Study on Space-Based Laser Weapons." 130 The board's task force, every member of which "has been a strong supporter of the U.S. laser weapon program," recommended against saddling the current space-based laser effort with the more stressing mission requirements of BMD. 1 3 1 The controversy instigated by proponents of near-term acceleration and BMD applications of the DOD space-laser program caused John Foster, chairman of the task force—and no enemy to either BMD or HELs—to comment: "Occasionally programs like this one are endangered as much by their advocates as by their enemies." 132 In support of the Gang of Four's proposal, a "laser lobby" formed in the Senate centered around Senator Wallop. Under the tutelage of Max Hunter and Alan Pike, Wallop wrote an article published in the fall 1979 issue of Strategic Review titled "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense." 133 Wallop also began recruiting senators to his cause, among them Senator Howell Heflin (D-Alabama) who held a hearing on laser technology in December 1979. 134 Wallop also proposed several amendments calling for additional funding for space lasers. 135 According to one key player in the laser lobby, much of its initial success was "simply because no elected official feels comfortable voting against any proposal that can be described, fairly or not, as protecting his constituents' lives." 136 The Gang o/35 1 3 7 Particle beam weapons were not without advocates, but they were less successful than laser proponents in raising interest within the military and defense industry. One scientist felt the "particle beam guys" were "a bit jealous of the laser folks." 138 Largely at the instigation of Edward Chapin of Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Particle Beam Technology Study Group was formed under the sponsorship of Ruth Davis, undersecretary of defense for research and advanced technology, in the fall of 1978. 139 The group brought together scientists from government and industry to investigate the critical issues in particle beam technology and propose a national five-year program. By early spring 1979, the members had completed their review. Known in the Pentagon as the "Gang of 35," the group proposed a $315 million five-year particle beam weapons technology development program. 140 This

72

Selling

Strategic

Defense

funding was substantially greater than current budget projections for the technology. 141 However, the group did conclude that a "crash national effort is not warranted at this time." (Emphasis in original.) 142 Within the Department of Defense, however, the Gang of 35's five-year plan never got off the ground. 143 For one thing, particle beam technology lacked the industrial constituency that laser technology had. And until the particle beam proponents could demonstrate that a particle beam could be accurately directed, they would be hard-pressed to win converts in DOD or industry. Whether one sees these individuals as Don Quixotes or Galileos is largely a matter of faith. As described in the Defense Science Board's review of the DOD's space-laser study, such technologies exist in the "presence of great uncertainty." 144 This uncertainty often leads to highly emotional debates concerning scientific analysis of potentially novel military technology. The debate over near-term BMD applications of DEWs was reminiscent of the emotional debates concerning the Sentinel and Safeguard ABMs in the 1960s. Because many assumptions must be highly speculative, either side may accuse the other of erecting straw men and of trouncing professional standards of objectivity. Demonstrating one's claims becomes a difficult and often treacherous enterprise in such an atmosphere.145 The ensuing controversy surrounding these gaps and gangs polarized the U.S. scientific community in the latter half of the 1970s. Some saw exotic BMD as a technological savior, others as a chimera—and still others believed the technologies were simply too premature to be tied to one potential application over another. These divisive sentiments made it difficult to imbue the programs with the sense of urgency advocated by sponsors of futuristic missile defenses. 146 Furthermore, for some within the defense policy network, the actions of the individuals instigating these gaps and gangs were seen as aberrant behavior. It was not so much that they were technically wrong (e.g., the Gang of Four) or totally off-track (e.g., Keegan) as it was that they went against the system. By marketing their ideas directly to the Congress and the media, without the concurrence of the uniform services or high-level executives, they broke some unwritten rules. Therefore, part of the wrath they incurred was aimed at putting these issues "back in the box." More precisely, the response of the military-industrial complex was to place these concepts back in their proper ranking according to predominant bureaucratic and industrial interests. However, the limited success of the sponsors of exotic BMD in promoting their particular programs obscures what they did in effect achieve. They helped breathe new life into the Soviet threat by advocating yet another "potentially decisive" weapons system that the United States must be first to develop and deploy or else face dire consequences. They also refocused the

The Evolving

Hedge

73

mission applications of these technologies back to the objectives of Project Defender (i.e., BMD). In this sense, the 1970s held a sort of quiet revolution: In the first part of the decade, the goals of DEWs narrowed from Defender's goals toward more near-term, tactical applications, but later returned to those earlier objectives.

Promoting the Prosaic While some BMD advocates were enamored with futuristic visions of beam weapons in the heavens, others were more down to earth. The army, still the only service charged with BMD, emphasized more prosaic technology. From its perspective, the next generation of ABMs would not be radically different from earlier concepts. The most novel system given considerable attention by BMD officials at the time was the possibility of producing a non-nuclear interceptor by the early 1980s. With less than 6 percent of the BMD budget for future technology going toward directed energy systems, the priorities were clear. The army and its contractors were interested in selling the programs that in their view stood the best chance for early deployment. Still another factor for keeping a low profile in exotic BMD concepts was the ABM Treaty restricting their development. As long as the component technologies were receiving funding for generic or other nonBMD applications, and with the BMD potential of such weapons still highly uncertain, there was little sense in raising treaty implications by having a high-profile program dedicated to developing a beam weapon for BMD. Such a program would have placed constraints on the development and testing of certain system concepts (e.g., space-based) or forced amendment or abrogation of the ABM Treaty.147 In addition, after losing battles with the Congress in the early 1970s over LAD and advanced prototyping, army officials skirted these issues by suggesting options for soft target protection and pre-prototyping. Given this context, it is not surprising that many army officials took a dim view of a gang of civilian scientists running around Congress and talking about a nationwide area defense and full-scale prototype demonstrations of space-based lasers in the early 1980s—these people were a threat to the army's BMD budget. Some level of coordination and support existed between the air force and the army concerning the BMD option for the MX. However, the air force's motivation for this enthusiasm did not necessarily reflect active support for BMD. As Jack Ruina, a former government scientist with a long history in defense matters, explained: "The air force supported the army's efforts in BMD just to get support for MX (or, better, not to create another enemy). But, the air force never liked the idea of the army protecting their missiles."148

74

Selling

Strategic

Defense

In order to help build wider support for strategic defense, BMDO sponsored several seminars between 1978 and 1981. 149 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the National Strategy Information Center, and the Hudson Institute were also active in sponsoring conferences and publishing reports generally supportive of BMD. 150 Many of these symposiums and reports were backed by the army's Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center. 151 On other fronts, several groups were articulating demands for an assortment of BMD options. In January 1980, Senator Pete Domenici (RNew Mexico) made a formal request of Donald Kerr, director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, to conduct a review and assessment of ABM advances since the ABM Treaty. 152 The ensuing report recommended an expanded role for BMD in U.S. strategic posture, claiming that "if the United States installs an anti-ballistic missile system along with reduced but modernized offensive strategic forces, arms limitation appears compatible with both assured destruction and war-fighting deterrence policies."153 R. H. Kupperman, executive director for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, co-authored the Los Alamos BMD report. In the spring of 1981, the center held a forum for disseminating the issues the report raised. 154 Perhaps the most influential policy-planning group in the late 1970s concerned with military issues was the Committee on the Present Danger. 155 Founded in November 1976, it was organized by a group of cold-war Democrats and Republicans who supported a U.S. policy of military containment toward the Soviet Union. 156 Détente was anathema to these individuals. They viewed the post-Vietnam U.S. foreign policy as creating a period of increasing danger. In the CPD's policy statement, the committee declared that "unless decisive steps are taken to alert the nation, and to change the course of its policy, our economic and military capacity will become inadequate to assure peace with security."157 On the issue of strategic weapons, the CPD supported an increased military buildup that included a "reinvigoration" of all U.S. strategic defense programs (i.e., civil, air, and missile defenses). 158 Besides advocating greater armaments, the members also called for changes in doctrine, championing greater emphasis on fighting and "winning" a nuclear war. 159 For this plan, strategic defense becomes indispensable. Corporate

Sponsors

The 1970s showed a major change in the complexion of BMD contractors. As illustrated in Table 4.3, only three of the top twelve BMD contractors at the end of the 1960s (listed by contract value) were among the top twelve by the end of the 1970s. Eight of the top twelve in fiscal 1969 had contracts totaling less than $1 million in fiscal 1980. Western Electric,

The Evolving Hedge

Table 4 3

Top 12 BMD Contractors, Fiscal Years 1969 and 1980 (Dollar values in millions)

Contractor Western Elec. Raytheon MCDAC Martin Marietta General Elec. Texas Instruments Sperry-Rand RCA Motorola Hercules IBM Thiokol Top 12 total ALL

75

$ Value

% Total

616.7 109.0 90.4 70.2 45.3 16.1 15.8 15.1 9.5 8.0 7.6 6.3

59.7 10.6 8.8 6.8 4.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 .9 .8 .7 .6

1010.0 1033.6

97.7 b 100.0

Contractor MCDAC Lockheed MIT Lincoln Boeing Raytheon Teledyne/Brown Martin Marietta Rockwell Int'l SDC General Motors Nichols Research Hughes

FY80 $ Value

% Total

45.3 40.8 16.6 10.9 10.1 9.5 7.9 4.2 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.1

20.1 18.1 7.4 4.8 4.5 4.2 3.5 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.2 .9

156.4 225.6

69.3 b 100.0

Sources: Congressional Quarterly, May 30, 1969, pp. 845-850 (Note: My total for Western Electric is lower than the one listed on page 847. I used the totals given on pages 848-849 and deducted the listed subcontracted amounts from the prime contracts for Westinghouse.); House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, pp. 573-576. a FY69 figures cover 21 months (7/67-4/69). b Percentage totals may not add due to rounding. MCDAC - McDonnell Douglas SDC - System Development Corporation

the number one BMD contractor in the 1960s, had almost left the field entirely. Contract values, although still highly concentrated, were spread more evenly at the end of the decade than at the beginning. Almost 70 percent of the total BMD contract value for fiscal year 1980 was concentrated in the top twelve contractors, compared with more than 97 percent in fiscal year 1969. In all, over 120 separate firms held direct or indirect contracts with the army's BMD program in fiscal 1980.160 Of these contractors, twenty held contracts totaling more than $1 million for fiscal year 1980. McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed (both major contributors to the American Security Council)161 were by far the largest contractors, with contracts totaling $45.3 million and $40.8 million, respectively. The next largest contractor was MIT Lincoln Laboratory with $16.6 million. However, for some of the smaller contractors, BMD contracts could account for a large share of their total revenues.162 The dominance of McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed resulted largely from their primary roles in the army's two major BMD programs at the end of the 1970s—McDonnell Douglas for LoADS and Lockheed for HOE. All

76

Selling Strategic

Defense

the major contractors for the SDS program were major contractors for LoADS. McDonnell Douglas had the primary system engineering role for both systems. Martin Marietta Corporation was scheduled to supply the interceptor for both systems, but congressional restrictions forced cancellation of the SDS interceptor. General Electric developed the radar for SDS, a modified version of which was selected for use in LoADS.163 The evolution from SDS to LoADS and the adoption of this design over other novel systems suggest a "follow-on imperative."164 The services and the contractors share an interest in keeping contractor teams together. When one program comes to an end, there is a tendency to keep the contractor teams from breaking up by providing follow-on work. The history of the army's BMD program tends to support this propensity even though the complexion of major BMD contractors changed so dramatically over the decade of the 1970s. The army was reluctant to adopt modifications to the original Nike-Zeus system that were developed outside the army's original contractor team. 165 The follow-on systems to Safeguard that were developed in the 1970s (SDS and LoADS) were largely modifications of their predecessors and maintained three of the major contracting teams throughout this period (McDonnell Douglas, Martin Marietta, and General Electric). Furthermore, both McDonnell Douglas and Martin Marietta were selected as LoADS contractors on a sole-source basis (i.e., the contracts were not competitively bid). 166 By not wholly rejecting previous designs and components for radically new systems, the follow-on imperative maintains the option to deploy a BMD system in relatively short order. This serves the interests of both contractor and service. While LoADS contractors wanted an MX basing scheme adopted that included missile defenses, Lockheed would have benefited from deployment of a strategic defense system for defending less protected military targets or, alternatively, a LAD system for defense against "accidental" or "Nth" country attacks. Even a treaty-limited deployment of 100 HOE interceptors would have been a lucrative contract for Lockheed. All of these firms stood to profit from a layered defense system incorporating overlay, underlay, and LoADS. But such a system would be unlikely without abrogating the ABM Treaty. Because of the enthusiasm for near-term applications of HEL technology, high-energy lasers had developed a substantial industrial base by the end of the 1970s. Many of the defense giants, such as TRW, Boeing, Rockwell International, Lockheed, United Technologies, Textron, and Hughes, had invested heavily in this new technology and likely stood to benefit from the deployment of an HEL BMD system. However, a question lingered: Would increased emphasis on the BMD mission at the end of the 1970s impose such difficult requirements on the HEL program as to jeopardize other near-term deployment options? There was no easy answer to this question, and opinions tended to leave many firms polarized internally. TRW was an example: on the one hand was John Foster, a vice-president of

The Evolving

77

Hedge

TRW and former director of Defense Research and Engineering, who chaired the Defense Science Board task force that argued against burdening the spacebased laser program with BMD mission requirements. On the other hand was TRW laser scientist Joseph Miller, who was a member of the Gang of Four and who supported near-term deployment of a space-based laser BMD. At the time, the safest strategy for industry would have been to continue supporting the current emphasis in the Pentagon's HEL program (e.g., space defense and tactical applications) and plan for a BMD contingency. Most of the particle beam work was being performed in the national laboratories, primarily at Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia. There were a few exceptions, however. These were mostly small corporations, such as Austin Research Associates (discussed previously), Maxwell Laboratories, Physical Dynamics Inc., Physics International, and Mission Research Corporation. With the exception of Austin Research, each of these firms was represented among the Gang of 35, which also included representatives from Lockheed, Hughes, Draper Laboratory, Lincoln Laboratory, and Rand. Six representatives from Science Applications, Inc. made it the best-represented firm in the gang.167 As the 1970s came to an end, several major defense contractors began to look seriously at defensive technologies for their long-term potential. 168 Offensive delivery systems were becoming increasingly sophisticated and costly; they could also deliver conventional weapons. Under these conditions, defensive systems, both tactical and strategic, might fare better in the offense/defense game than they had in the past. In the short run, the defense industry can assume that follow-on weapons systems will be similar to their predecessors, incoiporating only incremental modifications. However, technological advance and perceived changes in the threat make long-run forecasting far less predictable. By the end of the 1970s, with the Pentagon spending significant sums on R&D for strategic defense, corporate executives at least thought it prudent to plan for the contingency that greater emphasis would be placed on defensive technologies in the near future. Getting

on the

Agenda

BMD sponsors had greater success in getting the BMD issue into the national media in the late 1970s than they had in the four years following the ABM Treaty. Measured in number of articles devoted to missile defense, the BMD issue received more press in the latter half of the 1970s than it had in the first half. 169 Policy alternatives developed by policy-planning groups were disseminated through group-sponsored reports and the national media. Individual members wrote op-ed pieces for distribution and served as a source of expert opinion on national defense policy. The groups themselves generated news through the release of reports and through conferences or other

78

Selling

Strategic

Defense

planned events.170 In addition, several reporters from major newspapers—for example, Robert Bartley (editorial editor, Wall Street Journal), William Beecher (diplomatic correspondent, Boston Globe), Richard Burt (diplomatic correspondent, New York Times)—were either members of or participated in several of the groups and conferences aimed at promoting, inter alia, BMD. 171 The pages of Aviation Week & Space Technology became a voice box for BMD sponsors. The magazine reported favorably on Keegan's "gap" and the various gangs promoting exotic BMD technologies, about which it ran a series of special reports in 1978 and again in 1980.172 In view of the army's focus on more prosaic technology and the relatively limited amount of directed-energy BMD funding, beam weapons received a disproportionate amount of the attention given to BMD in the national media. This was largely the result of the controversy surrounding the "gaps and gangs" previously discussed, although not to be discounted is the proclivity the press has for concentrating on the exotic.

Increasing Options and Increasing Demands By the end of the 1970s, the army's BMD insurance policy had evolved into a menu of near-term options for U.S. policymakers. Many of the programs initiated early in the decade were reaching a stage where additional development and more money would be necessary to advance these technologies. However, the increasing cost of such development would make it more difficult to justify without a commitment to deploy. Additionally, weapons concepts can only be kept on hold for so long before new technological developments and/or changes in the perceived threat, whether real or contrived, force their redesign or obsolescence. Clearly, the interest of the service managers and the major BMD contractors was to push for nearterm deployment. Consistent with congressional directives and a service inclination toward less risky technologies, the army placed greatest emphasis on near-term options for less difficult BMD missions, such as defending land-based ICBMs. However, the LAD option, after being shelved in the early 1970s, was beginning to be reintroduced into the strategic debate by the end of the decade. These options were more or less evolutionary in nature, not revolutionary. Yet some within the defense community were less content with keeping what they saw as potentially revolutionary technology on the back burner. Through a combination of what may be described as technological infatuation, Sovietphobia, and a revulsion with the MAD state of strategic affairs, small groups within the defense community were motivated to circumvent the system in an attempt to sell their technological schemes. Thus, technological developments were putting upward pressure on the arms

The Evolving Hedge

79

race, but this pressure was spread over a variety of technologies. And many promoters of these new technologies were engaging in what may be called "parochial pushing." Pressures emanating from the demand side of the arms race stemmed from growing discontent, both popular and elite, with governmental policies designed to manage the threat of potential nuclear holocaust. The simmering discontent with the S A L T process manifest at the beginning of the Carter administration had by the end been raised to a boil. Although the S A L T II Treaty was being attacked more from the Right than the Left, both sides of the political spectrum voiced their discontent with it.173 The Left saw the treaty as allowing both countries to continue to modernize their strategic forces under a high ceiling—and therefore not really constraining the arms race. The Right, on the other hand, viewed the agreement as allowing the Soviets a strategic advantage and therefore worsening an already bad situation. Senate ratification of the treaty was highly questionable before the Soviets marched into Afghanistan—afterward it would have been politically impossible. In the face of such discontent over deterrence and arms control, a greater emphasis on strategic defense would not seem an unreasonable alternative. Concurrent with this rising discontent, and in part stimulating its growth, were the demands by certain groups of nuclear-war planners to incorporate into the U.S. nuclear arsenal greater "flexibility" (a euphemism for options to fight a nuclear war short of a spasmodic exchange of arsenals). The 1970s witnessed the ascendancy of government officials emphasizing damage-limiting strategies over assured destruction. From Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's "limited nuclear options" to Secretary of Defense Brown's "countervailing strategy," planning for fighting a nuclear war was increasingly being incorporated into the U.S. force structure along with the technology to accomplish it. Greater emphasis on war-fighting and war-winning strategies brings with it greater demands for active and passive strategic defenses. The diversity and enormity of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals assure that some forces would survive a counterforce strike and be able to retaliate with massive destruction. Furthermore, the ability to severely reduce an opponent's nuclear forces in a preemptive strike reduces the stress on strategic defenses and enhances the damage-limiting value of active and passive defenses.174 N e w demands for war-fighting armament were being formulated in policy-planning groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger. Because these groups served as a recruiting ground for the newly elected Reagan administration, the force of such demands inevitably increased. Many individuals moved into high-level positions in the new administration, bringing with them even more unabashedly war-fighting doctrines than held by their immediate predecessors. Although there was general agreement among these groups over the

80

Selling Strategic Defense

ends, there was less consensus about the means. Possessed with a common ideology—to contain communism by maintaining technological superiority in weaponry—these factions struggled over competing strategic premises and alternative technologies. As the nuclear arms race moved into its fourth decade, the U.S. armament process was primed for expansion. The 1970s had produced increasing options and increasing demands for more armament. What direction this expansion would take was somewhat ambiguous given the large number of technological candidates and strategies. Nevertheless, the prospects for a greater role for BMD appeared brighter than they had been for more than a decade.

Notes 1. See the appendix for information regarding budgetary data. 2. See the program guidance contained in Senate Report No. 93-385, SASC, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, pp. 32-33. 3. Senate Report 95-129, SASC, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, p. 89. General Jone's role is identified in Currie-McDaniel, The U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command, pp. 6-17. 4. See Conference Report HR 96-1222, Committee of Conference, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, p. 75. Also House Report 96-916, HASC, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981, p. 109. 5. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 483. 6. Based on data presented in SASC, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, p. 6889. See also House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 996. 7. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 586. 8. See, for example, SASC, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, p. 6886; SASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9, pp. 6516, 6520, 6523-6524. 9. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 488. 10. See, for example, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 506; and Garwin, "Effective Military Technologies for the Eighties," pp. 53-54. 11. See House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, pp. 583-584. Also Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on U.S. BMD, p. 30. 12. See, for example, SASC, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, p. 6921; House of Representatives, Committee on Appropria-

The Evolving

Hedge

81

tions, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, pp. 538-539. 13. See House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, pp. 499-500. 14. See Chapter 3; also Robinson, "DOD Presses for ABM Fund Restoration," p. 16. 15. See, for examples, SASC, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, pp. 6885, 6887, 6920, 6922; SASC, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 6531; House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, pp. 567, 578. 16. See the testimony of Maj. Gen. Grayson Tate in House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 537; also Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on U.S. BMD, pp. 70-71. 17. See SASC, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, p. 6885. 18. See House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1970, Part 4, p. 815. 19. See Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on U.S. BMD, pp. 21, 59. 20. Based on figures provided in SASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9, p. 6521. HOE funding actually represented roughly 46 percent of programmable funds because test facilities and management support accounted for approximately 32 percent of STP funds. 21. See House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, pp. 486^491. 22. Comptroller General, Ballistic Missile Defense, p. ii. 23. Unpublished correspondence form J. H. Stolarow to Harold Brown, March 13, 1979, p. 2. 24. See Comptroller General, Ballistic Missile Defense, appendix II. 25. Ibid., p. 72. 26. Comptroller General, Potential of the LoAD Ballistic Missile Defense System, p. iii. 27. Ibid., p. ii. 28. See Perry, "The Department of Defense Statement on the MX System and Ballistic Missile Defense." p. 14. See also House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 527. 29. Ibid., p. 15 in Perry, and p. 527 in hearings. 30. See the comments made by defense officials, as well as the official DOD response, in Comptroller General, Ballistic Missile Defense, pp. 20-22, and 83-84. 31. See the discussion of BMD program rationales in Chapter 3. Also Perry, "The Department of Defense Statement on the MX System and Ballistic Missile Defense," p. 15. 32. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Laser Technology—Development and Applications, p. 127.

82

Selling

Strategic

Defense

33. For example, see Los Alamos National Laboratory, Research Highlights 1980, p. 34. 34. See, "Directed-Energy Effort Shifted," pp. 44-47. 35. For example, see Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Laser Technology—Development and Applications, pp. 190-192. 36. ATP plus STP funding is less the amount attributed to DEW. See the appendix to this book. 37. See, for examples, SASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1979, p. 6518; and House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, pp. 535, 537. 38. See, for example, Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Laser Technology—Development and Applications, p. 193. 39. Ibid., pp. 178, 191-192. 40. Ibid., p. 188. 41. For examples, see ibid., pp. 189-190. 42. Ibid., p. 192. For specific contractors, see Klass, "Pulsed Laser Eyed for Extended Range," p. 56. 43. See Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Laser Technology—Development and Applications, pp. 233-248. 44. See U.S. Comptroller General, DOD's Space-Based Laser Program, p. 5. 45. Interviews with R. Bruce Miller, 10/5/87; and Robert Jameson, 10/7/87. 46. Interview with Edward Knapp, 3/24/88. 47. Sipapu, an American Indian name for "sacred fire," was changed to White Horse when objections were raised over using a name considered sacred by the Indian population in northern New Mexico. Interview with Robert Jameson, 10/7/87. 48. See Robinson, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapons," p. 22. 49. Interview with Wolfgang Panofsky, 3/14/88. Another off-the-record interview with a government scientist close to the controversy supports this assessment. 50. See House Report No. 96-166, HASC, Department of Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, p. 109; Robinson, "U.S. Pushes Development of Beam Weapons," p. 15; HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, p. 2756. 51. See Robinson, "Beam Weapons Effort to Grow," p. 15. 52. House Report No. 96-166, HASC, Department of Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, p. 109. 53. See House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 535; House Report No. 96-166, HASC, Department of Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, p. 109; HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, pp. 2756, and 1795-1799. 54. Interview with Robert Jameson, 10/7/87; also see "Technical Survey: Particle Beams, Laser Weapons (DEWS)," August 4, 1980, p. 51. 55. Interview with Wolfgang Panofsky, 3/14/88. 56. See Robinson, "U.S. Pushes Development of Beam Weapons" (10/2/78) p. 20. 57. Ibid., especially p. 22. 58. See, for example, Robinson, "U.S. Pushes Development of Beam

The Evolving Hedge

83

Weapons" (10/2/78), pp. 14-22; and "Directed Energy Effort Shifted," pp. 4 4 47. 59. See "Stronger Directed-Energy Effort Urged," pp. 18-19. 60. Interviews with R. Bruce Miller, 10/5/87; and Robert Jameson, 10/7/87. 61. Conference Report HR 96-1222, Committee of Conference, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, p. 88. 62. Interview with Jack Ruina, 1/18/88. 63. Interview with R. Bruce Miller, 10/5/87. 64. Interview with Edward Knapp, 3/24/88. 65. Interview with Robert Jameson, 10/7/87. 66. Off-the-record interview, 10/6/87. 67. See the discussion of BAMBI in Chapter 2. 68. See, for example, Markoff, "The Air Force Eyes a Star War,: pp. 1618. See also Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry," p. 4. 69. For a discussion of these processes, see Klass, "Advanced Weaponry Research Intensifies," p. 57. 70. For some of these other factors, see Klass, "Current Systems Still More Cost-Effective," p. 58. 71. Interview with Edward Knapp, 3/24/88. 72. See, for example, Tsipis, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age, chap. 9; also Union of Concerned Scientists, The Fallacy of Star Wars. 73. See Herken, The Winning Weapon. 74. See SASC, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, p. 6888. 75. Interview with Robert Jameson, 3/25/88. 76. See Pratt, Weapons Sponsorship, appendix C. 77. For example, see the discussion of the O'Neill Report in the Congressional Record, August 6, 1970, pp. 27723-27733. 78. See, for example, Science News 4 (May 21, 1977), p. 334. 79. Interview with Robert Jameson, 10/7/87, and ibid. 80. Interview with Wolfgang Panofsky, 3/14/88. 81. Interview with Robert Jameson, 10/7/87. 82. Los Alamos National Laboratory, Research Highlights 1980, p. 34. 83. Interview with Robert Jameson, 10/7/87. 84. This narrative is based mostly on an interview with R. Bruce Miller, 10/5/87, and testimony by Gerald Yonas in Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Laser Technology—Development and Applications, pp. 233-248. 85. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Laser Technology—Development and Applications, p. 233. 86. Ibid., p. 234. 87. Ibid., p. 245. 88. See Robinson, "Beam Weapons Effort to Grow," p. 14. 89. Interview with R. Bruce Miller, 10/5/87. 90. "Powerful Electron Beams Produced," p. 2. 91. See, for example, Robinson, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," pp. 16-23; Wade, "Particle Beams as ABM Weapons," pp. 407-408. 92. This account is based largely on an off-the-record interview with a government scientist familiar with the controversy. For other accounts, see ibid. Robinson and Wade; also Wade, "Charged Debate Erupts," pp. 9 5 7 959.

84

Selling Strategic Defense

93. Interview with Wolfgang Panofsky, 3/14/88. For a description of PNUTS, see Robinson "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," p. 19. 94. Interview with Wolfgang Panofsky, 3/14/88; off-the-record interview with a government scientist who participated in several reviews of ARA. 95. Off-the-record interview with a government scientist. 96. Interview with Wolfgang Panofsky, 3/14/88. 97. For example, another concept for collective ion acceleration received roughly $100,000 per year; in contrast, ARA received $2.3 million in 1979. See "Directed Energy Effort Shifted," p. 62. 98. See, for example, Kaplan, Dubious Specter; also The Military Balance 1986-87, pp. 218-221. 99. Quoted in Mangold, "The Real War in Space," p. 15. 100. Ibid., pp. 14-15; Robinson, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," p. 18; see also the preceding ARA discussion. 101. Robinson, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," p. 19. 102. See Mangold, "The Real War in Space," pp. 15-16. 103. See Keegan, "New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat," p. 48; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 286-287; Mangold, "The Real War in Space," p. 17; Robinson, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," pp. 20-21; and Garwin, "Charged-Particle Beam Weapons?" pp. 24-27. 104. Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 286-287; Robinson, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," pp. 20-21. 105. Interview with Wolfgang Panofsky, 3/14/88; and off-the-record interview with a government scientist. 106. See Robinson, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," pp. 16-22; Wade, "Particle Beams as ABM Weapons," pp. 407-408. 107. See Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, pp. 223-227. 108. See Keegan, "New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat," pp. 38-48. 109. Off-the-record interview with a government scientist. 110. See, for example, Keegan, "New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat," pp. 38-48; and Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics." 111. Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics." 112. Ibid., p. 1. 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid., p. 10. 115. Ibid., pp. 6-8. 116. "Special Report: Max Hunter," p. 56. 117. See Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics," p. 8. 118. There are several versions of the Gang of Four episode. See, for example, "Special Report: Max Hunter," p. 56; Codevilla, While Others Build, chap. 4. Much of this account is based on an off-the-record interview with a government scientist. 119. See Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 77; also Comptroller General, DOD's Space-Based Laser Program. 120. See Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 68. 121. Ibid., pp. 68-69. 122. "Special Report: Max Hunter," p. 56. 123. Se Codevilla, While Others Build, pp. 70-71; and "Special Report: Max Hunter," p. 56. 124. Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 71. 125. Ibid. 126. Off-the-record interview with a government scientist. 127. Ibid.

