Securitization and the Iraq War: The Rules of Engagement in World Politics 9780415518116, 9780203710494

Table of contents :
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 Why language matters
2 Speaking security: securitization and its limitations
3 From a speech act towards a language game
4 Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game
A different way of speaking security: conclusions and developments
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Securitization and the Iraq War

This book critiques the conceptualization of security found in mainstream and critical theoretical debates, and applies this to the empirical case of the 2003 Iraq War. The Iraq War represents one of the most puzzling, complex, and controversial events in the post-­Cold War era. The manner in which the Bush administration finally decided to hold Saddam Hussein accountable through military intervention provoked a worldwide outcry due to the narratives they constructed to justify the “pre-­emptive use of force” and “enhanced interrogation techniques.” Responding to constructivist and post-­structuralist scholars’ calls for a turn to discourse, and aligning its argument with critical security studies, particularly the Copenhagen School (CS), this book conceptualizes language as a pivotal mechanism of power. Adopting a Wittgensteinian approach, it moves away from thinking about the nexus between security and language from a single action, or speech act, to a series of actions or interactions. To illustrate this new approach, the author examines two cases in particular: the UN inspectors’ finding that there was no credible evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in early 2003 and the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004. Both events show that the boundaries and relations between securitized rules and environments are not pre-­given but produced in a particular language game. This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, US foreign policy, and IR in general. Faye Donnelly is Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, and has a Ph.D. in International Relations.

Routledge Critical Security Studies series

Titles in this series include: Securing Outer Space Edited by Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan Critique, Security and Power The political limits to emancipatory approaches Tara McCormack Gender, Human Security and the United Nations Security language as a political framework for women Natalie Florea Hudson The Struggle for the West A divided and contested legacy Christopher S. Browning and Marko Lehti Gender and International Security Feminist perspectives Edited by Laura Sjoberg Reimagining War in the 21st Century From Clausewitz to network-­centric warfare Manabrata Guha The New Spatiality of Security Operational uncertainty and the US military in Iraq Caroline M. Croser Human Security as Statecraft Structural conditions, articulations and unintended consequences Nik Hynek

US Domestic and International Regimes of Security Pacifying the globe, securing the homeland Markus Kienscherf Securitization and the Iraq War The rules of engagement in world politics Faye Donnelly

This page intentionally left blank

Securitization and the Iraq War

The rules of engagement in world politics

Faye Donnelly

First published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2013 Faye Donnelly The right of Faye Donnelly to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data Donnelly, Faye, 1982Securitization and the Iraq War : the rules of engagement in world politics / Faye Donnelly. pages cm. – (Routledge Critical Security Studies.) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Security, International. 2. International relations. 3. Iraq War, 2003– 2011. I. Title. JZ5588.D67 2013 355'.033–dc23 2013005957 ISBN: 978-0-415-51811-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-71049-4 (ebk) Typeset in Times by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

For mom and dad, people I will always look up to

This page intentionally left blank

Contents



Acknowledgments

x



Introduction

1

1 Why language matters

12

2 Speaking security: securitization and its limitations

42

3 From a speech act towards a language game

74

4 Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game

107



A different way of speaking security: conclusions and developments

141



Bibliography Index

157 193

Acknowledgments

This book is based on my Ph.D. Upgrading from a three-­letter to a four-­letter word was an exciting if somewhat daunting task. At the point of completing this project there is a definite sense of achievement on the one hand, along with the constant worry about what has been left out on the other. However, writing this book has taught me that the quest for perfection is always imperfect. Something can always be added, improved, rephrased or omitted. With this realization in mind, the arguments advanced in the pages that follow should be approached as both an end as well as a beginning point. I have been fortunate enough to meet many people without whom undertaking this piece of work would certainly not have been possible. First of all I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Karin Fierke for giving me the opportunity to undertake the Ph.D. at St Andrews. Throughout my studies she has always provided me with constructive comments and the space to nurture the ideas at the crux of this work. I am also delighted to have been given the opportunity to teach and lecture on her courses over the last year. On a related note, I would like to thank all the students who participated in the Critical Security Studies module IR4522 in 2012. Their questions made me (re)think about the importance of not only criticizing existing security agendas but also proposing new alternatives. Next I would like to thank my second supervisor Dr Anthony F. Lang. He went well beyond the requirements of this role. Tony read many drafts of this work without ever making me feel like I was burdening him, even though I was. This reassurance was very much appreciated as was all his feedback. I would also like to thank my external examiner, Professor Neta Crawford for her expertise and feedback on the project. The entire staff in the Department of International Relations at St Andrews from the secretaries onwards provided an extremely friendly and supportive atmosphere throughout this project. In particular I would like to express a huge thanks to Michael Boyle, Michelle Burgis, Jeffrey Muher, Emma Leonard, Sandra Pogodda, Nick Rengeer, Gurchathen Sanghera, Rashmi Singh, Taryn Sheppard, Kate Shick, Janka Skrzypek, Mohira Suyarkulova, and Andy Williams. Each in their own way has helped me to think about my work in a positive way, to see the finish line and believe it was attainable in “doable doses.” I

Acknowledgments   xi would also like to thank the head of School, Dr John Anderson, for enabling me to teach in the Department and to present my work as part of the departmental seminars. Keeping with the theme of institutional support I would also like to express my gratitude to all the people at Routledge and the anonymous reviewers who helped me with this project. Parts of this work have been presented in various places and on numerous panels. Tarak Barkawi, Francesco Cavatorta, Stefano Guzzini, Lene Hansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen, Matt McDonald, and Cian O’ Driscoll are among those who were very generous with their time and advice, listening as I tried to clarify my argument. I would especially like to thank Tarak for inviting me down to Cambridge to present a paper at their Ph.D. Colloquium. I really appreciate this opportunity to showcase my work to an outside audience and the valuable feedback I gained from Olf Corry. My meetings with Thomas Carothers and Patrick Jackson were also very informative during my research trip to Washington DC in the summer of 2007. I would also like to thank Jef Huysmans who provided me with great advice about always having your argument of the moment down on paper and general feedback on the project. The last person I would like to thank in terms of academic input is Mary Jane Fox. She was a real lifesaver, bringing energy and enthusiasm to the project at a critical time. More than this she was a genuine guardian angel. With her help I learnt invaluable skills about signposting, iterative processes, b-­steps, and unpacking a complex idea. The insights I gained are not immediately obvious in the pages ahead but it is definitely a starting point. She also put in a lot of time at the very end to proof read the entire manuscript and to help to ensure the arguments were coherent, consistent, and complete. Throughout this busy time she always enabled me to keep smiling. Throughout my studies I was lucky enough to make a group of very close friends, who I will simplify as the “Costa Crew” here. Hopefully by now they know who they are, despite being scattered around the world. Their laughter, conversations, and general company was really important to me. Without a doubt they made “life in Fife” much less lonely than could otherwise have been the case. There are two exceptions to this group. The first is Lindesay Scott-­ Hayward, for whom I will always have a special fondness for Wednesdays and tea. I would also like to say a big thank you to Ruth Bowness and her husband James. Together they have reminded me that work is not the most important thing and to “just to keep swimming.” Friends at home have also been a great source of support, both in their visits and their constant probes about finishing up. Lastly, but in no way least, I would like to thank my family and my two sisters Laura and Lynne. A particular, but extra special, thanks goes to Laura who had an innate ability to read my biggest fears and calm me down when no one else could. No matter what happened she was always there and had a lovely way to keep me grounded. When she said run, I ran, trusting her that I would make it the other side safely. I do not think many other people genuinely cared as much about what page I was on, how all the chapters were coming together

xii   Acknowledgments and how close I was to the end. Her kindness and positive energy throughout this entire process has reaffirmed what I already knew; that I could not and will not ever have a better friend than her. My deepest thanks are for my parents. In this case words really are not enough to say how much I appreciate all their love and encouragement. I dedicate this book to them. I certainly would not be who I am or where I am without them. On numerous occasions they were my strength and the hope that kept me trusting. No matter how badly things fell apart they were always there believing in me. They have taught me that who you are is just as important as what you do. I will always treasure this lesson and their gentle reminders about trying not to try too hard. Further thanks go to Dad for the enormous amount of trouble he went to on the references in the original thesis, missing many football matches in the process. Once he said it was “grand” that was definitely good enough for me. He will appreciate this transformation. As with any work, the remaining flaws and mistakes are my own. Equally I would like add a final thank you in case I have left anyone out.

Introduction

This book is about the relationship between language and security. More specifically, it explores how the language of security constitutes and constrains certain actions both when and after it is spoken and afterwards. Empirically it is argued that the language employed by the Bush administration to justify the Iraq War legitimated certain kinds of practices but not others in the name of security. This process of legitimation, in turn, had serious implications for setting the rules of engagement and play both inside this particular context as well as outside it in other settings. The ambition to explore these issues requires consideration of two deeper theoretical themes. Our first goal is to open up and reflect upon the linguistic paradox.

How is language a constitutive yet constraining device? This book sheds light on this question by conceptualizing language as a form of action and interaction. Stepping into the discursive processes highlights language as a site of contestation and thus negotiation. It is inherently linked to how agents make decisions and the language that they employ to communicate and justify their intentions. All of this points to some notion of constitution yet constraint. On the one hand, language enables agents to understand their surroundings, and thus act and interact, whereas on the other it helps to ensure that they can act in accordance with a wider social setting. It is crucial to note that these dialectical processes of communication and interactions are not always harmonious. Arguments about what a word means, what actions are permissible and where the boundaries of a language game begin and end are not always clear cut. An acute awareness of the potential for tensions and ruptures to occur even in the most reified linguistic and social setting brings us to our second theoretical theme, namely to ask.

How is it possible for words to change meanings? As a social formation, language is never a self-­contained or closed whole. Studying language as a transformative process enables explorations into the

2   Introduction manner in which interrelated sets of meaning not only co-­exist but alternate. How does one set of meanings replace, erase and/or alter another? How does the same word, such as security, come to mean different things in different contexts? How does the same word, such as security, come to mean something different at different stages or spheres of contestation within the same context? Do such changes impact on larger intersubjective structures and spheres of action? If so, how? If not, why not? The existence of these questions has been well established within the discipline of international relations (IR), particularly by those interested in the role of language in the creation and maintenance of social meanings and life (Butler 1997; Campbell 1998; Crawford 2002; Doty 1993, 1996; Fierke 1998, 2002; Hansen 2006; Larsen 1997, 1999; Milliken 1999; Risse 2000). Drawing on and also contributing to this burgeoning literature, this book advances a critical constructivist approach. This theoretical position is in harmony with a Wittgensteinian approach to language, which is unpacked and developed throughout. Adopting this line of inquiry ensures that the focus remains on exploring how meanings are constantly put into use. Although this analytical shift might appear to be minor, it is proposed that it adds greater theoretical depth to understanding the relationship between agency and structure on the one hand and the relationship between words on the other. Highlighting the ways in which different structures of meaning co-­exist, compete, conflict and even change depending on how they are woven together add a double layer of complexity to the linguistic paradox. The biggest implication that stands out is that change can come from within as well as from outside the language games available at any given time (Bell 2002).

Theorizing the language of security In the discipline of International Relations, the nexus between language and security has primarily been examined by scholars who work within the tradition of “Critical Security Studies” and the “Copenhagen School” (Buzan et al. 1998) approach. Here, the realist claim that language is cheap, particularly in the realm of security, is seriously undermined. Instead of being inconsequential, the way security is spoken is held as being imperative for understanding how state interests are formulated and executed. This study draws directly on the claim that the language of security is a form of power. Determining what kind of power is at stake is far from clear, however. As we will see, security is an essentially contested concept (Baldwin 1997; Burke 2002; Ciuta 2009; Fierke 2007b; Fierke and Fattah 2009; McDonald and Bellamy 2002; Wilkinson 2007). Under the broad umbrella of Critical Security Studies we can find alternative accounts of what security means, how it is constructed and how insecurity should be alleviated. The Copenhagen School acts as our point of entry to explore how speech acts enable certain things to be done when security is spoken. However, this book takes a slightly different approach from the extant securitization framework. The

Introduction   3 main aim is to view the language of security not so much as a speech act or utterance, but as part of an ongoing process or language game. While we take the Copenhagen School’s claims about security speech acts and securitizing moves having a powerful legitimizing and delegitimizing potential seriously, the central aim is to explore how agents constantly put these meanings into use. The book is thus intended as an analytical inquiry conducted within the broader theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School approach, complemented by the insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of a language game. By integrating a Wittgensteinian approach, this book shifts attention away from the speech act as the dominant action towards a larger intersubjective activity that may involve multiple players apart from the speaker and the audience. This complements existing calls to deepen analysis into the “sociological context” and “dramalogical settings” (Balzacq 2005, 2011; Salter 2008). Wittgenstein’s idea of a language game also advances these arguments in two ways. First, it illustrates that multiple speech acts may be in play during a securitizing move or thereafter. More importantly, it allows for these different structures of meanings to overlap as well as interlock. This provides a more complex picture of how agents are actually speaking security. Second, a Wittgenstein lens provides a point of departure to exploring how securitized speech acts or language games legitimate certain kinds of rules while rendering others illegitimate. What rules are justified and justifiable in the name of security? What kinds of rules function once exceptional measures are operational? How are these rules put into place and enforced? Examining the constitutive interaction between these different levels raises further questions about the nexus between language, security and international law. Where does responsibility lie? What kind of rights are people entitled to in a process of securitization? Who makes the rules? Focusing awareness on what is permissible in the name of security is crucial to demonstrate that while the language of security gives agency, it also acts as a structure. Two categories will be used to bring up the distinctiveness of the different multilayers at work, namely the “securitization of democracy” and the “democratization of security.” Although these two categories exist in a dialectal relationship, there are important distinctions between them. First, the securitization of democracy points to the idea that democracy can co-­exist with and even be embedded in how security is spoken. What happens when this occurs? The inclusion and co-­existence of security and democracy has particular ramifications for how we understand what constitutes everyday politics and what constitutes exceptional politics. The second category, the democratization of securitization, raises important questions about how securitization can become normalized or institutionalized over the long term. What happens when this occurs? Arguably, there is a danger that the normalization and institutionalization of the language of security can result in a situation where agents are no longer critically enga­ ging and disagreeing with the way this language is being spoken, but rather are accepting it as a matter of course. While this familiarity is not always problematic and can create the rules of engagement, Wittgenstein forces us to constantly “look and see” how security is being spoken even in the most naturalized,

4   Introduction s­ ecuritized, institutionalized environments. The second category, the democratization of security also serves to flag ethical questions about where responsibility and accountability lies when security is being spoken, and thereafter.

The Iraq War: an empirical case study Although our inquiry is primarily intended as a theoretical investigation, its findings have interesting implications for empirical debates on US foreign policy and security studies. The Iraq War represents one of the most puzzling, complex and controversial events in the post-­Cold War era. The manner in which the Bush administration finally decided to hold Saddam Hussein accountable through military intervention provoked a worldwide outcry, severely tarnished the United States’ reputation around the world and led to a succession of negative events such as those in Abu Ghraib, whose full implications are yet to be determined. Invading Iraq on the grounds of pre-­emptive self-­defense proved particularly contentious. The invasion marked a rare case in recent history when a major power engaged in military action against another country for preventive reasons, although rhetorically justified by the Bush administration as pre-­emptive action (Arend 2003; Farer 2003; Franck 2001, 2002; Hammond 2005). In March 2003, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq, and while legal justifications for the invasion were issued, a general consensus emerged that the Bush administration’s arguments were legally unpersuasive (Kegley and Raymond 2003; Lobel and Ratner 1999; Thomasson 2003). Yet assertions of illegality did not prevent the invasion. Reflecting on such a situation, it is pertinent to ask how this foreign policy move was made possible. How could the Bush administration make a case for war without sufficient evidence to support their claim of imminent threats? How did security come to occupy the dominant justification for the Iraq War when it was exactly the security of the situation that was itself under strenuous debate? Taking a further step back, why did the Bush administration choose to pursue their interests in the language of security? These matters require further investigation and shall concern us throughout the entire book. While much ink has been spilled over the US military invasion of Iraq in 2003, this book is not another rehearsal about the causes behind the Iraq War (Boyne 2003; Chandrasekaran 2007; Fawn and Hinnebusch 2006; Kaufmann 2004; Sifry and Cerf 2003). Explanations offered range from oil (Stiglitz 2008), to President Bush carrying out paternal legacies (Pauly and Lansford 2005), the rise of neoconservative hawks (Fukuyama 2006a, 2006b; Mann 2004) among others. While these accounts carry some validity the focus of this book is on portraying the Bush administration’s foreign policy ventures in Iraq as a series of criss-­crossing language games. Examining the arguments they constructed and implemented to justify the invasion highlights how this particular event was given meaning through the language of security. To those well versed in American foreign policy this is hardly surprising. Security represents a longstanding cornerstone of US initiatives at home and abroad (Cox and Stokes 2008;

Introduction   5 Wittkopf et al. 2008). What is interesting is to explicate how this particular “language game” both enabled and constrained the Bush administration as they justified their military action in Iraq, and by extension their actions thereafter. The unilateral argument Starting at the level of language departs significantly from the conventional wisdom that the Iraq War was a unilateral foreign policy adventure. For many the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine after September 11, 2001 made a special claim to global leadership, one premised on the concept of pre-­emptive self-­ defense (Cox 2004; Gaddis 2002; Heisbourg 2003; Rigstad 2009). The latter strongly implied that America would use any means necessary, including force, to secure itself from any future threats. As Charles Krauthammer remarked, “September 11 demonstrated a new form of American strength” and the “dominance of a single power unlike anything ever seen” (Krauthammer 2002/2003: 6–7). Speaking of America’s position today, Paul Kennedy remarked, “nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing” (Kennedy 2002). What is particularly interesting about these unilateralist argument is that America is depicted as being unbound (Daadler and Lindsay 2005; Newhouse 2003; Riely 2005–2006). Focusing on the unrivalled material powers and resources available to the Bush administration lends itself to the assumption that they could pursue their interests without encountering any serious impediments. Their ability to launch “Operation Iraqi Freedom” without the support of a second UN Security Council Resolution, and in the face of enormous national and international condemnation, strengthens the suggestion that the Bush administration was unrestricted in the pursuit of their own self-­interests. This line of argument echoes Thucydides famous claim that, “right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides 1993: 290). The unilateral position makes it difficult to show that the Bush administration’s power was constrained, particularly by language. Assuming that America went it alone or acted unilaterally to invade Iraq renders the language used by the Bush administration to justify their decision to go to war inconsequential. At best, their justifications can be interpreted as “cheap talk” and at worst they can be seen as cases of deliberate deceit and hypocrisy (Hancock 2010; Krasner 1999). While the aforementioned carry considerable validity, they are nevertheless too narrow to capture the processes that ultimately created the space in which the Bush administration could employ military actions against Iraq. It overlooks how this situation came to be understood as the grounds for war. Here the power of language becomes plain to see. Had a different discursive label been used, such as attack, a different sphere of action would have been created, one requiring a different set of rules and practices. As Neta Crawford reminds us, “persuasion is not about brute force, but argumentation” (2002: 11). Accounts of unilateralism are overly deterministic on a second level; they tend to assume that the Bush administration’s foreign policy was set to a

6   Introduction p­ articular course. Within these accounts, the war with Iraq is portrayed as an inevitable outgrowth of September 11, 2001: one caused the other. Throughout this book it also becomes apparent that many discrepancies exist between the Bush administration’s plans and the reality that actually unfolded at a plethora of points in the build-­up and execution of the Iraq War. For instance, no direct connection existed between Iraq and the events of September 11, 2001, as material evidence later verified. Instead, a narrative had to be built in order to establish this link. Rather than putting these constructions down to strategic recalculation, it is necessary to explore how America, the world’s sole superpower, was enabled but also constrained by the language they used to justify the Iraq War. Several critical veins of IR scholarship have provided useful entry points to show that neither the US war on terror nor the Iraq War were inevitable (Croft 2006, Holland 2009, 2012; R. Jackson 2005, Krebs and Lobasz 2007; McDonald 2005; Silberstein 2002). Through their analysis it is possible to see how, in the weeks and months after September 11, 2001, language played a powerful role in constructing the US war on terror as a common-­sense assumption. According to Stuart Croft (2006: 17) what is at stake here is “an examination of the production of meaning in a crisis, of the cultural production of a discourse and the cultural reproduction that followed.” This book seeks to advance this literature by providing a nuanced way to examine not only how the Bush administration’s security strategies were constructed as a war on terror, but also to explore how their language game of security transformed as it was put into practice. The goal is to excavate how the language employed by the administration helped constitute the boundaries of what was permissible and possible at different stages of the security policy pursued by the administration in the Iraq context. Adopting this viewpoint helps to trace the evolution of their security discourse from September 11, 2001 and how the Bush administration employed this narrative to speak security in two other episodes, or what are termed “defining moments,” during the Iraq War.

“Defining moments” The two defining moments examined in this book are, first, when no WMD were found in Iraq in early 2003, and second, when the Abu Ghraib photos were released in April 2004. Individually, both incidents represent sites of contestation when the Bush administration’s definition of security was severely challenged to a point where it might collapse. Examining these two junctures is important because it highlights that the Bush administration was forced not only to defend their security policies but also to redefine how they spoke security to fit the new context. Taken together, the defining moments aptly illustrate that agents cannot simply dismiss earlier justifications they gave for a particular course of action. As the cases are unpacked it becomes apparent that the subtle ways in which the Bush administration rebuilt or re-­securitized their arguments for invading Iraq impacted on how they could respond to events in a meaningful way.

Introduction   7 The first defining moment under investigation is when the main justification for the US invasion was challenged by the lack of credible evidence that Iraq possessed WMD in early 2003. Clearly this represents a period of acute crisis for the Bush administration since their decision to invade Iraq was premised on Saddam Hussein possessing WMD. The findings of the United Nations (UN) inspectors firmly refuted this line of argument. They also raised serious questions concerning the manner in which the architects of the intervention had built their case for war. The fact that the Bush administration could still speak security in a meaningful way begs further investigation. Why did their language of security not simply collapse? How did they rebuild their original justifications? A close examination of the Bush administration’s response at the first defining moment reveals that the language of security alone did not legitimate the Iraq War. Security was certainly not abandoned as a core rationale for the intervention. Nevertheless, at the defining moment the Bush administration rebuilt their arguments by placing a greater emphasis on the democratic components of America’s mission in Iraq. This is not to assert that neither the President nor his team never mentioned democracy post-­September 11, 2001, or throughout its global “war on terror” campaign. Themes of delivering humanitarian aid and liberating innocent Iraqi civilians were clearly present in the run-­up to the war, particularly as part of their policy of regime change (Roth 2006). The Bush administration also greatly raised the visibility of the democracy issue by rooting the war on terrorism in a global “freedom agenda” immediately after September 11, 2001 (Carothers 2007). As President Bush declared, “freedom and fear were at war” (Bush 2001l: September 20). Taking this line Jonathan Monten (2005: 112) claims the promotion of democracy is central to the George W. Bush administration’s prosecution of both the war on terrorism and its overall grand strategy, in which it is assumed that U.S. political and security interests are advanced by the spread of liberal political institutions and values abroad. While this observation is correct, alongside his claims that “the current US strategy falls squarely within the mainstream of American diplomatic traditions” (Monten 2005: 113; also see Boyle 2008), this book approaches the issue from a different angle. Making a more robust theoretical argument, it suggests that this shift altered the contours of their initial justifications for the Iraq War. The manner in which the Bush administration redefined their justifications for the Iraq War has been underplayed in the hype about the lack of material evidence and the fact that the invasion could still proceed without it. Alternatively, their recourse to democracy is taken as cheap talk to hide ulterior motives and an escape clause to retain legitimacy when their original arguments were nullified (Russett 2005). However, treating this linguistic shift as insignificant window-­ dressing cloaks exactly what was being undertaken in the name of security. More specifically, it overlooks what kind of war they were fighting and on what grounds. Analyzing the competing and alternating meaning structures contained

8   Introduction within their language game of security places the focus on not just how they justified the war but also how their justifications altered when they were put into use. The second defining moment concerns the Abu Ghraib abuses in 2004. Here again we find that the Bush administration’s language of security is extremely challenged by the allegations that their “enhanced interrogation techniques” legitimated the use of systemic abuse and were tantamount to torture. However, unlike the first defining moment, when their security narrative survived and adapted when it was challenged, Abu Ghraib signifies the evolution to a different context. Turning to this incident, we find that when the Bush administration tried to invoke the language of security, it failed to have the intended legitimacy they anticipated. At this point a glaring gap emerged between the rules of engagement and the rules of play underpinning their language game. Going further, this book will illustrate how the relationship between security and democracy changed from being conciliatory at the first defining moment when no WMD were found, to being extremely contentious in the case of Abu Ghraib. Indeed, the uneasy interrelationship between these speech acts is one of the most significant and underlying themes across the cases. The discrepancies that arise between how the Bush administration’s language of security performed at the two defining moments reaffirms that language is never complete, and thus is always susceptible to change. Case selection One might ask why these defining moments were chosen and not others. The answer is that gaining insight into how the Bush administration spoke security to justify the Iraq War, and how this language game was transformed, requires extensive awareness of the defining moments in question. To contextualize how security was spoken to justify the Iraq War, an extensive discourse analysis of the Bush administration’s foreign policy language is provided here for the six-­ month time period preceding and following September 11, the Iraq War and the Abu Ghraib scandal. Discourse analysis is a tool of critique to, “illustrate how . . . textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way that we think and act in the contemporary world” (George 1994: 191). Those well versed in discourse analysis will be aware there are several different, albeit related, types of discourse analysis (Hansen 2006; Milliken 1999). The goal here is not to find one perfect fit so much as to provide a methodological tool to critically evaluate the Bush administration’s language of security in a systematic way and pick up nuances that may otherwise have gone unnoticed. The analyses incorporated in this research are concentrated in very limited time frames. It is of course possible to extend the time frame of our inquiry to earlier and later periods given that the way in which security is spoken does not simply begin or end at one point in time. However, the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the Abu Ghraib abuses are useful starting and concluding points for

Introduction   9 this inquiry. Taking this view allows for a concentrated focus on the evolution and transformation of the Bush administration’s language game of security in greater breadth. Taking this broader analytical view also brings the transformative dimensions into sharper relief. Focusing extensively on the Bush administration’s language at one particular point would prevent the larger language game from becoming visible. The sources drawn upon in conducting this discourse analysis are multifaceted. Primarily there is a focus on the public speeches and official statements of the Bush administration. It is impossible to cite all the speeches studied, but what are presented are key samples which capture the core lines of argument that the Bush administration made in response to the events of September 11, 2001 and the two defining moments. To reflect what Lene Hansen (2006) refers to as intertextuality, attempts are made to demonstrate that neither things nor meanings stand in isolation, but only in reference to others. Consequently, the official documents which were accessed have been supplemented with extensive research of secondary sources, including newspapers, media coverage, official Congressional reports obtained from the Library of Congress, along with the transcripts of the 20 interviews conducted on a research trip to Washington DC in 2004. Disclaimers Within this book the Bush administration is discussed in broad terms. This categorization is problematic insofar as it treats this government as a unitary actor, omitting the factions within this government over the Iraq War. While these rivalries are worthy of closer inspection (Woodward 2002, 2004, 2006, 2009), they are not dealt with here. To compensate for any generalization of the Bush administration, reference is made to several members of the administration and the government rather than focusing solely on the President. Second, because the greatest concern is with how the Bush administration justified the Iraq War through a language game of security, the rise of the neoconservatives and the larger genealogy of American foreign policy history are backgrounded. This choice was made in order to provide a deeper exploration of how security was spoken to justify the war, and more importantly, how this language adapted and transformed when it was put into use. While the Bush administration’s definition of security discussed here likely involves elements of individual mindsets, the main concern is not whether this group of actors were cynical, self-­deceived or morally unreflective. In order to establish that language both constitutes and constrains, it is necessary and sufficient to demonstrate that the Bush administration’s language of security enabled and constrained them in important ways. This book claims that the Bush administration invoked international law to justify the Iraq War. However, providing an in-­depth account of the legalistic clauses and propositions the Bush administration reworked is beyond the scope and specialization of this work. Nonetheless, there is a need to reflect more substantively on the interrelations between language, security and international law.

10   Introduction Structure The last note is on the structure of the book. The central aim of the argument is to envision a new way of thinking about how security is being spoken in principle and in practice. To bring these issues together in a consistent fashion, a more integrated framework has been employed which weaves the theory and empirical together in each chapter. The case studies will, in each part, serve to show how those theoretical claims can be applied to security contexts. It is recognized that presenting the argument in this way is not a conventional approach. However, it also does not invalidate the original contribution this book might make to the further understanding of how security is being spoken in principle or in practice. Indeed, it is expected that by serving as the illustration of theoretical concepts and empirical data, this framework will shed some light on the evolution and adaptation of a language game of security in both domains. Moreover, the empirical discussions will not be the mere application of the theory. Instead, as the theoretical concepts are unpacked, they will highlight important tensions created in and by the language employed by the Bush administration to justify the Iraq War.

A chapter overview Chapter 1 acts as a foundational overview of the theoretical and methodological frameworks developed throughout this book. Here the suitability of critical constructivism for examining the role of language as a form of power is presented. Taking this line serves three functions. First, it challenges the idea that talk is cheap. Second it provides a middle ground between conventional constructivism and post-­structuralism. Finally, a critical constructivist account offers a new theoretical lens for thinking about the Iraq War. Rather than assuming that this foreign policy was an inevitable outcome of September 11, 2001 or a unilateral pursuit through this prism, the Iraq War becomes a social construction. The discourse analysis of the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War is longest in this chapter. This is necessary to contextualize how they moved within and also altered their language game of security after September 11, 2001 in order to legitimize their actions in a different theatre of war. In short, it establishes the rules of engagement and play. Chapter 2 outlines the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework as a starting point to explore the relationship between language and security. The strength of securitization is that it portrays security as a performative speech act rather than a zero-­sum game. From there the chapter engages with the current debates taking place within securitization studies to illuminate the ways in which original framework is being criticized and improved. Building on this literature, the chapter explores how multiple and overlapping speech acts and moves can be incorporated in a securitization framework. The second aim is to provide a critical understanding of the different kinds of rules that exist when security is spoken. The final section of Chapter 2 examines the strengths and weaknesses of

Introduction   11 conceptualizing the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War through a securitization framework. As shown, while illuminating important aspects of how the Bush administration spoke security to undertake their securitizing moves, the Copenhagen School’s framework runs into difficult terrain when it comes to analyzing the defining moment in question. Chapter 3 introduces the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and directs our analysis away from a speech act towards the larger process of a game. It is argued that his emphasis on “meaning in use” allows greater possibility for various language games to overlap, criss-­cross and even change. This kind of analysis acts as a nuanced way to integrate Balzacq’s observation that, “securitization exists in a field of struggles” (2011: 15). The second major advantage of adopting a Wittgensteinian outlook is that it draws our attention to the rules of engagement and play in a way that securitization does not. This is done in three ways. First, the idea of meaning in use complicating the nexus that the Copenhagen School draws between politicization and securitization, on the one hand, and securitization and desecuritization on the other. The implication that language games can overlap suggests that rules from one language game to the next can co-­exist side by side. Second, a language game sheds light on how rules are not only followed or broken, but also made and redefined, even subtly, through processes of interaction. The distinction that Wittgenstein draws between “obeying rules blindly” and “acts of interpretation” will be fleshed out to trace the evolution of legitimating and delegitimating processes in everyday as well as exceptional circumstances. The empirical section of this chapter undertakes a fresh examination of “the defining moment.” Adopting a language games approach brings a greater level of the significance to the redefinitions that occurred at this juncture. A Wittgensteinian lens also sheds light on the competing yet co-­constitutive language games that the Bush administration drew on during the Iraq War. The analysis in Chapter 4 moves from the justifications of the Iraq War to analyze how these meaning were put into use. Here the analysis is devoted to unpacking how the Bush administration’s language game played out in light of the Abu Ghraib scandal. The second “defining moment” is distinct as it constructs linkages between the way in which the Bush administration were enabled and constrained when they spoke security when no WMD were found and when the Abu Ghraib scandal broke. Drawing on the second case study reveals that even the smallest redefinitions can turn out to be highly significant. As shown, their overall language game of security affected how they could respond to the abuses in an intelligible way and provided a crucial contextual background against how this particular episode was understood. The conclusion returns to the questions raised at the beginning of the book, namely how language can act as a constitutive as well as a constraining device and how the meaning of words can change through the process of interaction. Adopting this outlook enables us to think more seriously not only about the potentiality of speaking about security, but also its limits. With this remit in mind we shall begin our investigation into the multifarious processes and relationships underpinning the social construction of the language of security.

1 Why language matters

Introduction This chapter sets out to show why it is important to pay attention to language in IR. Rather than assuming talk is cheap, a critical constructivist approach is adopted to illustrate that words really do matter and can even be very expensive for agents acting within particular spheres of engagement. The discussion begins by outlining the origins of the “constructivist turn” in IR (Adler 1997; Checkel 1998; Price and Reus-­Smit 1998). The next section turns a critical eye to the internal boundaries within this approach in order to address gaps at the heart of the literature that is being built upon. As shown, the dividing line between conventional and critical constructivists on the one hand and critical constructivism and post-­structuralism have serious implications for how each strand understands and explains the construction of social identities, realities and language. Having set the theoretical and methodological backdrop, the chapter turns to analyzing the Bush administration’s justification for the 2003 Iraq War. The main objective is to show that this particular foreign policy represents a socially constructed reality. More specifically the goal is to explicate that language was a powerful constitutive and constraining device in legitimating the Iraq War. Evidence is provided to show that the Bush administration’s justifications helped to constitute the rules of engagement for undertaking Operation Iraqi Freedom. Demonstrating that the Bush administration was constrained by these rules is much more difficult. At first glance it almost seems paradoxical, given the military prowess of the US and the pre-­emptive manner in which they conducted their foreign policies post-­September 11, 2001. This chapter intends to recollect this point on two levels. In conjunction with illustrating that President Bush and his team were constrained by the intersubjective context in which they were interacting, it is highlighted that they were also limited by the language they employed to legitimate the Iraq War. Sketching out the first defining moment illustrates the linguistic paradox in operation. Although the modifications that the Bush administration introduced to their justifications for undertaking the invasion gave them agency to proceed, it also constrained their actions at this moment and thereafter.

