Selling Reagan's Foreign Policy: Going Public vs. Executive Bargaining 1498569544, 9781498569545

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter One: Nicaragua
Chapter Two: Yellow Rain
Chapter Three: Arms and Controversy
Chapter Four: The MX Missile
Chapter Five: The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
Chapter Six: Grenada
Chapter Seven: Diversion, Denial, and Scandal
Conclusions
Note on Sources
Bibliography
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Index
About the Author

Citation preview

Selling Reagan’s Foreign Policy

Selling Reagan’s Foreign Policy Going Public vs. Executive Bargaining N. Stephen Kane

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2018 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available

ISBN 978-1-4985-6954-5 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4985-6955-2 (electronic) TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

For Roseanne, a woman of valor, whose wisdom enlightens me and whose spirit energizes me.

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction

ix 1

1

Nicaragua: Peril at the Gates?

19

2 3

Yellow Rain: To Bee or Not to Bee? Arms and Controversy: Selling Advanced Weapons to Saudi Arabia The MX Missile: Phoenix Rising The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI): The Impossible Dream? Grenada: The Fury That Wasn’t so Urgent Diversion, Denial, and Scandal: Responding to Iran-Contra

53

4 5 6 7

Conclusions: Analysis and Discussion Note on Sources Bibliography Abbreviations and Acronyms Index About the Author

vii

85 117 153 185 221 249 269 273 283 289 301

Preface and Acknowledgments

During my twenty-six-year career in the U.S. Department of State, primarily as a public affairs specialist, I had no particular inclination to write a book about President Ronald Reagan. I was much too busy drafting public communication strategies in the Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans in the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA/OAP), representing the PA bureau on various interagency working groups in the so-called “public diplomacy regime,” serving as public diplomacy consultant to the South African Working Group under Ambassador J. Douglas Holladay, traveling to various colleges and universities around the country to speak about U.S. foreign policy and publishing articles on U.S. policy toward Latin America in academic journals. It was not until I left the State Department and began teaching senior level courses in media and U.S. foreign policy as an adjunct professor in the Government Department at American University in Washington, DC, that I began to consider such a project. My students at the university essentially made the decision for me. Many of them were able to identify Reagan as the “Great Communicator,” and some thought that he was comparable to William Jennings Bryan or Martin Luther King, Jr. or other great orators from the past. I was intrigued, because that did not square with my experience in the State Department, which overlapped with Reagan’s two administrations. My assignments at State provided something of a front row seat, so to speak, which enabled me to observe how Reagan, his national security advisers and the inter-agency network of public diplomacy working groups that supported their efforts functioned as communicators in the real world. The more I thought about that, the more I began to believe that it was time to separate the real world Reagan from the Reagan of popular myth and the more inclined I became to write this book. I incurred a number of debts along the way and I would like to acknowledge those I believe are the most important. Foremost, I want to thank Bernard Roshco, a former editor of the Public Opinion Quarterly and director of the Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans at State, under whom I served throughout the Reagan administration. I learned a great deal from him about the construction of opinion poll questions and the parsing of respondents’ answers, as well as the media’s impact in the realm of public communication. He had a keen sense for anticipating which arguments would work and which would not when administration officials went public, and he was an ardent opponent of the view of ix

x

Preface and Acknowledgments

many public diplomacy practitioners that to save a failing communication strategy it was necessary to do more of it. I also want to thank Peter Knecht, Al Richman, and Stanley Shaloff, my former colleagues at State, who read and critiqued an early version of portions of my manuscript. In addition, Peter and I not only shared public diplomacy responsibilities, but on many occasions we shared notes about our experiences serving on different interagency groups involved in public communication. I owe Al Richman a huge debt for putting at my disposal his personal collection of the unclassified polling analyses he drafted for the Secretary of State and the White House. Stan Shaloff, who served in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), added a different but useful perspective and he was always there when I needed a supportive friend. I would be remiss if I failed to thank Alden Fahy, director of the office of information programs and services at State, and his assistant, Behar Godani, for coordinating and shepherding the draft manuscript through the labyrinthine security clearance process, which required clearances by State, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Outside the State Department, I am especially grateful to Professor Matthew Meselson, the distinguished molecular biologist and currently the Thomas Dudley Cabot Professor of the Natural Sciences at Harvard University, for agreeing to read and comment on the Yellow Rain chapter of the draft manuscript. I also want to thank Mary Curry, public service coordinator and research associate at the National Security Archive, who arranged my visits there and efficiently retrieved many boxes of paper materials from off-site for my use; and Shelly Williams, archivist and FOI coordinator, and her staff at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library for being so responsive to my requests and those of my research assistants for documents. I want to recognize the contributions of my graduate student research assistants at American University: Dane Neilsen, Vusala Safarova, Vanessa Careiro, Emily Christoff, and especially Alauna C. Safarpour, who was with me for the longest period. Without their pleasant assistance and untiring efforts to track down relevant documents and stray facts, it is unlikely that I would have made it to the finish line. I would also like to express my appreciation for all the support and guidance provided by my editor, Emily Roderick and her assistant, Courtney Morales, as well as Kate Roddy and her colleagues in the production team at Rowman & Littlefield publishers. I also wish to thank Terri Morrissey for preparing the index. As a former State Department officer, who held high-level security clearances, I am obligated to state the following disclaimer: “The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the official positions of the United States Government.”

Preface and Acknowledgments

xi

Finally, there is one more obligation left to fill: None of the individuals mentioned above are responsible for any factual errors or misstatements that I may have unintentionally made in this book. They are exclusively my responsibility.

Introduction

Ronald Reagan was a man of many nicknames. Depending on the time, location, and circumstances, he was called Dutch, the Gipper, the Great Communicator, the Greatest Communicator, 1 the Great Persuader, the Great Delegator, or the Teflon President. Nicknames often reflect an individual’s personal attributes, particular skills, or physical characteristics. They can also reflect the opposite of reality: for example, the thin lad who is called Chubby or the huge fellow who is called Tiny. In Reagan’s case, at least three of his nicknames suggest that he had extraordinary communicative or rhetorical skills, and imply that these attributes helped to explain his success as a politician and especially his presidential leadership. No doubt, Reagan honed his communicative skills during his days as a radio sports announcer, a traveling “motivational speaker” for General Electric and as a movie actor. Whether or not these skills carried over effectively to his role as president and successfully defined his style of presidential leadership are the fundamental questions addressed in this study. Did he deserve the encomiums about his communicative skills reflected in several of his nicknames or were they merely another reflection of unreality? To answer that question, it is necessary to evaluate how President Reagan, the nation’s communicator-in-chief between 1981 and 1989, and his senior national security advisers functioned as public/political communicators. The academic study of communication is a vast enterprise, primarily because there are many forms of communication and most of them relate in one way or another to the functioning of the American political system. The recognized forms of communication include mass communication, political communication, political marketing, public affairs, public communication, public diplomacy, public relations, rhetoric, strategic communication, and propaganda. Each of these is a specialized field of study, with its own literature, vocabulary, and theoretical concepts. They do, however, share some practical things in common. All of them involve communication between government, corporate or institutional organizations on the one side and public audiences on the other. In all cases it is essential for these entities to capture the attention of their respective target audiences, to deliver clear, understandable, and credible messages to them if they hope to influence their attitudes, preferences, beliefs, or actions, and to have some means of evaluating feedback from the target audiences to enable the communicators to make adjustments in 1

2

Introduction

their messages. All of these are fundamentally necessary when the transmitters of the messages require public support for their respective programs, policies, products, or electoral aspirations. They all utilize a broad array of communication resources, ranging from unilateral, direct approaches via publications and speakers, for example, to mediating institutions, such as radio, television, cable, and more recently, the internet. 2 My approach in this study is historical/analytical and my specific objectives are threefold: (1) to describe and analyze how Reagan and his extended communications team attempted to sell the administration’s foreign policy initiatives in real time and explain why they were largely unsuccessful, (2) to evaluate how their efforts impacted the president’s leadership strategy, and whether the president ultimately benefitted more from “going public” than he did from adopting a “bargaining” approach, and (3) to determine whether the administration’s innovation of the “public diplomacy regime” was a high value-added communications program. This study challenges much of the conventional wisdom about both Reagan’s effectiveness as a political communicator and his presidential leadership in the field of foreign policy making. It also fills a discernible gap in the literature by focusing almost exclusively on the foreign policy-making arena, rather than the domestic policy arena, which has generally been the predominant focus by academics in appraising Reagan’s role as a public communicator. It is grounded in extensive archival research, much of it recently declassified, and empirical data. Although I am not particularly interested in developing a new theory or model, I borrow from the theories and models of other scholars in various disciplines whenever I believe it is analytically useful to do so. 3 I examine how Reagan and his national security advisers communicated with the media, Congress, interest groups, and the public on seven national security issues, all of which were to varying degrees controversial and each of which was linked to a perceived, alleged, or contrived “threat” against U.S. national security interests from the Soviet Union and its allies: Soviet/Cuban military assistance to the left-leaning Sandinista government of Nicaragua and the anti-government rebels in El Salvador; Soviet use of chemical warfare (Yellow Rain) against anti-communist resistance forces in Southeast Asia; the sale of sophisticated AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia; the development and production of the MX intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to counter alleged Soviet superiority in intercontinental missiles; the pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to deflect Soviet missiles; the U.S. intervention in Grenada to prevent Soviet-Cuban penetration of the Caribbean; and the funds diversion issue in the Iran-Contra scandal, which resulted from the administration’s effort to support the Nicaraguan contras operating from Honduras in their effort to overthrow the Sandinista government. My specific aim here is primarily to assess the quality of the administration’s public narratives on these issues, in order to determine how effectively they were

Introduction

3

deployed in the domestic arena. I analyze what Reagan and his national security advisers said publicly on these issues, how they said it, why they said what they did, and the reactions to what they said from the media, Congress, interest groups, and the public, as well as the policy consequences that flowed from the interchange. It is my hope that this approach will enable us to clarify why Reagan and his communications team generally failed to mobilize mass and elite public opinion in support of the president’s foreign policy initiatives, to achieve congressional majorities in favor of those initiatives, and to neutralize critical media, congressional and public reaction. My analysis of the seven selected issues is presented in the form of case studies. 4 As with any case studies, several legitimate questions inevitably arise: (1) to what extent can the findings be replicated in unselected cases or in other administrations, (2) are there deviant cases that might seriously skew the results, (3) what precisely are the metrics of success and failure in any given case or group of cases, and (4) what cumulative impact did these cases have on Reagan’s governing strategy, presidential leadership, and his legacy? In five of the cases analyzed here, I found that Reagan and his public communication team failed to mobilize public support (Nicaragua, Yellow Rain, the MX missile, SDI, and the diversion issue). On the other hand, the administration “won” the intense public debate and congressional battle on the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia in late 1981 and the public supported the invasion of Grenada in October 1983, though after the fact. I could have included the failure of the president and his communication team to persuade the public and Congress to support a steadily increasing level of defense expenditures throughout his two terms, to mobilize public support for his policy in Lebanon, or his bilateral arms control negotiations with Soviet leaders but chose not to. 5 The selected cases, all of which involve major foreign policy issues effecting a variety of countries, and are integrally linked to Reagan’s policy toward the Soviet Union, are more than sufficient to demonstrate the argument that neither Reagan nor his senior national security advisers were great communicators. In the AWACS and Grenada cases, the explanation for the administration’s relative success was attributable to factors other than their alleged communicative skills. There are two broad opposing views among academics concerning President Reagan’s skill as a public communicator and his administration’s efficacy in selling his policy initiatives. Even before the end of his second term, studies by both academic specialists and generalists began to appear lauding his rhetorical skills, his remarkable ability to project a likeable and optimistic personal image via television, his uncanny proficiency in reducing complex ideas to appealing simplicities (which he referred to as “people talk”) and his selection of a creative, experienced, and adept public communications management team, who understood how the media worked or failed to work in Washington. 6 Moreover, the

4

Introduction

argument goes, this “master of symbolism” 7 and his savvy media advisers were able to “tame” the press and transform the media establishment into willing mouthpieces of the government, in large part because of the media’s consistently supine and passive role, reflected in their failure to hold him and his officials accountable for what they said publicly and to ask hard or incisive questions about his policy initiatives. 8 Many journalists, commentators, academics, and others initially accepted the description of Reagan as the Great Communicator, who skillfully used his supposedly unique communicative skills to achieve impressive policy and legislative victories. The opposing view, however, contends that Reagan was not an effective public communicator. The proponents of this view argue that he was prone to error, the mutilation of facts, and chronological confusion, that he often lapsed into incoherence, that he substituted emotional anecdotes and patriotic symbols for rational argument and when challenged resorted to the repetition of pieties and platitudes. They contend that he was often uninformed about the complexities and nuances of international politics and the specific issues he addressed, and that he performed poorly in his non-scripted public events and appearances. With respect to his commonly vaunted skills in using television to change public attitudes, researchers have found that the principal effect of watching Reagan on TV was to reinforce the audience’s predispositions, that only a small percentage of the public ever watched his prime-time addresses, and that those who did retained little. Essentially, they contend that Reagan enjoyed scant success in using radio and television to either change public attitudes or to mobilize public opinion in behalf of his policy initiatives. As George C. Edwards III, a leading scholar of presidential power and persuasion concludes, “Ronald Reagan was less a public relations phenomenon than the conventional wisdom indicates . . . when it came time to change public opinion or mobilize it in his behalf, he typically met with failure.” Moreover, according to Edwards: “Reagan’s image as The Great Communicator appears to owe more to his early success with Congress than to his ability to move the public in a reliable fashion.” 9 More recently, some journalists and academics have suggested that the inflation of the Great Communicator appellation was largely the result of a post-Reagan presidency “mythmaking machine” driven by Reagan acolytes who wanted to refurbish his image after the disastrous impact of the Iran-Contra scandal on his presidential legacy. 10 At the heart of the debate over Reagan’s skill as a public communicator and the success of his presidential leadership is the issue of whether the “going public” model is a superior, and ultimately more effective, presidential leadership strategy than the traditional model of the “bargaining president.” The “bargaining model” traces back to Richard E. Neustadt’s seminal work, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership, originally published in 1960, and after several later editions, revised and

Introduction

5

expanded in 1990 as Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. Neustadt contended that “Presidential power is the power to persuade” (p. 11 in the 1960 edition). Precisely because the executive office was inherently weak, the president had little alternative but to utilize extra-constitutional powers to govern effectively, primarily his powers to persuade and bargain. 11 This required deal making with bureaucratic officials and members of Congress. Aided by his “public prestige” in Washington and his personal reputation, he could effectively “bargain” his way to policy and political success. 12 Many studies of presidential leadership published during the 1980s and 1990s, were no doubt inspired by Reagan’s early congressional success with his domestic program of tax cuts and budgetary restraint and media reportage attributing that success to a combination of his skillful use of television and his persuasiveness in dealing with members of Congress. Perhaps the most important attempt to revise the traditional bargaining model was Samuel Kernell’s Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, originally published in 1986. According to Kernell, “going public” is a “strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing directly to the American public for support,” which developed “as a strategic adaptation to the information age.” 13 He contended that bargaining between the executive branch and Congress over the decades since about 1960 became increasingly ineffective, because of a variety of political and technological developments: the weakening of political parties and decline of party leadership, the persistent trend of divided government, the rise of entrepreneurial presidential candidates and the individualized politician, the growth of political action committees and appearance of congressional caucuses, and massive changes in communication technologies. As a result of these changes, according to Kernell, presidents increasingly found it necessary to engage in “televisual politics” and personal appearances, going over the heads of congressional members to generate popular support for and pressure behind their policy initiatives. On Reagan specifically, Kernell wrote that he “brought to the presidency ideal qualities for this new strategy of leadership,” that he “relied on going public for his influence in Washington more heavily and more profitably than did his predecessors,” and that by using the going public strategy he “excelled in rallying public opinion behind presidential policies.” 14 Although Kernell’s work helped to shift academic attention away from the “bargaining model” and to the “going public” model, it was in turn revised by George C. Edwards III and other scholars. In 2003, Edwards published his incisive study of presidential persuasion, titled On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. In that work, he contends that although “going public” was currently the central presidential governing strategy, in reality it was only one element of presidential leadership,

6

Introduction

which normally included such things as building party loyalty, stimulating coalitional and consensus politics, mobilizing interest groups, and developing legislative bargaining skills. In addition, he empirically demonstrated the limitations of televisual politics and the difficulties confronting presidents who attempted to structure choices via television and radio for the American public. Specifically, with respect to Reagan, he found that few people actually listened to or watched his presidential speeches and that those who did retained little of substance or fact, which made it difficult for him to focus the public’s attention or to structure its choices. 15 He also points out that Reagan’s early domestic policy successes in achieving tax cuts and budget reductions in 1981, often attributed to the president’s persuasive televisual skills, was more likely the result of the administration’s groundwork with a broad network of constituency groups, presidential travel to congressional districts, and grass roots lobbying campaigns organized by the White House. 16 Although Edwards and other scholars diminished the importance of televisual politics and the role of presidential persuasion, they seemed to leave the essentials of the bargaining model relatively intact. However, scholars applied the bargaining model mostly to Reagan’s domestic policy initiatives, and only rarely to his foreign policy initiatives. One must be careful, however, not to allow the bargaining model vs. the going public model debate to obscure the pragmatic fact that going public is essentially an “end game” strategy in a complex and extended process of policy formulation, and that other models may be relevant. As the “bureaucratic politics” model informs us, for example, it is a given that every newly elected president comes into the White House with considerable political baggage: promises made during the electoral campaign, the constraints of the party platform on which he ran, as well as statutory and treaty commitments made by his predecessors. It is also the case that as the new administration assumes control of the executive branch, members of the established bureaucracy, utilizing their knowledge and long-term experience in their respective policy areas usually seek to maximize their personal stakes in those areas. Within the executive branch, the incoming president may also encounter strong and conflicting vested interests among the various national security agencies and personnel, both civil and foreign service, wedded to particular bureaucratic routines and definitions of their respective agency’s core mission. Inevitably, the first challenge a new president confronts in formulating his foreign policy initiatives is achieving intra-governmental consensus, which frequently requires a substantial amount of intra-governmental bargaining with bureaucrats who often have a great deal of discretionary power. Once the executive branch produces a policy outcome that requires congressional input, such as funding or enabling legislation, the White House is committed to investing all of the administration’s communication assets, including, as necessary, the personal intervention of

Introduction

7

the president and his national security advisors to achieve a compatible outcome in Congress. In general, this situation encourages the executive branch to engage in coalition building, trade-offs, and executive-legislative bargaining. The greater the political and ideological fragmentation within Congress, the more it enables the White House to forge coalitions and to deal directly with the congressional leadership in order to reach a workable and mutually satisfactory foreign policy outcome. At some point in this scenario, interest groups and political elites are likely to become activated, which in turn makes it conducive as well as attractive for the president to go public, as an added dimension of his effort to bargain his way to success in selling his foreign policy initiatives. 17 Academic scholarship on presidential leadership, power and persuasion over the past decade and a half has in some ways broadened our understanding of the role of the chief executive and the executive branch, but it has also left us with numerous gaps in explaining how the president and the executive branch utilize their power in real time, politically navigating with the federal bureaucracy, Congress, advocacy groups, and the public, particularly in the foreign policy arena. Of all the published scholarship during that time frame, two works are of particular relevance to this study. In 2003, William G. Howell published his book, Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action, which in effect challenged Neustadt’s persuasion and bargaining paradigm. His “unilateral politics” or “direct presidential action” model contends that direct presidential action in the form of such extraconstitutional powers as executive orders and signing statements increases executive power, circumvents entanglements with Congress, and suggests that the president can govern effectively without the necessity of the persuasion and bargaining tactics that Neustadt and others found so indispensable. What Howell does not tell us, however, is precisely how his model applies to the foreign policy arena and how public opinion, media, advocacy groups, and coalitional politics impact his model, why unilateral action obviates the need for the president to pursue bargaining tactics either within the federal bureaucracy—the repository of the federal government’s institutional memory—or with members of Congress to ensure he can achieve the requisite enabling and funding legislation for his foreign policy initiatives. 18 Six years later, in 2009, George C. Edwards III, published his nuanced study, The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership, in which he concludes that overall “presidential power is not [italics in the source text] the power to persuade” (pp. x, 188). His “political opportunities” model argues that it usually takes events to alter public opinion, but that presidents can be “facilitators” who “recognize and skillfully exploit opportunities in their environments to achieve significant changes in public policy” (p. 10). He says the “evidence” (though, on some points, debatable) suggests Reagan was a “facilitator,” but he also

8

Introduction

affirms that Reagan used a wide range of activities, including “old-fashioned bargaining on a wholesale scale” (pp. 39-41) to achieve his budget proposals in the domestic arena and that on the AWACS issue, the only foreign policy initiative he addresses, the White House opted for an “inside strategy,” working directly, in effect bargaining, with members of Congress, to prevent a legislative veto (p. 42). On the other hand, Edwards concludes that generally a president’s personal appeals to and efforts to bargain with members to follow his lead is not only problematic, but usually produces relatively modest results. Based on the chapters that follow, however, I conclude that in the foreign policy arena Reagan’s modus operandi involved a considerable amount of presidential bargaining on virtually all of his foreign policy initiatives. His bargaining with both individual members and groups of congressmen, enabled him to implement his initiatives as policies, even though those policies were ultimately failures and publicly unpopular. On the issue of presidential bargaining, however, the record clearly indicates that Neustadt’s paradigm was intact and thriving during the Reagan administration. The academic debate over Reagan’s leadership, legislative and communicative skills focuses predominantly on the president’s role as communicator-in-chief and tends to downplay the impact of his administration-wide communications team, comprised of his senior White House advisers, cabinet-level officials, and the extensive bureaucratic network of public communications practitioners. In the institutional sense, Reagan’s “team” included the government’s traditional bureaucratic communications assets: the White House Office of Communications, individual agency public affairs and public relations bureaus and offices, as well as the numerous interagency groups, both permanent and ad hoc, whose mission it was to facilitate the transmission of the president’s public messages and to amplify their impact. A modern president, no matter how deeply committed to a strategy of “going public,” is always subject to limitations on his time, energy, and rhetorical ingenuity. He cannot go public on all his agenda issues all the time or give every issue the highest priority. Therefore, he must rely heavily on his administration-wide team. Reagan’s original senior communications advisers were James A. Baker III, White House chief of staff; Michael K. Deaver, deputy chief of staff; David Gergen, director of communications; and Richard J. Darman, chief presidential assistant. This so-called “gang of four” built the administration’s public communications strategy on four main pillars: the recognition that Reagan was the “ultimate presidential commodity . . . the right product,” 19 who had deep rapport with his audiences; the belief that television had the power to make or break politicians and policy initiatives; the conviction that the news had to be “managed” to insure that the administration’s version of reality predominated in the press and on the airwaves; and the knowledge that television, the administration’s favored medium, rarely self-corrected.

Introduction

9

To enhance its public communication efforts, the Reagan administration introduced a number of bureaucratic innovations, 20 the most important of which for this study was the establishment of the so-called public diplomacy regime. On January 14, 1983, it adopted National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77, titled “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security.” This presidential directive established a hierarchical bureaucratic structure designed to consolidate command and control of the administration’s communication activities in the National Security Council (NSC), to coordinate all information programs aimed at both domestic and foreign audiences, and to ensure that all of the administration’s public messages on national security issues, wherever they were directed, were aligned and consistent. The directive defined public diplomacy “as comprising those actions of the U.S. government designed to generate support for its national security objectives,” but it provided no specific guidelines on what those “actions” might entail. Although ostensibly directed primarily abroad, NSDD 77 had a domestic component. The section dealing with the international public affairs committee, one of the four standing committees it established, made clear that its mandate included the planning and coordination of public communication events relating to national security issues “with foreign and domestic dimensions.” 21 The officials who drafted the document, however, made no effort to distinguish public diplomacy from the government’s traditional practices of public relations or political communication efforts, its use of foreign and domestic propaganda during wartime or its permutation in the form of policy marketing. 22 Nevertheless, as both academic scholars and public diplomacy practitioners have pointed out, in the information age foreign relations is also intrinsically a domestic affair. When the president speaks publicly on national security issues or his highest ranking advisers appear on television news programs to defend his policy initiatives, public diplomacy automatically intrudes into the domestic arena, no matter how one defines the concept. For the purposes of this study, I regard public diplomacy as a crucial aspect of the Reagan administration’s public communication assets. It played a predominant role in the administration’s efforts to sell its policy initiatives on Central America, particularly Nicaragua, an important role in communicating with the public and Congress on Yellow Rain, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and development of the MX missile, but a smaller role in its response to the Iran-Contra scandal, the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia, and the decision to intervene in Grenada. Nevertheless, public diplomacy as a bureaucratic entity, survived the Reagan administration, and in one form or another, has been utilized by every administration since the 1980s. However, it is also clear that in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal, its purpose, orientation, and target audiences underwent a significant transformation. In the years following Reagan’s presidency, its use in the domestic arena significantly dimin-

10

Introduction

ished, while at the same time its role abroad expanded dramatically. My argument here is that despite all of its efforts to help sell the president’s foreign policy initiatives in the domestic arena, the program was largely self-defeating and ultimately had little value-added impact on the Reagan administration’s public communication efforts. All public communication efforts take place within an overall context. During the Reagan administration, public communication campaigns were implemented against a backdrop of resurgent Cold War anti-Soviet and anti-communist attitudes. Reagan’s views on the Soviet Union and communism were well known and copiously on the public record when he was elected president. 23 Many of the senior and mid-level officials he appointed were also consummate anti-Soviet hardliners, who came into the administration with a well-defined ideological position with respect to the Soviet Union. Some had been, and still were, members of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) and other like-minded conservative security organizations. 24 Whether described as 1950s Cold Warriors, traditional conservatives or neo-conservatives, many of these individuals were motivated by a particularly aggressive brand of anti-communism. They firmly believed that the United States had a moral obligation to eradicate communism and to foster the spread of democracy world-wide through an active policy of containment and rollback, and by strengthening its own offensive and defensive military capabilities. In general, they perceived the Soviet Union as an “evil” and “mendacious” nation, obsessively interested in exploiting its alleged nuclear superiority to gain advantage over the United States and to expand its power globally, both in the developed world and among the developing nations, for the sole purpose of tilting the international balance of power permanently in favor of the Soviet Union. They were vigorously opposed to any form of detent and dedicated to achieving “peace through strength,” which required a massive U.S. military build-up. They viewed Reagan’s electoral victory as a mandate to “rearm America,” and some of them also believed that the Soviet high command was convinced that a nuclear war was “winnable” and that they were preparing to fight one. 25 As Charles Hill, former executive secretary of the State Department and executive aide to George P. Shultz, Reagan’s second secretary of state, put it: the hardliners who migrated into the administration with Reagan adopted anti-Sovietism as their “mantra” and “would not agree to anything that was not resolutely, confrontationally anti-Soviet all the time.” 26 According to one recent scholar, although the hardliners did not “control” the administration’s foreign policy, they certainly “influenced” it on high profile issues, such as Central America, the MX missile and SDI. 27 Within the context outlined here, and reduced to practical terms, Reagan’s foreign policy agenda 28 was based on four interlocking beliefs: (1) that there was an ongoing global struggle for power and influence between a malevolent, communist, and totalitarian Soviet Union and a vir-

Introduction

11

tuous, capitalist, and democratic United States; (2) that to achieve victory in this struggle, the United States had to undertake a massive military build-up of both conventional and nuclear weapons; (3) that the United States had the moral and practical obligation to support, by both overt and covert means, anti-communist governments and revolutionary forces around the globe; 29 and (4) that all anti-communist leaders in other countries, irrespective of the internal policies they pursued, were natural allies of the United States. 30 This so-called Reagan Doctrine left little space for extended rumination about the complexities and nuances of international power politics. It also left little room for any kind of serious negotiations with communist-led countries or with allegedly communist-inspired revolutionary movements and little concern about human rights violations in right-wing dictatorships, such as those in Chile and Argentina. On the contrary, it promoted the provision of economic and military assistance to non-communist authoritarian governments to help “roll back” communist and proto-communist successes wherever they occurred in the developing world, which many Reagan hardliners believed would also facilitate regime change not only in Cuba and Nicaragua, but ultimately in the Soviet Union itself. 31 On the basis of the case studies presented here, I conclude the following. First, Reagan and his national security team were neither exceptionally skillful nor notably successful in their communication efforts. They failed to influence the most relevant constituencies opposed to the foreign policy initiatives they were trying to sell or to mobilize foreign policy elites or mass public opinion in support of those initiatives. Second, Reagan, his national security advisers, and many of the public diplomacy practitioners in his administration had unrealistic expectations about the role of public opinion and how it could be altered, a situation they complicated by frequently using confusing policy rationales and unconvincing public narratives. Third, the administration’s public communication practitioners committed numerous blunders, which helped undermine their chances of success and clearly demonstrated that in the effort to communicate on foreign policy initiatives, actions and their consequences frequently speak louder than words. Fourth, the administration’s use of public diplomacy was generally ineffective and clearly evolved into domestic propaganda. Fifth, the president and his national security advisers often opted to use a combination of emotional rhetoric, unrealistic visionary schemes, and threat creation that in the end had a largely self-defeating effect, and all of which had their roots in the administration’s obsessive anti-communist ideology. Sixth, and most important from my perspective, Reagan’s executive bargaining played a central role in his governing strategy, essentially defined his style of presidential leadership in the foreign policy arena and ultimately proved much more effective in securing legislative authorization than his efforts to go public.

12

Introduction

NOTES 1. This was the particular contribution of Richard (Dick) Wirthlin, the president’s chief public opinion pollster, who used the descriptive phrase in the title of his book, The Greatest Communicator: What Ronald Reagan Taught Me about Politics, Leadership, and Life (2004). Wirthlin predicted (p. 221) that Reagan would “remain one of the greatest communicators because his words transcend time,” and he used them “to make the world a better place.” In explaining why Reagan was the “greatest communicator,” however, his effort appears to be largely tautological: he claims (pp. 49-51, 139) that Reagan’s communicative success was based on his ability to convey persuasively a “clear set of values.” 2. There is some degree of overlap between the various forms of communication noted here. In my view, however, there are enough significant similarities between mass communication, political communication, and public communication to allow for the interchangeable use of these particular categories: they are all audience-centered, purposive, and seek practical results, such as altering preferences, attitudes, and beliefs and generating individual or collective action. They all engage in some form of institutionalized message production and utilize both mediated and unmediated communication outlets. For further discussion, see James Watson and Anne Hill, A Dictionary of Communication and Media Studies 1997, 132-33; Richard M. Perloff, Political Communication: Politics, Press and Public in America, 1998, 8; Robert E. Denton, Jr. and Jim A. Kuypers, Politics and Communication in America, 2008, 15; and Linda Lee Kaid (ed.), Handbook of Political Communication Research (2004). 3. I am aware of the vast amount of academic scholarship on presidential leadership, power, and persuasion—as well as the proliferation over the past fifty years of intricate, often elegant, theories, models, and paradigms aimed at expanding our understanding of the presidency within the political system. In the absence of a consensus mega-theory or mega-model, however, I am skeptical that the profusion of theories and models has lead inevitably to greater clarity or comprehension of how presidents actually function in real time or practically utilize their power and persuasion, however those terms are theorized or defined. All too often I find that the theories and models rely too heavily on presumptions, assumptions, inferences, and assertions and that they are ungrounded in archival and/or empirical research, thereby raising more questions than they answer and frequently producing conflicting results. An interesting example involves the perennial question of whether Reagan was a “restorative,” or “redefining” or “transformative” president. In his book titled Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (1990), updating his “presidential power and persuasion” paradigm, the dean of presidential leadership studies, Richard E. Neustadt, wrote that Reagan was “the last Roosevelt Democrat,” whose “Presidency restored [my italics] the public image of the office to a fair (if perhaps rickety) approximation of its Rooseveltian mold,” which squared with the image of the office Reagan “sought to live up to implanted there by FDR while Reagan was a youthful, ardent Democrat” (p. 269). Seven years later, Stephen Skowronek, published his updated opus, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (1997), in which he disagreed with Neustadt. Utilizing his “disruptive politics model,” he describes Reagan as “the great repudiator” (p. 409) and contends that he was a “reconstructive leader” with an “order-shattering thrust” (p. 414), who “pressed a classic politics of reconstruction” (p. 416), which made him the “most effective political leader to come to the presidency in the last fifty years” (p. 413). Skowronek’s work, however, left numerous questions unanswered. Were Reagan’s “reconstructive” efforts tonal, rhetorical, ideological, symbolic, stylistic, or substantive or some combination of these elements? What exactly in real political time did Reagan transform or reconstruct in a fundamental and systemic way? Did he significantly alter the constitutional structure of checks and balances and separation of powers; rearrange the historic institutional foundation of the American political system; or modify substantially the formal or informal processes (norms) of executive-legislative

Introduction

13

policy making? In short, precisely which part of the infrastructural political edifice did he actually reconstruct, deconstruct, or transform; precisely which political norms did he disrupt and how durable were those disruptions? More recently, the distinguished Oxford scholar, Archie Brown, in The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern Age (2014), outlining his “collective leadership” model, specifically excludes Reagan from a short list of transformative leaders, who achieved enduring systemic change for the better, and rejects the notion that Reagan was even a redefining leader. As Brown explains, transformational change in democracies is exceedingly difficult, because the constraining forces are too potent. He concludes that there “has not been a transformational American president since Abraham Lincoln” (pp. 345-46). Currently, we seem to be moving full cycle back towards Neustadt’s description of Reagan. In his recent book, titled The Working-Class Republican: Ronald Reagan and the Return of BlueCollar Conservatism (2017), political analyst Henry Olsen, argues essentially that Reagan was an FDR-Democrat masquerading as a conservative Republican. According to him, Reagan was motivated by a “unique mix of New Deal liberalism and freedomloving conservatism,” (p. 188), who had a “lifetime commitment to the New Deal’s social protections” (p. 188). So, bottom line, what we have in this case is a conundrum rather than clarity. Whether Reagan was a “restorative” or “redefining” or “transformative” leader remains something of a mystery. 4. The argument for using case studies to analyze political communication is provided in Lauren Cohen Bell, Joan L. Connors, and Theodore F. Shekels, Perspectives on Political Communication: A Case Approach, 2008, 4-6. 5. I deselected the defense budget issue because it was largely a domestic one and only nominally a foreign policy matter. The administration’s policy in Lebanon was unpopular with the public and Congress from the beginning, and particularly so after the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983, an attack in which 241 Americans were killed. The subject of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations is a well-plowed area of academic research, both substantively and in terms of public reaction. In general, as we shall see in this study, the public consistently favored serious bilateral negotiations on arms control with the Soviet Union and substantial reductions in the two countries nuclear stockpiles. I touch upon the subject of arms control in several of the following chapters. In my view these deselected cases neither seriously skew nor significantly alter the conclusions I have reached. 6. The academic literature concerning Reagan’s rhetorical skill, his administration’s successful manipulation of the press and its skillful use of television and other electronic media to help secure its policy objectives is extensive. See, for example, Robert Dallek, The Politics of Symbolism (1999); Kurt Ritter and David Henry, Ronald Reagan: The Great Communicator (1992); Mary E. Stuckey, Playing the Game: The Presidential Rhetoric of Ronald Reagan (1990); Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (1989); Robert E. Denton, Jr., The Primetime Presidency of Ronald Reagan: The Era of the Television Presidency (1987); and Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (1987). It is interesting to note that Mary Stuckey in her book (p. 1) suggests that “Reagan’s rhetorical success was built around foreign policy events, and this is why a foreign policy event (in the shape of Iran/Contra) provided the most conspicuous failure of the Reagan administration.” 7. This phrase is used by Lou Cannon, in his book Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, 2000, 520. 8. This view is extensively developed in Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency, 1989, 54-76. 9. The quotations are from George C. Edwards III, On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit, 2003, 72, 74. Michael Schudson, in The Power of News, 1995, 139-40, takes a somewhat different view: “Ronald Reagan came to be described as a Great Communicator in the press not because of his special skills in communicating directly to the American public but because of significant skill in communicating with key elites, including the media itself.” See also Elliott King and Michael Schudson, “The Myth of the Great Communicator,” Columbia Journalism Review, 26: 4 (November/December

14

Introduction

1987), 34-36; Mark Green and Gail McColl Jarrett, There He Goes Again: Ronald Reagan’s Reign of Error (1987); Martin Schram, The Great American Video Game: Presidential Politics in the Television Age (1987); and Roberta Glaros and Bruce Miroff, “Watching Ronald Reagan Viewers’ Reaction to the President on Television,” Congress and the Presidency, 1983, 25-46. 10. See, for example, Kyle Longley, Jeremy D. Mayer, Michael Schaller, and John W. Sloane, Deconstructing Reagan: Conservative Mythology and America’s Fortieth President (2010), and Will Bunch, Tear Down This Myth: The Right Wing Distortion of the Reagan Legacy (2009). 11. There is some confusion over what Neustadt actually meant by “persuasion.” A key lies in the sentence that precedes the well-known one often quoted by scholars and others. It reads in part as follows: “despite his [the president’s] status he does not get action without argument,” which clearly suggests that his conception of “bargaining” includes a persuasive component. In her recent study of the reasons for presidential success and failure, titled Why Presidents Fail: And How They Can Succeed Again (2016), Elaine C. Kamarck makes the perceptive point that “persuasive ability” in Neustadt’s paradigm is separate from persuasion in the public realm. She quite aptly states that it means “the ability to negotiate among equals” (p. 139). These “equals” could be members of Congress, cabinet-level officials and foreign leaders. This does not mean of course that the Reagan administration was not committed to public/political communication. The search for public approval of his foreign policy initiatives was, in fact, an obsessive concern on the part of Reagan, his national security advisors, and his communications team. Kamarck’s central argument about the connection between presidential leadership and communication is that presidents have an unhealthy “preoccupation with communication” (p. 15) and to be successful they need to spend less time communicating and more time actually governing. 12. For useful insights about the “bargaining model” in connection with the issues raised in this study, see George C. Edwards III, Presidential Influence in Congress (1980). Edwards finds that, in general, the president does not always get his way in Congress and therefore has to expend effort (i.e., bargain) to influence individual or groups of members to support his initiatives. He concludes, however, that in view of the impediments the president faces when dealing with Congress, there is little he can do to increase his influence and that therefore even when a president has excellent legislative skills, they are largely ineffective. For a case study that shows a “strong bargaining dynamic” at work in Reagan’s effort to obtain tax and budget cuts in 1981, see Marc A. Bodnick, “‘Going Public’ Reconsidered: Reagan’s 1981 Tax and Budget Cuts, and Revisionist Theories of Presidential Power,” Congress and the Presidency, 1990, 1328. 13. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 1997, 2. 14. Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 1997, 1, 140, 249. 15. See tables 8.3, 8.5, 8.8, 8.9 and 8.10 in Edwards, On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit, 2003, 193, 197, 203, 207-08. 16. Edwards, On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit, 2003, 95-96. 17. On the bureaucratic politics model, see the key study by Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (1974). See also Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics, 1972, 40-80; and N. Stephen Kane, “Reassessing the Bureaucratic Dimension of Foreign Policy Making,” Social Science Quarterly, 1983, 46-65. The more recent study by David E. Lewis and Terry M. Moe, “The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Levers of Presidential Control,” in Michael Nelson (ed.), The Presidency and the Political System, 2014, 374-405, updates aspects of the bureaucratic politics model. Lewis and Moe focus on the “collective action problems” of Congress, the high transaction costs of building congressional coalitions, the asymmetrical institutional concerns between the executive and the legislative branches and the “obstacle-strewn process of generating legislation.” They contend that these factors give the president an advantage in achieving his congressional objectives, but also

Introduction

15

often create “a situation that is ripe for trading [i.e., bargaining].” For the quotes, see Lewis and Moe, “The Presidency and the Bureaucracy,” in Nelson (ed.), The Presidency and the Political System, 381, 384, 385. 18. For a critique of the “direct presidential action” model within the domestic policy context, see Bruce Miroff, Presidents on Political Ground: Leaders in Action and What They Face, 2016, 101-02. Essentially, Miroff argues that “unilateral [executive] action does not function as the equivalent of legislation” for the following reasons: (1) unilateral actions “need to be justified through existing constitutional or statutory law”; (2) the scope of executive orders “is constrained by the appropriations power of Congress”; and (3) they can easily be overturned by successive presidents. For additional critical discussion of the model, particularly as it applies to the foreign policymaking arena, see my conclusions, n19. 19. A statement made by James Lake, press secretary of the Reagan-Bush 1984 presidential campaign, cited in Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee, 1989, 6. 20. These innovations included such things as the use of sophisticated opinion polling techniques utilizing “hierarchical values maps” of the electorate; the Pulse Line technique used to track selected groups of respondents’ reactions to Reagan’s speeches; “line of the day” daily meetings and Friday Group meetings chaired by chief of staff Baker to develop both short and longer term communications strategy; the establishment of the Legislative Strategy Group in the White House under Baker’s leadership to focus communication assets on obtaining passage of key legislation on the Hill; electronic distribution of White House mail; the use of the Republican Television Network to distribute administration news via a TV feed to local TV stations; and a vast expansion of interagency coordinating, monitoring, and working groups. For discussion of these innovations, as well as others, see Wirthlin, The Greatest Communicator, 2004, 176-79; David Gergen, Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership—Nixon to Clinton, 2001, 180-81; John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News, 1992, 197-204; Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee, 1989, 21-23, 35. 21. For text of NSDD 77, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, 265-67. The core structure established under NSDD 77 consisted of a Senior Political Group (SPG), chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs, and four senior level substantive committees: public affairs, international information, international political, and international broadcasting. At the lowest level of the new bureaucratic apparatus were numerous interagency working groups, covering a wide range of national security issues, such as arms control, Yellow Rain, and terrorism, staffed by officers drawn primarily from State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the Agency for International Development (AID). Policy guidance flowed down from the SPG to the working groups, and the chair of each working group reported to one of the four standing substantive groups. Over time, the core structure was augmented by additional working groups at the National Security Council’s (NSC) direction or request. Separate agencies also maintained their own working groups, such as the South African Working Group (SAWG) and the Central American Working Group (CAWG) at State, which generally worked in conjunction with the “public diplomacy regime,” the name practitioners gave to the new system. Ad hoc groups were also set up, both in the White House and the agencies, to pursue specific short-term public diplomacy objectives. The lines of authority and the demarcation of issues among all these groups, were not always clear, and in some instances, they duplicated the policy functions of existing bureaucratic units. Some scholars argue that in reality the new structure was primarily an attempt to organize propaganda and psychological operations campaigns, which previously had been handled exclusively by the CIA. For critical analyses of the new structure, see Gifford D. Malone, Organizing the Nation’s Public Diplomacy, 1988, 63-104; and Malone, “Functioning of Diplomatic Organs,” in Richard Staar (ed.), Public Diplomacy: USA Versus USSR, 1986, 125-57.

16

Introduction

22. There is an extensive academic literature—descriptive, empirical, analytical and theoretical—concerning public diplomacy. Since its formal inception in the Reagan administration, it has been variously defined as cultural diplomacy, strategic communication, “soft power,” nation branding and a “war of ideas.” However, it remains a particularly elusive concept. There is no consensus on precisely how to define it, to organize U.S. government resources to pursue it effectively, or to measure its impact. In general, the only agreement currently among scholars appears to be that it involves U.S government-directed communication campaigns abroad, in order to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics and governments in a way that is advantageous to U.S. foreign policy. Over the past couple of decades, however, scholars have often equated public diplomacy with domestic propaganda. For a sampling of the relevant literature in that regard, see Justin Hart, The Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy (2012); Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (2008); Nancy Snow, Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech and Opinion Control Since 9/11 (2003); and Anthony R. Pratkanis and Eliot Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion (1992). 23. See James Graham Wilson, “How Grand Was Reagan’s Strategy, 1976-1984?,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 2007, 733-803. 24. Justin Vaisse, in Neo-Conservatism: The Biography of a Movement (tr. by Arthur Goldhammer), 2010, 187, states that Reagan appointed twenty-seven members of the CPD’s board of directors to important positions in the executive branch, and that over his two terms many more held advisory positions. The twenty-seven included such individuals as William P. Casey, CIA director; Richard V. Allen, national security adviser; George P. Shultz, secretary of state; Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense; Paul Nitze, special adviser to the president on arms control; and Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary for human rights and then inter-American affairs (State). For a fuller list of CPD members who received nominations in the Reagan administration, see the companion website to Vaisse’s book, at www.neoconservatism.vaisse.net. Those who were not CPD members, such as Alexander M. Haig Jr., Reagan’s first secretary of state, were of the same ideological disposition. In his memoir, Inner Circles: How America Changed the World, 1992, 554, Haig wrote that “the doctrine of containment was in the air I breathed for more than thirty years.” See also David Shribman, “Group Goes From Exile to Influence,” New York Times, November 23, 1981, A20. 25. See, for example, Richard A. Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” Commentary, 1977, 21-34. Pipes, a Harvard professor of Russian history, served on the NSC staff, as director of East European and Soviet Affairs, during 1981-1982. For a retrospective and inflated view of his influence in the Reagan administration, see Sam Tanenhaus, “The Hard-Liner,” Boston Globe, November 2, 2003, G4. 26. For Hill’s quote, see Strober and Strober (eds.), Reagan: The Man and His Presidency: The Oral History of an Era, 1998, 114-15. 27. Vaisse’s argument is fleshed out in chapter 6 of his book, Neo-Conservatism: The Biography of a Movement (2010). Distinguishing between “control” and “influence” is not always easy. The fundamental issue, however, is the consequentiality of the hardliner’s influence. My argument in this study elides the definitional problem by showing that in real time the influence of hardliners within the Reagan administration generally had a retrograde and self-defeating impact. 28. In the formal institutional sense, the Reagan administration’s policy toward the Soviet Union was defined in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, dated January 17, 1983, which noted that the policy would “consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements.” This would require, inter alia, the modernization of U.S. military forces, both conventional and nuclear; and the effective “support

Introduction

17

of those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States.” This was a “long haul” policy, which made it “essential that the American people understand and support U.S. policy,” and for U.S. officials to avoid statements or actions that would “generate unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.” The text of NSDD 75 is available on the Federation of American Scientists website at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs /nsdd. For an example of how the policy was subsequently conveyed publicly, see Don Oberdorfer, “Shultz Outlines Policy of Opposing Soviets,” Washington Post, June 16, 1983, A1. 29. This part of the construct was often referred to as the “Reagan Doctrine.” The first use of this descriptive term is usually attributed to columnist Charles Krauthammer who used it in an essay published in Time magazine; see Krauthammer, “The Reagan Doctrine,” Time, 125: 13 (April 1, 1985), 54-58. Peter W. Rodman, in his memoir More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World, 1994, 261, points out that “While Reagan activism in the Third World had its beginnings in the first term (the Contras, the Afghans, Grenada), the doctrine did not reach its full flowering until the second term.” Rodman, who held several senior staff positions in the Reagan administration between April 1984 and January 1987, provides (pp. 259-88) an interesting personalized account of the convergence of factors that led to the development of the Reagan Doctrine as the formal policy of the Reagan administration and its eventual demise. The results of the Reagan Doctrine are highly controversial; in general, conservative political organizations and anti-communist hardliners warmly embraced the concept, arguing that it helped to restore democracy in places like Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan, and contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, while many progressives and centrists contend that mostly what its overt support and covert operations accomplished was to accelerate political fragmentation and to stimulate human rights abuses and terrorism in various countries, which continued long after the end of the Cold War. 30. For an exposition and defense of the policy of dealing with non-communist authoritarian governments and dictatorships, see Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Dictators and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (1982). The book is an extended version of her controversial article published earlier, which initially brought her to Reagan’s attention: Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary, 1979, 34-45. She served in the Reagan administration as U.S. ambassador to the U.N., February 1, 1981, to April 1, 1985. 31. For extensive and balanced assessments of Reagan’s foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, especially his alleged “grand strategy” to end the Cold War and the successes and failures of the Reagan Doctrine, see Jack F. Matlock Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (2004); Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (1994). For shorter studies, see James Graham Wilson, “How Grand Was Reagan’s Strategy, 1976-1984?,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 2007, 773-803; Fred Chernoff, “Ending the Cold War: The Soviet Retreat and the U.S. Military Buildup,” International Affairs, 1991, 111-26; and Robert W. Tucker, “Reagan’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 1988/1989, 1-27. In general, these writers agree that when Reagan assumed office in January 1981, he had no clear and welldefined “grand strategy” for ending the Cold War; the Reagan Doctrine achieved limited success in rolling back communist insurgencies; in his second term Reagan transitioned to a somewhat more flexible position regarding arms control negotiations with Soviet leaders, while personally remaining a consummate hardline anti-communist; and that Reagan did not single-handedly bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union, which resulted instead from a combination of various internal and external economic and political forces impinging on that country.

ONE Nicaragua Peril at the Gates?

In less than a month after Ronald Reagan’s victory in the presidential election of 1980, his administration began to deal with the Central American problem it inherited from the previous administration. 1 At two National Security Council (NSC) meetings in early February 1981, Reagan accepted the assertions of Caspar (“Cap”) Weinberger, secretary of defense, and Alexander M. Haig Jr., secretary of state, two of the administration’s most prominent hardliners, that the United States possessed “foolproof” evidence that Cuba was coordinating a Soviet-bloc supply network of weapons and military equipment, much of it channeled through Sandinista-controlled Nicaragua, for the guerrillas in El Salvador, who were trying to overthrow the military-civilian junta under José Napoleón Duarte. 2 The president wanted to prevent a communist victory in El Salvador that would allow Central America to “become another Cuba on the mainland.” He agreed that the public did not understand the stakes in Central America and that a vigorous public communication effort was essential to “turn the situation around.” 3 Shortly thereafter, the State Department released a white paper (with supporting documents) purporting to contain “definitive evidence” of Soviet meddling in Central America. According to the text, it was imperative for the American people to be aware of the gravity of this “well-coordinated covert effort,” with “tons of arms” coming into an area so close to the United States. 4 At a news conference four days after the white paper’s release, Secretary Haig declared that “it was our intention to deal with this matter at its source,” an infelicitous phrase, the implications of which inspired journalists and media outlets to begin making analogies to the U.S. experience in Vietnam. 5 19

20

Chapter 1

Initial media reaction to the white paper was positive, but it was not long before journalists from the Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal deconstructed its contents, and put the administration on the defensive. In June 1981, after Robert G. Kaiser of the Washington Post and Jonathan Kwitney of the Wall Street Journal analyzed the white paper’s accompanying documents (originally in Spanish, allegedly containing code-worded evidence, provided by the Salvadoran government), they both concluded that the documents failed to support the State Department’s allegations, and they exposed numerous factual errors, misattributions, exaggerations, and distortions in the white paper’s text. 6 The paper’s author, Jon Glassman, a foreign service officer, later admitted that parts of it were misleading, others “excessively embellished” or contained “errors,” and that some of its conclusions were based on “suppositions.” 7 In news reports, unnamed officials who were supposedly involved in the white paper’s preparation admitted that the administration had “overreached” the documentary evidence concerning the Soviet Union’s intrusion in Central America. The controversy over the white paper receded by early summer 1981, but its description of the Central American problem became a core narrative in the administration’s public communication efforts. Throughout late 1981 and early 1982, the administration conducted an intense public communication campaign aimed at dispelling rising doubts about its Central American policies. The effort relied heavily on a series of intelligence briefings of congressional committees by senior intelligence officials, based on electronic surveillance of radio traffic in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and other near-by nations; testimony by State and Defense Department officials on Soviet and Cuban efforts to foment terrorism and promote global subversion; and the public release of aerial reconnaissance photos to support the administration’s charges of Soviet and Cuban military assistance flowing to Nicaragua and from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran rebels. 8 In March 1982, the administration thought it had a “clincher” to prove its accusations about Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan interference in El Salvador, when it produced for the State Department press corps an alleged Nicaraguan defector, Orlando J. Tardencillas Espinosa, a nineteen-year old who had been captured in El Salvador the previous year. His handlers, who had extracted him from a Salvadoran prison cell, expected him to confirm on camera U.S. charges that Cuba and Nicaragua were supplying, training, and directing leftist Salvadoran insurgents. Instead, he announced that he had been tortured by the Salvadoran military and presented with an ultimatum by an official of the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador of either traveling to the United States to demonstrate publicly the presence of Cubans and Nicaraguans in El Salvador or facing “certain death.” John M. Goshko, a Washington Post reporter, who attended the briefing, called the performance “a fiasco” and questioned whether “the public can be induced to take seriously any future evidence

Nicaragua

21

that the administration might put forward about the alleged Cuban and Nicaraguan threat to Central America and the Caribbean.” 9 A Washington Post editorial concluded that even if Tardencillas had cooperated, his testimony would have been worthless. It was, wrote the editors, “reckless and ridiculous for the administration to have trotted him out in place of serious exposition and argument.” 10 When queried about this bungled affair, State Department spokesman Dean Fischer replied: “You win some and you lose some.” 11 By late 1982, however, the configuration of the Central American issue substantially changed. In early November, after Newsweek disclosed in a cover story that the U.S. ambassador in Honduras, John Negroponte, was involved in covert arming and training of Nicaraguan exiles there, the administration admitted, to the surprise of many in Congress, that it was pursuing a covert action program to aid opponents of the Sandinista regime (called contras, from the Spanish contrarevolucionarios or counterrevolutionaries), and to distract the Sandinista government from its alleged adventures in El Salvador. 12 From then on, the El Salvador issue was overshadowed by an increasingly bitter struggle between Congress and the administration over military aid to the contra forces, and mounting public opposition to U.S. military intervention in either El Salvador or Nicaragua. On December 8, the House unanimously adopted (411-0) the first Boland Amendment, named after its sponsor, Edward P. Boland (DMA), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee (HIC), prohibiting the Defense Department and the CIA from providing military equipment, training, or advice for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government. 13 Although the amendment had its flaws, it was the opening gambit in congressional efforts to restrain the administration’s covert war against Nicaragua. 14 Public opposition outside of Congress to Reagan’s Central American policy evolved from two major sources: an ecumenical religious protest movement and a disparate group of political activists, led by organizations such as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), which had chapters in many large cities. Religious groups, especially Catholic organizations, incensed and energized by the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero in San Salvador during a mass he was conducting in March 1980, the brutal rape and murder of four American churchwomen (Maryknoll nuns) in December of that year, and the insensitive and disparaging remarks made about the nuns by high-ranking hardliners in the Reagan administration, 15 had developed extensive networks of opposition. 16 Political activists, which included numerous organizations like CISPES, Citizens Committee on the El Salvador Crisis, Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE/Freeze), Nicaragua Network, and the Coalition for a New Foreign Policy expressed their strong opposition to the administration’s Central American policies through newspaper ads, pamphlets, public demonstrations, rallies, petitions, and

22

Chapter 1

in some cases, acts of civil disobedience. Although there were ideological and operational differences between the religious and political activists, they were both strongly opposed to the administration’s policies in El Salvador and Nicaragua. As the months of 1982 and 1983 rolled by, however, they tended to increase their focus on the administration’s covert war in Nicaragua. They challenged the administration’s public narrative with a counter narrative. From their perspective, the administration’s Central American policy was morally bankrupt and impervious to grievous human rights violations committed by Salvadoran security services and “death squads,” and by the contras in their cross-border raids into Nicaragua. They also contended that the area’s problems were rooted in internal causes of poverty and repression, which were not amenable to military solutions or pressure, that military aid would exacerbate the region’s problems, and any attempt to intervene militarily would inevitably lead to a Vietnam-like quagmire. They also believed that negotiations between the contending parties were the preferable path to peace, and that the administration’s charges of Soviet and Cuban aggression in Central America were specious. The public debate stimulated by the opposition apparently helped to inspire large demonstrations on college campuses and in major cities, such as New York, Washington, DC, Chicago, and Los Angeles, many of them organized by CISPES, 17 reminiscent of the 1960s anti-Vietnam war protests. 18 The precise impact the opposition’s counter narrative had on public opinion generally or Congress specifically is virtually impossible to demonstrate empirically. What is undeniably clear, however, is that not long after the administration began to focus on Central America it encountered substantial public resistance, particularly to its Salvadoran and Nicaraguan policies. Between early 1981 and early 1983, public concern focused heavily on El Salvador. National polls on the administration’s policy toward that country clearly revealed that the public feared that the Salvadoran conflict would drag on for years, become another “quagmire” like Vietnam, and end in failure. Poll respondents also believed that the Salvadoran government had a poor human rights record, and by a twoto-one margin they attributed unrest in Central America to “poverty and lack of human rights” rather than “subversion from Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union.” They disapproved of sending military advisers to El Salvador by a 48 to 38 percent plurality and both elites and the general public wanted the United States to “stay out” of that country. 19 El Salvador and Nicaragua were, of course, integrally linked, and there was no doubt some degree of spillover from one to the other when it came to measuring the public’s attitudes. As more information became available in the press and TV news about the administration’s military assistance to the contras and its involvement in a covert war against the Sandinista government, polling revealed public attitudes similar to those found in the El Salvador case.

Nicaragua

23

According to a Los Angeles Times poll, for example, conducted April 4-10, 1983, the public opposed a CIA-supported invasion of Nicaragua to overthrow the “leftist government” there by a six-to-one margin (62 to 10 percent), and a Gallup/Newsweek poll taken April 28-29, shortly after the president’s major speech on Central America on April 27, revealed that the “informed” public opposed giving “assistance to the guerrilla forces” now fighting against “the Marxist government” in Nicaragua by a 56 to 25 percent majority. 20 In an ABC News/Washington Post poll taken May 11-15, 1983, respondents opposed any secret U.S. effort to “try to overthrow the government in Nicaragua” by a resounding 78 to 13 percent majority. 21 Moreover, an internal State Department editorial content analysis revealed that twelve of the top twenty circulation newspapers opposed the administration’s policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua, while only five supported it. 22 The administration had recognized as early as April 1982 that there was little ambiguity in the public’s attitudes towards aiding the contras to overthrow the Sandinistas or for U.S. intervention to achieve that result, and that it had a serious problem with both public and congressional opinion. 23 Evidently, its initial decision to pursue “a concerted public information effort” had minimal impact, because the “problem” did not abate between April 1982 and July 1983. As an NSC strategy paper for Central America concluded in July 1983, “present U.S. policy faces substantial opposition, at home and abroad.” 24 Against this background, the administration revised its communication strategy in an effort to counter the negative trends in public opinion. First, Reagan’s senior advisers recommended “a massive public information program,” built around a much higher profile for the president, who they believed could “turn around” public opinion. 25 On March 10, 1983, in an address to the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), Reagan defended military assistance to the Salvadoran government and the Nicaraguan opposition as essential to winning the war against communist expansion in the region. He declared that a victory by the communist guerrillas in El Salvador would lead that country to join forces with Cuba and Nicaragua, and consequently set off a domino effect that would eventually ensnare Panama and Mexico. 26 On April 27, he addressed a joint session of Congress, which was then considering a budget request for military and economic assistance to Central America. He denied that the United States was seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, but was merely trying to interdict the alleged flow of arms to the guerrillas in El Salvador. Appealing directly to Congress to approve his requests, he stressed the proximity of El Salvador and Nicaragua to the Panama Canal. 27 Measured by opinion polls, however, the president’s efforts to go public had little apparent effect. According to an ABC/ Washington Post poll taken May 11-15, 1983, two weeks after the president’s speech to Congress, 70 percent of the public disapproved sending an increased amount of military equipment and weapons to El Salvador

24

Chapter 1

and a Gallup/Newsweek poll taken April 28-29, 1983, revealed that even among those respondents who correctly identified which side the United States backed in El Salvador, more than a two-to-one majority (56 to 25 percent) opposed assistance to the contras. 28 Second, in response to the president’s concern about the “persistent lack of public understanding” of his Central American policies, the decline of the security situation there and his urgent call for “revitalized” public diplomacy and legislative action plans to deal with the problem, 29 the administration revamped its bureaucratic communications machinery, while at the same time increasing its covert operations against Nicaragua. In May 1983, the White House established an interagency Outreach Working Group for Central America, chaired by Faith Ryan Whittlesey, who was director of the White House Office of Public Liaison (OPL), to propose and implement domestic outreach efforts on Central America, both to conservative groups who were the president’s “natural supporters” and uncommitted groups who had little experience with foreign policy issues. Her central mission was to transform OPL, which previously dealt only with domestic issues, into a “foreign policy advocacy office” designed to produce anti-Sandinista content. 30 On July 1, Otto J. Reich, who was currently assistant AID administrator, was brought in to replace Richard B. Stone, a former Republican senator, as head of the recently established Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (S/LPD), which was housed in the State Department. Reich was supposed to bring “some organizational harmony” to the public diplomacy effort on Central America and to intensify the administration’s public diplomacy activities, as a vehicle for translating increased public support into congressional support on the Hill. 31 In mid-July, S/LPD drafted an interagency action plan for the period August to December 1983, which tasked relevant offices in the White House, State, Defense, and the CIA with public communication activities aimed at accomplishing that rather dubious mission. 32 Under the provisions of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 100, signed on July 28, 1983, the president also approved a program of expanded U.S. military and naval activities and exercises in the Caribbean Basin area and on the Pacific coast of Central America, and tasked the secretaries of state and defense to prepare a coordinated legislative, diplomatic and public diplomacy strategy to support the new initiatives. 33 At the NSC, Walter Raymond Jr., the key staffer on public diplomacy, initiated his attempts to develop a private sector network to support the administration’s Central America policies, 34 and to intensify the administration’s domestic public diplomacy program on Nicaragua by “gluing black hats on the Sandinistas and white hats on UNO.” 35 The administration’s renewed attempt to increase public and congressional support for its Central American policies and to deflate media criticism foundered rather quickly. When the news broke in July 1983

Nicaragua

25

during a House debate on military assistance to the contras that the United States was planning a six-month-long military exercise involving war games conducted by U.S. and Honduran troops off the coasts of Nicaragua, the administration again found itself on the defensive. The president and senior officials at the Pentagon again tried to counter the negative reaction by going public. 36 A senior official at the Pentagon gave a briefing on July 25, in which he claimed that the maneuvers were intended as a deterrent to the Nicaraguan regime. 37 On the following evening, the president held a televised news conference at the White House, in which he denied that the United States had war aims in Central America, and insisted that the naval and military exercises were designed to provide a “shield for democracy” and a signal to the Soviets, Cubans, and Nicaraguans against creating turmoil in the area. 38 Their efforts, however, did not prevent a defeat in Congress. On July 28, 1983, the House voted 228 to 195 for shutting off contra assistance, which George P. Shultz, who had replaced Haig in July 1982, described as the administration’s “worst legislative defeat” to that date. 39 About two weeks later, in his nationally broadcast Saturday radio address, the president acknowledged public opposition to his Central American policy, insisted that “great progress” was being made to restrain atrocities against innocent civilians by Salvadoran “death squads” and contra forces in Nicaragua (thereby confirming that atrocities were in fact being committed), denounced the Soviets and Cubans for trying to exploit the situation there to “install ruthless Communist dictatorships,” and implied that the media were to blame for creating a situation where “the great majority of Americans don’t know which side we’re on.” 40 In his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 15, an apparently frustrated president again lambasted the media, contending that news organizations were offering “distorted accounts” of events in Central America, which prevented the public from knowing that “democracy is taking root there.” He said that he did not blame the media alone, because in many cases they were “just reporting the disinformation they hear coming from people who put politics ahead of our national interests.” 41 But he failed to specify precisely what the “distortions” were or which “people” were allegedly misleading the journalists. During the early months of 1984, concerned about a cut-off of congressional funding for the contras, the administration activated an NSC/CIAdeveloped plan, apparently approved by Reagan, 42 to inflict as much damage and economic pressure as possible on Nicaragua by placing magnetic mines in three of the country’s harbors. 43 Exposure of this activity led to another public communications disaster, when the story broke in the Wall Street Journal on April 6 that Americans working for the CIA were supervising the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, which, if true, would have been a violation of established international law and risked confrontation with other nations whose ships might be damaged. The

26

Chapter 1

Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Washington Post and numerous other news outlets quickly picked up the story. 44 Administration spokesmen responded to the brewing mini-scandal by first denying that Americans were involved, and then attempting to shift the blame to “irregular forces” who opposed the Soviet- and Cuban-supported regime in Nicaragua. Members of Congress expressed bipartisan outrage at not having been informed of this secret covert operation, and condemned it as both illegal and unwise. Many loyal Republicans broke ranks with the president on this issue, including Howard H. Baker Jr. (TN), Senate majority leader; and Barry M. Goldwater (AZ), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC). In a stiffly worded letter to William J. Casey, the CIA director, dated April 9, Goldwater stated that he was “pissed” about this “act of war,” and queried “how we are going to explain it.” 45 The following day, the Senate voted 84 to 12 in favor of a nonbinding resolution opposing the use of federal funds to mine Nicaraguan harbors. The House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) followed suit the next day by a vote of 32 to 3, with 3 abstentions. The New York Times editorially described the mining as “Illegal, Deceptive, and Dumb,” contending that the “symbolism is appalling, the timing egregious, the benefit illusory.” 46 The public expressed its strong disapproval of such activity in a CBS/New York Times poll, taken April 23-26, which found 67 percent of respondents disapproved, while only 13 percent approved. 47 In his diary, Reagan noted his concern that a “rebellion” was brewing in Congress, and that the affair “will probably lead to their shutting aid off to the Nicaraguan Contras—which will bring joy to the Soviets and Cubans.” 48 Secretary Shultz, who attributed the mining affair to unnamed “hardliners” at the NSC, later described it as a “political disaster.” 49 Throughout the remaining months of 1984, despite administration efforts to ramp up its public communication and public diplomacy efforts, 50 little progress was made in mobilizing public, media, or congressional support. The frustration of administration principals was clearly visible at a National Security Policy Group (NSPG) meeting on June 25, 1984. The president told the group that “Everything hangs on getting support for the anti-Sandinistas,” and he urged all those present to “be more active.” He expressed the view that negotiations with the Nicaraguans would be useful only if it helped to obtain support for contra assistance in Congress. Secretary Weinberger’s preferred solution was to politicize the issue by “taking the offensive against the Democrats in Congress,” by holding them “accountable for not providing the resources needed to defend democracy” and by asking them “whether they want a second Cuba.” 51 At the same time, however, hardliners in the NSC, the Pentagon, and the CIA continued to plan and execute actions that, when publicly exposed, undermined the administration’s communication strategy. In October, for example, a story leaked to the press concerning two manuals prepared under CIA auspices for use by contra rebels. One,

Nicaragua

27

entitled Freedom Fighters Manual, was essentially a comic book illustrating various forms of economic sabotage (apparently for those who couldn’t read), while the other, entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, advised the contras how to use “implicit terror” for political advantage and how “to neutralize” carefully selected targets such as court judges, magistrates, police, and state security officials. 52 The Washington Post dubbed the latter pamphlet the “CIA’s Murder Manual,” and lambasted the whole affair as “a lame-brained idea launched on the political side of the government,” that “tramples upon legislation specifically outlawing assassination as a tool of American policy.” 53 Editors at the New York Times described “neutralizing” adversaries as “a euphemism for political murder,” and concluded that the administration was lying to Congress about its objectives in Nicaragua, which evidently aimed at overthrowing a government which the United States recognized and with which it was “nominally at peace.” 54 Administration spokesmen scrambled to explain away the manual. They contended that the whole affair was a media-induced scare, attributed the “errors” in the manual to an unidentified “overzealous” contract employee in Honduras, and denied that the administration had any intention to create a crisis. Many in Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, found this an insufficient explanation, and some were irate. To appease them, Casey sent a letter on October 25 to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, stating that the manual was intended for instructional purposes only, to convert every contra into “a propagandist combatant” who would be “persuasive in face-to-face communication.” 55 The president dismissed the furor over the manual as “much ado about nothing” and asserted that neutralizing an enemy meant simply removing him from office. 56 Neither the president nor any senior administration official ever explained publicly precisely how contra rebels operating from Honduras could “remove” a judge or police official in Nicaragua from office or with whom they were supposed to engage in face-to-face communication. The scandal over the manual killed any consideration by Congress to pass another contra aid bill until March 1985; instead, led by the House Intelligence Committee, it approved, on October 12, 1984, a more strictly worded Boland Amendment, prohibiting any government agency from expending funds toward “supporting directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.” 57 Compounding the manual episode, administration hardliners committed another blunder on November 6, 1984, the day of the presidential election, which may have originated in an effort to deflect media and public attention away from the manual or to remind the public that a tough policy toward the Soviets and Nicaragua was necessary. An unidentified administration official “leaked” information to David Martin, a CBS news correspondent, indicating that a Bulgarian freighter carrying

28

Chapter 1

twelve crates thought to contain Soviet MiG-21s was off the northwest coast of South America heading for Nicaragua. At first, the ploy seemed to work. 58 CBS broke into its election coverage to announce that news, quickly followed by NBC, which said intelligence sources indicated that there might be at least eighteen to twenty-one jets involved. The Nicaraguans asked the United Nations Security Council to take up what it alleged were U.S. military preparations for an invasion of Nicaragua. When the ship docked and the crates were opened, however, it was found that they contained helicopters, not MiGs. 59 The press had a field day. A Washington Post editorial, for example, criticized the administration for creating a “scare” and called for a political solution in Central America. 60 In two editorials analyzing why it thought the administration had raised the red flag, the New York Times suggested that the United States was “whipping up a security scare among Americans” by inventing an “alarming fantasy” designed to “rekindle support in Congress for the recently defunded contra war.” 61 Despite these serial public communication blunders, Reagan’s reelection in November 1984, energized administration hardliners. From the immediate post-election period through the early summer of 1985, both Reich’s office at State and OPL at the White House accelerated their public diplomacy efforts. OPL concentrated on increasing its number of inhouse seminars and speaking engagements in major media markets. S/LPD adopted a mix of more or less conventional communication activities, such as funding official speakers and distributing pamphlets, with others that were either questionably legal or patently illegal, such as trying to influence media outlets to produce stories more favorable to the administration, 62 leaking official cables to the media, using “White Propaganda” operations, which involved the office in secret collaborations with conservative academics and Nicaraguan opposition leaders to write op-eds for the print media and TV news stories, and funding contra leaders’ trips to brief editorial boards and other news outlets in the United States. 63 It also stepped up its relationships with private conservative lobbying groups involved in raising funds for the contras, such as Citizens for America (CFA), a nation-wide grass-roots organization. 64 These efforts to “improve the news flow” in a direction favorable to the administration’s policy had little impact. Despite Reich’s claims to the contrary and his tendency to overstate his office’s accomplishments, 65 most of his efforts involved conventional damage control. In fact, as 1985 and 1986 wore on, both print and TV coverage of the administration’s Central American policy became more, rather than less, critical. For example, in March 1985, the New York Times published on its front page an article by reporter Joel Brinkley containing an analysis of Nicaragua’s military strength that demolished the administration’s contention that the Sandinistas were building the largest military force in Central America, 66 and several articles on the so-called Brody Report, describing contra

Nicaragua

29

attacks on civilians, which New York Times’ reporters independently confirmed. 67 In April, Newsweek published an eyewitness report, with photos, showing contras executing a captive by slitting his throat; 68 and in August, the Times criticized the administration for “hiding” its covert war against Nicaragua “with whoppers, all the while condemning the Sandinistas as liars.” 69 Also during that year, PBS more than once ran its controversial Frontline documentary, entitled “Revolution in El Salvador,” which focused on “death squad” atrocities; and in May 1986, ABC Evening News led its program with a ten-minute scathing report on the contras, accusing them of engaging in drug trafficking, atrocities, and skimming of funds provided by the United States, which produced consternation in the White House. 70 After Reich left S/LPD, he admitted that in the administration’s battle for the hearts and minds of the public, his office’s communication efforts “were microefforts in a macroenvironment.” 71 There were other problems, too. The administration’s public diplomacy experts continued to grope for persuasive themes to sell its Central American policy. One of Reich’s chief subordinates, for example, admitted that we “don’t know what themes will cause Americans to share the administration’s concern regarding Central America.” 72 Reich himself, who was appointed ambassador to Venezuela in early 1986, in a memorandum to Shultz, noted a “need to simplify and focus our themes” in order “to move the congressional doubters into the supporter column,” particularly by emphasizing that communism produces refugees and those fleeing Central America had a natural land bridge to the United States, 73 though the administration never publicly released any evidence to document such a phenomenon. At an NSC meeting on January 10, 1986, called to update the president on the situation in Central America and to discuss how to obtain more congressional funding for the contras, Casey and Weinberger stressed what they perceived as a massive Soviet military buildup in Cuba and Nicaragua. Casey advocated shifting the administration’s public focus away from the “export of revolution” by Nicaragua and linking the alleged threat posed by Nicaragua to the larger Soviet threat in Afghanistan, Libya, Angola, and other places. 74 Shortly after the January NSC meeting, Reagan echoed Casey’s and Weinberger’s globalized version of the Nicaraguan threat. In March, he appeared at the State Department to view the administration’s roll-out of a traveling display of arms described as U.S. weapons captured in Vietnam and allegedly funneled through the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua to the Salvadoran rebels. The president listened to two Sandinista opponents and a Salvadoran guerrilla defector, and then delivered his remarks. If the United States failed to aid the contras, he predicted, “Americans will, in the not too distant future, look to the south and see a string of anti-American communist dictatorships,” being “aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany, Bulgaria, Iran, Viet-

30

Chapter 1

nam, Libya, and other radical states, movements and organizations.” 75 Reporters at the event seemed unimpressed by the president’s effort to globalize the Nicaraguan threat and link the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua to the growing world-wide problem of terrorism. During the Q&A, they inquired whether the administration could produce real evidence, such as a plane, boat, or manifests proving the origin of the arms and whether or not they had been purchased on the open market. 76 Given the initial press reaction to the exhibit, it is understandable why the rolling arms display never generated much media or public interest. As the struggle between the administration and Congress over contra funding heated up in early 1986 over the president’s request for $100 million in new aid, the administration went into communications overdrive, directing its efforts toward achieving a positive outcome in Congress. 77 It adopted a “60-Day Plan,” a communications strategy approved by the White House and the NSC and conducted largely by S/LPD and an ad hoc group in the White House, often referred to as the White House Public Diplomacy Group, in which Pat Buchanan, director of White House communications, played an important role. The plan was structured around presidential speeches and briefings, appearances by administration principals on weekend TV talk shows, placement of op-eds in major newspapers, the distribution to reporters and other selected audiences of publications stressing the repressive nature of the Sandinista regime, and the rolling arms display noted above. All of the events scheduled in the plan, which was revised frequently in response to developments on the Hill and in Nicaragua, were keyed to the legislative calendar. From Buchanan’s perspective, however, the crux of the entire campaign was “to influence 30 or 40 people” who were considered swing voters in the House. 78 Some journalists and members of Congress at this point perceived the administration’s communications strategy as a “fear and smear” campaign, based on several dubious themes: (1) that support for the Sandinistas equaled support for communists; (2) that failure to aid the contras would remove them as a buffer and allow Nicaragua to become a portal for international terrorists to reach U.S. soil; (3) those who supported the president on aid to the contras were patriots who loved America; and (4) the Soviets and their Nicaraguan puppets were engaged in a massive disinformation campaign directed at Congress and the media. 79 In his remarks to pro-contra supporters at the White House on March 3, for example, the president said that “Congressional defeat of this aid could well deliver Nicaragua permanently to the Communist bloc,” and lead to the “consolidation of a privileged sanctuary for terrorists and subversives just 2 days’ driving time from Harlingen, Texas.” 80 On March 5, he told the leaders of Jewish groups that the Soviets and their Nicaraguan puppets had ties to terrorist groups in the Middle East, and suggested that if contra aid was not passed, it might not be long “before the Soviets turn

Nicaragua

31

their full attention to Israel, that lonely outpost of democracy in the Middle East,” and color the map of Central America “in a sea of red, eventually lapping at our own borders.” 81 And in his nationally televised speech on March 16, using a map of the Western Hemisphere colored red to show the countries where weapons allegedly supplied by the Nicaraguan communists had been found, he accused the Sandinistas of singling out the Catholic Church for violent treatment, transforming Nicaragua into “a command post for international terror” and drug-trafficking to the United States. In his peroration, he asked if Congress would provide the assistance he asked for or would “they abandon the democratic resistance to its Communist enemy.” 82 The president’s red-baiting language aimed at his opponents on the Hill, was echoed by other officials in the administration, such as Pat Buchanan, who published an op-ed in the Washington Post on March 5, which posed a rhetorical question: “Who wants Central America More—the West or the Warsaw Pact?” He predicted that “if Central America goes the way of Nicaragua, they will be in San Diego,” although he didn’t specify precisely who “they” were or how “they” would get there. However, he laid down a clear marker: “With the [forthcoming] vote on contra aid, the Democratic Party will reveal whether it stands with Ronald Reagan and the resistance—or Daniel Ortega and the communists.” 83 The White House also ran pro-contra and antiSandinista television ads, and Reagan and other officials attempted to line up support by bargaining with individual members of Congress from swing vote districts via a coordinated series of telephone calls. 84 Neither the administration’s fear and smear campaign nor the president’s personal attempts to bargain with legislators were successful. When the vote was taken in the House on March 20, 1986, the contra aid bill was defeated by a 220-210 vote. 85 Following an emergency NSC meeting in the White House to discuss follow-up strategy for achieving a better outcome in the Senate, where the voting odds favored the administration, 86 Reagan issued a statement criticizing the House vote as “a dark day for freedom” and stating that “this vote must be reversed.” 87 Undeterred by the legislative defeat, the administration renewed its bargaining efforts in Congress, narrowing its focus in the House to those Republicans who had opposed the president. In addition to the tactics employed earlier during the run-up to the first vote in the House, he prepared for a second House vote by inviting those regarded as potential vote switchers into the White House for private talks and made a round of last-minute telephone calls before the vote, while the House leadership exerted its own pressure in the interests of party unity. 88 This time around, when the role was called in June 1986, the House approved the $100 million ($70 million in military aid and $30 million in humanitarian aid). 89 The vote was a policy victory for Reagan, but it was also short-lived, because it was the last time the administration would be able to secure from Congress new lethal military aid for the contras. 90

32

Chapter 1

During the fall of 1986 and the first quarter of 1987, the political situation surrounding the administration’s Central American policy significantly changed. The Iran-Contra scandal erupted in October, and the administration soon found itself on the defensive, particularly concerning the diversion of profits from the sale of arms to Iran that were funneled to the contras (see chapter 7). The Democrats won control of the Senate in the off-year elections in November and thereafter controlled Congress, which led to contentious bargaining with the White House over the dispersal of the funds for the contras approved in June 1986. In March 1987, the House voted to suspend further aid to the contras until the president accounted for the money that had already been provided to them, and the Senate voted overwhelmingly to support the Central American peace plan promoted by President Oscar Arias Sánchez of Costa Rica. During the winter the military fortunes of the contras remarkably declined, as the Sandinistas took control of a buffer zone on the Honduran side of the border with Nicaragua. Divisive in-fighting among the contra leadership led to the resignation of Adolfo Calero in February and Arturo Cruz in March, two of the three main UNO leaders. 91 A number of senior moderate Republicans, who leaned toward negotiations with the Sandinistas, became more outspoken in their opposition to the administration’s Central American policy. Senators Warren Rudman (NH), William Cohen (ME) and Nancy Kassebaum (KS), for example, sent the president a letter in late March criticizing the ambiguity of the policy and concluding that the “disproportionate emphasis on the military aspects of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua is counterproductive.” 92 In the midst of this evolving situation, administration principals attended an NSPG meeting on February 20, 1987, just days after the Tower Board Commission delivered its report on the Iran-Contra scandal. Among those present at the meeting there was a palpable sense that the administration’s public communication efforts on Nicaragua were inadequate, both in terms of persuading the American public and obtaining additional congressional support for contra assistance. The president expressed his determination to “prevail in Central America” and urged all members of his administration “to work harder to make the policy succeed.” According to Reagan, the solution was simple: take “our story” to the American people, to counter the “sophisticated disinformation campaign mounted by the Sandinistas” that has confused the public, and to expose the “human side of the horrors committed by the Sandinistas,” which an allegedly unsympathetic press continued to ignore. The president’s new national security adviser, Frank Carlucci, had a more nuanced view, which involved redefining the administration’s objectives in an effort to “present clearer choices to the American people,” explaining precisely what “winning” in Nicaragua actually meant, clarifying whether the problem should be put into an East-West or a democracy versus communism context, and determining how to mobilize fully U.S. govern-

Nicaragua

33

ment communication resources on behalf of the policy. Charles Wick, the director of USIA, suggested setting up “a high-level White House conference with great visibility to get publicity for our point of view” or bringing in “major public relations firms . . . for assistance in turning around public opinion.” 93 Hardliners Weinberger and Ed Meese, counselor to the president, agreed that the best option would be to break relations with the Sandinistas, recognize the contras as a government-in-exile, and eject all Sandinista delegations from Washington, which allegedly were the key to the Sandinista disinformation campaign. 94 In early March 1987, despite administration’s unsuccessful efforts to decouple the issue of contra aid from the Iran-Contra investigations 95 and Reagan’s falling popularity ratings, the president was unwavering in his support of the contras. Evidently, he continued to believe that he could somehow bring the public and Congress around by going public. He devoted his weekly Saturday radio address on March 7 to the contra cause, telling his listeners that the trend in Central America was toward democracy, which the American public and Congress could support. He asked that Congress help the “freedom fighters” by releasing the funds that they approved in June 1986. 96 A few days later, at an NSC meeting on democracy in South America, Reagan said that he sincerely desired improved relations with the Latin American countries, and that in his meetings with the leaders of those countries he had told them that “we are not the ‘colossus of the north’ anymore.” However, with respect to Nicaragua, he quickly returned to form, stressing two of his most frequent complaints: Nicaragua’s “massive disinformation campaign entrenched in our media” and the troublesome voiceovers the TV news stations used whenever he delivered a nationally televised speech. 97 During the remaining months of 1987, the president and his cabinet-level advisers, while continuing their decoupling effort, were distracted by Iran-Contra revelations, but in October, anticipating the new appropriations cycle, Reagan delivered a speech to the Organization of American States (OAS), in which he promised to continue the struggle for contra aid, so long as there was breath in his body. 98 He and some of his closest advisers believed that only continued military pressure on the Sandinistas would provide the necessary leverage for the concessions they wanted in any peace agreement that might be signed with Nicaragua, such as the end of Soviet aid and strict verification provisions. His appeals to the public and Congress, however, fell on deaf ears. Shortly before Reagan’s speech to the OAS, Secretary Shultz told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) that the president would seek $270 million in new contra aid, but during the following weeks, the administration became increasingly unsure of both public and congressional support for another massive aid package for the contras. However, with intensive bargaining again directed at swing voters in both chambers, it was able to secure congressional approval of about only $14 mil-

34

Chapter 1

lion in non-lethal aid before the end of the year. Although the administration apparently wanted Congress to vote another large amount for the contras, ranging somewhere between $100 and $150 million in the next appropriations cycle, when it finally introduced a request for new contra funding in January 1988, it substantially scaled down its request to only $36 million, of which only $3.6 million was marked for military aid. 99 On February 3, however, the House rejected the entire aid package, which the New York Times’ editors described as a “deserved rebuke” to Reagan’s failed contra policy. 100 In an embarrassing finale to the entire saga, all three major television networks refused to broadcast a speech the president wanted to give in defense of contra aid, on the grounds that it contained nothing new. 101 Looking back at the administration’s communication efforts on Nicaragua and the contras, several things stand out in stark profile. First, over the course of Reagan’s two administrations, the president’s demonization of the Sandinistas gradually became more extreme and detached from reality. In his public remarks (all from Public Papers), he linked them to the Nazis (April 27, 1983); 102 described them as anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic and genocidal in their effort to “wipe out an entire culture” of Miskito Indians (May 9, 1984); charged them with being a “Marxist-Leninist clique” responsible for “exporting drugs to poison our children” (February 16, 1985); said that they “were using Stalin’s tactic of Gulag relocation” (March 25, 1985); accused them of abetting the Soviets in turning “Central America into a beachhead for subversion” (March 30, 1985); indicted them for establishing “a Communist dictatorship” in Nicaragua that practiced “repression and torture” and followed a “scorched earth policy” (April 15, 1985); claimed that they harbored “the followers of Qaddafi and the Ayatollah Khomeini” (April 20, 1985); asserted that they constituted “a new, international version of Murder, Incorporated” (July 8, 1985); insisted that there were thousands of terrorist elements gathered in Nicaragua “ready to descend on the United States” (March 16, 1986) and so on. On the other hand, he described the contras as “freedom fighters,” a “democratic resistance,” and “our brothers,” who were comparable to the French resistance against the Nazis, and who, most improbable of all, were “the moral equal of our Founding Fathers” (March 1, 1985). 103 Second, it would be a mistake to attribute Reagan’s cascading demonization of the Sandinistas merely to rhetorical excess. This was, in fact, Reagan the anti-communist ideologue at work against a weaker government, whose allegedly communist leadership he despised. When scrutinized carefully, however, his charges constitute a head-spinning mélange of spurious attacks, implausible comparisons, flamboyant distortions, utter fabrications, and cases of projection. Journalists seemed to let him off lightly, however. Apparently, no one ever asked him publicly, for example, to explain how the Sandinistas could simultaneously be Marxists and

Nicaragua

35

Nazis; or why they were not “freedom fighters,” in view of the fact that they had overthrown the dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle; or what the evidence was to prove that they were conducting a massive disinformation campaign that was entrenched in U.S. media and in Congress; or precisely how they could “restore democracy” in Nicaragua, when it had never existed there. 104 There were, in fact, no terrorists massing on the southern border of the United States, but there were U.S.financed contras, aided by their U.S. military advisers and covert operatives, in Honduras staging hundreds of cross-border raids and killing innocent Nicaraguan civilians. 105 While Reagan castigated the Sandinistas for exporting drugs to the United States, an accusation the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) could not prove, his “freedom fighters” were busily engaged in doing precisely that. 106 His charges of Sandinista antiSemitism were repudiated by several major human rights organizations, by his own ambassador to Nicaragua, by several Jewish groups, and by Jews in the capital city of Managua. 107 His condemnation of the Sandinistas for allegedly abusing priests and repressing the Catholic Church in Nicaragua found virtually no audience in the United States, where the Catholic Church hierarchy and the liberal Catholic press consistently criticized Reagan’s policy toward Nicaragua. 108 His accusation that the Sandinistas were guilty of committing genocide against the Miskito Indians was a severe distortion of the facts on the ground and a shamelessly transparent manipulation of a long-standing and complex indigenous struggle. 109 Evidently, Reagan and his public communication advisers believed that repetitious accusations of alleged Sandinista human rights violations and other crimes would shift public attention away from contra atrocities and failures, and that no matter how outrageous and unsubstantiated the president’s attacks against the Sandinistas were, members of Congress, the media, and the public would find them credible. Third, regardless of how the administration presented its narrative, it had a distinct problem explaining its floating rationale for its policy in Central America. Initially, the announced objective was to interdict an alleged clandestine arms flow from the Soviet Union via Nicaragua and Cuba to the Salvadoran guerrillas, but it later alternated between forcing the Sandinistas into negotiations, compelling them to “restore democracy,” making them say “Uncle,” 110 defending U.S. vital interests in the region, stopping the flow of refugees to the U.S., negating a domino effect, disrupting their part in the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, supporting all freedom fighters around the world, and preventing the spread of Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan-inspired terrorism. Although Reagan consistently denied seeking the overthrow of the Sandinista government, Reich later made it clear that the “objective of the policy was, in fact, the removal of the Sandinistas.” 111 Representative Mickey Edwards (R-OK), who supported aid to the contras, when look-

36

Chapter 1

ing back at the president’s efforts to get his Central American message across, remarked that he failed because he “kept changing his rationale about why we were there.” 112 In fact, the public rationale for the president’s Central American policy was essentially incoherent and irrational. Fourth, the administration’s communication resources were primarily directed to individuals, institutions, and audiences who were already sympathetic to the hardline anti-communist views of Reagan and his most trusted loyalists. As Elliott Abrams, the hardline former assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs (ARA), put it: the outreach program on Central America “rarely got beyond the effort to energize the people who were already with us.” 113 Operationally, this led to three significant results: (1) decisions to target publications largely to sympathetic recipients and to program speakers into “safe” venues, (2) place officially by-lined op-eds and articles in “friendly” news outlets and brief pro-policy editorial boards, and (3) develop one-way communication patterns that enabled administration speakers to elide all the hard and annoying questions that opponents of the policy were inclined to ask. Opposition literature and public presentations were filled with queries that the administration never publicly answered. For example, given all the military exercises and naval maneuvers in the area, how could the administration deny that it was planning for military intervention? Why didn’t the CIA’s “murder manual” qualify as state-supported terrorism? If the Sandinistas were systematically persecuting the Catholic Church, why was the majority Catholic press and the Catholic Church in the United States opposed to the administration’s policy? If the Sandinistas betrayed their promises to the OAS about “restoring democracy,” why didn’t the United States simply turn the matter over to the OAS for mediation? Why did the administration insist that it did not want to overthrow the Sandinista government, while it supported the contras who publicly said that they did? If the contras were as popular in Nicaragua as the administration claimed, why did they have so little military success and public support? If Nicaragua intended to invade neighboring countries, why did none of its neighbors publicly express concern over such potential adventurism? And why did the State Department persist in claiming that “tons of arms” were flowing into El Salvador from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua, while refusing to produce any concrete evidence to support that claim? 114 Occasionally, the State Department attempted to respond to questions like these via publications of limited circulation, 115 but for the most part, the White House, State, and Defense generally avoided confrontational venues, because they regarded such venues as wasted effort or believed that they would simply give opponents a platform to advocate their own views. Fifth, Reagan and his public communications team had serious evidentiary problems in dealing with Nicaragua and the Sandinistas. They had remarkable facility for inventing all sorts of wild accusations about

Nicaragua

37

alleged Sandinista human rights violations, gun-running to communist guerrillas in El Salvador, and drug smuggling to the United States; harboring PLO and other terrorists who were preparing to invade the United States; and coordinating a vast disinformation campaign in this country, suborning Americans in the process, to conceal the truth about all the pernicious Sandinista calamities already occurring or about to occur from the media, Congress, and the public. However, what they offered as proof was often weak, tendentious and merely one assertion piled on another. When pressed by the media or Congress, they often fell back on the old ploy of refusing to release the persuasive evidence they claimed to have to avoid compromising national security. For example, as described above, the administration used arms displays of weapons allegedly captured in El Salvador to prove the Sandinistas were funneling Soviet arms to the anti-government forces, sometimes buttressed by sketchy satellite aerial photos, but it never produced a captured vehicle or boat or downed plane that was actually used in transporting weapons from Nicaragua to El Salvador, even though the United States controlled the open waters off both coasts of Nicaragua and the air space above that country. The administration’s story line and the “evidence” it produced to prove it failed to convince many journalists accredited to the White House and the State Department, because they understood that arms were fungible, their actual source could not be easily traced and that aerial photos proved virtually nothing because they were subject to highly dubious readouts. An even more glaring example involved the charge, repeated on numerous occasions by the president, that the Soviet-CubanNicaraguan alliance was engaged in a sophisticated and well-organized disinformation effort in the United States, with the help of American citizens, 116 to change votes in Congress and hoodwink the media about the situation in Nicaragua, but the administration never produced any credible public evidence to prove that the charge was anything other than fatuous nonsense. 117 Sixth, between March 1983 and the end of his second term, President Reagan delivered about twenty major television and radio addresses defending his Central American policy, and administration principals spoke frequently on Central America. The public communication offices in State and Defense, S/LPD, and OPL collectively programmed thousands of public events, distributed scores of publications, and arranged numerous high level private briefings for specific groups in the White House and the State Department. The payoff from all this activity, however, was minimal. As opinion polls reveal, the American public consistently rejected, by substantial majorities or pluralities, the administration’s claim that Nicaragua was a top priority issue or that it seriously threatened U.S. vital security interests. The public also consistently opposed by a majority of about two-to-one the sending of military aid to the contras or troops to El Salvador, because they feared that U.S. military involve-

38

Chapter 1

ment in either country would lead to “another Vietnam.” Moreover, the president’s approval ratings on how he handled U.S. policy toward Central America in general or Nicaragua specifically were regularly low, averaging about 50 percent disapproval to 30 percent approval. 118 Despite the clear polling trends on public attitudes toward the administration’s Nicaragua policy, some administration officials displayed a remarkable capacity to perceive the opposite of what the polls actually revealed. 119 Finally, we are left with another question. If the administration’s Central American policy, particularly with respect to Nicaragua, was as inept as the foregoing indicates, consistently unpopular with the American public, and often subjected to withering media criticism, what explains the administration’s success in achieving support in Congress for providing military aid to the contras from 1983 through 1987? In answering this question, it is necessary to keep in mind that the calculations behind the votes of individual members of Congress are motivated by various goals: the desire for reelection, a commitment to preserve and protect the legislative branch’s constitutional prerogatives, achievement of influence in their respective chamber, to serve constituent interests, to make good policy, and possibly others. How they weigh these goals, either individually or collectively, is difficult, if not impossible, to parse. The issue of funding the contras was essentially a protracted struggle over the executive branch’s power to conduct foreign policy without intrusion or obstruction from Congress and the legislative branch’s power not to enable or fund policies they disapproved or believed were harmful to the nation. However, there was considerable fragmentation in Congress between opponents and proponents over funding the contras, with a significant proportion of moderate members who constituted a “swing group” of voters. The White House derived a considerable amount of bargaining leverage from this fragmentation, which enabled it to manipulate its requests for various forms of assistance to the contras (lethal military aid, non-lethal aid, and humanitarian assistance) over time, and to refocus policy objectives in a more positive way (e.g., restoration of democracy in Nicaragua and the importance of fostering peace negotiations). These developments, along with constituent concerns in some home districts about the threat of communism, war, or a quagmire in Central America, freed up swing voters in Congress to support the president and vote in favor of funding. 120 In looking back on his presidency two years after leaving office, Reagan wrote that he had repeatedly expressed his “frustration (and sometimes my downright exasperation) over my difficulties in convincing the American people and Congress of the seriousness of the threat in Central America,” and that he had hoped the outcome of his efforts to explain his policies to the public would “be an outpouring of support from Americans,” but that “too few cared enough about a Communist penetration of the Americas to apply the kind of pressure I needed on Congress.”

Nicaragua

39

He attributed this situation to the so-called post-Vietnam syndrome, the depth of isolationism among the public, the skillful disinformation efforts of the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas, and the failure of the press to “apply the same standards of journalistic skepticism that they applied to most of the topics they covered.” 121 In the end, he blamed his failure on the triad of the communication skills of his alleged communist enemies, the bias of the American press, and, ultimately, the lassitude and disinterest of the American public. NOTES 1. On the Central American policy of the Carter and Reagan administrations, see William M. Leogrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 19771992 (2000); and Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993 (1993). On Nicaragua specifically, see Robert A. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (2002); Robert A. Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990 (1996); and Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1978-1990 (1991). 2. John Bushnell, the acting assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs (ARA), who was not present at the NSC meetings, had a slightly different view of the evidence. In a memorandum to Haig, dated February 3, 1981, he wrote that the “documentary evidence of Cuban/Nicaraguan . . . involvement in shiping [sic.] arms to El Salvador may not be conclusive enough to justify wide public dissemination, but it is persuasive when combined with other available evidence.” Bushnell did not specify exactly what other “evidence” it was that he had in mind or whether it was publicly releasable. A copy of the memo is in the Digital El Salvador Collection, 1980-1994, Item EL00709, NSArchive. 3. For the minutes of NSC meeting 1, February 6, 1981, on the Caribbean Basin and NSC meeting 2, February 11, 1981, covering Central America, see Jason Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 2-9. 4. The State Department released the white paper, drafted by Jon Glassman, a foreign service officer, as “Communist Interference in El Salvador,” Special Report No. 80, dated February 23, 1981. 5. Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency, 1989, 11214. 6. On the deconstruction, see the following press articles: John Dinges, “White Paper or Blank Paper? U.S Report on Aid to El Salvador Guerrillas Falls Short,” Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1981, C7; Jonathan Kwitney, “Tarnished Report? Apparent Errors Cloud U.S. ‘White Paper’ on Reds in El Salvador,” Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1981, 1; Juan de Onis, “U.S. Officials Concede Flaws in El Salvador White Paper but Defend Its Conclusions,” New York Times, June 10, 1981, A6. 7. See Jonathan Kwitney’s description of his three-hour interview with Glassman in his book, Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World, 1984, 363-64. 8. For example, Casey briefed the House and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee (HSIOC), in closed session in December 1981; Fred C. Iklé, undersecretary of defense for policy, and Thomas O. Enders, assistant secretary of state for interAmerican affairs, testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism on March 4 and 12, respectively. For their testimony, see U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Hearings on the Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, March 4, 11, and 12, 1982, 85-117 and 142-60. For the campaign in general, see Philip Taubman, “Selling a Policy to Public: U.S. Intelligence Data on Central America, New York Times, March 15, 1982, A10.

