Self and the World: The Religious Philosophy of Richard Kroner 9781512818741

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Introduction
Introduction: Life Sketch and Intellectual Development
I The Metaphysics of Selfhood
II The Religious Imagination
III Experience and Culture
IV Analysis of Culture : Science and Art
V Analysis of Culture : Politics and Morality
VI Faith and the Antinomies
VII The Primacy of Faith
VIII Theological Implications
Bibliography of Richard Kroner
Index of Names

Citation preview

Self and World

Self and World THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF RICHARD KRONER

by JOHN E. SKINNER

University of Pennsylvania Press

© 1962 by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania Published in Great Britain, India, and Pakistan by the Oxford University Press London, Bombay, and Karachi Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 62-11269

7337 Printed in the United States of America

FOR ROSEMARY

whose tenderness of heart and sensitivity of spirit penetrate the inner soul and allow the depths of love to prevail

Preface For the past ten years I have had the privilege and pleasure of association with Richard Kroner, first as his student and later as his colleague and friend. It is my belief, which I know is shared by many others who have been his students at Union Theological Seminary in New York and at Temple University in Philadelphia, that his contribution to contemporary religious thought should be more widely known. Such is the purpose of this small volume. It has not been my intention to produce a "popular" book, as the term is commonly understood in this country. Rather, I have attempted to make Kroner's thought more accessible to those individuals who have some philosophical background but who, because of the current lack of appreciation for German idealism in many American universities, are relatively unfamiliar with the peculiar disciplines and problems of that branch of philosophical endeavor. I have not attempted a complete analysis of the development of Kroner's thought from his early years in Germany up to the present. My aim has been to offer a brief biographical sketch by way of introduction, followed by a more detailed outline of his contribution to religious philosophy. For those who are interested in his philosophic system before the shaking of the foundations of German culture by Hitler and the Nazis, I would suggest Siegfried Marck's account of his thought in Die Dialeclik in der Philosophie der Gegenwart (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, two volumes, 1929, 1931), pp. 56-90. The complete Kroner bibliography at the end of this book should also be useful for this purpose. 7

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In Germany Kroner's fame was achieved both as a systematic philosopher, metaphysical and political, and as a historian of philosophy. His two-volume work on German idealism, Von Kant bis Hegel, is still the definitive work on the subject in Europe; he was also associated with his two teachers, Windelband and Rickert, in the Heidelberg school of Kantian criticism. In America Kroner has been chiefly known for his works on the history of philosophy from the point of view of the Christian faith and for his theory of the religious imagination. Consequently his name is usually associated with studies in the history of philosophy and theology, rather than with any systematic contribution. This is unfortunate, since he has also produced many works which are of sufficient importance to attract the philosophical or theological scholar, although somewhat forbidding to the average reader. His Gifford Lectures under the title The Primacy of Faith, and his reworked German philosophic system (with a new Christian interpretation) as set forth in Culture and Faith, have great value in meeting contemporary religious questions. Reinhold Niebuhr of Union Theological Seminary had this to say about Culture and Faith: I know of nothing in modern religious thought which gives us a clearer insight into the reason why moralism, scientism, aestheticism, legalism, and ontologism are not only inadequate as final solutions for the problem of human existence, but also why they contain, not merely error, but the "sin" of pretension. (Union Seminary Quarterly Review, March 1952) Professor Kroner has read this work, and he has approved it as to its accuracy in presenting his point of view. Two qualifications are necessary. In the first place, as a student of Kroner I have presented the material in such a way that at times my own insights may creep into the discussion, although it is my belief that they have in no way interfered with the accuracy of the

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presentation. I have made use of some expressions—for example "personal dimension of reality" and "moral selfcontradiction"—which Kroner himself does not use, but these terms are an outgrowth of my complete saturation with his ideas. In this respect I am, to use Professor Kroner's own words, presenting an Americanized version of his thought. In the second place, I have taken the liberty of developing (in Chapter Eight) the theological implications of Kroner's religious philosophy, and here for the most part the reflection is mine rather than his. Grateful acknowledgment is made to the following for permission to quote from books on which they hold the copyright: University of Chicago Press for Kroner's Culture and Faith, 1951; Yale University Press, for Kroner's The Religious Function of Imagination, 1941; The Macmillan Company, for Kroner's The Primacy of Faith, 1943; Charles Scribner's Sons and T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, for Martin Buber's I And Thou, 1955; Princeton University Press, for S. Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, 1946.1 also wish to thank the following journals for permission to quote from articles or reviews: The Review of Metaphysics, for Kroner's "What Is Really Real," March 1954; The Union Seminary Quarterly Review, for Reinhold Niebuhr's review of Culture and Faith, March 1952; and also to The Anglican Theological Review for permission to republish in a revised form my article "Predestination and Determinism," October 1955. In conclusion I should like to make mention of those who have aided, either directly or indirectly, in the production of this book. In the first place, I am greatly indebted to Professor Kroner for his willingness to allow me to write this short account of his religious philosophy. I wish to thank him for his many suggestions, and for the numerous hours we spent together both on the manuscript and in the compilation of the bibliography. Dr. Tunis Prins, professor of philosophy at the University of Denver and my first teacher of philosophy,

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introduced me to Kroner's writings; for this I am grateful, as well as for the many hours of intellectual stimulation I enjoyed under this master of the maieutic method. Finally, I wish to thank Dr. F. Ernest Stoeffler, professor of church history at Temple University, for his many valuable suggestions. JOHN E . SKINNER

Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia September 1961

Contents Preface

7

Introduction: Life Sketch and Development

15

I

The Metaphysics of Selfhood

33

II

The Religious Imagination

43

III

Experience and Culture

55

IV

Analysis of Culture: Science and Art

65

Analysis of Culture: Politics and Morality

77

VI

Faith and The Antinomies

87

VII

The Primacy of Faith

98

V

VIII

Theological Implications

108

Bibliography

123

Index

135

Introduction

Introduction: Life Sketch and Intellectual Development Early Years (1884-1902). Richard Kroner was born at Breslau in Silesia on March 8, 1884. He was the son of a distinguished physician who was a member of the faculty of medicine at the University of Breslau. Although Silesia was a part of Prussia, the people had more resemblance to the Austrians in temperament and spirit, for Silesia earlier had been under the rule of Austria. Richard Kroner himself impresses one as being very un-Prussian in his person and manner. Kroner's life as a child was a combination of delight and gloom, of grandeur and misery. He had never known his father when he was not in a wheel chair; the elder Dr. Kroner suffered over a period of ten years from a lingering illness which ended only with his death. Kroner's mother was an extremely strong woman, both physically and spiritually, dedicating her entire life to the care of her family and to the nursing of her children. Kroner has often mentioned that she was to him "practical reason" personified. She had an artistic temperament and some talent as a painter. Several of her paintings are now to be seen in Kroner's study. His younger brother, Kurt, was endowed with artistic genius. He began his career as a painter. In addition he studied under Auguste Rodin and in Germany had a considerable reputation as a sculptor. Tragically, many of his works were destroyed by bombers during the Second World War, although a portfolio of photographic reproductions sponsored by Gerhart Hauptmann is extant. Kurt Kroner was so convinced that he was a genius that it was extremely difficult for his brother to achieve 15

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any personal harmony with him. They quarreled often, and the unhappiness of their relationship is a thing which Professor Kroner now intensely regrets. He has stated that it is very difficult to live with a genius, especially when the latter knows that he is a genius. The artistic works of Kurt Kroner reveal a deeply melancholy and tortured soul; he died a relatively young man, and his wife was later executed by the Nazis in Poland. Kroner's maternal grandmother was a "free-thinker," adverse to any religious tradition or faith. She was nevertheless extremely enthusiastic about the wonders of nature and never wearied in telling him about how intelligent the birds, horses, and other creatures were. She was a child of the Enlightenment, a rationalist, who was deeply influenced by the writings of Charles Darwin. She was exceedingly interested in his early philosophical studies. As Kroner grew older he often engaged in disputes with his grandmother, and tried to convince her that nature was much more mysterious than she thought—for in this respect the young Kroner was a romantic in reaction to the Enlightenment. A childhood friend, Hans von Staff, was responsible for the development of even further romantic tendencies in Kroner's temperament. The son of a judge who later became a distinguished justice in Berlin, and himself a professor of geology at the University there, von Staff read the great works of philosophy, talking incessantly about them and literally coercing his friend Kroner into reading Spinoza's Ethics, Descartes' Meditations, and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Hans von Staff not only urged Kroner to read the great thinkers but also suggested that he write a philosophic system of his own. Unfortunately Kroner's friend died in South Africa during the First World War, before he was thirty years of age. Kroner first attended private schools and later the Gymnasium zu St. Maria Magdalene where he studied Greek, Latin, mathematics, physics, and history. At the end of this period in his life he was beginning to read more philosophy, literature

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and poetry, especially Goethe, Schiller, Lessing and also some contemporary German poets. Before he finished at the Gymnasium he met, at a dancing school, a young lady named Alice Marie Kauffmann, whose father was the head of one of the great textile industries in eastern Germany, and to whom he was later to become engaged. He recalls that they had fallen in love with each other at an early age. Pre-War and War Years (1902-1919). During these years Kroner was occupied primarily with his intellectual development. He studied at several outstanding German universities, including those at Breslau, Berlin, and Heidelberg. He completed his doctorate in philosophy at the University of Freiburg in 1908 and eventually became a teacher. At the University of Berlin he was impressed by Wilhelm Dilthey's vivid and positive way of presenting the wonder and mystery of existence. Instead of attempting to solve the riddle of existence, he presented one by one all the solutions that had been offered in the history of thought, with the conclusion that in spite of all the tremendous intellectual energy and logical consistency to be found in the great thinkers of the past, the miraculous essence of being and life cannot be known. Such an insight Dilthey found not at all alarming or disturbing, but contributing rather to an easing of the perturbations of the heart and to an inner joy and serenity. Another professor at Berlin who influenced Kroner deeply was Georg Simmel, a dynamic lecturer who seized upon the philosophic implications of every subject. Throughout his lectures Kroner was completely captivated by his thought. Simmel was not an historicist like Dilthey but an exceptionally penetrating psychologist. At Heidelberg Kuno Fischer appealed to the imagination of the young Kroner. Fischer was an outstanding scholar in the field of literary and philosophic history, and it was from him that Kroner received his introduction to the classics of German philosophy and poetry. Kroner remembers vividly the lecture

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on Goethe's Faust during which he recited the entire first part of the drama in the fashion of an actor, playing each role in turn. The figure of Goethe was henceforth inseparably connected with his first impressions of Fischer. While Wilhelm Windelband was not as dramatic as Kuno Fischer, Kroner believes that he was much more instructive. He learned from him what it meant to think consistently and logically, and how to penetrate to the core of ontological and metaphysical problems. Because of Kroner's special interest in modern epistemology Windelband suggested that he study for his doctorate under Heinrich Rickert at the University of Freiburg in Baden. Professor Rickert, who had been a student of Windelband's, made an indescribable impression upon Kroner as the philosopher who understood life and existence better than anyone else. It was he who taught him the intricacies and the obscurities of the Critique of Pure Reason. Two young men at the University of Heidelberg also played a part in Kroner's academic development. The first was a young teacher, Emil Lask, who attracted him because he was nearly the same age. Lask understood his problems and doubts, and aided him immeasurably in his philosophic quest. He was killed on the Eastern Front in the First World War. The other young man was a fellow student at Heidelberg. He was Frederick Steppuhn, who later changed his name to Fedor Stepun. He was reared in Russia and subsequently became a minister of the state under Kerensky during the interim between Czarism and Bolshevism. Stepun was a man of genius, in whom many things—poet, actor, politician, historian, and metaphysician—were combined. He studied philosophy under Windelband and wrote his doctoral dissertation on Soloviev, a Russian philosopher who had been influenced by German idealism. He gave Kroner his introduction to Dostoievsky and to Russian literature from Pushkin to Maxim Gorki. Early in this period Kroner was painfully affected by the

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immense variety of opinion in the history of philosophy. He was obsessed by the feeling that if he could not solve all the riddles of the world, he would not be able to live—indeed, he often found himself afraid of becoming insane because of the multiplicity of viewpoints and the chaos of opinion. Kroner has never been vigorously healthy. His delicate physical constitution, added to this spiritual uncertainty, in 1904 forced him to give up his studies. On the verge of a nervous collapse he left the University and entered the German Army for one year. This military duty strengthened him greatly, and he was able to return to the University of Freiburg. Under Rickert he began to write his doctoral dissertation on the logical and aesthetic validity of judgment. This problem was suggested to him partly by Kant's Critique of Judgment, and partly by Edmund Husserl's Logical Inquiries. That Kroner was one of the first to take Husserl seriously can be observed in his dissertation, Vber Logische und Aesthetische Allgemeingultigkeit, which was accepted by the University of Freiburg for the doctor of philosophy degree in 1908 and published in the same year. In that year he also married Alice Marie Kauffmann. They lived in Freiburg until 1924. Their daughter, Gerda Margaret, was born in 1909. When she was twenty-five, she married Dr. Rudolph Seligsohn. He had studied Greek and Latin and was to have become an instructor in humanities and classical philology, but in reaction to Hitler and the anti-Semitism of the Nazis he became a Jewish rabbi. He died in a military camp in England during the Second World War. Gerda Margaret studied philology under Werner Jaeger in Germany, and is now professor of linguistics at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. Both Richard and Alice Kroner have Jewish antecedents. Although Kroner's parents did not profess any religious faith except perhaps a religion of artistic creativity, at the age of eighteen he was baptized a Christian in the Prussian Union

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Church. Mrs. Kroner is also a member of that Church. Kroner continued to study under Professor Rickert until 1910. At this time, with three Russian and two German friends, he founded the international journal for the philosophy of culture, Logos. Without the aid of Rickert and Windelband, Logos would not have achieved the great prominence that it did. Georg Mehlis was the first editor, and when Mehlis had to leave Germany under tragic circumstances, Kroner assumed the editorship, a post he held until the time of Hitler. Logos continued for a period of twenty-five years, but in 1934 it was transformed into a journal of German culture. In this form it existed until the end of the Second World War. In the initial number of Logos Kroner published an article on Henri Bergson. This was the first treatise written on the French philosopher in the German language. Because he was very young and hesitated to presume upon the great thinker's time he did not send a copy to Bergson. He was surprised, therefore, when after six weeks he received an eight-page letter from Bergson in which he said that Kroner had rendered his philosophy accurately, and that he was grateful for his article. In 1912 Kroner was appointed Privatdozent (Instructor) at the University of Freiburg in consequence of the publication of his book on biological causality, Zweck und Gesetz in der Biologie. From his earliest youth he had pondered the question of whether or not Darwinism had succeeded in eliminating final causes; he concluded in this volume that Darwin had not succeeded but on the contrary final causes are presupposed in organic life; even the leading concept of the survival of the fittest contains the implication of teleology. His first course at the University was once a week for one hour. At this time he lectured on Kant and attempted to interpret him as a kind of Platonic metaphysician. These lectures with some revision became Kants Weltanschauung, a book published just before the outbreak of the First World War.

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Kroner soon became an exponent of the Heidelberg school of Kantian interpretation. Other prominent members of this group were Rickert, Windelband, and Lask. The Heidelberg Kantians interpreted the Königsberg philosopher from the perspective of an ethical metaphysics based upon the primacy of the practical reason. In this they had as their chief inspiration the philosophy of Fichte. Two differing approaches to Kant current in Germany were the following: (1) the Marburg school of Natorp, Cohen, and Cassirer, which tended to identify Kantian method with the mathematical physics of Galileo, and (2) the Austrian School, represented by Alois Riehl, which explained the philosophy of the great critic of reason from the standpoint of Humean empiricism. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 Kroner, who held a lieutenant's commission in the Royal Prussian reserve, joined his regiment, which was mobilized in Silesia. During the war years he continued to deliberate upon and to set down his own philosophical system, which was partly Kantian and partly Hegelian. He utilized the time not spent in combat in reading innumerable books on all periods of history; this enriched considerably his systematical and philosophical knowledge and gave him a better foundation for his understanding of the world. Near the end of the conflict he became a captain in the light artillery and leader of a battery. For his distinguished service as a soldier Kroner received from the German government the Iron Cross First Class. Post-War Years (1919-1938). After Kroner's discharge from the German Army he returned to the University of Freiburg as an assistant professor of philosophy. A tremendous change had taken place. He found as the senior professor not his old teacher Heinrich Rickert but rather the great phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. His other colleagues included Georg Mehlis, Julius Ebbinghaus, and Martin Heidegger. During the years immediately after the First World War

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Kroner considered two possibilities to be pursued in the writing of books: (1) developing his own system, which was in an embryonic state at that time, or (2) composing a historical work on German idealism. Eventually he chose the second alternative because he did not feel satisfied that his system was mature enough to warrant publication, and concentrated on the history of German idealism from Kant to Hegel. Julius Ebbinghaus, who was at that time "an enraged and passionate" Hegelian, partly stimulated him to write such a work; he tried to convince Kroner that not Kant but Hegel was the true philosopher, the one who had found the solution to all philosophical problems. In a few years Ebbinghaus deserted this position and had an interesting intellectual development before he became a convinced Kantian. Upon completion of his great work Von Kant bis Hegel, two volumes, Kroner concluded that it was indeed Hegel rather than Kant who had found the correct solution to the problems of the transcendental philosophy, although he was never able to accept fully the Hegelian system. He could not become an orthodox Hegelian for one reason— Hegel's assertion that religion is somehow subordinate to speculation, and that speculation alone gives man the full truth because it does not veil it in the masquerade of prophetic images as religion does. This point was unacceptable from the beginning although Kroner did not mention it when he wrote his magnum opus; in the preface to the first edition he reserved the right to make a final judgment on Hegel at a later time. This judgment has been made in the preface to the second edition of his work, republished in 1961 as one volume by J. C. B. Mohr. In 1924 Kroner was appointed professor of philosophy and education at the Technological Institute of Dresden, remaining there until 1928. The Kroners decided to go to this beautiful city where cultural advantages were in abundance despite the fact that this call was not to a university, but rather to an institute for the training of teachers. He became a professor in

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the Department of General Studies. Lecturing on the philosophy of education, he investigated thoroughly its history and theory. He did not regret this study, because great men like Comenius and Rousseau would never have become as familiar to him if he had not pursued such a discipline. He also lectured on purely philosophical subjects, especially aesthetics. When a professorship in religion was added to the Department of General Studies, the Minister of Cultural Affairs asked Kroner to recommend a theologian for this position. One theological scholar in particular impressed him; and as a result Paul Tillich became Kroner's colleague at Dresden. This was the beginning of a close friendship which has continued through the years. In Dresden Kroner completed the system of philosophy which had been gradually unfolding in his mind; Die Selbstverwirklichung des Geistes: Prolegomena zur Kulturphilosophie was the consummation of the serious reflection which had begun during the First World War. In this book he conceived of religion as the highest cultural expression—the culmination of all the civilizing exertions of man as they are expressed in science, art, politics, and morality. Many years later he was forced to revise this treatise radically; the impact of the disintegrating powers of Nazism upon the classical German culture necessitated a new standpoint which emphasized the tensions between culture and faith. In 1928 Kroner was appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Kiel. An attack of neuritis, however, prevented him from accepting this position until 1929. Julius Stenzel, a noted Plato scholar, was a colleague there with whom Kroner had a delightful and harmonious relationship. They directed a seminar on Plato and in another read Aristotle's Logic. During his tenure at the University of Kiel Kroner wrote a book entitled Kulturphilosophische Grundlegung der Politik, which was well received in Germany. When Hitler came to

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power he demanded complete suppression of this treatise. While the subject matter was neither socialistic nor communistic, it was nevertheless critical of Nazism. In a footnote Kroner stated that the conflict between the Communists and the Nazis could tear Germany into two parts and lead to a civil war. In the Netherlands the Dutch Society of Pure Reason was a famous academic group dedicated to the study of Hegelianism. Kroner became a member and wrote articles for its journal. One of the members suggested that it should be enlarged into a world society for Hegelianism, and Kroner became exceedingly interested in the idea. In conjunction with Professor Wigersma of the Netherlands, he planned a meeting held at The Hague in 1930, to which many scholars were invited. German idealists from most of the European countries, and members of the Dutch Society of Pure Reason were present. Kroner spoke at the beginning of the meeting outlining plans for an international organization (see "Eröffnungsrede des Haager Hegelkongresses," Verhandlungen des Ersten Hegelkongresses); he received enthusiastic support and the International Hegel Society became a reality. Kroner was elected president of the organization and held that office until 1934. It was decided that the Second International Hegel Congress should take place at Berlin in 1931, on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of Hegel's death. It was Kroner's good fortune that among those present were two Oxford scholars, who were eventually to aid in his emigration from Germany and facilitate his entrance into England. One of these was Michael B. Foster, then a fellow of Christ Church, and a former student of Kroner's. With hundreds of philosophers in attendance, the Second Congress was opened at the University of Berlin. In the presence of the Minister of Culture, the Rector of the University, the Mayor of Berlin, and many eminent European scholars, Kroner gave the introductory address. This lecture, entitled