The Evolving Hedge

85

128. See Codevilla, While Others Build, pp. 71-72, for a discussion and polemical critique of this study. 129. Review of the DOD Space-Based Laser Weapon Study, appendix A. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid., pp. ii-iii, and 5-6. 132. Ibid., p. iii. 133. Wallop, "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense," pp. 12-21. See also Codevilla, While Others Build, pp. 66-67. 134. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Laser Technology—Development and Applications-, also Codevilla, While Others Build, chap. 4. 135. See Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 73. 136. Ibid., p. 74. 137. One report refers to this group as the "gang of 53" (Robinson, "Beam Weapons Effort to Grow," p. 12), but I believe this to be a misprint. Compare with "Beam Weapons Survey Team Formed," p. 21, which lists 35 members, although a few others are listed in HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, pp. 2790-2791. 138. Interview with R. Bruce Miller, 10/5/87. 139. "Beam Weapons Survey Team Formed," p. 21; also HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, pp. 2790-2791. 140. See Robinson, "Beam Weapons Effort to Grow," p. 12. 141. See ibid., p. 13; and HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, p. 2792. 142. HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, p. 2791. 143. Interview with R. Bruce Miller, 10/5/87. 144. Review of the DOD Space-Based Laser Weapon Study, p. 12. 145. See Guertner, "What Is Proof?" pp. 73-84. 146. See HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, p. 2800. 147. See, for examples, Johnsen, "Arms Control Statement Criticized," pp. 14-15; Griffiths, "Beam Weapon Impact Called Uncertain,:" pp. 28-29; Nunn, "Interpretation of the ABM Treaty," pp. 77-80; and Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on High Energy Lasers, appendix B, p. 56. 148. Interview with Jack Ruina, 1/18/88. 149. For example, see BMD Advanced Technology Center, U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense; and Hiatt and Atkinson, "Pentagon's 'Paper Warriors'" pp. Al, A10. 150. For examples, see Gouré, Hyland, and Gray, The Emerging Strategic Environment: Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense; Davis, et al., The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense-, Schneider, et al., U.S. StrategicNuclear Policy and Ballistic Missile Defense; Humphrey, et al., SALT II and American Security; Van Cleave and Thompson, Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What Can be Done?, p. vii. 151. See Humphrey, et al., SALT II and American Security; For F Y 7 9 FY80 BMD Advanced Technology Center funding to the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Hudson Institute, see House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 574. In addition, William A. Davis, Jr., deputy BMD program manager at the time, co-authored the report Schneider, et al., U.S. Strategic-Nuclear Policy and Ballistic Missile Defense.

86

Selling Strategic Defense

152. See House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 547. 153. Barasch, et al., Ballistic Missile Defense: A Potential Arms-Control Initiative, p. 1. 154. The contributions to the conference were published in "ABM Revisited: Promise or Peril?" pp. 53-85. 155. See Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis; and Tyroler, Alerting America, appendix 2. 156. See Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, p. 7. 157. Reprinted in Tyroler, Alerting America, p. 3. 158. See ibid., p. 65. 159. See ibid., p. 4; also Scheer, With Enough Shovels, passim. 160. House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, pp. 573576. 161. See Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, p. 223; Norrgard and Rosenbloom, "The Cold Warriors," p. 14; and Levine, "Anticommunist Group Lobbies," pp. 1, 23. 162. See Pratt, Pike, and Lindley, "SDI Contracting," pp. 125-127 in Steinberg, Lost in Space. 163. House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, pp. 583584; and "Special Report: Demonstration Planned for MX Defense System," pp. 220-221. 164. Kurth, "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," pp. 33-56. 165. Interview with Harold Agnew, 9/30/87. 166. House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, p. 583. 167. See "Beam Weapons Survey Team Formed," p. 21. 168. See Hiatt and Atkinson, "In Strategic Defense the Seeds of a New Industry Are Planted," pp. AI, A16. 169. Based on a review of the periodical literature from the 1970s. See Pratt, Weapons Sponsorship, p. 295, note 212. 170. See Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, pp. 217-228. 171. See Van Cleave and Thompson, Strategic Options for the Early Eighties, p. xv; and Scheer, With Enough Shovels, pp. 94-95. 172. For 1978 HEL series, see Klass, "Laser Destroys Missile in Test (title varies)" (August 7, 1978), pp. 14-16; (August 21, 1978), pp. 3 8 ^ 7 ; (August 28, 1978), pp. 56-60. For 1978 beam weapons series, see Robinson, "U.S. Pushes Development of Beam Weapons (title varies)" (October 2, 1978), pp. 14-22; (October 9, 1978), pp. 42-53; (October 16, 1978), pp. 42-52; (October 30, 1978), pp. 51-55; (November 6, 1978), pp. 50-58; (November 13, 1978), pp. 14-20. For 1980 DEW series, see "Technical Survey: Particle Beams, Laser Weapons (Directed Energy Weapons) (title varies)" (July 28, 1980), pp. 32-42; (August 4, 1980), pp. 44-68. For a special report on BMD, see Klass, "Ballistic Missile Defense Tests Set (title Varies)" (June 16, 1980), pp. 213-218; (July 14,1980), pp. 52-54ff. 173. See Talbott, Deadly Gambits, p. 220. 174. Michael Deane makes this point in regard to Soviet war-fighting doctrine, but it is no less relevant to the U.S. counterpart. See Deane, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Defensive Concepts," p. 60.

5

From Hedge to Pledge: Reagan's Decree for Strategic Defense

I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. —Ronald

Reagan, March 23, 1983

Prior to March 23, 1983, the U.S. BMD program in the post-ABM Treaty era had been largely justified as a hedge against Soviet behavior regarding arms control. In a public address that March day, Reagan directed that this predominant rationale be replaced by a pledge to find the means to defend against strategic missile attack. The president also made clear that by this he meant the protection of people and industry (area defense), not just ICBMs (point defense). He thereby broke with the dominant course followed by the army's BMD program throughout the 1970s, which concentrated on defending land-based ICBMs. In so doing, Reagan called for a radical reorientation of postwar military strategy and threatened a major reshuffling of military priorities. The predominant view within the military-industrial complex was that this breach with the past was aberrant behavior. When similar demands about more exotic technologies and mission goals arose in the latter half of the 1970s (e.g., the "beam gap" and the Gang of Four), the military-industrial complex invested considerable time and effort in putting these cats back in the bag. Why then did President Reagan, the most avowedly supportive of the military's wishes of any president in recent years, choose to circumvent the military-industrial complex and take this bizarre turn? Most likely, not even Reagan could provide a complete answer to this puzzle. However, in this chapter, I describe the context within which this decision was made and expose some of the underlying factors behind Reagan's pledge to build Star Wars.

87

88

Selling Strategic Defense

Closing the Window of Vulnerability There were early indications that President-elect Ronald Reagan would support an expanded BMD program. The 1980 Republican party platform contained a plank, largely at the instigation of Reagan's national security adviser Richard Allen, that called for proceeding with "vigorous research and development of an effective anti-ballistic missile system, such as is already at hand in the Soviet Union, as well as more modern ABM technologies."1 Seven of the thirteen members of Reagan's defense transition team, including its captain, participated in the Belmont conference, sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center in 1978, which called for greater emphasis on active defenses.2 Members of this team also reportedly told Republican congressional leaders that the space-based laser project would be one of the new administration's top priorities.3 In December 1980, the Washington Post reported that the president-elect told several Republican senators "he would like to improve the nation's defenses against missile attack."4 But these indicators left ambiguous which path the Reagan administration might take in regard to BMD. Given the army's traditional jurisdiction over BMD, the most likely direction such an expansion would take was in the programs the army and its major BMD contractors had invested the greatest amount of funds in throughout the 1970s and that held out the promise of near-term deployment. When Reagan came into office, LoADS was the most mature technology in the army's BMD repertory. In the first two years of the Reagan administration, BMD funding increased substantially. Consistent with predominant interests, the enlarged funding went toward accelerating the preexisting program and did not create any new capability.5 LoADS had been enjoying a boost even before Reagan took office. Congress increased STP funding by $15 million in fiscal year 1981 in order to accelerate LoADS. The Carter administration's fiscal year 1982 defense budget (submitted in January 1981) requested $215.8 million for STP, an increase of 50 percent over the previous year.6 The Reagan fiscal year 1982 budget amendment requested an additional $90 million over the Carter administration's request for STP. 7 This was 42 percent more than the Carter administration's proposal and an increase of 112 percent over fiscal year 1981 funding. (The administration's request for a $39 million supplement to fiscal year 1981 funding for STP was denied.) In October 1981, Reagan sought an additional $52 million for STP's fiscal year 1982 funding as part of his Strategic Force Modernization Plan. By year's end, Congress agreed to authorize $336.7 million for STP in fiscal 1982, an increase of 133 percent.8 On October 2, 1981, Reagan announced his Strategic Force Modernization Plan, which had five parts: (1) improve command, control, and communication (C3); (2) modernize the strategic bomber force; (3) deploy

From Hedge to Pledge

89

new submarine-launched ballistic missiles; (4) improve ICBMs and reduce their vulnerability to attack; (5) improve BMD.9 Part five, directed specifically at the BMD program, called for accelerated R&D on a terminal defense system (formerly LoADS, now called BTDS, for baseline terminal defense system). The plan also proclaimed continued support for R&D on the exoatmospheric overlay program and other advanced technology, although these projects were not earmarked for expansion in the early Reagan years.10 In the first two years of his administration, virtually all (99 percent) of the funding growth in dedicated BMD programs (ATP and STP) went toward accelerating the LoADS program. 11 This expedited development would allow a critical deployment decision (i.e., full scale engineering development, FSED) to fall within Reagan's first term. The acceleration of the LoADS program was connected to part four of the president's plan relating to long-term ICBM survivability. Indeed, the army's hopes for an operational BMD system brightened considerably when the new administration stated explicitly that "any ground-based ICBM scheme will ultimately require BMD for survivability." (Emphasis added.) 12 However, being tethered to the controversial MX specifically—and in general to the survivability of land-based ICBMs—was a mixed blessing. In an era of multiple and increasingly accurate warheads, many questioned whether any practical measures for assuring the survivability of a land-based missile force were possible. In his first year in office, Reagan canceled the Carter administration's decision to base the new MX missile in multiple protective shelters (MPSs) and recommended that a limited number of MX missiles be deployed in existing Titan or Minuteman silos as an interim basing mode. July 1983 was targeted as a decision date for a long-teim solution to ICBM vulnerability, with BMD cited as one of the possibilities.13 The following year the administration began circulating its own basing scheme, a concept utilizing closely spaced fixed silos and called "Dense Pack."14 Critics quickly labeled the plan "Dunce Pack," arguing that the new scheme would not solve the vulnerability problem as the administration claimed. Furthermore, critics asserted that the concept would inevitably lead to an expensive but relatively ineffective ABM system. The vacillation concerning a final MX basing plan left the LoADS program ill-defined and in a state of flux. This indecision allowed the Congress as a whole to resist Reagan's full requests for LoADS (see Table 5.1). For example, in fiscal year 1983, the first defense budget fully developed under the Reagan administration, Reagan requested a whopping $727.3 million for STP, twice the amount authorized for fiscal year 1982. However, Congress authorized only slightly more than half this request arguing as follows: "Until a resolution of the MX basing issue has been achieved, it would be ill-advised to embark upon an aggressive LoADS development program."15

90 Table 5.1

Selling Strategic Defense

Comparison of Requested and Actual Funding for STP, Fiscal Years 1982-1984 FY

Requested

Actual

1982

$357.8

$336

1983

$727.3

$371

1984

$538.4

$319

Sources: HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, pp. 889-900; Conference Report HR 97-749, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983, p. 121; Congressional Record, (April 4, 1985), pp. E1444E1446.

In an attempt to resolve the MX basing controversy, Reagan appointed a bipartisan presidential commission, known as the Scowcroft Commission after its chairman Brent Scowcroft, to study and recommend a permanent basing mode.16 Reagan administration officials had repeatedly referred to the theoretical ability of Soviet nuclear forces to destroy a large fraction of U.S. land-based ICBMs in a first strike as a "window of vulnerability" that needed to be closed. With its final report issued just two weeks after President Reagan made his Star Wars address, the Scowcroft Commission closed this window—but not in the way many had anticipated. In polite language, the commission's report described the "window of vulnerability" as a question that had been "miscast." The issue of ICBM vulnerability had in "recent times" been considered in isolation from other important factors, such as the larger percentage of nuclear warheads deployed on U.S. strategic missile firing submarines and bomber forces. In essence, the commission contended that in order to deter the kind of attacks posed by the "window of vulnerability" scenario, "we can reasonably rely both on our other strategic forces and on the range of operational uncertainties that the Soviets would have to consider in planning such aggression."17 With the window shut, the commission could then recommend that 100 MX missiles be deployed in existing silos. The commission believed the new larger, more accurate ten-warhead missile to be desirable enough to separate it from the survivability issue.18 (Critics had long argued that the real reason the air force wanted the MX was the missile's increased counterforce capability, not its supposed survivability.)19 The commission believed that long-term survivability could await their proposed follow-on missile, the small, single-warhead mobile missile.20 Ironically, the question of ICBM vulnerability was first "miscast" (in isolation from other factors) by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird during congressional testimony to justify the deployment of Safeguard. 21 ICBM survivability became the official guidance for the BMD mission throughout

From Hedge to Pledge

91

the 1970s, and the fate of near-term deployment rested on the perceived gravity of this threat. Fortuitously, President Reagan resurrected the area defense mission just two weeks before the commission foreclosed this opportunity for BMD proponents. Yet in this regard, it is interesting to note that the Scowcroft Commission found the current BMD technology could offer "no real promise of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attack in this century." 22 Others, however, were more optimistic.

Exotic Selling Prosaic BMD was boosted by the new administration only to become a solution in search of a mission. Meanwhile, more exotic BMD concepts, in terms of both technology and mission, were actively being promoted by individuals and groups inside and outside of the White House. White House machinations are discussed later, considered first is the exotic selling that occurred external to, but not exclusive of, the executive office. There were three prominent schemes sponsored in the early 1980s calling for a radical reorientation of BMD technology and mission. One approach was that advocated by members of the "laser lobby," discussed in the previous chapter. Another approach emanated from a study known as Project High Frontier, instigated by General Daniel Graham (USA ret.). Although these two approaches differed significantly in terms of the technologies incorporated into their respective designs, they shared several important features. Both proposals advocated a space-based BMD system as a key component of their defensive architecture. Both emphasized a "thick" area defense as opposed to a "thin" area defense or point defense. More important, both approaches asserted that their BMD schemes represented near-term options. Essentially, advocates argued that all that was required to build their systems was an engineering effort—no new scientific breakthroughs were necessary. And both groups believed that initial deployments of such missile defenses could occur before the end of the decade.23 A third approach centered around key advocates such as Edward Teller, Lowell Wood, and members of President Reagan's kitchen cabinet. This approach differed from the first two in terms of the technology proposed. More significant, proponents of the third plan did not believe that the extant technology advocated by the other two approaches warranted immediate and costly deployment. Instead, they called for a push like that of the Manhattan Project to accelerate what in their view were potentially more revolutionary technologies. Although certain promoters of this latter approach were wedded to particular technologies (e.g., the X-ray laser), it was more a perception of

92

Selling Strategic

Defense

revolutionary technologies for strategic defense on the horizon coupled with a belief that it was critical for the United States to develop this technological potential first. Factors distinguishing this group from other advocates of similar technology were the primacy of the BMD mission and the perceived need for a program paced by technology rather than by funding. All of these sellers of strategic defense shared a belief that the United States was locked into a race with the Soviet Union to develop missile defenses. Proponents of expedited laser weapons development painted a desperate picture for the country with charges of Soviet advances in laser weaponry. 2 4 Their claims were reminiscent of those used in previous weapons gaps. Lobbying

for

Lasers

The laser lobby, led by Senator Malcolm Wallop, pressed for a BMD scheme based on orbiting chemical lasers. DARPA's space-based laser (SBL) Triad program planned to demonstrate such a laser by the late 1980s.2S The laser lobby invested considerable effort in accelerating and weaponizing this demonstration, while popularizing its potential for strategic defense. Many expected the Reagan administration to immediately hike SBL funding. 26 William Schneider, Jr., Reagan's newly appointed head of the Office of Management and Budget's National Security Division, "formally suggested" to the Pentagon that it increase SBL funding by more than $500 million between fiscal year 1981 and fiscal year 1983 beyond current plans.27 However, in Reagan's fiscal year 1981 defense supplemental and fiscal year 1982 defense budget amendment, no increase was forthcoming. Acting in accordance with the recommendations presented in the Defense Science Board's April 1981, the Pentagon planned to increase SBL funding by $50 million annually for the five-year period beginning with fiscal year 1983.28 In the pre-SDI period, the laser lobby achieved some limited success. Initially, Wallop planned to offer an amendment to the fiscal year 1982 defense budget calling for a $250 million increase to the SBL program with specific instructions on how the money would be spent. 29 Under pressure from Senate leaders, Wallop agreed to limit his amendment to a $50 million increase and drop the specific instructions contained in his original proposal. The measure passed the Senate overwhelmingly (91-3). 30 However, the House had not been so accommodating: In conference, House and Senate conferees agreed to only a $5 million increase for DARPA and denied the funding for the air force program.31 In a counterattack, Wallop attached the $50 million increase to the defense appropriations bill.32 The laser lobby also pressed its demands on White House officials. In the fall of 1981, Senator Wallop and Codevilla sent a letter to James Baker, Reagan's chief of staff, complaining that administration officials, particularly

From Hedge to Pledge

93

George Keyworth, were hostile to the SBL program. The letter also called for the Reagan administration to make clear its position on the technology. 33 The battle on Capitol Hill took a new twist in 1982 when the House and Senate split over what kinds of laser weapons to develop. Labeled the "laser wars" in the popular media, the controversy focused on whether to place greater emphasis on laser designs that produced shorter wavelengths as opposed to the longer wavelengths generated by the DF/HF chemical lasers then being prototyped for space basing. 34 In committee action, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) virtually eliminated the administration's request for SBL funding in the fiscal year 1983 authorization bill substituting a recommendation that $50 million be authorized for DARPA "to accelerate short wavelength laser technology." 35 The committee stressed that it "strongly supports high energy laser research" as long as that research "focuses on the proper technology." (Emphasis added.) 36 The committee's recommendations were approved by the full House. On the other side of Capitol Hill, the Senate Armed Services Committee supported the administration's full funding request for SBL systems ($111.6 million, including $40.6 million for the air force's laser). However, the committee's report also contained a veiled attack on the demands of the laser lobby, contending that "a crash program to develop and deploy a significantly less capable program using available technologies and components" was undesirable. Instead, the committee urged a "balanced approach" studying both near- and long-term technologies and alternative missions. 37 In spite of the committee's recommendations against a "crash program," when the defense authorization bill came to the Senate floor, Wallop succeeded in attaching an amendment calling for an "on-orbit laser weapons system . . . as quickly as technology will allow." The amendment directed that system integration (an important step toward weaponization) be pressed "vigorously and concurrently" and that a system be demonstrated in space "within a decade." 38 During conference negotiations, the statutory directions of Wallop's amendment were dropped in exchange for the House conferees acceding to a restoration of funds for long wavelength SBLs. 39 Conferees also compromised on short wavelength laser technology by agreeing to add $20 million to DARPA's $27.6 million request. 40 In contrast to the late 1970s, the laser debate now focused on what type of laser would be more effective. By the early 1980s, few technical experts doubted that a chemical laser could be demonstrated in space by the end of the 1980s or early 1990s. Doubts remained concerning the military effectiveness of such a weapon, and opinions differed considerably over the prudence of making a large investment based on alternative technologies and competing military needs. In this regard, the initial action by HASC may well have been a tactical maneuver designed to gain some negotiating room because it was likely there

94

Selling Strategic

Defense

would be a conference committee. It was obvious that the laser lobby wielded greater influence in the Senate, and a new push for early demonstration and weaponization of an SBL was expected that year. The laser battles in Congress also illustrate how those opposed to the acceleration of the arms race into outer space can coalesce with proponents of less developed technologies in order to delay or avoid premature deployments of space-based weapons. In an environment of rapid technological change, the argument can always be made that something better is already in the pipeline. Proponents of early deployment, regardless of technology, often refer to this tactic as the "R&D forever" syndrome. Of course, this claim may reflect little more than the frustration of sponsors of a technology found wanting by a preponderance of expert opinion. In this case, however, the push for short wavelength lasers was not all subterfuge. Another group of "Star Warriors" had arisen to stake a claim on the heavens. Teller's

"Star

Warriors"41

Robert S. Cooper, then director of DARPA, and the president's science adviser, George Keyworth, along with the help of Anthony Battista, the Democratic staffer for the R&D subcommittee of HASC, engineered the fiscal year 1983 reorientation of funds toward short wavelength lasers. 42 Cooper and Keyworth also solicited Senator John Warner's support, then chairman of the Senate subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, which may partially account for that group's recommendation against a crash effort on long wavelength lasers.43 Most technical experts, both inside and outside of government positions, recognized that shorter wavelength lasers would be more efficient for potential weapons applications than the longer wavelength lasers reaching maturity in the early 1980s. In its April 1981 report, the Defense Science Board recommended that additional funding be provided for research on short wavelength lasers.44 There had been some notable advances concerning short wavelength lasers in recent years, such as the free-electron lasers (FELs) under development at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories.45 Even more significant, however, in terms of BMD advocacy, was the test of a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser device on November 14, 1980.46 The test was an official secret until January 1983, two months prior to Reagan's Star Wars speech.47 Yet news of the event leaked out onto the pages of Aviation Week & Space Technology the year before.48 The November 1980 test, code-named Dauphin, tested two competing designs for producing an X-ray laser from a nuclear detonation. Although both designs were reported to be successful, the device conceived by Peter Hagelstein was considered superior. Reportedly, the invention uses lazing rods whose electrons are pumped into an excited state by the energy

From Hedge to Pledge

95

produced in a nuclear explosion. As the electrons cascade back into their lower state, a laser beam is produced. All this occurs before the nuclear blast can destroy the device. 49 The invention is but one of a myriad of potential third-generation nuclear weapons pursued by scientists since the late 1950s.50 The political significance of the Dauphin test, however, had more to do with who, rather than what, was involved. The X-ray laser was developed by a team of scientists at Lawrence Livermore known as "O group." 51 The national laboratory at Livermore was established largely at the behest of Edward Teller, who has continued to wield considerable influence both there and in Washington. For nearly four decades, Teller has been a major force in the politics of the nuclear arms race. He once noted that he learned to be a politician in order to convince government officials to build the H-bomb, a skill he has continued to hone ever since. 52 Teller was an ardent proponent of ABMs in the 1960s, and he has not ceased in his conviction that active and passive defenses should be developed.53 One of Teller's protégés, Lowell Wood, headed the team at Livermore working on the X-ray laser. 54 Together, they began briefing congressional leaders and other government officials in early 1981 concerning the progress in third-generation weapons and their implications for strategic defense. 55 Another Teller protégé, George Keyworth, was selected as President Reagan's science adviser largely at Teller's urging. 56 Teller's enthusiasm for the new technology and his ability to transmit this enthusiasm to others played a significant part in laying the foundation for Star Wars. 57 However, Teller's role in Reagan's decision to inaugurate Star Wars has often been overstated. There were, in the words of a New York Times reporter, "many ideas converging," 58 and Teller's ideas were only part of this chorus. Moreover, the policy that Teller and his Star Warriors helped to instigate proved ironic for their preferred technological candidate. The Xray laser they promoted continued to be funded under Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, but not so much for its potential as a strategic defense weapon. Instead, SDI officials apparently found the technology more suitable for attacking space-based defensive systems—an anti-strategic defense weapon. 59 Top administration officials have also acknowledged that whereas Teller saw the idea of using nuclear weapons to destroy attacking nuclear weapons as something of a dream come true, Reagan viewed it more as a nightmare. 60 Indeed, Ronald Reagan seemed to have a visceral feeling against all nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive, and he repeatedly insisted that strategic defense should be non-nuclear.61 A Technological

End-Run?

While the laser lobby and Teller's Star Warriors were selling futuristic weapons concepts reminiscent of the movie Star Wars, another group of

96

Selling

Strategic

Defense

strategic defense advocates were busy sponsoring a quick-fix solution to what they saw as a situation of increasing Soviet strategic advantage.62 After Ronald Reagan's election, Daniel Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency and Team B member, founded Project High Frontier with support from the conservative Heritage Foundation. An underlying premise for the project was to redirect the strategic arms race between the United States and Soviet Union toward space, an arena where Graham and others believed the United States held a technological advantage.63 In a published report, Graham asserted that U.S. adoption of the High Frontier proposal would, in effect, accomplish a "technological endrun" around the Soviets, reestablishing U.S. strategic superiority.64 The High Frontier proposal, completed early in 1982, called for the establishment of a global ballistic missile defense (GBMD) system. This scheme utilized the layered defense concept, incorporating space-based satellites loaded with small interceptor missiles as a forward-based defense.65 High Frontier's concept of missile-bearing defensive satellites was strikingly similar to proposals such as B AMBI that were conceived of more than twenty years earlier but that never got off the ground. Perhaps not so coincidentally, Boeing, one of the contractors for this earlier work, provided much of the technical input for the High Frontier study. 66 The High Frontier group believed its design could be deployed more rapidly and for less cost than DEWs. 67 Besides, beam weapons could be added to the GBMD system at a later date. Like Max Hunter, Graham drew parallels between a global defense system and a Pax Americana. However, Graham, true to the strategic theories of Alfred T. Mahan, also stressed the interconnection between industrial exploitation of space and military command of the new high ground.68 High Frontier proponents claimed their proposed system would cost around $40 billion through 1990.69 Others, however, estimated the full cost to be more likely in the $200-$300 billion range.70 Many also challenged the proposal's alleged effectiveness and argued that it would be vulnerable to simple countermeasures.71 Even many supporters of the goal posed by High Frontier—moving away from MAD and toward "assured survival"—criticized the High Frontier scheme.72 Graham had advised Ronald Reagan on national security matters during Reagan's 1976 and 1980 campaigns.73 He also had many sympathizers within the White House.74 In the fall of 1981, Graham was initially included among the small cabal of men meeting in the offices of Edwin Meese to formulate a new policy on strategic defense. However, by the time the group made its presentation to the president, Graham was out. Denied access to the very top but still well connected throughout the defense policy network, the High Frontier team appears to have had a program that was less a policy blueprint and more an articulation of a popular ideal. As Jonathan Stein argued: "High Frontier's contribution to the

From Hedge to Pledge

97

decision-making process was limited to its doctrinal stimulus." In effect, High Frontier struck a responsive chord in an administration "wary of the arms control syndrome."75 High Frontier's vision was also directed toward the public at large. Using populist slogans such as "assured survival" and "a defense that defends," High Frontier had as one of its goals the generation of favorable public opinion regarding missile defenses. 76 For example, John Bosma, while a consultant to High Frontier, wrote a strategy memorandum aimed at, among other things, developing "enough political support" for an early BMD deployment so "that it could not be turned off by a replacement or successor Democratic administration."77 Generating

Publicity

Indeed, all three of these exotic BMD schemes presented themselves as a popular alternative to an increasingly MAD arms race.78 In the early 1980s, the publics in the United States and Western Europe were expressing dissatisfaction with what appeared to be a ceaseless accumulation by both superpowers of ever more redundant destructive potential. Yet these expressions of frustration tended to sanction more traditional alternatives to the arms race, such as proposals for arms control and disarmament. What the sponsors of exotic BMD were offering, however, was an alternative to the same offensive arms race, as well as traditional arms control. Although they differed in their BMD schemes, they were all dissatisfied with the way the arms race had been proceeding. In essence, they saw the Soviet Union as gaining a strategic advantage, and they were disdainful of previous attempts at arms control, from which they believed the Soviet Union had gained disproportionately. These proponents all appeared to be reacting to what they perceived was a U.S. retreat as a world power. All three approaches expressed a powerful faith in technology and the productive potential of the U.S. capitalist economy to outrace the Soviets. Most important, they held an immense fear of Soviet strategic advantage. Underlying all these proposals was a mounting fear that the Soviets would achieve similar goals first and subjugate the world to a "Pax Sovietica."79 Publicity

In the three years preceding Reagan's Star Wars decree, BMD and space warfare received more coverage in the media than in the previous seven years combined. More than three times as many articles appeared in 1982 than in 1979. Perhaps more significant, this publicity was now reaching a wider audience. A review of the periodical literature shows that although relevant articles appearing in Aviation Week & Space Technology (a trade magazine