40

Chapter 1

9. John M. Goshko, “State Department Guerrilla Recants,” Washington Post, March 13, 1982, 1. 10. “The Defector Who Defected,” Washington Post, March 14, 1982, D6. 11. Philip Taubman, “Captive Recants Salvador Story, to U.S. Dismay,” New York Times, March 13, 1982, 1. 12. “America’s Secret War, Target: Nicaragua,” Newsweek, 100: 19 (November 8, 1982), 42-55. 13. Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1983, Public Law 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830. 14. See Arnson, Crossroads, 11-12. 15. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, UN ambassador-designate, told reporter John Hall, Washington bureau chief of Media General News Service, in an interview on December 16, 1981, that the nuns “were not just nuns, the nuns were also political activists” on behalf of the Salvadoran rebels; his article was published in the Tampa Tribune, December 25, 1980, A23. Secretary Haig testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) that “the vehicle the nuns were riding in may have tried to run a roadblock and there may have been an exchange of gunfire.” For the testimony, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982 (Part 1), 97th Cong., 1st Sess., March 13, 18, 19, and 23, 1981, 163. Although Haig and Kirkpatrick later claimed that they were misquoted, their remarks angered many religious folks and their respective congressmen. The State Department soon retreated from the allegations. In a letter to John Roach of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Walter Stoessel, Jr., the undersecretary of state, admitted that the department had “no evidence that the four American missionaries were engaged in political activity as we define it.” On Stoessel’s letter, see Jim Castelli, “State Department Says Murdered Nuns Did Not Engage in Political Acts,” Washington Star, April 24, 1981, A3. For additional details, see Anthony Lewis, “Showing His Colors,” New York Times, March 29, 1981, E21; and John B. Oakes, “Haig’s Wrong Signals,” New York Times, April 13, 1981, A27. For a general account, see Donna W. Brett and Edward T. Brett, Murdered in Central America: The Story of Eleven U.S. Missionaries, 1988, 67-82. 16. For an extensive study of the religious peace movement, see Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America Peace Movement (1996). The decentralized movement involved a broad array of activist and multi-issue groups, such as the American Friends Service Committee, the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the National Council of Churches, as well as evangelical groups like Jim Wallis’ Sojourners. Smith concludes (pp. 267, 365-66) that the movement succeeded in developing a coherent and effective counter-frame to the administration’s narrative, but because of the latter’s substantial communication advantages, they lost on the central issue of ending the covert war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and U.S. support for the Salvadoran government. The Catholic press was also predominantly opposed to Reagan’s Central American policy, according to Edward T. Brett, The U.S. Catholic Press on Central America: Anti-Communism to Social Justice (2003). He concludes (p. 206) that the Catholic press’s essential contribution to the public debate on Central America was the conviction that U.S. policy “was premised on an outmoded anti-communist Cold War hypothesis,” which “was not only flawed but also immoral and counterproductive.” 17. CISPES had chapters in over a hundred cities and was heavily represented in college and university towns. It became a distinct thorn in the administration’s side, and was under FBI surveillance and infiltration for years. During several speaking engagements on university campuses, as a representative of the State Department, the author encountered the CISPES tactic of the “Ceremony of the Living Dead,” which involved student activists arising silently from their seats in the auditorium, congregating in front of the stage, smashing balloons full of red paint or other red liquid against their chests and then falling limply to the floor as a protest against U.S. policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua. For an analysis of CISPES’s protest activities and the

Nicaragua

41

surveillance/infiltration program, see Ross Gelbspan, Break-Ins, Death Threats, and the FBI: The Covert War against the Central America Movement (1991). Roger Peace, in “Winning Hearts and Minds: The Debate Over U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua in the 1980s,” Peace And Change, 2010, 1-38, contends that the anti-contra movement had limited success because it had no central focus or natural organizing center, and involved a plethora of groups actuated by differing political ideologies. 18. See, for example, Martin Tolchin, “Thousands in Washington March to Protest U.S. Policy in El Salvador,” New York Times, March 28, 1982, 18. 19. See, for example, the following press reports: “Reagan Mail Opposes Involvement,” New York Times, March 29, 1981, 17; George Gallup, “2 of 3 in U.S. See El Salvador Becoming ‘Another Vietnam,’” Washington Post, March 26, 1981, A2; Steven V. Roberts, “A Majority in Poll Want U.S. to Stay Out of El Salvador,” New York Times, March 21, 1982, 1. For actual polls, see the following, all taken in early 1981: ABC News/Washington Post poll, March 25-29; Roper poll, March 21-28; NBC News/Associated Press poll, April 13-14; and CBS News/New York Times poll, April 22-26. All of these polls are available at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu. 20. Both polls are available at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu. 21. The poll is available at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu. 22. Attachment to a public diplomacy strategy paper, drafted by Peter Sarros, Central America Working Group (CAWG), Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Department of State, May 5, 1983, a copy is in the Digital IranContra Collection, Item IC00096, NSArchive. 23. See the classified NSC document, titled “U.S. Policy in Central America and Cuba through F.Y. ‘84, Summary Paper,” apparently prepared for an NSPG meeting in April 1982, which was leaked to the New York Times and subsequently published by that newspaper on April 7, 1983, A16. The summary paper noted that “We continue to have serious difficulties with U.S. public and Congressional opinion, which jeopardizes our ability to stay the course.” 24. The NSC document, titled “Strategy for Central America,” July 6, 1983, is cited in Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention, 1987, 159 and n2. 25. Talking Paper prepared for Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, February 17, 1983, in the Digital El Salvador Collection, Item EL01367, NSArchive. 26. “Remarks on Central America and El Salvador at the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers,” March 10, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, I, 372-77. 27. “Address before a Joint Session of Congress on Central America,” April 27, 1983, Public Papers, I983, I, 601-7. 28. Both cited polls are available at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu. 29. See Memorandum from the President to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, CIA Director Casey, and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman, General John W. Vessey Jr., July 12, 1983, in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Items IC00133 and IC00136, NSArchive. The two items appear to be parts of the same memorandum. 30. Whittlesey was a staunch conservative Republican politician from Pennsylvania. She served in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1973 and 1976, and after campaigning for Reagan in the presidential election of 1980, was appointed ambassador to Switzerland. Upon completion of her tour in Zurich, she was appointed assistant to the president for public liaison to head up the White House Office of Public Liaison (OPL). According to Whittlesey, the new Working Group was established at the direction of the chief of staff, James Baker, because the State and Defense departments were “virtually ineffectual” in conducting public diplomacy and were not fully “committed to the president’s policy in Central America.” She had a particular animus toward Shultz, who she believed was running the State Department “according to the wishes of the Washington establishment” and carrying out “basically a Washington Post [sic.] agenda inside the agency.” She complained that the State Department tried to “block anything constructive to help the president explain his policies in Central America,” while claiming that her outreach efforts “paid tremendous dividends,”

42

Chapter 1

though she did not specify precisely how. At one point, she had an interview with Anthony Quainton, the U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, in Washington, and told him that he should be reporting “bad news” about the Sandinistas, because the embassy’s job was to help the president win the “ideological war” against Nicaragua in the United States, “where it was going badly.” On Whittlesey, see The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project: Women Ambassadors Series, Interview by Anne Miller Morin, December 7, 1988 and June 21, 1989, accessed at www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Whittlesey,%20Faith.toc.pdf, 114-17. See also a memorandum from Whittlesey to Shultz, May 12, 1983, and a memorandum from James H. Michel, acting assistant secretary (ARA), to Shultz, June 14, 1983, in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Items IC00100 and IC00113, respectively, NSArchive. On Whittlesey’s interview with Quainton, see The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Interview of Ambassador Anthony Quainton, by Charles Stuart Kennedy, November 6, 1997, 104, accessed at www.adst .org/OH%20TOCs/Quainton,%20Anthony.toc.pdf. 31. Reich’s appointment was promoted by Walter Raymond Jr., a senior psychological operations (psy-ops) professional at the CIA, who was transferred by Casey to the NSC staff in late 1982. He quickly became the NSC’s key staffer on public diplomacy with responsibility for a range of controversial issues (e.g., Yellow Rain, INF, Afghanistan, and Central America). Upon Raymond’s recommendation and Kirkpatrick’s endorsement, both of whom considered Reich “politically sound,” Reich received the appointment, with the rank of ambassador. Administratively, Reich nominally reported to the secretary of state (actually to Kenneth Dam, deputy secretary of state), but also to Raymond at the NSC. On Reich’s appointment and mission, see the following memos: Raymond to Clark, May 18, 1983, Raymond to Clark, May 27, 1983, Clark to Shultz, undated (ca. May 19, 1983), Clark via McFarlane, to all senior policy principals (SPG), July 1, 1983, all in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Items IC00102, IC00109, IC00103, IC00122, respectively, NSArchive. For Reich’s relationship with Raymond, see deposition of Otto Reich, July 15, 1987, in “Transcript of Hearings Before the Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition,” U. S. Senate, Washington, DC, 73, 84, 100, accessed at http://www.gwu .edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB40/deposition.pdf. For additional details, see Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, 4-6. 32. Central America Public Diplomacy Action Plan (August-September 1983), ca. July 15, 1983, in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Item IC00155, NSArchive. The drafter of the memo is unidentified, but it is likely to have been Otto Reich, whose appointment as S/LPD coordinator became effective on July 1, 1983. 33. For text of NSDD 100, dated July 28, 1983, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, 1995, 313-14. 34. See, for example, memoranda from Raymond to William P. Clark, national security adviser, August 9, 1983, and John M. Poindexter, deputy national security adviser, August 29, 1983, in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Items IC00169 and IC00181, NSArchive. 35. See PROFs note from Raymond to Poindexter, September 27, 1986, White House E-Mails, Diskette, ch. 6, p. 14. UNO stood for the United Nicaraguan Opposition, a contra organization established at the request of U.S. officials in June 1985. Led by Nicaraguan civilians Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz, Sr., UNO was part of the Reagan administration’s effort to portray the contras as civilian-democrats, rather than disgruntled, right-wing ex-Somocista military types. PROFS was an acronym for Professional Office System, an IBM system designed as a backup computer system to retain tapes of White House electronic mail. It was imported into the White House by Poindexter, who served as deputy national security adviser and then national security adviser, until his resignation on November 25, 1986. For additional information about PROFs, see Byrne, Iran-Contra, 2014, 145-46. 36. See, for example, “The United States’ Role . . .,” Washington Post, July 24, 1983, C6; Carlos Fuentes, “Force Won’t Work In Nicaragua,” New York Times, July 24, 1983,

Nicaragua

43

E21; Don Oberdorfer, “Muskie, Rusk, Vance Urge Hill to Cut Off Covert Aid in Nicaragua,” Washington Post, July 27, 1983, A16; and John B. Oakes, “Reagan’s Path to War,” New York Times, August 3, 1983, 23. 37. Richard Halloran, “Pentagon Details Honduras Action,” New York Times, July 26, 1983, A10. 38. For text of Reagan’s televised press conference, see “The President’s News Conference,” July 26, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, II, 1082-90. Precisely what Reagan meant by the phrase “shield for democracy” is uncertain. No reporters seemed to have pressed him then or later on what he meant by it. 39. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 311. 40. For text, see Public Papers, 1983, II, 1156-57. 41. For text, see “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars,” August 15, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, II, 1173-78. 42. See memorandum on “Special Activities in Nicaragua,” from Oliver L. North and Constantine Menges (NSC staff) to Robert C. McFarlane, the national security adviser, March 2, 1984, in Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, 1819; and Byrne, Iran-Contra, 2014, 26 and n79; see also Lou Cannon and Don Oberdorfer, “President Approved ‘Harassment Plan,’” Washington Post, April 11, 1984, A1. 43. Evidently, CIA and NSC staff hardliners learned little from earlier administration attempts to inflict damage on Nicaragua as a means of increasing economic pressure on the Sandinistas in the hope that it would force them to negotiate on U.S. terms or to make internal political changes satisfactory to the United States. In September 1983, for example, CIA operatives blew up Nicaragua’s only off-shore oil pipeline, used to transport oil from off-loading facilities to storage tanks on shore. Shortly after the event, Ambassador Quainton, was in Washington. At a meeting with Judge Clark, the national security adviser, he was asked about the results of the explosion. He told Clark that the oil pipeline was temporarily out of commission, but would be up and running “in about 10 days.” According to Quainton, Clark was “surprised” and said he had been told that the Sandinistas “would be without petroleum for six months.” The ambassador replied that only a simple fix was required, and “sure enough, the Sandinistas were back pumping oil again after two weeks.” In general, Quainton described CIA covert actions against Nicaragua during his tenure there as poorly coordinated, incompetent, “amateurish” and amounting to “sloppy tradecraft.” For his retrospective account of these events, see Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Interview of Ambassador Anthony Quainton, November 6, 1997, 101f, at www.adst .org/OH%20TOCs/Quainton,%20Anthony.toc.pdf. 44. David Rogers, “U.S. Role in Mining Nicaraguan Harbors Reportedly Larger Than First Thought,” Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1984, 6. See also Fred Hiatt and Joanne Omang, “CIA Helped to Mine Ports in Nicaragua,” Washington Post, April 7, 1984, A1; and Philip Taubman, “Americans on Ship Said to Supervise Nicaragua Mining,” New York Times, April 8, 1984, 1. For detailed background on the mining flap, see Arnson, Crossroads, 1993, 144-45, 167-72. 45. For text of Goldwater’s letter, see Congressional Quarterly, April 14, 1984, 833; most of the text, including the profanities, is also reprinted in Haynes Johnson, Sleepwalking through History, 1991, 277. 46. “Illegal, Deceptive, and Dumb,” New York Times, April 11, 1984, A26. 47. See the CBSNews/New York Times poll, taken April 23-26, 1984, available at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu. According to the poll, Republicans disapproved the laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters by a 58 to 22 percent majority. 48. See entry for April 10, 1984, in Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 231. 49. Shultz, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 406. The “disaster” Shultz evidently referred to was the fact that the “whole episode gave the Sandinistas a major propaganda victory, and the United States took a beating in Congress and from our allies around the world.” The Nicaraguan government sued the United States over the mining and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found the United States guilty of violating Nicaraguan waters. The United States, however, denied that the Court had jurisdic-

44

Chapter 1

tion in the matter, insisted it was acting in self-defense and refused to pay any damages. Nevertheless, Shultz believed that “the decision to use CIA personnel to mine Nicaragua’s harbors continued to be a costly one”; see Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 42627. For analysis of the legal issues involved in the Nicaraguan suit, see James P. Rowles, “U.S. Covert Operations against Nicaragua and Their Legality under Conventional and Customary International Law,” Inter-American Law Review, April 1, 1986, 407-508. 50. The flurry of public communication and public diplomacy activities in the first six months of 1984 led Ronald I. Spires, the assistant secretary of state for management, to express concern to Shultz that those activities lacked “coordination and central direction” and that the NSC’s and S/LPD’s requests for additional resources would compromise higher priority objectives. See Spiers’ memo to Shultz, May 7, 1984, in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Item IC00423, NSArchive. 51. “Minutes of a National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting on Central America,” June 25, 1984, Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 303-13. 52. For background on the so-called “manual caper,” see Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention, 1987, 41-46; and Holly Sklar, Washington’s War On Nicaragua, 1988, 177-87. An unofficial version of the manual was published by Vintage Books as The CIA’s Nicaragua Manual: Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, in 1985. 53. “The CIA’s Murder Manual,” Washington Post, October 21, 1984, C6. 54. “Bad Manual, Bad War,” New York Times, October 25, 1984, A26. 55. For the text of Casey’s letter, see New York Times, November 2, 1984, A3. 56. See Reagan’s “Question and Answer Session with Reporters on Foreign and Domestic Issues,” November 7, 1984, Public Papers, 1984, II, 1803-6. See also Associated Press report, Washington Post, November 8, 1984, A9. Ultimately, several low-level CIA employees were disciplined over the manual flap, a decision they protested; see David Hoffman, “President Agrees to Punishment in CIA Manual Case,” Washington Post, November 11, 1984, A1. 57. For relevant text of Public Law 98-473, Joint Resolution, October 12, 1984, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., see Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, 20. 58. During the Cold War, the United States used this false information propaganda tactic on several occasions as part of its “psychological warfare” efforts against allegedly Soviet dominated or influenced governments it sought to overthrow. In 1954, for example, the CIA fabricated “reports of Soviet arms deliveries to Guatemala by submarine, and then arranging to have a CIA planted cache of Soviet arms discovered and publicized.” Although in the Guatemala case the “mythical arms deliveries were superseded by the real thing,” the tactic itself became a standard U.S. psychological warfare practice. See the memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, May 12, 1975, printed in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala, 2003, 448-50. 59. Fred Hiatt, “No MIGs Seen in Nicaragua,” Washington Post, November 10, 1984, 1, and “Questions Remain on MIG Incident,” Washington Post, November 11, 1984, A1; Joanne Omang, “Nicaraguan Jet Incident Leaves Mysteries,” Washington Post, November 18, 1984, A34. 60. “A Scare in Nicaragua . . . ,” Washington Post, November 11, 1984, D6. 61. “The Crates of Nicaragua,” New York Times, November 9, 1984, D6 and “The Peril of the Missing MIGs,” New York Times, November 15, 1984, A30. 62. Memorandum from Reich to Wesley (Wes) Egan, chief of staff to John Whitehead, deputy secretary of state, February 8, 1985, in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Item IC00814, NSArchive. 63. Memorandum from Jonathan S. Miller (S/LPD) to Pat Buchanan, assistant to the president and director of White House communications, March 13, 1985, in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Item IC00940, NSArchive. This particular memo later became a key piece of evidence of S/LPD’s illegal “propaganda” activities during the IranContra hearings.

Nicaragua

45

64. See letter from the Comptroller General of the United States (signed by Harry van Cleve) to Jack Brooks, chairman, House Committee on Government Operations, and Dante B. Fascell, chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 30, 1987, Iran-Contra Electronic Briefing Book, accessed at http://www.gwu.edu /~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB/04287.pdf. The stepped-up relationship occurred during the tenure of Jack Abramoff as CFA executive director. For an indication of the extent of CFA’s integration into S/LPD’s and the NSC’s public communications planning for the forthcoming vote for renewed contra assistance in April 1985, see Oliver North’s memo to Robert McFarlane, March 20, 1985, and its attached “chronological event checklist,” Iran-Contra Electronic Briefing Book, accessed at http://www.gwu /~nsarchiv/nsaebb/nsaebb40/nscchron/pdf. 65. Reich engaged in considerable bureaucratic puffery about the impact of his office’s efforts to intervene in the news process and turn it to the administration’s advantage. He claimed to William “Bill” Buzenberg of National Public Radio, for example, that he had persuaded a number of newspapers and major TV networks to change some of their reporters in the field because of perceived bias and that “their coverage was better as a result.” He also claimed that on “several occasions S/LPD had ‘killed’ erroneous news stories” which “contributed toward the trend of more objective, accurate, and favorable reporting of Administration policy in the region.” He never, however, provided names or specific details, and there is no evidence to validate his claims. On the Buzenberg conversation, see Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention, 1987, 164; on the “killing” of news stories, see Reich’s memo to Egan, February 8, 1985, cited above; see also a memorandum from Shultz to the president, April 15, 1984, Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Item IC00397, NSArchive. Ironically, whatever passed between Reich and Buzenberg apparently had no impact on the latter’s critical reporting of the administration’s Nicaragua policy, particularly regarding the contras; see, for example, Buzenberg, “Who Got the $27 Million Intended for Contras?,” New York Times, June 19, 1986, A27. 66. Joel Brinkley, “Nicaraguan Army: ‘War Machine’ or Defender of a Besieged Nation?,” New York Times, March 30, 1985, 1. 67. See, for example, Larry Rohter, “Nicaragua Rebels Accused of Abuses: Private Group Reports Patterns of Attacks and Atrocities,” New York Times, March 7, 1985, 1A. The Brody Report, prepared by Reed Brody, former assistant state attorney general in New York, contained eyewitness accounts describing contra attacks on civilians, which New York Times’ reporters independently confirmed. For text of the report, see Reed Brody, Contra Terror in Nicaragua: Report on a Fact-Finding Mission (1985). 68. “Execution in the Jungle,” Newsweek, 105: 17 (April 29, 1985), 43. 69. “Hiding the War in the White House,” New York Times, August 11, 1985, E22. 70. PROFs note from Karna Small, NSC senior director for public affairs, to Oliver L. North, NSC deputy director for politico-military affairs and other NSC staffers, May 22, 1986, White House E-Mails, Diskette, ch. 6, p. 5. 71. For Reich’s comment, see Richard Sobel (ed.), Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Controversy Over Contra Aid, 1993, 118. 72. See “Public Diplomacy Action Plan: Support for the White House Educational Campaign,” drafted by Daniel “Jake” Jacobowitz (S/LPD), dated March 12, 1985, printed in Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, 22-30. Jacobowitz described the problem as one of “situational impediments” effecting S/LPD’s efforts to secure congressional passage of contra aid. Circumstantial evidence indicates that a copy of the plan went forward to North at the NSC. 73. Memorandum from Reich to Shultz, June 24, 1985, in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Item IC01254, NSArchive. 74. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting to Review U.S. Policy in Central America, January 10, 1986, Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 387-94. 75. See Reagan’s “Remarks at an Exhibit of Weapons Captured in Central America,” March 13, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, I, 334-35.

46

Chapter 1

76. See David Hoffman and Joanne Omang, “Contra Aid Dispute Breaks Out on Several Fronts,” Washington Post, March 14, 1986, A30. 77. In fact, the administration made a post-election victory trial run on contra aid in Congress during the first six months of 1985, which culminated in a victory for Reagan. Using the leverage he gained from the election and actively engaging in a sustained bargaining effort directed at southern Democrats, Republican moderates, and potential “swing voters,” he was able to secure congressional support in June 1985 for $27 million in overt non-lethal aid for the contras, to be administered by the CIA. As Cynthia Arnson points out in Crossroads, 1993, 182-83, there were a number of reasons to explain why Congress voted the way it did. I agree with her, but from my perspective the premium must be put on Reagan’s and the NSC’s agreement to reframe the spending request “in connection with peace proposals,” the president’s desire to seek a consensus between the targeted senators’ views and his own, and most importantly his persistence in meeting with and calling potential swing voters. On Reagan’s bargaining activities, see entries for April 3, 22, and 24, May 21, and June 7, 1985, in Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 313, 318-19, and 329. 78. Dick Kirschten, “For Reagan Communication Team It’s Strictly One Week at a Time,” National Journal, 18: 10 (March 8, 1986), 594-95; Memorandum from John D. Blacken (S/LPD) to the assistant secretary for inter-American affairs (ARA), et al., March 3, 1986, in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Item IC0247, NSArchive. 79. See, for example, the following articles by Anthony Lewis, “Conspiracy So Immense,” New York Times, February 24, 1986, A15; “A Fear and Intimidation Campaign,” Patriot Ledger, February 25, 1986, 20; and “By Hate Possessed,” New York Times, March 24, 1986, A19. In the rough and tumble politics of contra aid, hyperbole and rhetorical excess were common, but some Democrats and moderate Republicans perceived the fear and smear campaign as going too far. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (RKS), for example, bristled at the suggestions that the contra aid issue was purely a partisan one “between Republicans in white hats and Democrats wrapped in red banners,” that it was “a matter of patriotism,” and a “simple choice between good freedom fighters and evil Marxists.” She found “this simplistic reasoning to be highly offensive.” See the Congressional Record, Senate, March 6, 1986, 3970-71. 80. “Remarks at a White House Meeting for Supporters of United States Assistance for the Democratic Resistance,” March 3, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, I, 284-85. 81. “Remarks to Jewish Leaders during a White House Briefing on United States Assistance for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance,” March 5, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, I, 295-99. 82. “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua,” March 16, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, I, 352-57. 83. Patrick Buchanan, “The Contras Need Our Help,” Washington Post, March 5, 1986, A19. 84. Swing voters in Congress were a primary focus of the administration’s efforts to bargain over contra aid. In their study of the voting patterns of the 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses, William M. Leogrande and Phillip Brenner state that the “procontra” and “anti-contra” blocs were “evenly matched,” with 192 members supportive and 185 opposed, and 158 members constituting a swing group that changed sides at least once. They conclude that members’ ideology was the predominant factor in explaining the variation in aid votes, and that vote shifting was largely attributable to situational factors (e.g., Daniel Ortega’s visit to Moscow in the spring of 1985). See their article, “The House Divided: Ideological Polarization Over Aid to the Nicaraguan ‘Contras,’” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1993, 105-36. 85. For a detailed description and analysis of the political bargaining between the White House and Congress over contra aid in 1985 and 1986, see Arnson, Crossroads, 1993, 181-217. With respect to the 1986 round, she writes (p. 213) that “Instances of overt ‘horse-trading’ . . . did not publicly surface,” but in my view one must acknowledge that in such cases the absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. On the other hand, she notes that the House Republican leadership “issued veiled

Nicaragua

47

threats to withhold desired committee assignments and opportunities to rise in the Republican leadership if members continued to oppose the administration,” without indicating whether Reagan or other White House officials were involved in that effort. She also provides evidence (p. 214) that Reagan’s personal attention to some Republican and Democratic holdouts was a sufficient inducement to change their votes. If that is not traditional executive bargaining, then what is? 86. For text of the minutes of NSC Meeting 129A, on “Aid to the Democratic Nicaraguan Resistance,” March 20, 1986, see Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files, 2014, 406-8. 87. For text of the president’s statement, see “Statement on House of Representatives Disapproval of Assistance for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance,” March 20, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, I, 380-81. 88. On the president’s bargaining activities, see entries for June 24 and 25, 1986, in Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 42; Eleanor Clift, “Reagan Turns Up the Heat in Contras Aid Campaign,” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 1986, A5; Ken Fireman and Charles Green, “House Approves Aid to Contras: Reagan’s Side Wins, 221-209,” Philadelphia Enquirer, June 16, 1986, A1; and Arnson, Crossroads, 1993, 213-15. In addition to Reagan’s personal contacts with members of Congress, administration officials continued to make the public “case” for contra aid; see, for example, Elliott Abrams, “The Case for Contra Aid: An Administration Brief,” Los Angeles Times, June 22, 1986, G1. 89. Procedural tactics in the Senate delayed the dispersal of the aid approved in June. It was finally appropriated under the Fiscal Year 1987 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 99-591), which the president signed on October 24, 1986. The first installment of the funds began to flow to the contras the next day; see Doyle McManus, “Reagan Signs Order Releasing First of $100 Million for Contras’ War on Sandinistas,” Los Angeles Times, October 25, 1986, 8. 90. Not only was the vote in a real sense a Pyrrhic victory for Reagan, it ironically took place at a time when there was growing doubt within the administration about the viability of the contras as a military and political force, and of Reagan’s overall Nicaraguan policy. In a memorandum to Casey, dated December 14, 1984, for example, Robert M. Gates, the deputy director of intelligence, stressed that U.S. intelligence analysts agreed that “the Contras even with American support, cannot overthrow the Sandinista regime,” and if that objective was of paramount importance to U.S. security interests, then it would be necessary to adopt more assertive measures, such as withdrawal of recognition, overt provision of military assistance, broader economic sanctions (possibly including a quarantine), and “air strikes to destroy a considerable portion of Nicaragua’s military buildup.” Even Robert Owen, North’s personal gobetween with the contras, concluded in a memorandum to North, dated March 17, 1986, on the basis of his two years of clandestine work with the contras, that FDN/ UNO was not providing real leadership, but fighting amongst themselves and lining their own pockets waiting for the U.S. Marines to arrive. According to Owen, the CIA was doing a “shitty job” and the State Department was not much better. He believed that if the $100 million the administration wanted for aid to the contras was approved by Congress, “and things go on as they have for these last five years, it will be like pouring money down a sinkhole.” For the texts of these memoranda, see Kornbluh and Byrne, (eds.), The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, 45-49 and 53-57, respectively. There is no indication on the memoranda that they went to anyone else other than the named recipients. 91. On the in-fighting and resignations, see Elaine Sciolino, “Key Contra (Calero) Demands Reduction of Rightist’s Role,” New York Times, February 14, 1987, 5; George D. Moffett, III, “Shakeup in the Contras. Calero Resigns from Leadership Slot . . . ,” Christian Science Monitor, February 17, 1987, 1; and James LeMoyne, “Top Contra (Cruz) Quits, Saying Changes Were Blocked,” New York Times, March 10, 1987, A1. 92. Portions of the letter’s text are quoted in Flora Lewis, “Collision Course Ahead,” New York Times, April 3, 1987, A31. 93. Variations of these proposals had been floated by administration principals during August and September 1986, in the wake of Congress’s vote for contra assistance.

48

Chapter 1

For example, Peter H. Dailey, a former advertising executive from California, who had served as U.S. ambassador to Ireland, 1982-84, and as the president’s personal envoy to the NATO countries to direct public diplomacy on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) deployment, was brought in as a public relations consultant to the NSC (Walter Raymond’s office) and later as counselor to Casey. He advised, inter alia, improving the Central American public diplomacy campaign by setting up a 501 ©-(3) tax-exempt structure involving bi-partisan non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to mobilize American citizens in support of the policy and “frontloading” public diplomacy on the issue in order to “change attitudes concerning this program.” It is unclear what Dailey meant by “frontloading,” but his suggestions were supported by Raymond, Poindexter, and Casey. On his part, Casey appeared to prefer the appointment of a full-time White House political operative who could “twist arms and also run a high-powered public affairs campaign.” None of these proposals were adopted, however, and after the eruption of the Iran-Contra scandal in early October, it was unlikely that any such proposal would be. See the following memoranda: [Raymond] to Poindexter, August 7, 1986; Poindexter to Casey, August 13, 1986; and PROFs notes from Raymond to Poindexter, August 26, 1986, and Poindexter to North, September 13, 1986, all in the Digital Iran-Contra Collection, Items IC03254, IC03287, IC03330 and IC03405, respectively, NSArchive. 94. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting 125, February 20, 1987, Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files, 2014, 479-85. A week after this meeting, the administration adopted NSDD 264, dated February 27, 1987, in which the president authorized, inter alia, the Planning Review Group (PRG) to review U.S. goals and objectives for Nicaragua, the establishment of a task force to employ U.S. government resources in a public diplomacy campaign directed against Nicaragua, and the development of a comprehensive action plan to gain sustained congressional support for contra assistance; for text see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives, 1995, 783-84; it is also available online from the Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas .org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/. 95. See, for example, Elaine Sciolino, “Joint Chiefs’ Head Warns Contras; Shultz in Aid Plea,” New York Times, February 13, 1987, A3. 96. See “Radio Address to the Nation on Regional Conflicts,” March 7, 1987 (President’s Weekly Saturday Radio Address), March 7, 1987, Public Papers, 187, I, 221-22. 97. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting 142 on South America, March 13, 1987, Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files, 2014, 497-505. 98. “Address to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,” October 7, 1987, Public Papers, 1987, II, 1141-46. 99. For details on the aid requests, see Arnson, Crossroads, 1993, 218-26. 100. “Hearts—and Minds—on Nicaragua,” New York Times, February 5, 1988, A30. 101. Peter J. Boyer, “Networks Refuse to Broadcast Reagan’s Plea,” New York Times, February 5, 1988, A10. 102. No senior official in the administration appears to have been bothered by the president’s illogical link between the so-called communist Sandinistas and the Nazis. The linkage cropped up from time to time, and even Shultz became entangled in it. During his testimony before the SFRC in August 1983, he indirectly compared the Sandinistas to Hitler. Referring to the phrase, “revolution without frontiers,” which the Sandinistas supposedly used to indicate their aggressive intention to export their revolution by massive military force to other countries, he said: “we need to read and listen to what people say, and I think a lot of people made a mistake when they did not read ‘Mein Kampf.’ Hitler laid it all out. Nobody believed it . . . . [what Nicaragua] wants is ‘a revolution without frontiers.’” For Shultz’s comment, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Central American Policy, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., August 4, 1983, 17. When Representative Edward J. Markey (D-MA) wrote to the State Department on September 1, asking Shultz for the source of the phrase attributed to the Sandinistas, he received a reply, but not an answer, from Alvin P. Drischler, the acting assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, on September 22; see Joanne

Nicaragua

49

Omang, “Shultz Accused of Misquoting Sandinista Policy,” Washington Post, October 4, 1983, A10. Morton J. Blackwell, an assistant to Whittlesey in OPL, made a similar linkage during an interview with the Washington Post on August 9, 1983, when he compared Reagan’s warnings about Nicaragua’s “war machine” with “Winston Churchill’s unheeded warnings of German [i.e., Nazi] rearmament.” See Lou Cannon, “‘Distortion’ on Latin Policy Decried,” Washington Post, August 10, 1983, A1. These officials were not going off-script on the administration’s accusations about Nicaragua’s alleged interventionist policy; that charge was laid out in 1981 in a 49-page State Department pamphlet; see U.S. Department of State, Special Report No. 132, “‘Revolution beyond Our Borders,’ Sandinista Intervention in Central America,” September 1981, in which the statement was attributed to Tomás Borge Martinez, co-founder of the Sandinista Liberation Front. However, in 1985, an unnamed administration official was quoted in the New York Times as having said “actually we’ve had problems” with the quotation and he could not verify that anyone had actually said it; see “Did Nicaragua Say What the U.S. Says It Said?,” New York Times, March 30, 1985, 5. 103. The “moral equal” phrase was the most controversial of Reagan’s romanticized and ludicrous descriptions of the contras. Evidently, it was inserted into a draft of the speech he was scheduled to give on March 1, 1985, by Peggy Noonan, one of his top speechwriters. Noonan was responding to a request from Reagan, who thought it might be effective to compare the contras to the French resistance fighters in World War II or the American rebels of 1776. It had the opposite effect: it not only exposed Reagan to ridicule, it also allowed Reagan’s opponents to shift the focus of the debate over Nicaraguan policy to the character of the contras. For further details, see Mayer and McManus, Landslide, 1988, 86. 104. Some writers have noted that because of the administration’s recognition of its clear failure to counter public opposition to its Central American policy, by mid-1984 Reagan gradually began to shift from his initial “interdiction rationale” to a “democracy rationale.” This shift became more pronounced after the eruption of the Iran-Contra scandal in the fall of 1986, but though the shift may have temporarily had a positive impact on some members of Congress, in the end it was an utter failure. In the context of Nicaragua’s history, Reagan’s demands for the “restoration of democracy” or the establishment of “true democracy” were at best unrealistic and at worst nonsensical. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, 1991, 97-104. 105. Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, 1-2. 106. Byrne, Iran-Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power, 2014, 132-34, 215-16; Leslie Cockburn, Out of Control: The Story of the Reagan Administration’s War in Nicaragua, the Illegal Arms Pipeline, and the Contra Drug Connection, 1987, 152-88. 107. Apparently, the anti-Semitic accusations were based on a thinly sourced report by the B’nai Brith’s Anti-Defamation League (ADL), issued in May 1983, which charged that the tiny Jewish community in Managua had been systematically repressed, their synagogue desecrated, their property expropriated, and then forced into exile. For the State Department’s view, see the address by Elliott Abrams, before the United Jewish Appeal, June 28, 1984; the text was printed, in the Department of State Bulletin, 84: 2090 (September 1984), 49-51, as “Persecution and Restrictions of Religion in Nicaragua.” The story was picked up by the New York Times, and portions of it were included in various State Department publications. However, independent investigations by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the OAS, the New Jewish Agenda, and Pax Christi turned up no anti-Semitism in Managua. Ambassador Quainton had the embassy’s political officer conduct an in-depth investigation, which also turned up no evidence of anti-Semitism, a conclusion Quainton cabled to the State Department on July 15, 1983; for text, see cable 03129, from the American Embassy, Managua, to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC, dated July 16, 1983, released in full to the author by the State Department, May 6, 2016. When Abrams visited Managua soon thereafter, he was “angry” and demanded to meet with members of the

50

Chapter 1

Jewish community. According to Quainton’s retrospective account, the ambassador set up an interview with Jaime Levy, a successful Jewish businessman and exporter, who denied that there had been any persecution of Jews. On this incident, see Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Interview of Ambassador Anthony Quainton, November 6, 1997, 103-4, accessible at www.adst.org/OH%20TOCS/Quainton,%20Anthony.toc.pdf. See also the following press reports: Marjorie Hyer, “Jewish Group Finds No AntiSemitism by Sandinista Regime,” Washington Post, August 25, 1984, B6; Edward Cody, “Managua’s Jews Reject Anti-Semitism Charge; Sandinistas, U.S. Embassy Dispute Rabbi’s Widely Circulated Report,” Washington Post, August 29, 1983, A14; AP Wire, “U.S. Envoy Reportedly Finds No Anti-Semitic Policy in Nicaragua,” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1983, B10; “Rabbi Disputes Reagan Point about Jews in Nicaragua,” New York Times, March 19, 1986, A4; and Gregory Nokes, “Reagan’s Contra Aid Blitz Raises Questions of Truth,” Miami Herald, March 21, 1986, 24A. See also Betsy Cohn and Patricia Hynds, “The Manipulation of the Religious Issue,” in Thomas W. Walker (ed.), Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua, 1987, 107. What the ADL’s and Reagan’s accusations actually accomplished was to ignite a controversy within the American Jewish community. To follow the controversy, see for example, Cynthia Arnson and Rabbi Morton M. Rosenthal, “On Reagan and the ADL/ An Exchange,” and Robert Weisbrot, “Dateline Managua: Anti-Semitism or AntiClimax?,” both in Moment, 9: 9 (October 1984), 12-25; Joshua Muravchik, Susan Alberts, and Anthony Korenstein, “Sandinista Anti-Semitism and Its Apologists,” Commentary, 82: 3 (September 1, 1986), 25-29; and the resultant “Letters from Readers,” Commentary, 83: 1 (January 1, 1987), 2-11; and “Sandinistas and Anti-Semitism,” letters to the editor of the Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1985, Part 2, OC-A10. 108. See Betsy Cohn and Patricia Hynds, “The Manipulation of Religious Issues,” in Walker (ed.), Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua, 1987, 97122. Edward T. Brett, The U.S. Catholic Press on Central America, 2003, 122-24, notes that the liberal Catholic press “staunchly condemned” Reagan’s Nicaraguan policy, denied the Nicaraguan bishops’ claim that they were persecuted by the government and were particularly sensitive to reports of contra atrocities. On the other hand, the conservative Catholic press supported Reagan’s Central American policy in all its particulars, but failed “in defining the U.S. Catholic position on Central America largely due to its extremist mode of argumentation.” 109. The State Department laid out the administration’s indictment of the Sandinista government for its treatment of the Miskito Indians in its publication, Dispossessed— The Miskito Indians in Sandinista Nicaragua, Department of State Publication No. 9478, released in June 1986. In his public speeches, however, the president took the indictment several steps farther, condemning the Sandinistas for conducting an alleged policy of genocide. It is true that the Sandinistas, in response to U.S.-supported contra raids along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border in the Rio Coco area, forcibly relocated about 10,000 Miskitos in January 1982 for their own safety so government forces could better defend Nicaraguan territory; it is also true that the CIA armed and trained selected Miskitos in Honduras to join the contra forces and participate in cross-border raids. In 1986, the Sandinistas publicly acknowledged that abuses had occurred during the relocation program, and offered compensation to affected Miskito families. In 1987, they promised autonomy for the Miskitos, which became a reality after several years of negotiation. Although there are reputable critical accounts of the Sandinista’s treatment of the Miskitos, such as Bernard Nietschmann’s The Unknown War: The Miskito Nation, Nicaragua, and the United States (1989), none that I am aware of credibly document the charge that the Sandinistas were guilty of formulating or implementing a policy of genocide. Stephen Kinzer’s Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua, 1991, 251-88, offers a fair-handed treatment of this complex issue. Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention, 1987, 177-78; Martin Diskin, “The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles,” in Walker (ed.), Reagan Versus the Sandinistas,” 1987, 80-96; Americas Watch, Human Rights in Nicaragua: Reagan, Rhetoric and Reality, (NY: Americas Watch, 1985); and Abraham Brumberg, “Reagan’s Untruths about Managua,” New York Times,

Nicaragua

51

June 18, 1985, A27, all regard Reagan’s public comments and the administration’s public information materials about the Miskito Indians as replete with distortions and amounting to propaganda. Two examples of the distortions should suffice to indicate the quality of the administration’s case against the Sandinistas for their alleged maltreatment of the Miskitos. Secretary Haig once submitted a photograph during congressional testimony purportedly showing that Miskito bodies were being burned by Sandinista troops, which actually turned out to be an old photograph of corpses of people who were killed during the Somoza period being burned. A publication by S/LPD, titled Broken Promises: Sandinista Repression of Human Rights in Nicaragua (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1984), contained numerous factual errors, selective quotations, and argument by implication when addressing the Miskito issue. It contended that Sandinista socio-economic programs in the region inhabited by the Miskitos were “plots” to deprive them of their rights, but the “plots” were never documented. The publication also implied that systematic killing of Miskitos had taken place, without mentioning reports to the contrary by the OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), and Americas Watch. For additional details, see Diskin, “The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles,” in Walker (ed.), Reagan Versus the Sandinistas, 1987, 86-88. 110. Precisely what this meant remains a mystery. Reagan made the statement in response to an unidentified reporter’s question at his news conference on February 21, 1985, concerning whether the president’s goal was the overthrow of the Sandinista government. His response was so convoluted, it was virtually incomprehensible. For text of the Q&A session, see “The President’s News Conference,” February 21, 1985, Public Papers, 1985, I, 197-204. 111. Sobel (ed.), Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1993, 116. 112. Sobel (ed.), Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1993, 246. 113. Sobel (ed.), Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1993, 118. 114. See, for example, Alan Riding, “Honduras Detects No Major Arms Supply to Salvadoran Rebels,” New York Times, February 5, 1982, A8; Christopher Dickey, “Nicaraguan Aid Called Not Vital to Salvadorans,” Washington Post, February 21, 1983. A1; Clifford Krauss and Robert S. Greenberger, “Despite Fears of U.S., Soviet Aid to Nicaragua Appears to Be Limited, Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1985, 1. 115. For example, see the pamphlet drafted in S/LPD, titled “Misperceptions about U.S. Policy toward Nicaragua,” Department of State Publication No. 9417, released in June 1985. 116. Reagan frequently railed against “distorted” news coverage of his Central America policy and the alleged complicity of Americans who were either wittingly or unwittingly abetting the alleged Sandinista disinformation campaign in the United States. The specific “distortions” and the names of those responsible were not revealed, with one notable exception. At a Q&A session with reporters on March 11, 1986, he accused an eminent UCLA history professor, later identified by the White House as E. Bradford Burns, of writing “propaganda” on behalf of Nicaragua, “dispersing disinformation,” and serving as a dupe of the Sandinistas. For text, see “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Regional Editors and Broadcasters on United States Assistance for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance,” March 11, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, I, 316-20. See also Anne C. Roark, “Reagan Hits Professor’s Nicaragua Story,” Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1986, A18; and Burns’ amusing response to the charges, “A Star Was Born,” The Nation, 242: 13 (April 5, 1986), 477. 117. As Peter Kornbluh relates in The Price of Intervention, 1987, 205-6, the White House revealed the existence of a “highly classified” CIA document in February 1986 entitled “Sandinista Disinformation and Public Manipulation Plan” purporting to prove Nicaragua’s disinformation conspiracy. Casey distributed copies at White House meetings with some sixty members of Congress during the run-up to the March vote on the administration’s contra aid request, but the document was not made available to the public. Ultimately, the CIA document turned out to be based on a routine lobbying and public relations strategy drafted by Nicaragua’s New York

52

Chapter 1

public relations consultants, Agendas International, Inc. See Bob Woodward and Lou Cannon, “CIA Document Based on Lobby Techniques: Firm Wrote Plan for Nicaragua,” Washington Post, March 1, 1986, A1. It is ironic that the Reagan administration made this charge against Nicaragua, when it was in fact conducting an intensive disinformation campaign against Muammar Qadaffi. Bob Woodward broke the Libyan disinformation story on the front page of the Washington Post; see Woodward, “Gadhafi Target of Secret U.S. Deception Plan,” Washington Post, October 2, 1986, A1; and Woodward, “State Dept. Urged Libya Coup,” Washington Post, October 5, 1986, A1. See also Edwin Guthman, “They Call It Disinformation, But It’s Simply Lying,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 5, 1986, E9; and Anthony Lewis, “When We Practice to Deceive,” New York Times, October 6, 1986, A19. When the Libyan disinformation flap erupted, Bernard Kalb, the State Department’s assistant secretary of state for public affairs and spokesman, a well-known former New York Times, NBC, and CBS correspondent, announced his resignation to protest “the reported disinformation program.” The White House promptly denied the existence of such a program. See “Spokesman Quits, Citing a Principle,” New York Times, October 12, 1986, E1. 118. For analysis of poll trends, see Edwards, The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership, 2009, 43-47; Sobel, “A Report: Public Opinion about United States Intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 1989, 114-28; and Leogrande, “Central America and the Polls: A Study of U.S. Public Opinion Polls on U.S. Foreign Policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua under the Reagan Administration,” Special Report. Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 1987. 119. Despite all the available empirical data to the contrary, in September 1983, for example, Reich and Whittlesley were reportedly finding evidence of success in their respective efforts to inform the American public about Central America and to dispel alleged misconceptions and disinformation about the president’s policies; see Alfonso Chardy, “U.S. Policies in Central America Gaining Support, Reagan Aides Say,” Philadelphia Inquirer, September 18, 1983, E23. In a strategy paper for Nicaragua prepared by Oliver North in July 1985, he reported that “Public support of current U.S. policy in Central America is rapidly growing;” see North, “U.S. Political/Military Strategy for Nicaragua,” ca. July 15, 1985, in Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, 50. 120. For a somewhat different interpretation, see Arnson, Crossroads, 1993, 273-87. 121. Ronald Reagan, An American Life, 1990, 479-81.

TWO Yellow Rain To Bee or Not to Bee?

When Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., in a speech in Berlin on September 13, 1981, “strongly suggested” that the Soviet Union was supplying trichothecene mycotoxins (fungal poisons), commonly referred to as Yellow Rain, 1 to its Vietnamese and Laotian allies for military use against anti-communist resistance forces in Laos and Cambodia (Kampuchea), and of employing similar weapons in Afghanistan, he ignited a public controversy that endured throughout President Reagan’s two terms. 2 He declared that the United States had “physical evidence” to support its claim, 3 and that the evidence indicated that the Soviet Union was violating both the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the military use of chemical and biological weapons and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological and toxin warfare agents. 4 In effect, the speech raised the threshold specifically on the 1972 treaty provisions by elevating charges against the Soviet Union for actions that were initially perceived as involving the use of chemical weapons to their alleged use of biological weapons. The immediate reaction to the speech was mixed. Tass, the Soviet news agency, accused Haig of making a “monstrous, slanderous statement,” and asserting that “no state has used chemical weapons as widely as the U.S.” 5 The Vietnamese government also vigorously denied the charges and subsequently circulated as UN documents a two-part dossier on American chemical warfare in South Vietnam during the U.S. intervention there, claiming that it was in violation of the Geneva Protocol. 6 American media were initially reluctant to accept the charges at face value. The editors of the Washington Post, for example, wanted both the 53

54

Chapter 2

alleged “evidence” and “Soviet conduct” in the matter to “be examined by experts.” 7 Those at the Christian Science Monitor concurred and noted that the “administration had not spelled out direct links to Moscow,” nor had it “demonstrated that the Soviet Union was necessarily the manufacturer.” 8 On the other hand, the Wall Street Journal’s editors expressed disappointment that “the administration isn’t now following up on its own strong lead,” and recommended that it “insist that the United Nations conduct on-site investigations” under the provisions of existing arms control treaties, while we made it clear to the Soviets that “once again, Western good faith has been returned by Soviet duplicity and barbarous behavior.” 9 Why Haig raised these charges against the Soviet Union is an interesting question. According to Washington Post reporter Michael Getler, Haig’s unnamed aides privately suggested that it was a last minute addition to his speech in response to the vociferous public opposition in Europe to the emplacement of U.S. missiles. 10 It was, in fact, nothing of the sort. Lawrence Eagleburger, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, “had a hand” in the speech and the president approved Haig’s decision to deliver it in Berlin. 11 The charges were linked both to the larger effort to appear tough on the Soviets by making them pay a political cost for allegedly violating existing arms control treaties and the administration’s evolving policy regarding chemical and biological weapons arms control. The administration wanted to encourage Soviet compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol, by exposing what it alleged were illegal Soviet chemical and biological warfare activities. It also wanted to allow U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a verifiable convention banning all chemical and biological weapons, which had broken off in mid-1980, to continue to lapse, until the United States had the opportunity to modernize its own chemical and biological weapons arsenal. Throughout several permutations of national security decisions on the feasibility of negotiating a total chemical weapons ban, the administration internally committed itself to a continuing public communication campaign to expose alleged Soviet and its surrogates’ use of toxin and chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, which it hoped would serve ultimately as a “bargaining chip” to help enhance its chances for the successful negotiation of a total ban on chemical weapons, with stringent verification provisions. 12 Haig’s speech was problematic from the outset. In the first place, the evidence he claimed the United States had, consisted, at the time, of a single uncorroborated analysis of a leaf and stem sample from Cambodia (Kampuchea). The source of the sample was “ambiguous,” it had been collected without controls, was possibly naturally contaminated with mold, and its significance rested “largely on the negatively based inference that mycotoxins do not occur naturally in the area.” 13 Although there was on-going interagency discussion within the administration of

Yellow Rain

55

the need for additional corroboration of the evidence before any announcement about it was made, 14 the State Department pushed for releasing the information to the public as speedily as possible. As Richard Burt, the assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM), a former New York Times journalist, explained in a memorandum to Haig, the intelligence community had obtained “good evidence” that the Soviets and their allies in Southeast Asia were using a highly lethal toxin of the trichothecene or T-2 variety, rather than a chemical agent, against their purported enemies, and that this “new information” opened up a “whole new avenue” in the U.S. investigation of Soviet chemical weapons (CW) use. In light of this discovery and the fact that a book on Yellow Rain by Sterling Seagrave, which presented “evidence” that the Soviets were using T-2 toxins in Southeast Asia, would soon be released, Burt stated that “we need to be prepared to move quickly to ensure that the Administration is recognized as being on top of this important turn in events.” 15 Evidently, he not only wanted the State Department to get out in front of the public communication curve on Yellow Rain, he also apparently wanted to avoid being scooped by any of his former journalistic colleagues. In a briefing memorandum for Haig’s meeting with New York Times correspondent Bernard Gwertzman on September 3, for example, he mentioned that someone in State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) had told Gwertzman about the new information, and he recommended that Haig “not give Bernie anything on it at this time,” so as “not to preempt our strategy for securing the maximum impact from this issue.” 16 On September 10, Burt drafted a memorandum for Haig to the president, informing Reagan of this “significant breakthrough” and that Haig planned to present the new information publicly “at the earliest opportunity,” which would be the secretary’s scheduled September 13 speech in Berlin, which the president approved. 17 Following Haig’s speech other State Department officials amplified the charges, largely in response to questions raised in the press about the administration’s evidence linking the alleged use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan to the Soviet Union. On September 14, Walter J. Stoessel, the undersecretary of state, outlined the case against the Soviets in a press briefing at the State Department in which he described the evidence as “significant, though preliminary, information” to justify U.S. concerns and “good evidence” on a “leaf and stem sample” from Kampuchea that “potent and lethal mycotoxins of the trichothecene group have been used” in violation of the CBW Convention of 1972. 18 The following month, on November 10, Burt announced to a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, chaired by Larry Pressler (R-SD), that “we now have the smoking gun,” four separate pieces of physical evidence (water, rock scrapings, and vegetation samples gathered in Laos), that revealed a combination of four mycotoxins from different strains of the fungus. 19 Two days later, Kenneth Adelman, the U.S. ambassador to

56

Chapter 2

the UN raised the rhetorical ante, when he told the UN Committee on Disarmament, that for five years the Soviets had used chemical weapons of mass destruction against “unsophisticated and defenseless people in campaigns of mounting extermination” in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. 20 Finally, Haig himself closed this public communication loop by delivering another address on November 14 in Palm Beach, Florida, in which he stated that the new evidence led the administration to believe “beyond a shadow of a doubt” that chemical warfare was being employed on a “fairly broad scale” in Laos and Kampuchea and that there was growing evidence that chemical weapons “may be in use in Afghanistan.” 21 Burt’s “smoking gun” was a considerable leap, perhaps even a giant step, from Stoessel’s “good,” though “preliminary,” evidence. At the November 10 hearing before Senator Pressler’s subcommittee, the outlines of what would evolve into a long-running controversy in the scientific community began clearly to emerge. Pressler, a Vietnam veteran, who had long been concerned about the effects of Agent Orange, which the United States had used extensively in Vietnam, and who personally believed that toxic weapons were being used in Southeast Asia, intended to get to the bottom of what he thought might be a “holocaust” occurring there. Nevertheless, he regarded the administration’s evidence on the use of Yellow Rain as “far from conclusive,” and believed that there were many “questions about the reliability of evidence offered to date.” He suggested that the administration make a concerted effort to accumulate a substantial body of evidence to support its allegations, and in the meantime move cautiously in light of Burt’s “dramatic” announcement. Although the witnesses he called to testify were mostly government officials and private individuals who supported the administration’s position, the group included two scientists, one of whom was Dr. Chester J. Mirocha, a professor of plant pathology, from the University of Minnesota, and the other, Dr. Matthew Meselson, a Harvard professor of biochemistry. Pressler asked Mirocha, whose lab had analyzed the administration’s samples, 22 if it was “possible that fungus in Southeast Asia grows T-2 [toxin] naturally,” as some scientists were claiming. Mirocha agreed that it was genetically possible, but that the fungal agent involved (i.e., fusarium) would destroy the T-2 toxin. Meselson replied that there was insufficient scientific knowledge about the natural occurrence of mycotoxins in Southeast Asia to make a firm judgment. After referring to published scientific reports of cases of naturally occurring trichothecene mycotoxins, he suggested that until more was known about their properties, “we should avoid hasty assertions that the trichothecenes detected in Southeast Asia cannot be of normal occurrence.” What was urgently needed, he said, was more control studies and for the State Department to release all of its evidence to the scientific community for independent analysis and critical review. Mirocha agreed with Meselson on both points, and

Yellow Rain

57

Dr. Sharon Watson, a witness representing the U.S. Army’s Office of the Surgeon General, stated that the administration intended eventually to do just that. 23 Officials in the White House and the State Department were pleased with what they perceived as a “most supportive” initial press reaction to the rollout of the “new evidence” that Burt had presented to the SFRC subcommittee. 24 As Burt explained in a memorandum updating Haig on the issue: “Just as the media were ready to relegate the mycotoxin/CW use issue to the category of ‘old news,’ our release of the additional samples analyses helped keep the issue alive and on the front pages.” He concluded that State’s communication campaign was “clearly bearing fruit.” 25 By mid-November 1981, however, several leading newspapers began questioning the credibility of the administration’s evidence. In an editorial published November 17, 1981, for example, the New York Times suggested there was “a serious gap between the weight of evidence and the weight of the charges made by the State Department in the ‘yellow rain’ affair,” that its accusations based on such “preliminary” evidence sounded like an attempt to indict the Russians, and that the contention that trichothecene toxins do not occur naturally in Southeast Asia “is probably incorrect.” 26 This prompted a vigorous reply in a letter to the editor from Burt, who countered that the editorial was factually incorrect on several points, and that it would be a “moral dereliction” by the Reagan administration “if it did not voice its concerns in an effort to focus international attention and bring a halt to the killing of innocent and defenseless people by this particularly horrible and indiscriminate weapon.” 27 While Burt seemed fixated on the press, he apparently paid little attention to the growing skepticism among a number of prominent scientists that trichothecene toxins could not occur naturally and that they were dropped by chemical weapons. 28 The U.S. intelligence community, though it internally admitted that the “evidence on the Soviet role does not constitute proof in the scientific sense,” confirmed the administration’s overall position in a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), dated February 2, 1982. 29 Undeterred by the intelligence community’s caveat, the State Department released an unclassified version of the SNIE to Congress in March, as a special report from Haig. 30 This time around the State Department’s report to Congress contained much firmer charges than had earlier reports and statements by the administration. Most of the qualifiers previously used to describe the alleged use of mycotoxins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan were gone, as were phrases such as the Soviets “may be” or “are probably” supplying their clients with toxic weapons in those countries. Now, the administration concluded, based on a broad accumulation of physical evidence, refugee reports, laboratory testing of samples, and intelligence gathered by “national technical means,” that the Soviet Union’s Lao and Vietnamese allies, “operating under Soviet supervision . . . have used”

58

Chapter 2

lethal chemical and toxin agents. 31 Editorial writers at the New York Times and the Washington Post agreed that the administration’s efforts to produce better evidence to support its charges had improved, but they also agreed that there were still serious problems with the public presentation of its case. The New York Times, for example, noted that the State Department now conceded that the Vietnamese could manufacture Yellow Rain toxins themselves, thereby weakening the Soviet connection, and expressed “surprise” that in seven years of searching for “incontrovertible evidence,” the administration had not found any. 32 The Washington Post, on the other hand, stated that the report failed to “address, or even recognize, questions raised by scientists, refugee workers and others,” or to provide conclusive proof of Soviet culpability and clear identification of the chemical agents being used.” 33 The editors of both papers also noted that the Haig report failed to explain how such minute traces of fungal toxins that were found on the samples could be lethal, and the Times concluded that the report “still lacks the smoking gun that officials so confidently claimed to possess several months ago.” On the day that the new Haig report went forward to Congress, State Department officials were on the Hill testifying on Yellow Rain before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. During Burt’s opening statement, he denied reports by critics that the evidence for Yellow Rain was “circumstantial” or that it derived from “self-interested and therefore unreliable sources.” He claimed that there was substantial evidence on the public record that the “Soviet Union is directly engaged in chemical warfare in Afghanistan” and “is advising, supplying and supervising chemical warfare in Southeast Asia.” Senators Dan Quayle (R-IN), John Warner (R-VA) and Sam Nunn (D-GA) asked penetrating questions about precisely how the Soviets “dispensed” the chemical weapons to their allies in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and were “supervising” their use. The replies they received, however, were not particularly illuminating. When Senator Quayle, for example, persisted in asking for the name of a Soviet “chemical general” currently operating in Southeast Asia, both Burt and Gary Crocker, State’s leading expert on Yellow Rain, punted. In a later insertion for the record, the State Department admitted that “We do not have the names of Soviet chemical officers presently serving in Southeast Asia.” When Senator Warner asked why the new Haig report seemed to refrain from concluding that toxin weapons were being used in Afghanistan, Burt replied that “At present we are not willing to say with complete assurance that these toxin weapons are being used in Afghanistan.” And when Senator Nunn asked a series of questions about how the chemical weapons were delivered, including points of departure and port calls, Crocker referred to a Soviet merchant ship carrying suspected chemical weapons that sunk in the Black Sea in 1979 and another ship that landed in Ho Chi Minh City in July 1981 and unloaded crates of alleged toxic chemical substances. Nunn dismissed

Yellow Rain

59

the 1979 incident as irrelevant and asked for a more specific follow-up on the July 1981 incident. State’s later insertion for the record admitted that “We could not identify the Soviet merchant ship that delivered the toxic chemicals to Vietnam in July 1981 on the basis of the information provided by the source, a Vietnamese port security officer.” 34 On March 30, shortly after the submission of the new SNIE to Congress, two subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held joint hearings on chemical weapons use. Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI), explained that the purpose of the hearings was to “lead to a clearer understanding of the administration’s case” on Yellow Rain and “the active support of many of our friends and allies . . . which has been so lacking to date.” Administration witnesses invited to testify included Burt, Watson, and Mirocha, all of whom had testified before the SFRC the previous November. They presented familiar arguments to support the administration’s allegations and reiterated their view that the toxins being used by the Soviets and their allies were man-made. This time around, Professor Meselson was not present, but another witness, Daniel Cullen, a plant pathologist from the University of Wisconsin, who specialized in Fusarium mycotoxicology, presented the contrary scientific position. He contended that the physical evidence for the use of trichothecene toxins was “incomplete,” that the “overall feasibility” of mycotoxins as weapons and the reported symptoms of those allegedly attacked was “questionable,” and that, consequently, the State Department’s “allegations concerning the nature of ‘yellow rain’ are premature and perhaps incorrect.” In response to questions from Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY), chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Cullen elaborated, insisting that the possibility of the “natural occurrence” of the toxins could not be ruled out, because there had been no examination of the fungi on the obtained samples, and that these mycotoxins had shown up naturally “many times” in other parts of the world, such as Japan, the Soviet Union, and in the north central United States. He stated that it was possible for the Vietnamese to have produced them on their own as weapons. He also disagreed with Mirocha on the lethality of the agents identified on the samples, claiming that the amounts found there would not have lethal consequences. In response to a question from Solarz, he replied that he was prepared to have them applied to himself. In the end, both Mirocha and Cullen agreed that some kind of chemical or biological substance was being used in Southeast Asia, but they disagreed on its specific substance and Soviet complicity. By late March of 1982, however, it was clear that the scientific community had divided into two groups: those who advocated the so-called “trichothecene hypothesis,” contending that the mycotoxins found in Southeast Asia were man-made, lethal, and being weaponized, and the “natural occur-

60

Chapter 2

rence” hypothesis, which contended that the mycotoxins occurred naturally, were non-lethal, and virtually useless as weapons. 35 Shortly after George Shultz succeeded Haig as secretary of state in July 1982, he was briefed on the administration’s “game plan” for publicly exploiting the Yellow Rain issue. According to the briefing memorandum, State would continue to take the lead to secure the overall objective of stopping the use of the prohibited weapons, by pumping the administration’s charges against the Soviets, and utilizing all of its public communication assets to do so. It would continue to release additional evidence, arrange for presentations at scientific conventions, prepare articles for publication in respected scientific journals, and encourage other nations at the UN and the Geneva Committee on Disarmament to take a strong stand against the use of chemical weapons. 36 From the administration’s perspective it was crucial to build international and domestic public support behind its charges against the Soviets as a means of achieving leverage on the actions of other nations, which seemed to be much less concerned about the alleged use of toxic weapons than the Reagan administration. The briefing memo also informed Shultz that a special working group had been formed to expedite and expand the collection and analysis of evidence on the use of Yellow Rain. In an effort to heighten the impact of its communication campaign, State also appealed to White House officials, including the president, to adopt a higher public profile on Yellow Rain, to help mobilize public and congressional support. 37 State’s effort to persuade the president to go public on Yellow Rain was only minimally successful. Reagan, no doubt wary of the abstruse technical nature of the issue, and perhaps restrained by his principal advisers, never gave it as high a public priority as he did other national security issues, such as Central America or the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). He never delivered a major television address or nationally broadcast radio address exclusively on Yellow Rain, nor did he seem to want to engage reporters on the issue. Nevertheless, whenever he went public on arms control or U.S.-Soviet relations in controlled venues, he incorporated into his remarks the essential charge that Haig had raised publicly in Berlin. He invariably mentioned Yellow Rain in the context of the untrustworthiness of the Soviets, their failure to respect solemn treaty obligations, and their lack of cooperation in agreeing to stringent verification and compliance measures in arms control treaties. In his address to the UN General Assembly on September 26, 1983, for example, which was widely covered by both foreign and domestic media, he said that he didn’t want “pseudo arms control” while “deadly yellow rain and other toxic agents fall on Hmong villages and Afghan encampments.” 38 On the whole, however, the president seemed content to let the interagency process, initially led by Burt in the State Department, to conduct the public communication campaign on Yellow Rain.

Yellow Rain

61

By the time Shultz waded into the Yellow Rain issue, strong doubt was spreading rapidly in the scientific community about the evidence used to support the administration’s case. Both British and American scientists, after microscopic examination of many samples of alleged manufactured mycotoxins being used in Southeast Asia, found that they consisted mostly of pollen, connected with plants indigenous to Southeast Asia. U.S. government scientists, whose investigations had either completely missed this component, or who had ignored the finding, responded by asserting that the Soviets were deliberately adding pollen during the manufacturing process for the Yellow Rain toxin. Furthermore, they contended that the presence of pollens in the samples served as a carrier of the mycotoxins and helped to produce a secondary aerosol effect that would help retain the toxins in the intended victims’ lungs and was therefore a very “clever mixture.” 39 This fact, they contended, confirmed their view that the deadly mycotoxins were man-made, and that only a nation with advanced scientific technology such as the Soviet Union could produce them, though they never made public any conclusive evidence indicating precisely how or where the Soviets were doing it, or exactly how the toxins were transferred to their Lao and Vietnamese allies. 40 In short, the pollen discovery was a significant development in the evolving scientific explanation of Yellow Rain, because on the one hand it exposed a significant flaw in the administration’s case and on the other constituted a crucial link to the role of bee feces in the Yellow Rain controversy. 41 The evolving controversy within the scientific community spilled over into the press. Throughout the early months of 1982, the editorial boards of both the New York Times and the Washington Post, for example, hammered away at the administration’s failure to provide conclusive physical evidence, such as delivery weapons, shells or shell casings, photographs or chemical samples evaluated by impartial scientists, not linked to the federal government. They also questioned the “authenticity” and “origin” of the samples collected by the State Department, and reiterated their “surprise” that with all of the resources at its disposal, the government was unable to secure “incontrovertible proof” or explain how its samples, containing such small amounts of toxins, could be lethal. 42 On November 29, 1982, in a gesture aimed at deflating domestic criticism, the State Department finally made available for reporters a gas mask obtained in Afghanistan that was allegedly contaminated with fungal toxin T-2, the alleged active ingredient in Yellow Rain. According to one press report, when the cardboard sheath was removed from the plexiglass box containing the gas mask, the assembled reporters muttered aloud while their cameras clicked. Before the actual briefing by Robert Dean, deputy director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, officials assured the reporters that they were in no danger, because “the gas mask was sealed in an airtight container.” One of the reporters asked Dean in a joking

62

Chapter 2

manner: “Why don’t you slip it on for us, Bob?” 43 Jocularity aside, several reporters at the briefing openly expressed doubt because there had been no effort to determine whether the mask’s filters were contaminated with the suspect toxins, no definitive description of exactly where and how the gas mask had been found or the chain of events which enabled the administration to obtain it; and precisely how a gas mask obtained in Afghanistan proved anything about the alleged use of lethal mycotoxins in Southeast Asia. 44 The editorial boards of major newspapers had divergent reactions to the significance of the gas mask. The New York Times expressed the view that though the administration’s case was now somewhat “stronger,” it was still “inconclusive,” and it questioned “the authenticity of evidence brought from Soviet occupied Afghanistan in undisclosed circumstances.” 45 On its part, the Washington Post believed that with the addition of the contaminated gas mask to the accumulation of other evidence, it seemed “that the administration has proven out the Soviet pattern by a standard that reasonable people would accept.” 46 Both agreed, however, that there was now sufficient evidence to warrant an in-depth, impartial inquiry by the UN The Christian Science Monitor recommended that the administration consider appointing a panel of impartial scientists to examine and assess all of the relevant material gathered to date, respond more openly to the questions raised by academic scholars, and resume bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on the banning of chemical weapons. 47 The Boston Globe essentially agreed with the Monitor on the formation of a special scientific panel and the need to resume U.S.-Soviet bilateral negotiations. It also urged the administration to avoid “Clumsy, ritualistic anti-Sovietism” and “hipshooting indictments,” and advised Pentagon planners to “decontaminate their thinking” about the need for more chemical weapons. 48 The Chicago Tribune, which generally lined up with the Wall Street Journal on the Yellow Rain issue, simply concluded that “What the State Department has presented is not just propaganda— it is an indictment of murderers.” 49 Burt continued to lead the administration’s counterattack against opposition in the press to its Yellow Rain narrative, so long as he was director of the PM bureau, no matter where the criticism originated. He was, in fact, a one-man quick-response team. For example, the Washington Post published a critical editorial on March 12, 1982, stating that the administration had no one to blame but itself for “domestic skepticism” and “international indifference” to its accusations against the Soviets, because after years of making charges and “thousands” of refugee reports, it had failed to produce conclusive “physical evidence” in the form of weapons or shell casings, and was reluctant to consider seriously whether toxins occurred naturally in Southeast Asia. Burt responded with a letter to the editor, citing all the samples and analysis the government had accumulated, and other supportive material. He concluded that

Yellow Rain

63

in totality the government’s evidence demonstrated the “implausibility” of any natural explanation for the presence of mycotoxins at the sites of chemical attacks, and reiterated the administration’s moral responsibility not to keep silent “until we are able to construct a case so watertight and so extensively documented that even the most skeptical must be persuaded.” 50 When the Wall Street Journal charged “that the U.S. has not been pursuing this issue with the vigor it merits,” he wrote another letter to the editor, insisting the administration had given the issue of chemical and toxin weapons use the “highest priority,” and would continue to do so. He placated the Journal’s editors by inviting them to “join us in urging others to give this issue the attention it deserves, as you have done.” 51 While Burt continued to duel with editorial writers, the State Department released in November 1982 an updated special report, addressed to Congress and the UN, citing an increasing number of alleged chemical weapons attacks in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. This time, however, the report linked Soviet chemical weapons use to the issue of human rights. In his transmittal letter, Shultz queried: “If such basic elements of human rights can be so fundamentally ignored, how can we believe any [Soviet] pledges to respect human rights?” The prickly issue of human rights in U.S.-Soviet relations had now been joined to the issue of alleged illegal and immoral use of chemical weapons. 52 Although the New York Times regarded the new evidence contained in the report as “stronger,” it still found it “inconclusive.” It commended the State Department for using a “control group” for evaluating its mycotoxin samples, which was described in the report, and Shultz specifically for avoiding unnecessary rhetorical “flourishes.” Though it still had questions about the purpose and utility of such an “awkward weapon,” it concluded that there was sufficient evidence to justify an emergency meeting of the UNGA. 53 In December 1982, in an effort to intensify the impact of its public communication campaign, the administration established an interagency working group on Yellow Rain under NSC staffer Walter Raymond’s direction, representing State, Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and other agencies. The group met in the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB) to prepare strategy papers and action reports, and task actions to the individual agencies. 54 In May 1983, it floated a public diplomacy strategy paper on the Soviet use of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, in which it admitted to considerable public skepticism about the administration’s case and forewarned that further USG publication of evidence of Soviet CBW use, “unless of the ultimate ‘smoking gun’ type,” was unlikely by itself to either persuade the American public to support the administration or to pressure the Soviets to halt CBW use. Therefore, the group proposed, inter alia, a more “coordinated” and “subtle” public information strategy, to circumvent any perception that the administration was using the issue

64

Chapter 2

for purely propaganda purposes. 55 This bureaucratic change linked the communication campaign on Yellow Rain to the public diplomacy structure set up under the provisions of NSDD 77 in January 1983, and shifted somewhat the campaign’s center of gravity from the State Department to the NSC and the White House. The administration’s campaign also involved the encouragement of media “friendlies” like Robert Bartley, editor of the Wall Street Journal, who was invited to the White House to meet with William P. Clark Jr., the president’s national security adviser, in May 1983. Clark thanked Bartley for helping to focus public attention on Yellow Rain, 56 and other administration officials also appealed to the Journal to “keep this [issue] going.” 57 In February 1983, Senator Pressler’s subcommittee held another hearing on Yellow Rain. 58 Undersecretary Eagleburger reiterated the administration’s case, but it soon became evident that Pressler was concerned about several developments he regarded as major problems. First, he wanted to know why, in light of the administration’s claim that its evidence for the use of trichothecene toxins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan was both substantial and airtight, formal investigations of the matter by the UN and the Canadian government both found that it was “inconclusive.” 59 He also said that he could not understand why the administration, particularly the State Department, with all of the resources at its disposal, was unable to produce undeniably persuasive evidence in the form of hardware. 60 He seemed unimpressed by the administration’s responses that the UN and Canadian reports were based on “preliminary” investigations, that their investigators were restricted from certain vital geographic areas, and that there were many obstacles preventing the capture or acquisition of contaminated hardware, primarily because the toxins were being sprayed and not dumped in the form of canisters or bombs. On the latter issue, for example, he implied that the administration was not being creative enough, and that it should consider offering rewards, such as money, 61 possibly asylum, or a combination of both, as well as making a serious effort to “infiltrate” people into the areas targeted by the alleged users. 62 In addition, two of the witnesses this time around, who were former government officials, attributed the administration’s difficulties in persuading the scientific community, the media, and the public to what they perceived as the administration’s premature accusations during the fall of 1981. They contended that the administration had made public charges and then sought to produce the necessary accumulation of evidence to support them, rather than the other way around, which disposed many people to perceive the charges as a propaganda ploy, and resulted in a substantial credibility problem. 63 In early March 1983, the State Department was blindsided by news reports that Australian scientists had concluded that the Yellow Rain samples they had analyzed were “fakes.” According to the reports, the Australian scientists found that their leaf and soil samples, which had

Yellow Rain

65

been gathered under U.S. supervision in Thailand in 1982, were composed mostly of pollen grains “glued” together with an unidentified substance. They concluded that the yellow spots on the samples were formed from the pollen of rainforest trees, and that no significant toxicity could be found. In short, the traces of mycotoxins on the samples were so small that they could not be harmful to humans and had “no military meaning.” It was also reported that British scientists from the Chemical and Biological Warfare Establishment at Porton Down had been puzzled by the presence of pollen in their samples, but the official British government report had not been publicly released. 64 The State Department responded to these new developments in two ways: first, it came up with the rather bizarre explanation that the Soviets were gathering pollen on a “commercial scale” and using it as a carrying agent for the toxins and second, by stressing that the Australian report “sheds no light at all” on whether mycotoxins were actually being used in Southeast Asia, and that it ignored the fact that the United States had produced a broad range of public evidence on the issue. 65 In May of 1983, Harvard biochemist Meselson and Yale biologist Thomas D. Seeley publicly added a new dimension to the Yellow Rain controversy, by suggesting why the samples being analyzed were full of pollens. 66 At a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Detroit, on May 31, 1983, they presented evidence indicating that bee cleansing flights were the cause of the Yellow Rain spots that the administration claimed resulted from chemical spraying in Southeast Asia. 67 Between the spring of 1983 and March 1984, when Meselson and Seeley traveled to Thailand and experienced a bombardment of excrement from thousands of bees flying overhead, 68 Meselson publicly lectured on and debated that thesis on a number occasions, including at least two visits to the State Department. 69 A popular book, published in September 1983, titled The Yellow Rainmakers: Are Chemical Weapons Being Used in Southeast Asia, by Grant Evans, a social anthropologist, endorsed the bee feces theory and explained Laotian and Cambodian refugees’ stories of chemical attacks in terms of the myths of oral societies. 70 A BBC documentary on Yellow Rain, titled “Biology at War: The Mystery of Yellow Rain,” broadcast in prime time on May 15, 1984, which the U.S. Embassy in London described as “non-polemical,” concluded that the U.S. government’s claims were “unsound” and that the bee excrement theory best explained Yellow Rain’s “mystery.” 71 From a public communication perspective, given the new finding announced by Meselson and Seeley, the administration now faced a twofold task. On the one hand, it had to intensify its effort to persuade domestic audiences and Congress to support its position on Yellow Rain, and on the other to undercut the growing popularity, particularly within the scientific community and the media, of the so-called “bee feces hypothesis.” In pursuit of these goals, it took action on multiple fronts.

66

Chapter 2

On June 1, 1983, the day after Meselson’s and Seeley’s presentations at the AAAS meeting, State’s deputy spokesman Alan Romberg ridiculed what he called “the great bee caper” at the noon briefing and read a statement denouncing the new theory as “false,” on the grounds, inter alia, that a sample “droplet, in which toxin was present was removed from a rock at an attack site and weighed 300 milligrams, certainly more than a bee could drop,” and which would kill the bee before it could excrete the toxin. 72 In the early summer of 1983, U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly began offering “large cash bounties” to anyone who could bring out of Afghanistan, Soviet chemical warfare equipment or contaminated shell or bomb casings, with full information about “where, when and how contamination took place.” 73 On August 4, the administration submitted additional evidence to the UN in the form of blood samples containing what it insisted were detectable amounts of fungus-produced toxins, on the basis of which it contended that the Soviets had killed more than ten thousand people, and asserted that the levels of toxin found in the new samples “cannot be attributed to any known natural phenomenon.” 74 On August 11, officials from State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) briefed reporters at the Foreign Press Center in Washington, where they dismissed the “bee excretia” theory as “highly unlikely,” because it failed to explain, inter alia, how the fungus could grow fast enough after an attack to produce the victims’ symptoms, why the trichothecene toxins existed only in the areas of conflict in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, or why they could be isolated off of a contaminated Soviet gas mask. 75 The following summer, ACDA prepared a “point paper,” cleared by the NSC, for government-wide use in rebutting Meselson. The paper’s drafter admitted that the administration’s public presentation of the evidence was less than ideal, and he cautioned officials who had to respond publicly to Meselson, to do so without engaging in “an ad hominem rebuttal.” 76 Nevertheless, government officials criticized Meselson for engaging in rank speculation and analytical leaps of faith, and one charged that because he “has spent his whole career arguing that these weapons should not be used because they are inhumane and not militarily useful, it is understandable that he finds it intellectually difficult to accept the evidence that they have actually been used.” 77 The introduction of the “bee feces hypothesis” into the public debate over Yellow Rain also motivated the administration’s allies outside of government and in Congress to challenge it. Within weeks of Professors Meselson’s and Seeley’s presentations at the AAAS meeting, the New York Times printed a letter to the editor from a diverse group of seven scientists, several of whom had connections to the federal government, who collectively denied that there was any “alternative hypothesis . . . which provides an adequate explanation of the clear-cut evidence of chemical warfare” in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. 78 The reaction by administration supporters in Congress was even sharper. Representative

Yellow Rain

67

Jim Leach (R-IA), a former foreign service officer who had a record of advocating aid to countries like Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, which he believed were in imminent danger of communist takeover, 79 and who had traveled to refugee camps in Thailand to listen to testimony about Yellow Rain, for example, in a speech to the AAAS symposium on May 31, 1983, accused Meselson of developing “a bizarre alternative hypothesis to explain the genocide of thousands of Third World citizens.” Leach concluded that “if there were ever a scientific theory deserving of nomination for a Nobel Prize in Reverse, it is the Bee Excrement Hypothesis.” 80 About two months later, on the House floor, in a rather striking formulation of his case, he stated that the “cagey bee alleged to exist in Southeast Asia . . . is in actuality a three-letter ministry—the KGB.” 81 His colleague Stephen J. Solarz, placed an article in the Wall Street Journal, on June 22, 1983, reprinted in the Washington Post, stating that “the use of chemical warfare by the U.S.S.R. and Vietnam has now been established beyond doubt,” and that the “incredible bee hypothesis . . . does not even pretend to explain why these poisonous substances did not appear in earlier years or in other places.” 82 About a month later, Shultz sent Senator Solarz a letter thanking him for his “consistent support in helping to foster wide attention to and clearer understanding of this continuing tragedy in Asia.” 83 The configuration of the public debate over Yellow Rain began to change for several reasons between the late summer of 1983 and early 1985. In the first place, the reported number of allegedly Soviet-inspired toxin attacks in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan diminished, 84 which allowed the administration to claim that the international pressure it had stimulated against the Soviet Union’s illegal use of chemical and biological warfare was working. Second, the administration’s case against the Soviet Union for using Yellow Rain began to implode. Critical reports in the media were proliferating. 85 Both academic and professional scientists were systematically deconstructing the evidence cited by the government as “proof” of Soviet use of toxin weapons and publishing their views in scientific journals. 86 And the U.S. Joint Defense-State Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) Investigative Team, which operated in Thailand between November 1983 and October 1985, raised serious questions about the methodologies initially used in gathering and analyzing the samples on which the administration had based its case. 87 The DefenseState team also spent part of its time tracking down and disconfirming widely circulating rumors about Yellow Rain, such as the claim made by free-lance writer Dr. Jane Hamilton-Merritt concerning an alleged massacre of several thousands of civilians in Laos and reports in the Thailanguage and English press that “tens of thousands” of Soviet-made land mines coated with toxins had been buried along the Cambodian border. 88 During its operations in Thailand, the investigative team collected well over one thousand samples, and found a minute trace of trichothecene

68

Chapter 2

mycotoxins only on one. 89 Finally, even though the president in January 1984, submitted a classified report to Congress listing seven cases of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements, one of which involved Soviet use of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, it was only several months later that the U.S. delegation to the fortynation UN Committee on Disarmament in Geneva tabled a proposal for a treaty banning the use, manufacture, and possession of chemical and biological weapons. Between late 1985 and late 1986, several significant events occurred that altered the political, diplomatic, and scientific environment surrounding U.S.-Soviet relations and the urgency of the administration’s Yellow Rain campaign. In November 1985, President Reagan and Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to intensify efforts to achieve a verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. The following May, the British government disclosed that attempts by its scientists to find traces of mycotoxins in its Yellow Rain samples had “yielded negative results” and though it believed that chemical warfare attacks had probably occurred, it was “unable to say what agent may have been used . . . or who may have supplied it.” That same month the Canadian government announced in its report that after large-scale sampling of alleged victims of chemical warfare, many were found to have trichothecene toxins in their blood, but that finding was attributed to probable poisoning by fungus infested food, not chemical attacks. 90 After the release of the British and Canadian reports, Professor Meselson remarked in an interview with Washington Post journalist Philip J. Hilts that “I think that the matter is now settled . . . . This is the last gasp of one of the least careful jobs of intelligence work done in recent years.” 91 The New York Times agreed: its editorial on June 16, 1986, summed up the administration’s quandary—it could admit that it had made an “intelligence blunder” or it “can doggedly march on, unsupported by its own Army or allies, with the thesis that yellow rain is an agent of biological warfare.” 92 In fact, in the fall of 1986, after the midterm elections had resulted in substantial Democratic victories and trimmed the ranks of hardliners in the administration, Senator Solarz’s effort to nudge Shultz to support the convening of another hearing on Yellow Rain, was politely rebuffed. As Edward J. Fox, the assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, explained to Solarz, “we have been unable to confirm . . . any chemical or toxin weapon attacks in Southeast Asia or Afghanistan for over two years.” Therefore, the Department believed, no additional special report or hearing was warranted. 93 In retrospect, it seems that no matter what the administration did to mobilize support for its Yellow Rain narrative among the media, Congress and the scientific community, it had only very minimal success. Its early optimism about the public communication campaign “bearing fruit” in time became merely a defensive posture. With respect to the

Yellow Rain

69

press, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal represented polar opposites in their editorial reactions to the administration’s narrative. Most other large circulation newspapers, such as the Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, and the Washington Post fell somewhere in between on the reaction spectrum. The Washington Post, for example, tended to tilt closer to the Times, while the Chicago Tribune leaned closer to the Journal. The Times never deviated from its deep skepticism concerning the administration’s public evidence. 94 The Wall Street Journal’s editors, under Bartley’s leadership, on the other hand, remained consistent in their support of the administration’s accusations against the Soviets; in proclaiming that the State Department’s evidence was conclusive, “except to the willingly obtuse”; and dismissing UN investigations of the issue as tantamount to a “whitewash.” 95 The Christian Science Monitor followed a more middle-of-the-road approach, stressing the need for negotiations to achieve an effective and verifiable treaty banning all chemical and biological weapons. In short, there was no clearly discernible movement by any of the largest circulation or prestigious newspapers from a posture of opposition to one of support for the administration’s narrative. As far as Congress was concerned, only a handful of senators and representatives took an active interest in the issue. Senator Pressler and Representatives Leach and Solarz, all of whom held hearings on Yellow Rain, were the most outspoken congressional proponents of the administration’s case against the Soviets, but even they had certain misgivings about the quality of the evidence on which it was based. Following Pressler’s subcommittee hearings on Yellow Rain in November 1981, Congress adopted the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 Public Law (PL) 97-113, signed by President Reagan on December 29, 1981). Section 716 of that act condemned the use of chemical agents and toxin weapons against the peoples of Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, urged the president to give high priority to the collection of additional evidence, and vigorously seek a satisfactory explanation from the Soviet Union. 96 In August of 1983, Pressler introduced a “sense of the Senate resolution,” cosponsored by a bipartisan group of about twenty senators and apparently previewed with the NSC, urging the administration, inter alia, to “negotiate” with the Soviet Union and other countries to strengthen existing chemical weapons treaties, by including “on demand, on-site inspection when necessary.” 97 Two resolutions condemning Soviet use of chemical warfare were introduced in the Senate, one by Dan Quayle, another by Gus D’Amato (D-NY) and ten cosigners, 98 and in April 1984, Representative William “Bill” McCollum (R-FL) submitted House Concurrent Resolution 283, expressing the sense of Congress for the development of antidotes for chemical and biological weapons. 99 At no time, however, despite this flurry of hearings and resolutions, did majorities in the Senate or House vote for a formal accusation of treaty

70

Chapter 2

violation, the renunciation of the 1972 treaty, or any kind of unilateral punitive action against the Soviets. Congress’s temperate response to the Yellow Rain accusations was most likely related to the state of public opinion on the issue. Therefore, the public debate over Yellow Rain occurred largely between Reagan administration officials and its allies in Congress and the scientific community on one side and its scientific and media critics on the other. Precisely how that debate impacted the public’s attitude toward the administration’s charges against the Soviets is difficult to assess, but, in general, the public appeared to take little interest in what was a rather esoteric and technical scientific debate. As a poll taken by Gallup in August 1982 revealed, only about one in five adults was “informed” about the issue. The public, moreover, was consistently wary about further U.S. development of chemical and biological weapons, even if it were confirmed that the Soviets were developing their own (48 percent in favor vs 42 percent opposed). The approach preferred by the public was to deter the Soviets from using these kinds of weapons by continued diplomatic negotiation (42 percent), rather than developing U.S. chemical and biological weapons (17 percent) or relying on other types of weapons (17 percent). 100 Although substantial majorities between 1982 and 1988 continued to favor the “elimination” or “outlawing” of chemical weapons, the data trend clearly indicates that the public strongly favored bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union as the means to achieve that goal. 101 The evolution of the Yellow Rain controversy inevitably raises the question of why the administration’s public communication campaign had such limited success. In the first place, the issue attracted a high level of interest only among the professional and academic members of the scientific community and the editorial boards of about a dozen major newspapers. In both cases, the predominant opinion was opposed to the administration’s initiative on Yellow Rain, as well as to the way the administration portrayed the issue in its public narratives. Secondly, while the administration claimed to possess conclusive classified evidence that definitively proved its accusations, what it actually made public was neither unquestionably authentic nor indisputably persuasive. As the drafters of a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Soviet use of chemical and toxin weapons prepared in September 1983 noted: “the inherent limitations of sensitive intelligence . . . fundamentally inhibit its persuasive public use.” 102 Thirdly, although the administration consistently claimed that its accusations were based on a “broad range” of evidence, its case depended to a large extent on environmental samples obtained in Laos and Kampuchea. Of the hundreds of such samples accumulated early on, only six were found to contain toxins, and five of the six positive tests came from a single laboratory in the United States, results that were not confirmed by other research laboratories. 103 Finally,

Yellow Rain

71

administration officials unwisely failed to establish an independent public board of prominent scientists to review all of the government’s Yellow Rain evidence and the evaluations of critical scientists, which was recommended by several eminent scientists and the editors of leading newspapers, and had been promised early on by Sharon Watson. Had it done so, it might have dispelled suspicions that the whole Yellow Rain affair was nothing more than an anti-Soviet propaganda ploy. 104 There were also a number of puzzling gaps in the Yellow Rain story which administration officials never adequately explained, which not only seriously weakened its public narratives, but also raised a host of potentially embarrassing questions. For example, why had none of the many individuals who directed foreign aid projects in Laos confirmed reports of Yellow Rain; why was the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok never actually tasked to conduct a systematic investigation of Yellow Rain or produce an official report on the subject; why had the president’s science adviser not been directly or publicly involved in the issue; why had the administration not established a systematic program for the autopsy of those victims allegedly killed by Yellow Rain poisoning or for the collection of bone marrow samples; why had Emory Sarver, chief of the U.S. Army Chemical Systems Laboratory (CLS) at Aberdeen, Maryland, who had analyzed more than eighty environmental samples from alleged attack sites in Southeast Asia, not found trichothecene mycotoxins on any of them; 105 what explained the fact that Australian, British, Canadian, French, and Swedish government researchers found no mycotoxins on their respective samples; why did some U.S. Army scientists dismiss the notion that mycotoxins would make an effective military weapon and that therefore they had no military value; 106 why did the State Department consistently claim that only a scientifically advanced nation like the Soviet Union could have manufactured the suspect toxins, when it was widely known in both the scientific and academic communities that students could make them easily in someone’s garage or basement; 107 and, finally, why did the administration ignore the substantial body of countervailing evidence to its Yellow Rain narrative that was produced by scientific researchers both within and outside of the United States? 108 Some former Reagan administration officials claimed that the public communication campaign was highly successful, on the grounds that it focused international attention on the devastating consequences of the use of toxin agents, compelled the Soviets to stop using them in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, and to agree to enter negotiations with the United States for a comprehensive treaty ban on the possession and use of chemical and biological weapons. Opponents of the administration’s Yellow Rain campaign responded to these arguments with their own: that the whole effort was based on false information that utilized bad science and bordered on propaganda. They also contended that the campaign delayed any serious negotiations on a comprehensive treaty banning the

72

Chapter 2

possession and use of chemical weapons, and that the so-called “Gorbachev thaw” was responsible for the change in conditions that led to the opening of negotiations. Some of these claims are largely rhetorical and virtually impossible to prove. What is clear, however, is that it was not until many years later that a discernible public walk-back on the issue by the U.S. government occurred. It began in October 1991 during the Senate hearings on the confirmation of Robert M. Gates as CIA director. In his testimony, Melvin A. Goodman, a former division chief in the CIA’s Office of Soviet Analysis, who opposed Gates’s nomination, accused the agency’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) of providing “misleading information” on the Soviets’ alleged use of chemical agents in Southeast Asia for political purposes. 109 As of 2001, however, former Reagan administration officials such as Gary Crocker and Sharon Watson, continued to stand by Haig’s original accusations against the Soviets. 110 In 2005, the walk-back continued when the State Department released a fact sheet on Yellow Rain, stating that although “recent non-governmental reanalysis of the Yellow Rain investigation suggests that while the evidence most strongly supports the hypothesis that chemical /toxin attacks occurred in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, the scientific evidence is not strong enough to answer with certainty questions regarding the composition of the agent, the intent of use, or whether the agent originated in the Soviet Union.“ 111 Although that was not a definitive retraction, it was a significant self-correction, which took the State Department twenty-four years from Haig’s speech in Berlin to make. Ironically, it also turned the Yellow Rain narrative full cycle back to the position of the Carter administration in 1979. NOTES 1. The term “yellow rain” derived from reports of refugees, particularly Hmong tribespeople, who fled Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia) during the late 1970s and early 1980s, seeking refuge from warfare in those countries. Many of them reached refugee camps in Thailand, where some claimed to have been the victims of chemical attacks perpetrated by Vietnamese and Cambodian communist forces. The descriptions of the alleged attacks were quite diverse: air dropped canisters, aerial sprays, artillery shells, rockets, grenades, and mines, which produced droplets of liquid, powders, and smoke of various colors. The most distinctive and commonly reported characteristic, however, was the appearance of small, yellow spots on vegetation, tree bark, roofs, and the ground immediately following an “attack,” which supposedly caused a variety of physiological and neurological symptoms, such as seizures, blindness, internal bleeding, skin lesions, and frequently death. This particular phenomenon was dubbed “yellow rain” in the press. According to journalist Peter Pringle, the first use of the term in the American press appeared in August 1979, in dispatches sent to the Washington Post by Stanley Karnow reporting from northern Thailand, and it subsequently became a convenient journalistic label that “concealed an extraordinary confusion among the Hmong over exactly what kind of weapon was being used against them.” See Pringle, “Political Science: How a Rush to Judgement on Yellow Rain Embarrassed both U.S. Science and the U.S. Government,” The Atlantic Monthly, 1985,

Yellow Rain

73

68. For additional detail, see Jonathan Tucker, “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” The Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 26-28. 2. For text of Haig’s speech, see “A Certain Idea of Man: The Democratic Revolution and Its Future,” Current Policy No. 311, U.S. Department of State, September 13, 1981. Haig did not officially charge the Soviets with the treaties’ violations. 3. Similar accusations of Soviet and Vietnamese use of chemical agents against the Hmong tribespeople in Laos and in other countries had been made by both private individuals and organizations during the Carter administration. In 1978, U.S. officials brought the matter to the attention of the Soviet, Vietnamese, and Laotian governments, but they all denied the validity of the charges. By 1980, as reports of such use proliferated, the U.S. government asked the United Nations and the International Red Cross to “be alert for information that would bear on these reports,” and State Department officials testified before Congress on the issue. However, the late Carter administration’s and the early Reagan administration’s public position was that the “U.S. Government cannot confirm or conclusively disprove reports of the use of chemical weapons in remote areas where we have no presence,” but it supported the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1980, which called for a thorough and impartial investigation of the issue. See the letters from William J. Dyess, assistant secretary of state for public affairs, November 7, 1980, and Francis Terry McNamara, acting assistant secretary for public affairs, October 1, 1981, to individual American citizens and J. Brian Atwood, assistant secretary for congressional relations, to Senator Edward Zorinsky (D-NE), November 4, 1980, all inserted for the record, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Hearing on “Yellow Rain” and Other Forms of Chemical and Biological Warfare in Asia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., November 10, 1981, 59-61. 4. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, was signed by President Richard Nixon in 1972 and ratified by both parties in 1975. 5. For the Soviet reaction, see cable 12855, from the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, to the State Department, September 14, 1981; a copy is in CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Cables (1978-87): 1981, NSArchive. 6. Part 1 of the dossier was circulated as UN document A/5-12/AC.1/57 in June 1982 and part 2 as UN document A/327/377 in early September 1982; see cable 01927 from the U.S. Mission to the UN (USUN) to the State Department, July 9, 1982, and cable 02420 from USUN to the State Department, September 10, 1982, both in, CBW Collection, Box 1, Folder: Southeast Asia and Afghanistan Cables, NSArchive. 7. “Yellow Rain,” Washington Post, September 18, 1981, A22. 8. “Preventing Toxin Warfare,” Christian Science Monitor, September 16, 1981, 24. 9. “Yellow Rain and Arms Control,” Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1981, 34. 10. Michael Getler, “Haig Charges Chemical Arms Used in Asia,” Washington Post, September, 14, 1981, A1. According to press reports, while Haig was delivering his address, tens of thousands of individuals, organized by the youth wings of the parties in West Germany’s ruling coalition were conducting a noisy and rock throwing demonstration against the Reagan administration as the enemy of peace because of its nuclear policies. 11. See Haig’s memorandum to Reagan, September 11, 1981, attached to a Burt to Haig memorandum, dated September 10, 1981, in the CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1979-81), NSArchive. According to some press reports, while Haig was in Berlin, he “was reined in by the White House,” which ordered a change in the speech text, “deleting a direct reference to Moscow.” See, for example, John Maclean, “Aerial toxins: a genie is let out of the warfare bottle,” Chicago Tribune, September 20, 1981, 4. 12. See National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 18, “United States Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control Policy,” January 4, 1982, in Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, 1995, 85-87. A little

74

Chapter 2

more than a year later, Reagan signed NSDD 79, dated February 1, 1983, calling for U.S. support of a complete chemical weapons ban, but only one with verification measures that could “ensure compliance.” It also committed the administration to continue making the “direct connection” between the Soviet Union’s and its surrogates’ use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia; for text, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives, 1995, 273-74. See also NSDD 136, “U.S. Initiative to Ban Chemical Weapons” [April 2, 1984], in Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives, 1995, 402-4. Additional information on U.S. chemical weapons policy can be found in Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves, 2006, 260-66; and Susan Wright, “The buildup that was,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 45: 1 (January/February 1989), 52-56. 13. In a memorandum prepared by Major General E. R. Thompson in the Office of the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, dated August 24, 1981, he stated: “While the detection of trichocthecene toxins is extremely significant, their detection in one sample does not constitute sufficient proof that these toxins have been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, and are the causative agents of the physiological effects previously attributed to chemical warfare agents.” A copy of Thompson’s memo is in the CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles, Papers and Memoranda (1979-1981), NSArchive. Earlier that year, there were problems with the reports by alleged victims of chemical weapons use. In a memorandum for the file, dated March 18, 1981, for example, prepared by Henry Wilde, MD, a career foreign service officer, who was serving as the U.S. Embassy Bangkok’s regional medical officer, wrote about his visits to hospitals in Kampuchea. He found that the reports of CW use were “confusing and inconsistent,” and that those who claimed they suffered from CW effects, appeared instead to be suffering from “chronic malaria and/or other natural diseases.” A copy of his memorandum is in the CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles, Papers and Memoranda (1979-1981), NSArchive. Wilde actually spent one year part-time doing field investigations of reports of biological warfare, interviewing refugees from Laos and Cambodia in Thailand, who had allegedly been “poisoned” by chemical attacks. All of the “victims” he examined were clinically diagnosed as suffering from infectious or parasitic illnesses, unrelated to chemicals or toxins. He cabled numerous reports about his findings to the State Department, along with recommendations for the collection of better samples and systematic autopsies of dead individuals. He also repeatedly requested “modest funding” for a background study of Fusaria fungi, using a Thai mycology and toxicology expert from Siriraj Hospital in Thailand, but the State Department denied the requests, even though the U.S. ambassador in Thailand, John Gunther Dean, “strongly supported it.” Wilde later described his work in Thailand in “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Are There Lessons from the Past?,” Asian Biomedicine, 2008, 421-29. See also Julian Robinson, Jeanne Guillemin, and Matthew Meselson, “Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses,” Foreign Policy, 1987, 108; Nicholas Wade, “Toxin Warfare Charges May be Premature,” Science, 214: 4516 (October 2, 1981), 34. 14. See for example, Sharon Watson, “Memorandum for the Record, August 31, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . 7 (1979-81), NSArchive, concerning her telephone conversation with individuals at the State Department. Dr. Watson was an intelligence research specialist, in the United States Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency (USAMIIA). State’s Bureau of East Asia Affairs (EA) and U.S. Embassy officers in Bangkok urged caution against premature public announcement of the accusations against the Soviets. According to British journalist Peter Pringle, CIA and DIA representatives on the interagency monitoring group on Yellow Rain also favored additional tests before the release of the new information. Pringle contends that Burt was the driving force behind the decision to go public on Yellow Rain, and he cites an anonymous source on the monitoring group, who indicated that Burt “just railroaded it through.” See Pringle, “Political Science: How a Rush to Scientific Judgement on Yellow Rain Embarrassed Both U.S. Science and the U.S. Government,” The Atlantic Monthly, 1985, 71-72. Pringle’s contention is plausible, but without declassification of relevant CIA and DIA documents, particularly memoranda

Yellow Rain

75

that passed between the State Department and the NSC, it cannot be considered definitive. 15. Memorandum from Richard Burt (PM) to the Secretary, August 31, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1979-81), NSArchive. 16. Briefing memorandum from Richard Burt (PM) to The Secretary, September 3, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1979-81), NSArchive. 17. See action memorandum from Richard Burt (PM) to the Secretary, September 10, 1981, with attached memorandum from Alexander M. Haig Jr. to The President, September 10, 1981, in the CBW Collection, Box 5, Reports, Articles . . . (1979-1981), NSArchive. Haig’s memo is initialed and went forward to Reagan, who apparently approved the recommendation. 18. For text of Stoessel’s statement, see “Reported Use of Chemical Weapons,” Department of State Bulletin, 81: 2056 (November 1981), 79. His statement was also sent to all U.S. diplomatic posts as State Department cable 246282, September 16, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1979-81), NSArchive. At the briefing, Stoessel made available for the press a fact sheet stating that laboratory tests of the leaf and stem samples from Kampuchea had revealed the presence of three lethal mycotoxins of the trichothecene group in amounts much higher than would be normal in a natural occurrence or outbreak. For text, see U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet on Tests for CW Agents,” September 14, 1981, attached to U.S. International Communications Agency (ICA), EUR-203, November 3, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles, Papers, and Memoranda (1979-1981), NSArchive. 19. Burt’s statement before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment, chaired by Senator Larry L. Pressler (R-SD), was released by State as “Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia,” Current Policy No. 342, November 10, 1981. The editors of the Washington Post regarded the new evidence as “solid,” even though there was “no comparably firm evidence tying responsibility for its use to the Soviet Union.” To them it seemed reasonable to conclude that “the Soviet Union is directing a vicious campaign of chemical and biological warfare . . . .” See “Rain of Terror,” Washington Post, November 11, 1981, A26; and Philip J. Hilts, “New Data Found on Toxic ‘Rain,’” Washington Post, November 11, 1981, A1. 20. The text of Adelman’s statement is in U.S. International Communications Agency (ICA), EUR-516, November 13, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1979-81), NSArchive. The United States submitted its “new evidence” to the UN on November 12, 1981. 21. For text of the speech, see U.S., International Communications Agency (ICA), EUR 306, “The Long Search for Evidence of Chemical Warfare,” November 18, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (19 79-1981), NSArchive. 22. Mirocha was initially a “blind” analyst, who did not know that he was actually working for the U.S. government or precisely who had arranged for him to receive the samples. Eventually, however, he was employed as an outside government consultant. For additional detail and background, particularly on the role of the CIA in the Yellow Rain affair, see Pringle, “Political Science: How a Rush to Scientific Judgement on Yellow Rain Embarrassed Both U.S. Science and the U.S. Government,” The Atlantic Monthly, 1985, 70-71. 23. All of the quotations in this paragraph are taken from the record of the U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Hearing on “Yellow Rain” And Other Forms of Chemical and Biological Warfare in Asia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., November 10, 1981, 2, 4, 28-34. Despite Dr. Watson’s statement that the administration intended to turn over its Yellow Rain evidence to the scientific community for review, there is no official documentation indicating that it ever did. 24. See memorandum prepared for George A. Keyworth II, the president’s science adviser, November 18, 1981, Keyworth Files, Box 10, Folder: Yellow Rain, RRPL. The press reaction comment was based on two attached editorials: “Poisoning Disarmament,” Wall Street Journal, November 6, 1981, 34 (published before Burt’s testimony)

76

Chapter 2

and “Rain of Terror,” the Washington Post, November 11, 1981, A26; and an article by Philip J. Hilts, “New Data Found on Toxic ‘Rain’: U.S. Says Samples Link Soviets to Use of Poison Weapon,” Washington Post, November 11, 1981, A1. 25. See the memorandum from Burt to Haig, December 18, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1979-81), NSArchive. 26. “Too Quick on Yellow Rain,” New York Times, November 17, 1981, A30. 27. Clips of both the editorial and Burt’s letter, which was published November 29, 1981, are in the Scott Malone Donation, Box 11, Folder: Southeast Asia and Yellow Rain, NSArchive. 28. See, for example, Philip M. Boffey, “Are the Russians Using ‘Yellow Rain’ in Asia? Experts Debate the Data,” New York Times, November 24, 1981, C1. 29. A copy of the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 11/50/37-2), titled “Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan,” dated February 2, 1982, is in the CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1982-84, 1986-87, 1989), NSArchive and is also available online at http://www.foia.cia.gov. 30. U.S. Department of State, “Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: Report to the Congress from Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,” March 22, 1982, Special Report No. 98. 31. Ironically, while the State Department was hardening its public case against the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese and Laotian allies for using toxic chemical weapons in Southeast Asia, U.S. intelligence officers assigned to collect evidence of Yellow Rain were not finding any. According to Merle L. Pribbenow, a former working level CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) case officer assigned to collect Yellow Rain evidence, he and his fellow case officers debriefed hundreds of Vietnamese soldiers, both defectors and prisoners, during his two-year tour and none of them “ever provided a shred of information about anything remotely resembling ‘yellow rain.’” See Pribbenow, “Yellow Rain: Lessons from an Earlier WMD Controversy,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2006, 737-45. The quote appears on p. 741. 32. See “Smoke, Fire and Chemical War,” New York Times, March 29, 1982, A18. 33. “Progress on Yellow Rain,” Washington Post, March 30, 1982, A18. 34. The referenced exchanges took place on March 22. See U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983 (S. 2248), Part 7—Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 23, 24, 26; March 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 22, 1982, 501129. 35. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearings on Foreign Policy and Arms Control Implications of Chemical Weapons, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 30 and July 13, 1982, 2, 54-71, 115. The March session of the hearings pertained to Yellow Rain; the July session dealt mostly with the administration’s plans to develop binary chemical weapons and to negotiate a chemical weapons ban. Appendix 5 to the hearing record (pp. 219-23) contains a document titled “Answers to Selected Questions cncerning Yellow Rain, by James R. Bamburg, Professor and Interim Chairman, Department of Biochemistry, Colorado State University,” whose PhD thesis was on “Mycotoxins of the Trichothecene Family Produced by Cereal Molds.” He was a strong proponent of the position that trichothecene toxins could occur naturally, and his answers to the questions posed to him by the chairmen of the subcommittees fully complemented the testimony of Professor Cullen. 36. Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) to Secretary Shultz, September 11, 1982, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1982-84, 1986-87, 1989), NSArchive. The State Department generally attributed the reluctance of other nations, especially developing countries, to take a strong public stand on the use of toxin weapons in Southeast Asia, to their unwillingness to become involved in what they perceived as a U.S.-Soviet bilateral dispute. 37. Memorandum from L. Paul Bremer III, executive secretariat, Department of State, to the White House, January 7, 1982, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports,

Yellow Rain

77

Articles . . . (1982-84, 1986-87, 1989), NSArchive. In the memo, drafted in PM and cleared by Burt, the president was requested to “reinforce our concern at an appropriate meeting with journalists or the media,” and informed that White House speechwriters had been furnished with “appropriate language” for the president. 38. For text of the president’s address, see “Address Before the 38th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York,” September 26, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, II, 1350-54. See also Reagan’s “Remarks at the National Legislative Conference of the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO,” April 5, 1982, where he referred to the “genocide in Cambodia;” Public Papers, 1982, I, 431-37; and “Message on the Observance of Afghanistan Day,” March 21, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, I, 430-31. 39. For the administration’s response to the new scientific findings, see United States Information Agency (USIA), “Transcript of Briefing by Robert Dean and Gary Crocker on ‘Yellow Rain,’” November 30, 1982, 12-13. Dean was deputy director of the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and Crocker was in State’s Office of Politico-Military Analysis, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). The quoted statement was made by Sharon Watson, a toxicologist at the Armed Forces Medical Center in Ft. Detrick, Maryland, who also participated in the briefing. Kenneth Adelman made a statement on pollen, linking it to honeybees, before the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), on December 8, 1982; see USUN Press Release No. 172-(82), “Statement by Ambassador Kenneth L. Adelman, United States Deputy Representative to the United Nations, in the First Committee, on Item 54, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons,” December 8, 1982. During his statement, Adelman also alleged for the first time, that there were reports of Soviet-aided armed forces in Ethiopia using chemical weapons against Eritrean rebels, thereby extending the original allegations against the Soviet Union to Africa. For a press account, see Eric Pace, “U.S. Raises Issue of Toxic Arms in U.N.,” New York Times, December 9, 1982, A11. 40. On the issue of the alleged Soviet transportation of the suspect chemicals to their Vietnamese ally, for example, see Crocker’s confusing and unconvincing testimony in U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on S. 2248, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Part 7, February 23, 24, 26; March 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 22, 1982, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 5028-29. 41. See Robinson, Guillemin, and Meselson, “Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses,” Foreign Policy, 1987, 104-6. 42. See, for example: “Where is the Evidence?,” Washington Post, March 19, 1982, A28; “Seeing the World in Red and Yellow,” New York Times, March 19, 1982, A30; “Smoke, Fire and Chemical War,” New York Times, March 29, 1982; and “Progress on Yellow Rain,” Washington Post, March 30, 1982, A18. 43. The quotations are from Eliot Marshall, “A Cloudburst of Yellow Rain Reports,” Science, 218: 4578 (December 17, 1982), 1202-3. For a photo of the mask and additional detail, see “Deadly Dose,” Time, 120: 24 (December 13, 1982), 51. The on-the-record briefing and display were coordinated with the CIA. In addition to the gas mask, photographs of an alleged toxin attack victim were also displayed. The reporters seemed much more bemused than concerned. Several asked the author, who attended the briefing, why State Department officials thought that the press corps would find the mask convincing. 44. For text of Dean’s statement at the briefing, see U. S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 955 (1982), Document 478, 1018-19; for the briefing, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, “On the Record Briefing,” November 29, 1982. 45. “More Chemical Smoke in Asia,” New York Times, December 3, 1982, A30. 46. “Soviet Chemical War Goes On,” Washington Post, December 1, 1982, A26. 47. “Checking Toxin Warfare,” Christian Science Monitor, December 1, 1982, 24. 48. “Getting the Goods on the Soviets,” Boston Globe, December 3, 1982, 1. 49. “The Kremlin’s War Crimes,” Chicago Tribune, December 6, 1982, 18.