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"Rede zur Eröffnung des II. Hegelkongresses," can be found in the Verhandlungen des Zweiten Hegelkongresses. The Third Congress took place at Rome in 1933. At this meeting the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile gave the introductory address. The lectures were published in the third volume of the proceedings of the Congress that same year. Kroner contributed a discussion on the dialectic of time, entitled "Bemerkungen zur Dialektik der Zeit." In 1934 Hitler's Storm Troopers invaded one of Kroner's lectures at the University of Kiel. They humiliated and ridiculed him by singing Nazi songs, and started a riot. Kroner was so stunned that he stood paralyzed and could not believe the spectacle unfolding before his eyes. One of the students present that day was Professor Otis Lee of Vassar College, who had come to Germany to study Hegel under Kroner. This was in fact the end of Professor Kroner's academic career in his native land. His books were burned publicly by the Nazis, along with the volumes of many prominent colleagues. It was a scandalous and alarming signal of what was in store for the German nation in the years to come. Soon after these barbarous displays Professor Giovanni Gentile of the University of Rome intervened on Kroner's behalf, and he was appointed a visiting professor of philosophy. He journeyed to Rome with the intention of remaining indefinitely. Unfortunately once again the tremendous pain of neuritis forced him to terminate this association. Kroner was requested to return to Germany. In Berlin a personal representative of the Minister of Culture told him that he should voluntarily resign his professorship at Kiel; otherwise he would be dismissed completely. Upon submitting his resignation he was designated a professor emeritus, which implied that he was to receive his full salary. However, he did not receive any stipend from the University until after the Second World War. In most cases German officers of the First World War were

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not persecuted. Despite his excellent record, Kroner was attacked. A sham tolerance, however, had to be maintained toward former officers of the German Army. Accordingly after a short time in Frankfurt Kroner was appointed research professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin. He was not allowed to lecture or to meet with any of the students. His only responsibility was to prepare an occasional paper for the Ministry of Culture on some facet of Hegelianism. He and other professors in the same plight were permitted to join together once a week for academic discussion. They studied many philosophical classics, including Plato's Parmenides and Aristotle's Metaphysics. Except for these seminars and their attendance at the church of Pastor Martin Niemoeller, the Kroners led a solitary and isolated life in Berlin from 1935 up until they left Germany. In 1936 Kroner was invited to the United States in order to address the American Philosophical Association. During his sojourn in America he visited many universities, including Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Virginia, Chicago, and Minnesota. On the return trip to Germany he stopped at Oxford to deliver a lecture published in The Journal of Philosophy under the title "Philosophy of Life and Philosophy of History." Professor R. G. Collingwood responded with an appreciative critique. Kroner returned to Berlin and remained in Germany until 1938. That year he was urged to leave his homeland as soon as possible. War seemed inevitable. There was little doubt that at the outbreak of hostilities Hitler would intern or execute all those who opposed him. With some difficulty Kroner secured a German passport; through the intervention of Michael Foster he obtained an English visa and embarked for England in October 1938. Several months elapsed before, in the spring of 1939, Mrs. Kroner was permitted to join her husband. All of their property except what they were able to carry with them was confiscated by the Nazis. Mrs. Kroner's mother and sister stayed in Berlin

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under very distressing circumstances; though they expected to join the Kroners later, they were never able to do so. Kroner's mother, daughter, and son-in-law, on the other hand, arrived in England in the summer of 1939, just before the outbreak of the Second World War. Years in England and America (1938 -1961). From Germany to England is a short distance, but for Kroner the English Channel was all that separated hell from heaven; upon his arrival on British soil he went immediately to Oxford, where his friend Michael Foster had an apartment waiting for him at Christ Church. Oxford was a veritable academic haven for Kroner; he lectured on the political philosophy of Hobbes, Kant, and Hegel. He was warmly received and his lectures were well attended. The Kroners spent the summer of 1939 at the home of Bishop Boutflower near Oxford. It was Bishop Boutflower who introduced him to Reinhold Niebuhr's Beyond Tragedy. This work by the American theologian spoke to the inner soul of the refugee philosopher. Once again he considered the radical importance of Soren Kierkegaard, and also the significance of the theological revolution which had been taking place since Karl Barth had published his Epistle to the Romans in 1918. Kroner had discussed this commentary with Barth in conversation at Göttingen many years before. In addition Tillich's treatise, "Über die Idee einer Theologie der Kultur," in KantStudien had confirmed Kroner's own conclusion that religion was the zenith of the whole cultural trend; and also he had been challenged to rethink his position by Martin Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. But Beyond Tragedy had an effect more immediate and profound than any of these; it was the inspiration he needed, and it had a mysterious correspondence with his own faith. It made explicit what had been implicit in Kroner's belief for many years. He revised his systematic philosophical treatise on the basis of this inner change of heart and mind,

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and in 1951 it was published in its new and English form by the University of Chicago Press under the title Culture and Faith. During the autumn of 1939 Dr. and Mrs. Kroner and Dr. Kroner's mother occupied an apartment in Richmond, Surrey. Soon after their arrival in London, Dr. Kroner left for Scotland, where he had been invited to deliver the Gifford Lectures at the University of St. Andrews, tie was the guest of Professor T. M. Knox. His lectures were entitled "The Boundary Line Between Philosophy and Religion," and were later published as The Primacy of Faith. Before the end of this sojourn he was called back to England because of his mother's death. The Kroners emigrated from England to the United States early in 1940. Professor Otis Lee of Vassar College had arranged for a series of lectures at Vassar, Wellesley, and Smith colleges. Following these commitments he was offered the position of professor of philosophy by the Vice Chancellor at McGill University in Montreal. He was to occupy the chair left vacant by the resignation of Dr. Charles Hendel, who had become a professor at Yale University. He accepted the position; but four weeks later Hitler conquered France, and as a result of the invasion the Vice Chancellor advised him not to come to Montreal, because the war hysteria was so intense and the hatred of Germans was so deep that he might be interned. The Nazi menace had reached across the ocean to threaten the Kroners. Again their world was shattered; they faced the future with uncertainty. McGill University did, however, promise him a salary for the next two years. The remainder of the summer was spent resting at Seal Harbor, Maine. Professor Hendel arranged for a fellowship at Yale University for the academic year 1940-41. However, Kroner's situation was still uncertain and his mood was one of gloom. Under these disheartening circumstances he revised his Gilford Lectures for publication as The Primacy of Faith. On November 25 and 26, 1940 Kroner presented the Bedell Lectures at Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio. The Religious Function of Imagina-

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tion, setting forth his theory of the religious imagination, is an attempt to build a bridge between philosophy and religion; it became one of his most famous books. Paul Tillich was instrumental in Kroner's appointment as a professor of the philosophy of religion at Union Theological Seminary in New York. His lectures began during the academic year 1941-42 and continued until his retirement in 1952. President Henry Sloane Coffin, whom Kroner held in high esteem as a "prince of the church," was enthusiastic about the Hewett Lectures which were entitled How Do We Know God? They were delivered not only at Union Theological Seminary, but also at' the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, at Andover Newton Theological Seminary, and at McCormick Theological Seminary. Kroner's lectures at Union Seminary were mainly a discussion of the history of philosophy from the point of view of the Christian faith. He presented courses on Christianity and Hegelianism, on Faith and Reason in the Philosophy of Kant, and also on such problems as Freedom and Grace, Time and Eternity. Seminars were offered on the Church Fathers and Hegel's Phenomenology of the Mind. With his colleague David Roberts seminars were conducted on existentialism as well as Christianity and the Human Tragedy. Kroner's unpublished manuscript Tragedy and Faith is based on his contribution to the seminar on tragedy. Life was happy for him at Union Seminary. He had many instructive conversations with some of the outstanding theological scholars in the world, especially Reinhold Niebuhr, who became his close friend. Moreover he had the pleasure of renewing his friendship with Paul Tillich, which had begun when they were colleagues at Dresden. Kroner also had many constructive discussions with President Henry P. Van Dusen, and with Professors James Muilenburg, John Knox, Frederick C. Grant, Paul Scherer, and John C. Bennett, the last of whom he describes as sincerity personified.

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Equally important at Union were the chapel services. He appreciated the opportunity to hear the preaching of the faculty members. Kroner considered it a great event in his life to be asked to address the Union community at worship. He delivered many chapel addresses and in some sense felt himself to have been initiated as a Christian minister. In the atmosphere of this theological community the Kroners achieved a measure of serenity in spite of the tragic losses suffered by their family. Before the end of the Second World War Dr. Seligsohn, their son-in-law, died while serving in the British Army; Mrs. Kroner's mother died in Nazi Germany; and her sister committed suicide in order to avoid a concentration camp and Jewish persecution. In 1944 Kroner was invited to be a visiting lecturer in philosophy at Temple University in Philadelphia. He was appointed permanent visiting professor of philosophy at Temple in 1952. At the present time he has limited his teaching to one lecture course each year, devoting most of his energies to writing. The Kroners, who became naturalized citizens of the United States in 1945, now live in Elkins Park, Pennsylvania. They enjoy a quiet life in this pleasant suburban community. Dr. Kroner has been occupied for the past six years on three volumes which are the outgrowth of his lectures on the history of philosophy delivered at Union Theological Seminary and at Temple University. He traces the entire history of philosophic thought from the perspective of the tension between speculation and revelation. Speculation in Pre-Christian Philosophy was published in 1956; Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy in 1959; and the final volume, Speculation and Revelation in Modern Philosophy, in 1961. Kroner's unpublished manuscript, Being, Selfhood, and God, which was recently completed, is a discussion of the tensions between metaphysics and theology and his proposed solution to the problem.

Self and World

I The Metaphysics of Selfhood To regard the self as a foundation for metaphysics or ontology is a possibility only for the modern mind. Not until the breakdown of the medieval synthesis could the self become the center of metaphysical consideration, since this synthesis was a fusion of the Greek reflection about the cosmos and the Christian reflection about God; but the problem of man and consequently of selfhood was obscured and virtually lost in the great cosmological and theological speculations of ancient and medieval times. Alexander Pope has mused that the proper study of man is man. This is the unique character of the modern philosophic perspective. Man takes the place of cosmos and of God as the center of thought. The freedom which man achieved as a result of the dissolution of the medieval synthesis was not immediately accepted in philosophic circles. On the Continent Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza continued with cosmological and speculative questions. In English thought the newly found freedom occasioned empirical study which was man-centered, but the self became an object of psychological and scientific investigation rather than the basis for metaphysical reflection. When Immanuel Kant, confronted by the insoluble difficulties of Continental rationalism and British empiricism, produced his Critique of Pure Reason, the full impact of the new world was felt. The self assumed the center of the stage; man became the critic of his own reason. After Kant a metaphysics based upon selfhood developed. Fichte, dissatisfied with being merely a critic in the Kantian sense, was the first philosopher to construct such a system. In Hegel a metaphysics of selfhood burst into full bloom, but through a strange paradox the critical philosophy of Kant 33

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became subordinate to another type of cosmological thinking; the ancient Greek speculation was revived through a cosmological interpretation of selfhood. T h e human self was swallowed up in the Absolute. T h e self had to be emancipated from Hegelianism, and a solution to this problem was offered by the Danish theologian and philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard was indirectly indebted to Hegel for much of his philosophic insight, but the brilliant Dane loosed the self from its prominent place in Hegelian cosmology and transformed it from the concrete universal into a living and dynamic reality over against the world and transcendent to any speculative schemes. In his denunciation of all metaphysics Kierkegaard discovered the basis for a metaphysics of selfhood which is neither cosmological in the ancient sense nor theological in the medieval sense. He sets forth this insight in the Philosophical Fragments by declaring : The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something thought cannot think. This passion is at bottom present in all thinking, even in the thinking of the individual, insofar as in thinking he participates in something transcending himself.1 This is the supreme paradox of all reflection, to discover something thought cannot think; and this paradox is fundamental as a presupposition for a metaphysics of selfhood. It may appear to be a defiance of tradition to establish a nonspeculative metaphysics upon this presupposition but the Kantian "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy makes it necessary if the peculiar contribution of modern times is to be preserved. Richard Kroner's philosophical system developed out of this general background.Recognized in Germany as one of the great authorities on Kant and Hegel, for many years he held to a position somewhere between these two giants of philosophy. When modern Germany began to crumble under the disintegrating weight of Nazism, Kroner reconsidered the implica-

The Metaphysics of Selfhood

35

tions of a German idealism in which selfhood is swallowed up in Absolute Mind. One of his first encounters with the liberated selfhood of S0ren Kierkegaard came when he read Reinhold Niebuhr's Beyond Tragedy. It is common knowledge that Niebuhr has contributed immeasurably to the establishment of human selfhood as something which transcends rational coherence and participates in a dimension of reality which thought cannot think. In The Self and the Dramas of History and other works Niebuhr has demonstrated the living and dynamic qualities of selfhood, and together with such thinkers as Martin Buber, has been instrumental in destroying much pretentious objectification of selfhood in modern philosophic and social thought. Niebuhr, however, has not developed the full implications of his contribution. He functions more as a social critic and prophet than as a philosopher interested in metaphysical questions. Kroner, in his role as a philosopher and metaphysician, augments the contribution of Niebuhr, Buber, and others by constructing a metaphysics of selfhood based upon the presupposition of Kierkegaard. T h e metaphysical or philosophical study of that dimension of reality which thought cannot think, Kroner calls heautology." He means by this term a doctrine or logic of human selfhood. Kroner arrives at his doctrine by first examining the perennial metaphysical problem of the really real and its connection with the seemingly real. If the really real is affirmed as the only reality in the Parmenidean sense, contradiction arises in the negation of the apparently real. This is because the one who makes the affirmation is a participant in the realm of appearance. If the apparently real is affirmed as the real, then it must be concluded as in the Platonic dialogue Parmenides, that no criterion of reality is possible, and that nothing can be said about the real.

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It is Kroner's contention that if the really real in the Parmenidean sense represents perfect truth, then involved in the really real must also be the reason for negativity, error and

finitude.

T h e really real must be the ground for the apparently real; as a result, it must be the source of all evil, ugliness, and falsity. 1 This problem is vividly demonstrated b y the aforementioned Platonic dialogue, in which the antinomies resulting f r o m an affirmation or negation either of the really real or of

the

apparently real, demonstrate a basic contradiction between the two and make union impossible. T h e contradiction in Parmenidean ontology leads ultimately to the extreme of Hegel. Here, Kroner argues, Hegel introduced contradiction into his system and insisted that this would solve the problem, especially if the ontological system is pictured as a perfect circle ending where it begins. Kroner is certain, however, that if these alternatives constitute the only approaches to ontology, then such an endeavor is, in the words of K a n t , an impossible possibility. Ontology defies the capacity of

the

human mind. 1 Ontology, whether it is cast in a Parmenidean or Hegelian structure, deals with insoluble problems; but the fact that the ontological problem cannot be solved by thought does not mean that it should be ignored. T h e solution must be sought in a dimension outside of thought per se. In the Kantian Critique

a speculative k n o w l e d g e of world,

G o d , and soul was destroyed forever. K a n t completely vanquished the aspiration of the G r e e k s toward cosmos, which in reality was the treatment of the world as object to which all else was subject, and as he demonstrated the absurdity implicit in medieval philosophy and its attempt to find G o d in a half-speculative, half-revelational manner, he also refuted both the early moderns in their quest for a new c o s m o l o g y , and Descartes and L o c k e in their identification of the self with an object (res

cogitans).

He eliminated

the necessity

for

ontology in the traditional sense. Y e t the problems occasioned

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37

by ontological speculation remained after the onslaught of Kant's pen, and he furnished no new foundation for rebuilding anything in the place of what he had destroyed. Kroner approaches these questions of ontological import in a non-speculative way, but at the same time he attempts to do full justice to them. He agrees with Kant in the conclusions of the critical philosophy, but he wants to go further than Kant in an attempt to solve the problems. Heautology may be called a non-speculative metaphysics, a designation which appears paradoxical, but nevertheless a neccessary one since the ontological problem is ultimately the problem of man's self-contradiction. Kroner declares: Contradiction originally and ultimately means that we contradict ourselves or that the human mind contradicts itself, whereby the human mind represents the thinking self which is always the self of a concrete individual person.5 The logic or doctrine of the human self emerges when that self-contradiction is studied. Contradiction is constantly faced in ontological pursuits because ontology is in the last analysis heautology, and in this respect heautology is not merely the logic of selfhood, but the ontology of finite selfhood as well." The presupposition of the world is that of the self, and the presupposition of a world filled with contradiction and negativity is that of a finite self broken by deficiency and debasement. The proper study of metaphysics is the recognition of the primacy of the human self in its relation to the world, and at the same time the realization that the insoluble contradictions of traditional ontology must remain, unless something can be done to mend the source of the insolubility, i.e., the human self. In his metaphysics Kroner develops a system of antinomies which results from his insistence upon the primacy of the human self. In his system the self-world antinomy is both the basic duality and the fundamental factor in all human experience. The self from the beginning is confronted with its world. The self belongs to the world, is a part of the world, and

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appears as subordinate to the greater world-reality. But the self has the world as the object and content of its thought, and this expresses in a profound sense the truth uttered by Pascal in the Pensées, that the ego or self possesses the primacy. The tension between self and world must be seen from the perspective of this baffling mystery. The world needs the self to be a world, but the self needs the world to be a self. They complement each other, while simultaneously opposing each other. The basis of all human experience is this antinomy or contradiction. Martin Buber dramatically conveys the truth of this antinomy in the following scene : Thenceforth, if ever man shudders at the alienation, and the world strikes terror in his heart, he looks up (to right or left, just as it may chance) and sees a picture. There he sees that the I is embedded in the world and that there is really no I at all—so the world can do nothing to the I, and he is put at ease; or he sees that the world is embedded in the I, and that there is really no world at all—so the world can do nothing to the I, and he is put at ease. Another time, if the man shudders at the alienation, and the I strikes terror in his heart, he looks up and sees a picture; which picture he sees does not matter, the empty I is stuffed full with the world or the stream of the world flows over it, and he is put at ease. But a moment comes, and it is near, when the shuddering man looks up and sees both pictures in a flash together. And a deeper shudder seizes him.' The two antinomies which result directly from the ego-world duality are those of the "self" and "world" significance of the human person, i.e., the duality of individuality and universality; and also the duality of oneness and manifoldness which is described as the contradiction that the self should be the self of the one world, and yet many persons exist, each of whom is a self who claims to be his own world center." Man as an individual is also a universal ego. He is the center of the world he experiences. There is a world in each of us, it is our world; in fact it is the only world accessible to us. Universality represents the "world" function of our ego, while individu-

The Metaphysics of Selfhood

39

ality represents the " s e l f " function of our ego. W e are both universal and individual, yet at the same time we are neither. T h e greatest men of any period of time approach this universal individuality. They are universal because they are so individual, but there is always the gulf between the universal and the individual. Universality reveals the fact that I am not truly individual. T h e universal is what I ought to be; it is an objectified individuality over against my fragmented attempts to be truly an individual. A more abstract statement of the duality of individuality and universality is presented by the antinomy of oneness and manifoldness. All persons face the same world, each from his own perspective. In such a situation the one world is reflected in a manifold of worlds, i.e., my world which is the one world for me, but also the reality of a manifold of selves with each self having a world of his own. In the individuality-universality antinomy the question is directed towards the self. Here it is directed towards the world. How can the manifold of worlds be reconciled with the one world? Kroner elucidates the difficulty: Each self believes himself to be the one self on which the world hinges, though this belief may not assume the form of conscious reflection . . . Each individual is the self of his world, but this world is also the one world, and thus the self of each individual is the one self of the w o r l d . . . . The oneness of this self contradicts the plurality of individuals, and this contradiction is only another form of the contradiction of oneness and manifoldness.0 T h e two remaining antinomies in Kroner's system are freedom and necessity, time and eternity. These also issue from the self-world duality. Freedom represents the self in relation to the world; necessity represents the world in relation to the self. Time is the world element in relation to the self, while eternity is the self element when the self is seen as transcendent to its world. Freedom and eternity relate primarily to the personal

40

Self and World

dimension of reality, and as a result have meaning beyond or over against the real world. The antinomies in Kroner's system are not primarily logical antinomies. The duality of self and world is given a logical form by thought, but the duality precedes the thought's form. Before thought expresses these antinomies logically, they manifest themselves in experience in the form of emotional tensions and passions—grief, despair, anxiety, unrest, embarrassment, and perplexity. Kroner observes that All these emotions, which move the soul in its depths, are evidence and symptom not only of individual and specific difficulties which the self undergoes but also of the universal situation in which man finds himself, of his metaphysical status. The definite occasions and objects of such emotions as they occur in life are only the peculiar manifestations of that status.10 In other words, the antinomies are logical formulations of man's self-contradiction. Logical contradiction presupposes self-contradiction. Logic is the outcome of selfhood. Kroner would say that logic is one among many ways in which the self tries to defend itself against the danger of being lost in the temporalities and necessities of the world. Contradictions always emanate from propositional activity, but the propositions themselves are personal since they are uttered and constructed by persons. If contradiction arises, the presupposition is that of the self-contradictory person. In fact, if this were not true there would be no such activity as philosophizing or any other cultural scheme." The two important laws of thought, i.e., the law of identity and the law of contradiction, are treated by Kroner as logical categories of selfhood. The law of identity points to selfhood. It is the criterion of certainty, an ought in relation to the self. The self should be a unity, an identity; but it is not. The law of contradiction points to the non-self and its relation to the self. It is a threat to the self, since the self is not an identity. The self is not an identity because of the threat of the world, and man

The Metaphysics of Selfhood

41

finds himself in a struggle to keep his selfhood in the midst of this contradiction between self and world. As Kant's theoretical philosophy led to his moral philosophy, so Kroner sees the ultimate ontological or metaphysical problem to be the moral one. As a self, I am the presupposition of my world, and as that self I am not really a self, but always on the way toward the goal or away from the goal. The ultimate ontological problem of contradiction can only be understood through the finite human self, and because of the broken character of the human self, the moral problem is its ultimate issue. Kroner declares that only in the moral realm does the self know itself, and only here does the self receive a clue to the nature of its original self-contradiction.12 If Kroner is correct in his conclusion that the only possible answer to the ontological question rests in the solution to the moral problem of human selfhood, this restricts metaphysics to the human self. Speculation cannot be allowed about an Absolute Self. This is true because the problem of speculation is the self who speculates. The presupposition of ontology is the contradictory human self; as a result, the self can receive no knowledge of an Absolute, non-contradictory self through speculation. The ultimate problem in philosophy is moral because of the character of human selfhood. The solution to man's problem, in Kroner's view, is beyond human exertion. It lies in the realm of religious faith. Faith solves the moral self-contradiction of man, and at the same time erases the antinomies of metaphysics and ontology. Kroner's religious philosophy has as its basic task the establishment of the primacy of faith over philosophy and over all cultural enterprises. Both philosophy and culture attempt to solve man's problem, but in the end they are frustrated in their exertions. Only a reality outside the cultural walls stands as the possibility for man's realization of his true selfhood. In the development of Kroner's contribution to the field of religious philosophy, the next problem to be considered is his

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concept of the religious imagination. He posits the religious imagination as a synthesis between philosophy and religion; a careful analysis of his teachings on this subject will be made in Chapter Two.

