Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus [1 ed.] 9781614991878, 9781614991861

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SECURITY AND CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION IN THE EU, THE BLACK SEA REGION AND SOUTHERN CAUCASUS

Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013.

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division.

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 107 ISSN 1874-6276 (print) ISSN 1879-8268 (online) Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013.

Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus

Edited by

Ayça Ergun Associate Professor, Department of Sociology Vice-Chair, Center for Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA) Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

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Hamlet Isaxanli Professor, Khazar University Founder Chairman, Board of Directors and Trustees Khazar University Baku, Azerbaijan

Published in cooperation with NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013.

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Security and Cross/Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus Ankara, Turkey 23-24 September 2011

© 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher.

ISBN 978-1-61499-186-1 (print) ISBN 978-1-61499-187-8 (online) Library of Congress Control Number: 2012955620

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Contents Introduction Ayça Ergun

1

International and Domestic Actors in Security Building

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Resolving the Challenges to Security and Cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Region Lenore G. Martin

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The EU’s Role in Promoting Cross-Border Co-operation: Perspectives from the Finnish-Russian Border Region James Wesley Scott

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The Role of the EU and the OSCE in Promoting Security and Cooperation in the South Caucasus and Moldova Donnacha Ó. Beachàin

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EU Common Foreign Policies and CBC in a Wider Europe Ilkka Liikanen

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Cross-Border Cooperation and Regional Policy Coordination: The Role of BSEC Panagiota Manoli

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Patterns of Cross-Border Co-operation Evolution of Cooperation and Mutual Perceptions: Romania-Republic of Moldova Daniela oitu, Coniu-Tiberiu oitu and Camelia Morariu The Black Sea Security Space in Perspective: Ukraine’s Non-alignment as a Challenge to the ‘“New” Euro-Atlantism’ Sergii Glebov

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The Competing Security Agendas and Security Identities in the Black Sea Region 108 Marina Vorotnyuk Cross-Border Co-operation in the Southern Caucasus Turkish Foreign Policy and Cross-Border Cooperation in the South Caucasus Mitat Çelikpala

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Georgian Policy Towards the North Caucasus: Old Dilemmas, New Trends Ghia Nodia Politics of Insecurity: Cross-Border Conflict Dynamics and Security Challenges in Georgia Kornely K. Kakachia

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Subject Index

177

Author Index

179

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Energy and Security in the South Caucasus Brenda Shaffer

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Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus A. Ergun and H. Isaxanli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-187-8-1

1

Introduction

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Ayça Ergun

This book is the product of collaboration between the Center For Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA) at the Middle East Technical University and Khazar University, with generous support provided by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme. Both institutions jointly organized an Advanced Research Workshop entitled “Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus” between 23-24 September 2011 in Ankara. Prominent scholars from Europe, Turkey and countries of the Black Sea region and the Southern Caucasus participated to the workshop. With the organization of this workshop, our aim was to bring together academics, practitioners and policy makers in order to provide an in-depth discussion of issues and themes related to security and cross-border cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region, the Black Sea region and the Southern Caucasus. The participants found the opportunity to discuss the state of the art in regional studies namely, European Studies, Black Sea Studies and post-Soviet studies, focusing on the main debates, theories, approaches and methodologies. They focused on developing a future research agenda, strengthening regional studies, increasing interdisciplinarity, and means of cooperation. There was an open discussion to identify policy recommendations in order to increase and strengthen cross-border cooperation between Euro-Atlantic region, Black Sea region and the Southern Caucasus. The issues covered during the workshop were the role of international and domestic actors in security-building and cross-border cooperation, patterns of regional cross-border cooperation namely in East and Central Europe, the Black Sea region and the Southern Caucasus and issues and themes related to cross-border cooperation. This joint endeavour was very important in a number of respects. First, area studies seem to be detached from each other due to their regional coverage. There is also a very limited academic milieu of discussion comparing and contrasting different regions. Merging of these research areas can provide insights to both scholars and practitioners studying and working on different regions to a better understanding of issues related to securitybuilding and cross-border cooperation. Second, cross-border cooperation is vital in order to overcome obstacles in the way of the security-building and the consolidation of stability. Academic discussions related to security usually neglect the inclusion of patterns of cross-border cooperation among countries, regions and international actors. For a sustainable security-building in the Euro-Atlantic region, the Black Sea region and the Southern Caucasus, the nature of cross-border cooperation activities and their potentials should be clearly identified. The workshop also aimed at providing a comprehensive, interactive and interdisciplinary account of security-building and crossborder cooperation through which domestic, regional and international dimensions were discussed. It provided us with an excellent opportunity to facilitate exchange of knowledge and experience among different stakeholders, namely academics, practitioners and policy-makers; to encourage academic discussions among different

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A. Ergun / Introduction

disciplines and areas studies; and to provide policy recommendations with the input provided by national, regional and international experts. This book consists of three sections. The first section provides an analysis of the role of international and domestic actors in contributing to the security building in the Euro-Atlantic, the Black Sea and the Southern Caucasus regions. Authors describe and discuss the policies initiated by the international governmental organizations namely the United Nations (UN), NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) to promote cross-border cooperation. Lenore Martin, in her opening chapter, analyses the persistence of security challenges and the proliferation of international cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Region in the post-Cold War period. Frozen conflicts in three areas around Black Sea (Moldova vs. Transnistria; Armenia vs. Azerbaijan; Georgia vs. Abkhazia and South Ossetia) remain the main challenge for stability of the region. Using the multi-polar system framework, she argues that a comprehensive security policy in the region is most likely to bring about resolution of these conflicts. James W. Scott, in his chapter, focuses on the role of the EU in promoting crossborder cooperation while addressing the significance of the ‘neighborhood’ context for European regional policy by focusing on different aspects of cross-border ‘region building’. He questions whether the existing policy instruments actually facilitate networking between the EU and its neighbors as they claim to do. Based on the case study of Russian-Finnish cooperation he identifies simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion. He argues that a strict separation of EU internal and external policy activities would be counterproductive to pro-active strategies aimed at avoiding wider divisions between the EU and its neighboring regions. Donnacha O’Beachain examines the past and potential role of the EU and OSCE in addressing the four post-Soviet protracted conflicts, namely, the disagreement between Georgia and its erstwhile autonomous regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the frozen conflict between the Moldovan authorities in Chisinau and the Tiraspol based republic of Transnistria, along with the simmering struggle between Armenia and Azerbaijan for possession of the self-declared republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. His research aims to address the existing lacuna in the research on post-Soviet de-facto states. Based on data obtained through semi-structured interviews with key-personnel in the de-facto states, he argues that the EU and OSCE strategies have been risk-averse, incremental and based on securing agreement on what is politically possible in terms of what its members will accept rather than what is necessary to make a substantial difference to realities on the ground or the framework of the conflict. Ilkka Liikanen, in his chapter, examines conceptual change in the definition of EU policies of cross-border cooperation in the context of the shaping of common foreign policies of the Union. His analysis focuses on changes in the definitions of crossborder cooperation from the first INTERREG programs to present-day European Neighbourhood Policies. He analyses the conceptual shifts against the background of changing political agendas ranging from economic and social cohesion to preintegration, deepening integration and the constitution of the political Union. In the last part of the first section, Panagiota Manoli analyses how inter-governmental institutions such as regional organizations may affect cross-border cooperation, focusing on the wider Black Sea area where there is a parallel process of border areas cooperation and of regional, inter-governmental policy coordination, the latter led by the organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). She argues that institutionalized

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A. Ergun / Introduction

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collaboration between sub-state actors across borders has been encouraged in the Black Sea area as a means of practical problem-solving in a broad range of fields reflecting a top-down approach. The second part of the book mainly discusses the patterns of cross-border cooperation in East and Central Europe and the wider Black Sea region concentrating on Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and the Russian Federation. In their chapters, Daniela oitu, Coniu-Tiberiu oitu and Camelia Morariu focus on the evolution of cooperation and mutual perceptions of two neighboring states: Romania and the Republic of Moldova. They underline regional development and the way in which entrepreneurship, cooperation and development take place at the border between the two states. The authors analyse the description of the strategies and priorities defined by the actions of people engaged in regional development and entrepreneurship at the border level, the description of motivations, positive effects and problems in this process, as well as the impact of the EU and national policies on these processes. Sergii Glebov discusses Ukraine’s security challenges in the wider Black Sea region and Europe. He argues that the concept of New Euro-Atlantism gives a theoretical chance to combine different security spaces in Europe in order to share the security interests of Ukraine, together with those of the other European countries, including the Russian Federation and EU members. In her chapter, Marina Vorotnyuk identifies competing security agendas and security identities in the Black Sea region while focusing on the security policies of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Turkey. She discusses the impact of these policies on fostering and/or challenging the patterns of cross-border cooperation in the region. The last section of this book refers to cross-border cooperation in the Southern Caucasus where the conflicts have an enormous impact on nation-building, statebuilding and democratization. This is a region where the prospects for stability and a viable peace remain in serious question. Authors of this section mainly refer to the nature of the international involvement in conflict resolution, the role of regional actors along with insights from domestic actors. Because of existing local energy resources, it also draws a particular attention to the issues related to energy and security in the region. Mitat Çelikpala, in his chapter, analyses the role of Turkey in cross-border cooperation initiatives while referring to the Turkish foreign policy in the region. He identifies challenges for security-building and conflict resolution, focusing on Turkey’s bilateral relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Ghia Nodia and Kornely Kakachia, in their respective chapters concentrate on Geogia. Nodia analyses the implications of Georgia’s new policy towards Russia’s Northern Caucasus that includes the institution of a visa-free travel regime for the residents of this region, as well as recognition by the Georgian Parliament of the “Circassian Genocide”, etc. He argues that this policy is aimed at attracting the goodwill of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus and is based on the understanding that while this region is part of the Russian Federation, the attitudes and actions of the people residing there are important for Georgia’s security. He also discusses how the Georgian policies were perceived by the Russian government. Kornely Kakachia identifies the nature of a “politics of insecurity” and explores how the form of crossborder conflict dynamics relates to the character of the two states, Georgia and Russia. He underlines that the case of the Russia-Georgia divide is important for challenging traditional explanations of foreign policy and for learning possible ways to de-escalate dangerous cross-border conflicts.

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A. Ergun / Introduction

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In the last chapter of this section Brenda Shaffer discusses the influence of energy on security in the Southern Caucasus and Caspian region in the post-Soviet period. She argues that while energy is an important factor affecting security developments in the region, it is not the main driver. She also points out that energy flows have not served as an inducement for peace in the region, and most likely energy supply will not serve this function in the future. We would like to thank Prof. Aye Ayata, chairperson of KORA for initiating this joint project and providing us with generous support and feedback in every stage of the organization of the workshop and editing of this volume. Our research assistants, Zelal Özdemir, Leyla Sayfudinova, Gökten Doangün, Yelda Karada and Duygu Ünsal, deserve special thanks. They provided enormous assistance to us. Gulshen Pasayeva, Alexander Sotnichenko and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou who were the participants of the workshop contributed a lot in the discussion of the security and cross-border cooperation in the wider Black Sea region and the Southern Caucasus. We would also like to acknowledge the help provided by Ms. Sue Willamson and Ms. Alison Trapp from NATO Science For Peace and Security Programme in all stages of the organization of the workshop and Ms. Carry Koolbergen and Ms. Maureen Twaig from IOS Press during the editing of this volume. We hope that this book would contribute to the literature on area studies, cross-border cooperation, security, and peace studies.

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International and Domestic Actors in Security Building

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Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus A. Ergun and H. Isaxanli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-187-8-7

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Resolving the Challenges to Security and Cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Region Lenore G. MARTIN1 Louise Doherty Wyant Professor, Emmanuel College; Associate, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Associate, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University

Abstract. With the end of the Cold War the Black Sea area has seen the proliferation of international organizations while the stalemated security challenges symbolized by the three frozen conflicts remain: Moldova vs. Transniestria; Armenia vs. Azerbaijan; Georgia vs. Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. Identifying the region as a multi-polar system the chapter explores the dynamics among the major actors as well as between the major and lesser actors. This includes conflicts, negotiations and alliances. Because of the pervading mistrust among the actors the paper concludes that a comprehensive solution to the security issues in the region would be the most likely to produce successful negotiations of the frozen conflicts.

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Keywords. Wider Black Sea Region, frozen conflicts, NATO-Black Sea, IranAzerbaijan, Moldova vs. Azerbaijan, Georgia vs. Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, multi-polar system, bi-polar system, Iran-US, Iran-EU, Turkey-NATO, TurkeyBlack Sea, Russia-Black Sea, Romania-NATO, Turkey-Russia, Turkey-NATO, US-Russia, EU-Russia, EU-NATO, EU-Black Sea

Introduction The expansion of NATO to the shores of the Black Sea has changed the configuration of power in the region. This is affecting the perception of security and the achievement of cooperation for the EU, Russia, Iran, and the littoral states of the Black Sea as well as their Southern Caucasus neighbors, an area that for convenience may be called the “Wider Black Sea Region.” 1 The security challenges that result include the three socalled “frozen conflicts.” These long-standing and relatively intractable conflicts include: Moldova vs. Transniestria; Armenia vs. Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh; Georgia vs. Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War has also generated an unprecedented degree of international cooperation in the Region among the EU, the littoral states of the Black Sea, Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union. This is evidenced by the profusion of Regional organizations. To be sure, some are principally composed of

1

Louise Doherty Wyant Professor, Emmanuel College; Associate, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Associate, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University. E-mail: [email protected]. Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013.

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the littoral states. These include GUAM, (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, formed in 1997), the Commission on Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution (formed in 1992),2 Black Sea for (formed in 2001),3 Black Sea Harmony (formed in 2004),4 the Black Sea Forum (formed in 2006),5 the Eastern Partnership (formed in 2008). 6 However, others are more extensive and involve some or all of the littoral states and their neighbors or trading partners. These include the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, known as BSEC (formed in 1992), 7 the Transportation Corridor Europe, Caucasus, Asia (formed in 1998),8 the Danube Black Sea Task Force (formed in 2001),9 the European Neighborhood Policy (formed in 2004),10 the Community of Democratic Choice, (formed in 2005) 11 the Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe (formed in 2006), 12 and Black Sea Synergy (formed in 2007).13 How does one explain both the persistence of security challenges and proliferation of international cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Region? Or, why hasn’t the latter spirit of cooperation resolved the security issues of the former? What else is needed in order to resolve the intractable conflicts and induce a greater degree of international cooperation in the Region?

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The Role of Theory The search for explanations as to what on the surface appears to be contradictory international interactions leads to what might become a bewildering and large number of contending answers. These range in ascending levels of abstraction from the personalities of the leaders of the states of the region and their style of diplomacy; to the ideological preferences and bureaucratic organization of their decision-makers; to the economic, strategic, and other national interests of these states; and to the “structure” of the international politics of the region and its observable patterns of inter-state behavior. At this point, scholars turn to international relations theory to assist our analysis and to avoid such potential confusion from multiple explanations. As a general matter, theory guides us in the choice of variables and what to expect as the result of their interactions. This chapter proposes to use international relations theory to provide explanations for the apparently incompatible behavior of the states in the Wider Black Sea Region and to generate solutions for increasing interstate cooperation. What international relations theory is best suited for this purpose? A quick search of the literature for the reigning theories in the field of international relations would yield a large array of contenders for the title of the best theory or analytical framework for this project.14 Indeed there is much contention and considerable debate between proponents of such major schools of international theory, as “realism” versus “idealism” and “constructivism” vs. both realism and idealism [3]. Added to which there is even contention and considerable debate by proponents of sub-theories and derivative theories within each school.15 The clash of international relations theories makes it nigh impossible to crown any one particular approach as predominant in the field or as the most useful tool for analysts or policy makers. Nevertheless, by distilling the various theories that populate the field of international relations it is possible to formulate a useful theoretical approach to analyzing the issues of security and cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Region.

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Levels of Analysis The contending theories recognize three traditional levels of analysis: the individual level, the state level, and the international level. At each level the theorist attempts to select the fewest and most productive variables or propositions upon which to lay the foundations of the theory, thereby making it both manageable and useful. Too few variables may be manageable but the resulting theory will offer only weak explanatory power and will therefore be useless for formulating robust predictions or making policy recommendations. Too many variables make the theory unmanageable. There will be too many permutations and combinations by which the variables can relate to each other making it impossible for the scholar or policy maker to tell which variables have priority and therefore what predictions or policies have preeminence.

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The International Level Because this book focuses on a wide region and not any particular state or actor/individual in the region, this chapter will analyze international relations from the level of the international system16. One common approach at the international level is to identify the “structure” of the international politics under examination – be it the global system or a regional “system.”17 The theorist seeks out the major “actors” or in common parlance, the “major powers” of every system.18 The variables here are the numbers of major actors and their relative “power” or “capabilities.” While there can be disagreement over the components of a state’s “power”, there is at least agreement that “military” and “economic” capabilities are included among them19. Having then identified the major powers of an international system and their relative capabilities, the system’s “structure” can be defined as the principal relationship among the most powerful states in the system. Polarity is a useful term of reference as a short form way to describe such relationships. It can be applied to the three logical system structures of: “unipolar,” “bipolar,” and “multipolar.” The concept of “polarity” also assumes in theory at least, that the relative capabilities of the superpower in a unipolar system are predominant, and the capabilities of the dominant superpowers in a bipolar system are relatively equal, as are the relative capabilities of the major powers in the multipolar system. Of course, in the so-called “struggle for power” in any system, relative capabilities can change over time. Single powers or aggressive alliances can strive for predominance.20 Defensive alliances can counterbalance them. Such struggles do not always end by “resetting” the relative capabilities of the actors at relative parity. This “struggle for power” can take multiple forms in addition to alliance formation. In the deployment of what we now call “hard power” these forms include territorial expansion by invasion or conquest, subversion and intervention into civil strife, arms races, blockades, and other conflict creating behavior. Major powers also employ what we now call “soft power” to reduce the need to deploy the more costly hard power. Soft power includes cultural attraction and ideology as well as the exercise of diplomatic persuasion and economic inducements sometimes through international organizations [10]. Diplomatic persuasion often requires negotiation between and among the actors. Negotiations are also required for the resolution of conflicts as well as for alliance formation and obtaining alignments.

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It will be helpful to apply the term “alliance” in the hard power sense to describe an arrangement between or among states for their mutual defense or for aggressive purposes [11]. We can apply the term “alignment” in the soft power sense to describe an arrangement between or among states for their mutual benefit that involves something less than commitments for military defense or offense. We therefore can use the terms more precisely to distinguish alignments from alliances. All of these interactions between the major powers, their conflicts, alliances, alignments and negotiations, also involve interactions with the other and less powerful states in the system. We can refer to these other states as the “lesser powers.” Operating at the international level, the theorist posits that there are patterns of international behavior manifested by types of conflicts, alliances and negotiations and that these patterns are distinguishable in each system. This typology involves observation of the goals and lengths of conflicts, the ease or difficulty of forming alliances, and the willingness or not to cooperate in negotiations. Thus, in a “model” multipolar system one can posit that states have more limited goals, seeking to gain power but not seeking to eliminate a major actor, as superpowers might threaten in a bipolar system. Elimination can be by conquest or absorption into a bipolar block. By not seeking the total conquest of a major actor or binding it into a block, states preserve the major actor as a possible future ally. Lesser actors are more vulnerable to conquest or sensitive to the need to join a block for protection. However, there are also risks involved in the elimination of a lesser actor. Elimination of a lesser actor could signal a drive for predominance by an aggressor state or alliance. Accordingly, one would expect conflicts in a multipolar world to be shorter because of the actors’ goals of limited gains. One would also expect alliances in a multipolar system to be more easily formed and dissolved. This “flexibility” of alliances is assisted by the absence of contending ideologies or fear of elimination as affects members of a bipolar block. In a model multipolar system of major actors with relatively equal capabilities, the major actors compete for the allegiance of the lesser actors and offer them inducements to join alliances. The lesser actors are freer to strike the best bargain for their allegiance. As a result they may choose to “balance” between major actors and their alliances or “bandwagon” by joining other actors in the alliance that they consider the “strongest” [12]. Where major actors have relatively dominant capabilities, the lesser actors have a greater concern for their security and fewer choices between “balancing” to obtain greater inducements. They may have to settle with “bandwagoning.” In a model bipolar system where superpowers form blocs that seek to predominate, conflicts are expected to be of a longer duration. There is little incentive for the opposing superpowers and their allies to cooperate. Negotiations over resolution of conflicts may never occur or may be of long duration. In a model multipolar system, the major powers are more ready to cooperate with each other. They exhibit the same flexibility in creating compromises to end conflicts as they do in creating alliances and dissolving them. All actors exhibit flexibility in creating and switching alignments without committing to joining or withdrawing from alliances. Applying International Level Theory to the Wider Black Sea Region Applying theory at the international level to the Wider Black Sea Region raises the following initial questions: What is the structure of the international system in the region? To which of the models of polarity: unipolar, bipolar and multipolar, is the

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regional international system most akin? How close or divergent is this structure to the “model” international system? If divergent, what divergence is evident in the patterns of international behavior? What are the implications of this divergence for regional security and cooperation? To respond to the first question, one needs to define the region and specify the major and lesser powers and their relative capabilities. The Major and Lesser Powers The major powers appear to be: Russia, Turkey and a combination of the EU and NATO. Iran must also be considered a major power because of its keen interests in Caspian Sea oil and gas, some of which is transported through the Black Sea. Pursuing these interests Iran occasionally interacts with the Black Sea region, e.g. in the Armenia vs. Azerbaijan dispute or in proposing participation in the Nabucco pipeline. Furthermore, NATO’s emplacement of its missile defense system in Turkey and Romania to counter Iranian medium range missiles is evidence that the major powers include Iran as an actor in the Wider Region. The lesser powers in the Wider Region appear to be: the other four littoral states of Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia, as well as the adjacent states of Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. These neighbors are selected because the major powers compete for alignments with them; they are the focus of conflicts; and frequently the subject of interstate negotiations21.

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Relative Capabilities It is a far more difficult task to assess the relative capabilities of the major powers in the Wider Black Sea Region. On a stand-alone comparison of military capabilities, NATO is clearly the dominant power when compared to Russia 22. On the other hand, despite the superiority in capability of combat power, airlift and power projection, by the key NATO allies, the US, UK, France and Germany,23 as compared to Russia, Russia still maintains a significant strategic nuclear delivery capability that can deter existential threats by NATO24. It also has the advantage of physical proximity to the arenas of conflict in the Region25. While diminutive in comparison to the NATO and Russian military capabilities, the military capabilities of Turkey and Iran are roughly comparable to each other in terms of active military, reserves, and defense budgets26. Even more diminutive are the capabilities of the lesser actors in the region. Even relative diminution of military capabilities, however, does not render the lesser actors “toothless.” As demonstrated particularly by Iran, the lesser states can employ subversion, provide military assistance to rebels, and take other actions that promote asymmetrical conflict. What then is the structure of the international political system of the Wider Black Sea Region? Even given the superiority of NATO military capabilities to Russia and Iran, it is impossible to consider the EU and NATO actor as so predominant in the region as to consider it a unipolar system. Moreover, the region does not qualify as a bipolar system. True, there is rivalry between the EU and NATO actor and Russia and there is some solidity to NATO as a block. Indeed Bulgaria and Romania have been integrated into the Euro-Atlantic by becoming members of both NATO and the EU. On the other hand, while Turkey is also a member of NATO, it is not integrated in the EU. Moreover, Turkey forms alignments with the other major actors, Russia and Iran, independently of NATO, particularly for economic reasons. Furthermore, despite

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their rivalry, both NATO and Russia have issued declarations that they do not consider the other to be an existential threat.27 There even exists some modest military cooperation between the rivals within the NATO-Russia Council [17],28 and the Russian Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) can hardly be considered an opposing block. By default the Wider Black Sea Region should be considered a multipolar system. Unlike, however, a model multipolar system where the major actors jockey for power from the starting point of relatively equal capabilities, that is not the case in this region. Theoretically this deviation from the “model” structure should lead the analyst to expect some deviation from the predictable patterns of multipolar conflicts, alliances and negotiations.

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Expected Patterns of Multipolar Behavior in the Wider Black Sea Region That appears in fact to be the case. The international conflicts in the region have limited territorial goals that do not involve the elimination of a major actor. The three frozen conflicts fall into this category. For example, in the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008, no doubt, Russia had the military capabilities to conquer Georgia. However, it satisfied its limited goals by wresting the smaller chunks of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia away from Georgia, while the Euro-Atlantic remained on the sidelines, unwilling to intervene. This is an example of a multipolar conflict not a deviation. Deviation from the model multipolar system is evident particularly in the competition among the major actors for the allegiance of the lesser actors. In the model multipolar system, where the major actors have relatively equal capabilities, one would expect short term alliances. Lesser actors readily switch their allegiance. NATO, however, is a long-term alliance. The EU and NATO were able to bring both Bulgaria and Romania into the fold, first as NATO allies in 2004 and subsequently as members of the EU in 2007. Romania and Bulgaria have not been ready to switch their allegiance and “balance” between the EU and NATO actor and Russia. On the other hand, NATO and the EU did not succeed with their attempts to bring into NATO and the EU the other lesser powers, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova. Each of these lesser powers has participated in varying degrees with NATO and EU members (as has Russia) in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace program. However, Russia has pressured them in various ways not to go all the way to full membership in NATO. Thus, in the case of Armenia, Russia maintains a military base in Gyumri that Yerevan considers critical for its defense against Azerbaijan29. Russia also provides economic inducements to Azerbaijan in the form of deals to import gas into Russia. Of course, there are mutual benefits to these gas deals, as they support Russia’s opposition to the proposed Nabucco pipeline and give Azerbaijan leverage in opposition to what it perceives as EU and NATO support for Armenian-Turkish negotiations that did not include resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia also engages in modest military cooperation with Azerbaijan in the maintenance of a missile tracking radar station with a small contingent of troops at Gabala30. Russia pressures Moldova by maintaining a small contingent of troops in the breakaway province of Transniestra [24]. Moscow also has pressured the Ukraine by the maintenance of its naval base in Sevastopol and threatens to cut supplies of gas upon which the Ukraine depends31. The threats to Georgia have been more overtly

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violent. Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008 to support the separatist provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia has officially recognized their independence from Georgia and continues to maintain small contingents of troops in both places [23, 26]. 32 At the same time, the lesser powers have on occasion resisted Russian threats and have exercised varying degrees of autonomy from Russia. GUAM, a cooperative organization of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, formed in 1997 to resist Russian economic pressure and Russia’s interventionist policies exacerbating the separatist issues faced by Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Azerbaijan (NagornoKarabakh) and Moldova (Transniestra) as well political pressure on the Ukraine with its large Russian population. The EU and NATO promptly sought to take advantage of GUAM’s anti-Russia disaffection by forming the Eastern Partnership with them in 2008. The Ukraine, while conceding to Russia’s demands that it not become a fullfledged member of NATO, has rejected Russia’s inducements to join a customs union and obtain lower gas prices thereby allowing it to try to negotiate a Free Trade agreement with the EU as a stepping stone to accession to the EU [25]. Russia can afford to exercise soft power in negotiating these issues, unlike the hard power threats it made in 2009 with the gas cut off. Russia does not depend as much on the gas pipeline to Europe through the Ukraine, now that it has more gas going through Belarus and has opened up the first stage of the North Stream gas pipeline from Russia directly to Germany [28, 29]. Georgia has not renounced its ambition to join NATO, but the alliance is proceeding cautiously with its membership application. 33 There appears to be disagreement between the U.S. and certain European members who are unwilling to confront Russia over Georgia’s interest in recovering Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the breakaway provinces defended by Russia [32]. NATO tests Russia’s willingness to accommodate Georgia periodically by including Georgia in what could be seen as antiRussian military exercises in which Russia does not participate34. Moldova under Communist rule until 2009 has been actively pursuing EU membership with positive encouragement from the EU [35]. However, the postCommunist government has taken no obvious step to amend the Moldovan constitution to remove the clause pledging neutrality that would signal its willingness to pursue NATO membership over Russian objections [36]. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has the most flexible alignments in the Wider Region. It has been playing a complex four-way game, balancing its relationships amongst Russia (as noted above), EU and NATO, Turkey and Iran. With respect to the EU and NATO, Azerbaijan has participated in certain NATO programs that might ultimately lead to membership. However, its progress is hampered by prohibitions on significant U.S. military assistance to Baku under the 1992 Act that resulted from lobbying by Armenian-Americans.35 Azerbaijan also signaled its unwillingness to proceed towards full NATO membership by joining the Non-aligned Movement in June 2011 [39]. With respect to Turkey, Baku has been concerned over possible Turkish-Armenian rapprochement that would jeopardize Azerbaijan’s recovery of Nagorno-Karabakh held by Armenia. It threatened retaliation by re-routing gas supplies from the major gas pipeline from Baku and Tbilisi to Ceyhan that would also put at risk the success of the proposed Nabucco pipeline [40]. After Turkey backed down from its proposed repair of relations with Armenia, Baku became more willing to provide gas for the Nabucco pipeline36. Ultimately Baku prevailed in obtaining Turkish cooperation by agreeing to

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finance up to 80% of a Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline that would replace the Turkish section of the Nabucco pipeline [42,43]. Azerbaijan plays a similar balancing game with Iran. With the Iranian relationship there are additional issues created by a dispute over their maritime boundary in the Caspian Sea and the large Azeri population across the border and Iran’s concern about irredentism. Nonetheless, Iran has provided a lifeline to the Azeri enclave of Nakhchivan that is the subject of an Armenian blockade, and has threatened to cut the lifeline to pressure Azerbaijan from allowing visa free travel from Turkey [44]. In turn, Baku has entered into contracts to provide significant quantities of gas to Iran [45]. Yet, when Azerbaijan and Turkey created a closer relationship over Baku’s funding of the Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline, Iran signaled its displeasure with Baku by entering into energy cooperation and development assistance agreements with Armenia [46]. Turkey is the major actor in the Wider Black Sea Region that exhibits the most flexible set of alignments with all the other major actors37. What is unique about Turkey’s relationships with the EU and NATO, Russia and Iran, is that it is able to create these alignments notwithstanding its membership in the relatively inflexible NATO alliance. NATO institutionally links Turkey to the West. Its NATO membership to some extent supports its qualification as a “European” nation and helps to further its accession to the EU. However, even if the EU membership remains blocked, Turkey needs its NATO membership to provide a nuclear umbrella against potentially existential threats from a nuclear-armed Russia or potentially nuclear-armed Iran. Turkey’s membership in NATO, however, does not restrain it from creating alignments within the Wider Black Sea Region that are at cross-purposes with policies of EU and NATO. Thus, Turkey maintains an active trading and investment relationship with Iran.38 It has entered into major gas deals with Iran and has proposed Iranian participation in Nabucco, to the chagrin of the United States. Ankara under the Justice and Development Party (AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) leadership has gone further in refusing to join in EU and NATO policies seeking to contain Iran by imposing stronger economic sanctions than are required by the UN Security Council and indirectly threatening military action to suppress Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Turkey also maintains major economic relations with Russia, replacing Germany as Turkey’s major trading partner [49]. Much of their relationship involves energy, such as the negotiation of the supply of Russian gas in exchange for allowing Russia to run the South Stream gas pipeline through Turkey’s Economic Zone in the Black Sea [43]. Some of their energy deals, however, have longer term strategic implications, such as Russia’s agreement to build a $20 billion nuclear plant in Turkey [49]. Furthermore, and to Russia’s benefit, Turkey has steadfastly refused to agree to modifications to the Montreux Convention that would permit greater access to the Black Sea by its NATO allies.39 On the other hand, Turkey has not objected to U.S. warships participating in naval exercises in the Black Sea that have taken place within the three week limitation imposed by the Montreux Convention. Patterns of Negotiations Deviations from patterns of negotiations expected in the model multipolar system are also observable in the Wider Black Sea Region. International negotiations occur in the formation of alliances and alignments as well as in the settlement of conflicts.

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Negotiation of Alliances and Alignments With respect to alliance formation, joining NATO at least has involved an extensive process for the lesser actors. Unlike the easily formed coalitions of sometimes “strange bedfellows” within alliances in the model multipolar world, NATO expects its new partners to share in the common democratic culture of its original transatlantic members. The former Communist states of the Soviet Union were required to undergo a process of democratization before being eligible for NATO membership. On the other hand, in order to lower the risks to the lesser actors of confrontations with Russia, NATO has purposefully engaged in a more lengthy negotiation process with those lesser actors that prefer to align with NATO rather than join it as a member. With respect to the negotiation of alignments, the patterns of cooperation that one expects within a model multipolar system are evident in the profusion of international organizations that populate the Wider Black Sea Region as noted above 40.