78

Chapter 2

50. For the editorial, see “Where is the Evidence?,” Washington Post, March 12, 1982, A28; Burt’s response was published in the Post on March 19, 1982, A22. 51. For the editorial, see “ABC’s Deadly Evidence,” Wall Street Journal, December 18, 1981, 22; for the text of Burt’s letter, see “The U.S. Fight against Chemical War,” published in the Wall Street Journal, January 4, 1982, 31. 52. For text, see U.S. Department of State, “Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update. Report from Secretary of State George P. Shultz,” Special Report No. 104, November 1982. 53. “More Chemical Smoke in Asia,” New York Times, December 3, 1982, A30. 54. See the exchange of memoranda between Raymond and Sven Kraemer, director of arms control, NSC staff, December 10 and 13, 1982, White House Office of Records Management (WHORM) Subject Files, Folder: NDO17 (Warfare), RRPL. 55. See attachment to a memorandum from Charles Hill, executive secretary of the State Department, to Other Agency Recipients, May 11, 1983, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1982-84, 1986-87, 1989), NSArchive. 56. See memorandum from Robert B. Sims to Clark, May 4, 1983, and Clark’s note to “Bob” [Bartley], May 10, 1983, both in White House Office of Records Management (WHORM) Subject File, Folder: NDO17 (Warfare), RRPL. 57. See Alison Bass, “One Scientist’s Crusade: A Profile of Matthew Meselson,” Technology Review, 89: 3 (April 1986), 42. 58. For the record of the hearing, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Hearing on “Yellow Rain” (Chemical and Toxin Weapons Use): The Arms Control Implications, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., February 24, 1983. 59. Both reports indicated that investigators had found no evidence proving the use of fungal poisons (mycotoxins) in Southeast Asia. For the UN report, the product of two years of research, see UNGA, “Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: Report of the Secretary General,” UN Report No. A36/613, November 20, 1981. For the Canadian report, see G. R. Humphreys and J. Dow, “An Epidemiological Investigation of Alleged CW/BW Incidents in Southeast Asia,” Directorate of Preventive Medicine, Surgeon General Branch, National Defense Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, August 11, 1982. The Canadian report indicated, inter alia, that it was “impossible to exclude blackwater fever [a variety of malaria] as a possible cause of death” in at least one case attributed to T-2 toxin; that most of the deaths associated with CW/BW agents actually resulted from “inadequate or inappropriate medical care,” and that it was “impossible in the absence of laboratory results to identify the agents used.” For commentary on the reports, see Eliot Marshall, “A Cloudburst of Yellow Rain Reports,” Science, 218: 4578 (December 17, 1982), 1202-3. 60. The hardware issue is an interesting conundrum. One of the major components of the administration’s “evidence” to support its allegations of Soviet use of Yellow Rain in Southeast Asia consisted of refugee reports from camps in Thailand about the alleged attacks and the physical consequences suffered by the victims. The refugee reports were replete with descriptions of attacks by winged aircraft and helicopters that dropped bombs or canisters, shelling by howitzers and mortars and the placement of mines buried in the ground and hidden in trees. If these reports were valid, as the State Department claimed, it would be logical to conclude that the attack areas must have been littered with shrapnel. There were also some accounts of aerial spraying, but no Western observer had ever witnessed or documented such an attack. An account by a Laotian pilot, a defector who claimed that he had participated in a bombing/spraying attack, was later discredited. The administration’s claim that the toxins were usually sprayed from low-flying aircraft is clearly at odds with the refugee accounts. Either such attacks did not occur or the administration’s claim was a rationalization for the failure to recover contaminated hardware. On the Lao pilot’s discredited account, see cable 05196, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), January 27, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Cables (1978-87): 1981, NSArchive; and Matthew Meselson and Julian Perry Robinson, “The Yellow Rain

Yellow Rain

79

Affair: Lessons from a Discredited Allegation,” in Clunan, Savoy and Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War or Disease?, 2008, 90-91. 61. One of the witnesses at the hearing, Dr. Amos Townsend, representing the International Rescue Committee’s operation in Bangkok, testified that the only public “standing offer” of money in exchange for hardware was a private one, from the editors of Soldier of Fortune Magazine, who were offering a $100,000 reward for a fully equipped airplane, with chemical weapons and pilot. 62. For exchanges during the hearing on the issue of obtaining contaminated hardware, see SFRC Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Hearing on “Yellow Rain,” February 24, 1983, 97-101. 63. The two officials were James F. Leonard, former U.S. representative to the UN Committee on Disarmament, and Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies, USN (Ret.). For their comments, see SFRC Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Hearing on “Yellow Rain,” February 24, 1983, 86, 88, 97, and 103. 64. The Australian report was compiled by an Australian government scientist named Hugh Crone for the Australian Department of Defense. The Australian government sat on the so-called Crone Report for six months, releasing it only after its contents were apparently leaked to the London Observer. According to journalist Peter Pringle, Crone’s findings did not prove or disprove anything, but they were “politically significant,” because they reopened the whole question of whether Yellow Rain was a natural phenomenon or not. See Pringle, “‘Yellow Rain’ Evidence Fake, Scientists Say,” London Observer, March 6, 1983, 5; Pringle, “New Questions about ‘Yellow Rain’: An Australian Study Charging Fakery Adds Fuel for the Skeptics,” Washington Post, Outlook section, March 20, 1983, C1. Meselson and Robinson, “The Yellow Rain Affair,” in Clunan, et al., Terrorism, War, or Disease?, 2008, ch. 4, 93n12, cite the report as: H. D. Crone, “The Examination of ‘Yellow Rain’ Specimens Received at MRL in April 1982,” Australian Defense Scientific Service, Materials Research Laboratories (MRL), Maribyrnong, Technical Report OCD 82/14, August 1982. 65. See Lawrence S. Eagleburger, “The Yellow Rain Is No Hoax,” Washington Post, April 11, 1983, A11. 66. Evidently, Professor Thomas D. Seeley, a Yale University honeybee expert, initially made the suggestion that Yellow Rain was not a chemical agent, but rather the feces of wild honeybees; see Robinson, Guillemin, and Meselson, “Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses,” Foreign Policy, 1987, 105. 67. Linda Garmon, “Yellow rain: Bee ‘spring cleaning’?,” Science News, 123:24 (June 11, 1983), 374. During his trip to Thailand, Meselson, who traveled with Professor Seeley and Dr. Pongthep Akratanakul, of Kasetsart University, Thailand, visited the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok on March 22, 1984. He presented a sample to the deputy chief of mission (DCM) and explained that the “natural phenomenon of bee cleansing flights produced yellow spots in a way consistent with the alleged victims’ accounts of yellow rain attacks.” In a follow-up meeting with the embassy’s CBW team on April 6, Dr. Akratanakul confirmed Meselson’s findings “that wild honeybees can defecate yellow spots over wide areas in showers.” See cable 18465 from U.S. Embassy, Bangkok to the State Department and other recipients, dated April 9, 1984; a copy is in CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Cables (1978-87): 1984, NSArchive. 68. Article in China Post, March 30, 1984, 3; a clip is in the CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1982-84, 1986-87, 1989), NSArchive. 69. The author was present at both of the referenced presentations. Professor Meselson spoke to packed audiences, comprised of State Department employees and members of the press corps. The Q&A sessions following the presentations in both instances were quite lively. Oddly enough, however, although several of State’s key officials who had substantive responsibility for the Yellow Rain issue were present at both presentations, none of them asked Meselson a question. 70. See Grant Evans, The Yellow Rainmakers: Are Chemical Weapons Being Used in Southeast Asia? (1983).

80

Chapter 2

71. The television program is described in detail in cable 11771 from the U.S. Embassy, London, to USIA and the State Department, dated May 24, 1984; a copy is in the CBW Collection, Box 1, Folder: Southeast Asia and Afghanistan Cables, NSArchive. 72. For text of the statement see “U.S. Rejection of Hypothesis That Yellow Rain Might Be a Natural Phenomenon,” in U. S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983, Document 457, 966. In a telephone interview with New York Times correspondent Philip M. Boffey, Professor Meselson responded to Romberg’s critique by pointing out that the State Department’s chief error was that “they seem to believe that we are saying that the toxin is contained in the bee.” He countered Romberg’s arguments and then suggested that if the government had found additional samples without pollen, it should “publish the details openly so that scientists can judge their meaning.” He also contended that the issues raised in the State Department’s critique could best be resolved through “careful scientific discussions” and not by a battle of statements to the press. In a telephone conversation with the author on May 2, 2016, Meselson further explained that the 300 milligram droplet Romberg described was a “pooled” sample and that whoever had provided Romberg with the description of that sample had not done him a service. See Philip M. Boffey, “U.S. Rejects Idea That Bees Are the Source of ‘Yellow Rain,’” New York Times, June 2, 1983, A16. In fact, there was considerable confusion among the press and some administration officials on what it was that Meselson and Seeley had actually said in their presentation to the AAAS. As Linda Garmon pointed out, they did not contend that bee feces were the source of trichothecene mycotoxins, but that they “may be the source only of the yellow spots that have been discovered in Southeast Asia” and that the fungal toxins found in the spots, as well as in the blood and urine of alleged victims “could originate from naturally occurring Fusarium fungi.” See Garmon, “Yellow Rain: Bee ‘Spring Cleaning’?,” Science News, 123: 24 (June 11, 1983), 374. 73. Jonathan Alter, “Nerve Gas: A New Arms Race?,” Newsweek, 102: 4 (July 25, 1983), 17. 74. See Philip J. Hilts, “U.S. Turns Over to U.N. ‘Yellow Rain’ Evidence,” Washington Post, August 5, 1983, A8; and an Associated Press (AP) report, in the Boston Globe, August 5, 1983, 5. A copy of the report, titled “United States Submission to the United Nations Secretary General on the Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons,” August 4, 1983, is in the Scott Malone Donation, Box 11, Folder: Southwest Asia and Yellow Rain, NSArchive. According to the report, which described the comparison of blood samples of alleged chemical warfare victims with the blood of five “control” persons who lived in the same areas, none of the control samples showed mycotoxin poisoning. 75. United States Information Agency (USIA), Foreign Press Center, Briefing on Chemical Weapons Use and Arms Control, August 11, 1983, 26-28; a copy of the briefing text is in the CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles, Papers and Memoranda (1982-84, 1986-87 and 1989), NSArchive. The briefers were Robert Dean and Col. James Leonard, both from State’s PM Bureau. 76. A copy of the “Meselson Point Paper,” drafted in ACDA, dated July 2, 1984, is in CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1982-84, 1986-87, 1989), NSArchive. 77. Letter to the Editor from Manfred Eimer, ACDA’s assistant director for verification and intelligence, New York Times, March 10, 1984, 22. 78. Letter to the Editor, New York Times, June 13, 1983, A14. The seven signers included Chester J. Mirocha, Joseph D. Rosen, Stuart Schwartzstein, Bruno H. Shiefer, Sterling Seagrave, Bernard M. Wagner, M.D, and Bashir A. Zikria. Professor Rosen of Rutgers University, also wrote a letter to the editor of Science, in response to an article it published by Eliot Marshall on June 24 (p. 1356). Rosen pointed out that a sample he had given to Meselson contained polyethylene glycol (PEG), a man-made substance, thus making “irrelevant any explanation for the natural occurrence of yellow rain, bees or no bees.” For the text of Rosen’s letter, see Science, 221: 4612 (August 19, 1983),

Yellow Rain

81

698. Researchers later dismissed Rosen’s PEG finding, because it too easily could have resulted from contamination in his laboratory. 79. See memorandum for Francis I. McGinn, Jr., assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Pentagon Counterintelligence Force, Department of the Army, June 7, 1981, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder Reports, Articles . . . (1979-81), NSArchive. 80. See statement by Leach before the “Symposium on Chemical and Biological Weapons: Detection, Control and Disarmament,” AAAS, May 31, 1983; a copy is in Scott Malone Donation, Box 11, Folder: Southeast Asia and Yellow Rain, NSArchive. 81. “Gratifying Support,” Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1983, 16. 82. Solarz, “Yellow Rain: Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 1983, 30, reprinted as “Make No Mistake: They’re Using Yellow Rain,” Washington Post, June 27, 1983, A11. 83. A copy of Shultz’s letter is in the CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Reports, Articles . . . (1982-84, 1986-87, 1989), NSArchive. 84. See, for example, the heavily redacted declassified DDI cable 610371, July 1, 1983, CBW Collection, Box 5, Folder: Cables (1978-1987): 1983, NSArchive. 85. Barry Wain, “‘Yellow Rain’ Attacks Said to Continue, but Conclusive Evidence is Still Elusive,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1983, 36; Philip M. Boffey, “Evidence is Fading as U.S. Investigates Use of ‘Yellow Rain,’” New York Times, May 15, 1984, 1A; Eric Guyot, “‘Yellow Rain’—The Case is Not Proved,” The Nation, 239: 15 (November 10, 1984), 1, 465-84; Saul Hormats, “A Chemical Warfare Expert Who Doubts the Soviets Used Yellow Rain,” Washington Post, February 26, 1985, D1; and Nicholas Wade, “Rains of Error: The Administration Vs. Chemical Enemies, Foreign and Domestic,” New York Times, August 30, 1985, A24. 86. See, for example, Eliot Marshall, “Bugs in the Yellow Rain Theory,” Science, 220: 4604 (June 24, 1983), 1356-58; Lewis Thomas, “On Yellow Rain and Science,” Discover, 4: 8 (August 1983), 80-82; Lois Ember, “Yellow Rain,” Chemical and Engineering News, January 9, 1984, 8-34; Leonard A. Cole, “Yellow Rain or Yellow Journalism?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 40:7 (August-September 1984), 36-38; and Thomas D. Seeley, Joan W. Nowicke, Matthew Meselson, Jeanne Guillemin, and Prongthep Akratanakul, “Yellow Rain,” Scientific American, September 1985, 128-37. 87. The investigative team sent a steady stream of cables from the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok to the State Department and other federal agencies in Washington, and the team’s director sent quarterly progress reports. Many of these now declassified cables and reports can be found in the CBW Collection, Box 1, Folder: Southeast Asia and Afghanistan Cables, NSArchive. See also, Philip J. Hilts, “U.S. Yellow Rain Reports Rebutted,” Washington Post, May 29, 1986, A1; Robinson, Guillemin, and Meselson, “Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses,” Foreign Policy, 1987, 100-17; and Tucker, “The Yellow Rain Controversy,” 2001, 33-36. 88. On the two rumors cited here, see cable 67427 from U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, to the State Department, November 15, 1985, and cable 5952, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, to the State Department, February 25, 1986; copies are in the CBW Collection, Box 1, Folder: Southeast Asia and Afghanistan Cables, NSArchive. 89. See cable 134125, from U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, to the State Department, February 25, 1986, CBW Collection, Box 1, Folder: Southeast Asia and Afghanistan Cables, NSArchive. The now declassified cables from the U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, which originated from the Defense/State investigative team, also reveal that alleged victims’ stories had changed over time and many claims had been retracted, few refugee reports had been cross-checked, problems in the handling, refrigerating, packing, and shipping of samples had been common, the symptoms of victims who claimed to have been attacked by Yellow Rain could be attributable to a wide variety of other diseases and ailments, and that no systematic autopsies had been done on the alleged victims who had died. 90. On the British and Canadian government reports, see “Yellow Rain: British analyses find no toxin,” Nature, 321: 6069 (May 29-June 4, 1986), 459; Philip J. Hilts, “U.S. ‘Yellow Rain’ Reports Rebutted: Use of Toxins Doubted,” Washington Post, May

82

Chapter 2

29, 1986, A1; and Eliot Marshall, “Yellow Rain Evidence Slowly Whittled Away,” Science, 233: 4759 (July 4, 1986), 18-19. The State Department responded to the reports in its routine way: the PM Bureau prepared press guidance, which was cleared by State’s Public Affairs Bureau (PA) and the NSC, and distributed to the field. The guidance, dated May 30, 1986, stated that the reports did not alter the administration’s previous conclusions; a copy is in the Richard (Dick) Childress Files, Box 92402, Folder: Yellow Rain, RRPL. 91. “U.S. ‘Yellow Rain’ Reports Rebutted,” Washington Post, May 29, 1986, A1. 92. “Still Caught in the Yellow Rain,” New York Times, June 16, 1986, A18. 93. See Solarz’s letter to Shultz, October 2, 1986, and Fox’s reply, hand-dated December 9, 1986, in the CBW Collection, Box 1, Folder: Southeast Asia and Afghanistan Cables, NSArchive. 94. See, for example, “Still Caught in the Yellow Rain,” New York Times, June 16, 1986, A18; “Bottling Up Biological Warfare,” New York Times, September 20, 1986, 26; and “Still Secret after 30 Years?,” New York Times, February 12, 2012, 10. 95. According to Bartley, his paper published about fifty articles on Yellow Rain during the eighteen months following Haig’s Berlin speech, many of them editorials and articles written by William P. Kucewicz, advising the administration, inter alia, to delay any serious arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union until it definitively ended its use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. For examples of the Wall Street Journal’s consistent editorial line, see “How Many Smoking Guns,” November 3, 1981, 34; “Poisoning Disarmament,” November 6, 1981, 34; “Anyone Serious?,” November 13, 1981, 34; and “Whitewashing Yellow Rain,” November 23, 1981, 26. For sample articles written by Kucewicz, see “Mycotoxins: The Scientific Battlefield,” May 30, 1984, 32; “The ‘Bee Feces’ Theory Undone,” September 6, 1985, 18; “Yellow Rain Confirmed,” March 31, 1986, 18; “Bee-Feces Theory Still Has No Sting,” September 17, 1987, 34. Bartley’s and Kucewicz’s extended views about Yellow Rain and its linkage to arms control treaties are laid out in their co-authored article, “‘Yellow Rain’ and the Future of Arms Agreements,” Foreign Affairs, 1983, 805-26. Not all readers agreed with Kucewicz’s views. Leonard A. Cole, a professor of political science at William Paterson College in New Jersey, for example, found a series of articles on Yellow Rain written by Kucewicz between April 23 and May 18, 1984, “remarkable less for the evidence he produced than for the relentless drumbeat of his message.” Cole criticized Kucewicz for accepting as fact issues still in dispute, making false attributions, and offering a host of irrelevancies and non-sequiturs, which collectively could “only worsen the already parlous state of Soviet-American relations.” See Cole, “Yellow Rain or Yellow Journalism?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (August/ September 1984), 36-38. 96. U.S. Congress, International Security and Development Cooperation Act. Public Law 97-113, 97th Cong., 1981, 95 Stat. 1519-64. 97. U.S. Senate, Senate Res. 201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., August 4, 1983. On the NSC’s action, see an early draft of the resolution attached to a note from NSC Asia specialist Richard (Dick) Childress to Desaix Anderson, in the State Department’s Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Office of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea Affairs (EA/VLK), May 11, 1983, Childress Files, Box 92402, Folder: Yellow Rain, RRPL. On September 8, 1983, ACDA director Adelman wrote to Senator Pressler, thanking him for supporting and publicizing the administration’s position on illegal use of chemical and toxin weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan; a copy of the letter is attached to the record of the markup on the resolution. 98. See Senate Resolution 207, August 28, 1983, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. and Senate Resolution 457, September 28, 1984, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 99. See House Concurrent Resolution 283, April 3, 1984, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 100. See Roper Report 82-7, which can be accessed at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu. 101. See, for example, Louis Harris, “U.S.—U.S.S.R Accord on Nuclear Arms Desired,” analyzing a poll taken September 4-7, 1986 and released on September 22, 1986, which found that a substantial majority of 79 to 19 percent of the American public

Yellow Rain

83

supported a negotiated agreement on the “outlawing of chemical weapons and warfare.” Harris concluded that the poll results made it evident that “backing for negotiations and agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States runs deep in this country.” A poll taken by the Daniel Yankelovich Group for Americans Talk Security, November 4-7, 1988, revealed that 71 percent of the respondents “strongly approved” and 13 percent “somewhat approved” the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. Both polls can be accessed at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu. 102. See Director of Central Intelligence, “Implications of Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons for US Security Interests,” Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), 11-17-83, September 15, 1983, 2. A redacted copy is available at https://cata log.archives.gov/id/7327073. 103. The referenced findings came from samples analyzed in Dr. Mirocha’s lab at the University of Minnesota. A sixth sample obtained by ABC News was independently analyzed by Dr. Joseph A. Rosen of Rutgers University and found to contain mycotoxins. Of the 100 plus blood samples from alleged victims analyzed by various labs, twenty were reported as positive for mycotoxins, all of which came from Mirocha’s lab. See Lois Ember, “Yellow Rain,” Chemical and Engineering News, January 9, 1984, 18; and Erik Guyot, The Nation, November 10, 1984, 479-80. 104. Evidently, there was some internal discussion of this idea in the administration in late 1981. After Burt’s congressional testimony on November 10, 1981, Louis T. Montulli, a staffer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), sent George Keyworth, a copy of Burt’s statement attached to a memo informing him that State’s desk officer for Yellow Rain said State was “considering calling in a group of expert scientists to both review their evidence and hype their cause.” About three weeks later, Burt floated to Keyworth a proposal to establish a panel of scientific experts to review critically the available evidence on Soviet use of chemical and toxin weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. In his memo, Burt proposed terms of reference and a list of possible members for such a panel. It is unclear, however, from the available records whether the proposal went forward to the president. Copies of Montulli’s memo, dated November 18 and Burt’s memo, dated December 8, are in Keyworth Files, Box 10, Folder: Yellow Rain, RRPL. 105. On Sarver, see Pringle, “Political Science,” The Atlantic Monthly, October 1985, 79; and Tucker, “The Yellow Rain Controversy,” The Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 34. 106. See Philip Boffey, “Evidence Is Fading as U.S. Investigates Use of ‘Yellow Rain,’” New York Times, May 15, 1984, A1; and Saul Hormats, “A Chemical Warfare Expert Who Doubts the Soviets Used Yellow Rain,” Washington Post, February 26, 1985, D1. Hormats, a former chief engineer in the U.S. Army’s Manufacturing Technology Directorate at Edgewood Arsenal, told journalist Erik Guyot, that “There isn’t a damn bit of military value to it. At minimum, about 3,000 tons of yellow rain would be required to attack a village. To place this quantity on target would require 20,000 to 30,000 shells—some two hours of fire from a full Soviet division—or a minimum of 8,000 bombs dropped from the air.” For the quote, see Guyot, “The Case Is Not Proved,” The Nation, November 10, 1984, 484. 107. As Dr. James Bamburg, a professor of biochemistry at Colorado State University, who had produced and named the T-2 toxin as part of his doctoral dissertation, put it: “You don’t need a first-class pharmaceutical industry. You can do it in your basement or in a converted dog kennel.” For the quote, see Philip Boffey, “Are the Russians Using ‘Yellow Rain’ in Asia? Experts Debate the Data,” New York Times, November 24, 1981, C1. 108. For example, the investigation of the Yellow Rain incident that occurred in Jiangsu Province in China in 1976, the results of which were published in September 1977 in a Chinese scientific journal and brought to the attention of Western researchers in 1983. The Chinese case involved a “misidentification of honeybee feces as poison from the sky,” similar to the stories told by Hmong refugees in Thailand. Nor did the administration appear to acknowledge the views of researchers at the USDA’s Mycotoxin Research program in Peoria, Illinois, established at the request of the U.S. Army

84

Chapter 2

in 1984, who believed that the natural occurrence of trichothecene mycotoxins “is a more serious problem than any deliberate distribution.” Additional negative evidence came rather late in the controversy, when in 2002, a report of Yellow Rain (this time “yellow-green” rain), which was said to have fallen from the sky on the town of Sangrampur, near Calcutta, India. Indian researchers concluded that the colored rain was not a chemical warfare agent, but much more likely was “caused by the migration of a giant swarm of Asian honeybees, known to produce ‘golden showers.’” See the following: Meselson and Robinson, “The Yellow Rain Affair,” in Clunan, et al., Terrorism, War, or Disease, 2008, 80-81; Anne E. Desjardins, “From Yellow Rain to Green Wheat: 25 Years of Trichothecene Biosynthesis Research,” Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, 2009, 4478-84; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Conflicting Evidence Revives ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy,” available online at http://lisanagy.comcontent.php?id=1; and Fred Pearce, “Green Rain Over India Evokes Memories of Cold War Paranoia,” New Scientist, 174 (June 22, 2002), 13. 109. Tucker, “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy,” The Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 36-37. 110. Tucker, “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy,” The Nonproliferation Review, 2001, 36-37. 111. Fact Sheet, “Case Study: Yellow Rain,” October 1, 2005, prepared by the Bureau of Compliance and Implementation, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.

THREE Arms and Controversy Selling Advanced Weapons to Saudi Arabia

The controversy over the sale of enhanced F-15s and Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia traced its roots back to the administration of President Jimmy Carter. 1 In 1978, Carter agreed to sell sixty F-15 fighter aircraft to the Saudis. There was considerable congressional opposition to the sale, but after the Carter administration made several concessions, such as commitments to sell additional F-15s to Israel, not to include armaments in the Saudi sale that would enhance the F-15’s ground attack capabilities or AWACS air surveillance radar aircraft, the Senate approved the sale by a vote of 54 to 44. In early 1980, however, after the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Saudis requested both F-15 enhancements and AWACS. 2 Shortly after Ronald Reagan’s election in November 1980, Carter reversed his earlier position and said he would sell the Saudis both F-15 enhancements and AWACS for 1985 delivery, and then reversed himself again, when he told the Saudis that he was turning the matter over to the new administration. 3 On February 6, 1981, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. and Secretary of Defense Caspar “Cap” Weinberger, sent a joint memorandum to the White House recommending approval of an F-15 enhancement package for Saudi Arabia and agreement “in principle” to provide AWACS once it was determined precisely how many and what type were wanted. 4 Administration principals discussed the prospective Saudi arms package at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting on February 18, where Haig stated that “we should do more” for the Saudis than Carter had, because we “do not want to appear to be merely rubber stamping a Carter policy.” 5 At a follow up NSC meeting on February 27, the president gave final approval to the Haig-Weinberger pro85

86

Chapter 3

posal to provide selective F-15 enhancements to Saudi Arabia and additional security assistance to Israel, 6 announcing it publicly on March 6. 7 On April 1, two days after John Hinckley shot the president, NSC principals reached a decision at another meeting to include five AWACS in the arms package, 8 which Reagan approved from his hospital bedside, and was announced publicly on April 21. 9 Two days later, in an apparent but unavailing attempt to preempt criticism by those who opposed the sale of AWACS even before it was officially announced, the State Department issued a statement contending that “the overwhelming impact of the sale will be to enhance Saudi defensive capabilities—not to threaten Israel.” 10 Throughout the discussions at subsequent NSC meetings of the proposed Saudi/Israeli arms package during the period from mid-February to April 1, the president and his chief national security advisers were well aware that balancing Saudi and Israeli interests would be difficult and that public and congressional opposition would be substantial, especially if it was perceived that the United States was tilting toward one side or the other. The principals agreed that the package had to be split and that the two announcements had to be “widely separated” to avoid any perception that they were linked. The president wanted Israeli support for the sale, as well as their efforts to help “discourage their supporters in this country” from opposing it, and his counselor, Edwin Meese III, wanted Saudi agreement to “help us in a coordinated strategy to go to the Hill and sell the package.” 11 Two particular questions that vexed Richard V. Allen, the president’s national security adviser, and Haig were how to answer those Americans who wanted to know what the quid pro quo was for Israel in return for the Saudi AWACS and how to explain to the Israelis why we were giving more to Saudi Arabia “than we are giving to the NATO countries.” 12 At the February 27 NSC meeting, in anticipation of serious opposition from Jewish organizations in the United States, the NSC staff was tasked with preparing and circulating a draft paper for use with the key leaders of the American Jewish community, that stressed the president’s commitment to take no action that might damage Israel’s security interests. The ensuing public controversy over the prospective arms sale to Saudi Arabia went through two distinct phases. During the first phase, which lasted from roughly mid-February to August 5, 1981, opposition to the arms package developed and rapidly spread, while the administration assumed a reactive rather than a proactive public communication approach. This was the result of several things: the administration’s pragmatic decision to concentrate on pushing its domestic economic program through Congress; Senate majority leader Howard H. Baker Jr.’s advice to the White House team to delay a simultaneous push on the arms package; 13 John Hinckley’s attempt to assassinate Reagan on March 30, which put the president out of commission for about a month; and the administration’s effort to work out a set of understandings with Saudi

Arms and Controversy

87

leaders that would ensure the technology provided would be fully protected and employed to the mutual benefit of both countries. The second phase began almost immediately after the administration’s victory on its economic package in early August and continued until the Senate voted on October 28, 1981, to allow the arms sale to go forward. During this phase, the administration assumed the initiative. It accepted an unavoidable defeat in the Democratic House, while narrowing its communication outreach and bargaining efforts to concentrate on those moderate Republican and conservative Democratic senators, whose opposition to the arms package was perceived as “soft.” Administration officials went public with the narrative that had been developed over the previous months, and the president ultimately adopted a one-by-one peel-away strategy of attrition in the Senate, essentially replicating his successful bargaining strategy on his domestic economic package. 14 In the end, that strategy, combined with other developments, proved effective, and on October 28 the Republican-controlled Senate voted by a slim margin against a resolution of disapproval of the sale, thereby allowing it to go forward and giving the president his first foreign policy victory. PHASE ONE: THE OPPOSITION SURGES AND THE ADMINISTRATION RESPONDS Signs of public and congressional opposition to the proposed Saudi arms package began to occur early in 1981, even before the administration’s formal public announcement about the AWACS on April 21. In February, nineteen members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), sent a letter to Haig, reminding him that at the time of the original sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia in 1978, the Carter administration had given the Congress “explicit and unequivocal assurances that offensive equipment, including fuel tanks and bomb racks . . . would not be transferred to Saudi Arabia.” 15 An editorial on March 2 in the Los Angeles Times, urged Congress to veto any possibility that the Reagan administration would sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia, because “the plane is simply too valuable a tool of air defense and warfare to entrust to a country with a clouded political future.” 16 Editors at the New York Times insisted on April 7 that in return for any additional sophisticated armaments for Saudi Arabia, Congress should urge the Reagan administration to press for “a Saudi diplomacy that legitimizes Arab negotiations with Israel,” 17 and at the Washington Post on April 14, the editors stated that the “real problem with the AWACS” was that the “United States has drifted into using arms sales to satisfy political pressures of the moment . . . rather than to resolve the underlying Arab-Israeli split.” 18 And on April 20, the Wall Street Journal stated that the “really compelling argument” about an AWACS-armed Saudi Arabia is that they could easily become a target

88

Chapter 3

should war again break out in the Middle East. 19 In a three-page letter to Haig, Senate minority leader Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) noted that AWACS for Saudi Arabia “is certain to spark even greater controversy in the Senate than did a similar offer to the Shah of Iran in 1978,” and that he was concerned about “the potential security risks which could compromise a technology the Soviets are years away from perfecting.” He also queried why the Reagan administration wanted to sell AWACS to a nonNATO country, and wondered whether it had seriously taken Israeli concerns into account. 20 In short, many of the arguments that would be used by opponents of the sale to Saudi Arabia were on the public record by the end of April 1981. Some writers view the F-15/AWACS controversy primarily as a struggle between the so-called “Jewish lobby” or the “Israeli lobby” in the United States and the Reagan administration, but this view both minimizes and distorts the broad range of opposition to the sale. The opposition consisted of five distinct components: editorial opinion, public opinion, defense organizations and political elites, Jewish organizations, and Congress. With respect to editorial opinion, the State Department’s Office of Public Opinion and Plans (OAP) reviewed more than fifty daily newspapers in major and mid-level media markets in June 1981. It found that editorial opinion opposed the selling of AWACS to Saudi Arabia by a 3 to 1 margin, and that, as a group, the papers opposing the sale had larger circulation and were more prestigious than those favoring the sale. The recurring editorial arguments against the AWACS sale were that it constituted a potential threat to Israeli security, would place a superior technology in the hands of an unstable government, that Saudi defense in the region was not dependent on AWACS, that they threatened Middle East stability, and that they could make the Saudis targets in a regional conflict. OAP analysts also reviewed the columns of eight nationally syndicated columnists who wrote on the AWACS issue, and found that only one of them supported the sale. 21 Public opinion polling showed that most Americans opposed the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. An Associated Press/NBC News telephone poll taken May 18-19, 1981, found that respondents opposed the sale by a majority of 54 to 19 percent. 22 Two polls taken in September, one by CBS News/New York Times on September 22-27 and one by Associated Press/ NBC News on September 28-29, both shortly before the assassination of Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat on October 6, found that the public opposed the AWACS sale by pluralities of about 5 to 3 (CBS News/New York Times, 37 to 20 percent and Associated Press/NBC News, 40 to 25 percent), the decline from the majority of May to the pluralities of September being attributed to differences in question wording. 23 In an interesting breakdown of the Associated Press/NBC News poll, a plurality of 46 to 15 percent of those who expressed an opinion about the sale, thought that it would increase the chances of war in the Middle East and require in-

Arms and Controversy

89

creased military aid to Israel. These results are not particularly surprising, because poll tracking of Americans’ attitudes towards arms sales abroad has consistently demonstrated that the public opposes the sale of highly sophisticated weapons to countries considered “hot spots” and favors arms sales to countries that are clearly and unequivocally friendly to the United States, such as England, Germany, and Israel. Certain defense organizations and political/military elites also opposed the Saudi arms package. The Center for Defense Information (CDI), for example, located in Washington, DC, and headed bv Rear Admiral Gene R. La Roque (ret.) was arguably the most active. Though it supported strong defense, it opposed “excessive expenditures or forces.” Through its major publication, The Defense Monitor, it waged a campaign to enlighten the public and persuade members of the administration and Congress, that the United States should scale back or “temporarily suspend” all new major weapons sales to Saudi Arabia until a level more consistent with Saudi “absorption capacity” was reached. CDI also believed that the “arms for oil relationship” that existed between the United States and Saudi Arabia fueled the Middle East arms race, and that the proposed sale of enhanced F-15s and AWACS would increase instability in the area, as well as the possibility that the United States could be drawn into a conflict there. 24 Stansfield Turner, former director of the CIA, believed there was “no way the Saudi military establishment could operate or maintain a fleet” of AWACS on its own, and that it would be “irresponsible” for the United States to help the Saudis “prepare to defeat a sophisticated air threat . . . when they are incapable of handling the more elementary threats of insurrection and guerrilla warfare that are highly probable.” 25 Both Walter Mondale, who was Jimmy Carter’s vicepresident, and Cyrus Vance, who had been Carter’s secretary of state, also opposed the sale. 26 On several occasions, Mondale said publicly that he had opposed the sale of F-15 enhancements and AWACS to Saudi Arabia during the Carter administration and was still opposed to it. 27 General George Keegan (ret.), former assistant chief of staff, Air Force Intelligence, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) that the sale would upset the political balance in the area and “destabilize the region in the long term.” After “vast expenditure of equipment and dollars,” he contended, the AWACS would have little operational impact on the defense of the “vital assets” the United States wished to protect, and the sale could compromise the AWACS technology, tilt the United States away from its close relationship with Israel and imply a long-term commitment to the Arab world, none of which would be in the best interests of the United States. 28 Most major Jewish organizations in the United States vigorously opposed the sale. 29 The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) were particularly active opponents. Thomas A. Dine,

90

Chapter 3

executive director of AIPAC, testified before congressional committees, gave speeches around the country, and lobbied members of Congress. Other groups such as the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) organized public information campaigns, aimed at mobilizing Americans to contact members of the administration and Congress by mail, telephone, and telegram, conducted petition drives and made efforts to build coalitions with influential citizens and pro-Israel Christian allies. Although there were some minor differences between these groups’ respective program agendas and their operational tactics, their objections to the sale generally paralleled the concerns of congressional and other critics of the sale. 30 In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, Dine stressed the fact that there had never been and was not a Saudi quid pro quo for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and that selling enhanced F-15 weapon systems to the Saudis would violate previous assurances made by the Carter administration to Congress. AIPAC and the AJC agreed that giving advanced equipment to Saudi Arabia risked compromising the technology, that it was “political blackmail” for the Saudis to make the sale of such weapons a “test” of American friendship, and that the sale would contribute to the Middle East arms race and threaten Israel’s security. 31 In Congress, there was substantial opposition to the sale. On June 24, 1981, Senator Robert “Bob” Packwood (R-OR) was joined by a bipartisan group of fifty-three other senators as cosigners of a letter to President Reagan expressing their “deep concern” about the administration’s proposed arms package for Saudi Arabia and their “strong belief” that the sale would not be “in the best interest of the United States.” They recommended that the president “refrain” from sending the proposal forward to Congress. 32 That same day, in the House, Representatives Clarence D. (“Doc”) Long (D-MD) and Norman Lent (R-NY) introduced H. Con. Res. 118, cosponsored by a bipartisan group of 224 members, disapproving the Saudi arms package. 33 About three months later, on September 17, after the summer recess and shortly before Anwar Sadat’s assassination, Senator Packwood, along with forty-nine bipartisan cosponsors, introduced Sen. Con. Res. 37, disapproving the sale as it was submitted to Congress in late August. 34 By early fall, House and Senate opponents of the arms package deal had thrown down a political gauntlet to the president, as several of the president’s national security advisers had predicted back in February, when they were concerned that congressional opposition could derail the sale. The administration began to lay out its public rationale for the arms sale in early March, and it set up bureaucratic machinery to monitor interagency activities related to the proposed Saudi arms package. 35 From the outset, its defense of the sale was inextricably linked to its broader policy of “strategic consensus” in the Middle East. Essentially, that consensus involved bilateral cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Egypt,

Arms and Controversy

91

and Israel (and prospectively with other “moderate” Arab states) to defend the oil-rich Persian Gulf area from any type of Soviet threat and securing the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In his testimony before the SFRC in March, Haig stated that it was “fundamentally important to develop a consensus of strategic concerns throughout the region among Arab and Jew and to be sure that the overriding danger of Soviet inroads into this area are not overlooked.” 36 During a discussion at an NSC meeting on March 19, concerning the organization and composition of a proposed Sinai peacekeeping force, Haig was a bit more precise about the role of oil in U.S. policy toward the Middle East. We “should remember,” he commented, “that our primary objective in the Middle East is to defend the oil supplies.” 37 In public fora throughout the AWACS controversy, the president and his national security advisers consistently stressed the imminent danger of a Soviet threat in the area, particularly to Persian Gulf oil facilities. In briefings by State and Defense Department officials during the spring, the public narrative ran along the following lines. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war had created widespread regional instability, which increased the dangers of Soviet penetration and growing influence in the area. Therefore, it was necessary to help strengthen the pro-Western or “moderate” Arab regimes to enable them to play a greater military role, along with the United States, in that unstable area. The president had decided to sell the advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia that the Carter administration had withheld to increase that country’s confidence in its partnership with the United States, thereby facilitating the protection of the Persian Gulf oilfields and, over the long run, to encourage Saudi support for Middle East peace efforts. 38 Briefers consistently denied that the arms being sold to Saudi Arabia would constitute in any way a “realistic” threat to Israel, and insisted that the United States would retain sufficient control over the aircraft to preclude any use of the planes against that country. In fact, they contended, the proposed sale was the best long-term guarantee of Israeli security and that of other states in the region desiring to remain free of Soviet pressure. Administration officials also predicted that failure to approve the arms package would discredit those Saudis who expressed “moderate” political views and cause them to purchase comparable surveillance planes from America’s competitors. 39 In an article in the New York Times, the journalist Bernard Gwertzman astutely pointed out that the administration’s approach was based on the assumption that the Saudis would not only remain pro-Western, but would recognize their military inferiority vis-á-vis Israel, which would act as a brake on their risking their expensive American equipment against that country. He also predicted that the Saudis’ public declarations that Israel presented more of a threat to the region than the Soviet Union and revelations about

92

Chapter 3

Saudi funding of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would not help the administration’s strategic argument. 40 While the administration was developing its public narrative, it was also privately offering Israel, as it had discussed during the NSC meetings of February-April, an additional $600 million in credits, which it could apply to the purchase of more F-15s, and the relaxation of export restrictions, which would allow the Israelis to sell its Kfir airplanes, even in countries where they would be competing with U.S. aerospace corporations. 41 Although this had a temporary calming effect on Israeli officials and some of Israel’s supporters in the United States, the calm was shattered after the White House announced on April 21 that AWACS would be added to the Saudi arms package. At the White House daily press briefing following the announcement, Larry Speakes, the deputy press secretary, attempted to forestall negative reaction by explaining that the arms package was essential to protecting U.S. vital national interests, providing a stabilizing influence in the region and countering Soviet threats “to our friends” in the Persian Gulf and “other pressures.” Both Speakes and Dean Fischer, the State Department spokesman, stressed the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel and the fact that the administration considered that country a “friend and an ally.” 42 PHASE TWO: THE ADMINISTRATION PLAYS OFFENSE The administration’s decision to adopt a more assertive strategy on the Saudi arms sale package was linked to the convergence of four specific developments. First, was Israel’s attack on June 7, without prior notice to the White House, on Iraq’s nuclear facility at Osirak, which stimulated considerable criticism among the president’s subordinates, some of whom wanted “strong, even punitive measures against Israel.” 43 According to an interagency intelligence assessment, dated July 1, the Israeli raid “damaged the rationale for a US Middle East policy based on cooperation against threats from the USSR,” and raised concerns that “[Crown Prince] Fahd’s vulnerability to criticism over his US policy would be most pronounced if there were an early US decision not to sell AWACS aircraft and the F-15 enhancement package to Saudi Arabia.” The intelligence community believed that the Saudi arms package would help offset opportunities that the Soviets might exploit, stemming from the search by Arab leaders, in the wake of the Israeli action, to boost their security and protect their interests. 44 Second, by mid-June both Haig and Weinberger had come to the realization that the White House’s lack of urgency about the arms sale and the lack of coordination and effective communication between State, Defense, and the NSC on how best to pursue the issue in Congress and with the public needed to be addressed. They took the problem to Meese, who evidently laid it before the president. 45 On June

Arms and Controversy

93

15, Reagan signed an order appointing Richard V. Allen, his chief of staff, to chair a new interagency group to coordinate all administration efforts to mobilize public support for the sale. 46 Third, in response to PLO shelling of Israel with rockets from Lebanon, the Israeli air force on July 17, bombed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Beirut, inflicting heavy casualties on the local population. Shortly thereafter, Haig sent a memorandum to the president, routed through Allen, describing how a turndown of the sale would “inflict major damage on our relations with Riyadh” and “significantly harm our wider interests and our strategic objectives in the region.” On July 30, Allen responded to Haig’s memo with one of his own, which contained the president’s handwritten comment agreeing with “everything” in Haig’s memo and stating that he would help to win Senate approval. 47 Fourth, by early August, the administration had sealed a congressional victory on its domestic economic program, which freed Reagan and his senior officials to concentrate on the sale of the arms package to Saudi Arabia. 48 On August 5, the president sent a letter to congressional leaders, indicating that the administration would soon formally submit the arms package, which he believed would “improve the security of our friends, strengthen our own posture in the region, and make it clear to the Soviet leadership that the United States is determined to assist in preserving security and stability in Southwest Asia.” He expressed his hope that no one on the Hill would “prejudge our proposal,” 49 an opening gambit to his later efforts to bargain with Congress. When the administration assumed the offensive, it had a number of significant advantages. In the first place, ever since Congress had arrogated to itself the power to review and disapprove large arms sales in 1974, in the wake of the Vietnam War, no major arms sale to a foreign government had ever been disapproved by Congress, though in a few cases, congressional opposition had persuaded the executive branch to accept certain modifications. Second, congressional disapproval of a large arms sale required simple majority votes in both Houses, which in a divided legislature was exceedingly difficult, especially when the Senate was dominated by the president’s party. Third, in light of Reagan’s sweeping victory in the 1980 presidential election, many of the Republicans who came to Washington on his coattails had an outstanding electoral debt to the president, which Reagan had begun to call in during the struggle over his economic package, and no doubt expected to repeat during the AWACS controversy. Fourth, the president could count on the support of three past presidents: Richard Nixon, 50 Gerald Ford, 51 and Jimmy Carter, 52 as well as sixteen of the most prominent members of Washington’s national security establishment, ranging from Henry Kissinger 53 to Harold Brown to Brent Scowcroft, who had served in either Republican or Democratic administrations, as well as a few who had served in both. 54 Fifth, it could rely on significant independent lobbying efforts by the

94

Chapter 3

aerospace corporations and their subcontractors, such as Boeing, United Technologies, and Westinghouse, involved in arms sales to the Middle East, to lobby Congress hard in favor of the sale, on the grounds that defeat of the sale would result in the loss of exports and jobs, and serve the interest of British competitors because the Saudis could easily purchase comparable Nimrod radar surveillance planes from them. 55 Sixth, at this early stage of his first administration, Reagan’s popularity was high (even though his Saudi arms package proposal was not), Republican party discipline in Congress was strong and he could depend on majority leader Baker, the “Great Conciliator,” to handle deftly the passage of the arms package through the Senate. Finally, his upbeat attitude and his humor in response to Hinckley’s assassination attempt, won widespread sympathy among the American people, which could not be ignored on the Hill. During the period between August 5, when Reagan informed Congress that he would soon formally submit his arms proposal, and October 1, when he notified the press that he had done so that morning, he actually adopted a low public profile on the AWACS controversy. He neither delivered a prime-time televised address nor a nationally broadcast radio address devoted to that issue, nor did he show any inclination to engage reporters on the matter. 56 Instead, he evidently preferred to let his senior and mid-level national security officials—Allen, Haig, Weinberger, and James L. Buckley, the undersecretary of state for security assistance— carry the brunt of public presentation of the administration’s narrative concerning the importance of the sale to the national security interests of the United States. On August 24, when Buckley announced to State’s press corps the administration’s decision to sell “certain air defense equipment” to Saudi Arabia, he described the proposed sale as the “cornerstone” of Reagan’s policy of restoring America’s “strength and credibility” in the region. 57 On September 20, Haig was interviewed on ABC’s “Issues and Answers” by ABC News correspondents Sander Vanocur and Barrie Dunsmore, 58 and the Washington Post published Allen’s lengthy response to critics, in which he attempted to refute the “misconceptions” of the sale’s opponents. He countered the argument that the United States received no quid pro quo for the sale, by noting Saudi Arabia’s importance as an oil supplier and its efforts to shore up resistance by other countries in the region to Soviet penetration. He denied the charge that the sale constituted a threat to Israeli security, by contending that the AWACS were only flying radar platforms, which in no way reduced Israel’s qualitative air superiority. He dismissed the argument that the Saudis did not need and could not effectively use the AWACS and that the planes were merely a test of U.S.-Saudi friendship, by stressing the Saudi belief that they had a legitimate security need for the arms package. Faulting the argument that the AWACS should be leased and not sold, he pointed out that leasing was unacceptable to the Saudis, and that

Arms and Controversy

95

they could easily buy similar aircraft elsewhere. He contradicted the argument that the sale would jeopardize U.S. security by risking the loss of sensitive technology, by arguing that the computers used in the AWACS were commercially available, and that the means of recreating their software would not be furnished. Finally, he stated that the AWACS were not a “political favor,” but rather part of a “balanced and effective component of a comprehensive regional strategy to counter Soviet adventurism and to create the conditions for a durable Middle East Peace.” 59 During September, no doubt motivated by news reports that Senator Packwood was close to gathering a group of fifty-one senators who were ready to vote against the arms sale, the administration ramped up its efforts to bargain its way to Senate approval. The day after his state meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on September 9 and 10, the president had a forty-five-minute meeting at the White House with Senator Packwood. 60 On September 14, he invited twenty-seven senators to the White House, and on the following day, Allen and Meese met with forty senators on Capitol Hill. 61 Allen briefed White House reporters on the arms sale on September 16, 62 and Haig testified before the SFRC on September 17, where he attempted to respond to the requests of senators who wanted modifications in the terms of the sale, such as “geographic limitations” on the operational role of the planes and joint U.S.-Saudi command and control. 63 These efforts, however, failed to dissuade Senator Packwood from officially introducing S. Con. Res. 37, the resolution of disapproval of the sale, on September 17, which had a total of fifty co-signers, including nineteen Republicans. Nor did they prevent the HFRC on October 7, from voting 28 to 8, with ten of the sixteen Republicans on the committee joining the majority, to reject the sale. 64 By then, the outcome in the House was a foregone conclusion, and as expected by both the media and the administration, on October 14, after a four-hour floor debate, the House voted overwhelmingly by 301 to 111 in favor of its own concurrent resolution disapproving the sale. 65 After his defeat in the House, the president shifted his full attention to the Senate, where he began to meet on a one-to-one basis with senators who were undecided or considered possible switchers, such as Edward Zorinsky (D-NB), William Cohen (R-ME), and Jennings Randolph (D-NB), while privately confiding to his diary his displeasure with Senators Packwood and John H. Glenn Jr. (D-OH), both of whom remained avid opponents of the sale. 66 In his public statements concerning the AWACS controversy during this period, the president experienced some difficulties. In his televised White House press conference on October 1, for example, he stated that “while we must always take into account the vital interests of our allies . . . . It is not the business of other nations to make American foreign policy.” When UPI’s Helen Thomas asked him whether he was telling the press corps “that Israel should keep her hands off what we consider

96

Chapter 3

American national security matters in the Middle East,” the president quickly backtracked. He hastened to add that he did not mean what he said “in a deprecating way.” When asked by another reporter if he could guarantee that the AWACS system “would not fall into the wrong hands” as our top secret military equipment did in Iran after the Shah was deposed, the president responded “that Saudi Arabia, we will not permit to be an Iran.” When asked in a follow-up by a different reporter whether that meant he would “take military intervention if that was necessary to prevent it,” the president avoided a direct reply and after shifting to the United States’ partial responsibility for what had occurred in Iran, he replied that “there’s no way we could stand by and see that [region?] taken over by anyone that would shut off that oil.” 67 As far as AWACS and the Middle East were concerned, Reagan’s performance was particularly maladroit, and editorial response was negative. The New York Times, for example, found his veiled reference to the Israeli lobby an “ill-tempered, premeditated remark that was a crude effort to blame the ‘Israeli lobby’ for the likely defeat of a mismanaged venture.” 68 The Christian Science Monitor described the president’s references to Iran as “tactless,” and concluded that “the effect was to suggest publicly that the US was assuming the role of Saudi internal protector and demeaning the Saudis’ ability to take care of matters that are their own business.” 69 The Boston Globe’s response was even harsher: it stated that the “Reagan pledge [about Saudi Arabia] implies that our secular democracy is henceforth committed to defending the theocratic rule of reputedly corrupt kings and princes.” 70 The president’s comments about Iran also had reverberations in Congress, particularly among senators on the SFRC. On the day Reagan made his remarks at his press conference, final hearings were underway before that committee on the arms sale package. During the sessions held on October 1 and 5, Senators Joe Biden (D-DE), John Glenn (D-OH), Richard Lugar (R-IN), Claiborne Pell (D-RI), and Larry Pressler (R-SD) all wanted to know what “actions” the president might take to prevent Saudi Arabia from becoming another Iran. They also wanted to know how the president would respond to two very different threat scenarios: a Soviet or some other hostile country’s military attack on Saudi oil fields and the possibility of an internal political attempt to overthrow the Saudi government. Although they were relentless in putting their questions to Haig, Weinberger, Robert C. “Bud” McFarlane (who was deputy national security adviser until October 17, 1983, then national security adviser) and Buckley, no matter how they phrased and rephrased them, all that they were able to elicit were qualified replies, not answers. In general, administration witnesses took refuge by saying that the questions were hypothetical and that they could not parse any particular action that the president might decide to take on situations that had not yet occurred. As Weinberger put it to Senator Pell: “If a friendly government that ap-

Arms and Controversy

97

peared to be in trouble and one whose preservation seemed to be in the best interests of the United States requested certain kinds of assistance, certainly the President, so far as I understand him, would entertain very hospitably certain requests.” When Pell asked Haig if a revolution occurred in Saudi Arabia, “with no threat to our oil supply, with no proSoviet flavor to it,” would the administration consider intervening, Haig’s reply was curt and dismissive. He said: “I think there are too many uncertainties associated with such a contrived contingency to be worth responsible time and, most importantly, mine by indulging in speculations as to what we would or would not do.” 71 During his exchange with newspaper editors from outside Washington on October 16, in the Cabinet Room at the White House, the president did not fare well. When he was asked about his expectations of what the “Saudis might be willing to say about Israel’s right to exist,” he gave a long and rambling non-answer which shifted the ground to the alleged Soviet threat in the Middle East, the problem in Lebanon, and U.S. credibility. When another editor queried if the president would be prepared to “side openly with the ruling Saudis in case of a revolution there and help suppress it,” Reagan again evaded the question by responding to the completely different issue of the fear about U.S. technology falling into unfriendly hands. When still another editor asked him whether he thought it was a good idea for the Congress to have veto power over major foreign arms sales, he replied that “the Congress has gone too far,” because it would interfere with his ability to utilize his “quiet diplomacy.” 72 He compounded the difficulties inherent in these remarks by his comment upon his return from an economic conference in Cancún, Mexico, on October 26, when he said, in response to a question about the status of the AWACS vote in the Senate, that the arms sale would provide the “greatest security” for both the United States and Israel, and those senators who refused to see that “are not doing their country a service,” implying that the patriotism of his AWACS adversaries was questionable. 73 In both cases, the president’s comments generated critical headlines and negative media and editorial coverage in major newspapers. 74 The president’s description of Saudi contributions to the Middle East peace process was illusionary. Reagan never tired of describing Saudi Arabia as a “moderate” Arab nation, which was “as concerned about the threat to the Middle East by the Soviet Union as . . . we are.” He publicly stated his belief that the Saudis wanted “to be part of the West . . . and associate more with our views and our philosophy”; insisted on several occasions that they had played a constructive role in helping to bring about a cease fire in Lebanon, though exactly what they did and who was responsible for doing it was never made public; 75 and that the AWACS sale would enhance the perception of the United States as “a reliable security partner” which in turn would improve the prospects for greater U.S.-Saudi cooperation in working toward “our common goal of a just

98

Chapter 3

and lasting peace in the region.” 76 After his victory in the Senate on October 28, in response to a question from a reporter about whether the sale would induce the Saudis to get into the Middle East peace process, he replied that “as a matter of fact, the Saudis have shown by their introduction of a peace proposal that they are willing to discuss peace in the Middle East.” The submission of their plan by Crown Prince Fahd in August, he continued “was the first time that they had recognized Israel as a nation, and it’s a beginning point for negotiations.” 77 Whether all this erroneous analysis was the result of willful exaggeration designed for domestic public consumption, merely an attempt to inflate Saudi Arabia’s virtues to substantiate an alleged mutuality of interests, or a state of affairs that the president actually believed to exist is impossible to determine with any degree of certainty. Editorial opinion at some of the most influential newspapers, however, was unequivocally critical. The Boston Globe, for example, noted that the “Saudis have preached moderation more than they have practiced it.” 78 The Wall Street Journal, agreeing that it was unlikely the Saudis would “join the Camp David process,” wanted the administration at least to ask the Saudis “to drop their hostility to Egypt, Oman and any other Arab state that does choose to side more openly with the U.S.” 79 The New York Times viewed the Saudis as a “commercial asset, not a strategic partner,” and insisted that the arms deal nurtured “a fantasy . . . Saudi Arabia as a pillar of American strength.” 80 Specifically, on the so-called Saudi peace plan, the Washington Post pointed out that “There is nothing at all in the Saudi plan that would amount to recognizing Israel in a diplomatic sense,” and that the plan’s call reiterating the right of states in the area to live in peace, could “be extended by inference, but only by inference, to cover Israel.” In brief, the Post’s editors insisted, “Reagan’s remarks on the Saudi plan seem to represent a total misreading.” 81 The New York Times’ editors took an even stiffer position, bristling over “abject American praise for a warmed-over Saudi peace plan,” Saudi insistence on America’s acknowledgment that the Camp David peace between Egypt and Israel, is “a dead-end failure,” and its “acceptance of an independent P.L.O. state on the West Bank of the Jordan, with Jerusalem as its capital.” 82 A number of senators, both Democratic and Republican, were highly skeptical of the president’s illusions about Saudi Arabian political virtues. During several hearings conducted by the SFRC during 1981 on the AWACS sale, for example, they reminded administration witnesses that the Saudis were publicly critical of the U.S. effort to establish bases in Oman; that they continued to fund the PLO and other radical or antiIsrael organizations; that they were certainly not “moderate” toward Israel; that Saudi officials were still periodically calling for “jihad” or holy war against the Israelis; that various Saudi spokesmen had publicly stated that their country’s principal threat came not from the Soviet Union

Arms and Controversy

99

but Israel; and that they had publicly criticized the United States for shooting down two Libyan jets which had attacked U.S. planes as “acts of high piracy and barbarism.” 83 When asked about the Saudis’ strident anti-U.S. political rhetoric, administration witnesses had little to say. Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA), for example, asked Haig about the Saudi calls for “jihad” against the “Zionist enemy,” and Haig replied: “I do not know that at all to be the policy of the Government of Saudi Arabia. No responsible Saudi official has ever made such a statement to me or implied that was the case.” 84 In response to a similar question, Weinberger replied: “They [the Saudis] want and seek a warm and continuing working relationship with us.” 85 While the AWACS controversy was entering something of a “red meat” phase in mid- to late October, an important development in Congress was breaking in the administration’s favor. The joint, bipartisan effort by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and John W. Warner (R-VA), which had originated in late September/early October to achieve a compromise that would satisfy AWACS opponents who were deeply concerned that the Soviet Union or other hostile countries might obtain access to AWACS technology, began bearing fruit. Their non-binding “Sense of the Senate” Resolution, which they introduced in the Senate on October 7, guaranteed that the administration would transfer the AWACS only on the condition that the sale was consistent with all the terms and conditions of the Arms Control and Export Act and the standard Letter of Offer and Acceptance customarily used in arms sales. Nunn and Warner had the support of majority leader Baker and minority leader Byrd, as well as twenty-three cosigners. The final draft of the resolution, worked out with the cooperation of James A. Baker III, the president’s chief of staff, who by this time had taken over primary responsibility for getting the arms package through the Senate, 86 contained additional terms and conditions that went beyond the so-called “standard strictures” in arms contracts, designed to protect the security of the AWACS’ equipment and computer software. 87 It also contained agreements relating to the geographical areas in which the AWACS could be used, and a requirement that the president certify to the SFRC that all the conditions in the resolution had been met prior to actual delivery. 88 Reagan and his chief of staff ensured that the essence of the resolution was incorporated into a letter that the president promised to send to the Senate on October 28, the designated day of the floor vote. 89 As the Nunn-Warner resolution worked its way through Congress and gained adherents, there was also slippage in the ranks of the AWACS opponents, suggesting that their declared numbers were “soft” and that the administration’s bargaining strategy of attrition was turning support for the sale slowly but inexorably in favor of the president. 90 When the SFRC vote was taken on October 15, for example, the committee rejected the sale by a slim margin of 9 to 8, but the White House could take cautious

100

Chapter 3

comfort in the fact that two senators—Larry Pressler (R-SD) and S. I. Hayakawa (R-CA) who were known to be “leaning” against the sale, voted for it. Following the SFRC vote, the president and his senior national security advisers maintained a “full court press” in the Senate on the arms sale. The president continued to meet at the White House with both small groups of senators and in one-on-one knee-chat sessions, while Max Friedersdorf, his chief legislative liaison, and his colleagues worked the Hill. On October 27, after last-minute meetings with a number of senators, Reagan noted in his diary that he was “cautiously optimistic.” 91 During the final floor debates on the following day, while the proponents and opponents of the arms package consumed the full legislative day by repeating the arguments they had used over the past ten months, 92 the president sent copies of his promised letter to Senators Nunn, Warner, Baker, and Byrd, 93 which some journalists believed was the “key piece” in persuading the last few undecided or unannounced senators whom the president needed to vote against the resolution of disapproval. 94 After the final vote was taken and the resolution went down by 52-48, the president wrote in his diary: “What a victory this is—and what it means world wide [sic].” 95 Editorial and public opinion, however, were not quite so exuberant. The editorial boards of some of the largest circulation newspapers noted that they were relieved that the “bruising” AWACS chapter in the evolution of the Reagan presidency was over, and several of those who had consistently opposed the sale agreed that the administration’s slim victory avoided serious damage to the country’s foreign policy credibility, but they all also agreed that the substance of foreign policy developments following the sale was a much more important issue. All of them perceived the five-year window of delivery time for the AWACS as providing ample opportunity for the administration to formulate a serious, coherent, and effective Middle East policy that would help to resolve the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict. They also rejected administration claims that the Saudis were prepared to engage in serious negotiations that would lead to the recognition of Israel or a durable Arab-Israeli peace and they faulted the administration for failing to extract meaningful quid pro quos from Saudi Arabia. 96 There were, however, some differences between their respective points of view. Editors at the Boston Globe predicted that “Saudi Arabia is likely to interpret its role in the AWACS aftermath as simply a cash customer, purchasing no more obligations to follow Washington’s line than the United States does in buying Arabian oil.” 97 The Chicago Tribune criticized the sale as merely “symbolic,” and contended that it “should be the turn of the Saudis to come forth with something constructive . . . that could move the peace process forward.” 98 The Christian Science Monitor described the AWACS “drama” as more of “a political horserace than a serious foreign policy decision,” which “deflected attention from the core problems in the region.” 99 The

Arms and Controversy

101

New York Times, the most consistently critical of the arms sale, stated that the president had “proved that America is vulnerable to economic blackmail,” and that he had helped to summon up the “demons of anti-Semitism.” According to the editors, the only way to redeem the “blunders” made, was for the president to make clear to the Saudis that the United States expected “an Arab offer to negotiate a genuine peace—in exchange for territory—not just with the United States but directly with Israel.” 100 The Washington Post identified the “central defect” of the AWACS sale as the administration’s failure to link the transfer of arms to any coherent diplomatic plan designed to ease the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and insisted that it was time for the president to demonstrate that he had a truly national foreign policy, because 52-48 was “not good enough.” 101 Finally, the Wall Street Journal noted that the “most galling thing” about the sale was the fact that the Saudis were “working against any American presence,” such as failing “to join the Camp David peace process or to allow American bases on their own soil.” 102 With respect to public opinion, the numbers changed somewhat over the period from May to November, but it is clear that the American public remained opposed to the sale of AWACS and other high-grade weapons to Saudi Arabia. A Los Angeles Times poll taken in mid-October revealed that the public opposed the AWACS sale by almost a two-to-one (56 to 29 percent) majority. 103 A Louis Harris & Associates poll, taken October 28-November 3, during the few days immediately following the administration’s victory in the Senate, found that overall a 48-42 percent plurality of the public still opposed the sale. Breaking down his figures even further, Harris found that an overwhelming 81-16 percent majority opposed the United States’ giving, lending, or selling sophisticated weaponry to countries like Saudi Arabia without retaining control over how such equipment might be used. 104 This latter finding remained quite consistent over time; in a Roper poll taken August 13-20, 1983, for example, asking respondents whether the United States should sell weapons to thirteen specific countries, he found that the American public opposed selling weapons to Saudi Arabia by a 62 to 21 percent majority. The only country on the list that fared worse than Saudi Arabia was Iran, by an 836 percent majority. 105 Given the trajectory and outcome of the AWACS controversy, the question of how the administration managed to “snatch victory from the jaws of defeat” inevitably arose, both in the contemporary media and in later academic literature. Some writers attribute Reagan’s success to a combination of his alleged political genius, persuasive powers, and his mastery of the techniques of presidential lobbying. 106 Others stress that the outcome was primarily the product of traditional “political bargaining” between the president and his opponents, 107 a situation inherently tilted toward the executive branch, because of the president’s constitutionally mandated dominance over foreign policy. Both of these interpre-

102

Chapter 3

tations essentially posit the president as the primary actor, but they tend to downplay or overlook entirely the power context in which the bargaining took place. When it comes to executive-legislative bargaining, the president functions in a monopoly market. As the journalist Steven V. Roberts correctly pointed out, the president in the AWACS case had the power to make deals and to provide assurances that the deals would be carried out, regardless of whether they were actually offered, merely implied, subtly suggested, or mutually understood. In contrast, the leaders of the Senate opposition to the AWACS sale had virtually nothing to offer in their effort to dissuade proponents to switch sides. 108 Underlying the whole system of political bargaining is the fact that all members of Congress ultimately possess a commodity of value in the form of a vote. It would be exceedingly naïve to believe that every vote on every issue by every member of Congress is exclusively a vote of conscience. That might occur in a celestial parliament, but it is highly unlikely in the real world of policy making, where bargaining is an integral facet of the executivelegislative relationship. The president’s repeated denials that “no deals were made” and “none were offered” to senators in the AWACS case were belied by his own public admission on October 16 at a luncheon with out-of-town newspaper editors, that in the “battle of the budget” earlier in the year he had made a deal with “Boll Weevil” Democrats not to campaign against them, in return for their support on his domestic economic package. 109 The central problem with the concept of executive-legislative bargaining is the simple fact that it is virtually impossible to prove definitively that a deal was struck. A sitting president is unlikely to admit that one was offered and the target recipient is equally unlikely to admit that he or she agreed to one. However, in many cases, such as the AWACS controversy in the Senate, there is substantial, sometimes overwhelming, circumstantial evidence that inducements of some kind were actually offered or at least suggested. The “bargaining” takes place in an atmosphere of mutual knowledge on the part of the main actors about who wants what or who might need what: a military base to be opened or closed; establishing, restoring or extending Amtrak train service; the filling of a U.S. attorney’s slot; a commitment to campaign for or to refuse to campaign against an individual in state or national elections; the selling or the refusal to sell arms to particular countries; a decision not to place MX missiles in a particular state, and so on. In some cases, all it may take for the president to achieve a vote switch is paying attention to or carefully stroking an individual, perhaps by inviting him to lunch or dinner at the White House, or appealing to his party loyalty or patriotism, or by sitting down with a senator for a knee-to-knee chat and noting how important the individual’s vote is to maintaining U.S. international credibility or the president’s stature as chief executive. As Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR), an “undecided” who ultimately voted against the sale, put it: “It

Arms and Controversy

103

often works with a wink or a nod . . . . They don’t have to make overt promises. They know the way things work around here.” 110 Whatever inducements Reagan used, his bargaining worked effectively enough for him to change the minds of a handful of senators, who in addition to those who may have changed their minds for other reasons, allowed him to eke out a slim victory on the arms sale to Saudi Arabia. 111 Irrespective of any inducements that might have been offered, it seems that a number of senators personally agonized over their respective decisions to support or oppose the sale. An interesting and illuminating case is that of Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD), who initially leaned hard against the sale and wanted the administration to delay sending the package up for a vote, until the Senate had a full opportunity to study all of its implications. As he pointed out in early October during the SFRC’s hearings on the arms package, there were a small number of Jewish voters in South Dakota (“more senators than there are Rabbis”), and he was “certainly . . . not hostage to the Jewish vote.” However, he made it clear that he had “certain criteria,” which if met would justify reconsideration of his position. He had outlined those criteria publicly in August and incorporated them into a resolution he introduced in October, 112 which recommended that if the sale were made, the United States would assist Israel in procuring and financing additional radar jamming equipment needed to protect that country if the AWACS posed a new threat to Israeli security, by allowing the Saudis to monitor Israeli airspace. Throughout the hearings, Pressler was a persistent and often incisive questioner of administration witnesses about his major concerns: that the enhanced F-15s, Sidewinder missiles, and AWACS, which they described as defensive weapons, could be used offensively; that there needed to be effective safeguards to prevent the Saudis from providing the information gathered by the AWACS to other Arab states; and that the sale would lead ultimately to the ratcheting up of the arms race in the region. 113 On October 15, the day of the SFRC vote, Pressler announced his support for the sale, after receiving a last-minute telephone call from the president, who promised “to provide Israel with additional radio-jamming equipment if the Israelis asked for it to insure their security.” 114 Thus, when the Senate floor vote took place, Pressler joined other Republicans who voted to reject the Packwood resolution, because his criteria for supporting the sale had been met. In retrospect, it is clear that the president’s well-timed October 28 letter to the Senate, which incorporated the substance of the Nunn-Warner resolution was, in fact, the crucial element in the White House’s Senate strategy. Reagan and his chief of staff, Baker, were no doubt well aware of the senators’ concerns who opposed or leaned against the sale, as a result of public and closed session congressional hearings, the president’s and Baker’s meetings with groups of or individual senators, incoming letters from senators who were opposed to or doubtful about the sale,

104

Chapter 3

and feedback from the administration’s lobbying teams that were working the Hill. In early October, for example, shortly before the committee votes in the Senate, Baker met with five freshmen Republican senators to discuss the possibility that the president would promise in a letter to give written notice to Congress that several conditions concerning the use and security of the AWACS had been met by “the receiving nation” before any planes were delivered. 115 The senators subsequently furnished a draft letter, requesting, inter alia, that the president certify that the recipient country had “successfully completed” or made “significant progress” toward the peaceful settlement of disputes in the area. 116 In this way, the White House held out the promise of meeting senators’ concerns and invested them in the letter that was under preparation in the White House. It is not difficult to understand why contemporary journalists perceived the president’s October 28 letter as the “key piece” in the AWACS drama. Reagan’s close call in the Senate vote on AWACS, however, was not the end of the story. In the immediate aftermath of the Senate vote, the Defense Department held an interdepartmental meeting on November 24, 1981, attended by representatives from Defense, State, the CIA, and Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) to discuss specific host nation support (HNS) strategies in Southwest Asia. With respect to Saudi Arabia, it was thought that since the AWACS/F-15 enhancement package had survived a congressional veto, it was an opportune time to approach the Saudis to resume joint talks on security cooperation, including the establishment of United States “forward bases” on Saudi soil and a broad array of related host nation support activities and resources. According to a memorandum distributed for discussion at the meeting, a significant obstacle to that end was the attitude among Arab leaders, even in regimes the United States considered “moderate,” that “the most immediate threat to their security comes from an expansionist Israel.” 117 Ironically, when Weinberger visited the Middle East in February 1982, the Saudis reportedly made it clear to him that he should not expect any quid pro quo for the arms package. As one unnamed Saudi official reportedly remarked, Weinberger was just an arms salesman, and “we pay cash.” After negotiating for long hours, Weinberger ultimately came home with a “trinket” in the form of a cooperation agreement, which failed to commit the Saudis to anything substantive regarding forward bases or joint military cooperation. 118 When the Iran-Iraq War broke out in late 1983, and especially after both combatants began attacking non-combatant shipping in the Persian Gulf, the Saudis requested U.S. support and the acceleration of arms deliveries that were in the U.S.-Saudi pipeline. At an NSPG meeting on May 17, 1984, called to discuss escalation of the Gulf War, Secretary Shultz noted that he had told Saudi Prince Bandar that effective efforts to thwart aggression in the Persian Gulf required a speedy decision “on

Arms and Controversy

105

access to Saudi facilities and combined planning,” and that “We should make the Saudis come to us . . . . So far, we’ve made all the commitments and have heard nothing from them.” General Paul X. Kelley, commandant of the Marine Corps and member of the JCS, told the president that the “bottom line . . . is without access to Saudi bases, we cannot bring our combat capabilities to bear on the problem of protecting shipping in the Gulf.” 119 The fact that those Saudi bases never materialized did not deter the Reagan administration from certifying to Congress in June 1986, that all the conditions set forth in his letter of October 28, 1981, concerning the AWACS, had been met, that Saudi Arabia had made substantial contributions to both the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region and to advance the Arab-Israel peace process, and therefore the AWACS would be delivered. 120 Much of this was simply administration boilerplate that had no significance in the reality of U.S.-Saudi relations. However, more importantly it was the fulfillment of a deal already made, the result of Reagan’s rather optimistic belief that Saudi Arabia was the “key” to peace in the Middle East, 121 and the outcome of a brief but effective round of executive-legislative bargaining. NOTES 1. For background on the AWACS issue during the Carter administration, see Michael Thomas, American Policy Toward Israel: The Power and Limits of Beliefs, 2007, 7174; and Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy, 1990, 122-24. On the broader issue of the Carter administration’s arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East, see Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan, 1986, 346-53. 2. The F-15 “enhancements” included conformal fuel tanks (CSTs), streamlined fuel tanks that could be attached to the F-15 fuselages and rigged with rails allowing them to carry external air-to-air ordnance; KC-3 aerial tankers, which would allow inflight refueling of the F-15s; and sophisticated AIM 9-L Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles. The enhancement package also provided for the upgrading of the Saudi ground radar network. When five E-3A AWACS radar surveillance aircraft were added to the package, the total cost reached $8.5 billion, the largest arms sale ever offered by any country to that time. 3. See the attachment titled “Background on Saudi Arabia’s F-15 Request,” to an undated and unsigned memorandum from Reagan’s national security adviser, Richard V. Allen, to the president (presumably prepared prior to the NSC meeting on February 18, 1981), available online at www.thereaganfiles.com/19810227-nsc-docs -re-awacs.pdf.; and James Phillips, “The AWACS Sale: Prospects for U.S. Policy,” Backgrounder No. 153, Heritage Foundation, October 16, 1981, 1-2, retrieved at http:// www.heritage.org/research/reports/1981. 4. An undated and unsigned copy of the Haig-Weinberger memorandum is in Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File, Box 9182, Folder: NSC 00004 2/27/81 [Poland, Caribbean Basin, F-15, El Salvador], RRPL. Apparently, it went forward to the president as an attachment to Allen’s memorandum to the president, cited above. 5. See minutes of National Security Council (NSC) meeting 3, February 18, 1981, Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 9-14.

106

Chapter 3

6. The minutes of NSC meeting 4 are still classified, but after the meeting Richard V. Allen prepared a summary of conclusions reached; it is printed in Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 15-16. 7. U.S. Department of State announcement, “U.S. To Sell Military Equipment to Saudi Arabia,” March 6, 1981, printed in the Department of State Bulletin, 81: 2049 (April 1981), 31. William J. Dyess, the acting spokesman, read the statement to news correspondents at the State Department. It justified the sale as a response to the increased turmoil in the region and “the dangers of Soviet penetration and exploitation.” It also stated that the sale would indicate “our determination that the United States will move decisively and quickly to protect its interests and those of its friends and allies when they are threatened.” 8. Minutes of NSC meeting 7, on the Haig trip to the Middle East and Europe, Saudi AWACS, and Nicaragua, April 1, 1981, Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 25-33. 9. See Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Will Go Ahead on Deal with Saudis for 5 Radar Planes,” New York Times, April 22, 1981, A1. 10. U.S. Department of State statement, “Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia,” April 23, 1981, printed in the Department of State Bulletin, 81: 2051 (June 1981), 47. Dean Fischer, the State Department’s spokesman, read the statement to the press corps. 11. Reagan made his comment at the NSC meeting of February 18, and Meese made his at the NSC meeting of April 1, 1981, both cited above. 12. Allen’s and Haig’s concerns were expressed at the NSC meeting of April 1. 13. Entry for April 23, 1981, in Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 14. 14. For journalistic views of Reagan’s “horse trading” and “arm twisting” during the struggle to obtain congressional approval of his economic program, see Steven V. Roberts, “44 Democrats Are Objects of White House Attentions,” New York Times, May 1, 1981, A19; Ward Sinclair and Peter Behr, “Horse Trading,” Washington Post, June 27, 1981, A1; and Ward Sinclair and Richard L. Lyons, “Tactics That Won: Barrage of Phone Calls and Reports of Deals,” Washington Post, July 30, 1981, A1. 15. Portions of the letter are quoted in Center for Defense Information (CDI), The Defense Monitor, X: 4 (1981), 4. 16. “It’s Too Valuable,” Los Angeles Times, March 2, 1981, C4. 17. “Drive a Bargain with the Saudis,” New York Times, April 7, 1981, A18. 18. “Complicating the F-15 Equation,” Washington Post, April 14, 1981, A20. 19. “Selling the Saudis Targets,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 1981, 18. 20. For the full text of Senator Byrd’s letter to Haig, dated April 9, 1981, see the Congressional Record, Senate, October 21, 1981, S11762-S11763. Portions of the letter are quoted in Philip Geyelin, “Reaganites Flounder in the Bay of AWACS,” Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1981, Part 2, 11. 21. U.S. Department of State information memorandum, “Editorial Opinion on Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia,” June 12, 1981; a copy of this unclassified memorandum is in the author’s possession. The eight columnists reviewed were Philip Geyelin, Meg Greenfield, Joseph Harsch, Smith Hempstone, Joseph Kraft, James Reston, Hobart Rowen, and William Safire; only Hempstone supported the sale. Other columnists who expressed opposition to or doubts about the sale, who were not covered in the OAP review, included Jack Anderson, Anthony Lewis, and George Will. For Anderson’s views, see “Big Business Backing Saudis on AWACS Sale,” Washington Post, October 26, 1981, D8; for Lewis, see “Abroad at Home: Foreign Policy,” New York Times, September 28, 1981, A19; for Will, see “Foreign Policy: The Message is Garbled,” Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1981, C13. According to Anderson, all the rhetoric about dire results predicted by both proponents and opponents of the sale amounted to a “tempest in a teapot,” because everything involved in the sale could be bought on the open market and by the time the AWACS were delivered in 1985, “the Soviets will probably have radar planes of their own superior to the AWACS 20-year old technology.”