Why language matters   13

Origins of constructivism At this point it is necessary to investigate the origins of constructivism as it sets the groundwork for later discussions about securitization and language games. Constructivism arose as a disciplinary study within IR as the Cold War drew to a close. This timing was not coincidental. As the prevailing wind began to change, constructivism appeared more amenable in coming to grips with the possibility and presence of unintended consequences in everyday as well as exceptional situations (Fierke 1998; Kegley 1993; Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994; Kratochwil 1993). Much of the groundwork for constructivism had been set before 1989. It belongs to a rich tradition of scholars attempting to move beyond “scientific” ways of studying our world. This is often referred to as the “third way” (Kurki and Wight 2010; Lapid 1989). Scholars working in this tradition reject the orthodoxies of positivism and rationalism. Traditionally, scientists who are relying on a positivist methodology begin by selecting variables to explore or test whether these categories correspond with the real world (Nicholson 1996; Popper 1959). While this mode of inquiry is useful for certain kinds of studies, it often fails to reflect upon or question established structures (Ashley 1986; Walker 1988, 1993). As James Der Derian explains, “in international relations the meaning of realism is more often than not presented as uniform, self-­evident, and transparent – even by those critics who in debates great and not-­so-great have questioned its historical relevance, political function, or heuristic value” (Der Derian, 1996: 277). Theorists working in a constructivist tradition argue that it is counterproductive to start out by assuming actors behave in predetermined ways (Parenti 1970). Instead they claim that agents and structures are co-­constituted. As argued by Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch (2007: 106), “[b]ecause constructivist ontology rejects the notion of an objective reality against which analysts test the accuracy of interpretations, ‘falsifiabilty’ cannot be the goal. Researchers can do no more than contrast interpretations against other interpretations.” Meanwhile Stefano Guzzini (2000: 159) writes “what counts as a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretative construction of the world out there.” Assuming that nothing exists in a vacuum, the goal of constructivism is to see “the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being” (Adler 2005: 11). Thus a major advantage of constructivism is to demonstrate that causality and constitution operate according to different logics (Checkel 1998; Farrell 2002: Wendt 1995). Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s (1990) distinction between explanation and understanding captures this essential difference. According to them, the causal approaches explain phenomena, whereas the constitutive approaches seek to understand them first and foremost (Cox 1981; Hollis and Smith 1990). A concern with agency and constitution also leads constructivists to have different research foci. Causal modes of enquiry ask “why necessary” questions. With regards to the Iraq War, for instance, this style of reasoning would ask “why did the events of September 11, 2001 result in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003?” or

14   Why language matters “why did the Bush administration undertake this invasion as part of their Global War on Terrorism?” In comparison, constitutive modes employed by constructivists ask “how possible” questions (Barnett 1999; Doty 1993). Returning to the example of the Iraq War, they would ask, “how did it become possible that the events of September 11, 2001 resulted in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003?” or “how was it possible for the Bush administration to undertake invasion as part of their Global War on Terrorism?” Whereas “why” questions seek an explanation that corresponds to the invasion, “how possible” questions are interested in the groundwork that enabled this policy to materialize. It is important to note that the dichotomies between explanation and understanding, between why and how possible questions and between “hard scientific” and “soft interpretative” modes of analysis can be seen in a more pluralistic light (Jackson 2010). Indeed the boundary between them may not always be so clear cut. Attempts to bridge these boundaries can be found in “constructivist realism” (Barkin 2003; Jackson and Nexon 2004) and “critical realists” (Patomäki and Wight 2000) alike. Regardless of which version of any theory one chooses to adopt, for there will always be a choice, it is still essential to be aware that fundamental distinctions can and do exist between causation and constitution. Centrally, one assumes that the world can exist independent of knowledge, whereas the other assumes the former cannot be the case. Evidently these two positions are not easily reconcilable, nor would their proponents necessarily wish them to be. Starting from the belief that humans are social, constructivists argue that agents always have a choice in how they act. Moreover, they may alter their preferences through processes of interactions. Thus, without denying that material structures exist, constructivists “hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions” (Ruggie 1998: 33). Paying attention to the ideational aspects draws further attention to the inherent links between norms, rules, interests and identity (Crawford 2002; Price and Tannewald 1996). In general constructivism claims that shared normative understandings and cultures infuse actors with a shared sense of belongingness or identity (Jepperson et al. 1996: 33; Laffey and Weldes 1997: 209). This is important in two respects. On the one hand by attaining membership in social communities agents are able to gain a sense of who they are. On the other hand, this sense of individual and collective self enables actors to distinguish who they are not (Connolly 1974). What is most important from a constructivist viewpoint is that agents attain a sense of self and other through pro­ cesses of interaction (Wendt 1992: 396–397, 1994). In this respect, identities do not only tell people who they are, they also tell them what they want (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Mattern 2001). Although rules and norms influence and regulate human behavior fundamentally, constructivists are adamant that they do not determine it. Instead, they posit that rules exert power because they are internalized as the right thing to do or “logics of appropriateness” (Finnemore 1996; March and Olsen 1989; Risse 2000: 4; Kubalkova 2001). Constructivists do not claim that material interests

Why language matters   15 are unimportant in determining actor’s calculations or preferences, nor do they suggest that actors are totally free to choose or interpret their circumstances. Choices are not unlimited, as we will see in the case of the Bush administration later on. With this in mind, constructivists do not give in to pure idealism. Instead they argue that “norms guide action and make action possible, enabling agents to criticize assertions and justify action” (Frederking 2003: 365). This last claim reinforces that social reality is constructed and intersubjectively real because other people agree it is (Berger and Luckman 1966; Kratochwil 1989; Neufeld 1995: 77; Onuf 1989, 1998; Searle 1995). One common example here would be money (Searle 2006). Another example would be a flag. In material terms alone, neither a piece of paper nor a piece of cloth means much. However, when invested with social and normative meanings, both the former and the latter come to recognized as extremely valuable objects.

Conventional and critical constructivism Since its infancy, constructivism has diversified, and can now be seen through different prisms (Farrell 2002; Hopf 1998). The expansion of this field is testimony to the increasing acceptance of the constructivist position as a way of analyzing international politics (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Walt 1998: 38). Despite the ascendancy of constructivism, however, its identity as a theory per se remains disputed (Adler 1997: 109; Pouliot 2007: 359). The most distinctive fault line in constructivism is between conventional and critical strands (Barnett 1999: 258; Farrell 2002; Hopf 1998; Pouliot 2007). Each adheres to a social ontology, but in terms of epistemology they fundamentally disagree. Reflecting its point of origin, conventional constructivism does not reject the epistemological assumptions of positivist science (Widmaier et al. 2007). In fact, authors who contributed to The Culture of National Security (Katzenstein 1996) explicitly deny the use of “any special interpretativist methodology” or that they depart from “normal science” (Jepperson et al. 1996: 67). Similarly, Jeffrey Checkel argues “the quarrel with rationalists is not epistemological but ontological” (1998: 327). By retaining a positivist epistemology, conventional constructivists remain heavily indebted to more causal modes of analysis. Indeed it is the world out there which is independent of our thoughts that they want to explain (Joseph and Wight 2010; Wendt and Shapiro 1992; Wight 2007). Following Wendt’s “scientific realism,” “this requirement follows directly both from the scientific realist’s conception of explanation as identifying causal mechanisms, and from the ontological claims of structuration theory about the relationship of agents and structures” (Wendt 1987: 365). Critical constructivism Acknowledging that Wendt and other conventional constructivists offer an entry point to bring the social back into a discipline that has been under-­socialized

16   Why language matters (Wiener 2003: 256), some constructivists suggest their accounts do so in a limited capacity (Price and Reus Smit 1998). The biggest bone of contention critical constructivists have with their conventional counterparts is the way that they marry a social ontology to a positivist epistemology. As Karin Fierke notes, this union produces an inconsistent methodology (Fierke 2007). On the one hand, Wendt and other conventional constructivists argue that social relationships are formed in interactions and can thus be changed. On the other hand, they contend an objective world exists “out there,” contradicting the basic constructivist tenet that material conditions need to be created instead of being scientifically assumed. As Ian Hacking relays, to say that X is socially constructed is to show that X is neither “natural” nor “inevitable” (Hacking 1999: 6). A principled refusal by conventional constructivists to question “scientific” certainties is evidenced in their treatment of identity formation. For example, in Wendt’s account of Alter and Ego, two aliens interacting for the first time, identities are linked to interests to the point of compelling and causing action. The missing link in Wendt’s account is that he does not fully examine how the social context that Alter and Ego operate in originates (Smith 2000). Nor does he pause to ask how knowledge is produced either in or by existing structures. Rather, Wendt presents a first time encounter between ahistorical actors. As Maja Zehfuss (2002: 92) argues, “Wendt’s treatment of identity as something which is attached to and negotiated between pre-­existing anthropomorphic actors requires conceptualizing identity as a unitary, circumscribable concept.” Karin Fierke also questions the relevance of Wendt’s approach, “to a situation where alter and ego have a past, and are, therefore, already embedded in a context of social interaction” (2000: 337, italics in original). As such Wendt and other conventional constructivists are not able to cope with uncertainties (Copeland 2000). Premised on the above, it is possible to argue that conventional constructivism would not fully capture how it was possible for the Bush administration to justify or undertake military action in Iraq. Whilst the Iraq War was certainly what these agents and other agents made of it, retaining a scientific epistemology would overlook how this war became understood as a war, or how pre-­emptive action came to be understood as a common-­sense assumption with which to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Rather than assuming we can determine what caused the Bush administration to act and interact the way they did, it is necessary to explore the process of ascription that took place within this particular context. This requires taking language seriously. To overcome the aforementioned limitations, critical constructivism offers a more consistent theoretical follow-­through (Hopf 1998: 181). This is achieved by their merger of a social ontology with a social epistemology. Adopting a “consistent constructivism” is far-­reaching, for it suggests that knowledge does not have ontological foundations (Fierke 2007a). Contrary to Wendt, critical constructivists argue that the nature of being cannot be separated from ways of knowing. As Kratochwil (2000a: 91) points out,

Why language matters   17 hardly anyone – even among the most ardent constructivists or pragmatists – doubts that the “world” exists independent from our minds. The question is rather whether we can recognize it in a pure and direct fashion, that is, without any “description,” or whether what we recognize is always already formed by certain categorical and theoretical elements. A critical constructivist account thus creates sensitivity to the recovery of where meanings come from and how they came to be. What they add to conventional approaches is to take socializing the concepts of knowledge and epistemology as their starting point (Schmidt 2001). Adopting a social epistemology paints a different picture of language. A positivist epistemology rests on a correspondence theory of language, where words act as labels for objects which mirror reality (King et al. 1994). By contrast, critical constructivism contends that language is more than a mere description of a reality. Building on the “linguistic turn,” they illustrate how being in the world and knowledge about the world are intertwined (Palan 2000; Rorty 1992). As Thomas Risse establishes, “if we want to understand and explain social behavior, we need to take words, language, and communicative utterances seriously. It is through discursive practices that agents make sense of the world and attribute meaning to their activities” (2004: 164). In this respect, critical constructivists concentrate on the constitutive role played by language in the construction of knowledge (Wittgenstein 1979). This enables a more sophisticated understanding of language as an inherent feature of our world, not just an expression of it. As Nicholas Onuf claims, “talking is undoubtedly the most important way we go about making the world what it is” (Onuf 1998: 59). Acknowledging that knowledge only finds expression in and through language reaffirms the need for a social epistemology.

Revisiting the linguistic paradox The foundational claims that critical constructivists make about epistemology and language align them closely with post-­structuralism. Both approaches set out to analyze the mutually constitutive relationship between agency, structure and language (Ashley 1986; Connolly 1974; Walker 1990). François Debrix argues this more relativistic reflection meant that there was no given vocabulary, no master IR-­language, that once learned, would deliver the clues to the meaning of international relations [. . .] instead, language in/about IR would have to be the product of one’s interaction with the world. (2003: 4) Despite these similarities, however, fundamental theoretical and methodological distinctions remain between critical constructivism and post-­ structuralism. At this point it is worthwhile to pause and ask why it is important to understand the points of divergence between these two approaches. Why not

18   Why language matters unite them? After all, they both spring from a critique of orthodox IR theories and ask questions about knowledge. For our purposes the answer is simply that understanding the divides between critical constructivism and post-­structuralism has implications for the linguistic paradox (Ruggie 1998: 35). As shown below, the investigatory tools critical constructivists and post-­structuralists adopt to (re) conceptualize the world are extremely significant when it comes to conceptualizing language as a constitutive and constraining device. Whereas the former focuses on normative reconstruction, the latter focuses on textual deconstruction to uncover the power of language. It is to these issues that we now turn. Critical constructivism and reconstruction Wittgenstein’s assertion that “the limits of the language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world” (1979a, §5: 62) is exemplary of the critical constructivist stance on language. As a foundation, it relies on a way of analyzing social relations as actions and words. Drawing on speech acts, critical constructivists show that words do things (Austin 1975; Searle 1995; Wittgenstein 1979a, 1979b). Within critical constructivism, words exist on the same par as deeds. In fact, these two aspects are concomitant of each other. By saying something, the agent does something. For example, by specifying that the Iraq regime was a “grave and gathering threat,” the Bush administration also did something with considerable consequence. They constructed this object in terms of something that needed to be eliminated through military action. While acknowledging that words are constitutive, however, critical constructivists do not contend that words stand alone as foundational principles. Instead, their primary interest falls on how agents use language to construct and reconstruct social realities. In this sense, words do not speak for themselves. Rather, critical constructivists suggest that existing and emerging sets of meanings are always dependent on the presence of an intersubjective linguistic context in order to be explained and understood. Concurring, Friedrich Kratochwil (2001: 15) adds that “meaning is use and that communication among people is governed by conventions and criteria.” A critical constructivist understanding of knowledge is reliant on a language/ rule nexus. As Vendulka Kubalkova puts it, “to study international relations or any other aspect of human existence is to study language and rules” (Kubalkova 2001: 64). As suggested already, for constructivists all types of rules are constitutive as well as regulative. Taking this rule-­orientated approach further, critical constructivists argue that validity claims can be made through speech acts or language games. In the main they reaffirm that social and linguistic rules have a powerful reality-­making and legitimizing effect. However, critical constructivists are very clear that truths are not absolute. Instead they are intersubjective reference points that enable agents to act in one way as opposed to another. The goal for critical constructivists is to build on social facts that are naturalized and normalized by agents. This enables them to draw upon reified beliefs as a sort of “epistemic foundation” (Adler 2005). Accepting this premise allows critical

Why language matters   19 c­ onstructivism to study what agents believe to be true (their subjectivitiy) and how they put these meanings into operation to communicate their interests (their intentions). Their focus thus remains on developing knowledge about social life while remaining agonistic about words and practices being ascribed with one fixed meaning. Taking inspiration from this, Ruggie advocates building “narrative explanatory protocols” which show “why things are historically so and not otherwise” (1998: 32, italics in original). Post-­structuralism and deconstruction The rule-­orientated and intersubjective rules underpinning a critical constructivist approach to language separate it from post-­structuralism. Indeed, the latter denies the possibility of any foundations for knowledge altogether (Zehfuss 2002, 2006). Arriving at this “scepticism” regarding “secure knowledge,” post-­ structuralists argue that any system of meaning, including discourse, will always be unfinished and unstable (Der Derian 1989; Derrida 1967; Doty 1996; Hansen 2006). Making this plain Jacques Derrida argued the potential, “infinity of new contexts” means “that there are only contexts without any centre or absolute anchoring” (Derrida 1988: 12). Building on from there a key argument made in post-­structural scholarship is that discourse must remain inherently performative (Butler 1997; Campbell 1992; Doty 1998–1999; Hansen 2006). It is in this sense this theoretical approach rejects loading language up with questions of normativity. It is not so much that they ignore the latter. Rather they seek to expose the reified power struggles constituted by and embedded in existing normative and linguistic structures. They argue that accepting such internalized structures of meanings not only serves to control the performativity of language, but also represses it (Rengger and Hoffman 1992). Michel Foucault’s studies are a clear explication of the negative and “disciplining” effect of bringing exogenous elements into texts and discourse (Foucault 1995; Lyon 2006). Rather, akin to Jacques Derrida, he seeks to open up what he calls “discursive formations,” or several statements working together, to restore their performativity (Foucault 1972: 31). To expose the processes of power and “Othering” produced in and by discourses and text post-­structuralists claim that anyone deploying a discourse must position themselves as if they are if they were the subjects of the discourse (Campbell 1999; Diez and Steans 2005: 138; Foucault 1972: 95–96). To retain this level of performativity, scholars working in this tradition rely on deconstruction. This technique aims to tease out and unsettle naturalized concepts embedded in existing discourses and, in turn, challenge the power relations these naturalized concepts reify. In other words, deconstruction is “the process by which we have constructed origins and given meaning to particular representations of the past, representations that continually guide our daily lives and set clear limits to political and social options” (Blieker 2000: 25). Consequently, it “is concerned with both the constitution and de-­constitution of any totality, whether a text, theory, discourse, structure, edifice, assemblage or institution”

20   Why language matters (Devetak 2001: 187). It is in this vein that Derrida argued “that every definition ‘deconstructs’ itself – that is it tends to unravel when one probes deeper into its foundational assumptions and literary gestures” (Agger 1991: 112).

Implications for rules of engagement Building on the above-­mentioned discussions illustrates that critical constructivism and post-­structuralism set out different rules of engagement when it comes to conceptualsing the power of language. As noted, critical constructivists argue language is powerful because it creates intersubjective structures of meaning that enable agents to know how to go on. The problem for post-­structuralism is that in the latter account language is still structural insofar as it remains rule-­based, by the very rules they wish to deconstruct. At this point a sceptic could easily claim that the dichotomies between conventional constructivism, critical constructivism and post-­structuralism are problematic. At some level this argument is correct since authors are often lumped together in ways they themselves would not appreciate. There are, as we have seen, different ways of undertaking research within any theoretical position. However, the categorizations between conventional constructivism, critical constructivism and post-­structuralism are part and parcel of the language game of IR and thus an inherent part of the debate. If we wish to change the way these issues are discussed then we will have to be aware of how these terms are being put into use (Fierke 2003). Speaking to this last point, the remainder of this book will prioritize a critical constructivist approach to language over a post-­structural mode of analysis. Without diluting the importance of thinking “critically” of existing structures of meaning, the tool of reconstruction provides a platform to show that social objects and facts can be ascribed with a specific meaning at a specific moment in time and place. This provides a more holistic picture of the power of language as an enabling and constraining device. Acknowledging that language is constituted by competing sets of meanings illustrates that actors draw on alternative and often alternating terms to justify their actions. At first glance this appears compatible with the post-­structural claim that we need to examine how words are linked together in texts and language. Where the two theoretical cakes are cut differently is that critical constructivism does not assume we have to find differences when we “look and see” how language is being used. Again, the point to stress is not so much to claim that intersubjective rules and language games cannot be oppressive, as we will see they can have many hidden dangers, but to suggest that it is necessary to be able to show that certain things can have certain meanings without this necessarily being an insurmountable problem. In short, adopting a crucial construc­ titivism enables us to focus on how meanings are constructed and re-­constructed rather than assuming that these meanings need to be deconstructed. Working within a critical constructivist tradition also enables us to tap directly into securitization, and to sketch out how a Wittgensteinian approach

Why language matters   21 follows as a next step in this remit of debate. As we will see in the next two chapters the Copenhagen School provide a constructivist framework for analyzing how agents speak security, one which can be conceptualized as a specific and specialized language game. The task for now is to explore how it was possible for the Bush administration to construct and reconstruct their foreign policy for the Iraq War.

The use of language in justifying the 2003 Iraq War The justifications the US gave for the 2003 Iraq War offer an illustrative backdrop to explore the power of language in international political affairs generally, and foreign policy decision-­making more particularly. The empirical section will proceed in three parts. It begins by outlining the language of security that the Bush administration constructed post-­September 11, 2001. This discourse analysis contextualises their policy of pre-­emptive self-­defense, a key narrative re-­employed to justify the Iraq War. It also shows that the war is a social construction. From there, the core arguments made by President Bush and his team to legitimate the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s regime are unpacked. The focus here remains on how their language functioned as an enabling and constraining device. Lastly, we turn to the “defining moment” in order to show how the Bush administration rebuilt their argument for war, albeit subtly. It is argued that these modifications had enormous implications for both the kind of agency as well as the structures that were constituted in the name of security. Redefining the world after September 11, 2001 The events of September 11, 2001 will be remembered many years from now. As the world watched a first, and then a second, plane crash into the World Trade Towers in New York City, the overwhelming reaction was one of complete disbelief (Butler 2004; Edkins 2002). For the Bush administration and American citizens alike two fundamental questions need to be tackled: what can we do and what will we do in response? In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, security was prioritized as the overriding concern in the Bush administration’s foreign policy. From the outset they vowed to ensure that such attacks never happened again. Hours after the hijacked planes had crashed into the World Trade Center, President Bush remarked, Make no mistake: The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts [. . .]. Our military at home and around the world is on high alert status [. . .]. We have been in touch with the leaders of Congress and with world leaders to assure them that we will do whatever is necessary to protect America and Americans. The resolve of our great nation is being tested. But make no mistake: We will show the world that we will pass this test. (Bush 2001a: September 11)

22   Why language matters Later in that day he surmized, Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts [. . .]. Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured, and to take every precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks. (Bush 2001a: September 11) It is important to note that the acts of violence on September 11, 2001 did not speak for themselves. On the contrary, in the days and months that followed this event, the Bush administration had to interpret the attacks in a meaningful way and communicate this understanding to others so that they could also make sense of what had occurred. The compelling way in which they framed September 11, 2001 as an unprecedented security crisis had a powerful reality-­making effect (Croft 2006; Holland 2009, 2012; McDonald and Jackson 2009; Silberstein 2002). Indeed, the official response to the terrorist attacks as a moment of crisis compounded the sense of vulnerability and loss at the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. Speaking on September 20, 2001, President Bush remarked, Americans have known surprise attacks – but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day and night fell on a different world. (Bush 2001l: September 20) It quickly became apparent, however, that the Bush administration classified the terrorist attacks not only as crisis but as an “act of war” (Bush 2001d: September 12). President Bush’s remarks the next day reinforced this terminology when he declared the deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war [. . .] Freedom and democracy are under attack. (Bush 2001d: 13 September) Elsewhere President Bush asserted that “war has been waged against us” (Bush 2001g: September 14). A few days later he repeated, “there has been an act of war declared upon America by terrorists [. . .] a group of barbarians have declared war on the American people [. . .] ‘the wreckage of New York City’ was also described as ‘the first battle of war’ ” (Bush 2001i: September 15). Directly linked to this, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke about, “acts of war, military strikes against the United States of America” (Rumsfeld 2001b: September 27). Taken collectively, such ideas and remarks would become their overarching “war on terror.” Here it is clear that language really mattered. Categorizing the terrorist attacks as “acts of war,” allowed them to

Why language matters   23 frame their response in terms of accepted legal norms of self-­defense. Outlining the right to take offensive measures to protect America now and in the future, Secretary Rumsfeld explicitly stated, there is no question but that the United States of America has every right, as every country does, of self-­defense, and the problem with terrorism is that there is no way to defend against the terrorists at every place and every time against every conceivable technique. Therefore, the only way to deal with the terrorist network is to take the battle to them. That is in fact what we’re doing. That is in effect self-­defense of a preemptive nature. (Rumsfeld 2001f: October 28) The construction of the war on terror as legal and justified self-­defense under notions of international law finds a direct echo in Under-­Secretary of State Marc Grossman’s expressions, I believe that Security Council resolution 1368 that was passed on the 12th of September, offers all of the legal basis and requirement that we need, in addition to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which is the right of self-­defense. And we believe the United States was attacked on the 11th of September and that we have a right of self-­defense in this regard. (Grossman, October 19, 2001) An auxiliary set of meanings expressed in the above quotes is that the US “war on terrorism” was a “just war” because it was legally sanctioned by the authority of international law (Hurrell 2002: 188). Making a similar point, Attorney General Ashcroft stated, America has experienced one of the greatest tragedies ever witnessed on our soil. These heinous acts of violence are an assault on the security of our nation. They are an assault on the security and the freedom of every American citizen. We will not tolerate such acts. We will expend every effort and devote all the necessary resources to bring the people responsible for these acts, these crimes, to justice. (Ashcroft 2001a: September 11) Official assessments that America’s “best defense was a good offense” deserve further attention due to the way in which security and self-­defense were equated with pre-­emption (Crawford 2003, 2008; White House 2002: 6; Shue and Rodin 2010; Zoller 2004b). To this day, the Bush administration’s pre-­emptive doctrine remains the subject of heated debate on several fronts (Shue and Rodin 2007). Indeed, Richard Betts has accused the Bush administration of using the term pre­emption in a “sloppy or disingenuous way” (Betts 2003: 18). Most noticeably many challenge the way in which this American government argued that an imminent threat did not need to exist in order for military action to be justified.

24   Why language matters This differentiation signals a major transformation to the previous understanding of the just war principle (Jervis 2006). As Neta Crawford notes, “their pre-­ emptive-war doctrine not only encompasses legitimate pre-­emption, where a state acts in self-­defense to preempt an immediate and certain assault, but, in the context of the pre-­emptive doctrine, it becomes a preventive offensive war doctrine” (2004: 695). Traditional understandings of pre-­emption rest on the premise that this kind of action is only permissible in the narrow circumstance where there is a necessity of instant self-­defense (Strachan 2010; Trachtenberg 2010). Such circumstances leave no choice for deliberation because a state cannot wait until it is actually attacked before taking action. Where the Bush administration doctrine of pre-­emption departed from this understanding was in their claim that American would no longer wait for threats to materialize before they would take action. Outlining this shift the 2002 US National Security Strategy stated; We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by its adversaries, the State will, if necessary, act preemptively. (White House 2002) Vice President Cheney further noted, For this new century it’s very clear what our national security strategy must be. We must maintain a military second to none, and when necessary we must preempt grave threats to America before they materialize. (Cheney 2002g: October 2) Their new doctrine of preemptive action reinforced the idea that the old rules were no longer adequate to deal with threats posed by terrorism. Espousing the view that the contours of warfare had been transformed, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld “characterised this conflict, this campaign, this so-­called war, as being notably different from others” (Rumsfeld 2001c: October 7). President Bush also concluded that, “the mind-­set of war must change. It is a different type of battle. It’s a different type of battlefield. It’s a different type of war” (Bush 2001k: September 19). Reaffirming this line Vice President Cheney announced, 9/11 changed everything. It changed the way we think about threats to the United States. It changed our recognition of our vulnerabilities. It changed the terms of the kind of national security strategy we need to pursue. (Cheney 2002f: September 14)

Why language matters   25 Another way in which the Bush administration communicated how this war was different was by establishing the type of enemy that they were fighting. Overall it was argued that America was facing a new, and more dangerous, kind of enemy. According to the administration, terrorism posed not just a threat of sudden violent death to individual citizens, but a “threat to our way of life” (Bush 2001l: September 20), and a threat to “the peace of the world” (Bush 2002a: January 29). The repetition of this message is very high in nearly every political statement given by the President and his team within the one-­year time period following September 11, 2001. Throughout this period the Bush administration emphasized not only the enormous dangers that threatened US security but also their persistence. Time after time they claimed that new, unforeseen, terrorist attacks could come any time and without any warning. Secretary Rumsfeld’s discussion of the US capturing detainees in this context reaffirms why the US cannot let their guard down. As he put it, the most important thing, of course, is to try to find out as much intelligence as we can through the interrogations, and that is our principal focus. It is a matter of recognizing that the threats exist against our country, that there were thousands of people who went through these al Qaeda training camps. What we need to do is to just gather as much information as we can and try to prevent additional attacks to the extent that’s possible. (Rumsfeld 2002b: January 15) The existence of a deadly and supremely catastrophic terrorist threat provided them with a great deal of agency to maneuvre. In essence, it set the stage for how they moved forward. Most noticeably it buttressed their claims that inaction was no longer an option. Making this logic plain Vice President Cheney stated, The attack on our country forced us to come to grips with the possibility that the next time terrorists strike, they may well . . . direct chemical agents or diseases at our population, or attempt to detonate a nuclear weapon in one of our cities. [. . .] [N]o rational person can doubt that terrorists would use such weapons of mass murder the moment they are able to do so. [. . .] [W]e are dealing with terrorists . . . who are willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to kill millions of others. (Cheney 2003a: April 9) Directly related to this, Wolfowitz remarked, So I think you have to think about the worst-­case possibilities, then you make some prudent judgments about how far do you go in turning your normal life upside down in order to deal with them. Obviously that’s one of their objectives as well. (Wolfowitz 2001: October 28)

26   Why language matters Another core theme emerged within the Bush administration’s policy of pre-­ emptive self-­defense. Analyzing their statements after the attacks of September 11, 2001 illustrates that their war on terror drew “a bright line of demarcation between the civil and the savage” (Ashcroft 2001c: September 24). Here we can clearly see that language matters. Constructing these black and white distinctions enabled leading actors in the Bush administration to assert that you were either with America or you were with the terrorists. As Condoleezza Rice professed, “this President has rallied a coalition against terrorism not by speaking in shades of gray about what it was we’re facing, but in speaking in sharp, morally clear terms” (Rice 2002a: February 21). Elsewhere President Bush made it plain that “no nation can be neutral in this conflict because no civilized nation can be secure in a world threatened by terror” (Bush 2001s: November 6). These binaries enabled the construction of one kind of rules of engagement as opposed to another. As President Bush expressed it, this conflict is a fight to save the civilized world, and values common to the West, to Asia, to Islam. Throughout the world, people of strong faith, of all faiths, condemn the murder of the innocent [. . .]. By their cruelty, the terrorists have chosen to live on the hunted margin of mankind. By their hatred, they have divorced themselves from the values that define civilization, itself. (Bush 2001q: October 20) Most evident in these statements was the attempt to place terrorists outside the moral community and to depict them as basically non-­human. As the President explained, There is a great divide in our time – not between religions or cultures, but between civilization and barbarism. People of all cultures wish to live in safety and dignity. The hope of justice and mercy and better lives are common to all humanity. Our enemies reject these values – and by doing so, they set themselves not against the West, but against the entire world. [. . .] We’ve seen their kind before. The terrorists are the heirs to fascism. They have the same will to power, the same disdain for the individual, the same mad global ambitions. And they will be dealt with in just the same way. Like all fascists, the terrorists cannot be appeased: they must be defeated. (Bush 2001u: December 7) Repeating this sentiment elsewhere he noted, Our enemies are evil, and they’re ruthless. They have no conscience. They have no mercy. They have killed thousands of our citizens, and seek to kill many more. They seek to overthrow friendly governments to force America to retreat from the world. (Bush 2001t: November 21) Of course, such “an evil and inhuman group of men” (Baker 2001: September 23), or these “faceless enemies of human dignity” (Bush 2003p: May 21), were

Why language matters   27 constructed as being undeserving of our sympathy or protection. According to the Bush line, the only way to effectively and sensibly deal with the, “curse of terrorism that is upon the face of the earth” (Ashcroft 2001b: September 15) was through war. Making this assessment crystal clear Secretary Rumsfeld remarked, the problem with terrorism is that there is no way to defend against terrorism at every place at every time against every conceivable technique. Therefore the only way to deal with the terrorist network is to take the battle to the. That is in fact what we are doing. That is in effect the self-­defense of a preemptive nature. (Crawford 2007: 96) This particular language reinforces an enlarged sense of vulnerability. As the Bush Doctrine argued, the September 11, 2001 attacks proved that their enemies could come from anywhere, at any time. It is essential to note that the identity constructions invoked by the Bush administration have a second function. Not only do they work to construct the enemy as “terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own” (Bush 2002a: January 29), they also reaffirm America as a victim who has a right to self-­ protection. Within the confines of their narrative the US was a nation under attack as well as the “the greatest force for good in world history” (Bush 2001p: October 12). Based on these values the US had a duty to “lead the fight for what is good” (Wolfowitz 2001). Various speeches and policy documents of the Bush administration also clearly specified norms of “good,” “freedom” and “kindness” as being representative of American values and ideals. As President Bush noted, “We [the USA] defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedoms of people ­everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear” (Bush 2001n: October 7). Reinforcing this imaginary elsewhere, he stated, “Our compassion and concern do not stop at our border. They reach across the world” (Bush 2001p: October 12). To sum up, the reality-­making effect that the Bush administration’s language had after September 11, 2001 problematizes claims that talk is cheap. As shown, discourse played a fundamental role in constituting a war that would be waged on several fronts, cost billions of dollars and resulted in many human fatalities. Yet the Bush administration’s language also constituted a structure. In this intersubjective context, certain moves were considered as rational and legitimate while others were not. In this rhetorical construction, the use of any means necessary came to be understood as a legitimate response to the threat that the US faced. The Bush administration’s articulations on this line of argument closed off other possible understandings or representations of what occurred on September 11, 2001 (Roberts 2005). From the war on terror to the Iraq War 2003 The Bush administration’s war on terror was dominated by a particular perspective on Iraq. Richard Clarke (2004: 264) claimed that the Bush administration entered

28   Why language matters into office, “with Iraq on the agenda.” However, a link had to be found between Saddam Hussein and September 11, 2001. The problem with this, as former British Secretary Robin Cook notes, “is that no one has a shred of evidence that Saddam was involved” (Cook 2003: 212–213). Equally it was not clear that Iraq posed an “imminent threat” to America’s national security in the immediate future. Language was an essential tool employed by the Bush administration to build this linkage. Drawing on the meta-­language of the “war on terror” allowed them to make an argument that Saddam Hussein’s regime posed an impending and existential danger. Several of the Bush administration’s core justifications for the Iraq War derive directly from the language of security and pre-­emptive self-­defense constructed after September 11, 2001. In fact, they presented this invasion as another step in their fight against terrorism. Put differently, the Iraq War gained meaning in a context where the war on terror was already established as an intersubjectively understood and accepted reality. The Bush administration drew discursive linkages between Saddam Hussein and those responsible for the terrorist attacks on America, and at the same time limited its meaning to the same reference point. As President Bush argued, We learned a good lesson on September the 11th, that there is evil in this world [. . .]. There’s no question that the leader of Iraq is an evil man. After all, he gassed his own people. We know he’s been developing weapons of mass destruction. And I think it’s in his advantage to allow inspectors back in his country to make sure that he’s conforming to the agreement he made, after he was soundly trounced in the Gulf War. And so we’re watching him very carefully. (Bush 2001o: October 11) Suspicions about a looming war against Iraq were strengthened by the Bush administration labelling them as part of “an axis of evil” along with Iran and North Korea in 2002. Through this metaphor President Bush reaffirmed that the Iraq regime was on the side of evil and as such a threat. He made this exposition several times, stating: Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror [. . .]. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger [. . .]. We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. (Bush 2002a: January 29)

Why language matters   29 The “axis of evil” statement began what became the prolonged countdown to war against Iraq, with subsequent statements seeking to cement the link between Iraq and terrorism. From September 2002 onwards there was a notable shift away from Iraq as part of this troublesome trio to the gravest threat posed to US and worldwide security (Howard 2004). As Congress was preparing to vote on authorizing the war, the President said the Iraqi regime “is a threat of unique urgency” (Bush 2002i: October 2). Days later he echoed Condoleezza Rice’s image of nuclear devastation, “Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud” (Bush 2002j: October 7). After Congress had voted to authorize the President to use the US Armed Forces against Iraq, President Bush maintained that Iraq was a “real and dangerous threat” (Bush 2002m: October 28). In Fort Hood, Texas, President Bush called the Iraqi regime a “grave threat” (Bush 2003a: January 3). The argument that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD and had direct links with Al-­Qaeda constituted the most compelling argument that the Bush administration gave for war with Iraq. Making this connection plain, Vice President Cheney asserted, “We now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons [. . .] Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon” (2002d: August 26). He was even more emphatic about the threat Saddam posed a few months later, stating, “[We] do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon” (Cheney 2002e: September 8). Substantiating that the Saddam regime represents “a grave and gathering danger” Secretary Donald Rumsfeld inferred it also, [he] has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. And let there be no doubt about it, his regime has dozens of ballistic missiles and is working to extend their range in violation of U.N. restriction. His regime has in place an elaborate, organized system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts [. . .]. And his regime has violated 16 U.N. resolutions, repeatedly defying the will of the international community without or cost or consequence. (Rumsfeld 2002f: June 11) Appraising the Iraqi situation, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated, It is hard to see how we can expect to be successful in the long run if we leave Iraq as a sanctuary for terrorists and its murderous dictator in defiant safety. Saddam Hussein supports and conspires with our terrorist enemies. He lends them both moral and material support. Disarming Saddam Hussein and fighting the war on terror are not merely related, they are one and the same. [. . .] The dots are there for all to see. We must not wait for some terrible event that connects the dots for us. (Banusiewicz 2004)