Selling Strategic Defense

98

of the aerospace industry) still accounted for 48 percent of the total in 1981 and 41 percent in 1982, these percentages were significantly lower than in previous years.80 Direct contact between the media and BMD sponsors was not uncommon. For example, Gregory Fossedal, an editorial writer for the Wall Street Journal, wrote much of the High Frontier material and promoted the concept through editorials appearing there as well as in other newspapers such as the Washington Times.81 In addition, according to Sidney Blumenthal, "Fossedal's wife, Lisa, was placed in charge of a new counterEstablishment group, the Marshall Foundation (funded by the Olin Foundation), which disbursed grants to Star Wars proponents who produced studies in its favor." 82 Senator Wallop was the source of several Aviation Week & Space Technology editorials written by William Gregory. 83 And someone interested in promoting the X-ray laser must have leaked the story to that magazine. 84 Corporate

Interests

After the shutdown of Safeguard in 1975, R&D for BMD-related technologies (including HELs) was funded at approximately $1 billion per year (constant 1982 dollars), not a trivial amount. 85 Still, the corporate executives knew the big money would come with deployment. A limited defense of MX was given a $5 billion price tag. 86 Area defenses would, of course, cost much more. A 1981 DOD study estimated fleets of space-based laser battle stations would cost between $50 billion and $500 billion (in constant 1982 dollars) depending upon what mission the battle stations were assigned—the thick area defense mission being the most costly. 87 Other layers to a continental missile defense could add another $300-$500 billion, for a total tab of around $1 trillion.88 With the prospect of such funds, the defense industry could not be indifferent—and R&D contracts were the best way of getting a foot in the door where all the action would be. As previously noted, BMD and related R&D in the early 1980s were producing a bountiful menu of defensive options from which the new administration had yet to choose. In such an uncertain environment, prudence dictated maintaining some contingency plans. Table 5.2 presents the top 25 strategic defense contractors in fiscal 1983 and their respective stakes in assorted BMD component technologies. While the major contractors for LoADS would profit from a defense of the MX, most of these companies also held a stake in a more comprehensive missile defense. A significant part of any BMD scheme involves technologies for surveillance, acquisition, tracking, kill assessment, survivability, lethality, battle management, and designing and integrating the various systems in the overall architecture. 89 Twenty of the top 25 strategic defense contractors in fiscal year 1983 were working on these technologies (designated "supporting

99

From Hedge to Pledge

Table 52

Contractor

Stakes of the Top 25 BMD Contractors According to BMD Function

3

Lockheed LTV TRW Boeing McDonnell Douglas Utah Higher Education Lawrence Livermore NL Rockwell International EG&G Martin Marietta Teledyne Inc. Los Alamos NL Control Data Corporation Raytheon Textron BDM International General Motors/Hughes Honeywell Computer Sciences Corp. Science Applications Nichols Research Litton Systems University of Texas Acurex Corporation Charles S. Draper Lab

LOADS

Kill Mechanisms KEW DEW X X

X X

X X X

X X

X X

X

X X X X X

X X X X X X X

Supporting Technologies X X X X X X X X X

X X X X X X X X X X

X

X X X X X X X X X X X

X

Source\ FAS Contractor Study, compiled from contractor lists obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and trade publications. For further details, see Pratt, Weapons Sponsorship, appendix B. a Contractors are ranked according to their FY1983 contract values. See Pratt, Weapons Sponsorship, appendix B.

technologies" in Table 5.2). Furthermore, with three exceptions, these contractors also worked on miscellaneous technologies for destroying nuclear warheads ("kill mechanisms"). Seventeen worked on technologies for destroying warheads with kinetic energy weapons (KEWs), while 14 researched directed energy weapons (DEWs) to strike attacking missiles. Nine of these contractors worked on both types of kill mechanisms. Although some stood to benefit more than others, all shared an interest in a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles. The influence of these private interests was evident prior to Reagan's Star Wars speech. A 1983 study by the General Accounting Office found that six of the eight members on the BMD panel of the Army Science Board had financial interests that could be affected by the panel's recommendations. 9 0 Similarly, an investigation by the defense inspector general's office raised serious questions regarding the lack of balanced

100

Selling

Strategic

Defense

viewpoints among the members of several panels of the DSB. The inspector general's report specifically mentioned the DSB space-based laser panel, finding no "non-supporters" of the concept on its roster. The panel's chairman, John Foster (vice-president of TRW), acknowledged this bias in his forwarding memorandum: "I should point out that this group was not one which set out to find fault. . . . [E]very member of this panel has been a strong supporter of the U.S. laser weapons program, most of us since its inception."91 As it does with many new weapons systems, the DOD relies on private firms to study and design potential system concepts. Several pre-SDI studies of conceivable missile defense architectures were conducted by BMD contractors, notably McDonnell Douglas and Science Applications, Inc. 92 These contractors analyzed assorted BMD systems, assessed various aspects of strategic arms limitations, and considered the impact of antitactical missiles (ATMs). All of these were directly relevant to the development and preliminary design of what would become the Strategic Defense Initiative. However, this parochial influence may often create a cacophony. The military-industrial complex, as a whole, is an amalgam of harmonious and discordant concerns. Defense industry interests converge toward a general acceleration of the arms race, but compete over the specific directions such an expansion might take. In the first two years of the Reagan administration, the defense industry shared a common interest in a massive defense buildup. However, among these firms and throughout the defense policy network in general, there was a distinct lack of consensus concerning new military initiatives. Deadlock In the spring of 1982, the New York Times ran a story based on a secret DOD document detailing the new administration's defense guidance for the next five years.93 The document reportedly called on the U.S. military, inter alia, to devise plans to fight and win a protracted nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Additionally, the guidance asserted that the "U.S. and its allies" should engage the Soviets in a technological arms race with the aim of eroding the Soviet economy. Reportedly, the document stated that the United States should develop weapons that "are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military competition and obsolesce previous Soviet investment." The report went on to support the development of "space-based weapons systems" and called for further acceleration of BMD systems.94 By directing the arms race into "new areas," the Reagan administration expressed its willingness to take the arms race to new heights, but this conviction did not resolve the deadlock within the defense community. To

From Hedge to Pledge

101

turn a phrase, it was not so much "Where there is a will there is a way." Rather, the collective imagination of a prolific military-industrial-R&D complex had created a situation more akin to "Where there is a will there are many ways." BMD advocates in particular could not agree on the best way to proceed. Whereas the ambiguity and multi-mission potential of the army's Sentinel/Safeguard system allowed different interests to coalesce in the 1960s, the early 1980s witnessed various contenders for a defensive first step challenging the army's traditional prerogatives. The disarray was not just a matter of competing technologies. The scope of the mission and the best political strategies for obtaining BMD deployment were also in dispute. Even those advocates who supported continental defense as the ultimate mission goal disagreed over which political path to take. Should the end goal (nationwide area defense) be promoted up front, even though it might make technological sense to begin with terminal defenses and build up? Or should they avoid, at this time, the possible political albatross of area defense and attempt to sneak it in later? This turmoil left the defense community polarized, and without a catalyst a clear solution was not assured. In the fall of 1982, an editorial appearing in Aviation Week & Space Technology noted this lack of consensus in regard to the development of space-based laser battle stations. In the absence of a presidential decree or a Soviet "Sputnik-like" event, the editorial proclaimed "there is not likely to be one."95 Apparently, in order to perform a "technological end-run" on the Soviets, the administration first had to make an end-run on the militaryindustrial complex. Indeed, top officials within the White House had been planning to do that very thing.

Circumventing the Military-Industrial Complex Analyzing the gestation of Reagan's decision to initiate his Star Wars plan has become something of a minor literary enterprise.96 These studies list many factors that may have influenced Reagan. Yet not even Reagan could likely reconstruct all the factors behind his decision and assign them their proper weight. Indeed, Reagan asserts that he "thought of it [himself]."97 This is not surprising since the concept of constructing a defense against attack is a simple corollary of a given offensive capability. However, such a statement is devoid of the influence of context on cognition. It also ignores the various factors that may have shaped this idea following such an epiphany. There are several caveats to keep in mind when reading any historical reconstruction. The contemporary histories of the Star Wars decision are based largely on interviews with participants, both in and out of government.

102

Selling

Strategic

Defense

Such recollections are often colored by paternalistic claims, attempts to cover up, efforts to jump on the bandwagon, and just plain sour grapes. In addition, reconstructions may be skewed by one's perspective as critic or supporter. With these caveats in mind, I submit my own reconstruction of this decisionmaking process based on many of these contemporary histories as well as independent research. As the preceding discussion implies, Reagan's decision to initiate a new defense-oriented strategic policy was the result of "many ideas converging." However, further study shows this confluence to have been filtered through a close-knit policy network and matched to preconceived ideas. Presidential

Predisposition

One can foray into Ronald Reagan's past and speculate about experiences that may have predisposed him to propose such a radical shift in U.S. military strategy. A 1940 film, Murder in the Air, in which Reagan starred as secret agent Brass Bancroft, portrays this hero foiling communist spies who are attempting to steal a secret weapon that "not only makes the United States invincible in war, but in so doing, promises to become the greatest force for world peace ever discovered."98 There are some uncanny similarities between elements in the film and Reagan's Star Wars vision, particularly the "existence of an airborne defensive superweapon that will make America invulnerable." Although it is fair to question the degree to which Ronald Reagan's acting roles influenced his political decisions later in life, several scholars have noted that Reagan, as governor and president, has frequently mixed Hollywood fantasy with contemporary politics." Other pre-presidential experiences also foreshadow Reagan's proclivity for strategic defense. In 1967, while governor of California, Reagan visited Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory where Edward Teller shared with the future president his dream of constructing a strategic defense system. 100 Presumably, Teller also shared his nightmare—the Soviets might deploy such a system first.101 During his 1976 bid for the Republican nomination, Reagan expressed his abhorrence for the MAD doctrine. Two years later, while delivering one of his syndicated radio addresses, Reagan warned: "If the Soviets should push the button there is no defense against them—no way to prevent nuclear devastation of their targets here in the United States."102 Consistent with the civil defense gap popular among conservatives in the late 1970s, Reagan cited Soviet civil defense preparations as evidence that the Soviet Union rejected the mutual hostage relationship underlying the ABM Treaty. In contrast, Reagan apparently believed that the United States was foolishly adhering to a MAD doctrine.103 George Keyworth, science adviser to the president during the period 1981-1986, described Reagan's qualms about deterrence as "visceral, not

From Hedge to Pledge

103

intellectual." 104 Couple this with a belief that the Soviet Union is governed by a bunch of "godless monsters" who place a lower value on human life than do U.S. officials, and the mutual hostage relationship would appear to be a disadvantageous position for U.S. leaders. 105 That is, the supposedly greater willingness of Soviet leaders to accept high levels of casualties and the relative lack of U.S. defenses would leave U.S. leaders open to some form of nuclear blackmail. One can dispute the basis for these beliefs, but Reagan's possession of them may have predisposed him toward a greater emphasis on defensive measures. Reagan believed that a nuclear war—at least in terms of a massive exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union—would "destroy virtually the civilized world we live in." The prevention of such a disaster, Reagan asserted, was one of the major challenges of our time. 106 Yet he was openly skeptical of traditional attempts at dealing with this challenge through arms control. In this belief Reagan was strongly influenced by The Treaty Trap, a book written by an old friend, Laurence Beilenson. 107 Convinced that the Soviets were striving for military superiority over the United States and had used previous arms control agreements to their advantage, Reagan felt that the key to arms control favorable to the United States would be a major commitment to the buildup of U.S. military forces. As he reportedly confided to his advisers: "If we release the forces of our economy to produce the weapons we need the Soviets will never be able to keep up. And then, and only then, will they become reasonable and willing to seriously consider reductions in nuclear weapons." 108 Apparently these beliefs—the dream of a winning weapon, the potential devastation of nuclear war, abhorrence of MAD, fervent anti-communism, disdain for previous arms control agreements, and a belief that the U.S. could win an arms race with the Soviet Union—predisposed Reagan toward a policy initiative like Star Wars. 1 0 9 In addition, most chroniclers of the genesis of Reagan's Star Wars speech point to a triggering event that occurred early in Reagan's campaign for the 1980 Republican nomination. In the summer of 1979, Reagan visited the headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) underneath Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado. 110 Accompanying Reagan was Martin Anderson, a policy adviser to the campaign, and Douglas Morrow, a longtime acquaintance of Reagan who had arranged the tour through his friend, General James Hill, then commander of NORAD. After their tour of the massive underground complex, Reagan and Anderson queried the commander about what would happen if the Soviets were to fire a single missile targeted on a U.S. city. The commander answered that although missile would be detected shortly after launch, "We can't stop it." 111 Reagan later recalled his impression of the visit in an interview with Robert Scheer: N O R A D is an amazing place—that's out in Colorado, you know, under

104

Selling Strategic

Defense

the mountain there. They actually are tracking several thousand objects in space, meaning satellites of ours and everyone else's, even down to the point that they are tracking a glove lost by an astronaut that is still circling the earth up there. I think the thing that struck me was the irony that here, with this great technology of ours, we can do all of this yet we cannot stop any of the weapons that are coming at us. I don't think there's been a time in history when there wasn't a defense against some kind of thrust, even back in the oldfashioned days when we had coast artillery that would stop invading ships if they came. 112

The visit produced more than irony. On the flight home, Reagan and Anderson decided that perhaps it was time to reexamine the ABM idea. 113 Shortly after his return from NORAD, Anderson began to draft a policy memorandum on foreign policy and national security. (There were actually three memorandums: one on economic policy and another on energy policy; the third tackled defense policy.) 114 Although not an expert in national security affairs, Anderson wanted to attempt to write a defense policy based on what he "thought the American people would like if they could have their wishes come true." (Emphasis added.) 11S In his memorandum, Anderson laid out three alternative courses that the new administration, if elected, could follow in the 1980s to redress what was described as the "rapidly shifting balance of military power vis k vis the Soviet Union and other nations." 116 One approach would be to "rely on Soviet good intentions. . . . But this, as we know, is dangerous folly." Another would be to "match the Soviet buildup." However, "substantial increases in the attack missile capability of the United States would be a powerful, emotional issue to deal with politically—especially by Reagan." The third alternative would be to "develop a protective missile system." Anderson noted in the memorandum that the idea of defending against enemy missiles before they could strike U.S. soil is "probably fundamentally far more appealing to the American people than the questionable satisfaction of knowing that those who initiated an attack against us were also blown away." 117 Such a step, Anderson wrote, should be "taken in conjunction with a reasonable buildup in our conventional forces, and an acceleration in development of cruise missiles, laser beam technology, and conventional nuclear missiles like the MX." He ended this section of the memorandum by suggesting that the "technical feasibility and cost" of the concept could be evaluated by "the group of national defense experts we have working with us." 118 Included within this group were Richard Allen, Dick Whalen, Eugene Rostow, Henry Rowen, Ken Adelman, Roger Fontaine, Daniel Graham, Robert Strauzs-Hupe, Fred Ikl6, Edward Teller, and William Van Cleave. 119 Copies of the memorandum were distributed to Reagan and key staff people. According to Anderson, "Reagan embraced the principle of missile defense wholeheartedly." And "all the other key people in the campaign,

From Hedge to Pledge

105

especially Ed Meese, also supported the idea." 1 2 0 Nevertheless, John Sears (then in charge o f the Reagan campaign) and Michael Deaver were against Reagan proposing such a radical shift in traditional nuclear policy during the c a m p a i g n . 1 2 1 The idea would have to await a more politically opportune time. During the same summer as the N O R A D trip, Senator Wallop sent Reagan a draft of his article calling for the development and deployment of space-based laser battle stations for defending the United States against ballistic missile assault. Apparently Reagan was impressed with the article, returning the draft "with comments and annotations." 122 Richard Allen was enthusiastic about the defense concept and urged the inclusion o f a B M D plank in the 1 9 8 0 Republican party platform. 1 2 3 Although less encompassing than the proposal expressed in Anderson's memorandum, the wording in the p l a n k — " m o r e modern A B M technologies"—was precisely crafted to embrace exotic technologies, and its inclusion in the platform put the party on record as supporting "vigorous" efforts in B M D . 1 2 4 After Reagan's election win in November 1980, top aides turned their focus to staffing a new administration. As evidenced by the internal opposition to Reagan's Star Wars plan that surfaced on the heels of his March 1983 speech, not all of those appointed to key positions in foreign and defense policy areas were B M D zealots. That apparently was not intended, for according to Anderson: "Nobody who opposed the idea [building missile defenses] was knowingly placed in any of these positions." 1 2 5 A little more than two years passed from the time o f Reagan's inauguration until his Star Wars decree. During this period, the new administration was busy forming a government as well as initiating and reacting to many different issues, including strategic defense. As noted earlier, the new administration's Strategic Force Modernization Plan incorporated an invigorated strategic defense effort. However, this plan was more closely aligned with the traditional development o f that program. Meanwhile, the idea of a radical departure from postwar nuclear strategy was being kicked around by Reagan and a small group of highly placed administration officials, who had come to their posts "deeply committed to building missile defenses." 1 2 6 This small band carefully cultivated the seed that was planted with Anderson's memorandum, nursing the idea along and preventing bureaucratic opponents from strangling the notion before it saw the light of day. Policy

Orchestration

In the Reagan White House, the senior staff met daily (Monday through Friday) from 8 : 0 0 to 8:30 A.M. to discuss the current agenda. But these meetings were too unwieldy and short to allow any serious policy

106

Selling Strategic

Defense

development. Instead, a small group of key advisers to President Reagan got together in what was termed "special policy meetings." 127 Edwin Meese, as counselor to the president, chaired the meetings, which initially included Martin Anderson, Richard Allen, Edwin Harper, George Keyworth, and a few of Meese's top aides. The emphasis at these sessions was on "what ought to be done." (Emphasis added.)128 It was at these special policy meetings that the missile defense concept was cultivated and kept alive. Although Keyworth was something of a reluctant partner in the group, the rest were deeply committed to the idea.129 In July 1981, outside the official government, four members of Reagan's kitchen cabinet (Karl Bendetsen, William Wilson, Joseph Coors, and Jacqueline Hume) began meeting regularly with Edward Teller, Lowell Wood, and members of the High Frontier group.130 Congregating at the offices of the Heritage Foundation (a conservative think tank established in 1973 largely by the efforts of Joseph Coors), these individuals considered the '"looming threats' to the country and to the Reagan presidency." They saw the paramount danger as being the menace of a Soviet nuclear attack.131 In early September 1981, a series of phone calls among Bendetsen, Graham, Meese, and Anderson led to a special meeting on missile defense. 132 These men, along with Edward Teller, George Keyworth, and Edwin Thomas, met in Meese's office on September 14. According to one member of this group: "There was a general agreement that we should shift our nuclear defense strategy from reliance on total offense . . . to a policy that relied on both offense and defense to deter a nuclear war." (Emphasis in original.)133 The outside advisers to the special policy group went to work on a formal recommendation. Bendetsen and Graham presented a preliminary report in mid-October to Meese, Thomas, and Anderson. Anderson described their briefing as "glowing and encouraging." 134 However, a fissure had been opening among these outside advisers over the best way of proceeding. Greatly influenced by the views of Teller and Keyworth, Bendetsen and other members of the kitchen cabinet decided not to recommend the quick-fix concept advocated by General Graham's High Frontier group.135 Instead, these old friends and trusted advisers to Ronald Reagan recommended a project, along the lines of the Manhattan Project, aimed at speeding up development of promising technologies for negating a Soviet missile attack.136 According to Graham, another factor in this schism was Teller's insistence on a role for third-generation nuclear weapons, such as the X-ray laser under development at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. 137 This split was critical in terms of access to the president: When the outside advisers met with Reagan in January, Graham was not among them. On January 8, 1982, Bendetsen, Hume, Wilson, Coors, and Teller briefed the president on their recommendations for strategic defense. Also present at this meeting were top aides—Meese, Anderson, Keyworth, and William P. Clark. (Clark had taken over for Richard Allen, who had been

From Hedge to Pledge

107

forced to resign under scandal four days earlier.) 138 Aside from their conviction that technological advances had made missile defenses feasible, members of Reagan's kitchen cabinet emphasized the appeal they believed such a policy would hold for the American public. 139 The question apparently left for the president after this meeting was not whether to adopt such a policy but when.1*0 This group reportedly met with the president and top aides on several other occasions to discuss this issue prior to Reagan's Star Wars speech. 141 After making a public appeal on "Firing Line" to meet personally with the president, Teller was granted a private meeting on September 14, 1982. 142 However, aides cut this meeting short after Teller made a pitch for increased funding for work on the X-ray laser, characterizing his case as a desperate race with the Soviets to be the first to develop such weapons. 143 Teller also played a role in recruiting a crucial ally for strategic defense among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From October 1982 through January 1983, Teller met several times with Admiral James Watkins, then chief of naval operations. Teller's exuberance over the prospects of new technologies for missile defense incited an enthusiastic response from the admiral. 144 A devout Catholic and reportedly deeply involved in the debate then raging over a draft pastoral letter of the American Catholic bishops proclaiming the immorality of nuclear weapons, Watkins seized upon the moral implications of such a shift in strategy. 145 In December 1982, Reagan met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of regularly scheduled meetings established by William P. Clark. Frustrated over a House vote the same month blocking funds for the MX missile, 146 Reagan raised this question: "What if we began to move away from our total reliance on offense to deter a nuclear attack and moved toward a relatively greater reliance on defense?" 147 With some continued prodding, the Joint Chiefs began to get the message, and one phoned Clark after the meeting to see if they had just been given their "marching orders." Clark answered affirmatively and then gave Robert McFarlane, deputy national security adviser at the time, his marching orders. 148 Anticipating a major policy initiative, Clark wanted McFarlane to research strategic defense and come up with some ideas quickly. 149 In short order, McFarlane assembled a small team made up of staff assigned to the National Security Council to work actively on the issue. A seasoned insider on national security affairs, McFarlane knew that such an initiative would require some support from the Pentagon. Another member of the national security staff, Rear Admiral John Poindexter, contacted Admiral James Watkins. 150 As noted earlier, Teller's influence, coupled with the concerns raised by the Catholic bishops' letter, had primed Watkins for a new direction in U.S. strategic policy. In consultation with McFarlane, Watkins wrote a secret navy white paper, known to insiders as the "Freedom from Fear" paper, 151 in which he questioned the ethics of

108

Selling Strategic

Defense

nuclear deterrence and endorsed Teller's approach to a missile defense. 152 Reporter Hedrick Smith explained: "McFarlane and Poindexter encouraged Watkins to push his views with the other Chiefs. 'You can be assured that your input is always going to be welcomed' at the White House, Poindexter told Watkins."153 The Joint Chiefs of Staff were scheduled to meet with Reagan again on February 11, 1983. On February 5, they met to discuss what they would present at the meeting the following week. Because the Joint Chiefs had expressed opposition in congressional testimony to the administration's Dense Pack basing scheme for the MX—which had produced some political embarrassment—the "chiefs may have been keen on finding another issue on which they could reestablish rapport with the President." 154 After the December meeting, they could not have been wholly ignorant of the president's inclination toward a greater emphasis on strategic defense. Under these circumstances, Watkins offered his proposal. Watkins suggested that new technologies had made it prudent to reconsider the possibility of defending against a Soviet ICBM attack. He stressed that such a move would be gradual, in consultation with NATO allies, and combined with offensive weapons. Watkins also noted his belief that the United States had a "technological advantage" over the Soviet Union in these weapons concepts. Additionally, Watkins underlined the moral dimension by asking: "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them?" 155 (When Reagan heard this line, he was so taken by the phrase that he used it in his Star Wars speech.) The chiefs agreed to place Watkins's proposal on the agenda. Although orchestrated by Clark and McFarlane, the meeting on February 11 appeared unrehearsed. It began with an assessment of current trends in the arms race: the troubled MX; two new Soviet mobile ICBMs; the Catholic bishops' letter; increasing anti-nuclear demonstrations in the United States and Europe. Even though the Trident SLBM and strategic cruise missile programs were going strong, those in the room must have felt the policy of nuclear deterrence was under siege. In this context, General John Vessey, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, presented Reagan with several options for a new strategic vision. According to Herken, these included "shifting the emphasis in deterrence from land-based ICBMs to submarine-launched ballistic missiles, bolstering conventional forces, and increasing reliance on an expanded navy," as well as Watkins's proposal for "forward strategic defense."156 Reagan pressed the chiefs for their views on strategic defense. Although there is some dispute over whether or not the individual chiefs were polled for their views on the issue, all the chiefs apparently endorsed the general concept of a stepped-up research program in strategic defense.157 As if on cue, McFarlane interjected: "Mr. President, the implications of this are very, very far-reaching. If it were feasible to find an alternative basis for maintaining our

From Hedge to Pledge

109

security against nuclear ballistics [sic] missile weapons, that would be a substantial change, obviously." 158 Apparently this was the confirmation Reagan had been waiting for before initiating a policy he and top aides had been incubating for some time. The chiefs left the meeting with the impression that there would be more study and discussion before any new policy was announced. They were unaware that within hours of the meeting, McFarlane and a few members of his NSC team would begin drafting a public announcement of a new strategic vision for a defense-dominant future. 159 The Annex Immediately after the February 11 meeting, Reagan, with Clark's encouragement, became resolute in declaring a new national policy on strategic defense. 160 However, Reagan's view of a new strategic policy went well beyond the general concept discussed with the Joint Chiefs. According to top aides, Reagan described a vision of a world without nuclear weapons. 161 McFarlane was reluctant to move so fast on such a radical shift in military policy, but Reagan and Clark overruled him. 162 McFarlane explained the reason: "Reagan's view of the political payoff was sufficient rationale as far as he was concerned. By that I mean, providing the American people with an appealing answer to their fears." 163 Indeed, public appeal seemed to be critical in the thinking of Reagan and the top aides promoting a strategic defense initiative. Anderson had written his memorandum with the premise of designing a defense policy that he believed the public would want if dreams could become reality. 164 When the kitchen cabinet lobbied the president on strategic defense, Bendetsen had keyed on its public appeal. Watkins had struck the chord of populism with his rhetorical question about saving rather than avenging lives. Clark saw such an initiative as having the potential of becoming a major legacy of Ronald Reagan's presidency. 165 It had all the elements of a major drama—a bold vision of a new beginning emerging out of the mire of a failing arms race. In short, it was a script no actor could refuse. The national security staff received its instructions. Initially, McFarlane and his small team at the NSC were to "pull something together" on strategic defense, presumably a list of options and implications. 166 However, shortly after a speech in Orlando, Florida, in which the president described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," McFarlane received new instructions. He was to draft an addendum to the "threat speech" scheduled for the end of March announcing the president's new strategic vision. 167 The "threat speech" referred to Reagan's annual address in support of his defense buildup. The speech typically painted a grim assessment of Soviet militarism and the task of meeting that challenge. According to one official,

110

Selling Strategic

Defense

Reagan did not want to go to the people with the same old pitch—he wanted to offer them a new hope for an eventual end to the nuclear nightmare.168 It was not the traditional hope that previous presidents had offered—that arms control might eventually lead to a nuclear-free world. Reagan's dream saw the development of defensive technology as eventually rendering such weapons "impotent and obsolete." The threat speech also provided the appropriate context for making a dramatic pitch, a perfect setting for launching a bold initiative. In addition, Clark and Michael Deaver thought an uplifting address might renew support for the military buildup.169 Working quickly and secretly, McFarlane began drafting what was known to only a few as the "annex." Power Cocoon

Hedrick Smith aptly described the drafting of the annex as a policy developed in a "power cocoon."170 The secret was kept from all but a few of Reagan's top aides and perhaps a half dozen members of the national security staff. 171 Even the secretaries of defense and state were given only a few days notice of such a major revision of military doctrine.172 The president's science adviser, George Key worth, was shown a copy of the draft on March 19, five days before the speech would air. Recognizing the implications of what the president wanted to propose, Keyworth was initially reluctant to lend his support, but after some discussion with McFarlane and some soul searching, Keyworth decided to be a team player.173 In the last few days before the speech would air, as top officials in Reagan's own administration were being notified of the content of the annex, there were some efforts to block or change the speech. For proponents of the speech, it was perhaps fortuitous that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of defense, and key defense officials Richard Perle and Fred IkM were in Lisbon, Portugal, for a NATO meeting. As it was, Perle called Keyworth and requested he "fall on his sword" to block the speech. 174 But the best the internal critics could muster was a twenty-four-hour delay of the broadcast.175 Top officials—notably Perle, Ikl6, Shultz, and Richard Burt—were able to get a few "verbal Band Aids" applied.176 Essentially, these consisted of a few sentences added to the speech to gloss over some of the major implications left largely unaddressed in the original draft. Wording added to assure NATO allies of continued U.S. commitment to their vital interests and defense was coupled with a promise of future consultation. Another equally ambiguous assurance was directed toward the Soviets. While acknowledging that defensive systems coupled with offensive systems could be seen as an attempt to achieve a first-strike capability, Reagan asserted in his speech that "no one wants that."177 Several top officials, including McFarlane, tried to convince the president to narrow the scope of his proposal to defending against nuclear-

From Hedge to Pledge

111

armed missiles. Although Reagan yielded to the inclusion of a sentence referring to "our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles," he reportedly refused to rephrase the wording in an earlier paragraph that called for the "means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." (Emphasis added.)178 This ambiguity reflected in the speech became a source of confusion and contention among both proponents and opponents of Star Wars. From Vision to

Program

In his speech, Reagan was deliberately vague concerning what technologies and approaches his vision might entail. He directed only that "a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program" be initiated.179 This lack of definition allowed all three groups selling exotic BMD concepts to claim some measure of victory. 180 The interests of these groups and individuals went beyond paternalistic claims. The jockeying for a role in defining the president's vision—and for a chunk of the funding that would follow—had already begun. On April 18, 1983, President Reagan signed a national security study directive (NSSD 6-83) commissioning two study groups to assess the technologies and strategic implications of his decree. 181 The first panel— officially called the Defense Technologies Study Team (DTST) but known informally as the Fletcher panel after its chairman, James Fletcher— recommended "a major technology development effort" to accelerate the advance of missile defense technology.182 The Fletcher panel also supported a multi-tiered defense structure and took an optimistic view of the technological hurdles involved, concluding that "a robust BMD system can be made to work eventually."183 The second panel was also informally named after its chairman, Fred Hoffman, but was known officially as the Future Security Strategy Study (FS 3 ). The Hoffman panel recommended that in the absence of near-term options for area defense of the continental United States, other "interim" options be adopted, such as partial defenses and anti-tactical missile defenses.184 After the Fletcher and Hoffman panels had submitted their reports and an interagency panel headed by Franklin C. Miller had completed its own review of the new policy, President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative in January 1984.185 Contractors with a major stake in strategic defense contracting were well represented on these study groups. Forty-three representatives from twentyfour strategic defense contractors formed the majorities on both the Fletcher and Hoffman panels. 186 The plan as initially adopted by the administration consolidated over thirty ongoing BMD and related R&D programs and called for a multibillion-dollar R&D effort to facilitate a decision to deploy strategic defenses early in the next decade.187 The new initiative was so expansive that,

112

Selling

Strategic

Defense

as Donald Hafner surmised: "Almost everyone's favorite BMD technology or strategic purpose could find a place within the multi-tiered defense system." 188 Instead of choosing among competing options the initiative provided common ground for many diverse interests by redefining the official goals of strategic defense.

