Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe [New ed.] 0415625777, 9780415625777

Table of contents :
Dedication
Contents
List of Tables and Figures
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Housing, Neighbors and the Politics of Fear
1 How We Talk about Squatting
2 Squatting and Antisquatting in Britain
3 Incorporating the Enclave of Juliana Christiania
4 Grenoble, 2010: Failed Attempts to Securitize the Roma Squats
5 “The Last Bastion of Squatting in Europe” or the End of Dutch Tolerance
6 Conclusion: Is Desecuritization of Housing Policy Possible or Desirable?
Notes
References
Index

Citation preview

“Mary Manjikian’s book brings the ‘property question’ to the heart of critical debates on security. Manjikian offers a set of fascinating cases across Europe that illuminate important dynamics of contemporary securitizing practices. The securitization of squatting away from earlier social and economic policy debates is enacted across Europe in both similar and differentiated terms, drawing on national and local histories, current crises, and expert knowledge. At the same time, Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe opens an important discussion of desecuritization scenarios and political futures of the ‘property question’.” —Claudia Aradau, King’s College London “This book is a timely and probing analysis of the securitization of squatting. Analyzing modes of squatting, their politicizations and ways of governing them, Manjikian brings detailed insights in the growing securitization of housing. More generally, this book contributes in significant ways to our understanding of the transversal and pervasive nature of contemporary securitizing.” —Jef Huysmans, The Open University

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

Housing is no longer about having a place to live—but about state pressures to conform, norms and policies regarding citizenship, and practices of surveillance and security. Breaking new ground in the field of urban politics and international relations, Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe examines and critiques legislative initiatives and examines governmental attempts to reframe urban property squatting as a crime and a threat to domestic security. Using examples from France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Great Britain, Mary Manjikian argues that developments within the European Union—including terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, the rise of rightwing extremist parties and the lifting of barriers to immigration and travel within the EU—have had effects on housing policy, which has become the subject of state security policy in Europe’s urban areas. In Denmark, squatting has often had an ideological, antistate character. In Paris, housing policy can be viewed as a type of identity politics, with squatters as transnational actors who pose a transnational security threat. In Great Britain, the role of the press has created a drive to criminalize squatting. Events in the Netherlands present two competing notions of what housing is—a human right, or an economic good produced by the free market. Mary Manjikian is an assistant professor at the Robertson School of Government at Regent University in Virginia Beach, Virginia. She is the author of Threat Talk: Comparative Politics of Internet Addiction and Apocalypse and Post-Politics: The Romance of the End. She is a former US Foreign Service officer and has worked in the Netherlands, Russia, Germany and Bulgaria. In 2013, she will be a Fulbright Scholar at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Durham University, UK.

Routledge Research in Urban Politics and Policy

1 The Cultural Contradictions of Progressive Politics The Role of Cultural Change and the Global Economy in Local Policymaking Donald L. Rosdil

2 Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe Mary Manjikian

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe Mary Manjikian

~ 1 Routledge ~~

Taylor & Francis Group

NEW YORK

LONDON

First published 2013 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2013 Taylor & Francis The right of Mary Manjikian to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Manjikian, Mary. Securitization of property squatting in Europe / Mary Manjikian. pages cm. — (Routledge research in urban politics and policy ; 2) 1. Squatter settlements—Europe. 2. Squatters—Europe. 3. Housing policy—Europe. 4. Urban policy—Europe. 5. Internal security— Europe. 6. Public safety—Europe. I. Title. HD7287.96.E85M36 2013 307.336—dc23 2012042590 ISBN: 978-0-415-62577-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-10318-0 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To Lucine

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Contents

List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgments Introduction: Housing, Neighbors and the Politics of Fear

xi xiii 1

1 How We Talk about Squatting

41

2 Squatting and Antisquatting in Britain

75

3 Incorporating the Enclave of Juliana Christiania

117

4 Grenoble, 2010: Failed Attempts to Securitize the Roma Squats

138

5 “The Last Bastion of Squatting in Europe” or the End of Dutch Tolerance

157

6 Conclusion: Is Desecuritization of Housing Policy Possible or Desirable?

175

Notes References Index

187 217 237

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Tables and Figures

TABLES i.1 i.2 i.3 i.4 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 6.1

Actors Involved in Squatting in Western Europe Two Sets of Policies towards Squatting Assimilationist versus Exclusionary Discourses Who and What Is Being Securitized? Security Aspects of Home Security Aspects of the City The Improvement Frame The Free-Rider Frame Usage of the Crime Frame The Deviance Frame The Security Frame The Barbarism Frame The Community Frame Paths to Desecuritization

15 18 32 40 46 51 58 59 62 65 68 72 74 178

FIGURES 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2

Security threats associated with squats. Usage of the free-rider frame. Issues associated with squatting. Composition of newspaper coverage of squatting issues, 2000–2011. 2.3 Number of respondents. 2.4 Quotes in final report.

56 60 78 94 110 111

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Acknowledgments

I arrived in Russia as a single woman in the mid-1990s, eager to begin an assignment as a US Foreign Service junior officer. As part of the check-in process, I was assigned an apartment. That evening, I went to view the apartment in downtown Moscow and immediately noticed that it seemed like a dangerous place. The front door to the building was unlocked, and my companion assured me that the drunken men in the stairwells were harmless. It was very dark as it was set back in the woods and the street lights were out, perhaps permanently. The next day, I contacted the embassy security office and expressed my concerns about living in this location as a single woman who would frequently be traveling on my own. “There’s always Rossinka if you’re scared,” I was informed. I filled out the necessary paperwork and was then assigned a townhouse in Rossinka, along with a bus pass. The years I spent in Russia make up my first and only experience of living in a gated community, and an enclave for foreigners. I spent my Russian years walled off from the rest of Russian society, occupying a prefab townhouse in a prefab townhouse community that had been brought over from the United States and assembled, like a gigantic jigsaw puzzle. The community was set far away from downtown Moscow and Rossinka’s occupants were bussed back and forth to the embassy compound daily. It was easier certainly, living in an exact replica of a townhouse that might have fit in in Alexandria, Virginia, or another Washington, DC, suburb. It felt safer—but it also felt sterile and artificial to be so divorced from the Russian inhabitants of the original village of Rossinka, which was located down the road from the foreigners’ enclave. This book is my attempt to wrestle with some of the questions that arose out of that experience. Usually when we think about the politics of security in international relations, we think of hard power and state-level politics. Yet increasingly, as foreigners and natives interact in a variety of settings throughout the world, these negotiations about security occur on a local level as well. Both those who inhabit a country and those who come to visit or to work bring certain assumptions about safety, about risk and about identity into this equation. My thinking about housing and the politics of fear was further piqued when I spent a summer teaching in England. While I lectured, my teenaged

xiv

Acknowledgments

daughters spent their mornings watching British television. This led to my eventually viewing a British television show provocatively titled Vacation Nightmares. The show featured a segment on two British homeowners whose home was taken over by property squatters while they were away on holiday. I was immediately struck by the shrill overtones of the reporting, the attempt at constructing a threat and the ways in which the foreignness of the squatters themselves was alluded to but not addressed directly. Thus, I have dedicated this book to my daughter Lucine, who initially introduced me to the subject of property squatting, as well as other forms of sensationalist British television. I hope that one day she will dedicate a book to me when she begins her own scholarly career. In writing this book, I also owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the members of Regent University’s women’s faculty forum for the lunches, the encouragement and the support. I am, as always, grateful to my husband, Ara, for his interest in my research, his support of my scholarship, and his graphic design abilities as he formatted the charts and figures in this book. Finally, I would like to thank our new dean, Dr. Eric Patterson, for the support he has shown me as I continue in my research career. Finally, I wish to insert two quick methodological notes here. First, because property squatters are often anarchic in their politics and secretive by nature, the cites listed in this manuscript are sometimes a bit unconventional. The squatters’ view has been largely derived from my perusal of anarchist web sites, where the respondents often do not list their full names and sometimes use aliases and pseudonyms. I also found few property squatters willing to talk to me about these issues, either on the record or off. For this reason, I acknowledge up front that the citations and the information itself are sometimes incomplete. Next, I would like to take full responsibility for the section on the Netherlands. The translations are my own, as are any errors.

Introduction Housing, Neighbors and the Politics of Fear

Squatting, the practice of living in abandoned or unoccupied spaces that a squatter does not legally own, is a great way to avoid paying rent, if you’re willing to take the risk. While many squatters are routinely evicted, arrested, harassed, or even, in some parts of the world, beaten or killed, some manage to make comfortable long-term homes on someone else’s property. . . . Squatting may be the solution to your housing needs. From “How to Squat in Abandoned Property” http://www.wikihow.com

At first glance, property squatting seems like a relatively straightforward public policy problem. Squatting is generally defined as “an illegal, collective or individual, occupation of a building in order to get a house and to claim housing rights without the permission of the owner.”1 Initially, squatting appears as a problem of real estate, and therefore a problem that looks similar regardless of whether it takes place in Nepal, China, South America or Europe. In the cycle of property squatting, there are several steps. First, the disenfranchised citizens of an area attempt to take possession and build upon land they do not own and the landowners attempt to defend what is theirs from unauthorized interlopers. Not infrequently, the police are called upon to intervene upon the side of the landowners. The property developer in particular may pressure city bureaucrats to engage in “slum clearing” or rezoning—so that squatters can be forced out. Occasionally a nongovernmental organization (in both the developing world and the developed world) will attempt to advocate for the squatters, speaking directly with police and with the state, and in some instances seeking publicity in the newspapers. Often, the conflict between the two groups takes on the appearance of a dance, with police acting on behalf of the state to restore order to the territory through clearing slums and shooing away squatters. But the squatters invariably return, largely because they have nowhere else to go. The steps of the dance are also quite ancient— with conflicts between squatters, poachers and landowners recorded in documents dating back to the Middle Ages.

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

However, despite the ubiquity and pervasiveness of this problem, it is one that is largely undertheorized by political scientists. If property squatting is studied at all, it is most often studied by political economists as a problem of market economics and the allocation of resources. Here squatting is described as rooted in poverty and the problems caused by quick and large-scale economic transitions such as a nation’s rapid urbanization. In such a situation, economists suggest that large numbers of individuals come from the countryside to the city seeking economic opportunity. When they cannot afford housing, they may construct housing without a permit (eventually constructing squatter villages) or occupy empty houses somewhere in the cities that they go to. Squatting is thus viewed as a byproduct or an externality arising from a broken housing market. The economics literature (as well as the urban politics literature on housing policy) focuses primarily on understanding and posing suggestions for the repair and better working of institutional mechanisms for setting housing prices, responding to crises in the housing market and, in some instances, providing justice and equity for the dispossessed. Thus, it may have a normative component in considering the workings of social welfare policies and the provision of public housing. More recently, however, sociologists have taken an interest in the issue of property squatting, not focusing here on the property or the mechanisms by which it is contested, but rather seeking to understand the property squatters themselves on both an individual and a community level. In the sociology literature, property squatting is viewed as a type of deviant behavior that might be engaged in by marginalized, powerless individuals. Those who have no ability to legitimately acquire or claim housing might thus acquire housing at the margins of society—with their housing thus becoming a symbol of their own marginalized status. Those who are marginalized in this way include the Roma population throughout Europe2 as well as disenfranchised youth in both the developed and developing worlds.3 However, thus far, sociologists—like the economists—often tend to conflate relatively separate types of squatting: Subaltern squatting is a practice engaged in by those who are disempowered, marginalized within society and have nowhere else to go. (Here, we might consider work on the “Roma” or “Gypsy” squats4 that have grown up outside such cities as Lyon, Marseilles and Berlin.) However, there are others who have historically squatted in Western Europe not because they were poor but because they were ideologically motivated to make a statement about what they view as the rightness and justness of individual property ownership. These so-called anarchist squatters tend to be younger, better educated and potentially more likely to destabilize a city or neighborhood. Sociologists, however, have not clearly distinguished between the two groups and most literature focuses only on the socially marginalized. In addition, the sociology literature improperly problematizes squatting and treats squatters only as objects of inquiry. The analyst thus poses the question “How do we solve the problem of property squatting?” rather than

Introduction

3

seeking to understand or learn from the squatters themselves. Here legal, illegal and marginal housing residents are regarded as the subject of housing policy, rather than agents involved in creating housing or solving the housing crisis, and are often not the primary unit of analysis, which tends to be instead the social work office or the social worker.5 The squatter himself is often referred to as a “victim.”6 Historians have also considered squatters—often romanticizing the property squatter as a sort of Robin Hood whose taking of unauthorized land and housing might thus be seen as a sort of political and moral statement.7 (Interestingly, this is the only group of analysts who have imbued the squatter with a great deal of agency—both political and moral.) Finally, scholars in the field of public policy and law have theorized about squatting, largely through considering the ways in which housing is both a public and a private good.8 In this case, the emphasis is on the operation of adverse possession laws. The unit of analysis is the state itself, and the starting point of the analysis is that squatting is a problem requiring stateled policy solutions, including legislation. Those policy scholars who have focused on property squatting have focused largely on the phenomenon as it is presented in the developing world. Case studies have examined squatters in India9 and in Latin America.10 Furthermore, both legal scholars and political economists use a positivist framework in which they assume that housing shortages can be measured, citizen responses can be predicted and theorized and neutral policy positions can be created. Legal issues considered in the squatting literature include theorizing about the rights of squatters in both a national and international human rights context. Issues include the question of whether police have violated individuals’ human rights when they enter a squat without legal authorization for the purposes of carrying out search and seizure. Here, for example, they might ask whether a squat can be considered a “legal residence”—with the same rights to privacy attached to it as there would be if the squatter lived in a conventional home.11 Here the issue becomes particularly complicated when those involved in the case are not legal residents or citizens of the nations where the violation occurred, an increasingly common occurrence in a globalized world. However, thus far, no author has attempted to theorize about property squatting within the context of national security. Rather, analysts might mention in passing that the creation of squatter settlements is potentially destabilizing to a state—particularly a weak state—often theorizing about squatter settlements created as a result of border disputes and refugee flows. However, such an analysis thus treats squatting merely as a byproduct of some other larger and seemingly more important social problem—such as poverty or disaster—rather than as a security problem in its own right. In addition, squatting is mentioned as an important part of the growth of megacities—but the security aspects of having a largely unregistered and uncounted population that resides within a city’s borders without legal status are often not addressed.

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

SQUATTING AS A SECURITY PROBLEM Why then, we might ask, have security scholars not considered this problem, despite estimates that one in six of the world’s residents, or as many as 1 billion people, today are property squatters?12 Here the simplest explanation is that for many years, security studies scholars have conceptualized security as an activity within the realm of international relations, or something that occurred only at a macro level. As Weiss notes, historically, issues involving borders and defense of the state were the job of the national military forces, while issues involving domestic order or crime were the job of internal organizations such as the police.13 Indeed, the state’s own identity rests, according to some analysts, on its ability to define itself in relation to and to respond to threats in the international system. Thus, in explaining the evolution of a nation’s historic identity as well as its foreign policy, one might ask questions such as “Who does the nation seek to defend itself from?” and “What factors explain the differences between nations?”14 In contrast, issues of neighborhoods, housing and the people who dwell in these neighborhoods are regarded as matters of local or domestic politics. Border policies thus have a “politics” since they are matters of state policy, while domestic issues such as crime prevention and the apprehension of criminals do not. And individuals within the state are regarded as having committed a crime against a community or an individual, but they are not commonly regarded as engaging in antistate actions. If one violates housing policy, one is therefore branded a common criminal, rather than a threat to state security.15 The international relations theorist R. B. J. Walker refers to an “inside/ outside” distinction in explaining how the two spheres of politics differ, noting that they differ largely because they are practiced in such different environments—the domestic and the international.16 However, one can observe that politics is not only conceptualized differently in the two environments but often also practiced quite differently as well. In the (for the most part) orderly world inside the state, we may expect politics to be characterized by thoughtful, deliberative debates. There is usually no emergency, no crisis, no threat of imminent attack and often little genuine hostility between participants in a debate. (For example, participants at a city council meeting may differ about the importance of spending on education in the local community. However, despite differences of opinion, it is likely that neither side feels existentially threatened by the other.) Even when local politicians and pundits disagree, we can assume that in an ordered polity the communities and institutions will survive and that local politicians, like the mayor, will not overstep their bounds in designating enemies or marshaling forces to respond to a perceived threat. In contrast, politics within the anarchic international system is more frequently characterized by high conflict and high stakes. Issues are more often viewed through a lens of security, in which one’s enemies are viewed as an existential threat to the state itself.17 In this high-threat environment, the

Introduction

5

rhetoric of securitization is more often deployed in order to bring about a situation in which international decisions are made quickly, with less public input and discussion since policy making is viewed as a response to a crisis or an emergency. As Williams suggests, the language of securitization creates an understanding that an issue cannot be tackled using our regular everyday political logic. Instead, he notes, the implication is that “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant because we will not be here or will not be free to handle it in our own way.”18 Securitization thus transforms an issue from a mere nuisance to one that threatens “our very way of life.” And it is here that we arrive at the puzzle that led to this book. How is it that in the urban areas of many Western European nations, domestic policy issues having to do with housing, illegal immigrants and squatters have thus come to be viewed through the lens of securitization in the late 2000s? How is it that neighborhood relations are more often described in both the media and by politicians themselves as being in a state of emergency in which stringent measures must be taken in order to protect citizens and the neighborhood? What is different about neighborhood relations today, in comparison to neighborhood relations in the 1980s, that has caused citizens and policymakers to increasingly use the language and rhetoric of security to describe measures that must be taken? How is it that the language normally reserved for international relations and international conflicts is increasingly being used to describe conflicts within nations—among citizens and their fellow citizens who live in or attempt to take shelter in their neighborhoods? In order to begin to answer that question, we must first define the term “securitization” and its relationship to both emergency and crisis.

Defining Securitization Securitization is a term first used by Ole Waever in 1995 to refer to the process by which a topic comes to be seen as a matter of national security, and becomes removed from the realm of “politics as usual” to instead be treated as extraordinary politics.19 Securitization is thus both a rhetorical device and a set of policies and practices that aim to transform both the content and the practice of politics in a particular sphere. The lens or language of securitization can be used to construct a problem as being “about security” when previously the same situation was “about politics” or even “about real estate,” in the case of property squatting. (Here both security itself and the “referent object of security” are social constructs. There is no absolute definition of state security, nor is there any absolute way of understanding what threatens state security.) Issues that we have securitized in the twenty-first century thus include AIDS in Africa, migration policies, birth and natality issues in Western Europe and even environmental issues. Securitization practices thus create what Aradau calls a mode of extraordinary practices. Here, the main assumption of the Copenhagen School of

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analysis—whose analysts initially articulated the concept of securitization— is that “the enunciation of security itself creates a new social order wherein ‘normal politics’ is bracketed.”20 Once security is invoked, politicians and bureaucrats may abandon normal political practices such as open debate and deliberation, the calling of hearings or the formation of committees to study a problem and present findings and instead act to make sure that decisions are fast-tracked, and problems are confronted quickly and efficiently. In the process, public input may be regarded as less necessary and of lesser import. The move to securitize an issue thus raises both normative and ethical dilemmas. Didier Bigo in particular suggests that the “panic politics” of securitization can create a situation in which the relationship between the legislature and the citizens in a democracy is gravely threatened. In a crisis situation, he suggests that one of the few casualties is legislative accountability to citizens.21 Securitization can thus shut down a debate or indeed insure that one is never started, for as Aradau and van Munster note, rather than debate and deliberation, securitization calls for silence and speed.22 They argue that once an issue is framed as being “about security,” policies are more likely to be made by a small group of elites with outsiders unable to oppose or even oversee the legislation. This leads to an absence of public scrutiny.23 And if the threat to the state is regarded as sufficiently grave, policymakers may adopt sweeping new legislation that might include the imposition of new taxes, conscription and the limitation of civil rights that might previously have seemed inviolable.24 This is, in part, because decisions are more likely to be made by military or intelligence personnel, rather than publically elected officials—in a crisis situation.25 Aradau also faults securitization practices for frequently relying on the creation of an enemy and even producing an enemy in order to garner support for a policy solution. In a crisis situation, there is a perception that no middle-of-the-road solution is feasible anymore, citizens and policymakers alike begin to think differently about risk and their risk tolerance becomes much lower. As a result they may be less willing to practice tolerance—to live alongside states (or neighbors) who are quite different than themselves, and they may be more likely to err on the side of caution, even if it means restricting minorities’ rights, for example, in a region. The processes described here—the quick passage of legislation, a curtailment of public discussion on an issue and the creation of an enemy—can occur on both a national level (in, for example, the passage of the post–9/11 Patriot Act in the United States) and a local level (in, for example, putting up a fence around an apartment house or insisting that a guard check the passes of all who claim to live in the facility). As Neumann notes, one key indicator of whether an issue has become securitized is whether those involved are displaying fear and using language that augments or exhibits that fear. And as he notes, “Where there is fear, there should be IR scholars, for fear gives rise to policies, many of which are geared towards heightening security.”26 Thus,

Introduction

7

I believe that the issue of property squatting in Western Europe should be of interest to international relations scholars because it is “about security”— even if it is not about international politics but rather about policies and practices that are articulated within the state itself. It is my contention that in recent years it is increasingly likely that citizens may perceive a threat (even a domestic threat) as being “about security” and will thus often turn to the state, asking it to take extraordinary measures to preserve them from that threat—whether it is the threat of invasion, the threat of disease or even a social threat to their community. Here I am not arguing that the world (or indeed one’s neighborhood) has actually become more dangerous or that some situations today should be dealt with through strong state intervention or the taking of extraordinary measures. The securitization paradigm suggests that there is little utility in arguing about whether a threat, as constituted, is “real.” Rather, what is important is the way in which threats are created, constructed or understood within a particular social, political and cultural context. However, I am suggesting that today it is likely that more issues—both foreign and domestic—will be approached through the lens of security, and that both the public and those in authority will be more likely to suggest that issues are related to state, individual and community security.27

Securitization on the Local Level I am not the first analyst to suggest that securitization can thus exist on a local as well as an international level. In her work on neighborhoods in South Africa, the geographer Charlotte Lemanski suggests that all urbanized citizens have experiences with security and security threats in their day-today lives. Citizens may even be empowered to take their own actions to safeguard their safety. As she notes, security problems exist on a variety of scales—and security and securitization can be constructed from the bottom up as well as from the top down.28 More recently, McInnes and Rushton have described securitization as a multidimensional process that can be carried out on a variety of levels (local, state and international) as well as along a continuum, with some issues being more securitized than others. In addition, they suggest that issues can become both securitized and desecuritized over time.29 In this way, to paraphrase Alexander Wendt, our neighbors—like the international system that he describes—become “what we make of them.” As citizens, we may choose to view those in our neighborhoods who are unlike ourselves as potential friends, business associates and marriage partners or we may choose to see them as enemies or as an existential threat to our way of life, depending on the lens with which we choose to view the problem. Thus, it is not surprising that in a globalizing world as well as a post–9/11 world, we can find evidence of securitization on a local level in a variety of Western European cities. Therefore, it is plausible to consider

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how the squatter is constructed as a threat to the state, and the ways that these understandings structure state responses to the squatter. The squatter is constructed as a figure through speech acts uttered by officials who make housing policy, through media coverage of the issue of squatting and through judicial and legislative rulings that use language to describe the squatter and the issue of squatting. And not surprisingly in a Europe of open borders and a globalized world, we can also identify securitization rhetoric regarding property squatters that revolves around the presence of nonnative Others dwelling in one’s midst and that calls for the state to mobilize resources against this perceived threat. In this work, we trace the path by which securitization arose within local urban politics, with securitization logic being extended to produce an arena of housing security as a subset of social-cultural security. In doing so, it becomes clear that housing is an arena ripe for securitization because housing politics are so often really conversations about identity, culture and attachment to a place. Citizens throughout the world hold deep emotional attachments to their homes, which are not simply buildings but rather the repositories of feelings about who one is, where one belongs and the sort of community that one belongs to. (These feelings of attachment to home interact and overlap with larger feelings of attachment that citizens have to a homeland and their nation.) The ability to own a home of one’s own appears in American popular culture as “the American dream,” while for British citizens, there is an understanding that “a man’s home is his castle.” As I show in chapter 1, the home is the embodiment of deeply held values and principles—and it is viewed as a sanctuary, a fortress, an inheritance, the container for one’s family as well as a symbol of one’s past. Thus, it is not surprising that citizens are passionate about their attachment to a place, ready to defend it and willing to go to great lengths to assure the safety and security of their homes and neighborhoods—particularly when they perceive them as being under threat by non-European Others. As Albert and Buzan note, “societal or socio-cultural security is about the sustainability of collective identities.”30 In addition, housing policy is ripe for securitization because of the ways in which living in a neighborhood or a community has always produced practices of surveillance. As Charlotte Epstein argues, it is not surprising and perhaps inevitable that securitization would ultimately be practiced on the lowest levels—the level of the individual human body31 and the level of the home. Since 9/11, in both Europe and the United States we have seen governments and private firms devoting an increased budget share to training for and carrying out counterterrorism measures that seek to preempt the growth of a previously identified security threat. In many sectors, we have seen an increase in practices that seek to predict which types of citizens and groups might pose the greatest security threat—for example, through a reliance on profiling. At the same time, we have seen an increased share of government funds devoted to establishing and carrying out practices of surveillance—from the monitoring of telephone and internet conversations

Introduction

9

by those suspected of being or becoming terror threats, to the use of CCTV in both public places and neighborhoods, throughout the UK in particular. Once neighborhood politics and the danger of squatters become viewed as a matter of national security, it is likely that surveillance practices of all types will increase on the local level. The home, which we regard as a place of privacy, sanctity and safety, or a sanctuary from the stressors of public life, risks becoming just another site where individuals are monitored, ostensibly for the public good. It is even possible that citizens will become more comfortable participating in surveillance themselves—and there is some evidence that this is true—watching to see if individuals in their neighborhoods are engaging in illegal occupations or strange comings and goings. It is difficult to see how one can build neighborhood communities when individuals view their neighbors as potential security threats, watch them carefully and, in some instances, report them to the authorities. In his work on surveillance, Torin Monahan speaks of the creation of a new type of citizen whom he labels the “insecurity subject.” Such an individual is the subject of increased monitoring himself, and may himself engage in increased monitoring of his surroundings, his neighbors and their activities. As securitization becomes the norm in more and more sectors of society in more and more places, citizens everywhere begin to adopt a new identity—in which they are asked to view the world through the lens of securitization, and in the process thinking differently about themselves, their neighbors and their surroundings. The provision of security becomes not only the job of the government but also of each citizen, thereby definitely breaking the inside-outside distinction as security becomes, in a sense, everyone’s job everywhere.32 And, as Aradau notes, in each sector where securitization occurs there are also new classes of so-called security professionals who have specific know-how and technology to sell or lend to the problem.33 Such individuals or corporations may be skilled at framing their particular issue as one that threatens the security and even the survival of institutions within that sector. As Aradau notes, “to securitize, actors come up with statistics, relate them, and establish the ‘truth on scientific bases’ concerning immigration and other societal problems such as organized crime, AIDS or human trafficking.”34 Experts produce knowledge about the subject, which is then used to shore up a particular interpretation of the problem as it exists, as well as the policy solutions that are then put forth to confront the problem. In the case of property squatting, specialists have provided new knowledge on numbers of break-ins and the difficulties of eviction and then have gone on to create new classes of products and services for sale to those who are concerned about squatting. Here we can point to the creation of new types of antisquatter insurance policies that homeowners may purchase. Such policies promise to reimburse homeowners for repair costs they encounter as a result of having their property damaged, as well as legal costs they may encounter in evicting squatters from their property. Risk experts provide businesses with advice on preventing squatting, while security personnel

10

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

provide armed guards to secure both individual and corporate properties that are in danger of being squatted as a consequence of being left empty. Here, it appears to be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: the citizen observer may conclude that the mere existence of such services means that squatting is a serious problem that the state must quickly deploy resources to defeat—even if he himself has no personal experience with or need to fear squatters or squatting. Thus, the “mercenary” who lends himself out to provide security can find employment either abroad or in downtown London, since the security environment is now being portrayed as similar and similarly threatening.

The Upside and the Downside of Securitization Here one might ask why such securitization is problematic at all. If individuals feel safer within their gated enclaves and new private security firms are doing their jobs well, then why should anyone object to these new developments? However, I contend that increased securitization of housing policy is problematic for three reasons. First, the securitization of housing policy represents an extension of the state of emergency and politics of exceptionality to yet more sectors of life in society today—including the tendency for security politics to no longer be practiced just on an international, regional (European) or even a national level. Securitization of housing issues thus represents a burrowing down of security issues to even the lowest levels of politics—the local level. This is the level most associated with direct democracy. (Here we can point to institutions such as early New England town meetings, the politics of homeowners’ associations and even the Athenian city-state to show how citizens have exercised their rights within a democracy to participate in decision making in their communities.)35 Writing presciently in 2002, Didier Bigo described securitization politics as resembling a Möbius strip with no clear inside and outside, as the lines between external security and internal security, and the politics of external and internal threat management became increasingly blurred.36 In this way, the burrowing down of securitization politics to the local level poses the possibility of a loss of sovereignty, as local officials are urged or even forced to cede more of their decision-making authority to federal authorities, both those who are elected and those who are appointed. As Barry Buzan argued in 1997, the state has become increasingly powerful, with the influence of the state creeping into more and more aspects of individuals’ personal and private lives.37 Surveillance practices that were unthinkable in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, are now commonplace. And many types of disputes within society are now being examined and treated through the lens of criminality and security as the referent objects of security have expanded and changed.38 Most recently, the analyst Nadine Voelkner has adopted a Foucaultian perspective to describe the changing role of the state in an increasingly globalized world. In her work on disease and

Introduction

11

pathogenic security, she argues that states today no longer seek to control their borders as much as they seek to control the circulation of objects, ideas and people that seek to move into and out of their borders. In her work, she relies on Bennett’s definition of globalization as “a state of affairs in which the Earth (globe or world) is taken as a whole within which various parts— human and nonhuman—now circulate.”39 According to this logic, one can argue that the state now seeks both to better police and control the liminal space of the squats that exist within their borders, and simultaneously seeks to control the transient squatters who travel throughout Europe in search of empty spaces to occupy—sometimes bringing with them social problems or dangerous social philosophies like anarchism. Furthermore, since the politics of exceptionality requires the creation of an enemy in order to present a justification for practicing crisis politics, extending securitization to the local level changes how citizens view their neighbors, including those who are different from themselves. A politics of exclusion is therefore more likely on all levels of society. As Williams suggests, in considering the growth of securitization in the modern age, the most important questions to ask are: What is being secured? And what is it being secured from?40 In answering this question on the local level, we find that increasingly the city or neighborhood is being secured from those who are different because they are seen as threatening to societal security or identity. As a result of the creation of crisis politics within the community, even local politics is now practiced with greater secrecy, greater speed and less broad deliberation—and those who are different are even more likely to be left out of the community. (This may be described as a small price to pay in order to guarantee safety and reduce risks.) It is not mere coincidence thus that just as Europe’s nations have turned from a politics of multiculturalism to one that focuses instead on the burden and responsibilities of assimilation as practiced by the newcomer, so has securitization language arisen in the neighborhoods and communities that house the newcomers.

Securitization and the “War on Squatting” To come full circle from the introduction then, it becomes clear that property squatting in Western European capitals today needs to be examined not as a problem of political economy or through the sociological lens of deviance. Instead, we can learn much about the problem itself and the way in which states have acted to handle the problem through considering it as a problem of security. Discussions in the media and by politicians about Europe’s squatter problem have—along with legislation—served to move squatting from the status of public nuisance to grave security threat in the years since 2001. The measures enacted—and the ways they were enacted—suggest that property squatting was securitized in many nations, including England, France, Netherlands and Denmark. In each instance we can see a new timeline evolving, in which measures to cope with property squatting—particularly urban

12

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

property squatting and squatting engaged in by nonnationals of the country in question—passed quickly with a minimum of public debate. The debates that we would expect to see about human rights, including the right to housing, were absent. In some places, public protests against the legislation were quickly broken up by police personnel. Large-scale public information campaigns promoted the government’s view regarding the dangers of squatting. In this way, a cultural practice that persisted happily for over fifty years—and that often has deep roots in a culture, stretching back to the 1300s in the case of Britain—was redefined and rigidly controlled overnight. In his work, Stritzel speaks of “securitization logic,” or a “universal grammar,” which renders all issues that have become securitized as alike. Once an object problem or group becomes the object of securitization, the procedure for making policy is remarkably similar.41 He argues that it doesn’t matter to a large extent which nation is enacting the pageant of security, nor do the names or specific identities of the actors themselves matter. The relationship constructed between policymakers, the public and the object of security remains the same, with each set of actors playing their parts according to the same script. In this work, Stritzel’s argument is extended to demonstrate that the securitization pageant operates the same on both an international and a domestic level. Actions taken against property squatters—such as slum clearing and the deportation of foreign squatters—represent new types of exceptional actions taken by the state for reasons of public security. Analysts have previously examined the politics of slum clearance in the developing world, focusing on the ways in which slum clearing is justified on the grounds of health security since slums are seen as places of infestation and disease. However, as Aguilera points out, in conceptualizing the slum or squat as an unruly place, the assumption is that the squat itself is a threat that exists within a developing country. The squat becomes an extension of the chaos and ungovernability that might be associated with the state or region as a whole.42 However, what is unusual about the Western European situation is the notion that such pockets of ungovernability and chaos might exist within the modern state. In addition, what is unusual about European antisquatting legislation is the attempt to securitize the issue by making reference to some characteristics of the squatters themselves—rather than the chaotic nature of the space that they occupy. Squatters in general and multinational property squatters in particular are described in terms that make reference to terrorism, liminality and the danger presented by unregistered and unsurveilled citizens residing in the capital cities within one’s borders, rather than on the grounds of health. Thus, the squatter himself—rather than the practice of squatting or the squat itself—is demonized. Here, state interests are served both by demonizing property squatters— particularly foreign property squatters—and by redefining the squatting issue as one of national security. Estimates suggest that the squatter population has grown worldwide since 2007 in the developed and developing world due to adverse economic effects, widening income inequalities and the

Introduction

13

bank bailouts and foreclosure crises. Today, cities like Reykjavik in Iceland and Helsinki in Finland boast large and well-known squats. A UK-based web site for landlords reprints figures from a squatter group that suggests that since the 1970s, approximately 250,000 people have “squatted” in Britain.43 And Britain’s Ministry of Justice acknowledges that squatting has doubled in Britain since the beginning of the 2008 recession, mostly because of the vast increase in the numbers of empty and unoccupied homes.44 And within the increasing numbers of property squatters one can also identify increasing numbers of foreign squatters within the nations of Europe. These new squatters are coming from EU member nations and nations in Eastern Europe, as well as from former colonies, in the case of Africa. Statistics from the UK’s Department of Communities and Local Government indicate that in 2012, 52 percent of the homeless sleeping on the streets (or sleeping rough) in London were foreign, with 28 percent from other Western European countries.45 The ability of European citizens in particular to move from one European nation to another for employment-related purposes has spawned a culture of squatter settlements in both urban and rural areas throughout Europe. While some of the squatters are individuals belonging to groups (like Irish Travelers or East European gypsies) who were traditionally nomadic, other individuals were also added to the mix—including East European workmen squatting in England, and students from throughout Europe squatting in their home countries or abroad. Here, as Guild notes, EU nationals wanting to enter other EU nations are permitted to do so according to the Schengen cooperation agreements—though they must register if they wish to stay for longer than three months. Those who do not have the proper documents (including proof that they have a job in the host country) are not eligible to register for social benefits, such as social housing and health care in the host nation. These are the individuals thus most likely to end up homeless, either “sleeping rough” on the streets or squatting in abandoned properties. It is relatively difficult to expel homeless EU nationals from one’s nation. The only legitimate grounds for expelling EU nationals are “the grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”46 Thus, it is easy to see the appeal of redefining property squatting as a matter of national security. And in each case examined (the Netherlands, France, the UK and Denmark) the increase in international property squatters occurred within an environment in which multiculturalism was increasingly giving way to assimilationist tendencies within immigration circles and in which anti-immigrant sentiments among citizens were on the rise, largely as a backlash against economic downturns. In simple terms, in many nations squatters are no longer viewed as objects of charity, requiring care and kindness—but instead as a threat to national identity and national security. Thus, today’s social and political conversation about squatting—at least in Europe—is no longer merely “about” real estate. Rather, it is about questions of identity: who belongs in our community and who does not? What should our community look like?47

14

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

Securitization logic also explains why, although property squatting was formerly considered a local issue to be handled by neighborhood associations, local police and local politicians in recent years, squatter policy has become the subject of national-level policy making and often internationallevel policy making as well. Indeed, with the advent of globalization and the increased mobility of citizens, resources and capital, many analysts have begun to question the rigid distinction that is so often made between politics and the political process within and outside the state. Agnew speaks of a process of “deterritorialization” occurring within security politics—describing a decoupling of security from the state and an undermining of the notion of the state as a territorial container.48 Here, the advent of practices such as asymmetric warfare and terrorist attacks on civilians within states means that the language and practices of security are being increasingly applied by local politicians, by local police forces and by the media in discussing local threats. Thus, in the years since 9/11, many analysts have begun to suggest that this “universal grammar of security” is now being enacted in more and more sectors of society, both within the international system and within the state itself. Here, Albert and Buzan provide a list of five sectors that have become securitized—pointing to the realms of economic security, military security, environmental security, political security and societal or social-cultural security.49 Thus, we can now frame arguments describing a crisis occurring in the housing sector as one that calls for a marshaling of resources, a speedy solution to a problem and often the imposition of draconian measures to fend off a perceived threat. As a result politics in a so-called global city in a climate of globalization may no longer be local politics. That distinction between the orderly politics inside the polity and the high-stakes politics outside the polity no longer holds. As I show in chapter 1, defending the state and defending the city are now closely related—particularly when the identities of the “enemies” now closely overlap. Here Table i.1 lists all of the actors that have come to play a part in formulating and implementing policies regarding urban squatters in France, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK in the past ten years. As the chart shows, these actors include international or regional (European) actors, including nongovernmental organizations and transnational actors. In addition, they include national-level agencies, politicians and parliaments. And finally, they include local actors, such as the neighbors of the squatters, the squatter organizations themselves and local politicians. As the case studies in this work show, the making of antisquatter policy became the job of a new group of actors, including security professionals. Most of these actors—France’s minister of the interior, Britain’s minister of justice, the Red Cross, the European Court of Justice and the United Nations high commissioner for refugees—are not local, but rather national and international actors. Thus, what was previously regarded as a nuisance and a local problem has now become the object of policy making at the highest levels of government.

Introduction Table i.1

15

Actors Involved in Squatting in Western Europe International /regional actors UN HCR International Red Cross European Court of Justice Roma Congress National actors Department of Interior Department of Justice National newspapers Parliament President/prime minister Local actors Mayors Local newspapers Neighbours Homeowners’ associations Squatter organizations

In addressing issues related to the existence of property squats and property squatters within the borders of France, England, the Netherlands and Denmark, the issue thus becomes one of global governance. Legal rulings that might be referenced as the aforementioned actors attempt to regulate and respond to challenges of existing squats include the 1985 Schengen Agreement; the agreements created between France and the UK to regulate the activities of squatters in the port of Calais, France; the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights issued by the European Parliament; judicial rulings of the European Court of Human Rights; the UN Human Rights Charter; and rulings by the Council of Europe on the rights of the Roma. In addressing the right to squat, legal scholars and policy analysts have had to address related issues regarding the right to housing, the rights of refugees and asylum seekers and the rights of nomadic peoples like the Roma. In situations in which leaders deported squatters who were in the country illegally, separate legal rulings have addressed the authority of the state to deport these individuals. In this way, a local issue—there is a property squatter or group of property squatters in the home next to me—quickly becomes a national, a regional (Europe-wide) and often an international issue. Finally, in instances in which squatters were attacked, legal authorities have intervened on behalf of migrant or transient squatters. (For example, in Italy, Roma settlements were the victims of arson.)50

16

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

Two Visions of the Neighborhood Today Sophie Body-Gendrot uses an idea borrowed from mathematics to describe what she terms the “fractalization” in security policy today. She notes that in a fractal figure all of the parts that make up the object have the same shape or structure as the whole, albeit on a different scale. (She gives us the examples of snowflakes or tree branches.)51 Thus, one might expect to see the federal institutions of security reproduced on a local level, and the conversations about state security also reproduced on a local level. While states may fear the spread of chaos from a neighboring failed state, local officials may worry about the existence of squatter settlements within their borders, fearing that here too chaos may spread to other neighboring regions. It should be noted here that this is not a new problem—but rather one that is somewhat new for politicians in the West or the developed world. Scholars who write about slums, housing and development have long argued that the existence of large swaths of unregulated housing and unregulated people provides an obstacle to development. Here, they cite the likely destabilization that may occur as the result of uneven development that may exacerbate class differences, creating a class of those who are extremely wealthy alongside a class of those who are destitute.52 Here we can identify ideas related to globalization that are writ both large and small, through comparing the security discourses and security practices of the neighborhood and the state. While using the language of securitization to describe neighborhood politics might thus seem like a good “fit” for politicians and citizens, there are reasons why one should worry about this development. Constructivist analysts in particular have long argued that language does not merely describe an existing reality as much as it can serve to structure or create that reality. Albert and Buzan note that: In the social world, the structure of social reality and the way it is observed and described are inextricably intertwined. If something comes to be seen primarily as a “political,” an “economic,” a “military” issue and so on, which before had primarily been seen as something else, then this can both signal and lead to a change in the way social reality is structured.53 That is, security language when it appears in newspapers or on Sunday morning talk shows and when it appears frequently can actually change the ways in which citizens throughout Europe begin to think about their neighbors, their neighborhoods and the policies that they wish their states to adopt in dealing with neighborhood problems. People who did not previously fear property squatters may begin to do so, and individuals may begin to perceive their neighborhoods as under siege or in danger from foreign squatters— even if previously they were not worried about these developments. In this work, I warn about some of the dangers that accrue from the increasing tendency of politicians and news analysts to use security language to describe an ever larger number of activities and problems. This extension

Introduction

17

of securitization language to yet more spheres has negative effects upon the polity—for the growth of democratization and citizen participation since a politics of emergency is fundamentally incompatible with a politics of democracy. Secondly, as noted, the extension of securitization language to the sphere of housing policy has negative effects both upon the squatters themselves and upon their neighbors. Squatters are more likely to be demonized and disempowered, while neighbors are more likely to begin to see their neighborhood in terms of barriers to be defended and a simplistic enemy/ friend dichotomy. Finally, extending securitization language to describe the squatting issue today serves to close off the conversation, thus limiting the types of strategies considered acceptable and unacceptable in dealing with the phenomenon. As Neumann notes in his essay on the methodology of discourse analysis, a discourse can serve as a sort of blueprint whose purpose is to structure a conversation about a problem. Discourse is thus powerful because as he states: (Discourse) constrains how the stuff that the world consists of is ordered and so how people categorize and think about the world. It constrains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible and what is thought of as the “natural thing” to do in a given situation . . . it produces preconditions for action.54 Discussion of squatting as a security problem—rather than a social problem or a failure by the state to provide housing—thus affects what policy solutions are likely to be examined in dealing with squatting, who is likely to be blamed for the problem and what practices are viewed as possible within that system. Securitization language problematizes both squatting practices and the squatter him- or herself, as well as making a punitive, strong state solution to the problem more likely. That is, we can identify two different narratives: one that views squatting as a form of nascent citizenship, and one that portrays squatting as a form of antistate activity. Each narrative relies on a different construction of both the squatter and the squat. Table i.2 summarizes the two different sets of policy prescriptions—exclusionary and inclusionary—that flow from the two narratives. Each set of policies rests on different assumptions about what squatting is, the relationship between the squatter and the polity, and the character and orientation of those who squat. Table i.2 delineates those differences. This chart presents inclusion and exclusion strategies, thus, as two ideal types. In reality, it is unlikely that a state’s policy towards squatting will be a pure expression of only inclusion or only exclusion. Instead these policies can be seen as existing on a continuum, with states swinging like a pendulum from the embrace of exclusionist or inclusionist strategies over time—depending on the existence of other security threats within the polity, and the place of the state within the international community. States might also have a mixed strategy. The states of Western Europe in particular have

18

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

Table i.2

Two Sets of Policies towards Squatting Inclusionist

Squatting as practice represents

•

Exclusionist

First rung on property ladder • Bid for acceptance in society • Lower state of political, social, economic development • Legitimate response to social problems in housing sphere

• • •

Threat to existing community Anti-social behavior Illegitimate response

Orientation of accepting polity

• • •

• • •

Mono-ethnic Closed Fixed

State’s desired objective

•

Inclusion of squatters into community • Situation is problematized

•

Defense of community from squatters Squatter is problematized

Characterization of squatter by elites

• Nascent citizen • Able, willing to adapt • Identity is malleable, not fixed

•

Perceived ideology of squatter

• •

•

Agency of squatter

Victim of housing crisis, economy, economic circumstances

Empowered individual who chooses squatting

Likelihood of assimilation of squatters

High (inevitable?)

Low

Strategies, overtures by elites

• Privatization of squats • Employment schemes

•

Strategies, overtures by citizens

Cooperation with squatter charity

NIMBY

Government actions

Amnesty Extension of social welfare and benefits

Slum clearing Deportation of international squatters

Multicultural Open Adaptive

Pre-democratic Incrementalist

•

Security threat: untrustworthy • Social distance: too ethnically, culturally different to adapt • Identity is fixed

•

Antistate orientation, dangerous Revolutionary

“Containment of squatters”: borders, fortifications • Punitive • Security oriented • Criminalization

Introduction

19

had a somewhat schizophrenic approach to the issue of property squatting, for government policy has alternately embraced and outlawed the practice of squatting—giving rise to two different sets of policies for regulating the practice over time. In some instances, property squatters (including Roma) were described as barbaric. Language used in the popular press when describing the problem of squatting often emphasizes the ways in which property squatters and the property squat are dirty, dangerous and unsafe. In the words of Mary Douglas, the language of purity and defilement is used.55 Here, the fear is that those living in a neighborhood will somehow be contaminated by the presence of squatters. The only solution is thus shutting down squats, using violence if necessary. The social distance created thus provides a justification for processes like slum clearing, since those who are different are presented as dangerous—particularly if they are foreign. At the same time, there has always persisted a separate mythology about squatting—based both on religious and folk attitudes. Within a JudeoChristian worldview, land can be seen first and foremost as belonging to God, with individuals, families and corporations having only a limited claim upon it. Historically, some theologians and politicians have interpreted the passage in the Old Testament Book of Leviticus in particular, which describes the Year of Jubilee that occurs every fifty years and results in a type of land distribution, as being a statement in favor of commonly held lands and egalitarian land distribution. As Helen Hayward notes, radical agrarian movements within Britain have historically made use of this understanding in advocating for a variety of different schemes. She notes that groups like the Diggers and the Levelers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries opposed the payment of taxes or tithes for the privilege of living on church-held lands, based on the argument that the concentration of land in a few hands was both unjust and inequitable.56 In addition, Colin Ward calls our attention to the tradition of the “one night house,” a sort of folk understanding that an individual who builds a house under cover of darkness on unclaimed land may legally be permitted to do so.57 In this view, squatting thus becomes the bottom rung of the property ladder, with laws such as the right of adverse possession allowing a citizen who adds his labor to the land, in some instances, to win legal title to that land. In Ward’s work he likewise suggests that many current citizens are actually descended from early property squatters and that squatting is both an important democratic tradition as well as a common fix for market inequities such as a land shortage.58 This thread runs through British history, with individuals like Thomas Spence and William Wilberforce making arguments about the justice and inequity of land-tenure forms. Thus, within Britain in particular (as well as in France), there was limited public and elite support for schemes that would distribute land equally among citizens.59 However, the growth of securitization language in discussing squatting in the past ten years has caused the pendulum to swing once again between

20

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

the two approaches—away from a situation in which the property squatter might be viewed as a potential new neighbor and new citizen, to one in which the squatter is viewed as not quite human and therefore lacking in the rights and privileges of “decent society.” The use of security language or security discourse increases the likelihood that the state will adopt an exclusionist orientation towards property squatting. In the present day, property squatting is thus more likely to be tackled from an exclusionary perspective (which emphasizes the question: how might I secure my property from squatters?) rather than an inclusionary perspective (which might ask the question: how is it that people similar to ourselves were left out of the neighborhoods of our polity, and how might they be brought back in?). The danger here is that society as a whole will become more divided and polarized if an exclusionary perspective is adopted on the squatting issue. In order to explore this idea more fully, we must step back and examine the problem from a historic perspective.

Inclusion and Exclusion: Embracing the Squatter At some periods in the history of the state, squatting was viewed through an inclusionist lens. State policies have operated on the assumption that squatting represents the lowest rung on the property ladder. The preferred state is one of being settled, and those who are not settled but nomadic are regarded as deviant. However, the assumption is that squatting is merely a temporary problem associated with economic transition, rather than a permanent identity. For this reason, squatter slums are often referred to as “informal settlements”60—with the implied notion that they can eventually be converted (or institutionalized in the words of Hans Pruijt61) into formal settlements. As development continues, analysts argue, informal settlements will be absorbed into formal mechanisms as states become more modernized and better at administering their citizens.62 Inclusionist state policy also assumes that those who squat have a right to do so, and they are not to be regarded with suspicion but with compassion. Here, discourse focuses on the ways in which squatters are not practicing citizenship correctly and how they are violating many of the norms that longtime citizens take for granted regarding how one lives in a neighborhood. Nonetheless, the implication is that given the right set of conditions, property squatters may be socialized and transformed and eventually assimilated into the community. Squatters are thus acknowledged as political actors and human beings who are capable of practicing politics and eventually claiming the rights and privileges that other citizens enjoy. The assumption is that no one squats unless he is forced to by dire economic circumstances such as poverty, and that the squatter’s goal is not to damage the state or the neighborhood but merely to provide for the survival of him- or herself and his or her family in the only way possible. Here, both Aguilera and Pruijt suggest that precarious individuals in particular

Introduction

21

are often “coopted” into the system and their situation may become institutionalized.63 A member of a squatter community might even be absorbed into the leadership within the neighborhood, region or city. In this model, squatters are not “outside the system” because they wish to be outside but rather because they weren’t invited in and no one attempted to include them. Here the state may also acknowledge some degree of complicity or guilt for creating the conditions that led to a housing shortage for socially vulnerable members. Indeed, the state may tacitly or openly agree to look the other way when confronted with squatting practices, and over time the state may even begin to make overtures towards squatters with a view towards gradually legalizing their position and integrating them into society. In the inclusionist policy, squatting thus provides a “way in” for nascent citizens to gradually adopt the full mantle of citizenship in their neighborhoods and cities. Historically and even recently, squatting was a reasonable way of acquiring or even demanding to be let into a community. In this view, the squatter’s identity was not fixed but impermanent. The identity of both the squatter and the larger community changed or adapted. The squatter could become a genuine member of society, and society could remain open to embrace and accept squatters. As Ward shows in his history of squatting in Britain, folk traditions allowed an outsider to claim the right to establish a residence and in that way to claim status within society. Ward describes the mythology and norms that arose governing the building of dwellings by residents in Britain beginning with the Middle Ages. Here he describes the institution of the “one night” house—which is based on the social understanding that a dwelling that is put up within the span of one night (or in some instances built only after dark) can serve to establish a claim on both the residence and the land on which it resides by the builder. He describes this belief as mythological or magical, and goes on to note that many villages in Britain have a historic “squatter” house that eventually became legitimized by local definitions of squatter’s rights. One can find the one-night house myth in the cultures of Latin America, in Turkey and elsewhere throughout Europe.64 A variant of this inclusionist view also be found in James Holston’s writing about “insurgent citizenship” in Brazil, in which he notes that marginalized citizens have often organized informally to wrest property and eventually citizenship from the entrenched interests that were loath to share.65 In addition, the British organization Homeless International uses the language of inclusion to describe the ways in which India’s Pavement Dwellers are working within Mumbai’s Society of the Promotion of Area Sources Centers (SPARC) to create housing cooperatives leading to the full inclusion of pavement dwellers within India’s social, economic and political life.66 Both as individual actors, actors within a state and as transnational actors, squatters have often thus articulated a desire to join the existing capitalist system, and to be granted rights and privileges within the existing system (versus espousing a desire to transform or convert the existing system to something else—such as an anarchic society or a socialist or communist

22

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

scheme of property ownership). Inclusion strategies are thus assimilationist, and the transformation from squatter or pavement dweller to productive citizen is thus seen as inevitable. In other words, all that is lacking for these individuals to become homeowners (and productive citizens) is a home. In both narratives—that of insurgent citizenship and that of the extension of housing franchise—policy analysts see squatters as a force that ultimately can seek to shore up rather than to undermine the state. Despite the use of the term “insurgent citizenship,” squatters are not really seen as insurgents— since they do not seek to overturn or destroy the state, but rather to be embraced by the state and to have a role within the state. (However, analysts may differ about the role of agency—whether citizenship and housing rights need be wrested away from the dominant class, or whether they might simply be extended through government policies.) Thus, assimilation strategies rest on the assumption that every squatter is a nascent citizen, desiring to move beyond his or her rootless or unsettled status. In this narrative, over time, the squat dweller acquires both legitimacy in the eyes of his neighbors and a stake in the community. The chaotic and primitive landscape of the squat gives way to the civilized laying down of streets and alleys. Both the squatter and his dwelling evolve towards the norms of the community. Gradually, over time he becomes both a legal resident and a member of the community. He moves from the position of a threatening, marginalized outsider to occupy a place in the community. He accepts community norms and fulfills his responsibilities in the community—rather than remaining forever marginalized in his substandard house. As Ward describes the logic: Favorable circumstances can enable those overnight adventurers to form communities that evolve in about fifteen years into fully-serviced suburbs, providing livelihoods as well as homes, through people’s ability to turn their Labor into capital. This is something that neither government nor the market economy can do for the least influential of citizens.67 He describes the ways in which the dwellings themselves lose their strange angles and peculiar character. Over time, the squatters paint their houses the same color as those of their compatriots and gradually the house is absorbed into the larger milieu of the community. Ward suggests that the logic of property ownership is transformative—it literally changes who people are.68 Thus, the threat that the squatter presents is gradually reduced and the squatter himself is disarmed through a process of socialization. Gradually he is incorporated into the community, and becomes a means of support for the community and protection, rather than an outside threat. The assimilationist or inclusionist narrative thus assumes that even the squatter can become part of the capitalist system if his labor can be harnessed on behalf of that system. (Squatting is thus the first rung on the property ladder.) He may aspire to citizenship and come in voluntarily, or his actions may be harnessed or captured by the state. He can serve as a resource for the

Introduction

23

state if, for example, his actions can be used to force a correction to market mechanisms. Assimilationist strategies against squatting may thus involve the extension of amnesty to those in squats so that they can invoke legal claims towards the property without fear of facing criminal penalties for squatting. Other strategies may include paid squatting schemes in which squatters receive a fee for occupying homes and businesses that otherwise might be vacant—thus providing on-site security and protection against vandalism and decay. Strategies might also include legal and economic mechanisms for converting squats themselves into state-sanctioned or private legal housing. Thus, for example, throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, nations including Great Britain and the Netherlands invoked schemes in which property squatters were induced to squat “on behalf of” the government, and force a correction in the market system.69 The plan was to harness the squatter threat to entice or compel landlords to complete their renovations quickly and get their properties back on the market lest they be squatted while vacant!70 Similarly, media reports and government policy papers often report favorably about the British group Shelter, which grew out of citizen activism in the post–World War II period. Here, poor families organized to claim unoccupied buildings and to demand that the government provide more social housing. Today, Shelter urges Britain’s government to address property squatting through use of strategies such as appointing the homeless to serve as “property guardians,” occupying and maintaining dwellings that are abandoned or empty, or involving the homeless in short-life housing schemes. The Great London Council’s Squatters’ amnesty in 1977–1978 similarly encouraged squatters to come out of the shadows and to work out arrangements with the city to take legal tenancy of properties they occupied.71 In each case, the aim overall is to convert squatting into lawful tenancy and engagement in the mainstream. Within the inclusionist narrative, squatting is thus regarded as a strategy of incrementalism in which citizenship is gradually won, rather than a transformative or revolutionary strategy of squatters whose aims are to overthrow capitalism or democracy. Inclusionist practices are not always successful, however. This is because they rest on two assumptions that may not always hold. First, they assume that squatters themselves wish to assimilate culturally and ethnically into the polity as a whole, and that the polity is able and willing to accept them as part of itself. Next, they assume that squatters wish to assimilate politically and economically into the polity as a whole in such a way as to help prop up or support the state, rather than wishing to tear down the state and start anew. In Western Europe, policymakers often seem confused by the Roma organizations that do not wish to become assimilated into long-term dwellings and a settled life. Assimilation or inclusion may also fail if the group that the state is seeking to include harbors a radically different vision of its future, one that rests on a desire to overthrow the existing system rather than to work within it. In this case, an out-group may refuse overtures from the mainstream towards assimilation and elites may be forced to change their strategy towards squatters as a result. We can see the tensions between inclusion and exclusion

24

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

in the events of the late 1960s in London. At this time, a number of squatter organizations entered into negotiations with the government in an attempt to resolve the issues of urban homelessness and poverty. In particular, the British organization Shelter evolved a friendly relationship with the government. But many involved in the 1969 actions, including Ron Bailey, founder of the more radical organization known as the London Squatter’s Campaign, felt that Shelter had betrayed the squatting movement through aligning with the government and as a result was too willing to compromise and be patient. Bailey’s group faulted Shelter because of the fact that it did not see capitalism or government as the problem, whereas the London Squatter Campaign did. In an interview, Bailey noted that “We hoped that our small actions would set off a movement on a large scale with others inspired to challenge the government.” His more radical antistate movement worked with and was inspired by the International Socialist Worker’s movement.72 As noted, the assumption of the assimilationist/inclusionist strategy is that no one actually chooses to squat but that squatting is rather a lastresort strategy of the truly disempowered. For that reason, inclusionist strategies do not include a mechanism for situations like the one just mentioned, in which disaffected youths in Europe appeared to be choosing squatting not out of a necessity, but because it appealed to them intellectually, ethically and politically. Today, in particular, the anarchist squatter represents a threat because he does not accept societal norms regarding property rights, thus posing a threat to preexisting institutions like private property. These individuals have described themselves as “taking possession” as a protest of the capitalist ideology of private property.73 Assimilationist or inclusionist practices, however, might fail not because of characteristics of the squatters themselves, but rather because of characteristics of the state that is formulating policies to deal with squatting. In particular, inclusionist practices are unlikely to be embraced or adopted in situations in which those on top (including neighbors and national and local policymakers) are unable to envision a particular group as capable of being assimilated over time. Historically, we can identify periods in which squatting (and squatters) were viewed through an exclusionist lens, in which those who almost belonged to society were merely tolerated (and sometimes not even that), but were kept at arm’s length from the community as a whole. In this model, squatters may be acknowledged as living on the fringes of society but are not regarded as nascent citizens. Squatting is seen here not as a constructive strategy for claiming citizenship, but rather as a regressive and dangerous practice. In this view, citizenship does not naturally evolve in a more inclusionist direction, as franchise and housing are extended to more and more individuals. Rather in the exclusionist model the community is regarded as permanently closed. It has a static identity that cannot adapt to receive all comers. In this paradigm, the assumption by the homeowner is that one’s property and one’s rights are something to be defended from outsiders. In his work on the development and evolution of American foreign policy,

Introduction

25

the analyst Campbell notes that states produce their national identities through a discourse of security and insecurity, and through drawing boundaries between the inside and the outside of the state.74 Similarly, one can argue that neighborhoods can also produce their own identities, in part through drawing distinctions between themselves and those who live elsewhere. Here the neighborhood is not a laboratory or school for citizenship but rather a type of territory to be defended, as well as the bedrock on which in-group and out-group identities are created. The exclusionist view thus seeks to defend the interests of those who are firmly entrenched, through the building of enclaves and restrictive covenants that seek to defend the borders as they are. In this view, national (and residential) identities rest on drawing lines of difference and distinction between one’s own nation and neighboring nations, or one’s own neighborhood and the ones that border it. Living in a home in a particular neighborhood might represent a homeowner’s strategy to separate himself and his family from “others”—those who are different culturally, economically, ethnically or socially. And defending one’s neighborhood or home can thus take on racial overtones if homeowners band together against what they see as events or individuals that threaten to change their neighborhood’s profile or identity.

Inclusion and Exclusion: Rejecting the Squatter Exclusionist strategies thus view the social distance between settled homeowners and squatters as much greater and can even be implicated in the creation of that social distance. In essence, exclusionist strategies perceive a line (or in some cases create a line) between the two groups that cannot be crossed. Squatters do not become citizens, and neighborhoods do not undergo transformation in order to include squatters. In his work Homo Sacer, the analyst Agamben speaks of ways in which governments and citizens often think about those in camps—refugee camps, reservations for Native Americans or indigenous peoples, border and transition zones or jails in places like Guantanamo Bay. Agamben states that the camp “remains outside the normal order.” Individuals who inhabit camps are seen not as citizens with rights but rather as purely the subjects of governance. Camps are thus “spaces of abjection.” He suggests that policymakers often do not regard the inhabitants of these camps as fully human or like themselves.75 For this reason, government policies to deal with groups in these camps may not necessarily allow for assimilation or settlement. The exclusionist model allows us to see squatter settlements and squatter houses as a type of camp or space of abjection. Here squatter policy rests on accepting the notion that the squatter will never achieve citizenship or belonging because he or she is simply too different from his neighbors. He may be viewed as wholly other or not fully human. The practices and dwellings of squatters may be described as barbaric and filthy, and taboos may be invoked to create fear of the squatter, who may be regarded as unclean and thus a possible agent of contamination within the polity. He may be described

26

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

as a disease vector or a conduit for dangerous, anti-social ideas. Those who inhabit the space of the squat are not seen as displaying proper attributes of citizenship, and they are regarded as not properly integrated into public life—in part because they do not accept its norms and values. Evidence of the abjectionist view appears in Richard Ballard’s work on white South African’s attitudes towards property squatters. In a series of interviews carried out in Johannesburg in 2004, Ballard showed that white South Africans shared a propensity to describe their neighborhoods as under siege or on the verge of invasion by property squatters. In his view, this discourse is implicitly one about modernity and about race. White South Africans describe a historic process of wresting land from a wild Africa and establishing an outpost of civilization. In looking at their own neighborhoods, they repeat this metaphor, describing their fears that they could somehow be “dragged backward” and “lose everything.”76 Property squatters thus represent a sort of primal, tribal threat. He notes that respondents frequently drew upon aspects of the squatter lifestyle (such as a shortage of public toilet facilities) to shore up their own notions of squatters as dirty and animalistic—rather than acknowledging the role that poverty or poor city planning might play in leading to these conditions. Here, the language of purity and defilement creates social distance between the suburbanites and the squatters—rather than merely reflecting a distance that already existed. The use of the purity and defilement framework thus operates to render the squatters themselves as inassimilable, incapable of simply being accepted into existing society and the subdivision, and creates justification for policy prescriptions based on the assumption that these squatters cannot simply be offered housing or a place in the community. Our concepts of human rights are intimately related to our ability to conceptualize of what it is to be human, and our concepts of human rights rest upon those distinctions that we draw between who or what is human and who or what is not. Particularly today, the question of who is human and what it means to be human is fraught with tension and uncertainty. As Bruce Braun puts it: Here in the United States, evening news broadcasts mess up the category even further: “barely human” others (Iraqis, Rwandans, and Muslims) and “almost human” companions (monkeys, dog an cats) are discussed alongside accounts of “inter-species” exchange (bird flu, SARS) in which the boundaries of the human are suddenly porous and mobile.77 As analysts like Derrida and Agamben have noted, the notion of identity frequently rests on the drawing of borders or boundaries, between what I am and you are not.78 That is, my identity and my humanity are fully realized and described only when they are highlighted or contrasted against the differences between my life and that of others. And, as Agamben notes, the drawing of these distinctions frequently rests on power dynamics. He notes that man is drawn as in contrast with “the slave, the barbarian and the foreigner,

Introduction 79

27

as figures of an animal in human form.” As a recent editorial notes, identity frequently rests on the notion of distance. One’s own identity as a human might, for example, be measured by looking at the distance between one’s own life and that of animals or nonhuman life forms.80 Similarly, one can argue that many of our modern forms within the city— such as neighborhoods or enclaves—are described largely in terms of what they exclude, or the distance that they establish between themselves and their neighbors. The identity ascribed to a place and by extension to its citizens rests on the fact that these dwellers in this place are somehow different than those who live beyond or outside its gates. Thus, the identities of the enclaves of the newly wealthy citizens of Beijing or Shanghai rest on a notion of what it means to be civilized and to live in a civilized environment, in contrast to what lies outside the gates. And the residents of these areas strive to delineate themselves, as residents of this place, from others who do not belong within its gates. Thus, the squatter in particular represents a sort of transgressive figure— since his ultimate aim is to reside within the gates, but as an Other. He thus destroys the distance between the “civilized” dwellers of an enclave and those who reside outside (whether by choice or by act of conscious exclusion), by bringing the outside inside. And in this way, his very existence calls into question not only the identity of the place that he occupies, but also the identity of the other residents within the area. The squatter thus violates the original dwellers’ notions of themselves as members of a certain social class, as members of a certain educational class or as members of a particular national group. In particular, when a squatter collective moves into a neighborhood in Hampstead Heath in London or another high-rent, high-class residential neighborhood, they violate the residents’ own sacred understanding of what this place represents historically, in the narrative of Britain. A place associated, for example, with literature and culture may thus seem tarnished as it is occupied by another group of individuals who do not have the same relation to their environment. In a situation in which squatters are regarded as wholly Other, the government may be less likely to push for assimilation or settlement of the groups involved and more likely to react in some other manner—such as the taking of criminal or punitive measures or pushing for deportation if the camp’s residents are foreign. As early as 2002, Didier Bigo noted that migration in Western Europe was increasingly perceived as a security problem, and he argued that both private and public interests in Europe were actively seeking to securitize these issues in order to strengthen the state and its role. He argued that “The framing of the state as a body endangered by migrants is a political narrative activated for the purpose of political games.”81 In his view, politicians often sought to blur the lines between migrants, terrorists, criminals, spies and counterfeiters as part of a larger strategy of immigration management.82 In depicting migrants as dangerous and unlike oneself, it became easier to discipline and control migrants without encountering local opposition to heavy-handed government tactics.