NOTES 1

S0ren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, translated by David F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p.29. Reprinted by permission. 1 Metaphysics, Richard Kroner, "What Is Really Real," The Review of Vol. VII, No. 3 (March 1954), p.359. 1 Ibid., p. 356. ' Ibid., p. 357. "Ibid., p. 358. Reprinted by permission of The Review of Metaphysics. 8 Ibid., p. 360. ' Martin Buber, I And Thou, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 71-72. Reprinted by permission. ' R i c h a r d Kroner, Culture and Faith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 39. 9 Ibid., p. 43. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press. Ibid., p. 62. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press. " Ibid., p. 64. 1! Kroner, "What Is Really Real," loc.cit., p. 362.

II The Religious Imagination Is it possible for a synthesis between philosophy and religion to be achieved which will not subordinate one to the other, but rather maintain the tension between the two poles? May the tension between thought and faith be eased without losing the self in the throes of an object-world? Must religion abdicate to philosophy as far as truth is concerned and play the role assigned to it by modern philosophic analysis? Is religion only feeling and emotion? Is language about God fraudulent? Can a solution be found which will meet the demands of Kroner's metaphysics of selfhood and which will establish rather than negate the dimension of personal encounter as the primary basis for religious philosophy? The question could be phrased: Is religious philosophy possible? Kroner projects the religious imagination as a synthesis between philosophy and religion. Religious imagination does not impair either philosophy or religion, and at the same time maintains the conditions necessary for faith. Faith is not subordinate to the imagination. The religious imagination arises from faith as the proper synthesis between thought and itself. In this respect faith has the primacy in religious philosophy, but not at the expense of destroying a necessary philosophic function. Faith does not eliminate the need for thought, nor is faith iconoclastic in its relation to philosophical method and analysis. Through the religious imagination thought is reconciled to faith. Philosophy is a product of thought, while religion is a product of imagination. 1 Religion deals with ultimate reality by veiling it in symbolical images or myths, through the telling of stories and the development of rites. Philosophy approaches ultimate reality directly; it attempts to penetrate into its sub43

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Self and World

stance, its meaning, and does not have recourse to myth and symbol. The philosophers who have followed in the train of Aristotle fit this description, while the Plato of the dialogues of course defies it since he uses myths to demonstrate truths hidden to thought alone. In this respect Plato is closer to religion than Aristotle. It is Kroner's contention that the notion of the supremacy of philosophic thought over religious imagination is erroneous. The crucial questions are centered in the personal life. H e states: The deepest questions are the simplest questions: What is the meaning of man, of man's activity and destiny, of culture and history, of all our efforts and all our achievements? What is the ultimate meaning of our personal life, and what is the best way of living? What is the highest goal of mankind? What does death mean? These and similar questions are more important than merely theoretical problems, not only for our life, for the decisions to be made by ourselves, but also for our knowledge of the world at large, for our world view, and thus for our ultimate relationship to the real and even to nature and all things.2 These questions are of much greater importance than the merely theoretical problems of philosophy and logical analysis, and man's reason balks ultimately when confronted by them. In regard to such questions Kroner believes that it is religious imagination, and not philosophic thought, which gives the most satisfactory, the most profound and true answers. In order to substantiate this bold assertion an examination of imagination in general will be necessary before attempting a description of the peculiar religious function of imagination. Generally speaking, imagination has both a theoretical and a practical function. Imagination does not reproduce images of the world through imitation. It creates new worlds in a productive fashion. It does not depend upon sensation to furnish it with its content and then reproduce an image from that content. It produces an

The Religious Imagination

45

image for which there is no adequate content furnished through sensation. The theoretical function of imagination can be seen as a synthesis between sensation and intellection. Kant insists upon the productive character of imagination in the relation between object and thought. There can be no knowledge of nature in sensation qua sensation, nor in intellection qua intellection. In the Critique of Pure Reason productive imagination is displayed as a necessary link between the two.3 Imagination submits the matter of sense-perception to the notions of thought. It is a legitimate and necessary element in all scientific activity. In this respect theoretical imagination is scientific imagination. Abstract analysis gains no knowledge. A proper synthesis must be achieved between thought and object, and this is the function of imagination. The scientist seeks after a totality, a whole; and the peculiar function of theoretical imagination is to produce that totality which the scientist finds neither in the sense data nor in the categories of thought. The theoretical function of the imagination produces a task which pushes the scientist forever onward in his effort to construct a total picture of reality. Imagination produces the image of this totality, and thus unites sensation and intellection. This is the theoretical function of imagination. Paradoxically, the theoretical function of imagination is also the practical function. In fact, the presupposition of the theoretical function is the practical function, just as the presupposition of thought is the self which thinks. Imagination can produce an image of reality as totality in the theoretical or contemplative sphere because it already engages in such a productive function in the realm of practical life. The theoretical or contemplative sphere is the objectification by thought of the practical or action sphere of living. Thought attempts to depict reality, but the presupposition of the depiction is the depicted, and the depicted is the realm of life itself. What theoretical activity never completes in its task of con-

46

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structing a total picture of the real, the practical imagination furnishes from the outset to all men engaged in the business of living. In Kroner's view there is no human desire or exertion which is not accompanied by an image of the end to be accomplished, even though that image may at times be vague and clouded. Images are the forces in life which impel us to act; they contain our purposes and prospects, since they represent the concrete life of our opinions, our creeds, our presumptions, and our convictions.' In contrast to this, thought shatters the image of reality into a subjective-objective antithesis. Thought attempts to piece back together what has been shattered analytically, but such a synthesis can be accomplished only through the image, which transcends the shattering processes of thought. This image of the totality unites sensation and intellection, and being itself practical unites the poles of thought and action, of the theoretical and the practical. Without the practical function of imagination there could be no science. This is true because of the obvious but usually neglected fact that science presupposes a scientist, thought a thinker, and that the scientist and the thinker are not predominantly thoughts which think, but selves which live. Kroner defines man as the being who is aware of the world as a whole. In such awareness he is eventually a religious being. The practical function of imagination, which makes man aware of the whole, issues into the religious function of the imagination. He declares: Our image of the whole is closely connected with our emotional reaction toward reality. This reaction is probably the primary cause of the special direction and activity of our imagination. Not only particular instances, events in our life, the behavior of other people and so on, arouse our emotions, or kindle passions in our heart; the whole of reality engenders our fear and hope, our love and our hate, our rapture and our dismay, our gratitude or our horror, and a

The Religious Imagination

47

thousand other feelings and affections. . . . Thus the world of myths, legends, fairy tales, and so on is generated by our imagination. We call this kind of imagination religious imagination: it is the source of all religions. 5

The religious imagination is permitted access to the divine mystery. Thought is never allowed entrance. Religious imagination meets the genuine need of man as a religious being, while thought about ultimates falls short in the meeting of this need. Religious imagination has as its "object" the totality of reality, the whole of experience and thought, but thought, sensation, and perception concern only abstract fragments of consciousness. What is usually called reality, the material world of the senses, is from Kroner's approach nothing more than the arena or stage on which man performs the drama of his life. The full meaning of this drama can be expressed only through the religious imagination. In this respect there is a ubiquitous mystery in reality which has an intimate connection with the actuality and individuality of each person's life; imagination is more adequate in articulating this mystery than thought.8 The personal dimension of reality is "over against" the world in this special way. This does not eliminate a study of the arena or stage of life through science and other endeavors, but it does make a fundamental distinction between the arena or stage of life, and the selves who live out their existence in this arena. Imagination in general is the mediator between sensation and intellection, but the specific function of religious imagination is to mediate between the world of appearance and ultimate truth, reality, and meaning. It does not subordinate the world of appearance to the so-called ultimate reality, i.e., sensation to intellection, content to form; rather, the religious imagination produces images which are both sensuous, like the phenomenal world of space and time, and supersensuous, like the intellectual notions, but which are neither phenomenal nor conceptual. The language of imagination belongs to a person as a concrete

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totality, and not merely as an isolated intellect.1 Concepts of ultimate reality must be transformed into images before the real can appear to the human mind. It is the peculiar function of the religious imagination to make the ultimate enter the stage of the individual and personal life and address itself to man. Religious imagination transforms the abstract and impersonal concept of ultimacy depicted by thought into the God who turns to us, who can help and support, punish and frighten us, who can be our shield and our solace, and who on the other hand can rule over the world, thus solving the problem of how the universal can become the individual.8 Religious imagination makes possible personal encounter, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that the personal dimension of reality, when viewed as primary in religious philosophy, establishes the integrity of religious imagination. It is certainly true that in a purely philosophical concept of ultimate reality, the personal dimension is lost through an unwarranted subordination. If God is to meet any one of us, he will meet us as persons primarily and as minds secondarily. In the meeting between God and man personal encounter is basic, and in the communication of such meeting something other than the reflective capacity is needed. That which is partial cannot convey meaning about that which is total. The total person in meeting the Supreme God cannot communicate such meeting by thought. Thought is subordinate to the personal dimension. The religious function of imagination is to convey or communicate the reality of the meeting between God and man in the dimension of personal encounter. In this respect the Bible is not a product of thought per se, but rather a product of the religious imagination. At this point the question of the relation between imagination and revelation arises. It may be true that there is a sphere of reality in which imagination takes the primacy away from thought; but is there any criterion, in this peculiar sphere,

The Religious Imagination

49

which would enable the religious philosopher to distinguish between a true and a false image? If there is no criterion, then the danger is obvious. Are the somewhat crude and immoral images of the Homeric epic to have as much value as the image of the Christ in the New Testament? Such questions and difficulties necessitate consideration. Kroner declares that as long as religious imagination is treated as a merely human power like the intellect, it can claim no expression of the divine mystery as its own. If religious imagination is to achieve the synthesis which is closed to speculation and thought, a criterion must present itself. This criterion must transcend the merely human capacity to produce images. There is such a human productive capacity in the sciences and the arts and in the practical life, but religious imagination must be radically distinguished from these other image-producing realms. Religious imagination can be distinguished from the other image-producing realms only when the self of man is included in the divine mystery, or when the divine mystery is at work in the life of man. Kroner is convinced that the superiority of the Bible is based upon this presumption. The divine mystery working in man articulates itself through the human imagination so that religious imagination turns into revelation from the side of God and into inspiration from the side of man. The necessary conclusion is that religious imagination is inspired imagination." This view has profound theological implications. Revelation is certainly not information in the rational sense. Response of the total person is essential to the revelation of God. In the past the response has often been interpreted as a "response of reason," making Christianity furnish information about ultimate reality. The response of the total person transcends the subjective-objective antithesis and affirms the dimension of personal encounter. The objectification of such a faith-response in the Bible is not rational, but rather imaginative in the unique sense of the word as used by Professor Kroner.

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The criterion for religious imagination is implicit in the dimension of personal encounter. Revelation transcends the rational sphere because it takes place in that dimension of reality which thought cannot think. In Buber's terms, revelation occurs when an I is confronted by the Thou of God over against the I. This presupposes a certain response on the part of the I, and what results is revelation. It is obvious that such a reality cannot be articulated in rational categories. For the articulation would immediately transform the I-Thou relation into the I-It relation.10 The peculiar function of the religious imagination is to articulate the mystical experience of the IThou relation. The criterion for such articulation cannot be rational, but must be the personal encounter itself. The criticism has been raised that this makes the ultimate criterion a merely subjective device. William Seifriz states the objection that "[Such] imagination or revelation reveals as much as the theologians think it does.'" 1 This would be true if the human response were the basic element in the personal encounter, but the divine initiative is primary. Nevertheless, a problem does exist here to which Martin Buber is sensitive. He declares that Christianity is Hellenistic when it surrenders the concept of the holy people and recognizes only an individual or personal holiness." Community must be the presupposition for such encounter, and the chosen people of Israel, or the New Covenant community in Christ are the necessary complements to such a criterion. It is certainly true that the holy people produced the Bible, which, in Kroner's phrase, is the imaginative articulation of the mystical experience of personal encounter with God. Canonization is no accident. The Church is the presupposition of the Bible. A criterion having been established, a discussion of some of the fundamental problems inherent in such a position becomes necessary. Religious imagination is responsive to the ultimate task. This distinguishes it from reproductive imagination, of

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which memory is an example; from productive imagination, which is the function of artistic creativity; and from the responsive imagination of the practical sphere, which deals with political planning and other, allied endeavors. Religious imagination is responsive, but only to the ultimate task." This responsiveness to the ultimate task has been equated with revelation. Kroner, in his own more precise definition, makes explicit his belief that by revelation the ultimate ground of reality expresses itself in our imagination, and that our minds and wills are responsive to this self-articulation." Kroner's statement is an utterance of faith. It grows out of personal encounter with God. It cannot be logically demonstrated that the Living God who reveals himself is identical with the philosopher's ultimate ground of reality. No rational synthesis is possible between the ultimate ground and the Living God. If such a synthesis were possible, revelation would be unnecessary, or at least subordinate to the ultimate ground. In a synthesis of this type religion becomes only an imperfect metaphysics. It is Kroner's contention that this is not true even in respect to the pagan religions, much less in respect to Biblical faith. This occasions the problem of the essential difference between Biblical faith and the pagan religions. Pagan religions claim no revelation; Biblical faith does. Pagan religions have not arrived at the height of Biblical revelation, and do not pretend to be revealed. In this sense they are inferior. One need read only Plato to realize that there was dissatisfaction within the Greek world itself over the impurity and immorality of the gods; and the Platonic vision of the Good is much more akin to Biblical religion than to paganism. Kroner corrects an earlier philosophical error in his book The Religious Function of the Imagination when he insists upon the distinction between the mythical and the revelatory. The mythical originates from man's own creativity in the contemplative realm of culture, while the revelatory has its

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origin in the realm of personal encounter and comes from the Living God rather than the cultural striving of man. Its result is active faith. Kroner feels that the term "myth" does an injustice to the mighty acts of God in the Bible, and that it should be discarded by modern theologians, because the proper meaning of the word has its origin in contemplative cultural exertion. He is fully aware, however, that most modern theologians use the term in a sense equivalent to what he means by an "image." Religious imagination serves active faith, and is based not only upon mystical experience but also upon moral conditions. Revealed religion and Biblical faith are thoroughly moral. Kroner would insist, in addition, that the mystical and the moral truth are intrinsically connected with each other. He is certain that God can be truly moral only if he is also truly mystical. In this respect God can accomplish morally what man cannot achieve, only because he is neither created by man's imagination nor postulated by man's thought, but reveals himself as the true and only God, the Lord." The theoretical problem of the ultimate ground of reality and the practical problem of the moral self-contradiction of man are solved by the religious imagination through its revelation of the Living God who reveals himself as Lord. The Lordship of the Living God demonstrates the integrity of the moral law and bears witness to man's moral self-contradiction. Within the revelation of the Living God as Lord may be found his function as Creator, of which the ultimate ground of reality is a caricature, and his Holiness, which makes the relation between the I of man and the Thou of God a moral as well as a mystical relation. Such a revelation, Kroner believes, can be received by man solely through the medium of imagination. But this imagination is no longer contemplative; rather, it serves man's moral exertion and brings it to completion. Faith is basically trust and loyalty, and only secondarily an imaginative knowledge derived

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from the active attitude which needs this knowledge for its moral function." If there is any ultimate solution to the theoretical question, it must be found in the moral realm. In fact, Kroner has said, the contradictions of the theoretical approach to reality emerge out of the moral self-contradiction of man. Religious imagination is the key to such a solution of the contradictions of theoretical reason and morality. It bears witness to the revelatory truth of the Living God as Lord. The Lord is the reality of the personal dimension of existence. Such reality cannot be found through a speculative approach to the ultimate problem. The ultimate of metaphysics can never be the lord of the metaphysician. For the metaphysician is always superior to his ultimate concept. Neither can the Kantian moral law be a solution to the moral selfcontradiction. The moral law itself is a type of lord, but a lord which is abstract and impersonal, and in the last analysis, a product of the pure practical reason. The only solution to these ultimate problems is the Living Lord. As Creator, he is what the metaphysicians seek after in vain; as Lawgiver, he bears witness to the sinfulness and moral self-contradiction of man; as the Redeemer, he solves the moral self-contradiction, whereupon the law becomes grace, and he reveals himself as Creator through his redemptive activity." NOTES 1

Richard Kroner, The Religious Function of Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 1. ~lbid., pp. 2-3. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press. 3 Ibid., p. 4. See also Professor Kroner's Gifford Lectures, The Primacy of Faith (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943), pp. 24-66; and his Kant's Weltanschauung, translated by John E. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). For a thorough analysis of Kant's philosophy, see the first volume of his Von Kant bis Hegel (Tübingen: J. C. B. Möhr (Paul Siebeck), 1921). 4 Ibid., p. 7. 'Ibid., p. 14. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press. 'Ibid., p. 19.

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' Ibid., pp. 22-23. ' Ibid., p. 29. ' Ibid., p. 37. '"See Martin Buber, I and Thou, Part I, pp. 3-34. " Richard Kroner, "On the Religious Imagination," in Perspectives on a Troubled Decade: Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1939-1949, edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. Maclver (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 606. Seifriz' comment is included in a footnote to the article. Martin Buber, Eclipse of God (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 138. " Kroner, Culture and Faith, p. 201. " Ibid. " Ibid., p. 203. " Ibid. " For an excellent discussion of Kroner's theory of the religious imagination by such scholars as W. E. Hocking, Rudolph Allers, Paul Minear, Amos Wilder, E. S. Brightman, John E. Smith, and others, read the article cited in note 11, above.

