Selected Essays on the History of Contemporary China [1 ed.] 9789004292673, 9789004292758

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Selected Essays on the History of Contemporary China

Historical Studies of Contemporary China Series Editor Thomas DuBois (Australian National University) Advisory Board Joel Andreas ( Johns Hopkins University) Liping Bu (Alma College) Brian Demare (Tulane University) Xiaofei Kang (George Washington University) Huaiyin Li (The University of Texas at Austin) Luman Wang (Virginia Military Institute) Michael Szonyi (Harvard University)

VOLUME 1

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/hscc

Selected Essays on the History of Contemporary China Edited by

Zhang Xingxing

LEIDEN | BOSTON

This book is a result of the co-publication agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. These articles were selected and translated into English from the Chinese journal, Studies of Contemporary Chinese History 《 ( 当代中国史研究》Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu) sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary China, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The translation has received financial support from the Innovation Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

issn 2352-7919 isbn 978-90-04-29275-8 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-29267-3 (e-book) Copyright 2015 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents Series Foreword  vii List of Contributors  ix 1 Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping in the Early Period of Reform and Opening  1 Zhu Jiamu 2 A Study of the 1978 State Council Conference to Discuss Principles  30 Li Zhenghua 3 The 156 Projects and New China’s Industrial and Urban Development  54 He Yimin and Zhou Mingchang 4 Emergency Measures Taken During the Three-Year Period of Economic Difficulty  71 Shang Changfeng 5 The Relationship between Modern Neo-Confucianism and Marxism on the Mainland Following 1949  93 Zheng Dahua 6 Changes to China’s Assistance Programs for Urban Vagrants and Beggars  115 Gao Zhonghua 7 Discussion of Reforms to Rural Cooperative Medicine in the New Era  134 Yao Li 8 The Evolution of China’s International Arms Control Policies  149 Zhong Longbiao 9 Analysis of 1969’s “Order Number One”  168 Xu Jinzhou

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Changes to China’s Attitudes Toward Vietnam-U.S. Peace Talks and Their Influence on Sino-Viet Relations  194 Shao Xiao

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The Chinese Government’s Persuasion and Education of the Masses Prior to Reestablishing Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations  217 Gao Fanfu

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The Truth Behind the “Kashmir Princess” Incident  234 Li Hong

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The Current State of Historical Research in the People’s Republic of China  249 Zhang Xingxing

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Investigation into the History of the Central Investigation Department of the Chinese Communist Party  264 Michael Schoenhals Index  285

Series Foreword This series on Historical Studies of Contemporary China grows out of a history of collaboration between the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Brill Academic Publishers to bring the best of Chinese scholarship to English speaking readers. Brill has been a pioneer in the endeavor of bringing Chinese scholarship to the world, and is the publisher of other edited translations, such as the Religious Studies in Contemporary China Collection, as well as journals such as Rural China, Frontiers of History in China and the Journal of Chinese Humanities in which Chinese scholars feature prominently as both contributors and editors. The Historical Studies of Contemporary China series expands upon these efforts in new and exciting ways. The series draws source articles primarily from Studies of Contemporary Chinese History 《当代中国史研究》, one of the most prestigious historical journals in China, and one of the few that focuses specifically on the period after 1949. The journal content includes both domestic and international political history, as well as economic, legal and social historical topics. What can new readers expect to learn from the work of Chinese scholars on their own country’s recent history? Scholars working in China are without question the closest to the sources and events, and their work can serve as a guide to the archives and methods of empirical research in the country’s contemporary history. Looking closer, their work also speaks to the concerns and debates within Chinese historical scholarship. Even if the work published in China should not be taken to represent a politically orthodox or characteristically Chinese view of controversial topics, it does show us much about the world that these scholars operate in. As would be the case anywhere, the themes and topics that interest Chinese historians are also reflections of the present day. At this level, understanding this changing scholarly conception of history provides a means to understanding China at a very fundamental level. This series places great emphasis on moving beyond the evidentiary evidence, to trace the ideas and concerns that engage cutting edge historical scholarship in China. Each volume will begin with a scholarly introduction that aims to uncover these evolving themes, and to place them in political and intellectual context. At the same time, the work that appears in this series is intellectually global. Most historians in China will have some at least understanding of Western scholarly trends. In many cases, this knowledge is quite in-depth: in contrast to the relative paucity of Chinese scholarship available in English, significant

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scholarly translation in the other direction has been ongoing for nearly four decades. Moreover, the generation of scholars who went abroad in the 1980s to receive their graduate degrees are now approaching the peak of their careers. The series will be of interest to students or scholars of Chinese history at all levels, as well as to those who wish to better understand China’s role in global diplomacy, economy and politics. It begins with a general volume that expresses the range of topics to be covered. Later volumes will take a thematic approach. Forthcoming volumes will focus on agriculture and food policy (ed. Huaiyin Li and Thomas DuBois), family and gender (ed. Xiaofei Kang), and health and medicine (ed. Liping Bu), among other topics. Thomas DuBois

Series Editor

List of Contributors Editor Zhang Xingxing 张星星 born in Beijing in 1955, attended the Armored Force Engineering Institute at the People’s Liberation Army, and received an LLM from the University of National Defense in 1987 and PhD in Law from the Renmin University of China in 1996. Zhang’s past positions include tutor in the Office of Teaching and Research on Politics (II) in the PLA Armored Force Engineering Institute, deputy head of the Office of Teaching and Research on CPC (the Communist Party of China) History, CPC Party Building and Political Affairs in the University of National Defense, and head of the Office of Teaching and Research on CPC History and CPC Party Building in the University of National Defense. His current positions include deputy director of the Institute of Contemporary China, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, chief editor of Studies of Contemporary Chinese History, and director, professor, doctoral and postdoctoral advisor in the department of national history, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Graduate School. Zhang is recipient of the State Council Special Governance Allowance. He also serves as secretary-general of the China Society of the National History of the People’s Republic of China, and member of the standing committee of China Association for CPC Literature, Society of History of CPC, and the Society of Studies of Historical Figures in the CPC. Zhang has published over 40 books and more than 100 journal articles and book chapters. Contributors Gao Fanfu 高凡夫 is an associate professor in the Marxism Institute of the Qingdao University of Science and Technology. Gao Zhonghua 高中华 is an associate professor in the Party history research department of the Central Party School.

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He Yimin 何一民 is a professor at the Urban Research Institute, Sichuan University. Li Hong 黎虹 retired from the PRC Ministry of Public Security, is former deputy secretary of the Central Advisory Committee. Li Zhenghua 李正华 is a Ph.D. and researcher at the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies. Michael Schoenhals is a professor in the Language and Culture Institute, Lund University, Sweden. Shang Changfeng 尚长风 is a professor of economics at Nanjing University. Shao Xiao 邵笑 is a lecturer in Jinan University’s department of history. Xu Jinzhou 徐金洲 is an associate researcher at the China People’s Liberation Army Military Sciences Academy Military History Research Institute. Yao Li 姚力 is an associate researcher in the Modern China Research Institute’s Third Research Bureau. Zheng Dahua 郑大华 is a professor at Hunan Normal University and a researcher at the Modern History Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhong Longbiao 钟龙彪 is a lecturer at the CPC Tianjin Committee Party School’s Department of Construction, Education, and Research. Zhou Mingchang 周明长 is a lecturer in the urban construction department at the Sichuan College of Architectural Technology. Zhu Jiamu 朱佳木 is a researcher and a former vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and director of the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies.

CHAPTER 1

Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping in the Early Period of Reform and Opening Zhu Jiamu Abstract Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were two key figures operating at the central policymaking level in the early period of Reform and Opening. A broad-sweeping look indicates that their relationship was primarily complementary and cooperative, and that disparities and differences of opinion constituted a minority of interchanges. Their differences of opinion were not over whether to reform and open, but rather over how to reform and open. Their identical positions on a series of major issues constituted the ideological basis for their cooperation in launching Reform and Opening. Through the course of Reform and Opening, they supported, complemented, and coordinated with one another, causing all undertakings to proceed rather smoothly. When faced with differences of opinion, they put the big picture of Reform and Opening first and sought broad agreement despite minor disparities. Their cooperation not only laid a good foundation for Reform and Opening but to this day still exerts a long-lasting influence on Chinese political life. Their cooperation has become a precious political inheritance left to their successors.

Keywords Chen Yun – Deng Xiaoping – Reform and Opening

Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun had the longest political lives of anybody in China’s core policymaking echelon. They also played the most key roles on the political stage in the early period of Reform and Opening. Thus, their relationship during Reform and Opening naturally became the most important

* Zhu Jiamu is a researcher and deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences as well as the director of the Institute of Contemporary Chinese studies, Beijing.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004292673_002

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relationship between leaders in the Party and State at that time. However, most academic research into that period discusses the two men separately; those which do put them together for comparison do so only in the context of one concrete incident. Although academics outside of the Chinese mainland place importance on comparative research of the two, they often place too much emphasis on their differences and disagreements. Some even exaggerate their conflicts. None of the aforementioned situations can completely, truthfully reflect their relationship; they are also not beneficial to objectively understanding the history of China in the early period of Reform and Opening. Thus, in this essay I shall attempt to speak from Chen Yun’s perspective of his understanding of his relationship with Deng Xiaoping during the early period of Reform and Opening. 1

Relationship One: Jointly Launching Reform and Opening

The promotion of any policy requires the following few prerequisites: one, the proponents of the policy must possess enough appeal among supporters; and two, the proponents of the policy must be in a decision-making position. On China’s political stage following the dissolution of the “Gang of Four,” of all leaders who could propose new policies and knew the majority of high-level cadres, the most qualified was Deng, followed by Chen. The only question was how to get them back into decision-making positions fast enough. Chen and Deng were both early members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as well as important leaders. At the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, Chen was selected as a vice chairman of the Party Central Committee, and Deng as its secretary. After Lin Biao was selected vice chairman of the Party Central Committee at the Eight Party’s second plenum in 1958, the ranking of members of the Central Standing Committee was as follows: Mao (Zedong); Liu (Shaoqi); Zhou (Enlai); Zhu (De); Chen (Yun); Lin (Biao); Deng (Xiaoping). Chen was severely censured in 1956 for his “opposition to rash advances.” In 1962 he was politically ostracized for advocating for the household responsibility system. During the “Cultural Revolution,” Chen was purged from the Politburo. Deng was labeled the “number two capitalist roader” early in the “Cultural Revolution” and was subsequently thrown down from power. Although he was rehabilitated and put back in use in 1972, he was again stripped of all Party and State titles in 1976 for his alleged “blowing right and style of overturning precedents.” At that point, with Liu Shaoqi persecuted to death, Lin Biao dead from an airplane crash trying to flee his betrayal, and Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Mao Zedong dying in rapid succession from illnesses, the only two remaining

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members of the seven-man Politburo from before the “Cultural Revolution” were Deng and Chen. Chen at the time retained his position on the CCP Central Committee, and Deng was still a Party member. This made them the two leaders with the most qualifications, most prestige, and most ability to lead China away from the ruptures caused by the “leftist” errors of Mao’s later years and lead China onto a new road. This choice was only natural, and there was nothing strange to it at all. Although CCP Central leadership had stopped the “Cultural Revolution” at the time and begun correcting some “leftist” methods, the Party was still pushing the “two whatevers” policy (i.e. “we will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made,” and “unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.”). This thwarted and delayed the rehabilitation of Deng and his official positions. Under such conditions, at a March 1977 CCP Central work meeting, Chen stood up—despite political pressure—and delivered a written statement requesting that Deng Xiaoping be readmitted to Party Central leadership work. This impelled primary leaders at the time to formally declare their position: “at a suitable opportunity, we will allow Comrade Deng Xiaoping to come out and work.”1 This political victory accelerated the progress of Deng’s rehabilitation and bought time for the initiation of Reform and Opening. In July 1977, Deng was restored as a vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, number one vice premier of the State Council, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and other positions. He was back in a policymaking position. Shortly thereafter, he guided discussions on the question of the criteria of truth; advocated for Reform and Opening, democracy, and rule-by-law; pushed resolutions to several major problems handed down by history; and laid an important ideological basis and organizational foundation for the CCP Central work meeting’s negation of the “two whatevers” policy in late 1978, the establishment of a new line of thinking for the Party at the Eleventh Party’s third plenum, the successful refocusing of Party work, and the ultimate unveiling of Reform and Opening. At that meeting, Chen took the lead in proposing that the Party ought to rehabilitate those people who had been unjustly charged as quickly as possible; led delegates to launch an offensive against the “two whatevers” policy; threw into confusion the political circumstances of primary leadership at the time; changed the original agenda of the meeting; and made the meeting into 1  Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997), shang 《邓小平年谱 (1975–1997)》上 [Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997) Vol. 1], (Central Documentary Press, 2004), 156.

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one of new historical significance. Also at that conference, Chen—with the support of such central leaders as Deng, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian and others, as well as with fervent requests by leaders present—was again selected a vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, greatly strengthening his position at the policymaking level of Party Central during Reform and Opening. Although at the time the CCP Central Committee chairmanship was held by Hua Guofeng, and vice chairmanship by Wang Dongxing, the ultimate authority had already passed to Deng, due to his opposition to the “two whatevers” policy. Later, when speaking of the second generation of Party leadership with him at its core, Deng said, “after our Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum, we saw the birth of a second generation leadership collective, including myself as well as Comrade Chen Yun, Comrade Li Xiannian, as well as Marshal Ye [i.e. Ye Jianying—author’s note].”2 Of these four, Deng and Chen were ranked behind Ye and Li, but their qualifications and service records, abilities, and prestige naturally made them the most important two in the decision-making echelon. The “reform” of Reform and Opening—as far as the economic system is concerned—ultimately refers to properly handling the relationship between planning and the market, and expanding the role of the market. As for the political system, “reform” refers to properly handling the relationship between the collective and democracy, and expanding the scope of democracy. “Opening” refers to expanding economic and cultural exchanges with capitalist countries; learning and taking lessons from the advanced management methods of capitalism; economically coming in line with international markets; and joining the process of globalization. Deng and Chen shared fundamentally identical views as to these questions. Chen placed great importance on the question of expanding the market’s role in the 1950s, at which time he strove to have such policies implemented in guiding economic work. During the Eighth Party Congress, he proposed his conceptualization of the economic system after reforms to capitalist industry and commerce. In his plan, state-run and collective-run operations would be in the primary position of industrial and commercial operations, with private operations in a supplementary position. In production, State planned production would be in the primary position, with private production as in a supplementary position. In markets, the State market would be the in the primary position, and free markets would be in a supplementary position. Although his ideas were not implemented, they left a deep impression in the minds of many cadres. In March 1979—after over 20 years of real-world experience and 2  Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997) shang juan 《邓小平年谱 (1975–1997)》上卷 [Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997), Vol. 1], (Central Documentary Press, 2004), 1295.

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contemplation—he further improved his thinking and noted that “the primary flaws of planned work systems these 60 years, both in the Soviet Union and in China, are: there is only the line ‘planned and proportionate;’ nowhere is it written that markets under socialist systems must be regulated.” He said that during the entirety of the socialist phase, the economy must be divided into two parts: the planned economy portion, and the market regulated portion. Furthermore, he said, the planned economy and the market economy in subsequent economic system reforms did not have to have a perfectly balanced relationship, but rather the two could “both correspondingly increase.”3 Thereafter, he summarized this line of thinking as “planned economy in the primary position, supplemented by market regulation.” At the time, Deng’s views of the question of planned and market economies were identical to Chen’s. In a November 1979 meeting with vice chairman of the U.S. Encyclopedia Britannica Company Frank Gibney and director of the East Asian Studies Institute of Canada’s McGill University Professor Lin Daguang, Deng asked, “why can’t there be a market economy in socialism? We can’t say that this is capitalism. Our planned economy is in the primary position; it integrates with the market economy, but this is a socialist market economy.”4 In another discussion he had in April 1982, he said, “the important thing is, as Comrade Chen Yun said, a planned economy on the foundation of public ownership, supplemented by market regulation; the whole country is a chess game, with primary economic activities all included within the track of State planning.”5 For just that reason, the phrase “planned economy as primary and market regulation as supplement” was written into Hu Yaobang’s Twelfth CCP Congress report. It later became the objective model of early reforms to China’s economic system. At the ceremony to commemorate Chen Yun’s 90th birthday in 1995, Secretary Jiang Zemin said that following the third plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress, Chen took the lead in criticizing the pitfalls of past planning work, and “exerted a wide-reaching, profound influence on driving the planned economy reforms that liberated the entire Party’s thinking, sought truth from facts, and broke through a high degree of collectivization.”6 This is exactly what these words were referring to. 3  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3] (People’s Press, 1995), 244–245, 247. 4  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan 《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2] (People’s Press, 1994), 236. 5  Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995), xia juan 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995)》下卷 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995), Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 2000), 293. 6  Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, June 14, 1995, first edition.

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Chen and Deng also shared identical views on how to expand democracy. Both had been attacked by erroneous “leftist” movements, which left them with deep pains about the system’s lack of democracy. Prior to the Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum, Deng said “discussion about the question of democracy is now insufficient; this question is very important, and we must set off discussion about it.”7 In a closing speech to a central work meeting prior to the third plenum, Deng’s second subject heading was “democracy is an important condition for liberation of thought. In this speech, he also noted that, “in this current time, we must place particular emphasis on democracy. As democratic centralism has not been truly implemented for a very long period of time, we have spoken only of centralism with no democracy; there is too little democracy.”8 In a famous 1980 speech entitled “Reforms to Leadership Institutions of the Party and State,” Deng more systematically analyzed the institutional, historical, and thought reasons for China’s long-term lack of democracy. He noted that this phenomenon was related to: the inseparability of the Party and the government; the Party acting as the government; overcentralized power; and the lifelong tenure of cadres and leaders. It was related to a prevalence of feudal autocratic traditions left over from Old China and a scarcity of democratic, rule-by-law traditions. It was related to the erroneous thinking of the necessity for socialist systems to implement highly concentrated power in the Center, as well as personality cults. Deng proposed the resolution of pitfalls in the existing system in such areas as: shoring up rule-by-law; improving the People’s Congress system; dividing out the tasks and authorities of central leadership organizations; establishing a workers’ congress or workers’ representative conference system; implementing a one person, one vote system for decisions on major issues in Party committees; etc.9 As to the question of democracy within the Party, at an enlarged central work conference in February 1962, Chen said, “our intra-Party democratic life has been abnormal these past few years. Some people are expressing doubts that we can truly carry out democracy. This is strange.”10 In an impromptu speech following his appointment as vice chairman of the Central Committee at the Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum, Chen said that in 1957, Mao Zedong 7  

Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997), shang 《邓小平年谱 (1975–1997)》上 [Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997) Vol. 1], 394. 8   Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan 《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], 144. 9   Ibid., 327–341. 10  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 190.

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had proposed that the Party should be both centralized and democratic, with lively, active political circumstances possessing both discipline and freedom. Owing to all manner of interferences, this hadn’t been accomplished for many years, said Chen, who continued, “this Party Central Committee has set a good example; so long as everybody persists, this may be realized nationwide.”11 Prior to the Twelfth Party Congress, Chen reviewed a manuscript of the Central Committee’s report, in which he noticed that “insufficient democratic activities” were a major reason for the occurrence of the “Cultural Revolution.” Chen noted that this was incorrect. “We should say that democratic centralism went missing from the Party, as did collective leadership. This was a root cause of the ‘Cultural Revolution.’ ”12 Thereafter he noted several times that everybody should be allowed to raise dissenting opinions. “Don’t fear that others say the wrong thing; fear that they say nothing at all.” “If you hold a meeting and nobody talks, then the situation under the heavens is not encouraging.”13 At an enlarged Politburo meeting in January 1987, he proposed the question of institutionalizing democracy, emphasizing that the Party “should have systems for democratic life. There should be a rule for how often the Standing Committee meets and how often the Politburo meets. Standing Committee meetings, Politburo meetings, and expanded Politburo meetings should all be held separately. This is democratic life within the Party. Democratic centralism should be persisted in.”14 It was precisely because Deng and Chen held common perspectives regarding reforms to the political system that in those years, intra-Party democracy and democracy among the people multiplied by several magnitudes from before Reform and Opening. Our political system reforms today are still running along the correct directions they proposed back then, deepening as the economy and society continuously develop. One could say that the people of China have never before been as they are today, enjoying so many practical democratic rights. As to the question of whether to open the country to the outside world, Chen and Deng shared the same view. In the late period of the “Cultural Revolution,” Chen was restored to his working positions for a time in the State Council Business Group (this organization was composed of highest level of leadership and was charged with handling routine questions of economic 11  Chen Yun wenji, di 3 juan 《陈云文集》第 3 卷 [Collected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], (Central Documentary Press, 2005), 453–454. 12  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 274. 13  Ibid., 275. 14  Ibid., 359.

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construction—author’s note) in which he helped Zhou Enlai manage foreign trade policy and actively participated in the work of introducing a total of USD $4.3 billion in machinery, equipment, and technology from the West. In response to the extremely “leftist” theory of a closed-door policy advocated by the “Gang of Four,” he said, “we should not set the implementation of the policy of self-reliance at odds with the use of capitalist loans.”15 Chen further said that exchanges in capitalist nations could be used for the import of commodities and that such raw materials as cotton and chemical fertilizers could be imported from capitalist countries to be processed and re-exported.16 All of these positions were indicators of Chen’s coming advocation for opening to the outside. They were also completely the same in spirit as the attitude Deng Xiaoping adopted toward a series of opening policies. In the above series of major issues, Deng’s and Chen’s positions were identical; this formed the ideological basis for their joint launch of Reform and Opening. 2

Relationship Two: Mutual Support and Complementariness During the Course of Reform and Opening

Sometimes there may inevitably exist differences in the depth of understanding and the focus of concern regarding some matters between political leaders, owing to different responsibilities and different perspectives on problems. Thus, the key to whether an enterprise will be successful is whether those leaders—particularly core decision makers—can draw from the strengths of their counterparts and support them. The reason the various undertakings in the early period of Reform and Opening ran so smoothly is to a large degree attributable to the mutual support and complementariness of Chen and Deng. After the dissolution of the “Gang of Four,” the Chinese economy was left in a state of serious imbalance, following ten years of chaos. Primary central leaders at the time remained under the influence of the past guiding ideology of impatience for results—owing to years of focusing on infrastructure investments and ignoring the inertia of consumption, and also owing to the demand of the masses to quickly seize back the time wasted during the “Cultural Revolution.” This led those leaders to propose a “new Great Leap Forward” for the national economy, demanding that by 1985: grain output reach 80 million tonnes and steel output reach 60 million tonnes; and ten major steel refining 15  Ibid., 219. 16  Ibid., 221–224.

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bases, eight major coal bases, and ten major oil and gas fields be constructed. They placed their hopes for the new “Great Leap” in large quantities of foreign capital and advanced technology and equipment. Chen expressed his dissenting opinion to this proposal at a State Council conference to discuss principles in the summer of 1978. He told such State Council leaders as Li Xiannian and Gu Mu that “the people who leave the country for field study come back and drop hints. The top is also dropping hints downward—that we have to bring in so many hundreds of millions and increase speed. One hint for sure is that we should borrow more money, and another is that other nations can get up there in eight or ten years, and can we go a little faster?” “We could borrow money from abroad; the Center’s making such a resolution is very correct, but we can’t borrow so much so fast. Some comrades see only the situation in other countries and do not see the realities in our country . . . We can’t rely on borrowing disproportionately large sums from abroad.”17 At a central work meeting in late 1978, in addition to his speech regarding the resolution of major political problems handed down historically, he gave another speech advocating that economic construction must be both proactive and steady. Regarding the 1979 and 1980 economic planning draft proposals discussed at the meeting, he proposed first using foreign exchange to import grain. He said there was a SinoAmerican joint communiqué which could be used to buy grain directly from the U.S. Reductions to State grain requisitioning would allow farmers to take a breath and produce more cotton, meat, edible oil, and sugar, which would increase rural incomes and simultaneously resolve urban problems of insufficient consumable goods such as food and clothing. He further proposed introducing industrial projects from abroad. “We should proceed in sequence and not rush forward. If we rush forward, it will seem fast, but in reality it will lead to more haste and less speed. The projects should be listed in order of priority, so that if one is lost, it may be easily replaced, but facilities laying idle because of poor organization would be a hard problem to remedy.” As to production and infrastructure planning, he said “there can be no shortages in materials,” lest “there be jostling, with the fat ones jostling the thin ones, which in reality would mean jostling agriculture, light industry, and urban construction out of the picture.”18 After the Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum, while reviewing the State Council’s economic planning drafts, Chen commented on the document, 17  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 2005), 1473. 18  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 237.

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“I’d rather drop the quotas,” and “it would be better to reduce the number of projects” than to have material shortages.19 He also showed a document from the Xinhua News Agency reflecting that there would still be material shortages per the Planning Commission’s proposed plans to Hua Guofeng, Deng, and others. Deng quickly said, “Comrade Chen Yun has lodged an objection to the plans for this year and next year. He said that plans with material shortages are not truly reliable plans, that there should be no shortages in the plans, that he’d rather reduce quotas and reduce the number of projects to be built. This objection is very important; I entreat the Planning Commission to reconsider.” “We need to make some adjustments to our policies and plans for economic construction. We should first do those which are easy to start, which yield fast results, which can earn money, and which can earn foreign exchange. I’d rather cut out a few steel plants and large projects. We don’t necessarily need to absolutely hold to the steel output standard of 60 million tonnes by 1985.”20 Deng gave great support to Chen’s advocacy for adjusting the national economy from the very beginning. On April 14, 1979, Chen and Li Xiannian wrote a joint letter to Party Central suggesting the establishment of a financial and economic commission subordinate to the State Council, to serve as the policymaking organization for researching and establishing policies and directions of financial and economic work and making decisions on great matters in financial and economic work. They suggested making Chen the director, Li the deputy director, and named 10 people—including Yao Yilin, Wang Zhen, Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, and Bo Yibo—to serve as committee members. In the letter, they also proposed that economic adjustments take place over the course of three years, and that in the borrowing of foreign money, the nation’s investment capacity and ability to pay interest must be considered.21 In the writing of this letter which nominated Chen as the director of the proposed commission, which would undertake work of adjusting the national economy, Chen had Deng’s full support as well as suggestions from Deng.22 A week later, the Politburo held a meeting specifically to discuss revisions to plans for 1979 and the question of adjusting the national economy. At the meeting, Chen systematically pointed out that the goal of adjustments “is to 19  Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995) xia 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995)》下 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995), Vol. 2], 233. 20  Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997), shang 《邓小平年谱 (1975–1997)》上 [Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997) Vol. 1], 466. 21  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 248–249. 22  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], 1556.

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arrive at proportionality.” “Proportional development moves at the fastest speed.” Not only did we need foreign capital and foreign technology, he said, and need to make abundant use of them, but we had to “extend the time limit a little.”23 The top-level leaders’ understandings of adjustments were not entirely the same. Deng expressed his complete endorsement of Chen’s opinions in a speech, saying that the central task for the coming three years would be adjustments, and also saying, “Comrade Chen Yun’s proposal of making 80 million tonnes of steel by 2000 is reasonable. It is now time to sum up the past ways of taking grain and steel as our guidelines.”24 The meeting’s final resolution was to use three years time to make adjustments to the national economy, and for the State Council Financial and Economic Commission to unify management of all financial and economic work and adjustment work in the nation. As different understandings among the leadership echelon were not quickly unified, the guiding policy of adjustment encountered great resistance in the course of implementation. Particularly after the early 1980 proposal to establish a ten-year plan, the ideology of wanting fast results popped its head up again, causing many projects which should have been abandoned not to be abandoned. The annual rate of accumulation was still over 30 percent, with fiscal deficits continuing in excess of 10 billion yuan. Also in 1980, the commercial goods trade deficit and growth of the money supply hit all-time highs since the founding of New China. Deng gave Chen even greater support in the face of such a dire situation. At a State Council report meeting before the Politburo and Central Secretariat in late November that year, Deng asked Chen to “say a few words to wind up the meeting.” Chen said that some people believed that adjustments were tantamount to “delaying,” but that “we’ve delayed so much since the Opium War that it shouldn’t be so amazing that we’d delay another three years now.” “History will call me a right opportunist; I’m going to be opportunistic another time.” “We have not eliminated ‘leftist’ things in economic work. The fundamental errors are ‘leftist’ things.” In Deng’s following speech, he expressed approval of Chen’s opinions, saying “the method of thinking about issues should be to ask whether we’re abandoning enough [projects].” It would be ok for economic growth not to maintain levels of four or five percent, he said. At the CCP’s Twelfth Congress, Deng asked Chen to “give a speech about State economic policy.” The meeting was run on the basis of the spirit of Deng and Chen’s speeches, and economic plans were for 1981 were again adjusted: the originally planned industrial and agricultural output 23  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 250–255. 24  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], 1561.

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targets were reduced from growth of 695.5 billion yuan to growth of 680 billion yuan; investments in infrastructure were reduced from 55 billion yuan to 30 billion yuan, a reduction of 40 percent from the previous year.25 Party Central then convened a work meeting, the focus of which was the discussion of economic circumstances and the question of adjustments. Chen gave a speech titled “Economic Circumstances and Lessons from Experience,” in which he proposed a series of major principles regarding economic work. He noted that “using foreign capital and introducing foreign technology is another important policy measure of ours at present, but we must proceed with sober minds.” “Rampant commodity price increases are influencing the people’s lives.” “Instability in economic circumstances can cause instability in political circumstances.” “The ultimate goal of economic construction is to improve the people’s lives.” “We must absolutely not make any more predictions not based in reality, exceeding the UK and overtaking the U.S., etc. etc.” Adjustments mean withdrawing in some areas, and withdrawing enough. Don’t fear this sober, healthy adjustment.” “After this round of adjustments, our heels will be firmly on the ground, and we’ll continue stably advancing.”26 Deng gave the concluding remarks at that meeting. He began saying, “I completely agree with Comrade Chen Yun’s words. These words correctly summarized the experience and lessons we gained over 30 years of China’s economic experience across a series of issues. It is henceforth going to be our guiding policy for a long time.” “After the third plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in December 1978, Comrade Chen Yun was in charge of financial and economic work and proposed the policy direction of adjustments. A central work meeting in April last year made a resolution on this. However, as understandings across the entire Party are not identical, and not very deep, this not been executed very efficiently.” “These adjustments we’re making now are, as Comrade Chen Yun said, healthy, sober adjustments. These adjustments will require withdrawal from some areas, and the withdrawal must be sufficient.” “If we don’t adjust, and those things which should we withdrawn are not withdrawn or not withdrawn enough, our economy will not be able to advance stably.” He also expressed support for some political comments Chen had made. He said, “I agree with Comrade Chen Yun’s words; the style of conduct of the ruling Party is a question that touches on the Party’s very existence.” “Comrade Chen Yun says that whether we perform economic work properly and whether we perform publicity work well bear a great connection to whether economic 25  Ibid., 1599–1601. 26  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 277–282.

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circumstances and political circumstances can stably develop . . . the publicity work we speak of here in reality includes all of the Party’s thought and political work.” He emphasized that “strengthening thought and political work and improving publicity work have now become an extremely important task in guaranteeing the smooth realization of these adjustments, and solidifying, settling, and uniting the political situation, a task that is now placed before all comrades in the Party.”27 It was with great support from Deng that Chen called for adjustments to the national economy to be continued and advanced. In late 1981, basically all predetermined objectives of adjustments were met—in the proportion of agriculture, heavy industry, and light industry; in the relationship between accumulation and consumption; in the balance of fiscal balance of payments; and in price stability. This created beneficial conditions for the overall reforms and economic gains that came afterward. The promotion of younger Party members within the ranks of cadres was another major issue Chen Yun closely followed after his restoration to a Central policymaking position. As early as a central work meeting before the Eleventh Congress’s third plenum, he expressed that young comrades in their prime be organized into a Central Secretariat, to facilitate the Central Committee’s delegation of routine matters. Thereafter at a symposium of provincial, municipal, and autonomous region first secretaries called by the Center in October 1979, he formally recommended the establishment of the Central Secretariat.28 Deng expressed approval for this idea. With support from Deng, in early 1980 the Center established the Central Secretariat, consisting of young leading comrades, and passed a resolution on the setting up of consultants in work units at the county level and higher. At an enlarged Politburo meeting in August 1980, Deng emphasized his support for Chen’s bravely promoting the handing over of control to young cadres. He said, “Comrade Chen Yun has proposed that when we select cadres, we should pay attention to the two qualities of ethics and talent. Ethics is primarily a reference to persisting in the the socialist road and the Party’s leadership. Given this prerequisite, we are institutionalizing the promotion of younger, intellectualized, professionalized cadres. These opinions are well raised.”29

27  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan di 2 juan 《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], 354–365. 28  Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995), xia 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995)》下 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995), Vol. 2], 253. 29  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan 《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], 326.

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As some old cadres had only recently been rehabilitated to work, they couldn’t wrap their heads around being asked to retire soon; this caused slow progress and low efficiency of the work of promoting young cadres. Chen felt the problem was urgent, and so in April 1981 he wrote another manuscript, titled “Promoting and Fostering Young and Middle Aged Cadres is the Top Priority Task.” He sent this document to Deng, Hu Yaobang, and others, and recommended that there be discussion of the question of young cadres at the sixth plenum of the Party’s Eleventh Congress to be convened forthwith. In the document, he wrote that there were two choices. The first was to continue not being on guard against shortages in cadre successions and to allow the issue to drag on, the result of which would be hastily promoting unsuitable young cadres in a short time as old cadres continued to fall ill or die. The other choice was to immediately start promoting and fostering young and middle aged cadres by the thousands and tens of thousands, turning them into reserve power for Party work at all levels, from which leading cadres could be selected at any time. He noted that the second choice was more beneficial. He further suggested: that all levels establish supporting teams to support work agencies, such as research centers, deputy secretaries, ministerial assistants, etc., giving young and middle aged cadres a chance to experience comprehensive work; that the Central Organization Department establish a Young Cadre Bureau and a Technological Cadre Bureau; that old cadres who had fallen to the second and third tiers be given care and preferential treatment in such political and material treatment as reading documents, hearing reports, housing, medicine, transportation; etc. Deng agreed with these opinions, and at the same time noted that “we still have not properly handled the question of old cadres.”30 So Chen once again called a meeting of leading cadres in Party and military cadre work departments to study the question of retirement of old cadres and to draft minutes from the forum. The minutes from Chen’s meeting were issued at the Eleventh Party’s sixth plenum, after which Party secretaries from each province, city, and autonomous region remained for three days of meetings to discuss the questions of promotion and fostering of young and middle aged cadres, cadre retirement, and the care of retired cadres. At the meetings, Deng gave an impromptu speech following Chen’s speech, in which he said, “we have frequently said that this is a strategic question, a question that determines our fate. It is now extremely urgent that we resolve this problem.” “After the central work meeting in December last year, Comrade Chen Yun began pointing out this question 30  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 298.

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more sharply. It is very good that he raised the question, and I agree with him. At first our actions were somewhat smaller, but Comrade Chen Yun pointed out that promoting young and middle aged cadres should not be done in the tens or hundreds, but in the thousands and tens of thousands.” “Those people who are now 65 will be 70 in five years. Time goes fast. So I support this suggestion of Comrade Chen Yun’s with both hands.” In that speech, Deng further said, “Comrade Chen Yun and I have bared our hearts to one another, and speaking truthfully, if you asked us personally to retire, we would truly be overjoyed. Of course, we can’t just now. What is our greatest matter? State policies, Party guiding principles—we will of course want to be involved, but the biggest matter is the promotion of young and middle aged cadres. The primary task of us two is to resolve this problem.”31 At a Party Central work meeting in June 1983, the questions of centralized financial and material resources and ensuring focus construction were discussed. After Chen discussed four opinions on those matters at the meeting, he again made special note of the question of promoting young cadres. He said that the youngest of second-tier cadres managing daily work of the Center were over 60 years old, nearly the same as first tier cadres on the Standing Committee; thus the Party needed to urgently begin selecting outstanding cadres under 50—particularly under 40—to create a third tier of cadres. He said that as long as we had a second tier, and a third tier to boot, it would be impossible for the “three kinds of people” of the “Gang of Four” to cause great turmoil again. He said, “this is a matter of fundamental importance to the Party and the State. Old comrades should consciously, earnestly, correctly select their successors and wholeheartedly help them, foster them, and actively give way to them. ‘Help them onto their horses and accompany them a way down the road’ ”32 Deng again responded to this opinion, saying “in his speech, Comrade Chen Yun spoke not only of economic questions, but also of important political questions, such as the question of having in reserve a third tier of cadres. This question affects the fate of our Party and State, and it was well phrased.”33 With the combined impetus of Deng and Chen, the CCP resolved rather well the problem of institutionalization of replacing the old with the young—a problem that had never been resolved in the history of international communist

31  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan 《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], 384–385, 388. 32  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 325. 33  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], 1715.

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movements. This gave the the Party a new lease on life and new vitality, and allowed all undertakings of the State to experience sustained development. As the “Cultural Revolution” had only recently ended at that time, while Chen made great efforts to push promotion of young cadres, he also reminded everybody that in the promotion of young cadres, ethics and talent were both equally important. “Core factionalists and those who enjoy beating, smashing, and looting—not a one of those will be promoted into leadership positions.”34 Deng expressed complete approval of this point. At this meeting of the Politburo, he said, “We must absolutely select the right people. As I’ve said before, we must resolutely implement the ideas spoken of by Comrade Chen Yun; those types of people cannot be allowed entry!”35 Deng’s support for Chen’s positions was also displayed in the question of attacking grievous economic criminals. At the Eleventh Party’s third plenum, Chen was selected as the first secretary of the newly established Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), in charge of the work of processing cases of Party working style and Party discipline. As the CCDI began forcefully correcting the various dishonest practices within the Party, some places—particularly along the coastline in Guangdong and Fujian—took advantage of opening to the outside to implement special policies, giving rise to a trend of smuggling and illegal activities. Some Party members and leading cadres not only adopted lenient attitudes, but some even participated, becoming a protective umbrella for smuggling activities. In early 1982, Chen submitted a short report reflecting rampant smuggling activities in some parts of Guangdong to several members of the Standing Committee. He wrote in the margins, “I advocate for dealing with a few severely, sentencing a few to prison, and even killing a few whose crimes are egregious. I think these punishments should be reported in newspapers, lest we not be able to rectify the Party’s work style.” Members of the Standing Committee expressed agreement, and next to the words “reported in newspapers” Deng added the words “vigorously and quickly, do not release any of those caught.”36 Shortly thereafter, the CCDI called a meeting, from which it issued an emergency notice. It also convened a Guangdong-Fujian forum to deploy and implement work as instructed by Deng and Chen. Thereafter, the Standing Committee issued the “Resolution 34  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 301. 35  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan 《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], 400. 36  Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995), xia 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995)》下 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995), Vol. 2], 287.

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Regarding the Strict Punishment of Criminals Severely Harming the Economy,” and Party Central and the State Council jointly issued the “Resolution Regarding Attacking Serious Criminal Activities in Economic Domains.” At a Politburo meeting discussing this resolution, Deng made particular emphasis that “to kill this trend right now, we must act quickly, sternly, and severely.” “It won’t do not to have any imposing manner at all.”37 As of April 1983, over 190,000 cases had been tried in the nation, with over 70,000 filed against Party members and over 8500 Party members being expelled from the Party. Over 400 million yuan in embezzled funds and goods were repossessed. All this effectively inhibited such evil trends and egregious crimes as smuggling, selling smuggled goods, embezzling, stealing, bribery, opportunistic fraud, etc. With Deng and Chen collaborating to drive the movement, this struggle to combat criminal activities in the economic sphere at the beginning of Reform and Opening achieved its predetermined objectives. In the early period of Reform and Opening, Deng gave Chen great support, and in the same way, Chen actively cooperated with Deng’s important positions. For example, beginning in the late 1970s, a certain country bordering China to the south began implementing anti-China, anti-Chinese policies and even began invading China’s territory, destroying China’s villages, killing China’s soldiers, and launching wide-scale military invasions into neighboring countries. The Chinese government made several declarations and sent many diplomatic notices to the country in question expressing strong protest and condemnation. The country in question, however, turned a deaf ear to China’s protests, seeing us as weak and easily cowed. Deng thought that the necessary answer to such aggression and arrogance was a retaliation in self defense. He said, “If we do nothing regarding the Indochina question, we will only escalate international tensions.”38 As the issue of a self-defense retaliation was very serious, Deng asked Chen to make considerations of the pros and cons and possible losses and gains. After serious contemplation, Chen replied he thought such a retaliation was acceptable, and gave suggestions regarding guiding policies of combat.39 On February 14, 1979, Party Central issued a notice regarding a self-defense retaliation and struggle to protect the borders. The retaliation began on February 17. After Chinese frontier defense forces reached predetermined objectives, they left the opposing side’s frontiers on 37  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], 1723. 38  Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997), shang 《邓小平年谱 (1975–1997)》上 [Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997) Vol. 1], 487. 39  Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995), xia 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995)》下 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995), Vol. 2], 236.

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March 5, and were completely withdrawn back to China by March 16. Although combat was extremely limited in time, scale, and space, it played an important role in driving Reform and Opening and construction under conditions of solid Chinese national security. It also made a positive contribution to turning around the situation in Indochina. In the early 1990s, the country in question actively requested to reestablish good neighborly relations, at which point both nations put the misgivings of the past behind them and have ceaselessly increased friendship, again becoming good neighbors, good partners, and good brothers. Another example of Chen’s close cooperation with Deng was the drafting of the “Resolution Regarding Several Historical Questions of the Party Since the Founding of the Nation.” Following the third plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress, China systematically cleaned up “leftist” errors, inciting two major thought trends within the Party and in society. The first trend held that Party Central’s negation of Mao Zedong was a violation of Mao Zedong Thought. The second trend held that Mao himself and Mao Zedong Thought should both be completely negated. In the face of these two trends, Deng proposed that Party Central pass a resolution—at an appropriate time—regarding experience and lessons following the founding of New China and giving an assessment of that period of history. He maintained that in the drafting of this resolution, we should on the one hand conduct seeking-truth-from-facts analysis on the errors committed in Mao’s later years, while on the other hand differentiating these errors from Mao Zedong Thought—in broad strokes rather than fine. The crux of the resolution was to establish Mao’s historical position as well as to persist in the development of Mao Zedong Thought. Chen expressed complete approval of Deng’s position. Chen told the drafting group, “I agree with Comrade Xiaoping’s position that the ‘Resolution’ be written in broad strokes rather than fine. Under this principle, we should call achievements achievements and call errors errors.” “The ‘Resolution’ should be written in accordance with the opinions of Comrade Xiaoping, establish Comrade Mao Zedong’s historical position, and persist in developing Mao Zedong Thought.”40 To have the “Resolution” amply fulfill Deng’s intentions, Chen suggested that the drafters add a historical review on the 28 years of the CCP’s history prior to the founding of New China, the doing of which would “give a more complete basis for more completely outlining Comrade Mao Zedong’s achievements and contributions, for establishing Comrade Mao Zedong’s historical position, and for persisting in and developing Mao Zedong Thought. Say that Comrade Mao 40  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 238–284.

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Zedong’s achievements were the majority, and his errors a minority; say that Mao Zedong Thought led us to achieve victory; say it is more capable of convincing people.”41 Deng greatly admired this suggestion and said “this opinion [of Chen’s] is very good,” and “it is a very important opinion.”42 Owing to close cooperation between Deng and Chen, the “Resolution”—after over a year of drafting and discussions of over 4000 people—was passed by the Eleventh Party Congress’s sixth plenum. It played a role in the Party’s summarizing experience, unifying thought, and looking to the future as a united whole. 3

Relationship Three: Placing Importance on the Big Picture of Reform and Opening in the Face of Differences of Opinion

In all times and all places in history, it has never been possible for two likeminded political leaders to be completely without differences of opinion. The question, rather, is the nature of the disagreements and the attitudes adopted in their resolution. Although Deng and Chen both advocated for Reform and Opening, they still had some disagreements on the particulars of some questions. Not admitting to the disagreements is not materialism. Overexaggerating these disagreements or describing them as struggles for power would be a violation of the truth of history. The true situation was that during the early period of Reform and Opening, whenever they had disagreements, either one of them would abandon his perspective, or they would both seek agreement on larger issues while reserving disagreements on details. In either situation, they took as their highest principle the maintenance of the Party’s unity and the undertaking of Reform and Opening. It was Deng’s consistent belief that during the socialist period, the core task of the entire Party and entire population—excluding the case of largescale war—is modernized construction. Thus, after his third rehabilitation, he placed great importance on using beneficial international conditions at the time to demand an acceleration of introduction of foreign equipment and technology. Prior to the State Council conference to discuss principles in 1978, He summoned Gu Mu for a talk to hear reports of trips to European nations. Deng stressed his “resolution to borrow some money from foreign nations for

41  Ibid., 284. 42  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan 《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], 303, 306.

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construction; we must act urgently.”43 However, Chen quickly pointed out that the economy was severely unbalanced proportionately and that we should first adjust proportions across the board and only then accelerate development. He said we could not consider only the introduction of projects from abroad, but that we must also consider the State’s ability to put up matching funds domestically. Chen said we needed to analyze foreign debt, as there was very little truly free foreign exchange. Chen said that international markets at the time were buyers’ markets, that so long as no major changes occurred in international relations, these beneficial conditions would not be lost. Etc., etc. Deng then abandoned some of his perspectives. Deng said, “I approve of Comrade Chen Yun’s analysis. There are two kinds of foreign capital. One is called free foreign exchange, and the other is called equipment loans. No matter what they are called, we will use them all, as this opportunity is too hard to come by, and it would be a pity not to make use of these conditions.” “The question is how to use them well, how to have all projects bring about results quickly, including the resolution of solvency problems. The use of foreign capital is a major policy. I think we should support it.” “In each project we introduce, we must be solvent. We can first do two things and then see. Comrade Chen Yun’s opinion is that each project should be researched separately. I agree with this opinion. We should research them in this way.”44 One can see from these statements that although Deng reserved some personal misgivings as regarded this situation, on the whole he still agreed with Chen’s opinions. In the same way, when Chen encountered differences of opinion from Deng, he always expressed support for Deng’s opinion, or at least did not publicly persist in his own perspectives. One example was in the question of special economic zones. At a 1981 forum of first secretaries from provincial, city, and autonomous region governments, Chen said, “the four cities of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen in the two provinces of Guangdong and Fujian should be made into pilot special economic zones (neither Guangdong nor Fujian will be made entirely into special economic provinces). At present these are the only places, and we cannot add any more. Of course, processing trade and joint venture operations— these are being done in many places now, but we cannot add any more special

43  Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997), shang 《邓小平年谱 (1975–1997)》上 [Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997) Vol. 1], 335. 44  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan 《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], 198–199.

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zones . . . A province like Jiangsu cannot have a special zone.”45 Over Chinese New Year in 1982, Chen summoned several leading cadres of the CCDI to a forum, at which he again stressed that “now that we’re setting up special zones, every province wants them; they’re all trying to get involved. If that were the case, foreign capitalists and domestic opportunists would all come out of their cages; they would speculate and profiteer across the board. So we cannot let that happen. The first question in special zones is summarizing experience.”46 However, in early 1984 Deng told several leading cadres of the Center that “we are establishing economic special zones and implementing opening policies; we need a clear guiding ideology, i.e. whether to be conservative or to set them free.” “In addition to the current special zones, we can consider opening a few other port cities, such as Dalian and Qingdao. These places would not be called special zones, but certain policies of special zones can be implemented there.”47 He also requested that those leading cadres report this to Chen, who, upon hearing the reports, clearly expressed approval for Deng’s opinion. At a meeting of the Central Secretariat and the State Council that followed, Chen recommended—based on the spirit of Deng’s words—that 14 port cities, including Tianjin and Shanghai, be opened; this was later written up into the “Minutes of the Forum Concerning Some Coastal Cities.” Secretary of the Central Secretariat and member of the State Council Gu Mu reported this to Chen, who was convalescing in Hangzhou at the time. He again clearly expressed his support for opening up the 15 coastal port cities. At the same time he said that the existing special zones did not have any highly competitive products [“fist products”], that it would be difficult for them to come up with highly competitive products. The products of foreign-funded companies, he said, maintain a certain proportion of domestic sales, but domestic industry with a development prospects should be protected. The special zones should not have their own own currency, but if they absolutely required it, said Chen, all issuance powers should be concentrated in the Center.48 Obviously, Chen drew close to Deng’s opinions in this matter, but he did reserve some of his own perspectives. Another example was the question of Party members hiring laborers. During the early period of Reform and Opening, debate raged in the Party over 45  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 306. 46  Ibid., 311. 47  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 3 juan 《邓小平文选》第 3 卷 [Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3], (People’s Press, 1993), 51–52. 48  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], 1672–1677.

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differing opinions regarding the question of private businesses hiring laborers. Deng and Chen had both similar views and different views regarding this question. They both advocated for waiting a few years before making a decision, but there was a certain degree of deviation in their point of emphasis regarding the treatment of the question of Party members hiring laborers. In late 1982 at an enlarged Politburo meeting, Chen expressed his opinions on the question of rural hiring quotas, saying, “in the past, the State Council stipulated that the quota be seven at the maximum; in reality it is now somewhat higher. We must take a look at whether we should set limits at all, or how high to set the limit. Such questions, however, should not be disseminated with too much fanfare in newspapers. It will be more reliable to wait a while and see.”49 However in late 1983 as he was reviewing a manuscript of the Standing Committee’s “CCP Central Notice Regarding Rural Work in 1984,” Chen noticed that Party members would be allowed to hire laborers. He felt this was inappropriate and wrote a remark: “policies for hiring laborers can be looked into in a few years; it’s not so terrible if there are a few problems.” “We should be circumspect in allowing Party members to hire laborers. There are differences of opinions regarding this matter within the Party. The CCDI has a dissenting opinion which it is preparing to report to the Secretariat. Thus, it will be up to the Secretariat to engage in further debate to decide whether this document is allowed to make initial stipulations [on this matter]. This is a question of principles, and it must be fully debated. In the Eighth Party constitution report, Comrade Xiaoping wrote, ‘Party members must be engaged in labor and cannot be people who exploit the labor of others.’ Although circumstances have developed markedly since then, we should still persist in the basic requirements of Party members. We should look at the pros and cons of this question not only from the present perspective, but from the perspective of several years to come.” For concerns of stability, he expressly sent this memo to Deng before sending it to the Central Secretariat.50 After reviewing Chen’s comments, Deng added his own: “to be discussed again by the Central Secretariat.” Per Chen’s opinions, when the document was issued, the stipulation allowing Party members to hire laborers had been deleted, replaced by a clear demand to strengthen management and earnestly study the question of rural laborer hiring, in preparation for the release of concrete policies and regulations when conditions were ripe.51 Thereafter, 49  Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995), xia 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995)》下 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995), Vol. 2], 316. 50  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], 1730–1731. 51  Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995), xia 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995)》下 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995), Vol. 2], 344.

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the Central Secretariat overturned the portions of “Several Regulations for Strengthening Party Discipline,”—drafted by the CCDI—regarding Party members not being allowed to hire laborers. The Central Secretariat found that there were many different circumstances of hiring laborers, that the situation was extremely complicated and touched on several major theoretical and practical questions. The only way to make reasonable regulations on Party members’ hiring laborers would be to conduct investigations and research, the Secretariat concluded. Deng expressed two opinions regarding this question. First: “Looking again in two or three years, there’s nothing so remarkable about that. In the future when the economy is developed, if there are deviations, we can take them back with a single order.” Second: “We’re doing socialism here. We should encourage Party members to get involved in cooperative production; in the end what we’re doing is socialism.”52 In late 1985, somebody said that while rural Party members and cadres developed the economy, some would lead the masses to collectively grow rich, some would first become rich themselves, and some would rely on their privileges to conspire to become rich; those who operated with hired laborers would received special support from above, taking over public funds and large amounts of loans. Upon hearing this, Deng said that the third situation must be controlled, and that we could levy progressive taxes. The next time, he said, “I see that hiring laborers will be necessary in two or three years.” “A report says that there is a necessary trend for hired laborer operations; it is inevitable. Now we have to consider how to bring it onto the proper track. This opinion is correct.”53 In early 1987, the concept of “private enterprises” was mentioned in the Politburo separately from individual operators. The Politburo clearly stated that private enterprises could exceed laborer hiring limits applied to individual operators.54 Thereafter, Chen did not express any further opinions on this matter. Another example was the question of the relationship between planning and markets. Chen consistently advocated for planning being in the primary position of the economy with market regulation in a supplementary position. Although he later agreed that the planned economy’s being in a primary position was not tantamount to its planning playing a directive role, that guideline planning was a concrete embodiment of the planned economy, and that 52  Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997), xia 《邓小平年谱 (1975–1997)》下 [Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997), Vol. 2], 964. 53  Ibid., 1096–1097. 54  Shi’erda yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, xia 《十二大以来重要文献选编》下 [Selected Important Documents since the Twelfth National People’s Congress, Vol. 2], (People’s Press, 1988), 1237.

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guideline planning relied primarily on using economic leveraging,55 he continued to persist in his opinion that “in reforms, we cannot lose the principle of developing the economy based on planning and proportions.”56 Deng’s opinions on the matter were the same as Chen’s at the beginning, but later his thinking on the matter evolved considerably. In a 1989 meeting with military cadres at the capital martial law brigade level and higher, he said, “we must persist in combining the planned economy with market regulations. This cannot be changed. In the course of real work during the period of adjustment, we can strengthen or have a little more planning, and have more market regulation at another time; we should be a little more flexible.”57 In a talk with leading cadres from the Center in 1990, he said, “we must understand [this] theoretically. The difference between capitalism and socialism does not lie in the question of planning or markets. Socialism also has market economies, and capitalism also has planning controls . . . Do not think that having some market economy means taking the capitalist road. That is not the case.”58 In a 1991 tour of Shanghai, he said, “don’t think that talking of the planned economy is the same as socialism, or that talking of market economy is the same as capitalism. That’s not the way it is. Both are methods; the markets can also serve socialism.”59 In his “Southern Talks” during the spring of 1992, he even more clearly noted that “a little more planning or a little more markets—this does not constitute the substantive difference between socialism and capitalism. The planned economy is not tantamount to socialism, and capitalism also has plans. Market economies are not tantamount to capitalism, and socialism also has markets.”60 Per Deng’s opinions, the Party’s Fourteenth Congress decided to set the establishment of a socialist market economic system as the target model of economic system reforms. At the same time, the congress noted that such a system “should cause markets to play a fundamental role in resource allocation under socialist State macroeconomic regulation.” “We must strengthen and improve the State’s macroeconomic controls.” “State planning is one impor-

55  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 337 n. 288. 56  Ibid., 367. 57  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 3 juan 《邓小平文选》第 3 卷 [Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3], 306. 58  Ibid., 364. 59  Ibid., 367. 60  Ibid., 373.

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tant method in macroeconomic controls.”61 During this time, debates emerged in society regarding “disharmony between Deng and Chen.” Chen made no direct answer to this question, but rather opted to clarify the matter in a circuitous manner. When Li Xiannian passed away in June 1992, Deng suggested that Chen write a eulogy. Chen used this opportunity to express his opinions regarding economic special zones. He wrote: “Although Comrade Xiannian and I never visited the special zones, we always paid attention to the construction of the special zones. We thought they should be established, and that experience must be continuously summarized, so that the special zones be well run. These few years, the economy of the Shenzhen special zone has initially changed from import-based to export-based; high-rise buildings are springing from the earth; and development has indeed been fast.” He then transitioned to a few views on new issues within economic construction, saying, “the scale of our nation’s economic construction is much larger and more complex than before. Many methods effectively used in the past are no longer suitable for the new circumstances of Reform and Opening. This will require that we strive to study new things and ceaselessly explore and resolve new questions.”62 This eulogy was published in all major newspapers in China and played a role in dispelling the various rumors regarding his and Deng’s relationship. A comprehensive study of Chen and Deng’s relationship in the early period of Reform and Opening demonstrates that cooperation and complementariness constituted the mainstream of their relationship—the first place—and differences and disagreements constituted a branch—the second place. Their disagreements were not over whether to reform and open, but rather on how to reform and open. After the Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum, Chen repeatedly pointed out that “it is now imperative that we push systemic reforms.”63 “Smashing ‘the big pots of rice’ and the ‘iron rice bowls’ [in economic system reforms] means nothing less than reforms to privately operated industry and commerce.” “In systemic reforms, agriculture is the first step. I see that it is also imperative in industry and finance and trade.”64 However, in the steps and methods of reform, Chen placed more emphasis on 61  Shisida yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, shang 《十四大以来重要文献选编》上 [Selected Important Documents since the Fourteenth National People’s Congress, Vol. 1], (People’s Press, 1998), 1237. 62  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 379. 63  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], 1633. 64  Chen Yun wenji, di 3 juan 《陈云文集》第 3 卷 [Collected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 488–489.

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“making stable progress,” “beginning from pilots,” and “needing to ‘cross the river by feeling the stones.’ ”65 Deng, on the other hand, placed emphasis on “thought needing to be further liberated and the pace of Reform and Opening being further accelerated.” “We need to have some courage in Reform and Opening, dare to experiment, and not behave like women with bound feet. When we set our sights [on an objective], we must make bold experiments and take bold strides.”66 At one point there was a strain of public opinion that called Deng Xiaoping a reformer and Chen Yun a conservative. Deng indirectly refuted this point in a 1987 talk with then U.S. Secretary of State Schultz. He said, “some people don’t approve of some aspects and some methods of reform, but they don’t entirely disapprove. There is no faction in China that entirely opposes reform. Some people outside the country previously viewed me as a reformer and saw others as conservatives. It is true that I am a reformer, but if you say that anybody who persists in the four basic principles is a conservative, then I too am a conservative.”67 These words were both objective and correct. After Reform and Opening, Deng was extremely respectful of Chen and took his opinions seriously. Chen viewed Deng as the core leader of Party Central, always siding with Deng in the case of political dissent within the Center. In 1980, Chen supported Deng’s position that Hua Guofeng was not suitable to continue serving as Party chairman, and that he should be replaced by Hu Yaobang. He said, “it is everybody’s wish that Comrade Xiaoping serve as Party chairman. However, I believe that Comrade Xiaoping is not willing to do so, and so I propose with all my force that Comrade Yaobang take up the position.”68 In 1987, Zhao Ziyang replaced Hu Yaobang as CCP General Secretary. Chen then met with Zhao, starting the conversation saying, “the number one leader in our country at present is Comrade Xiaoping.”69 At the interchange of spring and summer in 1989, owing to a difference of opinion between Deng and Zhao on the question of how to react to the disturbances, Beijing entered a state of anarchy. Chen prematurely ended his convalescence outside of the capital and returned to Beijing, resolutely supporting Deng’s speech about not giving up further ground. He then sought out several old cadres and old generals for 65  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3  juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 279. 66  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 3 juan 《邓小平文选》第 3 卷 [Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3], 265, 372. 67  Ibid., 209. 68  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], 1548. 69  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], 360.

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conversations. He convened a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Advisory Committee, at which showed his true colors in expressing “we, as old comrades, must now resolutely support the Chinese Communist Party with Comrade Deng Xiaoping as its core.” He then asked news agencies to publicize this information. After the political disturbance had been put down, he made the following comment on the draft of Party Central’s report on the errors committed by Zhao Ziyang: “The [body] that initiated Reform and Opening was Party Central with Comrade Deng Xiaoping at its core.”70 It was not coincidence that Chen and Deng were able to support one another and cooperate with each other during the early period of Reform and Opening; it is rather attributable to a deep-seated historical background and ideological foundation. Their experiences in youth were largely similar. One served as an apprentice in Shanghai, where the influence of capitalism was quite profound. The other went off to the capitalist nation France to engage in work study. They both threw themselves into the enterprise of revolution at very young ages. They shared a common conviction: unswerving faith in communism. They shared fundamentally similar styles: they persisted in seeking truth from facts, handling affairs with justice, and opposition to cliques. It was exactly for these reasons that they did not approve of “leftist” methods during the Yan’an Rectification Movement, that they jointly exposed the high-level conspiracy to split the party following the founding of the nation, and that they suffered similar fates during the “Cultural Revolution.” All of these factors led to their establishment of a high degree of mutual trust in political matters. As the Seventh Party Congress’s seventh plenum in 1957 was making preparations for elections in the Eighth Party Congress, Mao Zedong gave a high assessment of Chen and Deng as they were about to be appointed vice chairman and general secretary. He said Chen “is a good person.” “Rather just, capable, and rather stable.” “He sees problems clearly.” “He’s keen and can grasp what’s important.” Mao described Deng as “rather talented, rather capable.” “Rather attentive, rather just, he is an honest and sincere person.” “Rather capable of seeing the big picture.” “He handles problems rather justly.”71 Fifty years later, Bo Yibo wrote in an article entitled “Missing Comrade Chen Yun” that Mao had said something else when praising Chen and Deng: “Comrade Chen Yun and Comrade Deng Xiaoping are up-and-comers,” and from then on they would “climb the stage and play leading roles.” He then wrote that “in the new era of Reform and Opening, Comrade Xiaoping was the core of the Party’s 70  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], 1802–1803. 71  Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976), shang 《毛泽东传 (1949–1976)》上 [The Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), Vol. 1], (Central Documentary Press, 2003), 521.

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second generation central leadership collective, and Comrade Chen Yun was an important member of that leadership collective. They did an outstanding job at ‘climbing the stage and playing leading roles,’ and successfully built the correct road to constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics.”72 I think that both Mao’s praise and Bo’s explanation serve as historical evidence. Finish In the early period of Reform and Opening, to have Deng and Chen cooperatively manning the nation’s helm was the great fortune of China, the great fortune of the Party, and the great fortune of the Chinese people. The results of their cooperation were not limited to just the laying of a good foundation for the undertaking of Reform and Opening, but rather continue to play a longlasting role on the dynamism of Chinese politics to this day. Their cooperation will be a valuable political legacy that is passed onto the next generation. References Bo Yibo 薄一波, Lingxiu yuanshuai yu zhanyou (tuwen ban)《领袖元帅与战友 (图文本)》 [Leaders, Supreme Commanders, and Comrades-in-Arms (Illustrated Edition)]. Central Documentary Press, 2008. Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995), xia juan 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995 )》下卷 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995), Vol. 2]. Central Documentary Press, 2000. Chen Yun wenji, di 3 juan 《陈云文集》第 3 卷 [Collected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3]. Central Documentary Press, 2005. Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3]. People’s Press, 1995. Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2]. Central Documentary Press, 2005. Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997), shang 《邓小平年谱 (1975–1997 )》上 [Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997), Vol. 1]. Central Documentary Press, 2004. Deng Xiaoping nianpu, xia (1975–1997) 《邓小平年谱 ( 1975–1997 )》下 [Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997), Vol. 2]. Central Documentary Press, 2004. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan 《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2]. People’s Press, 1994. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 3 juan 《邓小平文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3]. People’s Press, 1993.

72  Bo Yibo 薄一波, Lingxiu yuanshuai yu zhanyou (tuwen ban) 《领袖元帅与战友 (图文本)》 [Leaders, Supreme Commanders, and Comrades-in-Arms (Illustrated Edition)], (Central Documentary Press, 2008), 156.

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Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976), shang 《毛泽东传 (1949–1976 )》上 [The Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), Vol. 1]. Central Documentary Press, 2003. Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, June 14, 1995, first edition. Shi’erda yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, xia 《十二大以来重要文献选编》下 [Selected Important Documents since the Twelfth National People’s Congress, Vol. 2]. People’s Press, 1988. Shisida yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, shang 《十四大以来重要文献选编》上 [Selected Important Documents Since the Fourteenth National People’s Congress, Vol. 1]. People’s Press, 1998.

CHAPTER 2

A Study of the 1978 State Council Conference to Discuss Principles Li Zhenghua Abstract The 1978 State Council Conference to discuss principles was held at a time that the recovery of the Chinese economy was making laudable achievements, when Chinese politics was about to encounter historical turns of events, and when the people’s thinking was about to break through the restrictions of the “two whatevers” policy. Although no resolutions were passed at the conference, it did produce two documents that later became highly influential: Li Xiannian’s summary report and Hu Qiaomu’s speech. This conference to discuss principles made theoretical and public opinion preparations for refocusing of Party work and for the policy of Reform and Opening. The conference to discuss principles’s speak-as-you-please format was later directly imitated at the theoretical work conference to discuss principles. The conference’s prevailing ideology of being anxious to see results also later came to exert a certain degree of influence.

Keywords 1978 – State Council Conference to discuss principles – Hua Guofeng – Li Xiannian

The State Council conference to discuss principles held from July to September 1978 was an important meeting leading up to the Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum. The ideology of Reform and Opening proposed there, as well as the conference’s format, bore a direct influence on the third plenum, the theoretical work conference to discuss principles, and on the establishment of the new “character eight” guiding policy in adjustments to the national economy. Hua Guofeng and Li Xiannian played important roles in the convening of this conference. * Essay submitted December 12, 2009. Li Zhenghua is a Ph.D. and researcher at the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies.

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Background and Preparations of the State Council Conference to Discuss Principles

Great achievements had been made in restoring and developing China’s economy by the second half of 1978. Restorative growth had appeared within the domestic economy in 1977. Industrial and agricultural total output was 505.5 billion yuan, exceeding planning figures by 4.4 percent, for a year-onyear growth of 10.4 percent. The total industrial output was 372.8 billion yuan, exceeding planning figures by 3.6 percent, for a year-on-year growth of 14.3 percent. Agricultural outputs did not reach predetermined targets due to natural disasters; grain output was 565.5 billion jin, a reduction of 7.1 billion jin from the previous year, but year-on-year growth in agriculture was 1.7 percent. There was a transformation of great historical significance within State finance. Fiscal income exceeded estimates made at the beginning of the year by six percent, and exceeded the highest fiscal incomes in history, leading to a balance of payments in that year. There was a revenue balance of 3.1 billion yuan by year end, reversing the three-year trend of fiscal income falling short of planning figures. Social commercial retail output grew 7.1 percent, and total inventories grew 12 percent. Supply and demand on the market began to change for the better. Salaries were increased for 40 percent of state-owned work units, while farmers’ burdens decreased and their incomes increased. Such departments as railways, the post office, civil aviation, and others were able to shirk off chaos via reorganization. Such development trends continued in 1978. The national economy “began coming onto a track of sustained growth and healthy development. Such restoration and growth in the national economy was not manifested in one or in a few departments or regions, but in all departments and all regions.”1 At the same time, the document “Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth” incited great debate on the question of the criteria of truth. The debate spread like wildfire throughout the nation. The movement to reveal, criticize, and investigate the “Gang of Four” was already basically completed. Promptly finishing the mass movement of exposing and criticizing the “Gang of Four”; shifting the focus of work onto economic construction; accelerating the pace of economic construction; and closing the gap with advanced nations as fast as possible—these became the common wishes of all cadres and the masses. 1  Hua Guofeng 华国锋, “Zai quanguo caimao xue daqing xue dazhai huiyi shang de jianghua [Speech Given at the National Finance and Trade Studies Daqing University in Dazhai Conference] 《在全国财贸学大庆学大寨会议上的讲话》 in Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, July 12, 1978.

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In May 1978 at the latest, Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and other primary Party Central leaders had already become resolved on the question of opening to the outside. They were no longer wondering and considering “whether to open,” but rather “how to undertake opening to the outside.”2 Studying advanced things from abroad and introducing to China advanced equipment, technology, and capital were the primary tenets of opening to the outside being advocated at the time. Beginning in 1977, to better understand the outside world and learn from the advanced experience of foreign nations in economic construction and economic administration, 13 leaders at the level of vice premier and vice chairman and up—including Deng—visited 51 countries over 21 tours. In the second half of this year, the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Geology, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Metallurgy Industry, the Ministry of Ordnance Industry, the Ministry of Petroleum, the State Economic and Trade Commission, and other departments of the State Council dispatched field study groups to developed Western nations.3 In the first half of 1978, the Center dispatched two more delegations to study foreign economies. In March and April, an economic delegation led by State Planning Commission deputy director Lin Hujia conducted field studies and interviews in Japan. In May and June, State Council Vice Premier Gu Mu led a delegation, including six provincial-level cadres, to visit France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Switzerland, Denmark, and Belgium. “This was the first time that China dispatched a State-level government economic delegation to Western developed nations.”4 It was treated with great importance and passion by the five Western European nations, which were anxious to find new markets. In June, Lin and Gu, freshly returned from their tours, submitted reports to the Politburo, explaining the basic conditions and development experience of Western capitalist nations. They suggested making ample use of and boldly introducing foreign capital to accelerate domestic economic construction. In his report, Lin summarized the experience of Japan’s rapid post-war economic development in three principles: boldly introducing new technology, making 2  Gu Mu 谷牧, “Xiaoping tongzhi lingdao women zhua duiwai kaifang 《小平同志 领导我们抓对外开放》 [Comrade Xiaoping is Guiding Us to Grasp Opening to the Outside],” in Huiyi Deng Xiaoping 《回忆邓小平》 [Remembering Deng Xiaoping], ed. CCP Literary Research Bureau 中共中央文献研究室, (Central Documentary Press, 1998), 155–156. 3  Li Xiannian zhuan (1949–1992) 《李先念传 (1949–1992)》下 [Biography of Li Xiannian (1949–1992) Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 2009), 1048. 4  Ibid., 1049.

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ample use of foreign capital, and striving to develop education undertakings and scientific research. He suggested: using foreign capital to build coal mines of 100 million tonne capacity and an Eastern Hebei steel plant of 10 million tonne capacity; open up a few more non-ferrous metal mines; and ensure that total output of chemical fibers and plastics hit 2 million tonnes by 1985. In his report, Gu placed emphasis on three points. There had indeed been great economic growth in post-war Western Europe, particularly in technology, and we were already far behind; they also had much experience worthy of our study in organization and management of socialized major production. They were all seeking markets for their capital, products, and technology, so they were all in favor of developing relations with China. There were many common methods of economic operations in practice internationally, including compensation trade, production cooperation, attracting foreign investments, etc. that could be studied and put into practice.5 Gu thought that the economies of Western European capitalist nations were depressed, that they had excess capital, and that they were anxious for a way out. He recommended immediately beginning formal talks with several Western European nations, striving to sign long-term trade agreements, and getting oral agreements into practice as fast as possible. The explanations and recommendations of Lin, Gu and others were treated with great importance by Hua and other central leaders. After hearing Lin’s report, Deng Xiaoping said: we need to have great resolve and not be afraid of going into debt; so long as we have products, there is no danger. Don’t always be debating; once you’ve set your sights on something, do it. Start tomorrow; Do some projects, starting with coal mines, nonferrous, petroleum, power stations, electronics, military industries, transportation, all the way to feed processing plants—start work next year. We won’t pay in installments. Start with compensation trade and bank loans. On June 30, the Politburo met to hear the reports of Gu and the others. Hua, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian all thought that the opportunity could not be missed and that in the matter of introducing capital and technology, we should be bolder and make bigger strides. Hua asked all members of the delegations who had gone abroad for field study to perform joint study sessions and write their findings into a few principles, to be discussed at a State Council conference to discuss principles. “We’ll begin discussions in July, debating on the one hand and making decisions on the other. Once we set our aim, we’ll commence 5  [Gu Mu 谷牧, “Xiaoping tongzhi lingdao women zhua duiwai kaifang 《小平同志 领导我们抓对外开放》 [Comrade Xiaoping is Guiding Us to Grasp Opening to the Outside],” 156.

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work.”6 Ye, Li, and Nie Rongzhen all said that Gu was the most knowledgeable about the situation on the outside and had explained it well, and that now it was time to steel resolve and start taking actions. Li stressed that in introducing capital and technology from abroad, there were five areas to pay attention to. One was balance in diplomatic relations; he asked the Planning Commission and the Economic and Trade Commission to make a list of things to be introduced and to work toward international equilibrium through diplomatic channels. Two was domestic equilibrium; not everything could be imported at once, so there had to be priorities. Three was equilibrium with domestic machinery manufacturers. Four was matching facilities for introduced technology. Five was equilibrium in foreign exchange.7 After the report meeting, Gu—per Hua’s proposal—convened three halfday forums for delegations returned from abroad. They drafted seven documents to be debated at the State Council’s meeting for discussing principles. At one of the forums on July 4, Lin gave a long speech in which he primarily spoke about nine issues: we need to grasp technology; capital and talent; one key is steel; accelerate the petrochemical industry; actively develop processing trade; renovations are needed in machinery and industry; import projects should be presided over by lone dedicated individuals; expand exports and strengthen capacity to repay loans; great resolution and fast action are needed in introducing. This speech was later presented at the State Council conference to discuss principles in the form of a bulletin. One could say that prior to the convening of the conference to discuss principles, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central leadership had already come to a consensus on the issues of introducing foreign capital and technology, opening to the outside, and accelerating economic progress—under good political and economic conditions. 2

Primary Contents and Characteristics of the State Council’s Conference to Discuss Principles

The conference began on July 6 and ended on September 11. It was divided into two portions: from July 6 to August 3 was the debate stage, and September 9 to 11 was the summarizing stage. The conference was adjourned from August 4 to September 8. At the conference, Hua gave 13 speeches, and Li gave 14. 6  Li Xiannian zhuan (1949–1992) 《李先念传 (1949–1992)》下 [Biography of Li Xiannian (1949–1992) Vol. 2], 1053. 7  Ibid., 1053–1054.

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The primary progress and speech conditions of the conference—as documented in the conference’s bulletins—were as follows. On the morning of July 6, the conference began. A total of 47 leading cadres from all economic departments and State Council vice premiers were in attendance. Li Xiannian presided, and Gu Mu transmitted CCP Central’s opinions on principles. Li clearly noted that “this conference is to summarize experience, to summarize positive and negative experience, to plan work service, and to enrich and supplement the ‘Ten Year Planning Compendium.’ One principle to be discussed is the introduction of advanced foreign technology. The questions are how to do it, how to do it a little faster, from which country to introduce [these things], and through which diplomatic channels we must operate. We must combine introduced technology with increases to our own domestic abilities. We cannot be like some countries, which import everything. In introducing new technology, we must bring along our own machinery industry, not just one part, but the whole machinery industry must be built up. When Comrade Xiaoping brought up this ‘big policy’ in the past, the ‘Gang of Four’ went all out to attack it. This is a big policy; we must all grasp this thoroughly. In both basic industries and non-basic industries, in both civilian use and military use, we must work quickly and well. Everybody wants to say their peace to the fullest so we can run this conference well and unify our thinking. In brief, we must summarize experience and promote democracy.”8 On the morning of July 8, Deputy Foreign Minister Cui Qun gave a report on the situation of importing complete sets of equipment. His overall opinion was that they should be introduced slowly. Li also gave a speech, noting that expanding the scale of technology introduction was a big question, and he asked everybody to debate it well. He: said they should deeply analyze domestic and foreign circumstances; emphasized that economic development required planning and proportionality; emphasized that industry management needed to be strengthened; emphasized that high-level construction needed to be suitable to the needs of economic development; etc. On the afternoon of July 9, Huang Hua transmitted instructions from the Center regarding diplomatic relations. On the afternoon of July 11, Planning Commission director Li Renjun discussed an initial thought of expanding technology introductions, discussed plans for the work of introduction, and proposed an overall outlay of 50 billion. Then Li Xiannian and Hua took the floor. Hua said: the ten year plan must be revised, adjusted, and supplemented; China has the conditions for accelerating modernization; there are “four somewhats” to the question of introducing 8  Ibid., 1056.

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technology (i.e. that thought must be somewhat further liberated, that courage be somewhat bolstered, that somewhat more methods be found, and that the pace be somewhat faster); we must emphasize strengthening management; we must persist in distribution according to labor. Lastly, he discussed some questions regarding retooling military industry enterprises. Li then clearly pointed out that “in introducing new technology, we must not seek only a few ‘unities,’9 but we must also increase China’s level of machinery manufacturing to the global advanced level. Otherwise, this would be buying the four modernizations and not constructing the four modernizations on our own, which would be a problem of direction.” [3] (p. 1063) On July 12, the conference debated the question of how to perform the work of introducing projects and constructing them. Construction Committee member Song Yangchu raised ten concrete opinions regarding the scale of introduction and how to perform the introduction well. The conference debated how construction would proceed once projects were introduced. Hua proposed that the opinions of the Planning Commission and Construction Committee be written into a document and distributed. He emphasized that economic work must have strict institutions. He demanded that financial work be performed well, and that funds be accumulated. He also spoke once more about the question of distribution according to labor. Li Xiannian stressed that studies not be done in isolation, but that they be connected with the national economy. He said the scale of introduction must be reasonable. He said we must make an accurate assessment of the economic situation. He noted that the serious nature of agricultural problems had not yet been understood by many. He said, “I suggest that all ministries refrain from writing any more long lists, but you should first solidly perform such work on existing projects as project design and resource allocations.” “The Center has set the guiding policy for introducing new technology, and everybody’s opinions are in line. The issue is that when we’re studying the introduction, we must consider it in connection with the development situation of the entire national economy. We must earnestly study the question of how big the scale of introductions should be in the coming eight years in order to be appropriate. I think that USD $20, 30, or 40 billion could be suitable. We can also muster up our forces for a battle of annihilation; USD $100 billion would certainly smash proportions. We must truly continue doing this in accordance with plans and proportions, and separate the primary from the secondary. Ten thousand horses stampeding at once 9  Meaning: integrating newly introduced foreign technology with enterprise reforms, integrating purchased products and full sets of equipment with manufacturing technology, and integrating introduced technology with domestic machinery manufacturing—author’s note.