28

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

This view is useful as we consider the increasingly foreign makeup of property squatters within Europe today. A recent UK Shelter report indicates that an increasingly large number of UK squatters are so-called A8 nationals: those from the countries of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.83 As a result, states might also find it useful to emphasize the difference between these property squatters and the more settled residents of their nations. Politicians may thus find themselves emphasizing the exclusionary narrative that focuses on the differences between “proper” homeowners and neighborhood dwellers and squatters, who are regarded as interlopers. This narrative thus justifies taking a hard line against such individuals and groups, since they are seen to threaten the established neighborhood’s identity and security. The exclusionist narrative thus leads not to the integration of squatters and homeless residents, but instead focuses simply on managing these individuals—counting them and watching them, as well as registering them and keeping tabs on them—particularly if they are foreign. In exclusionist discourse, squatters themselves are regarded as marginal, and as not having a politics. The “politics” of the squatting issue are set forth by asking the question “How might existing society best be protected from this threat?” Within this type of discourse, there is no space for acknowledging that squatters are also the subject of politics with rights that must be acknowledged and respected. (Here, squatters may be blamed for having created the conditions for their own exclusion—for example, by adopting an antistate philosophy or their exclusion may be the result of forces such as racism or the colonialist legacy.) The exclusionary narrative presents society or the community as the object of security that is being defended, while assimilationist discourses tend to describe the state as the object of security. Because societal security is seen as zero-sum in exclusionist discourse, there is less likelihood that a rapprochement can come about between the community that seeks to defend its identity, and the squatters who are seen as threatening that identity. The notion of abjection explains not only government policy but also the reactions of citizens. When citizens regard the distance between themselves and the squatters not as something to be overcome but rather as something absolute, they are more likely to oppose the existence of squatter settlements or “camps” in their own neighborhoods. Instead of charity, citizens are more likely to practice “NIMBYism.” NIMBY is an abbreviation here of the slogan “not in my backyard.” Though the phrase was originally a rallying cry uttered by people opposing developments that they saw as carrying a risk to the environment or their health (for example, banding together to oppose the siting of a nuclear power plant near one’s neighborhood), NIMBYism can also be understood as a larger discursive strategy in which citizens seek to protect their property from a variety of threats. (It thus both reinforces and results from securitization.) Those who seek to exclude marginal individuals like refugees and squatters from their neighborhoods through legal strategies may be

Introduction

29

concerned merely about the economic damage that might occur to their house’s property price, or their actions may also have racial or class-based overtones. More recently, Hubbard has suggested that opposition to the siting of asylum and refugee centers in Britain is a variant of NIMBYism. Here he suggests that NIMBYers are defending a particular English sociocultural identity, noting that NIMBYers protesting against the construction of the asylum centers “evoked particular imaginings of asylum seekers, depicting them as Others who would potentially undermine local ways of life.”84 That is, neighbors today can be seen as working to defend their borders from “invasion” by dark Others—just as nations have historically done. NIMBYism thus becomes the microlevel articulation of security language and security procedures. Thus, while the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act was designed to protect the state on a macrolevel from the immigrant threat—through introducing new immigration controls, curtailing the civil rights of asylum seekers and changing legislation regarding receipt of welfare payments by asylum seekers85—the more recent 2011 squatting legislation now seeks to extend this protection to particular communities within England, in order to protect the state on an intrastate or local level. However, governments and neighbors are not the only ones practicing exclusionist strategies that emphasize social distance over the possibility of inclusion and assimilation. In some instances, squatters themselves avoid assimilation. Ideological or anarchist squatting is thus a type of assimilationist move. Unlike the survival squatting of those found in places of abjection, ideological squatting is often practiced by educated individuals of means who consciously choose to live outside the law and outside society. As Ian Friedman comments in his investigation of squats in Israel, “an anarchist squat is an abandoned building taken over by a group of people not because they’re otherwise homeless but because they believe it’s ‘absurd . . . that people have to kill themselves working (at steady jobs) in order to have a place to live.’”86 That is, they do not squat because they have no other options, but rather because they choose to do so. Anders Corr writes on an anarchist web site: Squats are growing as a form of resistance within the anarchist community . . . anarchists see squatting as a practical way of subverting current dominative constructs of real estate while at the same time creating a space for the growth of community forms which prefigure the soughtfor anarchist utopia. This current activity continues an anarchist project against spatial property . . . the commodification of food and housing.87 An anonymous anarchist who gives his address as “Vancouver, Canada, territory of the indigenous Coast Salish peoples” answers the question “why do I squat” with the following words: I want to take control of my life, of where and how I live, of the social and material conditions of my life. . . . I want and need space to breathe,

30

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe eat, drink, socialize, be creative and enjoy my life. I need space to think and plan and prepare, so that I can progressively expand my creative projects, which at the same time are destructive projects to undermine all the institutions of exploitation and politics.88

The philosophy of anarchist squatting is neither uniform nor clearly defined. Some squatters are more politically informed and politically astute than others. Some seem to conflate Marxist-Leninist ideas (about doing away with the state and the superstructure) with anarchy. Some see the movement’s roots as existing in Russian communism and collectivization while others cite Thoreau and the fact that his cabin at Walden was built on borrowed land. Anarchist squatting may also be associated, in some instances, with criminality. Writings by such anarchist and terrorist theorists as Bakunin, Nechaev and Marighella emphasize the advantages of living within the seams of society and outside the reach of government if one is plotting against the government. Here, squatting may be seen as merely one manifestation of a larger strategy of antistate activity. As this short survey has shown, one can find both narratives in more historic discussions of squatting in Western Europe. At some times, government policies towards squatting have led to a widening of suffrage and citizenship while at other times policies were exclusionary and punitive. However, what is clear today is that the pendulum has again swung towards the exclusionary end of the scale. What was described throughout the 1960s ad 1970s as an alternative lifestyle or a social nuisance is now increasingly described as a problem of security. Squatters were at various times portrayed as violating a variety of values and institutions, including sanctity, sovereignty, identity, solidarity and community or neighborhood. But today we can point to an increasing emphasis on the portrayal of squatters as outsiders, or different from ourselves. Here I contend that European squatting policy has moved gradually from an assimilationist model to an abjection or securitization model—to some degree as the result of a changed environment but also as the result of changes in the perception of squatting, which was colored by the prejudices of both the citizens and their elected officials. In each case, the major outcome of an issue’s securitization was a shift from an assimilationist, inclusive view of property squatting, in which society strives to extend the housing franchise to all and to make good, hardworking productive citizens out of property squatters, to a new exclusionist view in which property squatters are viewed as outside the parameters of decent society, incapable of being assimilated, and as enemies of the state who need to be punished or deported. And while the inclusionist view assumes that the problem will largely solve itself as economic development proceeds apace, the exclusionist view assumes that only large-scale government action against squatters from on high can begin to solve the crisis, which is clearly too worrisome to simply leave alone. Housing policy debates and the policies enacted in this sphere thus have affected the security of individual homeowners, those who live in a

Introduction

31

neighborhood, the city itself, the region and even the state. When politicians make housing policy including outlining policies towards squats and slums, the objects of security are manifold. Housing policies can serve to secure the state, the locality or region, the city and the safety and security of residents and their homes as well. The state is seen as responsible for the security being provided at all these levels.89 Burgess refers to a continuum of security, which ranges from internal to external security. He suggests that the state’s power to regulate may increase as one moves along the continuum, but all sections of the continuum are related. Figure i.1 illustrates the various levels of security that can be affected by migration and housing policy.90 In this work, we see that state security policies are related—both those occurring outside the state and those occurring inside the state. As Balzacq notes, securitization is a technique consciously articulated by those in authority who wish to securitize a problem, in order to resolve it quickly and with a minimum of public discussion.91 However, one can point to certain “felicitous circumstances” that allow politicians to successfully securitize the discussion of property squatting and to convince citizens to view this issue through the lens of security as well. First, in each nation of Europe that is examined, the absolute numbers of urban property squatters rose in the last ten years (largely as the result of changes to the world economy, which may have left larger numbers homeless or without employment). In addition, increases in international property squatting occurred within an environment in which citizens were increasingly concerned about crime—both domestic crimes against property and their persons, and international crimes such as terrorism. As a result, a strategy that moved to criminalize property squatting found fertile soil upon which to proceed. In each of the nations that provide the case studies for this work (France, Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark) elites in the Departments of Housing and the Interior and in Parliament used a three-pronged strategy that sought publicity around the issue of property squatting, which attempted to build and attach notoriety to the property squatters themselves, and which attempted to merge the interests of the media and politicians so that they were indeed “speaking the same language.” As Balzacq notes, the securitizing actor thus works to convince the general public to adhere to a particular version of the story, which emphasizes the security threat created by the object of securitization, and which builds a consensus regarding the need to act in response to the newly identified (though not newly emerging) threat.92 He operates from a position of power in “doing security.”

Towards Critical Squatter Studies: Discourse and the Construction of the Squatter However, as Bigo notes, those who seek to deploy security discourse or to securitize an issue are not usually straightforward about either their actions or their motives. Thus, the challenge for the researcher is to work

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

Table i.3

Assimilationist versus Exclusionary Discourses Assimilationist

Positive Negative

Exclusionary

Improvement Free rider

Barbarism

Deviance

Threat to community

Crime

Security

Investment

Nationalism

backwards—examining the evolution of threat discourse, and seeking to identify the themes, metaphors and rhetorical devices that have led to securitization of an issue. For this analysis, I have examined major national newspapers for each nation chosen as a case study—using original sources in English, Dutch and French. I used keyword searches to identify articles about squatting and squatters, searching from the year 2000 until 2012. For each article, key descriptors and metaphors involving squatters were noted and a master list of these terms was compiled to identify recurring themes and patterns. (All work was coded twice, once by myself and once by an assistant.) As a result, I have identified nine frames deployed by the media and often by politicians as well in describing the problematic of squatting and the squatter. As Table i.3 indicates, frames differ according to two dimensions— discourse can be either positively or negatively oriented towards the phenomenon, and discourse can also be oriented towards two different types of policy positions. In addition, one can note that not all press coverage of the squatting issue is negative, nor are all of the frames deployed negative. Of the negative frames, one can note that four fit into the assimilationist narrative while four fit into the exclusionist narrative. In the assimilationist narrative frames, squatters and squatted residences may be described as problematic, but the practices are ones that are viewed as reparable, leading to an outcome whereby squatters (like terrorists) are seen as capable of being rehabilitated and assimilated or reassimilated into society. In contrast, the frames of barbarism, threat to the community, security and nationalism depict a squatter who is often foreign, clearly Other and largely incapable of being assimilated or joining society and civilization. In this analysis, I arrive at two particular findings: First, it becomes clear that in each case study, over time the frames have shifted—from negative assimilationist narratives to negative exclusionary narratives. I also find that these frames have led to a radically different conception or construction of today’s squatter—in contrast to the squatter described by politicians and popular press in the early 2000s. That is, the term squatter is no longer merely a neutral designation but is rather a pejorative term applied by those

Introduction

33

in authority to confer a negative identity on those who squat. In this way, it becomes impossible for anyone in Europe today to hear the term “squatter” outside the discourse presented in the media and in legal and legislative proceedings. It is impossible for the squatter to present his case in any sort of neutral way because of the pervasiveness of the discourse about squatting. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a squatter merely as “a person who settles on new, especially public land without title, or a person who takes unauthorized possession of unoccupied premises.”93 That is, it is a merely a legal designation of someone who does not have title to the land that he occupies. However, Fox O’Mahony and Cobb point to “discursive constructions of squatters and squatting” that emerged in the UK in recent years. Here they call our attention to the ways in which the media presented squatters in 2002 and argue that current understandings of what it means to squat in the UK rest on implicit moral understandings.94 Beginning with 2002’s adverse possession claims that were heard in British courts, they suggest that the media began portraying squatters as thieves who attempted to “steal” something that was not theirs.95 In this way, the subject of squatting came to be framed not merely within a discussion about land use, but rather within a discussion about freeloading and “the immorality of jumping the queue.”96 In addition, today discussions about squatting are often framed within a larger discussion about violence. Here we can consider a headline that appeared in Britain’s Daily Mail in 2009, which noted that “Riot police storm G20 protestors’ squats . . . as violence spreads to France.” Here, the word squat in the headline is paired with pictures of policemen in riot gear, and references to tear gas, missiles being thrown, mobs throwing bombs, anarchists, knives, burglary and arson.97 In addition, the discourse of squatting has become increasingly racialized. In France in particular, the larger squatter camp in Calais, populated largely by immigrants and refugees from the Middle East, is known as “the jungle.” In each of these situations, the individual or group (usually a politician or the media) who defines the terms and attaches labels to a situation thus enjoys power. The labeler has the ability to shape how an audience views the situation as well as to begin to dictate which options are on the table and which solutions are viewed as acceptable and unacceptable.98 The adoption of an exclusionary (or securitization) perspective in describing squatting and squatters thus delegitimizes the claims that the object of securitization may be making. By portraying those who violate societal norms as antistate actors and as a monolithic, dangerous set of enemies, none of the issues that they raise need to be properly addressed or taken seriously within the polity. Thus the securitization perspective stops analysts, journalists and citizens from asking questions like the following: Why isn’t there more affordable housing available to the poor and marginalized in our societies? Why are so many European youth without the resources to make a life for themselves? Why is migration between European nations and the attainment of a decent

34

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

standard of living possible for some types of Europeans but not others? Why do we welcome those who are educated and seek to include them in our societies while we do not do the same for those whose main contribution is the provision of manual labor? Why are the promises of Europe open to some but not all? In a sense, simply applying the term closes the conversation. Since governments don’t negotiate with terrorists (or property squatters), it is no longer important that anyone in society, in the media or in government take seriously any of the claims or questions that a representative of the demonized group might raise. In recent years, the term “property squatter,” like the term “terrorist,” has become politicized and embedded within a larger narrative, in such a way that it is no longer possible to think objectively about the term itself or the person or group to whom it is applied. While previously the property squatter was understood as a sort of folk hero, carrying on in the tradition of Robin Hood, today he is more likely to be associated with social unrest, violence and antistate activity. Similarly, Bigo suggests that the term “immigrant” itself has taken on a pejorative connotation in Europe in recent years. He suggests that it no longer refers simply to passports, but rather connotes danger—“immigrant” actually means poor and inassimilable.99 Youth activists in particular have spoken out about the demonization of the property squatter and the rise of this sort of logic. Most recently, Professor Alexander Vasudevan argued that if the public can be persuaded to believe that anyone who occupies a building for any length of time to make a political protest is a dangerous property squatter then the government has now forged a particularly effective weapon for shutting down all sorts of protests—including students who demonstrate against higher tuition, workers who occupy a factory to demand higher wages or individuals who might be demonstrating on behalf of the environment. He has asked if it is merely coincidental that the government organized so quickly to pass legislation giving them greater rights to confront property squatting at the same time that Occupy London protests were spreading, and with them the occupation of historic sites like St. Paul’s Cathedral.100 Here, Wilkinson asks us to distinguish between proximate context and distal context in studying securitization. Proximate context refers to the immediate features of an interaction and the setting of a securitization move—the stage on which it is made, the genre in which it is made, the audience to whom it is pitched. The distal context refers to the macroenvironment in which securitization occurs—the broader sociocultural context, including matters of social class and ethnicity, regional and cultural settings and site of discourse.101 Here we can suggest that the proximate context of property squatting is the setting in which debate about legislation occurred—the individuals who sat in parliamentary chambers, the words they used and the ways in which they used the media to make claims in favor of and against legislation. The distal context refers to the larger canvas on which the squatting legislation

Introduction

35

and enforcement are carried out—including the state of relations between immigrants and native-born citizens. The distal context relies on underlying issues such as the meaning of home and the meaning of neighborhood. In other words, securitization is produced intersubjectively—with the participation (or collusion) of both the securitizing actor and his audience. Thus, for example, a politician might write an editorial that describes the situation in the hopes that it might resonate with newspaper readers, who would then take up similar language and frames of reference in describing the issue. In this situation, certain elements are required for “successful” securitization of an issue—that is, one in which there is a general acceptance of the existence of the crisis or threat, the need for emergency measures to be taken in relation to the crisis or threat and the successful passage of legislation or some other set of measures to address the problem.102

FOUR CASES In this work, I consider four cases in which securitization was extended to the housing sector, particularly in the areas of defending and protecting the neighborhood and city against the “threat” of property squatters. I chose the cases—France, Netherlands, Denmark and Great Britain—because each illustrates a particular aspect of the debate taking place on both an elite and a popular level regarding the dangers posed by urban property squatting. (They thus represent “most similar cases.”)103 The work uses both case studies and interviews with those engaged in debates today about the dangers of squatting and its relationship to security politics more generally. In considering the four cases, one can identify four trends that have occurred in each case. In each nation, we have seen the creation and imposition of increased penalties against those who squat. We have also seen the increased usage—both in the press and by policymakers themselves—of the language of racism and difference to describe and define the squatter. We have seen more violent clashes between squatters and law enforcement, and we have seen in each society a shift away from viewing squatting as an “alternative lifestyle” to viewing it within a crime frame. The case study that features most centrally in this work is an examination of the events that led to the adoption of amendments to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill in Great Britain, which makes up chapter 2. Britain, like the other European countries examined here, has a long history of tolerating property squatting. Citizen groups like Shelter, for example, arose as the result of citizen activism in the 1960s and 1970s, in which displaced residents occupied buildings to protest against housing shortages and policies that failed to provide adequate housing for British families. In this situation, a rapprochement eventually evolved between the activists and the government, with government providing amnesties to squatters and creating schemes for squatters to buy squatted properties. In

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

addition, laws regarding adverse possession have allowed some squatters to eventually claim rightful ownership of the properties they had squatted, provided they met certain conditions. However, in the period since 2001, British society and the media have become increasingly hostile to property squatters. Tabloid coverage has focused on building and orienting public ire regarding two types of squatters: First, the news has focused on high-profile cases in which groups of youth have occupied expensive properties in fashionable London neighborhoods. These youth are often middle-class and educated and may be squatting for ideological reasons—such as an opposition to capitalism. At the same time, news coverage has focused on international property squatters— including migrant workers from Eastern Europe or the Middle East who may be squatting for reasons of survival. (Included in this framework are large numbers of Roma squatters as well.) Squatters are described as being well organized and well versed in their rights. They are seen as having taken advantage of loopholes in existing legislation to make it difficult for homeowners to evict them. Thus, in the period since 2006, the UK government has attempted to pass new legislation aimed at closing loopholes. Crispin Blunt, the conservative justice minister, issued a report in July 2011 that proposed changing the designation of the matter of squatting through relabeling squatting as a criminal offense for which persistent offenders would go to prison. Such a step formally abolished the practice of granting squatter’s rights, gave squatted businesses the same protections that homeowners enjoyed and made sure that squatters were also prosecuted for any other crimes they committed while squatting (including the theft of electricity and vandalism).104 The October 2012 passage of amendments to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill has led to the criminalization of property squatting and property squatters. The Great Britain study examines the press’s role in creating a drive to criminalize squatting, as well as the media’s role in constructing the squatter and the act of squatting as a threat to domestic security. In chapter 3, I consider the case of Denmark. In Denmark, squatting has often had an ideological, antistate character. The case study of Freetown Christiania examines state policy towards an anarchist enclave of nearly one thousand people located on an abandoned military base within Copenhagen’s city limits. For thirty years, the site enjoyed the status of an autonomous region (with its own currency, social infrastructure and norms) but recently it was forcibly reincorporated within Copenhagen’s administrative structure. As Jacek Pawlicki describes the situation, the large-scale squat of Juliana Christiania in Copenhagen, which was established in 1971 when a group of residents took illegal possession of an abandoned military base, was originally conceptualized as a large-scale social experiment in living an alternative lifestyle. “Christiania” thus represented a sort of sanctuary for those whose lives were “deviant” or so far outside the norm that they could not live comfortably in an everyday

Introduction

37

setting. For this reason, individuals came from all over Denmark to take up residence in Christiania.105 However, despite having coexisted relatively peacefully with neighbors in Copenhagen for nearly forty years, the territory recently began experiencing increasing monitoring and surveillance by police who have sought to portray it as a space of danger, associated with drugs, gangs and prostitution. As an example, one can compare and contrast the descriptions of Freetown Christiania provided on the city of Copenhagen’s tourist web site with the descriptions of Freetown Christiania that appeared in the media and popular press in 2009, prior to the Supreme Court decision to terminate the autonomous status of the enclave. On the tourist web site Copenhagen.com, visitors are told that Freetown Christiania is “one of a kind,” and informed that: The approx. 850 citizens of Christiania work as artisans (carpenters, blacksmiths), and the famous Christiania Bikes (bicycle trailers) are produced here. The inhabitants have also established meditation centers, cafés, restaurants, and a couple of music night clubs. The Solvognen Theatre Group has until 1983 performed happenings, also outside the Town. Many houses, built, painted and decorated by their first inhabitants, became historical objects. Christiania is unique; one of its kind in the world, and for many people became a symbol of Danish liberal lifestyle.106 Meanwhile, press reports note that: There have been outbreaks of violence including gun battles on the streets as rival gangs fight for control of Christiania’s drugs trade. On the notorious Pusher Street, skinheads with pit bulls glare menacingly from behind their stalls draped in camouflage netting at anyone who looks like they might be there to do anything other than buy drugs.107 While forty years ago, a city like Copenhagen was comfortable harboring a sanctuary for deviant behavior within its borders, the international and domestic security climate has changed greatly since then. In chapter 6, the Copenhagen squat can be conceptualized as an enclave—a very particular type of liminal space—existing within the legal confines of a city, but often operating by its own norms and relational structures and frequently populated by individuals who do not look like the rest of the residents of the state. The Danish squatter enclave of Freetown Christiania, for example, has its own anthem, its own flag and its own currency.108 It thus came to represent a sort of failed state that bordered Copenhagen, and security measures were thus taken to annex it. In chapter 4, we consider France. Here Sarkozy’s attempt to securitize property squatting by the Roma was largely unsuccessful and securitization failed in France. Vuori argues that an issue is securitized when the lan-

38

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

guage or discourse used to talk about the issue shifts, regardless of whether actual acts are taken that change the situation with regard to the object of securitization. Thus, if the media begins to speak of Arab American immigrants in the United States differently after 9/11 then the position of Arab American immigrants was securitized, even if no legislation is ever passed reflecting this position. He also argues that not all attempts at securitization are successful—that is, a politician or agency may launch a speech about a particular threat only to find the audience of other politicians as well as the public unresponsive. In such a case, securitization moves can be said to have failed.109 In the French case, the moves by Sarkozy to quickly close nearly three hundred Roma squats throughout France, as well as a move to encourage Roma from Bulgaria and Romania to voluntarily depart from France, were immediately denounced in both the French and the international press. Press reporters made analogies to Vichy France, noting that the last time France rounded up and deported gypsies was during World War II. The killing of a policeman in Grenoble, which was given as the reason why a security crackdown was necessary, was not understood or supported by either French citizens or opinion makers in the nation. As Zizek notes, “securitization is only successful when it finds it support in everyday life, when even the facts which at first sight seem to contradict it start working in its favor.”110 In the French case, it became impossible to successfully reframe the problem of Roma citizens in France as a security problem and the attempt was ultimately aborted. In contrast, we can consider the successful securitizations of the issue of property squatting in the UK and Denmark. Here we can see how in each case a broad social consensus was built regarding the existence of a crisis or threat, a need for the undertaking of emergency or unusual measures was articulated, and such measures were carried out. The securitizing actor has found a language and a way of building a bridge between himself and the broader audience (in the case of British property squatters, for example, through the use of public interest stories on victims of property squatting placed in mass audience publications such as the London Evening Standard and the Daily Mail) in order to persuade them of the existence of and the seriousness of the threat. Language and images may be chosen to speak to the audience, so that the threat seems both meaningful and real to them. Here, I should note that I view successful securitization as operating along a continuum. In several of the case studies, one can make a counterargument, noting that not all Danish citizens (including the residents of Christiania, the objects of securitization itself) were on board regarding either the existence of a crisis or the need to respond. However, in each case one can point to clear products of securitization: In Britain, we can point to the passage in both houses of Parliament of clause 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, which criminalized property squatting. In Denmark, we can point to the adoption of formal measures to incorporate

Introduction

39

the squatter settlement of Christiania into the larger government workings of Copenhagen. In chapter 5, I consider the case of the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, squatting formally became illegal in October 2010, after a relatively brief discussion in the Dutch Parliament. The new legislation represents a radical shift from the days of the 1970s, when squatting was tacitly accepted by the Dutch government as a reasonable compromise given a housing shortage, high youth unemployment and a tendency for landlords to leave buildings empty for long periods of time. The freewheeling image of Holland as a place that allows dope smoking, prostitution and alternative lifestyles was repudiated with the adoption of the 2010 legislation. Traditionally, Holland was a place where citizens preferred less government, not more—and where the acceptance of practices like euthanasia suggests that government does not like to and is not encouraged to intrude into people’s private lives. In contrast, the new legislation seems to represent a more heavy-handed Dutch approach to governance. The legislation imposes penalties on those who refuse to vacate a squat—which include a year’s imprisonment, or more, if the eviction procedure turns violent. Although the law was passed in 2010 a legal suit one month later led a Dutch Court of Appeals to rule that the law was in violation of European Human Rights statutes.111 Specifically it was found to violate article 8 of the EU Human Rights Convention, which states that everyone has a right to a private life, a family life and a home. However, despite the swift actions taken to strike down the legislation, the language of securitization appears in the judicial ruling. The ruling states that in certain circumstances, article 8 may be set aside. In particular, this may occur “in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country.” That is, security concerns can still be used as a justification for shutting down property squats. Finally, a case study of the Netherlands examines the dialectic between two competing notions of what housing is—a human right, or an economic good produced by the free market. What happens when Europeans disagree about this question, particularly as they travel within Europe? In the Dutch case, squatters appealed to the EU Commission, arguing that criminalizing squatting violated their human rights. What is the likelihood that Europeans can form a unified understanding of how property squatting should be understood and treated? Table i.4 illustrates differences between the four different cases in regards to answering these questions: Who securitizes? What is being securitized? And how is securitization taking place? In this work’s conclusion, we consider whether housing issues can be desecuritized and examine the necessary conditions to bring this about. We also consider the views of squatters themselves, in particular their contention that squatting never was and still is not a security problem. In this way, we establish the preconditions for talking back to securitization through considering the data provided by squatters

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

Table i.4 Nation

Who and What Is Being Securitized? Strategy

Who securitizes?

Decision

Frame

Great Britain

Abjection

• “Bottom up” • Media • Elites

Criminalization of squatting legislation

• Criminality • Deviance • Security

Holland

Abjection

Government

Criminalization of squatting

• Deviance • Security

Denmark Institutionalization • Elites • Police

France

Abjection

Make Christiania • Criminality part of “official”

• Judicial system

Denmark

Government?

Set up camps for Roma

• Criminality

themselves regarding the existence or nonexistence of the problem, as well as their views regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of government actions towards squatting. Here we see squatters rejecting the anti-social label and instead questioning existing “knowledge” about squatters. In this way, we can see more clearly the power politics involved in the securitization of squatting, and the way that different epistemic communities have developed different knowledge about the subject.

1

How We Talk about Squatting

The advent of globalization in the late twentieth century has remade the map of the world and as a result has led to the creation of new social, political and economic institutions and patterns. But globalization is, as many analysts have noted, a double-edged sword. It produces new opportunities for democratization, increases in individual and group wealth and increased social and geographic mobility. However, at the same time, it gives rise to new dangers and challenges—from the threat of asymmetric warfare being perpetrated within and upon a society, to the threats of overpopulation and transnational crime. The challenges posed by globalization—including threats to national identities and the problems of urban security and border control—may seem new to analysts today, but they are in fact merely a reemergence of problems that have existed historically. As Mark Salter argues, the tendency for those in authority to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate movement by individuals within and between states and territories can be traced back to the Middle Ages. In his work on the history of the passport, he suggests that the king—and later the sovereign state—has historically exercised power to regulate, govern and approve of citizen movements outside the kingdom or the state’s borders. And as he notes, particularly in periods of great social change—such as the Middle Ages, the period following the Reformation and even the early 1900s prior to World War I—states have been particularly keen to regulate the ways in which their population has left their borders, as well as who has permission to enter their borders. That is, states have also long acknowledged the connection between creating a strong state based on a unified national identity, and policies that regulated who may and may not enter the state or claim its benefits as a citizen.1 This context is important as we begin to examine the phenomenon of urban property squatting in Europe today, and particularly the challenge of transnational urban property squatting. As the analysis of legislation to criminalize property squatting shows, today we are seeing two particularly interesting security developments that, though novel, are not new. First, we can note the decline in the importance of the state as the main architect and guarantor of security today—as regional and even local

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

governments become involved in regulating and surveilling citizen activities within their territories. At the same time, we can suggest that today the interstate and state levels are not the only levels of analysis that are important in considering urban security in particular today. Rather, as the case studies presented here show, today it is increasingly difficult to draw a distinction between domestic versus international security regimes and policies. Immigration, migration and border issues are thus “fractal” within societies. The attitudes of policymakers and citizens towards residents or outsiders of a nation and of a neighborhood can be similar. Methods of defending the neighborhood and the state may parallel one another, and the prejudices that exist against certain societal members at the national level can be found at the local level as well. Thus, it is not surprising to see that security regulations regarding undocumented or unsurveilled persons are increasingly being enacted at both a national and a local level. Analysts who study security today suggest that we ask a series of questions in order to truly understand the effects of current security policies. First, they ask us to consider what is being secured or the object of securitization. That is, in enacting legislation regarding voter identification, border security or zoning restrictions, we need to consider the threat that citizens and policymakers are reacting to, and the values that might underlie these fears. It is not always obvious what specifically is being defended.2 Next, we are asked to consider the threat that the object is being secured from. Then, after we have considered how securitization has been constructed, we can begin to ask questions about practices of securitization that stem from that construction. Here we ask how the object is being secured and who is doing the securing. These four questions—what, how, from whom and by whom—can be answered on several levels of analysis, from the state level to the neighborhood level. In this chapter, I argue that the securitization of property squatting rests on three different discourses of threat—those who fear the property squatter are concerned about threats to their homes (and neighborhoods), to their cities and to their nation. Each of these objects of securitization—the home, the city and the nation—has a resonance that goes beyond mere territory. The home and the city, like the nation, have an importance that derives from history, symbolism and psychological attachment. For that reason, each “territory” (the home, the city or the nation) is one that individuals and groups can be marshaled to defend if it appears to be threatened. Nils Bubandt refers to the overlapping of multiple securities, encompassing local, national and international levels, as “vernacular security,” and goes on to argue that securitization practices often serve to build a community—at the local, community, regional or national level. He notes the ways in which the Russian babushka, the Chinese “busybody” and the modern neighborhood watch committee provide surveillance of a neighborhood while simultaneously establishing and building ties between the residents.3 In building this community, however, securitization language often builds ties within a

How We Talk about Squatting

43

territory by granting those who live there a common enemy against whom they can unify. Thus, in an era when individuals are particularly concerned about the changing identity of their neighborhoods, cities and states as a result of globalization and increased migration, the property squatter in particular can become a focus of these insecurities, and marshaling forces against him (whether through protests, the founding of community watches or the passage of legislation) can thus serve as a community-building exercise at his expense. I briefly describe the types of threats to the home that can be identified and the types of threats to the city that can be identified, and then lay out a number of different discourses that have been used both in Western Europe and elsewhere to describe those who threaten both home and city. Here, I suggest that both media reports and statements of official government policy can be sorted into seven different categories. The issue of property squatting has been framed using the following themes: deviance and norm violation; identity politics; citizenship; criminality; security; investments and finances and human rights. In each case, the frame presents an answer to the question “What does the squatter threaten?” or “What is being secured?” in passing national level legislation to address property squatting, which had heretofore been regarded as a local or regional problem.

REALISM: THE MEANING OF HOME Policy debates about squatting and newspaper coverage of the squatting problem frequently rest on a package of implicit assumptions about what “home” means, and how rituals of living in a home should be enacted. Readers and voters are asked to consider not only whether foreigners and immigrants threaten their nation, but also whether they threaten their neighborhood and community identity, as well as their most basic unit of analysis, their home itself. In considering what it means to threaten someone’s home, one needs first to unpack the many meanings that the term home carries both historically and in modern society. Here, the Oxford English Dictionary defines a house merely as: a building for human habitation, especially one that consists of a ground floor and one or more upper stories (example: a house of Cotswold stone). If a house is understood primarily as a physical structure, then it is easy to derive the threats that might exist to that “home.” It could be the subject of a natural disaster like fire or flood, for example, and the purchase of flood insurance could thus act to secure the home along with the installation of smoke detectors. But “home” is actually a loaded term, which carries a variety of meanings. As Andrew Gorman-Murray indicates, “for a house to become a home, it must be imbued with a range of meanings, feelings and experiences by its occupants.”4 It may refer to a physical structure (or house), as well as

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

providing a point for the discussion of a variety of concepts and associations having to do with domesticity and domestic practices.5 Rapoport suggests that a home is a physical dwelling as well as a place that provides a means of self-expression (through decorating, for example). The home is also associated with one’s past or childhood and may feature in memories that an individual has. It can provide a feeling of security, continuity and order—or insecurity, depending on one’s circumstances (for example, if one is placed in foster care). It can be seen as an investment, and finally, it can provide one with a particular sense of one’s socioeconomic niche. (For example, one can grow up in public housing, on the wrong side of the tracks or in the lap of luxury.)6 Home thus refers to a physical property as well as the people and objects associated with this property, as well as the relations between all three of these elements. Finally, Dupuis and Thorns describe home as “an encompassing category that links together a material environment . . . with a deeply emotional set of meanings having to do with permanence and continuity.”7 In their work, they suggest that the home can provide a source of “ontological security,” noting that: Home is where people feel in control of their environment, free from surveillance, free to be themselves and at ease, in the deepest psychological sense, in a world that might at times be experienced as threatening and uncontrollable.8 That is, one’s environment affects one’s security—including one’s health security. People who live in stable housing situations are likely to have access to other resources that help them to stay healthy.9 Home ownership thus represents, to some degree, the purchase of security.10 One’s feeling of safety might be violated if one was subject to a break-in or home invasion.11 Here, the “home” can be secured through the use of alarms and door locks. In addition, Gorman-Murray suggests that the meanings of home and the connection between home and identity are not permanent, but that they can change or evolve over time. In each case, home as a concept is intertwined with concepts of one’s own identity and one’s own values. Thus, home’s meanings may vary by gender, race, class, age, disability and sexuality. At the same time, home may have some universal meanings—such as a connection with privacy, identity and family.12 As Hauge and Kofstad argue, the connection between home and identity can also be seen as dynamic, rather than static. That is, as the neighborhood evolves (either declining or gentrifying), so might our feelings about it and about ourselves as dwellers in it.13 Beyond the physical structure, a home may also be defined as a place of sovereignty, where one is free to do what one wants within one’s private space, without answering to others. In British parlance, one is told that “a man’s home is his castle.” If a home is defined as sovereign territory, then the major threat facing the home dweller is trespassing, and again the physical

How We Talk about Squatting

45

territory could be secured by means of erecting fences. Freedom from government overreach is further secured through a constitution. A home might also be defined primarily as an investment. British English speaks of “climbing the property ladder,” with the implication that home ownership is the highest status one can achieve. Those who purchase homes are congratulated on having secured their future. If a home is conceptualized in these terms, then the major threat to the home might come in the form of a drop in property prices or some form of eminent domain law in which the government takes one’s property for a below-market price. Here, the best hedge against this threat is to do one’s research to ensure that one is buying in a safe and profitable area. Both the home and the neighborhood are also associated with a sense of order and unity. Thus, a threat to this idea of home (rather than one’s home itself) might come in the form of some discontinuity within the family group—such as a death or divorce. (One might find oneself facing the threat of a “homewrecker” or the possibility of living in a “broken” home.)

CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE MEANING OF HOME Thus, the home can be identified—from a realist perspective—merely as territory, as a sanctuary or as something to be defended. It can also—from a constructivist perspective—be seen as a setting for the enactment of particular identities or as a source of identity itself. One’s identity may thus rest on the fact that one lives in a wealthy neighborhood, in contrast to poorer neighborhoods nearby. In this way, one derives an identity both from what is within the home and the neighborhood as well as what is outside it, and that exists in contrast to it.14 Thus, in recent years, housing policy—particularly in Western Europe—has served as a means of addressing and discussing issues of citizenship and community. Thus, disputes about housing tenancy may have nationalist or racial overtones, with people’s competing claims about housing often serving as a proxy for larger issues—such as competing claims for citizenship and national identity.15 For this reason, a change in the status of a neighborhood, or a change in the relationship with the territories surrounding the neighborhood, might be read as threatening to sociocultural identity on both a personal and a neighborhood level—since, as Gorman-Murray notes, the notion of home is socially constructed within a particular time frame and a particular culture. Gorman-Murray calls our attention to the ways in which the identity of the home often rests implicitly on a sort of hierarchy established between those who “do home” one way versus those who “do home” a different way. He suggests that in England, for example, the idealized version of home that appears in the media and in popular culture, including on television, is a heterosexual nuclear family, living in a detached, owner-occupied dwelling, in a suburban location.16 Changes in family formations or living patterns

46

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

that call that hierarchy into question (by, for example, accepting new family formations like cohabitation or gay married couples, which were previously considered deviant) might thus be viewed as threatening to mainstream sociocultural identity.17 As Williams writes: The concept of societal security is designed to highlight the role that “identity” plays in security relations. Here it is not the territorial inviolability . . . or governmental legitimacy and autonomy . . . that is threatened. Rather it is the identity of a society, its sense of “we-ness” that is at stake and which . . . can become the source of conflict.18

Table 1.1

Security Aspects of Home

Meaning

Security threat presented

Place of privacy

“Home invasion,” break-in, crime, peeping toms and surveillance

Object of securitization Physical possessions (jewelry, electronics) Personal dignity

Place of continuity, order

Breakup of social structures contained in the home: “a broken home,” “a homewrecker”

Sense of family continuity, permanence

Territory

Trespassing, squatting

Borders

Place of identity

“invasion” by those who are different, “there goes the neighborhood” (NIMBY)

National, local, regional, neighborhood identity

Can be maintained by home owners’ associations, condo boards, etc. with rules regarding architecture

Way of life for people like us

Threat to physical safety: reactor leak, natural disaster, NIMBY

Physical possessions Bodily safety, human life, health

Place of safety

Threat caused by criminality: gang activity in one’s neighborhood, etc. Can be covered by insurance, also by gating of communities, etc. Investment

Blight, eminent domain

Monetary “safety” or financial security

Physical structure

Fire, natural disaster Can be covered by insurance

Physical infrastructure

How We Talk about Squatting

47

In considering both the city and the home (or neighborhood) as a sociocultural entity, it is thus possible to construct a narrative of threat in which the object of security (city, home or neighborhood) is threatened by those with different values, those with a different ethnicity or those with a different lifestyle. A narrative can be constructed in which the city or neighborhood is under siege or the threat of invasion from those who are barbaric and do not appreciate the civilization that the pristine enclave or the city itself represents. An alternate narrative can be constructed in which the entity is threatened by those who behave differently—for example, by preferring a nomadic lifestyle to that of settlement. In addition, a narrative can be constructed in which individuals of a different ethnicity and way of living gradually do violence to the identity of the city, causing it to be redefined and vanishing in its original form. In conceptualizing what it means to defend one’s home or one’s neighborhood, it is thus necessary to consider each of these definitions. Because home has so many meanings, there are also many different threats to the “home” and different notions of what it means to secure one’s home. Some of these are quite mundane, while others are more philosophical. Some exist in every temporal period (routine threats), while others are more likely to be associated with a crisis period and high security (unusual and existential threats). Table 1.1 describes the various threats that can be associated with the home depending on how one defines home.

REALISM: SECURING THE CITY The language of security is already very much included in urban politics and housing policy. Thus, we can identify certain concepts that have been borrowed from the international relations theory known as realism in particular, as well as some that have been borrowed from the school known as constructivism. Here both realist and constructivist theories can be drawn upon to explain how both state and local officials are predisposed to think about the city as an object to be defended, and constructivist theories can also explain how state and local officials—as well as the general public— think about the home in particular as an object to be defended. The international relations theory known as realism rests on certain key principles: Realists believe that relations between states are inherently conflictual, with each state interested in maximizing its own power and assuring its own survival. States are not predisposed towards cooperating with one another, and in an anarchic international system there is no mechanism for forcing this cooperation. In the realist model, states are defined as territorial entities, rather than ethnic, linguistic or cultural entities. Although realism is a theory of interstate relations and of the international system, it is also possible to look at urban politics through the lens of realism. In today’s globalizing world, one can see realist principles at work in the state and local government’s attempts to defend the infrastructure of

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

cities from attack through reliance on policing and surveillance. Thus, just as practices of border security serve to protect citizens on a national level, so practices within the city such as increased surveillance protect citizens locally. Here, globalization and its ensuing migration flows can be viewed as a danger not only to the state but also to the newly emerging class of global cities—for populations do not merely flow over and around national borders. They also flow in and out of regions, threatening to overwhelm a city’s social services and physical infrastructures. In many ways, the conflicts that are writ large on a state level—between the native-born citizen and the immigrant, between those who wish to have open borders and those who do not—are also played out on a different scale in global cities in Europe, the United States and throughout the world. Thus, the city, like the state, can be seen as the site of both increased opportunities and increased dangers in a globalizing world. And increasingly in the period since September 11, 2001, issues of security and security threats are being articulated not only in national policies, but also on a local level. Lewis Mumford, an anthropologist writing in the 1960s, called our attention to the particular ways in which mankind has always thought about cities. He tells us that people who live in cities tend to have and to practice specialized skills—and that the city has thus always been associated with civilization and culture, with its ready supply of academics and artists and access to cultural activities and education.19 Thus, access to the city is desirable, as is a tendency for those who inhabit the city to organize to defend resources they see as theirs from others who might wish to share in them or take them away. Flusty also argues that planning in the urban environment has actually always been about security—with our first cities built as forts and places to be defended.20 Historically, as well, cities have always attracted transient, unsettled, unregistered people. A city’s population might include, for example, spies, saboteurs and people who were disloyal to the regime, as well as those who were not well integrated into system. Thus, the city has always been both a target and a place to be defended from security threats—and a generator of security threats. (Pandemics and epidemics are created in cities, as are revolutions.) The city thus, like the state, can exist in a state of complete stability, complete instability or failure or some combination in between. And yet, as Lemanski notes, international relations experts do not tend to recognize actions that citizens and policymakers take to protect the urban environment (such as installing a burglar alarm or putting up lights at a neighborhood park) as securitizing acts because of the mismatch between the international and the local level of analysis.21 However, analysts today are increasingly rethinking this narrative— asking instead how the city has been planned and organized and how it might be planned and organized in the future so that the city itself and the resources it contains might be defended.22 In this more securitized or militarized outlook, the city can thus be viewed as a public good23 that citizens and their leaders on some level “organize” to defend—through regulating

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or licensing citizenship, enacting zoning laws, and enacting regimes of surveillance and policing.24 Furthermore, wealthy citizens may purchase private security to guard “their” parts of the city from those whom they view as unauthorized, erecting walls and gates and increasingly engaging in practices of surveillance, coercion and security. As Caldeira argues, the modern city is increasingly a site of class and ethnic warfare. She remarks upon the ability of the first and third worlds to coexist side by side in the world’s global cities.25 One can even drill down to an even more microlevel to examine the ways in which particular neighborhoods or enclaves might be secured within the city, even from one’s neighbors.26 In today’s globalized world, threats to domestic order and threats to international order may be closely intertwined.27 While officials work to protect the city, international actors may seek to undermine urban domestic order—through demonstrations, vandalism, weaponized attacks or even property squatting, and the same types of security measures that are taken against international threats may now be taken against domestic threats as well. As a result, domestic law enforcement personnel and those forces that provide external security may find themselves drawing ever closer. They may begin to view threats in the same way—and their jobs of policing and providing security may begin to look similar as well.28 Domestic law enforcers may be concerned with threats to internal security from unauthorized or undocumented immigrants, and frameworks that we use to understand external security may be increasingly applied in a domestic framework. However, the question arises of whether the current emphasis on securing the city is actually justified. As McInnes and Rushton indicate, early writing on securitization theory adopted a positivist perspective, with analysts focusing on whether a threat was “real” or whether it had been securitized.29 Similarly, Flusty speaks of urban paranoia, suggesting that, for example, the increase in security measures in Los Angeles, in particular throughout the 1990s, was not justified by actual increases in crime rates.30 He suggests that the environment has not become more dangerous, but that the process of securitization is occurring due to other forces within society, such as a drive towards greater government power over citizens or an increased vigilance and desire to monitor foreigners and strangers in society, regardless of any actual increases in traditional crime. Next, it is possible that what is being “secured” through the erection of fences, new types of architecture and new methods of surveillance is not merely the physical infrastructure of Los Angeles. Rather, the threats to Los Angeles against which forces are being marshaled are somewhat larger and more complicated than merely criminal threats. Here, Setha Low suggests that fear often stems from the unknown. As one’s own city changes and begins to seem less familiar—due to an influx of new neighbors of different nationalities, different social and economic classes and different ethnicities—it is possible that one’s sense of insecurity might increase as a result of unfamiliarity.31

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Constructivism: Securing the City In order to understand the ways in which defense of the city is intertwined with issues of identity, one must consider the international relations theory known as constructivism. Constructivism asks us to think of the international system as based on ideas and identities, rather than merely on territories. Constructivism explains that ideas can create structures—pointing to, for example, the notion of Western versus Eastern Europe, noting that this is a geographical reality that actually rests on an understanding that is created intersubjectively by members of the international community. A constructivist thus would consider the city not merely as a territory, but also as a particular type of entity in comparison to other entities, such as the rural area. Here, a defense of the city might focus on identifying and responding to forces that might threaten the identity of the city. A constructivist would thus note that any major world city (like London, Paris, New York or Shanghai) actually represents or stands for a variety of values and ideas. Citizens may also not all agree on what the meaning of a city is, since there are multiple competing visions of what a city is. Some may focus their understanding on the idea of the neoliberal city, characterized primarily as a marketplace and governed by market forces that determine who lives where. Still others may view the city as a sanctuary, place of refuge or a community that takes care of its own, providing human security for its members. Others may view the city as a fortress whose primary function is to protect its members and keep out intruders. Today, there is a great deal of contestation regarding the issues of what a city is, whom it serves and what it is for. These questions may become particularly pronounced during periods of opening or globalization, when issues are raised such as whether all newcomers are welcome, whether some are welcome and the exact nature of the contract between the city and its residents. The city may have a longstanding identity, and there may be conflict over whether this identity should be kept unchanged, or whether it needs to adapt to a dynamic environment. That is, a city is a place that possesses a political and cultural history. In addition, the city (particularly a capital city) occupies an important position in supporting the nation’s political, economic, social and cultural institutions. Thus, in securing the city, officials may enact rules and legislation to secure not only the physical infrastructure, but also the other meanings and ideas that the city represents. Zoning laws may be used to preserve the aesthetic meaning of the city, while residency laws may regulate who may live in the city and under what circumstances. The city’s identity may be important for state prestige and power (as Shanghai’s is). Thus, the city is more than just a place, and the job of defending the city is thus about more than simply defending the citizens or the physical infrastructure of its territory. Table 1.2 illustrates the range of threats to the city that may be identified today. In the next section of this chapter, I consider the different discourses that can be identified in the public discussion about squatting. As we will see, these discourses diverge sharply in their visions of which of these meanings of the city are being secured.

How We Talk about Squatting Table 1.2

51

Security Aspects of the City

Meaning

Security threat presented

Object of securitization

Place of commerce

Attack on Wall Street

National and international monetary system

Place of continuity, order

Chaos: threat to government’s legitimacy if it cannot control

Norms and regimes that govern city functioning

Physical infrastructure

Fire, natural disaster, terrorist attack

Metro, buildings, etc.

Source of national pride

Symbolic attack on nation, harms credibility

Image of city

Territory (container for citizens)

Threats to human or physical security (pandemic, crime)

Physical possessions Bodily safety, human life, health

Investment

Bankruptcy, failure of financial institutions

Financial security

Civilization

Invasion

City’s identity

How Do Squatters Threaten the Home and the City? In considering the narratives about squatting put forth by politicians, the public, the media and pro- and antisquatting groups, it is thus possible to identify a number of different discourses used to describe squatting and squatters, mainly because participants may differ in terms of how they define the object of security to be defended. Squatting can be seen as a threat to property or one’s investment (from a realist perspective), or as a threat to individual, community and national identity (from a constructivist perspective). The squatter can be seen as jeopardizing the health security of others in a neighborhood as well as threatening social order. From an individual perspective, the squatter can be seen as threatening identity, community and property. The practice of squatting is seen as having the potential to reshape the urban environment (through, for example, damaging buildings and property values), as well as the identity and community of a neighborhood or city. Thus, it is plausible to consider how the squatter has been constructed as a threat to the state, the city, the neighborhood and the home—and the ways in which these understandings have structured state responses to the squatter. The squatter is constructed as a figure through speech acts uttered by officials who make housing policy, through media coverage of the issue of squatting and through judicial and legislative rulings that use language to describe the squatter and the issue of squatting. In recent years, the irregular resident of the state (which might include the undocumented immigrant, the nomadic Roma people, the guest worker, the homeless vagrant or mentally ill individual, or the property squatter) has

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increasingly become the object of securitization. While all of these “types” might previously have been regarded largely as a social problem (or someone who was down on his luck), all of these types have gradually come to be viewed through the lens of state security. In Western Europe in the early twenty-first century, one can identify two narratives that portray the squatter as threatening. First, the squatter can be viewed as a type of rootless individual who violates established norms that favor being settled over being nomadic. As Aas notes, both the immigrant and the asylum seeker are variants upon the older figure of the stranger, or the one who does not belong. She notes that the words “deviant” and “immigrant” are often linked, as are the notions of immigration and criminality. She asks us to consider how a community’s ethic of care for the stranger becomes transformed, so that it seems natural for a community to reject or fear the stranger, rather than embracing him.32 It is my contention that increasingly, squatters (many of whom are multinational) are seen as strangers rather than members of one’s own society and for this reason, the discourse used to describe the squatter is often one that seeks to characterize the squatter as a threat to security rather than as a person like oneself who deserves to be integrated into one’s community. Next, the squatter can be viewed as a type of liminal individual who resides in the interstices of society where he is often uncounted and unsurveilled, sharing an identity here with other types of uncounted and ill-defined individuals, such as terrorists. We shall consider each of these ideas in turn.

Fearing the Rootless The first narrative is based on the notion of the squatter as a type of rootless individual. This narrative is an ancient one, based upon longstanding stereotypes about those who are settled versus those who are not, and those who are ensconced within the mainstream of society versus those who reside on society’s margins or fringes. As Mumford points out in The City in History some anthropologists believe that the propensity to store up objects and to then settle down with them is an innate human trait.33 In this way, being settled is constructed as the default or normal setting, with a nomadic lifestyle constructed in contrast as one that is disorderly, chaotic and deviant. Those who are settled thus occupy the position of an insider within society, while those who do not settle are largely regarded as outsiders.34 As Sibley argues, those who do not adopt the norms of a culture but instead rely on alternate social structures and economies end up occupying a peripheral position characterized by social distance between them and the majority. In some cases, the distance between the two groups—the settled and the nomadic or migrant culture—may be based on older ideas regarding the cleanliness or purity of the object being secured (the home) and the dirtiness or uncleanliness of the interloper who seeks to enter the area.35 As Salter argues, the notion of the barbarian or uncivilized outsider is an old

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one, which is frequently applied to describe both historic situations and situations in the present day.36 On an individual level, those who were rootless or transient (including travelers, gypsies, merchants and sailors) were always suspected of disloyalty to their neighbors, their communities and the state. Early historians warned of spies among the Phoenicians and among the Roman troops. Men were urged to be wary of those who were different, or who had recently arrived. The message was already that such individuals could not be trusted, for they were not who they seemed to be. They did not belong and did not assimilate.37 Here, the normative assumption was that one’s proper identity was that of association with his tribe or his village. In contrast, Xenophon, a Greek historian, described the ways in which traveling merchants in the city-states were associated with their trade, rather than their place of origin.38 And Pow notes that the trope of the dangerous, rootless peasant can be traced back to the Qing Dynasty in China.39 The Middle Ages also gives us the trope of the Holy Fool, as well as stories about feral children. In each case, these individuals are described as those who don’t belong to decent society, but move from place to place. The rootless are thus seen as not assimilating or adopting the norms of the places where they might dwell temporarily. Their failure to assimilate becomes a danger when their own norms, values and lifestyle threaten to overtake the values of those who already inhabit an area. Here, the irregular resident can present a threat to social cohesion and the national and cultural identity of the neighborhood, city or region in which he resides. The fear is that he will somehow organize to destabilize society. In Voelkner’s words, he threatens the “social fabric of society.”40 Here, the rootless can be said to pose both an active and a passive threat. Rootless individuals and groups may pose a threat of toppling the system not because they are consciously opposed to the system or because they organized against it, but rather simply because they overwhelm a nation’s resources by their sheer numbers. As a passive threat, they may also play the role of carriers—in, for example, transmitting a threat like tuberculosis to a wider community. Indeed, the story of the fall of the Roman Empire often features the arrival of “hordes” of Vandals, Visigoths and Huns from Eastern Europe and Central Asia who are said to have overrun or swarmed over Western Europe, barbarically destroying its institutions and values in the process. (Here, as Stolcke points out, European xenophobia and distrust of strangers are an eternal theme.)41 If one searches even farther back in history, one can point to Genghis Khan, the nomadic ruler who used cavalry to perpetrate torture, rape and death upon unsuspecting settled populations. Thus, as Salter argues, irregular citizens are seen as an outside force that threatens the lifestyle, livelihoods and even lives of those who live inside the community.42 As Aas has noted, “mobility has been, inevitably, connected to security.”43 The rootless person is thus often regarded as an agent of disruption, a spreader of unrest and a taker of resources. He may also be both labeled and feared as a “disease vector”—one who brings germs and sickness from one

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region and spreads it to other locations that were previously pure, pristine and safe. This understanding, as well, is an ancient one. In the Middle Ages, Jews and peddlers were vilified and accused of bringing plague,44 while syphilis was known as “the French disease” in Britain in Victorian times, based on the idea that it had been brought to England from abroad by unscrupulous individuals. Today, migrant workers in Shanghai may be accused of carrying and spreading SARS into the pristine enclaves, where Shanghai’s wealthiest residents live.45 This same fear of rootlessness can be found in stories about hobos or tramps in the United States during the Great Depression. These economically marginalized individuals were accused of stealing from the communities they visited—accused of the theft of both property and children. Thus, as Voelker notes, human security can include both a macropolitics and a micropolitics. In both cases, insecurity is made manifest in situations of uncontrolled circulation—of goods (where it is labeled organized crime), of people (where it is labeled as trafficking) and all the way down to the level of viruses and germs (which are labeled as threats to health security).46 Thus, the person who circulates outside the rules and norms of order and control imposed by the state is seen as a security threat because of what he does, who he is and what he contains (germs and uncontrolled physical material, including genetic material). Thus, state strategies such as quarantines for newly arrived immigrants, slum clearing and the rounding up of marginalized and migrant individuals in preparation for an event like a coronation or the Olympics are neither new nor novel. Rather, they are part of a long tradition of states and communities reacting to “stranger danger.”

Fearing the Undocumented and Unsurveilled The rise of security rhetoric featuring the irregular dweller (or the notion that irregular dwellers are particularly dangerous) is however more pronounced and more common during times of economic unrest and globalization. This is because such time periods may be characterized by a breaking down of traditional barriers—geographic, economic, social and cultural, leading to the increased production of so-called liminal categories of individuals and groups. That is, categories may be in transition until they eventually stabilize. Here, Neumann defines the liminal individual as one who defies easy categorization, as he may not fit neatly into one group or another. He notes that: Liminality was a condition of being betwixt and between socially established categories, and not simply the condition of being in the midst of two stages in a ritual. Liminality could also be the condition of being suspended or even trapped between two different sets of role expectations.47 In his work, Salter points to a number of categories of “internal others” who often live at the margins of society but who are not fully recognized or absorbed into society. Among such groups he lists historical groups such as working and unmarried women, colonial subjects, criminals, prostitutes and members of

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48

lower classes. In modern times, we may point to such categories as illegal immigrants who are invisible because they lack proper documentation. As McGuire and Georges argue, those who are undocumented exist in a hierarchy in which they have less power and their needs are seen as less significant than those who enjoy legal status. She notes that “A hierarchy is constructed which privileges the official, insider and places the undocumented invisible person beneath him in social, legal and political interactions.”49 Today, the irregular dweller may also be viewed as “other” by virtue of his economic status. Rootless people or those who did not have a fixed identity have often been portrayed as parasitical, seeking to take advantage of collective goods such as national defense while simultaneously not paying into the costs of these goods. In ancient times, one can thus point to the activities of the Roman Empire, which conducted a census every fourteen years in order to record the numbers of males who were eligible to pay taxes and serve in the military. Those rootless or nomadic individuals who failed to participate in the census were thus seen as engaging in draft dodging and/or tax fraud.50 In our own times, the analyst Jeffrey Huysmans suggests that a newcomer in Europe can be viewed either as a “positive asset” who is bringing skills and energy to the collective, or alternately as a “fraudulent profiteer capitalizing on the wealth created by the established.”51 Similarly, legislative initiatives in the United States have focused on limiting services provided to illegal or undocumented immigrants from Latin America and Mexico in particular. Thus, if one conceptualizes the city primarily as a place of commerce and an economic entity, then the rootless person can be perceived as a risk to economic security since he is seen as wasting the space in the city that he occupies temporarily (since it is not incorporated into the city’s economy), as well as wasting any resources that he may take from the city. The transient or squatter is viewed as someone who engages in unregulated economic activity, and who does not invest in the community or himself. As Leitner and colleagues describe the problem, the entrepreneurial capitalist city is a place that provides workfare, not welfare. They portray the city as a type of economic contract between those who seek a place to be productive and the city that provides that site. Here, anyone of any nationality is welcome to visit the city and to participate in it, provided they play the role of a productive citizen.52

Fearing the Slum or Informal Settlement Thus, there is a long history of state suspicion of those who are rootless. There is an equally long history of linkages between informal squatter settlements and threats to security. Security analysts like Mark Sageman have suggested that liminal or ungoverned spaces—like enclaves—present a particular danger to the state.53 In his work on the Internet, he suggests that this “territory” includes dark spaces or failed spaces, which can serve as sanctuaries or harbors for terrorists. In these dark spaces, terrorists can meet and exchange information outside the gaze of the government. They can come and go at will, and the state is frequently unaware of either the size or the scope of the

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problem. Sageman’s solution is thus to extend the reach of government and infiltrate cyberspace, so that such failed spaces no longer exist. The informal settlement can also be conceived of as a liminal space—the subject of danger, negotiation and conflict—as different groups with radically different orientations towards the space converge in one neighborhood.54 And informal settlements have long been implicated in the generation of threats to health security, in particular. Informal settlements are frequently described as the site where health threats—to include HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, cholera and emerging pathogens—either reside in large numbers or are generated through the practices and/or demographics of the informal settlement members themselves. That is, analysts in international security worry about the possibility that the threats residing in the failed state might somehow overgrow or jump beyond their boundaries, infecting the larger organism of the international system . Meanwhile, analysts in domestic security—including health security—focus energy on considering how the threats resident in the informal settlement might be contained so that they do not spread beyond its borders.55 Containing the threats that reside in the informal settlement is thus the goal. This may be done by carrying out increased surveillance of the residents of the informal settlement, carrying out programs that aim to change the values and practices of those in the informal settlement or sometimes by containing the members of the informal settlement within the confines of that settlement.

Crime Prostitution Drug Use Nonpayment of Taxes Unregistered Businesses

Health Issues HIV/AIDS Sanitary Practices

SQUATTER SETTLEMENT

Lack of Vaccination/Registration Epidemic Disease Infant Mortality

Social Problems Child Abuse

Figure 1.1

Security threats associated with squats.

How We Talk about Squatting

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The danger posed by informal settlements (here the threat of the area and the threat of the individuals who reside in the area are often conflated) decreases the possibility of somehow tearing down the wall between formal and informal settlement or integrating informal settlers and settlements within the standard polity. Figure 1.1 illustrates the varieties of security threats that are often referenced in discussions of slums, informal settlements and squats.

DISCOURSES OF SECURITY AND INSECURITY The squatter is thus seen to threaten the home, the neighborhood, the city and the state. The squatter is a threat due to his rootless nature and his ability to thrive unsurveilled in a community. But how specifically do policymakers, journalists and the general public talk about this threat? What language do they use? There are eight different discourses that can be identified in referring to squatting and squatters in Western Europe in the period since 2000. Seven of the discourses or frames are negative, in that they portray squatters and squatting in a negative light. The “improvement frame,” in contrast, portrays squatting and squatters as a positive social, economic and cultural phenomenon. All of these frames have been identified through my analysis of mainstream newspaper coverage of squatting in Western Europe since 2000. The frames identified here can be seen as ideal types, with a mixed discourse often arising, which may incorporate elements of several types. The negative frames include: the deviance frame; the barbarism frame; the free-rider frame; the security invasion frame; the criminality frame; the threat to community frame and the foreign frame. Depending on the discourse used, the problem of squatting will be viewed quite differently, as will the policy solutions proposed.

The Home as Economic Good: Discourses of Improvement, Investment, Free-Riding and Crime The first four frames to be considered all concentrate predominantly on the home, neighborhood and community as an economic good. The squatter and the squat are thus seen to threaten economic values, including personal wealth and the inheritance that a home might represent. Despite the similarities in these frames, however, each gives rise to a different set of policy prescriptions regarding how one should deal with squatters on both an individual and a governmental level.

The Improvement Frame As noted, not all newspapers or all reporters viewed property squatting predominantly as a negative phenomenon in cities. The improvement frame often features reporting that incorporates the squatter’s own voice in the

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe

Table 1.3

The Improvement Frame

Terms indicating improvement frame for squat PR savvy

Terms indicating improvement frame for squatters Educated

Culture

Lively

Creative solution

PR-savvy

Enjoyment Transform, transformation Note: Reporting may also include the quotation of economic figures regarding property improvements.

article. In this way, the property squatter is viewed and presented not merely as the passive subject of policy making or analysis, but is rather as an active participant in the project of squatting, which is often presented as a positive one for the community. In examining the case of Christiania in Denmark, it becomes clear that initially an improvement frame was used to report on developments in the area. The improvement frame is often also used by both British and French reporters to describe so-called culture squats or art squats that have sprung up in Paris and London. The improvement frame may focus on the economic goods being provided to the larger community by squatters—including increased tourist traffic to the neighborhood if the squatters, for example, open an art gallery. It may also focus on the creativity of the squatters and the ways in which they are solving a community problem in a new and novel way. Table 1.3 lists some keywords that indicate the application of an improvement frame to describe squatting.

Free-Rider Frame In contrast, the free-rider frame presents squatting primarily as an economic crime. Here the main objection to the squatter is his sense of entitlement. In this frame, squatting may be presented as part of a larger critique of the welfare state. This framework that prevailed through the late 1990s and early 2000s was often used to describe situations in which British squatters in particular had won so-called squatter’s rights or managed to acquire land (sometimes quite expensive land) through the law of adverse possession. Stories that presented the outcome of legal trials in which the judge had ruled in favor of a squatter often described the individual as having won the lottery or gotten something for nothing. The author might adopt an outraged tone in narrating the events leading to an outcome in which someone was rewarded with land tenure or a house, while others who work hard and pay into system are not similarly rewarded.

How We Talk about Squatting Table 1.4

59

The Free-Rider Frame

Free-rider terms describing a squat

Free-rider terms describing a squatter

A racket

Handout

Rent-free

Windfall

Selfish

Luck

Pocketing the money

Lazy

Serial squatter

Selfish “Playing the odds/playing the game”

Thus, “posh squatters” are described in the Sun as “rent dodgers,” freeloaders and as “dossing in the 30 million pound house belonging to the Duke of Westminster.”56 Here one Swedish squatter noted that he had come to England since laws in the Netherlands no longer permitted squatting.57 Here, the implication is that squatters are market-savvy individuals who are capable of taking advantage of taxpayers in a variety of different locations, and that if the costs of squatting become too high in one nation, they will simply go to another. In this same article, the comments by readers are very telling. One reader notes that “all you need now is someone with a kind heart to show them the way to the airport and ensure they have their passports and a one way ticket as their holiday at our expense is finished!” Another commenter notes that “I would be more than happy to take care of this lot. Some tear gas will do the job as well as giving them a beating should do the trick! This is what’s wrong with this country—people like this!”58 In this situation, it is not a particular person or community who is being threatened by the squatter. Rather, the squatter is presented as committing a type of theft through stealing from society. He might also be presented as a type of gambler who took a risk and won (and who therefore violates the Puritan work ethic, a mainstay of European political identity). Table 1.4 presents terms often associated with the free-rider frame. As Figure 1.2 indicates, this frame declined in usage throughout 2000s, as it was replaced by other frames including deviant, barbarism and security framings. This chart presents numbers of articles in the British press that used the free-rider frame, broken down by year. As it indicates, the frame was most prevalent in the early 2000s, nearly vanishing in 2007–2009, and beginning to reappear in 2010.