30   Why language matters By framing their justifications for war on the basis that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat, the Bush administration were dependent on the UN to legalize the use of force. This exemplifies an intersubjective constraint on their agency. In order to classify the Iraq War as a legitimate case of self-­defense, it was necessary for the US to gain UN Security Council approval. To do otherwise would weaken their argument that Saddam actually represented an existential threat as well as their binary depiction of a battle between good and evil. The arguments that the Bush administration used to make their case at the UN did not depart from their claims that Saddam Hussein and his WMD stockpiles constituted grave and growing security threats that must be confronted. Rather, the UN provided them with another forum to construct their argument that military regime change was the only viable option for dealing with Iraq. Addressing the UN General Assembly President Bush declared: Our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place – in one regime – we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront. Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime’s forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources [. . .] Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime’s good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take. (Bush 2002i: October 2) The issue of non-­compliance was a supplementary building bloc in the Bush administration’s discursive claims that military regime change was necessary in Iraq. Yet the shift to regime change is in and of itself an astonishing alteration in the Bush administration’s foreign policy, especially given the President’s avid rebuttal of nation-­building as a US objective. As he initially maintained, “in this administration we’re not into nation building, we’re focused on justice and we are going to get justice” (Bush 2001m: September 25). Changing this line in the build-­up to the Iraq War, the Bush administration argued that given Saddam Hussein’s previous history of deceiving inspectors and the international community, he should be removed from power. As President Bush asserted: The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime’s own actions – its history of aggression, and its drive toward an arsenal of terror. Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It

Why language matters   31 has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s eleven-­year history of defiance, deception and bad faith. (Bush 2002j: October 7) On November 8, 2002 the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, which gave Saddam Hussein a final opportunity to comply with its dis­ armament obligations that had been set out in several previous resolutions. Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in material breach of the ceasefire terms presented under the terms of Resolution 687. These breaches related not only to the country’s possession of WMD, but also their known construction of prohibited types of missiles, the purchase and import of prohibited armaments, and the continuing refusal of Iraq to compensate Kuwait for the widespread looting conducted by its troops during the 1991 invasion and occupation (Byers 2004; McLain 2002). In very plain language Resolution 1441 went on to say that if Iraq would not cooperate with this round of inspections, it would be found in “further material breach” of Resolution 687 and “serious consequences” would ensue (United Nations 2002). With Resolution 1441, the US moved a step closer to delivering an ultimatum to Iraq and the international community that complete disarmament, and only complete disarmament, would prevent the US using force in this context. Outlining a zero-­sum policy to such a scenario, President Bush remarked: If he chooses not to disarm, we will disarm him. That should be clear to Saddam Hussein and everybody else. And if he chooses not to disarm, we will have a coalition of the willing with us. A lot of nations understand that in order to keep the peace, Saddam Hussein must be disarmed – decisions he makes. There’s no negotiations with Mr. Saddam Hussein. Those days are long gone. And so are the days of deceit and denial. And now it’s up to him. And I want to remind you all that inspectors are there to determine whether or not Saddam Hussein is willing to disarm. It’s his choice to make. And should he choose not to disarm, we will disarm him [. . .]. Zero tolerance. About as plain as I can make it. We will not tolerate any deception, denial or deceit. (Bush 2002p: November 13) Speaking to the Security Council just before the war commenced Secretary Powell reinforced the Bush line: While we were here in this council chamber debating Resolution 1441 last fall, we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was ­disbursing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads have been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape

32   Why language matters detection. We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities [. . .] The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. (Powell 2003b: February 5) Measured by such discursive yardsticks, Saddam Hussein’s regime is presented as having made the case against itself (Bush 2002g: September 14). Subsidiary themes of delivering humanitarian aid to Iraqi civilians were also present in the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War. Issues of liberation and freedom were important frames that they drew on to imbue their actions with morality. According to Bush this was not a war against the innocent Iraqi people. I’ve told all the members of the United Nations, America will play its historic role in defeating aggressive tyranny. I hope the good people of Iraq will remember our history, and not pay attention to the hateful propaganda of their government. America has never sought to dominate, has never sought to conquer. We’ve always sought to liberate and to free. Our desire is to help Iraqi citizens find the blessings of liberty within their own culture and their own traditions. The Iraqi people cannot flourish under a dictator that oppresses them and threatens them. Gifted people of Iraq will flourish if and when oppression is lifted. (Bush 2002k: October 16) Closer to the time of the invasion he reaffirmed this: I think that no matter how Mr. Saddam is dealt with, the goal of disarming Iraq still stays the same, regardless of who is in charge of the government. And that’s very important for the Iraqi people to know. And I also want to assure Silvio [the then Italian Prime Minister] that should we require military action, shortly after our troops go in, will go food and medicine and supplies to the Iraqi people. We will, of course, win militarily, if we have to. But we’ll also want to make sure that we win the peace, as well. (Bush 2003c: January 30) Marrying the severity of the situation alongside the morality of their endeavour, President Bush also remarked, If Saddam refuses even now to cooperate fully with the United Nations, he brings on himself the serious consequences foreseen in UNSCR 1441 and previous resolutions. In these circumstances, we would undertake a solemn obligation to help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbors. The Iraqi people deserve to be lifted from insecurity and

Why language matters   33 tyranny, and freed to determine for themselves the future of their country. We envisage a unified Iraq with its territorial integrity respected. All the Iraqi people – its rich mix of Sunni and Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and all others – should enjoy freedom, prosperity, and equality in a united country. We will support the Iraqi people’s aspirations for a representative government that upholds human rights and the rule of law as cornerstones of democracy. (Bush 2003k: March 16) These lines do more than identify Iraq as a dictatorial and repressive country. They also imbue the Bush administration’s use of pre-­emptive action with a sense of morality. Their bid to liberate innocent Iraqi people from the clutches of Saddam Hussein’s brutality added weight this administration’s claim that a military course of action was necessary and that America had an unmistakable “duty to protect them” (Bradford 2003–2004).

A “defining moment” The Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War experienced and constructed a moment of acute crisis in January 2003. At this point in time the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief weapons inspectors submitted their findings to the UN Security Council. Presenting their findings to the Security Council, Dr Hans Blix and Mohammed El Baradei’s updates essentially said that the inspections had not discovered prohibited weapons programmes and that more credible proof from Iraq was needed. They also reported that the inspectors would attain their goals given the time to accomplish the task. As Blix said in his briefing, so far, UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed. Another matter – and one of great significance – is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted for. To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were “unaccounted for.” One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented [. . .]. Without evidence, confidence cannot arise [he added that] As before, we do not know every cave and corner. (Blix 2003a: February 14) Such revelations clearly undermined the core justification that the Bush administration had used to legitimate offensive military actions against Iraq. Obviously the evidence presented by the inspectors did not fit the arguments or rules of

34   Why language matters game that the Bush administration had constantly used to give meaning to the Iraq War. On the contrary, they stood in contrast to their assertions of the imminent threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his WMD stockpiles. This poses the question, how did the Bush administration respond? How was it possible for them to justify a war in light of such revelations? Bush administration’s response The Bush administration’s reaction to the findings above-­mentioned and Hans Blix’s appeal for more time for weapons inspectors to complete their search for WMD was dismissive (Doig et al. 2007). As President Bush remarked, the business about, you know, more time – you know, how much time do we need to see clearly that he is not disarming?  . . . This looks like a return of a bad movie and I am not interested in watching it. (De Young, 2003) Rather than admitting they had made a mistake, the Bush administration became adamant that anything less than full compliance would not be tolerated. Taking this line enabled the Bush administration to sidestep the lack of material evidence as a problem. Indeed, they denied that this was the sole reason for invading. In his January 2003 State of the Union address President Bush warned, The resolution presents the Iraqi regime with a test, a final test. Iraq must now, without delay or negotiations, give up its weapons of mass destruction, welcome full inspections and fundamentally change the approach it has taken for more than a decade. The regime must allow immediate and unrestricted access to every site, every document and every person identified by inspectors. Iraq can be certain that the old game of cheat-­andretreat, tolerated at other times, will no longer be tolerated. Any act of delay or defiance will be an additional breach of Iraq’s international obligations, and a clear signal that the Iraqi regime has once again abandoned the path of voluntary compliance. If Iraq fails to fully comply with the U.N. resolution, the United States, in coalition with other nations, will disarm Saddam Hussein. (Bush 2003b: January 28) Reinforcing this hard line for complete disarmament days later, he noted, As Dr. Blix said in his report to the Security Council earlier this week, he’s not doing that. And therefore, what is important is that the international community comes together again and makes it absolutely clear that this is unacceptable. And the reason why I believe that it will do that is precisely because in the original Resolution 1441, we made it clear that failure to disarm would lead to serious consequences. So this is a test for the

Why language matters   35 i­nternational community. It’s not just a test for the United States or for Britain. It’s a test for the international community, too. And the judgment has to be, at the present time, that Saddam Hussein is not cooperating with the inspectors, and therefore is in breach of the U.N. resolution. And that’s why time is running out. (Bush 2003d: January 31) Closer to the invasion President Bush remarked If the Iraqi regime were disarming, we would know it – because we would see it; Iraq’s weapons would be presented to inspectors and destroyed. Inspection teams do not need more time, or more personnel – all they need is what they have never received, the full cooperation of the Iraqi regime. The only acceptable outcome is the outcome already demanded by a unanimous vote of the Security Council: total disarmament. Saddam Hussein has a long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes. He possesses weapons of terror. He provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists who would willingly deliver weapons of mass destruction against America and other peace-­loving countries [. . .]. We are determined to confront threats wherever they arise. And, as a last resort, we must be willing to use military force. We are doing everything we can to avoid war in Iraq. But if Saddam Hussein does not disarm peacefully, he will be disarmed by force. (Bush 2003j: March 8) With this discourse the Bush administration argued that it is not that their request to use military force against Iraq was unworthy of UN authorization. Instead, they drew on the language of Resolution 1441 to argue that inaction was not a viable option. Once again we can see that language enabled and constrained the Bush administration. Resolution 1441 provided a means for them to make a case for war, but prevented them from undertaking this action immediately. As Henry Kissinger put it in early February 2003, “if the United States marches 200,000 troops into the region and then marches them back out, the creditability of American power . . . will be gravely, and perhaps, irreparably, impaired” (Scheer et al. 2003: 80). Quoting the terms of Resolution 1441, the Bush administration also argued that the entire reputation of the UN was in jeopardy. Making this plain, President Bush stressed This is a defining moment for the U.N. Security Council. If the Security Council were to allow a dictator to lie and deceive, the Security Council would be weakened. I’m confident that when the members assess their responsibilities and the responsibilities of the U.N., that they will understand that 1441 must be upheld in the fullest. (Bush 2003f: February 7)

36   Why language matters Making the case more forcefully Secretary Rumsfeld noted The stakes are high. Iraq is now defying the 17th UN Security Council resolution. The Council voted to warn Iraq that this was its “final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.” Quote, unquote. The resolution, which passed unanimously, did not say the “next to final opportunity.” It said the “final opportunity.” And those who voted for it, and they voted unanimously, knew what it said. They were explicitly reminded what it said. The question is did the UN mean it? Did they mean it? We will soon know. Seventeen times the United Nations has drawn a line in the sand – and 17 times Saddam Hussein has crossed that line. As last week’s statement by the eight European leaders so eloquently put it, quote: “If [those resolutions] are not complied with, the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result.” (Rumsfeld 2003a: February 8) Once more they sold the war based on the present and looming Iraqi threat. Setting this out in clear and simple terms, President Bush stated, The dictator of Iraq and his weapons of mass destruction are a threat to the security of free nations. He is a danger to his neighbors. He’s a sponsor of terrorism. He’s an obstacle to progress in the Middle East. For decades he has been the cruel, cruel oppressor of the Iraq people [. . .] Saddam Hussein has a history of mass murder. He possesses the weapons of mass murder. He agrees – he agreed to disarm Iraq of these weapons as a condition for ending the Gulf War over a decade ago. The United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 1441, has declared Iraq in material breach of its longstanding obligations, demanding once again Iraq’s full and immediate disarmament, and promised serious consequences if the regime refused to comply. That resolution was passed unanimously and its logic is inescapable; the Iraqi regime will disarm itself, or the Iraqi regime will be disarmed by force. And the regime has not disarmed itself. (Bush 2003l: March 16) In addition to focusing blame on the Iraq regime for hiding WMD, the defining moment showcases how the Bush administration subtly reconstructed their justifications for the war. As demonstrated, the issue of security remained a paramount concern as did removing Saddam Hussein. What is interesting is that the Bush administration confirmed the morality of their mission by amplifying the democratic components that would be operationalized. These themes were already present in the Bush administration’s discursive justification under the rubric of liberation and freedom. After the defining moment, this link between regime change and installing a democratic government was solidified even further. Speaking just days after the inspectors report, President Bush remarked,

Why language matters   37 The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq’s new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected. Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more. The nation of Iraq – with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people – is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom [. . .]. The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East [. . .]. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region. (Bush 2003e: February 6) Discussing the future of Iraq after the invasion had begun, President Bush compared the huge improvements that had already occurred People who live in Iraq deserve the same freedom that you and I enjoy here in America. And after years of tyranny and torture, that freedom has finally arrived. I have confidence in the future of a free Iraq. The Iraqi people are fully capable of self-­government. Every day Iraqis are moving toward democracy and embracing the responsibilities of active citizenship. Every day life in Iraq improves as coalition troops work to secure unsafe areas and bring food and medical care to those in need. (Bush 2003n: April 28) The construction of the US mission as a form of democracy promotion also functioned to justify the Iraq War. Keeping with this representation worked to reinforce the morality and goodness of America’s actions compared to Saddam Hussein’s. After the war had started the Bush administration went to great lengths to demonstrate the enormous and invaluable changes their foreign policy had initiated. As Paul Bremer, the administrator for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, commented: The Iraqi people are now free. And they do not have to worry about the secret police coming after them in the middle of the night, and they don’t have to worry about their husbands and brothers being taken off and shot, or their wives being taken to rape rooms. Those days are over. (Filkins 2003) Putting this in plain language, President Bush remarked: Every woman in Iraq is better off because the rape rooms and torture chambers of Saddam Hussein are forever closed. He is a barbaric person. He

38   Why language matters v­ iolated people in such a brutal way that some never thought that the spirit of Iraq could arise again. We never felt that way here in this administration. We felt that people innately love freedom and if just given a chance, if given an opportunity, they will rise to the challenge. (Bush 2004a: March 12) National Security Advisor Rice also restated, Saddam’s torture chambers, and rape rooms, and children’s prison cells are closed. The war on terror is greatly served by the removal of this source of instability in the world’s most volatile region. (Rice 2003b: October 8) These snippets are congruent with the Bush administration’s claims that Saddam Hussein represented an existential threat that needed to be removed. Justifying the Iraq War on the grounds of democracy aided the Bush administration’s depiction of liberation being for benefit of the Iraqi people alone. Indeed, they were very clear to emphasize that America was not acting on imperialist tendencies. When asked about the fact that there were no WMD, and whether they would have gone to war had they known this, Rumsfeld then explained: this country and the 25 million people there that have been liberated and have just fashioned an interim constitution that protects the rights of women and ethnic groups and religious groups – they individually are vastly better off than they would have been. The killing fields are gone. The mass graves are not having new bodies piled up day after day as happened under Saddam Hussein. The prisons have been changed and they are no longer torturing and killing people there, so it’s been a good thing. Dr. David Kay came back; he reported that he thought they were about 85 percent through the process of looking; and thus far, except for some ballistic missiles beyond the range that were authorized by the United Nations, they have not found chemical, biological, or weapons in any large quantities. The search goes on. We’ve got 1,200 people still looking there and we’ll know more in the weeks and months ahead. (Rumsfeld 2004a: March 19) President Bush was more explicit that ultimate responsibility was to be left in the hands of the Iraqi people in his 2005 State of the Union address, where he commented: The United States has no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else. That is one of the main differences between us and our enemies. They seek to impose and expand an empire of oppression, in which a tiny group of brutal, self-­appointed rulers control every aspect of every life. Our aim is to build and preserve a community of

Why language matters   39 free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures. And because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to peace. (Bush 2005a: February 2) This shift towards democracy promotion as core to US foreign policy towards Iraq is now taken for granted. In fact, many suggest that the original arguments for the invasion were set to this course. This could easily be the case. Nevertheless what has been demonstrated this far is that the Bush administration’s original justifications for undertaking military action against the Iraqi state were modified, albeit subtly, as they tried to legitimize their actions. While the linguistic justifications and arguments they drew upon provided them with agency, they were also a source of constraint. Past language constrained their movement forward. They had to make a different set of arguments, but ones that did not challenge the discursive construction too much. At the defining moment, language was extremely powerful. It enabled the Bush administration to construct a justification for war on the basis that Saddam Hussein constituted an existential security threat. The presence of this danger, they argued, legitimated them to act in pre-­emptively in the name of self-­ defense. While this language enabled the Bush administration to act, their discourse also constrained them. The frames that they employed created an intersubjective structure that had to be maintained. As the defining moment demonstrates, the Bush administration had to justify when their arguments were not consistent. Their discursive justifications for undertaking the invasion turned out to limit the Bush administration when no WMD were found in Iraq, challenging their claim that Saddam threatened national and international security. Despite the disputes over what caused the Iraq War, the defining moment showed how it was possible for the Bush administration to draw on a two-­level game of security to enable the war to go ahead.

Conclusion Arguing that language matters in international relations challenges the idea that talk is cheap. However, it is imperative to note that language is all there is to understanding the construction of social realities and foreign policies. Taking a closer look reveals the mutually constitutive and constraining relationships that exist between language, agency, structure and legitimacy. Drawing on the constructivist turn provides a stepping stone to conceptualize language is a form of power. However, excavating the internal divisions within this theoretical approach illustrates that conventional constructivism is limited in fulfilling this function by their merger of a social ontology with a positivist epistemology. This positionality leads them to overlook language as a core feature of knowledge and social life. To overcome these gaps a critical constructivist approach adopts a “consistent” methodology, one which merges a social ontology with a social epistemology (Fierke 2007b; Hopf 1998). This merger brings

40   Why language matters the latter closely on par with post-­structuralism. Each standpoint acknowledges that being in the world and knowledge of the world is inherently interdependent. Yet important differences exist between the two approaches when it comes to the linguistic paradox. Critical constructivism allocates the power of language in its ability to construct and reconstruct social rules and practices, whereas post-­ structuralism tends to allocate the power of language in its ability to remain performative. With these considerations in mind, critical constructivism was advocated as the most enhanced approach to capture the constitutive and constraining dimensions of language. Without denying that the closure of meaning is impossible, this theoretical lens recollects that existing meaning structures can be beneficial for enabling agents to know how to go on (Wittgenstein 1979). Assuming that language matters offers a richer reading of how it was possible for the Bush administration to justify the Iraq War. As shown, their justifications for the Iraq War helped to establish the rules of engagement within which substantive political choices could be and were made. Within this intersubjective frame, for instance, identifications were drawn between those who were “good” and those who were “evil.” In the Iraq case, these categories were employed to show that Iraq constituted a “grave and growing” security threat due to its WMD capacity, as well as its alleged links to Al-­Qaeda and thus September 11, 2001. In sum, the language and arguments used by the Bush administration constituted the grounds to undertake pre-­emptive military action against Iraq. Aside from demonstrating that the language employed by President Bush and his team to legitimate the Iraq War gave them agency, careful attention was paid to highlight how they were restricted by their justifications. This became apparent in a number of ways. First, studying their arguments for the war closely illustrated that the President and his team were constrained by the contexts in which they were acting. That they continually tried to tailor their justifications to coincide with the boundaries of international law supports the idea that even as the sole superpower, they could not act as they pleased. The defining moment shows that the Bush administration was constrained by language in two further ways. First, it highlights that their original justifications for war limited how they could respond in a meaningful way when no WMD were uncovered in Iraq. The way that they constructed their case for war fastened them into a particular sphere of action. In order to pursue their policy of pre-­emptive self-­defense, an imminent threat had to exist. The “defining moment” highlights a second limitation on the Bush administration’s agency; namely that the Bush administration had to modify how they spoke security. Analyzing their response to the inspector’s findings indicated that they did not retract their repetitive arguments that Saddam Hussein posed a serious security threat warranting the use of pre-­emptive measures. Nevertheless, at this point their argument of pre-­emptive self-­defense was redefined to stand for more than simply disarming Saddam Hussein’s of WMD stockpiles. By and large this shift was achieved by the Bush administration holding fast to the issue of Iraq’s continual non-­compliance with inspectors as grounds for military action. What is also noticeable at this juncture is the manner in which

Why language matters   41 they integrated democracy promotion as a justification for war in a much more substantive way. On the one hand, this redefinition gave the Bush administration agency at the defining moment, enabling them to make a forceful case that the path to national and international security was not only through eliminating Iraq’s WMD capabilities but also through democracy promotion in the country. However, this alternation also constrained their actions. Crucially, it forced the Bush administration to embark on a policy of regime change; something which they originally claimed was not in American security interests. How did their security policy become reconstructed to such a large extent? Was it simply a case of them undertaking a gigantic game of bluff? What way did they speak security from the defining moment onwards? These questions will be explored in the next chapter.

2 Speaking security Securitization and its limitations

The previous chapter established that language matters in international relations, and from this we posit the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework as an advanced step towards developing a constructivist theory of language. Without a doubt this vein of scholarship has sparked extensive discussions about what security means (Buzan et al. 1998). The high praise bestowed on Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and other leading securitization theorists over the last 15 years is vindicated by the ever-­expanding research agendas their work has spawned (Huysmans 1998a; Williams 2003). As many note, it is common to see the term securitization invoked to explain a plethora of issues ranging from AIDS (Elbe 2002, 2006a, 2006b) to the environment (Floyd 2008; Trombetta 2008) to migration (Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Diez and Squire 2008; Huysmans 2000, 2006a; Ibrahim 2005) to organized crime (Emmers 2003; Loader 2002) to threats (Salter 2008; Sjöstedt 2008), among others (Buzan and Hansen 2009). This vast literature aptly captures a core principle of securitization, namely that security threats and issues do not necessarily exist a priori but can be socially constructed. At base, the meaning of security is what actors say it is (Taureck 2006: 55). High praise and application have not been the sole factors behind the evolution of the securitization agenda. On the contrary, the boundaries of this framework have been pushed and furthered through multiple strands of critiques, to the point where it has become common to speak of a “second generation” of securitization theorists (Balzacq 2005, 2011; Stritzel 2007, 2011). Within the most recent literature, three overarching veins of reassessment have been identified. These are (1) the explanatory power of the theory; (2) the normative political implications; and (3) the erasure of the boundary between the exceptional and the normal (Pram Gad and Lund Petersen 2011: 316–317). Others have spoken about the need for a more “sociological” or “pragmatic” view of securitization (Balzacq 2011), whether that is to overcome the thin and formal theorization of speech act theory or to develop the underspecified relationship between the speaker and their audience (Williams 2011b: 212). Throughout this chapter it will be made apparent that the scholarly debates on this topic constitute a complex sphere of academic inquiry. Going a step further, it will be suggested that these discussions can be conceived of as a specialized language game, a theme that will be returned to intermittently in the rest of this

Speaking security   43 chapter and in more depth in Chapter 3. Having said this much, it is important to clarify up front that the purpose of this chapter is not to referee contesting standpoints on how to refine and extend the securitization; this would be beyond the scope of this project. Building on existing literature, the explicit focus is to carve out a space to examine how multiple and overlapping speech acts and moves can be incorporated in a securitization framework. This raises interesting insights into the relationship between security and democracy in a securitization process. Can these speech acts overlap? Can the boundary between political and security issues overlap? If so, what are the consequences for speaking and practicing security? Answering these questions leads into the second aim of the chapter, namely to highlight the role that rules play in a process of securitization. The task here is twofold. The first is to broaden the rule-­following/rule-­breaking nexus at the heart of securitization. Taking this as a point of departure, the second task is to integrate the categories of redefining and rule-­making into the ongoing debates. This is a timely exercise since the issue of rules is attracting more and more attention in emerging research agendas in the field of securitization. Indeed, Michael Williams has asked, “when do the rules broken (or when are enough rules broken, or what kind of rules need to be broken) comprise a securitization rather than simply a policy evolution?” (2011a: 217). This question is about more than rules. It also touches on other pressing questions about what special security means (Vuori 2008, 2011), how security means (Wilkinson 2007) and ethical issues arising from the claim that agents can step outside existing rules (Aradau 2004; Huysmans 2002, 2004b) and who does security and what security does (Guzzini 2011). Seen in this light, the chapter serves a dual function. Not only does it contribute to the current debates on securitization theory, it also speaks to the larger questions regarding what security means. The remainder of this chapter is divided into five parts. First and foremost, the core components of the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework will be outlined. This context is an essential precursor to the second section, which outlines the more nuanced ways in which the contours of the securitization are being pushed and pulled. Against this backdrop, the third section unpacks how a more robust conceptualization of multiplicity and rules can be incorporated into ongoing discussions about the way security is spoken in theory and in practice. The fourth section returns to the empirical case to demonstrate the complexities, as well as some of the hidden dangers, involved in speaking security.

Security and securitization The Copenhagen School emerged in response to calls to “widen and deepen” traditional security agendas (Huysmans 1998b, 1998c; Krause and Williams 1996; Tarry 1999). Dissatisfied with restricting security to state survival and material resources, they made a serious attempt to integrate alternative “sectors,” “regions” and “constellations” into security studies, ranging from economic and

44   Speaking security environmental issues to human rights and migration (Buzan 1991, 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1995, 2000, 2002, 2003). Additionally, the Copenhagen School incorporated the concepts of “societal security” and “identity politics” to develop security agendas (Buzan et al. 1998: 119–126). Advancing traditional concerns, the Copenhagen School argued that identities are intrinsically linked to the construction of security perceptions, risks and threats (Weiner 1992–1993). In their account, security is not only about the survival of states but also about the survival of societal (group) identities. In sum, “societal security refers to the level of collective identities and actions taken to defend such ‘we identities’ ” (Buzan 1993; Buzan et al. 1998: 120; Wæver 1995). Phrased differently, “securitization creates a sense of danger to ‘us’ not to ‘me’ ” (Vultee 2011: 91). By addressing these additional aspects, the Copenahagen School shows the limitations of attempting to quantify what security “actually is” or whether an issue is “really” a threat. Their contribution is to offer “a constructivist operational method . . . for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions” (Buzan et al. 1998: vii). Working in this tradition, security is no longer an objective condition but a social construct with different referent objects. The decisive issue is not that a threat exists a priori or exogenously, but rather that agents believe a threat exists that warrants the use of urgent and extraordinary measures. It is from the construction of an issue as a security issue, and of the “Other” as a threat, that exceptional policies are approved, and not the actual materiality of the threat being present. Assuming that threats do not have to exist is relevant to the debate about the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War because it opens up the possibility that the actual presence of WMD was a less pressing issue establishing the security stakes in this context. What matters from a securitization perspective is that the Bush administration placed Iraq in the category of an existential threat, convinced others that Saddam Hussein posed an existential threat to a “we identity” and that this argument was accepted. How the Bush administration spoke security was thus critical. Clearly the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework is constructivist in orientation. However, they are explicit that the term security should not be widened to the point of irrelevancy. In short, security cannot be constructed in any way; rather, it must be constructed in a particular way. To retain analytical rigour, the Copenhagen School insist that security should be spoken according to a threat-­urgency modality (Buzan et al. 1998: 27; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009; Watson 2012). This stance has implications for determining who and what can securitize an issue and how security is spoken. In short, it creates particular rules of engagement. Speech acts and the securitization framework To explain how security threats are framed and constructed, the Copenhagen School relies on speech act theory. Building directly on the work of John Austin (1975), they claim that discursive utterances do things. In this tradition, the saying of something does more than simply label an object or directly represent

Speaking security   45 its meaning. What is also being undertaken is an act of social commitment. Taking Austin’s considerations on board, Wæver has defined security as a speech act. “In this usage security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting or promising or naming a ship)” (Wæver 1995: 55). Ultimately, the Copenhagen School argue speech acts have the ability to move issues beyond the realm of everyday politics into the realm of emergency politics where agents have the right to adopt “emergency action/special measures” to deal with it (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). In their fullest statement, “ ‘security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 22). This understanding endows securitization with enormous power. What becomes explicit in the Copenhagen School’s account is that the process of constructing a threat is not politically neutral. Instead, speaking security is a highly political action. By uttering security, actors move issues from the non-­politicized or private realm to the political realm, where they become a source of political debate or politicized. Securitization is presented as the next stage along the spectrum. Although securitization is conceptualized as a continuation of politicization by other means, it also signifies the shift to a different kind of context. Significantly, at this stage the boundary between the everyday and exceptional politics is transgressed (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). It is on the basis of this transgression that the Copenhagen School argue that securitization ultimately represents a failure. According to them, “security should be seen as a negative, a failure to deal with issues of normal politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Although the Copenhagen School acknowledges that it may be better to deal with some issues within the realm of security rather than outside it, particularly those which require the use of exceptional measures, desecuritization is defined as the general ideal (Wæver 2000: 251). The latter concept captures the refusal to use the language of security in regards to a particular issue, thus undermining the extent to which democratic processes can be overridden. Put succinctly, desecuritization is a normative goal, or “the shifting of issues out of emergency mode into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere” (Buzan et al. 1998: 34). We will return to this concept later on. The important point to take away thus far is that securitization is process that unfolds as agents start and stop speaking security. Securitizing move While the speech act is imperative to the securitization process, it alone does not constitute securitization per se. To be securitized, issues have to be accepted as constituting an existential threat via a “securitizing move.” This idea reaffirms that securitization represents a reciprocal interaction between the securitizing actor (whomever is speaking security) and their audience (the receiver). While actors can certainly frame a certain issue as a security threat and attempt to securitize it, only the audience can decide whether this proposal will be accepted as

46   Speaking security legitimate. In other words, to transcend the threshold between a securitizing move and successful securitization, the agent speaking security must convince others of the magnitude of the threats and vulnerabilities that exist. More importantly, the audience must judge such claims as an appropriate response to the level of threat presented. Indeed, a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accept it as such. (Buzan et al. 1998: 25) Speech acts do not securitize unless they are “backed up” (McDonald 2008). By extension, securitization can never be imposed or guaranteed to succeed since it is necessary for securitizing actors to justify their propositions and actions. Taking these factors into consideration, the Copenhagen School outline a securitizing move as a process of convincing as much as claiming (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Due to the indeterminacy of a securitizing move failing or succeeding, the Copenhagen School outlines “facilitating” conditions which enable a securitizing move to succeed, or securitized speech act to be accepted (Buzan et al. 1998: 25, 31–33; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 71–72, 74, also see Stritzel 2007: 362, 364). The first criteria that must be satisfied are the internal, linguistic-­grammatical contents of the speech act. This point refers back to need for agents to designate an existential security threat and the urgent actions that will be taken to defeat it. In addition to having a grammatical plot, a securitizing actor should also “hold a position from which the act can be made” (Buzan et al. 1998: 32). Within the Copenhagen School’s account an emphasis here resides on the articulations of capable agents, most predominantly political leaders, who are able to marshal the resources needed to deal with the threat. As Wæver (1995: 57) argues elsewhere, “security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.” Jef Huysmans also notes, “statesmen representing the state and uttering security in the name of the state are the privileged agents in the securitizing process” (Huysmans 2002: 54). The final aspect any securitization process requires is the feature(s) of the alleged threat that either help or hinder its legitimation. Taken together, this set of assumptions illustrates that securitization operates according to and, in turn, sets specific rules of engagement. This is how we know what securitization means; it is the grammar of this particular language game (Buzan et al. 1998: 27; Vuori 2008). Within the Copenhagen School’s account, the presence or absence of the above-­mentioned facilitating conditions have an enormous impact on making some situations more or less prone to successful securitization. The Iraq War and the US war on terror are examples of situations where securitization was a more probable outcome. Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression and deception made it easier for the Bush administration to construct a security

Speaking security   47 narrative which identified his regime as an existential threat, and for this narrative to have meaning. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 also added to weight to their claims that inaction was not an option due to the presence of direct and existential threats to American and international security. Such linguistic and external conditions made it more likely that the Bush administration’s securitizing move would succeed. Their securitized speech acts and moves did not determine or cause the Iraq War. Rather, they constituted the sphere in which it became necessary and therefore possible. Macrosecuritization and institutionalization Another two fundamental features of securitization processes are macrosecuritization and institutionalization. Both of these concepts broaden the scope and temporality of a speech acts and, in turn, the procedural dynamics entailed at different stages of a securitization process. Buzan and Wæver employ the idea of macrosecuritization to highlight the larger social formation in which lower-­level securitizations are incorporated and coordinated (Buzan and Wæver 2009: 257). According to them, macrosecuritizations can either rank multiple securitizations in a hierarchy or simply bundle them together. The utility of this concept is that it showcases that certain security utterances can constitute an overarching security agenda, and subsequently, how international security can be constructed by one overarching conflict (Buzan and Wæver 2009). Through this terminology the enormous order of complexity, layers and constellations framing a securitization process become evident. According to Buzan, the US “War on Terror” is an apt example of a macrosecuritization. Similar to the Cold War, he argues that this event constitutes a security framework and rationale ranked above other security agendas. Following his argument, part of the GWoT’s relative success can be attributed to the way in which it has tied together longstanding security concerns arising within the liberal order, most notably crime and the trades in drugs and the technologies for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (Buzan 2006: 1104) This discussion highlights how links are made between several referent objects in different regions and how agents seek to “graft a newer securitization on to an older one” (ibid.). Lene Hansen’s concept of fading also touches on this issue of how old securitizations can be re-­invoked to aid newer securitizations (Hansen 2011). While the concept of macrosecuritization is extremely useful in starting to think about multiplicity in relation to security speech acts, there is room for further conceptual advancement. Most noticeably, the avenues of change and transformation within a macrosecuritization remain underdeveloped. This statement needs further clarification. The Copenhagen School do not suggest that the

48   Speaking security referent object cannot or does not alter. Returning to Buzan’s analysis of the Global War on Terror, it is clear that shifts have occurred in what is now deemed to represent an existential threat to US security. Indeed fighting terrorism has usurped the Soviet Union as the gravest threat facing the world. Moreover, “in relation to the securitization of WMD, the new twist is the addition of a strong concern that not only “rogue states,” but also terrorist organizations, might acquire nuclear weapons or other WMD” (Buzan 2006: 1105). Juha Vuori’s analysis of the Doomsday Clock also clearly documents how alternative representations of security threat alter over time (Vuori 2010; Sjöstedt 2011). Without disputing the idea that the referent object can alter, there are little guidelines to explain how this change takes place. In relation to macrosecuritization, this question becomes more pressing given the dominant position of one overarching security logic. How can other processes of politicization, securitization or de­securitization come to challenge this larger frame? What modifications have to be made to the way that agents are speaking security in order for the underlying assumptions of a macrosecuritization to be questioned? Looking at the concept of macrosecuritization from a different angle also forces us to tackle an alternative issue. The ordering principle explicit in Buzan’s account raises questions about the relationship between the different components, or securitizations. How are these different securitizations linked up or ranked? How might this larger picture fit together? Are agents speaking security in the same way in each securitization? Are all the securitizations within the macrosecuritization complementary or do they conflict? What kind of agency and structure are constituted in the case of a macrosecuritization? Buzan is aware that tensions may exist between the different levels of securitization at work in any given macrosecuritization. What needs to be refined is the assumption that all of the securitizations are subordinated, or at least framed with the overarching speech act (Buzan 2006; Buzan and Wæver 2009). As we will see later, the way in which different speech acts are aligned and co-­constituted is not always so neatly arranged. To reiterate, the point being made here is not that the concept of macrosecuritization is inadequate, but to strengthen it by illuminating how multiple securitizations interact, overlap and intertwine. Taking this extra step opens up the potential to explore the multifaceted structures of meaning that can be at work in any part of the larger constellation (macrosecuritization) or its components (securitization). Institutionalization is another central concept in the securitization framework. This term is used to highlight when security no longer needs to be uttered every single time in order to designate what constitutes an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998). Rather, at this stage the security threat becomes taken for granted. Since the meaning of security is internalized, agents no longer have to speak security repetitively because everyone knows what the term refers to. AIDS is just one example of an institutionalized referent object (Elbe 2006a, 2006b). When this term is uttered, everyone is aware of what these words refer to and the security stakes involved. Institutionalization also refers to the creation of institutions and bureaucratic procedures to deal the security threat at hand. Put

Speaking security   49 d­ ifferently, “the securitization is institutionalized only if the threat (either perceived or real) is resilient enough to demand the build-­up of standing bureaucracies and procedures” (Vieira 2007: 139–140). On one level, the idea of constructing institutions to deal with security issues appears to be extremely logical since it provides a way for agents to monitor or manage the security problems as they arise and henceforth. A good example here would be the Bush administration’s construction of the Department of Homeland Security in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The working mandate of this establishment was to focus on federal preparations to deal with terrorism while trying to manage other duties, including border security, customs and emergency management (Miller 2003). On a deeper level, however, important work has shown that institutionalizing security issues may produce new kinds of security dilemmas (Bigo 2002; Neal 2009; Vaughan-­Williams and Peoples 2012). The idea of security being institutionalized also raises questions about how desecuritization becomes possible in this context. For starters, assuming that security is internalized to the point where it no longer has to be uttered, arguably what is taking place is the normalization of security as well as its institutionalization. As we will see later on, if speaking security becomes the norm rather than the exception, the boundary between politicization, securitization and de­securitization begins to blur (Aradau and Van Munster 2013; Neal 2009). Second, and perhaps more seriously, claiming that security is internalized to this degree suggests that agents may have become “blinded by their language” (Wittgenstein 1958). The danger here is that agents are no longer examining how security is being spoken or what their speech acts construct. Such oversights have important conceptual and theoretical implications with regards to the “securitization of democracy” and the “democratization of security.” These themes will be revisited later in this chapter when the discussion turns to explore how the boundary between the everyday and the exceptional is constructed and how it functions. Before undertaking this analysis, it is imperative to have a crystal clear picture of the current status of the debates taking place within securitization. This will be done below.