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Negotiation of Settlements of Conflicts On the other hand, the pattern of negotiation of settlement of conflicts in the Wider Black Sea Region distinctly deviates from the cooperative and expeditious resolution of conflicts associated with the model multipolar system. Since 2008 Russia has rejected all international efforts, including offers of the OSCE, to mediate the Georgian dispute over its breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia [51]. The other two frozen conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh and Moldova-Transniestra have not been resolved despite various prolonged attempts to settle them. With respect to Nagorno-Karabakh an international mediation effort by the OSCE established in 1992 and known as the Minsk Group, led by Russia, France and the U.S. eventually agreed upon a comprehensive settlement in 2007 termed the Madrid Principles. In 2008, Turkey revived an alternative proposal for a resolution of the conflict under the rubric of “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform”[52]. The two combatants have resisted the adoption of any of these proposals and none of the major actors have effectively pressured them to do so. With respect to the Moldova-Transniestra dispute, the OSCE also became involved in mediating a settlement immediately after the ceasefire of 1992. In 2005, the U.S. and EU joined the effort and together with the two combatants, the Ukraine and Russia, and a representative of the OSCE, formed the 5+2 group. There have been some six proposals for resolution of the conflict, but again none have been adopted [53].

Conclusions Structural Challenges to Security and Cooperation in the Region From the foregoing application of international relations theory to the Wider Black Sea Region we have observed deviations from the model multipolar system. What are the implications of these deviations for security and cooperation in the region? The intractability of the three “frozen conflicts” of Moldova/Transniestria, Georgia/Abkhazia/South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh are clearly manifestations of a lack of cooperation among the major actors. They are also an indication of the sense

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of insecurity within the region of both Russia and Iran. There are structural explanations for this lack of cooperation and Russian and Iranian insecurity. As we have observed, the EU and NATO are a dominant actor in the Wider Black Sea Region, outstripping both Russia and Iran in military capabilities. Russia, therefore, has good reason to be concerned about the possible expansion of the EU and NATO by absorption of Georgia and the Ukraine, as well as Moldova, into the EU and NATO. NATO expansion would eliminate these buffer states and bring a potentially predominant power to the Russian borders. Moreover, if there was a resolution to Nagorno-Karabakh, that would free up Armenia and Azerbaijan as potential NATO allies. Were Azerbaijan to be absorbed into the EU, the EU would have a more secure source of energy. Russia loses some of its leverage over the export of gas to Europe. This could adversely affect the larger Russian economy. For its part, Iran is also concerned over the loss of Armenia and Azerbaijan to NATO expansion. These territories would bring predominant NATO military capabilities closer to Iranian borders and present a greater threat to Iranian security.

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Security Solutions to the Structural Problem: Russia Focusing first on Russia we can conclude that there is a significant structural problem within the Wider Black Sea Region to attaining the cooperation of Russia for the settlement of the frozen conflicts. By the same token, we can conclude that there is no easy structural solution to the problem of lack of cooperation. NATO is unlikely in the near future to disband or withdraw militarily from the Region. The EU and NATO will therefore need to devise solutions to Russian cooperation that generate other ways to increase Moscow’s sense of security in the region. We should first define what is meant by “security.” The concept of “security” should not be limited to military security. Military capabilities are only one factor or variable in this concept [54].41 The other variables include political legitimacy, economic capabilities, ethnic and religious tolerance and the availability of essential natural resources such as energy supplies. The more developed states such as those in Western Europe and North America have fewer threats to the political legitimacy of their regimes or the degree of ethnic and religious tolerance within their political communities. 42 The states involved in the frozen conflicts have a high degree of ethnic and religious conflict that spills over into separatist challenges to the political legitimacy of their regimes. The threats to its security in the Wider Black Sea Region as perceived by Russia, on the other hand, involve its military capabilities, economy and natural resources. It would therefore be important for the EU and NATO to devise comprehensive ways to reduce Russia’s perceptions of these threats. That would invite the major actors in the region to engage in multi-track diplomacy seeking long-term agreements on NATO and Russian force deployments, oil and gas pipelines, energy production and pricing, and related issues. It is unlikely that “piecemeal” solutions to each of the frozen conflicts will work to overcome the structural problem of the disparate capabilities of the major actors in the Wider Black Sea Region. More comprehensive and far-reaching solutions to Russian insecurity are more likely to induce the requisite cooperation. Improving the EU and NATO’s relations with Russia by adopting measures to increase Russian security in the Wider Black Sea Region offers the prospect of a longterm change in international behavior in the Region. It increases the prospect, among other things, of a “thaw” the frozen conflicts in the Wider Black Sea Region.

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Security Solutions to the Structural Problem: Iran

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Another benefit from such a long-term solution would likely be increased cooperation from Russia with the EU and NATO’s strategic goals of reducing the risk that Iran might develop or acquire nuclear weaponry. Iran’s nuclear ambitions represent a major obstacle to achieving greater cooperation and lessening security issues not only in the Middle East but also in the Wider Black Sea Region. Would the same multi-track diplomacy seeking far reaching agreements with Iran as advocated for Russia be possible? If so, would they enable the EU and NATO to achieve those goals and decrease security issues in the Region? The patterns of international behavior as between Iran and the EU and NATO in the Wider Black Sea Region mirror their relationship in the Middle East. As such, they diverge substantially from the patterns anticipated in the model multipolar system. Because of the ideological differences between Iran and “the West,” with few exceptions (the Reagan-era Iran-Contra deal is notably one), it has been difficult for both sides to treat each other as potential alliance partners or likely to align with each other. Their bilateral relations echo the ideological split of the superpowers during the Cold War. These interactions are more suited to a bipolar contest, except that Iran is not a superpower. On the other hand, while Iran may feel existential threats, the EU and NATO do not fear them for themselves, only for their Middle Eastern allies if Iran did develop or acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. If Russia were to cooperate with the EU and NATO in un-freezing the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute, Iran would have one less opportunity to face off with the EU and NATO in the Wider Black Sea Region. Turkey and Russia could be instrumental in mediating a resolution of the EU and NATO hostilities with Iran, if the Islamic Republic would be willing to downplay its ideological differences with the West and its Middle East allies. Once each side has removed the fear of existential threats, patterns of negotiation between them could be restored to what is closer to those of the multipolar system. Region-wide improvement to security and cooperation would then be within reach.

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Endnotes

1

The term “Wider” has been used by others to describe the six littoral states of the Black Sea (Turkey, Russia, the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia) as well as certain of their neighbors. See Charles King [1]. 2 The members are the six littoral states. 3 Its members are the six littoral states. 4 Its members are Turkey and Russia, with Ukraine participating as an unofficial member. 5 Its members are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Turkey, Romania, and Russia. 6 Its members are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the EU. 7 Its members are the six littoral states plus Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Moldova, and Serbia 8 Its members are the six littoral states plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 9 Its members are the six littoral states plus the Balkan states of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia, as well as the Middle European and Danubian littoral states of Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Slovakia.

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10 Its members are the EU plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, and Ukraine, plus the MENA states of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia. 11 The EU/UN and the U.S plus the four littoral states of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and the Ukraine, plus Moldova and Azerbaijan, plus the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, plus the Middle European states of Macedonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Austria. 12 Its members are the four littoral states of Georgia, Russia (as observer only), Turkey and the Ukraine, plus the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Moldova 13 Its members are the BSEC and the EU. 14 See, for example, the incomplete list in the website by M. Beavis [2]. Indeed the very title of the list is evidence that no consensus exists as to what is meant by “theory”: some prefer “framework of analysis”, others “paradigm” or “approach.” 15 See with respect to the “realist” school , Annette Freyberg-Inan et al. [4], and Fred Chernoff [5] 399-407. 16 The author appreciates that it is still important to assess individual leaders of the states with which they interact, as well as to examine the foreign policy decision-making at the state level. 17 There are a variety of theoretical approaches to the analysis of international politics as a system. See, for example, O.R. Holsti [6]. The approach used here is derived from Morton A. Kaplan [7]. The concept of “system” is more of a “model” or borrowing from Weber, an “ideal type” [8]. 18 There are of course lesser powers that interact with the major powers. They may have varying degrees of importance in any system, particularly if they are in contention by the major powers. (For example, Alsace Lorraine as between France and Germany from 1870 to 1945 or Georgia and Ukraine in the Wider Black Sea Region as between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic.) However, theorists do not distinguish among international systems by the number and relative capabilities of these lesser powers. 19 The application of these capabilities by any state in its relations with other states has come to be known as “hard power.” Applying “soft power” on the other hand calls upon the implementation of less tangible variables such as diplomacy, moral leadership, influence, etc. 20 See, for example, Patrick James [9], 44-62. 21 Inclusion or not of other neighboring powers in the Wider Black Sea Region is debatable. Other candidates include the Central Asian states that supply oil and gas to the Black Sea powers and Greece as an occasional rival with Turkey. 22 The Military Balance lists in 2009 the number in armed forces for NATO as 3,793,000 and for Russia as 1,046 [13] (but Russia has estimated reserves of 20 million compared to NATO’s 2,827,000); and the same source lists defense expenditure in 2009 for NATO as $961,831 million versus Russia’s defense expenditure of $38,293 million, or $97,900 million if adjusted for “purchasing power parity” [14]. 23 See [13], pp. 34-35, 38. 24 Ibid.,p. 34. 25 Russia is also a founder of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that includes the relative smaller military capabilities of Armenia and Belarus as well as four of the five Central Asian states. However, it is doubtful that the addition of the combined forces in the CSTO makes much of a difference to the combined forces of NATO. 26 [15], (pp. 151-153 for Turkey); [16], pp. 309 -311. It is even more difficult to make qualitative assessments of the relative military capabilities of the two powers. The authors of the The Military Balance (2011), consider “Iran’s conventional military inventory is dominated by obsolete weapons systems …[and] have almost no modern armour, artillery, aircraft or major combat ships…[in sum] Iran’s conventional forces have limited capabilities…” Ibid, p. 296. 27 [15], p. 74; [14], p.178. 28 In the Black Sea Region such cooperation has included participation in joint fighter exercises over the Black Sea [18,19]. 29 The base agreement has been extended to 2044 and supports about 5,000 Russian troops with MIG-29 fighters and S-300 air defense missiles [20, 21]. 30 For the 2009 gas deal please see Nona Mikhelidze [22], p. 7; For the Gabala radar site please see Jim Nichol [23], p. 13. 31 The Ukraine depends on Russia for 50% of its natural gas; Russia cut off the supply for two weeks in 2009 [25]. 32 Russian coast guard ships protect the Abkhazian Black Sea port of Ochamchira and counter Georgia’s attempts to interfere with trading vessels [27]. 33 NATO established a NATO-Georgia Commission in 2008, promulgated a “Framework Document” for membership in September 2010, and has opened a “Liaison office” in Tbilisi in October 2010. [30,31] “NATO-Georgia Commission,” NATO http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics-52131.html, accessed

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September 18, 2011; “NATO door open for Georgia –Rasmussen” RT , October 1, 2010, accessed September 18, 2011, http://rt.com/politics/nato-membership-georgia-rasmussen. 34 Operation Sea Breeze was a naval exercise in the Black Sea near Sebastopol, home of the Russian Black Sea fleet. See Rick Rozoff [33]. Operation VIKING-2011 was held near Tbilisi in April, 2011 [34]. 35 See [37]. The U.S. has nonetheless, allocated a small $10 million of military assistance to Azerbaijan as part of a $44 million aid package that includes Tunisia, Malta, Lithuania and Hungary [38]. 36 Azerbaijan kept 3 competing pipelines guessing as to which it would supply (or how much to supply to each) [41]. 37 This has been encapsulated by the famous pronouncement of Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, that Turkey pursues a policy of “zero problems with its neighbors.” [47]. 38 In 2010 Turkey’s exports to Iran equaled $3,044,177 million this is up from $2,024,546 million in 2009 ,Turkstat, and imported $7,644,984 million this is up from $3,405,986 million in 2009, [48]. 39 The Montreux Convention of 1936 restricts non-riparian states from maintaining major battleships in the Black Sea, thereby providing Russia’s Black Sea fleet at Sebastopol some protection from NATO’s naval forces (but not its air forces) [50]. 40 See notes 2 – 13 above. 41 [54] The paradigm applies most efficiently at the state level of analysis. 42 There are exceptions of course, such as is evident in the Walloon/Flemish disputes in Belgium and the previous French Canadian/English Canadian disputes in Canada, as well as anti-Moslem sentiments in extreme nationalist parties in France and elsewhere in Europe.

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Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus A. Ergun and H. Isaxanli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-187-8-22

The EU’s Role in Promoting CrossBorder Co-operation: Perspectives from the Finnish-Russian Border Region

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James Wesley SCOTT1 Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland

Abstract. With its European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI CBC), the EU emphasises a strong policy commitment to promote cross-border co-operation as a vehicle for regional development and the advancement of cohesion goals. This policy operates from the assumption, furthermore, that the strategic development of urban networks across borders will be a central element in positively exploiting increasing interaction between the EU and its neighbours. However, to what extent do existing policy instruments actually facilitate such networking? Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes clear that territoriality principles regarding the use of EU funds could create a distinct policy gap between “internal” development and “external” networking. While cross-border co-operation (CBC) and the Europewide support of cross-border, interregional and transnational cooperation are now firmly embedded within the EU’s Cohesion Policy, CBC links to projects involving neighbouring states are as yet relatively weak. This case study of Finnish-Russian co-operation indicates that simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion operate in terms of the interaction of governance mechanisms of Cohesion Policy and ENPI CBC. We argue that a too strict separation of EU internal and external policy activities would be counterproductive to pro-active strategies aimed at avoiding wider divisions between the EU and its neighbouring regions. For this reason, the issue of policy innovation, of combining internal consolidation of the EU with external engagement and co-operation, should be explored and will be taken up by this paper. Keywords. ENPI, cross-border co-operation, regional development, cohesion policy, Finnish-Russian co-operation

Introduction Due to increasing levels of mutual interdependency with neighbouring countries, as well as general trends of globalization, the EU’s objective of economic and social cohesion necessitates a redoubled focus on external conditions that impact on the EU’s overall development. This has been reflected, for example, in the EU’s Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion (subtitled ‘Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength’) in which the need to develop strong cross-border linkages and more robust forms of regional and local co-operation with neighbouring states has been emphasized[1]. Cross-border relations between the European Union and post-Soviet states have evolved considerably during the last two decades with cities, regions and individuals opening new avenues of communication with their neighbours[2]. These new attempts at co1

Professor, Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland. E-mail: [email protected].

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operation along the EU’s external border aim at managing issues that transcend the confines of individual communities – issues that include social affairs, economic development, minority rights, cross-border employment and trade, the environment, etc. Cross-border co-operation (CBC) also involves attempts to exploit borderlands situations; using borders as a resource for economic and cultural exchange as well as for building political coalitions for regional development purposes [3,4]. At the same time, great socio-economic and political transformations are taking place at the EU’s new external borders and these portend not only new regional development opportunities but also many potential problems and tensions. Regions on the EU’s present external borders reflect perhaps most markedly both challenges to cohesion as well as the increasing importance of ‘Neighbourhood’ relations. As different as they are in social, cultural and geographical terms, these regions share general problems of economic peripherality and many negative impacts of structural change, such as rural de-population, ‘brain drain’, disinvestment and, frequently, below average levels of socio-economic well-being [5].By the same token, these regions will be affected – both positively and negatively – by increasing interaction between the EU and its neighbours. As a result, the future development perspectives of and development options open to these regions will be important to addressing coreperiphery contradictions, economic and demographic imbalances as well as general sustainability issues within the EU as a whole. Significant changes in the way in which regional co-operation at EU external borders is supported have taken place. In the 1990s, the PHARE and TACIS programmes sought to promote economic and political modernization in (then) neighbouring states and the former Soviet Union through strategic means, including regional development and spatial planning strategies that linked modernization with EU integration and enlargement processes.1 This phase of CBC promotion was informed by a historical sense of mission in breaking down dividing lines between states and strengthening the influence of the EU as a stabilizing force within a rapidly changing geopolitical situation. Since the 2004 enlargement, this logic has shifted; the EU is now concerned with its own political and territorial cohesion and has subsumed external co-operation, including at its external borders, within a policy of ‘Neighbourhood’ engagement. In this essay, the author will address the significance of the ‘Neighbourhood’ context for European regional policy by focusing on different aspects of cross-border ‘region building’. Examples of Finnish-Russian regional co-operation will be elaborated in order to suggest the possibility of re-thinking EU Neighbourhood policies in terms of a greater focus on local and regional development. Finnish-Russian crossborder co-operation (CBC) since 1991 reflects political and socio-cultural change as well as politically and economically motivated interaction that is arguably creating a ‘post-territorial’ perspective on development that goes beyond a strict, state-centred bounding of political, economic and socio-cultural space. The Finnish-Russian borderlands can also be understood as a product of ‘place-making’ in the intentional sense of a regional development project that capitalizes on border locations, network synergies and a historical notion of cross-border region (as embodied by the regional idea of Karelia). Post-Soviet and new EU (Schengen) border regimes have reconditioned political and economic orientations – disrupting interaction in some cases and creating new incentives for cross-border networking in others. Progress in regional CBC, for example in the Finnish-Russian case, will to a considerable extent depend on how EU

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policies and policy discourses translate into political capital for local/regional crossborder cooperation in the new borderlands. As it stands, the ‘post-territorial’ momentum of CBC and the inherent territoriality of security concerns and border management policies often clash to the detriment of local and regional actors. Perhaps more seriously, the rather strict separation of EU internal and external policy spheres does little to encourage pro-active strategies aimed at avoiding wider divisions between the EU and its neighbours. Given the future challenges facing regions straddling the EU’s external borders and the role of the EU as conditioner and agenda-setter of regional CBC, I will suggest a need for EU policies that bridge political, administrative and cultural divides between the EU and its Eastern neighbours. Ideally, these policies would break down the conceptual and administrative barriers between the EU’s Cohesion and Neighbourhood policy instruments.

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Emerging European Borderlands, Regional Development Issues and CrossBorder Co-operation Regions at the EU’s external borders represent a considerable challenge to national development policies as well as to European cohesion. While they do not constitute a homogeneous group, external border regions share common problems in terms of ‘peripherality’ and challenges to their future development. As the EU Report ‘Regions 2020’ indicates, most (external) border regions in Southern and Eastern Europe are subject to multiple vulnerabilities and globalization challenges [6]. Low labour productivity, high unemployment, low economic diversification, de-population of rural areas and, in many areas, demographic decline are some of the problems that exacerbate this regional vulnerability. In addition, future development potentials of the EU’s southernmost and easternmost regions will emerge against the backdrop of considerable structural, financial, political and cognitive constraints [7]. These regions are, by and large, peripheral areas, not only far from the dynamic centres of Core Europe but often distant from prosperous national centres as well. Many of them continue to suffer from outmigration, de-industrialization, and negative demographic trends. In addition, neighbouring regions on the other side of the border are similarly disadvantaged, resulting in ‘double peripheries’ within a greater European context [8]. Preliminary research has indicated that increasing interaction between the EU and neighbouring states such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey – and beyond – could have major impacts on the development perspectives of regions at the EU’s external borders – both in positive and negative terms [9]. In positive terms, these border areas are often situated at important transcontinental road and railway networks (although mostly distant from major airports). To the extent that they develop locational strengths beyond mere transit spaces for goods, people and infrastructure, cooperation within urban networks on both sides of the border could contribute to economic dynamism and socio-cultural development. On the other hand, however, such development perspectives cannot be separated from border-related problems that necessitate effective security and border-management policies. Environmental problems, the illegal trafficking of humans, the smuggling of harmful goods, illegal immigration and more general cross-border activities of organised crime must be dealt with decisively.2 It is these European and national concerns, rather than local interests, that affect economic, political and legal barriers, such as those inherent in labour market and

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foreign resident legislation, and that, ultimately, affect socio-economic mobility, innovation transfer and flexibility. Many of these regions continue to suffer from outmigration, de-industrialization, and negative demographic trends [10]. As the EU Commission’s Fourth [11] and Fifth [7] Reports on Social and Economic Cohesion document, despite increases in general welfare, imbalances between Europe’s core areas and its vast peripheries remain and depopulation of many rural zones continues unabated. Furthermore, regional disparities as well as cultural and political heterogeneity are certain to increase as a long-term result of enlargement. Gorzelak and Smtkowski [12] as well as other scholars have shown that, in stark contrast to the objectives of Cohesion Policy, a consolidation and ‘petrification’ of territorial patterns based on core-periphery inequalities is taking hold in the eastern regions of new EU-member states. As a result, regional polarization has been a fact of life since 1989. Large dynamic cities have virtually detached themselves from their regional contexts while peripheral regions (located mostly on the eastern borders) remain relatively underdeveloped in both quantitative and qualitative dimensions and continue to lose highly qualified workers to metropolitan cores. Future prospects for the EU’s easternmost and southernmost regions are thus interpreted in terms of continuing polarization and a danger of stagnation of internal and external peripheries. Regions on the other side of the border are similarly disadvantaged. Border regions during the Soviet period were both militarized and sealed off by a complex set of regulations, border zone passes and controls. These restrictions and the lack of economic investment that followed from them drastically affected their development prospects and resulted in outmigration and abandonment. This legacy of isolation has not been overcome. In addition, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, tense crossborder relations in several cases, such as the Estonian-Russian and the MoldovanRomanian, have hindered the development of new economic activity. This situation on both sides of the EU’s external borders is thus resulting in ‘double peripheries’ within a greater European context [13]. As a result, these border regions are potential areas of serious political and social problems, especially if living standards continue to stagnate.

European Union and the Promotion of Cross-Border Regional Development Within the context of these challenges, regions at the EU’s external border are struggling to define new opportunities for social and economic development and are also attempting to create greater capacities for territorial cooperation with other regions [14, 15]. Focused as it has been on issues of cohesion, identity and competitiveness, the European Union has envisaged a key role for border regions and has in the past played a crucial role in supporting local and regional cross-border co-operation as these are seen to be important aspects of interstate integration and a mechanism for deepening relations with non-EU neighbours. Arguably, since 1990 a formalized EU policy has emerged that promotes cross-border regionalism and provides support for development initiatives within border regions [16]. This policy combines material incentives for cooperative projects with the conditionality that is now EU standard practice: support is, for example, contingent upon the development of strategic plans, the establishment of joint planning and management structures and the judicious selection and monitoring of projects to be funded.

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Transcending boundaries is – at least rhetorically – is still a ‘leitmotif’ of European Union policies, even after 40 years of gradual progress in integrating nation-states and is supported by the INTERREG structural initiative which provides incentives for local, regional and interregional cross-border co-operation. European structural policy has decisively influenced the development of cross-border co-operation in Europe. INTERREG, now in its fourth phase (2007-2013), has supported numerous crossborder and transnational co-operation projects between regions. Financed out of the EU’s structural funds, INTERREG has since 1989 disbursed well over 10 Billion EUROS making it the community’s largest structural initiative. In addition, programmes targeted for Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, most prominently PHARE and TACIS, provided until 2004 supplemental funds for cross-border projects in regions on the EU’s external boundaries. CBC with neighbouring countries is now funded through European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument. The most conspicuous manifestation of cross-border regionalism within the EU is situated at the local level and known by the generic term of ‘Euroregions’. These municipal associations were pioneered and developed as locally based co-operation initiatives in Dutch-German border regions as early as the 1960s [16]. The main goal of these organizations is promote mutual learning and co-operative initiatives across borders in order to address specific regional economic, environmental, social and institutional problems. These associations, many with their own cross-border administrative bodies (e.g. councils), represent an additional, albeit strictly advisory, regional governance structure and play a vital role in channelling European regional development support into the border regions. The popularity of the concept is evident in its proliferation within the EU, particularly along Germany’s borders [17]. More striking is the fact, however, that since 1993 Euroregions have rapidly materialized in Central and Eastern Europe and many non-EU contexts, in areas characterized by decades of conflict, closure and non-co-operation [4,18].

Neighbourhood Policy as a Regional Development Context Cross-border co-operation at local and regional levels reflects the different regional dimensions of EU relations with neighbouring states. Similarly, local and regional cross-border co-operation is seen to promote social, economic and territorial cohesion – particularly in terms of the development prospects of many areas at the ‘edge’ of the EU-27. However, here, at the external border, larger geopolitical contexts must be taken into account. Because of geographical proximity, long-standing economic, social and political interrelationships and deepening mutual interdependencies, the EU is keen to assume a stabilising role in Post-Soviet, Eurasian and Mediterranean regional contexts [19]. The geopolitical vision that underlies this ideational projection of power is that of ‘privileged partnership’ – that is, of a special, multifaceted and mutually beneficial relationship with the EU, in some cases in place of concrete perspectives of EU membership.3 With this geopolitical vision, principles of (EU) European governance are being extended well beyond the borders of the EU. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is also the maximum expression of an emerging ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, the principal aim of which is to establish a greater regional context for economic growth and free trade, social modernization, political stability and security. The countries involved in the ENP are: Algeria,

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Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.4 While not part of the ENP process in the strict sense, Russia participates in cross-border programmes funded through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI-CBC). Furthermore, the Partnership process between the EU and Russia is, structurally very similar to ENP, pursuing almost identical goals in terms of economic co-operation, human rights, security, and institutional modernization. Regional cooperation with neighbouring states is another defining element of the EU; it is informed by discourses of ‘partnership’, ‘co-development’ and ‘mutual interdependence’ that are part of the ideational and visionary foundations of EU political community. Evidence for redoubled EU efforts to promote co-operation with its immediate neighbours is provided by the European Community (EC) Regulation 1638/2006 establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI Regulation) with plans for investment in three areas between 2007-2013. These areas include: (1) promoting cooperation and integration between the EU and neighbouring countries; (2) advancing good governance and sustainable socio-economic development in the respective states and (3) promoting cross-border cooperation.5 Furthermore, the ENPI-CBC programme is a reflection of the EU’s recognition of regional geopolitical, socio-economic and historical contexts and its attempt to develop a differentiated approach to co-operation. A new element of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy is the combination of foreign aid and structural funds into an integrated instrument of cooperation between territorial entities on either side of the EU’s outer borders – and that will now be extended to Mediterranean as well as Eastern and Southeastern neighbours. To that end, €1.12 billion have been allocated for the 20072013 period out of the 11,4 billion total for ENP. A total of 15 CBC programmes have so far been created by ENP member countries (each with a slightly different focus): 9 Land Border Programmes along the EU’s eastern borders; 3 Sea Crossing Programmes (Italy – Tunisia, Spain – Morocco, Morocco – Canaries); and 3 Sea Basin Programmes (across the Baltic, Black Sea, and Mediterranean Basins).

Neighbourhood and Regional Development: Evidence from Finnish-Russian Borderlands In terms of new borderlands situations that are emerging on the EU’s external frontiers, the Finnish-Russian case offers some compelling evidence of attempts to create common regional frameworks for social and economic development; these have thus been shaped both by a will to promote mutual interests and by eliminating structural, political and cognitive barriers to successful cooperation. The Finnish-Russian border acquired its present form in the aftermath of the Second World War. In a cultural and political sense, this region has formed a historical demarcation zone shaped by ‘EastWest’ rivalries. Between the two world wars, a hostile military border was established between Finland and Soviet Russia. Between 1939 and 1945, two wars were fought here, with Finland losing about one-tenth of its territory, including a large part of what is known as ‘Karelia’. The population of the ceded areas moved to Finland while new settlers came from various parts of the Soviet Union. This created a clear-cut ethnic and cultural border. During the Cold War years, the Finnish-Russian border marked a dividing line between two rivalling political and economic systems; the border was thoroughly militarized and heavily guarded on both sides.

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Before 1991, cross-border co-operation between Finland and the Soviet Union was largely limited to specific industrial sectors, such as mining, wood products and paper pulp. This economic co-operation was particularly important for Northwest Russia and Eastern Finland as the locus of industrial activities were ‘twin towns’ on the border such as Svetogorsk/Imatra and Kostamuksha/Kuhmo [20]. However, the movement of persons across the border was severely restricted. In addition, political co-operation was largely of a symbolic nature, largely instrumentalized as gestures of peaceful coexistence and friendship. The border was only opened in any real practical sense towards the end of the Soviet Union, as Perestroika gradually succeeded in liberalizing the political system. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, interaction between the two countries has been conditioned by deepening European integration and globalization, as well as by the effects of Post-Soviet transformation on the Russian side. Hence, relations between Finland and Russia have been reconstituted as part of the wider geopolitical shifts in Europe. Concrete indications of the new situation include, for instance, new border crossing points and logistical infrastructure, the abolition of travel restrictions on the Russian side and co-operation programmes aiming at strengthening cross-border links. Finnish membership in the European Union in 1995 increased these border-spanning activities in various forms and at various spatial levels. Relations between Russian and Finnish border regions are considered by both sides as a laboratory of co-operation between Russia and EU at the regional level [21,22,23,24]. New actors, economic enterprises and civic organizations, have entered the field that was earlier controlled by bilateral agreements between the states. In an administrative sense, the regional councils (formed as confederations of municipalities in 1994) have been granted a major role in implementing EU programmes and administrating EU funds [25]. EU funded programmes such as INTERREG (aimed at cross-border regional development within the EU) and TACIS (a programme earmarked for comprehensive development projects in post-Soviet states) have thus become an important part of promoting cross-border interaction on the regional level. In institutional terms, Finnish-Russian cross-border co-operation at the regional level has become part of policy frameworks and administrative structures that originally served regional development and co-operation within the European Union. The adaptation of EU administrative practices in Finland and the constitution of new democratic and administrative institutions in the Russian Federation have led to a continuous restructuring of administration on both sides, and in the Russian case to sharp political and administrative discontinuities. Since 1995, Finnish EU membership has led to a certain ‘Europeanization’ of the border and systems of European multilevel governance have been introduced on the Finnish side as part of the structural fund policies that condition CBC [26,27]. The implementation, for example, of INTERREG programmes has been institutionally linked to the integration of European and Finnish regional development policies. These developments have also impacted on Finnish administrative structures which traditionally have been characterized by a combination of strong central power and broad local self-government. It is important to mention that the strengthening of the intermediate level – in this case of the regional administrations of Finnish Karelia – in the management of EU funds and programmes has occurred outside the confined of traditional Finnish politics. As a result, the agenda of local and regional-level CBC projects has been strongly affected by regional level administrative organizations, regional councils and intermediate-level state administration, which together administer

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and allocate funding from EU instruments of CBC. Indeed, new EU instruments have, however, opened opportunities for new kinds of regional level co-operation in the field of education, health care, social work and environmental protection. In public-sector co-operation projects, state level agreements and strategies have also played a vital role in shaping the CBC mechanisms. At the municipal level, there were some, highly regulated CBC contacts with a para-diplomatic exchange of official delegations even in the Soviet times (Varkaus and Petrozavodsk were twinned towns, Kuhmo and Kostamuksha developed links on the basis of a major construction project). These relations have continued, grown in number, become less formal, and started to utilize EU support. On the regional level, the challenges of new cross-border co-operation opportunities were thus directly affected by the introduction of new European policy frames and instruments available to local civic and economic actors. Similarly, the inclusion of Russian regional actors in co-operation projects increased the complexity of coordinating projects between the INTERREG programmes on the Finnish side and the TACIS initiative on the Russian side.