The Investment Frame Both the free-rider frame and the investment frame conceptualize the home as property, and suggest that squatters are committing an economic crime— rather than a violent crime or an act of cultural aggression. Media reports that use the investment frame often describe the physical damage that has

60

Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe 7 6 Free-Rider Frame

5 4 3 2

Figure 1.2

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

0

2000

1

Usage of the free-rider frame.

been caused to the dwelling by squatters, describing house as “trashed,” detailing damages to property and describing squatters as a “blight.” An article in the Evening Standard about squatting in Ilford notes that windows have been broken, rubbish piled up and bathrooms “trashed.”59 Like the free-rider frame, the implication is that squatters somehow steal from the larger community through these actions, in this case through lowering property prices in a community and making everyone else’s investment worth less. Craig Gurney suggests that the home provides the homeowner with ontological security. He is secure in his place in the world now that he has secured a “piece of the American dream.” Thus, having purchased one’s own home means that one’s social status and place in the community are now secure.60 A threat to the value of one’s home threatens that ontological security. Ronald, in contrast, describes the way in which a home may be conceptualized as a “family good.” It represents real value or an inheritance, and homeowners often think about the ways in which that home and the value of the home may be secured by the homeowner and passed down to the next generation.61 Thus, a threat to the value of one’s home can also be seen as a threat to one’s patrimony. Here, it is easy to identify the intertextual connections that can be made between the ways in which interlopers and foreigners might threaten British cultural patrimony, for example, and the ways in which interlopers and squatters in one’s neighborhood might threaten one’s family’s own cultural patrimony. The investment frame is thus associated with a discourse of “residential exclusion” as homeowners may band together to preserve the value of their investment.62 They may do so by opposing the presence of certain types of individuals who seek to reside in their communities, or by opposing the siting

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of certain types of structures within their neighborhoods and communities. Thus, policy strategies that derive from the investment frame may include restrictive zoning laws based on the “Not in My Backyard” or NIMBY strategy. NIMBYism is defined as “the intense, sometimes emotional and often adamant local opposition to siting proposals that residents believe will result in adverse impacts.”63 Homeowners may also derive strategies that result in the creation of enclaves or gated communities in which physical barriers are constructed to keep unwanted individuals or groups out of one’s territory.64 However, the investment frame does not always result in a negative portrayal of squatters. Indeed, some in Britain have expressed sympathy for squatters, noting that there are no good jobs for young people, and that young people are thus locked out of their own pursuit of the home ownership dream due to high prices, low wages and the threat of unemployment.

The Criminality Frame Squatting may also be portrayed merely as a type of everyday criminal behavior that is no more or no less threatening than other types of criminal behavior. In this frame, the emphasis is not on the existence of a crisis and military metaphors are not used. Rather, incidences of squatting are reported merely in terms of the police actions that they have brought about. In this frame, terms like “illegal” may be used, and the specific actions committed (vandalism, for example) are detailed. As noted, here the emphasis is predominantly upon the possessions and property that have been destroyed, and the monetary damages sustained. In addition, the locations of squats are described as seedy and dangerous, and parallels are made between the bad neighborhoods that the squat occupies (and sometimes help to create) and the activities that take place there. For example, a story about squatting in the Daily Mail describes how a site currently occupied by squatters in Soho was previously “a venue for sex orgies and swinger’s parties.” The report includes the detail that “two years earlier a pensioner was stabbed in the neck there.”65 Meanwhile, government documents have increasingly spoken of the connection between housing and crime. The 2011 UK Housing Strategy notes, for example, that “a neglected home can quickly start to cause problems for neighbors, depressing the value of adjacent properties and attracting nuisance, squatting and criminal activity.”66 The criminality frame also appears in Danish coverage of squatting issues—as noted in the introduction. In Denmark, the conceptualization of Christiania as a place of crime has paved the way for increased police activity in the region, including the creation of a counterterrorism force that has made armed raids upon the enclave. In addition, it has allowed for the creation of a counterintelligence unit that now engages in preemptive policing, not waiting for an actual crime to occur but rather monitoring and surveying the site on a regular basis in the hopes of deterring crimes before they occur Table 1.5 indicates the specific language which alerts us to the presence of a crime frame when examining reportage on squatting.

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Table 1.5

Usage of the Crime Frame

Squat viewed through crime frame

Squatter viewed through crime frame

Ruined possessions

Illegal tenants

Destruction

Intruder

Wrecked belongings

Anti-social behavior

Jail

Drugs

Offense

Violence

Graffiti

Vandalism

Broke in Law Police Prosecute Eviction Occupation

Behavior Frames The next two frames to be considered are the deviance frame and the security frame. Each of these frames is concerned not with the economic value of the home (as the previous frames were) but rather with the figure of the squatter himself and the activities in which he engages. He is seen as behaving strangely and in a threatening manner towards homeowners and citizens in a region. Thus, the emphasis is not on securing the home from financial threats, but rather on controlling the behavior of the squatter himself.

The Deviance Frame As David Sibley writes, individuals who violate common cultural, social and economic norms are viewed by the mainstream as deviant and in need of correction.67 The deviance frame rests on the notion that squatting is first and foremost a failure of socialization. Those who squat are regarded as having been improperly socialized into accepted norms of living and being in society and in the community.68 Squatters of all varieties, but so-called posh squatters in particular (i.e., individuals from wealthy homes who squat not for survival reasons, but rather because they do not “buy into” the capitalist ideological notion that underlies the desire to seek and purchase a home), are seen as having somehow failed to acquire the basics of citizenship that others have acquired. As Gurney indicates, most housing analysts assume that everyone wants to climb the property ladder. Therefore, one who does not wish to participate in a hierarchical striving for success in which he with the biggest house wins is regarded as both strange and perhaps a little

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dangerous. They are therefore constructed as “bad neighbors”—often in moral terms that describe them as dirty, slothful and negligent, or in economic terms that portray them as lower class.69 The policy solution put forth for deviant squatting is thus not to increase social distance (or exclude squatters from society) but rather for the state to do a better job of integrating diverse groups into society. The lens of deviance is common in the mainstream press—and can be seen in the application of language that describes the squatters, their dwellings and their lifestyles. Articles frequently take note of the deviant family formations in which squatters live—since they may eschew the traditional, heterosexual nuclear family—instead residing either in extended family or nonfamily formations (such as communes). Squatting is furthermore described as an alternative lifestyle, in comparison to a mainstream lifestyle, since squatters may choose not to pursue traditional employment or channel a large percentage of their income towards investment in a home through a mortgage. Parallels may be drawn with other groups that have historically been portrayed as deviant— such as the hippies who created communal living spaces in the 1960s. In describing the physical structure of the squat itself, the emphasis is on the substandard living conditions found there. As Sibley notes, a related frame—the deprivation frame—can sometimes lead to a call for government action to address underlying issues of inequity. However, in other instances, deprivation and deviance frames can be mixed, with the implication that stigmatized groups choose to live in a deprived state, as a result of lifestyle choices made or underlying deficiencies of character that lead to both deprivation and deviance. In this way, discourse about squatting conforms to common discourse about homelessness, which may focus on one’s “career” as a homeless person or one’s “slide into homelessness.”70 As Sibley suggests, the application of a deviance frame can create a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy, which he refers to as “deviancy amplification.” Here a group may be portrayed in the press or even in academic writing as strange and different. Analysts may focus on the norm violation engaged in by the group, rather than seeking to understand the group on its own terms. As a result, readers may gain a stereotyped view of the group, which then comes to dominate society’s thinking about the group.71 Deviancy amplification explains why, despite increased press coverage of squatters, for example, readers have over time come not to understand the problem better, but instead have merely adopted a more extreme and prejudiced view of squatters in their society. Social distance has been increased rather than decreased. And more information has actually led to a greater perception of threat rather than a more nuanced view of the problem. However, squatters have not always been willing to accept this labeling of their activities as deviant. In a recent squatters’ blog entry by Lili, Melissa and Pete, they note that power politics allows the dominant group to describe those who are in the minority as deviant. They accuse those in the majority (those who are settled) of both mischaracterizing and misinterpreting the

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meaning of their squatting activities, focusing instead exclusively on the ways in which they appear to violate the norms of the dominant group.72 The notion of deviance, however, does not only explain how a group of individuals has arrived at the embrace of a particular lifestyle. It also explains the implications of this behavior for others within society. As Foucault has noted, mainstream groups may feel threatened by the existence of a group of individuals who engage in practices and behaviors regarded as deviant.73 The existence of a deviant group raises the possibility that it is possible to reject mainstream norms and practices, and in some cases even desirable to do so. In this way, the integrity of society itself is threatened— since one can easily ask, “If this group can reject the norms of mainstream society, why can’t I do so as well?” But what specific norms do squatters challenge? First, they violate the normative expectation that one should desire to own a private home. Anarchist squatters in particular make it very clear that they do not accept norms regarding either capitalism or the importance of owning private property. This is problematic because as Ronald points out in his work on the ideology of home ownership, “tenure practices are not benign but support a particular alignment or interaction of social and power relations.” That is, in many nations—including the nations of Western Europe—home ownership is tied into citizenship practices. He notes that governments frequently subsidize mortgages or provide tax breaks because homeowners are generally less likely to become disturbers of the peace or insurgents. Once an individual owns a home, he is invested in preserving social stability, which makes him a good government subject and renders his behavior more predictable. He invests in a home and simultaneously becomes invested in society. In this way, home ownership is established by the state as a normative expectation and those who violate the norm become suspect.74 In addition, Shubin and Swanson point to the norm of sedentarism, which they contrast with nomadism in their survey of Scottish gypsy travelers. They argue that those who refuse to conform through having a settled lifestyle are automatically suspect and categorized as deviant.75 Similarly, the residents of the squatter settlement in Christiania, Denmark, prided themselves for many years on their refusal to conform to many Danish norms. The settlement was associated with the embrace of nudity, with free drug use and with a rejection of traditional forms of employment, as well as with an embrace of communal living rather than in the nuclear family. Thus, squatters may be seen as violating economic norms (such as an embrace of private property, mortgages, leases and tenant agreements), cultural norms or norms regarding safety and sanitation (such as the need to have running water). In addition, Gurney has investigated the ways in which UK Government publications speak of home ownership.76 He argues that government creates a “normalizing” discourse, which implies that homeowners are better and more proper than those who do not own homes, that the desire to seek home ownership is natural and that not to desire this or to seek it is

How We Talk about Squatting Table 1.6

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The Deviance Frame

Words that frame squatters as deviant

Words that frame squatting as deviant

Caravan

Pit

Junkies

Shack

Camping

Eyesore

Jobless

Dilapidated

Alcohol

Hovel

Unemployed

Derelicts

Derelicts

Raves

Alternative lifestyle

Alternative lifestyle

Serial squatter

Commune

somehow unnatural. He also notes the social construction of a “shameful housing class,” pointing to the language used to describe those who have failed at establishing the desired social outcome, who are therefore seen as slackers who do not contribute to society as good parents, good neighbors or productive citizens. Policies may thus focus on ending deviant practices (like drug abuse), or often increasingly merely on “containing” such practices so that the values and lifestyles of squatters are kept from spreading and infecting the mainstream population. (For example, if large numbers of individuals reject mainstream norms regarding the importance of private property and private investment in housing, this will have implications for society’s longterm financial and social stability. Such implications will be felt both on the macrolevel of the nation as a whole and on the microlevel of one’s own neighborhood.) For this reason, governments have often sought to further marginalize deviant groups, sometimes using the politics of space to zone territories and move deviant groups far away from the mainstream, where they are less likely to contaminate others. In this way, the “problem” of the deviant group is resolved or solved by the mainstream. Table 1.6 presents some common words used to signal a deviance frame. The words on the left are used in framing the practices of squatting as deviant, while the words on the right are used in framing the character of the squatters themselves as deviant. Here, overlaps are created between the deviant lifestyle of squatting and other lifestyles that are also regarded as deviant or characterized by deviant behavior (such as alcoholism or unemployment). Squatting is thus seen as a type of deviant behavior that exists within a larger matrix of deviant behavior. It is a practice that coexists with other forms of social deviance—including drug use, unemployment, crime and arson.77 Here, it is important to note that the deviance frame creates social distance between the reader and the squatter—but does not portray the squatter as incapable of being rehabilitated or eventually assimilated into mainstream

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society. Alcoholics can be cured in some instances, and the unemployed can often be put to work either in the general economy or in a particular controlled setting such as a sheltered workshop. The deviance frame portrays squatting and squatters as a problem that can be resolved, provided the holders of deviant values can be persuaded to abandon them and adopt mainstream values.

The Security Frame Increasingly, in the years since 2005 language used in the press to describe the squatters themselves and the act of squatting has taken a turn towards the language of security. State and city government workers, as well as journalists, implicitly rely on metaphors of networks, invasion and infiltration when discussing squatting today. The “body politic” of the state or the city is described as threatened by the incursion of these unauthorized individuals. The state is also described as a house, with elected officials like Grant Shapps, UK minister of housing, and others using language in which they refer to shutting the door or slamming the door on squatting.78 In the media, the homeowner is urged to protect his own house, while the politician promises to protect the larger house, that of the state itself. The provision of security against squatters is described as a task of the state, but it is also one that is increasingly being privatized. Bigo speaks of the “managers of unease” who have made a profession of securing individuals and communities from threat, suggesting that in some ways the cycle becomes self-reinforcing. While some purchase security because they genuinely feel threatened, for others the mere presence of such security firms adds to their own sense of unease, so that those who did not previously feel threatened now do largely because of the enacting of the pageant of security that is taking place around them.79 In cities throughout Europe, one can point to the rise of security firms with names like Vigilance Properties, who advertise on their web site that their mission is to protect citizens’ homes from illegal squatters.80 These organizations employ military logos on their web sites, and boast of being staffed by ex-marines and ex-military individuals, including Gurkhas. Their logos and their advertisements highlight their use of weaponry in protecting properties. The web site for one of these firms, HG Security and Property Protection, Ltd., advertises that it provides: 24 hr response centre Only SIA licensed operatives provided Leadership team of ex services personnel Round the clock personal manned security services and surveillance81 The security frame appears in a February 2011 issue of Time profiling Kayne Manning and his fiancée, whose home in London was occupied by squatters.

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The article notes, “For Manning, however, squatters are nothing more than a dangerous scourge.” Readers are informed that “to this day, the couple feels scared in their own home.” Manning notes that “That’s what squatters are all about: fear.”82 Meanwhile, the populist British newspaper the Daily Mail offers its readers profiles of dangerous East Europeans wielding knives who seek to occupy the homes of law-abiding British homeowners, sometimes moving in when the resident has only stepped out to the store to purchase a quart of milk.83 The same publication tells the story of a neighborhood where the residents have organized their own vigilante police force to protect their homes from squatters.84 The implication in all cases is that something is under attack—homes, safety and perhaps the British way of life. In an interview in the Telegraph, 62-year-old Abu-Taher Ahmed, a British homeowner, is quoted as asking, “Who is going to protect this nation from these invaders? What is the government going to do about it?”85 In international relations terms, one may argue that the housing sector is securitized. Citizens are being told that in an emergency situation—like a terrorist threat—where the risks are very great, normal democratic citizenship practices, such as not reporting one’s neighbors or sending their picture to the police without their permission, are to be suspended for the good of the community. In other words, it is no longer “business as usual” at one’s apartment, house or residential dwelling. Instead, new practices of surveillance and reporting are not only necessary but also encouraged. Here, one can make the argument that the securitization of housing first occurred with the passage in New Jersey in 1994 of “Megan’s Law,” named for a girl who was killed by a sex offender living in her neighborhood. This law, and other variants that were later passed in all US states, allows each state to maintain a publically searchable database of those individuals who have been convicted of sexual offenses against minors—including fondling and rape. In addition, specific zoning regulations prevent child sexual offenders from living within a certain distance of facilities like schools and daycare centers. Here again, the thinking is that such offenses are so heinous and the dangers that they present to children living in an environment are so great, that it is acceptable to constrain the rights and privacy of individuals convicted of these crimes for the good of the greater community. The presence of a child sex offender thus creates a “state of exception.” Similar laws have been passed in England beginning in the 2000s under the name Sarah’s Law on both a district and national level.86 As a result of the securitization of housing issues, even issues like urban blight or decay are interpreted in a different light. Citizens have always worried about the implications of having a vacant house in their neighborhood— fearing that it might become a “shooting gallery” for heroin addicts, a crack house or a site of prostitution or gang activity. However, today, one can argue that the greatest threat posed by abandoned housing is not that it will become a place where crime occurs—but rather that such places will become a sort of “no mans’ land” that exists outside of the official structures

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Table 1.7

The Security Frame

Words that frame squatting in security terms

Words that frame squatters in security terms

Invaded by

Gangs

Properties are being targeted

Threat to our society

Council is fighting

Took over blocks of flats

Ransom

An army of squatters

Knives

Revenge

Battering rams

Retaliation

of surveillance, licensing and regulation. In a situation in which citizens are increasingly worried about problems like transnational crime and terrorism, there is less and less space available for unofficial or unregistered activities and the unofficial or unregistered citizens who carry them out. That is, empty homes are no longer viewed only as a waste of economic resources, but also increasingly as sites of danger. The security frame often uses military language like the words “invasion,” “siege” and “under attack.” The story appearing in the Evening Standard titled “11 Arrested in Mansion Disturbance” notes that “two uniformed officers came under attack when objects were thrown from the roof of the three million pound house.”87 Meanwhile, the first paragraph of a story about Ilford, England, informs the reader that “a community under siege by gangs of Romanian squatters targeting dozens of vacant homes has launched a fightback to reclaim properties there.”88 A woman organizing a petition to demand action by her local council notes that “the gangs have refused to leave occupied properties in the area and sometimes turned hostile when challenged by the owners.”89 Table 1.7 indicates the phrases that signal the use of a security frame. The connection between housing issues and security is not a new one. Rather, since 9/11, newspapers both in the United States and in England have increasingly begun to rely on the trope of “the terrorist next door”90 or “the jihadist next door.”91 Coverage frequently invokes a contrast between the peaceful, pleasant and often idyllic surroundings where the residents live and the violence and horror that an offender was contemplating—all while inhabiting these surroundings. The security frame often emphasizes that the solution to the security issues created is greater communal surveillance and control of a neighborhood or territory.92 Citizens are exhorted to be responsible and active participants in their neighborhoods, and security is presented as a collective good that all are responsible for maintaining and protecting. (Thus, housing might be private property but neighborhood security is a public, communal task.)93 Tenant empowerment schemes are, however, in Foucaultian terms,

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94

a type of governmentality. As Cruikshank notes, tenant empowerment is a technology of citizenship in which “the citizen here is conceptualized as an ‘instrument’ of political power, not simply a ‘participant’—with authorities trying to solicit, maximize and facilitate their voluntary engagement in the political process as opposed to procuring their apathy or docility.”95 In an analysis of homeowners as political citizens, Gilderbloom and Markham quote Harvey’s notion that “a worker mortgaged to the hilt is, for the most part, a pillar of social stability, and schemes to promote homeownership within the working class have long recognized this basic fact.”96 Thus, the new securitization paradigm offers the residence dweller a third option for conceptualization of his relationship with the state in relation to housing. In working to secure his dwelling and his neighborhood, he is neither the passive subject of state activity, nor is he an active opponent of state activity. Instead, he is a coenforcer of behavioral and political norms in the space that he lives in. That is, he becomes an arm of the state, imposing the will of the state upon the “othered” passive residents of the dwelling. Here, the metaphor of colonialism seems apt—since the homeowner does not recognize the claims of his fellow dwellers, instead siding with the authorities against them through engaging in practices of surveillance, disciplining and punishing. Those who misbehave are threatened with being removed from the community. In this way, security language can be used to create a movement that builds security not from the top down but from the bottom up.

Identity Frames As noted in the introduction, squatting issues often bring identity issues and identity conflicts in a society or in a nation sharply to the forefront. These identity conflicts can appear in two different guises—identity conflicts may be produced both as a product of agency and without agency. That is, in some instances, they are presented in naturalistic terms as events that simply happen—a “flood” of squatters arrives and gradually overruns the neighborhood or town by reshaping its character (eroding it, in much the same way that floods of water gradually erode the shorelines that they abut). In other instances, the change that squatters bring about is seen as deliberate. Arguably, anarchist squatters in particular aim to change the character of the spaces they occupy—doing so consciously. In this way, they threaten the existing identities of those whose sense of self relates to the place where they live in its present form. In this second instance, to use a military metaphor, the implied fear is that the original squatters will establish a beachhead in a neighborhood as they prepare for an eventual invasion of the whole neighborhood. The fear is that squatters and undesirable Others will colonize a neighborhood, changing its economic and moral meaning, thus stealing both the original dweller’s property and his or her identity. The new meanings that the squatters might ascribe or bring to the territory differ, depending on the character

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of the squatters themselves. New “anarchist” squatters frequently seek to transform the private, guarded spaces of wealthy enclaves—like Hampstead Heath in London—into public spaces that all may visit and enter. Squatting is here a performance that serves to voice a critique of capitalism. Thus, anarchist squatters have sought to take possession of private mansions in order to transform them into (illegal or unregistered) museums or schools in London, Paris, Berlin and elsewhere. The original squatters frequently invite the public into these buildings, once they have taken possession. In contrast to the anarchist squatters, survival squatters—including refugees, the dispossessed and the poor from Eastern Europe, as well as Roma individuals—are accused of transforming space through downgrading its overall quality. These squatters are accused of destroying a once pristine and well-kept home through filling it with livestock and squalling children, and through performing machine maintenance in the backyard or using it as a public toilet. The implication is that squatters are not merely destroying the homeowner’s property, but also, through congregating in national groups and carrying with them new values and norms, inevitably changing the character of England’s “national house,” through forcing change in preexisting national norms and institutions. Once the squatter is viewed as an Other, it then becomes a straightforward process for citizens to view the squatter as a problem requiring a solution, and to call for the removal of the squatter from their midst. Furthermore, in situations in which the state has decided to prosecute those who engage in property squatting, this decision could be seen as having a political as well as an economic dimension. Thus, the prosecution (and, some might say, persecution) of squatters may be based on variables such as the ethnicity and religion of the squatters (or the amount of social distance seen to exist between the legitimate and lawful residents and those who are regarded as illegitimate and unlawful).97 The remaining frames—barbarism, nationalism and community—all construct the squatter as an Other who threatens not economic goods or personal safety but something even more precious, personal and collective identity.

The Barbarism Frame In contrast to the deviance frame, the closely related barbarism frame seeks to portray squatters less as mere outsiders residing on the fringes of society, and more as animalistic and not quite human. Squatters are portrayed as wholly other in relation to the dominant group. They are dehumanized and may be described using the language of purity and defilement.98 As Salter notes, the trope of the barbarian as a threat to the dominant group is not new.99 Rather, states have historically needed to demonstrate their fitness through their ability, in part, to assimilate and come to a rapprochement with those within their borders who were different. The trope of the barbarian rests again on an implicit hierarchy—this time between the

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“civilized” institutions and individuals who reside within the mainstream and are portrayed as orderly and settled, and the outsiders or newcomers who may be regarded as violent and dangerous. Here, the danger of the barbarian is that in bringing his disorderly nature and lifestyle to the mainstream, he may infect or upset the orderly practices of the city, the neighborhood and the society that make up each. He is thus a destabilizing element. The barbarian frame, perhaps not surprisingly, is applied more often in describing nonnative squatters who come from elsewhere. Migrant workers who squat are thus often described using the language of barbarism. The barbarism framing thus does not hold out the possibility for rehabilitation or assimilation of the squatter. Instead, it may rely on intertextuality, creating implicit parallels with other, older tropes about race and ethnicity, some of which may date back to British colonial stereotypes about “natives.” Thus, the barbarian is described as being unlike others in his society, and is thus seen as incapable of being assimilated. The barbarian squatter also poses a different set of threats to the city and the neighborhood than the deviant squatter. While the deviant frame presents the possibility that norm violation will become acceptable, the barbarian frame presents the threat that the chaotic habits and lifestyles of the barbarian squatters will threaten and undermine the orderliness and calm of the neighborhood or the city.100 In his work on barbarism, Salter notes that from the earliest days of colonialism, colonial overlords were bothered by the untidy, uncontrolled cities that awaited them in the developing world. In describing these cities he notes that not everyone in the colonies was controlled, charted and surveilled. There were a lot of these barbarians who were invisible because of the ways they could hide in this messy environment. Salter writes that: The unsurveilled, the uncharted, the uncatalogued were not under the control of the empire, and were thus a source of disorder. The notion of barbarians being invisible accompanied this. Portrayed as wild and uncivilized, the colonies were not safe if the barbarian could not be seen.101 We can identify the barbarian frame in newspaper coverage that uses terms like filthy, unkempt and savage to describe squatters and their locations. The final scene of the British television show Home Nightmares (a weekly extravaganza that features law-abiding homeowners who have been victimized by shoddy construction engineers both at home and in “holiday homes” abroad, unscrupulous landlords and squatters) shows the original owners returning to their London home after the squatters have finally been forced out. The male character pokes at the wood around the fireplace, which has been scarred and ripped off the wall by the squatters, noting that “these people” don’t respect architecture, traditions and the history of Britain. Like the terrorist, the squatter is constructed as an Other, someone who does not share values, norms or a common humanity with the average citizen or residential

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dweller in London, Paris or Amsterdam. Press reports include details such as the fact that squatters are “dirty,” leaving excrement-stained apartments, dirty mattresses and drug needles behind after they are evicted.102 The barrier between the lawful citizen of Britain and the unlawful foreign squatter is thus clearly defined. The squatter is described as barbaric—with coverage frequently focusing on the weapons wielded by the squatters—screwdrivers, hammers and knives. Homes are described as being “like a refugee camp” and neighbors frequently complain that the dwellers have “loud squat parties.”103 In short, the homeowner is civilized while the squatter is uncivilized. Squatters themselves are described as taking drugs, jobless and dirty (littering the floor with rubbish). Many are “on the dole.” The viewer or reader is thus invited to view the squatter as something less than fully human, or like an animal. A web site for property owners offers tips for keeping out squatters that sound remarkably similar to those one might offer to homeowners plagued by squirrels or other wildlife living in their homes. They are urged to seal off windows, put up fences and monitor the situation carefully104—much as one does in coping with an invasion of ants or termites. Another insurance site notes that they are “awkward and difficult to get out—once they have become ensconced in a property.”105 In addition, the barbarian frame may use the language of time to refer to squatters as being backward or from an earlier era when they lacked modern conveniences and sanitation. Words like tribe may also be used to make sense of the seemingly chaotic squatter camps, while simultaneously drawing lines that separate squatters from those in more traditional urban housing. The language of barbarism is invoked in descriptions of the French squatter camp known as “the jungle” located in Calais, France. Stories of rapes and fights occurring there, as well as the descriptions of those who have come from Africa, serve to establish a discourse that separates the developed from the developing world. Most of the squatters in this camp are from former French colonies, and readers can thus draw intertextual connections between other narratives they may be familiar with that describe former French colonies. Table 1.8 indicates phrases—drawn from British newspapers—that establish the barbarism frame. Table 1.8

The Barbarism Frame

Words that frame squatting as barbaric

Words that frame squatters as barbaric

Dirty

Dreadlocks

Living like urban wolves

Hobo

Dogs fouling on floor

Tramp Hippies Hasn’t had a bath in years Drums

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The Nationalism Frame While the barbarism frame sets up an opposition between the modern and the primitive, and between the human and the subhuman, the nationalism frame sets up a more straightforward opposition between the native-born French, British, Dutch or Danish citizen and the nonnative individual who might find himself squatting in one’s home country. The use of a nationalism frame is identified by the presence of enumerative statistics that focus on the nationalities of those engaged in squatting activities. Newspaper copy might stress the nationality of squatters as well, as is the case in a London Evening Standard article that refers to “a community under siege by gangs of Romanian squatters.”106 In this frame, reporters and politicians might mix their discussion of transnational squatters together with other discussions about migrants, immigration and the politics of race. As Phil Hubbard notes, it is often common for those who seek to other a group to present them as a monolithic, undifferentiated mass. Thus, even politicians may fail to flesh out distinctions between, for example, refugees and other types of immigrants.107 In exploring the discourse of squatting, we can identify a similar tendency by British Tory politicians, for example, to fail to distinguish between the various types of squatters—instead aggregating both West European lifestyle squatters and East European survival squatters together as “foreign.” The nationalism frame rests thus on a binary opposition between “we French” and “those non-French” people, and for this reason we can often find strong support for antisquatting initiatives by extreme right-wing parties in Britain, France, the Netherlands and Denmark. In this way, antisquatting legislative initiatives and sentiments can fit into a larger nationalist discourse. In each case, what is threatened is national identity, and squatters are viewed as inadequately socialized both into housing norms and into larger national norms regarding behavior. Policy solutions might thus stress the importance of increased border security and tracking of immigrants within one’s society108 in order to reduce both the problems of property squatting and the larger problems of nonnative presence within one’s society. The problematic of property squatting can also be situated within a larger discourse about the failure of multiculturalism as a strategy within the Netherlands and Britain. International property squatters might thus be portrayed as both incapable of ever becoming Dutch109 and also incapable of ever becoming “proper homeowners” who obey, understand and conform to norms about what it means to be a Dutch homeowner. This description may take on heavy moral overtones as well. In addition, Innes suggests that current constructs of asylum seekers in Britain today rest on the assumption that every foreigner is devious and therefore a potential criminal if not an actual criminal.110 In this way, a case is again made for a strong policy of preemptively policing those (foreigners) who have the potential to become criminals so that their criminal careers

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may be halted before they begin. The nationalist discourse of squatting thus blurs the lines between legitimate and illegitimate foreign dwellers in Britain, as well as the lines between squatters and other types of criminals. This frame thus leads to the adoption of exclusionary policies. Foreign property squatters are not seen as having the necessary values or skills to ever become legal, respectable homeowners in the culture—and for this reason, the frame may lead to policy support for strategies such as the repatriation or deportation of international property squatters.

The Community Frame Finally, we can identify a community frame in the discourse of squatting. Here, as Table 1.9 indicates, this frame overlaps to some degree with the investment frame. However, stories using a community frame argue not merely that the neighborhood has lost value but also that it has lost its unique and special status. For example, we can identity this frame in news stories about so-called posh squatters moving into expensive neighborhoods that they are seen as not having earned and therefore not entitled to. In addition, stories using the community frame may focus on the ways in which squatters use public goods belonging to the neighborhood. For example, in Britain newspaper reports have noted that squatters have taken up residence in such properties as a community center or a scout headquarters, thereby denying the use of the facility to the rightful owners and the community.111 In the following chapters, I will illustrate how each of these frames has appeared in the press and policy discussions of a specific nation, as well as showing how the use of policy frames has evolved over time. Table 1.9

The Community Frame

Squat in community terms

Squatter in community terms

Nuisance

Neighbors from hell

Juxtaposition (quiet, tranquil streets versus loud, noisy tenants)

Next door

References to character of home or neighborhood (posh, sought-after, expensive) Blight

Nuisance

2

Squatting and Antisquatting in Britain

In this chapter, I examine the ways in which over time the meaning of squatting has changed in Britain. In the post–World War II period in Britain squatting was seen largely as an economic problem rather than a problem of anti-social behavior or security. Thus, until the early 1990s, government policy towards urban squatters was often cooperative, with government overtures aimed more at addressing problems of housing use than at either punishing squatters or ending the practice. However, in the post–9/11 era, the discourse used by residents, politicians and the media in describing and analyzing squatting has changed. What was previously viewed as a problem of market imperfections has come to be viewed as part of a much larger problem, and it is now being discussed within a different set of circumstances. Particularly since the introduction of legislative initiatives in 2011 aimed at criminalizing squatting, there has been a tendency for the squatting conversation to now include a new set of questions, such as: Who belongs in Britain? (Who may reside there?) Who does not? What kind of threat is presented by squatting and what does it threaten? And how might globalization change local institutions and structures, and can these changes be prevented or are they inevitable? In this chapter, I begin by laying out the institutional and historical context of the housing market in Britain. Here, I show how housing issues— including those related to housing the homeless as well as those requiring social support—have traditionally been handled on the local level. However, I also indicate the ways in which housing issues in general and squatting issues in particular exist in a web of other related issues—such that a conversation about the construction and occupation of housing also becomes a conversation about poverty, the role of government and the ways in which housing can create or destroy community. In this way, local issues like who lives in social housing and what is expected of these individuals also become part of a larger national conversation encompassing questions about rights of citizens and the politics of belonging in Britain. In the second section, I describe the cultural and historical context of squatting itself, explaining what the practice has traditionally meant in the story of Great Britain. In the third section I describe legislative attempts to “crack

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down” on squatting in Britain. I trace the evolution of discourse about squatting in the media and political discussions from 2000 until the present, showing how the meaning of squatting has changed. Here I show how legislative hearings in Parliament beginning in March 2011 led to the creation of a narrative that presented property squatting as a threat to citizen security, which culminated in the adoption of legislation in August 2011 that criminalized squatting. Here, we can identify a series of securitizing moves engaged in by Britain’s Ministry of Justice and MP Mike Weatherley along with other Conservative backbenchers, with the support of Britain’s tabloid newspapers and landlords’ associations. While these moves succeeded, leading to a successful securitization, it is also important here to examine the counternarrative put forth by Labor and squatters’ organizations. The question is thus raised of whether the issue, once securitized, could ever be desecuritized.

INSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SQUATTING IN BRITAIN In Britain, historically, housing policy has been made on the national level, but administered at a local or council level. Britain’s Department for Community and Local Government, led currently by Greg Clark, member of parliament and minister for housing and planning, develops national housing policies,1 but the implementation and financing of those policies are then delegated to the local level. The Department’s role is thus to give advice to town planners, but these are not seen as regulations. Most recently, the National Planning Policy Framework issued on March 27, 2012, lays out policies for cities, but they have a great deal of autonomy. Thus, for example, in a recent document on UK housing policy, the Department for Communities and Local Governments described itself as a “partner” with London’s Lord Mayor Boris Johnson,2 implying that the relationship between federal and local governments is not one of hierarchy but rather of equality. Historically, the balance between top-down administration from the national department and more bottom-up local decision making has swung back and forth, with Conservative governments generally pursuing a more bottom-up approach, with a reliance on market mechanisms and local initiatives to solve problems at the local level. The national-level Department for Communities and Local Governments provides a wide variety of services, including the collection of statistics on many aspects of UK housing policy— such as the number of unoccupied dwellings, the numbers of homeless and the numbers of gypsies or travelers resident within the UK. In addition, the Department works with matters of zoning and housing quality issues. More recently, the Department has begun tackling issues such as environmental sustainability of UK housing.3 The Department is particularly tasked with the provision of social programs and assuring that there is sufficient housing available for those who

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are in protected classes of citizens—including the elderly, the disabled, the mentally ill, those displaced by domestic violence and so forth. Those individuals who are dwelling in the UK who are classified as either refugees or asylum seekers, however, do not fall within the purview of Department for Communities and Local Government programs. Instead, their housing needs are handled by the UK Border Agency. The criteria regarding who may live in social or subsidized housing are thus set nationally, though wait lists, interviews and the actual assignment of housing all occur on the local level. Thus, aggregate data indicates that approximately 4 million people in Britain live in social housing, but occupancy rates, types of shortages that exist and types of occupants vary greatly from one region to another. In addition, local officials may appeal to the federal Department for Planning for federal funds to finance and administer specific types of programs, including facilities for the disabled, victims of domestic violence and the mentally ill. This localized nature of housing policy implementation means that situations may vary greatly from one part of the UK to another. It also explains why regulations on social problems like squatting differ from one region to another—with squatting in particular already illegal in Scotland—prior to the implementation of national laws governing squatting in England and Wales. Furthermore, since a variety of housing issues are administered on the local level, the federal Department often lacks complete national information on the existence of problems associated with housing—like squatting and empty homes—since statistics may be kept locally rather than nationally. And since data is collected on a local level, the creation later of federal statistics through a process of aggregation may be difficult, since definitions of indicators and types of data collected may differ from one locality to the next. (This issue becomes significant when a controversy arises—such as a dispute regarding the seriousness of a problem like property squatting in Britain. As I show later in this chapter, most estimates of the size of the problem are considered unreliable and statistical problems with the data are problematic.) The Department of Communities and Local Government also issues advice governing policies having to do with so-called travelers or native gypsies. Here again documents may be issued nationally, setting targets and requirements for local governments to provide sites for gypsy and travelers in each area.4 The devolution of housing issues to the local level is not unique to Great Britain, but is rather the case in France and other European nations. What is unusual is the amount of increasing national control of these issues in all European countries. As the brief history presented in this chapter indicates, the involvement of the federal government structures in the debate over criminalizing squatting is thus not unique. There is precedent for government involvement in housing issues—particularly with those having to do with public safety and anti-social behavior in the years since 1990. In this way, the current drive to securitize squatting can be read as the apogee of government involvement rather than a brand-new, unique development.

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Federal Policy towards Homelessness and Squatting As one can see from the previous description of UK housing policy, housing issues in Britain (including the issue of property squatting) are not standalone issues. Rather, housing policy is seen to intersect with—and needs to be coordinated with—a variety of related domestic issues. In addition, housing policy now needs to be coordinated regionally, within the European Union. Thus, just as the home itself represents many things to many people, so does housing policy today have a number of individuals and groups who have a stake in the ways in which it is carried out and administered. Thus, the debate regarding squatter’s rights in England touched on a variety of related subjects and led to policy statements and actions by many stakeholders in Britain and abroad.

Coordination with Other Issues in Britain As Figure 2.1 indicates, housing policy has historically been made and aligned to support a variety of other issues—including economic growth and competitiveness and the politics of citizenship. In addition, the problem of socially vulnerable populations—including the homeless—is regarded as a broad policy issue that encompasses issues of housing, but also issues of employment, health, education and veteran’s services. Thus, debates regarding the criminalization of squatting came to be associated with a number of other discourses—and points of contention in these larger issues led to controversies regarding the seriousness of property squatting, its dangers

Housing Shortage Antisocial behavior

Refugees

Squatting Economic Competition

Citizenship Mental Illness

Figure 2.1

Issues associated with squatting.

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and the optimal policy solution for confronting the issue. Thus, despite the fact that housing issues are considered local issues, the national government has maintained the ability to intervene in housing policy issues—in order to guarantee human rights and make sure that all are treated fairly in housing issues, to maintain economic competitiveness or to reinforce citizenship issues that are associated with housing. However, unlike in the Netherlands, the national government in Britain has been somewhat more hands-off in terms of intervening in both the housing market and the rights and responsibilities of landlords and tenants. Particularly under the Conservatives, rhetoric has emphasized that market forces should be freed up so that housing problems and labor problems can be more effectively addressed—rather than intervening directly. It is perhaps for that reason that the swift and centralized nature of Britain’s response to the problem of property squatting is so striking.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS Under the Conservative government, since 2009, there was a push towards making it easy for British citizens living in council or social housing to enjoy a “right to mobility,” so that they could, for example, pursue employment in another part of Britain without worrying about losing their right to live in social housing or being prevented from moving due to the existence of long waiting lists for council housing in a new location. In addition, initiatives since 2009 have focused on allowing citizens in council housing to eventually become owners of their properties, rather than renters. However, Britain’s government has not traditionally intervened to address the matter of vacant property. In European nations where land is scarce and expensive, the housing market may become sluggish, with new building not taking place as rapidly as the population expands and demands housing. Thus, nations like the Netherlands have implemented strict regulations so as to discourage both commercial and residential developers from keeping properties vacant for extended periods of time. In the UK, in contrast, housing charities have faulted the government for not intervening more strongly to address the problem of empty homes. Thus the charity Empty Homes gives an estimate of approximately 720,000 empty homes across England, while the Guardian gives an estimate of 900,000. Of that number, somewhere between one-fourth to one-third of these residential dwellings are estimated to have been empty for six months or longer. A dwelling might be empty due to foreclosure, lack of a suitable tenant or in some instances because it requires repairs. Discrepancies between numbers are because of differing rules regarding what constitutes residential property—for example, some numbers include houses scheduled for demolition and flats above shops, while others do not. Charities like Empty Homes have stated that it is immoral to simultaneously have long waiting lists for

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social housing and large stocks of housing sitting vacant. Other citizen groups have raised security concerns—noting that empty properties in one’s neighborhood tend to draw criminal activities—like drug use and squatting. For this reason, the Department for Communities and Local Governments has kept statistics on unoccupied housing, and has worked closely with builders’ associations and banks to assure that finances would be available for the construction of new housing and that onerous zoning regulations would be kept to a minimum. And beginning in December 2011, the UK government has passed regulations allowing local governments to levy higher taxes on unoccupied properties, and the central government has made loans available for gentrification programs intended to breathe life into blighted apartments and blighted areas.5 In addition, there has been a housing shortage, in which again the government has intervened to help the housing market to grow, including encouraging banks to offer mortgages to citizens wishing to buy. In addition, the 2011 document “Laying the Foundations: A Housing Strategy for the UK,” put forth by the new coalition government under the signatures of David Cameron and Nick Clegg, includes references to broader issues related to housing policy—including the connection between the availability of housing and economic growth and issues of individual agency and freedom, the responsibility of tenants and the responsibility of government to provide housing.6 The debate about housing in Britain is thus both long-standing and wideranging. When individuals contact their newspaper, for example, about an empty house in their neighborhood, they do not reference only their concerns about housing. Rather, they are likely to reference other related issues—like equity and fairness in the housing market. (Thus, “Tracy” is quoted in the Guardian as noting that recently built housing in east London stands empty. She notes that “The block backs on to the Lee Navigation and has views directly over the Olympic Stadium, but sadly no one is getting to enjoy the view.”)7

Politics of Citizenship We can also consider the ways in which British housing policy has always existed within a larger network of discourse regarding the rights and responsibilities of citizens, particularly those who reside in social housing. Beginning in the 1990s, the New Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair put forth a series of legislative and policy initiatives, all of which aimed to crack down on so-called anti-social behavior, including anti-social behavior in council housing. Accompanying the rhetoric were a series of legislative initiatives, all of which strengthened the role of local government and the police to regulate citizen behavior. Such mechanisms included antisocial behavior orders (ASBOs), dispersal orders, curfews, parenting orders, fixed penalty notices, closure orders and acceptable behavior contracts. At

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the same time, both the British and Welsh governments created anti-social behavior units within their home offices. In addition, Britain’s Department of Communities and Local Government created a new Respect Standard for Housing Management. Not all of the mechanisms created were coercive, however. At the same time, local authorities and council offices were encouraged to create both good neighbor agreements and tenant reward schemes. The new emphasis on tenant behavior thus can be understood as the creation of a social contract in which those who occupied social housing were no longer merely given housing as an entitlement. Instead, they were asked to participate in a relationship with the government, through conforming to behavioral and citizenship norms in return for receiving government housing. Housing thus came to be associated not with rights, but with responsibilities. Furthermore, the ability of citizens and officials to request and carry out anti-social behavior orders against those who were seen to violate the rules of council housing meant that surveillance of citizens was increasingly part of the housing experience. Arguably, the notion of one’s home as one’s castle or sovereignty was becoming less important as citizens were increasingly subject to both regulation and surveillance, even when on the grounds of their own housing. Thus, the drive to control squatting behaviors can be seen as an extension of an ongoing drive to control tenant behaviors in all facets. In 2005, under Blair’s third government, government rhetoric can be said to have shifted again, with politicians this time replacing the language of anti-social behavior with that of “respect.” That year, the prime minister gave a speech in which he asserted his desire to “bring back a proper sense of respect in our schools, in our communities, in our towns, in our villages.”8 The newly created Respect Task Force defined respect as “values and behavior that are automatically part of everyday life.” That is, housing was now increasingly seen as a site for the socialization of citizens into key British values. A house was thus not merely a place to live, but also a place to learn citizenship and how to be British. Critics of these housing policies have viewed them as evidence of increasing governmentality and have suggested that they are not entirely benign. Powell and Flint suggest that both anti-social behavior and respect-based behaviors serve to infantilize citizens through subjecting them to “micro regulation of social habits and conduct.” In addition, they have suggested that tools like ASBOs serve to humiliate and shame tenants. Finally, they have voiced concerns about the ways in which an emphasis on “civilizing tenants” carries colonial overtones, noting anti-social behavior orders have been issued for such offenses as singing, playing rap music, appearing in public wearing only undergarments, “referring to the Taliban” and wearing certain types of clothing.9 More recently, Lynsey Hanley, a reporter for the Guardian, has stated that what has been occurring under the conservatives is an increasing tendency by citizens and the media to view poor people in general with suspicion, and to believe that poor people in general are untrustworthy, and need to

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be subject to regimes of surveillance.10 Here, foreign poor people might be regarded by citizens and portrayed by the media as particularly untrustworthy, while unregistered mobile foreign poor people might be regarded as the least trustworthy of all, and the greatest existential threat. However, it is important to note that both anti-social behavior and respectbased strategies are still fundamentally inclusionist rather than exclusionist strategies. While government tactics on both the federal and local level could be seen as heavy-handed and intrusive, overall the aim is still to bring citizens into a relationship with the state, rather than to criminalize or exclude citizens from active citizenship. That is, these policies and doctrines assume that there are proper and improper ways of behaving in housing in the UK, but the underlying assumption is still that all new citizens can be assimilated and brought in, regardless of their national origin or social class. In contrast, criminalization of squatting is a turn towards an exclusionary strategy—and rests on an assumption that some individuals cannot be socialized or adequately surveilled. It concludes that people who “do not share our values” and cannot be taught to do so must therefore be excluded.

Socially Vulnerable Populations Finally, housing policy issues in Britain—and elsewhere—cannot be discussed without acknowledging the linkage between issues of poverty, socially vulnerable populations and housing. This linkage became important in debates about property squatting, as the push to criminalize the practice was read by many charitable groups as not a “war on squatting” but rather as part of a larger “war upon the homeless.” Some analysts have suggested that the right to be housed is sufficient to justify squatting, noting that real “crime” is the failure of a government to house its citizens, not the actions that citizens take to assure that they are housed. In response to these complaints, Britain’s government formed a cross ministerial group on homelessness in June 2011, which included representatives from the Department for Education, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defense, the Home Office, the Department of Health, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Department for Communities and Local Government.11 The recent report issued by the cross ministerial working group in July 2011, “Vision to End Rough Sleeping: No Second Night Out Nationwide,” thus includes a listing of six commitments of David Cameron’s government to end the problem of homelessness. The commitments include: helping people off the streets; providing access to health care; providing opportunities for employment; reducing bureaucratic burdens; increasing local control over services and devolving responsibility for tackling homelessness.12 The ability to use housing policy arguments to describe larger issues might thus explain some of the popularity of the many television shows and newspaper articles about housing that have appeared in both Britain and elsewhere in recent years. Talk about housing is a constant in British

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newspapers and media, and several newspapers maintain blogs on their web sites that deal specifically with matters of housing policy—including the Guardian13 and the Daily Telegraph.14 In addition, statistics indicate that the Guardian prints approximately five hundred news articles a year on housing issues, while the Daily Mail prints nearly twice that, at approximately nine hundred articles per year, or three per day. All major UK newspapers have a staff of at least four reporters who cover the “housing beat,” and stories on controversies in the housing sector may garner upwards of two hundred comments on a newspaper’s Internet site. The language used in these comments indicates that people have very strong feelings about housing issues.

COORDINATION WITH EUROPE Despite the British government’s concern with and stated commitment to addressing housing problems, and the larger social and economic problems that may be contributing to them, Britain’s government does not provide for a universal “right to housing” in the UK. As the EU works towards standardization of housing policies across Europe, this has become a point of contention. The United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in article 25 that “Everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care.” In this instance, the right to housing does not mean that every citizen needs to be provided with housing by the government, but only that a state’s government has a duty to make sure that all are housed adequately. For this reason, Britain’s provisions for granting social housing to citizens who are indigent, infirm, mentally ill or homeless are seen as complying with this duty to make sure that all are housed. Instead, rights are administered in accordance with one’s status within Great Britain and not everyone is permitted to live in government-provided housing. Thus, not everyone in Britain is covered under the current British policies regarding adequate housing. Those who are legally in the UK and who are from EU member nations are also eligible to apply for subsidized housing, provided that they meet the income requirements. However, the list of citizens who are not eligible to apply for subsidized housing, even if they meet income (or poverty) requirements, is quite lengthy. First, those in the status of “limited leave”—who may have a work permit, but do not have indefinite leave to remain—cannot apply for social housing.15 In addition, those who have applied for refugee status or asylum but have been refused may not apply for social housing.16 Thus, current developments in British housing policy have helped to create a class of individuals who are left at the margins of housing policy: those who perhaps cannot afford legal housing in Britain but who are not eligible for subsidized housing (including noncitizens who have come from Europe or elsewhere); those who have lost their homes or are between homes and

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those who have been denied asylum. This schematic assumes that all who are eligible to claim benefits actually do so, though this may also not be true. (There may be those who voluntarily place themselves outside of the existing social structures.) The disenfranchised thus make up one category of those who live in so-called squats or informal housing—though other categories exist as well, including those who are eligible for social housing but choose not to avail themselves of it. However, in recent years it has been found that Britain’s policies are not in full compliance with the other set of guidelines regarding housing policy, those contained in the Revised European Social Charter, article 31. This set of guidelines is somewhat broader, including the provisions that citizens should enjoy legal security of tenure, habitability and accessibility. This broader set of requirements can be read to state that individuals cannot be forcibly or unfairly evicted from their homes, and that homes should meet a minimal level of safety. That is, there is an expectation that the dweller enjoys sovereignty while in his dwelling. The right to housing, thus, does not merely state that citizens should be housed—but also that they should have certain rights while occupying this housing. The tenant’s home cannot be invaded or searched by law enforcement, inspectors or others without his permission, for example. Thus, a 2009 court ruling found that British policies regarding foreclosure are in violation of the European Social Charter. Currently a bank in Britain can evict a homeowner after missing one payment, without having to seek a court order of eviction. However, the European Court of Human Rights found against the UK in the case of McCann v. UK, stating that article 8 of the European Convention included the right to “respect for one’s home,” which included having an independent tribunal consider eviction proceedings. Furthermore, there are some areas of dispute in both the British and the European legislation regarding what specifically constitutes a dwelling or home for purposes of enforcing the rights of the residential dweller. For example, does a tent erected by a homeless man constitute a “residence”? What about a property that is being squatted by an illegal immigrant living in England? In addition, some activists have used the requirement that all be housed as a justification for forcibly taking possession of housing in, for example, engaging in property squatting. It is possible that the passage of legislation criminalizing property squatting in Great Britain will not therefore constitute the end of the debate but that further legal suits may be brought both to decide the matter and to harmonize the policies of Britain with those in the rest of Europe.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SQUATTING IN BRITAIN As noted in this volume’s introduction there have historically been two narratives to draw upon in considering the politics of squatting. In Britain in particular, there is a long history of respect for the squatter’s rights and a

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significant legal history that justifies the practice. The anarchist philosopher and historian of squatting Colin Ward explains that the terms “squatter” and squatting were not always pejorative, while noting that traditionally squatting movements were not only about solving a housing crisis, but also about challenging a system of land tenure that was seen as fundamentally inequitable when it led to the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few. An editorial on squatting published in 2011 by representatives of the campaign group Housing Solidarity notes that the history of squatting in this country is intimately tied to movements of the poor and dispossessed for housing and common land.17 Shelter’s own mission statement notes their own understanding that everyone has a right to a home and that government has an obligation to provide affordable housing for all. Historians thus point to the Forcible Entry Act, passed in 1381, which established the precedent that individuals could not be removed by force from property they had claimed. In addition, they point to Win Stanley and the Diggers movement, begun in 1649. Proponents of this movement came together to organize agricultural communes on the basis of common ownership of land. In addition, Giles Peaker describes the history of trespass as political protest in England, citing events dating back to Enclosure Laws of 1750–1850.18 In particular he points to the mass trespass of Kinder Scout in 1932, in which thousands of individuals trespassed on private moorland in the Peak district, eventually leading to the creation of national parks and rights of way many years later. Here, one can trace a line of government tolerance towards occupation-type protests (as distinguished from long-term squatting) as part of British culture. Throughout the years, the authorities have shown a tolerance of student protests—for example, over issues like unemployment and tuition hikes. In addition to noting that Britain’s government has often been tolerant of squatting, historians note that squatting has not always been an adversarial contest between squatters and the law. In Britain, squatting can thus be understood historically as a form of direct action taken by groups within society who feel that the state has violated a social contract with its citizens. However, it is not understood as antistate action since squatters who engage in squatting as a protest to claim housing do not wish to destroy or end the state. Rather, they often squat as a last resort because the state is seen as having violated the social contract through failure to provide enough decent, safe, affordable housing. The implication of groups like Shelter is thus that everyone would prefer to be a lawful homeowner and resident. The advice page of shelter.org states that: “Squatting is best avoided if you have other options. It isn’t strictly speaking illegal but you can be evicted very easily and it doesn’t give you any security.”19 Britain’s government responded to this social pressure throughout the twentieth century. For example, the British government intervened on behalf of property squatters, allowing them to take up residence in abandoned buildings, army camps, hotels and homes in the aftermath of World War II

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during a period of extreme housing shortage affecting upwards of fifty thousand people. One can see similar examples of cooperation and rapprochement between squatters and the government in the 1960s and 1970s, as groups like Shelter and Shelter Scotland worked to get unused housing into the hands of those who needed them.20 (Shelter is explicitly not an anticapitalist or antiproperty organization.) The events of 1968 thus led to the establishment of many of the homeless charities and squatter’s rights groups, which still exist today. Some of these groups are still explicitly pro-union, leftist and even communist. Such groups argue that there may be times when it is in the interests of both housing groups and the government to cooperate to solve a problem. However, the two sides still see themselves as having opposing interests. Tony Mahoney, spokesman for the Irish Squatting movement, which had left-wing roots, described the 1969 movement in London as follows: Capitalism created the modern city. As the power of the state over peoples’ lives grew, so increasing responsibility had to be shouldered. Housing the working class was one responsibility. But it is an intrusion into the single aim of making profit. It uses resources that could, according to capitalism, be so much better employed elsewhere, so housing has never been adequate.21 However, throughout the 1970s, housing groups cooperated with the government, as they worked to overturn longstanding regulations that provided housing, for example, to homeless children and mothers, while forcing fathers to seek other accommodation—thus breaking up families. City organizations like the Lambeth London Borough Council, for example, entered into agreements with social service agencies to allow the homeless to occupy unused council facilities, although a legal case in 1995 known as Lambeth London Borough Council v. Kay led to the ruling that those occupying the facility did not achieve squatter’s rights and thus title to the facilities as the result of a multiple-year occupation of the facilities.22 However, at the same time we can point to Conservative Party efforts stretching back to the 1970s and later in the 1990s under Prime Minister John Major to criminalize property squatting, and evidence of this second narrative portraying squatting in a negative light. In laying out this narrative, the first significant hallmark is the passage in 1977 of Section 7 of the Criminal Law Act, which made it an offense for a squatter to fail to leave a residential property when required to do so. This legislation made squatting a civil offense (rather than a criminal offense) in certain conditions. However, squatting was prosecutable only in situations in which there was a “displaced residential occupier”—either someone who had purchased a home and planned to move in or someone who was currently living there. The offense committed by the squatter was still, however, considered an offense only against that person—and not an offense against society, the

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state or the community as a whole. In addition, legislation passed in 1994 provided for a “fast-track” eviction process against squatters, in some circumstances, preventing a “protected intending occupier” from moving in. A landlord can go to court to ask for an interim possession order (or IPO). Squatters who fail to comply with an interim possession order (IPO) by vacating a squatted property within twenty-four hours of the order being served are thus charged with a criminal offense. The 1994 legislation can be seen as having roots in a more widespread anti-social behavior campaign implemented throughout the 1990s by the Tories. At the same time that the government was working to crack down on the behaviors of squatters, new legislation was also changing the laws regarding adverse possession. In particular, the Limitation Act of 1980 stated that no action shall be brought to recover any land after the expiration of a specified period, usually twelve years. This legislation meant that the squatter merely had to apply to the land registry for registration as the new proprietor—after supplying evidence that he had maintained adverse possession for at least ten years. The land registry was then tasked with notifying everyone who might have a claim to the property—including the registered landowner or registered mortgagee. Then, if none of them responded, after two years, the squatter could take possession. The legal case of Buckinghamshire County Council v. Moran in 1990 stated that “Limitation . . . extinguishes the rights of the true owner to recover the land, so the squatter’s possession becomes impregnable, giving him a title superior to all others.”24 In October 2002, the Land Registration Act took effect. Changes to the legislation meant that after 2002, a squatter could take possession if he has had actual possession of the land, he intended during that period to possess the land to the exclusion of others including the legal owner, his occupation was not with the landowner’s consent and the use of the land was inconsistent with owner’s present or intended use. As the legal analysts Fox O’Mahony and Cobb point out, legal wrangling regarding the issue of squatter’s rights (including the case of Pye v. United Kingdom, which went to the European Court of Human Rights) and the high-profile media coverage assigned to this issue led to the construction of a new view of the role of the squatter, the role of the landlord and the rights and responsibilities of each with respect to land in the UK. They note that the claiming of adverse possession was also presented as a type of “theft” by the squatter against the land owner.25Moral language suggested that queue jumping was unethical. They quote a 1991 Home Office Report that fuses together popular mythologies about squatters as “parasitic deviants who steal people’s houses and constitute a threat to everything decent in society” with legal writing that makes statements like “there are no valid arguments in defence of squatting. It represents the seizure of another’s property without consent.”26 At the same time, the new discourse about squatting also considers the obligations and responsibilities of landowners. Here, those who don’t look after their land property and open up the possibility of it

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being squatted are seen as having failed to fulfill responsibilities towards neighbors, owners, the neighborhood and society at large.27 They have failed to exercise stewardship. However, one can also read this language through the lens of security, suggesting that those who became victims of property squatters had failed in their duty to contribute to the provision of “collective security.” Here Fox O’Mahony and Cobb call our attention to the government’s “Empty Homes” agenda, which they suggest implies that landowners who leave their property lying empty and unsupervised are blameworthy. (A security analyst would suggest that their crime was a failure to defend borders, instead leaving them unguarded and undefended.)28 In this way, we can suggest that the security narrative of squatting was thus “born” in the 1990s, both in the UK and in the European Court of Human Rights. Newspaper coverage of squatting issues at this time thus ranges from descriptions of free-riders and parasites who appeared to have “won the lottery,” winding up the possessors of million-dollar properties and mansions or having reaped a “windfall,” to more circumspect analyses of the challenges faced by the poor and dispossessed, both those who are British and those who are not. At the same time, narratives tend to describe squatters as wily and clever, having hidden in plain sight, waiting for the right moment to make their move. That is, they are seen not as having reaped a windfall but having rather deliberately and willfully planned a crime that they then carried out against innocent civilians. Fox O’Mahony and Cobb thus refer to the narrative of the “acquisitive urban squatter.”29 In this way, they might be compared to the spy who lives like a mole within a community, or the urban terrorist who plots against the civilians whose community he hides within.30 At this time, it was already becoming clear that newspaper coverage had begun to “essentialize” the squatter, presenting him as a monolithic type.31 The construction of the wily squatter with resources at his disposal and a will to take advantage of legal loopholes and innocent landlords persisted throughout the 2000s, with the press showing how squatters used technology to make squatting easier than ever. Media reports thus detail the existence of web sites providing information on how to squat, suggesting that the availability of empty houses and lists of where to find them have helped to fuel the rise of both lifestyle and survival squatting.32 On the squatter blog X, reporters Melissa and Pete state that a wave of articles began appearing in 2010 that depicted wealthy unemployed squatters in luxurious homes and that featured interviews in which they discussed loopholes in the British legal system that allowed them to create their lifestyle. In particular, squatters were accused of having used so-called FOI requests (which allowed a citizen to ask for access to government documents under the Freedom of Information Act) to get lists of empty homes from the government for the purposes of squatting.33 In 2009, the Advisory Service for Squatters (or ASS), a nongovernmental organization, filed a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to obtain a list of unoccupied properties from

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the municipal government. (The list of all vacant properties in the Lambeth district of London had earlier been published in the appendix to a council document, which the Advisory Service thus requested be released to them.) The Daily Mail satirically referred to this list as the “good squat guide,” suggesting that it would be used for squatters to become better organized and to have a wider variety of possible accommodations from which to choose.34 In response, the squatter blog SNOB(AHA)—an abbreviation for “squatters network of Brighton and Hove actually”—posted a rebuttal, arguing that lots of people use FOI requests to find out information, including social workers and others involved in charity work. They argue that the fact that a homeless group might have asked for this information is not evidence of a widespread conspiracy to collect addresses, and they accuse the newspaper of sloppy reporting. The depiction of squatting as a transnational phenomenon first began appearing in the British press in 2005. That fall, Diane Taylor wrote a series of profiles in the Guardian that purported to show how squatting has “diversified” since 2002 as a result of new patterns of migration and globalization. She suggests that the ideological squatting by students in the early 1990s has given way largely to survival squatting by Eastern European migrant workers. In her piece she describes how modern communications have also enabled squatting practices, describing how people use technology to organize squatting—through keeping lists of empty homes and using cell phones to contact people who are looking for housing. In the article, she suggests there are at least ten thousand people squatting in London, many of them international.35 However, one can argue that with the July 7, 2005, subway bombings in London, the conversation about immigrants in British society shifted sharply. At that point, immigrants ceased to be regarded solely as a “nuisance,” posing, for example, social and economic challenges to Britain. Rather, at that moment immigrants began to be regarded instead as an existential threat to the British way of life. That is, in 2005, the conversation about immigration became securitized. Thus, after 2005, one can identify strong native British support for statements such as “British Muslims are more loyal to other Muslims around the world than they are to other people in this country” (62 percent of respondents in 2007 agreed with this statement), and “Muslims in British could never really be committed to Britain” (47 percent of respondents agreed with this statement).36 An additional 58 percent of those surveyed agreed with the statement that “it is impossible for people who do not share Britain’s customs and traditions to become fully British.”37 In 2008, the British Social Attitudes survey asked respondents to agree or disagree with the statement, “Immigrants are a threat to our national identity.” Here 64 percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.38 The immigration problematic in Britain is complex—with immigration being blamed for a wide variety of social ills—from rising crime, to

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unemployment, to housing shortages to declines in education. And increasingly in the twenty-first century citizens are voicing the sentiments that immigrants are both a threat to national unity and national pride, and a source of danger,39due to an assumed connection between (often Islamic) immigrants and the threat of terrorism, both at home and abroad. That is, anti-immigrant discourse contains a number of strands that serve to tie together many diverse social, political and economic problems in such a way that immigrants are perceived as to blame for all of them. Storm notes, for example, that those citizens in Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe who voice concern about a future “loss of national identity” or “loss of national unity” also tend to be highly anti-immigrant.40 Using data from the 2008 International Social Survey Programme, she points out that 64 percent of British respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that “immigrants are a threat to national unity.” That is, immigrants are seen to pose a symbolic threat to the English way of life.41 Data from 2012 indicates that British citizens see immigrants as having a negative impact on the availability of housing, jobs and public services such as schools and access to the National Health Service. Immigrants are also blamed for rising levels of crime and disorder.42 Furthermore, a majority of British citizens also profess the belief that there are “too many immigrants,” with the numbers of respondents agreeing with this statement increasing—though it has been relatively high since the 1960s.43 Blinder notes that most citizens are unable to specify what they regard as an acceptable or reasonable number of immigrants, thus suggesting that the response “there are simply too many” is more an indicator of free-floating anxiety about immigration in general than an indicator that respondents are aware of specific policy problems that could be solved by a concrete policy of reducing immigration to a specified level.44 That is, increasingly immigrants and immigration were seen to threaten the referent object of security, which was the nation of England. And as the immigrant threat became securitized, British citizens were more willing to voice support for measures that would impinge on people’s civil liberties, viewing this as a necessary evil given the gravity of the threat. Thus in the 2005 British Social Attitudes survey, respondents were asked if they would support the introduction of compulsory ID cards for all adults, or whether this was too steep a price to pay in order to provide security. Seventy-two percent of all respondents stated that this was a price worth paying in order to reduce terrorism. In the same survey, respondents were asked to indicate their support for a policy of “banning certain people from saying whatever they want in public.” Here again, 52 percent of respondents felt that this was a fair price to pay in return for reducing terrorism.45 Thus, by 2007, a majority of British citizens were willing to view immigration as a “crisis” for which the solution was the establishment of a state of exception whereby the normal rules of democratic society did not apply. There is strong support therefore in British society for the idea that “tolerance” may be an acceptable set of policy solutions in an everyday situation, but that in a

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period of grave crisis, it may be necessary to establish stronger state solutions, even if doing so robs individuals or groups of people of some of their rights.46

Art Squats Beginning in the late 2000s, tabloid newspapers also began focusing on so-called art squats or culture squats. What is most striking here are the two different frames used in describing the activities of culture squatters in London. Newspapers like the Guardian frequently reported on art squats in the Sunday supplements, portraying them as a unique facet of urban life in Britain. Reporting often allowed the squatters to speak for themselves in their own words, and often the newspaper thus gave space to a counternarrative that stressed property squatting as both a creative solution to the housing crisis and as a practice that often led to neighborhood improvements through lending an arty flair to a neighborhood, which then made it a desirable site for gentrification and rising property values. The Guardian thus ran a long piece that described the philosophy and activities of a culture squat known as the Oubliette Arthouse, which existed between April 2009 and February 2011.47 The members of Oubliette occupied seven different residences during that time period, including 55 Suffolk Street, a warehouse in South London, which they converted into a theater; the Reader’s Digest headquarters (which had been empty since 1998) in Mayfair, where they held an art show with paintings by the homeless and street artists; Shaftesbury Avenue in Soho; Leicester Squatter; the Mexican Embassy and the Academy on Oxford Street.48 Coverage of the organization in the alternative press focuses on the ways in which these squatters differ from the usual expectations: they are dressed neatly, they have a business plan and they speak of a desire to contribute to society in a positive way. Dan Simon, the group’s founder, notes that he and his associates are attracted to the “freedom” provided by squatting. He argues that not being subject to financial constraints of paying rent confers more artistic freedom and fits into his desire to experience autonomy and self-regulation. Furthermore, he notes that “Many squatters squat not to leech off society, but to contribute to society more effectively . . . we want to help people contribute to the arts economy,”49 thus refuting the narrative of the squatter as a parasitical opportunist. Guardian journalist Helen Pidd notes that “unlike many other squatters, who tend to be rather chaotic and anarchic, the Oubliette is run on near-corporate lines. They even have a sort of business plan . . . The goal? To persuade the rich to lend their empty properties for use for exhibitions, concerts and plays. ‘It’s an alternative way of offering extraordinarily wealthy people a way to contribute to the arts without an enormous pecuniary investment,’ according to 31-year-old Dan Simon.”50 Furthermore, the group does not portray their relationship with landlords as hostile. Simon notes that they have successfully negotiated with landlords

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in the past for the “right to squat”—describing what is created as a win-win situation for both parties. He notes that the landlord has people in the space who agree to treat it well and protect it from intruders, while the artists have a place to practice their art. Simon even speaks of plans to replicate the model elsewhere, in order to create an arthouse movement.51 At the same time, however, tabloids like the Daily Mail focus overwhelmingly on art squats as sites of anti-social activity. In February 2010, a group of “art squatters” known as the Temporary School of Thought (formerly known as the Da! Collective), who had occupied a mansion in the chic Mayfair section of the City of London, received an eviction notice and responded by posting a party invitation on Facebook. According to the Daily Mail, their intent was “to throw the most destructive party possible.” The newspaper features photos of policemen in riot gear storming the building, which they declare to be a “major public health hazard.”52 The Da! Collective is credited with having occupied six multimillion-pound London properties.53 Materials from the Temporary School of Thought’s own web site indicate that the group has a broad platform of social change. Supporters are interested in state failure, worldwide issues of poverty and hunger and opposing the roboticization of the armed forces.54 The Facebook page for the Temporary School of Thought offers the following explanation: The Temporary School of Thought was an amazing “free university” that flourished for a few weeks in early 2009 in a huge squatted townhouse in Mayfair. It was a space in which activists and artists debated and collaborated with defense analysts and internet entrepreneurs. You could spend the morning learning welding, the afternoon listening to a lecture on Ivan Illich’s educational philosophy and the evening in a workshop on applied sorcery. It was a space in which friendships were formed and new ideas and projects catalysed—spawning everything from the Treehouse Gallery in Regents Park that summer, to the foundation of the Institute for Collapsonomics.55 Although the media and UK police portray the members as dangerous radicals engaged in or plotting to engage in antistate activities, the biographies of the speakers at the Temporary School of Thought do not suggest that this is the case. For example, Vinay Gupta, who lectured at the Temporary School of Thought, has actually worked as a consultant for the US National Defense University and is credited with having established the program STAR-TIDES (Sharing To Accelerate Research-Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support), a research effort that promotes sustainable support to stressed populations in foreign or domestic contexts, for short-term or long-term (multiyear) operations.