The evolution of securitization: overlapping language games? Since its arrival on the scene of IR, the Copenhagen School’s framework has been the subject of much critical debate and, consequently, evolution. As mentioned earlier, it has become fashionable to identify a second generation within securitization literature. Thierry Balzacq and Holger Stritzel are advocated as leading figures within the latter vein, although many others are now included under this umbrella. What all of these scholars suggest “in different ways is that social construction of a security issue is more dynamic, nuanced and complex process than the one described by the Copenhagen School” (Trombetta 2011: 135). It is worth remembering that second-­generation scholars do not debunk the utility of the Copenhagen School’s framework outright. Rather, they seek to amend and improve some of the most important concepts underscoring securitization

50   Speaking security p­ rocesses. As mentioned already, it is impossible to address every single blind spot and nuanced advancement being advocated, nor is it necessary. Instead, this section builds on the trilogy outlined by Pram Gad and Lund Petersen to explore how security is being spoken within the ebb and flow of contemporary securitization debates and why these differences are important. The speech act and context A major advance made by Thierry Balzacq is to advance a more sociological twist to securitization theory. This idea builds on his previous claims that the Copenhagen School are preoccupied with the illocutionary aspects of the speech act at the expense of the perlocutionary effects (Balzacq 2005). Before illustrating the significance of this claim, it is worth recalling that Austin (1962: 95, 107) argued that each sentence can convey three types of acts, the combination of which constitutes the total speech act situation: (i) locutionary – the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference; (ii) illocutionary – the act performed in articulating a locution and (iii) perlocutionary, which is the “consequential effects” or “sequels” that are aimed at evoking the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience. Jürgen Habermas summarizes these different aspects in the following way: “to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying something” (1984: 289, emphasis in original; also see Balzacq 2011: 4–5). Unpacking these aspects, Balzacq highlights a tension in the Copenhagen School account between their claim that the speech act itself is the action on the one hand and their claim that securitization is an intersubjective process on the other (Balzacq 2005, 2011). His argument suggests that this tension arises from their prioritization of the illocutionary part of the speech act. According to Balzacq, this setup overlooks the larger contexts in which both the securitizing move and securitization occurs. To fill these gaps, he argues that we need to focus on “empowering the audience” and examining the larger social context in which securitization is constituted (Balzacq 2011: 8–11). Making a similar argument, Stritzel has argued that “too much weight is put on the semantic side of the speech act articulation at the expense of its social and linguistic relatedness and sequentiality” (Strizel 2007: 358). Akin to Balzacq, he argues that this set-­up poses problems when it comes to conceptualizing the audience as an active participant. According to Stritzel, the limitations of the Copenhagen School framework can be improved by incorporating an embedded analysis of securitization, one which captures both the situated relationship between the speaker and the audience and the existence of discourses that may predate the securitization underway (Stritzel 2007: 370). These ideas also find expression in Mark Salter’s dramaturgical analysis. Adopting this lens, he explores when securitization fails, which audiences matter and how securitizing moves take place within different sociological settings (Salter 2008). Elsewhere, Didier Bigo has talked about the study of “discursive fields” as a way to reveal the heterogeneous and competitive strands operating when security is spoken

Speaking security   51 (2006a). Through all these discussion it becomes apparent that the social and linguistic context in which security is spoken is a paramount and crucial consideration. Calls to focus on contextual issues in greater depth also taps into discussions which contend that the Copenhagen School’s analytical outlook is skewed towards a “Western-­Centric” or more specifically “European-­Centric” perspective (Aradau 2004; Åtland and Ven Bruusgaard 2009; Vuori 2008). A general assumption within this literature is that securitization is founded on the basis of liberal democratic systems (Hayes 2009). While useful in explaining how securitizing speech acts and moves work and unfold in these settings, several authors have argued that the Copenhagen School is less attentive when it comes to explaining how security is spoken in non-­Western cultures. Taking up this point, Claire Wilkinson argues that their account needs to shed the Westphalian straightjacket on which it is premised (Wilkinson 2007). Likewise Alan Collins (2005) has argued that securitization in a democratic society functions according to a very different system of rules than securitization in a non-­ democratic one. For instance, in the former, individuals have rights to ask questions of the speaker, whereas in the latter decisions are made at the top behind closed doors. Such considerations highlight not only that there are different cultural contexts which impact on how agents speak security, but also that there are different rules surrounding the way in which security is spoken. Raising greater awareness of the role that the context occupies in shaping how security is spoken, and the ability of speech act theory to capture this kind of analysis, is extremely important for the advancement of our discussion. Tying all of the above-­mentioned themes together highlights that the language of security is a multifaceted and evolving process. Focusing on these aspects reinforces the need to explore what securitizing speech acts and moves create and how they operate on different levels. The audience and the speaker Another controversial subject circulating within deliberations about securitization is how to conceptualize the relationship between the speaker and the audience. There are different, albeit interrelated, strands of arguments on this topic. First, many suggest that the role of the audience is underspecified (Balzacq 2011; Stritzel 2007). Wæver himself has acknowledged that the “audience needs better definition and probably differentiation” (Wæver 2008: 26). Ambiguity surrounding who or what actually constitutes the audience is deemed to be problematic on two fronts. On the one hand, it fails to acknowledge that there may be more than one audience, while on the other it neglects instances where the audience accepts some aspects of the speech act but not others (McDonald 2008; Roe 2008; Salter 2008; Stritzel 2007). Acknowledging that a securitization process can comprise different audiences reinforces that the speech act is characterized by different logics of persuasion. In short, not all securitizing moves will be considered as legitimate as others. This reinforces

52   Speaking security suggestions made by the second-­generation theorists about the need to pay closer attention to the contexts and how they are unfolding. The second major criticism about the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of the audience is that they are depicted as passive actors. Several scholars have suggested that rather than being active agents with an equal voice, the audience in a securitizing process actually represents recipients of any already formulated narrative (Doty 1998–1999; Leonard and Kaunert 2011; McDonald 2008; Williams 2003). Despite the Copenhagen School making constant back and forth deliberations between the speaker and the audience a requirement, several authors have suggested that their framework is not very suitable when it comes to incorporating modifications to the way security is uttered in or during this exchange (Balzacq 2005; Collins 2005; Salter 2008; Stritzel 2007). Consequently, the voice of the audience is reduced to a monologue rather than that of a dialogue, a relationship of acceptance rather than contestation (Salter 2008). Agents speak and frame security, i.e., provide the stimuli, and audiences respond to this stimulus either by accepting or rejecting it (Doty 1998–1999: 80). Such a “decisionistic” approach fails to explain how audiences grant the securitizing agent the permission to override the rules that would otherwise bind (Williams 2003: 521). Indeed, several authors have noted that it is not clear what audience acceptance actually means or entails in practice (Leonard and Kaunert 2010: 58; Salter 2008). As Myriam Dunn Cavelty notes, “it remains largely unclear as to which audience has to accept what argument, to what degree and for how long” (2008: 26). Given the centrality of the audience to determining when a securitization fails or succeeds, these concerns are important. Reflecting on the speaker–audience relationship provides an entry point to explore the way in which the term security is constantly ascribed with meaning, and not only in different contexts, but at different stages of the securitizing process. What the current literature aptly illustrates is that as the audience and the speaker interact and engage in communicative exchanges there is always a possibility of change. Important advances have been made to show how just how complex and unexpected these processes can be. What would aid such discussions even further is an analytical tool which could pick up not simply on whether securitization fails or succeeds, but also the more subtle nuances in the way in which agents are speaking security from beginning to end. This vantage point would allow us to explore how the meaning of security is ascribed with different meanings when security is spoken, while recognizing that there may never be a single ending but rather constant processes of re-­securitization as agents continue to speak security. This will be picked up again in the next chapter, where it will be argued that a language games approach provides an excellent analytical tool to explore how agents learn to speak security in different contexts. Again, the suggestion being made here is not that issues of multiplicity have not been broached in critical debates on securitization. Instead, the point being made is to support existing attempts to unpack the relationship between the speaker and their audiences by constantly analyzing how both sides are speaking

Speaking security   53 security. Taking this view facilitates careful considerations towards capturing subtle variations that may or may not be significant. The everyday and the exceptional The third relationship found in the pages of securitization literature is the one that focuses on the relationship between the everyday and the exceptional. To begin with, the relationship between the exceptional and the everyday surfaces with regards to the issue of desecuritization. The second place where it arises is in debates about the ethical and moral implications of creating an exceptional realm of action. These two strands should not be considered as being separate, but coterminous. Today significant attention has been given to problematizing and developing the idea of desecuritization as a way out of security. Here again, multiple strands of argument are at work. The issue of clarity and specification also reappear as a key bone of contention. Given that desecuritization is the ideal propagated by the Copenhagen School, the omission of clear guidelines as to when agents can and do desecuritize an issue is noteworthy (Aradau 2004; Hansen 2011). For many, this underdevelopment raises ethical questions about the possibility for desecuritization and the unmaking of security to become possible (Aradau 2004; Behnke 2006; Huysmans 2006b; Roe 2004, 2012). Taking this argument a step further, several scholars have accused the Copenhagen School’s framework as reifying Carl Schmitt’s understanding of the state of the exception, with the distinction between friend and enemy at its centre (Schmitt 1985, 1996). It has been argued that this conceptualization shares similarities to the picture garnered through a securitized lens. For instance, in both accounts we find a situation which allows agents to break with established rules of the game through obtaining legitimacy for extraordinary measures (Edjus 2009). Further, akin to a Schmittian understanding, the idea inherent in securitization is that agents construct identities of a threatened self and a threatening ‘Other’. Whereas the former is in need of protection, the latter is potential and often constructed as something in need of annihilation. As Jef Huysmans (2006b: 136) stresses, “exception refers to the ideas that an order is constituted in the definition of what is exceptional to it, what is seemingly outside.” Questions have been asked as to whether such us versus them dichotomies are harmful in trying to find a way out of security (Williams 2003; Hansen 2011; Huysmans 2006a, 2006b). Being aware of the relationship between the everyday and the exceptional and how this division operates is thus extremely important to further explorations into how security is being spoken, what this language legitimates and what is legitimate in the name of security. These topics have a number of implications when it comes to discussing how rules are made, unmade and remade in a process of securitization and in the contexts these speech acts create.

54   Speaking security Overlapping language games? Up to now this chapter has fulfilled two tasks. On the one hand it has provided an overview of the core features of the original securitization framework. On the other hand it has showed how the same framework has been criticized and amended. Taking a step back, something extremely interesting emerges from the academic conversations or language games that are taking place in securitization debates which could be developed. What particularly stands out is how all of the existing viewpoints are intimately interrelated at some level. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, they share certain “family resemblances” (Wittgenstein 1979a). For instance, the question of how important the context is approaches the issue of what kind of space exists for both the agent and the speaker to act and interact. Likewise, the question of how the speaker and their audience(s) talk back and forth to each other during securitization approaches the issue of how the boundary between the everyday and the exceptional is both constituted and legitimately or illegitimately transgressed. In sum, these different relationships are partly constituted and constrained by the others. Both the Copenhagen School and their critics make this last point explicit. Methodologically, a more novel avenue of inquiry would be to examine how these different discussions constitute and constrain each other and raise greater awareness about how these discussions are ascribing alternative meanings to the language of security (Erikson 1999; Huysmans 2006a; Williams 2003). The concept of the securitization of democracy will be unpacked below as an enhanced way of coping with the areas of intersection and overlap in the process of securitization itself and the surrounding academic debates. The securitization of democracy Jef Huysmans latest article focuses attention on the “little security nothings” operating within the everyday (2011). Here he argues that these smaller acts are just as powerful, if not more so, than the larger claims to the exception. With this suggestion, he turns the boundary that the Copenhagen School draws between politicization and securitization and desecuritization on its head. Instead of the power of the speech act residing in its ability to frame a referent object as an existential threat, the power of the speech act now also comes to reside in the localized or “everydayness” of situations. What Huysmans’ account further points to is the potential for given speech acts to not only be normalized through processes of institutionalization, and thus become the norm, but also for security to emerge from the context of the everyday. Picking up where he leaves off opens up the space to take the concept of the securitization of democracy more seriously. This term has a double impact. First, assuming that the boundary between the everyday and the exceptional is more flexible and fluid than the Copenhagen School originally anticipated shows that security cannot be confined to an either/or dichotomy. As Rita Abrahamsen (2005: 59) has argued, “focusing on a moment at which an issue ceases to be a

Speaking security   55 political issue and becomes a security one suggests an either/or approach to politics in which there are no gradations or continuum of issues.” Relaxing this dividing line creates the space in which democracy itself can be securitized. At one level this statement appears to mirror what the Copenhagen School claims happens: that “we identities” are threatened, especially if the “we identity” in question exists in the context of democratic societies. However, there is an important distinction being made here. The difference is that the securitization of democracy concept rests firmly on the idea that one sphere of action does not have to be transgressed, a particular boundary does not have to be crossed nor does one set of rules not have to be broken when security is spoken. Instead, this terminology brings us a step closer to beginning to look for and unpack the threads of intersection and co-­existence between different speech acts at play in a process of securitization or even different variations of the same securitizing speech act. Advancing this line of argument highlights the need for further exploration into instances where the different rules and norms from the everyday and the exceptional co-­exist. Equally, it directs theoretical attention towards identifying the areas of compatibility and incompatibility that are constituted when these two spheres of action interact. Returning to securitization, for example, it is necessary to broaden the theoretical and practical remit in order to cope with the possibility that alternative and alternating speech acts will run into each other, overlap and even collide depending on the particular case of securitization. Such arguments reinforce earlier suggestions by second-­generation theories to focus on process. What it is also foregrounded is how words are not only ascribed with meaning (for instance securitized), but also lose their meaning (for instance, desecuritized) depending on the linguistic composition of the securitizing and securitized speech acts in play. Put simply, the way in which multiple structures of meaning are grouped and regrouped together in a single speech act or a larger macrosecuritization is extremely important in constituting and constraining the agents interacting in either context. The environment that emerges from the interaction between the two would have to reconcile claims based on such competing values. The second theoretical impact that the securitization of democracy concept brings to securitization studies is that it taps into discussions about the normal­ ization of security. Building on the idea that multiple speech acts can exist when security is spoken, and that a single speech act can contain multiple structures of meaning, complicates the boundary that the Copenhagen School draws between the everyday and the exceptional. The blurriness of this divide has already has been touched upon. Advancing this argument also opens up the possibility that exceptionality can become the rule (Jabri 2006; Van Munster 2004). Such a permanent state of exception is inconsistent with the Copenhagen School’s understanding of desecuritization as the ideal. As noted, the twin concept in their securitization framework is presented as a potential mode of transformation, a way for agents and structures to find their way back to everyday politics. The idea that securitization can become the norm raises crucial questions concerning

56   Speaking security when agents can stop speaking security. For instance, if securitizing and securitized speech acts are part of the everyday grammar and/or normal institutional frameworks, does this undermine or increase the power of these words? The idea of macrosecuritization and institutionalization resurface here. Recognizing that alternative and alternating speech acts can co-­exist highlights the strengths and weaknesses of these terms. Their strength is that they allow for speech acts to interlink and interrelate in securitization processes. Their weakness is that they neglect the multiplicity of meanings that a single security utterance can contain. While security may be the overarching category expressed when a securitizing actor speaks security, this term may not stand alone. Rather, it may be reliant on or co-­constituted by subsidiary structures of meaning (Hansen 2006). For example, the Bush administration’s security utterance to justify the Iraq War was composed of multiple sets of meanings. While the security speech act constitutes a crucial action, the utterance of security captures only one aspect of the highly complex linguistic constellation that can be said to constitute how the Bush administration justified the Iraq War in the name of security. How do these different levels interact? What happens when they overlap? What happens when an agent uttering security includes democracy as a co-­constituted component? Addressing these questions takes Buzan’s arguments about the Global War on Terror representing a macrosecuritization to the next level. While showing that several securitization processes are in operation, incorporating the securitization of democracy as an analytical concept enables security to be spoken in a more multidimensional way, one in which the grammar of each securitization may not remain the same. Making this switch reinforces the Copenhagen School’s claim that the meaning of security is socially constructed, while advancing ideas from the second-­generation debates about taking different context, speech acts, moves, agents and securitizations into consideration. Building on the idea that there are multiple speech acts and securitization functioning at any moment in time strengthens the assumption that a plethora of rule-­ orientated actions may arise. This is our next port of call.

Different kinds of rules It was mentioned earlier that the concept of rules is gleaning more attention within the securitization debate (Werner 1998, 2001). Within these discussions the biggest questions being raised are whether rules can be broken, and if so, which rules they might be. Michael Williams (2011b) and Jonathan Bright (2012) have raised awareness about the need for further exploration into these topics. Bright’s account is a particularly useful entry point to unpack how rules are conceptualized within the Copenhagen School and the gaps found therein. In addition to pointing out that the initial formulation of securitization does not specify which rules have to be broken or why, he proceeds to show that there are multiple ways in which rules can be broken rather than there being only one way (Bright 2012). Both accounts are extremely helpful in redirecting securitization

Speaking security   57 literature towards exploring not only how security is constructed, but what securitization constructs. An important effect of both of Bright’s and William’s discussions on rules is that they unintentionally reify rule-­breaking as an inherent feature of speaking security. What is particularly noticeable in their accounts is that the main focus remains on how rules are broken. While it is evident that constant attention needs to be paid to the latter, this section contends that equal attention needs to be paid to exploring instances when agents speak security to redefine and make rules anew. Rule-­following at another level It has already been firmly established that the Copenhagen School’s framework outlines specific rules that agents must follow to speak security and for securitization to occur. However, their account is less attentive to instances when agents do not attempt to break free of existing social rules either during their securitizing move or thereafter. The idea that normal rules can be broken and replaced with emergency measures is not under dispute. Indeed, agents frequently frame referent objects as security threats to enable them to break free of rules that would otherwise bind for any number of reasons. For instance, securitizing actors may wish to liberate themselves from oppressive regimes or to ensure the utmost speed to deal with urgent security concerns. That said, it is worth remembering that it is equally possible that the same actors draw on and/or employ existing rules and norms as part of their securitizing move. Whereas the Copenhagen School primarily focus on the category of rule-­following in relation to the linguistic-­grammatical rules, it is important not to neglect the possibility that agents draw on existing intersubjective rules as a prerequisite to speak security. Put plainly, following social rules may be part and parcel of the context in which securitization occurs. By invoking and abiding by established rules, actors not only build their case to justify the implementation of security measures, they also strengthen the credibility of their proposed action. To be succinct, securitizing actors gain legitimacy by acting in accordance with the rules (Neocleous 2006). The upshot of this revelation is that rule-­breaking does not always or automatically have to stem from securitization. A caveat: the Copenhagen School states as much. Their account does not insist that rules are actually broken. While securitization requires the acceptance of a security threat existing, it does not also require the actual employment of extraordinary measures. In fact, the Copenhagen School make it clear: we do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures . . . that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats. (Buzan et al. 1998: 25)

58   Speaking security If agents do not actually have to break the rules for securitization to succeed, then why is rule breaking privileged as the classic tipping point for determining whether or not a securitization takes place? Assuming that a securitizing move is dependent on following normal rules rather than independent of them reinforces that the boundary between politicization and securitization is constantly under construction rather than being a fixed threshold that can be crossed. An equally noteworthy point to take away is that rule-­breaking may not be the most powerful mode of action a securitizing actor may undertake. Extending the ambit for rule-­following actions opens the space to show that agents may draw on some rules as well as breaking others. The idea that agents work within the boundaries of existing rules adds weight to Bright’s argument that “even when emergency act measures are adopted they do not outright break the rules in most cases so much as interfere with them” (Bright 2012: 18). Much will depend on the circumstances and how much agency the agents actually have to break free of the rules when they speak security. Redefining and (re)making the rules A second category worth incorporating into the rules-­following/rule-­breaking nexus underpinning the Copenhagen School’s framework is that of redefining. It is worth remembering that redefining the grammatical rules of securitization is out of the question for the Copenhagen School since modifying the way in which agents speak security would undermine the coherency of their entire framework. Another option would be to explore how the rules of engagement laid down by the Copenhagen School transform in the process of implementation and play. In principle, securitizing actors may alter the way in which they speak security in response to how their speech acts are received by their target audience. Built into this exchange is the suggestion that actors may sometimes need to rearticulate and even redefine the grounds on which they make their securitizing moves to achieve the required level of agreement. These feedback loops are also extremely powerful as they have the ability to transform how security is spoken during a securitizing move and thereafter. The original rules of engagement may also be redefined when an audience accepts parts of the speech act whilst rejecting others (Krebs and Jackson 2007). Such modifications will affect the kind of agency that the securitizing actors and their audiences will have as well as the structure in which they are interacting. These modes of redefining the rules of engagement and play are worthy of far greater consideration than they often receive. If the items that are being securitized are altered, then a different kind of securitization can said to be under construction. When the Copenhagen School speak about rules being broken, they are referring predominantly to existing intersubjective norms and laws. The boundaries that they claim are being transcended in a securitization process are those that define what constitutes “normal” politics. Yet even if agents are able to break free from rules that would otherwise bind in times of security, this does not mean that they are able to break free of all rules that would otherwise bind. By speaking security,

Speaking security   59 agents are undertaking an inherently rule based activity. This goes to the core of the understanding of security as a speech act: the utterance does something. While the Copenhagen School does an excellent job of demonstrating how speaking security empowers agents, they are less able to show how actors themselves are constrained by the contexts created by their speech acts. In some respects this ties in with Balzacq’s claims about the perlocutionary aspects playing second fiddle to the illocutionary aspects. This oversight stems from the lack of consideration of rule-­making as an equally important aspect of any securitizing move or securitization process. The kind of rules in question here are different to the Copenhagen School claims that one set of rules are suspended with another, that normal rules are transgressed when securitization occurs. Unlike existing intersubjective rules, the rules of speech are impossible to suspend. Without them the speech act would be meaningless, as these rules maintain the structures by which the words have meaning or sense. This deeper type of rule-­making is understated in the Copenhagen School framework. The rules of the act, so to speak, must be upgraded to explore how agents are forced to work within the confines of their discourse. By virtue of being spoken, or uttered, securitization has an intrinsic force to hold actors responsible for their words. As the Copenhagen School shows, speaking security establishes a space of maneuver. Yet it is possible to argue that there is more at stake here than audience acceptance or rejection. Although the speaker and the audiences are key agents in the process of speaking security, neither controls it per se. Instead, they participate in an intersubjective realm regarding the construction of a language of security (Fierke 2002: 337). As will be covered in the next chapter, it is necessary to look at how agents put the language of security into use. The war in Iraq is a good example of where it becomes imperative to examine how security is being spoken on a continual basis during the securitizing move and thereafter. Doing so provides a much clearer and more precise account of the rules of engagement and play underpinning their securitizing moves and speech acts. The claim that speaking security frees agents from everyday constraints runs into difficulties on another level. What the Copenhagen School is unable to clarify is what rules are now operational. As noted above, it is commonly argued that securitization legitimates a suspension of normal politics. What remains unaccounted for is what rules, if any, operate during securitization and afterwards. The quick reply here is that it is impossible to determine in advance how a securitization process will unfold. For the reasons put forth here, and consistent with the vocabulary of the speech act theory spelled out earlier, one must ask what rules the securitized speech act might bring into being. What do the rules of exceptionality look like? How do they function in principle and in practice? A close inspection of their securitization framework reveals that such considerations are not addressed. One difficultly with conceptualizing the rules of engagement in and for securitization, and a possible explanation of why this issue has not been very well

60   Speaking security studied, is that rules themselves are ambiguous. When added to the essentially contested concept of security, this ambiguity makes the delineation of what constitutes as rule-­following and rule-­breaking action even more evasive. The claim being made here is not to create a set of universal criteria to measure when, where and how securitization enables agents to break free from existing rules. The reason for this can partly be traced back to the assumption that to prescribe in advance what kind of rules need to be broken would undermine the constitutive nature of speech itself, and the rules and context which it constructs. Rather, what is being is suggested is that closer and more systematic attention is given to what rules are deemed important during a securitizing move and how these rules function thereafter, if at all. Taking this line facilitates more insightful and dynamic explorations into the relationship between rules of engagement and play and how they interact. Doing so illustrates that by changing the way that they speak security at any moment in time, agents also alter the rules at play during a securitization. This will become much clearer when we turn to Wittgenstein. For now the point to take away is that the relationships between different kind of rules is important, as they influence the way in which security can be spoken in a particular context, enabling and constraining those speaking security in different ways. Hidden dangers Exploring the different kind of rules at play when security is spoken offers a point of departure to prevent some of the hidden dangers of speaking security. Assuming that a larger amount of rules do apply when security is spoken prompts us to consider more coherently what securitized rules look like and who determines how they are constituted, implemented and legitimated. Indeed, the inclusion of different kinds of rules makes it necessary to ask questions about enforcement and responsibility. What rules are recognized as being legitimate to break? What rights are people entitled to in times of security? Who enforces the rules after securitization takes place? What are agents actually committed to when security is spoken? Who is responsible for what? Where does responsibility ultimately lie? Turning to the Copenhagen School’s framework we find that there is little mention of how the audience, if anyone, keeps securitized speakers in check once a securitizing move succeeds. In part this gap can be explained by the fact that, as a social construction, it is impossible to map out precisely how any securitization will unfold and what the outcomes will be. Yet the absence of any avenues for holding agents accountable once a successful securitization process succeeds potentially hinders the prospect of desecuritization taking place. Most noticeably, it weakens the avenues of contestation and transformation that may lead to this outcome. One potential avenue worth exploring here is the democratization of security. This broad term paves a way to introduce better forms of accountability into the securitization process. Instead of assuming that speakers are held accountable by their audiences, it would also become possible for speakers to be held accountable

Speaking security   61 by other audiences outside the securitization process. For instance, in the case of the Bush administration it would be possible for them not only to have to justify their actions to the domestic and international audiences to which they directed their securitizing speech acts (such as Congress or the UN), but also domestic and international audiences that were excluded (such as opposition groups and the International Criminal Court, or the International Red Crescent). Including the latter would help to empower audiences inside and outside the securitization process. Calling for the democratization of security also seems an apt way to start to grasp the evolving combination of language and law. Drawing the analysis of legal aspects into securitization studies could be an extremely useful mode of uncovering the way in which agents are engaging with rules in a more complex and specialized way. A potential problem with the above is that it encourages a democratic mode of governance. This is not what is being advocated. On the contrary it is far from clear that democracy is the best model for ensuring that security is attained in any context (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). It is also essential to be aware of silences in the law and that the language of security is not always inclusive (Constable 2005). As our discussion points out, not everyone is in a position to speak security in a way that will enhance their security (Hansen 2000). The quietening of certain critical voices in the Iraq War raises interesting questions about who is included in this kind of conversation. Similarly, while we assume that obeying rules will bring more peaceful outcomes, the Iraq War demonstrates that this is not the case. Here it is clear that the Bush administration’s use and redefinition of existing rules surrounding the legitimate use of force raised rather than lowered the security stakes. Being aware of all these issues and problems, however, still makes the idea of the democratization of security relevant. At base it makes us aware that rule-­governed order will create tensions that require constant attention to underlying dynamics, as we will see momentarily.

The Bush administration’s justifications for the 2003 Iraq War: a case of securitization? Before exploring how a securitization framework aids or hinders our analysis of how the Bush administration spoke security to justify and securitize the Iraq War, it is necessary to make two brief but important statements. First, some of the contentious issues addressed below will not surface in other case studies, for no two processes of securitization are identical. Second, given that the Copenhagen School advance specific rules of engagement, they may not wish to incorporate the recommendations outlined (Williams 2011b). However, it is suggested that adopting a more holistic conception of multiply and rules is imperative in order to grasp the complexities involved in the Bush administration’s securitizing speech acts and moves.

62   Speaking security Securitization and the Iraq War Striking parallels exist between the way President Bush and his cabinet spoke security to justify for the Iraq War and speech act theory outlined in the Copenhagen School securitization framework. As the previous chapter demonstrated, this administration relied heavily on security utterances to constitute and communicate the heightened dangers posed by Saddam Hussein’s terrorist regime and their WMD stockpiles. Through this medium they established an argument about the need to employ exceptional measures, or what they termed pre-­emptive action, to overthrow Saddam Hussein. In effect President Bush and his team contended that it was only by adopting special security agendas that normal freedoms could survive. Making this plain in the build-­up to the Iraq War, the President stated, the inspectors have gone to Iraq, and it is clear that not only is Saddam Hussein deceiving, it is clear he’s not disarming. And so you’ll see us over the next short period of time, working with friends and allies and the United Nations to bring that body along [. . .]. But one thing is certain, for the sake of peace and for the sake of security, the United States and our friends and allies, we will disarm Saddam Hussein if he will not disarm himself. (Bush 2003h: February 9) The Bush administration’s speech acts and securitizing moves also clearly convey the idea that the existing rules were not sufficient to respond to the heightened security threat that Iraq posed. Stating this plainly, President Bush asserted “containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorists allies” (Bush 2002e: June 1). Vice President Cheney also warned that the costs of inaction would be much higher than the costs of action in this case: “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us” (Cheney 2002d: August 26). Making this connection, Rice argued, By both its actions and its inactions, Iraq is proving not that it is a nation bent on disarmament, but that it is a nation with something to hide. Iraq is still treating inspections as a game. It should know that time is running out. (Rice 2003a: January 23) The main message being constructed and communicated in the quotations above is a situation in which urgent and emergency measures, above and beyond those already available in international law and normal politics, needed to be implemented to avoid a looming and existential threat from materializing. The lines of identification that the Bush administration drew between themselves and Saddam the terrorist are easily explained by the Copenhagen School

Speaking security   63 framework. Moreover, these divisions are deemed important. As we saw in the previous chapter, the justifications given for the Iraq invasion were founded on and by repeated references to the Saddam Hussein’s regime being a threatening other. Making this explicit President Bush proclaimed, I talked about an axis of evil, because I firmly believe that nations need to be put on notice that this nation will not allow our citizens to become threatened not only by terrorist acts, but by nations which develop weapons of mass destruction which could easily, or eventually be used against us. We will not be intimidated. I will not allow nations to hold us hostage, or our friends and allies hostage. Terror is our mission. (Bush 2002b: February 6) Restating this point, Rice concluded, The rationale has been the same from the very beginning. Saddam Hussein was a very dangerous man, in the world’s most dangerous region. This is someone who had acquired weapons of mass destruction, used them before, been sanctioned by the United Nations for 12 years, by his refusal to give them up. In Resolution 1441, had been ordered by the international community to finally disarm, and had failed to do so. He had invaded his neighbors, he had gassed his own people. (Rice 2004b: June 1) Tying all these quotations together demonstrates that in this case speaking security did something. Without a doubt, speaking security enabled the Bush administration to make a securitizing move to legitimate the use of extraordinary measures against Saddam Hussein. Up to this point the Bush administration’s speech acts appear to satisfy all the prerequisites necessary in the Copenhagen School securitization framework. Actually, it appears to be a perfect fit. In the case of the Iraq War, we find a securitizing actor (the Bush administration) undertaking a securitizing move by presenting a referent object (Saddam Hussein’s terrorist regime) as an existential threat (via their possession of WMD) that necessitated the adoption of emergency measures (a war of pre-­emptive self­defense). What is less clear is whether or not this move constitutes a case of successful securitization or not. Securitization or not securitization: that is the question Although we can establish that the Bush administration undertook a securitizing move to present the Iraq regime as an existential threat, uncertainty exists surrounding whether or not this move was accepted by the audience, as required by the Copenhagen School. Several scholars and practitioners have debated this issue. Studying the Iraq case, Paul Roe makes two important observations. First,

64   Speaking security he shows that there is a difference between the “stage of mobilization” and the “stage of implementation” (Roe 2008). In keeping with this formulation, he argues that securitization studies needs to pay greater attention to how speakers not only mobilize this speech act to make their move, but also who has the power to implement security practice. Elsewhere, Nicole Jackson (2006: 313) claims that, “once an issue is rhetorically adopted, it must affect the development of a policy for it to be effective in practice. Otherwise the activities have only been rhetorically securitized with no practical result.” The point to take away here is that it is not always easy to determine when the audience accepts a securitizing move or when securitization succeeds or fails, as second-­generation debates point out. Examining the Bush administration’s speech acts illustrates another twist when it comes to classifying the Iraq War as a successful case of securitization: clearly they were trying to convince more than one audience. The division between domestic and international audiences is one example, and the opposing partisan lines within each domain are another. Analysis has shown that the reception their securitized arguments received varied considerably from context to context (Kaufmann 2004; Kull et al. 2003/2004; McDonald 2005; O’Connor and Vucetic 2010; Thrall 2007). While the President’s decision to go to war received substantial support, important dissenting voices were heard inside and outside the securitization process (Carter 2002; Scowcroft 2002). In such circumstances, it is pertinent to ask which audience acceptance is essential. Following Roe, the Iraq War highlights that the opinion of “formal” audiences such as the UK Parliament appear to carry more weight (Roe 2008: 633). Through his account it becomes apparent that while certain audiences are in a more powerful position to speak security, certain audiences are also in a more powerful position to accept it. For while the mass public protested against the war, nationally and internationally, their leaders were still in a position to implement extraordinary measures. Ciaran O’Reilly offers an alternative answer to address the issue of audience reception and acceptance. According to him, while there were debates about the security issue, a general acceptance existed on the “securityness” of the situation by the audience (O’Reilly 2008). Given that there was little debate on the framing of the conflict in terms of security or terrorism (Gershkoff and Kushner 2005), it can be argued that securitization did succeed. Yet while the Bush administration and their allies were given acceptance from some “formal” audiences, they failed to obtain it from others. Most noticeably, they failed to win complete approval from the UN. The support of this particular institution proved extremely problematic, since no second resolution passed the UN Security Council, there was no legal mandate for war. The Secretary-­General at that time, Kofi Annan, drew the implications of those facts directly by explaining that the UN Charter “is very clear on the circumstances under which force can be used.” He went on to declare, “If the US and others were to go outside the Council and take military action on their own, it would not be in conformity with the Charter” (Prados 2004: 263–264).

