Seeking Peace From Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia 9781685856526

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Map of Somalia
Map of Ethnic Groups in Somalia
ACRONYMS
1 INTRODUCTION
2 THE BARRE ERA: ROOTS OF THE TRAGEDY
3 POST-BARRE POLITICS
4 ECONOMIC AND HUMAN DIMENSIONS
5 SUPERPOWER RIVALRY IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD
6 THE UN AND MULTINATIONAL INTERVENTION
7 CONCLUSION
ABOUT THIS OCCASIONAL PAPER
THE INTERNATIONAL, PEACE ACADEMY

Citation preview

SEEKING PEACE FROM CHAOS

INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

President of the Academy Olara A. Otunnu Editorial Board Marianne Heiberg, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs F. T. Liu, International Peace Academy Augustus Richard Norton, US Military Academy Henry Wiseman, University of Guelph

SEEKING PEACE FROM CHAOS HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

SAMUEL M . MAKINDA

LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

• BOULDER & LONDON

Published in the United States of America in 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, L o n d o n WC2E 8LU © 1993 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Makinda, Samuel M. Seeking peace from chaos : humanitarian intervention in Somalia / Samuel M. Makinda. p. cm. — (International Peace Academy occasional paper series) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-55587-477-0 (alk. paper) 1. Somalia—Politics and g o v e r n m e n t — 1 9 6 0 - . 2. Clans—Somalia. 3. Economic assistance—Somalia. 4. Insurgency—Somalia— History—20th century. I. Series. DT407.M35 1993 967.7305—dc20 93-20731 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and b o u n d in the United States of America T h e paper used in this publication meets the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments Map of Somalia Map of Ethnic Groups in Somalia Acronyms

(3 8 9 10

1

Introduction

1]

2

T h e Barre Era: Roots of the Tragedy

17

3

Post-Barre Politics

29

4

Economic and Human Dimensions

41

5

Superpower Rivalry in the Cold War Period

51

6

T h e UN and Multinational Intervention

59

7

Conclusion

83

About this Occasional Paper The International Peace Academy

91 92

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study is o n e result of my i n t e r e s t in t h e n o n m i l i t a r y s o u r c e s of insecurity in the H o r n of Africa a n d builds o n my earlier work Security in the Horn of Africa (Adelphi P a p e r No. 269), which was p u b l i s h e d by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute f o r Strategic Studies (IISS) in L o n d o n in 1992. My ideas have b e n e f i t e d f r o m discussions with f r i e n d s in several institutions, especially the IISS a n d the Global Security P r o g r a m m e of C a m b r i d g e University. Part of the research o n Somalia was f u n d e d by the J o h n D. & C a t h e r i n e T. M a c A r t h u r F o u n d a t i o n t h r o u g h the IISS in 1989-1990, while M u r d o c h University f u n d e d my research o n the c h a n g i n g d i m e n s i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l security in 1991-1992. I am g r a t e f u l to b o t h institutions. In the course of writing this m o n o g r a p h , I b e n e f i t e d directly f r o m c o m m e n t s by a wide r a n g e of p e o p l e . I w o u l d like particularly to t h a n k Mr. F. T. Liu, special adviser to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Academy a n d a f o r m e r UN Assistant Secretary-General f o r Special Political Affairs, f o r detailed c o m m e n t s o n earlier d r a f t s of the p a p e r a n d for e n c o u r a g i n g m e to c o m p l e t e t h e project quickly. I also a c k n o w l e d g e very useful c o m m e n t s f r o m Professor Michael W. Doyle, vice-president of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e A c a d e m y . Both g e n t l e m e n p r o v i d e d m e with u s e f u l r e a d i n g material at crucial stages of t h e writing. I g a i n e d considerably as well f r o m c o m m e n t s by Mr. G e o r g e L. Sherry, also a f o r m e r UN Assistant Secretary-General f o r Special Political Affairs. In the final stages of the writing, I p r o f i t e d e n o r m o u s l y f r o m a discussion with A m b a s s a d o r Ismat Kittani, shortly a f t e r h e h a d c o m p l e t e d his a s s i g n m e n t as t h e UN S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s Special R e p r e s e n t a t i v e to Somalia. E a r l i e r c o m m e n t s o n t h e m o n o g r a p h c a m e f r o m my c o l l e a g u e s at M u r d o c h University. I w o u l d like to give special t h a n k s to Patrick C o r n i s h , J a n i c e Dudley, J a n e H u t c h i s o n , C a t h e r i n e Iorns, a n d J o h n

6

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

7

Mugambwa. Professor R o b e r t Dowse o f the D e p a r t m e n t o f Political S c i e n c e at the University o f Western Australia also m a d e very useful comments on an initial draft. I was helped by librarians at three institutions and I would like to thank them sincerely for their services: Sue Baker o f the International Institute for Strategic Studies library, J o a n n e Marchioro of the United States Information Service library in Perth, and T o n i Smith o f the United Nations office in Sydney were extremely knowledgeable, polite, and prompt in responding to my incessant requests for various documents. I should like to thank the United Nations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies for permission to use the two maps printed in this occasional paper. I should also like to thank Gia Hamilton, Ellen Rifkin, and Kate M. Watts o f Lynne R i e n n e r Publishers for producing this m o n o g r a p h promptly. Finally, my biggest gratitude is to my wife, Isabella, who, as usual, served as a loving conscience. O t h e r m e m b e r s of my family—Wekesa, Lillian, Crispus, and J o s h u a — g a v e e n c o u r a g e m e n t and c o o p e r a t i o n . T o them, I am very grateful. Samuel M. Makinda

Somalia

Berbera

I he boundaries and names shown on this map do not imp y official endgrsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Dhuusamarreeb D (Dusa M a r r e b ) Hobyo Beledweyne

Tayeeglow

KENYA

INDIAN

OCEAN

Baydhabo Jawhar Baardheere

^ Muqdisho M a r k a (Merca)

Sacuein

(Mogadishu)

Baraawe

Legend "t" .

' Kismaayo (Chisimayu)

O 0 I

I

0

Source:

Map No. 3710, United Nations. O c t o b e r

Airlift sites L

Ports Capital 100 I

^

50

1992

R e p r i n t e d with p e r m i s s i o n o f the C a r t o g r a p h i c U n i t , U n i t e d N a t i o n s

I

200 k m I

100

ì

150 m i

Ethnic Groups in Somalia

Source: Based on a m a p published in Strategic Survey 1990; printed with permission of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Note: Clan Families: 1. Dir 2. Issaq 3. Darod 4. Hawiye 5. Digil 6. Rahanwein 7. Non-Somali

ACRONYMS

ICRC IMF NGO OAU SAMO SDA SDM SNA SNDU SNF SNM SNU SPM SRC SSDF SSNM SSRP UNDP UNESCO UNICEF UNITAF UNHCR UNOSOM I U N O S O M II USC USF USP WFP

International Committee of the Red Cross International Monetary Fund Non-Governmental Organization Organization of African Unity Somali Africans Muki Organization Somali Democratic Alliance Somali Democratic Movement Somali National Alliance Somali National Democratic Union Somali National Front Somali National Movement Somali National Union Somali Patriotic Movement S u p r e m e Revolutionary Council Somali Salvation Democratic Front Southern Somali National Movement Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party United Nations Development P r o g r a m m e United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization United Nations International Children's Fund Unified Task Force United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees First United Nations Operation in Somalia Second United Nations Operation in Somalia United Somali Congress United Somali Front United Somali Party World Food P r o g r a m m e 10

1

INTRODUCTION

T h e tragedy in Somalia is the most severe any i n d e p e n d e n t African state has suffered. T h e only sub-Saharan country comprising o n e ethnic g r o u p , Somalia has been torn apart by civil war since 1990, when clans and lineages turned against each other. At the time of this writing, Somalia has no army, no police force, n o civil service, no banking system and no schools or hospitals that function. Its public institutions were u n d e r m i n e d during the twenty-one-year rule of former President Siad Barre, who took power in a military c o u p in October 1969 and ruled until he was toppled in J a n u a r y 1991. U n d e r Barre, c o r r u p t i o n was r a m p a n t a n d public institutions were a b u s e d a n d weakened. After his ouster, Ali Mahdi a s s u m e d the title of interim president, but his authority has been challenged by other clan leaders; since that time, there has b e e n n o f u n c t i o n i n g g o v e r n m e n t in Somalia and no institutions worthy of the name. T h r o u g h o u t 1991 and 1992, power a n d authority were in the h a n d s of clan-based fiefs and their m a r a u d i n g g u n m e n . This situation started to change in D e c e m b e r 1992, a n d by the time the United Nations Security Council a p p r o v e d a new p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n with e n f o r c e m e n t powers on 26 March 1993, peace was slowly returning to the country. T h e Security Council, which reaffirmed its aim of c o n t i n u i n g humanitarian relief a n d the rehabilitation of S o m a l i a ' s political institutions and economy, a u t h o r i z e d a " p r o m p t , s m o o t h , and phased" transition from the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the second UN Operation in Somalia ( U N O S O M II). U N O S O M II consists of a b o u t 20,000 troops and 2,700 logistics e l e m e n t s — o n e of the biggest a n d most expensive p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n in U n i t e d Nations history. It was deployed in S o m a l i a in early May 1993 u n d e r the c o m m a n d of General Cevik Bir of Turkey. UN Secretary-General Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali told the Security Council in his report of

11

12

Samuel M. Ma kin da

3 M a r c h 1993 t h a t "without i m p r o v e d security all over the c o u n t r y , t h e political p r o c e s s c a n n o t p r o s p e r , a n d h u m a n i t a r i a n o p e r a t i o n s will r e m a i n v u l n e r a b l e to d i s r u p t i o n . " 1 Shortly a f t e r t h e Security C o u n c i l a u t h o r i z e d U N O S O M II, f o u r t e e n Somali factions that w e r e m e e t i n g in Addis Ababa, E t h i o p i a , a g r e e d to set u p a U N - m o n i t o r e d i n t e r i m g o v e r n m e n t to rule f o r two years. N o n e t h e l e s s , faction leaders a n d w a r l o r d s 2 who feel that o r d e r in the c o u n t r y will be d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s to t h e m d o not a p p e a r willing to c o o p e r a t e with U N O S O M II. In fact, in mid-1993 U N O S O M II units clashed with s u p p o r t e r s of the most v i r u l e n t o p p o n e n t of t h e UN military p r e s e n c e in Somalia, G e n e r a l M o h a m m e d Farah Aidid, w h o is l e a d e r of b o t h a f a c t i o n within t h e U n i t e d Somali C o n g r e s s (USC) a n d t h e Somali N a t i o n a l Alliance (SNA). G u n m e n l i n k e d with his g r o u p killed 23 Pakistani soldiers serving with U N O S O M II o n 5 J u n e 1993. Following this i n c i d e n t , U N O S O M II forces a t t a c k e d G e n e r a l Aidid's military facilities, seized his w e a p o n s , a n d issued a warrant for his arrest. 3 In the process, U N O S O M II f o r c e s killed a b o u t o n e h u n d r e d Somalis, i n c l u d i n g w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n . This c h a l l e n g e to UN a u t h o r i t y a n d t h e massive r e s p o n s e by U N O S O M II was n o t only an i n a u s p i c i o u s sign that t h e task of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g Somalia m i g h t take a l o n g time, b u t it also d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h e UN has n o t won t h e c o n f i d e n c e of the Somali p e o p l e . In t h e late 1980s, Somalia h a d p o o r l y m a n a g e d p u b l i c institutions a n d a centralized a n d u n d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t . T h e r e was n o m e c h a n i s m f o r resolving i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t . Barre, e s t i m a t e d to b e over eighty years old by 1989, f a c e d a s e r i o u s i n s u r g e n c y t h a t was g r o w i n g by t h e day. H e was also u n d e r c h a l l e n g e f r o m s o m e m e m b e r s of his own clan a n d family, a n d his g o v e r n m e n t lacked legitimacy. Morale in the civil a n d a r m e d services h a d p l u m m e t e d . A d d i n g to these difficulties, t h e e c o n o m y was in a shambles, a n d the national d e b t , a l t h o u g h small by African s t a n d a r d s , was growing. T h e s e p r o b lems, c o u p l e d with n e p o t i s m , aggravated t h e rivalry a m o n g t h e m a j o r clans a n d lineages. W i d e s p r e a d r e s e n t m e n t against B a r r e a n d his M a r e h a n clan f a n n e d factionalism as e a c h clan, subclan a n d l i n e a g e s t r u g g l e d f o r a s h a r e of the political a n d e c o n o m i c p l u m s . It was already clear in late 1989 a n d 1990 t h a t political a u t h o r i t y h a d brok e n d o w n a n d t h a t n o b o d y was in c o n t r o l of m u c h of S o m a l i a . By 1991, political a n d e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s w e r e so a p p a l l i n g t h a t few p e o p l e h a d any illusion that B a r r e ' s fall w o u l d e i t h e r b r i n g an i m m e d i a t e e n d to the s u f f e r i n g or r e s t o r e normalcy. 4 Moreover, the opposition forces mirrored the anarchic conditions of t h e Barre r e g i m e , thereby e n s u r i n g that the i m m e d i a t e postBarre era would be chaotic. T h e m a i n o p p o s i t i o n g r o u p s w e r e based

SEEKING P E A C E FROM C H A O S

13

on clans: the Somali National Movement (SNM) was based on the Issaq of n o r t h e r n Somalia, the United Somali Congress (USC) was based on the Hawiye of central Somalia, and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) drew its s u p p o r t f r o m the Ogadeni. These t h r e e movements loathed each o t h e r almost as m u c h as they did Barre. Increasingly, every public issue came to be d e f i n e d in clan and lineage terms. It was, therefore, not surprising that when Barre was toppled by the USC in J a n u a r y 1991, the country was p l u n g e d into deeper problems. T h e anarchy and factionalism that wrought destruction in Somalia in the past few years not only traumatized individual Somalis; it also transformed Somalia's collective identity profoundly. With the attainment of i n d e p e n d e n c e from the United Kingdom and Italy in July 1960, Somalia's overriding ambition had been to establish a Greater Somalia nation; to do so, it sought to "liberate" all ethnic Somalis in neighboring stales and unite them into one state. 5 However, the image of Somalia in the early 1990s is of a country so deeply divided that even the original union between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland might not hold. T h e ambition for a Greater Somalia and the simultaneous image of heavily divided clans raises questions for the reader: Is it the language and a c o m m o n cosmology that forms the shared identity of the different clans? Did clan struggles predate both colonialism and the i n d e p e n d e n t nation-state? How was interclan conflict formerly mediated? Some of these questions are answered in this paper. While the anarchy in Somalia has s t e m m e d in great part f r o m clan rivalry and the chronic struggle for power a m o n g warlords, the situation has been amplified by the availability of large quantities of arms. Somalia acquired large quantities of weapons in the 1970s and early 1980s. The arms were intended to be used principally in Somalia's bid to reclaim parts of the n e i g h b o r i n g states; they were also used to help Barre consolidate power and maintain internal o r d e r . However, in 1991, these weapons were used to topple Barre; they have subsequently b e e n utilized by ambitious politicians and warlords to set factions against each other and to prevent any claimant to power f r o m establishing internal o r d e r . While the Cold War lasted, Somalia played East against West and tried to m a n i p u l a t e both superpowers for its own gain. Following the end of the Cold War, Somalia has b e c o m e an international commodity—an object of international compassion—but has n o m e a n s of exercising diplomatic leverage. In the immediate p o s t - C o l d War period and until mid-1992, Somalia, like most African states, suffered benign neglect by Western

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SAMUEL M .

MAKINDA

powers. Its tragedy might have been averted had Western nations acted sooner rather than later. Instead, changes in the international political climate, especially the revolutions in Eastern E u r o p e and the 1991 Gulf War, served to shift attention away from Somalia. Even the overthrow of Barre in January 1991 went virtually u n n o t i c e d in most Western capitals except Rome. This was largely because outside the context of the Cold War, Somalia was of negligible strategic value to the major powers; hence they gave little attention to its plight in the initial stages of the tragedy. When international relief agencies raised the alarm in 1990 and 1991, the international community t u r n e d a deaf ear. During this period, the attention of the Western world was on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; when this was over, the focus shifted to the implosion in the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n , which eventually disintegrated in December 1991. As a Washington Post corr e s p o n d e n t has argued, the Western world often reacts to African problems only "when the catastrophe meter soars way up—when the body count clicks into the tens of thousands." 6 Why wouldn't regional organizations assist? Somalia is a m e m b e r of the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic C o n f e r e n c e (OIC), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), but these bodies had neither the capacity n o r the willingness to help. T h e OAU could not provide humanitarian assistance largely because of the desperate economic conditions of most of its members. The organization also lacks the finance and infrastructure to assemble a p e a c e k e e p i n g force. 7 T h e Arab League and the OIC include oil-rich n a t i o n s like Saudi Arabia and Iran a m o n g their members, but they were preoccupied with problems arising f r o m the 1991 Gulf War. T h e OAU, along with the Arab League and the OIC, tried to m e d i a t e in the Somali conflict in early 1992, but it was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the United Nations has continued to seek to involve these organizations in efforts to p r o m o t e national reconciliation in Somalia. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali believes strongly that in this p o s t Cold War era, regional organizations can help create conditions for peacemaking, reduce the b u r d e n of the Security Council in some regional conflicts, and "contribute to a d e e p e r sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs." 8 It has made considerable difference that the United Nations and industrialized countries eventually u n d e r t o o k to address the Somali tragedy in 1992 and started to provide humanitarian assistance. T h e food, clothing, and medicines will help save some lives a n d remove the incentive to kill for food. In the past year, the currency that gunmen have been fighting for has been food. They have attacked convoys, raided warehouses, and often prevented relief workers f r o m

S E E K I N G P E A C E FROM C H A O S

15

moving in their supplies. T h e U.S. decision in December 1992 to step up security for humanitarian supplies has ensured that food and o t h e r supplies reach those who n e e d it most. T h e U.S.-led Unified Task Force of about 37,000 troops f r o m more than twenty nations was the first h u m a n i t a r i a n intervention force in UN history. T h e Security Council authorized it after d e t e r m i n i n g that the h u m a n tragedy in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and security and invoking Chapter VII of the UN charter. This was arguably the quickest way of breaking through the obstacles impeding the flow of aid and delivering immediate relief. y However, UNITAF's m a n d a t e was restrictive in both conceptual and operational terms. In operation it was limited to only 40 percent of Somalia's territory and in conceptual terms it was based on a very narrow definition of security. Because of this, UNITAF and relief supplies dealt only with the symptoms and not the causes of the p r o b l e m . Starvation in Somalia is a consequence of the civil war, which is, in turn, a result of corruption, misguided macroeconomic policies, clan feuds, and power struggles. Given the widespread anarchy, humanitarian assistance could provide short-term relief, but it could not rebuild Somalia's ravaged political, social, and economic institutions. T r o o p s have p e r f o r m e d a policing function and made the delivery of humanitarian supplies safe, but they cannot in and of themselves create peace. In addition to a UN peace e n f o r c e m e n t presence and relief assistance, Somalia needs technical and economic assistance to address deeper structural problems and a broader political and economic malaise. As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali argued in his proposals for preventive diplomacy and peace building in J u n e 1992, o n e effective way of preventing war is to deal with "the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression." 1 0 T h e biggest h o p e for Somalia is that the Security Council, in Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993, asked Boutros-Ghali to provide security as appropriate, utilizing UNOSOM II forces. This is likely to give the Secretary-General a chance to adopt a broader definition of security that encompasses social, political, and economic reconstruction, refugee rehabilitation and resettlement, and the building of public institutions in general. This paper raises several questions: Does the Somali tragedy stem f r o m internal or external factors? How crucial is the segmented n a t u r e of Somali society to national instability? How instrumental was Barre's rule in the disintegration of society? Did the end of the Cold War and the subsequent i n d i f f e r e n c e of Western powers play any role? How should external assistance be made to help Somalis themselves rebuild their society? What impact does h u m a n i t a r i a n

Samuel M. Makinda

16

i n t e r v e n t i o n have on i n t e r n a t i o n a l law? D o e s t h e U N o p e r a t i o n in Somalia suggest that the international c o m m u n i t y has devised a way of d e a l i n g with massive humanitarian problems? T o address these questions as well as others, the paper starts with an analysis of the Barre era and e x p l a i n s the clan system and the weaknesses of public institutions. It g o e s o n to analyze clan militias and the civil war, describing the effect of the war o n society in general. It also e x a m i n e s the impact of the superpowers during the Cold War period and the recent U N and multinational interventions in an effort to alleviate and resolve the Somali tragedy. T h e c o n c l u s i o n posits o p t i o n s for Somalia and e x p l o r e s its future p r o s p e c t s . "

NOTES

1. Sec Security Council Document S/25354 of 3 March 1993. 2. The term "warlord" refers to leaders of political factions and paramilitary groups. Their power is acquired through arms, intrigue, intimidation, and harassment. It is these leaders who have wreaked havoc on Somalia. The term, however, does not apply to clan "elders," the legitimate clan leaders whose power stems from age-old traditions. 3. See Security Council Resolution 837 of 6 J u n e 1993. 4. For some analysis of the situation in Somalia one year prior to Barre's demise, see a special issue of Horn of Africa: An Independent Journal, Vol. 13, Nos. 1 & 2, April-June 1990. 5. T h e Greater Somalia concept stemmed from the fact that colonialism had split ethnic Somalis into five states: French Somaliland, later the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (now Djibouti); Ethiopia; Kenya; Italian Somaliland; and British Somaliland. The latter two united at the time of independence in 1960 to form the present-day Somalia. 6. Blaine Harden, Africa: Dispatches from a Fragile Continent (London: Fontana, 1992), pp. 14-15. 7. Somalia's relations with the OAU have not been without tension. Somalia was the only OAU member that refused to recognize the OAU resolution in the 1960s that required African states to respect state boundaries as they were at the end of colonial rule, because it h a r b o r e d irredentist ambitions against Ethiopia and Kenya. 8. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 37. 9. See Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992. 10. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 8. 11. Some of the ideas expressed in this paper were discussed in Samuel M. Makinda's Security in the Horn of Africa, Adelphi Paper No. 269 (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), and his Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

T H E BARRE ERA: ROOTS OF THE TRAGEDY

As already stated, the roots of anarchy in Somalia lie partly in Barre's policies of the 1970s and 1980s. T h e absence of legitimacy on the part of Barre and his imposition of centralized rule aggravated the negative results of these policies. As in o t h e r African states where democracy did not exist, the logic of one-man rule d e m a n d e d and led to ever increasing corruption. Barre had started as a nationalist with great regional ambitions. Indeed, Somalia's relative stability in the 1970s a n d early 1980s depended on his skillful manipulation of domestic politics. He maintained power often by suppressing critics, detaining o p p o n e n t s , and playing on clan interests and rivalries, and occasionally by buying out opposition groups with cash. However, by the late 1980s, increased interclan rivalries had weakened his military muscle. It had also become increasingly obvious that he had neither the skill to manipulate sectional interests nor the vision to lead the country quickly out of its political quagmire. 1 Barre's power to m a n i p u l a t e clans waned as Somalia's economic problems increased, a fact that demonstrates the crucial relationship between economic prosperity and political stability. Barre's rule had relied on his M a r e h a n clan, a m e m b e r of the Darod clan family, but his main power base until the late 1980s had been the army, which was dominated by Ogadenis (who also belong to the Darod g r o u p ) . In the last years of the Barre regime, nearly anarchic conditions existed side by side with a dictatorship, and while the government was unable to exercise power over much of the country, Barre ruled the areas he could reach with an iron h a n d . By the late 1980s, he was often r e f e r r e d to as the mayor of Mogadishu, because that was the only area of the country he controlled. T h e military had disintegrated into what looked like clan militias. 2 T h e civil 17

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SAMUEL M .

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service was totally demoralized and Barre's cabinet functioned like a federation of clans. Operating through the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP), which was established in 1976, Barre sought to maintain an autocratic centralized system that was alien to the segmented Somali society.