Ill Experience and Culture The cultural quest, whether it is mirrored in the arts and sciences or in political activity and moral development, demonstrates the fact that man engages in varied activities of building in order to restore something which he either has lost or finds lacking in his fundamental constitution. The presence of such striving indicates his need to go beyond himself in order to satisfy his thirst for something transcending the physical vitalities of existence. While the ultimate goal of cultural striving is never wholly attained, the undeniable reality of progress, however relative, assures man that the effort to work out his own salvation—not so much in fear and trembling as with an innate confidence in his own ability—is not entirely in vain. That effort comprises four general categories of cultural exertion: science, art, politics, and morality. Some philosophers of culture would include religion as a part of the cultural quest. Religion certainly possesses cultural forms, but the so-called culture religions are pseudo-religions; they find their primary purpose in meeting the scientific, aesthetic, political, or moral needs of man, and they usually do this in a very inadequate fashion. The Christian religion is both cultural and non-cultural. As a faith it certainly transcends culture, but in its cultural forms it too tends inevitably to fall under one or more of the four general categories of cultural striving. Christianity must live within the tension between culture and faith, and it ceases to be genuine when culture swallows it up in some scheme. H. Richard Niebuhr in his book Christ and Culture has conveyed in vivid detail the various tensions existing between the Christian faith and the cultural pursuits of humanity. He 55

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believes that when Christ is identified with culture, he becomes the solution to the scientific or moral questions of men.' In Gnosticism the aim is the cultural accommodation of Christ to a pseudo-scientific approach to reality. Abelard and his nineteenth-century counterpart, Albrecht Ritschl, transform Christ, as being the great moral teacher, into a moral solution to the problems of men. In the subordination of the state to the Church in the Middle Ages Christ became the solution to political problems; associated through the Church with artistic excellence, Christ has become the answer to the craving for beauty. The preceding argument seems to clinch the fourfold classification of cultural striving in science, art, politics, and morality. Since Christianity is a religion which by necessity emphasizes the tension between culture and faith, it cannot be a purely cultural product except in the "Christ of Culture" group which Richard Niebuhr describes. It will be the purpose of the next three chapters to examine the various cultural categories, to establish their rightful place, and to criticize the pretension which has accompanied a deification, indeed, of culture itself, in which the personal dimension of reality is reduced to a scientific, an aesthetic, a political, or a moral objectification. Cultural pretension eliminates the creative mystery and wonder of personality, so that the self is lost in the throes of a man-made system, and the freedom which is the essential characteristic of the personal dimension is transformed into the necessity of a rational, cultural coherence. Ontologism is the sin of the speculative philosopher, while scientism, aestheticism, statism, and moralism are the sins of a pretentious culture. In either case faith can have no primacy, since pretension and faith are mutually exclusive. In order to set forth the tension between culture and faith in Kroner's religious philosophy, we must begin by examining the concept of experience. It is necessary to inquire into the

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questions of what constitutes experience and of the relations between experience and culture, and between experience and faith. It will then be possible to proceed with an analysis of culture and a critique of cultural pretension, to be undertaken in Chapters Four and Five.2 Kroner describes experience as the process of becoming directly acquainted with the object of knowledge by an immediate contact. It is the opposite of learning by means of reason, since experience is something given to us while learning is something cultivated by us. Experience is the presupposition of all human activity. Without an immediate pre-scientific experience, no knowledge is possible. Rational activity may take the "matter" of experience and transform it, but the presupposition of such a transformation is the experience itself. Immediate experience may be misleading, and in many instances thought corrects errors of immediacy. Kroner utilizes the example of the geocentric theory of the earth's movement as an apparent error of immediate experience, while the heliocentric theory, although not a product of immediacy, is nevertheless the true approach to the earth's movement. In this case thought transforms immediacy in order to attain truth, but the importance of immediate experience is not lessened by this change. This act presupposes the experience which is transformed, since such experience is basic to the transformation. A certain trust in experience is necessary. Immediate experience is the synthesis of sense-impression and rational form; but man can never prove that this synthesis is true, or that experience can be trusted. The presupposition of the proof would be that which is the object of proof. Trust in experience is therefore basic. Philosophically, this trust is established by empiricism, which makes the sense-impression primary and the rational form secondary, or by rationalism, which makes the rational form primary and the sense-impression secondary. In-both of these schemes, however, the presupposed unity which is sought is already the basis for the seeking. Thus the schemes

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themselves will never reach a solution. T h e two philosophical disciplines, rationalism and empiricism, demonstrate the fundamental antinomy of all experience, the duality between self and world. Up to this point the discussion has been focused primarily upon the so-called scientific experience and its underlying presupposition. Scientific fact, contrary to popular fallacy, is only one small part of the totality of knowledge. Non-scientific knowledge, which issues from experience, makes up the major part of what we know. It is an error to abstract sense-experience from the living stream and make it the prototype of all experience. It has its place in real experience, which comprises the personal and the impersonal, the individual and the generic, the intellectual and the emotional, the moral and the political, the aesthetic and the religious. Scientific experience, itself impersonal, nevertheless has its foundation in the personal experiential dimension. Real or living experience, in Kroner's system, is the presupposition of all kinds of experience, and also it is the root of life itself. He elucidates the matter thus: What we call "life" in the human sense is by no means a biological process, as some philosophers consider it; it is an interplay of experience and action (including reaction) which mutually influence each other and inform each other. "Experience," however, is the wider term because action itself (in the human sense) is accompanied by self-experience. . . . Self-experience is inseparable from the self and therefore from will and action, by means of which the self realizes itself. Human life is this self-realization of selves and of one another. . . .The whole depth which is essential to the problem of experience is likewise essential to the problem of life and existence.3 Self-experience cannot be separated from the self; as a result human life is the self-realization of persons who are interrelated by mutual experience of themselves and of one another. Through this concrete stream of life all kinds of experience penetrate and permeate one another and are connected in a

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living and personal fashion. Thus the problem of experience is closely related to the problem of human life and existence. This constitutes real or living experience. A mutuality exists between this real experience and culture. Culture is the outcome of experience, and experience in turn issues from cultural activity. The promotion of cultural activity arises from experience; it presents the task of man's selfcivilizing exertions. Man's cultural activity, however, is different from the observable behavior patterns of the animal; the lack of disharmony in the realm of the beast is not a cultural achievement. The animal presents a unified and integrated picture to man, since the animal acts according to natural compulsion and instinct. Determinism is the rule for the animal kingdom. This is the reason why some thinkers desire to reduce man to the status of an animal. They feel that the animal does a better job in the business of living than man does. So behaviorisms emerge which possess a "neat" solution to the human problem, without the realization that the solution robs man of his humanity. Modern utopianism wishes to transform the human person into an "ant" or a "bee" since ants and bees exhibit greater social virtues than men. This is the trend of much modern psychological and sociological teaching. Yet to swallow up all of man's cultural striving into a restricted rational coherence, which deifies one cultural pursuit at the expense of the others, solves no problem. The man whom such an approach produces is non-cultural. He has no science, no art, no morality, and his politics is handled by the few who promulgate the system. The non-cultural man eventually sinks below the level of the animal he seeks to emulate, and bestiality may become the rule rather than the exception. Kroner affirms the great contrast in man which in modern times was made famous by Kierkegaard. Man stands in the ambiguous tension between finitude and infinitude, or he hangs between unconscious nature and the ideal of a natural con-

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sciousness which would also be cultural. T o personify this contrast, he declares that the human person hovers between animal and angel, nature and heaven. In the cultural exertion to create civilization man outgrows nature, yet he is always thwarted in his task of achieving heaven." The most revealing difference between man and animal is language. The word is primary. It is integrally connected with culture, since culture begins with speech. The self-civilizing function of man, which is interwoven with his experience, is rooted in the communication of meaning, whether that meaning be scientific, artistic, political, or moral. Man builds up a culture because he has an inner life which originates from an experience which itself has an inner meaning, and which asks for meaning. 5 The primary function of culture is to communicate an answer to that question and to satisfy the demand for meaning. The task of culture is to reach the perfect whole which is implicit in the fragmentary data available to human experience. All cultural activity attempts to reconstruct this totality. Immediate experience cannot be trusted, since there is always the thirst to know the giver of that given immediacy. Culture seeks the giver of the given in its building activity. Earlier conclusions demonstrate that the so-called giver must dwell in the personal dimension of reality. The trust necessary in all experience has its anchor in this dimension. Because of this the giver should be at least a person since only a person is morally reliable, and it is moral reliability alone which can evoke trust in the ultimate sense." Culture, when it is faced with the ultimate problem, meets with frustration. A certain impersonal element is implicit in cultural activity, and culture per se can never create what it seeks. The personal dimension of reality is the presupposition of all cultural striving, and what culture seeks in the ultimate sense must be sought there. Only in this respect can faith be

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possible, and can the giver of the given be found. Kroner concludes : Faith alone can provide man with that light, because it must shine in from outside the cultural walls if it is to be genuine and fulfill the task we expect from it.1 In Chapter One we noted Kroner's observation that the self-contradiction of man is mirrored in the self-world antinomy. This self-contradiction is basic to the experience of man. It is not something which he finds through a process of discovery; rather, he starts with the tension between the self and the world. Later he may give his self-contradiction a logical form, developing the antinomies which result from the contradictions of his personal life into a philosophical system. But the presupposition of all philosophical contradiction is the selfcontradiction of man in the personal dimension of reality. Kroner analyzes the cultural exertion expended in the resolution of the antinomies of experience by a consideration of two general spheres of culture. These two spheres are the realms of contemplation and action. Contemplation attempts a solution to man's problem from the perspective of the world. The contemplative task seeks to unite the manifold of worlds into one world picture. The existence of a manifold of worlds presupposes a manifold of selves. The one world of contemplation is a unification of the many worlds, but it is not a unification of the selves which are responsible for the manifold of worlds. The unification of the manifold of selves is the task of the cultural sphere of action. This realm attempts to bring about a harmony between the manifold of world-centers, each claiming a certain ascendancy over the other. The center of the world is a self. The many selves are thus faced with the contradiction that although the only world accessible to them is their world, yet there are many worlds and there are many selves. If the self of its world is not to make all other selves things or objects within its world, then there is a dimension of reality

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which is not a world dimension, but rather a dimension of selfhood. The presupposition of the world is this dimension, and this is the sphere in which the cultural exertion known as action has the prerogative. The contemplative realm issues into two distinct cultural activities: science and art. Man attempts through science and art to resolve the antinomies of experience through dealing in the world rather than in the dimension of selfhood. The peculiar function of science may be described as the subordination of all data to a picture of reality which is never finished. The peculiar contribution of the artist is in the coordination of the self-experience of the artist with the source of that experience, through a synthesis achieved by the use of a particular medium—canvas and paint, a musical score, or a dramatic production, for example. The essence of science is subordination; the essence of art is coordination. In the sphere of action there are two distinct cultural activities : politics and morality. The political realm is analogous to the scientific realm in the sphere of contemplation. Subordination is the primary function of the state. The manifold of selves are unified, at least outwardly, through becoming citizens of a state to which they are subordinate. Here the inward life of each man is less important than the unity of selves achieved through an external structure. The state is not visible, but it may be described as a universal self (abstract) to which all individual selves are subject. The cultural realm of morality, on the other hand, emphasizes the inwardness of each individual self and thus extols individuality. A tension between politics and morality arises in the sphere of action because of the antinomy of universality and individuality. The counterpart of art in the sphere of action is the religious realm. The analogue is imperfect, however; for since the religious realm is not wholly a cultural exertion, it is not properly regarded as subject to cultural analysis. In culture per se, no realm in the sphere of action wholly corresponds to the

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aesthetic realm in the sphere of contemplation. This demonstrates the limitations of culture. Such a realm would attempt to coordinate the relation of the manifold of selves to the universal self in community life. Such a realm would not subordinate the members to the abstract community which is the result of political exertion; rather, community would arise out of a prior relationship of unity between universal selfhood and individual selfhood. This realm, however, cannot be achieved by cultural exertion, since in the analysis of culture there is no place for such a realm of coordination in the sphere of action. As a result the personal dimension of reality in which community can be attained is the presupposition of the cultural spheres, and such community, if obtainable, is the result of the primacy of faith over man's civilizing enterprises. In the relation between contemplation and action which reflects the self-world antinomy, a primacy of action over contemplation is necessary. That this is true has already been argued in the previous chapters, which demonstrated the primacy of the personal dimension of reality. In the realm of contemplation the self is always engaged in the activity of contemplation, and such activity itself is a type of action. Contemplation is not possible without the contemplating self. So the primacy of the self in the self-world antinomy is apparent, but the resolution of the antinomy is not found in recognizing the primacy of the finite human ego. From this introductory discussion we can conclude that the cultural emphasis upon subordination is inferior to the emphasis upon coordination. As the artist rises to heights inaccessible to the scientist, so the religious man is in a position to experience the depth and profundity of reality much more vividly than the devotee of culture per se. The sphere of action is superior to the sphere of contemplation because of the primacy of the self over the world. The artistic realm is superior to the scientific realm in contemplation,

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because coordination rules rather than subordination. In the sphere of action, subordination is the rule both of politics and morality. Coordination, which creates true community, is beyond the limit of the active cultural enterprise. The confusion of art and religion develops as a result of the tendency to seek a world-solution to the ultimate problem. Although the artist practices coordination, so that he is not in principle subordinate to the work he creates, nevertheless the work itself is no solution to the self-contradiction of man. The artist still remains essentially the same self despite his creation. The final solution to the problem of man is the moral solution, transcending the sphere of contemplation and residing even beyond the limits of morality, in the realm of faith.

NOTES 1

H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture ( N e w Y o r k : Harper and Brothers, 1951), pp. 45-82. * The discussion relating to Kroner's views will be based primarily upon his book Culture and Faith. T h e material in this chapter concerning experience has special reference to pages 13-68 of that volume. Lecture notes taken by the author during Professor Kroner's course entitled "Secular Culture and the Christian Faith" have also been consulted. 3 Kroner, Culture and Faith, p. 21. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press. 1 Ibid., p. 26. D Ibid., p. 25. 1 Ibid., p. 28. ' Ibid., p. 29. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press.

IV Analysis of Culture : Science and Art In Kroner's analysis the various exertions of culture stem from the self-contradiction of man as this is mirrored in the self-world duality. This antinomy reflects itself in the spheres of contemplation (world) and of action (self); and the tensions between contemplation and action in cultural activity are occasioned by this duality. The cultural sphere of contemplation asserts itself in the realms of science and art.1 The principal task of this chapter is an investigation of the way these cultural categories attempt to resolve the antinomies of experience. The antinomies resulting from the self-world duality, in Kroner's metaphysics of selfhood, are: universality and individuality; oneness and manifoldness; freedom and necessity; and time and eternity. Coupled with an evaluation of these two cultural spheres and their relation to the antinomies will be a criticism of the pretension which may accompany a scientific or artistic exertion. The solution to the self-world antinomy contributed by science has as its starting point the establishment of the intelligibility of the world or nature. In fact, within the scientific realm the world is transformed into nature. Nature is the object of scientific investigation and is a more restricted concept than world. It is an abstract world which reflects a world-solution to this fundamental antinomy in terms of a contemplation which has subordination as its primary function. Nature is always intelligible to the scientist since it is a product of scientific activity itself. The order of nature is intellectual and therefore it is intelligible; it answers the questions of the intellect and at the same time subordinates the sensedata to the unity of the understanding.2 The Kantian thesis that the intellect prescribes to nature its laws is essential to the 65

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work of modern science. Science can achieve an empirical truth because a synthesis between the sense-data and the general concepts and principles of knowledge is possible. Nature emerges as that world, the world of phenomenal objects discovered by scientific investigation. Nature issues from the synthesis between the sense-data and the general forms. Speaking about the contribution of Kant in this regard, Kroner states: He showed that the natural sciences do reach an empirical truth by subordinating the phenomena to a general unity—the unity of a general understanding—and to general concepts and principles of knowledge, thereby uniting all the empirical data under general rules or laws. But he also showed they can never reach a speculative truth which would rival the intuitive and imaginative work of art in uniting the extreme poles of experience, thereby presenting the "things-in-themselves.'" Nature is a picture of the world as science sees it. It is a fragmented and incomplete picture since it is not a total world, but rather an objectified world, a world in restriction. The function of science is to complete the fragmented picture, or to objectify a non-objectifiable reality. As a result the work of science is never completed. In the subordination of the sense-data to the general category, the particular sense-data in themselves are not important to the function of science. Their importance is only in the establishment of the general category or law. These general laws are called the laws of nature; they make up the objectified worldreality known as nature. In this respect nature is a more general concept than any of its particular laws. The category of generality is an objectified universality. It is the only universal accessible to the scientist. But it is a pseudo-universal, since the reality of the general arises through a sacrifice to itself of the particular data. The antinomy of universality and individuality is transformed into the relation of the general to the particular. The proposed solution of this antinomy by science is no

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solution at all, since the general is not a true universal and the particular is not a true individual. Generality and particularity arise from an attempted world-solution to the antinomies. Particularity is subordinated to the general, and the contradiction is supposedly resolved. This same argument applies to the antinomy of oneness and manifoldness. The manifold of sense-data (particularity) is subordinated to the depicted unity of genera, and finally to nature itself. The antinomy of freedom and necessity is resolved by a loss of freedom in the subordination of the free to the necessities engendered by the general laws of nature. Freedom—and likewise eternity—has no function in the scientific picture of nature. The presence of freedom would upset the necessary subordination of all data to the general concept. Where subordination reigns, freedom has no reality. This conclusion also applies to the concept of "statistical probability" in scientific studies. Such probability is still the reflection of scientific necessity and bears little resemblance to freedom. In consideration of the antinomy between self and world, the limitations of the cultural exertion known as science become clear. Subordination is not threatened by a world-solution to the other antinomies which develop from this basic duality, because these can be objectified, as was noted above. In fact, this is absolutely necessary for the legitimate function of science. But when the relation of the scientist (self) to his object of study (world) is considered, such a simple, rational subordination cannot prevail. The scientist may desire to make the self an object of his investigation. This has been done in the history of thought; the ego has been reduced to a function of mind, or it has been equated with the behavior patterns of the organism. The soientist himself, however, never takes part in this objectification of selfhood. It is always some other ego or group of selves

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which are subject to the onslaught of

the

world-solution.

Kroner explains: The scientist does not figure within science and its world. H e is the tacit, hidden actor behind the scene. The world he investigates and presents is the world of facts and events; in this world he himself has no place, for he is neither a fact nor an event but the author of the play and the stage manager of its performance. Science may succeed in explaining everything that happens in the world; it will never succeed in explaining the scientist and his work in terms of science." Nature is the w o r l d of the scientist. It is by necessity an impersonal world; it is a w o r l d subordinate to the scientist or group

of

scientists.

If

pretension

plays

no

part

in

the

scientific enterprise, then in this impersonal w o r l d the e g o or the self of man will not be objectified. T h e self will remain outside the nature-world of science. I f pretension does assert itself, and the self is seen as a part of this restricted world, then all selves except the self of the scientist are objectified, and thus destroyed. N o genuine scientist would be so arrogant in seeking a solution to the antinomy of self and world. T h e scientist himself lives in a greater world than his o w n depicted w o r l d of nature. A s an ego, as a self, he participates in the personal dimension of reality, and when that dimension is discovered, a greater world is simultaneously discovered, a more p r o f o u n d reality than the restricted world of nature. Nature is the limit of science. A s long as this contemplative activity remains within its proper sphere, science contributes immeasurably to the knowledge and life of man. Science has demonstrated its value in the long years of its history, and fortunately most scientific thinkers d o not desire to transgress other spheres. T h e y are men as well as minds; persons as well as thoughts. In the scientific discipline, however, the danger of pretension always lurks in the background, since the legitimate sphere of

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science can easily be transformed into a caricature of itself. This caricature is scientism, wherein science itself becomes a kind of god. The devotees of this god cannot be scientific; usually they are superficial men who have lost their religious faith and seek for another object of adoration. The devotee of scientism sees in the limited picture of the world, known as nature, the whole of reality. He unreasonably subordinates all dimensions of reality to the so-called objectivity. The self is lost in the throes of naturalism. Such naturalism is an idolatrous consequence of the deification of a fragmented and limited picture of reality. Man becomes a slave to his own creation. It is Kroner's belief that people worship science when they have been deprived of their proper object of adoration. All men need to worship, are in search of something to adore; and often to the immature mind science becomes such an object. This leads to scientism. Scientists at the present time have achieved unbelievable things; they have become the modern miracle-workers, and because of this the scientist is becoming a kind of superman." Scientism is the totalitarianism of one phase of the contemplative sphere of culture. It is without doubt immersed in the sins of pretension and pride. Scientism is the modern form of idolatry and superstition. The second cultural exertion which attempts to solve the basic contradiction of experience within the sphere of contemplation is in the realm of art. Art also projects a world-solution, but it is radically different in its method. Science constructs a picture of reality called nature, a picture which is always in the process of being completed. It is an unfinished product and must always remain so. Art, on the other hand, constructs many pictures or world-images which are complete in themselves. The image-world of the artist is always diametrically opposed to the unfinished world of the scientist. Although art and science are alike contemplative, the former

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utilizes the imagination primarily and the intellect secondarily, while the latter is fundamentally intellectual and only partially imaginative. What science cannot accomplish in its endeavor, i.e., the depiction of the world in one image, art has as its primary task. The totality of the world cannot be grasped by the analytical methods of science; such a totality can be achieved only through the imagination. This is what Kroner means when he declares that the world as a totality is not intelligible, but is imaginable.6 The world as a whole is not intelligible. This observation is one of the great contributions of Kant. The world is not and can never be an object of the intellect, which is powerless to produce or depict the world in toto because of the fact that the intellect cannot construct such a totality.' Even the Greek cosmos was a product of the aesthetic imagination, and in the last analysis every other reality bowed down before the harmony and the beauty of the cosmos, even the Idea of the Good which in a mysterious way was united with the Beautiful.8 The arguments of Chapter Two demonstrated that the intellect itself, engaged in scientific pursuits, would never seek a totality if the image of the whole did not constitute the task of science. Imagination has its place even in scientific activity. However, imagination in the realm of contemplation is the primary function of the artist. Art, through imagination, reconciles all the antinomies of experience, the absolutely individual and the absolutely universal, the sensuous and the spiritual. Kroner explains that No abstract concept, no mere idea, no generic law, can ever hope to grasp the individual and concrete universe; only artistic creativity can produce the world in a mirror, a little world, a kind of microcosm in which the macrocosm is reflected . . . The little world of art is as sensuous as it is spiritual; the opposite poles of experience are most intimately united, without any chasm. The individual features of whatever phenomena are so depicted as to obtain at the same time a universal significance , . , The microcosmic

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world of the work of art does not embrace, like the macrocosm, all the details of the world but only a tiny fragment, some peculiar events, some particular persons, some individual feelings. Even so, it images the world in and through its form." The primacy of the self is maintained in the work, of artistic creation. The work of art is a synthesis between the sensuous and the spiritual, the media used and the self-experience of the artist. A painting is never a reproduction of the sense-data of experience; it can never be an abstract moment depicting a scene or a person. Rather, it attempts to identify the moment of time with eternity. It becomes complete in itself. This completeness is accomplished because the primary element, for example in a painting, is the artist who paints and expresses himself through that medium. The self-world antinomy is resolved by the artist in his creation of a little world, which is dependent upon his own self-experience for its existence. In this respect Kroner is right when he says that the world to the artist is only the reflex of man.10 As long as one can become identified with the artistic work, be overcome and possessed by the aesthetic expression of the artist, as one gazes upon the work of the painter or hears the sounds of the musical composition, a complete resolution of the self-world duality appears to be present. The world represented by the artistic work and the self of the one who gives his attention to it are unified through the aesthetic experience which results, and some philosophers of art would maintain that a unity is achieved with the artist himself in such an experience. This is, however, a solution to the problem from within the sphere of contemplation. Man is only imaged in the work of art; he is only depicted, not created by it. The real man is not produced by the artist, but only a picture of the real man. The tension between the actual man and the depicted man still ¿xists; but the artist can do more justice to man, as a self, than

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can science, since the artist does not subordinate the real man to the picture, but attempts to coordinate the actual and the depicted. This is the glory of artistic creation. The antinomy of freedom and necessity is resolved by the work of art in the mystery of artistic creativity. The artist who creates is certainly a free man in his activity; he does not work like a machine, and if he did the result would not really be art. Creativity is born out of the cradle of freedom. To create as the artist does is to be free. Yet the expressions of this freedom are necessitated by the character of the artist and the causal nexus of events and decisions, and thus the artist's freedom is limited in its scope." The antinomy of time and eternity is resolved by this contemplative activity in accordance with the fundamental principle of all artistic design, the principle of unity in variety. The finished work of art, whether a painting, a novel, a poem, or a symphony, images and depicts a self-contained world, a world which is complete. This completeness is the aspect of eternity in the work of art. The gradual unfolding from within the completed work depicts the temporal. This is the element of variety. In the temporal unfolding of the eternal, the eternal is represented by the theme, and the temporal is represented by the thematic variations. Here the manifold enriches the one without thereby losing itself. More or less perfect balance is present and the result is rhythm. Time and eternity are united in the work of art. A beginning and an end of time are present, and it is most vividly evident in a novel or musical composition. The completed work reflects a "temporal" eternity. From within the work itself the tension is resolved. Kroner feels that the artist redeems the world in a secular sense. He creates a pagan gospel; he even depends upon pagan grace in the form of inspiration. Mythology is an artistic or poetic attempt to solve the religious problem. The artist is a representative of the highest of all the cultural gods, the Muses.