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would not be good, for they would trample many people to death. We want to make one footstep per stride.”10 On the afternoon of July 14, the conference debated the question of accelerating the development of agriculture and agricultural mechanization. Ma Yi of the Economic Commission combined the European and Japanese experiences and put forward ten opinions. Hua spoke. On July 14 and 16, Yang Ligong of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry spoke specifically of agricultural questions. Hua gave a long speech, concerning mostly nine opinions: in summarizing agricultural experience since the founding of the nation, agriculture cannot be summarized into the sole question of mechanization; 800 billion jin of grains must be realized; he affirmed the Ministry of Metallurgy Industry’s opinion of needing to find the internal cause of the problem; all departments, including the Ministry of Agriculture, and all provinces, cities, and autonomous regions should research the reasons why over 200 counties could not increase their production; he emphasized the need to study Dazhai; the question of agricultural mechanization should be studied one province at a time; he emphasized soil problems; the question of developing Inner Mongolia’s agriculture; accelerating the fostering of agricultural technicians. Li Xiannian spoke, proffering three opinions: we must attach importance to research of and adjustments to agricultural polices; we must adjust the proactivity of 800 million peasants; and relying on introduction from abroad alone would not be able to realize the four modernizations. On the afternoon of July 17, Economic Commission member Yuan Baohua spoke of methods and policies for increasing workers’ level of technology. Hua said: we need to hire some experts to help us introduce and manage; workers must be trained, and peasants must also be trained; checks and assessments must be performed on workers at fixed intervals. Li Xiannian said: we must hire experts to help us renovate the technology of our old factories; he emphasized the need to perform digestion and absorption of technology well; Party committees at the provincial and prefectural level and large enterprises must accelerate the fostering of young and middle aged cadres. On July 18, First Machinery Minister Sun Youyu spoke of the question of combining introduced technology with domestic machinery manufacturing. On the afternoons of July 19 and 20, director of the Administration of Building Materials Bai Xiangyin raised his opinions regarding development of the building materials industry. Hua spoke. On July 20 and 21, Bureau of Labor Director Kang Yonghe spoke of the questions of labor and wages. Hua and Li Xiannian spoke. Hua raised five opinions: 10  Ibid., 1063.

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we cannot establish a capitalist labor wage system, nor can we establish a revisionist labor wage system, in particular like that of Yugoslavia; the labor wage system must take into consideration both present realities and the long-term future; multi-channel planning of labor, sending young intellectuals down to the countryside, and the four directions are correct;11 encourage innercontinental population to migrate to frontier regions. Li said: I maintain my original opinion regarding Yugoslavia; we need to consider how to balance industry and agriculture and peasant incomes; we need to consider collective welfare; we need to increase wages in industries society looks down upon; study methods for sending young intellectuals down to the countryside;12 production accident questions. On the afternoon of July 23, Duan Yun of the Planning Commission spoke about the questions of augmenting China’s capacity to make foreign payments. Hua raised four opinions: in expanding exports, foreign trade is not only a matter for foreign trade departments, and all departments must come up with methods; potential in military industries is great; First Machinery Ministry must come up with interchangeable equipment; study foreign exchange processes. Li Xiannian said: the scale of introductions must be enlarged; the scale must correspond to the nation’s capabilities; set up processing trade; enlarge handicrafts industries and exports of industrial products; bring the Hong Kong petroleum market into the picture. “Introducing patents [from abroad] is a necessity. But we must trust our own strength. What course would it be to buy the four modernizations? We must consider two accounts: how many renminbi will it cost us to introduce one U.S. dollar, and how much equipment can we make ourselves in eight years? Don’t say that introducing USD $50 billion is only $40 billion; we can’t necessarily digest that much. Using foreign loans of USD $40 billion is not so simple an affair; not even the Soviet Union has used so much! If we introduce everything, our own machinery industries will be put out of business, production stopped; it seems to me that the most important condition is that we do it ourselves. It won’t do to assess our own strength too low either. After the Japanese saw our petroleum exploration in 11  Hua Guofeng said, in the past, the Lin Biao / Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique had interfered much and caused widespread destruction in doing urban-rural labor interchanges; as big as our country is, adopting only one single method for the placement of labor will not do. 12  Li Xiannian said, every year the State, local governments, and enterprises spend over 2 billion yuan (used in the “down to the countryside” movement); we must persist in the direction of the “down to the countryside” movement, but we must determine what methods to employ.

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the Bohai Sea, they said that it was pretty impressive that we could perform such an engineering feat on our own.”13 On the afternoon of July 24, Third Machinery Industry Minister Lü Dong spoke about questions of the aviation industry. Fifth Machinery Minister Zhang Zhen spoke about questions of developing weapons industries. Hua spoke. On July 26 and 27, Minister of Metallurgy Tang Ke spoke of the questions of developing the metallurgy industry. Hua said: all ministries must introduce technology and firmly grasp exports; he spoke of the questions of being responsible for both investment and accumulation; emphasized the need to continue to send delegations abroad to conduct field studies. Li Xiannian said that the metallurgy industry needed to resolve the problem of selection of substandard mine sites as quickly as possible; he also spoke of the questions of coordination between recycling companies and the Department of Materials. On the afternoon of July 27, Zhang Jinfu of the Ministry of Finance spoke of the question of accelerating the accumulation of funds for construction. Hua said: we must make comprehensive equilibrium; we must prevent blind expansion of the scale of introduction; give small foreign exchange loans to local governments and enterprises; we must summarize 28 years of positive and negative experience in infrastructure and make regulations; we must strengthen material resources management. Li Xiannian said: we must earnestly study the four great equilibrium questions of the national economy; introductions must be performed well; we must hit the brakes on increasing infrastructure investments; the “five small” industries must be supported. He said, “establishing modernized industry is not to be done in isolation. We must adopt an extremely cautious attitude toward such large-scale projects that exceed the total sum of the past 28 years.” “The Planning Commission needs to study infrastructure. The scale now is big enough, and we must hit the brakes on all additional investments into infrastructure. Necessary project investments should be adjusted and resolved within their proper ministries. We should check to see if there are materials and equipment for projects that have been approved; if not, then they should be cancelled. Regardless of who approved them, the Planning Commission has this authority. The Planning Commission, Economic Commission, Construction Committee, and Ministry of Finance should come together and present a unified face to the outside.”14 On July 28, Hu Qiaomu gave a speech about handling matters in accordance with economic laws and accelerating the realization of the four modernizations. Hua said: we must reduce the burden on peasants; we must place 13  Ibid., 1064. 14  Ibid., 1064.

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importance on the over 20 million workers and fight for grain rations for the peasants we must increase the quality of products for supporting agriculture; we must consider adjusting prices of industrial and agricultural products. Li Xiannian said: we must resolve the unreasonable burden on peasants; we must resolve the fighting for grain rations and waiting for employment of workers and peasants; we must change the crude working style of rural cadres; we must increase the quality of products for supporting agriculture; we must adjust prices of industrial and agricultural products. On July 31, Sun Daguang of the Geology Bureau spoke of questions of material resource guarantees for realizing the four modernizations and accelerating the modernization of geological work. On July 21 and August 2, Liang Lingguang of the Ministry of Light Industry spoke of the question of accelerating the development of light industry. Li Xiannian gave two opinions: we must place importance on light industry and we cannot lose the handicrafts industry. On the afternoon of August 2, Li Kaixin of the Bureau of Material Resources spoke about the work of material resources. Li Xiannian said: labor wages, prices, and material resources are all old difficult problems in economic work; we must strengthen material resources management; enterprises must make general checkups of their assets. On August 3, Yao Yilin spoke of the question of agricultural product prices and demonstrated the necessity of adjusting grain prices. Wang Zhen said: the conference is being well handled; foreign and domestic investigation and research; achievements of military industries are great, but so are negative factors on that industry, potential also great; there is a new situation of solidarity within the entire Party. He emphasized: the military must be rectified; make large-scale imports and exports and care for the peasants; cultivate virgin land; develop the frontier and construct the frontier. Li Xiannian said: the conference is being well handled and is liberating thought; it is very necessary to increase agricultural product prices, but adjustments must be made carefully; adjust agricultural policies; expand introductions and bring about equilibrium; bring about unity. He particularly emphasized: “as long as our Party can unite, we’re in good condition. If the country is stable and united, we can borrow money. As long as we can balance the domestic situation, we can borrow as much as we please. But we must consider our capabilities. Will we be able to grasp and digest so much new technology if we introduce it all at once? We can’t let ourselves become like ‘The Beggar Who Finds Gold’ [Huazi shi jin, classical Chinese stage play—translator’s note]. Those comrades of ours performing economic work must carefully consider this question. As to balancing the domestic economy, there’s no way we can balance it well all at once, but we do

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need to get it pretty close. I wonder if we can borrow USD $50 billion. If we borrow $50 billion but can’t pay it back, international views of us will change. We wouldn’t be able to use all of $50 billion all at once anyway. I would like to first borrow $20 billion, using some and repaying some, rolling while we use it. All ministries must earnestly study this question; you cannot proceed on the basis of the total outlays you’ve all individually come up with.”15 Hua then expressed a few points: the conference is proceeding well; I approve of adjusting agricultural product prices; conditions are very good, solidifying and uniting, “don’t lean left one minute and right the next”; issues concerning the overall situation must be handled carefully; must cross the river feeling the stones; the Center and local governments must keep each other informed; commune and production team enterprises must be developed; military enterprises must be adjusted. On the afternoon of September 9, Li Xiannian gave a summary speech. On the mornings of September 10 and 11, small groups discussed Li’s summary speech. The above course of events demonstrates that this conference had the following five characteristics. One, it lasted a long time. The conference spanned a total of two months and five days, with 23 days actually in session, 18 days in July, two days in August, and three days in September. Two, the conference’s format was flexible, and its atmosphere relaxed. The conference was in session for about half a day every day it was in session, meaning that work time for attendees was about the same as usual; none stayed overnight at the conference. However, it is not true that, as it is claimed in some books, “Sunday was a day of rest as usual.” Four days of the conference’s 23 days in session were indeed Sundays. The list of attendees was not entirely fixed either. Sometimes there were more than 40, and sometimes between 50 and 60. The conference’s delegates were mostly leading cadres from important State Council departments. The conference’s general procedure was to first study and discuss important instructions given by Hua, Ye Jianying, and Deng Xiaoping regarding the reports they had heard from the overseas study delegations, and then to discuss individual subjects. The discussion of individual subjects was generally begun by leaders of departments discussing the situation of their departments, followed by general discussion based on the situation described. Attendees were allowed to speak freely, to ask questions, and to interrupt. Three, the conference’s aim was primarily to discuss principles; it passed no resolutions. Although no decisions were made, the conference did produce 15  Ibid., 1064.

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two highly influential documents. The first was Li Xiannian’s summary report, and the second was Hu Qiaomu’s speech. The overall tone of the conference was to—with the prerequisite of not abandoning self-reliance—expand the degree of openness, carry out modernized construction at a larger scale and faster speed, and organize new strides in the national economy. Four, a great deal of importance was attached to the conference. The conference was convened at the behest of the Party Central Committee Chairman and State Council Premier Hua Guofeng. Hua attended each session but one or two, and often gave impromptu speeches. He spoke on at least 13 of the 23 days of the conference. The conference was presided over by Party Central Committee Vice Chairman and State Council Vice Premier Li Xiannian, and State Council Vice Premier Gu Mu was in charge of the concrete daily work of the conference. Several other vice premiers were also frequently involved. For example, at the time the conference formally opened, a total of 47 leading cadres—either vice premiers or leading cadres from various State Council economic departments—including Li Xiannian, Yu Qiuli, Kang Shi’en, Geng Biao, Gu Mu, Wang Zhen, Chen Muhua, and others were in attendance. Li Xiannian presided over conference and frequently gave speeches, and Gu Mu transmitted Party Central’s principles and opinions regarding opening to the outside. Five, the conference’s objectives were clear, and its focuses obvious. The objective of this conference was—via summarizing 30 years of experience and lessons in economic construction and studying successful experience of foreign economies—to discuss how to accelerate China’s modernized construction. A focus of the conference was to discuss the question of introducing capital and technology, particularly such questions as how to strengthen introduction of technology, how to expand foreign trade and exports, how to flexibly make use of foreign capital, etc. The crux of Li Xiannian’s opening speech was how to accelerate the realization of the four modernizations. He spoke of revising the ten-year plan, particularly the question of the scale of introductions, and he pointed out the conference’s objectives and focuses. Leading cadres from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the State Planning Commission, the State Construction Committee, the State Economic and Trade Commission, the First Ministry of Machinery, the Building Materials Administration, the Third Ministry of Machinery, The Fifth Ministry of Machinery, the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, the Ministry of Finance, the Geology Bureau, and the Ministry of Light Industry all explained their situations as related to the question of introducing technology and capital and other related questions, as well as raising opinions.

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State Council Preparations for Reform and Opening Made at the Conference

The theme of the State Council’s Conference to Discuss Principles was to study the acceleration of construction of the four modernizations, and to launch a new Great Leap Forward in the national economy. As to this theme, the conference—on a foundation of summarizing experience and lessons from economic construction since the founding of the nation—boldly touched on problems within the economic system, such as: criticisms and self-criticisms regarding undervaluing economic management, allowing politics to interfere with the economy, and other erroneous methods; boldly proposing opinions regarding reforming labor relations and the superstructure; emphasizing the need to handle matters in accordance with economic laws; increasing the level of economic management; developing various operations methods in the countryside; allowing economic means and organization to be effective; implementing specialization; developing a labor contract system; thoroughly implementing the principle of distribution according to labor; and expanding the economic autonomy of enterprises. The conference demanded that relevant departments propose concrete measures for the thorough implementation of the above principles as quickly as possible. Through his 13 speeches and several interruptions, Hua expressed many opinions regarding the conference’s theme. He spoke mostly of a series of guiding policies on introducing technology, foreign trade exports, developing agriculture, developing industry, industry management and enterprise management, labor wages, and other aspects of economic work. He emphasized that economic work must be done carefully and solidly, that it should be done boldly and with free rein on the one hand, and cautiously and conscientiously on the other. Economic work, he said, must be done on the basis of objective economic laws; one must cross the river by feeling the stones. He said the policy of “taking grain as the key link” must be tailored to suit local conditions. Grain regions should take grain as the key link, while pasturing regions should emphasize pasturing, and forestry regions should emphasize forestry. His primary ideological trend was the “four somewhats,” which exerted a great influence on the conference. Although no resolutions were passed at the conference, both Li Xiannian’s September 9 summary report and Hu Qiaomu’s July 28 long speech are particularly worthy of attention. Li Xiannian wrote a summary report on behalf of Party Central and the State Council. His report was divided into six parts: grasp good opportunities

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and accelerate the realization of the four modernizations; strengthen comprehensive equilibrium and give rein to the proactivity of the Center, local governments, and enterprises under unified planning; perform technology introductions well and strive to expand exports; a few questions related to agriculture; a few questions related to industry; rectify the leadership team and improve the work style of leaders. This report systematically proposed several important perspectives and measures. It was in effect the conference’s theme report. The report pointed out that the realization of the four modernizations was a great revolution. “This revolution requires great changes to currently backward production capacity and also requires inevitable changes to production relations in many areas. We must change the superstructure and change management methods of both industrial and agricultural enterprises and the State’s management methods of industrial and agricultural enterprises. We must change people’s activity patterns and thought patterns, and cause them to be more suited to the needs of a modernized, large economy. The scale of this revolution is enormous, its changes wide-sweeping, intense, and profound. This task is not below any revolution the Party has led in the past in its onerousness and urgency or in the depth of its significance.”16 The report touched on questions of reforming the economic system. It concluded that in order to realize complete modernization: we must courageously transform all production relations not suitable to development of production capacity and all superstructure not suitable to the demands of the economic foundation, and loosen control to allow economic economic means and economic organizations to be effective. The report also lodged objections to problems previously existing in China’s economic system and economic leadership. It said, “China has reformed its economic system more than once and made many achievements. But in the area of enterprise and economic management systems, previously most considerations were placed on administrative authority. There was often an old routine of relaxing then tightening, tightening then relaxing; this made it difficult to conform to the needs of economic development.”17 In the work of economic leadership, we must resolutely shirk off slavish obeisance to administrative levels, administrative divisions, administrative authority, and administrative methods without discussing economic accounting, economic results, economic efficiency, and economic responsi16  Ibid., 1066. 17  Li Xiannian lun caizheng jinrong maoyi 《李先念论财政金融贸易》下 [Li Xiannian Discusses Finance, Financing, and Trade Vol. 2], (China Financial and Economic Press, 1992), 376.

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bilities. We must grasp the ability to guide and manage the great production of modernized industry and agriculture. The report emphasized the importance of seeking truth from facts and adhering to objective laws of economic development. The report read, “in order to quickly and concertedly develop the national economy, we must certainly adhere to objective economic laws. The first is the law by which the national economy must develop proportionally per planning; we must bring about comprehensive equilibrium.”18 The report then continues, “we must exalt the good tradition of seeking truth from facts. We do not have much experience in quickly, lastingly building socialism on the basis of planning and proportions, and our experience in realizing the four modernizations is even less. We must always remember the guidance of Chairman Mao: ‘As far as we’re concerned, there are still many unknown realms of necessity.’ ‘We must continue to investigate this in practice henceforth, and find intrinsic laws.’ We must avoid blindness to the extent possible and walk as few curvy roads as possible. Practice is the only criterion for testing truth. All matters that conform to objective laws which have been demonstrated in practice in society for a long time and which conform to the interests of the majority of people—we must persist in doing them and persist in doing them completely. We cannot allow anybody to casually change or revoke them.”19 The report also stressed that in China’s modernized construction, we must have economic interchanges with foreign nations. Self-reliance, it said, was not tantamount to a closed-door policy, and we absolutely had to study the advanced things of foreign nations. The report also proposed the perspective of combining the planned economy with a market economy. In late September, Party Central redistributed this report. Shortly thereafter, the Politburo held a meeting to discuss questions of convening a central work meeting. Li’s report was set as one of the topics for discussion at the central work meeting. Hu Qiaomu’s speech was revised several times and then printed in the October 6 People’s Daily [Renmin ribao] under the title “Handling Matters in Accordance with Economic Laws; Accelerating the Realization of the Four Modernizations [Anzhao jingji guilü banshi, jiakuai shixian sige xiandaihua.” This speech systematically summarized China’s positive and negative experience in economic construction as well as society’s understanding of economic laws at the time. It spoke of respecting objective economic laws and opposing 18  Li Xiannian wenxuan《李先念文选》[Collected Works of Li Xiannian], (People’s Press, 1989), 324. 19  Part six of Li Xiannian’s speech at the State Council conference to discuss principles.

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resolving problems based on the determinations of leaders alone. It proposed giving free rein to the four proactivities of the Center, local governments, enterprises, and individuals. It also proposed ceaselessly summarizing experience, and the gradual establishment of a set of management institutions and models suited to the needs of modernization. Hu’s speech was in reality a synthesis and embodiment of relevant thinking of CCP Central high-level leadership at the time. Such questions as increasing economic management levels, which touched upon the economic system, had been stressed prior to the conference by Hua, Li Xiannian, and other leaders. On June 20, 1978, Li gave the opening speech at the national financial and trade conference for studying Daqing and studying Dazhai, in which he said “at this conference we must discuss raising management levels as an extremely important question.” He continued, “the question of increasing management levels is not limited to the battle front of finance and trade; it also exists in agriculture, industry, infrastructure, transportation, and other battle fronts. This is an urgent problem that all economic work and the entire undertaking of socialist construction must now focus on resolving. We must bring the entire Party’s attention to this issue.”20 In a speech on July 7 of that year, Hua said, “under the conditions of a socialist planned economy, correct use of the law of value is extremely important in promoting the development of socialist production . . . If we don’t use the law of value and go against this principle, we will be unable to perform our economic work correctly and efficiently; we will be unable to gain the most results while expending the least possible. This will inevitably lead to severe waste and loss, will destroy socialist production, and will be punished by objective laws . . . In the entire Party, among all economic workers, and among all finance and trade workers, we must—with great fanfare—strengthen economic accounting, speak of strengthening economic results, increase enterprise profits, and rigorously enforce education in fiscal oversight. This will enable us to greatly promote production and accumulate more capital for socialist construction.” “Some comrades still lack due understanding of the importance of studying, grasping, and using socialist economic laws. Some even think that political leadership can ignore objective economic laws, that economic laws are a negation of political leadership; this perspective is completely wrong. In our economic work, we must have political leadership by the proletarian class, and we must also handle matters according to objec20  Li Xiannian 李先念, “Zai quanguo caimao xue daqing xue dazhai huiyi kaimushi shang de jianghua” 《在全国财贸学大庆学大寨会议开幕式上的讲话》 [Speech Given during the Opening Ceremony of the Nationwide Finance and Trade Study Daqing and Study Dazhai Conference], Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, June 27, 1978.

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tive economic laws; these two are one. All levels of leaders and cadres in the entire Party must strive to unite politics and economics and increase the level of economic management.”21 Hu used his solid theoretical training and profound learning to systematize and theoreticize the ideological sparks of others. He turned their vigorous, lively thoughts into a precious treasure of the Party. 4

The Significance and Influence of the Conference

First, the conference made theoretical and public opinion preparation for both the refocusing of Party work and for Reform and Opening. The themes and perspectives related to Reform and Opening discussed at the conference were further discussed and clarified at several important conferences that followed it. On September 6, before the conference ended, the State Council convened a nationwide planning conference, which ran until November 3. The focus of that conference was the question of reforms and the thorough implementation of the spirit of the conference to discuss principles. An important result of the nationwide planning conference was confirming the necessity of implementing three changes on the economic battle line in plans for 1979 and 1980. The first was that attention needed to be placed on production struggle and technological revolution from top to bottom. The second was that a transition from bureaucratic management systems and methods that did not account for economic results or economic efficiency into a track of scientific management that handled matters according to economic laws and very well combined democracy and centralism. The third was a transition from a closed-door or half-closed-door attitude of not engaging in any economic or technological interchanges with capitalist nations toward an attitude of actively introducing foreign advanced technology, using foreign capital, and boldly entering international markets.22 The conference made special note that “we must in many areas change production relations that are not suited to the development of production capacity; change the superstructure that is not suited to economic foundations; 21  Hua Guofeng 华国锋, “Zai quanguo caimao xue daqing xue dazhai huiyi shang de jianghua [Speech Given at the National Finance and Trade Studies Daqing University in Dazhai Conference] 《在全国财贸学大庆学大寨会议上的讲话》. 22  Ma Qibin et al. 马齐彬等, Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishi nian 《中国共产 党执政四十年》 [Forty Years in Power of the Chinese Communist Party], (CCP Party History Materials Press, 1989), 431.

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change management models and thought patterns in industrial and agricultural enterprises; and cause them to be more suited to the needs of a great, modernized economy. We must—under a prerequisite of political control— give a free hand and allow economic means and economic organizations to be effective; handle matters according to economic laws; and change those old patterns and old methods that do not speak to economic accounting, do not speak to economic results, do not speak to economic efficiency, and do not speak to economic responsibility. Leaders and cadres at all levels should take the initiative in understanding the importance, complexity, and arduousness of these changes, stand at the forefront of the battle, rely upon the masses, and boldly, meticulously guide these changes.” Delegates from each province, city, and autonomous region also discussed the question of reforming the economic management system and individually submitted written opinions. Everybody thought that, “in economic management work at present, there are few economic methods employed but many administrative methods. Even if there are phenomena of decentralization and anarchy, there are also problems of excessively limited authority on the part of local governments and enterprises, which is inhibiting the development of production capacity; we must enact big reforms. The principle of reform is to handle matters in accordance with objective economic laws and allow economic means and economic organizations to be effective. Under integrated planning, give rein to the proactivity of the Center, local governments, and enterprises. Tailor measures to local conditions and appropriately take care of frontier regions and minority regions, to facilitate gradually closing the gaps in economic and cultural development between regions.” Everybody raised concrete opinions regarding management system in the nine areas of planning, industry, infrastructure, material resources, finance, labor wages, commerce, prices, and foreign trade. For example, everybody held the same position regarding the planning management system: “Implementing two levels of management, one from the Center and one from the province/city/autonomous region, per the principle of ‘unified planning, graded management, integration of departments and regions at different levels, and giving primary status to horizontal authority.’ The task of central tierone [leadership] is to study and propose guiding principles and policies for developing the national economy and establishing unified plans. The provincial tier-one task is to combine real regional situations based on the Center’s guiding principles and policies and establish prefectural tier-one plans.” As for the industrial management system, everybody thought, “no matter which level [of government] manages enterprises, they must all change their status quo of employing only administrative management methods, smash regional restric-

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tions in their industries, organize all manner of companies, and implement management based on economic methods.”23 The issues discussed at the nationwide planning conference were in the exact same vein as those discussed at the State Council conference to discuss principles. They were clearly represented in the Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum’s great strategic policy that placed economic construction at its core, implemented Reform and Opening, and accelerated socialist modernized construction. Second, the conference’s format of free speech was directly imitated by the later theoretical work conference to discussing principles. The Party’s theoretical work conference to discuss principles held at the end of 1978 and beginning of 1979 exerted an important influence on Reform and Opening. It was this conference that directly triggered evaluations of Mao Zedong and the “Cultural Revolution” and prompted Deng Xiaoping to resolve himself to gather force in earnestly summarizing several of the Party’s historical problems following the founding of the nation. This was done to unite the will of the entire Party to muster all available energy in implementing the modernized construction of Reform and Opening. Ye Jianying ran the theoretical work conference in the same format as was used at the State Council’s conference to discuss principles. In autumn 1978, while discussion of the question of the criteria of truth was ongoing, the editor of the magazine Red Flag [Hong qi] wrote a long article called “Review of ‘On Practice,’ ” which he gave to Party Central’s Standing Committee. This article targeted the document “Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth,” using an emphasis on the effects of theory and guidance to repudiate the claim that practice is the sole criterion for testing truth. There were different opinions and reactions to this article in the upper echelons of the Center and in theoretical circles. At a mid-September meeting of the Standing Committee, Ye Jianying proposed summoning all comrades doing theoretical work together to hold another conference to discuss principles. In so doing, different opinions could be laid out, and understanding could be unified on a foundation of ample democratic discussion, that this question be resolved. This gave rise to the theoretical work conference to discuss principles, which ran from December 1978 to March 1979 in the same format as the State Council’s previous conference to discuss principles.

23  “Quanguo jihua huiyi jianbao” [Brief on Nationwide Planning Conference], September 26, 1978; “Quan guo ji hua hui yi jian bao” [Brief on Nationwide Planning Conference (supplement nine)], October 24, 1978.

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Third, the conference’s ideology of impatience for results and its influence led to the passage of the “eight-character” guiding principle. The State Council conference to discuss principles was held at a time the national economy was experiencing rather good recovery and development. The majority of attendees over-optimistically appraised economic conditions and development trends. They had an insufficient understanding of how economic growth of a restorative nature stemmed from poor foundations and low base-levels. They played down or ignored the various unreasonable factors inhibiting sustained growth that existed within economic development at the time. They believed that realizing a “new Great Leap” in the national economy was not only necessary, but also possible. They thought that conditions for this new great leap in the national economy were forming. Under such conditions, there were trends of impatience for results in the guiding ideology at the State Council conference to discuss principles. For example, the conference’s summary report read: “We must organize a new Great Leap.” “We must realize the four modernizations at a pace faster than originally anticipated; we must bring about a higher level of modernization by the end of this century.” The summary report also proposed: increasing the originally planned eight-year investment outlay for infrastructure from 400 billion to 500 billion yuan; bringing in USD $80 billion over ten years; and planning for the use of USD $30 to 40 billion in the following three to four years. The conference’s guiding ideology of being anxious to see results caused all economic indicators to be increased over baselines set in 1975’s “Ten-year Planning Compendium.” The day after Li Xiannian finished the summary report, the State Council approved the State Planning Commission’s report, which decided to increase infrastructure investments an additional 4.8 billion yuan in 1978. The originally determined figure for infrastructure investments in 1978 was 33.2 billion yuan; from January to August an additional 3.5 billion yuan were approved. By the end of the year, real investments in infrastructure totaled 39.5 billion yuan, an increase of 10 billion over the previous year. The quantity of large and mid-sized projects increased from 1433 the previous year to 1723, making the battle line even longer. After the conference, Party Central and the State Council held many discussion’s on the conference’s opinions and accelerated the pace of introduction [of technology and capital] negotiations. As of the end of the year, agreements totaling USD $7.8 billion had been signed, and there were 22 major projects, for which USD $3.1 billion in agreements were signed in the last ten days of December—primarily petrochemical projects. Almost all of these projects went into operations without first conducting feasibility studies, without implementing comprehensive balancing, and

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without acting in accordance with procedures for infrastructure projects. This exacerbated the existing imbalances in the national economy’s proportional relationships. With too much being purchased, the State’s ability to pay out foreign exchange and matching capacity were insufficient. This caused imbalances in material resources, loans, finance, and foreign exchange balance of payments. This gave rise to the following situation: agricultural growth could not keep up with the demands of industrial growth, and was even hard pressed to keep up with population growth; in the textiles industry, many important products were insufficient in quantity and low in quality, with few choices and poor supply in the market; although development in the coal, petroleum, electricity, and transportation industries was fast, they remained behind the demands of the national economy’s development; there were many areas of disharmony within and between industry sectors; too many infrastructure projects were proceeding simultaneously, such that many projects were unable to be converted into new production capacity for a long time; there were obvious shortcomings in both the economic management system and enterprise management systems, which severely inhibited the proactivity of workers, enterprises, local governments, and central departments, as well as inhibiting increases to efficiency in labor, equipment, and the use of liquid capital; of major products of nationwide focus industries, 43 percent were not restored to historical high quality indicators, and 55 percent were not restored to historical high raw material consumption indicators; and 24 percent of state-owned industrial enterprises were losing money at different rates.24 The trends of being anxious for results, not minding proportions and objective laws, and blindly pursuing high-speed economic construction caused Li Xiannian to worry. He spoke of his concerns and opinions at the conference. Chen Yun did not attend, but he paid close attention to the conference. He kept up with the various different opinions presented by reading briefs and related materials, and he thought that some major projects required profound, deep discussion and scientific argumentation before being put into operation. On July 31, Chen recommended that the conference dedicate a few days just for hearing negative opinions.25 It is a pity that these opinions did not receive 24  Hua Guofeng 华国锋, “Zhengfu gongzuo baogao—diwu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di’er ci huiyi shang” 《政府工作报告———第五届全国人民代表大会第二 次会议上》 [Government Work Report—From the Second Conference of the Fifteenth National People’s Congress], Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, June 26, 1979. 25  Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995) 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995)》下卷 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995) Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 2000), 223.

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ample attention at the time. At the Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum, Chen formally put forward that it was necessary to adjust the national economy. At the time, the danger to the national economy of the ideology of being in a rush to see results was becoming more evident in practice. More and more people, including Deng Xiaoping, were becoming aware of the serious nature of the problem. Deng supported Chen’s view and so at the third plenum, the question of adjustments was placed before the entire Party. The third plenum’s official report read, “we must see that owing to the long-term harm caused by Lin Biao and the ‘Gang of Four,’ there are many problems within the national economy. Some major proportional imbalances have not been entirely changed. Some chaotic phenomena in production, construction, distribution, and allocations have not yet been completely eliminated. A series of problems accumulated over several years in the lives of urban and rural people must be appropriately resolved. We must earnestly, gradually resolve these problems over the next few years and feasibly bring about comprehensive equilibrium, to enable us to quickly lay a stable foundation for development.”26 The third plenum did not have enough time to enter deep discussion of a series of concrete problems within economic construction, but rather agreed in principle on plans for the national economy in 1979 and 1980. After the third plenum, Party Central gradually confirmed its “eight-character” guiding principle of adjustments, reforms, rectifications, and increases—with adjustment as its core. Li Xiannian helped Chen in his struggle to thoroughly implement the “eight-character” guiding principle and ensure the stable development of the national economy prior to Reform and Opening. One could say that the new “eight-character” guiding principle’s fundamental ideology was formed from the opinions of Che and Li during the State Council’s conference to discuss principles. References Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995) 《陈云年谱 (1905–1995)》下卷 [Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995) Vol. 2]. Central Documentary Press, 2000.

26  Shiyi jie sanzhong quanhui yilai dang de lici quanguo daibiao dahui zhongyang quanhui zhongyao wenjian xuanbian 《十一届三中全会以来党的历次全国代表大会中央 全会重要文件选编》上 [Selected Important Documents From Several National People’s Congress Central Plena Since the Eleventh Congress’s Third Plenum Vol. 1], (Central Documentary Press, 1997), 22.

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Gu Mu 谷牧, “Xiaoping tongzhi lingdao women zhua duiwai kaifang 《小平同 志领导我们抓对外开放》 [Comrade Xiaoping is Guiding Us to Grasp Opening to the Outside],” in Huiyi Deng Xiaoping 《回忆邓小平》[Remembering Deng Xiaoping], ed. CCP Literary Research Bureau 中共中央文献研究室. Central Documentary Press, 1998. Hua Guofeng 华国锋, “Zai quanguo caimao xue daqing xue dazhai huiyi shang de jianghua [Speech Given at the National Finance and Trade Studies Daqing University in Dazhai Conference] 《在全国财贸学大庆学大寨会议上的讲话》​ in Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, July 12, 1978. ———, “Zhengfu gongzuo baogao—diwu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di’er ci huiyi shang”《政府工作报告———第五届全国人民代表大会第二次会 议上》 [Government Work Report—From the Second Conference of the Fifteenth National People’s Congress], Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, June 26, 1979. Li Xiannian 李先念, “Zai quanguo caimao xue daqing xue dazhai huiyi kaimushi shang de jianghua” 《在全国财贸学大庆学大寨会议开幕式上的讲话》 [Speech Given during the Opening Ceremony of the Nationwide Finance and Trade Study Daqing and Study Dazhai Conference], Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, June 27, 1978. Li Xiannian lun caizheng jinrong maoyi 《李先念论财政金融贸易》下 [Li Xiannian Discusses Finance, Financing, and Trade Vol. 2]. China Financial and Economic Press, 1992. Li Xiannian wenxuan 《李先念文选》 [Collected Works of Li Xiannian]. People’s Press, 1989. Li Xiannian zhuan (1949–1992) 《李先念传 (1949–1992)》下 [Biography of Li Xiannian (1949–1992) Vol. 2]. Central Documentary Press, 2009. Ma Qibin et al. 马齐彬等, Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishi nian 《中国共产党 执政四十年》 [Forty Years in Power of the Chinese Communist Party]. CCP Party History Materials Press, 1989. Shiyi jie sanzhong quanhui yilai dang de lici quanguo daibiao dahui zhongyang quanhui zhongyao wenjian xuanbian 《十一届三中全会以来党的历次全国代表大会 中央全会重要文件选编》上 [Selected Important Documents From Several National People’s Congress Central Plena Since the Eleventh Congress’s Third Plenum Vol. 1]. Central Documentary Press, 1997.

CHAPTER 3

The 156 Projects and New China’s Industrial and Urban Development He Yimin and Zhou Mingchang Abstract During the “First Five-year Plan” period, New China began comprehensive socialist industrialized construction, the turning point of which was the 156 projects. Setting these major economic construction projects in motion not only changed the road and direction of China’s urban development, but also provided China’s cities with a strong driver of rapid development, thus thrusting China’s cities into a new stage guided by a development strategy that prioritized heavy industry. Under the effects of this development model, the development of China’s cities displayed such new characteristics as economization of urban functions, rapid development of urbanization, prioritized development in large and mid-sized cities, balanced regional-urban development, etc. This change to urban development both completely changed the half-colonial, halffeudal nature of Chinese cities and laid a completely new foundation for the their development.

Keywords 156 projects – industrial and urban development – model – characteristics

On October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of China was formally founded. This meant not only regime change in China, but also “a major turning point in the course of China’s modernization.”1 Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in late 1951, New China rapidly established a devel* Essay submitted November 20, 2005. He Yimin is a professor at the Sichuan University Urban Research Institute, and Zhou Mingchang is a lecturer in the urban construction department at the Sichuan College of Architectural Technology. 1  Gilbert Rozman, Zhongguo de xiandaihua 《中国的现代化》 [The Modernization of China], translated from the English, (Jiangsu People’s Press, 2003), 6. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004292673_004

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opment strategy prioritizing heavy industry based on the “Soviet Model.” This strategy greatly propelled the rapid development of New China’s economy and society. As the major vessels of space for heavy industry to develop, New China’s cities entered an entirely new historical era of development. 1

Distribution of the 156 Projects and Regional Reorganization of Industry in New China

The “First Five-year Plan,” which China began implementing in 1953, established the primary direction of New China’s industrialized development— guided by a priority on heavy industry—i.e. “concentrate primary forces to implement industrial construction, with the 156 construction projects the Soviet Union is helping China design as its core, and composed of the 694 overquota complementary construction projects, to establish the initial foundation of China’s socialist industrialization.” The objectives were: to “cause China to be able to reform the original face of China’s national economy on a material resources foundation of major socialist industry” by “establishing and expanding the electricity industry, the coal industry, and the petroleum industry; establishing and expanding the modernized steel industry, non-ferrous metals industry, and basic chemicals industry; establishing machinery manufacturing industries that manufacture large metal cutting machines, power generation equipment, metallurgy equipment, mining equipment, automobiles, tractors, and airplanes.”2 Of the 156 projects the Soviets helped us build, actual construction began on 150 during the “First Five-year Plan”: “44 military industry enterprises, including 12 in the aviation industry, 10 in the electronics industry, 16 in the weapons industry, two in the aerospace industry, and four in the shipbuilding industry; 20 metallurgy industry enterprises, of which seven in the steel industry, 13 in the non-ferrous metals industry, and seven in the chemical industry; 24 machinery processing enterprises; 52 energy industry enterprises, of which 25 in the coal and electricity industries and two in the petroleum industry; and three in light industry and pharmaceuticals.”3 The primary objective of 2  Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian diliu ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》第 6 册 [Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Nation Vol. 6], (Central Documentary Press, 1993), 410–411. 3  Bo Yibo 薄一波, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, shang 《若干重大决策与 事件的回顾》上 [A Look Back on Several Major Policy Decisions and Events, Vol. 1], (People’s Press, 1991), 297.

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building these projects was to build a rather complete basic industrial system and national defense industry system for China, so as to lay an initial foundation for industrialization in New China. In the distribution of the 156 projects, the central government—on the basis of such construction principles as regional balanced development, resource allocations, focused development on inland industry, abundant consideration of defense and national security, etc.—established a regional location plan: on the one hand allowing the Northeast, Shanghai, and other existing industrial bases to play an ample role, and on the other implementing focus construction in the region north of the Yangtze River and east of Baotou and Lanzhou, making it into a new industrial base.4 At the nationwide macro level, the 156 projects were “primarily deployed in the northeastern region, the central region, and the western region. Out of the 106 civil industrial enterprises of the 150 projects, 50 were deployed in the northeastern region and 32 in the central region. Of the 44 national defense enterprises, 35 were deployed in the central and western regions, of which 21 were located in the two provinces of Sichuan and Shaanxi.”5 In terms of coastal/inland division, 118 of the 150 construction projects were planned in inland locations, accounting for 79 percent of total projects; coastal regions accounted for the remaining 21 percent. In macro terms, although the 156 projects of the “First Five-year Plan” were dispersed widely, it is doubtless that—in order to control investment costs of infrastructure construction—these projects were mostly deployed in large and mid-sized cities with pre-existing good foundations for development, such as the northeastern cities of Shenyang, Jilin, Fushun, Harbin, Anshan, and Qiqihar, the northern cities of Beijing, Taiyuan, Shijiazhuang, and Baotou, the northwestern cities of Xian and Lanzhou, and southwestern cities like Chengdu, etc.6 In micro terms, in order to reap benefits from the scale 4  Dangdai zhongguo de jibenjianshe, shang 《当代中国的基本建设》上 [Infrastructure in Contemporary China, Vol. 1], ed. Peng Min 彭敏, (China Social Sciences Press, 1989), 45. 5  See: Bo Yibo 薄一波, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu 《若干重大决策与 事件的回顾》 [A Look Back on Several Major Policy Decisions and Events], (People’s Press, 1991): 298. At the time, the nation was divided into the following regions: the eastern region—Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi; the central region—Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, and Jiangxi; the western region—Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Tibet. During the “First Five-year Plan” period, “coastal” referred to the eastern region, and “inland” referred to the central and western regions. 6  Lu Dadao 陆大道, Zhongguo gongye buju de lilun he shijian 《中国工业布局的理论和 实践》[Theory and Practice of China’s Industrial Distribution], (Science Press, 1990), 25.

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effect and agglomeration effect of investment, a large portion of large enterprises were coordinated with urban construction via joint factory site selection and grouped distribution, creating comprehensive, complete industrial zones. Table 3.1 demonstrates that these 156 projects were mostly distributed in core cities of emerging industrial zones and important supporting cities. Of those, 88 projects were situated in 18 focus cities: Beijing, Baotou, Taiyuan, Datong, Shijiazhuang, Xian, Lanzhou, Wuhan, Luoyang, Zhengzhou, Zhuzhou, table 3.1

Time distribution of the 156 projects

Province

Projects

Cities and numbers of projects

Liaoning

24

Shaanxi

24

Heilongjiang

22

Shanxi Jilin

15 10

Henan

10

Gansu Sichuan Hebei Inner Mongolia Beijing Yunnan Jiangxi Hunan Hubei Xinjiang Anhui

8 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 1 1

Shenyang 7, Fushun 8, Fuxin 4, Anshan 1, Benxi 1, Dalian 1, Yangjiazhangzi 1, Huludao 1 Xian 14, Xingping 4, Baoji 2, Huxian 2, Tongchuan 1, Weinan 1 Harbin 10, Fulaerji 3, Hegang 4, Jiamusi 2, Jixi 2, Shuangyashan 1 Taiyuan 11, Datong 2, Houma 1, Lu’an 1 Jilin City 6, Changchun 1, Fengman 1, Liaoyuan 1, Tonghua 1 Luoyang 6, Zhengzhou 1, Sanmenxia 1, Pingdingshan 1, Jiaozuo 1 Lanzhou 6, Baiyin 1, Haojiachuan 1 Chengdu 5, Chongqing 1 Shijiazhuang 2, Fengfeng 2, Rehe 1 Baotou 5 Beijing 4 Gejiu 2, Dongchuan 1, Huize 1 Nanchang 1, Daqian 1, Qiannan 1, Dingnan 1 Zhuzhou 3, Xiangtan 1 Wuhan 3 Urumqi 1 Huainan 1

Data source: Dong Zhikai and Wu Jiang 董志凯、吴江, Xin zhongguo gongye de dianjishi—156 xiang jianshe yanjiu 《新中国工业的奠基石——156 项建设研究》 [Cornerstone of New China’s Industry—Research into the 156 Construction Projects], (Guangdong Economic Press, 2004), 420–493.

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Shenyang, Anshan, Changchun, Jilin, Harbin, Fulaerji, and Chengdu.7 These 88 projects in 18 cities accounted for over 58% of all 150 projects in which real construction took place. During the same period, 694 over-quota projects complementing the 156 projects were constructed in urban bases. In 1954, the State Planning Commission approved the site selection plans of the 694 matching construction projects during the “First Five-year Plan.” These projects were mostly distributed over 91 cities and 116 workers towns. Sixty-five percent of these projects were distributed in 45 cities and 61 workers towns west of the BeijingGuangzhou railway. The other 35 percent were distributed in 46 cities and 55 workers towns east of the Beijing-Guangzhou railway and in the Northeast.8 This project distribution not only fundamentally adjusted the space orientation of New China’s industrialization but also laid a foundation for the development of China’s cities, particularly inland cities. The industrialization construction of the “First Five-year Plan”—centered around the 156 projects—caused China’s level of industrial technology to rise from their pre-liberation level, a century behind that of developed industrial nations, to the level of the 1940s.9 As of 1957, New China had established eight major industrial zones, with large and mid-sized cities at their cores: the northeastern industrial zone with centers in Shenyang and Anshan; the North China industrial zone with centers in Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan; the northwestern industrial zone with Taiyuan as its center; the Hubei industrial zone with Wuhan as its center; the Zheng-Luo-Bian [Zhengzhou, Luoyang, and Bianliang, i.e. Kaifeng] industrial zone with Zhengzhou as its center; the Shaanxi industrial zone with Xian as its center; the Gansu industrial zone with Lanzhou as its center; and the Southern Sichuan industrial zone with Chongqing as its

7  1953–1957 nian zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian (guding zichan touzi he jianzhuye juan《1953–1957 中华人民共和国经济档案资料选编》(固定 资产投资和建筑业卷) [Selected PRC Economic Files and Materials 1953–1957 (Fixed Asset Investments and Construction Volume)], ed. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and China State Archives Administration 中国社会科学院、中央档案馆, (China Commodity Prices Press, 1999), 892. 8  Dangdai zhongguo de chengshi jianshe 《当代中国的城市建设》 [Urban Construction in Contemporary China], ed. Cao Hongtao and Chu Chuanheng 曹洪涛、储传亨, (China Social Sciences Press, 1990), 48. 9  Chen Xi 陈夕, “156 xiang gongcheng yu zhongguo gongye de xiandaihua” 《156 项工程与中国工业的现代化》 [The 156 Projects and the Modernization of China’s Industry], in Dang de wenxian 《党的文献》 (1999) 5.

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center.10 This fundamentally changed the lopsided industrial distribution of Old China, in which 70 percent of industry and industrial cities were concentrated in eastern coastal regions. 2

The Emergence of Many Types of Industrial City Clusters During the “First Five-year Plan”

Such factors as heavy industry strategic decisions, industry sector compositions, regional distribution of industrialization, infrastructure principles, the size of industry projects, etc.—at the core of all of which were the 156 projects—determined such fundamental factors as the drivers, direction, nature, and technology of urban development, as well as urban construction methods, regional structures, planning structures, etc. As an important component of the national economy, urban construction transitioned from its former history of zero planning and high decentralization into a new era of planned construction based on focus construction plans. From this point, China formally opened a new chapter of orderly construction and focus development of modernized industrial cities. table 3.2

Newly constructed and expanded cities during the “First Five-year Plan” Quantity

6 Newly constructed cities Large-scale 20 expanded cities

West of the BeijingGuangzhou railway

Baotou (New District), Luoyang (Jianxi District), Baiyin, Zhuzhou, Maoming Beijing, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Datong, Xian, Lanzhou, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, Baoji, Zhanjiang

East of the Beijing-Guangzhou railway

Northeast

Fulaerji

Shanghai, Tianjin

Shenyang, Lüda, Anshan, Changchun, Jilin, Fushun, Harbin

10  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji shi, shang juan 《中华人民共和国经济史》上卷 [Economic History of the PRC, Vol. 1], ed. Dong Fu 董辅, (Economy and Science Press, 1999), 290.

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Table 3.2 Newly constructed and expanded cities during the “First Five-year Plan” (cont.)

Ordinary expanded cities

Quantity

West of the BeijingGuangzhou railway

East of the Beijing-Guangzhou railway

Northeast

74

Baoding, Handan, Zhangjiakou, Yangquan, Changzhi, Yuci, Jining, Xianyang, Tianshui, Yinchuan, Xining, Urumqi, Kashgar, Yining, Jiaozuo, Xinzhang, Anyang, Yichang, Changsha, Xiangtan, Guangzhou, Shaoguan, Haikou, Nanning, Liuzhou, Guilin, Pingxiang, Chongqing, Zigong, Neijiang, Luzhou, Yibin, Nanchong, Zunyi, Guiyang, Gejiu, Kunming

Qinhuangdao, Tangshan, Chengde, Jinan, Qingdao, Zibo, Weifang, Xuzhou, Hangzhou, Hefei, Wuhu, Bengbu, Huainan, Ma’anshan, Tongguanshan, Nanchang, Jingdezhen, Jiujiang, Huangshi, Fuzhou

Hailar, Benxi, Ulanhot, Xizhou, Huludao, Andong, Fuxin, Yingkou, Liaoyang, Tonghua, Liaoyuan, Yanji, Mudanjiang, Jiamusi, Hegang, Shuangyashan, Jixi

Data source: Dang dai zhong guo de cheng shi jian she 《当代中国的城市建设》 [Urban Construction in Contemporary China], ed. Cao Hongtao and Chu Chuanheng 曹洪涛、储传亨, (China Social Sciences Press, 1990), 65–66.

During this period, urban construction work around the nation—under guiding principles of “serve industrialization, production, and laboring people” and “focused construction, stable progress”—made outstanding achievements. Many consumption-oriented cities were gradually reconstructed into production-oriented cities. Many old industrial cities were fundamentally remade. Many new industrial cities were built up. Many existing cities were developed. Many rural villages were formed into new cities or workers towns. A great number of industrial cities and eight emerging industrial zones were born on our nation’s vast territory. The first nationwide urban construction conference in 1954 put forward that, “the construction and development of socialist cities must inevitably belong to the construction and development of socialist industry; the speed of development of socialist cities must inevitably be determined by the speed

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table 3.3 Primary industrial cities completely constructed or basically constructed during the “First Five-year Plan” period

Coal cities

Heavy industry cities

Datong, Fuxin, Fushun, Liaoyuan, Benxi, Tonghua, Hegang, Jixi, Shuangyashan, Pingdingshan, Jiaozuo, Tongchuan, Huainan Petroleum industry cities Fushun, Yumen Metallurgy industry cities Chengde, Anshan, Baotou, Wuhan, (steel, non-ferrous metals, etc.) Benxi, Jilin, Fulaerji, Fushun, Harbin, Zhuzhou, Gejiu, Baiyin Power generation cities Shijiazhuang, Zhengzhou, Taiyuan, Fuxin Chemical industry cities Jilin, Taiyuan, Lanzhou Machinery industry (including Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Fulaerji, electronics) cities Luoyang, Wuhan, Zhuzhou, Xiangtan, Lanzhou, Xian, Chengdu Food industry cities

Light industry cities

Textile industry cities Forestry industry cities Paper industry cities Other light industry cities

Comprehensive industrial cities

Harbin, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou Beijing, Shijiazhuang, Handan, Zhengzhou, Xian, Xianyang Yichun Jiamusi Shijiazhuang (pharmaceutical industry) Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, Chongqing, Taiyuan

Data source: compiled based on the construction table of the 156 projects (105 civil industry projects) from the “First Five-year Plan”; 1953–1957 Nian zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian (guding zichan touzi he jianzhuye juan 《1953–1957 中华人民共和国 经济档案资料选编》(固定资产投资和建筑业卷) [Selected PRC Economic Files and Materials 1953–1957 (Fixed Asset Investments and Construction Volume)] ed. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and China State Archives Administration 中国社会科学院、 中央档案馆, (China Commodity Prices Press, 1999),: 374–382; for “Industrial City Classification Standards,” see Gu Chaolin et al. 顾朝林等, Zhong guo cheng shi di li 《中国城市地理》[Chinese Urban Geography], (Business Press, 1999), 185.

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of development of socialist industry.”11 This gave rise to the new model of urban construction orienting industrial cities in which the 156 projects and 694 complementary projects were constructed. During the “First Five-year plan,” as industrial construction and other economic and cultural construction developed by leaps and bounds, cities around the nation—under the correct guidance of the Party and the government and with the great assistance of Soviet experts—achieved large-scale, planned focus construction, and urban construction in New China entered the first upsurge in urban construction. Large-scale economic construction—with the 156 projects at its core— caused New China not only to quickly construct a slew of core industrial cities and important complementary industrial cities, but also initially gave rise to many types of industrial urban clusters, particularly heavy industry cities and comprehensive industrial cities; this initially laid the foundation for the development of China’s urbanization and industrial cities. For example, coal industry cities: Datong, Fuxin, Benxi, etc; the three big steel industry cities: Anshan, Baotou, and Wuhan; non-ferrous metal industry cities: Fushun, Jilin, Taiyuan, and Lanzhou; machinery industry cities: Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, Qiqihar (Fulaerji), Luoyang, Wuhan, Zhuzhou, Xian, Lanzhou, Chengdu, etc.; petrochemical industry cities: Lanzhou, Fushun, etc.; coal and steel cities: Fushun, Benxi, etc; comprehensive industrial cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Wuhan, Chongqing, Taiyuan, etc.; the five big emerging textile industry cities: Beijing, Shijiazhuang, Handan, Zhengzhou, and Xian; the forestry industry city of Yichun; the paper industry city of Jiamusi; and pharmaceutical industry cities: Shijiazhuang, etc. The rise of different types of industrial cities, the primary theme of which being heavy industry, represented the development direction of China’s cities at the time. The formation of industrial urban agglomeration zones was another notable display of the large-scale development of industrial cities in the early period of New China. At this time the focus of investment in urban industry and the development of emerging industrial cities—excluding rapid development in old industrial cities along the coast and ceaseless expansion of industrial scale—further moved from the mid- and downstream reaches of the Yangtze northward toward the Northeast and North China, forming a line from Harbin to Dalian, including Anshan, Fushun, Changchun, Jilin, Harbin, Qiqihar, and other large and mid-sized cities on a heavy industry city development axis: Hebei, Shanxi, and the central-northern section of the Beijing-Guangzhou railway; the central-western section of the Longhai railway, including 11  “Guanche zhongdian jianshe chengshi de fangzhen” 《贯彻重点建设城市的方针》 [Thoroughly Implementing the Guiding Policy of Focusing on Constructing Cities], in Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, August 11, 1954, first edition.

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Beijing, Taiyuan, Datong, Shijiazhuang, Baotou, Shenyang, Zhengzhou, Xian, Zhanzhou and other industrial urban agglomeration zones of North China and the Northwest. At the same time this gave rise to a Central China industrial urban agglomeration zone with Wuhan, Zhuzhou, and other cities as its centers, and a southwestern industrial urban agglomeration zone with Chengdu and Chongqing as its centers.12 Construction was initially completed on inland emerging industrial zones and new cities. At the same time that this laid an initial foundation for an independent, relatively complete industrial system and national economic system in China, it also formed regional and even nationwide “growth poles” in central-western regions; this formed a relatively solid base and vessel for the sustained development of China’s future industrialization and urbanization. For this reason, the modernization spurred by the 156 projects not only promoted concrete urban progress, but also drove rejuvenation of China’s urban system to a certain degree. 3

Analysis of the Characteristics of Urban Development in the Early Period of New China

A look at the overall situation rom 1949 to 1957 reveals that during this period, cities of New China alighted onto a development road different from any other period in history—a new development model of heavy industry city construction oriented by a development strategy that placed priority on heavy industry. This model set the basic framework for China’s urban development under the planned economic system, and exerted a significant influence on the formation of contemporary China’s urban system. There were new characteristics to urban development in the early period of new China, the forerunner of which was industrial cities. 3.1 Economization of Urban Functions By “urban functions,” we mean tasks undertaken and effects made by cities in national and regional development. In the overall, on the eve of the founding of New China, the economic functions of Chinese cities were weak, and consumption-oriented cities occupied the dominant position. After the founding of New China, rapid economic construction urgently necessitated a national economic management system, which substituted historical administrative centers as economic centers. During the “First Five-year Plan” period, a new planned economic system was established; this not only strengthened the political functions of all of China’s administrative center cites, but also further 12  Lu Dadao, 194–195.

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strengthened their economic functions. The common drive of new political and economic functions, as well as a series of State policies giving priority to development of industry and construction of production-oriented industrial cities imbued administrative center cities with a strong driver of development, which rapidly brought about a transition of consumption-oriented cities into production-oriented cities. Such changes to urban functions were particularly striking in the processes of remaking and constructing provincial capital cities and some important large and mid-sized cities. Many administrative center cities were developed into multi-functional comprehensive industrial cities. On the other hand, as the focus of Chinese economic development was from beginning to end placed on energy, raw materials, the national defense industry, and heavy industry, a slew of industrial, mining, and industrial and mining cities emerged and became important components of China’s urban system. From 1949 to 1957, the proportion of the urban economy to the overall national economy grew markedly. In 1949, the total national industrial and agricultural output was 46.61 billion yuan, of which industry accounted for 14.02 billion, about 30 percent. In 1957 the national agricultural and industrial output had risen to 138.74 billion yuan, of which industry accounted for 78.39 billion, 56.5 percent.13 That was a 4.6-fold increase of industrial output. From this point, production-oriented cities replaced consumption-oriented cities, and the economic functions of China’s cities were markedly strengthened. During this period, changes to urban functions were concentrated in the formation and development of different types of industrial cities and a portion of comprehensive industrial cities. The rise of the multitudes of industrial cities, as well as their development into comprehensive industrial cities, symbolized the development direction of China’s cities under the planned economic system. 3.2 Acceleration of Urbanization Increases to the number of cities was an important manifestation of accelerated urbanization during this period. In 1949 there were 136 officiallydesignated cities, up to 160 in 1952, for an increase of 24 and an annual average increase of 5.9 percent. By 1957 the total was 176, and increase of 16 over 1952, an average annual growth of two percent over the five-year span. Over the eight-year span the number increased by 40, an average of five per year, or an annual increase of 3.7 percent.

13  Weida de shinian 《伟大的十年》 [A Great Decade], ed. National Bureau of Statistics 国家统计局, (People’s Press, 1959), 14–15.

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table 3.4 China’s urbanization and urban development Year

Directcontrolled cities

Prefectural level cities

County level cities

Total

Total urban population

Percentage of total population

1949 1952 1957

12 12 3

545 54 67 67 92 92

66 81 81

132 160 176

57,650,000 71,630,000 99,490,000

10.60 12.46 15.39

Data Source: Pu Shanxin 蒲善新, Zhongguo xingzheng quhua gailun 《中国行政区划概论》 [Outline of China’s Division of Administrative Districts], (Knowledge Press, 1995), 360–361; Zhongguo tongji nianjian 《中国统计年鉴》 (1996)、(1997)、(1998) [China Statistical Yearbook Years 1996, 1997, 1998], (China Statistical Press, 1996, 1997, 1998); Ministry of Civil Affairs District Division and Place Naming Division 民政部区划地名司, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng quhua tongji biao” 《中华人民共和国行政区划统计表》[Statistical Table of PRC Administrative Districts], in Zhongguo fangyu 《中国方域》 (1999) 2, 38.

Rapid growth to the urban population was another important manifestation of accelerated urbanization in this period. After three years of economic recovery, at the end of 1952, the urban population had grown from 57.65 million in 1949 to 71.63 million. During the “First Five-year Plan” period, the 156 projects and many other major urban industrial development projects, as well as accompanying policies that opened cities to migration from the countryside, actively attracted rural migrants into cities and industrial and mining areas to find employment. This greatly propelled the healthy development of cities and urbanization. During this period, although the natural urban population growth rate was higher than that of the countryside, of total urban population growth from 1950 to 1957, mechanical growth accounted for 60.8 percent, and the total number of laborers who migrated from the countryside into cities was 23 million. The proportion of rural laborers to total national labor fell from 91.5 percent in 1949 to 88 percent in 1952, and further to 81.2 percent in 1957.14 By the end of 1957, the population of all officially-designated cities in the nation totaled 69.02 million, up to 99.49 million including the populations of all county-cities and towns; this was an increase of 27.86 million over 1952, a growth of 38.9 percent. The level of China’s urbanization grew from

14  Zhongguo tongji nianjian (1984) 《中国统计年鉴》 (1984) [China Statistical Yearbook (1984)], (China Statistical Press, 1984), 107, 108, 82.

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10.6 percent in 1949 to 12.46 percent in 1952, and again to 15.39 percent in 1957, for an average annual growth of nearly 0.6 percent.15 Over eight years, New China’s urbanization rate grew nearly 4.8 percent. Compared to the five percent increase in urbanization that had transpired over the previous hundred years in China (1851–1949), such a growth was unprecedented at the time. It was much higher than the average annual increase to urbanization of 0.46 percent that took place from 1950 to 1970; it was also higher than the world’s average urbanization rate at the time.16 3.3 Expansion of Large and Mid-sized Cities The 156 projects and supporting projects were primarily planned and constructed “distributed in groups for mutual coordination” centered in inland large and mid-sized cities. A large portion of those cities were provincial capitals and mid-sized cities. Under those conditions, great industrial development inevitably attracted large swaths of population to agglomerate, and such populations as workers, technicians, managers, service workers, and their families, etc., all increased greatly. Such prerequisite service functions as political service functions, management service functions, etc., inherent to cities, as well as the expansion of such economic functions as industry, production, etc., made it extremely easy for changes to take place to urban populations in a short period of time. If we assign the urban population growth rate of 1949 a value of 100, then that value was up to 142.2 in 1957. Population growth was fastest in provincial capitals; if we assign a value of 100 to the population growth rate in provincial capitals in 1949, the value was up to 217.2 in 1957.17 In 1957, of the 34 cities with populations of 500,000 and larger, 19 were provincial capitals, over 50 percent. Of those, nine provincial capitals had populations of over 1 million, accounting for 64 percent of particularly large cities.18 Table 3.5 clearly demonstrates that under the conditions of priority development of heavy industry at the time, particularly large and large cities were preferentially developed, even developed ahead of planning schedules. Midsized cities grew fastest, but growth in small cities was slow, some even declining in relative terms. The characteristics of urban population changes during 15  Dangdai zhongguo de chengshi jianshe 《当代中国的城市建设》 [Urban Construction in Contemporary China], 65–66. 16  Xie Wenhui and Deng Wei 谢文蕙、邓卫, Chengshi jingjixue 《城市经济学》 [Urban Economics], (Tsinghua University Press, 1996), 60. 17  Gu Chaolin 顾朝林, Zhongguo chengzhen tixi—lishi, xianzhuang, zhanwang 《中国城镇体系——历史、现状、展望》 [China’s Urban System—History, Status Quo, and Outlook], (Business Press, 1996), 193–194. 18  Weida de shinian 《伟大的十年》 [A Great Decade], 10.

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table 3.5  Changes in population of Chinese cities, 1949–1957 1949 Percentage of total Chinese cities

Number of cities

1952 Percentage of total Chinese cities

Number of cities

1957 Percentage of total Chinese cities

Population of city

Number of cities

Over 1 million 500,000– 1 million 200,000– 500,000 Under 200,000 Total

5

3.7

9

5.6

14

8

7

5.1

15

9.4

20

12

18

13.2

21

13.1

37

21

106

78.0

115

71.9

105

59

136

100

160

100

176

100

Data Source: Gu Chaolin 顾朝林, Zhongguo chengzhen tixi—lishi, xianzhuang, zhanwang 《中国城镇体系——历史、现状、展望》 [China’s Urban System—History, Status Quo, and Outlook], (Business Press, 1996), 167–170; city populations from the years 1949, 1952, and 1957 taken from Xin zhongguo chengshi 50 nian 《新中国城市 50 年》 [50 Years of Cities in New China], ed. National Bureau of Statistics Urban Economics and Society Research Team 国家统计局城市经济社会调查总队, (Xinhua Press, 1999), 8; Weida de shinian《伟大的十年》 [A Great Decade], ed. National Bureau of Statistics 国家统计局, (People’s Press, 1959), 10–11.

this period were: large and mid-sized cities grew faster than small cities; the proportion of mid-sized cities growing into large cities was the greatest; and the proportion of small cities growing into mid-sized cities was the smallest. 3.4 Urban Regional Distribution Tends Toward Equilibrium Regional imbalances in urban industrial development in Old China determined imbalances in urban distribution. There were 58 officially-designated cities in the country in 1948, of which 26 were located in the East, which accounted for 46.6 percent of cities and 67.4 percent of urban population. There were 22 cities in the Center, which accounted for 36.2 percent of cities and 18.8% of urban population. The remaining 10 cities were in the West, which accounted for 17.2 percent of cities and 13.8 percent of urban population.19 19  Dangdai zhongguo de chengshi jianshe 《当代中国的城市建设》 [Urban Construction in Contemporary China], 123.

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table 3.6 Proportions of cities in the east, center, and west

Region

1949 Number of cities

Proportion of total (%)

1952 Number of cities

Proportion of total (%)

1957 Number of cities

Proportion of total (%)

East Center West Nationwide

69 54 13 136

50.4 40.0 9.6 100

68 62 30 160

42.5 38.9 18.6 100

73 73 30 176

41.5 41.5 17.0 100

Data source: same as Table 3.5

As said above, the 156 projects were primarily distributed in large and midsized cities in the central and western regions. Thus the regional orientation of industrialization determined the regional distribution of urban development. Table 3.6 demonstrates that of the 176 officially-designated cities in 1957, 73 were in the East (41.5 percent), 73 in the Center (41.5 percent), and 30 in the West (17 percent). The ratio of cities in the East, Center, and West changed from 2.3 : 2.1 : 1 in 1952 to 2.4 : 2.4 : 1 in 1957. From 1952 to 1957, urban development in the central region was fastest, with the number of cities growing from 62 to 73, a growth of 18 percent, and its proportion of total cities growing 2.6 percent. The proportion of western cities to total cities grew 7.4 percent from 1949 to 1957. There were marked changes to New China’s regional distribution of cities following 1949, as industrial construction—with the 156 projects at its core—drove the distribution of cities in New China toward development equilibrium. 3.5 Transition to Planning of Urban Development In the early period of New China, highly centralized political and economic systems were comprehensively established, with final decision-making authority over nationwide economic construction and urban construction resting with the central government. After construction began on the 156 focus projects, as limited human, material, and financial resources needed to be concentrated in the development of production and industrial construction, and as urban construction needed to serve industrial construction and be united with State focus construction, focus construction on a portion of cities transpired during only one period; so only an uneven application of resources could bring about rapid results. During the three-year recovery period, the Northeast was

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a State focus construction region, meaning rapid development of Shenyang, Anshan, Fushun, Benxi, Harbin, Qiqihar, and other cities, whereas inland cities remained in a stage of recovery. During the “First Five-year Plan” period, cities—excluding those in the Northeast already designated for focus construction—such as Wuhan, Luoyang, Lanzhou, Taiyuan, Datong, Shijiazhuang, Xian, Chengdu, Zhuzhou, Baotou, etc., were successively entered into the ranks of focus construction cities. These cities rapidly became the new backbone of China’s industrialization. Socialist institutions and the planned economic system caused China’s economic development to be of a planned nature. Urban construction, i.e. new construction and expansion, could only proceed in an orderly, planned manner according to long-term State plans, in order to be suitable to the needs of large-scale economic construction. This determined urban development’s characteristic of being of a planned nature. The planned nature of urban development—under the guidance of State planning and control of State policies—avoided various severe social problems encountered in some developing nations which promote blind development. It also more forcefully propelled industrialization and construction of the national economy. All the above indicate that industrial construction during the early period of New China—with the 156 projects at its core—not only drove fundamental changes to the classification structure, regional structure, functional structure, etc., of China’s industrial cities, but also brought about new characteristics and laws in the formation and development of China’s industrial cities. The urban development model of the time, which was oriented by a development strategy prioritizing heavy industry, was formally established and thoroughly changed the half-colonial, half-feudal nature of cities in Old China, causing unprecedented changes to the development road and development direction of New China’s cities, and laying a completely new foundation for the future development of China’s cities. References 1953–1957 nian zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian (guding zichan touzi he jianzhuye juan《1953–1957 中华人民共和国经济档案资料 选编》(固定资产投资和建筑业卷) [Selected PRC Economic Files and Materials 1953–1957 (Fixed Asset Investments and Construction Volume)], ed. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and China State Archives Administration中国社会 科学院、中央档案馆. China Commodity Prices Press, 1999.

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Bo Yibo 薄一波, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, shang 《若干重大决 策与事件的回顾》上 [A Look Back on Several Major Policy Decisions and Events, Vol. 1]. People’s Press, 1991. Chen Xi 陈夕, “156 xiang gongcheng yu zhongguo gongye de xiandaihua”《156 项工 程与中国工业的现代化》 [The 156 Projects and the Modernization of China’s Industry], in Dang de wenxian 《党的文献》 (1999) 5. Dangdai zhongguo de chengshi jianshe 《当代中国的城市建设》 [Urban Construction in Contemporary China], ed. Cao Hongtao and Chu Chuanheng 曹洪涛、储传亨. China Social Sciences Press, 1990. Dangdai zhongguo de jibenjianshe, shang 《当代中国的基本建设》上 [Infras­ tructure in Contemporary China, Vol. 1], ed. Peng Min 彭敏. China Social Sciences Press, 1989. Gu Chaolin 顾朝林, Zhongguo chengzhen tixi—lishi, xianzhuang, zhanwang 《中国城 镇体系——历史、现状、展望》 [China’s Urban System—History, Status Quo, and Outlook]. Business Press, 1996. “Guanche zhongdian jianshe chengshi de fangzhen” 《贯彻重点建设城市的 方针》 [Thoroughly Implementing the Guiding Policy of Focusing on Constructing Cities], in Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, August 11, 1954, first edition. Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian diliu ce 《建国以来重要文献选编》第 6 册 [Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Nation Vol. 6]. Central Documentary Press, 1993. Lu Dadao 陆大道, Zhongguo gongye buju de lilun he shijian 《中国工业布局的 理论和实践》 [Theory and Practice of China’s Industrial Distribution]. Science Press, 1990. Rozman, Gilbert, Zhongguo de xiandaihua 《中国的现代化》 [The Modernization of China], translated from the English. Jiangsu People’s Press, 2003. Weida de shinian 《伟大的十年》 [A Great Decade], ed. National Bureau of Statistics 国家统计局. People’s Press, 1959. Xie Wenhui and Deng Wei 谢文蕙、邓卫, Chengshi jingjixue 《城市经济学》 [Urban Economics]. Tsinghua University Press, 1996. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji shi shang juan 《中华人民共和国经济史》上卷 [Economic History of the PRC, Vol. 1], ed. Dong Fu 董辅. Economy and Science Press, 1999. Zhongguo tongji nianjian (1983) 《中国统计年鉴》 (1983) [China Statistical Yearbook (1983)]. China Statistical Press, 1983. Zhongguo tongji nianjian (1984)《中国统计年鉴》(1984) [China Statistical Yearbook (1984)]. China Statistical Press, 1984.

CHAPTER 4

Emergency Measures Taken During the Three-Year Period of Economic Difficulty Shang Changfeng Abstract During the three-years of difficulty from 1959 to 1961, the Party and the State earnestly summarized experience, paid attention to correcting errors, and went all out to lead the people to struggle to remedy the disaster. They took a series of measures which downsized the urban population, reduced the scale of grain requisitioning, urgently allocated and imported grains, economized on clothing and food and implemented the “gourds, vegetables, and substitutes” policy for grains, as well as increasing grain purchase prices, making a hard push in agriculture, etc. This gradually turned the situation around and ended up preserving social order and relative stability.

Keywords Three year period of difficulty – emergency disaster relief – grain – population – “gourds, vegetables, and substitutes”

Following the failure of the “Great Leap Forward” movement, China’s national economy encountered severe difficulties between the years 1959 to 1961. Nationwide agricultural and industrial output values fell dramatically. The nation’s total grain output fell from 400 billion jin in 1958 to 340 billion in 1959, then to 287 billion in 1960, even lower than 1951’s figure.1 Grain output rebounded slightly to 295 billion jin in 1961. Supply of grains, edible oils, * Essay submitted April 14, 2009. Shang Changfeng was a doctorate student at the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the time this essay was submitted. 1  Zhongguo nongcun jingji tongji daquan《中国农村经济统计大全 (1949–1986)》[Statis­ tical Encyclopedia of China’s Rural Economy] (1949–1986), ed. Ministry of Agriculture Planning Department 农业部计划司, (Beijing: Agricultural Press, 1989), 146.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004292673_005

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meat, eggs, etc., grew extremely tight, and there was a nationwide famine. The severe situation was a lesson to the whole party. In November 1960, the Central Committee issued the “Emergency Instructions Regarding the Present Policy Issues of Rural People’s Collectives,” which demanded that the entire Party do its utmost to resolve all manner of “leftist” deviations; to arrange for all levels of leadership and the entire body of cadres to make deep forays into rural villages; to read and explain policies to grassroots cadres and peasants; and to correct errors, implement policies, and struggle to reverse the difficulties together with them. At the same time, the Party and the State adopted a series of emergency relief measures. 1

Emergency Reallocations and Imports of Grain to Respond to the Grain Crisis

The first half of 1960 was the worst part of the famine. Statistics indicate that the grain inventories of all 82 large and mid-sized cities in the nation were less than one third of normal. At this time in the cities of Nanchang, Jingdezhen, Ganzhou, and Jiujiang in the province of Jiangxi, a major diverter of rice to elsewhere in the nation, rice was sold immediately upon being diverted.2 In the face of a nationwide famine, the Party issued a series of orders in 1960, calling for the emergency reallocation of grains. To respond to the emergency, the Party called for seasonal adjustments of “using early to save late” and “using late to save early,” i.e. first sending the year’s earliest wheat and rice from the South to the North to assist supply shortages prior to the autumn grain harvest of the Northeast; then, in winter and spring, sending northeastern grains to southern regions in need during spring famines.3 To assuage some concerns in the areas shipping grains away, the Center expressed that, “the Center is deeply concerned about the areas diverting away grains; we will send assistance to those regions facing cyclical difficulties in July, August, and September by all conceivable means. Right now it is important that these regions absolutely first

2  Dangdai zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo 《当代中国的粮食工作》 [Modern China’s Grain Work], (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1988), 107. 3  Yang Shaoqiao 杨少桥, “Wei min shi jiejin xinli” 《为民食竭尽心力》 [Going all out to feed the people] and “Huainian Li Xiannian tongzhi” 《怀念李先念同志》 [Remembering Comrade Li Xiannian] in Weida de renmin gongpu—huainian Li Xiannian tongzhi《伟大 的人民公仆 怀念李先念同志》 [Great Servant of the People, Remembering Comrade Li Xiannian], (Beijing: Central Documentary Press, 1993), 250.

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divert away their grain and allow the Center to begin maneuvering.”4 In order to accelerate the grain diversion turnover, the Central Committee established the Central Grain, Cotton, and Oil Diversion Command Center in 1960, led by Li Xiannian, and instructed that all rail and truck transit serve the task of emergency diversion of grains. In the first half of 1960, all manner of vehicles were use to transport grain, including 1540 military vehicles,5 and 1200 vehicles were imported specifically for the transport of grain.6 Incomplete statistics indicate that in 1960, there were over 57 million person-trips, over 3.1 million animal-trips, over 4.7 million private vehicle-trips, and over 300,000 boat-trips involved in the transport of grain.7 After a period of hardship and strenuous effort, the work of grain diversion achieved a certain degree of results. In the most severe year of 1960, 11 rice-producing regions diverted away 9.06 billion jin of grain, of which 7.28 billion jin were taken from granaries.8 From July 1960 to June 1961, 4.2 billion jin of “dead space” grain and “difficult-to-transport grain” were diverted from overstocked mountainous regions to the plains, from secondary lines to main lines; the “dead grain” thus became “living grain,” effectively supporting urban areas and industrial and mining areas.9 In addition to major diversions of grain from remote granaries, the seasonal redistribution of grain between provinces in 1961 and 1962 accounted for 12.3 percent of all interprovincial commerce. In 1961, the provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang increased inter-provincial commerce by 2.63 billion jin on the strength of seasonal grain adjustments alone.10 However, as most provinces diverting away grain truly had no grain to send, the execution of the grain diversion project was far from ideal. By November 1960, despite a great deal of effort on many parts, the grain diversion project had still not been completed.