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Cross-Border Regional Development and the Euregio Karelia With increasing cross-border interaction of a political, economic and socio-cultural nature, Karelia, a historical region that straddles the Finnish-Russian border, has become the focus of new processes of ‘region-building’ that mirror more general sociospatial transformations taking place in Europe. This of course does not mean that a new regional identity has emerged that transcends national loyalties or the mental barriers that exist between many Russians and Finns. What this ‘regional idea’ implies is a selective reframing of local structural and political conditions as well as of personal everyday activity spaces. The ‘selectivity’ of this phenomenon is of critical importance; we by no means even suggest that a majority of Finns and Russians living in Karelia would actively subscribe to the idea that they share an emerging transnational space. Karelia is, rather, a transnational space for those political actors, businesspeople, civil society organizations and ‘ordinary citizens’ who understand it as a resource and a specific place within Europe with common issues. Finnish-Russian Karelia can thus be understood as a region-building project which is on the one hand politically motivated and closely tied to projects of cross-border co-operation between Russia and Finland but, on the other hand, is also a product of shifting local perceptions of regionness and the border. Cross-border co-operation has been promoted as a way of breaking down differences between societies – at least in the sense that administrative and mental borders no longer create obstacles to addressing everyday problems and issues that affect communities on either side of state boundaries. When Finland joined the EU in 1995, conditions governing CBC faced a significant transformation. On the one hand, previously bilaterally governed co-operation across the border became part of the broader dynamics of international politics and EU-Russia relations. However, on the other hand, regional and local actors also have taken a more active role in ‘international affairs’ by co-operating directly across the border. In addition, EU funding via the m TACIS and INTERREG Programmes and, most recently, the ENP-Instrument to which Russia has become a partner, has made cross-border co-operation increasingly projectbased. A number of regions participate in recently created Euroregions along the former Soviet boundary and the boundary of Russia with its western neighbours [28]

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During the 1990s, the Finnish-Russian Karelian regional development agenda was shaped by the problems experienced by the Russian side. As Laine [27] has shown, the most common problems for Russian border communities were the following: (1) a crisis of municipal services and infrastructure, (2) unemployment and poverty, (3) alcoholism and drug abuse, (4) crime and lack of security, and (5) a poor investment climate. Correspondingly, a significant number of CBC projects addressed these problems with a varying degree of success. However, with time the character of Finnish-Russian CBC evolved from that of ‘development assistance’ to more genuine co-operation in the area of regional development. The need to more strategically channel and co-ordinate activities, as well as deal with the legal, social and political complexities of project implementation, led to attempts to build regionally based crossborder institutional structures in the Karelian context. This culminated in the 2000 establishment of the Euregio Karelia. The Euregio covers 700 km of land border between the EU and Russia, and it consists of four regions: the provinces of North Karelia, Kainuu and North Ostrobothnia on the Finnish side and the Republic of Karelia on the Russian side. Since Euregio Karelia was the first Euregio on land borders between the EU and the Russian Federation, the key figures behind the venture willingly promoted it from the beginning as a European model [29].It was seen as a pilot project for future joint administrative structures between the EU and Russian regional authorities [24]. The idea was that the governance mechanisms developed in the Euregio Karelia region would with time gain broader European significance. From the Finnish perspective, the institutional forms adopted on the Russian border were seen as exporting ‘border know-how’: they would generate a model or at least a set of experiences that could be useful for the elaboration of European border policies after the eastern enlargement [30, 26].Correspondingly, Finnish-Russian CBC in Karelia has developed in areas such as environmental protection, forest management, tourism, agriculture and the alleviation of unemployment. After Finnish EU-membership, the promotion of democracy and civil society in Russia and humanitarian assistance to Russian social welfare institutions, as well as cultural and educational exchange gained importance as well. Within the Finnish private sector and among Finnish civil society organizations, local and individual initiatives have played an important role.6 At the level of CBC coordinated by the Euregio Karelia, for example, project funds for the period 2001-2006 were focused on business activity, transport and communication, as well as upgrading stakeholder expertise. ENPI has replaced the earlier combination of Interreg (Finnish) and TACIS (Russian) funds, the co-ordination of which has proven difficult for carrying out projects on both sides of the border [31]. With ENPI, a single application and selection process for both sides of the border provides for more coherence and cross-border co-ordination for projects. An important aspect of the Finnish-Russian ENPI programme is that Russia contributes financially to the support of co-operation projects. Cross-border contacts have allowed both sides to gain basic knowledge about the living conditions of their neighbours thus fostering mutual understanding [22]. If, as Häyrynen [32] argues, the present-day Karelian landscape is a nostalgic construction, it is one informed by political, social, economic and cultural motivations. To an important degree, cross-border co-operation involves re-telling the history of Karelia through tourism, media representations, cityscapes, etc. Intercultural dialogue has contributed to the emergence of a shared notion of Karelia which reflects the political reality and the multicultural nature of Karelia [33].7Although the memories of FinnishRussian confrontation during the WWII are still alive amongst the older generations of

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Finns, Russia is no longer perceived as an enemy, but rather as an important neighbour whose well-being will also impact on Finland. In this context, cross-border cooperation is seen to serve as an instrument of co-development that contributing to a peaceful Finnish-Russian neighbourhood.

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Transcending Borders through a New Economic Image In both Russian and Finnish Karelia the influence of the border has been a dominant factor in regional development. Due to the closed nature of the border and the systemic differences between Finland and the Soviet Union, economic exchange between 1945 and 1991 was limited. Nevertheless, the economic activities that did take place across the border were vital for both sides; a synergistic relationship developed between industrial firms in the area of wood, paper and pulp production and mining. However, this situation also intensified the domination of extractive industries and low addedvalue economic activities (round wood, aluminium, paper sacks, newsprint, cellulose and ferrous metals) as well as the export dependency of both Finnish and Russian Karelia.8 By the same token, there are few exportable manufactures. Thus, Karelia has been ‘trapped’, as local economists argue, within an unfavourable resource-export development path [34].9 To exacerbate the situation, regional politics have at times tended to favour conservation rather than restructuring of weakly competitive industries; a development path that has been recognized as inefficient and unsustainable. Cross-border co-operation in the area of regional development has received attention as a solution to the structural problems of Eastern Finland and Russian Karelia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. More recently, regional administrations on both sides of the border have begun stimulating inward investments into highervalue-added industries, such as environment technologies, eco-tourism and more sophisticated forms of wood-processing. Recent development trends in Russia, that is, the relative stability of political conditions and economic growth, have led to a new wave of interest in cross-border activity in Finnish and Russian Karelia. Economic interaction has grown and ‘Russian connections’ are seen as a key strategy in regional development in Eastern Finland where concrete measures have been prepared for their enhancement [35].Significantly, and in contrast to the more traditional and central state oriented regional development policies employed in Russian Karelia, cross-border regional economic co-operation has since the mid-1990s been conceptualized in terms of creating a new economic regional image. While this ‘image-making’ objective has been more pronounced on the Russian side, it has resonated with local and regional actors in Finnish Karelia who are also seeking to counteract perceptions of peripherality and economic backwardness. The principal economic vision in this regard is the cross-border framing of Karelia as an ecoregion – basically as a touristically attractive region concerned with sustainability, trade, non-polluting manufactures and entrepreneurial development in improved extractive technologies. This ecoregional vision is largely inspired by the natural landscape and rural character of Finnish and Russian Karelia. Allied with the ecoregional image is the promotion of Karelia as a special region in Europe with a specific history and cultural/historical commonalities and as a promising point of contact.10

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ENP and Cross-Border Co-operation: Insights from the Finnish-Russian Case

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The ENP can be seen as a means by which to promote the values and external influence of the EU even without immediate prospects of direct membership for third states [36]. As one element in this multifaceted equation of regional partnership, local and regional forms of cross-border development co-operation are promoted in order to ‘integrate’ communities across the EU-Neighbourhood divide. In this way, co-operation objectives already established by the EU in the 1990s continue to be reflected in present policies. The TACIS programme was replaced in 2007 by the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) which aims to establish a coherent basis for political stability and economic growth within its immediate regional surroundings.The 2006 EU Regulation that establishes the general provisions regarding ENPI contains prosaic language, paragraph 15 of the preamble states: ‘In order to avoid the creation of new dividing lines, it is particularly important to remove obstacles to effective cross-border cooperation along the external borders of the European Union. Cross-border cooperation should contribute to integrated and sustainable regional development between neighbouring border regions and harmonious territorial integration across the community and with neighbouring countries. This aim can best be achieved by combining external policy objectives with environmentally sustainable economic and social cohesion.’ With the subprogramme ENPI-CBC, the EU thus envisages comprehensive cooperation agendas of a political, economic and cultural nature and that may provide possible opportunity structures and spaces for cross-border regional development at its external borders. In policy terms, ENPI CBC aims to builds upon previous experiences in cross-border regional development supported through INTERREG/TACIS/PHARE and encourage the establishment and/or consolidation of joint management and monitoring institutions in the border regions. At the same time, the EU seeks to make its policies towards neighbouring states more effective, coherent and responsive to local needs. Interestingly, and in contrast to previous programmes, with the ENPI, the EU has taken up the issue of border security as a regional co-operation issue. In concrete terms, the general objectives of ENPI CBC are: 1. Economic and social development (broad support for institutional capacitybuilding and regional development projects in economic, social, cultural, welfare policy areas), 2. Common challenges (for example in the areas of environmental protection; emergency services, border security and health and social development), 3. Efficient and secure borders (border management and the development of border-crossing infrastructures), 4. People to people co-operation (which includes support to civil society and local communities and also aims at the ‘cultural integration of border areas’). After some false starts, primarily because of tensions in EU-Russian relations, new regional cross-border co-operation programmes for the areas Southeast Finland-Russia, Karelia-Russia and the so-called Kolarctic Region, which also includes Norway and Sweden, came into effect in November 2009. With these programmes, strategies of cross-border regional development have been given further impetus. The Southeast Finland-Russia ENPI and Karelia-Russia ENPI Programmes for 2007-2013 both underscore general ENPI-CBC objectives in the areas of economic development, sustainability and social development issues. It is also clear that projecting the EU’s

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geopolitical objectives of securitization and social modernization (for example, as established in the Neighbourhood Policy framework) onto the local and regional level of co-operation could be a considerable constraint. It is therefore not surprising that not all ENPI CBC programmes with Finnish prioritize border security - this point will be discussed in more detail below. Given its policy significance and potential role in encouraging greater regional development co-operation at the EU’s external borders, I will provide a brief assessment of the ENPI’s present limitations based on Finnish-Russian CBC experiences. Among the issues that will be taken up here are geopolitical tensions, bureaucratic administrative procedures and a fragmented programme structure that mirrors policy mismatches between Cohesion, security policy and external relations competencies within the EU. Additionally, diverging regionalization trajectories within the EU and in neighbouring states present a potential barrier to cross-border partnerships in regional development. Generally speaking, ENPI CBC, as a new support programme, is as yet not suitably equipped to deal with the overall context within which Finnish-Russian co-operation takes place. Indeed, one could argue that, based on the Finnish-Russian case, cross-border cooperation at the EU’s external boundaries, all rhetorical statements to the contrary, has become mundane, technocratic, underfunded and bereft of the historical symbolism of earlier cooperation.

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The Finnish-Russian Border as a Policy Divide between Cohesion and Neighbourhood The present Finnish-Russian border is for all intents and purposes an open one, particularly when compared to the situation during the Soviet era. Provided Schengen rules and both Finnish and Russian visa regulations are observed, this border is thus no longer a barrier to economic, social or cultural exchange. However, the function of the Finnish-Russian border has shifted in rather subtle ways that confirm its role as a political divide between the two countries and, as such, between the EU and Russia. An in-depth investigation of the vicissitudes of EU-Russia relations is beyond the scope of this discussion, but certain issues can be emphasized that enhance the Finnish-Russian borders significance as a policy divide. To begin with, there is the inherent tension between attempts to consolidate and thus ‘border’ the European Union on the one hand, and to enhance the EU’s presence beyond its immediate borders through regional co-operation, on the other [38]. The wilful and strategic consolidation of a supranational European space provides the Union with increasingly sharpened territorial characteristics; as articulated in the (Reform) Lisbon Treaty, the EU is actively promoting an agenda of social, economic and territorial cohesion in order to strengthen the basis for political community and economic integration, which in turn enhances the status of territorial aspects within EU policy-making [39]. As a consequence, we are currently witnessing processes of ‘Europeanization’ in the ways policy-makers and researchers conceptualize (and subsequently attempt to organize) the EU-European territory as an increasingly unitary and integrated space. As a result of such consolidation efforts, EU policies could be accompanied by strategies that further solidify ‘Core’ Europe’s political and economic domination and thus reduce the voice of Europe’s ‘peripheries’ as well as de-emphasize regional development co-operation across the EU’s external borders. Feasible development

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scenarios for border regions on the EU’s external borders might, for example, be subsumed within the hegemonic logic of ‘polycentric’ metropolitan concentration [40].11 Similarly, Bialasiewicz et al. [41] suggest that the EU’s relations with its neighbours are increasingly characterized by a ‘hard territoriality’ where security issues, border management and sovereignty are emphasized. With mid to long-term perspectives of future enlargements clouded by political and economic uncertainty, the promise of potential EU membership has, for many neighbouring states, been replaced by an offer of ’special partnership’. However, concerns of ‘illegal’ migration, crossborder crime and terrorism and the imposition of visa restrictions on non-EU citizens could pose new obstacles to co-operation, conjuring fears of an emerging ‘Fortress Europe’ that effectively divides the continent [42]. Structural policies earmarked for regions of the EU’s 27 member states are part of a strategy of post-Enlargement European consolidation. However, while the ENPI can be seen as a counterpart to policies that target cohesion and territorial co-operation within the EU, the bulk of structural fund resources available for cross-border cooperation are targeted at the EU-27 and do not include regional dimensions at the EU’s external borders for the most part. At the same time, externally focused cross-border co-operation covered by ENPI-CBC simply does not enjoy the material and political support commensurate with the EU’s discursive exhortations to greater regional neighbourliness. The EU’s Cohesion and Regional Policy 2007-2013 has an operating budget of 321 billion Euros with a clear focus on distributing aid to poorer areas of the EU-27. By comparison, the ENP’s total budget for the same period will be about 11 billion Euros. In addition, and most surprisingly, out of this amount very few funds will be allocated to cross-border and interregional cooperation with neighbouring states. Ironically, over 1 billion Euros will be dedicated to border security and technology studies within European research programmes, more than the entire CBC budget planned for the ENP.12 Similarly, local and regional cross-border co-operation facilitated through ENP, operates under very different EU rules, administrative responsibilities and political logics than does Cohesion Policy. This is all the more ironic as the INTERREG IV structural initiative, which covers the current 2007-2013 programming period, is now one Europe-wide programme supporting cross-border, interregional and transnational cooperation. However, almost all of INTERREG IV support has been focused on cooperation within the EU and very little on projects involving neighbouring states; the July 2006 ERDF Regulation that applies here not only upholds but underscores strict tenets of ‘territoriality’ in the use of regional development funds.13 The basic tensions between internal consolidation and the external ‘bordering’ of the EU could therefore have serious consequences in terms of local and regional crossborder co-operation between the EU and its neighbours. Upon closer scrutiny, it furthermore becomes clear that there are not only distinct policy gaps between ‘internal’ development and ‘external’ co-operation. Berg and Ehin [43] have alluded to the more general situation of a fragmented policy process ‘at the border’ in which a jumble of rules defined by EU regional development, justice, external affairs and development aid agencies create uneven conditions for cross-border co-operation. In general terms, the complexity of different policy logics operating within the context of ‘Neighbourhood’ tends to privilege formal areas of bilateral co-operation (e.g. border management, large infrastructures, interagency technical assistance) while it marginalizes local and regional forms of CBC [44]. This is, on the one hand, a question of geopolitical priorities: ENP remains first and foremost a security-oriented policy that

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is being employed to enhance the EU’s external projection of power. It is directed at national elites, at national capitals and at traditional areas of international relations. ENP is also an arena of policy competition within the EU; for example, while the 2003 initiative to create the ENP foresaw the combination of external relations and regional co-operation policy frameworks, this has not yet been implemented. Furthermore, the EU Commission has refused to recognize and implement the decision of the European Parliament and European Council to develop shared management structures within European Union agencies for the ENPI CBC programme.14 At the level of specific EU-neighbouring state partnerships, the ENPI-CBC programme has envisaged the creation of a single funding vehicle with joint management authorities (JMAs). Here again, working reality is rather different as the ENPI CBC Implementing Regulation (2007) in fact centralizes major contractual aspects of ENPI CBC in the hands of the EU Commission, limiting the final authority of JMAs to decide on project funding and management. Nor does the application of development aid rules, as is presently the case, appear appropriate for CBC in the area of regional development as joint projects are burdened by onerous contracting rules [45] (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2011).

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Civil Society – a Neglected Development Resource The policy divide that ENPI CBC has propagated in the Finnish-Russian case is a particular vexation to civil society actors who have been striving for more than two decades to stabilize co-operation across the border. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Finland and Russia have been key players in the area of social development, intercultural dialogue, social welfare policy, capacity-building and in the strengthening of community institutions [22]. In doing this, they have not only received from the EU but also from the Finnish government which in 1992 established its own ‘Neighbouring Area Co-operation Programme’. Representatives of CSOs interviewed by researchers at the University of Eastern Finland indicated that Finland’s specific programmes have been instrumental in promoting horizontal cross-border networks; these are perceived as crucial for shaping the quality, thematic focus and dynamics of cross-border activities in ways that are sensitive to local concerns.15 Such networks have also enabled different actors to pool resources, share their knowledge and reduce CBC transactions costs for smaller local organizations. While there is no single formula or institutional architecture that characterises these networks, they are generally constructed around clusters of organizations with ties either to large national (i.e. Finnish) or international non-profit organizations. Larger and more experienced organizations within the network usually address politically relevant, bureaucratic and time-consuming aspects of grant-seeking and general project development while smaller, regionally embedded organizations with local knowledge carry out concrete projects. Thus, a division of labour has been possible that distributes resources in a more appropriate manner than an individual CSO would be capable of. In addition, through such networks, ‘weaker’ and smaller organizations can gain access to sources of support. A good example of this was the Finnish-Russian Network of Social and Health NGOs which consisted of approximately 50 Finnish and almost 100 Russian organizations. The network, which maintained offices in Helsinki, and in the nearby Russian cities of St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk, matured into a well-organized

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vehicle for the provision of social welfare and health services. However, with the advent of ENPI CBC and the subsequent reorganization of the Finnish Neighbouring Area Co-operation Programme, funds have been restricted to short-term, project-based work only. This resulted in October 2007 in the termination of the network as an officially supported initiative. In addition, the priorities of the Finnish programme are now in the area of economic development and environmental security and mainly involve co-operation with Russian public agencies rather than CSOs. 2012 will see a considerable downscaling of the Finnish government’s support, increasing reliance on ENPI CBC. Unfortunately, the EU’s focus on budgetary control, administrative standardization and security issues has promoted bureaucratic practices and policies of conditionality that tend to complicate CSO co-operation across the EU’s borders. The EU has, for example, developed a systematic framework for implementing cross-border civil society projects that involves a laborious implementation process that channels support for civil society projects largely through state structures. Here, the EU demands certain types of bureaucratic discipline, which includes budgeting, (including matching funds) auditing, monitoring and evaluating civil society projects which often subordinates CSOs to state agencies at the national, regional and local level. This approach largely determines the types of CSOs that are capable of practicing such discipline and of accessing EU financial support. It also contributes to the emergence of a privileged CSO elite, particularly in the neighbouring countries, that is separate from other CSOs and from its potential constituents and whose agenda and priorities may different from of the EU and other western donors. Similar to the observations of Darbouche [46], Klitsounova [47] and Kostadinova [36] our research suggests that despite the EU’s strong rhetorical commitment to facilitating transnational civil society networks, this goal is often subordinated to the dictates of geopolitical ‘realism’. However, the EUDIMENSIONS project has demonstrated that in areas such as social policy, welfare, health and economic development there is great potential for common agendas that transcend geopolitical and inter-state tensions. Social policy has been a major victim of neo-liberal ideology and economic reforms that have privileged economic growth and liberalization. Thanks to civil society networks between the EU and neighbouring countries, shortfalls in public provision of social services have been partially compensated for while notions of social equity, welfare and group rights have been reframed as politicy concerns in new member states and neighbouring states. As CSO representatives interviewed within the scope of EUDIMENSIONS research confirm, their activities have been highly influenced by social values central to the traditional social democracies of Europe and that are embodied by EU policies.

A Focus on Policy Innovation and Some Conclusions The EU is promoting a regional space that could potentially intensify and improve relations with neighbouring states such as Russia. Furthermore, through the process of enlargement and the development of new political relations with Russia and other neighbouring states, the EU has exerted considerable influence on political institutionbuilding and socio-cultural processes in the former ‘Soviet Bloc’ [48,42]. However, as discussed above, uneven conditions and disjointed policy environments help produce diverse patterns of inclusion and exclusion of co-operation partners in neighbouring states; they also complicate the pursuit of sustainable co-operation strategies. ENPI

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CBC restrictions create borders between civil society organisations as well, particularly through bureaucratic rules and a single-minded focus on ‘project-based co-operation’. Difficulties faced by Finnish-Russian CBC in the area of regional development are not only a result of EU policy shortcomings. In practice, the Russian federal government has been rather restrictive with respect to cross-border initiatives of Russian regions and municipalities.16 While CBC was one of the central themes of Russia-EU summit in May 2007 near Samara and both sides agreed on co-funding of joint CBC projects within the ENPI, a formal agreement to this effect was not signed until 2009.17 Since 2010, the Russian Federation has in fact begun to devise a CBC strategy and is the only neighbouring country that co-finances the ENPI. However, new EU-Russia programmes are focused on large-scale investments such as the improvement of border infrastructure, transport and transit improvements, the creation of logistics’ systems and terminals, economic development along transit corridors, telecommunications, and energy and environment protection.18National development interests clearly supersede those of Russian regions (such asthe Republic of Karelia) and it remains unclear whether regional cross-border co-operation will enjoy greater political priority within the Russian government’s foreign policy agenda. As Gorzelak [49] argues, internationalization and externally generated growth are realistic options for peripheral border regions, but only if ‘preparation’ through takes place through local initiatives that set basic conditions for the successful absorption of external impulses. In such cases, a context-sensitive ENPI could be instrumental in supporting local efforts. New support structures could promote collaborative forms of policy formulation and delivery based on partnerships involving the state, the private sector, foundations as well as civil society at large. This is particularly important in more peripheral regions with limited prospects for short-term ‘returns’ on social investment and where multiple support mechanisms are needed in order to nurture entrepreneurial activity. However, a change in focus within ENPI (and ENP in general) is needed; civil society networks and local-regional co-operation should be prioritized and eligible for more generous and specifically targeted support. In addition, cooperation partnerships, rather than mere projects, should be a target of multiannual support. One possible strategy would be to develop international networks between public, private and non-profit sector actors that provide assistance to emerging and future private and social entrepreneurs though a variety of means, including: support in project development, securing grants (including the provision of guarantees), assistance in acquisition and provision of loans and investment capital, as well as training, advisory, logistical and informational support. At the same time, such support would not only reduce one-sided grant dependency but establish greater rapport between CSOs and local governments. Pami Aalto [50] has provocatively characterized co-operation between EU and Russian in terms of regional peripheries caught between two concentric systems of power represented by the EU and Russia. The future context of co-operation between the EU and neighbouring states will be of decisive importance for the development prospects of regions at and near the EU’s external borders. With the evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy framework, a crucial future question remains as to how to adapt the regional perspectives of EU external relations to existing institutional models and how to bring Russian regional actors into the implementation and targeting of new policy instruments. In this setting, it also remains to be seen to what extent the concept of ‘Euregions’ can be further elaborated as an arena of adjusting regional, national and supranational interests, policy frames and instruments. If regional

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development partnerships between the EU and non-EU states are to be taken seriously, such partnerships require policy thinking that goes beyond traditional, i.e. territorialized, forms of regional development policy and that embraces heterogeneous economic and socio-political realities.

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European Commission 2008a. Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion: Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength, COM (2008) 616 final. Popescu, G., 2011. Understanding Borders: Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-first Century. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield. Lepik, K.-L., 2009. Euroregions as Mechanisms for Strengthening Cross-Border Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, TRAMES, 13(3), pp. 265-282. Popescu, G., 2008. The Conflicting Logics of CrossborderReterritorialization: Geopolitics of Euroregions in Eastern Europe.Political Geography 27, pp. 418-438. Petrakos, G. and L. Topaloglou (2008) Economic Geography and European Integration: The Effects on the EU External Border Regions, Journal for Public Policy, 3 (3/4), pp. 146-162. Commission of the European Communities, 2008b. Commission Staff Working Document. Regions 2020. An Assessment of Future Challenges for EU Regions. SEC (2008). Commission of the European Communities, 2010. Investing in Europe’s Future: Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities Topaloglou, L., Kallioras, D., Manetos, P., and Petrakos, G., 2005. A Border Regions Typology in the Enlarged European Union.Journal of Borderlands Studies, 20(2), pp. 67-90. Petrakos, G. and Topaloglou, L., 2008. Economic Geography and European Integration: The Effects on the EU External Border Regions.Journal for Public Policy3(3/4), pp. 146-162. Petrakos, G. and Economou, D., 2007. The Spatial Aspects of Development in Southeastern Europe, [online] Available at: www.ersa.org/ersaconfs/ersa02/cdrom/papers/139.pdf Commission of the European Communities, 2007. Growing Regions, Growing Europe. Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities Gorzelak, G. and Smetkowski, M., 2010. Regional Development Dynamics in Central and Eastern European Countries. In: G. Gorzelak, J. Bachtler and M. Smetkowski, eds.Regional Development in Central and Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge, p........ Topaloglou, L. and Petrakos,G., 2006. The New Geography of Interactions, Expectations and Policies in the External EU Border Regions. Paper presented at theEuropean Regional Science Association (ERSA) Conference 2006, Volos, Greece. NellesJ. and Walther, O.,2011. Changing European Borders: from Separation to Interface? An introduction,Articulo.Journal of Urban Research, 6 [online] Available at:http://articulo.revues.org/1658, accessed 1 December 2011. Zhurzhenko, T., 2006. Regional Cooperation in the Ukrainian-Russian Borderlands: Wider Europe or Post-Soviet Integration? In: J.W. Scott, ed.EU Enlargement, Region-Building and Shifting Borders of Inclusion and Exclusion. Aldershot:Ashgate, pp. 95-111. Perkmann, M., 2002.Euroregions: Institutional Entrepreneurship in the European Union.In M. Perkmann and N-L. Sum, eds.Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions.Basingtoke:Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 103-124. J.W. Scott, 2000.Euroregions, Governance and Transborder Co-operation within the EU.European Research in Regional Science 10, pp. 104-115. T. Zhurzhenko, 2010.Borderlands into Bordered Lands. Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine, Stuttgart: IbidemVerlag. Browning, C.S. and Joenniemi, P., 2008.Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy.European Journal of International Relations 14(3), pp. 519-551. Zimin, D., Kotilainen, J. and Prokhorova,E.,2013.Company Towns on the Border: Post-Soviet Transformation of Svetogorsk and Kostomuksha, in: H. Eskelinen, I. Liikanen and J. Scott, eds.The EU–Russia Borderland. New Contexts for Regional Co-operation. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 151-166.. Eskelinen, H., Liikanen I. and Oksa, J., 1999.Curtains of Iron and Gold. Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction, Aldershot (UK): Ashgate.

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[22] Laine,J. and Demidov, A., 2013. Civil Society Organizations as Drivers of Cross-Border Interaction: on Whose terms, for Which Purpose? In: H. Eskelinen, I. Liikanen and J. Scott, (eds).The EU–Russia Borderland. New Contexts for Regional Co-operation. London and New York: Routledge, pp.131-147. [23] Liikanen, I., 2004.Euregio Karelia: A Model for Cross-border Cooperation with Russia? Russia Regional Perspectives, Journal for Foreign and Security Policy, 1(3). [24] Shliamin V.A., (ed.), 2002. Russia in the “Northern Dimension. Petrozavodsk: University of Petrozavodsk Press. [25] KettunenP. and Kungla,T., 2005.Europeanization of Sub-National Governance in Unitary States: Estonia and Finland, Regional & Federal Studies, 15(3), pp. 353 – 378. [26] Eskelinen, H. and Fritsch,M., 2009.Polycentricity in the North-eastern Periphery of the EU Territory, European Planning Studies, 17(4), pp.605 - 619 [27] Laine, J., 2007. Incommodious Border? Rethinking the Function of the Finnish-Russian Border,Fennia 185(1), pp. 49–62. [28] Kolossov, V., 2006. Les nouvelles frontières de la Russie et les perspectives de la coopération rontalière. In: Decroly J.-M. et Nicolaï H., eds. Mutations des territoires dans le monde à l’aube du XXI siècle. Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 59-78. [29] Liikanen, I., 2008. New Neighbourhood and Cross-Border Region Building: Identity Politics of CBC onthe Finnish-Russian Border, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 23(2), pp. 19-38. [30] Cronberg, T., 2000.Euroregions in the Making: The Case of Euregio Karelia.In:P. Ahponen. and P. Jukarainen eds.Tearing Down the Curtain, Opening the Gates. Northern Boundaries in Change, SoPhi 54 (University of Jyväskylä), pp. 170–183 [31] Cronberg, T., 2003.Euregio Karelia: In Search of a Relevant Space for Action.In: L. Hedegaardand B. Lindström, eds. The NEBI Yearbook 2003. Berlin: Springer, p. 223-240. [32] Häyrynen, M., 2004. A periphery lost: the representation of Karelia in Finnish national landscape imagery,Fennia 182 (1), pp.23–32. [33] Niukko, K., 2009. The Concept of Landscape Among Karelian Migrants in Finland, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 24 (2), pp. 62–77. [34] Druzhinin, P., 2004. Karelian Economy: Caught in the Resource-Export Trap In: Zimin, D., ed.Northwest Russia: Current Economic Trends and Future Prospects. University of Joensuu, Reports of the Karelian Institute,  13/2004. [35] Eskelinen, H. 2013. Geopolitics and the Market: Borderland Economies in the Making, in: H. Eskelinen, I. Liikanen and J. Scott, eds. The EU–Russia Borderland. New Contexts for Regional Cooperation. London and New York: Routledge,pp. 47-59 [36] Kostadinova, V., 2009. The Commission, ENP and Construction of Borders.Geopolitics, 14(2), pp. 235-255 [37] Commission of the European Communities, 2004. Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper, COM (2004) 373 final. [38] Scott, J.W. and van Houtum, H., 2009. Reflections of EU Territoriality and the ‘Bordering’ of Europe.Political Geography, 28(5), pp. 271-273. [39] Fritsch, M., 2009. European Territorialization and the Eastern Neighbourhood: Spatial Development Co-operation between the EU and Russia, European Journal of Spatial Development35. Online. Available at: www.nordregio.se/Global/EJSD/Refereed%20articles/refereed35.pdf [40] Herrschel, T., 2009.City Regions, Polycentricity and the Construction of Peripheralities through Governance, Urban Research and Practice2(3), pp. 240-250. [41] Bialasiewicz, L., Elden, S.,and Painter, J., 2005. The Constitution of EU Territory,Comparative European Politics, 3, pp. 333-363. [42] Scott, J.W. and Liikanen,I., 2010. Civil Society and the “Neighbourhood”  Reconciling Supranational, National and Local Agendas, Journal of European Integration, 32(5), pp. 423-438. [43] Berg, E. and Ehin, P., 2006. What Kind of Border Regime? Towards a Differentiated and Uneven Border Strategy, Cooperation and Conflict, 41 (1), pp. 53 – 71. [44] Scott, J. W., 2011. Reflections on EU Geopolitics: Consolidation, Neighbourhood and Civil Society in the Reordering of European Space,Geopolitics, 16 (1), pp. 146-175. [45] Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2011.Implementation of EU External Border Cooperation after 2013, Particularly on Borders with the Russian Federation. Helsinki:Ministry for Foreign Affairs-Unit for Regional Cooperation. [46] Darbouche, H., 2008. Decoding Algeria's ENP Policy: Differentiation by Other Means? Mediterranean Politics, 13(3), pp. 371-389 [47] Klitsounova, E., 2008.Promoting Human Rights in Russia by supporting NGO’s How to Improve EU Strategies, CEPS Working Paper Document, No.287/April 2008. [48] Raik, K., 2006. Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step Up the EU’s Policy Towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. CEPS Working Paper, 237.

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[49] Gorzelak, G., 2009. Regional Development and ‘New’ Regionalism in Poland.In: J. Scott, ed. New Regionalism in Socio-Political Context: Space-Making and Systemic Transformation in Central Europe and Latin America. Aldershot:Ashgate. [50] Aalto, P., 2004.European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe. London and New York:Routledge.