Speaking security   65 Thus while the Bush administration and other members of their coalition of the willing may have been authorized by domestic legislative branches such as Congress, or the Parliament in the case of the UK, they were unable to get complete support from the UN. Failing to get the complete backing of the latter institution, moreover, proved to have a knock-­on effect on how other countries responded to their securitizing move. In fact, a majority of countries argued that “a preemptive strike would not be in accordance with international law and the UN Charter” (Dombrowski and Payne 2003: 398–388). Reflecting on the deep division that emerged between Europe and America over the legality of the Iraq invasion, Robert Kagan notes that “opinion polls taken before, during, and after the war show two peoples living on separate strategic and ideological planets. Whereas more than 8o percent of Americans believe that war can sometimes achieve justice, less than half of Europeans agree” (Kagan, 2004: 65). This leads us back to the question of how it was possible for Operation Iraqi Freedom to still go ahead if the claims that Saddam Hussein constituted an existential threat were questioned and challenged by some audiences even if it was rejected by others. Considering a multifaceted securitization Another striking issue that comes out in the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War is that their “securitizing move” was not based on speaking security alone. While security was the dominant speech act, it co-­existed with several others. Needless to say, the concept of macrosecuritization can cope with the existence of several securitizing speech acts co-­existing and linking up in the Bush administration’s securitization process. Indeed, it aptly highlights the massive scale of construction that was being undertaken by the Bush administration in the name of security. As the preamble to the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy established, “the war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration” (White House 2002). This concept runs into difficulty because it assumes that the President and other top officials in his administration were speaking security according to the grammatical rules of securitization; that is presenting Saddam Hussein and his WMD as an existential threat that required immediate actions. While it has been established that a securitizing logic ran throughout the Bush administration’s arguments for war, on closer inspection it appears that a far richer constellation of speech acts and structures of meaning were underpinning their securitizing moves. For one thing, as the last chapter established, America’s justifications for going to war with Iraq were premised on an array of arguments that ranged from Saddam Hussein’s possession of WMD and his links with Al-­ Qaeda, to regime change, to democracy promotion. While all of these themes can be, and were, subsumed under the rubric of security, they all permit and pertain to different modes of action. Thus, even taking the Iraq War as one securitization embedded in America’s macrosecuritization of the global war on terror, we find differences in how security is being spoken.

66   Speaking security Returning to the first defining moment reaffirms that the Bush administration’s securitizing move was more complex than that of a simple case of securitization. As mentioned, this juncture illustrates that other frames of reference, such as democracy, were not only linked to other securitizations in the US war on terror, but also deeply embedded within the security speech acts employed by the Bush administration to justify the Iraq War. Within their narrative, security and democracy were presented as two sides of the same coin. Remaining focused on the rules of engagement provided by the Copenhagen School and the Bush administration themselves underappreciates how the original grounds for war transformed as the securitizing moves for the Iraq case unfolded. Yet this kind of re-­securitization seems more in tune with the Bush administration’s securitizing move to legitimate the Iraq War. As the defining moment illustrates, the original justifications that this administration gave for undertaking the use of force against Iraq had to be rebuilt when no WMD were found. By drawing these additional layers of meaning into the remit of their securitizing speech acts, the Bush administration was able to construct their securitizing move above and beyond the Saddam threat. As Secretary Powell’s speech exemplifies, the subjects of security and democracy were intertwined on a regular basis, giving the impression that the latter was a logical extension of the former discussion: At times like these, we are reminded of the fundamentals, of the basics. We are reminded of how precious life and freedom are. We are reminded of how blessed we are as a country. We are reminded of the sacrifices that Americans of every generation have made, not just to preserve and protect and defend our way of life, but also to help others around the globe secure the blessings of liberty for themselves and for their children [. . .]. The American people can be proud that they will be here and that we are helping the men and women of Iraq realize their long-­held dream of freedom. American foreign policy is all about helping to build hope across the globe. For the sake of our most cherished values and our most vital interests, President Bush is deeply committed to working with friends and former foes around the world to build a world of hope where tyrants and terrorists cannot thrive. (Powell 2004c: December 6) This combination of security and democracy in the Bush administration’s securitizing move to overthrow Saddam Hussein brings us back to the underexplored issue of the securitization of democracy. The multiple issues woven together in the Bush administration’s security utterances demonstrate that the relationship between these various words mattered. Making a case for war premised on removing Saddam Hussein’s WMD is very different from justifying a war on the grounds of promoting democracy. For the Bush administration to undertake pre-­emptive measures to fight a growing threat through military actions was controversial but still interpreted as a legitimate and legal course of action, but for them to go to war to democratize and liberate Iraq was not. Making this plain, Henry Shue notes,

Speaking security   67 if the justification of military action were the elimination of stocks of WMD and the prevention of their reconstitution, then one would be justified in adopting reasonable means to that end. But only reasonable ends, and only means to justify the ends, not to a smorgasbord of other ends. (Shue 2010: 225) From a securitization perspective, the absence of these “dangerous and deadly weapons’ in and of themselves is not problematic. To recall, an existential threat does not have to exist per se; an audience just has to be convinced that they do. What was a problem for the Bush administration, however, was that the lack of WMD had bearing on how it was able to speak security to make a convincing case for war and how others understood and accepted this line of argument as a legitimate response. Here again we find the issue of rule-­following, rule-­breaking and rule-­making becomes important. Securitizing and securitized rules The issue of rules and international law played a dominant role in mobilizing debates and opinions about whether or not this invasion was a legitimate course of self-­defense or whether a security threat the Bush administration claimed existed actually existed. In this case we find the presence or absence of rule-­ following actions was paramount and influenced how different audiences decided to accept or reject the Bush administration’s securitizing speech acts and moves. Picking up on this idea, Marc Trachtenberg agues, what upsets many people about the Bush policy is not so much its acceptance of the idea that the United States might in some cases have to act “preemptively” and deal with threats before the country itself has been attacked, as the way that policy has been presented to the world. They are shocked that this principle of pre-­emption has been embraced so openly. It is the tone of the policy which they find offensive. (Trachtenberg 2010: 65) It is important to mention that the Bush administration did speak security to enable them to break free of rules and to alter the rules of everyday politics. The 2001 Patriot Act is a prominent example of this mode of action. Introduced on October 26, 2001, this piece of legislation encroached upon several individual rights by enabling intelligence agencies to conduct intrusive searches on “suspects” telephone records, email communication and financial and medical records (Doyle 2002). The Bush administration argued that such measures were essential to enable them to fight their war on terrorism in an effective and speedy manner. Although this legislation was not categorized by the President as rule-­breaking behavior, the activities that were legitimized by the Patriot Act certainly suggest that the Bush administration’s security policies enabled them to break free from rules that would otherwise bind. Without a doubt, encroachments on people’s

68   Speaking security lives and civil liberties would not have been so easily legitimated in normal circumstances (Whitehead and Aden 2001–2002). Further examples of how the Bush administration attempted to break free of the Geneva Conventions will be outlined in Chapter 4. Our concern for now is not so much to show that the Bush administration was not attempting to break existing rules, but to establish that the way in which they spoke security also signals an attempt to follow existing rules and even redefine them. Rule following Examining the Bush administration’s speech act highlights repeated references to rule-­following behavior on America’s part. Indeed, institutionalized rules surrounding the principles of self-­defense and pre-­emption constituted cornerstones of the security speech acts they used to justify the Iraq War. Contrary to rule-­ following/rule-­breaking nexus outlined in the Copenhagen School framework, whilst the Bush administration spoke security to construct Saddam Hussein as an existential threat that required using special measures, they did not advocate rule-­breaking action. Close scrutiny of their arguments for undertaking the Iraq War show that members of the Bush administration consistently argued that their definition of pre-­emption was consistent with the existing protocols found in international laws. For instance, Condoleezza Rice said The National Security Strategy does not overturn five decades of doctrine and jettison either containment or deterrence. These strategic concepts can and will continue to be employed wherever appropriate. (Rice 2002b: October 1) Further evidence of the Bush administration using existing rules rather than breaking them is found in the fact that they went to the UN to legalize the war. Even such avid sceptics of the UN as Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld recognized this was a necessary step to deal with the Iraqi regime. Their responses on Late Edition (CNN) and on Fox TV in Prague respectively are worth quoting at length to demonstrate how the Bush administration was constrained by pre-­existing intersubjective rules: Q: 

Are you still committed to trying to get U.N. weapons inspection teams back into Iraq? Because, as you know, some critics – Senator Fred Thompson, for example – said that would be a waste, that they’re just going to give a runaround. Cheney:  What we said, Wolf, if you go back and look at the record is, the issue’s not inspectors. The issue is that he has chemical weapons and he’s used them. The issue is that he’s developing and has biological weapons. The issue is that he’s pursuing nuclear weapons. (Cheney 2002b: March 24)

Speaking security   69 Rumsfeld made a similar assertion: Q: 

Why even go through the U.N. with Iraq? You’ve expressed doubts, as has the vice president, about the efficiency of arms inspections and what they generate. It seems that Saddam’s strategy, if we look at the past, would be to cheat around the edges, to stall, not to do anything that would unite the Security Council. Doesn’t that carry the risk that we could be thrown into limbo here for who knows how long? Rumsfeld:  It does. Yes, it does. The president knew that. He looked at the pluses and the minuses and said, look, there are disadvantages. We can get into our quagmire, where he strings along the U.N. Every time they are almost ready to find something, then he stops them. Then they get mad, and then he finds a way to acquiesce. He’s a professional at this. [. . .] The president saw that and said, well, that’s the disadvantage. The advantage is, people have a chance to think about it, talk about it. It’s a new security environment we’re in the 21st century. It’s different. People do need to get comfortable with the fact that, historically we’ve been organized to train and equip to deal with armies, navies, and air forces in other countries. Here there’s no country, in the case of Al Qaeda. There’s no army, navy, or air force that’s a particular impediment. And yet the threat is a very, very serious, lethal threat. And so we need time to think about that, and I think the President made the right judgment. And if and when something is required by the way of force, he will have a large coalition of willing countries. (Rumsfeld 2002g: November 21) Although this can be seen as a case of rational calculation and cheap talk on the Bush administration’s part, at the very least it demonstrates that they recognized that a certain level of rule-­following needed to be taken into consideration when they made their case for war. Indeed, presenting the Iraq War as a rule-­breaking endeavour could have weakened the legitimacy of their claims that they were acting in the name of self-­defense. While making it clear that the US would disarm Saddam Hussein if necessary, they presented this as a lawful and legitimate action given the security threats they faced. Hence, while the language of rule-­breaking had been clearly implied in their securitizing moves, it was not straightforwardly stated in the Bush administration’s security speech acts. As Secretary Powell suggested, President Bush has also made it clear that we reserve the right, the United States reserves the right, in the absence of international action to disarm Iraq, to act with like-­minded nations to disarm Iraq. And we are positioning ourselves for whatever eventuality might occur. And as the President has also said, he hopes for a peaceful solution, but we will be ready to act otherwise if that is what is required to make sure that Iraq is disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction. (Powell 2003a: January 10)

70   Speaking security Redefining and (re)making the rules Despite the absence of any explicit reference to rule-­breaking, it is important not to overlook the way in which they drew upon and followed existing rules in an attempting to redefine them. The defining moment offers an excellent example of where the Bush administration attempted to remake the rules of engagement and play constituted by the securitizing speech acts. First, it is clear that the Bush administration had to rebuild their argument for why it was necessary to go to war with Iraq if it had no WMD. What is often overlooked is that from this point onwards the Bush administration was speaking security in a different way. The adjustments to their securitizing moves are subtle and well crafted. At no point did the Bush administration or its coalition of the willing retract its contention that Saddam Hussein posed an existential security threat that required urgent measures to be adopted. In this respect their security utterances remained untouched. That said, however, it is possible to detect alterations in the way they framed and presented their core rationale for war. What the Bush administration presented at the defining moment was not a radically new discourse, but rather a redefinition of priorities and how they would respond to the urgent security threat that Saddam Hussein and his regime posed. As Cheney commented: Critics of the liberation of Iraq must also answer another question: what would that country look like today if we had failed to act? If we had not acted, Saddam Hussein and his sons would still be in power. If we had not acted, the torture chambers would still be in operation; the prison cells for children would still be filled; the mass graves would still be undiscovered; the terror network would still enjoy the support and protection of the regime; Iraq would still be making payments to the families of suicide bombers attacking Israel; and Saddam Hussein would still control vast wealth to spend on his chemical, biological, and nuclear ambitions. All of these crimes and dangers were ended by decisive military action. Everyone, for many years, wished for these good outcomes. Finally, one man made the decision to achieve them: President George W. Bush. And the Iraqi people, the people of the Middle East, and the American people have a safer future because Saddam Hussein’s regime is history. Having now liberated Iraq, the United States and our allies are determined to see all our commitments through. (Cheney 2003b: July 24) The idea of redefining the rules is also extremely important in the Bush administration’s response at the defining moment. At a quick glance, this juncture appears as an extreme example of rule-­breaking insofar as the US defied the UN. However, a closer investigation of the Bush administration’s language illuminates that even when no WMD were found, they drew on rules to frame the need for action. In fact, Resolution 1441 becomes a benchmark in the justifications for the Iraq War. Stripping the facts down to it most basic, Secretary Powell stated:

Speaking security   71 we took the case back to the United Nations last fall, got a solid resolution, 1441, which gave legitimacy to the use of military force if he didn’t comply with his many obligations over a period of ten years. He didn’t comply with those obligations, force was used, and now his regime is no longer. (Powell 2003c: April 12) Instead of breaking free of rules that would otherwise bind, what appears to be at stake in the Bush administration’s securitizing move is the use of existing rules to justify their actions. This point will be developed in more detail in the next chapter. Addressing the importance of rules is imperative in the empirical case for another reason: the Bush administration sought to conduct “a different kind of war.” Their message was clear: new threats required new thinking. Nevertheless, the specifics of what kind of rules the Bush administration had in mind are vague, even in retrospect. Using security as an overarching theme, the Bush administration claimed that they had to keep all options open, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones. (Rumsfeld 2002e: February 12) While the Bush administration’s security utterances did identify an existential threat, their actual plans for defeating Saddam Hussein were far from certain. This kind of ambiguity and uncertainty raises interesting points about the relationship between how agents speak security and how this language translates into practice. If we remain at the rules of engagement we only get a glimpse into the kinds of rules that the Bush administration were putting into play. What we still need to ask is what this language legitimates and what kinds of rules of play did speaking security enable them to instigate.

Conclusion Without a doubt the Copenhagen School offers an invaluable contribution to critical debates that challenge the maxims of cheap talk when it comes to security. At the core of securitization is the contention that “securitizing” speech acts create a social situation whereby referent objects are designated as existential threats. In this capacity, language really matters. With the consent of the audience, a securitizing move has the power to transfer issues from the realm of everyday politics to the realm of exceptional politics, where agents are empowered to break free of rules that would otherwise bind. Keeping this framework in mind enables securitization to be conceptualized as a specialized language game,

72   Speaking security one which operates according to specific rules of engagement. As noted above, the Copenhagen School argue that security must be spoken in a particular way or according to certain “facilitating conditions.” Whether through acclamation or censure, it is hard to miss that the field of securitization studies is expanding exponentially. Examining the myriad debates surrounding securitization exemplified that many voices are speaking to the original securitization framework. A common theme that emerges clearly from ongoing discussions within securitization studies is that security can be spoken in many ways rather than only in one way. Contributing to this idea, this chapter explored instances when speech acts and securitizing moves overlap and intertwine. Initially the idea of multiple structures of meanings and processes of securitization interacting is not a problem for the Copenhagen School. In fact, their concept of macrosecuritization provides an overarching mode of analysis to examine how different kinds of securitization link up. Although this concept is very useful, it remains somewhat limited to fully address instances where a speech act of security or macrosecuritization is composed of multiple and competing structures of meaning. Taking this kind of multiplicity seriously instigates a deeper level of analysis of the relationship between securitization and rules. A core theme that runs through the Copenhagen School’s framework is that speaking security enables agents to break free of rules that would otherwise bind. Without denying this kind of action can occur, and may be necessary, it has been argued that a more holistic theorization of the kind of rules operating during securitizing moves and afterwards is necessary. The idea that agents can remake, redefine and re-­ securitize rules was offered as an advanced argument to fill this gap. The concepts of the securitization of democracy and the democratization of security offer convincing ways to explore how the boundary between the everyday and the exceptional, or the politicized and the securitized, are not only transgressed but also how they overlap. The Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War offered a critical discussion point to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Copenhagen School framework. Adopting a securitized lens to this case study sheds key insights into the logic of danger, threat and exceptionality that characterize the Bush administration’s arguments for waging war against Saddam Hussein’s regime. Consistent with the Copenhagen School approach, members of this administration spoke security to present the Iraqi dictator and his regime as a “grave and gathering” threat that required urgent action and legitimated the use of extraordinary measures such as pre-­emptive strikes. Moreover, their speech acts constructed clear lines of identification between us and them. Where the Copenhagen School’s framework runs into difficulty is over whether or not the Bush administration’s securitizing speech acts and moves constitute a successful case of securitization. As noted, while the securitizing moves of the President and his team received the acceptance of some audiences to justify the use of force in the Iraqi case, they failed to convince others. Tensions produced in these heated debates reinforce second-­generation criticisms

Speaking security   73 about the ambiguity surrounding the benchmarks of success and failure in securitization and the actual power of the audience to accept and reject securitizing moves. Taking these arguments an extra step again highlights the importance of thinking about scenarios in which agents are still speaking security, but in a different way. This subtle type of redefinition and re-­securitization becomes necessary in studying the case at hand. As the preceding discussions clearly demonstrated, security was not the only speech act uttered by the Bush administration to legitimate the US military invasion of Iraq. On closer inspection, the interplay between different speech acts, moves and structures of meaning becomes apparent. Since the Bush administration was no longer speaking security in the same way, by extension, a different kind of securitization was under construction. As shown in later chapters, the Bush administration was now moving within contradictory premises (Koskenniemini 2011: 226) as well as complementary ones. The issue of rules poses further questions for securitization to consider when it comes to the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War. It is erroneous to argue that the President and his team did not attempt to break any rules in their bid to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Following their securitizing speech acts and moves closely indicates that they claimed they would use whatever measures necessary to quell what they perceived to be the deadly and dangerous threats posed by Iraq. America’s decision to purse military action without acquiring a second UN Security Council Resolution also appears to typify rule-­breaking actions. However, the case study in question reveals a more complex engagement with the rules than these actions might first suggest. What also stands out in their security speech acts is that this foreign policy venture was constantly framed as being law-­abiding. This mixture of rule-­ breaking and rule-­following does not neatly coincide with the Copenhagen School claim that speaking security enables agents to break free from rules that would otherwise bind or suspend the rules of everyday politics. Additionally it is possible to point to a kind of rule-­making and redefining with the Bush administration’s justification for the Iraq War. This latter mode of action forces us to consider whether there different ways of thinking and talking about speaking security inside and outside of securitization. It is to these issues that we will now turn.

3 From a speech act towards a language game

Introduction Building on previous discussions, this chapter outlines Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work on language games as an alternative angle for examining how security is spoken in theory and practice. By way of reference to the title, this moves us away from a focus on speech acts towards the larger language games of security that are in play. It is necessary to specify up front that Wittgenstein was not an IR scholar, but a philosopher interested in language and meaning. Thus, bringing his discussions to a different academic domain requires some conceptual adaptation since he does not provide a theory that can be neatly applied. Important inroads have been made to show the contribution of incorporating Wittgenstein’s language game approach into to the discipline of International Relations (Duffy et al. 1998; Fierke 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Kratochwil 1987, 1989, 2000a, 2006; Mulligan 2004, 2006; Onuf 1989, 1998, 2003). This discussion contributes to that line of work by juxtaposing the Copenhagen School’s speech act theory with that of a language game. Integrating Wittgenstein’s work into ongoing debates about securitization also lays out a framework for beginning to think more seriously about exploring not only about how agents speak security, but also how they put these rules of engagement into play within certain contexts. We begin with a synopsis of Wittgenstein’s later writings of a language game. Doing so sketches out the importance of analyzing “meanings in use” and understanding language as a “form of life.” Following on from there the next section unpacks the range of rules outlined in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of a language game. Here, particular attention is given to the distinction he draws between rule-­following and rule-­breaking on the one hand and an act of interpretation on the other as a way to link language and legitimacy together in nuanced ways. The third section sets out to integrate Wittgenstein’s conception of a language game into the securitization debates outlined in Chapter 2. This is beneficial for two distinct reasons. First, adopting a Wittgensteinian lens veers us away from the speech act as the main mode of action. Second, his idea of “meanings in use” is advocated as a more sophisticated building block to explore the kind of rules that are available within a language game of security, especially a securitized

From a speech act towards a language game   75 one. Drawing on the theoretical insights, the chapter revisits the empirical case study. Following Wittgenstein, the goal is to “look and see” what language games the Bush administration constructed to legitimize their foreign policy for the Iraq War. Taking this as the starting point illuminates the complex way in which overlapping and interfacing structures of meaning were woven together within the Bush administrations justifications for the Iraq War. An awareness of these points of intersection carves out a space to explore how the Bush administration not only followed rules but also how they redefined them. The final section brings the main arguments of this chapter together by raising further questions about the relationship between language and legitimacy, or, more particularly, what language legitimates. These themes will be given greater attention in Chapter 4. What happened in Abu Ghraib in the name of security provides a stark reminder of why it is necessary to examine and perhaps revise the way in which we speak security.

A language game Wittgenstein presented the notion of language games in The Philosophical Investigations (1979a). This book signalled a major departure from his earlier work, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, which was founded on the assumptions of logical positivism (Wittgenstein 1922). Where the early Wittgenstein was concerned with simple propositions and how these statements mirrored the world, his later considerations progressed away from a picture theory of language towards that of a game (Bloor 1983; Fierke 2002). As he remarked, “a picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (Wittgenstein 1979a: §115: 48). An essential part of Wittgenstein’s revision was to convey language as being fundamentally constitutive of the “reality” within which we find ourselves (Searle 1995; Winch 1958). Drawing on the notion of a game, he presented language as an interactive activity. From this perspective, participants do not merely act and react in a causal or predetermined manner. Nor do they experience language as an external aspect of their life. On the contrary, they live it and reproduce it through their everyday practices. For Wittgenstein, “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” (Wittgenstein 1979: §19: 8a). Elsewhere Wittgenstein maintains that “the term language game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life” (Wittgenstein 1979a: §23: 11, italics in original). Assuming no pre-­existing world exists “out there” for us to uncover, Wittgenstein contended that social reality is something that we learn and is revealed to us through our participation within specific language games. Keeping with this line, he argued that, “the meaning :of a word is its use in language” (Wittgenstein 1979a: §43: 18). This notion of meaning in use is crucial to Wittgenstein, since “it is only in a language that I can mean something by something” (1979a: §38: 18). This statement establishes that the rules of engagement are intimately interrelated to and interdependent on the rules of play in order to become meaningful.

76   From a speech act towards a language game Saying something is an important step, one which must then be constantly put into use to remain in existence. The idea of meaning in use also encourages multiplicity. Conceptualizing language as an ongoing construction, Wittgenstein conveys the infinite potentiality for such arrangements. From his perspective, there are as many worlds as there are language games through which they are expressed at any particular time. Some examples are useful to unpack this point. Within a game of chess, a player can choose to situate different pieces into different positions at different times, just a footballer can choose to strike, pass or score depending on the state of play when they are in possession of the ball. Equally, an agent can use the same word, such as security, to do a number of things. This last point echoes the Copenhagen School’s claim that security speech acts can represent and constitute multiple referent objects. It also strengthens suggestions made in Chapter 1 that the concept of security is essentially contested, since within a language game there is not one uniform meaning, but manifold and even competing ones. Consequently, Wittgenstein shied away from providing a fixed definition of a language game. Justifying this decision, he states, Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomenon have not one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all – but that they are related to one another in many different ways. (Wittgenstein 1979a: §65: 31) Multiplicity surfaces in an additional way within Wittgenstein’s work. Not only may agents speak security in different ways to do numerous things, they may also participate in more than one language game concurrently. To elaborate, agents can speak security to start a war, flag up environmental issues or protect human rights simultaneously. Assuming that an agent, such as the Bush administration, participates in more than one language game at a time, there is nothing to prevent them from taking on different roles in different spheres of action. With this in mind, actors can be considered to be both a speaker and an audience depending on which games they are participating in. Either way, what stands out in Wittgenstein’s work is that people face and make choices as they act and interact in any social context. These decisions are not fixed. On the contrary, Wittgenstein stressed that no two games will be identical. Even when agents undertake the same move, it does not necessarily have the same outcome. To return to our examples, a player who moves the queen in a game of chess may win or lose the game, while the footballer can score or miss when they shoot at the goal, just as the agent who speaks security can succeed or fail when they undertake a securitizing move. A constant possibility of different outcomes occurring reinforces that unintended consequences and change can arise at any point during the course of game. Multiplicity surfaces in Wittgenstein’s account of a language game in an even further capacity. Acknowledging that each language game may contain

From a speech act towards a language game   77 multiple meanings, he contends that various language games can connect with one another at a myriad of points. Building on this theme, Wittgenstein draws an apt analogy between language and a city, stating “our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods” (Wittgenstein 1979a: §18: 8). Elsewhere he describes language as a “labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about” (1979a: §203: 82). Wittgenstein introduces the term “family resemblances” to discuss the points of intersection that emerge from these overlaps. Such resemblances do not generate hypotheses or causal outcomes. Rather, these understandings are part of the grammar that enables agents to know how to act in the language games they are playing. For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to them all, but similarities, relationships and whole series of them at that. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-­crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances.” (Wittgenstein 1979a: §66–67: 32) Building on the idea of family resemblances illustrates that the way in which words are linked and grouped together has ramifications. According to Wittgenstein, the linguistic arrangement constituting any language game will influence the meaning of each term used within the course of play, and by extension, the meaning of the overall language game in which they are used. In other words, the way in which words criss-­cross will determine the kind of language game that it is possible to play, as well as the rules according to which that specific game unfolds. A different linguistic arrangement will constitute a different sphere of action. As we will see later on, the way in which the Bush administration defined security on the basis of pre-­emptive self-­ defense and WMD constructed one kind of game. The way in which they defined security on the basis of pre-­emptive self-­defense and democracy constructed another. While both can be seen as constituting a language game of security which share family resemblances, each is premised on a different mode of action and rules. Assuming any actor is embedded in several language games, and that these language games may be comprised of several sets of meanings, raises the question of how people distinguish one game from another. What does a “valid move” look like? Wittgenstein does not evade such issues. For him, however, the multiplicity afforded through a language game approach is a help rather than a hindrance. The very fact that social reality is so complex necessitates approaching it with a fluid mode of analysis.

78   From a speech act towards a language game As he remarks: But how many kind of sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and command? – There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols,” “words,” “sentences.” And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new kinds of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (Wittgenstein 1979a: §23: 11) Part of Wittgenstein’s primary argument here is to advocate a position which enables agents to constantly rethink and critique the state of play. He argues this helps us to overcome the tendency to become blinded or bewitched by our own language use (Wittgenstein 1979a: §206, 219). An important point is being made here. What Wittgenstein highlights is that it is dangerous to assume a priori what meanings mean without knowing what they actually mean in practice. To prevent this from occurring, he advocated opening up everything to view in our language. Commenting on this he notes, Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games.” I mean board-­ game, card-­games, ball-­games, Olympic games and so on. What is common to all of them? – Don’t say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called games” – but look and see whether there is anything common to them all. (Wittgenstein 1979a: §66: 31) A crucial point that follows when we “look and see” is that each move does not carry equal weight or legitimacy. In fact, falsehood is possible in language games. This occurs when the world as revealed by a particular language game fails the tests of truth associated with the game. Unlike positivism, however, what is true and false is constituted in the game. Indeed, the concept of language games sensitizes us to the fact that the “right names” are determined in the process of interaction. As he remarks, So are you saying that human agreement decides what is true and false? – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (Wittgenstein 1979a: §241: 88) The foregoing discussion highlights the importance of grasping what the rules of engagement and play are. According to Wittgenstein, each move only makes sense to players in the context of the language game in which they are immersed. Once removed from the specific context of the given game, the ascription of meaning alters. Consequently, one game can say little about the validity of the other games because they are constituted by differing types of meaning and behavior.

From a speech act towards a language game   79

The rules of a language game Earlier chapters called for a deeper conceptualization of the nexus between language and rules. Wittgenstein serves as an excellent entry point into this kind of discussion. For him, determining which meanings hold true in a given language game presupposes a system of rules which operate as structuring devices that govern the behavior of the participants. Crucially, these guidelines establish the parameters of acceptability within specific spheres of interaction, simplifying the numerous choices available to actors as they go about their daily life (Berger and Luckman 1966). This is beneficial. On the one hand, the rules of a language game provide actors with some guidelines in which people engage each other, for people are only capable of communicating in words and actions because they are socialized into and share a range of intersubjective understandings. Games, including a securitized game, are based on rules which are meaningful because they are shared. Without denying the regulatory side of rules or that they can be oppressive, Wittgenstein stressed that they do more than dictate how people behave (Onuf 1989). When people fully understand a rule and put it into use, Wittgenstein contends that the state of play is taken for granted. This level of internalization underpins his notion of “knowing a rule” or “knowing how to go on” (Wittgenstein 1979a, §134–155). At this stage rules are an automatic part of how individuals make sense and understand their surroundings. They are no longer questioned. As Wittgenstein expressed, “How am I to obey a rule?” – if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way that I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade has turned. Then I am inclined to say, “this is simply what I do.” (Wittgenstein 1979a: §217: 85) This level of familiarity is evidenced by the very fact that agents draw upon them repeatedly as a matter of course, that we obey the rules blindly (Kratochwil, 1989; Onuf 1989). Here again we find that Wittgenstein’s analysis is not merely about the construction of language, but about the construction of a way of life, characterized by particular habitual and collective patterns of behavior. To recall, it is, “the whole, consisting of the language and the actions into which it is woven, the ‘language game’ ” (Wittgenstein 1979a: §7: 5). Private language games Stating that rules are socially and linguistically constructed is different than asserting they are cheap or open to self-­interpretation. On the contrary, Wittgenstein is very clear that rules have a structural logic which stands apart from personal mindsets. Indeed he states categorically that there can be no such thing as a private language (Wittgenstein 1979a: §243–275). Maintaining this division

80   From a speech act towards a language game between a public and a private language game is crucial because once the rules of any game become the property of an individual, they cease to operate as overarching frameworks of meaning. According to him, this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (Wittgenstein 1979a: §201: 81) This quote serves to reaffirm that the meaning of language lies in its use. The idea of a language game leaves a space open for interpretative strategies. Before, after and during the course of play, actors can interpret a specific rule in different ways. In the realm of international law, for instance, people employ the vast vocabulary of rules in many different ways, taking many different forms to explain what they are doing (Lang 2007; Lang et al. 2006; O’Driscoll 2006). Such creative licence is found in the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War on the grounds of pre-­emptive self-­defense. Looking at their use of international law, we can see the associations they drew between the legality of their security practices and those codified in existing rules. In short, it gave them agency to act in one way rather than another. Although acknowledging diversity in interpretation, however, Wittgenstein asserts the rules of a language game cannot be exploited for the pursuit of individual self-­interest. What also becomes apparent in the Bush administration’s interpretation of pre-­emptive self-­defense is that these categories are not the property of individuals. On the contrary, they are part of the shared language which is constitutive of the identities and practices of the Bush administration. The existence of these shared understandings limited the agency available to them as they spoke security to legitimize their foreign policy both after September 11, 2001 and in the Iraq War. Acts of interpretation From the above it is clear that constitutive and regulative rules are inherently interrelated in Wittgenstein’s work (Fierke 1998; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989). Nevertheless, a third category of rules can be found in Wittgenstein’s work, and is referred to as an act of interpretation. To ensure that rules remain intersubjective rather than subjective properties, Wittgenstein draws a fundamental distinction between “following” or “breaking” a rule on the one hand and “interpreting” it on the other. With this distinction, individualistic mindsets are clearly delineated from shared understanding. Building on the idea that there is no such thing as a private language game, Wittgenstein maintains that the term interpretation should only be employed when we witness one set of meanings being replaced with another. Thus,

From a speech act towards a language game   81 there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases. Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we are out to restrict the term “interpretation” to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another. (Wittgenstein 1979a: §201: 81) Wittgenstein presents the example of a pointing arrow to elaborate on his meaning of interpretation. He argues that we do not interpret the meaning of this sign. Rather, it is a commonly accepted rule that an arrow pointing in a particular direction is a particular kind of signpost. According to him, “The sign-­post is in order – if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose” (Wittgenstein 1979a: §87). The sign on a road would be an obvious example. We recognize this meaning immediately and under normal circumstances would stop, turn right or left, or something else depending on the sign in question. Another example would be the symbol for the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC). For most people the presence of this infamous logo signals the presence of this particular organization. It is also generally assumed that this body is a neutral humanitarian actor and, as such, should not be attacked even in times of war (Forsythe 2005, 2007). Although these meanings are well established, they are not permanently fixed. While understanding and accepting the intersubjective meaning of road signs or the ICRC emblem it is also possible that we might add an interpretation whereby it would mean something else. That is, every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation . . . assume that you take the meaning to be a process accompanying the saying, and that it is translatable into, and so far equivalent to, a further sign. You have therefore further to tell me what you take to be the distinguishing mark between a sign and the meaning. (Wittgenstein 1958: 34) To put this into context, within international law it is commonly acknowledged that the arrow pointing to pre-­emption signals that the threat is inevitable and certain, that is, imminent. Agents act to thwart a credible source of harm, an immediate threat. Yet when we examine the Bush administration’s definition of pre-­emption we find an attempt to interpret this same arrow as pointing to pre-­ emption as the likelihood of a potential threat materializing in the future. Within their interpretation, there is no need for states to wait for an imminent threat to actually exist. Instead, the use of anticipatory measures is justified to make sure such a threat never materializes. Such strong language substitutes the existing definition of pre-­emption codified in international law with another (Crawford 2004; Shue and Rodin 2010). As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, similar substitutions are also found in the Bush administration’s interpretation of the Geneva Conventions as well as those on torture. The central message being conveyed here is not so much that only one interpretation of pre-­emption or the Geneva

