Sedition in Liberal Democracies 9780199481699, 0199481695, 9780199091829, 019909182X

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CONTENTS

Published in India by Oxford University Press 2/11 Ground Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110 002, India

© Oxford University Press 2018 The moral rights of the author have been asserted.

Acknowledgements List of AbbreviatiotlS

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ISBN-13 (print edition): 978-0-19-948169-9 lSBN-10 (print edltion): 0-19-948169-5

Introduction: Liberal Democracy and Free Speech 1.

Political Offences and Speech Crimes: Comparing

xi 1

28

Legal Regimes 2.

· ·The Past Sedition and Western Liberal Democracies.

73

and the Present

4.

· tism· Sedition · Resistance, Suppression, and Patno in Colonial India . I D.1scourse in Postcolonial India Sed 1·t·ton and t h e Ju eli eta

5.

Caste, Class, Community, and the Everyday Tales of Law

6.

Indian Democracy and the 'Moment of Contradiction'

3.

Conclusion: The Life of a Law and Contradictions ISBN-13 (eBook): 978-0-19-909182-9 ISBN-10 (eBook): 0-19-909182-X

vii

136 176

225 310 363

of Liberal Democracies

369

Typeset in Berling LT Std 9.5/13 . . by The d . Graph·tcs so1utlon, New Delhi II 0 092 Prmte tn India b R krn y a 0 Press, New Delhi 110 020

Bibliography Index About the Author

387 393

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work evolved from my doctoral research at the Department of Political Science, University of Delhi, and bears the imprint of the efforts of no single individual but a collective. I express my sincere thanks to all the faculty members, non-teaching staffs, and fellow research students in the department for their support. I have been extremely fortunate to receive the guidance of noted academics over the years who have shaped my understanding of politics. I am thankful to Achin Vanaik, Pradip Kumar Datta, and Pumima Roy. To Yogendra Yadav I would always remain indebted for his unflinching support and faith in me. I was privileged to receive the insightful comments and words of encouragement from Anuradha Chenoy, Manjari Katju, and Monica Sakhrani, which propelled the work forward. The doctoral research fellowship at King's College, London, granted by the Ministry of Culture Government of India, was one of the most facilitating experiences fo; this research. I am extremely grateful to the faculty, staff, and students at King's India Institute, King's College, London. The incisive comments of Sunil Khilnani, Conor Gearty, and Sandipto Dasgupta are reflected in this work. I am also thankful to Robert Sharp at English PEN, for sharing his views and for putting me in touch with those involved with the movement for abolition of the offence of sedition in England. I thank the staff of British Library, London, which was virtually my home for over three months, and major parts of the work were written in its reading room which were subsequently revised.

Acknowledgements viii

Acknowledgements

This work would be incomplete without the mention of my dear friends, colleagues, and fellow researchers. Om Prakash, Prccti, Vikas, Santana, Subarta, lndrajeet, Anusha, Kamal, Pooja, Kunal, and K.K. Subha-1 cannot thank them enough for their comments, discussions, and overwhelming support over the years. I also thank my colleagues at Gargi College, University of Delhi, for their cheerful support. Friends at People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and their resilience to struggle have been constantly inspiring. I have benefitted enormously from the various discussions and the work we did together. Manoranjan Mohanty, Uma Chakravarti, and Gautam Navlakha have never ceased to amaze and inspire me with their passion, commitment, and energy. While working on this book, I have found some of the recent studies theorizing the nature of the liberal democratic states and democratic rights within most engaging. In this regard, the contribution to the field made by Michael Held, Sarah Sorial, Katherine Gelber, Jinee Lokaneeta, and Gautam Bhatia is immense. The conceptual categories innovated and theoretical interventions made by Laura Nader, Julia Eckert, and Ujjwal Singh have benefitted this work enormously. I am grateful to my two anonymous reviewers whose suggestions for improvement were extremely beneficial, and to Oxford University Press for their guidance and support. 1 thank the staff at the National Archives of India, New Delhi, and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi for their help. The fieldwork in parts of Haryana, Maharashtra, Delhi, and Bihar would not have been possible without the support and generosity of the people there. Everywhere I went and stayed, 1 felt received and aided. Many of the everyday stories I attempt to theorize in this work bear the imprint of the ordinary and the extraordinary struggles of these people and their institutions; naming a few would belittle the struggles of the thousands. The immense love and support received from my family, and the autonomy I have been granted, has indelibly shaped this work. Singh and Shweta Singh, would remain the strength behind To U.N. Singh, Poonam Singh, A.K. Singh, Pushpa Kumar, .K. Smgh, Kinshuk, and Tejrashi Mehrotra, among others, I remam indebted. My soul sisters, Anamika Asthana and Shivani Naram, have been my lifelines. I also thank Jamshed and Jyotsna for