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Endnotes

1 PHARE refers to the Poland Hungary Aid for Reconstruction of the Economy – a fully-fledged ‘preintegration’ programme established in 1989 that was extended to the Central and Eastern European candidates who became EU members in 2004 and 2007 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia – Until 2000, Balkan state were also included). TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States) was expressly targeted for technical and development assistance for Post-Soviet countries; TACIS operated as a fully-fledged programme from 1991 to 2006. 2 Dealing with the issue of refugees at the EU’s external borders in a humane and effective fashion also requires effective coordination and sufficient resources. However, the setting up of detention centres for undocumented border-crossers restrictive border regimes encumber local and regional cooperation, particularly in the light of insufficient arrangements. 3 According to the ENP strategy paper (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 3) : ‘the privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.” It then states: ‘The level of ambition of the EU’s relationships with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared’. 4 While formally included in the ENP, no agreements have been established to date with Belarus, Libya and Syria. 5 Article 2 of the ENPI Regulation reads as follows: ‘Community assistance shall promote enhanced cooperation and progressive economic integration between the European Union and the partner countries and, in particular, the implementation of partnership and cooperation agreements, association agreements or other existing and future agreements. It shall also encourage partner countries’ efforts aimed at promoting good governance and equitable social and economic development’. 6 Obtaining EU support for local initiatives tends to be, however, difficult for groups and organizations not familiar with the workings of regional administration. Most successful actors are those involved in organizations, which have enough social and cultural capital to successfully apply for and utilize EU funds and CBC instruments. 7 The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the opening of Russia in the early 1990s allowed Finns to rediscover Karelia. This did stimulate discourse about the re-unification of the formerly Finnish areas of Karelia with Finland proper. But at the same time, the re-discovery of Eastern (Russian) Karelia offered the best evidence that it was an illusion, in particular, because of the loss of Finnish symbols and landscapes. 8 In comparison to Finland’s overall economic relations, economic relations between Finland and Russia are based relatively more on trade and only to a limited degree on investments. Finland is the first economic partner of the Republic of Karelia (in 2006 30% of the total turnover, or about 500 Million dollars) and one of the most important partners of Leningrad region (about 12%) and Murmansk region (23%). The trade between Finland and neighbouring Russian regions in 2000-2006 more than doubled. A rapid increase of Finnish investments could also be observed, these have significantly contributed to the modernization of the Karelian economy. 9 In the Leningrad region, by contrast, its influence has been combined with other powerful factors, such as the proximity to St Petersburg, direct access to the Gulf of Finland and generally more developed transport infrastructure and communications. During almost a decade of economic growth, Leningrad region demonstrated much higher rates than the country in average, and has considerably improved its position in the list of Russian regions. Its economy is directed in-ward and has little to do with cross-boundary interactions. Regional authorities, both in Russian Karelia and in the Leningrad region, have been rather enthusiastic about CBC.

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Progress in this area has been admittedly slow in terms of large investments. Amongst Russian enterprises with Finnish Karelian participation only the Stora Enso’s saw mill, PKC Group’s automobile wiring plant, Helkama’s refrigerator plant and a number of timber-logging enterprises and subcontracting ventures in the clothing industry stand out. At the same time, tourism and trade have increased considerably. 11 The concept of polycentricity has, in fact, been a major bone of contention between Nordic States and the EU Commission (see Eskelinen and Fritsch 2009) [26]. 12 See the Cordis website on security research at http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/ (accessed 9 December 2011). 13 According to the Regulation: ‘It is necessary to support effective cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation with the Community’s neighbouring countries where this is necessary to ensure that the regions of the Member States which border third countries can be effectively assisted in their development. Accordingly, it is appropriate to authorize on an exceptional basis the financing of assistance from the ERDF for projects located on the territory of third countries where they are for the benefit of the regions of the Community’. Text taken from Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the European Regional Development Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1783/1999, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, L210/1, 31.7.2006. 14 Originally, the EU envisaged a ‘two-stage’ approach with the implementation of ENP. During the initial phase (2004-2006), EU internal development funds (i.e. Structural Funds) and the externally oriented programmes (TACIS and MEDA) were pooled in order to co-ordinate the joint (cross-border) development and selection of co-operation projects. With the second phase, ENPI was introduced in order to streamline the entire process, creating a single instrument governed by shared administrative structures and a common set of rules. 15 Reference is made here to the international research projects EUBORDERREGIONS: European Regions, EU External Borders and the Immediate Neighbours. Analysing Regional Development Options through Policies and Practices of Cross-Border Co-operation (contract: SSH-2010-2.2.1-266920), financed by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research (see: www.euborderregions.eu) and Security and Development Research within the Wider Europe Initiative Security Cluster, funded by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (contract: HEL 8207-75). 16 In summer 2005, the Russian Parliament adopted a Law on Special Economic Zones, and the federal Ministry for Economic Development and Trade has begun to develop plans for setting up Free Trade Zones. It can be expected that some of these will be set up in Russian border regions. 17 About 600 Million Euros have been earmarked for EU-Russian CBC during 2008-2013. EU and Russian federal budgets will contribute 122 Million Euros, EU countries will provide 360 Million. 18 Still, Russia needs to create a legal basis which can allow the sustainable co-funding of CBC programmes and harmonize norms of financial reports and auditing. In particular, Russian regions have no specialized funds and institutions which could consider the projects submitted by local authorities or private companies. For many years the State Duma was not able to adopt a law on CBC - a number of bills were declined or postponed. This law would facilitate easier the coordination of different federal institutions’ policy regulating cross-boundary flows and relations. This is a reason why seven joint programs worked out by Russian and European experts have not been launched.

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Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus A. Ergun and H. Isaxanli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-187-8-42

The Role of the EU and the OSCE in Promoting Security and Cooperation in the South Caucasus and Moldova1 Donnacha Ó BEACHÀIN2 School of Law and Government, Dublin City University

Abstract. This article examines the persistence and conflict resolution potential of so-called protracted conflicts in the former Soviet Union, employing all four relevant case studies from the post-Soviet sphere and analyzes the capacity of the EU and OSCE to positively intervene in these conflicts. There currently exists a dearth of both theoretical and empirical research on post-Soviet on de facto states and on the place of the EU and OSCE as actor in the conflicts from which they have evolved. This article makes a modest attempt to address the existing lacunae by providing an analysis based primarily on semi-structured interviews with key personnel involved in the unrecognized/partially recognized states, in the states from which they have de facto seceded and with those in the EU and OSCE responsible for devising and/or implementing policies on the protracted conflicts. The article produces an analysis of intervention involving the EU and OSCE in four case studies, namely Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.

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Keywords. EU, OSCE, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistra, Nagorno-Karabagh, post-Soviet conflicts

Introduction

This article examines the past and potential role of the EU and OSCE in the addressing the four post-Soviet protracted conflicts. These disputes involve disagreement between Georgia and its erstwhile autonomous regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the frozen conflict between the Moldovan authorities in Chisinau and the Tiraspol based republic of Transnistria, along with the simmering struggle between Armenia and Azerbaijan for possession of the self-declared republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. In exploring the character of these conflicts and the role of the OSCE and EU I am guided almost exclusively by interviews conducted with a wide variety of key political actors in Tbilisi, Sukhumi, Tskhinvali, Baku, Yerevan, Chisinau and Tiraspol. With few exceptions I have not named the informants.

1

The field research on which this article is based was made possible with a grant from the Irish Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences. 2 School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, e-mail: [email protected]. Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013.

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The EU and OSCE in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts Russia’s vetoing of the UN and OSCE missions in Georgia in 2009 has left the field by default to the EU. When I asked EU Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Fűle about the role of the EU in the protracted conflicts, he emphasized a need to enhance the current “engagement without recognition” policy favored by the EU: I think that we could make our current policy of non-recognition but engagement more effective. As for engagement we will have the new head of European Union Monitoring Mission and the appointment of a new EU Special Representatives [both have since been appointed] and us making positive steps on delivering on the action plan as well as the strategy on the occupied territories. All of that provides us with the possibility to reflect on how to make engagement in detail effective and to be beneficial for all Georgians.1 According to the Georgian Chair of the National Security Council, Giga Bokeria, the EU needed to establish a clear linkage between Russia’s behavior regarding the de facto states and its relationship with the EU and to introduce a hard security element on the ground. If it failed to do so, Moscow would interpret the laudable statements affirming support for Georgia and Moldova’s territorial integrity as formalities that must be said at the beginning of meetings in order to agree to disagree before being put on the shelf. That would not only be wrong, Bokeria, concluded, but it would be dangerous.2 The value of EU involvement was echoed by another senior foreign affairs minister who stressed the role that the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) plays in keeping the temperature down and counteracting claims emanating from the Kremlin that Georgian military forces are amassing at the administrative boundary line. For the Georgian Government the OSCE retains a vital importance as it is an organization to which they are a party unlike NATO or the EU. Whereas the EUMM reports are only for the internal consumption of the EU, OSCE reports go before the 56 member states. For non-NATO members the OSCE is their security organization. While NATO is considered the organisation for the use of military force the OSCE is viewed as the organisation to deal with softer versions of security for it is mandated with the necessary authority and endowed with the requisite functions. According to one senior government figure I spoke with Georgia was ... the first country which activated the Vienna mechanism and the Bucharest mechanism. During 20 years nobody activated any mechanism. The Vienna mechanism is just about sharing information, just about discussing particular topics by putting them under the spotlight. With Abkhazia we used the Vienna mechanism and Russia had to answer very awkward questions. So it’s possible to have this mechanism and to develop it. Yes they don’t change anything at the end of the day, they do not provide any change in the security situation, but they are important instruments for information sharing, for getting to know more.3 The viewpoint is quite different in Sukhum/i. The issue of visas to the EU is seen as a litmus test of the EU’s sincerity when it comes to promoting a policy of engagement. Only those few fortunate enough to have acquired a Russian passport that was issued and registered in Russia can avoid the current travel prohibition. It should also be pointed out that I was told by several well-placed individuals in Abkhazia that

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D.Ó. Beachàin / The Role of the EU and the OSCE in Promoting Security

people in Abkhazia are not being issued with Russian passports anymore.4 This seems to be based on the argument that as they now have their own Abkhazian passports, which are recognized in Russia, citizens of Abkhazia can travel freely to Russia without the need of a Russian passport. This may, of course, be a deliberate strategy on Russia’s part to confine the movements of the Abkhazians to Russia and restrict travel and interaction with the rest of the world. If so, the EU policy complements this objective perfectly. During a lengthy interview that I conducted with the Head of the State Press Agency of Abkhazia (ApsnyPress), Manana Gurguria, she argued that whereas one might understand at some level not providing a visa to a politician or government representatives as the EU does not recognize Abkhazia, she characterized as ‘very strange’ the denial of visas to ordinary citizens who simply want to get medical treatment in a European country: How can we speak about any engagement, if the simple citizens can not cross the borders? People who go with a cultural, or a sports mission etc. They cannot cross borders ... The strategy of engagement without recognition is promoted by the EU [but] in Abkhazia people can’t see what they can really offer in the frames of this strategy. What are the concrete steps that can be taken? ... At the very minimum, people in Abkhazia cannot get real messages about the desire of the EU to get closer to Abkhazia ... Here in Abkhazia it seems that EU countries constantly look at Georgia. What does Georgia say, will it criticize any steps that they are taking? Georgia is strictly against Abkhazian contacts with the rest of the world that can not be done through Georgia.5 The then (until September 2011) Abkhaz foreign minister Maxim Gvindzhiya expressed frustration at how his efforts to widen the base of countries that recognized Abkhazia have been stymied by US and EU missions around the world. I attracted so many states already; it’s only because of the United States that I cannot advance further, they block me wherever I go. If it wasn’t for the United States and the European Union, their position, their influence [my efforts would be much more successful]. If they would give me a fair game I can play a fair game - I could get many more countries to recognise us. 6 Gvindzhiya was dismissive of EU efforts to pursue a policy of engagement without recognition, not least because the levels of engagement appear miniscule. He gave examples of how the EU would offer small amounts of money for projects, most of which would be destined for the salaries of EU citizens. When I spoke with the Abkhaz President Alexander Ankvab on the issue of recognition and whether he was confident that he could build on the current six UN member states that had already established diplomatic relations with Abkhazia, Ankvab replied that ‘we don’t have any plans such as tomorrow the UK will recognize us, then the day after that Germany and then the United States of America. We don’t build these types of plans. Our goal is to develop in a way that other countries will be attracted to collaborate with us. But that we will be recognized slowly in time we are sure!’. However, the Abkhaz president was extremely critical of the EU for bolstering Georgia through financial aid, much of which had been used to purchase military hardware. 7 The OSCE’s direct involvement in matters pertaining to Abkhazia has been relatively insignificant. This is in large part due to the fact that prior to 2008, the UN was ceded the major conflict prevention/management/resolution role in Abkhazia

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whereas the OSCE took the lead in South Ossetia. After the 2008 War, Russia’s vetoing of the OSCE mission to Georgia and UNOMIG left a vacuum that, though not filled, has in some part been replaced by the EU through its monitoring mission program. OSCE officials in Vienna rejected the oft-repeated claim that the OSCE did little to detect or warn of the 2008 conflagration. This claim, common in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia, and beyond, criticizes the OSCE as having failed to fulfill some of its central functions, not least in conflict prevention and providing an on-the-ground early warning system. As one senior OSCE official put it: The [OSCE] mission down there [in South Ossetia] was giving lots and lots of signals. The OSCE is a consensus based organization, and you have Russia as a member state, so what kind of action do you expect? There were tons of tons of reports [warning of danger] ... and even the OSCE ambassadors were down there at the Roki tunnel in July and there were signs and indications [that something would happen]. But there was no political will to act. Even when ... the people [in South Ossetia] were evacuated [to Russia] there was really no reaction.8 The OSCE officials I met with consider it noteworthy that they are the only international organization that has regular access to South Ossetia. One OSCE official, Emmanuel Anquetil, travels to Tskhinval/i quite frequently and they take pride from the fact that they have managed to bring Georgian engineers to South Ossetia to inspect to the dam. The OSCE has three major water projects, which aim to supply two million gallons of drinking water and are hoping to have them completed by the end of 2011. Former Georgian villages in South Ossetia have been razed to the ground as part of a deliberate strategy to block any opportunity to return. Not a single house remains. The South Ossetians are willing to toy with the case of Akhalgori, which was largely inhabited by Georgians. It was never under the control of South Ossetia prior to 2008, and poses no security threat to the town of Tskhinvali. Talk of South Ossetians allowing a return to Akhalgori, often accompanied with rhetorical claims to South Ossetia being a multi-ethnic society, is considered to be merely a PR stunt. 9 Similarly the South Ossetians occasionally speak vaguely about Georgians being able to return once and then the border being closed again, which eschews any possibility of a safe and dignified return let alone exercising the universal right to travel freely. Many displaced Georgians would wish to commute between freely between their new “homes” (the refugee camps constructed close to Gori) and their former places of residence in South Ossetia but this is something that both the South Ossetian leaders and their Russian supporters will not countenance. The Abkhazians are ‘much more flexible’ on the issue of returnees and have already permitted large-scale return to Gali.10 However, they remain opposed to permitting Georgians to return to other parts of Abkhazia and refuse to consider those who participated in the 1992-93 war. The OSCE officials were clear that their aims are not in the sphere of conflict resolution (“we are not naïve”, as one put it). In the end there’s no conflict resolution and the Geneva discussions and the Geneva process is not a conflict resolution process ... all of these mechanisms and processes are dealing more with crisis management, just to offer the opportunities for meetings. I think it’s more to prevent the escalation ... and to manage and keep stable some kind of unsatisfactory status quo. This is, for example, how our water project works.11

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Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) From the interviews conducted with officials from the EU and the OSCE it is clear that to be most effective both organizations rely upon some measure of agreement between the conflicting parties. Essentially, they maintain that the moment the warring parties are of a frame of mind conducive to compromise and constructive negotiation, they are ready to assist. Neither organization believes that they possess the leverage or the tools necessary to manufacture a breakthrough if the local will and momentum is not there. What results is a cycle of unfulfilled expectations whereby the EU and OSCE look to Armenia and Azerbaijan for a signal that they are ready to move while these states look to the international community for signs of their determination to resolve the conflict on their respective terms by knocking some sense into their opponents. The expectation that “something” would happen or that the process was on the verge of a breakthrough was raised in the aftermath of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War when there were multiple signs of renewed commitment to resolve the conflict. President Medvedev in particular made it something of a personal mission to achieve a breakthrough, meeting the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents together on no less than seven occasions. Turkey and Armenia similarly embarked on a bold process of rapprochement throughout 2009 and 2010 but this actually had a destabilizing effect on Azerbaijan’s relations with Armenia, not to mention Turkey. The agreement, inter alia, would have opened the border and trade between the two countries and have facilitated the establishment of diplomatic relations. The failure to ratify the agreement between Turkey and Armenia signed in Zurich in the presence of Hilary Clinton, Sergei Lavrov and Bernard Kouchner came as relief to Baku and led to recriminations between Yerevan and Ankara. The failure to make a breakthrough in Armenian-Turkish relations highlighted the limits of what could be achieved even given propitious circumstances and the difficulty of breaking new symbolic ground that challenged national identity and inter-state obligations. The fact that – unlike the case with Georgia – Russia and the West enjoyed a relative unity of purpose when it came to their approach to the NK issue at this time also demonstrated that even with a consensus and focus among the key international players a breakthrough could and cannot be achieved without some level of consensus among the political elites in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The main problem therefore is how to create an environment conducive to creating this level of consensus. The NK conflict does not lend itself to the kinds of activities that the EU does best - confidence building measures (CBMs), post-conflict management, and addressing soft-security issues. In dealing with NK, the EU has largely left matters to the OSCE not least because there have been no concerted demands from the key protagonists for a more proactive stance. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have reasons for being reluctant to involve the EU (Armenia is largely content with the OSCE format and the composition of the co-chairs while Azerbaijan is not confident that EU would take its side and fears that it may be even more ineffective). France, a co-chair of the OSCE, has always been determined not to cede its role to the EU, even if a French diplomat was in the chair. The importance of the Armenian Diaspora in France should not be underestimated (it was no coincidence that when President Sarkozy visited all three South Caucasus capitals in October 2011 he chose to spend his solitary night in Yerevan). At the request, or insistence, of the Caucasian states, the EU’s Action Plan for Azerbaijan emphasizes territorial integrity while for Armenia it emphasizes self-

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determination. The content of the Action Plans is almost identical but the hierarchy of priorities are different. This no doubt discourages the EU from getting involved to a greater extent as the EU does not wish its partnership with Azerbaijan and Armenia to turn into the verbal battlefield in which both Azerbaijan and Armenia use EU partnership documents to assert conflicting claims. Russia’s role in the NK conflict is crucial but, arguably, not as determinative as in the other three conflicts under review. Whereas Russia has manipulated separatist conflicts in what is internationally recognized Georgia and Moldovan territory and whereas the separatist territories are able to persuade the Kremlin that their interests lie more with them that with the governments in Tbilisi and Chisinau, the NK conflict is over a territory that Russia does not border, with which it has little direct contact and the combatants are two sovereign states with which Moscow would like to enjoy cordial relations. Consequently, there is no “peace-keeping” force in NK as has been the case in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. It should be noted that Russia’s role is perceived far more favorably in Armenia than in Azerbaijan, where many believe that Russia favors the status quo because it allows Russia to continue exerting leverage on both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish influence is also important. Many in Armenia were disappointed with the breakdown of diplomatic efforts between Turkey and Armenia. This offered the possibility of breaking out of isolation, opening up trade possibilities and would also have potentially driven a wedge between the political elites in Ankara and Baku. Some influential figures in Armenia argued that as Prime Minister Erdoğan has recently been re-elected (June 2011) he had the mandate and the security from an impending election to lift the embargo on Armenia. Not surprisingly this view did not have much currency in Azerbaijan. It was felt that many western countries and international organizations held the ideological conviction that confidence building measures like lifting trade restrictions or joint efforts in ensuring a clean water supply would encourage conflict resolution. It was put to me that the notion that public diplomacy, CBMs and crossborder cooperation builds an atmosphere conducive to fostering political compromises is an integral part of western ideology but that in Azerbaijan people believe more in realpolitik. They maintained that the conflict was in essence about land, power, and security. Whatever chance there was of getting Armenia to give up the lands when subjected to an embargo and economic hardship would evaporate if the embargo was lifted and trade/contacts resumed. In such a situation Armenia would have no reason to change its position as it would have the territories while at the same time benefitting from the trade and de-isolation. Thus from the perspective of the Azerbaijan government this was not an attractive proposition. The likelihood of another war over Nagorno-Karabakh is far more likely than a major conflagration in Georgia or Moldova over their “lost territories”. This is because whereas a war over Transnistria, Abkhazia or South Ossetia would involve a direct military confrontation with Russia the two sides that would fight over NK are relatively evenly matched and both sides are outwardly confident that they would defeat their opponent. Azerbaijan’s confidence grows with every year of increased wealth while Armenia believes it has already beaten Azerbaijan militarily in recent times and would do so again were Baku to initiate an attack. If there is to be another war all sides believe that Azerbaijan is most likely to start it, because Azerbaijan is trying to radically change that status-quo. If Azerbaijan believes that negotiations are not leading anywhere, it may also start provocations, as happened in June 2010 when within hours of meetings in St. Petersburg, an Azerbaijani

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commando unit allegedly crossed the Armenian position. Few think the timing of to be coincidental or unauthorized given that the Azerbaijani system of governance and the society is very hierarchical and there is no room for initiative on the level of local commanders. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war has probably restrained enthusiasm in Azerbaijan for a bold military gesture. As in Georgia prior to 2008, the Aliev regime’s rapid increase in the size and capabilities of its military has led to fears of a renewed conflagration. However, a war would be a high-risk strategy for the Aliev government. Anything but an undisputed victory would most likely spell the end of Aliev. The current wealth being derived from oil and gas is dependent on stability. Armenians are quick to point out that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline comes within 20 kilometres of Armenia and would be an easy target in the event of war.

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View from Armenia The Armenians with whom I spoke were in general quite happy with the OSCE work and its composition. They maintain that the OSCE’s main achievement has been preventing renewed warfare, which should not be underestimated, and it is clear that they feel that the US, France and Russia are sensitive to Armenia’s concerns. The OSCE, it was pointed out, does not have the toolkit to impose a solution nor does any other organization. The type of solution expected by many Azerbaijanis erroneously assumed the 1988 ante but it was argued that what happened in 1988, in 1990 and 1991 and 1993 is that Armenians did for Karabakh what NATO subsequently did for Kosovo. They had achieved this by themselves and the mentality that exists today in Azerbaijan did little to assuage fears that anti-Armenian hysteria had been diluted. The war was within relatively recent memory and the wounds had not healed. Numerous examples were provided of these anti-Armenian attitudes being fostered at official level, most notably the veneration of an Azeri soldier who decapitated with an axe his fellow NATO PfP student in Budapest seven years ago.3 Disbelief was expressed at how such things could be done while at the same time expecting that Armenians would ever deliver their ethnic kin into the hands of Azerbaijan. From the Armenian perspective the issue of Karabakh is not only tied up with identity and security but is considered at base a human rights issue. It was continuously stated the Karabakh issue had developed because the Armenians there did not feel secure and their government, Azerbaijan, did not take care of their welfare. The whole process of government in Azerbaijan today is believed to be in the hands of a very small number of people in a very autocratic government. It is claimed that whereas one will find a wide diversity of opinions on different issues in Armenia, the same could not be said for Azerbaijan. The lack of a break-through at Kazan earlier this year is considered deeply disappointing. As one informed source put it: They all went to Kazan. Our President was even willing to sign off on part of this ‘un-sign-off-able’ Kelbajar and Lachin. To the extent that those who 3

On 19 February 2004, Armenian citizen Gurgen Margaryan, 26 years old, was hacked to death while sleeping by Ramil Safarov, a Lieutenant of the Azerbaijani Army. Both were participants of an English language training course within the framework of the NATO-sponsored “Partnership for Peace” program held in Budapest, Hungary. Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013.

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kind of knew how far he could go with this, were worried that he would never be able to sell that. He was still willing to, but Aliyev at Kazan says, and the co-chairs will tell you this too, it’s not an Armenian story, Aliyev showed up with a new list of ten new items, saying, by the way, I’d also like this and this. So, we don’t have creative negotiators anymore and these poor co-chairs are stuck. They really can’t impose and they shouldn’t. Because if you can impose today, then you can do it tomorrow and that was the bad thing as far as Kosovo goes, as far as we are concerned. The bad thing about Kosovo was that it was unilaterally imposed.12 The view in Armenia was generally that they had reached the furthermost limits of compromise to move the process forward while the Azeris still retained some cards. Because of its inherent limitations in the sphere of devising foreign policy and the fact that it was still in the process of finding its feet in this area, the EU could not be organically involved in the negotiation process. The Armenian side could also not countenance UN involvement. Political deals there were struck as in a Middle Eastern bazaar, it was maintained, and to support this contention the decisions of Tuvalu and Vanuatu to recognize Abkhazia were cited as recent examples. The issues were far too important for Armenians to allow them to be subjected to the bargaining process that is integral to the UN. The Karabakh issue should not, it was argued, be won or lost as a result of deals struck on other issues but should be solved for its own sake and on its own merits. Otherwise, any attempt at conflict resolution would not be sustainable. In terms of EU involvement in the conflict resolution process the feeling is that its main role is to support the OSCE. Of course, if there is a European agreement on political rhetoric; if the EU adds its voice and emphasizes particular aspects it will give more weight to recommendations of the OSCE. The EU’s main role, however, is considered to be post-conflict rehabilitation. They would be willing, it is assumed, to come and help rehabilitate the territories. The importance of the Eastern Partnership’s integration process was also stressed. This conflict should, it was said, be viewed within a context of that integration process and over time this will make the conflict resolution process more relevant and urgent, because this integration requires regional cooperation and Karabakh is a serious problem that should be overcome to help make the Eastern Partnership more efficient and more effective. The EU would work with Armenia and Azerbaijan regardless of what happens in Karabakh but it was stressed that the main role that the EU could play in the conflict is more of a post-conflict involvement, rather than in the process of negotiating a final settlement.

View from Azerbaijan There is a strong sense in Azerbaijan that the OSCE Minsk process is wanting and, if not going nowhere, is going in circles. The impression is given that having exhausted all legal and constitutional remedies to obtain their legitimate objectives the prospect of another war is not a matter of “if” but “when”. Independent analysts, academics, officials, foreign diplomats all felt that this frustration was not dissipating but, instead, was getting stronger over time. Moreover, a younger generation have been brought up during the last 20 years who have had no contact with Armenians, who view them as enemies, and who have a less nuanced view of the conflict than the older generation who might have had many Armenian contacts. The narrative is almost unanimously about getting back the territory of Karabakh, there is usually no reference made to the

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people of Karabakh. One didn’t get any sense that it was anticipated that there would ever be a reunification of, or reconciliation between, the people of Karabakh and the rest of Azerbaijan. Rather, allusion to past atrocities and an ill-concealed dislike of Armenians qua Armenians suggested that the current residents of Karabakh would not be treated affectionately if under Baku’s control. There were frequent appeals to international law and attempts to draw parallels with other conflicts, including Northern Ireland. The most common parallel cited was that of the Aland Islands, which were disputed by Sweden and Finland before being awarded by the League of Nations to the later in 1920. The amount of autonomy enjoyed by the Aland Islands was cited as an example of what Nagorno-Karabakh might be given as part of an overall agreement. This parallel, however, evades some obvious differences with the Karabakh conflict. The two sides, Armenia and Azerbaijan, are not willing to submit the issue to international arbitration. Furthermore, there was no risk of conflict should the Aland Islands be awarded to either side. Finally, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not Sweden and Finland. Both Scandinavian states were then and are now liberal democracies that could accommodate the rights of ethnic minorities. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan can make claim to a similar description. This point was famously touched upon by the former President of Nagorno-Karabakh Arkadi Ghukasyan at a foreign press-conference. When the Aland island case was put to him as a model he surprised his audience by accepting the idea, before adding “Karabakh with maximum autonomy in Finland – anytime”. There was open derision in some official and semiofficial quarters for the efforts of the OSCE. Some wondered what was the point of continued negotiations. Generally speaking it was felt that the West had adopted a double standard and consequently would not apply sufficient pressure to return the occupied territories (‘they are not going to bomb Armenia like they are bombing Ghadaffi’, as one informant noted). The suggestion that the EU replace France as a Minsk Group co-chair invited scorn. It would be more difficult to move forward with the unwieldy 27 member EU than with France, they argued, but, most importantly, the mere suggestion assumed that the OSCE was interested in resolving the conflict. It was noted that the EU is a relatively new player having been absent from the region during the 1990s. A semi-official source claimed that the EU program in the region was of meagre importance and that they lacked a ‘concrete carrot’ such as the prospect of membership that was dangled before most of post-communist Europe during the 1990s. Most of what the EU has offered has boiled down to money and it was confidently proclaimed by official and semi-official sources that Azerbaijan had plenty already. And while there are discussions on whether the EU should be encouraged to be more actively involved no one seems eager that it should occur in a way that replaces the Minsk Group with the EU. Furthermore, there was a unanimous view expressed that if the EU replaced France as a co-chair it would not add a significant value to the negotiation process itself but would merely represent a technical difference. What might be beneficial is to discuss the EU’s greater involvement in ‘Track Two’, in funding and designing these activities, and perhaps regular discussion of this conflict within the EU arena. As deliberations within the Minsk Group are more negotiations and not discussions there could be additional talks in different formats and in different international arenas, such as in the UN, OSCE, and in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Indeed, a committee could be established within the EU so that EU policy-makers are able to ask questions about the current situation in

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NK. Once there is a comprehensive peace agreement, the EU is expected to have one of the leading roles is serving as a guarantor. With its expertise in conflict-resolution matters, its experience in the Balkans, with its funding, with the creative solutions, and, most importantly, with its power to guarantee the final settlement, the EU could play a leading role in any post-conflict rehabilitation efforts. One of the main reasons why Baku is so reluctant to permit the EU’s “statusneutral” involvement in NK, and why the government reacts so harshly to anyone who goes to NK without coordinating first with their officials, is that Azerbaijan fears that if it allows greater access to the international non-governmental and governmental actors to NK, this will only boost NK’s claim for independence or unification with Armenia. There is a perception in Azerbaijan that Georgia’s territorial integrity is defended much more ardently by the international community and international organizations than that of Azerbaijan. A cynicism has developed that the foreign policy of western governments is beholden to numerically significant electorates of Armenian origin. At the same time there is recognition too that many players in the West (and, indeed, Russia) simply want to have a good relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan and do not wish to antagonize one to placate the other. This makes them reluctant to take very firm position on certain issues. Those engaged at the level of civil society in Azerbaijan argued that confidence building measures should not be considered ends in themselves. Measures such as bringing Armenians to Azerbaijan and vice versa can only produce results, they argue, if they are accompanied in parallel by certain positive movements in the official, ‘Track One’ process. ‘Track Two’ won’t be sustainable without ‘Track One’ and the reverse is also true. Accordingly, a parallel movement is required at both levels and in both directions: confidence building on the front line and among the population in general, and, at the same time, a more active involvement, more encouragement and more determination on the part of international community, which primarily means the states of the Minsk Group co-chairs and the EU. It is recognized however that the necessary level of commitment is difficult to acquire when NK is relatively calm (though some fear this may be the calm before the storm) and when so many countries are tackling problems associated with the global economic crisis. Azerbaijani society remains in a quandary it doesn’t want war and it doesn’t want to give up on Karabakh. While there is an increasing belief that after 20 years of negotiations, this conflict has no other solution but the military, the majority, if independent polls carried out by prominent political expert and member of parliament Rasim Musabayev are to be credited, certainly doesn’t want war.13 As one informant put it: Armenians and Azerbaijanis both on civil society and on political level are stuck because they don’t know how to find the acceptable negotiation range. This mutual blame game will continue forever. The longer the status-quo continues, the more intractable the conflict becomes, accordingly the chances that the status-quo will change not through peaceful means but through violent conflict. The status-quo is something that is working against us all – Armenians, Azerbaijanis and the international community who has an interest in this region at large.14 They reject the notion that because the status-quo has endured for almost 20 years that it can be maintained for another two decades. The idea that the ceasefire should be consolidated, as promoted by Armenia, ignores the core issues and is a recipe for the conflict to drag on and to postpone a solution, thus providing Yerevan with the means

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to achieve a fait accompli solution. For Azerbaijan, the red line is that there shouldn’t be any alteration of its territorial integrity; Azerbaijan may be ready to negotiate the defacto independence of NK but not de jure. While neither Armenians nor Azerbaijanis are fully satisfied with the OSCE process they don’t know what to replace it with and would be unable to reach a consensus on a new format. Regardless of its flaws and the criticisms directed against it the Minsk Group may be simply, as put by one Azerbaijani analyst, ‘the best worst format we have right now’.

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The Role of the EU and OSCE in Moldova Of the four protracted conflicts under review the Transnistrian problem is considered the easiest to solve. Indeed, earlier this year Chancellor Merkel described it as a ‘lowhanging fruit’. This perception is based on the fact that, unlike the more volatile situations in the South Caucasus, there is no explicitly ethnic component to the struggle between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Rather the conflict, which originally flared up in the 1990s as a result of fears for the fate of Russian language and unification with Romania, is now sustained by political and economic factors. Moreover, it is believed that these political and economic factors can be eliminated over time by adopting policies designed to produce optimal results. Unlike the conflicts in the South Caucasus few believe a resumption of military hostilities between the opposing sides is likely. For almost two decades a number of mechanisms have been employed for conflict management purposes. These include a trilateral peacekeeping operation composed of Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian military that is entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring a demilitarized security zone separating the territories controlled from Chisinau and Tiraspol respectively. This in turn is directed by a Joint Control Commission (JCC) composed of Moldova and Transnistria with Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE acting as observers. Parallel to these activities are those of the “5+2” political process.4 These sporadic negotiations involve the two conflicting parties along with Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators. Since 2005 the talks format has been expanded to include the EU and the US as observers (thus “5+2”). Due largely to an initiative on the part of Germany and Russia these talks were restarted in 2011. Despite the oft-proclaimed relative ease with which a solution should be found a settlement has proved elusive. There have been long periods of silence and inertia punctuated by brief flurries of activity and face-to-face discussions between the main protagonists. Consequently, there is a tendency to measure success not in terms of the results or areas of agreement negotiated during talks but rather in the fact that talks take place at all. Fundamental assumptions to follow when devising specific policy measures include the fact that there are political and economic elites in Transnistria (and, some would argue, in Chisinau) with a strong interest in preventing any change to the status quo. Leaving aside those with state jobs, there is a large political class who would be unlikely to enjoy the same level of dominance should Transnistria come under the overall control of Chisinau. More importantly, much of the economy is concentrated in the hands of a small number of individuals. Criminality, much of it stemming from 4

The 5+2 format is officially called “The Permanent Conference on Political Issues in the Framework of the Negotiating Process for Transdniestrian Settlement”.