4  “Zhongyang guanyu jianjue wancheng liangshi diaobo renwu, jixu zhuajin anpai renmin shenghuo duguo chunhuang de tongzhi” 《中央关于坚决完成粮食调拨任务, 继续抓紧安排人民生活度过春荒的通知》 [Central Notice Regarding Resolutely Com­pleting the Task of Grain Allocations and Continuing to Urgently Plan for the People’s Lives to Tide Through the Spring Famine], February 13, 1961. 5  State Council Finance and Trade Office 国务院财贸办公室, “Guanyu jinji diaoyun liangshi de ji xiang cuoshi de baogao 《关于紧急调运粮食的几项措施的报告》[Report Regarding Several Measures for Urgently Diverting Grains], April 17, 1960. 6  Liu Minggang 刘明钢, “Zhou Enlai kang huang” 《周恩来抗荒》 [Zhou Enlai Resists Famine], in Dangshi zongheng 《党史纵横》 4 (2008). 7  Yang Shaoqiao, 271, 272. 8  Ibid., 122. 9  Ibid., 273. 10  Ibid., 122.

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To further mitigate the grain shortages, the State also opted to import grain. In December 1960, the State Council Finance and Trade Office calculated that at the end of 1960, the true extent of the grain shortage might be near 1.5 billion jin; “the greatest danger will be from March to June next year, when many regions and large and mid-sized cities might run out of stock and experience trouble.”11 To this end, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and others conducted repeated investigations into possible allocation plans. On December 30 at a central work conference, Chen Yun proposed that, “in the import of grains, we should import as much as we can, as I think that ‘eating comes first and construction comes second.’ ”12 The Center concurred. Grains were then bought primarily from Canada and Australia. However, in the first half of 1961, Canada, Australia, and other nations declared national disasters and announced that payments for grain could not be deferred and that grain prices had increased.13 In August 1961, Chen Yun—with the consent of Mao Zedong—decided to buy American grain transshipped through France.14 After efforts, the first shipload of grain was delivered to Tianjin, in the space of only a month after the decision had been made.15 “Prior to June 30, 1960, we rushed to transport 2.15 million tonnes (4.3 billion jin) of grain, which got here just in the nick of time, thus averting the danger of having no grain to sell in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, and major disaster areas.”16 A total of 11.7 billion jin of grain were imported during the grain year that ran from July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962.17 From 1961 to 1965, annual grain imports held near 5 million tonnes. 11  State Council Finance and Trade Office 国务院财贸办公室, “Caimao bangongshi guanyu yijiuliuyi nian liangshi he shichang wenti de anpai yaodian” 《财贸办公室关于 一九六一年粮食和市场问题的安排要点》 [Finance and Trade Office Planning Essentials Regarding the 1961 Grain and Market Problems], December 22, 1960. 12  Mao Zedong zhuan 《毛泽东传》 [Biography of Mao Zedong], (Beijing: Central Documentary Press: 2003), 1111. 13  “Li Xiannian tongzhi guanyu nong chanpin shougou jiage fangmian de qingkuang he wenti de baogao 《先念同志关于农产品收购价格方面的情况和问题的报告》[Comrade Li Xiannian’s Report Regarding the Situation and Problems of Agricultural Product Purchase Pricing], July 6, 1961. 14  Chen Yun zhuan, xia 《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 2005), 1231. 15  Tang Zhengmang 唐正芒, “Chen Yun yu kunnan shiqi de liangshi jinkou”《陈云与 困难时期的粮食进口》 [Chen Yun and Grain Imports During the Period of Difficulty], in Dang shi tian di 《党史天地》 10 (2007). 16  Li Xiannian 李先念, “Guanyu liangshi wenti de yi feng xin” 《关于粮食问题的一封信》​ [A Letter Regarding Grain Problems], July 30, 1961. 17  State Council Finance and Trade Office 国务院财贸办公室, “Guanyu liangshi wenti de baogao” 《关于粮食问题的报告》 [Report Regarding Grain Problems], July 28, 1962.

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In order to raise foreign exchange reserves and ensure grain imports, the State not only did its utmost to organize the export of agricultural and sideline products as well as industrial and mining products, but also sold off large quantities of gold and silver. On January 18, 1961, the State Council Finance and Trade Office proposed the use of the State’s gold and silver reserves, specifically proposing the export of 410,000 taels of gold and 140 million taels of silver.18 The Center approved this plan on February 7. In February 1962, the Center again approved the sale of 950,000 taels of gold and 20 million taels of silver (valued at USD $131 million).19 The Center also decided to reduce imports of goods other than grains and established the following ranking for imports: grains, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, medicine, and oil; raw materials and chemical materials used in the processing of finished goods for export; rubber, petroleum, copper, aluminum, steel, leading-edge technology and equipment needed for national defense, industrial equipment, etc.20 In addition, the Center resolutely determined to cease all exports of grain being used to repay debts, despite immense political pressure. In December 1960, the Center decided to reduce its exports to the Soviet Union from the 3.19 billion rubles estimated in 1960 to 2.22 billion rubles, and that China would basically not export grain, cotton, oil, or other primary agricultural and sideline products; however, exports of industrial and mining products would largely go unchanged. Debt-repayment grain and oil exports to Eastern European nations were also slowed.21 The Chinese government during the three years of difficulties did not disregard human life

18  State Council Finance and Trade Office 国务院财贸办公室, “Guanyu yijiuliuyi nian duiwai maoyi ruogan wenti de qingshi baogao” 《关于一九六一年对外贸易若干问 题的请示报告》 [Consultative Report Regarding Several Problems of Foreign Trade in 1961], January 18, 1961. 19   “Duiwai maoyi bu dangzu guanyu 1962 nian duiwai maoyi jihua de baogao” 《对外贸易部党组关于1962年对外贸易计划的报告》 [Report by the Ministry of Foreign Trade’s Party Organization Regarding Foreign Trade Plans in 1962], February 24, 1962. 20  “Zhongyang pizhuan caimao bangongshi guanyu yijiuliuyi nian duiwai maoyi ruogan wenti de qingshi baogao 《中央批转财贸办公室关于一九六一年对外贸易若干问 题的请示报告》 [Consultative Report by the Office of Finance and Trade Regarding Several Problems of Foreign Trade in 1961, Transmitted with Comments by the Center], February 7, 1961. 21  State Council Office of Finance and Trade 国务院财贸办公室, “Caimao bangongshi guanyu yijiuliuyi nian liangshi he shichang wenti de anpai yaodian” 《财贸办公 室关于一九六一年粮食和市场问题的安排要点》 [Office of Finance and Trade’s Planning Essentials Regarding Grain and Market Problems in 1961], December 22, 1960.

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to increase gold reserves or export grains to develop the military; there is no evidence to indicate that such statements are true. 2

Safeguarding the Interests of Peasants and Greatly Decreasing Grain Purchases while Increasing Grain Prices and Spurring Proactivity in Grain Planting among Peasants

Owing to the influence of the “trend of boasting and exaggerating,” many local governments made false reports of grain production figures, leading to excessive grain requisitioning. During the three years from 1959 to 1960, on average 34.4 percent of grains produced were requisitioned. In 1959, the State requisitioned 39.6 percent of all grains produced. In ordinary years, grain requisitioning took only about 20 percent or more of grains produced.22 Per an estimate from the State Council’s Finance and Trade Office, “in the two years of 1958 and 1959, we purchased approximately 20 billion to 30 billion jin of trade grain.”23 Although State reselling of grains increased the strength of rural villages thereafter, when the rural villages encountered major grain production losses in the face of natural disaster, excessive grain requisitioning exacerbated grain shortages in the countryside. The State moved to reduce grain requisitioning to alleviate the “leftist” mistakes of “over-high production estimates, overarduous tasks, and excessive allocations” as well as “excessive procurement by grain departments and commercial departments.” On January 15, 1961, the Center demanded that, “when establishing State agricultural product purchasing tasks, we should mind that we leave to the peasants enough for their own use.”24 Statistics indicate that during the grain year from July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962, the total amount of grain requisitioned was 67.9 billion jin (trade grain,25 same below), a reduction of 3.85 billion jin from the requisitioning plan of 71.75 22  Zhongguo nongcun jingji tongji daquan《中国农村经济统计大全 (1949–1986)》[Statistical Encyclopedia of China’s Rural Economy] (1949–1986), 410. 23  State Council Office of Finance and Trade 国务院财贸办公室, “Caimao bangongshi guanyu yijiuliuyi nian liangshi he shichang wenti de anpai yaodian” 《财贸办公室关于 一九六一年粮食和市场问题的安排要点》 [Office of Finance and Trade’s Planning Essentials Regarding Grain and Market Problems in 1961], December 22, 1960. 24  “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu muqian nong chanpin shougou gongzuo zhong ji ge zhengce wenti de guiding”《中共中央关于目前农产品收购工作中几个政策问题 的规定》[Several Policy Question Regulations of CCP Central Regarding Current Work of Agricultural Product Purchasing], January 15, 1961. 25  “Trade grain” is an overarching term for grain products used by State grain departments when calculating quantities of grain to be purchased, sold, allocated, or warehoused.

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billion jin established at the Lushan Conference, a reduction of 15.8 billion jin from the total of 83.7 billion jin requisitioned in the previous grain year, the equivalent of 19 billion jin of unprocessed grain;26 for an average of over 30 jin of grain per farmer in the nation, the equivalent of one month of food per person.27 The State also greatly reduced the collection of agricultural taxes across the nation. After two adjustments to agricultural tax collection in 1960 and 1961, agricultural tax collection fell from 38.8 billion jin in 1958 to 21.5 billion jin in 1961 (regular tax and fine food grains, same below). The total agricultural tax collected in 1961 was only 19.4 billion jin, owing to taking care of disaster areas.28 In addition, the State also resold large quantities of grain back to the countryside. Average annual State grain resales to the countryside over the three years 1959 to 1961 totaled 36.44 billion jin, accounting for 34.4 percent of average requisitioning over those three years, an increase of 8.1 billion jin over 1957.29 In addition, the Center thoroughly rectified such errors in the “anti deceptive production” movement. At the time, people’s communes and production teams of some regions maintained “small warehouses” outside of the grain warehouses managed by principal production teams; some advocated for investigations into their origins and bringing them back under state control, or for requisitioning 50 to 60 percent of their holdings. The Center resolutely thwarted this method, holding that these grains “should be subject to the decisions of the masses. Higher-level bodies should publicly announce that State promises not to have this portion of grains transferred upward, and never again to increase requisitioning demands.”30 In order to rouse proactivity in planting grains among the peasantry, the Center established a Grain Price Issues Small Group, headed by Chen Yun, charged to study the issue of raising grain prices and submitting a report on its findings. The small group’s recommended method was: beginning with the summer harvest of 1961, increase grain purchase prices by an average of 20 percent; increase the State’s increased price incentive 26  “Unprocessed grains” are grains not ground or processed after harvesting and threshing. 27  State Council Office of Finance and Trade 国务院财贸办公室, “Guanyu liangshi wenti de baogao” 《关于粮食问题的报告》 [Report Regarding Grain Problems], July 28, 1962. 28   Ministry of Finance Party Organization 财政部党组, “Guanyu zhengshou nongye shui liang xiang cuoshi de baogao” 《关于征收农业税两项措施的报告》 [Report Regarding Two Measures for the Collection of the Agricultural Tax], March 23, 1962. 29  Yang Shaoqiao, 108. 30  “Zhongyang guanyu zhengque duidai shedui ‘xiao cangku’ wenti de tongzhi” 中央关 于正确对待社队“小仓库”问题的通知》 [Central Notice Regarding the Question of Properly Handling ‘Small Warehouses’ of Communes and Production Teams], January 23, 1961.

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program for primary grain-producing regions implemented in 1960 by an average of 5 percent; a total increase of 25 percent, leading to an estimated increase in peasant revenues from the sale of grain by approximately 6.5 to 7.5 billion yuan. At the same time, the small group recommended not increasing grain sale prices in the short term.31 The Center approved the report on January 15, 1961. The State also made corresponding increases to the prices of other agricultural products. Statistics indicate that as compared with 1957, in 1962: the purchase prices of agricultural products and by-products increased by an average of 32.3 percent. Of that average increase, grain prices increased 36.1 percent; economic cash crops increased 14.7 percent; livestock products increased 31.6 percent; and other agricultural and agricultural by-products increased 40.9 percent.32 The State also rewarded those people’s communes and production teams which produced more grains and provided more commercial grain.33 On September 8, 1961, Party Central decided to award 15 chi (five meters) of cloth, three cases of cigarettes, and one pair of rubber shoes to production teams for each 1500 jin of commercial grain sold to the State, and to award industrial products at the full value of all grains sold to the State in excess of mandated quotas.34 The implementation of several important policies, including reduced requisitioning, increased imports, increased grain prices, and rewards for the sale of agricultural products, increased the peasantry’s proactivity in planting grains. Over the two years from July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962, the State’s grain warehousing turnover increased by 1.7 billion jin, reversing the declining trend of the previous few years.35

31  Grain Price Question Group 粮价问题小组, “Guanyu tigao liangshi shougou jiage wenti de baogao” 《关于提高粮食收购价格问题的报告》 [Report Regarding the Question of Increasing Grain Purchase Prices], January 9, 1961. 32  Dangdai zhongguo de nongye 《当代中国的农业》 [Contemporary Chinese Agri­ culture], (Beijing: Modern Chinese Press, 1992), 202. 33  State Council Office of Finance and Trade 国务院财贸办公室, “Guanyu duo chan liangshi he duo tigong shangpin liangshi de renmin gongshe shixing jian li banfa de fang’an”《对于多产粮食和多提供商品粮食的人民公社实行奖励办法的 方案》 [Scheme of Measures for Rewarding People’s Communes which Produce More Grain and Provide More Commercial Grain],” October 20, 1960. 34  “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu yijiuliuyi nian dao yijiuliu’er niandu liangshi gongzuo de ji xiang guiding” 《中共中央关于一九六一年到一九六二年度粮食工作的几 项规定》 [Several CCP Central Regulations Regarding Grain Work from 1961 to 1962], September 8, 1961. 35  State Council Bureau of Finance and Trade 国务院财贸所, “Guanyu liangshi wenti de baogao” 《关于粮食问题的报告》 [Report on Grain Problems], July 28, 1962.

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Reducing and Simplifying Urban the Population, Supporting the Agricultural Battlefront

As a great many new mining and industrial enterprises were established during the “Great Leap Forward,” attracting large quantities of rural population into urban centers, “the urban population quickly grew by over 30 million,”36 and urban demand for grain rose vigorously, exacerbating the existing grain shortage. With urban grain sales growing too quickly, on September 14, 1960, the Center issued instructions to reduce the urban population, by sending people to the countryside. An average of 3 million people were reduced from the urban population over the course of a year.37 At the time, there were different opinions regarding whether this course of action was necessary, and if so, how much pressure should be applied. At a central work meeting in May 1961, Chen Yun incisively explained the importance of mobilizing a portion of the urban population to descend to the countryside. He said, “in the first year that workers descend, we will need to provide on average 150 fewer jin of grain per person per year. If 10 million people go down, that’s 1.5 billion jin; if 20 million people go, that’s 3 billion jin. This is the difference in the first year. The difference in the second year will be more striking. Those workers from the countryside will go home, and those workers from the city will make their homes in the countryside. They participate in collective production and allocation, which in addition to the land left to households for private use, will cause them to no longer be reliant upon State provision of grains. In this way, if 10 million people descend to the countryside, we can provide 4.5 billion fewer jin of grain, and 9 billion fewer jin if 20 million people descend.”38 The central work meeting accepted Chen’s opinion, drafted the “Nine Measures for Reducing Urban Population and Curbing Urban Grain Sales Volume,” and demanded that the urban population be reduced by 10 million people that year, and over 20 million within three years.39 In May 1962 the Politburo Standing Committee 36  Zhong Wen 钟文, Bai nian Chen Yun 《百年陈云》 [One Hundred Years of Chen Yun], (Beijing: Central Documentary Press, 2005), 304. 37  “Zhongyang guanyu zhengdun chengshi liangshi tongxiao he jiangdi chengshi kouliang biaozhun de zhishi” 《中央关于整顿城市粮食统销和降低城市口粮标准的 指示》 [Central Instructions Regarding Reorganizing Urban Grain Sales and Reducing Urban Grain Ration Standards], September 14, 1960. 38  Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Writings of Chen Yun, Vol. 3], (Beijing: People’s Press, 1995), 169. 39   Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, di 14 juan 《建国以来重要文献选编》​ 第 14 卷 [Selected Important Literary Contributions Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 14], (Beijing: Central Documentary Press, 1997), 412.

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decided to further reduce the industrial production and construction battle front and greatly reduce the worker and urban populations.40 Statistics indicate that from January 1961 to June 1963, there was a nationwide reduction of workers by 18.87 million, a reduction of urban population by 26 million, and a reduction of population consuming commercial grain of 28 million.41 Grain sales in cities dropped correspondingly. “Sales volume of non-agricultural population in cities dropped from 63.1 billion jin in 1960 to 47 billion jin in 1962, a reduction of 16.1 billion jin.”42 This greatly streamlined the worker and urban populations, reduced grain sales volumes and grain requisitioning volumes, and augmented the rural labor force. This not only effectively mitigated the grain shortage, but was also beneficial to accelerating the restoration of agriculture. 4

Increased Frugality in Clothing and Food Around the Nation; Reductions to Grain Rations; Widespread “Gourds, Vegetables, and Substitutes”

With a serious grain shortage on, the only way to prevent a famine and preserve life to the greatest extent possible was to universally reduce grain ration standards. During the three years of difficulties, the State established an effective coupon supply system, which did the most possible to ensure basic ration standards for the people using average allocations of necessities for life. On September 7, 1960, Party Central issued the “Instructions Regarding Reducing Rural and Urban Ration Standards,” which demanded that “rural ration standards must be reduced. In the region south of the Huai River extending to the Pearl River Basin, we should maintain an average standard of 360 jin of unprocessed grain per person per year, and less in those regions affected by disaster . . . Rations in the region north of the Huai River should be reduced to an average of 300 jin of unprocessed grain per person per year, slightly higher in regions affected by serious cold, such as the Northeast; in major disaster 40  Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, di 15 juan 《建国以来重要文献选编》第 15 卷 [Selected Important Literary Contributions Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 15], (Beijing: Central Documentary Press, 1997), 462. 41  Jiang Yongqing 蒋永青, “Chen Yun zai “da yue jin” hou guanyu huifu nongye de ji dian sikao yu duice” 《陈云在“大跃进”后关于恢复农业的几点思考与对策》 [Some Thoughts and Countermeasures of Chen Yun Regarding the Restoration of Agriculture Following the ‘Great Leap Forward’], in Dang de wenxian 《党的文献》 3 (1995). 42  Yang Shaoqiao, 119.

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areas of each province, rations should be reduced to under 300 jin per person per year. Rations for workers in collective-run enterprises and public institutions should be exactly the same as those for ordinary peasants, no higher.” The Instructions further pointed out that “urban supply standards must also be correspondingly lowered. Excepting those workers working in high temperatures, at high altitude, in well bottoms, and those performing taxing physical labor, ration standards for all other urban residents must be reduced by two jin (commercial grain) per month per person.”43 On September 23, Party Central issued more instructions, reducing fixed per capita edible oil rations from 10 to 7 liang in central-controlled cities, from 7 to 4 liang in provincial-controlled cities, and from 5 to 3 liang in county seats.44 The State, in order to get through the difficult time, demanded that everybody in the nation share in weal and woe, and proposed the slogan “workers, farmers, soldiers, students, and merchants–together tide through the lean year.” The Center issued a strict order that ration standards for all rural cadres, including those in county committees, be exactly the same as in rural villages, and that cadres at the level of prefectural-level Party committees and higher, including those in Party organs, also reduce their supply standards. The Center strictly forbade any cadre from “going through back channels” to obtain special supply.45 Nevertheless, some regions did not meet minimum standards. Both the Center and local governments had very high expectations for substitute foodstuffs to mitigate the grain shortage. The so-called “gourd, vegetables, and substitutes” plan was a reference to gourds and fruits, vegetables, and substitute foodstuffs. As the growth period for gourds, fruits, and vegetables is generally much shorter than that of grains, and as substitute foods are not subject to the dual restrictions of land area and growth period, many past generations used “gourds, vegetables, and substitutes” to assist in famine relief. In 1959, officials in Acheng County, Heilongjiang Province, “universally promoted the increase of foodstuffs by first boiling, then grinding, and finally steaming corn; they also invented methods of increasing the edible contents of sorghum, rice, and others.” County 43  Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, di 13 juan《建国以来重要文献选编》第 13 卷 [Selected Important Literary Contributions Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13], (Beijing: Central Documentary Press, 1996), 567–569. 44   Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, di 13 juan《建国以来重要文献选编》​ 第 13 卷 [Selected Important Literary Contributions Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13], 586. 45  Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian xuanbian, xiace 《农业集体化重要文件选编》下册 [Important Selected Works of Agricultural Collectivization, Vol. 2], (Beijing: CCP Central Party School Press, 1981), 345.

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officials also made use of corn husk pith, sorghum husks, and others to produce substitute livestock feed.46 On January 19, 1960, the Center publicized their experience to the rest of the nation. In 1960, grain shortages became more severe. On March 18, in its “Instructions Regarding Strengthening Public Cafeteria Leadership,” the Center emphasized that “the use of plant stalks, shafts, roots, and leaves to manufacture starch is a significant invention, and all communes in the nation should promote it.”47 On August 10, Party Central issued the “Instructions Regarding the Entire Party’s Mobilization to Greatly Promote Agriculture and Grains,” which demanded feasible planning for the usage and conservation of grain. It further demanded that ration standards be low, and that other standards also be low, and that the nation also strive to plant gourds and vegetables and auxiliary foodstuffs, as well as substitute foods and substitute products.48 These two policies were known colloquially as “low standards; gourds, vegetables, and substitutes.” On November 14, Party Central issued the “Urgent Instructions Regarding Immediately Launching the Movement of Wide-scale Collection and Manufacture of Substitute Foodstuffs,” which called for “immediately mobilizing the masses to launch a movement of wide-scale collection and manufacture of substitute foodstuffs.” At the same time, the Center established a five-person leading group with a dedicated office headed by Zhou Enlai, and also demanded that local party committees at every level follow the Center’s measures in combining concrete situations and establishing leading groups and offices to be responsible for the concrete instructions of this movement.49 All localities actively responded to the State’s call. Statistics indicate that in Hubei Province between November 1959 and June 1960, the masses in disaster areas planted over 9.74 million mu of

46  CCP Heilongjiang Provincial Grain Bureau Party Group 中共黑龙江省粮食厅党组, “Guanyu zhaokai quansheng nongcun liangshi xiaofei anpai xianchang huiyi de baogao” 《关于召开全省农村粮食消费安排现场会议的报告》[Report Regarding Convening a Provincial Meeting for Rural Grain Consumption Planning], December 16, 1959. 47  “Zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang gonggong shitang lingdao de pishi” 《中央关于加强公 共食堂领导的批示》 [Central Memo Regarding Strengthening the Leadership of Public Cafeterias], March 18, 1960. 48  Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, di 13 juan 《建国以来重要文献选编》第 13 卷 [Selected Important Literary Contributions Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13], 523. 49  “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu liji kaizhan da guimo caiji he zhizao daishipin yundong de jinji zhishi” 《中共中央关于立即开展大规模采集和制造代食品运动的紧急 指示》 [CCP Central Urgent Instructions Regarding Immediately Launching a WideScale Movement for the Collection and Manufacture of Substitute Foodstuffs], November 14, 1960.

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vegetables and collected 4 billion jin of substitute foodstuffs.50 As the autumn harvest and autumn planting of 1960 were wrapping up, the Anhui Provincial Committee instructed all localities in the province to arrange for 40 percent of labor to collect agricultural by-products and all manner of wild plants, launching the wide-scale “small autumn harvest” movement, in which over 4 million people participated in the collection of the equivalent of 700 million jin of grains in substitute foodstuffs.51 Shandong provincial officials launched a wide-area dried vegetable movement, in which 4.3 billion jin of dried vegetables were collected in the entire province, an average of over 80 jin per person, as of February 1960. The entire province also actively launched the “Conserve Grains and Strive to Procure Substitute Foodstuffs” movement, which led to the manufacture of over 200 million jin of starch from stalks, shafts, leaves, etc., to be consumed by both humans and livestock.52 In 1961 in Shandong province, “communes and production teams in disaster areas around the province collected a total of 456 million kilograms of substitute foodstuffs and planted 790,000 mu of winter vegetables.”53 In terms of efficiency, methods for increasing food included multiple steamings and boilings to inflate grains to double their original size; this not only resulted in zero net gains of food, but actually detracted from nutritional content. Some substitute foodstuffs were eaten directly, and some were fermented or underwent extraction to transform the stalks, roots, and husks of agricultural by-products as well as various wild plants into edible products. This reflected the resolute spirit of the Chinese people in facing extreme difficulty. 5

Enlarging the Scale of Rescue Work in Major Disaster Areas

The State invested large amounts of money and resources into rescue work in major disaster areas. 50  Hubei sheng zhi · minzheng zhi 《湖北省志·民政志》 [Records of Hubei Province · Records of Civil Administration], (Hubei People’s Press, 1994), 267. 51  “Shengchan jiuzai gongzuo cailiao” 《生产救灾工作材料》 [Working Materials for Disaster Relief Through Production], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 121-1960-012-Y00000127, December 26, 1960. 52  “Zhonggong Shandong shengwei guanyu shenghuo anpai qingkuang de baogao” 《中共 山东省委关于生活安排情况的报告》 [Shandong Provincial CCP Committee Report Regarding Living Arrangement Circumstances], February 27, 1960. 53  Shandong sheng zhi · minzheng zhi 《山东省志·民政志》 [Records of Shandong Province · Records of Civil Administration], (Shandong People’s Press, 1992), 181.

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First, it greatly increased relief expenditures. During this period, State fiscal income plummeted, with great losses to all major corresponding outlays, including administrative fees and military expenditures, yet all State relief expenditures increased greatly. In 1961, State fiscal income fell from the 1960 level of 57.229 billion yuan to 35.606 billion yuan, but compensation and social relief expenses rose from 441 million yuan in 1959 to 794 million yuan in 1960, and again to 1.009 billion in 1961.54 From 1960 to 1963, the State issued a total of 480 million yuan in rural social relief funds, greater than the total of relief funds issued during the years 1950 to 1959.55 At a Ministry of Internal Affairs disaster relief forum in September 1959, Vice Minister Wang Zixuan noted that: “the State had allocated 500 to 600 million yuan per year to be used in civil affairs work. The Party and the State were extremely concerned with the costs of civil affairs undertakings. The State reduced other funding but did not reduce our funding; the Center has never not approved any needs we have presented. We have paid out disaster relief funds in full as requested by officials in every province.”56 Speaking to the concrete uses of the disaster relief funds, Internal Affairs Minister Qian Ying noted that: “part of the money is used to buy grains, part to resolve the housing needs of the masses, and part for treating illness and buying clothing. In addition to that, some funds are used as subsidies, for uses such as buying furniture, etc., in cases of extreme need.”57 Officials in all localities generally arranged the uses of disaster relief funds based on concrete circumstances. An investigation into five production brigades in Henan province indicated that 38.8 percent of funds were used for grain rations, 5.5 percent for purchasing salt, 1.74 percent for purchasing vegetables, 13.1 percent for purchasing coal, 14.6 percent

54  Zhongguo caizheng nianjian 2000 《中国财政年鉴·2000》 [China Financial Yearbook 2000], (China Financial Magazine Press, 2000), 396 and 402. 55   Meng Zhaohua and Wang Han 孟昭华、王涵, Zhongguo minzheng tongshi, xia 《中国民政通史》下 [A General History of China’s Civil Administration, Vol. 2], (China Social Press, 2006), 1224. 56  “Wang Zixuan (neiwu bu) fu buzhang zai jiuzai gongzuo zuotanhui shang de zongjie fayan ( jilu)”《 王 子 宣  (内 务 部 ) 副 部 长 在 救 灾 工 作 座 谈 会 上 的 总 结 发 言 (记录)》 [The Summarizing Speech of Vice Minister Wang Zixuan (Ministry of Internal Affairs) at the Disaster Relief Working Forum (Recorded)], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1959-011-Y-00000112, October 16, 1959. 57  “Neiwu bu di 163 ci buwu huiyi jilu” 《内务部第163次部务会议纪录》 [Records of the 163rd Ministerial Affairs Meeting of the Ministry of Internal Affairs], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1960-012-Y-00000001, September 8, 1960.

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for treating illness, 17 percent for resolving clothing and blanket needs, 1.66 percent for repairing and building housing, and 7.6 percent on other needs.58 Second, the State guaranteed basic grain rations for disaster victims. In the early period, governments at all levels rescinded the grain supply system in public cafeterias, and implemented a new measure of “planned use of grains, conservation of grains, fixing amounts per person, and grain conserved by individuals being given to those individuals.”59 Thereafter they primarily strengthened the basic preservation work of grains in disaster areas and implemented disaster-apology reductions and exemptions and grain requisitioning policies of first leaving the grains and then purchasing them. In January 1960, while actively increasing a State marketing monopoly on over a billion jin of grain in disaster areas, the Center planned for the addition of 3.8 billion additional jin per the requests of all provinces, as well as allocating 600 million jin of feedstock grain to the Ministry of Commerce, a total addition of 4.4 billion jin of planned grain.60 From 1959 to 1960, the State monopoly quota on grain rose from its initial figure of 87.3 billion jin to 91.7 billion jin, and rose again in February 1960 to 96 billion jin.61 Addressing grain ration arrangements, the Ministry of Internal Affairs emphasized the necessity of ceaselessly and throughly prioritizing, in order to always maintain decent knowledge of the situation: “Do not fear low [ration] standards; fear only an end to rations altogether.” In facing situations in which conditions are not altogether clear, one must deepen local investigations. In facing reports and letters and appeals of the masses reflecting grain shortages and utter lack of grains, one must promptly dispatch officials to

58  “Henan sheng minzhengting Xu Ren’an fu tingzhang zai jiuzai gongzuo zuotanhui shang de huibao zhaiyao” 《河南省民政厅许仁安付厅长在救灾工作座谈会 上的汇报摘要》 [Abstract of the Report of vice director of the Henan Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs Xu Ren’an at the Disaster Relief Working Forum], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1961-013-Y-00000056, April 12, 1960. 59  Guizhou Provincial CCP Committee 中共贵州省委, “Guanyu muqian nongcun gonggong shitang qingkuang de baogao” 《关于目前农村公共食堂情况的报告》 [Report Regarding the Current Situation of Rural Public Cafeterias], February 24, 1960. 60  Li Xiannian 李先念, “Guanyu anpai nongcun renmin shenghuo wenti he jixu kaizhan aiguo shou mian yundong de baogao” 《关于安排农村人民生活问题和继 续开展爱国售棉运动的报告》 [Report Regarding Arranging Rural People’s Living Problems and Continuing the Patriotic Cotton Sale Movement], January 13, 1960. 61  Ministry of Grain Party Organization 粮食部党组, “Guanyu nongcun renmin shenghuo anpai qingkuang he yijian de baogao” 《关于农村人民生活安排情况和意见的 报告》 [Report Regarding Rural People’s Living Arrangements Situation and Opinions], February 17, 1960.

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conduct investigations and report situations truly to one’s superiors; one must absolutely not adopt a bureaucratic attitude.62 Third, the State dispatched large groups of medical personnel to disaster areas to rescue the dying and heal the wounded, in an attempt to preserve life. Many in disaster areas contracted edema and other illnesses due to long-term nutritional insufficiency; in some regions, there were outbreaks of contagious diseases. To save the lives of the ill, the Party and the government urgently transferred great numbers of medical personnel to all disaster regions, as well as constructing large amounts of temporary medical stations to supplement existing hospitals and clinics. Owing to the great numbers of the ill and the lack of medical personnel, all localities strove to provide short-term training and simple medical knowledge to women’s leaders and statisticians, in order that they may serve as doctors’ assistants. In some areas, personnel were transferred from party organs, factories, mines, and rural youth leagues to perform nursing duties. Some medical stations dispatched illness condition report intelligence agents to discern the health conditions of disaster victims and strengthen the treatment of those convalescing away from centralized stations. In Xinyang, Henan, beginning in November 1959, over 80,000 medical personnel were transferred from provincial, prefectural, and county level institutions and organized into a touring medical team, which established convalescent hospitals (hospitals for edema), accepted and treated patients, treated the masses in disaster areas free of charge, and distributed various medicines valuing 17.25 million yuan free of charge.63 After great efforts, the outbreak and spread of epidemics were basically halted in Henan at the end of 1961. From 1959 to 1961, “the Sichuan Provincial People’s Government established leading groups and offices for the elimination of diseases and scourges, and implemented unified leadership and supervision urging people’s governments at all levels to adopt measures combining both centralized and decentralized steps to treat illness. In places with relatively more patients suffering from edema, [we have] established temporary edema hospitals, in which communes and sometimes production brigades are the responsible units, in order to conduct centralized treatment of the seriously ill, and to provide certain quantities of

62  “Guanyu zuohao jiuzai gongzuo de baogao” 《关于做好救灾工作的报告》 [Report on Performing the Work of Disaster Relief Well], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1961-013Y-00000054, October 7, 1961. 63  Henan sheng zhi · minzheng zhi 《河南省志·民政志》 [Records of Henan Province · Records of Civil Affairs], (Henan People’s Press, 1993), 189.

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sugar, oil, and refined grains.”64 Edema hospitals were widely established in all disaster areas of Anhui province, and great numbers of medical personnel ventured deeply into disaster areas, in which large areas were broken into smaller zones for which certain people were responsible (the fenpian baogan system). They adopted measures of centralized treatment, home delivery of medicine, and establishment of cafeterias to improve nutrition in order to save the ill. For example, at the end of 1960 in Lingbi County there were 520 people suffering from edema, of whom 450 were receiving centralized treatment. The county government distributed a total of 2000 jin of foodstuffs made from brown sugar, one jin of staple grains and half a jin in soybeans per patient, as well as fresh vegetables, in order to help the patients restore their health in a timely fashion.65 Officials in other provinces severely affected by the disaster also established temporary medical stations. In disaster areas, treatment was generally paid for via government relief funding. The establishment of a large quantity of temporary edema relief centers was an effective measure for saving the lives of disaster victims. Investigations reveal that in Henan province alone, over 20,000 temporary edema treatment stations were established during the three years of difficulties, treating over 3.6 million patients.66 Rough estimates indicate that over 100,000 such medical stations were established nationwide, an unprecedented figure in the history of human disaster relief. These played a key role in the saving of a great quantity of lives. 6

Experiences and Summaries

It is precisely because of the adoption of the aforementioned five areas of urgent disaster relief measures that by 1962, the rural situation displayed marked improvement and cases of edema and abnormal death were basically eradicated. Thus, there is a great need to summarize the experience of these urgent disaster relief measures.

64  Sichuan sheng zhi · minzheng zhi 《四川省志·民政志》 [Records of Sichuan Province · Records of Civil Affairs], (Sichuan People’s Press, 1996), 297. 65  “Shengchan jiuzai gongzuo cailiao” 《生产救灾工作材料》 [Working Materials for Disaster Relief Through Production], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 121-1960-012-Y00000127, December 26, 1960. 66  Henan sheng zhi minzheng zhi 《河南省志·民政志》 [Records of Henan Province · Records of Civil Affairs], 189–190.

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First, the entire Party and entire nation made concerted efforts, shared in weal and woe, and forged through difficult times together; this is what guaranteed victory over the disaster. During the period of disaster relief, Party and State cadres at all levels from the Center to the local level maintained honest and clean work styles and strict discipline. The highest leadership were affected equally with the common folk, in reductions of grain rations and the abstaining from eating meat and eggs. The vast majority of regions and work units in the entire nation engaged in reciprocal aid, reciprocal cooperation, service to the big picture, and avoidance of selfish departmentalism—under the unified guidance of the Party. Such a work style of equality and spirit of cooperation strengthened the power of the State to deal with the crisis, and played an important role in stabilizing the people’s emotions, preserving basic social stability, and tiding through the difficult times. Just as Bo Yibo noted, “leadership at all levels of the Party maintained the features of common laborers, and both Party members and the masses shared in weal and woe; this was an important link in correcting errors and achieving victory over difficulty.”67 Second, disaster relief work should proceed according to the principle of seeking truth from facts and exalting the democratic work style. Although great achievements were made in disaster relief work from 1959 to 1961, there were still abnormal deaths occurring in many areas. The deepest lesson to be learned from this is the lack of prompt, complete reports on the nature of the disaster. Particularly after the Lushan Conference of 1959, we mistakenly launched the “anti-rightist” movement, destroying the principle of democratic centralism and giving rise to the “tendency to boast and exaggerate.” Those cadres “did not dare to actively understand the nature of the disaster, and also did not dare to report the nature of the disaster to Party committees and higherlevel departments according to the principle of seeking truth from facts, out of fear of being labelled rightists.”68 In 1959, a total of 90 million were affected by the spring famine, but the Ministry of Internal Affairs was criticized when it reported the situation to superiors. Minister Qian Ying was forced to submit 67  Bo Yibo 薄一波, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, xiajuan 《若干重大决策与 事件的回顾》下卷 [A Review of Several Major Policy Decisions and Incidents Vol. 2], (Beijing: CCP Central Party School Press, 1993), 1287. 68   Guizhou Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs 贵州省民政厅, “Guanyu jiuzai gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian de baogao (caogao)” 《关于救灾工作情况和今后 意见的报告 (草稿)》 [Report on the Situation of Disaster Relief Work and Opinions Going Forward (Draft)], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1960-012-C-00000106, September 7, 1960.

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a self-criticism for “delivering a bombshell to Peng Dehuai.”69 During the first half of 1960, the most severe period of rural grain shortages, some areas mistakenly launched the “oppose false reporting and private distribution” movement, causing disaster relief work to be delayed by a year, and letting slip the best opportunity. Disaster relief work became the utmost focus only once the Party and State realized and squarely faced these egregious errors and began to restore the principle of seeking truth from facts. The total area of agricultural disaster and non-producing land was larger in 1961 than in 1960, but the number of abnormal deaths was reduced greatly in 1961.70 Third, disaster prevention must be given the ultimate status in disaster relief work, and we must further ameliorate the institutions and systems underpinning disaster relief work. During the “Great Leap Forward” movement of 1958, some people were blindly optimistic, believing that under such “great” circumstances disaster and famine could be eradicated. This led to a relaxation in disaster relief work and the abolishment of many central and local disaster relief bodies. That in turn led to insufficient preparation by the time the famine hit crescendo, and increased the difficulty of mitigating the disaster. Thus, we should be fully aware of human beings’ limited abilities to resist natural disasters, make ample mental and physical preparations to fight off disaster when it strikes, and promote the scientificization, standardization, and socialization of disaster relief work. The three years of economic difficulties taught both the Party and the State a deep, painful lesson. In 1965, Mao Zedong proposed the slogan of “preparing for war and preparing for famine for the people,” a slogan which persisted even during the “Cultural Revolution.” Since that time, not again have we ignored the seriousness of disaster in this nation’s history. References Bo Yibo 薄一波, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, xiajuan 《若干重大决 策与事件的回顾》下卷 [A Review of Several Major Policy Decisions and Incidents Vol. 2]. Beijing: CCP Central Party School Press, 1993.

69  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzheng bu da shi ji (1949–1986) 《中华人民共和国 民政部大事记 (1949–1986)》 [Records of Major Events of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (1949–1986)], (China Social Press, 2004), 125. 70  Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1983 《中国统计年鉴·1983》 [China Statistical Yearbook 1983], (China Statistical Press, 1983), 103.

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Chen Yun zhuan, xia《陈云传》下 [Biography of Chen Yun, Vol. 2]. Central Documentary Press, 2005. Chen Yun wenxuan, di 3 juan 《陈云文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Writings of Chen Yun, Vol. 3]. People’s Press, 1995. Dangdai zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo 《当代中国的粮食工作》 [Modern China’s Grain Work]. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1988. Dangdai zhongguo de nongye 《当代中国的农业》 [Contemporary Chinese Agri­ culture]. Modern Chinese Press, 1992. “Guanyu zuohao jiuzai gongzuo de baogao” 《关于做好救灾工作的报告》 [Report on Performing the Work of Disaster Relief Well], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1961-013-Y-00000054, October 7, 1961. Guizhou Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs 贵州省民政厅, “Guanyu jiuzai gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou yijian de baogao (caogao)” 《关于救灾工作情况和今 后意见的报告 (草稿)》 [Report on the Situation of Disaster Relief Work and Opinions Going Forward (Draft)], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1960-012-C00000106, September 7, 1960. “Henan sheng minzhengting Xu Ren’an fu tingzhang zai jiuzai gongzuo zuotanhui shang de huibao zhaiyao” 《河南省民政厅许仁安付厅长在救灾工作座谈会 上的汇报摘要》 [Abstract of the Report of vice director of the Henan Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs Xu Ren’an at the Disaster Relief Working Forum], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1961-013-Y-00000056, April 12, 1960. Henan sheng zhi · minzheng zhi 《河南省志·民政志》 [Records of Henan Province · Records of Civil Affairs]. Henan People’s Press, 1993. Hubei sheng zhi · minzheng zhi 《湖北省志·民政志》 [Records of Hubei Province · Records of Civil Administration]. Hubei People’s Press, 1994. Jiang Yongqing 蒋永青, “Chen Yun zai ‘da yue jin’ hou guanyu huifu nongye de ji dian sikao yu duice”《陈云在“大跃进”后关于恢复农业的几点思考与对策》[Some Thoughts and Countermeasures of Chen Yun Regarding the Restoration of Agriculture Following the ‘Great Leap Forward’], in Dang de wenxian《党的文献》​ 3 (1995). Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, di 13 juan《建国以来重要文献选编》​ 第 13 卷 [Selected Important Literary Contributions Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13]. Central Documentary Press, 1996. Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, di 14 juan《建国以来重要文献选编》​ 第 14 卷 [Selected Important Literary Contributions Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 14]. Central Documentary Press, 1997. Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, di 15 juan《建国以来重要文献选编》​ 第 15 卷 [Selected Important Literary Contributions Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 15]. Beijing: Central Documentary Press, 1997.

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Liu Minggang 刘明钢, “Zhou Enlai kang huang” 《周恩来抗荒》 [Zhou Enlai Resists Famine], in Dangshi zongheng 《党史纵横》 4 (2008). Mao Zedong zhuan 《毛泽东传》 [Biography of Mao Zedong]. Central Documentary Press: 2003. Meng Zhaohua and Wang Han 孟昭华、王涵, Zhongguo minzheng tongshi, xia 《中国民政通史》下 [A General History of China’s Civil Administration, Vol. 2]. China Social Press, 2006. “Neiwu bu di 163 ci buwu huiyi jilu” 《内务部第163次部务会议纪录》 [Records of the 163rd Ministerial Affairs Meeting of the Ministry of Internal Affairs], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1960-012-Y-00000001, September 8, 1960. Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian xuanbian, xiace 《农业集体化重要文件选编》​ 下册 [Important Selected Works of Agricultural Collectivization, Vol. 2]. CCP Central Party School Press, 1981. Shandong sheng zhi · minzheng zhi 《山东省志·民政志》 [Records of Shandong Province · Records of Civil Administration]. Shandong People’s Press, 1992. “Shengchan jiuzai gongzuo cailiao” 《生产救灾工作材料》 [Working Materials for Disaster Relief Through Production], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 121-1960-012-Y00000127, December 26, 1960. Sichuan sheng zhi · minzheng zhi《四川省志·民政志》[Records of Sichuan Province · Records of Civil Affairs]. Sichuan People’s Press, 1996. Tang Zhengmang 唐正芒, “Chen Yun yu kunnan shiqi de liangshi jinkou” 《陈云与困难时期的粮食进口》 [Chen Yun and Grain Imports During the Period of Difficulty], in Dang shi tian di 《党史天地》 10 (2007). “Wang Zixuan (neiwu bu) fu buzhang zai jiuzai gongzuo zuotanhui shang de zongjie fayan (jilu)” 《王子宣 (内务部) 副部长在救灾工作座谈会上的总结发言 (记录)》 [The Summarizing Speech of Vice Minister Wang Zixuan (Ministry of Internal Affairs) at the Disaster Relief Working Forum (Recorded)], Ministry of Civil Affairs file no. 131-1959-011-Y-00000112, October 16, 1959. Yang Shaoqiao 杨少桥, “Wei min shi jiejin xinli” 《为民食竭尽心力》 [Going all out to feed the people] and “Huainian Li Xiannian tongzhi” 《怀念李先念 同志》[Remembering Comrade Li Xiannian] in Weida de renmin gongpu—huainian Li Xiannian tongzhi 《伟大的人民公仆 怀念李先念同志》 [Great Servant of the People, Remembering Comrade Li Xiannian]. Central Documentary Press, 1993. Zhong Wen 钟文, Bai nian Chen Yun 《百年陈云》 [One Hundred Years of Chen Yun]. Central Documentary Press, 2005. Zhongguo caizheng nianjian 2000 《中国财政年鉴·2000》 [China Financial Yearbook 2000]. China Financial Magazine Press, 2000. Zhongguo nongcun jingji tongji daquan《中国农村经济统计大全 (1949–1986)》​ [Statistical Encyclopedia of China’s Rural Economy] (1949–1986), ed. Ministry of Agriculture Planning Department 农业部计划司. Agricultural Press, 1989.

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Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1983 《中国统计年鉴·1983》 [China Statistical Yearbook 1983]. China Statistical Press, 1983. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzheng bu da shi ji (1949–1986) 《中华人民共和国 民政部大事记 (1949–1986)》 [Records of Major Events of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (1949–1986)]. China Social Press, 2004.

CHAPTER 5

The Relationship between Modern Neo-Confucianism and Marxism on the Mainland Following 1949 Zheng Dahua Abstract The relationship between modern Neo-Confucianism and Marxism on the mainland following 1949 can be divided into three schools. Adherents of the first, represented by Feng Youlan and He Lin, discarded their Neo-Confucian thinking and identified with and accepted Marxism, some going so far as to join the Chinese Communist Party (He Lin, for one). Adherents of the second, represented by Liang Shuming, maintained the fundamental thinking of Neo-Confucianism while also accepting the influence of Marxism, at the same time using and Confucianizing Marxism (particularly Mao Zedong Thought). Adherents of the third, represented by Xiong Shili and Ma Yifu, maintained their Neo-Confucian thinking and fundamentally did not identify with or accept Marxism.

Keywords modern Neo-Confucianism – Marxism – Feng Youlan – Liang Shuming – Xiong Shili

After the founding of New China, most of the first generation of modern NeoConfucians—with a few exceptions—stayed in mainland China. Those in whose thinking the academic world has remained primarily interested for a long time include Feng Youlan, He Lin, Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, Ma Yifu, and others, yet not enough attention has been paid to their relationship with Marxism following 1949. To date, nobody has published a work dedicated to this subject. This essay will attempt to make an initial exploration into the topic. * Essay submitted April 15, 2008. Zheng Dahua is a professor at Hunan Normal University and a researcher at the Modern History Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004292673_006

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1 After the founding of New China, Feng Youlan made an earnest introspection into his past new rational Confucian thinking and his research into the history of Chinese philosophy. He proceeded to write several self-criticizing articles, including “A Self-review of New Rational Philosophy [Xin li xue],”1 “Speaking to the Differences Between Old and New Philosophy From ‘A Self-review of New Rational Philosophy,’ ”2 “A Self-criticism of Former Work in the History of Philosophy,”3 etc. as well as a book titled A Look Back on Forty Years [Sishi nian de huigu].4 In those writings, he thoroughly examined his past academic work and thinking and rejected it all, while at the same time clearly expressing his complete faith in the standpoints, perspectives, and methods of Marxism. From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, he published two volumes of A New History of Chinese Philosophy [Zhongguo zhexue shi xinbian], three volumes of Essays on the History of Chinese Philosophy [Zhongguo zhexue shi lunwenji], Draft Historical Data of the History of Chinese Philosophy [Zhongguo zhexue shi shiliao xuechu gao], etc. Using Feng’s own words from the foreword to A New History of Chinese Philosophy, he wrote these works “using the standpoints, perspectives, and methods of Marxism.”5 He Lin was another major figure in modern Neo-Confucianism. After the founding of New China, he not only abandoned the academic standpoints of modern Neo-Confucianism and identified with and accepted Marxism, but in his late years also joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In his book Mr. He Lin as I Knew Him [Wo suo renshi de He Lin xiansheng], Zhang Dainian wrote, “in the 1950s, some Chinese philosophers, such as Mr. Jin Yuelin, Mr. Feng Youlan, Mr. Tang Yongtong, and Mr. He Lin, all sided with materialism, reconsidering all manner of academic questions using the perspectives 1  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, “Xin li xue di zi wo jian tao” 《〈新理学〉底自我检讨》 [Self-criticism of New Rationalistic Philosophy], in Guangming ribao 《光明日报》, October 8, 1950. 2  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, “Cong ‘xin lixue di ziwo jiantao’ shuo dao xin-jiu zhexue di qubie” 《从〈新理学底自我检讨〉说到新旧哲学底区别》 [Speaking to the Differ­ ence Between Old and New Philosophy Beginning from the ‘Self-criticism of New Rational Philosophy’], in Xin jianshe 《新建设》 3, Vol. 3 (1950). 3  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, “Guoqu zhexue shi gongzuo di ziwo pipan” 《过去哲学史工作 底自我批判》 [Self-criticism of My Past Philosophical Work], in Beijing Daxue xuebao 《北京大学学报》 2 (1956). 4  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, Sishi nian de huigu 《四十年的回顾》 [A Look Back on Forty Years], (Scientific Press, 1959). 5  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, Sansongtang quanji, di 8 juan 《三松堂全集》第 8 卷 [Collected works of San Song Tang Vol. 8], (Henan People’s Press, 2000), 3.

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and methods of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. This was a major event in the development of the history Chinese philosophy, as well as a major event in the development of the history of world philosophy.”6 Some academics, particularly foreign academics, thought that Feng and He rejected their previous thinking and came to identify with and accept Marxism as a result of external pressure, thus demonstrating problems with their character—succumbing to pressure and not maintaining their fundamental moral baseline and “pandering to authorities” while adopting an attitude of pragmatism. I have great difficulty accepting such a perspective. The fundamental reason for the changes to the thinking of Feng and He lay in the earthshaking changes that transpired after the founding of New China, which gave them a new understanding of Marxism, the guiding thought of the CCP. From that point on, they abandoned their previous academic thought and came to identify with and accept Marxism. Feng was just one example. On June 30, 1951, he published an article entitled “Grand Achievements of New China Under the Guidance of the Communist Party [Gongchandang lingdao xia de xin zhongguo di qiji]” in the Guangming Daily [Guangming ribao]. In the article, Feng wrote that though New China had been founded less than two years prior, it had accomplished many great deeds. “In North Korea, our volunteer army defeated the so-called crack troops of the American imperialists, who call themselves the world’s greatest power. Tibet returned to our great national family. Several million people came together to tame the Huai River, fundamentally resolving the flood and drought problems of so many years. In the past history of China, just one event similar to these would be considered a ‘tremendous achievement’ or an event that ‘shakes heaven and earth.’ In the history of China, just one similar event would be enough to ‘throw the masses into poverty.’ But as for us now? All manner of great events are proceeding at the same time, and both public and private undertakings are flourishing more by the day. The people’s lives are also being increased daily.” He thought that these were all the CCP’s “applying the truth of Marxism to Chinese society,” i.e. attaining victory by “resolving China’s problems on the basis of the societal laws discovered by Marx and Engels.”7 On June 12, 1953, he published another article in the Guangming Daily, entitled “The Realization 6  Zhang Dainian 张岱年, “Wo suo renshi de He Lin xiansheng”《我所认识的贺麟先生》​ [Mr. He Lin as I Knew Him], in Huitongji—He Lin shengping yu xueshu 《会通集—— 贺麟生平与学术》[The Mastery Collection—the Life and Academics of He Lin], (Beijing: Sanlin Bookstore, 1993), 41. 7  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, Sansongtang quanji, di 14 juan《三松堂全集》第 14 卷 [Collected works of San Song Tang Vol. 14], (Henan People’s Press, 2000): 447–448.

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of the Chinese People’s Hundred Year Dream [Zhongguo renmin yibai nian mengxiang di shixian],” in which he wrote “in 1838, Lin Zexu bore the task of banning opium and resisting the English in Guangdong. At that time, renowned author Gong Zizhen gave him an essay, expressing hope that within two years he could expel the English invasion and ‘cause the eighteen provinces of China to have stable silver prices, substantial material resources, and calm popular sentiment.’ However, contrary to his hopes, the people began from that time to lead their lives under the ever worsening brutality and oppression of foreign and domestic enemies; material resources grew ever scarcer; and the people’s lives grew ever less stable. It was not until the Chinese Communist Party led the people to liberate China, and the people assumed political power, that within the short span of three to four years, great accomplishments were made, realizing the dream of the Chinese people for the last hundred years.” [7] (p. 455) It is thus easy to imagine how the realization of the hundred year dream of the Chinese people could shake the thinking of a person like Feng, who had experienced both the late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China, and had endured his fill of imperialist aggression. This is exactly the kind of ideological change Feng’s daughter Zhong Pu mentioned when discussing her father. “Other than the objective circumstances which caused it to be so, it was also partly attributable to his own initiative. The primary reason behind that personal initiative was patriotism. He had a profound, extensive love for his motherland and for Chinese culture. Such love is not reserved for a particular era or a particular regime, but rather for his own history and culture, for his own living space, a kind of sentiment toward the land of his parents, in the same way that genetic factors are passed down into one’s blood and flesh. In the past hundred years, our nation has frequently endured humiliation and forfeit of sovereignty, to the point that our nation was not a nation, and our people were not a people. Having endured such a history, how could the enormous cry for the ‘Chinese people to rise up’ not cause the people to give up everything!”8 There are two other factors in addition to the aforementioned which caused the changes to the academic thought of Feng and He. The first factor was the influence on their thinking of having participated in land reforms shortly after the nation’s founding. In the early 1950s, Feng and his wife participated in land reforms in the suburbs of Beijing. Although their time thus spent was not long (approximately one and a half months), it was in

8  Zhong Pu 钟璞, “Xiang lishi sushuo” 《向历史诉说》 [Recounting History], in Feng Youlan xiansheng bainian danchen jinian wenji 《冯友兰先生百年诞辰纪念文集》 [Centennial Memorial Collected Works of Mr. Feng Youlan], (Tsinghua University Press, 1995), 10–11.

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Feng’s own words, “of great significance in my life.”9 It caused Feng to personally experience not only the new changes in China’s countryside, but also “the peasants who had been oppressed under two thousand years of feudal land institutions, who, after land reforms, were economically liberated. After liberation, the peasants were free economically and politically, and the restrictions placed upon agriculture by feudal land institutions were eliminated. The production morale of the peasants was also lifted.”10 This also gave Feng an initial understanding of Marxist philosophy. “During over a month of work, I came to understand a philosophical term: ‘the concrete universal.’ This is a term from the Hegelian philosophical system, and it expresses a key point of dialectics. Up to this point, I had understood this term as a contradiction. If something is universal, it cannot then be concrete, and if something is concrete, it cannot be universal. As the work of land reform was divided into ranks, all people who were related to the land were assigned a class rank. Some were landlords, some poor peasants, etc. Some people were landlords, but the special circumstances of each individual landlord were different. Many people were poor peasants, but the special circumstances of each individual poor peasant were different. From this perspective, everybody was a concrete universal. The concrete universal is thus the synthesis of the concrete and the universal. In other words, it is a synthesis of the ordinary and the specific. Once I understood this term, I began to realize the error of my previous philosophical thought. Marxism places an emphasis on the synthesis of the universal and the concrete, the synthesis of the general and the specific. My previous philosophical thought, however, had placed emphasis on the separation of the universal and the concrete, the separation of the general and the specific. This enlightenment was of great importance to me.”11 Thus, shortly thereafter in his “A Self-review of New Rational Philosophy [Xin li xue],” he wrote that he had not previously acknowledged that his New Rational Philosophy belonged to the ideological school of philosophy, and that he discovered after his practical experience with land reform that his New Rational Philosophy was indeed “a form of idealism.” He also wrote that his former philosophical thought “did not conform to the fundamentals of dialectical materialism, and placed emphasis on the unification of the contrast of things with regards to the spirit and methodology of 9  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, Sansongtang quanji, di 14 juan 《三松堂全集》第 14 卷 [Collected works of San Song Tang Vol. 14], 403. 10  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, Sansongtang quanji, di 14 juan 《三松堂全集》第 14 卷 [Collected works of San Song Tang Vol. 14], 415. 11  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, Sansongtang quanji, di 14 juan 《三松堂全集》第 14 卷 [Collected works of San Song Tang Vol. 14], 407–408.

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dialectical materialism.” However, his previous “spirit and methodology of philosophical thought placed emphasis on the contrast of the unification of things.”12 Thereafter in some self-criticizing articles, he frequently mentioned the influence of his having participated in land reforms, as well as his belief that this influence was one of the important factors driving the changes to his thought. He Lin participated in the land reforms of Shaanxi province. On April 2, 1951, he published an article in the Guangming Daily, in which he gave a detailed description of the changes to his thought spurred by his participation in the land reforms. The practice of participating in the land reform movement, he wrote, caused him to begin to understand that it was in error that he had previously believed that materialism placed sole emphasis on those surface material phenomena which could be seen and touched, and was thus unable to penetrate into the essence of things. His practical experience in the land reforms demonstrated that, “the more deeply I went into the countryside, into the masses, into the lower strata of things and society, and the more deeply I participated in real struggle, the more I was able to understand the essence, the core, and the typical case of things.” Another error he came to realize through his experience in the land reforms was his prior belief that materialism took one away from one’s proper role, that it placed sole emphasis on remaking the external world, on remaking the material environment, while not seeking to strive to reach inside and remake one’s self and one’s thinking. But once he discovered that Marxists placed the utmost emphasis on publicity, education, and study, and that they assigned an extremely important status to making sense of and remaking thought, he came to mistakenly believe that materialists placed emphasis on remaking thought on the one hand and remaking the world on the other. If it wasn’t contradictory, it was at least dualism, or rather the skin was materialism while idealism lived inside the bones, he reasoned. However, during his stint in land reforms, he discovered that “materialism is none other than placing an emphasis on making sense of thinking by reflecting a true understanding of a situation, studying from the masses, using the wisdom of the masses to make sense of one’s own thinking or patiently, gradually making sense of the thinking of the masses in stages, and then making sense of thinking via practice and struggle in society. It is thus remaking the thinking of individuals and the masses in the process of struggling to remake the world. On the contrary, leaving facts, leaving practice and struggle in society, leaving

12  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, Sansongtang quanji, di 14 juan 《三松堂全集》第 14 卷 [Collected works of San Song Tang Vol. 14], 925, 929.

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the masses, and making sense of or remaking personal thinking from books alone and exaggerating the power of one’s own thinking—that is idealism.”13 The second factor was the effect on their thinking of the thought reform movement launched shortly after the founding of the nation. In the nation’s early period, in order to help those intellectuals who had come over from the old society to change their thinking—per relevant instructions from Mao Zedong and the unified deployment of CCP Central—a thought reform movement directed at intellectuals was launched nationwide, particularly in cultural and educational arenas. The goal of the movement was to resolve problems of standpoint and attitude. The substance of this movement can be roughly divided into two parts. The first was to use Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought to cause those intellectuals who had come over from the old society to be able to rather systematically understand and grasp the world view and methodology of Marxism, to fundamentally discern the difference between materialism and idealism and the demarcation between seeking truth from facts and subjectivism. To this end—with permission from Mao Zedong—CCP Central decided to publish two philosophical treatises of Mao Zedong in the People’s Daily [Renmin ribao]: “On Practice” and “On Contradiction,” prior to the publication of Selected Works of Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong xuanji], and to initiate a mass fever for the study of these two philosophical treatises (also known as the “two treatises”). Feng and He were no exceptions; they engaged in an earnest study of the “two treatises.” In March 1951, Feng published an article entitled “ ‘On Practice’—the Development of Marxism-Leninism and the Answer to China’s Traditional Philosophical Questions [‘Shijian lun’— ma-lie zhuyi di fazhan yu zhongguo chuantong zhexue wenti di jiejue]” in volume six of the third edition of New Construction [Xin jianshe]. In the article, he gave a focused description of of his personal gains after having studied the “two treatises,” particularly “On Practice,” while at the same time conducting rather systematic analysis and criticism of all the various explanations of the relationship between knowledge and action in the history of Chinese philosophy— under the guidance of the fundamental perspectives of “On Practice.” Although his usage of the fundamental perspectives of “On Practice” came off as slightly stiff and inaccurate, it was the beginning of Feng’s systematic acceptance and usage of dialectical materialism, and was of great significance to the changes 13  He Lin 贺麟, “Canjia tugai gaibian le wode sixiang—qifa le wo dui bianzheng weiwulun de xin lijie he dui weixinlun de pipan” 《参加土改改变了我的思想——启发 了我对辩证唯物论的新理解和对唯心论的批判》 [Participating in Land Reforms Changed My Thinking—Gave Me a New Understanding of Dialectical Materialism and a Criticism of Idealism], in Guangming ribao 《光明日报》, April 2, 1951.

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which took place in his academic thinking. The second part of the movement was to use “criticisms and self-criticisms” to cause those intellectuals who had come over from the old society to—in the course of “self-education and self-reform”—eradicate the influence of idealism, metaphysics, and all other non-Marxist thoughts, theories, and concepts, and to change their thought and standpoints. As renowned intellectuals who had come over from the old society, Feng and He naturally participated in the movement and not only accepted the criticism of others, but also engaged in self-criticism. In the preceding paragraphs, we have analyzed the reasons behind the changes to the academic thought of Feng Youlan and He Lin after 1949. Our analysis indicates that their abandoning of their original academic thought and identifying with and accepting Marxism was a rational choice they made of their own initiative. It is precisely for this reason that even in their later years—owing to thought liberation and the eradication of the negative influence of extreme “leftism”—they never again completely denied or criticized their previous academic thought as they did with their thought prior to 1949 during the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, they used objective analysis and assessment in alignment with the principle of seeking truth from facts. Their identification with and acceptance of Marxism, however, never changed, and they ultimately believed that Marxism was the truth and the guide for engaging in academic research. In the preface to his New History of Chinese Philosophy [Zhongguo zhexue shi xinbian], Feng, after describing his experience and lessons learned in using Marxism to research the history of Chinese philosophy, clearly stated that he wanted to “use the standpoints, perspectives, and methods of Marxism” to write the New History of Chinese Philosophy, but that “using the standpoints, perspectives, and methods of Marxism is not equivalent to modeling myself on Marxism, and is even less copying Marxism.”14 In an assessment of Feng’s New History, Feng’s student, the renowned academic Ren Jiyu, wrote, “one could think that Mr. Feng propelled himself to a new frontier in the research of the history of Chinese philosophy in his New History. He used the perspectives of historical materialism to smash old sayings that had been set in routine for years, and he proposed his own original ideas.”15 One can see that “Mr. Feng in his later years even more resolutely believed in materialism, and

14  Feng Youlan 冯友兰, Sansongtang quanji, di 8 juan 《三松堂全集》第 8 卷 [Collected works of San Song Tang Vol. 8], 4. 15  Feng Youlan xiansheng jinian wenji 《冯友兰先生纪念文集》 [Commemorative Collection of Works by Mr. Feng Youlan], (Peking University Press, 1993), 97.

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his thought became even more mature.”16 In a speech on June 4, 1981, nearly at the same time as Feng, He Lin delivered a full endorsement of Marxist philosophy, particularly of the dialectical materialism of Marxism. He said, “I’ve discovered that there is no ideal for some idealism, but there is an ideal for some materialism. The ideal without idealism, and materialism with an ideal, that is the philosophy of Marxism, a philosophy that advocates for seeking truth from facts.” He continued, “I—under the inspiration and nurture of MarxismLeninism—have studied the history of philosophy for many years, and only after criticizing the rational dialectical system of Hegel’s idealism did I gradually come to believe in and endorse dialectical materialism, which serves as a link to the past and ushers in the future, is of profound and penetrating nature, is based in practice, possesses noble ideals, and is of great power.”17 It is thus evident that such a perspective which holds that Feng and He came to identify with and accept Marxism in the 1950’s due to external pressure, but in their late years, with no such pressure, decided to abandon Marxism, is worthy of deliberation. 2 National unification and social progress, particularly the earthshaking changes to the countryside incited by land reforms, caused transformations in the thinking of Liang Shuming, just as with Feng and He. In October 1951, he gave a speech at the third plenum of the China People’s Political Consultative Conference, in which he admitted that “I have serious shortcomings, serious defects in my life attitude and in my thought.” He also expressed that he would thereafter “study the thought and methods of the Communist Party in order to reform myself.”18 Not long thereafter, he published an article in the Guangming Daily entitled “The Changes I’ve Experienced These Past Two Years [liang nian lai wo you le naxie zhuanbian],” in which he publicly “criticized the root of his problems” and earnestly expressed his willingness to accept the class viewpoint and materialism viewpoint of the CCP, and to strengthen his study 16   Feng Youlan xiansheng bainian danchen jinian wenji 《冯友兰先生百年诞辰纪念文集》 ​ [Centennial Memorial Collected Works of Mr. Feng Youlan], (Tsinghua University Press, 1995), 7. 17  He Lin 贺麟, Zhexue yu zhexue shi lunwen ji 《哲学与哲学史论文集》 [Collection of Essays on Philosophy and the History of Philosophy], (Commercial Press, 1990), 586, 588. 18  Liang Shuming quanji, di 6 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 6 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 6], (Shandong People’s Press, 1993), 876.

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of Marxism.19 Liang was a man who practiced what he preached. After the article, he did indeed spend a great amount of time in the study of the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and particularly Mao Zedong; this gave him a new knowledge and understanding of Marxism. Overall, however, though his thinking did change, the change was not great. He studied Marxism, but his understanding of Marxism was in the end only scanty. In later life Liang admitted that “my study of Marxist-Leninist writings and subsequent reform of my thought came behind many people, it went on repeatedly, and there were great difficulties. To this day I have only a scanty knowledge of many issues.”20 Why did Liang not experience changes to his thinking in the same way as Feng and He? Analysis leads us to two reasons, as follows. First, although Feng and He had not identified with and accepted Marxism before 1949, they had encountered it, particularly Feng, who had earnestly read Marxist writings as far back as the early 1930s.21 He had also used the Marxist theories of productive forces and production relations to explain the reasons behind the development of history, society, and culture in such books as New Discourses on Events [Xin shi lun]. So in discussing the changes to Feng’s academic thinking, Zhang Dainian espoused that the seed for Feng’s acceptance of materialism had been planted in his thought much earlier.22 He Lin had long worked in Hegelian philosophy and had profound knowledge of and experience in Hegel’s rational dialectics. As a result, in his writings in the 1940s, He emphasized the unity of rationality and the ideal, and proffered that only idealism could achieve such unity. But as some researchers have pointed out, “as for those philosophers who have truly arrived at a concrete understanding and recognition of rationality or the spirit, there could not exist such a sharp

19  Ibid., 857. 20  Wang Donglin 汪东林, Liang Shuming wenti lu 《梁漱溟问题录》 [Records of Liang Shuming’s Questions], (Hunan People’s Press, 1992), 165. 21  In his 1950 work “A Self-criticism of New Rational Philosophy” Feng Youlan wrote, “in 1933, I lived in England for half a year and read some communist books. Historical materialism helped me understand problems of Chinese and Western culture. My book New Rationalistic Philosophy, which I wrote during the war of resistance, was the crystallization of my thought at that time. Looking back now, my understanding of historical materialism at the time was very insufficient, but ever since 1933, I have believed that the historical materialism of Marx and Engels is correct.” Guangming Daily, October 8, 1950. 22  Zhang Dainian 张岱年, “Feng Youlan zhexue sixiang de zhuanbian gei women de qishi” 《冯友兰哲学思想的转变给我们的启示》 [Our Enlightenments from the Changes to the Philosophical Thought of Feng Youlan], in Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian《高校理 论战线》 2 (1991).

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delineation between the so-called ‘mind’ and ‘object.’ ”23 We must make special note that neither Feng nor He ever publicly criticized Marxism. Liang, however, did. In his 1921 lecture and book Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies [Dongxi wenhua ji qi zhexue], he criticized the historical materialism of Marxism, which had only recently entered China at that time. He thought that the development of human society did not proceed as described in historical materialism, i.e. being determined by productive forces; he held that it was determined by “spirit [ jingshen].” In the 1930s, he even more clearly expressed his opposition to the use of Marxism to analyze and resolve China’s problems. He believed Marxism to be the product of modern European society, and held that it was suitable to Europe alone, not to China, as China’s national conditions were different from those of Europe, and China had its own peculiarities.24 He then emphasized the special characteristics of Chinese society and culture, which became the starting point for all of Liang’s considerations of Chinese society and other academic questions. This never fundamentally changed, even after 1949. Second, Feng and He were academically trained philosophers who had led their entire lives studying, teaching, and researching philosophy; profound theoretical knowledge was their greatest commonality. So the earthshaking changes that took place in China after the founding of the nation and all they saw, heard, and felt during the land reforms could be elevated to the sphere of philosophy for theoretical analysis, thus leading to changes in their academic thought. Liang, however, never attended university, and was not an academically trained philosopher. In his own words, his learning had come from “fumbling about from error to error” in the real world, as well as the influence of his father Liang Juchuan’s ideal of “learning in order to be of use.” Throughout his life, Liang “liked to take action and was not game for idle talk. He never had much interest in such purely philosophical concepts as “idealism,” “materialism,” “metaphysical,” and “concrete”—which did not have a terribly direct connection with China’s practical issues. This is an important reason that despite his having studied Marxism, he only ever possessed a scanty knowledge thereof. Liang’s relationship with Marxism can be summed up in the three words “assimilation, utilization, and Confucianization.”

23  Zheng Jiadong 郑家栋, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhijian 《学术与政治之间》 [Between Academia and Politics], (Taibei: Water Buffalo Press, 2001), 41. 24  Liang Shuming quanji, di 5 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 5 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 5], (Shandong People’s Press, 1992), 265–266.

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“Assimilation” in this case refers to Liang’s acceptance of some individual standpoints of Marxism in order to critique or correct some of his prior errors. For example, he had previously denied the existence of classes or class struggle in China, but after observation and study, he came to admit that he had overemphasized the lack of classes in China—though he still did not believe they existed—and that he had not understood that a lack was not the same thing as non-existence. He also admitted not having known of the existence of class struggle and the uses of class struggle in resolving China’s problems. In his article “The Changes I’ve Experienced These Past Two Years,” Liang very earnestly wrote that he had in the past opposed the CCP’s viewing Chinese society through the lens of classes and the resolution of China’s problems using class struggle. The realities that had come to pass following the founding of New China, however, had caused him to “realize that although Chinese society does indeed lack classes, one must grasp it from the perspective of classes in order to be able to act.” The reason the CCP was able to establish a nationally unified, stable regime, he wrote, and the reason it was able to unite the previously divided peasantry, was that the CCP was deft in undertaking “class struggle.” “Class struggle is the truth in resolving China’s problems; the reality before my eyes is the proof.”25 Not long thereafter, in a long article entitled “My Efforts and Reflections [Wo de nuli yu fanxing]” he admitted his previous errors. “When I was unilaterally emphasizing ‘there were no two sides’ to ‘the lack of classes,’ I overlooked the possibilities of changes taking place.” He saw the countryside as “an entirety” and did not see the classes and class conflicts that existed therein.26 Thereafter he often engaged in reflection. For example, in one “outline” he had written prior to 1970, Liang self-criticized his “past emphasis on the external conflicts of the countryside—the destruction of the countryside—while downplaying internal conflicts—downplaying class conflict.”27 “Utilization” in this case refers to a a borrowing of certain perspectives or terms from Marxism to package or explain Liang’s own thought. In his own words, he had “borrowed” words from Marx and Mao Zedong to express his own thoughts.28 Liang “utilized” the most typical examples of Marxism in his 25  Liang Shuming quanji, di 6 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 6 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 6], 860 and 865. 26  Ibid., 1004 and 1011. 27  Liang Shuming quanji, di 7 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 7 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 7], (Shandong People’s Press, 2005), 215. 28  Liang Shuming quanji, di 3 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 3 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 3], (Shandong People’s Press, 1990), 539.

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final and most important work, Human Mind and Human Life [Renxin yu rensheng], in which he borrowed from the Marxist theory of knowledge and particularly from Mao Zedong’s “conscious initiative.” A core concept of Human Mind and Human Life is the “human mind.” Liang believed that for humans to know themselves, they must first know the human mind. So how does one come to know the human mind? Liang noted that in order to know the human mind, one could read two articles from the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against the Japanese [Kangri youji zhanzheng de zhanlüe wenti]” and “On Protracted War [Lun chijiu zhan].” In those two articles, Mao proposed that “conscious initiative” is the fundamental characteristic that differentiates humans from other objects. He also discussed military strategy in terms of the three characteristics of initiative, intelligence, and planning, of which the most important is initiative. “Are these three not what makes the human mind the human mind? Use of military force comes down to trying to gain the initiative. In the same way, all of human life can be boiled down to trying to gain the initiative. Building the road of life is nothing other than putting the workings of the human mind into practice.”29 So when defining the “human mind,” Liang “borrowed” Mao’s three concepts of initiative, intelligence, and planning, and “began from these three points” his analysis of why the human mind is the human mind. In essence, the initiative, intelligence, and planning discussed by Liang are not only connected with exposure to real life, but are contrastingly also imbued with a strong metaphysical character. In Liang’s own words, “my book discusses the human mind and proceeds from knowledge into an surpassing of knowledge and an opposition to knowledge, and also moves from science into metaphysics, and from the human mind, which plays a role in real life, to the nature of the universe itself.”30 Although he borrowed the concept of “consciousness” from Mao’s “conscious initiative,” the consciousness discussed by Liang is a kind of inner activity of which only the person involved is aware, one that knows itself, and which does not deceive itself; it is “where all unselfish feelings reside.” Although all people have one, they are all different in strength or weakness, brightness or darkness, and obviousness or obscurity, based on the individual person and the times. These characteristics of “consciousness” inevitably conjure the concept of “conscience [liangzhi]” as proposed by Mencius. Liang himself admitted that “the consciousness inherent to the human mind as I have discussed here

29  Ibid., 539. 30  Ibid., 538–539.

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was known to ancient Chinese people as the ‘conscience [liangzhi],’ or as the ‘solitary knowledge [duzhi].’ ”31 “Confucianization” in Liang’s case refers to his use of his own personal thought to explain the works of Marxism and Mao Zedong, particularly the revolutionary victories and construction achievements of the Chinese people as guided by the CCP. In Liang’s own words, he “sold his own thoughts and opinions by passing them off as the study of (Marxism and the works of Mao Zedong).”32 For example, in his first work following the founding of New China, China’s Road to State Building [Zhongguo jianguo zhi lu], he wrote that the CCP’s primary contribution was the realization of nationwide unification—with the exception of Taiwan—and elimination of the division that had existed since the founding of the Republic of China. Its second greatest contribution, he wrote, was to introduce group living to China, thus remedying China’s deadliest wound, i.e. the lack of group living. Its third greatest contribution, he wrote, was to “penetrate into the human mind.” The “human mind” he mentioned here was the very same “human mind” that later appeared in his book Human Mind and Human Life; it was his Neo-Confucian cultural psychology. He pointed out that an important reason the Communist Party was able to “penetrate” the “human mind” was that it had introduced group living— as a necessity for struggle—to replace the old order based on classical moral principles, thus increasing the conscious initiative of the Chinese people. The reason the CCP was able to introduce group living lay in the “intangible conditions” laid by “2500 years of the Chinese human mind guided by ‘non-religions’ culture.” He further explained that the beginning of human culture was not religious, and neither was the beginning of Chinese culture, but that afterward Confucius had stimulated the blooming of the people’s rational consciousness. Confucius had not, Liang wrote, given any dogmatic norms for people to follow, further stressed by Mencius [Mengzi], who said that “righteousness is not external.” All this gave rise to “non-religious” cultural characteristics. This characteristic of Chinese culture “became a favorable intangible condition for the Chinese Communist Party’s formation of this formidable organization.” The “spirit or mentality of the proletariat” as espoused by the CCP, wrote Liang, “is precisely the thing that the Chinese people came to love and uphold long ago—benevolence [ren] and righteousness [yi].”33 In this way, reasoned Liang, the CCP’s contribution was to make his Neo-Confucian cultural psychology a reality, as the proletarian spirit was just another name for the traditional Chinese concepts of “benevolence [ren] and righteousness [yi].” The work 31  Ibid., 655. 32  Ibid., 520. 33  Ibid., 404.