Arms and Controversy

107

22. The Associated Press/NBC News poll was reported and analyzed in an article entitled “Most in Poll Oppose AWACS Sale to Saudis,” Boston Globe, May 26, 1981, 1. 23. The two polls can be accessed at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu. 24. See, for example “The U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia: Investing in Stability or Disaster?,” The Defense Monitor, X: 4 (1981), 1-12; see also the article by CDI senior research analyst Stephen D. Goose, “AWACS: Winnable but Not Worth It,” New York Times, August 28, 1981, A17. 25. For Turner’s views, see his op-ed “No to AWACS,” Washington Post, April 22, 1981, A27. 26. See John Goshko, “AWACS Shortcomings Stressed in Pitch to Hill for Saudi Sale,” Washington Post, September 23, 1981, A5. 27. See, for example, Phil Gailey, “The Great Divide, 1981: Taking Sides on AWACS,” New York Times, October 1, 1981, A28. 28. For Keegan’s SFRC testimony on October 6, 1981, see U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Sales Package to Saudi Arabia: Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, October 1, 5, 6, 14 and 15, 1981, 265-72. 29. The organizations publicly opposing the sale included the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), American Jewish Committee (AJC), Anti-Defamation League (ADL), B’nai Brith International, American Jewish Congress, Conference of National Jewish Women’s Organizations, Hadassah, and Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. 30. Documents pertaining to the public information activities of the ZOA and the AJC can be found in Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Rabbi Marc H. Tannenbaum Collection, 1945-1992, Series D: International Relations Activities, 1961-1992, Box 54, Folder 4: Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS] to Saudi Arabia, 1981; accessible online at http://collections.americanjewish archives.org/ms/ms0603/ms0603.054.004.pdf. 31. For Dine’s testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, see Arms Sales Package to Saudi Arabia: Hearings, October 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, October 5, 1981, 156-63; for the AJC’s views, see American Jewish Committee, News Release, August 24, 1981, Tannenbaum Collection, Series D, Box 54, Folder 4: Airborne Warning and Control Systems to Saudi Arabia, 1981. 32. For text of the letter, see Bob Packwood to President Ronald Reagan, June 24, 1981, ID FO003-02: 029781, White House Office of Records Management (WHORM) Subject File, RRPL. 33. House Concurrent Resolution 117, submitted by Congressman Lent, and House Concurrent Resolution 118, submitted by Congressman Long, April 27, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., which were similar in content, were referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Their respective comments upon submission are in Congressional Record, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., April 27, 1981, H7522-23 and H7472. The two resolutions were henceforth known as the Lent-Long resolution. 34. For text of Senate Concurrent Resolution 35, submitted by Senator Packwood on September 17, and comments made by him and several cosigners, see Congressional Record, Senate, September 17, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., S21083-85. It was reintroduced as a Senate Concurrent Resolution on October 1, 1981, with notice of House concurrence; see Congressional Record, Senate, October 1, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., S22735. 35. A Coordinating Group on Certain Mideast Initiatives, chaired by Fred Iklé of the Defense Department, was established under the National Security Planning Group (NSPG). It was tasked with monitoring interagency activities relating to the Saudi arms package and advising on issues requiring policy-level decisions. Several working groups were also set up, which reported to the Coordinating Group, including a group chaired by Richard Fairbanks, assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, to develop short-term initiatives to prevent “premature adverse commitments by legislators” on the arms package. See memorandum from Robert Kimmitt to members of the

108

Chapter 3

Coordinating Group, April 28, 1981, OA7887, David Gergen Files, AWACS (2) 1981, RRPL. 36. For Haig’s testimony before the SFRC on March 19, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Authorization for Fiscal Year 1982: Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., March 19, 24, 26, April 3, 10, 22, and May 4, 1981, 1-40. See also Bernard Gwertzman, “Haig Says U.S. Seeks Consensus Strategy in the Middle East,” New York Times, March 20, 1981, A1. A few journalists interpreted the concept of “strategic consensus” as a diplomatic-military strategy that the Reagan administration “hopes will eventually lead to a permanent U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region;” for example, see Karen Elliott House, “Planned Sale to Saudis Reflects U.S. Aim of Permanent Mideast Military Presence,” Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1981, 4. 37. For Haig’s comment, see NSC meeting 5, March 19, 1981, held in the Cabinet Room, Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 1621. 38. See “U.S. To Sell Military Equipment to Saudi Arabia,” U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 81: 2049 (April 1981), 31. 39. Richard Halloran, “AWACS for Saudis: Curb on Soviets or Peril to Israel,” New York Times, June 26, 1981, A2. 40. Bernard Gwertzman, “Saudi Plane Sale: An Israeli Dilemma,” New York Times, August 25, 1981, A3. 41. Judith Miller, “U.S. to Offer Israel Jets on Easy Terms,” New York Times, February 26, 1981, A1. 42. Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Will Go Ahead on Deal with Saudis for 5 Radar Planes,” New York Times, April 22, 1981, A1; and Gwertzman, “U.S. Says Saudi Deal Will Not Endanger Security of Israelis,” New York Times, April 23, 1981, A1. 43. Punitive action was not likely to have occurred, given Reagan’s well-known sympathy for the Israelis. On June 7, he wrote in his diaries: “Got word of Israeli bombing of Iraq—nuclear reactor. I swear I believe Armageddon is near.” On June 9, he wrote: “I can understand his [Begin’s] fear but feel he took the wrong action . . . . However, we are not turning on Israel—that would be an invitation for the Arabs to attack. It’s time to raise H—l worldwide for a settlement of the ‘middle-east’ problem. What has happened is the result of fear & suspicion on both sides. We need a real push for a solid peace.” And on June 11, after meeting with five ambassadors from Arab countries and the Israeli ambassador, he wrote: “The truth is the Arab indignation on behalf of Iraq is a waste. Saddam Hussein is a ‘no good nut’ and I think he was trying to build a nuclear weapon. He has called for the destruction of Israel & and he wants to be leader of the Arab world—that’s why he invaded Iran.” See entries for June 7, 9, 11, 1981, in Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 23-25. In the end, Reagan suspended delivery of four F-16 aircraft in the U.S.-Israeli pipeline, because that type of plane had been used to take out Iraq’s nuclear reactor, but in due course the suspension was lifted and the planes were delivered. On the Osirak incident, see Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy, 1984, 182-84. For sample press commentary, see Mary McGrory, “The Israeli Attack on Iraq: What Will Reagan Do Now?,” New York Times, June 10, 1981, A19; and “Israel’s Raid on Iraq Produces Heavy Cloud of Diplomatic Fallout,” New York Times, June 14, 1981, A1. 44. “Implications of Israeli Attack on Iraq,” Interagency Intelligence Assessment, July 1, 1981, prepared in the CIA, and coordinated with intelligence offices in the Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Department of Energy, and the military services. Text can be accessed at http://thereaganfiles.com/19810701-is.pdf. 45. Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy, 1984, 181-82. 46. See the memorandum from Ronald Reagan to the vice president, secretaries of State and Defense, and other senior officials, dated June 13, 1981, informing them that he had designated Richard V. Allen, then national security affairs adviser, to coordinate and direct the effort to obtain legislative support for the arms sale to Saudi Arabia. Allen, in turn, would report to the president through the White House Legisla-

Arms and Controversy

109

tive Strategy Group, co-chaired by chief of staff Baker and counsellor to the president Ed Meese. For a copy of the memorandum, see ID FO003-02: 029720, White House Office of Records Management (WHORM) Subject File, RRPL. 47. See memorandum for the president from Richard V. Allen, dated July 30, 1981, forwarding an attached memorandum from Secretary Haig to the president, dated July 24, 1981 (heavily redacted), ID FO 003-12 and FO003.2: 033082, White House Office of Records Management (WHORM) Subject File, RRPL. Allen’s transmittal bore the president’s handwritten note of agreement. In his memoir, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy, 1984, 186, Haig states that in his memo to Reagan, he urged the president to become “fully engaged” in the sale of the arms package, but that phrase does not appear in the declassified portions of the memo. However, Haig’s memo clearly implied that there was urgency in obtaining Senate approval of the sale. 48. See Martin Tolchin, “House and Senate Give Final Votes of Approval to Reagan Budget Cuts,” New York Times, August 1, 1981, 7; and Hedrick Smith, “Reagan’s Big Victory: Passage of the Tax Rise Bill Vindicates Major Political Gamble,” New York Times, August 20, 1981, D14. 49. “Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Sale of AWACS and Other Air Defense Equipment to Saudi Arabia,” August 5, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, I, 694. 50. In his statement supporting the sale, Nixon said, inter alia, that “if it were not for the intense opposition” of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and “parts of the American Jewish community, the AWACS sale would go through.” Although Nixon sent his statement to the New York Times for publication on October 4, 1981, the paper’s editors apparently printed only portions of it rather than the entire text. His published comments, which raised the highly sensitive issue of “divided loyalties,” drew immediate criticism from the media and Jewish groups. For the complete statement, see “Statement by Former President Richard Nixon, provided to the New York Times, for release on October 4, 1981,” in Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File, Box 91402, AWACS, RRPL. For press accounts, see William G. Blair, “Nixon Supporting the Sale of AWACS,” New York Times, October 4, 1981, 1; Geoffrey Godsell, “Why AWACS fight risks Reagan Mideast plan,” Christian Science Monitor, October 5, 1981, 1; and Shawn G. Kennedy, “Nixon’s AWACS View Assailed,” New York Times, October 5, 1981, A3. Apparently, no Reagan administration official publicly repudiated Nixon’s remarks. In fact, national security adviser Allen, who had initially asked Nixon to issue a statement on AWACS, sent a memorandum to Reagan, copied to eight other senior officials, noting that the “splendid piece” was “exactly what we had hoped he would do.” For Allen’s memo, see Allen to the President, October 3, 1981, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject File, Box 1 AWACS (3), RRPL. 51. See Phil Gailey, “The Great Divide, 1981: Taking Sides on AWACS,” New York Times, October 1, 1981, A28. 52. Carter believed it was necessary to support the AWACS sale because it involved both the president’s and the United States’ international credibility, but at the same time, he continued publicly to criticize other domestic and foreign policy decisions of the Reagan administration. See Carter’s letter to Senator Robert C. Byrd, dated October 11, 1981, printed in the Congressional Record, Senate, October 21, 1981, S11763; and Phil Gailey, “Carter Is Critical Of Reagan’s Policies,” New York Times, October 14, 1981, A27. 53. Kissinger believed that the Reagan administration had acted “prudently” in fulfilling the Carter administration’s commitments on the AWACS, and that rejection of the sale would have “grave, perhaps irretrievable consequences” on the “moderate evolution of the area and to a constructive peace process.” He also contended that the best compromise of the controversy generated by the sale would be “an urgent discussion with Israel on how to maintain its technological and military position” after the sale was approved. See his op-ed, “Don’t Make the AWACS Sale a Test of Strength,” Washington Post, October 6, 1981, A21. 54. In addition to Kissinger, Brown, and Scowcroft, these former high-ranking government officials included Melvin R. Laird, Robert S. McNamara, Elliott L. Rich-

110

Chapter 3

ardson, Donald Rumsfeld, James R. Schlesinger, Zbigniew Brzezkinski, McGeorge Bundy, Gordon Gray, Walt W. Rostow, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, and William P. Rogers. They all appeared with the president following a meeting at the White House on October 5, after which they released a statement. See “Remarks Following a Meeting with Former National Security Officials on the sale of AWACS and Other Air Defense Equipment to Saudi Arabia,” October 5, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, I, 889-90. 55. See Steven Emerson, “The Petrodollar Connection,” New Republic, 1982, 18-25. For press accounts, see AP, “Boeing and Workers Lobbying Hard to Save $5B Sale,” Boston Globe, October 16, 1981, 1; AP, “Boeing Lobbying for Awacs Sale,” New York Times, October 17, 1981, Section 2, 30; Jack Anderson, “Big Business Backing Saudis on AWACS Sale,” Washington Post, October 26, 1981, D8; Thomas B. Edsall, “Conservatives, Corporations Aided AWACS,” Washington Post, November 1, 1981, A11; and Hobart Rowan, “Pressure Behind AWACS Was Crass Business Greed,” Washington Post, November 8, 1981, F1. 56. In fact, in an “exchange” with reporters on the South Lawn of the White House as he prepared to depart for Camp David on September 25, the journalists wanted to know if the president was negotiating a compromise with congressional opponents in order to get the sale through Congress and whether or not Americans would co-crew the AWACS. Reagan tap-danced around the questions without answering either one, except to revert to the boilerplate generality that if congressional opponents “reverse this decision to sell, they are literally doing away with our ability to try to continue to bring peace to the Middle East.” For text, see “Exchange with Reporters on Departure for Camp David, Maryland,” September 25, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, I, 838-39. 57. For the text of Buckley’s statement and a Background Paper, describing the content of the proposed sale, which was made available to the press, see Department of State Bulletin, 81: 2055 (October 1981), 52-53. 58. For text of Haig’s interview, see “Secretary Interviewed on ‘Issues and Answers,’” Department of State Bulletin, 81: 2056 (November, 1981), 17-20. 59. For text, see Richard V. Allen, “Why the AWACS Sale Is Good for Us,” Washington Post, Outlook Section, September 20, 1981, C1. 60. There is no mention of a meeting on September 11 between the president and Senator Packwood in the Reagan Diaries; there is a brief reference to Packwood in the entry for September 15, which may indicate that Reagan and Packwood also met on that date. The September 11 date for their meeting is based on press accounts; see, for example, Charles E. Mohr, “Begin’s Visit Lifts AWACS Foe’s Hopes,” New York Times, September 17, 1981, A7. 61. United Press International (UPI), “Reagan Starts Lobbying to Get OK for Sale of AWACS,” Los Angeles Times, September 14, 1981, A1; “Reagan Begins Personal Lobby for Sale of AWACS to Saudis,” Chicago Tribune, September 15, 1981, 2; and Mohr, “Begin’s Visit Lifts AWACS Foe’s Hopes,” New York Times, September 17, 1981, A7. 62. Lee Lescaze, “Administration Sees Gains in AWACS Lobbying,” Washington Post, September 17, 1981, A3. 63. Associated Press (AP), “57 Senators Said Against AWACS,” Boston Globe, September 18, 1981, 1; Charles Mohr, “Foes of AWACS Sale Assert 51 Senators Back Their Effort,” New York Times, September 18, 1981, A1. For Haig’s testimony, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Persian Gulf Situation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., September 17, 1981, 2-9 (Haig’s prepared statement) and 9-34 (Haig’s testimony and Q&A). 64. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report No. 97-268; Disapproving the Proposed Sales to Saudi Arabia of E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Aircraft, Conformal Fuel Tanks for F-15 Aircraft, AIM-9L Sidewinder Missiles, and Boeing 707 Aerial Refueling Aircraft, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., October 7, 1981. For press commentary, see “AWACS Dealt Blow as House Panel Votes No,” Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1981, A1.

Arms and Controversy

111

65. For the debate preceding the vote, see Congressional Record, House, October 14, 1981, H23796-H23872. For media commentary, see John M. Goshko, “Saudi AWACS Sale Defeated in House By 301-111 Vote,” Washington Post, October 15, 1981, A1; Albert R. Hunt, “House Rejects Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia,” Wall Street Journal, October 15, 1981, 2; and Richard L. Strout, “House Rings Up ‘No Sale’ on AWACS,” Christian Science Monitor, October 15, 1981, 1. 66. See the entries for September 15, 24, October 16, 17, 26, and 28, 1981, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 38, 40, 44, and 46. 67. “The President’s News Conference,” October 1, 1981, Public Papers, I, 867-74. The event, his fourth press conference, was held in the East Room of the White House and broadcast live on radio and television. 68. “Mr. Reagan Blames Mr. Begin,” New York Times, October 4, 1981, E18. 69. “Wrong Way to Woo the Saudis,” Christian Science Monitor, October 5, 1981, 28. 70. “Reagan’s Saudi Pledge,” Boston Globe, October 8, 1981, 16. 71. For the exchanges between Pell, Weinberger, and Haig, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the AWACS and F-15 Enhancements Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, October 1, 5, 6, 14, and 15, 1981, 64-5, 190-91. Pell put the same question to Buckley on October 15, and received a similar reply; Part 2 of the Hearings, 40-41. 72. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Working Luncheon with Out-of-Town Editors,” October 16, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, I, 947-60. 73. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters upon Returning from the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development in Cancún, Mexico,” October 24, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, I, 986-87. 74. For example, see “‘No’ on AWACS,” Boston Globe, October 17, 1981, 10; Bryce Nelson, “Congress Goes ‘Too Far’ on AWACS—Reagan,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1981, A1; John M. Goshko, “President Raps AWACS Foes’ Patriotism,” Washington Post, October 25, 1981, A9; and “The Final Folly of AWACS,” New York Times, October 27, 1981, 30. 75. For the quoted remarks, see “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Working Luncheon with Out-of-Town Editors,” October 16, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, I, 947-60 (949). 76. See Letters from Ronald Reagan to Howard H. Baker Jr., Robert C. Byrd, Sam Nunn and John W. Warner, October 28, 1981, ID FO003: 045429, White House Office of Records Management (WHORM) Subject File, RRPL. 77. See “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters Following Senate Approval of the Sale of AWACS and Other Air Defense Equipment to Saudi Arabia,” October 28, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, I, 995-97 (995). 78. “The AWACS Aftermath,” Boston Globe, October 30, 1981, 18. 79. “After AWACS,” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 1981, 30. 80. “The Final Folly of AWACS,” New York Times, October 27, 1981, 30. 81. “A Presidential Slip,” Washington Post, November 1, 1981, C6. 82. “Thanks, Saudi Style,” New York Times, November 4, 1981, A30. 83. At the SFRC hearing on October 1, 1981, Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA), the Democratic whip, had inserted into the hearings record a number of documents to substantiate these claims about the Saudis: (1) transcript of the text of an article published in the Saudi newspaper Al Medinah, January 21, 1981; (2) UPI report from the UN, dated October 4, 1980; (3) article from the Washington Star, August 14, 1980; (4) article from the New York Times, January 21, 1981; (5) article from the Washington Post, March 22, 1979; and (6) text of a speech by Saudi Foreign Minister Amir Sa’ud alFaysal to the UN General Assembly, delivered on October 3, 1980. For the documents, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, October 1, 1981, 41-48; for senators’ discussion of these issues, see Part 1, 19, 21-23, 26-28; Part 2, 71, 74, 79.

112

Chapter 3

84. For the exchange, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, October 1, 1981, 39. 85. For the exchange, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, October 1, 1981, 84. 86. See Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy, 1984, 190. In his memoir, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992, 118, Baker states that as White House chief of staff, he had “led the legislative strategy effort to support President Reagan’s decision to allow the sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia in 1981.” In fact, by late September/early October, Baker had essentially taken over Allen’s AWACS portfolio and his Legislative Strategy Group had assumed the lead role in dealing with the Senate on the AWACS issue. According to testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services in 1982, Russell Rourke, the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs, stated that under Baker three teams had been organized, “red, white and blue teams,” which had “specific assignments in the Senate” for briefing senators on the AWACS issue, one headed by Allen, one by James Buckley and a third by Fred Iklé, the undersecretary of defense for policy. He also stated the following: “I don’t think that there were any Senators left untouched with whom we didn’t arrange personal briefings and to whose offices various members of these teams did not go for the purpose of providing all the technical data that were available if that were required.” For Rourke’s testimony, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Investigations Subcommittee, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., Hearings on Allegations of Improper Lobbying by Department of Defense Personnel Of the C-5B and B1B Aircraft and Sale to Saudi Arabia of the Airborne Warning and Control System , September 14, 15, 16, 30, and November 30, 1982, 1983, 150. 87. In his testimony before the SFRC on October 1 1981, Haig attempted unsuccessfully to assure doubtful senators that “understandings” had been reached with the Saudis that would resolve their concerns; see Charles Mohr, “New AWACS Provisions Cited by Haig in Senate,” New York Times, October 2, 1981, A28. When he returned to testify again on October 5, he provided the committee with a “compendium” containing a brief description of the administration’s proposed terms and conditions for the sale that went beyond the customary conditions for arms sales to foreign countries; for the compendium, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, October 5, 1981, 186-87. 88. For text of Senate Resolution 228, “Expressing the sense of the Senate respecting the requirement for certain protective terms and conditions as part of the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) from the United States to any foreign country,” and comments by Senators Warner and Nunn, see Congressional Record, Senate, October 7, 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., S23583-88. According to press reports, several senators were given an opportunity to suggest changes in the resolution’s language; see, for example, Charles Mohr, “Reagan Has a Week Left to Sway Congress on AWACS,” New York Times, October 13, 1981, A16. 89. According to Haig, the letter’s content was worked out “behind the scenes” largely by Richard Fairbanks, the State Department’s assistant secretary for congressional relations, who had met with key senators of both parties during October; see Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy, 1984, 190. 90. See, for example, John M. Goshko, “9 More Senators Back Reagan on AWACS Sale; Still in Minority,” Washington Post, October 9, 1981, A8; “Reagan Picks Up One More Convert for AWACS Sale,” Los Angeles Times, October 17, 1981, A18; Martin Schram, “Behind the Grand Scheme of AWACS, Little Things Mean a Lot,” Washington Post, October 18, 1981 A6; John M. Goshko, “President Wins One, Loses One As His AWACS Lobbying Falters,” Washington Post, October 23, 1981, A6; and Albert R. Hunt, “Reagan Steps Up Pressure in AWACS Fight as Confidence of Senate Opponents Grows,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 181, 3. 91. Note for Tuesday, October 27, 1981, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 46. According to one account, between September 11 and the afternoon of October 28, Reagan met with 75 senators at the White House on AWACS, held 44 one-on-one

Arms and Controversy

113

sessions, and talked with 17 during the day and a half before the vote; see George J. Church, Gregory Wierzynski and Laurance I. Barrett, “AWACS: He Does It Again,” Time, 118: 19 (November 9, 1981), 12-19. 92. For the final floor debates and the roll call vote, see the Congressional Record, Senate, October 28, 1981, S25771-S25886. 93. Letters from Ronald Reagan to Howard H. Baker Jr., Robert C. Byrd, Sam Nunn, and John W. Warner, October 28, 1981, ID FO003-02: 045429, White House Office of Records Management (WHORM) Subject File, RRPL. 94. See, for example, Charles Mohr, “Senate, 52-48, Supports Reagan on AWACS Jet Sale to Saudis; Heavy Lobbying Tips Key Votes,” New York Times, October 29, 1981, A1. According to Mohr, nine senators who were previously undecided or unannounced voted for the sale and five senators switched from opposition to support, giving the president his margin of victory. They are identified in his article. The New York Times printed the roll call vote separately on October 29, B11. 95. Entry for October 28, 1981, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 46. 96. The editorials reviewed were published in newspapers that ranged across the political and geographical spectrum: Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. 97. “The AWACS Aftermath,” Boston Globe, October 30, 1981, 18. 98. “The AWACS and symbolism,” Chicago Tribune, October 30, 1981, A26. 99. “After AWACS,” Christian Science Monitor, October 30, 1981, 24. 100. “The Price of Five Airplanes,” New York Times, October 30, 1981, A34; “The Demons Beneath the AWACS,” New York Times, November 1, 1981, E20; and “Thanks, Saudi Style,” New York Times, November 4, 1981, A30. 101. “The AWACS Victory,” Washington Post, October 29, 1981, A26; and “A Presidential Slip,” Washington Post, November 1, 1981, C6. 102. “After Awacs,” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 1981, 30. 103. David Threadwell, “The Times Poll: 56% of Americans Found to Oppose AWACS Sale,” Los Angeles Times, October 8, 1981, A6. 104. Louis Harris & Associates, “Most Americans Still Opposed to AWACS Sale to Saudi Arabia,” released November 12, 1981, accessed at www.harrisinteractive.com. 105. For the poll, see Roper Report 83-8, accessible at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu. 106. For example, in his book Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia (2007) Nicholas Laham offers a laudatory account of Reagan’s handling of the AWACS controversy. After noting that Reagan “demonstrated sheer political genius rarely demonstrated by presidents in their relations with Congress” (p. 192) and contending that the president achieved the rejection of the Packwood resolution because he effectively used his “enormous political skills and persuasive powers,” he concludes (pp. 218-19) that the episode shows Reagan “to be unquestionably one of the greatest masters in the art of politics ever to reside in the White House.” He also asserts (pp. 60, 62, 66-67) that the president won on the AWACS issue because the administration’s strategic case was “overwhelming,” that congressional opposition was entirely the result of the Israeli lobby’s pressure and that the forty-eight senators who ultimately voted for the Packwood resolution were motivated by an “irrational fear” of the powerful pro-Israel lobby. For an analysis that refutes Laham’s arguments, see Public Interest Investigations, “The Battle over AWACS (1981),” accessible at powerbase.info/index.php/ The_Battle_over_AWACS_(1981). 107. See, for example, Bard, “Interest Groups, the President, and Foreign Policy: How Reagan Snatched Victory from the Jaws of Defeat,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1988, 594-97. 108. Steven V. Roberts, “Recipe for a White House Victory: Arm Twisting, Flattery and Aura,” New York Times, October 29, 1981, A1. 109. For Reagan’s “admission,” see “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Working Luncheon with Out-of-Town Editors,” October 16, 1981, Public Papers, I, 950. For his denials about deals, see the October 16 Q&A; “Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on the Sale of AWACS and Other Air Defense Equipment to

114

Chapter 3

Saudi Arabia,” October 27, 1981, Public Papers, I, 1981, 990; and “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters Following Senate Approval of the Sale of AWACS and Other Air Defense Equipment to Saudi Arabia,” October 28, 1981, Public Papers, I, 1981, 995-96. Months later, the president continued to deny that he had made deals or “twisted arms” to persuade senators to change their votes on the AWACS sale. In an interview with the New York Post’s editorial board on March 23, 1982, for example, he stated that he was able to gain the support of senators who were concerned about a potential threat to Israel by convincing them that their concern was “equally my concern.” For text of the interview, see “Interview in New York City With Members of the Editorial Board of the New York Post,” March 23, 1982, Public Papers, 1982, I, 362-69. 110. For Senator Bumpers’ quote, see Steven V. Roberts, “Pressure on AWACS Comes with Winks and Nods,” New York Times, October 16, 1981, A18. 111. Contemporary journalists offered considerable circumstantial evidence that some kind of deals were offered to senators, primarily via White House staff members. See the following press accounts: Albert R. Hunt, “Some Senators Say They Were Promised White House Favors to Vote for AWACS,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1981, 4; Gerald F. Seib, “Senate Panel Opposes Awacs Sale to Saudis,” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 1981, 3; Martin Schram, “Behind the Grand Scheme of AWACS, Little Things Mean a Lot,” Washington Post, October 18, 1981, A6; Bryce Nelson, “Congress Goes ‘Too Far’ on AWACS—Reagan: Veto Would Hurt His Mideast Peace Efforts,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1981, A1; Curtis Wilkie and David Rogers, “Reagan Stalks AWACS Vote,” Boston Globe, October 18, 1981, 1; John M. Goshko, “President Wins One, Loses One as His AWACS Lobbying Falters,” Washington Post, October 23, 1981, A6; and Albert R. Hunt, “Reagan Steps Up Pressure in Awacs Fight as Confidence of Senate Opponents Grows,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1981, 3; Brad Knickerbocker, “Stiffest Test Yet of Reagan Clout on Hill,” Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 1981, 10; and Walter Isaacson, Evan Thomas and Johanna McGeary, “The Man with the Golden Arm,” Time, 118: 19 (November 9, 1981), 25-29. For additional detail on Reagan’s political bargaining, see Bard, “Interest Groups, the President, and Foreign Policy: How Reagan Snatched Victory from the Jaws of Defeat,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1988, 594-97. 112. For text, see Senate Resolution 227, “Resolution Relating to Protection for Israel in the Event of Sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia,” Congressional Record, Senate, October 7, 1981, S23676. 113. For Pressler’s statements and questioning of administration witnesses, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia, Part 1, 35-37, 67-68, 198-99; Part 2, 54-55, 57, 73. 114. On Pressler’s conversion and the quote, see Charles Mohr, “Senate Unit Votes, 9 to 8, to Oppose Saudi AWACS Sale,” New York Times, 1981, A1; see also, Gerald F. Seib, “Senate Panel Opposes Awacs Sale to Saudis,” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 1981, 3; and Martin Schram, “Behind the Grand Scheme of AWACS, Little Things Mean a Lot,” Washington Post, October 18, 1981, A6. 115. The five were: Slade Gorton (R-WA), Robert W. Kasten Jr. (R-WI), Mack Mattingly (R-GE), Frank H. Murkowski (R-AK), and Dan Quayle (R-IN). All but Kasten ultimately voted to reject the resolution of disapproval. 116. See Charles Mohr, “Reagan to Send Congress a Note on AWACS,” New York Times, October 14, 1981, A1. 117. The minutes of the November 24th meeting are evidently still classified; however, see the memorandum prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, dated November 17, 1981, prepared for discussion at that meeting; the text can be accessed at www.thereaganfiles.com/19811117-swa.pdf. 118. “To the Middle East, by Carpet,” New York Times, February 17, 1982, A22. 119. See minutes of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting 89, “Escalation in the Gulf War,” May 17, 1984, in Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 296-301. General Kelley had made a similar point, even

Arms and Controversy

115

more strongly, at a congressional hearing five years earlier when he stated that, in his view, “it is absolutely essential that we have free and willing—and I emphasize these two words, free and willing, access to Saudi land bases, Saudi ports, Saudi host nation support, and a considerable labor pool from the Saudis” in order to protect Saudi oil fields in any air threat scenario. For Kelley’s earlier comments, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military and Technical Implications of the Proposed Sale to Saudi Arabia of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and F-15 Enhancements, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., September 28, 30, 1981, 38-39. 120. “Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate on the Sale of AWACS Aircraft to Saudi Arabia,” June 18, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, I, 797-800. The actual certification is attached to the president’s letter. 121. On several occasions, Reagan made comments asserting Saudi Arabia’s essential role in achieving peace in the Middle East; see, for example, “Remarks and a Questionand-Answer Session At a Working Luncheon with Out-of-Town Editors,” October 16, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, I, 947-60 (948); and “Exchange with Reporters on Departure for Camp David, Maryland,” September 25, 1981; Public Papers, 1981, I, 838-39.

FOUR The MX Missile Phoenix Rising

The Reagan administration inherited the controversy over developing, producing, and deploying the Missile eXperimental (MX), a seventy-onefoot-long, 195,000-pound intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying ten independently targetable warheads, from the Carter administration. 1 Carter proposed deploying two hundred MX missiles in 4,600 so-called Multiple Placement Shelters (MPS) in Utah and Nevada, which would require a “racetrack” shuttling system, in order to increase their mobility and decrease their vulnerability. According to many political analysts and commentators, Carter’s proposal was linked to his administration’s SALT II negotiations with the Soviets, and was aimed at gaining support for the draft treaty from hardline members of Congress. That gambit, however, failed and all it accomplished was to set off a major controversy over the MX missile and its deployment mode that spilled over into the 1980 presidential election campaign and endured throughout President Reagan’s two administrations. During the election campaign, Reagan vigorously criticized Carter for allowing the Soviet Union to forge ahead of the United States in developing new, more powerful and increasingly accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby opening an alleged “window of vulnerability” and dangerously reducing the United States’ “margin of safety,” which put the country at a serious disadvantage visá-vis the Soviet Union. 2 Reagan promised to erase the alleged Soviet advantage by modernizing and strengthening all three elements (land, sea, and air) of the U.S. arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, in addition to expanding the nation’s conventional armed forces. Like many presidential candidates before and after him, he thereby committed himself and his administration to a course of action, though evidently neither he 117

118

Chapter 4

nor his national security advisers during the campaign had a firm idea of precisely what that course should be. What they did not want, however, was to support any defense plan that could be associated with Carter, whom they considered “soft on defense.” Entangled from the outset in campaign rhetoric, President Reagan and his national security advisers were faced with an immediate post-election dilemma: what to do about the proposed MX/MPS system, which had become President Carter’s albatross and ignited considerable public and congressional opposition both inside and outside of the Great Basin area, the designated target area for the emplacement of the missiles. Whether Reagan’s national security advisers foresaw the dimensions of the political and public communication problems they had inherited is unknowable, but from the day of Reagan’s inauguration, they were confronted by the challenge of finding an effective technological and politically acceptable alternative. The controversy erupted initially over Carter’s proposal to place the MX missiles, which had not yet been built, in Utah and Nevada. The Mormon Church in Utah; agricultural, ranching, and environmental constituencies in both states; Native Americans, who held title to tribal lands; and the states’ political establishments, were all virtually unanimously opposed to the MPS sheltering scheme and the so-called “race-track” plan to shuttle the missiles around from shelter to shelter. Although the inhabitants of those two states were predominantly Republican and conservative, and had a particular problem with Carter, Reagan’s 1980 electoral victory and his initial popularity did not diminish their opposition to MX/MPS, largely because they perceived the local struggle there as one involving land appropriation and use, which ultimately posed a threat to their way of life. Therefore, any effort by the administration, or particularly by the Air Force, to appeal to MX/MPS opponents in those two states on the basis of their disparate individual interests, their patriotism, or the economic benefits they might reap were destined to fail. By the time Reagan took office, they were already adept at hiring lobbyists in DC and filing legal suits against potential environmental damage, which would require federal Environmental Impact Statements (EISs), to protect their interests. 3 In order to reinforce local pressure, they also brought in well-known academic scientists who opposed MX/MPS from outside the Great Basin area, like Richard L. Garwin of Harvard and Sidney Drell of Stanford, both of whom supported submarine basing of a small ICBM, for speaking tours throughout the two states. 4 The controversy in those two states spread rapidly elsewhere and among other sectors of the public. There was mounting opposition to the whole idea of developing and producing the MX missile, much of it channeled by organizations such as the National Campaign to Stop the MX, which by the spring of 1981 had organized a broad coalitional network of about thirty national church groups, defense and scientific organizations, progressive political activists, and fiscal conservatives to

The MX Missile

119

lobby against the MX. The “network,” as it was called by its members, organized letter-writing, telephone, and telegram campaigns aimed primarily at the White House, the Department of Defense, and Congress. It also distributed anti-MX literature, including pamphlets and handbills, as well as studies and books by MX/MPS opponents, and it organized local protest events. The network’s overall mission was two-fold: to kill the MX missile and to pressure the Reagan administration to adopt a more flexible posture toward the Soviet Union, so that real reductions in both strategic nuclear and conventional weapons could be successfully negotiated. 5 Although Roman Catholic and Protestant church groups worked cooperatively with the network, they also lobbied Congress on their own, particularly Roman Catholic bishops. As early as mid-1982, the bishops began drafting a pastoral letter opposing the “first use of nuclear weapons,” supporting substantial arms reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union and appealing for an end to the production of new nuclear weapons, including the MX. In May 1983, they issued their letter, entitled “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” which was addressed to Catholic congregations throughout the United States, but intended also for a national audience. Between 1981 and early 1985, their opposition to the MX on moral, fiscal, and strategic grounds intensified, and they urged all members of Congress to vote against funds to produce the MX missile. 6 In Congress itself, the array of positions on the MX/MPS proposal was quite wide and somewhat confusing. Irrespective of party affiliation, senators and representatives divided into three basic groups, depending on how they viewed the proposed MX/MPS system. There were those who supported both building the MX missile and its racetrack MPS basing mode; others supported the missile, but rejected the proposed deployment mode; while still others opposed both the missile and its MPS basing scheme. The lines between these groups were fluid, and in quite a few cases, opinions evolved over time. 7 Congressional opposition was often both bipartisan and intense, and regardless which part of the proposed system opponents disliked, they often came together to oppose the estimated cost of the program, which ranged from a low of $33 billion and a high of $100 billion over an indeterminate number of years. 8 The enormous estimated cost of the proposed system was anathema to many strong fiscal conservatives, Republicans and Democrats, who believed that the prospective costs of the program conflicted with Reagan’s firm commitment during the election to reduce the deficit. Reducing the deficit while spending billions on new strategic nuclear weapons and on conventional forces simultaneously was apparently difficult for many of them to rationalize, even those who favored a survivable, mobile ICBM. On the other hand, there were many members who believed that the proposed system’s political liabilities were the major problem. In any case, MX/MPS became the first round of a long struggle between the

120

Chapter 4

administration and Congress about whether to build the MX, how to deploy it once it was developed and produced, and whether the additional security the administration claimed it would bring was worth the enormous estimated cost of the system. Since there were no assured majorities, votes on the MX/MPS system, particularly on funding legislation, were often close and considerable vote shifting became the norm. Many of the largest-circulation newspapers in the nation, irrespective of how they leaned politically, were either opposed to or had serious qualms about certain aspects of the MX missile, its MPS basing mode, or both. The critical newspapers were geographically dispersed and included, for example, the Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor, Denver Post, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal. 9 Though the editorial boards of these newspapers had different angles of vision on the MX/MPS system, most of them seemed to agree that it was fiscally imprudent to build it because it would compete with other high priority defense needs; that it provided no absolute assurance that the Soviets could not overwhelm the system by building more missiles, thereby instigating an unnecessary and dangerous arms race; that efforts to insure survivability of the new missile might require the construction of an anti-ballistic missile system, which could necessitate scraping restrictions negotiated in SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972; that the vulnerable MX would fail to close the alleged “window of vulnerability”; and that the best method of increasing national security would be bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve real reductions in nuclear arsenals. There was, however, wide variation in the criticisms. For example, the Los Angeles Times found the case against the MPS basing scheme “persuasive,” and concluded that even a scaled down deployment plan would make “no sense” in military terms; 10 while the Wall Street Journal, which consistently warned about the need to counter the alleged ongoing Soviet nuclear arms buildup, stressed that the survivability of the MX/MPS system was ultimately dependent on the administration’s agreement to build an anti-ballistic missile system. 11 A number of well-known members of the contemporary political and military establishment, who had served in national security positions during previous administrations, also added their voices to the wide range of critics of the MX missile and its MPS basing mode, and in some cases offered alternative recommendations for modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear arms. For example, General Danny Graham, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the promoter of anti-ballistic missile defenses, described the MX/MPS system as “grotesque” and asserted that the “scheme should be rejected because it is the offspring of a very bad strategy.” 12 Paul Warnke, former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and chief negotiator for the SALT II talks during the Carter administration, denied that the MX was needed

The MX Missile

121

at all, because it would increase the possibility of nuclear holocaust. If it had to be built because of the political momentum behind it, Warnke stated, then the best deployment option, among a number of flawed options, would be to house it in hardened underground silos. 13 For retired general Maxwell D. Taylor, who had served as army chief of staff during the Eisenhower administrations and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the MX was an ineffective weapon because it failed the test of “essentiality,” that is, the urgency of the threat it was designed to counter was unproved and the probability that the Soviet leaders would risk an attack on U.S. silo-based ICBMs was “extremely low.” 14 Both George F. Kennan, the father of the containment doctrine, and Dean Rusk, who served as secretary of state during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, supported a 50 percent reduction in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers and negotiations as the means to achieve that outcome. Kennan believed in monitoring agreed reductions by “national means of detection,” while Rusk favored negotiating desirable levels of nuclear arms given the recognized U.S. capacity to build more ICBMs rapidly, if the Soviets signaled that they preferred an expensive arms race. 15 Finally, Admiral Stansfield Turner, who retired as director of central intelligence in January 1980, regarded building the MX as a “serious mistake,” and argued that at “the very least” the proposed missile should be scaled down, so that it was deployable “in more ways than just in fixed shelters,” because it was literally a case of smaller was not only cheaper but better. 16 The administration also had few supporters in the scientific community. Virtually every prominent professional and academic scientist who went on the public record about the MX opposed it. With only slight variations in their views, they regarded heavy land-based ICBM missiles as more destabilizing than deterrent forces, because they could never be made invulnerable, and there were too many technological options that would allow adversaries to defeat such a system. Moreover, they argued, it was unlikely that the Pentagon could perfect an anti-ballistic missile defense system to fill the vacuum within a decade, as planners there were recommending, when it had already tried and failed to do so for two previous decades. They also believed that because the MX could not be effectively defended made it an attractive target for an adversary’s first strike. Because of their views on the many technological weaknesses of the MX and its vulnerability, they logically also opposed every basing system that the administration came up with, including Multiple Placement Shelters (MPS), any form of cluster basing, such as Dense Pack (DP), or insertion of the missiles in deep, super-hardened, underground silos. They were persuaded that all of these systems would ultimately fail, because there was no reliable way to test them, short of war itself. Many of them called for the elimination of the MX program and in its place the development of small, mobile, multi-purpose missiles that

122

Chapter 4

could be submarine or aircraft launched. 17 On several occasions, unnamed officials in the administration complained to journalists that they were having difficulty selling the MX system to Congress and the public, because all the eminent scientists seemed to be on the other side. 18 It was against this background that Reagan administration officials during 1981 attempted to reach an internal bureaucratic consensus on the MX/MPS issue, but that proved difficult. Caspar W. Weinberger, the secretary of defense, known by his nickname “Cap” within the national security bureaucracy, objected to the MPS basing mode, in part because it was associated with Carter and in part because he believed that it provided an “immense opportunity” for environmentalists and other opponents of the system to slow it down or halt it, by filing separate lawsuits against each silo. Instead, he flirted with several other options: sea-based, air-based, and deep, hardened silos. The Air Force, the Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chaired by Air Force General David C. Jones, however, remained committed to the MPS basing mode, which had originally been devised by the Air Force. As General Richard H. Ellis, commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), which would have the responsibility for deploying the MX, told a session of the Nevada State Legislature in February, the “SAC remains convinced the presently proposed basing plan is best, not only from an operational point of view but also from an environmental one.” 19 At the State Department, Alexander M. Haig Jr., Reagan’s first secretary of state, reportedly at first favored a sea-based option, but ultimately came out in favor of a land-based system, 20 while Eugene V. Rostow, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), preferred “simple vertical shelters,” rather than “elaborate grids and racetracks.” 21 Given the lack of consensus in the administration, Weinberger opted for a common bureaucratic delaying tactic, to allow time for a consensus to build. On March 16, 1981, he appointed a twelve-man panel of nongovernment experts to conduct an independent review of the various MX basing modes, and to report its findings by July 1, the date on which the basing decision was supposed to be made. The panel, chaired by University of California Nobel-winning physicist, Dr. Charles H. Townes, restudied many of the basing options, all of which had been studied several times before, interviewed individuals from Utah and Nevada, and consulted other arms control experts and scientists. According to the panel’s final report, which was never made public in its entirety, 22 the group agreed that the Soviet Union could overwhelm a U.S. shelter system by building more missiles, and that there was no basing mode on the earth’s surface that would ensure the survivability of an adequate number of warheads. The panel regarded the best possible immediate approach to be “continuous airborne patrol.” As a long term solution, however, it unanimously recommended building a small, mobile ICBM in place of the big MX with its ten independently targeted warheads. A majority of

The MX Missile

123

the panel’s members recommended a scaled-down deployment of one hundred MX missiles near-term as a hedge against perceived Soviet superiority, but a minority believed that was a wasteful expense and the money could be more usefully spent on upgrading other strategic arms systems, including anti-ballistic missile defenses. 23 This was not exactly what Weinberger wanted to hear, but it was close enough, because by this time, he was leaning toward an air-mobile option, which involved putting the ICBMs on C5 transport planes, eventually to be replaced by huge, new “big bird” planes able to remain in the air much longer than the C5s. That option was problematic, however, because in mid-August a special panel of the Defense Science Board, which had been appointed by Weinberger, recommended that he support the land-based shelter plan for the MX, with an anti-missile defense system to protect the ICBMs. 24 Haig opposed the air-borne option, contending that scrapping the landbased system would have a seriously detrimental impact on U.S. allies in Europe, and the Townes panel reportedly refused to endorse Weinberger’s version of an air-mobile system. All of this came to a head at a National Security Council (NSC) meeting in California, where the president was on vacation. The meeting was held at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles on August 17, 1981. The participants discussed strategic forces, along with other issues, 25 and according to press accounts, based on conversations with White House aides, Weinberger presented his proposal for an air-borne MX deployment option to a skeptical audience. Haig, Rostow, William J. Casey, the director of central intelligence, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, ambassador to the U.N., David C. Jones, JCS chairman, and General Lew Allen, Air Force chief of staff, reportedly all opposed the concept and spoke in favor of land-basing in the West. Apparently, the president listened to the various arguments, but remained “studiously noncommittal.” 26 Several days after the NSC meeting, John G. Tower (R-TX), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and William I. Dickinson (R-AL), the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, met with the president at his invitation for lunch, and after a ninety-minute session with him, told reporters that, although they could not speak for him, they opposed aircraft-basing for the MX. 27 By late August, it was clear to many observers that the air-borne option for the MX was dying or already dead, and that the administration was slowly moving back toward a scaled down version of the land-based deployment option. However, Larry Speakes, the White House deputy press secretary, later told the press corps that though the president had made some “preliminary decisions” on the MX missile, he would not announce a final decision until September, and he acknowledged that presidential approval of the landbased launching system would reverse the position Reagan had taken in the 1980 presidential campaign. 28

124

Chapter 4

The president, however, did not announce his position on the MX/ MPS until early October, and the fact that it took nine months for the administration to do so was both a political mistake and a problem from a public communication perspective. The long delay, exacerbated by conflicting media accounts of which administration official supported which MX basing mode, projected an image of indecisiveness, internal bureaucratic bickering and policy-making confusion. That situation was further complicated by the fact that lack of an internal consensus made it virtually impossible for the administration’s political communication practitioners to construct a coherent narrative it could use to respond to critics and to shore up support among those who defended the need to modernize U.S. strategic weapons. This communication gap grew larger as the months of 1981 wore on, and resulted in severely reducing the potential of the administration’s manifold communication assets, and put communication specialists far behind the curve of public reaction to the MX missile controversy. Even more damaging to the president and his national security advisers, was the fact that the failure to announce a decision by July 1 or by September 1, both dates having been promised and then bypassed, provided an opportunity for MX/MPS opponents of all political shades and stripes and organizational affiliations, to raise grave doubts about the program. One of the most serious and troubling for the administration, was an editorial in the prominent conservative journal, Strategic Review, which sharply challenged and severely undercut the fundamental premise on which Reagan’s and Weinberger’s nuclear modernization program was based: the existence of a “window of vulnerability.” The highly respected military editor of the journal, Arthur G. B. Metcalf, argued, with respect to the existing Minuteman missiles, that “nothing has been put forward which technologically supports the belief that we (or the Soviets) could, with any degree of confidence, expect to hit one silo at ICBM range, let alone 1,000 of them distributed over an area equal to one-third of the United States.” He also contended that the Soviet “threat” of nuclear superiority was not a “substantiated fact,” but merely an “agreed upon position” by some military authorities. 29 His editorial received wide coverage in major newspapers, but virtually no response from administration spokesmen. Moreover, an editorial in the pro-defense buildup, Chicago Tribune summed up much media reaction to Metcalf’s views: “Mr. Metcalf suggests, and we agree, that Pentagon planners should first come up with convincing proof that a genuine, doubt-free vulnerability exists before going ahead with a costly system to overcome it.” 30 Metcalf’s thesis was also supported by many arms control experts. In a frequently reviewed book, MX: Prescription for Disaster (1981), for example, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., president of the Arms Control Association, and formerly an official in the CIA and an assistant director of science and technology in ACDA, contended that Soviet missiles were not as accurate

The MX Missile

125

or reliable as the Pentagon claimed. He argued that there was no technological proof that they were, because their necessary strike path over the North Pole had never been field tested and would be subject to “bias” resulting from different natural physical forces. He concluded, inter alia, that the MX in its present configuration would be an “invitation to an accelerated and endless strategic arms race with no winners.” 31 As journalist Tom Wicker pointed out in the New York Times, if the arguments about the inaccuracy of existing intercontinental missiles were true, then the administration’s claim of needing the MX was “chimerical.” 32 Finally, on October 2, President Reagan announced his decision on the MX/MPS plan to a group of print and TV journalists in the East Room of the White House. His announcement was based on National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 12, approved the previous day, which reportedly had been drafted in Weinberger’s office in the Defense Department and then coordinated with the NSC and the White House. 33 After making obligatory opening remarks about “a weakening in our security posture” and the opening of a “window of vulnerability,” he outlined the administration’s five-part plan for the modernization of the United States strategic nuclear forces. 34 On the MX/MPS, he said that the administration would complete the MX missile, deploy a small number of them in existing Minuteman silos, while pursuing three promising long-term basing options, one of which would be selected by 1984. In short, he officially declared the MPS system dead. When the president took questions, Helen Thomas (UPI) asked him when exactly the “window of vulnerability” had occurred. Had it already occurred or would it occur sometime in the future, such as 1984 or 1987, both of which had been suggested at one time or another? The president rambled on about “the imbalance of forces . . . on the Western front” and Soviet superiority at sea, both of which evaded rather than answered the question. Reagan did even worse on the follow-up, when Thomas asked him if there was or would be a “window of vulnerability,” why would the MX missiles be any less vulnerable if they were placed in silos, the location of which the Soviets presumably already knew, “unless we were going to launch on their attack?” The president was stumped. “I don’t know,” he replied, “but what maybe you haven’t gotten into the area that I’m going to turn over to the Secretary of Defense.” 35 It was, as both Lou Cannon and Francis Fitzgerald have pointed out, an embarrassing performance, which led many reporters in the room to believe that Reagan failed to understand what he had agreed to. 36 That was not the only communication fiasco on the president’s part. Three days later, at a session with a group of out-of-town editors, one participant asked him, how he could square Weinberger’s statement at a recent congressional hearing that the MX system would not work unless it were in fact mobile, with the president’s current position that the missiles could now be stationary? Again, Reagan rambled on inarticulately,

126

Chapter 4

without ever answering the question, and then cut bait by moving on to another subject. 37 Two weeks after his announcement, the president tried again, at another session with out-of-town editors, but he still seemed unable to connect his answer with the question asked. Noting that both General Jones and Senator Tower, among others, had questioned the survivability of missiles even in super-hardened silos, one editor asked him whether this kind of reaction would undercut “the credibility of your MX program with the rest of the world, particularly with Moscow?” Reagan agreed that there was vulnerability even in hardened silos, but that the administration was “buying some time while we try to narrow that window of vulnerability.” What we “really mean,” he said, is that we will try to persuade them [the Soviets] into a “program of actual reduction of these strategic weapons,” and “will start in November the negotiations of theatre nuclear forces.” There was no follow up question. 38 Essentially, the administration’s October decision on the MX system was to kick the proverbial can down the road; in short, a decision not to decide. Reaction to the “decision” was mixed. It satisfied some, and dissatisfied many others. Several leading newspapers praised the decision to scuttle the MPS mobile plan and to defer a basing decision for three years, but they also stressed the necessity of negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve significant reductions in strategic nuclear arms. Others contended that MX invulnerability the administration sought was unachievable, and the best option would be to scrap the MX completely. 39 The Pentagon brass, including JCS chairman General Jones, were reportedly miffed because the decision had been reached by the president’s civilian advisers, with little input from the Pentagon. In Congress, defense hardliners like Senators Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) and John Tower (R-TX), and Representative Melvin Price (D-IL), for example, were unhappy with the president’s decision. Senator Tower publicly disputed Weinberger’s assertion that the president’s new plan for nuclear weapons gave the United States a “vastly increased and strengthened strategic program to close this window of vulnerability, as soon after it opens as possible.” He asserted that putting the MX in super-hardened silos “would not buy anything much but a little time in terms of invulnerability.” 40 In light of such exchanges, the Washington Post noted that the center of gravity within Congress on the MX program would be within the ranks of the defense conservatives, and predicted that would be “where the real defense debate will now begin.” 41 Thirteen months elapsed between the president’s announcement of his non-decision on October 2, 1981, and his proposal for a new MX basing plan on November 22, 1982, which the administration called “Dense Pack,” and its opponents quickly dubbed either “Dunce Pack” or “Dense Think.” In the interim, the number of critical books and studies by academics, scientists, and journalists continued to appear in an unabated flow, all of which in one way or another argued that land-based

The MX Missile

127

missiles could not be made invulnerable, urged the administration to invest instead in nuclear submarines and cruise missiles, and stressed the critical importance of serious negotiations with the Soviets leading to substantial reductions in nuclear arms, if not complete nuclear disarmament. 42 During the long decisional gap, the Nuclear Freeze Movement (NFM), organized in 1980 by Randall Forsberg, a defense analyst, began to gain numerous adherents across the country and attract widespread media and television news attention, with its popular call for a bilateral U.S.-Soviet adoption of a freeze on the building of nuclear weapons, leading ultimately to the elimination of all nuclear arms and an end to the nuclear arms race. 43 In an effort to counter the public criticism of its nuclear arms control policies the administration went into offensive mode. At an interagency White House meeting on April 28, 1982, chaired by Robert C. “Bud” McFarlane, deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, the State Department was tasked to prepare a public communications strategy to support the administration’s nuclear policies. The resulting draft strategy was prepared in early May in State’s Bureau of Public Affairs, and subsequently sent to the White House. The drafters of the strategy outlined the basis of a counter-narrative to the arguments of the anti-nuclear critics, based on a few fundamental premises: that the president understood and shared the public’s concern about the prospect of nuclear war; that he would soon propose a comprehensive and explicit negotiating package that was supported by a united administration; that he was sincerely interested in negotiating deep cuts in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms; and that both sides had the same goal—peace. They also cautioned that until a firm negotiating policy was articulated, the administration would lack an adequate foundation for an effective public communication campaign or a secure base on which to develop essential “talking points.” They recommended that since resources were limited, they should not be expended on hostile audiences, but rather “knowledgeable and influential” ones which were not fully aligned with the administration’s views. Operationally, the draft strategy focused on about twenty major media markets and involved programming individual principal speakers from the White House, State, DOD, and ACDA; media tours by upper and mid-level officials; placement of op-eds; meetings with editorial boards; direct-line interviews with radio and television stations; and the distribution of targeted publications. 44 The implementation of the strategy was monitored by the interagency Arms Control Information Working Group, initially chaired by McFarlane, and coordinated by the NSC. Weekly meetings were held at the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB), to ensure that the taskings, which came down from McFarlane, were carried out by the responsible agencies. The NSC also prepared a briefing book for speakers to use and hundreds of events were subse-

128

Chapter 4

quently programmed through the public affairs bureaus at State and Defense. 45 Judged by public opinion polls, however, the administration’s efforts to turn the tide of public criticism of its nuclear arms control policies, particularly on the MX missile, were not particularly successful. Polling on the MX revealed that the administration’s position had eroded badly over time. A September 1981 Time/Yankelovich, Skelly & White poll, taken September 15-17, showed that 45 percent of respondents favored producing the MX, but a year later, another Time/Yankelovich poll, taken December 8-9, 1982, showed that support for building the MX had dropped to 35 percent, while opposition rose to 52 percent. A Louis Harris & Associates poll, taken November 23-28, 1982, just days after the president’s televised speech of November 22, in which he specifically asked for congressional and public support for the MX program, showed an even larger majority of 58 percent opposed to the building of the MX missile system. 46 In the early months of 1982, key administration officials began openly discussing some form of “cluster basing” for the as-yet undeveloped MX missile. MX opponents in the media, the scientific community, activist organizations, the religious community, and Congress were already critical of the administration’s waffling and shifts on the basing mode issue (e.g., the “race-track” shuttling scheme, then putting them in super-hardened Titan silos, then in Minuteman silos, then abandoning super-hardening, then considering cluster basing), and they were inclined to attack any form of MX basing mode, because they uniformly believed that landbased missiles could not be made invulnerable, and therefore were not survivable. Moreover, they believed that any effort by the administration to consider anti-missile defenses in conjunction with a land-based deployment mode would signal to the Soviets that the United States was building a first-strike weapon, and would endanger the successful 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). To resolve these problems, they urged the administration to adopt a small, mobile submarine-launched missile system or an air-launched cruise missile system, or both. 47 Key administration officials, however, were inexorably moving toward alignment on the “necessity” of building the MX. They wanted to achieve parity in heavy intercontinental missiles with the Soviets, which they believed would induce them to negotiate a mutually acceptable nuclear arms control treaty. Weinberger and Haig agreed at an NSC meeting on April 27, 1982, that it was “imperative” to start building the MX, and that deployment in existing silos was preferable to warehousing them, until a basing mode acceptable to Congress could be determined. 48 About three weeks later, the president adopted NSDD 35, an MX-specific directive, which foreclosed any further development of the MPS system and the continuous air-borne option. He emphasized that the MX was “absolutely essential” to U.S. security needs, and that the “closely spaced basing”

The MX Missile

129

(CSB) option was the “most promising” route to pursue. The directive also called for initial operational capability (IOC) of the MX by 1986, and required DOD to recommend a permanent basing mode in sufficient time to allow the president to make a decision and advise Congress by December 1, 1982. 49 During the period between the administration’s adoption of NSDD 35 in May and the run-up to the midterm elections in November 1982, the CSB option, became a highly controversial issue. The controversy swirled around the theoretical concept of “fratricide,” which administration officials used to justify and defend the survivability of the MX missile. According to the fratricide theory, an adversary’s incoming intercontinental missiles aimed at the MX in a closely spaced basing arrangement, would essentially blow each other up, leaving most U.S. missiles in deep superhardened silos virtually intact, and capable of a devastating counter attack. MX/DP opponents contended, on the other hand, that there were too many ways by which the Soviets could circumvent the alleged fratricide effect, thereby rendering it unreliable as a deterrent. Since that would increase overall uncertainty about the deterrent effect of the MX, the situation would become dangerously destabilized. They also argued that the nuclear tactic known as “pindown,” a scenario in which an adversary could explode a timed series of nuclear warheads at high altitudes above a missile field, and the X-ray energy released by the explosion would prevent the host’s missiles from lifting off, would trump fratricide. 50 For administration experts like Richard DeLauer, the Pentagon’s chief of research and engineering, however, the opponents’ arguments did not constitute check-mate. He responded that the Soviets could not circumvent the fratricide effect, because they lacked “precise timing and fusing mechanisms,” and that the “uncertainty factor” would actually operate in favor of the United States, because if the Soviets were uncertain about whether fratricide would actually work, they would allegedly be reluctant to take a first strike, and therefore the result would be stabilizing. MX/DP opponents dismissed DeLauer’s comments as inapplicable, because specialized clocks to allow the Soviets to time missile explosions precisely were commercially available. 51 Contributing to the confusion were the views of individuals like Senator Tower, who believed that no matter which basing mode the administration selected for the MX, an anti-ballistic missile system was vitally necessary to provide real survivability. 52 This public debate turned on theories that had never been atmospherically tested, were most likely untestable in real time and which no one on either side of the debate was suggesting. The debate had an ethereal and almost mystical quality, like the medieval disputes about how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. By the late summer and early fall of 1982, the public debate over the proposed MX/DP system merged with the run-up to the midterm congressional elections. Perhaps a bipartisan letter to President Reagan from

130

Chapter 4

Representative Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA), who served on the House Armed Services Committee, dated October 4, 1982, bearing the names of thirty-five cosigners, was a harbinger of things to come. It urged the president to reject dense pack because it was based on unproven theories, its cost would damage the economy, a ballistic missile defense system would be necessary, and it would exacerbate the “already escalating nuclear arms race.” 53 When the elections were over, the GOP lost twentyseven seats in the House, enlarging the Democratic majority by 269-166, and the Democrats also picked up one seat in the Senate, which reduced the Republican majority there by 53 to 47. In the Democratic swap in the House, many Republican “coat-tailors” who had come in with Reagan were rejected by the voters. The NFM also did well: of nine state-wide freeze proposals, all won except Arizona’s, and of the many local freeze referenda, only two lost in small counties in Arkansas and Colorado, despite aggressive administration attempts to defeat them. As syndicated columnist Anthony Lewis noted in the New York Times, it “is not often that American voters send so clear a message on a substantive issue of foreign and defense policy.” 54 The “message,” however, had mixed results. At an NSC meeting on November 18, 1982, Reagan and his senior arms control advisers reached a decision to proceed with the MX in a CSB mode. 55 Four days later, in a major televised address on Thanksgiving Day from the Oval Office, Reagan announced his decision to deploy one hundred MX missiles in the CSB arrangement in super-hardened silos at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyoming. In his speech, which was arguably somewhat conciliatory, he avoided any mention of the “window of vulnerability,” though he used electronically generated color charts to describe how far ahead of the United States the Soviets were in both nuclear and conventional arms. He said that he was committed to searching for peace along “two parallel paths: deterrence and arms reductions,” and that his administration was pursuing negotiations with the Soviets on START, INF, and chemical weapons. The speech was also larded with typical Reaganesque emotional non-sequiturs about frightened children and uniformed men and women who had “given their lives to missile explosions and aircraft accidents caused by the old age of their equipment.” He concluded that the MX was “absolutely essential” for U.S. national security, because it would provide effective deterrence and incentivize the Soviets to negotiate deep arms reductions. Therefore, he said, “MX was the right missile at the right time.” 56 On the same day, he sent letters to the Speaker of the House, the president of the Senate and members of Congress notifying them of the deployment basing decision, which he had earlier agreed to provide by December 1, informing them that the MX would now be called the “Peacekeeper,” and requesting they keep an open mind, while the administration made its case for the decision. 57

The MX Missile

131

Rather than tamping down the public controversy over MX/DP, Reagan’s adoption of the CSB mode touched off another round of vigorous public opposition to the entire scheme. If the speech had been aimed at mollifying MX/DP opponents, as some commentators suggested, by emphasizing the administration’s efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union and to adopt a cheaper basing scheme that would require fewer missiles, it failed. Editorial response in leading newspapers was distinctly tepid, and both the Chicago Tribune and the New York Times agreed that the name Peacekeeper for a missile with ten thermonuclear warheads was both “silly” and sent the “wrong message.” 58 Almost immediately after the president’s speech, the administration and its MX/DP opponents, both inside and outside of Congress, lined up for the anticipated struggle on the Hill over funding the missile and its basing scheme. The initial focal point of the square-off was consideration by the House Appropriations Committee of the FY 1983 defense appropriations bill on December 2. By this time, the administration’s narrative had firmed up; it consisted of four interrelated basic arguments: that the MX was “absolutely essential” to achieve ICBM parity with the Soviets, demonstrate U.S. “resolve,” provide significant leverage for U.S arms control negotiators, and incentivize the Soviets to negotiate arms reductions seriously. On their part, MX/DP opponents countered that the United States already had nuclear superiority; that the Soviets were not preparing to fight and win a nuclear war; that they did not need incentives to negotiate, because they had requested negotiations several times in the past, which had been rebuffed by hardliners in the administration; that land-based missiles could not be made invulnerable; and that MX/DP was a destabilizing weapon. 59 Their views were buttressed by scientific and academic critics, who contended in numerous publications and media articles that all things considered, the DP system would most likely fail, that using the MX/DP as a “bargaining chip” was a smokescreen, because bargaining chips were merely a theory that had never been proved and it was political fantasy for Reagan to believe that such an enormously costly weapon would be offered as a trade-off; and that anti-ballistic missile defenses would be required to defend the missiles. 60 The anti-MX/DP groups lobbied intensively, targeting the House Appropriations Committee specifically and Congress generally through letters, telegrams, phone calls, and visits to congressional offices. The administration responded with an intense lobbying effort of its own, focused around the president, but also involving a number of midand senior-level officials from the White House, Pentagon, State, Defense, and ACDA, coordinated by the NSC. Lobbyists representing the aerospace manufacturers who held contracts for developing the MX also joined the effort, as did a number of MX/DP supporters in both the House and the Senate. The president, who was on a tour of Latin America, Vice President Bush in Washington, DC, and Secretary Weinberger, who was

132

Chapter 4

attending a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, all telephoned members of the House Appropriations Committee to urge them to vote against an amendment sponsored by Representative Joseph P. Addabbo, chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, to cut all production funds for the MX. Air Force officials issued a statement describing how a November 8 test of the hardened MX silos demonstrated how well they would hold up under a Soviet attack and “surpassed Air Force expectations in terms of resistance to blast effects.” 61 In a close call for the administration, Addabbo’s amendment was defeated by a 2626 tie vote, but after the amendment went down, the committee by voice vote approved two other amendments forbidding the Pentagon from spending money to produce the MX or to start developing DP until March 15, 1983, when the new House with twenty-six additional Democrats would be seated. 62 The president was pleased with the outcome of this initial skirmish, but was wary about celebrating in the face of an anticipated uphill battle on the House floor. 63 As the Washington Post editors commented, the House committee had merely extended the MX program’s “political vulnerability” for another two-and-a-half months, and that Reagan still needed to “project a sense of purposeful design” to his efforts to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons program. 64 The full House vote on MX/DP funding was scheduled for December 7, a fateful day in American history. Once again the administration went into intensive bargaining mode. This time around, both Reagan and Weinberger were in town. The president sent a letter to House members urging them to vote for full funding of MX/DP, 65 but he also went further, inviting seventy-six House members to the White House for a personal pitch on behalf of MX/DP, of whom more than forty showed up, perhaps a sign that there was trouble for the White House on the horizon. Reagan and Weinberger presented the administration’s case, and Reagan, taking advantage of the historic day on which the House vote was scheduled, told the visiting congressmen that World War II came about because the United States did not have an effective deterrent to prevent the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a dubious analogy at best. Weinberger, Clark, and Rowny were dispatched to the Hill to meet with Republican members of Congress, and George Keyworth, the president’s science adviser, hastily called a press conference at the Pentagon during which he made the remarkable assertion that with DP, the “MX would be survivable, assuredly, until the end of this century.” 66 The administration’s bargaining efforts were to no avail. On December 7, the House voted, 245-176, to cut funding for the MX. Fifty Republicans joined with 195 Democrats to oppose the president, the first time since World War II that Congress voted against a new major weapons program. 67 A “grim” Reagan described the vote as “a grave mistake” and a “grievous error,” that would “seriously set back our efforts to protect the Nation’s security.” He accused the House majority of choosing “to go sleepwalking into the

The MX Missile

133

future,” and he vowed to do everything in his power to “take this case to the country.” 68 Reaction in the media to the House vote and Reagan’s comments was swift and critical. The Chicago Tribune, for example, contended that the MX symbolized an “uncontrolled” arms race and defense spending, and that the public was “galvanized” by the “careless, loose-lipped way” he and his officials spoke about the prospect of nuclear war and “his reluctance to begin arms control talks.” The Tribune’s editors called upon the president to “be honest about the real capabilities of the Soviet strategic forces which . . . cannot be considered superior to those of the United States,” and “to prove the proposition that the MX is cost-effective.” 69 The Los Angeles Times described the House action as “consistent with the mood of the country” and “with economic and military realities.” The editors faulted the president for “continuing to exaggerate the military power of the Soviet Union relative to that of the United States” and concluded that he was “needlessly staking the prestige of his presidency on the fate of a dubious project.” 70 The New York Times editors simply denied that the House vote was a mistake, and insisted it was “the only sensible course, and the Senate should follow suit.” Not until Dense Pack could be shown “to provide a safe site,” they concluded, “buying the MX for it now is to buy the wrong missile at the wrong time for the wrong base.” 71 The Washington Post, commenting on the president’s vow to take his MX case to the country, queried “precisely what calculation of votes and stakes makes him ready to risk more of his political capital on this project.” 72 All of these editorial writers, as well as other journalists who wrote for these papers, seemed to believe that Reagan and his arms control advisers were hopelessly out of step with changing technical and political realities, that they had ignored the conclusion of many eminent scientists and some of their own arms control experts, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the age of fixed land-based missiles was rapidly coming to an end. They also claimed that the American public favored serious negotiations with the Soviets for deep, mutual reductions in nuclear arms; and that they were deeply concerned about the budgetary impact of Reagan’s massive military buildup, when the country was facing a mounting budget deficit and a severe recession. 73 True to his vow, the president made a strenuous effort to go public to head off a Senate vote against the MX. On December 10, 1982, he met with reporters in the Oval Office at the White House, and his remarks were broadcast live over nationwide radio and television. The following day, he delivered his Saturday radio address on the production of the MX missile from Camp David, Maryland, the presidential retreat. Most of what he had to offer the public on these two occasions, however, consisted of a rehash of the administration’s positions on the MX and its DP basing mode. At the same time, he made some rather unwise and inept comments that could only serve to draw fire from his opponents: that

134

Chapter 4

those who had voted against funding the MX were “lacking a little in honesty” because they had unfairly focused on the DP basing mode rather than the MX missile; that those who insisted the basing mode would violate the 1972 ABMT were being “dishonest”; and that the House voted down the money for the MX “without really considering the facts.” 74 Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC), for example, in his “blistering” response to the president’s radio address, tried to turn the debate toward the economic aspects of MX/DP. He called Reagan the “biggest spender of all time,” and he denounced the president’s “totally undisciplined program of weapons purchases that is busting the budget and breaking the economy upon which national security depends.” 75 However, neither side was seeking a real confrontation. In his Q&A with reporters on December 10, the president left ample room for compromise. He said that he was “perfectly willing” to sit down with members of the Senate to debate and discuss possible alternatives to Dense Pack. On his part, Senator Hollings said at a Senate news conference that “we’re not looking for confrontation,” and Mark O. Hatfield (R-OR), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, in his remarks said he was opposed to the MX, but gave no indication that he would try to delete production funds for it when the FY 1983 defense appropriations bill came up in the Senate. 76 In fact, both sides had motives that propelled them toward an executive-legislative bargain. Those Democratic and Republican senators who opposed MX were concerned that if they followed the House action and cut all MX funding, they would be faced with a presidential veto, while the president and his advisers were willing to negotiate on the basing mode, which was unpopular in Congress, so long as they could retain the MX as both an incentive and a wedge in Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations with the Soviets. The route to compromise was through the Senate leadership, principally majority leader Howard H. Baker Jr. (TN), Republican whip Ted Stevens (AK) and Senator Tower, but the group also included two senior Democrats, Henry “Scoop” Jackson (WA) and Sam Nunn (GA). The resulting bipartisan deal was worked out during the evening of December 13, and the president announced it the following day at an abruptly called press conference in the White House briefing room. 77 According to the initial agreement, the president’s full request of $988 million for production of the MX would be preserved. However, those funds would be “fenced,” meaning that they could not be dispersed until the president certified his selection of a basing mode, and submitted it to Congress by March 1, along with information concerning alternative basing modes. Both houses of Congress would be required to approve the basing mode recommended by the president or any one of the alternatives that members might select, by April 15. The expedited procedure for congressional approval was designed to avoid a filibuster. There was an immediate glitch, however, because several key members of the Senate

The MX Missile

135

denied that there was any agreement. Senators Hatfield and Hollings, for example, were particularly incensed and refused to be locked into any kind of time restrictions regarding debate on the MX or its basing mode. Hollings proposed an amendment to the continuing resolution then under debate in the Senate Appropriations Committee, which included most of the provisions of the initial compromise, but eliminated any deadline for voting on the MX or its basing mode. The Hollings amendment passed, 16-12, with the support of four Republicans, a defection that some journalists agreed was an “embarrassing setback” for the president and dramatized “the growing unhappiness with the MX on Capitol Hill.” 78 The “setback” was merely temporary, however, because in the wee small hours of the morning on December 17, another bargain was worked out by Senators Jackson, Tower, Stevens, and Nunn. It restored the timelines of the earlier compromise, stipulated that the administration must produce its new assessment of basing modes no earlier than March 1, required an analysis of bombers and ballistic missile submarines as well as land-based missiles in justifying its basing decision, and limited debate in each chamber to fifty hours. It was clearly a face-saving script for the president, but it also made clear that Dense Pack was virtually dead. The Senate approved the Jackson amendment to the Continuing Resolution (CR) by 56-42, 79 and later that morning the White House released a statement by the president commending the Senate on its “welcome and wise” action, and announcing that he would soon appoint a bipartisan commission to undertake a thorough analysis of basing options. 80 On January 3, 1983, Reagan appointed the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, popularly called the Scowcroft Commission, after its chairman, Brent L. Scowcroft, a retired Air Force lieutenant general, who had also served as NSC adviser to President Gerald Ford. The commission was politically bipartisan, but ideologically most of its personnel represented the old Cold War arms control establishment, several of whom had been past advocates of the MX missile. Many journalists and media commentators perceived the panel as “safe” and purposefully “stacked,” to give the president a compromise that would, above all, preserve the MX as the keystone of his nuclear arms modernization program and a basing option that Congress would find palatable. 81 The commission had a broad mandate to study the full array of the nation’s nuclear deterrence, and it was charged specifically with producing a “consensus-building report” for Congress concerning basing options for U.S. strategic missiles. It finished its work on April 6, and on April 19, the president informed Congress that he endorsed its recommendations and urged prompt congressional action. 82 In its recommendations, the commission supported the president’s request to deploy one hundred MX missiles in improved Minuteman silos as an interim measure, but stressed that they should be used as bargaining chips in U.S.-Soviet arms

136

Chapter 4

control negotiations. For the longer term, the commission recommended a “new departure,” the development and eventual deployment of a small, highly accurate single-warhead mobile missile, which would strengthen the survivability of the U.S. ICBM force, and at the same time be less destabilizing. Scrapping the MX, the commission contended, would “undermine the incentives to the Soviets” to convert their heavy landbased missiles to smaller, single warhead missiles. The commission also discarded the concept of a “window of vulnerability,” noting that the problem of ICBM vulnerability is “not so dominant a part of the overall problem as to require immediate steps.” It therefore freed the administration from public support of an indefensible political myth, and linked it to the Carter administration’s logic that in combination with the U.S. bomber and submarine nuclear forces, the MX contributed to the overall American deterrent force despite its vulnerability. 83 The Scowcroft Commission’s report was a “calculated political package deal,” aimed at two objectives. The first was to gain the support of administration and congressional hardliners like Senator Tower for limited MX deployment in return for approval of the new, smaller, and less threatening missile, soon to be called Midgetman. The second was to gain the support of moderates who wanted more effective arms control negotiations with the Soviets and the full integration of the Scowcroft Commission’s recommendations into the administration’s nuclear arms modernization program, beginning with the START negotiations in Geneva. However, the package deal quickly evolved into a bargaining chip between the White House and its congressional allies with moderates in Congress. In his response to a letter from a bipartisan group (mostly Democratic) of ten junior members of the House Appropriations Committee subcommittee on defense, dated May 2, 1983, for example, the president reassured them that he would change the administration’s arms control proposals in the START talks to conform with the Scowcroft recommendations, and commit himself as strongly to arms control as he had to deployment of the MX. 84 In a similar letter to influential moderate Senators Charles H. Percy (R-IL), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and two members of the Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn and William S. Cohen (R-ME), the following day, he stated that he supported the so-called “builddown” concept, being pushed by Nunn and Cohen, which would require the elimination by both the United States and Soviet negotiating parties of a set number of existing missiles for every new one deployed. 85 These letters, augmented by more personal contact with individual and groups of senators and representatives, public reaffirmations of his support for the Scowcroft panel’s recommendations, and a barrage of telephone calls to wavering legislators enabled the administration to win every committee and floor vote related to Research and Development (R&D), as well as testing of and production funds for the MX in the House and Senate between May and July 1983. 86

The MX Missile

137

The events of April/July 1983 set in motion a pattern that would endure with little variation until the summer of 1985. The administration, energized by the defeat it had suffered in the House the previous December and intent on keeping the MX missile alive, made an important practical calculation. Realizing it had considerable leverage in Congress, it turned its full attention to House and Senate moderates and those individuals who were considered potential MX swing voters, ramping up its bargaining activities for each FY’s Defense budget authorization cycle. The White House was able to work with its moderate allies, the so-called “gang of six,” which included Les Aspin, Al Gore, and Norman Dicks in the House and Sam Nunn, Charles Percy, and William Cohen in the Senate, all of whom supported the MX, in return for Reagan’s promise to seek deep arms reductions in negotiations with the Soviets. Reagan also evidently reached a private agreement with Tip O’Neill, Speaker of the House, who told the president that though he was personally opposed to the MX, he would not attempt to persuade anyone else to adopt that position. 87 Groups of congressmen were invited to the White House for special briefings, and individual congressmen were asked to meet with the president for personal chats. The president and his senior arms control advisers made telephone calls to those who wavered on voting with the administration. Weinberger, Shultz, and other officials trooped to the Hill to testify and meet with congressmen. Brent Scowcroft was selected to write a letter to Congress, cautioning members that a vote against the MX would abort arms control progress at Geneva, and at one point Max Kampelman, the chief U.S. negotiator at Geneva, who was also a Democrat, was brought home to meet with congressmen to reinforce Scowcroft’s message. 88 The White House also encouraged pro-defense organizations to publish favorable newspaper ads, held presidential pep talks for corporate executives, and placed op-eds by Reagan and other senior officials in leading newspapers. 89 In numerous votes (subcommittee, committee, and floor) between the spring of 1983 and the summer of 1985, the president managed to prevail, often by close outcomes, largely because of frequent vote-shifting by moderates. Some journalists, editorial writers, and political commentators perceived the slim margins of victory for Reagan in the House and Senate on the MX as evidence of his “persuasiveness” and his ability to change political negatives into positives by going public. This view, however, raises the pertinent question of whether the moderates, particularly Democrats, were reacting to Reagan’s narrative about the MX, or were they motivated by other considerations? It is highly likely, though difficult to document, that Democratic moderates, many of whom believed that the MX was a flawed, destabilizing and much too costly weapon, voted yes because they were concerned about being labeled “soft on defense,” which had been a significant problem for President Carter and the Democratic Party in the 1980 presidential elections, and was reinforced

138

Chapter 4

by Reagan’s thrashing of Walter Mondale, who had supported the nuclear freeze and promised to kill the MX, in the 1984 elections. There were also probably some who wanted to express their solidarity with Reagan and his negotiating team in Geneva, to avoid being characterized by their political opponents as “unpatriotic” in their respective home districts. No doubt there were others who believed that the MX was the price they had to pay for Reagan’s acceptance of the Nunn-Cohen “build-down” concept or that a U.S.-Soviet agreement on ICBMs at Geneva would dislodge stalled arms agreements that the Soviets had already accepted, such as SALT II, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE). It is also highly likely that still others were moved by an unwillingness to appear as naysayers during the televised debates and votes on the MX or by its impact on the federal budget deficit. Finally, given that members are generally inclined to support federal spending in their home districts, some no doubt anticipated benefits from the fact that the thirteen primary ICBM defense contractors and their subcontractors in twenty-eight states could bring home jobs in a time of recession. 90 Despite the political advantages and the support of moderates the president enjoyed in Congress, there were problems. As early as mid-1983, signs began to appear that congressional patience with the administration’s MX program had limits. In late May, nineteen moderate Republican senators, who had supported him on the MX, sent Reagan a “blunt” letter warning him not to take their future support for granted, unless he took active steps to reformulate the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva to bring it into full conformity with the Scowcroft commission’s recommendations, moved vigorously ahead on development of the Midgetman, and presented a “meaningful” build-down proposal to the Soviets in Geneva. They also urged the president to keep in mind that their current vote supporting production of the MX, did not constitute approval of the full one hundred missile MX program. 91 Senator Nunn took a similar position at the time, and two years later, he favored capping the number of MX missiles authorized, and said he had reached “the end of the line” on the MX, so long as it was deployed in vulnerable Minuteman silos. 92 In the post-1984 election period, Senator Barry Goldwater, the new chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, came out strongly in favor of killing the MX program as an administration contribution toward deficit reduction, 93 which the president feared might be the “kiss of death” for the MX. 94 In the meantime, MX opponents in Congress, even though outvoted on the missile itself, were able to load up the FY funding resolutions for the Defense Department with various limitations and restrictions, particularly with respect to the number of missiles authorized and withholding funds for actual deployment in the absence of a survivable basing scheme. They were able to limit production funds to support only twenty-one missiles in both the FY 1984 and FY 1985 de-

The MX Missile

139

fense authorization cycles, while making actual deployment contingent on signs of the president’s genuine arms control flexibility and specific progress toward developing the Midgetman missile. In July 1985, after several months of intense White House bargaining to secure authorization for another fifty missiles, in addition to the forty-two already authorized, the House-Senate Conference Committee cancelled the 100-MX option, when it set a statutory limit capping production at fifty missiles for placement in Minuteman silos, until a more survivable basing plan could be developed. At the same time, the conferees authorized $100 million for development of the Midgetman missile, despite the misgivings of the Air Force, the JCS, the Defense Department and many civilian officials in the administration. 95 Between late 1986 and the summer of 1987, the political climate surrounding the MX debate changed once again, and not particularly in the administration’s favor. In October, for example, eighteen House members wrote a letter to Reagan, which was made public in December, indicating that they would oppose any further administration requests for additional MX missiles. Signatories of the letter included Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who had previously been instrumental in lining up moderate Democratic support for Reagan’s MX requests, a clear indication that both bipartisan and moderate Democratic support for the MX was eroding. 96 In the November midterm elections, the Democrats enlarged their control of the House by a margin of 258 to 182, and they regained control of the Senate by a margin of 55 to 45. During the early months of 1987, press and television news stories began to appear concerning various technical problems with the MX, and in August the House Armed Services Committee released a General Accounting Office (GAO) report describing the missile’s guidance systems as “deficient,” which raised “serious questions” about the accuracy of those missiles already deployed in Wyoming. 97 It was also clear that public opinion was still running strongly against the MX. A USA Today survey, conducted by the Gordon S. Block Corporation in May 1985, for example, found a 55-43 percent majority opposed to Congress’s approval of funding twenty-one MX missiles. A Louis Harris & Associates poll taken in July 1985, revealed that the public supported Congress’ efforts to cut back on the MX missile by a 55-39 percent majority. And another Harris poll, taken in January 1987, found an even stronger majority of 5833 percent of respondents who believed that Congress was more right than Reagan in wanting to reduce the number of MX missiles. 98 Reading the proverbial handwriting on the wall, Reagan and his senior arms control advisers opted to support an alternative MX basing system and the rapid development of the Midgetman missile. At an NSC meeting on December 16, 1986, the participants recognized the fact that Congress had successfully made the basing of the MX a political hostage to the Midgetman. They dredged up an old concept of railroad basing,

140

Chapter 4

which traced its roots back beyond the Carter administration, and renamed it the Garrison Rail Mobile Basing (GRMB) system, which was fundamentally a shuttling system, conceptually not all that dissimilar from the Carter administration’s “racetrack” system. The president seemed to understand that if he had any possibility of obtaining additional MX missiles and the GRMB system, he would have to trade support for the costly small, mobile one-warhead missile, which the administration had never vigorously promoted, in part because the Air Force and the Defense Department were still wedded to the MX. 99 Three days later, Larry Speakes announced the president’s decision to proceed with the GRMB system and full-scale development of the Midgetman, but he made no mention of any request for an additional fifty MX missiles. 100 On December 24, the president approved NSDD 252, which incorporated these elements officially into the administration’s nuclear arms modernization plans. 101 Ultimately, the MX/Peacekeeper and the Midgetman programs failed to work out precisely as the Reagan administration desired. Neither system was ever fully deployed. As the tensions of the Cold War receded, the likelihood that they would be rapidly declined. Twenty years after the initial start-up of the MX program, President George H. W. Bush, who had served as Reagan’s vice-president and had inherited it from the Reagan administration, cancelled both the rail-mobile MX/Peacekeeper and the Midgetman. In the end, the cost of the land-based missile program reached about $20 billion by 1998. It produced 114 missiles (including both test missiles and spares) at a cost of $400 million for each operational missile, with the “fly-away” cost of each warhead estimated at between $20 and $70 million. Bush formally cancelled the mobile MX/Peacekeeper program in September 1991, and later committed to eliminating the entire MX/Peacekeeper force by 2003, as part of the January 1993 START II agreement with the Soviets. That agreement, however, never entered into force. By that time, both U.S. military and political leaders were agreed that the land-based missile program no longer served a deterrent purpose. The MX/Peacekeepers were gradually drawn down, until the last one was deactivated at the Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming, on September 19, 2005. 102 Ironically, as several writers have pointed out, the MX/Peacekeeper outlasted the adversary it was designed to counter by almost fifteen years. In retrospect, the seemingly interminable public debate over the MX that occurred during the two Reagan administrations was a veritable Alice-in-Wonderland spectacle that never managed to emerge fully from the web of political mythology and anti-Soviet ideology in which it was enmeshed. The administration’s public narrative was, on the one hand, simplistic and based largely on platitudes about American “resolve” and “strength” and “parity,” while on the other, it was mired in political contradictions and theoretical obfuscations like “fratricide” and “bar-

The MX Missile

141

gaining chips.” Luckily for Reagan, the journalists assigned to the White House press corps had little opportunity to ask him hard questions and follow-ups on his statements, given the president’s scripted performances and tightly controlled press conferences. Syndicated columnists, editorial writers, scientific experts, and political activists had a better opportunity to raise trenchant questions, but the administration had no obligation to respond to them, and only rarely displayed any inclination to engage its critics directly. 103 It preferred safer venues and a one-way model of communication, where the president and his senior advisers delivered their comments, took a few “softball” questions and everyone then dispersed. Members of Congress often raised hard questions about Reagan’s nuclear modernization program in letters to the president and in congressional hearings, but the exchanges of correspondence were not widely available to the public, and questions raised during testimony on the Hill were not always reported in the press. It was a “public debate” that took place in a relative communication vacuum, where the MX opponents and proponents rarely engaged one another directly in public forums. Essentially, the “debate” was reduced to a protracted and tortuous process of executive-legislative bargaining on virtually every aspect of the MX program: the number and type of missiles, the time-frame for production, the best basing mode, the amount of funding for it in the annual Defense Department’s budget authorization, and so on. The administration’s communication efforts on the MX never really served either the press or the public, and the critics’ hard questions were never really answered. They wanted to know, for example, why the utter devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic “weapons of terror” during World War II, which was embodied in the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) theory, was not an effective deterrent? Why did the administration contend, they queried, that the MX was an “indispensable weapon,” if it was not survivable and if the administration wanted to trade it away as a bargaining chip? Many wanted to know, why the administration considered the MX a valuable bargaining chip at all, if no survivable basing mode could be found for it, and there was massive public, media, and congressional opposition to it? How could the administration deem the MX “reliable,” they also wanted to know, if the preponderant weight of expert scientific opinion regarded it as unworkable and easily surmountable by the Soviets? Why did the administration, some asked, constantly talk about Soviet nuclear arms superiority when most of the recognized arms control experts on the public record denied that was the case, especially when American submarine-launched and air-launched nuclear missiles were taken into account? Others desired to know precisely how deploying MX missiles in admittedly vulnerable silos like “sitting ducks” would convince the Soviets of American “resolve?” And, finally, many critics questioned why the administration appeared to believe that the leaders of the Soviet Union were either dumb enough or

142

Chapter 4

crazy enough to risk initiating a nuclear exchange with the United States, when they knew that the United States had nuclear superiority? 104 Questions like these could not be answered with administration boilerplate, nor by Reagan’s public ruminations, so they were essentially ignored. Nor did administration officials generally, or the president specifically, ever entirely escape from their entrapment in the contradictions and illogicalities of their own narrative. For example, they never resolved the problem of “obsolescence,” which held that the rate of technical progress would make nuclear arms systems, no matter how sophisticated they were today obsolete tomorrow, thereby requiring an ever-mounting need for additional weapons. 105 They also failed to deal effectively with the “bargaining chip” theory, given the facts that there was no actual evidence that it had ever worked in the past, that it rested on the fatuous assumption that the Soviets were simply puppets on a string, and that the theory implied that the United States could live without the MX and therefore the missile was not “indispensable” as the president frequently claimed. Moreover, rather than dispelling the resulting confusion about the role of the MX, they exacerbated it, by failing to distinguish precisely whether the MX was a negotiating pawn designed to be traded away for deep nuclear arms reductions or merely serve as an incentive to entice the Soviets to engage in negotiations. 106 Regardless of how the administration parsed the efficacy of “bargaining chips,” the American public’s view was quite clear: as early as the spring of 1983, and consistently thereafter, when the public was polled on the issue, a two-to-one majority believed that a U.S. military buildup was more likely to induce the Soviet Union to produce more weapons rather than to negotiate seriously. 107 Finally, the administration’s handling of the alleged Soviet superiority in ICBM forces actually reached the level of comedy. When the president or his senior arms control advisers were publicly asked if they would trade the alleged “superior” Soviet ICBM forces for those of the United States, the usual answer, after some tap-dancing around the question, was that they would not, because of their “faith” in U.S. technology and/or the “American people,” an evasion required because the premise of the question was erroneous, and because it looped back to the issue of obsolescence and foundered on the shoals of unreality. 108 Perhaps the best way to sum up the whole rather surreal public non-debate on the MX is to cite the words of House minority leader Robert H. Michel (R-IL), who suggested that “a visitor from another planet could only conclude that the MX is a dangerous weapon that does not work and that it is terribly vulnerable even though it is in no danger of attack.” 109 Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), a long-time MX opponent, described the debate a bit more colorfully: “it was like critics of The Three Stooges debating the right way to squirt seltzer up your nose.” 110

The MX Missile

143

NOTES 1. Much of the literature on the MX program is highly technical, but for general background focusing on the controversy over the issue during the Carter and early Reagan administrations, see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (1991); and John Edwards, Superweapon: The Making of MX (1982). Also highly useful is Steven Anthony Pomeroy’s doctoral dissertation, “Echoes That Never Were: American Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, 1956-1983,” Auburn University, May 11, 2006, which is available from Auburn University or online at ADA452153.pdf. 2. The alleged “window of vulnerability” was Reagan’s version of John F. Kennedy’s “missile gap” of the late 1950s, which Senator Kennedy used effectively to criticize the strategic defense policies of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and candidate Richard Nixon in the 1960 presidential election. When Kennedy was informed by experts that the facts did not support his assertions, and that if there was a missile gap, it favored the United States, he apparently shrugged off the information and continued to use the alleged strategic disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union as a political strategy. When officials in his administration admitted there was no such gap in the fall of 1961, the whole issue quickly evaporated. On his part, Reagan apparently borrowed the phrase “window of vulnerability” from his former colleagues at the Committee on the Present Danger, and used it frequently throughout the first two years of his administration, until it was discarded in April 1983 by the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, which Reagan appointed. On Kennedy, see Christopher A. Preble, “Who Ever Believed in the ‘Missile Gap’?: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2003, 801-26, and his full length study, John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap (2004). For background on the “window of vulnerability” concept, see Pavel Podvig, “The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s: A Research Note,” International Security, 2008, 118-38. According to David E. Hoffman, between 1979 and early 1985, a Soviet spy, Adolf Tolkachev, provided the CIA with a mass of documents containing information, inter alia, about the design of Soviet radar, rocket guidance systems, and fighter airplanes, which put the United States in position “to dominate the skies in aerial combat and confirmed the vulnerability of Soviet air defenses,” especially “showing that American cruise missiles and strategic bombers could fly under the [Soviet] radar.” For the quotation, see Hoffman, “How the CIA ran a ‘billion dollar spy’ in Moscow,” Washington Post, July 3, 2015, A1, and for additional information on the Tolkachev operation, see his full-length study, The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal (2015). In short, whatever gaps or windows may have existed were on the Soviet side, not the U.S. side. 3. See Matthew Glass, Citizens Against the MX, 1993, 35-36. 4. “Must MX Be a Shell Game,” New York Times, March 18, 1981, A26. 5. Extensive documentation on the national Campaign to Stop the MX can be found in NDCR Collection, Boxes 25 and 26, NSArchive; see also David Cortright, Peace Works, 1993, 133-58. 6. See the following: “Proposed Catholic Bishops’ Letter Opposes First Use of Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, October 26, 1982, A1; “14 Catholic Bishops Say MX Threatens World,” New York Times, September 20, 1983, A21; Richard Halloran, “Catholic Bishops Urge Lawmakers to Bar MX Funds,” New York Times, March 16, 1985, 1. For text of the Bishops’ Letter to Congress on MX, see New York Times, March 16, 1985, 4. 7. For example, Senators Jake Garn (R-UT) and Paul Laxalt (R-NV), who had initially temporized on the MPS scheme, came out forcefully against it on June 26, and in favor of putting the MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos, as well as diversification in U.S. strategic arms, including ABM defenses, development of lasers and resuming negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve reductions in strategic arms. See “Key Senators Oppose Missiles for Their States,” New York Times, July 26, 1981, A1, 17. Senator Tower responded with a press advisory on the same day, noting his disap-

144

Chapter 4

pointment with Garn and Laxalt; a copy is in NDCR Collection, Box 25, Folder: MX— Cong + Leg 1981, NSArchive. 8. One estimate, by the Council on Economic Priorities, which opposed the MX/ MPS system, went as high as $232 billion, when the rate of inflation was taken into account. See the figures as reported in Defense Daily, August 3, 1981, 179, NDCR Collection, Box 25, Folder: MX July-Aug 1981, NSArchive. 9. For a sampling of editorials from these newspapers, see “The MX Question,” Boston Globe, February 15, 1981, 17; “The MX Monster—Doubts from Those in the Know,” Christian Science Monitor, March 31, 1981, 9; “Needed: a Nuclear Policy,” Denver Post, April 30, 1981, 30; and “The Real Defense Debate,” Washington Post, October 4, 1981, C6. 10. See “Avoiding Doomsday,” Los Angeles Times, July 5, 1981, E4, and “Holes in the MX Plans,” July 19, 1981, P4. 11. “Don’t Decide,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 1981, 12. 12. General Graham’s views are quoted in “US: MX Issues Clouding Project?,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, March 27, 1981, 1; a copy is in NDCR Collection, Box 25, Folder: MX—April-May 1981, NSArchive. 13. Paul C. Warnke, “On the MX Question, Reagan’s Choices Are Equally Bad,” Los Angeles Times, August 23, 1981, H1. 14. Maxwell D. Taylor, “How Much for Defense? Only What’s Essential,” Washington Post, September 1, 1981, A17. 15. Dean Rusk, “Nuclear Advice from One Who Has Been There,” Washington Post, October 1, 1981, A29. 16. Stansfield Turner, “Why We Shouldn’t Build the MX,” New York Times Magazine, March 29, 1981, A15. 17. The notable scientists opposed to the MX included Hans A. Bethe, Sidney D. Drell, Richard L. Garwin, Kent Johnson, George Kistiakowsky, William J. Perry, George W. Rathjens, Herbert Scoville Jr., Kosta Tsipis, Jerome B. Weisner, and Herbert York. Most of them had served at one time or another as scientists or scientific consultants in the Pentagon, State Department, or the CIA. Bethe was a Nobel laureate, all the others held prestigious science awards. For a sampling of their views, see Sidney D. Drell and Richard L. Garwin, “Basing the MX Missile: A Better Idea,” Technology Review, 1981, 20-29; Kosta Tsipis, “Why Dense Pack Would Probably Fail,” Los Angeles Times, November 24, 1982, C5; Herbert Scoville Jr., “The MX Invites Attack,” New York Times, December 13, 1982, A23; and Jerome B. Weisner, “MX, the Danger,” New York Times, April 12, 1983, A23. Perry, who had served as undersecretary of defense for research and engineering in the Carter administration, and was appointed by Reagan to the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces in 1983, writes about his experiences with the MX program in his memoir, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, 2015, 49-51. Scientific organizations opposed to MX included the American Federation of Scientists and the Union of Concerned Scientists. 18. See, for example, Steven R. Weisman, “White House Setback on MX Had Diverse Roots,” New York Times, December 17, 1982, A21. 19. See Richard Halloran, “Air Force and Weinberger at Odds Over MX Missile,” New York Times, February 15, 1981, 27. 20. See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “The MX Stall,” Washington Post, February 27, 1981, A15, and Bernard Gwertzman, “Haig to Press Reagan to Abandon Weinberger’s Airborne MX Plan,” New York Times, August 15, 1981, 17. 21. See Eugene Rostow’s “Briefing Notes” for the National Security Council Meeting, held on August 17, 1981, at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles, California, printed in Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 72. 22. Lou Cannon, Reagan, 1982, 390, says that the final report was not made public and Francis Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 2000, 188, says it was “kept a secret even from the Air Force.” In fact, that was not quite the case. Evidently, at least one copy of the report, Townes’ Panel, “Report of the Committee on MX Basing,” dated

The MX Missile

145

July 1981, was submitted to the Air Force’s Ballistic Missile Office (BMO), and then eventually retired with papers from that office to the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), where Steven Anthony Pomeroy consulted it while writing his doctoral dissertation. For information on the provenance of the report, see Pomeroy, “Echoes That Never Were,” 229 n39. Moreover, according to one journalist, portions of the report were released by the Pentagon in March 1982; see George C. Wilson, “MX Missile Program, Once a GOP Priority, Is Now in Limbo,” Washington Post, March 25, 1982, A7, in which he quotes from the report. 23. Pomeroy cites various portions of the report in his dissertation, which are paraphrased here; see Pomeroy, “Echoes That Never Were,” 229-31. 24. See Gerald F. Seib, “MX Basing Decision May Be Put Off by Reagan Pending More Study of Options,” Wall Street Journal, August 17, 1981, 6, and Associated Press (AP) report, “Key Defense Advisory Panel Said to Back Land Basing of MX,” Baltimore Sun, August 17, 1981, 3. 25. The minutes for National Security Council Meeting 20 on Central America, EastWest Trade and Strategic Forces, have of this writing not yet been declassified. However, Eugene Rostow’s remarks prepared for the discussion of strategic forces have recently been declassified and are included in Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 70-73. 26. See, for example, Charles W. Corddry, “It’s Land Bases or Nowhere for MX, Aides Say,” Baltimore Sun, August 21, 1981, 1. 27. See Lee Lescaze, “Airborne MX Version Finds Foes,” Washington Post, August 22, 1981, A1. 28. See Howell Raines, “Air-Based Missile May Be Ruled Out,” New York Times, August 25, 1981, A17; Walter Pincus and Jay Matthews, “President Deciding on MX Plan,” Washington Post, August 25, 1981, A1. 29. See Arthur G. B. Metcalf, “Missile Accuracy—The Need to Know,” Strategic Review, IX: 3 (Summer 1981), 5-8. 30. For the quote, see “MX and the ‘Uncertainty Gap,’” Chicago Tribune, August 27, 1981, 12. For other examples of media and editorial coverage, see the following: “MX: Not Where, but Why,” Chicago Sun-Times, August 15, 1981, 18; Michael Getler, “Journal Questions Premise of MX Program,” Washington Post, August 18, 1981, A10; Tom Wicker, “Rethinking the MX,” New York Times, August 25, 1981, A19; Leslie Gelb, “Missile Strategy Draws Challenges,” New York Times, August 26, 1981, A1. 31. Herbert Scoville Jr., MX: Prescription for Disaster (1981). To sample contemporary reviews, see Michael R. Gordon, “Defense or Debacle: The Great Missile Debate,” Washington Post Book World, August 9, 1981, 3; and Burke Wilkinson, “Case against the MX, a Shell Game That Could Misfire,” Christian Science Monitor, August 10, 1981, B4. The book was sold commercially and through several anti-MX groups, such as the Council for a Livable World. For other studies that followed a similar line of reasoning, see David Gold, Christopher Paine, and Gail Shields, Misguided Expenditure: An Analysis of the Proposed MX Missile System (1981); and Rear Admiral (ret.) Eugene J. Carroll, MX: The Weapon Nobody Wants (1981); copies of these two publications can be found in the NDCR Collection, Box 25, NSArchive. 32. Tom Wicker, “In the Nation: Rethinking the MX,” New York Times, August 25, 1981, A19. 33. For the text of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 12, titled “Strategic Forces Modernization Program” (redacted), dated October 1, 1981, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, 1981-1991, 1995, 4647. 34. The five parts of the program were: making U.S. strategic communications command systems more survivable; modernizing the strategic bomber force by the addition of two new bombers (B-1 and “stealth”); increasing the accuracy and payload of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); improving strategic defenses; and deploying a new, larger, more accurate land-based ballistic missile.