Lx

b th my grandmothers and Badi familial love. Those who left midway- o Ma-continue to live within me. 1 rvisor: critic, friend, and menh my doctora supe ' and po1·ttiCS. · 11o him . s Ujjwal Kumar mg , world view . tor for life, has constantly mdy ch commitment to acttv. ente resear , . h" I owe my interest in praxts-on h b "11"1ance of which reflects m ts "th law-t e n k fr "ts ism, and engagement wt ·s reflections on this wor om t own work on the anti-terror laws. Ht various drafts, and persistent book. I have deep respect for inception onwards, critical . rt Over ealed mto t lS h encouragement ave cong t d yet unrelentt.ng suppo · Anupama Roy who has been an unsdta e. rably failed at emulating the the years 1 have read h er w orks an rntse To Anupama Roy an d UJ·J·wal strength and expression of her argument ts. and unconditionality. . h .r sheer ove Singh I owe this work, for t et

ABBREVIATIONS

ABVP ALRC ATS BJP BKU BSP CM CPA CPGB CPI CrPC FALN INLD IPC

IWW JCM JNU KKM KMKU NIA 0BC PIL POTA PUCL PUDR

Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarathi Parishad Australian Law Reform Commission Anti-Terrorism Squad Bharatiya Janta Party Bharatiya Kisan Union Bahujan Samaj Party Chief Minister Communist Party of Australia Communist Party of the Great Britain Communist Party of India Code of Criminal Procedure Fuerzas Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional Indian National Lok Dal Indian Penal Code Industrial Workers of the World (USA) Jagrook Chhatra Morcha Jawaharlal Nehru University Kahir Kala Manch Krantikari Mazdoor Kisan Union National Investigating Agency Other Backward Class Public Interest Litigation Prevention of Terrorism Act People's Union for Civil Liberties People's Union for Democratic Rights

·---, xii

SAD SIMI SJSM TADA UAPA

Abbreviations

Shiromani Akali Dal Student · M ovement of India . . Isla mtc ShJValtk Jan Sangharsh Manch Terrorist and Disru tiv . . . Unlawful Activit" pp e Acttvtttes (Prevention) Act tes revention Act

INTRODUCTION Liberal Democracy and Free Speech

On 1 February 2017 at the University of California, Berkeley, USA, mob violence erupted on campus with 1,500 protesters demanding the cancellation of a public lecture by Milo Yiannopoulos, a British author notorious for his alleged racist and anti-Islamic views. 1 Consequently, event was cancelled triggering a chain of reactions on the desirabilIty and limits of freedom of expression within American democracy. The Left-leaning intellectuals and politicians were accused of allowing the mob violence to become a riot on campus defending it in the name of protest against racism fascism and social injustice. In defending the rights of the protesters not 'illiberal' or hate speech on campus, however, many claimed that the message conveyed was that only liberals had th e ng · h t to free speech. 2 Almost contemporarily in 2016, in India, a series of criminal cases registered involving the act of sloganeering in support of the nght to self-determination of people in Kashmir. Kashmir is one of the states of the Indian Union where the movement for self-determination 1

New York Times, 2 February 2017 'A Free Speech Battle at the Birthplace of , . ovement at Berkeley', available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/ us/university-california-berkeley-free-speech-milo-yiannopoulos.html?_r=O, accessed: 12 February 2017 2 . htt . Matthew Vadum, 6 February 2017, 'The Sedition Left', available at p.//www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/265 71 7/seditious-left-matthew-vadum, accessed: 12 April 2017. aM

_, '