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In a certain sense, he creates out of nothing as God does. Tn his realm he is a little god of his own, with his own little world. It is because of this that the great contribution of art can degenerate into a presumptuous caricature of its own function. Just as science can be perverted into scientism through a failure to recognise its own limits, so art can become aestheticism through the deification of its many little worlds of harmony and unity. If the limit of art is not understood, presumption and arrogance may also prevail in this more profound realm of contemplative culture. Contemplation cannot solve the real antinomies of experience. The artist, as a self, is still distinguished from his created works. He still lives in a dimension which transcends even the glories of the aesthetic realm. The aesthetic sphere is a shabby one indeed when compared with the dimension of personal life and its potentialities. If culture could achieve, in the realm of action, what has been accomplished by artistic creativity in the realm of contemplation, heaven would become a reality upon the earth. Despite the impotence of culture when it attempts to accomplish this impossibility, still the sphere of action, of the self, has the primacy over the contemplative realms. The actual world in which human selves live can never be wholly replaced by the artistic counterpart. The human self may revel in the harmony of an artistic solution, but eventually that self must return to an actual life quite other than the depicted life of a work of art. Unfortunately, when a self identifies itself too closely with an aesthetic harmony, the contradictions and frustrations of actual life are intensified because of the contrast. In some instances the person becomes an aesthetic caricature, attempting to live out his life in a depicted world. This can be destructive of selfhood, or it may result in the artistic eccentric who is not a total self, but rather a slave to the aesthetic.12 . Art never actually solves the antinomy between self and world. The self immersed in aesthetic contemplation must

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always return to the sphere of action and there meet again the dreadful fact of its self-contradiction. This is true even if aesthetic forms have ceased to be harmonious, and reflect instead the frustrations of actual life. T h e distinction between actual and depicted still stands. It is also possible that the self may be enriched by such aesthetic experiences; indeed, the aesthetic realm is wholesome when it does not transgress its limits. But art cannot solve the self-contradiction of man. Art fails in its solution of the antinomy of oneness and manifoldness, since there is a manifold of these little worlds which are so complete in themselves. N o way is open that would make possible a unity out of this manifold. T h e same is true of universality and individuality. Each artistic creation is not so universal as it is individual. In this respect a community of artists devoted to the task of promoting universal art is impossible. Here science presents a more possible basis for community, since scientists can gather together in a community task of establishing general truth. Art never solves the tensions between freedom and necessity, since the artist transcends his work, and if he wishes to participate in the resolution effected by the work itself, he becomes the victim of his own creation. T h e problem of time and eternity is never solved by art. T h e eternity of the work of art is a temporal eternity, and beyond it the real tension is not affected. Man still lives within this contradiction. Aestheticism refuses to recognize the limitations of art and exalts this contemplative sphere beyond its proper place. Kroner observes that aestheticism would like to make art into religion and religion into a kind of aesthetic contemplation. He sees mythological religions to be the result of aestheticism. It is important to realize that mythology reigned, for example, in ancient Greece, where the aesthetic element was primary. 13 Aestheticism is pretentious because it cannot do justice to actual life. Both scientism and aestheticism attempt to objectify

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actual life and make it subordinate to contemplation. Kroner observes: It [the actual life] undergoes a metamorphosis which deprives it of its peculiarity and destroys its actuality. Objectification kills the significance and the reality of the living subject . . . Contemplation is the opposite of action, and this opposition is not neutralized or placated by aestheticism but is, rather, ignored, so that life appears to be imaginative only, instead of being actual and real in the moral and religious sense." Aestheticism defies the law of all legitimate art: the law of coordination. This law, operating within the artistic sphere, is a safeguard against aestheticism. The sphere of contemplation finds its culmination in the aesthetic realm. The profundities of this realm, coupled with its obvious limitations, are one aspect of the cultural enterprise. Kroner also takes up, when discussing the cultural spheres of contemplation and action, the contrast between works and life. The contemplative sphere produces "works," while the active sphere concentrates on life. The place of technology in the sphere of contemplation has not been treated in this book; however, we may note that since it grows out of science—since, in other words, it is an applied science—to that extent technology is contemplative because it produces "works." NOTES 1

This analysis of contemplative culture in Kroner's religious philosophy is based upon his Culture and Faith, Part II, pp. 71-142. 1 Culture and Faith, p. 98. 3 Ibid., p. 100. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press. 1 1bid., p. 103. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press. '¡bid., pp. 112-13. 'Ibid., p. 117. ' Plato in his dialogue Theaetetus demonstrates this truth in a convincing way. Rational discourse cannot arrive at a totality. 8 The highest good in Greek thought was the supremely beautiful to kalon. The union of the two was expressed as: kalokagathon. *Culture and Faith, p. 118. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press.

76 10

Ibid., p. Ibid., p. 12 Culture "Ibid., p. " Ibid., p. 11

Self and World 120. 121. and Faith, p. 129. 132. 134. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press.

V Analysis of Culture : Politics and Morality The metaphysical problem of man's moral self-contradiction now faces the solutions offered by the active sphere of culture.1 Action approaches the manifold of selves, and attempts to achieve a resolution of the antinomies in terms of the establishment of a community of selves. Both politics and religion attempt such a resolution. Community is paramount in both realms. The mediator between politics and religion is morality. Morality is the center of all culture; through the recognition of the limitations of morality, one is ushered into the realm of religion and faith. In the sphere of action the personal dimension of reality is affirmed. This dimension is given the primacy over all contemplative realms. The manifold of selves is recognized. Although the sphere of action falls short of this rule, nevertheless the I-Thou relationship should reign in the active realm. In contemplation the I-It relation is primary. This does injustice to the fundamental dimension of all reality. The exertion for community is based upon the importance of treating each man as a person, as a Thou. The purely cultural attempt to achieve community, and to resolve the antinomy of oneness and manifoldness, is centered in the political realm. The state is a projected resolution of this antinomy, since it represents the integrating factor in bringing together all of the selves under its jurisdiction. The state is a universal self. It is not abstract, insofar as it can act and will and determine the actions of its citizens, but it is a universal self because it has no objective existence. It cannot be observed, analyzed, or studied as an object. No such reality as the state can be found from the perspective of contemplation. 77

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Buildings, documents, and laws represent the state, but the sum total of such objects does not constitute the reality of the state. Governing officers and the electorate function in the democratic state, but these do not constitute the state as such. Its officers, and likewise the electorate, are subordinate to the state, and are affected by the actions of the state. In this sense political (and also religious) institutions are invisible. They have a reality in the sphere of action, but they never become an object of contemplation. The political institution of the state is the universal self of each of its citizens; yet it has a reality distinct from its citizens. Kroner states that Political life aims at constantly new attempts to organize and to unify the community so that the contradiction between the manifoldness and the oneness may be resolved by the creation of one ego comprising all the ego-subjects belonging to the community. This one ego represents the universality and the ego-subjects represent the individuality of the ego, so that this contrast no longer leads to conflicts and struggles cither between persons or within each person.2 In the relation of one state to another, the separateness of the universal self from the ego-subjects is clear. That relation also involves a new tension between the various states. The state speaks as a unity. It decides upon this or that course of action, and the decision is more than the decision of any one individual. It is a state decision, and it affects all the ego-subjects of the state itself. In democratic countries the state exists for the sake of "the people." Kroner believes that "the people" is not merely a collection of individuals, but is itself a universal ego. The fact that "the people" is universal makes necessary the universality of the state. The state has an authority over its citizens. It can compel them to act according to its laws, since these laws are supposed to represent the universal will of the citizens themselves. This leads Kroner to believe that the state not only satisfies the temporary needs of the community, but also represents the cultural aspirations which are directed to eternity. 3

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Kroner sees an analogy between the state and God. Both represent the universal will, superior to the will of any or all individuals. He sees this as the reason for the deification of the state in history through the person of a ruler such as Caesar was. The state is a universal self and thus a kind of earthly god. This constitutes, however, the limitation of the state. The antinomy of universality and individuality is resolved by the state in the sphere of action in a way similar to that by which science resolves it in the sphere of contemplation. The state is the active counterpart of science. The universal self of the state resembles the "general" category of the scientist, for as the scientist subordinates the particular data to the general category, so the state must subordinate the individual citizen to itself and its will. Subordination is the rule of the state. The citizen of a state is an abstract entity. His individuality is transformed into particularity. As a citizen, he is not so much an individual as he is a particular part of the universal will of the state. Even in democracy, which is the highest form of statehood, the concept of "majority rule" demonstrates that individuality is subordinate to universality. The individual will and the universal will are never completely coordinated in the state; the principle of subordination rules. Because of this, a loss of individuality on the part of the citizens in the state is inevitable. The state is itself abstract, as its citizens are, because it does not possess any genuine individuality. The tension between universality and individuality is never resolved by the state, and the state cannot achieve a solution to the antinomies for this reason. The fundamental task of the state is to resolve the moral self-contradiction of man. But the state does not possess the power to effect this resolution. It cannot make its citizens morally good; it can only insist that they be legally correct. Law reigns within the state, and for this reason justice must be defined in terms of the outward observance of the law. Legality, outward observance of law, still leaves unresolved the

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contradiction of the self. The inwardness of the self is unimportant in comparison to the conformity of the manifold of selves to the general laws of the state, and thus inwardness tends to lose itself in the demand for general conformity. The universality of the state's self is objectified in terms of an outward observance of general laws. The irony of this situation can be seen in the necessary affirmation of the state as always being right and in the necessity of individual conformity. The idea that an individual may be in rebellion against the state, for the good of the people of the state, is really not admissible. Yet this is a fact of everyday life. The state cannot ultimately objectify the individual; as a result, the individual always stands as a threat to the state, and since this is true, the antinomies have not been resolved by political activity. The only legitimate political activity seems to be found in the maintenance of this tension between the state and the individual. The state, as the universal self, is a safeguard against the arrogance of individual selves, and at the same time the individual self always threatens the pretension of a state which has exceeded its limits. Totalitarianism in political activity (statism) is the counterpart in the active sphere of scientism and aestheticism in the contemplative sphere. The totalitarian state emphasizes the loss of individual selfhood to the ultimate extreme. All individual selves become abstract entities under the category of universal selfhood which is embodied in the state. The individual counts little; the particular entities of the state are subordinate to the state itself. Through this subordination the state becomes "god" and the individual selves are its manipulatable tools. But this type of state is constantly threatened because its reality is less than the individual selves it seeks to control. The personal dimension of reality asserts itself against such arrogance, and this means the ultimate downfall of statism. Subordination is inadmissible in the creation of true com-

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munity. If any true community can be found, it will be based upon a principle of coordination which does full justice to the uniqueness of individual personality, and it will have as its foundation a fellowship based upon the freedom and integrity of all members of that community. This is the ideal of American democracy, but democracy in the end falls short of its ideal; the realization of this kind of community is beyond the reach of cultural striving." As the state is a universal attempt to resolve the antinomies, so morality is an individual solution. The moral sphere is more personal that the sphere of the state. Morality has contact with the inward life of the individual; and although it, too, may degenerate into a legalism, its legitimate place is nevertheless found in the inwardness of the individual selves. Morality is not itself a sphere of culture, but is intimately related to all spheres. It is the center of man's life. In science and in art morality is implicit. The task of the scientist is a moral task. He must be conscientious in all that he does; he must be looked upon as a man of honesty and integrity. This is true because the presupposition of all science is the scientist, and this person is moral. Kroner says: Without the operation of the conscientious will, no work, no creation of any worth, is possible. This relation shows the primacy of the ego and of man's active life in all realms of civilization. Morality is nowhere absent from human existence; on the contrary, it is the very heart of this exislence. Reality is of moral essence. Morality is the substance and the basis of culture throughout.5 In this respect morality transcends the boundaries of culture. It does not produce any works, such as science and art produce in their contemplative activity, nor does morality establish any institutions such as are established by the political exertions of men. Morality is present in all these efforts, but it can never be objectified in a "work" of contemplation or an "institution" of action. It is the hidden reality implicit in all cultural striving. It

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is related to the innermost reality of the personal dimension, the human self. Morality is inward, but it is also an exertion or action. It is the action of the self upon itself; it is the attempt by the self to make of itself a real self. The moral struggle of man is centered in the relating of the individual human self to its universality. Coupled with this fundamental moral exertion is a concern for the good community. Morality is "selfish" in the sense that it is intimately related to the human self and acts upon itself in this way. But at the same time, in the attempt to reconcile individual selfhood with universal selfhood, the corresponding exertion towards community life arises. The moral self adds more to the life of the community than the immoral self. So morality is an "enlightened" selfishness. Such selfishness is inevitable for man, since he is the self of his world. Freedom is the presupposition of the moral life. It is the essence of moral exertion. The moral activity of man does not seek to construct a "world" to which the self is subordinate; it does not seek to objectify itself and lose itself thereby. Freedom is the action of the self upon itself, and it is the peculiar reality of the personal dimension of existence. Morality is at the center of this dimension. Throughout this book the central theme has been the personal dimension of reality and the moral self-contradiction of man. The answer to the moral problem is the answer to the metaphysical antinomies. Does morality per se furnish such a solution? The moral self-contradiction of man is observed in moral exertion itself. I am not what I ought to be. I strive to become the ought. I attempt to integrate my individual self with the universality of the ought. This ought emerges in morality as the moral law. The moral law should not be identified with any particular content, i.e., with any specified number of laws or rules. Rather, the moral law is an objectified universal selfhood. As such it has

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no individual content, but stands as the ought in every individual situation. Because of its universality in relation to every individual self, insofar as the self seeks to become the ought, the multiplicity of impulses and desires are integrated by the moral law. In a sense the moral law occasions moral freedom, since it allows for choice between universality and integration (good), or individuality and disintegration (evil). When the self succumbs to one of its many finite vitalities, it ceases to be the self it ought to be, and becomes identified instead with a particular finite vitality. From the conflict between the ought and the disregard of the ought arises conscience. Conscience demonstrates the split nature of the self; it is an inner police force, and dictates to the self what it ought to be. In this respect the universal self is the judge and the individual self the perpetrator. Both of these realities exist within the self. They arise because of the moral self-contradiction of man. As a self, I am either on the way towards becoming a self, or I am in the process of selfdisintegration. Guilt develops because of the presence of moral law within the self, and because of the split between the individuality and universality of the ego. All selves are guilty because all selves are faced with this dichotomy. This results in moral exertion, the attempt to resolve the antinomy. Kroner adds: No man is free from guilt of some kind and weight. As man, he cannot avoid guilt because guilt is the outer manifestation of the inner split and self-contradiction belonging to the very nature of self-experience. . . . Here the innermost substance of the self is violated or, rather, violates itself. Here the same ego that feels the antinomies of experience as the source of all sorrows and conflicts of human life contributes voluntarily to this very source and aggravates its darkness. Here the same ego which commands itself to subordinate the merely individual and anti-universal tendencies of the impulses and the will to the universal law subordinates, in strict 'opposition to the law, its own universality to its individual arbitrariness and lawlessness.6

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The presence of guilt betrays the inability of moral exertion to resolve the antinomies of experience. Morality in the realm of action is also analogous to science in the realm of contemplation. The principle of subordination still prevails. The individual elements of the self are subordinated to the universal self. The presence of the moral law as an objectified universal selfhood demonstrates this subordination. As in science and in politics, so in morality there is never a completion of the moral struggle. A never-ending exertion prevails; and because of this, guilt continues to be a reality in self-experience. In this sense morality is not the active counterpart of art. Legality manifests itself in morality. In the state it is an outer legality. In morality it is an inner legality. Both realms are incomplete. They never produce a totality in which "inner" and "outer" are reconciled. As a result, in the moral sphere the self is sacrificed to the moral law, which is an abstract form devoid of any content. Coordination is negated in favor of a moral subordination. Morality solves no problem of man. Rather, it demonstrates the self-contradiction of man in a vivid way. It illustrates the truth that all the contradictions in the contemplative and active spheres are contradictions because of what man is. In this respect morality is pervasive of every cultural sphere. Of such spheres it is the presupposition, and illustrates most profoundly a contradiction within the presupposition of all cultural exertion, that of the personal dimension of reality. The solution to the contradiction present in the personal dimension will be the answer to all the contradictions of experience. The pretentious element in morality is moralism. Moralism exceeds the proper limits of its sphere, and becomes totalitarian. It asserts that morality itself is sufficient, and that nothing is needed beyond moral reason and insight. Several examples of moralism are developed by Kroner. The most familiar is that of the Pharisees in Jesus' time. Here un-

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swerving devotion to the law and its observance is practically deified. Law had become a savior to the Pharisees. Evidence of moralism can also be found in Kantian formalism. Kant, in his insistence upon the absolute and unconditional moral law, forced upon himself a law without content, a form of law only; but law must always function in life, and a form of law only is not adequate to the situations of life. The existentialism of Heidegger reflects anothei species of moralism. Heidegger exalts beyond its limit the principle of autonomy which issues from the moral philosophy of Kant. Here morality is transcended, and the individual self of Heidegger is equated with universal selfhood in a presumptuous fashion. Heidegger becomes "god" in defiance of any community, law, or nature outside himself. He becomes authentic when he faces death as his ultimate end. But the moral problem is not solved by identifying the universal self with individual selfhood in its anticipation of death. This is nothing but sheer idolatry, the totalitarianism of individual selfhood, which is as repugnant as a totalitarianism of universal selfhood. The limits of morality are also the limits of culture. Perhaps the most positive truth to come out of this analysis of culture is the dependence of all cultural spheres upon the moral sphere, and the impotence of morality to solve its own problem. The moral self-contradiction of the human self is responsible for cultural exertion in the first place, and it is also responsible for any contradictions arising within that quest. As long as the cultural spheres were considered separately, the limitations of each sphere did not have a particularly frightening character. But when all the spheres of culture are examined, and culture is seen to be impotent in its attempt to solve the contradictions of experience, anxiety may result. Tragedy may appear to be the ultimate end of man. Kroner declares: Culture is a tragic undertaking if it is not supplemented by a faith which assures us that it is not destitute of meaning, although

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it cannot be finished and although it does not bring the ultimate satisfaction for which we long. And what is true with respect to culture is true with respect to the whole of our life, since our life is ours only inasmuch as it is devoted to the goal of self-civilization, for we are selves only insofar as we realize ourselves, i.e., insofar as we make ourselves real selves.' This realm of faith about which Kroner speaks must be a sphere which transcends culture, but at the same time it must solve the problems of cultural exertion. In this sense the realm of faith has the same characteristics in the personal dimension of reality as the aesthetic sphere possesses in the realm of contemplation. Through coordination faith must produce the kind of community in which the moral self-contradiction of all men will be erased. The community would be a finished product, since the selves of the community would be real selves, no longer merely on the way toward selfhood or self-disintegration, but selves fully realized. Faith now asserts itself and has its proper place in the personal dimension of reality. Faith has its most intimate relation to the human self in its moral self-contradiction. If faith can solve the moral problem of man, it will simultaneously cast out all metaphysical and cultural contradictions.

NOTES 1

This analysis of active culture in Kroner's religious philosophy is based upon his Culture and Faith, Part II, pp. 142-82. * Culture and Faith, p. 143. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press. J Ibid., p. 147. 4 See Part Three of Reinhold Niebuhr's The Self and the Dramas of History for a pertinent discussion of this problem. 5 Culture and Faith, p. 160. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press. 'Ibid., p. 168. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press. 'Ibid., p. 179. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press.