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smuggling, has also created vested interests that would be difficult to persuade of the virtues of a integration in Moldova. Thus, while external pressure on domestic elites in Transnistria can bear fruit the most potentially beneficial results will most likely stem from undermining the political basis of the regime by appealing to the residents of Transnistria though economic incentives, confidence building measures and extensive propaganda campaigns. To achieve maximum results these efforts should be complemented by pressure on Russia, which remains the decisive actor and certainly has the power to fundamentally alter the political and economic realities within Transnistria. With its 14 th Army ensconced in Transnistria for two decades and its huge energy subsidies to Tiraspol (it is estimated that Transnistria owes just under $3 billion in unpaid energy bills to Russia), the Kremlin is a, if not the, decisive player. These OSCE brokered talks, while providing an occasional forum for discussion between the conflicting sides and defusing potential crises, have failed to produce a comprehensive agreement that would transform the conflict. The closest the Moldovan and Transnistrian leaderships came to signing up to a new dispensation was in 2003 with the Russian-brokered “Kozak memorandum”. Negotiations for this agreement were conducted in complete secrecy and without consulting the OSCE, EU, US, Ukraine or other interested parties. When western powers did get wind of the deal they persuaded Chisinau to withdraw at the last minute (President Putin was ready to fly to Moldova to oversee the signing of the agreement). Rather than being a solution to a problem the view in the EU and US was that a settlement based on the Kozak memorandum would paralyze the united state and make it dependent in perpetuity on external (read Russian) mediation to achieve the consensus necessary to devise and implement political policies. The Kozak memorandum was a variation of a consistent theme in Russian foreign policy towards Moldova. Transnistria is not to be separate. Rather Russia would like Transnistria to be part of a federal Moldova and to enjoy such wide-ranging powers that it would block forever any attempt on Chisinau’s part to drift westwards in terms of political orientation. This has frustrated Transnistria’s long-time president Igor Smirnov who has been looking for the Kremlin to support Transnistrian secessionism and an “independent” republic with the capital based in Tiraspol.15 The rejection of the memorandum triggered a breakdown in settlement talks. Since 2003 the parties have met both officially and unofficially. Earlier in 2011 talks between the parties took place in Moscow (21 June) and again in Germany in September. The talks that took place in Vilnius from 30 November-1 December failed to produce a public declaration of agreement. After almost 20 years of conflict resolution efforts and, arguably, without being closer to a settlement the OSCE has been the object of criticism for being ineffective. However, it can be argued that the OSCE remains a convenient substitute for great power involvement and absolves them from acting in their own name. The Russian veto within the OSCE paralyzes movement and for this reason the Kremlin favours it being entrusted with conflict resolution efforts. This contrasts with Russia’s suspicious response to the ever-increasing involvement of the EU in the region. With the enlargement of NATO and the EU, the OSCE has lost many of its designated powers as these organizations have absorbed much of the OSCE’s functions. 16 NATO has taken over the first basket of the OSCE’s remit, which, as per 1975 Helsinki Final Act, refers to security while the EU has taken over the second basket relating to co-operation in

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the fields of economics, science and technology and the environment, and, to a large extent, the third basket that focuses on human rights. The OSCE is never acting in its own name. In terms of conflict resolution it is less an organisation and more akin to a forum (the original name of course referred to it being a conference). It does not have a leader and the Secretary General is a civil servant. It has no hierarchy, it works by consensus, and has an institutionalized veto given to every member. Thus, the OSCE is but a platform. Accordingly, it is hard to pin political responsibility for the failure of the OSCE, as is popular in some quarters, on the OSCE “as such” as it is really an organization composed of civil servants. Any responsibility for deadlock rests with member states and not with the OSCE as an entity. During the 1990s, the EU very much left the issue of Transnistria to the OSCE. From 2002 the EU reversed this policy of inertia largely due to the inauguration of the ENP and the impending enlargements of the organization, which would soon bring its membership to the borders of Moldova. During the last five years the EU has slowly increased its efforts to attract and compel Transnistria to have closer ties with Chisinau. The granting by the EU of the Generalized System of Preferences Plus trade regime to Moldova in 2006, the introduction of a new customs regime the same year and the extension to Moldova of the Autonomous Trade Preferences had the combined effect of shepherding Transnistrian companies to Chisinau to register with the authorities there so as to access EU markets. Moreover, Moldova’s trade has switched from being focused on the former Soviet Union, as was the case during all of the 1990s to the EU. Since 2008, the majority of Moldova’s exports are destined for the EU market. EU assistance to Moldova has doubled to €250 million between 2007 and 2010. The advantages would be accentuated were Moldova to be offered a path to EU membership. Depending on the conflict resolution proposal that might accompany negotiations to join the EU Moldova might either entice Transnistria to align itself with Moldova or result in a situation such as that in Cyprus where EU membership is de jure for the whole island but de facto is less relevant to the north. However, EU membership has been attractive for some time to Northern Cypriots and to its sponsor, Turkey. The same cannot be said for Transnistria or Russia. The EU’s most ambitious initiative has been the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) established in 2005 at the invitation of Presidents Yuschenko and Voronin. Its brief was to help monitor smuggling and trafficking along the 472 km stretch of the 1,222 km border shared by Moldova and Ukraine over which Chisinau exercises no control.17 Under a 1997 agreement goods destined for Transnistria were not liable to be taxed in Ukraine or Moldova. Consequently, a large amount of goods officially destined for Transnistria were in fact so-declared to evade taxation. A good example of how this played out was the notorious ‘chicken legs’ conundrum whereby the Transnistrian authorities were claiming straight-faced to have imported almost 70 kilos of chicken legs per capita over six month periods. Even allowing for any local culinary tastes this represented an implausible amount of chicken legs and, in fact, the vast majority were smuggled into Ukraine or Moldova. EUBAM enjoyed a double advantage in that its operation did not depend on the Kremlin’s acquiescence or goodwill and its mandate was not overtly political but rather a technical endeavor to assist in the fight against weapons trafficking, smuggling, organized crime and corruption.18 It recognized that such efforts might ‘contribute to wider efforts to find a viable and sustainable solution to the Transnistria conflict’.19

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The size and scope of EUBAM increased incrementally. In 2006 the number of EU personnel increased from 70 to 100 and was raised again to 122 at the end of the following year. An almost identical number of local personnel was employed in EUBAM. As the mission became more entrenched it made numerous recommendations to the Ukrainian government on how to assist in making its mandate more effective. These included recommending that Ukrainian border guards be allowed to launch criminal investigations, that the monetary threshold for triggering an automatic investigation into illegal smuggling be lowered and that the operation of the monitoring mission be decentralized in part to prevent copies of scheduled spot checks being made available by corrupted officials to criminal gangs. The EU has been much less successful in promoting more politicized conflict resolution endeavors that require Russian approval. A good example was the rejection in 2006 of EUSR Jacobovits proposal to change the peacekeeping format in Transnistria so that it was transformed from a Russian dominated force to one jointly administered by Russia and the EU. This echoed Jacobovits 2003 proposal when as special envoy to Moldova during the Dutch OSCE chairmanship he proposed a widening of the peacekeeping format. The proposal was killed by the opposition or scepticism of key EU states, which feared that it would unduly antagonize Russia and was an open-ended commitment with no guarantee of success. The obstacles facing the EU in promoting conflict-resolution efforts remain substantial. As one senior EU official put it: We have an entire new generation in Transnistria which hasn’t known what Moldova means. They do not consider Moldova as a motherland and when you read the history text books in Transnistria you understand why those guys don’t want to be with Moldova. There is no reason. And … you have a growing disinterest for [the] Transnistrian issue amongst the population [of Moldova]. Studies … show that in Moldova you have more than 50 % of the population that predict that their future is within the EU whereas in Transnistria it is not really this. If you ask them, they want to be with Russia. So, we have a clear line in this. We have cultural and social distrust. In Transnistria this is all fed by propaganda, in Moldova probably also. The bottom line is that there is a chance that they can agree. But if you look at our papers on the settlement, one prepared by Transnistria, and the other prepared by Moldavians, they are totally two extremes. I mean Transnistria says they want to be independent and simply wish for normal neighborly relations with Moldova and Moldova says that it wants to reunite and give a special status to Transnistria.20 Though the OSCE has primary responsibility for negotiations to achieve a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict it has a relatively low public profile on the issue. According to the OSCE itself the low visibility of the organization is logical. Officials stress that the OSCE as an organization has a budget of 150 million Euros the size of two/three projects funded by the EU. With just 17 field operations, a secretariat in Vienna and a couple of related organization offices, it remains in their view a ‘pretty small project’. 21 Moreover, the OSCE concerns itself with ‘soft diplomacy’, which does not require a large budget, but which also requires discretion. Consequently, the OSCE could not often publicize their actions due to the sensitive nature of negotiations as is typical for the Transnistrian case. On relatively noncontroversial issues (gender was provided as an example) there is no problem regarding publicising the OSCE’s work. However, OSCE activities were in general only visible

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in those countries hosting a field mission. In other countries, while the state may be a member of the OSCE very few ordinary people know of the organisation’s work or, indeed, its existence. According to officials in Moldova, the OSCE would like to have policing role and the view was expressed that a peacekeeping operation in Transnistria is desirable.22 Some form of international civilian police force would be suitable, which could transfer lessons drawing on the experience gained in the former USSR or the former Yugoslavia. However, all parties to the conflict would need to consent for this to happen. At the time of writing there is political uncertainty in both Tiraspol and Chisinau. Transnistria held presidential elections on 11 and 25 December, which saw the four term septuagenarian Igor Smirnov defeated and replaced by the 43 year old former parliamentary speaker, Yevgeny Shevchuk. Elections are also due to be held in Chisinau-controlled Moldova to elect, finally, a new president. This follows a long period of instability as parliament proved unable to elect an executive. Until this is resolved it may be difficult for a Moldovan government to negotiate a settlement. On the plus side, however, opinion polls and focus groups continue to show that Transnistria is not an issue of high priority for the electorate and, thus, the Moldovan political elite have more room for manoeuvre than, say, their counterparts in the South Caucasus. A decision to resume the official 5+2 negotiations was taken in Moscow on 22 September, 2011, following a nearly six-year hiatus. Consequently, there were two days of talks (30 November-1 December) in Vilnius after which Lithuania Foreign Minister Audronius Azubalis told reporters "... I am happy to see that we've moved a golden millimeter forward”. If progress is to be measured in millimeters the road to a resolution of the conflict will, indeed, be a long one.

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Conclusion The research conducted in the course of preparing this article suggests that EU and OSCE strategies has been risk-averse, incremental and based on securing agreement on what is politically possible in terms of what its members will accept rather than what is necessary to make a substantial difference to realities on the ground or framework of the conflict. Accordingly, its policies tend to be those of the lowest common dominator. The result is often policies that make little impact on the dynamics of the conflict. Initiatives and funding tend to be aimed at low-level, small-scale and depoliticised projects.

Endnotes

1

In response to question put by author, Batumi, July, 2011. In response to question by author, Batumi, 2011. 3 Interview with author, Tbilisi, July, 2011. 4 Interview with senior NGO figure, Sukhum/i, August 2011. 5 Interview with author, Sukhum/i, August, 2011. 6 Interview with author, Sukhumi/i, August, 2011. 7 Interview with author, Sukhum/i, August, 2011. 8 OSCE official, interview with author, Vienna, September, 2011. 2

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OSCE official, interview with author, Vienna, September, 2011. Senior OSCE official, interview with author, Vienna, September, 2011 OSCE official, Vienna, interview with author September, 2011. 12 Former senior Armenian foreign policy advisor, interview with author, Yerevan, October, 2011. 13 Rasim Musabayev, interview with author, Baku, November 2010, and supplied poll data. 14 Interview with author, Baku, October, 2011. 15 Vladimir Socor, interview with author, Tbilisi, May, 2011. 16 Vladimir Socor, interview with author, Tbilisi, May, 2011. 17 Vasili Sova, Minister for Reintegration, interview with author, Chisinau, July 2006. 18 Council of the European Union. 2005. ‘European Union’s Border Mission to Moldova and Ukraine Declaration by the Presidency of the European Union’ 15178/05, 30 November 2005. Available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st15/st15178.en05.pdf 19 Council of the European Union. 2005. 20 Interview with author, Brussels, June, 2011. 21 OSCE official, interview with author, Chisinau, September, 2011. 22 OSCE officials, interview with author, Chisinau, September 2011. 10

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Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus A. Ergun and H. Isaxanli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-187-8-58

EU Common Foreign Policies and CBC in a Wider Europe1 Ilkka LIIKANEN2 Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland

Abstract: This article examines conceptual change in the definition of EU policies of CBC in the context of the shaping of common foreign policies of the Union. The analysis focuses on changes in the definitions of CBC from the first INTERREG programs to present-day European Neighborhood Policies. The aim is to understand the conceptual shifts against the background of changing political agendas ranging from economic and social cohesion to pre-integration, deepening integration and the constitution of the political Union. The paper aims to contributing to the discussion on the formation of EU policies of common foreign affairs by asking what kind of discursive legacies and maybe even institutional path dependencies earlier programs of CBC have left to present-day policies of external relations. The ultimate question is: what kind of effects have CBC policy frames and instruments had on the role of the EU as a foreign political actor, and on the normative or soft power approach the EU is said to represent? Keywords: European Union, common policies of foreign affairs, cross-border cooperation, European Neighborhood Policy

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Introduction Cross-border cooperation (CBC) has often been a fundamental element in the scholarly discussion on EU common external relations. Not just institutionally, but even in terms of policy content, CBC has been understood as an essential part of the shaping of a new type of normative value-based foreign policy that the EU is seen to represent. In contrast to military security dominated Cold War policies, the EU programs of crossborder co-operation have been seen to stand for new security thinking that seeks to exercise soft, or normative, power, calibrated to the new ‘post-Westphalian’ realities in which territorial borders and their integrity are no longer the core of international relations [1, 4]. This image of co-operation based “post-modern” EU policies is sometimes set in sharp contrast with Russian foreign policies which in a “realist” manner seek to secure spheres of influence in post-Soviet space by manipulating a range of hard and soft instruments [5,6]. Lately, in the context of the configuration of EU common policies for foreign affairs, a second wave of discussion has emerged and it has been asked to what degree the institutional changes are signaling a sea-change, a turn back towards traditional realist international relations or even if we are witnessing some kind of convergence of 1 The article has been prepared as part of the project Regional Stability, Borders, Minorities and Migrations funded by the Wider Europe program of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. 2 Professor, Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland, E-mail: [email protected].

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the two models. Following Manners [7], some scholars have questioned the onedimensional models of normative soft power and traditional hard power and emphasized the need for more sophisticated approaches to the relationship between cross-border co-operation and the broader architecture of international relations. In more nuanced terms, it has been questioned whether normative policies can in the first place be seen to represent a new type of ‘soft power’ policies or whether the tightened conditionality of the EU’s normative policies actually comes very close to traditional policies of regional hegemony [8, 12]. It has been noted that conditionality is easily reinforced by the actions of the EU neighbors, e.g. through Russia’s “self-exclusion” from the ENP, which has been said to create competing agendas between the relevant actors in post-Soviet space [13]. Indirectly, EU normative policies of cross-border cooperation have thus according to this logic put post-Soviet countries into a situation where there is obvious tension between the attractions of the ENP and traditional cooperation with Russia. This is, however, not to say that the development could be characterized as a failure of a “post-modern” policy approach represented by the EU - and a clear turn back to Cold War security driven policies. As Derek Averre has noted there are competing rationales not just between the “postmodern”, or normative, policies of the EU, and Russian “modern” policy approach, but there is also a tension between elements of normative and structural power in the relations of both powers with the countries of their peripheries [14]. In this sense, the boundaries between hard power and normative, civilian or soft power are fuzzy, and a conception of the EU as a normative power can in many ways be contested. Alone, the national preferences of EU member states make the notion of a Common EU foreign policy heavily qualified. Furthermore, the EU’s external relations encompass a wide range of policies: financial, legal, regulatory and environmental, which go beyond classical foreign policy and are linked to various internal EU policy agendas and rationales [14]. When considering the relationship between CBC and EU common foreign policies it is thus on one hand necessary to keep an eye on these competing rationales embedded in EU policies of external relations. On the other hand, the notion of competing rationales should be extended also to the long-term configuration of EU policies of CBC. In the present situation, there is an obvious need to analyze in detail what kind of discursive and institutional layers can be recognized in the development of EU policies of CBC, and how these competing rationales have affected the configuration of common policies of foreign affairs at different stages of the consolidation of the political union.

1. The EU’s New Response to Its Changing Neighborhood Signaling changes in the institutional architecture of EU common foreign policies, a policy paper called ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood. A Review of European Neighborhood Policy’ was published in the spring of 2011as a ‘Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission’ [15]. The paper provided a topical, short-term-analysis of the current state of the EU’s external relations. However, perhaps the most interesting feature of the brief review paper was, the way the document offered an official account of the role of cross-border co-operation policies in the design of EU common policies for foreign affairs.

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As such, the idea of cross-border co-operation as the root or core of EU common foreign policies is not novel. Already the key policy document of EU external relations, ‘Wider Europe — Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors’ (2003) elaborated broad foreign political tasks in the context of reforming earlier CBC policy frames and instruments – which eventually led to the initiation of the European Neighborhood Policies (ENP) in 2004. For a long time, scholars studying European borders and external relations have analyzed cross-border co-operation programs as key elements of the constitution of EU common policies for external relations – even before the official institutional linking of the two[16, 17, 12]. Against this background, the recent ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood’ gives a rather thin account of the connection between EU external relations and the promotion of regional and intra-regional co-operation. This connection is taken rather as a self-evident starting-point than an object of serious analysis, and the paper concentrates on reviewing EU policies in the context of current topical events along the EU’s Eastern and Southern borders. Important self-critical observations are made in regard to the application of CBC policy instruments as tools for promoting common foreign policy goals. These observations, however, are more a reaction to external impulses, most notably to the Arab Spring, than a profound analysis of the significance and effect of earlier programs of regional and intra-regional co-operation for the formulation of EU common foreign policies. In the assessment of the changes in the European neighborhood the specification of the tasks of ENP remains unrelated to broader discussions concerning the role of the EU as a foreign political actor. In the absence of critical discussion, there seems to be a teleological explanation model forming, which approaches earlier CBC programs simply as steps on the way towards a given goal – the shaping of EU common policies for foreign affairs. In this respect the approach is open to a similar kind of methodological criticism that Alan S. Milward has aimed at scrutiny of earlier forms of European integration as simply steps towards a political union. Taking the outcome as given prevents analyzing the breaks and internal contradictions of the process. In the process of the formulation of EU common foreign policies we can recognize a similar phenomenon of constant ‘stretching’ of the earlier institutional frames, as is typical in the history of the whole European Union. Gradually, policy frames that were first designed for promoting regional cohesion were stretched to govern cross-border external relations and finally common foreign policies – in the same manner that the institutional frames designed for coal and steel trade were stretched to govern common markets and finally used as a basis for the administration of a political union [18-20]. Obviously, the role of earlier policies of CBC in the codification and co-ordination of EU common foreign and security policy similarly requires a more thorough scholarly analysis and further political discussion: how has this legacy of earlier policy frames and instruments influenced the development of the political language of EU external relations, and has the stretching of earlier administrative structures created path-dependencies at the level of institutional practices? With the 2009 Lisbon treaty the EU has tried to put an end to this stretching of the institutional frames and to redesign its administrative institutions and practices to meet the demands of the political union of the day. In regard to common foreign affairs we might say that the EU is approaching the stage at which it is necessary to reconfigure the institutional and discursive practices that originated from earlier policy frames and institutional structures. This requires that the focus of the analysis is turned upside-

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down, and changes in the definitions of CBC from the first INTERREG programs to present-day European Neighborhood Policies are analyzed not as steps towards a given goal, but as contested and conflicting conceptual shifts that have left their mark on today’s political discussion on common foreign policies. Furthermore, the changing political contexts should be taken more seriously into account when analyzing the development of CBC policies from early instruments of regional cohesion to tools of pre-integration and enlargement – and finally as part of policies of consolidation of the political union and formulation of its common foreign policies.

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2. Cohesion policies and external relations The starting point for the EU’s CBC policies can be seen in the so-called INTERREG initiative, designed to stimulate cooperation between regions in the European Union. The first INTERREG program started in 1989 and was financed under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The first INTERREG programming period was set for the years 1989-1993, and it continued later as INTERREG II (1994-1999) and INTERREG III (2000-2006).The first INTERREG program documents aimed at diminishing the influence of national borders in favor of the equal economic, social and cultural development of the entire territory of the European Union. In the Technical Fiche of INTERREG I, the main aim of the program was defined “to prepare the border areas for the opening of the Single Market, with an eye to the economic and social cohesion of the European Community”. This aim was to be achieved by measures that all concerned social and economic cohesion: 1) helping these regions to overcome problems arising from their isolation from the main economic and decision-making centers; 2) promoting administrative collaboration and the development of networks of cooperation on both sides of the internal borders; establishing links between these networks and wider Community networks; 3) preparing external border areas for their new role in this integrated market, by exploring possibilities for cooperation with third countries [21].Notably, even the measures concerning external border areas and third countries were targeted at promoting adjustment to internal integrated markets. This emphasis remained the same until the end of the INTERREG program periods. As the 2001 Communication of the Commission on INTERREG III stated, “The objective of inter-regional cooperation … is to improve the effectiveness of policies and instruments for regional development and cohesion.” [22] The Commission considers that inter-regional cooperation offers an additional dimension to the field of cooperation activity over and above that provided by cross-border and trans-national programs. It allows noncontiguous regions to enter into contact and to build up relationships, leading to exchanges of experience and networking which will assist the balanced, harmonious and sustainable development of the European Union and of third countries. To a high degree, CBC along the external borders of the Union was similarly conceptualized in terms of cohesion policies and the language was characteristic of regional development and planning studies. This is seen, for example, in the 2001 communication, in the definition of the aims and added value of inter-regional cooperation: The objective of inter-regional cooperation, “is to improve the effectiveness of policies and instruments for regional development and cohesion” [22].

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At the turn of the new millennium, the preparation of the new INTERREG III program broadened the agenda and introduced tasks that are closely connected to policies of pre-enlargement. The overall aim of the INTERREG initiatives has been, and remains, that national borders should not be a barrier to the balanced development and integration of the European territory. The isolation of border areas has been of a double nature: on the one hand, the presence of borders cuts off border communities from each other economically, socially and culturally and hinders the coherent management of eco-systems; on the other, border areas have often been neglected under national policy, with the result that their economies have tended to become peripheral within national boundaries. The single market and EMU are strong catalysts for changing this situation. Nevertheless, the scope for strengthening cooperation to the mutual advantage of border areas throughout the Community remains enormous. The challenge is all the greater when the future enlargement of the Community is considered, as this will increase the number of its internal borders and, progressively, shift the Community's external borders eastwards [23]. The Communication from the commission to member states on 28thApril 2000 was said to lay down guidelines for a Community Initiative concerning trans-European cooperation intended to encourage the harmonious and balanced development of European territory. It demanded effective coordination between INTERREG III and external community policy instruments, especially with a view to enlargement. Similarly, INTERREG III’s General Principles defined at the Cohesion Forum held in Brussels in May 2001 included ‘economic and social cohesion’, ‘balanced and sustainable development of European territory’ and ‘territorial integration with candidate and other neighboring countries’. Since 1995, following a European Parliament initiative, the PHARE program, jointly with INTERREG, had also financed cooperation programs between border regions of the EU and the candidate countries, as well as after a revision of the PHARE-CBC regulation in 1998 between the candidate countries themselves. On the basis of the new PHARE CBC Regulation and the new INTERREG guidelines, a Single Programming Document, covering regions on both sides of the border and including joint cooperation priorities for the 2000-2006 period was prepared for each eligible border. The problem of the coordination of programs concerning internal and external border areas was, however, not solved by these measures but it soon led to major reconfiguration of EU policies of CBC.

3. Pre-enlargement and coordination of the policies of CBC The new program documents governing CBC came to reflect the need to coordinating policies of integration and technical aid to CIS countries on bases of a clear preenlargement agenda. Under the banner ‘Reconstructing European Territory: cooperation without frontiers’, it was declared that aid to Central and East European countries (CEEC) and bordering regions to the Union was “providing them with a real opportunity to become acquainted with the methods and rules of Community programming”. The paper called for preparations to manage, after accession, the future programs of cross-border cooperation and regional development [24].

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At the same time, and partly in connection with the launch of the EU’s Northern Dimension policies, demands were raised to make INTERREG and TACIS work better together in order to further the development of border regions on the external borders of the union. In 2001 the European Commission published a booklet called A Guide to Bringing INTERREG and TACIS Funding Together which re-assessed tasks of CBC programs with an enthusiastic rhetoric: “This guide reflects our joint determination to ensure that cross-border cooperation with Russia is a success today” [25]. At the cross-border level between the EU and CIS countries, the ultimate aim is to create new opportunities for the population living in border areas, to promote the spirit of cooperation and to foster trust between the authorities on each side of the border. At the wider regional level (i.e. the Baltic region), there is a need to promote interstate and inter-regional cooperation with a view to assisting the development of the Northern Dimension and moving towards enlargement. [25] With TACIS CBC, a new program was designed to offer support to partner states undergoing transition. At this point the EU officially set as its goal the acceleration of the transformation process in partner states through their cooperation with border regions in the European Union or CEEC. It thus linked CBC policies with a task of influencing domestic development of its neighbors. Objective: TACIS CBC is one of the multi-country programs of TACIS and covers four partner states: Belarus, Moldova, Russia and the Ukraine. The TACIS regulation defines the purpose of cross-border cooperation as: - assisting border regions in overcoming their specific development problems; - encouraging the linking of networks on both sides of the border, e.g. border-crossing facilities; - accelerating the transformation process in the partner States through their cooperation with border regions in the European Union or Central and Eastern Europe - reducing trans-boundary environmental risks and pollution [26]. This more systematic coordination of EU policies of CBC and external relations was formulated during the preparation of the document Wider Europe -Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors (2003), which justified the reconfiguration of CBC programs with more ideological tones than mere administrative streamlining. The document defined the main goals of EU policies towards its post-enlargement neighborhood. The Union aimed to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and, instead tried to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond its new borders. Furthermore, the aim was to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighborhood – a “ring of friends" - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations. In addition, Russia, the countries of the Western NIS3 and the Southern Mediterranean countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (also known as the four freedoms) [27]. In this sense, the Wider Europe document continued the reorientation started already a year earlier at the Copenhagen European Council, which decided that the Union should take the opportunity offered by enlargement to enhance relations with its neighbors on the basis of “shared values”[28].

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4. Normative Wider Europe With the Big Bang of 2004 in mind and with the accession of ten new member states to the EU, new regional cross-border programs were launched and amendments were introduced to upgrade the existing programs to include the new states as partners. In EU documents, the primary aim was to coordinate INTERREG with the instruments for accession and programs concerning third countries, i.e. TACIS, PHARE and CARDS (e.g. [29]). This practical task can, however, be seen in connection with broader reconfiguration of EU policies of external relations. In the Wider Europe document, the idea of the EU as a new type of security community, using normative or soft power was officially introduced to the rhetoric of EU documents. This was reflected e.g. in the objective of avoiding drawing new dividing lines in Europe and promoting stability and prosperity “within and beyond the new borders of the Union”. The document emphasised that inter-dependence – both political and economic – can itself be a means to promote stability, security and sustainable development both within and without the EU[27]. These formulations of the Wider Europe document can be seen as the main impetus to the broad discussion on the EU’s policies representing a new type of ‘soft power’ and an alternative framework to Cold War visions of conflict and security threats. In the new rhetoric, institutional streamlining was accompanied by new notions of European values and conditionality, which have ever since become more and more important tools for EU external relations. Already, the Wider Europe document referred to the need to establish a strong partnership, based on historic links and common values expressed in earlier Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in effect with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova[27]. The idea of common values was, from the beginning, linked to a notion of conditionality: “In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including reforming legislation in line with the Acquis, the EU’s neighborhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU” [27]. The setting of clear and public objectives and benchmarks spelling out the actions the EU expects of its partners is a means to ensure a consistent and credible approach between countries. Benchmarks also offer greater predictability and certainty for the partner countries than traditional ‘conditionality’. Political and economic benchmarks could be used to evaluate progress in key areas of reform and against agreed targets. Beyond the regulatory and administrative aspects directly linked to market integration, key benchmarks should include the ratification and implementation of international commitments which demonstrate respect for shared values, in particular the values codified in the UN Human Rights Declaration, the OSCE and Council of Europe standards. Wherever possible, these benchmarks should be developed in close cooperation with the partner countries themselves, in order to ensure national ownership and commitment [27]. With the introduction of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 this normative commitment to shared values was in practice adopted as a key element of EU policies of CBC [30]. In the 2007 review of the ENP, it was insisted that “a motivating framework should be established, based on agreements with ENP countries which respect fundamental European values, are willing to integrate more closely with

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the EU and demonstrate objective performance in terms of ENP action plan implementation” [31]3.According to observers, this form of institutional and discursive Europeanization that the ENP represents has sometimes made it difficult for the neighbors to share common visions and find domestic support for broadened cooperation with the EU [12]4.

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5. “One Program – One Instrument”: CBC and the Consolidation of the Union The European Neighborhood Program (2004) was to put into practice the high goals defined a year earlier. At the same time, the objective was to have one single financial instrument that avoided the coordination difficulties faced by existing programs trying to combine funding from INTERREG, PHARE, TACIS, CARDS or MEDA. This administrative streamlining can be seen in connection with the topical aim of consolidating EU internal administration that crystallized in the unsuccessful constitution project [34]. In this sense, the elaboration of a new type of “soft power” policies was intimately linked to the creation of more centralized institutional frames. The explanatory memorandum introducing the Commission’s proposal on the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) opens rather prosaically with a reference to the Commission’s earlier communications on financial perspectives [35]. The blunt opening is, however, well justified by the fact that the necessity of creating the new instrument was, indeed, introduced before the actual ENP policy proposal in the Commission’s communication Building Our Common Future: Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013,[33] targeted at streamlining administration in the field of external relations and CBC. In a communication on financial perspectives the need to create new policy instruments was derived from the more general principle of “simplifying instruments to improve delivery.” According to the communication, the success of policies relies on “the efficiency of delivery instruments and, more broadly, in the appropriate system of economic governance.” In order to maximize performance, there was a need to strengthen cooperation and partnership, especially for “simplified instruments, replacing the existing variety of complex decision-making powers and policy instruments, ranging from local and regional to national and EU levels” [36]. Following this simplification principle the communication defined two future building blocks: the introduction of an integration policy roadmap and the simplification of the instruments of expenditure management. Strongly highlighted in the text, the Commission committed itself to adopting the principle of one instrument per policy area, one fund per program. It stated that “EU funding instruments will, as far as possible, be consolidated and rationalized so that each policy area responsible for operational expenditure has a single funding instrument covering the full range of its interventions” [36]. In regard to the area of external relations, the Commission stated that a simplified architecture will be proposed, based on six instruments, replacing the overone hundred different currently existing instruments. More specifically, the commission proposed 3

See also [32, 33]. This conclusion is confirmed also by the reports on academic and political discussion on borders and crossborder co-operation in the countries of the ex-Soviet Union prepared in the frame of the project Regional stability, borders, minorities and immigration funded by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the frame of its Wider Europeprogram, see http://www.uef.fi/ktl/state-of-the-art-reports. 4

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the creation of a new Neighborhood Instrument, saying: “It is in the interest of the whole EU to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines on and around its external borders and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond these external borders. A joint and united effort by the EU is vital to achieve this ambitious objective. Member States are not well equipped to address this challenge on an individual basis. The cross-border component of the New Neighborhood Instrument would be implemented as simply as possible through a single legal instrument, building on the principles of existing European cross-border programs – partnership, multi-annual programming and co-financing” [36]. In supporting administrative efficiency the explanatory memorandum naturally also stresses the factual goals of the instrument and the innovative features of its crossborder cooperation component, which is said to emphasize the role and significance of the regions. In a comment on Article 1, the scope of the assistance is defined by referring to the importance of developing an area of prosperity and close cooperation involving the European Union and the neighboring countries, “as recognized in the draft Constitution” [35]. Even though the reference to the Constitution is limited to this one sentence, we may ask to what degree, in the composition of the document, features exist which, in a deeper sense, are akin to the guiding principles behind the Constitution project. This question is especially relevant with regard to account of the work of the “Peace Group”, which was set by the Commission to draft the first guidelines for ENPI: As far as external community instruments are concerned, the “Peace Group” recognized that the European Union's cooperation and assistance policy is the result of 50 years of successive sedimentation, which results in a multiplication of assistance instruments and a fragmentation of aid management both in terms of programming and implementation functions (even if recent policy and structural reforms have helped to improve the coherence and consistency of the European Union's cooperation and assistance policy). The “Peace Group” put forward the idea that the European Union’s framework for external assistance should be rationalized and simplified by a reduction in the number of legal bases, the number of budget lines, and the number of programs. More precisely, it recommended that: the complex structure of existing aid programs … covering a wide range of interventions … should be significantly streamlined; and that European Community and Member States policies and implementation should be harmonized. [35] As we know today, the desire to streamline and harmonize EU policies put forward in the draft Constitution were later rejected by European citizens in the constitutional referendums in France and the Netherlands. Considering the situation at the time of the elaboration of the ENPI, there is reason to ask to what degree the streamlining of the policy frame carried elements of the Draft Constitution and to what degree these can be seen to represent discursive or institutional path-dependencies embedded in present-day EU neighborhood policies. With the formulation of EU common foreign policies, the need to recognize the different layers that have affected the modification of EU programs of CBC has come to concern all previous stages of EU policies. The momentum has come to review thoroughly the institutional and discursive paths and path-dependencies that have shaped the relationship between CBC and EU external relations. This is vital in order to clear the table for conscious decisions on what kind of role the EU wants to play as a

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foreign political actor - and to what degree and in what form it wants to elaborate new types of policies of soft power.