Liberal Democracy mtd Free Speeclt Sedition in Liberal Democracies

2

has existed since its integration within the Union in 194 7. Notably, in February 2016, students of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi, were charged and arrested for sedition for participating in a meeting in which· it was alleged that slogans were raised to support Kashmir's freedom from India.3 In March 2017, in an interview given to India Today, Union Minister Venkaiah Naidu said that 'pro-freedom' slogans will not be tolerated and must be penalized, as they result in violence and endanger national unity. 4 In this case, the justification for restriction on free speech was in the name of protecting the Indian nation state, to which secessionism is interpreted as the biggest threat. The incident at Berkeley, presents with a case, in which restriction on free speech was demanded and justified in the name of protecting what is largely called the 'liberal-democratic' values from 'illiberal' political opinions. In the Indian case, however, the restriction on the right to freedom of expression of individuals was justified in the name of coagulating state security. The brief description above pre-empts the larger framework within which this work is placed, which is the debate over the centrality of free speech and the restrictions on the same. These concerns, however, gain prominence only within a specific context. An authoritarian state which does not recognize the individual as a right-bearing citizen is inappropriate for any debate on freedom to take shape. The appropriate context is informed by a form of government, which we refer to as liberal democracy, which claims to guarantee the liberal right to freedom of speech and expression to all citizens. As an ideal, as well as an evaluative framework, democracy realizes itself politically through a democratic state. The process of this realization is, however, fraught, since it involves reconciling conflicting tendencies which inhere in the logic of 'democracy' and the logic of the 'state'. A liberal democratic state, it may be said, is a fraught combination of competing tendencies and traditions, since it attempts 3

The Indian Express, 16 March 2016, 'JNU Row: University Report Links Azadi Slogans to "Outs"d .h . . 1 ers " Wtt Covered Faces' available at http://mdtanexpress.com/artide/indi /' d" . . . ' . . . . a m ta-news-mdta/}nu-report-hnks-azadt-slogans-tooutstders-wtth-covered-faces/' accessed: 20 March 2016. 4 Naidu's interview giv t I d" . . . en o n ta Today TV Network, available at http:// mdtatoday.mtoday.in!story/v k · h "d .. . en ata -nat u-ratsmg-azaadi-slogans-treason-seditmn-law/1/895067 .html, accessed: 10 March 201 7.

3

. d democracy, on the one hand, and to bring together liberahsm an d th tate on the other. It is in the cyan es ' .. the imperatives o fd emocra ence of these confhcting ten. fr 0 m the converg di . 15 · contestations emergmg peech' of which se a ' . f 'extremes f political speech, an expresston dencies, that the category o . . · ·s a form 0 a · 1:torb"dden d state which 1s 1 kin d , emerges. Sed tttonf •th vernment an ' against the authority : e ate criticism, and, therefore, profor exceeding the limtt of legtttm eech and expression. By ratsmg the of s_p h may be freely exercised, t ec t e d by the right to freedom d htch speec 'th' issue of the conditions un er w d clition reveals a dilemma wt m or alternatively legitimately curbe , lds in the tensions between the liberal democracies. This between freedoms of citizens •P d the relations relative preced ence an of the many restrictions on and obligations of the state. ti n are one . . di The laws to penalize se o d ex ression. Hence it ts tmperathe right to freedom of speech an palysis on this account would tive to mention at the democracy and the right not make any sweeping clatms atho' rk is the fate of those forms f 1S wo d · t the to free speech. The concern o des that are uttere agams of expressions within liberal thus is the state of freedom of authority of the state. The uiliority within those forms gamst e a · h expression that citizens ave a th liberal and democratic. of government that claim to be bo

·Amalgam or a Conundrum'? Liberal Democracy: An

Life and Times of Liberal

d · t the wrote The In 1977 when C.B. Macp h erson . that existe pnor 0 he excluded the entire democracy. He counted nineteenth century from the frame loh"sttofY of the western democral"tica t · the way the pre-nineteenth-century po 1 d cracy gradually pavmg d th at emo · n ' Macph erson argue 1 . . cies as precursor mo deIs 0 f l'beral 10 dtsttnct ' 1 d cracy were this to its emergence. In rnaki ng . r to libera emo eties (Macpherson 1977,. P· all models of democracy that existed -class soct .· hip pnvbased on either classless or one . . al equality and c1uzens 11 ). The understanding was that poltttc U eople belonged to the same ileges belonged either to one class or a. pt Greece fitted the model of class. The Athenian democracy 1·n Anc1enth privilege of At h ens-born .· hip was e u·c mode1s proposed by one-class society where ctttzens ) Democra propertied men (Held 1987, P· 23 ·