VI Faith and the Antinomies Through his analysis of culture Kroner has developed the thesis that man's self-contradiction cannot be ultimately solved by his civilizing exertions. The fact of the impotence of culture is even more vivid than this analysis would suggest, since all the exertions of culture are integrally joined with each other, and to break down culture into various spheres gives the impression that the spheres are not organically connected. Yet they are, and the total effort of man to solve his self-contradiction meets ultimate frustration, notwithstanding the relative success of cultural pursuits. The analysis of culture has, however, brought out certain truths which are basic to the establishment of the primacy of faith over philosophical and cultural endeavors. In the first place, the primacy of the self over the world, or of action over contemplation, demonstrates that if faith is basic, it is faith centered in the personal dimension of reality; it is living or dynamic faith, rather than the rational faith of the philosopher or the faith which consists in assent to certain theological systems. This living faith would give full recognition to the freedom and the integrity of the individual person. In the second place, the analysis has indicated the primacy of coordination over the cultural method of subordination. The implication is that living faith creates community, and that in such community individual faith is not negated but sustained and strengthened. Through such living faith the community and the individual maintain their respective integrity. These two elements constitute the conditions essential for faith. To establish these conditions is the task of religious philosophy. But in so doing it does not produce faith. Philosophy .can neither create nor engender that response. Faith transcends philosophy. Because of this, faith cannot be 87

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viewed as a rational solution to the problems of man's reason, i.e., as the supplying of a lack or the completion of an unfinished menial process. The problems of philosophy are due to man's self-contradiction, and this self-contradiction is not an emptiness or ignorance in the Greek sense, but rather a false-fullness 1 in the Biblical sense. This false-fullness is sin. The reality of sin is the crucial element in the impotence of culture in general and of philosophy in particular. The presence of sin in ontological and cultural pursuits is selfevident. The cultural exertion of man always tends to exceed its limitations; man always wants to recreate heaven through his own efforts. Throughout the pages of this book the futility of this effort has been repeatedly observed. It follows that the proper function of a religious philosophy is to be critical of all ontological schemes and cultural solutions, setting forth their relative validity and demonstrating their ultimate impotence. Religious philosophy should always maintain this tension between culture and faith, and at the same time recognize the primacy of faith over culture. Philosophy, because of man's sinfulness, cannot generate faith. Faith is a gift which comes through God's intention and guidance. 2 It is a reality outside the boundaries of culture. Life itself has an intimate relationship to the mystery of ultimate reality.3 The relation of this mysterious totality to the whole of experience may be designated as mystical, especially if this relation has not been interpreted or explained through a religious articulation. Rudolf Otto has given classic expression to this mystical element by such terms as the numinous or the mysterium tremendum.' Kroner describes the mystical element as follows: Life is surrounded by the mystery of ultimate reality, that reality which secular experience and secular culture can never reach, since both breathe and create in the atmosphere of the original split and contradiction characteristic of man's consciousness. But this

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atmosphere is felt to be less than ultimate; otherwise man would not strive to improve his situation by achieving self-reconciliation and self-realization through his cultural exertion. Behind the secular and cultural atmosphere another one is longed for which would not be determined by the disunity of world and ego, of ego and ego . . . but which would enable man to live in complete harmony and peace.5 This mystical reality is the fundamental basis for all religion —this sense of mystery, this realization of the totality of being, this overwhelming sense of holiness. The child is much more aware of it than the adult. The child has more trust than the adult, and the mystery and wonder of life itself are often more sensitively felt. Perhaps this is one reason why Jesus taught that to inherit the kingdom one must become as a little child. In Kroner's view mystical experience refers to the original unity which reveals the contradictions of the disunity. In a sense mystical experience is the task of culture. Cultural exertion seeks after this original unity, seeks after the elimination of contradiction; and perhaps mystical experience in turn furnishes the impulse behind cultural productivity. It is certainly true that the scientist and the artist seek after such a totality, and their contemplative striving presupposes the mystical totality whether or not it has actually been experienced. Art comes closer to the totality than science, since art is imaginative in its character, and a relation exists between mystical experience and imagination. The proper articulation of this ultimate mystery is accomplished through religious faith. The mystical element in faith corresponds to the contemplative sphere of culture—if such an analogy is permissible. The contemplative realm seeks a worldsolution to the antinomies of experience; it wishes to construct an image of the world-totality. If faith can solve these antinomies, a "world" element must be in faith. Mystical experience constitutes such an element. Faith does not seek to construct or paint a picture of this totality; but through a living

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relation to the ultimate mystery, the unity is realized. Since contemplation in cultural exertion is secondary to action, the mystical character of faith receives its meaning through the moral element, in the Biblical sense. It is undoubtedly true that man's first relation to the mysterium tremendum was not moral, but through Biblical revelation and faith the holiness of God becomes not only mystical but moral as well. Mysticism per se is a caricature of faith in the Biblical sense. Only with the development of the moral is the true meaning of the mystical possible, since through the moral element soteriology becomes a reality. According to Old Testament scholars, it was not until after the covenant relation between God and the Israelites had been established that the creation stories developed. The implication is thus that God cannot be understood as Creator until he is first seen as in some ways a Redeemer. It is also important to note that not until after the Law was given did a worship of one God begin. The gift of the Law transformed the purely mysterious ultimate reality which was reflected in animism and polytheism into the recognition of God as Creator of heaven and earth. When this was done, polytheistic beliefs lost their hold among the Israelites. The mystical totality was articulated through a redemptive relationship which produced the religious image of the Creator. But this image demanded holiness in the moral sense. Thus the moral, in the Biblical meaning of the word, has the primacy over the mystical. The Creator and the Redeemer are the Lord, and the Biblical image of Lord brings together the mystical and the moral, the theoretical and the practical, without itself becoming a rational faith; for the Lord is one who reveals himself, not one who is a postulate of the pure practical reason in the Kantian sense. Thus faith brings about the completion of the task of morality, and in completing the moral task solves the theoretical problem as well. A leap is implicit in faith. Leaps also occur in cultural

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endeavor—from contemplation to action, from science to art, or from science to technology. Because of this leap and because of the mystical element in itself, faith is not protected completely from superstition, illusion, or idolatry." That which transcends a rational coherence can very easily be identified with an incoherence, and thus religious faith entails danger—a great adventure into the unknown is always involved in making the leap. Is there such a reality as true faith? Faith, in Kroner's system, is true when it promotes a community where selves live together in harmony without losing their individuality. The individual expression of faith must center upon what is morally good and just; it must generate moral goodness and justice both in the life of the community and in the life of the individual. 1 Such is the definition of faith as regarded from the purely human standpoint or from the perspective of the philosopher, who looks upon faith as a solution to the antinomies of experience. But faith has a wider and deeper meaning than this—a meaning the depth of which cannot be known outside the community which faith creates. It is at this point that the limit of philosophy is seen. Philosophy can reflect upon faith, but cannot in itself produce it. Faith fulfills a mediating function in the relation between man and G o d . Insofar as faith is a human attitude towards God, it can be understood by philosophy. But since it is an attitude toward G o d which in the last analysis is God-given the reality of faith is such that it can only be understood from within the faith-community.

T h e term " G o d " has been used in

the history of modern philosophy without reference to the community of faith, as though it were a concept of thought rather than a revealed truth. But since the Name of G o d has only been revealed within the faith-community, it is presumptuous for the philosopher to use the term without acknowledging its revelatory significance. 8 In failing to do so it makes the

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Name of God either an "idol" of thought or a meaningless expression. The task of religious philosophy has been described as the discovery of the conditions necessary for faith. Thus religious philosophy is a philosophy of faith, whose proper study is the mediating function of faith in its relation to secular philosophy and culture, and also to sacred theology. From Kroner's perspective the philosophical definition of faith as that trust in the content of mystical experience articulated by revelation as the Living God, is theologically inadequate, since faith and theology allow no mystical experience other than that articulated by Biblical revelation. Because of this, an antagonism is set up between religious philosophy and Christian theology. It is Kroner's contention that a philosophy of faith can be a link between secular thought and sacred theology, but only from the perspective of philosophy. Theology does not need such a connecting link and in fact does not tolerate it.° It is true that theology, which has as its primary function the systematization of the faith from within the Church, has no regard for a philosophy of faith so far as its dogmatic function is concerned. A philosophy is not needed to bolster the faith of the community, but it may be needed in defining what constitutes the dogmatic function; for as will be demonstrated in Chapter Eight, theology should limit its reflection to living faith and have as its intellectual basis the findings of religious philosophy. Apologetic theology, which has as its function the relating of the faith to philosophical systems outside the faith-community, is itself a kind of religious philosophy. The antagonism need not exist, if the functions of both are clearly outlined; it will exist if religious philosophy presumes to produce faith, or if theology of a dogmatic type exceeds its limitations. From this perspective, then, a religious philosophy can be a proper function of the believing community, and can contribute

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immeasurably to the life of the community, since it can show how faith relates to secular experience and thought. Its function is a missionary one and thus one of apologetics. The philosophy of faith has as its primary task the solution of the antinomies of experience. A l l the cultural endeavors of man attempt such a solution, but ultimately are unsuccessful. If a particular cultural sphere presumes to have found an answer, it degenerates into a caricature of itself, as in scientism, aestheticism, statism, and moralism. Totalitarianism is the outcome of cultural arrogance. Paradoxically, however, if a solution is to be achieved, it must be a totalitarian solution. But a totalitarianism based upon faith is infinitely different from a totalitarianism of cultural exertion. T h e former issues f r o m the Lordship of G o d the Creator; the latter is an emergent from the pretensions of sinful man. Kroner exclaims: Faith is the truly "totalitarian" power on earth, the only one which is permitted and commissioned to raise that absolute and allembracing claim. Bolshevism and naziism produced only countetfeits. God alone, since he comprises the totality of existence, is entitled to demand absolute obedience and discipleship. He alone controls not onlv the conduct and outer actions of man, as the state and civil law do, but also the inner intentions and motivations of man's decisions, his will and his heart."1 God himself is the ultimate solution to man's problem. Culture cannot be the hope of man, since culture is so fragmented, fleeting and temporary. Cultures die; G o d alone lives on forever. Biblical faith solves the antinomy of self and world not by means of a principle f r o m which both are derived, in the fashion of Plotinus, nor through a speculative system which attempts to explain the dichotomy, nor by means of the exaltation of the finite self to the place of absoluteness; rather, the antinomy is solved by faith in its reception of the revelation of G o d as Creator and L o r d . These two elements, Creator and Lord, cannot be derived philosophically. They transcend the spheres of philosophy and culture. T h e y are not principles which

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explain, but are the revelation of the Living God in the personal dimension of reality. Kroner is right when he observes that the Living God solves the antinomy by "begging the question." It is not in the principle of the absolute self swallowing up the world, or in the absolutely real (world) swallowing up the self, but it is in God himself that the problem is solved. It is a self-solution, but not at the expense of the world, since God is Creator and sustainer of the world. Kroner's background as a German idealist asserts itself when he argues that absolute idealism was right in what it intended to say, but was wrong in presuming to say it through the categories of logical speculation. The truth of absolute idealism can be expressed only in the dramatic or epic language of revelation. It can be articulated only in an existential and non-speculative fashion." The absolute idealists were wrong because they attempted to transform the Living God of the Bible into a concept or object of the contemplative sphere, whereas in reality God meets man in the personal dimension. It is doubtful whether the profound truth of absolute idealism would have been possible without the conscious or unconscious influence of Biblical faith upon its adherents. But the reduction of God to a contemplative scheme is not permissible. It solves no problems, and it creates new ones, since the temptation of the idealist is to presume to know as much as God himself. So, paradoxically, the profoundest philosophic attempt to know God can transform the philosopher into a kind of "god" himself, and thus he loses the reality of the Living God as Lord. The solution which Biblical faith makes to the antinomy of self and world is a practical rather than a theoretical one. Faith has a reality only in the realm of personal relation. This realm has been shown to be primary to the other spheres. Faith is therefore the possessor of the primacy, since its peculiar abode is that dimension of reality which thought cannot think.

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T h e Living G o d is over against the world. He is not dependent upon the world in any way for his reality. He cannot be found by searching the world; he is not the first cause of the world because causation is a world-category. Creator means something infinitely more than cause. Causation has its place in necessity; creativity is the offspring of freedom. G o d is absolutely free because he is determined by no world, and by no necessity. Creativity is the free expression of God. In fact, Kroner observes, the work of G o d in creation is similar to an artistic work, except that the picture produced is the actual world rather than a world-image. A t the same time Kroner sees the world as an institution, in the political sense, where man works and lives. Origen developed such a view when he called the world an educational plant where man prepares for his return to God. 12 T h e absolute transcendence of G o d portrayed in the Bible is the only solution to the self-world antinomy. G o d is completely free from this contradiction. T h e world is no threat to him, nevertheless the world has a reality since he created it. T h e antinomy of universality and individuality is solved by Biblical faith, since G o d is the Universal self, although not in the abstract philosophical sense. His universality is derived from his Lordship and his function as the Creator. His individuality is also derived from these two elements. There is only one Lord and he is G o d , the absolute synthesis of individuality and universality, of oneness and manifoldness. The presence of these antinomies in human life demonstrates that man is not L o r d or Creator. His self-contradiction is mirrored in the antinomies. It is obvious that the solution to these antinomies cannot have its source in those afflicted with them. Only G o d transcends these contradictions, and only G o d is the Lord. T h e hope of man's liberation from these antinomies rests in the hands of the Lord, who is not only Creator but also Redeemer. T h e solution of faith is practical. It avoids the pitfalls of attempting to solve the problems, and rests in

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the only solution possible, the Life which is not split by contradiction. The solution of Biblical faith is not admissible from the standpoint of philosophy. After all, there is no proof for this solution, since it is anchored to life, or to the whole man, and not to the cognitive understanding of man. Yet, as Kroner demonstrates, there is much reason for adopting such a solution, so that it is not irrational, but a solution which transcends reason, just as the existence of man as a person transcends the existence of his mind. Biblical faith solves the antinomies of freedom and of eternity. This was observed in the discussion concerning the work of creation and the Lordship of God. Since God is transcendent of any necessity, he is absolutely free. His freedom is in a sense his eternity, since he is not hampered by time. In the preceding discussion faith is seen as solving the antinomies of experience from the perspective of contemplation. Those problems peculiar to the contemplative sphere are erased by faith in God who transcends the world, and all worldsolutions. But the responsible factor in all these antinomies of experience is the moral self-contradiction of man. The antinomies issue from this basic difficulty. The solution to man's moral self-contradiction by faith will be the task of the next chapter. NOTES

' See Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950), p. 17. * Kroner, Culture and Faith, p. xii. ' The substance of these discussions will be taken from Part Three of Culture and Faith, pp. 185-218. * See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 5-30. ' Culture and Faith, p. 186. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press. 'Ibid., p. 193. 'Ibid., p. 194.

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' For a penetrating discussion concerning the problem of the Name of God, read Chapter Twelve of Brunner's The Christian Doctrine of God. ' Culture and Faith, p. 206. 10

Ibid., p. 211. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press.

»Ibid., "Ibid.,

p . 214. p. 215.

VII The Primacy of Faith What contribution does Biblical faith make to the solution of the moral problem? If the ultimate solution is centered in the realm of action, how does faith complete or fulfill the task of politics and morality? The solution which Biblical faith presents to the problems of contemplation is contingent upon the answer which faith gives to man's self-contradiction. If a solution is found to this problem of man, the contemplative difficulties disappear simultaneously. It thus follows that a faithsolution is ultimately practical rather than theoretical. The philosophy of faith, or pistology as Kroner calls it, meets its crucial test at this point.1 Here morality demonstrates its intimate relation to the religious realm. The crucial problem arising from this relation centers around the word "sin" and its corresponding religious meaning. Sin is not merely a moral category. Guilt is. Guilt has reference to the moral self-contradiction of man. Every man is guilty, because every man is split by the antinomies of experience. An incompleteness is present in man which makes him strive for completeness. The experience of this finiteness or incompleteness develops into guilt. Man is guilty because he lacks something. Guilt per se may have reference only to an emptiness in man. This is why there could be a sense of guilt in the Greek world and also why this sense of guilt could be soothed or erased by filling the emptiness through knowledge, at any rate from the perspective of the Greek philosophers. Guilt also appears when man finds himself in relation to the moral law. The moral law stands as the integrating factor in his life, but since he is never totally identified with the law, guilt manifests itself. The law is always an object dictating to him 98

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what he ought to do or be. From this tension between isness and oughtness, guilt emerges. Guilt is dependent upon a lack of knowledge, or an emptiness or finiteness in relation to a perfect knowledge, fullness, or completeness; or it is dependent upon the tension between the ought of the impersonal law and contradictory tendencies of the self. Guilt can also develop when man is overwhelmed by the mysterium tremendum. The relation to the holiness of the mystical totality will evoke the feeling of guilt on the part of the finite individual. In this respect guilt always has a religious as well as a moral connotation. It is interesting to note that the Greek tragedians were more sensitive than the philosophers to this truth. The philosophers were so completely in reaction against the superstitions and immoral elements in Greek religion that they overrationalized guilt, and made it due primarily to a lack of knowledge. The tragedians, on the other hand, imperfectly realized that guilt is religious as well as moral, and thus develops into a kind of sin which alienates and separates man from the gods. Their contribution was incomplete because the religious element contained a disproportion of the aesthetic, but at least in the great tragedies a preparation for the Gospel can be found. Sin is a unique category of the religious realm. Sin is a kind of guilt. It is guilt appearing in relation to the Holy God who reveals himself. Guilt per se in a religious sense is always related to the non-articulated mystical totality. Sin has reference to the relation of man to the articulated mystical totality, the Holy God of the Bible, the Creator and Lord. Sin, therefore, has its reality in the personal dimension of existence. It entails rebellion and estrangement between man and God. The moral self-contradiction of man becomes sin when man is confronted in personal encounter by the majestic Thou of God. When the so-called mystical totality is articulated by the revelation of God, the Holy God asserts himself. Sin has

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reference to an alienation between the I of man and the Thou of God, an alienation which presupposes that community and fellowship have been disrupted by man himself. In this respect sin must always presuppose itself. Because sin takes place in the personal dimension of reality, it is now obvious why philosophy frowns upon such a concept and can consider only matters of guilt. Sin transcends philosophy, since it is connected with the inner life of the philosopher himself. Man does not view God as Creator until he first has a redemptive encounter with the Holy. Thus any confrontation of the I of man by the Thou of God is a redemptive encounter. The articulation of the pistological mystical totality is always to a degree redemptive. Redemption is integrally connected with revelation. One of the strangest of all paradoxes is embedded in this observation. Man cannot fully realize his sinfulness until he is confronted by the Holy God in the personal dimension of reality. Until such an encounter takes place a sense of guilt is present, but sin is not truly real. When man is confronted by the Holy God, he finds himself a sinner, but that same confrontation is (or may be) the beginning of redemption. Sin is, therefore, the moral self-contradiction of man viewed in the light of God's revelation. Sin is most seriously evidenced by the revelation of God in the Christ. The Cross is a compelling witness to the sinfulness of man, since it is anchored in the personal dimension. The Law given through Moses bears witness to sin, but as a Law it lacks the decisiveness of the Cross. The Cross is the final revelation of man's sin to himself, and at the same time it is the means of redemption from that sin. In the Cross God's revelation meets us where we live. In the Cross the Holy God is revealed simultaneously with the God who is Love. The Holiness of God reveals sin to us; the Love of God assures us of forgiveness. Kroner declares: . . . The greatest and the most mysterious of all the wonders of divine love is the forgiveness of sin. By stooping down to the repentant sinner and by accepting him again into his fellowship, God

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has shattered the ultimate barrier to the "solution" of the antinomies. . . . This is the greatest victory of love over all the contradictions of existence, since guilt and sin represent the severest and most offensive of all. Forgiving love finally closes the gap between man and God, and thereby all gaps which divide the human self. By graciously receiving the sinner God "reconciles the world unto himself" and thus reconciles world and ego by his love.2 Repentance is made possible by the revelation of man's sin to himself. Forgiveness of sin is made possible by the revelation of the Holy Love of God in the person of Jecus as the Christ. This leads Kroner to declare that the action of man (repentance) and the action of God (forgiveness) condition and supplement each other. Thus in the love of Jesus the Christ the love of God reveals its fullness, and faith attains its fulfillment. In this practical way faith resolves the moral self-contradiction of man. Forgiving love erases the contradiction and establishes community between man and man, and between man and God. Faith thus solves the moral question, and all the metaphysical problems which have their issue from it. Morality has an intimate connection with politics; and in the solution of the moral problem the political problem is also solved. This is true because faith's solution to the moral problem is achieved through the creation of a community of love and redemption whose head is the Christ himself. In this community disruption no longer exists between the head and the subjects, between the outer conduct and the inner motive. In such a community the governing reality is love, and love is the desire which is in complete agreement with the law, since the law is fulfilled in love. In this way both morality and the body politic are transcended. 3 The final victory of faith is evidenced in its relation to the problem of time. Faith insists that time is not infinite, but is bounded by God. God is the alpha and the omega. In this respect time is the image of the disunity, the ever-present witness to the original split which experience encounters in