Missile Defense Missionaries The preceding narrative reveals that the concept initiating a dramatic shift toward strategic defense was nurtured for several years by a close-knit coterie dedicated to this mission. Policymaking by a small cohesive group often results in the type of psychological dynamic that Irving Janis has termed "groupthink," described as "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." 189 The policymaking style adopted by White House missile defense missionaries was not unique to the drafting of the annex, nor to the issue of strategic defense. A similar style of policymaking resulted in the Iran-Contra fiasco. Allen Greb has noted that the ambitiousness of the SDI goal and the technical uncertainty involved "were greatly magnified by the lack of serious science advice in the White House." 190 However, this lack of input was not because of any system failure—it came about by design. Those involved had only to look outside the cocoon for such advice. There was no scarcity of serious scientific study and alternative viewpoints in the larger defense policymaking network. The issue was actively studied and the results were being discussed both publicly and privately. Exotic technologies for BMD were the source of considerable debate in Congress at this time, and the issue was receiving more press coverage than at any time since the ABM Treaty. The insulated approach adopted by these BMD zealots was taken, in part, as a precaution against what they saw as a likely source of opposition. Well aware that bureaucracies dislike radical change,191 these proponents believed that a major policy shift dictated that they bypass traditional channels. However, this rationale may also be used to discount conflicting views and to sidestep legitimate objections. Working inside a cocoon, insulated from dissent, these individuals sought to short-circuit the system.192 However, in this case, seclusion was also apparently selected in order to achieve a dramatic effect. Reagan and his chief aides had a well-honed sense for the dramatic. The annex was carefully crafted to be a bolt from the blue. A leak would have not only mobilized the opposition, it would also have spoiled the surprise. Even if some of these missile defense missionaries believed that Reagan's professed goals for missile defense would prove unattainable, there

From Hedge to Pledge

113

was little inclination on their part to shy away from a technological arms race with the Soviet Union. To the contrary, they believed such a race was unavoidable if the United States wished to regain strategic superiority. One top official involved explained the SDI process this way: "The idea was to make a decision and then make it happen."193 These individuals were not seeking moderation. Their belief in the inherent popularity of their idea obviated the need to seek a broader coalition. Instead, they sought confirmation for preconceived ideas and some assurance that they were not simply, in a colloquially appropriate phrase, wishing upon a star.

Notes 1. Johnson, National Party Platforms of 1980, p. 207; and Anderson, Revolution, p. 87. 2. See Van Cleave and Thompson, Strategic Options for the Early Eighties, pp. xv-xvi; and Robinson, "Rancor Erupts Within Transition Team," pp. 21-23. 3. See O'Toole, "Reagan Interested in Speeding Development of Spacebased Lasers." 4. Ibid. 5. See HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, pp. 899-901. 6. SASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, p. 4127. 7. Ibid. 8. Conference Report HR 97-311, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, p. 82; and SASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, p. 4127. 9. SASC, Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Strategic Force Modernization Programs, p. 414. 10. Ibid., pp. 414-415. 11. HASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, pp. 899-901; and the appendix to this book. 12. SASC, Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Strategic Force Modernization Programs, pp. 414-415. 13. Ibid. 14. See Robinson, "Administration Pushes ICBM Defense," pp. 113116ff. 15. Conference Report HR 97-749, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983, p. 121. 16. President's Commission on Strategic Forces, Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, April 1983. 17. Ibid., especially pp. 12-17. 18. Ibid. 19. See, for example, Aldridge, The Counterforce Syndrome, pp. 37-38. 20. Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, p. 14. 21. See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Intelligence and the ABM, especially pp. 7, 52-63; also Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 210; and Herken, Counsels of War, p. 271.

114

Selling

Strategic

Defense

22. Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, p. 9. 23. See, for example, Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry"; and Graham, High Frontier. 24. See, for examples, Mossberg, "Soviets Could Build Laser Weapon to Kill Satellites in 5 Years, Pentagon Aide Says," p. A6; statement by Senator Wallop, Congressional Record, May 13, 1982, p. S5093; statement by Senator Dole, Congressional Record, May 13, 1981, p. S4979. 25. See DOD's Space-Based Laser Program, p. 13. 26. O'Toole, "Reagan Interested in Speeding Development of Space-based Lasers"; also "Beaming in on New Weaponry," pp. 67-68. 27. Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 77. 28. DOD's Space-Based Laser Program, p. 13. 29. See statement of Senator Wallop, Congressional Record, May 13, 1981, pp. S4975-S4976. See also Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 80. 30. See Congressional Record, May 13, 1981, p. S4980; and Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 80. 31. See Conference Report HR 97-311, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, pp. 76-78, 93. 32. See Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 81; and Conference Report HR 97-749, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983, p. 125. 33. See Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," pp. 20-21; and Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 83-84. 34. For discussion, see Broad, "Laser Wars on Capitol Hill," pp. 10821083. 35. HASC, HR 97-482, Department of Defense Authorization for Act, 1983, p. 132. 36. Ibid. 37. See SASC, SR 97-330, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, pp. 106-107. 38. Congressional Record, May 13, 1982, p. S5092. 39. Conference Report HR 97-749, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983, p. 125. 40. Ibid., p. 126. 41. This term was popularized in Broad, Star Warriors. 42. See Codevilla, While Others Build, pp. 84-91. 43. Ibid. 44. Review of the DOD Space-Based Laser Weapon Study, pp. 9-10. 45. See, for example, "Free-Electron Laser Technology Gains," pp. 6 0 65. 46. See Robinson, "Advance Made on High-Energy Laser," pp. 25-27; Broad, "Reagan's Star Wars Bid," pp. Alff; and Scheer, "Flaws Peril Pivotal 'Star Wars' Laser," pp. Alff. 47. Broad, "Reagan's Star Wars Bid," pp. Alff. 48. See Robinson, "Advance Made on High-Energy Laser," pp. 25-27. 49. See Broad, Star Warriors, pp. 96-128. 50. See, for examples, Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, pp. 282-284; Taylor, "Endless Generations of Nuclear Weapons," pp. 12-15. 51. See Broad, Star Warriors, pp. 96-128. 52. Herken, Counsels of War, p. 71. 53. See, for example, Teller, The Legacy of Hiroshima; and Teller, Better a Shield Than a Sword. 54. See Broad, Star Warriors, p. 118.

From Hedge to Pledge

115

55. See Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 22. 56. See Lakoff and York, A Shield in Space? p. 11. 57. See, for examples, Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars"; Greve, "Star Wars," pp. A1-A21; and Broad, "Reagan's Star Wars Bid," pp. Alff. 58. Broad, "Reagan's Star Wars Bid," pp. Alff. 59. See, for example, Scheer, "Flaws Peril Pivotal 'Star Wars' Laser," pp. Alff. 60. Off-the-record interview with a former government official, 1/7/87. 61. See, for example, SDIO, Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, p. 1-2. 62. See Greve, "Star Wars," pp. 20A-21A. 63. Ibid. 64. See Graham, High Frontier, pp. ix, 21-22. 65. Ibid., chap. 1. 66. See ibid., p. x; and Codevilla, While Others Build, pp. 8 2 - 8 3 . BAMBI's principal contractors were General Dynamics, Hughes, and TRW. See Klass, "Missile Defense Keyed to Technology (High Frontier Study)," p. 79. 67. See SASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, p. 4880. 68. Ibid., pp. 4893, 4896-4902. 69. Ibid., p. 4899. 70. See ibid., pp. 4635, 4874. 71. Ibid. 72. For examples, see Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 22. 73. Greve, "Star Wars," p. 20A. 74. See Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," pp. 22-25. 75. Stein, From H-Bomb to Star Wars, pp. 59-60. 76. See Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 83. 77. Bosma, "A Proposed Plan for Project on BMD and Arms Control," p. 1. 78. See SASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, p. 4900; Wallop, "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense," pp. 13-21; Teller, Better a Shield Than a Sword, chap. 2. 79. For expressions of this concern, see SASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, p. 4893; Wallop, "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense," p. 21; and Teller, The Legacy of Hiroshima, p. 129. 80. For details of this periodical search, see Pratt, Weapons Sponsorship, chap. 6, note 212, and chap. 7, note 82. 81. See Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment, p. 306; also Graham and Fossedal, A Defense That Defends, p. xiii. 82. Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment, p. 306. 83. See, for example, the editorials in Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 26, 1982, p. 13; and June 14, 1982, p. 13; also Codevilla, While Others Build, p. 86. 84. Robinson, "Advance Made on High-Energy Laser," pp. 25-27. 85. See the appendix to this book. 86. See Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 22. 87. SASC, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, p. 4148.

116

Selling Strategic

Defense

88. See Blechman and Utgoff, "Fiscal and Economic Implications of Strategic Defense," pp. E2-E10. 89. See Pratt, Pike, and Lindley, "SDI Contracting," pp. 111-112. 90. Comptroller General, Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can be Better Assured. 91. Review of the DOD Space-Based Laser Weapon Study, accompanying letter. See also House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Defense Science Boards: A Question of integrity, pp. 7-8; and House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Favoritism and Bias Within the Defense Science Board and Other Military Advisory Panels. 92. See Pratt, Weapons Sponsorship, Appendix B. 93. Halloran, "Pentagon Draws up First Strategy for Fighting a Long Nuclear War," pp. Al, A12. 94. Ibid. 95. Gregory, "Military Power in Space," p. 7. 96. See, for example, Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars"; Greve, "Star Wars"; Smith, The Power Game; Boffey, et al., Claiming the Heavens-, Stein, From H-Bomb to Star Wars; and Anderson, Revolution. 97. See Hoffman and Cannon, "President Overruled Advisers on Announcing Defense Plan," pp. A1-A7. 98. Boffey, et al., Claiming the Heavens, p. 3. 99. Ibid., p. 6. 100. Ibid., pp. 7 - 8 . 101. For an early expression of this nightmare, see Teller, The Legacy of Hiroshima, p. 129. 102. See Boffey, et al., Claiming the Heavens, p. 8. 103. See, for example, Scheer, With Enough Shovels, pp. 31, 232-234, 240-441, and 250-251. 104. See Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 23. 105. See Scheer, With Enough Shovels, p. 31. 106. See Reagan's speech to the 1976 Republican convention quoted in Anderson, Revolution, pp. 70-71. 107. Beilenson, The Treaty Trap. Also see Scheer, With Enough Shovels, pp. 99-103; and Anderson, Revolution, pp. 74-75. 108. Quoted in Anderson, Revolution, p. 74. See also Nelson, "Presidential Text," p. A2. 109. Martin Anderson, a longtime policy adviser to Ronald Reagan, lists a similar set of reasons underlying Reagan's adoption of an initiative in strategic defense. See Anderson, Revolution, pp. 72-76. See also Stein, From H-Bomb to Star Wars, p. 77. 110. See, for example, Scheer, With Enough Shovels, p. 104; Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 20; Greve, "Star Wars," p. 21A; Anderson, Revolution, pp. 80-83. The following narrative was also supported by an interview with Martin Anderson, 3/14/88. 111. Anderson, Revolution, p. 83. 112. Scheer, With Enough Shovels, p. 104. 113. Anderson, Revolution, p. 83. 114. Interview with Martin Anderson, 3/14/88. 115. Anderson, Revolution, p. 83. 116. Anderson, "Policy Memorandum No. 3," p. 5. 117. Ibid., pp. 5-7. 118. Ibid., p. 7 - 8 .

From Hedge to Pledge

117

119. Ibid., p. 10; and interview with Martin Anderson, 3/14/88. 120. Anderson, Revolution, p. 86. 121. Interview with Martin Anderson, 3/14/88. 122. See Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 20. 123. Interview with Martin Anderson, 3/14/88. 124. See Anderson, Revolution, p. 88. 125. Ibid., p. 89. 126. Ibid. 127. Ibid., pp. 88-90. 128. Ibid., p. 90. 129. Interview with Martin Anderson, 3/14/88. 130. Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 21; Broad, "Reagan's Star Wars Bid," pp. Alff. 131. Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 21. 132. Anderson, Revolution, p. 94. 133. Ibid., pp. 94-95. 134. Ibid., p. 95. 135. Se Greve, "Star Wars"; and Broad, "Reagan's Star Wars Bid," pp. Alff. 136. See Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 21. 137. See Broad, "Reagan's Star Wars Bid," pp. Alff. 138. See Anderson, Revolution, p. 95. 139. See Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 21. 140. See Anderson, Revolution, p. 96; and Smith, The Power Game, p. 605. 141. See Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 22; and Broad, Star Warriors, p. 122. 142. Compare Lakoff and York, A Shield in Space, p. 12. 143. Off-the-record interview with a former government official, 1/7/87. See also Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 22; and ibid., pp. 1213. 144. See Greve, "Star Wars," p. 21A. 145. Ibid. 146. See Smith, The Power Game, p. 605. 147. Quoted in Anderson, Revolution, p. 97. 148. Ibid. 149. See ibid., p. 97; and Smith, The Power Game, p. 605. 150. Ibid. 151. See Boffey, et al., Claiming the Heavens, p. 18. 152. See, for example, ibid., pp. 17-18; and Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 23. 153. See Smith, The Power Game, p. 607, and note 12. 154. Lakoff and York, A Shield in Space? p. 17. 155. See Smith, The Power Game, p. 607; and Greve, "Star Wars," p. 21A.

156. Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 24. 157. Compare Greve, "Star Wars," p. 21A; and Smith, The Power Game, pp. 607-608. 158. Quoted in Smith, The Power Game, p. 608. 159. See Greve, "Star Wars," p. 21A; Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 25; Smith, The Power Game, pp. 609-610. 160. See Smith, The Power Game, p. 609. 161. Ibid.

118

Selling Strategic Defense

162. Ibid., pp. 609-610. 163. Ibid. 164. Anderson, "Policy Memorandum No. 3," p. 85. 165. See Smith, The Power Game, p. 604. 166. See Greve, "Star Wars," p. 21A. 167. Ibid. 168. Off-the-record interview with a former government official, 1/7/87. 169. See Smith, The Power Game, p. 610. 170. Ibid., p. 609. 171. See Greve, "Star Wars." 172. See ibid., p. 20A. 173. See Smith, The Power Game, pp. 611-6512; and Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," pp. 25-26; confirmed by off-the-record interview with a formal government official, 1/7/87. 174. See Smith, The Power Game, p. 614. 175. Ibid., p. 614. 176. See ibid., pp. 614-615; Greve, "Star Wars," p. 21A. 177. Ibid.; also Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," pp. 26-27. 178. For text, see Reagan, Public Papers, p. 448. For the dispute, see Smith, The Power Game, pp. 612, 614-615; Greve, "Star Wars," p. 21A; and Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 26. 179. Reagan, Public Papers, p. 448. 180. See, for examples, Scheer, With Enough Shovels, pp. 294-295. 181. See Pike, The Strategic Defense Initiative, p. 45. 182. Reprinted in House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1985, pp. 773-802. 183. Testimony of James Fletcher quoted in Hafner, "Assessing the President's Vision," p. 95. 184. Ibid., p. 97. 185. See SDIO, Report to Congress, p. 1-2. 186. See Pratt, Pike, and Lindley, "SDI Contracting," pp. 131-132. 187. See Pike, The Strategic Defense Initiative, p.47. 188. Hafner, "Assessing the President's Vision," p. 104. 189. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, p. 9. 190. Greb, "Short-Circuiting the System," p. 23. 191. See Anderson, Revolution, p. 93; Greve, "Star Wars," p. 20A; Herken, "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," p. 25. 192. Several others have used this metaphor in this regard. See Smith, The Power Game, p. 603; also Greb, "Short-Circuiting the System." 193. See Greve, "Star Wars," p. 20A.

6

Rethinking the Military-Industrial Complex: The Case of Strategic Defense Why did a president of the United States initiate a major scientific and technological effort—the size of eight Manhattan Projects—to develop technologies and capabilities expressly prohibited by an arms control treaty that had been in force for only a decade? My inquiry began with this question. Having traced the evolution of U.S. BMD policy in the post-World War II period, I now offer some answers. In brief, the ABM Treaty deprived BMD sponsors of the one system that had provided a central focus for their efforts. Under the treaty, the Safeguard ABM system could not be expanded into a militarily significant system (even if technological deficiencies could have been overcome). Defense advocates persistently criticized the ABM Treaty for institutionalizing a MAD policy and depicted other official efforts at arms control as giving the Soviets a strategic advantage. In the latter half of the 1970s, supporters of missile defenses began promoting exotic new technologies for the BMD mission. At the same time, backers of these technologies were searching for a mission that would justify the increasing cost of continued development. By the early 1980s, a wide range of BMD options was being enthusiastically pushed by different factions within the defense policy community. As a result of their efforts, BMD sponsors helped generate demands for new initiatives in U.S. strategic policy by depreciating the traditional alternatives (e.g., arms control) while making fantastic claims about their preferred alternatives. Nevertheless, none of these BMD alternatives enjoyed broad support within this community. In 1980, a new president was elected, one predisposed to technological solutions in general and ballistic missile defense in particular. Soon after taking office in 1981, a small band of top advisers to the new president began, with his blessing, to orchestrate a radical shift in U.S. strategic policy. In the end, none of the BMD options floating about at the time was singled out for presidential favor. Instead, the vision Ronald Reagan outlined in his March 23, 1983 address was so encompassing that virtually all of these competing BMD alternatives could find a place under this new policy umbrella. The program initiated in response to his vision forged an alliance among advocates of various BMD options. Their interests became bound to a

119

120

Selling Strategic

Defense

new strategic vision—known unofficially as Star Wars—that threatened to take the arms race to truly new heights. This brief description of how Star Wars came to pass provides an adequate summary. However, a greater understanding of the processes involved, the interests at stake, and the implications these raise for current and future strategic defense policy requires further explication of the complex decisionmaking structures underlying the weapons acquisition process. In the pages remaining, I (1) further elaborate the context within which Reagan formed his vision; (2) analyze the role of BMD sponsors in shaping this context; 3) discuss the ability for presidential initiatives to forge alliances among competing yet compatible interests; (4) characterize the Star Wars alliance and raise some possible implications for the SDI program; and (5) propose some general propositions, derived from this study, for U.S. strategic defense policy in particular and the arms race in general.

U.S. BMD Policy: In and Out of the Mainstream Since Sputnik catalyzed a large part of the defense community in 1957, the U.S. government has maintained a significant research program in ballistic missile defense. However, the scope of this program narrowed over the years. Early BMD programs, such as DARPA's Project Defender and the army's Nike-Zeus, were initially concerned with nationwide protection for civilian as well as military targets. At least officially, these goals were pared to the more tractable and technically more feasible goals of light area defense in the last half of the 1960s. Safeguard, with its multifunctional nature, served as a transitional program to the still more limited goal of point defense for landbased missiles. In the aftermath of the ABM Treaty, grandiose defensive schemes all but evaporated from the official U.S. BMD program, leaving behind a significant R&D effort largely justified as a hedge. Reagan's SDI brought U.S. BMD policy full circle, back to the goals of the late 1950s. Protecting the nation against nuclear attack had remained a dream for some individuals within the defense community, but not since the early days of Project Defender had the pursuit of comprehensive nationwide defenses received such official sanction. Shadow

Programs

However, outside the official BMD program there existed what may be called "shadow" programs—R&D projects with potential BMD applications but funded under a variety of other government programs. Some were even funded outside of the DOD, as exemplified by some of the DOE-sponsored work in inertial confinement fusion. In certain cases, the technologies had originally been part of the official BMD program, but were eventually pushed out as

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

121

program goals narrowed and pulled out as interest in other applications increased (e.g., tri-service lasers). Technology may be exceedingly flexible regarding its end use, especially at the level of basic research. This malleability makes it difficult to delineate, with a high degree of precision, the extent of these shadow programs. However, some indication of their breadth may be attained from a review of selected programs.1 If this case study is any guide, the review understates the extent of B M D shadow programs. Figure 6.1 depicts aggregated data for fiscal years 1962-1983. The gap between total strategic defense-related spending and officially recognized B M D funding indicates the degree to which other military R & D programs shadowed the official B M D program. According to this measure, a major source for the growth of these shadow programs stemmed from the rapid acceleration of HEL funding beginning in the early 1970s. For the period 1973-1983, shadow programs averaged nearly a halfbillion dollars per year ($447.5 million in constant 1982 dollars). In the latter half of the 1970s (1977-1980 inclusive), the aggregate funding for shadow programs was actually greater than the total funding for the official B M D program. The sharp decline in shadow program funding in 1985 (the first full fiscal year following the initiation of SDI) illustrates the consolidation of the majority of strategic defense-related funding (both official and shadow funding) under the administrative structure of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO). In effect, the unofficial became official. Celebrating this official recognition were those B M D sponsors whose missile defense proposals were considered out of the mainstream before Reagan's Star Wars speech. Many such sponsors had a personal stake in these shadow programs. For years they had advocated new initiatives in U.S. strategic defense policy, often resorting to improper channels to promote their preferred policy alternative. Thus, the growth in shadow programs throughout the 1970s graphically depicts the inflationary pressures on the arms race emanating from an increasing supply of alternative technologies and rising demands for initiatives in strategic defense.

Increasing

Supply

The military-industrial complex is structured in such a way that when a weapons system is being removed from service, (1) a new one is being deployed, (2) its follow-on is in advanced development, and (3) future concepts are being actively researched in the laboratories. However, the dynamism of military R & D produces a greater supply of new concepts and technologies than there are follow-on slots to fill. This dynamic intensified with the prodigious growth in the military-industrial complex in the postwar period. As one longtime participant in and observer of the arms race

122

Selling

Strategic

Defense

Figure 6.1 Official and Shadow BMD Programs Millions in 1982 Dollars 2200

400

200

0

. . •

•

! 1

1

1 1

1 ! I 1

fNciTinior^cooìO'-tfNn^'iDiDr^cooìO^cMnq'ir) Fiscal Year Source:

See the appendix to this book.

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

123

explained: "Back then [the 1950s] it seemed like there were too many problems [military threats] and too few solutions [weapons systems]. Now, the inverse seems true. There are many more solutions than there are problems." 2 This overabundance of new weapons concepts increases the competition for potentially new missions. Beam weapon concepts were struggling against the flood of new weapons ideas being considered in the 1970s. In the competition for potential near-term applications, these extraordinary technologies were being passed over in favor of more prosaic, less risky designs. A coincidence of interests developed between some of the sponsors of these novel technologies and longtime supporters of nationwide defenses: an exotic technology for an exotic mission. Partisans of these imaginative schemes attempted to sell their ideas to others—and any effective sales technique involves defining the problem in a way that best suits the solution being marketed. Getting

MAD

and Shaping

Demand

The early 1980s were marked by a besieged nuclear policy and a heightened fear of nuclear war. BMD advocates played an active role in redefining U.S. policy as problematic and raising public concern about the nuclear threat. After all, it was a staunch BMD advocate who originally coined the term "MAD" and thus defined a tragic condition of the nuclear age as the intentional policy of the U.S. government. BMD advocates rallied against the ABM Treaty, arguing that it formalized this immoral policy. Historically, public aggrandizements of the military threat have preceded changes in U.S. force structure. Here again, BMD sponsors portrayed the U.S. government as foolishly adhering to a MAD policy while the Soviet Union prepared to "fight and win a nuclear war." 3 Rumors of Soviet superweapons were spread by sponsors of analagous U.S. designs as evidence of the Soviet drive for superiority. Many missile defense advocates also believed that the United States was falling behind in the nuclear arms race and needed to make a "technological end-run" to regain superiority over the Soviet Union.4 As elaborated in the previous chapter, it was in the context of the ABM debate that the question of land-based ICBM survivability was miscast. In order to justify the deployment of Safeguard, the threat to ICBMs was overblown to such a degree that the capacity to destroy a large percentage of the land-based missile force was labeled a first-strike capability by Melvin Laird and others.5 BMD sponsors proceeded to promulgate this redefinition of a first strike and advocated active missile defenses to deal with this threat. The actions of BMD advocates were not the sole cause for a compelling reassessment of U.S. nuclear policy. Proponents of other strategic choices also raised potent reasons for reflection and change. For example, the nuclearfreeze proposal achieved considerable success while drawing public and

124

Selling

Strategic

Defense

official attention to the need to stop the nuclear aims race. Other events also focused public attention on nuclear policy in the early 1980s. Candid comments about fighting and winning a nuclear war, made by newly appointed Reagan administration officials, fanned public fears about war in the nuclear age. Mass protests over nuclear weapons policy had spread across the United States and Western Europe. A pastoral letter of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops highlighted the immorality of nuclear war. And theories of nuclear winter reemphasized the suicidal nature of such a war. Still, marketing strategic defense was an integral part of this milieu. Although heightened public concern over nuclear weapons policy did not always favor the policy alternatives BMD sponsors were selling, it helped to create a climate conducive to a major policy shift. The Pushers and Pullers The BMD sponsors identified in this book are shown to have mobilized resources to foster research, formulate policy, influence opinion, and enact legislation favorable to missile defenses. They are the individuals and groups that pushed and pulled new missile defense concepts through the policy process. Many weapons sponsors stand to benefit monetarily, professionally, or organizationally from governmental sanction for their preferred BMD policies. Part of the supply side of the weapons acquisition process, they attempt to sell their particular product as a solution to a national security problem. Weapons marketers such as these put the "push" in "technological push." On the demand side of the armament process, government officials proclaim the needs of the state. Simple demand side models that depict a unitary national actor making decisions about what weapons to buy in an exceptionally rational environment are too sterile and ignore the complex undercurrents in the policy process. Nevertheless, it is necessary to account for the potential of actors to act in the interest of the state. 6 Parochial interests are major factors in determining policy, but are insufficient for governmental sanction. Ultimately, weapons decisions must be grounded in the national interest. 7 As nebulous as the concept of national interest is, it still constitutes the primary medium for legitimizing weapons policy. As Ted Greenwood emphasized in his study about the making of MIRV, individuals in decisionmaking positions have a "responsibility to determine policy according to their perception of the national interest."8 By articulating national security needs, these individuals help pull new weapons systems through the weapons acquisition process. However, various interconnections within the policy formation process often make it difficult to distinguish between pushers and pullers. An individual may be a pusher one day and a puller the next. "Revolving doors,"

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

125

through which defense contractors and the Pentagon exchange personnel, connect supply and demand.9 Private interests serve on governmental advisory bodies, and personal ties often develop between buyer and seller. The presence of conflicting associational ties poses a problem for the researcher: How does one assess an actor's motivation when there is the appearance of conflicts of interest? It may often be difficult to discern whether the person is acting out of an expectation of personal gain or a sense of patriotism. One must look beyond the stated objectives. As J. P. Morgan once observed: " A man always has two reasons for doing anything—a good reason and the real reason." Cynicism aside, it is incumbent upon the researcher to delineate associational ties and raise their potential implications. Throughout this case study, I have described assorted connections linking various B M D sponsors. At times this sponsorship appears to have been largely unorganized. However, periodically there have been coordinated efforts for promoting B M D schemes through various networks. After the A B M Treaty, the army's B M D O sponsored promotional activities and research aimed at increasing support for deploying an active defense of land-based ICBMs and other hardened military targets. B M D contractors, including researchers at several think tanks, wrote internal policy papers, published reports, and participated in conferences expounding the merits of missile defenses. Aviation Week & Space Technology continued to be a major vehicle for promoting the army's BMD programs. Efforts to sell more exotic defensive schemes were coordinated largely outside the government, although government officials were often involved. In the early 1980s, the laser lobby, Teller's Star Warriors, and Project High Frontier were the most prominent organizations sponsoring radical designs for missile defense. The associational networks of these policy-planning groups are depicted in Figure 6.2. These networks reflect primary associations (e.g., personal connections and money) as well as primary information flows (lobbying, ideas, and publications). However, many personal networks and secondary associations are not depicted in the diagram. The policy-planning groups form a nucleus for coordinating and promoting particular weapons policies. They link resource institutions with opinion-making and decisionmaking institutions. Their resources (personnel, expertise, ideas, and money) stem mostly from the military, the defense industry, and anti-communist organizations. In these groups, industry personnel are brought together with current and former government officials to plan and promote their preferred weapons policy. The foundations and think tanks associated with these groups are all linked to the right wing of U.S. politics. These institutions sponsor research generally supportive of increasing U.S. military might and advocate a hardline policy toward the Soviet Union. The opinion-making institutions connected with the promotion of these policy preferences are also generally uncritical of new weapons systems. For

126

Selling Strategic

Defense

Figure 6.2 BMD Policy-Planning Networks Resources

Research

Policy-Planning Groups

Opinion-Making

Decisionmaking

(P - Personal, t - Money, I - Ideas/Influence, PR - Policy Reconmendations) Source: The basic framework for this diagram was adapted from Dye's elite policy-formation process. See Dye, Mho's Running America, p. 245.