Liberal Democracy and Free Speech

Sedition in Liberal Democracies

4

Rousseau in the mid-eighteenth century or Thomas Jefferson towards the end of the eighteenth century envisaged societies with no class distinction (Macpherson 1977, pp. 15-16). Rousseau and Jefferson differed from the Athenian model in the sense that they did not exclude the property-less from the class of citizenry but both presupposed a society in which everyone who could be called a citizen, would have at least a little property to work on, hence a limited property right. Hence, within the supposed class of citizens, there would have been inequality of property but all still belonged to the same class of propertied bodies. Liberal democratic model, for the first time in the nineteenth century envisaged a form of government for a society that had class divisions and the rights-bearing citizens belonging to different classes. Liberal democracy hence, as Macpherson opined, was essentially a form of government for a capitalist society that sustained the class divisions in the society while guaranteeing the same rights in theory to different classes of citizens. (Macpherson 1977, pp. 9-20). Liberal democracy came to be identified with a form of government that guaranteed equal rights to all citizens, rule of law, basic civil liberties, and popular sovereignty. It is evident in Macpherson's argument that liberal democracy was an imperative of the liberal state based on capitalist relations. Hence, liberal democracy is referred to as a form of government that became liberal first and then democratic. David Held brings forth this argument in tracing the historical emergence of modem state in the west in which he makes reference to liberal state and liberal democracy as two different forms of modern states (Held 1992, p. 89). The liberal state was founded on the idea of constitutionalism 5 that is, an idea of a limited government, private property, and economy. It upheld the right to life, liberty, and property of the citizens hut the citizens were essentially the property-owning male adult class. It ':as only in the course of many struggles fought for voting rights that umversal adult franchise was established as a governing principle of 5

th d which emerged as a principle of liberal states, became , e e. feature of liberal democratic states as well. Constitutionalism or garantiSme as Sartori · . d . ' Wntes, m mo ernity is believed to be teleological where th e te1os IS securing rights t . d" "d by limiting the power of the . o m lVI ua1 c1tizens government. See Sartori 1962, pp. 853 -6 4 .

5

t of the ushering in of representThe form that governments governmcnt.6 This was the ative democracy within the hbera states. took then was called liberal ld be disagreements on . da1m ere wou h Contrary to Macp erson s 'd t" g these principles had been f, f rnment eno m the fact that a orm o gove the nineteenth century. In 1885, put in place in the west much bhe oCre tI in the Baraum po aid retired life with his son who worke . 8 s Begusarai district, Bihar. ()ti' . B •nee, on 28 February 2015 m arau ni VI 11age,