146

Chapter 4

35. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on the Announcement of the United States Strategic Weapons Program,” October 2, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, II, 878-80. 36. See Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 2000, 189, and Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, 1991, 169. 37. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with a Group of Out-of-Town Editors,” October 5, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, II, 891-96. The exchange on the MX system is on p. 896. 38. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Working Luncheon with Out-of-Town Editors,” October 16, 1981, Public Papers, 1981, II, 947-60. The referenced exchange is on pp. 950-51. 39. To sample early editorial reaction, see “The Missile and the Bomber,” New York Times, October 4, 1981, E18; “Putting the MX in its place,” Christian Science Monitor, October 5, 1981, 28; and “Reagan’s MX Decision,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 6, 1981, 18. 40. Richard Halloran, “Reagan’s Plans on Missiles Stir Growing Debate,” New York Times, October 5, 1981, A1; Robert S. Dudney, “Why the Backlash against Reagan’s MX Plan,” U.S. News and World Report, 91: 16 (October 19, 1981), 35-36. 41. “The Real Defense Debate,” Washington Post, October 4, 1981, C6. 42. For example, see Barry Blechman (ed.), Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture: A Report from the Aspen Institute on Arms Control and Security Issues (1982), which contained a series of essays by eminent scholars, such as Joseph S. Nye Jr. Jonathan Schell’s best-selling book, The Fate of the Earth (1982), also appeared, which graphically described the potential horrors of nuclear war and called for negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament. Journalist Lou Cannon published his book titled Reagan (1982), in which he portrayed the president as a “likeable” individual, but one who had a lax managerial style that enabled non-experts like Weinberger and Edwin Meese III, senior counselor to the president, to make dubious decisions on national security issues like the MX. Excerpts from Cannon’s book were serialized in the Washington Post; see, for example, “Reagan Trusted MX Decision to an ‘Inexpert’ Weinberger,” Washington Post, September 16, 1982, A2. 43. For background on the origin and evolution of the NFM, see Lawrence S. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement (2009). 44. The referenced strategy was drafted in the Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans (OAP), in the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA), on May 3, 1982, and subsequently forwarded to the White House, as an attachment to a memorandum from State’s executive secretary, L. Paul Bremer III, to Reagan’s national security adviser, William P. Clark. A copy of this unclassified memorandum is in the author’s possession. 45. In his memoir, McFarlane claims the administration’s public campaign against the NFM was effective, but he provides no evidence to support his claim; see Robert C. McFarlane, with Sofia Smardz, Special Trust, 1994, 197-98. In fact, public opinion polling on a nuclear freeze, showed precisely the opposite; see William Schneider, “Peace and Strength: American Public Opinion on National Security,” in Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (eds.), The Public and Atlantic Defense, 1985, 347-49. 46. See “Making Headway on Defense,” Time, 120: 26 (December 27, 1982), 19. The Time/Yankelovich and Harris polls were accessed at www.ropercenter.uconn.edu. 47. See, for example, the following articles: Michael Getler, “President Scrapping 2d MX Idea,” Washington Post, February 11, 1982, A1; Tom Wicker, “A Switch for the MX,” New York Times, February 19, 1982, A31; Anthony Lewis, “Why the Kid Gloves?,” New York Times, February 22, 1982, A17; Hedrick Smith, “Struggling to Find a Place for the MX,” New York Times, February 23, 1982, A18; “MX: Let’s Put It on Hold,” Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1982, C6; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Reagan’s Plan for MX Attracts Fire,” Science, April 9, 1982, 150-52; Charles W. Corddry, “A Decade and Billions of Dollars Later, MX Still Up in the Air,” Baltimore Sun, April 25, 1982, A8. 48. Minutes of NSC meeting 47, concerning NSDD 1-82 (U.S. National Security Strategy), April 27, 1982, in Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National

The MX Missile

147

Security Council, 2014, 168-74. The April 27th meeting was a continuation of NSC meeting 45, April 16, 1982, on the same subject; for text of the minutes of the April 16 meeting, see pp. 56-62. 49. For text of NSDD 35 on the MX program, adopted May 17, 1982, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives, 1985, 123-24. 50. For a sampling of MX/DP opponents’ views, see Richard L. Garwin’s essay, “Dense Pack—Better Than What,” May 24, 1982, a copy is in NDCR Files, Box 25, Folder: Dense Pack, NSArchive; Melinda Beck with John J. Lindsay, “‘Dunce Pack’?,” Newsweek, 100: 3 (July 19, 1982), 25; Tom Wicker, “Doubts on Dense Pack,” New York Times, July 27, 1982, A23; “Window Pain,” The New Republic, 187: 16 (October 18, 1982), 7-9. 51. For pushback by administration officials, including DeLauer, see Robert C. Toth, “Time Running Out for Action on MX Missile,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 1982, 5-6; Colin S. Gray, “Why the US needs the MX in its future,” Christian Science Monitor, September 8, 1982, 7; Michael Getler, “Science Adviser [George A. Keyworth] Confident about MX Plan,” Washington Post, September 9, 1982, A14. Gray served on the Reagan administration’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 1982 to 1987. 52. George C. Wilson, “Tower Says MX Requires ABM Protection,” Washington Post, August 17, 1982, A11. 53. A copy of Mavroules’s letter is in NDCR Collection, Box 25, Folder: Dense Pack, NSArchive. 54. Anthony Lewis, “First Consequences,” New York Times, November 4, 1982, A27; see also, Steven V. Roberts, “Democrats Regain Control in House,” New York Times, November 4, 1982, A19. 55. For minutes of NSC meeting 66 on the MX Basing Decision, November 18, 1982, see Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 207-9. The decision was officially adopted in NSDD 69, titled The M-X Program, dated November 22, 1982; for text, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives, 221-22. The decision also required DOD to provide a progress report on ballistic missile defense (BMD) options associated with MX deployment in CSB array by October 1, 1983. 56. For Reagan’s “Statement on Deployment of the MX Missile,” November 22, 1982, see Public Papers, 1982, II, 1502-3. On the same day, the White House also released a similar but different statement by the president on his decision, urging Congress and the American people to support the program, along with a Pentagon fact sheet explaining the CSB deployment scheme, which, inter alia, rehearsed the fratricide theory. The text of the statement and fact sheet were printed in the New York Times, November 23, 1982, 14. 57. For text of Reagan’s letter to the members of Congress, November 22, 1982, see Public Papers, 1982, II, 1503-04. 58. See “Justifying the ‘Peacekeeper,’” Chicago Tribune, November 24, 1982, A10 and “Deterrents,” New York Times, November 24, 1982, A22. For additional editorial comment, see “The MX Decision,” Washington Post, November 24, 1982, A16 “Dense Pack or Dense Think?,” New York Times, November 24, 1982, A22. 59. See, for example, Judith Miller, “Anti-Arms Groups Rebut Plan for MX,” New York Times, November 24, 1982, A19; Joanne Omang, “Hill Fight Seen as MX Plan Is Attacked, Defended,” Washington Post, November 24, 1982, A8; R. Jeffrey Smith, “A Last Go-Around for the MX Missile?,” Science, November 26, 1982, 14-15; George C. Wilson, “Religious Groups Lobby against the MX Missile,” Washington Post, December 1, 1982, A12. 60. See, for example, Kosta Tsipis, “Why Dense Pack Would Probably Fail,” Los Angeles Times, November 24, 1982, C5 and his side-by-side article with Charles Monfort, “An MX ‘Dense Pack’ Would Need ABMs, Both Periling Security,” New York Times, December 1, 1982, A31. See also Robert Hunter, “Dense Pack Is Not the Answer,” Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1982, E11.

148

Chapter 4

61. George C. Wilson, “Lobbying to Save MX Intensified,” Washington Post, December 2, 1982, A1. 62. George C. Wilson, “Funding for MX Survives on Tied Committee Vote,” Washington Post, December 3, 1982, A1. 63. See Reagan’s “Remarks to Reporters on Action by the House Appropriations Committee Supporting Production of the MX Missile,” December 2, 1982, Public Papers, 1982, II, 1544. 64. “A Long, Hard MX Fight,” Washington Post, December 5, 1982, C6. 65. “Letter to Members of the House of Representatives Urging Support for Production of the MX Missile,” December 6, 1982, Public Papers, 1982, II, 1569. 66. See Richard Halloran, “President, Invoking Pearl Harbor, Presses Campaign to Save the MX,” New York Times, December 7, 1982, A1; Margot Hornblower and Juan Williams, “Administration Steps Up Lobbying for MX,” Washington Post, December 7, 1982, A16. 67. See Richard Halloran, “The House, 245-176, Votes Down $988 Million for MX Missile; Setback for Reagan Policy,” New York Times, December 8, 1982, A1; Margot Hornblower, “House Votes, 245-176, to Drop MX Funding,” Washington Post, A1; and Steven V. Roberts, “House Votes Funds Permitting Study on MX to Continue,” New York Times, December 9, 1982, A1. Although the House cut $988 million which had been earmarked in the FY 1983 defense appropriation bill for production of the first five MX missiles, it retained by voice vote $1.7 billion for research and development on the missile, and an additional $715 million for research and development on basing modes. For text of the debate on the FY 1983 Defense appropriations bill (H.R. 7355), and the recorded vote, see Congressional Record, House, December 7, 1982, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., 29038-29093. 68. “Statement on Action by the House of Representatives on Production of the MX Missile,” December 7, 1982, Public Papers, 1982, II, 1573-74. 69. “The MX and Public Opinion,” Chicago Tribune, December 90, 1982, 26. 70. “Dying Duck,” Los Angeles Times, December 9, 1982, F6. 71. “Putting MX in Its Place,” New York Times,” December 9, 1982, A26. 72. “Sleepwalking,” Washington Post, December 9, 1982, A28. 73. See, for example, Steven V. Roberts, “Reagan Loses on MX,” New York Times, December 8, 1982, D23; George C. Wilson and David Hoffman, “Joint Chiefs Had Counseled Reagan against ‘Dense Pack,’” Washington Post, December 9, 1982, A1; Anthony Lewis, “The MX Message,” New York Times, December 9, 1982, A27; Helen Dewar, “Reagan Put on Notice He Can’t Count on Benefit of the Doubt,” Washington Post, December 9, 1982, A11. 74. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on Production of the MX Missile,” December 10, 1982, and “Radio Address to the Nation on Production of the MX Missile,” December 11, 1982, both in Public Papers, 1982, II, 1593-99. 75. Kathy Sawyer, “Reagan Renews Call for Support of MX Missile,” Washington Post, December 12, 1982, A1. 76. George C. Wilson and Juan Williams, “Reagan, Senators Seek Compromise on the MX,” Washington Post, December 11, 1982, A1; Francis X. Clines, “Reagan Is Willing to Review His Plan for Basing the MX,” New York Times, December 11, 1982, 1. 77. For text of the president’s press conference, see “Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on Production of the MX Missile,” December 14, 1982, Public Papers, 1982, II, 1602-5. 78. To follow the press reporting on these events, see Steven R. Weisman, “President Agrees to Freeze Money for Building MX,” New York Times, December 15, 1982, A1; Margot Hornblower and George C. Wilson, “Reagan Reports Compromise on MX but Key Members Deny Agreement,” Washington Post, December 15, 1982, A1; Steven V. Roberts, “Senate Unit Drops Reagan’s Deadline for Voting on MX,” New York Times, December 16, 1982, A1; Margot Hornblower, “Senate Unit Restricts MX Funds,” Washington Post, December 16, 1982, A1; and Steven R. Weisman, “White House Setback on MX Had Diverse Roots,” New York Times, December 17, 1982, A21. The four Republi-

The MX Missile

149

cans who deserted the president on the committee vote were: Chairman Mark O. Hatfield (OR), Lowell P. Weicker (CN), Mark Andrews (ND), and Arlen Specter (PA). 79. See Maize Kennedy, “Senate Writes a Face-Saving Script for Ronald Reagan,” Defense Week, December 20, 1982, 13; a copy is in NDCR Files, Box 25, Folder: Dense Pack, NSArchive. 80. “Statement on Senate Action on Production of the MX Missile and Announcing the Formation of a Bipartisan Commission to Study Basing Options,” December 17, 1982, Public Papers, 1982, II, 1617. 81. For these press perceptions of the panel, see the following examples: Francis X. Clines, “Reagan Appoints a Panel to Study the MX Missile System,” New York Times, January 3, 1983, A1; and Walter Pincus, “Will You Defense Mavens Open Reagan’s Window of Reality on the MX?,” Washington Post, January 16, 1983, B1. 82. For Reagan’s public endorsement in remarks made at the White House, see “Remarks Endorsing the Recommendations of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces,” April 19, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, I, 535-57. On the same day, he sent a letter to congressional leaders reporting on the panel’s recommendations and reconfirming his commitment to pursuing “ambitious and objective arms reductions negotiations” with the Soviet Union; for text, see “Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Recommendations in the Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces,” April 19, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, I, 557-58. 83. For text of the report, see President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces. The commission’s recommendations were officially incorporated into the administration’s strategic forces modernization program in NSDD 91, dated April 19, 1983; for text, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives, 1995, 294-95. Early editorial and press reaction to the report ranged from fairly positive to highly critical. Both the New York Times’ and Washington Post’s editorial boards, for example, found the report reasonable in tone, argument, and analysis, and agreed with most of its recommendations, with the glaring exception of its support for the MX missile; see “The MX Report,” Washington Post, April 12, 1983, A16, and “Beyond the MX at Last,” New York Times, April 13, 1983, A30. For more critical reaction, see Tom Wicker, “And Still the MX,” New York Times, April 15, 1983, A31; Robert G. Kaiser, “Crazy Assumptions and the MX; How Will We Explain This Nuttiness to Our Grandchildren?,” Washington Post, April 17, 1983, D1; and Anthony Lewis, “The MX’s New Clothes,” New York Times, April 21, 1983, A27, all of which essentially deconstructed the panel’s report and concluded that it was replete with contradictions and fraudulent arguments. A balanced effort to assess the report’s pros and cons, particularly with respect to the MX, is Steven V. Roberts, “Proposal by Reagan Administration to Deploy the MX Missile in Existing Silos,” New York Times, April 26, 1983, B7. 84. The exchange of letters, dated respectively May 2 and May 11, 1983, were read into the Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks, House, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., on May 12, 1983, E2229-30, by Representative Norman Dicks (D-WA). 85. See Steven V. Roberts, “Lawmakers Vow to Block the MX Unless Reagan Backs Arms Limits,” New York Times, May 3, 1983, A1. The text of Cohen’s, Nunn’s, and Percy’s letter to Reagan, dated April 29, 1983, can be accessed on the Carnegie Mellon University Digital Archive, at http:digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarch ive?type=file&item=579339; for Reagan’s response of May 12, see Public Papers, 1983, I, 696-97. 86. See Lou Cannon and George C. Wilson, “Reagan Reassures Congress, Is Rewarded with MX Vote,” Washington Post, May 12, 1983, A1; and the series of articles written by Steven V. Roberts in the New York Times: “MX Plan Clears Another Hurdle by a 17-11 Vote,” May 13, 1983, A1; “MX Survives a Test in House after Lobbying by President,” May 18, 1983, A1; “President’s Plan for Basing of MX Approved in House,” May 25, 1983, A1; and “Senate, by 59-39, Votes $625 Million for Testing of MX,” May 26, 1983, A1. See also George Lardner Jr., “House Approves Funding for MX in Reagan Victory,” Washington Post, July 21, 1983, A1

150

Chapter 4

87. For O’Neill’s position, see entries for March 7 and 28, 1985, Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 306, 312. 88. Walter Pincus, “Arms Envoy Is Called Home to Boost MX,” Washington Post, March 23, 1985, A1. 89. On the administration’s political bargaining, see David Hoffman and Lou Cannon, “An End to the Sleepwalking,” Washington Post, May 25, 1983, A16; Steven V. Roberts, “Reagan Mounts New Phone Drive to Gain MX Funds in the House,” New York Times, July 20, 1983, A1; Helen Dewar and George Lardner Jr., “Supporters of MX Seize Offensive,” Washington Post, July 20, 1983, A4; and Julia Malone, “MX Debate Turns Senate into ‘Super Bowl’ of Lobbying,” Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1985, 3. For an op-ed article by the president, see Ronald Reagan, “The MX: A Key to Arms Reduction,” published in the Washington Post, May 24, 1983, A19. For a representative corporate pep talk, see Reagan’s “Remarks at a White House Briefing for Chief Executive Officers of Trade Associations and Corporations on Deployment of the MX Missile,” May 16, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, I, 714-15. For a representative letter from Reagan to Congress, see “Letter to Members of the House of Representatives on Production of the MX Missile,” July 19, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, II, 1060; for a representative briefing, see “Remarks to Members of Congress during a White House Briefing on the MX Missile . . . ,” March 25, 1985, Public Papers, 1985, I, 348-51. 90. Some sense of why moderate Democrats voted for the MX can be gleaned from the following: Representative Dan Glickman (D-KA), “Why I Switched on the MX,” May 18, 1983, Washington Post, A27; Charles W. Corddry, “Deal to Keep MX Hanging is Reported,” Baltimore Sun, September 20, 1984, A1; Hedrick Smith, “MX and the New Guns and Butter Argument,” New York Times, March 19, 1985, A20; “House Debate Links MX to 32,000 Jobs in the U.S.,” Washington Post, March 26, 1985, A6; and John Isaacs, “MX: Reagan’s Pyrrhic Victory,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 41: 6 (June/July, 1985), 4-6, which suggests that considerable political bargaining occurred, such as promises to bring jobs to certain districts and for assistance in electoral campaigns. Syndicated columnist Tom Wicker argued that many Democrats rationalized their “yes” votes on the grounds that any particular vote on the MX was not final, and that if Reagan failed to live up to his promises, they could always vote no later, because the MX required annual reauthorization; see his op-ed “Congress Cons Itself,” New York Times, June 3, 1983, A31. 91. For text of the letter, see Republican Senators to President Reagan, May 26, 1983, ID#14803, NDO18, White House Office of Records Management Subject Files (WHORM Subject File), RRPL. See also Michael Getler, “MX Backers Put Reagan on Notice,” Washington Post, May 27, 1983, A1, which quotes portions of the letter. 92. See Letter to the President, signed by Nunn, Percy, and Cohen, April 29, 1983, cited above. See also Steven V. Roberts, “Lawmakers Vow to Block MX unless Reagan Backs Arms Limits,” New York Times, May 3, 1983, A1, which quotes the letter, and George C. Wilson, “Senators Push for Cap of 40 MX Missiles,” Washington Post, May 23, 1985, A1. 93. See Fred Hiatt and George C. Wilson, “Goldwater Favors Killing MX, Freezing Military Spending,” Washington Post, December 6, 1984, A1. 94. See the entry for December 12, 1984, The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 286. 95. See the following articles by Michael Weisskopf, in the Washington Post: “Limit of 50 MX Missiles Agreed on by Conferees,” July 18, 1985, A32 and “New Basing for the MX Studied to Surmount Deployment Lid,” August 9, 1985, A2. Prior to the conference committee’s vote, Reagan reached a compromise with the Senate leadership to accept a limit of fifty missiles deployed in existing silos, in order to avoid a cap at forty, which was sought by the House; see George C. Wilson, “Reagan Halves MX Deployment, Agrees to Base 50 in Silos,” Washington Post, May 24, 1985, A1; Steven V. Roberts, “Senate, in Pact with President, Votes 50 MXs,” New York Times, May 24, 1983, A1 and “House Votes a Bar to Purchase of MX in the Next Year,” New York Times, June 19, 1985, A1.

The MX Missile

151

96. For text of the letter, see House Members to President Reagan, October 15, 1986, ID#42958, FI004, White House Office of Records Management Subject Files (WHORM Subject File), RRPL; see also Richard Halloran, “White House Seeks Funds for Basing MX on Train Cars,” New York Times, December 20, 1986, 1. 97. For the GAO report, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Briefing Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, “Procurement: Inertial Measurement Units for Peacekeeper Missiles,” July 1987; for the House version, see Report of the Subcommittee on Research and Development and Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, Committee on Armed Services, “The MX Inertial Measurement Unit: A Program Review,” House, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 1987. See also the following press reports: Michael R. Gordon, “House Panel Says MX Tests Indicate Serious Problem,” New York Times, August 24, 1987, A1; Richard Whitmire, “Air Force Defends MX as ‘the Finest,’” USA Today, August 25, 1987, 04a; and John Barry, “Trouble for the Triad,” Newsweek, 110: 10 (September 7, 1987), 17. Press stories on poor MX test results initially began to appear as early as 1984; see Wayne Biddle, “Tests Said to Lag on MX Capability,” New York Times, March 7, 1985, A25. 98. All of the referenced polls were accessed at www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll -database/. 99. For notes on and partial minutes of NSC Meeting b140, concerning ICBM Modernization (MX), December 16, 1986, see Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 458-60. 100. For text, see “Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Modernization,” December 19, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1636-37; see also Molly Moore and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Reagan Favors Midgetman,” Washington Post, December 20, 1986, A2. 101. For text of NSDD 252, December 24, 1986, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives, 1995, 727-29. 102. On the fate of the MX program, see Pomeroy, “Echoes That Never Were,” 23742, and Federation of American Scientists, Fact Sheet: LGM-118A Peacekeeper, accessed at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/lgm-118.htm. Most of the cost of the program involved direct payments to about thirteen major contractors and numerous subcontractors; for a list of the major contractors as of December 1982, see David Shribman, “Contractors’ Stakes Big in House Debate,” New York Times, December 7, 1982, D1; for a list as of mid-1986, see “Peacekeeper Associate Contractors,” Air Force Magazine, 69: 6 (June 1986), 84, a copy of which is also in NDCR Collection, Box 25, Folder: MX—1986, NSArchive. 103. On a number of occasions, administration officials did “debate” MX opponents, but these debates were essentially “paper debates,” which involved the presentation of their respective views in formats that did not require live events in front of an audience or television cameras. They were usually exchanges of views in op-eds or side-by-side articles in newspapers and news magazines. To sample these exchanges, see Eugene V. Rostow and Paul Warnke, “Which Comes First, Arms Control or Security?,” New York Times, March 21, 1982, E5; George A. Keyworth, II, “‘Dense Pack’ Works” and Herbert Scoville Jr., “The MX Invites Attack,” both in New York Times, December 13, 1982, A23; Richard Perle’s op-ed, “The Wondrous Turnabout of the MX’s Enemies,” Washington Post, December 13, 1982, A15, and Herbert Scoville Jr.’s response in a letter-to-the-editor, “A Threatening Missile We Don’t Need,” Washington Post, December 18, 1982, A17; and Richard D. DeLaurer and Richard L. Garwin, “Densepack MX: Will It Work?,” Baltimore Sun, December 19, 1982, A10. Beginning in 1983, however, following the Scowcroft Commission’s report, even these kinds of exchanges diminished. 104. Most of these questions are paraphrases of those culled from materials distributed by anti-MX organizations, including pamphlets, handbills, mailings, news alerts, and letters to Congress, which can be found in NDCR Collection, Boxes 25 and 26, NSArchive.

152

Chapter 4

105. For perceptive comments on the obsolescence problem, see Leslie Gelb, “One Plan Would Put All MX’s in One Basket,” New York Times, September 5, 1982, E6. 106. On the “bargaining chip” theory, its contradictions and historical failures, see Strobe Talbott, “Disturbing the Strategic Balance,” Time, 120: 23 (December 6, 1982), 16-18; Gerard C. Smith, “Chips Are No Bargain,” New York Times, May 23, 1983, A19; Don Oberdorfer, “Buildup Hasn’t Led to Negotiating Table,” Washington Post, May 16, 1984, A2; and Gerard C. Smith, Clark M. Clifford and Paul C. Warnke, “MX Is Not a Useful Bargaining Chip,” Washington Post, March 16, 1985, A19. On confusion about the role of the MX in U.S.-Soviet negotiations, see Michel Getler, “State Aide Denies MX Is Talk ‘Bargaining Chip,’” Washington Post, June 24, 1983, A2; “Missile Truths,” New York Times, June 27, 1983, A14; and Hedrick Smith, “Future of MX: Tightrope for Reagan,” New York Times, June 27, 1983, A6. 107. See, for example, the CBS News/New York Times poll, taken April 7-11, 1983, accessible at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/. 108. See, for example, the president’s “Remarks in an Interview with Independent Radio Network Correspondents on Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues,” December 18, 1982, Public Papers, 1982, II, 1619-26. 109. For the quote, see Jonathan Alter, with John J. Lindsay, “The Weapon That Won’t Die,” Newsweek, 103: 22 (May 28, 1984), 21. 110. For the Frank quotation, see Fred Kaplan, “All It Touched Off Was a Debate,” New York Times, September 18, 2005, C5.

FIVE The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) The Impossible Dream?

In a nationally televised address on March 23, 1983, urging the nation to support a huge increase in defense spending, President Reagan also offered a vision of a more secure future in which the United States would create a defensive shield 1 in space against the threat of Soviet ballistic missiles. “What if,” he asked, “free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?” He appealed to the country’s scientists “to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering . . . nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” 2 This insert in the president’s address evolved into the administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 3 which was quickly dubbed “Star Wars” by the concept’s early opponents, 4 and subsequently became the subject of extensive rhetorical 5 and political analysis. 6 The speech was a curious amalgam of Reagan’s vintage anti-Soviet rhetoric and a utopian vision of world peace. 7 Although he admitted that his “vision” had “problems,” “limitations,” and “ambiguities,” he seemed unaware of its internal inconsistencies and logical contradictions, particularly within the context of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union at that time. If the Soviet Union was a devious and mendacious “Evil Empire,” as he had publicly charged in an address to the National Association of Evangelicals Convention in Orlando only two weeks before his spacedefense speech, 8 how could he believe that the Soviets would not make every conceivable effort to overwhelm American defenses with offensive systems of their own? Early opponents of Reagan’s space-defense idea 153

154

Chapter 5

had already begun to ask numerous questions about what was then only an informal proposal. How could his vision of peace, they wanted to know, be reconciled with his plea in the same speech for a massive increase in the defense budget for offensive nuclear weapons? What was the logic behind increasing nuclear weapons in order to reduce or eliminate them? And what was the justification for abandoning the concept of mutual deterrence, which had worked effectively for almost four decades, for an unproved and untested new strategic strategy? 9 From its very inception, SDI became embroiled in controversy 10 and presented the administration with a substantial public communication challenge. In the few days immediately following the president’s speech, the editors of a number of major daily newspapers expressed deep skepticism about his proposal. Those at the New York Times dismissed strategic defense as a “pipe dream, a projection of fantasy into policy,” 11 while those at the Baltimore Sun described it as “a reversion to the ballistic missile defense proposals of the Johnson administration . . . that were all but abandoned . . . because they were basically unworkable.” 12 The Los Angeles Times’ editors wondered whether the president was “serious” or merely searching for a “gimmick” to distract attention from the nuclearfreeze proposal then before Congress or the “controversy-plagued MX missile project.” 13 Those at the Chicago Tribune derided the concept of anti-missile “death rays” that exist “only in our imaginations and in the special effects labs of Hollywood,” while concluding that in the absence of a “foolproof” system for defending against incoming missiles “the only apparent solution is to negotiate the danger away.” 14 The Washington Post’s editors predicted that Reagan’s proposal was “sure to arouse a storm.” 15 They were right in a way that the president probably did not anticipate. Opposition to the president’s “vision” formed quickly among key constituencies: arms control experts, the scientific community, the political and foreign policy establishment, and members of Congress. In order to mobilize support for SDI, the administration had to persuade several key sectors of the public that SDI was feasible, practical, would not worsen relations with the Soviet Union or break the budget. More specifically, it had to convince arms control experts and practitioners that space defense was not only feasible but a legitimate replacement strategy for the concept of mutual deterrence, which many of them had helped to shape, through negotiations with their Soviet counterparts. Second, it had to persuade the larger scientific community, composed of many scientists and physicists who had done the research that had produced nuclear weapons in the first place, knew what utter destruction they could wreak, and were generally skeptical of any plans or programs that could lead to the building of more nuclear weapons. Third, it had to cajole Congress to fund the hugely expensive SDI research and development program, while simultaneously funding an expansion of the defense budget for the

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

155

acquisition of more offensive weapons. Finally, it had to counter the views of eminent political and foreign policy experts, both inside and outside of Congress, who were opposed to the administration’s whole approach to the Soviet Union and believed in the primacy of negotiations to achieve agreements with the Soviets to limit and constrain nuclear weapons. What united these groups was their common belief in the effectiveness of deterrence based on the capability of mutual assured destruction (MAD) and the technical infeasibility of building a protective shield of any kind against nuclear weapons that would protect the United States and its allies. Congressional Democrats lost no time in responding, and the tone and substance of their responses did not bode well for the president’s SDI proposal. From their perspective, the president’s speech was primarily an attempt to rally support for his “excessive defense budget,” which was already in trouble in both the House and the Senate, and had little to do with the critical issues of national security. They regarded his use of graphs and declassified aerial photographs, purportedly showing a massive Soviet buildup of arms in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, as a distorted and misleading account of the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, designed to inflate the alleged Soviet threat. They accused him of resorting to empty platitudes about space defense to divert attention from the “dismal failure of his economic policies,” and to counter his image as a “warmonger.” Senator Daniel K. Inouye (HI) delivered the official Democratic response to the president’s speech on the three major television networks between March 25 and April 6. He specifically accused the president of conveying misinformation for “political effect” in order to distract the public with talk of “Buck Rogers” weapons and allegations of American nuclear inferiority. 16 Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy (MA), characterized the speech as “misleading Red-scare tactics and reckless Star Wars schemes.” 17 Other outspoken Democratic critics included Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd (WV), Senators Alan Cranston (CA), Gary Hart (CO), and Sam Nunn (GA); and House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neill Jr. 18 The scientific community was even less enamored than Democratic politicians. Pulitzer Prize winning astronomer Carl Sagan and Richard L. Garwin, a noted Columbia University physicist who had helped to design the H-bomb, for example, contended that because no workable antiICBM system could be constructed with current or foreseeable technology, regardless of the size of the investment in research and development, the whole effort was “a fool’s errand.” The only solution to an arms race in space, they maintained, was the pursuit of a U.S.-Soviet bilateral treaty precluding space-based weaponry and anti-satellite missiles based on earth. 19 In the months following, Garwin proved a tireless opponent of Star Wars, and was joined by a growing group of scientists and mathematicians, both in universities and research organizations, many of

156

Chapter 5

whom had served in Democratic and/or Republican administrations. The group included Nobel physicists Hans A. Bethe and Isidor I. Rabi; Kosta Tsipis, a renowned M.I.T physicist, who specialized in laser and particle beam weaponry; Stanford physicists Sidney Drell and Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky; Paul Doty, a prominent Harvard biochemist; and David L. Parnas, a leading computer software specialist at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, who eventually resigned his senior position with the Pentagon’s Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), after publicly announcing that regardless of the amount of resources expended no operable software system could be built for SDI. 20 By the end of 1983, a number of like-minded scientists, led by Garwin, constituted an informal advisory group to bipartisan congressional opponents of Star Wars and public interest groups advocating more assertive arms control efforts by the Reagan administration. 21 The administration also had its scientific boosters, most prominently Edward Teller, who had worked on the development of the H-bomb, and was senior research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and Robert Jastrow, former director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 22 Although Teller, who had reputedly put the space-defense idea into Reagan’s ear, 23 and Jastrow provided some counterbalance to SDI critics, they were not only in a distinct minority, but they themselves became public targets of the critics. 24 The campaign against Star Wars was also joined by prominent political and foreign policy experts, who helped focus the public’s attention on the need to seek effective bilateral arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, without undoing those treaties on which the successful strategy of mutual deterrence was based. William J. Perry, who had served as undersecretary of defense for research and engineering in the Carter administration, was one of the earliest critics of Reagan’s proposal, pointing out that it was an expensive technological risk, and that even if it were feasible “like every other weapon system, it will be subject to some countermeasures.” 25 Well-known members of Washington’s political elite, such as George W. Ball, Harold Brown, McGeorge Bundy, W. Averell Harriman, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, James A. Schlesinger, Gerard Smith, and Cyrus R. Vance, criticized the Reagan administration for treating negotiations with the Soviets as “a forum for propaganda,” squandering every opportunity for effective arms control, following a policy that would destabilize the present nuclear balance, and promising security that was beyond our capacity to provide, thereby cruelly exploiting the public’s hopes and fears. In their view, it would be possible either to achieve good bilateral arms control agreements or to insist upon the Star Wars program, but wholly impossible to do both. They uniformly favored vigorous pursuit and achievement of a comprehensive arms control treaty placing sharp limits on offensive weapons before the administration made any effort to launch a defensive program in space. 26

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

157

By the winter of 1983-1984, opponents of Star Wars were conducting their own public communication campaign, with a “platform” consisting of the following themes. First, no perfect “peace shield” was technically feasible and therefore even small “leakage” would result in horrendous death and destruction. Second, the cost of trying to build a defensive system in space could reach a trillion dollars, while consuming resources that could be effectively spent on more technologically feasible programs. Third, SDI would be destabilizing, because during periods of high tension, the Soviet Union could perceive it as an offensive program and be compelled to consider a preemptive strike. Fourth, it would destroy the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), commonly referred to as the ABM Treaty, which specifically prohibited such weapons in space. 27 Fifth, it would accelerate the arms race by increasing pressure to develop countermeasures and to militarize space, the last frontier. Sixth, it was politically unwise because it could give “hawks” in Congress a tool they could use to derail arms control and verification efforts permanently. Seventh, the only realistic solution to the arms control dilemma was a comprehensive arms control treaty placing sharp limits on offensive nuclear weapons. 28 Some arms control experts within the federal bureaucracy had doubts about aspects of SDI. In November 1983, the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defense for research, Richard D. DeLauer, testified before the House Armed Services Committee, that the space-defense program as proposed by President Reagan was at least two decades away, because at least eight major technical problems had to be resolved first, each of which would involve “staggering costs.” 29 The following March, the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, known as the Scowcroft Commission after its chairman, former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, despite supporting continued research on anti-missile technology, warned that any effort to move toward development of a space-defense system could seriously undermine the ABM Treaty, which it regarded as “one of the most successful arms control agreements.” 30 In April, the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) issued a negative report that described the prospect for space-based defense “so remote that it should not serve as the basis of public expectation or national policy,” and concluded that the ABM Treaty forbade the testing and deployment of space-based anti-missile weapons. 31 The administration’s public narrative on SDI began to form after President Reagan’s March speech, and a public diplomacy working group was eventually set up, under the provisions of NSDD 77, which had been approved in June 1983, to mobilize public support. In the interim, however, the early and continuing barrage of public criticism caught administration principals by surprise and put them on the defensive. Caspar W. “Cap” Weinberger, the secretary of defense, perhaps the president’s staunchest ally on strategic defense, assumed the role of first responder.

158

Chapter 5

Less than two weeks after the administration rolled out the concept, he responded to the aforementioned editorial in the Baltimore Sun which criticized the president for “overdoing” the Soviet threat and unwisely inserting the SDI initiative in a speech about the defense budget. He stated that the “dramatic” Soviet arms buildup required a dramatic rejoinder by the president, and noted that the defense initiative was an important part of the president’s efforts to achieve “genuine arms reductions.” 32 About a week later, he denied that SDI was a “hasty, ill-conceived scheme.” It is not, he insisted, a “Star Wars fantasy.” 33 He also evidently took a step back from the original implication in the president’s speech that the United States wanted to construct a leak-proof defensive system. He contended that the administration was not seeking a single perfect system that could defend against all Soviet missile attacks, but a defense network, a series of systems, which together would provide a reliable defense against nuclear ballistic missiles. 34 By October 1983, the president, at his news conferences, was denying that the proposed SDI program would cost anywhere near what the critics were claiming, though he offered no estimate, or that it would lead to a defensive arms race in space between the United States and the Soviet Union, which of course no one could guarantee. 35 In early December, the president’s science adviser, George A. Keyworth II, an ardent supporter of the SDI program, summed up the public reaction to SDI in a memorandum to Weinberger. He admitted to Weinberger that the administration was “not getting the President’s [underlining in source text] story across,” and that it was necessary to recognize that even some of the administration’s supporters in the scientific community were concerned about the cost, feasibility, and effectiveness of such a system. He recommended that officials who spoke publicly about SDI should “avoid highly detailed technical descriptions, projections and simplistic promises,” and concentrate on explaining the “critical Presidential-level logic” that focused on the need for future options to achieve a stable strategic environment based on modernization, weapons reduction, and defense. He attached to his memorandum a set of preliminary talking points, which were aimed at defining and explaining the future circumstances that impelled the president to propose the extraordinary SDI challenge, why emerging technologies made the current decade so different from past decades, and how these technological developments were keyed to the president’s vision for arms reduction and increased stability. He expressed his hope that such “topline arguments” could be folded into the president’s speeches on SDI and that this would go a long way in helping to maintain his credibility on the issue. 36 There is scant available evidence, however, that the White House speechwriters followed Keyworth’s suggestions. In response to the broad range of negative reactions to SDI, the president’s senior advisers in the White House and the NSC opted to intensify

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

159

the administration’s public diplomacy efforts. In December 1983, the NSC directed State, Defense, and the CIA to produce a classified presentation, with text and visuals designed to convince key congressmen of SDI’s value. To oversee this effort, the directive established a new White House Coordinating Group, chaired by the deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, charged with monitoring SDI public diplomacy both abroad and at home. The committee was directed to place special emphasis on responding to the widespread criticism that SDI represented the abandonment of long-standing doctrines on nuclear deterrence, such as mutual assured destruction, and to highlight the potential that SDI offered for deterrence based on effective defense. To ensure that administration messages on SDI were aligned, the coordinating group was tasked with reviewing in advance all of the government’s public statements concerning SDI, no matter what their origin, and to work in conjunction with the existing interagency public diplomacy working group on SDI, set up earlier under the provisions of NSDD 77. 37 This emphasis on coordinating the public presentation of SDI was important because, by the spring of 1984, the administration was already gearing up for the forthcoming presidential election, and it was common currency among media commentators and even among some individuals in the administration, that the president faced major obstacles in pursuing SDI. 38 Lt. General James A. Abrahamson, director of the president’s Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), for example, in an address in New York noted that one of the major obstacles confronting the president’s program was the “very, very low” understanding about it in Congress. 39 Weinberger attributed the president’s problems to SDI critics, such as a new public interest group, the Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, which included among its members former President Jimmy Carter, for purveying “a wealth of misinformation.” 40 The NSC staff expressed concern that though public opinion polls showed “considerable latent support for SDI,” the administration’s public diplomacy campaign had not yet effectively capitalized on it, and that there was considerable public confusion about it. Consequently, both State and ACDA drafted new public diplomacy strategies, which were submitted to McFarlane and coordinated by the NSC staff. Their recommendations were, inter alia, to focus on a broad public educational campaign and a well-coordinated “Congressional game plan” to ensure “maximum positive exposure for our position.” The most prominent theme of this “position” was essentially that SDI was a long-term research program fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. 41 Largely because of public opposition, and the continuing division within the administration over how best to present SDI to the public, Reagan and his advisors decided to low-key the program during the 1984 presidential campaign. After Reagan’s resounding victory, however, it went on offense. On December 19, in a speech at the Foreign Press Center

160

Chapter 5

in Washington, Weinberger claimed that by reelecting Reagan the American people had “overwhelmingly endorsed” his concept of defense against ballistic missiles. He contended that mutual assured destruction was a flawed strategy, and that the “true believers” in it failed “to appreciate the deterrent value of missile defenses.” He insisted that unilateral voluntary restraint in nuclear arms competition does not work, and that the Soviets were leading the United States in defensive space research and spending more than the United States to do so. He asserted that the Soviets had “almost certainly” violated the ABM Treaty, and enhancing the U.S. deterrent capability would strengthen rather than weaken stability. The overall goal of the administration’s SDI research program, he said, was a system of “layered defense” 42 designed to destroy weapons, not people, by non-nuclear means. “This objective,” he concluded, “is far more idealistic, moral, and practical than the position taken by those who still adhere to the mutual-assured destruction theory.” 43 Weinberger’s speech became the template for the administration’s renewed public diplomacy effort on SDI. As the two-year anniversary of the president’s initial speech on SDI approached, George Keyworth persuaded several senior administration officials (McFarlane, Weinberger, and CIA director William J. Casey) to support his recommendation that the president deliver another major address on SDI to “reinvigorate” the fundamental rationale underlying the concept. In a letter addressed to the president, he said that such a speech would reemphasize Reagan’s personal commitment to, and leadership on, that strategic concept, help to dispel the “trail of confusion” and “ambiguity of purpose” left by administration officials who were speaking publicly on the issue, and counter bureaucratic resistance to the change in strategy that SDI represented. If the president failed to weigh in on SDI now that the Soviet Union was back at the Geneva negotiations, 44 Keyworth noted, he risked losing credibility and the possibility that the attitudes of the public and Congress would morph from confusion into disillusion. According to Keyworth, the confusion and ambiguity derived from bureaucratic assertions that strengthening deterrence must be the primary goal for SDI and that protecting weapons, especially ICBM silos, was a near-term and most likely goal for the program. He recommended that the president, in his remarks, stress the fact that SDI was not a weapon, but an “anti-weapon,” and therefore was not about fear, but about hope. In his forwarding cover memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane informed the president that the NSC was preparing a speech on the theme “Space for Peace,” which would incorporate Keyworth’s “outstanding points,” and would be ready for his scheduled appearance at the National Space Club luncheon on March 29, 1985, at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington. Reagan’s handwritten note, dated March 25, on McFarlane’s memo read as follows: “I agree—argument for SDI is that it can make possible the elimination of nuclear missiles. I agree with Jay’s

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

161

[Keyworth’s] letter.” 45 When Reagan delivered his remarks, the basic thrust of his presentation was that a defensive system would ultimately make nuclear missiles “less effective” and therefore “more negotiable.” However, he also told his audience: “The Strategic Defense Initiative has been labeled ‘Star Wars,’ but it isn’t about war; it’s about peace. It isn’t about retaliation; it’s about prevention. It isn’t about fear; it’s about hope.” He could not resist adding: “And in that struggle, if you’ll pardon my stealing a film line: The force is with us.” To the press, the use of a line from the popular film seemed not only to override his objection to the use of the phrase “Star Wars,” but actually to endorse it. 46 Evidently, the president’s second anniversary speech on SDI had little impact on public or congressional opinion. In a memorandum to the White House chief of staff Donald Regan, dated April 3, 1985, on the public’s response to the president’s defensive strategy, Keyworth renewed his complaints about the opposition to and confusion about what precisely the president was proposing. He thought that the erosion could be reversed and public support recaptured, if the administration could clarify the presidential agenda, by “rebalancing” his entirely new defensive strategy for the West, with the necessity for accelerating the modernization of conventional forces. He continued to believe that the major obstacles to rebalancing were the resistance to change within the federal bureaucracy, where “the architects of nuclear deterrence have drawn their wagons into a circle”; the failure to make clear to Congress, the press, and the public how change to a defensive strategy provided hope and options for the future; and the fact that SDI proponents who focused on deterrence led public discussion to the protection of hard site weapons and thus completed the circle back to MAD. What Keyworth was actually recommending was for the administration to decouple the concept of space defense from the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and to concentrate heavily on the former. 47 Keyworth ultimately lost the internal bureaucratic stand-off over the interpretation of SDI when Reagan approved NSDD 172 the following month. In that document, titled “Presenting the Strategic Defense Initiative,” the president’s national security advisers made an effort to unify the rival interpretations within the administration that had so plagued Keyworth. The new NSDD stressed the importance of two overriding objectives of the administration’s defensive strategy: the modernization of U.S. offensive nuclear retaliatory forces to reestablish and maintain the offensive balance in the near term, and the search for new deterrent options, such as a layered defense, the combination of which supposedly would lead the Soviets toward “more stabilizing and mutually beneficial ends.” The new NSDD, drafted in the NSC, also required that all major public and written statements on SDI, regardless of the forum or the medium in which they were presented would have to be cleared by the assistant to the president for national security affairs. This was an obvi-

162

Chapter 5

ous effort to control the administration’s public communication efforts more effectively, and subliminally at least suggested that the communication efforts of the White House coordinating group and the interagency public diplomacy working group were inadequate. 48 Keyworth believed the new NSDD was merely a consensus statement “saying all things to all people,” guaranteed to result in “ambiguity as to what SDI is all about and whether it’s real or just a pipe dream.” He also objected to the “controls” on public presentations by senior officials, which he regarded as a “gag rule.” 49 Public opinion polling on SDI throughout 1985 tended to vindicate Keyworth’s general views. In a poll conducted by Louis Harris & Associates on March 2-5, 1985, respondents agreed by a margin of more than 3 to 1 (75 to 20 percent) that once the Soviets learned that we were building a defensive system, they would “go all-out to develop brand new kinds of nuclear and other weapons we couldn’t defend against.” They also agreed (63 to 30 percent) that the cost of developing a laser defense system “could rise to $25 to $50 billion” for a system that might not work, and opposed (56 to 39 percent) spending billions of dollars to develop a laser beam and particle beam missile defense system in outer space and on the ground. 50 A series of polls taken during the summer of 1985 by ABC News/Washington Post, Gallup/Newsweek and Roper found that the American public continued to be closely divided on the need for developing SDI, that support for SDI remained “soft” and that public attitudes about the program were largely related to the president’s popularity. Regarding the development of SDI, the average of three polls taken during the summer was about 45 percent in favor vs. 45 percent opposed to developing a “space-based star wars system to guard against nuclear attack.” With respect to the “softness” of support for SDI, the pollsters found that even in cases where the public favored the concept of building a “defensive system against nuclear missiles and bombers” by large majorities (70 to 80 percent), that support diminished by about 30 percentage points when questions were asked about cost, effectiveness, the employment of nuclear weapons in the system and its potential impact for reducing chances of achieving an arms control agreement with the Soviets. 51 A follow-up ABC/Washington Post poll, taken October 25-28, confirmed the earlier results and also found that among groups most likely to support SDI in principle, a clear majority (about 65 percent) nevertheless preferred a U.S.-Soviet agreement to reduce nuclear arms rather than the development of SDI. 52 From early 1985 through the fall of that year, several administration principals became involved in an internal struggle between hardliners and moderates over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty and how it should be presented to the public, which had a significant impact on the White House’s communication strategy on SDI. Administration hardliners in the NSC, DOD and SDIO pushed for a “reinterpretation” of the trea-

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

163

ty’s relevant provisions to allow for a wider range of testing in the SDI research and development program, particularly those based on “new physical principles” not available in 1972, when the treaty was signed. In September, the White House recruited a New York lawyer, Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, as legal adviser to Shultz to develop a rationale for the socalled “broad” or “permissive” interpretation of the treaty, which would allow for wider testing of defensive components than the treaty’s “traditional” or “restrictive” interpretation warranted. On October 6, evidently based on Sofaer’s initial analyses, McFarlane went public on the issue, when he supported the “broad” interpretation of the treaty on NBC’s Meet the Press, stating that the treaty permitted the research, development, and testing of new defensive systems. Shultz notes in his memoir that no such decision had been made, that McFarlane had deliberately gone public to force the issue, and that he was “appalled and angry” at his “arrogation of power,” in part because it would lead to problems with the public’s perception of, and reception to, the SDI program. 53 Shultz was right. The public fallout was immediate and negative. CBS’s Evening News program on the night of October 6, 1985, led with the story that a major policy shift had occurred in the Reagan administration, which now was saying, in the person of the president’s national security adviser, that there were no limits on SDI testing. 54 Two days later, in an article in the New York Times, Bernard Gwertzman queried whether the policy-making role in the administration had shifted to the NSC adviser. 55 According to Shultz, he not only met with Weinberger and McFarlane and gave them his view “with the bark off,” he also took up the matter with the president. 56 The issue was resolved temporarily with an agreement at a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) on October 11, 1985, that the United States would continue its research program on defensive systems within the more restrictive view of its obligations under the ABM Treaty, but that a “broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified.” 57 On the basis of this compromise, Shultz delivered a major speech to the North Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco on October 14. With language he had vetted with the president, he stated that Reagan had recently reaffirmed that the SDI program would be conducted in accordance with the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. 58 McFarlane’s premature effort to preempt the State Department and go public on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, however, was only the beginning of a long and contentious battle between the administration and Congress on the meaning of the ABM Treaty. Sofaer’s initial analysis, which concluded that the negotiating and ratification record on the treaty offered “fairly consistent support for the broader interpretation” of the treaty, was transmitted to Dante B. Fascell (D-FL), chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on October 29, 1985. 59 It leaked almost immediately, and lit a powder keg in Congress, where opponents of Star

164

Chapter 5

Wars demanded that the administration release to Congress, prior to consideration of the FY 1987 budget request for SDI, the full negotiating record for the treaty. 60 It also motivated SDI proponents in Congress to urge senior administration officials to intensify their public communication campaign on SDI to restore the momentum of the administration’s defense initiative. They recommended centering the campaign on a series of televised speeches by the president, explaining “why a strong deterrent is consistent with our desire for genuine arms agreements,” to overcome congressional “hostility.” Decisive action was necessary, they claimed, to forestall massive defense cuts, avoid eroding the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, the gutting of the SDI program, and ultimately causing a “global shift in the balance of power against the United States.” 61 As the months of 1986 wore on, the administration’s attention turned to the forthcoming midterm elections. With the support of his congressional allies on SDI, the president continued his efforts to mobilize public support for the space-defense program. On July 12, he delivered a national radio address, reaffirming his support for SDI, and denying it was a bargaining chip 62 for negotiating with the Soviets. He stressed nonnuclear means of destroying incoming missiles, identified “some members of Congress” as the obstacle to a defensive system, and implored the public to make its voice heard. 63 He also gave a major briefing for SDI supporters in Washington on August 6, the forty-first anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, in which he denied that the administration was seeking unilateral advantage over the Soviet Union, and again appealed for the public’s “active support” to make plain to Congress that “this is the worst time to undermine vital defense programs and take away America’s needed negotiating leverage,” apparently anticipating the forthcoming summit with his Soviet counterpart in the fall. 64 Evidently, it seems that no reporter had the opportunity or the inclination to ask the president just exactly how his reference to U.S. “negotiating leverage” with the Soviets squared with his denials that SDI was not a “bargaining chip.” In October 1986, after the last-minute collapse of the arms control summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, over the issue of SDI testing, 65 the president continued to go public. He attempted to explain why he had been unable to achieve a U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement. In a major nationwide live television broadcast from the Oval Office and a follow-up extensive session with broadcast reporters in Washington, he said he had offered the Soviets important concessions on SDI: to suspend deployment for a decade, coupled with a ten-year plan for eliminating all Soviet and American ballistic missiles, and a promise to share SDI technology. 66 The latter concession, according to the president, failed to entice Gorbachev, who wanted the United States to accept tighter limits on SDI research than the ABM Treaty required, specifically to confine all research on and testing of space-defense

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

165

weapons to the laboratory. Reagan refused, and thereafter consistently insisted publicly that “There wasn’t any way that I was going to back away from SDI.” 67 Reagan adhered to that position throughout the remainder of his presidency, and ironically it was a combination of his obstinacy to retain it, and Gorbachev’s adamant refusal to accept it, that killed any chance for Reagan to achieve a U.S.-Soviet treaty providing for a sharp reduction in the ICBM arsenals of the two countries. 68 Despite Democratic victories in the midterm elections, which resulted in their control of both House and Senate, SDI proponents in Congress and hardliners in the administration, continued to push for accelerated research on space-based anti-missile weapons and for early deployment to counteract the allegedly “large strides” being made in Soviet defenses which could “soon render U.S. retaliatory capabilities obsolescent.” 69 In January 1987, Weinberger and other administration officials, adopted “the Soviets will get there first” theme as the rationale for early deployment of at least one segment of a proposed space-based anti-missile network. 70 According to Shultz, at an NSPG meeting on February 3, Weinberger pressed the president to go forward with this idea, even though it would require a “broad” reading of the ABM Treaty provisions. Neither Shultz nor Max Kampelman, the chief U.S. negotiator at the Geneva arms talks, favored that approach. 71 Shultz, who believed Weinberger’s hard line was responsible for inciting public furor over ABM reinterpretation, tried to dissuade the president from making such a precipitous move, in part because there was so much public opposition to it, and in part because it could have a negative impact on SDI funding. He recommended instead a bargaining option, which he described as engaging “in a convincing process of examining the evidence collaboratively with the Senate.” 72 Weinberger’s effort to build support within the administration for the early deployment of at least one component of SDI aroused a strong reaction from SDI critics, both inside and outside of Congress. Senator Albert Gore Jr. (D-TN), for example, criticized the administration for trying to mislead the public into believing that the SDI program was designed for population defense rather than merely defending U.S. missiles, and for trying to lock in the SDI program to foreclose arms control options for Reagan’s successors. He predicted that Congress would not follow the president down the road to early phased deployment and its “inescapable corollary,” abrogation of the ABM Treaty. 73 Similar opposition came from academics and scientists, some of whom perceived Weinberger’s announcement about early deployment as an effort to exploit the president’s current “political predicament” [Iran-Contra] to make an “end run” around him. 74 Ambassador Paul Warnke, former SALT negotiator and head of ACDA, and currently director of the Committee for National Security, gave a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington on January 14, in which he strongly defended the ABM Treaty and denied that the president’s offer at Reykjavik to share SDI technol-

166

Chapter 5

ogy with the Soviets was “serious,” because we wouldn’t even sell them an Apple computer. 75 Two former secretaries of state, Cyrus R. Vance and Henry Kissinger, appeared on NBC’s Meet the Press on February 8, and advised against “ad hoc” reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty and for negotiations with Gorbachev. 76 The storm over early deployment escalated further that month, when Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, and a firm proponent of the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, sent a letter to Reagan on February 6, 1987, insisting that any effort by the administration to change substantially its interpretation to allow for testing of new defensive components, should only be done “after a thorough consultative process.” He warned that “absent due consultation, a unilateral Executive Branch decision . . . would provoke a constitutional confrontation of profound dimensions.” 77 Senator Nunn followed up during the week of March 9, with three speeches on the Senate floor concerning SDI and the ABM Treaty, which were widely covered by the media, challenging virtually every one of the administration’s public assertions defending reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. He announced that his review of the record left no room for any other conclusion than that the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty had been “explicitly” supported by both the White House and the Pentagon when the treaty was signed during the Nixon administration. In fact, he said, official statements made during the ratification hearings on the treaty “flatly and unequivocally contradicted” all administration assertions to the contrary. Moreover, he criticized the earlier views expressed by Judge Sofaer on the broad interpretation of the ABM treaty as “absurd” and “illogical,” and concluded that the administration was guilty of engaging in an “amazing sort of legalistic gymnastics,” which had seriously undermined its credibility. 78 Nunn’s public rebukes of the administration had at least three major consequences. First, they precipitated a dispute within Congress over the correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty between Democrats and moderate Republicans on one side, who supported Nunn, and mostly conservative and hardline Republicans, led by Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (KS), who supported the administration. The conservative Republican counterattack, however, was weakened by several factors. There was a serious division in its ranks between a right-wing group, which included Jesse Helms (NC) and Strom Thurmond (SC) in the Senate and Jack Kemp (NY) in the House, who wanted to scrap the ABM Treaty altogether and move quickly toward deployment of available SDI technology, and a more moderate group, led by Richard Lugar (IN), which supported a well-funded SDI research program, but cautioned against “premature” moves by the White House or Congress to reinterpret the treaty and opposed early deployment of “immature” systems that might fail to meet even minimum defensive requirements. The hardliners had a tough

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

167

grind against Nunn, whose conservative credentials and well-known expertise on arms control issues severely undercut the credibility of those who pushed for treaty reinterpretation and early deployment. 79 Second, Nunn’s strong positon seemed to inspire additional opposition from seasoned Washington political types to the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty to allow for wider testing of SDI components and early deployment. For example, on March 9, 1987, a bipartisan group of six former secretaries of defense circulated a statement expressing their collective view that that the United States and the Soviet Union “should continue to adhere to the traditional interpretation of Article V of the [ABM] Treaty as it was presented to the Senate for advice and consent and as it has been observed by both sides since the Treaty was signed in 1972.” 80 Later that month, four former legal advisers to the State Department submitted a brief to Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Senator Joseph Biden (DDE), chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, who held joint hearings on SDI in late March, opposing the administration’s position on the ABM Treaty. 81 In addition, several of the individuals who had been involved in negotiating the 1972 treaty, such as Paul Nitze, Gerard Smith, Sidney Graybeal, and Lt. Gen. Royal Allison were already on the public record as opposing any reinterpretation of the treaty that would allow for early deployment of an SDI component. 82 Third, Nunn played a central role in the administration’s walk-back on the alleged necessity of reinterpreting the ABM Treaty. Initially, administration officials responded to Nunn’s attacks by appearing on television talk shows to support the “broad” interpretation of the treaty, but as media, congressional, and public opposition continued to mount, their public presentation began to change. On February 8, in an interview on ABC’s This Week with David Brinkley, Shultz indicated that even though he now accepted a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty to allow for testing of key elements of the SDI program, there was no early deployment decision in the offing. 83 If deployment was contemplated at some future point, he said, not only would the administration consult with Congress, but it would have to meet the president’s three criteria for SDI: technical feasibility, survivability, and cost effectiveness at the margin. 84 On the same day, Weinberger, in an interview for BBC television, said that even though research on SDI was making remarkable progress, especially in the area of “kinetic kill weapons,” small space-based rockets designed to destroy incoming missiles by direct collision, he didn’t know when a decision could be made on deployment, thereby publicly capitulating on the issue. 85 The Washington Post’s editorial writers applauded what they perceived as Shultz’s resolution of “the reigning official confusion” concerning early deployment and the ABM Treaty provisions by expressing “exactly what the president’s position is,” and agreeing to forego a deployment decision “this year or next year,” 86 which practical-

168

Chapter 5

ly meant that a testing and deployment decision would be held over at least to the next administration. The administration’s February walk-back did not fully satisfy SDI opponents, and oppositional pressure continued to build. In its lead editorial on March 15, the Washington Post, for example, described Nunn’s statements on the Senate floor as a “political event.” The editorial writers stated that Nunn had “demolished the administration’s . . . reinterpretation” of the ABM Treaty, “savaged” Judge Sofaer’s earlier handiwork, and concluded that it seemed “the administration has lost for good the legal basis” for more aggressive testing and early deployment. 87 According to other press reports, senior administration officials, including the former Republican senator Howard H. Baker Jr., the new White House chief of staff, and Frank Carlucci, the new national security adviser, were engaged in bargaining to work out a “constructive arrangement” with the Senate to avoid a confrontation that might lead to legislation demanding adherence to the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty or negative consequences for SDI funding. 88 Judge Sofaer sent Nunn a letter, not cleared by the State Department or the White House, essentially disavowing his earlier analyses of the ABM Treaty, and in an apparent effort to deflect criticism from himself, attributed the research on those papers to unnamed “young lawyers” in his office. 89 At about the same time, in his testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, General Abrahamson, head of SDIO at the Pentagon, began tamping down the Pentagon’s aggressive push for what it called the “legally correct interpretation” (LCI), the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. 90 While the administration’s walk-back was in motion, another stake was driven into its SDI public diplomacy campaign, when the American Physical Society (APS), the largest professional society of American physicists, released on April 23, 1987, its long-awaited report on SDI. According to the APS, which had been asked by the administration eighteen months earlier to review the program, early deployment based on laser and/or particle beam weapons was unfeasible. In a news conference following publication of the majority report, APS representatives explained that they based their view on the unanimous opinion of their panel’s members 91 that numerous scientific breakthroughs and a minimum of a decade or more of intensive research were needed just to determine whether the development of such weapons was feasible. For the first time in public, the panel also concluded that many space-based platforms for launching anti-missile weapons would require nuclear reactors for power, thereby demolishing the president’s claim that his defensive system would be non-nuclear. 92 In an official statement released on the same day as the report, SDIO praised it, but said that it was a “snap-shot-in-time” that did not take into account research done since it was completed. 93 On April 30, the APS governing council went even further, when it released a

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

169

statement critical of early SDI deployment on the grounds that it “risks enormous waste of financial and human resources.” Pentagon leadership criticized the report as “subjective and unduly pessimistic,” but did not provide either a technical rebuttal or contrary data. 94 Some reporters regarded the Pentagon’s response as a “brush-off” and a failed attempt to discredit the APS’s report. 95 Throughout its public diplomacy campaign on SDI, the president and other administration officials frequently referred to “widespread” or “massive” public support for SDI. What they meant was that when the public was asked to evaluate the simple concept of space-based defense to destroy incoming missiles, impressive majorities or strong pluralities favored the idea. On this basis, White House officials appeared to believe that the president could safely appeal to the public in his struggle with a recalcitrant Congress and SDI critics. After the president’s radio address on January 12, 1986, for example, the White House distributed an Issue Brief in which it cherry-picked the results from seven national polls demonstrating majorities, or in some cases substantial pluralities, in favor of the “concept” of a space-based defensive system against incoming missiles. 96 Polling analysis done at the State Department, however, presented a more nuanced description of the public’s attitudes towards SDI. In a paper delivered at the 1987 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, State’s senior public opinion analyst noted that when countervailing or two-sided questions were asked, or when contingencies were introduced, such as the prospective cost of an SDI system, especially at the expense of domestic programs, limitations in the scope or effectiveness of the protective shield, or the possibility that the proposed system might employ nuclear weapons, support for SDI diminished. The sharpest reversal, he pointed out, was obtained in a March 1985 Harris poll, stressing the cost factor, which found that a 56-39 percent majority opposed “spending billions of dollars for the US to develop a laser-beam and particle-beam anti-nuclear missile defense system in outer-space and on the ground.” In fact, he concluded, the numerous variations in question wording across national polls on SDI produced marked differences in the level of public support. 97 These findings confirmed and expanded similar results found in an independent academic study. 98 What trend polling on SDI strongly suggested was that the level of public knowledge about SDI and the ABM Treaty was low, its confusion high, its support weak, and that neither the administration’s public diplomacy campaign nor the president’s efforts to go public did anything to change that. The wide-spread public opposition to the cost of building an SDI defensive system and the related deep concern on the Hill about its budgetbusting potential, had a substantial cumulative impact on the administration’s efforts to fund the program. It is true that during Reagan’s tenure, funding authorized by Congress for SDI research steadily increased, from $1 billion in 1984 to $4.1 billion in FY 1989. However, it is also a fact that

170

Chapter 5

in each fiscal year, the funding was bargained down and the administration received less for SDI research than it requested. For example, in FY 1986, it requested $3.8 billion in the defense authorization bill, but Congress trimmed that figure to $3 billion; in FY 1987 it cut the administration’s request from $4.9 to $3.5 billion; in FY 1988, in its largest percentage cut of SDI funding, it authorized only $3.9 billion of the administration’s request for $5.7 billion; and in FY 1989, when the president was rapidly approaching lame duck status, his request for $4.9 billion was lowered to $4.1 billion. 99 The Democratic Caucus in the House was arguably the strongest group on the Hill dedicated to slowing the rate of increase in SDI funding and upgrading conventional forces and technologies, in its overall effort to balance defense priorities. 100 In the Senate, a bipartisan coalition of forty-six senators formed before the hearings on the administration’s FY 1987 defense budget were scheduled to begin, and they signed a collective letter to Senators Goldwater and Nunn, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee, respectively, demanding a limit on SDI’s funding increase to no more than 3 percent over the amount authorized for the previous fiscal year. 101 In the FY 1988 defense budget round, when the Democrats controlled the chamber, Senators Nunn and Carl Levin (MI), introduced an amendment to the budget bill banning spending for Star Wars tests that violated the narrow interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, unless both houses of Congress approved. 102 Essentially, during the last two years of his administration, Reagan’s struggle to obtain from Congress what he considered adequate funding for SDI became a distinctly uphill battle, both in the public arena and in Congress. 103 With so much opposition to SDI both inside and outside of Congress, why was the administration able to achieve an annual increase in the amount of SDI funding? In the first place, it was no doubt difficult for members of Congress, Democrats or Republicans, to ignore the fact that contracts for SDI research went to over twenty major contractors, such as Lockheed, General Motors, Boeing, and TRW, as well as a number of smaller ones, and many subcontractors—all of which were geographically dispersed among cities throughout the United States. In addition, many universities and government research labs, such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory, received SDI research grants. 104 Even scientists who were confirmed opponents of SDI, such as Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin, did not oppose limited amounts of congressional funding for pure research, so long as the funding did not support demonstration projects or deployment. 105 Many members of Congress evidently were quite capable of disaggregating and particularizing the benefits they perceived might flow to their home districts as a result of supporting SDI research, irrespective of how they felt about the program in general. Having a positive incentive to support federal spending in their respective districts that could benefit at

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

171

least some of their constituents, they evidently had no difficulty voting for SDI research funding. They apparently also understood that such legislation was distributional, that it could generate jobs in the near term and that there could be an economic multiplier effect in the future when corporate grant recipients actually undertook demonstration projects and developed physical systems, which was where the major profits were likely to be. The polls cited above confirm the fact that the efforts of Reagan and his senior national security officials to present a clear, unified, and persuasive narrative about SDI failed to broaden the public’s understanding of, or to increase support for, SDI. To a large extent this outcome can be attributed to the fact that the administration’s SDI narrative was poorly defined, internally inconsistent, marred by serious contradictions, occasionally incoherent, and enveloped in a fog of dubious assertions and wishful thinking. In the first place, even though the administration actively sought to unify rival bureaucratic factions and attempted to control communication content, it was unable to bridge or override the vested interests of the national security agencies, which had long-standing bureaucratic commitments to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and its focus on the protection of missiles and missile sites. This created a situation in which every speech or public address on SDI tended to reflect the perception of the agency the individual speaker represented. Secondly, administration officials were unable to dispel the confusion about the president’s concept of a “shield” to protect the American population from nuclear weapons. In fact, they contributed to the confusion by frequently using such open-ended phrases as “protecting the American public,” “protection not retaliation” and “intercepting and destroying strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies,” which clearly implied that a leak-proof defensive system was a realizable objective. Third, the administration never really resolved the fundamental issues of whether the president’s strategic vision was spacebased, ground-based, or some combination of the two, or whether the components of a layered system could be developed independently and then integrated into a workable whole. Fourth, it never clarified whether SDI was simply a potentially interesting research program or a “vital” national security program, even though a substantial majority of expert scientific opinion regarded it as unworkable. Fifth, it elided the serious question of why the current strategic triad (air, submarine, and groundbased missiles) was incapable of providing effective homeland defense and had to be augmented by a vast and enormously costly technological breakthrough when there was no palpable national security threat compelling a program for deploying a strategic defense. Sixth, officials ignored the question of how a space-based defensive system would constitute a protective shield for the United States and its allies if the Soviet Union could still attack population centers with their nuclear cruise and

172

Chapter 5

submarine missiles, as well as a variety of other delivery systems. Seventh, they never resolved the conundrum of “bargaining chips.” On the one hand, if an effective defensive system was scientifically infeasible, then how could it serve as a bargaining chip? On the other hand, if it was achievable at an astronomical cost in the relatively near term, then why would the administration want to trade it away? Finally, they never developed an effective answer to the question of why policy makers preferred the development of a defensive system that would take years, probably decades, to achieve, if it were achievable at all, instead of serious current negotiations for equitable and verifiable deep cuts in strategic weapons, which seemed to be more a matter of political will than an issue of nuclear strategy? As the months of 1988 rolled by, and national attention turned to the forthcoming presidential election, the controversy over ABM Treaty interpretation and early deployment subsided. Representative Jack Kemp, one of the most assertive leaders of the pro-SDI group in Congress, entered the presidential race, vowing to transform it into a “national referendum” on the Strategic Defense Initiative. 106 That never came to pass; Kemp fared poorly and withdrew from the primaries. The official Republican Party platform, adopted on August 16, 1988, devoted all of three sentences to SDI. 107 In fact, SDI never achieved anything remotely resembling Reagan’s dream of an impenetrable shield that would “change history.” When Director of SDIO Abrahamson announced his resignation effective February 1, 1989, he admitted that blueprints for SDI would have to be “scaled back” and that the first phase of an anti-missile system could not be in place before the late 1990s. In 1991, President Bush, who was reluctant to accept any kind of an SDI inheritance from Reagan, called for a more limited version of the program, focused on ground-based, rocket-launched “interceptors” in fixed, single sites. About two years later, he authorized the reorganization of SDI as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), thereby effectively scrapping the SDI program and underscoring the widespread recognition that Reagan’s “dream” of a defensive umbrella to protect the United States and its allies was indeed a scientific fantasy. 108 SDI opponents who had fought a long and hard battle against it no doubt felt vindicated. NOTES 1. The concept of a “defensive shield” became problematic from the outset. Precisely what Reagan meant by that phrase was not absolutely clear, and it quickly became a subject of public discussion after his defense speech. In his autobiography, published about two years after he left office, he states that even before he became president, he had “a dream of a nuclear free world.” He writes that some of his advisers, including several at the Pentagon, did not share his dream, but that about two weeks before he delivered his speech, the JCS informed him that their “collective judgement” was “that development of a shield against nuclear missiles might be fea-

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

173

sible,” and he then decided to “make my dream public.” It was at least implicit in many of his subsequent remarks on SDI that the shield would be impenetrable, but he also later claimed that he “never viewed SDI as an impenetrable shield—no defense could ever be expected to be one hundred percent effective.” Nevertheless, irrespective of how Reagan described the “shield” after he left office, many supporters and critics during his administration perceived that he actually meant an impenetrable or impermeable shield. For Reagan’s views, see Ronald Reagan: An American Life, 1990, 550, 571, 608. 2. For the official text, see “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,” March 23, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, I, 437-43; it was also distributed by the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs, as Current Policy Series No. 472, and printed in the New York Times, March 24, 1983, 20. Shultz notes in his memoir, Turmoil and Tradition: My Years as Secretary of State, 1993, 246-64, that the draft of the president’s speech he saw only several days before the president delivered it was full of “extravagant” statements and “sweeping” language, and that he and his subordinates had serious qualms about how it would change “the strategic view and doctrine of the United States” and “unilaterally destroy the foundation of the Western alliance.” According to his account, he wrestled with William P. Clark Jr., the president’s national security adviser, and Clark’s deputy, Robert “Bud” McFarlane, to tone down the speech and focus it primarily on research and development, in order to prevent the president from going too far out on a limb. George A. (“Jay”) Keyworth II, the president’s science adviser, who apparently coordinated the drafting of the speech, claims that he was responsible for the final product. He also states that one of the most difficult obstacles in keeping the text of the speech aligned with the president’s “vision” was internal opposition from DOD and particularly from the State Department. He claims that he and McFarlane, in their negotiations with State, tried to accommodate “the elements of their concerns that seemed most valid,” but that “we always had two versions of the speech going,” the “wimp version (the one responding to State Department concerns) and the real version (the one based on McFarlane’s original text).” According to Keyworth, whenever he presented the two versions to Reagan, the president always chose the revised McFarlane text. For Keyworth’s recollections, see “Exit Interview with Dr. George A. Keyworth,” conducted by Lt. Col. Donald R. Baucom, September 28, 1987, 25-27, accessed at http://www.thereaganfiles.com/sdi .html. On his part, Reagan noted in his diaries that when he found a draft of the defense speech on his desk on the morning of March 22, he “did a lot of rewriting . . . to change bureaucratic into people talk.” See entry for March 22, 1983, in Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 139. 3. The official basis for the actual SDI research and development program was National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 85, dated March 25, 1983; for text, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, 1995, 287. A copy of the action memorandum establishing the Organization of Defensive Technologies Executive Committee in the Department of Defense to oversee the R&D program is in SDI Research Files, Box 2, Folder: White House Press Releases, NSArchive. 4. The name “Star Wars” was derived from the popular George Lucas science fiction film with the same name that was released in U.S. theaters in 1977. Its use spread rapidly in the media and the scientific community, and quickly became the popular reference to Reagan’s SDI proposal. George Keyworth and his staff in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) disliked the term, especially as opposition to the program mounted. In January 1985, Keyworth complained to McFarlane that “We all abhor the ludicrous connotation of the name ‘Star Wars,’” but that efforts to come up with an alternative had not been successful. He suggested that the SDI be renamed “Project A,” a simple solution that would lead to the logical conclusion that other projects would follow “as a comprehensive strategy,” and that the president’s State of the Union address (SOU) would be “an excellent time to do so.” In October 1985, a staffer in OSTP proposed to Keyworth that in order to counter

174

Chapter 5

the efforts of those who were trying to sow semantic confusion about SDI, “it ought to be suggested to the President that he refuse [underlining in the source text] to answer any questions from reporters” making reference to “Star Wars,” because he did not have such a program, after which he should segue into a discussion of SDI, the program he did have. Neither of these suggestions, however, went anywhere. See Keyworth’s note to McFarlane, January 31, 1985, and the memorandum from Burgess Laird to Keyworth, October 1, 1985, both of which can be accessed at http://www.the reaganfiles.com/sdi.html. Evidently, the nickname also irked George Lucas, who wanted to protect his trademark and who was so incensed by political ads using children to argue about the controversial defense proposal, that he had his lawyer ask U.S. District Judge Gerhard Gesell to grant a preliminary injunction to prevent such practice, on the grounds that “Star Wars” was a “fantasy” and political use of the term “will cause children and parents to tend to shy away from ‘Star Wars.’” See “Filmmaker asks court to yell ‘cut’ in ads’ use of ‘Star Wars,’” Chicago Tribune, November 26, 1985, 5. 5. See, for example, G. Thomas Goodnight, “Ronald Reagan’s Reformulation of the Rhetoric of War: Analysis of the ‘Zero Option,’ ‘Evil Empire,’ and ‘Star Wars’ Addresses,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 1986, 390-414, and Janet Hocker Rushing, “Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ Address,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 1986, 415-33. 6. For example, see Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (2005); Francis Fitzgerald’s Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (2000); and William J. Broad, Teller’s War: The Top Secret Story Behind the Star Wars Deception (1992). For information on Reagan’s efforts to sell SDI, see Erik K. Pratt, Selling Strategic Defense: Interests, Ideologies and the Arms Race (1990), and for background on the evolution of the concept of strategic defense from 1945 to 1980, see Craig Eisendrath, Melvin A. Goodman, and Gerald E. Marsh, The Phantom Defense: America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion (2001), which traces the concept of space defense into the George W. Bush administration. 7. Some journalists and commentators perceived a domestic political objective in Reagan’s speech. They regarded it as part of a larger effort by the administration to “seize the moral high ground” in its struggle with the proponents of a nuclear freeze, who vociferously opposed modernization of the nation’s strategic forces and pushed for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to “freeze” further production and use of nuclear weapons; see, for example, Joseph Fromm, with Robert Dudney, “Behind Reagan’s Star-Wars Strategy,” U.S. News and World Report, 94: 13 (April 4, 1983), 29-31. The available records do not indicate clear linkage, but it certainly is plausible, because during the period between the late fall of 1982 and the run-up to the speech in March 1983, Reagan was in the midst of an on-going flap over his public accusations that Soviet agents had infiltrated and were manipulating the nuclear freeze movement, including its main organization, the Nuclear Freeze Movement (NFM). When Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) challenged the administration to release the names of Soviet KGB agents who were instigating the freeze movement, he was ignored. When journalists pressed the president for “evidence” to support his charges, Reagan referred to articles in conservative-leaning publications, such as Readers Digest, Commentary, and the American Spectator, written by individuals who shared his views, but who produced no credible documentary evidence. Ultimately, at the request of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the FBI investigated the charges and its “Report on Soviet Active Measures,” which was partially released and read into the Congressional Record, essentially contradicted the president’s assertions. To follow the controversy, as it played out in the press and Congress, see the following: “President Says Foes of U.S. Have Duped Arms Freeze Group,” New York Times, October 5, 1982, A22; “The President’s News Conference,” November 11, 1982, Public Papers, 1982, II, 1450-57; Leslie Maitland, “Sources Are Cited for Charge of Soviet Tie to Arms Freeze,” New York Times, November 13, 1982, 7; Daniel Southerland, “Communist Influence in Peace Movement: Threat or Red Herring?,” Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 1982, 1; Judith Miller, “President Says Freeze Proponents May Unwit-

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

175

tingly Aid the Russians,” New York Times, December 11, 1982, 9; Leslie Maitland, “F.B.I. Rules Out Russian Control of Freeze Drive,” New York Times, March 26, 1983, 1; and the Congressional Record, March 24, 1983, 7406-12. In 1988, after he had left the Reagan administration, former national security adviser McFarlane published an article in Foreign Affairs, in which he wrote that “there is much to criticize in the misleading simplicity of the administration’s announcement of the SDI program and the way it exploited popular antinuclear aspirations.” See McFarlane, “Effective Strategic Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 1988, 40. 8. For text of the so-called “Evil Empire” address, see “Address to the National Association of Evangelicals National Convention in Orlando, Florida,” March 8, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, I, 359-64. 9. For example, see the views of Thomas C. Schelling, “What Went Wrong with Arms Control?,” Foreign Affairs, 1985-86, 219-33. 10. The evening after Reagan delivered his speech, he recorded in his diary that those who had been invited to the White House to observe his address “all praised it to the sky” and also noted rather prophetically that they “seemed to think it would be a source of debate for some time to come.” See entry for March 23, 1983, Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 140. 11. “Nuclear Facts, Science Fictions,” New York Times, March 27, 1983, E18. 12. “Razzle-Dazzle Reagan,” Baltimore Sun, March 25, 1983, A18. 13. “Lost in Space?,” Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1983, D6. 14. “The Death-Ray Solution,” Chicago Tribune, March 26, 1983, 6. 15. “Mr. Reagan’s New Defense Idea,” Washington Post, March 25, 1983, A22. 16. The text of Inouye’s address is printed in the Congressional Record, Senate, March 24, 1983, 7100. For press commentary, see Francis X. Clines, “Democrats Assert Reagan Is Using ‘Star’ Wars to Hide Blunders,” New York Times, March 25, 1983, A9; and Steven V. Roberts, “Reagan Arms Effort: A Plan in Peril,” New York Times, April 4, 1983, B6. 17. For the Kennedy quote, see Lou Cannon, “President Seeks Futuristic Defense against Missiles,” Washington Post, March 24, 1983, A1. 18. For comments by these Democratic critics, see Michael Getler, “Speech Also Attacked on Anti-ICBM Issue,” Washington Post, March 25, 1983, A1; Hedrick Smith, “Would a Space-Age Defense Ease Tensions or Create Them?,” New York Times, March 27, 1983, E1; and Lou Cannon and Margot Hornblower, “Reagan Defense Push May Backfire: In Selling Defense Buildup Plan, Reagan Evokes ‘Warmonger’ Title,” Washington Post, April 7, 1983, A1. 19. See, for example, David Hoffman, “2 Scientists Bemoan Space War Proposal,” The Washington Times, May 13, 1983, 4A. For Sagan’s extended views, see his article, “The Case against SDI,” Discover, 1985, 66-75. 20. Parnas announced his resignation in 1985, a critical period in the administration’s effort to sell SDI, and it received widespread media coverage; for example, see Michael R. Gordon, “Scientist Assails ‘Star Wars’ Plan,” New York Times, December 4, 1985, A5 and Ware Myers, “The Star Wars Software Debate,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42: 2 (February 1986), 31-36. 21. For the views of prominent individual scientists who opposed SDI, see for example, Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway, The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political, and Arms Control Assessment (1984); John Noble Wilford, “Group of Top Scientists Close to Government Fighting Space Weapons Plan,” New York Times, November 16, 1983, 8; and David L. Parnas, “Views: Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems,” American Scientist, 1985, 432-40. For a more collective view released by the Union of Concerned Scientists, see Space-Based Missile Defense: A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, 1984, a 106-page report that concluded (p. 69), inter alia, “total ballistic missile defense . . . is unattainable if the Soviet Union exploits the many vulnerabilities intrinsic to all the schemes that have been proposed this far.” In the spring of 1983, a large group of scientists working in the fields of physics, space research, and astronomy sent identical letters to Soviet

176

Chapter 5

leader Yuri Andropov and President Reagan supporting a ban on space weapons and efforts to prevent the militarization of space; see John F. Burns, “Andropov Offers Ban on Space Arms,” New York Times, April 28, 1983, A6. By the spring of 1986, more than 6,500 working scientists, including a majority of professors in the top twenty university physics departments in the United States, a number of whom were Nobel laureates, formally declared their opposition to Reagan’s SDI program and pledged not to accept any funds for SDI-related research; see Fred Hiatt, “6,500 College Scientists Take Anti-SDI Pledge: System Called Ill-Conceived and Dangerous,” Washington Post, May 14, 1986, A3. 22. For Jastrow’s position, see his article “Reagan vs. the Scientists: Why the President is Right about Missile Defense,” Commentary, 1984, 23-32; for Teller, see “The Case for the Strategic Defense Initiative,” Discover, 1985, 66-74. 23. Much has been written about the genesis of Reagan’s idea of a space-defense strategy for the United States. In his memoir, Special Trust, 1994, 231-33, McFarlane claims credit for initially persuading the president and the JCS to focus on and adopt a proposal for a space-defense program. According to Keyworth, there was “absolutely no question that SDI originated with the President,” but he also noted that there were “a number of antecedents [that] seem to have manifested themselves in many different ways.” Those “antecedents” included Martin Anderson and Edward Teller. The former served as a policy adviser to Reagan during the 1976 and 1980 presidential elections, and as the president’s senior economic policy adviser, 1981-1982. He had accompanied Reagan on a trip to the NORAD base at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, in July 1979, where Reagan discovered that the United States had no defenses against Soviet missiles. Shortly thereafter, Anderson wrote a memorandum for Reagan on foreign policy, which included a proposal for the development of a “protective missile system,” which Reagan embraced. Keyworth regarded Teller as his “mentor,” and Teller developed a fairly close relationship with Reagan. He was an early advocate of space-based defense and was particularly interested in “bomb-pumped laser technology.” He served voluntarily on the White House Science Council, an advisory group established in February 1982, to advise OSTP, and he met a number of times with the president to discuss space-based defenses, both before and after the president’s initial SDI speech. See Keyworth’s exit interview of September 26, 1987, 5-8, cited above; and Martin Anderson, Revolution: The Reagan Legacy, 1988, 80-86. For Teller’s involvement with Reagan and other White House officials, see for example his letters to Reagan, July 23, 1982, and Cap Weinberger, November 8, 1985, both available at http://www.thereagan files.com/sdi.html. For his visits to the White House, see Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 100, 165, 334, 633. To follow the story of how the space-defense proposal moved through the federal bureaucracy, see Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 2000, 194-209. 24. For example, see Teller’s article titled “Dangerous Myths about Nuclear Arms,” originally published in the Reader’s Digest, 121: 727 (November 1982), 139-44, and the response by Frank Hippel, a senior research physicist at Princeton University and chairman of the American Federation of Scientists, both printed in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 39:3 (March 1983), 6-12. 25. See William J. Perry, “It May Be Plausible—And It May Be Ineffective,” Washington Post, March 27, 1983, B8. For Perry’s retrospective comments on the SDI program, see his memoir, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, 2015, 65-68. 26. See the following: W. Averell Harriman, “If the Reagan Pattern Continues, America May Face a Nuclear War,” New York Times, January 1, 1984, E13; McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith, “The President’s Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs, 1984-1985, 264-78; Joel Brinkley, “Vance Concerned About Space Arms,” New York Times, February 5, 1985, A13; and Charles Mohr, “A Warning from Bundy,” New York Times, May 24, 1986, 1, 29. On Schlesinger, see AP wire, “Reagan Takes Wrong ‘Star Wars’ Tack, Say Ex-Defense Chiefs,” reporting on Schlesinger’s and McNamara’s appearance at a two-day conference on strategic defense sponsored by the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia,

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

177

published in the Morning Call (Allentown, PA), October 6, 1985, A4. On Brown, see “It May Be Plausible—And It May Be Ineffective,” Washington Post, March 27, 1983, B8, and “The Star Wars Debate,” Chicago Tribune, January 4, 1985, 26. The view of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had been President Carter’s national security adviser, and was invited to the White House to meet with Reagan shortly before the president delivered his defense speech, is interesting. Though he took “exception to a great many elements of the Reagan defense program,” he felt that the president’s speech raised important issues about U.S. national security and “that perhaps the time has come that, on the basis of new scientific development, it may be possible to enhance our defensive capabilities to a point where they begin to overshadow the offensive capability to deter . . . .” See Brzezinski, “Far Reaching and Risky: Reagan’s Missile Defense Proposal,” Baltimore Sun, March 28, 1983, A9. 27. The text of the “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” signed May 26, 1972, can be accessed at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm. 28. This “platform” is a composite of themes found in the publications of national organizations opposed to SDI, of which there were over a hundred on record. Many of their publications can be found in SDI Research Files, Box 2, NSArchive. 29. Fred Hiatt, “Staggering Costs Predicted,” Washington Post, November 11, 1983, 29. 30. “Scowcroft panel warns ‘Star Wars’ plan threatens treaty,” National Journal, 16: 13 (March 31, 1984), 81-82. 31. Strobe Talbot, “The Case against Star Wars Weapons,” Time, 123: 19 (May 7, 1984), 81-82. See also Wayne Biddle, “Reagan Officials Defend Space Weapons Plan,” New York Times, April 26, 1984, A17. 32. See Caspar W. Weinberger, “Defense Reply,” Baltimore Sun, April 5, 1983, A7. 33. See the statements cited from Weinberger’s remarks to the Aviation /Space Writer’s Association, April 11, 1983, in an article by Whitt Flora, “Weinberger: ‘Star Wars’ Defense Plan Is No Fantasy,” Washington Times, April 12, 1983, 4A. 34. “Weinberger Softens Insistence on a Leak-Proof ABM System,” Washington Post, April 12, 1983, 6. See also the exchange between George Keyworth and Jan Lodal, former NSC director of program analysis, in U.S. News and World Report, 94: 14 (April 11, 1983), 24-25. 35. See, for example, “The President’s News Conference,” October 19, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, II, 1486-93. 36. See the memorandum from Keyworth (signed “Jay”) to Weinberger, with attached “Point Paper on the President’s Defense Initiative,” December 9, 1983; it can be accessed at http://www.thereaganfiles.com/sdi.html. The underlining of the word “President’s,” evidently for emphasis, is in the source text. 37. See “Strategic Defense Initiative: Congressional and Allied Consultation,” NSDD 116, December 2, 1983, Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives, 1995, 353 (text) and 248 (commentary). This directive was augmented by “Strategic Defense Initiative,” NSDD 119, January 6, 1984, with unclassified fact sheet, in Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives, 1995, 374. The latter authorized DOD to manage the SDI program and also stressed that all official statements about SDI should be “low key” and “closely coordinated to ensure that an accurate picture of the nature and scope of this R&D effort is presented to the public.” 38. See, for example, Fred Hiatt, “Low Key Push Due ‘Star Wars,’” Washington Post, June 19, 1984, 1; and Joseph Kraft, “Shattering Myths,” Washington Post, July 3, 1984, 15. 39. Walter Andrews, “‘Star Wars’ Misunderstood in Congress, Director Says,” Washington Times, June 19, 1984, 5. Keyworth and his colleagues in OSTP, however, viewed the problem of congressional reaction to SDI very differently. For example, in a memorandum to Keyworth, OSTP staffer Michael Havey wrote that the real problem was rivalry between Abrahamson’s SDIO and the “established DOD bureaucracy” which wanted to make Reagan’s defense idea “fit into present policy” and that OSD

178

Chapter 5

had made no effort to address seriously “any objective other than the maintenance of both the policy—and means—of Assured Destruction.” In short, there was no effective leadership at the top and Abrahamson was insufficiently assertive to alter the situation. Consequently, the administration was losing the battle on the Hill, because staffers there didn’t want to hear about how our gadgets were better than our adversary’s gadgets, but did want to know where the president wants to go with his idea, how it fitted into the larger strategic picture and “why it matters.” Havey’s memo can be accessed at http://www.thereaganfiles.com/sdi.html. 40. “Weinberger Takes Aim at ‘Star Wars’ Critics,” Baltimore Sun, June 21, 1984, 16. 41. See “Next Steps in Preparing for Vienna,” strategy paper drafted by an unidentified NSC staffer (possibly Robert Linhard), dated September 4, 1984, Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: Strategic Defense Initiative 1350, NSArchive; and memorandum from Charles Hill (State) to McFarlane, September 18, 1984, transmitting a Public Diplomacy Strategy Paper (heavily redacted), co-drafted in State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) and the Office of Public Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR/PA), Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: Strategic Defense Initiative 10860, NSAchive. According to an undated memorandum from McFarlane to the president, the overall public diplomacy strategy plan was discussed, inter alia, at an NSPG meeting on September 18; see McFarlane’s memorandum to the president, Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: Strategic Defense Initiative 1350, NSArchive. Although NSPG meeting 96, “Next Steps in the Vienna Process,” took place on September 18, 1984, no specific discussion of the public diplomacy strategy was recorded at that meeting; see Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 327-33. Consequently, it is unclear which NSPG meeting McFarlane referred to. 42. A “layered defense” system involved overlapping non-nuclear components designed to engage incoming enemy missiles in continuous attack from the moment they were launched to just before they reached their targets. 43. Caspar W. Weinberger, “The Rationale for Strategic Defense,” Excerpts from a speech to the Foreign Press Center, December 19, 1984, printed in the Wall Street Journal, January 2, 1985, 18. 44. The Geneva arms control negotiations, after a considerable lapse, resumed in March 1985. Staff exchanges between the United States and Soviet sides continued throughout the year, preparatory to a meeting between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in November. At the meeting on November 18-19, the leaders agreed in principle on a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear forces, and an interim agreement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). 45. The memoranda referenced here are as follows: Keyworth to the President, February 27, 1985; Keyworth to McFarlane, February 27, 1985; Keyworth to Cap [Weinberger], February 27, 1985; McFarlane to the President, March 20, 1985; and Casey to Keyworth and Herb Meyer (vice chairman, National Intelligence Council), March 25, 1985—all of which can be accessed at http://thereaganfiles.com/sdi.html. 46. For the text of Reagan’s remarks at the luncheon, see “Remarks at the National Space Club Luncheon,” March 29, 1985, Public Papers, 1985, I, 363-66. For press reaction, see for example, David Hoffman, “Reagan Seeks to Link SDI, Missile Cutbacks: Weapons Would Become More Negotiable,” Washington Post, March 30, 1985, A1. 47. See the memorandum from Keyworth to Reagan, April 3, 1985; it can be accessed at http://thereaganfiles.com/sdi.html. 48. For text of NSDD 172, titled “Presenting the Strategic Defense Initiative,” dated May 30, 1985, see Simpson (ed.), National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, 1995, 535-48. 49. See the memorandum from Keyworth to McFarlane, April 10, 1985, containing comments on a draft version of NSDD 172; and a memorandum from Keyworth to Pat Buchanan, director of the White House Office of Communications, May 15, 1985, which is marked “not sent”; both can be accessed at http://thereaganfiles.com/sdi.html. The content of NSDD 172 and the recognition that he had achieved only limited effect

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

179

in his effort to change the thrust of the administration’s public communications effort on SDI and its interpretation of the president’s defensive strategy probably had an impact on Keyworth’s decision to resign his position, which he announced in late November 1985; he was gone by January 1986. 50. The Harris poll results can be accessed at www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll -database/. 51. For the relevant polling results, see the Roper poll (Report 85-7), taken July 1320; ABC News/Washington Post poll, taken July 25-29; and the Gallup/Newsweek poll, taken August 27-28, 1985. All of these polls can be accessed at https://ropercenter .cornell.edu/. 52. An independent poll taken by Penn and Schoen Associates, October 6-9, on the basis of a questionnaire designed in conjunction with the Committee on the Present Danger, found a substantial majority of the public favoring SDI (73 percent), but that poll was apparently a one-off effort, not based on averaged results. William Graham, chairman of Reagan’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, sent a copy to Keyworth, under cover of a note dated October 25, in which he stated that the poll “confirms statistically what we already knew intuitively—the real people of this country strongly support SDI.” The text of the Penn and Schoen results and Graham’s covering note can be accessed at http://www.thereganfiles.com/ sdi.html. Graham replaced Keyworth as the president’s science adviser, after the latter’s resignation. 53. Shultz, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 578-79. 54. Shultz, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 580. 55. Bernard Gwertzman, “Reticence and Foreign Policy,” New York Times, October 8, 1985, A20. 56. Shultz, Turmoil and Tradition, 580. 57. The agreement is reflected in the text of NSDD 192, “The ABM Treaty and the SDI Program,” which is attached to a memorandum from McFarlane to seven administration principals; a copy is in Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: Strategic Defense Initiative/ABM Treaty-1979, NSArchive. 58. Shultz, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 582. 59. Letter from William L. Ball, III, assistant secretary for legislative and intergovernmental affairs, Department of State, October 29, 1985, to Representative Fascell, with attachment titled “Analysis of U.S. Post-Negotiation Public Statements Interpreting the ABM Treaty’s Application to Future Systems,” in Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: SDI/ASAT/ABM, NSArchive. In fact, there was substantial bureaucratic disagreement among the relevant government agencies concerning the ABM Treaty. ACDA’s general counsel, Thomas Graham Jr., contended that the treaty unambiguously prohibited the development, testing and deployment of systems or components that were based “on other physical principals” [i.e., technology] than those current when the treaty was ratified in 1972. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) argued that the treaty was ambiguous respecting systems or components based on new physical principles, and that the negotiating record demonstrated that the development, testing, and deployment of such systems or components were not controlled by the treaty, except for a requirement that both signatories discuss specific limitations on such systems. Sofaer’s interpretation construed the treaty to allow research, testing, and development, but not deployment, irrespective of the technology involved. See memorandum from Sofaer (L) to Ambassador Paul Nitze, advisor to the president and the Secretary of State on arms control (S/ARN), October 3, 1985; and Graham to Chairman of the SDI Interagency Group, September 20, 1985, both in Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: Strategic Defense Initiative-1460, NSArchive; and information memorandum (revised) from Sofaer to Shultz, October 10, 1985 (redacted), attached to a memorandum from Sofaer to Nitze, October 10, 1985, Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: Strategic Defense Initiative-10860, NSArchive. 60. Letter from Senator John W. Warner (R-VA), chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, and Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), ranking minority member, to Shultz,

180

Chapter 5

January 14, 1986, Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: Strategic Defense Initiative-1460, NSArchive. The squabble between Congress and the State Department over access to the full ABM Treaty negotiating record went on for months. Eventually, after considerable bargaining a compromise was reached, whereby senators would have “controlled access” to the treaty record, and the administration’s budget request for SDI would be taken up at the scheduled hearing; for relevant documentation, see Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: Strategic Defense Initiative-1460, NSArchive. 61. Letter from Representatives Jim Courter (R-NJ) and Jack Kemp (R-NY) to Weinberger, March 6, 1986, SDI Research Files, Box 5, Folder: [Appeals], NSArchive. Identical letters were sent to national security adviser Poindexter and communications director Buchanan at the White House. 62. If the recollections of several administration principals are accurate, there was a curious disconnect between them and the president on the “bargaining chip” issue. Reagan repeatedly denied publicly that SDI was a bargaining chip to force or entice the Soviets to the negotiating table. Shultz, Weinberger, McFarlane, Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense, and Jack Matlock, the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, however, all later insisted that it was. McFarlane wrote in his memoir, Special Trust, 1994, 234, that SDI’s “primary value” at the time was as “a means of imposing a fearsome financial burden on the Soviets and leveraging their behavior at the bargaining table.” Shultz, in his memoir, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 263-64, described it as the “ultimate bargaining chip.” For the other officials mentioned, see Strober and Strober: Reagan: The Man and His Presidency, 1998, 248, 356. 63. “Radio Address to the Nation on the Strategic Defense Initiative,” July 12, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 949-50. 64. “Remarks at a White House Briefing for Supporters of Strategic Defense Initiative,” August 6, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1057-59. The State Department released the text as “SDI: Progress and Promise,” Current Policy No. 858. 65. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev held a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, October 11-12, 1986. They traded proposals for eliminating substantial numbers of weapons systems, but the talks collapsed at the last minute, when they failed to reach a compromise on the issue of laboratory testing versus field testing of SDI components. For views of two participants at the summit, see Shultz, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 751-80, and Jack F. Matlock Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended, 2004, 215-50. 66. Precisely what the president meant by sharing SDI technology is not clear. In the late summer or early fall of 1985, George Keyworth and Herbert Meyer sent a memorandum to Casey noting that the president’s public offer to do that had “not attained the support it deserves, partly because some do not believe it, and partly because we don’t know how to implement it.” They rejected the idea of sharing technology to “develop” SDI, because it would be too problematic, and proposed instead to share sufficient technology to “jointly operate strategic defense systems,” which presumably would obviate the difficulties and could involve other nations. They contended that joint operation would “underscore U.S. commitment to SDI as a deployed system, not just a research project,” emphasize that “SDI is an alliance system, not just a territorial defense,” and would undercut Soviet arguments that SDI “is part of a strategy to achieve U.S. superiority.” They suggested that the president announce “joint operation” at a summit meeting with Gorbachev for “dramatic effect,” presumably at the Geneva Summit, scheduled for November 19-20. There is no indication in the available files why Keyworth and Meyer sent the memo to Casey rather than through White House channels to the president, nor is there any indication that it was forwarded to anyone else. The memo, whose date is obscured in the source text, can be accessed at http://wwwthereaganfiles.com/sdi.html. 67. For the president’s October remarks, see “Address to the Nation on the Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland,” October 13, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1367-71; “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Broad-

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

181

cast Journalists on the Meetings in Iceland . . . ,” October 14, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1376-79. Reagan also spoke to employees of the State Department and ACDA on October 14, and State subsequently released the text of those remarks as “The Significance of Reykjavik,” Current Policy No. 880. After Reykjavik, high level administration speakers frequently used the theme that the Soviets’ aim there was to cripple SDI in order to maintain their “monopoly” on space-defense research; for example, see Weinberger’s remarks before the American Legislative Exchange Council, December 11, 1986, a transcript of which is in SDI Research Files, Box 4, Folder: SDI/ABM Federal Newswire, NSArchive. Reagan’s obstinacy on retaining SDI goes back much earlier than Reykjavik. In November 1985, he had recorded in his diary that “Gorbachev is adamant we must cave in our S.D.I.—well, this will be a case of an irresistible force meeting an unmovable object.” See entry for November 5, 1985, Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 365-66. 68. In his autobiography, published about two years after he left office, Reagan blamed Gorbachev for the collapse of the Reykjavik negotiations and the failure thereafter of the two leaders to reach agreement on a START treaty before he left office. He claimed that Gorbachev had agreed to meet with him in Reykjavik for “one purpose,” to seek the “collapse” of the talks and thereby kill SDI. That is why, Reagan asserted, Gorbachev saved discussion of SDI until the final sessions of the meeting. See Reagan, Ronald Reagan: An American Life, 1990, 676-79. 69. See, for example, letter from Representatives Courter and Kemp to Reagan, with about two dozen other signatures, including those of Teller and Jastrow, October 1, 1986, SDI Research Files, Box 2, Folder: SDI (ABMT) Correspondence Docs, NSArchive. 70. George C. Wilson, “Reagan May Pick an SDI System Soon,” Washington Post, January 14, 1987, A10. 71. Kampelman later told interviewers Strober and Strober, Reagan: The Man and His Presidency, 1998, 238: “Cap felt a need to deploy . . . . What I don’t know. I remember him saying to the President . . . ‘we’ll be ready in six months, Mr. President.’ I knew that was nonsense.” 72. Shultz wrote the following in his memoir, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 872: “Weinberger’s zeal for SDI, which far surpassed our present ability to deploy, had needlessly stirred up a potentially devastating resistance to the entire SDI program.” 73. Gore, “Beware of Phase 1 of SDI,” New York Times, February 1, 1987, E25. 74. See, for example, Robert E. Hunter, director of European studies at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Weinberger Pulls a Fast One,” Christian Science Monitor, February 1, 1987, 5. 75. For a transcript of the Warnke press conference, see SDI Research Files, Box 54, Folder: SDI/ABM Federal Newsletter, NSArchive. 76. Dusko Doder and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Shultz Accepts Broad View of ABM Treaty,” Washington Post, February 9, 1987, A1, 17. 77. A copy of Nunn’s letter to Reagan is in SDI Research Files, Box 2, Folder: SDI/ ABMT Correspondence Docs, NSArchive. Representatives Fascell and William Broomfield (R-MI), chairman and ranking minority member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HFAC), respectively, sent the president a similar, but somewhat more restrained letter, dated February 3, 1987; a copy is in SDI Research Files, Box 2, Folder: SDI/ABMT Correspondence Docs, NSArchive. Reagan apparently became frustrated with Nunn’s position on SDI, and described him as “a highly over rated Sen.” For his comment, see Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 589. 78. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Nunn Takes Strict View on ABM,” Washington Post, February 9, 1987, A1; and Dusko Doder, “Nunn Again Hits ABM Pact Shift,” Washington Post, March 13, 1987, A35. For text of Nunn’s speeches, see Congressional Record, Senate, March 12, 1987, 5582-87. Evidently, Sofaer never forgave Nunn and several of Nunn’s colleagues for attacking him “most vociferously,” and had only derisive things to say about them; see his interview with Strober and Strober, in Reagan: The Man and His Presidency, 1998, 238-39.