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Another variant of politicized squatting that occurred in London in the 2000s is the occupation on March 9, 2011 of a property in Hampstead Garden in North London belonging to Saif Gaddafi. In this case, a group of Libyan exiles claimed squatter’s rights in the name of the Libyan revolution. This activity was portrayed somewhat favorably in the press, with a member of the collective stressing that he was not there because he couldn’t afford rent, but rather in order to “show the world what he (Gaddafi) did with our money.” The house is worth 11 million pounds.56

Did Squatting Actually Increase in the 2000s? Thus, it behooves us to ask whether squatting actually increased in all its varieties throughout the 2000s, or whether it was merely a “panic” on the part of the media that caused citizens to react as though it did. As noted, there are numerous statistics available regarding the presence of squatters and homeless, as well as numerous controversies regarding the veracity of these statistics. In Britain, the number of actual, existing property squatters is a matter of dispute, due partly, as noted earlier, to the problem of overlapping definitions (sleeping rough versus property squatting). The Independent reports that squatting has increased by 25 percent since 2005, while the Advisory Service for Squatters (ASS) believes that number of people living in squats has risen from fifteen thousand to twenty-two thousand, and it attributes this rise partially to numbers of repossessions and mortgage issues. In addition, as Paul Cheston has noted, greater amounts of foreign investment in London by overseas billionaires means that there are also more empty homes than ever before. (He notes that it is common for a foreigner to buy a flat as an investment, but to frequently leave it empty for long periods of time—often because he intends to renovate.)57 Statistics also indicate that legal proceedings against squatters are on the upswing. The legal service provider “Tenant Eviction UK” notes that by 2012, they had dealt with seven to eight a month, up from two a month in 2010. Here, at least some of the increase can be attributed to mortgage foreclosures and problems with the economy. New official statistics released in March 2012 indicate that overall the homeless rate has jumped by 14 percent. In London, local authorities list 48,510 households as homeless in 2011, which is the largest increase in nine years. At the same time, statistics that look at the composition of newspaper article coverage regarding squatting issues indicates a shift in the types of stories that have been presented. In the early part of the 2000s, newspaper coverage focused predominantly on lawsuits undertaken by individuals hoping to win ownership of their properties using the legal claim of adverse possession. Thus, the predominant depiction of a squatter was of a parasitical freeloader hoping to “win the lottery” by “stealing” a home or piece of property that he had not paid for and hadn’t earned. However, beginning with the year 2006, we can detect an increase in stories that focus

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Lawsuits Occupations

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Figure 2.2

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Composition of newspaper coverage of squatting issues, 2000–2011.

on high-profile occupations of real estate in metropolitan London. That is, as Figure 2.2 indicates, we can see the creation of a typology of squatters, which includes the lifestyle squatter, along with the foreign or transnational squatter. However, despite the willingness of the British media to present immigration and the mobility of immigrants as a crisis, some analysts suggest that the fear was unjustified. In particular, Welch and Schuster point to what they refer to as a “moral panic” over bogus asylum seekers in the UK.58 A “moral panic” can be said to have occurred when a group, condition or person is presented as a threat to social values and interests, when the threat is presented in a stereotyped fashion by the media or by politicians and when there is a marked disproportionality between the size and severity of the threat and the reaction to it. Welch and Schuster argue that moral panic has allowed for the incarceration and indefinite detention of asylum seekers in England while their claims are adjudicated, arguing that the stereotype of the “shiftless, lying, bogus asylum seeker” has led to a situation in which officials feel justified in treating all asylum seekers in less human ways, including the use of confinement. The authors accuse the Daily Mail in particular of having helped to create moral panic in Britain regarding the issue of asylum seekers, beginning in the late 1980s.59 What is striking is the way in which rhetoric about squatters in contemporary Britain parallels rhetoric about both legal and illegal immigrants. In both cases, the newcomers may be described in language that comes from the world of insects—like termites, squatters are said to be infesting the houses that they occupy. They are described, like vermin, as unwanted and uninvited. Furthermore, they are seen as parasitical—siphoning off and utilizing

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resources that others have earned while they themselves pay nothing into the system. Finally, they are described as weakening the structure—in the fashion of termites, leading eventually to its inevitable collapse. Inevitably, they change the character and identity of the home and its surrounding neighborhood. It becomes clear that the neighborhoods that they seek to occupy have a preexisting moral geography—or a moral ordering—that clashes sharply with the values of the squatters. The tendency to sensationalize immigrant issues, as well as to stir up panic about them, may help to explain the current situation in which British citizens are both strongly opinionated and not particularly well informed about the ways in which immigration interacts with the problem of public housing. Reports today suggest that Britons believe two sets of “myths” about housing in Britain that may not be true. First, many citizens believe that there is a shortage of housing and of rural, green land and that an influx of new residents will lead to an inevitable urbanization of all of Britain. As the Shelter report indicates, British citizens overwhelmingly believe that illegal and legal immigrants take a disproportionate share of social housing, often through engaging in corruption and queue jumping.60 Thus, public perceptions of a housing crisis in Britain tend to focus on the existence of a shortage, a perception that corruption plays a part in who gets housing and a sense that foreigners and outsiders are unfairly getting access to something that British citizens are entitled to and are paying for.61 As Rutter and Latorre note in their study, there appears to be a correlation between housing shortages in the local market and respondents’ hostility to migrants. These myths affect how citizens view other issues, including the issue of squatting. It may also explain the fact that the first attempts at criminalizing sleeping rough were local. According to Bob Baker, the director of the homeless charity Simon Community, various local charitable organizations banded together to defeat this proposal in the Westminster section of London. Subsequently, the coalition government attempted to legislate this on a national level.62 The squatting support group squatter.org has forcefully and consistently called out journalists from the Daily Mail for running what they see as both biased and inaccurate stories about the so-called squatting menace leading to the creation of a moral panic about the issue. In January 2012, they called out two reporters, Andrew Levy and Max Hastings, for a story that they had written about Moldovan squatters. The story suggests that it will take eight months and thousands of pounds for the rightful owners to evict their squatters, which squatter.org alleges is false. The article also notes that the squatters broke into the house by the backdoor, a claim that squatter.org again refutes. Squatter.org’s writers also question the tone taken by the Daily Mail’s reporters, who speak of Mrs. Mason’s “childhood home,” which they regard as irrelevant since she is selling the property. They note that the squatters are described as having “invaded” the property, and that readers are told that the woman squatter who answered the door is “heavily pregnant.” Here, they note the contrast between an earlier Daily Mail story about a pregnant

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couple, Mr. and Mrs. Cokerell, who cannot occupy the London home they hope to renovate for their family, including the new baby, and the “heavily pregnant” Moldovan squatter. The reader is meant to feel sympathy for the couple of English heritage (including the pregnant English woman), who are merely inconvenienced and not homeless—since they have a home to live in while they renovate the new one—while the reader is meant to feel disgust at the “heavily pregnant” Moldovan woman. The squatter.org analysts argue that “Max Hastings, like your publication in general, picks the ‘injustices’ he chooses to rant about on the basis of the nationality of the people involved . . . His attacks are racist because they deliberately give the impression that it is ‘foreigners’ who are the problem, along with those do-gooders who support them, when in fact anti-social behavior is carried out by people of all nationalities and no law will ever stop this.”63

Federal Involvement in the Squatting Issue Despite growing concern over the “problem” of squatting in the national media since 2005, the first concrete evidence of national involvement in the squatting issue was the release in November 2010 by Housing Minister Grant Shapps of the short pamphlet “Advice on Dealing with Squatters in Your Home.” The pamphlet, produced jointly with the Ministry of Justice, is clearly aimed at homeowners, and it details the steps necessary for the homeowner to receive an interim possession order in order to evict squatters. The pamphlet includes a Frequently Asked Questions section, which describes squatters as behaving in an anti-social and intimidatory manner, and also explains the homeowner’s rights if a squatter has vandalized or damaged property. The matter of criminalizing squatting officially entered Parliament, however, in March 2011, with the introduction in Parliament of an early day motion recommending the criminalization of squatting by MP Michael Weatherley. Michael Weatherley, a former film executive, has served as a Conservative MP representing the districts of Brighton and Hove since 2006.64 Brighton and Hove are in the 10 percent of cities with the highest number of vacant dwellings in the country, and thus squatting has been a persistent issue on Weatherley’s agenda. (As a former city councilman it is also one that he has a great deal of experience discussing and dealing with.) Weatherley had been campaigning for criminalization of squatting since 2010, and the proposed legislation even came to be referred to in some circles as “Weatherley’s Law.” That is, Weatherly could be said to have introduced the construct of the dangerous transnational squatter who requires legislation to be controlled as early as 2010. At the same time, backbench Conservative MPs began asking similar questions in Parliament—calling for a legislative solution to the problem. Media and politicians, particularly the Conservative party, helped create a general view of squatters as feckless, overprivileged criminals.

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Nonetheless, the official start of the legislative initiative to ban squatting can be traced to March 7, 2011, when MP Mike Weatherly submitted an early day motion on the subject.65 An early day motion (or EDM) is a onesentence statement of an issue, and EDM 1545 reads in its entirety, “This house believes that squatting should be criminalized.” An EDM can be compared to a resolution passed in the US Congress. Often, an EDM is simply a formality, something submitted to the nation’s official record merely to appease constituents or special interests, or simply to raise public awareness of an issue. An EDM can be as trivial as the recognition of someone’s birthday or as significant as a statement about foreign policy. Like resolutions in the US Congress, EDMs are nonbinding and do not represent legislation, and there are no formalized parliamentary mechanisms mandating follow-up to them. And like Congressional resolutions, the number issued during one session of Parliament can be massive—frequently totaling over one thousand. Finally, like Congressional resolutions, EDMs are frequently passed without debate in Parliament, usually at the beginning of the day’s activities. However, in both the UK and the United States, debate may occur regarding the passage of a resolution, and the presence of such debate is often an indicator both of divisions within the polity on a particular issue and of strong, entrenched interests willing to take a stand on the issue. Nonetheless, like Congressional resolutions, they are of interest to observers of politics because the number of legislators supporting an EDM, as well as the amount of public support for an EDM, can be an indicator of shifts in public opinion or public awareness of an issue. In the case of EDM 1545, MP Mike Weatherly cosponsored the resolution with five other MPs, with an additional eighteen endorsing it. For purposes of comparison, one can note that most EDMs (60 percent of them) get less than thirty signatures. Thus, twenty-three signatures out of more than four hundred are actually considered reasonable.66 Twenty signatories belonged to the Conservative Party, one to the Liberal Democrats, one to the Labour Party and one to two parties: Social Democratic and Labour. EDM 1545 was amended one week later, with one additional signature (that of Robert Halfon) to add “with the exception of the squat in the house of Saif al-Gaddafi in North London.” Along with the EDM, the group Landlord Action created a petition for constituents to sign via Facebook that indicated their support for the resolution. Signers were also requested to contact their MPs to ask them to support the resolution. 1,417 individuals logged on and signed the petition, voicing support for the resolution. Many of them left comments on the site indicating that they themselves were landlords who had either had problems with squatters or who were worried about the issue.67 The parliamentary debate on squatting that MP Weatherley had requested occurred on March 30, 2011, at 11:00 a.m. and lasted approximately one half hour. Weatherley opened the proceedings, beginning with a quote pulled from a London Evening Standard article, attributed to the “notorious” Latvian squatter Jason Ruddick.68 Ruddick, who has been referred

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to by the British tabloids as Public Enemy Number One, is a staple feature of stories on squatting appearing in the Telegraph, the Daily Mail and the Independent.69 The twenty-one-year-old achieved notoriety through his leadership of groups of international young people who have taken over expensive mansions in London’s most luxurious neighborhoods, squatting in the home of the movie director Guy Ritchie, as well as the home of the Congolese ambassador. Ruddick conducted interviews in both Britain’s print and broadcast media, noting that squatting was easy to carry out in England and that the chances of being arrested were practically nonexistent. His interviews enraged British citizens because they presented an image of young people coming to England from throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union expressly for the purpose of exploiting loopholes in Britain’s legal system in order to collect public goods without paying. Ruddick is referred to in interviews as a “serial squatter” because he has spent most of his adult life simply moving from one squat to another. Thus, he becomes a serial committer of crimes—like a serial killer.70 The quote with which MP Weatherley began his testimony stated, “This place isn’t nice enough for me. I want somewhere posher, with a swimming pool, if possible.” In doing so, Weatherley established the construct of the so-called posh squatter—putting him forth as the only example of a squatter in Britain, and presenting squatters as a monolithic group. The “posh squatter,” named for both the posh or luxurious environments he covets and his own posh lifestyle (and sometimes background), is a common media stereotype. The posh squatter is thus distinguished from the survival squatter, since he squats by choice rather than necessity. Weatherley presents squatters as a monolithic, well-organized, transnational group—a stance that he frequently takes. In a question posed to the prime minister during the weekly question time in May 2011, he described how “the squatters’ network of Brighton and Hove invited its anarchist friends from around Europe to campaign against what they call Weatherley’s law.” In the same statement, he referred to “the Green Party’s support for squatters.”71 In Weatherley’s construct of the squatter, then, the squatter is transnational, well organized and not the same as the group of socially vulnerable homeless who should still be treated with charity and government care and concern. Coverage in Weatherley’s hometown newspaper, the Brighton and Hove Free Press, described his testimony in Parliament, noting that Weatherley believes that squatting should be criminalized “In order to curb the trend of resourceful squatters exploiting legal loopholes.”72 In other interviews, Weatherley has also blamed the publication The Squatter’s Handbook for empowering squatters, noting that the document is “sadly very selective in both law, and morality.”73 In the March 2011 debate Weatherley stated that “I wish to dispel the myth, once and for all, that squatters and homeless people are one and the same.” He noted that “in my experience, squatters do not fit the profile of the kind of vulnerable people that we should be looking out for.” In his tes-

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timony (and the decision to quote a Lithuanian squatter), Weatherley thus implicated both foreign squatters and the more general problem of “antisocial behavior,” which he references in creating the squatting problem.74 Analyst Victoria Blitz, writing on the blog “Critical Legal Thinking,” suggests that the line taken by Tory backbenchers—that squatters were not needy, vulnerable members of society but rather wealthy opportunists who squatted by choice—represented an attempt to delegitimize squatting through dividing it from the issue of homelessness.75 Thus, the response of squatter organizations has been to rebuild that linkage, continually stressing the actual needs of those who squat. Blitz argues that unmet housing needs, the supply of empty property and squatting are connected. In contrast, Weatherly removes squatting from the context of issues of housing supply and town planning, substituting instead a context of foreignness and security. Weatherley’s testimony ends with another quote attributed to Jason Ruddick in the Evening Standard article, this one stating that “Law changes will never stop us. The Government can say all they want but squatting will still go on. . . . There is nothing they can do.” Here Weatherley repeats the frames created by Britain’s media, including the notion that Ruddick is a sort of enemy who is taking advantage of loopholes in Britain’s regulations. (Here, legal loopholes can be seen as a sort of breach in Britain’s defenses or borders. In his testimony, Weatherley suggests that squatters are an “enemy” and implicitly sets up a military metaphor of invasion by squatters. Thus, physical borders must be manned, and legal loopholes that represent a breach in the defenses must be plugged.) In other interviews conducted in the run-up to the passage of legislation in 2012, Weatherley has adopted a similarly alarmist tone. In a letter published in the Guardian in September 2012 he says to readers, “I dare you to vacate your home for a few days, advertise it on squatter sites as empty. That will teach you to think twice before defending squatters.”76 This letter is interesting because of the way in which Weatherley assumes that his readers are themselves landlords or tenants, rather than homeless individuals. His framing of the issue implicitly takes the position of a landlord, in suggesting to readers that “In the meantime, the unlawful occupiers will have been damaging your home, using your electricity, drinking your wine and sleeping in your beds.” At the same time, Weatherley sets up a zero-sum opposition between squatters and landlords, arguing that one will always win at the expense of the other, never suggesting that any type of rapprochement or understanding is possible. The other speakers in the parliamentary “debate” are Undersecretary of State for Justice Crispin Blunt, who again speaks on behalf of landlords, empathizing with the “distress and misery” this issue has cost them. Blunt again sets up a binary opposition between squatters and landlords not only in this testimony but also in other interviews. In an interview in the fall of 2012, he noted, “For too long squatters have had the justice system on the

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run . . . not anymore. Hard working homeowners need and deserve a justice system where their rights come first, this new offense will ensure the police and other agencies can take quick and decisive action to deal with the misery of squatting.”77 Here again, the implication is that the squatting issue is a sort of battle in which there can be only one winner. In his remarks Blunt notes that at present there is not full information available regarding the numbers of squatters nationwide, nor any actual figures on the damages purportedly caused by squatters. He does provide the figure that 360 landlords applied for interim possession orders last year in order to evict squatters. Here he notes that “it provides an indicator of how many households are blighted by squatting each year, but that figure is probably only the tip of the iceberg.”78 Blunt also replied to a question regarding whether the UK Border Agency was involved in policing squatting by noting that he “hadn’t considered that angle.” As the prosquatter blogger “Nitrate” indicates in his analysis of EDM 1545, Blunt’s remarks at the debate indicate that he had already been considering legislation to address what he sees as loopholes in current squatting legislation for some time and had possibly already consulted with Landlord Action regarding this proposed legislation. In his remarks, Blunt indicates that it is job of the Ministry of Justice to “identify the appropriate legislative vehicle with which . . . um . . . er . . . IF legislation is required.”79 In an interview in 2012 with the Arab news source Al Jazeera, MP Weatherley stated that implementing these laws was already on the conservative agenda, and he merely gave them a nudge.80 Thus, one can suggest that Weatherley was the “front man” rather than the instigator of the legislative resolution.81 In his remarks, Weatherley introduced what he saw as the main legal problem—namely, the fact that squatters had (in his words) “taken advantage of” Section 5 of the Criminal Law Act of 1977, which makes it an offense to use violence or the threat of violence to access a property if it is occupied by someone opposed to entry. Weatherley also suggested that materials available online like “The Squatter’s Handbook” had empowered those wishing to squat by showing them how to get around the law. Later in the interview he also referred to the problem of “serial squatters.” He also noted the coverage of squatting issues by the Daily Telegraph and the Evening Standard, stating that they are “certainly helping to highlight what is really going on.” In the aftermath of the March 2011 Parliamentary debate, squatter blogs faulted Blunt in particular for failing to maintain a neutral posture in what was meant to be an investigation of the issue in Parliament. Lili, Melissa and Pete of the campaign group Housing Solidarity quote Blunt’s statement in the debate regarding the “misery and expenses endured by landlords.”82 Thus, the short (half-hour-long) hearing on the subject can be read as a sort of one-act play that presents the object of securitization or “the enemy” (the transnational property squatter), the object to be defended (the residential and commercial holdings of Britain’s citizens as well as their communities)

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and the policy solution (the criminalization of squatting). The messages presented by MP Weatherly and Conservative Justice Minister Crispin Blunt thus match, as each reinforces the other’s message that squatting is a serious problem, it is getting worse and that halfway measures will be insufficient to defeat this menace. Thus, EDM 1545 and the subsequent debate in Parliament represent a securitizing actor’s attempt to float a new securitization paradigm to see if it is adopted by larger society. However, as the debate played out over the next year, it became obvious that there were actually four points of contention in the debate. The two sides disagreed regarding the scope of problem (or how many squatters there were in Britain); the composition of the vulnerable population (were they vulnerable homeless or opportunistic young people taking advantage?); the necessity of legislation (is current legislative sufficient?) and the implications of the legislation (that is, what exactly was likely to end up criminalized). Not all were convinced that squatters were dangerous criminals, that society needed to be protected from squatters or that heavy-handed legislative initiatives were necessary to do so. That is, not everyone was amenable to seeing the issue securitized.

After the Early Decision Motion: Spring 2011 Some squatting activists suggest that the parliamentary hearing in March 2011 represented a sort of warm-up or the beginning of a new phased crackdown on urban squatting. In particular, they point to police raids on squats in London on April 28, 2011 prior to the royal wedding. These raids can be seen as preemptive policing in advance of anything happening, to ensure that it didn’t (thus representing the first actions towards securitizing squatting). Five squats across London were visited by police, with fifteen arrests. In addition, an alternative narrative about squatting—in comparison to the official government line—began to emerge in the spring of 2011. Nongovernmental organizations organized a formal response to the EDM in May 2011, when representatives of SQUASH (Squatters Action for Secure Homes) gave a parliamentary briefing at the Houses of Parliament. The activity included presentations by Crisis, the empty homes agency, an advisory service for squatters and SQUASH. The briefings included anecdotes about the ways in which squatting is part of the safety net for vulnerable individuals when all else has failed. Much of the material presented in May was based on two documents produced by the squatting and homeless communities: the 2004 report by Crisis “Life on the Margins: The Experiences of Homeless People Living in Squats” and the SQUASH campaign report “Criminalizing the Vulnerable.” However, from the beginning, more radical anarchist squatter groups criticized SQUASH for responding to government proposals, as well as for trying to educate the government as to the facts of squatting—including absolute numbers and types of squatters. Anarchist groups believed that

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it was inappropriate to engage with the political process at all, suggesting that doing so legitimizes the role of the state in regulating property and social issues. In response, a SQUASH representative noted that “we believe that using the sanctioned channels of communication and working within a legally legitimate framework is crucial if we want to build networks with groups of people who are not comfortable with working outside of those parameters.” Here SQUASH representatives were quick to note that at this point (and subsequently) the government had very little data to contribute to the discussion. Rather, it appeared that they had not thought through how to define squatting nor were they aware of the actual numbers of squatters. These groups came together again to oppose the securitization and criminalization of property squatting in July 2011, when the charity Crisis wrote the “Joint Letter of Squatting,” addressed to both Undersecretary for Justice Crispin Blunt and the Ministry of Justice. The document was signed by eleven charities and organizations, and it formally asked the government to consider the needs of the homeless. In addition, MP Adrian Sanders introduced a counterresolution to Parliament on July 20, 2011, which became Early Day Motion 2114. This resolution, which had five cosponsors and forty-five signatures, states: That this House notes research by Crisis showing that 39 percent of single homeless people have squatted; acknowledges that conditions in squats are often horrendous; further notes that homeless people who squat are among the most vulnerable in society; with 37 percent having mental health problems and 20 percent being dependent on alcohol, and calls on the Government to ensure that any reform of the law on squatting does not penalize vulnerable homeless people and to focus on tackling the root cause of the problem by ensuring that no homeless person is forced to squat.83 Of those who signed the motion, seventeen identified as Liberal Democrat, one as Plaid Cymru, twenty-three as Labour, one as Conservative, one as Social Democrat and Labour and one as an independent. This resolution thus sought to redefine (or reconstruct) the vision of a squatter as a feckless, irresponsible, anti-social individual who squatted for lifestyle reasons through presenting evidence of the serious social needs of many squatters, who according to Crisis are often homeless through circumstances, not choice. Correspondence obtained from the House of Commons web site indicates that many more parliamentarians were approached regarding their support for the bill. A letter addressed to the Right Honorable Tessa Jowell, MP, from Tom McNally, deputy minister at the Ministry of Justice, indicates that the Ministry of Justice was aware of the EDM and that some of those approached to back the petition had first consulted with the Ministry of Justice. In the letter to MP Jowell, the Ministry of Justice representa-

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tive reiterates the narrative that “I am aware of reports of people squatting because they have decided to opt out of paying council tax and bills, because they want to live in a particular area they would not otherwise be able to afford or because they believe it demonstrates nonconformity.”84 The letter again sympathizes with landlords who have “spent time and money evicting squatters.”

The Consultation Paper “Options for Dealing with Squatting” However, despite the willingness of SQUASH and Crisis members to work with the government as lobbyists or advice givers, those in the Ministry of Justice were less willing to offer them a seat at the table or to take their suggestions into account. Instead, in July 2011 the Ministry of Justice issued a consultation paper entitled “Options for Dealing with Squatting.” This consultation paper was made available on web sites and was discussed in the news, and interested parties were given a deadline of October 5, 2011, to log onto the web site to post their responses to the series of questions posed in the paper. The consultation paper (or white paper) presents a particular view of the phenomenon of property squatting. The writing of the document reflects both editorial choices and implicit biases that cause some aspects of the problem to be overemphasized, while others are ignored. Critics of the document point to five specific problems with the analysis.

PROBLEM ONE: VIEWPOINT First, the document is written from the viewpoint of the homeowner, and the property squatter himself is viewed merely as a problem to be solved, rather than another (albeit different) type of citizen with both rights and responsibilities under the UK and EU systems of justice. The document, which is thirty-two pages long and divided into four chapters, opens with a letter or foreword by Crispin Blunt, parliamentary undersecretary of state for Justice. In this document he notes that: Ministerial colleagues and I are very concerned about the harm that squatters can cause. I have been contacted time and time again by MPs and constituents about the appalling impact that squatting can have on their homes, businesses and local communities. This is not media hype. It can and does really happen; and when it does it can be highly stressful for the owner or lawful occupier of the property concerned.85 At the same time as the document was issued, UK Housing Minister Grant Shapps authored an editorial in the Telegraph in which he noted that “For too long it has been the squatters, not the law-abiding homeowners,

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who seem to have had the upper hand.”86 As social policy analyst Wendy Wilson notes in an advice paper to MPs (this is similar to a US Congressional Research Service paper), the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 legislation is aimed at repairing problems with Section 6 of the Criminal Law Act of 1977, which is seen as offering too much protection to property squatters. She notes that the law as it stands “makes it an offense for a person, without lawful authority, to use or threaten violence to enter a property where someone inside is opposed to their entry.” The original law was meant to protect tenants from harassment by landlords as well as to protect individuals from violent partners who might try to break back into their homes after being asked to leave.87 However, currently property squatters are seen as utilizing this legislation to keep the rightful owners from reclaiming their property. The implication here is that all squatters are clever, well educated and well versed in the nuances of UK property law and their legal rights. While this is sometimes the case, it is perhaps simplistic to say that it is always the case. In a statement made on November 1, 2011, Minister of Justice Crispin Blunt laid out the government’s position regarding the legislation, noting that: There are many reasons why a house might be left empty for more than six months without any steps being taken to refurbish, let or sell the building. For example, somebody might decide to do charitable work in another country for a year, or they might visit their second home during the summer months only. It is the owner’s prerogative to leave the house empty in those circumstances.88 In this instance, Blunt appears to be channeling the homeowner, speaking at length about his preferences and his desires and showing understanding for the individual who owns two homes. It is clear that his sympathies are with the homeowner and that he understands how he thinks. There is no similar instance in which either Blunt or Weatherley appears to be speaking on behalf of the property squatter. Rather, when he speaks of property squatters Blunt notes that “many squatters claim . . .” and then reports their words as a quote, rather than paraphrasing the sentiments as he does with the homeowner—that is, he creates a verbal distance between himself and the squatter, whereas he does not with himself and the homeowner. Similarly, speaking in the House of Lords on February 15, 2012, Lord McNally noted that “the whole point of creating this offence is that the Government wants to send a clear message to existing and would-be squatters that occupying someone else’s house without permission is unacceptable.”89 In such an instance, the members of parliament appear to speaking to the squatters rather than on behalf of the squatters (in contrast to the way Blunt spoke on behalf of the homeowners). Furthermore, the language is didactic, suggesting that the role of government is to frame the debate and then

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teach the squatters how to view the issue. That is, a hierarchy is established between government figures who understand the issue correctly and those in the squatter community who are mistaken.

PROBLEM TWO: CHARACTERIZATION OF SQUATTING AS INHERENTLY CONFLICTUAL As Rebecca Hobson notes, the document appears to have been influenced by the same discourse used in the Evening Standard and the Daily Mail, in which criminals and squatters are viewed as interchangeable.90 It implies that only the homeowner is a citizen who obeys laws, while the other side is presented as a law breaker who is outside of society. The squatter is seen as twisting the law and taking advantage of any ambiguities contained in that law. However, in an editorial published in the Independent in June 2011, analyst Laurie Penny noted that “Most people who live legally in abandoned or unused buildings are not hoodie-wearing trustafarian thugs, but ordinary citizens, parents and children, who happen, like hundreds of thousands of others, to be too young or too poor to afford safe homes of their own.”91 By setting up a binary opposition between the law-abiding homeowner and the criminal squatter, the assumption is thus that the altercation between the landlord or homeowner and the property squatter is one characterized by conflict, as the two sides engage in a zero-sum game in which there can be no winner. There is no acknowledgment that the problem of abandoned and unoccupied real estate and the problem of homelessness, for example, might form part and parcel of the same problem, with the possibility of identifying a solution set that could benefit both parties in a negotiation rather than a dispute. As Penny notes, there are actually instances in which an art squat in particular might be welcomed by local residents, who see it driving traffic to a neighborhood, leading to a process of gentrification and perhaps even raising their own property values as a result. They may also prefer the presence of squatters to the presence of an abandoned, rotting building on their own doorsteps.92 A respondent to the consultation paper similarly noted that: The squatting I have been aware of has been in empty buildings that have been neglected for years. The people who entered them put them to good use and sometimes helped keep them in good repair. Other squats I have heard about have been where homeless people have quietly found residences in empty buildings.93 Several analysts, including the signatories to the letter published in the Guardian by members of the law society, suggest that the language of the law seems designed to address a number of recent high-profile specific situations, including the squatters who occupied the residence of Dr. Oliver

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Cockrell and his wife, as well as those who occupied the residence of Julia High. Since those instances of squatting were characterized by squatters displaying disrespect for the law and a high degree of conflict, the implication is that all situations involving squatting will evolve in the same way, and should thus be dealt with in the same way.94 They thus provide a template for thinking about squatters and the practices of squatting. In the hearings in Parliament regarding the legislation, MP John McDonnell made the same point, noting that “Making new laws, especially ones that can put people in prison for up to a year, is an extremely serious matter, so judgment cannot be undertaken or driven by anecdote, prejudice or media headlines.”95 Many respondents who replied in support of the SQUASH campaign also agreed that the existing law should not be changed. Several blamed the media for scaring the public unnecessarily over rare cases of residential squatters. As one of the respondents to the consultation paper noted: There’s no need for a new law. Much of the recent anxiety around squatting has been stirred by press reporters in need of stories and crusades at the expense of accuracy.96 Hobson suggests that the document issued by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) fails in not providing more historical background into the history of squatting in the UK, including the positive ways in which squatters organized to address housing shortages following the London Blitz. In ignoring history, some analysts suggest, the MOJ is thus able to get away with not acknowledging that squatting has often been seen as both a moral and ethical activity and one that supports state goals of housing people and looking after the vulnerable. In utilizing a wider historic lens, one can thus see squatting as a broader social phenomenon that has at times enjoyed a high degree of both state and social support.97 In contrast, the current document seems to present the squatter as simply arising in the present day (as though the problem was actually discovered in 2010 by the MP from Hove)—with no mention of the origins of squatters or the conditions that have produced squatting. (Here, squatting is viewed as the problem itself rather than the answer to a deeper problem, that of a failure to provide adequate housing to everyone in Britain who needs it.)

PROBLEM THREE: CHARACTERIZATION OF SQUATTER AS ONE-DIMENSIONAL Next, the squatter is viewed as a monolithic type—with no acknowledgment of the fact that even within a relatively small nation like Britain there may be a myriad of different types of squatters and a variety of different types of squatting activities. The researchers at the Center for Regional and Economic Research at Sheffield Hallam University who prepared a response to

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the position paper under a contract from the nonprofit organization Charity. org argue that the Ministry of Justice paper assumes that the average property squatter is a “lifestyle squatter”—one who has alternate living arrangements available to him, but who makes an ideological decision to squat rather than to pay rent.98 Penny, writing in the New Statesman, makes a somewhat harsher assessment, suggesting that the Ministry of Justice has been influenced by the tabloids, which tend to portray all types of squatters including education activists and social justice organizers as “a gang of criminal yobs.”99 That is, in portraying the squatter as a monolithic type, the MOJ others him—inviting the reader to view him as the problem rather than part of the solution, and to view him as a creature radically and completely different from the reader himself. Regardless of whether the squatter is a university educated student who opposes capitalism, or a recent Romanian immigrant who needs housing, the reader is invited to view him merely as a dangerous antistate actor. In a response to the Ministry of Justice paper, researchers from the University of Sheffield present statistics to show that lifestyle squatters (who appear to present the major target of the MOJ report and proposed legislation) actually make up a very small subset of property squatters, with the majority of those in housing actually homeless people or survival squatters. (Here, too, the distinction between so-called rough sleeping and property squatting is not fleshed out within the paper. Instead, both long-term squats or occupations—which might last up to a year—and short-term “rough sleeping” arrangements, which might last a night, are conflated together, though the issues that they present to the homeowner and landlord are actually quite separate and distinct.) Shelter notes an increase in housing issues because of the mortgage crisis in the UK. Their helpline has had a 38 percent increase in calls from people worried about their mortgages; Breadline Britain suggests there are 7 million UK citizens on a “financial cliff edge”—vulnerable to slide into homelessness, despite holding employment (working poor).100 Respondents to the Ministry of Justice consultation paper likewise noted that: I have known many different types of people who have squatted or continue to do so, families and single people young and old, and all of them were seen by their neighbors as assets to the communities they moved in to.101 Thames Reach, a London-based voluntary organization working with homeless and vulnerable people, said: The stereotypes of squatting which polarize around family homes being taken over by aggressive squatters or groups of people in housing need contentedly living in a communal nirvana are extremely unhelpful and

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Securitization of Property Squatting in Europe some way from the real experiences of those squatting in derelict buildings that Thames Reach staff witness on a daily basis. . . . Our experience of people engaged in squatting is that they are often extremely vulnerable and have chronic drug and alcohol problems.102

The problem here is that conflating all types of squatters and all types of squats—as the Ministry of Justice does—leads to the assumption that all squatters use the same tactics, including breaking and entering and vandalism. In response, lifestyle squatters like Dan Simon of the Oubliette Project decry some of the tactics used by other types of squatters, including those who are criminals. Simon notes that his organization, for example, occupies only long-term abandoned buildings and would never occupy a residential space while the homeowner is on vacation. In his own words, “(The report’s authors) have been knowingly and willingly peddling misinformation about squatters; they have been corroborating absolute crap.”103 Finally, the failure to distinguish between rough sleeping, occupation and squatting is problematic to several researchers who have seen the document, since they believe it means that legal antisquatting measures might be used not only against lifestyle squatters who complicate the renovation or resale of a building through occupying it, but also against students occupying a university building or other venue in the short-term to make a political or ideological point. If the new measures are indeed used in this way, the implication is that legislation against squatting could be used by the state and its law enforcement teams to shut down venues for free speech that have historically existed in democratic nations like Britain. As Penny notes, “the new law will make criminals of students who occupy their universities, of outraged citizens who occupy their council buildings, of striking employees who occupy their places of work.”104 The following quotes are representative of many of those responding to the consultation in support of the SQUASH Campaign: These definitions are so broad they could conceivably cover those who are victims of fraud at the hands of a false letting agency, or those occupying buildings for peaceful political purposes. Using this definition to create a new criminal offence of squatting would infringe upon both the rights of squatters, equating their actions which can be beneficial as well as criminal, and protestors, who stand up for a long tradition of civil disobedience in Britain, this definition is unacceptable.

PROBLEM FOUR: PROBLEMS WITH THE DATA Academic analysts and housing activists alike have evinced concern about the statistics cited in the Ministry of Justice paper regarding the scope and severity of the squatting issue in Britain. The paper notes that “there is no

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data held by central Government about the number of people who squat or their reasons for doing so.” The paper then goes on to provide numbers of interim possession orders granted in 2010 under Civil Procedure Rules.105 (This is the document typically used to evict squatters.) The document also cites the figure of twenty thousand squatters, which has been bandied about in newspaper articles, and which appears to derive from a Crisis study “Life on the Margins: The Experiences of Homeless People Living in Squats,” carried out in 2004, about which there are serious methodological concerns. (In essence, the number is derived as an estimate based on a small sample of those found rough sleeping in one city on one night. Many feel that the sample is not representative). Also, analysts from the Law Society suggest that the proposed new legislation was needless because existing laws, including the Criminal Law Act of 1977, already deal adequately with the phenomenon of squatting. They accuse both Housing Minister Grant Shapps and Justice Minister Crispin Blunt of peddling misinformation and “myths” that led to an ill-informed debate in public about the limits on existing legislation and the need for new legislation.106

PROBLEM FIVE: FAILURE TO CONSIDER COSTS Finally, the paper does not acknowledge any increased costs that might be incurred by the state if additional documents, steps and procedures for evicting squatters are undertaken, and if additional state resources are made available for the purposes of evicting squatters. An analyst for the Guardian, however, estimates that squatting law reforms could cost taxpayers 790 million pounds over five years.107 The paper was released by the Ministry of Justice in August 2011 and published online, to be accessed through both the Ministry of Justice web site and links from other popular publications. The report includes a number of boxes that include questions, and citizens who read the report were urged to e-mail the Ministry of Justice with their responses to the questions listed. In the responses that were received, many people described the bias that they saw as implicit in the questions being posed. Questions that were seen as biased included the following: Question 1: Is squatting a particular problem in your area and where does it occur the most, e.g. in residential or non-residential property? Were these properties empty/abandoned/derelict before they were occupied, or were they in use? Question 5: If you have taken steps to evict squatters from your properties, what difficulties have you encountered (if any) in removing squatters from your property using existing procedures? Have you had any positive experiences of using existing procedures?108

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The consultation period closed on October 5, 2011, thus just meeting the criteria for government consultations (outlined in the MOJ report). The criteria include the stipulations that formal consultations should take place at a point at which respondents can still influence the policy outcome. (Thus, respondents were asked for their assistance in defining key terms such as squatter, as well as in defining the types of properties that should be covered by the law.) The next criteria stipulates that consultations be held open for twelve weeks, with longer times if possible. (The time period from the publication of the white paper to the closing of responses measures twelve weeks exactly.) Government agents are tasked with making sure the consultation process is accessible to those whom it will affect, and with responding to the feedback that is provided. According to the nonprofit prosquatting group SQUASH, 95 percent of the responses that the Ministry of Justice received to its paper were against the legislation. Approximately three thousand responses to the paper were recorded.109 The majority were submitted by SQUASH members or supporters. Of the responses received, 1,990 were against criminalization. In the response paper published by the government, the decision was made to look at the feedback in a qualitative rather than a quantitative manner, since SQUASH respondents were felt to be overrepresented in the sample. One can make a larger methodological argument about the wisdom of soliciting this type of input, since clearly only those who feel the strongest about the issue will take the time to read through a sixty-page report, and then respond to up to seventeen questions. The question then becomes how representative a sample one really has if two homeowners who are highly exercised about the issue of property squatting respond to the consultation. Are they more or less representative of how property owners on the whole feel about this issue? A response to the feedback paper was published by Crispin Blunt in which he recommended criminalization of squatting in residential properties. The resulting feedback paper includes seventy-one quoted responses. As Figures 2.3 and 2.4 indicate, the report attempts to draw equally upon all the responses of the groups who provided input. In doing so, the argument can be made that it unfairly overrepresents the views of groups such as landNumber of Respondents Law Enforcement Legal Landlord Government Squatter Charity Victims

Figure 2.3

Number of respondents.

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Quoted in Final Report Law Enforcement Legal Landlord Government Squatter Charity Victims

Figure 2.4

Quotes in final report.

lords, law enforcement officers, government officials and victims of crimes. This is the view of the SQUASH, which has accused the Ministry of Justice of ignoring the input that they and their members provided, and simply driving on with their own agenda, despite the fact that a majority of respondents did not feel the legislation was necessary or helpful.110 As is typical in situations of crisis, the window for policy discussion was very brief. A mere three weeks after the paper’s release, the state proceeded to discuss and vote on the proposed legislation in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Critics of the legislation suggest that it is simply not possible that officials from the Ministry of Justice seriously considered the three thousand responses to the white paper that they received. They argue that there simply wasn’t time. In an article published in Corporate Watch magazine in the winter of 2011, the author refers to the squat law as having been “fast-tracked” because the Ministry of Justice produced a consultation paper on July 13, 2011, with the consultation period set for as short a period as legally allowable, closing on October 5.111 (Here it should be noted that the debate in Parliament does not meet the legal definition of “fast-tracking” as set out by the House of Lords’ study on fast-tracking legislation in 2009. Technically, for a bill to be “fast-tracked,” it would have to pass through several stages of passage in one day—for example, going from the introduction of a measure to passage of the measure in a twenty-four-hour period. Such fast-tracking has occurred, often for reasons of national security, but the passage of squatting legislation does not fit this narrow definition.) The author also describes legislation as having been “sneaked through Parliament” at six days’ notice—and suggests that the particular clause referring to squatting was attached to a nearly unrelated bill. At the same time that the consultation was being held open to discuss the report on squatting, a very public exchange of letters on the issue was published in the Guardian in September 2011. In particular, a group of housing lawyers signed a letter that noted that there was a lot of misinformation about loopholes in existing law. The letter’s main author, Michael Arden, noted that many citizens believed that refusing to leave someone’s home is

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not a criminal offense (not trespassing) and that new law needs to render this illegal. However, he stated that Criminal Law Act 1977 allows police to arrest any trespasser who does not leave.112 A letter signed by members of the Law Society noted that “there is no reason to believe that the existing law does not deal adequately with squatting.” John Wotton, president of the Law Society of England and Wales, noted that “a new criminal offense of squatting is unnecessary. Squatting is not a major problem and where it does occur, there are a range of laws both civil and criminal that are adequate to deal with it.” Groups including the Law Society, the Metropolitan Police and the Criminal Bar Association opposed the measure, noting that the 1977 Criminal Law Act already specifies remedies and procedures for evicting squatters.113 As part of any proposed legislation, the government is required to carry out an equality impact assessment, which is aimed at describing who is likely to be affected by proposed legislation, as well as assuring that there will not be a disproportionate adverse impact upon any one group in society. The assessment may also include discussion of the costs of implementing any proposed legislation. The equality impact assessment of “options for dealing with squatting” was made publicly available on the Department of Justice web site in July 2011.114 The assessment found that no group would be unduly impacted by the legislation, including transnational migrants. In response to the equality impact assessment, the analyst Alexander Vasudevan, a professor at the University of Nottingham, published an article warning about what he sees as a turn towards a “law and order agenda” under the coalition government.115 In his words, the unfair impact of the bill will come from a closing off of creative means of protest and the right of all citizens to claim public space in order to meet and to express opinions. He noted that “the seizure and reclamation of space (temporary or otherwise) has become a key and potent symbol of protest here in the UK from campus occupation to the playful interventions of groups such as UK Uncut.” He notes that the law creates a new offense known as “intentional trespass”— committed when trespassers are asked but fail to leave. He describes this category as insufficiently broad, noting that “this would encompass virtually any presence on land without permission, save for former tenants or possibly licenses” and thus could be used against Occupy-type protests. In addition, he faults the UK Ministry of Justice for not mentioning specifically the impacts upon gypsies and travelers as part of the assessment, noting that the proposed law appears to remove legal aid for trespassers, including gypsies and travelers. The Advisory Service for Squatters notes that “We are concerned that new legislation might be read in such a way that travelers are no longer eligible for legal aid . . . although 20 percent of Irish travelers in Britain are considered to be homeless.”116 Vasudevan suggests that while everyone is focusing on the impact of legislation on squatters, perhaps it is a backdoor way to crack down on gypsies. By criminalizing intentional trespass, the legislation will also help regions to get away with no longer complying with regional development plans, which impose

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requirements on local authorities to identify and provide new sites. It is possible, he notes, that this new legislation is thus not in accord with European Union statutes regarding the rights of travelers and gypsies.117 At the same time, SQUASH published a briefing paper that was distributed to members of the House of Commons and House of Lords. In the paper, the group describes clause 130 as “unjust, unnecessary and unaffordable.” In addition, SQUASH accuses Her Majesty’s government of rushing through criminal laws “in a knee-jerk reaction to high profile media stories.”118 A spokesman speaking on behalf of the Advisory Service for Squatters similarly noted that the legislation was a response to articles in some of the media, rather than the facts as they are known by the homeless charities and their clients.119 In addition to questioning the necessity of the criminalization statute, charitable and squatter groups continued to contest the narrative that characterized the average squatter as a lifestyle squatter rather than a desperate homeless person. In their “Consultation Response: MOJ Options for Dealing with Squatting,” Shelter contended the following: If it is the case (as Ministry of Justice claims) that incidents of squatting have risen, this should be a clear signal to government that there is a dysfunction within the housing system and that some people are taking desperate measures in their search for somewhere to stay.120 In addition, it is important to consider the context in which parliamentary discussions about squatting were taking place. During widespread occupations of university buildings as part of student protests in late 2010 and 2011, squatting rights were an issue of contention for authorities. Despite the fact that students technically had the legal right to remain in university buildings to protest, some universities used private law to remove demonstrating students. In addition, the Occupy London movement had begun on October 15, 2011, and it lasted in its most public form—the occupation of the land near St. Paul’s Cathedral—until February 2012. For this reason, Professor Danny Dorling of Sheffield University has called the measures to outlaw squatting at this time “ideologically driven.”121 Vasudevan, a researcher at the University of Nottingham, sees something “sinister” in changes in laws about squatting, arguing that the final goal is to outlaw “occupation type protests”—particularly those that take place in public using public space.122 Vasudevan quotes a tweet from Minister of Housing Grant Shapps during the height of the Occupy London protests, in which he tweeted “St. Pauls’ right to protest not a right to squat. Looking at law to see if change needed to deal with camps like St. Paul’s and Dale Farm faster.” Vasudevan argues that “Shapps’ casual and lazy equation of protest and collective assembly with the rich and varied history of squatting reveals, it seems to me, the ultimate target of the governments’ legal revanchism.”123 Vasudevan refers to squatting as a type of “occupation-based practice” and expresses concern that a ban on squatting may lead to a more generalized ban on occupation-based protests.124

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The criminalization legislation did not form the basis for a separate bill introduced to the House of Commons. Instead, the criminalization of squatting clause was included initially as a clause (clause 136) within the Legal Aid, Sentence and Punishment of Offenders bill (LASPO). LASPO dealt overall with reducing government expenditures on legal aid and included clauses limiting the use of government funds to provide legal aid in a variety of circumstances. However, at least one group of housing activists felt that by including the squatting statute as a clause within a bill, rather than making it the subject of separate legislation, the government was engaged in devious politics and subterfuge, preferring to alter the policies secretly rather than holding them open for a public airing. In an article titled “Oppose Red, Yellow and Blue Tories,” Hardy argues that “the coalition held a consultation on the proposal—then when 90 percent of respondents said it was a bad idea, tore up the results and pushed the changes through immediately by tacking them onto the Legal Aid, sentencing and punishment of offenders (LASPO) bill as clause 136.”125 On November 1, 2011, legislative hearings were held, with 283 out of 650 MPs voting in favor of the legislation, which was passed. In passing the legislation, MPs considered five options: creating a new offense of squatting in buildings; amending section 7 of the Criminal Act of 1977 to extend the offense to other types of premises; repealing or amending Section 6 of the Criminal Act of 1977, since this is the section typically used by squatters who lay claim to a property, or doing nothing, other than continuing with existing sanctions and enforcement activity. During deliberations, the narrative regarding the dangerous property squatter was put forth by MP David Ward, who described squats as “cold, damp, dark, dangerous and very violent” places, as well as describing squatters themselves as “without friends, without families and without futures.”126 (Here, he implies that, like the terrorist, the squatter is someone with no future who thus engages in and accepts the need for risky behavior.) During the debate, several MPs also refused to accept the contention that squatters can actually improve property, leaving it better than they found it. However, others spoke out against the legislation. In particular, senior peers vowed to oppose plans to make squatting a criminal offense and began working to water down the squatting clause in LASPO. In particular, MP McDonnell described the bill as an overreaction.127 The bill, once passed, then proceeded to the House of Lords for further discussion. LASPO in particular bounced back and forth between Commons and Lords for a period of six months as various clauses within the document were debated. It was finally passed on March 30, 2012, and came into law on May 2, 2012. The final vote on the legislation, which made it a matter of law, occurred during a late-night session on March 30, 2012, at the House of Lords. Baroness Miller of Chilthorn Domer proposed voting on an amendment (Amendment 26), which was intended to water down the language of the original bill, through stating that squatting was not criminal if a home had been vacant for at least six months and where there were no significant

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efforts being taken to refurbish, let or sell the building at the time. The baroness took the side of those who felt that the bill as written was intended to criminalize homelessness. She noted that “in passing the legislation the government can give the appearance that they are dealing with homelessness and the housing crisis while in reality they are not.”129 In the resulting vote, her amendment did not pass but the legislation itself was adopted. In writing about this vote, Joseph Blake, the spokesman for SQUASH, noted that “It was a struggle to get what is a serious piece of legislation heard properly—it was debated late at night and never properly scrutinized.”130 An editorial that appeared on the web site of SQUASH on March 30, 2012, stated flatly that “Democracy is dead . . . You have to wonder what is the point of having a consultation in the first place . . . if government ignored the fact that 96 percent of respondents were against the law.” In addition, SQUASH accused the government of secrecy in policy making, noting that “it was continuously discussed at the end of the day when most people were in bed . . . It’s disgusting that a law with such serious implications for so many can be ushered in through the back door in this way.”131 Analysts and representatives of squatter groups accused the government of not being forthright in describing its motives for the passage of the legislation. In particular, Tanya Gold, writing for the Guardian, accused the new coalition government of attempting to “criminalize poverty”—noting that 40 percent of single homeless people have squatted. (Single people are usually not eligible for council housing and therefore these are the people whom the system has turned its back on.) She described squatters as “the most fragile of citizens, who have almost always asked for housing and been refused.”132 And Duncan Shrubsole, director of policy and external affairs at the homeless charity Crisis, noted that “Ultimately the best way to end squatting will not be through fines and criminal sanction but by ensuring all homeless people, not just those deemed a ‘priority,’ get the help they need.”133 Joseph Blake, speaking on behalf of Shelter, noted that “I think it fundamentally comes to a lack of democracy in this country. Now what we may see is thousands of people becoming criminals at some point, in the middle of what is one of the worst housing crises this country has ever seen.”134 Informally, ministers have guaranteed that those who occupy abandoned or dilapidated buildings will not be committing an offense, as well as that the law will not be used to prosecute students engaged in temporary occupation for purposes of protest. However, the legislation here is unclear.

IMPLEMENTING THE LEGISLATION On May 1, 2012, the Legal Aid, Sentence and Punishment of Offenders Bill (LASPO) was enacted into law. Section 144 of the act creates a new criminal offense of squatting in a residential building. The person is deemed to have squatted if he is in a residential building as a trespasser—having entered as a

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trespasser; if he knows or ought to know that he or she is a trespasser and is living in the building or intends to live there for any period of time. The law does not criminalize the individual if he or she is a legitimate tenant who is refusing to leave as part of a dispute with the landlord.135 Those convicted of squatting in residential areas can face one year’s imprisonment and/or a 5,000-pound fee. The law does not criminalize squatting in commercial or nonresidential buildings. The new law is thus stricter than existing legislation because previously it was a crime to squat only if it inconvenienced someone who required access to the property—to sell it, rent it or live in it. Previously, squatting in an unoccupied building was not considered a crime. The new law thus broadens the scope of government and citizen power to evict squatters as it also extends to residential properties that are empty and not being lived in. In addition, lawyer Richard John notes on his web site that “The Bill (and defeat of the amendment) is to be welcomed by property owners and occupiers who have born the cost of evicting squatters and the associated property repair and clean-up costs which can be a lengthy and expensive process.” He expects to see legislation widened to cover nonresidential property in the future.136 Finally, an editorial in the Guardian warns that squatting law reforms could cost taxpayers 790 million pounds over five years, noting that “the LASPO is supposed to cut government’s costs for dealing with criminality, while criminalizing squatting is said to raise the costs of policing.” In addition, the analyst warns that police misconduct will likely increase if police are encouraged to think of these people as criminals.137

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE LEGISLATION As this chapter has shown, securitization measures led to a quick resolution of the squatting issue in Britain, due largely to efforts by the media to portray squatters as a menace to society. However, it is equally clear that the actual “knowledge” on which claims about the danger presented by squatters rested was contested and often incomplete. The squatter was constructed, perhaps incorrectly, as someone wholly unlike others in society. At the same time, squatter groups attempted to show that this conception was false, marshaling evidence to show that squatters are often more integrated into the larger political fabric than we might have previously thought. They have often been portrayed as isolated “fringe” groups and extremists. However, despite a tendency by the media and Tory politicians to “other” the squatter, presenting him as unidimensional and wholly unlike his neighbors, it has been possible to form a more nuanced portrait. Nonetheless this persistent othering of the squatter makes it possible for the issue of squatting to become securitized and for legislation outlawing squatting practices to be passed quickly with only limited public debate.

3

Incorporating the Enclave of Juliana Christiania

In the previous chapter, we explored the criminalization of property squatting in Great Britain, where securitization took a typical trajectory. Decisions were made quickly with little public input, and harsh measures were enacted to reexert state control over the security threat allegedly posed by squats in the capital. In this chapter, we consider the case of Denmark and in particular the actions taken to secure the vast, multidwelling enclave known as Juliana Christiania. In this case, securitization proceeded slowly, over the course of nearly forty years. Multiple attempts at securitizing acts were taken against Juliana Christiania and against other property squats in Copenhagen. In some instances these acts were successful, while in others they were not. As in the British case, public opinion again played a role in the dialogue regarding the security threat posed by Juliana Christiania and its residents. So how do we account for the shift in both public opinion and state strategies towards this squatter settlement over time? Here, we can consider two possibilities: First, we might posit that there was something threatening about the place itself—because it is a sort of liminal place that both is and is not part of Copenhagen proper. Although it was geographically within the city limits, it enjoyed a status that marked it as separate—governed by a different architectural aesthetic, a different social status, and a different “political culture” or set of political norms and values. It is thus what Jacek Pawlicki terms “an alternative metropolis.”1 Christiania can be described by making reference to Foucault’s notion of a “heterotopia”—a utopian or nonutopian space in which social hierarchies are suspended. Heterotopias are places that are out of tune with regular, ordinary spaces for a variety of reasons. They represent a sort of crossing of boundaries—for example, a cemetery can be said to be situated both in the present, in the past and even in eternity, in a sense. Heterotopias are thus a type of deviant space because they are in synch with a different time zone, a different set of rules or a different aesthetic. Foucault himself notes that such spaces “have the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror or reflect.”2 Thus, Christiania inevitably draws and begs people to notice the contrast between how life is there and

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how it is in the rest of Copenhagen—setting up a contrast between regulated, conformist Denmark and freewheeling Christiania. However, it is perhaps too simplistic to say that it was the character of Juliana Christiania itself that was threatening—since the squat existed quite publically for forty years before the recent drive to shut it down. Christiania was never a space that hid in the shadows. Its residents sought not to blend in or to hide within Denmark, but were instead always overt in their identity and their activities. In addition, Christiania was always politicized. Its ethos might be described as countercultural but not necessarily antistate. In this way, the push to establish and maintain Christiania owes much to Holston’s notion of “insurgent citizenship.”3 He notes that those who occupy or take possession of uninhabited properties are not simply deviants behaving in an anti-social manner. (They are not those for whom socialization into housing mores has failed.) Instead, they are individuals and groups engaged in a powerful form of civil disobedience meant overall to call the state to account. Claiming property by squatting is thus a form of “active citizenship.”4 As Miraftab and Wills describe the situation, “the protagonists of this citizenship drama use nonformalized channels, create new spaces of citizenship, and improvise and innovate innovative practices, all of which attract a captive constituency that embraces their just demands.”5 Thus, a more compelling explanation for the crackdown suggests that the decision to rein in and incorporate Christiania into the existing political structures had less to do with any characteristics of the enclave itself, and more to do with changes that occurred within the larger political entity of Denmark itself. Here one can argue that a relatively peaceful, homogeneous society could absorb any sort of threat that the presence of a liminal space like Christiania represented, but a society that viewed itself as already under siege through the threats of undocumented immigrants, the increasing diversity of the population and a rising drug problem could not. In that way, Christiania became a risk multiplier within an already threatened environment. Thus, the answer as to why Christiania, which had existed happily for nearly forty years, was suddenly securitized in the early 2000s lies not only in Danish domestic politics but also in the international system. The changing character of Denmark’s residents helped provide the conditions that made reexerting control over Juliana Christiania conceivable. While the squatter enclave was acceptable in a Copenhagen that was largely homogeneous, the changing ethnic, national and religious composition of the refugee and squatter population of Copenhagen caused squatting to be viewed differently in the period since 2005. In this chapter I provide a chronological overview of the history of Juliana Christiania and the attempts at securitization of the region that have occurred since its founding in 1971. Here I hope to show how the autonomy and sovereignty granted to the region were gradually whittled away, due largely to increased police presence and surveillance over the enclave

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beginning in the 1990s. In addition, I argue that Juliana Christiania ultimately came to seem like a “failed state” within the confines of Copenhagen, a place where state authority was weak and nonexistent. And just as spillover from an actual failed state has the ability to destabilize a region, residents and political authorities in Denmark worried about a spillover effect from Juliana Christiania, fearing the criminal activities might spill over into surrounding communities. I also consider the alternate narrative put forth by Christiania dwellers, who assert that Christiania was unfairly targeted or scapegoated and portrayed as the producer of all of the social problems in the region. In this way, the government was able to avoid engaging with larger issues—such as whether enough social services were being provided to new immigrants, why so many of Copenhagen’s young people had so few social opportunities, or why poverty had increased. Instead, squatter settlements were portrayed as breeding grounds for crime and drug abuse, and the obvious solution of controlling and shutting down the settlement was seen as the simplest solution.

THE FOUNDING OF JULIANA CHRISTIANIA The squatter enclave of Juliana Christiania sits on a former Norwegian military base of approximately eighty-four acres in the Christianshavn section of Copenhagen. The settlement, named after Norwegian king Christian IV, who originally commissioned the barracks in the 1800s,6 began when neighbors to the base decided one day to knock down a fence in order to allow their children to play in the green spaces of the military installation Badmandstraedes.7 (The military had formally abandoned the buildings in 1971 and they were unused and in a state of disrepair.) After these actions the journalist Jacob Ludvigsen wrote an article in the magazine Hovedbladet that described the creation of a new settlement, which he referred to as a free town. Ludvigsen also participated in the drafting of a mission statement for the community, which noted that it wanted to be a self-governing community that was economically self-sustaining.8 (Interestingly, later historians have suggested that Ludvigsen’s call to citizens to “come and occupy Christiania” was meant to be satirical as was the article itself, entitled “Immigrate with Bus Number 8: The Direct Route to Christiania.”9 According to some, neither he nor the authorities either predicted or anticipated the creation of an actual squatter settlement a few walkable blocks from the center of Copenhagen.) Officially described as anarchist, Christiania from the beginning embraced an ideology of consensus decision making and communalism. Residents joke that there are always long meetings to go to and note that participating in democracy in Freetown Christiania is a demanding responsibility. (Ludvigsen himself left the compound after three months, finding its requirements for deliberative democracy “too demanding.”10) Thus, they are “anarchists

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with rules.” Later, this same settlement would be described as “a countercultural oasis with no government, no cars and no police.”11 The settlement also has no paved roads. In addition to occupying the formal barracks buildings, Christiania residents created their own residences on the grounds of the Army barracks without garnering official permission to do so, and with little regard to zoning regulations. Some tourist brochures thus describe the “fairytale structures” that exist in Christiania, as the houses, though small, may sit in fields and green spaces around the property, perhaps leaning to one side due to structural problems. The houses are often made of scrounged materials that are being recycled. Others have taken over old military buildings, subdividing the properties into various types of studio spaces and living quarters. An estimate in 1996 counted 325 buildings, with 104 state-built and 221 selfbuilt. The population has ranged from 850 to about 1,000. Thus, Christiania originally had many of the features of an art squat. The settlement was characterized by the presence of creative endeavors, and many members of the artist community came there originally seeking cheap space to establish a studio. Like other art squats, Christiania was embraced by many neighbors who felt that the creativity and energy of the settlement helped support business and tourism. Pornography was legal in Denmark throughout the 1970s and many residents made nudity part of the experiment.12 The settlement would go on to become Copenhagen’s third most popular tourist attraction, hosting a million visitors per year.13

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS INCORPORATION The first attempt to give Christiania some type of legal status began in 1972, when residents met with the minister of defense regarding the squat, since the land and the buildings still legally belonged to the Defense Ministry. A preliminary agreement gave residents the right to continue using the land and buildings of Christiania. In June 1973, the project received experimental status and an agreement noted that the squat could remain for up to a three-year period. Based on this agreement, residents went ahead with plans to upgrade Christiania, including connecting it to the grid so that residents could have heat and light in the winter and so that children would have access to schooling and day care. At that time Christiania agreed to pay the government to install water and electricity on the compound. By 1994, Christiania residents also paid the city government for waste removal and firefighting.14 Members of the group also pay into a communal fund that covers garbage removal, childcare facilities and a post office. Christiania thus accepted a certain level of relationship with and incorporation into Copenhagen. At the same time, Christiania emphasized an ethic of care. Early on, the community established a number of structures to furnish social services,

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including a drug treatment facility in 1979 (which treats all sorts of citizens, not just those who are Danish) and a homeless shelter known as Starship.15 In addition, a social services agency established in 1980 visits the elderly and looks after those with emotional or behavioral problems. Partially funded by the Danish government, the agency works with residents who wish to apply for benefits as well.16 The commune has its own kindergarten but the institution of higher educational facilities failed—largely because members of the group could not agree on a philosophy of education that would be used to teach children.17 The group enjoyed a sort of sovereignty and proudly displayed its own flag. Children learned the Christiania national anthem in school, and the enclave had its own newspaper, radio station, cinema and cafés. A sign at the entrance to the commune notes that “You are now entering the EU.” One resident interviewed in a British newspaper referred to the land outside the walls of Christiania as “Denmark.”18 Many members of the collective note that they may go days or even weeks without ever leaving the enclave. An official government report concluded that Christiania comprised (as of 2012) a static group of residents with limited mobility. The population included runaways, the mentally ill and others who occupied society’s fringes. Only one-third were found to be connected with the official labor market, one-third were on public assistance19 and most had a low education level.20 Thus, depending on one’s perspective, Christiania was either sovereign or poorly integrated into the larger city of Copenhagen and the nation of Denmark.