d

ifl le

29

Ram Nandan v. State on 16 May 1958, AIR 1959 All101; 1959 Cn·I) 1, Point 25. i

198

Sedition in Liberal Democracies

Sedition and the Judicial Discourse itl

Congress goondas to the gaddi and seated them on it ... These official dogs will also be liquidated along with these Congress goondas. Congress goondas are banking upon the American dollars and imposmg various kinds of taxes on the people today. The blood of our brothersmazdoors and kishans is being sucked. The capitalists and the of this country help these Congress goondas. These zamindars and talists will also have to be brought before the people's court along wtth these Congress goondas ... On the strength of the organisation and of kishans and mazdoors the Forward Communist Party will expose e black deeds of the Congress goondas ... We believe in that revolution, which will come and in the flames of which the capitalists, zamindars and the Congress leaders of India ... will be reduced to ashes.... 31 The Supreme Court made a clear separation between incitement to disaffection and strong criticism of the government or disapprobatior It held that while the criticism of the government may be strong worded, the speech remains within the limits of disapprobation, an is legally sanctioned within Section 124A. What was not given space· however, was an attempt at creating disaffection. The judgment in clear agreement with the fact that the speech given by Kedar Na Singh went beyond the limits of strong criticism of the government. In considering the above, the judgment made attempts at analysing what was disaffection. The understanding of disaffection comes frotn the decision on the earliest recorded case of sedition in colonial Indiathe case against Jogendra Chunder Bose, the editor of the newspaper Bangobasi, in 1891, as discussed in the previous chapter. Disaffecti;tl meant absence of affection or presence of any form of bad feelings the government. In 1898, the amendment to the Section 124A qualified disaffection as disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. In present case, however, the verdict opined that the feelings of tion import the idea of tendency to cause harm to public order incitement to violence. In that instance, feelings of disaffection towar the government become a threat to public order. 'f 80 According to the Ramnandan case, Section 124A penalized attempt at mere incitement of feelings of disaffection towards the go"' tO ernment, irrespective of the fact whether there is an actual tendenc'feld incite violence. The present case turned the argument around. It h

w:

31

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar on 20 January 1962 AIR 955; 1962

SCR Supl. (2) 769.

India

199

ds • interpreted in such a way that that the section in question nee ent which has tendency to disaffection would actually include mcltem d Th. to say that excite violence that may actually cause dil·sof\ther. . :s :::sofa speech ·tted on y at e ms a h t e crime of sedition was commt . h" h would disturb . . nt to VIO1ence w tc act having a tendency o f . A was constitutionally 124 b reasonable restriction Public order. Going by that premJse, valid in relation to Article 19(2) and co d e a sion The interpretaech an expres ·· on the exercise of rig h t to free spe . . I nee' however. lacked , d to inctte VIO e , , ti on of disaffection as ten ency t of disaffection and . . lity between an ac , s a manipulative word coherence in establishmg causa t 'Tendency wa PUbli·c order or security o f sta e. test to qualify what 'tenand Kedar Nath ruling failed to develop a dency' meant (Bhatia 2016, P· 95). Court decisions in the This was in sharp contrast to 0 .tB"har Supreme Court had Ia D . State OJ z , al f lab Past. In 1952, in Shai a WI v. ces determine their potenti o ruled that the circumstances of utteran involving publication of Producing an effect on public. It was a matter all r r a revolution and I • ing a C II0 an objectionable pamphlet 'Sangram d nied that the pamphlet v·to1ent overthrow of state. The court' however, e th state by grounding its arguhad any possibility to pose a threat to had been published. It said tnents on the context in which the pamp bl circumstances inflame that 'rhetoric of this kind mt·ght 10 · conceiVa e . d mob' and 'if such excepp . ·f ddr d to an exote , 8Ssions for example 1 a esse emment to estabt·ISh the . ' , . . f; thestategov . tionat circumstances extst, tt was or . ch exceptional orcumstances fact;•. In other cases the court added, if su d by educated persons in do not eXist then 'the ' pamphiet wouldberea where the atmosph ere.ts ..t. • 0 ther places di th "lle quietness of their homes or m effect. 32 In this ver ct, e 110 trnal' and in that case, it would have no ircumstances in which a c0 llink between c Urt established a direct causa th security of state. Speech is uttered and it's potential to harmh e Lohia in Uttar Pradesh, l ar n 1960, in a case against Ram Mano wl theorize public ord er. Loh.ta the Supreme Court had tried to narro Y ot pay taxes to the state \\1as charged for instigating th e cultivators th to nobservation rnad e b Yth e go d f; nee llto Connecticut. e S Vernment. The court rna e re ere Upreme Court of America in Cantewe v.

S

. 26 May 1952 AIR 329; 1952 The State of Bihar v. Shaz·JabaIa Devt on

tR6s4.

·1

I

!