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Conclusions: CBC, cohesion policies, pre-enlargement and the consolidation of the political Union Evidently, path dependencies from stretching the earlier frames of CBC form clear obstacles to a common vision of a topical policy agenda both within the EU and in its relations with its neighbors. The first cross-border cooperation programs (INTERREG I and II) were initially targeted at promoting inter-regional cohesion within the Union and they were based largely on an apoliticised vision of (economic) cross-border regionalisation. In this respect, the initial policy frames and instruments were not appropriately calibrated and hardly suitable for tackling the problems of post-colonial and post-communist transition. Later, the INTERREG III program (2000-2006) was to some degree modified to meet post-communist conditions mainly in order to serve as a tool for enlargement and pre-integration. In this context, the program language that emphasized cross-border regionalisation was imbued with rhetoric of shared or common values and a rather strong dimension of identity political Europeanization. The elements of conditionality embedded in this rhetoric have later been openly criticized especially in Russian political discussion, and it has put other countries of the ex-Soviet Union under pressures of competing rationales of policies of Russia and the EU. The ENP created a separate agenda for cross-border cooperation on the external borders of the EU and then introduced country-specific agreements with neighboring countries. The initiation of the ENP was, however, also closely linked to the institutional streamlining of the EU that was connected to the project of establishing a constitution for the EU and later the configuration of the Lisbon Treaty. Obviously, these tensions are still today embedded in the political rhetoric and even institutional practices connected to EU policies of CBC, and their careful analysis and open discussion is a precondition for developing a common foreign policy in line with the task of making the EU a new kind of actor in international relations. Today, the EU cannot just proclaim itself a representative of a new type of ‘soft and smart power’ in its external relations. In order to gain this status in the eyes of its neighbors it has to reflect critically on the contradictory stages of the shaping of the CBC policy frames and instruments that today form the bases of its common foreign policies.

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Kostadinova, V., 2009. The Commission, ENP and Construction of Borders, Geopolitics, 14(2), pp. 235-255. Manners, I., 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), pp. 235-258. Haukkala, H., 2009. Lost in Translation? Why the EU Has Failed to Influence Russia's Development. Europe-Asia Studies, 61(10), pp. 1757–1775. Jones, A. and Clark, J.R.A., 2008. Europeanization and Discourse-Building: the European Commission, European Narratives and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Geopolitics, 13 (3), pp. 1-27. Kochenov, D., 2008. EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. Sasse, G., 2008. The European Neighborhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU’s Eastern Neighbors, Europe-Asia Studies, 60(2), pp. 295-316. Scott, J. and I. Liikanen, eds., 2011. European Neighborhood through Civil Society Networks? Policies, Practices and Perceptions. London: Routledge. Haukkala, H., 2008. The Russian Challenge to Russian Normative Power. The Case of European Neighborhood Policy. The International Spectator, 43(2), p.38 Averre, D., 2011. Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared Neighborhood.’ In J. Gower and G. Timmins, The European Union, Russia and the Shared Neighborhood. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 5-29. P.7 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, 2011. A New Response to a Changing hood. A review of European Neighborhood Policy, Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission. Eskelinen, H., Liikanen, I. and Oksa, J. eds., 1999. Curtains of Iron and Gold.Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction. Aldershot: Ashgate. Scott, J., ed., 2006. EU Enlargement, Region-building and Shifting Borders of Inclusion and Exclusion. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 133-148. Milward, A., 1992. The European Rescue of the Nation-State. London: Routlegde. Milward, A., 1997. The Social Bases of Monetary Union. In: P. Gowan and P. Anderson, eds., The Question of Europe. London: Verso. Stråth, B. 2011. Still the Europe of Milward? UCL. The European Institute. Working Paper No. 1/2011. Commission of the European Communities, 1990. Technical Fiche on INTERREG I. Commission of the European Communities, 2001a. Communication from the Commission to the Member States. INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION.C (2001) 1188 final. Commission of the European Communities, 2004. Communication from the Commission to the Member States of 2 September 2004 laying down guidelines for a Community initiative concerning transEuropean cooperation intended to encourage harmonious and balanced development of the European territory INTERREG III. Official Journal of the European Union, 10 September 2004. COM (2004) C 226/02. Commission of the European Communities, 2002.Brochure. Structural policies and European territory. Cooperation without frontiers. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities, 2001b.A Guide to Bringing INTERREG and TACIS Funding Together, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. European Council, 2000.Council Regulation of 29 December 1999 concerning the provision of assistance to the partner states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, EC, Euratom 99/2000. Commission of the European Communities, 2003.Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors, COM (2003) 104 final. Council of the European Union, 2002. Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002. Presidency conclusions. POLGEN 8415917/02. INTERREG in 2004, 2004. [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/interreg3/new/doc/interreg2004_en.pdf Commission of the European Communities, 2004a.Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy.Strategy Paper, COM (2004) 373 final. European Parliament, 2007. European Parliament Resolution of 15 November 2007, Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (2007/2088(INI). Commission of the European Communities, 2006.European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. Cross-Border Co-operation. Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative Programme 2007-2013, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities

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[33] Commission of the European Communities, 2007. A Stronger European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. [34] Liikanen, I. & Virtanen, P., 2006. The new neighbourhood: a Constitution for cross-border cooperation? In J. Scott (ed.), EU Enlargement, Region Building and Shifting Borders of Inclusion and Exclusion. Aldershot: Ashgate. [35] Commission of the European Communities, 2004b.Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council. Laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, COM (2004) 628. [36] Commission of the European Communities, 2004c. Communication from the Commission, Building Our Common Future. Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013,COM (2004) 101.

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Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus A. Ergun and H. Isaxanli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-187-8-70

Cross-border Cooperation and Regional Policy Coordination:The Role of BSEC Panagiota MANOLI1 Department of Mediterranean Studies, University of the Aegean

Abstract. This article examines how inter-governmental institutions such as regional organizations may affect cross-border cooperation. In doing so the focus of analysis becomes the wider Black Sea area where there is a parallel process of border areas cooperation and of regional, inter-governmental policy coordination, the latter led by the organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Institutionalized collaboration between sub-state actors across borders has been encouraged in the Black Sea area as a means of practical problem-solving in a broad range of fields reflecting a top-down approach. Still, regional, intergovernmental institutions such as BSEC by adhering to politics of state interest have played a limited role in providing resources for cross-border cooperation as they have been neglecting the role of non-state actors. The securitization of crossborder cooperation comes as the outcome of the seriousness of transnational organized crime harbored, destined to or transiting the Black Sea countries and the high security dilemma among the Black Sea states. Keywords. cross-border cooperation, Black Sea, BSEC, regionalism

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Introduction The type of cross-border cooperation examined in this essay reflects a more or less institutionalized collaboration between contiguous sub-national authorities across national borders. Cross-border cooperation (CBC) and regionalism have been catchwords on the political scene and have been part of the transformation of the political economy and governance of the Black Sea space in the last twenty years. Disputes over border areas, state sovereignty and the demarcation of boundaries have, however, restricted cooperative forces at all levels of interaction (state, regional and local). Contemporary international borders in the Black Sea area have been disputed, violated, used for economic sanctions or simply poorly managed. Border areas have been treated as an issue of conflict rather than cooperation. Accordingly, the international community has been advancing policies of border security, border monitoring and dispute settlement in the Black Sea area while governments have been reluctant to loosen control over cross-border communication. Under conditions of regional fragmentation and state building, which leads to inter-state conflict and mistrust, how can cross-border cooperation (CBC) emerge? What is the role of regional organizations in this process? This essay looks into the conditions and processes shaping cross-border cooperation in the Black Sea area, placing an emphasis on the role of the Organization 1

Lecturer, University of the Aegean. Email: [email protected].

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of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, a regional economic organization established by the Black Sea countries in 1992 with the aim of promoting stability and prosperity in the Black Sea area, through means of economic interaction. The question thus asked here is whether BSEC, through its policies, directly or indirectly provides opportunity structures for promoting cross-border activities. It looks into how cooperation between adjacent authorities is linked to regional cooperation the latter constituting the reason of existence of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)2. Post-Cold War dynamics changed the political economy of the Black Sea area, dissolving internal borders, opening-up new ones, moving and reshaping old borders. Since 1991, the Black Sea countries have signed several agreements advancing interstate and inter-regional cooperation, while at the same time some of them have been to war over borders and sovereignty issues. The necessity of establishing communication links across borders led slowly to the emergence of networks promoting multilevel and multifaceted interaction among civil society actors. However, CBC has remained largely ‘securitized’ and captured in inter-governmental bargaining, and only recently have there been efforts to generate bottom-up civil society interaction. Cross-border cooperation in post-Soviet space was applied to overcome post-Cold War divisions and maintain communication across –newly– established or opened borders. Today, it has additionally acquired a developmental perspective as it is shown hereafter.

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Border Areas in the Black Sea Region The border areas of the wider Black Sea region display high heterogeneity linked to different paths in recent political history of littoral states and their diverse economic structures. Though at the crossroads of cultural, commercial and energy routes along the East-West and North-South axes, the region lags behind the rest of Europe in economic development and integration. Intra-regional transactions are at low levels despite geographical proximity undermining the emergence of cross-border regions. The shores of the Black Sea harbor significant regional cities and ports such as Istanbul at the entrance of the Black Sea, Odessa and Novorossiysk in the north and Constanta in the west. The overall economic performance of the border areas is however poor compared to other regions in Europe. FDI remains low and targeted only to infrastructure (especially in the energy sector) while transport links are weak, reflecting low trade flows. The Black Sea coastal areas were, prior to the Cold War division of much of the 20th century, linked via sea-born trade, generating wealthy and prosperous local communities. These ‘spontaneous’ networks were abruptly interrupted by the Cold War iron curtain that divided the Black Sea world in recent history between the Western and the Eastern blocs. With the dissolution of the Soviet Empire in 1991, most of the areas around the Black Sea were left in a security gap that allowed for interstate conflict, civil unrest and organized crime to emerge, while at the same time the Black Sea communities were struggling to build new state institutions, mend links with their (new) neighbors and enter the global markets.

2

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation was established in 1992 between eleven countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine and gained the status of an international organization in 1999. In 2004, Serbia also joined as a member.

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Twenty years since then, most of the countries’ coastal areas are among the least developed within national contexts. Furthermore, from a wider, regional perspective, the level of economic development is extremely unequal in the areas directly surrounding the Black Sea while their economic structures are extremely heterogeneous. Thus, in Turkey, tourism, commercial and public services are dominant (65.2%), followed by the industrial sector (25.6 %). Many other areas bordering or close to the sea, such as in Russia, Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria show a more industrially oriented economy, although the relative weight of the service sector in the Black Sea regions of Ukraine and Russia, especially tourism and maritime services, is somewhat higher than the national average. In other countries, especially in Armenia and Georgia, and to a lesser extent Moldova, the agricultural sector is more strongly represented [1]. Differences in the economic structures of the border areas have hindered the emergence of common priorities at a policy level, while the absence of an externally oriented business sector has deprived CBC of its key drivers. There are, of course, exceptions to that, as it is in the case of the Bulgarian-Greek border where new market opportunities and legislative (tax) differentiations between the two EU members have led to the emergence of a new wave of cross-border FDI and trade. Cross-border economic and trade interaction is also hindered by the high security dilemma especially with regard to the South Caucasus borders. The quality and quantity of the region’s infrastructure reflects the general level of economic development. The availability of transport infrastructure is limited, even taking into account the sometimes relatively low intensity of use of some of this infrastructure, which also reflects low levels of economic development. The share of trade that remains internal to the Black Sea basin is very limited, consisting mostly of energy. FDI is focused mainly on the exploitation of natural resources, the construction of infrastructure for energy networks rather than the creation of manufacturing plants despite the competitiveness of labor supply (low cost, skilled workers) in the area. Border areas in the Black Sea countries face common challenges linked to transnational organized crime including illegal human trafficking, illegal migration, money laundering and trafficking in weapons and drugs. This is an area where CBC networks have emerged, especially at a regional level as it is indicated in the next section. In addition, customs issues and environmental protection have emerged on the top of CBC agenda. The importance of regulation and exchange of information with regard to customs procedures was also raised by a study (2006) conducted on cross-border cooperation between Georgia and Armenia. The study argued that the ‘local population’s low level of awareness of customs procedures and the inadequate access to relevant information, however, have created tension and complicated the perception of such procedures. Furthermore, better access to information is essential for the population of the bordering regions for expanding business and other types of cooperation against the current background of 27% of the population of Georgia’s bordering regions having connections with the Republic of Armenia…’ [2]. Nevertheless, the challenge most often identified by local and international actors as being the most relevant for cross-border activities is the environmental degradation that is rooted in the geological structure of the basin, but has been accelerating due to human factors, especially since the political and economic changes in the early 1990s. All countries are extremely energy intensive, which has a great impact on the environment. The insufficient environmental infrastructure leads to heavy pollution, especially of rivers within the Sea basin and the Black Sea itself. Cooperative structures to deal with environmental issues have been set up, still, however, even in

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the case of EU’s external borders the obstacles remain high linked to poor international relations and people to people contacts, lack of resources and knowledge and the peripheral place of border areas. In the case of the Black Sea collaboration between trans-boundary countries has dealt with the promotion of relevant national legislation and the implementation of international environmental treaties. One challenge for CBC in the wider Black Sea region, which reflects the different political path of the countries involved, concerns their administrative systems which are based on two layers: the central and local administrations, with a strong dominance by the central institutions and very little space for regional institutions between the local and central levels. The slow process of decentralization and the democratic deficit in most Black Sea countries has kept the pillars of local governance (such as financial resources and clear division of powers) weak. Twenty years since the regime change only now there is some awareness of the role of the local authorities. In June 2009, the National Association of Local Authorities of Georgia (NALAG) and the Communities Association Armenia (CAA) established the EuroCaucas organization with the aim of assisting local governments in the Armenian-Georgian border regions in developing cross-border co-operation initiatives. Still, the central government exerts too strong control over local authorities while civil society and citizens remain distant from policy making at the local level. In addition to the above, when studying border areas in the Black Sea region, there are two key aspects that need to be taken into consideration as the general background within which CBC takes place. First, the most serious challenge for border areas around the Black Sea is the internal and international tensions with which they are involved in particular the protracted conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria). Second, mobility is a complex and turbulent aspect of this border space. Visa requirements resulting from the EU membership of some Black Sea countries (Greece, Romania and Bulgaria) pose new obstacles for trans-border movement. For example, after the border was opened between Moldova and Romania in 1991, an identity card sufficed for citizens of Moldova and Romania to cross it during the course of the next ten years. However, since 1 January 2007, citizens of the Republic of Moldova have been required to obtain a visa to enter Romania. The recent signing in 2009 of the agreement on border traffic is a sign of the re-establishment of ties between Romania and Moldova. Currently, Moldovan citizens have the right of free circulation at a distance of 30 km from the national border. Besides the Convention on Small Border Traffic, Romania and Moldova also signed the Intergovernmental Agreement on checkpoints at the national border and the Protocol amending the Intergovernmental Agreement on promotion and mutual protection of investments. Furthermore, visa policies have been used as a means of political pressure, as in the case of the introduction of visa requirements for Georgian citizens entering Russia following the 2008 August war between the two countries. The consequences of such visa requirements are not only economic but also social and emotional.

Cross-border Cooperation at Governmental Level The Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) has been serving multilateral political and economic interaction among its member states since 1992, and is one of the most institutionalized initiatives in the region. The starting point of the discussion with regard to BSEC’s contribution to CBC is the recognition of the vast

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geographical scope of the organization (i.e. covering long border areas of its twelve member states) and its primarily intergovernmental nature (i.e. government to government relations) that accordingly shape its agenda and working methods, and which have undermined its potential in fostering CBC. Accordingly, cross-border cooperation has not been a priority on its agenda. Whenever initiatives have been taken in this direction they have fallen victim to tense inter-governmental relations, while no separate institution-building of cross-border regions has been encouraged. BSEC’s importance for CBC stems from its potential to promote common policies at the governmental level, which help CBC to take place. As an inter-governmental organization, BSEC promotes multilateralism among its twelve member states, focusing on issues of economic development and soft security. Its intergovernmental approach thus constitutes its core means of engagement in crossborder cooperation. Rather than trying to bring adjacent authorities together, it promotes common understanding and common policies among central authorities of member states in dealing with trans-national and trans-border issues. In addition to the BSEC organization itself, there are other (related) bodies which play a role in crossborder activities. These include the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, the Business Council and the Parliamentary Assembly of BSEC. Some of the organization’s activities in trade, transport infrastructure and customs cooperation, which are priority policy areas on its agenda, have a direct impact on border management. Such activities include the promotion of a system of real-time information exchange between the customs agencies based on standards set by the World Customs Organization. As an economic organization, BSEC has attempted to facilitate the movement of goods across the Black Sea and eliminate non-tariff barriers that hinder trans-national movement. Thus, one of the first issues placed on its agenda was customs. In 2008, BSEC upgraded the ad hoc Group of Experts on Customs Matters into a Working Group. Despite this institutional advancement, its agenda still remains at the level of exchange of information. Though several proposals (e.g. establishing a mechanism of exchange of preliminary information about goods and vehicles moved through the borders of member-states among the customs administrations of the interested parties) have been tabled, an agreement has been difficult to reach. Difficulties for the deepening of cooperation in customs matters are of two kinds; bilateral disputes and EU-related obligations.3,4 Instead of progress in project implementation, regular meetings of the Heads of Customs Administrations of 3

With regard to the Model Draft Protocol on the Exchange of Information on the Movement of Goods and Conveyance, elaborated by Russia in 2010 ‘[t]he Republic of Azerbaijan expressed its position that, at present, the mechanism of exchange of preliminary information should be established at a bilateral level between the interested Member States. The Republic of Bulgaria and Romania reiterated that within the EU the European Commission is the sole spokesman on the issue of exchange of information and that the EU member states, which are also Member States of BSEC, cannot participate in bilateral arrangements on their behalf’ (See Report of the WG on Customs Matters, Istanbul, BSEC Headquarters, 10-11 March 2011). 4 ‘The representative of the European Commission (EC) reconfirmed the position of the Commission which states that the EC shows a positive approach towards the establishment of a preliminary information exchange mechanism of customs data among the non EU BSEC Member States. The EC also pointed out that within the EU the EC is the sole spokesman on the issue of exchange of information and that the three EU Member States that are also Member States of BSEC cannot participate in such an arrangement, the European Commission being the entity which can conclude bilateral agreements with third countries in this respect. The EC stated that the EC welcomes and encourages the establishment of such systems as they are regarded as useful tools and effective instruments of reducing waiting times at the borders and stimulating trade flows among the participating countries’ (see Report of the WG on Customs Matters, Istanbul, 6-7 April 2010).

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the BSEC Member States have taken place. The failure, however, of BSEC in trade related issues has undermined its potential to develop the border areas economically, which would have been beneficial for intra-regional trade and development.. Another dimension with which BSEC has been concerned is the improvement of border crossing by advancing different modes of transport. The work on the gradual liberalization of transportation is going on within the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Facilitation of Road Transport of Goods in the BSEC Region (signed in Kyiv in 2002 and entered into force in 2006). The Steering Committee established in accordance with this MoU works on the issues of gradual liberalization of transport, monitoring of border waiting times, introduction of the International Vehicle Weight Certificate, harmonization of charging policies, etc. Issues related in particular to road infrastructure are dealt with within the Memorandum of Understanding for the Coordinated Development of the Black Sea Ring Highway (signed in Belgrade on 19 April 2007). The issues related to organizational matters regarding the functioning of the Steering Committee and its Secretariat were resolved and the BSRH Action Plan was adopted. Currently, the participating states are working on finalizing the main BSRH route and its connections5. The development of maritime infrastructure and links is under way within the Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of the Motorways of the Sea in the BSEC Region (signed in Belgrade on 19 April 2007) and the relevant ad hoc Working Group coordinates this work. Two more agreements on Simplification of Visa Procedures for Businesspeople and for the Professional Lorry Drivers Nationals of the BSEC Member States (signed in Tirana in 2008) also constitute a contribution to facilitating border crossing. Most attention has been placed, however, on fighting cross-border organized crime. The specialized WG on Combating Crime, in particular in its organized form, mentions that one of its activities is exactly to ‘strengthen cross border cooperation among the competent authorities of the BSEC Participating States…’[3]. The Network of Liaison Officers on Combating Organized Crime, founded in 2002, has been focusing on sharing information on border movement, criminal justice response and preventing terrorist travel. Recently, BSEC has taken some steps towards other aspects of CBS. Its newly established working groups on Culture and Tourism promote another aspect of crossborder communication through cultural projects such as the routes of coinage, cultural routes of the Roman emperors, the silk road, vine and wine routes and the legend of the Argonauts6. In the field of environmental protection the most significant advancement is the creation of a BSEC Information System on Environmental Protection 7. 5

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the International Road Federation (IRF) was signed in Antalya, the Republic of Turkey, on 24 November 2006. The MoU looks essentially on collaboration between the IRF and BSEC regarding the Black Sea Ring Highway (BSRH). The BSRH is a high capacity highway. The BSRH length is approximately 7000 km. The main route and its connections may include the following cities: Istanbul (Turkey), Samsun (Turkey), Trabzon (Turkey), Batumi (Georgia), Poti (Georgia), Yerevan (Armenia), Baku (Azerbaijan), Novorossiysk (Russia), Rostov-on-Don (Russia), Taganrog (Russia), Mariupol (Ukraine), Melitopol (Ukraine), Odessa (Ukraine), Chisinau (Moldova), Bucharest (Romania), Constantza (Romania), Haskovo (Bulgaria), Sofia (Bulgaria), Nish (Serbia), Belgrade (Serbia), Tirana (Albania), Edirne (Turkey), Komotini (Greece), Alexandroupolis (Greece), Istanbul (Turkey). 6 Indicative are also the BSEC - Global Heritage Fund Workshops on ‘Cultural Heritage Across Borders’ to identify programs that can stimulate regional economic development and build political stability along border regions of the Black Sea Region. 7 BSEC has been implementing environmental projects such as Joint BSEC-UNDP Project ‘Introducing Climate Change in the Environmental Strategy for the Protection of the Black Sea’ and the Joint BSEC-GTZ

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Cross-border cooperation in the Black Sea area has actually acquired a security as well as an economic development perspective. The securitization of cross-border cooperation comes as the outcome of the seriousness of trans-national organized crime harbored, destined to or transiting the Black Sea countries and the high security dilemma among the Black Sea states. Effective cross-border interaction requires that borders are both efficient (facilitating legitimate trade and transit) and secure (preventing illegitimate trade and transit). BSEC has attempted to improve conditions with both the efficiency and security of borders through close cooperation at a national level. Such efforts include the upgrading of border-crossing infrastructure, enhancing cooperation between border authorities at the local level and improving governance via a more coordinated approach to the management of common challenges.

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Other Drivers of Cross-Border Cooperation Regional cooperation between border authorities in the Black Sea Region has been primarily driven through multilateral projects by ‘outside’ drivers such as the EU or other specialized international groups. Especially for the EU, the susceptibility of its external border regions to crime, together with the Schengen zone requirements have motivated the EU to concentrate on ensuring efficient and secure borders. The most important tool of cross-border cooperation in the area is the multilateral program of Black Sea CBC launched by the EU within the framework of the ENPI. Black Sea CBC covers territories of the ten countries on the external borders of the EU around the Black Sea basin (having an ENPI budget of €25.696 million for the period 2007-13). Its core policy objectives are intended to help: promote economic and social development in regions on both sides of common borders; address common challenges, in fields such as the environment, public health and the prevention of and fight against organized crime; ensure efficient and secure borders; and promote local cross-border ‘people-to-people’ actions. The Black Sea Synergy (BSS) which is the main regional approach of the EU towards the Black Sea (launched in Kiev in 2008) has given priority to the intergovernmental level. The BSS identifies key areas where regional cooperation could be promoted including, among others, energy, trade, environment, transport, good governance as well as contacts between local authorities. Border management is not specifically mentioned, whereas ‘managing movement and improving security’, as well as transport and trade, are key target areas. However, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy of the EU (launched in Prague in 2009) has placed Integrated Border Management (IBM) as a Flagship Initiative. In 2010, the Integrated Border Management Panel was established and attached to the EaP Platform ‘Democracy, Good Governance and Stability’. This Panel decided on the Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management Flagship Initiative Project with the overall objective to facilitate the movement of persons and goods across borders in the six EaP countries, while at the same time maintaining secure borders. The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) launched in 2005, following a joint request made by Moldova and Ukraine to the European Commission, is an advisory, technical body mandated to enhance the capacities of the Project ‘Legal Framework for a Green Economy within the BSEC Member States–Regional Review and Dialogue on Systems and Perspectives’ (2011). Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus, IOS Press, Incorporated, 2013.

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border guard and customs authorities and other law enforcement and state agencies of Moldova and Ukraine. EUBAM provides on-the-job training, technical assistance and advice to the Moldovan and Ukrainian border guards and customs services, reinforcing their capacity to carry out effective border and customs controls and border surveillance. The mandate of the Mission has already been extended three times (in 2007, 2009 and 2011), with the current mandate expiring on the 30thNovember 2015. With the support of EUBAM, Moldova and Ukraine have reached considerable results in the area of integrated border management, such as joint border control operations, production of common border security assessments, joint public information activities, pilot projects on jointly operated border crossing points and joint patrols, confidence building measures and exchange of customs pre-arrival information. Accordingly, the South Caucasus Integrated Border Management Program (SCIBM) implemented by UNDP, has since 2009 been supporting the implementation of integrated border management strategies by the governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The establishment of a Black Sea Euroregion (in 2008) bringing together regional and municipal competencies, has been another initiative that, as a CBC instrument, has largely failed to meet expectations. Currently, there are other more confined Euroregions in the Black Sea area, which involve a Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian Euro-region - Low Danube (1998) and Upper Prut (2000), as well as the MoldovanRomanian Euro-region - Siret-Prut-Nistru (2000). As it has also been argued elsewhere Euroregions are actually in a dormant mode [4], and their revitalization will occur only if the existing legal framework for developing cross-border cooperation between Black Sea states will be filled with specific projects and actions. The support of Euroregions and CBC programs by the EU constitutes an effort to mediate the effects of discriminatory and exclusionary practices (such as the Schengen regime) that are contributing to the hardening of its external borders in the East and South. Other cooperation initiatives have been established for this purpose, reflecting priorities of the littoral states. The littoral Black Sea states have developed maritime border cooperation lead by the Black Sea Border/Coast Guard Cooperation Forum (BSCF), whose operations are through the Border Coordination and Information Centre (BS BCIC) in Burgas. Since 2000, the leaders of the Black Sea Littoral States Border/Coast Guard Agencies8 have been meeting annually regarding maritime regional border cooperation in the Black Sea. The purpose is to enhance interaction among border/coast guard agencies in order to prevent smuggling by sea, illegal migration and other kinds of illegal activities. In order to achieve this aim, an automated information exchange system (AIES) enables rapid information flow regarding illegal activities in the Black Sea region through an online computer network between the littoral states.

Conclusion One obvious reason for the low level of cross-border cooperation in the Black Sea area is the long list of obstacles which includes: a) the security dilemma linked to borders; b) economic embargoes and closed borders; c) administrative weaknesses of local governments to exercise border control; d) transnational organized crime; e) diverse capacity and authority of local authorities; f) diverse legal and regulatory environments 8

From Bulgaria, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine.

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(i.e. EU borders, non-EU borders); g) weak civil society; h) underdeveloped border areas. As a result and within this context of regional fragmentation, cross-border cooperation among civil society actors was late to develop, despite its celebrated importance as a tool for social transformation, economic development and modernization. The EU’s role via policies and tools such as the ENP has been a catalyst in improving conditions for civil society cooperation. This essay has argued that Black Sea CBC represents a policy-driven rather than a spontaneous case of local cross-border integration. BSEC’s role in this process is one of a facilitator of cooperative relationships between public bodies, reflecting a very formal and hierarchical process. While the EU has focused on civil society as the main engine capable of boosting cross-border cooperation BSEC gives priority to governments in an effort to change norms and cooperative practices among its members. Both approaches are complementary as CBC involves a particular consideration of civil and social rights, information, culture, training, and education as well as good international relations between neighboring countries. BSEC’s role may be described as a tool of policy-driven cross-border cooperation, creating networks consisting mainly of public agency institutions either on the local, district or regional level, to address inter-dependencies and to stabilize cross-border contacts. In substantive terms, CBC is foremost concerned with practical problem solving in a broad range of fields of everyday administrative life. However, CBS around the Black Sea has been increasingly influenced not by formal institutions but increasingly by civil society groups through processes of de-centralized political ‘socialization.

References

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[1] [2] [3]

[4]

European Commission 2007. Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Programme 2007-2013, p.5. Narmania, D. and Grigoryan, S., 2010. Cross-Border Co-operation between Georgia and the Republic of Armenia (Existing Problems and Challenges), CARE International in the Caucasus, p.5. See ‘The terms of reference of the WG on Combating Crime in particular in its Organized Form’. Online. Available at: http://www.bsec-organization.org/aoc/coooeration/Pages/TermsR.aspx [Accessed on 7 September 2011]. Chirila, V. Food-for-Thought Paper Cross-border Cooperation (CBC) in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood. International Center for Democratic Transition [online] Available at: http://interregional.icdt.hu/public/files/Crossborder%20Cooperation%20_CBC_%20in%20the%20EUs%20Eastern%20Neighborhood%20%20Chirila.pdf [Accessed on 7 September 2011].

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Patterns of Cross-Border Co-operation

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Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus A. Ergun and H. Isaxanli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-187-8-81

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Evolution of Cooperation and Mutual Perceptions: Romania-Republic of Moldova Daniela OITU,a,1 Coniu-Tiberiu OITUb and Camelia MORARIUc Department of Sociology and Social Work, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Iai, Romania

a, b, c

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Abstract. This article focuses on the evolution of cooperation and mutual perceptions of two neighboring states: Romania and the Republic of Moldova. It underlines regional development and the way in which entrepreneurship, cooperation and development, take place at the border of the two states. The article’s main objectives are the description of the strategies and priorities defined by the action of people engaged in regional development and entrepreneurship at the border level, the description of motivations, positive effects and problems in this process, the impact of the EU and national policies on these processes.. Data has been collected, analyzed and interpreted, starting with European, national and regional documents, regarding regional development and cross-border entrepreneurship, from political declarations of the representatives of the two countries, to basic interviews with local and regional stakeholders, with representatives of civil organizations, and small and medium enterprises who are involved in cross-border cooperation projects at the Romanian-Moldavian border as well. The main conclusions emphasize the importance of European and national politics and financing for the evolution of cooperation, for regional development and for cross-border partnership. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Keywords. Cross-border cooperation, perceptions, social and economic cohesion, European policies, regional development

Introduction In specialized analysis it is considered that balancing levels of economic and social development of the region in question, within national and European contexts, is a fundamental condition for ensuring the internal cohesion of the aforementioned territory. This internal cohesion supposes a balanced organization of the territory from both the demographic and economic perspective, an infrastructure which is divided in a rather balanced way, and, primarily, the presence of a unified consciousness and sense of common destiny; the formation of a unitary way to solve the economic, social and cultural problems of the specific territory. In 2002, Stefan Krätke pointed out the fact that European regions in the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ are differing with respect to their economic and institutional resources, and to 1 Department of Sociology and Social Work, Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Bd. Carol I, 11, 700506, Iai, Romania. E-mail: [email protected].