182

Chapter 5

79. See Don Oberdorfer, “Sofaer Disavows Portion of ABM Pact Stand,” Washington Post, March 27, 1987, A22, and Helen Dewar, “Hill ‘Star Wars’ Debate Escalates,” Washington Post, April 13, 1987, A8. 80. “Statement by Former Secretaries of Defense on the ABM Treaty,” March 9, 1987; a copy is in SDI Research Files, Box 2, Folder: ABMT Correspondence, NSArchive. The signatories included Harold Brown, Clark M. Clifford, Melvin R. Laird, Robert S. McNamara, Elliott, L. Richardson, and James R. Schlesinger. 81. Brief by Abram Chayes, Ernest A. Gross, Leonard C. Meeker, and Roberts B. Owen, March 26, 1987, SDI Research Files, Box 4, Folder: 1987 SFR/Judiciary Hearing, NSArchive. For Chayes’s extended views, see his article, “The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative,” Pace Law Review, 1985, 735-48. For the referenced hearings, known as the Pell/Biden hearings, see Joint Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Judiciary Committee, The ABM Treaty and the Constitution, March 11, 26, and April 29, 1987, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987). 82. Smith, Graybeal, and Allison testified during the Joint SFRC and Judiciary Committee (Pell/Biden) hearings: Allison on March 11 (pp. 5-26); Smith on March 26 (pp. 170-71 and 480-83); and Graybeal on April 29 (pp. 202-25). 83. A transcript of Shultz’s interview is in SDI Research Files, Box 4, Folder: SDI/ ABM Federal Newswire, NSArchive. For press reaction to the interview, see Dusko Doder and R. Jeffrey Smith, “Shultz Accepts Broad View of the ABM Treaty,” Washington Post, February 9, 1987, A1, 17. 84. The “cost-effective-at-the-margin” criterion was aimed at ensuring that any deployed defensive system would create powerful incentives on an adversary’s part not to respond with new offensive arms, since those arms would cost more than the additional defensive capability needed to defeat them. 85. A transcript of Weinberger’s BBC interview is in SDI Research Files, Box 4, Folder: SDI/ABM Federal Newswire, NSArchive. 86. “Calming the SDI Storm,” Washington Post, February 10, 1987, A20. 87. “Senator Nunn and the ABM Treaty,” Washington Post, March 15, 1987, C6. 88. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Nunn Takes Strict View on ABM,” Washington Post, March 10, 1987, A1. 89. Letter from Sofaer to Nunn, March 9, 1987, SDI Research Files, Box 2, Folder: SDI/ABMT Correspondence Docs, NSArchive. On Sofaer’s failure to clear the letter, see Walter Pincus, “Administration Upset by Adviser’s ABM Letter,” Washington Post, March 17, 1987, A4. According to Robert S. Greenberger’s article, “State Department Counsel, Sofaer, Draws Fire for ‘Politically Motivated’ View of ‘72 ABM Pact,” published in the Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1987, 54, several staff members in Sofaer’s office wore yellow stickers reading: “I am not a young lawyer.” 90. A transcript of Abrahamson’s testimony on March 19, 1987, is in SDI Research Files, Box 1, Folder: 1987, NSArchive. See also Tim Carrington and Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “Pentagon Slows Its Push for a More Lax Interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1987, 4. 91. The APS panel, or study group, was co-chaired by Nicholas Bloembergen, a Harvard University physicist who won a Nobel Prize for laser research and C. K. N. Patel, a laser inventor and executive director of research at AT&T Bell Laboratories. It comprised fifteen members drawn from academia, corporate and independent research institutes, and government laboratories. 92. For text of this technical report, see “Report to the American Physical Society of the Study Group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons,” in Reviews of Modern Physics, 59:3 (July 1987), Part 2, S1-S201; it can also be accessed on the APS’s website at http://rmp.aps.org/pdf/RMP/v59/pS1_1. For laymen the report has a useful “Executive Summary and Major Conclusions,” at S9-S16. The APS had submitted its report to SDIO in September 1986, but it took SDIO seven months to purge it of classified information for public release.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

183

93. SDIO’s statement is attached to a memorandum from H. Allen Holmes, director of State’s PM Bureau, to Shultz, April 27, 1987, Incoming FOIAs Collection, Box 13, Folder: SDI, NSArchive. 94. For press coverage of these events, see Phillip M. Boffey, “Physicists Express “Star Wars’ Doubt: Long Delays Seen,” New York Times, April 23, 1987, 1; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Early Deployment Unfeasible, Experts Say,” Washington Post, April 24, 1987, A16; David E. Sanger, “Missile Defense: New Turn in Debate,” New York Times, April 24, A8; and Smith, “‘Broad’ ABM Pact is Justified, Sofaer Asserts,” Washington Post, May 1, 1987, A4. 95. See, for example, Daniel S. Greenberg, “Reagan’s faith in a pet project keeps SDI alive,” Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1987, 21. 96. The Issue Brief was a White House press release attached to a packet of materials sent out to media editors, July 21, 1986; a copy is in SDI Research Files, Box 2, Folder: White House Press Releases, NSArchive. 97. “Gauging the American Public’s Attitudes towards SDI From National Polls,” paper prepared by Alvin Richman, senior public opinion analyst, Department of State, for delivery at the meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, April 15-18, 1987; a copy is in SDI Research Files, Box 2, Folder: Chronologies, NSArchive. 98. See Thomas W. Graham and Bernard M. Kramer, “The Polls: ABM and Star Wars: Attitudes toward Nuclear Defense, 1945-1985,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 1986, 125-34, who earlier had reached conclusions similar to Richman’s. Graham and Kramer found, inter alia, that when the choice for respondents was between SDI and disarmament (the cheaper alternative), there was substantial downward impact on support for SDI, and that a substantial majority favored the idea of negotiating limitations on Star Wars with the Soviets. 99. For a convenient and useful summary of congressional funding for SDI, see the United Nations University website at archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu38ne /uu38ne0c.htm. To follow press reporting on the issue, see the following articles in the Chicago Tribune, whose editors seemed to be particularly concerned about what they regarded as unnecessarily high levels of SDI funding: Dorothy Collin, “Reagan wins in ‘Star Wars’ votes,” Chicago Tribune, June 5, 1985, 3; Collin, “Senate cuts defense funding, redirects ‘Star Wars’ course,” Chicago Tribune, August 10, 1986, 3; Daniel S. Greenberg, “Reagan’s faith in a pet project keeps SDI alive,” Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1987, 21; and Thom Shanker, “‘Star Wars’ Director Resigns,” Chicago Tribune, September 28, 1988, 17. Francis Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 2000, 372-73 and 376-78, offers interesting comments on congressional debates over SDI funding. 100. For the Caucus’s position on SDI, see “Strategic Defense—Strategic Choices.” Staff Report on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Democratic Caucus of the U.S. House of Representatives, May 1988, accessible at www.bits.de/NRANEU/BMD/documents /strategic%20choices.PDF. The report was prepared under the auspices of the Caucus’s Task Force on the Strategic Defense Initiative, chaired by Representatives Charles E. Bennett (FL) and Vic Fazio (CA). 101. For text of the letter, with list of signatories, dated May 22, 1986, and remarks by Senator Johnston, see “Star Wars Letter of Concern,” Congressional Record, Senate, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 17, 1986, 14184-86. A second letter, dated June 2, 1986, indicating that the original list of forty-six senators was augmented by the addition of Senators Bill Bradley and Orin Hatch, is also included. For a press account, see “46 Senators Demand Big ‘Star War’s Cuts,” Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1986, D15. 102. Republicans in the Senate failed to kill the so-called Nunn-Levin Amendment; however, the issue was compromised during the budget reconciliation process, during which the Senate agreed that SDI testing would remain within the bounds of the narrow reading of the ABM Treaty for at least another year, though it was also agreed that the defense bill’s language would avoid an explicit endorsement of the narrow ABM interpretation. President Reagan had threatened a veto, but he did not exercise it, most likely because he did not want a messy veto battle as a new U.S.-Soviet

184

Chapter 5

summit was approaching. See Peter Grier, “Reagan agrees to narrow reading of ABM Treaty—for now,” Christian Science Monitor, November 19, 1987, 6; and United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989: Report With Additional and Minority Views, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Report 100-57, May 8, 1987, 225-26. 103. In the FY 1989 defense budget round, Reagan tried to forestall what he considered the “gutting” of the administration’s request for SDI funding. On May 4, 1988, he sent a letter to House minority leader Robert H. (“Bob”) Michel (R-IL) protesting against efforts in the House to cut SDI funding. In early August, he delivered a Saturday national radio address, denouncing Congress’s defense bill as “an all but open attempt to block our Strategic Defense Initiative” and an effort to “handcuff” him in his arms reductions negotiations with the Soviets, thereby giving them a “unilateral concession” that “could set back all the progress we’ve made on the arms reduction front.” Although Frank Carlucci, the defense secretary and Colin Powell, the NSC adviser, recommended that he accept the budget reconciliation amount of $4.1 billion, he took Ed Meese’s advice instead and vetoed the bill. Eventually, after another round of bargaining, Carlucci and congressional leaders agreed to retain the $4.1 billion level of spending for SDI in the vetoed bill, but to drop the spending restrictions Congress had placed on the space-based, anti-missile interceptor program. To follow these events, see entries for May 4 and August 1, 1988, Brinkley (ed.), The Reagan Diaries, 2007, 604, 635; Reagan’s “Radio Address to the Nation on the Veto of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989,” August 6, 1988, Public Papers, 1988-1989, II, 1034-35; John H. Cushman Jr., “House Votes to Cut Spending on Anti-Missile Plan,” New York Times, May 5, 1988, A21, which quotes at length Reagan’s letter to Michel; and Carlucci’s letter to Representative Dickinson, May 4, 1988, read into the Congressional Record, House, May 4, 1988, 9828-29. 104. SDI research contracts were let through the Innovative Science and Technology (IST) office, a separate SDIO agency. For information on the corporate and university contractors, see “Groans of Academe,” The Economist, 301: 7472 (November 15, 1986), 36-37. 105. See, for example, the testimony of Bethe and Garwin before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5167, Department of Defense Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 4, March 20, 1984, 1124-25. They had no particular problem with annual funding for SDI research at a level between $1 and $1.5 billion. 106. David Shribman, “Kemp Joins GOP Race for Presidency, Vows to Make It Star Wars Referendum,” Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1987, 7. 107. For text of the 1988 Republican Party Platform, see “Political Party Platforms,” The American Presidency Project, accessible at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index .php?pid=25846. 108. For the fate of SDI under the Bush administration, see Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 2000, 480-90.

SIX Grenada The Fury That Wasn’t so Urgent

While Grenada was under the autocratic control of Sir Eric Gairy and his so-called “Mongoose Squad,” that tiny island in the eastern Caribbean, famous for its white-sand beaches and the export of nutmeg and other spices, was of little consequence to the United States. When a bloodless internal coup led by the young and charismatic Maurice Bishop, head of the New Jewel Movement (NJM), deposed Gairy in March 1979, the normally placid political atmosphere on the island began to change and Grenada moved perceptibly onto the United States’ radar screen. 1 Bishop proclaimed himself prime minister and instituted a number of progressive social and economic reforms by fiat. Although some claimed that he had set up a Marxist government, Bishop denied it and insisted that he was committed to an independent and non-aligned foreign policy. By that time, the U.S. Department of State was already tracking “five wellknown international [Soviet] front organizations” which, according to State’s intelligence analysts, had set up local affiliates on the island and whose evolving activities suggested that “Moscow hopes to use its Grenada foothold for future front activities in the Caribbean.” Not only did those fronts give the Bishop regime “international standing,” wrote the analysts, they promoted a “favorable Soviet image in the Caribbean” and influenced public opinion there against the United States. 2 Early on, Bishop made public statements about U.S. “imperialism” in the Caribbean, the threat of an imminent U.S. invasion of Grenada and his aim to eliminate the “inherently exploitive” political system on the impoverished island and to build instead a “post-colonial society.” 3 He developed friendly ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union, inviting advisers from those countries to help rebuild the economy of Grenada, as well as with other east185

186

Chapter 6

ern and western European and Latin American countries, actions which endeared him to Grenadian youth, but not to the United States. Perhaps Bishop’s greatest mistake vis-á-vis the United States was his failure to deliver in any visible way on his public promise to erect a constitutional society free from corruption and intimidation; instead, he failed to hold elections promptly, banned all political parties except the NJM and imposed restraints on the press. Tension between Bishop and the Reagan administration grew during the years from 1981 through mid-1983. 4 On one occasion, Bishop publicly criticized Reagan as a “Hollywood cowboy” 5 and on another called him a “fascist.” 6 Several times he charged that the United States had intentions to destabilize Grenada as a prelude to intervention in the island’s affairs. He also ridiculed Reagan’s Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which the president formally unveiled in a major address to the Organization of American States (OAS) on February 24, 1982, 7 as “chicken feed” and an “insult” that is “only aimed at achieving military interests.” 8 On his part, Reagan was predisposed to regard Bishop as a Soviet-Cuban lackey who was exceedingly antagonistic to the United States, engaged in protoCommunist activities such as establishing free medical and dental clinics on the island staffed by Cuban doctors and who had allowed Grenada to become an entry point for Soviet-Cuban infiltration in the Caribbean and Central America. In his CBI address to the OAS in February 1982, he referred to “the tightening grip of the totalitarian left in Grenada and Nicaragua.” 9 The following April, in remarks to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) leaders in Barbados, he alleged that Grenada “now bears the Soviet and Cuban trademark which means that it will attempt to spread the [Communist] virus among its neighbors.” When Reagan delivered his so-called “Star Wars” speech on March 23, 1983, he displayed an aerial photograph of Grenada’s airfield construction and, in a transparent effort to cue the TV audience to perceive a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, stated: “The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada can only be seen as power projection into the region.” 10 In June 1983, Bishop traveled to Washington, DC, in an apparent effort to boost the NJM’s image, perhaps in the hope of achieving initial steps toward improving U.S.-Grenadian relations, as a prelude to requesting financial assistance. He met with members of the Congressional Black Caucus, led by Representative Ron Dellums (D-CA); TransAfrica, an advocacy organization headed by Randall Robinson, which sponsored his trip; several members of Congress 11 and a variety of other groups to explain his political and socio-economic program for the island. Adopting a somewhat conciliatory tone, but defending Grenada’s relationship with Cuba, he announced the formation of a commission to write a new constitution for Grenada. Unfortunately for Bishop, the Reagan administration was at the time tightening both political and economic pressure on Grenada in an effort to nudge him away from his strident anti-U.S.

Grenada

187

rhetoric and his attachment to the Soviet Union and Cuba, while prodding him toward a more democratic posture. Although he was snubbed by the president, after much bureaucratic toing and froing, a reluctant administration finally granted him a forty-minute session on June 7, with William P. Clark, the national security adviser, and Kenneth Dam, the deputy secretary of state. Other NSC and State Department officials also attended the meeting. Although there was a frank exchange of views, Bishop conceded little on the issue of Grenada’s ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union or the NJM’s anti-U.S. rhetoric. His proposals for an exchange of ambassadors within a year and the establishment of a joint U.S.-Grenada commission to review disputed issues between the two countries fell on deaf ears. 12 In fact, in late July, Reagan secretly authorized enhanced U.S. military activities and exercises in the Central American and Caribbean region, specifically including the waters around Grenada. 13 In early October, citing Grenada’s “increasingly closer ties to Cuba,” the “possible use of the island as a base for subversion,” and its potential threat to the oil sea lanes in the Caribbean, he authorized increased security assistance to the member countries of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) to enable them to respond to “emergencies on other islands.” 14 What eventually would have happened to the U.S.-Grenada relationship had Bishop lived cannot be known, because he was overthrown in another coup on October 12, 1983, the result of an intense ideological and personal rivalry within the NJM between Bishop and Bernard Coard. Bishop, who Reagan described as “a protégé of Fidel Castro,” was deposed and subsequently placed under house arrest by Coard and his supporters, whom Reagan claimed in turn were “more radical and more devoted to Castro’s Cuba than he [Bishop] had been.” 15 His arrest was followed by large street demonstrations in various areas of the island, and one group managed to free him from house arrest and either led him or followed him to army headquarters at Fort Rupert, the People’s Revolutionary Army’s (PRA’s) headquarters, where he was joined by a small loyal military force. Fighting erupted and a number of civilians were killed. Coard’s followers then captured Bishop and seven others, including three cabinet ministers, and they were executed by an army firing squad at Fort Rupert on October 19. After Bishop’s death, the Grenadian army, led by General Hudson Austin, established a sixteen-member military council, the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), to run the government and issued a twent-four-hour shoot-on-sight curfew. 16 Local rumors were rife that Coard was pulling the strings behind Austin and the army. In the wake of Bishop’s assassination, rumors also began to spread, both in the island countries of the eastern Caribbean and in Washington, that the Soviet-Cuban nexus was responsible for urging Coard to take down Bishop, because having a Soviet-style Marxist in

188

Chapter 6

power better served their geo-political purposes, both in the Caribbean and in the Western Hemisphere generally. George Shultz, the secretary of state, however, publicly denied the rumors of Cuban involvement, stating that the United States did not “have any direct evidence” that Cuba or the Soviet Union were behind the coup, 17 which in fact Fidel Castro had publicly and quickly denounced. 18 The deteriorating political situation in Grenada galvanized the Reagan administration’s national security planning process and led to the administration’s decision to establish a news “blackout” concerning unfolding events on the island. 19 On October 19, the U.S. ambassador in Bridgetown, Barbados, Milan Bish, sent a classified cable to the State Department reporting that there appeared to be “imminent danger to U.S. citizens resident on Grenada” and recommended the United States should “be prepared to conduct an emergency evacuation” of those citizens. 20 On October 21, Reagan secretly ordered naval and marine units to the vicinity of Grenada in preparation to forestall further radicalization of Grenadian society and Cuban/Soviet intervention, to take all “prudent measures” to protect the lives and safety of American citizens and to consult with allies to determine the level of support for military action to “restore order” on the island. 21 Two days later, terrorists using a TNTladen truck, drove it into the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Marines, an event that not only confirmed U.S. officials’ belief in the need for a news blackout, but made maintaining it easier, because it temporarily shifted public attention away from the events transpiring in Grenada. At the same time, the attack in Lebanon increased the administration’s urgency to take action in Grenada. 22 That same day, October 23, Reagan signed another secret NSDD, ordering military action against Grenada, in what he later claimed was a response to a formal request from the OECS. That directive also noted that the Soviet Union and Cuba would be informed of the multilateral force’s actions “at an appropriate time,” but that in the meanwhile, appropriate cover and deception methods would be employed “to mislead the Grenadian regime and the Cubans concerning our true intentions.” 23 The assault on Grenada, which the administration codenamed “Operation Urgent Fury,” and would later publicly describe as a “rescue mission,” 24 actually commenced on October 25, much to the surprise of many members of Congress, the press, and the national leaders of other countries. 25 The most glaring question that arises with respect to the administration’s Grenada decision is whether there were viable alternatives to the military/naval invasion option. There were a number of non-military options—bilateral or multilateral negotiations, intervention by the OAS and/or the UN, or an appeal to the International Red Cross (IRC) to dispatch a crisis unit to monitor the safety of all foreign citizens on the island. Certainly the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 constituted a vastly more dangerous situation for the United States and the world than anything that existed on

Grenada

189

Grenada, but the Kennedy administration was committed to negotiating a peaceful resolution of that crisis. Grenada, however, was not Cuba. On the Cold War international scale it was low hanging fruit that dangled temptingly before the eyes of the anti-communist hardliners in the Reagan administration. Careful searching by many scholars of the available documentary record on Grenada indicates that the Reagan administration made no serious effort to consider or to implement any of the possible non-military alternatives. In fact, Reagan and his chief national security advisers either ignored them or actively discouraged them. For example, they chose to ignore public statements by the Cuban government and the RMC that American citizens on the island were safe and would be protected. They refused to respond to diplomatic notes from Cuba until after the invasion was under way. They made no vigorous effort to charter commercial cruise ships or airlines to evacuate American citizens. They ignored both the OAS and the UN, and showed no disposition to arrange promptly for peaceful intervention by the IRC, the OAS, or the UN to monitor the safety of all foreign citizens on the island. The Grenada policy track was unidirectional—it converted the last policy resort of military invasion into the first resort of political necessity. The U.S. invasion of Grenada was unlike the other issues analyzed in this study. It was not an evolving public issue up for debate, for which the administration sought congressional, media, and public support, but rather a fait accompli before anyone outside the inner circle of the senior national security policy makers had an opportunity to respond to it. In that public communication vacuum, the administration had an enormous advantage. It was able to proceed without having to seek congressional or public support for its decision. On October 25, the day of the invasion, the president, in the company of Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, publicly announced to the press corps in the White House briefing room the “deployment” of U.S. military forces in Grenada, and informed Congress by letter as well. 26 At this point in the drama, the administration’s public justification for the invasion involved two basic reasons: (1) to protect the lives of the one thousand or so American citizens on the island, about eight hundred of which were students at the St. George’s University Medical School; and (2) to respond to a request from the OECS, the member countries of which claimed they felt threatened by the political chaos in Grenada and wanted the restoration of order there. Two days later, however, in his national TV address to the American people to justify the intervention, the president linked the recent events in Lebanon and Grenada, declaring that Moscow had “assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries,” thereby shifting the drama from a local affair into an East-West Cold War confrontation. 27 In addition to his patriotic flourishes and highly emotional anecdotes, the president now offered three additional reasons for the presence of American forces in Grenada: (3) to prevent a repetition of the “nightmare” of the

190

Chapter 6

Iran hostage crisis which “must never be repeated”; (4) to neutralize the Soviet-Cuban colony there, which was allegedly being “readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy”; and (5) to prevent Moscow from abetting violence and terrorism in an area of “strategic importance” to the United States, 28 no doubt a thinly veiled reference to the United States’ historic commitment to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. The charges contained in the president’s October 25 and 27 speeches were echoed by senior administration officials in numerous public events between October 25 and November 4, the day after hostilities were declared ended. They all stuck to the script, with its core allegation that Grenada constituted a “threat” to the peace and security of the Central American and Caribbean region. No matter how many times the word “threat” was repeated it was always either in generalized terms or as a potentiality. There was never, as far as the available record shows, an attempt to specify exactly against whom the threat was aimed, who the responsible party was for implementing it, and at what point the threat had evolved from a potentiality to an actuality. Official speakers referred frequently, for example, to Grenada’s massive arms buildup, which they claimed was vastly disproportionate to its legitimate defense needs. Aside from the question of how one country could accurately judge the defense needs of another, the accumulation of defensive arms by Grenada, a country without an army or a navy, in no way proved external subversive intent. Similarly, close ties between Grenada and Cuba was scarcely definitive proof that Grenada was committed to abetting violence and terrorism in the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps the problem was, as Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga said, that “revolution breeds revolution,” a claim that U.S. officials seemed to agree with. However, that “domino effect” argument was as implausible and discredited in the 1980s as it was in the 1970s. In short, there was no real proof of Grenada’s alleged subversive or terroristic intent to justify a pre-emptive military strike against that country. 29 Editorial reaction in major newspapers to the president’s address and the invasion ran along fairly predictable lines. Papers like the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Baltimore Sun were generally critical, while the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times were largely commendatory. The Washington Post noted its “relief” that American civilians on the island were safe. However, it also stated that its initial “misgivings” about the invasion had “deepened,” because the “United States has trampled on non-intervention, the doctrine that is the sine qua non of hemispheric relations,” which would make it more difficult for the administration to persuade the democratic Contadora 30 nations to support his Central America policy. 31 In a follow-up editorial three days later, after the administration had announced the capture of warehouses “full of arms,” the Post’s editors stated that they found it “powerfully disturb-

Grenada

191

ing” that the administration reached for findings to support its accusations against Moscow “that came to light after [italics in the source text] the intervention to justify the decision to go in.” 32 The editors of the Baltimore Sun criticized the president for his “grandiose vision” of the United States’ global security mission, contending that if Moscow “can range worldwide, creating conflicts that are fought out between its [italics in the source text] surrogates and our [italics in the source text] soldiers, then it has an opportunity to involve this country in dozens of places of its own choosing,” and that rather than trying to play the world’s policeman, what “is needed is a sense of careful selectivity.” 33 The reaction of the New York Times was even harsher. On the day before the president’s speech, its editors stated that the president’s asserted threat to American lives on Grenada was merely “hypothetical,” and that a “frustrated Administration acted not because it is right or necessary, only desirable and doable.” 34 The day following the speech, they stated that if there was a case for invading Grenada the president was “clumsy” in making it. The evacuation of the American students, they believed, “could have been accomplished by lesser means,” the legal justifications used “were a sham,” and whatever the gain from the action, the cost was “the loss of the moral high ground,” and the fact that “America has defined its duty and security in ways that make it look like a paranoid bully.” 35 On the other hand, the editors of both the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times had nothing but praise for the president’s speech and scorn for his critics. For the Wall Street Journal, the most important lessons of Grenada were that it was “once again known that the U.S. is willing to use its military as an instrument of policy,” and that the most effective way to deal with the so-called Vietnam syndrome “was to unashamedly repudiate it.” 36 The Washington Times was even more truculent: its editors insisted that the president’s decision to invade Grenada was justified, because “one has to have been blind for four decades to believe anything but force discourages Moscow from imposing puppet dictatorships.” They also found, in a somewhat ironical twist, the president’s speech “reminiscent of those eloquent summons to national pride and purpose voiced by John F. Kennedy two decades ago.” 37 Some newspapers, such as the Chicago Tribune and the Christian Science Monitor, took a more middle-of-the-road position. The Tribune’s editors allowed that there were both good and bad reasons for the use of American forces to invade Grenada. On the one hand, they argued that any actual Soviet meddling in the Caribbean, which is “clearly within the U.S. sphere of influence” would be “an invitation to legitimate and necessary American action to counter it,” but on the other they stated unequivocally that “It doesn’t show much resolve to take over as soft a target as Grenada, and risking American lives to serve a transient political purpose,” which “would be an act of shocking, cynical irresponsibility.” 38 The Monitor’s editors stated that on the plus side, they believed that the

192

Chapter 6

invasion would satisfy Reagan’s conservative friends at home, who would accept his accusations against the Cubans and Soviets as a convincing justification for the invasion, but on the minus side, they agreed with the Washington Post and the New York Times that the UN Security Council’s condemnation of the invasion projected an “image of tarnished moral superiority for America.” 39 While editorial writers plied their trade, both print and electronic media journalists encountered serious obstacles in reporting on the Grenada episode. The administration’s news blackout during the planning phase of the Grenada action, its refusal to allow media access to the island during the invasion itself, and the tight restrictions it thereafter placed on the media gave rise to accusations of “news management,” “news orchestration,” and infringement on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. 40 From the outset of the Grenada drama, the media became increasingly disturbed and angry about what they perceived as the administration’s effort to keep reporters and the American people in the dark. 41 The fracas began as early as October 24, when Bill Plante, CBS White House correspondent, asked White House spokesman Larry Speakes if an invasion of Grenada was “imminent,” and Speakes replied that was “preposterous,” a statement for which he later apologized. It escalated two days later at a Pentagon press briefing by the secretary of defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, and JCS chairman John W. Vessey Jr., when Weinberger said that field commanders had decided reporters should be barred from the battlefield areas for their own safety. When he was queried about that, he responded: “I wouldn’t ever dream of overriding the commander’s decision that he was not able to guarantee any kind of safety for anyone.” Weinberger’s statement incensed reporters and news managers alike, primarily because the safety of reporters had never been an issue before. That same day, friction between the White House and the media exploded at the daily White House press briefing, when a shouting match occurred between ABC’s Sam Donaldson, who “angrily” protested the news blackout and a “furious” Speakes, who called Donaldson “venomous.” 42 In due course, many prominent TV news anchors and newscasters representing the three major TV networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC), syndicated columnists, and news executives were claiming that the reasons offered by the military authorities for excluding the press from Grenada—the need for surprise, safety of the reporters, and the distractions they would pose during combat—were “transparently false” and that there was a “calculated policy” of keeping the press out. 43 Ironically, once the administration had the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) shut down ham radio operators from transmitting out of Grenada and other near-by islands, the only option, other than the official version of the situation on Grenada, was via Radio Free Havana, for anyone with a short-wave radio. 44 Perhaps Henry E. Catto Jr., who had served as deputy secretary of defense for public affairs in the Reagan

Grenada

193

administration from March 1981 to September 1983, put the matter best when he observed: “Unhappily, the average Joint Chiefs of Staff member has all the public relations sense of Attila the Hun,” and “that the costs of denying access outweigh any benefits.” Catto observed that the military should “be our country’s defenders, not the filters of our information.” 45 Reaction to the Grenada invasion by intellectuals and academics divided along liberal and conservative lines. The views of Arthur G. Schlesinger Jr. and Irving Kristol represent polar opposites on the political spectrum. Schlesinger contended that the U.S. military action constituted a “sneak attack” on a “pathetic island,” launched without congressional authorization to deal with an internal situation that was nothing more than a “local squabble” between two sets of “Marxist thugs.” He regarded all of the administration’s rationales for the invasion as either “implausible” or a “post-invasion pretext.” No one in his “right senses,” he wrote, could claim that the national security of the United States “was at stake in Grenada,” and none of the eighty or so rescue operations in U.S. history had ever required “the invasion of a country, the overthrow of its government and the military occupation of its soil.” In short, he contended that Reagan was motivated by “ideological obsessions and hypothetical fears,” and wanted to demonstrate American power with impunity and his own anti-communist credentials. In the process, he acted as if he were a rule unto himself and ignored the fact that “upholding the rule of due process in the world,” serves America’s interests best. 46 On his part, Kristol strongly criticized the moral objections against the invasion of Grenada expressed in the “liberal media” and by “leftwing Democrats” who believed that “no conservative Republican administration can conduct a moral foreign policy.” From his perspective, the United States had “the moral right but also the moral duty” to encourage nations with “morally illegitimate governments to change them,” and to intervene in order to help them achieve that goal. 47 Harvard professor of government Stanley Hoffman, author of Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics (1981), aligned with Schlesinger, arguing that a Grenada-like intervention “is justifiable only if there is strong evidence that the regime in power has begun actively to subvert its neighbors,” while Richard Pipes, a history professor at Harvard and former Reagan administration official, advocated more such actions and criticized as “ridiculous” the notion that America “cannot use force short of an absolute Pearl Harbor-like attack.” 48 In the literature on the intervention in Grenada, much has been made of the American public’s support for Reagan’s October 27 speech and the invasion. However, one has to read the public opinion polls on those issues carefully and note the nuances of the polling results. According to three national polls taken shortly before and after the president’s speech, by CBS/New York Times (October 26-27), ABC/Washington Post (October 26, 28) and Gallup/Newsweek (October 26-27), public support for sending

194

Chapter 6

U.S. troops to Grenada rose appreciably from about a 5-to-4 plurality before the speech to about a two-to-one majority after the speech. However, it should be noted that the post-speech polls were taken on the heels of the highly publicized evacuation of the American medical students from the island, and therefore distinguishing the speech’s influence from that of other events was no doubt exceedingly difficult. Moreover, despite the concern expressed in editorials and press stories concerning Grenada as a harbinger for Nicaragua, there was no spill-over to Nicaragua. The polls clearly confirmed the fact that the public remained wary of military intervention abroad generally and in Nicaragua specifically. With respect to Nicaragua, for example, a CBS News/New York Times poll taken in June 1983, had found a 53 to 23 percent majority opposed helping the contras overthrow “the pro-Soviet government there,” and after the president’s October 27 speech, CBS News/New York Times recorded even higher public opposition (60 to 21 percent) opposed to U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. 49 There was little opportunity for Congress to play an effective consulting role, which was required by the provisions of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, prior to the administration’s decision to intervene in Grenada. 50 Reagan “informed” the leadership of the House and Senate on October 25 that the invasion was under way. No closed or open hearing on the decision to intervene, however, was held until October 27, when Senator Charles H. Percy (R-IL), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), at the request of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD), called a hearing and invited Kenneth W. Dam as a witness. By that time, U.S. forces on the island were mopping up military activities, and Dam rehearsed the administration’s basic narrative, evading a number of the questions put to him. Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), the ranking minority member of the SFRC, opened the questioning by expressing his concern over whether the American citizens on the island were really in danger, whether diplomatic alternatives to military intervention had been explored and what the impact of the intervention might be on the U.S. image abroad. Specifically, he asked Dam why the administration had not consulted with Congress on the decision to intervene in Grenada, rather than merely informing it. Dam replied that was “a question of interpretation.” When Pell asked him if he considered “the time clock running now under the War Powers Resolution,” which required U.S. troops to be withdrawn within sixty days, Dam circled around the question until Pell insisted on an answer. Dam finally capitulated: “All I can say is that the administration does not have a view to express on that position and, therefore I cannot give you an administration answer.” Senator Sarbanes asked him why American journalists were banned from the island during the initial days of the invasion; Dam replied that several news organizations had expressed concern about the safety of their reporters. Sarbanes asked Dam to identify those news organizations, to

Grenada

195

which Dam replied: “I really am not certain. I do not know the facts.” Dam then punted the whole issue to the military authorities. He also dodged when Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD), asked him whether there were any American companies involved in building the new airport at Point Salines, and when Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) asked him if the group that overthrew Bishop were demonstrably “Marxists.” 51 Perhaps the sharpest exchanges between Dam and the senators involved the OECS request for the United States to intervene in Grenada to restore order. Senator Pell, for example, pointed out that the clear intention of the OECS treaty was to defend against external aggression and that unanimous consent of the parties (including the vote of Grenada) was required to activate the relevant collective security provision in the treaty. Therefore, he queried, how we could justify our intervention? In response, Dam stressed the administration’s view that because there was no actual government functioning in Grenada, the treaty requirement for unanimity was voided. To which Pell responded: “the very fact that there was a 24-hour curfew and a shoot-to-kill order could show that there was a government, repugnant and distasteful as it was, in place, or it could not have enforced the law.” Chairman Percy, Senators Nancy L. Kassebaum (R-KS) and Edward Zorinsky (D-NE) were particularly concerned about whether there were timetables for the rapid withdrawal of American troops and elections. Dam was not particularly forthcoming on either issue, which caused a very perturbed Zorinsky to comment that without a timetable for elections “I have really got a low esteem for the State Department.” 52 In a real sense, the SFRC hearing of October 27, along with the initial media response on that date and the immediately succeeding days to the president’s speech, mark the actual beginning of the ex post facto public debate on the Grenada intervention. The hearing and the editorials quoted above anticipated many of the questions about the administration’s rationale for the intervention that critics would raise. The primary issue was whether or not the American citizens on the island, particularly the students at the St. George’s Medical School, were in imminent danger of being taken hostage or otherwise exposed to physical harm. That question of course raises numerous others. First, if American citizens were indeed targeted as hostages, who would have been the likely perpetrators: Austin’s RMC, the Cuban construction workers building the airport, the thirty-five or so Soviet advisers who had formally been invited to the island by the Bishop government, Bishop’s supporters in an act of revenge for the invasion, or some combination of these forces? Second, if there was clear evidence that American citizens, students and retirees, were in mortal danger, why did White House press spokesman Larry Speakes, when repeatedly asked by reporters at a press briefing on October 26, for concrete evidence of a palpable threat, reply that he could not cite any specific threats aimed at American citizens or any overt moves to

196

Chapter 6

make them hostages, 53 and why thereafter did the administration fail to produce evidence of a single case of actual harm to an American citizen as proof of its charge? Third, if any individuals or groups on the island were intent on seizing American citizens as hostages, why did they fail to do so at the most opportune times—the several days that lapsed between the spreading public news in the Caribbean countries of an impending attack (October 21) and the actual invasion (October 25) or preceding the delayed “liberation” of the American medical students at the university’s True Blue and Grand Anse campus areas. Finally, why would anyone on Grenada want to disrupt or endanger the American community there, when the students, retirees, and tourists were responsible for a substantial flow of hard currency earnings into the hands of local businessmen and the treasury of that impoverished island? When the administration’s narrative on the hostage issue is subjected to careful scrutiny, one quickly realizes how remarkably threadbare it was. The administration contended that American citizens, especially the students at the medical school, were in grave danger because the political structure in Grenada was a “floating crap game” and “bloody anarchy” prevailed there. 54 Moreover, their means of leaving the island by airplane or chartered vessels were allegedly foreclosed by the RMC, thereby stranding them and exposing them to “imminent danger.” Given these conditions, administration officials insisted, the students were “concerned,” “anxious,” “panicked” or “frightened to death.” However, the counter facts are substantial. At a meeting in New York of parents of five hundred of the students, many of whom had been in touch with their children in Grenada, learned that only about 10 percent of the students had expressed a desire to leave. The parents decided to send a cable to Reagan informing him that their children were safe and requesting that he not move too quickly or to take any precipitous actions. 55 Contrary to the administration’s denials that the airports were closed, there were in fact several flights out of Grenada on October 24, which included some Americans. Both British and Canadian evacuation flights were arranged with Grenadian authorities, but they were prevented from going forward by other Caribbean governments. Two administrators at the medical school, Dr. Geoffry Bourne, the vice chancellor, and Gary Solin, the bursar, both publicly declared at the time and in retrospect that the students were safe and that an invasion to evacuate them was unnecessary. 56 And on November 2, at a congressional hearing before two subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dam confirmed Larry Speakes’s earlier assessment of the students’ safety. In response to a question from Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY) inquiring whether any Americans on Grenada were “specifically harmed or threatened” between Bishop’s overthrow and the arrival of U.S. forces, Dam replied: “I do not believe that any of them were harmed.” When Solarz asked in a follow-up

Grenada

197

whether any of them had been “specifically threatened,” Dam responded: “I do not have any information to that effect.” 57 On the face of it, the whole “rescue the endangered American citizens” theme in the administration’s narrative was clearly an exercise in threat creation. Officials who echoed the administration’s narrative on the hostage issue ignored the significant difference between the students’ alleged “concern” or “fear” and actual physical threats or harm, and the absolute difference between a potential threat and an actual harmful physical act. In all the “evidence” that the administration produced relating to the potential threat of American citizens being taken hostage, there wasn’t at any time a single demonstrable case of a specific threat of, or actual physical harm to, an American citizen on Grenada, nor was any American citizen taken hostage or even detained. It is likely that the real driving force behind the administration’s assertion of a potential hostage issue was a combination of two things: Reagan’s fear that he would be “Carterized” and have to spend the remainder of his term wearing a hostage albatross around his neck, and confidence that the inflated allegation of a Cuban-Soviet threat to American citizens in America’s Caribbean “sphere of influence” would inspire an emotional “rally-around-the-flag” public response. It appears that at least on the second belief he was quite correct. As several academics, journalists, and commentators have suggested, however, it was more likely that the American citizens on Grenada, particularly the students, had less to fear from the RMC than from the invasion itself. The second major question is an even broader one: did Grenada constitute a palpable national security threat to the United States, the eastern Caribbean, and Central America? The allegation that Grenada, a tiny speck of an island in the eastern Caribbean (113 square miles with a population of about 112,000) that had no air force, navy, or even a merchant marine, and a poorly trained and equipped constabulary/militia force of at most about three thousand men, presented a national security threat to any country is rather ludicrous. However, the Grenadian government itself was not the crux of the problem, irrespective of whether it was under the control of Bishop, Coard, or Austin’s RMC. From the Reagan administration’s perfervid anti-communist perspective, Grenada was merely a prop for Soviet and Cuban communists, a means of facilitating the projection of communist “influence” into the Western Hemisphere. Although there was some confusion in the administration’s public comments about whether the Soviet Union or Cuba was the main culprit in Grenada, officials usually side-stepped that problem by referring to the “Soviet Union and its allies.” In order to prove that a palpable “threat” existed on Grenada, in light of Reagan’s assertion that the “Soviet-Cuban colony” there was “being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy,” administration officials in their preinvasion and immediate post-invasion public remarks exaggerated the

198

Chapter 6

influence of the Soviet advisers on the island; overestimated the number of Cubans there, while blurring the distinctions between Cuban construction workers, technicians, and actual soldiers; and seriously hyperbolized the amount, type, and lethality of the armaments and weapons Bishop had obtained from his allies. 58 In short, because the administration had very little useful intelligence about these matters before the invasion, 59 and in the days immediately following the assault by American troops, the so-called “intelligence gap,” it had to scramble to construct an ex post facto case for this asserted “threat.” A substantial part of the effort to manufacture a “threat case” involved the production of fanciful analyses of Soviet-Cuban intentions about and activities on Grenada. A revealing example of this effort is a memorandum evidently drafted in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) for Shultz in late October 1983, analyzing the strategic importance of Soviet-Cuban activities on the island. According to the unidentified drafter(s) of this memorandum, the Soviet Union and its allies were transforming Grenada into a fortified military base for the purpose of threatening subversion of Venezuela and those islands that controlled access to the Caribbean, which could put them in a position to interdict the sea lanes over which Venezuela shipped its oil, as well as access to the Panama Canal. Moreover, “if Cuba had aircraft based in both Cuba and Grenada,” which could land on the new Grenadian airfield, it “could threaten vessels passing through . . . to the Atlantic.” The new airfield “could also be used by Libyan aircraft to refuel on trips to Nicaragua.” According to the memorandum, the Calivigny Military Facility, located on the southern tip of the island, also presented a security problem, because it was similar in design to Cuban bases in Angola and Nicaragua, “could garrison a unit of battalion size (800-900 men),” and include fortified anti-aircraft sites. Finally, the construction of a 75,000 watt Radio Free Grenada transmitter was also problematic, because it had enough power to reach most of Venezuela and extend to Florida, which presumably gave it useful propaganda value. The memorandum concludes that it was “clear the island was being turned into a fortress, a pro-Soviet military facility anchoring the southern end of the Caribbean as Cuba anchors the northern end.” 60 What was “clear” to the drafter(s) of the memo, however, is not quite so clear to the perspicacious eye. The memo is a classic case of speculative and subjunctive analysis, full of “coulds” and “ifs,” without a single significant qualifier, divergent view, or opposing argument. It was the stark opposite of objective and depoliticized analysis. Without tangible supporting evidence that the results that allegedly “could” occur, would occur, it was essentially an exercise in crystal-ball reading, aimed at “proving” the existence of a non-existent threat and thus serving a foreordained conclusion. The administration made a strenuous effort, however, to buttress the “threat case” by publicizing the role of Cuba in Grenada, the amount of

Grenada

199

armaments and weapons from Soviet-bloc countries found on the island, and the content of written military assistance and other agreements between Grenada and Eastern-bloc countries that it captured during the invasion. American and international journalists, however, who managed to make it to Grenada were underwhelmed by what they found. The “battalions” of well-armed Cuban troops who were supposedly manning heavily fortified anti-aircraft installations at the new airport turned out to be a mirage. There were no Soviet-made MiGs at the airport, no missile sites being built there, no fortified bunkers with four-foot thick walls and no heavy anti-aircraft weapons. Nor had the Grenadian militia been equipped with portable heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles, which would no doubt have inflicted severe damage on U.S. helicopter gunships. Although the administration initially alleged that there were 1,100 Cubans on the island, there were in fact only 784, most of whom were either doctors, technicians, or construction workers. As New York Times reporter Richard J. Meislin noted, many of the Cubans who were being returned to Cuba after the hostilities ended “appeared to be well beyond the age and below the physical condition of soldiers.” 61 Journalists who viewed the contents of the captured warehouses that were supposedly well-stocked with modern, high-grade weapons found little to substantiate Reagan’s charges. Perhaps William McWhirter, a reporter for Time, put it best when he concisely stated that he found the military supplies “more of a hodgepodge of wholesale weaponry than a sophisticated armory.” 62 With respect to the ballyhooed Soviet-bloc arms agreements found on the island, which provided for about $38 billion in future military assistance to Grenada over a five-year period, New York Times reporter Philip Taubman commented that they “did not show in themselves that the island was in danger of being occupied by Cuba.” 63 The administration’s public narrative concerning the alleged SovietCuban-Grenadian security threat hung heavily on the new airport being built at Point Salines and the alleged role of Grenada as a platform for communist subversion in the eastern Caribbean and Central America. In regard to the airport, the administration contended that a nine-thousandfoot runway far exceeded Grenada’s commercial and tourism needs, that it was being built and fortified to serve as a transit or delivery point for huge Soviet and Cuban airplanes, both military and commercial, and that it would therefore facilitate the export of Soviet-Cuban subversion and terrorism throughout the Western Hemisphere. The actual facts, however, indicate that the administration’s narrative had its roots either in faulty intelligence or in the land of make-believe. In the first place, Grenada’s economic viability was heavily based on tourism, and in order to compete effectively with other Caribbean nations, it needed a new airport, with an extended runway. Studies by British, Canadian, and American consultants had all recommended construction of a new airport to promote tourism. Construction planning predated Bishop’s over-

200

Chapter 6

throw of Gairy, and at least a dozen Caribbean nations had airfields with runways that were either comparable or longer. 64 Financing for the airport project was multinational, coming from about a dozen states, including Britain and Canada, private commercial banks in Finland (Metex), and affiliates of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 65 The actual construction project was under the direction of a British firm, Plessy Airports, a component of Plessy Electronics Systems. A Florida-based firm, Layne Dredging Company, headquartered in Hallandale, was a subcontractor for the dredging of the sea inlet over which a part of the new runway was to transit. Contrary to administration claims that the airport was being militarized, and that a “base complex” was being built nearby, the Plessy company headquarters in London publicly confirmed that the “airport . . . was being built to purely civilian specifications.” 66 The blueprints for the airport included no plans for hardened artillery sites, protected fuel dumps, hardened shelters for military aircraft, bunkers or weapons caches. 67 Nor was there anything secret about the airport: it was open to tourists who could freely photograph it, and to students from the near-by medical school campus who used completed sections of the runway for jogging and racing their motor scooters. Moreover, a Canadian firm was planning to build an expensive hotel near the airport when it was completed. Cumulatively, these facts demolish the administration’s claim that the airport was being constructed to serve as a covert Soviet-Cuban military base or to enable Grenadian plans for exporting subversion. In short, the airport was a strictly commercial venture, whose planning and initial construction predated Maurice Bishop’s rise to power. If the Grenadians were not the actual culprit for spreading the communist virus and exporting subversion in the Caribbean and Central America, perhaps it was the Cubans. However, for the Cubans to have played that role, they would presumably have had to control Grenada first. During the congressional hearings on Grenada held during early November before two subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Representative Solarz asked Dam: “What evidence do we have that the Cubans were in fact planning to militarily occupy Grenada?” Dam replied: “I guess I do not know when it was actually going to happen.” To which Solarz responded: “There is a big difference between having a military presence in the country and militarily occupying it. We have a military presence in many nations which we do not occupy militarily.” Later in the course of the hearings, Solarz asked Dam: what could the Cubans specifically “have done in terms of fomenting and spreading subversion in the eastern Caribbean from Grenada that they are not already in a position to do from Cuba itself?” Dam’s reply was quite revealing: with respect to supplying arms, he stated “there is the cover of operating through another country so that theoretically [author’s italics] they may have been able to do it from Cuba. The question is the

Grenada

201

ease with which they could do it.” Was Dam implying that because Grenada was closer to Venezuela than it is to Central America, it would be easier for a Cuban-dominated Grenada to subvert Venezuela than countries in Central America? 68 If this was an example of the administration’s logic, then one would have to ask, as Representative Howard Wolpe (D-MI) did: why did Venezuela oppose the invasion, “given their proximity to Grenada,” to which Dam replied rather lamely: “I am sorry, I am not really able to respond fully to that.” 69 In addition to questions raised by critics about the alleged national security threat in Grenada, there was also a broad effort to rebut the administration’s claims about the legal basis for the invasion. The administration contended that there were three solid legal justifications for using military force in Grenada: (1) a right enjoyed under international law allowing the United States to protect and evacuate threatened American citizens from the island, (2) a formal request from the OECS states to restore order and democracy in Grenada, 70 and (3) a formal appeal from Grenadian Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon delivered via the OECS for assistance in stabilizing the situation in Grenada. In the first place, in order for the administration to have invoked its right under international law, especially in the alleged non-permissive situation it claimed existed on Grenada, it would have had to produce tangible evidence that the safety of American citizens on the island was directly threatened and that they were in “imminent danger.” As we have seen above, however, this was not the case. In the view of many legal scholars, the asserted threat was at best disputable and at worst nonexistent. Moreover, international law requires that less violent remedies should be exercised first and that any armed force should be proportional to what was necessary to accomplish a rescue. Second, with respect to the OECS treaty, the United States was not a signatory to the treaty, the relevant provisions of which applied to external aggression and not internal political affairs. The treaty provisions also required the unanimous vote of the signatories, which were clearly violated by the fact that neither Grenada, Montserrat, nor St. KittsNevis voted for intervention. 71 And finally, the appeal received by the United States from Sir Paul Scoon, which he had no formal authority to issue, was apparently an ex post facto development. As a report released by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British House of Commons in March 1984 concluded, both the timing and the nature of the Scoon appeal “is shrouded in some mystery” and it was the intention of the parties directly involved that “the mystery should not be displaced.” 72 On the evening of November 2, Weinberger informed the president that hostilities on Grenada had ended and Reagan announced that publicly at his White House press conference the following morning, noting that U.S. combat forces would be withdrawn from Grenada within a “few days.” 73 Beyond the initial orgy of self-congratulation over the U.S. victory, it soon became clear that nothing succeeds quite like military success.

202

Chapter 6

An ABC/Washington Post poll taken November 3-7, revealed that public approval of the military operation in Grenada had increased sharply, as its success became evident. Approval increased to 71 percent, up from 53 percent shortly before Reagan’s October 27 speech to the nation and 65 percent shortly afterwards. However, there were some disquieting aspects of the overall results: the same poll showed that, by almost a two-to-one majority (57 to 30 percent), the public believed that Reagan’s handling of foreign affairs increased rather than decreased the chances for war. It also revealed that more Americans believed that the reason for the invasion of Grenada was to “overthrow the Marxist generals” there (41 percent) rather than to “protect Americans” (39 percent). 74 According to a Harris poll, taken November 9-14, the public gave President Reagan a substantial positive rating (56 to 34 percent) for “ordering” the invasion of Grenada. And a Los Angeles Times poll taken roughly about the same time, November 12-17, showed that the public believed by more than a two-to-one majority (59 vs. 25 percent) that U.S. involvement in Grenada was “vital to our national defense,” but it was evenly split on whether the success in Grenada would make the Soviet Union more or less willing to negotiate on nuclear disarmament (21 percent more willing vs. 21 percent less willing). 75 Editorial reaction in major newspapers to the U.S. “victory” in Grenada in the first few weeks of November reflected minimal change in the pro vs. con split during the invasion phase of the drama. The New York Times, for example, continued to be severely critical of the invasion. Its editors dismissed as inadequate the “Orwellian arguments” the administration used to justify its “grave action” and criticized it for not providing “hard evidence” to support its accusations. A great power that wanted “respect for its values as well as its power,” the editors wrote, “would have marshalled its economic and diplomatic might” to contain any real threat, used force as a “desperate last resort” and proved its case for military action “instead of hiding behind transparent pretexts.” 76 The Boston Globe also remained critical of the administration. Its editors criticized the “preposterous bugaboos conjured up by the Administration apologists” to justify the invasion, denied that the weapons captured justified Reagan’s claims about a Soviet-Cuban “military bastion to export terror,” condemned the administration for its “barbaric” treatment of Coard and Austin, who were made to “look like captured savages,” and bombing a civilian mental hospital, killing two dozen patients and staff. 77 The Washington Post, on the other hand, revised its earlier “skeptical” attitude. Its editors wrote that although it was “a bad precedent” for the president to “yield so much authority over the actual operation to the uniformed military,” they concluded that he “made the right decision in Grenada. He redeemed a truly disturbing situation with an economical use of force.” 78 About a week later, however, the Post’s editors urged Reagan “to reduce the American involvement in Grenada” and “to get

Grenada

203

out quickly,” because “liberating Grenada was one thing, playing political police is another.” 79 The Wall Street Journal’s editors put the Grenada invasion and its immediate aftermath in a wider geo-strategic context. They noted the American public’s overwhelming approval of the invasion of Grenada and concluded that it suggested “a U.S. victory against communist expansionism, even a small victory, was what Americans mainly needed to cure themselves of the remaining fears and uncertainties left over from the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.” They also referred to the “irony” of European anti-communist nations assisting Grenada to build its new airport, thereby enabling Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere, and attributed it to the naïveté of the Europeans. 80 In Congress, criticism of the president became much more muted than it had been in October, 81 especially after the findings of a fourteen-member bipartisan (nine Democrats and five Republicans) House delegation fact-finding tour of Grenada in early November were released. 82 The delegation, appointed by Tip O’Neill, the House Speaker, and led by majority whip Thomas S. Foley (D-WA) and minority leader Robert H. Michel (R-IL), included several members, such as Michael D. Barnes (DMD), chairman of the House subcommittee on inter-American affairs, and Don L. Bonker (D-WA), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who were initially critical of Reagan’s decision to invade Grenada. Upon the delegation’s return and the issue of its report, several changed their minds. The difference in view is exemplified by the public exchange between Barnes and Bonker. In an op-ed in the Washington Post, Barnes said that he initially had many “serious questions” about U.S. policy toward Grenada, but that his tour of the island answered all of them to his satisfaction. He now believed that American citizens there were in “serious physical danger,” that the OECS request for assistance in restoring order was “genuine,” that the U.S. bombing of the mental hospital, which many Democrats had decried, was a “genuine accident” and that the whole affair was a “unique experience” that “should not happen again.” 83 In his response to Barnes, Bonker wrote that he also had questions about the U.S. role in Grenada, but he disagreed that the American citizens were in “imminent danger,” because all of the evidence presented to the delegation “disclosed no immediate or direct threat” to them; that our allies in the region had arranged for flights to evacuate American citizens, but that the plans were scuttled by the OECS nations; there were many alternatives to invasion that the administration failed to utilize; and that the airport project was “an essential commercial facility.” In Bonker’s view, Reagan’s decision to invade Grenada was the result of a convergence between his administration and the OECS, both of which were committed to preemptive military action. 84 In short, Barnes came around to accepting the administration’s narrative, and Bonker fully rejected it. However, it took House Speaker O’Neill, a critic of Reagan’s policy a week before the delegation departed Washington to put the icing

204

Chapter 6

on the proverbial cake, when he declared on the day after the delegation returned that the military operation in Grenada “was justified.” 85 The New York Times skewered O’Neill for his flip-flop, 86 no doubt induced in part by his awareness of the public’s support for the president and the forthcoming presidential election. He issued a response in which he attempted to mollify Democratic critics 87 of the invasion: “Grenada must not become a symbol of our approach to international disputes. If this administration tries to ‘follow up’ on Grenada with action elsewhere, it cannot expect help from the House leadership.” 88 As the situation in Grenada slowly returned to normal between early November 1983 and January 1984 and public interest in Grenada began to wane, the Reagan administration made a vigorous effort to maintain the public’s support initially generated by the military victory, and the TV images of American students landing on American soil and bedraggled and wounded Cubans being returned to Cuba. Preliminary actions in what became a wide-ranging “information campaign” actually began in late October when three senior administration officials—Dam, Kirkpatrick, and Eagleburger—appeared on TV news shows to defend the invasion as necessary to rescue American citizens and block the Soviet-Cuban effort to use Grenada as a center for aiding subversion and insurgency in the region. They all claimed, in one way or another, that the documents captured on the island would validate the administration’s charges against Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. 89 The State Department followed up by making public on November 4 some of the captured documents. About a week later, in a complementary action designed to hype the public release of Grenada documents, DOD and State set up a joint display of some of the weapons seized in Grenada at Andrews Air Force base in Washington, which was open to the public and reportedly attracted long lines of visitors. 90 These preliminary “information” efforts soon became more formalized. On November 15, President Reagan signed NSDD 112, authorizing the initial assessment of the captured documents. According to the new NSDD, the captured documents represented a “unique source” that would (1) “add substantially to our detailed understanding of the anatomy of the creation of a Soviet/Cuban third world proxy,” and (2) and “could add to public and allied understanding of this phenomena of Soviet/Cuban foreign policy.” The NSDD also authorized the establishment of an interagency committee under the control of the secretary of state, which subsequently became known as the Interagency Committee for Public Disclosure and Information, to develop plans for the exploitation and public dissemination of the captured documents. 91 Between November 1983 and September 1984, the administration released at least five sets of captured documents and a forty-six-page illustrated white paper entitled Grenada: A Preliminary Report, 92 designed to demonstrate that the captured documents “proved” the administration’s previous ac-

Grenada

205

cusations against the NJM and the alleged Soviet-Cuban-Grenadian nexus. The report, however, essentially restated those accusations, and added a few additional ones, without producing any concrete evidence. The released documents and the Preliminary Report were widely distributed to members of Congress, libraries, educational institutions, foreign policy groups, and the press. 93 To complement the work of the interagency committee, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) produced studies of human rights abuses in Grenada and the NJM’s efforts to undermine religious freedom in the country, both of which were based on analysis of the captured documents and scheduled for public release. 94 The impact of this extensive effort to substantiate the administration’s “threat case” seems to have fizzled rather early. Journalists covering the Grenada story were either unimpressed or unconvinced. The New York Times’ Philip Taubman, for example, wrote that “There is nothing in the documents . . . that specifically indicates that Cuba and the Soviet Union were on the verge of taking over Grenada.” 95 Even CIA director Casey had his doubts. In an interview with Bob Woodward, Casey admitted that the captured documents “were not a real find.” 96 Beginning in late November, the administration also tried to reach an accommodation with the news establishment concerning the treatment of reporters during the Grenada invasion. On November 6, while many journalists and news executives were still fuming about what they perceived as the administration’s efforts to thwart media access to the island, JCS chairman Vessey announced on the NBC News program Meet the Press, that he would create a panel to discuss mutually agreeable rules for media coverage of military actions. He selected a retired major general, Winant Sidle, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs and current director of public relations for the Martin Marietta Corporation, to head the panel. Major news organizations were invited to name representatives to the panel, but all declined, on the grounds that journalists should not serve on a governmental rule-making body. They did agree, however, to send individuals to testify before the panel in hearings held at the National Defense University in Washington. At the beginning of the five-day hearings, held February 6-10, Sidle announced that there was general agreement that “the U.S. media should cover future military operations to the maximum degree possible without jeopardizing military security or endangering soldiers’ lives.” 97 The panel submitted its final report to the Pentagon in April, and publicly released it on August 23. Substantively, the report elided the whole issue of First Amendment rights, said nothing that would alter the concept of military primacy in combat areas and offered no assessment of the news coverage of Grenada. The most important substantive recommendations concerned the establishment of “pools” of reporters who could be ready on short notice to accompany U.S. forces on “contingency operations” and “voluntary compliance” by the media with security guidelines issued by

206

Chapter 6

the military. In a final comment, the panel stated that an adversary relationship between the press and the military was “healthy,” but that “mutual antagonism and distrust are not in the best interests of the media, the military, or the American people.” 98 The panel’s report was only recommendatory and the Pentagon would have to formulate an actual set of ground rules based on the recommendations. After receiving the report, Weinberger announced that he was forming a special panel of unnamed “eminent journalists” to advise him on the best way to meet the Sidle panel’s objectives, which was cold comfort to journalists who believed that he was always inclined to tighten control over the flow of information from the Defense Department. Although the initial response of news organizations to the Sidle panel’s report and the Pentagon’s seemingly more open attitude toward increasing journalists’ freedom to cover military operations was positive, it soon turned more critical. Journalists and editorial writers for some of the major newspapers began expressing their doubts about how the new system would work. For example, as Richard Halloran, a New York Times reporter put it: the panel’s recommendations accepted by Weinberger suggests “that the Defense Department, while eschewing formal censorship of news and pictures before they are transmitted from combat zones, has left itself plenty of room, in the name of military security, to impose stringent limitations on coverage.” 99 Editorial writers at the Washington Post identified what they believed was the central error that Weinberger made in Grenada: that he “let the military make the rules,” and they contended that the pool system left this issue unresolved. From the Post’s perspective, civilian control of the reporting process was necessary, because “press coverage is a political question, not an operational one—and that was “the distinction that cries out to be restored.” 100 By the fall of 1984, both print and broadcast news organizations were voicing a variety of concerns about, and objections to, the Pentagon’s arrangements for the early pool system and other aspects of the Sidle panel’s proposals: the degree of control the Pentagon would have over the selection of the news organizations to participate in the early pool, which raised the question of the “ideological screening” of reporters; the assignment of “escort officers” to accompany reporters, which raised the question of how restrictive and how much of a hindrance they might be; and that the degree of journalists’ access to combat zones would be determined on a “case-bycase” basis, which could allow the situation to revert to the way things were before the Sidle report. 101 Editors at the Los Angeles Times summed up the situation this way: “the Pentagon appears to be dictating the terms on which Americans would be informed of [military] actions in the first few hours or days of an engagement, rather than negotiating them.” 102 In short, the combination of the Sidle panel’s report and the Pentagon’s new ground rules failed to resolve the problem. Issues concerning press/mili-

Grenada

207

tary relations continued to percolate throughout the remainder of Reagan’s administration. 103 Viewed from the perspective of public communication one thing seems remarkable about the week-long U.S. invasion of Grenada. It inspired a mindboggling array of rhetorical excess: extravagant and unrealistic pronouncements, dire or fanciful predictions, dissemination of misleading information, and wishful thinking. For example, the president insisted on numerous occasions that the military operation in Grenada was a “rescue mission.” Many journalists and others were unconvinced in view of the facts that the invading force consisted of a flotilla of eleven ships, one of which was the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Independence with ninety aircraft, other vessels with five-inch guns, dozens of helicopter gunships, and a combined ground force of about six thousand men— against a tiny island with scant defensive capabilities. 104 Shultz was reported to have told a cabinet meeting on October 25 that the Grenada landing “may be a turning point in history,” 105 the meaning of which journalists evidently had no opportunity to ask him about directly. Did he mean that it would signify the reassertion of the United States’ global military role, its past glories as a colonial power, or interventions along the lines of the tragic misadventure in Vietnam? Kirkpatrick insisted in her address to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on October 27, that the recent events on the island had led to “what can only be called an authentic reign of terror in Grenada,” 106 which raises the question of whether she had ever contemplated what a real reign of terror looked like, such as Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge inflicted on Cambodians. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, commander of the American task force in Grenada, summed up the U.S. military operation in these few words: “We blew them away,” a massive dose of self-congratulation. Washington Post journalist Richard Harwood, however, injected some reality into the matter with his response: “As a test of arms . . . the Grenada episode was without large meaning. A great military power overcame a feeble adversary which . . . was too poorly armed and trained to offer effective resistance.” 107 At a press conference on October 28, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, overall commander of Operation Urgent Fury, said that “there was a terrorist [i.e., Cuban] training base taking place at Calivigny barracks,” and that captured documents showed that the Cubans were bringing in “341 more officers and 4,000 reservists” as part of their plan to “take over the island.” In fact, when American forces reached the barracks, they found them empty, and an unnamed Pentagon official later said that McDonald had been “confused” about the 4,341 additional troops, which were to have been Grenadians, not Cubans. 108 On November 8, Weinberger said that the invasion of Grenada would “help convince our adversaries that it is not in their interests to threaten freedom.” 109 Possibly so, but wishful thinking nevertheless to believe that the Grenada

208

Chapter 6

charade would make the Soviets or even the Cubans tremble in their boots. In the end, several major questions remain about the Grenada incident: (1) what did it all mean (2) why did Congress, where there was initially substantial opposition to the invasion, prove so impotent and (3) what assessment can be made about the administration’s public communication efforts? In response to the first question, it appears that the U.S. invasion of Grenada was the result of the convergence of two broad forces: the pre-determined anti-communist mind-set of Reagan and his national security advisers, who were seeking a low-cost way to revitalize the image of the United States as an effective anti-communist world power on the one hand and on the other the NJM’s alignment with the Soviet bloc, compounded by its decision to opt for confrontation with the United States and its inability to resolve peacefully its internal political rivalries. Between 1981 and mid-1983, the Reagan administration perceived Grenada as “a small object in a larger East-West struggle,” which a policy of isolation, intimidation, and economic pressure could contain, but the overthrow of Bishop and his execution provided an opening for Reagan to achieve a “symbolic victory” to counter the negative images that were the legacy of Vietnam and the Iranian hostage crisis—an opportunity that Reagan could not lose, and which permitted the United States to appear strong in the short term, while it flailed around in the more challenging international environments of Central America, the Middle East, and in its relations with the Soviet Union. 110 Although there was considerable early bipartisan opposition in Congress to the invasion of Grenada, it quickly became evident that there was little inclination to challenge the president. The reasons for congressional reluctance were several. First, given the compressed time sequence of the Grenada events, the opportunity to mount an effective opposition was severely limited. Second, it was difficult for individual members of Congress to sustain their opposition, in light of the broad public support for the president’s decision to send troops to Grenada and their easy military victory at relatively low cost. Third, a presidential election campaign was already unfolding, and the Democratic candidate, Walter Mondale, showed no inclination to criticize Reagan on the Grenada issue. Finally, many Democrats who initially opposed the Grenada scenario, such as Tip O’Neill and Michael Barnes, changed their minds, in light of the findings of the congressional fact-finding mission that visited Grenada in early November. Fourth, the administration’s assertions, exaggerations, and distortions about Grenada were so numerous there was no single issue that could serve as a focal point for a concentrated opposition. In fact, at no time did Congress make an effort to deny funds for the military operation against Grenada, it was unable to achieve a joint congressional resolution invoking the War Powers Resolution of 1973 in reference to the Grenada invasion, and several resolutions of impeachment introduced in

Grenada

209

the House went nowhere. 111 Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY) aptly summed up the mood of the Senate: “the move [invasion] is popular and therefore there’s no disposition in the Senate to be opposed to it.” 112 In assessing Reagan’s efforts to go public on Grenada and the administration’s complementary public communication activities, I would have to agree with the analyses of both Eldon Kenworthy, a professor at Cornell, who wrote about the Grenada invasion in 1984, an ironically appropriate year, and Bruce Miroff, who has written about it recently. Kenworthy described the U.S. venture there as “theatre,” presented to the public in the form of a docudrama, in which “reality [is] processed into images that the public can easily absorb while the Executive proceeds with whatever it planned to do all along.” Essentially, docudrama eliminates the necessity for analysis, persuasion, and debate; it relies on emotion, exaggeration, and illusion. 113 From Miroff’s perspective, the Grenada affair was a “presidential spectacle,” where “gestures” and “symbols” were more important than facts and designed primarily to present selective positive scenarios aimed at burnishing the identity and character of the president. In short, according to Miroff, spectacle is “impression management” which aims “to craft public impressions of the president’s identity as a leader.” 114 There may be instances where docudrama and spectacle are communicatively useful, but in the Grenada case, the administration’s public information efforts had more dubious and sinister overtones. Its narrative on the necessity for an invasion of Grenada was constructed around the core of a manufactured threat to U.S. national security interests, a threat for which virtually no palpable, credible, or persuasive evidence was ever produced—about the imminent danger to American citizens on the island, the militarization of the airport at Port Salines, the evil intent of both the Soviets and the Cubans to transform the island into a “platform for subversion,” the vast and terrible armaments the PRA possessed, Grenadian efforts to destabilize the eastern Caribbean and/or Central America, and to interfere with the Caribbean oil lanes. The shabby and hollow evidentiary basis of the administration’s narrative helps to explain why it invested so much time, effort, and expense trying to exploit the captured documents found on the island, long after the public’s interest in Grenada turned elsewhere. In short, it was all pretty much a propagandistic sham, which the public bought with alacrity, no doubt because it longed for a military victory, even a small and unnecessary one, to erase the humiliations of Vietnam, the 444 days of the Iranian hostage crisis and the near-term tragedy in Beirut. Finally, the Grenada episode clearly demonstrates the effect of a virtual public communication monopoly. The initial “news blackout” during the policy decision stage, the subsequent media ban during the first few days of the invasion and the tight restrictions thereafter placed on journalists were all integral parts of the docudrama/spectacle. Despite administration claims to the contrary, they were designed with one purpose in

210

Chapter 6

mind—to ensure that narratives and pictures contrary to the administration’s story were not introduced by the media. Grenada would not be permitted to become, even on a substantially downsized scale, another Vietnam. The monopoly also eliminated the necessity for the administration to explain publicly how the tiny, impoverished island of Grenada could have successfully subverted or invaded any other country, either in the Caribbean or elsewhere. Though the monopoly was not airtight, it was sufficient to achieve one-way communication on the proverbial twoway street. As Michael K. Deaver, former White House deputy chief of staff, so aptly wrote in his memoir: “We got away with it by establishing special ground rules, by not letting the press in and justifying it later.” 115 The retrospective views of some individuals directly involved with the invasion were much more sharply critical. Vice Admiral Metcalf, for example, later stated that the “whole thing with Bishop was completely mismanaged; we should have built that airport for them. It was going to cost ninety million dollars—compared to nineteen killed and over a half billion dollars.” General Vessey noted that locking the press out from the invasion was “a stupid thing to do—and got us a lot of bad publicity. We should have found a way to put them in from the beginning.” 116 NOTES 1. For thoughtful analyses of the rise and fall of Maurice Bishop and the NJM in Grenada, and the difference between Carter’s and Reagan’s reactions to those events, see Robert A. Pastor, “The United States and the Grenada Revolution: Who Pushed First and Why?,” in Jorge Heine (ed.), A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, 1990, 181-214; and Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, 1992, 145-67. For more recent studies, see Jon Western, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media and the American Public, 2005, 94-132; and Russell Crandall, Gunboat Diplomacy: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama, 2006, 105-70. 2. See “Report on Grenada: Soviet Front Organizations,” prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), U.S. Department of State, March 22, 1983; a copy is in the Grenada Collection, Box 4, Folder: 11/01/83 DOS 8303503 Grenada, NSArchive. The front organizations tracked included the following: World Peace Council (WPC), International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), International Union of Students (IUS), World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF). 3. For some of Bishop’s views, see the excerpts from “Text of Address by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop at the International Airport Site to Commemorate Jeremiah Richardson Day,” April 18, 1982, which can be accessed at www.thegrenadarevolution online.com/bishspeechlist.html. For additional speeches and statements by Bishop, see Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (eds.), Maurice Bishop Speaks (1983). 4. A sense of the tension and the standoff between the United States and Grenada in mid-1982 can be gleaned from the prepared statements of Dessima Williams, Grenadian ambassador to the OAS, and Stephen W. Bosworth, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, presented as part of the testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Hearings on United States Policy Toward Grenada, 97th Con., 2nd Sess., June 15, 1982, 12-14 and 31-

Grenada

211

41, respectively. Ambassador Williams’ statement was read into the record by Representative George W. Crockett Jr. (D-MI), a member of the Congressional Black Caucus. 5. See Eric Pace, “Grenadian’s Appeal to Young Was the Promise of Change,” New York Times, October 21, 1983, A8. 6. See the “Prepared Statement” submitted for the record by Bosworth, in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Hearings on United States Policy Toward Grenada, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 15, 1982, 39. 7. For text, see “Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,” February 24, 1982, Public Papers, 1982, I, 210-15. The CBI was an economic and military assistance program for the Caribbean nations, intended largely to prevent communist inroads in the Caribbean region. It encountered numerous problems from the outset, including congressional resistance, opposition from the AFL-CIO and criticism in the U.S. media. Ultimately, the program had little impact on improving the economic situation of impoverished Caribbean nations. For examples of critical press reporting, see Brad Knickerbocker, “President’s Faltering Caribbean Initiative,” Christian Science Monitor, August 25, 1982, 3; and William R. Long, “Caribbean Plan Fails to Bring Wide Investment, U.S. Effort Disappoints Region with Too Little Funding, Unrealized Potential,” November 24, 1986, Los Angeles Times, OC_C2. 8. See Bosworth’s “Prepared Statement,” in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Hearings on United States Policy toward Grenada, June 15, 1982, 39. 9. For the quote, see Reagan’s “Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,” February 24, 1982, Public Papers, I, 1982, 213. 10. For the official text of the speech, see “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,” March 23, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, I, 437-43; it was also distributed by the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs, as Current Policy No. 472, and printed in the New York Times, March 24, 1983, 20. 11. For example, Bishop met with Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), who later stated that if an exchange of ambassadors between the two countries had resulted from his [Bishop’s] discussions with administration principals, “we would not be witnessing the violence in Grenada and the stress that is being placed on our standing in the international community.” For Pell’s comments, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in Grenada: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., October 27, 1983, 3, 12-13. 12. For details on Bishop’s visit to Washington, see Gary Williams, “Brief Encounter: Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s Visit to Washington,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 2002, 659-85. Williams concludes: “The irony was that the lack of progress towards normalizing relations had little to do with the reason for the [U.S.] intervention nor made such action any more, or less, likely . . . . Both governments were not averse to exploring the normalization of relations but only on terms that would have proved unacceptable to the other in practice.” 13. The text of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 100, “Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and Assistance for the Central American Region,” dated July 28, 1983, is available online at NARA, Numbered National Security Policy Papers Collection, 1981-1989, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6879699. 14. For text of NSDD 105, “Eastern Caribbean Regional Security Policy,” dated October 4, 1983, see NARA, Numbered National Security Policy Papers Collection, 1981-1989, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6879704. 15. The quotes are from Reagan’s “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada,” October 27, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, II, 1517-22. In a telephone conversation with Australian Prime Minister Hawke the previous day, Reagan told him that “Bishop, had really set up [a] communist, authoritarian or totalitarian regime there.” For the quote, see memorandum of the president’s conversation with Prime Minister

212

Chapter 6

Hawke of Australia, October 26, 1983, in Saltoun-Ebin (ed.), The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2014, 261-65. 16. For a detailed description of the internal events in Grenada between October 13 and 19, ending with Bishop’s execution and the establishment of military rule, see Gary Williams, “Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 1997, 131-69. The author concludes, inter alia, that the United States opted for a military solution primarily because it defined the outcome of the internal coup as “a potential hostage situation . . . . After the situation in Iran, the US government was hypersensitive to any possibility of another such crisis.” 17. For Shultz’s comment, see Stuart Taylor Jr., “Invasion in Grenada: The Legal Justification,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A22. 18. See Doyle McManus, “Invasion Jolts Cuban Ambitions for Influence over Caribbean Neighbors,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 1983, 17. On Cuba’s reaction to the coup, see Edward Cody, “Cuba Condemns Grenada Coup, Will Review Tie,” Washington Post, October 22, 1983, A1. According to Kendrick Radix, a pro-Bishop former Grenadian official and ambassador to the United States, Castro interceded with the Grenadian Central Committee while Bishop was under house arrest, advising that Bishop be treated “with compassion and kindness.” For Radix’s comments, see his interview with Strober and Strober (eds.), in Reagan: The Man and His Presidency, 1998, 259. 19. In his autobiography, Reagan later explained why he believed the “strictest secrecy” for the Grenada operation was necessary. He wrote that he wanted to prevent the Cubans on the island from having time to bring in reinforcements or to take American citizens hostage, especially the medical students, and to circumvent the possibility that those members of Congress who were afflicted with the “Vietnam syndrome” would “leak it to the press together with the prediction that Grenada was going to become ‘another Vietnam’. . . . We didn’t ask anybody, we just did it.” See Reagan, Ronald Reagan: An American Life, 1990, 450-51. Reagan’s comment is vaguely reminiscent of Theodore Roosevelt’s famous boast: “I took Panama.” 20. A portion of the cable’s text is quoted in Williams, “Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 1997, 164. 21. See the text (redacted) of NSDD 110, titled “Grenada: Contingency Planning,” October 21, 1983, Digital National Security Archive, Presidential Directives Collection, Part 2, Item PR01506. 22. See the memorandum from NSC staffers Lt. Col. Oliver North and Constantine Menges to Robert C. McFarlane, national security adviser, on the subject “Grenada Input for NSPG,” October 23, 1983, accessible online at htpp://www.thereagan files.com/19831023-nspg-75-grenada.pdf. Some critics of the Grenada intervention have contended that the decision to invade the island was intended as a “covering action” to divert public attention from the disaster in Lebanon. This is unlikely, however, given the fact that internal policy deliberations began to move inexorably toward a military option in Grenada days before the explosion occurred. 23. For the text (redacted) of NSDD 110A, titled “Response to Caribbean Governments’ Request to Restore Democracy on Grenada,” October 23, 1983, see Digital National Security Archive, Presidential Directives Collection, Part 2, Item PR01507. Apparently, some deception was practiced against the OECS representatives as well. In the North/Menges memorandum to McFarlane of October 23, cited above, the drafters reported that U.S. ambassador Frank McNeil and Marine Major General George Crist were en route to Barbados to discuss contingency planning with OECS representatives, and that Crist “will develop plans for their forces as though we had not yet made up our mind to go.” This suggests that the decision to invade Grenada preceded the OECS’s request. 24. There was no consensus on the terminology used to describe the U.S. action in Grenada. Reagan initially referred to it as an “invasion,” but thereafter used the term “rescue mission.” James A. Baker III, the White House chief of staff, publicly called it a

Grenada

213

“commando operation,” and the State Department described it as a “collective action” or “joint maneuver.” Critics preferred “invasion,” “intervention,” or “aggression.” 25. For a detailed description and analysis of U.S. and Grenada interactions prior to the intervention, see Williams, “Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada 1983,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 1997, 131-69. For press accounts, see Patrick E. Tyler, “The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning,” Washington Post, October 30, 1983, A1; and Bernard Gwertzman, “Steps to the Invasion: No More ‘Paper Tiger,’” New York Times, October 30, 1983, 1. 26. For the official texts, see “Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica Announcing the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada,” and “Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tem of the Senate on the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada,” both dated October 25, 1983, in Public Papers, 1983, II, 1505-08 and 1512-13, respectively. 27. According to New York Times reporter Hedrick Smith, at a White House briefing for reporters prior to the president’s speech, the unnamed senior official who briefed said that the president “did not mean to implicate Moscow in the Beirut bombing or to charge that the Soviet Union had directed that attack.” See Smith, “Reagan Says Cuba Aimed to Take Grenada,” New York Times, October 28, 1983, 1. The question remains, however: if the president did not mean to implicate the Soviet Union in the Lebanon attack, why did he? 28. See Reagan’s TV address, October 27, 1983, cited above. The address was also printed in the New York Times, October 28, 1983, 9. 29. For a selection of official remarks and press conferences about U.S. policy toward Grenada in late October and early November 1983, see U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 83: 2081 (December 1983), 67-82; or U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983, Grenada, 1394-1425. 30. A reference to efforts by the so-called Contadora Four countries (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) to promote negotiations between affected parties in Central America that might lead to peace. 31. “Grenada: The Morning After,” Washington Post, October 27, 1983, A22. 32. “The Week That Was,” Washington Post, October 30, 1983, C6. 33. “Commitment and Capability,” Baltimore Sun, October 28, 1983, A18. 34. “Which Threat in Grenada?,” New York Times, October 26, 1983, A26. 35. “Goliath in Grenada,” New York Times, October 30, 1983, E18. 36. “The Lesson of Grenada,” Wall Street Journal, October 28, 1983, 30. 37. “Semper Fidelis,” Washington Times, October 28, 1983, 11A. 38. “Why Invade Grenada?,” Chicago Tribune, October 26, 1983, 14. 39. For text of the UNSC resolution on the invasion of Grenada, which the United States vetoed on October 28, 1983, see New York Times, October 29, 1983, 4. 40. For a description of the restrictions, as viewed by a journalist, see William E. Farrell, “U.S. Allows 15 Reporters to Grenada for Day,” New York Times, October 28, 1983, 13. Reporters were banned from joining the invasion force during the first two days of action, on the grounds that their presence would jeopardize security and create logistical problems for the military. Any efforts by journalists to gain access to the island by private vessels were stopped by the U.S. Navy. It was not until the third day of hostilities that the military authorities allowed a pool of fifteen journalists, under military escort, to enter the island, but only for a few hours. Journalists had no unrestricted access to the island until six days after the initial invasion, by which time military operations were almost over. In one State Department roundup of early editorial opinion on the Grenada invasion, 28 large circulation papers were reviewed, 14 of which addressed the administration’s news “embargo.” Of the 14, irrespective of how they viewed the invasion, 13 were critical. A copy of this unclassified State Department information memorandum, dated November 5, 1983, analyzing the relevant editorial opinion is in the author’s possession. For a legal study of contemporary press access issues in U.S. military conflicts, including Grenada, see Brian William DelVec-

214

Chapter 6

chio, “Press Access to American Military Operations and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Imposing Restrictions,” Tulsa Law Journal, 1995, 227-50. 41. TV newscasters and syndicated columnists who were vocal critics of the administration’s press ban included Tom Brokaw, John Chancellor, Walter Cronkite, Marvin Kalb, Anthony Lewis, Mary McGrory, Dan Rather, and Tom Shales. 42. On the developing controversy over media censorship, see the following press accounts, from which the quotations are cited: Phil Gailey, “U.S. Bars Coverage of Grenada Action: News Groups Protest,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A1; Lou Cannon and David Hoffman, “Speakes Complained in Memo—Invasion Secrecy Creating a Furor,” Washington Post, October 27, 1983, A1; Jim Hoagland, “U.S. Troops Remove Reporters From Island,” Washington Post, October 27, 1983, A11; Tom Shales, “Grenada: A Question of News Control,” Washington Post, October 28, 1983, B1; Jody Powell, “Government’s Right to Lie vs. Press’ Right to Know,” Los Angeles Times, October 30, 1983, D5; Anthony Lewis, “What Was He Hiding?,” New York Times, October 31, 1983, A19; Dan Rather, “Under Wraps,” Boston Globe, October 31, 1983, 15; and Janice Castro and Patricia Delaney, “Keeping the Press from the Action,” Time, 122: 20 (November 7, 1983), 65-66. Weinberger continued to defend his position in other venues: see his comments in a published debate with Col. Harry G. Summers Jr., “Should the Press Have Been with the Military on Grenada?,” Los Angeles Times, November 13, 1983, E1. Joseph L. “Jody” Powell had served as White House press secretary under President Carter, 1977-1981. 43. For examples of news executives’ views, see Henry Grunwald, “Trying to Censor Reality,” Time, 122: 20 (November 7, 1983), 102; Heath Meriwether, “How the Administration Controlled Grenada ‘News’,” Miami Herald, October 30, 1983, 4E; and Jerry Friedheim, “Censor Journalists Covering Wars?,” U.S. News and World Report, 95: 20 (November 14, 1983), 33. Grunwald was managing editor of Time; Meriwether was executive editor of the Miami Herald; and Friedheim was executive vice president of the American Newspaper Publishing Association (ANPA). 44. There was another irony in the Grenada news coverage situation: According to a UPI report from Paris, a French photographer, Michel Parbol, filmed the entire invasion for the French state-owned TV channel and the Sygma Photo Agency, including footage of wounded American soldiers. There is no indication in the public record that any of the United States TV networks made an effort to have Parbol’s footage rebroadcast on American TV. See UPI (Paris), “Invasion Shown on Paris TV,” Washington Times, November 1, 1983, 7A. 45. See Henry E. Catto Jr., “Dateline Grenada: The Media and the Military Go at It,” Washington Post, October 30, 1983, C7. 46. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “Grenada, without Warning,” Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1983, 30; and “Grenada Again: Living within the Law,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 1983, 30. Schlesinger, a guest contributor to the Wall Street Journal, was Albert Schweitzer professor of humanities at the City College of New York (CCNY) and winner of Pulitzer Prizes in history and biography. 47. Irving Kristol, “Toward a Moral Foreign Policy,” Wall Street Journal, November 15, 1983, 34. Kristol was a professor at New York University, Graduate School of Business and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). 48. For Hoffman’s and Pipes’ views, see Walter Isaacson, Laurence I. Barrett, and Strobe Talbot, “Weighing the Proper Role,” Time, 122:20 (November 7, 1983), 49. 49. The referenced poll can be accessed at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/. 50. For an incisive study of the issues raised by the Grenada invasion vis-à-vis the War Powers Resolution, see Rubner, “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly, 1985-1986, 627-47. 51. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in an interview with the Miami Herald in November 1979, Bernard Coard stated that the NJM government “is not a Marxist government. But it’s not that we are defensive on the subject. If we were Marxist, we would say we were Marxist. It’s no big thing as far as we’re concerned.”