CLAN RIVALRY AND CORRUPTION For generations, the single most important factor in Somali society has been the clan. Although all Somalis belong to o n e ethnic group and enjoy a sense of c o m m o n identity based on a shared culture, clan loyalty often undercuts the sense of shared nationhood. Traditionally, Somali clans have played two apparently contradictory roles, as centripetal and centrifugal forces, whereby there has been solidarity against external threats and antagonism when the threat has vanished. Somalia's social, political, and e c o n o m i c activities have traditionally stemmed from lineage systems based on o n e of the six major clan families—Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawiye, Issaq, and Rahanwein —which can be traced back to two brothers, Sab and Samaal. 3 The Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and Issaq clan families—who trace their origin to Samaal—constitute about 75 percent of the Somali population. T h e six family groups are further split into smaller clans and hundreds of lineages. For instance, the Darod clan family includes the Dolbahante, Majerteen, Marehan, and Ogadeni clans. T h e Hawiye clan family consists of six smaller clans, two of which are sharply divided, namely the Abgal clan of the interim president, Ali Mahdi, and the Habr Gedir clan of General Mohammed Farah Aidid. Membership in clans and lineages is usually traced through males from a c o m m o n ancestor. T o a large extent, especially in regions unaffected by recent refugee settlements, clans have been associated with a given territorial unit, essentially defined by the circuit of nomadic migration. T h e territorial units are without specified boundaries, so that the territories of neighboring clans tend to overlap. In the past, various family groupings often fought each other over access to grazing areas and water; occasionally, there were armed conflicts even between segments of the same clan. In some cases, temporary alliances were formed between clans of different families. T h e traditional social structure was characterized by competition and conflicts, and clan conflicts and rivalries have been a feature of the Somali society. Clan affiliations were important in the period just before and after independence in 1960. For instance, in the p r e - i n d e p e n d e n c e elections of 1956, a clan voting system was used in some areas, whereby

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n o m a d i c pastoralists of each clan m e t in a n assembly a n d d e c i d e d jointly o n t h e c a n d i d a t e f o r w h o m all t h e i r votes w o u l d b e cast, a n d clan e l d e r s s u b s e q u e n t l y i n f o r m e d t h e a u t h o r i t i e s of t h e assembly's decision a n d the n u m b e r of individual votes. T h e i m p o r t a n c e of clan solidarity in n a t i o n a l politics was d e m o n s t r a t e d in 1964; t h e newly a p p o i n t e d p r i m e minister, A b d i r a z a k H a j i H u s s e i n , p i c k e d his ministers f o r t h e i r ability without r e g a r d f o r t h e i r clan origins. His gove r n m e n t fell b e c a u s e of a vote of n o c o n f i d e n c e . In t h e i m m e d i a t e p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e era as well, u n s u c c e s s f u l a t t e m p t s h a d b e e n m a d e to r e p l a c e loyalty to the clan a n d l i n e a g e with loyalty to t h e n a t i o n . In fact, n e p o t i s m a n d clan-based politics m a d e it difficult f o r Somalia to enjoy d e m o c r a c y t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1960s. C o m p e t i t i o n for power a n d wealth o f t e n took t h e f o r m of s h i f t i n g a l l i a n c e s a n d conflicts b e t w e e n c l a n s a n d led to c o r r u p t i o n . Clan a n d l i n e a g e affiliations also have b e e n vital in o b t a i n i n g j o b s , services, a n d favors. W h e n B a r r e seized p o w e r in 1969, h e vowed to p u t a n e n d to clan loyalty a n d p r o h i b i t e d any r e f e r e n c e to clans in t h e early 1970s. H e d e n o u n c e d the s e g m e n t e d system as a divisive f o r c e , a source of n e p o t i s m a n d of c o r r u p t i o n , a n d i n s t i t u t e d various m e a s u r e s in t h e early 1970s d e s i g n e d to e r o d e d a n i s m . B a r r e also s o u g h t to u n d e r m i n e the actual f u n c t i o n s of clans a n d lineages t h r o u g h t h e institution of a variety of political a n d administrative offices that took over s o m e clan f u n c t i o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , h e s o u g h t to p r o m o t e sexual equality a n d to p r o h i b i t t h e use of l a n g u a g e t h a t was d i s p a r a g i n g to clans traditionally t h o u g h t to b e i n f e r i o r . H e r e q u i r e d all Somalis to r e f e r to e a c h o t h e r as challe ( c o m r a d e ) , a n d h e a d o p t e d "scientific" socialism in an e f f o r t to u n i t e t h e n a t i o n . T h r o u g h t h e s e m e a s u r e s , Barre t r i e d to p r o m o t e t h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i t y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n to s u p e r s e d e l i n e a g e affiliation. T h r o u g h intense radio p r o p a g a n d a a n d t h r o u g h o r i e n t a t i o n centers set u p t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y in t h e 1970s with Soviet assistance, B a r r e h a d s o u g h t to r e p l a c e a r c h a i c a n d divisive l i n e a g e loyalty by r e v o l u t i o n a r y a l l e g i a n c e to t h e n a t i o n , b u t h e h a d little success. In fact, B a r r e himself was i n f l u e n c e d by k i n s h i p c o n s i d e r a tions. H e relied o n his M a r e h a n clan, a n d m o s t of his t r u s t e d ministers w e r e d r a w n f r o m it. H e also e s t a b l i s h e d close links with two o t h e r clans: t h e O g a d e n i , w h e r e his m o t h e r c a m e f r o m ; a n d the Dolb a h a n t e , t h e clan of o n e of his sons-in-law, A h m e d S u l e i m a n . S u l e i m a n was at various times h e a d of t h e N a t i o n a l Security Services, i n t e r i o r minister, a n d assistant secretary-general of t h e r u l i n g party. B a r r e ' s i n n e r circle of advisers also c a m e f r o m t h e s e t h r e e clans, a n d in t h e early 1970s, his g o v e r n m e n t was o f t e n d i s p a r a g i n g l y r e f e r r e d to as M O D (i.e., M a r e h a n , O g a d e n i , a n d D o l b a h a n t e ) .

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In times of crisis in the 1970s a n d early 1980s, Barre relied on these three clans to see him t h r o u g h , but by the late 1980s they were split. Barre might have expected support from his Marehan clan, but even t h e r e he could not take anything for g r a n t e d ; in 1989 some p r o m i n e n t m e m b e r s of the clan publicly criticized him for concentrating power in his family and asked him to step down. By the last few m o n t h s of his leadership, Barre had come to rely on his family to hold o n t o power, but even his family was split over succession. By this time also, Barre had lost his vision of a united Somalia and even of the pan-Somali nationalism that u n d e r p i n n e d the Greater Somalia goal. Until recently, pan-Somali nationalism has been the unifying and legitimizing principle of the nation, and every Somali l e a d e r has b e e n j u d g e d on the basis of his willingness to pursue the Greater Somalia goal. T h e O g a d e n region of Ethiopia, inhabited p r e d o m i nantly by the Ogadeni, has been the main target of this nationalism. T h e Somali-Ethiopian relationship is complicated by the fact that the border between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland was still n o t settled when the UN trusteeship over Italian Somaliland e n d e d in 1960. From 1960 to 1967, three Somali prime ministers, all from the Darod clan family, laid claim to the O g a d e n . U n d e r Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal (1967-1969), an Issaq with few ties to the Ogaden, Somalia sought a rapprochement with Ethiopia, but Egal was overthrown by Barre. T h e opposition to Barre increased after it was clear that h e could not unite all ethnic Somalis—including those in neighboring states— u n d e r o n e flag. T h e first m a j o r signs of serious disaffection toward Barre's leadership a p p e a r e d in 1978, following his failure to take the O g a d e n region after Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia in 1977. T h e war with Ethiopia, which "represented the high point of Somali nationalist fervour," 4 had been very popular. However, defeat at the h a n d s of Ethiopia (helped by the Soviets a n d Cubans) was d e m o r a l i z i n g and led to an upsurge of clan antagonisms as each g r o u p s o u g h t scapegoats to explain the failure. This situation led to an abortive c o u p in April 1978. Some of the officers involved, mainly f r o m the Majerteen clan (the only clan f r o m the Darod clan family that Barre had excluded from central power), subsequently f o r m e d the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which, ironically, was given sanctuary by Ethiopia. By seeking asylum in Ethiopia, the Majerteen officers signaled the disintegration of Somali national unity. T h e Ethiopians welcomed the defectors in the h o p e of using t h e m to u n d e r m i n e Somali national solidarity. T h e strongest challenge to Barre's rule took place in May 1988, o n e m o n t h after the signing of the Somali-Ethiopian p e a c e

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a g r e e m e n t . T h e a c c o r d called for the demilitarization o f the two c o u n t r i e s ' c o m m o n b o r d e r , and t h r o u g h it S o m a l i a effectively ren o u n c e d its claims to the O g a d e n r e g i o n . T h e a g r e e m e n t was designed to d e m o n s t r a t e that Barre had eschewed his earlier policies of seeking to detach parts o f n e i g h b o r i n g states, but it was also dictated by clan, and specifically family, interests in Mogadishu. Following B a r r e ' s involvement in a car a c c i d e n t in May 1 9 8 6 , some m e m bers o f the M a r e h a n clan started to feel insecure at the prospect of a n o t h e r clan taking power. 5 T h e r e were also rivalries within B a r r e ' s family and clan as to who should succeed him. T h e ensuing disagreements led to the collapse o f the alliance between the Marehan, Ogadeni, and D o l b a h a n t e clans. At the same time, s o m e p r o m i n e n t m e m b e r s of the M a r e h a n clan felt they should seek Ethiopia's cooperation to put an e n d to guerrilla activity from the S S D F and the Somali National M o v e m e n t ( S N M ) — h e n c e the p e a c e a c c o r d . T h e a g r e e m e n t was resented by the Ogadenis, then the d o m i n a n t clan in the army, who felt that their h o m e l a n d had b e e n a b a n d o n e d and who directed their anger toward Barre. For years, Barre pitted one clan or lineage block against another, in order to direct attention away from appalling s o c i o e c o n o m i c conditions. He sometimes used political or e c o n o m i c rewards to appease a group that was d i s c o n t e n t e d . H e also frequently shuffled his ministers, partly as a way o f reasserting his authority and partly to balance clan interests. As had been the case in the 1960s, c o m p e t i t i o n for power and wealth in the 1980s often took the f o r m o f shifting alliances and conflicts between lineages and clans. Inevitably, however, clan rivalry precipitated Barre's demise and sowed the seeds for the present anarchy.

FRAGILE INSTITUTIONS AND CENTRALIZED RULE A n o t h e r source o f instability in Somalia has been harsh political rule. Like other states in the H o r n , Somalia was governed by an undemocratic and centralized one-party system until 1991. T h e civil service was emasculated while the army was politicized. T h e r e was no r o o m for dissent, and any opposition was suppressed. Immediately following B a r r e ' s c o u p o f 1969, S o m a l i a was ruled by the S u p r e m e Revolutionary C o u n c i l ( S R C ) , which r e p e a l e d the constitution and b a n n e d political parties. Somalia was subsequently governed without a constitution until 1979. Barre, as chairman o f the S R C , assumed total power and c o n t i n u e d to rule that way until h e was toppled in J a n u a r y 1991.

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In July 1976, the SRC was abolished and replaced by a "civilian" party, the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP), which was established with Soviet help. Outwardly, Barre wanted to show that the military j u n t a that had ruled since 1969 had s u r r e n d e r e d power to a civilian institution. In actual fact, very little c h a n g e d . All members of the SRC took up positions in the party's central committee. T h e party's five-member politburo was composed entirely of members of the SRC. The party, initially based on Marxist-I.eninist principles, was hierarchically organized. Barre was both secretary-general of the party and chairman of its central committee. Theoretically the party was the supreme authority in political and socioeconomic matters, but, in practice, supremacy rested with Barre. For instance, in the face of widespread antigovernment demonstrations in 1981, sparked by the decision to allow U.S. forces access to Somali military facilities, Barre simply suspended the party and assumed emergency powers. T h e incident served to juxtapose the authority of Barre against the weakness of political institutions. When seven senior m e m b e r s of the central committee tried to challenge Barre's increasingly unrestrained personal power in 1982, they were detained. 6 Following Somalia's defeat by Ethiopia in the war of 1977-1978, Barre came u n d e r considerable pressure. He attempted to b r o a d e n the political process in an effort to divert attention away f r o m his miscalculated adventure. With a view to showing that Somalia was not governed by one m a n but by institutions, Barre u n d e r t o o k several political steps in 1979. In January 1979, he called an extraordinary party congress and promised a constitution. 7 I n t r o d u c e d by the party in August 1979, the constitution provided for an elected legislative body, the People's Assembly, and c o n f i r m e d Somalia as a one-party state. However, neither the party congress nor elections for the People's Assembly have been considered an exercise in democracy. Election procedures were carefully controlled to ensure that all delegates were dedicated supporters of the SSRP. In fact, both the constitution and the People's Assembly were s u b o r d i n a t e to the party. In particular, the assembly was entrusted with little authority beyond ratifying decisions reached by the party leadership—which was controlled by Barre. The SSRP, like other political parties in sub-Saharan Africa at the time, lacked grassroots support and effective popular participation. In the mid-1970s, the SSRP had relied on the National Security Services and Victory Pioneers (local vigilante groups) to establish its influence. I n d e e d , the formation of the party was controlled by Barre's close associates and Soviet advisers. It is believed that Barre

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agreed to its establishment only after constant p r o m p t i n g f r o m his Soviet advisers, who regarded the party as an indispensable step in the institutionalization of the regime. The SSRP was also created to p e r f o r m three o t h e r functions: to e d u c a t e and indoctrinate the Somalis to socialist ideas; to spearhead the implementation of socialism; and to e n h a n c e the security of Barre's regime. 8 Only the third objective, however, appears to have been accomplished, through the establishment (with Soviet and East G e r m a n help) of the National Security Services, originally headed by Ahmed Suleiman, Barre's sonin-law. Within the party, irredentism, i.e., the urge for a Greater Somalia nation, came to be the unifying factor. T h e loss of the war against Ethiopia inevitably led to fractures within the party. By the late 1980s, the party had completely lost credibility among the people. Due to increased domestic and external pressure on Barre, he agreed in August 1989 to work on a new constitution, with a view to creating a multiparty system in 1991. Accordingly, he set up a constitutional review committee in November 1989, consisting of seven Somalis and six Italians, to d r a f t a new constitution. In an attempt to avoid the chaos of the 1960s, when more than eighty clanbased political parties existed, Barre reportedly instructed the constitutional review committee to allow only three parties, respectively labeled nationalist, democratic, and socialist. T h e constitutional review committee drafted a multiparty constitution that was approved by the People's Assembly in October 1990. It was subject to a national referendum, but that did not take place. As internal pressure against Barre intensified, his government a n n o u n c e d on 26 December 1990 that political parties had been legalized with immediate effect. However, he was swept away before that could h a p p e n . Another Somali institution that represented pan-Somali nationalism and that also appeared to disintegrate when this goal could not be realized was the army. T h e army highlights as well the close connection between military means and political power in Somalia. This connection obtains largely because Barre came to power t h r o u g h a military coup. In the 1970s, Barre m a d e attempts to replace formal military rule with civilian rule, b u t h e e n d e d u p creating civilian institutions that were headed and r u n by f o r m e r military and police officers. For instance, in 1981, eighty-five new district and regional party secretaries were a p p o i n t e d and sixty-eight of t h e m were f r o m either the military or the police. Since October 1969, the military has b e e n a part of Somalia's political culture, and therein lies o n e of Somalia's problems. Military and quasi-military forces have had such a strong influence on Somali politics that it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between military and civilian participants in the political

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MAKINDA

process. Barre was an army general, but by 1976 he was ruling t h r o u g h a "civilian" political party, in which the military exercised e n o r m o u s power. Ali Mahdi is a civilian, but he is essentially head of a paramilitary group, the United Somali Congress. T h e army had been the instrument through which Barre sought to realize the Greater Somalia d r e a m . However, by the time Barre was toppled, the military was seriously affected by lineage and clan rivalry, partly because of the president's intervention in recruitment procedures. In the 1960s, various governments had m a d e efforts to have balanced clan and regional representation in the army. While this practice was a d h e r e d to in the earlier years of Barre's rule, in later years, preference was given to the Marehan and Ogadeni clans in the r e c r u i t m e n t of the officer corps. In addition, in the 1970s, Barre rapidly increased the size of the armed forces in anticipation of a war with Ethiopia; the army grew from 12,000 troops in 1970 to 30,000 in 1977. After defeat in the 1977-1978 Ogaden war, the army started to experience some organizational problems, leading to the deterioration of discipline even among senior officers. Problems in the military became obvious in the late 1980s as feuding between rival generals and their clans h a m p e r e d the army's ability to fight the rebels. T h e army's problems were exacerbated by the fact that in the 1980s, recruitment p r o c e e d e d along clan lines, with new recruits being p u t into units f r o m their own areas and u n d e r officers f r o m their own clans. As a result, by the late 1980s, there was no clear d i f f e r e n c e between regular army units a n d clan militias. As factionalism and lineage competition permeated the military, Barre increasingly came to rely heavily on the 77th sector of the army, the best-equipped and most efficient unit, which was for a time c o m m a n d e d by his son, General Maslah Siad.

CLAN MILITIAS AND CIVIL WAR

Since 1988, Somalia has r e p r e s e n t e d a classic example of Clausewitz's aphorism that war is politics by other means. For several years before Barre's fall f r o m power, the government's principal preoccupation was the m a n a g e m e n t of civil war; the opposition was the insurgency; and guerrilla activity had become the only effective way of making the government accountable. 9 T h e civil war led to a bigger defense b u d g e t and thereby diverted m e a g e r resources away f r o m social and economic development. T h e war has also c o n t i n u e d to have a d a m a g i n g effect on society in general. People at war for extended periods of time often find it difficult to adapt to peacetime

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normalcy. Many Somalis, including guerrilla fighters and t e e n a g e boys who have taken to fighting because o f the d e s t r u c t i o n o f the schools, might feel m o r e comfortable with a Kalashnikov or an AK-47 than a plowshare. T h e civil war in the 1980s s t e m m e d f r o m several factors: clan rivalries, n e p o t i s m , c o r r u p t i o n in high places, the uneven distribution o f national resources, and B a r r e ' s centralized and dictatorial rule. F u r t h e r m o r e , there was an increasing p e r c e p t i o n that the octogenarian president, who was also in poor health as a result o f a nearfatal car accident in 1986, lacked the capability and vision to resolve the country's crises. All opposition groups s e e m e d to a g r e e that Barre should step down. Faced with this situation, B a r r e in 1989 and 1990 offered to negotiate with his adversaries anywhere at any time, but they declined the offer and d e m a n d e d his removal. It is possible that had the president resigned in 1989 or early 1 9 9 0 , the civil war might have b e e n c o n t a i n e d and the subsequent anarchy averted. Instead, Barre decided to fight on and sought to contain the civil war through the use o f force. During the period o f i n t e n s e fighting in the late 1980s, the security forces dealt with rebels and their supporters ruthlessly. O n several occasions, they went o n the r a m p a g e , b o m b i n g civilian targets, planting land mines, p o i s o n i n g wells, and s o m e t i m e s deliberately destroying livestock. A 1 9 9 0 r e p o r t by the New Y o r k - b a s e d Africa Watch C o m m i t t e e estimated the n u m b e r o f civilian deaths from May 1988 to D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 9 at between 5 0 , 0 0 0 and 6 0 , 0 0 0 , with most o f the victims f r o m the Issaq c l a n . 1 0 R a t h e r than discouraging support for the insurgency, B a r r e ' s brutality merely created c o n d i t i o n s for the e m e r g e n c e o f still m o r e r e b e l movements. In o t h e r words, B a r r e ' s use o f f o r c e to suppress his opponents widened r a t h e r than limited the civil war. T h e opposition groups included the Somali National M o v e m e n t ( S N M ) , the U n i t e d Somali Congress ( U S C ) , the S o m a l i Salvation D e m o c r a t i c F r o n t ( S S D F ) , the Somali Patriotic M o v e m e n t ( S P M ) , the Somali D e m o c r a t i c Alliance ( S D A ) , and several o t h e r groups. T h e Issaq-dominated SNM, f o r m e d in 1981 and n u r t u r e d by the Ethiopian government, carried the brunt o f the assault on the B a r r e government, especially in 1988. It started to wage war against B a r r e ' s forces in n o r t h e r n S o m a l i a in May 1988, when the m o v e m e n t was required to leave its Ethiopian bases following the Somali-Ethiopian a g r e e m e n t o f April 1 9 8 8 . With some outside help, the SNM m o b i lized a force o f about 1 0 , 0 0 0 in mid-1988, but its size has fluctuated ever since. T h e m o v e m e n t was poorly organized a n d was divided along ideological lines, with differences a m o n g "liberals," Islamic fundamentalists, and traditionalists. T h e SNM's initial external support

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c a m e from Ethiopia, and it has also received s o m e financial support from Saudi Arabia. T h e U S C , b a s e d on the Hawiye clan of central Somalia, was established in Rome in 1989. Although considered the largest clan in Somalia, the Hawiye had played virtually n o role in the struggle against Barre before 1990, although a few Hawiye fighters had j o i n e d the SNM in the mid-1980s. In fact, the U S C was launched by Ali M o h a m m e d ("Wardigly"), who had b e e n the vice-chairman of the SNM from 1984 until 1987, when he was d r o p p e d on account of clan connections. Following Wardigly's death in April 1990, some prominent Abgal Hawiye personalities f o r m e d a g r o u p that called itself the "executive c o m m i t t e e " of the U S C . With financial backing f r o m Interim President Ali Mahdi, the committee operated like a guerrilla g r o u p , under the c o m m a n d of General M o h a m m e d Nur ("Galaal"), a f o r m e r deputy d e f e n s e minister in the B a r r e government. Two other political g r o u p s e m e r g e d in 1989: the Ogadeni-based SPM and the Gadabursi-based SDA. Perhaps the oldest of the anti-Barre forces was the Majerteen-based SSDF, which was established in Ethiopia in the late 1970s. T h e S S D F was virtually m o r i b u n d by the late 1980s, but it was revived shortly b e f o r e B a r r e ' s fall from power. In early 1991, some reports suggested that a faction of the SPM had amalgamated with other g r o u p s from the Darod clan family, including some Barre supporters, to form the Somali National Front (SNF). 1 1 T h e sizes and strengths of these g r o u p s have b e e n difficult to g a u g e , because most of them are unstable and shifting in their membership and alliances. 1 2 Alliances r u p t u r e a n d r e g r o u p frequently; subclans split from o n e g r o u p and m a k e deals with a n o t h e r quite often. Their ideological positions are also vague, and their objectives, besides the capture of political power in M o g a d i s h u , are not clear. Most of them can be described as pragmatic or Machiavellian. S o m e political g r o u p s have a p p e a l e d to primordial ties, which have served to divide rather than unite them. Indeed, virtually all political groups have manifested the anarchic characteristics that were the downfall of the Barre regime. T h e s e divisions have prevented them f r o m e x p l o r i n g opportunities of c o o p e r a t i n g with each other, e x c e p t on rare occasions. O n e of the few occasions when these clan-based g r o u p s showed a willingness to cooperate was in August 1990 when the SNM, the SPM, and the U S C a g r e e d to c o o r d i n a t e their efforts to remove Barre. With this c o o p e r a t i o n , B a r r e ' s fall b e c a m e inevitable. A p e a c e plan p r o p o s e d by Italy on 9 J a n u a r y 1991 stipulated that B a r r e r e m a i n h e a d of state but relinquish most of his powers to a g o v e r n m e n t of national unity in p r e p a r a t i o n for a p e a c e c o n f e r e n c e a n d U n i t e d

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Nations-supervised elections. T h e plan was rejected by the USC, which a n n o u n c e d two weeks later in Rome, on 23 January 1991, that it had f o r m e d a national salvation committee with t h r e e other groups: SPM, SSDF, and SDA. The SNM, however, stayed away. As the strongest guerrilla group, why was the SNM so late in coming to Mogadishu in the final hours of the Barre regime? O n e explanation is that the SNM had little interest in governing the whole of Somalia. Although it often claimed that it aimed to overthrow the Barre regime and establish democracy in the whole of Somalia, few observers doubted its secessionist tendencies. Another explanation is that the final assault on Barre came earlier than expected by most rebel movements. The trigger was a fight in the northeastern parts of Mogadishu between two Hawiye clans that formed factions within the USC—the Abgal and Habr Gedir. Barre's security forces tried to take advantage of this fighting to destroy the USC, but intervention by government forces p r o m p t e d the Abgal g r o u p to b r i n g in about three h u n d r e d guerrillas to help. T h e g r o u p ' s o p e r a t i o n s included ambushes and attacks on military officers. T h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s response was quite severe and thereby set off a popular uprising. This forced the USC to bring in the rest of its forces long before it had p l a n n e d to do so. T h e c o m m a n d e r of the USC's executive committee, General Mohammed Galaal, and 1,500 o t h e r USC guerrillas, who had been operating about fifty kilometers f r o m Mogadishu, arrived at the end of the first week of January 1991. But it was not until more heavily armed Ogadeni fighters from the SPM arrived on 23 January 1991 (under the c o m m a n d of Colonel A h m e d O m a r Jess) that the guerrillas were able to force Barre out of the military b u n k e r near the airport where he had been lodging for several weeks. The USC's executive committee had initially planned to reopen discussions with the well-armed Hawiye guerrillas operating successfully in central Somalia in conjunction with the SNM u n d e r General M o h a m m e d Farah Aidid's c o m m a n d , but that intention was overtaken by events. Barre's defeat in late January 1991 merely accelerated the disintegration of Somalia, for several reasons. First, the opposition forces had only o n e thing in common: the d e f e a t of Barre. Beyond that, they had no c o m m o n ground and hated each other as m u c h as they did Barre. Second, when Barre was overthrown, power was immediately assumed by the Hawiye, a clan that played virtually n o role in the anti-Barre struggle until a few m o n t h s before his fall. Third, by a p p o i n t i n g an interim president without consulting o t h e r groups, the USC went against the August 1990 a g r e e m e n t to consult with other groups.