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their competitiveness. As a consequence of these differences, Eastern enlargement in 2004 “will thus have a strong impact on a large number of European regions, and there will be ‘winners and losers’ within the present European Union (EU) as well as the accession countries” [1]. The space analyzed by this article is the eastern border between the European Union and Republic of Moldova. The Romanian-Moldovan border is 450km long. Along the border there are three Euro-regions2: the Upper Prut Euro-region, the SiretPrut-Nistru Rivers Euro-region and the Lower-Danube River Euro-region - which covers six counties in Romania (28,799.5 km2 from a total of 237,500 km2), but the whole territory of the Moldovan Republic (33,843 km2). The main objectives of this study are: a) to identify perceptions and motivations which are the basis of the strategies for general cross-border cooperation3, including economic cooperation; to present the impact of European Union and of national politics on regional development and entrepreneurship; and to emphasize the positive effects and problems related to cross-border cooperation. We were interested in the perceptions of those involved in cross-border entrepreneurship, following studies that point out the fact that the characteristics of the entrepreneur play a particularly strong role in new venture creation [3]. From amongst these characteristics there are some that are emphasized as external: political decisions; legislation; social, economic and cultural context; and the level of scientific knowledge [4, 5]. Others are emphasized as internal: the formation of expectations in parallel with identification of opportunities [6]; decision making capacity; and a need for cognitive closure [7]. In a survey undertaken in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova [8] the main reason given for starting a business shows that “independence” or autonomy was by far the most common reason, followed by “a desire to boost income” and “personal fulfilment”.

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1. Background to the Cooperation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova Romania was the first state to recognize the independence of Moldova, only a few hours after the new state's independence, on August the 27th, 1991. Two days later, 2

Euro-regions are administrative-territorial structures intended to promote cross-border cooperation between neighbouring local or regional authorities of different countries located along shared state borders [2]. Euro-regions are structures and tools of cooperation among the regions and can have their own financial resources. This fact made them able to address a variety of cross-border topics: such as health, research and development, education and training, waste management, environmental protection, tourism and leisure, rescue and security, transport and communication infrastructure, mobility of people, and business cooperation [2]. 3 Cross-border cooperation is seen as neighbourhood cooperation across national borders between adjacent border regions, involving regional and local authorities and other organizations in the border area. In our case there are European Territorial Cooperation on EU Internal Borders (FEDR): operational programmes for cross-border cooperation Romania - Bulgaria and Romania – Hungary 2007-2013 and by European Territorial Cooperation on EU External Borders – here for us has to be mentioned: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), with operational programme for cross-border cooperation Romania - Moldova - Ukraine (126 millions Euro, for Romania). Trans-national Cooperation expresses cooperation between countries in a particular area or on a broader. For Romania it is Operational programme for trans-national cooperation - South East European space. Interregional cooperation is seen as subject oriented cooperation across national borders between regional and local authorities and other organizations which can be located anywhere within a state’s territory. It is sustained by Interregional operational programmes.

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diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level were established. The Embassy of Romania was also the first diplomatic representative of a state opened in Chisinau, on the 20th January 1992. Political, cultural and commercial relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova are developing constantly. Starting with the early independence era of “flower bridges”, many programs ran based on volunteer work: they were mainly culture oriented (visits from folk music ensembles, singers, sports teams). Extended cooperation in education has been developed since. These include bilateral governmental scholarships for pupils and students, as well as joint master’s degree programs. From 2007, political, cultural and commercial relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova have been influenced by the changes Romania has gone through since it acceded to the EU. The compulsory visa, required to cross the new European border on the Prut River, affects collaboration in all sectors. Romania facilitated visa processes for Moldovan citizens however, and at that time, political declarations had not influenced cooperation directly. At the beginning of year 2009, with the background of the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova (5th April 2009), the Moldovan institutions were “moderately open” for cooperation. After the events taking place in the Republic of Moldova on 6th-8th of April 2009, and considering the decisions and statements that followed, we can say that cross-border cooperation was profoundly affected by political practices and decisions. These affects have meant that since 1990 the relationship between Romania and the Republic of Moldova has been changeable, and sometimes even unpredictable. From December 2009, political, cultural and commercial relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova have restarted. According to official data, Moldova has benefited, from 2007 onwards, by 60-75% of the total of Romanian Official Development Assistance. Synthesizing this information, we can underline many dimensions of cooperation between these two states. On the public level, there are partnerships in areas such as: commercial; cultural and educational; political (of parties sharing the same political orientation); environmental protection; infrastructure development and resource exchanges; border security and the free circulation of citizens; local public administration and regional development networks (Euro-regions); harmonization of legislation etc. On the private and civil society organizations (CSO) level, cooperation has developed on commercial, social, cultural, educational, environment protection, but also on know-how, such as the exchange of practices and experience (CSO as a 'watch dog’). There are and were many external influences on the evolution of cooperation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The main actors involved here are at the trans-national and international level: NATO, the US, the UN and its institutions etc.; The European Union and its institutions played an important role; the OSCE; and in the immediate neighbourhood, Russia and Ukraine are the main actors. On the national level, presidents, governments, parliaments, parties, churches, state-owned and private-owned companies and civil society representatives make significant contribution to general perceptions, promoting or, sometimes, restricting cooperation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The European Union has established the issues open for collaboration and financing through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), Phare CBC

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programs, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), the Central European Initiative (ICE) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP).

2. Issues Shaping Mutual Perceptions 2.1. Citizenship According to Romanian law, those who can prove that they themselves, their parents or their grandparents have held Romanian citizenship in the past, can apply or re-apply for a Romanian passport. The current process for obtaining citizenship is complicated and slow. Similar laws to those of Romania, according to which original citizens can regain their citizenship lost through no fault of their own, are also present in other EU member states: Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. The topic of citizenship is especially sensitive in the Republic of Moldova, due to geographic as well as political reasons. The Republic of Moldova risks heading fast into depopulation; even natural population growth between the latest censuses (1989 and 2004) has shown an average yearly value of – 0.5%. Besides, the Republic of Moldova has a high number of people working abroad. Between March 2009 and July 2011 (while preparing the list of voters), the official data showed that about 600,000 citizens of voting age (over 18) out of a total of 2.5 million voters were abroad at election time. Unofficially, the estimates indicated that one million individuals over the age of 18 were outside the borders of the Republic of Moldova at that time.

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2.2. Financial Assistance Romania's experience as a donor to Moldova has manifested itself only relatively recently, since its accession to the European Union, particularly in the cultural dimension through the Romanian Cultural Institute and the Department for Relations with Romanians Everywhere. Since 2007 Romania has become an EU member and one of its European obligations is to donate money for development to third countries. Romania established the Republic of Moldova on its list of priority countries for its development funds. In 2010, Romania decided to award Moldova, for the next four years, a grant of €100 million, in addition to annual funds provided by the MFA (about €900,000 in 2010). At present, the official development assistance (ODA) of Romania is offered through the following two funding mechanisms: a) Financing through multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Moldova. Thus, in 2007 - 2009 approximately €1.64 million has been awarded for 13 projects, in areas such as local development, social protection, infrastructure, civil society development, human rights etc. b) Bilateral funding (since 2010) - six projects worth €1.3 million in sectors such as agriculture, health, good governance, education and media etc.

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3. Study Methodology

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The aim of this study is to examine the perceptions and relationships between regional development, entrepreneurship and cross-border cooperation along the common border between Romania, as a member of the European Union, and the Republic of Moldova. Throughout data collection and the analysis process, we sought cooperation from actors and institutions, based on political, economic and social mechanisms, at the local, regional, national and European level. The methodology is complex, consisting of documentation of the context and the evolution of relations of cross-border economic cooperation since 2000. Field investigation consisted of basic interviews with representatives of civil society organizations involved in joint projects for cooperation in areas of economic and social cohesion, in both Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The respondents to the basic interviews were managers of projects and programs of organizations in Moldova and Romania involved in crossborder cooperation. Their selection followed two coordinates: primarily, the presence of organizations financed by Phare CBC 2004 or 2005 was sought, and from there, by snowball method, other organizations engaged in trans-national and inter-regional cooperation. We also monitored the cross-border cooperation projects carried out under Phare 2005 and 2007. We focused on the specific role of the EU in influencing policies by considering the impact of neighborhood programs, national action plans and the new Eastern Partnership. In close connection, we have focused on language change and political speeches, particularly on bilateral relations, attitudes towards the EU and towards the political ideas held by European institutions. An important dimension of analysis was the identification of the role of civil society and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in developing cross-border cooperation, aiming at identifying priorities for funding cross-border cooperation projects. These priorities and the level at which they are established - local, regional, international - are issues which prevail between local initiatives and regional cooperation activities, and we have sought to find their origin - groups, organizations, structures - through basic interviews.

4. European and National Policies and Strategies of Regional Development Support 4.1. Politics, Policies and Regional Cooperation for Development The idea of a ‘politics of regional development’ is new, and it generates comments of speculation, controversy and confusion. Regional politics, the way it is defined at the EU level, is a mechanism which puts into practice the principle of inter-regional solidarity and cohesion between economic and social sectors, following a distribution function [9], of redirection of income flow from certain territories (areas or regions) towards the ones which need them more. The main quality of this type of economic politics is that it aims to reunite, at the same time, in the same location, all the three factors of development: human resources, natural resources available to a special territory and the necessary capital [10]. In Romania, the regions that are found closer to Western Europe (North-West, West and Centre) have enjoyed greater economic growth. Although the statistics data indicate certain fluctuations due to a local geography, Eastern regions (North-East,

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South-East) situated at the border with Moldova, as well as the Southern ones (South and South-West) situated along the Danube river, are the least developed. Regional development means the ‘use of resources (local but also remote from the national and international environment), for the growth of general competitiveness of the territory, to raise the level of adaptability of production and functional components to the necessities of structural reduction (to meet regional and national needs) and, not least, from a macroeconomic perspective, for the reduction of delays between different components of the structure of the national space [11]. At the EU level as well as the level of member states, the politics of regional development generally represents a set of measures that the central government authorities take in favour of the social and economic development of the poorer regions. The policies through which economic, social and territorial cohesion is promoted are evaluated considering their efficiency in reducing regional disparities and in providing equal opportunities for individuals, irrespective of the regions or countries in which they live. Cohesion policies represent the community instrument through which economic convergence is promoted [12]. One of the first conditions for creating a solid regional policy is diagnosis, by carrying out scientific research on economic and social disparities at national level. The future orientation of regional policy should take into consideration not only the existing disparities, but also the prevention and deepening of their occurrence. The structuring process of Romanian regional policy has evolved from a simple description of the existing situation to the development of some concrete action strategies and programme implementing. Although in the last variant these appear more detailed, partnership and monitoring still remain a goal [13]. It is difficult to note a true regional approach of the central or local administration [14]. Social and economic cohesion, in terms of content and scope, covers the broader issue of regional imbalances and various aspects of environmental and social dimensions: social protection, worker’s rights, employment etc. In other words, the economic and social area includes all effects, all risks of community development based on free movement of capital, goods and people. Economic and social cohesion appears immediately as a corollary of EU policies and strategies, including regional ones. Roland Tavitian [15] states that the Community policy for economic and social cohesion has three basic components: traditional regional policy, reform of structural funds and the social dimension of the internal market. For other authors [16], cohesion is a political purpose relating to the search for a more egalitarian and just society that can create opportunities for all EU citizens, regardless of the local area. Since 2004 the European Commission has supported the reform of cohesion policy rules and, in 2006, the European Parliament adopted a package of new regulations relating to the cohesion policy, which maintain the principle of allocation for countries with a GDP of less than 90% of the community average. The most important change, compared to the period 2000-2006, is that the first three objectives, together with the four community initiatives (INTERREG III, LEADER+, URBAN II and EQUAL) have been reorganized since 2007 into just three objectives, grouped under the name of cohesion policy: ‘Convergence’, ‘Regional Competitiveness and Employment’ and ‘Territorial and European Cooperation’. Starting from the positive experience achieved through the former community initiative INTERREG, convergence policy has increased cross-border, trans-national and inter-regional cooperation by creating and institutionalizing some regional crossborder authorities. This aimed at promoting common solutions for neighborhood

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authorities in the field of urban, rural and coastal development, as well as at developing economic relations and at developing a network of SMEs. The cooperation is broken up into sub-areas of research, development, the information society, environment, risk prevention and integrated water management. This exercise covers land and maritime border cooperation; an amount of €8.7 billion has been granted for it (that is 2.52% from the total budget granted for this purpose) as follows: €6.44 billion for the border cooperation, €1.58 billion for trans-national cooperation and €445 million for interregional cooperation. Over 181 million people, representing 37.5% of the total population of the European Union, live in border areas. Furthermore, all the areas and all the EU’s citizens belong to one of those 13 areas of border cooperation. The European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion (ESPON) offers scientific information for the development of more complex regions or areas through research, analysis and tools (ERDF’s contribution will be €34 million). Since the 1st of January 2007, the territorial administrative units, public law structures and associations belonging to the Euro-regions1 can benefit from a new tool of territorial cooperation, according to Regulation no. 1082/2006, regarding the European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). In order to enhance the efficiency of the activities in the EU’s external border areas, the Commission has proposed the institutionalization of a new European Instrument of Neighborhood and Partnership (ENPI) in the context of the European Neighborhood Strategy for the period 1st January 2007 – 31st December 2013. The Republic of Moldova can be included in this category, through the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. For the period 2007-2013, the ENPI budget is €12 billion. In order to create a better absorption of funds dedicated to the cohesion policy, the European Commission in partnership with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Council Development Bank (ECDB), have decided on the creation of three new financial instruments: JASPERS, JEREMIE and JESICA. JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro and Medium Enterprises) supports the improvement of financing access for SMEs and the creation of some facilities for micro-credits during 2007-2013, involving ERDF resources of €2.5 billion. Romania benefits from all the three funds mentioned above, as well as from the support of the financial initiatives/instruments. The planning of these resources is possible through the Reference and Operational Programmes National Strategic Frame. At the moment, the priorities of the European Industrial Policy are: promoting entrepreneurship and skills, improving SMEs’ access to the market, improving the potential of SMEs by supporting research and innovation, and improving communication and consulting with SMEs. In order that these priorities become achieved, the EU has adopted a succession of documents; a modern policy of SMEs for development and employment (The European Commission Statement no. 551/2005), and the statement dedicated to the SMEs’ financing in order to promote value that Europe brings along (349/2006). Thus, these actions come to complete the financial instruments of the frame programme for competitiveness and innovation, as well as the JEREMIE instrument, designed to facilitate the access of SMEs and micro-enterprises to credit [17]. Both the European Plan of Economical Straightening (2008) and the strategy Small Business Act for Europe (2008) foresee policies and measures for encouraging

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the entrepreneurship and facilitation of the activity of SMEs. Some of these are: reducing the administrative burden for SMEs, cancellation of the obligation to prepare the annual results and the payment of invoices, the support of employment by a reduction in the social expenses of the employees in case of low incomes, and reduced VAT quota for services that require intensive utilization of employees, enhancing the access to financing, including structural funds. In September 2008, the EU created the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIIT) that comprised all the three dimensions necessary for a dynamic economy: research, education and innovation. For improving the competitiveness of enterprises during 2007-2008, the EU allocated large sums of money for technological research and innovation through two programmes: The Seventh Framework Programme and The Frame Programme for Competitiveness and Innovation (with a budget of only 3.6 billion euros, it is addressed especially to SMEs that want to innovate in fields such as: environmental technologies, IT and communication, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources). Although the cohesion policy has proved to have a real effect in supporting the development of the EU’s regions, it will have to face new challenges in the next years.

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4.2. The Impact of European Policies and Strategies on Evolution of Cooperation When analysing the funds allocated to the 27 EU member states, one notices that most financial resources will be allocated, as well as in 2000-2006, to the poorest member states and regions, especially to the new EU’s new member states. Thus, out of a total amount of €347.4 billion for the 27 states for the next seven years, Poland receives the largest part, that is €67.3 billion. Romania is the ninth on the list, and is expected to receive €19.7 billion for the ‘Convergence’ and ‘European Territorial Cooperation’ objectives. Unfortunately, Romania doesn’t benefit from the ‘Regional Competitiveness and Employment’ objective because it doesn’t yet have convergent regions to meet these requirements. The level of the annual allocations for Romania for these seven programming years is about four times higher than the available funds through EU pre-accession instruments – Phare, Ispa and Sapard. The global financial allocation established by the European Council’s Decision from December 2005 is about 3.8% of GDP, an absolute amount of €19.668 billion, out of which €12.661 billion will be allocated through Structural Funds within the ‘Convergence’ objective, €6.552 billion are allocated through the Cohesion Fund, and €0.455 billion will be allocated to the ‘European Territorial Cooperation’ objective. In recent years SMEs have been the spine of the economies of almost every major country in the EU. The Government Strategy to support development of Romanian SMEs during 2004-2008 has been promoted. Following this, through the network of economic advisors of the embassies, consulates and Romania’s own economic offices abroad, A Business Guidance, for each country has been developed, which contains useful information for helping Romanian economic operators who want to export or to initiate business with companies from the partner countries. In the opinion of the Romanian authorities, Romanian companies and Romania itself have a great chance to recover with the support of the European grants. During 2009 over 700 financing contracts were signed. The contracts were related to the projects submitted within the first two calls launched by the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises, Trade and Business Affairs (MSMETBA), as an Intermediate

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Body for the Operational Sector Programme “Enhancing Economic Competitiveness”, Priority Axis 1 – “An efficient and innovative production system”. Despite this, the rate of absorption of EU funds was at least 10% over the total amount available in 2007-2009. The official data, available for November 30th,, 2009, shows an absorption rate of 9.58%. In Varna on the 21st October 1992, representatives of governmental organizations that administer policies and programmes of stimulation to SMEs from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey signed an agreement to create the Balkan Centre for Cooperation between Small and Medium Enterprises, that now has three headquarters: one in Bucharest, one in Istanbul and another one in Thessaloniki. The document has been approved by the Romanian Government, by HG no. 237/1993. At the level of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CCI), Romania has concluded 32 bilateral agreements. One of these is the CCI Bilateral Romania – the Republic of Moldova “Unirea”. Within The Neighbourhood Programme Romania, The Republic of Moldova Phare CBC 2005, at the level of the three Euro-regions (Upper Prut, Siret-Prut-Nistru and Lower Danube) 62 projects have been financed: 37 with first priority, Economic and Social Development, and 25 concerning People to People Actions - compared to Phare CBC 2004, which contracted 47 projects. The first call for proposals and projects for the Common Operational Programme Romania-Ukraine-the Republic of Moldova 2007-2013, has resulted in the submission of 422 projects, of which 260 are within the first two priorities of the Programme (The first priority is entitled ‘towards a more competitive border economy’ and the second priority is entitled ‘environment and preparing for emergencies’), and 156 within the third priority (entitled ‘The Cooperation “People to People”’). The Regional Office for Cross-border Cooperation (Iai) claims that the value of the submitted projects exceeds the overall amount allocated to this project auction (€30 million for the first two priorities and €5 million for the third priority). After the evaluation phase, the first grant contracts were signed on the second quarter of 2010. We have been interested in the activity of those types of institutions with implications for cross-border cooperation and regional development.

5. Trade Exchange between Romania and the Republic of Moldova In 2007, the volume of trade between Romania and the Republic of Moldova was calculated to be worth $882.17 million, compared to $564.0 million in 2006, which means an increase of 55.1%. In 2007, of this trade, Romanian exports were worth $632.46 million, compared to $427.0 million in 2006, which means an increase of 48.12%, and imports from the Republic of Moldova were valued at $246.4 million compared to $137.0 million in 2006, which means an increase of 76.04 %. The Romanian trade balance was + $386.06. Compared to the same period of the year, the volume of bilateral trade exchange increased until 48.12%, and imports increased until 76.04%. In Romania, 2,925 mixed joint ventures are registered Romanian – Moldovan, and the value of Moldovan capital invested is $29.25 million (the 36th highest foreign investor in the country), and in the Republic of Moldova about

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600 mixed Moldovan – Romanian joint ventures are registered, and Romanian invested capital is about $60 million (the 9th highest foreign investors country). In 2008, the total number of foreign companies that made investments in the Republic of Moldova was about 5,650, and the total foreign capital invested was about $1.7 billion. For the Republic of Moldova it is estimated that more than 80% of traders are registered in Chisinau; in the rest of the Republic of Moldova a state of depression is maintained which hinders attempts to modernize the economy. The major countries to which the Republic of Moldova exported in 2007, in order of export value, from greatest to least, are: Russia with $232.7 million, Romania with $211.3 million, Ukraine with $167.8 million, Italy with $140.2 million, Germany with $86.2 million, Belarus with $81.9 million, Poland with $48.3 million, and Kazakhstan with $45.5 million. These countries received 90% of the total Moldovan exports. The major countries from which the Republic of Moldova received imports in the analysed period, in order of import value, from greatest to least, are: Ukraine with $686.9 million, Russia with $498.6 million and Romania with $450 million. The trade balance in 2007 was negative, of $2,348 million, with a decrease of 56.8% compared to 2006. Since March 2008, the Republic of Moldova has benefited from the EU’s System of Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP), and also from quotas for some sensitive products. There are further plans to extend the list of goods which can be exported to EU member states duty free even more. Since the 1st of January 2006, the Republic of Moldova benefits from GSP+, a system of customs preferences provided by the EU to the Republic of Moldova, according to which the export of about 7,200 products made in the EU member states will be included within a duty-free regime.

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6. Strategies and Perceptions Related to Cross-Border Cooperation There are common economic development strategies taken into consideration at the level of the Euro-regions. For example, the Siret-Prut-Nistru Euro-region, which, supported by CBC Phare, has developed such a common strategy given the economic opportunities fostered by the presence of Chisinau in this area. The business climate in the Republic of Moldova is attractive for Romanian investors, motivated by socio–cultural similarity. This similarity is also appreciated by Moldovan businessmen in Romania, combined with the prospect of investment in a state of the European Union. Six out of ten Romanian businessmen prefer to export to the Republic of Moldova rather than domestic business expansion, while only four out of ten Moldovan businessmen agree to the same question regarding investment in Romania. The cross-border entrepreneurial dynamics identified in the two countries are different: while in Romania the SMEs desire the possibility of cross-border extension, in the Republic of Moldova the export intentions, but not really the cross-border extension of business or relocation, along with a desire to associate with a Romanian shareholder, is made clear by medium and large firms. Business people from both sides of the Prut appreciate the short length of time needed to establish a company in the Republic of Moldova. The bureaucracy sometimes involved with establishing a business through Romanian institutions, and

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the requisite respect of the Community Aquis clearly discourages half of potential entrepreneurs. In a study conducted in early 2009 for local administration of Iasi city [18], some of our previous results [19, 20]; were confirmed. The differences become clear in the perception of the influence of politicians’ statements and the political climate – they seemed not to affect perception in 2009 to a great extent, but rather through their effects (for example, the obligation of visa for border-crossings). A multitude of factors – mainly cultural, geographical, social, legal and commercial lead to an optimistic conclusion: the economic and social cooperation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova is expected to expand and become more interesting for all types of actors, including, or especially, for SMEs. Analysing the statistical data, previously mentioned, we can reach a relative confirmation of this optimism: Romania and the Republic of Moldova are in the top of each country’s list of economic partners. Moving the analysis on to the perceptions of the entire public, or only the representatives of business, the conclusions suddenly become less optimistic or even pessimistic. When trying to explain these negative perceptions we find two categories of factors: objective and subjective. 6.1. Factors that Have a Negative Influence on the Evolution of Cooperation of the Two Countries and their Mutual Perceptions

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6.1.1. Objective Factors: (a) Border traffic regime. The border traffic regime has frequently been influenced by public and administrative decisions in the last years: x The unilateral introduction of visas for Moldovan citizens from the 1st of January 2007. This measure was a consequence of Romania’s accession to the EU. For most of 2007, visas were difficult to obtain because of the inability of the Consular Service of the Romanian Embassy in Chisinau to process the large number of requests. The request of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create two new consulates, at Balti and Cahul, was rejected then, but has now been put into practice. x The introduction of a visa for entry to the Republic of Moldova for Romanian citizens since April 2009, as a result of the diplomatic tension between the two countries. The communist President of Moldova accused Romania of trying to interfere in the elections in Moldova against the Communist Party. The measure was contrary to the agreements between the Republic of Moldova and the EU. An extremely small number of visa requests got a positive answer (estimates made by the Moldovan and Romanian press indicated about 15-20%). x A waiver of the visa regime for Romanian citizens in September 2009. x The agreement between the Romanian Government and the Government of the Republic of Moldova regarding local border traffic, signed in November 2009. The agreement sets up a proper regime for people who live in the areas situated on the both parts of the common border, simplifying their movement across the border. Thus, Moldovan citizens who are the beneficiaries of the agreement’s provision will be permitted to enter Romania without a visa, with only a permit for border traffic. The agreement allows residents from both countries, who legally live in areas

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near to the borders (usually up to 30km, in some situations up to 50 km), to travel without visas, in areas similar in size located in the other country. The validity of the permits is between 2 and 5 years. (b) Trade, tax, customs and legislative barriers. Actually, there are not any barriers to trade between the two countries, but only agreements that aim at facilitating overcoming barriers. Romania’s EU membership only increased the economic attraction of EU countries for Romanian SMEs. The Republic of Moldova – despite agreements that encourage trade with Romania and with the entire EU – doesn’t have all the facilities of a member state, although it has some. Legislation in the Republic of Moldova is only in the early or preliminary stages of approaching the Community Aquis.

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6.1.2. Subjective Factors: (a) According to the perceptions of Moldova: x Instability/communist regime. The Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova lost the September 2009 elections. Political instability persists; there were seems to be a kind of incapacity of the Parliament to elect a new president, since 2011. x Insufficient early economic and social development. The most common issues are: infrastructure problems, poverty, insecurity and crime. x Protectionist measures: ‘perfectible’ legislation, corruption. x Lack of complete and correct information on the business climate. (b) According to the perceptions of Romania: x High taxes and high cost of employment. x EU legislation that protects member states. x Visa system. x Bureaucracy and corruption. x Competition. x Romanian mistrust in partnership with Moldova. x Lack of information. 6.2. The factors that can Balance the Economic Relations between the Two Countries 6.2.1. Objective Factors: x x

Geographical proximity. Cultural affinities and common language.

6.2.2. Subjective Factors: (a) According to Romanian perceptions of Moldova: x Qualified and cheaper employees. x Accessible market. x Authorities do not cause problems for foreign investors. (b) According to Moldovan perceptions of Romania: x Foreign and especially EU investment. x The Integration into the EU and NATO helps Romania to be more economically and politically stable.

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x Much larger and more developed market. x Friendly legislative framework. On the official level, Romania conceives its relationship with Moldova on two major coordinates: a) affirmation of the special nature of this relationship, given their common language, history, culture, traditions; b) European dimension of bilateral cooperation, based on the strategic objective of the integration of Moldova into the EU. We also still meet - even though more rarely - commonly perceived attitude of ‘older brother’. In Moldova, perceptions are strongly influenced by demographic factors like: ethnic origin, location in metropolitan, urban or rural environments, age, level of education, experiences of study or work abroad. ‘Nuances’ of Moldavian perceptions can be found in the perception of ethnic Russians, indicating Russia as the more desirable partner of Moldova, whilst making clear their plans to apply for Romanian citizenship. In all barometers of opinion in Moldova, a large majority indicates a desire to integrate into the EU (76% in May 2011), but very few accept the idea of NATO membership (15% in May 2011).

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Conclusions and Implications for Future Research and Practice Now, in a period that negatively affects financial, economic and, implicitly, social evolutions, an analysis of the business climate makes reporting of figures, numbers and sums difficult. Welfare cases in the period 2000-2007 have only historical relevance. For example, in the Annual Report of SMEs in Romania of 2008 some macroeconomic indicators have followed a positive evolution: the number of unemployed people reduced to about a third from the level existing in 2000, the inflation rate fell from 45.7 in 2000 to 4.5 in 2007, the annual growth rate of gross domestic product tripled (from 2.1% to 6%). However, other macro-economic indicators create concern for the external trade balance, which reached a deficit of €1.876 million in 2000, and of €17568 million in 2007; at the same time the budget deficit and external debt have tripled. Under these conditions, the private sector’s contribution (including SMEs) has been 71.2 % of GDP. A spectacular evolution was registered in the Moldovan SMEs, where it was estimated that for 2007 these had 68.7% of the total turnover of the national economy. However, in both countries the economic crisis’ effects are being currently felt right now. Cooperation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova still lacks a development cooperation agreement, a general legal framework that would cover the whole range of priorities, mechanisms of delivery, procedures used (for example, tax exemption for all projects financed by Romania for this purpose), the amount of contributions and the period for which these funds are provided. Also, the strategy for the priorities of each partner country is under construction. Thus, identification of priorities takes place only at inter-governmental discussions on the country, without an analysis and wide consultation and without a single document that would guide support. (In early March, 2012, members of the Bucharest Government and the Executive of the Chisinau had a common meeting in Iasi, discussed issues as: energy, transport, social security and education; at the end of the meeting were signed several bilateral documents by the members of the two Governments.) The existence of a strategy would increase predictability and transparency of the assistance and participation of other actors at different stages of programming assistance.

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Romania, as a donor, has a lack of experience. It is necessary to improve systems and procedures for delivery of assistance: procedures related to procurement, contracting consultants, reporting, monitoring, documentation processing and payment methods etc. must be developed. Unlike other new EU countries, Romania has not yet formed an autonomous and specialized development cooperation agency (such as SlovakAid, Czech Aid, Polish Aid etc.). We find justification for a further comparative analysis of the two business climates, especially for SMEs, in the fact that the economy of the Republic of Moldova may be considered exposed to adverse economic developments in Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine – because of the Republic of Moldova’s geographical position seen as being trapped between Romania and Ukraine, but first of all because it has a disproportionately large volume of economic trade with these countries compared to others.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

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[8]

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Krätke, S., 2002. The regional impact of EU Eastern enlargement: a view from Germany. European Planning Studies, 10(5), pp. 651-664. Lepik, K.L., 2009. Euro-regions as mechanisms for strengthening cross-border cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. TRAMES: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Science, 13(63/58), pp. 265-284. Harms, R., Kraus, S. and Schwarz, E., 2009. The suitability of the configuration approach in entrepreneurship research. Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, 21(1), pp.25 -49. Shane, S., 2000. Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. Organization Science 11, pp. 448-469. Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A., 1990. Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35, pp. 128-152. Shane, S. and Venkataraman, S., 2000.The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of research. Academy of Management Review 25, pp. 217-226. Schenkel, M.T., Matthews C.H. and Ford, M.W., 2009. Making rational use of ‘irrationality’? Exploring the role of need for cognitive closure in nascent entrepreneurial activity. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development. 21(1), pp. 51-76. Smallbone, D. and Welter, F., 2001. The distinctiveness of entrepreneurship in transition economies. Small Business Economics. 16, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 249–262 apud Smallbone, D., F. Welter, N. Isakova, Y. Klochko, Aculai E. and Slonimski A., 1999. Identifying the support needs of small enterprises in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to develop an agenda for policy at national and regional levels. Final report for Tacis ACE project (contract no. T 95-4139R), Centre for Enterprise and Economic Development Research, Middlesex University . Trifu, A., 2006. Globalizare i dezvoltare. Iai: Editura Performantica. Nica, N.A., 1997. Politici regionale în România. Economistul, p. 913. Carta Verde (Green Charta), 1997. Politica de dezvoltare regionalã în România, Bucureti. Dinu, M., Socol, C. and Marina, M., 2005. Mecanisme de convergen i coeziune. Bucureti: Editura Economic . Mitroi, V., 2006. Politica de dezvoltare regional : între necesitate i proiect: ce fel de regionalizare? In C. Zamfir and L. Stoica ed. O nou provocare: dezvoltarea social. Iai: Editura Polirom, pp. 105-119. Constantin, D.L., 2004. Strategia i politica regional în România. Administraie i management public, 2. Tavitian, R., 1991. Le système économique de la Communauté européenne, Collection Mementos Dalloz, Paris. Leonardi, R. ed., 1993. The regions and the European community: the regional response to the single market in the underdeveloped areas. London: Frank Cass. Profiroiu, M., Profiroiu, A. and Popescu, I., 2008. Instituii i politici europene. Bucureti: Editura Economic . Jijie, T., 2009. Cercetare de marketing privind domeniile cu potenial de dezvolare a afacerilor la nivel transfrontalier pentru Primaria Municipiului Iai. SC Fast Training Consulting SRL.[online] Available at: http://www.orcet.ro/despre-o.r.c.e.t/cercetare-de-marketing-privind-domeniile-de-potential-dedezvoltare-a-afacerilor-la-nivel-transfrontalier_ro.html

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[19] oitu, D. and oitu, C., 2008. Gender and human trafficking issues on Romania-Republic of Moldova cross-border cooperation. Caiete Sociologice 6, pp. 177-198. [20] oitu, C. and oitu, D., 2010. Europeanization at the EU’s external borders: the case of RomanianMoldovan civil society cooperation. Journal of European Integration 32(5), pp.493-508.