DEVELOPING PROBLEMS The main street of the enclave, however, soon became known as Pusher Street, because of the drug dealers who sold both marijuana and harder drugs to visitors and tourists who came to Christiania hoping to experience a bit of the countercultural lifestyle. In addition the local police acknowledged that heroin was a problem throughout Europe, and the solution throughout the 1970s was to encourage addicts to go to Christiania, where at least they were off the streets of the rest of Copenhagen.21 Some analysts, including Copenhagen Criminal Commissioner Jan Richman Olsen, suggested that Christiania’s social activities and governance were always financed by drug money contributed by the pushers, with estimates that the sales of drugs bring the community about one million pounds a year.22 For a time, Christiania accepted all comers, though as space began to run out, the community later set up rules describing the procedures by which new residents could come to Christiania. Word of vacancies traveled largely by word of mouth, and new residents had to be voted upon by a consensus meeting of Christiania residents. Thus, over time, the enclave became more exclusive and less democratic in its acceptance of new members. The original

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rhetoric that described Christiania residents as early pioneers, enduring harsh conditions for the right to live as they wished, gradually came to seem less accurate. In recent years, children who grow up in Christiania have had to leave the commune as there is no new space for them to occupy if they wish to have their own home or apartment. By 1980, rifts were starting to exist in the community, which was widely becoming known as a haven for eccentric or deviant behaviors and lifestyles, between traditional families wishing to live a communal lifestyle and more dangerous elements. As Anthony describes the situation, there were those who wished to live a sort of bucolic lifestyle in an urban setting, and who were willing to accept rules in order to live in a peaceful, countercultural democracy. At the same time, other members of the collective truly embraced the philosophy of anarchism and limited government, wishing to avoid imposing regulations and building the structures of a state. For that reason, they were willing to accept drugs and crime as the price of living an unregulated life.23

SECURITIZING ACT ONE: AN ABORTIVE ATTEMPT AT SLUM CLEARING At this point, one can suggest that Christiania provided a sort of convenient interstitial site for the Danish government. It was a sort of unregulated space where activities took place beneath the radar. Thus, the policy towards Christiania was one of “don’t ask, don’t tell” or “out of sight and out of mind.” Regular social problems could be steered towards Christiania where they were then no longer officially a problem. However, Christiania was also starting to assume a larger significance to the wider community, since it appeared to serve as a sort of magnet for both drugs and criminal activity, as well as for those from across Europe who wished to experiment with alternative or deviant lifestyles. In the words of one dealer, “people come from all over to buy here.”24 A resident of Christiania described the commune as a “hippie Israel,” noting that “every Jew can go to Israel. Every hippie can come here.”25 Christiania could thus already be described as messy, violent and chaotic. The question then became whether the commitment to the existence of Christiania as a unique social experiment was worth the risk that its existence engendered. In addition, we encounter the notion that the risk was not shared—Christiania residents lived well, while their neighbors lived in fear. The language of risk, which is often a facet of securitization, was thus starting to emerge in conversations about Christiania’s future. As Richard Ballard suggests in describing squatter settlements in South Africa, The “danger” of squatter settlements is that they are seen to be zones in which formal residents and police lack control. They are a convenient

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way for criminals to access formal residential areas and an easy place for them to hide. . . . Although not all squatters are thieves, rapist or murderers, it is impossible to tell harmless and innocent squatters from criminals, with the result that every squatter is a potential threat.26 Thus, the liminal status of Christiania led to a blurring between lawful and unlawful residential practices, and lawful and unlawful practices in other areas, such as the consumption of drugs. The lines were not so clear-cut between lawful and unlawful citizens, and as a result all citizens and all of the space of Christiania became suspect. In 1975, the initial three-year agreement ran out, and the Danish Parliament initially declared that Christiania would be cleared of its inhabitants. Christiania residents immediately filed legal suits against the Danish attorney general. However, the original decision was upheld by the Danish Supreme Court in 1978.27 Despite the ruling, the Danish parliament adopted an adjournment, deciding that residents should have continued “temporary” use of the area. At the same time, they hired the consulting firm Moller and Gronborg to develop a plan for the future use of the Christiania area. The firm recommended a model that would establish Christiania as a “legitimate experimental city.”28 Thus, the plan was arguably to establish Christiania as a sort of reservation or colony. The settlement’s residents would be allowed by the government to have their unique lifestyle, with the understanding that they were always subject to government oversight. Thus, one might describe the legal position of the enclave as one of conditional or limited sovereignty, or even as a sort of protectorate. Here, protectorate is defined as a relationship of protection and partial control assumed by a superior power over a dependent country or region; or a territory largely controlled by but not annexed to a stronger state. In this new position it was thus not surprising to see both residents enacting stricter regulations to police themselves as well as government threatening to police the region more strictly if it became necessary to do so. In 1980, Christiania residents banned the sale of drugs harder than marijuana, and in 1987 they ousted bikers from the commune, worked to disband gangs and adopted a rule forbidding the wearing of gang colors in the commune.29 Here one can argue that Christiania’s policies were generated less by internal politics and more by external events over which they had little control, for, in the 1980s in particular, the enclave faced two threats that affected life in Christiania. First, rising unemployment throughout Europe meant that more unemployed individuals were coming to Christiania. (A policy of open borders with other Scandinavian countries that had existed since the 1950s exacerbated that tendency.) At the same time, the Danish government began its fight against the rising problem of gang violence throughout Denmark. As rival gangs fought for control of Denmark’s drug trade, many of these battles were played out on the streets of Christiania. The first large-scale skirmish took place between the biker gangs Hells Angels and Bullshit in

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1983. In 1987, Danish police found a dead body in a motorcycle workshop associated with the Bullshitter gang. Thus, Christiania was drawn into larger conflicts having to do with drugs, immigration and gang warfare. Squatter policy was not made independently of these issues but rather in concert with them. Christiania’s reputation as a dangerous place affected any decisions made about the residents of the enclave. Political sentiments about the need to more closely regulate the enclave were growing, and in 1985 the Danish Parliament established a special committee on Christiania’s future.30 At the same time that the Danish police were cracking down on drugs and gang activity, other members of the Danish government were starting to look more closely at some of the architectural safety issues facing Christiania. In 1989, legislation passed that required the people of Christiania to submit plans and gain permission from the Ministry of Defense to build houses or to add on to existing ones. However, despite the passage of this legislation, the government did not enforce the law for thirteen years. During this time, one hundred new constructions took place. At the same time, the legislation ceded control of the territory to the residents of Christiania, giving them special status.31

SECURITIZING ACT TWO: TOWARDS NORMALIZATION AND INCLUSION However, it becomes clear that by 1990, Danish politicians were already losing patience with the ongoing negotiations regarding Christiania’s status as well as the effects of crime that were associated with the region. Thus, the first policy aimed at inclusion for Christiania through incorporating the settlement into politics as usual occurred in 1995, when the government developed a four-point plan to “normalize” the area. First, the initiative spelled out strategies for assuring that Christiania had the same infrastructure as the rest of the city. In this way, Christiania would no longer be a no-go zone where citizens were not subject to state authority, nor would it resemble a failed state. Second, the initiative required that citizens would buy their houses from the Ministry of Defense. This is a common strategy for integrating squatters practiced in Asia, Africa and South America. Next, the initiative aimed to renovate buildings in Christiania and bring them up to code. Finally, the initiative aimed to stop the trafficking of hashish. (The four-point plan was actually a compromise initiative in comparison to the original set of demands put forth by the Liberal Party, which wanted to build private homes for four hundred new residents, tear down fifty existing homes to build a public park and make remaining residents into “owners” of their property either as private tenants or shareholders.)32 Throughout the proceedings involving the legal status of Christiania the enclave’s own residents have sought to advocate for their rights through

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the legal system while simultaneously preserving Christiania’s existence on a temporary basis through hanging up any legal proceedings in court for a prolonged period of time. In response to the 1995 initiatives, nearly seven hundred Christiania residents filed independent lawsuits against the Danish government, alleging that the plan to incorporate Christiania violated their squatter’s rights. A class action suit on behalf of a larger group of residents was filed as well.33 At this time, there was a shift overall in Danish society from an attitude of tolerance towards squats to one that was less welcoming. A reporter from a small independent newspaper notes that there had been no new squats created in Copenhagen since 1998—though there were some that were longstanding. He notes that “As you know the thing in Denmark is different than from Germany. Due to government repression it is impossible to keep the squats. We have still got a couple of autonomous centers.”34 The “clampdown” on Juliana Christiania might be said to have begun, however, in 2001 with the election of a liberal-conservative government headed by Anders Fogh Rasmussen. His party platform for the election emphasized combating drug trafficking and political radicalism. The new government also included, for the first time, a right-wing party called the Danish People’s Party. This group, which was previously considered a fringe group, was now the third largest party in Parliament. Led by Pia Kjaersgaard, an older grandmotherly woman, the party was described as setting the terms of debate for the 2001 election. The Danish People’s Party focused on the issues of inner-city gang violence and problems of immigration. Under the Danish system of “contract politics,” which was the norm between 2001 and 2011, the electorate was promised specific policies and initiatives that were met by the government after the election.35 In this case, the electorate expected to see its new government making strong moves to address these problems. Thus, the new government put forth a “zero tolerance” policy aimed at tightening legal control of drugs, raising penalties for offenses and increasing access to treatment. Vibeke Asmussen suggests that the new government created a “moral panic” about the issue of drug abuse, though it was always present in Denmark. (Statistics indicate that Denmark has the highest lifetime prevalence of cannabis in the EU, with 31.3 percent of the adult population admitting to occasionally using the substance.)36 Drug policy had actually been a permanent matter of dispute between Denmark’s political parties for the previous thirty years. The parties disagreed about whether drugs should be banned outright or tolerated, and about whether legal distinctions should exist between those who deal drugs and those who merely purchase drugs, as well as whether all drugs should be treated the same in legal terms.37 At this time, the government passed the 2001 “Law Prohibiting Visitors to Designated Places”—better known as the Hash House law. This law was intended to clamp down on places where drug activities were known to be taking place, but also targeted Christiania, which was said to be the site of criminal activities including a market in cannabis, as well as harder drugs

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such as cocaine and amphetamines, in addition to a weapons trade. (The law was reinterpreted in 2005 to make it easier to close down hash houses altogether.)38 The new government also began actually enforcing many of the laws pertaining to Christiania that were formally on the books, but that were not enforced. Thus, government officials identified ninety-eight illegal buildings that needed to be either torn down or upgraded.39 In 2002, the new government asked Christiania to tear down five structures that were deemed unsafe. The people complied without argument.40 In May 2003, the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defense published a report on Christiania that documented links between organized crime and biker gangs. At this point, the metaphor of the failed state can be said to have fully emerged. The report by the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defense in particular warned about a “spillover effect” of hard drugs, noting that after Christiania made trading in hard drugs illegal, dealers merely relocated outside the grounds of Christiania to nearby surrounding neighborhoods. The rhetoric of securitization is obvious in the report’s call for the allocation of extremely high police resources for a sustained duration41 to confront the problem as well as in the government’s formal launch of a program (or campaign) known as “The Fight Against Drugs.” However, the campaign might also be perceived as a “fight against Christiania”—since a government official at this time described Christiania as “an eyesore, a security hazard and an unruly community which needs to step in line with the rest of the country.”42 Helge Adam Mueller, the Conservative Party spokesman, noted that “Christiania’s days as a hotbed for hashish are numbered.”43 Empowered by new measures detailed in the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defense report, Norway’s police began conducting surveillance and countermeasures in Christiania—including videotaping Pusher Street, tapping radio communications and phone calls. The security force deployed to the area was dubbed “Christiania’s intelligence service.” Later, the police denied the existence of this group. However, the Christiania café Månefiskeren set up a bulletin board where patrons were urged to keep a record of the number of police patrols on Christiania beginning in November 2005. In the summer of 2006 this record noted the one thousandth patrol (about four to six patrols a day). These patrols normally consisted of six to twenty police officers, often dressed in combat uniform and sometimes with police dogs. In addition the report and subsequent legislation explicitly removed the distinction between sellers and buyers, saying that it needed to target both supply and demand for drugs.44 At the same time that the government was conducting a crackdown on drug activity in Christiania, it also began looking more closely at architectural and zoning violations in the enclave. A spokesman for the Left Liberal party Venstre noted that many of the buildings that were being degraded by the squatter settlement had great cultural value to the rest of Denmark.45

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THE DISCOURSE OF FREE-RIDING, CULTURAL PATRIMONY AND CRIME At this point in time, there was an insertion of three novel discourses in the discussion of Christiania—both by the media and particularly by Denmark’s conservative politicians. First, we encounter the discourse of cultural patrimony, along with the discourse of theft or free-riding. We also encounter the securitization frame. At this time, Denmark’s Agency for Palaces and Cultural Properties became involved in discussions regarding the fate of Christiania. The agency issued a reported that noted that the fortifications were overgrown and that buildings were improperly preserved. The agency also was concerned about buildings the residents had erected that leaned against or otherwise touched historic structures, fearing that these constructions might eventually damage the structures.46 Here the argument was that the historic treasures of the military barracks, which had existed since 1816, were something that belonged to all of Denmark. Everyone should have the right to tour and visit the monument and it should be preserved for the good of all. For the first time, Christiania was also portrayed as a group of freeloaders or free-riders, profiting at the expense of the rest of Denmark through taking something that was not theirs. As a British newspaper reporter notes, “other people in Copenhagen feel that ‘why should they be allowed to live so well, so cheaply?’”47 In reality, most Copenhagen residents were ill-informed about the status of Christiania. Since 1991, residents of Christiania have paid both real property taxes and personal taxes. (The commune also paid approximately $750,000 a year in rent to the Ministry of Defense until a recent agreement allowed the residents to purchase the compound.)48 Businesses in the compound also have had to register legally with Danish authorities since 1991 and thus pay VAT.49 Finally, the rhetoric of both criminality and security was applied in both media and public policy discussions about Christiania. Hjort suggests that for politicians “crime” became a sort of catchword or code word to describe events in Christiania, and that in this way reports tended to exaggerate the nature of illegal activity taking place in Christiania. Thus, already, one can see a conflation of the themes of illegal immigration, drugs, gang warfare and squatting. In the period since 1973 and the end of the guest worker program in Norway, one can see a gradual tightening of immigration policies in Denmark, which today has some of strictest policies in Europe for acquiring citizenship.50 In particular, the Danish People’s Party has strongly emphasized both law and order rhetoric and antiimmigrant policies. In this way, the word “gangs” appears to often function as a code word for a larger conversation about immigration. Gang strongholds that are mentioned in news reports are frequently found in Noerrebro, a district of Copenhagen that is heavily associated with immigrants. In addition, though the term “immigrant” is often attached to gang members,

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the members may in fact be second- or even third-generation citizens of Denmark, although they are not ethnically Danish. Here we can see the simultaneous securitization of the immigration issue, the gang issue, the drugs issue and the squatting issue. The four are seen as related and equally harmful, and extraordinary resources are called for to defeat all four. In granting the police extraordinary resources to confront the gang and drug problems, it thus became possible also to extend the reach of the police and the powers granted to them even within the confines of Christiania. In this way, policy towards Christiania was often conflated with other issues, including gang policy, drug policy and immigration policy. Gangs were seen as a problem of illegal immigration, and Christiania was seen as a place that harbored both gangs and drugs. In a sense, Christiania was a casualty of the attempts made to reestablish state control in the other arenas—those of drugs, gangs and immigration. In addition, closing Christiania was both a politically simple and politically palatable solution. In choosing this option, the police and policy makers appeared to be taking a hard-line stance against drugs and gangs without encountering charges that they were acting specifically against immigrants. In a globalizing world, policing becomes increasingly challenging. If it was not possible to deal satisfactorily and thoroughly with either illegal immigration or with transnational crimes like drugs and gangs, then perhaps closing Christiania was a short-term domestic solution to an international problem. At least it would not provide the setting for these new crimes. Ageold Danish values of alternative lifestyles and tolerance were thus a casualty of life in a globalized world, where such values were no longer practical with open borders.51

SECURITIZING ACT THREE: RAIDS AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE The clampdown continued with the passage of the Christiania Act of 2004. This act reintroduced a number of laws and regulations in the area. In particular, this law legally abolished Christiania’s status as a collective, noting that from now on all nine hundred members would be treated as individuals. In March 2004, a report was produced, the aim of which was to advise Denmark’s government on how to “normalize” and “legalize” Christiania. “Normalization” was a term that essentially meant taking away the special protected status that Christiania had enjoyed. Here authority figures noted that “regular citizens” objected to the special status of Christiania’s residents or the notion that their own behavior was tightly regulated in a society that values conformity while the residents of Christiania could apparently violate the rules with impunity. The analysts Mikkelsen and Karpantschof have suggested that “ordinary citizens are angered by the idea that they can be fined for speeding while in Christiania drug dealers continue to earn

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52

untaxed revenue unchecked. It seems that police turn a blind eye.” Adam Moller, a former Special Forces soldier and Conservative MP, has noted that “We have been too tolerant and too liberal for too long in this country. No one in Denmark should be beyond the law. There is a limit and Christiania is past that limit.”53 At this point, the main rhetorical frame used to talk about Christiania was one of free-riding and economic crime. Christiania’s residents were described—as Britain’s residents initially were—as engaging in a type of theft of property through enjoying goods that they had not paid for and had not earned. We can trace the growth of this rhetoric back to the influence of the Liberal Party (Venstre) and other members of the Liberal Conservative alliance who were very much probusiness and on the side of industry. Thus, they took a businesslike approach to Christiania, treating it as real estate that was potentially of interest to developers, and that, as real estate, had the potential to affect real estate prices in surrounding neighborhoods.54 As Christa Amouroux notes: The state argued that normalization was a transparent, lawful process that would simply make things more equitable by integrating and legalizing the Christiania area. . . . The state argued that communal control and ownership over public space provided an unfair advantage, one that was not available to the rest of the law abiding Danes.55 A citizen of Christiania commented on developments, noting that official policy was to “reinstate the logic of private property. . . . If you live on expensive land, you have to pay for it.”56 Thus, in considering solutions, Jacob Heinessen, the chairman of the parliamentary committee producing the report, suggested two possible options that would materialize several years later: either the Danish government should clear the land and sell it to property developers, or it should allow the commune to form a cooperative in order to purchase the land themselves.57 At the same time, British reporter Anthony offered a different take on the forces leading to a crackdown on Christiania. He noted that: The outside world has changed almost beyond recognition since the days of the peace and love idealism that gave birth to the commune. The communism of the soviet bloc is long dead, European socialism is on life support (or an EU grant) and the free market now reigns supreme. . . . No walls can withstand the siege of history and the commune has had to adapt, at the risk of falling apart.58 In this analysis, Christiania is described as a sort of backward area (like a colony) that time has forgotten. The analyst describes the hash scene on Pusher Street, noting that “at night, the scene, with its dirty road and ramshackle bars is reminiscent of a Wild West Town or some lawless backwater

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of Dickensian London.” Thus, Christiania was increasingly being viewed as a relic of a past era in Danish politics and culture, but not as a place whose mission or identity fit into the new Denmark, which faced an array of different problems. Christiania thus starts to appear like a quaint museum or monument to past ideals—and its residents like members of an indigenous group or culture whose lifestyle might merit preservation on historic grounds rather than a place or group of people with independent agency and the right to participate fully in the making of policies involving them. At the same time, the law on euphoria-inducing substances was revised to criminalize possession of cannabis. It was now illegal to possess any amount of drugs, cannabis included, in Denmark. The settlement itself at this point conformed, largely by imposing new rules upon itself. New rules adopted in Christiania included a ban on violence; a ban on hard drugs; a ban on weapons (which they hoped would end the clashes between drug gangs operating on Pusher Street) and a ban on the wearing of bulletproof vests.59 On March 16–17, 2004, the police conducted the first of several raids on the area. In the March raid, two hundred police detained fifty-three people in a crackdown on the open sale of hashish, keeping forty in solitary confinement for three months. The raid is said to have destroyed the local cannabis economy, whose transactions were valued at 80 million dollars annually. The ultimate aim of the raid was the closure of Pusher Street. An interview conducted with Police Chief Kai Vittrup notes that now that the police had gotten Pusher Street and Christiania under control, they had additional police forces available to deploy elsewhere in the city as the drug war continued to be fought.60 The notion here is one of opportunity costs—surveilling Christiania was seen as simply taking too many resources. Thus, it became a liability that law enforcement could no longer afford—regardless of its financial contributions to the tourist industry in Denmark. The prevalence of the security frame is obvious in the language used by neighborhood bystanders and Christiania residents who describe the raid, noting that “they came at night,” landing on buildings from helicopters and utilizing a full arsenal of antiterrorist equipment.61 On April 24, 2005, a twenty-six-year-old Christiania resident was killed and three other residents injured in a violent gang assault on Pusher Street. The reason for this was a feud over the cannabis market of Copenhagen. That same year, the law on hash houses was reinterpreted to mean that the government could close them. A statement by the Departments of Finance and Economics noted that in January 1, 2006, Christiania would be stripped of its special status. The statement noted that “Christiania will become a neighborhood like any other, which is open to everyone, freed of drugs and which respects the laws of the country.”62 The residents of Christiania formed a contact group consisting of representatives of the fourteen districts of Christiania, obtained legal representation and appealed the decision, arguing that it violated the European

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Convention on Human Rights. They also objected to the establishment of any sort of park that might glorify the military history of Denmark, arguing that they themselves were pacifists. Finally, they voiced ideological objections to what they saw as the “privatization” of Christiania. However, the appeal was struck down in Danish courts in 2009.63 Nonetheless, the attempt at normalization is widely perceived as having failed. “Jessica” wrote in 2011 that the attempt at cracking down had merely wasted police resources and succeeded in spreading the illegal drug trade across the city rather than keeping it contained in one location. In addition, the continued police actions had a negative impact on the tourist trade in Christiania.64

SECURITIZING ACT FOUR: THE FINAL ACT In 2007, the National Heritage Agency proposed protection status for some of the ancient military buildings, now in Christiania. In May 2007, the authorities also attempted to clear out the remains of a building that had burned down in Christiania. This led to some of the worst violence in the commune’s history, as protestors threw rocks and bottles at the riot squads, and lit barricades on fire. Police used tear gas and in the violence a library and a school were damaged. A Christiania member noted that “This is war. If the police want to come in and rip down our homes they will get what they deserve.”65 In September 2007, the representatives of Christiania and Copenhagen’s city council reached an agreement to cede control of Christiania to the city over the course of ten years for the purposes of business development.66 The settlement was officially placed under the jurisdiction of the Agency for Palaces and Cultural Properties, which was a subsidiary of Denmark’s Ministry of Finance. Christiania’s residents would be required to buy the site on which the squat stood from the Danish government, and in the future anyone would be able to live in Christiania if an apartment was put up for sale by a resident and purchased. Thus, the houses were “just real estate” and the old policies and procedures of vetting new residents on ideological and social grounds would be eliminated. Residents feared losing their communal character if, for example, new residents did not share the same values or commitment to the Christiania way of life. At the same time, Copenhagen’s city government cracked down on another squat known as Ungdomshuset (Young People’s House) in the Noerrebro district of Copenhagen. Left-wing youth activists had used the building since 1982, but the city sold it in 1999 to a Christian group known as Human A/S, which wished to establish a refuge called Fadershuset (Father’s House).67 In the notice regarding the decision to close the house and put it up for repair, city officials noted that it was fungus-infested, did not meet codes for fire safety—given that it was being used to hold large public events like

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concerts—and that it would cost 1 million pounds to repair.68 In language reminiscent of that used to describe Christiania, Ungdomshuset has also been described as “an autonomous space run according to anti-authoritarian and anti-capitalist principles.” It was used for a variety of activities, including concerts, festivals, feeding the homeless, meetings, a bookstore, a studio and a city garden.69 The group that had purchased the building acquired a court order to evict the squatters but they refused to leave. The Danish police first attempted to remove the squatters in December 2006, leading to a riot involving one thousand protestors. Fleming Steen Munch, the spokesman for the police, noted, “It is extremely violent. It looked like a war zone and it’s been many years since we last had to use tear gas on the streets.”70 At that point, those who supported Ungdomshuset began conducting weekly demonstrations, and the Danish government began preemptively arresting people in advance of the demonstrations.71 The next operation carried out in March 2007 to evict the squatters led to 217 arrests, and twenty-five injuries. Again, the Danish media described the scene as a “war zone.” Antiterrorist squad troops arrived on top of the building by helicopter in the middle of the night, while police in riot gear blocked streets. Youths gathered behind barricades, yelling and throwing objects. According to Police Spokesman Fleming Steen Munch, “In the last ten years we haven’t had riots like these.”72 A bonfire set by protesters in the street also ignited a fire in a nearby building that housed a daycare center, leading the media to report that arson had also occurred.73 Among those arrested were foreigners from France, Germany, Norway, Poland, Lithuania, New Zealand and the United States. Protests also occurred in support of Ungdomshuset and against police brutality outside embassies in Germany, Sweden, Norway and Austria.74 This operation was successful and the Christian group proceeded to carry out repairs on the house in order to make it habitable. However, they were forced to use Polish construction workers on the project since Danish unions forbid workers from working on a site where police protection is required.75 At the time, a correspondent for a local Danish paper queried the attachment of the word “squatter” to the residents of Ungdomshuset, noting that many Danish viewed the relationship between the residents and the house as “like a common law marriage to the house: if after 20 years the post office will deliver your mail and you can book Bjork to perform there, the place is yours. The youth, though, being as youth are, would rather cohabitate than make that marriage official.”76 Here, it was suggested that the crackdowns on both Ungdomshuset and Christiania were part of a carefully planned and crafted effort to eliminate squats in Copenhagen. The plan was first to eliminate the minor problem of Ungdomshuset before moving on to the major problem of Christiania.77 While Ungdomshuset was described in language that focused on youth violence and squalor, in contrast to descriptions of Christiania as a site of gang

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violence and drugs, the methods used by the police were similar, as was the pattern of allocation of resources to conduct antisquat activities. It is also worth noting that this is the first time in Europe that we can identify a systematic pattern of government actions against ideological squats or art squats in particular. Previously, government officials in Europe had practiced tolerance towards art squats, placing them in a different danger category than survival squats, for example. Writing in 2009, a journalist for the publication Occupied London noted that: Insecurity and suspicion (if not downright hate against anything falling outside the narrowing definitions of “Danishness”) is intensifying and altogether forming a part of what the neo-liberal government calls its “kultur kamp”. Culture war: the goal is to eradicate all traces of Denmark’s socialist, communal history. . . . Everything that does not conform is marginalized, undermined or crushed. The response: intensifying conflict and refusal of compromise.78

The Discourse of Crime and Security However, the discourse of danger that surrounded squats was increasing as public opinion and policymakers became increasingly concerned about the rise of gang-related activities. Beginning in 2007, both Danish and international analysts had begun to focus on the rise in gang warfare. Reports detailed the racial aspects of the gang wars, noting that traditionally Danish gangs like the Hells Angels and AK81 had gone to war with new immigrant gangs, including the Black Cobra, founded by Palestinian immigrants in 2000. The new gangs were Arab, Bosnian, Turkish, Somali, Iraqi, Moroccan, Palestinian and Pakistani. Many functioned as transnational criminal actors, establishing related gangs in other Scandinavian cities and throughout Western Europe.79 The gangs fought largely over the control of the drug trade, as well as over the control of the markets in prostitution and human trafficking and smuggling.80 Copenhagen’s police bureau called for the analysis of the problem and the writing of a report in 2007. This was the first attempt at gauging the seriousness of the problem, and the report concluded that approximately fourteen gangs were operating in Denmark, with approximately one thousand members.81 That same year, Canadian reporter Rachel Mendleson wrote in MacLean’s that approximately sixty people had died in gang warfare in Denmark in 2007. Her own statistics indicate that fifteen hundred members were involved in gang activities by 2008.82 Reports on the gang wars used both a barbarian frame and a nationalist frame. A report by Sennels quotes a Norwegian police officer who notes that “visiting the dungeons of the immigrant gangs is like visiting a monkey cage. They crawl on walls, try to escape and have absolutely no respect

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for the police.” The parallel with a failed state is also drawn, when the police officer notes the existence of so-called “no go” zones in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Paris and London. Here he is referring to immigrant enclaves within the capital where criminals can vanish from the authorities. A lack of infrastructure means that those who live there are not well documented, and criminal authorities may have a hard time pursuing individuals once they disappear into an enclave since they lack the cultural and linguistic knowledge to collect intelligence and make inroads in the community. Thus, immigrant enclaves (and other types of unsurveilled space, like Christiania) are seen as places that threaten the stability of their surrounding neighborhoods. They are a type of interstitial or failed space. Here, Sennels suggests that the number of no-go zones is increasing, noting that “we can’t surrender any more turf to the barbarians.”83 The notion of a crisis of extraordinary proportions appears again in a quote by Brian Mikkelsen, Denmark’s justice minister. In describing the threat posed by immigrant gangs, he notes that “we’ll give police almost anything they ask for. We need extraordinary steps. We won’t give the gangs a moment’s rest.”84 In 2009, two developments took place that again landed Christiania in the spotlight. The commune was drawn into the violence that surrounded the UN Climate Change Summit in December 2009. The commune hosted an “alternative summit” known as Klima Forum, attended largely by NGO members who were frustrated with official state attempts to confront climate change, and who were interested in exploring small, sustainable development initiatives of the type found at Christiania. (Christiania has embraced composting and solar power.) However, thousands of individuals from a variety of groups, including Black Bloc, who had traveled to Denmark hoping to disrupt the UN Summit, also took refuge at Christiania.85 Fearing violence, police cordoned off Christiania, erecting barricades so individuals could not enter. Thirty-six individuals attending the summit (most of whom were foreign) were arrested. Demonstrators responded by throwing petrol bombs and starting fires. Police used tear gas and water cannons against protestors and entered Christiania with dogs to make arrests.86 A police officer was injured and four cars were burned during the clash.87 A number of gang-related shootouts occurred on the streets of Christiania throughout 2009 as well. In each case, it appears that Christiania did not so much cause the violence as it hosted the violence. The anarchic, ungoverned nature of Christiania meant that it provided a welcoming environment for those who were planning acts of an illegal and violent nature, since it was possible to operate in Christiania with less police surveillance. But as the government was pressured to crack down on violent gang-related activities occurring in the capital, Christiania was implicated in the conversation, and cracking down on Christiania soon became part of the overall crackdown plan.

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2012: FROM SOCIAL EXPERIMENT TO PUBLIC RECREATION AREA In June 2011, Claus Jhort Frederiksen, the Danish finance minister, proposed a buyout option that would allow Christiania residents to collectively buy the property. At the same time, a court ruled that the region should be a self-regulating, autonomous region but that it should be responsible for its own security.88 This would prove challenging, due to the limited financial means of many individual members, as well as of the collective. The group was given until July 1, 2012, to put up an initial down payment of 51.8 million kroner towards the total purchase price of 85.4 million kroners. The loan was to be paid off over thirty years, with interest.89 At this point, the residents of Christiania came up with the novel solution of selling shares in the enterprise. They hoped that the IPO would raise 10 million euros.90 Shares were available for purchase by visitors to Christiania as well as over the Internet. Prices ranged from 3.50 to 1750 dollars. A resident noted that “Christiania belongs to everyone. We’re trying to put ownership in an abstract form.”91 In the words of a member of the newly formed Christiania fund, “We don’t want to own anything . . . we don’t want to own the houses. We don’t want to own the land. . . . But we were stuck between a rock and a hard place.”92 In addition, a representative of Christiania traveled to New York in an attempt to sell shares to the Occupy Wall Street protestors, most of whom had never heard of Christiania and seemed confused by the offer. Two of Denmark’s major political parties spoke out against the offer of a loan to Christiania. Peter Skaarup, spokesman for the Danish Folkeparti, noted that his party would support the deal only if enough order was restored to Christiania to allow police to patrol there. He noted that “We can’t promise to vote for the document (offering a loan) if the situation in Christiania is as lawless as it is. We must assure that the police have the necessary resources to stop the disorder and uphold the law against the gangster stronghold in Christiania.”93 In addition, an article in the Jyllands-Posten suggests that the government was being cowardly in somehow signing off on an agreement that would give thieves the right to own their stolen property, and even at a subsidized rate.94 Thus, it was clear that what the commune was “purchasing” was not sovereignty but rather legality.

CONCLUSIONS The final chapter of the story of Christiania begins in 2011, when plans led to the legal incorporating of Christiania into Copenhagen. The final solution, which involved a buyout of the land by the Christiania Foundation through a subsided thirty-year loan from the government, is particularly interesting when compared to the British solution to squatting. In Britain,

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the 2011 legislation led to the criminalization of squatters as individuals, since those who choose to squat are now subject to legal penalties for carrying out squatting activities. Here, the aim was to defend individual homeowners and neighborhoods from individuals and their activities. In contrast, in Denmark, the squat itself or the enclave was criminalized—as it came to be associated with criminal activity, including gangs and drugs. Thus, in Britain, new legislation evolved to regulate the activities of individuals who were considered to be participating in dangerous activities. In Denmark, however, new legislation evolved to regulate the spaces associated with squatting rather than the individuals who made a decision to squat. Here the emphasis was on regulating collective behaviors, rather than individual behaviors. In addition, the conversation about regulation in Britain was specifically a conversation about immigration. In contrast, the crackdown on Christiania never explicitly mentioned immigration or the immigrant threat. Instead, the rhetoric of criminality, securitization and free-riding was used to muster public opinion and to challenge perceptions about the utility and role of Christiania. It could be argued that the Danish solution is more moderate while the British solution is more extreme. In Britain, the aim was to eliminate squatting altogether from the list of acceptable lifestyle choices for both British residents and those who might come from abroad. In contrast, Denmark has found a way to keep the squat, but to preserve it as a relic or a museum piece. In his blog “Travel as a Political Act,” the travel writer Rick Steves compares the Christianites he sees wandering in Copenhagen (wearing simple hand-knit sweaters and pushing their Christiania tricycles, the baskets laden with fresh produce) to the Amish you might see riding along a highway in the United States in a horse-drawn buggy.95 He comments that they look out of place and that they somehow manage to live both in their native city and somewhere else, maybe even in a different time period. It can be seen that Christianites are thus an asset to Copenhagen and its tourism industry because they add local color. However, they do not wield any significant influence in the city of Copenhagen or perhaps even in their own community. In Denmark, squatting was not eliminated. It has been rather domesticated or expropriated.96 Evidence of this domestication of Christiania can be seen in an information sheet available at Denmark’s Agency for Palaces and Cultural Properties. The sheet notes the fact that Christiania’s amenities should be available to all citizens and not only those who reside in Christiania. Thus, in a city where open space is in short supply, the government’s policy is that Christiania should be treated as a park where all can walk on weekends and get fresh air. The information sheet notes that: The area shall continue to be a green and traffic-free area in Copenhagen; with room for alternative lifestyles but in accordance with general rules of Danish law without a special act, without the hash trade,

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with rent payment and open housing allocation, with maintenance of preservation-worthy buildings, and protection of the fortification as an open and recreational area for Christianites, Copenhageners and the public in general.97 However, the question remains whether this attempt at the domestication of Christiania will ultimately be successful. While on paper the plan appears to have succeeded, and legally Christiania is no longer an independent site of ideology and activity, it remains to be seen whether the activities that made Christiania a site of danger can actually be brought under control. The squatter “Tom” notes that Christiania is a place “both reviled and celebrated: to some it is a successful social experiment; to others it is a lawless drug den.”98 Indeed, a recent BBC Report on Danish terrorism cases that have occurred in the last ten years includes a report of five left-wing extremists who planned arson attacks on the Danish Parliament, the Justice Ministry, the Integration Ministry and other sites in Copenhagen. The individuals were arrested in April 2012. The report notes that most of the planning meetings that took place were conducted at Christiania.99 Thus, the image of a poorly monitored site that attracts a criminal element, including potential terrorists, remains.

4

Grenoble, 2010 Failed Attempts to Securitize the Roma Squats

Thus far in this work, we have examined squats in Britain—including the art squat as well as the survival squat. We have also considered the squatter enclave in Denmark that was described as a heterotopia, a space within a space characterized by a unique ideology, residence pattern and philosophy. In this chapter, we will turn our eye towards the decision in the summer of 2010 by the right-wing government of Nikolas Sarkozy to demolish the over 300 so-called Roma squats located throughout France and to deport their residents. In doing so, we will consider the events of 2010 as a case of unsuccessful securitization—since the international community criticized and condemned Sarkozy’s attempts to frame these activities as a justifiable response to an epidemic of crime within France and within the Roma community. Squatting in Britain was successfully securitized—in the sense that legislation was passed and not subsequently changed—largely through the actions of politicians and the media to portray lifestyle squatters as a threat to British national identity and property values. Squatting in Denmark in contrast was successfully securitized through the efforts of elected politicians and bureaucrats, who focused on portraying not individuals but rather the space of Christiania itself as an existential security threat. That is, Christiania itself was characterized as a sort of internal failed state within the confines of Copenhagen that provided a haven for drug-dealing and gang violence. For this reason, many Danes came to view the reincorporation of Christiania into the confines of Copenhagen proper as a necessary and justified step by Denmark’s government. As we have seen, in both the Danish and the British cases, policy towards property squatting did not emerge in isolation, nor were efforts to securitize the issue created out of thin air. Instead, rhetoric by politicians and the media regarding the dangers presented by squatters, who and what they threatened and the measures that needed to be taken to counteract squatting rested on older conversations and discourses—about who belonged in a society, the obligations of citizenship and the nation’s future. However, in considering the decision to securitize and crack down on unregistered squats, both large and small, France in particular has taken a hard line—making international headlines in 2002, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010

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and on into the present day as the result of the demolitions of encampments of Roma throughout France, and the demolition of the squatter camp known as “the jungle” in Calais. Indeed, following the imposition of a policy in 2010 under President Sarkozy to close over three hundred illegal Roma encampments, the term “ethnic cleansing” was used in the European press,1 with many analysts suggesting that France was not conducting a war on crime nor a war on squatting, but rather that France was using rhetoric about crime and squatting as a subterfuge in order to conduct a war (which enjoyed high levels of domestic support) on the Roma people living in France.2 Since the Roma people in particular are a protected class of citizens within the European Union, attempts by the French government to address the problems of large squats—which were depicted by the Sarkozy government in 2010 and later by Francois Hollander’s socialist government in 2012 as a threat to internal security—quickly became the subject of international scrutiny and regulation, with EU representatives in particular commenting harshly on the French decisions to deport residents of the squats back to Bulgaria and Romania. In France in particular, squatting has become a direct foreign policy issue, in the case of negotiations between Britain and France regarding the situation of illegal immigrants living in the squat known as the jungle in Calais. It has also become an international issue as both the EU and international bodies have weighed in on decisions regarding the Roma immigrants as well as the mostly African and Arab residents of “the jungle.” In this chapter, we will consider in particular the attempt by then president Sarkozy to raze approximately three hundred Roma squats around France beginning in July 2010. In looking at the 2010 rhetoric and actions for the deportation of Roma immigrants, one can see that efforts to securitize the problem of Roma squats succeeded internally in France, while simultaneously failing as a strategy within international affairs. That is, domestic French public opinion was overwhelmingly supportive of the hard line taken by French president Sarkozy towards what he depicted as a crisis situation, with over three hundred Roma “camps” located outside Paris’s largest cities. The camps were (according to Sarkozy and his supporters) the site of “illegal trafficking, of profoundly shocking living standards, of exploitation of children for begging, of prostitution and of crime.”3 However, as Sarkozy went forward with an initiative to shut over three hundred illegal camps and deport the approximately twelve thousand illegal Roma immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania in France, members of the European Union Parliament roundly condemned actions that they saw as violating EU antidiscrimination laws, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights.4 Attempts by President Sarkozy and Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux to reframe the issue of Roma squats as an issue not of human rights and the rights of national minorities but rather of security and safety for France’s residents fell on deaf ears in the European Parliament, where the prevailing view was that the issue was one of freedom of movement and ethnic discrimination, not crime—either domestic or transnational.

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Thus, one can view the events of France’s so-called Summer of Shame as an attempted securitization that ultimately failed. Thus we must consider why the securitization of property squatting was relatively successful in England and Denmark but not in France. In this chapter we explore the significant differences in the French example. First we can consider the objects of securitization, the Roma themselves. As Jean-Pierre Liegeois notes, the category of those who are “travelers” in France is quite broad. Those who refer to themselves as Gitans are originally from Spain, Portugal and France. Manouches, or fairground gypsies, are actually from Germany and France, while those who are described as Roms are from Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria predominantly.5 In addition, there are French citizens who are of Romani extraction, or second-generation Roma in France, though both public policy documents and the general public often fail to make a distinction between French-born Roma and those from Eastern Europe. What is important here, however, is that France’s decision in July 2010 to both close Roma encampments or squats and repatriate Roma who lived in the camps back to their countries of origin (largely Bulgaria and Romania) was not regarded as merely an internal French policy decision; because of the status of the Roma within the European Community, the European Parliament has a particular interest in coordinating Europe-wide policies on the rights of Roma people due to the Roma’s status as one of the most marginalized groups in the EU.6 The long and violent history of persecution of the Gypsies—from the Middle Ages to the Nazi holocaust, when an estimated five hundred thousand gypsies died at Auschwitz and Dachau—has rendered European institutions particularly sensitive to the need to safeguard the human rights of this group.7 Thus, the European Parliament is working to implement a European Strategy for Roma Inclusion by 2020, which would include Europe-wide goals and policies in the areas of education policy, employment policy, housing policy and health policy. Because of this propensity by the European Union (as well as other international bodies) to regard even Roma citizens who carry citizenship of the EU nations as a special sort of category of citizen, it was impossible for President Sarkozy to securitize the issue of Roma settlements without the full cooperation and concurrence of many additional European and international players, and this did not occur. Furthermore, because of the history of the Nazi holocaust and the persecutions of Gypsies that occurred throughout Europe including in Vichy France, any attempt to stigmatize a particular minority ethnic group or to blame them for generating a social problem was likely to be read within this historic context, thus limiting the effectiveness or attractiveness of a securitization strategy. Because of the legal and cultural status of the Roma, Sarkozy’s attempt at securitizing the matter of Roma encampments succeeded on an internal level while failing externally. That is, when the closure of the camps was marketed to French citizens as a necessary step due to dangers posed by the encampments—including the risk of criminality as well as a health

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risk—many of France’s citizens supported this initiative. They agreed with Sarkozy about the need for a national response to what they saw largely as a domestic social problem of housing, and agreed with him about the solution as well as the need to implement it rapidly as part of a war on crime. However, Sarkozy massively underestimated the role that international actors would take in this situation. He essentially saw it as a matter of internal politics, while Europe saw it as a matter of European politics and the UN saw it as a matter of international policy. While the threat may have seemed severe to villagers on a local level, neither the regional (European) community nor the international community agreed with Sarkozy’s assessment of either the danger presented or the necessity of taking steps to deal with this danger. Instead, Sarkozy was widely criticized by the European Union, which undertook infringement procedures against him. This outcome suggests that attempts to securitize squatting and encampments in the future may be markedly less successful as Europe integrates, since individual states will have far less latitude in articulating and framing security threats or in establishing a hard-line state response to these problems. The French examples may thus provide clues as to how these issues might look elsewhere in Europe in the years to come as the border between domestic and international issues becomes less clear and freedom of movement continues to grow. And securitization, which seems more effective as an internal strategy than an international strategy, may come to have limited utility in the future as a result.8

HOUSING POLICY IN FRANCE As noted, what is unusual about the French situation is that a language of housing rights and public responsibility to provide housing to citizens arose at the same time as rhetoric of exclusion and criminality in reference to the housing situation of immigrants. Thus, providing housing to all eligible citizens was described as a duty of both the French government and its citizens, and the language of charity and provision was frequently used in making these claims. At the same time, one can identify the growth of right-wing, anti-immigrant rhetoric that described the ways in which immigrants would be excluded from the social system and even deported if necessary. Thus, providing housing to French citizens was part of a politics of positive identity, while excluding the non-French from accessing the same services was part of a politics of negative identity. Analyst Marie Loison calls our attention to the existence of housing rights in France, which can be traced back to the Constitution of October 27, 1946. This document notes that: The Nation shall provide the individual and the family with the conditions necessary to their development. . . . All people who, by virtue

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However, as Lanzaro point out, until the 1950s, private charities had exclusive responsibility for sheltering the poor and the state did not create social assistance services until 1953.10 While France’s efforts to shelter the homeless and socially vulnerable populations were considered adequate, difficulties began in the 1980s with increasing unemployment and job insecurity, and since then the number of homeless, particularly in urban areas, has grown. Thus, at least some of France’s squatter problem is considered by housing analysts to be internally generated—as the result of market inefficiencies, insufficient housing stock and economic factors. As the result of the growing problems in the housing sector in the 1980s, the Quilliot Act was passed in 1982, which restated the principle that “the right to housing is a fundamental right.” However, the right to housing was substantively strengthened with the passage of the Besson Act in 1999. (Besson was France’s minister of housing at the time.) This legislation noted that “guaranteeing the right to housing is a duty of solidarity incumbent upon the whole nation” while clarifying the principle that France’s government was not obligated to provide housing as such, but was obligated to assist all who qualified for social housing in their attempts to procure such housing. (That is, the government was not obligated to respond to a housing shortage by creating new housing, but was required to assure that the existing housing was allocated fairly.) In addition, the Anti-Exclusion Act of 1998 reinforced tenants’ rights through implementing measures to prevent eviction, to force landlords to take action and empty homes and to tackle substandard housing. As noted in Britain, rhetoric about housing policy in France rested on a notion of social inclusion. While Britain’s government made reference to a property ladder that all should wish to climb, France’s government spoke of a “staircase of transition” that was to allow categories of individuals such as the homeless and disadvantaged the chance to become normal housing residents.11 (Here it should be noted that private home ownership is less widespread in France, particularly in urban areas, so the rhetoric of normal homeownership might include both those who rent for their whole lives as well as those who own homes.) Thus, a government that was unable to house its own people and to gradually include them in the political system was seen as one that was illegitimate and as failing at least some percentage of its population. The housing crisis again made headlines in 2005, as a result of two events. First, a heat wave in Paris in August 2005 led to many deaths, particularly of elderly residents. In addition, that same month, a fire occurred in a temporary shelter located in a six-floor building in Paris’s thirteenth district. The fire injured thirty people and killed seventeen, mostly children.

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(Many of those killed were immigrants from Mali.) Although the shelter was described as temporary, the residents had lived there since 1991, while waiting for public housing to open up. Public outrage led to another of the many long-running attempts to pass legislation in the French National Assembly to strengthen the right to housing, through providing legal provisions to force the government to provide it if shortages of affordable housing made it inaccessible to large groups of people. However, the bill was not passed. In 2006, then, large public protests grew as homeless French citizens— backstopped by the media, well-known actresses and celebrities and the socialist government—began developing large public squats in Paris. The demonstrations began when the charitable group Medicines du Monde distributed tents to the homeless during a cold winter. However, the tents and tent cities remained in Paris in the spring of 2006. That same year, entertainment personality August le Grand, head of the organization Enfants de Don Quichotte, set up a blog, reached out to the public and invited them to come and spend time in the tent cities. The organization made up a charter for access to housing for all and met with the minister for social cohesion.12 The movement spread to other French cities, including Orleans, Lyons, Toulouse, Marseilles, Nice, Strasburg and Bordeaux. French housing squats were met with public charity, public outrage and ultimately a decision to implement legislation to create an “enforceable right to public housing” (known as DALO), which essentially gave teeth to citizens’ claims that they had a right to be housed by their localities through allowing them to petition the courts if this obligation was not met. The DALO legislation was implemented through bill no. 2007–290, which created a performance standard for the government in relation to the provision of housing. The demonstrations in Paris in 2006 helped create the narrative of a housing sector crisis, which enabled Deputy Prime Minister Etienne Pinte to assemble a report on housing that proposed emergency measures. (In this way, the domestic housing crisis became securitized—since it was regarded as a crisis that required the commitment of serious resources immediately in order to fend off future harm.) Emergency measures included creating a new position of prefect for housing policy, who was authorized to coordinate shelters and access to housing. In addition, construction work rose to the rank of a national priority for 2008–2012. Targets were set for local authorities to create stocks of appropriate housing and communities that failed to comply were fined.13 In this way, a local issue rose in rank on the national agenda, with more coordinated national action to reduce the number of people sleeping on the streets. However, from the beginning critics argued that DALO—while doing much to shore up the position of French homeless people—was discriminatory since it didn’t extend to all the homeless and unsheltered in France.14 As Aubry points out, only permanent residents and French citizens were eligible for DALO protection. Documented immigrants needed to have been on

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French territory for at least two years. For this reason, a legal suit alleging discrimination was filed against France’s housing ministry and heard in the French antidiscrimination commission known as HALDE (Haute Autorite de lute Contre les discriminations et pour l’egalitie or the High Authority Fighting against Discrimination and for Equal Rights) in 2007. HALDE found that anyone living in the country who fulfills the necessary conditions for securing housing access is eligible for DALO protection, noting that “There cannot be any orphan category deprived of fundamental rights provided by law.” Thus, the ruling indicated that from January 1 2012, DALO should extend to everyone who qualifies for but has not received social housing.15 The new bill also includes measures to create more social housing in addition to providing better immediate measures for relief for those who are homeless. Such measures include specifying a maximum length of stay in emergency accommodation before the state is required to provide more permanent housing, as well as measures providing for social follow-up for homeless individuals. Finally, the legislation sets targets dates for local authorities to create stocks of appropriate housing and provides for fines if targets are not met.16 Thus, France appears to have carried out exactly the measures that housing activists in Britain accused their government of not doing—namely, going beyond merely punishing those who carry out squatting to instead figuring out the causes of the housing crisis and providing genuine government support in addressing them, through increasing the stock of permanent housing available, as well as providing a greater variety of options for those who require housing. However, the solution is incomplete—largely because DALO applies only to those who are living lawfully in France but do not have decent housing.17 Thus, in contradiction to the European mandates, housing is regarded predominantly as a domestic policy issue within France, without being tied into the larger European conversation about the right to free movement or the rights of those who are non-French but living in France—as legal refugees, legal European visitors or illegal or unregistered individuals, including refugees and Roma. Instead, within France a separate policy has evolved to define the housing rights of French travelers and Roma in France, as well as to lay out the legal responsibilities of the government (both local and national) to provide housing for this group.18 In France, the legal framework for describing and discussing the rights of travelers themselves as well as the responsibilities of the government on all levels to accommodate these European citizens rests on the 2000 Law on Welcome and Accommodation of Travelling People. This legal document spells out the responsibility of each town in France to have a consultative commission that includes representatives of the municipality, of traveling people and of charitable organizations associated with housing, homelessness and the Roma. The state is also required to participate and encourage meetings.19 In addition, any city with more than five thousand residents must set aside areas for travelers to camp on—although the nongovernmental organization Amnesty International suggests that in

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20

point of fact less than half do. In addition, an analyst from Der Spiegel calls attention to the problems of de facto and de jure implementation of the rules. Thus, he notes that while municipalities are required by law to provide camping space for Roma they often provide space near a sewage plant, near a dump or on otherwise undesirable land so that Roma are then forced to camp illegally. City officials then can choose either to ignore the existence of the illegal camps or to make a point of enforcing the rules as they are written. In addition, European mandates note the obligation of local communities to make an effort to include Roma travelers in the life of the communities where they are located, through, for example, encouraging Roma families to send their children to the local school up until the legally mandated age for leaving school. In point of fact, however, municipalities in France and elsewhere in Europe may differ greatly in how seriously they take this responsibility and the steps they take to ease the incorporation of Roma into the life of the community.

THE EVENTS OF 2010 Thus, as the brief history just outlined shows, the tendency of both politicians and French citizens to regard Roma in one’s community as a “problem” and the existence of debate regarding the community’s obligations to the Roma are not a new theme in French—or indeed in European—politics. And even the rhetorical linking of the Roma people to the problem of crime was not a new strategy when President Sarkozy began to use it in 2010. Rather, as ethnologists have noted, the tendency for cultures to link the most socially marginalized group (those with undesirable social status) with ideas of purity and defilement as well as crime and socially undesirable behavior is quite ancient.21 In Western Europe, the issue of Roma citizens and the social problems associated with the communities came to the fore once again with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the lifting of tight border controls in the nations of Romania, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslavia. Thus, initiatives to exclude Roma travelers, as well as conversations about social integration, were on the agenda of most Western European nations throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, France is not the only nation to have attempted to remove the Roma population from its borders or to use force to shut down camps and squats of the Roma. Indeed since 2008, Italy has conducted expulsions of Roma, and in 2010 the vice mayor of Milan confirmed that Italy also had an agenda to destroy Roma camps there. Human rights groups also allege that Belgium has conducted the clandestine removal of Roma from camps there, and France’s own policy of “voluntarily” deporting Roma people back to Bulgaria and Romania was ongoing since 2007.22 Thus, what is significant about the events of 2010 was not that Sarkozy was introducing a new or novel strategy of responding to the Roma

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problem. Indeed, Sarkozy’s own history of dealing with squatters and refugees in France can be traced back to 2002, when, as interior minister under the government of Jacques Chirac, he led the drive to shut down the refugee camp at Calais for the first time.23 (The camp was the subject of negotiations between Britain and France in the late 2000s, was shut down in 2009 and has subsequently reappeared.) In addition, in 2009, France expelled two hundred to three hundred Roma from a camp near Paris. Riot police acted to break up the camp, acting on orders from a local judge. In addition, the Minister of the Interior Hortefeux noted that almost ten thousand Romanian and Bulgarian Roma were expelled from France in 2009. However, what was new was the way in which Sarkozy and his government framed the existence of Roma squatter camps as a security threat, as well as the ways in which he built the notion that France was under siege and therefore required to fight back against a problem of criminality that threatened to destroy France. As in other securitization situations, we can note in particular the rapid pace at which the initiatives to shut down Roma squats were undertaken. In his famous “Grenoble speech,” Sarkozy promised that half of the 539 illegal camps in France would be gone “within three months.”24 In addition, the plans that were put into place to raze camps were drawn up and disseminated to the local and regional police in a climate of secrecy, with information about the content of the memos issued by the government only coming out several months after their issuance, due to investigative reporting efforts carried out by French journalists. Thus the same complaints that British activists made—that there was no time to include outsiders in debating what the proper response to this alleged threat should be and no effort made to include them—can be made about the French situation as well. Thirdly, we can identify the implementation of a national, coordinated response that relied on the working together of immigration, housing and security elements as a hallmark of securitization. In addition, we can point to the use of the language of campaigns, including the trope “war on” in both Sarkozy’s July 28 ministerial meeting as well as his speech in Grenoble on July 30. We can also point to the setting of targets for action, as in the target of dismantling three hundred settlements set by the interior minister. Finally, we can identify efforts by Sarkozy to frame the events of July 28, 2010, as a problem requiring an international solution as a hallmark of securitization. In his remarks following the Grenoble riots, Sarkozy suggested bringing in Romanian and Bulgarian police officers to work in France as well as sending French police to Romania and Bulgaria to help fight crime and trafficking by Roma.

The Timeline of Events In analyzing the response to the July events, it is first necessary to spell out exactly what happened. On July 17, 2010, a twenty-two-year-old French Roma citizen named Luigi Duquenet was killed by police in Saint Aignan, a

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town in central France. Duquenet was shot after he drove through a police checkpoint, knocking over a policeman.25 After the shooting, fifty Roma people armed with clubs, hatchets and iron bars stormed the local police station. Cars were burned and a community hall in a neighboring town was burned down.26 By July 21, rioting spread to the town of Grenoble, where a group of Roma protestors burned cars, attacked a tram, shot at police and destroyed government property. After the events, Interior Minister Hortefeux organized a visit to Grenoble, where he promised that the national government would take quick action to restore public order. In his remarks, he noted that “When I say quick, I mean immediately, that’s how we are going to reestablish public order and the authority of the state. . . . There is a simple and clear reality in this country: there’s no future for hoodlums and a delinquents because in the end the public authority always wins.”27 Here, we may identify a common securitization strategy—the need for a swift taking of action, often with little or no public debate. A few days later, on July 28, French president Nikolas Sarkozy visited Grenoble and gave a press conference in which he gave a speech that was widely reported and dissected by the press, not only in France but also throughout Europe and abroad. In this speech, he declared “war” on urban violence, noting that “The government will continue to wage a relentless fight against crime. This is a war that we will take to the traffickers and criminals—the rule of law must be respected throughout the national territory.”28 The speech was thus described as the launch of an “offensive securitaire” or security offensive. The speech, however, singled out the Roma people as the particular subjects of securitization. First, Sarkozy declared that he had asked his interior minister to put an end to the “wild squatting and camping of the Roma.”29 Here again, we may note his use of the language of barbarism. The Roma squatter is again othered as he is described as a monolith, with all Roma being described as having the same values and displaying the same tendency. Furthermore, in describing them as “wild” (sauvage), a distinction is drawn between the civilized Frenchman and the uncivilized Other. However, in his speech, Sarkozy made references both to the squatters themselves as a source of danger and to the places that they occupied as sites of danger. Here again we can note the comparison (as in Christiania) with the squat as a type of internal failed state. Just as Denmark’s politicians regarded Christiania as a place where laws had no power and lawbreakers went to hide, Sarkozy also described the gypsy camps as “lawless zones.”30 At the same time, a statement from the president’s office described the camps as sources of illegal trafficking, of profoundly shocking living standards, of exploitation of children for begging and of prostitution and crime.31 In the speech, Sarkozy laid out the specific initiatives that his government would undertake as part of its offensive on urban crime, noting that many of these measures were aimed at the Roma in particular. He began by noting

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that “These incidents (destruction of police station) highlight a certain kind of behavior among some of the travelling people and Roma. Those living in illegal settlements will be evicted.” He then noted that the government would create legislation “to facilitate the deportation of foreigners in irregular situations including, in some circumstances, citizens of the European Union.” He proposed a new rule that would come into effect, saying that when immigrants threaten public order, have no durable means of supporting themselves or abuse the right of free movement, they then could be removed from France.32 In addition, Sarkozy took decisive action, immediately firing the government prefect in the Grenoble region and replacing him with a former police officer, again signaling his commitment to law and order.33 On July 30, 2010, the actual campaign to clear Roma encampments began when the government issued an order to expel illegal Roma and itinerant immigrants and to dismantle their camps “for reasons of public order.” In explaining the order to close three hundred illegal camps, two hundred of which belonged to the Roma, Interior Minister Hortefeux argued that the government was not stigmatizing the Roma, but responding to concerns about public safety. He noted that “the evacuation and demolition operations of illegal and illicit camps will continue because they are legitimate and necessary.”34 At the same time, new surveillance measures were implemented, including the use of digital fingerprinting technology to track immigrants so that they could be more easily deported and so that they could not claim the deportation benefit multiple times if they were deported more than once.35 In mid-August 2010, the French government hired several charter flights to carry ninety-three Roma back to Bucharest, Romania. Each Roma citizen who returned was given a sum of money for settlement. Adults received €300 or approximately $390 per adult. Families also received a smaller sum for each child repatriated. At same time, eighty-four Roma in Tremblay-en-France, a Paris suburb, were forced to leave public land belonging to the city. In Bordeaux, Roma were expelled from a campground and they blocked roads in the region in protest. Police also cleared out a Roma camp in Harmes, a city two hundred kilometers north of Paris. By mid-August Interior Minister Hortefeux claimed to have closed down forty illegal camps with a total of seven hundred people affected.36

Europe Reacts The reaction to Sarkozy’s speech, as well as the slum clearing actions that soon occurred, was swift throughout Europe. Analysts made three major criticisms of the policy. First, many doubted that the threat that Sarkozy claimed to be reacting to was genuine—that is, they did not agree with his use of the language of security to describe the threat. In the words of an analyst for Britain’s

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Financial Times, “The controversy concerns, at its heart, whether France is responding to legitimate security concerns—be it over public disorder or immigration—or acting out of racial prejudice.”37 Next, they questioned whether Sarkozy himself actually viewed France as genuinely threatened by the violence—or whether he was being opportunistic and using the July 2010 events to carry out a set of anti-immigrant policies that he had planned for some time. Here, the Financial Times analyst notes that people doubted Sarkozy’s motives in July because earlier in the spring of 2010 he made a speech in which he suggested establishing a list of crimes for which newly naturalized immigrants could lose French nationality— including female circumcision, polygamy and domestic slavery—thus suggesting that national citizenship for new immigrants was conditional rather than absolute, to be granted and then later rescinded at the whim of the state. By claiming that some citizens should be subjected to this type of conditional citizenship, Sarkozy thus attempted to create a dual-class system of citizenship, with some citizens enjoying “more” citizenship than others. Later Sarkozy backtracked on these statements by noting that in the case of polygamists, they would lose citizenship only if they claimed the welfare benefits of multiple wives.38 Nonetheless, analysts read this rhetoric regarding the “stripping of nationality” within a broader historical context, with the analogy to citizenship practices of the Nazis again surfacing.39 In particular, Nabila Ramdani, a French analyst of Algerian descent writing in the New Statesman, noted that the collaborators under the Vichy regime in France also stripped “undesirables” of nationality and later deported them—though by train, not chartered airline.40 In other words, the rhetoric of securitization as typically used by politicians suggests that in times of grave national threat, citizens should be willing to put up with fewer civil rights for the good of the community in the short term. Thus, securitization provides the justification for imposing martial law–like situations, in which citizens give up some freedom in exchange for security. However, in the French case, analysts alleged that Sarkozy was not interested in taking away civil rights for the short term, but rather as a matter of practice, and that he was interested in taking away civil rights selectively, in essence securitizing not the situation but rather a group of people associated with the situation. This is a major issue of securitization and one reason why so many analysts and citizens are critical of all securitization attempts. Authorities often claim that all citizens will, for example, give up their right to Internet or phone privacy in the short term for the good of society, while many citizens believe that securitization practices are likely to fall much more harshly on groups identified as suspicious—not necessarily because of evidence or practices but often because of preexisting prejudices in society, as well as racism and nationalism. Thus, Jocelyn Cesari points to a pattern in the domestic politics of several European nations—including Britain, France and the Netherlands—of “securitizing Islam” through treating citizens of Islamic descent as inherently more suspicious, and thus requiring

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these citizens to prove their loyalty to the regime in many ways, including by engaging in assimilation.41 In the French case, Ramdani claims that Sarkozy was actually “securitizing” non-French citizens, rather than practices of squatting, and that he was doing so out of political motives.42 That is, he hoped to win votes in the upcoming elections from the Front National Party of Jean-Marie Le Pen through “demonizing immigrants.” Green Party representatives described a policy of state racism and the Socialists referred to a “summer of shame.”43 A German analyst writing in Der Spiegel made even more serious charges against Sarkozy: In fact, what is happening in France today would most likely be referred to as “ethnic cleansing” in less prestigious countries. Crews are showing up in shantytowns with bulldozers and backhoes, destroying the roofs of shacks and demolishing them completely. Before the demolition crews arrive the residents are driven out by canine squads, often provided by private security firms. Then the police units arrive, together with teams wearing white overalls and facemasks, suggesting a need for disinfection.44 The German analyst again makes the analogy with Vichy France, noting that Sarkozy and others have used the term “rafles” to refer to a roundup of Roma that would occur, noting that this was the same term used by Nazi occupiers in France, who also engaged in “rounding up” Gypsies.45 On September 9, 2010 (just in advance of the EU Summit), French newspaper reports carried a leaked memo that was allegedly issued to local and regional prefects from the Ministry of the Interior on June 24—before violence erupted in Grenoble.46 In this memo, the department lays out three concerns posed by illegal settlements—the fact that they infringe on property rights, the fact that health and security risks are associated with occupants’ living conditions and the fact that the camps could potentially serve as a haven for illegal activity.47 Here again, the use of security language to describe settlements in advance of the Grenoble violence suggests that the planned campaign against settlements likely preceded any particular incident, rather than serving as a reaction to that incident. Interestingly, when asked in September, Immigration Minister Besson said he had not seen the internal French departmental memo and did not know about its existence48—suggesting that at this point internal security officials were making housing policy and excluding housing officials from the process. Indeed, France’s minister of housing, Fadela Amara, opined in a Parisian newspaper that she did not support the Roma expulsions and that she and her department opposed broadening the list of crimes leading to loss of citizenship. (Here it is important to note that Amara was born in Algeria and brings to her work a background as a former antiracism activist. Amara, a socialist, was brought into Sarkozy’s government as part of his policy of overture, or opening up to left-wing figures.)49

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Reaction to Sarkozy’s initiative led to a split within the center-right bloc on immigration issues, with Prime Minister Francois Fillon admitting that there was unease within the government about Sarkozy’s policy. Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner noted that he considered resigning over the policy.50 Herve Morin, defense minister from the centrist Nouveau Centre party, expressed misgivings,51 while Jean Pierre Grand, a member of parliament from Sarkozy’s own Union for a Popular Movement, stated that the arrests recalled the mass incarceration of Gypsies in occupied France during World War II.52 In addition, three right-wing former prime ministers—JeanPierre Raffarin, Alain Jupee and Dominique de Villepin—questioned the strategy publically. Echoing a common theme of antisquatting activists in Europe, the opposition socialists noted that the government really needed to address the underlying social problems leading to the violence—rather than simply engaging in a security crackdown.53 Pouria Amirshari, socialist national secretary for human rights, accused Sarkozy of following a “xenophobic logic.”54 In addition, individuals objected to the manner in which the deportations and slum clearing actions took place, suggesting that France had violated several European Union legal policies. As noted, securitization rhetoric focused not only on the association between squats and criminal behavior, but also on the association between Roma people specifically and criminal activity. Questions about the legality of French actions became more salient in the conversation in September 2010, when the British newspaper the Independent published an article detailing the contents of a memo allegedly issued by the Department of the Interior on August 5, 2010. In this memo, France’s Interior Ministry provided guidance to police officers throughout the region who would be involved in the squat clearing activities, noting the need to make the removal of “the Roma” a priority. The Independent alleged that the failure of the French government to distinguish between those Roma who were the subject of security complaints and those who were not amounted to an order for collective punishment of the Roma people on the basis of their nationality. The Interior Ministry and by extension the French government thus violated EU standards by engaging in the collective stigmatization and punishment of an entire ethnic group.55 For this reason, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICRED) began looking into the matter of the “collective deportation of the Roma people.”56 The foreign minister of Romania also objected to what he saw as the collective punishment of Roma. The UN Committee concluded that while the security concerns raised by Sarkozy and his government may have been real, their major concern was with the proposed solution to this problem. They described the solution imposed as inappropriate, disproportionate and illegal. In considering whether France violated EU procedures regarding freedom of movement, they noted that the deported were not fully informed of their rights nor did they freely consent to leave—regardless of whether they received money for doing so.