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the self-world duality. But Kroner is certain that the consciousness of such disunity, as the antinomies indicate, is not ultimate; it experiences the truth in a distorted way, in the way of secular ity, whose literal meaning is temporality.4 In the affirmation of God as the Creator, the primacy of God over time is affirmed. But in the recognition of God as the Creator there is the presupposed redemptive element. This redemption points to the fact that when it is completed, it is also a redemption from the transitoriness of time into the eternity of fellowship and communion with the Holy God. The profound reality of meeting God in the personal dimension transcends the time process. Faith conquers time, because faith makes possible communion with the eternal. In this way culture is transcended and consummated by faith. The conflict between self and world is finally ended in the conquest of time. Culture, however, is not consummated in time, and it is not replaced by faith. Christ is the end of time, but time did not end through him.5 Although there is a consummation of culture by faith, and although faith has the primacy over philosophic and cultural exertion, still a tension between Biblical faith and culture persists. This is the final question in the establishment of the primacy of faith. In the preceding discussions faith has been shown to have the primacy over philosophy and culture. A new tension now develops, which is not a reflection of the self-world antinomy solved by faith, but rather a tension between the solution of faith and the attempted solutions of culture. Although faith solves the antinomies of experience, faith does not replace or terminate man's cultural quest. It was noted that the noncultural man degenerates to the level of bestiality, and it is certainly true that faith under temporal conditions cannot replace the cultural exertions of science, art, state, and morality. The latter are necessities, and as a result the tension arises between culture and faith. True faith cannot degenerate into a caricature of itself in the

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way that science, art, politics, and morality may degenerate. Faith is not an exertion of man, and as a result it humbles the man of faith not only in relation to God but also in relation to culture. The man of faith may realize the ultimate impotence of culture, but he should be the last person to be iconoclastic in his relation to it. Most anti-culture groups in Christianity, as Richard Niebuhr has demonstrated, have neglected living faith in favor of culturally articulated forms of faith which they exalt to the same status as that given to faith itself. In the name of the exalted cultural form which has replaced faith, they denounce culture and exalt their "pure faith." So there is a Christian counterpart to the devotees of scientism and the other caricatures of cultural endeavor; but such devotion is misguided since faith has been diluted by a cultural element." In the history of Christianity attempts have been made to erase the tension between culture and faith through the absorption of the cultural task by the Church itself. The medieval period represents faith's attempt to erase the tension. But faith lost out in its attempt; culture was the victor! Paganism arose within the confines of the Holy Roman Church. When culture takes the primacy away from faith, faith degenerates into a cultural pattern and loses its vitality and its relevance. In order for faith to maintain its primacy under the conditions of temporality, this tension must constantly be maintained. In a sense the tension humbles man and makes him realize the profound importance of the gift of faith which he possesses from Almighty God. Augustine was sensitive to this tension when he symbolized it in terms of the two "cities" in his De Civitate Dei. Reinhold Niebuhr, following in the footsteps of Augustine, uses this tension as the basis for his theology. As Christians, we have to live our lives between opposite sets of imperatives, and although we know that one of them is the only absolute one, we can never have a clear conscience so long as we fall short

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of martyrdom.7 In the first chapter of Beyond Tragedy Niebuhr emphasizes this tension vividly when he describes the man of faith as "a deceiver and yet true."8 This observation is clearly illustrated in the tension between fact and faith. Faith transcends the realm of the factual or the demonstrable. As a result, every statement made by the man of faith must give the appearance of deception as well as truth. He must state it in the same way as he would state a fact, yet in so doing what is said is not factual but transcendent of fact. What he proclaims, therefore, is really true; yet it bears the cloak of deception. Only one example is needed to clarify this statement. One cannot know the Creator without first responding to the grace of redemption. From the perspective of redemption, one may say that God is Creator. But if this statement is heard by one who has not responded to redemptive grace, he will take it to be either deception or nonsense, since it cannot be rationally demonstrated. Thought deals primarily with facts. Facts are the products of thought. They are necessitated by the antinomies which lead to reflective activity. Faith concerns realities beyond factuality. Faith has its abode in the personal dimension of reality, and this dimension is not a fact since it cannot be objectified by thought. A great difference exists between the idea of this dimension and the dimension itself. This constitutes the gulf between fact and faith. As long as time endures a tension will remain between thought and faith. True faith will not desire to replace thought, but because of the presumption of man, thought will be apt to equate faith with deception or with nonsense, or on the other hand transform it into some type of rational coherence. This tendency is graphically illustrated by those systems which define faith as "intellectual assent" to theological propositions. A tension also exists between religion and faith. Faith is inward. Religion is inevitably allied to a cultural articulation. Faith consequently reflects the self-element, while religion re-

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fleets the world-element. Religion can be a product of culture; faith is never the result of human exertion. Christianity reflects this tension between religion and faith, but its emphasis is primarily transcendent of the tension. Christianity is more accurately described as the Christian faith than as the Christian religion. The religious element in Christianity ought always to be (even though often it is not) the fruit of faith. The outward manifestation should always be animated by the inward motive. The tension between religious externality and the inwardness of faith should not be a subject-object problem from the Christian perspective. Inwardness in Christianity has reference to the total person. It is not applicable to the merely subjective element. The inwardness of faith sustains the outward expression, makes it truly personal and vital. Thus Christian inwardness should be not subjective but existential, and it is existential because it is not purely individualistic, but is rather faith sustained and strengthened by the community of which Christ is the Head." The basis for the primacy of faith over all cultural and philosophic endeavors is mirrored in the events of the Crucifixion and the Resurrection of Jesus the Christ. These two crucial events establish the ultimate primacy of faith. The Crucifixion, in Kroner's view, marks the victory of the world over the love of God; it is the victory of cultural powers over faith, or, in theological language, the victory of fallen man over Christ. But the Resurrection is the correction of this error. The Resurrection reverses the meaning of the Cross by bringing out the truth that the letter is weaker than the spirit, that time cannot destroy the eternal, that freedom and foresight are more powerful than necessity and ignorance. The Resurrection is the center of Christian faith, because it embodies the victory of faith over culture; it presents faith in its unlimited glory.10 The final resolution of the tension between culture and faith

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is theological rather than philosophical. Faith resolves the antinomies of experience, yet the faith-solution constitutes a pole of tension in relation to culture itself. Although faith is primary in relation to culture, for as long as time endures this tribulation is ineradicable from the nature of man, even the man of faith. The Bible speaks about the Last Day, the eschaton, when all will be fulfilled. This Biblical image of the end, which constitutes the theological discipline of eschatology, is the solution to the tension between culture and faith. It is not a philosophically permissible conclusion, even though many philosophical solutions have an implicitly eschatological element. This solution has its legitimate sphere within the community of faith itself. It is the hope, which develops from the faith of the redeemed community, that in the Last Day all will be fulfilled in love. Thus the tension between culture and faith will be erased, and eternal fellowship with the Holy God will ensue. Faith solves the moral self-contradiction of man; it erases the antinomies of experience. Faith has its abode in the personal dimension of reality which thought cannot think. Thought cannot think faith. Faith is a more profound reality than thought. Thus faith has the primacy NOTES 1

The substance of these discussions is based on Part Three of Kroner's Culture and Faith, pp. 218-78. 2 Culture and Faith, p. 225. Reprinted by permission of University of Chicago Press. ' Ibid, p. 230. 4 Ibid., p. 237. 'Ibid., p. 238. ' Extreme dogmatism, which makes a particular theological system the "faith once delivered to the saints," whether that dogmatism be Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Anglican, or Protestant is an example of such pretension within Christianity itself. * Culture and Faith, p. 248. ' Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy ( N e w Y o r k : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 1.

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' This is the proper approach to the sacramental life of the Church. A sacrament is not an object to be received by a subject. This reflects a negation of the faith element. A sacrament is existential. For example, the "real presence" of Christ in the Holy Eucharist is not to be found in the elements qua elements, nor in the subjective reception by the communicant, but in the mystical presence of the Lord who meets the communicant in an act of worship. The sacraments are, or should be, real acts of meeting, real encounters with the mystical presence of Christ in the personal dimension. 10 Culture and Faith, p. 278. In this same context Prof. Kroner quotes John 16:32-33: "Behold, the hour cometh, yea, is now come, that ye shall be scattered, every man to his own, and shall leave me alone ; and yet I am not alone, because the Father is with me. These things have I spoken unto you, that in me ye might have peace. In the world ye shall have tribulation ; but be of good cheer ; I have overcome the world." " In Professor Kroner's Gifford Lectures, published as The Primacy of Faith he confirms this conclusion by asserting (p. 222): "The 'logic of the heart' discloses that the victory of truth and good can nowise be won but by faith. Faith claims primacy therefore in the ontological as well as in the moral field." Reprinted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

VIII Theological Implications The function of Kroner's religious philosophy is twofold. In the first place, it is critical in its relation to rationalistic, philosophic systems which lose the personal dimension of reality in some type of ontological scheme. Ontologism is a pretension of sinful man which religious philosophy must criticize. In a broader sense all cultural pretension comes under the discriminating eye of the religious philosopher; here again he must be critical. In fact, secular philosophy should have as its primary function the profound contribution which Kant made to philosophic studies. Philosophy outside the religious realm is pretentious if it attempts to build up contemplative schemes of reality. All philosophy should be critical, and religious philosophy should rest upon the foundation of this Kantian revolution in philosophical method. In the second place, religious philosophy can, through the adoption of the critical outlook, go beyond the efforts of a secular critical philosophy. This is true because the religious philosopher can project a solution to the philosophic antinomies in terms of faith. Faith must be primary in religious philosophy, not because faith itself is philosophic or rational, but because faith is the mediating factor between the personal dimension of reality, in which man meets God, and the many insoluble contradictions of culture and philosophy which are due to man's self-contradiction. Faith can be projected as a solution since it is a solution with which man is confronted in a dimension of reality which thought cannot think. Faith is not a rational principle which the religious philosopher develops in order to solve the philosophical problem; faith is the answer to the philosophical problem because it is simultaneously the answer to man's problem as a person. 108

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Philosophy, abstracted from faith, becomes pretentious if it attempts a resolution in terms of a "principle," or a "faith in reason," or a "moral law," or an "absolute self," because it ignores the impossibility of solving the problem through human projections such as these. Therefore, the legitimate function of philosophy is the recognition of the limits of man's reason and the limits of his cultural quest, and a criticism of any violation of these limits. Philosophy per se cannot project a solution because of man's self-contradiction, but it can pave the way for a solution by destroying where possible all pretentious human solutions, and thus becoming critical in its function. Philosophy, however, cannot remain merely critical. Even Kant had to project an answer in terms of rational faith; but because this was unwarranted from a purely critical perspective, Kant himself became a prey to what he so vigorously opposed. If the contribution of Kant is heeded, philosophy must issue into religious philosophy in order for a solution to be obtained. Critical philosophy cannot project a solution, yet if a solution is not found the temptation is too great and pretension arises, as we have seen that it did with Kant. Thus it becomes clear that religious philosophy is the necessary complement to a critical philosophy. Religious philosophy, if it is true to its function, is not pretentious, since the solution offered is not of human origin, but is a gift from Almighty God. Certain difficulties arise at this point. If faith has the primacy in religious philosophy, is this discipline really a philosophy at all? It is certainly not a philosophy in the traditional sense, as are realism, idealism, empiricism, and rationalism. Secular thinkers would deny its right to the classification of philosophy, and from their own various points of view their judgment would be valid, nevertheless it is philosophy. Religious philosophy, which sees the solution to the ultimate

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problems as being outside the boundaries of human exertion, has not violated the spirit of a critical philosophy. The function of a critical philosophy is to demonstrate the limits of reason and culture. Religious philosophy fulfills this function. In this respect there is no difference between a critical philosopher and a religious philosopher. Religious philosophy is loyal to the critical function, but at the same time, being sustained by a reality beyond human exertion, it finds a solution to these problems without violating the proper function of philosophy itself. Implicitly this is what Kant attempted to do, and this is why he is often called a Protestant-Christian philosopher. The conclusions of previous chapters have demonstrated that in the last analysis religious philosophy must be a function of the faith-community. It cannot be merely an individual projection, but must be developed by an individual who finds himself as a member of the community whose reason for being is in the faith encounter.' Religious philosophy, because of this truth, may serve as a mediating factor between secular society and the redemptive community. It has a relation to secular society, since it honestly approaches philosophical problems from a critical perspective, and of course it could not be religious philosophy without that faith which transcends secular society and which ultimately solves the problems. From the secular philosopher's point of view, all this is nonsense. Religion is itself a cultural product, and an imperfect one at that. This faith which presumes to solve philosophic problems is also pretentious. The secular philosopher is both right and wrong. He is right because religion is imperfect and subject to criticism, but he is wrong either because he equates faith with the cultural element of religion, or because he demands that faith must be rational in order to be acceptable. This is the "foolishness to the Greeks" about which Paul of Tarsus had much to say. The secular philosopher notwithstanding, religious philosophy is a function of the faith-community,

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and if it has any function outside the community, that function is of a critical nature. At this point there arises the question of the relation between religious philosophy and sacred theology. If religious philosophy is a function of the Church,1 is there a mark of distinction between religious philosophy and sacred theology? Is theology a kind of philosophy? 3 Sacred theology has contributed more than its share of the trouble which the Church has encountered during its history. For the most part theology has been equated with a type of superior philosophy. It has presumed much in its development, and it has too often adopted the rationalism of the secular philosopher in the presentation of the so-called divine wisdom. In many instances faith disintegrated into an intellectual assent, theology became the queen of the sciences, and in the Church dogma tended to replace dynamic faith. In many periods of Christian thought the only characteristic which distinguished theology from philosophy was the donum superadditum of revelation which the theologians had at their disposal. They utilized revelation in a way similar to the modern philosopher's use of sense-data as a content for the forms of thought. Paradoxically, however, sacred theology was a necessary function of the Church. The infiltration of Gnosticism necessitated some kind of authoritative statement. Gnosticism won a subtle victory, however, because faith tended to disintegrate into assent to this authority. Greek philosophy also became the basis for expounding and interpreting the truths of the faith. As the history of the Church unfolded, this victory became even greater. With Thomas Aquinas' production of the Summa, Christ bowed down before the Stagirite. Unfortunately, the theological task came to be regarded as a synthesis between thought and faith, and it was not until modern times that this synthesis was broken, and that faith once again could stand in its own realm, possessing the primacy over philosophy and culture. If the Protestant Reformation contri-

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buted nothing else, it paved the way for this distinction, and thus for an emphasis upon the faith of the Bible. It is true that Protestantism itself provided still other scholastic theologies, which were only the poor reflection of Thomas Aquinas. Anyone who investigates the dogmatic theology of Protestantism will find how the living faith of the Bible is subordinated all over again to the categories of philosophy. An indiscriminate blending of philosophical and theological elements may be found in most Protestant systematic or dogmatic theologies. The tendency is evident, for example, in the preoccupation of the theologian with ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological problems. Most dogmatic theologies deal with such matters. But this is not the proper function of theology. It is rather a reflection of the influence of ontologism, even in the field of sacred learning. Religious philosophy, as a function of the Church, has a tremendous contribution to make to the study of theology. What religious philosophy has criticized as pretension in the philosophic or cultural spheres should hardly be incorporated into an attempted apprehension of faith itself. The conditions which make faith possible should be the conditions upon which theology is based. The study of theology should be concerned primarily with the personal dimension of reality, the faith-encounter between the I of man and the Thou of God which takes place in this dimension, and with the imaginative articulation of this encounter as it is set forth in the Bible. Theology should be critical of those systems which have exceeded this limitation, but its work should be discharged from within the Church. From this perspective religious philosophy is a mediator between the Church and secular philosophy. Religious philosophy is the attacking force of the Church; it exercises a critical function in relation to culture and philosophy, while its other contribution provides the basis for theological reflection. It limits theology to a function within the Church,4

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Theology, thus regarded, has for its foundation the revelation of God as it is recorded in the Old Testament and consummated in Jesus the Christ. He is the final revelation, since he is Emmanuel (God with us)! In the reception of this revelation, a community is formed. The reception is the faith-encounter; the community is the Church which Jesus the Christ established, and this is a faith-community. Both these elements are living, personal, active, and have their reality in the personal dimension. The imaginative articulation of the encounter with Christ is conveyed in the Bible. The Bible is not a rational exposition, although it certainly includes the rational; it transcends thought per se, since it conveys encounter by means of inspired imagination. This inspired imagination demonstrates what is meant by the testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum, and here again is confirmation of the Church which was established when the Spirit was given at Pentecost. No theologian has a right to construct a system without first being a participant in that community whose Head is the Lord and which is sustained by the Spirit. No theological system can replace those living realities which occasioned its production. Theology attempts a partial, relative, and systematic apprehension of the faith-encounter articulated in the Bible. It should not desire to replace the Bible, but only to relate the truths of the Bible to each successive age. There is always the lurking temptation, however, for theology to become pretentious, and for theologians to consider their systems as superior to the Holy Scriptures. All theologies are replaceable. This truth is confirmed by the abundance of such systems in the history of the Church. Yet the Bible has not been replaced, nor that to which the Bible gives imaginative articulation. No theological system can have more than a relative validity. Theology must learn from religious philosophy not to exceed its function. The religious philosopher works both within and without the Church. The theologian's task is strictly within the Church. He must accept the critical findings of religious phil-

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osophy, and adapt his theological system to the personal dimension of reality. There is, after all, a distinction between the truths of faith (encounter) and the truths of theology.5 The distinction is relative, but the more reflection and impersonal objectivity predominate, the greater will be the difference. The closer the theologian stays to living faith, the less will be the difference. The contribution of Kroner's religious philosophy, as it has been developed in this book, may serve as a foundation for the discussion of a particularly difficult problem in theology, i.e., the Biblical doctrine of predestinationThe difficulty for the theologian is particularly acute since he constantly faces the danger of subordinating living faith to a rational coherence which manifests itself in a philosophic determinism, masked by the proclamation that it is a determinism by God himself, in other words a theistic determinism. It is hoped that this discussion will demonstrate the way religious philosophy and sacred theology may complement each other, as functions of the Church, when both are based upon the primacy of faith. When predestination is identified with determinism, the resulting concept is set over against freedom as its opposite. This error obviously makes any recognition of the tension between the two impossible, indeed, it makes it appear that no problem exists. But to equate predestination with determinism is simply to deny the tension between philosophy and faith. A recapture of this tension must be effected. For predestination means something quite distinct from determinism. In reality predestination is the theological expression both of man's freedom and of his final destiny, which is the fulfillment of that freedom. Therefore, the nature of philosophic determinism will be discussed in relation to the freedom of man, and predestination will be considered as the opposite of philosophic determinism; it will be seen as the fulfillment of man's freedom. The philosophy of the Greeks, which so greatly influenced the medieval thinkers, demonstrates better than any other a

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doctrine of determinism at a high level. That doctrine was noble, because in a person like Socrates it transcended a crude materialism, and was a matter of ethical rather than natural law—in other words, a determinism of virtue. What is this teaching? From a study of the Platonic dialogues, especially the earlier ones, it can be observed that Socrates taught that virtue consists in the knowledge of the good. To possess knowledge of the good is tantamount to doing the good. Knowledge of the good causes an individual to do good and therefore to be virtuous. No one wills to do evil; no one does wrong purposely. If anyone does wrong it is because the intellect has failed to furnish the will of man with the appropriate information. Knowledge determines the direction of the will without opposition from the will. The will is in bondage to the intellect and does what the intellect dictates. Sin, in such a scheme, is intellectual defect or error. To be in a state of sin is to be in a state of ignorance. But if sin is ignorance the will cannot be held responsible for its action. The will is not free. Man's action is determined by his knowledge of the good. This is essentially the Socratic position, and it sums up the philosophic determinism of the Greeks. Man is in bondage to the good, but nevertheless because of this bondage human freedom is negated. Strictly speaking, freedom has no place in Greek philosophy—a situation due to the predominantly contemplative influence in Greek thought and life, as mirrored in the primacy of the cultural sphere of aesthetics. Such a theory takes the horror out of sin. Man is usually willing to give up his freedom in order to avoid the burden of choice. As noble as the argument is, the effect of the theory is a confusion of the spheres of contemplation and action, and a denial of individual responsibility which amounts to a negation of the individual person. The Socratic position of a determinism of the will by the intellect is similar to the Pharisaic teaching of a determinism

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which places a person in bondage to the law. Knowledge of the law, and the proper response to the law, justifies man. And if knowledge of the law and observance of the law as that knowledge dictates is all, then there is a determinism arising even in the religion of the chosen people. In this case, moralism in contrast to aestheticism (and the rationalism issuing from aestheticism) asserts itself as a solution to man's selfcontradiction. The difficulty is—and this is the point of transition to predestination—that a knowledge of the good or of the law does not guarantee a doing of the good or a keeping of the law. The Socratic position defies human experience. Man is a creature who sins despite his knowledge of the good or of the law. St. Paul's confession is a universal one: The evil which I would not do, that I do. The paradox, that man inevitably sins and yet remains free to do so, establishes the contrast between the determinism of the Greeks and the Christian doctrine of predestination. In the doctrine of predestination the person is primary, and the intellect is subordinate to the person as a totality. This doctrine is in direct opposition to the Greek view of the bondage of the person to the intellect. If the above analysis is correct, predestination is the expression of the Christian insistence upon the freedom of the person over against any kind of determinism. The meaning of the doctrine must be found within the context of man's freedom, not outside of it, for it must be seen as the presupposition and fulfillment of man's freedom. Predestination should not be treated in a contemplative way, but should always be approached within the sphere of action. A t this point the contribution of religious philosophy is evident. Theology must regard its function as an investigation of the implications of the faith-encounter in the personal dimension of reality. Predestination is the sign of man's freedom. A free man has a destiny. In that destiny the freedom of man is fulfilled and not negated. The Christian can have a destiny, since he looks