Sedition and the Judicial Discourse in Postcolonial India

Sedition in Liberal Democracies

200

[0 ]ffence known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquillity. It includes not only violent acts and words likely to produce violence in others . · · but also when clear and present, danger of riot disorder: interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other to public safety, peace, or order appears.33 Taking a range of conduct into consideration that might affect public order, Supreme Court meticulously pointed out that the restriction made in the interests of public order must also have 'reasonable relation to the object to be achieved, that is, the public order ... but not one far-fetched, hypothetical, or problematical or too remote in the chain of its relation the public order'. This interpretation made tighter causal connections an act and its effect on public order. 34 Nine years later, the Amencan Supreme Court in Brandenburg judgment, took a similar line of reasoning when it said a speech can be restricted only when it poses · threat of'imminent lawless action', which is 'likely' to occur. Kedar Nath ruling, while making reference to causality, did not the link between a speech act and the consequence by choos· mg to not define the word 'tendency' unambiguously. It is another matter that four years later in 1966, another bench of Supreme Court heard a case against the state of Bihar petitioned by Lohia in a case of his detenti on, rmpose · d on h'rm to prevent him to act in a manner that would be dangerous for public safety and public order. The Supreme upheld the petition and set aside the detention. The court theo· the act committed by any person and its potential to threaten pubhc order and security of state. It was careful to note that anY act . t he breach of law and order cannot affect the publiC co mmt"tte d m order, as public order was a wider term that affected a community. '[he court observed, 'one has to imagine three concentric circles, the largest

1 Reference to CanteweU v. Connecticut in The Superintendent centrt1 Pn.son'· F.a tehganh v. Ram Manohar Lohia on 21 January 1960 AIR 633· ' 1960 .

33

SCR (2) 821. 34

G

201

representing "law and order", the next representing "public order" and the smallest representing "security of state". An act may affect 'law and order' but not "public order", just as an act may affect "public order" hut not "security of the State".' 35 'fhe two Supreme Court verdicts in Lohia's case established that the term public order was specific to the prefix of 'public' before 'order'. It is not the disturbance caused to the general.prevailing order that tnakes an act stand against public order; it is the 'publicness' of the act committed in terms of its potential or actual harm caused to wider community of people that makes it deleterious to public order. On a note, the term security of state was equally specific in terms of Its impact on the existence of the institutions of state and the people Who constituted its apparatus. It had to be a specific act calling for Violence against the apparatus or its overthrow for it to be termed Prejudicial to the security of state. 'fhe Kedar Nath ruling failed to make any such security of state and public order; second, ben:een the mstitutlons of state and the organs of the government; and th1rd, between the tendency to disorder and its likelihood to occur. Security of the state, according to the verdict was dependent on maintenance of law and Order: Th· 1 t th t ·flaw and order is disturbed, it would · 1s c ear1y mean a 1 . affect the security of the state. If sedition as an offence was causmg dtsorde th . a1 th t t the security of the state. The court r, en 1t was so a rea o 8Pec1'fi 11 h ld h th . f government is the representative ca y e t at e ent1ty o of th fl tt" two entities to mean that .. d th th . estate. It was an attempt at con a ng . a ted the stab1lity an us e dtsao:uectton against the government auec secu. r1ty of the state. It said: G h · 'bl symbol of the State. The very ovemment established by law is. t e vzsz . d 1·fe the Government establ'IShed extstence of the State will be in Jeopar b 1 . Yd existence of the Government e Y aw b is subverted. Hence the. connnue diti 0 f th e stab'lity 1 of the Stat e. sta lished by law is an essential con on b h . d, 1'h · 124A has een c aractense 10 at is why 'sedition', as the offence a: s.ces agamst . th e State. 36 c 0 tnes under Chapter VI relating to ouen

'

_autam Bhatia while analyzing the Kedar Nath judgment has made tbe companson . had already established a 'strict test . . saying th at th e L oh·ta Judgment of proXImity' b . etween an expression and public disorder in 1960. The Supreftle Court m 1962 whiled "d· tbe Lohia test S Bh . eel mg on the Kedar Nath case, completely ignored · ee at1a 2016, pp. 95-6.

h' S .1 Bihar And Others, 1966 AIR 740; 35 D 1 r Ram Manohar Lo za vs tate o, 966scR 3 (I) 709. . 26 May 1952 AIR 329; 1952 6 St The State of Bihar v. Shailabala DeVI, 00