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The League for Human Rights (Ligue des Droits de L’Homme) noted that the government was mixing up the situation of European Roma with travelers who have French nationality. (Here again, this is a sign of the securitization of an issue—when the object of securitization is being presented as a one-dimensional Other.) They noted as well that France’s government was developing the idea that there is an ethnic solution to the problem of delinquency.57 Human Rights League president Jean-Pierre Dubois noted that “Mr. Sarkozy is there to stand for the constitution, not to trample it. . . . We consider this situation extremely dangerous.”58 Mouloud Aounit, head of MRAP, an antiracism organization, echoed the same sentiment, referring to Sarkozy’s July 30 speech as “a declaration of war against the (French) republic.”59 The Tuscany-based Gypsy leader Marcello Zuinisi also reminded France of its commitment to the stated values of liberté, egalité and fraternité, noting that “we want those values to be respected today.”60 A representative of the European Roma Rights Center (ERR), based in Hungary, also noted that the mass expulsions ran counter to several laws—including the EU Freedom of movement directive, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR—European Convention on Human Rights.61 In addition, Pope Benedict voiced his criticism of the policy.62 Several Romanian public officials spoke out about the deportations as well. Romanian prime minister Emil Boc noted that all European countries have a common obligation to millions of Roma on the continent,63 while Romanian foreign minister Teodor Baconschi noted concerns about a possible populist backlash against Gypsies in France and in Western Europe. He cautioned against generating “xenophobic reactions” during an economic crisis.64 Finally, Romanian president Trian Basescu noted that his government supports the “right of every Romanian citizen to travel without restrictions within the European Union.”65

France Responds In responding to allegations of abuse and improprieties in its campaign against the property squats, France’s government used two tactics. First France charged that the measures implemented conformed with citizen rights and European rules. In particular, Interior Minister Hortefeux noted that “the measures are not meant to stigmatize any community, regardless of who they are, but to punish illegal behavior.”66 Here, Hortefeux also used the phrase “war against insecurity” and again sought to link illegal camps with criminality, noting that “When we must adapt to or confront new difficulties, we don’t hesitate to do so. We’re waging a war against insecurity. We’re on the side of the victims and we have but a sole enemy: the crooks.”67 In this speech, Hortefeux also noted that the traveling population was not above the law—here attempting to rally the French public by playing on the perception that the Roma in particular sometimes received favored treatment as part of a national minority. (Again, this is a common theme in

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antisquatter rhetoric seen in both Britain and Denmark: the notion that squatters are somehow taking advantage of the system because they believe and act as though the rules that all other citizens must follow somehow do not apply to them.) In responding to criticisms of French policy, Immigration Minister Besson also reiterated the stance that France is not engaged in “collective expulsions,” noting that France is respecting European Union laws on the freedom of movement. In addition, Besson apparently sought to separate out the actual actions occurring from rhetoric about what was likely to occur in the future, through noting that in particular changing the rules for acquiring and revoking nationality “requires extremely deep examination” and may have to be referred to France’s highest legal body, the State Council.68 However, he too noted that the French government had no intention of backing down on policy towards Roma immigrants—despite concern from the UN and antiracism groups.69 Claude Gueant, the president’s chief of staff, noted that public opinion in France supported the actions since most citizens feared the rising trend of illegal camps. He noted that “We do not intend to abandon an action that is perfectly legal and the French expect from us. France has the right to apply the law on its own territory.”70 And a senior UMP deputy accused the media of creating frenzy against Sarkozy, noting that “He may be wrong in the style but he is right on the substance.”71 Finally, Christian Estrosi, France’s minister of industry (and the mayor of Nice, France), noted that all cities should be required to comply with the campaign and that those who do not should be fined. In response to his statement, a group of socialist mayors led by Jacques Pelissard, head of the Association of French Mayors, noted that the state was violating the rights of local officials in requiring them to enforce the campaign and threatening to sanction them if they did not.72 The EU Summit in Brussels on September 13, 2010, was thus largely taken up with the issue of France’s policies towards the Roma, with several European nations reacting angrily towards France. EU Justice Minister Viviane Reding used particularly harsh language, calling the policy “a disgrace . . . a situation I had thought Europe would not have to witness again after the Second World War.”73 She mentioned the possibility that the EU could implement an infringement process against France for failure to comply with EU law regarding freedom of movement. Infringement is the first stage of a multistage process, aimed at allowing the nation that is out of compliance to voluntarily undertake measures to bring its domestic laws and procedures into compliance with EU standards.74 Over lunch at the EU Summit, President Sarkozy objected to Reding’s comments and had an altercation with European Commission President Jose Manueal Barroso. He then sought to deflect attention away from his government’s policies and France’s policies in particular by suggesting that other European states either had implemented or planned to implement similar security measures in regard to the presence of illegal squats on their land.

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Sarkozy claimed to have spoken with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, who noted that Germany would soon be embarking on a similar campaign.75 In response German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle denied Sarkozy’s statement that Chancellor Merkel or the German government supported France’s policy, noting that policies of collective punishment and deportation violate the German constitution. At the same time, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning France’s action and calling for an end to the expulsions. The resolution was not legally binding but again called attention to the EU’s general ire with regard to France’s policies. In response to the actions of the European Parliament and the European Commission, France’s government went back and amended the second memo sent to France’s policemen from the Ministry of the Interior, removing specific mentions of the Roma. On September 29, the European Commission ended the infringement proceedings against France due to the change in the wording of the memo, so that it no longer appeared to support discrimination against any specific group. EU legislation notes that EU residents can be expelled from a nation for reasons of public health, public security or public policy; however, it must be an individual who poses this threat and it cannot be a group. However, the commission also found that France did not sufficiently adhere to the EU Directive on Freedom of Movement in its national legislation. Freedom of movement needs to be identified as a “fundamental right” in the constitution. Thus, they sent a formal notice stipulating that France needed to fix the wording by October 15.

More Recent Developments: 2012 After the events of summer 2010, Roma encampments no longer occupied a central place in either France’s media or France’s policies. However, the issue has once again emerged in the summer of 2012. Although France is now ruled by the Socialists and not the center-right, Roma encampments continue to be portrayed as a security issue. And now France’s Socialist Party is threatening to dismantle Roma encampments and carry out mass expulsions, and in a new twist it is suggesting that the Roma who do remain in France should be forced to live in so-called integration villages. Again it is a minister of the interior (this time, Manuel Valls) who is leading the campaign to close down Roma camps. And as of August 2012, eight villages (village d’insertion) were constructed. An anarchist web site run by the organization Black Bloc notes that creating integration villages represents government overreach, as “the Roma would be forced to live in ultra-cheap fabricated houses and be monitored by state employees and security forces.”76 Once again, the securitization rhetoric is not read in isolation, and again historic parallels are being drawn with the French experience in World War II, through describing integration villages as “ghettoes.” An editorial by a Greek commentator notes that even the title of the French immigration ministry

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(Ministry for Immigration, Nationality and French Identity) is problematic. However, Minister of the Interior Valls has added a slightly new reading of securitization, not focusing on crime as a security threat but instead using the language of “health security”—arguing that camps near Paris, Lille and Lyon must be dismantled on health and sanitation grounds.77 In particular, he has described sanitary conditions in the Avery settlement as “unbearable.” Again, the government quickly moved to action, ordering local police to carry out an early morning raid on the Evry camp on August 28, 2012. (Evry is a suburb of Paris.) The eviction and expulsion order was signed by local mayor Francis Chouat, who claimed the sweep was necessary on safety and public health grounds.78 In response Catholic bishop Jacques Gaillot described the police sweep as “scandalous.”79 However, as in 2010, efforts at securitizing the encampment issue seem destined to fail. Already, Francois Crepeau, UN special rapporteur of the human rights of migrants, has noted “the ultimate objective seems to be the expulsion of migrant Roma communities from France. . . . Collective expulsion is banned under international law and any repatriation should be voluntary, in compliance with international standards and based on individual assessment and independent monitoring.”80 Meanwhile, Mutuma Ruteere, UN special rapporteur on racism, has noted that “the evictions are fueling an already worrying climate of hostility against Roma in France.”81 Finally, Raquel Rolnik, UN special rapporteur on adequate housing, has noted that “forced eviction is not an appropriate response and alternative solutions should be sought that conform with human rights standards. People should not be left homeless as a result, particularly the socially vulnerable.”82

CONCLUSIONS The question raised by the French example is ultimately how much freedom individual EU member states should have to frame their own migration and housing policies, particularly when there is a perceived security threat to crime or public health in a region. It also suggests that in the present climate of closer EU integration, securitization may work better as an internal strategy than it does on the international level. If we regard securitization as an extreme form of politicization, we can see it as an attempt to escalate both the rhetoric and policy making regarding an issue outside of the normal bounds of politics, so that the speaker may then go on to take unusual actions or devote unusual amounts of resources to an issue.83 In the case of the Grenoble incidents, we can see both the interior minister and President Sarkozy engaging in securitizing speech acts—by virtue of their use of the phrases “war on” and “extreme security threat.” Here, Atland and Bruusgaard note that “the essence of securitization theory is that security is a ‘speech act’ whereby a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area and thereby claims a special right to use

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whatever means are necessary to block it.”84 However, while they did make the speeches and in their own minds declare the issue of Roma violence and Roma living conditions to be an existential threat to the French nation—thus authorizing a national policy to confront the issue, and the devotion of large numbers of resources (including police manpower) to the issue—the question is ultimately whether such a securitizing act succeeded or failed. Balzacq notes that successful speech acts are made by a person in authority under facilitating circumstances, and that they thus convince a significant audience.85 Why then did Sarkozy fail? First, he underestimated the number of people, including the Roma representatives themselves, who would speak back to these attempts to portray them as a security threat. In the final analysis, those who came out in support of the Roma included French party representatives, the European media, and European and international actors. (He also underestimated the extent to which this would be seen as a domestic policy issue alone.) Furthermore, his attempt to portray the Roma squats as an existential threat was not believable or credible and thus his motives in responding as he did were suspect. He may also not have had the authority that he thought he did (as he was embroiled in personal scandal at the time as a result of some tax dealings that his wife was engaged in). It also appears that he overestimated the number and names of those in Europe who would back him in this strategy. It appeared that he was not speaking on behalf of France or French citizens but only his own behalf—as he was seen as wanting to win votes and reelection. Finally, he could not have predicted the emergence of evidence that the events were planned in advance of the securitization act. Furthermore, public evidence showed that Sarkozy did not arrive at this new policy nor at his views regarding the Roma as a result of the events of July 2010. Instead, media analysts point out that in 2005, when he was minister of the interior, Sarkozy first publicly used the term “racaille”—which translates as scum, thugs, rabble, scoundrels, lowlife and riffraff—to refer to youth violence.86 Later that same year, Sarkozy again spoke publically of wishing to “flush out delinquent vermin with a power-hose.”87 In this way, one can suggest that Sarkozy did not suddenly gravitate towards using incendiary language to describe the rising crime problem in France, but was rather reaching back into a package of rhetorical devices that he had previously deployed with varying degrees of success. The French example shows as well the consequences that may ensue as the result of framing something (a place, activity or group of people) as a security threat.88 Here, national and international representatives rightly identified the ways in which security language had been used in the past to frame socially vulnerable people (including Jews and Gypsies) as threatening, and as a pretext for robbing them of their civil rights. Hitler’s defeat in World War II helped to discredit this securitization strategy and made it less likely to succeed as a strategy in the future.

5

“The Last Bastion of Squatting in Europe” or the End of Dutch Tolerance

In her work on European immigration policies, Sophie Body-Gendrot suggests that such issues are “fractal,” in that the same issues with the same players and the same positions on an issue can be identified on many different levels of analysis.1 That is, the factions that preach openness and welcoming and the factions that worry about loosening the grips on border control can be identified within neighborhoods, in city government, in regional government, on the state level and on up to the European level. This same fractalization can be found in Europe when looking at squatting and antisquatting policies. The fractalization of squatting issues is best illustrated by comparing two newspaper articles that appeared in recent years in France and in the Netherlands. In an article that appeared in the French newspaper Le Monde on September 1, 2012, the policies of clearing Roma slums being carried out by various municipalities within France are described with reference to a card game analogy. The analyst Delphine Roucate suggests that local officials were playing “Mistigri,” a card game in which the loser is the one who ends up holding a certain card.2 In the same way, she suggested, whichever municipality was last to crack down on Roma squatting within its vicinity would be left “holding the bag” or “holding the hot potato” in the American vernacular. That is, each municipality maneuvered to be the place in France with the harshest antisquatting policy, in order to avoid becoming the soft spot (or undefended place) that therefore drew additional squatters to its region. Along the same lines, a series of articles appeared in the Dutch newspaper Elsevier between 2007 and 2008 that likewise described Holland itself as being in danger of becoming the soft place in Europe. For that reason, the Elsevier editor argued that it was imperative that Holland toughen up its policy on squatters or else it risked attracting additional squatters from all over Europe. In this way, van Rijckevorsel set up an analogy again of a race in which each country scrambles to defend its borders and its housing first, lest he be the one left holding the bag at the end of the game.3 This chapter examines the scramble that thus led to the adoption of antisquatting legislation in the Netherlands in 2010. What is striking here is the ways in which Dutch squatting culture shares much common ground with the

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Danish case, in the sense that squatting has come to represent something more than a mere set of housing practices. In the Netherlands, squatting is seen as a hallmark and exemplar of key Dutch political cultural values—including openness to experimentation, a tolerance for a wide variety of lifestyles and a quasi-libertarian ethos in which individuals can do what they like individually as long as it does not impinge upon the rights of the collective. It is thus important to examine how a practice that was so meaningful in Dutch society was nonetheless ended. Again, the debate about squatting is about much larger issues—about the need for public safety in urban areas, about the politics of threat—including the practices of transnational squatting by non-Dutch nationals—and finally, about the place of the Netherlands within the European Union. In the debates that took place both in 2003 and again in 2009 as legislators pushed for a legal solution to the socalled squatting menace, several right-wing politicians noted that even if the Netherlands had wanted to continue to exercise tolerance towards the practices of squatting, this was not possible because squatting had already been criminalized elsewhere in Europe. Politicians like Jan Ten Hoopen made the argument that the Netherlands was uniquely vulnerable to the problem of transnational squatting since it remained the only nation where it was possible to engage in such practices legally. Thus, the fear was that foreign squatters (of both the survival squatter and the lifestyle squatter persuasions) who were unable to continue to live rent free in France, Belgium or elsewhere would suddenly all descend upon the Netherlands. In such a situation, criminalizing squatting in the Netherlands was presented in Parliament as a necessary defensive move, rather than an assault upon any particular group currently in the Netherlands. In this way, squatting was securitized in the Netherlands using different rhetoric, with a different set of objects and practices to be defended and a different set of threats described. In addition, the Dutch case study shares common ground with the Danish case in that the profile of the squatter changed significantly in the period since 2000. In the Dutch media as well as in parliamentary debates, the squatter was increasingly referred to as “hardened” (verharden). Here, the term invokes parallels with hardened criminals, those who are incapable of rehabilitation and who are seen as without remorse or pity for their victims. In addition, squatters were referred to as violent, particularly in the wake of a police attempt in 2008 to enter a squatter flat in Amsterdam that had been booby-trapped, resulting in serious injuries for Dutch policemen.4 Over time, a rhetorical opposition was created between the new police mobile units (or SWAT teams) and the squatters, and the situation was increasingly described as one of antagonism rather than cooperation. In this way, the practice of squatting, and the persona of the squatter, became less a mainstream practice in Holland and instead was labeled as a marginalized practice associated with marginal individuals, including those from abroad. In considering the lowering of Dutch tolerance for marginal or deviant practices, we may also consider the squatting issue within the larger context

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of Dutch attempts to end practices of multiculturalism in the Netherlands beginning in the 1990s. As Schinkel suggests, throughout the 1980s (the heyday of squatting), the Netherlands practiced a pluralist policy towards ethnic minorities. Minorities were expected to respect certain Dutch traditions and ideas if they sought citizenship, but they were not necessarily expected to adopt or embrace them. That is, members did not need to join the Dutch community but were expected not to go out of their way to destabilize it. However, as he notes, beginning in 1994, “minority policy became integration policy.” In the 1994 government document, “An Outline for the Integration of Ethnic Minorities,” the Dutch government put forth new understandings, including the fact that citizenship was a reciprocal process involving rights and duties, and that citizenship was a responsibility that the non-Dutch were meant to take seriously.5 That is, it was made clear that individuals (and groups) no longer had the right to reside either outside of society or on the margins of society. Instead, they were expected to enter wholeheartedly into Dutch society—including learning Dutch and adopting values such as tolerance to homosexuality, nudity and “living together”— even if such values contradicted preexisting religious or cultural values. From a security studies perspective, one can argue that those on the margins are often perceived as disloyal and not fully integrated. They threaten the body politic. Thus, a society and body politic under increased threat— from globalization, open borders and increased immigration—might choose to require greater assimilation as the cost of entering the community. In such a situation, it is not surprising that there is less Dutch tolerance of either marginal cultural practices or marginal housing practices such as property squatting. As in France, new cabinet positions were created that emphasized the integration of minorities. While France created a new position of minister for immigration, integration and national identity, in the Netherlands the position of minister for housing, communities and integration was created during the 2007 government of Jan Peter Balkenende, from the Christian Democratic Alliance. Thus the ban on squatting can be read as simply one step among many being taken in Holland to move away from the stereotype of the Netherlands as a place characterized by tolerance as a key virtue. Analysts in this bent frequently note that “squatting . . . seems destined to be the latest of the country’s liberal institutions—such as legal prostitution and the cafes that openly sell marijuana—to be curtailed as the Dutch become more conservative.”6 As we see in the Dutch case, gradually throughout the 1990s, fewer Dutch government resources were devoted to supporting minority identity activities such as the establishment of minority religious centers and cultural centers.7 Multiculturalism was deemed in many ways to have failed, and Dutch society showed less tolerance for those who deviated from cultural norms—as evidenced by the increasing vote shares garnered by extreme right-wing and anti-immigrant parties. Thus, it is not surprising that the narrowing of cultural norms was accompanied by a similar narrowing of housing norms, with

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a more rigidly defined set of criteria determining what constitutes normal housing and normal housing practices. In addition, attempts to erect barriers to the entrance of foreign squatters to the Netherlands are not surprising, as they parallel practices such as the 1998 Civic Integration of Newcomers Act and the 2000 Alien Act, both of which sought to make Dutch citizenship more difficult to attain. In addition, we can identify the increasing adoption of a moralizing tone in public discussions of citizenship practices, which is again echoed in the tone of housing discussions, including those about squatting. However, while the aim of the criminalization of squatting legislation may have been largely to guard the Netherlands against a perceived threat from abroad, including from other European nations, those who were affected by the legislation were predominantly young Dutch citizens who appeared not to buy into either the rationale for the legislation or the perception of the threat. For that reason, after the adoption of the 2010 legislation, several Dutch cities originally declined to carry out the provisions of the new law. Though the so-called G4 cities of the Hague, Utrecht, Rotterdam and Amsterdam did eventually agree to carry out the legislation and end squatting practices in their towns, legal challenges were then mounted by groups of squatters themselves. Though the legal issues were resolved by 2012, it took a full two years for the full force of the antisquatting law to be implemented in the Netherlands, and the issue might still not be fully resolved. In this chapter, we consider the history of squatting in the Netherlands, the attempts that took place in the spring of 2009 to end squatting—including the moral, social and immigration context of these discussions, and the legal challenges that were then mounted by Dutch squatters until the final clearing of most Dutch squats in the fall of 2011.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SQUATTING IN THE NETHERLANDS A lack of adequate and affordable housing has been a perennial problem in the Netherlands, which is one of the most densely populated countries in Europe. For purposes of comparison, population density per square mile is thirty-one people in the United States, and 358 people in the Netherlands.8 As a small nation with a limited amount of land, the Netherlands for many years had a forgiving policy in regards to property squatting, in essence agreeing to look the other way in regards to marginal housing practices, which have included the presence of large numbers of people living on boats moored in Amsterdam’s canals, people living in warehouses and other nonstandard residential dwellings and people living as squatters in abandoned or empty real estate throughout the nation. In addition, as a small country with a limited amount of housing options, the Netherlands, like the UK, has enforced zoning and home ownership laws quite strenuously, placing pressure on landlords to put housing back into circulation as quickly as possible when renovations or negotiations are taking place.

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Hugo Priemus, professor of housing in Delft, Netherlands, traces squatting as a practice back to 1964 in Amsterdam and describes the 1980s as the heyday of squatting, with perhaps twenty thousand total squatters at that point.9 In contrast, van der Zee traces it back further to the 1930s, claiming that squatting first occurred as a consequence of the worldwide depression that also affected Europe.10 As has been the case in both Britain and Denmark, squatting was originally a student-led movement aimed at freeing up more housing in the expensive city centers for those studying at universities around the Netherlands. The first formal squatting action took place in 1964 when students occupied properties in the Kattenburg section of Amsterdam, which had been condemned but not torn down. With the occupation of a vacant place on Dam Square in Amsterdam in 1966, squatters began the practice of painting doors white to indicate that a house was available to be squatted. In 1968, squatters again organized to protest against the construction of public transport lines in Amsterdam, which would disrupt squats. In the late 1960s, squatting again became the subject of public interest when the media reported on a family from Suriname who occupied a house in Amsterdam’s Oudezides Achterburgwal. Here we can see the ways in which the nationality of the squatters may have affected media coverage of the story. It was at this time that the Dutch media coined the term “cracking” to refer to those who squatted. The verb is related to the notion of safecracking, and its use in describing squatters conveys the notion that squatters have committed a criminal act through breaking into something and taking possession. However, the media also reported on the ways in which the social safety net had failed to provide sufficient housing for the Netherlands’ most vulnerable residents, including those coming to Holland from former colonies abroad. Thus, the same year saw the establishment of squatter support organizations. Here one can see that squatting has always been highly politicized, with squatter organizations speaking out against what they see as speculative real estate practices, as well as working to pressure government offices to build more social housing more quickly in response to citizen needs. In 1971, a Dutch court upheld the rights of squatters by finding that entering an unused building was not trespassing under article 138 of the Dutch criminal code. However, it is incumbent on squatters to provide evidence that their intent is to provide a home rather than to disturb the peace. Squatters can provide evidence of this intent through arranging possessions like a table, chair and bed in the home.11 In this way, so-called squatter’s rights were conferred upon Dutch squatters. The legal decision thus led to an increase in the numbers of squatters throughout the Netherlands since it was no longer a marginal or illegal practice. In 1975, squatters became better organized, coming together for the first time to cooperate and fight against evacuation orders. As van der Zee describes the situation, there were several attempts in the Dutch Parliament beginning in the 1970s to overturn the court’s finding and to criminalize squatting. However, none of the attempts were adopted in

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Parliament, as many felt that criminalizing squatting would simply exacerbate the Netherland’s dire housing shortage through removing any pressure on landlords to quickly get unoccupied dwellings back into circulation.12 While the Dutch legislation thus created a category of so-called legal squatters, it is important to note that not all squatting activities are legal. Beginning in 2009 city officials in Amsterdam in particular began enforcing this distinction between legal and illegal squats13 and using quasi-military force (SWT teams, tear gas and police dogs) to shut down those that were still illegal and to evict their residents. Violent confrontations often ensued. However, 1980 is the date often cited when describing how squat politics became violent. In that year, police used tanks to get through ranks of protestors due to occupation of a building on Vondelstraat. It is also the year in which police cracked down on squats in advance of the coronation of Queen Beatrix. Here, squatters throughout the Netherlands organized under the slogan “Geen Woning, Geen Kroning” or “no housing, no coronation.”14 Activists spoke out about the government’s decision to spend large sums of money on carrying out a coronation when there were homeless citizens whose needs were going unmet. By 1980, there were established squatter communities in a number of Dutch cities, including Utrecht, Amsterdam, Haarlem, Maastricht, Rotterdam, Eindhoven, Groningen, Wageningen, Zwolle Arnhem, Katwijk and the Hague. However, Priemus notes that the squatters in the 1980s were almost exclusively Dutch and student-aged.15 In 1981, the Leegstandwet (vacant property act) was adopted in Parliament. This legislation described squatting as a criminal offense only if the property had been vacant for less than six months.16 In 1993, article 429 of the criminal code was adopted. This legislation extended the period of vacancy required before squatters could move in to one year. This law was in force until 2008, when legislative attempts were again made to change the situation of squatters in the Netherlands.17

MOVES TO OUTLAW SQUATTING The most recent debate can be traced back to October 2003, when the first motion to limit squatting was introduced in Holland’s Second Chamber (similar to the House of Representatives). The motion was introduced by Member of Parliament Jan ten Hoopen, of the Christian Democratic Alliance, with support from three other MPs. The 2003 legislation can be seen not as an attempt to enact a ban on squatting but rather as an attempt to establish a better legal framework that would protect the rights of the owner (by, for example, assuring that he would not be held legally liable for utility bills that squatters run up). Squatter organizations banded together to protest the proposed legislation, concerned that while the legislation sought only to limit squatting in certain circumstances, it might be part of a long-run attempt to outlaw squatting altogether. The public relations campaign put together by

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squatter organizations focused on squatting as a public good that provided benefits to many parts of society beyond simply those who squat.18 In 2004, MP Ten Hoopen again attempted to introduce legislation, making reference to a fire that occurred that year during a “squat party” being held in a warehouse. This call to limit squatting to only residential properties was described as being necessary for reasons of both protecting businesses and public safety. (Here we can again see a parallel with the events of the Ungdomshuset in Denmark.)19 The legislation also sought to end illegal house parties that occur in warehouses or other industrial buildings that have been squatted. In introducing the motion Ten Hoopen placed the squatting issue within a larger context. First he noted that in many of Holland’s major cities “raves” were being held in squats, bringing with them the problems of vandalism and drug abuse. Ten Hoopen also spoke out against the problem of foreign squatters.20 Here he noted that “squatting activities . . . have been infiltrated by a criminal element from abroad,” which is highly professionalized and which is making money off of these activities.21 Since then, the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) has frequently paired the issue of squatting with the larger issue of criminality.22 Beginning in 2003, Ten Hoopen and other members of the Christian Democratic Alliance, a right-wing party in the Netherlands, have spoken of a “hardening” of the squatting movement in the Netherlands. In doing so, they seek to draw a line between the relatively innocent students and young working people who squatted in cities throughout Holland in the 1980s for largely economic reasons, and the individuals who they believe are involved in squatting today. The “hardened” squatters may be more ideologically motivated, more antistate and less well integrated into society as a whole. At the time there was still not a consensus among policymakers regarding the seriousness of the squatting threat, or the necessity of adopting rigid measures to combat it. Within Parliament, officials from the two left parties, the Social Party and the Green Party, spoke out against the Ten Hoopen initiative, stating that the real problem to be addressed was that of real estate speculation and the housing shortage. At the same time, Marnix Norder, alderman for building and housing in the Hague, voiced his opposition to the bill. He also called the attention of legislators to the underlying social issues, which he noted could not be addressed merely by banning squatting. Here he noted that squatters can make a difference in addressing the housing balance issue—in essence acting as a pressure group to force commercial establishments to move forward quickly with renovations and to get real estate back into circulation as soon as possible. Despite a lack of consensus, the legislation passed in both houses of the legislature.23 However, it was struck down by State Secretary for Economic Matters Karien Van Gennip. She stated that modifying the existing legislation was unnecessary and undesirable.24 The next attempt at introducing legislation to address the problem of squatting began in 2006 when Minister for Housing Sybille Deker and Justice Minister Piet Hein Donner proposed that squatting should be banned altogether.

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Legislation to do just that was formally introduced by MPs Herman and Veenendaal. However, the cabinet fell in June 2006 before the legislation had gone forward.25 Legislation was again introduced in August 2008 by members of Parliament Jan Ten Hoopen of the CDA, Arie Slob of the Christian Union and Brigitte van der Burg of the conservative VVD party.26 At the time, Holland was ruled by a coalition government, consisting of representatives of both the VVD and CDA parties. The new housing minister, Eberhard van der Laan, stated that he would not oppose the bill. This legislation proposed to amend article 138a of the Dutch criminal code and to remove article 429. The new legislation thus defined squatting as a crime, even if the premises had been vacant for one year.27 The discussions that led to the 2010 ban on squatting went on for approximately two years as both sides marshaled evidence regarding the necessity of the ban and the circumstances in which squatting was occurring. As was the case with the other nations studied here, the initial debates about squatting in the Netherlands took place from a relatively low knowledge base. As was the case in the UK, there were no official statistics regarding either the numbers or the ethnic and national makeup of squatters in the Netherlands, on either a local or a national level. However, during the two-year period leading up to the adoption of the Dutch squatting ban, three policy documents were assembled that became the basis of the squatting debate. The documents included a research report put together by the Department of Criminology at Amsterdam’s Free University, a document that came to be known as the black book and a third document whose official title was “Everything You Wanted to Know about Squatting but Were Afraid to Ask,” which came to be known as the white book. The white book was assembled by squatter organizations as a response to the issuing of the black book. The three documents when considered side by side provide evidence of the large scope of agreement and disagreement in the Netherlands regarding the problem of squatting. First, the three documents indicate a high level of disagreement regarding the number and makeup of the Dutch and nonDutch squatting population in the Netherlands. Next they show a lack of consensus regarding the violence and aggressiveness of squatters today, with both sides using examples to prove their own points of view. Thirdly, the documents show a disagreement about whether there is an overlap between squatting and other types of violent and nonviolent crime. Finally the documents show a lack of consensus regarding the ways in which squatting does and does not enhance Dutch society.

THE UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM REPORT The first document considered by the public and by legislators in making a decision about the necessity for new antisquatting legislation was a report entitled “Squatting Scene in the Year 2009.”28 This research project was

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carried out by the Department of Criminology at the law faculty of the University of Amsterdam. Similar in scope to the research report commissioned by the British Parliament, the report includes interviews with squatters as well as an attempt to compile what aggregate data about the problem existed. Surprisingly, the report did not find any evidence of the “hardening” of squatters, nor was there any evidence that squatters were becoming increasingly violent. The report does note, however, that there were more foreign squatters. However, the report clearly indicates that the two groups were almost entirely separate. Foreign squatters tended to be apolitical individuals, such as manual laborers from Poland, who availed themselves of cheap housing while working to earn money to remunerate back home for their families, while Dutch squatters were more likely to be politicized and mobilized as part of a squatting movement.29 The research report, however, provides no actual numbers of foreign squatters or a breakdown of where they were from. The report suggests that squatting was largely carried out quietly and privately, while evacuations or clearings tended to be public, since this is the point at which squatters tended to seek publicity. For this reason, media coverage of the issue may be reporting largely on unrepresentative cases as well as overemphasizing the violence that accompanies squatting.

THE BLACK BOOK The black book on squatting was put together by Bas van’t Wout, a member of the VVD Party for Amsterdam. While public copies of the document are not available, reports indicate that it is composed largely of a list of “excesses” that are attributed to squatting in the Netherlands, with a particular emphasis on major cities, including Amsterdam.30 In the words of Simone Pekelsma, “Squatting is an ideologically laden term which raises political questions with moral overtones.” She notes that the black book presents a picture of squatters as “anti-social types who destroy property, terrorize families and who are harassed by the police.” In contrast, those who present their views in the white book emphasize the ways in which squatting can contribute to society.31

THE WHITE BOOK In response to the issuing of the black book, a white book was issued in 2009 by prosquatting activists. The white book aimed to provide legislators with details that would inform their parliamentary discussions on the squatting issue through providing details on the types of individuals living in squats, and the types of projects taking place in those dwellings—including programs that looked after society’s most vulnerable members, such as the elderly and the mentally ill. The white book thus responded to media coverage that its authors felt was unrepresentative, showing only “squat

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parties” and drug dens, when, in reality, its authors argue, many types of people live in squats for many reasons. White book representatives accused the government of opportunism, in making use of certain well-known examples to pass legislation outlawing all squatting.32 The white book, assembled by squatting activists and organizations, provides an estimate of 1,500–2,000 squatters in Amsterdam occupying 200–300 squatting sites. At the same time the activists note that in the Netherlands there are approximately 5 million square meters of unoccupied housing space.33 These analysts suggest that half of squatters are doing so for political reasons—namely an attempt to protest against housing practices that they see as unfair and unjust—while another percentage of squatters are simply homeless, and others are unable to afford the studio space they might require to carry out art activities. Thus, squatting is presented again as a form of active citizenship in which squatters seek to contribute to their communities where they live as well as to change society through making it more democratic, rather than a form of anti-social activity.34 We can contrast the “othering” that legislators engaged in through describing squatters as a single entity (in short, a collection of violent individuals with drug and criminal problems) with the more nuanced view put forth by the report’s editors, which presents squatters as making up several different constituencies. Othering is again a hallmark of securitization. Furthermore, the authors of the pamphlet “What You Need to Know about Squatting” refute the notion that the squatters of the 2000s are “hardened.” (Here again, the description of squatters as “hardened” represents a form of othering, since it implicitly creates a social distance between the “normal homeowner” and the “hardened” squatter. The hardening trope can thus be seen as a way of utilizing the discourse of barbarism, through suggesting that the squatter is not quite human and totally different from oneself.) Instead, the authors argue that it is incorrect to draw a line between the squatting hippies of the 1970s and the squatters today. Today’s squatters are thus not free-riders or drug addicts. However, the authors suggest that the growing number of squatters is best explained by economic conditions today. In the brochure, they also note that those who take up residence work hard to “make the squat a home” through, for example, working to hook up water and power and cleaning. Thus, activists resist being labeled as either vandals or criminals. The activists also accused Ten Hoopen of fabricating his claims regarding the existence of a connection between transnational criminals, terrorism and squatting. In their work, they trace the information that he is using back to the government-led Van Traa Commission on organized crime, which examined the increases in both drug trafficking and human trafficking that occurred in the Netherlands as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union. In doing so, they questioned the accuracy and timeliness of his information. As in the UK, squatter organizations accused those introducing legislation of being misinformed about how squatting actually works, and in many

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cases made the argument that new legislative initiatives were unnecessary since the scenarios envisioned by MPs were already handled with existing legislation. (For example, in the White Book, they noted that the scenario posed in which a squatter would run up the utilities on a building is already covered by existing legislation.)35 Squatter organizations also took issue with Ten Hoopen’s description of the use of squats for illegal house parties, noting that those who organize raves and other large-scale events are aware of rules regarding number of individuals allowed in a property, as well as noise ordinances, and all proper permits are secured.36 That is, while they do not legally own the space, the events they organize are still legal, in that they are carried out in accordance with proper procedures. Finally, they noted that only a very small percentage of squats have ever been used for house parties,37 and they also took issue with the fact that he zeroes in on the drug use of party-goers. They noted that just as many illegal drugs, like Ecstasy, are used at parties at people’s homes, and they did not buy the connection between squatting and illegal drug use. In addition, they noted that just as many illegal drugs are manufactured in legal housing as in illegal housing.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA In addition to the information about squatting furnished by the white and black books, several Dutch media outlets also became engaged in building a consensus regarding the dangers of squatters. Here we can draw a parallel between the role of the Evening Standard in London and the Elsevier media outlet in the Netherlands. However, while the Evening Standard and the Daily Mail appealed to lower-class, less educated British citizens, Elsevier appealed to Holland’s educated business community, engaging them in thinking about and lobbying for antisquatting measures.38 Elsevier editor Rene van Rijckevorsel was particularly involved in lobbying for antisquatting legislation, and he wrote a series of editorials on the subject. In a November 2007 editorial he asks, “when will the Chamber decide to do something about this idiotic relic from the 1970’s and 1980’s?”39 In a later editorial he asks why it was taking so long to pass legislation outlawing squatting, noting that the conversation had been going on since 2004. In his analysis, he faults left-leaning legislators (such as those from the Green Party) for holding up the passage of this legislation, suggesting that some of them may have been former squatters themselves. In this way, he suggests they are nostalgic for the “good old days” of squatting, and are unable to see the genuine danger it now presents. Van Rijckevorsel suggests that legislation should have been implemented in 2006, but notes that the two major parties, the Christian Democratic Alliance and the Dutch Liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), were not in agreement. He credits the November 2007 events—in which Dutch policemen were injured by a booby trap installed by squatters on

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a wall in Amsterdam—with waking up legislators. He also points to the increased presence of anarchist squatters who travel to the Netherlands for political reasons.40 It is in the Elsevier editorials that the argument about the Netherlands as the last bastion of squatting first appears. Here Van Rijckevorsel points to the fact that Holland is now “unique in Europe” in that there is no legislation against squatting. He suggests that this fact will make squatting in Holland even more attractive to individuals from Eastern and Southern Europe and goes on to suggest that foreign squatters might even establish a “stronghold” in Amsterdam41 as they have in Berlin and Calais. Member of Parliament Ten Hoopen repeated these predictions in Parliament, noting that the Netherlands is attracting squatters from other countries because of the leniency of its laws, and arguing for the necessity of bringing Dutch squatting policy thus in line with European policies as a whole. In response, squatter organizations conceded that squatting was still easier in Holland than elsewhere in Europe, but argued that people have many reasons for choosing where to live, and the relative ease of squatting in the Netherlands is not enough to attract people there.42 In addition, they accused Ten Hoopen of not having any evidence to back up his accusations that most foreign squatters who come to the Netherlands either are criminals or do so for criminal reasons.43 Antisquatting rhetoric also relied on the free-rider frame throughout the 2000s. The Dutch Christian Democratic member of Parliament Diederik Boomsma wrote about Dutch squatting in the US right-wing publication the National Review, noting that “passing the law was a necessary first step towards bringing some order to the Netherlands’ urban areas. . . . Just as Spartan citizen-hoplites and medieval nobles were legally exempt from paying taxes, modern squatters are exempt from paying rent—a kind of bohemian aristocracy.”44 Meanwhile, Elsevier referred to squatters as “land thieves” in an article that described the nuisance that squatters can cause to their neighbors. In an article, an Elsevier journalist notes that “from left to right, citizens have had enough of the often drunk and drugged squatters who take over houses and cause a nuisance.”45

THE “HARDENING” OF SQUATTING IN THE NETHERLANDS The successful passage of a broad and wide-ranging antisquatting law that came into effect in 2010 can be attributed to two factors—the success of the narrative of the “hardened squatter” in manufacturing both public and elite support for antisquatting legislation, and the increasing turn towards the right and towards policies of anti-immigration in the Netherlands. As we saw in the British case, media coverage in the Netherlands often drew upon an unrepresentative set of squatting events to paint a picture of the squatting problem. In the Dutch case, a new narrative emerged,

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which set out to describe the ways in which squatters had become more violent towards the police and society, and more antistate. This narrative of the “hardened squatter” drew new strength in 2007 when actions by a police mobile unit (similar to a SWAT team) aimed at entering squats in Amsterdam in order to search for evidence of organized crime were met with violence. In March 2007, police attempted to enter a squat that had been booby-trapped and several policemen were injured. In May 2008, the media reported widely on violence that occurred in Amsterdam when protestors broke windows and vandalized the official residence of Mayor Job Cohen, after he issued orders for the evacuation of some squats in the city center. As a result of these events, newspaper articles began referring to the phenomenon of so-called aggressive squatting and aggressive squatters, noting that squatters were now using extreme violence and becoming more dangerous.46 Coverage also focused on the public costs that violent squatters could inflict on the whole community, noting that “stores were closed, public transport was shut down and there was a great deal of damage.”47 In an interview in the documentary Kraaken: Waarom Niet? (or “Why not squat?”), made in 2009, Amsterdam’s police commander Leen Schapp pointed to “a progressive hardening of the squat movement,” including increasing use of arson and ties to European anarchist movements.48 The party platform for the Christian Democratic Alliance Party in Amsterdam also contains a policy on squatting. The party’s political representatives draw a clear distinction between the idealistic squatting of the 1980s and the “hardened” squatters who squat today. The platform refers to squatters as dangerous and notes that squat sites in the capital are often used by nonDutch squatters, who often bring criminal activity with them. The platform notes that “we see as well that criminal activities are often associated with the squatting sites.”49

THE ROLE OF POPULAR OPINION In addition, Dutch squatters reacted to attempts at criminalizing the practice through appealing for popular opposition to the ban both in the Netherlands and abroad. In appealing to foreign citizens to protest at Dutch embassies across the world, Dutch squatters presented squatting as a sort of collective good—calling on anyone who had ever enjoyed a party at a squat or stayed at one cheaply while traveling to now join in saving the squats. A notice on indymedia.nl on November 22, 2009, a “call out from the Netherlands,” speaks “to all the people who are against squatting prohibition, to all the squatters, to all the ex-squatters, to all the young people who would like to become squatters in the future, to all the friends of the squatters, to all political activists, to all antifascist activists, to all artists, band members, people who enjoy parties in the squats, etc.”50

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However, as noted, the 2008 attempts at criminalizing squatting were different than previous attempts because of the ways in which the political and economic environment had changed in the Netherlands. By 2008, critics were beginning to rethink the welfare state as a set of practices as the result of economic slowdowns affecting all of Europe. In this climate, talk about squatters as “freeloaders” again had resonance in political circles and among voters.51 In addition, squatting activists point to cooperation that legislators received from two right-wing politicians often associated with extreme Dutch nationalism—Rita Verdonk and Geert Willders. Squatting was presented as an issue of “integration,” and citizens appeared to conflate fears about ethnic integration with their fears about social integration.

PASSING THE LEGISLATION However, while the ban was ultimately adopted in the Netherlands, there were still many who spoke out against the legislation at all levels of government. Writing in the spring of 2009, Simone Pekelsma quoted a lawyer who noted that article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights refers to a right to property, noting that people could not forcibly be made homeless.52 Before the legislation had even been passed, there were individuals and groups querying the legality of the proposed legislation. This same problem would later become a sticking point when local and national authorities sought to enforce the legislation by carrying out evictions. In addition, the lack of an overwhelming consensus in support of the legislation would pose problems when the legislation passed and it then needed to be implemented, often by those who had not initially backed the legislation. In particular, despite the violent events that had occurred in squats in Amsterdam, Amsterdam’s own mayor, Job Cohen, spoke against the legislation, pointing out (as many British politicians did in the British case) the enormous costs that would be required in order to implement the legislation. Cohen argued that at present Amsterdam simply did not have the policing capacity to crack down on squatting in the ways that the CDA Party was envisioning.53 In interviews granted in 2009 and 2010, he expressed his satisfaction with the way in which police had tackled squatting in the past and did not feel the new initiative was necessary.54 On May 19, 2010, the bill on squatting was passed in Holland’s First Chamber (similar to the Senate) after only one day of discussion, passing with a majority. An article in De Volkskrant notes that the law “sailed through” the Senate in 2010 with little or no discussion, thus suggesting that “the squatters’ movement no longer wields much influence on society.”55 The legislation was introduced by senators from the Christian Union (Christen Unie) who answered questions about the measure. Debate in the Second Chamber (similar to the House of Representatives) was a bit more

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animated, with members of the PvDA speaking out against the measures, calling the legislation “unnecessary, illogical and incomprehensible.”56

IMPLEMENTING THE LEGISLATION The 2010 Law on Squatting and Empty Property (Wet Kraken en Leegstand) amends both the Dutch criminal code and the existing Vacant Property Act (Leegstandwet). The new law allows landlords to ask police to clear their properties of squatters.57 Squatters can now earn a one-year jail sentence, which can be lengthened to two or more years if intimidation and violence are used by squatters. Liberal MP Brigitte van der Berg, one of the MPs behind the ban, provided further guidance, suggesting that cities should tackle the newest squats first, with the backlog of old ones tackled according to a roster.58 The new legislation thus treats squatting as a federal problem. However, the legislation does cede some powers to the municipality. In particular, the municipal or city council may introduce bylaws on vacancy, but is not required to do so. City groups may also compile lists of vacant properties and compel owners to notify the city if a property is going to be vacant. However, the lack of consensus regarding the need for the legislation, the appropriateness of the legislation and the effects that it might achieve are perhaps indicative of a deeper problem. In particular, a hallmark of securitization is the raising of a problem that may have previously been a local or a regional problem to a national level instead. In cases in which there is a consensus regarding the danger and risk of a particular issue to citizens and the nation, there will also be a social and governmental consensus on the need for a national solution. In this way, securitization issues can also become issues of states’ rights. In the Dutch case, there was a marked unwillingness by many local and regional organizations to go along with the national solution—in part because they did not buy into the securitization script and did not ultimately believe that the problem was serious enough to warrant a national solution (which obviously involves ceding some local power and authority). Thus, it is not surprising that the National Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) went on record that it was not supportive of the new act. One can also consider the ways in which European cities like Amsterdam, Paris or London might be understood both as the capitals of their nations and as world capitals. For those who regard Amsterdam as a world city, it might be easy to then see squatting as a security threat requiring a federal solution. However, for those who regard it merely as the capital of the Netherlands, there is a tendency to see squatting as largely a municipal (not an international) problem, which is properly handled by Amsterdam’s mayor. Here it is perhaps useful to compare the personas of Boris Johnson, London’s mayor, and also something of an international figure,

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who gained international exposure and notoriety during the 2012 London Olympics, with the persona of Job Cohen, Amsterdam’s mayor. While Johnson appears to relish his international role, Cohen appeals more to the Dutch population as a national figure, and while Johnson might regard the involvement of federal law enforcement in London’s governance as enhancing the prestige of London as a world city, Cohen clearly does not feel the same way about Amsterdam. That is, the CDA’s attempt to “securitize” the squatting issue failed to some extent, because the mayor of the major city in the Netherlands did not concur on the necessity for securitization or on Amsterdam’s role as a world city. In reacting to the new legislation, several Dutch cities indicated that they would not implement it in their districts or that they would move only very slowly and halfheartedly in implementing new legislation. (In this way, they could be seen as exhibiting a form of prosecutorial discretion, as occurs in an American court when a judge declines to enforce a law that is on the books. Prosecutorial discretion has been used in recent years, for example, when federal authorities have made only limited attempts to deport undocumented immigrants in the United States, often acting out of a principled stand that states that undocumented individuals brought to the United States as children should not be held responsible for their parents’ misdeeds. Judges may not have the authority to throw out legislation, but they do have the ability to act only slowly or halfheartedly in implementing it.) In the city of Utrecht, where most of the legislators belong to the Green Party, the city council noted that they regarded the squatting ban as legislation designed to solve a problem that did not exist.59 Thus, they agreed to give carrying out the legislation a low priority. Meanwhile, squatters predicted an “awakening” would take place after the legislation was passed—in which squatters and society would realize the harmfulness of the law and protest against it. In the spring of 2010 a large group of PvDa, Green Links and VVD legislators thus pledged not to enforce or carry out the law.60 Utrecht did not act alone in carrying out this strategy. Rather, it participated in drafting a letter to Parliament that was signed by the mayors of the so-called G4 (the Netherland’s four largest cities)—Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague and Utrecht. In the letter, the mayors called the legislation “counterproductive.” They also noted that the penalties on homeowners who left their properties empty for more than one year were too high (up to €7,500) and suggested that the fine should be tied to the value of the property and thus should be more flexible. Finally, they noted that much of the squatting problem occurred in empty businesses and not empty homes, which were not addressed in the legislation.61 However, despite going on record as being opposed to the legislation, by October 2010 (the point at which the legislation was slated to go into effect), the mayors of Groningen, Amsterdam and Utrecht had also changed their stances, noting that they would be enforcing the legislation as it was

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62

written. In addition, the municipality of Amsterdam did decide to issue a vacancy bylaw that would go into effect on June 1, 2011. Utrecht and the Hague, however, decided not to introduce a bylaw.63

STRIKING DOWN THE LAW The ban on squatting took effect on October 1, 2010. Prior to that date, however, squatters launched violent protests against it, clashing with police, setting fires and erecting barricades in Amsterdam’s city center.64 However, the legislative fight was far from over. On October 28, 2010, rulings by appeals courts in Amsterdam and the Hague suggested that the law could not be enforced since it conflicted with the European Treaty on Human Rights, which states that a person cannot be forced from a home unless a judge has affirmed the eviction is legal.65 A statement by city officials in Amsterdam issued on November 9 noted that “Given the general character of this ruling, the mayor, chief prosecutor and police commissioner have decided for now not to clear any buildings on criminal grounds.”66 The legal challenge was resolved in 2011, when the Supreme Court affirmed that squatters can be evicted only after a criminal procedure has been carried out. This did not mean that police could not force out squatters. Rather, it affirmed that squat clearings had to be carried out according to legal means. The procedure established by the courts is as follows: a city’s public prosecution department must announce the evictions that are scheduled (i.e., tenants cannot be surprised in the middle of the night) and wait for the outcome of an injunction hearing.67 Only then can clearings begin.

ENFORCING THE LAW As we have seen in other cases, including the French case, once the legal precedents for an activity have been established, the usual procedure is for the state to act quickly to shut down and clear squats. By June 2012, a followup report on the ban pointed to the changing character of the Netherlands itself as a result of the implementation of the squatting ban. In a newspaper article titled “Amsterdam No Longer a City of Squatters,” a reporter from De Volkskrant noted that Amsterdam now has just 23 squats left, while 350 have been cleared.68 Additional reports note that Amsterdam has cleaned up three hundred squat sites since the legislation went into effect, working in a series of five very public raids. Reporters note that a norm has developed that squatters are to be given a warning and an opportunity to find alternate housing. The police thus provide advance warnings of their plans to visit certain addresses.69 At the same time, squatters continue to file complaints against local police for unnecessary use of force. Approximately fifty people have filed

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complaints in Amsterdam in the past year. In addition, immigration issues continue to be present. Minister of Immigration, Integration and Asylum Gerd Leers has spoken publically of the problems presented when people who are rounded up in the clearing of squats refuse to provide identification, often because they are in the Netherlands illegally.70 Finally, at least some percentage of Dutch squatters has been incorporated into the legal system of the Netherlands, often by hiring themselves out as “property guardians.” Landlords may hire “legal squatters” to legally occupy their properties so that they are not subject to either the threat of squatters or the fines they might incur for having their property stand empty. The idea has been around since the early 1990s, and was also practiced in East Germany. A number of businesses currently exist to “place” squatters as guardians in buildings—in both the Netherlands and the UK.71

6

Conclusion Is Desecuritization of Housing Policy Possible or Desirable?

Throughout this manuscript, I have demonstrated the ways in which housing policy in general and policy towards property squatting in particular has become securitized. At the same time, I have shown that there is not unanimous support either by the political establishment or by the general public for the securitizing moves undertaken by politicians in the Netherlands, Great Britain, France and Denmark. Rather, in each nation the process of securitization has been contested, and a counternarrative has emerged that still attempts to place property squatting not in the context of security but rather in the context of an ethic of care for society’s most vulnerable members, as well as a more general context of human rights for both citizens and migrants in each nation. In an essay published in 2008, Iver Neumann, a Norwegian analyst, argues that discourses are frequently contested and always dynamic. He notes that “if there is only one representation, the discourse is closed,” while at the same time reminding us that “Not all representations are equally lasting. They differ in historical depth, in variation and in degree of dominance/marginalization in the discourse.”1 However, at the same time, Roe warns that language and discourse has a tendency to become institutionalized over time, so that people may automatically attribute a certain context to certain language—for example, automatically hearing echoes of security language when encountering a term like terrorism. At that point, securitization becomes something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is no longer necessary for those in authority to provide the securitizing context, since there may either be no alternative discourse, or the hearers may be unable to conceptualize an alternative discourse at all.2 Thus, the task for the analyst is to determine what the life cycle of a particular discourse is and to predict the conditions under which a discourse might change—if, indeed, one believes that it can change at all. For this reason, in recent years, a number of analysts concerned with securitization have evinced an equal and compelling interest in the process of so-called desecuritization, asking whether and under what conditions an issue might move from the arena of a security—in which the issue is described as an existential threat requiring the commitment of major resources—back to the arena of politics as usual. Thus, desecuritization may involve a dialing

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back of the rhetoric of security, danger and crisis and the reframing of an issue from the politics of crisis to politics as usual. In this way, an issue can be said to have been normalized, rather than securitized.3

CAN DESECURITIZATION HAPPEN? But what are the implications of an issue being normalized rather than securitized? Giorgio Agamben, the Italian philosopher, describes the politics of security as characterized by a politics of exception. (Here he notes the idea of a state of exception comes from Schmitt’s book Dictatorship, which draws upon the lessons of Weimar Germany.) According to Agamben, the most important characteristic of the state of exception is the absence of rule of law—and the conflation of all of government’s powers (executive, legislative, judicial) together. In his work, Agamben talks about Guantanamo and the ways in which the individuals there were invisible and had no rights. They were not subject to rule of law because officially they did not exist—as they were neither citizens nor prisoners of war. Agamben suggests that the state of exception has a tendency over time to become permanent—with more and more issues being subject to the state of exception until finally the state of exception becomes the rule.4 However, other analysts disagree—noting that it is indeed possible to draw back the state of exception—to desecuritize or normalize an issue— and they suggest means by which this has happened in other sectors.5 From a critical theory perspective, then, desecuritization can be seen as a type of emancipating process, by which a social problem can be reinterpreted and reconceptualized, so that new policy solutions to an old problem might emerge. By developing a new optic or a new lens for viewing a problem, it is entirely possible that the problem itself can now be shaped in a new way. Indeed Didier Bigo asked as early as 2002 why it was that migration issues were increasingly being understood within the context of “terrorism, crime, unemployment and religious zealotry,” rather than in the context of “new opportunities for European societies, freedom of travel over the world, cosmopolitanism or a new understanding of citizenship.”6 In asking this question, he was implicitly acknowledging both that desecuritization of migration policies was possible, and that it was desirable. However, analysts differ as to whether desecuritization can occur in all areas—with Roe in particular arguing that issues involving identity and ethnicity are particularly bad targets of desecuritization since ethnic identity is so often construed in zero-sum terms, where one side’s gain is the other side’s loss.7 Aradau builds on this notion, suggesting that security frames create social formations. As she states the problem: Since security utterances are constitutive of who belongs to the (political) community and who does not—when you speak of societal security—

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you have necessarily created a zero-sum game, where helping one group means taking from another. There are no non-divisible goods, nor any way of distributing them between the opposing camps.8 This dynamic is very much in evidence as we think about antisquatting legislation. The implication of the securitizing frame is that the best—and perhaps the only—way to assure the safety of neighbors and those in the neighborhood and urban community is through outlawing and cracking down on squatting. There is no middle-range solution.

HOW DOES DESECURITIZATION HAPPEN? Among those who agree that desecuritization is possible, however, there are still points of contention. Analysts differ about the conditions that make desecuritization most likely and whether desecuritization is a strategy that may be actively pursued by actors employing agency, or whether it is merely part of a gradual evolution in which over time the importance of an issue in society can change. That is, some analysts argue that desecuritization is a top-down process that can be pursued and managed (i.e., desecuritization is a normative goal rather than an observable process), while others argue that it merely happens as a result of environmental factors or some other impetus, and that it can thus occur in a bottom-up fashion as well. Huysmans, for example, suggests that desecuritization can be pursued and managed through a process of political socialization in which a government might consciously seek to shape citizen attitudes towards their neighbors.9 Tjalve argues that the task of international relations theories should be explicitly normative in spelling out and encouraging the development of strategies that would allow policymakers and the public to move away from the state of exception and towards the creation of “normal politics.” Here, normal politics are characterized by open dialogue and a climate that allows for the articulation of diverse viewpoints, in which citizens do not have to worry about seen as “unpatriotic” if they disagree with government policies or the majority view.10 Salter, on the other hand, suggests that the moral and social authority of an actor involved in securitizing an issue may decay or fail over time, if, for example, that actor is found to be incompetent. In that way, he implicitly references Carl Schmitt’s famous saying that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception,”11 noting that he who no longer decides or describes the exception is one who is powerless.12 Here, desecuritization is not seen as managed or pursued, but rather as a set of affairs that may occur over time. For example, when a war ends, some players and issues may be removed from the realm of security. If one buys the assumption that desecuritization is possible and desirable, then one needs to ask finally, how does desecuritization happen?

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Table 6.1

Paths to Desecuritization Managed desecuritization

Evolutionary desecuritization

Top down

Change in language of security; change in security procedures

Change in international system

Bottom up

Empowerment of objects of securitization: visibility, articulation

Changed views of object of securitization

As Table 6.1 indicates, desecuritization may occur in four different ways. The matrix indicates that there are two possible paths towards managed desecuritization—top-down and bottom-up—as well as two paths to evolutionary desecuritization—top-down and bottom-up. We shall consider each of these in turn.

“TALKING OURSELVES DOWN” OR MOVING AWAY FROM SECURITIZATION A top-down, managed strategy for desecuritizing an issue has been articulated by Aradau. She argues that it is possible for those in power to frame new rules for how citizens and policymakers should behave in discussing and describing an issue—such that issues either do not become securitized or may be desecuritized. In her work, she blames the notion of risk, suggesting that “risk policies” often affect the democratic process. She notes that “Risk policies are often speechless policies, communicated through the symbolic, the visual, the insinuated and the vague.”13 That is, as long as actors persist in describing other groups as presenting a risk without deploying evidence and spelling out their accusations in full, it is impossible for a rational conversation to occur in society. Instead, it is likely that the conversations engaged in by policymakers will include elements of secrecy and quick decision making with an absence of public debate. Drawing upon her insights, the question then becomes: Is it possible to have a civil, nonhysterical, calm, rational dialogue about squatting in society? In pursuing this strategy we would wish to ask how the media and politicians might behave responsibly and rationally in discussing this issue. Is it possible for all sides to agree upon some ground rules that might keep this issue (or indeed any issue) from becoming merely a war of words or a war of images? It is my contention that the establishment of such a space for rationally discussing the issue of property squatting is possible. However, doing so would require establishing norms regarding the content of debates that take place both in Parliament and in the media. (For example, all parties might be required to furnish empirical data, to back it up and as much as possible to refrain from sensationalizing the issue.) Legislators would be required to

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carry out deliberations without such haste that those citizens and the objects of securitization themselves feel that they are being “railroaded” into finding a solution to the problem. And finally, the media should be encouraged to pursue ethical coverage of the squatting issue. Politicians might agree to check their facts more carefully in speaking about issues, not to cite statistics that have not been verified and not to draw upon examples and stereotypes presented in the mass media. Fines might be imposed upon media outlets that act irresponsibly—in stirring up dissent regarding the rape of a journalism student at Calais or against transnational property squatters. Governments might also agree to fund more research for problems for which there is little hard data and little agreement about that data. (For example, we still do not have any definitive statistics regarding the number and types of squatters in Britain, nor a complete picture of the numbers of individuals in the camp in Calais, France.)

THE OBJECTS OF SECURITIZATION SPEAK OUT Next we can consider the possibility that the objects of securitization themselves may experience empowerment and agency, taking on the job of “talking back to securitization” themselves. As chapter 1 of this volume has attempted to show, squatters—as objects of securitization—are both ultravisible and “in your face” and simultaneously invisible in that their stories are seldom told. Instead, they are othered, presented as a monolith and described in ways that tend to ignore their essential humanity. Instead, they are regarded as termites, as parasites and as invaders. Thus, desecuritization may come about once those who have been othered and marginalized organize so that they might be seen and heard by those who seek to define them largely as a security problem to be solved. The objects of security speak back to securitization by disputing generalizations made about them, as well as by presenting additional evidence that might call into question the facts of a particular case. In the case of squatters, a number of the case studies presented here do show that squatters themselves have engaged in the process of talking back to securitization—particularly in Great Britain. In the UK in particular, individual squatters as well as members of groups like Shelter have publically disputed the facts being put forth by those in authority in order to construct squatting as a security issue. They have disputed such pieces of “common wisdom” as the official number of squatters, the monetary damage alleged to have been caused by squatting and the motives of squatters. In addition, they have actively sought to reframe squatting as a housing issue rather than a security issue through calling the attention of legislators and citizens to the underlying issues that led to the problem. Thus we can point to the actions of “Nick,” a London squatter, as an example of talking back to securitization. On the blog “Diddly Squat London,” we can see a transcript of an interview conducted by Nick with a member of the UK’s Ministry of

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Justice, in which he disputes the numbers of squatters put forth by UK representatives in their official publications, as well as the fact that they themselves don’t seem to know where the numbers are coming from.14 Even the tendency of squatters in Holland to dress up like clowns and mimes while demonstrating can be seen as a way of talking back to the prevailing rhetoric, which seeks to portray squatters as arsonists, drug dealers and dangerous anarchists—rather than harmless students who enjoy wearing costumes. We are perhaps seeing an empowerment of Roma people in the same way—with the formation of such Roma organizations as the European Roma Rights Centre and the beginning of Roma representation as stateless peoples within the European Parliament. Certainly in the United States we have seen the Arab American community as well as gay activists disputing stereotypes put forth about them and about the danger that they are described as posing to a community. For example, activists have spoken out against media articles that suggest that gays should not work with children because they are thought to pose a risk as sexual predators. Citizen activism and study have led to this “common wisdom” being widely discredited. In this way, the objects of securitization have sought a space at the table and membership in the epistemic community that has made knowledge about a particular social problem. Speaking back to securitization may also involve acts by the objects of securitization, as well as their supporters, in which they deploy language in such a way as to construct the situation differently. Thus, squatting activists have frequently noted that “For us, this is not a matter of danger, but rather a matter of justice and human rights.” In addition, activists have criticized the media for engaging in generalizations that seek to portray squatters merely as dangerous foreigners without noting that they might improve a neighborhood or contribute to a community. Thus, speaking back to securitization might also involve efforts to call the media to account, through asking them to provide balanced coverage and adhere to a code of journalistic ethics. However, while certainly the group that is being securitized might be said to have sufficient, even superior, knowledge of the condition being studied, it may not have the necessary resources to disseminate and compile this knowledge enough to change the tenor of societal debate. Instead, activism by the objects of securitization might be constrained by the structural factors such as the finances of the nongovernmental organizations in comparison to government agencies. In addition, in the case of squatters, it is important to recognize the fact that anarchist groups in particular may be reluctant to form the formal structures necessary to fundraise and otherwise advocate for their cause. Furthermore, even in situations where the objects of securitization have attempted to speak out and sway the terms of the debate, the media may still prefer the established side and may not be diligent in providing both sides with equal time. Here we can consider the many British squatters who did devote time and effort to responding to the British government consultation paper. However, their input was downplayed in the final document that was released, as well as in the media.

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The final two possibilities for achieving desecuritization of the squatting issue rest not on actions taken by any players but rather on events that may or may not occur domestically or internationally. The first possibility here is that over time changes in the domestic politics of each nation may lead to the evolution of a consensus whereby the average citizen no longer fears his neighbors or buys into a worldview that would depict the squatter or rootless individual as an existential threat to an individual or collective way of life. In this way, a group that had enjoyed liminal status might move towards the mainstream and as a result be viewed as less threatening.

THE EVOLUTION OF TOLERANCE In this scenario, desecuritization could occur due to broad-ranging changes in society that lead to the development of a different majority view of the object of securitization. That is, collectively, our society’s vision of the object of security changes and an actor or set of actors that were previously regarded as suspect, deviant and dangerous are no longer so. For that reason, attempts to mobilize majority opinion about the need for securitization against this particular object of securitization no longer resonate within society. Over time, it appears, we may begin to think about our neighbors differently and no longer regard them as enemies. (For example, increased rates of racial intermarriage in the United States have changed the way that Americans think about race relations, and attempts to securitize racial issues are now much more prone to failure due to changes in social views and norms.) Examples of desecuritization that occurs due to a change in the majority’s view of the object of securitization include the ways in which Americans have changed their views regarding traditional “threats” such as homosexuals or people of minority races. We might also point to the ways in which German society no longer believed or acted as though Jews were a threat to the state after the defeat of Hitler. In recent years, we have seen how homosexuality has become more accepted in the American mainstream due to legislative initiatives in the areas of gay marriage, homosexual adoption and gays serving in the military. Gradually, in the United States, views have changed, so that homosexuals are no longer regarded by a majority of citizens as mentally ill deviants, or as people who are too compromised and untrustworthy to serve in the military or as bad neighbors to be avoided. Because views towards the object of securitization have changed, we can ask whether the securitizing rhetoric of the late 1980s that shut down gay establishments due to fears of the spread of AIDS would be as effective or as accepted today. Similarly, it is possible that efforts to include Roma children in schools and Roma families in societies may have contributed to the failure of securitizing acts in France aimed at shutting down Roma squats. Today, in the United States we may also point to a failure of securitization when citizens raised objections to the profiling of Arab Americans at

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security checkpoints in the United States.15 We can also point to the public information campaign and statements by prominent individuals who spoke out against the 2012 Arizona “show me your papers provision” to the immigration law that allows police to stop people whom they suspect of being illegal aliens. In this case, prominent American citizens posed for pictures, noting that “I look like an illegal alien,” thus indicating that they did not accept the government’s attempt to “other” illegal residents through constructing a huge gulf between them and their neighbors.16 Instead, legal citizens showed solidarity with the objects of securitization, noting that they all had much in common, such as Hispanic surnames or immigrant ancestors. In the language of the physical sciences, liminality can be seen as being in motion, as an individual, a place or a group exists in a transitory state before becoming something permanent. Thus, in asking about squatting we can ask how the liminal status of the squatter might be altered. Earlier in this work, I suggested that there are two types of strategies that might be used towards squatters and those in transitional housing. Inclusionist strategies describe how the squatter might either demand or be granted rights to more satisfactory housing, and with it he could accrue a place within mainstream society.17 In this way, his liminal status would be resolved as he became a member of the mainstream. On the other hand, an exclusionist strategy would draw a starker line between the squatter and others in his neighborhood, noting that he was wholly unlike them and perhaps not entirely human. In this way, his liminal status would be resolved by banishing him from regular society either through deporting him (if he is foreign) or by criminalizing him. Clearly, only the first possibility—that squatters and those who squat might somehow be incorporated into wider society—would lead to a desecuritization of the squatting problem. In his work, Aguilera has suggested that squatters often squat in an attempt to “hack” legal housing policy. That is, their overall aim is to acquire access to legitimate public housing in a timely fashion.18 In this case, once squatters succeed in reaching this goal the issue may be seen as resolved and removed from the legislative agenda. The squatters have become nascent citizens and legitimate participants in the polity. However, the European situation at present is different because of the ways in which those who are squatters are often left out of legitimate means for achieving legitimate housing. For groups such as foreigners in France or students in England, where there is no legitimate housing available, it is difficult to think about how they might be reconceptualized as citizens within the polity. However, the Dutch case offers a possible solution—those who have become “house sitters” are no longer regarded as the problem, but rather as part of the solution, working with government to pressure and force homeowners to keep housing in circulation, and providing protection from vandalism. And discussions in England about the “big society,” implemented by Prime Minister David Cameron in the summer of 2011, describe the ways

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in which citizens might be induced to cooperate on a local level to solve problems rather than merely relying on the government. These discussions have been of interest to squatters. In a recent op-ed, the analyst Matthew Bell quotes a young British squatter who notes the following: Squatting is the perfect example of the Big Society. It’s about people taking matters into their own hands, looking after their own, and getting together in groups and putting on events that are of benefit to the whole community. They’re not relying on the state to survive. In fact they’re saving the Government money by not signing on and claiming housing benefit.19 However, this possibility that squatters might be redefined as part of the solution rather than the problem and thus lose their liminal status encounters two obstacles in reality. First, as Blitz argues, Britain’s squatters may not have as much common ground with the government as they are claiming since anarchist squatters, for example, do not recognize the right to private property. She suggests that this difference in thinking is simply too great an ideological gulf to ever be traversed, and, for that reason, squatters will always be marginal, liminal and outside society.20 In addition, the proposed desecuritization of squatting broached here rests on the assumption that what has been and is being securitized is actually property squatting and not “being poor” or “being a foreigner.” Just as some suggest that the war on terror was actually a war on Islam and Islamic people,21 one might argue that squatting was never really the problem in the first place. That is, one might argue that France’s war on squatting was in actuality not a war on a particular lifestyle or set of housing practices but rather a war against the fact of being a Roma minority illegally in France. In this case, regardless of strides made in housing policies or steps towards the incorporation of squatters into more regular housing, the securitization rhetoric is likely to persist as it is merely one way (among many) of securitizing the situation of minorities in France and elsewhere. The final possible way in which desecuritization might occur rests on the assumption that changes might occur in the international system so that the threat is no longer seen as quite so dangerous. In this way, again, securitization strategies and securitization rhetoric are likely to fail and to thus no longer present such an effective weapon in the arsenal of strategies available to a political leader.