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forward to the eschaton, the Last Day. The Greeks had no eschaton, and thus no destiny. For the Greeks there was an ever-recurring cycle of events. The Christian has a destiny, and his destiny is transcendent to an ethical determinism. Predestination concerns the end of man, the destiny of man, and may be defined as the perfect freedom of man objectified. What does this mean? If the perfect freedom of man is the destiny of man, then the implication is that at present man is not perfectly free. This perfect freedom objectified, which is the theological expression of man's destiny, demonstrates that the substance of the doctrine of predestination is God's interest in man's fulfillment of his destiny. Now, is it possible to say that man is free, but not perfectly free, and that his final destiny is perfect freedom, without negating in any way what is meant by the freedom of man? Most thinkers would agree that what is popularly meant by the freedom of man is his moral freedom, i.e., his ability to choose good or evil, even though he may know that his choice is evil. The presence of alternative action, the fact that he has a choice, constitutes a man's free will. No thinker, whether Greek or Christian, would want man to choose the evil rather than the good. Socrates' desire to have man always choose the good was so great that he denied the freedom knowingly to choose anything but the good. The Christian is more realistic. Yet the presence of alternative choice which is the essence of moral freedom demonstrates a defect in that freedom. Man may choose good or evil, but the fact that he may, shows that he has an imperfect freedom. The superior person would be choosing only the good, since the person would be good, and evil would offer no allurement. It follows that the perfect freedom of man would consist in always choosing the good, not because the good dictates the choice, but because the man who chooses is himself that type of person. This seems to answer the aforementioned question. The perfect freedom, thus defined, would not deny man's moral freedom but fulfill it. Man is still morally

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free, but more, since his moral freedom is inferior to the freedom of being good. The question arises as to whether or not this perfect freedom is obtainable through the exercise of man's moral freedom. The answer is: No! The fact that man's moral freedom is inferior to this perfect freedom precludes any possibility of attaining the perfect freedom on the part of man qua man. This question results in the Christian doctrine of grace, which is an integral part of the doctrine of predestination. In Christian theology such thinkers as Augustine have equated perfect freedom with the grace of God. In a sense the grace of God is the freedom of God. It has always been the Christian affirmation that the perfect freedom of man, called eternal life, is a gift of God. Man's exercise of moral freedom is unable to achieve this perfect freedom. That must come from God himself. Man cannot achieve perfect freedom, because he is a sinner. Yet the good that man chooses as a free moral agent is a good already given to him by God. Any choice of good by man is a reflection of the fact that he ought always to choose the good, but does not. Thus any choice of good by man is a gift of God. The ought arises because the integrating factor in moral freedom is the law. Only the perfectly free Being (God) is without law. Law makes possible man's moral freedom, since it allows choice, but moral freedom qua moral freedom is never able to transcend that which makes it possible, namely, the law. In the Christian faith the law is summed up in love. The law of love is the commandment of Christianity. The fact that there is a law of love precludes any possibility of man's fulfilling it without the grace of God. Love cannot be commanded and remain love. Yet it is commanded. If man loved because he was commanded to love, the love would be inferior, since he was commanded to do so. In fact it would not be love. At the same time such a commandment would be given in vain if man had no free choice. The paradox emerges! The law, which

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makes possible man's moral freedom, negates man's ability through moral freedom to fulfill it. The law of love is the grace of God objectified. It is not the grace of God, but it is what the sinner, who is morally free, takes the grace of God to be. The fact of choice in the law allows for moral freedom; but if this is so, then perfect freedom can be possessed by man only through the gift of God's grace. Man's moral freedom is the result of the law of love, which is the grace of God objectified. Man's perfect freedom is the result of God's grace working within the person of man, making it possible for him to be integrated not by an object (i.e., the law as the grace of God objectified), but rather through love and fellowship with one who is perfectly free. This is the final destiny of man, to be, with God, perfectly free in a relation of love and fellowship. This is the hope of faith which through the eschaton is fulfilled in love. Why some men become perfectly free and others do not is an unexplainable mystery. Whether all are saved, or only some, cannot be known by man. To attempt an explanation is to do an injustice to the doctrine of predestination. It is beyond human ability to answer the ultimate question. This final question is completely shrouded in mystery and must remain so. The Christian's only certainty is that in God his freedom is not negated but perfectly fulfilled, and that in the grace of the Son he finds his eternal destiny. From the preceding discussion, the relative character of theology is evident. In order not to be presumptuous, the theologian must refuse to answer the ultimate questions. His refusal is based upon the fact that he has the answer already in Jesus the Christ, but until he sees Christ face to face he must not make him a convenience of reason, and when he does see him the questions no longer will be relevant. In Kroner's metaphysics of selfhood, the personal dimension of reality was shown to be primary. The human self was seen as the reason for the contradictions of metaphysics and specula-

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tion. If a solution to the moral self-contradiction of man could be found, then the metaphysical problem would also be solved. The final solution to this problem has been found, but it is a solution due not to the exertions of men, but rather to the gift of God himself. In the last analysis, the primacy of faith in religious philosophy demonstrates the primacy of Christ over all philosophical and cultural spheres. This primacy of Christ has led all of his disciples throughout the ages, and especially those following in the train of the doubting Thomas, to exclaim when confronted by his Glory (the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father abounding in grace and truth): My Lord and My God!

NOTES 1

Martin Buber, as a Jew, demonstrates this truth. He is a religious philosopher who has fulfilled the function outlined above, but he would be the first to admit that his inspiration and guidance has been derived from the holy people of God. 3 In most cases the terms Church, faith-community, holy people of God, etc., have reference to that reality in which, in Kierkegaard's words, the self can relate itself to its own self, and by willing to be itself, becomes grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it— or, in the expression of Paul Tillich, "the Gestalt of Grace." s For Kroner's views on this question, the reader is referred to his How Do We Know God? (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), in which it is given a thorough discussion. ' For an interesting discussion on the function of theology within the Church, see Brunner's The Christian Doctrine of God. * Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, pp. 84-85. " The substance of this discussion is taken from the author's article on "Predestination and Determinism" in the October 1955 issue of the Anglican Theological Review. Reprinted in revised form by permission of the Editor.

Bibliography

Bibliography of Richard Kroner This bibliography includes all the published works of Professor Richard Kroner from 1908 to 1961. It is divided into two parts: Books and Articles, and Book Reviews and Notes. Books and Articles 1908 1. Uber Logische und Aesthetische Allgemeingültigkeit (On Logical and Aesthetic Validity). Eckhardt. 99 pp. (Ph.D. dissertation at Freiburg /Br.). la. (Announcement of the dissertation by the author) KantStudien, Bd. XIII. 2. "Kritizismus und Erkenntnistheoretische Resignation" (Criticism and Epistemological Resignation). Verhandlungen des III International Kongresses für Philosophie, Heidelberg. 1909 3. "Ein Blatt aus dem Tagebuche unserer Zeit" (A Page from the Diary of our Time), in Vom Messias, kulturphilosophische Essays. Engelmann. 4.

1910 "Henri Bergson" Logos, Bd. I.

1912 5. "Zur Kritik des Philosophischen Monismus" (Concerning the Critique of Philosophical Monism). Logos, Bd. Ill, 2. 6. "Lask und Christiansen." Logos, Bd. Ill, 3 (Article signed "K"). 7. "Philosophie oder Psychologie?" Zeit im Bild, Jahrgang X, 46 (5 November). 1913 8. Zweck und Gesetz in der Biologie (Teleology and Causality in Biology). Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 8a. (Announcement of the book by the author) Kant-Studien, Bd. XVIII, p. 527. 123

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9. Kants Weltanschauung. Siebeck). 91 pp.

1914 Tübingen:

J. C. B. Möhr (Paul

1916 10. "Politik und Weltpolitik" (Politics and World Politics), in Zeitschrift für Politik, herausg. von R. Schmidt und A. Grabowsky, Bd. X, 1. (Written in the front-line trenches during the First World War). 1919 11. Das Problem der historischen Biologie (The Problem ot Historical Biology). Berlin: Gebr. Born träger (Published in a series entitled Abhandlungen zur Theoretischen Biologie, herausg. von J. Schnaxel, No. 2.) 12. "Program für Logos" (Program for Logos). Logos, Bd. VIII, 1. 1920 13. "Der soziale und nationale Gedanke bei Fichte," (The Social and National Idea in Fichte). Fichte-Hochschulgemeinde zu Freiburg/Br.: Speyer und Kärner. (Lecture given in Fichte-Hochschulgemeinde, etc.) 14. "Hegel im Urteile Nietzches" (Hegel in the Judgment of Nietzsche). Die Brücke (December). 1921 15.. Von Kant bis Hegel (From Kant to Hegel). Erster Band. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 612 pp. 1923 16. "Schicksal und Wille" (Destiny and Will). Schule und Leben. Zürich: III. Jahrgang, No. 2. 17. "Der junge Hegel und das Christentum" (The Young Hegel and Christianity). Berner Bund. (A newspaper article) 18. "Wille und Gnade" (Will and Grace), Schule und Leben. Zürich: III. Jahrgang, No. 3. 19. "Geschichte und Philosophie" (History and Philosophy). Logos, Bd. XI, 1. 20. "Wilhelm Dilthey." Logos, Bd. XI, 2. 21. "Anschauen und Denken" (Intuition and Thought). Logos, Bd. XIII, 1.

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22. Von Kant bis Hegel (From Kant to Hegel), Zweiter Band, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 526 pp. 1926 23. "Vom Wert der historischen Bildung" (On the Value of Historical Erudition). Die Erziehung, Bd. I, 12, pp. 570ff. (Inauguration Address at Dresden) 1927 24. "Kulturleben und Seelenleben" (The Life of Culture and the Life of the Soul), Logos, Bd. XVI, 1. 25. "Ziel en Wereld" (Soul and World), Denken an Leven, 1, 2, 3. (Article translated into Dutch for publication in this Dutch Journal) 26. "Die Selbstverwirklichung des Geistes" (The Self-Realization of the Spirit), De Idee, V, 173-92, (July). (A German article appearing in this Dutch Journal) 1928 27. Die Selbstverwirklichung des Geistes: Prolegomena zur Kulturphilosophie (The Self-Realizaticn of the Spirit: A Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Culture). Tübingen: J. C. B. Möhr (Paul Siebeck). 225 pp. 1929 28. "Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart" (Philosophical Movements of the Present), in Volk und Reich der Deutschen, herausg. von Harms. 1930 29. "Idee und Wirklichkeit des Staats" (Idea and Reality of the State). Kiel: Lipsius und Tischer (An address given at the University of Kiel on the occasion of the celebration of the constitution of the German Reich.) 30. "Eröffnungsrede des Haager Hegelkongresses" (Address at the Foundation of the Hegel Congress), in Verhandlungen des Ersten Hegelkongresses. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1931 31. "Die Bedeutung Hegels für die Gegenwart" (The Significance of Hegel for the Present Time). (Appeared in Japanese translation. Further details unknown.) 31a. (The same in Chinese translation, 1932. Further details unknown.)

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32. Japanese translation of the Hegel section of Von Kant bis Hegel, with a new preface. (Further details unknown.) 33. Kulturphilosophische Grundlegung der Politik (Politics based on the Philosophy of Culture). Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag. 112 pp. 34. "Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft bei Hegel" (The Civic Society in Hegel). Zeitschrift für angewandte Soziologie, Bd. IV, 1, pp. Iff. 35. "System und Geschichte bei Hegel" (System and History in Hegel). Logos, Bd. XX, 2, pp. 242ff. 36. "Die internationale Bedeutung Hegels" (The International Significance of Hegel). Inter Nationes. 36a. (The same in Chinese translation, 1932. Further details unknown.) 37. "Hegel und die Gegenwart" (Hegel and the Present). Forschungen und Fortschritte. 37a. (The same in Spanish translation, 1932. Further details unknown.) 1932 38. Rede zur Eröffnung des II. Hegelkongresses" (Address at the Inauguration of the Second Hegel Congress), in Verhandlungen des Zweiten Hegelkongresses. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 39. "Hegel zum 100. Todestage: Vortrag in der Aula der Universität Kiel am 14 November 1931" (Hegel at the One Hundredth Anniversary of his Death: Address at the University of Kiel). Breslau: Verlag Ferdinand Hirt. 40. "Religion und Philosophie: Eine Erwiderung" (Religion and Philosophy: An Answer). Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 13. Jahrgg., 1, pp. 5Iff. 1933 41. "Seele und Welt" (Soul and World). Die Tatwelt, 9. Jahrgg., 1, pp. 20ff. 42. "Bemerkungen zur Dialektik der Zeit" (Remarks on the Dialectic of Time), in Vorhandlungen des Dritten Hegelkongresses. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1936 43. "Die Identität der Gegensätze: Das Grundprinzip aller Metaphysik" (The Unity of the Opposites: The Fundamental Principle of all Metaphysics), De Idee, pp. 241-63.

Bibliography

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44. "Philosophy of Life and Philosophy of History." The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. Ill, No. 8. 1938 45. " L a filosofia e la vita" (Philosophy and Life). Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana, diretto da Giovanni Gentile, Marzo-Aprile. 1941 46. The Religious Function of Imagination. New Haven: Yale University Press. 70 pp. (Bedell Lectures, delivered at Kenyon College, November 25 and 26, 1940). 47. "The German Universities and Nazism" Union Review, Vol. Ill, No. 1 (December), p. 8. 48. "God, Nation and Individual in the Philosophy of Hegel." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, December, pp. 188-98. 1942 49. "No Concentration Camps Here." The New York Times, July 20, 1942. (Letter to the editor). 1943 50. "Reason, Reality, Imagination." Science, Philosophy and Religion: Third Symposium, pp. 33-64. 51. How Do We Know God? New York: Harper and Brothers. 134 pp. (The Hewett Lectures at Union Theological Seminary, New York City; the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass.; and the Andover Newton Theological Seminary in Massachusetts; also given as the Roberts Lectures at McCormick Theological Seminary in Chicago). 52. "The Mystery of Time in the Mirror of Faith." The Anglican Theological Review, April. (Commencement Address at Union Theological Seminary, 1942). 53. The Primacy of Faith. New York: The Macmillan Company. 226 pp. (The Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 1939-40). 54. "Existential Philosophy—A Paradox." Union Review, Vol. IV, No. 3 (May), pp. 19-21. 1944 55. "Kierkegaard's Either-Or Today." Union Review, Vol. VI, No. 1 (December).

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1946 56. "History and Historicism." The Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (August). 57. "Mysticism, Speculation and Revelation." Religion in Life (Summer issue). 58. "Science, Philosophy and Theology." Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. II, No. 3 (March), p. 9. 1947 59. "The Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man." The Conwellian (Temple University). Vol. IV, No. 1 (April). 1948 60. Hegel's Early Theological Writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. 340 pp. (Introduction, and some translations, by Kroner; remainder of book translated and edited by T. M. Knox). 61. "Meditation on I Corinthians 13." The Anglican Theological Review, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (November). 62. "Logos and Logic." Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. IV, No. 1 (November), pp. 3-7. 63. "The Year 1800 in the Development of German Idealism." The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. I, No. 4 (Summer), pp. 1-31. 1949 "Immortality." The Anglican Theological Review, Vol. XXXI, 2 (April), pp. 98ff. "Faith Needs Imagination." The Intercollegian, Vol. LXVII, 4 (December), p. 4. 1950 66. "On the Religious Imagination." Perspectives on a Troubled Decade: Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1939-1949—A Symposium. New York: Harper and Brothers (pp. 595-622). 64. No. 65. No.

1951 67. Culture and Faith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 278 pp. (A completely revised version of Die Selbstverwirklichung des Geistes: Prolegomena zur Kulturphilosophie. See also Dimensions of Faith, edited by William Kimmel and Geoffrey Clive [New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960], pp. 385-430. A portion of

Bibliography

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Chapter Four of Culture and Faith is republished in this volume; the editors also dedicated the book to Professor Kroner.) 68. "The Meaning of the Reformation Today." The Lutheran Quarterly, Vol. Ill (November), pp. 340-52. 1952 69. "Kierkegaard or Hegel?" Revue Internationale de Philosophie, No. 19, pp. 79-96. 1953 70. "Mure and Other English Hegelians." The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. VII, No. 1 (September), pp. 64-75. 71. "Lebendige Vernünftigkeit," (Reason in Life: Foundation for Philosophical-Theological Thought in America). Deutsche Universitätszeitung, 8, Jahrgg. (Göttingen, December 7), p. 13. 1954 72. "What Is Really Real?" The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. VII, No. 3 (March), pp. 351-62. 73. "Kierkegaards Hegelverständnis" (Kierkegaard's Understanding of Hegel). Kant-Studien, Bd. 46, 1 (1954-55), pp. 19-27. 74. "A New Critique of Theoretical Thought." The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (December), pp. 321-24. 1955 75. "Heideggers Privatreligion." Eckhart, Oct.-Dec., pp. 30-41. 75a. "Heidegger's Private Religion." Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. XI, No. 4 (May), pp. 23-27. (Translation by the author of "Heideggers Privatreligion.") 1956 76. "The Historical Roots of Niebuhr's Thought," in Reinhold Niebuhr; His Religious, Social and Political Thought, edited by C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall (The Library of Living Theology, Vol. II). New York: The Macmillan Company (pp. 177-92). 77. Kant's Weltanschauung, Translated by John E. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 119 pp. (An authorized translation of Kants Weltanschauung, Tiibingen, 1914, with revisions by the author.) 78. Speculation in Pre-Christian Philosophy. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 251 nn. (The first volume of a triloev on Snecu-

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Index of Names Abelard, Peter, 56 Allers, Rudolph, 54n Aquinas, Thomas, 111, 112 Aristotle, 23, 26, 44 Augustine, Aurelius, 103, 118

Hendel, Charles, 28 Hitler, Adolf, 7, 19, 20, 23, 25, 28 Hobbes, Thomas, 27 Hocking, W. E„ 54n Husserl, Edmund, 19, 21

Barth, Karl, 27 Bennett, John C., 29 Bergson, Henri, 20, 123 Boutflower, Bishop, 27 Brightman, E. S., 54n Brunner, Emil, 96n, 97n, 120n Buber," Martin, 9, 35, 38, 42n, 50, 54, 120n

Jaeger, Werner, 19 Jesus the Christ, 89,100,101, 102, 105, 113, 119, 120

Cassirer, Ernst, 21 Coffin, Henry S„ 29 Cohen, Hermann, 21 Collingwood, R. G., 26 Comenius, Johann A., 23 Darwin, Charles, 16, 20 Descartes, Rene, 16, 33, 36 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 17, 124 Dostoievsky, Feodor, 18

Kant, Immanuel, 8, 16,19, 20, 22, 27, 29, 33, 34, 36, 37, 41, 45, 66, 70, 85, 108, 109, 110, 124, 125, 126, 129, 131 Kerensky, Alexander, 18 Kierkegaard, S. A., 9, 27, 34, 35, 42n, 59, 120n, 127, 129 Knox, John, 29 Knox, T. M., 28 Kroner, Alice Marie (Kauffmann), 17, 19, 26, 28, 30 Kroner, Kurt, 15, 16

Lask, Emil, 18, 21 Lee, Otis, 25, 28 Leibniz, G. W. von, 33 Ebbinghaus, Julius, 21, 22 Lessing, Gotthold E., 16 Litt, Theodor, 130 Fichte, Johann G„ 21, 33,124,130 Locke, John, 36 Fischer, Kuno, 17, 18 Foster, Michael B., 24, 26, 27 Marek, Siegfried, 7 Mehlis, Georg, 20, 21 Minear, Paul, 54n Galileo, 21 Muilenburg, James, 29 Gentile, Giovanni, 25 Mure, G. R. G., 129 Goethe, Johann von, 16, 17, 18, 130 Gorki, Maxim, 18 Natorp, Paul, 21 Grant, Frederick C„ 29 Niebuhr, H. Richard, 55, 56, 64n, 103 Hauptmann, Gerhart, 15 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 8, 27, 29, Hegel, G. W. F„ 8, 22, 24, 25, 35, 86n, 103, 104, 106n, 129 27, 29, 33, 34, 36, 124, 125, Niemoeller, Martin, 26 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131 Nietzsche, Frederick, 124 Heidegger, Martin, 21, 27, 85, 129 135

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Seifriz, William, 50, 54n Seligsohn, Gerda Margaret (Kroner), 19 Seligsohn, Rudolph, 19, 30 Parmenides, 35, 36 Simmel, Georg, 17, 130 Pascal, Blaise, 38 Smith, John E., 54n Paul of Tarsus, 110, 115 Socrates, 115 Plato, 23, 26, 44, 51, 75n Soloviev, Vladimir, 18 Plotinus, 93 Spinoza, Baruch, 16, 33 Pope, Alexander, 33 Staff, Hans von, 16 Pushkin, Alexander, 18 Stenzel, Julius, 23 Rickert, Heinrich, 8,18, 19, 20, 21 Stepun, Fedor, 18 Riehl, Alois, 21 (Also Frederick Steppuhn) Ritschi, Albrecht, 56 Roberts, David, 29 Tillich, Paul, 23, 27, 29, 120n Rodin, Auguste, 15 Rousseau, Jean J., 23 Van Dusen, Henry P., 29 Origen, 95 Otto, Rudolf, 88, 96n

Schelling, F. W. J. von, 130 Scherer, Paul, 29 Schiller, J. C. F. von, 16

Wilder, Amos, 54n Windelband, Wilhelm, 8, 18, 20, 21