82   From a speech act towards a language game Conventions exists in international law, but to suggest that there is an intersubjective understanding and consensus surrounding what these terms should normally mean. Distinguishing an act of interpretation from rule-­breaking It is important to reflect on the differentiation between breaking a rule and interpreting it. Arguably, both kinds of behavior challenge pre-­existing rules, yet the dividing line for Wittgenstein is that breaking a rule still assumes that there is a rule in place to be broken. Acknowledging that it is possible for people to disobey or go against the established rules of the game, Wittgenstein argues that such considerations are still informed by the presence of these overarching structures of meaning (Wittgenstein 1979a: §83). As such, the actual validity of the rules is not in doubt. Alternatively, actors have understood what the rules of the specific game are and based on this knowledge, they have decided not to follow them for whatever reason. Part and parcel of this awareness is an acceptance that deviance from the rules has consequences. To return briefly to our examples, when an actor fails to stop at a stop sign on the road, they may cause an accident or get pulled over by the police. Or they might simply get away with it. Similarly, when the ICRC is attacked or bombed, there are implications. Certainly when the ICRC compound in Baghdad was attacked by suicide bombers on 27 October 2003, it sent shockwaves through the aid and international community (de Torrente 2004: 1). Because this attack was a deliberate and targeted assault on civilians and aid workers, it was also a blatant war crime (de Torrente 2004; Roberts and Guelff 2000). A host of other potential and hypothetical situations obviously exist for each case, reaffirming the need to constantly look and see what is happening in different social and linguistic settings. Nevertheless, what remains important is that actors know they are breaking the rules and that by doing so they may incur penalties. Hence, even if agents get away with breaking the rules, they are aware that they were fortunate and that they can still be held accountable if it emerges that they broke them. With acts of interpretation, however, the rules of a game are challenged in a far more dramatic way. In such scenarios it is the internalized rules themselves which are questioned. During acts of interpretation the actor/actors seek to instil a completely alternative rule system. Whereas rule following and even rule-­ breaking work to maintain the status quo, acts of interpretation seek to alter it. At this point the participants are no longer obeying rules or accepting their legitimacy blindly. Instead, they are seeking to replace them with an alternative set of rules. This is extremely disruptive to the fabric of social reality. Once the intersubjective consensus about what rules mean starts to crumble, people no longer know automatically how to go on. As Wittgenstein remarks, it is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case. The more abnormal

From a speech act towards a language game   83 the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say. And if things were quite different from what they actually are –; if rule became exception and exception became the rule, or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency – this would make our normal language-­games lose their point. (Wittgenstein 1979a: §142: 36) Remaking the rules Given the important implications interpreting rules has for the entire meaning structure of a language game, Wittgenstein is careful to outline that substituting one set of rules for another is no easy feat. Rather, departing from the old rules, or interpreting them differently, requires some form of justification. Since agents undertaking an act of interpretation are not simply interpreting the rules differently at a subjective level, they must make a case as to why such a substitution is necessary. The participant(s) undertaking the act of interpretation must also outline why their proposed changes are beneficial not just to themselves but also to the overall game. Although the impetus may come from a single actor, for an act of interpretation to succeed it can never be a unitary act. Nor is it guaranteed to succeed. In some cases, the proposed “interpretation” would not even be thinkable. On this last point the Bush administration’s suggestions that waterboarding did not count as torture would be a good example. Wittgenstein’s distinction does not preclude the possibility that an interpretation will become the rule. This can occur. A new set of rules can become thinkable. Again the Bush administration was able to make a case that waterboarding did not count as torture and was therefore an acceptable form of enhanced interrogation. However, the possibility of an interpretation becoming a different kind of rule, or installing a new structure of meaning, rests on convincing enough people to begin to live according to a different set of rules. Wittgenstein clearly argues this kind of change cannot occur as a one-­off. This is central. For the new interpretation of the rules to become meaningful it must be put into use. It has to be repeated frequently in order to be accepted as a common practice. As he says, Before I judge that two images which I have are the same, I must recognize them as the same. And when that has happened, how am I to know that the word “same” describes what I recognize? Only if I can express my recognition in some other way, and if it is possible for someone else to teach me that “same” is the correct word here. For if I need a justification for using a word, it must also be one for someone else. (Wittgenstein 1979a: §378: 117) This stipulation of new interpretation needing to be put repeatedly into use draws attention to a longer-­term process of legitimation. As conceptualized by Wittgenstein, new interpretations and potentially new rules are not created in a vacuum. On the contrary, to make the act of interpretation meaningful, those

84   From a speech act towards a language game undertaking this action must clarify how the new set of rules they are proposing relate to existing ones. Thus any new language must be developed on the basis of the one already possessed. Subsequently certain rules always remain in operation even when the language game in question begins to change. If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so – it is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call “measuring” is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement. (Wittgenstein 1979a: §242: 88; brackets in original text) Interpretation understood this way is different from interpretation understood by post-­structural accounts. What it highlights is that intersubjectivity remains key in determining how the new rule will be constructed and put into practice. Acts of interpretation are not primarily a matter of seeing something or interpreting a text differently. Instead, it is an acknowledgement of such differences actually existing and attempting to persuade others to play the new game. Establishing that following a rule and interpreting it are two separate forms of action reveals a deeper level of change. It also reveals the construction of a different set of rules and the emergence of a more complex process of legitimation. Acts of interpretation illustrate that it is not enough for agents to just discard the rules of the game as they please. In order to discard the existing rules they must constitute a new set of rules, a new way of speaking, and persuade others to actively participate in this new language game. Building on this process of rule-­making feeds into deeper examinations of how it is possible for words to change meanings in the process of interaction. What Wittgenstein highlights is that language contains the grounds for meaning, but also the grounds for contestation. This links back to the linguistic paradox and the agent–structure debate. On one level, Wittgenstein emphasizes the constitutive nature of language. A possibility always exists that a new set of meanings can be introduced through acts of interpretation. However, his approach also encapsulates a more constraining picture of language. For an act of interpretation to be successful, individuals undertaking the interpretation have to learn the parameters of this new language. Once they stop putting their language into use it becomes meaningless.

Juxtaposing a speech act with a language game This section outlines the main advantages that can be obtained by juxtaposing the speech act theory of the Copenhagen School with Wittgenstein’s language games approach. First, it is possible to draw on Wittgenstein’s arguments to conceptualize securitization as a specific kind of language game. This enables the original framework to retain the methodological rigour that its architects wanted

From a speech act towards a language game   85 (Buzan et al. 1998; Williams 2011b: 217). Even at this point, however, bringing Wittgenstein into the discussion aids our analysis of what the rules of a securitized game are. In particular his work encourages us to “look and see” how agents communicate and know how go on according to this guideline. Turning to Wittgenstein’s work also is extremely worthwhile when it comes to the issue of macrosecuritization. Not only do his writings enable us to zoom out to see how these larger constellations fit together, a language game approach also allows us to zoom in to see the specific dynamics operating in each securitization. From there we can start to explore how these different strands of argumentation and interaction are woven together. Wittgenstein’s language game approach also taps into several of the research agendas being advanced by second-­generation theorists. Not only are Wittgenstein’s core arguments sympathetic to many of the debates taking place within this vein about the relationship between the speech act and the context, the speaker and the audience, and the everyday and the exceptional, his work also provides a way to cope with them. Let us “look and see” how this happens. Multiplicity: speech acts, moves and countermoves The first contribution a language game approach brings to the securitization framework is that it centres on processes. Akin to Balzacq and other second-­ generation theorists, a language games approach reinforces the importance of contextual considerations and outcomes (Balzacq 2005, 2011). Within a language game approach this emphasis is twofold. First, Wittgenstein’s writings demonstrate that language itself is an inherently evolving and transformative process of interaction. Speaking security is thus portrayed as a constant form of communication. The metaphor of language as being part of a game rests on a second assumption, that it constitutes a larger realm of action and interaction. Putting meanings into use creates intersubjective realities. It is important here to recall that agents are not simply putting static meanings into use. Rather, what Wittgenstein’s account points to is a double dialectical process whereby agents draw on existing meanings to engage with each other in the language game, and in doing so, provide the space in which new sets of meanings may emerge in the course of play. Accordingly, there is a constant need to “look and see” how meanings are being generated and used in specific contexts. Again, this takes us beyond the speech act itself as the main action towards more in-­depth examinations about how language is put into practice. In many respects this provides an accessible way to respond to calls made in the last chapter to focus more on the outcomes of securitized and securitizing speech acts. The concept of “meaning in use” helps us to constantly and critically explore what the outcomes of speaking security are, whether they are “little security nothings” (Huysmans 2011) or big claims to the exception (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan 2006).

86   From a speech act towards a language game The next step Examining how meanings are constantly being put into use enables the implementation and evolution of speech acts and securitization processes to be traced. The overarching framework provided by a language game offers a great opportunity to explore the social and linguistic dynamics at work in multiple ways. Analytically, it provides a lens to zoom in and zoom out in order to grasp the different ways the language of security is spoken whether in securitization or outside. Juxtaposing a speech act with a language game approach, it becomes clear that Wittgenstein’s work provides wider coverage of how security is being spoken at different stages of the securitization process and the contexts in which the given speech act is emerging from. His thought helps to emphasize language as a form of life, expressed in historically and culturally specific language games. This depiction highlights the extent to which previous utterances enable and constrain the way in which security can be spoken at any given moment. Actors rely on “background knowledge” as a basis for interpreting and understanding one another’s moves (Kratochwil 1978). Wittgenstein also adds a sharper angle to tease out the structures of meaning that may be embedded in a speech act itself. In tandem to second-­generation debates, a language game approach affords specialized tools to unpack the various ways in which speech acts are embedded in linguistic, social and other milieu. More importantly, it offers a point of entry to trace how these different structures of meaning interact and co-­exist. Thinking critically about the relationship between language and security involves unpacking how different parts are interwoven together in a relationship of fascinating complexity. The way in which each structure of meaning is woven into the fabric of the language game will determine the rules of engagement and play. It is useful to think about Wittgenstein’s conceptualization of language as a “form of life” in relation to institutionalization as well. Conceptually, the idea of institutionalization found within the Copenhagen School’s framework implies that agents know how to go on. Indeed, at this juncture speaking security is routinized to the point that the meaning of security is internalized and thus taken for granted. What Wittgenstein also brings to this discussion is a reflexive tool to look and see how agents actually go on in institutionalized and securitized contexts. In addition to showing what is constructed when security is spoken and, by extension, how language games become institutionalized, he encourages acute awareness of the way in which agents are speaking security on an ongoing but uncompleted basis. Being aware of how agents are employing the language of security in institutionalized settings ensures that there is always an awareness of what kind of rules of engagement and thus play are in operation. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s notion of meaning in use highlights how even a single utterance may alter in the course of play. It may, of course, also alter the entire course of play. As such, a language game outlook allows us to treat the language of security as an evolving and transformative practice. Taking Wittgenstein’s approach amplifies the way in which the term security is used by

From a speech act towards a language game   87 agents in the course of acting, reacting and interacting. Accentuating these kinds of interactions highlights that the meaning of security is not static. The multipli­ city afforded through a language game approach allows for security to be spoken in different ways during a securitizing move as well as afterwards. Taking stock of this kind of multiplicity makes it easier to identify competing narratives that arise to challenge and even replace securitized speech acts. Through a language games approach, we gain a better understanding of the way in which the language of security may fall out of use or come to acquire a set of meanings that was initially unthinkable as the preferences and interests of the actors of this specific language game transform. Such diversity is helpful when it comes to thinking seriously about the concept of desecuritization and how it becomes possible. Concentrating on meaning in use fosters greater vigilance towards spotting modifications that occur in languages over time, irrespective of what part of the language game we are analyzing or what kind of language game it is. Wittgenstein’s work provides an innovative angle to show the different and sometimes conflicting arguments that can emerge in the course of play. His conceptualization of language as a series of overlapping and criss-­crossing entities also provides investigatory tools to explore the spaces in which new words are constructed. Being aware of the points of intersections between different words, speech acts and language games opens up underexplored terrain. Audience/speaker Taking Wittgenstein’s considerations on board provides a way to allow for a fuller level of contestation between the speaker and the audience. This deepens the dialectical relationship at the heart of the Copenhagen School’s framework and serves as a tool to critics who wish to develop this part of securitization theory. As noted in the last chapter, the Copenhagen School has come under extensive criticism for advocating an unequal relationship between these two groups (Balzacq 2005, 2011; Doty 1998–1999; Hansen 2000; Leonard and Kaunert 2011; McDonald 2008; Salter 2008; Stritzel 2007; Williams 2003). The inequality of this interaction is not overly problematic from a Wittgensteinian perspective. In any game it is possible, and often likely, for one player to be stronger vis-­à-vis others. However, the two approaches diverge on the emphasis they place on the ability of one agent to set and change the rules of a language game. Moreover, because new players can always join in the game, those who initially spoke security or even accepted it are not automatically entitled to have the final say. Wittgenstein plainly states that changing the rules of any game cannot be achieved by one person or speaker. Due to their inherent intersubjectivity, such changes require public justification. Obviously, this stipulation mirrors the Copenhagen School requirement for audience support. However, whereas securitization framework tends to make this relational reciprocity a secondary requirement, i.e., only after security is uttered does the audience really factor into the equation, Wittgenstein’s concept of language games would see the

88   From a speech act towards a language game p­ resence of an audience as a prerequisite for security to be uttered at all. The notion of a game suggests involving others and interacting with them according to a shared set of rules. Going a step further, a language game highlights that the audience does not simply accept or reject the securitized speech act; instead, they also participate in putting the accepted meaning into practice. By the same token, speakers and their audiences must fully understand what the terms of the language game are, such as whether they are communicating with each other or people outside of it. This level of interaction takes us beyond the mere speech act of the speaker and even the reciprocated recognition of the audience as the sole factors involved in the legitimization of speech acts or moves. Instead, the actual stage of implementation comes directly into the equation. For a language game to function, agents cannot simply mobilize this language; rather, they must constantly put it into use. This angle reaffirms that the speech act is a powerful action while also ensuring it remains an interactive one. Moreover, it makes the stage of mobilization and the stage of implementation two sides of the same coin (Roe 2008). Language cannot be spoken in a meaningful way unless it is put into use. Criss-­crossing the boundary between the everyday and the exceptional Wittgenstein’s argument about multiplicity also allows the transitions from politicization and securitization to unfold without determining the exact form this path it will take. Whereas the Copenhagen School posits a blueprint of how security will be spoken, from a language games perspective there is always more than one way to speak security. This importance of this statement is twofold. On the one hand Wittgenstein allows for agents to modify the way in which they speak securitization throughout this entire process, from politicization to macro­ securitization. What he firmly establishes is that the way security is spoken and altered will be determined in the course of play. This level of fluidity reaffirms the presence of intermediary spaces between securitization and politicization, and where these discourses of the exceptional and the normal criss-­cross and intertwine. On the other hand, Wittgenstein highlights that any change to the rules of engagement will alter the entire rules of play due to their mutual constitution. Such discoveries can only be made by looking and seeing how people are using their language. This position leads to a bigger question of how security is being spoken within the discipline of IR and beyond. We will return to this point soon. Rethinking the rules of a game Besides increasing the layers of multiplicity at work within securitization theory, Wittgenstein’s notion of language games offers a point of departure to rethink the kinds of rules that occur in this process. Within his account, language is presented as an inherently rule-­bound practice. Taking this idea seriously offers a

From a speech act towards a language game   89 theoretical contribution to the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of rule-­ following and rule-­breaking actions. Importantly, it shifts the focus of enquiry away from rule-­breaking behavior as the predominant mode of action. Instead, a language game perspective allows for instances where multiple kinds of rule-­following and breaking action can occur with a securitization process. Through the lens of a language game, speaking security comes to be seen as a tapestry of overlapping rules, some of which may contradict each other, rather than a straightforward blueprint of agents following grammatical rules to break other kinds of rules. The Copenhagen School mainly concentrate on the ability of securitized speech acts to place issues beyond traditional rules of the game, that is, how they enable actors to override rules that would otherwise bind. While Wittgenstein clearly deals with the notion of rule-­breaking, his discussion on this topic is richer. In the first place, a Wittgensteinian analysis reinforces that any departures from existing social rules occur in an intersubjective context. Subsequently, the construction of new rules necessarily draws on older ones. There is not an automatic break; one game does not have to be suspended in order for another one to come into existence. Since all rules are fundamentally languages that enable us to go on, they can never cease to exist. Taking this claim seriously strengthens the idea that agents speaking security are always informed by some kind of rule. This, in turn, injects the Copenhagen School’s grammatical rules with more power than they receive in their original framework. Upgrading to a language game approach illustrates that the power of the speech act does not simply reside in its ability to enable agents to break free of rules that would otherwise bind or adopt exceptional measures to deal with existential threats. What is just as powerful, if not more powerful, is persuading others to follow these grammatical rules and to put them into practice continuously. Following grammatical rules is often more tedious than it might appear, as agents must ensure that their speech acts correspond with existing structures of meaning as well as retaining a high level of internal consistency when they put their language game into practice. Given the diversity of everyday life, it is assumed that the same word can have multiple meanings depending upon how it is used in particular circumstances. This makes it imperative that all the different parts of any language game can be and are woven together. However, it does not make this task any easier. Wittgenstein’s work provides an innovative angle to examine how linguistic or grammatical rules enable and constrain. In this sense, it becomes possible to explore what it is possible for the speakers to say in a meaningful way when they speak security. A language game perspective does not suggest that extraordinary or special rules cannot be adopted. However, what it conveys is that the construction and implementation of the exceptional rules may not be achieved by speaking security alone. Using Wittgenstein’s notion of a language game enriches the concept of rule-­ following in another vein. In short, it identifies the kinds of intersubjective rules that agents draw on or follow to legitimize securitization in the first place. Where the Copenhagen School emphasize that speaking security has the power to

90   From a speech act towards a language game suspend normal rules and replace them with exceptional ones, a Wittgensteinian approach highlights that this move represents a shift from one type of language game to another. From this reading, the rules that hold in politicization are part of the background which enables the definition of securitization to become possible. Moreover, the rules of politicization can continue to co-­exist and function alongside those operational in a securitization process. Beyond simply facilitating change, these older structures remain partly constitutive of its meaning. According to Wittgenstein, new rules must also be built up and put into regular use before they are transformed into accepted principles and practices. A securitized speech act is not very meaningful unless we understand the overall context and grammar in which it is embedded. Again, this provides a better indication of how one set of rules can replace another. Incorporating the idea of an act of interpretation takes the Copenhagen School’s discussion of rules to the next level. Following the Copenhagen School logic, the move from politicization to securitization, and from securitization back to desecuritization, alters the rules of engagement and play. As they plainly state, these moves alter the way agents are speaking and the context in which they are acting. The significance of seeing the transitions between politicization, securitization and desecuritization as acts of interpretation is that it points to a different structure of rule-­making and breaking. Acts of interpretation allow for agents to break free of one set of rules, as the Copenhagen School maintain. However, Wittgenstein’s definition of interpretation highlights the idea of substitution, that is, one set of rules being substituted with another. This brings the idea of redefining rules into the equation. His distinction between rule and interpretation provides greater insights into how new rules are made, and what type of rules are constituted by speaking security. However, securitizing actors are no longer playing the same game. In moving from a notion of suspending rules to redefining them through acts of interpretation, rule-­like patterns remain in place. At this juncture the notion of agents breaking free of rules that would otherwise bind as the foundations for action dissolves even further. Instead, the construction of an alternative set of rules becomes a greater consideration. The idea that one set of rules are replaced with another through an act of interpretation helps aid investigations in what the rules of exceptionality might look like and what is actually constructed when security is spoken. Overcoming the hidden dangers of speaking security Paying constant attention to how the language of security is being used opens up the space to start thinking about the democratization of security in a substantive manner. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s idea of a language game instils an expectation that speakers of security will be held responsible for their words by audiences on a continuous basis. The reach and remit of this kind of expectation holds fast at all the different stages of securitization. For instance, following Wittgenstein ensures that throughout the course of undertaking a securitizing

From a speech act towards a language game   91 move, the claim that exceptional measures are necessary must be repeatedly justified. Even if the audience accepts the securitizing move and the legitimacy of the speech acts, the speaker can be called on at any point to explain their position, even in the most institutionalized settings. This kind of explanation can vary from language game to language game, or securitization process to securitization process. Within the context of a language game, agents are not just responsible for their actions when they speak security, but also as they continue to put this speech act into use. By the same token, audience acceptance is not a one-­off occurrence, for even if the speaker faces little or no obstacles when they undertake their securitizing move, the kind of agency made available to them by speaking security can be altered in the course of play, depending on how they put this language into use. Factoring all of these additional aspects into the equation adds a greater degree of accountability and responsibility into the Copenhagen School’s framework. Pursuing Wittgenstein’s claim that private language games can never exist renders the secrecy of security less removed from ongoing critical evaluation. At some level, this argument undermines the need for agents to frame their securitizing moves as extreme threats, for even when referent objects are securitized, they are not removed from complete public scrutiny. The concept of a language game theoretically advances the assumption that there must always be more than one player, and as such, no agent can escape accountability. To briefly return to our empirical example, although the Bush administration spoke security behind closed doors, the President was not speaking to himself. While the American public or the international community may not have been present when decisions were made to implement enhanced interrogation techniques, or privy to what these practices legitimated, there was a shared understanding among certain members of the Bush administration, their international lawyers and US military officials what the rules of engagement and play were for this particular securitized language game (Woodward 2002). In short an intersubjective, if selective, set of meanings were put into practice. Again, this line of argument allows the audience to gain a much more active role in determining how security is defined and spoken. On one level, the impossibility of a private language game strengthens the Copenhagen School’s claim that the speaker alone cannot securitize an issue, and that there is the need for the speech act to be backed up (McDonald 2008). On another level, it encourages the active audience participation that second-­generation theorists seek to instil. At a deeper level, however, Wittgenstein encourages us to view the two-­ way relationship between the speaker and the audience as inherently intersubjective. Reaffirming the intersubjectivity of language ensures that the interaction(s) between the speaker(s) and the audience(s) is not merely about who is speaking security and who is accepting their speech act. Instead, the meaning of security becomes dependent on some degree of implementation in order to gain legitimacy. To return to our example, even if the President was speaking to himself, Wittgenstein would argue that this language game was not meaningful because it was not shared. It is due to the existence of a language game that actions and

92   From a speech act towards a language game processes, including speech acts and securitization, have sedimented meanings which can change over time, but are stable in that context. The impossibility of a private language helps to explain why the Bush administration had to speak security on so many levels. In particular, a language game approach prevents us from becoming blinded by our language. Rather than simply accepting that the current debates are what scholars must do and build on in order to participate, it is also beneficial to start to think more seriously about how we want security to be spoken and what we want it to mean. Although it is imperative to critically engage with the existing debates about security, it is also important to have propositions to further these discussions. Hence, even if we wish to move beyond securitization, we need to understand the rules of this particular language game. If we think of the second generation as sharing certain family resemblances with the Copenhagen School, we also gain an entry point to show the traits they do and do not share. This helps agents to know how to go on, but in different ways. Lastly, because there are as many language games as people want to make possible, Wittgenstein provides us with the ability to take the extra step through the door that securitization leaves open when it comes to exploring the rules of engagement and play when security is spoken.

The Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War: a language game of security So far it has been argued that the language games approach provides a more diversified way of speaking security. What follows is an attempt to bring these extra theoretical dimensions to bear on the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War. Moving from a securitized lens to the notion of a language game offers a richer reading on three levels. In the broadest terms, his work provides a framework for addressing the interfacing and criss-­crossing language games associated with and expressed in the Bush administration’s overall justifications for the Iraq War. Second, Wittgenstein provides clearer insights into not only how the Iraq War became possible through a multilayered language game of security, but also how the grounds of the latter came to be contested. Last but not least, a language game approach is well equipped to analyze how the Bush administration attempted a redefinition of the rules of their existing language game and intersubjective rules. This provides a springboard to start examining the sort of game the Bush administration was now playing. Revisiting the defining moment Chapter 2 ended with the conclusion that the Copenhagen School’s securitization approach confronts two particular problems in explaining how the Bush administration spoke security to justify the Iraq War at the first defining moment. On the one hand, it is not clear whether or not their securitizing speech acts and moves constitute a case of successful securitization. On the other hand, we have

From a speech act towards a language game   93 seen that the President and his team spoke security in multiple ways rather than through a singular frame of reference. The interesting question left unanswered is how the Bush administration was able to justify the war in the name of security when both their securitized speech act and securitizing move had been so badly undermined. A language game approach provides us with a way past the question of whether or not this was a successful or unsuccessful case of securitization. Rather, the focus falls on examining how the Bush administration put their language game of security into practice. In other words, we need to “look and see” how they spoke security at the defining moment and beyond to fully grasp how their justifications for the war persisted and transformed. Taking this avenue illuminates that although the Bush administration was still speaking security, they were speaking it in a different way to adapt to new situations. Paying closer attention to what exactly the Bush administration was saying when they spoke security and what they were legitimating in the name of security is vital to showing the ways in which they were enabled and constrained in unexpected ways. Multiplicity: an empirical reflection From a language games perspective, the manner in which the Bush administration responded at the first defining moment is extremely telling. It reveals the multiple layers of meaning that were in play within their language game. Wittgenstein’s notion of a language game hinges on the idea of criss-­crossing structures of meaning and thus multiplicity. He also assumes that agents may engage in several and even interfacing language games simultaneously. Applying this pluralistic lens at the defining moment is extremely beneficial. Whereas the Copenhagen School’s strict formulation struggles with the presence of multiple speech acts, especially ones that do not conform to the grammatical rules of securitization, within the Bush administration’s final justifications for the Iraq War a language game approach captures them. Given the span and complexity of the US global war on terror, it is hardly surprising that the Bush administration drew on several languages to inscribe specific things with specific meaning. As Vice President Cheney reinforced, For the last 22 months, the United States has been fighting this war across the globe [. . .]. This worldwide campaign began after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, a watershed event in the history of our nation [. . .] September 11th signaled the arrival of an entirely different era [. . .]. For decades, terrorists have waged war against this country. Now, under the leadership of President Bush, America is waging war against them. (Cheney 2003b: July 24) This extract showcases the multiple structures of meaning at the core of the Bush administration’s language game of security. Not only is Cheney constructing

94   From a speech act towards a language game explicit linkages between September 11, 2001 and the global war on terror, his statement also embeds both of these events in a richer history of US counter-­ terrorism strategies (see Beeson and Higgott 2005; Bialasiewicz et al. 2007; Sarkesian et al. 2008). An additional line of argument is also being expressed within this quotation. In joining the events of September 11, 2001 and the global war on terror together, the Vice President is able to argue that US national security policies are infinitely more complicated and multifaceted than at any time in history. Wittgenstein’s notion of a language game facilitates this layering effect. Further, his idea of “family resemblances” and “meaning in use” provide a theoretical avenue to examine interactions taking place between the various language games in operation with the Bush administration’s foreign policy for the Iraq War. Together they provide an entry point to capture the intersections between old and new US national security strategies and lexicons. Being aware of the family resemblances makes it easier to critically review the changes President Bush and his administration introduced as they put alternative sets of meanings into use. It is worth pausing here to make a crucial point. The multiplicity afforded by adopting a language game approach adds weight to Buzan’s suggestion that the Global War on Terror represents a macrosecuritization (Buzan 2006). Both foreground the density and complexity of the linguistic arguments that were constructed in order for America to justify their security policies after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. They also provide the methodological apparatus to study how security was spoken in different contexts and at different moments in time, and how these sequences were all joined together. Through either prism, the associations between the securitizing speech acts the Bush administration constructed post-­September 11, 2001 and the one they employed to legitimate the invasion in March 2003, shine through. As mentioned, the US argued that “Disarming Saddam Hussein and fighting the war on terror are not merely related, they are one and the same” (Wolfowitz 2002: December 2). Constructing a more extensive connection between September 11, 2001 and the existential threat posed by Saddam Hussein, Secretary Powell remarked, And so we’re making the case to our friends, and it’s a case that is increasingly hard to deny, that this regime is a real and present danger to the world, and to the region especially; and that we believe it is in the best interest of the world and the region and the Iraqi people for the regime to be changed [. . .]. We have a right to defend ourselves and defend our friends from the kinds of weapons that he is developing that could cause thousands upon thousands of casualties. He has shown previously that he would use such weapons against his neighbors and against his friends. And what we have to do is persuade the international community that this is a real and present danger requiring political, diplomatic and perhaps military action to resolve. (Powell 2002d: July 18)

From a speech act towards a language game   95 Once again the picture that emerges from this snippet is the multilevelled nature of the Bush administration’s language game and the way in which the different speech acts of security are linked together. Indeed, Powell’s argument weaves the justification of the Iraq War, America’s right to self-­defense, WMD and an array of possible international responses together into a coherent whole. The point of departure gained by adopting a language game perspective arises from its ability to show is that security was not being spoken according to an exclusively securitized logic. To recall, Buzan and Wæver argue that macrosecuritization either rank multiple securitizations in a hierarchy or simply bundle them together (Buzan and Wæver 2009). Going further, a language game approach highlights that the way in which the numerous securitizations were arranged and bundled together was extremely complex in this macrosecuritization. Pushing beyond the idea that the Bush administration was participating in several securitizations at a time, a language game illustrates that the boundaries between these different yet interlinked spheres of action were not neatly separated. On the contrary, the boundary between the securitization constructed by the Bush administration to legitimate their war on terror and then the Iraq War is very blurry and slippery. They are not simply linked together but co-­constituted, making it very difficult to discern where one securitization stops and the other begins. A sceptic could reply here that this is the point of macrosecuritization, that all its subsidiary parts join together into a clustered whole. Without diluting the potential for this kind of situation, Wittgenstein enables us to show that security may not be spoken in the same way in each individual process of securitization and, consequently, in the macrosecuritization constellation. To recall removing one set of meanings into another domain alters the rules of the game. The levels and layers of multiplicity a language game approach makes available sheds light on how the Bush administration was speaking security as events unfolded. Analytically, this enables us to understand how it was possible for them to move from one language game to another at the defining moment when no WMD were found. Essentially it enables us to zoom in and out to identify the way in which President Bush and other members of his government drew from several strands of argument simultaneously. From a language game standpoint the alternative and alternating structures of meaning at work in the Bush administration’s security narrative can be treated as family resemblances, sharing certain similar characteristics with each other, but nonetheless are individually distinguishable and unique (Howard 2004; Wittgenstein 1979a). This enables us to examine how the Bush administration was able to justify the Iraq War as standing for pre-­emptive self-­defense and the promotion of democracy simultaneously. Not only was it possible for the Bush administration to partake in numerous language games of security simultaneously, the presence of multiple sets of meaning within these language games provided them with an array of choices to redefine their original arguments for war. Downplaying the importance of the lack of WMD existing in Iraq, Bush stated,

96   From a speech act towards a language game part of the reason we went into Iraq was – the main reason we went into Iraq at the time was we thought he had weapons of mass destruction. It turns out he didn’t, but he had the capacity to make weapons of mass destruction. But I also talked about the human suffering in Iraq, and I also talked the need to advance a freedom agenda. And so my question – my answer to your question is, is that – imagine a world in which Saddam Hussein was there, stirring up even more trouble in a part of the world that had so much resentment and so much hatred that people came and killed 3,000 of our citizens. (Bush 2006a: August 21) This quote clearly shows that the President perceived the justifications for the Iraq War in a much broader set of arguments than the presence and absence of WMD. Likewise, Vice President Cheney unapologetically defended the US decision to invade Iraq, He had the technology, he had the people. This was a bad actor and the country’s better off, the world’s better off with Saddam gone. We made the right decision. (Pilkington 2008) While holding the line that the US war was justified, both of the above excerpts are a far cry from earlier claims that explicitly stated, “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction” (Cheney 2002d: August 26). As their language game of security evolved, their claims altered from the premise that Saddam Hussein has WMD, to one in which he had WMD and even to one where he had none. This is a very interesting line of progression that would easily be missed had the focus remained solely on how they spoke security to justify the Iraq War without also looking to see how this language was constantly being put into practice. Importantly, moving from a speech act to a language game aids our analysis of how the Bush administration added and removed issues from their foreign policy agenda towards Iraq. Paying attention to the relationship between words is crucial from a language game perspective. As Wittgenstein indicates, the way words are grouped together affects the meaning of each word as well as the entire language game they are part of. Changing the relationship between words alters the type of games that are played. This becomes apparent in the case at hand. The Bush administration’s discursive response to the lack of WMD involved a reconstruction of their justifications for the Iraq War. They were still speaking security, though not in the same way. Where their initial justifications for the war centred on the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, their final justification centred on security and democracy as being two sides of the same coin. President Bush’s comments at the American Enterprise Institute outline this discursive shift. Noting that “the nation of Iraq is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom” he went on to suggest that,

From a speech act towards a language game   97 The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East. (Bush 2003h: February 26) Elsewhere, President Bush reinforced the naturalness of the connection between security and democracy in justifying the Iraq War when he noted, Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option [. . .]. The dictator who is assembling the world’s most dangerous weapons has already used them on whole villages – leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured. Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained – by torturing children while their parents are made to watch. International human rights groups have catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning [. . .]. And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country – your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation. (Bush 2003b: January 28) On the surface, the divergence between these two language games is initially minute. Indeed, they can simply be explained and justified within the scope of their multilayered language game. As mentioned, because members of the Bush administration were participating in several games simultaneously, they were able to incorporate democracy promotion and their freedom into the overarching grammar of security without having to create a completely new language game. However, a closer inspection reveals that the inclusion of democracy promotion as a core rather than peripheral objective altered the range of moves available to the Bush administration as they spoke security in this context. Again, while the old and new justifications share family resemblances, they are not constituted by the same rules of engagement. Security was no longer simply about disarmament and regime change, but also about the promotion of democracy. As Secretary Rice confirmed, As the President has said, Iraq is the central front in the war on Terror. But it is also a central front in the international effort to realize the vision of a Middle East that is a center of hope and change, rather than despair and

98   From a speech act towards a language game hatred. We are aggressively attacking the Baathist remnants and foreign terrorists. And increasingly, Iraqis are fighting alongside our troops to secure their own freedom. [. . .] These achievements do not, of course, come without great sacrifice. Today those sacrifices are being borne by our men and women in uniform, by those of our coalition partners, by international aid workers, and by the Iraqi people. But we must and will stay the course – because free nations do not sponsor terror, and free nations do not breed hatred. (Rice 2003c: October 31) What may appear to be a trivial switch in their language had enormous consequences. A language game approach firmly stipulates that security must be spoken on a constant basis. This is extremely beneficial insofar as it acknowledges that the way in which agents speak security at the start of the game is not necessarily the way that they speak it at the end. Being aware of how the meaning of words and language games can alter is precisely what is needed when it comes to analyzing the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War. As the defining moment demonstrates, the way in which the President and his government uttered security at the outset was not the final argument they advanced to legitimate their actions. Abu Ghraib is a further example of transformations in the way in which the Bush administration spoke security to defend their security strategy. In the next chapter we will see that the language game of security advanced by President Bush and his team was reascribed with a set of meanings that contradicted their entire language game. Both cases serve to highlight the multilevelled and multilayered language games that the President and his administration were drawing on in order to justify and legitimate their actions. A language game outlook delivers a way to problematize the appropriate place for democracy in the Bush administration’s language game of security. In much the same way, it provides a platform to examine the securitization of democracy. Resisting the temptation to see security and democracy along a dichotomy of securitization and politicization, a language games perspective draws attention to the way in which they criss-­cross and overlap. This sheds light on why the cord between the old game of security and the new game could not be cut completely. To preserve the language game of security, to use pre-­emptive and preventative actions against Iraq, the Bush administration had to retain a level of consistency. What the defining moment illustrates is that they could not abandon their initial language game of security if they wanted their securitizing move to succeed. While it was important for the President and his team to ensure that their claims to self-­defense overlapped with the principles of self-­defense and pre-­emption found in existing UN legislation, it was equally important that their arguments for war retained a degree of internal consistency. Put succinctly, the linguistic frames they had constructed to go to war had to be in accordance with the intersubjective sphere of action within which these arguments were meaningful.