THE WORLD BECOMES LESS DANGEROUS In this scenario, the context changes, and with it so does the way in which everyone thinks about risk, including the risk presented by the object of securitization. That is, policymakers and the audience no longer think of the

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situation as so risky, and therefore they are more willing to accept some risk generated within their societies by not mobilizing on a large scale against the risk. For this reason, policymakers and the population may agree that a crisis stance towards the situation—including the allocation of massive resources—is no longer necessary. Therefore, the state of exception ends and the society goes back to “normal politics” in all arenas, including towards the object of securitization. An example of desecuritization taking place due to changes in the global arena might thus be the end of the Cold War, and with it a dialing down of rhetoric about the Soviet threat in the United States, and eventually a full-scale US military demobilization in many parts of Germany. Credible empirical evidence suggested that the threat simply was no longer a threat. In this situation desecuritization was not pursued but was rather a result of changes in the international system. However, it is difficult to see how changes in the international system might occur such that squatting (including international property squatting) is no longer seen as threatening. It is doubtful that the nations of Europe will ever return to a world of tightly controlled borders, nor is it likely that globalization will end. It is also doubtful that the terrorist threat will recede to the point that citizens stop worrying about who resides within their borders. Thus, the threat of unauthorized, unregistered and unsurveilled citizens within one’s borders will continue to persist and with it the securitization of property squatting.

ARE THERE REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR DESECURITIZATION? Although the aim of this chapter was merely to articulate some possible ways in which squatting might become desecuritized in Western Europe, it is also necessary to ask whether such possibilities are actually feasible rather than simply possible. In several cases, I have raised objections to the feasibility of specific strategies—noting that some groups do not have the power or organizational capacity to speak back to securitization, noting the limits to tolerance and suggesting the unlikelihood of sweeping changes in the international system. However, one might raise a final objection to all of the strategies for desecuritization discussed here, and this is that they are largely domestic strategies designed to be practiced within a specific state. However, the problem of property squatting has thus far been conceptualized largely as a regional problem affecting all of Europe. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether any of the desecuritization strategies examined and proposed here could ever really be effective on a Europe-wide scale. Instead, it is possible that as European culture becomes more homogenized, individual nations may have less leeway in deciding individually what does and does not threaten their societies. (That is, societal security may come to be conceptualized as occurring on

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a Europe-wide scale, with all of the nations of Europe eventually coming together to protect the societal security of Europe. Thus, for example, we saw both Holland and Denmark abandoning their social commitments to tolerance and alternative lifestyles in order to bring their own squatting policies more in line with those of other European nations, including those of their bordering neighbors. For this reason, over time we may see not just the moving of more issues into the realm of securitization (as Agamben suggests) but also the increasing development of similar worldviews and similar norms regarding what does and does not threaten domestic security in Europe. In this way, nations can be said to be exercising “peer pressure” on their neighbors in influencing them to tighten their security policies and to implement harsher policies towards those who are seen to threaten societal security not just in one nation but in all the nations of Europe. Here one can see the utility of Axelrod’s work on the evolution of cooperation, in which he suggests that in situations of group cohesion, actors can band together to punish those players who do not enforce penalties against norm violators.22 That is, group cohesion is predicated upon common defense, and one’s loyalty to the group is demonstrated in part through one’s willingness to participate in collective sanctioning of norm violators.23 In this case we can point to the evolution of a norm against property squatting throughout Europe, which all nations have been pressured to participate in enforcing. Thus, it appears that as states begin to frame security threats in similar terms, national characteristics (including tolerance of alternate lifestyles and dissent) may begin to recede—as states adopt a universal definition of what threatens the state.

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Notes

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION 1. Thomas Aguilera, “The Hidden Side of Metropolization. Governing Squats and Slums in Paris: Illegal Cities and Public Policies Dilemmas” (paper presented at the Annual RC21 Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands, July 2011). 2. See Nando Sigona, “Locating ‘the Gypsy Problem’: The Roma in Italy: Stereotyping, Labeling and ‘Nomad Camps,’” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 4 (2005): 741–756. 3. See Deniz Yonucu, “A Story of a Squatter Neighborhood: From the Place of the ‘Dangerous Classes’ to the ‘Place of Danger,’” Berkeley Journal of Sociology 52 (2009): 50–72. 4. See also Tayyab Mahmud, “‘Surplus Humanity’ and the Margins of Legality: Slums, Slum Dogs, and Accumulation by Dispossession,” Chapman Law Review 14 (2010): 1–75, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678202 (accessed April 1, 2012). 5. This is the stance taken by Sigona, for example. 6. See, for example, Aviva Stampfer, “Squatting and Eminent Domain: A Study of the Potential for Public Good,” Barnard College, 2010, http://sociology.barnard. edu/sites/default/files/inline/stampfered-squatting.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012). 7. Eduardo Penalver and Sonia Katyal, Property Outlaws: How Squatters, Pirates and Protestors Improve the Law of Ownership (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). See also Nadine Voelkner, “Managing Pathogenic Circulation: Human Security and the Migrant Assemblage in Thailand,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 3 (2011): 239–259. Voelkner also imbues irregular residents with agency, arguing that they choose how they will circulate in the global system. She thus refers to them as an “assemblage” rather than a population flow. 8. See Stampfer, “Squatting and Eminent Domain.” 9. Robert Neuwirth, Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, a New Urban World (New York: Routledge, 2004). See also Mahmud, “‘Surplus Humanity.’” 10. See Joan Nelson, “The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities?” World Politics 22, no. 3 (1970): 393–414. 11. This issue is raised by Adam Bodnar and Barbara Grabowska, “Squat Is Also a Home,” trans. Piotr Mleczko, Human Rights House Foundation, July 31, 2009 http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/11497.html (accessed June 2, 2012). 12. Joel Audefroy, “Eviction Trends Worldwide and the Role of Local Authorities in the Right to Housing,” Environment and Urbanization 6, no. 1 (1994): 8–24. 13. See Tomas Weiss, “The Blurring Border between the Police and the Military: A Debate without Foundations,” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no. 3 (2011): 396–405. 14. For more on this subject, see Lene Hansen, Security as Practice (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2007).

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15. Weiss makes this distinction in “The Blurring Border,” 397. 16. R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 17. Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (New York: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 21, quoted in Lene Hansen, Security as Practice (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2007), 95. 18. Michael C. Williams, “Securitization and the Liberalism of Fear,” Security Dialogue 42 (2011): 453. 19. Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in On Security, ed. R. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 47. 20. Claudia Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation,” Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (2004): 171. 21. Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Towards a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” Alternatives 27 (2002): 63–92. 22. Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, “Governing Terrorism through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un)Knowing the Future,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 89–115. 23. Andreas Behnke, “No Way Out: Desecuritization, Emancipation and the Eternal Return of the Political—A Reply to Aradau,” Journal of International Relations and Development 9 (2006): 62–69. 24. Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene,” 391. 25. Didier Bigo, “Delivering Liberty and Security? The Reframing of Freedom When Associated with Security,” in Europe’s 21st Century Challenge, ed. Didier Bigo et al. (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2001), 263. 26. Iver Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2. 27. Here my thinking is shaped by Stefano Guzzini, “Securitization as a Causal Mechanism,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 4–5 (2011): 329–341. 28. Charlotte Lemanski, “Everyday Human (in) Security: Rescaling for the Southern City,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 1 (2012): 61–78. 29. Colin McInnes and Simon Rushton, “HIV/AIDS and Securitization Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 4 (2012): 1–24. 30. Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan, “Securitization, Sectors and Functional Differentiation,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 4–5 (2011): 418. 31. Charlotte Epstein, “Guilty Bodies, Productive Bodies, Destructive Bodies: Crossing the Biometric Borders,” International Political Sociology 1, no. 2 (2007): 149–164. 32. Torin Monahan, Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2010). 33. Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene,” 394. 34. Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene,” 393. 35. See Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001) for a description of how local politics works in a democracy, at least historically. 36. Didier Bigo, “The Mobius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies),” in Identity, Borders, Orders: Rethinking IR Theory, ed. Mathias Albert et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 91–116. 37. Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Security after the Cold War.” Cooperation and Conflict 32, no. 1 (1997): 5–28. See also M. C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): 511–531. 38. Michael C. Williams, “Modernity, Identity and Security: A Comment on the ‘Copenhagen Controversy,’” Review of International Studies 24 (1998): 435– 439.

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39. Voelkner, “Managing Pathogenic Circulation,” 239. 40. Williams, “Modernity, Identity and Security.” 41. Olger Stritzel, “Security: The Translation,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 4–5 (2011): 348. 42. Aguilera, “Hidden Side of Metropolization.” 43. Anonymous, “Squatters,” Landlord Zone, n.d., http://www.landlordzone.co.uk/ squatters.htm (accessed December 2, 2012). 44. Alastair Jamieson and Ben Leach, “The Middle Class Serial Squatters Exploiting the Law,” Telegraph, March 6, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ law-and-order/8363406/ (accessed August 16, 2011). 45. Mark Moody, “The Growing Problem of Foreign National Homelessness,” Guardian, April 13, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/housing-network/2012/ apr/13/immigrant—foreign-national-homelessness (accessed July 5, 2012). 46. Elspeth Guild, “The Legal Framework: Who Is Entitled to Move?” in Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe, ed. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2005), 21. 47. Williams, “Modernity, Identity and Security,” describes the securitization of identity. 48. Agnew, John. “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumpitons of International Relations Theory,” Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80, cited in Jeffrey Huysmans. 49. Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan, “Securitization, Sectors and Functional Differentiation,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 4–5 (2011): 413–425. 50. For more on this, see ADN Kronos International, “Italy: Gypsy Camp Set on Fire in Rome,” July 23, 2011, http://adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security? id= 1.0.2359723925 (accessed July 6, 2012). 51. Sophie Body-Gendrot, The Social Control of Cities? A Comparative Perspective (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2000), 21. 52. See, for example, Isabelle Milberg, “Slums, Slum Dwellers and Multilevel Governance,” European Journal of Development Research 18 (2006): 299–318. 53. Albert and Buzan, “Securitization,” 421. 54. Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” 62. 55. Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. New York: Taylor, 2002. 56. Helen Hayward, Attitudes to the Ownership and Distribution of Land in Britain 1500–1930: A Survey with Particular Reference to Old Testament Paradigm and the Role of the Church (Cambridge, UK: Jubilee Center, 1991), http://www. jubilee-centre.org/uploaded/files/Attitudes%20to%20land%20ownership.Pdf (accessed July 23, 2012). 57. Ward, Colin. Cotters and Squatters: Housing’s Hidden History. London: Five Leaves, 2002. 58. This view of squatting as an inevitable and even desirable part of development is described in Hari Srinivas, “Defining Squatter Settlements,” Global Development Research Center, 2011, http://www.gdrc.org/uem/squatteres/define-squatter.html (accessed July 9, 2012). 59. See Hayward, Attitudes to the Ownership and Distribution of Land, 15. 60. See, for example, Richard Grant, “Out of Place? Global Citizens in Local Spaces: A Study of the Informal Settlements in the Korle Lagoon Environs in Accra, Ghana,” Urban Forum 17, no. 1 (2006): 3–24. 61. See Hans Pruijt, “Is the Institutionalization of Urban Movements Inevitable? A Comparison of the Opportunities for Sustained Squatting in New York City and Amsterdam,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, no. 1 (2003): 133–157. 62. Grant, “Out of Place?,” 21.

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63. Aguilera, “Hidden Side of Metropolization,” 42; Pruijt, “Is the Institutionalization of Urban Movements Inevitable?” 64. Ward, Cotters and Squatters, 10–11. 65. James Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 66. See the web site at http://www.homeless-international.org/our_projects_1.aspx? id=0:598 for more information on this project. 67. Ward, Cotters and Squatters, 9. 68. Ward, Cotters and Squatters, 16. 69. Pruijt, “Is the Institutionalization of Urban Movements Inevitable?” 70. Tony Mahony, “London Squatter Talks,” Politico: Social and Political Issues, 1969, http://www.politico.ie/component/content/article/6304.html (accessed January 11, 2012). 71. Eric Mattocks, “Occupational Hazards,” Guardian, February 2, 1999, Factiva (accessed September 14, 2012). 72. Ron Bailey, The Squatters (London: Penguin, 1973), 30. 73. David Carter, “Squatters Evicted from Ten Million Pound Property in Highgate,” January 14, 2011, Sheriffs Office, http://thesheriffsoffice.com/articles/squatters_ evicted_from_10_million (accessed August 11, 2012). 74. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). 75. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 197. 76. Richard Ballard, “Middle Class Neighborhoods or ‘African Kraals?’ The Impact of Informal Settlements and Vagrants in Post-Apartheid White Identity,” Urban Forum 15, no. 1 (2004): 48–73. 77. Bruce Braun, “Editorial: Querying Posthumanisms,” Geoforum 35, no. 3 (2004): 269. 78. Jacques Derrida, On Grammatology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); Agamben, Homo Sacer. See also, Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (New York: Meridian, 1998) 79. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (New York: Meridian, 1998), 37, quoted in Braun, “Editorial,” 270. 80. Braun, “Editorial,” 270. 81. Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” 68. 82. Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” 63–92. 83. Shelter, “Consultation Response: Ministry of Justice Options for Dealing with Squatters,” Shelter, 2011, http://england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/ 0010/385732/10-11_Options_for_Dealing_with_Squatting.pdf (accessed August 1, 2012). 84. Phil Hubbard, “Accommodating Otherness: Anti-asylum Center Protest and the Maintenance of White Privilege,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30 (2005): 53. 85. Hubbard, “Accommodating Otherness,” 55. 86. Ina Friedman, “Fringe Benefits,” Anarchists against the Walls, http://awalls.org/ fringe_benefits (accessed January 4, 2012). Previously published in The Jerusalem Report, September 1, 2006. 87. Anders Corr, “Anarchist Squatting and Land Use in the West: Direct Action and the Critique of Real Estate,” squat.net, http://archiv.squat.net/anders/anarchist_ squatting.html (accessed September 5, 2012). 88. Anonymous, “What Is a Squat? Why Do I Squat?,” Anarchistnews.org, October 23, 2006, http://anarchistnews.org (accessed January 2, 2012). 89. See James Westcott, “Slum Politics,” AlterNet, 2005, http://www.alternet.org/ story/21297/slum_politics (accessed December 17, 2011).

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90. J. Peter Burgess, The Ethical Subject of Security (New York: Routledge, 2011). 91. Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 172–173. 92. Balzacq, “Three Faces,” 182. 93. Oxford English Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/words (accessed July 1, 2012). 94. Lorna Fox O’Mahony and Neil Cobb, “Taxonomies of Squatting: Unlawful Occupation in a New Legal Order,” The Modern Law Review 71, no. 6 (2008): 878. 95. Fox O’Mahony and Cobb, “Taxonomies of Squatting,” 878–911. 96. Fox O’Mahony and Cobb, “Taxonomies of Squatting,” 883. 97. Daily Mail, “Riot Police Storm G20 Protestors’ Squats . . . as Violence Spreads to France,” Mail Online, April 3, 2009, http://www.dailymail.c.uk/news/ articel=1166349/Riot-police-storm-G20 (accessed August 15, 2012). 98. Here my thinking is shaped by the work being done by Stohl and Franks in the emerging field of critical terrorism studies. See Michael Stohl, “Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 1 (2008): 5–16, and Jason Franks, “Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Beyond Orthodox Terrorism Theory: A Critical Research Agenda,” Global Society 23, no. 2 (2009): 153–176. 99. Didier Bigo, “Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who Is in Control?” in Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe, ed. Bigo and Guild, 69. 100. Alexander Vasudevan, “Criminalizing Squatting Would Threaten Our Rights,” Guardian, June 22, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/ ju/22/criminalising-squatting.html (accessed May 9, 2012). 101. C. Wilkinson, “The Limits of Spoken Words: From Meta-narratives to Experiences of Security,” in Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, ed. Thierry Balzacq (New York: Routledge, 2011), 98. 102. Balzacq, “Three Faces,” 172. 103. Andrew Przeworski and Henry Teune, Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Krieger, 1982). 104. Crispin Blunt, “Ending the Misery of Squatting,” UK Ministry of Justice, 2011, http://justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/moj/newsrelease130711 (accessed July 30, 2012). 105. Jacek Pawlicki, “End of Line for Christiania’s Flower Children,” Gazeta Wyborcza, March 7, 2011, http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/532361-endline-christiania-s-flower-children (accessed August 15, 2012). 106. “Freetown Christiania,” copenhagen.com A/S, http://www.copenhagen.com/ tourism/musts/christiania.asp?Menu=Tourism (accessed November 1, 2012). 107. BBC News, “Denmark Christiania: New Challenges for Copenhagen’s Hippy Zone,” BBC, August 14, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe14496193 (accessed November 12, 2012). 108. Pawlicki, “End of Line.” 109. Juha Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 1 (2008): 69, quoted in Stritzel, “Security,” 349. 110. Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 2003), quoted in Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene,” 400. 111. DutchNews.nl, “Anti-squatting Law Breaks Human Rights Legislation, Says Court,” DutchNews.nl, 2010, http://dutchnews.nl/news/archives/print/024786. php (accessed July 20, 2012).

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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Mark Salter, Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 6. 2. J. Peter Burgess, The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat against Europe (New York: Routledge, 2011). 3. Nils Bubandt, “Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005): 275–296. 4. Andrew Gorman-Murray, “Reconfiguring Domestic Values: Meanings of Home for Gay Men and Lesbians,” Housing, Theory and Society 24, no. 3 (2007): 329. 5. David Benjamin, ed. The Home: Words, Interpretations, Meanings and Environments (Aldershot, UK: Averbury, 1995), 229. See also David Saile, foreword to Home, ed. Benjamin, ix–xiii. Also, Roderick J. Lawrence, “Deciphering Home: An Integrative Historical Perspective,” in Home, ed. Benjamin, 53–68. 6. Amos Rapoport, “A Critical Look at the Concept ‘Home,’” in Home, ed. David Benjamin, 30. 7. Ann Dupuis and David C. Thorns, “Home, Home Ownership and the Search for Ontological Security,” Sociological Review 46, no. 1 (1988): 30. 8. Dupuis and Thorns, “Home,” 24. 9. Susan Smith et al., “Housing as Health Capital: How Health Trajectories and Housing Paths Are Linked,” Journal of Social Issues 59, no. 3 (2003): 501–525. 10. Dupuis and Thorns, “Home.” 11. Setha Low, “Fortification of Residential Neighborhoods and the New Emotions of Home,” Housing, Theory and Society 25, no. 1 (2008): 47–65. 12. Gorman-Murray, “Reconfiguring Domestic Values.” 13. Ashild Lappegard Hauge and Arnulf Kostad, “Dwelling as an Expression of Identity: A Comparative Study among Residents in High-Priced and Low-Priced Neighborhoods in Norway,” Housing, Theory and Society 24, no. 4 (2007): 272–292. 14. Shelley Mallett, “Understanding Home: A Critical Review of the Literature,” Sociological Review 52, no. 1 (2004): 62–89. 15. Andrew Skuse and Thomas Cousins, “Spaces of Resistance: Informal Settlement, Communication and Community Organization in a Cape Town Township,” Urban Studies 44, no. 5–6 (2007): 979–995. 16. Gorman-Murray, “Reconfiguring Domestic Values,” 230. 17. Gorman-Murray, “Reconfiguring Domestic Values.” 18. Michael Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 513. 19. Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations and Its Prospects (New York: Mariner Books, 1968). 20. Steven Flusty, Building Paranoia: The Proliferation of Interdictory Space and the Erosion of Spatial Justice (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles Forum for Architecture and Urban Design, 1994), http://laforum.org/content/publications/pamphlet/ building-paranoia-the-proliferation-of-interdictory-space-and-the-erosion-ofspatial-justice (accessed August 15, 2012). 21. Charlotte Lemanski, “Everyday Human (in) Security: Rescaling for the Southern City,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 1 (2012): 61–78. 22. Sophie Body-Gendrot, The Social Control of Cities: A Comparative Perspective (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2000). 23. Flusty, Building Paranoia. 24. Jon Coaffee makes this argument in Terrorism, Risk and the Global City (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2009). 25. Teresa P. R. Caldeira, “Fortified Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation,” Public Culture 8, no. 2 (1996): 303–328.

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26. Setha M. Low, “The Edge and the Center: Gated Communities and the Discourse of Urban Fear,” American Anthropologist 103, no. 1 (2001): 45–58. 27. J. Peter Burgess makes this point in The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat against Europe (New York: Routledge, 2011). 28. For more on this point, see Michele Acuto, “Global Cities: Gorillas in Our Midst,” Alternatives 35 (2010): 425–448. 29. C. McInnes and S. Rushton, “HIV, AIDS and Security: Where Are We Now?,” International Affairs 86 (2010): 225–245. 30. Flusty, Building Paranoia, 15. 31. Low, “The Edge and the Center.” 32. Katja Franko Aas, “Analyzing a World in Motion: Global Flows Meet Criminology of the Other,” Theoretical Criminology 11, no. 2 (2007): 283–303. 33. Mumford, The City in History, 5. 34. For more on the association between rootlessness and chaos, see Alan Smart, “Unruly Places: Urban Governance and the Persistence of Illegality in Hong Kong’s Urban Squatter Areas,” American Anthropologist 103, no. 1 (2008): 30–44. 35. David Sibley, Outsiders in Urban Societies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981). 36. Mark Salter, Rights of Passage, 11–16. 37. See Brian Champion, “Spies (Look) Like Us: The Early Use of Business and Civilian Covers in Covert Operations,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 21 (2008): 530–564. Also Rosemary Sheldon, Operation Messiah: St. Paul, Roman Intelligence and the Birth of Christianity (New York: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008). 38. Xenophon, The Cavalry General (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2004), 2, quoted in Champion, “Spies (Look) Like Us,” 534. 39. Choon-Piew Pow, “Securing the ‘Civilised’ Enclaves: Gated Communities and the Moral Geographies of Exclusion in (Post-)Socialist Shanghai,” Urban Studies 44, no. 8 (2007): 1546. 40. Voelkner, “Managing Pathogenic Circulation,” 255. 41. Verena Stolcke, “New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe,” International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (2002): 25–35. 42. Salter, Rights of Passage, 25. 43. Aas, “Analyzing a World in Motion,” 287. 44. Andrew T. Price-Smith, Contagion and Chaos: Disease, Ecology and National Security in the Era of Globalization (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2009), 42. 45. Pow, “Securing the ‘Civilised’ Enclaves,” 1544. 46. Voelkner, “Managing Pathogenic Circulation.” 47. Iver B. Neumann, “Introduction to the Forum on Liminality,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): 1–2. 48. Salter, Rights of Passage, 86. 49. Sharon McGuire and Jane Georges, “Undocumentedness and Liminality as Health Variables,” Advances in Nursing Science 26, no. 3 (2003): 190. Also, D. Gastaldo and L. Magalhaes, “International Migration versus National Healthcare,” Nursing Inquiry 17, no. 3 (2010): 185. 50. On the Roman Census see James N. Thurman, “Think That Census Form Is Nosy? Try Ancient Rome,” Christian Science Monitor, April 19, 2000, EBSCO (accessed July 1, 2012). 51. Jeffrey Huysmans, “Insecurity, Technology and the Political,” in The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, ed. Jeffrey Huysmans (New York: Routledge, 2006), 3. 52. Helga Leitner, Eric Sheppard, Kristin Sziarto and Anant Maringanti, “Contesting Urban Futures: Decentering Liberalism,” in Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers, ed. Helga Leitner, Jamie Pecck and Eric Sheppard (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2006), 1–25.

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53. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 54. For the purposes of this analysis, I am interested only in those individuals who are defined as squatters and who are engaged in the act of property squatting. There is some overlap between the categories of occupiers, squatters and those who are merely homeless. However, for the purpose of theorizing about the character and motivations of the squatter as well as the danger that he poses to the state, I am considering only those who are engaged specifically in the act of property squatting. Thus, I will not be discussing state policy towards homelessness as a social problem, nor will I engage specifically with the politics and aims of the Occupy Wall Street movement, for example. Squatting is different from occupying because it is based on one’s physically taking possession of a property, usually a residence, which one does not own, for the purposes of establishing one’s own long-term residence there. This is fundamentally different than occupying a park or other public space that does not exist primarily for the purposes of residence, and for which there is no “homeowner” and where one does not wish to reside permanently. Both squatting and occupying can have similar political goals (namely taking symbolic possession of territory for the purposes of creating social change, as well as engaging in civil disobedience) but the self-concept of the squatter is different from the self-concept of the occupier, since for one the condition may be a permanent condition of his identity, while for the other the decision to engage in occupation may be only a temporary identity shift. 55. Elizabeth Ngugi, Cecilia Benoit, Helga Hallgrimsdottir, Mikael Jansson and Eric Abella Roth, “Partners and Clients of Female Sex Workers in an Informal Urban Settlement in Nairobi, Kenya,” Culture, Health and Sexuality 14, no. 1 (2012): 17–30. 56. Lynsey Haywood, “Posh Squatters on the Move,” Sun, January 28, 2009, http:// www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/2191921/Posh-squatters (accessed July 11, 2012). 57. Haywood, “Posh Squatters on the Move.” 58. Haywood, “Posh Squatters on the Move.” 59. Mark Blunden and Rob Parsons, “Ilford: A Community Besieged by Squatters,” Evening Standard, January 12, 2012, http://www.standard.co.uk/news/ilford-acommunity-besieged-by-squatters (accessed August 15, 2012). 60. Craig M. Gurney, “Lowering the Drawbridge: A Case Study of Analogy and Metaphor in the Social Construction of Home Ownership,” Urban Studies 36, no. 10 (1999): 1705–1722. See also Rob Rowlands and Craig M. Gurney, “Young People’s Perceptions of Housing Tenure: A Case Study in the Socialization of Tenure Prejudice,” Housing, Theory and Society 17 (2001): 121–130. 61. Richard Ronald, “Home Ownership, Ideology and Diversity: Re-evaluating Conceptions of Housing Ideology in the Case of Japan,” Housing, Theory and Society 21, no. 2 (2004): 49–64. 62. Grant R. Saf, “Exclusionary Discourse towards Squatters in Suburban Cape Town,” Ecumene 8, no. 1 (2001): 87–107. 63. This definition comes from Michael Kraft and Bruce B. Clary, “Public Testimony in Nuclear Waste Repository Hearings,” in Public Opinion and Nuclear Waste, ed. Riley E. Dunlap and Michael E. Kraft (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 27, quoted in Belinda Creel Davis and Valentina Bali, “Examining the Role of Race, NIMBY and Local Politics in FEMA Trailer Park Placement,” Social Science Quarterly 89, no. 5 (2008): 1176. 64. For more on these strategies, see Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder, “Divided We Fall: Gated and Wall Communities in the United States,” in Architecture of Fear, ed. Nan Ellin (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), 85–99.

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65. London Evening Standard, “Squatters and Residents Clash over Raves,” London Evening Standard, February 20, 2012, http://www.standard.co.uk/london/ squatters-and-residents-clash (accessed August 20, 2012). 66. Department of Communities and Local Government, “Laying the Foundations: A Housing Strategy for England,” Gov.uk, November 21, 2011: 39. http://www. communities.gov.uk/publications/housing/housingstrategy2011 (accessed February 2, 2012). 67. David Sibley, Outsiders in Urban Societies (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1981). 68. Craig Gurney, “Pride and Prejudice: Discourses of Normalisation in Public and Private Accounts of Home Ownership,” Housing Studies 14, no. 2 (1999): 163–183. 69. Gurney, “Pride and Prejudice,” 168. 70. Rodney Fopp describes these discourses about homelessness in “Metaphors in Homeless Discourse, and Research: Exploring ‘Pathways,’ Careers and Safety Nets,” Housing, Theory and Society 26, no. 4 (2009): 271–291. 71. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (New York: Paladin, 1973), 225, quoted in Sibley, Outsiders in Urban Societies, 29. 72. Lili, Melissa and Pete, “Squatters in Britain: Vulnerable, Demonized and Soon to Be Criminalized?” Our Kingdom: Power and Liberty in Britain, July 22, 2011, http:// www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/lili-melissa-and-pete-of-campaign-grouphousing-solidarity/squatters-in-britain-vulnerabl (accessed December 1, 2012). 73. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Vintage, 1975), 55. 74. Richard Ronald, The Ideology of Home Ownership: Homeowner Societies and the Role of Housing (NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 8. 75. Ergei Shubin and Kate Swanson, “I’m an Imaginary Figure: Unraveling the Mobility and Marginalization of Scottish Gypsy Travelers,” Geoforum 41 (2010): 919–929. 76. Gurney, “Pride and Prejudice.” 77. Sigona, “Locating ‘the Gypsy Problem,’” 742. 78. Adam Wagner, “No More Squatting?,” UK Human Rights Blog, March 21, 2011, http://www.ukhumanrightsblog.com (accessed July 1, 2012). 79. See Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002), Supplement, p. 69, in Alexandra J. Innes, “When the Threatened Become the Threat: The Construction of Asylum Seekers in British Media Narratives,” International Relations 24, no. 4 (2010): 469. 80. The organization is profiled at: http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article23938105-gurkhas-hired-to-keep-squatters-out-of-billionaires-row.do (accessed July 1, 2012). See also the web site: http://www.vigilanceproperties.co.uk/ (accessed December 1, 2012). 81. HG Security and Property Protection, “Vacant Property Protection,” HG Security and Property Protection, n.d., http://www.hgsecurity.co.uk/our-services-2/ our-services (accessed December 1, 2012). 82. Time, “U.K. Squatting Laws: Is Homeowner Relief on the Way?,” Time, February 18, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2049946,00. html (accessed July 1, 2012). 83. Ryan Kisel, “Knife-Wielding Lithuanian Squatters Who Move in When Residents Go Out,” Mail Online, September 24, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/article-1314526/Knife-wielding-Lithuanian-squatters-residents-out.html (accessed July 1, 2012). 84. Steve Bird, “Where My Wife Comes From, They Shoot Squatters,” Mail Online, September 9, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2035699/Squattersshot-wife-comes-Doctor-1m-home-taken-spongers-hits-law.html (accessed July 1, 2012).

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85. Telegraph, “Squatters Destroy Family Home While Residents Take Three Day Holiday,” Telegraph, May 26, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ uknews/crime/7768655/Squatters-destroy-family-home-while-residents-takethree-day-holiday.html (accessed July 1, 2012). 86. Mark Hughes, “Sarah’s Law to Be Rolled Out Nationally,” Independent, March 3, 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/sarahs-law-tobe-rolled-out-nationally-1914989.html (accessed July 1, 2012). 87. London Evening Standard, “11 Arrested in Mansion Disturbance,” London Evening Standard, April 1, 2012, http://www.standard.co.uk/panewsfeed/11arrested-in-mansion-disturbance.html (accessed July 1, 2012). 88. Blunden and Parsons, “Ilford.” 89. Blunden and Parsons, “Ilford.” 90. Kim Murphy, “In Alaska, Becoming the Militants Next Door,” Los Angeles Times, December 22, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/22/nation/lana-alaska-terrorist-20111222 (accessed August 1, 2012). 91. Andrea Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door,” New York Times, January 27, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadist-t.html?_r=1& pagewanted=all (accessed August 1, 2012). 92. For example, the formation of Neighborhood Watch programs is actually an attempt at creating security in one’s neighborhood. See Katy Holloway et al., Crime Prevention Research Review No. 3: Does Neighborhood Watch Reduce Crime?, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2008, http://www.Cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/publications/e040825133res-review3.pdf (accessed July 1, 2012). 93. Kim McKee and Vickie Cooper, “The Paradox of Tenant Empowerment: Regulatory and Liberatory Possibilities,” Housing, Theory and Society 25, no. 2 (2008): 132–146. 94. Arjun Appadurai makes this point in “Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of Politics,” Public Culture 14, no. 1 (2002): 21–47. 95. B. Cruikshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 1999), 134. 96. John I. Gilderbloom and John Markham, “The Impact of Homeownership on Political Beliefs,” Social Forces 73, no. 4 (1995): 1589–1607. 97. Gilderbloom and Markham, “The Impact of Homeownership.” 98. For more on the stigmatization associated with the barbarism frame, see Ryan Powell, “Understanding the Stigmatization of Gypsies: Power and the Dialectics of (Dis)identification,” Housing, Theory and Society 25, no. 2 (2008): 87–109. 99. Mark Salter, Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 4. 100. For a description of the history on which such notions rest, see Richard Ballard, “Middle Class Neighborhoods or ‘African Kraals’? The Impact of Informal Settlements and Vagrants in Post-Apartheid White Identity,” Urban Forum 15, no. 1 (2004): 48–73. See also Alan Smart, “Unruly Places: Urban Governance and the Persistence of Illegality in Hong Kong’s Urban Squatter Areas,” American Anthropologist, 103, no. 1 (2001): 30–44. 101. Salter, Rights of Passage, 45. 102. See, for example, Michael Howie, “Landlord Left with Squatter Nightmare Because of Legal Loophole,” Telegraph, March 20, 2011, http://www.telegraph. co.uk/news/uknews/8392580/Landlord-left-with-squatter-nightmare-becauseof-legal-loophole.html (accessed April 1, 2012). 103. See Paul Bentley, “Come Over and Join Me in Soft-Touch Britain, Says the Latvian Who Traveled 1,500 Miles and Ended Up Squatting in a 6 Million Pound Mansion,” Mail Online, January 7, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/article-1344634/ Latvian-squatter-Britain-easy-touch-ends-10m-manion.html (accessed December 1,

Notes

104.

105. 106. 107. 108.

109. 110. 111.

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2012). See also Anna Edwards, “Squatters Invade Grade I Listed Georgian Office Block as They Carry On Living the High Life after Eviction from Eight-Bedroom Mansion,” Mail Online, August 10, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-2186651/Squatters-invade-Grade-I-listed-Georgian-office-block-carryliving-high-life-eviction-bedroom-mansion.html (accessed December 1, 2012). Aviva, “Increase in Squatter Problem Gives Property Owners Expensive Headache,” Aviva, December 14, 2010, http://www.aviva.co.uk/media-centre/story/ 9059/increase-in-squatter-problem-gives-property-owners (accessed December 1, 2012). Otto Santa Ana makes a similar claim about US media framing of the undocumented worker issue in the United States, arguing that “the metaphors discerned (in media coverage by the Los Angeles Times) are that immigrants are animals.” See Otto Santa Ana, “Like an Animal I Was Treated: Antiimmigrant Metaphor in US Public Discourse,” Discourse and Society 10, no. 2 (2009): 191–224. Admin, “Squatters Plague Homeowners in London,” Fresh Insurance, March 18, 2011, http://www.freshinsurance.co.uk/blog/2011/03/squatters-plague-homeownersin-london/ (accessed December 1, 2012). Blunden and Parsons, “Ilford.” Phil Hubbard, “Accommodating Otherness: Anti-asylum Center Protest and the Maintenance of White Privilege,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30 (2005): 52–65. David Cutts et al., “Anti-immigrant, Politically Disaffected or Still Racist after All? Examining the Attitudinal Drivers of Extreme Right Support in Britain in the 2009 European Elections,” European Journal of Political Research 50 (2011): 418–440. Willem Schinkel and Friso van Houdt, “The Double Helix of Cultural Assimilationism and Neo-liberalism: Citizenship and Contemporary Governmentality,” British Journal of Sociology 61, no. 4 (2010): 696–715. Innes, “When the Threatened Becomes the Threat.” Mark Blunden, “Squatters Leave Scout Headquarters with Thanks,” Evening Standard, February 6, 2012, http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/ squatters-leave-scout-hq-with-thanks.html (accessed March 1, 2012).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 1. These policies are laid out in Department for Communities and Local Government, “Laying the Foundations: Housing Strategy for England,” Gov.uk, 2011, http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/housing/housingstrategy2011 (accessed September 12, 2012). 2. Department for Communities and Local Government, “Laying the Foundations,” 1. 3. Department for Communities and Local Government, “Laying the Foundations.” 4. See Department of Housing and Local Communities, “Progress Report on Gypsy and Traveler Policy,” 2011, http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/ housing/pdf/1284500 (accessed September 12, 2012). 5. Hilary Osborne, “The 900,000 Empty Homes Falling Apart While Thousands Have Nowhere to Live,” Guardian, December 3, 2011, http://www.guardian. co.uk/2011/dec/03/empty-homes-falling-apart (accessed August 3, 2012). 6. Department of Housing and Local Communities, “Laying the Foundations,” 3. 7. Osborne, “900,000 Empty Homes.” 8. Ryan Powell and John Flint, “(In)formalization and the Civilizing Process: Applying the Work of Norbert Elias to Housing-Based Anti-Social Behavior Interventions in the UK,” Housing, Theory and Society 26, no. 3 (2009): 160.

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9. Powell and Flint, “(In)formalization,” 181. 10. Lynsey Hanley, “Welfare Reform Reinforces Suspicion of Social Housing and Its Tenants,” Guardian, August 6, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/housingnetwork/2012/aug/06/welfare-reform (accessed August 30, 2012). 11. Department of Communities and Local Government, “Ministerial Working Group on Preventing and Tackling Homelessness,” Gov.uk, 2012, http:// www.communities.gov.uk/housing/homelessness/homelessnessworkinggroup (accessed August 11, 2012). 12. Department of Communities and Local Government, “Vision to End Rough Sleeping: No Second Night Out Nationwide,” Gov.uk, July 6, 2011, http://www. communities.gov.uk/publications/housing/visionendroughsleeping (accessed August 12, 2012). 13. “Housing,” Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/housing (accessed December 2, 2012). 14. “UK House Prices,” Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/ houseprices (accessed December 2, 2012). 15. Chartered Institute of Housing, “Housing Rights Information England and Wales,” Chartered Institute of Housing, 2012, http://www.housing-rights.info/ index (accessed August 11, 2012). 16. Chartered Institute of Housing, “Housing Rights Information England and Wales.” 17. Lili, Melissa and Pete, “Squatters in Britain: Vulnerable, Demonized and Soon to Be Criminalized?” Our Kingdom: Power and Liberty in Britain, July 22, 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/lili-melissa-and-pete-of-campaigngroup-housing-solidarity/squatters-in-britain-vulnerabl (accessed December 1, 2012). 18. Giles Peaker, “Ignore Headlines about Squatters, Government Proposals Target Gypsies and Travelers,” Guardian, July 13, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ law/2011/jul/13/criminalise-squatting-targets-gypsies (accessed August 10, 2012). 19. Shelter, “Squatting,” Shelter, n.d., http://england.shelter.org.uk/get_advice/ homelessness/squatting (accessed December 1, 2012). 20. Shelter, “Consultation Response: Ministry of Justice Options for Dealing with Squatters,” Shelter, 2011, http://england.shelter.org.uk/professional_resources/ policy_and_research/policy_library/policy_library_folder/response_-_options_ for_dealing_with_squatting (accessed August 10, 2012). 21. Mahony, Tony. “London Squatters Talks.” Politico: Social and Political Issues. 1969. http://www.politico.ie/component/article/6304.html (accessed December 6, 2011). 22. Ron Bailey, The Squatters (London: Penguin Books, 1973). 23. Matthew Bell, “Squatting Is the Perfect Example of the Big Society,” Independent May 29, 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/property/house-and-home/ home-truths-squatting-is-the-perfect-example-of-the-big-society-2288870.html (accessed June 1, 2012). 24. Propertydrum, “Closing the Door on Squatters,” 2011, Propertydrum, http:// www.propertydrum.com/articles/squatters/print (accessed July 20, 2012). 25. Fox O’Mahony and Cobb, “Taxonomies of Squatting,” 879. 26. Home Office, Squatting: A Home Office Consultation Paper (London: HMSO, 1991), paras 5, 62, quoted in Fox O’Mahony and Cobb, “Taxonomies of Squatting,” 889. 27. Fox O’Mahony and Cobb, “Taxonomies of Squatting,” 888. 28. Fox O’Mahony and Cobb, “Taxonomies of Squatting,” 888. 29. Neil Cobb and Lorna Fox, “Living Outside the System? The (Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration Act 2002,” Legal Studies 27, no. 2 (2007): 21. 30. Cobb and Fox, “Living Outside the System?”

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31. Cobb and Fox, “Living Outside the System?” 32. Propertydrum, “Closing the Door on Squatters.” 33. The Brighton Argus newspaper published a “sensational” piece called “Squatters Use Law to Find Empty Homes.” The text is excerpted on the web site for Squatters Network of Brighton and Hove Actually. 34. Daily Mail, “Council Forced to Give Squatters a List of All Its Empty Properties,” Mail Online, March 20, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-1163457/Council-forced-squatters (accessed March 14, 2012). 35. Guardian, “Living for Today: People from All over the World Are Now Squatting,” Guardian, October 26, 2005, Factiva (accessed August 1, 2012). 36. Lauren McLaren and Mark Johnson, “Resources, Group Conflict and Symbols: Explaining Anti-immigration Hostility in Britain,” Political Studies 55 (2007): 720. 37. McLaren and Johnson, “Resources, Group Conflict and Symbols,” 721. 38. British Social Attitudes, “British Social Attitudes Information System,” Center for Comparative European Survey Data, n.d., http://www.britsocat.com/Home (accessed December 2, 2012). 39. Scott Blinder, “UK Public Opinion toward Migration,” May 27, 2011, http:// migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-migrationdeterminants-attitudes (accessed June 1, 2012), 1–2. Blinder notes that “Research provides strong evidence that opposition to immigration comes from feelings of threat to one’s group—especially to national identity and culture.” 40. Ingrid Storm, “Christian Nations? Ethnic Christianity and Anti-immigration Attitudes in Four Western European Countries,” Nordic Journal of Religion and Society 24, no. 1 (2011): 75. 41. McLaren and Johnson, “Resources, Group Conflict and Symbols,” 709. 42. Tom Frere-Smith, “What Does It Mean to Be British?,” Ipsos MORI: The Big Society (blog), January 9, 2012, http://www.ipsos-mori.com/newsevents/blogs/ thebigsociety/982/what-does-it-mean-to-be-British.aspx (accessed June 6, 2012). 43. McLaren and Johnson, “Resources, Group Conflict and Symbols,” 709–732. 44. Scott Blinder, “UK Public Opinion towards Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern,” The Migration Observatory, February 23, 2012, http:// www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/uk-public-opinion-towardimmigration-overall-attitudes-and-level-concern (accessed December 2, 2012). 45. John Carvel and Lucy Ward, “Huge Majority Say Civil Liberty Curbs a ‘Price Worth Paying’ to Fight Terror,” Guardian, January 23, 2012, http://www. guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jan/24/terrorism.idcards (accessed December 2, 2012). 46. Williams, “Securitization and the Liberalism of Fear.” 47. Helen Pidd, “‘We’re Not Squatters’ Says Art Group Occupying Mayfair Mansion,” Guardian, December 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/dec/21/ oubliette-art-group-not-squatters (accessed December 21, 2009). More information on the Oubliette Collective can be found at their Facebook page: “Oubliette Arthouse,” Facebook.com, April 10, 2009, https://www.facebook.com/pages/TheOubliette-Arthouse/133754310033447 (accessed December 2, 2012). 48. Information about the activities of the Oubliette group can be found on its web site: http://www.theoubliette.co.uk/interim.php (accessed August 12, 2012). 49. “Interview with Art Squatters of the Oubliette Arthouse,” Vivid Ink (blog), http://vividinkblog.wordpress.co/2009/08/09/the-art-of-squatting-an-i (accessed May 13, 2012). 50. Pidd, “‘We’re Not Squatters.’” 51. Pidd, “‘We’re Not Squatters.’” 52. Daily Mail, “Riot Police Raid 30 Million Pound Mayfair Squat after 2000 People Show Up to Facebook Party Gone Wrong,” Mail Online, February 17, 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1250414/Riot-police-called-parkLane-Facebook-party-attracts-2–000-people.html (accessed August 9, 2012).

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53. Arthur Martin, “Squatters Evicted from 6.25 Million Pound House Find a New Home,” Mail Online, January 9, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-1110286/squatters-evicted-6–25m-house (accessed May 13, 2012). 54. See the web site of Vinay Gupta, a frequent lecturer at Temporary School of Thought events, at http://www.vinay.howtolivewiki.com/blog/about. 55. Information about these events can be found at the Facebook page for the Temporary School of Thought: Dougald Hine, “Temporary School Reunion,” Facebook.com, January 9, 2010, https://www.facebook.com/events/235698829196/ (accessed June 6, 2012). 56. Bell, “Squatting Is the Perfect Example of the Big Society.” 57. Paul Cheston, “Foreign Buyers’ Vacant Homes See Squatting Cases Doubling in Rich Boroughs,” London Evening Standard, June 8, 2012, http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/foreign-buyers-vacant-homes. 58. Michael Welch and Liza Schuster, “Detention of Asylum Seekers in the UK and USA Deciphering Noisy and Quiet Constructions,” Punishment and Society 7, no. 4 (2005): 397–417. 59. Welch and Schuster, “Detention of Asylum Seekers.” 60. Elizabeth O’Hara, “Policy Discussion Paper: No Place Like Home? Addressing the Issues of Housing and Migration” (London: Shelter 2008), 11, http:// england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/132103/No_place_like_ home_migration_discussion_paper.pdf (accessed December 1, 2012). 61. See also Jill Rutter and Maria Latorre, “Social Housing Allocation and Immigrant Communities,” Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2008, http://www. equalityhumanrights.com (accessed June 1, 2012). They performed a study in 2007 that looked at focus groups in four locations in Britain (Birmingham, London, rural eastern England and an urban northern town). In each case, respondents (longsettled residents in the area) expressed the belief that migration was placing undue stress on public services, that foreign individuals were jumping queues to get access to housing and that they had engaged in corruption in order to do so. 62. Bob Baker, “Letter: Homelessness and Squatting,” Guardian, June 29, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2012/sep/05/constructive-approachessquatting (accessed October 1, 2012). 63. Advisory Service for Squatters, “Another Daily Mail Attack—Response,” Advisory Service for Squatters, February 1, 2012, http://www.squatter.org.uk/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=269:another-daily-mail-attackresponse (accessed June 1, 2012). 64. SNOB, “Anti-squatting Laws Progress through Parliament,” SNOBAHA (blog), http://www.network23.org/snob/2012/02/10/anti-squatting-laws-progressthrough-Parliament.html (accessed July 10, 2012). 65. The document is available at Parliament of the UK, “Early Day Motion 1545,” March 7, 2011, http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2010-12/1545 (accessed December 2, 2012). 66. The best discussion of EDM 1545 is found at Nitrate (author), “Squatgeddon?! The Potential Law Change,” Indymedia, July 16, 2011, http://london. indymedia.org/articles/9566 (accessed September 2, 2012). 67. The petition “Criminalize Squatting” can be viewed at http://www.gopetition. com/petition/43976.html. Landlord Action representative Yogesh Chandarana indicated that he would be delivering the petition to 10 Downing Street for the prime minister to view. 68. The article can be found at Peter Dominiczak, “4 Million Pound House Isn’t Posh Enough Says Squatter Who Wants a Pool,” London Evening Standard, March 24, 2011, http://www.standard.co.uk/news/4m-house-isnt-posh-enoughsays-squatter-who-wants-a-pool-6384476.html (accessed June 1, 2012). 69. See, for example, Murray Wardrop, “Latvian Travels 1500 Miles to Milk Britain’s Soft Laws against Squatters,” Telegraph, January 7, 2011, http://www.

Notes

70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

87. 88.

89.

90.

201

telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/8244715/Latvian-travels-1500-miles-to-milkBritains-soft-laws-against-squatters.html (accessed July 10, 2012). Alastair Jamieson and Ben Leach, “The Middle Class Serial Squatters Exploiting the Law,” Telegraph, March 6, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ law-and-order/8363406/ (accessed August 16, 2011). “Hove MP Raised Squatting at Prime Minister’s Questions,” Thelatest.co.uk, May 23, 2011, http://thelatest.co.uk/brighton/2012/05/23/hove-mp-raisedsquatting-at-prime-ministers-questions/ (accessed June 1, 2012). Charalampos Xekoukoulotakis, “Weatherley Holds Squatting Debate in Parliament,” Brighton and Hove Free Press, March 30, 2011, http://www. brightonandhovefreepress.co.uk/brighton-and-hove-news/weatherley-heldsquatting-debate-in-parliament/22683 (accessed August 1, 2012). Xekoukoulotakis, “Weatherley Holds Squatting Debate.” Nitrate, “Squatgeddon?!” Victoria Blitz, “Our Society Is Bigger Than Yours: Squatting and the Wider Political Rumblings,” Critical Legal Thinking, June 27, 2011, http://www. criticallegalthinking.com/?p=3644 (accessed June 1, 2012). Mike Weatherley, “Lawyers’ Interest in Squatting Law,” Guardian, September 29, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/sep/29/lawyers-interest-insquatting-law (accessed July 17, 2012.) London Evening Standard, “Squatting to Become a Criminal Offense,” London Evening Standard, May 1, 2012, http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/squattingto-becom-a-criminal-offense (accessed May 15, 2012). House of Commons, “Debate on Squatting,” Hansard, March 30, 2011, http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110330/ halltext/110330h0001.htm (accessed December 2, 2012). Nitrate, “Squatgeddon?!” Simon Hooper, “British Ban Squatting to Tackle ‘Anarchists,’” Al Jazeera, November 12, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/11/2012 11572220964248.html (accessed December 2, 2012). SNOB, “Anti-squatting Laws Progress through Parliament.” Lili, Melissa and Pete, “Squatters in Britain.” Adrian Sanders, “Early Day Motion 2114: Homelessness and Squatting,” Parliament of the United Kingdom, July 20, 2011, http://www.parliament.uk/ edm/2010-12/2114 (accessed December 2, 2012). Tom McNally, “Early Day Motion on Homelessness and Squatting,” Tessajowell.net, September 23, 2011, http://www.tessajowell.net/uploads/bf0cb2b5b3d2-58f4-21c7-1b20fc924c01.pdf (accessed December 1, 2012). Ministry of Justice, “Options for Dealing with Squatting,” Consultation Paper CP12/2011, http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/consultations/options-dealingwith-squatting.pdf (accessed December 1, 2011), 1. Grant Shapps, “Grant Shapps: Why the Government Will Outlaw Squatting ‘Once and for All,’” Telegraph, March 20, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/uknews/8392587/Grant-Shapps-why-the-Government-will-outlawsquatting-once-and-for-all.html (accessed December 2, 2012). Wilson, “Squatting in Residential Premises.” House of Commons, “Debate on Squatting,” Hansard, July 13, 2011, http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110713/ debtext/110713-0003.htm (accessed December 2, 2012), quoted in Wilson, “Squatting in Residential Premises,” 7. House of Lords, “Debate on the Law on Alternative Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders,” Hansard, February 15, 2012, http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/text/110215-0001.htm (accessed December 2, 2012), quoted in Wilson, “Squatting in Residential Premises,” 16. Hobson, “The Untold Story of Squats.”

202

Notes

91. Laurie Penny, “This Spiteful New Law against Squatting Must Be Stopped,” Independent, June 27, 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/opoinion/commentators/ laurie-penny-this-spite-new-law (accessed July 17, 2012). 92. Laurie Penny, “In Defense of Squatting: The Occupation of Private Property Is Brave and Necessary,” New Statesman, February 20, 2011, http://www. newstatesman.com/print/36748 (accessed July 17, 2012). 93. Ministry of Justice, “Response to Consultation CP12/2011,” October 26, 2011, https://consult.justice.gov.uk/ . . . /dealing . . . /options-dealing-squa . . . (accessed June 1, 2012), 15. 94. Andrew Arden, “Letter: Media and Politicians Are Misleading about Law on Squatters,” Guardian, September 25, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ society/2011/sep/25/squatting-law-media-politicians (accessed June 1, 2012). 95. House of Commons, “Debate on Squatting,” Hansard, November 1, 2011, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111101/ debtext/111101-0004.htm (accessed December 2, 2012), quoted in Wilson, “Squatting in Residential Premises,” 15. 96. Ministry of Justice, “Response to Consultation CP12/2011,” 19. 97. Penny, “In Defense of Squatting.” 98. Kesia Reeve, Squatting—A Homelessness Issue (Sheffield, UK: Center for Regional and Economic Research at Sheffield Hallam University, 2011). 99. Penny, “In Defense of Squatting.” 100. Patrick Butler, “Breadline Britain: Work, Poverty and the Financial ‘Cliff Edge,’” Guardian, June 18, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/blog/ 2012/jun/18/breadline-britain-working-poverty-and-the-financial-cliff-edge (accessed December 2, 2012). 101. Quoted in Ministry of Justice, “Response to Consultation CP12/2011.”. 102. Thames Reach, “Thames Reach Response to Government Consultation on Squatting,” ThamesReach, October 7, 2011, http://www.thamesreach.org. uk/news-and-views/news/news-archive-2011/thames-reach-response-togovernment-consultation-on-squatting/ (accessed December 1, 2012). 103. Quoted in Hobson, “The Untold Story of Squats.” 104. Penny, “This Spiteful New Law.” 105. Ministry of Justice, “Options for Dealing with Squatting,” 1, quoted in Wilson, “Squatting in Residential Premises.” 106. Arden, “Letter.” 107. Shiv Malik, “Squatter Law Reforms ‘Could Cost Taxpayers 790 Million Pounds over Five Years,’” Guardian, March 16, 2012, http://www.guardian. co.uk/society/2012/mar/16/squatting-law-reforms-taxpayer (accessed December 1, 2012). 108. Ministry of Justice, “Options for Dealing with Squatting,” 13. 109. However, in a compilation of responses to the consultation paper—available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/consultations/options-dealingsquatting-response.pdf—the official government response notes that it does not regard the responses to the report as in any way representative, since 1,909 responses (or 90 percent of the total) were “managed” by the Squatters’ Action for Secure Homes (SQUASH) campaign. Indeed, a read-through of responses found in this document indicates that so-called lifestyle squatters may be overrepresented as survey respondents—thus shoring up the misperception that most squatters do so for ideological reasons, rather than out of a genuine need to survive in a warm place out of the elements. 110. SQUASH (Squatters’ Action for Secure Homes), “House of Lords Briefing Paper,” SQUASH, February 2012, http://www.squashcampaign.org/laspo-lordsbriefing/ (accessed December 1, 2012).

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111. Corporate Watch, “The Criminalization of Squatting,” Corporate Watch, Autumn– Winter 2011, http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/?li=4193 (accessed July 1, 2012). 112. Arden, “Letter.” 113. The Law Society, “Creating a Criminal Offense of Squatting Is Unnecessary, Says Law Society,” The Law Society, October 6, 2011, http://www.lawsociety. org.uk/news/press-releases/creating-a-criminal-offence-of-squatting-isunnecessary-says-law-society/ (accessed December 1, 2012). 114. It may be accessed here: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/billsacts/legal-aid-sentencing/squatting-eia.pdf. 115. Alexander Vasudevan, “Criminalizing Squatting Would Threaten Our Rights,” Guardian, June 22, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/22/ criminalising-squatting-would-threaten-our-rights.html (accessed July 12, 2012). 116. Advisory Service for Squatters, “ASS Response to Government Squatting Consultation,” Advisory Service for Squatters, August 10, 2011, http://www. squashcampaign.org/2011/08/advisory-service-for-squatters-response-to-theconsultation/ (accessed July 1, 2012). 117. Alexander Vasudevan, “The Sinister Logic behind Criminalizing Squatting,” Guardian, November 3, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/ nov/03/criminalising-squatting-law-trespass-homeless (accessed December 1, 2012). 118. SQUASH, “House of Lords Briefing Paper.” 119. Owen Bowcott, “Charities Fear End of ‘Squatter’s Rights’ Could Lead to Big Rise in Homelessness,” Guardian, August 30, 2012, http://www.guardian.co. uk/society/2012/aug/31/charities-end-squatters-rights-homelessness (accessed December 2, 2012). 120. Shelter, “Response: Options for Dealing with Squatting,” Shelter, http:// england.shelter.org.uk/professional_resources/policy_and_research/policy_ library/policy_library_folder/response_-_options_for_dealing_with_squatting (accessed August 1, 2012), 2. 121. SQUASH, “Cost of New Squatting Law Could Be 790 Million Pounds,” SQUASH, 2012, http://www.squashcampaign.org/2012/03/cost-of-new-squatting-law-could-be-790m/ (accessed June 1, 2012). 122. Vasudevan, “Sinister Logic.” 123. Vasudevan, “Sinister Logic.” 124. Vasudevan, “Criminalizing Squatting Would Threaten Our Rights.” 125. Tim Hardy, “Oppose Red, Yellow and Blue Tories,” Beyond Clicktivism, March 16, 2012, http://beyondclicktivism.com/2012/03/16/oppose-red-yellow-andblue-tories-and-stopclause136/ (accessed June 1, 2012). 126. House of Commons, “Commons Debate: Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill,” Hansard (The Official Report), November 1, 2011, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm/11101/ debtext/111101-0004.htm (accessed February 10, 2012). 127. House of Commons, “Commons Debate.” 128. Nicholas Cecil, “Lib-Dem Peers Oppose Bid to Outlaw Squatting,” Evening Standard, January 20, 2012, http://www.standard.co.uk/news/libdem-peersoppose-bid-to-outlaw-squatting (accessed July 6, 2012). 129. House of Lords, “Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill: Third Reading,” House of Lords Hansard, November 2, 2011 http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/ld201212/ldhansrd/text/120327-0001.htm#12032757001721 (accessed December 1, 2012). 130. Ryan Gallagher, “Squatter’s Rights?,” Ryan Gallagher (blog), April 20, 2012, http://www.rjgallagher.co.uk/2012/04/squatters-rights.html (accessed May 10, 2012).

204

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131. SQUASH, “UK: Squatting in Residential Properties to Be Criminalized in Months,” SQUASH, March 30, 2010, http://en.squat.net/2012/03/30/uksquatting-in-residential-properties-to-be-criminalised-in-months (accessed August 7, 2012). 132. Tanya Gold, “Squatting Law Will Only Criminalize the Homeless. Let’s Demolish Clause 130,” Guardian, February 20, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/2012/feb/20/squatting-law-will-criminalise-the-homeless.html (accessed May 6, 2012). 133. Gallagher, “Squatter’s Rights?” 134. Joseph Blake, “Criminalizing Squatting Hurts the Poor and Benefits the Rich,” Guardian, August 31, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/ aug/31/criminalising-squatting-poor-rich (accessed December 1, 2012). 135. Richard John, “Squatting in a Residential Property Has Become a Criminal Offence,” Mablaw (blog), May 10, 2012, http://www.mablaw.com/2012/05/ squatting-in-a-residential-property-has-become-a-criminal-offense.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 136. Richard John, “Squatting in Residential Properties Is Set to Become a Criminal Offence,” Mablaw (blog), November 7, 2011, http://www.mablaw.co/2011/11/ squatting-in-residential-properties (accessed May 13, 2012). 137. Malik, “Squatter Law Reforms.”

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 1. Jacek Pawlicki, “End of Line for Christiania’s Flower Children,” Gazeta Wyborcza, March 7, 2011, http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/532361-endline-christiania-s-flower-children (accessed August 15, 2012). 2. Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” 1967, Foucault.info, http://foucault.info/ documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html (accessed October 3, 2012). 3. James Holston, Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2008). 4. See Faranak Miraftab and Shana Wills, “Insurgency and Spaces of Active Citizenship: The Story of Western Cape Anti-eviction Campaign in South Africa,” Journal of Planning Education and Research 25 (2005): 200–217. 5. Miraftab and Wills, “Insurgency and Spaces of Active Citizenship,” 202. 6. Trish Gibson and Ida Hjort, “Controversial Christiania: Deciding the Fate of the Free Town,” http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/280=controversialchristiania (accessed October 5, 2012). 7. Andrew Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke,” Guardian, February 21, 2004, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2004/feb/22/features.magazine37 (accessed September 10, 2012). 8. Jacob Ludvigsen, “Fristaden Christiania—Eventyret der blev (til) virkelighed,” Hovedbladet, date uncertain; Tom, “Freetown Christiania: Denmark’s Controversial Commune,” Urban Ghosts Media, October 29, 2010, http://www. urbanghostsmedia.com/2010/10/freetown-christiania-denmarks-controversialcommune/ (accessed October 1, 2012). 9. Gibson and Hjort, “Controversial Christiania.” 10. Jan M. Olsen, “At 25, Barracks in Denmark Blossoms into Hippie Museum,” Times-Picayune, September 26, 1996, Factiva (accessed June 1, 2012). 11. New York Times, “Hippie Enclave Raided,” New York Times, March 17, 2004, Ebscohost (accessed October 1, 2012). 12. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 13. Pawlicki, “End of Line.” 14. Gibson and Hjort, “Controversial Christiania.”

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15. Gibson and Hjort, “Controversial Christiania.” 16. Gibson and Hjort, “Controversial Christiania.” 17. Sophie Arie, “Pusher Street Dealers Face Up to the Shove,” Guardian, July 25, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jul/26/sophiearie/print (accessed September 15, 2012). 18. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 19. Stephen Kinzer, “Copenhagen Journal: At 25, the Hippies’ Free City Isn’t So Carefree,” New York Times, May 16, 1996, Ebscohost (accessed August 1, 2012). 20. Agency for Palaces and Cultural Properties, “Information about Christiania,” February 22, 2011, http://www.slke.dk/en/Christiania/informationomchristiania.aspx (accessed June 1, 2012). 21. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 22. Olsen, “At 25, Barracks in Denmark Blossoms into Hippie Museum.” 23. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 24. Arie, “Pusher Street Dealers.” 25. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 26. Richard Ballard, “Middle Class Neighborhoods or ‘African Kraals’? The Impact of Informal Settlements and Vagrants in Post-Apartheid White Identity,” Urban Forum 15, no. 1 (2004): 57. 27. Gibson and Hjort, “Controversial Christiania.” 28. Karsten S., “Christiania Facts and History,” Spirehuset, June 22, 2011, http:// www.spirehuset.net/Christiania-facts-and-history (accessed September 12, 2012). 29. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 30. Bus No. 8, “Christiania: 40 Years of Occupation,” Kickstarter.com, January 11, 2012, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/christiania/christiania-40-years-ofoccupation/posts?page=2 (accessed June 1, 2012). 31. Gibson and Hjort, “Controversial Christiania.” 32. Gibson and Hjort, “Controversial Christiania.” 33. Jan Olsen, “Denmark Enclave Tears Down Hashish Stands,” Associated Press, April 1, 2004, http://forum.grasscity.com/marijuana-news-usa/32429-denmarkenclave-tears-down-hashish-stands.html (accessed June 1, 2012). 34. Squat!net, “Some News from Ungdomshuset,” Squat!net, December 18, 1999, http://squat.net/tag/ungdomshuset/page/2 (accessed August 29, 2012). 35. Karina Kosiara-Pedersen, “The 2011 Danish Parliamentary Election: A Very New Government,” West European Politics 35, no. 2 (2011): 415–424. 36. Vibeke Asmussen, “Cannabis Policy: Tightening the Ties in Denmark,” in A Cannabis Reader: Global Issues and Local Experiences, 1, no. 8, ed. Sharon Rodner Sznitman et al. (Lisbon: EMCDDA Monographs), 159. 37. Asmussen, “Cannabis Policy,” 161. 38. Asmussen, “Cannabis Policy.” 39. Arie, “Pusher Street Dealers.” 40. Gibson and Hjort, “Controversial Christiania.” 41. Asmussen, “Cannabis Policy,” 160. 42. Arie, “Pusher Street Dealers.” 43. Arie, “Pusher Street Dealers.” 44. Asmussen, “Cannabis Policy.” 45. Arie, “Pusher Street Dealers.” 46. Agency for Palaces and Cultural Properties, “The Christiania Project,” http:// www.slke.dk/en/Christiania.aspx (accessed June 1, 2012). 47. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 48. Olsen, “At 25, Christiania Blossoms into a Living Hippie Museum.” 49. Gibson and Hjort, “Controversial Christiania.” 50. Ilpo Kauppinen and Panu Poutvaara, “Family Migration and Policies: Lessons from Denmark,” CESifo DICE Report 9, no. 4 (2011): 37–40.