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most demonstrative of Liang’s “Confucianization” of Marxism was his book China—a Rational Nation [Zhongguo—lixing zhi guo]. Therein he wrote that it was in no way happenstance that “China is now able to display its characteristics to the world,” but rather that there was “a special historical background” underpinning such a display.34 The goal of his writing that book was to give an explanation for the background of the history particular to China, and to explore what contributions Chinese culture could make to communist culture in the future. Speaking to the first question, he wrote that per Marxism, the first step to establishing socialism would be to establish a developed, capitalist industrial nation. In reality, however, great success was made in the establishment of socialism in China, a nation almost entirely lacking capitalism. The first reason for that was the knack the CCP and Mao Zedong had at leadership. Their valuing of the “human mind” over the “human body” gave great power and manifestation to human creative capacity. Second, China is a nation in which “reason was long ago inspired” and “culture long ago mature,” and socialism is in essence the “thorough implementation of human reason.” Socialism, he wrote, is compatible with Chinese traditional culture—with Confucianism as its core—making it easy for socialism to be successful in China. Speaking to the second question, he noted that once human society departed from capitalism and entered socialism and then communism, it would have to resolve two major problems: how to allow people to cooperate and jointly manage large and small collectives, and how to achieve consciousness and discipline therein. “Chinese traditional moral principles and departmentalism” and “the rites and music traditionally espoused by the ancient Chinese” would be of use to finding a complete resolution to these two problems.35 So on the surface, just as some people later criticized him, Liang was “singing songs of praise” for the CCP and for Mao Zedong. In reality, however, he was interpreting Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought on the basis of his own cultural theories and thought. This demonstrates that a distinctive reason for the success of the Chinese socialist revolution and socialist construction was the clear Confucianized leanings of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought. In Liang’s estimation, modern Chinese society was an extension of historical China, and there was continuity and compatibility between the essence of socialism and communism and Traditional Chinese culture—the core of which was Confucianism. Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought were nothing more than Confucian thought in the new era.

34  Liang Shuming quanji, di 4 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 4 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 4], (Shandong People’s Press, 1991), 220. 35  Ibid., 291–295.

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3 Different from Feng and He, Xiong Shili never announced the desire to abandon his academic thought, much less that he wished to identify with and accept Marxism. Different from Liang as well, he never engaged in criticism of his past thinking, and never expressed a desire to accept so-called thought reform. On the contrary, “he expressed that he could not reform, that if he reformed he would no longer be Xiong Shili.”36 He continued to arrange the fruits of his research on the basis of his own thinking. He published, in order, such NeoConfucian works as Discussing Zhang Jiangling with Friends [Yu youren lun Zhang Jiangling], Discussing the Six Classics with Friends [Yu youren lun liu jing], Origins of Confucianism [Yuan ru], Essay on Substance and Function [Ti yong lun], Introspective Essays [Ming xin pian], and On Change [Qian kun xian]. Although he used a great quantity of popular terminology in these works and explored so-called “socialist thought” in ancient China in order to prove the legitimacy of the CCP’s leading the Chinese people to undertake socialist revolution and construction, there were no changes to his academic thought, which remained rooted in idealism. In the words of Zhang Dainian, “after liberation, the attitudes of representative figures in the philosophy world toward idealism were not entirely identical. Mr. Xiong Shili expressed endorsement of socialism, but he still maintained his own ‘new doctrine of consciousness only [xin weishi lun].’ ”37 After the founding of New China, Ma Yifu, like Xiong, earnestly supported the leadership of the CCP as well as serving in such public posts as member of the CPPCC and deputy director of the Central Research Institute of Culture and History. However, he maintained his own traditional perspectives in academic thought and did not engage in any self-reflection or criticism. Generally speaking, there are two reasons that, after 1949, Xiong and Ma maintained their own academic thought, as opposed to Feng, He, and even Liang, who accepted or expressed acceptance of Marxism. First, they had close relationships with the higher echelons of CCP leadership, who protected them. Dong Biwu, one of the “four elders” of the CCP, was from Xiong’s native Hubei and a participant in the 1911 Revolution. The two were similar in age and shared a close relationship. Even when Dong held the important position of vice chairman of the Central People’s Government, he 36  Song Zhiming 宋志明, Xiong Shili pingzhuan 《熊十力评传》 [Critical Biography of Xiong Shili], (Baihuazhou Literary Arts Press, 1993), 208–209. 37  Zhang Dainian 张岱年, “Wo suo renshi de He Lin xiansheng” 《我所认识的贺麟先生》​ [Mr. He Lin as I Knew Him], 41.

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referred to Xiong as his brother. At the time of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, when Xiong was vacillating over whether to go (to the U.S., Hong Kong, or Taiwan) or to stay (in the mainland), a telegram written jointly by Dong and Guo Moruo convinced Xiong to stay. Thereafter Dong personally invited Xiong to move to Beijing, where Dong found him housing, moved his family in, and found him work. Xiong’s relationship with Guo was also extraordinarily close, their tight friendship having been forged during the War of Resistance against Japan. After Xiong’s arrival, it was Guo’s wish that he work for the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), of which Guo was the director, but Xiong opted to continue his former profession, going to Peking University where he served as a professor who received pay but did not teach classes. Though Xiong did not enter the CAS, Guo was always there to help him through any difficulties as much as he could. As he was unaccustomed to Beijing’s climate, in 1954 Xiong moved to Shanghai to live with his eldest son Shipu. Upon Xiong’s arrival in Shanghai, he became a close friend of then mayor Chen Yi, who helped Xiong resolve such difficulties as housing and work. At the time some people fell under the influence of extreme “leftist” thinking and came to equate idealism with reactionary ideology, at which point many did not dare come near Xiong. Some didn’t dare to approach him even in purely academic matters. Once he came to know of this situation, Chen publicly called for the people not to be afraid of having an “idealism” hat placed on their heads, and to bravely seek guidance from Xiong Shili in academic matters. Not long thereafter, in a response to a letter from Xiong, Chen clearly pointed out that, “whether one engages in writing of academic works or personal cultivation, the government should care for them and give them assistance. The policies of Chairman Mao and the Party are thus established, and are the acme of reason, and that is the reason that I should act as directed. When academic opinions are not entirely identical, there is no need to impose that they become identical.” He hoped that Xiong would not worry about this matter and continue to conduct his research and writings according to his own thinking.38 Zhou Enlai was also an ardent admirer of Xiong. Every time Xiong traveled to Beijing to attend the CPPCC (of which he was a member during its second, third, and fourth sessions beginning in 1956), Zhou personally asked Xiong what car he’d like to ride in, what room he’d like to stay in, even going so far as to ask what kind of curtains were best, in order to make preparations for his stay. Zhou also often invited Xiong to dinner and spent his own money to buy books for Xiong.

38  Xiong Shili quanji, di 8 juan 《熊十力全集》第 8 卷 [Collected works of Xiong Shili, Vol. 8], (Hubei Educational Press, 2001), 735–736.

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Ma Yifu also shared an extremely intimate relationship with Chen Yi. In April 1952, Chen once made a visit to Jiangzhuang, Hangzhou, specifically to pay a visit to Ma. On the day of the visit, Chen intentionally wore an oldfashioned academic’s long gown to demonstrate his respect for Ma, who reversed his initial decision to never serve as a public official and served as a member of Shanghai Municipal Cultural Relics Preservation Committee, the first director of the Zhejiang Province Research Institute of Culture and History, a member of the CPPCC, and deputy director of the Central Research Institute of Culture and History. Zhou Enlai also greatly respected Ma. Zhou made a visit to Ma’s home in Jiangzhuang while escorting Soviet head of state Voroshilov on a tour of Hangzhou, at which meeting the three posed for a photograph, and Zhou called Ma “the only modern Chinese rationalist.” Zhou treated Ma the same way he treated Xiong whenever Ma went to Beijing to attend the CPPCC. Zhou also repeatedly instructed Zhejiang provincial officials to accord special care to Ma, to allow the philosopher to pass his declining years in peace. At Ma’s 80th birthday in 1963, a year of tremendous financial difficulty for the central government, Zhou arranged for a payment of 10,000 yuan to serve as Ma’s living assurance. It is precisely because of protection and concern from Dong, Guo, Chen, and particularly Zhou, that Xiong and Ma were not—like most intellectuals who had come over from the old society—requested to participate in land reforms shortly after the nation’s founding, or requested to participate in thought reform movements for intellectuals. They were also not named in criticisms or demanded to engage in self-criticism. On the contrary, under the care of Dong, Xiong published several works in Neo-Confucianism. Their situation was different from that of Feng, He, and even Liang. Feng and He had almost no friends in the upper echelons of CCP leadership. Liang once had close contact with Mao Zedong, but following their disagreement over the status of the peasantry in 1953, Liang never again met privately with Mao. Thereafter, Mao not only did not protect him, but even went so far as to initiate a movement to criticize his idealistic thinking. Second, they possessed relatively unique identities, and were not the focus of thought reform. Although Xiong and Ma were representative figures of NeoConfucianism and widely respected academics, their influence in modern Chinese history was not only less substantial than that of Hu Shi and Liang Shuming, but also fell short of Feng and He. Their influence was limited to an extremely narrow academic circle. Very few contemporary Chinese, particularly among the masses of young students, knew of them or had heard their names, let alone their academic thought. This is another reason they were not focus targets of the intellectual thought reform movement. Another difference was that Feng and He were renowned university professors with contingen-

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cies of followers. Objectively speaking, if they had persisted in espousing their original academic thought, they would have “poisoned” the masses of students and created bad social influence. Thus they had no choice but to abandon their original academic thought and identify with and accept Marxism, lest they not be able to tide through the movement. Although the targets of the thought reform movements shortly after the founding of the nation were intellectuals who had come over from the old society, the focus was university professors, with the movement getting its start at Peking University. All those university professors who did not reform themselves well, or did not abandon their idealism-rooted academic thought to identify with and accept Marxism were ultimately transferred away from universities or not allowed to lecture at their universities anymore. In this respect, Liang, Xiong, and Ma were all similar. This was also an important reason behind the existence of a degree of difference between them and the university professors Feng and He in their acceptance of the influence of Marxism. We must note here that although Xiong and Ma did not abandon their original academic thought and identify with and accept the historical materialism and dialectical materialism of Marxism, this fact did not demonstrate that they experienced no changes to their thinking. In reality, the slew of achievements that followed the founding of the People’s Republic of China stirred up their thinking enormously. Not only did they wholeheartedly endorse the leadership of the CCP and socialist institutions, but they also came to a new understanding of the historical materialism and dialectical materialism of Marxism. At the end of 1964, Xiong was present at the third National People’s Congress, where he heard Zhou Enlai’s “government work report.” He was moved by Zhou’s citation of Mao’s theory on the relationship between realms of freedom and realms of necessity. Thereafter he made repeated studies and had sincere experiences, which he eventually wrote into his work of notes from his experiences called “Far-reaching and Profound, Meticulous and Correct—Feelings After Reading Premier Zhou’s ‘Government Work Report.’ ” He asked Dong Biwu to read it, who then handed it to Zhou and Mao. These notes demonstrate that Xiong had come to an initial understanding of a few essential viewpoints of dialectical materialism. He wrote in his letter to Dong that in the Premier’s report, “there was one part that read ‘human history is a history that ceaselessly develops from a realm of necessity into a realm of freedom; this history will never come to an end’ and so on. I feel strongly that the meaning expressed here is extremely profound and endlessly rich. The first one or two times I read it, I did not come to an accurate understanding of ‘realm of necessity.’ After repeated readings, I began to think it referred to ‘nature’ as it exists objectively. All in the natural world changes endlessly. This is easy to speak of; they are at

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all moments giving up the old and giving birth to the new, never coming to an end. The changes of all things have laws; there has never been a movement made in utter chaos.”39 Party and State leadership gave abundant affirmation and encouragement to Xiong for this change in his thought. In order to help him make progress, Zhou spent his own money to buy four philosophical works, including Selected Works of Mao Zedong and Mao’s “On Practice” and “On Contradition,” as well as Engels’ Ludwig Feueurbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, in thread-bound books with large characters, suitable for reading by the elderly, and had Dong deliver them to Xiong. In Dong’s response, he lauded Xiong for being “fond of learning and a deep thinker, transcending the rest of his generation,” and encouraged Xiong to earnestly “read” these books “if he had interest,” that he “should be able to understand the ins and outs of Chairman Mao’s philosophy.” He also expressed that “your younger brother [I] understand my elder brother’s background in researching philosophy, and many in my Party also understand.”40 In addition to his own letter, Dong also had his secretary write a letter to Xiong’s son Shipu, expressing hope that Shipu could “help” his father make progress. The secretary wrote that Zhou and Dong thought that “Old Xiong is very good at studying. His experience of the Premier’s report was profound, and is testament to that fact. If Old Xiong were able to use the energy with which he researches the philosophy of idealism in researching the philosophy of materialism, that would certainly be incredible. You and I are both Party members; we should help Old Xiong to develop in this direction.” Not long thereafter, Dong’s secretary wrote another letter to Shipu, saying that Dong and other Party and State leaders understood Xiong’s philosophical background, and that the “major change in thought” after earnestly studying Premier Zhou’s report was a good thing, but he hoped that Xiong would not rush and would “come along slowly.” In the letter, Dong’s secretary also told Shipu that his father’s “previous letter had been seen by the Premier and had been printed and sent to Vice Premier Chen Yi and Old Guo [Moruo].”41 It is a pity, however, that not long thereafter, after the eruption of the “Cultural Revolution,” Xiong was killed at the behest of the “Gang of Four” before he had a chance to earnestly read the works sent to him by Zhou, and 39  Ibid., 855. 40  Ibid., 857–858. 41  Above material all taken from Song Zhiming 宋志明, Xiong shi li ping zhuan 《熊十力 评传》 [Critical Biography of Xiong Shili], (Baihuazhou Literary Arts Press, 1993), 208–209.

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before he had a chance to make progress in the direction of materialism as Zhou and Dong had hoped. This is not only a personal misfortune, but a misfortune for modern Chinese academia. Nearly at the same time as Xiong, Ma Yifu was also departed from this world after being killed at the behest of the “Gang of Four.” References Feng Youlan 冯友兰, “Cong ‘xin lixue di ziwo jiantao’ shuo dao xin-jiu zhexue di qubie” 《从〈新理学底自我检讨〉说到新旧哲学底区别》 [Speaking to the Difference Between Old and New Philosophy Beginning from the ‘Self-criticism of New Rational Philosophy’], in Xin jianshe 《新建设》 3, Vol. 3 (1950). ———, “Guoqu zhexue shi gongzuo di ziwo pipan” 《过去哲学史工作底自我 批判》[Self-criticism of My Past Philosophical Work], in Beijing Daxue xuebao 《北京大学学报》 2 (1956). ———, Sansongtang quanji, di 8 juan 《三松堂全集》第 8 卷 [Collected works of San Song Tang Vol. 8]. Henan People’s Press, 2000. ———, Sansongtang quanji, di 14 juan 《三松堂全集》第 14 卷 [Collected works of San Song Tang Vol. 14]. Henan People’s Press, 2000. ———, Sishi nian de huigu 《四十年的回顾》 [A Look Back on Forty Years]. Scientific Press, 1959. ———, “Xin li xue di zi wo jian tao” 《 〈新理学〉底自我检讨》[Self-criticism of New Rationalistic Philosophy], in Guangming ribao 《光明日报》, October 8, 1950. Feng Youlan xiansheng bainian danchen jinian wenji 《冯友兰先生百年诞辰纪 念文集》 [Centennial Memorial Collected Works of Mr. Feng Youlan]. Tsinghua University Press, 1995. Feng Youlan xiansheng jinian wenji 《冯友兰先生纪念文集》 [Commemorative Collection of Works by Mr. Feng Youlan]. Peking University Press, 1993. He Lin 贺麟, “Canjia tugai gaibian le wode sixiang—qifa le wo dui bianzheng weiwulun de xin lijie he dui weixinlun de pipan” 《参加土改改变了我的思想—— 启发了我对辩证唯物论的新理解和对唯心论的批判》 [Participating in Land Reforms Changed My Thinking—Gave Me a New Understanding of Dialectical Materialism and a Criticism of Idealism], in Guangming ribao 《光明日报》, April 2, 1951. ———, Zhexue yu zhexue shi lunwen ji 《哲学与哲学史论文集》 [Collection of Essays on Philosophy and the History of Philosophy]. Commercial Press, 1990. Liang Shuming quanji, di 3 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 3 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 3]. Shandong People’s Press, 1990.

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Liang Shuming quanji, di 4 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 4 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 4]. Shandong People’s Press, 1991. Liang Shuming quanji, di 5 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 5 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 5]. Shandong People’s Press, 1992. Liang Shuming quanji, di 6 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 6 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 6]. Shandong People’s Press, 1993. Liang Shuming quanji, di 7 juan 《梁漱溟全集》第 7 卷 [Collected Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 7]. Shandong People’s Press, 2005. Song Zhiming 宋志明, Xiong Shili pingzhuan 《熊十力评传》 [Critical Biography of Xiong Shili]. Baihuazhou Literary Arts Press, 1993. Wang Donglin 汪东林, Liang Shuming wenti lu 《梁漱溟问题录》 [Records of Liang Shuming’s Questions]. Hunan People’s Press, 1992. Xiong Shili quanji, di 8 juan 《熊十力全集》第 8 卷 [Collected works of Xiong Shili, Vol. 8]. Hubei Educational Press, 2001. Zhang Dainian 张岱年, “Feng Youlan zhexue sixiang de zhuanbian gei women de qishi” 《冯友兰哲学思想的转变给我们的启示》 [Our Enlightenments from the Changes to the Philosophical Thought of Feng Youlan], in Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian 《高校理论战线》 2 (1991). ———, “Wo suo renshi de He Lin xiansheng” 《我所认识的贺麟先生》 [Mr. He Lin as I Knew Him], in Huitongji—He Lin shengping yu xueshu 《会通集——贺麟 生平与学术》 [The Mastery Collection—the Life and Academics of He Lin]. Beijing: Sanlin Bookstore, 1993. Zheng Jiadong 郑家栋, Xueshu yu zhengzhi zhijian 《学术与政治之间》 [Between Academia and Politics]. Taibei: Water Buffalo Press, 2001. Zhong Pu 钟璞, “Xiang lishi sushuo” 《向历史诉说》[Recounting History], in Feng Youlan xiansheng bainian danchen jinian wenji 《冯友兰先生百年诞辰纪 念文集》 [Centennial Memorial Collected Works of Mr. Feng Youlan]. Tsinghua University Press, 1995.

CHAPTER 6

Changes to China’s Assistance Programs for Urban Vagrants and Beggars Gao Zhonghua Abstract Since the founding of the nation, China’s policies toward vagrants and beggars have changed from sheltering and sending home management to assistance-based management. The institution sheltering and sending home beggars played a prominent role in maintaining social stability following the founding of the nation, whereas assistancebased institutions are better suited to the needs of China’s modern social development. These institutions—owing to constraints of a transitioning era—have not yet fully developed and still face many difficulties in society.

Keywords Sheltering and sending home – aid management – urban vagrants and beggars

As a special echelon of society, urban vagrants and beggars are an inevitability once history develops to a certain extent. Management of this disadvantaged segment of urban society has gone through two phases since the founding of New China, from management by sheltering and sending them home to assistance management, during which time a great process of change took place, reflecting changes to the level of China’s urban management and development trends in social security.

* Essay submitted January 12, 2009. Gao Zhonghua is an associate professor in the Party history research department of the Central Party School.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004292673_007

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1 During the 29 years from the peaceful liberation of Beiping in 1949 to 1978, just before Reform and Opening, China’s institution of sheltering and sending home fell within the scope of administrative relief. As there were differing degrees of social development and many different social tasks, the targets and methods of sheltering and sending home policies experienced great changes. Speaking concretely, they can be divided into three historical phases. During the First Phase (1949–1956), the Primary Goal of Sheltering Work was to Stabilize the Social Order; Such Work was of an Administrative Management Nature On the eve of the founding of New China, large numbers of rural disaster victims and refugees flooded into large and mid-sized cities such as Beiping, Shanghai, Tianjin, and others. An investigative assessment into 12 districts of Beiping shortly after the peaceful liberation revealed a total of 910 beggars. Despite the low number, they were egregiously disturbing social order and the development of industry and commerce.1 At the time, the people’s governments of large and mid-sized cities like Beiping actively adopted four types of measures to stabilize the new regime. First, all local governments promptly established unified management mechanisms which issued corresponding measures. On May 12, 1949, the city government of Beiping at an administrative conference decided to establish an agency specifically for the management of beggars. The Beiping Municipal Handling Beggars Committee was established on the 27th, led by the Bureau of Civil Affairs with representation from such work units as the Public Security Bureau, the Bureau of Health, the General Picket Squad, the People’s Court, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the North China People’s Government.2 Although names for the various sheltering agencies were different—such as Municipal Sheltering Management Organizations, 1.1

1  “Qigai ye yao shengchan; pingshifu minzheng ju niding juti banfa; xiyisuo jiaoyangsuo yi shourong sanbai yu” 《乞丐也要生产；平市府民政局拟定具体办法；习艺所教养所 已收容三百余》 [Beggars Also Want to Produce; Beiping City Civil Affairs Bureau Drafts Concrete Measures; Vocational Training Institutes and Reformatories Have Taken in Over Three Hundred], in Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, May 12, 1949. 2  “Zhonggong beiping shiwei guanyu shourong qigai gongzuo zongjie (1949 nian 7 yue)” 《中共北平市委关于收容乞丐工作总结 (1949 年 7 月)》[CCP Beiping City Committee Summary Regarding the Work of Sheltering Beggars (July 1949)], in Beijing shi zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (1948 nian 12 yue zhi 1949 nian) 《北京市重要文献选编 (1948 年 12 月至 1949年)》 [Anthology of Important Beijing Documents (December 1948 to 1949)], ed. Beijing

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Municipal Sheltering Management Stations, Sheltering and Sending Home Stations (S&S stations)—they were all under the purview of local governments, with S&S stations established at the lowest at the county tier-one level. S&S stations were established in all large and mid-sized cities, sheltering and sending home primarily straggling and disbanded soldiers, disaster victims, and refugees. Such temporary agencies as Beijing and Shanghai transitional S&S stations were established in traffic hubs and other areas. Thereafter, corresponding management methods were issued, clarifying the direction of sheltering and related measures. In order to reform and educate beggars, on May 27, 1949, the Beiping city government issued the “Temporary Measures for Urban Handling of Beggars,” stipulating that the primary direction for the sheltering of beggars was to take them in on the one hand and organize them for labor on the other. The direction of beggar sheltering in Tianjin was to take them in on the one hand and handle them on the other, aiming toward gradual elimination. The policy directions of other cities were largely similar. In April 1950, the Beijing city government adjusted its work direction, adding elements of education and also emphasizing the division of situations and differentiated handling. On April 8, the city government emphasized “centralized sheltering and differentiated processing” in its “Instructions Regarding Sending Disaster Victims Home for Production.” All those old and infirm not capable of production were directly sent to elderly centers or relief centers. An investigation revealed that all those who could be returned to their places of origins were being assigned to different sheltering work units based on their situations in order to be reformed. At the time, all shelters around the nation took in a total of 1781 people.3 At the same time, most relief centers, elderly centers, nurseries, women’s penitentiaries, and civilian workhouses began production. There were changes in the thinking of most beggars who had been educated and reformed by labor; they became aware of the principle of the glory of labor and alighted on the path of earning their own living. Sheltering work proceeded in time installments and batches owing to the tightness of time and the gravity of the task. The sheltering work of the Beiping government was divided into four batches—owing to the large number of beggars at the time—with a different Municipal Archives and Party History Research Bureau of the CCP Beijing City Committee 北京市档案馆、中共北京市委党史研究室, (China Records Press, 2001), 598–613. 3  “Jing shou qigai jin san qian ren; yi fenbie anzhi laodong shengchan” 《京收乞丐近三 千人；已分别安置劳动生产》 [Beijing Takes in Nearly 3000 Beggars; Already Settled into Labor and Production], Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, November 11, 1949.

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sheltering focus target for each batch. The first batch saw the processing of beggars able to perform labor, without illness, and without families; these were divided into labor teams compelled into short-term training camps where they were housed, fed, and educated. Those with families in Beiping were sent to commoner vocational training institutions to learn a craft, and the rest were organized into labor teams and sent to designated areas to participate in labor and production. Four brigades were assembled, comprising a total of 694 people, who were divided up and sent to the Yellow River to repair dykes, Chahar province to cultivate virgin land, and Inner Mongolia to chop wood.4 The second batch consisted of those who had fled to Beiping from elsewhere and become beggars as a result of lack of support from family and friends, as well as those who had families on which they could rely but chose to remain beggars. After collective training, this batch was sent back to their original homes to participate in production. The third batch consisted of people who had temporarily become beggars owing to illness or special circumstances; they were assisted in recovering their ability to produce. The fourth batch consisted of elderly, infirm, handicapped, disabled, and youth from the city without anybody on whom to rely and lacking the ability to produce. This batch were sent without exceptions to relief centers and afforded long-term relief. Those with any degree of capability for labor were dispatched to undertake light labor and production. From May 27 to June 2, 1949, the second round of sheltering work was launched, during which 854 people were taken in over seven days. In August, the first National People’s Congress was convened in Beiping, after which the city Bureau of Civil Affairs took in a further 1687 people, at which point the work of sheltering vagrants was fundamentally completed.5 Statistics indicate that over the 10 months from May to the end of December, 1949, a total of 4599 beggars were taken in, of whom 1498 either began making their own way or were sent home; 694 joined labor brigades; and over 2000 remained in relief centers to engage in study, reform, or labor.6 Other cities, such as Chengdu, Shanghai, Jinan, etc., also launched sheltering and processing work for beggars, achieving rather good results. Owing to the late liberation of Chengdu, sheltering work didn’t begin there until July 1950; 4  Beijing minzheng zhi 《北京民政志》 [Records of Beijing Civil Affairs], (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1988), 88. 5  Beiping heping jiefang qianhou 《北平和平解放前后》 [Before and After the Peaceful Liberation of Beiping], ed. Beijing City Archives 北京市档案馆, (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1988), 398. 6  Beijing minzheng zhi 《北京民政志》 [Records of Beijing Civil Affairs], 88.

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city officials established a total of 12 sheltering work units, which had taken in a total of 15,559 social vagrants by the end of December 1953. After education and reforms, 4524 were sent home; 4313 became employed, married, or adopted; 4958 were sheltered in reformatories; 965 were handed off to relevant departments for processing; and 772 died from illness. After four years of grueling work, this social problem was fundamentally resolved.7 By the end of 1949, officials in Shanghai had taken in over 11,000 people, most being dispatched to the agrarian regions north of the Huai River and in northern Jiangsu province to restore production and make a living with their own hands.8 Statistics from eight cities, including Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Guangzhou, indicate that 1.1 million people in those cities were sent home by the end of 1950.9 Other statistics indicate that a total of 920 production reformatories were established around the nation, taking in a total of 448,000 prostitutes, beggars, thieves, and vagrants for reform.10 In the end, work focuses were adjusted at appropriate times according to changes to situations. In 1953, China began its entry into the era of construction of the planned economy; the focus of sheltering work changed accordingly. During this period, the primary targets of sheltering and sending home were people who had entered cities as a result of disasters or jealousy of urban life. The original direction of sheltering and settling agencies no longer suited the needs of the situation. In April of that year, the Beijing city government consolidated and adjusted all work units under production reformatories led by the Bureau of Civil Affairs and all relief work units under the Beijing section of the China People’s Relief Association. In May, the North China People’s Government issued the ‘Provisional Measures for the Processing of Beggars in North China Cities,” stipulating integration of financial outlays for all funding of sheltering centers and unification of managing agencies to be included in fiscal budgets. 7  Jieguan Chengdu 《接管成都》 [Taking Over Control of Chengdu], ed. CCP Chengdu City Committee Party History Research Bureau 中共成都市委员会党史研究室, (Chengdu: Chengdu Press, 1991), 191. 8  “Jieguan guomindang shanghai shi jingchaju jishi” 《接管国民党上海市警察局纪实》​ [Actual Records of Taking Over the Shanghai City Police Bureau from the Guomindang], in Gong’an shi ziliao 《公安史资料》12 (1986). 9  Meng Zhaohua and Wang Minghuan 孟昭华、王明寰, Zhongguo minzheng sixiang shi《中国民政思想史》 [History of Chinese Civil Affairs Thought], (Heilongjiang People’s Press, 1986), 597. 10  Meng Zhaohua, Xie Zhiwu, and Fu Yang 孟昭华、谢志武、傅阳, Zhongguo minzheng sixiang shi 《中国民政思想史》 [History of Chinese Civil Affairs Thought], (China Social Press, 2000), 596.

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During this period, several simple, practical, and easily operated measures were introduced, and many achievements were made in the work of reform and education. On a foundation of reforming vagrants, all local governments established production reformatories and vagrant reform farms. Statistics indicate that over 420,000 people had been taken in and reformed around the nation by 1956.11 The sheltering and sending home work of this era played an important role in rectifying public safety, changing the appearance of cities, realizing the socialist reform of agriculture, supporting agricultural production, solidifying the alliance between industry and agriculture, and supporting the restoration and development of industrial and agricultural production. During the Second Phase (1957–1966), Natural Disasters Led to Increases in Outflows of Population; the Task of Urban Sending Home Became More Grave; and There Were Changes to the Work of Sheltering of a Social Relief Nature During the first period (1957–1963), there were increases to outflows of population owing to a large number of natural disasters; at this time, the focus of sheltering work was sending home. From 1959 to 1961, there were severe difficulties in the national economy, which caused great outflows of peasants. From 1957 to 1963, there was a great migration of approximately 8 to 10 million peasants around the nation. In 1960, a total of 6 million vagrants and beggars were taken in, the greatest in any one year following liberation.12 In order to thoroughly implement the instructions of CCP Central regarding action by all the people, performing agriculture in a big way, planting grain in a big way, reducing urban migrant populations, and strengthening the first line of agriculture, in November 1960, the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued the “Notice Regarding Further Improving the Work of Sheltering and Sending Home,” requiring civil affairs departments to complete the work of sheltering and sending home as a political task. One year thereafter, the Center approved and circulated the Ministry of Public Security’s “Report Regarding the Cessation of Free Migration of the Population,” which determined the establishment of sheltering and sending home stations in large and mid-sized cities, led by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which would be responsible for the taking in of people who had blindly entered cities and repatriating them to their homes. Public security organs were responsible for the investigation and differentiation of the targets of sheltering work. During this period, sheltering and sending home agencies had already been handed over by governments to civil affairs depart1.2

11  Meng Zhaohua and Wang Minghuan 孟昭华、王明寰, 302. 12  Ibid., 303.

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ments, the work nature of which was purely provision of social aid, which came in different names in various localities—relief stations, city sending home committees, etc. In 1961, the Ministry of Internal Affairs established the “Work Plan for Urban Sheltering and Sending Home Stations,” which clearly stipulated that the targets of sheltering were to be outflow peasants who had entered cities without food or shelter, as well as those people who had entered cities to live vagrant lives without the means to sustain life (known as the “two withouts”). In 1962, to address the settlement of those vagrants who frequently returned to cities after having been repatriated, the State Council stipulated special funds to be used for the settling in allowance and living allowances of migrants with no family to return to and migrants frequently repatriated but frequently returned (“long migrants”) to be controlled by production teams and farms; this was to ensure the effective development of their work. During the second period (1963–1966), the focus of sheltering work became “two on-the-spots” (i.e. on-the-spot sheltering and on-the-spot settlement). After 1963, the number of migrant beggars greatly reduced as the national economy improved, but there were still some “long migrants” lingering in society. To resolve this issue, in March 1963, the Ministry of Civil Affairs adopted the “two on-the-spots” policy, changing former methods of centralized sheltering and scattered settlement. The primary work during this period was to strive to settle vagrants on farms. In December of that year, the Ministry of Internal Affairs convened a nationwide farm settlement work conference and wrote the “Provisional Measures for the Work of Settlement Farms (Draft),” establishing the function of settlement farms as “settling and employment, education and reform.” In January 1964, the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued the “Provisional Measures for the Work of Settlement Farms (Draft),” which clearly stipulated that the nature of settlement farms was to be “farms for settlement and employment and education and reform; they are agricultural enterprises owned by the whole people, and the production and construction of these farms is to be included in State planning.” Thereupon, all newly formed and pre-existing vagrant reform farms were converted into settlement farms, which totaled 101 in quantity. They occupied a total of 970,000 mu of land and settled a total of over 36,000 people by the end of 1963.13

13  Liao Yiguang et al. 廖益光等, Minzheng gongzuo gailun 《民政工作概论》 [General Outline of Civil Affairs Work], (Hunan University Press, 1987), 283.

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In the Third Phase (1966–1977) the Administrative Management Nature of Sheltering and Sending Home Became More Apparent Following the beginning of the “Cultural Revolution,” in January 1969 the Ministry of Internal Affairs was disbanded, and departments (and bureaus) of civil affairs were merged with other departments. During this period, the targets of sheltering and sending home became increasingly complex, and the work involved became increasingly difficult to undertake. For those reasons, some sheltering and sending home stations adopted half-coercive measures in their work; they engaged in such egregious infractions of law and discipline as casually arresting, interrogating, tying up, hanging and beating, etc. of sheltered people. At the time, the vast majority of the over 700 sheltering and sending home stations in the nation were run at the county level; at the same time, there was a great reduction to the number of settlement farms, causing the work of settlement to become decentralized and unable to amply serve their functions. The number of settlement farms had been reduced from 101 to 44 by 1978, with the number of those sheltered reduced from over 36,000 to over 16,000. The work of settlement had become half-paralyzed.14 During this period, the administration of the criminals guilty of various offenses related to unchecked population migration became a primary contradiction within the work. S&S stations were all handed over to public security departments; this comprised a major difference from the two previous periods. Thereafter, some prefectural, city, and county governments of some provinces restored S&S stations for outflow population, causing reductions to the scale of outflow population. On the whole, the institutions for sheltering and sending home over the years 1949 to 1977 brought about overall efficiency in cvil affairs work, in that they performed a great amount of work in providing relief to disaster victims returning home and rebuilding homes during a major natural disaster. 1.3

2 From 1978 to 2003, a few new problems emerged in the development of sheltering and sending home institutions. These can be divided into two stages in terms of concrete development phases.

14  Ibid., 283.

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The First Stage (From the Beginning of Reform and Opening in 1978 to 1990) In 1978, after the establishment of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the work of sheltering and sending home returned to the proper track. Decision-making in sheltering and sending home during this time was based on a value preference for stability and social order. At the same time, there was an objective of protecting basic human rights. In July 1982, the National Politics and Law Working Conference proposed “performing comprehensive administration well and striving to make fundamental improvements to public order in society.” On November 15, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the “Notice Regarding Performing Sheltering and Sending Home, Disaster Relief and Aid, and Discharge and Settlement,” declaring that “we must promptly make clear the situation of the vagrant begging population sent back to their counties, and feasibly resolve their real difficulties. We stridently demand that settlement be firmly implemented, and that frequent sending home and returning be avoided.” When there was difficulty for communes and production teams in the settlement of “long migrants,” they could send them to settlement farms belonging to civil affairs departments.15 Let’s take Beijing as an example. At the end of March 1980, the Beijing city government undertook a city-wide investigation, during which 851 beggars were discovered over the course of three days. Of those, 558—65.5%—were in the capital to petition the government or nominally to petition the government. The investigation revealed that the vast majority of urban begging population had come to the city from their rural villages. Most—60%—were in the prime of youth, with only 15% being elderly and 25% children.16 Analysis of 2142 beggars sheltered in the eleven cities of Shenyang, Guangzhou, Zhengzhou, Shijiazhuang, Nanchang, Bengbu, Shaoguan, Anyang, Handan, Shantou, and Pingxiang revealed the following overall circumstances. 2.1

15  Minzheng gongzuo wenjian huibian (yi) 《民政工作文件汇编 (一)》 [Compilation of Civil Affairs Work Documents (one)], ed. Ministry of Civil Affairs Policy Research Bureau 民政部政策研究室, (1985), 44 and 52. 16  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzheng fagui huibian (1949.10–1993.12) 《中华人民 共和国民政法规汇编 (1949.10–1993.12)》 [Compilation of People’s Republic of China Civil Affairs Laws and Regulations (October 1949 to December 1993)], (Huaxia Press, 1994), 993.

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table 6.1

Quantitative analysis from 11-city beggar investigation

Type

No.

1

Living difficulties 731

2

Indolents, lovers of ease and haters of work

690

3

Family reasons

403

4

Physiological causes

132

5

Criminal history

100

6

Life not difficult, begging to increase income Vagrants and beggars claiming to be filing a petition

46

7

Concrete classification

Those having life difficulties caused by disasters or other reasons; a portion consisted of solitarily elderly persons and disabled youth caused Without household registration or a place to settle, and unwilling to labor on civil affairs departments’ settlement farms; some were loafers who hated work and loved ease who became frequent targets of sending home Inadequate family discipline or those who fled from abuse; the majority were youths, and a portion were children who had grown stubborn and wild at a young age Dull-witted people and sufferers of mental illness whose families were unable to care for them, or who were abandoned Those unable to settle in cities or receiving no welcome from family following reform through labor and re-education through labor, as well as those whose money and grain had been stolen Those who had gone to the city to beg money to use to build a house or to arrange a marriage for children

40

Data source: Zhongguo shehui baozhang zhidu zonglan 《中国社会保障制度总览》 [An Overview of China’s Social Security Institutions], (China Democratic Rule By Law Press, 1995), 1134–1135.

After Reform and Opening had just begun, the problem of migration from the countryside to cities started becoming apparent, and there was increase to the number of “long migrants.” In order to preserve social stability and maintain public order in cities, the State Council issued a series of administrative measures and methods. On May 12, 1982, the State Council issued the “Measures

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for Sheltering and Sending Home Urban Vagrants and Beggars (Trial),” which stipulated that civil affairs and public security departments be responsible for the work of sheltering and sending home. The Measures bestowed legality on sheltering and sending home institutions while at the same time converting such work into pluralistic social affairs administrative management work that touched on social relief, social education, social management, and public order in society. Per the spirit of the document, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security drafted and issued the “Detailed Implementation Regulations of the Measures for Sheltering and Sending Home Urban Vagrants and Beggars (Trial)” and the “Notice Regarding Strengthening the Work of Sheltering and Sending Home.”17 The issuance of the aforementioned series of documents and measures played a great effect in leading the work of sheltering and sending home back to the correct track. S&S stations at this time played two roles: social aid organizations and administrative management organs. This put two responsibilities on the stations: social aid in order to safeguard basic human rights, as well as preservation of public order in order to maintain social order. This dualistic nature exerted great pressure on sheltering and sending home institutions and foreshadowed changes that were to take place in said institutions. In terms of real operations, regulations for sheltering and sending home remained at the level of policy writing, but no actual laws were ever written. At the same time, there was a certain degree of variability in policy regulations. 2.2 The Second Stage (1991 to July 31, 2003) In the 1990s: the “three agricultural” problems began becoming apparent, at which time urban reforms were taking place; social organizations became more flexible; and large quantities of blind, disorderly population migration hit cities, affecting public order in those cities. In order to remedy the difficulties of insufficient personnel numbers and abilities in the administration of public order, in May 1991 the State Council issued the “Opinions Regarding Reform Problems in the Work of Sheltering and Sending Home,” the regulations of which encompassed those people without legal documentation, without fixed dwellings, and without stable income (the “three withouts”) in the scope of sheltering and sending home work. The Opinions also expanded the scope of said work to those vagrants with incomplete sets of the three items of identification cards, temporary residence permits, and work permits (the “three documents”). This caused institutions for sheltering and sending home to become of a more purely public order administration nature, while elements of social 17  Zhongguo shehui baozhang zhidu zonglan 《中国社会保障制度总览》 [An Overview of China’s Social Security Institutions], (China Democratic Rule-by-law Press, 1995), 1139.

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aid were gradually removed. After the Code of Criminal Procedure [Xingshi susong fa] of 1996 abolished sheltering investigations, a vacuum developed in social and public order administration. To that end, public security organs in many places sacrificed the basic human rights guarantees of sheltering and sending home institutions in order to safeguard social order and stability. During this stage, the value preference behind sheltering and sending home institutions became one of preserving stability and order. At the same time, officials became concerned with the economic productivity of sheltering and sending home stations and fundamentally abandoned all elements of social aid. With extremely limited funding and the scope of sheltering and sending home ceaselessly growing, this work faced serious economic difficulties, which in turn caused even more social problems. There have long been problems of financial shortages in organs belonging to civil affairs departments; total expenditures of all civil affairs department undertakings generally account for only about 1.5% of total government expenditures.18 As only a portion of funding for sheltering and sending home came from civil affairs operating expenses, most had no choice but to rely on labor performed by those people they were sheltering or by forcing the sheltered to bear the expenses of feeding themselves and going home on their own. In one example, on June 10, 1996, the Guangdong Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, the Guangdong Provincial Pricing Bureau, and the Guangdong Provincial Department of Finance jointly issued the “Supplementary Notice Regarding Strengthening Fee Collection in Sheltering and Sending Home Management,” stipulating maximum limits for collection of the “three fees:” no more than eight yuan per day in food fees, a fine of no more than 10 to 15 yuan to “three withouts” persons who had incurred minor infractions of the law engaging in unchecked migration, and that all fees be levied on the true number of days sheltered. The primary problems with the sheltering and sending home institutions during this phase lay in three areas. The first was the positioning of sheltering and sending home institutions, which had been assigned the task of “actively uniting in attacking criminal activities which egregiously endanger social order.” This caused them to become a component of “comprehensive administration of social order.” The second was the positioning of peasants entering cities to find work. They came to be seen by the government and society as engaging in unchecked migration, which made them the “ringleaders” in imperiling urban security. The third was the positioning of sheltering and end18  Lin Wei et al. 林炜等, “Yangguang xia de yinying: laizi Guangzhou shi dajianshan shourong fenzhan de baogao” 《阳光下的阴影:来自广州市大尖山收容分站的报告》 [A Shadow in the Sunlight: a Report from the Dajianshan Sheltering Station of Guangzhou], in Zhong guo qing nian bao 《中国青年报》, July 24, 1998.

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ing home stations, which were obliged to “earn all the money they spent” in the performance of their work, thus causing them to cease being welfare agencies and become administrative departments responsible for their own financial outlays. Under such circumstances, changes to concepts governing administrative departments caused structural abnormalities to sheltering and sending home institutions. Owing to the synthesis of several complicated factors, sheltering and sending home institutions were warped into public security administrative institutions. As defects of the institutions grew greater, the justice and efficiency of those institutions grew weaker. The warping of the institutions and disorder in management eventually incited a series of pernicious incidents. Prominent incidents include the Hunan Lianyuan incident,19 the sex trafficking of sheltered women incident in Xuzhou,20 the Sun Zhigang incident,21 and others. Why would problems of this and that sort appear? The heart of the problem lay in the lack of State legal backing for local regulations. For example, some regulations inappropriately expanded sheltering institutions to restrict the scope of personal freedoms; this is an obvious overstepping of authority. For this reason, at the same time as we affirm that sheltering and sending home institutions are reasonable and functional, we should also objectively determine whether there are any problems with those institutions. As society developed, mechanisms and administrative methods governing sheltering and sending home institutions became unsuitable to real needs. With the inclusion of illegal operations on the part of some local governments, there came to be many grave problems in sheltering and sending home institutions. 3 There have been major changes to administrative institutions for Chinese urban vagrant beggars—symbolized by the issuance and implementation of 19  Chen Feng 陈峰, “Hunan sheng lianyuan shi shourong qiansongzhan de heise zhifu lu” 《湖南省涟源市收容遣送站的黑色致富路》 [The Black Road to Riches for the Sheltering and Sending Home Station of Lianyuan City, Hunan], in Nanfang dushi bao《南方都市报》, June 19, 2003. 20  Li Guoming 李国明, “Xuzhou jianchaguan jiekai qiansong heimu” 《徐州检察官揭 开遣送黑幕》 [Prosecutors in Xuzhou Reeveal Black Curtain of Sending Home], in Jiancha ribao 《检察日报》, September 12, 2001. 21  Chen Feng et al. 陈峰等, “Daxue bieyesheng yin wu zanzhuzheng bei shourong bing zao duda zhisi”《大学毕业生因无暂住证被收容并遭毒打致死》 [College Graduate Taken in by Shelter and Beaten to Death for not Having Temporary Residence Permit], in Nanfang dushi bao 《南方都市报》, April 25, 2003.

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the “Measures for Aid Management to Urban Vagrant Beggars with No Means for a Living (Draft).” For one, their function as providers of social aid has become more prominent. On June 18, 2003, Wen Jiabao convened a meeting of the State Council Standing Committee. The Committee came to the opinion that over the course of 20 years, there had been major changes to China’s economic and social development and to the internal migration situation, and that the “Measures for Sheltering and Sending Home Urban Vagrant Beggars” were no longer suitable for the needs of new development. In order to fundamentally resolve the difficulties of vagrants and beggars with no means for a living and improve social aid institutions and related regulations and laws, the Committee deliberated on and in principle passed the “Measures for Aid Management to Urban Vagrants and Beggars with No Means to Make a Living (Draft).” On June 20, Wen signed State Council Directive No. 381 of the People’s Republic of China—the “Administrative Measures for Aid to Urban Vagrants and Beggars with No Means to Make a Living.” The measures went into force on August 1, thereby superseding the “Measures for Sheltering and Sending Home of Urban Vagrants and Beggars” issued by the State Council in 1982. Social aid management institutions are very different from sheltering and sending home institutions, mostly in such areas as constitutional basis, institutional targets, methods and contents of aid, etc. table 6.2 Simple comparison between sheltering and sending home institutions and aid management institutions

Constitutional basis Institutional targets Institutional supposition Aid method What aid entails Aid limits

Sheltering and sending home institutions

Aid management institutions

Lacking All manner of vagrants and beggars There is no reason behind internal migration Aid by coercion and charging fees for aid Unclear 15 days to 1 month

Abundant Vagrants and beggars with no means to make a living There is reason behind internal migration Voluntary acceptance of aid and aid given free of charge Clear Generally not more than 10 days

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Aid agency

Sheltering and sending home stations Method of departure Compulsive return home

Responsible departments

Public security and civil affairs

Aid management institutions

Aid management stations Voluntary departure or departure at the end of aid term Civil affairs

Data source: See Hong Dayong 洪大用, Zhuanxing shiqi zhongguo shehui jiuzhu 《转型时期 中国社会救助》 [Social Aid in China During the Period of Transformation], (Liaoning Educational Press, 2004), 228.

The Measures clearly defined the nature and organization of aid stations: “the assistance to be provided by aid centers to vagrants and beggars is a temporary social aid measure.” Stations were to be established at the county-level and higher, and “urban people’s governments at the county level and higher are to establish aid stations for vagrants and beggars based on necessity.” In July, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the “Notice Regarding the Renaming of Sheltering and Sending Home Stations to Aid Management Stations.” On August 1, aid management stations around the nation formally entered operations. As stipulated in the “Notice Regarding the Agency Structure and Funding Issues of the Implementation of the Measures for Aid Management to Vagrants and Beggars without the Means to Make a Living,” jointly issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security, aid management stations were to be considered State-run institutional work units with fiscal subsidies. To better understand the development of aid management centers, please see Table 6.3. Under new historical conditions, CCP Central and the State Council have adapted to the pace of progress of both society and civilization and the demands of socialist rule-by-law construction by abolishing the Measures for Sheltering and Sending Home and establishing the new social relief institution of aid management to urban vagrants and beggars without the means to make a living. There’s only a difference of a few words between “sheltering and sending home” and “aid management,” but that difference represents a historical transition for China’s urban management policies.

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table 6.3  The development of aid management stations

End 2003 End 2004 End 2005

Aid management stations

Total assisted

No. of beds in all stations

864 977 1079

635,000 820,000 1.196 million

47,000 45,000 44,000

Data source: Zhongguo minzheng tongji nianjian 《中国民政统计年鉴》 [China Civil Affairs Statistical Yearbook] from each year noted in the table. Explanation: There are deviations in the statistics for 2003. Page 159 of Zhongguo laodong he shehui baozhang nianjian (2004) 《中国劳动和社会保障年鉴 (2004)》 [China Labor and Social Security Yearbook (2004)] (China Labor and Social Security Press, 2005), reads “as of the end of 2003, there were a total of 909 aid management stations built in the entire nation, offering assistance to over 210,000 vagrants and beggars with no means to make a living.” Page 135 of Zeng Gang and Liu Zhihong’s Minzheng yu shehui gongzuo《民政与社会工作》 [Civil Affairs and Social Work] (University of National Defense Technology Press, 2006), reads “As of December 31, 2003, there were 929 aid management stations in the entire nation, 97 higher than the total of 832 sheltering and sending home stations in the previous period.”

From a legislative perspective, abolishing sheltering and sending home institutions and establishing aid management institutions was a symbolic event in the history of socialist construction in China. The Aid Management Measures are an administrative regulation that tacitly combines the spirit of rule-by-law and manifests concern for humanity and an institutional construction that directly affects the personal interests of the masses. From the perspective of the process of the development of social aid institutions in China, the issuance and implementation of the Measures have realized a smooth transition from coerced sheltering and sending home institutions into voluntary concern and loving aid management provided free of charge. This is a major reform for the State toward improving social aid institutions; it has formally ushered the coercive sheltering and sending home policies in place for over 50 year off the stage. The transition from “sheltering and sending home” to “aid” represents a transition from coercive management to social welfare and aid. It abundantly manifests a concern for humanity based in placing people above all else and aid given to urban vagrants and beggars in need without means to make a living. Real results indicate that since the implementation of the “measures, the beginning of aid management work in all localities has been smooth; aid agencies are basically all in place; initial administration institutions have been established; operating bodies are forming; and work has gotten off the ground

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stably and smoothly. The masses have a great many praises for this. At the same time, many problems and contradictions are gradually being exposed in the course of real operations. This is appearing in veiled criticisms to the Measures, which include that the work of aid management is inherently not meeting stated goals, that social and public order are coming unglued, that legislative work is not clear or up to snuff, etc. This has caused the work of aid management to continue to face difficulties in screening aid targets, difficulty in providing aid to the seriously ill and mentally ill, difficulty in transporting people across provincial lines, a lack of funding for aid management in impoverished areas, and other problems. The major contradictions therein lie in difficulties in obtaining funding, difficulties in interdepartmental cooperation, and difficulties in settling vagrants, etc. Under the current circumstances, the following are a few areas worthy of attention in the resolution of the aforementioned problems. First, placing lone emphasis on the rescinding of sheltering is not practical at this point. The phenomenon of urban vagrants and beggars proceeds apace with urban evolution, as well as with the society’s structure of urbanrural duality. As long as the dual structure remains, it is not practical to put an end to this phenomenon, and so neither is an abolishment of sheltering, which continues to play a mitigating role in the space between provision of aid and arresting on criminal charges. Second, we must gradually standardize practical questions on the basis of the law. One academic wrote in an essay that China remains in a transitional period from primarily administrative adjustments toward primarily legal adjustments; so it is understandable that some institutions would come with policy-like characteristics. The key is to gradually establish a legal system; ceaselessly strengthen the judicial components of sheltering and sending home; and to standardize sheltering and sending home. This would also be beneficial to the work of sheltering’s coming further under the oversight of the National People’s Congress, the China People’s Political Consultative Congress, all areas of society, and the judiciary. At the same time, we should strengthen the reorganization and administration of those carrying out the work of sheltering and sending home during the course of concrete operations. Third, comprehensive administration is the key to resolving problems. The beggar problem is a social problem, closely related to problems of public security and social security. For that reason it is possible that we may not be able to handle it impeccably all at once. As for the problem of how to treat urban vagrants and beggars, we must merge sheltering and sending home with on-the-spot settlement. We must also gradually construct a complete aid

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management system and mechanisms and better resolve this social problem within the promotion of economic development, social progress, the universalization of education, cultural prosperity, rule-by-law, and ethical standardization. References Beijing minzheng zhi 《北京民政志》 [Records of Beijing Civil Affairs]. Beijing Press, 1988. Beiping heping jiefang qianhou 《北平和平解放前后》 [Before and After the Peaceful Liberation of Beiping], ed. Beijing City Archives 北京市档案馆. Beijing Press, 1988. Chen Feng 陈峰, “Hunan sheng lianyuan shi shourong qiansongzhan de heise zhifu lu” 《湖南省涟源市收容遣送站的黑色致富路》 [The Black Road to Riches for the Sheltering and Sending Home Station of Lianyuan City, Hunan], in Nanfang dushi bao 《南方都市报》, June 19, 2003. Chen Feng et al. 陈峰等, “Daxue bieyesheng yin wu zanzhuzheng bei shourong bing zao duda zhisi” 《大学毕业生因无暂住证被收容并遭毒打致死》 [College Graduate Taken in by Shelter and Beaten to Death for not Having Temporary Residence Permit], in Nanfang dushi bao 《南方都市报》, April 25, 2003. Jieguan Chengdu 《接管成都》 [Taking Over Control of Chengdu], ed. CCP Chengdu City Committee Party History Research Bureau 中共成都市委员会党史研究室 Chengdu: Chengdu Press, 1991. “Jieguan guomindang shanghai shi jingchaju jishi” 《接管国民党上海市警察 局纪实》 [Actual Records of Taking Over the Shanghai City Police Bureau from the Guomindang], in Gong’an shi ziliao 《公安史资料》12 (1986). “Jing shou qigai jin san qian ren; yi fenbie anzhi laodong shengchan” 《京收乞丐近 三千人；已分别安置劳动生产》 [Beijing Takes in Nearly 3000 Beggars; Already Settled into Labor and Production], Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, November 11, 1949. Li Guoming 李国明, “Xuzhou jianchaguan jiekai qiansong heimu”《徐州检察官 揭开遣送黑幕》 [Prosecutors in Xuzhou Reeveal Black Curtain of Sending Home], in Jiancha ribao 《检察日报》, September 12, 2001. Liao Yiguang et al. 廖益光等, Minzheng gongzuo gailun 《民政工作概论》 [General Outline of Civil Affairs Work]. Hunan University Press, 1987. Lin Wei et al. 林炜等, “Yangguang xia de yinying: laizi Guangzhou shi dajianshan shourong fenzhan de baogao” 《阳光下的阴影:来自广州市大尖山收容分站 的报告》 [A Shadow in the Sunlight: a Report from the Dajianshan Sheltering Station of Guangzhou], in Zhong guo qing nian bao 《中国青年报》, July 24, 1998.

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Meng Zhaohua and Wang Minghuan 孟昭华、王明寰, Zhongguo minzheng sixiang shi 《中国民政思想史》 [History of Chinese Civil Affairs Thought]. Heilongjiang People’s Press, 1986. Meng Zhaohua, Xie Zhiwu, and Fu Yang 孟昭华、谢志武、傅阳, Zhongguo minzheng sixiang shi 《中国民政思想史》 [History of Chinese Civil Affairs Thought]. China Social Press, 2000. “Qigai ye yao shengchan; pingshifu minzheng ju niding juti banfa; xiyisuo jiaoyangsuo yi shourong sanbai yu” 《乞丐也要生产；平市府民政局拟定具体办法；习艺 所教养所已收容三百余》 [Beggars Also Want to Produce; Beiping City Civil Affairs Bureau Drafts Concrete Measures; Vocational Training Institutes and Reformatories Have Taken in Over Three Hundred], in Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, May 12, 1949. “Zhonggong beiping shiwei guanyu shourong qigai gongzuo zongjie (1949 nian 7 yue)” 《中共北平市委关于收容乞丐工作总结 (1949 年 7 月)》[CCP Beiping City Committee Summary Regarding the Work of Sheltering Beggars (July 1949)], in Beijing shi zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (1948 nian 12 yue zhi 1949 nian) 《北京市 重要文献选编 (1948 年 12 月至 1949 年)》 [Anthology of Important Beijing Documents (December 1948 to 1949)], ed. Beijing Municipal Archives and Party History Research Bureau of the CCP Beijing City Committee 北京市档案馆、中共 北京市委党史研究室. China Records Press, 2001. Zhongguo shehui baozhang zhidu zonglan 《中国社会保障制度总览》 [An Over­ view of China’s Social Security Institutions]. China Democratic Rule By Law Press, 1995. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzheng fagui huibian (1949.10–1993.12)《中华人民 共和国民政法规汇编 (1949.10–1993.12)》 [Compilation of People’s Republic of China Civil Affairs Laws and Regulations (October 1949 to December 1993)]. Huaxia Press, 1994.

CHAPTER 7

Discussion of Reforms to Rural Cooperative Medicine in the New Era Yao Li Abstract Rural cooperative medicine in the new era has taken a winding development path. As the household contracting management system was promoted, rural cooperative medicine quickly disintegrated, with its coverage rates falling from 90 percent in the late 1970s to five percent in 1985. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Party and the government strove to restore cooperative medicine, but the work of reconstruction hit repeated setbacks. Self-payment for medicine by rural residents brought about severe social problems. The beginning of 2003 saw the issuance of the new rural cooperative medicine (NRCM) system, yet another socialist institutional innovation rich in Chinese characteristics. Pilots and practical extensions for the past few years have proven that NRCM is in conformance with the realities of China and is of great significance to safeguarding the health of rural citizens, maintaining social harmony, and promoting economic development. At the same time, the construction of a perfected rural medical assurance system will require integration of power from all areas; the task is arduous, and the road far.

Keywords New era – rural cooperative medicine – medical assurance

Rural collective medicine (RCM) was a kind of collective medical assurance system spontaneously innovated in China’s countryside in the mid-1950s. Its creation shattered China’s history of the peasantry’s having to look to their own medical assurances. Although the funding level and assurance capacity of RCM *  This article was selected at the 8th Annual Conference for Academia of National History, essay submitted on August 4, 2008. Yao Li is an associate researcher in the Modern China Research Institute’s Third Research Bureau.

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were both severely limited, the system required low levels of investments, and it conformed to the extremely backward reality of the economy at the time. Its nature of reciprocal help and mutual aid was also a good fit with the traditional ethics of China’s rural society. So RCM was quickly approved and promoted by the Center, which played an enormous role in changing China’s rural medical and health conditions. In the 1960s and 1970s, RCM, “barefoot doctors,” and rural health stations were collectively known as the “three magical weapons” in Chinese rural medical and health work. After the third plenum of the CCP’s eleventh congress, the wave of economic reform hastened the birth of all manner of reforms to social institutions. During this period, RCM experienced a winding development course amid explorations of “feeling the stones to cross the river.” In the end, China opted for the road of innovation subsequently called new rural cooperative medicine (NRCM). 1

Vicissitudes of RCM amid the Torrents of Reform

The rural household contracting management system was the breakthrough point for China’s Reform and Opening. The weakening of the collective economy brought about by that system directly influenced the survival and stability of the RCM system, the coverage of which fell from 90 percent in the late 1970s to only five percent in 1985. In the early 1990s, the “only RCM systems still surviving” in the entire nation “were distributed primarily in Shanghai and southern Jiangsu.”1 The majority of “barefoot doctors,” the implementers of cooperative medicine, became “self-employing private businesspeople” who bore profits and losses on their own. The 640,000 “countryside doctors” who passed the initial qualifications test in 1986 represented only half of the 1.5 million “barefoot” doctors of the late 1970s. The dissolution of cooperative medicine thrust peasants back into the realm of self-paid medicine. In some places, illnesses that had been previously wiped out—particularly contagious ones—made come-backs, in some cases even spreading out of control. In one example, schistosomiasis, following the founding of New China, the Party and the government attached a great degree of importance to the work of prevention and treatment, based on the conditions at the time of wide spread, great numbers of ill, and severe threat. The Party and the government established prevention 1  “Zhongguo nongcun weisheng fuwu chouzi he nongcun baochou jizhi yanjiu” [Research into the Funding of China’s Rural Health Services and Rural Compensation Mechanisms],《中国农 村卫生服务筹资和农村报酬机制研究》 , in Zhongguo chuji weisheng baojian《中国初 级卫生保健》7 (2000).

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and treatment organizations from the Center down to the areas of epidemic spread, investing a great degree of capital and human effort, widely launching the mass movement to eradicate schistosomiasis. After this, schistosomiasis was fundamentally controlled and eradicated. In 1985, the central schistosomiasis prevention and treatment leading group, as well as local prevention and treatment leading groups and their administrative agencies were abolished in succession. Thereafter, at the end of the 20th century, schistosomiasis made a comeback, becoming a great calamity for the health of rural citizens. In terms of the common international standard for evaluating the health of the population in a country or region—life expectancy and infant mortality rates—after the 1980s, China’s rate of improvement was much slower than that in other countries, primarily because of the deteriorating health condition of the peasantry, which constituted the vast majority of the population. The health conditions of the peasantry in impoverished regions of the Midwest were particularly dismal. At the same time, the rate of increase to rural incomes fell as the costs of medicine rose sharply. From 1990 to 1999, average rural net incomes rose from 686.31 yuan to 2210.34 yuan, a 2.2-fold increase. During that same period, the average cost of a single medical consultation rose from 10.9 yuan to 79 yuan, a 6.2-fold increase, and average in-patient medical fees rose from 473.3 yuan to 2891 yuan, a 5.1-fold increase.2 The problems of peasants’ “becoming impoverished because of illness and returning to poverty because of illness” became more severe, to the point that the misery was summed up in the saying “drag a small illness, carry a big illness, and for serious illness wait to see the king of the afterlife.” This further exacerbated urban-rural disparities and the imbalance of social justice. Monitoring of maternal mortality rates in 30 provinces, cities, and regions in the early 1990s indicated that the rate in cities was 49.4 per 100,000, close to the standard of developed nations, but the rural rate was 114.9 per 100,000, with half of all maternal mortalities attributable to inaccessibility of transportation and lack of timely blood transfusions.3 The World Health Report 2000, issued by the World Health Organization, indicated that of the 191 nations in the world, the overall effectiveness of China’s health depart2  Nongcun weisheng gaige yu xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao gong zuo shou ce”《农村卫生 改革与新型农村合作医疗工作手册》[Guide to Rural Health Reforms and the Work of New Rural Cooperative Medicine], ed. Ding Xiaobo 丁晓波, (China Financial and Economic Press, 2005), 26. 3  Ai Xiao 艾笑, “Quanguo weisheng ting-ju zhang huiyi xingcheng gong shi fazhan nongcun weisheng shiye shi dangwuzhiji”《全国卫生厅局长会议形成共识发展农村卫生事业 是当务之急》[Health Directors Around the Nation Come to Consensus that Developing Rural Health is the Most Urgent Task], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》 , January 22, 1991.

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ments was at a low level, with particularly poor marks in public health. The Report ranked China 188, only four from the bottom, in the fairness of health ­burdens.4 The near total collapse of RCM and the resurgence of self-paid medical treatment in rural areas brought about myriad social problems and caused the construction of rural medical assurance systems to become increasingly difficult. Something had to be done, and quickly. Beginning in the early 1990s, the Party and the government again placed all their hopes in cooperative medicine, as they made efforts in exploring the construction of a rural medical assurance institution suited to China’s characteristics. The Center issued a series of documents and established corresponding policies in order to re-establish rural cooperative medicine. In 1991, the State Council approved and issued the “Request for Instructions Regarding Reforming and Strengthening Rural Medical and Health Work,” originally written by the Ministry of Health and other departments. The document required all local governments to stably promote cooperative medical assurance institutions in order to make good on promises from the Almaty Declaration and realize the provision of social assurances in which everybody enjoyed health maintenance. In 1992, there was a trend among many local governments around the nation to temporarily establish cooperative medicine. To this end, Health Minister Qian Xinzhong—a strident advocate of cooperative medicine—published an article entitled “Restore the Power and Prestige of Cooperative Medicine [Chongzhen hezuo yi iao de xiongfeng]” in the People’s Daily [Renmin ribao]. Thereafter, right as cooperative medicine’s return was getting off the ground, the Ministry of Agriculture called for a halt to all policies that demanded government receipt of money and other ­articles—including cooperative medicine—in order to alleviate the burden on the peasantry. This was a major setback in the work of re-establishing cooperative medical institutions. The Center then promptly issued an order to rectify the name of cooperative medicine in order to preserve achievements already made. In 1993, CCP Central called for “developing and improving rural cooperative medical institutions” in its document “Resolutions Regarding Several Problems in Establishing a Socialist Market Economic System.” In the following year, the State Council Research Office, the Ministry of Health, and 4  Wang Junxiu 王俊秀, “Dapo cheng-xiang, suoyouzhi deng jiexian dapo liangji fenhua dapo ‘yiyao hemou’—san da ‘yaofang’ zhi yigai bingzheng”《打破城乡、所有制等界 限打破两极分化打破“医药合谋”——三大“药方”治医改病症》[Smashing Urban-rural and Ownership Boundaries, Smashing Polarization, and Smashing the ‘Pharmaceutical Conspiracy’—Three ‘Prescriptions’ to Treat the Ailments of Medical Reforms], in Zhongguo qingnian bao 《中国青年报》, July 29, 2005.

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the Ministry of Agriculture colluded with the World Health Organization to launch pilots and follow-up research work in “Chinese rural cooperative medical system reforms” in 14 counties in seven provinces. At the National Health Work Conference in 1996, Jiang Zemin noted that “now many rural villages are developing cooperative medicine. This has won strong popular support. The people are calling it a ‘project of popular will’ and ‘benevolent rule.’ It seems that the key to strengthening the work of rural health lies in developing and perfecting rural cooperative medical institutions. This is the summary of longterm practical experience, and it conforms to both China’s national conditions and to the wishes of the peasantry. We must further unify understanding, strengthen leadership, and actively, reliably perform this deed.”5 In January 1997, CCP Central and the State Council even more clearly proposed the need to “actively and reliably develop and perfect cooperative medical systems” in the document “Resolutions Regarding Health Reform and Development.” In order to throughly implement the Resolutions, in March the Ministry of Health and other departments submitted the “Opinions Regarding Developing and Perfecting Rural Cooperative Medicine” to the State Council, which quickly approved the document. On November 7, the Ministry of Health issued the “Notice Regarding Further Promoting Cooperative Medicine.” All these efforts drove a small fervor for re-establishing cooperative medicine in 1997. Twentyfour provincial, city, and autonomous region governments around the nation the issued policy-nature documents strengthening rural cooperative medicine, and 18 provincial and autonomous region governments convened work conferences dedicated to rural cooperative medicine, during which they established development plans for cooperative medicine. Twelve provincial governments conducted medical training courses. Cooperative medical pilots were launched in different forms by all provincial governments in a total of 917 counties.6 The work of re-establishing cooperative medicine, however, did not proceed ideally. A second State health services investigation launched in 1998 indicated that only 12.68 percent of the population in rural villages enjoyed medical assurance, and only 6.5 percent were enrolled in cooperative medicine.7 The reasons for that situation included insufficient government 5  Zhongguo weisheng nianjian (1997)《中国卫生年鉴 (1997)》[China Health Yearbook [1997], (People’s Health Press, 1997), 10. 6  Zhongguo weisheng nianjian (1998)《中国卫生年鉴 (1998)》[China Health Yearbook [1998], (People’s Health Press, 1998), 31. 7  “Di’er ci guojia weisheng fuwu diaocha (1998)”《第二次国家卫生服务调查 (1998)》[Second National Health Services Investigation (1998)], accessed from http://www.moh.gov.cn/statis tics/ronhs98/index.htm.

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investments in cooperative medicine, a lack of faith on the part of rural citizens in cooperative medicine, and poor planning of the institutions themselves. These and other factors inhibited the system’s re-establishment. The third plenum of the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1998 passed the “CCP Central Guiding Opinions Regarding Several Major Problems in Agriculture and Rural Work,” which emphasized the need to improve rural medical and health equipment, stably develop cooperative medicine, and increase the health level of rural citizens. The State’s attitude toward re-establishment of cooperative medicine had become only more resolute following the setbacks and difficulties. After entry into the new century, the Ministry of Health broadened the investigation and research work for rural cooperative medicine, and Party group members led teams deep into rural areas of varying degrees of economic development. They discovered real problems within rural medical assurances and analyzed them. On a foundation of absorbing the successful experiences and lessons from defeat of cooperative medicine, they established pilots and construction agendas for new rural cooperative medicine (NRCM). 2

Innovations of New Rural Cooperative Medicine

After entry into the new century, the Party and the State came to a clearer understanding of the importance of rural health work—on the basis of a summary of 50 years of achievements and problems in rural health work. Jiang Zemin pointed out that, “rural health work directly affects rural development, the prosperity of agriculture, and the health of rural citizens; it affects the realization of China’s economic and social development goals.”8 The high degree of importance attached by the Center to the construction of rural medical assurance institutions serves as a fundamental testament to that fact. At the same time, the active pilots and brave explorations made by theoretical research departments and real operational departments provided a theoretical basis and practical experience for the issuance of new institutions and to scientific resolutions. In May 2001, the State Council issued the “Guiding Opinions Regarding Rural Health Reforms and Development,” drafted by five departments and committees, including the State Council Office for Restructuring Economic Systems. The Opinions initially established reform directions and policy principles for the development of rural health institutions. At the same time, the Ministry of Health and six other departments jointly issued the “Chinese Rural 8  Zhongguo weisheng nianjian (2003)《中国卫生年鉴 (2003)》[China Health Yearbook [2003], (People’s Health Press, 2003), 9.

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Primary-level Health Maintenance Development Compendium (2001–2010).” These documents made rural health work the priority of nationwide health work and one important issue to be resolved in the development of the national economy. In January 2002, the State Council determined to convene a nationwide rural health work conference in the name of CCP Central and the State Council. On October 29, after 10 months of drafting and deliberations and over 30 revisions, CCP Central and the State Council issued the “Resolutions Regarding Further Strengthening Rural Health Work.” The Resolutions required the gradual establishment of new rural cooperative health institutions and that “new rural cooperative medical institutions fundamentally cover rural residents by 2010.”9 This was the first time that the Center formally proposed the concept and objective of “new rural cooperative ­medicine.” On that same day, the State Council convened the first national rural health work conference. The conference earnestly acted in the spirit of the Resolutions and conducted profound research into the issues of: establishing NRCM institutions; deepening reforms to rural health organizations; implementing rural health subsidy policies; strengthening rural health personnel training and team formation; launching the work of urban health supporting rural health; strengthening rural medical administration; etc. On December 28, the Ninth National People’s Congress passed the “Agricultural Law of the People’s Republic of China (Revised Draft),” which stressed the need to establish rural medical assurance institutions, and in which the State encouraged and supported the development of rural cooperative medicine and other forms of medical assurances as well as increasing the health levels of rural citizens. In this way, the objectives of NRCM construction and medical insurance were fixed within national law. This provided a legal basis for the establishment of NRCM institutions. On January 16, 2003, the State Council General Office transmitted the “Opinions Regarding the Establishment of New Rural Cooperative Medical Institutions,” jointly drafted by the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Opinions provided concrete and clear regulations and guidance regarding the problems within the process of establishing NRCM institutions. NRCM increased the government’s financial burden, and there were fundamental differences between it and traditional cooperative medicine in funding, reimbursements, management, insurance levels, etc. First, its definition is more scientific, clear, and concrete. “It is a rural medical institution of reciprocal aid and mutual help organized, guided, and sup9  “Di’er ci guojia weisheng fuwu diaocha (1998)”《第二次国家卫生服务调查(1998)》[Second National Health Services Investigation (1998)], accessed from http://www.moh.gov.cn/statis tics/ronhs98/index.htm, 8.

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ported by the government, in which rural citizens voluntarily enroll, funded by individuals, collectives, and the government, and which is planned primarily for the treatment of major illnesses.” The implications of traditional cooperative medical institutions were sketchier, including the summaries in the first central document in which it appeared in 1960, the “Rural Cooperative Medicine Regulations (Trial Draft)” of 1979, and the “Request for Instructions Regarding Reforming and Strengthening Rural Medical and Health Work” of 1991. Those documents solely emphasized RCM’s “reliance upon collective strength,” its being a “collective welfare institution of the masses of commune members,” and its being “a medical and health maintenance institution that assembles all forms of medical prevention and health maintenance fees.” Second, its objectives are extremely clear: fundamental coverage of rural residents by 2010. This objective makes stipulations to time, scope, and targets. With efforts from all parties involved, this objective was achieved two years ahead of schedule. Third, it relaxes conditions for enrollment: all rural residents are welcome. Such a stipulation conforms to the new situation in which the people engage in various industries and maintain diverse identities, as well as the large quantity of migrants stuck between the urban and rural worlds. It also conforms to the ideal objective of “all people enrolling in medical and health maintenance” programs. Fourth, it enlarges the scale of funding. It designates counties as funding units, and in those places where conditions do not permit, allows towns and townships to serve as funding units in the initial phase while funding is gradually transitioned to the county (or prefecture). Its advantages include expanding insurance funds, increasing the strength of insurance, and reducing capital management costs. The funding unit of traditional RCM, on the other hand, was the village. That meant small capital quotas which could maintain only low levels of medical expenses and would not be suitable for the current funding needs of rural contagious disease models. Fifth, it strengthens the government’s responsibility. The government is the key actor in the implementation of NRCM institutions; it is responsible for organizing, leading, and supporting, which has changed the system’s former nature of being “established by the people and helped by the government” and ensures the effective implementation of NRCM institutions. In the beginning, per capita annual central financial allocations to NRCM enrollees in the Midwest totaled only 10 yuan, augmented by subsidies of no less than 10 yuan by local governments. Under the funding model of the “three three policy,” government allocations accounted for two thirds of total funding. Thereafter, central and local financial subsidy standards were increased annually, up to 80 yuan in 2007. Sixth, its focus is funding for major illnesses. In recent years, chronic illnesses and malignant diseases—which are costly to treat—have

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become the major threats to rural health and life. In order to resolve the major problem of “becoming impoverished because of illness and returning to poverty because of illness,” we must use limited NRCM funding to protect against “major illnesses.” For that reason, funding for major illnesses was established as the crux of the system. This conforms to both the realities of China’s countryside and the principles of insurance. Seventh, it improves oversight mechanisms. Traditional cooperative medicine demanded only “dedicated use of earmarked funds” and “accounts cleared daily, settled monthly, and publicized at fixed intervals.” Oversight mechanisms of NRCM are especially standardized and precise, with relevant departments of county governments coming together with rural citizens enrolled in NRCM to form oversight committees, with committee members participating in investigation and oversight work of NRCM jointly with local people’s congresses and accounting departments. In addition, the revenues and expenditures of cooperative medicine funds, as well as their usages, must be publicized to society at fixed intervals via posted notices, and they must accept oversight by the masses of people and by social discourse. Eighth, it links up with medical assistance and medical commercial insurance institutions, thus exerting a mutual effect. Medical assistance institutions provide subsidies for medical expenses to destitute households and enrollees of the “five insurances,” materially helping them participate in local NRCM. The new institution encourages rural families of more opulent living standards in developed regions to simultaneously enroll in commercial medical insurance, to ensure that they receive better medical assurance. NRCM is yet another socialist institutional innovation rich in Chinese characteristics. Beginning in June 2003, the first batch of 304 pilots was launched in 30 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions, covering a total of over 93 million rural citizens. In order to soundly, stably perform the work of these pilots, the State Council, the Ministry of Health, and other relevant departments issued a series of documents related to organizational management, institutional reforms, funding management, and policies governing a portion of State-designated particularly impoverished regions under the NRCM umbrella. These documents provided theoretical guidance and policy support to NRCM pilot work. In December 2003, the State Council convened the National NRCM Pilot Work Conference. Prior to the conference, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao each gave instructions for the work of NRCM, emphasizing the great significance of NRCM and raising demands on how the pilot work should be performed. The number of pilot counties and cities was increased to 333 in 2004, and by 2005 that number had swelled to 641—with at least one pilot in each prefecturallevel administrative region—covering a total of 225 million people, with 163 million rural citizens actually enrolled, for an enrollment rate of 72.6 percent.