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

127

the most part, the links tying these institutions to the policy-planning group involve information flows. Opinion-making institutions primarily receive and disseminate information and reports (classified and unclassified). However, in a few cases, personnel attached to opinion-making institutions participate in the policy-planning group. In the years just prior to the initiation of Star Wars, all three of these groups had ties to governmental institutions facilitating their lobbying efforts, which were directed toward both the legislative and executive branches. Of the three, the Star Warriors had the greatest access to the inner core of the Reagan White House. These groups also had personal ties with other policy-planning groups (e.g., the Committee on the Present Danger), and private associations (e.g., the American Security Council) that support U.S. military superiority in order to contain the Soviet Union. These intergroup ties extend the networking web over a broader set of elites. In sum, the primary BMD networks were associated with organizations that sponsored efforts to maintain U.S. military superiority, held particularly virulent anti-Soviet views, and scorned previous efforts aimed at controlling the arms race. A common theme running throughout these groups was a belief in the need to contain the Soviets by maintaining technologically superior weaponry. In addition, BMD offered an opportunity to take the nuclear arms race into a new arena where the United States might have an advantage. All of these policy-planning groups were connected to organizations that stood to benefit from government adoption of their policy proposals. These connections tend to highlight the potential for corruption and conflicts of interests, but focusing on these features misses a more basic point. Richard Bamet stated the problem succinctly: "Corruption is not nearly so serious a problem as sincerity." 10 The men (they are almost invariably men) in these organizations believe that what they are doing is right and in the national interest. That they should benefit from such enterprise is viewed as only natural because that is their business. The main issue is that this policy-formation process facilitates the confluence of private and public interests (allowing supply to shape demand), which biases the weapons acquisition process towards particular policy alternatives at the expense of others.11 This bias is further underscored by linkages among ideological organizations charged with perpetuating a particular conception of national interest and those organizations that profit from the arms race and others that decide upon armament policy. By linking policy, profits, and beliefs, the networks depicted in Figure 6.2 give the impression of a blueprint for a perpetual-motion machine. Given the persistence of the nuclear arms race, such an impression may not be far off the mark. However, this picture reveals only part of the process. The structure of the weapons-acquisition process pits competing interests against one another.

128

Selling Strategic

Defense

Besides competition over profits and budgets, there are competing strategic premises, as well as disagreements concerning political strategies for achieving particular armament goals. In the case of the policy-planning groups described in Figure 6.2, all held a general interest in shifting U.S. strategic policy toward a greater emphasis on strategic defense. Yet relations among these groups were largely uncoordinated, often competitive, and sometimes antagonistic. Even within their respective organizations, relations were far from harmonious. Frequently, one faction was selling certain technologies for a BMD mission, while associates were pushing an alternative project (e.g., AS AT). These diverging objectives often resulted in internal polarization concerning the best way to secure government support for a sponsor's corporate technologies. Furthermore, the parochial interests of sponsors of exotic BMD designs clashed with the interests of those pushing more prosaic missile defenses. Although all of these interests could be accommodated in a grandiose version of a layered defense system, few at the time believed such a costly undertaking to be politically and/or technically feasible. Moreover, certain BMD advocates believed many of the competing schemes to be a waste of resources that would delay or jeopardize their own plans. Without some kind of catalyst, it appeared unlikely that these competing interests could form a significant coalition powerful enough to redirect the arms race into a new arena. It took a presidential initiative to pull these disparate advocates into alignment.

Strategic Defense: A Case of Initiative The actions of top elected officials or their appointees have played a critical role in the ebb and flow of U.S. BMD policy. In the case of program expansion, presidential initiatives have been especially important. Reagan's Star Wars speech marked the second major presidential initiative involving missile defense, raising BMD once again to the stature of a "presidential issue." 12 Much in the way President Eisenhower handled decisions in the wake of Sputnik, Reagan sought to overcome bureaucratic resistance and fiscal limitations by placing the BMD program above the normal competition among military programs. In both cases (early Project Defender and SDI), the broad goals of protecting the nation against nuclear attack became a centralizing theme for pursuing a variety of new technologies that could possibly alter the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the expression of presidential interest, strategic defense became a rallying point around which various advocates of technologies and/or missions could congregate. As discussed later, however, much of this congregation appears to be sycophantic.

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

129

Although there were similarities between the two programs, the trigger which opened a policy window differed. In the Eisenhower era, Sputnik served as the precipitating event for the president to take extraordinary actions. In contrast, the change of administration in January 1981 inaugurated an administration attentive to a compelling problem (MAD), predisposed to a particular solution (BMD), and willing to pursue a dramatic departure from its immediate predecessors. The political context in which these two initiatives were launched contrasted in other ways as well. Sputnik served as a catalytic event for much of the scientific-technical community. Hence, Eisenhower acted in concert with his science advisory structure, itself in the process of being constructed. This community became increasingly polarized on the nuclear issue during the often bitter ABM debates in the 1960s. The signing in 1972 of a treaty restricting the deployment and development of ABMs in the United States and the Soviet Union widened this division, a feature that further distinguished the two initiatives. Reagan and his small cadre of missile defense missionaries, with a few exceptions, bypassed the science advisory structure. Indeed, Reagan's Star Wars speech appears to have been an attempt to rally opinion within this community in the absence of a Sputnik-like event. The proliferation of BMD sponsors throughout the 1970s, however, facilitated this discontinuous shift in policy by providing a ready-made constituency. As previously discussed, the search for alternatives to traditional nuclear policy was becoming more compelling, partly as a result of actions by BMD sponsors in redefining the problem and partly because of an oversupply of new military technologies in search of a mission. Faced with competing alternatives, Reagan's missile defense missionaries chose not to decide on a single alternative. Instead, they orchestrated a radical shift in military policy to create a program that enveloped these competing interests. Reagan's decree to provide nationwide protection from missile attack opened a vortex for a confluence of many diverse and often competing interests. However, this kind of elite orchestration may have a limited tenure. When presidential interest wanes (as it appears to be in the first year of the Bush administration),13 the character of this coalition will likely become more important in shaping the final outcome of this presidential initiative. Coalition

and

Cohesion

The potential stakes involved in SDI are enormous, even in terms of modern military programs. Hundreds of billions of dollars could be expended on the deployment of an extensive strategic defense system. The strategic stakes are no less encompassing. Because it claims to change the very nature of the postwar strategic environment, Star Wars may provide a new sense of

130

Selling Strategic Defense

mission for this policy community. 14 By its sheer breadth and potential, Star Wars has forged many competing interests into an alliance. Various interests relegated to the shadows of BMD policy in the 1970s are now allied with interests formerly connected to a BMD policy of substantially lesser scope. In addition, the growth of the SDI program in its first few years has attracted many new interests. Thousands of jobs and substantial profits currently depend on the future of Star Wars. Many varied and diverse interests have found a place as particular building-blocks in this expansive scheme. There is a common interest among many powerful interests within the military-industrial complex, giving SDI tremendous momentum. However, the cohesion of this alliance is highly dependent on continued growth of the program. The inability of the Reagan administration to secure congressional approval for the full SDI budget requests raises questions regarding the durability of this alliance. 15 Viewed from afar, this union appears extremely powerful, but a closer look reveals a variety of fractures. Irreconcilable differences? One area of contention within this alliance involves reconciling the wide range of strategic interests with the publicly stated goals of the program. Considerable differences exist among BMD sponsors concerning the proper role defenses would play in an integrated strategy. As SDI's founder, Ronald Reagan has expressed his desire to achieve a defense-dominant world. Taken at face value, his statements concerning how this will be accomplished appear to support both a competitive and a cooperative transition from the current offense-dominant situation. 16 However, this confusion over Reagan's preferred path for reaching his dream may be more apparent than real. As noted in Chapter 5, Reagan premised his vision of Star Wars on a powerful faith in the technological prowess of U.S. industry. This faith, coupled with a belief that a technological arms race was not inherently destabilizing, left Reagan and his fellow BMD missionaries little reason to eschew an arms race even if cooperation appeared to be a remote possibility. More to the point, a belief that successful cooperative arrangements may be imposed by negotiating from a position of relative strength resolves the discrepancy others perceive between these two paths by portraying competitive advantage as complementary to cooperative agreements. Put simply, Reagan may have believed that a defense-dominant world could be achieved with or without Soviet cooperation. However, such true believers constitute a minority among strategic defense advocates. The goal of a defense-dominant world became the central theme for BMD sponsors for a simple reason: A member of this minority was elected president of the United States. For the majority of BMD advocates, defense is secondary to the goals of assuring the destruction of the enemy and limiting damage in a nuclear war. Such advocates see strategic

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

131

defenses as one element of a strategy for nuclear "victory."17 While they desire invincibility, proponents of a defense-dominant world desire invulnerability; potential adversaries are sure to take note of the difference. During the last forty-odd years, a few individuals have advocated using arms control to create the conditions for an effective defense or using defense as an insurance policy in a disarmed world.18 Some have also sponsored various proposals for "defense-protected build-downs," whereby active defenses help protect the smaller stockpiles of offensive weapons achieved through negotiated reductions. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, the predominant view in the arms control community since the 1960s has been that missile defenses complicate rather than complement arms control. As a result, strategic defense advocates tend to be composed of those individuals who see little hope in achieving meaningful cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union. Underlying this conviction is a particularly virulent Sovietphobia buttressed by a state-centric realism that premises national security on unilateral actions. The combination of competing strategic premises and a general disinclination toward arms control leaves the majority of BMD sponsors ambivalent about the fortunes of the true believers in their quest for a defense-dominant world. On the one hand, the claim of a cooperative transition to that new world poses a conceptual problem for the bulk of strategic defense advocates. For them it is inconceivable that the United States could trust the Kremlin to abide by such an arrangement and the Star Wars program reflects this skepticism. According to one official charged with reviewing the program, not one of the projects he analyzed was directed toward Reagan's aspiration for a cooperative transition to a defense-dominant world.19 On the other hand, the enormous technological claim that must be made for a competitive transition goes beyond what many of these same advocates believe is achievable. Effective nationwide defenses must be "cost-effective at the margin" (the Nitze criterion) in order for a defense-oriented transition to take place under competitive conditions.20 Even staunch supporters of Star Wars admit that a determination of whether or not this goal could ever be met will require many more years of intensive study, which pushes the research program into the next century.21 However, there is a way around the enormous technological challenge the Nitze criterion poses for the various interests involved in Star Wars. Plans for sequential deployment permit deployment decisions to be made on individual components rather than on the system as a whole. 22 This handy dodge corresponds with the sentiments of the Hoffman panel, which championed "interim options." 23 And the Bush administration appears content to avoid the challenge of Reagan's vision 24 These assorted aims and rationales among BMD supporters lend a kind of "used car sales" quality to the entire debate—that is, say whatever it takes to sell the product. As a consequence, Star Wars advocates often make

132

Selling

Strategic

Defense

inconsistent, ambiguous, and contradictory statements about the mission goals and ultimate aim of the program. Such meandering rhetoric serves to dispel the notion that Star Wars is a coherent program and further underscores the fact that a centralizing theme had to be imposed from above rather than emerging on its own from these competing interests. Bureaucratic rivalry. Star Wars refueled the rivalry between the army and the air force concerning jurisdiction over missile defense. Since the McElroy decision in 1958, which left the matter somewhat ambiguous, the army has been the primary military sponsor of BMD. However, in the past, with a few exceptions, BMD schemes were ground-based. The incorporation of spacebased systems, a medium for which the air force has traditionally held primary responsibility, provided the air force with a new jurisdictional claim. Moreover, while the U.S. BMD program lumbered through the 1970s as a hedge, there was little incentive for either service to fight over it. With the renewed emphasis on area defense in the 1980s, a potentially vast new military command suddenly opened up. The question of which service would command this new ground caused inter-service rivalries to flare up. Previous chapters revealed varying degrees of ambivalence within the military services concerning the strategic defense mission. Although this judgment is somewhat harsh for the army, strategic defense never became part of that organization's essence. The creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization did little to settle this bureaucratic infighting—and in some ways made the situation worse. SDIO was not placed under the army's command, nor was it created as a separate service. Instead, it was jointly staffed, essentially balanced between army and air force personnel. To compound the injury, members of the army's BMDSCOM were somewhat chagrined when an air force general was placed in command of the new organization.25 The failure to create an independent service dedicated to strategic defense (similar to the Soviet Union's PVO) or to place the command wholly within one or the other service left this rivalry as a potential point of cleavage. This infighting could be quelled by establishing some kind of strategic defense dyad with separate army and air force commands. The navy could even push for a defensive triad by adding sea-basing to the scheme. The tripartite structure of the U.S. military services makes this a possibility for any potentially vast new arena. However, if the result is a program with tremendous redundancy built into it to accommodate competing service interests, the projected cost of the system will likely grow well beyond the amount politically feasible in an era of tight budgets and relaxed East-West tensions. Defection. Although sponsors of various technological solutions were initially swept into the Star Wars program, a massive R&D program

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

133

naturally produces incentives and avenues for defection. As the research develops, some highly funded programs will be found to hold less promise than others. Firms that have invested in the technological losers will resist efforts to cut funding for these projects—in fact, large firms often try to protect their investment by insisting on heavy penalties in the event of project termination. When less successful technologies continue to receive funding, capital is drained away from firms backing technological winners, fostering resentment.26 Interests also diverge between organizations that benefit primarily from R&D projects and those that stand to gain much more from production. As candidate technologies reach higher stages of development, rifts will likely occur between the weapons labs and small research firms on one side, and the weapon manufacturers and the services on the other. The former stand to gain from the continuation of high levels of funding for basic research, especially in the more exotic technologies. If production for near-term deployment were to begin, research funds would most likely shrink. In contrast, the large defense contractors and military services share an interest in moving programs out of R&D and into production, creating more profits and billets. Additionally, alternative missions for particular technologies create incentives and opportunities to defect. As discussed previously, many supporters of novel technologies considered the BMD mission too difficult and a potential threat to their investment, leaving some organizations split between BMD champions and backers of nearer-term, less difficult missions. Many of these individuals continue to see their organizations' interests better served by pursuing less risky missions. As executive euphoria over missile defense recedes, demands for alternative missions will reassert themselves. Another path for defection leads to alternative missile defense missions. For instance, Lockheed, the prime contractor for ERIS (exoatmospheric reentry-vehicle interceptor system), would benefit substantially from a limited deployment of ERIS interceptors justified as a defense against accidental launches of ballistic missiles. Similarly, McDonnell Douglas, developer of HEDI (high endoatmosperic defense interceptor), would profit from an ALPS (accidental launch protection system) incorporating its interceptor. Indeed, both Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas officials have been pressing these options.27 Such proposals also fit into plans for interim options. In short, competing interests and assorted avenues for defection weaken a potentially powerful alliance of interests. Because this alliance was forged by presidential initiative and did not form independently within the defense community, it is unlikely to survive the waning of executive interest. In the past, after initially being quite broad, the scope of the U.S. missile defense program narrowed. Some BMD R&D projects continued under the constricted policy, many were pushed into the shadow of official missile defense programs, others were canceled. In the wake of the Reagan

134

Selling Strategic

Defense

administration, a similar fate may await SDI. Nevertheless, many before Reagan dreamed of a defense-dominant world; in a frightful world, it will likely remain a compelling dream.

Conclusion In bringing this book to a close, I want to reiterate the impressions of two other analysts of the weapons acquisition process. Restating the sentiments of James Kurth, Ted Greenwood noted that in analyzing case studies, the researcher is faced with a posteriori over determination and a priori underdetermination. Retrospectively, several alternative explanations always seem, logically and plausibly, to be sufficient explanations for the observed outcome. But none of the theories alone, nor even a combination of them, is sufficient to permit reliable prediction of future policies. 28

In the attempt to understand and explain the outcome of a particular decisionmaking process, the analyst often applies rational explanations to what is often an irrational process. Not all action is the product of purposeful behavior. Additionally, the product of one process may in some ways be the byproduct of another process left unexplored by the analyst. This study has striven to provide some of the broad context within which policies regarding systems of strategic defense developed in the postwar period. Regardless of the degree to which Reagan considered this broader context before announcing his Star Wars decree, it is within this setting that his initiative must struggle to survive beyond his tenure. In the preceding chapters, I have used several analytical frameworks and concepts in order to convey a sense of the complex character of the defense policymaking community and its decisionmaking structures. Examining these attributes is a way to explore the "silences of policy" and study how the range of policy options is delimited.29 I have also sought to provide greater perspective on a contemporary policy issue by placing it within the framework of competing strategic premises and exposing some of the characteristics of those selling strategic defense. The task remaining is to raise some possible implications of this study by adding to an already long list a few generalized propositions concerning the weapons acquisition process and the nuclear arms race.30 The first three propositions address some of the technological dynamics involved in the arms race and the difficulties these pose for achieving effective arms control. Proposition 1: New weapons concepts are sold in a market of fear and hope.31 Technological competition in an arms race is a dynamic process that

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

135

fosters both fear and hope: the fear that the other side will achieve a technological breakthrough and the hope that your side will. This paradox stimulates aberrant behavior among certain individuals frustrated with the normal flow of the weapons acquisition process. Proponents of novel technology are able to play on feelings of both technological paranoia and technological chiliasm: Frankenstein and Utopia in political debate—a politics that touches nightmares as well as dreams. In this atmosphere, gaps and gangs characterize the marketing behavior of peddlers of non-traditional technologies and missions. The instigators of the gaps and gangs of the late 1970s were largely technological enthusiasts motivated by both interest and ideology, producing a kind of "parochial patriotism." These were technologies with which they were intimately familiar. Couple this with a belief in technology's potential to liberate a MAD world and a virulent mistrust of the Soviet Union, and the elements exist for BMD zealots. On one front, they portrayed themselves as battling technological pessimists, entrenched bureaucracy, and, worse yet, believers in the immoral philosophy of MAD. 32 On another front, they saw themselves as battling the Soviets—locked in a desperate race to maintain a technological lead over what they perceived to be an intractable and dangerous enemy. Proposition 2: Contact between the scientific and intelligence communities generates technological change by increasing opportunities for both research and innovation. In an antagonistic competition like an arms race, the tendency of one side to perform a worstcase analysis of the other side's actions leads to another proposition concerning the dynamics of military technology. The nature of both intelligence gathering and basic scientific research involves high levels of uncertainty. The suspicion that the other side may be hard at work developing a particular technology presents scientists with an avenue to receive funding (or greater levels of it) for research projects given low priority or judged as questionable by other sources of scientific capital. Besides an additional source of financing, close contact between the scientific and intelligence communities inspires innovation. Scientific advances have often benefited from the open interchange of ideas, both within and without national boundaries. Arms competition and its concomitant security classification often set up barriers to the scientific interchange of ideas, which mitigates some potential sources of innovation. The interconnections between the intelligence and technical communities regenerate some of this dynamic. As illustrated in Chapter 4, scientists requisitioned to survey technical intelligence concerning the other side's research are exposed to new ideas and concepts. Proposition 3: Incremental arms control is like squeezing a balloon. In the midst of such technological dynamism, efforts aimed at controlling

136

Selling

Strategic

Defense

the arms race face tremendous obstacles. New military technologies often possess a potential for multiple military missions, posing a major problem for arms control strategies designed to chip away at the arms race in a piecemeal fashion. Arms limitations squeeze technologies into other programs not covered by such treaties. Furthermore, proponents of new technologies often seek additional support for their projects by attaching these technologies to other potential missions. These technologies begin to shadow the official treaty-limited policy, thus providing pressures for expansion. In the face of a constant threat of nuclear annihilation and an international environment of mutual distrust, the development of new technologies with obvious parallels for B M D applications will inevitably raise fears that the other side is cheating as well as bring cries of salvation from technological millenarians. Incremental arms control is thus analogous to squeezing a balloon: A squeeze in one place is compensated by an expansion somewhere else. The preceding three propositions point to a technological arms race with few limits, but this study has exposed other features that suggest constraints to an unbounded and unending arms race. The final three propositions address some of these barriers. Underlying propositions four and five is the perception that the militaryindustrial complex at times appears to work as an "iron triangle." 33 Yet at other times, when there is a discontinuous shift in policy such as Star Wars, normal channels within the military-industrial complex are circumvented in order to establish non-incremental changes. This suggests that there are two modes of policy formulation at work: the problem-solving technocratic mode and the crisis mode. 34 In the technocratic mode, policies are generated and adopted largely within the normal policymaking process. However, these policies will differ in only minor ways from previous policies. In the crisis mode, radical changes in policy are imposed on the normal policymaking process. The final proposition is more intuitive, but is connected with the two previous propositions because it appears to be the source of the crisis to which Star Wars was a response. In brief, by the early 1980s, the nuclear arms race faced a crisis of legitimacy that the normal technocratic mode of policy formulation, with its competing interests, was unable to deal with effectively. In the absence of a catalytic event, state intervention was necessary to overcome parochial interests and direct the arms race into a new arena of competition. Proposition 4: The military-industrial complex is not a rogue elephant. From this analysis, the military-industrial complex does not appear to be a rogue elephant crashing through the jungle in whatever direction it pleases. Instead, it appears that this behemoth must be kicked and

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

137

prodded onto another path. And, once there, it may come crashing back to the path with which it is more familiar. At the strategic level, offensive deterrence is the one path that has been institutionalized within the military, industrial, laboratory, and governmental apparatuses for defense policy. Along this well-trampled path, this elephantine apparatus requires little or no external prodding to keep on running, but it resists efforts to move into uncharted territory. More to the point, modernization is welcomed as long as it fits within the old military paradigm.35 As a corollary, weapons sponsors will have greater success getting a new weapons policy adopted if it does not require a radical change in direction. The only sustained successes for BMD sponsors were those missile defense schemes that closely paralleled the traditional path of offensive deterrence (e.g., protecting deterrent forces)—and even here they achieved only limited success. When the BMD goal veered away from the traditional path, the resources of assorted bands of BMD advocates alone were insufficient to sustain and expand the program. Proposition 5: Strategic defense is a presidential issue. The historical ambivalence of the military services toward strategic defense couples with technological parochialism and competing strategic premises among weapons sponsors to make an alliance of BMD advocates unlikely in the absence of a strong centripetal force. Interest in alternatives to offensive deterrence arises naturally enough in the office of the presidency. The burden of being the person who would "push the button" would necessarily prompt reflections on the alternatives. Seeking a defense-dominant world or a disarmed one represents two alternative paths for preventing the "unthinkable." Traditionally, presidents have chosen to concentrate on arms control/disarmament as an alternative to an increasingly MAD arms race. As demonstrated previously (as well as in Ronald Reagan's diplomacy following Reykjavik), conceptually these two alternative paths (strategic defense and arms control) need not be exclusive. Yet even under Reagan's watch, the SDI program virtually neglected this approach. Pursuing strategic defense as the primary alternative would require a radical change in the course the nuclear arms race has taken until now. In the United States, the office of the presidency has the capability of orchestrating such a reorientation. Indeed, the two strategic defense initiatives in the postwar period were launched at the behest of a president. But interests wane and administrations change. Whether the newest reorientation (Star Wars) can survive a fall from presidential favor has yet to be demonstrated. The foregoing analysis suggests that its chances are not very good. Apparently, ardent presidential interest is a necessary but insufficient condition for the vigorous pursuit of strategic defense.

138

Selling

Strategic

Defense

Proposition 6: The nuclear arms race may be "running out of gas." Early in my research, I attended a dinner party where the keynote speaker suggested that Star Wars was an indicator that the nuclear arms race was "running out of gas." At first this struck me as quite glib. However, as I continued my research and reflected upon it, the more it seemed to capture the essence of what was happening. 36 The nuclear aims race is presently more than forty years old—quite a long time as arms races go. 37 Each new advance in offensive weapons has been fairly quickly imitated or countered by the other side. 38 The result has been, predictably enough, a condition of strategic stalemate. With thousands of nuclear warheads on each side, marginal changes are strategically insignificant and any advantage is soon eliminated. Curiously enough, that is why Star Wars is a signal that the race may be losing its momentum. As Jeremy Stone put it: "Nothing less than Star Wars can keep the contest moving in a strategically significant way." 39 Comments by some of SDI's staunchest supporters tend to attest to this perception. Many premised their advocacy of exotic BMD schemes on a strategic stalemate in offensive weapons competition. 40 In his seminal study of arms races, Samuel P. Huntington suggested that a qualitative arms race may become, in the words of William James, "permanent, unceasing"—and this is one possible future we face. 41 However, Huntington also pointed out that there are at least four ways an arms race may come to an e n d : " . . . in war, formal or informal agreement between the two states to call off the race, or victory for one state which achieves and maintains the distribution of power which it desires and ultimately causes its rival to give up the struggle." 42 It should go without saying that no one wants the current race to end through the utter devastation of the first of these means. The last of these means has been shown to be exceedingly unlikely, and a failed Star Wars would serve as a further illustration of the futility of chasing victory. The economic costs of pursuing strategic superiority, although presently more apparent in the Soviet Union, are no less relevant to the current political climate in the United States. Increasing concerns over the U.S. deficit has produced a politics of constraint. Regardless of whether one assigns the blame for the current situation to four decades of arms competition, new initiatives in the strategic arms race are now less likely to win a broad consensus. The military-industrial complex will likely continue with plans to modernize conventional armament and even produce some follow-on systems at the strategic level. But the heretofore influential drive to achieve strategic advantage appears to be weakening on both sides. A formal agreement to call off the race, whether or not it was accompanied by disarmament, may yet happen. Indeed, the INF agreement, which entered into force in 1988, set some new and encouraging precedents for future disarmament agreements.

Rethinking

the Military-Industrial

Complex

139

But, if a formal ending eludes us, the arms race could, like an old soldier, just "fade away."43 If so, a potential irony of Star Wars may be that while it may never succeed in rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," it may at long last drive home the lesson that the nuclear arms race has itself become "impotent and obsolete."

Notes 1. For the basis of this budget history, see Congressional Record, April 4, 1985, p. E1444; and the appendix to this book. 2. Interview with Dr. Herbert F. York, 9/30/87. 3. See Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," pp. 21-35. 4. See Graham, High Frontier, p. ix. 5. Interview with Jeremy Stone, 4/17/87. See also Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Intelligence and the ABM, especially pp. 7, 52-63; also Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 210; and Herken, Counsels of War, p. 271. 6. See Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, pp. 3-43; Katznelson, "Rethinking the Silences of Social and Economic Policy," pp. 307-325; Senghaas, "Arms Race Dynamics and Arms Control in Europe," pp. 10-11. 7. See Greenwood, Making the MIRV, p. 52. 8. Ibid. 9. For example, see Pratt, Pike, and Lindley, "SDI Contracting," pp. 133-134. 10. Barnet, The Economy of Death, p. 62. 11. See also Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting, p. 77. 12. See Barber Associates, The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974, especially pp. X-13-X-17. 13. See Kempster, '"Star Wars' Cuts Confirmed by White House," pp. A l A16. 14. See Broad, Star Warriors, p. 47. 15. See, for example, Broder, "Key Arms Funding Issues Resolved"; Eaton, "$299 Billion in Defense Funds Ok'd," p. A4. 16. See, for example, statements in Arms Control Today (November 1986), p. 10; and Reagan, Public Papers, pp. 447-448. Also see the criteria set down in Nitze, "On the Road to a More Stable Peace," p. 2. 17. See Gray and Payne, "Victory Is Possible," pp. 14-27. 18. For recent examples, see Dyson, Weapons and Hope-, and Schell, The Abolition. 19. Interview with Glenn Kent, 4/13/87. 20. Nitze, "On the Road to a More Stable Peace," p. 2. 21. See, for example, the summary of the Hoffman panel report in Defense Against Ballistic Missiles. 22. See Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, p. IV-12. 23. See Defense Against Ballistic Missiles. 24. See Kempster, '"Star Wars' Cuts Confirmed by White House," pp. A l A16. 25. Interview with Ruth Currie-McDaniel, 1/5/87.