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51. Interestingly, in their work on European squatting, the analysts Mikkelsen and Karpantschof use writing about the notion of the issue-attention cycle to argue that there have been times historically when squatter movements have profited from the international system, and in particular, have been able to harness concern about issues like sustainable development and human rights to garner support for their squatting activities from the international community. However, they do not address the converse scenario—one in which dangers in the international system come to negatively impact squatters, if they are implicated in discussions regarding generation or existence of this threat. Their work can be found at: Fleming Mikkelsen and Rene Karpantschof, “Youth as a Political Movement: Development and the Squatters and Autonomous Movement in Copenhagen, 1981–95,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25, no. 3 (2001): 609–622. 52. Flemming Mikkelsen and Rene Karpantschof, “Youth as a Political Movement: Development of the Squatters’ and Autonomous Movement in Copenhagen, 1981–95,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25, no. 3 (2001): 618. 53. Christa S. Amouroux, “Conflict in Copenhagen: Urban Reconfigurations Disciplining the Unruly” (paper presented at the Breslauer Symposium, Berkeley, CA, April 2006), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/9cb3f8t8 (accessed May 6, 2011). 54. Maria Bernbom, “The Liberals Take Over,” Europe, June 1, 2002, http://www. highbeam.com/doc/1G1–87510441.html (accessed May 11, 2012). 55. Amouroux, “Conflict in Copenhagen,” 6. 56. Neil Arun, “Storming Denmark’s Drugs Stronghold,” BBC News, May 19, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3524274.stm (accessed June 1, 2012). 57. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 58. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 59. Anthony, “Going Up in Smoke.” 60. Arun, “Storming Denmark’s Drugs Stronghold.” 61. Arun, “Storming Denmark’s Drugs Stronghold.” 62. New York Times, “Denmark: Free City to Be Anytown,” New York Times, March 13, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/13/world/world-briefingeurope-denmark-free-city-to-be-anytown.html?src = pm (accessed June 11, 2012). 63. Pawlicki, “End of Line.” 64. Jessica, “Still Adjusting: Legalize the Safer Choice,” Copenhagen Post, December 18, 2011, http://www.cphpost.dk/print/2741 (accessed January 15, 2012). 65. Cahal Milmo, “Trouble in a Hippie Paradise,” The Independent, May 31, 2007, Factiva (accessed October 15, 2012). 66. Tom, “Freetown Christiania: Denmark’s Controversial Commune.” 67. Stephen Castle, “Copenhagen’s Calm Broken by Riots over Evictions of Squatters,” The Independent, December 18, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/world/europe/copenhagens-calm-broken-by-riots-over-eviction-ofsquatters-428937.html (accessed June 14, 2012). 68. Squat!net, “Ungdomshuset,” Squat!net, August 13, 2012, http://squat.net/tag/ ungdomshuset/page/2/ (accessed May 12, 2012). 69. Squat!net, “Copenhagen: Ungdomshuset Is Threatened by Eviction!,” Squat!net, August 31, 2006, http://squat.net/tag/ungdomshuset/page/2/ (accessed May 12, 2012). 70. Castle, “Copenhagen’s Calm Broken.” 71. “Changing Climate: Denmark Becoming Police State?,” The Rag Blog, December 15, 2009, http://theragblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/changing-climate-denmarkbecoming.html (accessed June 12, 2012). 72. Scotsman, “Copenhagen Erupts over Squatter Action,” Johnston Publishing, March 4, 2007, http://archive.is/P9Wt (accessed November 6, 2012).

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73. Scotsman, “Copenhagen Erupts.” 74. BBC News, “Danish Protests Spark 100 Arrests,” BBC, March 3, 2007, http:// newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpappas/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ (accessed June 1, 2012). 75. “Changing Climate.” 76. Beth Milton, “Disturbance at Ungdomshuset,” March 6, 2007, http://www. themorningnews.org/article/disturbance-at-ungdomshuset (accessed June 13, 2012). 77. Tommy, “The Ungdomshuset Movement: Squatting in Denmark,” Resistance Studies, October 19, 2007, http://resistancestudies.org/?p=228 (accessed December 2, 2012). 78. “Copenhagen,” Occupied London: An Anarchist Journal of Theory and Action, July 28, 2009, http://www.occupiedlondon.org/Copenhagen (accessed November 20, 2011). 79. Soeren Kern, “Muslim Gangs Terrorize Denmark,” March 14, 2012, http://www. gatestoneinstitute.org/2941/muslim-gangs-denmark (accessed June 1, 2012). 80. Awal Journaa, “Copenhagen’s ‘Racial’ Gang Wars,” Al Jazeera, April 21, 2009, http://www.aljazeera.com/ocus/2009/03/200933194152661158.html (accessed August 1, 2012). 81. Rachel Mendleson, “Biker Gang Warfare Rocks Copenhagen,” Maclean’s, March 26, 2009, http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/03/26/biker-gang-warfarerockscopenhagen/ (accessed December 2, 2012). 82. Mendleson, “Biker Gang Warfare Rocks Copenhagen,” 28. 83. Nicolai Sennels, “Denmark: 1000 Police Officers in Coordinated Crackdown on Muslim Gangs,” Jihad Watch, February 11, 2012, http://www.jihadwatch. org/2012/02/denmark-1000-police-officers-in-coordinated-crackdown-onmuslim-gangs.html (accessed December 1, 2012). 84. Journaa, “Copenhagen’s ‘Racial’ Gang Wars.” 85. Ben Webster, “Britain Helps Obama to Buy His Way Out of Saving World; Compromise Will Spare the US a Painful Shock,” Financial Times, December 16, 2009, Factiva (accessed December 2, 2011). 86. Richard Ingham, “Walkout Heightens Failure Fears for Climate Marathon,” Agence France Presse, December 14, 2009, Factiva (accessed October 21, 2011). 87. Marlowe Hood, “Thousands March for Tough Action on Climate Change,” Mail and Guardian, December 13, 2009, Factiva. 88. Karen A. Franc and Quentin Stevens, “Loose Space: Possibility and Diversity in Urban Life,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14496193 (accessed June 1, 2012). 89. Christian Wenande, “Loan Ensures Christiania Survival,” Copenhagen Post, June 15, 2012, http://www.cphpost.dk/print/16941 (accessed November 2, 2012). 90. Le Monde, “Danish Squatters Launch Alternative ‘IPO’ to Avoid Eviction,” Worldcrunch, September 30, 2011, http://worldcrunch.com/culture-society/danish-squatters-launch-alternative-ipo-to-avoid-eviction/c3s3849/#.ULzq34awVy8 (accessed November 26, 2012). 91. Sally McGrane, “Free-Spirited Enclaves Reluctant Landowners Fear Capitalism’s Harness,” New York Times, January 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes. com/2012/01/13/world/europe/danish-squatters-in-christiania-warily-tryownership.html?pagewanted=all (accessed December 2, 2012). 92. Wenande, “Loan Ensures Christiania Survival.” 93. Justin Cremer, “Christiania Moves Forward on Historic Purchase,” Copenhagen Post, April 2, 2012, http://www.cphpost.dk/print/10761 (accessed September 30, 2012). 94. Jyllands-Posten, “Leder: En Losning?” Jyllands-Posten, June 22, 2011, http:// jyllands-posten.dk/opinion/leder/article2469147.ece (accessed December 2, 2012).

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95. Rick Steves, “The Politics of Christiania,” Rick Steve’s Europe, December 2, 2009, http://www.ricksteves.com/tapa_blog/index.cfm?fuseaction=entry&entryID=95 (accessed December 2, 2012). 96. Amouroux uses the neoliberal rhetoric of squatting to suggest that the space has been commodified. Like a theme park, Christiania is a tourist attraction that enriches the coffers of the Danish state without posing an actual ideological threat to that state. 97. Agency for Palaces and Cultural Properties, “Frequently Asked Questions,” Slotte & Kultur-ejendom, March 7, 2012, http://www.slke.dk/en/Christiania/ informationomchristiania.aspx (accessed December 2, 2012). 98. Tom, “Freetown Christiania.” 99. BBC News, “Daily Reviews 11 Danish Terrorism Cases from 1993–2012,” May 31, 2012, Factiva (accessed June 24, 2012).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 1. Ulrich Fichtner, “Sarkozy’s War against the Roma,” Der Spiegel, September 15, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/driving-out-the-unwanted-sarkozy-swar-against-the-roma-a-717324.html (accessed June 8, 2012). 2. Robert Kushen, “Submission in Relation to the Analysis and Consideration of Legality under EU Law of the Situation of Roma in France: Factual Update,” September 27, 2010, http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/france-ec-legalbrief27-sept-2010.pdf (accessed September 5, 2012). 3. Nikolas Sarkozy, “Discours Grenoble 30 Juillet 2010,” YouTube, http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=JB9WPfh2ZxI (accessed September 9, 2012). 4. BBC News, “Q & A: France Roma Expulsions,” BBC, October 19, 2010, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11027288?print=true (accessed September 5, 2012). 5. Jeanne-Pierre Liegeois, Roma, Gypsies, Travellers (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, 1994), 233, quoted in Violaine Gagnet, “Travelling People in France: French Legislation and Living Conditions,” http://www.tolerance.cz/courses/ papers/violaine.htm (accessed September 2, 2012). 6. William Bartlett et al., Measures to Promote the Situation of Roma EU Citizens in the European Union (Strasburg, France: European Parliament Directorate General DES for Internal Policies, 2011), 2. 7. See Isabel Fonseca, Bury Me Standing: The Gypsies and Their Journey (London: Vintage, 1996). 8. The 2010 (and 2012) events are not the only times in which France’s government has dealt with squatting. In examining squatting politics in France, I also considered including a case study of the squat at Calais, France, which again offers insight both into globalization and securitization issues. In addition, the focus on the Roma squats in this chapter does not mean that they are the only manifestation of squatting. Indeed, France has a long and proud tradition of hosting lifestyle squats that have been homes to artists, poets and musicians. However, the focus in this chapter is on the events of 2010 largely because of the visceral reaction that emerged from the public as a result of the actions of President Sarkozy. This analysis thus helps us to understand the conditions under which securitization of squatting may fail, and the reasons why it does. 9. Marie Loison, “The Implementation of an Enforceable Right to Housing in France,” European Journal of Homelessness 1 (2007): 186. 10. Loison, “Implementation,” 187. 11. Marie Lanzaro, “Access to Housing for Homeless People in Region Ile de France in 2010: Current Trends in Housing and Policies,” European Network for Housing

Notes

12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37.

209

Research, 2011, http://www.enhr2011.com/sites/default/files/Paper-M.Lanzaro-04. pdf (accessed November 1, 2011). Lanzaro, “Access to Housing,” 183. Lanzaro, “Access to Housing,” 192. Alexandra Aubry, “FRANCE: The Regulation Relating to the Right of Enforceable Housing (DALO) Is Discriminating!,” March 24, 2010, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Action, http://www.agirpourlesdesc.org/english/esc-rightson-the-ground/article (accessed September 1, 2012). Aubry, “FRANCE,” 189. Aubry, “FRANCE,” 192. Aubry, “FRANCE,” 190. Gagnet, “Travelling People.” Gagnet, “Travelling People.” Amnesty International, “French Authorities Must Stop Stigmatizing the Roma,” Amnesty International, January 5, 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/en/appeals-foraction/french-authorities-must-stop-stigmatizing-roma (accessed July 1, 2012). Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: Taylor, 2002). Kristi Severance, “France’s Expulsion of Roma Migrants: A Test Case for Europe,” Migration Policy Institute, 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/frances-expulsion-of-roma-migrants-a-test-case-for-europe (accessed June 5, 2012). Vivienne Walt, “Will France’s Immigration Crackdown Solve Anything?,” Time, September 22, 2009, http://www.time.come/time/printout/08816,1925335,00. html (accessed September 9, 2012). Fichtner, “Sarkozy’s War.” Simona Marican, “Citizen Rights Don’t Apply to ‘Gypsies,’” Wave International Youth Magazine, 2010, http://www.wavemagazine.net/arhiva/47/soc/franceexpulsion-roma-people.htm (accessed December 2, 2012) Fichtner, “Sarkozy’s War.” Marican, “Citizen Rights,” 2. Agence France Press, “A Grenoble, Sarkozy degaine tous azimuts,” Liberation, July 30, 2010, http://www.liberation.fr/societe/0101649756-sarkozy-veutevaluer-les-droits-et-prestations-des-sans-papiers (accessed December 2, 2012). Agence France Press, “A Grenoble, Sarkozy degaine tous azimuts.” Ben Hall and Peggy Hollinger, “Divisive and Defiant,” Financial Times, September 18, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 7, 2012). “Communiqué de la Présidence de la République, en date du 28 juillet 2010, sur la situation des gens du voyage et des Roms en France,” Vie Publique, July 28, 2010, http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/102001758.html (accessed December 2, 2012), quoted in Marican, “Citizen Rights,” 2. Agence France-Presse, “France to Strip Nationality for Killing Police: Sarkozy,” September 6, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 6, 2010). Fichtner, “Sarkozy’s War,” 2. Quoted in Lizzy Davies, “Sarkozy Loyalists Refuse to Soften on France’s Controversial Roma Crackdown,” Guardian, August 30, 2010, http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/2010/aug/30/nicolas-sarkozy-controversial-roma-crackdown (accessed December 2, 2012). New York Times, “World Briefing Europe: France: Plan on Gypsy Camps Opposed,” July 30, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 5, 2012). Stefan Simons, “Sarkozy Finds a Scapegoat: France Begins Controversial Roma Deportations,” Spiegel Online International, August 19, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 5, 2010). Christopher Caldwell, “Roma Reveal a Rootless Europe,” Financial Times, August 28, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 5, 2012).

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38. Agence France-Presse, “France to Strip Nationality.” 39. This charge appeared in the Bosnian newspaper the Morning Star, which used the term “Roma purge” in a headline in September 2010. The authors accuse Sarkozy of violating French traditions of providing political asylum and welcoming the oppressed. In addition, they note that Sarkozy’s proposed policy of stripping citizenship from those who threaten the lives of police officers shares parallels with Vichy France during World War II, concluding that the proposal is unconstitutional. 40. Nabila Ramdani, “Echoes of Vichy,” New Statesman, September 13, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 5, 2012). 41. Jocelyn Cesari, The Securitization of Islam (Brussels, Belgium: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009), http://www.ceps.eu (accessed September 12, 2012). 42. Nabila Ramdani, “France’s Racial Intolerance Comes from the Very Top,” Guardian, August 2, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/ aug/02/france-racial-intolerance-sarkozy (accessed December 2, 2012). 43. Helen Fouquet, “Sarkozy’s Security Policy Brings ‘Shame’ on France, Socialist Aubry Says,” Bloomberg, August 29, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2010-08-29/sarkozy-s-security-policy-brings-shame-to-france-socialistsaubry-says.html (accessed December 2, 2012). 44. Fichtner, “Sarkozy’s War.” 45. Fichtner, “Sarkozy’s War.” 46. For an example of this reporting, see David Prochasson, “Expulsions de Roms, Un ‘Mode d’Emploi Explicite,’” Le Canard Social, September 13, 2010, http:// www.lecanardsocial.com/ArticleFil.aspx?i=182 (accessed December 2, 2012). A copy of the leaked memo itself is also available. See Le Ministre de L’Interieure, “Lutte Contre Les Campements Illicites,” Le Canard Social, n.d., http://www. lecanardsocial.com/upload/IllustrationsLibres/Circulaire_du_24_juin_2010. pdf (accessed December 2, 2012). 47. Kushen, “Submission in Relation,” 2. 48. John Lichfield, “Leaked Memo Reveals Roma Was Targeted Despite Denials,” Independent, September 14, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 7, 2010). 49. Ruadhan MacCormac, “Sarkozy Stands by Tough Position on Crime and Security,” Irish Times, September 1, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 5, 2012). 50. Morning Star Online, “Roma Purge Sparks French Protests,” September 5, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 15, 2012). 51. MacCormac, “Sarkozy Stands by Tough Position.” 52. Jean-Michel Pinon, “Une meprisable ‘odeur de Vichy’ plane sur les actes de Sarkozy,” Danactu-Resistance, September 3, 2010, http://danactu-resistance. over-blog.com/article-une-meprisable-odeur-de-vichy-plane-sur-les-actes-desarkozy-56048542.html (accessed December 2, 2012). 53. Reuters, “France’s Sarkozy Declares ‘War’ on Urban Violence,” July 21, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 6, 2012). 54. New York Times, “World Briefing Europe: France: Plan on Gypsy Camps Opposed.” 55. John Lichfield, “Leaked Memo Reveals Roma Was Targeted Despite Denials,” Independent, September 14, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 7, 2010). 56. Lisa Schlein, “UN Urges France to Stop Collective Deportation of Roma,” Voice of America, August 26, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/content/unurges-france-to-stop-collective-deportation-of-roma-101663143/124639.html (accessed December 2, 2012). 57. New York Times, “World Briefing Europe: France: Plan on Gypsy Camps Opposed.” 58. Morning Star Online, “Roma Purge Sparks French Protests.” 59. Jenny Barchfield, “Outrage as Sarkozy Moves to Far-Right Stance on Race Issues,” Advertiser, August 3, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 5, 2012).

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60. Morning Star Online, “Roma Purge Sparks French Protests.” 61. Kushen, “Submission in Relation,” 3. 62. Pascal Riche, “Roms: appel du pape a accueillir les ‘legitimes diversites,’” Le Nouvel Observateur, August 22, 2010, http://www.rue89.com/2010/08/22/roms-lappeldu-pape-a-accueillir-les-legitimes-diversites-163461 (accessed December 2, 2012). 63. New York Times, “World Briefing Europe: France: Plan on Gypsy Camps Opposed.” 64. Fichtner, “Sarkozy’s War.” 65. Al Jazeera, “France to Take Roma Fingerprints,” October 2, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 2, 2012). 66. Le Point.fr, “Roms et gens du voyage: Hortefeux se defend de ‘stigmatiser une communaute,’” Le Point.fr, July 27, 2010, http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/ roms-et-gens-du-voyage-hortefeux-se-defend-de-stigmatiser-une-communaute27-07-2010-1219356_20.php (accessed December 2, 2012). 67. Barchfield, “Outrage.” 68. Agence France-Presse, “France to Strip Nationality.” 69. MacCormac, “Sarkozy Stands by Tough Position.” 70. Hall and Hollinger, “Divisive and Defiant.” 71. Hall and Hollinger, “Divisive and Defiant.” 72. Premier Syndicat Europeen de Police, “Jacques Pelissard, president de l’Association des Maires de France ne sait pas ce que doit faire un maire!” Syndicat Independent de la Police Municipale, August 17, 2010, http://www.euro-sipm.eu/articlejacques-pelissard-president-de-l-association-des-maires-de-france-ne-sait-pas-ceque-doit-faire-un-maire-55540106.html (accessed December 2, 2012). 73. Robert Marquand, “Why Germany Rebuffed France over Its Gypsy Crackdown,” Christian Science Monitor, September 17, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 7, 2012). 74. European Commission, “Application of EU Law,” European Commission, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/infringements_en.htm (accessed September 6, 2012). 75. Britta Sandberg and Stefan Simons, “The Loneliness of Nicolas Sarkozy: Roma Campaign Isolates Leader in Europe and France,” Spiegel Online International, Factiva (accessed September 20, 2010). 76. Blackblocknoname, “France’s Socialist Party Government Plans to Force Roma into Ghettos,” Athens Indymedia, August 8, 2012, https://athens.indymedia. org/frontphp3?lag-en&article_id=1415663 (accessed September 12, 2012). 77. Reuters, “UN Rights Experts Urge France to Respect Roma Rights,” Thomson Reuters, August 29, 2012, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/48831104/ns/ . . . /unrights-experts-urgen-france-respect-roma-rights (accessed September 2, 2012). 78. Times of Malta, “France Resumes Roma Migrants’ Expulsion,” Times of Malta, August 28, 2012, http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120828/world/ France-resumes-Roma-migrants-expulsions.434674 (accessed September 1, 2012). 79. Agence France Presse, “Un Campement de Roms evacuee a Evry,” Liberation, August 27, 2012, http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2012/08/27/un-campementde-roms-evacue-a-evry_842033 (accessed December 2, 2012). 80. Reuters, “UN Rights Experts.” 81. United Press International, “UN Slams France for Roma Evictions,” UPI.com, August 30, 2012, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2012/08/30/UN-slamsFrance-for-Roma-evictions/UPI-54341346345387/ (accessed December 2, 2012). 82. Reuters, “UN Rights Experts.” 83. Kirstin Atland and Kristin van Bruusgaard, “When Security Speech Acts Misfire: Russia and the Elektron Incident,” Security Dialogue 40, no. 3 (2009): 334–352. 84. Atland and van Bruusgaard, “When Security Speech Acts Misfire,” 337. 85. Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 171–201, quoted in Atland and van Bruusgaard, “When Security Speech Acts Misfire,” 338.

212

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86. Fichtner, “Sarkozy’s War.” The original statements by Sarkozy are quoted in Le Monde, “Nicolas Sarkozy continue de vilipender ‘racailles et voyous,’” Le Monde, November 11, 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2005/11/11/ nicolas-sarkozy-persiste-et-signe-contre-les-racailles_709112_3224.html (accessed December 2, 2012). 87. Fichtner, “Sarkozy’s War.” 88. Junio Palomba raises this question in “What Are the Risks of Securitizing Infectious Disease Pandemics Such as HIV-AIDS and SARS?,” E-International Relations, 2008, http://www.e-ir.info/208/07/19/what-are-the-risks-of-securitizing-HIV-AIDSand-SARS/ (accessed September 12, 2012).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 1. Body-Gendrot, Social Control of Cities. 2. Delphine Roucaute, “Expulsions de Roms: le Jeu du Mistigri des Elus Locaux,” Le Monde.fr, September 1, 2012, http://www.lemonde.ffr/societe/article/ . . . / expulsions-de-rom-le-jeu-du-mistigri-des-elus-locaux_1754194_3224.html (accessed September 29, 2012). 3. Rene van Rijckevorsel, “En nu een keer korte metten met die krakers!,” November 3, 2007, http://www.elsevier.nl/web/10145063/Artikel/En-nu-een-keerkorte-metten-met-die-krakers.html (accessed September 10, 2012). 4. Elsevier, “VVD eist actieplan tegen agressieve krakers,” Elsevier, February 29, 2008, http://www.elsevier.nl/web/10160144/Nederland/VVD-eist-actieplantegen-agressieve-krakers.htm (accessed September 18, 2012). 5. Willem Schinkel, “The Moralization of Citizenship in Dutch Integration Discourse,” Amsterdam Law Forum (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit), 15–26. 6. Toby Sterline, “Amsterdam Clears Squatters from Buildings, but Court Ruling Puts Wider Squatting Ban in Doubt,” Associated Press, November 9, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 3, 2012). 7. Queens University, “Multiculturalism Policies in Contemporary Democracies— Netherlands,” Queens University, 2012, http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/ evidence/Netherlands.html (accessed September 18, 2012). 8. National Association of Home Builders, “US vs. European Housing Markets,” National Association of Home Builders, http://www.nahb.org/generic. aspx?sectionID=734&genericContentID=57411&channelID=311&print=true (accessed September 8, 2012). 9. Hugo Priemus, “Squatters and Municipal Policies to Reduce Vacancy: Evidence from the Netherlands” (paper presented at the Enhr Conference, Toulouse, France, July 2011), http://www.enhr2011.com/sites/default/files/Paper-H. Priemus-WS21.pdf (accessed May 1, 2012). 10. Femke van der Zee, “A Prohibition on Squatting in the Netherlands” (The Hague, the Netherlands: Hague School of European Studies, unpublished manuscript), http://hbo-kennisbank.uvt.nl/cgi/hh/show.cgi?fid=1888 (accessed December 2, 2012):1. 11. Van der Zee, Prohibition. 12. Femke van der Zee, A Prohibition on Squatting. 13. Nicola Chadwick, “Amsterdam Gets Tough on Squatters,” Radio Netherlands, November 4, 2009, http://www.expatica.com/nl/housing/renting/Amsterdamgets-tough-on-squatters_13954.html (accessed September 19, 2012). 14. Van der Zee, Prohibition, 5. 15. Priemus, “Squatters and Municipal Policies,” 4. 16. Priemus, “Squatters and Municipal Policies.” 17. Van der Zee, Prohibition, 6.

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18. Squat!net, “New Antisquatting Law off the Agenda,” Squat!net, 2003, http:// www.squat.net/kraakverbod (accessed September 12, 2012). 19. Priemus, “Squatters and Municipal Policies.” 20. Lorain O’Mahoney, “De nieuwe krakers,” Intermediar, July 19, 2006, http:// www.intermediair.nl/artikel/weekblad-archief/38572/de-nieuwe-krakers.html (accessed June 1, 2012). 21. Comite tegen het Kraakverbod, “Alle wat een kamerlid zou moeten weten over Kraken (maar nooit heft durven vragen bij het kraapand om de hoek),” September 13, 2003, http://www.krakengaatdoor.nl/node/8.html (accessed September 1, 2012), 16. 22. De Telegraaf, “Verkiezingen: Balkenende daagt Cohen uit over kraakverbod,” De Telegraaf, June 3, 2010, http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/verkiezingen2010/ 6855971/_Balkenende_daag_Cohen_uit-oer-kraakverbod (accessed September 14, 2012). 23. Van der Zee, Prohibition, 6. 24. Comite tegen het Kraakverbod, “Kraakverbod van de baan,” Squat!net, July 9, 2004, http://nl.squat.net/2004/07/09/nederlands-kraakverbod-van-de-baan/ (accessed November 15, 2012). 25. Van der Zee, Prohibition. 26. Chadwick, “Amsterdam Gets Tough.” 27. Willemijn Jansen and Anne Bos, “The Squatting and Vacancy Act: Good News and Bad News,” In-House Lawyer, November 2010, 48–49. 28. Frank van Gemert, Dina Siegel, Rutger Visser, Deanna Dadusc and Christian Brouwers, Kraken in Amsterdam anno 2009 (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, afdeling Strafrecht en Criminologie, sectie Criminologie, 2010), http://www. politieenwetenschap.nl/pdf/kraken_anno_2009.pdf (accessed December 1, 2011). 29. Parool.nl, “Het nieuwe kraken, geen verharde strijd,” Parool.nl, January 8, 2010, http://www.parool.nl/parool/nl/6/2010/article/oprint/detail/274723/Hetnieuwe-kraken-geen-verharde-strijd (accessed September 17, 2012). 30. Van der Zee, Prohibition, 17. 31. Simone Pekelsma, “Witboek versus Zwartboek,” City Journal, March 2009, 20–21. 32. Selje Slager, “Krakers Presenteren Witboek,” Trouw, January 15, 2009, http:// www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/2009/article/print/detail/1136926/Krakers-presenterenWitbok.html (accessed September 18, 2012). 33. Comite tegen het Kraakverbod, “Alle wat een kamerlid,” 8–9. 34. Comite tegen het Kraakverbod, “Alle wat een kamerlid,” 9–11. 35. Comite tegen het Kraakverbod, “Alle wat een kamerlid,” 16. 36. Comite tegen het Kraakverbod, “Alle wat een kamerlid,” 17. 37. Comite tegen het Kraakverbod, “Alle wat een kamerlid,” 17. 38. The media was sharply divided in their coverage of the squatting issue, with the Elsevier media empire in particular taking a hard line against squatting. (This is not surprising since most readers of the Elsevier magazine and web site are educated individuals engaged in business.) At the same time, the left-leaning Trouw appeared to side with the squatters, while the mainstream Het Parool was more neutral in its analysis. Information about typical readers is taken from “Visitor’s Profile,” Elsevier Media, http://www.elseviermedia.com/brands/elsevier/ elseviernl (accessed September 10, 2012). 39. Van Rijckevorsel, “En nu een keer korte metten met die krakers!” 40. Van Rijckevorsel, “En nu een keer korte metten met die krakers!” 41. Van Rijckevorsel, “Commentaren,” Elsevier, June 13, 2009, http://www. elsevier.nl/web/10237025/Commentaren/Tweede-kamer-schiet-een-op-metkraakverbod (accessed September 7, 2012). 42. Comite tegen het Kraakverbod, “Alle wat een kamerlid,” 19. 43. Comite tegen het Kraakverbod, “Alle wat een kamerlid,” 20.

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44. Diederik Boomsma, “The Price of Zero Intolerance,” National Review 62, no. 21 (2010): 15–16. Factiva (accessed November 15, 2010). 45. Jelte Wiersma, “Laatste Steuiptrekkingen van de kraakbeweging,” July 12, 2011, http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Opinie/Commentaren/303320/Laatste-stuiptrekkingen (accessed September 10, 2012). 46. Elsevier, “VVD eist actieplan tegen agressieve krakers.” 47. Elsevier, “Krakers zijn aan het verharden,” Bandwerk Internet, February 2008, http://www.jovd.nl/nieuws/140/Politie:-Krakers-zijn-aan-het-verharden.htm (accessed September 18, 2012). 48. Bart van Zoelen, “Liever geen Kraakverbod,” Het Parool, September 9, 2009, http://www.parool.nl/parool/nl/6/WONEN/article/detail/261356/2009/09/09/ Liever-geen-kraakverbod.dhtml (accessed December 2, 2012). The documentary, by Moira van Dijk, Bart Rosinga, John Trefer and Toon Westra, can be viewed at http://www.stoorzender.tv/Kraakverbod/Kraken,_waarom_niet.html (accessed December 2, 2012) 49. Christian Democratic Alliance Amsterdam, “Standpunt: Kraken,” Christian Democratic Alliance, 2011, http://www.cda.nl/Amsterdam/Waar_staan_we_ voor/Standpunten/Kraken (accessed September 7, 2012). 50. Squat!net, “Call Out from the Netherlands,” Squat!net, November 22, 2009, http:// squat.net/2009/11/22/call-out-from-the-netherlands/ (accessed December 2, 2012). 51. Sterline, “Amsterdam Clears Squatters.” 52. Pekelsma, “Witboek versus Zwartboek,” 20–21. 53. NU.nl, “Verkiezingen: Balkenende daagt Cohen uit over kraakverbod,” NU.nl, June 3, 2010, http://www.nu.nl/nieuws/2262026/balkenende-daagt-cohenkraakverbod.html (accessed September 14, 2012). 54. De Telegraaf, “Cohen: Kraakverbod niet nodig,” 2010, De Telegraaf, http:// www.telegraaf.lnl/binnenland/3697615/_Cohen_kraakverbod_niet_nodig (accessed September 14, 2012). 55. De Volkskrant, “Antikraakwet,” De Volkskrant, June 3, 2010, http://www. volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/3184/opinie/article/detail/2450342/2010/06/03/Antikraakwet. dhtml (accessed November 12, 2011). 56. Robin van der Kloor, “Ook Eerste Kamer akkoord met kraakverbod,” Elsevier, 2010, http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/Politiek/266012/Ook-Eerste-Kamerakkoord-met-kraakverbod.htm (accessed September 10, 2012). 57. Canadian Press, “Dutch Court Bans Eviction of Squatters,” November 8, 2010, Factiva (accessed September 10, 2012). 58. Dutchnews.nl, “Trouble Looms over Squatting Ban, from Official Sources,” Dutchnews.nl, June 4, 2010, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/print/022510.php (accessed September 3, 2012). 59. RTV Utrecht, “Utrecht wil kraakverbod beperkt uitvoeren,” RTV Utrecht, June 3, 2010, http://www.rtvutrecht.nl/nieuws/241785 (accessed September 13, 2012). 60. Jeroen Langelaar, 2010, “Woedende krakersbeweging: Wij Blijven de wet breken!,” Elsevier, September 24, 2010, http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/ Nederland/276664/Woedende-krakersbeweging-wij-blijven-de-wet-breken. html (accessed September 13, 2012). 61. De Telegraaf, “Binnenland: Grote steden: Kraakverbod werkt niet,” De Telegraaf, 2010, http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/2346336/_Steden_Kraakverbod (accessed September 14, 2012). 62. Jeroen Langelaar, “Ook Groningen gaat kraakverbod toch handhaven,” Elsevier, October 8, 2010, http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/Nederland/278027/OokGroningen-gaat-kraakverbod-toch-handhaven (accessed September 12, 2012). 63. Jaira Mees-Bolle, “Squatting and Vacant Property Act,” Mondaq Business Briefing, March 24, 2011, Factiva (accessed September 2, 2012). 64. Sterline, “Amsterdam Clears Squatters.”

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65. Canadian Press, “Dutch Court Bans Eviction.” 66. Sterline, “Amsterdam Clears Squatters.” 67. DutchNews.nl, “Rules for Emptying Squats Now Established,” DutchNews.nl, 2011, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archies/print/030314.php (accessed September 2, 2012). 68. DutchNews.nl, “Amsterdam No Longer a City of Squatters,” DutchNews.nl, June 25, 2012, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/print/033675.php (accessed September 3, 2012). 69. De Volkskrant, “Amsterdam ontruimt 300 panden sinds kraakwet,” De Volkskrant, 2012, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/327165. . . . (accessed September 9, 2012). 70. De Volkskrant, “Klachten over politie-optreden Amsterdam,” De Volkskrant, 2012, http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/328217 (accessed September 9, 2012). 71. Richard Warren, “To Rent and Protect: International Property,” Financial Times, September 24, 2011, Factiva (accessed September 10, 2012).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 1. Iver B. Neumann, “Discourse Analysis,” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, ed. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 70. 2. Paul Roe, “Is Securitization a ‘Negative’ Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2012): 249–266. 3. Aras and Polat use the term “normalization” to refer to the dialing down or softening of governmental commitment to an extreme position on an issue that had previously been securitized. In their case, they describe Turkish foreign policy towards Iran and Syria as having become normalized, and therefore shifting out of a securitization paradigm in which the other nations are seen as posing an existential threat. See Bulent Aras and Rabia Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 5 (2008): 495–515. 4. Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005), 5–6. 5. See Salter’s discussion of desecuritization in airport security, for example. Mark Salter, “Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority,” Journal of International Relations and Development 11 (2009): 321–328. See also Matti Jutila, “Desecuritizing Minority Rights: Against Determinism,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 2 (2006): 167–185. 6. Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” Alternatives 27 (2002): 64. 7. Paul Roe, “Securitization of Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 279–294. Quoted in Jutila, “Desecuritizing Minority Rights,” 167. 8. Claudia Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation,” Journal of International Relations and Development 7, no. 4 (2004): 388–413, quoted in Roe, “Is Securitization a ‘Negative’ Concept?,” 259. 9. Jef Huysmans, “The Question of the Limit: Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism,” Millennium 27, no. 2 (1998): 569–589. Referenced in Jutila, “Desecuritizing Minority Rights,” 169. 10. Vibeke Schon Tjalve, “Designing (De)security,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 4–5 (2011): 441–452.

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11. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 5. 12. Salter, “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In this work, Salter suggests that when the Canadian airport authority was found to have made mistakes and was portrayed as less than fully competent, its authority to securitize issues was therefore lessened. 13. Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene,” 449. 14. Nick, “Squatting by the Numbers,” Diddly Squat London, http://www. diddlysquatlondon.com/2012/02/20/squatting-by-numbers (accessed May 1, 2012). 15. See, for example, Angela Davis, “Racial Profiling Post 9/11—Still a Bad Idea,” Brennan Center for Justice, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/ racial-profiling-post-9–11-still-a-bad-idea (accessed October 1, 2012). 16. This campaign is described by Robert Greenwald, “Do I Look Illegal?,” Huffington Post, April 30, 2010, http://huffingtonpost.com/robert-greenwald-do-Ilook-illegal-B-559498.html (accessed September 2, 2012). 17. Here, one can argue that if liminality itself is a construct, then logically it should be possible both to reconstruct and unconstruct the concept. Indeed, we can point to efforts to do just that. For example, in their work, Higgot and Nossal describe the ways in which Australian leaders have in recent years consciously sought to remake people’s conception of Australia’s place in the region, causing people to see it as a member of the Asia Pacific region, rather than a very faraway part of Europe. Through deploying language, they “relocated” Australia, so that it lost its liminal status. See Richard Higgot and Kim Nossal, “The International Politics of Liminality: Relocating Australia in the Asia Pacific,” Australian Journal of Political Science 32, no. 2 (1997): 169–185. Similarly, we can raise the possibility that squatters too can lose their liminal status through increasing the likelihood that they can be seen as legitimate members of society and would-be citizens. 18. Thomas Aguilera, Struggling within Illegality against Housing Crisis in Paris: Squats and Slums as a Challenge to Urban Policies (Paris: Workpapers du programme villes et territoires, Sciences Po, 2011). 19. Matthew Bell, “Home Truths: ‘Squatting Is the Perfect Example of the Big Society,’” Independent, May 29, 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/property/house-andhome/home-truths-squatting-is-the-perfect-example-of-the-big-society-2288870. html (accessed September 2, 2012). 20. Victoria Blitz, “Our Society Is Bigger than Yours: Squatting and the Wider Political Rumblings,” June 27, 2011, http://www.criticallegalthinking.com/?p=3644 (accessed August 1, 2011). 21. See, for example, Stuart Croft, Securitizing Islam (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 22. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 23. This theory is expounded in Christine Horne, “The Enforcement of Norms: Group Cohesion and Meta-Norms,” Social Psychology Quarterly 64, no. 3 (2001): 253–266.

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Index

acceptable behavior contracts 80 acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS): securitization of 5, 9; threat of 56, 181 acquisitive urban squatter 88 active citizenship 82, 166 adverse possession laws 3, 19, 33, 36, 87, 93 Advisory Service for Squatters (ASS) 88–9, 93, 101, 112–13 A8 nationals 28 Africa 5, 13, 26, 72, 124, 139; South Africa 7, 26, 122 Agamben, Giorgio 176 Agency for Palaces and Cultural Properties (Denmark) 127, 131, 136 Aguilera, Thomas 12, 20, 182 Ahmed, Abu-Taher 67 AK81 (gang) 133 alcoholics/alcoholism 65–6, 102, 108 Alien Act (2000) 160 alternative lifestyle of squatting 63, 65, 136, 186; experimentation with 122; Holland 39; security threat 30, 36; social experiment 37; values of 128 Amara, Fadela 150 Amirshari, Pouria 151 Amnesty International 144–5 Amouroux, Christa 129 amphetamine problems 126 anarchist society 21, 34; philosophy of 11, 47, 122; politics of 4, 98, 154 anarchist squatters 29–30, 37, 119; as assimilationist move 29; capitalist critique of 70; defined 85; demographics of 2; identity

frames of 69–70; philosophy of 30; politics of 4, 64, 101, 168, 183; security threats with 24, 134, 169, 180 Anti-Exclusion Act (1998) 142 anti-immigrant sentiments 13, 90, 127, 149, 159, 168 anti-social behavior 26, 75, 77, 81, 102; art squats 92; black book on squatting and 165; civil disobedience 118; legislation against 96; UK crackdown on 80–2, 87 anti-social behavior orders (ASBOs) 80, 81 anti-social labels 40 antisquatting 12, 108; groups 51, 151; legislation 73, 160, 164, 167–8, 177; policies 157; see also squatting antiterrorist squad troops 130, 132 Aounit, Mouloud 152 Arab American immigrants 38, 133, 139, 180 Aradau, x 176–8 art squats 91–3, 120, 133, 138; benefits of 105; improvement frame and 58 Asia 124 Asmussen, Vibeke 125 assimilationist strategies 13, 21–4, 28–30, 32–3 Association of French Mayors 153 asylum seekers 29, 52; constructs of 73; moral panic over 94; rights of 15; United Kingdom 77 asymmetric warfare 14, 41 Austria 132 Axelrod, Robert 185

238

Index

Baconschi, Teador 152 Bailey, Ron 24 Baker, Bob 95 Balkenende, Jan Peter 159 Ballard, Richard 26, 122–3 barbarism frames for squatters 70–2 Barroso, Jose Manueal 153 behavior frames for squatters 62 Berlin Wall 145 Bigo, Didier 6, 10, 27, 34, 66, 176 Black Bloc group 134, 154 black book on squatting 164–5, 167 Black Cobra (gang) 133 Blair, Tony 80, 81 Blake, Joseph 115 Blitz, Victoria 99, 183 Blunt, Crispin 36, 99–104, 109 Boc, Emil 152 Body-Gendrot, Sophie 16, 157 Boomsma, Diederik 168 Braun, Bruce 26 Brazil 21 British Muslims 89 British Social Attitudes survey 89, 90 British Tory politicians 73 Bubandt, Nils 42 Bulgaria 38, 139–40, 145–6 Bullshit gang 123–4 Buzan, Barry 8, 10, 14 Calais, squatter camp 15, 34, 72, 139, 146, 179 Cameron, David 80, 182–3 Canada 29 capitalist/capitalism 55, 62, 86; opposition to 36, 70, 107, 132; squatters and 21–4, 64, 86 Center for Regional and Economic Research at Sheffield Hallam University 106–7 Central Asia 53 Cesari, Jocelyn 149 Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU) 15, 139, 152 Cheston, Paul 93 child sexual offenders 67 China 1, 53 Chirac, Jacques 146 Chouat, Francis 155 Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) 159, 162, 163, 169 Christiania Act (2004) 128 Christiania Foundation 135 Christiania in Copenhagen see Juliana Christiania

Christian Union (Netherlands) 164, 170 church-held lands 19 citizenship 43, 45, 49, 118, 140; active citizenship 82, 166; deviance frame and 62; home ownership ties to 64; of immigrants 149–50, 159–60; obligations of 138; policies 30, 127; politics 1, 78–9, 80–2; practices 67, 69, 160; squatting as 17, 20–6; understanding of 176 The City in History (Mumford) 52 Civic Integration of Newcomers Act (1998) 160 Civil Procedure Rules 109 Clark, Greg 76 Clegg, Nick 80 closure orders 80, 130, 140 Coast Salish peoples 29 cocaine problems 126 Cockrell, Oliver 105–6 Cohen, Job 169, 170, 172 Cold War 184 collectivization 30 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICRED) 151 communalism 63–4, 119, 122, 131 communist society 21, 30, 86, 129 community frame for squatters 57, 74 Conservative Party: Denmark 126, 127, 129; Holland 164; UK 76, 79, 86, 96–7 construction of the squatter 32–5 constructivism 16, 24, 45–7, 50–1 Copenhagen School of analysis 5–6 Corporate Watch (magazine) 111 Corr, Anders 29 Council of Europe 15 counterterrorism measures 8, 61 cracking, defined 161 Crepeau, Francois 155 crime: economic crime 58, 59; free riding and 57, 127–8; increases in 49, 156; organized crime 9, 54, 126, 166, 169; transnational crime 41, 68, 128, 133, 166 crime frame 36, 61–2 Criminal Bar Association 112 criminality discourse 127, 133–4 criminality frame for squatters 61–2 criminalization of squatting 96–7, 110–15, 117; in Great Britain 37, 78, 82, 96, 135–6 Criminal Law Act (1977) 86, 100, 104, 109, 112

Index Crisis agency 101, 102 critical squatter studies 32–5 cultural patrimony discourse 60, 127 Czech Republic 28 Daily Mail (newspaper) 33–4, 61, 92; media role of 167; moral panic by 94, 95–6; squatter profiles by 67, 98 Daily Telegraph (newspaper) 67, 98, 100, 103–4 DALO legislation (France) 143–4 Danish Folkeparti 135 Danish Parliament 123–4, 137 Danish People’s Party 125, 127 Deker, Sybille 163 demonstrators 34–5 Denmark 11, 73, 119, 185; antisquatter rhetoric 153; criminality frame for squatters 61; gang violence in 123–8, 130, 133–6, 134; securitization cases in 35, 39; urban squatters in 14–15; see also Juliana Christiania Department for Business (UK) 82 Department for Education (UK) 82 Department for Work and Pensions (UK) 82 Department of Community and Local Government (UK) 13, 76–7, 80, 82 Department of Health (UK) 82 Department of the Interior (UK) 82 deportation of foreign squatters 12, 27, 74; in Roma squat 139, 148, 151–2, 154 Der Spiegel (news magazine) 145, 150 desecuritization: evolution of tolerance 181–3; implications of 176–7; less dangerous world and 183–4; moving away from securitization 178–9; objects of securitization 179–81; overview 175–6; paths to 178; possibilities of 184–5; process of 177–8; see also securitization “deterritorialization” 13 deviance frame for squatters 62–6 de Villepin, Dominique 151 De Volkskrant (newspaper) 170, 173 Dictatorship (Schmitt) 176, 177 Diddly Squat London (blog) 179–80 Diggers movement 19, 85 Directive on Freedom of Movement 154

239

disease: pathogenic security and 7, 10–12; vector 26, 53 dispersal orders 80 domestic law enforcers 49, 153 Donner, Piet Hein 163 Dorling, Danny 113 drug addicts 166 drug trafficking/trade 123, 125, 128, 131, 133, 166; cocaine problems 126; hashish trafficking 124, 126, 130; heroin problems 121; see also marijuana drug treatment 121 Dubois, Jean-Pierre 152 Duquenet, Luigi 146–7 Dutch Christian Democratic 168 Dutch Court of Appeals 39, 161 Dutch Liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) 165, 167 Dutch Parliament 161–2 Dutch squatting see the Netherlands early day motion (EDM) 97, 101–3 Eastern Europe 13, 36, 50, 67, 98, 140; migrant workers 89; survival squatters 70, 73 East European gypsies 13 East Germany 174 economic crime 58, 59 Elsevier (newspaper) 157, 167–8 Empty Homes charity 79–80 Enclosure Laws (1750-1850) 85 England 11, 29 Epstein, Charlotte 8 Estonia 28 Estrosi, Christian 153 ethic of care for strangers 52 ethnic minorities in the Netherlands 159 Europe: active citizenship 82, 166; coordination over squatters 83–4, 98, 144, 149, 151; drug problems in 121; slum clearing 1, 12, 122–4; Southern Europe 168; see also Eastern Europe; European Union; securitization in Europe; Western Europe; individual European countries European antisquatting legislation 12 European Commission 154 European Convention on Human Rights 84, 130–1, 170 European Court of Human Rights 15, 84, 87–8 European Court of Justice 14

240

Index

European Human Rights statutes 39 European Parliament 15, 139–40, 154, 180 European Roma Rights Center (ERR) 152, 180 European Social Charter 84 European squatting policy 30 European Treaty on Human Rights 173 European Union (EU) 1, 78, 113, 148; Charter of Fundamental Rights 152; France violation of policies 151, 153; homeless nationals 13; Human Rights Convention 39; the Netherlands in 158; Roma squats and 139–41 Evening Standard (newspaper) 60, 68, 73; media role of 167; squatter articles by 97–8, 99, 100 evictions 9, 142, 155; carrying out of 170; homeowners in UK 84; squatters in Holland 173; squatters in UK 87, 92–3; violence and 39 evolution of tolerance 181–3 exclusionary policy 11, 17–18, 60; adoption of 34; embracing the squatter 20–5; narratives of 33; nationalist frame and 74; rejecting the squatter 25–32, 182; see also criminalization of squatting failed state 16; danger of 56; Juliana Christiania as 38, 119, 124, 126, 138, 147; no go zones 134 federal involvement in squatting issues 96–101 feral children 53 Fillon, Francois 151 Financial Times (newspaper) 149 Finland 13 fixed penalty notices 80 Forcible Entry Act (1381) 85 Foucaultian perspective 10–11 Fox O’Mahony and Cobb 87, 88 France 11, 34; barbarism frame of squatters 72; housing policy in 141–5; right-wing parties in 73; securitization cases in 35; urban squatters in 14–15; see also the Roma squats Frederiksen, Claus Jhort 135 Freedom of Information (FOI) requests by squatters 88–9 free rider frame: crime and 57, 127–8; for squatters 58–9, 166, 170

Freetown Christiania see Juliana Christiania Friedman, Ian 29 Gaddafi, Saif 93, 97 Gaillot, Jacques 155 gangs 67; dangers with 37; immigrant gangs 133; of Romanian squatters 68, 73; violence by 123–8, 130, 133–6, 134; see also individual gangs Germany 125, 132, 154, 181; gypsies from 140; US military demobilization 184 globalization 3, 7–8, 10; defined 11; impact of 41, 43, 50, 128, 184; impact on securitization 16, 54; impact on squatting 14, 41–3, 89; irregular dwellers and 54; realism and 47–9; threat from 159 Gold, Tanya 115 Grand, Jean Pierre 151 Great Britain 1, 13, 23, 117, 175; antisquatter rhetoric 153; housing issues 77, 83–4; rightwing parties in 73; securitization cases in 35, 37, 179; squatter viewpoints 183; squatting in 23, 75; see also United Kingdom Great Depression 53 Great London Council’s Squatters’ amnesty 23 Green Party (France) 150 Green Party (Netherlands) 163, 167, 172 Green Party (UK) 98 “Grenoble speech” (Sarkozy) 146 Guantanamo Bay 25, 176 Guardian (newspaper) 81, 89, 91, 115, 116 Gueant, Claude 153 Gupta, Vinay 92 Gurney, Craig 60, 62, 64 gypsy squats 2, 140, 150; deportation from 38; in France 140, 147, 151–2; in UK 76–7, 112–13 Hanley, Lynsey 81–2 hashish trafficking 124, 126, 130 Hastings, Max 95–6 Haute Autorite de lute Contre les discriminations et pour l’egalitie (HALDE) 144 Hayward, Helen 19

Index Hells Angels (gang) 123, 133 heroin problems 121 HG Security 66 hippie lifestyle 63, 122, 166 Hobson, Rebecca 105–6 Holland 39, 157–64, 167–70, 180, 185 Hollander, Francois 139 Holston, James 21, 118 the Holy Fool 53 home issues 8–9, 13, 35, 64; constructivism and 45–7; defined 43–4; economic good 57; investment frame for squatters 60; ownership laws, Netherlands 160; realism and 43–5; securitization and 8; security aspects of 46; as sovereign territory 44–5; squatter threats to 42, 51–2, 57; vacancies 68, 71, 77–9, 89, 93, 99, 114; see also evictions; homelessness; homeowners Homeless International 21 homelessness 13, 21–4, 63; federal policy towards 78, 82–3; shelters 121; vagrants 51, 78; see also squatting Home Nightmares (TV show) 71 Home Office Report (1991) 87 homeowner concerns 30–1, 60–2, 66–7 homeowners 9–10, 22, 64, 69–74; defined 44; eviction of 84; security of 30–1, 60–2, 66–7; viewpoint on squatters 103–5 Homo Sacer (Agamben) 25 Hortefeux, Brice 139, 147, 148, 152 house, defined 43 housing policy: constructivism and 45–7; domestic policy impact on 5; in France 141–5; marginal housing residents 3, 159, 160; overview 1–3; policy debates 30–1, 78, 82–3; realism and 43–5; securitization and 8, 10 Housing Solidarity group 85 Hovedbladet (magazine) 119 Hubbard, Phil 73 human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 56 human rights 3, 12, 26, 139–40; criminalization of squatting 40, 43, 145; forced eviction 155; housing policy issues 79; securitization and 180

241

human trafficking 9, 133, 166 Hungary 28, 140, 152 Huysmans, Jeffrey 55, 177 Iceland 13 identity frames for squatters 69–70 illegal immigrants 5, 55, 94, 127–8, 139, 182 immigrant/immigration concerns 9, 34, 42; anti-immigrant sentiments 13, 90, 127, 149, 159, 168; in Denmark 127–8; gangs 133; quarantines 54; sensationalizing of 95; threat of 89–90; see also migrants/migration concerns; undocumented immigrants Immigration and Asylum Act (1999) 29 improvement frame for squatters 57–8 inclusionary policy 17–18; embracing the squatter 20–5; rejecting the squatter 25–32 Independent (newspaper) 93, 151 India 3, 21 informal settlement 20, 55–7 insurgent citizenship 21–2, 118 interim possession order (IPO) 87, 96, 100, 109 international property squatters 13, 32, 36, 73–4, 128, 171, 184 International Socialist Worker’s movement 24 International Social Survey Programme 90 investment frame for squatters 59–61 Irish Squatting movement 86 irregular dwellers 54–5 Israel 29, 122 John, Richard 116 Johnson, Boris 76, 171 Jowell, Tessa 102–3 Judeo-Christian worldview 19 Juliana Christiania, in Copenhagen: criminality discourse 127, 133–4; criminality frame for squatters 61; deviance frame for squatters 64; discourses in 127–8; as failed state 38, 119, 124, 126, 138, 147; final securitization attempt 131–3; founding of 119–20; improvement frame for squatters 58; normalization and inclusion of 124–6; overview 117–19,

242

Index

135–7; problems in 121–2; as public recreation area 135; raids and counterintelligence against 128–31; reincorporation of 37–8, 138; slum clearing attempt 122–4; steps toward incorporation 120–1 Jupee, Alain 151 Jyllands-Posten (newspaper) 135 Khan, Genghis 53 Kjaersgaard, Pia 125 Klima Forum 134 Kouchner, Bernard 151 Labour Party (UK) 80, 97, 102 Landlord Action group 97, 100 landowners 1, 87–8 Land Registration Act (2002) 87 language of securitization 5, 16, 39, 47, 66, 148 Latin America 3, 21, 55 Latvia 28, 97 Law on Squatting and Empty Property (Netherlands) 171–4 Law on Welcome and Accommodation of Travelling People (2000) 143 Law Society 109 League for Human Rights (France) 152 Leegstandwet (vacant property act) 162 Leers, Gerd 174 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Bill 36, 37, 39, 104, 114, 115–16 legal squatters 162, 174 le Grand, August 143 Lemanski, Charlotte 7, 48 Le Monde (newspaper) 157 Le Pen, Jean-Marie 150 Levy, Andrew 95 Liberal Democrats (UK) 97, 102 Liberal Party (Venstre) 126, 129 Liegeois, Jean-Pierre 140 liminal status (liminality) 55–6, 181–3; categories of individuals 54; of Christiania 38, 117, 118, 123; defined 54; of squatters 11–12, 52 Limitation Act (1980) 87 Lithuania 28, 99, 132 local level securitization 7–10 Loison, Marie 141–2 London Squatter’s Campaign 24 Low, Setha 49 Ludvigsen, Jacob 119

McDonnell, John 106, 114 McNally, Tom 102, 104 Mahoney, Tony 86 Major, John 86 “managers of unease” 66 Manning, Kayne 66–7 marginal housing residents 3, 159, 160 marijuana: in Holland 159; in Juliana Christiania 121, 125, 130 Marxist-Leninist ideas 30 Medicines du Monde 143 Megan’s Law 67 Mendleson, Rachel 133 Mexico 55, 91 Middle Ages 1, 21, 41, 54; Gypsy squats during 140; trope of the Holy Fool in 53 middle class squatters 36 migrants/migration concerns 38, 42, 52, 71, 73; dangers of 15, 27; diseases from 54; globalism and 48; hostility to 95; human rights of 155, 175; see also immigrant/ immigration concerns Mikkelsen, Brian 128, 134 Baroness Miller of Chilthorn Domer 114–15 Ministry of Defense 82 Ministry of Justice (Great Britain) 13, 82, 96, 106 Ministry of the Interior (France) 154 Möbius strip 10 Moldovan squatters 95–6 Moller, Adam 129 Moller and Gronborg consulting 123 Monahan, Torin 9 moral panic 94–5, 125 MRAP organization 152 Mueller, Helge Adam 126 multiculturalism 11, 13, 73, 159–60 Mumford, Lewis 48, 52 Munch, Fleming Steen 132 Muslims 89 narrative of threat 47 National Health Service 90 National Heritage Agency 131 nationalism 33, 70, 149, 170 nationalism frames for squatters 73–4 National Planning Policy Framework 76 National Review (magazine) 168 national security concerns 3, 5, 7, 39; counterterrorism measures 8;

Index squatters as 9, 12–13; squatting legislation for 111 Native Americans 25 neighborhood issues 1–4; identities of 27; narrative of threat 47; in South Africa 7; two visions of 16–20 Nepal 1 the Netherlands, squatting: black book on 164–5, 167; brief history of 160–2; hardening of 168–9; laws against 59, 162–4; legislation against 170–4; media role 167–8; overview 157–60; popular opinion role 169–70; right-wing parties in 73; securitization cases in 11, 35, 39; squats on behalf of government 23; University of Amsterdam report on 164–5; urban squatters in 14–15; white book on 165–7 Neumann, Iver 6, 17, 54, 175 New Labour government 80 newspaper coverage of squatting issues 94 New Statesman (magazine) 107, 149 9/11 see September 11, 2001, attacks no-go zone 124, 134 nomadic individuals 13, 15, 20, 52–3, 55 non-European Others 8 nongovernmental organization (NGO) 1, 14, 88, 101, 144, 180 nonnative squatters 8, 71, 73 Norway 126, 127, 132 not in my backyard (NIMBY) 28–9, 61 Occupy London movement 35, 113 Occupy Wall Street protestors 135 Old Testament Book of Leviticus 19 Olsen, Jan Richman 121 O’Mahony, Fox 33, 87, 88 Options for Dealing with Squatting, paper: cost consideration failures 109–15; data problems in 108–9; overview 103; squatter characterization as conflictual 105–6; squatter characterization as one-dimensional 106–8; viewpoint of homeowner 103–5 organized crime 9, 54, 126, 166, 169 Oubliette Arthouse 91–2, 108 panic politics of securitization 6 Pawlicki, Jacek 37, 117 Peaker, Giles 85

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Pekelsma, Simone 165, 170 Pelissard, Jacques 153 Penny, Laurie 105, 107, 108 Pidd, Helen 91 Pinte, Etienne 143 Poland 28, 132, 165 politics of citizenship 80–2 polygamists 149 pornography 120 posh squatters 59, 62, 74, 98 poverty 3, 26, 92, 119; criminalization of 115; homelessness and 24; housing and 75, 82, 83; squatting and 2, 20 Priemus, Hugo 161, 162 private security 10, 49, 150 property damage 9 Property Protection, Ltd. 66 property rights 24, 150 property squatting see squatting Pruijt, Hans 20–1 public information campaigns 12, 182 Puritan work ethic 59 Qing Dynasty in China 53 quarantines for immigrants 54 Quilliot Act (1982) 142 Raffarin, Jean-Pierre 151 Ramdani, Nabila 149, 150 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 125 Reader’s Digest (magazine) 91 realism: home and 43–5; securitization and 47–9 the Red Cross 14 Reding, Viviane 153 Reformation period 41 refugees 3, 14, 34, 70, 118; camps 25, 29, 72, 146; rights of 15, 28, 144, 146; status of 73, 83 rent dodgers 59 Respect Standard for Housing Management 81 Respect Task Force 81 riot police/squads 33–4, 92, 131–2, 146 Ritchie, Guy 98 Roe, Paul 175, 176 Rolnik, Raquel 155 Roman Empire 53, 55 Romania 38, 140; deportation of squatters from 139, 145–6, 148, 151–2; immigrants in 107; squatters in 68, 73

244

Index

the Roma squats: Europe reacts to threat of 148–52; events of 2010 145–56; housing policy in France 141–5; organizations 15, 23; overview 138–41; property rights campaign in France 152–4; recent developments 154–5; Sarkozy, Nikolas policies on 138–41, 145–56; securitization attempts of 38, 181 rootless individuals 22, 52–5, 57, 181 Roucate, Delphine 157 rough sleeping 82, 107–9 Ruddick, Jason 97–8, 99 Russian communism 30 Sageman, Mark 55–6 Salter, Mark 41, 52–4, 53, 70–1, 177 Sanders, Adrian 102 Sarah’s Law 67 Sarkozy, Nikolas 138–41, 145–56; see also the Roma squats Schapp, Leen 169 Schmitt, Carl 176, 177 Scottish gypsies 64 securitization in Europe: constructivism and 50–1; defined 5–7; four cases of 35–40; language of 5, 16–20, 39, 47, 66, 148; language of securitization 5, 16, 39, 47, 66, 148; on the local level 7–10; local level securitization 7–10; moving away from 178–9; new paradigm of 69; objects of 179–81; overview 4–5; realism and 47–9; upside and downside of 10–11; war on squatting 11–15; of who and what 40; see also individual European countries “securitization logic” 12 security and insecurity frames for squatters: barbarism frames 70–2; behavior frames 62; community frame 74; criminality frame 61–2; deviance frame 62–6; free-rider frame 58–9; identity frames 69–70; improvement frame 57–8; investment frame 59–61; nationalism frames 73–4; overview 57; security frame 66–9 security aspects of home 46

security threats: alternative lifestyles 30, 36; anarchist squatters 24, 134, 169, 180; pathogenic 7, 10–12; private security against 10, 49, 150; from squats 56, 57, 114, 133; from squatting 16–17, 56, 179; “vernacular security” 42; see also national security concerns September 11, 2001, attacks 14, 48 serial squatters 98, 100 Shapps, Grant 66, 96, 103, 109, 113 Sharing To Accelerate ResearchTransformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support (STAR-TIDES) 92 Shelter organization 24, 36, 85–6, 95, 179 Shrubsole, Duncan 115 Sibley, David 52, 62–3 Simon, Dan 91–2, 108 Skaarup, Peter 135 Slob, Arie 164 Slovakia 28 Slovenia 28 slum clearing 1, 54, 122–4, 148; justification for 12, 19, 157; objection to 151 slums 20, 31; fear of 55–7; obstacles to development 16 Socialist Party (France) 154 socialist society 21, 139; Denmark 133; France 133, 143, 150–1, 154 socially vulnerable populations 82–3 Social Party (Netherlands) 163 Society of the Promotion of Area Sources Centers (SPARC) 21 South Africa 7, 26, 122; attitudes toward squatters 26; neighborhood issues in 7; squatter settlements in 122–3 South America 1, 124 Southern Europe 168 Spence, Thomas 19 squats 84, 107–9, 165–7; conversion of 23; increase of 93; Israel 29; the Netherlands 23, 169–74; policies toward 31; raids on 101; security threats from 56, 57, 114, 133; shutting down of 39; see also art squats; gypsy squats; Juliana Christiania; the Roma squats squatter.org 95

Index squatter organizations 24, 76, 162–3; in the Netherlands 162–3, 166–7 squatters: anarchist squatters 2, 70; characterization is conflictual 105–6; defined 33, 93; discourse and the construction of 32–5; foreign make-up of 28; international property squatters 13, 32, 36, 73–4, 128, 171, 184; irregular dwellers 54–5; legal squatters 162, 174; national security concerns 9; nonnative squatters 8, 71, 73; policy against 20–5; population rates of 12–13; posh squatters 59, 62, 74, 98; rejecting the 25–32; rights of 125, 161; rootless individuals 52–4; serial squatters 98, 100; threat to home and city 51–2, 57; threat to state 8, 14, 57; urban squatters 14–15, 75, 88, 101; violations by 30; see also deportation of foreign squatters Squatters Action for Secure Homes (SQUASH) 101–2, 108–15 The Squatter’s Handbook (SquatSpace) 98, 100 squatters network of Brighton and Hove actually SNOB(AHA) 89 squatting: actors involved in 15; alternative lifestyle of 63; black book on 164–5, 167; criminalization of 32, 37, 96–7, 110–15; for ideological reasons 36; issues associated with 78; newspaper coverage of 94; overview 1–3; prevention of 9–10; security problems 16–17, 56, 179; student-led 161; war on 11–15, 82, 139, 183; white book on 164–7; see also antisquatting; criminalization of squatting; homelessness squatting, cultural and historical context: art squats 91–3; brief history 84–91; coordination with Europe 83–4; coordination with other issues 78–9; early day motion and 101–3; economic growth and competitiveness 79–80; federal involvement in 78, 96–101; future of legislation for 116; implementing legislation

245

for 115–16; institutional and historical 76–7; options for dealing with 103–15; overview 75–6; politics of citizenship 80–2; questions of increases in 93–6; socially vulnerable populations 82–3 Stanley, Win 85 STAR-TIDES see Sharing To Accelerate Research-Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support Steves, Rick 136 subaltern squatting 2 Supreme Court (Denmark) 37, 123 Supreme Court (Netherlands) 173 Sweden 132 Taylor, Diane 89 Temporary School of Thought 92 tenant empowerment schemes 68–9 Ten Hoopen, Jan 158, 162–4, 166–8 terrorist/terrorism 52, 55, 68, 166, 176; reduction of 90; terminology of 34, 175; threat of 67, 90, 137, 165, 184; urban terrorist 88 Thames Reach organization 107–8 threat narrative 47 Time (magazine) 66 tolerance, evolution of 181–3 transnational crime 41, 68, 128, 133, 166 Turkey 21 UK Border Agency 77, 100 UK Department of Communities and Local Government 13 UK Housing Strategy (2011) 61 UN Climate Change Summit 134 undocumented immigrants 42, 51, 118; deportation of 172; threats from 49, 54–5 Ungdomshuset (Young People’s House) squat 131–3, 163 UN Human Rights Charter 15 Union for a Popular Movement (France) 151 United Kingdom (UK): asylum seekers 77; cultural patrimony discourse 60, 127; home ownership in 64; securitization in 179; squatting case study in 38–9; urban squatters in 14–15; see also Great Britain United Nations (UN) 14, 151

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United States (US) 54, 132, 136, 160; Arab American immigrants in 38; banning squatting 97; homosexual equality in 181; human rights concept 26; military demobilization in Germany 184; securitization failure in 180–2; securitization in 6, 8, 68; undocumented immigrants 55, 172 “universal grammar” 12 University of Amsterdam report 164–5 University of Nottingham 112 University of Sheffield 107 urban squatters 14–15, 75, 88, 101 urban terrorist 88 Valls, Manuel 154, 155 van der Burg, Brigitte 164 van der Laan, Eberhard 164 Van Gennip, Karien 163 van Rijckevorsel, Rene 167–8 Vasudevan, Alexander 34–5, 112–13 VAT tax 127 Venstre party 126, 129 “vernacular security” 42 Vigilance Properties 66 Vittrup, Kai 130 Voelkner, Nadine 10, 54 Waever, Ole 5 Walker, R.B.J. 4 Ward, Colin 19, 21, 22, 85 Ward, David 114 war on squatting 11–15, 82, 139, 183

war on terror 183 Weatherley, Michael 76, 96–101 Wendt, Alexander 7 Western Europe 11–13, 23, 64, 90; actors involved in squatting 15; desecuritization in 184; housing policy of 45; pockets of ungovernability and chaos in 12; securitization impact in 2, 5, 7, 133; squatter as threat narratives 43, 52–3, 57; squatter relationships 17–19, 152; threat of rootless individuals 53; see also individual European countries Westerwelle, Guido 154 white book on squatting 164–7 Wilberforce, William 19 wily squatter 88 World War I 41 World War II 38, 85–6, 154 Wotton, John 112 Wout, Bas van’t 165 Xenophon (Greek historian) 53 youth activists 34–5, 131 Yugoslavia 145 zoning laws 1, 42, 49–50, 160; for child offenders 67; in Christiania 120, 126; housing issues and 76, 80; NIMBY strategy and 61 Zuinisi, Marcello 152