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1. S e e , for instance, Strategic Survey 1989-1990 ( L o n d o n : Brassey's for the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute for Strategic Studies, 1 9 9 0 ) , pp. 8 5 - 8 8 . 2. For a well-informed discussion o f the civil war in S o m a l i a during the Barre era, see, for instance, a two-part special report, "Somalia: Political and Military O u t l o o k , " The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2 4 M a r c h 1 9 9 0 and 7 April 1990. 3. A c c o r d i n g to traditional history, Sab and Samaal were sons o f Aqiil, who was d e s c e n d e d f r o m the Quraysh o f Arabia, the tribe o f the P r o p h e t Mohammed. 4. I. M. Lewis, " T h e O g a d e n and t h e Fragility o f S o m a l i S e g m e n t a r y Nationalism," African Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 354, O c t o b e r 1989, p. 5 7 3 . 5. S e e , for i n s t a n c e , M i c h a e l D u n n , "Power S t r u g g l e in S o m a l i a , " Defence & Foreign Affairs, D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 6 , p. 31. 6. S e e A. I. S a m a t a r , " S o m a l i a I m p a s s e : State Power a n d Dissent Politics," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4, O c t o b e r 1987, p. 8 8 3 . 7. M a r i n a Ottaway, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa (New York: Praeger, 1 9 8 2 ) , p. 121. 8. See, for instance, Harold D. Nelson, Somalia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G o v e r n m e n t Printing O f f i c e , 1 9 8 2 ) , pp. 1 8 5 - 1 8 8 . 9. T h i s a r g u m e n t is p a r a p h r a s e d f r o m J o h n C h i p m a n , " T h i r d W o r l d Politics and Security in the 1990s: ' T h e W o r l d F o r g e t t i n g , By t h e World Forg o t ' ? " The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1, W i n t e r 1991, pp. 1 5 1 - 1 6 8 . 10. Africa Watch C o m m i t t e e , Somalia: A Government at War With Its Own People (New York: Africa Watch C o m m i t t e e , 1 9 9 0 ) , C h a p t e r s 7 - 1 0 . 11. S e e Keesing's Record of World Events, March 1 9 9 1 , p. 3 8 0 8 9 . 12. F o r a useful analysis o f t h e a n t i - B a r r e r e s i s t a n c e f o r c e s , see D a n i e l C o m p a g n o n , " T h e S o m a l i O p p o s i t i o n F r o n t s : S o m e Q u e s t i o n s and C o m m e n t s , " Horn of Africa, Vol. 13, Nos. 1 and 2, A p r i l - J u n e 1990, pp. 2 9 - 5 4 .

POST-BARRE POLITICS

Following Barre's d e p a r t u r e f r o m the political scene i n j a n u a r y 1991, the security situation d e t e r i o r a t e d considerably. T h e i n t e r i m presid e n t , Ali M a h d i , s u p p o r t e d by o n e faction of the USC, faced insurm o u n t a b l e political a n d e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s . H e did n o t even control Mogadishu for m o r e t h a n a few m o n t h s ; by O c t o b e r 1991 he had b e e n evicted f r o m s o u t h e r n Mogadishu, after which time h e was confined to the n o r t h e r n part of the city. In the confusion that p r e c e d e d a n d followed the overthrow of the Barre regime, g o v e r n m e n t offices a n d f o r e i g n embassies were l o o t e d a n d hospitals a n d schools ravaged. I n d e e d , since 1991 the largely u n g o v e r n a b l e Somali society has looked m u c h like the o n e described by t h e seventeenth-century English p h i l o s o p h e r T h o m a s H o b b e s . H o b b e s a r g u e d that h u m a n action was motivated entirely by selfish concerns, which would in turn lead to a "war of all against all." H e argued that an individual's desire for security, the f u n d a m e n t a l n e e d of h u m a n n a t u r e , was inseparable f r o m the desire for power. 1 W i t h o u t any legitimate or stable political authority, Somalis have lived in continual fear for the past few years. Meanwhile, as shall be discussed in g r e a t e r detail later in this c h a p t e r , n o r t h e r n Somalia, t h e f o r m e r British Somaliland, s e c e d e d in May 1991. British Somaliland had u n i t e d with Italian Somaliland at the time of i n d e p e n d e n c e in July 1960 to f o r m the Somali Democratic Republic. T h e formal separation of the two parts in 1991 came at a time when virtually all f o r e i g n powers h a d a b a n d o n e d Somalia. 2

NO GOVERNMENT—ONLY OPPOSITION While Ali Mahdi is still r e f e r r e d to as the interim p r e s i d e n t , t h e r e is n o d o u b t that h e h e a d s a g o v e r n m e n t that does n o t f u n c t i o n . In fact, 29

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there is only opposition and no g o v e r n m e n t . Mahdi had promised in early 1991 to rule "with justice, democracy, and equality," but, in light of the prevailing anarchy, he must be j u d g e d as having been too optimistic. His embattled "cabinet" is d o m i n a t e d by the Hawiye, although the O g a d e n i s and the Issaqs were also given nominally important posts. Mahdi p l e d g e d in early 1991 to maintain a broadly based g o v e r n m e n t of national reconciliation and a multiparty system, but persistent political squabbles have prevented the realization of these objectives. A m e m b e r of parliament b e f o r e Barre's coup of 1969, M a h d i was out o f active politics f o r m o r e than two decades, during which time he concentrated on business activities. T h e owner o f o n e of the biggest hotels in M o g a d i s h u — t h e Makkah el Mukarr a m — h e was o n e of the main sponsors o f the USC's executive committee. H e is also a founding m e m b e r of the Manifesto Group, which e m e r g e d in May 1990 with the circulation of a set o f political demands. 3 T h e manifesto, signed by 115 p r o m i n e n t personalities, including politicians, business people, and professionals f r o m different clans, was a last-ditch attempt to persuade Barre to bow out of politics. T h e biggest challenge for the post-Barre leadership is how to establish public institutions out of the present anarchy. T h e r e is no police f o r c e , although in early 1993 efforts were reportedly m a d e to retrain some f o r m e r members of the police f o r c e that the Germans had begun training in 1978. In his report to the Security Council on 19 D e c e m b e r 1992, U N Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali indicated that he was studying how the international c o m m u n i t y could help create a new, professional police f o r c e . O n 3 March 1993, BoutrosGhali i n f o r m e d the Security Council that he had sent "an expert team" to Somalia "to study the feasibility of establishing . . . a national p o l i c e f o r c e , make r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , and d e v e l o p a strategy f o r implementation." 4 T h e team was asked to outline appropriate modalities f o r training Somali personnel in the m a i n t e n a n c e o f law and o r d e r while adhering to internationally accepted principles and practices f o r the protection o f human rights. Boutros-Ghali p r o m i s e d to include an international civilian p o l i c e c o m p o n e n t in U N O S O M II. Somalia also has n o semblance o f a national army. A future Somali g o v e r n m e n t will t h e r e f o r e face the daunting task of creating a totally new army out of the existing clan militias. Early in January 1991, a g r o u p o f respected generals (those w h o had m o v e d up the ranks b e f o r e Barre destroyed the p r o m o t i o n a l structures in the armed services) established a c o m m i t t e e to try to restore the status o f the army as a professional body. T h i s g r o u p as well as the clan

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militias will want to play a role in the restructuring of Somalia's new military. T h e biggest problem the army will face is how to integrate erstwhile guerrillas with their f o r m e r enemies, and how to stress national identification as opposed to clan loyalty. However, before stable public institutions can be established, a leader acceptable to all the major factions must be f o u n d . T h e situation in Somalia cries o u t for what T h o m a s Hobbes described as a Leviathan, some form of political authority that can guarantee peace, o r d e r , and security. Mahdi, who belongs to the Abgal clan of the Hawiye clan family, was installed in office in January 1991 in controversial circumstances, without either the approval of the entire leadership of the USC or the support of other resistance movements, particularly the m o r e experienced SNM. Not surprisingly, his a p p o i n t m e n t was immediately contested by the SNM and the SPM. He was also challenged by some sections of the USC, especially the faction aligned with General M o h a m m e d Farah Aidid of the H a b r Gedir clan of the Hawiye. Aidid then headed a USC faction that had signed an a g r e e m e n t with the SNM and the SPM in August 1990 to coordinate their military efforts. Although Mahdi and Aidid appeared to be the main contenders for national leadership in early 1993, neither of them was likely to unite the country. T h e UN SecretaryGeneral's Special Representatives—first M o h a m m e d S a h n o u n , then Ismat Kittani, and now J o n a t h a n Howe—have made the search for a political settlement a top priority, but the n a t u r e of Somali society has r e n d e r e d the realization of this goal difficult, at least in the short term. A solution will require a great deal of time, patience, and diplomatic effort. O n e of the most difficult tasks is how to control the many clanbased militia groups. Factions within the USC, especially the respective groups led by Aidid and Mahdi, do not agree on many issues. The uneasy relations between Aidid and Mahdi were exacerbated in July 1991. At the USC's a n n u a l congress on 4 July 1991, Aidid was elected chairman with 70 p e r c e n t of the vote; shortly after, at the national reconciliation conference held in Djibouti 15-21 July 1991, Mahdi was c o n f i r m e d as interim president for two years. Aidid had apparently wanted both jobs. Because of the legitimacy c o n f e r r e d on Ali Mahdi by the Djibouti c o n f e r e n c e , his government was recognized by several countries, including Djibouti, Egypt, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. However, as o t h e r states appeared to recognize Mahdi, Aidid b e c a m e increasingly intransigent about accepting the conditions of unity. Besides Aidid, several political groups were dissatisfied with the post-Barre power-sharing a r r a n g e m e n t . After taking power, Mahdi

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had proposed a "conference of national reconciliation" for 28 February 1991, and later postponed it to 14 March 1991, but other political groups refused to attend. T h e c o n f e r e n c e was Finally convened in two stages by Djibouti's President Hassan Gouled in J u n e a n d j u l y 1991 and was a t t e n d e d by most of the groups except the SNM. T h e USC, SPM, SSDF, and the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) participated in t h e j u n e 1991 talks, and those in July 1991 were attended by the same four groups, plus the Gadabursi-based SDA and the Issabased United Somali Front (USF). (The Issa, f o u n d in n o r t h e r n Somalia and Djibouti, is a clan from the Dir clan family and should not be confused with the Issaq.) T h e SNM stayed away. T h e six groups were still so divided that it was hard to see how they could coordinate their programs, but for a start they agreed to readopt the 1960 Somali constitution. In addition to Djibouti, other nations, especially Egypt and Italy, tried to mediate the conflict in 1991 without success. Mediation efforts in Somalia have failed for several reasons: the various clans and subclans still hate each o t h e r vehemently; the faction leaders and warlords have virtually no legitimacy, and their supporters can a b a n d o n them at any time; and the n u m b e r of clan militias and other political groups keeps rising. It was partly for this reason that Boutros-Ghali's r e p o r t to the Security Council on 3 March 1993 argued: "National reconciliation is a difficult process in the best of circumstances; it is particularly difficult in Somalia because of the multiplicity of parties, factions, and o t h e r leaders, and the total absence of law and order in all parts of the country." 5 By the end of 1991, fierce fighting in Mogadishu between Aidid's and Mahdi's forces had paralyzed the city. Despite appeals for a cessation of hostilities by OAU Secretary-General Salim A h m e d Salim and by the secretary-general of the Arab League, A h m e d Esmat Abdel Meguid, the fighting c o n t i n u e d . Had the OAU, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic C o n f e r e n c e (OIC) m a d e serious efforts to negotiate peace in early 1991, the tragedy could probably have been averted. However, these regional organizations' role d u r i n g this period did not go beyond issuing calls f o r the warring parties to stop the fighting. T h e f o r m e r UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar also called on the factions on 28 D e c e m b e r 1991 to stop the war, but it only intensified. T h r o u g h o u t 1991 and 1992, the d o m i n a n t political g r o u p in southern Somalia, and especially in the area a r o u n d Mogadishu, was the USC faction led by Aidid. In August 1992, Aidid sought an alliance with other groups and formed the Somali National Alliance (SNA). T h e factions that have g r o u p e d u n d e r the SNA include

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Aidid's faction of the USC; Colonel Abdi Warsame Isaaq's Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM), a coalition of several southern clans, such as the Bimal and some Majerteen subclans; Colonel Ahmed O m a r Jess's faction of the Somali People's Movement (SPM), mainly Ogadeni; and Colonel M o h a m m e d Nur Aliyou's Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), from the Digil and Miriflesh clans. The SNA represents an important symbolic step toward Aidid's goal to establish a multiclan political authority in Somalia. Suspicious of outside intervention, Aidid has been critical of the United Nations' humanitarian intervention. In July 1992, he claimed that a UN plane that had brought food to Somalia had carried military e q u i p m e n t and money for his rival, Ali Mahdi. 6 Aidid agreed to the deployment of only 500 Pakistani UN peacekeeping troops and consistently objected to the higher figure of 3,500 (which was approved by the Security Council in August 1992 but never deployed). He has argued that there should be a Somali solution to Somalia's problems. O n several occasions, he boasted of 30,000 armed men at his c o m m a n d , who, he claimed, could control eleven of Somalia's eighteen districts. T h e r e is n o way of c o n f i r m i n g this. Indeed, no Somali faction leader can claim control over such a big g r o u p for any extended period. Just as Aidid was forging his national alliance, his arch-rival, Interim President Ali Mahdi, was also busy crafting a multiclan coalition. O n e of the guerrilla groups Mahdi has courted is the pro-Barre militia group, the Somali National Front (SNF), led by Barre's sonin-law and former defense minister, General M o h a m m e d Said Hersi, also known as General "Morgan." 7 T h e SNF recaptured the town of Bardera (Baardheere) in O c t o b e r 1992 after it had b e e n used as Aidid's headquarters for several months. Mahdi also teamed up with the Majerteen-based Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in the northeast. As already stated, territorial control and alliance formation in Somalia do not last long. I n d e e d , while Mahdi was trying to create a transclan alliance in 1992, his own Abgal clan of the Hawiye g r o u p was split into three factions, thereby leaving Mahdi with a very narrow base even within his own clan. (In mid-1993 Aidid succeeded in persuading the SSDF to defect from Mahdi's camp and to join his SNA. Ali Ismael Abdi's Somali National Democratic Union also supports Aidid.) Attempts by Aidid a n d Mahdi to f o r m transclan coalitions were fueled by the fact that a f o r m e r Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, M o h a m m e d S a h n o u n , p l a n n e d to convene what the UN has termed a "technical m e e t i n g " between the UN and Somali factions in Addis Ababa in early D e c e m b e r 1992. According

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to s o m e reports, it had b e e n a g r e e d that the interim g o v e r n m e n t under Mahdi would resign o n c e the meeting had taken place. 8 This was o n e o f Aidid's c o n d i t i o n s to his taking part in the c o n f e r e n c e . T h e meeting took place as planned, and although it c h a n g e d little in Somalia, the UN Secretary-General said its results were e n c o u r a g i n g . In J a n u a r y 1993, a n o t h e r m e e t i n g o f f o u r t e e n Somali factions was c o n v e n e d in Addis Ababa u n d e r UN auspices. T h e fourteen factions i n c l u d e d the Somali Africans Muki O r g a n i z a t i o n ( S A M O ) , led by M o h a m m e d Ramadan Arbow; SDA, led by M o h a m m e d Farah Abdullahi; o n e SDM group led by Abdi Muse Mayo and a n o t h e r group led by M o h a m m e d Nur Aliyou; the Somali National D e m o c r a t i c U n i o n ( S N D U ) , led by Ali Ismael Abdi; SNF, led by G e n e r a l O m a r Hagi M o h a m m e d Hersi ( G e n e r a l " M o r g a n " ) ; the Somali National U n i o n ( S N U ) , led by Dr. M o h a m m e d Ragis M o h a m m e d ; o n e SPM g r o u p led by G e n e r a l Aden Abdillahi N o o r and a n o t h e r g r o u p led by Colonel O m a r Jess; SSDF, led by General M o h a m m e d Abshir Musse; SSNM, led by C o l o n e l Abdi Warsame Isaaq; o n e U S C g r o u p led by General Aidid and a n o t h e r group led by M o h a m m e d Qanyare Afrah; USF, led by A b d u r a h m a n Dualeh Ali; and the U n i t e d Somali Party ( U S P ) , led by M o h a m m e d Abdi Hashi. At least on the surface, their m e e t i n g held promise for a political s e t t l e m e n t because the groups agreed to a nationwide ceasefire, g e n e r a l d i s a r m a m e n t and a national reconciliation c o n f e r e n c e to be held o n 15 March 1993. T h e J a n u a r y 1993 "preparatory" meeting o f the fourteen factions took place against the b a c k g r o u n d o f a U.S.-led multinational intervention in Somalia. It is possible that the U.S. military presence influe n c e d the o u t c o m e of the meeting. As did several o t h e r faction leaders, Aidid, the strongest o p p o n e n t o f the UN p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n , accepted in D e c e m b e r 1992 the U.S.-led interventionary f o r c e to e s c o r t food convoys. Although s o m e warlords had c o m p l a i n e d o f a lack o f consultation over the U n i f i e d Task F o r c e , they e n d o r s e d it at this point. S o m e o f them sought to ingratiate t h e m selves with the United States as a way o f improving their legitimacy. E n d o r s e m e n t by warlords, however, did not p r e c l u d e d a n g e r to the troops in the Unified Task F o r c e . (Neither c o u l d warlords g u a r a n t e e security for U N O S O M II.) T h i s was largely b e c a u s e warlords did n o t effectively c o n t r o l the g u n m e n who terrorized m u c h o f S o m a l i a . I n d e e d , in late J a n u a r y 1993, SNF forces n e a r Kismayu tried to threaten U N I T A F units, thereby prompting U . S . and Belgian troops in t h e a r e a to o p e n fire. Again in early J u n e 1 9 9 3 , G e n e r a l Aidid's supporters attacked U N O S O M II units, killing 2 3 soldiers. T h i s led to i m m e d i a t e retaliation by U N O S O M II and U . S . forces. S u c h incidents were symptomatic o f the volatility of the security situation.

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The Addis Ababa meeting of January 1993 represented an important step in the national reconciliation process. The f o u r t e e n participating factions agreed to a nationwide ceasefire, disarmament, and a national reconciliation c o n f e r e n c e , which was held on 15 March 1993. This was the first of many conferences to d e t e r m i n e Somalia's future. T h e factions established a seven-member ad hoc c o m m i t t e e to work out an agenda and agree on participants for the reconciliation conference. However, by late J a n u a r y 1993, the reconciliation process was already h a m p e r e d by the failure of the ad hoc committee to meet and work out an a g e n d a for the national reconciliation conference. T h e ad hoc committee meeting scheduled for 22 January 1993 convened, b u t it was suspended because the Somali National Alliance, h e a d e d by General Aidid, complained that the Somali National Front, led by General Hersi, Siad Barre's son-in-law, had violated the ceasefire a g r e e m e n t of 15 January 1993. N e i t h e r UNOSOM I nor UNITAF could confirm the allegation, b u t the ad hoc committee meeting could not be convened because the SNA decided not to participate. This incident illustrated once m o r e how difficult the national reconciliation process is in Somalia. As the conference date a p p r o a c h e d , there were n o signs of a d e q u a t e preparation for it. This immediately raised questions as to w h e t h e r the national reconciliation conference would be held for the sake of having one or as part of efforts to achieve a bigger goal. Although the conference convened in March 1993 as scheduled, it was soon suspended when Aidid complained that Hersi's SNF had violated the ceasefire in the Kismayu area and attacked SPM forces led by Aidid's ally, Colonel O m a r Jess. T h e conference resumed after Aidid received assurances f r o m UNITAF that the security situation in Kismayu was u n d e r control. Toward the end of March 1993, the fourteen factions a t t e n d i n g the c o n f e r e n c e agreed to form an interim government to rule Somalia for two years, leading to national elections. The accord provides for a presidential council as the transitional authority. However, because of chronic squabbling and unpredictability, it is too early to assess prospects for a political settlement. Efforts toward national reconciliation may also be influenced by the regional and international connections of the faction leaders. It is not clear whether most warlords have external backers, but the fact that they continue to receive arms suggests external connections. For example, there were claims in late 1992 that Aidid enjoyed some limited support in the U n i t e d States and that one of his financiers, Osman Ato, maintained useful contacts in the U.S. government, 9 but this could n o t be c o n f i r m e d . Mahdi, on the o t h e r h a n d , is said to have support in Italian, Egyptian, and Djibouti g o v e r n m e n t circles.

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W h e t h e r these claims are true or not, in p u r s u i n g national reconciliation, the UN o u g h t to bear in m i n d the possibility that Western and regional g o v e r n m e n t s might have leverage on some faction leaders.

THE SOMALI LAND QUESTION With the rest of Somalia facing serious questions of survival, the mid1991 move by n o r t h e r n Somalia to secede has b e e n given very little, if any, a t t e n t i o n . At issue is the role of Issaqs in S o m a l i a ' s national politics. T h e Issaq clan, which comprises about 20 p e r c e n t of Somalia's p o p u l a t i o n , p r e s e n t e d the strongest c h a l l e n g e to B a r r e ' s leadership f r o m 1988 until his fall f r o m power. T h e i r main political organization is the SNM, whose d e c l a r e d aim in the 1980s was to overthrow Barre a n d establish a m o r e d e m o c r a t i c system in the whole of Somalia. However, the organization was n o t heavily involved in t h e final assault against Barre, a d e v e l o p m e n t that d e n i e d it a c h a n c e to f o r m the i m m e d i a t e post-Barre g o v e r n m e n t . R a t h e r than c o n t i n u e the civil war against a new regime, t h e SNM leader, Abdur a h m a n A h m e d Ali, p r o c l a i m e d the "Republic of S o m a l i l a n d " on 18 May 1991, with himself as president. A l t h o u g h the secession followed the failure of m e d i a t i o n efforts by Egypt, Djibouti, a n d Italy to secure i n c r e a s e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the SNM a n d o t h e r g r o u p s in the Mahdi g o v e r n m e n t , certain SNM leaders h a d shown a t e n d e n c y toward secession f o r several years. N o n e t h e l e s s , secession was n o t u n a n i mously s u p p o r t e d by the SNM l e a d e r s h i p , s o m e of w h o m r e g a r d e d the move n o t as a final settlement, b u t as a step toward r e n e g o t i a t i n g the 1960 unification a g r e e m e n t . T h e secession of the "Republic of S o m a l i l a n d " can be u n d e r stood against the b a c k g r o u n d of several factors. First, f o r many years, the Issaq p e o p l e h a d n o t h a d g o o d relations with M o g a d i s h u . They had c o m p l a i n e d r e p e a t e d l y that m o r e t h a n 90 p e r c e n t of Somalia's d e v e l o p m e n t took place in the s o u t h , a n d that since i n d e p e n d e n c e the s o u t h e r n clans h a d o c c u p i e d most of t h e s e n i o r g o v e r n m e n t posts. Second, some of the Issaq elders hated Barre f o r having overthrown the only Issaq p r i m e minister, M o h a m m e d I b r a h i m Egal, in 1969. (Egal was elected p r e s i d e n t of Somaliland in May 1993.) Third, in the 1980s the Issaqs e n d u r e d harsh military rule, which only served to increase their disaffection in relation to the M o g a d i s h u governm e n t . Fourth, the Issaq clan's colonial b a c k g r o u n d u n d e r the British has set it apart; the rest of Somalia was an Italian colony until 1960. (Italian Somaliland was occupied by the British d u r i n g World War II, b u t it b e c a m e a UN trust territory u n d e r Italian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in

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1950.) T h e iwo parts united at i n d e p e n d e n c e in J u n e 1960, but the Issaqs were never satisfied with the u n i o n arrangements. T h e b r e a k u p of old unions around the world in the early 1990s caused some Issaqs and leaders of the SNM to d e m a n d revision of the union agreement. However, like most Somali groups, the SNM is divided along ideological lines. Whether the Issaqs would be united in Somaliland is hard to predict; Somaliland has appeared to mirror the anarchic conditions of the rest of Somalia. In the towns of Hargeisa (Somaliland's capital) and Burao, there have been serious divisions a m o n g different Issaq clans. Even more fierce has been the fighting between Issaq clans for control of the port of Berbera, which threatens to throttle Somaliland's trade. T h e secession has serious national and regional implications. In Somaliland, the main political organization, the SNM, is predominantly, although not exclusively, Issaq. An i n d e p e n d e n t Somaliland dominated by Issaqs and the SNM would be resented by other northern clans, especially the D o l b a h a n t e and Gadabursi. A h m e d Ali f o r m e d an interim g o v e r n m e n t in May 1991 and pledged to have multiparty elections within two years. Although his government was dominated by Issaqs, its membership appeared to have been carefully balanced between the main Issaq clans and o t h e r clans in the territory. In May 1993, the 140-member central committee (parliament) of the "Republic of Somaliland" elected Ibrahim Egal as president. Ahmed Ali did not stand for re-election; the other serious c o n t e n d e r for the post was Omar Arteh Ghaleb, who had just resigned his post as prime minister in Ali Mahdi's interim government in Mogadishu. Although Egal's cabinet is d o m i n a t e d by f o r m e r SNM fighters f r o m the Issaq clan, his vice-president, Colonel A b d u r a h m a n Ali, is f r o m the Gadabursi clan. 1 0 Egal was one of the architects of the u n i o n between British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960. The fact that he has been elected president of Somaliland and that Arteh Ghaleb resigned f r o m Ali Mahdi's "cabinet" to stand for the same post confirms the view that many Issaqs have little interest in the reunification of the two parts of Somalia. By mid-1993, Somaliland had n o t been formally recognized by any country. Its immediate neighbors, Ethiopia a n d Djibouti, have been worried about the possible effects of secession on their own internal stability. In particular, Djibouti a n d Somalia have campaigned against international recognition of the territory. Since secession violates Article III of the OAU charter and since it might set a p r e c e d e n t for solving o t h e r contentious problems in the rest of Africa, the new republic is unlikely to find allies on the c o n t i n e n t . Somaliland might seek m e m b e r s h i p in the Arab League, as a way

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of maximizing its chances for obtaining economic assistance, but as of mid-1993 there were no signs that the League was looking forward to admitting Somaliland to its m e m b e r s h i p . Saudi Arabia clandestinely provided limited s u p p o r t for the SNM when it was fighting against Barre, but whether the Saudis or o t h e r Arab states are keen to support a secessionist state is not clear. If the OAU and the Arab League continue to deny recognition to Somaliland, the rest of the international community will be reluctant to recognize it. International recognition of a new state is i m p o r t a n t in several ways: it enables the state to join the UN and to apply for membership in other organizations to e n h a n c e its prestige. The issue of recognition for Somaliland raises an important question: would recognition have any positive effect on peace and o r d e r in the rest of the country? T h e situation in anarchic Somalia is so volatile that recognition of Somaliland is not likely to have a predictable effect on the fighting clans in other parts of Somalia. By the same token, it is hard to see how denial of recognition would help the national reconciliation process. T h e administration of the "Republic of Somaliland" initially resisted UN attempts to deploy peacekeeping troops on the territory. However, b e f o r e resigning his post as the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Somalia late in October 1992, M o h a m m e d S a h n o u n signed an accord with the Somaliland administration for the deployment of 350 UN soldiers in Berbera and Hargeisa. It was envisaged that UN troops in the territory would ensure food aid protection as it passed through Berbera to northeast and central Somalia. In r e t u r n , the UN promised to help repair local infrastructures such as the a e r o d r o m e and the port of Berbera. In various reports to the Security Council since D e c e m b e r 1992, however, Boutros-Ghali has insisted that the "Republic of Somaliland" should be treated as a part of Somalia.