140

Selling Strategic

Defense

26. For example, see the discussion of Alpha in Waller, Bruce, and Cook, "SDI: Progress and Challenges," p. 44. 27. See Pike, "Corporate Interest in the SDI," p. 10; and Fainberg, "Limited Missile Defenses," p. 17. 28. Greenwood, Making the MIRV, p. 141. See also Kurth, "A Widening Gyre," pp. 373^104. 29. See Katznelson, "Rethinking the Silences of Social and Economic Policy," pp. 307-325. 30. See, for example, Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 143-155. 31. This is similar to Galtung's "market of fear." Compare Galtung, Peace, War and Defense, p. 106. 32. For examples of foes as pessimists, see Keegan, "New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat," pp. 38-48. The battle against "trahison des clercs" is evident in Keegan's speech as well as in Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry"; and Codevilla, While Others Build. All of these writings show a disdain for MAD. 33. See Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting, p. 11. 34. Katznelson, "Rethinking the Silences of Social and Economic Policy," pp. 318-319. 35. See the discussion of "baroque" arsenals in Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal. 36. The speaker was Jeremy Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists. This section is largely indebted to his remarks that evening. The gist of those remarks were printed in an op/ed piece for the Los Angeles Times. See Stone, "Arms Race May Be Petering Out," p. B7. 37. See, for example, Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," pp. 41-83. 38. See, for examples, Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88, p. 4; and York, "The Arms Race and the Fallacy of the Last Move," pp. 27-43. 39. Stone, "Arms Race May Be Petering Out," p. B7. 40. See, for examples, Graham, High Frontier, chap. 2; and Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry," p. 1. 41. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," p. 83. 42. Ibid., pp. 54-55. 43. A refrain from an old British war song, popularized in an address by General Douglas MacArthur to a joint session of Congress, April 19, 1951.

Appendix: BMD and Related Funding (1962-1987)

Explanation of Appendix Funding Data In 1985, Congressman Dante B. Fascell requested and received from the Department of Defense a budget history of U.S. BMD/strategic defense programs (Congressional Record, April 4, 1985, p. E1444). This budget history provides the basis for the figures presented here. Although this budget history can be legitimately challenged on the basis of particular programs that were either included or excluded, it serves as a rough measure of BMD and related program funding between 1962 and 1987. Figures for 1986-1987 are projections. Price deflators were derived from "Implicit Price Deflators for Federal Outlays by Major Investment Type Categories," in Budget of the United States Government, column "Research and Development: National Defense," table 9 (government-supplied mimeo). Dedicated BMD program funding was derived by summing the following items: the army's strategic defense programs listed in the appendix for each year (1962-1985); the air force's funding for program element 12429F (Nike Targets) for fiscal years 1962-1971; funding for DARPA's Project Defender (1962-1967); and the total funding listed for SDIO in fiscal year 1985. Funding for SDIO in fiscal year 1984 was excluded because of double counting in the original data. The transitional quarter in fiscal year 1977 was excluded from these figures.

141

142

Appendix

BHD & RELATED FUNDING: 1962-1970 (FY) ( M i l l i o n s of constant 1982 d o l l a r s ) Program Agency Elerent 1231 OF 12311F 12313F 12323F 12423 F 12424F 12429F 12432F 12434F 63314F 6342« F 63425 F 63426F 63438F 6360SF 64711F

Title NCMC TU/AA Sys. NCHC Space Defense System B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e TU/AA TU/AA Interface Network BMEUS Spacetrack Nike Targets SLBM Radar Uarning System PARCS Stategic Laser System Technology M i s s i l e Surveillance Technology Advanced Uarning System Space Surveillance Tech. SBSS S a t e l l i t e System Surv. ( p a r t ) Advanced Radiation Technology System S u r v i v a b i l i t y (Nuclear E f f e c t s ) Agency Total

12514A 12516A 12517A 12518« 12520A 62113A 62304A 63304A 63305A 63308A 64301A 64304A 65301A

Sentinel/Safeguard Ccflruiications-O&M L o g i s t i c s Spt-O&M T r a i n i n g - M i l i t a r y Personnel Base Sicport Hardened M a t e r i a l s Exploratory Developnent-ATP ATP ZMAR/Sprint S i t e Defense/System Technology Nike-X Nike-Zeus KMR Agency Total

DARPA

¿1101E 61101E 62107E 62301E 62301E 62702E 62707E 6271 IE 6271 IE 62711E 62711E 65805E

Conputer Science Space Nuclear Power 3rd-Generation Defense Technology Project Defender Shortwave Laser Technology Electromagnetic Gun P a r t i c l e Beam Technology Advanced Sensor Talon Gold Alpha Lode

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

10.8

24.1

22.8

16.7

1.5

0.7

80.7 18.1

95.5 24.5

50.7 14.4

32.2 28.3

29.0 31.9

34.2

22.8

35.6

34.1

109.6

166.9

123.5

111.3

62.4

34.9

1968

1969

1970

22.8

22.2

20.5

4.0

10.2

3.2 37.1

16.2 4.4

20.5 6.1

53.0

87.4

26.8 1289.5

1117.8

730.6

1074.7 1275.2 1429.6 1393.4 255.7 155.0 116.3 106.3 117.6

987.3 1166.0

97.4

425.4

321.4

131.0

184.1

242.5

1199.8 1104.2 1330.4 1546.5 1535.9 1511.0 1517.9 1596.8 1729.9

498.5

457.0

512.2

500.4

414.6

373.8

498.5

457.0

512.2

500.4

414.6

373.8

T r i - S e r v i c e National Test Range Agency Total

47.6

Aerospace System V u l n e r a b i l i t y

50.6 0.9

Agency Total 62735« 62768N 63318N 63754N 64303N 64304N 64307N 64363« 64365N

High-Energy Laser Directed Energy Technology Advanced Surface-to-Air M i s s i l e High-Energy Laser Area A i r Defense CSED Ccnfcat System Engineering Development Aegis Inprovement Trident I I Penaids SH-2 Nuclear

7.9 81.6

16.9 102.3

Agency Total 63220C 63221C 63222C 63223C 63224C 65989C

SATKA DEU KEU SA/BH SLKT SO 10 KGttT

Annual Expenditures

1807.9 1728.1 1966.1 2158.2 2012.9 1919.7 1544.7 1786.9 1988.0

143

Appendix

BHD & RELATED FUNDING: 1971-1979 ( F Y ) ( M i l l i o n s of constant 1982 d o l l a r s ) Program Agency Element

12310F 12311F 12313F 12323F 12423F 12424F 12429F 12432F 124J4F 63314F 63424F 63425 F 63428F 63438F 63605F 64711F

Army

12514A 12516« 12517A 12518« 12520« 62113« 62304« 63304« 63305« 63308« 64301A 64304A 65301A

Title

NCMC TW/AA S y s . NCHC Space Defense system B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e TW/AA TW/AA I n t e r f a c e Network BMEWS Spacetrack Nike T a r g e t s SLBM Radar Warning System PARCS S t a t e g i c Laser System Technology M i s s i l e S u r v e i l l a n c e Technology Advanced Warning System Space S u r v e i l l a n c e Tech. SBSS S a t e l l i t e System S u r v . < p a r t ) Advanced R a d i a t i o n Technology System S u r v i v a b i l i t y (Nuclear E f f e c t s )

Navy

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1977

24.6

11.8

10.9

4.8

5.3

10.3

0.2

3.8

10.4

6.9 11.1

9.8

18.8 0.7

4.5

11.1

2.5 28.7

3.3 26.1

7.3

10.3 10.5

13.3 11.4

33.8 9.1

12.6 14.9 70.0 13.5

80.3 8.0

13.7

6.2

50.2 8.3

65.1 7.7

5.6 6.6 68.0 16.5

35.9 3.8 58.9 17.1

35.1 4.5 85.7 12.5

22.9 7.1 93.8 12.9

32.6 7.6 127.2 13.1

54.8 13.1 113.3 15.4

49.3 29.2 124.5 14.5

243.1

323.3

340.6

2.7 57.2

6.5

150.9

110.2

126.1

157.4

171.1

177.0

Sentinel/Safeguard Ccflnuiications-08H L o g i s t i c s Spt-O&M T r a i n i n g - M i l i t a r y Perswinel Base Support Hardened M a t e r i a l s E x p l o r a t o r y Development-ATP ATP ZMAR/Sprint S i t e Oefense/System Technology Nike-x Nike-Zeus

969.4

743.7 37.4 92.3 10.0

378.0 0.0 83.5

63.5 14.9 78.4

8.6 98.3

12.5 8.4 50.1 79.4

20.5

17.3

170.0

167.3

162.4

157.5

155.1

229.7

218.5

172.5

159.3

158.9

155.1

279.3

239.6

703.4 23.5 89.4 7.1 11.8 9.4 103.5 115.3

67.1

149.7

188.2

204.1

199.7

178.8

148.3

141.9

138.0

148.1

139.6

133.1

1519.9 1482.4 1430.4

989.9

707.7

602.0

469.8

456.0

443.3

35.5

39.2

42.6

38.5

35.1

28.1 0.8

10.0

61101E 61101E 62107E 62301E 62301E 62702E 62707E 62711E 62711E 62711E 62711E 65805E

Confxjter S c i e n c e Space Nuclear Power 3rd-Générât i o n Oefense Technology P r o j e c t Defender Shortwave Laser Technology E l e c t r o m a g n e t i c Gun P a r t i c l e Beam Technology Advanced Sensor T a l o n Gold Alpha Lode T r i - S e r v i c e N a t i o n a l Test Range

43.8

52.7

48.2

35.5

39.2

42.6

38.5

35.1

62715«

Aerospace System V u l n e r a b i l i t y

2.4

2.2

1.4

6.1

3.9

3.8

3.8

3.6

4.5

Agency Total

2.4

2.2

1.4

6.1

3.9

3.8

3.8

3.6

4.5

12.6 193.3

29.2 249.6

42.8 184.7

40.7 81.7

42.0 117.7

53.6 113.5 77.6

2.1 38.4 44.9 131.9

4.9 22.7 42.3 52.7

7.4 46.4 37.5 53.3

0.7

1.7

2.2

8.9

9.7

205.9

278.8

227.5

122.4

160.4

246.4

219.5

131.5

154.3

1922.9 1926.3 1833.6 1311.3 1082.3 1071.8

974.7

9 4 9 . 5 1003.9

Agency Total DNA

1972

Agency T o t a l

«gency T o t a l DARPA

1971

62735N 62768N 63318N 63754N 64303N 64304N 64307N 64363N 64365N

H i g h - E n e r g y Laser D i r e c t e d Energy Technology Advanced S u r f a c e - t o - A i r M i s s i l e H i g h - E n e r g y Laser Area A i r Defense CSED Caitiat System E n g i n e e r i n g Development A e g i s Inprovement Trident I I Penaids SM-2 Nuclear Agency T o t a l

SDIO

63220C 63221C 63222C 63223C 63224C 65989C

Annual

Expenditures

43.8

52.7

48.2

18.5 7.1 6.7

61.2

SATKA DEW KEU SA/BM SLKT SOIO MGMT

144

Appendix

BHD & RELATED FUNDING: 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 8 7 ( F T ) & TOTAL ( M i l l i o n s of c o n s t a n t 1982 d o l l a r s ) Program Agency Element

12310F 12311F 1231 I F 12323F 12423F 12424 F 12429F 12432F 12434F 63314F 63424F 63425 F 63426F 63438F 63405 F 64711F

Title

NCMC TW/AA S y s . NCMC Space D e f e n s e S y s t e m B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e TW/AA TU/AA I n t e r f a c e Network BMEWS Spacetrack Hike Targets SLBM Radar Warning S y s t e m PARCS S t a t e g i c Laser System Technology M i s s i l e S u r v e i l l a n c e Technology Advanced W a r n i n g S y s t e m Space S u r v e i l l a n c e Tech. S B S S S a t e l l i t e System Surv. ( p a r t ) Advanced R a d i a t i o n T e c h n o l o g y System S u r v i v a b i l i t y ( N u c l e a r E f f e c t s ) Agency T o t a l

12514A 12516« 12517Í 1251SA 12520A 62113« 62304« 63304« 63305« 63308« 64301« 64304« 65301«

61101E 61101E 62107E 62301E 62301E 62702E 62707E 62711E 62711E 62711E 62711E 65805E

62735N 62768N 63318k 63754M 64303N 64304N 64307N 64363N 64365N

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

7.2

17.4

1.3 23.5

4.1 23.1 1.2

19.7 43.7 1.8

21.4 33.7 2.9

7.6

9.1 7.3

12.2 9.1

7.9 7.8

11.7 4.7

9.0 9.2

50.6 64.3 2.4 1.3 11.4 8.4

58.5 56.0 2.8 6.0 16.2 12.2

3.0

5.4

3.4

11.0

7.2

20.3

3.0 4.5 8.2

2.8 17.4 7.0

3.7 44.8 9.6

102.9

172.8

230.1

4068.3

5.1

4.9 6.1 52.2 22.5 95.9 17.2

27.8 21.2 63.2 13.2

14.5 8.0 27.7 5.6 75.5 12.1

11.0 9.6 19.5 4.5 73.3 11.5

42.6 10.3 10.0 13.6 10.5 43.4 10.9

218.7

170.6

192.5

178.9

226.3

11.4

Total*

155.6 413.2 11.1 17.1 84.4 379.9 235.7 90.8 14.9 361.8 267.9 33.7 396.9 145.7 1241.4 218.2

122.5

135.7

140.0

145.7

133.0

138.8

142.6

140.4

6300.8 86.1 463.7 17.1 67.1 27.8 153.6 3096.9 455.6 2832.5 5172.9 2259.1 3461.6

Agency T o t a l

417.7

424.6

602.0

637.3

572.0

138.8

142.6

140.4

24394.8

Carputer Science Space N u c l e a r Power 3 r d - G e n e r a t i o n Defense Technology P r o j e c t Defender Shortwave L a s e r T e c h n o l o g y E l e c t r o m a g n e t i c Gun P a r t i c l e Beam T e c h n o l o g y Advanced S e n s o r T a l o n Gold Alpha Lode T r i - S e r v i c e N a t i o n a l T e s t Range

147.0

133.6

126.0

136.1

142.3

148.2

155.3

336.0

355.5

296.7

17.1 4.7 6.3 33.2 1.8

25.1 1.D 15.5 18.6 18.5 7.4

45.0 3.6 30.5 17.8 25.6 20.4 13.2

52.0 4.7 34.8 15.1 33.3 22.6 13.1

14.0 12.7 7.8 6.0

53.9 34.3 21.4 22.3

17.1 4.7 6.3 2756.5 676.7 18.4 94.0 80.9 151.2 110.3 61.1 22.3

59.5 6.5 28.7

75.5

86.1

156.1

175.6

254.7

3999.5

A e r o s p a c e System V u l n e r a b i l i t y

4.9

4.5

5.4

7.1

7.3

61.8

Agency T o t a l

4.9

4.5

5.4

7.1

7.3

41.6 5.6

57.5 6.0 10.9

58.5 12.9 13.6

18.2 28.6

36.7 16.1

7.8 10.7 39.0

High-Energy Laser D i r e c t e d Energy Technology Advanced S u r f a c e - t o - A i r M i s s i l e High-Energy Laser Area A i r D e f e n s e CSED C o r t e t S y s t e m E n g i n e e r i n g Development A e g i s Improvement Trident I I Penaids SM-2 N u c l e a r

3.9 43.2 17.6 54.9

0.1

4.3

13.1

18.0

119.7

98.3

140.3

160.5

61.8

12.5 3.6

6.6

36.5

69.9

11.4

12.3

9.8

10.9

49.9 4.6 15.9

40.4 12.6

9.8 13.3 8.6

10.9 1.7 20.6

71.9

78.0

157.6 31.4 165.0 408.1 1390.0 436.7 150.0 32.2 104.1

114.0

2875.1

SATKA DEW KEW SA/BM SLKT SDIO MGMT

340.9 299.9 182.1 76.9 21.9

4 9 1 . 9 1 2 2 0 . 3 1614.8 339.1 849.7 1029.7 230.7 756.7 1066.7 89.2 214.2 234.7 100.9 227.3 272.8 8.6 7.2 8.1

3667.9 2518.4 2236.2 615.0 622.9 23.9

Agency T o t a l

921.7 1259.0 3276.3 4227.3

9684.3

7 8 4 . 1 1 0 9 6 . 3 1159.4 2 0 7 9 . 9 1 5 7 2 . 6 3 6 6 9 . 7 4 7 1 1 . 8

45083.8

Agency T o t a l 63220C 63221C 63222C 63223C 63224C 65989C

1981

Sentinel/Safeguard Commit i cat i ons-O&H L o g i s t i c s Spt-OAM T r a i n i n g - M i l i t a r y Personnel Base Si43port Hardened M a t e r i a l s E x p l o r a t o r y Development-ATP ATP ZMAR/Sprint S i t e Defense/System Technology Nike-X Nike-Zeus KMR

Agency T o t a l 62715H

1980

Expendí t u r e s * I n c l u d e s f u n d s f o r the 1977 t r a n s i t i o n q u a r t e r not l i s t e d i n

836.5 tables.

97.9

Acronyms

ABM

anti-ballistic missile

ABMDA

Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency

ADSEC

Air Defense Systems Engineering Committee

AFB

air force base

AFWL

Air Force Weapons Laboratory

ARA

autoresonant accelerator

ASAT

anti-satellite

ASC

American Security Council

ASW

anti-submarine warfare

ATA

advanced test accelerator

ATM

anti-tactical missile

ATP

Advanced Technology Program

AWST

Aviation Week & Space Technology

BAMBI

ballistic missile boost intercept

BMD

ballistic missile defense

BMDATC

Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center

BMDO

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

BMDSCOM

Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command

C3I

command, control, communication, and intelligence

CONAD

continental air defense

CPD

Committee on the Present Danger

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DEW

directed energy weapon

DOD

Department of Defense

DOE

Department of Energy

DSB

Defense Science Board

DTST

Defensive Technologies Study Team 145

146

List of Acronyms

ERIS

Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Intercept System

ETA

experimental test accelerator

FASAC

Foreign Applied Sciences Assessment Center

FDM

fleet demonstration model

FEL

free-electron laser

FS 3

Future Security Strategy Study

FY

fiscal year

GAO

General Accounting Office

GBMD

Global Ballistic Missile Defense

GDL

gas dynamic laser

GLIPAR

Guideline Identification Program for Anti-missile Research

HASC

House Armed Services Committee

HEDI

high endoatmospheric defense interceptor

HEL

high-energy laser

HIT

homing intercept technology

HOE

homing overlay experiment

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

ICF

inertial confinement fusion

LAD

light area defense

LDS

Layered Defense System

LOADS

Low-Altitude Defense System

MAD

mutual assured destruction

MIRV

multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles

MIA

Missile Intelligence Agency

MPS

multiple protection shelters

MTU

mobile test unit

NABS

nuclear-armed bombardment satellites

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NCA

National Command Authority

NNK

non-nuclear kill

NORAD

North American Defense Command

NPB

neutral-particle beam

NSC

National Security Council

OSD

office of the secretary of defense

PNUTS

possible nuclear underground test site

147

List of Acronyms

PSAC

President's Science Advisory Committee

R&D

research and development

RADLAC

radio-frequency linear accelerator

RBIG

reentry body identification group

RFQ

radio frequency quadrupole

RV

reentry vehicle

SAC

Strategic Air Command

SAGE

semi-automated ground environment

SALT

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SASC

Senate Armed Services Committee

SBL

space-based laser

see

Standing Consultative Commission

SDI

Strategic Defense Initiative

SDIO

Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

SDS

site defense system

SPAD

space patrol active defense

STO

Strategic Technology Office

STP

System Technology Program

USAF

United States Air Force

References

Interviews Harold M. Agnew, September 30, 1987, La Jolla, CA. Martin Anderson, March 14, 1988, Palo Alto, CA. Robert Bowman, April 13, 1987, Chesapeake Beach, MD. Anne Hessing Cahn, April 16, 1987, telephone interview. Ruth Currie-McDaniel, January 25, 1988, telephone interview. James Digby, February 3, 1987, telephone interview. Juventino R. Garcia, October 5, 1987, Albuquerque, NM. Richard Garwin, February 1, 1988, telephone interview. Gregg Herken, March 27, 1987, Los Angeles, CA. Robert Jameson, October 7, 1987, Los Alamos, NM, and March 25, 1988, telephone interview. Gerald Johnson, May 12, 1987, La Jolla, CA. Glenn A. Kent, April 13, 1987, Washington, DC. Edward Knapp, March 24, 1988, telephone interview. Thomas Krebs, April 12, 1987, Clifton, VA. R. Bruce Miller, October 5, 1987, Albuquerque, NM. Wolfgang Panofsky, March 14, 1988, Palo Alto, CA. John E. Pike, January 8, 1988, telephone interview. George Rathjens, April 2, 1987, La Jolla, CA. Louis Rosen, October 6, 1987, Los Alamos, NM. Jack Ruina, January 18, 1988, La Jolla, CA. Jeremy Stone, April 17, 1987, Washington, DC. Edward Vaughn, April 9, 1987, telephone interview. Paul C. White, October 7, 1987, Los Alamos, NM. Herbert F. York, January 7, 1987, La Jolla, CA; January 26, 1987, La Jolla, CA; April 6, 1987, La Jolla, CA; July 2, 1987, La Jolla, CA; September 30, 1987, La Jolla, CA. Peter Zimmerman, April 16, 1987, Washington, DC.

General References "ABM Revisited: Promise or Peril?" Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1981), 5385. Adams, Benson D., Ballistic Missile Defense (New York, American Elsevier), 1971. Adams, Gordon, The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle (New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books), 1982. 149

150

References

Aldridge, Robert C., The Counterforce Syndrome (Washington, D.C., IPS), 1978. Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.), 1971. , "Questions About the Arms Race: Who's Racing Whom? A Bureaucratic Perspective," in Endicott, John E„ and Roy W. Stafford, Jr. (eds.), American Defense Policy, 4th ed. (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press), 1977. Allison, Graham T., and Frederic Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control: Explaining the Determinants of Military Weapons," Daedalus 104 (Summer 1975), 99-129. Anderson, Martin, "Policy Memorandum No. 3: Foreign Policy and National Security," Reagan for President, Los Angeles, Calif., August 1979 (unpublished). , Revolution (San Diego, Calif., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 1988. Armacost, Michael H„ The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York, Columbia University Press), 1969. Ball, Desmond, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, University of California Press), 1980. Baran, Paul A., and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York, Modern Reader), 1966. Barasch, G. E., D, M. Kerr, R. H. Kupperman, R. Pollock, and H. A. Smith, Ballistic Missile Defense: A Potential Arms-Control Initiative, No. LA8632 (Los Alamos, N.M., Los Alamos National Laboratory), January 1981:1-24. Barber Associates, Richard J., "The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974," December 1975 (unpublished). Barnet, Richard J., The Economy of Death (New York, Atheneum), 1969. , Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade (New York, Simon & Schuster), 1981. "Battle over ABM Switches to Nation's Grassroots," Congressional Quarterly (May 30, 1969), 845-851. "Beam Weapons Survey Team Formed," Aviation Week & Space Technology (October 2, 1978), 21. "Beaming in on New Weaponry," Business Week (February 9, 1981), 67-68. Beard, Edmund, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York, Columbia University Press), 1976. Beilenson, Laurence W., assisted by Bernard M. Dain, The Treaty Trap: A History of the Performance of Political Treaties by the United States and European Nations, A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book (Washington, Public Affairs Press), 1969. Binder, David, "New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms," New York Times (December 26, 1976), AI, A14. Blechman, Barry M., and Victor A. Utgoff, "Fiscal and Economic Implications of Strategic Defense," prepared for the project "The Military Uses of Space," The John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, second draft, (mimeo). Block, Fred L., The Origins of International Economic Disorder (Berkeley, University of California Press), 1977. Blumenthal, Sidney, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power (New York, Times Books), 1986.

References

151

Boffey, Philip M„ William J. Broad, Leslie H. Gelb, Charles Möhr, and Holcomb B. Noble, Claiming the Heavens: The New York Times Complete Guide to the Star Wars Debate, (New York, Times Books) 1988. Bosma, John, "A Proposed Plan for Project on BMD and Arms Control" (memorandum) The Heritage Foundation, NSR #46: High Frontier (1984), 1-11; most of the memo appears in Harper's, vol. 270 (June 1985), 2224. Bradley, William E., memorandum to Dr. James Killian. subject: "Effectiveness of the Nike-Zeus System Against ICBM Attack," (October 29, 1958), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office File, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Box 4, AICBM. Brennan, Donald, "Strategic Alternatives I," New York Times (May 24, 1971), A31. , "Strategic Alternatives II," New York Times (May 25, 1971), A33. , "When the SALT Hit the Fan," National Review (June 23, 1972), 685692. Broad, William J., "Laser Wars on Capitol Hill," Science 216 (June 4, 1982), 1082-1083. , "Reagan's Star Wars Bid: Many Ideas Converging," New York Times (March 4, 1985), A l f f . , Star Warriors (New York, Simon & Schuster), 1985. Broder, John M., "Key Arms Funding Issues Resolved," Los Angeles Times (November 18, 1987), A5. Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press), 1959. "Brown Comments on Beam Weapons," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 30, 1977), 12. Bush, Vannevar, Modern Arms and Free Men (New York, Simon & Schuster), 1949. Cahn, Anne Hessing, "Eggheads and Warheads: Scientists and the ABM," doctoral dissertation (Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1971. Carnoy, Martin, The State and Political Theory (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press), 1984. Carter, Ashton B„ and David N. Schwartz (eds.), Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution), 1984. Chayes, Abram, and Jerome B. Wiesner (eds.), ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System (New York, Harper & Row), 1969. Clarke, Duncan C., Politics of Arms Control (New York, Free Press), 1979. Claude, Inis L., Jr., "The Balance of Power," reprinted in Art, Robert J., and Robert Jervis (eds.), International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy, and Decision-making, 2d ed. (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.), 1985:111-125. Codevilla, Angelo, While Others Build: The Commonsense Approach to the Strategic Defense Initiative (New York, The Free Press), 1988. Cohn, Carol, "Nuclear Language and How We Learned to Pat the Bomb," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1987), 17-24. Comptroller General, Ballistic Missile Defense: Some Work Should Be Stopped and Remaining Effort Evaluated, U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1, 1978. , Defense Against Ballistic Missiles (Washington, Government Printing Office), April 1984.

152

References

, DOD's Space-Based Laser Program—Potential, Progress, and Problems, U.S. General Accounting Office, February 26, 1982. , Objectivity of DOD's Senior Scientific Advisory Committees Can Be Better Assured, U.S. General Accounting Office, September 21, 1983. , Potential of the LoAD Ballistic Missile Defense System for Protecting the MX Missile System, U.S. General Accounting Office, November 12, 1980. Conference Report 93-1038, Committee of Conference, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Military Training Student Loads, and for Other Purposes, July 30, 1974 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1974. Conference Report 93-1212, Committee of Conference, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, and for Other Purposes (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1974. Conference Report 95-565, Committee of Conference, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, August 4, 1977 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1977. Conference Report 96-1222, Committee of Conference, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, and for Other Purposes, August 18, 1980 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1980. Conference Report 96-546, Department of Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, October 23, 1979 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1979. Conference Report 97-311, Committee of Conference, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, November 3, 1981 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1981. Conference Report 97-749, Committee of Conference, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983, August 16, 1982 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1982. Congressional Record, August 6, 1970:27723-27733. Congressional Record, June 5, 1975:17413-17428. Congressional Record, November 14, 1975:36755-36763. Congressional Record, December 10, 1975:39786-39793. Congressional Record, May 13, 1981:S4975-S4980. Congressional Record, May 13, 1982:S5092-S5093. Congressional Record, April 4, 1985:E1444-E1446. Corthright, David, and Robert Borosage, "The Russians Are Coming," Nation (February 19, 1977), 205-208. Cox, Arthur Macy, "The CIA's Tragic Error," New York Review of Books (November 6, 1980), 21-22. Curnow, R., M. Kaldor, M. McLean, J. Robinson, and P. Sheperd, "General and Complete Disarmament: A Systems-Analysis Approach," Futures (October 1976), 384-396. Currie-McDaniel, Ruth, The U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command: Its History and Role in the Strategic Defense Initiative (Huntsville, Ala., Historical Office U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command), 1987. Davis, Jacquelyn K„ Uri Ra'anan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Michael J. Deane,

References

153

and John M. Collins, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense, IFPA Special Report (Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis), April 1980. Defense Dollars and Sense: A Common Cause Guide to the Defense Budget Process, Mark Rovner (Washington, Common Cause), 1983. Dickson, Paul, Think Tanks (New York, Atheneum), 1971. DMS Inc., DMS Market Intelligence Report (DMS Inc.), 1984. DOD Revolving Door, General Accounting Office, (Washington, Government Printing Office), March 1986. Dolbeare, Kenneth M„ and Murray J. Edelman, American Politics: Policies, Power, and Change (Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath), 1971. Domhoff, G. William, The Powers That Be: Processes of Ruling Class Domination in America (New York, Vintage Books), 1979. Donovan, John C., The Cold Warriors: A Policy Making Elite (Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath), 1974. Dye, Thomas, Who's Running America, 4th ed. (Inglewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall), 1986. Dyson, Freeman, Weapons and Hope (New York, Harper & Row), 1985. Easlea, Brian, Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race (London, Pluto Press), 1983. Easley, Ronald L., et al., "Net Technical Assessment of Soviet and U.S. ABM Programs, Volume III," SPC Report 212, System Planning Corporation, Arlington, Va„ April 1, 1975 (unpublished). Easterbrook, Gregg, "York, York, York, the Divad Joke Is on Us," New Republic (December 30, 1985), 17-20. Eaton, William J., "$299 Billion in Defense Funds OKd," Los Angeles Times (July 15, 1988), A4. Eisenhower, Dwight D., "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," Department of State Bulletin 44 (February 6, 1961), 180-181. Etheredge, Lloyd S., A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MIT Press), 1978. Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 1987. Fainberg, Anthony, "Limited Missile Defenses—What Can They Protect?" Arms Control Today (April 1989), 17-22. Federal Support to Universities, Colleges, and Selected Nonprofit Institutions, Fiscal Year 1983, National Science Foundation, NSF 85-321. Fisk, Milton, "The Logic of the Arms Race," in Cohen, Alven and Steven Lee (eds.), Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions (Totowa, N.J., Rowman & Allanheld), 1986:457479. Five Hundred Contractors Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards for RDT&E, Fiscal Year 1983, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Washington Headquarters Services (Washington, The Pentagon), 1983. Five Hundred Contractors Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards for RDT&E, Fiscal Year 1985, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Washington Headquarters Services (Washington, The Pentagon), 1985. Fox, J. Ronald, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons, Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University (Boston, Harvard University Press), 1974.