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Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU, the Black Sea Region and Southern Caucasus A. Ergun and H. Isaxanli (Eds.) IOS Press, 2013 © 2013 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-187-8-96

The Black Sea Security Space in Perspective: Ukraine’s Non-alignment as a Challenge to the ‘“New” EuroAtlantism’ Sergii GLEBOV1 Odessa Mechnikov National University

Abstract. Ukraine, as part of the Black Sea region, found itself on the crossroads of the great powers’ interests long ago. Having had little chance to develop its current official status as a non-aligned state, on the way to neutrality, by its own resources, Ukraine brought itself into a peculiar, almost deadlocked, situation: it appears to be outside existing security spaces in Europe. Always being ‘in between’ helps little in defending national interests. The concept of the ‘“New” Euro-Atlantism’2 gives a theoretical chance to combine different security spaces in Europe in order to share the security interests of Ukraine, together with those of the other European countries, including the Russian Federation and EU members. Such an agenda is also a challenge to the Black Sea region, which, on the one hand, is part of the Euro-Atlantic security space, but on the other is still a divided European periphery.

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Keywords. “New” Euro-Atlantism”, security spaces, collective security, Black Sea security, NATO, Russia, Ukraine, Ukrainian non-alignment

Introduction For the last twenty years, key voices within international relations have been actively searching for the new security architecture and mechanisms on global, regional, and sub-regional systemic levels. Objectively, they are in a search for a, if not ‘brand new’ security system, at least something different from the Cold War paradigm. The need to establish a more flexible and efficient security system is a reaction to the new threats, powers and regimes that have recently emerged. Subjectively, some of the great powers have been trying to set the parameters of security conditions favorably, to best meet



1 Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Dean; Senior Researcher, Center for International Studies, Odessa Mechnikov National University, Odessa, Ukraine. E-mail: [email protected]. 2 The concept of the “New” Euro-Atlantism” first was proposed by the author in:   ..  « »  :         !#* -X\^` // {-\| *  : * #   !#  / }  }. \.. ~*| . – X€ X!}: !-* *}  !} €  , 2009; Glebov, Sergii. Concerning “Strange” Relations: Extensive Perseptions of Security Spaces Within the Ukraine-Russia-NATO Triangle // Russian Politics and Law / Editors: Dmitry Gorenburg and Andrey Makarychev. – September-October 2009 / Vol. 47,  5 – M.E.Sharpe: Armonk, NY.

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their own national interests. Such a tendency, by the way, hampers a collective transformation to the long awaited for system of multi-polar security, free of hegemons and built on a collective security consensus (or cooperative security compromises), a new international legal basis, and a willingness to cooperate, even unite, by restricting state sovereignty to some extent in the face of globalized traditional and non-traditional threats. Has the time for political idealism to determine global, regional and subregional security trends finally come? While experts debate theory, in the main course of realpolitik-driven competition for the most suitable security conditions, the United States of America is still the most influential actor– which is natural – followed by the less powerful, but still with remnants of super-power ambition, though restricted influence, Russian Federation. The emerging China as a global military power, traditionally influential Japan, strengthened Brazil and nuclear India, straggling global pressure Iran, as well as the unique political, economic, military and cultural symbiosis of European great powers, from 1993 known as the European Union – all together have been breaking up the bipolar scenario of the second half of the twentieth century. Putting aside current complexities and problems, financial and other economic challenges on the edge of the systemic crises which global security agents face nowadays, the idea of keeping closer to stable and predictable wide-ranging security measures in the era of new clashes over resources is among the long-term top international priorities of the global security agenda, despite the temporal risks for economic security. Such an agenda requires the establishment of an inter-system net of balances which incorporates respective security sub-system connections, in order to have the mechanism of preemptive and preventive tools to keep security relations stable and make international actors unable to produce and reproduce destructive ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security threats. On the other hand, as it was mentioned, the idea of a multipolar world and a globally (at least regionally) accepted ‘multi-polar world’ conceptbased security architecture clashes over sometimes different, sometimes contradictive national interests (what a herculean task for the EU to have a common security policy!); and who in general is interested in achieving such an agenda under the condition of sacrificing some of the own interests in favor of those of their partners? Nevertheless, the scenario of the establishment of a new security mechanism on the global level has a chance to be initiated as a model, on the basis of the regional and inter-regional security constructions. Among pre-existing structures is the oldest EuroAtlantic security space with its sole security body – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Black Sea region as an international system of the post-bipolar era, on the wave of the ‘new regionalism’, appeared to be the new security hub – the new Rubikon – which NATO and its allies are challenged to cross in order to stretch their traditional security space, as well as for the sake of the security interests of those who historically were outside of NATO, with the status of potential enemy. Do such semialtruistic intentions, to share security guaranties and democracy-based values, appear to be sincere from the perspective of the current outsiders who treat NATO’s intention of eastward enlargement sometimes as a threat? Now the time has come to talk not about enlargements of military blocs and penetration into new spheres of influence, but about the interconnection of different security spaces. The Black Sea region’s security situation at the beginning of the 21st century, and the regional policy of Ukraine for the last decade, provide an example of how the idea of the ‘“New” Euro-Atlantism’ concept could, or could not, work on the way to becoming what was pointed out above a new security architecture of security system’s interconnections on all systemic levels.

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S. Glebov / The Black Sea Security Space in Perspective

‘Old’ Euro-Atlantism: the case of Ukraine

The Black Sea region seems to be at the epicenter of the ongoing process of the transformation which was always known as ‘Euro-Atlantic security’. In the security context, experts usually associate a semiotic construction such as the ‘Euro-Atlantic space’ with a ‘framework’ — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As part of the collective unconscious, NATO appears to the man in the street as a symbol of all that is Euro-Atlantic and American. We may conjecture that in academic and philistine discourses this symbol of Euro-Atlanticism — NATO — functions as semantic agent in designating the characteristics of the trans-Atlantic space, in which the United States has indeed played, and still plays, a key role. This statement is especially true in the area of military security. Most post-Soviet societies, including Ukraine, perceive the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ through the NATO prism of an image that is not ‘friendly’ to the postSoviet space. Nor is this surprising, because the historical roots of the association can be traced back to the shared past of the Cold War and the Soviet period, when NATO was perceived as a hostile bloc. Certain groups within Ukrainian society continue to regard NATO not just as a hostile bloc, but as an aggressor; as a threat to the national security of both Russia and Ukraine. In the context described here, the perception of a concept such as the ‘EuroAtlantic security space’ often — for historical, geopolitical, ideological, cultural, and psychological reasons — acquires in the mass post-Soviet mind an extremely negative meaning that excludes the entire post-Soviet space. Georgia, where public support for Euro-Atlantic integration reached 77 percent, perhaps constitutes an exception [1]. Thus, the behavioral logic of the maxim “the enemy of my friend is my enemy” becomes virtually the sole reason for pro-Russian forces in Ukraine to counter pose NATO and the Russian Federation, accompanied by loud talk about Slavic brotherhood, Orthodox unity, and the historical bond among the three East Slavic peoples. Basically, we may state, that some anti-NATO moods in Ukraine have been strong because Russia, in its propaganda towards Ukraine did not accept NATO as a friendly bloc, neither for itself, nor for Ukraine. Such an approach was typical particularly in the period of 2003-2008, when NATO’s eastward enlargement strategy was aimed at Ukraine and Georgia, with Russia officially standing against. Russia did its best to press its European partners – NATO members – to block launching the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia during the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, 2008. Both countries simply were ‘kicked off’ the Euro-Atlantic security space. The NATO Eastern enlargement with Ukraine and Georgia has not been on the agenda since then: Officially Ukraine has not even been seeking membership in the Alliance since 2010, and Georgia’s way to NATO has been blocked by internal problems after the ‘Five-day’ War; while, at the same time, Russia’s bilateral cooperation with NATO has always been quite intensive. Nevertheless, Russia’s position towards NATO in general reflects its state interests, and this is a sovereign right of any country to develop that policy which best meets national interests. At the same time, Russia acts as a great power and can afford to pursue the policy of multipolarity, while Ukraine is not and cannot; even in the case when the latter was looking for NATO membership, but Russia wasn’t.

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Ukraine’s security dilemma and the Black Sea concern

If Russia’s emerging multipolarity, against any criticism [2], could be seen as a positive sign, even at the beginning of the new progressive era of decentralization and modernization it has never had before, Ukraine’s multivectoralism is the constant traditional state of existence of its statehood which always has always been under threat from outside. If multipolarity seeks for attracting different agents from different places, multivectoralism seeks ways to be attracted by different poles. Thus, the political ambiguity of Ukrainian foreign policy is not only a trademark of Ukraine on the postbipolar European arena, but already a natural factor and integral part of global, and Black Sea relations. The ambivalent foreign policy of Ukraine reflects probably the most sharp and traditional, already classical, discourse on where Ukraine should be – within integrated Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures of security, or with Russia inside Russian led integrative political, economic, and military institutions. The historically regular dilemma for Ukraine - East or West - is also accompanied today by the question “Should Ukraine be anywhere at all?” In the capacity of the ‘bridge’ like current power Ukraine is trying to present the future international position and geopolitical role of Ukraine between East and West. However, inside Europe (even without mentioning Ukraine’s security dilemma), on the basis of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as in Russia, we can witness the ongoing discussion towards (re)constructing ‘European security space’. Nevertheless, the ambition to do so faces a number of security challenges from all sides. There is a broad vision, that “the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 revealed that Europe lacks a coherent joint system of security. Not only did the current system fail to prevent the war, it also fared poorly in the task of mediation. Even more importantly, it turned out that there was little common ground as to the very principles on which European security was to be founded.” [3] At the same time, Ukraine, as a major Black Sea actor, signed itself up to play a more important role in the region, and expressed a desire to join the process of constructing European security space in the Black Sea region, which it is an integral geopolitical part of. When the “Kharkiv agreements” to extend the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea were signed in April 2010, Ukrainian President Yanukovych pointed out, that he considered the Black Sea Fleet’s stationing extension on its territory “in the context of the collective security system in Europe” [4]. Obviously, this view was in a line with Russian President Medvedev’s initiative to adopt the Treaty on European Security [5]. Did Ukraine act in line with its own national security strategy? No, if we presume that to be part of any collective security system with the status of a non-aligned country contradicts the idea of common security obligations, which, in its turn, secures no place for neutrality in case of a conflict with a third party. Thus, Ukraine has put itself into a situation in which the strategic determination of its own place in any European security space contravenes the Law of Ukraine  2411-VI “On domestic and foreign policy", adopted on July 1st, 2010 [6]. The Law commits Ukraine to the non-alignment principle, which actually means non-participation in military and political alliances. At the same time Ukraine did not remove from its agenda the priority of participation in the “European system of collective security.” To what extent Ukrainian “nonalignment” has a chance to be combined with the notion of a “European system of collective security”, when the latter inevitably calls for mutual obligations and participation in the complex strategic arrangements on a ‘collective’ basis within a single military-political structure (the other is simply not effective), is not yet known.

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In its turn, the same law, signed by President Viktor Yanukovych on July 15th, 2010, removed from the agenda the former strategic goal of integration into the Euro-Atlantic system of collective security - NATO. What does this mean for Ukraine and what could be the way out in order to strengthen national security? In such a situation, when Ukraine has refused to take part in the Euro-Atlantic security mechanisms and failed to penetrate into European security space (in this context Euro-Atlantic fully means European) as a reliable actor, and when Ukraine spins in the orbit of Russian security interests, it may be at least interested in ‘merging’ existing and future security systems into one overall system of security. What are the theoretical and possible practical routes of such convergence?

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3.

The “Space of Interconnection” and the “Interconnection of (Security) Spaces”: a chance for the Black Sea security space?

The presence of multiple, often non-overlapping security spaces became possible because the new world order, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, reoriented itself from the global to the regional level. A period of isolation gave way to a global process of internationalization, which led to a compression of space. Globalization strengthened the interconnection of spaces, and growing regionalism deepened and concentrated this interconnection at every specific point. Each post-bipolar region, including the Black Sea, turned into a space of interstate connections, and the traditional, historic Euro-Atlantic security region was no exception. It is hard not to agree with the Russian political scientist Nikolai Kosolapov: “Globalization may be defined as the process by which a set of spaces that have arisen at different times to constitute the sphere of international relations and that occupy niches from the substate (regions within countries) to the global level are organized into a single systemic whole” [7]. Thus, the subjects of contemporary international relations enter into a special regional interconnection, in which each region turns into an arena of interaction, a ‘space of interconnections’, and what is now a multiplicity of region-spaces form an ‘interconnection of (security) spaces’ that constitutes the global security system. In this respect, the old ‘stratification’ of security spaces (construction of the geopolitical spheres of influence of the Cold War period, and their imperative division between antagonistic military-political and economic blocs) differs from the ‘new’ mechanism of the formation of security spaces on the basis of equal rights, common interests, and free choice exercised by a multitude of actors. In the early 1990’s the question of the ‘coalescence’ of the Cold War Euro-Atlantic space with the former space of the Warsaw Pact arised in a line with global transformations. The formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe successfully navigated this ‘coalescence’ of security spaces in the first two stages of NATO enlargements. But the inertia of disintegration of the single Soviet security space is such that it is still in a condition of semidisintegration, ‘suspended’ among many security (sub) spaces that resemble, if not ‘black holes’, then ‘gray zones’. These zones impede Euro-Atlantic integration, on the one hand, and the development of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), on the other (although only at a considerable stretch can the CSTO lay claim to the status of a definite military-political bloc representing a single security space of CIS countries, heir to the ‘Soviet’ zone of responsibility under the Warsaw Pact).

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‘Overlapping’ spaces are conceptualized in the theory of an East European borderland, which experts in Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine actively promote. Here it will be a long time before questions of the acquisition and preservation of sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of state borders lose their urgency. Ukraine today also fits the conceptual model of Borderland Europe — the designation that some Western theorists attach to the space between the European Union and Russia. For example, Michael Emerson views Ukraine as a state situated on the frontiers of a single integrated Europe [8]. The regions of Borderland Europe are assigned to three categories: integrated peripheries, divided peripheries, and overlapping peripheries. The first category comprises states that pursue the goal of joining one or the other ‘empire’. The second category includes countries that are divided between preferences, simultaneously professing a Western and an Eastern orientation and striving to develop relations with both empires. The third category applies to societies that belong to one empire but have found themselves cut off inside the other. Proceeding from this theoretical premise, I offer the following idea. The specific situation of Ukraine demonstrates that Ukraine has in fact absorbed characteristics of all three categories; as a result, it has no clear strategy or clear perspective in its domestic and foreign policy. Like Ukraine, the Black Sea region also could, to some extent, be seen as a divided periphery. If we extend borderland theory to include security issues of the Black Sea region, we can try to “securitize” the “theory of peripheries.” Thus, developing the above thesis of the existence of a number of security (sub) spaces, we can model three basic types of such (sub) space: integrated, divided, and overlapping. Integrated (sub) spaces of the Euro-Atlantic are those that constitute a single Euro-Atlantic field as a result of the ‘coalescence’ of Western and post-Soviet security (sub)spaces. This may occur either as a result of Russia and other European newly independent states joining NATO, or through the formation — on the basis of NATO — of another ‘allencompassing’ collective security structure. Today, however, we are dealing, rather, with divided security (sub)spaces: one on the Western side, for which NATO is ‘responsible’; another on the Eastern side, where Russia is attempting to revive the CSTO and strengthen bilateral military-political and military-technological cooperation with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. There is also the future possibility of a Euro-Atlantic security space from Alaska to Vladivostok, on the basis of overlapping (sub) spaces through the Black Sea region; this might involve the formation of a cooperative security system with new ‘junctural’ structures and control mechanisms, so that all countries that have chosen to join the system can take part in decision making. The realization of a given scenario depends mostly on the United States and Russia, on how willing they are to become a single whole within the framework of combined security spaces. I have in mind their readiness to share the burden of responsibility for maintaining security in the same zones of influence that were once considered the sole responsibility of the United States or the Soviet Union. But such a scenario is unlikely, because neither the United States nor Russia is inclined to share the zone of its historical responsibility with anyone. Each perceives the penetration of ‘alien’ influence into its zone as a direct threat, even though the universalization of global threats dictates the ‘coalescence’ of security (sub) spaces within the framework of a ‘“New” Euro-Atlanticism’.

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“New” Euro-Atlantism and the case of the Black Sea region

Returning to perceptions of the North Atlantic alliance as a structure that still has ambitions to develop a “new culture of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic region,” [9], and the interests of Russia to elaborate more on European security system, we are interested to know: how exclusive or inclusive is the Euro-Atlantic space in terms of stability and contact with other (in)security spaces? Are we speaking here of many security spaces or of one? Having begun with reflections on the relationship between Euro-Atlanticism and NATO, I would like to offer the conjecture that the concept of ‘Euro-Atlantic space’, with a ‘new’ significance, is expanding its meaning to encompass the territory of the former Soviet Union, as well as the former Soviet Black Sea space (The example of the Baltic States already being NATO members is especially indicative). Following this we may presume that this concept need not necessarily be associated exclusively with NATO; it may potentially include not only Black Sea countries like Ukraine and Georgia, but all the countries of the European part of the former Soviet Union. This thesis also applies in full to Russia, which, due to its unique geographical coordinates, in fact expands Euro-Atlantic space to the shores of the Pacific Ocean. Thus, it is possible to understand a Euro-Atlantic security space as encompassing the geographical space from Alaska eastward to Vladivostok. As yet, this semantic consultation exists only in a hypothetical format; possibly it requires deeper conceptual elaboration. By now, let us note that if Russia were to join NATO, this space might be more or less unified. As such a variant is not realistic, a EuroAtlantic space would contain a number of security (sub) spaces: a traditional (historical) ‘NATO’ space and a post-Soviet ‘non-NATO’ space. The problem is that unless a common security system is created within a single Euro-Atlantic space from Alaska to Vladivostok, no state in this zone will feel secure. Russia also understands this and is therefore conceptually prepared to regard itself as a part of a single Euro-Atlantic space, but only on certain conditions. Having already mentioned Russia’s idea to work on European security space, it is worth getting back to the Russian approach, which may be treated as an option on the way to the ‘new’ EuroAtlanticism, because at least theoretically it is based on creating a ‘common undivided space’ of Euro-Atlantic security. It is worthwhile remembering that, on June 5th, 2008, the President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, put forward an initiative to develop a new pan-European security treaty, the main idea of which was to create – in the context of military and political security in the Euro-Atlantic region– a common undivided space in order to finally do away with the Cold War legacy [10]. In view of this, Dmitry Medvedev suggested formalizing in international law the principle of indivisible security as a legal obligation pursuant to which no nation or international organization operating in the Euro-Atlantic region is entitled to strengthen its own security at the cost of other nations or organizations. As we can judge, there is no direct call on to create a collective security system on the basis of a single international organization. For the Russian Federation, institutional accession to NATO is not crucial, but its right to veto decision making within this organization at least by the normative power of international obligations is. Nevertheless, the ‘“new” Euro-Atlanticism’ has the potential to emerge from inside the Black Sea region, which is located exactly on the crossroads of different, so far divided, security spaces. The case of Turkish-Russian relations could be instructive at this point, because Turkey is a NATO member with a long history of being an integral part of the EuroAtlantic space, and was involved in direct competition with another active Black Sea

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power – Russia. In the 1990’s, regional competition even led to the emergence of two regional groupings which were formed around the two centers of power on the basis of shared regional interests: Russia-Armenia-Greece plus Iran on the one side and TurkeyGeorgia-Ukraine-Moldova-Azerbaijan on the other, along with the clear pro-NATO orientation of Romania and Bulgaria. At the same time, the international relations that had taken place in the Black Sea region in the first decade of the 21st century had already changed the balance of regional power. As always, Turkey and Russia made the most influential impact of the current re-grouping. Once Turkey strengthened its geopolitical, economic, and military position in the Black Sea and neighboring regions, and, what is more important, successfully resolved the Caspian energy question for itself, both Russia and Turkey changed their tactics in favor of a pragmatic political, diplomatic and economic rapprochement at the beginning of the 21st century. Mutual economic benefits are the primary motivation of politics in the region now, which is actually good news for this unstable zone. From the regional point of view, reduced tensions between the main regional actors means more stability and security in the region, which prevents the two centers of power from a violent clash of interests. Recent developments show that both countries – Russia and Turkey—seem to be ready to enter a deeper strategic partnership and are not anticipating future uncertainties, at least one which has the potential to go outside business competition (for example, negotiations on the Russian national company Gazprom gas prices for Turkey on the basis of the market interests). At the same time, the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia may not only change the regional balance of power, but also that in the entire Euro-Atlantic region to some extent. There are, however, still some questions. What will, for example, the long-term political effects of Russian-Turkish relations for the energy and military status quo in the region be? Even Turkey’s NATO allies suspect that both Turkey and Russia oppose the NATO presence in the Black Sea so that they can then share the sea for themselves. Which interests will be prioritized in the region by Ankara: the ‘old’ Ukrainian ones or the ‘new’ Russian ones? The same question can be asked for Moscow: the ‘old’ Armenian interests or the ‘new’ Turkish interests? How will the Russia-US-Georgia triangle be incorporated into the regional security discourse, which is especially important after the Russian strategy on constructing a so-called European collective security system, involving Ukraine, was announced? Even the global interests of Turkey’s traditional partner – the USA – could be changed with the regional rapprochement of Turkey with Russia. So, how far will the American factor push Russia and Turkey towards each other and threaten Euro-Atlantic unity? Or, will Turkey be ready to act as a key agent in making two different spaces of security as a one, what was always known as the space from Vancouver to Vladivostok, using its new influence on Russia? All the possible answers and scenarios at this top systemic level have strong and long-term implications, not only on the Black Sea region, but also for the entire issue of the ‘“new” Euro-Atlantism’.

5. Did Ukraine lose its chance to push forward a ‘“new’ in the Black Sea region?

In 2007 this author proposed several scenarios on how the situation could develop3; let me repeat them. I stated that the consent of Ukrainian authorities to extend the lease



3 For example, see: Glebov S. Russian Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine’s Security Strategy: Agenda 2017 // Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges / NATO Science for Peace and Security

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after 2017, in case Ukraine does not become a member of NATO before 2017, would represent the reintegration of Ukraine into a common defensive space with Russia. On the other hand, if Ukraine continued to declare its desire to complete its process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration by joining NATO and the EU, and was a member by 2017, Ukraine would be obliged to have the Russian fleet withdrawn after 2017. However, if Ukraine joined NATO before 2017, NATO, at the request of Ukraine, could agree to accept the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine after 2017, despite the fact that NATO members are not allowed to have foreign military forces on their territory. However, in 2002, the secretary general of NATO, George Robertson, said that the question about foreign military units on the territory of a country which wants to become a member of the alliance must be decided based on the conditions in that country [11]. Therefore, as stated by Ukraine and NATO, the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine was not a barrier for Ukraine to join NATO [12]. Ukraine, as a member of NATO, could obtain a “moral right” to continue the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea after 2017. In that case, why would NATO not agree to Russian military forces stationed in Ukrainian territory as a NATO member, providing that both NATO and Russia were allies, and not enemies, and were ready to build a common security system? If such a scenario would be realized the answer to skeptics who dream about an alternative to the NATO system of collective security would be given. Obviously, the pan-European security system in which NATO members and Russia cooperate strategically is in Ukraine’s security interests. The Ukrainian example of the peaceful coexistence of the Ukrainian navy and the Russian Black Sea Fleet in a NATO member country (even with a refusal of Ukraine to allow the permanent stationing of NATO bases on its territory) would show a new direction for the construction of a general system of security in the Euro-Atlantic space, with a parallel decline of conflict between NATO and Russia over Ukraine. In this case, Ukraine would have a chance to use its geopolitical position to push NATO and Russia into closer geopolitical cooperation, pushing away their possible aggressive intentions. Coming back to 2010, Ukraine not only refused to join NATO, but, with the signing of the “Kharkiv agreements”, made the development of a regional security system impossible compared to earlier scenarios that saw the Black Sea Fleet being withdrawn in 2017. Instead, the agreement preserves the traditional scenario of the Black Sea being divided between two powers, Russia and Turkey. Ukraine has lost its chance to introduce a new scenario to ensure its ability to act as a regional independent sovereign actor. In addition, as we have seen, Ukraine, along with Russia, lost its chance to create the actual collective security system together with other European countries, of which Russian leaders are dreaming nowadays, and made this Russian initiative almost impossible to realize. Such a situation, whit Ukraine unilaterally strengthening its strategic military partnership only with Russia as opposed to multilateral efforts, would remain a problem if Ukraine does not refuse at least politically to join NATO in the future. Why do we mention NATO again when Ukraine is not attempting to join the alliance anymore? The answer is clear: the Russian initiatives to create a collective

 Series E: Human and Sociaetal Dynamics – Vol. 51. / Proceedings of the NATO Advanced research Workshop on Political and Sociatel Impact of Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges, Lisbon, Portugal, 13-15 December 2007 / Edited By Luis Rodrigues and Sergiy Glebov. – Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009. – P. 186.

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security system would not be possible and would inevitably fail without a matching security space: one from the NATO side, and another from the Russian, post-Soviet side. Ukraine lost its chance to become the real ‘bridge’ between the Euro-Atlantic security space and the post-Soviet one. Now it is problematic to expect a different rapprochement between these two ‘security spaces’ when Ukraine declares its nonalignment, and in fact its reintegration with Russia blocks its way to neutrality. Russia would not be weakened in the region if Ukraine kept its options open by negotiating not only with Russia but also with NATO about cooperative security mechanisms. Russia still remains a regional superpower, the Russian Black Sea Fleet would remain in Crimea after 2017, and NATO has never spoken about its intention to station military bases in Crimea or in the rest of Ukraine4. The Ukrainian-NATO political dialog, even in the light of possible membership, could have been a test for Russia on its ability to accept Ukrainian independence. Moreover, the NATO-Russian partnership could be strengthened, which would remove any contradictions over Ukraine. In this way, NATO membership prospects could also have been seen as a test for the potential of Europe to integrate Kyiv: traditionally, new members in the enlarged NATO and EU became NATO members first, which opens the way to EU membership. Why was it necessary to examine some failed scenarios in the current discourse on the ‘“New” Euro-Atlanticism” here once again? I would like to admit that strategically for Ukraine and even for the Black Sea region the current Ukrainian ruling elites probably made a mistake by refusing to integrate into NATO when calling for nonalignment. If Ukraine officially declares its inability to join any military bloc, how would Kyiv be ready, for example, to support the newly proclaimed Russian idea of collective security in Europe and take part and join other forms of common security system when the nature of the collective security system is based on the collective nature of common obligations? With closer relations with NATO, Ukraine could add benefit for Russia in the Black Sea region, compared to an unstable and quasi-neutral Ukraine outside the alliance’s future plans. For example, in talks with NATO, the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s presence in Crimea after 2017 was seen as rational and that it could even help support the idea of a cooperative regional security system: Sevastopol could even become the headquarters of the BLACKSEAFOR, a regional cooperative naval security unit consisting of the Black Sea NATO states, Russia, Georgia, and obviously Ukraine. Having both partners in Ukraine, Kyiv could also counterbalance the sides and strengthen its national security. In this sense, there would be no need to revise the Montreaux Convention. Crimea could become the new example of the partnership between NATO and Russia without the establishment of NATO military bases in Crimea or elsewhere in Ukraine. The BLACKSEAFOR could become the ultimate military player in the region for resolving ‘soft’ security issues. Such a scenario is not utopian, taking into account the developments in NATO-Russian relations on meeting common security interests “towards a strategic partnership” (at least in light of the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010) [14]. Besides these developments, the Black Sea has had periods in its history when partial “demilitarization of its shores” took place, such as between 1856 and 1871 under the Treaty of Paris after the Crimean War, as well as the naval restrictions under the Montreaux Convention of 1936 [15].



4 NATO spokesperson James Appathurai says NATO has neither reason nor intention to have any bases in Crimea. Governmental Portal [13].

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Moreover, as a long-term goal, the Black Sea basin could be proclaimed a nonmilitary zone, if not totally weapon-free but with a restricted amount of military just for the defensive purposes for the Black Sea countries. The level of regional security against global threats could be guaranteed by higher level protection measures: the ‘nuclear umbrella’, satellite systems, inter-regional radar shields, etc. By the way, a step to this and also towards meeting the needs of ‘“new” Euro-Atlantism’ was also made in 2010, when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed to NATO leaders a joint missile defense system that divides military protection of Europe between the former Cold War rivals [16].

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Conclusion Even if the concept of the ‘“new” Euro-Atlantism’ has failed so far to be developed directly out of the Black Sea region, recently because of different policies of Russia and other actors, it is still quite promising. This is simply because there is no other chance to establish stable global and regional security conditions. The concept, however, may be elaborated on in the future on the basis of partner US-Russia, EURussia, Russia-NATO, and Russian-Turkish relations. The position of Russia towards a single security space is still acute, not only because there is a definite call to create a ‘common undivided space’ of Euro-Atlantic security, but because (as far as we link foreign policy to the interests of the ruling elites) ruling elites in Russia are already fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic space of high standards of living and business circles. Why not, then, as a continuation, anticipate the ‘coalescence’ of different, so far divided, security spaces in the Euro-Atlantic zone with a middle-term perspective? If such scenarios are treated as fully naïve, we should also confess that the future clashes of interests in the Black Sea will conserve the Black Sea region’s status as a “gray zone” on the crossroad of different (in)security spaces. The key question arises: are all parts of the big geopolitical game sincerely willing to step into the process of making several security spaces into one in the frame of the ‘“new” Euro-Atlanticism’, or any other concept? Or will national egoism prevail and the realpolitik paradigm remain acute in the era of globalization of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security threats? Will President Medvedev’s initiative to form a European security system find a way out in the policy of the next Russian President after the March 2012 elections? And will US and Russia find a solution for the Anti-Missile Defense System, and its parts in Central and Eastern Europe? As far as such issues are long-running, perspectives for the ‘“new” Euro-Atlanticism’ are in shadow, but positive answers to these questions will meet the practical needs of the ‘“new” Euro-Atlanticism’ to be realized in international relations anyway. In all cases, Ukraine in the Black Sea region has lost a good chance to play the ‘bridge’ role, to ‘coalesce’ different security spaces, already with a short-term perspective, even though we do tend to identify such spaces (at least the CIS zone) as more likely to be insecure rather than secure, and not only in a military sense. Having ‘prolonged’ the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until 2042, Ukraine, which has stepped onto the train of non-alignment, on the way to neutrality, was in a deadlock when answering at least two questions. The first one: what is the real de-facto meaning of Ukrainian neutrality when the country has prolonged the stationing of a foreign naval sea base on its territory for an additional 25 years? And the second one: will a non-aligned and even neutral Ukraine be successful in combating regional and global

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threats to its security, being outside any alliance of collective security mechanism, in a situation when other forms of protection are ineffective? Will it be a collective security system in the Black Sea region, or a less integrated (but also less efficient) cooperative system in the frame of the ‘“new” Euro-Atlanticism’ that shape Ukraine’s future, and will Ukraine be able to achieve its current efforts towards neutrality and non-alignment in the long-term in the Black Sea region? These questions are subject to wide debate.

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#|* \. 2002. † *€ *# } *! .   # $, 143(2657), [online], July 8. Available at: http://old.kv.com.ua/index.php?rub=8&number_old=2657 ~’“: †” >”       }