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There were a total of 119 million State reimbursements of NRCM enrollees for a total of 5.038 billion yuan.10 By 2006, 1433 counties (and county-level cities and regions), 50.1 percent of all such regions in the nation, had launched NRCM, realizing the work objective set earlier that year. Also in 2006, 405 million rural residents were enrolled in NRCM, 45.8 percent of all rural citizens in the nation, for an enrollment rate of 80.5 percent. From January to September 2006, a total of 140 million rural residents benefitted from NRCM, with a total of 9.58 billion yuan in medical expenses reimbursed.11 The resolve and strength of the Center in building NRCM, the eagerness of the masses of rural citizens for the establishment of medical assurance institutions, and the active, stable performance of work on the part of local governments and personnel all congealed into a formidable driving force, which ensured the smooth progress of NRCM pilot work. NRCM entered a phase of complete universalization in 2007. At the end of that year, 2451 counties (and county-level prefectures and regions) had fundamentally established NRCM institutions, covering 730 million rural citizens, for an enrollment rate of 86 percent; there were 924 million instances of rural citizens benefitting from the program, with 59.1 billion yuan in medical expenses recompensed.12 This created the conditions and the possibility for the realization of full coverage of NRCM to be accomplished by the end of 2008, two years ahead of the central agenda. This marked a victorious close to the first battle in the implementation of NRCM institutions. 3

Historical Inspirations and Considerations

For a major socialist nation in a period of rapid development such as ours, there were no ready-made models or experiences from which to learn and draw lessons in terms of which form of rural medical assurance institutions 10  Ministry of Health 卫生部, “Quanguo xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao shi dian gongzuo qude mingxian chengxiao”《全国新型农村合作医疗试点工作取得明显成效》[Work in New Rural Cooperative Medicine Pilots Around the Nation Makes Great Achievements], accessed from http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2005-12/30/con-tent_142860.htm. 11  “Weisheng buzhang Gao Qiang: 2006 nian quanguo weisheng gongzuo qude zhongda jinzhan”《卫生部长高强: 2006 年全国卫生工作取得重大进展》[Minister of Health Gao Qiang: Health Work Around the Nation Makes Great Strides in 2006], accessed from http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-01/08/content_489970.htm. 12  “Jueding jiedu: zenyang gonggu he fazhan xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao zhidu”《决定 解读: 怎样巩固和发展新型农村合作医疗制度》[Interpretation of the Resolution: How to Solidify and Develop the New Rural Cooperative Medical System], accessed from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-01/03/content_1194517.htm.

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to choose. In order to construct a suitable, effective rural medical assurance system, we had to make a complete summary of the 60 years of development of China’s medical and health systems, particularly the successful experiences and lessons of defeat from the previous 30 years of rural medical assurance systems. Rural Medical Assurance Systems Cannot Go Slack, Even for a Moment China is a major agricultural nation, the national condition of which is that most of the population is rural. This will not change for a very long period of time. As early as the initial period of Reform and Opening, Deng Xiaoping noted that, “eighty percent of China’s population lives in the countryside. Before we can determine whether Chinese society can stabilize and whether the Chinese economy can develop, we must see that the countryside can develop and the lives of rural citizens can improve.”13 The problem of rural residents’ medical assurances are a decisive factor in the resolution of the “three agricultural” problems and the undertaking of new socialist rural construction; they are also the focuses of medical and health reforms and the construction of medical assurance institutions. Minister of Health Gao Qiang once said that the key to building a moderately prosperous [xiaokang] society lay in whether rural citizens could be healthy. Certainly, the resolution—or lack of resolution—of rural medical assurance problems directly affects both the moderate prosperity [xiaokang] of rural citizens and overall societal harmony. The fourth plenum of the Seventh National People’s Congress in 1991 included “placing the focus of medical and health work on the countryside” within the guiding principle of health work in the new era. The “CCP Central and State Council Resolutions Regarding Health Reform and Development” of 1997 set the priority of health work in the new era on “placing the focus on the countryside.” The CCP’s 17th National People’s Congress Report continued the Party’s persistence in maintaining “placing the focus on the countryside” as an important component of establishing basic medical and health institutions. This conformed to the realities of China’s population distribution, the development of medical and health institutions, and the Party’s aims of preserving the basic interests of the most people possible and allowing the people to enjoy the fruits of development. The problem of rural medical assurance is not limited to merely whether rural citizens can afford to see doctors and buy medicine. Rather, it affects the survival and power of the Chinese people and 3.1

13  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 3 juan《邓小平文选》第3卷 [Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3], (People’s Press, 1993), 77–78.

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influences the stability and development of all of Chinese society. Thus, there is an economic value—and great social significance and political import—to the construction of a medical assurance system that is suitable to the masses of rural residents. The Construction of Rural Medical Assurance Institutions Requires an Integration of Power from All Parties The construction of rural medical assurance systems is not an isolated problem. It requires a high degree of attention and financial support from the government and complementary reforms to the medical and health system; it is inseparable from increases to the overall level of public health services. The reason that RCM was able to achieve good results prior to Reform and Opening lay first in government interference which caused it to maintain a high coverage rate; second in major funding support from the State and rigorous controls of medicine prices; and third in the favorable conditions created by the mass health movement and public health services. The atrophying of collective medicine and the difficulties of re-establishing medical work during the 1980s and 1990s have a direct connection with the loss of these factors. In 1979, State subsidies for collective medicine totaled 100 million yuan, down in 1992 to only 35 million yuan, only 0.36 percent of total health expenditures and accounting for only 0.4 yuan per rural citizen. Funding cuts led to the elimination of over 8000 town and township health centers, over 240,000 beds, and 129,000 professional technicians between 1980 and 1990.14 NRCM institutions strengthened government responsibilities; this was in conformance with cooperative medicine’s being both a public product and of a public service nature. Even under the market economy, basic medical assurance institutions should be made the top priority of social productivity. It is heartening that government guidance and social fairness and justice are prominent in the recently published new medical reform plan’s request for opinions, and that planning considering all factors and comprehensive complementary measures were emphasized. These concepts and measures will all play a powerful supporting role in the establishment of NRCM institutions. 3.2

14  Zhongguo yiliao baozhang zhidu gaige shiyong quanshu《中国医疗保障制度改革实 用全书》[Practical Comprehensive Guide to Reforms to China’s Medical Assurance System], ed. Cai Renhua 蔡仁华, (China Human Resources Press, 1997), 356.

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Improving and Solidifying NRCM Institutions: An Arduous Task with a Long Way to Go On July 29, 2005, the China Youth Daily [Zhongguo qingnian bao] reported that the “China Medical and Health System Reform” research group formed jointly by the State Council Research Institute’s Social Development Research Center and the World Health Organization had found that China’s “medical reforms have been fundamentally unsuccessful.” This phrase instantly incited great attention from society, and wide-spread public debate began on the success or failure of medical reforms. The report’s authors performed analysis and evaluations of NRCM, noted five problems in the design of the system, and raised six suggestions for the construction of the rural medical assurance system. We should note that that the objectives of the report were to discover problems and seek progress. Its challenges and criticisms were highly incisive and correct, and it represented the present attitudes of many toward NRCM. Many problems were discovered in the pilots and during the universalization of NRCM, such as funding difficulties, low enrollment rates, shortcomings in funding and information management, etc. In recent years, the central government and all local governments have ceaselessly summarized experience and convened specialized conferences every year at fixed intervals. They have ceaselessly made adjustments and corrections to problems discovered and have added some new measures. We must see that the implementation of NRCM is a long-term, complicated, arduous task that touches upon the interests of over 900 million rural residents. Constructing perfected medical assurance systems is not only a difficult task for every nation in the world at present, but it is an important task and challenge facing China’s reform and development. In June 2006, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued the “Guiding Opinions for the Development of the Pharmaceutical Industry During the ‘Eleventh Five-year Plan’ Period,” in which the realization of the promise that “all people enjoy health and medical services” was placed on the agenda. Shortly thereafter, the sixth plenum of the CCP’s 16th National People’s Congress clearly proposed the historical task of constructing a basic health and medical system that covers urban and rural residents. In the current basic medical assurance system comprised of urban workers basic medical insurance, new rural cooperative medicine, and urban residents basic medical insurance, NRCM is doubtlessly the most important component. The key to realizing the objective of all people enjoying health and medical services lies in the universalization, solidification, and effective use of the NRCM system. In the past, China resolved the medical and health problems of 22 percent of the world’s population using only one percent of the world’s health resources. In the future, China will certainly be able to realize the objective of all having 3.3

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access to medical and health services; this is the correct understanding and staunch belief that historical research has given us. Thirty years ago, China’s RCM was lauded by the World Health Organization as “the only model among developing nations for resolving health funding.” Thirty years hence, the wisdom of the Chinese people along with the theories and practical experience of China’s medical assurance system are sure to influence the entire world again. References Ai Xiao 艾笑, “Quanguo weisheng ting-ju zhang huiyi xingcheng gong shi fazhan nongcun weisheng shiye shi dangwuzhiji” 《全国卫生厅局长会议形成共识发展农 村卫生事业是当务之急》[Health Directors Around the Nation Come to Consensus that Developing Rural Health is the Most Urgent Task], in Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, January 22, 1991. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 3 juan 《邓小平文选》第3卷 [Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3]. People’s Press, 1993. “Di’er ci guojia weisheng fuwu diaocha (1998)”《第二次国家卫生服务调查 (1998)》 [Second National Health Services Investigation (1998)], accessed from http://www .moh.gov.cn/statistics/ronhs98/index.htm. “Jueding jiedu: zenyang gonggu he fazhan xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao zhidu”《决 定解读:怎样巩固和发展新型农村合作医疗制度》 [Interpretation of the Resolution: How to Solidify and Develop the New Rural Cooperative Medical System], accessed from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-01/03/content_1194517.htm. Ministry of Health 卫生部, “Quanguo xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao shi dian gongzuo qude mingxian chengxiao” 全国新型农村合作医疗试点工作取得明显成效》 [Work in New Rural Cooperative Medicine Pilots Around the Nation Makes Great Achievements], accessed from http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2005-12/30/content_142860 .htm. Nongcun weisheng gaige yu xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao gong zuo shou ce《农村卫生 改革与新型农村合作医疗工作手册》[Guide to Rural Health Reforms and the Work of New Rural Cooperative Medicine], ed. Ding Xiaobo 丁晓波. China Financial and Economic Press, 2005. Wang Junxiu 王俊秀, “Dapo cheng-xiang, suoyouzhi deng jiexian dapo liangji fenhua dapo ‘yiyao hemou’—san da ‘yaofang’ zhi yigai bingzheng”《打破城乡、所有 制 等 界 限 打 破 两 极 分 化 打 破 “医 药 合 谋 ”——三 大 “药 方 ”治 医 改 病 症 》 [Smashing Urban-rural and Ownership Boundaries, Smashing Polarization, and Smashing the ‘Pharmaceutical Conspiracy’—Three ‘Prescriptions’ to Treat the Ailments of Medical Reforms], in Zhongguo qingnian bao《中国青年报》 , July 29, 2005.

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“Weisheng buzhang Gao Qiang: 2006 nian quanguo weisheng gongzuo qude zhongda jinzhan” 《卫生部长高强: 2006 年全国卫生工作取得重大进展》 [Minister of Health Gao Qiang: Health Work Around the Nation Makes Great Strides in 2006], accessed from http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-01/08/content_489970.htm. “Zhongguo nongcun weisheng fuwu chouzi he nongcun baochou jizhi yanjiu” [Research into the Funding of China’s Rural Health Services and Rural Compensation Mechanisms],《中国农村卫生服务筹资和农村报酬机制研究》, in Zhongguo chuji weisheng baojian《中国初级卫生保健》7 (2000). Zhongguo weisheng nianjian (1997)《中国卫生年鉴 (1997)》[China Health Year­book [1997]. People’s Health Press, 1997. Zhongguo weisheng nianjian (1998)《中国卫生年鉴 (1998)》[China Health Year­book [1998]. People’s Health Press, 1998. Zhongguo weisheng nianjian (2003)《中国卫生年鉴 (2003)》[China Health Year­ book [2003]. People’s Health Press, 2003. Zhongguo yiliao baozhang zhidu gaige shiyong quanshu《中国医疗保障制度改革 实用全书》[Practical Comprehensive Guide to Reforms to China’s Medical Assurance System], ed. Cai Renhua 蔡仁华. China Human Resources Press, 1997.

CHAPTER 8

The Evolution of China’s International Arms Control Policies Zhong Longbiao Abstract For the past 60 years, China’s international arms controls policies have gone through three phases of development. First, before Reform and Opening, we maintained a solitary position and were outside of the international arms controls system. After Reform and Opening, we entered the system and gradually grew more deeply entrenched therein. After the end of the Cold War, we integrated actively and participated widely. Changes and trends to China’s arms controls policies in recent years have made clear China’s determination and sincere desire—as a responsible major nation—toward the construction of a harmonious world.

Keywords China – arms controls – policy evolution

By “arms controls,” we mean restricting the deployment, stockpiling, manufacture, and testing of given types of weapons, restricting the personnel numbers, equipment, and deployment of armed forces, as well as the formulation of security and defense measures for controlling arms races and for the prevention of war. The primary use of arms controls lies in: reducing dangers born from military circumstances; reducing instability in military matters; reducing the overall possibility of war; and increasing the possibility of enacting restrictive policies in the event of a real conflict.1 Arms controls are an important *  Essay submitted February 9, 2009. Zhong Longbiao is a lecturing professor at the CCP Tianjin Committee Party School’s Department of Construction, Education, and Research. 1  Du Xiangwan 杜祥琬, He junbei kongzhi kexue jishu jichu《核军备控制科学技术基础》 [Scientific and Technical Foundation for Control of Nuclear Arms], (National Defense and Industry Press, 1996), 15. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004292673_009

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issue in international politics and security, as well as an important component of foreign diplomacy and defense policies. Over the 60 years since the ­founding of New China, changes to international security circumstances have caused Chinese leaders to ceaselessly adjust their understanding of national security, as well as the nature and uses of arms controls. Over this period, Chinese leaders have evolved through three stages of involvement in international arms controls policies: nearly complete non-participation, selective participation, and active participation. These changes and trends display China’s resolution and sincere desire as a responsible major nation to build a harmonious world. 1

Before Reform and Opening: Maintaining Our Unique Position

As early as the birth of New China, opposing arms races and striving for disarmament were already components of China’s foreign diplomacy policies.2 On October 16, 1964, “China exploded an atomic bomb, successfully conducting our first nuclear trial.” Immediately afterward, the Chinese government solemnly declared that “China possesses nuclear weapons, entirely for defense, in order to defend the Chinese people from the American nuclear threat . . . At no time and under no circumstances will China ever be the first to use nuclear weapons . . . [We should] convene a meeting of leaders of all nations in the world to discuss the issues of complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. As a first step, the leaders of all nations at the conference should come to an agreement, under which those nations which already possess nuclear weapons or may soon possess nuclear weapons commit to: not using nuclear weapons, not using nuclear weapons on nations that don’t possess nuclear weapons, not using nuclear weapons on regions that don’t possess nuclear weapons, and not using nuclear weapons on each other.”3 China was the first among nuclear nations to proclaim that it would not strike first with nuclear weapons. Both during the Cold War when faced with nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail and after the Cold War when major changes took place in the international security environment, China has faithfully stuck by that promise. However, for complex historical reasons, China maintained its own 2  “Zhongguo de junkong, caijun yu kuosan nuli”《中国的军控、裁军与防扩散努力》[China’s Efforts in Arms Controls, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation], in Renmin ribao《人民日 报》, September 2, 2005. 3  “Zhou Enlai zongli zhidian shijie ge guo zhengfu shounao” 《周恩来总理致电世界各国政 府首脑》[Premier Zhou Enlai Cables Government Leaders of All Nations], Ren min ri bao 《人民日报》, October 21, 1964.

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understanding and judgment of the nature and uses of arms controls prior to Reform and Opening, maintaining a foreign policy of independence and resolutely safeguarding our own security and interests. For a long time we maintained a unique style on the international stage, remaining outside of the international arms control system. During this period, China became party to only one multilateral arms control, disarmament, and anti-proliferation treaty, the second additional protocol of the “Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,” signed in August, 1973.4 In one academic’s opinion, “China’s criticism of arms controls activities at the time was discriminatory; it limited those [nations] lacking arms and demanded that those [nations] possessing arms reduce their armaments. For that reason, China refused to participate in multilateral arms controls talks, even going so far as to condemn such activities and condemn the US’s and the Soviet Union’s arms controls agreement, claiming that such disarmaments were false, and that their real goal was to institutionalize their hegemonies.”5 One should say that this commentary basically conformed with historical facts. This could be seen first in China’s resolute opposition of the “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water” [commonly known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty or PTBT]. On August 23, 1962, the Soviet government informed the Chinese government that the Soviets were preparing to receive the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk to discuss recommendations of the Anti Nuclear Proliferation Treaty signed by the Soviets and the Americans. The Chinese government repeatedly pointed out to the Soviet government that Rusk’s suggestions were in reality an attempt to force socialist nations without nuclear weapons to assume an obligation to never obtain them, and that his spear was pointed primarily at China. On April 20, 1963, the Soviet government sent the Chinese government a memorandum reproaching the Chinese and expressing that the Soviets would uphold the “Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” signed by the Soviets and the Americans. On June 6, the Chinese government sent a memorandum to the Soviet government refuting their criticisms and warning that if the Soviet g­ overnment agreed to sign the agreement or made any international 4  “Zhongguo jiaru de duobian junkong, caijun, he fangkuosan tiaoyue”《中国加入的多 边军控、裁军和防扩散条约》 [The Multilateral Arms Controls, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Treaties to Which China is Party], People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry website, accessed from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/tytj/t228262.htm. 5  Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, Zhongguo canyu shijie《中国参与世界》China Joins the World], translated from the English by Hua Hongxun et al. 华宏勋等, (Xinhua Press, 2001), 105.

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promises on behalf of China, the Chinese government would retain its right to comment on this issue, and that the Soviets would have to bear responsibility for the consequences of formally pronouncing the disagreement that would ensue to our global enemies. The Soviet government refused to consider the Chinese opinion and on July 25 in Moscow—along with delegates from the U.S. and UK ­governments—signed the PTBT, which was closely related to antiproliferation. The PTBT foreswore underground nuclear tests, but allowed the three nations to continue using underground nuclear tests to develop their nuclear weapons. On July 31, the Chinese government issued a statement accusing the three major nuclear nations of signing the treaty in order to solidify their nuclear monopoly, and declaring that the treaty ran counter to disarmament. The statement also recommended the convening of a conference of world government leaders to discuss the issues of complete banning and total destruction of nuclear weapons. On August 2, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to the leaders of all world nations transmitting the recommendation the Chinese government had made on July 31. This recommendation was refused by the Soviet government, which on August 3 responded to China’s statement by stubbornly insisting that the three-nation treaty was in conformance with the interests of the people of every nation and attacking China’s use of the term “total disarmament,” as it concealed the true intention of disarmament. The Soviets then attempted to use this to deny China’s signing of the PTBT. On August 15, a Chinese government spokesperson issued a statement claiming that the Soviets’ willingness to sign the three-nation partial ban treaty was tantamount to the Soviets’ abandoning their own position and accepting that of the U.S., and was an unprincipled concession to imperialism.6 Second, it was demonstrated in China’s refusal to become party to the “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” [commonly known as the NonProliferation Treaty or NPT]. On June 12, 1968, the U.S. and the Soviet Union issued a draft of the treaty to the United Nations [UN] General Assembly’s First Committee, which passed it. Beginning on July 1, the treaty was issued to all nations for signing, and went into force on March 5, 1970. The contents of the NPT were primarily concerned with opposing nuclear proliferation, promoting nuclear disarmament, and encouraging international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. China did not become party to the treaty at that time. The Chinese government’s thinking was that the treaty gave different rights and obligations to different signatories and was not balanced. The 6  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi (1957–1969)《中华人民共和国外交史 (1957– 1969)》[History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (1957–1969)], ed. Wang Taiping 王泰平, (World Knowledge Press, 1998), 252–254.

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Americans and Soviets pushed hard for the creation of this treaty, as their goal was to inhibit the development of nuclear weapons by nations not already possessing them, but they—as the world’s major nuclear powers—did not truly plan to fulfill their end of nuclear disarmament. In truth, for a long time following the signing of the treaty, the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviets not only did not cease, but in fact further escalated; there was no nuclear disarmament to speak of. So their active pushing the creation of this treaty was deceptive. At the time, the People’s Republic of China’s lawful position in the UN had not yet been restored at the time, as the Guomindang delegation—with support from the U.S. and other nations—was forcibly occupying the position at the time and illegally signed the treaty on behalf of China. So China refused to accede to the treaty.7 Third, it was demonstrated in China’s participation in UN disarmament activities. The UN attached a great deal of importance to arms controls and disarmament, with the General Assembly and related committees frequently deliberating on disarmament and security issues as important matters. The UN even went so far as to call the 1970s the “disarmament decade.” On October 25, 1971, the People’s Republic of China’s lawful position in the UN was restored. At that time, China made use of the forum of the UN to expose the arms build-ups of the two world superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and in particular to criticize the hypocrisy of the Soviets’ facade of disarmament, while all the time maintaining an aloof attitude toward discussion of concrete disarmament measures. Beginning from our initial participation in UN disarmament activities in the early 1970s running all the way through the 1980s, China did not once submit a single proposal related to disarmament. In addition to voting for proposals of third world nations which opposed arms races and military expansion, China also maintained an aloof attitude toward many proposals, and often voted against Soviet proposals. On October 24, 1972, in a speech regarding disarmament, China’s delegate noted that “the entire world is very clear that those engaging in a major arms race are none other than the two world superpowers. If we want disarmament, we must first disarm them . . . At present, there have only been increases and no decreases to the nuclear arms race of the two superpowers . . . The ‘partial nuclear testing ban treaty’ and ‘treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’ and so forth that they concocted are all meant to deceive, all meant to maintain the nuclear monopoly and nuclear hegemony of these two.” China advocated for nations possessing nuclear weapons—particularly the two nations possessing the 7  Tian Jin, Yu Mengjia, et al. 田进、俞孟嘉等, Zhongguo zai lianheguo 《中国在联合国》 [China in the United Nations], (World Knowledge Press, 1999), 137.

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­largest ­stockpiles: the U.S. and the Soviet Union—to pledge not to strike first with nuclear weapons, and to unconditionally promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nations that do not possess them. China further advocated for the withdrawal of all armed forces stationed outside their home nations, and for the removal of all military bases installed outside their home nations, including nuclear bases.8 Prior to Reform and Opening, China maintained its own standpoint toward international arms controls. The reasons for our near complete non-­ involvement are many. The first reason is related to a judgment of the era’s theme. During the early 1960s, Mao Zedong said, “beginning now, the next fifty to one hundred years will be the great era of complete changes to social systems in the world, an era of tremendous changes, an era that cannot be compared to any era of the past.”9 An editorial in the People’s Daily [Renmin ribao] read that, “after the major disturbances, splits, and reorganizations of the 1960s, the world’s revolutionary power has grown stronger, and the class front has become clearer. New development of the world’s basic contradictions will inevitably continue to incite revolution. The 1970s will be a decade in which the storm of people’s revolutions rises higher in the world; will be the the decade of the accelerated collapse of the endless contradictions of imperialism; will be an important decade in which the forces of global revolution engage in heated struggle with counter-revolutionary forces, which are putting up a last-ditch fight.”10 Slogans of disarmament clearly were not suitable for such a judgment of the era’s theme. As the Chinese representative to the UN put it, imperialist “publicization of arms races are the root cause of war. Their goal in calling for complete disarmament is, to put it bluntly, to cover up the fundamental fact that imperialism is the root cause of war, and to have the people of every nation abandon the struggle against imperialism and colonialism, and to have [us] cow to their wanton manipulation in getting rid of arms before the aggression and threat of imperialism and new and old colonialism.”11 8  Woguo daibiaotuan chuxi lianheguo youguan huiyi wenjianji xuji《我国代表团出 席联合国有关会议文件集续集 (1972)》[Continuation of Collection of Relevant Conference Documents of Chinese Delegations in the United Nations], (People’s Press, 1973), 72. 9  Mao Zedong wenji, di 8 juan《毛泽东文集》第8卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 8], (People’s Press, 1999), 302. 10   “Yingjie weida de qishi niandai”《迎接伟大的七十年代》[Welcoming the Great 1970s], Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, January 1, 1970. 11  Woguo daibiaotuan chuxi lianheguo youguan huiyi wenjianji xuji《我国代表团出 席联合国有关会议文件集续集 (1972)》[Continuation of Collection of Relevant Conference Documents of Chinese Delegations in the United Nations], 72.

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The second reason is related to the long-term grim security threats facing China at the time. New China was founded very shortly after the beginning of the East-West Cold War. As an emerging socialist nation, we bore the brunt of the hostility between the two major camps of socialism and imperialism. During the 1950s, the U.S. politically viewed China as an enemy, economically blockaded China, and militarily encircled China, establishing a ring of encirclement around China. In the 1960s, there was no relaxation to the American policies of hostility toward China, but rather there was an escalation of the scale of the Vietnam War. At the same time, hostility between China and the Soviet Union led to a major escalation of military forces on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian border in addition to constant border skirmishes and manufactured disturbances, which posed an enormous threat to China’s North. In the early 1970s, tensions were relaxed in the Sino-American relationship, but the Soviet threat remained unabated. Under such an imposing foreign threat, it was imperative for China to strengthen national defense construction—and not to engage in disarmament—in order to maintain national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. As the Chinese representative to the UN put it, “China has always been in favor of disarmament. However, we oppose calling undifferentiated disarmament an issue of utmost importance and universal requirement to the people of every nation . . . What arms does the vast third world possess that require disarmament? None. To them, the most urgent issue and most universal requirement is not disarmament; on the contrary, it’s strengthening their national defense capabilities, resisting foreign invasion and pressure, and protecting the independence of their peoples and national sovereignty.”12 The third reason is closely related to China’s understanding of the nature and uses of arms controls at the time. China thought that imperialism was the root cause of war in the modern era, and that the possibility for the eruption of war existed every day that imperialism existed. In order to protect world peace, we had to resolutely oppose invasive and bellicose policies of imperialist nations. “However, there are indeed now some people claiming that the arms race is the primary cause of the threat of war, and they place the responsibility for the arms race on all nations. According to their propaganda, the only way to completely eradicate the threat of war from the lives of the human race would be from a foundation of complete and total disarmament. Such an explanation lacks common sense and is deceptive.”13 One can thus see that 12  “2008 nian zhongguo de guofang”《2008年中国的国防》[Chinese National Defense in 2008], Renmin ribao《人民日报》, January 21, 2009. 13  Ibid., 71.

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China’s understanding at the time was that arms controls could not reduce the outbreak of war or ultimately eradicate war; so Chinese officials did not support or participate in disarmament. 2

After Reform and Opening: Selective Participation and Gradual Deepening

The third plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, convened in December 1978, symbolized China’s entry into a new era of Reform and Opening. Chinese policymakers at the time made major adjustments to China’s foreign diplomacy strategy and proposed an entirely new diplomatic strategy based on the needs of modernized construction, new changes to international circumstances, and new developments in Chinese foreign relations. Correspondingly, there were clear changes to China’s arms controls policies. As of the present, China is party to over 20 multilateral arms controls, disarmament, and anti-proliferation treaties, eight of which China joined in the 1980s.14 One can thus see that China truly began participating in international arms controls only after Reform and Opening. The characteristics of this era were: relative caution, selective participation, and gradual deepening. First, we actively participated in UN disarmament activities. China actively participated in the work of the First Committee (which primarily discusses disarmament and security issues) of the UN General Assembly, attended annual meetings of the Joint Disarmament Commission, and attended three special sessions of the UN General Assembly specifically discussing disarmament issues. In 1976, the 31st General Assembly passed a resolution to convene a special session to discuss disarmament issues. In 1978, China had only just begun Reform and Opening and was hesitant to participate in the disarmament special session. Specifically, Chinese officials were concerned that with the lack of sincere intention to disarm on the part of the superpowers—who were in fact ramping up the arms race—the convening of such a meeting would not only be useless in promoting disarmament, but might also promote the growth of the illusion of peace. Thereafter, in response to the request of Yugoslavia and other non-aligned nations, China decided to dispatch a delegation led by Foreign Minister Huang Hua to the special session, in order to express support for mid-sized and small nations. Huang’s speech at the session received 14  “Zhongguo jiaru de duobian junkong, caijun, he fangkuosan tiaoyue”《中国加入的多 边军控、裁军和防扩散条约》[The Multilateral Arms Controls, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Treaties to Which China is Party].

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due attention from all nations, particularly mid-sized and small nations. The thoughts he expounded in his speech—that the two major nuclear nations bear a special responsibility for disarmament and should be the first to act— received approbation and favorable reactions in the session’s final document. Thus, the first General Assembly special session for disarmament provided the opportunity for China to later become fully involved in disarmament talks. Thereafter, China also participated in the second and third special disarmament sessions of the General Assembly held in 1982 and 1988. Second, we actively put forward our own disarmament proposals. During the late 1980s, China’s participation in UN disarmament activities became increasingly active. In 1984, during the period of the 39th General Assembly, China for the first time raised its own proposal, the draft resolution “the Prevention of the Arms Race in Outer Space.” Once the proposal had been raised, non-aligned nations suggested that the Chinese delegation that the General Assembly would be best served passing only one proposal and not many, in order to display the common demand and hope of the international community to oppose an outer space arms race; and so they hoped that China would consider co-sponsoring a joint proposal with all un-aligned nations. After deliberations, the proposal of un-aligned nations absorbed some of the content from the Chinese proposal, and China agreed not to submit its draft resolution, in order to increase friendly cooperation with other un-aligned nations. In 1986, during the period of the 41st General Assembly, China raised two proposals for nuclear and conventional weapons disarmament, both of which were smoothly passed. Thereafter, China continued to raise these two proposals to the General Assembly for five consecutive years in order to push the progress of disarmament. In December 1987, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” and in November 1990, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (WarPac) signed the “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.” As the U.S. and the Soviet Union had already made preliminary steps toward nuclear disarmament, and as disarmament of conventional forces in Europe was beginning, China decided in 1991 to no longer raise its two planned proposals in the General Assembly. Third, we began real participation in international arms controls talks. The first UN General Assembly special session for disarmament established the Disarmament Commission, which served as the UN’s review body for disarmament issues. The special session also determined to reorganize the Disarmament Commission into a permanent committee for disarmament talks headquartered in Geneva, and to confirm it as the only international body for multilateral disarmament talks. In 1979, China attended the ­discussion and

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talks of the Disarmament commission as an observer, and formally joined in 1980. In 1983, we dispatched a disarmament ambassador specially charged with negotiations work. The Chinese delegation actively participated in all aspects of the work of disarmament talks and conferences in Geneva in the unflagging spirit of maintaining world peace. Fourth, we not only actively advocated for disarmament in international forums, but we also actively took many real steps toward disarmament. In March 1986, China announced it would no longer conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere. In 1985, China decided to cut 1 million soldiers from its armed forces. By 1987, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been reduced from 4.238 million members to 3.235 million, and to 3.199 million in 1990, a total reduction of 1.039 million. [2] China also decided to convert large quantities of military airports, docks, and barracks to civilian use in order to support and encourage national economic construction, to both reduce and restrict national defense spending, and to maintain a low military budget. From 1978 to 1987, as the focus of State work shifted onto economic construction, spending on national defense construction entered a state of maintenance and low spending; defense spending grew by an average of 3.5 percent annually, as compared to average GDP increases of 14.1 percent—based on prices at the time. State fiscal expenditures grew by an annual average of 10.4 percent, with defense spending accounting for 4.6 percent of GDP and 14.96 percent of State spending in 1978, down to 1.74 percent and 9.27 percent in 1987.15 These actions and measures not only promoted the development of China’s national economy and improvements to the lives of the Chinese people, but also proved helpful to the process of international disarmament. There were three overarching reasons for China’s major adjustments to arms controls policies following Reform and Opening. The first was the promotion of changes to State strategy. After Reform and Opening, the direct driver of adjustments to China’s arms controls policies was the need to change national strategy. The most important resolution of the Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum was to cease “seeing class struggle as the central task,” and to transfer the focus of work onto socialist modernized construction. Correspondingly, there were strategic changes to guiding thought in the military and national defense construction. Deng Xiaoping emphasized that “national defense construction without a certain level of

15  “2008 nian zhongguo de guofang”《2008 年中国的国防》[Chinese National Defense in 2008], Renmin ribao《人民日报》, January 21, 2009.

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e­ conomic foundation will not do.”16 He continued, “there must be a beginning and an end to the Four Modernizations. The only possible way to truly modernize military equipment is for the national economy to establish a relatively good foundation.”17 Thus, he demanded that the economy take precedence, and that there could be military rejuvenation once economic strength had been bolstered. “Now we must harden our heads and put the economy first. This is the big picture. Everything must serve this big picture.”18 Thus, changes to State strategy drove adjustments to arms controls policies. The second reason was improvements to international security conditions. Disarmament and security have historically been complementary and bound into a single cause. A good international security environment can provide drive to international disarmament. After Reform and Opening, Chinese officials found the theme of the times to be peace and development. Chinese leaders no longer analyzed international circumstances through a framework of war and revolution, but rather came to a new understanding of the characteristics and development trends of international circumstances from the perspective of peace and development. They came to believe that the world had transitioned away from confrontation and toward conversation, that international circumstances had tended away from ramping up tensions and toward relaxing tensions, and that international cooperation was the new world trend. It was precisely because of this judgment—that international security circumstances were improving and would continue to improve—that Chinese leadership opted for major unilateral disarmament and active participation in multilateral disarmament. The third reason was changes to opinions of the nature and uses of arms controls. After Reform and Opening, China positively affirmed petitions for disarmament from the international community. On September 27, 1983, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said, “the numerous nations and peoples who love peace are eager for the realization of disarmament. They use all sorts of methods to express this longing. In recent years those nations have seen the emergence of a massive peace movement, the mainstream of which reflects the strong feelings of those people who endured the calamities of the two world wars toward the ever-­escalating threat of nuclear war, and their fervent wish for peace. This is something the entire 16  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan《邓小平文选》第2卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], (People’s Press, 1994), 240. 17  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 3 juan《邓小平文选》第3卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3], (People’s Press, 1993), 128. 18  Ibid., 129.

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world can understand, and we should empathize with it.”19 One can thus see that many fundamental changes had taken place within Chinese leadership’s views on arms controls, and that they were beginning to view arms controls issues completely and with an attitude of great importance.20 3

After the Cold War: More Pragmatic, Broader Participation

After the end of the Cold War, as dramatic changes to international circumstances accelerated the progress of arms controls, China’s attitude toward arms controls issues became more active and positive; our participation became broader and deeper; and our strategy became more dynamic and pragmatic. China became party to over half of the over 20 multilateral arms controls, disarmament, and anti-proliferation treaties it has joined only after the end of the Cold War.21 First, we have actively participated in activities in the areas of arms controls and disarmament and strictly adhered to and completely fulfilled our international arms controls treaty obligations. China actively participated in the UN General Assembly’s First Committee, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and other talks and work in related agencies. We proposed many policy positions that were fair, reasonable, feasible, and practicable. China actively participated in the review process of the NPT, striving to maintain the treaty’s universality, prestige, and efficacy. China also made significant contributions toward the signing of such arms controls treaties as the “Chemical Weapons Convention” (CWC), the “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” (CTBT), and others. China made efforts to promote the international community’s adoption of feasible measures to prevent an outer space arms race and the weaponization of outer space. We also took constructive actions to push the Geneva disarmament talks toward a foundation of complete, balanced work plans in order to end the stalemate as early as possible. In June 2005, China and Russia jointly issued the document “Definition 19  Zhongguo daibiaotuan chuxi lianheguo youguan huiyi wenjian ji (1983 nian 7–12 yue)《中国 代表团出席联合国有关会议文件集 (1983 年 7–12 月)》[Collection of Relevant Con­ fer­­ence Documents of Chinese Delegations in the United Nations (July to December 1983)], (World Knowledge Press, 1985), 4. 20  Economy and Oksenberg. 21  “Zhongguo jiaru de duobian junkong, caijun, he fangkuosan tiaoyue” 《中国加入的多 边军控、裁军和防扩散条约》[The Multilateral Arms Controls, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Treaties to Which China is Party].

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Issues Regarding Legal Instruments on the Prevention of Weaponization of Outer Space” to the Disarmament Commission. China has taken effective measures and faithfully fulfilled its international arms controls treaty obligations, including: strict adherence to the NPT; conscientious implementation of CWC stipulations; ceaselessly strengthening capability and construction of State agencies responsible for carrying out treaty obligations; earnestly performing the organization, inspection, and receiving work of banning chemical weapons; submitting State treaty performance reports in a timely fashion per the requirements of the “Biological Weapons Convention” (BWC) and the “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons”; establishing a State agency charged with fulfilling the preparation work of the CTBT; earnestly launching the preparation work of treaty ratification; and making efforts to push the treaty fulfillment preparation work of the “Firearms Protocol” and the “Protocol on the Explosive Remnants of War.” Second, we have actively participated in international non-proliferation efforts. For many years, China has broadly participated in the construction of multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms; actively pushed ceaseless improvement and development of said mechanisms; and participated in all international treaties and international organizations related to non-proliferation.22 In the early 1990s, as the Cold War came to an end, Chinese leadership came to believe that the NPT possessed a certain degree of positive significance in the area of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and so they adjusted their attitude toward said treaty. In 1990, China attended the fourth NPT conference as an observer—the first time China had done so. In March 1992, China formally acceded to the treaty. In April 1995 at UN headquarters in New York, a treaty extension and deliberation conference was convened, at which China voted for indefinite extension of the treaty. China also actively participated in talks related to the CTBT at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, making important contributions to securing the success of the treaty, which China ratified in 1996. The Chinese government announced that it would cease nuclear tests beginning in July 1996, a promise it has faithfully abided ever since. China attaches a great deal of importance to the work of export restrictions in nonproliferation, and has established a complete legal system for export restrictions on nuclear materials, biological materials, chemicals, guided missiles, and relevant dual-use materials and technologies. We have also made ceaseless revisions to relevant laws and regulations per the requirements of international treaty obligations and the work of export restrictions. In November 22  Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], 240.

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2006, we revised the “Nuclear Export Control Regulations of the People’s Republic of China.” In January 2007, we revised the “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Export Controls of Dual-Use Nuclear Materials and Related Technologies.” In July 2007, we revised the “Export Controls of DualUse Nuclear Materials and Related Technologies List.” Beginning in 2003, in order to hasten a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear problem, the Chinese government played a role in multilateral mediations, hosting several rounds of six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. Third, we have devoted ourselves to regional disarmament. China places a great deal of importance on and actively drives regional disarmament and the establishment of confidence-building measures of cooperation. We have reached a series of agreements and consensuses with neighboring countries and have made contributions to improving the regional security environment and promoting common development. In July 1994, China and Russia signed the “Agreement Regarding the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities.” In April 1996, China signed the “Agreement on Strengthening Confidence in Military Areas in Border Regions” with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. In April 1997, China signed the “Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions” with the aforementioned nations. In September 1993, China signed the “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas” with India. In November 1996, the two nations signed the “Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas.” In April 2005, China and India signed the “Protocols on Implementation Measures for ConfidenceBuilding Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas,” setting specific implementation measures for relevant articles from the 1996 Agreement. In November 2002, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” exhibiting the common wish of all parties to preserve stability in the South China Sea and to develop cooperation in the South China Sea. All parties pledged: to resolve territorial and jurisdiction conflicts by peaceful means; not to take any actions to further complicate or escalate conflicts; to promote mutual trust through official dialogues, voluntary reports to the UN of military exercises, etc.; to actively pursue cooperation in oceanic environmental protection, oceanic scientific explorations, shipping and transportation security, rescue missions, fighting transnational crime, etc. In December 2004, China and ASEAN held a follow-up action meeting of senior officials to implement the Declaration. At the meeting, officials reached an important consensus in enacting cooperation in the South China

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Sea and resolved to establish a joint working group to implement the followup actions of the Declaration. In August 2005, the first meeting of the working group was held in the Philippines. China attaches a great deal of importance to the effects of ASEAN regional forums, supports the development and construction of confidence-building measures, and every year actively submits an annual security outlook report. Fourth, we resolutely pursue preventive defense policies. Given a prerequisite of safeguarding national security interests, China has always limited the personnel and scale of the military to the minimum level necessary to maintain national security, and has actively undertaken unilateral disarmament activities many times. After 1990, the Chinese military began undergoing a series of adjustments, which further reduced the scale of the military. In 1997, China resolved to reduce military personnel again, this time by 500,000, bringing the total size of the Chinese military to 2.5 million. In 2003, China again resolved to reduce military personnel by 200,000, bringing the size of the military to 2.3 million.23 The breadth and size of China’s unilateral disarmament activities over a short span of time were nearly unprecedented in the history of international arms controls and disarmament, and abundantly demonstrated the resoluteness in arms controls and disarmament, the love of peace, and the sincere desire to pursue development of the Chinese government and people. As the Cold War came to an end, overall international circumstances tended toward a relaxing of tensions, presenting an important opportunity in international arms controls, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Efforts in multilateral arms controls made ceaseless achievements, and a series of important arms controls treaties were signed in succession. This played an irreplaceable role in maintaining global strategic stability, increasing cooperation between major nations, and promoting a relaxing of tensions both regionally and globally. Since entry into the new century, with the deep development the trends of multipolarity and economic globalization and constant technological advancements, exchanges and cooperation between all the nations and regions of the world have ceaselessly strengthened; mutual dependence for security has grown deeper daily; factors maintaining peace and inhibiting war have further grown; and peace, the pursuit of development, and the quest for cooperation have become the irresistible trend of the times. The international arms controls, disarmament, and non-proliferation system’s organic components for global security and order have continued to play an important role in maintaining world peace. The universality, prestige, and efficacy 23  “Zhongguo de junkong, caijun yu kuosan nuli”《中国的军控、裁军与防扩散努力》 [China’s Efforts in Arms Controls, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation].

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of multilateral arms controls and disarmament treaties have been ceaselessly strengthened. The international consensus toward non-proliferation has become further solidified, symbolized by UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on non-­proliferation, passed in April 2004. Political and diplomatic efforts to resolve proliferation issues through dialogue and cooperation have continued to advance, with all manner of security dialogues in the ascendant and regional security cooperation thriving. In an article, Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui wrote, “seizing new opportunities; responding to new challenges; earnestly maintaining the international arms controls, disarmament, and nonproliferation treaty system; deeply advancing the progress of international arms controls, disarmament, and non-proliferation—these not only conform to the common interests of all nations, but also the common obligations of all nations.”24 As the Cold War ended and the global political landscape underwent major changes, China accelerated its merger into the pace of international society, increased the amplitude of multilateral diplomacy, and strengthened cooperation with the UN. In 1996, the Chinese government officially advocated for the “New Security Perspective,” which it ceaselessly reiterated, improved, and enriched in documents thereafter. In a speech to the Geneva Disarmament Conference on March 26, 1999, Jiang Zemin said, “history tells us that the old security perspective, based in military alliances, and the primary method of which was strengthening armaments, did not help to safeguard international security, and was even less able to create lasting world peace. That requires us to establish a new security perspective that is suitable to the needs of the new era, as well as active exploration and maintaining of new paths to peace and security. We believe that the core of the new security perspective should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation. The five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-invasion, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual interest, and peaceful co-existence, in addition to other generally acknowledged international relations norms, are the political foundation for maintaining peace. Mutual interest and cooperation and common prosperity are the economic safeguards for maintaining peace. Dialogues, consultations, and negotiations established on a foundation of equality are the correct conduits for resolving conflicts and maintaining peace. The only way to fundamentally encourage the 24  Zhang Yesui 张业遂, “Guoji anquan xingshi yu zhongguo de junkong, caijun he fangkuosan zhengce”《国际安全形势与中国的军控、裁军和防扩散政策》[International Security Circumstances and China’s Arms Controls, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Policies], in Qiu shi《求是》19 (2005), 57.

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healthy development of disarmament and safeguard world peace and international security is to establish a new security perspective and a fair, reasonable new international order. The goal of disarmament is to enhance security, and that security must be the universal security of all nations.”25 On September 15, 2005, at the world leaders conference commemorating 60 years of UN peacekeeping, Hu Jintao again emphasized that “we want to discard the thinking of the Cold War and establish a new security perspective of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation. We want to build a just, effective collective security system, to jointly prevent conflicts and wars, to preserve world peace and security . . . We should: encourage and support resolution of international disputes or conflicts by peaceful means, through consultations and negotiations; jointly oppose actions that invade on the sovereignty of other nations; oppose coercive interference into the domestic affairs of a nation; and oppose arbitrary use of force or threat of the use of force. We should: strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation; resolutely strike at the symptoms and the causes of problems; place emphasis on eradicating their root causes; and resolutely fight terrorism. We should—per the principles of justice, reason, comprehensiveness, and balance—implement effective disarmament and arms controls; prevent nuclear proliferation; actively promote international nuclear disarmament; and maintain global strategic stability.”26 The development of China’s arms controls policies demonstrates: that China has from beginning to end treated and handled the issues of international arms controls, disarmament, and non-proliferation with an attitude of grave responsibility. It also demonstrates that China has resolutely taken as the basis for its decisions: whether [a decision] is beneficial to protecting national sovereignty and security; whether [a decision] is beneficial to maintaining global strategic security and stability; and whether [a decision] is beneficial to enhancing universal security and mutual trust between all nations. Since Reform and Opening, particularly after the end of the Cold War, the policies China has adopted and the real actions China has taken in arms controls, disarmament, and non-proliferation have been proactive, sincere, and responsible. Thus, the people of the world have reason to believe that in the future,

25  “Jiang Zemin zhuxi zai rineiwa caijun tanpan huiyi shang de jianghua”《江泽民主席 在日内瓦裁军谈判会议上的讲话》[Chairman Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Geneva Disarmament Talks], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, March 27, 1999. 26  “Nuli jianshe chijiu heping, gongtong fanrong de hexie shijie”《努力建设持久和平、 共同繁荣的和谐世界》[Striving to Build Lasting Peace, Common Prosperity, and a Harmonious World], Renmin ribao《人民日报》 , September 16, 2005.

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after China’s rise, China will remain a dependable power in maintaining world peace and advancing the common development of humanity. References “2008 nian zhongguo de guofang”《2008 年中国的国防》[Chinese National Defense in 2008], Renmin ribao《人民日报》, January 21, 2009. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 2 juan《邓小平文选》第 2 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2]. People’s Press, 1994. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di 3 juan《邓小平文选》第 3 卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3]. People’s Press, 1993. Du Xiangwan 杜祥琬, He junbei kongzhi kexue jishu jichu《核军备控制科学技术 基础》[Scientific and Technical Foundation for Control of Nuclear Arms]. National Defense and Industry Press, 1996. Economy, Elizabeth and Michel Oksenberg, Zhongguo canyu shijie《中国参与世 界》[China Joins the World], translated from the English by Hua Hongxun et al. 华宏勋等. Xinhua Press, 2001. “Jiang Zemin zhuxi zai rineiwa caijun tanpan huiyi shang de jianghua”《江泽民主席 在日内瓦裁军谈判会议上的讲话》 [Chairman Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Geneva Disarmament Talks], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, March 27, 1999. Mao Zedong wenji, di 8 juan《毛泽东文集》第 8 卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 8]. People’s Press, 1999. “Nuli jianshe chijiu heping, gongtong fanrong de hexie shijie”《努力建设持久和 平、共同繁荣的和谐世界》[Striving to Build Lasting Peace, Common Prosperity, and a Harmonious World], Renmin ribao《人民日报》, September 16, 2005. Tian Jin, Yu Mengjia, et al. 田进、俞孟嘉等, Zhongguo zai lianheguo《中国在联合 国》[China in the United Nations]. World Knowledge Press, 1999. Woguo daibiaotuan chuxi lianheguo youguan huiyi wenjianji xuji 《我国代表团出席 联合国有关会议文件集续集 (1972)》[Continuation of Collection of Relevant Conference Documents of Chinese Delegations in the United Nations]. People’s Press, 1973. “Yingjie weida de qishi niandai”《迎接伟大的七十年代》[Welcoming the Great 1970s], Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, January 1, 1970. Zhang Yesui 张业遂, “Guoji anquan xingshi yu zhongguo de junkong, caijun he fangkuosan zhengce” 《国际安全形势与中国的军控、裁军和防扩散政策》[Inter­ national Security Circumstances and China’s Arms Controls, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Policies], in Qiu shi 《求是》 19 (2005).

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Zhongguo daibiaotuan chuxi lianheguo youguan huiyi wenjian ji (1983 nian 7–12 yue) 《中国代表团出席联合国有关会议文件集 (1983 年 7–12 月)》[Collection of Relevant Conference Documents of Chinese Delegations in the United Nations (July to December 1983)]. World Knowledge Press, 1985. “Zhongguo de junkong, caijun yu kuosan nuli” 《中国的军控、裁军与防扩散努 力》 [China’s Efforts in Arms Controls, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, September 2, 2005. “Zhongguo jiaru de duobian junkong, caijun, he fangkuosan tiaoyue”《中国加入的 多边军控、裁军和防扩散条约》[The Multilateral Arms Controls, Disar­ ma­ ment, and Nonproliferation Treaties to Which China is Party], People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry website, accessed from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ ziliao/tytj/t228262.htm. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi (1957–1969)《中华人民共和国外交史 (1957–1969)》[History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (1957–1969)], ed. Wang Taiping 王泰平. World Knowledge Press, 1998. “Zhou Enlai zongli zhidian shijie ge guo zhengfu shounao”《周恩来总理致电世界 各国政府首脑》[Premier Zhou Enlai Cables Government Leaders of All Nations], Ren min ri bao《人民日报》, October 21, 1964.

CHAPTER 9

Analysis of 1969’s “Order Number One” Xu Jinzhou Abstract “Order Number One” was a combat readiness order issued to the entire Chinese military by Lin Biao through the Central Military Commission’s Working Group in mid-October 1969. The order came at a critical juncture following the Zhenbao Island incident, in which the Soviet Union took a series of unusual military actions targeting China, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central judged that it was extremely possible that the Soviet Union was preparing to launch a surprise attack on China. Before issuing the order, Lin submitted a report to Mao Zedong, but there were problems in the transmission of the order, including titles used, which incited a series of complex responses to the order at CCP Central’s core level. Following the “September 13” incident, “Order Number One” became known as a “preview” of Lin Biao’s intention to “usurp the Party and steal power.” Subsequent years of follow-up investigations have made the issue even more complex, with many misunderstandings remaining to this day. The problems associated with “Order Number One” reflected several comprehensive problems within the military. The order was directly related to the political landscape during the “Cultural Revolution,” as well as abnormalities within military leadership at the time and the decision against establishment of a conventional military system. It further reflected latent crises in military construction present following the launch of “Cultural Revolution.”

Keywords “Order Number One” – CMC Working Group – military construction – combat readiness

*  Essay submitted May 12, 2011. Xu Jinzhou is an associate researcher at the China People’s Liberation Army Military Sciences Academy Military History Research Institute.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004292673_010

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“Order Number One,” which is also variously known as “Directive Number One,” “The First Order as Instructed by Vice Chairman Lin,” and other names, was a combat readiness order issued by Lin Biao in mid-October 1969 through the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Working Group. For simplicity’s sake, I refer to this order only by the name “Order Number One” [or “the Order”] in this essay. The Order made great waves both within and without the military, incited a complex reaction among core Party and military leadership, and to this day elicits a wide spectrum of explanations. Clear explanations of the evacuation of old cadres and dispersal of urban population related to the Order were made long ago.1 However, to this day there has been a dearth of detailed research into the Order itself, with several unexplored areas including: how was the Order issued; were its contents appropriate; were there any problems with the Order; why were Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai not pleased with it; what were the unexpected repercussions of the Order; etc. In this essay, I shall attempt to analyze these issues using relevant materials. 1

Order Number One’s Background

After Sino-Soviet armed conflicts at Zhenbao Island in March 1969, a series of parades, demonstrations, protests, and declarations were made within both countries, after which both sides ramped up combat readiness. The breakdown in the alliance between China and the USSR that had begun in the 1960s now devolved to the point where both nations began preparing for a military standoff. On March 15 in China, Mao Zedong declared, “we must be ready to fight.”2 In April, the political report passed by the Ninth CCP Congress sent a signal to the entire Party to prepare for war: “We must make ample preparations, be ready for them to fight in a big way, be ready for them to fight soon, be ready for

1  Su Caiqing 苏采青, “ ‘Wenhua dageming’ shishi bianwu san ze”《“文化大革命”史事辨误 三则》[Three Mistakes in Understanding Historical Events of the ‘Cultural Revolution’], in Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu《中共党史研究》(1989) 5. 2  There are two theories regarding the exact time Mao Zedong proposed “being ready to fight”—one on March 5, and the other on March 15. In this article, I believe the first is correct, based on a speech by Huang Yongsheng at a meeting of the General Staff Headquarters and Regional Leadership on March 18, 1969, and based on instructions given by Huang upon hearing a guiding report on studies made into the provinces and cities of the northeastern region on November 22, 1969.

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them to fight a conventional war, and be ready for them to fight a nuclear war.”3 At the time, the Soviets possessed more military power than the Chinese. The connotation of Mao’s call to be “ready to fight” was to prepare to prevent a Soviet invasion. Mao also said, “they may come fighting, but we will not go out [of our country] to fight [them]. We will not go out to fight.”4 Thereafter, CMC military strategies and plans were primarily focused on preventing a Soviet invasion. China began preparing for war from a posture of defense. Following the Zhenbao Island incident, the Soviets continuously ramped up domestic anti-China propaganda, calling China an “invader” and Chinese leadership “modern adventurists.” They made slanderous remarks alleging: that the Chinese were a brutal people; that China planned to change the world with military force; that China wanted to annex the Mongolian People’s Republic; that China wanted to fight a nuclear war with the Soviets; and that China wanted to establish an empire from the Pacific to the Black Sea. With these remarks came Soviet leadership’s call to attack China.5 On June 13, the Soviets issued a declaration claiming that the Chinese territory forcibly occupied as a result of treaties signed by Tsarist Russia had always belonged to the Soviet Union. “China’s northern border is symbolized by the approximately 4000 ­kilometer-long Great Wall . . . In the West, China’s boundaries do not exceed the provinces of Gansu and Sichuan, and have never reached Lake Balkhash.” The declaration claimed that the Sino-Soviet border dispute had been the result of “Chinese authorities’ repeated organized provocations on the Soviet border,” and that “any attempt to cross the Soviet Border would result in devastating retaliation.”6 Discussions by the Soviet Politburo on whether to launch a nuclear attack on China continued for several months. Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko actively advocated for a nuclear attack on China, c­ alling to “permanently remove the Chinese threat.” The Soviet Politburo decided in favor of a nuclear attack on China and used the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and the GRU to probe 3  “Zai zhongguo gongchandang dijiu ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao”《在中国 共产党第九次全国代表大会上的报告》[Report of the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, April 28, 1969, first edition. 4  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 13 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 13 册 [Mao Zedong’s Draft Writings Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13], (Central Documentary Press, 1998), 38. 5  “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao bu wenjian—bo sulian zhengfu yijiuliujiu nian liuyue shisan ri shengming”《中华人民共和国外交部文件——驳苏联政府一九六九年六 月十三日声明》[PRC Foreign Ministry Documents—Refuting the Soviet Governments Declaration of June 13, 1969], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, October 9, 1969, second edition. 6  “Sulian zhengfu liuyue shisan ri shengming”《苏联政府六月十三日声明》[The Soviet Union Government’s Declaration of June 13], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, October 9, 1969, third edition.

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the American reaction.7 On June 5, 1969, the USSR convened the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Moscow, at which it again espoused opposition to China. On June 7, Brezhnev proposed the establishment of an “Asian Collective Security Apparatus,” and the USSR began research into Asian collective security safeguards and concrete plans, dispatching over 20 delegations to nations in China’s periphery, attempting to create an antiChina encirclement.8 The Chinese government promptly discovered the Soviets’ behavior and came to believe that the USSR and the U.S. were “establishing ties with counter-revolutionaries in all nations, rigging together an evil conspiracy of anti-China military encirclement to seriously threaten China’s security.”9 At the same time, the USSR was stepping up military deployments against China. Brezhnev declared strengthening of national defenses that “spared no human or material resources.” High-level Soviet military officials ordered the military to “waste zero time in increasing combat readiness,” and “not allowing even a moment’s delay.”10 The Soviets stationed large quantities of armed brigades across the entire border, armed with nuclear weapons.11 Chinese officials calculated that Soviet military forces deployed in Asia that could be used against China in 1969 totaled over 1 million soldiers, over 70 army divisions,

7  Arkady Shevchenko, Yu mosike juelie《与莫斯科决裂》[Breaking with Moscow], translated from the Russian by Wang Guansheng et al. 王观声等, (World Knowledge Press, 1986), 194–195. 8  Chai Chengwen et al. 柴成文等, San da tupo—xin zhongguo zou xiang shijie de baogao 三大突破——新中国走向世界的报告》[Three Major Breakthroughs—Report on New China Entering the World], (People’s Liberation Army Press, 1994), 331. 9  “Jiecheng fangeming zhengzhi he junshi lianmeng jinxing fangong fanrenmin zui’e goudang mei-su—dui shijie e’gun langbei wei jian jiajin fanhua mei-su fanhua dong buliao zhongguo yi gen haomao zhongguo renmin shi ba fandui di-xiu fandouzheng jinxing daodi”《结成反革命政治和军事联盟进行反共反人民罪恶勾当美苏一对世界恶 棍狼狈为奸加紧反华美苏反华动不了中国一根毫毛中国人民誓把反对帝修反 斗争进行到底》[Forming an Alliance of Counter-revolutionary Politics and Military Alliances to Conduct Crimes Against the Party and Against the People in Collusion with the U.S. and the USSR—The U.S.-Soviet Anti-China Association of Scoundrels Cannot Move Even One Hair on the Heads of the Chinese, Who Pledge to Take the Struggle Against Imperialist Revisionism To the Very End],” in Renmin ribao《人民日报》 , June 19, 1969, sixth edition. 10  Xiong Xianghui 熊向晖, Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya《我的情报与外交生涯》 [My Career in Intelligence and Diplomacy], (CCP Party History Press, 1999), 168. 11  Shevchenko, 195.

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over 20,000 tanks, over 3000 airplanes, over 800 naval vessels, totaling over 600,00 tonnes.12 Following the Zhenbao Island incident, Sino-Soviet border clashes began escalating, and the Soviet army increased armed provocations against and escalated the conflict from the Ussuri River into Heilongjiang Province, bringing the border clash into China’s territory, expanding the conflict from east of the river westward, and provoking a series of border incidents.13 The Soviet Union continued firing shells deep into Chinese territory.14 On August 13, the Soviet army invaded the Tielieketi region of China’s Xinjiang Province in a surprise attack on Chinese border patrols, in which 25 border patrol soldiers and three regular soldiers were killed.15 At the same time, the Soviet military stepped up into an even higher state of combat readiness, with army divisions on the march toward the Sino-Soviet border, increasing strategic monitoring of China, ceaselessly conducting military exercises on the border region, and further increasing battlefield preparations. The USSR expanded military conscriptions, hastily built combat readiness roads and railroads near China’s border, evacuated Soviet residents living near the border, and established a no-man’szone 20-kilometers wide along the border.16

12  Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi, di 6 juan《中国人民解放军军史》第6卷 [Military History of China’s People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 6], (Military Science Press, 2011), 102. 13  On June 6, 1969, China’s Foreign Ministry issued to the Soviet ambassador to China a detailed account of “the serious event of the Soviet Union’s deliberate incursion onto Chinese territory and savage provocation of the Chinese people.” For details, see “Woguo zhengfu biaoshi jida fenkai xiang sulian zhengfu tichu qianglie kangyi”《我国政府表示 极大愤慨向苏联政府提出强烈抗议》[The Chinese Government Expresses Extreme Anger and Strong Protest Toward the Soviet Government], Renmin ribao《人民日报》, June 7, 1969, first edition. 14   “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming”《中华人民共和国政府声明》 [Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China], in Renmin ribao《人 民日报》, May 25, 1969, first edition. 15  Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi, di 6 juan《中国人民解放军军史》第 6 卷 [Military History of China’s People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 6], 103. 16  “Yi mian jiajin tong meidi goujie yi mian da gao fanhua zhanzheng dongyuan suxiu toumu shengsi lijie fachu fanhua zhanzheng jiaoxiao suxiu de junshi donghe zhi neng baolu qi shehui diguo zhuyi de chailang benxing he xuruo benzhi”《一面加紧同美帝勾结一 面大搞反华战争动员苏修头目声嘶力竭发出反华战争叫嚣苏修的军事恫吓只 能暴露其社会帝国主义的豺狼本性和虚弱本质》[Soviet Revisionist Ringleaders Have Shouted Themselves Hoarse, on the One Hand Increasing Collusion with American Imperialism and on the Other Calling for War Against China; Soviet Revisionist Calls for Military Intimidation of China Will Only Reveal the Cruel, Rapacious Character and Weak

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In 1969, there was fervent international discourse over whether a war would break out between China and the USSR. On August 18, a foreign news agency dispatch reported that a staff member of the Soviet embassy in the U.S. had asked an American expert how the U.S. would react if the Soviets launched a surprise nuclear attack on China. On August 27, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Helms told reporters that the Soviet Union might sound out Eastern European Communist Bloc nations on the question of launching a preemptive strike on China’s nuclear facilities. On September 16, the London newspaper Evening News published an article by Soviet journalist Victor Louis, who wrote that Marxist theorists had been discussing the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war, and that if a war did break out, the world would only know once fighting had started. He further said that the development of the situation in the past year had demonstrated the Soviet Union’s strict adherence to the principle that socialist nations have the right to interfere in the issues of other socialist nations for their own interests if their national interests are ­threatened.17 Louis’s article was published with the Kremlin’s consent.18 The scale of Soviet military deployments on the Sino-Soviet (Mongolian) border by September demonstrated that the Soviets were capable of launching an invasion into China, particularly on China’s nuclear facilities.19 Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense Zakharov declared that the Soviet “missile brigade . . . was ready to spring into action at a moment’s notice . . . launch unexpected attacks . . . [and] give the enemy no time to react.”20 CCP Central did not rush to a hasty conclusion as to whether the Soviets’ intention was to merely intimidate or to truly begin a war with China. Central leadership instead began serious analysis of Soviet military and political states and international circumstances, and began round-the-clock revision of that analysis based on the development of affairs. Nature of Their Social Imperialism], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》 , August 15, 1969, sixth edition. 17  Chai Chengwen et al., 339. 18  Anatoly Khazanov, “Heluxiaofu zhizheng shiqi sulian de duihua zhengce”《赫鲁晓夫 执政时期苏联的对华政策》[Soviet Policy Toward China During the Khrushchev Regime], translated from the Russian by Chen Xi 陈夕, in Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu《中 共党史研究》(1999) 2. 19  John H. Holdridge, 1945 nian yilai mei-zhong waijiao guanxi zhengchanghua 1945 年以来 美中外交关系正常化》[Normalization of U.S.-China Relations Since 1945], translated from the English by Yang Liyi et al. 杨立义等, (Shanghai Translated Texts Press, 1997), 42. 20  Wei Dongsi 卫东思, “He e’zha jiu buliao xin shahuang de ming”《核讹诈救不了新沙 皇的命》[Nuclear Extortion Cannot Save the Life of the New Tsar], in Renmin ribao《人 民日报》, September 12, 1969, sixth edition.

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It has not been determined whether the Sino-Russian conflict following the Zhenbao Island incident was limited to the border or whether it continued escalating elsewhere. When Mao first declared the need to “be ready to fight,” emphasis was placed on combat readiness thinking of being prepared and leaving no possibility for calamity. Following the launch of the “Cultural Revolution,” large amounts of time and manpower of the Chinese military were invested in political movements, with a near full stoppage of regular training, severely reducing our level of combat readiness. In that time’s tense national security situation, the state of the military was dangerous. The intention of Mao’s emphasis on “being ready to fight” was to restore and augment the military’s level of combat readiness. In explaining the thinking behind “being ready to fight,” he said “don’t worry whether they come or not; we should be prepared . . . We should always be ready to fight, no matter which year it is . . . Taking the initiative requires spiritual preparation.”21 Maybe Mao felt in his heart that war was coming,22 but the circumstances of these times are still unclear, and military deployments at the time could be considered common combat readiness. Thereafter continued Soviet military movements and bellicose words by Soviet leadership further convinced the CMC that war might be coming. The “Three Norths” Conference (referring to the Northeast, the North, and the Northwest) convened by the CMC Working Group in June and July concluded that every aspect of the situation indicated that the Soviet revisionists were increasing preparations to launch an invasive war into China and were actively increasing preparations on the Sino-Soviet border (Mongolia). While listening to a report, Lin Bao proposed being ready to stave off the sneak attack methods used by Soviet revisionists in retaliation against Czechoslovakia. The Center concluded that the Soviet military strategy was to calm down Europe while simultaneously increasing tensions in Asia. Mao also thought that the Soviets intended to bring down China first and then expand westward. The outbreak of the Tielieketi incident in August demonstrated that the Soviets did not intend to leave the situation alone so easily, and at this time in particular the 21  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 13 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 13 册 [Mao Zedong’s Draft Writings Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13], 38. 22  On November 28, 1968, in a meeting with foreign visitors, Mao Zedong said, “Is the world full of war? Or is it full of revolution? Is revolution incited after a war, or can revolution stop wars? In short, right now there’s neither fighting nor revolution; such a state cannot persist long.” This reflected Mao Zedong’s pressing view on war in the world. For details, see Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao《建国以来毛泽东文稿》[Mao Zedong’s Draft Writings Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13], (Central Documentary Press, 1998), 32.

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Soviets began making noise about preparing to use nuclear weapons on China. These two facts greatly bolstered the CMC’s conclusion that war was imminent. The CMC Working Group assembled relevant members of the General Staff Headquarters Enemy Sneak Attack Prevention Small Group and had them conduct analysis on Soviet military movements. On September 10, the CMC Working Group submitted a report to Politburo members Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng, in which it posited that following the Zhenbao Island incident, the Soviets had indeed accelerated combat preparations aimed at China, and that although it would be difficult for the Soviets to immediately launch a full-scale war, central Soviet leadership were a band of risk-takers who did not consider consequences. Even Nixon had called Soviet leadership incompetent, and had asserted there was great risk of their committing a fatal error. The report asserted that Soviet leadership frequently miscalculated Chinese and global circumstances, and that the risk existed that the Soviets would launch an attack before expected. On the same day, the CMC Working Group issued instructions to all military regions, all branches of the armed forces, and all bases to augment readiness for a surprise attack, and for frontline troops in the “three norths” and on the coastline and for air defense forces to immediately begin augmenting measures to prevent an enemy surprise attack, to maintain a high level of alert, and to be always ready to respond to any sudden circumstances. On September 11, Premier Zhou Enlai acquiesced to the Soviets’ request for a meeting and formally met with Soviet Council of Ministers Chairman Kosygin in the Beijing airport. They agreed to a four-point consensus—including maintaining the status quo on the border and avoiding armed conflict—and settled on holding talks on border issues at a later date with delegations from each party involved. On September 18, Zhou sent a letter to Kosygin, based on the procedures the two had discussed in Beijing, turning their oral consensus into a written document, which would become an effective agreement between the two nations once approved by the Soviet government. However, on September 26, Kosygin sent a reply in which he completely avoided mention of the understanding the two had come to in the airport, saying merely: we have already taken real measures to normalize the situation on the border, the genesis of which was already agreed-upon relevant agreements with the Chinese government achieved using similar measures on the basis of mutual principles.23 Both sides agreed on holding border talks on October 20 in Beijing.

23  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976) xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976 年)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 1997), 323 and 327.

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The refusal on the part of the Soviets to discuss important issues of the understanding which both sides had reached demonstrated backpedaling by the Soviets in their position toward border issues. The Soviets were increasing combat preparations and urgently trying to engage China in talks, but their negotiating standpoint vacillated widely. This caused the CMC to become highly alert. Mao, Lin, and the CMC Working Group all began to think that the Soviet push for talks was a ruse to cover their true intention of full-blown war. At the time, the possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack on China was the focus of the CMC’s attention. During the talks in the Beijing airport, Zhou asked Kosygin about foreign media reports on a Soviet nuclear sneak attack on China, which Kosygin did not deny. Looking back at Soviet military deployments and their military strategic theory, comparisons between the Soviet and the Chinese militaries in every branch of armed services, the status of Sino-Soviet relations, etc., it seemed extremely likely that the Soviets were planning to use nuclear weapons to retaliate against China, and that if war came, it would probably start in the form of a surprise attack. Beginning in mid-September, the CMC’s alertness toward battle preparations increased dramatically, and the military entered a state of being prepared to begin fighting at a moment’s notice. Combat preparations were made especially stalwart during the National Day Holiday and for October 19, during the Soviet delegation’s visit to Beijing. Mao called all the people of the nation to be ready for war. As he was reading through the slogans to be called out in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, he added one: “People of the entire world, unite to oppose an invasive war by any imperialist or socialist imperialist nation; in particular oppose any invasive war which makes use of atomic bombs! If such a war occurs, the people of the entire world should use revolutionary war to eradicate invasive war. We should be ready starting right now!”24 This was not a run-of-the-mill slogan, but rather came to be regarded as a “great mobilization order, which possessed profound strategic significance.”25 24  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 13 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 13 册 [Mao Zedong’s Draft Writings Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13], 66. 25  “Quanguo renmin relie huanhu ‘qingzhu zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli ershi zhounian kouhao’ fabiao jingen weida lingxiu Mao zhuxi duoqu shehuizhuyi geming he jianshe xin shengli tong quan shijie renmin yidao ba fandui di-xiu-fan de weida douzheng jinxing daodi”《全国人民热烈欢呼〈庆祝中华人民共和国成立二十周年 口号〉发表紧跟伟大领袖毛主席夺取社会主义革命和建设新胜利同全世界人 民一道把反对帝修反的伟大斗争进行到底》[People Around the Nation Fervently Cheer ‘Celebrate the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC Slogans’ and Express Their Keeping in Step with the Great Leader Chairman Mao in Striving for New Victories

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The All-Military Combat Readiness Conference was convened in Beijing from September 20 to 29. Mao instructed that “the military not slacken up.” Lin stated that the “core task of the entire military at present is to strengthen combat readiness.” Zhou emphasized a “particular need to prevent the enemy from launching a surprise attack.”26 At Mao’s behest, the conference was stopped halfway just before National Day, and the leaders of all combat regions immediately returned to their posts to ramp up combat readiness, not staying in Beijing for the holiday. On the evening of September 30, Lin issued a combat readiness order, instructing all garrisons of the army, navy, and air force in the “three north” regions to take immediate action in entering a state of evacuation and preparation for battle. Following National Day, on October 9, Lin boarded an airplane to make aerial observations of focus defense areas and general deployments. In mid-October, Mao said it was bad to concentrate all central leadership in Beijing, as a single atomic bomb could obliterate them all. He encouraged a dispersion of leadership, with several old comrades being evacuated elsewhere.27 At Mao’s behest, Lin chaired a session of the Politburo, which looked into the possibility of a Soviet attack. All present at the meeting concluded that the Soviets lacked the true intention to negotiate and might very likely take the risk of launching a surprise attack; they also agreed with Mao’s instructions on dispersing the leadership.28 After the Politburo session, CCP Central notified Party and State leaders in Beijing of the evacuation order. Mao was the first to leave Beijing, arriving in Wuchang on the evening of October 15. On October 16, Lin and Ye Qun left Beijing for Suzhou. Thereafter, Politburo and CCP Central Committee members Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Ye Jianying, and others, as well as former Party and State leaders Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Wentian, Tao Zhu, and others were evacuated out of Beijing. Zhou Enlai and CMC Small Group members

in Socialist Revolution and Construction and Will Continue the Great Struggle Against Imperialism, Revisionism, and Counter-revolutionaries to the Bitter End with the People of the World], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》 , September 18, 1969, first edition. 26  Liu Zhinan 刘志男, “1969 nian, zhongguo zhanbei yu dui mei-su guanxi de yanjiu he tiaozheng”《1969 年，中国战备与对美苏关系的研究和调整》[1969, Chinese Combat Readiness and Research and Adjustments to the U.S.-Soviet Relationship], in Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu《当代中国史研究》(1999) 3. 27  For details, see Xiong Xianghui 熊向晖, Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya [My Career in Intelligence and Diplomacy], (CCP Party History Press, 1999): 182. 28  Yang Kuisong 杨奎松, Mao Zedong yu mosike de en’enyuanyuan《毛泽东与莫斯科 的恩恩怨怨》[Gratitudes and Grudges Between Mao Zedong and Moscow], (Jiangxi People’s Press, 1999), 502.

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Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, and others remained in Beijing to supervise the work of the Party, State, and military. These were the circumstances under which Lin Biao issued the combat readiness order. We should say that given the development of the situation, there was a rational need for the order, and it was appropriate for the moment. 2

The Contents of “Order Number One” and the Course of Its Issuance

Lin’s combat readiness order was issued by the CMC Working Group and the “Front Command,”29 which divided the original order into four different orders, issued to different departments within the military. The records of the acting staff officer indicate that the first instruction was titled “The First Order as Instructed by Vice Chairman Lin Issued by Deputy Chief Yan.” The second was titled “The Second Instruction of Vice Chairman Lin (to the Second Artillery Corps).” The Third was titled “Instructions Transmitted by the CMC Working Group to the Second and Third Divisions (No. 3).” The fourth was titled “Instructions from the CMC Working Group to All Headquarters, All Branches of the Armed Forces, and All Relevant Departments of State-owned Enterprises, Scientific Committees, and Headquarters.” The contents of the first instruction read as follows: First, in the past two days there have been many abnormal circumstances among the American Imperialists and Soviet Revisionists, etc. The Soviet Revisionists’ so-called negotiations delegation is expected to arrive in Beijing tomorrow [the 19th]. We must increase our alert 100-fold and prevent being duped by the Soviet Revisionists, especially on the 19th and 20th. Pay special attention. Second, all military regions, especially the “three norths,” should immediately disperse and conceal all heavy weaponry, such as tanks, aircraft, and artillery.

29  The “Front Command” was also referred to as the “Crack Team,” “Tier-One Team,” “Command Central,” “Command Team,” etc. It was organized in mid-October per instructions from Lin Biao, who intended it to command the entire military in wartime. “Front Command” was personally led by General Staff Headquarters Chief Yan Zhongchuan and acted in collusion with the CMC Working Group.

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Third, all military regions along the coast should strengthen precautions to prevent a possible sneak attack from the American Imperialists and Soviet Revisionists. Do not lower your guard. Fourth, quickly and urgently deploy anti-tank weaponry, such as 4–0 rocket launchers, anti-tank artillery, etc. (including recoilless guns and 8–5 anti-tank guns). Fifth, immediately organize crack command companies and deploy them into wartime command positions. Sixth, all levels must increase leadership duty time, to promptly take control of the situation. Report execution situations quickly. October 18, 21:3030

Although instructions three and four were issued in the name of the CMC Working Group, they were originally derived from Lin’s order. They were completely the concretization of Lin’s combat readiness order, and did not exceed the contents or scope of the original order. We can see that the “Front Command” received the order at 21:30 hours on the evening of October 18. So when did Lin issue it? Between February and March, 1972, Zhang Yunsheng31 came under investigation and wrote several documents in evidence of his position. Per his recollection: Lin dictated the order orally around 3pm on October 18; I transmitted the order by telephone to Huang Yongsheng after dusk that evening, around 5 or 6 pm. In Zhang Yunsheng’s memoirs, Records of Maojiawan [Maojiawan jishi], his recollection of the incident run approximately parallel to that statement. However, an investigation into the original records indicate clearly that Lin had dictated the order on October 17. This basically demonstrates an error in Zhang’s memory, i.e. that Lin dictated the order to his secretary on the 17, not the 18. That means a delay of one day and one night between Lin’s drafting the order and its being transmitted to the “Front Command.” Per Zhang’s statements, the order was—per routine practice—suppressed for two to three hours before being transmitted. So when was it really issued? Where and why was the order delayed for a day? First let us analyze the time that Zhang transmitted the order to Huang. In mid-October, following CCP Central’s decision to evacuate leadership in case 30  Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi, di 6 juan《中国人民解放军军史》第 6 卷 [Military History of China’s People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 6], 108–109. 31  Lin Biao’s secretary at the time, evacuated with Lin to Suzhou, responsible for taking records and transmitting Lin’s instructions.