154

References

"Free-Electron Laser Technology Gains," Aviation Week & Space Technology (September 28, 1981), 60-65. Fulbright, Senator J. W„ The Pentagon Propaganda Machine (New York, Liveright), 1970. Galbraith, John Kenneth, How to Control the Military (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co.), 1969. Galtung, Johan, "Military Formations and Social Formations: A Structural Analysis," in Wallensteen, Peter, Johan Galtung, and Carlos Portales (eds.), Global Militarization (Boulder, Colo., Westview Press), 1985:122. , Peace: Research, Education, Action, Essays in Peace Research, Vol. 1 (Copenhagen, Christian Ejlers), 1975. , Peace, War and Defense, Essays in Peace Research, Vol. 2 (Copenhagen, Christian Ejlers), 1976. , "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 8, no. 2 (1971), 81-117. , There Are Alternatives! Four Roads to Peace and Security (Nottingham, Spokesman), 1984. Garwin, Richard L„ "Charged-Particle Beam Weapons?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October 1978), 24-27. , "Effective Military Technologies for the Eighties," International Security, vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall 1976), 50-77. Garwin, Richard L., and Hans A. Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems," Scientific American, vol. 218, no. 3 (March 1968), 21-31. Gerstenzang, James, "'Star Wars' Cuts Confirmed by White House," Los Angeles Times (September 8, 1989), A l f f . Getier, Michael, "Senate Panel Cuts B-l Fund, Bars New ABM," Washington Post (August 3, 1973), A2. Geyelin, Philip, "Bid by Resor to Sell Public on ABM Told," Washington Post (February 16, 1969), A l - A l l . Gilpin, Robert, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press), 1962. , War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 1981. Goure, Leon, William G. Hyland, and Colin S. Gray, The Emerging Strategic Environment: Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense, IFPA Special Report (Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis), December 1979. Graham, Lt. Gen. Daniel O. (USA ret.), High Frontier: A New National Strategy (Washington, D.C., High Frontier, Inc.), 1982. Graham, Lt. Gen. Daniel O. (USA ret.), and Gregory A. Fossedal, A Defense That Defends: Blocking Nuclear Attack (Old Greenwich, Conn., DevinAdair), 1983. Gray, Colin S., and Keith Payne, "Victory Is Possible," Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980), 13-27. Greb, G. Allen, "Short-Circuiting the System," in Gerald M. Steinberg (ed.), Lost in Space (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books) 1988, 19-36. Greenwood, Ted, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making (Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co.), 1975. Gregory, William H., "Military Power in Space," Aviation Week & Space Technology (October 18, 1982), 7. Greve, Frank, "Star Wars: How Reagan's Plan Caught Many Insiders by Surprise," San Jose Mercury News (November 17, 1985), A1-A21.

References

155

Griffiths, David R., "Beam Weapon Impact Called Uncertain," Aviation Week & Space Technology (April 30, 1979), 28-29. Guertner, Gary, "What Is Proof?" Foreign Policy 59 (Summer 1985), 73-84. Hafner, Donald L„ "Assessing the President's Vision," Daedalus 114 (Spring 1985), 91-107. Halloran, Richard, "Pentagon Draws up First Strategy for Fighting a Long Nuclear War," New York Times, (May 30, 1982), AI, A12. Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution), 1974. , National Security Policy-making (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books), 1975. Hecht, Jeff, Beam Weapons: The Next Arms Race (New York, Plenum Press), 1984. Heclo, Hugh, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in King, Anthony (ed.), The New American Political System (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute), 1979. Herken, Gregg, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950 (New York, Vintage Books), 1982. , Counsels of War (New York, Alfred A. Knopf), 1985. , "The Earthly Origins of Star Wars," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October 1987), 20-28. Hiatt, Fred, and Rick Atkinson, "In Strategic Defense the Seeds of a New Industry are Planted," Washington Post, (October 20, 1985), AI, A16. , "Pentagon's 'Paper Warriors' Find Market for SDI Advice," Washington Post (October 21, 1985), AI, A10. Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, or Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, 1651, reprinted in The Great Books, vol. 23 (Chicago, William Benton), 1978. Hoffman, David, and Lou Cannon, "President Overruled Advisers On Announcing Defense Plan," Washington Post (March 26, 1983), A1-A7. Holst, Johan J., and William Schneider, Jr. (eds.), Why ABM? (New York, Pergamon), 1969. House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization For Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Part 3, Research and Development, Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1979. House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Part 5, 97th Congress 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1982. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1970: Part 4, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1969. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1974, Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, October 5, 1973 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1973. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1981, Part 9, Hearings, 96th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1980. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1985,

156

References

Hearings, 98th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1984. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1972. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Defense Science Boards: A Question of Integrity, November 28, 1983. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Favoritism and Bias Within the Defense Science Boards and Other Military Advisory Panels, Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st Session, September 22, 1983 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1982. House Report No. 93-1035, House Armed Services Committee, Authorizing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1975, for Military Procurement; Research and Development; Strengths for Active-Duty Military Components, Civilian Personnel of the Defense Establishment and Reserve Components; Military Training Students Loads, and for Other Purposes, May 30, 1974 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1974. House Report No. 94-413, House Armed Services Committee, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976 and the Period Beginning July 1, 1976, and Ending September 30, 1976, for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Active Duty, Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strength Levels, Military Training Student Loads, and for Other Purposes, July 26, 1975 (Washington, Government Printing Office) 1974. House Report No. 94-967, House Armed Services Committee, Authorizing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1977, for Military Procurement; Research and Development; Strengths for Active-Duty Military Components, Reserve Components and Civilian Personnel of the Defense Establishment; Military Training Students Loads; and for Other Purposes, March 26, 1976 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1974. House Report No. 96-166, House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, May 15, 1979 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1979. House Report No. 96-916, House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981, April 30, 1980 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1980. House Report No. 97-482, House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983, August 13, 1982 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1982. Howard, Michael, Studies in War and Peace (London, Temple Smith), 1970. Humphrey, Gordon J., et al., SALT II and American Security, IFPA Special Report (Cambridge, Mass., Intstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis), 1980. Hunter, Maxwell W., II, "Strategic Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry," October 31, 1977 (unpublished). Huntington, Samuel P., "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy (1958), 41-83. , The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York, Columbia University Press), 1961. , "To Choose Peace or War," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 83 (April 1957), 359-369. "ICBM Intercept Tests Planned: Army Selects Lockheed as Prime," Aviation Week & Space Technology (August 14, 1978), 19. ICBM Survivability Study, Volume 2, Department of Defense (unpublished), commissioned in 1975.

References

157

Iklé, Fred C., Every War Must End (New York, Columbia University Press), 1971. , "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 51, no. 2 (January 1973), 267-285. Isikoss, Michael, "Boeing May Be Suspended from Air Force Contracts," Washington Post (August 22, 1986), C l l . Jane's Fighting Ships 1985-86, (New York, Jane's Publishing, Inc.) 1986. Janis, Irving, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co.), 1972. Jayne, Edward Randolph, II, "The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Security," doctoral dissertation (Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), June 1969. Jervis, Robert, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1978), 167-214. Johnsen, Katherine, "Arms Control Statement Criticized," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 16, 1977), 14-15. Johnson, Donald Bruce (Comp.), National Party Platforms of 1980 (Urbana, University of Illinois Press), 1982. Johnson, Oswald, "New U.S. Nuclear Policy: Just a Footnote in Politics," Los Angeles Times (September 10, 1980). Kahn, Herman, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York, Praeger), 1965. , Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York, Horizon), 1962. Kaldor, Mary, The Baroque Arsenal (London, Andre Deutsch), 1982. , "Military R&D: Cause or Consequence of the Arms Race?" International Social Science Journal, vol. 35, no. 1 (1983), 25-45. Kaplan, Fred, Dubious Specter: A Second Look at the "Soviet Threat" (Washington, D.C., Transnational Institute), 1977. , The Wizards of Armageddon (New York, Simon & Schuster), 1983. Karas, Thomas, The New High Ground: Strategies and Weapons of Space-Age War (New York, Simon & Schuster), 1983. Katznelson, Ira, "Rethinking the Silences of Social and Economic Policy," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, no. 2, (1986), 307-325. Kaufmann, William W. (ed.), Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press), 1956. Keegan, George, text of speech to Washington newsmen, printed in "New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat," Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 28, 1977), 38-48. Keeney, Spurgeon, and Wolfgang Panofsky, "MAD versus NUTS," reprinted in Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), The Nuclear Reader (New York, St. Martin's Press) 1985:38-42. Kemp, Anthony, The Maginot Line: Myth and Reality (London, Frederic Warne), 1981. Kempster, Norman, '"Star Wars' Goal Cut, Quayle Says," Los Angeles Times (September 7, 1989), A l f f . Killian, James R., Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MIT Press), 1977. Kintner, William R. (ed.), Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense (New York, Hawthorn Books), 1969. Klare, Michael T., and Cynthia Arnson, Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad (Washington, D.C., Institute for Policy Studies), 1981.

References

158

Klass, Phillip J., "Advanced Weaponry Research Intensifies," Aviation Week & Space Technology (August 18, 1975), 34-39. , "Ballistic Missile Defense Tests Set (title varies)" (AWST 1980 Special Report on BMD), Aviation Week & Space Technology (June 16, 1980), 213-218; (July 14, 1980), 52-54ff. , "Current Systems Still More Cost-Effective," Aviation Week & Space Technology (September 8, 1975), 53-59. , "Laser Destroys Missile in Test (title varies)" (AWST 1978 HEL Series), Aviation Week & Space Technology (August 7, 1978), 14-16; (August 21, 1978), 38-47; (August 28, 1978), 56-60. , "Missile Defense Keyed to Technology (High Frontier Study)," Aviation Week & Space Technology (April 19, 1982), 79ff. , "Power Boost Key to Feasibility," Aviation Week & Space Technology (August 21, 1972), 32-33. , "Research Nears Application Level," Aviation Week & Space Technology (August 14, 1972), 12-14. Kurth, James R., "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," Foreign Policy 11 (Summer 1973), 33-56. , "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement," Public Policy 19 (Summer 1971), 373-404. Lakoff, Sanford, and Herbert F. York, A Shield in Space? Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (unedited draft) (Berkeley, University of California Press), forthcoming. Lapp, Ralph E., "A Biography of the ABM," New York Times Magazine (May 4, 1969), 29-128. , Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology (New York, Cowles Book Co.), 1970. LeMay, General Curtis (USAF), with Dale O. Smith, America Is in Danger (New York, Funk & Wagnalls), 1968. Lens, Sidney, The Military-Industrial Complex (Kansas City, Mo., Pilgrim Press), 1970. Levine, Richard J., "Anticommunist Group Lobbies to Keep U.S. a Military Superpower," Wall Street Journal (August 1, 1972), Al, A23. London, Michael P., "Safeguard: Is There a Choice?" Space/Aeronautics 6 (1969), 48-55. Long, Franklin A., and Judith Reppy (eds.), The Genesis of New Weapons: Decision Making for Military R&D (New York, Pergamon Press), 1980. Long, John S., "Pentagon 'Revolving Door' Turning Fast," Cleveland Plain Dealer (August 17, 1986), A21. Mangold, Tom (reporter), "The Real War in Space," BBC Production, (Boston, WGBH Transcripts), 1979. Manno, Jack, Arming the Heavens: The Hidden Military Agenda for Space, 1945-1995 (New York, Dodd, Mead & Co.), 1984. Marder, Murray, "Carter to Inherit Intense Dispute on Soviet Intentions," Washington Post (January 2, 1977), Al, A4. Markoff, John, "The Air Force Eyes a Star War," Nation (January 14, 1978), 16-18.

McWilliams, Carey, "Gold-braided Blackmail," Nation (July 10, 1972), 4-5. Melman, Seymour, Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War (New York, McGraw-Hill), 1970. , The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline (New York, Touchstone), 1985.

References

159

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan 1956-1966 (March 28, 1958). Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: JCS 2245/45-CADOP 5666, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (March 27, 1958). Military Balance 1986-87, The, International Institute of Strategic Studies, (London, IISS), 1986. Miller, Nathan, "The Making of a Majority: The Senate and the A B M , " Washington Monthly (October 1969), 60-72. Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite (New York, Oxford University Press), 1956. Morrison, Philip, "The Spiral of Peril: A Narrative of the Nuclear Arms Race," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January 1983), 10-17. Mossberg, Walter, "Soviets Could Build Laser Weapon to Kill Satellites in 5 Years, Pentagon Aide Says," Wall Street Journal (February 11, 1981), A6. Murphy, Carlyle, "U.S. Sues Boeing Company over Severance Pay," Washington Post (July 23, 1986). "Mutual Genocide?" editorial, Wall Street Journal (January 11, 1973). National Campaign to Save the A B M Treaty, Briefing Book on the ABM Treaty and Related Issues (Washington, D.C., National Campaign to Save the A B M Treaty), 1986. Nelson, Jack, "Presidential Text: From the Mashed-Potato Circuit to the White House," Los Angeles Times (January 21, 1982), A2. Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York, Holt, Rinehart, & Winston), 1973. Nitze, Paul H „ "On the road to a More Stable Peace," Current Policy No. 657, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, (February 20, 1985), 1-3. Norrgard, Lee, and Joe Rosenbloom, III, "The Cold Warriors," Common Cause Magazine (July/August 1985), 14. Norris, John G., "Anti-Missile Plan Altered Under Budget," Washington Post (January 18, 1963), A l . Nunn, Sam, "Interpretation of the A B M Treaty," included in the Congressional Record March 11, 1987, pp. S2973-S2985; March 12, 1987, pp. S3090S3095; March 13, 1987, pp. S3171-S3173. O'Toole, Thomas, "Reagan Interested in Speeding Development of Space-based Lasers," Washington Post (December 26, 1980). One Hundred Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards, Fiscal Year 1985, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Washington Headquarters Services (Washington, The Pentagon), 1985. Oppenheimer, J. Robert, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," Foreign Affairs 31 (July 1953), 525-535. Paine, Christopher, and Gordon Adams, "The R & D Slush Fund," Nation (January 26, 1980), 72-75. Peck, Merton J., and Frederic M. Sherer, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis, (Boston, Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University), 1962. Perry, William J., "The Department of Defense Statement on the M X System and Ballistic Missile Defense," presented before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, March 12, 1980.

160

References

Pike, John, "Corporate Interest in the SDI," Public Interest Report (April 1987), 10. , The Strategic Defense Initiative Budget and Program: A Staff Study (Washington, D.C., Federation of American Scientists), 1985. Pipes, Richard, "Strategic Superiority," New York Times (February 6, 1977), E15. Pipes, Richard, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary (July 1977), 21-35. "Powerful Electron Beams Produced by New RADLAC II Accelerator," Sandia Science News, vol. 20, no. 13 (December 1985). Prados, John, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York, Dial Press), 1982. Pratt, Erik K„ "Weapons Sponsorship: Promoting Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Era," doctoral dissertation (Riverside, University of California), March 1989. Pratt, Erik K., John Pike, and Daniel Lindley, "SDI Contracting: Building a Star Wars Constituency," in Gerald Steinberg (ed.), Lost in Space (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books) 1988, 111-183. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President, The President of the United States, June 1986. President's Commission on Strategic Forces, Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, April 1983. President's Science Advisory Committee, Report of the AICBM Panel, May 21, 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office File, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Box 4, AICBM. Pringle, Peter, and William Arkin, S.I.O.P.: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War (New York, W. W. Norton & Co.), 1983. Project Charles, videocassette, 1 hr„ Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, New York, 1981. "Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, 1982 ed. (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1982: 162-163. Reagan, Ronald, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Administration of Ronald Reagan, Book 1—January 1 to July 1, 1983 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1984. Report by the President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age (The Finletter Report), January 1, 1948 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1948. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on High-Energy Lasers, Undersecretary of Defense, Research and Engineering, October 18, 1979 (unpublished). Report of the DSB Task Force on U.S. BMD, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, September 1979 (unpublished, released through FOIA). Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Department of Defense (June 1986). "Report to the President Persuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950," April 7, 1950, National Security Council series 68 (NSC 68), reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume I

References

161

National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1977:235-293. Research and Development in the Department of Defense: A Management Overview, Office of the Director of Defense, Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, May 1974. Research Highlights, Los Alamos National Laboratory/Annual Report, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1980. Review of the DOD Space-Based Laser Weapon Study, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, May 1, 1981 (unpublished). Richardson, Lewis F., Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War (Pittsburgh, Boxwood Press), 1960. Robinson, Clarence A., Jr., "Administration Pushes ICBM Defense," Aviation Week & Space Technology (October 11, 1982), 113-116ff. , "Advance Made on High-Energy Laser," Aviation Week & Space Technology (February 23, 1981), 25-27. , "Beam-Target Interaction Tested," Aviation Week & Space Technology (October 8, 1979), 14-17. , "Beam Weapons Effort to Grow," Aviation Week & Space Technology (April 2, 1979), 12-16. , "DOD Presses for ABM Fund Restoration," Aviation Week & Space Technology (June 7, 1976), 16-17. , "Rancor Erupts Within Transition Team," Aviation Week & Space Technology (November 17, 1980), 21-23. , "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 2, 1977), 16-23. , "U.S. Pushes Development of Beam Weapons (title varies)" (AWST 1978 beam weapons series), Aviation Week & Space Technology (October 2, 1978), 14-22; (October 9, 1978), 42-53; (October 16, 1978), 42-52; (October 30, 1978), 51-55; (November 6, 1978), 50-58; (November 13, 1978), 14-20. Rosenberg, David Allan, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983), 3-71. , "A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours," International Security, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981/82), 3-38. Ruina, Jack, "ABM Revisited: Promise or Peril?" Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1981), 62-65. Rumsfeld, Donald H., "Annual Defense Department Report FY78," presented to Congress January 17, 1977 (mimeo). , Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1977 Budget and Its Implications for the FY1 1978 Authorization Request and the FY 1977-1981 Defense Programs, January 27, 1976 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1976. Russet, Bruce, "International Interactions and Processes: The Internal vs. External Debate Revisited," in Finifter, Ada W. (ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, D.C., American Political Science Association) 1983:541-568. Sagan, Carl, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1983/84), 257-292. Sanders, Jerry W., Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, South End Press), 1983. Sapolsky, Harvey M., The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and

162

References

Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, Harvard University Press), 1972. Scheer, Robert, "Flaws Peril Pivotal 'Star Wars' Laser," Los Angeles Times (September 23, 1985), Alff. , With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (New York, Vintage), 1983. Schell, Jonathon, The Abolition (New York, Avon Books), 1984. Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press), 1966. , "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," in Brennan, Donald G. (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York, George Braziller), 1961:167-186. Schlesinger, James R., Report of the Secretary of Defense to Authorization Request and FY 1976-1980 Defense Programs, February 5, 1975 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1975. Schneider, William S., Jr., Donald G. Brennan, Hans Rühle, and William A. Davis, U.S. Strategic-Nuclear Policy and Ballistic Missile Defense, IFPA Special Report (Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis), May 1980. Schumpeter, Joseph A., Imperialism and Social Classes, translated by Heinz Norden, edited and with an introduction by Paul M. Sweezy (Oxford, Basil Blackwell), 1951. Schwartz, David N„ "Past and Present: The Historical Legacy," in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (eds.), Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C., Brookings), 1984, 330-349. Senate Armed Services Committee, Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1970, and Reserve Strength, Part 2, Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1969. Senate Armed Services Committee, Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1971, and Reserve Strength, Part 3, Hearings, 91st Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1970. Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Part 9, Hearings, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1978. Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Part 7, 97th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1981. Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Part 7, 97th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1982. Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Part 4, Hearings, February 8, 1973, 93rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1973. Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1976 and July-September 1976 Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 4, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1975. Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected

References

163

Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 10, Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1977. Senate Armed Services Committee, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearings, June 20, 22, 28; July 18, 19, 21, 24, and 25, 1972, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1972. Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths: Part 7, Research and Development, Hearings, April 4, 1974, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1974. Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on R&D, Fiscal Year 1976 and July-September 1976 Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths: Part 6, Research and Development, Hearings, March, 19, 1975, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1975. Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, Strategic Force Modernization Programs, Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1981. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1975: Part 1, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1974. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, Interlocking Directorates Among the Major U.S. Corporations, staff study, June 15, 1978 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1978. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Intelligence and the ABM, Hearings, June 23, 1969, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1969. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1972. Senate Report No. 93-385, Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Construction Authorization for the Safeguard ABM, and Active Duty and Selected Reserve Strength, and for Other Purposes, September 6, 1973 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1973. Senate Report No. 93-884, Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, and for Other Purposes, May 29, 1974 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1974. Senate Report No. 94-1004, Senate Armed Services Committee, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strength Levels, Military Training Student Loads, and for Other Purposes, June 28, 1976 (Washington, Government Printing Office) 1976. Senate Report No. 94-146, Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976 and July-September 1976 Transition Period for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths and for Other

164

References

Purposes, May 19, 1975 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1975. Senate Report No. 94-878, Senate Armed Services Committee, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, and for Other Purposes, May 14, 1976 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1976. Senate Report No. 95-129, Senate Armed Services Committee, Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978 for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Civil Defense, and for Other Purposes, May 10, 1977 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1977. Senate Report No. 97-330, Senate Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983 and Supplemental Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, April 13, 1982 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1982. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Laser Technology-Development and Applications, Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, serial #96-106 (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1980. Senghaas, Dieter, "Armament Dynamics and Disarmament," Instant Research on Peace and Violence, vol. 6, no. 1-2 (1976), 3-17. , "Arms Race Dynamics and Arms Control in Europe," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 10, no. 1 (1979), 8-19. , "Militarism Dynamics in the Contemporary Context of Periphery Capitalism," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 8, no. 2, (1977), 103109. Shapely, Deborah, "Technology Creep and the Arms Race: Two Future Arms Control Problems—Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense and Space Satellites," Science (October 20, 1978), 289-292. Shoup, Laurence H., and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust (New York, Monthly Review Press), 1977. Singer, J. David, "Threat Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (1958), 90-105. Sivard, Ruth Leger, World Military and Social Expenditures 1985 (Washington, D.C., World Priorities Inc.), 1985. , World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88 (Washington, D.C., World Priorities, Inc.), 1987. Sklar, Holly (ed.), Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management (Boston, South End Press), 1980. Smith, Gerard, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (New York, Doubleday & Co.), 1980. Smith, Hedrick, The Power Game (New York, Random House), 1988. Smith, Perry M., The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press), 1970. Snyder, Glen H„ Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press), 1961. "Special Report: Demonstration Planned for MX Defense System," Aviation Week & Space Technology (June 16, 1980), 220-221. "Special Report: Max Hunter: The Force Behind Reagan's Star Wars Strategy," Business Week (June 20, 1983), 56. Stares, Paul B„ Space Weapons and U.S. Strategy: Origins and Development (London, Croom Helm), 1985.

References

165

Stein, Jonathan B„ From H-Bomb to Star Wars (Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath & Co.), 1984. Steinberg, Gerald (ed.), Lost in Space: The Domestic Politics of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books), 1988. Stoffer, Howard, "Congressional Defense Policy-Making and the Arms Control Community: The Case of the Anti-Ballistic Missile," doctoral dissertation (Columbia University), 1980. Stone, Jeremy, "Arms Race May Be Petering Out," Los Angeles Times (May 22, 1986), B7. "Stronger Directed-Energy Effort Urged," Aviation Week & Space Technology (October 8, 1979), 18-19. Stubbing, Richard A., with Richard A. Mendel, The Defense Game: An Insider Explores the Astonishing Realities of America's Defense Establishment (New York, Harper & Row), 1986. "Successful Homing Overlay Experiment Intercept Announced," News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), June 11, 1984, Washington, D.C. Talbott, Strobe, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Arms Control (New York, Alfred A. Knopf), 1984. Tarr, David W., "Military Technology and the Policy Process," Western Political Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 1965), 135-148. Taylor, Theodore B., "Endless Generations of Nuclear Weapons," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1986), 12-15. "Third-Generation Nuclear Weapons," Scientific American, vol. 256, no. 4 (April 1987), 30-39. "Technical Survey: Particle Beams, Laser Weapons (Directed-Energy Weapons) (title varies)" (AWST 1980 series on DEWs) Aviation Week & Space Technology (July 28, 1980), 32-42; (August 4, 1980), 44-68. Teller, Edward, with Allen Brown, Better a Shield Than a Sword: Perspectives on Defense and Technology (New York, Free Press), 1987. , The Legacy of Hiroshima (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co.), 1962. "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, 1982 ed. (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1982:139-147 and 162-163. Tsipis, Kosta, Arsenal: Understanding Weapons in the Nuclear Age (New York, Touchstone), 1983. Tyroler, Charles, II (ed.), Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger (Washington, D.C., Pergamon-Brassey's), 1984. U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense, proceedings of a symposium held at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center, November 1-2, 1979 (Contract No. DASG60-79-C-0132). Union of Concerned Scientists, The Fallacy of Star Wars (New York, Vintage Books), 1984. Van Cleave, William R„ and W. Scott Thompson (eds.), Strategic Options for the Early Eighties: What Can Be Done? National Strategy Information Center, Inc. (White Plains, N.Y., Automated Graphic Systems), 1979. Wade, Nicholas, "Charged Debate Erupts over Russian Beam Weapon," Science 196 (May 27, 1977), 957-959.