N O T E S

1. On Hobbes's Leviathan, see, for instance, George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (London: H a r r a p & Co., I960), 3rd ed., pp. 387-404. I am grateful to Professor Robert Dowse of the University of Western Australia for drawing my attention to this comparison in a c o m m e n t a r y on ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) radio on 26 August 1992. 2. See, for instance, Africa Confidential, 8 February 1991. 3. "Somalia: Power Struggle," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2 February 1991, p. 1. 4. See Security Council D o c u m e n t S / 2 5 3 5 4 of 3 March 1993.

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5. Security Council Document S / 2 5 3 5 4 of 3 March 1993. 6. Indian Ocean Newsletter, 18 July 1992, p. 4. 7. See Indian Ocean Newsletter, 17 October 1992, p. 2. 8. Indian Ocean Newsletter, 17 October 1992, p. 2. 9. See Africa Confidential, 4 D e c e m b e r 1992, p. 2. The Indian Ocean Newsletter of 1 9 J u n e 1993 reported that Belgian contingents in UNOSOM II, who are based in Kismayu, complained that a senior U.S. military officer in Mogadishu pressured the Belgians in May 1993 to set free Osmato Ato after he had been arrested in Kismayu. 10. See Indian Ocean Newsletter, 22 May 1993 and 12 J u n e 1993.

4 ECONOMIC AND HUMAN DIMENSIONS

E c o n o m i c f a c t o r s play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in n a t i o n a l security. A n a t i o n ' s political stability c a n n o t b e a s s u r e d w i t h o u t a s o u n d e c o n omy. 1 Somalia's political instability i n c r e a s e d in t h e late 1980s as the e c o n o m y progressively slid i n t o malaise. I n d e e d , e c o n o m i c misery a n d political p r o b l e m s a r e so i n t e r t w i n e d t h a t it is h a r d to e x p l a i n o n e w i t h o u t t h e o t h e r . As t h e Economist p r o c l a i m e d in an editorial in August 1992, Somalia h a d d i s i n t e g r a t e d a n d "its c r o p s , h e r d s , c o m m e r c e , a n d institutions'" 2 h a d b e e n d e s t r o y e d in the f i g h t i n g that followed t h e overthrow of Barre. T h e f a m i n e is certainly d u e as m u c h to d r o u g h t as to the civil war. T h e war has resulted in t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of the physical i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , especially bridges, a i r p o r t s , schools, a n d hospitals. It has also u p r o o t e d m a n y p e o p l e , most of w h o m have lost the h a b i t of w o r k i n g a n d know only how to fight. In a d d i t i o n , war has m a i m e d the y o u n g a n d a b l e - b o d i e d a n d t h e r e b y d e n i e d Somalia p o t e n t i a l labor. Most f a m i n e s can b e p r e v e n t e d , b u t a n a r c h y in S o m a l i a m a d e t h e u s u a l early w a r n i n g s f r o m h e a l t h surveys, c r o p m e a s u r e m e n t s , a n d p r i c e c h a n g e s h a r d to i n t e r p r e t . Political u n c e r t a i n t y i m p e d e d p r e c a u t i o n a r y m e a s u r e s . M o r e o v e r , as a result of t h e u n c e r t a i n t y , c r o p seeds a n d m u c h of t h e livestock w e r e e i t h e r c o n s u m e d by t h e f a r m e r s or stolen by g u n m e n . T h e p r o b l e m was c o m p o u n d e d by a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y r e l u c t a n t to r e s p o n d quickly to e v e n t s in the H o r n of Africa. W h e n an a l a r m was raised by i n t e r n a t i o n a l relief a g e n c i e s in 1991 a n d early 1992 a b o u t t h e i m p e n d i n g c a t a s t r o p h e , the industrialized countries had their focus elsewhere and did not pay m u c h a t t e n t i o n . In a sense, t h e gravity of t h e situation in Somalia has b e e n partly d u e to t h e w o r l d c o m m u n i t y ' s i n d i f f e r e n c e . D e s p i t e t h e fact t h a t i n s e c u r i t y i n c r e a s e d in t h e 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 p e r i o d , some i n t e r n a t i o n a l n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( N G O s )

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remained b e h i n d and continued their efforts to alleviate the suffering. Organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Save the Children Fund, CARE, World Vision, Oxfam, Médecins sans Frontières, Concern, and several others continued to provide medicines, food, and clothing u n d e r severe conditions. Because of their neutrality, NGOs have been able to provide assistance to all sides in the conflict. However, they have faced n u m e r o u s problems, including lack of security for their personnel. (Four ICRC officials were killed between October 1990 and January 1993.) Relief agencies faced other severe logistics problems during that period as well. Supplies were left unloaded for several months, for example, because of disputes among competing clans. Once unloaded, relief aid was stolen in warehouses or on the way to its destination. Poor road conditions throughout the country, debilitated trucks, and the unreliability of drivers also multiplied the problems the NGOs faced. In some cases, relief workers were subjected to extortion, blackmail, and robbery. Warlords and m e r c h a n t s often d e m a n d e d "protection" money. For several months, some of the NGOs paid militias to escort the food, only to have some of it stolen by marauding gunmen. Convoys of trucks taking food to distribution centers in the interior were often escorted by men in jeeps armed with assault rifles and r o o f - m o u n t e d anti-aircraft guns. (Somalis call these vehicles "technicals.") However, these convoys were routinely looted, often by the escorts themselves. T h e only consolation was that even if most of the food was stolen, the gangs would not hoard it indefinitely. It was assumed that part of the stolen food would be put on the market, and eventually the price would fall. Furthermore, humanitarian assistance was h a m p e r e d by the lack of r u n n i n g water and electricity. During the period of intense fighting in N o v e m b e r - D e c e m b e r 1991, the ICRC and Médecins sans Frontières were a m o n g the few relief organizations c o n t i n u i n g to operate in Mogadishu. As a result of the fighting, Interim President Mahdi was c o n f i n e d to n o r t h e r n Mogadishu, where t h e r e was n o hospital; however, before long, a surgical team from the ICRC set up a makeshift hospital there, without water or electricity. According to the ICRC's own records, the organization's relief operation in Somalia in 1992 was its biggest undertaking since World War II. T h e ICRC, with the largest humanitarian program, had in early 1993 m o r e than fourteen outposts t h r o u g h o u t the country and about nine h u n d r e d kitchens through which it fed about one million people a day. It continues to provide medical and veterinary services and to distribute seed. The ICRC, Médecins sans Frontières, and the International Medical Corps have medical and surgical teams in various health posts;

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they also run i m m u n i z a t i o n , water, sanitation, and nutrition programs in key towns and villages. It is international relief agencies that have ensured since 1991 that humanitarian assistance reaches those most in need. They estimated in mid-1992 that about 7 0 , 0 0 0 tons o f food aid per month was required to m e e t the needs in Somalia. By August 1992, it was estimated that in s o u t h e r n Somalia (excluding the self-proclaimed i n d e p e n d e n t Somaliland), 1.5 million people were in immediate d a n g e r o f starvation. As o n e press report argued at the time: "In the countryside, people try to survive on goatskin and grass; in the towns, they wait for handouts. Hundreds die by the day; one-third o f southern Somalia's 4.5 million people could be dead within months; a g e n e r a t i o n o f c h i l d r e n wiped o u t . " 3 T h i s graphic description o f the e c o n o m i c and h u m a n c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the Somali civil war was an u n d e r s t a t e m e n t . T h e carnage and agony o f m u c h o f Somalia at the time were virtually indescribable. By the time Western governments started to send in relief supplies in mid1992, nearly all children in rural areas were said to suffer from malnutrition. In D e c e m b e r 1992, it was estimated that the death toll from starvation for the year had r e a c h e d 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Much o f the food has b e e n provided or c o o r d i n a t e d by the UN World Food Program (WFP). ( T h e WFP had predicted the famine in Somalia as early as D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 0 . ) Several c o u n t r i e s — i n c l u d i n g Australia, Austria, B e l g i u m , C a n a d a , F r a n c e , Germany, J a p a n , and the UK—have also provided relief supplies (see T a b l e 4.2 below). In August 1992, the United States attempted to go it alone in providing humanitarian assistance, and its air f o r c e started to fly in an estimated 1 4 5 , 0 0 0 tons o f f o o d f r o m M o m b a s a , Kenya. T h e U.S. food airlift, c o d e - n a m e d O p e r a t i o n Provide R e l i e f , was d o n e in such a hurry that U.S. military aircraft started landing in M o m b a s a even b e f o r e the U.S. g o v e r n m e n t had asked permission from the Kenyan g o v e r n m e n t . It was the plan o f t h e U . S . air f o r c e n o t to land on Somali territory b e c a u s e n o security a r r a n g e m e n t s had b e e n m a d e for the planes o n c e landed and because there were n o a r r a n g e m e n t s for food distribution. In fact, at o n e time in 1992, the U n i t e d States suggested that it would start d r o p p i n g food parcels in targeted areas from the air. This plan a n g e r e d the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e o f the Red Cross, which had spent nearly a year trying to set up a humanitarian aid network that would work diplomatically with t h e Somali warlords and clan elders. T h e I C R C felt that r a n d o m drops would spark fresh hostilities. By late 1992, it had b e c o m e c l e a r that delivering h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance in the anarchic c o n d i t i o n s was fraught with great danger. S o m e d o n o r countries had resorted to airlifting food, but successful

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airlifts d e p e n d e d on delicate coordination of spare parts, fuel, and supplies and on the simultaneous cooperation of people on the ground. Not all these things could be ensured all the time. Trucks were cheaper and easier than airlifts, but they could be waylaid easily. Moreover, the lack of all-weather roads also m a d e delivery by trucks very difficult during rainy periods. Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 D e c e m b e r 1992, which authorized the use of force to provide relief assistance, also requested the establishment of a trust f u n d . T h e 'Trust Fund for Somalia," with an initial target of US$400 million, had raised a total of $114,215,000 by mid-January 1993.

Table 4.1

Countries that Had Contributed to the Somali Fund by Mid-January 1993

Denmark Finland Ireland Japan Norway Philippines Republic of Korea Saudi Arabia Singapore

$1,000,000 $70,000 $115,000 $100,000,000 $1,000,000 $5,000 $2,000,000 $ 10,000,000 $25,000

Total

$114,215,000

Source: UN Africa Recovery Briefing Paper, No. 7, 15 J a n u a r y 1993, p. 2.

Somalia itself has no resources that could have been mobilized to limit the severity of the famine. O n e of the poorest countries in the world, Somalia had a per capita GDP of about $120 in 1990. 4 It has a hostile climate, which ranges f r o m arid to semi-arid, a major factor in the economy's p e r f o r m a n c e and potential. Two areas have relatively good rainfall: a small area in the northwest a r o u n d Hargeisa, which is now part of the "Republic of Somaliland," and a much larger area in the south between the Shebelli and J u b a rivers. T h e small farming towns of Baidoa (Baydhabo) and Bardera (Baardheere) lie between these two rivers, in Somalia's best arable land; however, the two towns have been hit hard by famine. T h e civil war since 1988 has prevented the use of any of the arable areas for agricultural

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Table 4.2

Somalia Relief Contributions (US$)*

Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Denmark EC Finland France Germany Iceland Indonesia Ireland Italy japan Libya Luxembourg Morocco Netherlands Nigeria Norway OPEC Qatar Republic of Korea Saudi Arabia Spain Sudan Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom USA

5,563,903 2,327,048 12,125,152 6/799,125 10,000 3,840,654 58,621,238 736,695 6,298,767 13,643,997 259,259 2,506 1,175,066 16,614,297 13,400,000 1,864,297 1,015,153 662,651 30,333,672 622,369 3,563,631 1,000,000 252,544 80,000 1,278,658 680,000 6,930,693 4,364,788 134,196 150,000 29,894,040 82,860,406

Subtotal

307,105,105

Grand Total+

335,268,591

Source: UN Africa Recovery Briefing Paper, No. 7, 15 January 1993, p. 8. Notes: * Based o n U N Department of Humanitarian Affairs appeal for the Special Emergency Program for the Horn of Africa. Somalia specified as recipient country. As reported by 13January 1993. + including international agencies, etc.

development. Indeed, there has been so much disruption that it is possible to describe Somalia's economy only in terms of the past and its potential. The present is represented by disorder and uncertainty. Although natural disasters, especially drought, have wreaked havoc on the economy, the roots of poverty go back many years and

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can be f o u n d in a combination of b a d e c o n o m i c policies, lack of qualified p e r s o n n e l , and many years of administrative mismanagement. In the early 1970s, the Barre government launched a socialist program, with the aim of making the country less d e p e n d e n t on the international community for its development efforts. It emphasized self-help, self-sufficiency, and self-reliance in attempts to move out of the poverty cycle. Most private enterprises were nationalized, large parastatal organizations were created, and some p r o d u c e r and service cooperatives were formed. Private ownership was eliminated in banking, insurance, and wholesale trade. These policies were aimed at s t r e n g t h e n i n g government control over the economy, increasing production, and reducing inequalities, but Barre soon realized that there was no quick fix for Somalia's economic problems. In the early 1980s, the g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r t o o k policy reforms within the framework of programs s u p p o r t e d by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These programs included major devaluations of the official exchange rate, the introduction of a foreign exchange retention scheme for exporters, and the establishment of a legal free market for foreign exchange. T h e governm e n t also accepted IMF prescriptions to reduce the public sector, encourage private enterprise, and remove price controls on various commodities. For example, a significant liberalization of agricultural pricing and marketing was allowed. Thus, in the 1980s, Somalia took measures to move from a centrally planned economy to a reliance on market forces. The new policies did not eliminate poverty, however, and their positive impact on the economy was u n d e r m i n e d by d r o u g h t , civil war, and restrictions in export markets. Lack of confidence in the country's economic and political stability on the part of private investors also inhibited any significant rise in private investment. Somalia's major economic activity has been agriculture, with cattle p r o d u c t i o n d o m i n a n t . In the early 1970s, the government took various measures to improve the agricultural sector. In the 1980s, livestock production accounted for about 47 p e r c e n t of GDP and 65 p e r c e n t of export earnings. In 1990, a b o u t 50 p e r c e n t of the p o p u lation were nomads who d e p e n d e d on livestock for their livelihood, and a b o u t 25 percent were settled farmers. In normal times, the agricultural sector as a whole represents a b o u t 63 p e r c e n t of the GDP. T h e main handicap to improvement in the agricultural sector has b e e n d r o u g h t . When the economy is reconstituted, t h e r e f o r e , improved agricultural production will require extensive irrigation. In mid-1992, it was estimated that in southern Somalia, at least half the livestock was dead. This m e a n s that when the situation stabilizes, many farmers will start from nothing.

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Somalia's principal trading p a r t n e r s in the past have b e e n Saudi Arabia and Italy. T h e country's m a j o r e x p o r t s have b e e n live animals to the Middle East, b u t that m a r k e t has b e e n sensitive to animal diseases. Saudi Arabia's ban o n Somali cattle e x p o r t s in t h e late 1980s had an adverse effect on Somalia's e c o n o m y . Bananas have b e e n the principal cash c r o p and most of t h e m have b e e n e x p o r t e d to Djibouti and the Middle East. Somalia's d e v e l o p m e n t has always d e p e n d e d o n external financing, both as s u p p o r t in m e e t i n g domestic d e v e l o p m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s a n d as p a y m e n t for i m p o r t e d materials a n d technical assistance comp o n e n t s . Over the years, foreign f i n a n c i n g in Somalia has g o n e primarily i n t o p r o j e c t s in t h e productive sectors a n d e c o n o m i c infrastructure, while domestic f i n a n c i n g has g o n e into the social sector. Somalia's principal aid d o n o r was, until recently, the U n i t e d States, which f i n a n c e d a n u m b e r of projects. But t h e U n i t e d States cut aid in 1989 in p r o t e s t against B a r r e ' s h u m a n rights r e c o r d . T h e termin a t i o n of aid h a d a devastating effect o n an e c o n o m y already crippled by c o r r u p t i o n , m i s m a n a g e m e n t , a n d a small b u t growing external debt. (By 1990, the external d e b t service c o n s u m e d m o r e than 50 p e r c e n t of its e x p o r t , a n d with d e c l i n i n g e x p o r t e a r n i n g s , this perc e n t a g e could only go up.) Somalia's o t h e r m a j o r W e s t e r n aid d o n o r , Italy, went o n working with the W o r l d Bank to h e l p achieve e c o n o m i c recovery, b u t increased f i g h t i n g in 1991 m a d e it h a r d for foreign aid p r o g r a m s to o p e r a t e . W i t h o u t f o r e i g n assistance, Somalia's chances of e c o n o m i c recovery are virtually nil. D e v e l o p m e n t prospects are in the agricultural sector, which has the p o t e n t i a l to b e the m a j o r c o n t r i b u t o r to the c o u n t r y ' s o u t p u t , exports, a n d e m p l o y m e n t . However, its p o t e n t i a l can b e e x p l o i t e d only t h r o u g h b e t t e r incentives, m o r e e f f i c i e n t irrigation a n d o t h e r i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and improved m a r k e t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s . Unless measures are taken to i m p r o v e this sector, t h e e c o n o m i c situation will r e m a i n precarious a n d Somalia's a t t e m p t s to achieve political stability will have limited results. T h e converse, t h o u g h , is also true: t h e r e c a n be n o a m e l i o r a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m i c malaise until t h e political o r d e r has b e e n established.

THE REFUGEE SITUATION T h e Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977-1978 a n d the d e t e r i o r a t i o n in the security situation in Ethiopia in t h e 1970s a n d early 1980s compelled many Ethiopians (of Somali origin) to cross into Somalia as refugees. T h e first wave of Ethiopian r e f u g e e s , a b o u t 500,000 of t h e m , crossed into Somalia in 1978. About half of these, mostly O g a d e n i s , were p u t

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in refugee camps in n o r t h e r n Somalia, where their hosts were Issaqs. In spite of a long history of conflict over water and grazing lands between these two pastoral clans, relations between the refugees and their hosts were initially very good. T h e refugees were almost totally d e p e n d e n t on international relief supplies. This created immense problems for Somalia, which became increasingly d e p e n d e n t on humanitarian aid. In d u e course, however, refugees became a boon rather than a b u r d e n to Somalia's economy, as Barre used them to obtain external aid on easy terms. Moreover, some Ogadeni refugees were illegally recruited into the army to help maintain the Barre regime. For some years, the n u m b e r of refugees in Somalia was a matter of controversy, but n u m b e r s decreased considerably after mid-1988, when arrangements were made for voluntary repatriation u n d e r the tripartite system. Tripartite meetings between Ethiopia, Somalia, and representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were held in Geneva, Mogadishu, a n d Addis Ababa in 1988—1989 to work out the mechanism for voluntary repatriation. T h e UNHCR has been active in Somalia since the 1970s, and up to 1989 it had spent an estimated US$50 million annually to house and feed the refugees. T h e onset of civil war in 1988 strained relations between the Barre government and the UNHCR. O n e issue that particularly concerned the UNHCR was the forced conscription and arming of some refugees in the camps. Barre sought to exploit the traditional rivalry between the Issaq and Ogadeni clans by using Ogadeni refugees to attack their Issaq hosts, who were suspected of aiding the guerrillas of the Somali National Movement. T h e UNHCR saw the arming of refugees as a violation of the basic principle governing refugee status and protested to the Barre government. There was also disagreement over the n u m b e r of refugees in the country. The Barre government inflated the figures in hopes of obtaining more s u p p o r t f r o m the international community. The UNHCR, on the other h a n d , insisted that internally displaced persons could not be c o u n t e d as refugees. These disagreements culminated in Barre's expulsion of the UNHCR representative in March 1989, b u t the UNHCR has r e m a i n e d active in the country. By early 1993, the situation in the H o r n had b e c o m e so fluid as to make it virtually impossible to keep count of refugees in any country. In Somalia, the n u m b e r of displaced persons exceeded the level of refugees anywhere in the region. In fact, there were two types of Somali refugees: those who crossed the b o r d e r into Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen; and those who flocked to the m a j o r

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cities and feeding centers in search of food. In the initial stages, Somali r e f u g e e s crossing into Kenya and Djibouti had relatively few problems settling down; they were quickly absorbed into the Somali populations in these countries. However, as the n u m b e r of refugees increased, ethnic Somalis in neighboring states started to resent the newcomers. In Kenya alone, there were more than 400,000 registered refugees f r o m Somalia by January 1993 and their n u m b e r s were increasing; there were many other Somali refugees in the country who had not been registered. The boat journey to Yemen has always been the most dangerous for Somali refugees. In 1992, thousands of Somalis took the risk of crossing by boat to Yemen to seek refuge. Because of these movements of refugees, the UNHCR's activities in Somalia have increased tremendously in the past few years. It continues to coordinate cross-border support for refugees from El Wak and M a n d e r a in northwest Kenya and f r o m Jijigga in eastern Ethiopia, where there are m o r e than 700,000 r e f u g e e s in Fifteen camps. T h e UNHCR also provides support for the m o r e than 50,000 Somali refugees in Yemen. Inside Somalia, both local and international relief agencies have been seeking to keep the population as stationary as possible by providing h e l p on the spot, but this has been virtually impossible. In 1992 there was a large influx into Mogadishu and o t h e r feeding centers. T h e UNHCR, in c o n j u n c t i o n with NGOs, provides water and social services to help r e t u r n i n g refugees and displaced persons resettle. In his report to the Security Council on 3 March 1993, the UN Secretary-General argued that one of the "major challenges in 1993 will be to facilitate the voluntary r e t u r n of approximately 300,000 r e f u g e e s . . . and internally displaced persons." 5 Security Council Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993 has reinforced this by asking Boutros-Ghali, t h r o u g h his Special Representative, "to assist in the repatriation of refugees and the . . . r e s e t t l e m e n t of displaced persons, utilizing UNOSOM II forces." 6

NOTES 1. For a useful discussion of the e c o n o m i c d i m e n s i o n of security in developing countries, see Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries, Adelphi Paper No. 251 ( L o n d o n : Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), pp. 23-41. 2. The Economist, 15 August 1992, p. 2. 3. The Economist, 15 August 1992, p. 2. 4. See UN Africa Recovery Briefing Paper, No. 7, 15 J a n u a r y 1993, p. 18. 5. See Security Council D o c u m e n t S / 2 5 3 5 4 of 3 March 1993. 6. See Security Council Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993.

5 SUPERPOWER RIVALRY IN THE C O L D WAR PERIOD

Somalia's strategic location n e a r the oil-rich Middle East was of great value to the s u p e r p o w e r s d u r i n g the Cold War. B o t h t h e f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n a n d t h e U n i t e d States sought to have a military prese n c e in Somalia a n d the H o r n of Africa in g e n e r a l . T h e o v e r r i d i n g interest of t h e s u p e r p o w e r s was n o t primarily to h e l p Somalia b u t to p u r s u e their own global a n d regional agendas. As was the case with s u p e r p o w e r relations in o t h e r "strategic" regions of t h e T h i r d World, the U n i t e d States a n d the USSR c o m p e t e d f o r i n f l u e n c e in the H o r n in the 1970s a n d early 1980s. T h i s rivalry gave Somalia leverage t h r o u g h which it o b t a i n e d substantial e c o n o m i c a n d military assistance, first f r o m t h e Soviet U n i o n and later f r o m t h e U n i t e d States. T h e e n d of t h e Cold War in the late 1980s m e a n t t h a t t h e U n i t e d States a n d the f o r m e r USSR were n o longer i n t e r e s t e d in c o m p e t i n g with each o t h e r in the H o r n a n d they subsequently withdrew.