From a speech act towards a language game   99 The review of the Bush administration’s response at the defining moment and thereafter raises an extremely interesting point. As highlighted above, it illustrates how they interwove various arguments in a complex pattern where the boundaries of several language games overlapped. Building on this insight strengthens the idea of re-­securitization because the meaning of security within their language game altered in the course of play. Arguing that the Bush administration rebuilt their arguments rather than abandoning them leads back to the securitization of democracy. What is extremely noticeable so far is the Bush administration’s inclusion of democracy as an integral part of securitization rather than simply a way out of it. This blurs the boundary between the everyday and the exceptional on the one hand, and securitization and desecuritization on the other. At the first defining moment, the inclusion of democracy as part of America’s securitizing language did not seek to desecuritize the issue. On the contrary, this speech act was included to ensure that the military invasion was not thwarted. Bringing these points together alters the type of relationship that exists between agents. Rather than presenting the Bush administration simply doing as they pleased, unpacking their justifications for the Iraq War very closely highlights that they constantly had to act on the basis of intersubjective understandings in order for their actions to become meaningful. This sheds light onto why the Bush administration had to constantly justify their actions even once they were securitized. Even in his farewell address, President Bush defended his position for going to war with Iraq; Over the past seven years [. . .] Iraq has gone from a brutal dictatorship and a sworn enemy of America to an Arab democracy at the heart of the Middle East and a friend of the United States. There is legitimate debate about many of these decisions. But there can be little debate about the results. America has gone more than seven years without another terrorist attack on our soil. This is a tribute to those who toil night and day to keep us safe – law enforcement officers, intelligence analysts, homeland security and diplomatic personnel, and the men and women of the United States Armed Forces. (Bush 2009: 15 January) Beyond breaking rules: an empirical reflection Wittgenstein’s theorization of rules brings greater clarity to the kinds of rules that were operating in the Bush administration’s language game of security. Indeed, it allows us to study an intricate triangulation of rule-­following, rule-­ breaking and rule-­making practices at the linguistic and social levels. These different modes of action can be easily conceptualized as a series of criss-­crossing and overlapping language games. What immediately becomes noticeable when we look at the first defining moment through a Wittgensteinian lens is an absence of the narrative of

100   From a speech act towards a language game r­ ule-­breaking in the Bush administration’s language game of security. Allied to this, another extremely interesting point to elaborate on is that following the grammatical rules was more difficult than the Bush administration anticipated, especially when we gear the level of analysis towards studying meanings in use. At the defining moment, the problem that America encountered was not so much saying they could use any means necessary. Evidently the Bush administration repeatedly made this type of claim by suggesting that they were fighting a new kind of war. The problematic hurdle for them to straddle was to ensure that they could put this language into practice and to persuade others to participate in their shared game. In other words, the Bush administration became bound up in a range of practices merely by speaking security. Problems ensued from this point onwards, for while the Bush administration felt their actions were legitimate, they were dependent on other people to also put their meanings into use. Here, the issue of audience acceptance resurfaces. If we take the Bush administration itself as a speaker and an audience, for instance, with certain members setting the agenda and others accepting it, then the idea that America could go it alone becomes easier to understand. All the players were putting this script into practice. When their security arguments are put into use outside of the Bush administration, it does not function in the same way. Another point arises within the empirical case when it comes to the Bush administration following the grammatical rules. According to Wittgenstein, language and rules are mutually constituted. Subsequently changing a language is equivalent to changing the rules of the game. By redefining their language of security at the defining moment, the Bush administration thus changed the rules. This is not cheap talk, even if it may appear as such. While raising awareness that the argumentative reasoning advanced by the President and his administration drew heavily on a multilayered language game, one that enabled them to rebuild and redefine their language game at the defining moment, Wittgenstein also picks up that a new sphere of agency and constraint was created. For instance, the rules of a language game of security which was premised on democracy did not neatly coincide with the rules of a language game of security based on the use of any means necessary. This produced a tension. In the old game of security, Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator who posed an existential threat by possessing WMD and having affiliations with Al-­Qaeda and other terrorist networks. They belonged to the “thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning” (Bush 2002a: January 29). Diffusing and eliminating Iraq’s “ticking bomb” required using “any means necessary,” including pre-­emptive self-­defense and enhanced interrogation techniques. For example, even whilst it was acknowledged that no WMD were actually found in Iraq, Rumsfeld still made the following assessment: Our intelligence argued that they had chemical and biological weapons. They did not have nuclear weapons, to our knowledge. They had programs,

From a speech act towards a language game   101 a reconstituted program was what our intelligence indicated. It was broadly agreed by the countries that have intelligence capabilities of that type [. . .]. The reality is that I believed the intelligence before the war, I believe it today, and we’ll all know more over some period of time. But we’re not likely to just go discover things or find them. You’re more likely to find somebody who will tell you about them through an interrogation of some kind. (Rumsfeld 2003c: November 20) The last sentence in the snippet it is very interesting in terms of exposing the kinds of rules that were in operation in the Bush administrations language game of security. By mentioning the word interrogation, Rumsfeld made it plain that America was willing to use any means necessary to conduct their war on terror and against Iraq. The manner in which he defends the intelligence that American relied on to justify the war also illustrates that he did not believe Saddam Hussein and thought that he was playing a deceptive game of hide and seek. What remains outstanding here is Saddam Hussein’s claimed capacity to produce these weapons, and thus, the potential for these weapons still to materialize. Factoring democracy into this equation changed the way in which the Bush administration was speaking security, albeit subtlety. It also changed the sphere of action available to them to pursue their security policies in a legitimate manner. In this new language game, Saddam Hussein still remained an evil dictator and, following the Bush line, he still possessed WMD, which he was hiding. Their arguments about existential threats and security thus remained paramount. The difference, however, is that the rules of this game are not the same. A promise to liberate Iraq and install a democracy represented a rewriting of an earlier script in which any means necessary would be used to confront this existential threat. The means to national and international security were no longer through pre-­emptive self defense or any means necessary alone. Rather, governmental elections and institutional procedures also became the name of the game. As President Bush remarked, I am absolutely confident that we made the right decision. And not only that, I’m absolutely confident that the actions we took in Iraq are influencing reformers and freedom lovers in the greater Middle East. And I believe that you’re going to see the rise of democracy in many countries in the broader Middle East, which will lay the foundation for peace. (Bush 2005b: June 29) In a profound way, removing Saddam was not just an end in itself, but a means to a larger end: the liberation of the Middle East. In this scenario, Iraq is “ ‘the cork in the bottle’ to Middle East reform” (Hasting Dunn 2003: 290). Wittgenstein’s notion of a language game also allows us to examine the ways in which the Bush administration followed existing intersubjective rules rather than assuming that they were simply breaking them. As noted, they never admitted

102   From a speech act towards a language game that the actions they planned to undertake were anything but lawful. Even at the defining moment the Bush administration emphasized that Iraq’s breach of Resolution 1441 was sufficient grounds for undertaking pre-­emptive measures against Saddam Hussein. Although many consider their decision to go to war without the backing of the UN as an extreme case of rule-­breaking, the Bush administration fended off these allegations by drawing on the language set out in Resolution 1441, which had been authorized by the UN Security Council. Clarifying the relationship between the terms of Resolution 1441 and what this law allows for, Secretary Powell said, the Resolution will point out that lack of cooperation and point to the fact that the United Nations Security Council is supposed to act in the presence of this lack of cooperation. A lot of arguments about more inspectors, keep the inspections going, but we must not lose sight of the basic issue. The basic issue is Iraqi compliance, and that’s not what we’re getting [. . .] right now, an argument can be made, and it’s an argument we would make, that 1441, Resolution 1441, provides more than enough authority. This next resolution need not say “military action” to provide the authority for the use of force if that’s what is decided is appropriate. And so we’re looking at the language to come up with language that the Security Council will receive in a positive way and recognize that it is time for them to meet their responsibilities to the international community. But this is not a rush to war, as some say. This issue has been lingering for 12 years and it has been months since the inspectors got started and months since 1441 was passed, and Iraq is still not in compliance. And so we’ll see what the language of the resolution looks like and the whole world will see it in the not too distant future. (Powell 2003d: February 20) Unpacking their line of argument about the legitimacy of Resolution 1441 reveals a further level of rule-­following. Noticeably, the Bush administration drew parallels between Saddam’s failure to disarm under previous Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687. The latter had been adopted in response to Iraq’s threatening behavior towards, and later invasion of, Kuwait. Recalling the existence of previous Security Council Resolutions, the Bush administration argued that the issue in 2003 revolved around the dictators’ failure to observe internationally agreed conditions relating to behavior on their own territories (Taft and Buchwald 2003). Resolution 1441 removed any doubt that Iraq’s actions constituted material breaches. As it stated, Following the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991, the Security Council, in its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, mandated a ceasefire; but it also imposed a number of essential conditions on Iraq, including the destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the acceptance by Iraq of United Nations Inspections [. . .] Iraq has repeatedly taken actions which constitute flagrant, material breaches of these provisions. On a number of

From a speech act towards a language game   103 occasions, the Council has affirmed that similar Iraqi actions constitute such breaches, as well as a threat to international peace and security. In our view, the Council need not state these conclusions on each occasion. (Taft and Buchwald 2003: 560) Operative paragraph 4 of Resolution 1441 stated the Council’s decision that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully with the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further breach material breach by Iraq. (Taft and Buchwald 2003: 561) Keeping in line with these terms and conditions not only empowered the Bush administration to claim that they were following international legal protocols, but also was meant to show that Saddam Hussein was breaking them. To reassert, the point being made here is not so much to establish whether or not the President and his administration were breaking international laws, but to note the absence of rule-­breaking with the grammar of their language game of security. The Bush administration also attempted to construct the lawfulness of the Iraq War by showing that their decision to act pre-­emptively had created a civil society in Iraq. Speaking about the Iraqi election in 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked, Well, every indication is that the election in Iraq is going better than could have been expected. The Iraqi people are very brave. What we’re seeing here, I think, is the emergence of an Iraqi force for freedom. (Rice 2005a: January 30) The running together of a fresh start for the Iraqi people and the decision to remove Saddam Hussein in close succession legitimated the Bush administration’s actions. Making this connection also provided them with a way to denying that their justifications for undertaking the war had been misplaced. Later on in the same speech Rice outlines the difficulties that America faced, but also the problems they surmounted, The fact is we have had to do very difficult things over the last several years. It is not easy to confront a Middle East where the status quo is falling apart, where terrorism and Islamic extremism is growing, when you have in Saddam Hussein a brutal dictator, dangerous to the region with his ambitions for the region and for weapons of mass destruction. Those things are not easy. But over time I think that we will see that the policies that the President has adopted will have the benefit of a different kind of Middle East. We’re seeing signs of that today in Iraq. No, it’s not a perfect election. Yes, there are difficult times ahead. But did anyone think three years ago,

104   From a speech act towards a language game with Saddam Hussein sitting in Iraq, that we would be seeing the Iraqi people turn out in these numbers to voice their desire for a democratic Iraq, a stable Iraq and an Iraq at peace with its neighbors? (Rice 2005a: January 30) Drawing on the multiple layers embedded in their language game of security afforded them with the possibility of arguing that their actions were lawful. Building on the distinction that Wittgenstein draws between rule-­following and breaking on the one hand and act of interpretation on the other creates an opening to take processes of rule-­making and redefining seriously. The two kinds of actions are particularly visible in the Bush administration’s language game of security. Following Wittgenstein, we witness several attempts in the empirical case studies where the President and his team attempted to substitute one set of meanings with another. This opens up a bigger can of worms than the Copenhagen School can envisage. While the latter engage with the idea of everyday rules being suspended or even broken when security is spoken, a language games approach highlights that the Bush administration’s security discourse sought to render existing rules inconsequential at a deeper level. Not only did the Bush administration wish to break free from rules that would otherwise bind, they sought to construct an alternative rule system. As mentioned, they attempted to show that the arrow pointing in the direction of pre-­emptive self-­ defense meant that specific, imminent, threats did not need to exist for military action to be taken. Their arrow suggested the goal was to prevent more general threats from materializing. While remaining vague about what the rules of their language game of security were, an analysis of the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War reveals that they were working to enact an array of new rules. At this point Wittgenstein’s notion of acts of interpretation is very insightful. First, it illustrates that precisely because the Bush administration sought to redefine existing rules, they also had to replace them with an alternative set of intersubjective standards of what constituted legitimate behavior. Indeed, a language game approach highlights the Bush administration’s act of interpretation relied on an engagement with existing rules. The need for the highest echelons of the White House to engage with the established rules for undertaking military invasions, even if they only wanted to break them, produced an inconsistency in their language game of security. On the one hand the Bush administration claimed they could use any means necessary, including pre-­emptive decisions, whereas on the other they sought to argue that they were acting in accordance with the rules. At the start of the war, the President alluded to the United States’ “sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security” (Bush 2003m: March 17). Defending his decision to go to war in his 2004 State of the Union address, the President stated that “America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our people” (Shannon and Keller 2007: 89). Elsewhere he conceded that “at some point we may be the only ones left and that’s ok with me: We are America” (Woodward 2002: 81). The level of agency they actually had

From a speech act towards a language game   105 to act alone is more limited than their policies and language suggest. Indeed, an explicit tension emerges from their attempt to claim they had the right to use any means necessary on the one hand but were acting in accordance with international law to create new rules to fight their war on terror on the other. We will return to the constitutive and constraining dimensions constructed by the Bush administration’s attempts to following existing rules, even to break free of them, in the next chapter.

Conclusion Incorporating Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of a language game into the field of securitization debates revises how security is spoken in IR and beyond. An essential part of Wittgenstein’s later work was to convey a language “form of life” that enables us to “know how to go on.” The emerging baseline from here is that it is necessary for actors to “look and see” how words are being used in order to determine what they mean and what they do. Studying meanings in use reveals that tensions may arise as agents follow, break or change the rules of engagement and thus play at any point in time. Consequently, we cannot assume a priori that the meaning of words will stay the same. Juxtaposing the idea of a language game advances the Copenhagen School’s framework in three ways. First, it corrects their overreliance on speech act theory. Second, Wittgenstein’s idea of “meaning in use” adds conceptual plurality to the speech acts that can be drawn upon, the moves that speakers and audiences can make and the boundaries that can be crossed. Both of these developments should be a welcome advancement for those working in the second generation. However, taking Wittgenstein’s arguments seriously always opens up new lines of enquiry within securitization studies. To begin with, arguing that agents participate in multiple language games simultaneously opens up questions about how all these different spheres of action criss-­cross and overlap. Exploring these nodes of intersection draws attention to the relationship between words in nuanced ways. Following Wittgenstein, the way in which terms criss-­cross and intersect influences the agency available to participants of a given language game as well as the context in which they are interacting. Despite having numerous choices, those who partake in a language game must always ensure that their actions are consistent with the rules of the game and are understood and accepted by other players. Assuming that there is no such thing as a private language game, this last point remains paramount. Building on this last claim provides a somewhat different point of departure to theorize how rules operate when security is spoken. A language game reinforces that agents must follow the rules of the language game in order to go on, even in securitized and institutionalized environments. Without denying that agents can break rules within a language game, Wittgenstein’s account reaffirms that this kind of action is costly and an inherently rule-­based activity. Distinguishing between an act of interpretation and rule-­breaking reaffirms that established rules do not fade away easily or automatically. While new games can

106   From a speech act towards a language game grow out of an interpretation, Wittgenstein argues that this kind of transformation must establish a new way of going on that is understandable to all participants. Hence, within a language game set up, the rules of engagement and play never cease to exist. Rather, they are put into use in different ways. Adopting a Wittgensteinian lens offers a new reading of the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War. When we look and see how they spoke security in this case, it is very clear that they were participating in several overlapping and interlocking language games simultaneously. Drawing on Wittgenstein reminds us that while the language game of security that the Bush administration put into use at the defining moment shared certain family resemblances with their original justifications for going to war, new rules of engagement and play were now in operation. Doing so demonstrates how they were enabled and constrained by and within their language game of security as it evolved. Moving from a securitized lens to the notion of a language game pushes the analysis to explore how the Bush administration put this new language into use after the Iraq War started. As shown, it was not easy for the Bush administration to construct a coherent unison between security and democracy. This unison was made especially difficult by their attempts to play the new language game according to the rules of the old language game. Whereas the relationship between security and democracy turned out to be complementary at the first defining moment, the next chapter illustrates that this inclusion of democracy in the Bush administration’s language pushed the limits of their language game of security to extremes. In the next chapter we will see that language and rules may exist and function in a way that retains their legitimacy, even as they are collapsing. To show places where such anomalies occur, we must look and see how security is spoken during securitization and beyond.

4 Abu Ghraib The limits of a language game

Introduction Thus far, the construction and reconstruction of the Bush administration’s language game of security has been outlined. This chapter turns to a focus on the breakdown of the rules of engagement and play of this particular game. While the President and his team continued to speak security, their responses to the Abu Ghraib abuses illustrates that they were no longer able to put a language game into use in a meaningful way. What is interesting from a language game perspective is that the Abu Ghraib images were given a meaning which fell outside, and actually contradicted, their securitized response. Investigating this type of transformation is crucial to exposing the limits of the Bush administration’s language game of security and the spheres of action constituted by and connected to it. This chapter diverges from the large and still growing literature documenting the coercive interrogation techniques and torture that occurred in this prison (Barrett 2004; Cohen 2005; Danner 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Eisenman 2007; Greenberg 2005; Lang and Beattie 2009; Rajiva 2003; Sontag 2004a). Instead, it explores the Bush administration’s response as a second defining moment in their justifications for the Iraq War. Once again we find that the President and his team were forced to reconstitute the way in which they spoke security. Examining their response during the Abu Ghraib episode illustrates that the way in which the Bush administration had reconstituted their justifications for the Iraq War at the first defining moment was extremely important. Since democracy was part of the “grammar” of their language game of security, it became part and parcel of the framework within which the abuses were judged, as well as a framework of further debate. The structure of this chapter is slightly different to the preceding chapters because it reflects that the core theoretical debates have now been firmly established. As such, the discussion focuses immediately on the empirical case, drawing new insights about how the Bush administration’s language game evolved as it was put into use. The first section provides a brief re-­ contextualization of the Abu Ghraib prison since this seems key to understanding what exactly was at a stake in terms of the Bush administration’s language of

108   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game security. From there, the next section engages with the linguistic frames used by the Bush administration in response to the publication of the Abu Ghraib photographs. This episode is worthy of deep exegesis as it provides a way to uncover the meanings the Bush administration tried to ascribe to the Abu Ghraib images. When we “look and see” how they responded to the photographs, the multiple and overlapping language games that were in operation become extremely apparent. Taking these considerations on board provides an avenue to critically examine two further issues. The third part of the chapter explicates the acts of interpretation that were revealed to have been undertaken by the Bush administration with regards to established international laws surrounding the treatment of prisoners in war. Their interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment are especially notable. Hence, in many respects the Bush administration’s response to the Abu Ghraib affair can be seen as a contest over security and its relationship to rules. Apart from showing how the President and his team attempted to redefine international law, Wittgenstein’s concept of an act of interpretation highlights how disputes over the legitimacy and legality of their “enhanced interrogation techniques” eroded the rules constituted in and by the Bush administration’s language game of security. When we “look and see,” we find that they did not convince enough people to act according to their new set of rules. On a related yet separate point, the next section explicates the internal inconsistencies that appeared in the Bush administration’s language game of security. Unpacking the different structures of meaning embedded in their language games illustrates that two arguments in particular clash. Overall, the administration’s written and oral statements about these photographs categorize the brutal behavior conducted at the prison as unacceptable sadism and brutality of a few individuals or what James R. Schlesinger called “Animal House on the night shift” (Carter 2004). However, a supporting argument was also made that the pictures depicted the work of a few un-­American soldiers. This enabled the Bush administration to suggest that their “enhanced interrogation techniques” were legitimate and lawful. When invoked by the Bush administration to give meaning to what happened in Abu Ghraib, the alternative structures of meaning woven into their language game conflicted in an irreconcilable way. Neither argument was able to justify the photographed actions in their own right. The Bush administration’s attempt to join them together was even less convincing. Developing this line of argument highlights an interrelated struggle over meanings. The last section argues that Abu Ghraib exposed many hidden dangers of speaking security both in the Copenhagen School framework and in reality. Overcoming these dangers requires taking securitized speech acts and environments much more seriously than had been done. Focusing on the rules of engagement is not enough in coming to grips with what happened in Abu Ghraib. In moving away from the Copenhagen School’s notion of a speech act to a Wittgensteinian language game, it becomes apparent that putting the language

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   109 of security into practice often involves a more serious undertaking than those speaking security anticipate. The chapter ends by questioning what is legitimated by the language of security. This gives rise to larger questions about the kind of order and rules that we want to create and safeguard. The events that took place at Abu Ghraib make such reflections imperative.

Reconstructing the context Before the 2003 Iraq War, the Abu Ghraib prison, 20 miles west of Baghdad, invoked unpleasant images of the draconian measures practiced during Saddam Hussein’s rule. While the full extent of what occurred in the compound during his reign in power is not fully known, organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have documented serious human rights violations therein. For instance, in 2001 Amnesty International Annual Report noted that political prisoners and detainees were subjected to brutal forms of torture. The bodies of many those executed had visible signs of torture, including the gouging out of the eyes, when they were returned to their families. Common methods of physical torture included electric shocks or cigarette burns to various parts of the body, pulling out fingernails, rape, long periods of suspension by limbs, beating with cables [. . .] psychological torture included threats to arrest and harm relatives of the detainee or to rape a female relative in front of the detainee, mock executions and long periods in solitary confinement. (Amnesty International Annual Report 2001) Human Rights Watch, the Center for Constitutional Rights and the United Nations, also echoed these critical voices. Local tales are equally explicit about what happened within the prisons walls. As a former inmate, Radi Ismael Mekhed recounts, I was severely tortured during my imprisonment because I was considered a traitor to my country. I never believed a person could be subjected to such treatment by another human being [. . .]. Life was already painful under Saddam, and if you came to the prison, you were always in fear for your life. (Whitelaw 2003) Seymour Hersh also reported that torture, weekly executions, and vile living conditions were common practice during Saddam Hussein’s rule with, “as many as fifty thousand men and women – no accurate count – were jammed into Abu Ghraib at one time, in twelve-­by-twelve-­foot cells that were little more than human holding pits” (Hersh 2004). Unfortunately the harrowing reputation of Abu Ghraib remains today. However, since the public release of graphic photographs on April 28 2004, Abu

110   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game Ghraib is now predominantly associated with the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers (McGeary 2004). The mistreatment of US detainees was kept hidden by the US military and certain governmental officials until photographs were aired on 60 Minutes II, to stunned audiences. Some of the pictures published depict US soldiers, both men and women in military uniforms, laughing and giving thumbs-­up signs while posing with naked Iraqi prisoners made to stand, stacked in a pyramid or positioned to perform sex acts (Greenberg 2005; The New Yorker 2004). These revelations sparked a series of investigations, including the Taguba Report (2004) commissioned by Secretary Rumsfeld, the Fay/Jones Report (2004), commissioned by the Pentagon, and the Schlesinger Report, an independent panel to review the Department of Defense (DoD) Detention Operations (Danner 2004a). Through these disclosures it became apparent that American policies in Abu Ghraib prison were governed by entirely different principles than those espoused in the Geneva Conventions. As President Bush conceded, “under the dictator, prisons like Abu Ghraib were symbols of death and torture. That same prison became a symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few American troops who dishonoured our country and disregarded our values” (Bush 2004e: May 24). The President’s acknowledgement that American action resembled those of the previous custodians of Abu Ghraib contradicts everything this administration had invited others to believe about the virtue of American intentions, and flowing from that virtue, their right to undertake pre-­emptive action in Iraq. Any admission that the Bush administration was prepared to use the same kinds of tactics as the most repressive regimes also challenged the core of their identity as the leaders in a war against evil. As the American historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr (2004) suggested “the abuse of captives brutalizes their captors.” The possibility of such comparisons deserves further attention. The remainder of the chapter will be dedicated to tracing how the Bush administration’s language game of security was pushed to the point of collapse.

Responding to Abu Ghraib: a multilevel game of security The crimes committed and documented in the Abu Ghraib images confirmed pre-­existing concerns about the “enhanced interrogation techniques” legitimated by the US after September 11, 2001 to deal with suspects, detainees and prisoners of war (Mayer 2008). Despite public statements that the “gloves were coming off ” in the war on terror, the graphic images of American soldiers torturing detainees being held in US custody were extremely problematic for the Bush administration to address. Examining the language that they used to respond to this situation reveals that a multilevel language game of security was still in play. The Bush administration’s remarks about what occurred in Abu Ghraib forwarded two basic claims within this linguistic context. On the one hand, they employed the language of security to differentiate their enhanced interrogation techniques from torture. On the other hand, the administration employed the language of security to condemn the practices captured in the Abu Ghraib photos.

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   111 However, when we zoom in, we find tensions between the different ways in which the various language games were interwoven and criss-­crossed. The theoretical significance of these points of intersection will be discussed later in this chapter. For now the focus is on delineating the Bush administration’s dual agenda of justifying their security policies on the one hand whilst condemning the security practices captured in the Abu Ghraib pictures on the other. Agenda 1: security as a justification of enhanced interrogation techniques It is crucial to note that the Bush administration’s condemnation of the treatment of the photographed prisoners was intimately linked with a strong set of counter arguments which defended the harsh interrogation techniques and detention policies that they had introduced after September 11, 2001. Their initial failure to apologize for what occurred in the prison itself makes this noticeable. Even when the President was finally compelled to apologize, the focus of his regret appears to be on the damage done to America’s identity. Standing alongside King Abdullah II of Jordan, President Bush stated he was “sorry for the humiliation suffered by the Iraqi prisoners and the humiliation suffered by their families . . . equally sorry that people seeing these pictures didn’t understand the true nature and heart of America” (Bush 2004c: May 6). The lingering implication is that the fault lay in the images, not in what they depicted. Indeed, a large subtext of the Bush administration’s reply to Abu Ghraib was an avid defense of their so-­called enhanced interrogation techniques. To make this claim they employed the language of security. In the main this represented a throwback to their central claim that they were fighting a different kind of war after September 11, 2001, which would be conducted by a different set of rules. As outlined in Chapter 1, the Bush administration coupled the freedom to act in new ways with their desire to pre-­empt potential security threats. As Secretary Rumsfeld iterated, “business as usual won’t do it” (Kinsella 2005: 166). Holding fast to this line, the Bush administration maintained that the problem in Abu Ghraib was not that their security policies or practices were unlawful. Conversely, the problem was that in this instance they were carried out inaccurately. As Senator Mark Dayton told the Armed Services Committee, We’ve now had fifteen of the highest-­level officials involved in this entire operation, from the secretary of defense to the generals in command, and nobody knew that anything was amiss, no one approved anything amiss, nobody did anything amiss. We have a general acceptance of responsibility, but there’s no one to blame, except for the people at the very bottom of one prison. (Dayton 2004: May 19) Playing the security card in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Bush administration emphasized terrorist suspects were still at large. While stressing

112   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game that great progress had been made in bringing dangerous individuals to justice, they also argued that the existence of “grave and gathering” threats still justified the employment of “any means necessary” to take terrorists out of action and to save lives. To make this overarching argument, the Bush administration had to orchestrate a very delicate balancing act, one which was made enormously difficult since it was the right to employ tough measures in the name of security that was now under serious scrutiny. Safeguarding America’s right to execute harsh interrogations after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, Vice President Cheney remarked, Well, there’s no question, there was a desire – there always is – when you’ve got ongoing military operations, attacks being launched against our troops and soldiers, as well as innocent civilians over there, to learn as much as you can from people that have been detained in order to prevent further attacks and/or to be able to go prosecute guilty parties. But there’s a right way to do it and a wrong way to do it. And these forces in Iraq, people captured in Iraq, are subject to the Geneva Convention. And so, as I say, there are legitimate ways to handle that. And I don’t think in this case, you would want to call these methods legitimate. (Cheney 2004: May 11) The distinction that the Bush administration drew between a right and a wrong way of conducting “enhanced interrogation techniques” certainly sought to re­affirm that their security procedures were lawful. What is also being suggested is that the Bush administration had outlined clear ground rules for how their security procedures were to be conducted. As Rice explained, the United States is quite clear and quite determined to carry out the President’s policy, which he articulated clearly, that the United States does not engage in torture, doesn’t condone it, doesn’t expect its employees to engage in it. Will there be abuses of policy? That is entirely possible. Because just because you are a democracy, it doesn’t mean that you’re perfect. We saw in Iraq at Abu Ghraib under the traditional framework of the Geneva Convention that we had actions that were outside of U.S. policy and those actions were investigated, investigated thoroughly, and people have been punished. That is the only promise that we can make to people, which is that if we find abuses we will investigate them thoroughly and we will punish them. (Rice 2005c: December 8) Both Cheney and Rice’s speeches explicitly draw a positive association between the US security policies and concepts of legality and correctness. A key point they aimed to show was that what happened in Abu Ghraib represented not only gross abuses to the detainees, but also gross abuses of policy.

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   113 Torture as taboo The Bush administration’s defense of their security practices in light of the Abu Ghraib photographs aroused controversy by the manner in which it drew flat assertions that what was shown in the images did not constitute torture. In fact, a complete avoidance of the word torture is noticeable in the Bush administration’s response. Despite the evidence contained in the Abu Ghraib photographs, as well as other US detention facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, Washington consistently denied any use of torture by US officials. The most that was initially admitted was that the prisoners had possibly been the objects of “abuse,” eventually of “humiliation.” Fending off allegations of torture, Secretary Rumsfeld stressed, I think that – I’m not a lawyer. My impression is that what has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe is technically different than torture [. . .] I don’t know if – it is correct to say what you just said, that torture has taken place, or that there’s been a conviction for torture. And therefore I’m not going to address the torture word. (Rumsfeld 2004b: May 4) Affirming torture was not part of the administration’s official vocabulary; Condoleezza Rice stressed, “The United States does not permit, tolerate, or condone torture under any circumstances [. . .] Torture, and conspiracy to commit torture, are crimes under U.S. law, wherever they may occur in the world” (Rice 2005b: December 5). Denying similar charges, Secretary Powell remarked, “It’s also absolutely clear that the President never, in any way, condoned the use of torture” (Powell 2004b: June 27). The grammatical and terminological distinctions that the Bush administration made over how Abu Ghraib should be labelled goes to the core of the power of language. Their responses explicitly demonstrate that which words were used to give meaning to the interrogation practices depicted in these images clearly mattered. The word torture was taboo for the Bush administration in order for them to preserve the overarching claims they had made not only about the necessity, but also the legality of the harsher security practices being implemented in their global war on terror and the Iraq War. In the course of building these arguments and their subsequent security policies, they promised to treat US detainees in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. In fact, the Bush administration’s stated position was that these Conventions would be “fully applicable” in Iraq (Jehl and Lewis 2004). The actual measures taken by the Bush administration to uphold the principles of the Conventions cut to the heart of the controversy over Abu Ghraib. Although the Bush administration’s recourse to a complex language game of security gave them some leverage in responding to Abu Ghraib, it also constrained their agency. Most notably, it opened up their security policies to greater scrutiny far beyond the walls of the Iraqi prison. Indeed, Abu Ghraib catalysed

114   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game an extensive reassessment of the less well-­known aspects of the Bush administration’s security policies and the finer details of the “any measures” they deemed were necessary to conduct their wars. The extraordinary secrecy surrounding the post-­September 11, 2001 programmes had made it difficult to discern what procedures were being implemented. From the outset, senior officials who addressed the treatment of detainees offset discussions about the vagueness of their coercive intelligence techniques and programmes. Adopting the language of security provided the President and members of his administration with a supreme rationale to justify the new rules of their game. As Vice President Cheney forewarned, We’ll have to work sort of in the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies – if we are going to be successful. That’s the world these folks operate in. And, uh, so it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal basically to achieve our objectives [. . .] we need to make certain that we have not tied the hands of our intelligence communities. (Cheney 2001: September 16) Without allocating individual blame, it is possible to establish that such securitized outlooks and protocols constituted a context in which torture not only become thinkable but also possible as an outgrowth of the US war on terror. Some even go as far as to say that this kind of linguistic and social context institutionalized torture (Bassiouni 2006). In examining the Bush administration’s language game of security, it becomes apparent that these extraordinary measures were considered to be a necessity for winning that war. Lawyers advising the President and his cabinet on how far interrogators could go in putting pressure on detainees and suspects well understood this issue. The way in which they worded their counsel to the White House had serious repercussions. Far from being cheap talk, the way in which the Bush administration, as well as their legal and military advisors, spoke security directly impacted on matters of life and death by determining how people would be categorized and treated inside and outside of the remit of international law (Goldsmith 2007; Yoo 2005, 2006, 2011). Redefining the rules of torture Many of the security policies and practices constructed by the Bush administration made serious attempts to redefine existing rules surrounding the treatment of detainees and prisoners of war. For instance, they argued that inflicting physical pain does not count as torture unless the interrogator specifically intends the pain to reach the level associated with organ failure or death (Lewis 2004: Luban 2007). “Physical pain amounting to torture,” Assistant Attorney

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   115 General Jay S. Bybee advised the then Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales, “must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function or even death” (Greenberg 2005: xiii). The significance of this statement is that it expands what is traditionally deemed to count as torture under international humanitarian law and the laws of war (Danner 2004a). In addition, the interrog­ator had to have the intent to cause this pain (Rubenstein and Xenakis 2008: 230). Both of these stipulations run contrary to the international Convention Against Torture. As David Forsythe points out, “there it is written that the infliction of severe pain for any reason whatsoever is prohibited regardless of the intent” (Forsythe 2011: 65). Adhering to a narrower interpretation of the Torture Conventions, the Bush administration embraced a wide variety of abusive interrogation practices that they claimed were necessary but not illegal. The prime example here is “waterboarding,” which is broadly described as a practice whereby, the prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet. Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner’s face and water is poured over him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the treatment to a halt. (Druce, 2008: 351–352; Ross and Esposito, 2005) Within the Bush administration’s language game of security, this kind of practice did not count as torture (Johnsen 2008: 401). For example, without explicitly using the word waterboarding, Vice President Cheney openly stated that it was a “no brainer” to subject terror suspects to a “dunk in the water if it saved lives” (Correa 2007: 23; Eggen 2006a, 2006b). These kinds of guidelines set by President Bush and some members of his cabinet rendered the Geneva Conventions and other human rights conventions, to which the United States is a signatory, outdated and quaint. The primary document concerning torture is the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Acts. This specifically states that torture can never be employed. As Section 2 of Article 2 states, No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. (United Nations 1984: Section 2, Article 2) On one level this language is particularly powerful, as it forecloses the possibility that any circumstances, no matter how securitized or exceptional, could ever justify this practice (Levinson 2004). As Anthony Lang (2009: 8) points out, however, despite this strong condemnation, the same Convention is open-­ended on what exactly constitutes torture and what does not. Broadly, it equates torture as,

116   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. (UN 1984) The essential contestability over the exact meaning of torture leaves space for potential abuse. What Abu Ghraib revealed is how much these terms had been exploited by the Bush administration, US military officials and legal advisors. As probes over this story filled out, an extensive paper trail surfaced about the techniques sanctioned by Secretary Rumsfeld which helped foster the abusive climate displayed in the Abu Ghraib photos. Five weeks after the Abu Ghraib revelations transfixed the country, newspapers broke the story of a secret “torture memo,” written by lawyers such as John Yoo in the Office of Legal Council (OLC), an elite law office in the US Justice Department in August 2002. What the memo verified was that the Bush administration authorized the creation of a parallel legal framework in which intelligence agencies such as the CIA were given the green light to operate by their own set of secret rules. In a memorandum to President Bush in 2002, for instance, Alberto R. Gonzales urged the President to declare the Taliban forces in Afghanistan as well as Al-­Qaeda were outside the formal protection of the Geneva Conventions. In much the same way as top officials in the Bush administration, he emphasized the war against terrorism is a new kind of war. To be specific, “The nature of the new war places a high premium on other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians.” Subsequently he argued that, “in my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions” (Gonzales 2002: January 25). In another memo dated 9 January 2002, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, John Yoo, JD, Former Deputy Assistant US Attorney General, wrote: We conclude that these treaties (Geneva Conventions) do not protect members of al Qaeda organization, which as a non-­State actor cannot be a party to the international agreements governing war. We further conclude that these treaties do not apply to the Taliban militia. The nature of the conflict precludes application of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Al Qaeda is not covered by common Article 3, because the current conflict is not covered by the Geneva Conventions. (Yoo 2002: January 9)

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   117 Ignoring the deeply rooted US military practice of applying the Geneva Conventions broadly, Rumsfeld labelled the first detainees to arrive at Guantnamo on January 11, 2002 as “unlawful combatants,” automatically denying them possible status as prisoners of war (POWs). This categorical label is incredibly important because, as Secretary Rumsfeld remarked, They will be handled not as prisoners of wars, because they’re not, but as unlawful combatants. The – as I understand it, technically unlawful combatants do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention. (Rumsfeld 2002a: January 11) Within the same speech, Secretary Rumsfeld signalled US compliance with international law by saying that the US government would still handle them in the right way. As he put it, we have indicated that we do plan to, for the most part, treat them in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions, to the extent they are appropriate, and that is exactly what we have been doing. (Rumsfeld 2002a: January 11) What is particularly interesting in the above is the claim “for the most part,” as it signals that American compliance would be partial if they deemed it necessary for their security. Building on this noncommittal language, Secretary Rumsfeld questioned the relevance of the Geneva Conventions to current US military operations. As he noted, “the reality is the set of facts that exist today with the al-­Qaeda and the Taliban were not necessarily the set of facts that were considered when the Geneva Convention was fashioned” (Garamone 2002: February 7). Rumsfeld expanded to say that the President decided the Al-­Qaeda would not fit under the Geneva Conventions because the Geneva Conventions are an instrument among states in conflict. “The Al Qaeda is not a state; it is a terrorist organization” (Garamone 2002: February 7). The following day he stressed this line of argument again, The President has . . . now determined that the Geneva Convention does apply to the conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan. It does not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere. He also determined that under the Geneva Convention, Taliban detainees do not meet the criteria for prisoner of war status. When the Geneva Convention was signed in the mid-­20th century, it was crafted by sovereign states to deal with conflicts between sovereign states. Today the war on terrorism, in which our country was attacked by and is defending itself against terrorist networks that operate in dozens of countries, was not contemplated by the framers of the convention. (Rumsfeld 2002d: February 8)

118   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game Despite these dismissive remarks about the rights of US detainees, the Bush administration still promised that their prisoners would be treated humanely. In the “Memorandum for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” it is noted that, [t]he Combatant Commanders shall, in detaining al-­Qaeda and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department of Defense, treat them humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. (US Congress 2001: October 11) Likewise, President Bush reassured that even though al-­Qaeda detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions, as a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva. (Bush 2002c: February 7) Secretary Powell was much more outspoken in concluding that Geneva Convention III did apply to both Al-­Qaeda and the Taliban (Gellman and Becker 2007). Commenting on this issue with the then UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, he stated, we talked about other issues, to include the detainees at Guantanamo, which I briefed the Foreign Secretary on the status of them and to make sure that there was no question in anyone’s mind that they are receiving the best care that they can receive, as one would expect from the United States. (Powell 2002a: January 31) This promise signified the goodness of the US in its fight against evil as well as their identity as a law-­abiding nation. This argument, in turn, added weight to their construction of Saddam Hussein as an evil villain who could only be dealt with through heightened security measures. Affirming this dichotomous identity, Secretary Rumsfeld said, International law draws a clear distinction between civilians and combatants. The principle that civilians must be protected lies at the heart of international law of armed conflict. It is the distinction between combatants and innocent civilians that terrorism, and practices like the use of human shields, so directly assaults. Saddam Hussein makes no such distinction. During Operation Desert Shield, he held hundreds of non-­Iraqi civilians at government and military facilities throughout Iraq and described them as human shields. He deliberately constructs mosques near military facilities, uses schools, hospitals, orphanages and cultural treasures to shield military forces, thereby exposing helpless men, women and children to danger.