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of attack, the CMC Working Group members who remained in Beijing to continue routine work performed that work from a posture of combat readiness. On October 17 at 21:00, all members of the “Front Command” were stationed in evacuation areas, formally announced the formation of the “Front Command,” and began their work. On October 18 at 02:00 in the morning, CMC Working Group members Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, Wen Yucheng, Li Desheng, and Liu Xianquan scattered to evacuation areas. The CMC Working Group headed by Huang and the “Front Command” headed by Yan Zhongchuan were situated not far apart. Per Yan’s recollections and an investigation organized by the General Staff Headquarters, Huang summoned Yan to the Working Group immediately upon receipt of the order to transmit it to Yan, who then returned to the “Front Command” to issue the order to the staff officer on duty. All of this transpired after the officers’ entry into evacuation areas. Once the order reached Beijing, officers there retransmitted it urgently with no delay. Per Yan’s recollection, at the time he received the order at the Working Group, Huang had just convened a Working Group meeting. Zhang recalled another relevant detail. After Huang had recorded the order from Zhang, the two engaged in a few sentences of idle conversation, at which point Huang said he was in the middle of a meeting. Huang completed the receipt and retransmission of the order in the middle of a meeting. The time of the meeting was approximately 18:00 on the 18. One can thus infer that Zhang transmitted the order to Huang on the afternoon of the 18; it is not possible that the instruction was issued on the 17. That is to say that Lin’s order was suppressed in Suzhou for a day before it reached Beijing. There has long been a suspicion about “Order Number One,” namely that it had not been reported to Mao Zedong before being issued. Initially, the most authoritative source corroborating that the order had not been approved by Mao before its issuance came from the The Struggle to Shatter the Lin-Chen Anti-Party Clique’s Counterrevolutionary Coup (Documents Vol. 1) [Fensui LinChen fandang jituan fangeming zhengbian de douzheng (cailiao zhi yi)] compiled by a central task force on December 7, 1971. One document therein read, “On October 18, 1969, Lin Biao took advantage of Chairman Mao’s absence from Beijing to issue the so-called ‘First Order as Instructed by Vice Chairman Lin,’ which directed the entire military to enter a state of combat readiness. Such an action taken without requesting instructions from Chairman Mao and Party Central constituted in reality a preview of [his later plot to] usurp the Party and steal power.” Many books and publications thereafter adopted this position. However, the opinions of those involved vary. Per Zhang’s recollection: Ye Qun was at the time actively promoting such an action, that it would not be bad

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not to report to the Chairman. She also suggested that she place a telephone call to Wang Dongxing to report the issue to Mao Zedong, and that Zhang should add a sentence to Lin’s dictated order: at the same time this telephone record was transmitted to Staff Chief Huang, Comrade Wang Dongxing would report it to the Chairman; if the Chairman had instructions, the Chairman’s instructions would prevail. Zhang’s recollection of various places may be inaccurate, but his attitude was solemn and serious. His recollection of the contents of the order are basically the same as those on file. Zhang wrote these materials two months after the Center had issued a document reaching their conclusion, but he still recounted the true events of the incident in a seeking-truth-from-facts manner. Given the political atmosphere at the time, such an attitude was truly laudable. The most important person in Wuhan at the time—other than Chairman Mao—was Wang Dongxing.32 However, in Wang’s memoir Mao Zedong’s Struggle Against the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Clique, published in 1997, he touched upon the events of October 17 and 18 only very quickly, and his perspectives and materials entirely identical to the central documents issued in 1971 and 1972 detailing the incident. One can thus see a contradiction in the statements of the two men involved regarding whether “Order Number One” was approved by Mao before being issued. Zhang positively affirmed that Lin and Ye had requested instructions from the Chairman via Wang, whereas Wang recollects that such a request for confirmation did not happen. To determine what really happened, we can perform analysis on the origins and developments of related incidents. First, a large quantity of facts demonstrate that the Lin Biao clique was indeed plotting a coup in 1971. This conspiracy began only after the second plenum of the Ninth Party Congress in 1970, at which Lin’s political status was shaken. There is no evidence to attest that Lin was harboring such an intention in 1969, or that he took any direct actions toward such an intention. Second, following the beginning of the “Cultural Revolution,” Lin took various measures 32  There are doubts that Wang was in Wuhan at the time. Per page 122 of Mao Mao, Wo de fuqin Deng Xiaoping “geming” suiyue《我的父亲邓小平“革命”岁月》[The “Revolutionary” Times of My Father Deng Xiaoping], (Central Documentary Press, 2000), Wang was in Beijing at this time. On pages 14–15 of his book Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》[Mao Zedong’s Struggle Against the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Clique], Wang does not clearly state when he arrived in Wuhan. His style, however, indicates that Wang had arrived in Wuhan on October 19. There are contradictions between the statements of these two books. Also, Zhang Yunsheng recalled in his written testimony given on February 10, 1972 that Wang was in Wuhan at the time.

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to strengthen his personal power, but it seems unreasonable that Lin would exceed his authority and issue an obviously illegal order just to affirm his own authority. Such an action would not conform to Lin’s habitual actions. Third, at this time Lin painstakingly maintained his relationship with Mao in all areas, avoiding any irritation of Mao to the greatest extent possible. Such a barefaced challenge to Mao’s authority would have been imprudent. Fourth, the logic behind the event’s unfolding demonstrates that Lin successfully used “Order Number One” to direct the entire military, and there is no evidence that he used this result to his own benefit. The issuance of “Order Number One” was an isolated incident. Fifth, the everyday actions of the CMC Working Group members at the time demonstrated their loyalty to Lin; there was no need to take such a measure to win their loyalty. Sixth, such a pan-military action could not have been concealed from Mao. If that were the case, Mao would have equated it with a conspiracy once he found out, and the results would have been disastrous. A comparison with the situation in 1971 demonstrates this point. In 1971, in step with the “Criticize Chen [Boda] Rectification” movement, Mao noticed Lin’s dissatisfaction and initially observed the conspiracy to usurp power, at which point he did not delay to take action, not for a moment relaxing his attention or handling of the event. If Mao had detected a conspiracy within such a sensitive issue affecting military authority as “Order Number One,” he in no way would have let it slide. Seventh, at a meeting of all headquarters and all branches of the armed forces convened by the CMC Working Group on October 21, 1969, Wu Faxian declared that Vice Chairman Lin’s Order Number One had been first reported to Chairman Mao. On the basis of the indirect logical relationships of all the above facts, I infer that it was not very possible that Lin intentionally concealed the order in a plot to usurp power. So was it possible that he forgot? The order was suppressed in Suzhou for a day after being drafted; that was ample time for Lin to report it to Mao. Nobody involved who was later interviewed reported having forgotten. If it had been oversight on the part of a worker, nobody was brought up on charges of neglect afterward. It is likewise not very likely that Ye Qun forgot, as a wall scroll33 given by Lin to Ye on the 19 does not indicate any blame of Ye by Lin, but rather simply that the two gave each other scrolls for mutual encouragement. In addition, in the atmosphere of the time—one gearing up for war—Lin and Ye evacuated to Suzhou specifically in advance of potential attack; it is highly unlikely that a combat readiness order that touched on the State and military could have been overlooked. 33  “Take all things at a unhurried pace; this is the only important thing in returning oneself to the sphere of ritual.”

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For all the above reasons, one can conclude that Zhang’s recollections of related incidents are basically reliable. That is to say: Lin reported the combat readiness instruction to Mao Zedong, and this order reached Beijing the day after it was written, at which time it was disseminated to the entire military via the CMC Working Group. Conversely, even if Lin did not request Mao’s authorization before issuing the order, this would not constitute action without authorization. Under normal circumstances, such a pan-military mobilization order would have to be authorized by the CMC Chairman, i.e. Mao Zedong. However, in September and October 1969, the State was in a special period of high military alert. On October 7, the State Council and CMC issued the “Report Regarding Establishing An Alert System for Preventing Enemy Sneak Attacks,” which proposed: in order to ensure the Center’s prompt, correct issuance of alarm at the time of an enemy sneak attack, all military divisions and locales around the country must immediately enter wartime status. The report mandated that the entire nation had the authority to issue warnings, with central authority concentrated in the hands of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin. In the case of an emergency, the report authorized the CMC Working Group to make resolutions to be enacted by the General Staff Headquarters. Per this stipulation, Lin had the authority to issue combat readiness orders to the entire nation and the entire military. Even though it was this way in theory, Lin did not abuse the power of this stipulation. However, after the issuance of “Order Number One,” both Mao and Zhou expressed discontent. So where was the problem? 3

The Reasons Behind Mao Zedong’s Dissatisfaction with “Order Number One”

On the evening of October 18, 1969, the “Front Command” transmitted Lin’s “Order Number One” to the entire military as quickly as possible. That night, most combat divisions of the army, navy, and air force completed evacuations. Statistics taken after the fact indicate that over 90 divisions, over 520 regiments, over 430 naval vessels, and over 4100 airplanes were evacuated.34

34  Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi, di 6 juan《中国人民解放军军史》第 6 卷 [Military History of China’s People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 6], 109.

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On October 19, a rumor unfavorable to Lin and Ye was circulated through the CMC Working Group: Mao had immediately burned the order upon seeing it.35 This was an unusual reaction for him, demonstrating Mao’s dissatisfaction. In Beijing, Zhou also made inquiries into the contents and genesis of the order. In Kunming and many other places, Lin’s combat readiness order trickled into civilian circles. Some wrote the contents of the order into big-character signs, which they posted on public thoroughfares, inciting panic among the masses. Lin and Ye were also displeased with the problems that cropped up after the issuance of the order. When their secretary reported the situation from Beijing to Lin and Ye, they both said this was “of more hindrance than help.” In summary, after the issuance of “Order Number One,” Mao, Zhou, and Lin were all displeased. There are no mentions in case materials or written statements of persons involved as to the source of Mao’s displeasure. My analysis has yielded four possibilities: displeasure at not having been consulted before the order’s issuance, displeasure with the order’s contents, displeasure at the order’s being leaked, and displeasure with use of titles. We have already refuted the possibility that Lin issued the order without first consulting Mao. Now let us analyze whether Mao did not approve of the order’s contents. In Wang Dongxing’s recollection, Lin, Huang, et al. became panicked upon discovering that Mao had burned the order in displeasure, at which point they rescinded the order.36 This seems to demonstrate that Mao did not approve of the order’s contents. However, the facts do not point to such a conclusion. As stated above, prior to the Sino-Soviet negotiations, Mao predicted a possible escalation of Sino-Soviet war conditions and ordered an evacuation of central leadership. Under such circumstances, it was necessary for the military to enter a state of high alert; it would have been abnormal for the military not to make such preparations. Although the situation did not escalate thereafter, Mao did not slacken his vigilance against a possible Soviet invasion, and the entire military remained in a state of high alert. On October 22, 1969, the CMC Working Group’s wartime command group’s instructions called for c­ ontinued 35  On page 14 of Wang Dongxing, Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng 《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》[Mao Zedong’s Struggle Against the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Clique], Wang notes Mao Zedong’s burning of the order. On October 21, 1969, Wang recalls Huang Yongsheng’s mentioning of Mao’s burning of the order at a meeting of all headquarters and branches of the armed services. 36  Wang Dongxing 汪东兴, Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng 《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》[Mao Zedong’s Struggle Against the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Clique], (Modern China Press, 1997), 15.

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augmentation of combat readiness and prevention of a Soviet sneak attack. On October 23, the CMC Working Group gave instructions regarding evacuations, ordering that those divisions evacuated might need to remain in a state of evacuation for a while longer, requesting them to perform the work of evacuating the military well, and to continue maintaining a high state of combat readiness. On December 12, the CMC again instructed all military regions to “greatly increase their state of alert and prevent a Soviet Revisionist sneak attack.” On December 18, the CMC Working Group again instructed the entire military to escalate combat readiness during the New Year and Chinese New Year holidays, as well as ordering further defense measures taken for the divisions and weaponry evacuated. On January 20, 1970, the CMC Working Group ordered the navy and air force in relevant military regions to prepare for a Soviet Revisionist attack from the ocean. On February 23, they ordered for an increase in vigilance in taking precautions against provocation from the Soviet Revisionists. On March 9, they ordered an increase in vigilance in preventing the enemy from making off with a large quantity of captured equipment. All of these combat readiness orders—whether issued in the name of the CMC or the CMC Working Group—were approved by Mao, and certainly not done at the sole behest of Lin or the CMC Working Group. Without Mao’s attaching great importance to issues of combat readiness, there would have been no way for the CMC Working Group to repeatedly issue commands to increase combat readiness over the course of several months after Order Number One. As of mid-April, 1970, combat readiness evacuations had already been instigated for over half a year. As winter turned to spring, many places around the nation entered the rainy season, causing great difficulties in the lives of evacuated troops and the maintenance of evacuated weapons. On April 24, the CMC directed portions of evacuated troops to—on the basis of their real situation and the circumstances of combat readiness—return to their original camps either in entirety or in shifts. Thereafter, however, Mao issued another instruction for combat readiness, and on the basis of the spirit of that instruction, on April 29, the CMC Working Group issued supplementary instructions for troop evacuations, demanding a great increase to the degree of combat readiness over the National Day holiday period of 1969, and ordering only augmentation and no weakening of soldiers’ combat readiness thought education, combat readiness training, material preparations, defense projects, and front line garrisons. This demonstrates that after the issuance of “Order Number One,” combat readiness was continually augmented, and evacuations continued. Mao’s guiding thought and demand regarding combat readiness was the same as within “Order Number One,” and he showed no apparent displeasure with the contents of the order.

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Now let us treat the possibility of leakage of secret information. Is it possible that the leakage of the order, which caused widespread public panic, is what really caused Mao’s displeasure? Leakages are the result of negligence and are a question of concrete operations. If Mao had been displeased, he could have resolved the issue directly via a memo to his inferiors, and would not have had to resort to unusually emotional actions that would have been difficult for others ascertain. In fact, after the rebel movement to seize power that took place early in the “Cultural Revolution,” leakages were a common occurrence in the organizational system, which had previously been sealed tight as a drum. It was at this time very difficult to ensure tight precautions against leakages at every link of the chain. It would seem from all the evidence that Mao was most displeased with the titles used in the order. The order he burned was most likely in the format of an order issued down to the army from the “Front Command.” To comply with general protocol, all relevant orders of the CMC and General Staff Headquarters were be copied to CMC leadership and relevant persons in the Politburo at the same time as its dissemination to the military. That is to say that Mao received the order twice, once before its issuance, and once afterward. The first time it came in the form as a request for instructions. The second time it would have been a finished document written as an order. Mao burned the second document, titled “The First Order as Instructed by Vice Chairman Lin.” Taken at face value, there seem to be no problems with the titles used in “Order Number One.” During wartime, all strategic regions frequently issue military orders in the personal name of military chiefs. In October 1969, amid a highly tense combat readiness atmosphere, the CMC Working Group and the “Front Command” were making preparations to assume the important task of “highest level of wartime command,” and the order was handled in accordance with the unusual circumstances of the time. There had been no unified format for the several orders issued by the “Front Command” up to this point, which demonstrates a state of relative disorder. This was reflected by the fact that work performed by the “Front Command” after evacuation had not come back to the correct path, but had rather entered a state of hurry and confusion. Politically speaking, this title constituted an error in principle; it at very least lacked political sensitivity. Following the founding of New China, use of phrasing such as “As Instructed by Vice Chairman Lin” in an order issued to the entire military was extremely unusual—one of its kind in fact. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army maintains the principle of absolute guidance by the Party. Even though the order was drafted by an individual, it should have been—by standard protocol—issued in the name of a collective body. The

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“Cultural Revolution” damaged the principle of collective leadership, but its most prominent aspect was the status of Mao Zedong as the ultimate leader. Any actions beyond one’s accorded authority or taken in order to seize more authority were still strictly prohibited. It became seen as normal to issue directives to the entire military in the name of Chairman Mao, but Mao himself opposed this practice. He frequently demanded that his recommendations be deliberated by the CMC and then issued in the name of the CMC or other appropriate institution. The issuing of a command to the entire military in the name of Vice Chairman Lin was extremely uncommon and a violation of organization principles. It inappropriately emphasized Lin and incited suspicion of his overstepping his authority. Military matters are of the utmost sensitivity. Such an incident happening between Mao and Lin affected their personal relationship. It would not have been appropriate to speak of how the incident affected their relationship, but nor would it have been appropriate to make no response to the incident. In this situation, Mao tactfully used his burning of the order to demonstrate his attitude. After seeing the order on the 19, Zhou Enlai summoned members of the CMC Working Group to inquire into “Order Number One.” As he was inquiring about the leakage, he in particular asked why Lin’s instruction was called “Order Number One.” Zhou directly expressed sensitivity to the Order’s name. Neither Lin nor Ye had anticipated that such issues would crop up following the issuance of the combat readiness order. The name of the order enables one to feel the respect for and compliance to Lin on the part of the CMC Working Group and the “Front Command,” but the influence created by the order was quite bad. Lin and Ye also complained that this had caused “more hindrance than help.” In cleaning up the aftermath of “Order Number One,” the CMC Working Group dealt with the leakage on one hand and the title issue on the other. Huang Yongsheng and others made a big show of opposing punitive investigations into leakages by individual units that occurred during the execution of the order. The CMC Working Group made telephone calls to each military region and each branch of the armed forces, as well as issuing a series of memos and notices. At cadre conferences in each headquarters and branch of armed services, Huang sternly declared that if such an incident occurred again, he would “lift his head to come and see!” At the same time, he covered up the influence caused by the error in naming to the utmost of his abilities. After all military regions and branches of the military issued reports on the execution of “Order Number One,” the CMC Working Group relayed some of them—with the words “first order” deleted—to Mao and other central readership, and suppressed some without reporting them to central leadership.

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Reasons Behind the Problems that Followed “Order Number One” and Their Influence

When Lin first issued the combat readiness instructions, there was only content and no title. After his secretary recorded his dictation, he added the title “Senior Officer’s Urgent Instructions Regarding Strengthening Combat Readiness and Preventing an Enemy Sneak Attack.”37 Under normal circumstances, any instructions coming from Mao or Lin—once deliberated and passed by the CMC—would generally be issued to the military in the name of the CMC, or in special circumstances in the name of the General Staff Headquarters or General Political Department. After March 1968, the CMC Working Group replaced the CMC Standing Committee, a practice that continued following the Ninth Party Congress. That is to say that resolutions made by the CMC Working Group were not issued cleanly in the name of the CMC as the CMC Standing Committee before it had done, but were instead made in the name of the CMC Working Group or CMC headquarters. Only instructions coming from Mao or those clearly designated by Lin were issued in the name of the CMC. During such tense times leading up to perceived war, there were no regulations for how the “Front Command” was to process orders from superiors, and nor were there precedents from which to draw. As for the combat readiness instructions Lin issued, the CMC was also in a difficult position. To issue the command in the name of the CMC Working Group would diminish Lin’s stature, but to issue the order in the CMC’s name would not be very appropriate either. In addition, not long before, a notice had been circulated announcing that Lin had the authority to issue orders to the entire military. So it would seem that Huang and the CMC Working Group encountered a difficult problem in terms of the system and protocol when attaching a title to the order. After Lin’s order had passed through the CMC Working Group, it was transferred to the “Front Command” in its entirety without a title attached. Yan Zhongchuan recalled that the order was the first that had been issued to the “Front Command” following its establishment. “Let’s start numbering from number one and call this ‘Order Number One!” he said. It was at this point that the order’s name changed considerably. “Senior Officer” was changed to “Vice Chairman Lin,” and the words “Strengthening Combat Readiness and Preventing an Enemy Sneak Attack” were removed and replaced with “Order Number One.” In this 37  See attached figure on pg. 95 of Wang Dongxing 汪东兴, Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》[Mao Zedong’s Struggle Against the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Clique].

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form, the order was disseminated down through the ranks and was eventually leaked to the public. As for secrecy concerns, as the order was being issued downward to every branch of the military in every region, nobody from Lin and Ye to the CMC Working Group to the “Front Command” had contemplated every link in the chain. This constitutes negligence. Particularly under the particular auspices of the “Cultural Revolution,” many military cadres participated in local leadership work. In many provincial, city, regional, and county revolutionary committees, military cadres were charged with the responsibility of providing primary leadership. This caused an unprecedentedly close relationship between the military and local governments; one could go so far as to say that the two had been integrated to a certain degree. Under such conditions, the military’s execution of special strategic tasks must be specially communicated, with scopes clearly delineated and secrecy emphasized. In a broader sense, the titling and leakage errors of “Order Number One” reflected some comprehensive military problems of the times. They bore a direct relationship with the political landscape amid the “Cultural Revolution,” abnormalities within the military leadership structure, and an overruling of standardization of military construction. They also reflected latent crises lurking within military construction following the beginning of the “Cultural Revolution.” As far as the highest levels of military command, the military leadership structure born of the “Cultural Revolution” was neither reasonable nor tight. Following the Yang-Yu-Fu incident in March 1968, the CMC Working Group took over the functions of CMC leadership, and changes to membership of military command units (here meaning the CMC working Group, responsible for concrete leadership work) overturned the previous balance of membership from each strategic region, leading to near homogenous representation by members of the former First Army and Fourth Field Army. The CCP’s Ninth Party Congress did not make any fundamental changes to this situation. Under the guidance of Mao, Lin controlled all CMC bodies. A rather obvious personal attachment relationship then developed between primary members of the CMC Working Group and Lin himself. In addition, the former collective leadership of the CMC was abruptly transitioned into the CMC Working Group—staffed with entirely new people—without a transitionary period. CMC Working Group chiefs Huang Yongsheng and Wu Faxian, lacked experience in guiding the entire military, and lacked both relevant knowledge and circumspect working styles. They maintained their leadership primarily through reliance on Lin’s personal support and obedience to Lin. The selection of Ye Qun as Lin’s office director and as a member of the CMC Working Group

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was clearly inappropriate. She was a special persona in the Working Group, and whenever she appeared at meetings of the Working Group, she would say it was “amid a hundred worries that I participate in this meeting, which [ought to be] a very great inspiration to everybody.”38 Her words at Working Group meetings were interpreted as “giving instructions.” All communication between Lin and the Working Group passed through Ye. Her existence caused the relationship between Lin and the Working Group to become even tighter and more nuanced. Such a system within the CMC Working Group smashed ordinary working relationships and necessary balancing measures within collective leadership and interposed many private emotional issues onto great affairs of the military and the State. The disastrous results of the “Cultural Revolution” bore a direct influence on the errors of “Order Number One.” If leadership relationships had been reasonable, institutions solid, and working styles sound, such problems likely would not have occurred. The events surrounding “Order Number One” may seem random, but in fact it was an inevitability. “Order Number One” was an incident in the evolution of Mao and Lin’s relationship that is worthy of attention. Mao’s wordless response shocked Lin greatly. He was naturally aware of the misunderstanding that could easily be incited by the erroneous use of titles in the order. It was not appropriate to use language to explain this either. On the day the event occurred, Lin wrote two hanging scrolls of similar content: “Take all things at a unhurried pace; this is the only important thing in returning oneself to the sphere of ritual [i.e. the emperor’s good graces—translator’s note]—given to Comrade Ye Qun (Yurong), October 19, 1969.” This scroll hung on the wall of Lin and Ye’s bedroom. In the intervening three days, Ye wrote a scroll back to Lin, reading “Take all things at an unhurried pace; this is the only important thing. I can restore myself to the sphere of ritual. Given by Comrade Yurong Ye Qun on October 23, 1969.”39 This was the reaction of Lin and Ye to the incident. This demonstrates that the incident was a great shock to Lin, and it also demonstrates that Lin and Ye were extremely sensitive and cautious in handling their relationship with Mao. As for Mao, other than burning the order, there were no other apparent direct responses on his part. It would seem that the incident had ended as soon as it began. It is not certain that Mao thought the error bore a direct ­relationship 38  Huang Yongsheng’s words, June 5, 1970. 39  See Lin Biao yu Kong-Meng zhi dao (cailiao zhi yi)《林彪与孔孟之道 (材料之一)》 [The Way of Lin Biao and Confucius and Mencius (First Documents)],” issued by CCP Central, January 18, 1974.

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with Lin, but it did reflect abnormalities in the structure of the CMC Working Group and its tight relationship with Lin, so tight, in fact, that it could overlook basic protocol in military leadership. This put Mao on high alert. This incident becomes much clearer when analyzed next to to the election upheavals at the CCP Ninth Congress in April and the problems that emerged a year later at the Ninth Congress’s second plenum. This incident was but one in a series of events that led to the split between Mao and Lin. References Chai Chengwen et al. 柴成文等, San da tupo—xin zhongguo zou xiang shijie de baogao 三大突破——新中国走向世界的报告》[Three Major Breakthroughs—Report on New China Entering the World]. People’s Liberation Army Press, 1994. Holdridge, John H., 1945 nian yilai mei-zhong waijiao guanxi zhengchanghua 1945 年以 来美中外交关系正常化》[Normalization of U.S.-China Relations Since 1945], translated from the English by Yang Liyi et al. 杨立义等. Shanghai Translated Texts Press, 1997. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 13 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 13 册 [Mao Zedong’s Draft Writings Since the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13]. Central Documentary Press, 1998. “Jiecheng fangeming zhengzhi he junshi lianmeng jinxing fangong fanrenmin zui’e goudang mei-su—dui shijie e’gun langbei wei jian jiajin fanhua mei-su fanhua dong buliao zhongguo yi gen haomao zhongguo renmin shi ba fandui di-xiu fandouzheng jinxing daodi”《结成反革命政治和军事联盟进行反共反人民罪恶勾 当美苏一对世界恶棍狼狈为奸加紧反华美苏反华动不了中国一根毫毛中 国人民誓把反对帝修反斗争进行到底》[Forming an Alliance of Counterrevolutionary Politics and Military Alliances to Conduct Crimes Against the Party and Against the People in Collusion with the U.S. and the USSR—The U.S.-Soviet Anti-China Association of Scoundrels Cannot Move Even One Hair on the Heads of the Chinese, Who Pledge to Take the Struggle Against Imperialist Revisionism To the Very End],” in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, June 19, 1969, sixth edition. Khazanov, Anatoly, “Heluxiaofu zhizheng shiqi sulian de duihua zhengce”《赫鲁晓 夫执政时期苏联的对华政策》[Soviet Policy Toward China During the Khrushchev Regime], translated from the Russian by Chen Xi 陈夕, in Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu《中共党史研究》(1999) 2. Liu Zhinan 刘志男, “1969 nian, zhongguo zhanbei yu dui mei-su guanxi de yanjiu he tiaozheng”《1969年，中国战备与对美苏关系的研究和调整》[1969, Chinese Combat Readiness and Research and Adjustments to the U.S.-Soviet Relationship], in Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu《当代中国史研究》(1999) 3.

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“Quanguo renmin relie huanhu ‘qingzhu zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli ershi zhounian kouhao’ fabiao jingen weida lingxiu Mao zhuxi duoqu shehuizhuyi geming he jianshe xin shengli tong quan shijie renmin yidao ba fandui di-xiu-fan de weida douzheng jinxing daodi”《全国人民热烈欢呼〈庆祝中华人民共和国 成立二十周年口号〉发表紧跟伟大领袖毛主席夺取社会主义革命和建设 新胜利同全世界人民一道把反对帝修反的伟大斗争进行到底》[People Around the Nation Fervently Cheer ‘Celebrate the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC Slogans’ and Express Their Keeping in Step with the Great Leader Chairman Mao in Striving for New Victories in Socialist Revolution and Construction and Will Continue the Great Struggle Against Imperialism, Revisionism, and Counter-revolutionaries to the Bitter End with the People of the World], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, September 18, 1969, first edition. Shevchenko, Arkady, Yu mosike juelie《与莫斯科决裂》[Breaking with Moscow], translated from the Russian by Wang Guansheng et al. 王观声等. World Knowledge Press, 1986. Su Caiqing 苏采青, “ ‘Wenhua dageming’ shishi bianwu san ze”《“文化大革命”史事 辨误三则》[Three Mistakes in Understanding Historical Events of the ‘Cultural Revolution’], in Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu《中共党史研究》(1989) 5. “Sulian zhengfu liuyue shisan ri shengming”《苏联政府六月十三日声明》[The Soviet Union Government’s Declaration of June 13], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》 , October 9, 1969, third edition. Wang Dongxing 汪东兴, Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangeming jituan de douzheng《毛 泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》[Mao Zedong’s Struggle Against the Lin Biao Counterrevolutionary Clique]. Modern China Press, 1997. Wei Dongsi 卫东思, “He e’zha jiu buliao xin shahuang de ming”《核讹诈救不了新 沙皇的命》[Nuclear Extortion Cannot Save the Life of the New Tsar], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, September 12, 1969, sixth edition. Xiong Xianghui 熊向晖, Wo de qingbao yu waijiao shengya《我的情报与外交生 涯》[My Career in Intelligence and Diplomacy]. CCP Party History Press, 1999. Yang Kuisong 杨奎松, Mao Zedong yu mosike de en’enyuanyuan《毛泽东与莫斯科 的恩恩怨怨》[Gratitudes and Grudges Between Mao Zedong and Moscow]. Jiangxi People’s Press, 1999. “Yi mian jiajin tong meidi goujie yi mian da gao fanhua zhanzheng dongyuan suxiu toumu shengsi lijie fachu fanhua zhanzheng jiaoxiao suxiu de junshi donghe zhi neng baolu qi shehui diguo zhuyi de chailang benxing he xuruo benzhi”《一面加 紧同美帝勾结一面大搞反华战争动员苏修头目声嘶力竭发出反华战争叫 嚣苏修的军事恫吓只能暴露其社会帝国主义的豺狼本性和虚弱本质》 [Soviet Revisionist Ringleaders Have Shouted Themselves Hoarse, on the One Hand Increasing Collusion with American Imperialism and on the Other Calling for War Against China; Soviet Revisionist Calls for Military Intimidation of China Will Only

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Reveal the Cruel, Rapacious Character and Weak Nature of Their Social Imperialism], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, August 15, 1969, sixth edition. “Zai zhongguo gongchandang dijiu ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao”《在中 国共产党第九次全国代表大会上的报告》[Report of the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, April 28, 1969, first edition. Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi, di 6 juan《中国人民解放军军史》第 6 卷 [Military History of China’s People’s Liberation Army, Vol. 6]. Military Science Press, 2011. “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao bu wenjian—bo sulian zhengfu yijiuliujiu nian liuyue shisan ri shengming”《中华人民共和国外交部文件——驳苏联政府一 九六九年六月十三日声明》[PRC Foreign Ministry Documents—Refuting the Soviet Governments Declaration of June 13, 1969], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》 , October 9, 1969, second edition. “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu shengming”《中华人民共和国政府声明》 [Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, May 25, 1969, first edition. Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976) xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976 年)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), Vol. 2]. Central Documentary Press, 1997.

CHAPTER 10

Changes to China’s Attitudes Toward Vietnam-U.S. Peace Talks and Their Influence on Sino-Viet Relations Shao Xiao Abstract There were major changes to the attitudes of Chinese leadership regarding the Vietnam War between 1968 and 1971. From early 1968 through the first half of 1969, the attitude was one of sustained opposition to peace talks between Vietnam and the U.S. From the second half of 1969 to August 1970, China’s non-intervention into Vietnamese-American peace talks turned into support for Vietnam’s engaging in peace talks. After September 1970, the attitude changed into one of clear support for peace talks. All of these attitudes on the part of the Chinese incited incited strong resentment on the part of the Vietnamese. Although China did not sacrifice Vietnam’s interests in exchange for a relaxing of tensions in Sino-American relations, and although China gave great quantities of gratuitous support to Vietnam despite not being a rich nation, these efforts did not change the dissatisfaction, misgivings, and trepidations toward China of the part of the Vietnamese. During the process of Sino-American reconciliation and VietnameseAmerican peace talks, Sino-Vietnamese relations degraded, laying the hidden danger for a later conflict between the two.

Keywords Vietnam War – Vietnam-U.S. Peace Talks – Sino-Viet Relations

During the Vietnam War, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (hereafter referred to simply as “Vietnam” or “DRV”), which endured great pressure from the war, very early on had the idea of ending the war via peace talks with the

*  Essay submitted June 13, 2011. Shao Xiao is a lecturing professor in Jinan University’s department of history.

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U.S. Although both the Americans and the Vietnamese were constantly sounding each other out,1 no progress came of the peace talks. In the Vietnamese perspective, the American’s escalating the war on one hand while probing chances for peace on the other seemed to represent a lack of sincere intention. At another level, under the influence of China’s attitude, Vietnam was not willing to actively make any substantial concessions. In the late 1950s and nearly all of the 1960s, China resolutely opposed peace talks between Vietnam and the U.S., exerting a substantial influence on Vietnam’s diplomatic policies. Many academics have deep analysis and evidence to support this point.2 Although after the Gulf of Tonkin incident Moscow changed its policies toward Vietnam, increasing its support of the Vietnamese, and the Soviet Union’s influence on Vietnam grew gradually greater, China’s attitude remained a factor the Vietnamese had to contemplate when drafting foreign policy. This remained true through early 1968, when Vietnam suffered a massive hit during 1  See Shi Yinhong 时殷弘, Meiguo zai yuenan de ganshe he zhanzheng (1954–1968)《美国在越 南的干涉和战争 (1954–1968)》[American Interference and War in Vietnam (1954–1968)], (World Knowledge Press, 1993), 242–254. Per U.S. official statistics, there were over 2000 probes into the possibility of Vietnamese-American peace talks from the years 1965 to 1967. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975 (Third Edition), (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996): 182. The Soviet Union also played an intermediary role in exploring the possibility of Vietnamese-American peace talks. See Anatoly Dobrynin, Xinlai—duoboliening huiyilu《信赖——多勃雷宁回忆录》[In Confidence— Dobrynin’s Memoirs], translated from the Russian by Xiao Min et al., (World Knowledge Press, 1997), 177–178. 2  For more about China’s attitude toward the Vietnam War and Vietnamese-American peace talks, see Li Danhui 李丹慧, “Zhongguo dui yue-mei hetan de lichang fangzhen ji qi bianhua (1965–1968)”《中国对越美和谈的立场方针及其变化 (1965–1968)》[Chinese Stand­­points and Policies Toward Vietnamese-American Peace Talks and Changes Thereto (1965–1968)], May 19, 2011, http://www.coldwarchina.org/DanganDetails.aspx?articalid=251; Li Danhui 李丹慧, “Zhong-mei huanhe yu yuanyue kangmei—zhongguo waijiao zhanlüe tiaozheng zhong de yuenan yinsu”《中美缓和与援越抗美——中国外交战略调整中 的越南因素》[Sino-American Détente and the War of Supporting Vietnam and Resisting America—Vietnamese Factors in Strategic Adjustments to China’s Foreign Policy], in Dang de wen xian《党的文献》(2002) 3; Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui 沈志华、李丹慧, “Zhong-mei hejie yu zhongguo duiyue waijiao (1971–1973)”《中美和解与中国对越外交 (1971–1973)》[Sino-American Détente and China’s Foreign Policy Toward Vietnam (1971– 1973)], in Meiguo yanjiu《美国研究》(2000) 1. Pan Yining 潘一宁, “Yuenan zhanzheng houqi zhong-yue guanxi de yanbian”《越南战争后期中越关系的演变》[Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations Late in the Vietnam War], in Nanyang wenti yanjiu《南洋问题 研究》(2008) 3; Qiang Zhai, “Opposing Negotiations: China and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965–1968,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol.68, No.1 (Feb., 1999), 21–49; Qiang Zhai, “China and the Vietnam War,” 1950–1975, Chapel Hill: The University Press of North Carolina, 2000.

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the “Tet Offensive,” at which point Hanoi decided to ignore China’s opposition and begin negotiation with the Americans. Hanoi’s decision was fiercely opposed by the Chinese government, causing momentary vacillation by the Vietnamese regarding the peace talks. However, in the end Hanoi persisted in its initial decision, inevitably influencing the relationship between the two nations. Thereafter, when China’s national security was seriously threatened in the wake of the Zhenbao Island incident, Chinese leadership changed their thinking and no longer opposed peace talks between the Vietnamese and the Americans. This did not, however, relax tensions in Sino-Vietnamese relations, but on the contrary caused Hanoi to suspect the Chinese would betray Vietnam to ease tensions in Sino-American relations. This turned out to be foreshadowing for later escalation of the conflict between the two nations. Domestic academic research into the issues of China’s involvement in VietnameseAmerican peace talks after 1968 are rather flimsy as a result of lack of relevant data. I hope this essay is of some help in this area. 1 In the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the Johnson administration rapidly escalated the conflict. As Johnson was escalating the conflict, he did not, however, abandon his attempts to resolve the Vietnam problem through talks. As early as March 25, 1965, Johnson made a statement expressing he was prepared to go anywhere at any time to see anybody, so long as he could bring about glorious peace.3 On April 7, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University, Johnson emphasized the limited nature of American objectives in Vietnam and restated his willingness to enter unconditional discussions with Hanoi; he also expressed willingness to provide economic aid to Vietnam.4 Hanoi refused this offer. On April 8, Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong set forth Vietnam’s position in a government report, in which he demanded an unconditional withdrawal by U.S. forces and called for the Vietnamese people to resolve

3  Lyndon B. Johnson, “130. Statement by the President on Viet-Nam, March 25, 1965,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), 319. 4  Johnson, “172. Address at Johns Hopkins University: ‘Peace Without Conquest.’ April 7, 1965,” in Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 394–399.

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Vietnam’s problems.5 The Chinese government supported this position. On April 9, the People’s Daily [Renmin ribao] reported Johnson’s April 7 speech, calling his proposal of unconditional discussions “old goods in new packaging, the objective of which is none other than to make the Vietnamese people throw down their weapons, stop struggling, and allow the American military to remain in Vietnam and enjoy the easy life, invading and meddling to the very end.” The article also claimed that “other portions of Johnson’s speech employ bandit logic and a string of lies.”6 In July that year, Ho Chi Minh published an appeal in which he expressed that Vietnam would never cooperate: “We are resolved to fight for complete independence of our motherland, to fight for complete liberty of the people . . . Even if we have to fight for five years, ten years, twenty years, or even longer, we will resolutely fight until we achieve complete victory.”7 American sounding out of the Vietnamese continued until early 1968 with zero results. On January 31, 1968, Vietnam launched the “Tet Offensive,” sending nearly 100,000 soldiers of the South Vietnam People’s Liberation Armed Forces (VPLAF) to attack most cities of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter referred to as “South Vietnam”), including the capital Saigon. In military terms the offensive ended in failure. The VPLAF suffered heavy casualties, with nearly 32,000 dead in battle and 5800 captured, as compared to only over 3000 lost for the Americans and Saigon government forces. In addition, People’s Liberation Front (PLF—also known as National Liberation Front, NLF, or National Liberation Front for South Vietnam) grassroots organizations suffered unprecedented damage, with 30% of grassroots cadres injured or dead during the “Tet Offensive,” with many others captured, resigning, or defecting.8 With such 5  “Haozhao yi shenglizhe de qigai jianjue jibai meiguo qinlüezhe”《号召以胜利者的气概坚 决击败美国侵略者》[Calling for the Spirit of the Victor to Resolutely Defeat the American Invaders], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》 , April 14, 1965, first edition. 6  “Yuehanxun dachu xin zhaopai fanmai jiu huose wangxiang yong ‘wutiaojian de taolun’ pianju shi nanyue renmin fangxia wuqi lougu jiaorang meiguo jue bu hui chetui zhunbei ‘yi chang chijiu de chongtu’ ”《约翰逊打出新招牌贩卖旧货色妄想用“无条件的讨 论”骗局使南越人民放下武器露骨叫嚷美国决不会撤退准备“一场持久的冲突”》 [Johnson Uses a New Sign to Sell Old Goods; Vainly Hopes to Use the Ruse of ‘Unconditional Discussion’ to Cause the People of South Vietnam to Throw Down Their Weapons and Expose Themselves; The U.S. Will Certainly Never Withdraw, so Prepare for ‘a Protracted Conflict’], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, April 9, 1965, fourth edition. 7  Ho Chi Minh, Weile duli ziyou, weile shehuizhuyi《为了独立自由，为了社会主义》[For Independence and Liberty, For Socialism], (Vietnam Foreign Diplomacy Press, 1971), 270. 8  William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Second Edition), (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 295.

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heavy casualties in the South, Vietnam increased its military infiltration into South Vietnam, and the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA) gradually became the main force in the Vietnamese theater of combat. Vietnam sought to end the affair in one fell swoop in one large-scale ­battle—like the battle of Dien Bien Phu—and force the Americans to leave Vietnam.9 However, the “Tet Offensive” destroyed this idea. On March 31, Johnson announced he was ending all activities of the American air force and Navy against Vietnam (not including activities in neighboring non-military zones). At the same time, he announced he would not seek reelection.10 On April 3, Hanoi made a declaration agreeing to enter talks with the U.S.11 Upon hearing this news, Zhou Enlai immediately sought out Ho Chi Minh, who was convalescing in Beijing at the time. It astounded Zhou to discover that Ho knew nothing of this development.12 Hanoi’s decision greatly displeased Chinese leadership. On April 13, Zhou told Premier Pham that Hanoi’s declaration was cooperation and a concession and that it resolved the Americans’ difficulties: “In the eyes of the people of the world, you have compromised twice . . . Vietnamese comrades compromise too easily.” Zhou did not want the Vietnamese to entertain any fantasies about the peace talks. “We have complete faith in your battle experience, but as for talks with the Americans, we probably have more experience than you do.”13 On April 17,14 Zhou emphasized to Pham that he should prepare to fight for three years, i.e. 1968 to 1970, in order to attain complete victory. “Scale warfare will be necessary to achieve this objective,” he said.15 In a meeting two days later, Zhou again mentioned 9  Mao Zedong approved of this strategic thinking of the Vietnamese. See Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao《建国以来毛泽东军事文稿》[Writings of Mao Zedong on Military Affairs Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 2], (Military Sciences Press, 2010), 341–342. 10  Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), 237. 11  Nhan Dan, April 4, 1968, quoted in Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris, (Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1996), 16. 12  Hoang Van Hoan, Canghai yi su—Huang Wenhuan geming huiyilu《沧海一粟——黄 文欢革命回忆录》[A Drop in the Ocean—Hoang Van Hoan’s Revolutionary Memoirs], (People’s Liberation Press, 1987), 308. 13  “31. Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong,” in 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Chen Jian, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 1998), 123–126. 14  All citations come from Wilson Center files. I was unable to confirm them with any Chinese language files. 15  “Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 04/17/1968,” accessed from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&

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that Vietnam’s compromising was tantamount to abandoning the revolution. Comrade Pham expressed in a hard-line attitude that Vietnam would consider the Chinese opinions, adding “it is, after all, we who are fighting with the Americans and beating them. We take responsibility for our military and diplomatic actions.”16 On May 7, in a meeting with the head of the Vietnamese delegation to the peace talks Comrade Xuan Thuy, Zhou used North Korea as an example to once again warn the Vietnamese not to embrace any fantasies, even going so far as to express it was a mistake for the Vietnamese to sign the Geneva Accords.17 China’s opposition did nothing to change Vietnam’s decision. On May 13, Vietnam and the U.S. held the first public negotiations in Paris. The Americans refused to acknowledge the PLF and thus requested to convene two-sided talks: the U.S. and South Vietnam on one side, and the DRV and the PLF on the other. The DRV at first refused to enter talks with South Vietnam in an attempt to force the U.S. and South Vietnam to acknowledge the legality of the PLF. The DRV pushed for four-sided talks: the U.S., the DRV, the PLF, and South Vietnam all as independent parties to the talks. Both sides then engaged in long, heated debates, which ended in zero progress. Owing to the low efficiency of the public talks, the U.S. and the DRV entered the first round of secret talks18 on September 8, 1968 in Paris, without informing South Vietnam. To promote progress in the talks, on October 3, DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh instructed his government’s delegation to adopt flexible policies: “the [American] presidential election will run from now until [November 5]; this is a good opportunity to reduce the scale of American involvement in the war.” Hanoi also agreed with the DRV delegation’s acting as it saw fit and expressed that as long as South Vietnam acknowledged the PLF and agreed to establish

identifier=5034CCC4-96B6-175C-9E7935247F02CC38&sort=Collection&item=The%20 Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s). 16  “Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 04/19/1968,” accessed from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document& identifier=5034CCD3-96B6-175C-9ADB6C82F64A30AD&sort=Collection&item=The%20 Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s). 17  People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Bureau 中华 人民共和国外交部外交史研究室, Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji (1949–1975) 《周恩来外交活动大事记 (1949–1975)》[Records of Major Events in Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities (1949–1975)], (World Knowledge Press, 1993), 534. 18  It is currently impossible to verify if China knew about the secret talks in Paris at the time, but from events that followed, it is clear that the Vietnamese did conceal a great deal from China.

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a united government, they could agree to four-sided talks.19 On October 11, in accordance with Hanoi’s instructions, DRV Politburo member Le Duc Tho—in Paris to participate in the talks—began secret talks with the American delegate Harriman. However, on October 13, Le received new, tougher instructions from Hanoi: the DRV would assent to participating in four-sided talks only if the U.S. stopped all military activities in Vietnam and acknowledged the PLF, and if the South Vietnamese government changed its policies.20 A reasonable guess as to why Hanoi would suddenly change its instructions is that Hanoi leadership had been influenced by China’s attitude. To encourage the DRV to continue fighting, China consented to giving large quantities of gratuitous aid to Vietnam. On June 26, China agreed to charge-free material aid valued at 70 million yuan to southern Vietnam. On July 23, the Sino-Vietnamese aid agreement was signed, with China agreeing to give material aid valued at 770 million yuan to Vietnam, of which 720 million was to be paid in 1969. On September 30, China agreed to giving USD $25 million in foreign exchange to southern Vietnam.21 China continued expressing opposition to peace talks and solicited the DRV for its opinions on continuing the war. On September 2, at a reception thrown by DRV ambassador to China Wu Minh Luan to celebrate 23 years of Vietnamese independence, Zhou Enlai said that so long as the Vietnamese people persisted in their protracted war and opposed surrender and cooperation, they would certainly achieve final victory in the war to resist America and save the nation.22 On October 6, in response to the Vietnamese request to send a delegation to China, Zhou personally drafted a cable to the Chinese envoy to the DRV Chen Shuliang, demanding he immediately seek a meeting with Premier Pham to “say that leading cadres of the Chinese Party and government will be busy with domestic affairs in October, and thus will be unable to receive a delegation from the Vietnamese Party and government.” On October 9, Zhou again expressed this opinion to the DRV’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Lop.23 19  Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 44. 20  Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 47. 21  People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry 中华人民共和国外交部, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tiaoyue ji, di 21 ji《中华人民共和国条约集》第 21 集 [Compilation of PRC Treaties, Vol. 21], (People’s Press, 1981), 276–283. 22  Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji (1949–1975)《周恩来外交活动大事记 (1949– 1975)》[Records of Major Events in Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities (1949–1975)], 529; Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976),] Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 1997), 256. 23  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 2], 262.

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On his return from Paris, Le Duc Tho stopped in Beijing, where he had a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi. Le reported the situation of the talks to Chen, whom he asked to requisition Mao Zedong and other central leadership for their opinions on the talks. Chen met with Le again on October 17, recounting to him instructions from Mao and CCP leadership given to him by Zhou Enlai, as well as some of Zhou’s personal opinions. Chen said that the DRV’s accepting four-sided talks would be yet another loss of the right to take the initiative—it would acknowledge the Saigon government and cause the PLF to lose its legality. “This gives us no choice but to believe you are strengthening the enemy’s position and weakening our position . . . We believe that you have in a short period of time accepted the Soviet Revisionists’ suggestion for compromise and surrender. So there is nothing further to discuss between the Chinese and Vietnamese Parties and governments.”24 China’s adamant opposition to Vietnamese-American peace talks did not remotely influence Hanoi’s policies. Le returned to Vietnam to persuade Hanoi leadership to change their October 13 instructions.25 Hanoi then quickly requested once again that negotiators maintain flexibility. On October 20, Hanoi issued new instructions to the DRV delegation in Paris: four-sided talks can be accepted so long as the Americans stop bombing Vietnam. “Talks between the U.S. and the PLF, as well as the Saigon regime changing their policies, do not in any way constitute a prerequisite the Americans must fulfill before we will accept an agreement with them.”26 The DRV’s new instructions played an immediate role in driving the peace talks. After talks on October 21 and 26, the Americans agreed to announce a cessation of bombing in Vietnam at a meeting on the 31st. The DRV agreed to participate in four-sided talks after November 6. In the peace talks, Xuan Thuy claimed that the DRV had always wanted the U.S. to unconditionally halt bombing, and that the U.S. statement indeed did not contain additional conditions. This demonstrates that the U.S. in fact did agree to an unconditional end to the bombing.27 Although the DRV did place particular emphasis on the US’s unconditional end to bombing— in consideration of China’s attitude—their policies had begun changing even earlier. In an appeal written on November 3, Ho Chi Minh changed previous 24  “Discussion between Chen Yi and Le Duc Tho, 10/17/1968,” accessed from http://www .wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034 CD21-96B6-175C-9DAF353B89FA26B2&sort=Collection&item=The%20Vietnam%20 (Indochina)%20War(s), 2011. 25  Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 48. 26  Ibid., 52–53. 27  Ibid., 61.

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language and proposed a peaceful, unified slogan: “American imperialism is extremely stubborn and tricky. It speaks of ‘peace’ and ‘talks’ but it remains unwilling to abandon its invasive ambition . . . Thus, the sacred duty of all the people of our country at present is that we must encourage a spirit of devotion to battle and victory, be resolved in liberating the South, protect the North, and make progress in peacefully uniting our motherland.”28 After negotiations, the first four-sided talks were held on January 25, 1969. China was helpless to do anything about Vietnam’s decision. On November 13, 15, and 17, Zhou Enlai engaged Premier Pham—stopped over in Beijing returning from a tour of the Soviet Union—in three separate talks. On November 14, Zhou reported the situation of the talks with Pham to Mao, who said to let them make their own decisions on everything.29 On November 17, Mao himself spoke with Pham. During their discussion, Mao said it would be very difficult to resolve Vietnam’s problems through talks. “It will be very difficult to talk them [the U.S.] away,” said Mao. He wanted Vietnam to see not only their own difficulties, but to see the difficulties of the U.S. as well. Then Mao raised the issue of the Chinese troops that had been dispatched to assist Vietnam. “You should think over which you want to keep and which you don’t want to keep. Keep the ones useful to you and send home the ones not useful. If they’ll be helpful again in the future, we’ll send them back.” Although Mao said “I laud your strategy of fighting and talking simultaneously,” in his opinion both fighting and talking were the same in that, “sometimes you’re going to get tricked.”30 After these talks, at the end of 1968, China began withdrawing its troops from Vietnam. As of July 1970, all Chinese troops had been withdrawn.31

28  Ho Chi Minh, 310. 29  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 2], 266. 30  CCP Literary Research Bureau and PLA Military Science Institute 中共中央文献研 究室、中国人民解放军军事科学院, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao, xia juan《建国以来毛泽东军事文稿》下卷 [Writings of Mao Zedong on Military Affairs Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 2], (Military Sciences Press, 2010), 345–348. 31  “Yuenan kangfa, kangmei douzheng shiqi de zhong-yue guanxi—er ping yuenan waijiao bu guanyu yue-zhong guanxi de baipishu”《越南抗法、抗美斗争时期的中越关 系——二评越南外交部关于越中关系的白皮书》[Sino-Vietnamese Relations During the Struggles Against France and America—Two White Papers of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Regarding Sino-Vietnamese Relations], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, November 21, 1979, first edition.

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2 On November 5, 1968, Republican candidate Richard Nixon was elected president of the United States. In the following two months, the four-sided talks remained deadlocked due to disputes between the U.S. and the DRV over trifling matters such as location and arrangements—and certainly for nothing important. Nixon’s national security advisor Kissinger said the procedural disagreement continued until January 16, 1969, with no substantive talks taking place up to the day that Nixon took office.32 In reality, during the first year of Nixon’s term, no significant progress was made in the Paris talks. On the one hand, this was because Nixon needed time to establish policies and sound out the Vietnamese side’s attitudes. On the other, the international environment in 1969 was inimical to conducting peace talks with Vietnam. On March 2, China and the Soviet Union came into armed conflict in the Zhenbao Island incident, leading to a complete breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations, causing changes to the overall conditions of the Cold War. The Vietnamese were highly concerned about the Sino-Soviet conflict. In talks with Kissinger on March 22, Xuan Thuy mentioned the Zhenbao Island incident and warned the Americans not to use the disagreement between socialist nations to prolong their invasive war in Vietnam.33 In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled that this caused the Americans to pay attention to a crisis they had not been sufficiently aware of previously.34 However, the Zhenbao Island incident did not immediately change the attitude of Chinese leadership toward the U.S. or the Vietnamese-American peace talks. On March 15, while listening to a report on the Zhenbao Island incident, Mao said that “the Northeast, the North, and the Northwest must all prepare for the Soviet Union to come. All the southern provinces must prepare for the U.S. to come.”35 On February 28, a few days before the incident, Zhou Enlai expressed his views that talks would be unable to resolve the Vietnam problem to a visiting delegation from the Guinean government, saying that no result would come of the Paris talks. It is impossible to solve on the ­negotiating table

32  Kissinger, White House Years, 237. 33  Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 80; Kissinger, White House Years, 137. 34  Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 73. 35  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao, xia juan《建国以来毛泽东军事文稿》下卷 [Writings of Mao Zedong on Military Affairs Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 2], 356.

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any problem that cannot be resolved on the battlefield, said Zhou.36 Shortly after the Zhenbao Island incident, the Ninth Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress was held in Beijing. The Congress wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Vietnam [renamed the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1976—translator’s note] which read: “In this letter, the Chinese people express support for the revolution of southern Vietnam, as well as support for the necessity to obtain victory through war.”37 During the Party Congress, Zhou and Kang Sheng met with Pham and other Vietnamese leaders. During talks on April 20, Zhou reasserted that the Vietnamese would not be able to achieve victory through talks, and that the DRV should “spend a little less foreign exchange and officials’ time at the Paris talks.” In a meeting on April 29, Vice Premier Li Xiannian told Le Duc Tho, “final victory depends on battle . . . it is impossible to obtain victory at the negotiating table,” and that the Vietnamese had to completely destroy the enemy’s ideas.38 After the Zhenbao Island incident, Mao calculated a worst case scenario: abandoning large swaths of territory and enacting strategic contraction, swapping space for time in order to launch a people’s war. “We must be prepared for the Soviet Union to occupy Shenyang. We would let them have Shenyang, Harbin, and Changchun while we flee into the countryside. We could let them take the Northeast, the North, and the Northwest, let them occupy them all. If we give them some face, they’ll come in further and occupy more land. Once they’re in, they’ll be easy to fight, and then we’ll slowly devour them.”39 Of course, Mao and other central leaders did not want this worst case scenario 36  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 2], 281. 37  “No. 01840 sujun zongcanmou bu zhencha zongju guanyu guoji xingshi diaocha gei sugong zhongyang de baogao (1969 nian 8 yue 15 ri)”《No. 01840 苏军总参谋部侦察总 局关于国际形势调查给苏共中央的报告 (1969年8月15日)》[Report No. 01840 to CPSU Central by the Soviet Army’s General Staff Headquarters Reconnaissance Office Regarding an Investigation into International Circumstances (August 15, 1969), in Sulian lishi dang’an xuanbian di 31 juan《苏联历史档案选编》第31卷 [Selected Files from the History of the Soviet Union], ed. Shen Zhihua 沈志华, (Social Sciences Literary Press, 2002), 405. 38  “Discussion between Li Xiannian and Le Duc Tho, 04/29/1969,” accessed from http://www .wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier= 5034CD60-96B6-175C-9A2711F564AC5E31&sort=Collection&item=The%20Vietnam%20 (Indochina)%20War(s). 39  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao, xia juan《建国以来毛泽东军事文稿》下卷 [Writings of Mao Zedong on Military Affairs Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 2], 355.

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to come to be. As China’s national security came under serious threat, Chinese leaders began to change their thinking, in preference of détente with the U.S. to resist the Soviet Union. Thus, China gradually changed its attitude toward the Paris talks to one of non-intervention. The Chinese government remained silent for a period of time on the question of Vietnamese-American peace talks. At this time, Sino-Vietnamese relations also fell to a low point. Ho Chi Minh died on September 2, 1969. On September 3, Zhou Enlai led a Chinese delegation to Hanoi to mourn Ho’s death, returning to China that same night.40 Three days later, Zhou told a Romanian government delegation which had attended Ho’s funeral, “as for the Vietnam question, it’s ok if Vietnam continues its war of resistance or if they continue the Paris peace talks. This is entirely the Vietnamese Party’s personal matter. As for the Paris talks, I never ask them anything. One reason is that Vietnam is the master [there] and another is that the Soviet Union is involved, so I’m less willing to participate. I have not paid attention to the speed at which the talks are proceeding.”41 One can observe from Zhou’s comments that China no longer directly opposed Vietnam’s peace talks with the U.S. At the same time, China continued sending large amounts of charge-free aid to Vietnam. On September 26, China and Vietnam signed an assistance agreement, in which China pledged to give material aid to Vietnam worth 470 million yuan in 1970.42 Though this figure was much lower than the 1969 figure, it was still a large expenditure for China at the time. On August 4, Kissinger and Xuan Thuy entered the first round of secret talks. As the talks ended fruitlessly and as anti-war pressure in the U.S. was mounting, in a speech on November 3, Nixon called for the “silent majority” to support his Vietnam policy.43 Nixon’s speech enraged Hanoi, which threw the Paris talks into another deadlock. Facing a resolute Hanoi, the U.S. had no choice but to actively request more talks. After a round of initial consultations, Kissinger held three rounds of secret talks with Le Doc Tho and Xuan Thuy on February 21, March 16, and April 4, 1970. Nothing came of any of the secret talks. In his memoirs, Kissinger recollects that Le Duc Tho’s idea of ­negotiations was 40  Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji (1949–1975)《周恩来外交活动大事记 (1949– 1975)》[Records of Major Events in Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities (1949–1975)], 538 and 319. 41  Ibid., 538–539. 42  People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry 中华人民共和国外交部, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tiaoyue ji, di 21 ji《中华人民共和国条约集》第21集 [Compilation of PRC Treaties, Vol. 21], 284–285. 43  Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 409.

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that he would unilaterally raise demands, the essence of which was that the U.S. must withdraw in a very short time and the Saigon government had to collapse.44 With the talks at a halt, General Lon Nol launched a military coup in Cambodia, supported by the U.S., to overthrow the Sihanouk regime. On March 21, Premier Pham visited China, where he met with Zhou Enlai several times to discuss Cambodia and the Indochina question.45 In their meetings, Zhou said that China gave Sihanouk cautious support.46 (On March 25, Zhou wrote a letter to Mao and Lin Biao regarding the Cambodia question and the Indochina situation, in which he said that Sihanouk proposed that Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos—coming together as three nations and four parties—write a declaration of opposition to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and that they desired the use of Guangzhou or Nanning to host their conference. Mao agreed to their request.47 The Cambodia question temporarily diverted attention away from the conflicts between China and Vietnam, and the Chinese opinion was supported by Vietnam. On April 17, Zhou and the General Secretary of the Workers Party of Vietnam Le Duan swapped opinions about such questions as the situation in Southeast Asia and Indochina, the “three nations and four parties talks,” Sino-Soviet relations, etc. From April 24 to 25, the People’s Summit of Indochina (i.e. the “three nations and four parties” talks) were held in the Conghua Hot Springs Resort in the suburbs of Guangzhou. Zhou arrived to Guangzhou on the morning of the 25, where he spoke with leaders of the four parties.48 On May 4, the Chinese government issued a declaration, sternly reprimanding the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and their expansion of military actions in Indochina. The declaration also expressed support for the “United

44  Kissinger, White House Years, 446. 45  Yun Shui 云水, Chushi qi guo jishi—jiang jun dashi Wang Youping《出使七国纪实—— 将军大使王幼平》[Records of Diplomatic Missions to Seven Nations—General and Ambassador Wang Youping], (World Knowledge Press, 1996), 128. 46  “Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 03/21/1970,” accessed from http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document& identifier=5034CD70-96B6-175C-9A541E8A6B456C7D&sort=Collection&item=The%20 Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s). 47  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 2], 357–358. 48  Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji (1949–1975)《周恩来外交活动大事记 (1949– 1975)》[Records of Major Events in Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities (1949–1975)], 552 and 362–364.

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Declaration” passed at the People’s Summit of Indochina.49 To further express protest, China also delayed Sino-American talks in Warsaw twice. The Chinese government at the time, however, had no desire for the war to continue. On May 11, on his way to the Soviet Union, Le Duan stopped in Beijing, where he had an audience with Mao. This was the first time Mao met with Le since 1964. Le’s attitude was extremely respectful: “The reason we’ve been able to perform our work well comes down to three methods that Chairman Mao told us in the past: First, don’t fear, don’t fear the enemy. Second, go for every victory. Third, fight for a long time.” In response, Mao said: “You should to prepare to fight a protracted war, but wouldn’t it be better to fight for a shorter time?” “The Americans are afraid of fighting. They have no courage. You make your own judgment. I’m not saying you can’t negotiate, but you should put your primary energy into fighting.”50 On July 23, Zhou met with a delegation from the Vietnam People’s Democratic and Peaceful Forces Coalition. In their talk, Zhou did not again completely negate the Geneva Accords, but rather gave an assessment of their positives and negatives, saying: “There’s a good side to having signed the Geneva Accords, but there’s a flawed side as well. The good side is that northern Vietnam has obtained temporary peace, and can begin socialist construction. The flawed side is that Vietnam’s troops have evacuated into the North . . . At the time we could have opted for one of two models: one was to sign, and the other was for the U.S. not to sign, and us not to sign either. However, several socialist countries deliberated and decided it was better to sign. Later Chairman Mao said we could have considered not signing. Chairman Ho Chi Minh, and Comrades Le Duan and Pham Van Dong said there were more positives to that side. Looking back now, the Vietnamese people have endured a period of hardship, but there are also positives. This has taught the Vietnamese people to engage in fighting of their own accord, and to rely entirely upon themselves to fight out of their current situation.”51 The attitude of Chinese leadership toward the Geneva Accords demonstrated that China now approved of the ongoing Paris talks. 49  [17] (p. 365) “Discussion between Chen Yi and Le Duc Tho, 10/17/1968,” accessed from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document& identifier=5034CD21-96B6-175C-9DAF353B89FA26B2&sort=Collection&item=The%20 Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s), 2011. 50  “Discussion between Mao Zedong and Le Duan, 05/11/1970,” accessed from http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document& identifier=5034CDED-96B6-175C-98F6DE458848C82E&sort=Collection&item=The%20 Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s). 51  Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji (1949–1975)《周恩来外交活动大事记 (1949– 1975)》[Records of Major Events in Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities (1949–1975)], 561.

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Vietnam perceived the changes in China’s attitude. On September 17, Nguyen Thi Binh announced the PLF’s eight-point peace plan at the “three nations and four parties” conference. Her plan included the following: the forces of the U.S. and its allies withdrawing from Vietnam before June 30, 1971, and the establishment a government in Saigon without Nguyen Van Thieu as president, Nguyen Cao Ky as vice president, and Tran Thien Kiem as government premier.52 On the same day that Nguyen Thi Binh proposed the eight-point plan, Zhou Enlai met with Pham in Beijing. Pham made a special explanation of Vietnam’s diplomatic struggles, saying that Vietnam always felt that both political struggle and military struggle played a decisive role, but to a certain degree, diplomatic struggle was also effective. “We believe that the objective of Nixon’s Vietnam policy is still to obtain military victory in Vietnam. That said, this doesn’t mean that Nixon hasn’t considered diplomatic channels.” Pham told Zhou that the PLF’s demand for an unconditional U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and replacement of Vietnamese leadership was not a new demand. The goal of the demand, said Pham, lay in “our desire to force Nixon into an impasse by influencing public opinion in the U.S. and other places in the world. The objective of these goals is to support the military struggle and political struggle in the South. We have absolutely no fantasies that they will bring us any results.” Zhou did not give an opinion on Pham’s words, but rather only expressed a desire to strengthen Sino-Vietnamese cooperation and that the CCP would do its utmost to aid Vietnam.53 On September 19, Zhou met Pham again, this time clearly expressing his position: “We have observed that you have won experience through your diplomatic struggle.” Zhou also commended Xuan Thuy’s performance in the secret talks.54 These two discussions demonstrate that Pham might have been sounding out the Chinese attitude toward the peace talks, which China had previously opposed. Zhou’s words indicate that China no longer opposed the VietnameseAmerican peace talks at the time. In a September 23 meeting with Pham, Mao said the outbreak of a world war was not likely. As for the Paris talks, Mao said, “we can see that you are able to lead a diplomatic struggle, and you’re doing quite well. The talks have already gone on for two years now. At first we were somewhat concerned that you would fall into a trap. We are no longer concerned . . . You are fighting extremely well on the battlefield. Your diplomatic 52  Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 153. 53  “51. Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong,” in 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Chen Jian, 174–176. 54  “52. Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong,” in 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Chen Jian, 176.

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struggle policies are correct. We will certainly give you what you want.” Mao went on to say that “the Americans still want to come to Beijing to talk. They have proposed this themselves. They said that Warsaw is not suitable, and we replied saying: ‘if you want to come to Beijing, then come on.’ Afterward, they did not dare to come.”55 This may have been Mao hinting that China and the U.S. might engage in more direct, higher-level talks, but Pham did not realize this.56 To eliminate Vietnamese concerns about China’s changing attitude, China further increased the amplitude of gratuitous aid to Vietnam. On October 6, China and Vietnam signed an aid agreement, in which the Chinese consented to giving Vietnam—free of charge—material aid and complete equipment valued at 1.2 billion yuan, as well as USD $60 million in foreign exchange.57 This raised the level of aid much higher than in 1969 and 1970. After pressure from China dropped off, the Vietnamese did not make any major concessions out of haste to conclude the talks. On the contrary, they began to become irresolute about the question of talks. The slow progress of the talks gave Nixon no choice but to reduce his demands. On October 7, Nixon went on television to announce for the first time that the U.S. had accepted a ceasefire in place.58 In Kissinger’s memoirs, he recalled that the ceasefire in place resolution of 1970 hinted at the solution of 1972. The recommendation for a ceasefire, said Kissinger, hinted that Vietnamese military forces would stay in Vietnam.59 Nixon’s suggestion, however, was refused by Vietnam, and the peace talks fell into another impasse. No further talks were held between the Vietnamese and the Americans until the end of May 1971. One very important reason the Vietnamese adopted this attitude was the influence of changes to Sino-American relations at the time.

55  “54. Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong,” in 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Chen Jian, 177–178. 56  Pan Yining 潘一宁, “Yuenan zhanzheng houqi zhong-yue guanxi de yanbian”《越南 战争后期中越关系的演变》[Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations Late in the Vietnam War], in Nanyang wenti yanjiu《南洋问题研究》(2008) 3. 57  People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry 中华人民共和国外交部, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tiaoyue ji, di 21 ji《中华人民共和国条约集》第21集 [Compilation of PRC Treaties, Vol. 21], 289–291. 58  “335—Address to the Nation about a New Initiative for Peace in Southeast Asia,” accessed from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2708&st=&st1=#axzz1VckjNa00. 59  Kissinger, White House Years, 974.

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3 The breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations and tension on the Sino-Soviet border represented a major threat to China’s national security. This threat caused Chinese leaders to change their thinking and reevaluate Sino-American relations. The American strategic contraction also made possible a relaxing of Sino-American tensions. In a meeting on December 18, 1970, Mao asked American writer Edgar Snow to transmit to Nixon an invitation for him to visit China.60 Thereafter, Zhou Enlai used “ping pong diplomacy” to extend a formal invitation to Nixon to visit China.61 At the same time as it was courting the Americans, the Chinese government continued charge-free aid to the Vietnamese, on February 15, 1971 signing another agreement, pledging aid of 400 million yuan.62 Zhou then led a Chinese Party and government delegation on a visit Vietnam from March 5 to 8, during which he expressed that the Chinese government and people would continue—as they always had—­ resolutely supporting the Vietnamese people’s just struggle to resist America and save the nation.63 These Chinese measures did not mitigate the Sino-Vietnamese fissure, as their divergence of opinion toward American policies grew wider. At a meeting on March 7, Zhou told Le Duan and Pham that “Comrade Mao Zedong has already told Comrades Le Duan and Pham Van Dong that Vietnamese comrades know how to fight and how to talk. I have also told Comrades Xuan Thuy and Nguyen Thi Binh that the talks are proceeding very well. I used to have some experience in negotiating, but now I am studying from you.” Hanoi was not pleased with this. Le Duan suggested establishing a World People’s Front to resist the Americans. When Zhou expressed he did not wish for the Soviet Union to be a part, Le resolutely supported leadership by China. Zhou said that “we need more time to consider the question of establishing a people’s front to oppose them.” As to this issue, the Vietnamese “had a more beneficial ­position” 60  PRC Foreign Ministry and CCP Literary Research Bureau 中华人民共和国外交部、中共 中央文献研究室, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan 毛泽东外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong], (Central Documentary Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994), 592–594. 61  Kissinger, White House Years, 714. 62  People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry 中华人民共和国外交部, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tiaoyue ji, di 21 ji《中华人民共和国条约集》第21集 [Compilation of PRC Treaties, Vol. 21], 298–299. 63  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 2], 441–442.

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than China.”64 The Chinese government’s attitude displeased Vietnam. During Zhou’s trip to Vietnam, Le Duan told him that beginning in 1939, China, North Korea, and Vietnam had become a united front. It has been this way for the past thirty or forty years, said Le, and it will continue to be this way for the coming thirty to forty years; we will fight the U.S. for as many years as they want to fight. “The Europeans once fought for 100 years [the Hundred Years War]!”65 On March 25, Le Duan stopped in Beijing with a Workers Party of Vietnam delegation on its way to the Soviet Union. On May 10, the delegation stopped in Beijing again.66 During Le’s stay in Beijing, Zhou told him that China supported Vietnam’s demand that the U.S. completely withdraw, the timetable for said U.S. withdrawal, and the demand to not reorganize the Nguyen Van Thieu government. If the Americans did not consent, “we will resolutely fight.”67 However, these Chinese methods did not eliminate Vietnamese concerns. The Vietnamese had their own explanations of contact between China and the U.S.: “Before, China’s not agreeing with the Vietnamese policy of negotiating and fighting at the same time stemmed from China’s own internal difficulties. As the Cultural Revolution has now been realized and Mao Zedong’s power solidified, and with their trump card of Vietnam in their hand, the Chinese want to normalize relations with the U.S. Of course, the most important thing is for China to consider its own interests. The U.S. is now exerting a new degree of pressure on Vietnam. Now, under more difficult and more complex conditions, Vietnam’s only choice is to continue the war with the U.S.”68 At the Americans’ urging, Vietnam consented to secret talks on May 31, but Hanoi clearly lacked sincere intention at the time. The Vietnamese, suspicious about the Sino-American détente, were concerned that the Americans would play the China card, but more concerned that China would betray them for the sake of better Sino-American relations. Under these circumstances, the 64  “55. Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Le Duan and Pham Van Dong,” in 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Chen Jian: 178. 65  Yun Shui, 132–133. 66  Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji (1949–1975)《周恩来外交活动大事记 (1949– 1975)》[Records of Major Events in Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities (1949–1975)], 585, 589, and 456. 67  “Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duan, 00/00/1971,” http://www.wilsoncenter .org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034C765-96B6175C-9721717AA5E29B77&sort=Collection&item=The%20Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20 War(s), 2011.08.21. This document lacks concrete dates, making it impossible to determine if this conversation happened before or after Le Duan’s visit to the Soviet Union. 68  Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 167–168.

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Vietnamese used the restoration of the secret talks as a cover to begin planning another massive attack. On May 21, Soviet ambassador to Hanoi Shcherbakov sent a report to Moscow: “Vietnamese comrades have begun mustering forces in preparation for a wide-spread offensive on southern Vietnam during the ‘dry season’ of 1972. This offensive has been planned to commence at the time of the American presidential election; its goal is to ‘topple Nixon.’ Per our friends’ ideas, this will certainly create more favorable conditions for the coordination of peace in Vietnam and Indochina.”69 During the secret talks on May 31, Kissinger made a seven-point proposal.70 The Vietnamese then responded with a nine-point proposal in the secret talks of June 26.71 The contents of Nguyen Thi Binh’s seven-point proposal at the four-sided talks were mostly represented in the contents of the nine-point proposal.72 Outside of the question of Vietnam’s ruling regime, the contents of the American and Vietnamese proposals were basically the same. This time the DRV’s demand was only that the U.S. “cease supporting” the Saigon government, a reduction from their previous demand that the U.S. overturn the existing Vietnamese regime. In Kissinger’s opinion at the time, there are broad connotations to “ceasing to support” an ally; it could mean anything from withdrawing U.S. forces all the way to ceasing all economic and military assistance, or even tacitly approving somebody else’s actions to overturn an ally.73 Vietnamese concessions were more of a strategic cover, as at the time the Vietnamese Politburo had already made a decision: “In 1972 [we will] achieve a decisive victory to force the American imperialists to end the war through talks from a disadvantaged position; at the same time, in order to prevent a prolonging of the war, we will prepare to unyieldingly escalate fighting.”74 Faced with a protracted war and amid suspicions concerning SinoAmerican détente, the Vietnamese decided to launch a new offensive to procure a battlefield victory and reproduce the glorious results of the battle of 69  “No. 01840 sujun zongcanmou bu zhencha zongju guanyu guoji xingshi diaocha gei sugong zhongyang de baogao (1969 nian 8 yue 15 ri)”《No. 01840 苏军总参谋部侦察总 局关于国际形势调查给苏共中央的报告 (1969年8月15日)》[Report No. 01840 to CPSU Central by the Soviet Army’s General Staff Headquarters Reconnaissance Office Regarding an Investigation into International Circumstances (August 15, 1969)], 467. 70  Kissinger, White House Years, 1488–1489. 71  Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 178–179. 72  0612-119th Plenary Session, July 1, 1971, pp. 5–12, Transcripts and Files of the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1968–1973, Reel IX. 73  Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War, 214. 74  Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, 181.

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Dien Bien Phu. That said, the “Easter Offensive” launched by the Vietnamese in early 1972 ended in defeat. This forced the DRV back to the negotiating table with the U.S., where they eventually decided to end the Vietnam War. It was during this process that Sino-Vietnamese tensions escalated. Of course, the Sino-Vietnamese fissure was not the result of China’s standpoint toward the Paris Peace Accords, but was also attributable to other factors, such as questions of Chinese and Soviet aid to Vietnam. In addition, the Soviet attitude toward Vietnamese-American talks displeased the Vietnamese. In fact, further exploration is needed to determine why this did not lead to a worsening of Vietnamese-Soviet relations. 4 In summary, the attitude of Chinese leadership toward the Vietnam War swung a complete 180 degree turn from 1968 to 1971, with changes taking place over three distinct stages. The first stage ran from early 1968 to the first half of 1969, typified by staunch opposition to talks between Vietnam and the U.S. The second stage ran from the second half of 1969 to August 1970, with the Chinese attitude changing from non-interference in the Vietnamese-American talks into support for the talks. The third phase ran from September 1970 until the war’s conclusion, with an attitude of clear support for the peace talks. An important factor affecting Sino-Vietnamese relations during the Vietnam War was the method China employed to determine its standpoint toward the Vietnam War question. Starting before the Zhenbao Island incident as early as the late 1950s, China opposed peace talks and emphasized that only war could resolve the Vietnamese problem. China also hoped that Vietnam would side with it in opposition to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this never inhibited the peace talks between Vietnam and the U.S. After the Zhenbao Island incident, China gradually changed its initial standpoint and began to desire a resolution of the Vietnam problem though peaceful means. Both of these Chinese standpoints incited intense displeasure on the part of the Vietnamese. A look back at the facts demonstrates that as China was working toward détente in Sino-American relations and encouraging the peace talks, Chinese leaders were doing their utmost to balance national interests with their international obligation to Vietnam. In no way did China sacrifice the interests of Vietnam in exchange for détente with the U.S. In addition, China gave massive amounts of gratuitous aid to the Vietnamese despite not being rich itself. These efforts, however, did nothing to affect Vietnam’s displeasure with and suspicions of China. Over the course of Sino-American détente and Vietnamese-American

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peace talks, Sino-Vietnamese relations continuously worsened, laying down a hidden foundation for later conflict between the two neighboring nations. Under conditions of severe threat to national security, China adjusted its policies toward the U.S., which in itself is no cause for reproach. China did not sacrifice the national interests of Vietnam while adjusting its America policies. In fact, ending the war via negotiations was in conformance with Vietnam’s national interests. It is, however, regrettable that this situation, which should have been a win-win for both sides, ended up escalating tensions between China and Vietnam. This situation is cause for deep reflection. How to maintain relations with traditional allies while adjusting national policies is a question we still need to earnestly consider today. We may be able to derive some lessons from 40 years of strategic adjustments to Sino-Vietnamese relations. References 0612-119th Plenary Session, July 1, 1971, pp. 5–12, Transcripts and Files of the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1968–1973, Reel IX. “335—Address to the Nation about a New Initiative for Peace in Southeast Asia.” Accessed from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2708&st=&st1= #axzz1VckjNa00. 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964– 1977, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Chen Jian. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Inter­ national Center, 1998. CCP Literary Research Bureau and PLA Military Science Institute 中共中央文献研 究室、中国人民解放军军事科学院, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao, xia juan《建国以来毛泽东军事文稿》下卷 [Writings of Mao Zedong on Military Affairs Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 2]. Military Sciences Press, 2010. “Discussion between Chen Yi and Le Duc Tho, 10/17/1968.” Accessed from http://www .wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document& identifier=5034CD21-96B6-175C-9DAF353B89FA26B2&sort=Collection&item= The%20Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s), 2011. “Discussion between Li Xiannian and Le Duc Tho, 04/29/1969.” Accessed from http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document& identifier=5034CD60-96B6-175C-9A2711F564AC5E31&sort=Collection&item= The%20Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s). “Discussion between Mao Zedong and Le Duan, 05/11/1970.” Accessed from http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document& identifier=5034CDED-96B6-175C-98F6DE458848C82E&sort=Collection&item= The%20Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s).