THE SOVIET PRESENCE T h e Soviet interest in Somalia was, in part, an e x t e n s i o n of its objectives in the Red Sea r e g i o n . T h e USSR h a d m a i n t a i n e d a military p r e s e n c e in Egypt since t h e 1950s, b u t by 1972, its relations with Egypt had d e v e l o p e d serious strains. Although Moscow h e l p e d Egypt d u r i n g the O c t o b e r 1973 Middle East war, their r e l a t i o n s r e m a i n e d cool, a n d Egypt u n d e r Anwar Sadat increasingly l o o k e d toward the U n i t e d States f o r e c o n o m i c and military support. 1 T h e Soviet U n i o n established a f o o t h o l d in the H o r n in the early 1970s, w h e n it built a sophisticated naval base at the p o r t of B e r b e r a in Somalia. 2 In fact, the USSR s t r e n g t h e n e d ties with Somalia j u s t as its r e l a t i o n s with Egypt were w e a k e n i n g in the early 1970s. Several factors h e l p e d 51

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Moscow consider establishing a strong military p r e s e n c e in the Horn in the 1970s. First, the United States was withdrawing troops from Vietnam a n d that s e e m e d to a b s o r b the attention of most policymakers in Washington. Second, revelations of the Watergate scandal, which had surfaced in 1973, m a d e it difficult for the Nixon administration to exert influence on what was h a p p e n i n g a r o u n d the world. Third, the government of E m p e r o r Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, where the United States had established a military c o m m u n i c a t i o n s base in the 1950s, was overthrown by a socialist-leaning military junta in 1974, paving the way for improved relations between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. Policy planners in Moscow felt that the time was ripe for the Soviet Union to make a move to increase its influence in a region previously dominated by U.S. or Western influence. In July 1974, the Soviet U n i o n signed a f r i e n d s h i p treaty with Somalia. T h e pact p r o m i s e d protection and both military and economic assistance for Somalia. It was u n d e r this a r r a n g e m e n t that Moscow provided Somalia with large quantities of weapons. T h e Soviet Union and East Germany also helped S o m a l i a set up the National Security Services ( N S S ) , h e a d e d by A h m e d Suleiman, Siad Barre's son-in-law. T h e N S S proved useful to Barre as an instrument for internal control and surveillance. By 1975, the Soviet naval base at B e r b e r a was r e g a r d e d by Western leaders and policymakers as a serious threat to vital Western security interests in the Gulf and Indian Ocean regions. Soviet installations at B e r b e r a included a dry dock, missile handling and storage facilities, a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s station, a large fuel storage facility, and a 15,000-foot runway capable of accommodating large Soviet aircraft. 3 S o m e of these facilities, especially the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s receiver and transmitter sites, were accessible only to Soviet personnel. T h e Soviet U n i o n also had a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s center at Kismayu and access to air facilities at Mogadishu. By 1976, Moscow had "nearly 4,000 military and civilian advisers in Somalia." 4 This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union h a d an easy ride in S o m a l i a d u r i n g this p e r i o d . Barre a p p e a r s to have r e m a i n e d suspicious of Moscow and to have wanted to play o n e superpower off against the other. For example, in 1975, the U.S. administration was pressing C o n g r e s s to f u n d the e x p a n s i o n of naval facilities on the Indian O c e a n island of Diego Garcia, to counter the Soviet presence in the r e g i o n . Also at that time, S o m a l i a was indicating through Saudi Arabia that it was ready to expel the Soviet Union from B e r b e r a if the United States could provide sufficient e c o n o m i c a n d military aid to r e p l a c e what S o m a l i a had b e e n receiving from Moscow. A c c o r d i n g to the f o r m e r U.S. a m b a s s a d o r to Saudi Arabia,

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James Akins, the Saudis had agreed to finance military and economic assistance programs in Somalia as a means of eliminating the Soviet presence there. Saudi Arabia offered in 1975 to take over economic aid projects then financed by Moscow and to buy U.S. arms for Somalia to replace the flow of Soviet weapons into that country. However. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused. 5 T h e a p p a r e n t reason for Kissinger's lack of interest was that Congress might not have approved f u n d s for the expansion of Diego Garcia facilities if the Soviets—the official rationale for building the Diego Garcia base— had been expelled from Berbera at that time. Somalia's interest in forging closer relations with the United States stemmed f r o m several factors. First, it was increasingly coming u n d e r the influence of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These countries had sponsored its membership in the Arab League in 1974 and wanted to reduce Soviet influence in the Red Sea region. Second, with the fall of E m p e r o r Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1974, Somalia thought the main obstacle in its relations with the United States had been removed. T h i r d , it was a p p a r e n t that friction was developing in Somali-Soviet relations and Barre wanted to get rid of the Soviets. The turning point in superpower relations with the Horn came in 1977, when the United States pulled out of Ethiopia, thereby enabling the Soviet Union to move in. At the same time, Somalia invaded Ethiopia (in late J u n e 1977), thereby precipitating the O g a d e n war of 1977-1978. T h e fact that Somalia could invade Ethiopia against Moscow's advice was an indication that Soviet influence in Somalia was on the wane. T h e Soviet Union a n n o u n c e d in October 1977 that it was stopping arms supplies to Somalia and that it had decided to help Ethiopia repulse the Somali attack. This angered the Somalis, who in November expelled Soviet military advisers and o r d e r e d the closure of their military facilities in the country. 6 T h e overriding Soviet objective in the H o r n was to secure and maintain air and naval facilities that would enable it to monitor the m o v e m e n t of U.S. and o t h e r Western forces and to project its own power m o r e effectively in the Indian Ocean. However, three years after the USSR was thrown out of Somalia, its f o r m e r facilities were taken over by the United States.

T H E

U.S.

R O L E

As already indicated, the U n i t e d States established a military prese n c e in the H o r n in the 1950s when it built a military communications base at Kagnew in Ethiopia. (Kagnew is now a part of Eritrea.)

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T h e facility at K a g n e w was o n c e vital to the w o r l d w i d e n e t w o r k of U.S. military c o m m u n i c a t i o n s linking, f o r e x a m p l e , the P h i l i p p i n e s , M o r o c c o , a n d A r l i n g t o n , V i r g i n i a . It was also i m p o r t a n t f o r N A T O c o m m u n i c a t i o n s within W e s t e r n E u r o p e . 7 In t h e early 1970s, the U n i t e d S t a t e s s t a r t e d to l o s e i n t e r e s t in E t h i o p i a , partly b e c a u s e i m p r o v e d satellite t e c h n o l o g y h a d m a d e the military c o m m u n i c a tions facilities at K a g n e w r e d u n d a n t , a n d partly b e c a u s e the U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e h a d a c q u i r e d the facility o n D i e g o G a r c i a , a b o u t 3 , 0 0 0 n a u t i c a l m i l e s f r o m t h e G u l f . F r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the P e n t a g o n , the island h a d n u m e r o u s security a d v a n t a g e s over Kagnew: its i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n h a d b e e n r e l o c a t e d by t h e British b e f o r e l e a s i n g the island to the U n i t e d States in 1965; it was far f r o m o t h e r c o u n t r i e s a n d thus, unlike K a g n e w , was in n o d a n g e r o f attack by i n s u r g e n t s or a n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r y ; a n d it c o u l d also s t o r e fuel a n d h a r b o r s h i p s . T h e f a c t that a M a r x i s t - o r i e n t e d military g o v e r n m e n t h a d overthrown H a i l e S e l a s s i e in 1974 also h e l p e d to e x p e d i t e the U.S. withdrawal f r o m K a g n e w . Shortly a f t e r p u l l i n g o u t of E t h i o p i a in 1977, the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t s t a r t e d s e n d i n g c o n f l i c t i n g s i g n a l s to S o m a l i a , which m i g h t have e n c o u r a g e d B a r r e to try to p a r t c o m p a n y with the Soviet U n i o n . O n 10 J u n e 1977, P r e s i d e n t J i m m y C a r t e r a r g u e d that h e was i n c l i n e d to " a g g r e s s i v e l y c h a l l e n g e . . . the S o v i e t U n i o n " in m a n y a r e a s of the w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g S o m a l i a . 8 A s k e d at a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e t h r e e days later to clarify this p o i n t , C a r t e r r e p l i e d , "We d o n ' t want to b e in a p o s i t i o n that o n c e a c o u n t r y is not f r i e n d l y to us a n d o n c e they a r e c o m p l e t e l y within the i n f l u e n c e of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , they s h o u l d f o r e v e r b e in that s t a t u s . " 9 H e a g a i n m e n t i o n e d S o m a l i a as o n e of the c o u n t r i e s in which he w a n t e d to c h a l l e n g e the Soviet prese n c e . A l t h o u g h C a r t e r ' s s t a t e m e n t s w e r e v a g u e , they g a v e S o m a l i a the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m i g h t p r o v i d e a r m s if the Soviet s u p p l y w e r e cut. T o a d d c r e d e n c e to that, U . S . S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e C y r u s V a n c e e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n o n 1 J u l y 1977 a b o u t t h e inc r e a s e in S o v i e t w e a p o n s a n d C u b a n t r o o p s in A f r i c a , e s p e c i a l l y the H o r n , a n d r e m a r k e d , "We s e e k f r i e n d s h i p with all the g o v e r n m e n t s o f that r e g i o n . " 1 0 By t h e time V a n c e m a d e this s t a t e m e n t , S o m a l i a h a d a l r e a d y c o m m i t t e d t r o o p s to t h e O g a d e n r e g i o n of E t h i o p i a , a fact V a n c e o u g h t to h a v e k n o w n n o t only t h r o u g h i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s b u t also t h r o u g h the press. As t h e O g a d e n war r e c e i v e d w i d e publicity, W a s h i n g t o n ' s position vis-à-vis S o m a l i a b e c a m e a m b i v a l e n t . O n 2 8 J u l y 1977, C a r t e r c o m m e n t e d t h a t while the U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d n o t want to b e g i n a c o m p e t i t i o n with the U S S R in a r m s s u p p l y , in t h e c a s e o f S o m a l i a the U n i t e d S t a t e s was "trying to work n o t o n a u n i l a t e r a l b a s i s b u t in

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conjunction with other nations, like the Saudis." 11 The following day, Vance disclosed that Somalia had a p p r o a c h e d Washington for arms and added, "Insofar as military assistance is concerned, we have indicated that, in principle, we would be p r e p a r e d to consider the furnishing of some military assistance for defensive arms . . . in conj u n c t i o n with a n u m b e r of o t h e r countries." 1 '- By this time, Somalia was willing to play the East-West card to suit Washington's interests. It turned out that the a g r e e m e n t "in principle" to supply defensive arms to Somalia had been m a d e early in July and conveyed to Somalia on 15 July 1977, in a coordinated response by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. T h a t decision was not publicly known until 27 October 1977, when Anthony Lake, then director of policy p l a n n i n g staff in the State D e p a r t m e n t , gave an official address. 1 3 However, by the end of August 1977, the United States had made a decision not to give Somalia arms (but this did not deter the Somalis f r o m cutting military ties with the Soviet Union in November 1977). In 1979, following the revolution in Iran (where the United States lost tracking stations) and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the United States tried once again to increase its military presence in the H o r n . At a National Security Council meeting of 4 December 1979, the Carter administration made a decision to seek access to military facilities in the H o r n and the Gulf. As Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, later argued, by midDecember 1979, the Carter administration had worked out plans to "generate a b r o a d e r and m o r e energetic response to the deterioration in [its] position brought on by the collapse of the Shah's regime [in Iran] and the growing Soviet involvement in the area." 1 4 In the Horn, the United States signed agreements with Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan to have access to their military facilities. Negotiations for access to Somali facilities took m u c h longer t h a n did those with o t h e r countries. This was partly because the Somali leaders had come to overvalue the Berbera facilities established by the Soviets in the early 1970s. Barre did n o t expect the Soviet U n i o n to withdraw f r o m Berbera so quickly in November 1977. T h r e e years later, he still attached considerable value to the facilities and believed that the United States would pay any price to inherit them, b u t when he asked for $2 billion over a ten-year period for their use, he f o u n d that the United States was n o t willing to pay more than $40 million over a two-year p e r i o d . Washington subsequently improved its relations with Somalia and in 1980 took over the f o r m e r Soviet base at Berbera for use by the newly f o r m e d Rapid Deployment J o i n t Task Force (now U.S. Central C o m m a n d ) .

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T h e U.S. presence in Somalia was an a p p e n d a g e of U.S. interests in the Gulf and Indian Ocean. As Chester Crocker, a former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, argued in 1983, "Our strategic interests in the H o r n of Africa are strictly corollary to o u r b r o a d e r interests in Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean, and o u r military activity in the H o r n , including our acquisition of access rights in Kenya and Somalia, is directed at protecting these larger interests." 1 5 By the late 1980s, as the Cold War came to an end, the United States had virtually no interest in maintaining a military presence in Somalia. In the wake of the changes in East-West relations in the 1980s, the collapse of c o m m u n i s m , and the political whirlwind that swept Eastern Europe f r o m 1989, Somalia, like o t h e r Third World countries, was neglected. In fact, Somalia's problems were exacerbated in the late 1980s, when it was deserted by its friends and by all Western powers except Italy. T h e United States, which had provided the Barre regime with e c o n o m i c and military assistance f r o m 1980, terminated aid in the wake of h u m a n rights violations in mid-1989. The United States subsequently urged m a j o r political and economic reforms as a prerequisite for the r e s u m p t i o n of aid. T h e European Community also cut aid in 1989 in o r d e r to pressure Barre to liberalize the political system. Italy m a d e no secret of the fact that it wanted the United Kingdom, then wrongly perceived to be close to the Somali National Movement guerrilla group, to be involved in mediation efforts. However, L o n d o n did not want to have anything to do with the peace process in Somalia because it had n o economic interests there. By 1990, Italy was the only Western nation working with Somalia in h o p e s of containing the civil war, r e f o r m i n g the political system, and putting the economy on a sound footing. Faced with evidence of an impending political and economic disaster, the Italians retained a degree of optimism a b o u t prospects for Somalia. T h e main Italian argument in the 1989-1990 period was that the Barre regime was finished, but that the Western world n e e d e d to work with it in o r d e r to create political structures that would at least have a chance of providing coherence and stability for a successor regime. However, the Italians sometimes c o n f u s e d h o p e with analysis, and their efforts failed, largely because of Somalia's complex political problems, feuding clans, r a m p a n t c o r r u p t i o n , and a d e e p e n i n g economic malaise. T h e Italian embassy was ransacked and by 20 November 1991, all its staff had been evacuated f r o m the country. I n d e p e n d e n t observers believe that if the United States and the EC had directed some efforts toward mediation in 1989-1990, the crisis might have been averted. However, revolutions in Eastern

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E u r o p e a n d t h e e n d of c o m m u n i s m t u r n e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of m a j o r W e s t e r n p o w e r s to o p p o r t u n i t i e s in E a s t e r n E u r o p e , to t h e n e g l e c t of Africa. O n c e a b e n e f i c i a r y of C o l d W a r t e n s i o n s b e t w e e n t h e s u p e r powers, S o m a l i a e v e n t u a l l y b e c a m e a victim of t h e g e n e r a l i n d i f f e r e n c e of W e s t e r n n a t i o n s to t h e p l i g h t of d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s in t h e new world order.

THE LEGACY OF SUPERPOWER RIVALRY O n e c o n s e q u e n c e of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in t h e H o r n was t h e acquisition of l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of a r m s by local states in t h e 1970s a n d 1980s. For i n s t a n c e , in t h e m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , at t h e h e i g h t of t h e S o v i e t - S o m a l i f r i e n d s h i p , Somalia h a d t h e b e s t - e q u i p p e d a r m e d f o r c e s in s u b - S a h a r a n Africa. By 1976, S o m a l i a was e s t i m a t e d to have m o r e t h a n 2 5 0 t a n k s , m o r e t h a n 3 0 0 a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r s , a n d o v e r 52 f i g h t e r p l a n e s . 1 6 D u r i n g this p e r i o d , S o m a l i a ' s a r m y i n c r e a s e d f r o m 12,000 in 1970 t o 3 0 , 0 0 0 in 1977. W e a p o n s s u p p l i e s s e r v e d t h e i n t e r e s t s of both the suppliers a n d recipients. Barre sought a r m s partly for t h e p u r p o s e of s u p p r e s s i n g d i s s i d e n t s a n d d o m e s t i c o p p o s i t i o n g r o u p s a n d m a i n t a i n i n g his r e g i m e ; b u t h e g e n e r a l l y p o r t r a y e d t h e s e n e e d s in t e r m s of t h e security of t h e state. H e also s o u g h t a r m s in p u r s u i t of e x p a n s i o n i s t g o a l s , with a view to a n n e x i n g p a r t of E t h i o p i a a n d Kenya. In t h e 1980s, t h e U n i t e d States d i d n o t supply S o m a l i a with as m a n y a r m s as t h e Soviet U n i o n h a d d o n e in t h e 1970s. H o w e v e r , in 1990, with a p o p u l a t i o n of a b o u t six m i l l i o n , S o m a l i a h a d a m i l i t a r y f o r c e of o v e r 65,000, h u g e by A f r i c a n s t a n d a r d s . T h e availability of a r m a m e n t s in l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s in a n a r c h i c S o m a l i a in t h e early 1990s is a legacy of t h e U.S.-Soviet rivalry in t h e H o r n . T h e w e a p o n s did n o t create the tension, b u t they have played a r o l e in c h a n g i n g its m a g n i t u d e , d i r e c t i o n , a n d i n t e n s i t y . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e U n i t e d States (in t h e a b s e n c e of t h e USSR) h a s a r e s p o n sibility to h e l p stabilize t h e s i t u a t i o n .

NOTES 1. This change in Egypt's foreign policy has been explained well in Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: H a r p e r 8c Row, 1978), pp. 271-313. 2. A detailed analysis of superpower competition in the Horn would necessarily go back to the 1960s and consider the U.S. decision to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean, the British withdrawal from "East of Suez," and the Soviet perceptions of threat at the time. For a concise discussion of

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some of these issues, see Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: T h e Brookings Institution, 1987), especially pp. 196-203. 3. See, for instance, Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia, Report of Senator Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, July 1975, pp. 7 - 1 9 . 4. See Paul B. Henz.e, "Communism and Ethiopia," Problems of Communism, Vol. 30, No. 3, May-June 1981, p. 16; and Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Trouble in the Horn," Newsweek, 27 J u n e 1977, pp. 15-16. 5. "Testimony of James Akins, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia," in Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 4 May 1976, pp. 4 3 0 - 4 3 3 . 6. For an interesting discussion of the Soviet presence in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, see Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), especially Chapter 4. 7. See, for instance, the testimony of John Spencer, former chief adviser to the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 4—6 August 1976, p. 26. 8. President Carter in an interview with Magazine Publishers Association, 10 J u n e 1977, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 13, No. 25, 20 J u n e 1977, p. 866. 9. "President Carter's News Conference of 13 J u n e , " Department of Stale Bulletin, Vol. 77, No. 1984, 4 J u l y 1977, p. 3. 10. Cyrus Vance, "The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations," Address to the NAACP in St. Louis, 1 July 1977, Department of Slate Bulletin, Vol. 77, No. 1989, 8 August 1977, pp. 169-170. 11. "President Carter's News Conference of July 28," Department of Stale Bulletin, Vol. 77, No. 1991, 22 August 1977, p. 222. 12. "Secretary Vance's News Conference of July 29," Department of Stale Bulletin, Vol. 77, No. 1991, 22 August 1977, p. 229. 13. See Anthony Lake, "Africa in Global Perspective," Africa Report, Vol. 23, No. 1, January-February 1978, pp. 4 4 - 4 8 . 14. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), p. 426. 15. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1984, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 304. 16. The Military Balance 1975-1976 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975). According to Paul Henze, a former Carter administration official, Somalia received over U S $ 3 1 0 million worth of weapons in the three-year period 1974-1976. See his Arming the Horn, 1960-1980, Working Paper No. 43 (Washington, D.C.: T h e Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, 1982), p. 25. However, the pricing of secondhand equipment quite often is so arbitrary that financial figures alone cannot reflect the quality and quantity of weapons.

6

T H E U N AND MULTINATIONAL INTERVENTION

Since the late 1980s, the United Nations has played a prominent role in negotiating peace and a r r a n g i n g ceasefires in regional conflicts and in organizing h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance. T h r o u g h the offices of the Secretary-General in tandem with the Security Council, the UN has arguably proved to be a powerful catalyst for peacekeeping and for the settlement of international disputes. It negotiated the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, negotiated an end to the eightyear-old war between Iraq and Iran in 1988, and brought about the South African withdrawal from Namibia in 1989. T h e Iraq-Kuwait crisis of 1990-1991 particularly highlighted the fact that the UN was beginning to assert itself in the m a i n t e n a n c e of international peace and security in the post-Cold War era. In that crisis the world body gave legitimacy to the U.S.-led multinational force to evict Iraq from Kuwait. 1 T h e Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 led to u n p r e c e d e n t e d cooperation between the United States and the former Soviet Union in the Security Council and m a d e the UN action much easier. However, some critics argued at the time that the IraqKuwait crisis could not serve as an archetype for international responses in f u t u r e Third World crises. They p o i n t e d out that the political importance of the balance of power in the Middle East, the significance of the region's oil resources, and the despotic nature of Saddam Hussein's rule in Iraq all provided an unusually powerful incentive for Western—especially British and U.S.—intervention. Now f r e e d from the paralysis of the Cold War years, d u r i n g which the United States and the Soviet Union frequently used their veto power to block Security Council action, the UN has attempted to p e r f o r m humanitarian and peacekeeping functions in many parts of the world. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has an ambitious a g e n d a f o r peace, through which he plans u n p r e c e d e n t e d UN 59

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involvement in p e a c e m a k i n g , p e a c e k e e p i n g , a n d p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n t . H e is c o n v i n c e d that the UN now has a n o p p o r t u n i t y to achieve the g r e a t objectives f o r which it was e s t a b l i s h e d , i n c l u d i n g m a i n t a i n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e a n d security, s e c u r i n g j u s t i c e a n d h u m a n rights, a n d p r o m o t i n g social progress. By early 1993, the U N h a d m o r e than a d o z e n p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s u n d e r way, a n d t h e f u n c t i o n s of these o p e r a t i o n s h a d grown f r o m m e r e military observation or interposition to m u l t i f a c e t e d p e a c e s e t t l e m e n t p l a n s (as in C a m b o d i a ) or t h e provision a n d p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n i t a r i a n relief s u p p l i e s (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina a n d Somalia). For m a n y years it was a r g u e d that the UN h a d n o credibility with r e g a r d to t h e r e s o l u t i o n of i n t e r n a tional conflicts; by 1992, however, B o u t r o s - G h a l i ' s o b s e r v a t i o n that the UN h a d "almost too m u c h credibility" was i n d i s p u t a b l e . In J a n u a r y 1992, the Security C o u n c i l r e q u e s t e d Boutros-Ghali to p r e p a r e an "analysis a n d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s o n ways of s t r e n g t h e n i n g a n d m a k i n g m o r e e f f i c i e n t " t h e capacity of the UN f o r preventive d i p l o m a c y , p e a c e m a k i n g , a n d p e a c e k e e p i n g . His a n s w e r was a fiftyt h r e e - p a g e p a p e r e n t i t l e d An Agenda for Peace, p u b l i s h e d in J u n e 1992, in which h e p r o p o s e d relatively new ideas a b o u t p e a c e m a k i n g a n d p e a c e k e e p i n g . H e s u g g e s t e d t h a t m e m b e r states u n d e r t a k e to m a k e specially t r a i n e d a n d a r m e d p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n t units, plus e q u i p m e n t , available to t h e Security C o u n c i l o n a p e r m a n e n t basis, to b e d e s p a t c h e d to t r o u b l e spots at s h o r t n o t i c e . 2 A c c o r d i n g to B o u t r o s - G h a l i , s u c h a f o r c e w o u l d m a k e t h e UN m o r e responsive to t h e c h a n g i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l climate. T h r o u g h t h e s e proposals, the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l s i g n a l e d t h e U N ' s i n t e n t i o n to a s s u m e a m o r e active role in p e a c e m a k i n g a n d p e a c e k e e p i n g in t h e p o s t - C o l d War world. As of this writing, t h e Security C o u n c i l h a s n o t f o r m a l l y a c c e p t e d Boutros-Ghali's p r o p o s a l , b u t s o m e of his ideas have b e e n a d o p t e d t h r o u g h t h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d m a n d a t e of U N O S O M II. As is generally a c k n o w l e d g e d , the priorities of t h e UN in the a r e a of i n t e r n a t i o n a l security a n d o r d e r are largely d e t e r m i n e d by the perm a n e n t m e m b e r s of the Security Council, which has b e e n d o m i n a t e d by t h e U n i t e d States, t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , a n d F r a n c e in the p o s t Cold W a r e r a , especially since t h e d e m i s e of t h e Soviet U n i o n in 1991. T h e U N was very slow in r e s p o n d i n g to Somalia b o t h b e c a u s e t h e s e c o u n t r i e s h a d t h e i r i n t e r e s t s e l s e w h e r e ( f o r e x a m p l e , in t h e M i d d l e East, E a s t e r n E u r o p e , a n d t h e f o r m e r Yugoslavia) a n d b e c a u s e t h e total collapse of g o v e r n m e n t s t r u c t u r e s in Somalia a n d t h e b e h a v i o r s of w a r l o r d s m a d e it e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t to p r o v i d e h u m a n i t a r i a n relief. I n d e e d , a l t h o u g h t h e Somali tragedy was k n o w n as early as N o v e m b e r 1991, t h e world b o d y w a i t e d u n t i l very late b e f o r e c o m m i t t i n g its r e s o u r c e s . T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s I n t e r n a t i o n a l

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C h i l d r e n ' s F u n d (UNICEF) a n d t h e UN World Food P r o g r a m m e have b e e n active in Somalia for years, but the UN as a whole is a relative n e w c o m e r t h e r e . In fact, t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n started to c o n s i d e r Somalia seriously only a f t e r Boutros-Ghali b e c a m e Secretary-General in J a n u a r y 1992. As a f o r m e r Egyptian minister of state f o r f o r e i g n affairs, h e has had a long-standing interest in the H o r n . In c o n j u n c t i o n with relief agencies, the U n i t e d Nations took an active role in organizing h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance f o r Somalia in mid1992. T h e UN has several objectives in Somalia, which were initially stipulated in Security Council Resolution 733 of 23 J a n u a r y 1992: to a r r a n g e a ceasefire between warring factions; to organize a n d deliver h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance; a n d to p r o m o t e national reconciliation a n d a political settlement. A c c o r d i n g to Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 D e c e m b e r 1992, the UN m a n d a t e in Somalia includes h e l p i n g to rebuild public institutions. Security Council Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993 stressed repeatedly the n e e d to rehabilitate b o t h Somalia's political institutions a n d its economy, while p r o m o t i n g a political s e t t l e m e n t a n d n a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . This is o n e of the most ambitious operations the UN has u n d e r t a k e n in a sovereign state a n d r e p r e s e n t s the first time t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n has i n t e r v e n e d in t h e domestic affairs of a m e m b e r state when that state has n o t p r e s e n t e d a military threat to its n e i g h b o r s . Security Council R e s o l u t i o n 794, which a u t h o r i z e d a U n i f i e d Task Force (UNITAF) u n d e r C h a p t e r VII of t h e UN C h a r t e r , also r e q u i r e d the Secretary-General to r e p o r t to t h e C o u n c i l o n a regular basis a b o u t efforts toward the alleviation of the Somali p r o b l e m . T h e main objective of the UNITAF, which o p e r a t e d u n d e r U.S. comm a n d f r o m D e c e m b e r 1992 to May 1993, was to establish a s e c u r e e n v i r o n m e n t for h u m a n i t a r i a n relief o p e r a t i o n s , i.e., to stop organized militias a n d bandits f r o m looting convoys of relief supplies a n d to e n s u r e that ceasefires were observed.