Grenada

215

See R. A. Zaldivar, “A Latecomer to Revolution Leads Opposition to Bishop,” Miami Herald, October 18, 1983, 12A. 52. For the exchanges described here, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Situation in Grenada: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, October 27, 1983, particularly 10-12, 18-19, 29-30, 33-35. 53. See Hedrick Smith, “Reagan Aide Says U.S. Invasion Forestalled Cuban Arms Buildup,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A1. In fact, in his memoir Speaking Out, 1988, 161, Larry Speakes noted that he was “skeptical” from the beginning that American students in Grenada were in any danger. 54. The enumerated questions are derived from the following press commentary: Hedrick Smith, “Reagan Aide Says U.S. Invasion Forestalled Cuban Arms Buildup,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A1; Joanne Omang, “U.S. Saw Uncertain Grenada as ‘Floating Crap Game,’” Washington Post, October 27, A9; and Patrick E. Tyler, The Making of an Invasion: Chronology of the Planning,” Washington Post, October 30, 1983, A1. 55. The cable text is cited in Robert A. Pastor’s “Prepared Statement” presented for the record, in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Hearings on U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., November 2, 3, and 16, 1983, 80-81. Whether the cable ever actually reached the president is unknown. 56. On the issue of evacuation flights, see Smith, “Reagan Aide Says U.S. Invasion Forestalled Cuban Arms Buildup,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A1; and Taylor, “In Wake of Invasion, Much Official Misinformation by U.S. Comes to Light,” New York Times, November 6, 1983, 20. 57. For the exchanges between Solarz and Dam, see Hearings on U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, November 2, 1983, 46. In a later insertion for the record, concerning whether any Americans had been “specifically threatened,” Dam provided State Department boilerplate on the RMC’s shooton-sight curfew, which was a reply, but not an answer. 58. See the following press accounts: Hedrick Smith, “Reagan Aide Says U.S. Invasion Forestalled Cuban Arms Buildup,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A1; Frank Greve, “Missile Sites Were Expected,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 28, 1983, 1; Drew Middleton, “The Grenada Conquest: How Forces Performed,” New York Times, October 28, 1983, 12; Philip Taubman, “U.S. Now Puts Strength of Cubans on Isle at 1100,” New York Times, October 29, 1983, A6; Taubman, “Senators Suggest Administration Exaggerated Its Cuba Assessment,” New York Times, October 30, 1983, 22; and Richard Halloran, “U.S. Reduces Force in Grenada by 700,” New York Times, October 30, 1983, A1. 59. On the issue of the poor quality of the administration’s intelligence regarding Grenada, see Gerald Hopple and Cynthia Gilley, “Policy without Intelligence,” in Peter M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson (eds.), American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation “Urgent Fury,” 1985, 55-71. Hopple and Gilley note (p. 56) that “the conclusion is inescapable that intelligence available to U.S. policymakers was deficient in volume and quality.” See also Charles Maechling Jr., “Grenada ‘Intelligence’ Simply Wasn’t,” Los Angeles Times, November 17, 1983, 7. Maechling was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. For confirmatory retrospective comments on the intelligence issue by Craig Johnstone, deputy assistant secretary of state for Latin America, and Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, commander of the American task force in Grenada, see Strober and Strober (eds.), Reagan: The Man and His Presidency, 1998, 280. 60. A copy of the referenced information memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe, director of the PM bureau, to Shultz, October [29?], 1983, is in the Grenada Collection, Box 1, Folder: Rostow, Walt: Memos to the President, NSArchive. The document is redacted and the precise date on the source text is obscured. Glimmers of this kind of subjunctive treatment of the Grenada situation found their way into a number of State

216

Chapter 6

Department publications; see, for example, Gist: Grenada Collective Action, released by the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA), January 1984. 61. Richard J. Meislin, “Cuba Assails U.S. on Casualty List,” New York Times, November 3, 1983, A20. According to the retrospective account of JCS chairman General Vessey, who visited some of the captured Cubans two or three days after the invasion, they “were what we would call construction engineers—military construction engineers . . . more mechanics than soldiers.” For Vessey’s comment, see Strober and Strober (eds.), Reagan: The Man and His Presidency, 1998, 286. 62. See the joint article by Ed Magnuson, Douglas Brew, Bernard Diederich, and William McWhirter, “D-Day in Grenada,” Time, 122: 20 (November 7, 1983), 22-28. 63. Philip Taubman, “U.S. Makes Public Arms Pacts It Says Grenadians Made,” New York Times, November 4, 1983, 1; and Taubman, “Experts Say Grenada Arms Pacts Exceeded Needs of Isle’s Defense,” New York Times, November 6, 1983, 1. 64. See the “Statement of Representative Mervyn M. Dymmally (D-CA)” and Robert A. Pastor’s “Prepared Statement,” both submitted for the record, printed in Hearings on U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, November 3, 1983, 4-8 and 88-90, respectively. Caribbean airport runways comparable to or longer than the one on Grenada included: Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Guadeloupe, Jamaica, Martinique, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, and Trinidad. Pastor, who had served as senior adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean on the NSC staff during the Carter administration, notes (p. 89) that in the fall of 1982, he had a conversation with Bishop and asked him whether the new airport would be used for any military purpose, and that Bishop said it would not “because to do so would jeopardize it for tourism.” Pastor recognized that Bishop may have been lying or saying what he believed Pastor wanted to hear, but on the whole he considered Bishop’s remarks as sincere. 65. With respect to financing, the State Department insisted that the “bulk” of financing for the airport was provided by Cuba, but it appears that no unclassified statistical breakdown demonstrating that claim was ever provided to Congress. For the administration’s standard reply concerning financing for the airport during congressional testimony, see the statement for the record submitted after Dam’s testimony on November 2, in Hearings on U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, November 2, 1983, 34. 66. See Lynton McLain, “Grenadian airport is civil, says contractor,” Financial Times [London], October 31, 1983, 30. 67. This was indirectly confirmed by Major General George Crist, a government witness who testified during the early November 1983 House hearings on Grenada. In response to a question from Representative Douglas “Doug” Bereuter (R-NE) as to whether there was any evidence of protective shelters at the airport, he responded: “I saw the plans for the airfield in the engineer’s office—Mr. Robert Evans who is the engineer manager. They were clearly labeled passenger terminals . . . . There was nothing in that airport that I saw that did not match the plans that were laid out on the engineer’s table.” See Hearings on U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Caribbean, November 2, 1983, 31. 68. For the Solarz-Dam exchanges cited here, see Hearings on U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Caribbean, November 2, 1983, 21-22, 47-48. 69. For the Wolpe-Dam exchange, see Hearings on U.S. Military Actions on Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, November 2, 1983, 50. 70. The timing and impact of the OCES request are both controversial issues. The administration always insisted that the request was received before its decision was reached to wage a full-fledged military strike against the island, and that the request was one of the reasons it opted for a military response. Michael Rubner points out, however, that though the planning for a military strike was stretched out over several days, the decision to invade was clearly the objective prior to the receipt of the OECS request. Russell Crandall, on the other hand, writes that “It was actually the leaders of the OECS who strongly urged the United States to invade Grenada,” implying that it

Grenada

217

might not have done so otherwise, and he denies that the OECS invitation was a pretext for the invasion. See Rubner, “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly, 1986, 632-33; and Crandall, Gunboat Diplomacy, 2006, 137-40. 71. For contemporary accounts, see Stuart Taylor Jr., “Invasion in Grenada: The Legal Justification,” New York Times, October 27, 1983, A22; Aaron Epstein “Law Experts Rebut Reagan’s Rationale for Invasion,” Miami Herald, October 30, 1983, 18A; Abram Chayes, “Grenada Was Illegally Invaded,” New York Times, November 15, 1983, A35; and Charles William Maynes, “Grenada: New Colony, New Myth,” Baltimore Sun, October 24, 1984, 11A. Chayes, a Harvard law professor, was legal adviser to the State Department, 1961-1964, who played a key role in the successful effort to persuade the OAS in 1962 to provide a legal basis for the blockade of Cuba. Maynes was editor of the journal, Foreign Policy. 72. See House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1983-84, Second Report: Grenada (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1984), xvi. 73. For text, see “Remarks Announcing the Appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as the President’s Personal Representative in the Middle East,” November 3, 1983, Public Papers, 1983, II, 1533-36. A transcript of the press conference was also published in the New York Times, November 4, 1983, A16. For press commentary, see Robert S. Greenberger and Gerald S. Seib, “Reagan Declares Grenada Action Ended, Says U.S. Troops to Leave ‘Within Days,’” Wall Street Journal, November 3, 1983, 3 and Francis X. Clines, “It Was a Rescue Mission, Reagan Says,” New York Times, November 4, 1983, A16. 74. Barry Sussman, “Grenada Move Earns Reagan Broad Political Gains,” Washington Post, November 9, 1983, A3. 75. The Harris and Los Angeles Times polls can be accessed at http://ropercenter.cor nell.edu. 76. “Grenada, by O’Neill, by Orwell,” New York Times, November 10, 1983, 26. 77. See the following Globe editorials: “Crying Wolf,” November 2, 1983, 14; “Atrocity and mistake,” November 3, 1983, 18; and “Barbaric Images,” November 11, 1983, 18. 78. “Grenada: All Things Considered,” Washington Post, November 9, 1983, A18. 79. “Grenada: Getting Out,” Washington Post, November 15, 1983, A14. 80. “Europe, the U.S. and Grenada,” Wall Street Journal, November 4, 1983, 33. 81. See Hedrick Smith, “Capitol Hill Outcry Softens As Public’s Support Swells,” New York Times, November 4, 1983, A18. 82. Actually, three congressional delegations visited Grenada during the period November 4 to 8: the fourteen-member bipartisan House group, led by Foley and Michel; a group of four Republican House members sponsored by the National Defense Council, a conservative lobbying organization; and a one-person mission by Senator John Tower (D-TX). For information on the House group, see John Felton, “Congressional Delegations Tour Grenada,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly, (November 12, 1983), 2360-61. Representatives Samuel S. Stratton (D-NY), Elwood H. “Bud” Hillis (R-IN) and Ronald V. Dellums (D-CA) submitted individual reports on the trip to the House Committee on Armed Services; see House Committee on Armed Services, Hearing, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., November 15, 1983, 1-11. 83. Michael D. Barnes, “The Invasion Was Right,” Washington Post, November 9, 1983, A19. 84. Don Bonker, “An Answer to Mike Barnes,” Washington Post, November 11, 1983, A17. 85. See T. R. Reid and Margaret Shapiro, “Hill Democrats Back Reagan on Grenada Action,” Washington Post, November 9, 1983, A1. 86. See for example, “Grenada, by O’Neill, by Orwell,” New York Times, November 10, 1983, A26. 87. For example, shortly after the House delegation returned to Washington, a group of seven Democrats led by Representative Ted Weiss (D-NY) offered a resolution of impeachment against the president for launching an undeclared war that vio-

218

Chapter 6

lated the War Powers Resolution of 1973, but it died for lack of additional sponsors; see Felton, “Congressional Delegations Tour Grenada,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly, November 12, 1983, 2360. The members of the Black Caucus continued to remain opposed to the U.S. invasion of Grenada; see Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, “Black Caucus Remains Critical of U.S. Invasion of Grenada,” Baltimore Sun, December 8, 1983, A10. 88. Thomas P. O’Neill, “Yes, There’s Room for Compromise,” Washington Post, November 20, 1983, F7. 89. See John M. Goshko, “Captured Documents’ Contents Outlined,” Washington Post, October 31, 1983, A1; Philip Taubman, “U.S. Makes Public Arms Pacts It Says Grenadians Made,” New York Times, November 4, 1983, 1; and Taubman, “Experts Say Grenada Arms Pacts Exceeded Needs of Isle’s Defense,” New York Times, November 6, 1983, 1. Preliminary analysis by State’s INR bureau of the first three batches of Grenada documents actually began in late October and early November; see the memorandum from Natale Belloci, acting director of INR, to Shultz, November 4, 1983, in Grenada Collection, Box 4, Folder: FOI Docs, NSArchive. 90. See Judith Valente, “Grenada’s Guns” Washington Post, November 13, 1983, B1. 91. The official text of NSDD 112, titled “Processing and Disposition of Documents Acquired by US Forces in Grenada,” November 15, 1983, can be retrieved from the National Archives Electronic Database at htttps://catalog.archives.gov/id/6879711. The new interagency committee was chaired by James Michel, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, and included representatives from State, Defense, the JCS, USIA and the CIA. Much of the ground work in reviewing and analyzing the documents, however, was done by Otto Reich’s office, S/LPD, with the participation of a Psychological Operations team of four specialists from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on temporary detail to S/LPD, and the assistance of two well-known, anti-communist hardliners, Michael Ledeen, who worked as a consultant to the State Department, and Herbert Romerstein, a USIA official. S/LPD was already engaged in disseminating “white propaganda” about Nicaragua; exploitation of the Grenada documents apparently fit seamlessly into its operations. On the Nicaragua effort, see chapter one; on the Grenada effort, see the memorandum from Reich to Shultz, December 22, 1983, Grenada Collection, Box 4: Grenada FOI Docs, NSArchive. 92. Grenada: A Preliminary Report was a joint State/Defense publication, dated December 16, 1983, and released by State’s Bureau of Public Affairs; it can be accessed at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/ReadingRoom/InternationalSecurityAffairs/153.pdf. The report essentially repeated the charges the administration had made since October and added a few new ones, such as the NJM’s falsification of economic and financial statistics, which they purportedly had learned how to do from the Cubans, to disguise the fact that the island’s economy was a “disaster.” No reporter seems to have publicly asked why the NJM tried to hide what was plainly visible on the island, a situation Grenadian leaders were trying to address. On dissemination of the report, see “Grenada Documents—Interim Report of the Interagency Committee for Document Review, Public Disclosure, and Information,” January 6, 1984, Digital National Security Archive, Presidential Directives Collection, Part 2, Item PR01509. 93. See memorandum from Charles Hill, State Department executive secretary (signed by B. McKinley) to McFarlane, August 15, 1984, Digital National Security Archive, Presidential Directives Collection, Part 2, Item PR01511. 94. See the Hill-McFarlane memorandum, August 15, 1984, cited above, and “Grenada: The New Jewel Movement and Religion,” prepared by William L. Krieg, Report 771-AR, February 2, 1984, Digital National Security Archive, Presidential Directives Collection, Item PD01765. 95. Taubman, “U.S. Makes Public Arms Pacts It Says Grenadians Made,” New York Times, November 5, 1983, 1; see also, John M. Goshko, “Militant Grenada,” Washington Post, December 17, 1983, A1. 96. See Bob Woodward, Veil: Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987, 1987, 294. 97. There were three days of open hearings and two days of closed deliberations. For press commentary on the appointment, composition and public sessions of the

Grenada

219

Sidle Panel, from which the quoted comments are cited, see Jonathan Friendly, “Panel to Review Curb on the Press,” New York Times, November 7, 1983, A16; Friendly, “Pentagon’s Panel on Press Coverage to Meet,” New York Times, February 5, 1984, 8; Friendly, “War Zone Access by Press Affirmed,” New York Times, February 6, 1984, A12; Eleanor Randolph, “Panel Supports Press Access to Combat,” Los Angeles Times, February 7, 1984, SD7; Steve Farnsworth, “Military, Press Learn from Grenada Friction, Pentagon Panel Told,” Los Angeles Times, February 10, B10; and Friendly, “Joint Chiefs Plan New Press Policy: Move Said to Recognize That Keeping Reporters Out of Grenada Was Mistake,” New York Times, February 10, 1984, A7. 98. The text of the report, titled “Report by CJCS Media—Military Relations Panel,” No. 450-84, August 23, 1984, is available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? Location=U2&doc=-GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA416788. For press commentary, see Fred Hiatt, “Pentagon Plans Media Pool to Cover Missions,” Washington Post, August 24, 1984, A1; Gerald F. Seib, “Pentagon Says It Will Study Plan to Let Reporters Accompany Troops into Battle,” Wall Street Journal, August 24, 1984, 6; and Richard Halloran, “Pentagon Issues News Guidelines for Combat Zones,” New York Times, August 24, 1984, A1. 99. Halloran, “The Pentagon; Weinberger and the Press: An Ebb in the Flow,” New York Times, August 25, 1984, 1, 6. 100. “Covering the Next War,” Washington Post, August 31, 1984, A20. 101. See for example, Charles Mohr, “The Pentagon; The Continuing Battle Over Covering Wars,” New York Times, September 14, 1984, A24. 102. “The Pentagon Is Off Base,” Los Angeles Times, October 14, 1984, E4. 103. See for example, “Sinking in the First Wave,” Chicago Tribune, April 26, 1985, 22; and “To War without the Press,” Chicago Tribune, March 28, 1986, 10. 104. Richard Harwood, “Tidy U.S. War Ends: ‘We Blew Them Away,’” Washington Post, November 6, 1983, A1. There is a stark contrast, for example, between the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the Israeli rescue strike at Entebbe in Uganda in 1976. 105. See Isaacson, Barrett, and Talbott, “Weighing the Proper Role,” Time, November 7, 1983, 42. 106. The text of Kirkpatrick’s address is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, December 1983, 74-76. 107. Harwood, “Tidy U.S. War Ends: ‘We Blew Them Away,’” Washington Post, November 6, 1983, A1. 108. Taylor, “In Wake of Invasion, Much Official Misinformation by the U.S. Comes to Light,” New York Times, November 6, 1983, 20. 109. Reid and Shapiro, “Hill Democrats Back Reagan on Grenada Action,” Washington Post, November 9, 1983, A1. 110. For further discussion of the points made here, see Pastor, “The United States and the Grenada Revolution: Who Pushed First and Why?,” in Heine (ed.), A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada, 198-210; and Crandall, Gunboat Diplomacy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama, 2006, 106-9. The quote from Pastor appears on p. 209. 111. For additional details and analysis of Congress’ role in the Grenada affair, see Crandall, Gunboat Diplomacy, U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama, 2006, 157-58; and Rubner, “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly, 1985-1986, 638-39. 112. See Hedrick Smith, “Capitol Hill Outcry Softens as Public Support Swells,” New York Times, November 4, 1983, A18. 113. See Kenworthy, “Grenada as Theater,” World Policy Journal, 1984, 635-41. The quote appears on p. 635. 114. See Miroff, Presidents on Political Ground: Leaders in Action and What They Face, 2016, 10-28. The quotes appear on pp. 13, 16, and 18. 115. Michael K. Deaver, Behind the Scenes, 1987, 147. 116. For Metcalf’s and Vessey’s comments, see Strober and Strober (eds.), Reagan: The Man and His Presidency, 1998, 257 and 273, respectively.

SEVEN Diversion, Denial, and Scandal Responding to Iran-Contra

In early October 1986, while Congress and the administration were contending over the disbursement of appropriated funds for the contras, Nicaraguan soldiers shot down an unmarked C-123 cargo plane over Nicaraguan territory. Three of its four occupants were killed in the crash, but an American ex-marine survivor, Eugene J. Hasenfus, was captured, and soon paraded on Nicaraguan national television. Within days his picture appeared on the front pages of newspapers and on television screens across the United States. Sufficient evidence had been found in the plane’s wreckage and in Hasenfus’s possession to implicate him and his dead companions as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives, who were involved in covert resupply efforts to assist the contras. 1 The hapless Hasenfus, who confessed during his public trial in Managua that he was working for the CIA, thus became the first public loose thread in the unraveling of what became known as the Iran-Contra scandal. Over the next six weeks, the American public and publics abroad were exposed to the scandal’s main elements: the Reagan administration’s sale of sophisticated weapons to alleged “moderates” 2 in the Iranian regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini, in exchange for the release of American hostages being held by terrorists in Lebanon, in flagrant violation of the U.S. arms embargo against Iran and the declared U.S. policy not to negotiate with terrorists or terrorist entities; the covert involvement of third countries and other parties in transferring the arms and raising funds for the contras, without congressional knowledge or authorization; and the diversion of funds siphoned off from the marked up prices of the arms to the contra forces, in clear violation of the congressional ban on the fund221

222

Chapter 7

ing of any effort to overthrow the Sandinista government in Managua, which was the contras’ publicly avowed objective. By late November 1986, the administration faced an enormous public communication challenge consisting of several intertwined elements of scandal. In this chapter, I will focus primarily on the contra side of the scandal, particularly the diversion of funds, but will not ignore the Iran side, especially as it impacted the administration’s public communication efforts. With respect to the downed plane in Nicaragua, had it not been Hasenfus, someone or something else would have blown the cover of the so-called Enterprise, the off-the-books, privatized, covert network responsible for running the Iran-Contra operation, which involved in one way or another nearly a dozen countries and numerous individuals in those countries. It was only a matter of time. How Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, the National Security Council (NSC) deputy director for politicalmilitary affairs and his compatriots in the CIA and elsewhere could expect that the whole intricate structure would remain publicly invisible and immune from exposure in Washington is mindboggling. In fact, the “secret” operation began to fray as early as mid-1985. Both in the summer and the fall of that year, reporters from the Associated Press, the Miami Herald and other major news outlets published stories linking North, then considered an obscure mid-level NSC official, to a covert role in advising and raising funds for the contras. Congressman Michael D. Barnes (DMD), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, attempted to obtain a response from the administration to the allegations, but he was effectively stonewalled and his effort failed. 3 In late December 1985 and early January 1986, accusations were raised in the Miami Herald, on the UPI wire, and on NBC News that the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL), a tax-exempt educational organization, run by Carl “Spitz” Channell, was illegally using funds donated to the organization to aid the contras, and that North was coordinating NEPL’s “educational” expenditures. These charges energized the NSC to develop a public affairs strategy to help Channell defuse the allegations. 4 In the summer of 1986, the Barnes scenario described above was replayed, when new allegations appeared on the Associated Press wire and in the New York Times identifying North and others on the NSC staff as the leaders of the covert war against Nicaragua, in violation of congressional limitations on military aid to the contras. This time, a congressional delegation led by Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), and Representative David McCurdy (D-OK) met with North to investigate, but they accepted at face value North’s statements that he was not involved in anything inappropriate, and the controversy evaporated. 5 Finally, in late September 1986, less than two weeks before Hasenfus’s plane was shot down, a high-ranking Costa Rican official made public the discovery of a secret airstrip in San Jose which had been built

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

223

and was being used to support the contras, thereby effectively exposing the contra resupply operation, and forcing North and his accomplices into a frantic cover-up effort, to erase all “USG fingerprints on any of the operation.” 6 The administration’s overall response to the evolving scandal consisted of several interconnected and overlapping tactics: denial, coverup, 7 damage control, and shifting the blame to others, particularly the media, for the administration’s embarrassment. The White House’s immediate response to the downed plane in Nicaragua was two-fold: to have the contras assume responsibility for the flight, and to assure Congress that there was no connection between the plane, the individuals on it, and the U.S. government. As the Sandinistas continued publicly to exploit Hasenfus’s capture, 8 leading officials of the administration—Reagan, Shultz, Elliott Abrams, the assistant secretary of state for interAmerican affairs, Clair George, CIA deputy director for operations, and Alan Fiers, chief of the CIA’s Central American Task Force—publicly denied, both to Congress and the press, any official connection between Hasenfus or the downed plane and the U.S government. The general line followed in press interviews and congressional appearances was that the contra resupply operations were being carried out by private individuals who opposed the Sandinista government. Abrams actually blamed Congress for the deaths of the Americans aboard the plane, because it would not act to fund the contras. The members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) seemed satisfied with the testimony of administration officials at this point and raised no major objections. 9 However, on November 25, at a noon press briefing at the White House, the president and his attorney general, Ed Meese, publicly disclosed for the first time the diversion of funds to the contras from arms sales to Iran. It was in this rather strange way that the diversion story became inextricably entangled with the arms-for-hostages story. 10 The administration followed a similar strategy with respect to the Iranian arms sales. When that story first broke in the news media, officials assumed a “no comment” posture, which quickly morphed into a public position that the administration could not answer any questions about such wild allegations because “to do so will endanger the lives of those we are trying to help.” 11 The general line for administration principals to follow in their public remarks was worked out at a meeting in the Oval Office on November 10: we did not trade arms for hostages, but gave Iran “some small defensive weapons,” in order to improve our leverage with the new government and its military. 12 This approach, however, did not calm the “press storm” of charges that the administration was negotiating with terrorists and paying ransom for the release of American hostages, in violation of its own frequently stated policy. The president was upset with the “whole irresponsible press bilge about hostages &

224

Chapter 7

Iran,” confiding to his diary on November 12 that it “has gotten totally out of hand.” He thought that the media were trying to create another Watergate to sabotage his administration, and he “laid down the law” at his morning staff meetings that he wanted “to go public personally & tell the people the truth.” 13 During the afternoon that same day, he met with several of his top advisers and the key members of the congressional leadership in the White House Situation Room, where John M. Poindexter, the president’s national security adviser, noted that arms had been sent to Iran, but he said nothing that linked the arms to hostages. However, according to Shultz, leaks immediately followed that meeting, and NBC-TV promptly reported that the president had admitted for the first time that arms had actually been sent to Iran. In Shultz’s view, the leaks stirred up the press, and led to the arms-for-hostages issue becoming an even hotter media story. 14 On November 13, in a televised speech to the nation, Reagan denied that the United States had sent “offensive weapons” to Iran or made any deal for the release of hostages. He insisted that the policy of no concessions to terrorists was still intact and that neither arms nor anything else were traded for hostages. 15 In a press conference on November 19, which Shultz later described as “disastrous,” the president seriously misspoke, when he denied that any third countries were involved in the sale of arms to Iran, which caused the White House to issue a quick retraction that same evening. 16 That statement put Reagan out on the proverbial limb, because it had already become public knowledge that the Israelis were involved in the transfer of arms to Iran. By mid-November, there was considerable confusion in the White House about precisely what its public communication message on armsfor-hostages should be. 17 Television network news programs were deconstructing the president’s public remarks. Don Regan, the president’s chief of staff, during one TV interview said there would be no more arms for hostages, while Poindexter on another program suggested there would be. The main face-off between principals occurred on November 16, when Shultz appeared on CBS’s Face the Nation, and Poindexter was interviewed on NBC’s Meet the Press. Schultz was incensed that the NSC had become a “wildcat operation,” developing an operational capability that was not subject to congressional oversight, and had usurped functions that properly belonged to the State Department. He wanted to end arms transfers to Iran, and in the process reclaim State’s control over Iran policy. Interviewed by Lesley Stahl, he said that it was “clearly wrong to trade arms for hostages . . . because it encourages taking more.” When Stahl asked him whether there would be any more arms shipments to Iran, he replied that as far as he was concerned there would not be. When he was asked “if he had the authority to speak for the entire administration,” he said no, thereby publicly exposing internal divisions in the administration, throwing down a gauntlet to the White House, and providing another opening for further press inquiry. At roughly the same

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

225

time, Poindexter was indicating that more arms sales were to come. Shultz expected to be fired, but the White House blinked. Larry Speakes, the White House press spokesman, announced that Shultz did speak for the administration, and that the president had no intention of sending any more arms to Iran. 18 On November 19, the president confirmed that position in his press conference, broadcast live from the East Room of the White House. He said that to eliminate “the mistaken perception that we have been exchanging arms for hostages, I have directed that no further sales of arms of any kind be sent to Iran.” 19 The administration found it exceedingly difficult to sustain its denial strategy. It had become hopelessly entangled in an uninterrupted flow of new revelations about Iran-Contra operations, which fed the public’s perception that there was a potential political scandal involving the highest levels of government. In addition to the flow of revelations into the public arena from a variety of sources, the daily press and Sunday TV talk shows focused intense scrutiny on the issue, and opinion polls revealed that the administration’s denials were falling on deaf ears. A Louis Harris & Associates poll taken after the president’s November 19 press conference, for example, found that by an overwhelming 79 to 9 percent, a huge majority of the public was convinced that Reagan “deliberately left a lot out” in his explanation of the Iranian arms deal, and that less than one in ten respondents believed that he had “told the real story.” Even more damaging to the president’s credibility was the fact that respondents rated the way he handled questions from the media on the issue at a 75 to 18 percent negative ratio. 20 The bad news about the public’s reaction to the administration’s efforts to explain the rationale for its Iran policy was far from over. At the president’s aforementioned press conference on November 25 at the White House, he announced in his brief opening statement that as a result of an internal investigation of his national security apparatus by Attorney General Meese, he concluded that he had not been “fully informed” about “one aspect” of the Iran initiative, which involved a serious “flaw,” a coy reference to the diversion of funds from arms sales profits funneled to the Nicaraguan contras. 21 Without specifying the particular flaw, he nevertheless denied any knowledge of it. He also announced that Poindexter had asked to be reassigned and that North had been relieved of his duties at the NSC, insisting that their decisions had been voluntary and that they had not been “let go,” that is, fired. The correspondents attending the briefing were stunned, no doubt smelling a “smoking gun,” and they inquired whether anyone else would be “let go.” They seemed particularly interested in Shultz’s fate, but the president left the podium abruptly and tossed the hot potato to Meese, who provided some additional details concerning the Iran-Contra story, but denied that any other senior administration officials knew about the funds diversion. From that moment on, the media, Congress, political

226

Chapter 7

elites, and the public began to focus increasing attention on the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan contras. 22 An ABC News survey taken after the president’s November 25 press conference revealed that 62 percent of Americans believed that Reagan knew about the diversion of funds, and was not telling the truth. 23 In a frequently cited New York Times/CBS News Poll taken on November 30 (reported on the New York Times’ front page on December 2) the results were an even more serious setback for the president. Conducted five days after Meese disclosed the diversion of funds to the contras, it found that Reagan’s public approval rating had plunged from 67 percent the previous month to 46 percent, the sharpest one-month drop ever recorded by a public opinion poll measuring approval of presidential job performance. 24 Further analysis of the drop in approval revealed that only 16 percent of the public approved of “selling arms to Iran in order to get the American hostages in Lebanon released” and only 37 percent believed that Reagan “was really in charge of what goes on in his administration.” 25 Evidently, the administration’s denial strategy was not working. Consequently it shifted from broad denials to damage control, which unnamed White House officials reportedly described as “an offensive” to restore public confidence. On November 25, at the White House briefing for reporters noted above, the president announced that he had ordered Meese to undertake an internal investigation of the Iran-Contra matter, called for a fuller investigation by the Department of Justice, and promised to appoint a special review board to conduct a comprehensive review of the NSC’s role and procedures, which he did on the following day (The Tower Board, chaired by John G. Tower, a former Republican senator from Texas). 26 On December 2, in a televised address from the Oval Office, he said he would welcome the appointment of an independent counsel to look into the “allegations of illegality” in the sale of arms to Iran and the diversion of funds to the contra forces, announced the appointment of Frank Carlucci, a respected Washington official, as the new national security adviser, endorsed the consolidation of special Senate and House committees to investigate the secret elements of IranContra, and pledged his cooperation with those committees. 27 And on December 6, in his weekly Saturday radio address to the nation from Camp David, he capped this flurry of activity by conceding that the “execution” of his Iran policies “was flawed and mistakes were made,” but again he failed to specify what those mistakes were or to take any personal responsibility for what had occurred. 28 The administration’s damage control efforts had little positive impact on the public’s attitudes towards the president’s credibility, his administration’s policy regarding Iran, or the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan contras. A second New York Times/CBS News poll taken on December 7-8 (reported on December 10), found that respondents by a 47 to 37 percent plurality believed Reagan was “lying” when he said that he did

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

227

not know about the diversion of funds. 29 A Gallup poll taken between January 16 and 18, 1987 (released January 22), was further evidence that the administration’s efforts to enhance Reagan’s credibility, or to ameliorate the public’s disappointment in him specifically, and in the administration generally, had not gained any appreciable traction. In that poll, the respondents by an overwhelming 75 to 15 percent majority, expressed the opinion that the president was not telling everything he knew about the Iran-Contra affair, and even self-described Republicans by a two-toone margin believed that he was not levelling with the American people. 30 It was clear by the end of January 1987 that the president had lost control of the public narrative on arms sales to Iran and the diversion of funds to the contras, but it was not until March 4 that he made another effort to redress the balance. In a thirteen-minute nationally televised speech, he acknowledged for the first time that his administration had swapped arms for hostages and admitted that “it was a mistake.” He also said that he took “full responsibility” for his own actions and those of his administration, recognizing that “secret bank accounts and diverted funds . . . happened on my watch,” though he again denied that he knew anything about the diversion. 31 Editorial response in several major newspapers was critical. The Los Angeles Times, for example, stated that a speech could not wash away the public disappointment of revelations of “presidential inattentiveness and managerial sloth” 32 and the New York Times, though describing the speech as a “laudable” step, noted that the president “still cannot pronounce the word ‘I’ in the same sentence as the word ‘mistake’” and sounding “like a man who’s sure he hasn’t done anything wrong—and promises never to do it again.” 33 The general public’s response was not reassuring. In an ABC News/Washington Post telephone poll, conducted between March 5 and 9, 62 percent of respondents said that the speech had not changed their opinion of the president’s involvement in the Iran-Contra matter one way or the other, and a CBS News poll taken on March 4, revealed that 58 percent of respondents believed the president should have apologized to the country, suggesting that his effort to obscure the difference between accepting general responsibility and actual blame had failed. 34 It was also clear by early 1987, that the president had become the Great Shifter, or perhaps the Artless Dodger, rather than the Great Communicator. He adopted a “dodge and weave” game plan built around several interrelated themes that he used consistently, in one form or another: (1) that the Iranians and the Israelis had insisted upon secrecy from the beginning, thereby shifting the blame to them for the administration’s failure to inform congressional intelligence committees about what was going on; (2) that his Iran policy was well intentioned and worth the risk, but that the execution was flawed, thereby shifting the argument from policy substance to policy process; (3) shifting the blame for his adminis-

228

Chapter 7

tration’s problems to the media, who he claimed were more interested in a “beltway bloodletting” to undermine his administration than in the facts; 35 (4) that he had never been fully informed by the NSC staff or his other principal advisers about the exposed secret Swiss bank accounts and the diversion of funds to assist the contras, thereby shifting the blame to his subordinates, whom he believed were trying to protect him by not informing him of what they knew; (5) shifting when necessary to the “I can’t remember” defense which he attributed to the lack of ample record keeping and proper briefings from his principal advisors; and (6) that he was willing to tell the American people exactly how the bureaucratic system had malfunctioned just as soon as congressional investigators told him, thereby shifting the onus of uncovering the truth to the various investigating boards and committees. 36 The other side of the dodge and weave coin involved the total avoidance of the inconvenient facts that the Sandinista government in Managua had been democratically elected in 1984, in an election judged “free and fair” by international observers; was officially recognized by most governments, including the United States; was a participating member of the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations (UN), and the World Court (ICJ); and was a country with which the United States was officially at peace. The polls referenced above and below in this study clearly show the limitations of the presidential option of going public and specifically his “dodge and weave” strategy. He complicated matters by his tendency to create communication problems rather than solve them, because his messages tended to be contradictory and confusing, particularly with respect to the diversion issue. On May 15, 1987, for example, he told a group of southern journalists that he was “kept briefed” on the contras and “was very definitely involved in the decisions about support” to them. In fact, he said the contra fund was “my idea to begin with,” thereby contradicting several earlier public statements that he knew generally about contra aid, but not the details. 37 Perhaps this was a reaction to the fact that witnesses such as Richard Secord, a retired air force major general, who was a key operative in the secret effort to transfer arms to Iran and “residual” funds to the contras, were testifying that Reagan knew about the diversion, 38 and the president’s frustration over being portrayed as out of touch with what was going on in his own administration, and therefore responsible for a “management breakdown.” Whatever the reason, his remarks apparently motivated reporters to hone in even more aggressively on the issue of who authorized the diversion. The highlight of congressional testimony on the diversion of funds to the contras 39 was the dramatic performance by Oliver North, who testified under immunity between July 7 and 10, 1987. 40 With a tone that was sometimes confrontational, sometimes emotional, and sometimes insolent, he became the quintessential hero, who embodied strong mascu-

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

229

linity, inflexible patriotism, and unquestioned obedience to the chain-ofcommand. Essentially, he contended that keeping the contras in the field, so that they could disrupt the communist regime in Nicaragua and bring democracy to that country was the highest responsibility and that he was fully committed to it in the face of Congress’s weak-willed and wavering support. Specifically on the diversion, he said that he never “personally discussed” it with the president, but had “assumed that the President was aware of what I was doing and through my superiors had approved it.” 41 It was mostly melodramatic malarkey dressed up in hardline anticommunist zeal, but it was effective, and caused a public outbreak of support for North, referred to in the media as “Olliemania.” Conservative organizations orchestrated a telegram and telephone blitz of Congress and the White House in support of North, demanding that he receive medals for courage and bravery, and not be compelled to testify or subjected to prosecution. In an encomium that the president, who had previously described North as “a hero,” must have appreciated, Newsweek commented that North, “somehow embodied Jimmy Stewart, Gary Cooper and John Wayne in one bemedaled uniform.” 42 In Reagan’s view, North’s testimony was a victory, because it made clear that North “did not [underlining in the source text] tell me about the extra money in the Iran arms deal.” The president also seemed to take delight in noting that when the news of North’s testimony became public, “the market went up 20 points,” 43 a silly non-sequitur, which he confided to his diary. The morning newspapers that Reagan presumably read on July 13, 1987, featured headlines about a memorandum initialed by Admiral Poindexter that supposedly indicated Reagan knew about the diversion. In his diary, the president dismissed the story as “phony as a $3 bill,” and attributed it to “the media lynch mob.” 44 Two days later, Poindexter in fact gave the president additional cover on the diversion issue. He testified before the congressional investigating committees that he had approved the diversion, and had deliberately kept Reagan in the dark to “provide some future deniability for the President if it ever leaked out.” 45 Poindexter insisted that “the buck stopped with him,” although he also said that he believed the president would have approved the diversion, if he had known about it, an assertion the White House publicly denied. Apparently, reporters never had the opportunity to query Poindexter about why he thought he had the power to make such an operational decision without first briefing the president, or why a high ranking naval officer chose to ignore the executive branch’s clear and established chain of command, or whether there was any link between his effort to afford the president deniability and the possibility that what was being done in his name was illegal. Nevertheless, in his diary the president was exultant about Poindexter’s overall testimony. He wrote that it “was the bombshell I’ve been waiting for 7 months. The day is brighter.” 46

230

Chapter 7

However, neither North’s nor Poindexter’s testimonies had much impact on the public’s view of the administration’s policy toward Nicaragua in general or of aiding the contras in particular. At least seven major national opinion polls were taken during the months of July and August, during and following their testimonies, which showed a modest increase of about 12 percentage points on average in public support for military aid to the contras, apparently a temporary uptick effect of North’s confrontational and spellbinding televised testimony. In most of the polls, however, there were still pluralities opposed to military aid to the contras. All of those polls but one asked generalized questions about “aid,” without mentioning a specific dollar amount. The sole exception was a Louis Harris & Associates poll, which asked respondents whether they would favor or oppose “the US once again sending $100 million in military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua.” That poll recorded a two-toone majority (61 to 32 percent) opposed to giving any military aid to the contras. 47 With respect to North personally, his popularity bumped up after his testimony, but again it did not translate into any major increase in support for contra aid. Moreover, in several polls, between 68 and 81 percent of respondents disagreed with the description “hero” for North and preferred other labels, such as “dangerous” or “fanatic.” 48 When Reagan delivered his nationally televised address on August 12, he seemed to be back on track about the diversion. He again insisted that he did not know about it, or that there were even excess funds, but he stated that the “buck” stopped with him. He expressed his belief that both Poindexter and North were trying to protect him, but that “no President should ever be protected from the truth.” He admitted that he had let his “preoccupation with the [American] hostages intrude into areas where it didn’t belong,” and that he was “stubborn” in his “pursuit of a policy that went astray.” 49 Although he said little in the address to “boost the contras,” as Weinberger and Carlucci reportedly wanted, he did shift his remarks in a more positive direction. He devoted a major portion of his address to other matters, including his administrative actions aimed at reforming the NSC system, 50 his initiatives to end the Nicaraguan conflict, and his support for the peace agreement signed by the five Central American presidents on August 7 in Guatemala City. 51 Neither editorial writers nor the general public, however, found his address particularly persuasive. In an editorial two days after Reagan’s speech, the New York Times characterized the president as “more stubborn than sensible,” noting that “a majority of the American people concluded months ago that the President had lied to them on an important issue, and nothing [he has said] has shaken that conclusion.” 52 The Washington Post’s editors concluded that the “main impression” the president left “was that he has not come fully to terms with the most convulsive events his administration has so far known.” 53 Two national opinion polls, taken shortly after the speech, revealed that the public’s opposition to military aid to the contras

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

231

had reverted to pre-North/Poindexter testimony levels. An ABC News/ Washington Post poll, conducted August 3-5, revealed that respondents opposed military aid to the contras by a 59 to 36 percent majority, and a CBS News/New York Times poll, taken August 16-22, found a 49 to 33 percent plurality opposed giving “military and other aid” to the contras. 54 Contrary to Reagan’s dyspeptic charges against the media, he had only himself to blame for their critical editorial stances. His denials, evasions, contradictory statements, errors, retractions, failure to accept any degree of personal blame, his “I can’t remember” refuge and outright falsehoods constructed the atmosphere in which he became an editorial target. Of the five major newspapers surveyed for this study (Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post), 55 regardless of how they leaned in their general treatment of Reagan, all had serious problems with his effort to trade arms for hostages and the diversion of profits from the arms sales to the contras. In the cases of the Los Angeles Times, arguably the most relentlessly critical, the New York Times and Washington Post, although there were some minor differences between them, all three editorial boards perceived the trading of arms for hostages as a serious violation of the president’s public promises not to negotiate with terrorists or terrorist organizations, and believed that such policy would endanger American citizens in many countries because it would invite more hostage taking. The revelations about the diversion of funds to the contras underscored for them their long-standing opposition to the administration’s “irrational obsession” with the contras, the folly of military aid to an unreliable ally plagued with internal divisions, and the squandering of millions of dollars on a “slow horse” that lacked the capability to topple the Sandinista regime or even to nudge it in any direction it was disinclined to go. They all agreed that amateurism, incompetence, ineptitude, and zealotry were running rampant among the White House “cowboys,” particularly among the NSC staff, and they insisted that the fundamental problem was not that the execution of the president’s policy went astray, but that the entire policy involving Iran and the privatized war against the contras was “fatally flawed” from the beginning. They criticized the president for being “unresponsive” and engaging in “stonewalling in motion” tactics, and being congenitally incapable of accepting any degree of personal blame for the situation that he, by virtue of omission, and his subordinates in the White House and the CIA, by virtue of commission, had created. They also expressed their belief that the investigative entities, charged with exposing the truth, would have an exceedingly difficult task wading through the intricate “layers of lies” and multiple “deceits” of the participants in the scandal. 56 On the other hand, they all praised the president when he took concrete actions to get at the truth or to replace those who had been at the center of the scandal, such as the reassignment of Poindexter and firing of North, his appointment of the Tower Board, support of the joint

232

Chapter 7

congressional hearings, the appointments of Frank Carlucci to succeed Poindexter as national security adviser, Howard Baker to replace Don Regan as White House chief of staff, and William Webster to succeed Casey as director of the CIA, and the naming of Lawrence E. Walsh as independent special counsel. 57 Neither did the president nor his administration fare well in the Chicago Tribune or the Wall Street Journal, both of which generally tended to support him and his policies. The Chicago Tribune’s editors, for example, contended that no matter what the administration had been attempting to do with respect to Iran and the hostages, that there was “something decidedly disappointing and unseemly about trading airplane parts and other war materiel to Iran in exchange for human beings”; 58 that the administration had secretly “violated its own ban on delivery of U.S. arms to Iran,” and in the process “all but destroyed the effectiveness and credibility of Secretary of State George Shultz”; 59 that the whole affair was “badly botched” and exposed the risks of the White House going beyond policy making into operations; 60 that the “real problem” was not the news media, but rather the “enduring delusion among presidents that they can successfully, and ultimately, control the flow of information to the public”; 61 that though the revelation of the funds diversion was “not another Watergate,” the president’s best strategy was the “candor option”; 62 and that his “hedged answers” to questions about the diversion were “disturbing,” because the public “like to think that their President is on top of the job, and if he didn’t know he should have known.” 63 The Wall Street Journal, which the administration had considered a “friendly” newspaper, took an even harder line, from an acutely different angle. Its editorial board had serious problems with Reagan’s passive and lame response to the “Iranian sideshow,” which it viewed in the context of a struggle between Congress and the executive branch over the control of foreign policy, the politicization of the administration’s revival of U.S. covert-action capability, and the Democratic opposition’s “war against the presidency.” 64 According to the paper’s editors, “much of the blame” for the “fiasco” fell on Congress, which allegedly “forced” the president and his senior officials to navigate between its unconstitutional efforts to circumscribe the powers of the executive branch, inducing the administration to resort to mismanagement, improvisation, inadequate consultation, and making mistakes. 65 With respect to the diversion of funds, they criticized Reagan for trying to “save his own skin” and not supporting Lt. Col. North’s patriotic stance. What the president should have said earlier and should say now, they contended, “is that even though [italics in the source text] he didn’t know about the diversion, he will stand behind his staff.” 66 They also argued that none of the proposed peace plans for Central America should be taken seriously, and the failure of the administration to seek an up-or-down vote on additional military aid to the contras was “appeasement.” 67 Finally, they criticized the

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

233

president for caving in to the Democrats, by staging “a flabby defense both of its policies and the authority of the presidency,” and for having failed to veto the “continuing resolutions that carried the Boland amendments,” which they retrospectively predicted “would have forced a national debate on Nicaragua years ago, which the White House could have won.” 68 Throughout the saga of Iran-Contra, the president never lost interest in how the revelations of wrongdoing affected his public image. As early as December 1, 1986, he noted in his diary his concern that his “truthfulness seems to have become the issue.” 69 As media and public interest in the Iran-Contra hearings began to ebb in late 1987 and early 1988, he flirted with the idea of making some kind of last ditch effort to wipe the record clean and restore his integrity and his image as a “man of character.” In late July 1987, for example, he met with Charles Wick, director of USIA, who proposed a plan to put the president on WorldNet and other news outlets “to reach world audiences & undo the damage done by our press with regard to the Iran-Contra Affair.” 70 There seems to be no record available indicating that this proposal ever went beyond the talking stage, because it is likely that Reagan’s senior advisers opposed the idea. As the year 1988 opened, he recorded his concern in his diary “about the continuing belief by so many that we had been less than candid about Iran-Contra,” apparently because of the negative impact it could have “during the year about our goals & achievements.” 71 And in August 1988, the president discussed with some unidentified individuals his proposal “to do an explanation of the Iran-Contra affair” in his scheduled speech to the Republican national convention in New Orleans. That proposal also seemed to go nowhere; in fact, his speech to the convention did not contain a single reference to any aspect of the Iran-Contra scandal. 72 Between mid-November 1987, when the congressional joint investigating committee issued its official report on the Iran arms and contra aid “controversy,” 73 and Reagan’s departure from Washington in January 1989, the president never deviated from his denial mode and his “I didn’t know” posture. On November 28, 1987, at a meeting with business leaders on his deficit reduction plan, an attendee asked during the Q&A session why the president was silent on the congressional joint investigating committee’s report, which had been released ten days earlier, after promising to tell all when it appeared. He replied that “maybe they labored and brought forth a mouse.” 74 On December 3, in an interview with television network broadcasters, he denied that his attempted opening to Iran constituted a scandal, because his administration had no dealings with the Ayatollah or the Iranian revolutionary guard and those individuals who had been dealt with made it “pretty plain that they didn’t support terrorism.” He also denied that he had known about the diversion of funds to the contras until it was revealed by a Beirut news-

234

Chapter 7

paper, and then claimed credit for telling the media that money had been diverted. 75 On June 21, 1988, at a news conference in Toronto, in response to questions about the diversion of funds, he said that he had appointed the Tower Commission to follow the money trail, but that “after all the months of investigation by the Congress, I still haven’t found out how there was extra money.” 76 Finally, at an informal exchange with reporters on October 31, 1988, in response to a question from UPI’s Helen Thomas about the scandal in his administration and the diversion of funds to the contras, he said that “scandal . . . has been artificially created by a media that I cannot understand.” Thomas followed up by asking him whether he should have known what occurred “when it happened from your White House?” Reagan replied: “But we didn’t know it. And I am still asking, after 10 months of a congressional investigation. I still don’t know who delivered the weapons and where the money came from.” 77 During this late phase of his administration, two things were readily apparent: (1) true to the position he had announced almost two years before, he was still waiting for the investigative committees to inform him what had occurred in his own administration and (2) his parsing of what he knew about the whole Iran-Contra episode became increasingly detached from reality. When Reagan left Washington at the end of his second term, the fallout from the Iran-Contra scandal followed him to California. During the post-presidential period, he had at least two more opportunities to wipe the record clean and refurbish his image as a credible chief executive. The first was the publication of his autobiography in 1990. The version of the scandal he presented there did not differ markedly from the version that had evolved between mid-1986 and January 1989. Assuming the role once again of the Great Shifter, he tried rather unconvincingly to explain why he had been uninformed about the policies executed in his name. He blamed individuals like Oliver North, whom he knew “only slightly,” the deceased Bill Casey, in whom he “trusted and believed,” and Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, his national security advisers, who considered the NSC exempt from the Boland Amendments, for misinforming and misleading him. At the same time, he attributed the origin of the effort to open a channel in Iran to Iranian “moderates” and to the Israelis, who were presumably following the wishes of Prime Minister Shimon Peres. He averred that he never heard a “whisper” about the diversion of funds to the contras, and that if he had known, he “would not have approved it,” and that he was completely in the dark about the wholesale shredding of documents after the diversion memo was found. Unfortunately, the take-away from his autobiography was the implicit admission that he had lied to the American people on the basis of his subordinates’ assurances that everything they were doing was legal. 78 That was a curious admission indeed from a former president who was presumably sup-

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

235

posed to have known how the executive branch chain of command actually worked. Reagan’s second opportunity to clear the air was when he testified for the defense at Poindexter’s trial in February 1992, 79 which was widely covered by the media. 80 His testimony turned into a personal disaster for the former president, and it did little to help Poindexter, whose attorneys wanted to demonstrate that Reagan had approved Poindexter’s actions in the Iran-Contra affair. Reagan, who was seventy-nine years old at the time he testified, sat in the witness box for eight hours over a two-day period. Those who watched his testimony on video either then or later, after the presiding judge, Harold H. Greene, ordered the tapes released to the public, witnessed a caricature of the so-called Great Communicator. He fumbled his words, was unable to recall individuals such as General John W. Vessey Jr., his JCS chairman, with whom he had worked closely, or simple facts that were on the public record pertaining to the Tower Board, which he had appointed. He pled ignorance over eighty times to the questions lawyers put to him. He was, in fact, unable to recall much of anything, leading many who watched his performance to wonder about his mental lapses and the condition of his mind. 81 On two points, however, he seemed quite sure of himself: his passionate commitment to the anti-communist contras and his belief that no one had ever told him about the diversion of funds to them. With respect to the contras, he explained that he had supported them unconditionally because of his belief that the Soviet Union planned, as Lenin had laid out, to “take Eastern Europe . . . organize the hordes of Asia and . . . [then] move onto Latin America. And once having taken that . . . the United States would fall into their outstretched hand like overripe fruit.” Evidently, Reagan had reached some sort of bizarre pinnacle in his remarkably ill-informed and unidimensional view of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy and the complexities of international politics. Regarding the diversion, as Theodore Draper has observed, “Reagan’s memory apparently deserted him altogether,” despite the fact that he had been provided with considerable information about it by his closest advisers in 1986 and the Tower Board report in February 1987. 82 The former president insisted that “to this day, I don’t have any information or knowledge that . . . there was a diversion . . . . I, to this day do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,” or that “there was ever more money in that Swiss [bank] account that had been diverted someplace else.” 83 In a Boston Globe/WBZ-TV poll of voters taken in late February, after the release of Reagan’s testimony, 61 percent of those surveyed said that they believed he was lying about what he could and could not remember about his role in the Iran-Contra affair, as opposed to 26 percent who thought he was being truthful. 84 It was a sad end to an almost seven-year-long saga that severely eroded the claim that Reagan was the Great Communicator and damaged his presidential legacy.

236

Chapter 7

The epilogue to the Iran-Contra scandal was perhaps even more unfortunate. It was another unsavory concoction compounded of several distinct elements. In the first place, many of the main participants, minor players and bystanders in the scandal wrote and published their own versions of the story in an effort to “explain” or “clarify” or “defend” or “justify” their respective roles. Their memoirs and accounts, however, were collectively tantamount to an effort to rewrite the history of the scandal, to shift the blame for what had occurred from themselves to others and/or to protect their own reputations. 85 In a series of incisive and critical reviews published in the New York Review of Books between 1989 and 1994, Theodore Draper deconstructed many of these revisionist accounts. He pointed out the distortions, selective use of “facts,” selfserving interpretations, and mythical reconstructions of the public record they contained. For example, he found Michael A. Ledeen’s Perilous Statecraft (1988), “mainly an apologia for himself” and offering a “mythical” version of the shipment of HAWK missiles from Israel to Iran in November 1985. 86 In his review of George Shultz’s memoir, Turmoil and Tradition (1993), which contains three chapters on Iran-Contra, he noted that although Shultz “played the most honorable role” of all the leading figures in the scandal, he faults him for inflating his alleged “victories” in the internal bureaucratic struggles to terminate the arms for hostages deal in 1985 and for his timidity in pushing the president to come clean publicly about the whole Iran-Contra affair in 1986. 87 Draper also dismisses Caspar Weinberger’s Fighting for Peace (1990), the former secretary of defense’s memoir, which contains a chapter on Iran and the hostages as a “travesty of events,” and specifically for shifting the responsibility for almost everything that went wrong to Robert McFarlane, the former national security adviser who had resigned from the administration in December 1985, before most of the arms sales and the diversion of profits to the contras had actually taken place. 88 While some of the participants in the Iran-Contra follies were attempting to rewrite the history of the scandal, others who had served in the Reagan administration and their conservative allies who had not, mounted a campaign to shift responsibility for the whole sordid affair to the Democratic-controlled Congress and especially the Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC), Lawrence E. Walsh. These individuals offered a curious patchwork of arguments in their effort to find the “real villains” in the story: those involved in the Iran-Contra effort were “patriots” who wanted to defend the United States against the serious threat of SovietCuban-Nicaraguan communism in the Western Hemisphere; they were merely following the president’s request to keep the contras afloat so that they could become a viable political force against the communist Sandinistas; they were compelled to mislead Congress because all that body did was to dilly-dally and erect obstacles in the form of confusing Boland Amendments in the face of a palpable threat to U.S. national security;

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

237

that withholding information from Congress in unsworn testimony was not a criminal act, but a historical tradition in the United States, done by many administrations with impunity, because it was recognized as an integral part of executive-legislative bargaining; that Walsh was a creature of Congress and the dupe of his ruthlessly ambitious staff; that his prosecutions primarily had the effect of criminalizing what were essentially political differences; 89 and that both Presidents Reagan and Bush allowed those who were indicted by Walsh to twist slowly in the wind, instead of promptly pardoning them. 90 Elliott Abrams exemplified this line of argument in his angry and vitriolic book, Undue Process (1993), but Draper and others pointed out his errors. For example, despite Abrams’s claims, Walsh was not a “creature of Congress.” His appointment as independent counsel was initiated and approved by President Reagan and Congress actually was an impediment to the effective functioning of his office. Moreover, though Abrams argued otherwise, there were ample legal precedents for charging government officials with a criminal offense when they willfully lied to Congress, especially in an effort to cover up possible violations of law. 91 It is undeniable, however, that the cover-ups initiated by those responsible for the Iran-Contra scandal ultimately succeeded. The joint congressional committees produced numerous revelations concerning the administration’s skullduggery in running the off-the-books covert operation involving the sale of arms to Iran and the diversion of profits from those sales to the contras. Following the criminal investigations by the OIC, Walsh achieved a number of convictions against national security officials and had trials pending for two more by December 1992. 92 However, not a single official ever stood trial for the diversion of funds to the contras, even though Alan Fiers, former head of the CIA’s Central American Task Force, publicly revealed as part of his plea bargain that Oliver North had told him about the diversion, which he subsequently reported to his CIA superior. 93 Moreover, those who were convicted of obstruction of justice and perjury of Congress managed to avoid jail time or any other serious penalty. President Bush pardoned six former Reagan administration officials on December 24, 1992, including two (Weinberger and Duane R. Clarridge Jr.) who were preemptively pardoned before their actual trials, on the grounds that all of these individuals were “patriots” and victims of the “criminalization of policy differences.” 94 The earlier convictions of Oliver North in May 1989 and John Poindexter in April 1990, were overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals. After the U.S. Supreme Court denied an appeal of the Poindexter conviction, both cases were dismissed, on the grounds that the trials had been tainted by their immunized testimony before Congress. 95 Ironically, the only Iran-Contra figure who served time was Thomas Clines, a former CIA operative who was convicted of four tax-related felonies. The outcome of all the hearings, investigations, trials, and convictions over a seven-year period

238

Chapter 7

proved the viability of the old Washington maxim: bureaucratic responsibility, blame, and punishment for policy failure or malfeasance often descends from the highest to the lowest level of government officials. There was also an unmistakable thread of irony that ran through the entire diversion story. As investigators, particularly Walsh, followed the “money trail” in the Iran-Contra case, it became apparent that the funds diverted from the profits on arms sales to Iran actually involved a “diversion within the diversion.” Of the $30 million Iran paid for the arms it received, only about $3.6 to $4.7 million actually reached the contras. The “patriots” who were supposed to be keeping the contras alive “body and soul” seemed to have had other, more important needs. Most of the $30 million went to the Enterprise to reimburse expenses ($2 million) and as profits ($16 million), the latter of which wound up in Swiss bank accounts, controlled by General Secord and Albert Hakim, who ran the Enterprise and profited handsomely from that operation. 96 As Theodore Draper pointed out: “In effect, the contras share did not really come out of the money from Iran; it resulted in large part from the low prices charged [for the arms sold] by the Department of Defense and thus from every taxpayer in the United States.” 97 In short, the money diverted from the arms sales did little to help the contras and served mainly as a subsidy program for the “contrapreneuers.” 98 There was one final irony to the whole Iran-Contra affair. Oliver North ran as a Republican for a U.S. Senate seat in Virginia in the off-year elections of 1994. During a bitter campaign against incumbent Charles “Chuck” Robb, a vulnerable Democrat who faced a scandal of his own, and Marshall Coleman, an Independent supported by Virginia Republican Senator John W. Warner, North encountered several problems. Early in the campaign, he ran into difficulty, after making comments in campaign events that he had kept former President Reagan informed about his Iran-Contra operations, including the diversion of funds to the contras, and that he was told to mislead Congress about those events. 99 In a letter to former Senator Paul Laxalt (R-NV), which was released to the press by Senator Warner, Reagan stated that he was “getting pretty steamed” about North’s “false” statements, and denied that he had instructed him “or anyone else in my administration to mislead Congress on Iran-Contra matters or anything else.” 100 Senator Warner refused to support North and recommended that he withdraw from the campaign. Shortly before the election, former First Lady Nancy Reagan publicly called North a “liar.” North found it difficult to exploit the brief popularity he had achieved during his 1987 congressional testimony and the wave of “Olliemania” that followed his performance, or to obscure the fact that he had been convicted in May 1989 of obstructing Congress, destroying government documents, and accepting an illegal gratuity. Throughout the campaign, Robb hammered away at North, calling him “a document-shredding, Constitution-trashing, Commander-in-Chief-bash-

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

239

ing, Congress-thrashing, uniform-shaming, Ayatollah-loving . . . snake-oil salesman who can’t tell the difference between the truth and a lie.” 101 Although North heavily outspent Robb in the campaign, the election outcome was close. Robb won by a plurality of 46 to 43 percent, thereby ending North’s foray into electoral politics and reminding the public once again of the Iran-Contra scandal, the most negative legacy of the Reagan administration. NOTES 1. On the Hasenfus downing, see Byrne, Iran-Contra, 2014, 234-35; and Cynthia Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993, 1993, 215-17. According to press reports, Hasenfus implicated the CIA at a news conference in Managua, where he claimed that the supply flights to Nicaraguan rebels were “directly supervised” by agency operatives in El Salvador. The CIA denied the charge, but the incident led House Speaker Tip O’Neil to launch an investigation of the flight; see, for example, “Nicaragua Downs Plane and Survivor Implicates C.I.A.,” New York Times, October 12, 1986, E1. 2. The alleged opening to Iranian “moderates” was, as Theodore Draper and others have pointed out, a myth. Apparently, the claim that “moderates” existed within the Iranian government was a perception confirmed by the CIA’s office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis (NESA). In a paper prepared in March 1985, a copy of which was sent to Jock Covey, the president’s special assistant for national security affairs, at the White House, the analyst(s) reported increased infighting among factions in the regime and noted that “Iranian moderates have become increasingly skeptical of the usefulness of terrorism,” without identifying specifically who those “moderates” were. On July 29, 1986, however, Amiram Nir, Israeli counterterrorism adviser to Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who also served as the principal Israeli contact during the early phase of the Iran initiative, told Vice President George Bush that the Iranian intermediaries they were dealing with represented the “most radical elements” of the regime. By late August that year, Oliver North and his associates were dealing with a new Iranian intermediary, Ali Hashemi Bahramani, nephew of the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and an officer in the radical Islamist Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which was deeply involved in international terrorism. Evidently, neither Bush nor North felt it necessary to inform the president about these facts. In 1990 when Reagan published his autobiography, An American Life, 542, he expressed second thoughts about those alleged Iranian moderates: “it appears that, despite Israel’s repeated assurances that we were dealing with responsible moderates in Iran, some of those ‘moderates’ may have had links to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s government and were trying to obtain weapons under false pretenses.” The NESA analysis, titled “Iran: Prospects for Near Term Instability,” dated March 28, 1985, is available online at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000833184.pdf. For Bush’s meeting with Nir, see memorandum by Craig Fuller, “The Vice President’s Meeting with Mr. Nir,” July 29, 1986, printed in Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The IranContra Scandal: The Declassified History, 1993, Document 67, 240-41; on Bahramani, see Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs, 1991, 399-400, 420-35, 452-56; and his article “Iran-Contra: The Mystery Solved,” New York Review of Books, 40: 11 (June 10, 1993), 53-59 (56). Ultimately, who the alleged “moderates” were is irrelevant, because they were merely intermediaries. The arms sold to Iran, as the independent counsel, Lawrence E. Walsh, would later point out, were sold to the Iranian government itself. In short, according to Reagan’s post-presidential view, both the Israelis and U.S. officials involved in the “opening to Iran” had been duped, but what he failed to understand was the fact that the convergence of his desire to free the American hostages in a

240

Chapter 7

volatile Lebanon and his wishful thinking about resetting the political balance in the Middle East, together with the conviction of hardline anti-communists in his administration that Soviet penetration in the Persian Gulf must not be allowed, were the root of the problem. In his retrospective view of the hostage situation in Lebanon, the former U.S. ambassador to that country, John H. Kelly, who served there between August 1986 and September 1988, noted that the Hezbollah terrorists who had kidnapped the American citizens were practicing a “long standing Lebanese tradition” of political ransom and that they were in the “fund raising” business of selling hostages to support their terrorist activities in Lebanon and elsewhere and also wanted to embarrass the United States. He saw no difference between them and the individuals with whom the administration covertly dealt with in Iran. To believe otherwise, he stated, was “total hogwash.” From Kelly’s perspective, North’s plan to “buy the hostages out” of Lebanon was “hopeful thinking” and “not based on reality”; therefore, his “stupid” plan turned out to be “a complete and abject failure.” For Kelly’s views, see “Interview with John H. Kelly,” by Thomas Stern, December 12, 1995, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, accessible on the Library of Congress website at http://www.loc.gov/item/mfd//ipbib/000598 or the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training’s site at adst.org/2015/04/the-iran-contrascandal. Kelly’s description of his tour in Lebanon is on pp. 184-241 of his 336-page interview; the quotations cited here can be found on pp. 202-3, 205-6 and 219. The author served under Kelly when Kelly was senior deputy assistant secretary of state for public affairs (PA) in 1983-1985. For additional insights into the unofficial “negotiations” that went on between Iranians and Americans in the arms-for-hostages scenario, and the depth of ineptitude on both sides, see John W. Limbert, Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History, 2009, 121-39. Limbert, a thirty-three-year career foreign service officer who had served at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, was himself a hostage there for fourteen months in 1979-1980. According to him, the American officials who dealt with the Iranian intermediaries accepted the latter’s assertions as fact, because they were motivated by selfdelusion and heard only what they wanted to hear. In the end, Limbert writes, they were exploited by a series of Iranian con-men and the arms for hostages deal became a zero-sum game of three hostages out (Benjamin Weir, Lawrence Jenco, and David Jacobsen) and three hostages in (Frank Reed, Joseph Ciccipio, and Edward Tracy). 3. On Barnes’ effort, see Byrne, Iran-Contra, 2014, 141-43. 4. See memorandum, Public Affairs Strategy for Spitz Channell and NEPL, c. January 1986, Iran-Contra Digital Collection, Item IC02058, NSArchive. 5. See PROFs note from NSC counsel Robert (“Bob”) Pearson to Poindexter, August 8, 1986, and Poindexter’s reply, printed in Tom Blanton (ed.), White House E-Mail, 1995, 149. 6. See two PROFs notes from Oliver North to Poindexter, both dated September 25, 1986, in Blanton (ed.), White House E-Mail, 1995, 99. The plane carrying Hasenfus that was shot down on October 6, was one of several operated by Project Democracy, which was a cover for the contra resupply effort. Ultimately, the planes were destroyed by the CIA in a remote area in an action that North later described as perhaps “the ultimate cover-up.” See his memoir, Under Fire, 1991, 272. 7. The administration’s cover-up, actually cover-ups, of NSC/CIA activities with respect to the contras began in the early summer of 1985, when articles about North first began to appear in the U.S. press. It continued until the fall and winter of 1986, when it expanded to include the sale of arms to Iran in exchange for American hostages being held in Beirut, the involvement of third parties, such as Israel, in the arms transfers, and the diversion of funds from arms sales profits to the contras. The coverups involved lying to Congress, the press, and the public about the legality and propriety of a number of actions taken by the NSC and the CIA. For a detailed description and analysis of the cover-ups, by the State Department’s former legal adviser, Abraham D. Sofaer, who served during the Reagan administration, see his article “Iran-

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

241

Contra: Ethical Conduct and Public Policy,” Houston Law Review, 2003, 1081-1109. Sofaer makes clear that the cover-ups were of two types: those expediently contrived by lower ranking officials to deal with revelations about events on the ground and those deliberately developed by senior officials to respond to major public revelations about administration wrongdoing. 8. The Sandinista government put Hasenfus on public trial, found him guilty, sentenced him to a thirty-year prison term, and then released him to return to the United States a few days before Christmas in 1986, thereby reaping a significant public relations victory at the United States’ expense, and sowing concern in the Reagan administration that North and his accomplices were essentially “caught with their pants down,” which put the administration on the defensive and well behind the public communications curve. 9. See PROFs note from Vincent Cannistraro, the NSC’s director of intelligence programs, to Poindexter and McFarlane, October 8, 1986, and “Memorandum for the Record: Testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) Regarding the Crash of a C-123 in Nicaragua,” October 14, 1986, both in Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, 193-96. For secondary accounts, see Alterman, When Presidents Lie, 2005, 281-83; and Mayer and McManus, Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1988, 274-76. 10. “Remarks Announcing the Review of the National Security Council’s Role in the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” November 25, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1587-88. 11. Entry for November 7, 1986, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 448-49. 12. See Weinberger’s Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting on November 10, 1986,” undated, printed in Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, 315-17. 13. Entry for November 12, 1986, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 449-50. 14. Shultz, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 817-18. 15. “Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” November 13, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1546-48. 16. “The President’s News Conference,” and “Statement on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” November 19, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1567-75. 17. To a large extent this was the result of the fact that there was no clear consensus among Reagan and his national security advisers on what U.S. policy toward Iran should be. There was extensive internal bureaucratic debate over the policy and its objectives: was the centerpiece of the policy to be the initiative to facilitate an opening to alleged “moderates” in Iran to reestablish the U.S-Iran alliance of the Shah period; to end the devastating Iran-Iraq war, which was creating dangerous political turmoil in the region; to terminate Iranian support for Islamic terrorism; to free the American hostages held by followers of the terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon; to prevent Soviet inroads and the increase of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf area; or simply to counterbalance the Soviet sale of arms to Iran? There were advocates for and differences over these various objectives among Reagan’s senior national security advisers, but over time Reagan narrowed the public focus of Iran policy to freeing the hostages. When he testified before the Tower Commission in late January 1987, he told the members of the commission that his primary objective vis-á-vis Iran was to free the hostages, and he later also made that claim in his autobiography. It is more than likely, however, that he was also equally motivated by the desire to preserve U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf against Soviet penetration, given his belief that the Soviets were avid expansionists who would exploit any political vacuum in the region, primarily by selling arms openly to Iran while the United States could not. To gain a sense of the internal bureaucratic divisions over Iran policy in the Reagan administration, see the following: Draft National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), “U.S. Policy toward Iran,” ca. June 11, 1985, with cover note by Robert McFarlane, dated June 17, 1985, and Colin Powell’s handwritten note to Caspar Weinberger, with Weinberger’s response, June 18, 1985, both printed in Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, Documents 60 and 61, 220-26 and 227-28, respectively. See also Tower, Muskie, and

242

Chapter 7

Scowcroft, The Tower Commission Report, 1987, 21-22, 102-5, 112-21; Byrne, Iran-Contra, 2014, 28-41; and James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, 1988, 409-24. 18. These incidents are fully recounted in Shultz, Turmoil and Tradition, 1993, 821-24. 19. “The President’s News Conference,” November 19, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1567-75. 20. Louis Harris & Associates, “Reagan Rating on Inspiring Confidence Plummets,” Harris Survey, November 21-24, released on December 1, 1986; accessed at ropercen ter.cornell.edu/ipoll-database/. 21. “Remarks Announcing the Review of the National Security Council’s Role in the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” November 25, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1587-88. 22. With respect to Congress, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by David L. Boren (D-OK), reacted to the announcement of the diversion by opening a preliminary inquiry into the matter, and published its report in early February 1987. The report enumerated fourteen unresolved issues concerning the sale of arms to Iran and the “possible” diversion of funds to the contras. For text of the report, see U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Preliminary Inquiry into the Sale of Arms to Iran and Possible Diversion of Funds to the Nicaraguan Resistance, Report 100-7, February 2, 1987. 23. “Reagan lying, 62% in poll believe,” Chicago Tribune, November 28, 1986, 36. 24. Richard J. Meislin, “Special Report,” New York Times, December 2, 1986, A1. 25. Adam Clymer, “Analyzing the Drop in Reagan’s Ratings,” New York Times, December 7, 1986, E5. 26. “Remarks . . . ,” November 25, 1986, cited above. 27. “Address to the Nation on the Investigation of the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” December 2, 1986, Public Papers, 1986, II, 1594-95. 28. “Radio Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” December 6, 1986, Public Papers, II, 1607-8. 29. Gerald M. Boyd, “New Poll Shows 47% Hold View Reagan Is Lying,” New York Times, December 10, 1986, A1. 30. George Gallup Jr. “Iran-Contras Affair Continues to Undermine Reagan’s Credibility,” January 22, 1987; it can be accessed at ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll-database/. 31. “Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” March 4, 1987, Public Papers, 1987, I, 208-11. According to Bob Woodward’s account in Shadow, Five President’s and the Legacy of Watergate, 1999, 128-30, Marlin Fitzwater, the president’s press secretary, and Arthur B. Culvahouse, the new White House counsel, began working out prior to the March 4 television address what soon became an “innocence by association strategy,” based on Reagan’s assurances that his advisers had never mentioned the diversion of funds to him and that he knew nothing about it until Ed Meese had told him. The White House pursued this public communication strategy throughout the remainder of Reagan’s presidency, but it evidently had little persuasive impact on public opinion, the media, and many members of Congress. 32. “The Task Ahead,” Los Angeles Times, March 5, 1987, D4. 33. “The President and the Quagmire,” New York Times, March 6, 1987, A30. 34. Both referenced polls were accessed at http://www.ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/. 35. See, for example, Hugh Sidey, “An Interview with the President,” November 30, 1986, published in Time, 128: 23 (December 8, 1986), 18. 36. These themes are clearly reflected in the following: “Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy,” March 4, 1987, Public Papers, 1987, I, 20811; “The President’s News Conference,” March 19, 1987, Public Papers, 1987, I, 258-66; and president’s televised “Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy and Administration Goals,” August 12, 1987, Public Papers, 1987, II, 94245. 37. “Remarks and a Q-and-A Session with Southeast Regional Editors and Broadcasters,” May 15, 1987, Public Papers, 1987, II, 512-16.

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

243

38. Secord began testifying on May 5, 1987, the first witness to appear before the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee. He said that North had told him that the president was informed about the diversion of funds to the contras. Two days later, in a brief ceremony in the Rose Garden at the White House, the president dismissed Secord’s testimony, on the grounds that he was “misinformed.” For editorial reaction to Secord’s testimony and Reagan’s response, see, for example, “On the Stand: Patriots or Rogues?,” New York Times, May 10, 1987, E24; and “Day One of the Hearings,” Washington Post, May 6, 1987, A18. 39. Between late 1986 and the summer of 1987, the White House, via the office of Arthur B. Culvahouse Jr., counsel to the president, carefully monitored the testimony of all the witnesses who appeared before the joint congressional committees in both open and closed sessions, about events relating to Iran-Contra operations. This coverage included the testimonies of Oliver North, John Poindexter, George Shultz, Caspar Weinberger, and others. Shultz testified that he “had no knowledge or even suspicion” of a diversion, until Meese revealed it at the White House press conference on November 25, 1986. Weinberger agreed that the diversion of funds was “improper” and that it failed to provide any effective help for the contras. North revealed that there were four memoranda dealing with the diversion, in addition to the key document of April 4, 1986 (referred to as the “Diversion Memo”). That document had an attachment concerning “terms of reference” with negotiating instructions for the Tehran trip, which the president eventually approved. He also stated that a similar memorandum covering the May 1986 arms transaction and mentioning the diversion “went up the line” with these same terms of reference. In short, North implied that the president “may have approved a memorandum that discussed diversion to the Contras.” Poindexter testified that he “still believes that the President would have approved the diversion [if he had known about it], and that the contrary statements by Marlin Fitzwater do not persuade him otherwise.” But neither North nor Poindexter ever admitted having told the president directly or explicitly about the diversion. See the White House memoranda from William B. Lytton III, to Culvahouse, dated July 10, 13, 17, 20, 21, 24, and August 3, 1987; and “Summary of Documentary Record of Secretary of State George P. Shultz Concerning Iran Arms Sales,” December 16, 1986, prepared for his closed session testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The referenced documents, including the formerly classified Shultz testimony, are in the Arthur B. Culvahouse Files, RRPL; they are now available at http://www.thereaganfiles.com /document-collections/iran-contra-files.html. 40. For North’s testimony, see U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Joint Hearings on the IranContra Investigation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, July 7, 8, 9 and 10, 1987, and Part 2, July 10, 13, and 14, 1987. 41. North’s statement appears in Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation, Part 1, Tuesday, July 7, 1987, 10. 42. “Ollie North Takes the Hill,” Newsweek, 110: 3 (July 20, 1987), 12. 43. Entry for July 7, 1987, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 514. 44. Entry for July 13, 1987, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 515. 45. For Poindexter’s testimony, see Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., July 15, 16, 17, 20 and 21, 1987, 36-40; the quoted statement, made on Wednesday, July 15, appears on page 36. For additional details, see Byrne, Iran-Contra, 2014, 299-300. 46. Entry for July 15, 1987, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 515-16. 47. See the following 1987 polls: ABC News/Washington Post, July 21; CBS News/ New York Times, July 21-22; and Los Angeles Times, August 15-19, all of which can be accessed at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/. See also Tom Wicker, “Where the Buck Stops,” New York Times, July 29, 1987, A23. 48. See Alterman, When President’s Lie, 2005, 290, 401n215.

244

Chapter 7

49. “Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy and Administration Goals,” August 12, 1987, Public Papers, 1987, II, 942-45. 50. For a description of these administrative reforms, see Colin Powell, “The NSC System in the Last Two Years of the Reagan Administration,” in James P. Pfiffner and R. Gordon Hoxie (eds.), The Presidency in Transition, VI, 1 (1989), 204-18. 51. The president was referring to the Esquipulas II Accord, which inter alia provided for an end to hostilities, steps toward greater democratization, free elections, and the termination of all assistance to irregular forces. On September 11, 1987, Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 71, expressing support for the agreement, urging all parties to implement fully its provisions, and pledging cooperation in the implementation of the accord, which was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). For text of the accord, see New York Times, August 12, 1987, A8. The White House was not happy with the accord, because it failed to stipulate anything specific about stopping Soviet aid to the Sandinistas, and lacked verification provisions acceptable to the United States. For additional detail, see Kagan, Twilight Struggle, 1996, 544-66, 577-96. 52. “Stubborn? Yes. Also Wrong,” New York Times, August 14, 1987, A30. 53. “Mr. Reagan’s Speech,” Washington Post, August 13, 1987, A14. 54. The referenced polls can be accessed at https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/. 55. Numerous editorials on the Iran-Contra scandal from the following national newspapers, which ranged politically from center-left to center-right, were reviewed for this study, distributed as follows: Chicago Tribune (14), Los Angeles Times (18), New York Times (27), Washington Post (28), and the Wall Street Journal (13). For a broad selection of additional editorials on the evolution of the scandal, many from local and regional newspapers, see Oliver Trager (ed.), The Iran-Contra Arms Scandal: Foreign Policy Disaster (1988). 56. For example, see the New York Times: “The Supply-Side Hostage Policy,” November 12, 1986, A30; “The Facts Roar for Themselves,” November 26, 1986, A26; “The Iran Policy Was Wrong, Too,” December 10, 1986, A30; “Layers of Lies on Iran,” February 1, 1987, E24; “The Contras and the Drain,” March 15, 1987, 213; “They Lied to Congress,” May 15, 1987, A30; “‘The Enterprise’ and Public Trust,” November 22, 1987, E26. For the Washington Post, see “The President and Iran,” November 12, 1986, A18; “The President’s Problem,” December 2, 1986, A18; “The Tower Report and Nicaragua,” March 2, 1987, A10; “Making Adjustments,” July 13, 1987, A10; “After the Public Hearings,” August 5, 1987, A22; “The Iran-Contra Report,” November 19, 1987, A22. For the Los Angeles Times, see “Facing the Consequences,” November 7, 1986, B4; “Picking Up the Pieces,” November 11, 1986, B4; “Who Will Believe Him?,” November 20, 1986, C4; “The Buck Stops Here,” February 27, 1987, C4; “Backing a Slow Horse,” June 8, 1987, C4; “Why Contra Aid Is Wrong,” July 19, 1987, E4. 57. See, for example, “Struggling to Recover,” Washington Post, November 27, 1986, A20, and “The Nicaraguan Move,” August 7, 1987, A22; “Acting Like a President,” New York Times, December 3, 1986, A30, and “Explore Peace in Nicaragua,” June 18, 1987, A30; “An Uncertain Future,” Los Angeles Times,” January 28, 1987, A4 and “The Press Conference,” March 20, 1987, D4. 58. “Mission Impossible in Tehran,” Chicago Tribune, November 7, 1986, 28. 59. “The White House’s Iran Adventure,” Chicago Tribune, November 11, 1986, 14. 60. “The Making of the Mission to Iran,” Chicago Tribune, November 16, 1986, D2. 61. “The Real Source of Misinformation,” Chicago Tribune, November 16, 1986, D2. 62. “No. It’s Not Another Watergate,” Chicago Tribune, November 27, 1986, 26; “Take the Candor Option Now,” Chicago Tribune, December 3, 1986, 22; and ““Looking the People in the Eye Again,” Chicago Tribune, December 8, 1986, 28. 63. “Reagan’s Admissions and Denials,” Chicago Tribune, March 22, 1987, C2. 64. “Iran in ‘88,” Wall Street Journal, December 29, 1986, 18; “Keeping Secrets,” Wall Street Journal, January 20, 1987, 34; and “The Tower Report,” Wall Street Journal, February 27, 1987, 14.

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

245

65. “The President’ Speech,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1987, 30; and “Not Following the Script,” Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1987, 32. 66. “High Noon for the Constitution,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1987, 32. 67. “Reagan’s Bay of Pigs,” Wall Street Journal, August 11, 1987, 26. 68. “Reagan’s Hard Lesson,” Wall Street Journal, November 18, 1987, 32. 69. Entry for December 1, 1986, Brinkley (ed.) Reagan Diaries, 2007, 455. 70. Entry for July 22, 1987, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 518. 71. Entry for January 14, 1988, Brinkley (ed.), Reagan Diaries, 2007, 567. 72. For text of Reagan’s speech, see “Remarks at the Republican National Convention in New Orleans, Louisiana,” August 15, 1988, Public Papers, 1988, II, 1080-86. 73. There were actually two reports: (1) a Majority Report, which essentially concluded that the NSC staff had utilized private parties and third countries to conduct official U.S. government business, using funds obtained from those sources which Congress had denied, and (2) a Minority Report, which contended that Congress was to blame for the situation, because it used “vaguely worded and constantly changing laws to impose policies in Central America that went beyond the law itself,” and that the administration had acted covertly, “instead of forcing a public and principled confrontation that would have been healthier in the long run.” For text of the reports, see U.S. Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, and House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Report 100-216, November 1987. 74. “Remarks to Business Leaders on the Deficit Reduction Plan,” November 23, 1987, Public Papers, 1987, II, 1377-78. 75. “Interview with Television Network Broadcasters,” December 3, 1987, Public Papers, 1987, II, 1425-31. 76. “The President’s News Conference in Toronto, Canada,” June 21, 1988, Public Papers, 1988, I, 804-11. 77. “Informal Exchange with Reporters,” October 31, 1988, Public Papers, 1988, II, 1418-20. The exchange took place in the International Ballroom at the Beverley Hilton Hotel, in Los Angeles, California. 78. See Reagan, An American Life, 1990, 485-87, 504-43. 79. Poindexter’s trial took place between March 5 and April 7, 1990, before Judge Harold H. Greene in Washington, DC, at the end of which he was convicted of the five charges against him, involving lying to Congress and obstruction of congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair. Former president Reagan did not appear physically at the trial; he was deposed in mid-February in Los Angeles, where his testimony was videotaped and the tapes were subsequently shown to the jury on March 21 and 22, 1990. After Reagan’s testimony, Judge Green ordered the tapes released to the public. Ultimately, Poindexter’s convictions were reversed on appeal in 1991. The videotapes of Reagan’s testimony are available on both YouTube and the C-Span video library. For additional information, see Byrne, Iran-Contra, 2014, 316-18. 80. For media coverage of Reagan’s deposition and the trial, see the following: Charles Green, “Reagan to Give Testimony, Will Tape It for Poindexter Trial,” Philadelphia Inquirer, February 10, 1990, A1; David Johnston, “Reagan Testifies in the Poindexter Case,” New York Times, February 17, 1990, 1; Joe Pichirallo, “Reagan Finishes Deposition in Iran-Contra Case; 8 Hours of Testimony, Given for Poindexter’s Defense, May be Released This Week,” Washington Post, February 18, 1990, A4; Janet P. Cawley and Linda P. Campbell, “Reagan Hazy on Iran-Contra,” Chicago Tribune, February 23, 1990, N1; Ethan Bronner, “Poindexter’s Iran-Contra Trial Opens,” Boston Globe, March 9, 1990, 10; David Johnston, “Blunt Arguments by Lawyers Open Poindexter Trial,” New York Times, March 9, 1990, A1; Stanley Meisler, “North: He Saw Poindexter Tear Data to Shield Reagan,” New York Times, March 13, 1990, A1; Joe Pichirallo, “Arms Sales Widely Known, North Says,” Washington Post, March 14, 1990, A4; Aaron Epstein, “Poindexter Jury Hears Final Arguments,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 31, 1990, A3;

246

Chapter 7

and David Johnston, “Convicted of Lying: Ex-Security Chief Misled Congress to Protect Reagan, Jury Finds,” New York Times, April 9, 1990, 1. 81. Based on his review of the video tapes of Reagan’s testimony, the historian H. W. Brands writes that at the trial, Reagan came across as “a confused old man”; see his biography, Reagan: The Life, 2015, 711. Editors at the Boston Globe opined that “The videotaped testimony he gave in the trial saddened millions and should make his unblinking apologists pause”; see “John Poindexter’s Crimes,” Boston Globe, April 9, 1990, 10, while editors at the Baltimore Sun simply dismissed Reagan’s testimony as “obfuscatory”; see “The Poindexter Verdict,” Baltimore Sun, April 9, 1990, 6A. 82. See Theodore Draper, “How Not to Deal with the Iran-Contra Crimes,” The New York Review of Books, 37: 10 (June 14, 1990), 39-44 (42). 83. See “Deposition of Ronald W. Reagan, Taken on Behalf of the Defendant at the United States District Court, Central District of California, Commencing at 10:00 a.m., Friday, February 16, 1990,” a copy of which is in Judicial Documents Archives Collection, American University, Washington College of Law Library, Iran-Contra Affairs, Box 5, Folder 1. For the quotations, see pp. 61-62, 155-56, and 240. 84. See “Ortega Fares Poorly in Poll of US Voters,” Boston Globe, March 1, 1990, 10. 85. A partial list would include the following: Michael A. Ledeen, Perilous Statecraft (1988); George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (1993); Edwin Meese III, With Reagan (1992); Robert C. McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (1994); Elliott Abrams, Undue Process (1993); Donald Regan, For the Record (1988); Ronald Reagan, An American Life (1990); Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (1990); Constantine C. Menges, Inside the National Security Council (1988); Oliver L. North, with William Novak, Under Fire (1991); and Richard Secord, with Jay Wurts, Honored and Betrayed (1992). 86. Theodore Draper, “Rewriting the Iran-Contra Story,” New York Review of Books, 35: 21-22 (January 19, 1989), 38-45. The quotes appear on pp. 42 and 43. 87. Theodore Draper, “The Iran-Contra Secrets,” New York Review of Books, 40: 10 (May 27, 1993), 43-48. The quote appears on p. 43. See also, “Iran-Contra: The Mystery Solved,” New York Review of Books, 40: 11 (June 10, 1993), 53-54 and 56-59; and the exchange of letters between Draper and Charles Hill, Shultz’s executive secretary at the State Department, published in the New York Review of Books, 40: 13 (July 15, 1993), 57. 88. Theodore Draper, “Iran-Contra: The Mystery Solved,” New York Review of Books, 40: 11 (June 10, 1993), 53. 89. The charge that the prosecutions pursued and the convictions obtained by special counsel Walsh against six individuals involved in the Iran-Contra scandal represented “the criminalization of policy differences” was made by President Bush in his grant of executive clemency on December 24, 1992, for those individuals. It became the mantra not only of neo-conservatives and their political allies in particular, but of Walsh’s detractors in general. A reflective editorial published about two years later in the Christion Science Monitor, reminded the paper’s readers that “The [Walsh] investigation was not, as former President Bush has suggested an attempt to criminalize historic disagreements between the executive and legislative branches over the conduct of foreign policy. It was an attempt to determine whether the executive branch knowingly violated the laws it is constitutionally directed to enforce.” See “IranContra’s Final Page,” Christian Science Monitor, January 20, 1994, 18. 90. See, for example, Elliott Abrams, Undue Process (1993) Peter Brimelow, “Cardiac Arrest,” National Review, 44: 23 (November 30, 1992), 46-47; Robert D. Novak, “Abrams and the Special Prosecutor, The National Interest, 29 (Fall 1992), 76-82; and Robert H. Bork, “Against the Independent Counsel,” Commentary, 95: 2 (February 1993), 21-26. 91. See, for example, Draper, “The Iran-Contra Secrets,” New York Review of Books, May 27, 1993, 46-49; Kenneth Jost, “Iran-Contratemps—Undue Process: A Story of How Political Differences Are Turned into Crimes,” American Bar Association Journal, 79: 1 (January 1993), 92; and Arthur L. Liman, Review of Undue Process: A Story of How Political Differences Are Turned into Crimes, in Foreign Policy, 92 (October 1, 1993), 17479.

Diversion, Denial, and Scandal

247

92. For a tally of Walsh’s convictions, see the Fact Sheet, prepared by the OIC, dated December 1992; a copy is printed in Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The Iran Contra Scandal, 1993, Document 90, 342-43. 93. On Fiers, see United States of America v. Alan Fiers, Jr., Government’s Statement of the Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea, July 9, 1991, in Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, Document 96, 360-63; and Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up (1997), 285-90. 94. A copy of President Bush’s Grant of Executive Clemency for Elliott Abrams, Duane Clarridge, Alan Fiers, Clair George, Robert McFarlane, and Weinberger, December 24, 1992, and Walsh’s response are printed in Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The Iran-Contra Scandal, 1993, Documents 100 and 101, 374-78. See also, David Johnston, “The Pardons: Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair, Aborting a Weinberger Trial; Prosecutor Assails ‘Cover-Up,’” New York Times, December 25, 1992, A1. 95. On the North and Poindexter trials, see Kornbluh and Byrne (eds.), The IranContra Scandal, 1993, 332-34; see also “Justice Obstructed in the Poindexter Case,” New York Times, December 8, 1992, A24. 96. On the “money trail,” see Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters—United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, August 4, 1993, “The Enterprise and Its Finances,” chapter 8, in vol. 1, 159-72. See also, Robert Kagan, Twilight Struggle, 1996, 465-81. 97. See Draper, “Walsh’s Last Stand,” New York Review of Books, 41:5 (March 3, 1994), 26-30 (29). 98. The term is borrowed from David Ignatius, “The Contrapreneuers: Skirting Congress and the Law for Years,” Washington Post, December 7, 1986, D1, 2. It refers to those responsible for setting up the illegal, off-line fund raising effort to funnel money to the contras in the absence of congressional authorization and to profit personally from the operation. 99. By this point in time, such charges had become customary for North. In his memoir about the Iran-Contra scandal, Under Fire, published in 1991, p. 12, he stated that with respect to the arms-for-hostages deal and the funds diversion to the contras, he was convinced that “President Reagan knew everything.” [Italics in the source text.] During a twenty-city tour in October and November to promote his book, he made similar charges while being interviewed twice on Ted Koppel’s ABC Nightline show and twice on the Phil Donahue show. The book was also featured in a Time cover story, and in mid-November, North had a contentious exchange with Michael Reagan, the former president’s son on a KSDO radio talk-show station in San Diego, California. When queried by his interviewers about evidence to support his assertions about Reagan’s knowledge of the diversion, he referred to the so-called “smoking gun in the closet” tape, first played on the Nightline show, which was purported to be a taped telephone conversation between two unidentified men, whom North claimed were White House aides, discussing Reagan’s alleged knowledge of the diversion. The authenticity of the tape, however, was never established, and some journalists considered it a hoax. In general, those journalists who reported on his book tour and/or interviewed him, found North’s book self-serving and the evidence he offered to support his charges as “slim,” “circumstantial,” and “unpersuasive.” To sample media coverage on North’s book and his promotional tour, see David Johnston, “North Says Reagan Knew of Iran Deal,” New York Times, October 20, 1991, 16; Lloyd Grove, “Oliver North, In from the Cold: Cleared of All Charges, The Colonel Points a Finger in His Memoir,” Washington Post, October 23, 1991, B1; Larry Bensky, “Ollie North: A Soldier for ‘God’s America,’” Los Angeles Times, November 3, 1991, 8; and Kevin Brass, “North vs. a Reagan: Iran-Contra Figure Feuds on Radio with Son of Ex-Boss,” Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1991, SDF1. 100. See “Reagan Hits ‘False’ Statements by Oliver North,” United Press International, March 17, 1994; “Reagan Getting ‘Steamed’ at North over Iran-Contra Remarks,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 1994, 15; Elizabeth Shogren and Michael Ross, “Elections ‘94: Robb Defeats North in Virginia’s Scandal-Scarred Senate Competition,” Los An-

248

Chapter 7

geles Times, November 9, 1994, A17. See also “The Truth According to Ollie,” New York Times, February 4, 1994, A22. 101. For the quote, see Katherine O. Seelye, “The 1994 Elections: The Senate Virginia; After a Bitter Campaign, Voters Stick with Robb,” New York Times, November 9, 1994, B3.

Conclusions Analysis and Discussion

President Reagan’s strategy of going public on his foreign policy initiatives was at best only minimally successful. His administration’s extended communication efforts to mobilize public, interest group, media and congressional support for his foreign policy initiatives were, in most cases, distinct failures. Those efforts operated on two interconnected levels: (1) the presidential level where Reagan functioned as the communicatorin-chief, supported by his national security advisers, and (2) the bureaucratic level where an administration-wide network of individual agencies and interagency groups conducted complementary communication activities. There were, however, serious problems at both levels. The combined efforts of Reagan, his senior national security advisers and the interagency entities to persuade the media, Congress and the general public, including “niche constituencies” within it, to follow the president’s lead failed largely because those efforts were based on dubious assumptions about public opinion: that the public’s resistance was the result of insufficient or inadequate information, that the president’s allegedly unique communicative skills with television and radio would intensify his impact on public perceptions, that those perceptions were mutable and therefore easily changed, that Reagan had such remarkable emotional rapport with the public that it was more than likely to buy what he was selling, and that the combination of these elements would enable the administration to “turn around” those who opposed his policies. These assumptions were not only problematic, they were erroneous for several reasons. In the first place, in the electronic media age, all domestic communication efforts occur in a crowded communications environment. Just as television and radio give a president and his communications team certain advantages, virtually all of an administration’s intended target audiences, whether long-standing or ad hoc, also have access to a variety of communication outlets. This situation often leads to overloaded airwaves, which in turn results in a plethora of competing messages, as well as frames and counter-frames. In the electronic world, there is simply no way for a president or his administration to ensure that their messages will be heard among all the others that are available. Likewise, even if an administration’s messages are heard, there is no guarantee that they will be heard in the way the administration desires, 249

250

Conclusions

that they will have the intended effect or that they will not be diluted beyond recognition by a myriad of other types of noise. Secondly, the process of changing people’s attitudes (or beliefs) is exceedingly complex, much more difficult than the process of forming them. If it occurs at all, attitudinal and preferential change in individuals will take place slowly and in a decidedly incremental manner. This problem is compounded by the fact that individuals are selective in their consumption of political communication and tend to deselect views that are inconsistent with those they already have. 1 If we consider organized interest groups from this perspective, for example, they are normatively structured around commonly shared perceptions and a commitment to action, which constitute the core of their existence. Messages intended to “turn around” this situation must first dislodge the core beliefs of the groups’ members and replace them with new ones, a process of value transformation that is likely to occur only in the rarest of instances, if at all. Finally, over the four or eight years of an administration’s tenure in the electronic era, it is highly likely that new types of news outlets and sources will proliferate more quickly than the federal government’s capacity to respond to them effectively, thereby eroding what has long been regarded as the executive branch’s natural communication advantages. It is also axiomatic that in the formal political sense the mass public is unorganized, and the attitudes and preferences of individual citizens cannot be turned on and off like a faucet. Moreover, there is no such thing as a tabula rasa with respect to public perceptions of national security issues. Over time, collective public attitudes on major national security issues have tended to be relatively stable; for example, on the extension of foreign aid (opposed), military intervention abroad (opposed), except when there is a convincing proximate and palpable threat, the sale of advanced weapons systems to foreign countries, especially when a particular country’s support of the United States is in question (opposed); substantial and sustained increases in arms expenditures (opposed); the reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles (favor); and embroilments abroad that might lead to war (opposed). 2 The cases analyzed here represent variations on these themes. In virtually all of them, the media, Congress, and the public tended to respond in ways that could have been anticipated, and in fact were in the Nicaraguan case by the president’s chief pollster, Dick Wirthlin, who advised Reagan in April 1985 against “going public” on the contra aid issue, because doing so would most likely result in lowering his approval rating and generating more opposition than support. 3 What ultimately happened in virtually all of the cases analyzed here was that despite the intentions of Reagan and his senior national security advisers to go public on his foreign policy initiatives, operationally the administration took the path of least resistance and increasingly concentrated its communication assets and efforts on those

Conclusions

251

who were already sympathetic, thereby merely preaching to the choir and wasting enormous resources. The president, his senior national security advisers and public diplomacy “experts,” moreover, had no real understanding of the limitations of public diplomacy. The problem was most acutely seen in the Nicaragua, Yellow Rain, and SDI cases, but it was manifest in all the others as well. In incident after incident, those responsible for public diplomacy on the president’s foreign policy initiatives, whether they were in advisory, operational or policy-making positions, committed one embarrassing communications blunder after another. They were guilty of serious misjudgments, failure to vet their claims and accusations thoroughly before announcing them publicly, basing their accusations on flimsy or nonreleasable “evidence,” and what amounted to serial ineptitude in presentation. The problem was compounded by the president’s tendency to use emotional images and rhetoric that often strained credulity, and his administration’s difficulty in presenting to public audiences internally consistent and logically coherent rationales for his policies. It was exceedingly difficult, for example, for the president and his public diplomacy team to explain convincingly to the public, why the contras were “freedom fighters” and the Salvadoran opposition was not; why a technical solution to the problem of Soviet ballistic missiles was superior to a political solution; why SDI was a feasible and achievable program when the preponderant assessment of the scientific community disagreed; and why, if the administration possessed persuasive or definitive evidence on Yellow Rain, Soviet-Cuban machinations in Grenada, or Soviet conventional and nuclear weapons superiority, it could not release it publicly? In real time, this evidentiary problem led to others. Because the administration often refused to release the allegedly indisputable evidence it claimed to have, for example, it undercut its own arguments and often found itself in the uncomfortable position of significantly overreaching and inflating the evidence it did make public. This links directly to the question of the substantive quality of the administration’s public narratives. There was a certain similarity among all the narratives used to sell the administration’s foreign policy initiatives. Every narrative analyzed here, in one way or another, was constructed around a core accusation against the Soviet Union and/or its Cuban and Nicaraguan allies. These accusations were essentially ideological in nature, and both Reagan and his senior national security advisers appeared to believe that the evidence offered to prove their claims was self-validating. From their pre-determined anti-Soviet perspective the Soviet Union could do no right, and the “facts” used to substantiate the accusations against them were always considered less important than the accusations themselves. Accusations were easy to hurl and offered some initial advantages: they enabled the administration to assume the offensive in the public arena, thereby forcing opponents to play defense; to

252

Conclusions

claim that its hardline anti-Soviet policy was responsible for even the slightest concession made by the Soviets; to shift the onus to others, specifically the media, interest groups, political and intellectual elites, and Congress, to scrutinize them and to “prove” that what officials claimed was incorrect. In the short run, this approach generally made it possible for Reagan and his advisers to frame the public debate, but over time it also encouraged media outlets and the administration’s opponents to construct viable counter-frames and counter-arguments, which helped to nullify the administration’s initial communication advantages. When deploying the administration’s public narratives, Reagan consistently used a range of relatively common rhetorical techniques: patriotic political symbols, emotionally tinged anecdotes and stories, repetition of moral certitudes, the oversimplification of reality and the substitution of popular myth for political substance. 4 However, the most fundamental of all of the president’s and his senior advisers’ rhetorical exertions involved the use of “threat creation,” 5 the deliberate manufacture of alleged threats either in real-world situations where they did not in fact exist or where they existed only in the perceptions of Reagan and his advisers. As we have seen above, although the Reagan administration publicly insisted otherwise, there was no “missile gap” between the United States and the Soviet Union nor a global power imbalance favoring the Soviets that required a massive U.S. arms build-up; the Sandinistas in Nicaragua were not seeking to subvert the other countries in Central America, to implement a policy of genocide against the Miskito Indians, or practicing religious persecution against the Roman Catholic Church or the Jewish community in Nicaragua; there was no definitive evidence that the Soviets had employed lethal chemical weapons in Southeast Asia, which the State Department admitted twenty-five years after it initially made the accusation; and the U.S. reaction to the overthrow of Maurice Bishop in Grenada was a huge overreaction to a minor internal political feud that in no way represented a palpable national security threat to the United States, American citizens on Grenada or the other island nations of the Caribbean. Reagan’s reaction to the diversion of funds in the Iran-Contra scandal was ironically a reversal of threat escalation: it was an effort to deescalate his own role in the affair. The use of threat creation and its escalation can provide an administration with certain temporary advantages because it shifts the onus to opponents to prove a negative. On the other hand, it is clear that in all the cases analyzed here, the most significant failures of the Reagan administration were that its communication efforts never effectively neutralized its opponents and in the end the use of threat creation and its escalation proved self-defeating. This situation raises questions about the role of the media during the Reagan administration. Were print and TV journalists as supine as some writers have suggested? Did they characteristically give a friendly and

Conclusions

253

charming president a bye on tough questioning and lob softballs when they did confront him? Did they, in short, constitute a “palace court”? From the case studies presented here, it is clear that was not the case. While it is true that the editorial boards of some major newspapers like the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times generally, but not always, supported the administration, there was substantial criticism from many others, such as the Boston Globe, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and the Washington Post. Both editorially and via the stories they ran under their respective reporters’ by-lines, this latter group showed no reluctance to criticize the administration’s domestic and foreign policies, as well as the president himself. To determine whether this critical approach filtered down from these cue newspapers to regional and local papers throughout the country would require a separate study, but one thing is certainly clear: Reagan and his principal advisers often laid the blame for his failure to persuade the public to support his foreign policy initiatives squarely on the media. It is also clear that, despite the administration’s preference for going to television, because it believed TV was a friendlier media source and did not bother to self-correct, as the years wore on television news outlets became increasingly problematic for Reagan’s communications team. The major TV networks showed an increasing willingness to air critical documentaries and news reports and to deny air time requested by the president. Could journalists have asked more trenchant questions, assumed a more investigative role, exposed more frequently the president’s inaccuracies and illogicalities? Yes, they could have, and perhaps would have, had the internal divisions within the administration between hardliners and moderates become more publicly visible and had Reagan held more freewheeling and unscripted exchanges with reporters. Nevertheless, there was sufficient division within the federal bureaucracy and within the executive-legislative arena to provide an opening for reasonably critical reporting. 6 For writers to condemn journalists and TV news outlets for timidity and kowtowing to the president and his entourage, however, is both inaccurate and empirically unsupportable. There is an even more fundamental question that has to be addressed. What did all the administration’s public communication efforts actually achieve, either in terms of mobilizing public opinion or in successful policy outcomes? From the case studies presented here, it is evident that the administration’s largely one-way communication pattern bought little in return. In the Nicaragua case, for example, if it was Reagan’s objective to mobilize public and congressional support for toppling Daniel Ortega’s Sandinista government, then the ultimate outcome was failure. If it was to force the Sandinistas into free and fair elections in the hope that they would lose, the picture is only a bit less clear. In the 1984 Nicaraguan elections, closely watched by international observers, the Sandinistas won, but they lost in 1990. 7 In opposition, however, they

254

Conclusions

retained a plurality of seats in the national legislature and did well in municipal elections. In the 2006 national elections, former president Daniel Ortega was reelected with a substantial plurality, 8 and then reelected in November 2011. In the process his leftist FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación) party emerged as one of the two major political parties in Nicaragua and its ideological commitment to the doctrines of Sandinismo, though pragmatically revised over time, became deeply embedded in the political culture of Nicaragua. This outcome represents the opposite of what the Reagan administration sought to achieve in that country, and it paid a high price for its failure: the squandering of millions of dollars, the responsibility for keeping a bloody conflict alive and a scandal that severely tarnished Reagan’s legacy. The fact that the administration managed to obtain from Congress military and non-military aid for the contras through 1986, and non-military assistance beyond that can be explained more by bargaining outcomes, situational factors (e.g., Daniel Ortega’s visit to Moscow in 1985), and some lawmakers’ uneasiness about being labeled “soft on communism” in their home districts than by Reagan’s public drama about “another Cuba” in the Western Hemisphere and the rather ludicrous “threat” that communists and terrorists were ready to descend on California or Texas. In the Yellow Rain case, the administration’s fundamental objective was always rather opaque. Were the accusations against the Soviets merely an effort to damage its international reputation and add weight to Reagan’s description of that country as an “evil empire”; was it part of an effort to mobilize world opinion to prod the Soviets into negotiating a treaty banning the use of chemical weapons on terms acceptable to the United States; or was it an attempt to shift the public onus from the United States’ use of lethal chemical weapons (e.g., Agent Orange, white phosphorous and napalm) in Vietnam to alleged Soviet use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan? Whatever the precise objective or objectives, the administration’s combined public diplomacy and political communication efforts failed to neutralize the opposition of the American scientific community and major media outlets. The administration could not sustain or credibly prove the accusations, because the “evidence” it produced to do so was flimsy, conjectural and at best an unwise rush to judgment. In the process, the administration became a laughing stock in the world-wide scientific community and lost the support of many friendly governments on the issue, as well as that of major international organizations. The most embarrassing feature of the whole episode was the fact that even some scientists and diplomatic officials in the Reagan administration had serious doubts about the administration’s case. Despite these developments, the State Department continued to defend the accusations it launched in early 1981 for a quarter of a century, when it obliquely admitted in 2005 that it had no case.