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“Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 04/17/1968.” Accessed from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.docu ment&identifier=5034CCC4-96B6-175C-9E7935247F02CC38&sort=Collection& item=The%20Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s). “Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 04/19/1968.” Accessed from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.docu ment&identifier=5034CCD3-96B6-175C-9ADB6C82F64A30AD&sort=Collection& item=The%20Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s). “Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong, 03/21/1970.” Accessed from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.docu ment&identifier=5034CD70-96B6-175C-9A541E8A6B456C7D&sort=Collection& item=The%20Vietnam%20(Indochina)%20War(s). Duiker, William J., The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Second Edition). Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. “Haozhao yi shenglizhe de qigai jianjue jibai meiguo qinlüezhe”《号召以胜利者的 气概坚决击败美国侵略者》[Calling for the Spirit of the Victor to Resolutely Defeat the American Invaders], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, April 14, 1965, first edition. Ho Chi Minh, Weile duli ziyou, weile shehuizhuyi《为了独立自由，为了社会 主义》[For Independence and Liberty, For Socialism]. Vietnam Foreign Diplomacy Press, 1971. Hoang Van Hoan, Canghai yi su—Huang Wenhuan geming huiyilu《沧海一粟—— 黄文欢革命回忆录》[A Drop in the Ocean—Hoang Van Hoan’s Revolutionary Memoirs]. People’s Liberation Army Press, 1987. Johnson, Lyndon B., Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966. Kissinger, Henry, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003. Kissinger, Henry, White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979. Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu, Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris. Hanoi: The Gioi Publishers, 1996. “No. 01840 sujun zongcanmou bu zhencha zongju guanyu guoji xingshi diaocha gei sugong zhongyang de baogao (1969 nian 8 yue 15 ri)”《No. 01840 苏军总参谋部侦 察总局关于国际形势调查给苏共中央的报告 (1969年8月15日)》[Report No. 01840 to CPSU Central by the Soviet Army’s General Staff Headquarters Reconnaissance Office Regarding an Investigation into International Circumstances (August 15, 1969)], in Sulian lishi dang’an xuanbian di 31 juan《苏联历史档案选 编》第 31 卷 [Selected Files from the History of the Soviet Union], ed. Shen Zhihua 沈志华, Social Sciences Literary Press, 2002. Nixon, Richard, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978.

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Pan Yining 潘一宁, “Yuenan zhanzheng houqi zhong-yue guanxi de yanbian”《越南 战争后期中越关系的演变》[Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations Late in the Vietnam War], in Nanyang wenti yanjiu《南洋问题研究》(2008) 3. People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry 中华人民共和国外交部, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tiaoyue ji, di 21 ji《中华人民共和国条约集》第21集 [Compilation of PRC Treaties, Vol. 21]. People’s Press, 1981. People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry and CCP Literary Research Bureau 中华 人民共和国外交部、中共中央文献研究室, Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan 毛泽东外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong]. Central Documentary Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994. People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Bureau 中华 人民共和国外交部外交史研究室, Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji (1949– 1975)《周恩来外交活动大事记 (1949–1975)》[Records of Major Events in Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities (1949–1975)]. World Knowledge Press, 1993. “Yuenan kangfa, kangmei douzheng shiqi de zhong-yue guanxi—er ping yuenan waijiao bu guanyu yue-zhong guanxi de baipishu”《越南抗法、抗美斗争时期 的 中 越 关 系 ——二 评 越 南 外 交 部 关 于 越 中 关 系 的 白 皮 书 》 [SinoVietnamese Relations During the Struggles Against France and America—Two White Papers of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Regarding Sino-Vietnamese Relations], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, November 21, 1979, first edition. “Yuehanxun dachu xin zhaopai fanmai jiu huose wangxiang yong ‘wutiaojian de taolun’ pianju shi nanyue renmin fangxia wuqi lougu jiaorang meiguo jue bu hui chetui zhunbei ‘yi chang chijiu de chongtu’ ”《约翰逊打出新招牌贩卖旧货色 妄想用“无条件的讨论”骗局使南越人民放下武器露骨叫嚷美国决不会撤 退准备“一场持久的冲突”》[Johnson Uses a New Sign to Sell Old Goods; Vainly Hopes to Use the Ruse of ‘Unconditional Discussion’ to Cause the People of South Vietnam to Throw Down Their Weapons and Expose Themselves; The U.S. Will Certainly Never Withdraw, so Prepare for ‘a Protracted Conflict’], in Renmin ribao 《人民日报》, April 9, 1965, fourth edition. Yun Shui 云水, Chushi qi guo jishi—jiang jun dashi Wang Youping《出使七国纪 实——将军大使王幼平》[Records of Diplomatic Missions to Seven Nations— General and Ambassador Wang Youping]. World Knowledge Press, 1996. Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 2]. Central Documentary Press, 1997. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji (1949–1975)《周恩来外交活动大事记 (1949– 1975)》[Records of Major Events in Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities (1949–1975)].

CHAPTER 11

The Chinese Government’s Persuasion and Education of the Masses Prior to Reestablishing Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations Gao Fanfu Abstract To promote normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, the Chinese ­government—from a strategic perspective—played down the memories of war and hoped that historical problems would not influence reestablishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. It was, however, inevitable that this would encounter a certain degree of resistance from nationalistic sentiment. The Chinese government, which represents the overall interests of the people, could not fail to consider such nationalistic sentiment among the masses. To dispel and mitigate the conflicted, disgusted feelings of the masses, the Chinese government launched wide-scale persuasion and education and positive guidance work, based in a “theory of differentiation” toward Japan. The government cautioned the people against “substituting feelings for policies.” In the end, the masses accepted the reality of normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.

Keywords normalization of Sino-Japanese relations – Chinese government – mass feelings – persuasion and education

As everybody knows, popular diplomacy made a significant contribution to normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Past academic research has focused heavily on the positive role played by nationalistic sentiment in

*  Essay submitted June 16, 2012. Gao Fanfu is an associate professor in the Marxism Institute of the Qingdao University of Science and Technology.

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the process of normalizing Sino-Japanese relations, overlooking the influence of popular Chinese sentiments to a certain degree. In reality, painful memories from the war caused the Chinese people not to be able to emotionally understand or accept the Chinese government’s active implementation of friendly policies toward Japan. How to persuade and educate the masses became a great difficulty for the Chinese government. In this essay, I will make observations into the methods employed by the Chinese government to persuade and educate the masses, on the basis of relevant materials. 1

The Chinese Government’s Standpoint on War Memories: Play Them Down from a High Strategic Perspective, Not Allowing Historical Problems to Influence the Big Picture of Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations

Following the founding of New China, the Chinese government placed great importance on Sino-Japanese relations, hoping they could be normalized quickly. However, as the Japanese government adopted long-term policies towing the American line and regarding China with hostility, the government’s attitude was: “New China’s policies toward Japan can be made only from a basic starting point of developing friendly relations between the people of China and the people of Japan (not between their governments). On this basis, we will isolate the U.S., indirectly influence the Japanese people, exert pressure on the Japanese government, and force Japan to change its relations with China, gradually realizing normalization of Sino-Japanese relations.”1 The Chinese government’s attitude stemmed from the concept of “trusting the people, relying on the people, and placing hope in the people.” Government officials believed that the vast majority of Japanese people were willing to be friendly with the Chinese people, and so established a policy of popular diplomacy toward Japan. This policy employed a method of “gradual accumulation and using the people to urge officials” to proactively promote normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. “Based on this policy, and as the Japanese Communist Party gave enthusiastic, precious support to the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese people during the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party—from its standpoint of proletarian internationalism—naturally extends unlimited empathy and resolute sup1  Zhang Xiangshan 张香山, “Tongwang zhong-ri bangjiao zhengchanghua zhi lu”《通往中 日邦交正常化之路》[The Road to Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations], in Riben xuekan《日本学刊》(1997) 5.

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port to the Japanese Communist Party and Japanese people, who are currently constructing a peaceful, democratic New Japan.”2 In the 1950s, the Chinese government’s perspective toward Japan changed gradually. In 1954, Mao Zedong began to see Japan as an intermediate zone controlled by the U.S. In a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Nehru on October 19, Mao said, “now even Japan is being bullied.”3 In a meeting with Burmese Prime Minister U Nu on December 1, Mao was even more clear: “The Japanese people have been repressed,” and so “the Chinese people are not as resentful toward Japan anymore, but have instead adopted a friendly attitude.”4 As to the question of trade with Japan, following the Korean War, Japan— following the U.S. line—placed an embargo on China, but the Chinese government intended to break through the embargo, starting with Japan. The Chinese government signed private trade agreements with three private Japanese citizens, one in 1952, one in 1953, and one in 1955. In April 1956, Mao said, “it is like this with some nations; no matter how reactionary they are, so long as they’re willing to do business with us and willing to establish diplomatic relations with us, we should strive [for the opportunity].” He continued, “we should do our utmost to seize [the opportunity] with Japan, no matter how great the resentment toward them for their past invasion of China, we should strive for Japanese capitalists and former high-level Japanese military leadership.”5 Although Japan’s militaristic invasion of China caused great losses to China, and there was deep resentment between the peoples of China and Japan, in the eyes of China’s leadership Japan had become bullied and repressed following the end of World War II. American-occupied Japan, they concluded, was becoming a colony or dependency of the U.S., which was now the common enemy of both Japan and China. This made Japan a power that China could strive for or unite with. In a meeting with a Japanese legislator visiting China on October 15, 1955, Mao said, “we are understanding of the entire Japanese

2  Tian Huan 田桓, Zhan hou zhong-ri guanxi shi (1945–1995)《战后中日关系史 (1945– 1995)》[Post-War History of Sino-Japanese Relations (1945–1995)], (China Social Sciences Press, 2002), 82. 3  Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan《毛泽东外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong], (Central Documentary Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994), 163. 4  Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan《毛泽东外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong], 184. 5  Mao Zedong wenxuan, di 7 juan《毛泽东文集》第7卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 7], (People’s Press, 1999), 63.

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population; the Chinese people want to augment your power and repel the Americans’ hand.”6 As to the question of responsibility for Japan’s invasive war into China, the Chinese government advocated for a differentiation between Japanese militarists and the Japanese people. The government viewed the Japanese people as also being victims of war and adopted a forgiving policy of forgetting past atrocities toward ordinary participants in the war. As to memories of the war, the Chinese government advocated for a high strategic perspective of playing down of the memory and not allowing memories of the war or historical problems to become hindrances affecting the development of Sino-Japanese relations. It was precisely from a consideration of the need to play down historical problems that in meeting Japanese visitors, Chinese leaders always made two important points: First, they differentiated between Japanese militarists and the Japanese people, who were willing to be friendly with the Chinese people. Second, unhappy bygones should be ushered into the past as quickly as possible, and now everything should be undertaken with a view to the future; historical problems should not be allowed to influence the big picture of Sino-Japanese friendliness. On January 23, 1955, in a meeting with the director of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade Murata Shōzō, Zhou Enlai said, “the Chinese people are very capable of differentiating Japanese militarism from the Japanese people. The Chinese people can also tell the difference between the long-term interests of Japan and China and past discord . . . The people of Japan and China are willing to be friendly and able to be friendly.”7 In a meeting with a visiting Japanese legislator on October 15, Mao said, “old accounts from the past don’t hinder us at all, and systemic differences of today don’t hinder us either. Bygones are bygones; now the primary question is the future.”8 “Our ancestors got into arguments and fights; all this can be forgotten! It should be forgotten, because those were unhappy events, so what’s the point of holding onto those memories?”9 In a meeting with a delegation from Japan’s state-run railroad union and other leaders on June 28, 1956, Zhou said, “our two countries have historically been friendly. There was 6  Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan《毛泽东外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong], 221. 7  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), shang juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976)》上卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 1], (Central Documentary Press, 1997), 443. 8  Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan《毛泽东外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong], 222. 9  Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan《毛泽东外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong], 222 and 226.

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only one short period of unhappiness between us. We should forget this period of time and develop our long-term friendly relationship.”10 In a meeting with a Japanese delegation in China to negotiate a long-term trade agreement memorandum on the evening of November 1, 1962, Zhou said, “since the First SinoJapanese War, Japan invaded China for 80 years, leading to large losses to life and property . . . we saw this as a deep enmity and great resentment. Those those 80 years of enmity are very short when compared to the 2000 year history of friendliness between China and Japan. We are making efforts to forget this enmity. To forget this enmity, we must begin to join hands and cause Asia to grow strong and prosperous together.”11 Clearly, the Chinese government did not want historical problems to become hindrances to normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. In truth, “during the Mao Zedong era, Japan was seen as an ‘intermediate zone’ between the hegemony of the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the third world, including China. It was a member of the so-called ‘second world’ . . . Tokyo was seen as a target that could be striven for.”12 This abundantly demonstrates the tradition of the old generation of Chinese leadership—Mao, Zhou, etc.—using strategic thinking to consider diplomatic relations with Japan in the context of the overall global situation. As Hu Jintao pointed out to Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko at a meeting in Honolulu on November 12, 2011, the Chinese have consistently placed a high degree of long-term strategic importance on developing Sino-Japanese relations and maintaining friendly Sino-Japanese policies.13 Of course, there is one major reason that historical problems still affect normal development of Sino-Japanese relations today—a highly complex historical, practical reason—and the blame for this reason rests squarely on the Japanese. To present date, every conflict over historical issues has been provoked by the Japanese government, forcing the Chinese government to make a response. 10  Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan《周恩来外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai], (Central Documentary Press, 1990), 168. 11  Zhou Enlai yu riben pengyoumen《周恩来与日本朋友们》[Zhou Enlai and Japanese Friends], translated by Li De’an et al. 李德安等, (Central Documentary Press, 1992), 139–140. 12  Zhao Quansheng 赵全胜, Daguo zhengzhi yu waijiao: meiguo, riben, zhongguo, yu daguo guanxi guanli《大国政治与外交：美国、日本、中国与大国关系管理》[Politics and Diplomacy of Major Nations: the U.S., Japan, China, and Management of Major Nation Relations], (World Knowledge Press, 2009), 218. 13  “Hu Jintao huijian riben shouxiang Yetian Jiayan”《胡锦涛会见日本首相野田佳彦》 [Hu Jintao Meets With Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko], in Renmin ribao《人民 日报》, November 14, 2011.

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It is noteworthy that the Chinese government’s method of differentiating Japanese militarists from the Japanese people after World War II was not adopted only to persuade and educate the Chinese people, but also to unify and attract more of the Japanese public and eliminate concerns of friendly Japanese citizens. During that time, when Japanese people advocating for friendly Sino-Japanese relations visited China, they had deep concerns and— with hearts wrenched by guilt—made repeated apologies. Some were concerned that a newly invigorated China might exact revenge upon Japan. To dispel such concerns, Chinese leaders always emphasized to visiting Japanese delegations that the Japanese people were also victims in the Japanese war of aggression, as well as the fact that American imperialism was the common enemy of the peoples of both China and Japan. The goal of so doing was to ease the burden on the minds of Japanese friends so they could throw themselves heart and mind into the enterprise of building friendly relations between Japan and China. 2

Conflicts With Nationalistic Sentiment: A Difficulty the Chinese Government Had to Face

There is no need to shy from the fact that an end to bellicosity and a restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and China objectively conformed to not only the fundamental interests and long-term interests of the people of the two nations, but it also made an important contribution in easing tensions in Asia and to world peace. This was long ago proven by history, but painful memories of the war made it difficult for the Chinese people to emotionally understand or accept the Chinese government’s friendly policies toward Japan. This caused a conflict between the government and nationalistic sentiment, which became a difficulty the government had to face in actively promoting the restoration of Sino-Japanese relations. Neither China’s actively assisting Japanese nationals to return home after the war nor the signing of a Sino-Japanese Popular Trade Agreement—or any other actions by the government—encountered obstruction from the masses. However, when the Chinese government began actively implementing a series of measures intended to boost Sino-Japanese relations—including allowing Japanese merchants to display the Japanese flag at commodities fairs, releasing Japanese prisoners-of-war, inviting Tanaka to visit China, and dropping demands for war remunerations—all encountered fervent suspicion and resentment from the masses.

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The hoisting of Japanese flags above Japanese commodity fairs in Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and other places incited impassioned popular anger. Director of the Japanese commodity fairs Morii Shōnai recalled in his memoirs that many Chinese people, “felt extremely grieved upon seeing the rising sun flag.” Some wrote articles or placed telephone calls to newspapers, or showed up at the commodity fairs to accuse the Japanese of war crimes.14 Sun Pinghua, who previously undertook Japanese work for a long time, recalled in his memoirs that, “before liberation, the people’s impression of the Japanese remained bad; they harbored immense distrust, particularly in the countryside, which had been trampled by Japanese militarism’s iron heels. This made the work more difficult to do.” Problems similar to those with the commodity fairs arose in planning for tours of Japanese visitors to China in the early 1950s. The commoners had suffered thoroughly through “Japanese mop-up military raids” and the “Three Alls Policy,” making it impossible for them to reverse their thinking all at once, especially in personally escorting Japanese visitors. The mere sight of Japanese people or the rising sun flag was enough to evoke painful memories, which meant that the work of persuasion required patience and time. Sometimes arranging for foreign guests to visit the countryside required advance notice to explain the situation and spread policy publicity.15 Wu Xuewen recalled in his memoirs that in the early stages of Sino-Japanese popular diplomacy that tensions in Sino-Japanese relations following World War II—particularly the Chinese people’s hatred of Japanese imperialism’s invasion—constituted a psychological barrier toward the Japanese on the part of the Chinese people. Although the Japanese visitors came to China with friendly intentions and a true desire for interchange, and expressed a desire to contribute efforts to developing Sino-Japanese relations, there were still problems. For example, some Japanese incited anger in Chinese people by indiscriminately using words such as “zhina” [a derogatory term for China— translator’s note] and “manzhou” [an outdated term meaning Manchuria or 14  Morii Shōnai, “Renmen shi zenyang duidai taiyangqi de—ri-zhong jingji duanjiao xianchang baogao”《人们是怎样对待太阳旗的——日中经济断交现场报告》[How the People React to the Rising Sun Flag—an On-the-Scene Report of Severed SinoJapanese Economic Relations] in Sherane Zerao, Zhan hou ri-zhong maoyi shi《战后日 中贸易史》[Post-War Sino-Japanese Trade History], translated from the Japanese by Fang Guizhi 方桂芝, (Liaoning People’s Press, 1988), 52–55. 15  Sun Pinghua 孙平化, Zhong-ri youhao suixianglu《中日友好随想录》[Random Thoughts on Sino-Japanese Friendship], (World Knowledge Press, 1986), 8 and 36.

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Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet regime in the region now referred to as China’s Northeast—translator’s note]. “In Shenyang, some of the masses looked on in anger at touring Japanese delegations.”16 In the same way, the masses could not completely accept the Chinese government’s lenient release of Japanese war criminals. These criminals by rights should have been strictly punished for their crimes against the Chinese people. For that reason the Northeastern Work Team charged with handling the Japanese war criminal question and the Fushun war criminal administration office both recommended severe punishment of the criminals in accordance with the law to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Supreme People’s Court. At the end of 1955, the leading cadre of the Northeastern Work Team went to Beijing to make a work report to Zhou Enlai, who responded with the Center’s principles regarding the lenient treatment of Japanese war criminals. He demanded that “none be sentenced to death, none be sentenced to life in prison, and only an extreme minority be sentenced to terms in prison.” Not only did the Northeastern Work Team find this decision difficult to understand,17 but the Supreme People’s Procuratorate also pushed for severe punishment. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate later changed its understanding: “As our understanding of changes to domestic and foreign political circumstances is insufficient and we lacked deep comprehension of the principles of treating Japanese war criminals leniently, the handling plan we originally put forward contained erroneous tendencies of too many targets of suits and too strict punishments. We have recently made further research on the basis of Comrade Zhou Enlai’s instructions.”18 This goes to show that with organizations and leading cadres in charge of administering and trying the cases of Japanese war criminals advocating for strict punishment, it is not difficult to imagine the reaction of the Chinese public, who had suffered greatly during Japan’s invasive war.

16  Wu Xuewen 吴学文, Fengyu yinqing—wo suo jingli de zhong-ri guanxi《风雨阴晴—— 我所经历的中日关系》[Fair and Inclement Weather—Sino-Japanese Relations as I Experienced Them], (World Knowledge Press, 2002), 17. 17  Wang Heli et al. 王和利等, “Tebie junshi fating zai shenyang shenpan riben zhanfan shimo”《特别军事法庭在沈阳审判日本战犯始末》[The Whole Story of the Special Military Tribunal for Japanese War Criminals in Shenyang], in Jianghuai wen shi《江淮 文史》(2000) 1. 18   “Guanyu zhencha riben zhanfan de zhuyao qingkuang he chuli yijian de baogao deng”《关于侦察日本战犯的主要情况和处理意见的报告等》[Report, etc., on Reconnoitering the Primary Situation of Japanese War Criminals and Opinions on Dealing with Them], Foreign Ministry file no. 105-00501-07 (1).

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At the time, the greatest domestic problem was how to handle the popular demand for war reparations. Not only was it difficult for the Chinese masses to accept the Chinese government’s inviting the Japanese prime minister to visit China, but there was a universal push to demand war reparations from Japan. Prior to this time, the vast majority of Chinese citizens were unaware that the government was preparing to abandon demands for war reparations, while a portion of people who knew relevant regulations were expecting that “[China] could demand reparations.”19 One should say that all the way up to the government’s inviting Kakuei Tanaka to visit China, “both [China and Japan] remained in a blocked-off era in which neither could freely communicate with the other in any area; interchanges between the people of the two nations were few, and sources of information relatively singular. Common Chinese people had no way of understanding Japan’s true situation.”20 Although a “China frenzy” and “come close to China faction” developed in Japan prior to restoration of Sino-Japanese relations, there was nothing close to a “Japan frenzy” or “come close to Japan faction” in China at the time.21 In the words of Hosei University Professor Wang Min, “the Chinese people have always viewed Japan as an enemy . . . The common folk felt a great contradiction toward normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan, a nation they had always been taught to equate with Japanese imperialism.”22 Thus, how to persuade and educate the Chinese public to accept Tanaka’s visit and normalization of Sino-Japanese relations became another difficulty the Chinese government had to face in the modern era.

19  Kazuko Mōri, Zhong-ri guanxi—cong zhan hou zou xiang xin shidai 中日关系——从战 后走向新时代》[Sino-Japanese Relations—From Post-War to the New Era], translated from the Japanese by Xu Xianfen 徐显芬, (Social Sciences Press, 2009), 75. 20  Cui Shiguang 崔世广, “Zhong-ri huxiang renshi de xianzhuang, tezheng yu keti”《中日 相互认识的现状、特征与课题》[The Status Quo, Particularities, and Problems of Sino-Japanese Mutual Understanding], in Riben xuekan《日本学刊》(2011) 6. 21  Zhong-ri liang guo de huxiang renshi: disi jie riben yanjiu qingnian luntan wenji《中 日两国的相互认识：第四届日本研究青年论坛论文集》[Sino-Japanese Mutual Understanding: Collected Works from the Fourth Japan Research Youth Forum], ed. Jiang Lifeng 蒋立峰, (World Knowledge Press, 2003), 204. 22  Yoshibuma Wakamiya, Hejie yu minzuzhuyi《和解与民族主义》[Détente and Nationalism], translated from the Japanese by Wu Jinan 吴寄南, (Shanghai Translated Works Press, 2008), 24.

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Persuasion and Education: The Chinese Government’s Positive Guidance of Popular Opinion

One can imagine the difficulty and obstructions present in persuading and guiding the Chinese people—who had not yet extricated themselves from the shadow of war—to accept China’s policies of friendliness toward Japan. On the one hand, there was nobody to blame for the nationalistic sentiment. On the other, the government could not allow such a nationalistic sentiment to influence the big picture of reestablishing Sino-Japanese relations. To remedy this, the Chinese government undertook a great quantity of work in persuading and educating and positive guidance—on the basis of the “differentiation theory” of the Japanese people—to cause the masses to drop their popular resentment and understand and accept the government’s Japan policies from a broad perspective. In his memoirs, Sun Pinghua recalled that after the birth of New China, the Party undertook a great deal of publicity and explanation work as well as internationalist education of the people. Mao Zedong once noted that “in order to differentiate imperialist governments from the people of those nations, we must differentiate those people who decided on government policies from ordinary officials.” Zhou Enlai also frequently proposed the need for more work in persuading and educating the masses.23 As to the popular resentment toward Japanese flags encountered at Japanese commodity fairs, the Chinese government repeatedly demanded that workers at the fairs “discuss policies and do more masses work.” Zhou repeatedly emphasized that “[we] must make it clear to the masses that the people of both China and Japan were victims of the invasive war launched by Japanese militarism. The Japanese people have no fault; the Japanese people are willing to be friendly with the Chinese people. Furthermore, at present the situation has changed. Neither China nor Japan are the China of the past or the Japan of the past. We should become friendly again on a new foundation.” The Chinese government performed a large amount of domestic work per Zhou’s ­instructions.24 While inspecting the Japanese commodity fairs, Liu Shaoqi said to the Japanese delegation, “now when some Chinese commoners see the Japanese flag, they are not very happy. We want to explain to these people. If Japan does a few good things beneficial to the people of China and Japan, the

23  Sun Pinghua, 8. 24  Sun Pinghua, 36.

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Chinese people will understand.”25 Through efforts on the Chinese end, the Japanese commodity fairs achieved great success. The Chinese government’s lenient treatment of Japanese war criminals was not just a legal question, but was even more a political question related to international struggle.26 On this basis, the Chinese government explained to the masses that releasing war criminals would be an important link in boosting “development of friendly relations between the people of China and Japan.”27 Zhou made a further explanation, saying that a primary reason behind the release of Japanese war criminals was to “influence Japan, in other words to strive to win the hearts of the Japanese people, influence them to shirk off American control, strive to get them to walk the road of peace, walk the road of friendship with China.”28 At the same time, in order to bring about fairness, justice, and the dignity of the law, the Chinese government—owing to a large extent to its understanding of and respect for nationalistic sentiment—­ sentenced a minority of Japanese war criminals, those whose crimes had been particularly egregious, to prison terms of between eight and 20 years. “Forty or so out of over 1000 is a very small proportion. Why do we want to sentence only this small proportion of war criminals? Because the Chinese people want an accounting.”29 This illustrates the Chinese government’s ample consideration of the nationalistic sentiments of the Chinese people. The Chinese government implemented attentive arrangements and deployments, launching wide-spread propaganda, education, persuasion, and explanation work for the masses, in inviting Tanaka to visit China and attempting to normalize Sino-Japanese relations. To eliminate concerns or feelings of 25  Cai Chengxi 蔡成喜, “Hongdong beijing de diyi ci riben shangpin zhanlanhui”《轰动北 京的第一次日本商品展览会》[The First Japanese Commodity Fair that Made a Stir in Beijing], in Zongheng《纵横》(2002) 12. 26  “Guanyu jiefang riben zhanfan wenti de qingshijian, baogao, mingling deng”《关于释 放日本战犯问题的请示件、报告、命令等》[Requests for Instructions, Reports, Orders, etc., Regarding the Question of Releasing Japanese War Criminals], Foreign Ministry file no. 105-00220-06 (1). 27  Zhengyi de shenpan—zuigao renmin fayuan tebie junshi fating shenpan riben zhanfan jishi《正义的审判——最高人民法院特别军事法庭审判日本战犯纪实》[A Just Trial—Records of the Supreme People’s Court’s Special Military Tribunal of Japanese War Criminals], ed. Wang Zhanping 王战平, (People’s Court Press, 1991), 2. 28  Zhou Enlai 周恩来, “Yiqie shexiang dou yao youli yu shehuizhuyi jianshe shiye”《一切 设想都要有利于社会主义建设事业》[All Considerations Must Be Beneficial to the Enterprise of Socialist Construction], Dang de wenxian《党的文献》(1995) 2. 29  Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan《周恩来外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai], 169.

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displeasure on the part of the masses, cause the people of the entire nation to understand the significance of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, and avoid the occurrence of any unexpected situations, the Foreign Ministry drafted the “Internal Propaganda Outline Regarding Receiving Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka on His Visit to China” in late August 1972. After revisions by Zhou Enlai, Party Central disseminated the outline on September 8 to all Party organizations from the county level up, demanding that they study and discuss it and make oral disseminations and explanations of it to the masses. The government demanded that normalization of Sino-Japanese relations become a household word prior to September 20 in the four major cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. It demanded that all dissemination and explanation tasks be completed before the end of October in 16 cities including Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Nanchang, Changsha, and Guilin. In all places, the government demanded that all cadres and the masses come to a unified understanding of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. The outline primarily spoke to the two questions of “why does Tanaka want to visit China?” and “why did China invite Tanaka to visit?” It emphasized that inviting Tanaka to China to discuss and resolve the problem of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations was “the result of a long-term common struggle of the people of China and Japan” and “an important strategic deployment of Chairman Mao and Party Central.”30 To the question of foregoing war reparations, Zhou gave a special explanation: if Japan paid reparations to China, the burden would fall on the heads of the Japanese people. If that were the case, they would be forced to lead difficult lives for a long time in order to pay the Chinese reparations. This would not conform with the Center’s intentions of lasting friendship with the Japanese people.31 It is particularly noteworthy that the Chinese government adopted an attitude of understanding and directly facing the nationalistic sentiments and feelings of displeasure of the Chinese masses. The government did not avoid or suppress those feelings, but rather undertook profound positive guidance, persuasion, and education. The outline emphasized that the Chinese people had suffered greatly—families broken and loved ones dead, mothers separated 30  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 13 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 13 册 [Writings of Mao Zedong Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13], (Central Documentary Press, 1998), 316. 31  NHK Interview Team, Zhou Enlai de jueduan—ri-zhong bangjiao zhengchanghua de lailongqumai《周恩来的决断——日中邦交正常化的来龙去脉》[Zhou Enlai’s Resolution—the Ins and Outs of the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations], translated from the Japanese by Xiao Hong 肖红, (China Youth Press, 1994), 67.

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from their children—from the long-term invasion of China by Japanese militarism, and this deep enmity could never be forgotten. So some cadres’ and citizens’ feelings of intense resentment at seeing the rising sun flag could be understood. History would not forget, said the outline, but at the same time one should see that the people of Japan were also victims of the Japanese militaristic war of invasion, and the past crimes of invading China could not be borne by the people of Japan. For that reason, emotions were not a substitute for policies. The nation should look at the big picture and understand the significance of inviting Tanaka to visit China.32 Per Party Central’s instructions, local governments around the nation broadly and deeply launched the work of persuading cadres and the masses. On September 14, Shanghai officials erected a main assembly facility in Culture Square as well as several branch assembly facilities, where over 140,000 cadres heard a report regarding the invitation of Tanaka via wired radio broadcast. The cadres participating were requested to perform the work of persuading the masses upon returning home. During his meeting with Tanaka, Zhou noted that a minority of Chinese opposed normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan. “We still need to make explanations to the people. If we don’t educate the people, then we won’t be able to persuade the masses who suffered from the ‘Three Alls Policy.’ ”33 It was none other than the Chinese government’s active dissemination, guidance, persuasion, and education work that gave restoration of Sino-Japanese relations its requisite, deserved popular foundation. As one academic put it, in the question of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, “although some Chinese people could not follow the reasoning or make the mental turn

32  Luo Pinghan 罗平汉, Zhongguo duiri zhengce yu zhong-ri bang-jiao zhengchanghua: 1949– 1972 nian zhongguo duiri zhengce yanjiu《中国对日政策与中日邦交正常化：1949– 1972年中国对日政策研究》[Chinese Policies Toward Japan and Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations: Research into China’s Japan Policies from 1949 to 1972], (Current Affairs Press, 2000), 236. 33  Akira Ishii et al., “Ri-zhong di’er ci shounao hui jilu (1972 nian 9 yue 26 ri)”《日中第二次 首脑会谈记录 (1972 年 9 月 26 日)》[Records of the Second Meeting of Japanese and Chinese Leaders (September 26, 1972)], in Jilu yu kaozheng: ri-zhong bangjiao zhengchanghua, ri-zhong heping youhao tiaoyue tanpan《记录与考证：日中邦交正常化、日中 和平友好条约谈判》[Records and Criticisms: Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations and Negotiations for Peaceful, Friendly Treaties Between Japan and China], translated from the Japanese, (Yanbo Shoten, 2003), 60.

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i­ mmediately, they still responded to the call of the Party and government and earnestly implemented the government’s policy.”34 It was precisely out of consideration for nationalistic sentiments on the part of the masses that the Chinese government remained resolute in its original principles and standpoint toward historical questions during the process of negotiating to restore Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese attitude and understanding of “we made trouble for you,” as they played it down, once incited intense displeasure on the part of the Chinese. Although the Japanese changed their diction at the fervent insistence of the Chinese, they never atoned for their crimes or asked for forgiveness for their invasive war. This laid the foundation for inevitable conflicts between the two nations regarding historical questions. One Japanese academic summed up the situation saying “the Chinese use the reason of national feelings to demand the Japanese to apologize for crimes of war, whereas the Japanese cite the law to demonstrate that the issue is already ‘resolved.’ The relations model between Japan and China has already formed.”35 In reality, the Japanese government to this day has not offered a formal written apology for its invasive war to the Chinese government or to the Chinese people. This is not only a violation of universal human justice, fairness, and conscience, but is even more an egregious affront to the feelings and dignity of the Chinese masses. The above analysis demonstrates that in the process of actively promoting normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, the Chinese government encountered conflicts between its standpoint on memories of the war and historical problems and between nationalistic sentiments of the people of China. The Chinese government understood and did not look away from these feelings of the masses; it took corresponding necessary measures to implement a large quantity of persuasion, education, and positive guidance work to convince the people to see the big picture of Sino-Japanese friendship on the basis of the Japanese “differentiation theory.” This ultimately caused the people to accept normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Correspondingly, 34  Lu Yi 鲁义, Zhong-ri xianghu lijie hai you duo yuan—guanyu liang guo minzhong xianghu renshi de bijiao yanjiu《中日相互理解还有多远——关于两国民众相互认识 的比较研究》[How Much Further Until Japan and China Understand One Another— Comparative Research into Mutual Understanding of the People of the Two Countries], (World Knowledge Press, 2006), 19. 35  Xinban zhan hou riben waijiao shi: 1945–2005《新版战后日本外交史：1945–2005》 [New Version of Japan’s Post-War Diplomatic History: 1945–2005], ed. Iokibe Makoto, translated from the Japanese by Wu Wanhong 吴万虹, (World Knowledge Press, 2007), 120.

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under h ­ istorical conditions at the time, these policies and work efforts of the Chinese government achieved positive, obvious successes, which are doubtlessly worthy of being affirmed. References Akira Ishii et al., “Ri-zhong di’er ci shounao hui jilu (1972 nian 9 yue 26 ri)”《日中第二 次首脑会谈记录 (1972 年 9 月 26 日)》[Records of the Second Meeting of Japa­ nese and Chinese Leaders (September 26, 1972)], in Jilu yu kaozheng: ri-zhong bangjiao zhengchanghua, ri-zhong heping youhao tiaoyue tanpan《记录与考证： 日中邦交正常化、日中和平友好条约谈判》[Records and Criticisms: Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations and Negotiations for Peaceful, Friendly Treaties Between Japan and China], translated from the Japanese. Yanbo Shoten, 2003. Cai Chengxi 蔡成喜, “Hongdong beijing de diyi ci riben shangpin zhanlanhui”《轰动 北京的第一次日本商品展览会》[The First Japanese Commodity Fair that Made a Stir in Beijing], in Zongheng《纵横》(2002) 12. Cui Shiguang 崔世广, “Zhong-ri huxiang renshi de xianzhuang, tezheng yu keti”《中日 相互认识的现状、特征与课题》[The Status Quo, Particularities, and Problems of Sino-Japanese Mutual Understanding], in Riben xuekan《日本学刊》(2011) 6. “Guanyu jiefang riben zhanfan wenti de qingshijian, baogao, mingling deng”《关于释 放日本战犯问题的请示件、报告、命令等》[Requests for Instructions, Reports, Orders, etc., Regarding the Question of Releasing Japanese War Criminals], Foreign Ministry file no. 105-00220-06 (1). “Guanyu zhencha riben zhanfan de zhuyao qingkuang he chuli yijian de baogao deng”《关于侦察日本战犯的主要情况和处理意见的报告等》[Report, etc., on Reconnoitering the Primary Situation of Japanese War Criminals and Opinions on Dealing with Them], Foreign Ministry file no. 105-00501-07 (1). “Hu Jintao huijian riben shouxiang Yetian Jiayan”《胡锦涛会见日本首相野田佳 彦》[Hu Jintao Meets With Japanese Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko], in Renmin ribao《人民日报》, November 14, 2011. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 13 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 13 册 [Writings of Mao Zedong Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 13]. Central Documentary Press, 1998. Kazuko Mōri, Zhong-ri guanxi—cong zhan hou zou xiang xin shidai 中日关系——从 战后走向新时代》[Sino-Japanese Relations—From Post-War to the New Era], translated from the Japanese by Xu Xianfen 徐显芬. Social Sciences Press, 2009.

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Lu Yi 鲁义, Zhong-ri xianghu lijie hai you duo yuan—guanyu liang guo minzhong xianghu renshi de bijiao yanjiu《中日相互理解还有多远——关于两国民众相互 认识的比较研究》[How Much Further Until Japan and China Understand One Another—Comparative Research into Mutual Understanding of the People of the Two Countries]. World Knowledge Press, 2006. Luo Pinghan 罗平汉, Zhongguo duiri zhengce yu zhong-ri bang-jiao zhengchanghua: 1949–1972 nian zhongguo duiri zhengce yanjiu《中国对日政策与中日邦交正常 化：1949–1972年中国对日政策研究》[Chinese Policies Toward Japan and Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations: Research into China’s Japan Policies from 1949 to 1972]. Current Affairs Press, 2000. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan《毛泽东外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Writings of Mao Zedong]. Central Documentary Press and World Knowledge Press, 1994. Mao Zedong wenxuan, di 7 juan《毛泽东文集》第7卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 7]. People’s Press, 1999. Morii Shōnai, “Renmen shi zenyang duidai taiyangqi de—ri-zhong jingji duan­jiao xianchang baogao”《人们是怎样对待太阳旗的——日中经济断交现场报告》 [How the People React to the Rising Sun Flag—an On-the-Scene Report of Severed Sino-Japanese Economic Relations] in Sherane Zerao, Zhan hou ri-zhong maoyi shi《战后日中贸易史》[Post-War Sino-Japanese Trade History], translated from the Japanese by Fang Guizhi 方桂芝. Liaoning People’s Press, 1988. NHK Interview Team, Zhou Enlai de jueduan—ri-zhong bangjiao zhengchanghua de lailongqumai《周恩来的决断——日中邦交正常化的来龙去脉》[Zhou Enlai’s Resolution—the Ins and Outs of the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations], translated from the Japanese by Xiao Hong 肖红. China Youth Press, 1994. Sun Pinghua 孙平化, Zhong-ri youhao suixianglu《中日友好随想录》[Random Thoughts on Sino-Japanese Friendship]. World Knowledge Press, 1986. Tian Huan 田桓, Zhan hou zhong-ri guanxi shi (1945–1995)《战后中日关系史 (1945–1995)》[Post-War History of Sino-Japanese Relations (1945–1995)]. China Social Sciences Press, 2002. Wang Heli et al. 王和利等, “Tebie junshi fating zai shenyang shenpan riben zhanfan shimo”《特别军事法庭在沈阳审判日本战犯始末》[The Whole Story of the Special Military Tribunal for Japanese War Criminals in Shenyang], in Jianghuai wen shi《江淮文史》(2000) 1. Wu Xuewen 吴学文, Fengyu yinqing—wo suo jingli de zhong-ri guanxi《风雨阴 晴——我所经历的中日关系》[Fair and Inclement Weather—Sino-Japanese Relations as I Experienced Them]. World Knowledge Press, 2002. Xinban zhan hou riben waijiao shi: 1945–2005《新版战后日本外交史：1945–2005》 [New Version of Japan’s Post-War Diplomatic History: 1945–2005], ed. Iokibe

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Makoto, translated from the Japanese by Wu Wanhong 吴万虹. World Knowledge Press, 2007. Yoshibuma Wakamiya, Hejie yu minzuzhuyi《和解与民族主义》[Détente and Nationalism], translated from the Japanese by Wu Jinan 吴寄南. Shanghai Translated Works Press, 2008. Zhang Xiangshan 张香山, “Tongwang zhong-ri bangjiao zhengchanghua zhi lu”《通 往中日邦交正常化之路》[The Road to Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations], in Riben xuekan《日本学刊》(1997) 5. Zhao Quansheng 赵全胜, Daguo zhengzhi yu waijiao: meiguo, riben, zhongguo, yu daguo guanxi guanli《大国政治与外交：美国、日本、中国与大国关系管 理》[Politics and Diplomacy of Major Nations: the U.S., Japan, China, and Management of Major Nation Relations]. World Knowledge Press, 2009. Zhengyi de shenpan—zuigao renmin fayuan tebie junshi fating shenpan riben zhanfan jishi《正义的审判——最高人民法院特别军事法庭审判日本战犯纪实》[A Just Trial—Records of the Supreme People’s Court’s Special Military Tribunal of Japanese War Criminals], ed. Wang Zhanping 王战平. People’s Court Press, 1991. Zhong-ri liang guo de huxiang renshi: disi jie riben yanjiu qingnian luntan wenji《中日 两国的相互认识：第四届日本研究青年论坛论文集》[Sino-Japanese Mutual Understanding: Collected Works from the Fourth Japan Research Youth Forum], ed. Jiang Lifeng 蒋立峰. World Knowledge Press, 2003. Zhou Enlai 周恩来, “Yiqie shexiang dou yao youli yu shehuizhuyi jianshe shiye”《一 切设想都要有利于社会主义建设事业》[All Considerations Must Be Beneficial to the Enterprise of Socialist Construction], Dang de wenxian《党的文献》(1995) 2. Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), shang juan《周恩来年谱 (1949–1976)》上卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 1]. Central Documentary Press, 1997. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan《周恩来外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai]. Central Documentary Press, 1990. Zhou Enlai yu riben pengyoumen《周恩来与日本朋友们》[Zhou Enlai and Japanese Friends], translated by Li De’an et al. 李德安等. Central Documentary Press, 1992.

CHAPTER 12

The Truth Behind the “Kashmir Princess” Incident Li Hong Abstract In February 1955, Taiwanese spy agencies learned that Zhou Enlai would be attending the Bandung Conference in Malaysia, whereupon they organized a plot to have him killed on his flight out of Hong Kong. The crash of the Indian airliner “Kashmir Princess,” slated to carry Zhou and his entourage, shook the world on April 11. Deeply grieved by the plane crash, Zhou—who for health reasons delayed his travel—personally oversaw efforts to crack the case, dispatching trusted intelligence officer Xiong Xianghui to Hong Kong as his liaison with other intelligence bodies. In June 1956, British authorities in Hong Kong arrested 44 Chiang Kai-Shek spies, who were all expelled from the territory, and thus let free. On August 4, Zhou lodged a formal complaint with British authorities and solemnly declared that “the British government still bears an inescapable international responsibility. Although investigations into the Kashmir Princess incident ended fruitlessly, the Chinese government—particularly Zhou himself—made enormous efforts to expose the destructive American-Taiwanese plot and impel the British authorities in Hong Kong to make arrests and break the case. The sacrifices made in the pursuit of world peace by the martyrs on board will forever be remembered.

Keywords Zhou Enlai – Kashmir Princess – Truth

*   This essay first appeared in Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu《当代中国史研究》 [Contemporary Chinese History Studies] Vol. 19 No. 4, July 2012. Li Hong is a retired cadre of the PRC Ministry of Public Security and former deputy secretary of the Central Advisory Committee.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004292673_013

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Fifty-seven years have passed since the Kashmir Princess incident rocked China and the world in April 1955. Chinese and foreign media have c­ontinuously reported on the incident for over half a decade, but the truth of the incident remains obscure, alternative explanations rampant, and misunderstandings abundant. As one of the people who participated in handling the aftermath of the affair, I have an obligation to divulge what I know in order to clarify the truth. 1

The Center Decides to Dispatch Zhou Enlai to Lead the Chinese Delegation to the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference

In the 1950s, there were great changes to the international order. As the Korean War ended and wide-scale economic construction began in China, our nation urgently needed a new international environment of peace and security. Antiimperialism and anti-colonialism movements were hitting crescendo among Asian and African nations at the time. They were demanding peace, demanding independence, demanding to develop their national economies. At the same time, demands to improve relations with China were growing increasingly fervent. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were gradually becoming a consensus among the Asian and African nations that accounted for half of the world’s population. Under such auspices, the Center decided to open the gate and walk out into the wider world. On July 7, 1954, when discussing the Geneva Conference with an enlarged meeting of the Politburo, Zhou said, “we originally wanted to keep the door closed another year, but it now seems we can’t keep it closed any longer.” Mao Zedong affirmed Zhou’s point, saying “can’t keep it shut, can’t close it, so we have to walk out.” On January 15, 1955, Indonesian Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo sent a letter to Zhou, inviting him to the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in mid-April on behalf of the five host nations—Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. On February 10, Zhou responded affirming his desire to attend and his desire to make efforts to promote cooperation between Asian and African nations. Twenty-nine nations were represented at the conference, but only six had established relations with China (Afghanistan, Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam). The other 23 all maintained “diplomatic relations” with the Guomindang on Taiwan. China’s attendance of the Afro-Asian Conference was bound to exert a great influence on Asian and African regions, as well as the entire world. The U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek were both afraid of such a situation, and so they used every trick in their arsenal to thwart and destroy the Chinese delegation to the conference.

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To maintain secrecy, the Xinhua News Agency reported that China was sending a delegation only right before they left, on April 6. State Council Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai was to be China’s chief delegate. Other ­delegates were State Council Vice Premier Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign Trade Ye Jizhuang, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu, and Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia Huang Zhen. Advisors to the delegation included Liao Chengzhi, Yang Qiqing, Chen Jiakang, Huang Hua, and Dapusheng. Wang Zhuoru served as secretary. How the delegation was to arrive in Indonesia was an important consideration for Zhou. At the time, China did not have any long-distance airplanes. Of the countries that had established diplomatic relations with China, only India had such airplanes. At the time, no Air India airplanes had ever flown to China; so the delegation had no choice but to board the airplane in Hong Kong’s Kai Tak Airport. After careful consideration, Zhou decided to charter an Air India airplane to carry the delegation from Hong Kong to Indonesia. The aircraft selected was an L-749, a highly functional passenger plane, named the “Kashmir Princess.” Out of considerations for security, Zhou instructed relevant departments to make arrangements with Air India. The Kashmir Princess was to make a routine flight from India to Hong Kong, at which point it would temporarily become a chartered flight to carry the Chinese delegation. A few days before the delegation’s departure, the situation changed. Burmese Prime Minister U Nu invited Zhou to take his delegation to visit Rangoon from April 14 to 16, where Zhou and U Nu could discuss questions relating to the Bandung Conference with Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Egyptian President Nasser, and Afghan Vice Premier Naeem. Zhou had the Chinese delegation assemble in Kunming with the intention to head to Indonesia after visiting Burma. However, eight workers needed to head directly to Bandung directly for work-related needs. Those eight were: Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong branch director Huang Zuomei in Mandarin; Xinhua reporters Shen Jiantu, Du Hong, Li Ping, and HaoFengge; Foreign Ministry News Bureau cadre Li Zhaoji; employee of the Premier’s office ZhongBuyun; and Foreign Trade Ministry cadre Shi Zhi’ang. Three foreigners also needed to arrive early in Bandung. They were: the Austrian journalist known as Yan Feide in Chinese; the Polish journalist known as Sitaliezi in Chinese, and Democratic Republic of Vietnam official known as Wang Mingfang in Chinese. To this end, relevant Chinese work units informed Air India that the Kashmir Princess should operate a routine flight from Bombay to Hong Kong on April 10, and on April 11 should then serve as a special chartered plane for the Chinese delegation, flying directly from Hong Kong to Indonesia.

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Taiwanese Spy Agencies Plot to Murder Zhou Enlai

Despite Xinhua’s tardy announcement of the delegation’s plans, Taiwanese spy agencies were aware of Zhou’s plans to lead a delegation to the Bandung Conference in mid-February. In mid-March, Chinese intelligence departments became aware that director of the Taiwanese “National Security Department” Zheng Jiemin had—with personal permission from Chiang Kai-shek—ordered Intelligence Bureau Director Mao Renfeng to assassinate Zhou Enlai in Hong Kong or Indonesia. Zhou was at this time suffering from acute appendicitis, for which he was treated in a hospital from March 12 to 28. Owing to the urgent nature of the situation, Zhou’s deputy office director Luo Qingchang had no choice but to report the situation to Zhou in the hospital. Zhou immediately ordered People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Deputy Chief of Staff Li Kenong—responsible for intelligence work—to get to the bottom of Chiang’s plot as quickly as possible. On April 7, Zhou, who had still not entirely recovered from surgery, led the delegation to Kunming. Before leaving Beijing, Zhou ordered Luo and Li to continue closely following the movements of Chiang’s spies in Hong Kong and make timely reports to leading cadres of relevant departments. At the time, I was working under the leadership of Luo Qingchang, who put me in charge of handling relevant enemy intelligence reports, particularly the movements of Chiang’s spies in Hong Kong. On the evening of April 9, I received an important intelligence report, which claimed that Taiwanese Guomindang spy agencies were planning to destroy the delegation’s airplane with a time bomb. I immediately reported this to Luo, who ordered me to rush the information to Foreign Ministry General Office Director Dong Yueqian. Luo then telephoned Zhou in Kunming to give him this information. Zhou then instructed the Foreign Ministry to immediately inform both the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong branch and the workers from our delegation who had gone ahead. He wanted them to make representations of the situation to the Hong Kong authorities and request that they guarantee the security of relevant persons to the delegation. He also had the Foreign Ministry detail the situation to the British representative’s office in Beijing. On the afternoon of April 11, I received another intelligence report, claiming that Chiang’s spies in Hong Kong were aware that Zhou would not fly out of Hong Kong, but they still wished to attack members of the delegation’s entourage to reduce China’s influence at the Bandung Conference. To this end, Chiang’s spy organization in Hong Kong ordered the Kai Tak Airport airplane mechanic they had bought off to carry out the attack as originally planned.

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However, as he had less time than he had anticipated, he could not place the bomb in the plane’s fuel tank, but rather had to affix the bomb below the fuel tank, setting it to explode at 4pm. I immediately sent an urgent cable to Zhou Enlai upon receipt of the report, but the Kashmir Princess had already taken off at 12:15pm on April 11. Shortly after my urgent cable, Reuters News Agency reported that an Air India L-749 aircraft, the “Kashmir Princess” had crashed into the ocean to the northwest of Borneo on its way to Jakarta from Hong Kong. The report claimed that 11 passengers, including the government workers and journalists, as well as eight crew members were feared dead. 3

Zhou’s Instructions after the Crash

Luo told me that Zhou was overcome with grief after hearing of the crash, after which he immediately telephoned Wang Zhuoru and Dong Yueqian. The Foreign Ministry proceeded to handle the incident per Zhou’s urgent instructions. Dong responded that he had immediately told Huang Zuomei of the Hong Kong Xinhua branch, and that Huang had reported the incident to Hong Kong authorities. Huang also alerted the Hong Kong offices of Air India. At 8:30am on April 10, Dong reported the intelligence to Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wentian. At 9:30am, deputy director of the Europe and Africa Bureau Zhang Yue met with the attaché to the British representative office John Addis and told him of the incident. On the afternoon of April 11, Zhou gave instructions to Zhang Wentian: Have the Foreign Ministry immediately send a diplomatic notice to the British government informing them that the Hong Kong authorities under the British government bear the burden and must launch an earnest investigation and arrest the Chiang spies responsible for the attack; at the same time, draft a diplomatic declaration as quickly as possible to be issued the following day. Zhou emphasized that in both the statement and the diplomatic notice to the British government, the Foreign Ministry should truthfully recount Zhang Yue’s notice to Addis on the morning of the 10 and Addis’s response regarding the measures the Hong Kong authorities would take. The Foreign Ministry demanded in the diplomatic notice that Hong Kong authorities particularly investigate airport employees. On April 12, Xinhua published the “Declaration of the Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China,” which read, “this unfortunate incident was absolutely not a common airplane accident, but was a premeditated murder attempt perpetrated by American and Chiang Kai-shek spy agencies. Before

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the delegation members and journalists began their journey, the People’s Republic of China government had already become aware that American and Chiang Kai-shek spy agencies were actively plotting to destroy the Indian airplane chartered for the Chinese delegation, in an attempt to assassinate the members of our delegation to the Afro-Asian Conference, to be headed by Premier Zhou Enlai, as well as to harm the Conference itself. Thus, the People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry notified the British representative office in Beijing of this situation at 9:30am on April 10, demanding that the British representative office have British authorities in Hong Kong pay attention to the matter and take measures to ensure the security of the aforementioned delegation members and journalists. Once the British representative office had ascertained the airline company to be operating the flight carrying these persons, it promised to inform British authorities in Hong Kong by cable. Nevertheless, the plot of the American and Chiang spies was carried out. The British government and British authorities in Hong Kong bear a grave responsibility in this unfortunate incident. We have demanded that the British government and British authorities in Hong Kong launch a thorough investigation, as well as arrest and prosecute all those spies who participated in the insidious assassination plot, to fulfill their duty.” On the morning of April 13, Zhang Wentian met Humphrey Trevelyan of the British representative office and read to him the diplomatic notice. Trevelyan objected to a line of the notice: “the British government and Hong Kong authorities bear an inescapable responsibility for this unfortunate incident.” He said that the cause behind the crash had yet to be determined, and that all should wait for the results of an investigation. He also accused the intelligence report provided by China of “not claiming that anybody had planned to destroy [the plane].” He further defended the British position, saying that the Hong Kong government had taken abundant precautionary measures. Zhang noted that he could not accept the British objection, as there were reasons behind our accusations. The Hong Kong authorities knew there were U.S./Chiang spies conducting activities at the airport; they could find sufficient evidence there. The British and Hong Kong governments first needed to have determination, Zhang said. Once they had determination, they could investigate, at which point the case would not be difficult to figure out. As the plane had crashed in Indonesian waters, per international civil aviation laws, only the Indonesian government could organize an investigative committee to investigate the accident. After an aerial and ocean surface search, the wreckage of the Kashmir Princess was located 500 kilometers northwest of Singapore near Indonesia’s Natuna archipelago. The plane had submerged into the water one kilometer from the shoreline, and three of its passengers had been rescued by the British

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frigate Dampier. Three bodies had been recovered from the surrounding waters. After a month of investigation and evidence-seeking, the Indonesian investigation committee publicized their report on May 27. They “concluded that the cause of the accident was a time bomb affixed to the wheel of the aircraft’s right wing. The explosion ripped open the number three fuel tank and caused an uncontrollable fire.” After Zhou personally agreed to cooperate in the investigation, he not only took necessary diplomatic measures, but also became personally involved with relevant authorities. In a meeting with Prime Minister Nehru in Rangoon on April 14, Zhou said that China and India were both victims in this incident, and that both governments should collectively push the British government to break the case. Zhou further said that if the British government truly desired to cooperate, the Chinese government would be willing to provide materials helpful to breaking the case. Zhou hoped that Nehru would urge British Prime Minister Eden to cooperate; Nehru agreed. During the Bandung Conference, Nehru told Zhou that he had sent a letter to Eden on April 19, to which Eden responded on April 22. In his response, Eden said that if the Hong Kong authorities’ investigation were to be effective, it would require all involved parties to provide all intelligence they had obtained regarding the plane crash. Nehru also informed Zhou by letter that the Indian Intelligence Bureau’s Deputy Director Kao—in charge of investigating this case—had arrived in Jakarta and would soon be proceeding to Hong Kong. Nehru hoped Zhou would meet with Kao in Jakarta. On April 27, Zhou met with Nehru and Kao. Zhou told them about the intelligence reports the Chinese Foreign Ministry had given to British authorities before and after the incident and invited Kao to visit Beijing in early May. Nehru agreed. On May 7, Zhou returned to Beijing, and on the next day he met with Indian Ambassador Raghavan and Kao, with whom he discussed cooperation in breaking the case. Zhou met with Trevelyan on May 5 and May 15, expressing that if the British government was willing to cooperate wholeheartedly, the Chinese government would be willing to provide detailed materials and dispatch a representative to Hong Kong to communicate with Kao and Hong Kong authorities. The British immediately agreed. On May 10, Luo summoned me, saying that Premier Zhou urgently required an intelligence report regarding the Chiang Kai-shek spy agency’s plan to explode the Kashmir Princess in order to help Hong Kong authorities break the case. This report was to be given to Kao, leaving Beijing forthwith to meet with Hong Kong authorities. Luo gave me two important directions. One, make only simple descriptions of the course of the incident, no need to be too detailed. Two, any newly provided intelligence reports must be accurate and concrete. Per Luo’s instructions, I wrote the report that day and delivered it to

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him. After reviewing the report, he made corrections to only individual words. In its entirety, the report read: (ONE) Relevant authorities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became aware in March 1955 that American and Chiang Kai-shek spy agencies were preparing to assassinate members of a PRC delegation passing through Hong Kong on their way to the Afro-Asian Conference. Although as of April 10 relevant PRC authorities had not become aware of the details of the assassination plot, they were certain that U.S./Chiang spy agencies were actively laying the groundwork for this plot in Hong Kong. For this reason, at 9:30am on April 10, the PRC Foreign Ministry notified the UK’s representative office in Beijing, asking them to pass the information onto the British authorities in Hong Kong for them to take preventive measures. (TWO) Shortly after the Air India [Lockheed] Constellation passenger aircraft “Kashmir Princess,” carrying members of the PRC delegation to the Afro-Asian Conference, crashed into the ocean, relevant PRC authorities obtained reliable intelligence that the Chiang Kai-shek clique’s spy agency in Hong Kong planted a time bomb on the “Kashmir Princess,” causing an explosion and fire on the plane during its flight. (THREE) As of May 10, relevant PRC authorities have obtained the following intelligence reports: 1.

2.

This assassination activity was planned by the Hong Kong intelligence station belonging the Chiang Kai-shek clique’s spy agency, the Intelligence Bureau [baomi ju], orchestrated by Zhao Bincheng, directly conducted by JinJianfu, with Shen Qiping aiding in the planning, funding distributed by Cai Weiqing, information distributed by Zeng Hanfu, and Feng Han and Liu Guodong responsible for liaison work. The concrete executor of the plot was Hong Kong Kai Tak Airport ground service worker Chou Chu (aka Chow Tseming), with a certain Li Duanyuan receiving damage training at the same time as Zhou. The bomb used to damage the “Kashmir Princess” was an incendiary time bomb furnished by the United States. A batch of bombs was secretly delivered by the Taiwan Intelligence Bureau to Hong Kong on April 5 via the steamship “Sichuan,” owned by the Taigu Steamer Company, which departed from Keelung, Taiwan. It was delivered to the Hong Kong intelligence station subsidiary to the Intelligence Bureau, who stored the bombs in the home of Zhang

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3.

4.

Zushun on the second floor of no. 178, Third Street, Sai Ying Pun, Hong Kong. Li Yimin of the Hong Kong intelligence station then retrieved the bomb and delivered it to Zhou Ju. Prior to the incident, the Hong Kong intelligence station instructed spy Xu Zhen to train Zhou on how to install said bomb. Prior to the takeoff of the “Kashmir Princess” from Hong Kong’s Kai Tak Airport, Zhou secretly affixed the bomb near one of the plane’s fuel tanks in an extremely short period of time. The addresses of the above-mentioned Chiang spies are, respectively, [omitted]. All the above intelligence is true and reliable.

That afternoon, Luo delivered this intelligence report to Zhou, who, upon reading it, had it reviewed by Li Kenong. After his review, Li added a title: “First Intelligence Report Furnished to Hong Kong Authorities,” dated May 11. On May 12, Zhou gave the Chinese and English versions of the report to Kao. 4

Zhou Enlai Dispatches Xiong Xianghui to Hong Kong

On the night of May 15, Zhou summoned Luo and Xiong Xianghui (director of the Foreign Ministry’s News Bureau at the time). First he concisely explained the situation of the Kashmir Princess case and dealings with the British government. Then he told Xiong, “the British government is willing to cooperate to break the case. Tomorrow you will make preparations, and the day after tomorrow you will go to Hong Kong with Kao. Kao represents Nehru and the Indian government. You represent me and the Chinese government. This will facilitate your carrying out your task. You will provide the new situation to the Hong Kong authorities, and return to report the situation of the Hong Kong authorities as relayed to them by Kao. A representative is not a megaphone, and a spy case is not an ordinary case. If you find problems in the handling of the case by the Hong Kong authorities, if time permits, return to report to me to request instructions. If time is tight, make a declaration of our position to Kao, and do not miss the opportunity.” The morning of the next day, Luo ordered me to his office, where Xiong was seated. He first told me why Zhou had spoken with them, and then he told me “Comrade Xiong Xianghui will be operating on the frontline. You will be in the background coordinating logistics for me. Comrade Xiong Xianghui will leave Beijing for Hong Kong tomorrow. This morning you will brief him on relevant situations and gather relevant materials for him to read.”

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On May 17, Xiong and Kao left Beijing together. They arrived in Hong Kong on the 18 via Guangzhou. On May 19, I received the first cable sent by Xiong, in which he told me he had given our intelligence report to Hong Kong Governor Sir Alexander William George Herder Grantham. Both the governor and the Hong Kong police chief found the report to be good, and on that night instigated searches based on the 12 names and addresses in our report. They reported that four of the people on our report had been detained, arrested, or monitored. Zhou Ju had secretly fled to Taiwan on the morning of the 18, and the other seven could not be found. The Hong Kong authorities requested that this information not be publicized during the course of the investigation. They also requested that the Chinese government continue providing intelligence. On May 28, Luo instructed me to write a new report containing newly acquired intelligence. He gave this report to Zhou Enlai to become the second intelligence report furnished to the Hong Kong authorities. After reading it, Zhou ordered Luo to wire the report to Xiong, but he first had Luo add to the cable a request that the Hong Kong authorities not have ethnically Chinese police officers participate in the case’s investigation. In broad strokes, the content of the report read as follows: Li Fuji [Mandarin name], present deputy director of the Hong Kong police department’s political bureau for Guomindang investigations is an important spy for Taiwan. He is a member of the [Taiwanese] Intelligence Bureau’s special Hong Kong unit. He has served as ears and eyes for Taiwan in all of Hong Kong’s several actions to punish illegal activities of Chiang spies in Hong Kong since 1954, and he has enabled Chiang’s spy organizations to avoid suffering great losses. In the present “Indian airplane” case, Li has been making inquiries into the actions of the Hong Kong authorities at the behest of the Chiang spy organization. Zhou Ju fled to Taiwan ahead of official investigations because he had been tipped off. Li also informed other Chiang spies of the impending searches and arrests. He also suggested that Taiwan seek assistance from the Americans to mediate with Hong Kong authorities and have the culprits in this case escorted to Taiwan. Per Zhou Enlai’s instructions, I added a paragraph to the end of the report: “When the British government responded to the Chinese government indicating willingness to cooperate in breaking this case, it promised it would not allow ethnically Chinese employees to see materials furnished by the Chinese government. At present the Chiang spy Li Fuji is participating in interrogations, which is extremely inimical to the breaking of this case. We sincerely hope that the Hong Kong authorities will take urgent measures against Li Fuji and inform us of how his situation is handled.”

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On May 30, Xiong sent a reply cable, informing us that Kao found the matter to be extremely serious, which he told the Hong Kong governor personally. The Hong Kong governor expressed the following to Kao: (1) Although Li Fuji had participated in interrogations, he was not the chief interrogator and did not know the entire situation. (2) Hong Kong was presently taking measures to ensure that Li did not influence the case. (3) Hong Kong authorities never revealed any intelligence reports furnished by China to ethnically Chinese workers. The case was being handled entirely by Englishmen, but as all lower-level police officers were Chinese, they would have to be involved in some concrete work, which the governor hoped the Chinese government could understand. Upon receiving Xiong’s cable on May 30, Zhou Enlai immediately asked India’s chief representative to the United Nations Menon to transmit to the Hong Kong governor his wish that Li Fuji be immediately transferred. On June 2, Xiong reported that Li Fuji had been transferred and replaced by another ethnic Chinese Li Luofu [Mandarin name]. Luo then ordered me to make inquiries into Li Luofu’s background with relevant departments. My inquiries revealed that Li Luofu had been a member of the Chiang spy network for a long time, and that in his capacity as interrogator and translator in the “Indian airplane” case, he had frequently reported the case’s status to Taiwan and had planned to lighten the culprits’ charges. Li Luofu was also in daily contact with Hong Kong spy Zeng Hanyuan. Upon hearing this information, on June 4, Zhou Enlai met with British government representative Trevelyan to inform him of the Li Luofu situation. He also noted that the Chinese government found this situation extremely serious and hoped that the Hong Kong governor would take measures. That same day, Zhou informed Xiong of this situation via cable. 5

India’s Wish to Withdraw and Changes to the Hong Kong Authorities’ Attitude

As there were countless links between ethnically Chinese police officers in the Hong Kong police department and Taiwanese Chiang spies, not much progress was made in breaking the case. As a result, Kao wished to return to India. He recommended to the Hong Kong governor that once the case had developed to a certain stage, Hong Kong authorities directly communicate with the Chinese government’s representative Mr. Xiong, thus ending Kao’s role as intermediary. The Hong Kong governor expressed that the case had transitioned from public

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searches and arrests into a stage of secret investigation and interrogations, and that the case would not likely be solved in a short time; Kao’s decision to remain or leave would be determined entirely by our needs. Kao then presented this request to Xiong, who responded that all their activities should be made in compliance with instructions from their home governments, and that he was not authorized to answer the question of Kao’s returning to India. As a friend, Xiong suggested that Kao not extricate himself from a task assigned to him by the Indian government at a time when Indian public opinion was in an uproar. On May 23, Xiong wired Beijing, saying that it was imperative that Kao not leave before himself, lest his remaining in Hong Kong encounter all manner of inconvenience. On the 24, we replied to Xiong with Zhou Enlai’s opinions: You may thank Kao for his efforts in this case at Zhou Enlai’s instruction. Zhou hopes that he will—on the basis of progress already made—remain in Hong Kong and cooperate with you until the case is solved. On June 1, Nehru dispatched his supreme intelligence officer Malik to Hong Kong with the task of “urging progress in the Indian airplane case.” On June 2, Malik met with Kao and Xiong. Malik said there were both political and legal aspects to the “Indian airplane” case. It was believable that Chiang spies would disrupt the political aspects of the case, but the legal case could not stand without evidence. He asked that the Chinese continue to provide evidence and intelligence reports. Malik also said that none of the arrested individuals had yet confessed. Legally speaking, however, even if they admitted to the crime, they could not be convicted, as the accused could not all testify at the same time. He believed the case against Zhou Ju could stand legally, but there was only a 50 percent chance the others would be found guilty. The British might expel them from the territory, he said, to display their good intentions to the Chinese. The Indian government, he said, would not offer any dissent to the decision of Hong Kong’s court. On June 2, the same day Malik met with Xiong, the Hong Kong authorities reported similar information through Kao. The Hong Kong authorities indicated that in political terms, they could believe that the Kashmir Princess was destroyed by Chiang spies. In legal terms, however, they would require evidence to reach a verdict. They thus requested that China furnish evidence. They divided the culprits into two categories: one related to the destruction of the airplane, and the other to Chiang spy organizations. They said that of the first category, some had admitted to having ties to Chiang spy organizations, but they had no evidence that they had participated in the airplane’s destruction. The Hong Kong authorities hinted that without evidence, members of the second category would be expelled from the territory.

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In Xiong’s view, it was no coincidence that Malik and the Hong Kong authorities made the same representation at the same time, but rather it was a reflection of the Indian government’s attitude and changes in the Hong Kong authorities. The British emphasis that they were viewing the matter from a legal perspective may have been the result of American pressure. It is likely that they wanted to be done with the matter of Zhou Ju, who was nowhere to be found. Xiong felt this question was important; so that day he cabled the Foreign Ministry, suggesting they go through diplomatic channels to work on higher levels of the British and Indian governments and strive to solve the majority of the case. After reading Xiong’s cable, I felt his analysis was reasonable. So I reported the situation to Luo, telling him that our most recent intelligence indicated that Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S. were exerting pressure on the Hong Kong authorities, telling them that if the arrested persons were not deported to Macau with seized documents returned to them, they would dispatch people to Hong Kong to cause disturbances, and the security of the British “consulate” in Taiwan would be threatened, and Taiwanese authorities would not offer protection. Luo found this situation to be important, and ordered me to immediately write a report to the Premier. Zhou Enlai placed extreme importance upon the matter after reading the report. He met with Indian ambassador Raghavan on June 4. Zhou told him that Malik had told Xiong that other than the murderer who had already fled, it would be impossible to find other parties guilty due to lack of evidence, and deportation would be the only option. The Hong Kong authorities’ thus handling the case would indicate their desire to close the case hastily. We had obtained intelligence, Zhou said, proving that Chiang was exerting pressure through the U.S. to have the arrested persons deported to Macau and to return seized documents to them, lest the UK “consulate” in Taiwan not be protected and government agents be dispatched to Hong Kong to cause disturbances. The U.S., he said, was also exerting pressure. The intelligence we had received seemed correct, but the Hong Kong authorities had denied the claims. Malik had further said that if the British authorities in Hong Kong found only Zhou Ju guilty, the Indian government would not dissent, which astonished us in the Chinese government. We wondered if this was truly the opinion of the Indian government, Zhou said. Did the Indian government really send Mr. Malik to Hong Kong to explain this to us? Zhou asked the ambassador to report all these issues to Prime Minster Nehru, as he wished to hear Nehru’s opinions. Raghavan expressed that there may have been errors, that Malik did not have the authority to represent the Indian government, and he pledged to report Zhou’s words to Nehru.

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British Authorities in Hong Kong Hastily Conclude Investigation, as Expected

After Xiong and Kao’s arrival in Hong Kong on April 18, the attitude of the British authorities in Hong Kong toward breaking the case was initially positive. They placed importance on the intelligence reports I provided. They made searches based on the list of Chiang spies I had provided, arresting Shen Qiping, who participated in planning, Zhang Zushun, who transported and concealed the bomb, Li Duanyuan, who had received training with Zhou Ju, Cai Weiqing, who had distributed funds, as well as 44 others. However, the executor of the plot, Zhou Ju, fled Hong Kong to Taiwan on the day that Kao and Xiong arrived in Hong Kong (April 18). Prior to June, the British authorities in Hong Kong communicated the situation with me through Kao. They expressed to us complete confidence in the accuracy of the intelligence reports the Chinese government was providing, their resolution to solve the case, as well as their carefully laid plans. Not only that, but they also expressed a resolve to root out Chiang Kaishek clique spies lurking in Hong Kong within a larger scope. After the beginning of June, however, Xiong and Kao received almost no reports on how the case was proceeding from Hong Kong authorities. Xiong repeatedly asked Kao to request that the British authorities in Hong Kong provide more materials from the interrogations and investigation of the case. The Hong Kong authorities responded that, “the investigation is still in progress, and we have no comment on that progress.” A month and a half later, on July 21, the British authorities in Hong Kong informed Xiong via Kao that the Chiang spies Feng Han and Liu Guodong had been released for lack of evidence. Xiong immediately asked Kao to tell the British authorities that they presently had yet to provide any detailed information of the case’s investigation, and that a lack of evidence against Feng and Liu did not mean they were not guilty. Before the case was settled, said Xiong, they should at least be detained as suspects, and there was no reason to release them. The British authorities informed us of their release only after the fact, which did not indicate an attitude of cooperation. This could not but cause us surprise and displeasure, and made us feel that the British authorities in Hong Kong had not worked to make progress in the case but rather had worked to retreat from it. Xiong reported this situation to the Foreign Ministry via cable, and also expressed there would be no purpose to his continued presence in Hong Kong. At Zhou Enlai’s instruction, Xiong returned to Beijing on August 15. He had been in Hong Kong for 89 days, where he had collaborated with Kao in a great deal of work. During that time, he provided reports to Zhou, kept us informed of the situation, and made timely descriptions of our position.

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After pulling out the case for a year, the British government finally reported their results to us in two installments. On January 16, 1956, the British representative office in China sent a diplomatic notice informing the Chinese Foreign Ministry that 31 persons arrested in the case had been deported and sent to Taiwan. These persons had been found to have been “involved in Guomindang intelligence activities in Hong Kong . . . but cannot raise any allegations relevant to breaking the case.” The Hong Kong authorities still detained 13 persons at that time. On June 23, the UK representative office sent another diplomatic notice, this time stating that for a lack of sufficient evidence, the 13 remaining arrested persons had been deported by the Hong Kong authorities. This is to say that the British authorities in Hong Kong had released all of the Chiang spies and suspects in the case via deportation. On August 4, Zhou Enlai sent a diplomatic notice to the UK representative office in his capacity as Foreign Minister, lodging a serious protest for the British authorities’ release of the suspects, and solemnly declaring that as the case had not yet been solved, “the British government still bears an inescapable international responsibility.” Although the Kashmir Princess investigation ended with no results, and no culprits received the punishment they deserved, the martyrs of the crash may take comfort in the fact that the Chinese government—particularly Zhou Enlai—made extreme efforts to reveal the U.S.-Chiang conspiracy and urge the British authorities in Hong Kong to arrest the culprits involved. The sacrifice the martyrs made in the enterprise of world peace will forever be remembered by the people.

CHAPTER 13

 he Current State of Historical Research in the T People’s Republic of China Zhang Xingxing Abstract Since the early 1980s, study of the history of the People’s Republic of China has gradually been established in the academic world. Thirty years of efforts in the field have yielded remarkable achievements. Formal research institutions and academic groups have been established, forming research teams of certain size. Many files and documents have been edited and published, providing beneficial conditions for academic research. Many research findings have been published, propelling deep development of ­academic research. The study of history has also been included within the national education

*   This essay first appeared in Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu《当代中国史研究》 [Contemporary Chinese History Studies] Vol. 15 No. 2, March 2008. Author’s Note: When I presented this essay at the “Current State and Future of the Study of Chinese History” academic symposium, hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Association of National History for the International History and Science Commission on September 16, 2007, there were omissions. In the writing of this article, I referred to the following works: Zhu Jiamu 朱佳木, “Guoshi yanjiu de xianzhuang yu qianjing”《国史研究的现状 与前景》[The Current State and Future Prospects of National History Study], in Jiaoxue yu yanjiu《教学与研究》(2002) 1; “Guanyu zhongguo dangdai shi xueke jianshe zhong de ji ge wenti”《关于中国当代史学科建设中的几个问题》[Several Questions in the Establishment of the Field of Contemporary Chinese History Studies], in Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu《当代中国史研究》(2003) 6; “Gongheguo shi, dangdai shi yu xiandai shi san zhe guanxi de sikao”《共和国史、当代史与现代史三者关系的思考》[Reflections on the Relationship between the History of the Republic, Contemporary History, and Modern History], in Guangming ribao《光明日报》, March 30, 2007; and Cheng Zhongyuan 程中原, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi yanjiu de huigu he qianzhan”《中华人民共和国史研 究的回顾和前瞻》[A Look Back and Look Forward on the History of the PRC], in Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu《当代中国史研究》(2004) 5. I would like to thank the authors of those works here. Zhang Xingxing is a professor and deputy director of the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies.