CEASEFIRES AND RECONCILIATION T h e tragedy in Somalia was c o m p o u n d e d by c o n t i n u o u s f a c t i o n a l fighting f r o m late 1991 until the e n d of 1992. D u r i n g this p e r i o d , it b e c a m e obvious that t h e r e was little t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y could d o to h e l p Somalia u n l e s s its own p e o p l e s t o p p e d f i g h t i n g each o t h e r . In t h e face of t h e o n g o i n g violence, the UN SecretaryG e n e r a l a n d his Special Representatives in 1992 m a d e several a t t e m p t s at b o t h p e a c e k e e p i n g a n d p e a c e m a k i n g , b u t t h e i r e f f o r t s m e t with little success. P e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s usually succeed in

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conditions where parties to a conflict are willing to maintain ceasefires, as has b e e n the case in Cyprus since the mid-1970s. However, arranging ceasefires in Somalia has b e e n extremely difficult. Political alliances shift frequently, parties d o n o t trust each o t h e r , a n d there is considerable uncertainty in t h e military situation. T h e UN has f o u n d , in fact, that ceasefires in Somalia c a n n o t hold for long, and this has m a d e the task of creating c o n d i t i o n s conducive to negotiations or national reconciliation very difficult. Early in 1992, the UN arranged a t e n u o u s ceasefire between t h e warring Hawiye factions in Mogadishu. T h e Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, J a m e s J o n a h , was dispatched to Somalia in J a n u a r y 1992 to try to p e r s u a d e the factions to n e g o t i a t e peace. In t h e same m o n t h , the Security Council approved a resolution imposing an arms e m b a r g o on Somalia a n d calling on the c o m b a t a n t s to " c o o p e r a t e " with the UN and relief agencies in their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need.'' Representatives of the two United Somali Congress factions went to New York in mid-February 1992, and a l t h o u g h they refused to negotiate with each o t h e r face to face, they agreed to e n d the fighting. Nevertheless, as they h a d d o n e in the past, they flouted this ceasefire as well. T h e UN subsequently warned t h e m in early March 1992 that the international community had b e c o m e exasperated by their ceasefire violations a n d t h a t Somalia might be aband o n e d a l t o g e t h e r . A n o t h e r ceasefire a g r e e m e n t between the USC factions was signed on 5 March 1992, a n d this held tenuously for a few months. In April 1992 t h e UN Secretary-General a p p o i n t e d a seasoned Algerian diplomat, M o h a m m e d S a h n o u n , as his Special Representative to Somalia. S a h n o u n ' s responsibility was to provide overall direction of UN activities in the country a n d to assist in efforts toward a political s e t t l e m e n t a n d n a t i o n a l reconciliation. Security Council Resolution 751 of 24 April 1992 a u t h o r i z e d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a peacekeeping force to provide security f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n activities in Mogadishu; this force later b e c a m e known as the first UN O p e r a t i o n in Somalia ( U N O S O M I). T h e resolution also approved the deploym e n t of fifty u n a r m e d military observers to m o n i t o r the ceasefire on both sides of t h e d e m a r c a t i o n line in t h e capital. Interim President Mahdi immediately notified the UN that h e agreed to its stipulated conditions, which r e q u i r e d that t h e fifty ceasefire observers be in u n i f o r m a n d u n a r m e d . However, his rival, General Aidid, insisted that the observers n o t be in u n i f o r m b u t in civilian attire, with UN insignia. After t o r t u o u s n e g o t i a t i o n s with S a h n o u n , Aidid formally accepted UN conditions r e g a r d i n g t h e d e p l o y m e n t of the observers on 21 J u n e 1992. T h e observers, led by Pakistani G e n e r a l Imtiaz

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Shaheen, arrived in the Somali capital in July 1992. 4 Although Resolution 751 also made references to other parts of Somalia and called on Boutros-Ghali to facilitate the reconciliation process and provide h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance t h r o u g h o u t the country, its focus was basically on Mogadishu. At this stage, it a p p e a r e d as if the UN wanted to alleviate the suffering in Mogadishu alone, but S a h n o u n seemed d e t e r m i n e d to cover the whole country. His activities revolved a r o u n d three m a j o r issues: monitoring the ceasefire in Mogadishu and the cessation of hostilities throughout the country; expediting the delivery of humanitarian assistance and p r o m o t i n g efforts toward rehabilitation and institution building; and facilitating the process of national reconciliation. To establish rapport with clan elders and faction leaders, Sahn o u n sought permission from them for the deliver)' of humanitarian supplies in the areas they controlled. In the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on 24 July 1992, it was indicated that Sahnoun had consulted faction leaders and clan elders t h r o u g h o u t the country between 4 May and 19 July 1992. Sahnoun was generally successful in arranging reconciliations between various guerrilla groups. He was frustrated, however, by the way the UN Secretariat and the international community r e s p o n d e d to the situation. As o n e press r e p o r t has suggested, by mid-1992, Sahnoun had "discovered that the world was largely indiff e r e n t and . . . the UN had been scared into lethargy, f r i g h t e n e d both by the danger and the lack of rules and precedent." 5 It was only after many weeks of prodding by the Secretary-General that the Security Council belatedly voted on 27 July 1992 for an urgent airlift of food to Somalia. By this time, Boutros-Ghali had complained in his report to the Security Council (on 24 July 1992) that Council members allotted a disproportionate a m o u n t of limited resources to the tragedies that affected them directly. He had argued that unless the UN acted quickly, one-third of the Somali population would perish. It was then that the Security Council a p p e a r e d to take the Somali tragedy more seriously. O n 28 August 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 775 extending the UN m a n d a t e to cover other parts of Somalia. T h e resolution stipulated that the UN would have to work in consultation with the Somali factions and "authorities." Although this s o u n d e d good diplomatically, in practice, its fulfillment was difficult since it in effect gave the warring parties a veto over the whole operation. Sahn o u n had m a d e contact with warlords and clan elders in some parts of Somalia, b u t in others, he f o u n d it hard to obtain permission for the deployment of security forces to protect humanitarian operations.

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In some areas the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative reached agreements with local warlords, but, unlike in o t h e r countries where such understandings implied a c o m m i t m e n t by the parties to cooperate with the UN, in Somalia the a g r e e m e n t s were violated more often than not. It was largely because of these frustrations that Boutros-Ghali decided to seek a larger military intervention, with or without the consent of the parties. In this context he sought the Security Council's authority to send in the Unified Task Force in late 1992. T h e events leading to the establishment of the task force are set forth later in this chapter. According to Security Council Resolution 794, one of the missions of the Unified Task Force was to continue efforts to achieve a political settlement. In a r e p o r t to the Security Council on 19 December 1992, Boutros-Ghali argued that progress "on the political front is a necessary condition for the United Nations to be able to assist Somalia in launching the economic and social programs for rehabilitation and reconstruction." 6 Earlier, in his letter to President Bush on 8 December 1992, the UN Secretary-General had observed that the United States had u n d e r t a k e n to "take the lead in creating the secure e n v i r o n m e n t which is an inescapable condition for the United Nations to provide humanitarian relief and p r o m o t e national reconciliation and e c o n o m i c reconstruction." 7 However, political progress has been h a m p e r e d by lack of willingness on the part of the factions to cooperate and respect ceasefires. A ceasefire, b r o k e r e d jointly by President George Bush's special envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley, and the UN Secretary-General's new Special Representative, Ismat Kittani, was reached in early December 1992, when Interim President Ali Mahdi and his rival General Aidid met for the first time in eighteen m o n t h s and issued a j o i n t statement forswearing mutual hostilities. (Oakley, a former U.S. ambassador to Somalia, was appointed special envoy to Somalia to explain to the Somali faction leaders and clan elders the mission of the U.S. operation there. Oakley was replaced by Robert Gosende, formerly of the U.S. Information Agency, in March 1993.) Boutros-Ghali has argued that ceasefire agreements between organized factions should include provisions for the concentration of their heavy weapons at designated locations where they can be b r o u g h t u n d e r international control. (While Aidid and Mahdi agreed in December 1992 to the concentration of their heavy weapons in designated locations, the other factions—estimated at about twelve—did not agree to do so until late January 1993.) Encouraged by these developments, the UN invited f o u r t e e n political factions to Addis Ababa in J a n u a r y 1993 for an "informal" meeting preparatory to the c o n f e r e n c e on national reconciliation

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and unity. T h e meeting was also attended by the secretaries-general of the OAU, the Arab League, and the OIC, by a representative of the chairman of the nonaligned movement, and by a representative of the chairman of the standing c o m m i t t e e of the countries of the H o r n . The task of this meeting, which was addressed by BoutrosGhali on 4 J a n u a r y 1993, was to p r e p a r e a framework that would enable Somalis themselves to develop ideas and work out arrangements for the establishment of a g o v e r n m e n t in accordance with their own traditions and values. Following the preparatory meeting, the participating factions signed three accords. O n e agreement dealt with the implementation of the ceasefire, one stipulated modalities of disarmament, and a n o t h e r established an ad hoc committee to help resolve the agenda for and criteria for participation in a national reconciliation c o n f e r e n c e in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. For the first time in more than eighteen months, the fourteen factions agreed to "an immediate and binding ceasefire" throughout the country, but this agreement was soon violated. Moreover, the ad hoc committee meeting, convened in Addis Ababa on 22 January 1993, was suspended immediately following allegations by the Somali National Alliance (SNA) that the ceasefire had been violated by the Somali National Front (SNF). (The allegations were repeated in March, as described earlier.) O n e problem with the national reconciliation process is that it is n o t easy to know w h e t h e r the faction leaders are representative of the Somali population. F u r t h e r m o r e , because of the international publicity Mahdi and Aidid have received, it is possible that foreign observers may be ascribing to their roles greater impact than they actually carry on Somalia's bloodied stage. In an a t t e m p t to give impetus to the peace process, the UN Secretary-General visited Somalia briefly on 3 January 1993, but he was greeted by demonstrations in Mogadishu. T h e demonstrations were reportedly organized by supporters of General Aidid, who felt that the UN had been partisan and had favored Ali Mahdi. 8 Aidid's supporters also claimed that Boutros-Ghali, while still an Egyptian g o v e r n m e n t official, had been close to Siad Barre. T h e demonstrations also reflected d i s a p p o i n t m e n t that the UN had not provided immediate relief and effective law and o r d e r . Unfortunately, those expectations neglected other factors governing the UN, whose activities in Somalia have been constrained by its charter, by its limited resources, a n d by the interests of the p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of the Security Council. T h e national reconciliation process slowed down considerably in February and March 1993, just when UNITAF forces were preparing

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to withdraw. As described earlier in this chapter, the UN-sponsored national reconciliation c o n f e r e n c e , which started in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993, was soon suspended because of claims by General Aidid that the SNF was violating the ceasefire agreement in the Kismayu area. T h e SNF guerrillas, formally under the c o m m a n d of General Hersi, repeatedly attacked forces of the Somali Patriotic Movement, controlled by Aidid's ally, Colonel Omar Jess. Although the conference resumed after two days, the fighting that look place around Kismayu in the first three months of 1993 suggested that the international community would have to resort to continued force in the future to achieve political stability in Somalia.

UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION: UNOSOM I Without secure routes in the country, the UN aim of delivering humanitarian assistance was seriously hampered for much o f 1992. A peacekeeping operation was t h e r e f o r e needed to facilitate UN efforts to maintain ceasefires and provide humanitarian assistance. T h e problem the world body faced was how to send a peacekeeping operation to a country that had no government and in which ceasefires were not respected. Traditionally, "UN peacekeeping operations can be set up in areas of conflict only with the consent of the parties directly c o n c e r n e d . " 9 Moreover, peacekeeping operations had never been sent to any sovereign state without the permission of the gove r n m e n t of that state. In Somalia, where there was n o government but many militia groups, such consent was hard to obtain; even when warlords and clan elders gave their c o n s e n t , they sometimes withdrew it without notice. Interim President Ali Mahdi agreed to the UN deployment in early 1992, but he had virtually no authority in the country. T h e fact that he requested a UN peacekeeping force made his adversaries view such an operation as essentially partisan. Indeed, other political groups remained suspicious o f a foreign military presence for some time. In a country without a government or political structure, the UN and its members have been breaking dangerous new ground. S o m e c o m m e n t a t o r s have argued that the UN needed to ask the permission o f clan elders or warlords b e f o r e deploying p e a c e k e e p i n g forces in areas that they controlled. T h e Secretary-General's Special Representative Mohammed Sahnoun did exactly that, but he realized that territorial control in Somalia was tenuous. Indeed, since 1990, it has been hard to know which clan is in charge of which region on which day.

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By the end of July 1992, the UN Security Council had recognized that human suffering and insecurity in Somalia constituted "a threat to international p e a c e and security" and warned that in the absence of c o o p e r a t i o n f r o m the Somali factions, the Council would "not e x c l u d e other m e a s u r e s to deliver humanitarian assistance." 1 0 Somalia as a s/atedid not pose a direct security threat to its neighbors, but its political instability and the high n u m b e r of r e f u g e e s e m a n a t i n g from it had destabilizing c o n s e q u e n c e s in the region. 1 1 T h e Security Council Resolution of 27 July 1992 asked the Secretary-General to m o u n t an urgent airlift of humanitarian assistance to Somalia. By the end of July 1992, the Council had approved a p e a c e k e e p i n g force of five h u n d r e d troops ( p r o p o s e d by the Secretary-General and e n d o r s e d in Security Council Resolution 751 of 24 April 1992) to escort f o o d convoys in M o g a d i s h u and the s u r r o u n d i n g area. Sahn o u n eventually signed an a c c o r d with General Aidid, the main obstructionist warlord in the Mogadishu area, on 12 August 1992, for the five h u n d r e d U N soldiers f r o m Pakistan; but this force was not large e n o u g h to control the increasingly violent situation in the S o m a l i capital. Following Boutros-Ghali's r e p o r t to the Security Council on 26 August 1992, the Council agreed to increase the number of troops in U N O S O M I to 3,500. T h e s e f o r c e s were not deployed, partly because of opposition f r o m s o m e warlords and merchants who wanted to continue looting and maintaining "protection" rackets. (By D e c e m b e r 1992, U N O S O M I had a strength of 564, including 50 military observers, a 5 0 0 - m e m b e r battalion, plus movement-and-logistics elements a n d a small h e a d q u a r t e r s staff. T h e h e a d q u a r t e r s p e r s o n n e l was later increased by 100.) As is the case with U N p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n s everywhere, U N O S O M I forces were to be deployed on the principle of non-use of f o r c e e x c e p t in self-defense. It is this nonviolent nature of U N p e a c e k e e p i n g forces that makes them acceptable to the parties in conflict. It was also the g r e a t e s t weakness of U N O S O M I, b e c a u s e the situation in Somalia r e q u i r e d p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n t rather than p e a c e k e e p i n g . Moreover, given the gravity of the situation in the country, there was no doubt that a force of 3,500—even if it had been deployed—was too small to be of much use outside Mogadishu. C o m p a r e d with other U N o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g the s a m e period, especially UN involvement in C a m b o d i a a n d Bosnia-Herzegovina, S o m a l i a had been badly neglected. In C a m b o d i a , where there was a f u n c t i o n i n g but c o r r u p t g o v e r n m e n t , the U N established a largescale p e a c e k e e p i n g o p e r a t i o n — t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s Transitional Authority in C a m b o d i a ( U N T A C ) . While the U N p e a c e k e e p i n g operation in C a m b o d i a at the time was the largest in U N history, costing

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about $1.7 billion in eighteen months, it might be argued that the security situation in Cambodia was not as desperate as it was in Somalia in 1992. In Bosnia-Herzegovina also, the UN c o m m i t m e n t for much of 1992 was greater than its c o m m i t m e n t to Somalia. Unlike Cambodia and Somalia, where regional organizations did not provide much help, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been monitored by the European Community, NATO, and the Western European Union. Until the U.S.-led Unified Task Force for Somalia was approved in December 1992, the Security Council appeared not at all keen to utilize extra means to resolve the crisis. T h e initial UN peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n , as already stated, was i n t e n d e d to provide security for h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance in Mogadishu. T h e force's terms of r e f e r e n c e were based on p e a c e k e e p i n g operations in situations where parties in dispute are stable; given the situation in Somalia, these terms were i n a d e q u a t e . T h e force was predicated on the cooperation of the Somali "authorities," which either did not exist or were unreliable and inconsistent. As a result, UNOSOM I was ineffective and played virtually no positive role in the situation. Even after the five h u n d r e d Pakistani troops arrived in October 1992, they were kept in their barracks n e a r Mogadishu airport for weeks without clear instructions. Many international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and relief workers criticized the UN's preoccupation with centralizing the decisionmaking process in such an urgent situation and faulted it for delays in deploying troops. O n e of the sharpest critics of UN operations in Somalia was S a h n o u n . Sahn o u n had earned the respect of virtually all NGOs, but he was frustrated by UN agency delays and by bureaucratic obfuscation. He also castigated UN agencies, especially UNICEF and the World Food Prog r a m m e , for fleeing Somalia in the wake of the civil war in 1991. UNICEF and the WFP, together with o t h e r international organizations, withdrew early in 1991 because of the rapid deterioration in the security situation. In fact, they left just as most Western embassies in Mogadishu were evacuated. S a h n o u n ' s criticisms did n o t go down well with senior UN bureaucrats who acknowledged that the decision to leave Somalia looked bad at the time but felt that m u c h of Sahn o u n ' s criticism was based on incomplete knowledge of the circumstances. 1 2 When Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali hit back and criticized S a h n o u n publicly, S a h n o u n resigned his UN post. H e was replaced by an Iraqi (Kurdish) diplomat, Ismat Kittani, a week after his resignation of 26 October 1992. S a h n o u n ' s disagreement with the UN was m o r e complicated t h a n it seemed on the surface. Boutros-Ghali had wanted a m a j o r

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military intervention in Somalia to demonstrate to the Western nations that the U N n e e d e d a rapid deployment force. Sahnoun was not totally opposed to such a force; however, he argued that an agreement with faction leaders and clan elders was n e e d e d b e f o r e such a deployment. 1 3 Boutros-Ghali felt that Sahnoun (his f o r m e r student colleague) was hindering his attempts to demonstrate the new interventionist doctrine f o r the U N . Shortly after Ismat Kittani had taken up his duties as Special Representative on 8 November 1992, he prepared a detailed report f o r the Secretary-General on the difficulties U N O S O M I was facing. It was this report that provided the rationale for Boulros-Ghali's decision in late N o v e m b e r 1992 to seek an expanded military presence. (Ismat Kittani was also very critical of some U N agencies, but because of his long association with the U N , he expressed his criticisms privately, though firmly and persistently.) After forcing out Sahnoun, Boutros-Ghali succeeded in g o i n g through with his decision to send an intervention force to Somalia. While the U.S.-led force met the need for a large military intervention at the time, it delayed for five months the realization of the SecretaryGeneral's concept of a rapid deployment force under UN control.

THE U.S.-LED MULTINATIONAL INTERVENTION Having left Somalia when the security situation deteriorated in 1990, the United States returned with a large military f o r c e in late 1992, thanks to persistent and grim television pictures about starvation. T h e U.S.-led multinational f o r c e was arguably a result of a convergence of interests between Boutros-Ghali and f o r m e r U.S. President G e o r g e Bush. W h i l e Boutros-Ghali was frustrated by the intransigence and unreliability of Somali warlords and faction leaders w h o had prevented the deployment of the initial U N O S O M I force, Bush was embarrassed by the fact that the new world o r d e r , which was identified with U.S. leadership, was now characterized by the mass starvation o f Somali children. In fact, both Bush and Boutros-Ghali were c o n c e r n e d that the f o o d and supplies sent to Somalia by the U N and industrialized countries were not reaching those they were meant to help. T h e U N decision in late N o v e m b e r 1992 to call on the United States to lead an intervention f o r c e appears to have stemmed also f r o m the realization that the 100-day humanitarian action program, launched in Geneva in O c t o b e r 1992, would fail. I n d e e d , by this time, the security situation in Somalia had deteriorated considerably, but the U N lacked the financial and logistical capacity to carry out a rapid military intervention.