166

References

, "Particle Beams as ABM Weapons: General and Physicists Differ," Science 196 (April 22, 1977), 407-408. Wallace, Michael D., "Arms and Escalation: Some New Evidence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 23, no. 1 (March 1979), 3-16. Waller, Douglas, James Bruce, and Douglas Cook, "SDI: Progress and Challenges," Staff Report submitted to Senator William Proxmire, Senator J. Bennett Johnston, and Senator Lawton Chiles, March 17, 1986 (unpublished). Wallop, Malcom, "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense," Strategic Review (Fall 1979), 13-21. Waltz, Kenneth N„ Man, the State and War (New York, Columbia University Press), 1959. , Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley), 1979. Weinrod, W. Bruce (ed.), Assessing Strategic Defense (Washington, D.C., Heritage Foundation), 1985. Williams, William Appleton, Empire as a Way of Life (New York, Oxford University Press), 1980. Wohlstetter, Albert, Good Guys, Bad Guys and the ABM, The Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, Paper No. 6, 1970. , "Rivals But No Race," Foreign Policy 16 (Fall 1974), 48-81. Wolfe, Alan, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat: Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus (Boston, South End Press), 1984. Wright, Quincy, A Study of War, 2nd ed. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press), 1965. Yanarella, Ernest J., The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972 (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky), 1977. York, Herbert F., "ABM, MIRV, and the Arms Race," Science 169 (July 17, 1970), 257-260. , The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco, W. H. Freeman & Co.), 1976. , "The Arms Race and the Fallacy of the Last Move," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1969), 27-43. , Does Strategic Defense Breed Offense? CSIA Occasional Paper Series, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (Boston, University Press of America), 1987. , Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New York, Basic Books, Inc.), 1987. , Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York, Simon & Schuster), 1970. Zacharias, J.R., memorandum to A. G. Hill. (June 13, 1952), Oppenheimer Papers Box 187, Project Lincoln, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, reproduced from the collections in the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

Index

Accelerator Technology Division, 62, 65 accidental launch (protection), 20; ALPS, 133 Accurex Corp., 99 Acheson, Dean, 24 Adelman, Kenneth, 104 Advanced Ballistic Reentry System (ABRES), 37 Advanced Technology Program (ATP), 53-56, 58, 89 advanced test accelerator (ATA), 60 Aegis, 37 Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL), 39 air defense, 9-15, 17, 25; ADSEC, 11; and air force, 10, 13, 14, 22; and army, 13; British, 5; CONAD, 10-15, 25; and extended deterrence, 15; and NSC-68, 1011; and navy, 12, 23; and R&D, 10-11; and sponsorship, 12-15, 41 Airey, Richard, 61 air force, 9-11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 2 1 23, 34, 36-38, 41, 46, 55, 57-60, 63, 68, 73, 90, 132; Foreign Technology Division, 66; and lasers, 39, 58, 60, 92-93; Science Advisory Board, 11, 68 Air Force Weapons Laboratory (AFWL), 39; Directed Energy Experimental Range, 66 Afghanistan, 65, 79 Albuquerque (NM), 65, 66 Allen, Richard, 88, 104-106 Allison, Graham, 2 American Catholic bishops (pastoral letter), 107, 108, 124 American Security Council (ASC), 23, 43, 69, 75, 126, 127

Anderson, Martin, 103-106, 109 Annex (the), 109-110, 112 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 1, 9, 16, 17, 19-25, 32-34, 36, 37, 3 9 ^ 3 , 47, 55, 56, 60, 65, 72-74, 88, 89, 104, 105, 119, 123, 129; contractors, 23, 42; "gap," 3, 20; limits, 20, 21, 24, 32, 43; nonnuclear, 37, 55; opponents, 19, 24, 25, 43; proponents, 20, 2 3 25, 32, 43, 95; R&D, 23, 33; Soviet, 20, 24; space-based, 17, 33, 34. See also, ABM Treaty, active defense, area defense, BMD, LoADs, missile defense, Nike-Zeus, Nike-X, point defense, Safeguard, SDS, Sentinel. Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 1, 20, 21, 25, 31-37, 40-47, 5357, 64, 73, 74, 76, 77, 87, 102, 112, 119, 120, 123, 125, 129; abrogation, 31, 36, 40, 41, 47, 57, 73, 76; Agreed Statement D, 21; breakout, 34; preamble, 1, 32, 43; protocal, 21, 31, 32, 41 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons, 36, 37, 60, 62, 63, 128; "gap," 68; Soviet, 63 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 23 Anti-tactical missile (ATM), 100, 111 area defense, 19-23, 25, 34-36, 41, 54, 55, 57, 73, 87, 91, 98, 101, 111, 120, 132 arms control, 2, 5, 7, 9, 14-16, 2 4 26, 32, 57, 79, 87, 97, 103, 110, 119, 131, 134-137; community, 25, 131; syndrome, 97 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 45^16 army, 3, 4, 9, 10, 13; and ABM 167

168 Treaty, 40; Advanced BMD Agency (ABMDA), 37, 53; Advanced Technology Center, 58-60, 74; and air defense, 13; and BMD, 1624, 32-37, 41, 42, 47, 53-57, 59, 70, 75, 76, 78, 87-89, 101, 120, 125, 132; BMD Organization (BMDO), 42, 58, 74, 125; BMD Systems Command (BMDSCOM), 53, 64 126; and lasers, 39, 58, 60; and particle beams, 60, 61, 65; Science Board, 99 ARPAT, 34 assured destruction, 24, 44, 74, 79 assured survival, 96, 97 AT&T, 23 Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, 68 Austin Research Associates, 60, 61, 67, 77 Autoresonant Accelerator (ARA), 5961, 64, 66, 67 AVCO, 38, 39, 58, 61 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 68, 69, 78, 94, 97, 98, 101, 125 Baker, James, 92 BAMBI (ballistic missile boost intercept), 17, 34, 96 ballistic missile defense (BMD), 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 31-37, 39-42, 46, 47, 53-58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 70, 73-76, 78, 80, 87-89, 91, 98, 100, 105, 111, 119-121, 128-130, 132, 133, 136, 137; sponsorship (proponents), 5, 7, 19-21, 25, 26, 31, 32, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 56, 67-69, 72-74, 77, 78, 91, 92, 94, 97, 98, 101, 111, 112, 119-121, 123-125, 127-133, 137, 138; contractors, 23, 24, 42, 74-78, 88, 100, 125; and DEWs, 72, 73, 78; lasers, 38, 39, 69, 71, 76, 77; opponents, 57; and particle beams, 18, 37, 61, 62, 66; program managers, 54, 55, 64, 70; zealots, 105, 112, 135. See also, ABM. bargaining chip, 21, 25, 36, 57 Barnet, Richard, 127 Bartley, Robert, 78 Battista, Anthony, 94

Index Battle of Britain, 5 BDM International, 99 beam gap, 46, 68, 87 beam weapons, 18, 38, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 69, 71, 73, 78, 96 Beecher, William, 78 Beilenson, Laurence, 103 Bell/Douglas team, 22 Bell Laboratories, 16 Belmont Conference, 88 Bendetsen, Karl, 106 blackout (radar), 55 Blumenthal, Sidney, 98 Boeing, 75, 76, 96, 99 Bomarc project, 10 bomber defense, 19, 39 bomber gap, 3 "bombs in the backyard," 21, 55 boost-phase intercept, 17, 22, 62 Bosma, John, 97 Boston Globe, 78 Bradley, William, 19 Brennan, Donald, 24, 32, 43, 45 Brown, Harold, 56, 79 bureaucratic interests, 17, 70, 72; opponents, 105; politics, 2, 4; resistance, 70 128; rivalry, 132 Burt, Richard, 78, 110 Bush, George, 46, 129, 131 Canada, 11, 65 Capitol Hill, 22, 70, 93 Casey, William, 23 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 74 CIA, 23, 46; Nuclear Intelligence Panel, 68 Chair Heritage, 18, 38, 59, 60 Chapin, Edward, 71 Charged-particle beams (CPB), 18, 37, 38, 41, 60-63, 66, 68 Chinese, 20, 35 Citizens' Committee for Peace and Security, 23 civil defense, 19, 45, 46; gap, 45, 68; Soviet, 45, 46, 102 Clark, William P., 106-110 Clements, William P., Jr., 67 Clifford, Clark, 22 Coalition for Peace Through Strength, 69, 126 Codevilla, Angelo, 70, 92 cold war, 31

Index Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (C 3 I), 36, 88 Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), 47, 74, 79, 126, 127 Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, 25 competing strategic premises, 4, 7, 80, 128, 131, 134, 137 Computer Sciences Corp., 99 Congress (U.S.), 7, 16, 21, 23, 32, 34, 41, 47, 55, 56, 61, 72, 73, 88, 89, 94, 112, 126; congressional, 21, 35, 36, 47, 55, 57, 70, 95, 130; congressmen, 22, 31; directives, 35-36, 41, 53, 54, 61, 76, 78; hearings (testimony), 33, 35, 90, 108 Continental Defense Command, 12 Control Data Corp., 99 Cooper, Robert S., 94 Coors, Joseph, 106, 126 Cox, Arthur Macy, 46 cruise missile, 38, 104, 108 Czech scientist, 65 damage limiting, 19, 44, 79; studies, 19 DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Agency), 17, 18, 22, 33, 37-39, 41, 42, 53, 58-61, 70, 92-94, 120 Dauphin (test), 94-95 Davis, Ruth, 71 Davis, William A., Jr., 70 Deaver, Michael, 105, 110 defense community, 2, 9, 10, 17, 18, 25, 63, 64, 78, 100, 101, 120, 133 defense dominant (future), 109; (world), 130, 131, 134, 137 defense guidance (Reagan), 100 defense industry, 23, 39, 57, 71, 77, 98, 100, 125; Soviet, 46 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 64, 96 defense-protected build-down, 131 Defense Science Board (DSB), 71, 100, 126; Task Force on Soviet Missile Defense, 64; Task Force on Space-Based Lasers, 71, 72, 77, 92, 94; Task Force on U.S. BMD, 56 defensive deterrent, 14

169 Defensive Technologies Study Team (DTST), 111 Democratic, 31, 94, 97; Democrats, 74 Department of Defense (DOD), 19, 39, 53, 57, 58, 61, 65, 70-72, 98, 100, 120, 126. See also, Pentagon. Department of Energy (DOE), 58, 65, 120, 126 deterrence, 3, 74, 79, 102, 108, 137; extended, 15; graduated, 15 deterrent, 3, 14, 24, 35-37, 137 Dickson, Paul, 24 directed energy weapons (DEWs), 18, 37, 58-61, 63, 73, 99 Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 3, 37, 77 disarmament, 14, 32, 97, 137, 138 Domenici, Pete, 74 Douglas Aircraft, 16. See also, McDonnell Douglas. Dornberger, Walter, 18 Douhet, Giulio, 10 Draper Laboratory, 70, 77, 99 Drummond, William, 66-67 Dudnikov, V. G., 65 early warning, 10, 12; jurisdiction, 22; restrictions, 36 EG&G, 99 Eisenhower, Dwight D„ 16, 128, 129; administration, 12, 15, 16, 22 endoatmospheric interceptor, 17-20, 55. See also HEDI; and Sprint. Europe, 13, 15, 97, 108, 124 exoatmospheric interceptor, 16, 20, 55, 56, 89, 133. See also Spartan; HOE; and ERIS. Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Interception System (ERIS), 133 exotic technologies, 18, 33, 38, 61, 68, 78, 87, 105, 112, 119, 123, 133; BMD schemes, 17, 67, 72, 73, 91, 97, 125, 128; sponsorship, 67, 72, 91, 111, 126, 138 first-strike, 90, 110, 123 finite-containment school, 14 Fleet Demonstration Model (FDM), 39

170 Fletcher, James, 111 Fletcher Panel, 111 "follow-on imperative," 76 Fontaine, Roger, 104 Ford, Gerald, (administration), 31, 47 Foreign Affairs, 44 Foreign Applied Sciences Assessment Center (FASAC), 64 "fortress America," 15 forward-based defense, 96 Fossedal, Gregory, 98 Foster, John, 3, 37, 71, 76, 100 "Freedom from Fear" paper, 107 free electron lasers (FELs), 58, 94 Fuhrman, Robert, 70 Future Security Strategy Study (FS 3 ), 111 Gang of Four, 69-72, 77, 87 Gang of 35, 71, 72, 77 Gas Dynamic laser (GDL), 38-39 Gavin, Robert, 23 General Accounting Office (GAO), 56, 99 General Electric (GE), 9, 23, 75, 76 General Motors, 75, 99 Gerry, Edward, 39 Gilpin, Robert, 14 Gilstein, J. B„ 33 Glassboro (NJ), 20 GLIPAR (guide line identification program for anti-missile research), 18 Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD), 96 Graham, Daniel O., 46, 69, 96, 104, 106 Grand Forks, (ND) (ABM site), 21, 32, 40, 41, 47 Greb, Allen, 112 Greenwood, Ted, 124, 134 Gregory, William, 98 groupthink, 112 Hafner, Donald, 112 Hagelstein, Peter, 94 hard rock silos, 23 Hardsite, 34 Harper, Edwin, 106 Harvard Symposium, 126 heavy-missile gap, 68 Hercules Corp., 75 Heflin, Howell, 71

Index Heritage Foundation, 96, 106, 126 Hermes II, 65 Hertz Foundation, 126 High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI), 133 High Energy Lasers (HELs), 18, 3739, 41, 42, 58, 60, 61, 71, 76, 77, 98, 121; funding, 39, 58; review group, 39; space-based, 60, 63, 70. See also, lasers; DEWs. High Frontier (project), 47, 91, 9 6 98, 106, 125, 126 Hill, A. G., 11 Hill, James, 103 HIT (homing intercept technology), 34, 37, 55, 56 HOE (homing overlay experiment), 37, 56, 70, 75, 76 Hoffman, Fred, 111 Hoffman Panel, 111, 131 Honeywell, 99 Hoover Institution, 126 House Armed Services Committee (HASC), 93; R&D subcommittee, 94 House (of Representatives), 92, 93, 107 Hudson Institute, 24, 74, 126 Hughes, 42, 75-77, 99 Hume, Jacqueline, 106 Hunter, Maxwell, II, 69-71, 96 Huntington, Samuel P., 138 Huntsville, AL, 64 IBM, 75 Ikl6, Fred, 44, 45, 104, 110 Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF), 38, 65, 120 inspector general, 99-100 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), 74, 126 integral air defense, 13, 39 ICBMs (inter-continental ballistic missiles), 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 20, 25, 60, 62, 108; Chinese, 20; defense of, 25, 41, 54, 78, 87, 89, 125; mobile systems, 23, 56, 90; Soviet, 108; survivability, 54, 8 9 91, 123 Interim Agreement (on Offensive Arms), 21, 40, 41, 43, 46 interim options, 111, 131, 133 interservice rivalry, 7, 21, 22, 132

Index Iran-Contra, 112 iron triangle, 136 Jackson, Henry, 32, 44 Jameson, Robert, 62, 65 James, William, 138 Janis, Irving, 112 Jason (group), 18 Johnson, Lyndon B., 20 Johnson, Roy, 17 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 23, 40, 41, 57, 107-110 Jones, John, 54, 64 Jones, T. K„ 45 Kahn, Herman, 24 Keegan, George, 46, 66, 68, 69, 72, 78 Kelly Committee (summer study review), 26 (n22) Kennedy, Edward, 24 Kent, Glenn, 19; studies, 19-20 Kerr, Donald, 74 Keyworth, George, 93-95, 102, 106, 110 Killian, James, 14, 16 kinetic energy weapons (KEWs), 99 Kirtland AFB, 39 kitchen cabinet (Reagan's), 91, 106107, 109, 126 Knapp, Edward, 62, 65 Kohler, Foy, 46-47 Kosygin, Aleksei, 20 Kupperman, R. H., 74 Kurth, James, 134 Laird, Melvin, 22, 32, 90, 123 laser, 18, 33, 38, 39, 42, 58, 60, 62, 63, 71, 72, 92-94, 100, 104; cost, 98; funding, 38, 58, 92, 93; space-based, 37, 39, 42, 58, 60, 61, 63, 69-71, 73, 77, 88, 92-94, 101, 105; Soviet, 92. See also, HELs; tri-service lasers; and DEWs. laser lobby, 71, 91-95, 125, 126 laser wars, 93 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 60, 77, 94, 95, 99, 102, 106, 126 layered defense, 54, 55, 57, 96; system (LDS), 54-56, 76, 128 Leber, Walter, 35 light area defense (LAD), 20, 21, 35,

171 41, 55, 73, 76, 78, 120 limited nuclear options (LNOs), 36, 79 limited nuclear war, 44, 63 Limited Test Ban Treaty, 55 Lincoln Laboratories, 11, 14, 75, 77 Lisbon (Portugal), 110 Litton Systems, 99 LoADS (low altitude defense system), 54-56, 75, 76, 88, 89, 98 Lockheed, 23, 42, 69, 70, 75-77, 99, 133 LODE (large optics demonstration experiment), 60 Logan experiment, 16; report, 47 Los Alamos National Laboratory, 60, 62, 65, 71, 74, 77, 94, 99, 126 LTV, 99. See also, Vought. MAD (mutual assured destruction), 24, 32, 43-45, 78, 96, 97, 102, 103, 119, 123, 129, 135, 137 Maginot line, 15 Mahan, Alfred T., 96 Manhattan Project, 2, 91, 106, 119 Marshall Foundation, 98, 126 Martin Marietta, 75, 76, 99 Maxwell Laboratory, 77 McDonnell Douglas, 42, 75, 76, 99, 100, 133 McElroy, Neil, 22, 132 Mclntyre, Thomas J., 35 McLean, (VA), 64 McNamara, Robert, 20, 23 McFarlane, Robert, 107-110 media, 5, 22, 57, 69, 72, 77, 78, 93, 97, 98, 126 Meese, Edwin, 96, 105-106 Middle East, 31 military-industrial complex (MIC), 53, 72, 87, 100, 101, 119, 121, 130, 136, 138 Miller, Frankin C., I l l Miller, Joseph, 70, 77 Minuteman (missile), 24, 54, 89 MIRVs (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles), 56, 62, 124 Mission Research Corporation, 77 missile defense, 7, 9, 10, 17-19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 33, 37, 41, 46, 47, 53, 72, 74, 76-78, 91, 92, 97, 98, 104-108, 111, 112, 119, 121,

172 123-125, 128, 129, 131-133, 137; Soviet, 64 missile gap, 3, 68 Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA), 64 MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 11, 14, 75 Mobile Test Unit (MTU), 39 Morgan, J. P., 125 Morris, Frederic, 2 Morrow, Douglas, 103 Motorola, 23, 75 MPS (multiple protection shelters), 89 multiple warhead interceptors, 33-34, 56 "Murder in the Air," 102 mutual destruction, 24 MX (missile experimental), 54-56, 73, 76, 89, 90, 98, 104, 107, 108 NASA, 58 National Command Authority (NCA), 32 National Foreign Intelligence Board, 68 national interest, 36, 124, 127 National Security Council (NSC), 10, 11, 107; staff, 107, 109, 110; advisor, 107; NSC-68, 10-11; NSC-141 (summer study review), 26 (n22); NSC-162, 12 National Security Resources Board, 11 National Strategy Information Center, 74, 88, 126 national technical means (NTMs), 33 NATO, 108, 110 Naval Research Center, 61 networks, 2, 4, 5, 7, 69, 102, 125127; defense policy, 4, 72, 96, 100, 112 neutron warhead, 17 "new strategic concept," 10, 69 Nichols Research, 75, 99 Nike-Hercules, 16 Nike-X, 19, 20, 55 Nike-Zeus, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 42, 55, 76, 120 Nitze, Paul, 19, 24, 46, 47 Nitze criterion, 19, 131 Nixon, Richard, 21, 31-33, 35, 36, 47 non-nuclear kill (NNK), 55-56

Index NORAD (North American Defense Command), 21, 103-105 NSSD 6-83 (national security study directive), 111 Nth country attacks, 55, 76 nuclear armed bombardment satellites (NABS), 17 nuclear blackmail, 103 nuclear-freeze, 123 nuclear weapons, 1, 6, 7, 15-17, 32, 44, 87, 95, 103, 107, 109, 111, 124, 139; simulated effects, 38; third-generation, 17, 95, 106 nuclear winter, 6, 124 Office of Management and Budget National Security Division, 92 O group, 95 126 Olin Foundation, 98, 126 O'Neill, Lawrence, 37 Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 14-15 Orlando, FL, 109 Oulette, Gerald, 70 overlay, 37, 55, 56, 75, 76, 89 Palm Beach, FL, 38 Palmer, Bruce, 40 Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator (PBFA), 66 Particle Beam Technology Study Group (Gang of 35), 71 passive defense, 45, 47, 79, 95 Pavlovskiy, A. I., 66 Pax Americana, 69, 96 Pax Sovietica, 97 Pearl Harbor, 16 Pentagon, 23, 24, 38, 39, 53, 58, 63, 64, 70, 71, 77, 92, 107, 125 Perkin Elmer, 70 Perle, Richard, 110 Perry, William J., 56-57 Physics International, 77 Physical Dynamics Incorporated, 77 Pike, H. Alan, 70-71 Pipes, Richard, 4 6 ^ 7 PNUTS (possible nuclear underground test site), 6 7 - 6 9 Poindexter, John, 107 point defense, 13, 21, 22, 25, 34, 36, 47, 57, 87, 91, 120 policy-planning group, 74, 77, 79, 125-128 president (U.S.), 2, 31, 102, 110,

Index 119, 129, 130, 137; Eisenhower, 16, 128; Johnson, 20; Nixon, 21, 32; Reagan, 1, 17, 41, 87-91, 96, 102, 106-111, 119; science advisor, 94, 95, 102, 110; science advisory committee, 18; Truman, 10 presidential initiatives, 120, 128129, 133 "presidential issue," 128, 137 President's Air Policy Commission (Finletter Report), 10 Project Alpha, 60 Project Charles, 11 Project Defender, 17 18, 22, 37-39, 41, 53, 73, 120, 128 Project Lincoln, 11, 14, 15 Project Thumper, 9, 10, 16 Project Vista, 14 Project Wizard, 9, 10, 22 radar, 11, 12, 19-21, 31, 36, 37, 42, 55, 76; phased-arrray (PAR), 19, 20, 37 radio-frequency linear accelerator (RADLAC), 59, 64-66 radio-frequency quadrupole (RFQ), 65 Rand, 14, 24, 44, 77 Raytheon, 75, 99 RCA, 75 "R&D forever" syndrome, 94 Reagan, Ronald, 1, 2, 14, 17, 23, 41, 79, 87-97, 99-112, 119121, 124, 127-131, 133, 134, 137; administration, 14, 23, 79, 88-90, 92, 93, 100, 106, 110, 124, 127, 130, 133; Star Wars speech, 41, 87, 90, 94, 99, 103, 107, 109-112, 119, 121, 128, 129. See also, kitchen cabinet. Reentry Body Indentification Group (RBIG), 19 Reis, Victor, 71 Resor, Stanley, 22 revolving doors, 124 Reykjavik (Iceland), 137 Rockwell International, 42, 75, 76, 99 Rostow, Eugene, 104 Rowen, Henry, 104 Ruina, Jack, 73 Rumsfeld, Donald, 45

173 Safeguard, 21, 24, 25, 32, 34, 35, 41, 55, 72, 76. 90, 98, 101, 119, 120, 123; contractors, 23, 42; sponsorship, 24-25 SAGE (semi-automated ground environment), 11-12 Sandia National Laboratory, 60, 65, 66, 77 satellite defense, 36 Scheer, Robert, 103 Schlesinger, James, 79 Schneider, William, 92 Schnog, Norbert, 70 Science Applications International Corp., 64, 77, 99, 100 Semipalatinsk (USSR), 66-68 Scowcroft, Brent, 90 Scowcroft Commission, 90-91 Sears, John, 105 Secretary of Defense, 20-23, 32, 45, 56, 79, 90, 110; deputy secretary, 67; deputy undersecretary for research and engineering, 71; office of directed energy technology, 61; undersecretary of defense for research and advanced technology, 61, 71 Seesaw, 18, 37, 59, 61 Senate (U.S.), 21, 32, 71, 79, 92-94; hearings, 35; senators, 21, 24, 32, 35, 36, 43, 44, 70, 71, 74, 88, 92, 94, 98, 105 Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), 35, 54, 71, 93; subcommittee on arms control, 44; subcommittee on research and development, 34-35; subcommittee on strategic and theater nuclear forces, 94 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 70 Sentinel, 20-22, 55, 72, 101 shadow programs, 121-122 Sino-American relations, 31 Sipapu, 60 site defense (system) (SDS), 34, 35, 39, 41, 42, 53-57, 76 Sloan, W. L„ 67 Smith, Gerard, 33 45 Smith, Hedrick, 108, 110 Soviet Union, 1, 9, 14-16, 19, 21, 24, 31, 37, 43, 45-47, 54, 63-65, 72, 74, 78, 79, 87, 90, 96, 97,

174 100-104, 106-110, 113, 119, 123, 125, 127-131, 135, 138; Abomb, 10-11; Afghanistan, 65, 79; ASAT, 64; beam weapons, 57, 61, 64-68, 92; BMD, 19, 20, 24, 40, 46, 54, 57, 58, 61, 88; civil defense, 45, 46, 102; connection, 63-65; H-bomb, 12 space, 17, 41, 69, 94, 96, 104; -based BMD, 1, 33, 34, 62, 63, 73, 91, 94, 95, 96, 132; -based lasers, 39, 42, 57, 58, 60, 61, 63, 69-71, 73, 77, 88, 92-94, 98, 101, 105; -based military systems, 36, 37, 63, 100; -based neutral particle beam, 37, 60, 63-65; defense, 58, 60, 63, 70, 77; militarization of, 63; warfare, 57, 97 Space-laser Triad, 60, 92 space shuttle, 63 Spartan, 20, 55 special policy meetings, 106 Sperry-Rand, 75 Sprint, 19, 20, 55 Sputnik, 16, 42, 101, 120, 128, 129 Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), 33 Stanford Research Institute (SRI), 24, 126 Starbird, Alfred, 22 Star Wars, 1, 2, 7, 17, 37, 41, 57, 87, 90, 94, 95, 97, 98, 101-103, 105, 107, 108, 111, 120, 121, 128-132, 136-139; cost, 7, 129; movie, 57, 95 Star Warriors, 94, 95, 125-127 State Department, 46; Advisory Committee on Disarmament, 14; secretary of, 110 Stein, Jonathan, 96 Stillwill Board, 9 Stolarow, J. H., 56 Stone, Jeremy, 138 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 20, 24, 54 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 21, 32, 33, 35, 40, 42, 47, 56, 69, 79 strategic defense, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16, 19, 21-23, 42, 43, 53, 55, 79, 87, 92, 95, 105, 107, 109,

Index

119-121, 132, 134; corporations, 42, 76, 77, 98, 111; funding, 53, 121, 129; sponsorship, 10, 1315, 25, 26, 43, 74, 92, 95, 96, 102, 106-109, 112, 124, 128, 130-132, 134, 137 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1, 14, 17, 92, 95, 100, 111-113, 120, 121, 128-130, 134, 137 Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), 121, 132 Strategic Force Modernization Plan, 88, 105 strategic offensive, 25, 34 Strategic Technology Office (STO), 18, 38, 42 Strauz-Hupe, Robert, 104 Summer Study group, 11; report, 12 "Survival in the Air Age," (Finlettcr Report), 10 System Development Corp., 75 System Technology Program (STP), 53, 54, 56, 58, 88-90 Talon Gold, 60 Tate, Grayson, 54 Team B, 46, 69, 96 technological arms race, 67, 100, 113, 130, 136 Technological Capabilities Panel, 16 technological creep, 7 technological end-run, 95, 96, 101, 123 technological imperative, 7 technological push, 37, 47, 124 technological surprise, 40, 42 Teledyne, 75, 99 Teller, Edward, 25, 43, 91, 94, 95, 102, 104, 106-108, 125 terminal defenses, 33, 55, 89, 101 Texas, 67 Texas Instruments, 75 Textron, 76, 99 think tank, 14, 24, 106, 125 Thiokol, 75 Thomas, Edwin, 106 threat speech, 109, 110 treaty discontents, 42, 45 treaty insurance, 41, 47, 53 Trident, 41, 108 tri-service laser, 39, 41, 58, 121 Truman, Harry, 10 TRW, 3, 70, 76, 77, 99, 100

Index underlay, 55, 76 Unification Church, 126 unitary (national) actor model, 2-4, 124 University of Michigan, 9 University of Texas, 66, 99 Utah Higher Education, 99 V-2, 9 Valley, George, 11 Van Cleave, William, 46, 47, 69, 104 Vessy, John, 108 Vogt, John, Jr., 46 Vought, 55 Wallop, Malcolm, 70, 71, 92, 93, 98, 105 Wall Street Journal, 44, 78, 98 Warner, John, 94 war-winning strategy (also warfighting), 45, 74, 79 Washington, (D.C.). 31, 32, 39. 41, 70, 95 Washington Post, 22, 88 Washington Times, 98 Watergate, 31 Watkins, James, 107-109 weapons acquisition process, 2, 4,

175 62, 120, 124, 127, 134, 135 weapons laboratory, 38, 133 weapons sponsorship, 5, 7; sponsors, 5, 62, 137 Weiss, Seymour, 46, 47 Welch, Jasper, 46, 47 Western Electric, 16, 23, 74, 75 Whalen, Dick, 104 Whirlwind, 11 White Horse, 37, 59-61, 63-65 White House, 91, 92, 96, 101, 105, 108, 112, 126, 127 Williams, Steve, 66 Wilson, Charles, 21 Wilson, William, 106 window of vulnerability, 88, 90 Wohlstetter, Albert, 24 Wolfe, Thomas, 46 Wolfowitz, Paul, 46 Wood, Lowell, 91, 95, 106 Wright-Patterson AFB, 66 X-ray laser, 17, 91, 94, 95, 98, 106, 107 Yonas, Gerald, 66 York, Herbert F., 7, 17 Zeiberg, Seymour, 71

About the Book and the Author

Erik Pratt examines the origins of U.S. missile defense programs since 1945 and analyzes the personal stakes and political fortunes of the individuals and groups who have tried to sell the U.S. government and public on the idea of strategic defense. Considering the roles of both presidential power and bureaucratic and interest group politics, Pratt sheds new light on the often arcane arena of national security decisionmaking. He presents a study not only of the decisionmaking process underlying new weapons systems, but also of competing strategic premises and how these have shaped the nuclear arms race. Selling Strategic Defense shows that the parochial concerns, bureaucratic ambivalence, competing strategic premises, and ideological differences present within coalitions of strategic defense sponsors weaken their cohesiveness and political power; without the strength of the Executive firmly behind them, these coalitions cannot sustain a radical shift in strategic policy. It is also clear that parochial interests are inevitably intertwined with more broadly based national security interests in the process of determining the types of weapons systems developed in the U.S. Erik K. Pratt is a lecturer in political science at the California State University, Fullerton.

177