203

Sedition in Liberal Democracies

Sedition and the Judicial Discourse in Postcolonial India

The verdict interpreted Section 124A as constitutionally valid. Lawrence Liang writes that Supreme Court was eager to save Section 124A from being invalidated which could have been possible only if sedition which meant disaffection, could be read as having an impact on national security and public order and not just mere feelings of contempt and hatred (Liang 2016). Kedar Nath Singh was held guiltY as his speech had the use of words like revolution, which in popular imagery is held to be inciting a tendency to violence. The validation of the colonial law through this judgment, writes, A.G. Noorani, made sedition an advocacy of revolution which was to 'poison the wells of free speech' in times to come (Noorani 2016, pp. 82-3). Kedar Nath Singh passed away sometime in late 1990s in Barauni, Bihar; the exact year is not in people's memory. Kedar Nath Singh's case was referred as the first case of deshdroh in the vicinity by the villagers. But for those who live the communist legacy even today-the members of erstwhile Forward Communist Party-he was not a desh· drohi. Those who worked with him remembered him as someone whO fought for social justice. According to them, what Kedar Nath Singh was doing may have been seditious for the Congress ruled government, the zamindars and the capitalists, but for the workers and the poor, he was not seditious. 37

security discourse of the state was indomitable in the act of upholding the constitutionality of sedition through this verdict. The s·ame discourse of state security had prompted, in 1963, another amendment to the constitution in relation to the fundamental right to freedom of expression.

202

The 1962 verdict, nevertheless, is regarded as the defining moment for the offence of sedition within the juridical regime of India. The deci· sion that read down the law of sedition, acts as precedence in all cases dealing with the charge of sedition. It established a narrow understand· ing of the offence of sedition surpassing its colonial interpretation. 'fWS narrow understanding, however, interpreted sedition within the ambit of Article 19(2) and thereafter, sedition could be a constitutional groufld for imposing restrictions on right to freedom of speech and expressiofl· This was done in the name of 'striking the correct balance betweetl individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order' .38 'fhe Co nversation . Wl'th Ra dh ekant Mishr, now an octogenarian who was ......,;tlt K.N. Singh in the Forward Block and his later endeavours on 28 February 20 15' Barauni village• Begusara1 distri' ct, B'h 1 ar; C onversation ,with C. Jh a t h e thell o Party on 28 February 2015 in Baraunl ' · vil• secretary ofthe Forwal'd Commurust lage, Begusarai district Bihar. 38 • I 2 Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar on 20 January 1962 AIR 955; 196 SCR Supt. (2) 769. 37

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A Passage to Sedition with the 'Maturing of Democracy' The decade of the 1960s was marked by political jitters and uncertainty. The war with China in 1962 was a concern for geopolitics: Additionally, the events in domestic politics had started challengmg . Consr:ess dOtntnance. · There was .Master Tara s·mgh' s long fast demanding I da frSikh ·da nJ39 as a separate an om state and DMK's demand for DraVI na h . I d· · d growing appre enstons n ta. Movements demanding secesston an dm · d another amen ent to I Th A d t re ated to territorial consolidation tnggere men the Constitution in relation to Article 19(2) in 1963 . I e men . . reasonab e restrictions on empowered the state to make laws tmposmg . th . t t f th th h fr domm em eres o e e exercise of the fundamental. rig .t ee .on of two phrases in the sovereignty and integrity of India wtth msoerti t of' and 'sovereignty se ti . . •· the tnteres c on of reasonable restrictions, m th Am dment was tabled and · · f I d' • 40 Wh the bill for e en . tntegnty o n ta · en d th t this was done to tn J th th 1 minister state a d for secession or disinte. anuary 1963, e en aw ltnpose restrictions on those who use p. 50-3). 1999 of regional gration of India for political purposes (Austill During the 1960s and early 1970s, the.re wthas a:ne-party-dominated Parties, especially in south In di a co ntesting h ed also managed to crestructure. By then the Commums· t m0 vement a U territorial influence. The ate a fairly large ideological space as we movement. had felt most threatened ued the Indian State which . Was a revolutionary movement that crtdq ·-coloniaJ.4I The tribals tn 1'ts . c dal an seffil understanding was semt-reu f rrupt officials landlords, and Poor facing hardshtps . m othhdsoco , e an 0

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Dravidanand was a demand for a sep

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arate land from India comprising of

adras, Mysore, Kerala, and Andhra. t) Act 1963 available at http:/I