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In his letter of 24 November 1992 to the president of the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali indicated that UNOSOM I was not fulfilling its purpose and that the time had come for the Council to review the basic premises and principles of the UN effort in Somalia. He felt that there was n o alternative but to adopt more forceful measures to secure h u m a n i t a r i a n operations. It was in this context that the United States offered the next day to commit about 24,000 troops to Somalia, at an estimated cost of $450 million. It a n n o u n c e d that if the Security Council authorized m e m b e r states to use forceful means to e n h a n c e the delivery of relief supplies to the people of Somalia, it would be ready to take the lead in organizing and c o m m a n d i n g such an operation, given that a n u m b e r of o t h e r m e m b e r states would also participate. Boutros-Ghali would have preferred an enforcement force u n d e r UN c o m m a n d and control, but if that were n o t possible, he would accept the U.S. offer. Such was the sense of his second letter to the president of the Security Council dated 29 November 1992, in which he set out five options for action, including the one proposed by the United States. Accordingly, Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 D e c e m b e r 1992 authorized a Unified Task Force u n d e r C h a p t e r VII of the UN Charter. It gave the force the right "to use all necessary m e a n s to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for h u m a n i t a r i a n relief operations." 1 4 T h e terms of reference of the U.S.-led UNITAF, code-named Operation Restore Hope, revolved a r o u n d this authority. T h e United States had organized Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in January 1991 u n d e r the same terms. Nonetheless, there were important differences between the two operations. While O p e r a t i o n Desert Storm was run by the United States a n d its allies i n d e p e n dently, UNITAF was to operate in close liaison with the UN, both at the UN headquarters in New York and in the field. T h e r e were also differences in the levels of force the two o p e r a t i o n s used. Desert Storm used massive force to evict Iraqis f r o m Kuwait; UNITAF used force in Somalia in a relatively restrained way. UNITAF had three functions: to secure the main ports of Mogadishu and Kismayu; to o p e n supply routes and secure o t h e r towns and major feeding centers; and to prepare the way for UNOSOM II to take over. UNITAF has had e n o r m o u s implications f o r international law, for this was the first time that the Security Council authorized e n f o r c e m e n t action u n d e r Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thus avoiding the prohibition in Article 2, p a r a g r a p h 7, against interference in domestic affairs of a sovereign state. UNITAF has raised questions about balancing the n e e d to respect state sovereignty with the imperative to uphold h u m a n dignity. T h e fact that humanitarian

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concerns have been interpreted to prevail over the r e q u i r e m e n t to respect state sovereignty has the potential for wide application. (This point has not been lost to Sudanese leaders, who fear that the UN might intervene in the civil war in southern Sudan, where non-Muslim southerners are fighting a fundamentalist Islamic regime. However, the circumstances framing the Somali intervention were different, because there was no government.) Within a week of the U.S. force's arrival in Mogadishu, there was a disagreement between the UN Secretary-General and UNITAF's c o m m a n d e r regarding the disarming of Somali g u n m e n . Security Council Resolution 794 did not require the Unified Task Force to disarm the Somalis, but Boutros-Ghali subsequently argued that he had had an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with the White House that the force would disarm the Somali g u n m e n . In fact, the Secretary-General argued that the creation of "a secure environment" presupposed disarming the g u n m e n . In a letter to President Bush on 8 D e c e m b e r 1992, Boutros-Ghali argued that the UNITAF should ensure, before it withdrew, that the heavy weapons of the organized factions be "neutralized and brought u n d e r international control" and that the irregular forces and gangs be disarmed. 1 5 He firmly believed that without this action, it would be impossible to establish a secure envir o n m e n t for humanitarian operations or to create conditions for the p r o m o t i o n of national reconciliation. T h e Secretary-General also wanted the Unified Task Force not only to confiscate the weapons of the gangs but also to destroy them before its d e p a r t u r e . He argued that he would be in a position to r e c o m m e n d to the Security Council the transition to UNOSOM II only after a secure e n v i r o n m e n t for humanitarian operations and for the promotion of a political settlement had been established. However, the U.S. c o m m a n d e r of the UNITAF argued that disarming the Somalis was not part of his mission. T h e disagreement between the UN and the UNITAF c o m m a n d e r on the n e e d for disa r m a m e n t stemmed f r o m several factors. First, the two sides had different interpretations of what constituted a secure environment. T h e UN wanted the United States to leave Somalia in a condition conducive to peacekeeping and peaceful settlement. It felt that without bringing arms u n d e r international control, the bandits and organized factions would become a m e n a c e after UNITAF's d e p a r t u r e . T h e U.S. c o m m a n d e r did not consider disarmament a necessary elem e n t in creating a secure environment. Second, the disagreement also reflected the U.S. intention to avoid any high-risk operation beyond o p e n i n g up supply routes. Third, disarmament and de-mining are long-term operations, and the United States was intent on

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withdrawing most of its forces as soon as supply routes had b e e n secured. In addition, disarming g u n m e n was fraught with d a n g e r , as nobody knew how many weapons there were in the country or how the Somalis would react to this form of humiliation. In J a n u a r y 1993, however, the U.S. forces in M o g a d i s h u disarmed some g u n m e n and seized many weapons, but these efforts were haphazard. As will be described later in this chapter, U N I T A F ' s failure to disarm factions and g u n m e n is largely to blame for the military clashes between U N O S O M II forces and Somalis in M o g a d i s h u in early J u n e 1993, during which 23 U N O S O M II soldiers and many Somalis were killed. In the initial p e r i o d of U N I T A F ' s o p e r a t i o n , there was uncertainty over how long U.S. troops would remain in Somalia. T h e chairman of the U.S. J o i n t Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, had estimated in D e c e m b e r 1992 that the o p e r a t i o n would take several months. It was envisaged that it would take about four weeks to get all U.S. troops in position in Somalia. T h e s e forces would n e e d a n o t h e r six weeks to "get the situation u n d e r control, establish a secure environment and then h a n d over to the United Nations p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e s . " 1 6 However, in J a n u a r y 1993, the question of how long U.S. forces would serve in Somalia had been addressed and the phased withdrawal of these forces started later that month. It was not until after 26 March 1993, when the Security Council a d o p t e d Resolution 814 accepting the Secretary-General's report on the transition to U N O S O M II, that it b e c a m e s o m e w h a t clearer that U.S. forces were to be in S o m a l i a for a while l o n g e r . While the actual transfer of responsibilities from U N I T A F to U N O S O M II in various regions d e p e n d e d on local circumstances, the Secretary-General prop o s e d that for budgetary a n d administrative p u r p o s e s , the f o r m a l date for the transfer of c o m m a n d was 4 May 1993. T h e Security Council indicated it would "conduct a formal review of the progress toward accomplishing the p u r p o s e s " of Resolution 814 by 31 October 1993. 1 7 L e a d e r s h i p of the U n i f i e d T a s k F o r c e a p p e a r e d to have b e e n associated with leadership of the p o s t - C o l d War world order. Despite the fact that there was already a U N c o m m a n d e r on the g r o u n d (Pakistani General Imtiaz S h a h e e n ) , the United States insisted that if it contributed troops to Somalia, it had to c o m m a n d them. Accordingly, UNITAF was led by G e n e r a l R o g e r J o h n s t o n of the U.S. Marines. If S a h n o u n a p p e a r e d to have f r u s t r a t e d the SecretaryG e n e r a l ' s interventionist a m b i t i o n s by insisting on working out a g r e e m e n t s with clan elders a n d faction leaders, the U n i t e d States effectively p o s t p o n e d the realization of his c o n c e p t of a UN-led rapid d e p l o y m e n t unit. T h e multinational f o r c e i n c l u d e d t h o u s a n d s of

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extra troops from more than twenty other nations. O f these, France sent in 2,500 Foreign Legionnaires from neighboring Djibouti, and Australia provided 900 soldiers from its elite infantry battalion. (See Table 6.1.) Table 6.1 International Troop Commitments for Somalia (Estimates) Country Australia Belgium Botswana Canada Egypt France India Italy Kuwait Morocco New Z e a l a n d Nigeria Norway Pakistan Saudi Arabia Sweden Tunisia Turkey UK USA Zimbabwe

No. of Tro' 900 570 300 900 250 2,500 3,000 3,800 230 1,250 60 550 80 4,000 700 130 130 300 90 24,000 400

Source: Adapted from UN Africa Recovery Briefing Paper, No. 7, 15January 1993, p. 3.

U.S. intervention in Somalia gave the impression that in the absence o f a Cold War threat, the U.S. military might be in search of a vital new mission through global humanitarian emergencies. Critics have speculated that the Bush administration and the Pentagon u n d e r t o o k the Somalia mission to provide a counterweight to the powerful domestic impetus to focus public investment at home. Foreign policy debate in the United States has reflected this tension and the U.S. government has felt obliged to deny that it has any interest in intervening politically in Somalia; it has rejected any suggestion that it be involved in building that country's political structure. T h e timing and size of UNITAF also raised several questions conc e r n i n g the security of the relief agencies and humanitarian aid

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workers. Some relief agencies felt that greater security for food would deprive g u n m e n of their main currency; in frustration, they feared, some g u n m e n might turn their anger against Western relief workers. Faction leaders, freelance g u n m e n , and m e r c h a n t s had grown rich as a result of famine and did not want to see an e n d to the chaos and anarchy that had characterized Somalia for the previous two years. Furthermore, the Unified Task Force, which some critics described as a heavy-handed intervention force, was initially criticized by relief agency officials who felt that it might u n d e r m i n e the reconciliation that had been achieved. They argued that use of force should be the last resort. However, after some time, relief agencies accepted the positive role of the unified force. For example, the then head of the Africa Watch Committee in London, Rukiyah Omaar, a Somali, was dismissed in December 1992 after she had criticized the U.S. deployment. However, one month later she said in Mogadishu she had seen the positive role of the U.S. force and urged it to stay longer. By February 1993, the effect of UNITAF on Somali society a p p e a r e d positive. T h e r e was increased relief delivery to ports and major distribution centers in the country. Virtually all supply routes t h r o u g h o u t central and southern Somalia had b e e n secured, the port and airport of Mogadishu were functioning, and bandits had disappeared f r o m the city. Improved security had e n a b l e d the United Nations Development P r o g r a m m e (UNDP) to make some progress toward restoring Mogadishu's water supply. Although there was sporadic fighting n e a r the southern p o r t of Kismayu in early 1993, the port was o p e n for use. T h e looting of relief supplies and the protection rackets operated by some merchants had stopped. As a result, h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance has reached many p e o p l e who would have perished in various towns and villages, and the death toll f r o m starvation has d r o p p e d t h r o u g h o u t the country. In the short term, UNITAF has succeeded in establishing a secure e n v i r o n m e n t for h u m a n i t a r i a n supplies at least in central and s o u t h e r n Somalia where it was deployed. Rival leaders who refused to meet face to face for many months have started talking, and this has paved the way for a renewed UN effort to bring about national reconciliation. It had been recognized that the continued operation of UNITAF d e p e n d e d largely on the U.S. government, but would the operation outlast Bush's presidency? President Bill Clinton, who took office on 20 January 1993, showed no inclination to alter the UNITAF operation plans that had been approved by his predecessor. This continuity g u a r a n t e e d an orderly d e p a r t u r e for the Unified Task Force, which was completed in May 1993.

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Nonetheless, at the time the Security Council a d o p t e d Resolution 814 on 26 March 1993 (authorizing the d e p l o y m e n t of UNOSOM II) many p r o b l e m s still r e m a i n e d . Only a few organized factions had been disarmed and most of the gangs had hidden their arms, possibly for use at a later period. Some g u n m e n h a d in fact shot at U.S. and o t h e r allied troops, a n d although such shootings had been sporadic, they indicated that problems f r o m g u n m e n still remained. Moreover, in the absence of established political and social structures at the time of UNITAF's withdrawal, it was difficult to assess the force's long-term achievement. Indeed, in mid-1993 the struggle for security remains, and UNOSOM II is set to c o n f r o n t uncertainties.

THE UNITAF-UNOSOM I RELATIONSHIP

As soon as the Unified Task Force was authorized by the Security Council in December 1992, questions were raised concerning its relationship with the Council and UNOSOM I. Would the U.S.-led force remain until it achieved the goals set out in Security Council Resolution 794, as interpreted by the Secretary-General? T o what extent would the Secretary-General influence its operation? As it turned out, the Secretary-General had little power over UNITAF's day-to-day operations, but the force had very good relations with UNOSOM I and the UN as a whole. Security Council Resolution 794 stipulated that the multinational force would hand over responsibility to the UN peacekeeping troops after aid distribution had been safeguarded. In an e f f o r t to achieve a smooth transition f r o m UNITAF to a f u t u r e U N O S O M II, the UN established an effective mechanism of coordination between UNITAF a n d UNOSOM I in early D e c e m b e r 1992. In New York, there have been three coordination levels, one of which was a policy g r o u p that met two or three times a week and was chaired by the Secretary-General. This first group, which also met at least o n c e a week with senior U.S. g o v e r n m e n t representatives, reviewed the progress of the o p e r a t i o n , composition of the force, and f u n d i n g a n d planning for the projected UNOSOM II. T h e second level coordinating group was the operational task force that met at least once a day u n d e r the c h a i r m a n s h i p of the UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan. U.S. governm e n t representatives attended the g r o u p ' s meetings several times a week. T h e third g r o u p was a cell within the UN D e p a r t m e n t of Peacekeeping Operations that maintained contact with UNOSOM I twenty-four hours every day.

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At the U N O S O M I h e a d q u a r t e r s in Mogadishu, t h e r e was also close c o o r d i n a t i o n between the UN staff and U.S. p e r s o n n e l . From D e c e m b e r 1992 to March 1993, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Ismat Kittani, and the U N O S O M I Commander, G e n e r a l Imtiaz S h a h e e n , worked closely with General J o h n ston and with the U.S. special envoy, Ambassador Robert Oakley, to coordinate activities. According to the UN Secretary-General, much of the detailed p l a n n i n g for the transition to p e a c e k e e p i n g operations was to take place in Mogadishu. A U N O S O M I liaison team was deployed to the Unified Task Force headquarters. T h e S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l ' s report to the Security C o u n c i l on 3 March 1993 r e q u e s t e d U N O S O M II with an e x p a n d e d m a n d a t e . U N O S O M II is u n d e r United Nations c o m m a n d and control, and its mandate, c o n c e p t o f o p e r a t i o n s , level o f a r m a m e n t , and rules o f engagement are roughly similar to those of the Unified Task F o r c e . 1 8 In Resolution 8 1 4 o f 26 March 1993, the Security Council requested Boutros-Ghali "to direct the C o m m a n d e r o f U N O S O M II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion, and m a i n t e n a n c e o f a secure e n v i r o n m e n t t h r o u g h o u t Somalia on an expedited basis."

UNOSOM II: A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION WITH ENFORCEMENT POWERS With the Security C o u n c i l ' s authorization o f U N O S O M II on 26 March 1993, Somalia has b e c o m e the testing g r o u n d for new peacekeeping and p e a c e m a k i n g ideas by the United Nations. Earlier, in a detailed report to the Security Council on 3 March 1993, the SecretaryGeneral had argued that the m a n d a t e for U N O S O M II "must cover the whole territory o f S o m a l i a . " 1 9 T h i s goes beyond U N I T A F ' s operational m a n d a t e , which covered a b o u t 4 0 p e r c e n t o f Somalia. T h e mission o f U N O S O M II is: to ensure that factions observe the ceasefires and o t h e r a g r e e m e n t s ; to take action against factions that violate ceasefires; to maintain c o n t r o l over weapons relinquished by or confiscated f r o m the o r g a n i z e d factions and p l a c e d in designated areas; to disarm factions and carry out de-mining; to s e c u r e ports, airports, and supply routes; and to protect UN and N G O personnel and their e q u i p m e n t . In a nutshell, U N O S O M I I ' s main f u n c t i o n s are to maintain the ceasefire, facilitate the delivery o f humanitarian supplies, and create conditions conducive to a political settlement. U N O S O M II represents the first p e a c e k e e p i n g operation in UN history that has b e e n given the m a n d a t e to use force not only in selfdefense but to pursue its mission. In functional terms, U N O S O M II

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is a two-tier operation. Its contingents operate in a traditional peacekeeping m o d e where the use of force is not required. But, as was the case in J u n e 1993, they operate as peace e n f o r c e m e n t units when the use of force becomes necessary for them to carry out their mission u n d e r the Security Council's mandate. T h e new m a n d a t e gives the operation the flexibility it needs in these complex circumstances. 2 0 This flexibility is the main strength of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM I was a failure in large part because it lacked the authority to e n f o r c e peace. T h e concept b e h i n d UNOSOM II is derived f r o m the "peace e n f o r c e m e n t " concept envisioned in the Secretary-General's report, An Agenda for Peace.21 Because of their expanded mandate, UNOSOM II forces are more heavily armed than traditional peacekeeping operations. This is the first time that a Chapter VII operation has been undertaken under the Secretary-General's direction. Even as the U.S. p e r m a n e n t representative to the UN, Madeleine Albright, has argued, the operation has committed "the world community to provide the most comprehensive assistance ever given to any country" but with "few lessons a n d n o models to guide" it. T h e fact that the Security Council voted for the force unanimously shows how much the thinking in the Council, and in the UN as a whole, has changed in the face of e m e r g i n g regional security problems. This kind of m a n d a t e for a UN peacekeeping operation was inconceivable two years previously. Boutros-Ghali argued for this precedent-setting operation in his report to the Security Council as early as 19 December 1992. By that time he had reached an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with the United States that such a m a n d a t e would be possible. Indeed, while the concept behind UNOSOM II reflected some of Boutros-Ghali's ideas, p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s of the Security Council also took into account political realities, especially the U.S. desire to get out of Somalia. T h e United States did not want to maintain its forces in Somalia for a long period and n e e d e d the Secretary-General's support to withdraw as early as possible. T h e UN, on the other h a n d , n e e d e d U.S. participation in UNOSOM II for continuing logistical support and over-the-horizon deterrence. As was the case prior to UNITAF's deployment, a convergence of interests between the United States and the UN led to UNITAF's withdrawal and the deployment of UNOSOM II. In fact, the United States, through the Security Council, will continue to have significant influence on the continued operation of the force. Moreover, UNOSOM li s c o m m a n d e r , a Turkish general, Cevik Bir, was nominated by the United States, and both the deputy force commander, Major-General Thomas Montgomery, and the Secretary-General's

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Special Representative, Admiral Jonathan Howe (Ret.), are from the United States. Security Council Resolution 814 approved a UNOSOM II force of 20,000 troops, with a logistics element of about 8,000. As stated earlier, the UN had inevitably to rely on U.S. logistics support to make the operation work. T h e size of the force will be reduced as the security situation improves. As Boutros-Ghali argued in a report to the Security Council on 3 March 1993, the strength of the force "would have to be substantial in the early stage to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security conditions and to ensure a secure environment as quickly as possible both in the areas covered by UNITAF and in those that are not.'" 22 T o carry out this operation without much interruption, the Secretary-General asked for combat units from countries that had supplied troops to UNITAF. While some of these countries responded positively to Boutros-Ghali's request, others, including Australia, did not. T h e United States undertook to provide most of the logistics component of UNOSOM II at the initial stage. It would not supply any combat units, but promised to maintain a sizable tactical quick reaction force in proximity, which would be deployed in Somalia at short notice to assist UNOSOM II if occasion required. UNOSOM II military operations are to be conducted in four phases, the exact time of each phase being determined by political reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts. T h e four phases are: • • • •

Phase Phase Phase Phase

I—Transition from UNITAF. II—Consolidation and expansion of security. III—Transfer to civilian institutions. IV—Redeployment.

T h e phases will not be applied rigidly or uniformly throughout Somalia. The Security Council will review progress on the operation by 31 October 1993. T h e Council deliberated for a long time before approving this force because o f financial implications; it will cost $1.55 billion per annum (see Table 6.2). T h e nature and size of UNOSOM II has ultimately been determined by the complex and unpredictable circumstances and especially the condition in which UNITAF left Somalia. UNITAF was withdrawn before the heavy weapons o f some organized factions had been concentrated in designated areas under international control and even before some warlords had provided an inventory of their forces. Disarmament will undoubtedly be one o f the keys to the

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Table 6.2

Twelve-Month Cost Estimate for UNOSOM II (thousands of $US)

Objects

expenditure

of

Military c o m p o n e n t Contingent personnel O t h e r c o s t s p e r t a i n i n g to c o n t i n g e n t s Civilian p o l i c e

598,550 237,450 8,900

Civilian s t a f f c o s t s , i n c l u d i n g travel to t h e mission area2 Premises, rental, a n d m a i n t e n a n c e Vehicle operations Air operations

166,950 166,300 61,600 179,990

Communications and other equipment

59,900

Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs

52,260

Mine clearance

18,100

Total estimate (gross)

1,550,000

Source: Security Council D o c u m e n t S / 2 5 3 5 4 Note: a. Provides for 2 , 5 4 5 i n t e r n a t i o n a l staff, including locally r e c r u i t e d staff and 2 5 5 UN volunteers

success of UNOSOM II. Without it there will be no security or lasting political reconciliation. T h e Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on 3 March 1993 argued that to "be effective the disarmament process should be enforceable." 2 3 T h e Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on 3 March 1993 and Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993 stipulate that factions or personnel who fail to comply with timetables or other modalities of the disarmament process will have their weapons and equipment confiscated. In Resolution 837 of 6 J u n e 1993, the Security Council reaffirmed the authority of the Secretary-General to use all necessary measures to implement agreements reached, and to arrest, detain, try, and punish those who attempt to hinder the realization of the Council mandate. 2 4 For disarmament to be effective, UNOSOM II ought also to be in a position to secure Somalia's borders and prevent fresh arms from coming in. T h e complexity of the Somali situation was underlined by the fact that in mid-1993 ceasefires were still being violated by some factions, disarmament had not been achieved, and the prospect of

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achieving national r e c o n c i l i a t i o n was bleak. It n e e d s e m p h a s i z i n g that when U N I T A F withdrew, Somalia was still very unstable. As the Secretary-General a r g u e d in his report to the Security Council on 3 March 1993: It is c l e a r to m e that the e f f o r t u n d e r t a k e n by U N I T A F to e s t a b l i s h a s e c u r e e n v i r o n m e n t in S o m a l i a is f a r f r o m c o m p l e t e a n d in any c a s e h a s n o t a t t e m p t e d to a d d r e s s the situation t h r o u g h o u t S o m a l i a . M o r e o v e r , t h e r e have b e e n , e s p e c i a l l y recently, s o m e d i s h e a r t e n i n g reverses. A c c o r d i n g l y , the t h r e a t to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e a n d security w h i c h t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l d e t e r m i n e d in . . . R e s o l u t i o n 7 9 4 ( 1 9 9 2 ) is still in e x i s t e n c e . 2 " '

U n d e r these circumstances, U N O S O M II has no alternative but to move beyond humanitarian c o n c e r n s a n d address the issue of institution b u i l d i n g a n d r e c o n s t r u c t i o n (see C h a p t e r 7). Its e n f o r c e m e n t m a n d a t e gives it an o p p o r t u n i t y to try to i n d u c e the S o m a l i factions to establish a functioning g o v e r n m e n t and an orderly system of law. It is clear that with the e x p a n d e d m a n d a t e , a c o n f r o n t a t i o n between U N O S O M II a n d S o m a l i factions, whether over c e a s e f i r e violations or d i s a r m a m e n t matters, is inevitable. I n d e e d , U N O S O M U s two-tier system was p u t to the test in M o g a d i s h u in J u n e 1993. O n 5 J u n e , a U N O S O M II c o n t i n g e n t of Pakistani s o l d i e r s went to inspect an a r m s d e p o t b e l o n g i n g to G e n e r a l Aidid's S o m a l i National Alliance ( S N A ) in s o u t h e r n M o g a d i s h u . T h e S N A s u p p o r t e r s , who had b e e n c a m p a i g n i n g a g a i n s t the U N military p r e s e n c e f o r weeks, o p e n e d fire, killing 23 U N O S O M II soldiers a n d w o u n d i n g m a n y o t h e r s . A i d i d ' s s u p p o r t e r s a r g u e d that their attack on U N O S O M II f o r c e s was a r e s p o n s e to a t t e m p t s by the U N s o l d i e r s to destroy the SNA r a d i o station, also known as " R a d i o M o g a d i s h u , " which was located n e a r the arms d e p o t . For several weeks prior to this incident, R a d i o M o g a d i s h u h a d b e e n b r o a d c a s t i n g a n t i - U N O S O M II m e s sages. However, the U N O S O M II security c o m m a n d believes the attack was p r e m e d i t a t e d a n d was calculated to h i n d e r the U N f o r c e s f r o m carrying out their m a n d a t e . T h e following day, 6 J u n e 1993, the Security C o u n c i l u n a n i mously p a s s e d Resolution 837, in which it c o n d e m n e d the attack o n U N O S O M II a n d r e a f f i r m e d U N O S O M li s m a n d a t e to take all necessary m e a s u r e s against those responsible for the attacks. T h e C o u n cil e m p h a s i z e d o n c e a g a i n the crucial i m p o r t a n c e of d i s a r m i n g a n d of " n e u t r a l i z i n g r a d i o b r o a d c a s t i n g systems" that incited v i o l e n c e against U N O S O M II. It was against this b a c k g r o u n d that U N O S O M II forces, in c o o p e r a t i o n with U.S. quick reaction units, b o m b a r d e d Aidid's f o r c e s a n d military facilities on three consecutive nights a n d destroyed R a d i o M o g a d i s h u in mid-June. A c c o r d i n g to press reports,

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a b o u t o n e h u n d r e d S o m a l i s , i n c l u d i n g w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , lost t h e i r lives. In a r a d i o b r o a d c a s t o n 12 J u n e 1993, U.S. P r e s i d e n t Bill Clinton a r g u e d that military action against Aidid's s u p p o r t e r s a n d military facilities was d e s i g n e d to r e s t o r e o r d e r in M o g a d i s h u a n d to s t r e n g t h e n t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s a n d t h e credibility of "UN p e a c e k e e p i n g in S o m a l i a a n d a r o u n d t h e w o r l d . " T h i s p o i n t was u n d e r s c o r e d two days l a t e r by t h e p r e s i d e n t of t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , J u a n A n t o n i o Y a n e z - B a r n u e v o (of S p a i n ) , w h o a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of law a n d o r d e r was e s s e n t i a l if U N O S O M II was to effectively carry o u t its tasks r e l a t i n g to t h e delivery of h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance a n d t h e prom o t i o n of n a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . I n d e e d , w i t h o u t r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t s u c h a t t a c k s , a t t e m p t s to i n t i m i d a t e U N O S O M II w e r e likely to i n c r e a s e . H o w e v e r , in killing w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , t h e U N h a s a n t a g o n i z e d a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of S o m a l i s . T h e U N a c t i o n m i g h t also m a k e Aidid m o r e p o p u l a r by p o r t r a y i n g h i m as t h e only p e r s o n capable of c h a l l e n g i n g a f o r e i g n military p r e s e n c e . (It s h o u l d b e b o r n e in m i n d t h a t since c o l o n i a l times, S o m a l i s h a v e o f t e n felt t h a t w h a t e v e r they d o , f o r e i g n e r s will b e a t t r a c t e d to t h e i r c o u n t r y . ) G i v e n t h e c o m p l e x i t y of t h e S o m a l i s i t u a t i o n , t h e issue is n o t w h e t h e r f o r c e s h o u l d b e u s e d . R a t h e r , it is: h o w m u c h f o r c e s h o u l d b e u s e d a n d u n d e r w h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? I n d e e d , U N O S O M II's m a n d a t e w o u l d a p p e a r to p r e s e n t a d i l e m m a . U N O S O M II n e e d s to d e m o n s t r a t e f o r c e to c o m p e l t h e f a c t i o n s to o b s e r v e t h e c e a s e f i r e s a n d o t h e r a g r e e m e n t s . H o w e v e r , it h a s to r e f r a i n f r o m e x e r c i s i n g too m u c h p o w e r , lest it a l i e n a t e t h e S o m a l i p o p u l a c e . In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e p e r m i s s i o n to use f o r c e , if n o t a c t e d u p o n carefully, c a n l e a d to s o m e s e r i o u s c o m p l i c a t i o n s . F o r e m o s t a m o n g t h e s e is t h e d a n g e r t h a t U N O S O M II m i g h t find itself e n m e s h e d in f a c t i o n a l f i g h t i n g . Witho u t g r e a t c a r e , U N O S O M II m i g h t b e c o m e p a r t of t h e p r o b l e m , n o t a solution.