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system, which has fostered a generation of dedicated talent in academic research. Hereafter, we must further clarify its positioning among academic fields, broaden the scope of research, strengthen the establishment of the field, and dig up more files and documents.

Keywords History of the People’s Republic of China – current state of research – academic ­positioning – national history research mainline – national history installments

The founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 ushered in a new era in the history of the Chinese people. Since the 1980s, study of PRC history has gradually arisen in the academic world, accompanied by summaries of the history and experiences of both the positive and negative sides of New China’s socialist construction. After 30 years of efforts, this research has yielded remarkable achievements, and has become an emerging field in the study of China’s history. 1

Development Outline of PRC History Research

Initial attempts to establish the study of PRC history were made as early as the 1950s. At a meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee in June 1956, Vice Chairman Huang Yanpei discussed the need to “collect and preserve historical materials related to the founding of the nation in a timely fashion.”1 In 1958, Nankai University’s history department compiled and published the book Major Events of the People’s Republic of China (1949– 1956) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dashi ji (1949–1956)], and the Hebei Normal University of Beijing’s history department compiled and published Historical Manuscripts of the People’s Republic of China (1949–1956) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shigao (1949–1956)]. However, study of PRC history in the strict academic sense did not truly begin until the 1980s. From that time to present, the academic development of the study of PRC history has been manifested in the following four areas.

1  Renmin ribao《人民日报》, June 28, 1956, second edition.

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Formal Research Institutions and Academic Groups have been Established, Forming Research Teams of Certain Size In 1990, the State established a dedicated agency for the compilation, research, and publication of PRC history—the Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies (ICCS). The ICCS now possesses four research bureaus—for political history, economic history, cultural and social history, and diplomatic and Hong Kong/Macau/Taiwan history—a periodical professional journal of national history studies—Contemporary China History Studies [Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu], a bimonthly publication—a dedicated national history press— Contemporary China Press [Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe]—and a nationwide academic group—the PRC National History Society. The ICCS runs an annual academic conference with the National History Society, which it has convened six times, including the “International High Level Form for Contemporary Chinese History” in 2004. In 2001, the ICCS and Renmin University of China jointly founded the Center for Contemporary Chinese Studies, for the common development of study of contemporary Chinese history and to foster a new generation of researchers of contemporary Chinese history. In addition, many provincial, city, and autonomous regional governments around the nation have established institutions dedicated to the study of contemporary history, and many universities have established institutes or centers for the study of contemporary Chinese history. 1.1

Many Files and Documents have been Compiled and Published, Providing Beneficial Conditions for Academic Research Major documents openly published in the past 30 years by Party Central and State leadership organizations include the following: Selected Important Documents from the Founding of the Nation to 1965 [ Jianguo yilai zhi 1965 nian de zhongyao wenxian xuanbian]; Selected Important Documents over the Span of Several Congresses from the Third Plenum of the First CCP to the Sixteenth Party Congress [Zhonggong shiyi jie sanzhong quanhui yilai zhi shiliu da yilai lici daibiao dahui qijian de zhongyao wenxian xuanbian]; Selected Documents from National People’s Congresses [Renmin daibiao dahui wenxian xuanbian]; Historical Materials from the People’s Republic of China’s Treasury [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo caizheng shiliao]; Important People’s Republic of China Educational Documents [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongyao jiaoyu wenxian]; Collected Foreign Relations Documents of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjian ji] and other historical materials; Selected Documents on the Question of Intellectuals [Zhishifenzi wenti wenxian xuanbian]; Selected Documents on Ethnicity Work (1990–2002) [Minzu gongzuo wenxian xuanbian (1990–2002)]; Selected One Country, Two Systems 1.2

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Important Documents [Yi guo liang zhi zhongyao wenxian xuanbian]; and other anthologies on dedicated topics. In addition, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the State Archives Administration collaboratively published Selected Economic Archives and Materials of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian] in 21 volumes covering years 1949–1957.2 Publicly published speeches, articles, and reports of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and State leaders include: Collected Works of Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong wenji]; Mao Zedong Manuscripts Following the Founding of the Nation [ Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao]; Selected Works of Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai xuanji]; Selected Economic Works of Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai jingji wenxuan]; Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan]; Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi [Liu Shaoqi xuanji]; Liu Shaoqi Manuscripts Following the Founding of the Nation [ Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao]; Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping [Deng Xiaoping wenxuan]; Selected Works of Chen Yun [Chen Yun wenxuan]; Collected Works of Chen Yun [Chen Yun wenji]; and others. Also published were many biographies, chronicles, memoirs, and oral histories of leaders, including: The Biography of Mao Zedong [Mao Zedong zhuan]; The Biography of Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai zhuan]; The Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997) [Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997)]; The Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995) [Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995)]; Bo Yibo’s A Look Back on Several Major Policy Decisions and Events [Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu]; and others. These are all of extreme historical importance. Large Quantities of Research have been Published, Promoting Deep Development of Academic Studies Beginning in 1983, 100,000 people around the nation devoted 16 years to the publication of the Contemporary China [Dangdai zhongguo] series, which deserves to be called the most representative work of the field. The series is divided by department, industry, region, and topic, and includes 150 tomes, 208 volumes, about 100 million characters, and over 30,000 images. It contains complete records of the development of New China, and it lays an important foundation for the systemic study of the PRC. Writings on the “History of the People’s Republic of China” began coming out during the 40th anniversary of 1.3

2  The Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian《中华人民共和国经济 档案资料选编》[Selected Economic Archives and Materials of the People’s Republic of China (1949–1957)] published jointly by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the State Archives Administration were published by the Social Sciences Literary Press, Economic Management Press, China Urban Press, and China Material Press over the years 1990 to 1998.

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the country’s founding.3 As of now, about 60 or 70 kinds of academic writings on the history of the PRC have been published. They include—divided by different primary research fields—the following: History of Political Institutions of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengzhi zhidu shi]; History of Rule-By-Law in the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fazhi shi]; Economic History of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji shi]; Cultural History of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wenhua shi]; History of Education in the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu shi]; Diplomatic History of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi]; Essential Military History of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo junshi shiyao]; and others. Thematic histories divided by historical stage include: the China from 1949–1989 [1949 nian–1989 nian de zhongguo] series; Historical Manuscripts from the “Cultural Revolution” [“Wenhua dageming” shigao]; History of China’s Reform and Opening [Zhongguo gaige kaifang shi]; and others. Thematic works of concentrated study into major events include: History of the War to Resist America and Aid North Korea [Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng shi]; History of the Land Reform Movement [Tudi gaige yundong shi]; The Whole Story of the Agricultural Collectivization Movement [Nongye hezuohua yundong shimo]; Three Line Construction: Development of China’s West During the Period of Preparation for War [San xian jianshe: beizhan shiqi de xibu kaifa]; and others. Reference books include: Chronological Records of the National History of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoshi biannian]; Records of Major Events of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dashi ji]; Encyclopedia of People’s Republic of China History (1949–1999) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi baike quanshu (1949–1999)]; and others. Statistics indicate that there are about 300 new writings on the history of the PRC of academic value published every year.

3  Consisting of over 10, including: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi《中华人民共和国史》 [History of the People’s Republic of China], ed. He Li 何理, (China Archives Press, 1989, revised 1995); Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi《中华人民共和国史》[History of the People’s Republic of China], ed. Jin Dexing 靳德行, (Henan University Press, 1989, revised 2005); Xin zhongguo sishi nian yanjiu《新中国四十年研究》[Forty Years of Studying New China], ed. Chen Mingxian et al. 陈明显等, (Beijing Institute of Technology Press, 1989); and others.

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The Study of History has also been Included Within the National Education System, which has Fostered a Generation of Dedicated Talent in Academic Research Prior to the 1980s, there were no dedicated curricula for PRC history or contemporary Chinese history—excluding those portions of CCP history curricula touching on the founding of the PRC—in any Chinese universities. Now, not only are there dedicated curricula within university history departments, but PRC history has become mandatory coursework in many other fields of study. To this end, the Higher Learning Educational Press has published several editions of professional textbooks called History of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi]. In 2006, universities and colleges revised their curricula and further established a “compendium of contemporary Chinese history” curricula, which included PRC history. In addition, in 2001, the CASS went through the ICCS to found the PRC National History Department. Since then, many universities have founded “contemporary Chinese history” majors or have established research directions for PRC history under contemporary Chinese history majors or CCP history majors. These majors have attracted masters and ph.D. students, as well as foreign exchange students. 1.4

2

Major Issues in the Study of PRC History

As PRC history remains a young academic field, there are inevitable differences in understanding within the construction of the field from the academic vantage-points of academics everywhere. These differences can be seen in the following areas. 2.1 Regarding the Academic Positioning of PRC History Can PRC history be considered an independent academic field? If so, then what is its connection with modern Chinese history and contemporary Chinese history? At present, the majority of academics think that PRC history is a branch field of Chinese history, a component of the general history of China, identical in connotation to modern and contemporary Chinese history. It is, they say, the history of China following the PRC’s founding in 1949. However, as the State academic subject catalogue does not contain the titles “PRC history” or “contemporary Chinese history,” all modern history contained within the field of “recent Chinese history” continues usage of the definition set at the founding of the nation: history of the period of new democratic revolution from 1919 to 1949. So we are advocating for modern Chinese history to break away from recent Chinese history as an independent field of study, with its upper limit set

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at 1949. We also think it should be merged with PRC history and contemporary Chinese history under a unified title of “modern Chinese history.” If the new upper limit is not agreed upon, then it should be defined as after the founding of the PRC in 1949. Some academics think that PRC history is markedly different from contemporary Chinese history, as politics are the mainline of national history, and research is heavily slanted toward changes to upper-echelon politics and policies. The scope of contemporary Chinese history studies is relatively broad, and it treats both guidance of society and guidance by society equally.4 We think this perspective is too narrow in the understanding of the concept of PRC history. 2.2 Regarding the Research Mainline of PRC History By “mainline,” we mean the primary historical sequence that connects the beginning and end of PRC history and influences the PRC’s development direction. There are currently different understandings of this question. The primary perspectives are as follows. Proponents of the first perspective think that study of PRC history should be centered on the first article of the PRC constitution, i.e. that “the People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.” This makes the mainline the history and patterns of the establishment, solidification, and development of the PRC.5 Proponents of the second perspective think that the historical mainline of China should be the establishment, solidification, and development of a socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship, the exploration and formation of a road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the construction of a strong, modernized socialist state. This perspective, to put it briefly, is laying a foundation for, innovating, and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.6 Proponents of the third perspective think that 4  Gao Hua 高华, “Xushi shijiao de duoyangxing yu dangdai shi yanjiu—yi 50 niandai lishi yanjiu wei li”《叙事视角的多样性与当代史研究—以50年代历史研究为例》[Diversity and the Study of Contemporary History from a Narrative Perspective—Taking Study of 1950s History as an Example], in Nankai Daxue xuebao (zhexue—renwen kexue—shehui kexue) 《南京大学学报（哲学·人文科学·社会科学）》(2003) 3. 5  Chen Mingxian and Chen Rong 陈明显、陈蓉, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi jiaocai bianxie taolunhui jianjie”《中华人民共和国史教材编写讨论会简介》[Brief Description of the PRC History Textbook Writing Symposium], in Jiaoxue yu yanjiu《教学 与研究》(1994) 1. 6  Cheng Zhongyuan 程中原, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi yanjiu de huigu he qianzhan” 《中华人民共和国史研究的回顾和前瞻》[A Look Back and Look Forward on the Study of PRC History], in Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu《当代中国史研究》2 (2004) 5.

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there is no one definite ­mainline of PRC history, that there are many mainlines. Concretely speaking, this perspective includes primarily the exploration of the road to socialism with Chinese characteristics, striving to realize industrialization and modernization early, and protecting national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national independence, etc. 2.3 Regarding the Development Mainline of PRC History The historical mainline must be defined relative to its sub-branches, and even its countercurrent. How to correctly understand and grasp the mainline and sub-branches, the whole picture and the partial picture, the relationship between the overall process and individual phenomena—these are all extremely important and highly difficult questions for somebody working in the study of history. We think that over the course of the development of contemporary China, there have been grievous mistakes and serious setbacks, which even for a time brought upon the State and the people grave calamities. But this can only be considered a sub-branch as compared to the mainline of contemporary Chinese history. After the founding of the PRC, the Chinese people—under the guidance of the CCP and Chinese government—actively explored the road to socialism with Chinese characteristics; made efforts to promote modernized socialist construction; caused ancient China to assume a brand new posture and stand tall in the East; and made glorious achievements visible to all. This is the mainline of the 60 years of history of the PRC. Only by grasping and properly processing this relationship can one make a complete, objective, and just analysis and assessment of the history of the PRC and cause the study of PRC history to truly play a role in making sense of facts, summarizing experience, finding patterns, and helping to administer the nation and aid the people. 2.4 Regarding the Division of PRC History into Stages Within academia, there are different methods of dividing the history of the PRC. One major method is the “four-stage method,” which uses the document “Several Resolutions on Party History Questions Since the Founding of the Nation” to divide the PRC’s history into four stages: the stage of fundamentally completing socialist reconstruction (1949–1956); the stage of beginning to completely construct socialism (1957–1966); the “Cultural Revolution” stage (1966–1976); and the stage of great historical transformation (1976 onward). The “three-stage method” divides the PRC’s history into three stages: the stage of new democracy transitioning into socialism (1949–1956); the stage of

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socialist construction and winding exploration (1957–1978); and the new era of socialist modernized construction (1978 onward). The “two-stage method” divides PRC history into two stages at the dividing line of 1978: the stage of establishment of socialist institutions in China and exploration of the road of socialist construction (1949–1978); and the new era of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics (1978 onward). We think that how history is divided into stages is an important question in the study of PRC history; at the same time, we think it is a dynamic study project. Various different methods of dividing historical stages can all be used to deepen understanding equally within academic discussion. 3

Some Considerations in Deepening PRC History Study

At present, the study of PRC history is faced with a great opportunity for development. As China’s comprehensive national strength rapidly grows, the historical experiences of the PRC’s successful developing are drawing attention from increasingly wide circles. Universities around China are establishing “recent Chinese history compendium” curricula, which is exerting higher demands on the study of PRC history. Delegates to the National People’s (NPC) and China People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in March 2007 submitted a proposal titled “We Recommend Founding a National History Museum and Carrying out the State’s Duty to Write History.”7 We have reason to believe that as the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2009 draws near, the study and dissemination of PRC history will reach a new high point. Faced with new circumstances, we will further strengthen and deepen the study of PRC history in the following few areas. 3.1 Further Clarify the Academic Positioning of PRC History The study of PRC history has gone through 30 years of vigorous development, during which a relatively solid academic foundation has been laid. However, PRC history does not have independent status in either the State academic subject catalogue or the major fields of graduate studies. This has become an 7  Zhongguo wenhua bao《中国文化报》 , February 28, 2007; “Renda daibiao liang hui jianyan: jianli guoshiguan duxiu guoshi jian wang zhi lai”《人大代表两会建言：建立国史 馆续修国史鉴往知来》[NPC Declaration: Establish National History Museum, Continue Revision of National History], Central News Service Beijing, March 14, 2007.

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important factor influencing and restricting the development of this field. We will continue cooperating with colleagues in academia and call for relevant State departments to strive to have PRC history formally entered into the State academic subject catalogue and into the major fields of graduate students as early as possible to promote the independent development of this field. 3.2 Further Broaden the Scope of the Study of PRC History As the study of PRC history was initially broken out of the study of the era of socialism within the study of CCP history, there were many tendencies within the field of focusing too concentratedly on political history or major State policies. This has weakened study of such fields as the history of rule-by-law, economic history, scientific and technological history, cultural history, educational history, social history, etc., and has affected the rounded development of the study. We will henceforth further broaden the scope of the study of PRC history, strengthen study in such weak areas as social life, etc., give prominence to the “general history” characteristics of national history, and develop the prospects of PRC history more completely, more dynamically, and more colorfully. Further Strengthen Construction of the Academic Field of PRC History As compared to traditional academic history fields, PRC history is still lacking in many fundamental areas, such as foundational theory, applicable theory, and disciplinary history. We will earnestly study the construction experience of other fields of study within the scope of traditional history; establish complete, rigorous academic standards; and further strengthen the construction of the academic field of PRC history by borrowing from the experience of political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, public administration and management, etc.—in order to lay a more solid academic foundation for the development of the study of PRC history. 3.3

3.4 Further Excavate Files and Documents for the Study of PRC History There are many problems within the study of PRC history owing to insufficient publicly available files and documents, as well as problems of those files and documents already publicly available not being sufficiently studied and used. This has caused many academic studies to remain at a low level and has led to frequent repetitions. We will strengthen the excavation and use of files and documents on the one hand while amply studying and using those files and documents already available on the other. This will aid us in promoting the development and innovation in the field of PRC history with more complete, more detailed, and more rigorous evidence.

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References The 1949 nian–1989 nian de zhongguo《1949年～1989年的中国》[China from 1949– 1989] series: Lin Yunhui, Fan Shouxin, and Zhang Gong 林蕴晖、范守信、张弓, Kaige xingjin de shiqi《凯歌行进的时期》[The Era of the Victory Song]; Cong Jin 丛进, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue《曲折发展的岁月》[Years of Complicated Development]; Wang Nianyi 王年一, Da dongluan de niandai《大动乱的年代》 [Decade of Chaos]; Wang Hongmo et al. 王洪模等, Gaige kaifang de licheng 《改革开放的历程》[The Course of Reform and Opening]. Henan People’s Press, 1989. Bo Yibo 薄一波, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu《若干重大决策与事件 的回顾》[A Look Back on Several Major Policy Decisions and Events]. People’s Press, 1997. CCP Central Party History Research Institute Third Research Department 中共中央 党史研究室第三研究部, Zhongguo gaige kaifang shi《中国改革开放史》 [History of China’s Reform and Opening]. Liaoning People’s Press, 2002. Chen Donglin 陈东林, San xian jianshe: beizhan shiqi de xibu kaifa《三线建设：备 战时期的西部开发》[Three Line Construction: Development of China’s West During the Period of Preparation for War]. CCP Central Party School Press, 2003. Chen Mingxian and Chen Rong 陈明显、陈蓉, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi jiaocai bianxie taolunhui jianjie”《中华人民共和国史教材编写讨论会简介》 [Brief Description of the PRC History Textbook Writing Symposium], in Jiaoxue yu yanjiu《教学与研究》(1994) 1. Chen Yun nianpu (1905–1995)《陈云年谱（一九0五—一九九五）》[The Chronicles of Chen Yun (1905–1995)]. Central Documentary Press, 2000. Chen Yun wenji《陈云文集》[Collected Works of Chen Yun]. Central Documentary Press, 2005. Chen Yun wenxuan《陈云文选 Selected Works of Chen Yun]. People’s Press, 1995. Cheng Zhongyuan 程中原, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi yanjiu de huigu he qianzhan”《中华人民共和国史研究的回顾和前瞻》[A Look Back and Look Forward on the Study of PRC History], in Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu《当代中国 史研究》2 (2004) 5. Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975–1997)《邓小平年谱 (1975–1997)》[The Chronicles of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997)]. Central Documentary Press, 2004. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan《邓小平文选》[Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping]. People’s Press, 1993–1994. Gao Hua 高华, “Xushi shijiao de duoyangxing yu dangdai shi yanjiu—yi 50 niandai lishi yanjiu wei li”《叙事视角的多样性与当代史研究—以50年代历史研究 为例》[Diversity and the Study of Contemporary History from a Narrative Perspective—Taking Study of 1950s History as an Example], in Nankai Daxue

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x­ uebao (zhexue–renwen kexue–shehui kexue)《南京大学学报（哲学·人文科 学·社会科学）》(2003) 3. Gao Huamin 高化民, Nongye hezuohua yundong shimo《农业合作化运动始末》 [The Whole Story of the Agricultural Collectivization Movement]. China Youth Press, 1999. Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao《建国以来刘少奇文稿》[Liu Shaoqi Manuscripts Following the Founding of the Nation]. Central Documentary Press, 2005. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao《建国以来毛泽东文稿》[Mao Zedong Manu­ scripts Following the Founding of the Nation]. Central Documentary Press, 1987–1998. Jianguo yilai zhi 1965 nian de zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, di 1–20 ce《建国以来重要 文献选编》（第1–20册） [Selected Important Documents from the Founding of the Nation to 1965, Vols. 1–20]. Central Documentary Press, 1992–1998. Jin Chunming 金春明, “Wenhua dageming” shigao《“文化大革命”史稿》[Historical Manuscripts from the “Cultural Revolution”]. Sichuan People’s Press, 1995. Liu Shaoqi xuanji《刘少奇选集》[Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi]. People’s Press, 1985. Luo Pinghan 罗平汉, Tudi gaige yundong shi《土地改革运动史》[History of the Land Reform Movement]. Fujian People’s Press, 2005. Mao Zedong wenji di 6–8 juan《毛泽东文集》第 6–8 卷 [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vols. 6–8]. People’s Press, 1999. Mao Zedong zhuan (1893–1949)《毛泽东传 (1893–1949)》[The Biography of Mao Zedong (1893–1949)]. Central Documentary Press, 1996. Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976)《毛泽东传 (1949–1976)》[The Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976)]. Central Documentary Press, 2003. Military Science Institute 军事科学院, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng shi《抗美援 朝战争史》[History of the War to Resist America and Aid North Korea]. People’s Liberation Army Press, 2001. Minzu gongzuo wenxian xuanbian (1990–2002)《民族工作文献选编（一九九O— 二00二年）》[Selected Documents on Ethnicity Work (1990–2002)], ed. State Ethnic Affairs Commission and Central Document Research Bureau 国家民族事 务委员会、中央文献研究室. Central Documentary Press, 2003. “Renda daibiao liang hui jianyan: jianli guoshiguan duxiu guoshi jian wang zhi lai”《人大代表两会建言：建立国史馆续修国史鉴往知来》[NPC Declaration: Estab­ lish National History Museum, Continue Revision of National History], Central News Service Beijing, March 14, 2007. Renmin daibiao dahui wenxian xuanbian《人民代表大会文献选编》[Selected Documents from National People’s Congresses], ed. National People’s Congress Standing Committee General Office Research Bureau 全国人大常委会办公厅研 究室. China Democracy and Rule By Law Press, 1992.

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Renmin ribao《人民日报》, June 28, 1956, second edition. Sanzhong quanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian《三中全会以来重要文献 选编》[Selected Important Documents Since Third Plenum]. People’s Press, 1982. Shi’er da yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian《十二大以来重要文献选编》[Selected Important Documents Since the Twelfth National People’s Congress]. People’s Press, 1986–1988. Shiliu da yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian《十六大以来重 要文献选编》[Selected Important Documents Since the Sixteenth National People’s Congress, Vols. 1 and 2 of 3]. People’s Press, 2005–2006. Shisan da yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian《十三大以来重要文献选编》[Selected Important Documents Since the Thirteenth National People’s Congress]. People’s Press, 1991–1993. Shisi da yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian《十四大以来重要文献选编》[Selected Important Documents Since the Fourteenth National People’s Congress]. People’s Press, 1996–1999. Shiwu da yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian《十五大以来重要文献选编》[Selected Important Documents Since the Fifteenth National People’s Congress]. People’s Press, 2000–2003. Wu Benxiang 吴本祥, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi《中华人民共和国史》 [History of the People’s Republic of China]. Higher Learning Education Press, 1999. Yi guo liang zhi zhongyao wenxian xuanbian《一国两制重要文献选编》[Selected One Country, Two Systems Important Documents], ed. CCP Central Document Research Bureau 中共中央文献研究室. Central Documentary Press, 1997. Zhishifenzi wenti wenxian xuanbian《知识分子问题文献选编》[Selected Docu­ ments on the Question of Intellectuals], ed. CCP Organization Department and CCP Central Document Research Bureau 中共中央组织部、中共中央文献研究室. People’s Press: 1983. Zhongguo lishi: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo juan《中国历史：中华人民共和 国卷》[Chinese History: the People’s Republic of China Tome], ed. Yang Xiancai 杨先材. Higher Learning Education Press, 2001. Zhongguo wenhua bao《中国文化报》, February 28, 2007. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo caizheng shiliao《中华人民共和国财政史料》 [Historical Materials from the People’s Republic of China’s Treasury]. China Financial and Economic Press, 1982–1983. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dashi ji《中华人民共和国大事记》[Records of Major Events of the People’s Republic of China], ed. Xinhua Communications Agency Domestic Materials Group 新华通讯社国内资料组. Xinhua Press, 1982, 1985. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dashi ji (1949–1956)《中华人民共和国大事记（1949– 1959 年）》[Major Events of the People’s Republic of China (1949–1956)], ed. Nankai University history department 南开大学历史系. Hebei People’s Press, 1958–1960.

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Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjian ji《中华人民共和国对外关系 文件集》[Collected Foreign Relations Documents of the People’s Republic of China]. World Knowledge Press, 1957–1965. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fazhi shi《中华人民共和国法制史》[History of RuleBy-Law in the People’s Republic of China], ed. Yang Yifan et al. 杨一凡等. Heilongjiang People’s Press, 1997. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoshi biannian (1949 nian juan, 1950 nian juan)《中华 人民共和国国史编年》(1949 年卷、1950 年卷) [Chronological Records of the National History of the People’s Republic of China (1949 and 1950 editions)], ed. Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies 当代中国研究所. Contemporary China Press, 2004, 2006. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyu shi《中华人民共和国教育史》[History of Education in the People’s Republic of China], ed. He Dongchang 何东昌. Hainan Press, 2007. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji shi《中华人民共和国经济史》[Economic History of the People’s Republic of China], ed. Dong Fureng 董辅礽. Economic and Scientific Press, 1999. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji shi《中华人民共和国经济史》[Economic History of the People’s Republic of China], ed. Wu Li 武力. China Economic Press, 1999. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji shi《中华人民共和国经济史》[Economic History of the People’s Republic of China], ed. Zhao Dexin 赵德馨. Henan People’s Press, 1989. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo junshi shiyao《中华人民共和国军事史要》[Essential Military History of the People’s Republic of China], ed. Military Science Institute Military History Research Institute 军事科学院军事历史研究所. Military Science Press, 2005. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi《中华人民共和国史》[History of the People’s Republic of China], ed. He Qin 何沁. Higher Learning Education Press, Vol. 1: 1997, Vol. 2: 1999. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi baike quanshu (1949–1999)《中华人民共和国史百 科全书 (1949–1999)》[Encyclopedia of People’s Republic of China History (1949– 1999)], ed. Deng Liqun 邓力群. China Encyclopedia Press, 1999. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shigao (1949–1956)《中华人民共和国史稿》[Historical Manuscripts of the People’s Republic of China (1949–1956)], collectively edited by third-year students of Hebei Normal University of Beijing’s history department 河北北京师范学院历史系三年级. People’s Press, 1958. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi《中华人民共和国外交史》[Diplomatic History of the People’s Republic of China], ed. Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Bureau 外交部外交史研究室; Vol. 1 (1949–1956) edited by Pei Xianzhang

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裴坚章, Vol. 2 (1957–1969) and Vol. 3 (1970–1978) edited by Wang Taiping 王泰平. World Knowledge Press, 1994–1999. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wenhua shi《中华人民共和国文化史》[Cultural History of the People’s Republic of China], ed. Zhang Shunqing et al. 张顺清等. Heilongjiang Educational Press, 1992. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengzhi zhidu shi《中华人民共和国政治制度史》 [History of Political Institutions of the People’s Republic of China], ed. Chen Mingxian 陈明显. Nankai University Press, 1998. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongyao jiaoyu wenxian《中华人民共和国重要教育 文献》[Important People’s Republic of China Educational Documents], ed. He Dongchang] 何东昌. Hainan Press, 1998–2003. Zhou Enlai jingji wenxuan《周恩来选集》[Selected Economic Works of Zhou Enlai]. Central Documentary Press, 1993. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan《周恩来外交文选》[Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai]. Central Documentary Press, 1990. Zhou Enlai xuanji《周恩来选集》[Selected Works of Zhou Enlai]. People’s Press: 1984. Zhou Enlai zhuan《周恩来传》[The Biography of Zhou Enlai]. People’s Press, 1989.

CHAPTER 14

I nvestigation into the History of the Central Investigation Department of the Chinese Communist Party Michael Schoenhals translated into Chinese by Huang Yusheng Abstract Of all the important agencies that have existed in China in the 60 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, such a little-known organization as the Central Investigation Department (CID) was one of a kind, as determined by the nature of the work it performed. The CID was founded in 1955 and rolled into the Ministry of National Security in 1983. It played an extremely important role in maintaining the interests of the PRC during the Cold War. Had it not been for the outstanding contributions of people working on the “hidden front,” the development road of contemporary China might be very different.

Keywords Central Investigation Department – Liaison Department – Central Department of Social Affairs – Ministry of National Security

About 30 years ago, the Chinese embassy in Stockholm hosted a reception, at which I spoke with two senior Chinese diplomats. At the time I was preparing a doctorate thesis on the subject of the “Great Leap Forward.” In our talk, I mentioned that in a document that had come from outside the People’s Republic of China (PRC), I had randomly come across an agency called the PRC Central

*   This essay was presented as a thesis at the second Contemporary Chinese History International Forum. This is an abridged version of that thesis. Michael Schoenhals is a professor in the Language and Culture Institute of Sweden’s Lund University.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi ��.��63/9789004292673_015

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Investigation Department (CID), but I had never seen mention of this agency in the People’s Daily [Ren min ri bao]. So I asked them for confirmation: did this mysterious organization exist in the past, or did it still exist? They apologized and said they could not confirm, as they had no knowledge of this organization. The two diplomats who spoke with me were extremely familiar with the CID, but at the time it was a State secret. Their only option in responding to the query of a curious Swedish doctorate student was to closely guard their secret. It was, after all, an agency comparable to the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Even the British didn’t formally acknowledge the existence of the SIS until the passage of the Intelligence Act in March 1994. In other words, if in the 1980s I had asked two British diplomats about the existence of MI6, they would have denied it in the same way. This was because there was a conflict between my academic curiosity and state secrets. A few years later, the name CID1 appeared in a document about China I was reading. In 1983 it became the Ministry of National Defense, at which point the CID’s existence as an independent agency became history. Thus, I decided to use scattered materials from China that I could find to write a brief history of the CID. 1

Predecessor of the Central Investigation Department

The CID was not, as it is claimed in some second-hand materials, founded at the end of the 1940s.2 Nor was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Department of Social Affairs (CDSA) its predecessor, as others claim.3 The CID was founded in 1955, before which it had gone through a somewhat long transitional period. On the eve of the founding of New China, the CDSA was disbanded. In all the six years following 1949, all military intelligence departments and local (political) intelligence departments were managed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Some departments of the abolished CDSW were reorganized into the CID in 1955, but from the years 1950 to 1955, they were called

1  Michael Schoenhals, “Note: On the Existence of the CCP’s Central Investigation Department,” in CCP Research Newsletter, (Spring 1989) 2, 17–20. 2  Thomas Kampen, “The CCP’s Central Committee Departments (1921–1991): A Study of their Evolution,” in China Report (1993) 29, No. 3, 309–310. 3  John Pike, “History [of the Chinese Ministry of State Security],” accessed from http://www .globalsecurity.org/intell/world/china/mss.htm.

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the Central Military Commission (CMC) Liaison Department.4 During this period Zhou Enlai was in charge of intelligence work. He was the initiator of the CCP’s secret intelligence activities, and from the beginning he insisted on devoting large amounts of resources into all forms of intelligence work (human affairs intelligence, technological intelligence, military tactical intelligence, strategic intelligence). He thought that so long as class struggle existed for one day, intelligence work and security work were extremely important. On April 1, 1950, he reiterated, “to be victorious over our enemies, intelligence work is indispensable.”5 Under the guidance of Zhou, great changes took place within Chinese intelligence agencies from 1949 to 1955. These changes were rather well adapted to the complex, variable environment of the time. In the 1970s, a renowned British journalist and academic, speaking to the significant influence of the Korean War, wrote that the war had forced the Communist Party to accelerate construction of China’s secret intelligence team; work that would ordinarily require 10 years to accomplish was hurriedly accomplished in a span of two to three years, and so there were some inevitable mistakes in organization.6 However, looking back now, we can see that Soviet intelligence agencies, still not stable themselves at the time, may have played a role in how China’s intelligence agencies were organized. Russian intelligence historians Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin posit that Soviet foreign intelligence agencies were in a state of “chaos” in the late 1940s. That was the era of the Intelligence Committee, which attempted to combine the Soviet Ministry of National Security’s Foreign Intelligence Bureau with the Soviet Military Intelligence Bureau. The objective of this reorganization, however, was not fully reached; the Committee experienced problems only one year after its formation, and was abolished in the second half of 1951.7 As top level advisors from Moscow’s Intelligence Committee (formally under the jurisdiction of the Soviet embassy, but in reality controlled directly from Moscow)8 actively participated in 4  Wei Xiaolan 魏小兰, “ ‘Shatao shijian’ shimo”《“沙韬事件”始末》[The Whole Story of the Shatao Incident’], in Zuojia wenzhai《作家文摘》 , September 8, 2007. 5  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), shang juan《周恩来年谱 (1949～1976)》上卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 1], (Central Documentary Press, 1997),30. 6  Richard Deacon and Donald McCormick, The Chinese Secret Service, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1974), 314. 7  Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 189–191. 8  Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, di 2 ce《建国以来周恩来文稿》第 2 册 [Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 2008), 483.

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­ elping China establish an intelligence agency, the advice they gave to China at h the time may seem to us now as equally “chaotic.”9 In 1949, during the preparation period for the New Political Consultative Conference, Zhou hosted a CCP Central report conference on July 8 and 9, at which such questions as the organization of intelligence and public security agencies were discussed.10 On July 11, Zhou consented to the recommendation of the CCP’s North China Bureau to roll the North China Bureau’s Department of Social Affairs into the Central Department of Social Affairs.11 Later happenings demonstrate that this was the beginning of the abolition of all existing supreme agencies at the time, as CCP Central and the CMC sent a cable to all central bureaus and branch bureaus in liberated zones on August 9 reading: “To divide work and to facilitate better constructing our defense and intelligence work, we have decided to abolish the Central Department of Social Affairs and establish an Intelligence Department and a Public Security Department (which will serve as intelligence and public security ministries for the government when the central government is established).”12 Only a portion of that plan was actually implemented. After the PRC Central People’s Government Ministry of Public Security was founded, the defense work of the Central Department of Social Affairs was indeed handed off, but the planned Ministry of Intelligence was never founded. In October and November 1949, Li Kenong was appointed director of the CMC General Staff Headquarters Department of Intelligence (his public

9  There are differences of opinions between PLA leadership and Soviet advisors regarding the organization and work of the General Cadre Department. See Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, di 3 ce《见过以来周恩来文稿》第 3 册 [Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 3], (Central Documentary Press, 2008), 431. 10  Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi (1918–1975) xia juan《周恩来军事活动纪事 (1918⁓1975)》下卷 [Records of Zhou Enlai’s Military Activities (1918–1975), Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 2000), pg. 105 mentions only the conference on July 8. In Wang Zhongfang’s (王仲方) article “Gong’an bu shi zenyang chengli de”《公安部是 怎样成立的》[How the Ministry of Public Security Was Founded], in Lishi shunjian, di 1 ce《历史瞬间》第1册 [An Instant in History, Vol. 1], ed. Zhu Chunlin 祝春林, (Masses Press, 1999), 4, the author mentions that meetings were held on July 8 and 9. 11  Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, di 1 ce《建国以来周恩来文稿》第1册 [Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 1], (Central Documentary Press, 2008), 126–127. 12  Lishi shunjian, di 1 ce《历史瞬间》第1册 [An Instant in History, Vol. 1], ed. Zhu Chunlin 祝春林, (Masses Press, 1999), 5.

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i­dentity was deputy foreign minister).13 Prior to this, he had been a leading cadre of the Central Department of Social Affairs beginning in May 1948, first as acting director and then as director. After 1949, the CMC established “dedicated agencies performing international intelligence work” in all regions.14 Li reported directly to Zhou. Li’s assistant at this time was Luo Qingchang. In 1955, after the CID was established, Luo was appointed secretary, and retired as the CID’s last director in 1983. [9] (p. 643) He maintained a close relationship with Zhou Enlai, and in 1954 he served as Zhou’s deputy office director in charge of intelligence work.15 Using presently available materials, it is impossible to give an outline of the organization adjustments that occurred over the winter 1949 to 1950, or to determine the nature of the relationship between the CID and the CMC’s Intelligence Department at this time. However, on the basis of presently available materials, researchers of history can confirm when the CMC Intelligence Department was founded and who its leaders were, but they can give only a sketchy picture of the CID itself.16 A quasi-official table related to Luo’s duties demonstrates that for a time, these two agencies were in fact one, and Luo served as both director of the CMC’s First Intelligence Bureau and the director of the Liaison Department’s First Bureau. Among figures who served in high-level leadership positions in the Liaison Department in late 1950 and later served as primary leadership of the CID were Zou Dapeng, Ma Ciqing, and Feng Xuan. 1950 was the year that China’s high-level intelligence officials summarized the past and planned for the future. Li Kenong wrote the official history of the 13  Li Li 李力, Cong mimi zhanxian zou chu lai de kaiguo shangjiang: huainian jiafu Li Kenong《从秘密战线走出来的开国上将:怀念家父李克农》[From Secret Battle Line to State-Founding Top General: Remembering My Father Li Kenong], (People’s Press, 2008), 257. 14  Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, di 3 ce《建国以来周恩来文稿》第3册 [Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 3], (Central Documentary Press, 2008), 436. 15  Zhu Xiaoping 朱晓萍, “Mimi zhanxian shang de chuanqi renwu Luo Qingchang”《秘 密战线上的传奇人物罗青长》[Legendary Figure from the Secret Battle Line Luo Qingchang], accessed from http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/41038/4863660.html. 16  One document notes that Liu Shaoqi was the first director of the Liaison Department (prior to December 1950). Other documents do not confirm this, but rather indicate that at the time, Liu was in Shanghai guiding economic and financial restoration work. See Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi shi ziliao huibian《中国共产党组织史资料汇编》 [Compilation of Historical Materials of CCP Organization], ed. Wang Jianying 王健英, (Red Flag Press, 1983), 852.

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CCP’s intelligence activities (not publicized), the objective of which was to “promote the political and professional development of China’s intelligence work.”17 His colleagues appraised the policies and professional structure of the CCP’s Central Department of Social Affairs, making it more suited to the needs of the new environment. Under such conditions, the dispatching of intelligence officers abroad was one of many sensitive questions that needed to be resolved. Intelligence officers were not simply dispatched by a revolutionary political organization (the CCP); they were in fact and in legal principle dispatched by the Chinese government. The intelligence work conference convened in April 1950 brought about a consensus toward some of the State’s earliest intelligence policies.18 Prior to the conference, at the fourth northeastern public security work conference held at the end of January, it was determined that, regarding making great efforts to develop foreign intelligence work, “we must establish anti-traitor intelligence dispatching work. For this reason, the Northeastern Public Security Department, the Provincial Public Security Departments of Liaodong and Liaoxi, and the Public Security Bureaus of Shenyang and Lüda should seek Party cadres or reliable relations with dispatching conditions, as well as individual Party spy elements who have secretly surrendered to us, whom we can control, and who are suitable for dispatching; they should be given secret training and dispatched outward. Their task: primarily to think of ways to infiltrate Chiang, American, English, North Korean, and Japanese spy agencies, to reconnoiter the activities of enemy spies, schemes and plans, clues as to spies they have dispatched to us, etc. Such dispatching must be done capably and secretly, with long-term planning, and a single line of leadership. We must not assign bodies to this task just to pad numbers, and you may not develop relations. As for those people who are thus used, we must be constantly vigilant, and prevent the enemy from using them against us as double agents.”19 So what were the overall policies for intelligence work (particularly foreign intelligence) at the time? On April 1, 1950, Zhou put forward that intelligence 17  Li Li, 265. 18  Mao Zedong’s dedication of the conference was “know thyself and know the other, one hundred victories in one hundred battles.” See Gong’an shi zhishi wenda《公安史知识 问答》[Questions and Answers of Public Security History Knowledge] (Masses Press, 1994), 68. 19  Northeastern People’s Government Department of Public Security: “Instructions on Strengthening Reconnoitering Work.” See Gong’an baowei gongzuo, di 17 juan《公安保 卫工作》第 17 卷 [The Work of Public Security and Protection, Vol. 17], February 15, 1950, p. 23.

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work must transition from simple military intelligence into military and political intelligence, that economic intelligence needed to be added, that China still had no technological intelligence, and that foreign intelligence work must be initiated.20 The objective of intelligence work was not to export revolution, but was rather completely aimed at actively defending against threats. In an October meeting with Vice Minister of Public Security Luo Qiqing and State Political Security Bureau Director Chen Long, Public Security Minister Luo Ruiqing said, “the principle behind China’s engaging in foreign intelligence work is different from that of imperialism. Our goal is to understand enemy conspiracies against us. Our goal is to be on the defensive, to actively defend. The only way to better protect ourselves is to understand the other side.”21 A year after the founding of the PRC, the intelligence work envisioned by Zhou and others remained on the whole in elementary stages. On November 1, 1950, a cable from Party Central read, “the work and cadres of intelligence departments in all areas have been scanty and slipshod, not proactive enough; this is still affecting the development of the work.” Li Kenong demanded that improvements be made in all areas.22 These improvements eventually prompted the founding of the CID in 1955. On December 10, 1950, military intelligence, technological intelligence, and political intelligence were all formally incorporated into a newly established agency: the General Intelligence Department [zongqingbao ju], with Li Kenong as its director, and directly subordinate to Party Central, not to the General Staff Headquarters. This organizational format was beneficial to horizontal coordination, but was of no great help in increasing the agency’s ability to acquire intelligence. On January 29, 1953, the General Intelligence Department was disbanded, and Li was appointed PLA deputy chief of staff, all the while continuing his oversight of the Liaison Department’s work. A long-time sufferer of heart disease, Li’s health deteriorated at this point, and on March 5 he was instructed by Mao Zedong to leave his post and seek treatment.23 In spring 1954, there was a dispute regarding who should fund the Liaison Department 20  Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, di 2 ce《建国以来周恩来文稿》第 2 册 [Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 2], 241, 251. 21  Xiu Lairong 修来荣, Chen Long zhuan《陈龙传》[Biography of Chen Long], (Masses Press, 1996), 386. See also Richard Deacon, The Chinese Secret Service, 316, claiming that China’s intelligence work after 1950 was almost entirely defensive. 22  Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, di 3 ce《建国以来周恩来文稿》第 3 册 [Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 3], 436. 23  Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao, di 5 ce《建国以来刘少奇文稿》第 5 册 [Manuscripts of Liu Shaoqi Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 5], (Central Documentary Press, 2008), 84.

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and through what channels. This problem was passed off by organizations directly reporting to Party Central to Supply Minister Deng Diantao and Party Central General Office Director Yang Shangkun, who consulted on the problem and resolved it.24 This issue was the result of Party Central’s bringing “extra-budgetary capital” of directly-reporting bodies under standardized management.”25 In autumn 1954, conditions for reorganization reform were ripe. 2 1955: CID Founded In 2001, prior to the publication of The Diary of Yang Shangkun [Yang Shangkun riji], foreign academics knew almost no details of the founding of the CID. Sinologists and intelligence history experts could only guess about the time and circumstances of its founding. Yang continuously served as Party Central General Office Manager for 14 years after the PRC’s founding. With the information he provided in his diary, we could finally surmise a rough sketch of the timing. On February 23, 1955, Luo Qingchang, Zou Dapeng, and Ma Ciqing of the Liaison Department paid a call on Yang, who, along with Mao Cheng, discussed the question of “finding a home” for the Liaison Department. They expressed willingness to return to the Party system, calling this a “kind of emotion of the masses.”26 On the 28, Yang and Li Kenong discussed the question of to which work unit the Liaison Department (Yang called it the “Political Intelligence Department [zhengqing bu]” in his diary) should belong. Li’s opinion was that it would be best to put it under a Party organization, that it could be its own department, and this department could be called the Investigation and Research Department. Zhou Enlai was in favor of Li concurrently being the leading cadre of this new department to facilitate unified management, but the matter had first to be discussed by the Secretariat before a decision could be made.27

24  Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆, Yang Shangkun riji, shang《杨尚昆日记》上 [Diary of Yang Shangkun, Vol. 1], (Central Documentary Press, 2001), 116. 25  Zhonggong zhongyang zhishu jiguan shiwu guanli ju shi, di 1 juan《中共中央直属机 关事务管理局史》第 1 卷 [History of the CCP Central Directly Reporting Organs Management Administration, Vol. 1], 1991, 125. 26  Yang Shangkun Vol. 1, 161. 27  Yang Shangkun Vol. 1, 165.

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On March 4, Zhou’s office held a meeting, at which Zhou, Yang Shangkun, Su Yu, Li Kenong, Luo Qingchang, and others were present. The meeting decided to incorporate the military intelligence units of the Liaison Department into the CMC, and to establish an investigation department within the Party, of which Li would concurrently serve as director. That evening, Zhou gave the Central Party Secretariat the meeting’s approval. At 8pm that night, Liu Shaoqi’s office held a meeting of the Secretariat which ran until 1:30am on March 5. The Secretariat approved Zhou’s draft document and reported it to Mao Zedong.28 It is unknown when Mao approved this document, but on April 8, Yang wrote in his diary that “the Center and the chairman have approved the founding of the Central Investigation Department.”29 Another document claimed that “on June 20, 1955, CCP Central and the Central Military Commission decided to place the Liaison Department, formerly subordinate to the General Staff Headquarters, under direct leadership of the Central Secretariat, under the name ‘Central Investigation Department.’ ”30 Li Kenong’s son recalls that, “in July 1955, the General Staff Headquarters’ Liaison Department was restructured into the CCP Central Investigation Department, with my father concurrently serving as its director.”31 For the CID’s daily operations, Li stayed in contact with Yang, but Deng Xiaoping was consulted on significant matters.32 Records of the years 1956 to 1958 in Yang Shangkun’s Diary are not very complete, but beginning in 1959, the Diary contains records of Yang’s frequent, fixed-interval meetings with Kong Yuan. In November 1962, nine months after Li Kenong’s death, Kong was formally appointed director of the CID. We know very little of the CID’s organizational structure. All we know is that it contained a secretariat and had several bureaus under its umbrella. We know from Xinhua News Agency’s obituary of Xiao Chi (1911 to 2006) that the CID once had a management bureau, and that Xiao was the director of said bureau.33 Based on the fact that a graduate of the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Military and Political University retired from the position of director of the Liaison Department, we think that the work 28  Yang Shangkun Vol. 1, 169. 29  Yang Shangkun Vol. 1, 185. 30  Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi shi ziliao huibian《中国共产党组织史资料汇编》 [Compilation of Historical Materials of CCP Organization], ed. Wang Jianying 王健英, (Red Flag Press, 1983), 963. 31  Li Li, 324. 32  Yang Shangkun Vol. 1, 185. 33  PRC People’s Government website, accessed from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-12/28/ content_482305.htm.

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of these bureaus was divided functionally.34 In addition to other bureaus, the quantity of which we are not sure, the CID had a Taiwan Affairs Bureau. This fact was revealed in a brief description of Yang Yindong. In 1955, CCP Central founded the Taiwan Affairs Work Group and Taiwan Affairs Office, with “the Taiwan Affairs Office installed in the Central Investigation Department, its directorship to be concurrently held by the director of Premier Zhou’s office, and Yang Yindong in charge of concrete work.”35 The CID established permanent and non-permanent agencies in some provinces and large cities. For example, in August 1955, the CCP Guangdong and Yunnan provincial committees established their own investigation depart­ments per a resolution from the Center. These were under the jurisdiction of both the provincial committees and the CID. The Guangdong Inves­ ti­ga­tion Department existed continuously throughout and after the “Cultural Revolution.”36 The Yunnan Investigation Department was in charge of foreign investigations, but it was disbanded in June 1957.37 The CCP Shanghai Committee Investigation Department was founded in June 1955.38 The Shandong Investigation Department was founded in December 1978 with a staff of 48 cadres and four offices.39 Only Henan never founded an investigation department. The CID generally reported its intelligence to decision-makers in the CCP, the government, and the military. The book Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Following the Founding of the Nation [ Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao] 34  Zhongguo renmin kangri junzheng daxue diyi fenxiao xiaoyou tongxinlu《中国人民 抗日军政大学第一分校校友通信录》[Correspondence Records of Alumni of the China People’s Resist Japan Military and Political University First College], ed. Resistance University’s First College School History Research Society, 1989, 48. 35  Heyang County People’s Government website, accessed from http://www.heyang.gov.cn/ Article.asp?NewsID=845. 36  Zhongguo gongchandang Guangdong sheng zuzhi shi ziliao, di 2 juan《中国共产 党广东省组织史资料》第 2 卷 [Historical CCP Guangdong Province Organization Materials, Vol. 2], (CCP Party History Press, 1996), 25–26, 138–139 and 196. 37  Zhongguo gongchandang Yunnan sheng zuzhi shi ziliao《中国共产党云南省组织史资 料》[Historical CCP Yunnan Province Organization Materials], (CCP Party History Press, 1994), 180. 38  Zhongguo gongchandang Shanghai shi zuzhi shi ziliao《中国共产党上海市组织史资 料》[Historical CCP Shanghai City Organization Materials], (Shanghai People’s Press, 1991), 527. 39  Zhongguo gongchandang Shandong sheng zuzhi shi ziliao《中国共产党山东省组织史 资料》[Historical CCP Shandong Province Organization Materials], (CCP Party History Press, 1991), 516 and 521.

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­ entions that Mao read a document titled “Investigation Report [diaocha m tongbao] no. 872,” compiled by the CID on July 30, 1965, regarding the question of a Taiwanese’s discussion of Li Zongren’s repatriation.40 Decision-makers sometimes sometimes distributed intelligence reports to a broader readership, but still restricted to the highest levels. On November 4, 1958, right after the U.S. congressional elections (in which the Republican Party lost many seats), Mao directed that that the CID’s analysis of the U.S. elections and their results be distributed at the Eight Party Congress’s sixth plenum.41 Mao presided over this plenum, which was attended by 166 members and alternate members of the Central Committee as well as “leading cadres and comrades of relevant central departments, and first secretaries from each province, direct-controlled city, and autonomous region.”42 Mao added a title to the CID’s analysis: “U.S. Political Atmosphere’s Development in Good Directions.” He also added a personal remark, that the analysis was “very interesting.” 3 The CID’s Activities After the CID’s general framework had been established, it was necessary that its daily activities and policies be extremely discreet. This was not a simple task. In his diary, Yang Shangkun wrote, “such work is very difficult to perform; one must be attentive, even more attentive than attentive, and one must pay attention to frequently submitting to the Center for decisions.”43 Many important matters were decided or agreed to at the second political intelligence work conference, hosted by the CID in December 1955, and at which both Mao and Liu Shaoqi gave dedication speeches. On December 6, Mao said in his dedication, “seek truth from facts and work hard.”44 On December 8, Liu said in his 40  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 11 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 11 册 [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 11], (Central Documentary Press, 1998), 423. 41  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 7 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 7 册 [Manu­ scripts of Mao Zedong Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 7], (Central Docu­men­ tary Press, 1998), 589. 42  Zhongguo gongchandang lici zhongyao huiyi ji, di 2 juan《中国共产党历次重要会议 集》第 2 卷 [All Important Conferences of the CCP, Vol. 2], (Shanghai People’s Press, 1983), 123. 43  Yang Shangkun Vol. 1, 185. 44  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 5 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 5 册 [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 5], (Central Documentary Press, 1991), 473.

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dedication, “summarize experience, improve work, strive for greater victories in the struggle against imperialism, and protect the socialist construction of the motherland.”45 On December 24, Zhou Enlai met with delegates to the conference and commended them as “playing an important role in solidifying the people’s democratic dictatorship.”46 He then further stressed that “an important link to such a route is how to fight for international peace. The more protracted the fight for peace, the better. We must make use of this time of peace to build our nation, more, faster, better, and more economically, make our nation stronger and more prosperous and powerful.”47 More similar meetings were held later. For example, the CID convened a nationwide intelligence work conference in February and March 1959. On February 26, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, and Yang Shangkun met with foreign work comrades from the CID’s work conference.48 Secrecy was the CID’s utmost concern. The “Compiled List of Leading Cadres of State Bodies and Political Party Organizations” issued internally by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee General Office in the 1950s included neither the CID nor any of its primary leadership. Information on other organizations was abundant, with detailed lists of names and primary leadership with government bodies at the provincial first level, political parties (the CCP and democratic parties), mass organizations, major universities and research organizations, etc.49 If readers of internally circulated Party documents were not in the scope of “needing to know,” but the CID still had to be mentioned, code was used. In a document issued by CCP Central’s Organization Department on September 27, 1965, the names of all other Party committees were correct, but the CID was referred to as the “Party committee

45  Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao, di 7 ce《建国以来刘少奇文稿》第 7 册 [Manuscripts of Liu Shaoqi Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 7], (Central Documentary Press, 2008), 416. 46  Jianguo yilai gong’an gongzuo dashi yaolan《建国以来公安工作大事要览》[Highlights of Major Events in Public Security Work Since the Founding of the Nation], (Masses Press, 2003), 93–94. 47  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949～1976)》上卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 1], 531. 48  Yang Shangkun, 359. 49   See “Guojia jiguan pai tuanti fuzeren mingdan huibian”《国家机关派团体负责 人名单汇编》[Compiled List of Leading Cadres of State Bodies and Political Party Organizations], ed. National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1959, 89–91.

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of the organ in Xiyuan.”50 Xiyuan was a reference to the CID’s headquarters, located at number 100 Xiyuan, Haidian District, Beijing. Overall, the CID was very successful at protecting its secrecy. Authors Donald W. Clark and Anne B. Klein wrote in their 1960s book Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism (which was written using primarily publicly available from the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong) that they thought Li Kenong and Zou Dapeng performed “intelligence work,” and Kong Yuan was described as the most important foreign trade expert since the founding of the PRC.51 The CID’s representatives in Hong Kong sometimes performed functions in the name of major Chinese trade companies. As the nature of this work was “investigation,” these operatives often concealed their identities by claiming to be journalists.52 The practice of claiming to be a journalist to conceal secret agents’ identities existed before either the PRC or the CID were founded. The charter of the CCP Central Policy Research Bureau, founded in December 1948, had already approved this method.53 Wu Lingxi notes that, “in many branch agencies, journalists for the Xinhua News Agency received specific orders from the CID or from consulate investigative groups. Over the course of a few years, such work was necessary and successful; we should summarize it. On the one hand, by fully using privileges of their professional status, Xinhua journalists could greatly assist the work of the CID, as it was highly likely for journalists to obtain valuable intelligence through their activities. This was in line with the CID’s demands. On the other hand, journalists were different from secret 50  See the Central Organization’s Department’s “Guanyu zhongyang zhishu jiguan dangwei fuze de zhuanyi dangyuan zuzhi guanxi de ongzuo gaiyou zhongyang ge buwei banli de tongzhi”《关于中央直属机关党委负责的转移党员组织关系的工作改由 中央各部委办理的通知》[Notice Regarding the Work of Organizing Party Member Organizations and Relationships, Under Charge of Central Directly-Reporting Organs, Being Transferred to the Various Departments and Committees of the Center]. Also see Zuzhi gongzuo wenxian huibian (dangwu bufen), di 2 ce《组织工作文件汇编 (党务 部分)》第 2 册 [Compiled Documents of Organization Works (Party Affairs Portion), Vol. 2], ed. Lanzhou Military Region Political Organization Department 兰州军区政治 部组织部, 398–399. 51  Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism 1921–1965, Vol. 1: 457, 511; Vol. 2: 871. 52  Richard Deacon, The Chinese Secret Service, 410. A British journalist cited the words of an official of the American Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1970s: Nine out of ten Chinese spies in Europe are journalists; the situation with Taiwanese intelligence agents, though fewer in number, is the same. 53  Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, di 14 ce《中共中央文件选集》第 14 册 [Selected CCP Central Documents, Vol. 14], (CCP Central Party School Press, 1987), 446.

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intelligence agents; their activities were mostly performed publicly and legally. When assigning intelligence tasks, one should make full use of this characteristic of journalists’ activities, and one should not use them as secret intelligence agents. Journalists should be separated from professional investigation agents in both methods and means. Some work methods, such as making face meetings with targets, etc., are not suitable for journalists, because not only will he be unable to stand if his cover is revealed, but this would also harm the international reputation of the Xinhua News Agency.”54 If foreign or colonial governments discovered that Xinhua journalists were engaged in “activities not conforming to their identities,” they would retaliate using various methods. In Hong Kong, this struggle never stopped, owing to the special status of Xinhua. For example, one Ministry of Public Security internal document leaked in 1960 noted that the Hong Kong authorities “have arrested four people this year on suspicion of being Chinese underground workers. They have gathered intelligence and monitored 87 people, including such comrades as Liang Weilin, Qi Feng, etc., as well as Fei Yimin, etc.”55 In 1963, the Xinhua News Agency Prague branch (the first Xinhua branch established in Europe, one year earlier than the founding of the PRC) was closed by order of Czech authorities for “being accused of engaging in spy activities.”56 One British author described Xinhua’s intelligence activities as: careful, often conducted within the confines of the law, and always low-key. This author further cited the words of a reputed China expert in London: China has no intelligence network in the UK whatsoever.57 Xinhua’s London branch was formally founded in July 1956, its Cairo branch in December 1956, and its Paris branch in July 1957 (this was the first time China founded a journalistic organization in a country with which it had no diplomatic relations).58 The first Xinhua branch in Japan was not founded until September 1964. Some people may think that the CID and Xinhua cooperated extremely closely. To dispel such a misunderstanding, Wu Lingxi suggested that a management body 54  Xinhua she wenjian ziliao xuanbian, di 4 juan《新华社文件资料选编》第 4 卷 [Selected Materials and Documents of the Xinhua News Agency, Vol. 4], 569. 55  “Gang-ying dangju jiajin dui wofang renyuan he jinbu renshi de zhencha kongzhi”《港英 当局加紧对我方人员和进步人士的侦查控制》[Hong Kong British Authorities Step Up Investigations and Controls of Our Agents and Progressives], in Gong’an qingbao《公 安情报》(April 1960) 47, 2–3. 56  Deacon and McCormick, 325. 57  Deacon and McCormick, 353. 58  Zou xiang shijie—xinhua she guoji baodao 70 nian《走向世界——新华社国际报 道70年》[Moving Toward the World—70 Years of Xinhua News Agency International Reports], ed. Ma Shengrong 马生荣, (Xinhua Press, 2001), 528–530.

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be established between Xinhua and the CID. He said, “none of us knows the details of the CID’s past work deployments and experience among journalists. I suggest that the CID summarize work in this area, and derive useful experience in the use of the privileges of journalists in strengthening investigation work, as well as making regulations pertaining to those investigation methods not suited for use among journalists. This is necessary for strengthening and elevating journalists’ work in this area, as well as for avoiding potential losses.”59 We do not know how CCP Central’s Foreign Affairs Group reacted to Wu’s suggestion, but it seems that they agreed in principle. In autumn 1961, Yang Shangkun decided to convene another nationwide intelligence work conference after studying the issue with Kong Yuan and others. Conference attendees came from the CID, the Ministry of Public Security, the Foreign Ministry, the PLA’s Military Intelligence Department, the PLA’s General Political Department, the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, etc. On October 20, Yang and a few conference attendees discussed the question of how to rectify intelligence work, as well as questions of divisions of labor and cooperation between the various systems.60 The nature of the relationship between the CID and the Foreign Ministry is not clear at this time. In the 1970s, a foreign researcher comparing Chinese and Soviet intelligence agencies concluded that China was much more cautious, and assigned only a minority of primary embassy officials to this work, and it was not conducted in the capital of every nation.61 4

Development and Evolution of the CID

The CID’s budget was a top-level secret, but it is no secret that it was affected by the overall development of the Chinese economy. During the “Great Leap Forward,” China’s economy suffered severely. On March 25, 1962, the Finance and Trade Office suggested cutting 3.1 billion yuan in State spending as a relief measure.62 This directly affected the CID’s work. On April 4, the CCP Central General Office summoned the CID, the State Science and Technology 59  Xinhua she wenjian ziliao xuanbian, di 4 juan《新华社文件资料选编》第 4 卷 [Selected Materials and Documents of the Xinhua News Agency, Vol. 4], 569–570. 60  Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆, Yang Shangkun riji, xia《杨尚昆日记》下 [Diary of Yang Shangkun, Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 2001), 79. 61  Deacon and McCormick, 313. 62  Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961–1966, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 179 and 196.

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Commission, and the CCP Central Liaison Department to an urgent meeting to “discuss the question of cutting down on non-trade foreign exchange.” In his diary, Yang wrote that everybody was enthusiastically in favor of cutbacks. “Self-reported figures from each work unit were substantial, and the benefits great.”63 In 1964, the Chinese economy began a marked recovery, and CCP Central supported several recommendations regarding diplomatic affairs and international relations. Many of these recommendations came from a 1963 report written by the Central Foreign Affairs Group and the Central Publicity Department, calling for active development of the work of researching foreign nations. Mao Zedong’s comment was, “this document is very good” (he also proposed that China conduct more studies into the world’s major religions).64 One of the document’s recommendations that directly affected the CID was to improve and expand plans for the study of foreign languages. In order to conduct intelligence work abroad, one must of course understand foreign languages, and analysis of such intelligence likewise needed to understand foreign languages. Shortly after its inception in 1955, the CID inherited a school from its predecessor, the Central Liaison Department. This school had previously specialized in diplomatic knowledge and training courses in diplomatic affairs, which Li Kenong had established in 1949 and 1950—on instructions from Zhou Enlai and his assistant Yan Baohang—to train the PRC’s first class of ambassadors and high-level diplomatic officers. Most of the school’s first graduates were assigned to the Foreign Ministry, but some later served as leadership in the CID. In the 1950s, the school was originally called the Foreign Affairs Cadre School, but in 1961 it was renamed a “branch of the Diplomatic Academy,” and expanded for the first time. In spring 1964, Party Central announced that it would urgently require a large quantity of cadres who understood foreign languages in the coming few years, “to facilitate the use of global advanced science and technology to accelerate China’s socialist construction.”65 Party Central also needed to increase the quantity and quality of intelligence agents, and so the CID’s scale was expanded again, and the recommendation to “convert all

63  Yang Shangkun, Vol. 2, 140. 64  Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di 10 ce《建国以来毛泽东文稿》第 10 册 [Manu­ scripts of Mao Zedong Following the Founding of the Nation, Vol. 10], (Central Documentary Press, 1996), 470–471. 65  Zuzhi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian (1964)《组织工作文件选编 (1964 年)》[Selected Documents in Organization Work (1964)], ed. CCP Central Organization Department General Office 中共中央组织部办公厅, 1980, 221–222.

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existing cadre schools into one foreign language institute” was approved.66 The University of International Relations (UIR) was founded in 1965. CID Director Kong Yuan was one of the alternate members present at an expanded Politburo meeting in May 1965. This extremely important meeting issued the so-called “May 16 Notice,” which indicated the beginning of the nationwide movement to ferret out so-called “counter-revolutionary revisionists who have infiltrated the Party, the government, and the military.”67 In summer 1966, factional differences emerged among students and staff of the UIR regarding school management and political questions. When the disagreement began to directly affect the CID’s work, Deng Xiaoping and Li Fuchun went to the university for observations and quickly put down the dispute. But not long after the Eighth Party Congress’s first plenum, Deng was criticized as “capitalist roader,” at which point management of the CID was handed over to Kang Sheng. Nothing ostensibly changed in the CID’s routine work after Kang took over, but at a meeting of the Central Standing Committee on December 6, 1966, Zhou Enlai criticized some departments, and in particular pointed out the CID for “doing mysterious things.” Zhou demanded that CID leadership accept top-to-bottom investigations like all other Party, government, and military departments, per the overall deployment of the “Cultural Revolution.” In March 1967, Zhou, with Mao Zedong’s approval, announced that the military was taking charge of the CID.68 The CID was jointly managed by the PLA and the “rebel faction” during the following two years. In November 1969, the CID was made a branch of the General Staff Headquarters Intelligence Department (GSHID). Among top leadership, including Kong Yuan, some went to prison, and some went to “May 7 Cadre Schools” for labor. When the CID was merged with the GSHID, Luo Qingchang was made one of its deputy directors. How long were the CID and GSHID merged? Historical documents do not give us a reliable answer. On March 3, 1973, a meeting of the Politburo presided over by Zhou Enlai agreed to return to the State Council some departments that had been incorporated into the General Staff Headquarters in 1969.69 Among those units returned were 66  Zuzhi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian (1964)《组织工作文件选编 (1964 年)》[Selected Documents in Organization Work (1964)], 208. 67  Important Documents on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1970), 127. 68  Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), xia juan《周恩来年谱 (1949～1976)》下卷 [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai (1946–1976), Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 1997), 138. 69  Zhou Enlai junshi huodong jishi (1918⁓1975), xia juan《周恩来军事活动纪事 (1918～ 1975)》下卷 [Records of Zhou Enlai’s Military Activities (1918–1975), Vol. 2], (Central Documentary Press, 2000), 759.

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t­opographical, astronomical, telecommunications, and other departments. Although we have no clear documents demonstrating when the CID’s original affiliation was restored, in summer 1973 provincial first level investigation departments were either restored or renamed as investigation departments (those which had been renamed as revolutionary committee office number X).70 In 2000, Xiong Xianghui wrote in an article that he had “been deputy director of the CID from October 1973 to April 1982.”71 An Internet search turned up Luo Qingchang’s résumé, which reads, “1973–1983, leading cadre and director of the CCP Central Investigation Bureau.”72 This demonstrates that the CID was restored as an independent department under CCP Central some time between March and October, 1973. After 1978, the CID’s material conditions began to gradually improve. From January 1979 to April 1981, Feng Jiping, former director of the Beijing Public Security Bureau, served as a CID deputy director. In 1980, most of his time was spent publicly trying the “Gang of Four.”73 The CID also participated in an investigation of Kang Sheng’s activities. On July 1, 1983, the CID was disbanded, ending 28 years of history, and formally incorporating its constituent parts into the Ministry of National Security. In this essay I have given a brief outline of the history of the CID, somewhat similar to a “record of major events.” Although I searched far and wide for materials, many readers may still find this essay rather superficial. The truth is, although I would love to do much deeper research into the topic, such a task would be difficult to accomplish. The CID was a unique organization among all the many organizations that have existed—for short or long terms—in the 60 years of the existence of the PRC. This was determined by the nature of its work. This organization played an extremely important role in protecting the PRC’s interests during the Cold War. Had it not been for the contributions of people working on the “hidden front,” the development road of contemporary

70  “Zhonggong zhizheng yilai shengji dangwei xulie jigou de lishi huigu”《中共执政以 来省级党委序列机构的历史回顾》[A Historical Review of Provincial-Level Party Committee Ranked Organizations Since the CCP Has Been In Power], accessed from http://msn.myspace.cn/t/4181591.html. 71  Xiong Xianghui 熊向晖, “Dui ‘zhonggong tebie gongzuo kaichuangzhe Li Kenong’ yi wen zhiyi”《对〈中共特别工作开创者李克农〉一文质疑》[A Challenge to the Document ‘Founder of CCP Special Work Li Kenong’], in Yanhuang chunqiu《炎黄春 秋》(2000) 3, 80. 72  http://baike.baidu.com/view/308079.htm. 73  Jingdu gong’an juzhang Feng Jiping zhuan《京都公安局长冯基平传》[Biography of Beijing Public Security Bureau Director Feng Jiping], ed. Liu Guangren, Zhao Yimin, and Yu Xingqian 刘光人、赵益民、于行前, (Masses Press, 1997), 380–385.

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Index academic positioning 250, 254, 257 aid management 115, 128–131 Anti-proliferation 151, 156, 160 arms controls 149–151, 153–160, 163–165 Bandung Conference 234–237, 240 Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 16 Central Department of Social Affairs  264–265, 267–269 Central Investigation Department 264–265, 272–273 Central Secretariat 11, 13, 21–23, 272 Chen Yun 1–5, 10–16, 20, 26–28, 51, 74, 77, 79, 252 Chiang Kai-shek 234, 237–241, 246 Chinese government 17, 75, 150–152, 161–164, 171, 175, 196–197, 205–207, 210–211, 217–231, 234, 240, 242–244, 246–248, 256, 269 City Clusters 59 CMC Working Group 168–169, 174–176, 178–180, 182–191 Cold War 149–150, 155, 160–161, 163–165, 203, 264, 281 combat readiness 168–169, 171–172, 174, 177–180, 182–188 commodity fairs 223, 226–227 conscious initiative 105–106 contemporary history 251 CPPCC 108–110, 257 current state of research 250 Deng Xiaoping 1–3, 8, 26–27, 32–33, 41, 49, 52, 144, 158, 177, 252, 272, 275, 280 Development 11, 16, 18, 20–21, 25, 31–32, 35–37, 40, 44–48, 50–52, 54–56, 58–60, 62–69, 95, 99, 102–103, 115–116, 120–122, 128–130, 132, 134–135, 138–140, 143–146, 149, 153–154, 156, 158–159, 161–163, 165–166, 173, 178, 181, 198, 220–221, 227, 249–253, 255–258, 264, 269–270, 274, 278–279, 281 disaster prevention 89 disaster relief 71, 84, 87–89, 123

Economic and Trade Commission 32, 34, 42 economic work 4, 10–12, 36, 40, 43, 46, 252 edema 86–87 “eight-character” guiding principle 50, 52 Eleventh Party Congress’s third plenum 4, 6, 9, 25, 30, 49, 52, 158 emergency disaster relief 71 Feng Youlan 93–94, 100, 102 n. 21 “First Five-year Plan” 54–56, 58–59, 62–63, 65, 69 “four somewhats” 35, 43 Front Command 178–180, 183, 186–189 General Assembly 152–153, 156–157, 159–160 “gourds, vegetables, and substitutes” 71, 80–82 Grain 8–9, 11, 31, 37, 40, 43, 71–85, 87–89, 120 Great Leap Forward 8, 43, 71, 79, 80 n. 41, 89, 264, 278 Gu Mu 9–10, 19, 21, 32, 35, 42 He Lin 5, 38 n. 11, 93–94, 98, 100–102 hiring laborers 21–23 historical research 147 History of the People’s Republic of China  249–250, 252–254 Ho Chih Minh 197–198, 201, 205, 207 Hong Kong 38, 109, 234, 236–248, 251, 276–277 Hu Qiaomu 30, 39, 42–43, 45 Hua Guofeng 4, 10, 26, 30, 32, 38 n. 11, 42 Huang Yongsheng 169 n. 2, 178–180, 184 n. 35, 187, 189 Humphrey Trevelyan 239 impatience for results 8, 50 industrial and urban development 54 industrial zone 57–58, 60, 63 Jiang Zemin 5, 138–139, 164 Kang Sheng 175, 204, 280–281 Kashmir Princess 234–236, 238–242, 245, 248

286 labor 22, 36–38, 40, 43, 48, 51, 65, 80–81, 83, 117–118, 126, 278, 280 land reforms 96–98, 101, 103, 110 Le Doc Tho 205 Le Duan 206–207, 210–211 Li Kenong 237, 242, 267–268, 270–272, 276, 279, 281 n. 71 Li Xiannian 4, 9–10, 25, 30, 33, 35–43, 46, 50–52, 73, 204 Liaison Department 264, 266, 268, 270–272, 279 Liang Shuming 93, 101, 110 Lin Biao 2, 38 n. 11, 52, 168–169, 175, 178, 179 n. 31, 180–181, 206 Luo Qingchang 237, 268, 271–272, 280–281 Ma Yifu 93, 108, 110, 113 Mao Zedong 2, 6, 18–19, 27, 49, 74, 89, 93, 99, 102, 104–107, 110, 112, 154, 168–169, 174 n. 22, 175, 180–181, 183, 184 n. 35, 187, 198 n. 9, 201, 207 n. 50, 210–211, 219, 221, 226, 235, 252, 269 n. 18, 270, 272–273, 279–280 Mao Zedong Thought 18–19, 93, 99, 107 Marxism 93–95, 97, 99–104, 106–108, 111, 217 mass feelings 217 Medical assistance 142 medical assurance 134, 137–140, 142–147 military construction 168, 189 Ministry of Civil Affairs 116, 120–121, 123, 125, 129 Ministry of National Security 264, 266, 281 modern Neo-Confucianism 93–94

index Paris Talks 203–205, 207–208 People’s Liberation Army 3, 158, 168, 186, 237, 265 persuasion and education 217, 228–229 Pham Van Dong 196, 207, 210 Planning Commission 10, 32, 34–36, 38–39, 42, 50, 58 policy evolution 149 Population 19, 38, 51, 65–67, 71, 79–80, 120, 122–123, 125, 136, 138, 144, 146, 169, 220, 235 156 projects 54–59, 62–63, 65–67, 68–69 PTBT 151–152 public cafeterias 85 public order 123–126, 131 R. N. Kao 240, 242–245, 247 RCM 134–135, 137, 141, 145, 147 Reform 1–8, 13, 17–19, 21, 24–28, 30, 36 n. 9, 43, 47–49, 52, 55, 96–103, 108, 110–111, 116–121, 123–125, 130, 135, 138–140, 142, 144–146, 149–151, 154, 156, 158–159, 165, 253, 271 Reform and Opening 1–4, 7–8, 17–19, 21, 25–28, 30, 47, 49, 52, 116, 123–124, 135, 144–145, 149–151, 154, 156, 158–159, 165, 253 regional imbalance 67 rural cooperative medicine 134–135, 137–141, 146

national history installments 250 national history research mainline 250 National Liberation Front 197 nationalistic sentiment 217, 222, 226–228, 230 Nehru 219, 236, 240, 242, 245–246 New era 134, 144, 156, 164, 250, 257 normalization of Sino-Japanese relations  217–218, 225, 228–230 NRCM 134–135, 139–143, 145–146 nuclear arms 153

settlement farm 121–123 Sheltering and sending home 115–117, 119–123, 125–131 Sino-Viet Relations 194 social relief 84, 120, 125, 129 socialist construction 46, 107, 130, 207, 250, 256–257, 275, 279 Southern Talks 24 Sovereignty 96, 155, 164–165, 256 Soviet Union 5, 38, 55, 75, 151–155, 157, 168, 170, 172–173, 195, 202–207, 210–211, 213, 221 State Council Conference 9, 19, 30, 33–34, 49–50 summarize experience 35, 275

old cadres 14, 26, 169 On Practice 49, 99, 112 “Order Number One” 168–169, 180–190

Tanaka 222, 225, 227–229 Tet Offensive 196–198 Three year period of difficulty 71

287

Index Truth 2–3, 5, 15, 18–19, 27, 31, 45, 49, 88–89, 95, 99–101, 104, 153, 181, 221, 234–235, 238, 274, 281 “two whatevers” policy 3–4, 30 U Nu 219, 236 United Nations 152, 244 urban vagrants and beggars 115, 125, 128–131 Urbanization 54, 62–66 U.S. 5, 9, 26, 38, 151–153, 155, 157, 173, 202, 205–209, 211–214, 218–221, 235, 241, 246–248, 276 Vietnam War 155, 194, 213 Vietnam-U.S. Peace Talks 194 Wang Dongxing 4, 181, 184 war criminals 224, 227 World Health Organization 136, 138, 146–147

Xinhua News Agency 10, 236–237, 272, 276–277 Xiong Shili 93, 108–109 Xiong Xianghui 234, 242, 281 Xuan Thuy 199, 201, 203, 205, 208, 210 Yang Shangkun 271–272, 274–275, 278 Ye Qun 177, 180, 182, 189–190 Zhenbao Island incident 168, 170, 172, 174–175, 196, 203–204, 213 Zhou Enlai 2, 8, 74, 82, 109–111, 152, 169, 175, 177, 187, 198, 200–203, 205–206, 208, 210, 220, 224, 226, 228, 234–239, 242–248, 252, 266, 268, 271, 275, 279–280 Zou Dapeng 268, 271, 276