Conclusions

255

The successful sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia was the result of two distinct factors: the Reagan administration’s fulfillment of a commitment initially made by the Carter administration; and the president’s triumph in bargaining with members of Congress, particularly in the Senate. The sale did not depend on the president’s effort to mobilize media and public opinion, which he clearly failed to accomplish. In fact, administration public communication assets were of distinctly secondary importance, while the president’s and his advisers’ efforts to bargain with senators assumed primary importance. Reagan and his national security advisers were able to use effectively the range of powers and perquisites that inhere in the executive branch to obtain congressional assent to the AWACS sale, in part because the executive branch enjoys what often has been called a “natural monopoly” in the area of national security policy, in part because they were able to take advantage of considerable fragmentation and vote-shifting in Congress; and in part because James Baker and his legislative strategy team were able to work successfully with the Senate leadership of both parties. Various promises and guarantees were made part of the public record of the sale to satisfy the initial doubts and misgivings of many members, particularly in the Senate, which ultimately gained enough support to approve the sale. Insofar as the U.S.Saudi bilateral relationship was concerned, there was minimal near-term payoff for the United States from what appeared to be an exchange in the form of a quid pro quo, in which the Saudis quickly accepted the quid, but conveniently ignored the quo. In the MX case, the administration encountered a number of significant problems from the outset that militated against the possibility that it could mobilize public and congressional opinion behind the program. In the first place, the fundamental problem was rooted in the contrived claim that the MX was absolutely necessary for national security, because alleged Soviet conventional and nuclear arms superiority put the United States in a dangerously vulnerable position. Critics all along the political and ideological spectrum denied the administration’s claim, which was also opposed by many scientists, arms control experts, and fiscal conservatives in Congress. In the second place, the public debate over the necessity and desirability of the program became mired from the outset in a swamp of technological arcana: “window of vulnerability,” “margin of safety,” “fratricide,” “pindown,” and “bargaining chips.” Neither Reagan, who often seemed confused about facets of the program, nor his more informed national security advisers were able to break through the miasma in a convincing way. Finally, the administration never persuasively demonstrated that it could resolve the festering issues of how or where to base the new missile. The cumulative impact of these problems reduced the whole affair to what was essentially a protracted and tortuous process of executive-legislative bargaining between the administration and its MX opponents in Congress on virtually every aspect of the

256

Conclusions

program. The continued support for funding MX development and production did not result from the president’s success in moving public opinion, but rather from bargaining and the political calculations of individual members of Congress. In fact, the bargaining made it necessary for the president and his national security advisers to shift their communication assets to reinforce their efforts to obtain annual funding for the program. In the end, the ultimate policy outcome was a costly failure. President George H. W. Bush formally cancelled the $20+ billion program in 1991, and the last of 114 MX missiles was deactivated in September 2005. At no time was there any demonstrable proof that the MX program deterred the Soviets from anything or that it compelled them to negotiate arms control agreements, which they had been willing to do from early on during the Reagan administration and especially during the tenure of Gorbachev. Regarding SDI, if the objective was to mobilize elite and mass opinion to support the construction of a total or partial (it was never definitively clear which) defensive umbrella around the United States and its allies to deflect an adversary’s incoming missiles, then the outcome was also a failure. If it was to use the prospect of such a defensive system as a bargaining chip (which Reagan consistently denied) to nudge the Soviets toward a more amenable position on arms control in general and verifiability in particular, then again the record is only a tad less than absolutely clear. On the one hand, the United States and the Soviet Union successfully negotiated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, but that outcome was largely attributable to substantial political and economic changes in the Soviet Union instituted by Gorbachev, and to Reagan’s quest for a post-presidential legacy, especially after the eruption of the Iran-Contra scandal, than it was to any pressure generated by U.S. insistence on building a space-based defense system. On the other hand, the administration achieved some success in bargaining with lawmakers to support the research and development program associated with SDI, given the distributional benefits that accrued to many congressional home districts. Between March 1983 and March 1988, the USG dispensed about $15 billion on various SDI research contracts, 78 percent of which went to corporations in all but four of the states. 9 This was distributive legislation par excellence, where the benefits were concentrated on a specialized research sector and the costs widely dispersed to taxpayers. Year after year, regardless of their individual beliefs in the feasibility or sensibility of a space-based defensive system, lawmakers voted funding for the research program, though usually not as much as the administration requested. In the end, however, the SDI research program primarily benefitted defense corporations and never actually produced a system even remotely resembling Reagan’s “vision.” The Grenada docudrama/spectacle also resulted from a “threat” manufactured by the Reagan administration. Reagan and his national security

Conclusions

257

advisers resorted to tactics of secrecy and news blackout to immunize themselves against public, media, and congressional opposition. They ultimately presented the public with a fait accompli, which they attempted to justify with ex post facto arguments. Their public narrative explaining the invasion was characterized by a remarkable degree of factual distortion, insupportable insinuation and patriotic bluster. Had nineteen Americans not been killed and 116 not been wounded in the five-day “war,” it is likely that many observers would have regarded the affair as an opéra bouffe. In their efforts to justify the invasion, neither the president nor his advisers ever made perfectly clear what their reasons actually were. In his public speeches, the president initially said that the reasons were the safety of American citizens and a formal request from the OECS, but most of his public commentary focused on Soviet-Cuban intentions to convert the island into a military bastion for subversion in the Caribbean region. The deputy secretary of state, Kenneth Dam, however, told two congressional subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 2, 1983, that the elimination of Soviet-Cuban influence in Grenada was just “an extra bonus for the American people,” and not a reason for the invasion. 10 Fortunately for the administration, the public seemed unconcerned about such fuzziness, and its support for the “victory” in Grenada, as measured by major opinion polls, was substantial, though qualified in a variety of ways. In this particular case, it was the military action itself that counted and not the alleged persuasiveness of Reagan and his senior advisers. At last, a public pummeled by the embarrassing U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the infamous 444-day Iran hostage crisis and the tragic terrorist action against the U.S. Marine base in Beirut were presented with something positive that they could celebrate. The funds diversion case in the Iran-Contra scandal was the epitome of a failed presidential effort to go public. In this case, the president had no real bargaining option and he seemed confident that his television and radio addresses would persuade the public to buy his version of the events. In fact, the entire scenario was a classic “tar baby” situation: the more Reagan and his closest advisers tried to clarify, explain, or deny his role in the diversion of funds from the sale of arms to Iran to help finance the contra war against the legitimate and democratically elected Sandinista government of Nicaragua, the more deeply entangled they became in the dense web of obfuscation, cover-up, and prevarication that suffused the whole issue of the president’s involvement. The way they handled the public narrative on that issue was utterly amateurish and unbefitting their roles as officials responsible for the conduct of American foreign policy. In the process, they created conundrums for which they could not provide even minimally satisfactory answers. If the president in fact did not know about the diversion, which was hatched in the White House, the NSC, and the CIA, then where was he when it all unfolded and how lax and irresponsible was his management of his own administration? On

258

Conclusions

the other hand, if he had even an inkling of what was done in his name and on his watch, then weren’t his denials tantamount to public fabrications and wasn’t he culpable for serious violations of congressional legislation and intent. Throughout the course of the tawdry scandal, Reagan and his cohorts, managed to fool some people, but in the end, the American public by consistent substantial majorities perceived Reagan as a liar, an ironic outcome for a president whom the public had previously regarded as a congenial, honest, and likeable individual. On balance Reagan achieved much more success with political bargaining, referred to in the media as “making deals,” “negotiating,” “horse trading,” “arm twisting,” “political wrangling,” or even “lobbying,” than he did by going public. In six of the seven cases examined here, his television and radio addresses and his public appearances never successfully mobilized majorities in support of his policy initiatives, generated discernible pressure on Congress, or neutralized the counter-pressure from his opponents. The bargaining model was clearly manifest in the Nicaragua, AWACS, MX, and SDI cases, where the common denominator was the administration’s need for congressional funding, which had to be renewed in each case on an annual basis. In the Yellow Rain and Grenada cases, where funding imperatives were less urgent, the president and his national security advisers devoted a lot of energy to public speeches and appearances, without much payoff. In the Yellow Rain case, going public failed totally and essentially became an embarrassment for the administration, while the Grenada invasion merely presented the public with a fait accompli and an opportunity to participate in an informal referendum on a military “victory.” All of this, however, should not be surprising. As even Kernell notes, Reagan always had the choice to “deal” or go public, and when he opted to go public, he did it “sometimes exclusively, other times in combination with bargaining.” 11 The cases presented here, however, confirm that in the field of executivelegislative foreign policy making he generally opted not to choose the “exclusive” option. The bottom line is that his efforts to go public produced little policy support, and that he would have been better off emphasizing more traditional political leverages, such as coalition and consensus building and more travel to congressional districts. In the process of foreign policy formulation and implementation, the “going public” model has minimal utility. The problem is largely attributable to the fact that the model elides numerous fundamental questions and fails to draw from other models that are relevant, such as the “bureaucratic politics” model. We can agree that every president has the option of going public and that the dominance of electronic forms of communication is an enticement to do so. However, whenever a president opts to go public on a foreign policy initiative, the immediate question is, to which public: political activists, national security experts and intellectual elites who usually obtain their information from quality

Conclusions

259

newspapers, journals, on-line sites and think-tank publications; interest groups, which are primed to lobby members of Congress, when the policy initiative in question moves from the executive to the legislative branch; or the general public? If the latter, then additional questions arise: which segment or segments of that unorganized, and often disorganized, entity should be targeted; how can the public be segmented to achieve maximum impact; whether the targeted segments might cancel each other out; and whether the issue involved is actually salient for the mass public or only for niche constituencies within it? These questions are further muddied by what we know about the role of public opinion in the foreign policy arena. Only a minute percentage of the public (an estimated 3 to 5 percent) has a sustained interest in foreign policy issues and the percentage of those who are knowledgeable about foreign policy is equally small. During crisis situations, there may be a temporary uptick in interest, but that quickly subsides after the crisis passes, and in fact most foreign policy issues are non-crisis ones, dealing with such matters as trade and aid. And finally, those members of the general public who are interested in foreign policy have relatively fixed attitudes, which are unlikely targets for change, especially via national television or radio addresses, because the intended audience targets are usually unpredictable. Any effort by an administration to “turn around” that situation is an exercise in high expectations and low achievement. In short, the foreign policy arena is not fertile soil for going public. The cases analyzed also strongly suggest that the administration’s public diplomacy regime had a more negative than positive impact on both Reagan’s efforts to mobilize public opinion and his presidential leadership. The basic reasons were three-fold. In the first place, as the failure of the administration’s public diplomacy experts to “turn around” or “mobilize” public opinion became clearer over time, the more their efforts veered off into propagandistic tropes and severely undercut the credibility of their arguments and therefore the credibility of the narratives. Secondly, anti-communism and anti-Sovietism failed as a basis for public diplomacy, largely because the media, political activists, interest groups, many members of Congress, and the general public perceived no palpable and proximate threat to U.S. national security. Whether or not there was a threat in the alleged Soviet Union’s conventional and nuclear arms superiority and the progress they were making on anti-missile defense, for example, was essentially irrelevant, because the administration’s proposed solutions (e.g., massive arms buildup and visionary defensive schemes) were at best uncertain, potentially provocative, and startlingly expensive. Ideology cannot substitute for a credible and internally coherent policy, and ideological zeal is a highly distorting prism, which often drives the invention of political reality rather than the comprehension of it. Nor is it ever a viable substitute for substantive public debate. Thirdly, public diplomacy practitioners spent too much time, energy, and re-

260

Conclusions

sources attempting to make the administration’s accusations, distortions, and fallacious arguments comport with political reality. Essentially, that was a zero-sum game, because insupportable assertions and deliberate threat creation do not constitute political realism and political reality usually trumps everything else. Foreign policy was sufficiently polarized in the post-Vietnam period to make a president’s efforts to mobilize a significant majority of public opinion, absent a clearly perceived and proximate national security threat, exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, instead of opting to expend more of his political capital on traditional coalition and consensus building, both inside and outside of Congress, Reagan and his communication advisers chose instead to resort increasingly to a combination of emotional rhetoric and threat creation, thereby making a substantial contribution to what has become since then a frequent presidential public communication and leadership strategy. Ultimately, the president may have subliminally recognized the limitations of the approach he followed, when he delivered his farewell address to the nation, admitting that “I wasn’t a great communicator . . . .” 12 That admission may have been merely another example of Reagan’s disarming simplicity, but in light of this study it seems to have been a more accurate assessment of his role as president than that offered by many scholars and writers since 1980. There are lessons about the use of public diplomacy abroad that one might also glean from the cases studied here. Public diplomacy practitioners and analysts, no matter which administration they serve or which audiences they target, often have a tendency to peer into the proverbial wrong end of the political telescope. They focus primarily on reforming the bureaucratic apparatus enabling the communication of messages at home and abroad, improving message content and segmenting audiences for maximum effect. There is less interest in determining the impact of actual or potential forces and conditions in foreign environments that may domesticate, dilute, reformulate, displace, or deflect incoming messages. If actions speak louder than words, which I have suggested above, then there are numerous obstacles that political messages exported abroad encounter. Like the domestic arena, there is no tabula rasa in the international arena. Historical images like “Colossus of the North” or “Great Satan” or “Defiler of Holy Soil” or “the supporter of repressive regimes,” to name just a few, are not only often potent, but they timebind, passing from one generation to the next, particularly in societies where memories are long. Real time events, such as “collateral damage” resulting from drone strikes or widely disseminated photos of the abuse of “detainees,” for example, add to the problem. The problem is further exacerbated by disparate levels of internal ethnic, religious, socioeconomic and tribal or clan divisiveness, and weak or fragmented political structures in many target countries abroad. This situation is likely to require a symphonic diversity of outgoing messages, which increases the

Conclusions

261

potential for message misalignment. Finally, it is unlikely that individuals abroad are less susceptible to selective perception and rationalization than American citizens. In short, if an administration’s domestic public diplomacy efforts are of limited impact, as we have seen in this study, then how can we expect them to be effective abroad where the communication barriers are arguably much higher? 13 There are several broader political generalizations that can be drawn as well. First, the analyses presented above make it clear that Reagan was lamentably uninformed about both the complexities and realities of regional politics in many geographic areas. With respect to the Middle East, for example, he publicly claimed on the one hand that an “opening” to Iran could lead to a resetting or a rebalancing of the Middle East, while on the other he claimed that Saudi Arabia was the key to peace in the region. The fact that Persian Shiite Iran and Arab Sunni Saudi Arabia were historic adversaries divided by ethnic, religious, tribal, and political differences seemed to elude him. He never attempted to describe precisely or even generally how those opposing claims could be reconciled or by what possible political or diplomatic alchemy such potentially transformative outcomes could be realized. One has to wonder whether his lapses were attributable to cognitive dissonance, what he was hearing from his intelligence briefers on the Middle East, how he mentally processed what he heard, or all three. Optimism is one thing, but living in an apparent bubble of one’s own reality is quite another. Regarding Iran specifically, he seems never during his administration to have questioned the perception of some of his subordinates that there were “moderates” in or associated with the Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime who would be receptive to an “opening” gambit from the United States. There weren’t any. The Iranians were not interested in a “strategic realignment” with the United States. Their paramount goal was the acquisition of sophisticated weapons they could use in their war with Iraq, and during their exchanges with American emissaries like McFarlane and North, they quickly learned how easily they could exploit the Reagan administration’s anti-Soviet obsessions. 14 With respect to Central America, Reagan insisted repeatedly that the Sandinistas in Nicaragua were intent on exporting communist subversion and terrorism to neighboring countries and perhaps beyond. However, the evidence that the administration produced to prove such intent was highly conjectural, if not in many cases comically ludicrous. In fact, his own ambassador to Nicaragua, Anthony Quainton, is on the public record indicating that Reagan was inspired by a distorted version of the so-called “domino theory” and that it vastly misinterpreted the reality of Central America, where the conditions that gave rise to the Sandinista revolution were not replicable anywhere else in the region, including El Salvador. 15 Richard Ullman, professor of international relations at Princeton University, deconstructed Reagan’s argument that Cuban or Soviet bases in Central America and the Caribbean

262

Conclusions

would seriously threaten U.S. national security interests, essentially because the cost of challenging the huge preponderance of American military power in those regions would simply be too enormously high for the Cubans and even the Soviets to bear. 16 In short, there was little rational thinking and virtually no balance in the Reagan administration’s overall policy toward Latin America. There was considerable bluster about the pernicious Sandinistas, but little public concern, for example, about the grave human rights violations, leading to the deaths of untold thousands of civilians, practiced by the corrupt, repressive, authoritarian governments (and/or their “death squad” henchmen) in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Argentina, and Chile. Second, the images of Reagan as a superb arms control negotiator with Soviet leaders and as the individual responsible for “ending the Cold War” are largely post-Reagan administration mythology. As a matter of fact, the only arms control agreement that Reagan successfully negotiated with the Soviet Union during the eight years of his presidency was the INF Treaty, signed in December 1987. That particular treaty, which eliminated intermediate range nuclear missiles from NATO countries, was relatively low-hanging fruit, because those missiles were highly unpopular with many members of the parliaments and the publics of several major NATO allies. On the other hand, his attempts to negotiate a START treaty with Gorbachev ended in stalemate, largely because Reagan never came ready to sign an agreement, which would have to wait for another administration. Nor did he make any concrete progress, for example, in negotiating the stalled Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) banning the production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons, or the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaty (PNE). Moreover, even though both Reagan and Gorbachev each publicly expressed their desire to eliminate nuclear weapons on numerous occasions, between January 1986 and the end of his administration, Reagan essentially dismissed as propaganda Gorbachev’s actual proposals to do so. Their tentative negotiations on the issue during summit meetings ultimately foundered over their disagreement on SDI. In short, Reagan’s record on negotiating and signing effective arms control treaties, either nuclear or conventional, is exceedingly thin, and scarcely constitutes an impressive breakthrough in the area of international arms control politics. In fact, instead of achieving his publicly claimed goals of abolishing nuclear weapons and internationalizing nuclear power, he exacerbated the existing problem by pushing development and production of the highly destabilizing MX intercontinental missile and other forms of nuclear proliferation. The claim that he was singlehandedly responsible for ending the Cold War not only defies logic and political rationality, it seriously devalues the enormous contributions made by Mikhail Gorbachev toward that transformation in world politics. 17 The effusive assertions about Reagan saving the West are largely

Conclusions

263

attributable to post-Reagan administration partisan puffery, embroidered with aspects of the long-outmoded “great man” theory of history. Perhaps the Oxford scholar Archie Brown has most neatly summed up the situation: there has been “a tendency to exaggerate the difference” Reagan made, and though fundamental changes in world politics occurred during his presidency, they were “not the result of contemporaneous American policy.” 18 Third, no matter how much theorizing, modeling, and conceptualizing is done by academic scholars about presidential leadership, power, and persuasion, one practical thing remains constant—the role of executive-legislative bargaining. No matter how frequently or intensively the president “goes public,” how many executive orders he signs or unilateral directives he issues, or how deeply he is committed to “direct political action,” 19 there is no way for him ultimately to elide the inherent necessity of bargaining, even when his political party controls the White House and both houses of Congress. Why? For at least two major reasons: the president needs funding and enabling legislation to implement his policy initiatives, and because each member of Congress owns a vote. A congressional vote is a valuable transactional commodity, and politics is essentially both a transactional and a distributional enterprise. In the transactional sense, bargaining works when the transaction costs are not exceedingly high for any particular participant or discernibly unequal from the various participants’ perspectives and each participant stands to gain something of value. Low political transaction costs make compromise and concessions feasible. In the distributional sense, bargaining is the primary determinant of who gets how much of what, in which way, and when. Most political transactions are all about the calculation, distribution, and redistribution of benefits to individuals, specific groups of citizens, or the American public at large. The necessary bargaining that occurs in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas can be internal bureaucratic, intra- or inter-party, intra-congressional, or executive-legislative. Changing economic and political conditions, shifting party alignments, increases or decreases in the level of political polarization, the impact of technological change, the degree of legislative bargaining skills presidents possess and can exercise, and the varying reactions or responsiveness of allies and adversaries can all effect bargaining outcomes. Bargaining itself, however, is the center of the American political system, around which virtually everything else orbits. This is certainly the case in the domestic political arena and, as I have argued here, in the foreign policy-making arena as well. In the international sphere, where negotiation occurs between state leaders and/or their respective representatives, “negotiation” is essentially a transnational form of political bargaining. 20 Fourth, the centrality of political bargaining in the executive-legislative policy-making process relates directly to the question of what explains the Reagan administration’s success in achieving congressional

264

Conclusions

and budgetary support for his foreign policy initiatives, even though those initiatives were mostly unpopular with the American public, and their ultimate outcome was mostly failure? In the first place, Reagan, who had been governor of California, was not inexperienced at the game. Apparently, he intuitively and pragmatically understood that playing hardball and issuing threats was not necessarily a winning strategy and that if used would result in the stiffening of congressional members’ attitudes, rigid defensive postures about congressional prerogatives and disinclination to give him what he wanted. His instincts usually led him to opt for a softer touch: relatively open efforts to build congressional support by stressing points of agreement between his proposals and those of his opponents; knee to knee chats with individual members in the Oval Office and personal telephone calls to them to shore up support; and a willingness to make certain compromises in the administration’s foreign policy agenda. At the same time, his legislative strategy team under the capable leadership of James A. Baker, his chief of staff, was able to take advantage of the high level of internal fragmentation in Congress, where a relatively large number of members from both parties were frequent vote shifters. Apparently, Baker recognized that even slight agenda alterations, such as those made in the contra aid and AWACS cases, for example, would enable the administration to forge a supportive coalition. The administration’s congressional strategy involved two basic tactics: focusing on a combination of southern Democrats and moderates in both parties, and working through the majority and minority leaderships in both houses of Congress. What induced individual members to shift their respective votes in the administration’s direction is not easily determinable, but all the relevant congressional players presumably understood that the value of members’ individual votes is often enhanced by their inclination to shift. In general elections, a single vote shift is unlikely to make much difference; however, in the legislative arena, it can be decisive. Moreover, in many cases, it is also likely that a president’s personal attention, either in the White House or over the telephone or both, is sufficient reward for cooperation, because it could help elevate a member’s stature and image of efficacy among his or her constituents. Finally, one is entitled to ask, given Reagan’s failure to mobilize support for his foreign policy initiatives, what explains his substantial electoral victory in the 1984 election and his generally high personal popularity ratings (with the exception of the Iran-Contra scandal)? There really is no mystery. Based on the parsing of major opinion poll trend results, it seems clear that Americans were quite easily able to separate their attitudes toward Reagan, the man, from Reagan, the president. By impressive majorities they perceived him as a likeable individual, while by similar majorities they rejected many of his foreign policy initiatives. 21 Why was that the case? It is likely that during Reagan’s first administration, the

Conclusions

265

public perceived his hardline anti-Soviet policy as unacceptably zealous, which made it seem unnecessarily provocative and therefore potentially dangerous. During his second administration, particularly in light of Gorbachev’s more progressive policies at home and abroad, the public apparently sensed that Reagan’s foreign policy was still too truculent in a changing bilateral environment that offered opportunities to redefine the trajectory of U.S.-Soviet relations. 22 In the end, however, as George C. Edwards has pointed out, likeability does not automatically or necessarily correlate with persuasibility. 23 It may be sufficient to win presidential elections and reelections, but by itself it is an insufficient communication asset for mobilizing public opinion behind presidential policy initiatives, particularly in the field of foreign policy making. NOTES 1. For further discussion of attitude change, see Denton and Kuypers, Politics and Communication in America, 2008, 99-101; for a relevant discussion of political communication effects, within the context of political communication research, see Perloff, Political Communication, 1998, 185-205. 2. For further discussion of these themes, see Benjamin I. Page with Marshall M. Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don’t Get (2006); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public (1992); and James A. Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings (1991). 3. George C. Edwards III, in The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership, 2009, 45-46 and n105, cites a memorandum from Wirthlin to Reagan, dated April 20, 1985, drafted when Reagan was at the height of his popularity, containing this assessment. 4. For an introduction to the history and theory of rhetoric, see Bruce E. Gronbeck, “Rhetoric and Politics,” in Lynda Lee Kaid (ed.), Handbook of Political Communication Research, 2004, 135-51; on the use of political symbols and language to generate political support, see Denton and Kuypers, Politics and Communication in America, 2008, 2539. 5. “Threat creation” is often referred to as “threat inflation;” in practical terms, the two are essentially coterminous. For an interesting analysis of how “threat inflation” works, see Jeffry M. Cavanaugh, “From the ‘Red Juggernaut’ to Iraqi WMD: Threat Inflation and How It Succeeds in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly, 20072008, 555-84. 6. My findings on this subject generally align with the “indexing hypothesis,” which suggests that the spectrum of debate over a foreign policy initiative in the news media is a function of the spectrum of debate in Washington. If there is no publicly visible debate in Washington, then there is unlikely to be critical debate in the news media. For an introduction to the concept and its application to post-Vietnam U.S. intervention episodes, see Jonathan Mermin, Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post -Vietnam Era (1999). 7. Reagan acolytes rejoiced over the Sandinista defeat in the 1990 elections, which they claimed was vindication of Reagan’s Nicaragua policy, but they generally fell silent in 2006 and were not heard from at all in 2011. 8. In a final irony of the failed U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, several days before the elections, which Jimmy Carter helped to monitor, Oliver North appeared in Managua advising Nicaraguans to vote for the right-wing Liberal Constitutional Party, comprised in part of old contra sympathizers, to prevent Ortega from being elected president. Apparently, he was unaware of the fact that the Liberal Constitutionalists

266

Conclusions

were allied with the Sandinistas and that they helped pave the way for his victory by splitting the anti-Sandinista vote. See Álvaro Vargas Llosa, “Viva el Capitalismo,” New York Times, November 13, 2006, A25. For additional details on the election, see James McKinley Jr. and Jill Replogle, “Leftist Headed toward Victory in Nicaragua,” New York Times, November 7, 2006, A1. 9. See “Who Gets ‘Star Wars’ Money,” USA Today, March 21, 1988, 6. 10. Dam made this statement before two House subcommittees on November 2, when he testified about Grenada; see Richard Whittle, “Objectives Achieved, Reagan Says: Congress Examines Causes, Costs of Grenada Operation,” CQ Weekly, November 5, 1983, 2292-93. 11. See Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 1997, 140. 12. For text of Reagan’s “Farewell Address to the Nation,” January 11, 1989, see Public Papers, 1988-89, II, 1718-23. 13. Perhaps Robert Entman has put the crucial question about public diplomacy most cogently: if we do not have a theory, that “fully explains how media coverage and other forces influence elite and public opinion toward American foreign policy within the United States,” [italics in the source text] how can we develop a theory of how those same forces impact foreign political communication systems and audiences.” See Entman, “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case,” International Journal of Press/Politics, 2008, 87-88. For further elaboration of the theoretical issues associated with the concept and practice of public diplomacy, see the following: Eytan Gilboa, “Mass Communication and Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework,” Communication Theory, 2000, 275-309; Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy,” in G. Cowan and N. J. Cull (eds.), The Annals: Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, 2008, 55-77; and Michael Ignatieff, “The New World Disorder,” The New York Review, 2014, 30-33. 14. For an extended treatment of U.S. relations with Iran during the Reagan administration, see James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, 1988, 306-15 and 409-24. 15. For Quainton’s views, see his interview (pp. 99, 101) by Charles Stuart Kennedy, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, November 6, 1997, available at www.adst.org/OH%2OTOCS/Quainton%20 Anthony.toc.pdf. 16. See Richard H. Ullman, “Plain Talk on Central America,” New York Times, July 10, 1983, E21. 17. For an incisive and nuanced study of Gorbachev’s efforts to transform internal Soviet political and economic structures and to eliminate the scourge of nuclear weapons, see William Taubman, Gorbachev: His Life and Times (2017). 18. See Brown, The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern Age, 2014, 110-11. 19. See William G. Howell, Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action (2003), for an empirical study describing the growing influence and importance of the so-called “unilateral politics model,” which posits presidents’ increased use of extraconstitutional powers to expand their ability to govern, rather than resorting to persuasion and bargaining a la Neustadt’s paradigm. It is unlikely, however, that the issuing of executive orders and other presidential directives will ever displace the necessity for executive-legislative bargaining, either operationally or substantively. The reasons are many. For example, successive presidents can easily overturn executive orders, and if that cycle continues, the process becomes a zero-sum game; such orders have little power in law and many of them merely shift responsibility to Congress to propose, pass, and implement enabling legislation, which is not a given; if implementation of the orders requires funding legislation, that in turn generates pressure for bargaining, thereby completing the traditional executive-legislative cycle; federal courts can intervene to reshape or to nullify the intent of such orders; and powerful congressional committees, such as the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations can alter the ultimate outcome of executive actions. In short, the issuance of executive

Conclusions

267

orders and other presidential directives constitutes an unreliable and comparatively weak alternative to bargaining and offers little in the way of effective presidential leadership. 20. For some of the analysis in this and the following paragraph, I draw on the work of public choice theorists, particularly Gordon Tullock, The Economics and Politics of Wealth Redistribution (2005) and The Economics of Politics (2005); William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Public Economics (1996); and Eamon Butler, “Public Choice—A Primer,” accessible online at iae.org.uk. 21. As George C. Edwards has pointed out: “The average difference between approval of Reagan as a person and approval of his performance as president was 21 percentage points, representing more than a fifth of the public.” See Edwards, On Deaf Ears, The Limitations of the Bully Pulpit, 2003, 101. 22. On changing public attitudes towards the Soviet Union during Reagan’s second term, see Alvin Richman, “Changing American Attitudes toward the Soviet Union,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 1991, 135-48. Richman shows that during the 1980s the public’s views of the Soviet Union changed more rapidly than those of the Reagan administration, from a deep pessimism to a “cautious, dual approach toward the USSR—showing receptivity to genuine Soviet conciliatory moves.” In practical terms, as we have seen at several points in this study, the American public tended to support legitimate, equitable, and realistic efforts to increase nuclear weapons and thereby stimulate a new nuclear weapons arms race, either on the ground or in space. 23. See Edwards, On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit, 2003, 106.

Note on Sources

Much of the research for this study was done at the National Security Archive, located on the seventh floor of the Gelman Library on the campus of George Washington University in Washington, DC. The Archive has a very substantial collection of paper documentary materials, some of it housed on-site and more off-site, which can be quickly and efficiently ordered upon request by researchers. The paper collections I used include the Chemical and Biological Warfare Collection, cited here as the CBW Collection; the Investigative Journalism Research Collection (Scott Malone Donation), cited as the Scott Malone Donation; the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Collection, cited as the SDI Collection; the Natural Resources Defense Council Research (NRDC) Collection, cited as the NRDC Collection; the Grenada Research Collection, cited as Grenada Collection; and the Incoming FOIAs Collection, cited as the Incoming FOIAs Collection. In each citation to these materials, I have provided the box number and the folder title for the document used and identified them as NSArchive materials. I supplemented my research in these collections with documents obtained from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. In each case where I have cited documents from the Reagan Library, I have provided provenance, as recommended by the RRPL staff, and identified them with the acronym RRPL. Throughout this study, there are also a number of citations to documents in the collections held by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), principally found at or requested from the NARA facility in College Park, Maryland, near the main campus of the University of Maryland; these items are identified as NARA documents. There is a substantial, almost overwhelming, amount of digitized material available for research dealing with the Reagan administration. For this project, I have used the following digital collections prepared by the National Security Archive: El Salvador Collection (EL), 1977-1984 and 1980-1994; the Iran-Contra Collection (IC); the Nicaragua Collection (NI); the Iran-Contra Electronic Briefing Book (EBB); the Presidential Directives Collection; and the White House E-Mails Collection. For each document I have cited from these collections, I have provided an item number to facilitate online access; they are all also identified as NSArchive materials. I have also provided appropriate identifying information for documents cited from NARA’s Electronic Database, such as its Numbered National Security Policy Papers Collection. I have profitably used Jason 269

270

Note on Sources

Saltoun-Ebin’s growing trove of declassified documents from the RRPL through his main website at http//:www.thereaganfiles.com and several subsets of that site. Other important online sources used for this study include those made available by the American Federation of Scientists, which contains many official U.S. documents related to national security; the Rabbi Marc H. Tannenbaum Collection, at the Jacob Rader Marcus Center for American Jewish Archives, which contains documents related to the AWACS controversy; the Carnegie Mellon University Digital Archive; the American Physical Society site; the Judicial Documents Archives Collection at American University’s Washington College of Law; and The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. Whenever I have cited documents from these sources, I have provided the most up-to-date link I could in the endnotes, but researchers must keep in mind that not all links are stable and they can change over time. To gain an understanding of how American media responded to the Reagan administration’s foreign policy initiatives, I used a wide array of major newspapers, representing a broad political and geographical spectrum. These include, but are not limited to, the following: Baltimore Sun, Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, Miami Herald, New York Times, Philadelphia Inquirer, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and the Washington Times. In each case where I have cited a newspaper article or editorial, I have provided full bibliographic information in the endnotes, including page number(s). All citations to news magazines, such as the Newsweek, Time and U.S. News and World Report follow the same pattern; and all journal articles, such as those published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Columbia Journalism Review, Science, Science News, Strategic Review, The Nation, The New Republic, and The New York Review of Books, that are less than five pages in length are also fully identified in the endnotes and, as a rule, do not appear in the bibliography. Researching newspaper articles and editorials is of course now fairly easy, given the fact that most of the major daily newspapers have digitized their files. To track public opinion polls, I have cited many polls done by the major polling organizations, such as Gallup, Harris and Roper, most of which are available online from the Roper Center iPoll database at Cornell University or the University of Connecticut. In some cases, I have cited poll results and analyses directly from the individual polling organizations’ websites, such as the Harris organization’s polls on their website. All the necessary links, as current as possible, are provided in the endnotes. For the roles of Congress and individual members of the House and Senate, I have mined a broad array of congressional materials, ranging from the Congressional Record to committee and subcommittee hearings, reports, and investigations. Full citations for all these materials are pro-

Note on Sources

271

vided in the bibliography; they are short-formed, however, in the endnotes. I have drawn a considerable amount of material from the numerous memoirs and autobiographies of officials, both high-ranking and midlevel, who served in the Reagan administration, such as Alexander M. Haig Jr., Robert C. McFarlane, George P. Shultz, Casper Weinberger, and others. I have also profitably used Ronald Reagan’s autobiography and the indispensable work, The Reagan Diaries, meticulously edited by the historian Douglas Brinkley. All of these sources are listed in the bibliography and when cited in the endnotes are usually short-formed.

Bibliography

Abrams, Elliott. Undue Process: A Story of How Political Difference Are Turned into Crimes (New York: The Free Press, 1993). Allison, Graham T. and Halperin, Morton H. “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics, 24 (Spring 1972), 40-80. Alterman, Eric. Why Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences (New York: Viking, 2005). Anderson, Martin. Revolution: The Reagan Legacy (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988). Arnson, Cynthia J. Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993, 2nd ed. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993). Baker, James A., III, with Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995). Bard, Mitchell. “Interest Groups, the President, and Foreign Policy: How Reagan Snatched Victory from the Jaws of Defeat on AWACS,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 18: 3 (Summer 1988), 583-600. Bartley, Robert L. and Kucewicz, William P. “‘Yellow Rain’ and the Future of Arms Agreements,” Foreign Affairs, 61: 4 (Spring 1983), 805-26. Bell, Lauren Cohen, Conners, Joan L., and Sheckels, Theodore F. Perspectives on Political Communication: A Case Approach (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008). Bill, James A. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1988). Blanton, Tom (ed.). White House E-Mail: The Top Secret Computer Messages the Reagan/ Bush White House Tried to Destroy (New York: New Press, 1995). Blechman, Barry (ed.). Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture: A Report from the Aspen Institute on Arms Control and Security Issues (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982). Blechman, Barry and Ellis, W. Philip. The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Bodnick, Marc A. “‘Going Public’ Reconsidered: Reagan’s 1981 Tax and Budget Cuts, and Revisionist Theories of Presidential Power,” Congress and the Presidency, 17: 1 (Spring 1990), 13-28. Brands, H. W. Reagan: The Life (New York: Doubleday, 2015). Brett, Donna W. and Brett, Edward T. Murdered in Central America: The Story of Eleven U.S. Missionaries (New York: Orbis Books, 1988). Brett, Edward T. The U.S. Catholic Press on Central America: Anti-Communism to Social Justice (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2003). Brinkley, Douglas (ed.). The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007). Broad, William J. Teller’s War: The Top Secret Story Behind the Star Wars Deception (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). Brody, Reed. Contra Terror in Nicaragua: Report on a Fact Finding Mission, September 1984-January 1985 (Boston: South End Press, 1985). Brown, Archie. The Myth of the Strong Leader: Political Leadership in the Modern Age (New York: Basic Books, 2014). Bunch, Will. Tear Down This Myth: The Right-Wing Distortion of the Reagan Legacy (New York: Free Press, 2010).

273

274

Bibliography

Bundy, McGeorge, Kennan, George F., McNamara, Robert, and Smith, Gerard. “The President’s Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs, 63: 2 (Winter 19841985), 264-78. Byrne, Malcolm. Iran-Contra: Reagan’s Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014). Byrne, Malcolm and Kornbluh, Peter. The Iran-Contra Affair: The Making of a Scandal, 1983-1988 (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healy, 1990). Cannon, Lou. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). ———. Reagan (New York: Putnam, 1982). Carothers, Thomas. In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Carroll, Eugene J. MX: The Weapon That Nobody Wants (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 1981). Cavanaugh, Jeffry M. “From the ‘Red Juggernaut’ to Iraqi WMD: Threat Inflation and How It Succeeds in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly, 122: 4 (2007-2008), 555-84. Chayes, Abram. “The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative,” Pace Law Review, 5: 4 (Summer 1985), 735-48. Chernoff, Fred. “Ending the Cold War: The Soviet Retreat and the U.S. Military Buildup,” International Affairs, 67: 1 (1991), 111-26. Cockburn, Leslie. Out of Control: The Story of the Reagan Administration’s War in Nicaragua, the Illegal Arms Pipeline, and the Contra Drug Connection (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987). Cortright, David. Peace Works: The Citizens’ Role in Ending the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). Crandall, Russell. Gunboat Diplomacy: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). Cull, Nicholas J. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Dallek, Robert. The Politics of Symbolism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). Deaver, Michael K., with Mickey Hershkowitz. Behind the Scenes (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1988). DelVecchio, Brian William. “Press Access to American Military Operations and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Imposing Restrictions,” Tulsa Law Journal, 33: 1 (1995), 227-50. Denton, Robert E., Jr. The Primetime Presidency of Ronald Regan: The Era of the Television Presidency (New York: Praeger, 1987). Desjardins, Anne E. “From Yellow Rain to Green Wheat: 25 Years of Trichothecene Biosynthesis Research,” Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry, 57: 11 (2009), 4478-84. Draper, Theodore. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991). Drell, Sidney D, Farley, Philip J., and Holloway, David. The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984). Drell, Sidney D. and Garwin, Richard L. “Basing the MX Missile: A Better Idea,” Technology Review, 83: 6 (May-June 1981), 20-29. Dunn, Peter M. and Watson, Bruce W. (eds.). American Intervention in Grenada: The Implications of Operation “Urgent Fury” (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). Edwards, George C., III. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). ———. Presidential Influence in Congress (New York: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1980).

Bibliography

275

———. The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). Edwards, John. Superweapon: The Making of MX (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1982). Eisendraft, Craig, Goodman, Melvin A., and Marsh, Gerald E. The Phantom Defense: America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). Ember, Lois. “Yellow Rain,” Chemical and Engineering News, 62: 2 (January 9, 1984), 8-34. Emerson, Steven. “The Petrodollar Connection,” New Republic, 186: 7 (February 17, 1982), 18-25. Entman, Robert M. “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The U.S. Case,” International Journal of Press/Politics, 13: 2 (April 2008), 87-102. Evans, Grant. The Yellow Rainmakers: Are Chemical Weapons Being Used in Southeast Asa? (New York: Verso Books, 1983). Fitzgerald, Francis. Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). Garthoff, Raymond L. The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994). Gelbspan, Ross. Break-Ins, Death Threats, and the FBI: The Covert War against the Central America Movement (Boston: South End Press, 1991). Gergen, David. Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership—Nixon to Clinton (New York: Touchstone, 2001). Glaros, Roberta and Miroff, Bruce. “Watching Ronald Reagan Viewers’ Reactions to the President on Television,” Congress and the Presidency 10: 1 (Spring 1983), 25-46. Glass, Matthew. Citizens against the MX: Public Languages in the Nuclear Age (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993). Gold, David, Paine, Christopher, and Shields, Gail. Misguided Expenditure: An Analysis of the Proposed MX Missile System (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1981). Goodnight, G. Thomas. “Ronald Reagan’s Reformulation of the Rhetoric of War: Analysis of the ‘Zero Option,’ ‘Evil Empire,’ and ‘Star Wars’ Addresses,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 72: 4 (November 1986), 390-414. Graham, Thomas W. and Kramer, Bernard M. “The Polls: ABM and Star Wars: Attitudes towards Nuclear Defense,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 50: 1 (Spring 1986), 12534. Green, Mark and Jarrett, Gail McColl. There He Goes Again: Ronald Reagan’s Reign of Error, rev. ed. (New York: Putnam, 1987). Haig, Alexander M., Jr. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan, 1984). Haig, Alexander, Jr., with Charles McCarry. Inner Circles: How America Changed the World (New York: Warner Books, 1992). Halperin, Morton H., Clapp, Priscilla, and Kanter, Arnold. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974). Hart, Justin. The Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Hertsgaard, Mark. On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency (New York: Schocken Books, 1989). Hoffman, David E. The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal (New York: Doubleday, 2015). Howell, William G. Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Jastrow, Robert. “Reagan vs. the Scientists: Why the President is Right about Missile Defense,” Commentary, 77: 1 (January 1984), 23-32. Johnson, Haynes. Sleepwalking through History: America in the Reagan Years (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1991). Kaid, Linda Lee (ed.). Handbook of Political Communication Research (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004).

276

Bibliography

Kagan, Robert. A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990 (New York: Free Press, 1996). Kamarck, Elaine C. Why Presidents Fail: And How They Can Succeed Again (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016). Kane, N. Stephen. “Reassessing the Bureaucratic Dimension of Foreign Policy Making,” Social Science Quarterly, 64: 1 (March 1983), 46-65. Kaplan, Fred. The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991). Kernell, Samuel. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2007). Kinzer, Stephen. Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua (New York: Putnam’s, 1991). Kirkpatrick, Jeanne J. “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary, 68: 5 (November 1979), 34-45. ———. Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). Kornbluh, Peter. Nicaragua: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1978-1990 (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1991). ———. Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention—Reagan’s Wars against the Sandinistas (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987). Kornbluh, Peter and Byrne, Malcolm (eds.). The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: The New Press, 1993). Kwitney, Jonathan. Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World (New York: Penguin, 1984). Laham, Nicholas. Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of America’s Competing Interests in the Middle East (Westport, CT: Routledge, 2007). Ledeen, Michael. Perilous Statecraft: An Insider’s Account of the Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Scribner’s, 1988). Leogrande, William M. “Central America and the Polls: A Study of U.S. Public Opinion Polls on U.S. Foreign Policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua under the Reagan Administration,” Special Report (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 1987). ——— . Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). Leogrande, William M. and Brenner, Phillip. “The House Divided: Ideological Polarization over Aid to the Nicaraguan ‘Contras,’” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 18: 1 (February 1993), 105-36. Lettow, Paul. Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House, 2005). Lewis, David E. and Moe, Terry M. “The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Levers of Presidential Control,” in Michael Nelson (ed.), The Presidency and the Political System. 10th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2014), 374-405. Longley, Kyle, Mayer, Jeremy D., Schaller, Michael, and Sloane, John W. Deconstructing Reagan: Conservative Mythology and America’s Fortieth President (New York: Routledge, 2010). Lord, Carnes. “In Defense of Public Diplomacy,” Commentary, 77: 4 (1984), 42-50. Malone, Gifford D. “Functioning of Diplomatic Organs,” in Richard Staar (ed.), Public Diplomacy: USA Versus USSR (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 124-41. Maltese, John Anthony. Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992). ———. Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication: Organizing the Nation’s Public Diplomacy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988). Marcus, Bruce and Taber, Michael (eds.). Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow, 1979-83 (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1983), 125-57.

Bibliography

277

Matlock, Jack F., Jr. Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004). Mayer, Jane and McManus, Doyle. Landslide: The Unmaking of the President, 1984-1988 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988). McFarlane, Robert C. “Effective Strategic Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 67: 1 (Fall 1988), 3348. McFarlane, Robert C., with Zofia Smardz. Special Trust (New York: Cadell and Davies, 1994). Meese, Edwin. With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992). Menges, Constantine C. Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988). Meselson, Matthew and Robinson, Julian Perry. “The Yellow Rain Affair: Lessons from a Discredited Allegation,” in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Savoy, and Susan B. Martin (eds.), Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 72-96. Miroff, Bruce. Presidents on Political Ground: Leaders in Action and What They Face (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2016). Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: Wiley, 1960). ———. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1990). Newman, Bruce I. The Handbook of Political Marketing (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999). Nietschmann, Bernard. The Unknown War: The Miskito Nation, Nicaragua, and the United States (New York: Freedom House, 1989). Niskanen, William A. Bureaucracy and Public Economics, 2nd ed. (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1996). North, Oliver L., with William Novak. Under Fire: An American Story (New York: HarperCollins, 1991). Olsen, Henry. The Working-Class Republican: Ronald Reagan and the Return of Blue-Collar Conservatism (New York: HarperCollins, 2017). Osgood, Kenneth. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). Page, Benjamin I. and Shapiro, Robert Y. The Rational Public (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Parnas, David L. “Views: Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems” American Scientist, 73-5 (September-October 1985), 432-40. Pastor, Robert A. Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). ———. Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua, rev. ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002). ———. “The United States and the Grenada Revolution: Who Pushed First and Why?,” in Jorge Heine (ed.), A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 181-214. Peace, Roger. “Winning Hearts and Minds: The Debate over U.S. Intervention in Nicaragua in the 1980s,” Peace and Change, 35: 1 (January 2010), 1-38. Perloff, Richard M. Political Communication: Politics, Press, and Public in America (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998). Perry, William J. My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015). Pipes, Richard A. “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” Commentary, 64 (July 1977), 21-34. Podvig, Pavel. “The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s: A Research Note,” International Security, 33: 1 (Summer 2008), 118-38.

278

Bibliography

Pomeroy, Steven Anthony. “Echoes That Never Were: American Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, 1956-1983,” Doctoral Dissertation, Auburn University, May 11, 2006. Powell, Colin. “The NSC System in the Last Two Years of the Reagan Administration,” in James P. Pfiffner and R. Gordon Hoxie (eds.), The Presidency in Transition, Proceedings of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, VI, 1 (1989), 204-18. Pratkanis, Anthony R. and Aronson, Eliot. Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1992). Pratt, Erik K. Selling Strategic Defense: Interests, Ideologies and the Arms Race (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990). Preble, Christopher A. John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004). ———. “Who Ever Believed in the ‘Missile Gap’? John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 33: 4 (December 2003), 801-26. President’s Commission on Strategic Forces. Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983). Pribbenow, Merle L. “Yellow Rain: Lessons from an Earlier WMD Controversy,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 19: 4 (2006), 737-45. Pringle, Peter. “Political Science: How a Rush to Judgement on Yellow Rain Embarrassed Both U.S. Science and the U.S. Government,” The Atlantic Monthly, 256: 4 (October 1985), 67-81. Reagan, Ronald. An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990). ———. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1980-88 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981-89). Regan, Donald T. For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988). Reeves, Richard. President Reagan: Triumph of the Imagination (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005). “Report to the American Physical Society of the Study Group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons,” Reviews of Modern Physics, 59: 3 (July 1987), Part 2, S1-S201. Richman, Alvin. “Changing American Attitudes toward the Soviet Union,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 55 (1991), 135-48. ———. “Gauging the American Public’s Attitudes towards SDI from National Polls,” paper prepared for delivery at the meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, April 15-18, 1987. Ritter, Kurt and Henry, David. Ronald Reagan: The Great Communicator (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992). Robinson, Julian, Guillemin, Jeanne, and Meselson, Matthew. “Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses,” Foreign Policy, 68 (Autumn 1987), 100-17. Rodman, Peter W. More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994). Rowles, James P. “U.S. Covert Operations against Nicaragua and Their Legality under Conventional and Customary International Law,” Inter-American Law Review, 17: 3 (April 1, 1986), 407-508. Rubner, Michael. “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada,” Political Science Quarterly, 100: 4 (Winter, 1985-1986), 62747. Rushing, Janet Hocker. “Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ Address,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 72: 4 (November 1986), 415-33. Sagan, Carl. “The Case Against SDI,” Discover, 6: 9 (September 1985), 66-75. Saltoun-Ebin, Jason (ed.). The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council, 2nd ed. (Seabec Books, 2014). Schell, Jonathan. The Fate of the Earth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982). Schelling, Thomas C. “What Went Wrong with Arms Control?,” Foreign Affairs, 64: 2 (Winter 1985-1986), 219-33.

Bibliography

279

Schieffer, Bob and Gates, Gary Paul. The Acting President (New York: Dutton, 1990). Schneider, William. “Peace and Strength: American Public Opinion on National Security,” in Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger (eds.), The Public and Atlantic Defense (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 321-64. Schram, Martin. The Great American Video Game: Presidential Politics in the Television Age (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1987). Schudson, Michael. The Power of News (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Scoville, Herbert, Jr. MX: Prescription for Disaster (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981). Seagrave, Sterling. Yellow Rain: A Journey through the Terror of Chemical Warfare (New York: M. Evans & Co., 1981). Secord, Richard, with Jay Wurts. Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos (New York: Wiley, 1992). Seeley, Thomas D., Nowicke, Joan W., Meselson, Matthew, Guellemin, Jeanne, and Akratanakul, Prongthep. “Yellow Rain,” Scientific American, 253: 3 (September 1985), 128-37. Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Tradition: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993). Simpson, Christopher (ed.). National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). Sklar, Holly. Washington’s War on Nicaragua (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1988). Skowronek, Stephen. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Smith, Christian. Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central American Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Snow, Nancy. Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech and Opinion Control Since 9/11 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003). Sobel, Richard. “A Report: Public Opinion about United States Intervention in El Salvador and Nicaragua,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 53: 1 (Spring 1989), 114-28. ——— (ed.). Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Controversy over Contra Aid (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993). Sofaer, Abraham D. “Iran-Contra: Ethical Conduct and Public Policy,” Houston Law Review, 40: 4 (Winter 2003), 1081-1109. Speakes, Larry, with Robert Pack. Speaking Out: The Reagan Presidency from Inside the White House (New York: Scribner’s, 1988). Spiegel, Steven. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Stimson, James A. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). Strober, Gerald and Strober, Deborah Hart (eds.). Reagan: The Man and His Presidency: The Oral History of an Era (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998). Stuckey, Mary E. Playing the game: The Presidential Rhetoric of Ronald Reagan (New York: Praeger, 1990). Taubman, William. Gorbachev: His Life and Times (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2017). Teller, Edward. “The Case for the Strategic Defense Initiative,” Discover, 6: 9 (September 1985), 66-74. The CIA’s Nicaragua Manual: Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1985). “The U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia: Investing in Stability or Disaster?,” The Defense Monitor, X: 4 (1981), 1-12. Thomas, Michael. American Policy Toward Israel: The Power and Limits of Beliefs (New York: Routledge, 2007).

280

Bibliography

Tower, John, Muskie, Edmund S. and Scowcroft, Brent. The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President’s Special Review Board (New York: Bantam Books, Inc. and Times Books, 1987). Trager, Oliver (ed.). The Iran-Contra Arms Scandal: Foreign Policy Disaster (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1988). Treverton, Gregory F. Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York: Basic Books, 1987). Tucker, Jonathan B. “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2001), 25-42. ———. War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Queda (New York: Pantheon, 2006). Tucker, Robert W. “Reagan’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 68: 1 (1988/1989), 1-27. Tulis, Jeffrey. The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). Tullock, Gordon. The Economics and Politics of Wealth Redistribution: Selected Works, Vol. 7, ed. by Charles K. Rowley (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Press, 2005). ———. The Economics of Politics: Selected Works, Vol. 4, ed. by Charles K. Rowley (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Press, 2005). Union of Concerned Scientists, Space-Based Missile Defense: A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists (Cambridge, MA: March 1984). U.S. Congress, Congressional Record (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981-88). U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Joint Hearings on the Iran-Contra Investigation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, July 7, 8, 9, and 10, 1987, and Part 2, July 10, 13 and 14, 1987 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987). U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the IranContra Affair, with Supplemental, Minority and Additional Views, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Report 100-216, November 1987 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987). U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985). U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003). U.S. General Accounting Office, Briefing Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, “Procurement: Inertial Measurement Units for Peacekeeper Missiles,” July, 1987 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1987). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Full Committee Hearing on Lessons Learned as a Result of the U.S. Military Operations in Grenada, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 24, 1984 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on H.R. 5167, Department of Defense Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 4, March 20, 1984 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Investigations Subcommittee, Hearings on Allegations of Improper Lobbying by Defense Department Personnel of the C-5B and B1B Aircraft and Sale to Saudi Arabia of the Airborne Warning and Control System, September 14, 15, 16, 30, and November 30, 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Research and Development and Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear

Bibliography

281

Systems, Report: “The MX Inertial Measurement Unit: A Program Review,” 100th Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982 (Part 1), 97th Cong., 1st Sess., March 13, 18, 19, and 23, 1981 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report No. 97-268; Disapproving the Proposed Sales to Saudi Arabia of E3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Aircraft, Conformal Fuel Tanks for F-15 Aircraft, AIM-9L Sidewinder Missiles, and Boeing 707 Aerial Refueling Aircraft, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., October 7, 1981 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on InterAmerican Affairs, Hearing on United States Policy toward Grenada, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 15, 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security Affairs and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Hearings on U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., November 2, 3, and 16, 1983 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearings on Foreign Policy and Arms Control Implications of Chemical Weapons, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 30 and July 13, 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982). U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983 (S. 2248), Part 7—Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 23, 24, 26; March 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 22, 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982). U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military and Technical Implications of the Proposed Sale to Saudi Arabia of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and F-15 Enhancements, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., September 28, 30, 1981 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989: Report with Additional and Minority Views, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 100-57, May 8, 1987 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987). U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983 (S. 2248), Part 7—Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 23, 24, 26; March 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 22, 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982). U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, October 1, 5, 6, 14 and 15, 1981 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Central American Policy, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., August 4, 1983 (Washington, DC: Government printing Office, 1983). U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the AWACS and F-15 Enhancements Arms Sale Package to Saudi Arabia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, October 1, 5, 6, 14, and 15 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Foreign Assistance Authorization for Fiscal Year 1982, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., March 19, 24, 26, April 3, 10, 22, and May 4, 1981 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981). U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Persian Gulf Situation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., September 17, 1981 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981).

282

Bibliography

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on the Situation in Grenada, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., October 27, 1983 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983). U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committee, Joint Hearings on the ABM Treaty and the Constitution, March 11, 26, and April 29, 1987, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987). U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Hearing on “Yellow Rain” and Other Forms of Chemical and Biological Warfare in Asia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., November 10, 1981 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982). U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Hearing on “Yellow Rain” (Chemical and Toxin Weapons Use): The Arms Control Implications, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., February 24, 1983 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983). U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Hearing on the Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, March 4, 11, and 12, 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982). U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Preliminary Inquiry Into the Sale of Arms to Iran and Possible Diversion of Funds to the Nicaraguan Resistance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., February 2, 1987, Report No. 100-107 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987). Vaisse, Justin. Neo-Conservatism: The Biography of a Movement (tr. by Arthur Goldhammer) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). Walker, Thomas W. (ed.). Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987). Walsh, Lawrence E. Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997). Watson, James and Hill, Anne. A Dictionary of Communication and Media Studies, 4th ed. (London: Arnold, 1997). Weinberger, Casper. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990). Western, Jon. Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media and the American Public (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). Wilde, Henry. “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Are There Lessons from the Past?,” Asian Biomedicine, 2: 5 (October 2008), 421-29. Williams, Gary. “Brief Encounter: Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s Visit to Washington,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 34: 3 (August 2002), 659-85. ———. “Prelude to an Intervention: Grenada: 1983,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 29: 1 (February 1997), 131-69. Wilson, James Graham. “How Grand Was Reagan’s Strategy, 1976-1984?,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18 (2007), 733-803. Wirthlin, Richard, with C. Wynton Hall. The Greatest Communicator: What Ronald Reagan Taught Me about Politics, Leadership, and Life (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2004). Wittner, Lawrence S. Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009). Woodward, Bob. Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). ———. Veil: Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAAS

American Association for the Advancement of Science

ABM

anti-ballistic missile

ABMT

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

ACDA

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ADL

Anti-Defamation League

AEI

American Enterprise Institute

AFHRA

Air Force Historical Research Agency

AFL-CIO

American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations

AIPAC

American Israel Public Affairs Committee

AJC

American Jewish Committee

ANPA

American Newspaper Publishing Association

AP

Associated Press

APS

American Physical Society

ARA

Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control System

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

BMD

ballistic missile defense

BMDO

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

BMO

Ballistic Missile Office

CAWG

Central American Working Group

CBI

Caribbean Basin Initiative

CBW

Chemical and Biological Warfare

CDI

Center for Defense Information

CFA

Citizens for America

CISPES

Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador

CLS

U.S. Army Chemical Systems Laboratory 283

284

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CPD

Committee on the Present Danger

CSB

“closely spaced basing”

CSTs

conformal fuel tanks for F-15 fighter aircraft

CW

chemical weapons

CWC

Chemical Weapons Convention

DCM

deputy chief of mission

DEA

Drug Enforcement Agency

DI

Directorate of Intelligence

DIA

Defense of Intelligence Agency

DO

Directorate of Operations

DOD

Department of Defense

DP

Dense Pack

EA

Bureau of East Asia Affairs, Department of State

EEC

European Economic Community

EIS

Environmental Impact Statements

EUR/PA

Office of Public Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

FCC

Federal Communications Commission

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

GAO

General Accounting Office

GRMB

Garrison Rail Mobile Basing

HFAC

House Foreign Affairs Committee

HIC

House Intelligence Committee

HNS

host nation support

HPSCI

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

HSIOC

House and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee

ICA

International Communications Agency

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

ICJ

International Court of Justice

INF

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

INR

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IOC

initial operational capability

IOJ

International Organization of Journalists

Abbreviations and Acronyms

285

IRC

International Red Cross

IST

Innovative Science and Technology office, SDIO

IUS

International Union of Students

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

L

Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

LCI

“legally correct interpretation”

MAD

Mutual Assured Destruction

MPS

Multiple Placement Shelters

MRL

Materials Research Laboratories

MX

Missile eXperimental

NAM

National Association of Manufacturers

NARA

National Archives and Records Administration

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEPL

National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty

NESA

Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis office, Central Intelligence Agency

NFM

Nuclear Freeze Movement

NJM

New Jewel Movement

NORAD

North American Aerospace Defense Command

NSArchive

National Security Archive, Washington, DC

NSC

National Security Council

NSDD

National Security Decision Directive

NSPG

National Security Planning Group

OAP

Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans, Department of State

OAS

Organization of American States

OECS

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

OEOB

Old Executive Office Building

OIC

Office of the Independent Counsel

OJCS

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OPEC

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPL

White House Office of Public Liaison

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

286

Abbreviations and Acronyms

OSTP

Office of Science and Technology Policy, White House

OTA

Office of Technology Assessment

PA

Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

PO/OAP

Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

PEG

polyethylene glycol

PLO

Palestine Liberation Organization

PM

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State

PNET

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

PRA

People’s Revolutionary Army

PROFS

Professional Office System

RMC

Revolutionary Military Council

RRPL

Ronal Reagan Presidential Library

SAC

Strategic Air Command

SALT

Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty

SANE/Freeze

Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy/Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign

S/ARN

Office of the Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Negotiations, Department of State

SAWG

South African Working Group, Department of State

SDI

Strategic Defense Initiative

SDIO

Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Pentagon

SFRC

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SIC

Senate Intelligence Committee

SLBM

submarine launched ballistic missile

S/LPD

Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, Department of State

SNIE

Special National Intelligence Estimate

SOU

State of the Union

SPG

Senior Political Group

SSCI

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

START

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TTBT

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

Abbreviations and Acronyms

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNO

United Nicaraguan Opposition

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UPI

United Press International

USAMIIA

United States Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency

USDA

United States Department of Agriculture

USIA

United States Information Agency

WFDY

World Federation of Democratic Youth

WHORM

White House Office of Records Management

WIDF

Women’s International Democratic Federation

WPC

World Peace Council

ZOA

Zionist Organization of America

287

Index

AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science), 65 ABMT (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty), 157, 160, 162–168, 179n59 Abrahamson, James A., 159, 168, 172 Abrams, Elliott, 36, 223, 237 ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), 122 Addabbo, Joseph P., 131 Adelman, Kenneth, 56 air-borne MX deployment, 122–123 Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft (AWACS). See AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia Allen, Richard V., 86, 93, 94 American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 65 American Physical Society (APS), 168 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), 157, 160, 162–168, 179n59 anti-Semitism of Sandinistas, 34, 48n102, 49n107 APS (American Physical Society), 168 Arias Sánchez, Oscar, 32 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 122 Arms Control Information Working Group, 127 arms control negotiations: ABM Treaty, 157, 160, 162–168, 179n59; INF Treaty, 256, 262; Kennan and Rusk on, 121; MX missiles, 136–137; public favoring, 13n5; Strategic Defense Initiative and, 164 arms for hostages, 221–225, 231, 238, 240n3. See also Iran-Contra scandal Aspin, Les, 137, 139 Austin, General Hudson, 187

AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia: bargaining strategy, 8, 93–96, 101–103, 112n86, 113n94, 258; Carter administration and, 85, 89, 109n52; Congressional reactions to, 90, 93–96, 98–99, 113n94, 255; early opposition to, 86–92, 107n29; editorial board reactions to, 87–88, 98, 100, 106n21; “going public” strategy, 9, 255; Kissinger’s support for, 109n53; Nixon’s support for, 109n50; peace process and, 100; public opinion on, 88, 101; rationale for, 90–92, 92–93, 95, 97, 106n7; Reagan’s certification to Congress, 104; Saudi’s views on quid pro quo, 104; success, reasons for, 101–103, 104, 255 Baker, Howard H., Jr., 134, 168 Baker, James A., III, 8, 99, 112n86, 264 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), 172 bargaining strategies: for AWACS sale, 8, 93–96, 101–103, 112n86, 113n94, 258; “bureaucratic politics” model and, 6, 14n17; as center of American political system, 263; “direct presidential action” (”unilateral politics”) model, 7, 15n18, 266n19; effectiveness of, 11, 258; executive orders compared to, 266n19; “going public” model compared to, 4–7, 258; for Grenada invasion, 258; for MX missiles, 132, 134–139, 258; negotiation as, 263; for Nicaragua, 30–31, 38, 46n77, 46n84, 46n85, 47n88, 258; for Strategic Defense Initiative, 154–155, 258; for Yellow Rain, 258. See also Congressional 289

290

Index

reactions; persuasion; public opinion; specific foreign policy issues Barnes, Michael D., 203, 208, 222 Bartley, Robert, 64, 69, 82n95 Biden, Joseph, 167 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 53–55 biological weapons. See Yellow Rain Bish, Milan, 188 Bishop, Maurice, 185 BMDO (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization), 172 Boland, Edward P., 21 Boland Amendments, 21, 27, 232, 234, 236 Bonker, Don L., 203 Bourne, Geoffry, 196 Brenner, Phillip, 46n84 Brinkley, Joel, 28 Brody Report, 28 Brown, Archie, 12n3, 263 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 177n27 Buchanan, Pat, 30 Buckley, James L., 94 Bulgarian freighter security issue, 27 Bumpers, Dale, 102 bureaucratic innovations, 9, 15n20 “bureaucratic politics” model, 6, 9, 14n17 Burns, E. Bradford, 51n116 Burt, Richard, 55, 57, 58–59, 62, 74n14 Bush, George H. W., 140, 239n2 Bushnell, John, 39n2 Buzenberg, William “Bill”, 45n65 Byrd, Robert C., 88, 155 Calivigny Military Facility, 198 captured documents, 204, 218n91 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 186, 211n7 Carlucci, Frank, 32, 168, 226, 230, 231 Carter administration: AWACS sale and, 85, 89, 109n52; MX missiles and, 117–118; Yellow Rain and, 72, 73n3 Casey, William J. “Bill”, 26, 29, 205, 234 Catholic Church: conflicting views on Central American policy, 40n16, 50n108; nuns murdered in Central

America, 21, 40n15; opposing MX missile, 119; Sandinistas portrayed as anti-Catholic, 34, 36 Catto, Henry E., Jr., 192 CBI (Caribbean Basin Initiative), 186, 211n7 Center for Defense Information (CDI), 89 Central American policies. See El Salvador; Nicaragua Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): AWACS sale involvement, 89; disinformation campaigns, 51n117; Iran-Contra scandal involvement, 221; Nicaraguan involvement, 25, 26–27, 43n43, 43n49 Channell, Carl “Spitz”, 222 Charles, Eugenia, 189 CISPES (Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador), 21, 22, 40n17 Clark, William P., Jr., 64 Clines, Thomas, 237 cluster basing for MX missiles, 128 Coard, Bernard, 187 Cohen, William S., 32, 136, 137 Cold War. See Soviet Union Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), 21, 22, 40n17 Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), 10, 16n24 communication: crowded environment for, 249; executive bargaining more important than, 11; forms of, 1, 12n2; one-way model, 140–142; opposing views concerning Reagan’s skills in, 3–4, 11, 13n9; presidents’ preoccupation with, 14n11; Reagan’s self-assessment of skills in, 260; Reagan’s testimony revealing problems in, 235. See also “going public” strategies; public diplomacy communist narrative. See Cuba; Soviet Union; threat narratives Congress: blamed for Iran-Contra scandal, 236; Central American policies and, 23; contra funding

Index decisions, 25; House Intelligence Committee, 21; presidents’ ineffectiveness with, 14n12; S. Con. Res. 37, 95; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 98; vote shifters in, 264. See also bargaining strategies; Congressional reactions Congressional reactions: to AWACS sale, 90, 93–96, 98–99, 113n94, 255; contra funding decisions, 25, 33, 38, 46n77; to Grenada invasion, 194–195, 203, 208; to MX missiles, 119, 126, 131–134, 136–139, 141, 255; to Nicaragua, 25, 30–31, 33; to Strategic Defense Initiative, 155, 161, 165–167, 169–170, 177n39, 183n102; to Yellow Rain hearings, 56–59, 64, 69–70 Contadora, 190 contras: Congressional decisions about funding, 25, 33, 38, 46n77; doubts about viability of, 47n90; in Nicaragua, 221–223; public opinion on military aid to, 230–231. See also Iran-Contra scandal; Nicaragua CPD (Committee on the Present Danger), 10, 16n24 Cranston, Alan, 99, 155 Crocker, Gary, 58 Cuba: accusations against, 251; building bases in Central America, 185–187, 197–200, 200, 261; channeling weapons through Nicaragua, 19; missile crisis in, 188 Cullen, Daniel, 59 Dailey, Peter H., 47n93 Dam, Kenneth W., 194, 196, 200 D’Amato, Gus, 69 Darman, Richard J., 8 DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency), 35 Dean, Robert, 61 Deaver, Michael K., 8, 210 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 120 DeLauer, Richard, 129, 157 Dellums, Ron, 186 Dense Pack, 126, 129, 133, 134 DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), 120 Dickinson, William I., 123

291

Dicks, Norman, 137 “direct presidential action” model, 7, 15n18, 266n19 disinformation. See evidentiary problems; false information; threat narratives Dodd, Christopher, 195 Dole, Robert J., 166 Donaldson, Sam, 192 Draper, Theodore, 236, 237, 238 Drell, Sidney, 118 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 35 Dunsmore, Barrie, 94 Duties Beyond Borders (Hoffman), 193 Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 54, 64, 204 editorial board reactions: to AWACS sale, 87–88, 98, 100, 106n21; to Grenada invasion, 190–191, 202, 206; to Iran-Contra scandal, 227, 230–232; to MX missiles, 120, 124–126, 131, 132–133, 151n103; to Nicaragua, 20, 25–26, 28; role of, 252; to Strategic Defense Initiative, 154, 167–168; to Yellow Rain, 53–54, 61–64, 67, 68 Edwards, George C., III, 4, 5, 7, 14n12, 264 Edwards, Mickey, 35 EEC (European Economic Community), 200 Ellis, General Richard H., 122 El Salvador, 21–23 Entman, Robert, 266n13 Esquipulas II Accord, 244n51 European Economic Community (EEC), 200 Evans, Grant, 65 evidentiary problems: accusations and distortions, 259; in Nicaragua, 36, 51n117; public diplomacy and, 251. See also false information; scientific evidence; threat narratives executive-legislative bargaining. See bargaining strategies executive orders, 266n19 facilitator role of Reagan, 7

292

Index

false information: on Bulgarian freighter case, 27; on Central American policy, 51n116; on Guatemala case, 44n58; on Yellow Rain, 71. See also evidentiary problems Fascell, Dante B., 163 FCC (Federal Communications Commission), 192 “fear and smear” campaign, 30–31, 46n79 federal budget: Congressional decisions about funding for contras, 25, 33, 38, 46n77; defense as domestic issue, 13n5; increases in defense spending, 3; public opinion on funding contras, 230–231; Strategic Defense Initiative, 169–170, 184n103 Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 192 F-15 fighters, 105n2. See also AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia Fiers, Alan, 237 Fighting for Peace (Weinberger), 236 Fischer, Dean, 21, 92 Foley, Thomas S., 203 foreign policy agenda, 2, 10. See also threat narratives; specific foreign policy Forsberg, Randall, 127 Fox, Edward J., 68 Frank, Barney, 143 fratricide theory, 129 freedom fighters, contras as, 34, 48n102 Freedom Fighters Manual, 26 Friedersdorf, Max, 100 funding issues. See federal budget; Iran-Contra scandal fungal poisons (trichothecene mycotoxins). See Yellow Rain Gairy, Sir Eric, 185 GAO (General Accounting Office), 139 Garrison Rail Mobile Basing (GRMB) system, 140 Garwin, Richard L., 155, 170 gas mask controversy, 61–62 Gates, Robert M., 47n90, 72

General Accounting Office (GAO), 139 Geneva Protocol, 53–54 Gergen, David, 8 Getler, Michael, 54 Glassman, Jon, 20 Going Public (Kernell), 5 “going public” strategies: achievements in, 253–257; assumptions about, 249; for AWACS sale, 9, 255; bargaining compared to, 11, 258; “bureaucratic politics” model and, 6; collective beliefs and attitudes of the public, 250; for Grenada invasion, 9, 204–207, 209, 258; for Iran-Contra scandal, 9, 250, 257; for MX missiles, 9, 125, 127, 130–131, 133–134, 140–142, 255; for Nicaragua, 9, 23–24, 32–37, 251, 253; problems with, 258; for Strategic Defense Initiative, 9, 157–161, 164, 251; for Yellow Rain, 9, 53–55, 67–68, 251, 254, 258. See also public diplomacy Goldwater, Barry M., 26, 138 Goodman, Melvin A., 72 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 262 Gore, Albert, Jr., 137, 165 Goshko, John M., 20 Graham, Danny, 120 Great Communicator appellation, ix, 1, 3–4, 13n9, 235, 260. See also communication; “going public” strategies; public diplomacy The Greatest Communicator (Wirthlin), 12n1 Grenada invasion: airport construction rumors, 195, 199; alternatives to, 188; Congressional reactions to, 194–195, 203, 208; as docudrama, 209; early political and economic pressures, 186; editorial board reactions to, 190–191, 202, 206; “going public” strategy, 9, 204–207, 209, 258; intellectuals’ reactions to, 193; news blackout, 188, 189, 192, 194, 209, 213n40; OECS request for, 203; outcomes of, 256; panel on treatment of journalists, 205–206; public opinion on, 193, 201; quality

Index of intelligence on, 197, 215n59; questions remaining on, 208; rationale for, 189–190, 208; SovietCuban connection, 185–187, 197–200, 200; terminology, 212n24; threat narratives, 189, 194–201, 203 GRMB (Garrison Rail Mobile Basing) system, 140 Gwertzman, Bernard, 55, 91, 163 Haig, Alexander M., Jr.: on AWACS controversy, 16n24, 85–86, 91, 93, 99; on MX missiles, 122, 128; on Nicaragua, 19, 40n15; on Yellow Rain, 53–55, 72 Hakim, Albert, 238 Halloran, Richard, 206 Hamilton, Lee, 222 Hamilton-Merritt, Jane, 67 Harwood, Richard, 208 Hasenfus, Eugene J., 221–223, 239n1, 241n8 Hatfield, Mark O., 134 Hayakawa, S. I., 100 Helms, Jesse, 166 HIC (House Intelligence Committee), 21 Hill, Charles, 10 Hilts, Philip J., 68 Hmong tribesmen, 72n1, 73n3 Hoffman, Stanley, 193 Hollings, Ernest F., 133, 134 hostages: arms for,. See also Iran-Contra scandal 221–225, 231, 238, 240n3; narrative for Grenada invasion, 189, 194–197, 201, 203 House Intelligence Committee (HIC), 21 Howell, William G., 7 “indexing hypothesis”, 265n6 INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, 256, 262 Inner Circles (Haig), 16n24 Inouye, Daniel K., 155 intelligence community, 57, 197, 215n59 Interagency Committee for Public Disclosure and Information, 204

293

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 256, 262 International Red Cross (IRC), 188 Iran: AWACS controversy and, 95; moderates in, 221, 234, 239n2, 241n17, 261 Iran-Contra scandal: blame for, 227; convictions and pardons, 236–237, 245n79, 246n89; cover-ups, 223, 237, 240n6, 240n7, 257; damage control strategy, 226; denial strategy, 223–225, 227, 233, 236; “dodge and weave” strategy, 227–228; editorial board reactions to, 227, 230–232; “going public” strategy, 9, 250, 257; Hasenfus’s capture and unraveling of, 221–223, 239n1, 241n8; ironies of, 236–238; Majority and Minority reports on, 245n73; North and Poindexter testimony, 228–230, 243n39; objectives of, 241n17; public opinion on, 225–227, 228, 230, 233; Reagan’s testimony at Poindexter’s trial, 235; revisionist accounts, 236–237 IRC (International Red Cross), 188 Israel: attack on Iraq’s nuclear facility, 92; AWACS sale to Saudis and, 89, 92; bombing PLO headquarters, 93; Saudi/Israeli arms package, 85–86 Jackson, Henry M. “Scoop”, 126, 134 Jastrow, Robert, 156 JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 121 Jewish opposition to AWACS sale, 89, 107n29 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 121 Joint Defense-State Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) Investigative Team, 67 Jones, General David C., 126 journalists, role of, 252. See also media Kaiser, Robert G., 20 Kamarck, Elaine C., 14n11 Kampelman, Max, 137 Kassebaum, Nancy L., 32, 195 Keegan, George, 89 Kelley, Paul X., 104, 114n119

294

Index

Kelly, John H., 240n3 Kemp, Jack, 166, 172 Kennan, George F., 121 Kennedy, Edward “Ted”, 155 Kennedy, John F., 143n2, 188 Kenworthy, Eldon, 209 Kernell, Samuel, 5, 258 Keyworth, George A. “Jay”, 132, 158, 160–162, 173n2, 173n4 Kirkpatrick, Jeanne, 40n15, 208 Kissinger, Henry, 109n53, 166 Kristol, Irving, 193 Kwitney, Jonathan, 20 Laham, Nicholas, 113n106 Laos. See Yellow Rain Laxalt, Paul, 238 Layne Dredging Company, 200 Leach, Jim, 67, 69 Lebanon, 13n5. See also Iran-Contra scandal Ledeen, Michael A., 236 Lent, Norman, 90 Leogrande, William M., 46n84 Levin, Carl, 170 Lewis, Anthony, 130 Lewis, David E., 14n17 Liberal Constitutional Party, 265n8 Libyan disinformation, 52n118 likeability and persuasibility, 264 Limbert, John W., 240n3 Long, Clarence D. “Doc”, 90 Lugar, Richard, 166 Managua, 228 manuals for contras, 26–27 Martin, David, 27 McCollum, William “Bill”, 69 McCurdy, David, 222 McDonald, Wesley L., 208 McFarlane, Robert C. “Bud”, 127, 160, 163, 173n2, 180n62, 234, 236 McWhirter, William, 199 media: news blackout for Grenada invasion, 188, 189, 192, 194, 209, 213n40; political panel on treatment of journalists, 205–206; role in public diplomacy, 252; targeting sympathetic publications, 36;

television news, 252; televisual politics, 5. See also editorial board reactions Meese, Edwin, III, “Ed”, 33, 223, 225–226 Meislin, Richard J., 199 Meselson, Matthew, 56, 65–66, 68 Metcalf, Arthur G. B., 124 Metcalf, Joseph, III, 208, 210 Michel, Robert H., 143, 203 Middle East: Lebanon, 13n5; peace process in, 100; Reagan uninformed about, 261. See also AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia; Iran; Iran-Contra scandal; Israel Midgetman missile, 138–139 MiG-21s, 27 Mirocha, Chester J., 56, 59, 75n22 Miroff, Bruce, 15n18, 209 Miskito Indians, 34, 50n109 Missile eXperimental (MX). See MX missiles Moe, Terry M., 14n17 Mondale, Walter, 89, 137, 208 More Precious Than Peace (Rodman), 17n29 Moynihan, Daniel P., 208 MPS (Multiple Placement Shelters), 117–118, 121 Multiple Placement Shelters (MPS), 117–118, 121 Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Theory, 141, 160 mutual deterrence, 154, 156 MX: Prescription for Disaster (Scoville), 124 MX missiles: arms control experts’ reactions to, 124; bargaining, 132, 134–139; bargaining strategy, 258; basing mode issue, 122–131, 134–135, 139; Carter administration and, 117–118; Congressional reactions to, 119, 126, 131–134, 136–139, 141, 255; editorial board reactions to, 120, 124–126, 131, 132–133, 151n103; “going public” strategy, 9, 125, 127, 130–131, 133–134, 140–142, 255; lack of administrative consensus, 122–124;

Index Midgetman missile and, 138, 139–140; network of opposition to, 118; political and military opposition to, 120; portrayed as bargaining chip in Soviet relations, 143; public opinion, 128, 139; questions never answered about, 141; scientific community’s reactions to, 121, 122, 126, 131; Scowcroft Commission, 135–136, 138; states opposed to, 118; “window of vulnerability” remarks and, 117, 120, 124–126, 130, 135, 143n2 The Myth of the Strong Leader (Brown), 12n3 NAM (National Association of Manufacturers), 23 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 156 National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), 23 National Campaign to Stop the MX, 118 National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL), 222 National Security Council (NSC), 19 National Security Decision Directives: NSDD 12, 125; NSDD 35, 128–129; NSDD 75, 16n28; NSDD 77, 9, 15n21, 64, 157, 158; NSDD 79, 74n13; NSDD 100, 24; NSDD 112, 204; NSDD 172, 161 national security issues. See AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia; Grenada invasion; Iran-Contra scandal; MX missiles; Nicaragua; Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); Yellow Rain National Security Policy Group (NSPG), 26, 32 Negroponte, John, 21 Nelson, Michael, 14n17 Neo-Conservatism (Vaisse), 16n24, 16n27 NEPL (National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty), 222 Neustadt, Richard E., 4, 7, 12n3, 14n11

295

New Jewel Movement (NJM), 185, 186, 205 “news blackout” for Grenada invasion, 188, 189, 192, 194, 209, 213n40 news media. See editorial board reactions; media NFM (Nuclear Freeze Movement), 127, 130, 174n7 Nicaragua: bargaining strategy, 30–31, 38, 46n77, 46n84, 46n85, 47n88, 258; Boland Amendments, 21, 27; changing rationale/themes for, 29–30, 35, 49n104; CIA involvement, 25, 26–27, 43n43, 43n49; Congressional funding of contras, 25, 30–31, 33; damage control strategy, 28; demonization of Sandinistas, 34, 48n102; doubts about viability of contras, 47n90; editorial board reactions to, 20, 25–26, 28; “fear and smear” campaign, 30–31, 46n79; “going public” strategy, 9, 23–24, 32–37, 251, 253; initial white paper on, 19–20; Iran-Contra scandal and, 32–33; Liberal Constitutional Party, 265n8; public opinion on, 21–22, 24, 26, 37, 194, 202; Reagan on his failure in, 38; security scare involving MiG-21s, 27; Tardencillas fiasco, 20; threat narratives, 251 Nitze, Paul, 167 Nixon, Richard M., 109n50 NJM (New Jewel Movement), 185, 186, 205 Noonan, Peggy, 49n103 North, Oliver, 222, 225, 228–232, 234, 237, 238, 239n2, 243n39, 247n99, 265n8 NSC/CIA-developed plan, 25, 43n49, 240n7 NSC (National Security Council), 19 NSDD. See National Security Decision Directives NSPG (National Security Policy Group), 26, 32 nuclear deterrence, 159–161 Nuclear Freeze Movement (NFM), 127, 130, 174n7

296

Index

Nunn, Sam: on AWACS sale, 99, 103; on MX missiles, 134, 136, 137, 138; on Strategic Defense Initiative, 155, 166–168, 170; on Yellow Rain, 58 OAS (Organization of American States), 33, 36 OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean States), 195, 201, 203, 216n70 Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (S/ LPD), 24, 28, 30, 37, 45n65, 51n110, 204, 218n91 Office of Public Liaison (OPL), 24, 28, 37 Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 173n4. See also Keyworth, George A. “Jay” Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 157 Olsen, Henry, 12n3 On Deaf Ears (Edwards), 5 O’Neill, Thomas P. “Tip”, 137, 155, 203, 208 OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), 200 Operation Urgent Fury. See Grenada invasion Organization of American States (OAS), 33, 36 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), 195, 201, 203, 216n70 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 200 OTA (Office of Technology Assessment), 157 Outreach Working Group for Central America, 24 Owen, Robert, 47n90 Packwood, Robert “Bob”, 90, 95 Parnas, David L., 156 “Peacemaker” MX, 130–131, 140 Pell, Claiborne, 167, 194 People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA), 187 Percy, Charles H., 136, 137, 194 Perilous Statecraft (Ledeen), 236

Perry, William J., 156 persuasion, 14n11, 264. See also bargaining strategies; “going public” strategies; Neustadt, Richard E.; public diplomacy “pindown” scenario, 129 Pipes, Richard, 193 Plante, Bill, 192 Plessy Airports/Plessy Electronics, 200 Poindexter, John M., 224, 228–231, 234–235, 237, 243n39 The Politics Presidents Make (Skowronek), 12n3 pollen discovery in Yellow Rain, 61 Power Without Persuasion (Howell), 7 PRA (People’s Revolutionary Army), 187 presidency, scholarship on, 12n3 The Presidency and the Political System (Nelson), 14n17 presidential challenges (incoming), 6 Presidential Influence in Congress (Edwards), 14n12 Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents (Neustadt), 4, 12n3 Presidential Power (Neustadt), 4 President’s Commision on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission), 135–136 Presidents on Political Ground (Miroff), 15n18 Pressler, Larry, 55, 64, 69, 99, 103, 194 Pribbenow, Merle L., 76n31 Price, Melvin, 126 Professional Office System (PROFS), 42n35 propaganda, 156. See also evidentiary problems; false information; threat narratives Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, 27 public diplomacy: about, 9; barriers in foreign environments, 260; definitions of, 16n22; limitations of, 251; quality of narratives, 251; reasons for failures in, 259; role of media in, 252; “threat creation” and, 251–252, 254–255, 256. See also Congressional reactions; editorial

Index board reactions; “going public” strategies; public opinion Public Diplomacy Group, 30 public opinion: on AWACS controversy, 88, 101; on chemical and biological weapon elimination, 82n101; in foreign policy arena, 259; on Grenada invasion, 193, 201; on MX missiles, 128, 139; on Nicaragua, 21–22, 24, 26, 37, 194, 202; on Strategic Defense Initiative, 161, 162, 163, 169–171; unrealistic expectations about, 264; on Yellow Rain, 70–71. See also “going public” strategies; public diplomacy Quainton, Anthony, 261 Quayle, Dan, 58, 69 Raymond, Walter, Jr., 24, 42n31 Reagan, Nancy, 238 Reagan, Ronald: assassination attempt on, 86; autobiography of, 234; campaign in 1984, 159; communications team, 8; electoral success and public opinion, 264; on failures in Nicaragua, 38; as “Great Communicator”, ix, 1, 3–4, 13n9, 235, 260; post-presidential vew of Iran, 239n2. See also bargaining strategies; communication; Congressional reactions; editorial board reactions; “going public” strategies; public diplomacy; specific foreign policy issues; specific members of Reagan administration Reagan Doctrine, 11, 17n29 Regan, Donald, 161, 224 Reich, Otto J., 24, 28, 29, 42n31, 45n65 Resisting Reagan (Smith), 40n16 restorative presidents, 12n3 Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) in Grenada, 187, 189, 196–197 Robb, Charles “Chuck”, 238 Roberts, Steven V., 102 Robinson, Randall, 186 Rodman, Peter W., 17n29 Romberg, Alan, 66 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 12n3

297

Rostow, Eugene V., 122 Rowny, Lt. General Edward L., 132 Rudman, Warren, 32 Rusk, Dean, 121 Sagan, Carl, 155 Sandinistas: demonization of, 34, 48n102; in Managua, 228; in Nicaragua, 261; “Sandinista Disinformation and Public Manipulation Plan”, 51n117; secret mission to overthrow, 221–223. See also Iran-Contra scandal; Nicaragua Sarbanes, Paul S., 194 Sarver, Emory, 71 Saudi Arabia. See AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 193 Schultz, George P., 224 scientific evidence: Strategic Defense Initiative, 154, 155, 165, 168, 175n21; Yellow Rain, 54–57, 59, 61, 64, 70–71, 74n13, 76n31, 78n59, 254 Scoon, Sir Paul, 201 Scoville, Herbert, Jr., 124 Scowcroft, Brent, 137 Scowcroft Commission, 135–136, 138, 157 SDI. See Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) SDIO (Strategic Defense Initiative Organization), 156, 159, 172 Seaga, Edward, 190 Seagrave, Sterling, 55 Secord, Richard, 228, 238, 243n38 Seeley, Thomas D., 65–66 Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia (Laham), 113n106 Senior Political Group (SPG), 15n21 “Sense of the Senate” Resolution, 99 Shultz, George P.: on AWACS controversy, 10; on Grenada, 208; on Iran-Contra scandal, 224, 225, 232, 236; on MX Missiles, 137; on Nicaragua, 25, 29, 33, 43n49, 48n102; on SDI, 163, 165, 167, 180n62; on Yellow Rain, 60, 63, 67 Sidle, Winant, 205–206 Skowronek, Stephen, 12n3

298

Index

S/LPD (Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean), 24, 28, 30, 37, 45n65, 51n110, 204, 218n91 Smith, Christian, 40n16 Sofaer, Abraham D., 163, 166, 168 Solarz, Stephen J., 59, 67, 68, 69, 196, 200 Solin, Gary, 196 Soviet Union: accusations against, 251; arms control negotiations, 3, 13n5; Cold War ending, 17n31, 262; Grenada invasion and, 185–187, 197–200, 200; hardliners against, 10; intruding in Central America, 19–20, 185–187, 197–200, 200, 261; Reagan’s NSDD 75 policy toward, 16n28; resurgent Cold War attitudes, 10; SDI as bargaining chip for negotiations with, 164, 172, 180n62; sharing SDI with, 164, 180n66; threat narratives, 90–92, 251–252, 259, 261 Speakes, Larry, 92, 123, 140, 192, 195, 225 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), 57, 59, 70 SPG (Senior Political Group), 15n21 Stahl, Lesley, 224 START II agreement, 140 Star Wars defense system, 153, 161, 173n4. See also Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Stevens, Ted, 134 Stoessel, Walter J., 55–56, 75n18 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 122 Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), 156, 159, 172 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI): ABM treaty reinterpretation and, 162–168; announcement of, 153, 173n2; bargaining strategy, 159–160, 258; Congressional reactions to, 155, 161, 165–167, 169–170, 177n39, 183n102; cost factors and funding, 169–170, 184n103; “defensive shield” concept, 153, 172n1; early deployment controversy, 165–168; early opposition to, 154–157;

editorial board reactions to, 154, 167–168; genesis of, 176n23; “going public” strategy, 9, 157–161, 164, 251; mutual deterrence and, 154; narrative problems, 171–172; outcomes, 256; political and foreign policy experts’ reactions to, 156; portrayed as bargaining chip for Soviet negotiations, 164, 172, 180n62; public opinion on, 161, 162, 163, 169–171; scientific community’s reaction to, 154, 155, 165, 168, 175n21; sharing with Soviet Union, 164, 180n66; Star Wars name, 153, 161, 173n4 The Strategic President (Edwards), 7 Strategic Review, 124 Tardencillas Espinosa, Orlando J., 20 Taubman, Philip, 199, 205 Taylor, Maxwell D., 121 television news, 252 televisual politics, 5 Teller, Edward, 156 terrorists, negotiating with. See IranContra scandal Thomas, Helen, 95, 125, 234 threat narratives: about, 251–252, 261; Cuba as threat, 185–187, 197–200; hostage narratives, 189, 194–197, 201, 203; Nicaragua as threat, 251; Soviet Union as threat, 90–92, 185–187, 197–200, 259. See also evidentiary problems; MX missiles; Soviet Union; Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); specific foreign policy issue Thurmond, Strom, 166 Tower, John G., 123, 126, 129, 134, 136, 226 Tower Board, 226, 231, 236 Townes, Charles H., 122 transformative presidents, 12n3 trichothecene mycotoxins (fungal poisons). See Yellow Rain Turmoil and Tradition (Shultz), 236 Turner, Stansfield, 89, 121 Ullman, Richard, 261

Index

299

Under Fire (North), 247n99 Undue Process (Abrams), 237 “unilateral politics” model, 7, 15n18, 266n19 United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), 24, 42n35

“window of vulnerability” remarks, 117, 120, 124–126, 130, 135, 143n2 Wirthlin, Richard (Dick), 12n1, 250 Wolpe, Howard, 200 The Working-Class Republican (Olsen), 12n3

Vaisse, Justin, 16n24, 16n27 value transformation, 250 Vance, Cyrus R., 156, 166 Vanocur, Sander, 94 Vessey, John W., Jr., 192, 205, 210, 236 Vietnam. See Yellow Rain

Yellow Rain: bargaining strategy, 258; bee feces theory, 61, 65–66, 79n67, 80n72; Carter administration and, 72, 73n3; Congressional hearings on, 56–59, 64, 69–70; editorial board reactions to, 53–54, 61–64, 67, 68; gaps in story of, 71; gas mask controversy, 61–62; “going public” strategy, 9, 53–55, 67–68, 251, 254, 258; hardware issue, 64, 78n60; intelligence community’s reactions, 57; interagency working group on, 63; objectives of, 254; public diplomacy and, 9, 251; public opinion on, 70–71; Reagan on, 60; reasons for limited success of campaign, 70–71, 254; scientific evidence for and against, 54–57, 59, 61, 64, 70–71, 74n13, 76n31, 78n59, 254; State Department special report, 63; terminology, 72n1; walking back on issue, 72 The Yellow Rainmakers (Evans), 65

Walsh, Lawrence E., 236–237 Warner, John W., 58, 99, 103, 238 Warnke, Paul, 120, 165 War Powers Resolution, 194 Watson, Sharon, 57, 59 Webster, William, 231 Weinberger, Caspar (“Cap”): on AWACS controversy, 85, 96, 104; on Grenada invasion, 192, 206; on IranContra scandal, 230, 236; on MX missiles and, 122–123, 128, 132, 137; on Nicaragua, 19, 26, 29, 33; on SDI, 157–158, 159, 163, 167 White House Coordinating Group, 158 Whittlesey, Faith Ryan, 24, 41n30 Why Presidents Fail (Kamarck), 14n11 Wick, Charles, 32, 233 Wicker, Tom, 125 Wilde, Henry, 74n13

Zablocki, Clement J., 59 Zorinsky, Edward, 95, 194, 195

About the Author

N. Stephen Kane has had a dual career. For twenty-one years he taught courses in American history, U.S. foreign policy and politics in the TV age, first as a tenured assistant professor in the History Department at the University of Wisconsin in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, and later as an adjunct professor in the Government Department at American University in Washington, DC. Between his teaching engagements, he served twentysix years in the Bureau of Public Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, primarily as a public affairs specialist, which afforded him both an opportunity to practice public communication and to observe how it functioned across the relevant agencies of the U.S. government. While at State, he served as the Public Affairs (PA) bureau’s representative to several interagency public diplomacy groups and as public diplomacy consultant to the South Africa Working Group. He also published a number of articles in academic journals, drafted numerous public communication strategies, wrote or coauthored over two dozen pamphlets and studies for public distribution on various aspects of U.S. foreign policy. He coedited seven volumes of the well-known documentary series, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), mostly dealing with Latin America, and taught courses on Latin American political development at the Joint Military Intelligence College at Bolling AFB. He was awarded fellowships by Harvard University, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Colorado and the National Historical Publications Commission. He holds a PhD from the University of Colorado in Boulder, Colorado.

301