NOTES 1. For discussion of the use of force in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, see Lawrence Freedman, "The Gulf War and the New World Order," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 3, May-June 1991, pp. 195-209; and Abram Chayes, "The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf," in Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer (eds.), Law and Force in the New International Order (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 3-12. 2. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), especially pp. 20-31. 3. See Security Council Resolution 733 of 23 January 1992. 4. T h e group of unarmed observers was drawn from Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe. Three of the observers arrived in Mogadishu on 5 July

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1992 with General Shaheen. T h e other forty-seven were due to arrive in Nairobi between 8 and 12July 1992 for onward transport to Mogadishu. But, following an incident on 25 J u n e 1992 involving an Antonov aircraft that had previously been under charter by the WFP, General Aidid accused the UN of bias. T h e plane, which was no longer in the WFP service, still sported UN insignia and had been used for the illicit transport of money and arms to Mahdi. Because of this, Aidid issued an expulsion notice to the UN staff in Mogadishu. T h e incident was promptly investigated by the UN, and on 15 July 1992, Aidid informed Sahnoun that he had rescinded his expulsion notice and agreed to the deployment of the other forty-seven ceasefire monitors. 5. "The Squeezing of Sahnoun," The Economist, 7 November 1992, p. 48. 6. See Security Council Document S/24992 of 19 December 1992. 7. Security Council Document S/24992 of 19 December 1992. 8. Alison Mitchell, "Angry Crowd of Somalis Disrupts Visit to Mogadishu by UN Chief," New York Times, 4January 1993. 9. See F. T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 11. See also Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the ' S h e r i f f s Posse,'" Survival, Vol. 32, No. 3, May-June 1990, pp. 196-205. 10. See Security Council Resolution 767 of 27 July 1992. 11. It is possibly in this context that a former UN official, George Sherry, has argued that "Somalia's nightmare is threatening international peace and security in the entire area." See his "Somalia: Birthpangs of a Combined Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operation," UNITAR Bulletin, April-August 1992, p. 15. 12. It can also be argued that Sahnoun's criticisms were a little biased against the UN bureaucracy, because much of the blame for the nondeployment of UNOSOM I actually lay with Somali faction leaders and merchants who benefited from the chaos. His decision to make the criticisms public also indicated that he might have been at odds with the UN system. 13. See Africa Confidential, 4 December 1992, p. 1. 14. See Security Council Documents S / 2 4 8 5 9 of 27 November and S/24868 of 30 November 1992. 15. See Security Council Document S/24992 of 19 December 1992. 16. Bryan Boswell, "10 Weeks to Secure Somalia—Powell," The Australian, 7 December 1992, p. 5. 17. See Security Council Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993. 18. See Security Council Document S/24992 of 19 December 1992. 19. See Security Council Document S/25354 of 3 March 1993. 20. For some interesting discussions of a two-tier peacekeeping operation, see F. T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), especially pp. 4 1 - 4 3 . See also George L. Sherry, "Somalia: Birthpangs of a Combined Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operation," UNITAR Bulletin, April-August 1992, p. 21. 21. See Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, p. 26. 22. See Security Council Document S/25354 of 3 March 1993. 23. Security Council Document S/25354 of 3 March 1993. 24. See Security Council Resolution 837 of 6 J u n e 1993. 25. See Security Council Document S/25354 of 3 March 1993.

CONCLUSION

The international community's efforts to "restore h o p e " to Somalis were showing mixed signs of success at this writing in mid-1993. Earlier in the year, relief supplies increased and most supply routes throughout the country were secured. As a consequence, humanitarian assistance has reached many people who would have perished. The fighting between UNOSOM II units and General Aidid's Somali National Alliance in Mogadishu in J u n e 1993 illustrated the precariousness of the security situation there, but did n o t constitute an irreparable setback to the peace process. Most factions have agreed to a ceasefire and some of them appear willing to achieve a political settlement. However, major security problems and political uncertainties still r e m a i n . U n d e r these circumstances, the UN military presence is likely to remain for a considerable period. But, as has already b e e n stated, the foreign military presence by itself c a n n o t reconstruct a society and establish public institutions. T h e primary issue, t h e r e f o r e , is whether UN efforts in Somalia have any c h a n c e of achieving durable peace and o r d e r . T h e r e is already a large UN presence in the country, with m o r e than half a dozen UN agencies r u n n i n g different services. T h e World Food Programme, UNICEF, the UNHCR, UNDP, the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and the Food and Agriculture Organization have been developing and financing projects in d i f f e r e n t parts of the country. Some of these agencies have been quite effective, while others have b e e n slow and ineffective. To ensure satisfactory performance, the Security Council should require all the agencies involved to prepare plans for reconstruction and insist that they report regularly about the implementation of their plans. C o o r d i n a t i n g the work of these organizations is UNOSOM II, under the direction of the Secretary-General's Special Representative 83

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Admiral J o n a t h a n Howe (Ret.), who is supported by the UNOSOM II Security Command and by the D e p a r t m e n t of Humanitarian Affairs. T h e structure and functions of the UN presence appear to suggest a de facto UN administration for Somalia. I n d e e d , some critics have argued that there is little the UN can d o a b o u t Somalia short of establishing a trusteeship over the country. T h e concept of a trusteeship is in this age generally considered anachronistic and politically unacceptable, but calls for one illustrate the desperate nature of the Somali situation. T h e UN Secretary-General has frequently sought to involve regional organizations in attempts to find a solution to the Somali tragedy. It is generally assumed that regional organizations are more knowledgeable about the causes of the conflict and that they are also likely to be more sensitive to the issues at stake, but the efforts of the OAU, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Conference in the Somali problem have been abysmal. Boutros-Ghali, whose h o m e country belongs to the three organizations, knows how ineffective some of these organizations are on matters of war and peace. However, because of his belief that regional organizations have the potential to make contributions to preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, a n d peacemaking, the Secretary-General has always sought to involve the three groups. At the time of this writing, Somalia's seat in these regional organizations (and at the UN) had not been occupied since early 1991. As has been the case t h r o u g h o u t the tragedy, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other international relief organizations (in c o n j u n c t i o n with local h u m a n i t a r i a n bodies) continue to provide useful services in difficult conditions. If past practice is any guide, it can be assumed that long after the UN has departed, some NGOs will still be in Somalia offering help. However, in early 1993 some NGOs argued that insecurity for their p e r s o n n e l had risen as g u n m e n learned that U.S. troops were a b o u t to be withdrawn. T h e situation improved t h r o u g h o u t much of Somalia when it was learned that the U.S. withdrawal was not "total" and that UNOSOM II's mandate is similar to UNITAF's a n d different f r o m that of UNOSOM I. Nonetheless, some NGOs were quite c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the potential risk to their staff following the crisis in Mogadishu in J u n e 1993. UNOSOM II, like UNITAF, has m a d e the delivery of humanitarian assistance possible. T h e h u m a n i t a r i a n issue is very important, and the Security Council, in Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993, asked the Secretary-General, t h r o u g h his Special Representative, to continue to provide humanitarian and other assistance to Somalia. However, the humanitarian goal is the least difficult to realize. T h e most

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important factors in the Somali situation are national reconciliation and reconstruction. T h e y are also the most intractable. T h e p r o b l e m is c o m p o u n d e d by the fact that the UN, and indeed the whole international c o m m u n i t y , does n o t have many p e o p l e e x p e r i e n c e d in establishing d e m o c r a c y and creating public institutions out o f anarchic conditions like those in Somalia. T h e situation requires p e o p l e knowledgeable not only about Somalia's history, geography, and culture, but also a b o u t e c o n o m i c m a n a g e m e n t and d e m o c r a t i c principles and practice. It also n e e d s a UN bureaucracy that is willing and able to r e s p o n d quickly to c h a n g i n g circumstances. T h i s c h a p t e r speculates on how the UN can bring about national r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and reconstruction or institution building.

NATIONAL R E C O N C I L I A T I O N — A MEANS O R AN END?

Prospects for p e a c e , stability, and national r e c o n c i l i a t i o n will c o n tinue to be affected by clan rivalry, a d e e p e n i n g e c o n o m i c malaise, power struggles, and the a b s e n c e o f social and political institutions on which o r d e r must be a n c h o r e d . T h e r e are several ways by which the UN can bring p e a c e to Somalia. T h e process o f national r e c o n ciliation is o n e o f t h e m , but it is not the only o n e . It has b e e n preferred by the U N b e c a u s e it has the advantage o f giving Somalis a c h a n c e to discuss and shape their future. T h e r e is n o doubt that the UN team trying to f o r g e n a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n faces a d a u n t i n g task. It needs to r e c o n c i l e the supporters o f Siad Barre with his erstwhile o p p o n e n t s , to r e c o n c i l e rival clans that have hated e a c h o t h e r for g e n e r a t i o n s , and to persuade warlords or faction leaders to accept e a c h o t h e r as compatriots. T h e team also n e e d s to strike balances between m o d e r n i t y and tradition, secular and religious factions, and civilian and military or quasi-military groups. It has also to c o n s i d e r seriously the issue o f Somali unity: is it necessary to c o n tinue spending resources and time on trying to forge unity for a people who do n o t want it? T h e task ahead is, i n d e e d , o n e r o u s a n d might take a long time to accomplish. In his report o f 2 6 J a n u a r y 1993 to the Security Council, BoutrosGhali argued that the "crisis in Somalia can only b e resolved by the Somali p e o p l e themselves t h r o u g h a process o f n a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a tion." 1 H e also recognized that the process would b e "long and difficult." In R e s o l u t i o n 8 1 4 o f 2 6 March 1 9 9 3 , t h e Security C o u n c i l as well emphasized that the Somali p e o p l e b e a r the ultimate responsibility for national r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e i r country. It is i m p o r t a n t to seek to involve Somalis in efforts to find a

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solution to their tragedy, but this should be balanced against the fact that most Somalis under twenty-five years old have never experienced democracy at all. People who have known dictatorial rule and war all their lives may negotiate peace in good faith, but they are also easily tempted to resort to force to realize their goals. As was explained in Chapter 3, at the national reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa at the end of March 1993 the fourteen participating factions signed an accord through which they committed themselves to end armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also pledged to comply fully with the ceasefire agreement ofjanuary 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II. However, some of them have continued to violate the ceasefire, while others have not surrendered weapons to UNOSOM II. T h e ongoing ceasefire violations in the Kismayu area and the J u n e 1993 crisis in Mogadishu during which UNOSOM II soldiers were killed have presented a further signal that more force is required to safeguard the gains made through negotiations. In light of these developments, UN officials and other groups involved in organizing the national reconciliation process should impress on the faction leaders that this process is only one means of restoring peace and that if it does not work, more forceful means will be utilized. The problems surrounding the deployment of UNOSOM I in 1992 should serve as a lesson, namely that a conventional approach to the extraordinarily complex situation in Somalia is not likely to work. The UNOSOM I forces were not deployed when needed because obtaining the permission of warlords and clan elders took too long; the UNITAF was deployed without the permission of the Somali "authorities" and it appears to have worked. Some of the faction leaders and merchants who benefited from the chaos that existed prior to the deployment of UNITAF would do anything to sabotage the creation of a functioning civil society and government. For this reason, on the crucial issue of national reconciliation, the UN should step in and force the pace. It should draw up a timetable for national reconciliation and insist that faction leaders who are not at the "station" at the appropriate time to catch the train will be left behind. This may not be the best way to deal with future leaders of a sovereign nation, but it might help save Somalia from falling into the abyss a second time. T h e UN should not leave the selection of all participants at the national reconciliation conferences entirely to the Somali factions. It should exercise more discretion and invite people who might not have been selected by the factions but who, in its

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o p i n i o n , a r e likely to play an i m p o r t a n t role in the rehabilitation and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n process. In t h e m e a n t i m e , m o r e a t t e n t i o n s h o u l d be given to t h e possibility o f establishing a c o n f e d e r a t i o n o r f e d e r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n a unitary state. T h e fact that Somali clans still o c c u p y specified territorial units suggests that establishing a system o f c a n t o n i z a t i o n m i g h t be m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e than instituting a c e n t r a l i z e d system. As in Switzerland, e a c h c a n t o n o r t e r r i t o r i a l unit would f u n c t i o n as a semia u t o n o m o u s g o v e r n m e n t within the l a r g e r state. I n d e e d , o n e way o f m e d i a t i n g t h e Somali conflict a n d fostering r e c o n c i l i a t i o n is to introd u c e a m o d e r n i z e d traditional system o f g o v e r n m e n t , in which clan e l d e r s can be c o n s u l t e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d to play key roles in e n h a n c ing stability and m a i n t a i n i n g o r d e r . Efforts to involve clan elders to a g r e a t e r d e g r e e than h i t h e r t o in the s e a r c h for a political solution are likely to result in a type o f g o v e r n m e n t t h a t is suited to t h e S o m a l i c o n d i t i o n s . T h e y c a n also signal t h e U N ' s willingness to bypass recalc i t r a n t o r i n t r a n s i g e n t faction leaders. Clan elders a n d f a c t i o n leaders, even if they may b e l o n g to the s a m e c l a n , m i g h t n o t always see the situation from a similar perspective. If t h e r e is any o n e t h i n g that m a n y o f t h e f a c t i o n l e a d e r s seek t h r o u g h t h e n a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n p r o c e s s , it is political p o w e r . T h e y are n o t f u n d a m e n t a l l y interested in t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f Somali t r a d i t i o n s , especially as far as politics is c o n c e r n e d , a n d s o m e o f t h e m stand to lose if c l a n e l d e r s have t h e i r way. I n d e e d , G e n e r a l A i d i d ' s s u p p o r t e r s have already c o m p l a i n e d that the U N seeks to r e s t o r e tribal l e a d e r s to power. Aidid has lost p o p u l a r s u p p o r t c o n siderably since t h e arrival of U N I T A F in D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 2 , a n d it was partly b e c a u s e o f the fear of obscurity that his s u p p o r t e r s o p e n e d fire on U N O S O M II in J u n e 1 9 9 3 . While p r u d e n c e d e m a n d s that t h e U N n e e d s to t r e a d carefully t h e line b e t w e e n c l a n e l d e r s a n d " m o d e r n " f a c t i o n leaders, it would be c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e for U N n e g o t i a t o r s to c o n t i n u e b e n d i n g to the whims o f individual faction leaders.

RECONSTRUCTING

INSTITUTIONS

N a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n will have limited value w i t h o u t r e j u v e n a t e d a n d s t r o n g political a n d social institutions. As t h e Security C o u n c i l p o i n t e d out in R e s o l u t i o n 8 1 4 o f 2 6 M a r c h 1 9 9 3 , t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f law a n d o r d e r is crucial to h u m a n i t a r i a n r e l i e f o p e r a t i o n s , reconcilia t i o n a n d political s e t t l e m e n t , a n d t h e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n o f political institutions a n d t h e e c o n o m y . P e a c e a n d o r d e r will inevitably be

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a n c h o r e d o n these institutions. While it can b e a r g u e d t h a t the ultim a t e solution to Somalia's difficulties s h o u l d c o m e f r o m within, t h e c o u n t r y lacks t h e vital e c o n o m i c , political, a n d physical i n f r a s t r u c tures necessary to carry o u t the n e e d e d r e f o r m s . It also lacks skilled a n d e x p e r i e n c e d p r o f e s s i o n a l s in key sectors of society; p e o p l e with t e c h n i c a l skills have left t h e c o u n t r y a n d s o u g h t j o b s e l s e w h e r e . In o t h e r words, the very c o n d i t i o n s S o m a l i a f i n d s itself in are a hind r a n c e to the r e s o l u t i o n of its p r o b l e m s . U n d e r these circumstances, it is i m p e r a t i v e that t h e UN a n d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y c o n t i n u e to provide technical, e c o n o m i c , a n d military assistance to h e l p revive public i n s t i t u t i o n s in Somalia. W i t h o u t the realization of this goal, all h u m a n i t a r i a n a n d p e a c e k e e p i n g e f f o r t s to d a t e will have b e e n wasted. In t h e r e p o r t An Agenda for Peace, p u b l i s h e d in J u n e 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali a r g u e d t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l comm u n i t y s h o u l d h e l p in " r e b u i l d i n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s of n a t i o n s t o r n by civil war a n d strife.'"-' Six m o n t h s later, Boutros-Ghali, in his r e p o r t to t h e Security Council on 19 D e c e m b e r 1992, stressed that t h e U N was c o m m i t t e d to the r e b u i l d i n g of political, social, a n d e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e s in Somalia. H e r e p e a t e d this p l e d g e in his r e p o r t to t h e Security C o u n c i l o n 3 M a r c h 1993. His Special Representative to Somalia, J o n a t h a n T. Howe, like his p r e d e cessors M o h a m m e d S a h n o u n a n d Ismat Kittani, has m a d e efforts to tackle the issue, b u t t h e r e a r e as yet n o positive results. T h e work of institution b u i l d i n g s h o u l d i n c l u d e what Boutros-Ghali has identified as " s u p p o r t f o r t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of d e f i c i e n t n a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s a n d capabilities, a n d f o r t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of new d e m o c r a t i c instit u t i o n s . " 3 T h e r e is i n d e e d a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n d e m o c r a t i c practices a n d political stability, i n c l u d i n g p e a c e a n d o r d e r . T h i s m e a n s that t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y ( i n c l u d i n g r e g i o n a l organizations) o u g h t to h e l p to r e s t r u c t u r e t h e Somali e c o n o m y , assist Somalis to d r a f t a d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d establish the r u l e of law, a n d r e b u i l d o t h e r p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s . S o m e U N I T A F u n i t s have started m a k i n g e f f o r t s to h e l p r e b u i l d S o m a l i i n s t i t u t i o n s , especially by r e t r a i n i n g f o r m e r p o l i c e a n d a r m y o f f i c e r s to take u p simple law e n f o r c e m e n t d u t i e s . W h i l e it can b e a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e is an u r g e n t n e e d f o r t h e U N a n d t h e w o r l d c o m m u n i t y to t r a i n a n d r e t r a i n Somalis to r u n t h e i r society, t h e r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t of p u b l i c institutions a n d the p r o m o t i o n of g o o d g o v e r n a n c e by U N O S O M II is likely to i n d u c e Somali professors, s c h o o l t e a c h e r s , j u d g e s , e n g i n e e r s , doctors, n u r s e s , e c o n o m i s t s , a r c h i t e c t s , a n d o t h e r p r o f e s s i o n a l s now in exile to r e t u r n h o m e .

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OBSERVATIONS UN intervention in Somalia will be r e m e m b e r e d partly for its implications f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. A l t h o u g h it can be a r g u e d that t h e a b s e n c e of a f u n c t i o n i n g g o v e r n m e n t in Somalia m a k e s its case u n i q u e , t h e Security C o u n c i l has set a p r e c e d e n t t h e r e by p l a c i n g overwhelming h u m a n i t a r i a n n e e d s above traditional c o n s t r a i n t s against i n t e r f e r i n g in the i n t e r n a l affairs of sovereign states. A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t p r e c e d e n t is the d e p l o y m e n t of a UN p e a c e k e e p i n g operation, U N O S O M II, with e n f o r c e m e n t powers. For the first time in UN history, the Secretary-General is in c h a r g e of a C h a p t e r VII operation. While t h e r e is irony in the fact that a c o u n t r y without a gove r n m e n t or political s t r u c t u r e has indirectly i n f l u e n c e d the i n t r o d u c t i o n of p r o f o u n d c h a n g e s in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, arguably it is precisely t h e vacuum caused by the absence of g o v e r n m e n t that has m a d e it possible to test new ideas in p e a c e k e e p i n g . In geopolitical terms, Somalia's tragedy illustrates several important a n d i n t e r r e l a t e d points. First, the withdrawal of the U n i t e d States and the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n f r o m the H o r n in the 1989-1990 p e r i o d led to the f u r t h e r m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n of African affairs, which were already o n the p e r i p h e r y of world politics. T h e H o r n has h e l d little strategic value since Cold War priorities ceased to be operative on the world stage. Even its proximity to the Gulf, which had previously u n d e r l i n e d the r e g i o n ' s strategic value, is now of limited significance. S e c o n d , the calamity provides a clear e x a m p l e of how some security p r o b l e m s have b e e n aggravated r a t h e r than mitigated by the e n d of the Cold War a n d the withdrawal of the s u p e r p o w e r s f r o m d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . T h i r d , Somalia's a n a r c h y d e m o n s t r a t e s that security p r o b l e m s in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s stem f u n d a m e n t a l l y n o t f r o m external threats, b u t f r o m internal sources, especially weak state structures, a lack of social cohesion, and poverty. Fourth, Somalia's circumstances have b r o u g h t out clearly the c o n n e c t i o n between d e m o c r a c y a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . W i t h o u t a stable d e m o c r a t i c system, the c h a n c e f o r social a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t is progressively d i m i n i s h e d . T h e s e circumstances are f u r t h e r proof that political stability d e p e n d s o n a s o u n d economy, and vice versa. Fifth, achieving political, e c o n o m i c , a n d social stability in Somalia will be h a r d , b u t unless they are achieved, national and regional security will c o n t i n u e to suffer. Finally, Somalia has shown how inadequately e q u i p p e d the international system is to deal decisively with h u m a n i t a r i a n problems. T h e UN action has b e e n u n p r e c e d e n t e d b o t h in scale and cost, b u t t h e r e is n o t h i n g to suggest that it is a viable m o d e l for i n t e r n a t i o n a l

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r e s p o n s e s to massive h u m a n i t a r i a n disasters. At b e s t , we have l e a r n e d that e a c h c a s e m u s t b e t r e a t e d in t h e light o f its u n i q u e c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

NOTES 1. See Security Council Document S / 2 5 1 6 8 of 26 January 1993. 2. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda fur Peace, p. 8. 3. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, pp. 3 3 - 3 4 .

A B O U T THIS OCCASIONAL PAPER

This detailed analysis of the Somali tragedy addresses both the internal sources of the country's devastation and the external factors that served sometimes to exacerbate and sometimes to alleviate it. Makinda explains how the segmented n a t u r e of Somali society, and especially the clan system, interacted with the centralized rule of former President Siad Barre with disastrous results. He also discusses clan militias and the overall effects on society of the civil war. T h o u g h arguing that the e n d of the Cold War and the s u b s e q u e n t indifference of Western powers were crucial in the aggravation of the emerging anarchy, he points out that the U.S.-led multinational forces and the UN p e a c e k e e p i n g troops have p e r f o r m e d , and will continue to p e r f o r m , a useful policing function, making the delivery of h u m a n i t a r i a n supplies safe. Without the construction of social, political, and economic institutions on which peace can be anchored, however, international humanitarian efforts will have been wasted. T h e book concludes with Makinda's assessment of the options for Somalia, suggesting how the international community can help Somalis to rebuild their society. a lecturer in international politics at Murdoch University, was a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in L o n d o n in 1989-1990, on a MacArthur Foundation Fellowship. He was also a visiting fellow in the Global Security P r o g r a m m e at the University of Cambridge, England, in J a n u a r y 1992. Dr. Makinda was born in Kenya, where he grew up with Somalis. He is the a u t h o r of Security in the Horn of Africa and Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa; he has published articles in more than a dozen j o u r n a l s , including The World Today, Survival, Orbis, Australian Journal of International Affairs, and Third World Quarterly. SAMUEL M . MAKJNDA,

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T H E INTERNATIONAL, PEACE ACADEMY

T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Academy is an i n d e p e n d e n t , nonpartisan, i n t e r n a t i o n a l institution devoted to the p r o m o t i o n o f peaceful and multilateral a p p r o a c h e s to the resolution o f international as well as internal conflicts. IPA plays a facilitating role in efforts to settle conflicts, providing a middle g r o u n d where the options for settling particular conflicts are e x p l o r e d and p r o m o t e d in an informal setting. O t h e r activities o f the organization include public forums; training seminars on conflict resolution and peacekeeping; and research and workshops on collective security, regional and i n t e r n a l conflicts, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and nonmilitary aspects o f security. In fulfilling its mission, IPA works closely with the U n i t e d Nations, r e g i o n a l and o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations, governments, and parties to conflicts. T h e work o f IPA is further e n h a n c e d by its ability to draw on a worldwide network o f e m i n e n t persons comprising g o v e r n m e n t leaders, statesmen, business leaders, diplomats, military officers, and scholars. In the a f t e r m a t h o f the Cold War, t h e r e is a g e n e r a l awakening to the e n o r m o u s potential o f peaceful and multilateral approaches to resolving conflicts. T h i s has given renewed impetus to the role o f IPA. IPA is governed by an international board o f directors. Financial support for the work o f the organization is provided primarily by philanthropic foundations, as well as individual donors.

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O C C A S I O N A I . PAPER SERIES

Available f r o m t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e A c a d e m y , 777 U n i t e d N a t i o n s Plaza, New York, New York 10017 ( 2 1 2 - 9 4 9 - 8 4 8 0 ) : The Future of Peacekeeping, I n d a r Jit Rikhye Paths to Peace in Afghanistan: The Geneva Accords and After, Selig S. Harrison The Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for a Sound Financial Basis, S u s a n R. Mills United Nations Peacekeeping: Management and Operations, F. T . Liu Negotiations Before Peacekeeping, C a m e r o n R. H u m e Available f r o m L y n n e R i e n n e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1800 3 0 t h S t r e e t , B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o 80301 ( 3 0 3 - 4 4 4 - 6 6 8 4 ) : The United Nations in a Turbulent World, J a m e s N. R o u s e n a u United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force, F. T . L i u The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping, R o b e r t S t e p h e n s Staley II Political Order in Post-Communist Afghanistan, William Maley a n d Fazel H a q Saikal