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   119 These are not tactics of war, they are crimes of war. Deploying human shields is not a military strategy, it’s murder, a violation of the laws of armed conflict, and a crime against humanity, and it will be treated as such. Those who follow his orders to use human shields will pay a severe price for their actions. (Rumsfeld 2003b: February 19) The White House position on the above issues is in some ways consistent with its efforts to expand executive power and resist attempts by Congress to rein in the President’s authority (Savage 2007). In the February 7, 2002 directive already cited above, President Bush wrote “I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline to exercise that authority at this time” (Bush 2002c: February 7). Part and parcel of declaring that Taliban and Al-­Qaeda fighters were unprotected by the Geneva Conventions’ prisoners of war status was that it substantially reduced the threat of domestic criminal prosecution (Barry et al. 2004). Again language mattered in making this case. Indeed, a series of legal memoranda written in late 2001 and early 2002 by the Justice Department helped build the framework for circumventing international law restraints on prisoner interrogation by providing interrogations with the authority to act with maximum impunity from war crimes. For instance, in November 2001, President Bush issued an order for trial by military tribunal of non-­Americans charged with terrorist crimes (US Military Order, November 13, 2001: 57831; also see Mundis 2002). The order forbade the accused from going to any court, American or foreign (Smith 2004). The Military Commissions Act of 2006, passed by Congress on January 3, 2006 and signed into law by President Bush on October 17, 2006, further stated: Military commissions shall not have jurisdiction over lawful enemy combatant. Courts-­martial shall have jurisdiction to try a lawful enemy combatant for any offense made punishable under this chapter. A finding that a person is an unlawful enemy combatant is dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction for trial by military commission under this chapter. No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights. (Military Commissions Act of 2006: S. 3930–4) According to Colin Powell’s Chief of Staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld decided to ignore the portions promising humane treatment for prisoners. Wilkerson later recalls, “in going back and looking at the deliberations it was clear to me that what the President had decided was one thing and what was implemented was quite another thing” (Bernstein and Dubose 2006: 190–191). This line of argument echoes unilateral claims that America could act as it wanted, and contrary to legal restraint. Moreover, in the case of Abu Ghraib, realists could argue that their language game of

120   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game security simply enabled America to pursue her own self-­interest by exposing existing loopholes in international law to ensure that they could proceed unhindered as they conducted their war on terror. The subjugated and dehumanized victims captured in the Abu Ghraib photos certainly echo Thucydides’ claim that the strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must. Without denying the above-­mentioned account mirrors what the President and his team did, it is equally important to note that the Bush administration was constrained by their language. The Abu Ghraib photos made their securitized provisions increasingly redundant. Once released, the photos became intersubjective property, beyond the Bush administration’s direct control. The photographs provided the space for an alternative language game to gain more prominence than the one espoused by the Bush administration. Outside of their language game of security, the enhanced interrogation techniques came to be categorized as torture. The emergence of this alternative ascription of meaning contradicted the Bush administration’s claims that their security policies were consistent with the Geneva Conventions and their promise to treat US detainees humanely, even in places like Abu Ghraib. That these discrepancies emerged to construct a different language game of torture, irrespective of the Bush administration’s assertions that this was not a proper way to label these photos, problematizes the claim that they could simply do as they please. On more than one level, the language employed by the Bush administration in response to the scandal caused the kind of rules that were operating in the game of security to be visible even when they wished to keep it private. While the President and his team initially managed to prevent all the photographs being circulated once the current the pictures were out in the open, their language game of security was in a position to be seriously challenged. In exposing the major disjuncture between the provisions of the Geneva and Torture Conventions and the Bush administration’s practice, for instance, many civil liberties and human rights advocates claimed that this government purposefully bent, if not broke, international law. Here the contestability of language shines through. Drawing on the same rules, many actors reached a completely different understanding of how the rules surrounding the treatment of detainees and prisoners of war should be implemented. Outlining the findings of the Human Rights Watch Report The Road to Abu Ghraib (2004), their attorney Reed Brody concluded, basically the mindset was anything goes. The gloves come off. They felt we’re not going to fight this war with one hand tied behind our backs so we’re going to do what we have to. Then they set about looking for every legal loophole they could, then they undermined 50 years of international law [. . .] but even when they’re not prisoners of war, they’re entitled to some protection. (Brody 2004b) The publication of a Red Cross report from February 2004 was another key ­reference point in substantiating charges that the Bush administration policies

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   121 violated the Geneva Conventions. The fact that the publication of the February report predated the release of the photographs seriously discredited the Bush administration’s claim that they were unaware enhanced interrogation techniques that were “tantamount to torture” were being implemented in this Iraqi prison. Conversely, they argued that they were shocked to learn that abuses were taking place in Abu Ghraib. The ICRC report, however, strengthened suggestions that at least some members of the Bush administration and US military had been made aware of such systemic abuses and had failed to take action. Months before the Abu Ghraib photographs were released, the Red Cross reported, According to the allegations collected by the ICRC, ill-­treatment during interrogation was not systematic, except with regard to persons arrested in connected with suspected security offences or deemed to have an “intelligence” value. In these cases, persons deprived of their liberty under supervision of Military Intelligence were at high risk of being subjected to a variety of harsh treatments ranging from insults, threats and humiliations to both physical and psychological coercion, which in some cases was tantamount to torture, in order to force cooperation with their interrogators. (ICRC 2004: 3–4) Among the methods of ill-­treatment the ICRC reported were hooding, handcuffing, beating with hard objects (including pistols and rifles), slapping, punching, kicking with knees or feet on various parts of the body. The findings of the Red Cross corresponded with practices documented in the official US governmental investigations which were conducted into the procedures that allowed the abuses in Abu Ghraib to occur. While making a concerted point that the practices contained within the photographs were not a matter of policy, the investigative teams of the Taguba, Schlesinger and Fay Reports all reported systematic abuses in Abu Ghraib. According to the findings of General Taguba, The intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel included the following acts: a b c d e f g

(S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet; (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees; (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing; (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a time; (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s underwear; (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and videotaped; (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;

122   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game h

(S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture; i (S) Writing “I am a Rapest” (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year-­old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked; j (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee’s neck and having a female Soldier pose for a picture; k (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee; l (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee; m (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees. (Taguba 2004: 16–17) The Schlesinger Report also recounts “There were five cases of detainee deaths as a result of abuse by US personnel during interrogation . . . there were 23 cases of detainee deaths still under investigation” (Schlesinger et al. 2004: 13). Going one step further Major General George Fay, who headed the inquiry into Abu Ghraib, conceded in a press conference that, “there are a few instances when torture was being used” (Schmitt 2002; Strauss 2005). Such findings obviously undercut the Bush administration’s claims that their enhanced interrogation techniques did not equate to torture. The appearance of widespread abuse and humiliation of detainees held in Abu Ghraib across all the reports also undermined the argument that the abuses were isolated incidents, although the official reports argued that they were. These kind of findings limited how the Bush administration could respond to Abu Ghraib as a security issue in a meaningful way. The existence of an alternative language game which explicitly identified the US security practice as being “tantamount to torture,” played an important role in enabling and constraining the way in which the Bush administration could present the Abu Ghraib abuses to the public. When compared to the standards set in the Geneva and Torture Conventions, it became increasingly apparent that the Bush administration was not conducting a lawful war. Another major question raised by the entire Abu Ghraib incident was the dividing line between security and human rights. Agenda 2: justifying the securitization of democracy? The Bush administration faced another serious problem in their attempt to respond to the Abu Ghraib photographs and abuses through the language of security. This concerned how their definition of security was co-­constituted by democracy, especially since the first defining moment. The presence of this term within the overall language game of security limited the legitimacy of their claims that the “enhanced interrogation techniques” implemented in Abu Ghraib were legal and acceptable in the name of security. As Karin Greenberg notes,

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   123 “The word torture, long an outcast from the discourse of democracy, is now in frequent usage” (2005: xvii, italics in original). Evidently there was an uneasy relationship between the two structures of meaning underscoring the Bush administration’s language game of security. Images of prisoners stacked naked on top of each other and forced to perform humiliating sexual acts tarnished the Bush administration’s self-­proclaimed promise to establish democracy in Iraq. The pictures showed neither the freedom nor the liberation that they had promised their military operation would bring to and foster in Iraq. Contrary to the claims the Bush administration had made to justify the military invasion in 2003, “Iraq was not free from rape rooms and torture chambers” (Bush 2003p: October 8). Worse still, America was now exposed as constructing the very practices they claimed their security agendas would foreclose. Touching on this shortfall, UN General Secretary Kofi Annan remarked, I hope they will take a strong and firm stand to ensure that those kinds of activities are not repeated, because it does do damage, as you can see from reactions in the region. And, of course, the US is in Iraq, as it has indicated, to also try and establish democracy and law and order, and rule of law. And so it is important that it should be seen as dealing very firmly with this. (Annan 2004: May 2) Nevertheless, the Bush administration did not abandon the democratic component of their language game of security as they responded to the Abu Ghraib abuses. On the contrary, they strongly reinforced it on several fronts. First and foremost, the Bush administration conveyed democracy as an enabling factor in investigating such “abhorrent” practices and bringing those responsible to justice. As Secretary Colin Powell proclaimed, what we are going to show to the world is what democracy does, what the strongest democracy in the world does when faced with a situation like this. We don’t turn away. We don’t hide from it. We investigate it. We find out what happened. We have a free press that examines it and lets the whole world know what happened and what we’re doing about it. We have a Congress that supervizes all of this and we have a court system as well. And I hope it will be an example to the world of how you deal with these kinds of tragedies when they come along. (Powell 2004a: May 28) At a later point Secretary Rice reaffirmed, just because you are a democracy, it doesn’t mean that you’re perfect. We saw in Iraq at Abu Ghraib under the traditional framework of the Geneva Convention that we had actions that were outside of U.S. policy and those actions were investigated, investigated thoroughly, and people have been

124   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game punished. That is the only promise that we can make to people, which is that if we find abuses we will investigate them thoroughly and we will punish them. (Rice 2005c: December 8) President Bush was also quick to clarify that “one basic difference between democracies and dictatorships is that free countries confront such abuses openly and directly” (Bush 2004d: May 10). The language of democracy also served to valorize the Bush administration’s democratizing efforts in Iraq. Even after the photographs of Abu Ghraib were made public, the President and his team focused attention on the progress that had been made and the major accomplishments that had been achieved, emphasizing “the goodness and the character of the United States Armed Forces” the President said, no military in the history of the world has fought so hard and so often for the freedom of others. Today, our soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines are keeping terrorists across the world on the run. They’re helping the people of Afghanistan and Iraq build democratic societies. They’re defending America with unselfish courage. And these achievements have brought pride and credit to this nation. (Bush 2004d: May 10) Discussing the revelations at Abu Ghraib, Donald Rumsfeld remarked, Our enemies will exploit this episode to prove their negative views of our country, but then they were doing that before this episode. We see repeated instances where untruths about our country and about our conduct are put out on the regional media. But friends of freedom will understand that it is a virtue of our system that the president and the most senior officials take responsibility for and are involved in seeing that the punishment for such violations of human rights occur. That stands in stark contrast to the many parts of the world where governments use torture or collude in it and do not express shock or dismay, nor do they apologize when it’s uncovered. So at the end of the day, there is, even here, reason for pride in democracy, and certainly there is reason for pride in the standards by which the military forces of our country are governed. (Rumsfeld 2004c: May 11) Rumsfield’s remarks reaffirm the Manichean us versus them identities the Bush administration drew between those who were on the side of good and those who were on the side of evil. Following his account, it is reasonable to assume that only evil people would believe that the actions undertaken inside the Iraqi prison were anything other than the work of a few un-­American soldiers.

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   125 The issue of democracy was also rooted in the administration’s avid denial that their security policies condoned the use of torture. From the start they insisted that what occurred in Abu Ghraib represented the work of a “few bad apples” or rogue soldiers (Dorf 2010). Promulgating this narrative, the Bush administration categorized the photographed soldiers and their actions as “un-­ American.” Making this plain, President Bush contended that these actions did not “reflect the nature of the American people. That’s not the way we do things in America” (Bush 2004b: April 30). Secretary Rumsfeld was equally astute in articulating that the images that we have seen that include U.S. forces are deeply disturbing – both because of the fundamental unacceptability of what they depicted, and because the actions of U.S. military personnel in those photos do not in any way represent the values of our country or the armed forces. (Rumsfeld 2004b: May 4) That the Bush administration categorized the perpetrators and the heinous acts captured in the Abu Ghraib photographs as un-­American is not surprising. Earmarking agentive culpability at the individual rather than systemic level buttressed their claims that what occurred at this prison represented exceptional rather than accepted behavior. Arguing that such practices were not a matter of policy, Secretary Rumsfeld summarized, Has it been harmful to our country? Yes. Is it something that has to be corrected? Yes. Is it something that shouldn’t have happened in the first place? Yes. Was it done as a matter of policy? No. I think that – I think that the Department of Defense has addressed it in a serious way that reflects the responsibility the department has to treat people properly who are in the custody of the Department of Defense. And in this case that did not happen. It was wrong. We should have treated those properly and they were not treated properly. (Rumsfeld 2004d: September 10) General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, expressed the same conviction, Those soldiers were not following orders. That is not what we expect of ourselves. It is not what the American people expect of us. We are expected to perform our duties honorably. And the vast majority of the hundreds of thousands of young men and women, active, Reserve and Guard who have served in Iraq have done so honorably. These incidents are not acceptable. They are being thoroughly investigated. They were reported from within the chain of command. And there are five or six separate investigations ongoing as I speak that are, in fact, looking into every detail of every facet of this that we can find. (Pace 2004: May 5)

126   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game The Bush administration’s use of the term democracy as a way to convey the “un-­American” nature of the Abu Ghraib abuses complements their assertions that this was an aberration in their security policies rather than an established code of conduct. Making this connection also reinforced their identity as the country leading a fight against evil in the name of national and international security. Contradiction in terms However, the recourse to the democratic aspect of their language game proved to be extremely contradictory when the President and his government tried to convey what happened in Abu Ghraib as the work of a few bad apples and un-­ American personnel. As shown above, in this context, the Bush administration drew on the concept of democracy to reaffirm the undemocratic and illegal nature of these actions on the one hand and the legality of their enhanced interrogation procedures on the other. Making this multilevelled and overlapping set of arguments, however, produced a weak spot at the centre of their language game of security. Rather than reaffirming the morality of the Bush administration’s war in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib pictures illustrated how immoral and undemocratic their security policies actually were. As Sheik Mohammed Bashir said in Baghdad during Friday prayers, It was discovered that freedom in this land is not ours. It is the freedom of the occupying soldiers in doing what they like [. . .] abusing women, children, men, and the old men and women whom they arrested randomly and without any guilt. No one can ask them what they are doing, because they are protected by their freedom [. . .]. No one can punish them, whether in our country or their country. They expressed the freedom of rape, the freedom of nudity and the freedom of humiliation. (Cody 2004; Danner 2004c) The intersection of these two competing structures of meaning were contradictory in that they sought to justify the use of “any means necessary” to ensure national and international security, while at the same time they wished to claim their security policies remained morally acceptable (Priest and Gellman 2002). Remarks made by President Bush in response to James Harding from the Financial Times are worth quoting at length to illustrate this: James Harding:  Mr. President, I want to return to the question of torture. What we’ve learned from these memos this week is that the Department of Justice lawyers and the Pentagon lawyers have essentially worked out a way that US officials can torture detainees without running afoul of the law. So when you say you want the US to adhere to international and US laws, that’s not very comforting. This is a moral question: Is torture ever justified?

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   127 President Bush: 

Look, I’m going to say it one more time [. . .] Maybe I can be more clear. The instructions went out to our people to adhere to law. That ought to comfort you. We’re a nation of law. We adhere to laws. We have laws on the books. You might look at these laws, and that might provide comfort for you. And those were the instructions [. . .] from me to the government. (Bush 2004f: June 10)

The repeated reference Bush made to the lawfulness of America aimed to convey that the country was still the leader in the fight against evil. The problem was that his reference to the laws also worked to convey the unlawful nature of what occurred in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. The point being made here is not to say that the photographed practices were only problematic due to the presence of this term. On the contrary, and as noted above, even within the context of their securitized speech acts these actions could not be justified. What is far more noteworthy is that the presence of alternative meanings, especially democracy, within the Bush administration justifications for undertaking the Iraq War limited the vocabulary available to them to respond to the abuses in a meaningful way. Here, their multiple levels and layers underpinning the rules of engagement and play in this context act as a structure. Indeed, the interfacing, overlapping and criss-­crossing language games that the Bush administration were drawing upon proved problematic as they had to ensure that all these different strands were woven together cohesively. In the case of Abu Ghraib, this kind of consistency was almost impossible to obtain due to the glaring gaps between what the Bush administration was saying and how they were putting this language into use. When these structures of meaning were blurred, if not reversed, as in the case of Abu Ghraib, the game began to change. As Manfred Nowak, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, stressed, ever since former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld authorized the use of so-­called “enhanced interrogation” techniques in Abu Ghraib, the United States has lost its moral leadership and authority [. . .]. Today, when the Bush administration criticizes other countries for their human rights abuses, no one takes them seriously anymore. (Ertel and Kraske 2007)

Theoretical significance The practices which were implemented in Abu Ghraib in the name of security spark serious questions about how language constitutes and constrains agency. What would have happened had the photographs not been leaked? For many, it is the presence of the physical photographs which sparked the controversy, not the fact that the Bush administration’s language game of security contained glaring gaps. As Javal Davis, a Military Policeman (MP) court-­martialled for his activity in the prison, aptly remarked, “If there were no photographs, there would

128   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game be no Abu Ghraib. There would have been no investigation” (Kennedy 2007; Steele 2008: 253). Disturbing concerns about the men and women incarcerated by the Bush administration had existed long before 2004. As such, it is relevant to question why we did not see change before the photographs themselves were released. Strangely, little was said in the discussions that took place after the Abu Ghraib affair became public knowledge about how the abuses could happen without any robust check by national or international legislative or judicial branches. How could these violations have gone unnoticed? We will return to these issues later in this chapter and in the final conclusions. The question to pose now is whether language had any real role in ascribing meaning to the Abu Ghraib photos, and whether or not the photographs simply spoke for themselves. It is impossible to deny the actual images coming out of Abu Ghraib did not speak loudly in generating debates about the Bush administration’s security policies. As Susan Sontag (2004a) argues, photographs have an insuperable power to determine what we recall of events. Moreover, to paraphrase Henry Kissinger, they have, in the Abu Ghraib context, the considerable advantage of being true (Danner 2004c: October 7). It now seems probable that the defining association of people everywhere with the war that the United States launched preemptively in Iraq in 2003 will be photographs of the torture of Iraqi prisoners by Amer­ icans in Abu Ghraib. As one commentator notes, Images from Abu Ghraib will burn themselves into the world’s collective memory, the shocking legacy of a superpower gone astray – icons of America’s shame. They will become the images future generations most associated with the war in Iraq. (Spiegel Online International 2006: 20 February) The appearance of these images and their power to shape perceptions about the legitimacy of the Bush administration’s security practices resonate with calls being made for visual representations and media to be incorporated into securitization studies (Hansen 2006; Vuori 2010; Williams 2003). Scholars working in this vein argue that focusing on the speech act alone potentially prevents the powerful role that images play in the construction of different security narratives from being overlooked. This certainly seems the case in Abu Ghraib. That said, it is important not to stop at the photograph alone when it comes to understanding how the Bush administration’s language game of security was pushed to it limits. Instead, the photographs need to be contextualized within this very same language game in order for their disruptive potential to be uncovered. A more satisfactory way of addressing how these pictures came to be described as torture rather than so-­called “enhanced interrogation techniques” is to scrutinize the linguistic milieu in which these images assumed their meaning. A language game offers a way to show the processes through which the Abu Ghraib “reality” was constructed; that is, how the “material” was given meaning as a “reality.” On a different but connected point, critics and realists could certainly argue that the language employed by the President and his team in response to the Abu

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   129 Ghraib images simply depicted more cheap talk by the most powerful actors. President Bush’s decision not to accept Secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation over the procedures that were authorized in the Iraqi prison appears to be particularly telling in this respect (Boston Globe 2004: May 2; Economist – North American Edition 2004; Sontag 2004b). Suspicions of a cover-­up can be fuelled further by the ad hoc way in which those responsible were brought to justice for what took place in Abu Ghraib. While certain military personal were put on trial and imprisoned, others, mainly higher-­ranking officials, were not subjected to the same level of punishment (Savage 2005). Emphasizing this disjuncture, Ian Kierpaul writes, “Private military contractors accounted for one-­third of the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Yet, none of those private military contractors ever faced criminal prosecution for their role in the abuse” (Kierpaul 2007–2008: 407–408). Moves made by the Bush administration to prevent all of the photographs from being released add weight to the idea that they were more interested in concealing rather than revealing the truth about what took place inside the prison (Barstow and Stein 2005). The temptation to place the Bush administration’s reply in a framework of more of the same, that is, cheap talk, is misguided. While their response and reactions to the Abu Ghraib abuses illustrate that language can be used strategic­ ally, a language game perspective reaffirms that even the most powerful actors cannot always determine the outcome. To have the American effort in Iraq summed up by these images must seem, to those who saw some justification in a war that did overthrow one of the monster tyrants of modern times, unacceptable. What is further amiss in cheap-­talk accounts is that these images were not fashioned in a vacuum. The reason the Abu Ghraib photographs were so problematic for the Bush administration to respond to is that the contours of their language game of security were exposed and then challenged. Within the remit of the Bush administration’s security agendas, while the abuses were regrettable they did not count as torture. Employing Wittgenstein’s language game approach also illuminates a different reading of the Bush administration’s reply to Abu Ghraib. It exposes how they were constrained not simply by the photographs but also by their previous utterances. From a language game perspective, Abu Ghraib can be conceptualized as a dual site of contestation. On the one hand, Wittgenstein’s notion of acts of interpretation highlights the rupture between the Bush administration’s definition of the rules of war and those encoded in international law. On the other, his language game approach highlights the appearance of an irreconcilable internal inconsistency in the Bush administration’s language of security. Excavating both of these dynamics provides a sharper lens for analyzing how it is possible for words to change their meaning, and by extension, of the Bush administration’s language game of security to be disrupted. Placed in the context of a larger ongoing game, we find that the Bush administration was forced to make important concessions that require some explanation.

130   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game

Acts of interpretation in Abu Ghraib Exposing the acts of interpretation being undertaken by the Bush administration before and after the Abu Ghraib incident brings extra insights and significance to the processes of legitimation and eventually delegitimization that occurred at this juncture. To recall, Wittgenstein classifies this kind of action as the substitution of one set of rules/meanings with another. Taking this concept on board provides a specialized tool which makes the moves the Bush administration had made to redefine the rules more and more apparent. Evidently part and parcel of undertaking the Iraq War pre-­emptively was that America pioneered an alternative outlook on the Geneva Conventions and the UN Conventions Against Torture. This much has been established. What is significant is that the Bush administration did not simply ignore international law to make securitizing claims to adopt such exceptional rules. Rather, the Abu Ghraib incident confirmed that they had closely read and engaged with existing law to justify their actions (Sands 2005). Aware there were consequences involved in breaking the Geneva Conventions outright, the Bush administration insisted that, “for the most part” they would treat detainees “in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions, to the extent they are appropriate” (Rumsfeld 2002a: January 11). Although technically redefining and breaking international law, they repeatedly claimed they were acting in accordance with that law. Drawing parallels with Wittgenstein’s conceptualization of acts of interpretation changes the dynamics of the Bush administration’s attempt to redefine these rules. The focus on substituting one set of rules with another, as opposed to breaking or suspending rules, suggests that an alternative set of rules were being put into use. In other words, it draws attention to not only what rules existed and were being eroded, but also what rules were being redefined and implemented. Cutting in at this level makes the kind of rules that were operating in the Bush administration’s language game of security visible. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s idea of meaning in use enables us to gain a more substantive picture of how the Bush administration were speaking security and what the outcomes of this language game was. This was mainly achieved by arguing that they were fighting a different kind of war post September 11, 2001. In sum, “the nature of the new placed high premium on other factors that renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions” (Gonzales 2002: January 25). As Cheney had stated in his first interview after 9/11, “it is going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective” (Ripley 2004: Strauss 2005: 1269). However, in building on Wittgenstein’s work, it becomes possible to zoom in to see the intricate ways in which the Bush administration crafted the rules of their language game and the contexts in which these rules applied. Moreover, it enables us to zoom out also, in order to see the manner in which their arguments about redefining the Geneva and Torture Conventions were woven into the fabric of other language games, such as international humanitarian law. Examining the case at hand, for

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   131 instance, highlights how the Bush administration attempted to redefine the Geneva Conventions and also how they undertook to modify this act of interpretation to fit the Iraqi contexts. While the Taliban and Al-­Qaeda could be classified as non-­state actors, and thus enemy combatants, this type of classification did not neatly translate into the Iraqi case because the latter was a sovereign state and as such Iraq civilians and prisoners were most certainly entitled to POW status. As David E. Graham, among others, notes, “this kind of status determination is extremely important when one makes distinctions with respect to treatment and interrogation” (2005–2006: 61). Wittgenstein’s notion of an act of interpretation helps to further explain why the Bush administration’s language of security failed to gain credibility in response to what occurred in the Abu Ghraib prison. First, it makes the intersubjective context in which the Bush administration was acting obvious. As noted in the last chapter, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, even if this group had wished to re-­interpret the meaning of the Geneva and Torture Conventions, it was necessary for them to at least make reference to these existing rules in order to proceed. In sum, in order to break these rules, they had to engage with them and justify why their new interpretation was more viable than the old or what they called “quaint” rules. Private language game In reality, Abu Ghraib is a very good example which reinforces Wittgenstein’s argument that there is such no such thing as a private language game. Although the practices evidenced in these images occurred in highly private and securitized contexts, the dominant meanings these images were inscribed with went beyond the Bush administration’s control. Rather, Washington’s assertions that their security policies did abide with international law were dependent on the others accepting them as such. This restricted how they could respond. Unpacking the Bush administration’s response to what happened in Abu Ghraib makes it apparent that they cared how they were perceived by a larger intersubjective community at home and abroad. The great lengths they went to classify the practices as un-­American and their avid denial of torture taking place in the prison exemplifies this. However, the revelation that they had undertaken measures to redefine the rules compounded the dilemmas that they faced in preserving the legitimacy of their language game of security and, by extension, the rules constituted therein. To give an example, the Bush administration’s identity as fighting a war against evil was predicated on the idea that they were undertaking correct and necessary actions to eradicate evil in Iraq and beyond. Evidently this was their justification for undertaking the war and the foundation of the Bush Doctrine. The Abu Ghraib photos by themselves, while reflecting the binaries inherent in the Bush administration’s multilevelled and multilayered language game of security, also severely destabilized them. The gap that appeared between the Bush administration’s

132   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game i­nterpretation of the rules and others’ interpretation of the same rules weakened the ability of the US to claim that they were acting in a law-­abiding manner. Once the abuses came to light, the Bush administration were increasingly held responsible for their words. As the New York Times reported, In the case of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a high-­level detainee who is believed to have helped plan the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, CIA interrogators used graduated levels of force, including a technique known as “water-­ boarding,” in which a prisoner is strapped down, forcibly pushed under water and made to believe he might drown. (Risen et al. 2004: May 1) A Wittgenstinian notion of language games points to a further contrast in the Bush administration’s interpretation of the rules. As established in Chapter 3, undertaking an act of interpretation is no easy feat. As the agent moves to substitute one set of meanings with another, there is no guarantee they will succeed in installing this interpretation. For this to occur, they must convince others to put these new meanings into use. Abu Ghraib demonstrated that this administration’s attempt to reinterpret humanitarian law, such as the Geneva Conventions, was accepted by some. The inhumane treatment of prisoners captured in the photographs signalled that US soldiers had considered it acceptable to treat detainees in this manner (Hooks and Mosher 2005; Puar 2004). However, other players, outside the “few” “un-­American” soldiers who allegedly disobeyed orders, refused to follow these rules. After Abu Ghraib, when these meanings were put into wider use, Washington’s argument that the Geneva and Torture Conventions could be interpreted in a way that legitimated the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques found in the Abu Ghraib prison was deemed increasingly unacceptable. The problems created by the acts of interpretation in the Bush administration’s response highlights that the legitimacy of even the most securitized speech act is limited. It also weakens the Bush administration assertions of unlimited power to fight their war on terror. If the latter scenario had of been the case their attempt to change existing laws surrounding torture would be almost guaranteed, since they represented the most powerful player. Abu Ghraib illustrates a different scenario. Despite their earlier attempt to redefine existing rules, such as the Geneva Conventions, they were unable to justify these changes as being legitimate. That Abu Ghraib came to be represented as “tantamount to torture” demonstrates the legitimacy of existing intersubjective laws to override the Bush administration’s own interpretation of them. Despite constructing new terminology and a parallel interpretation of certain codes of international law to legally conduct their wars, the most powerful figures in the White House and Washington were unable to break free of binding rules. Again, this is not to suggest in any way that these agents did not alter or attempt to break free of rules. Rather, the goal is to highlight that a constellation of alternative and alternating rules were in operation, some that sought to break rules, some that sought to follow

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   133 rules and some that sought to make existing interpretations of international law anew. The outcome that emerges from Abu Ghraib when all these competing sets of meanings and spheres of action interact is an enormous site of contestation of what was considered to be legitimate in the name of security. Evidently the Bush administration’s interpretations of torture and the Geneva Conventions did not succeed in convincing everyone to play according to the new set of rules of their securitized game. Wittgenstein’s notion of an act of interpretation also reveals another constraint on the Bush administration with regards to Abu Ghraib. Focusing on this situation highlights that the legitimacy of their interpretation of the Geneva and Torture Conventions required that others not only accepted it, but also constantly put their interpretation into use. Even if the Bush administration had no intention of holding true to their promises of treating detainees “humanely,” the very fact that they had made a set of arguments surrounding the legal and illegal ways of treating detainees meant that intersubjective reference points existed for their actions. Their unwillingness to admit that their interpretation of the Geneva and Torture Conventions was inappropriate was nullified with the photographic docu­mentation of violently inflicted abuse. The rules of engagement and thus play that they attempted to legitimate in the name of security were both what was being contested as well as the grounds for that judgement. When placed outside the Bush administration’s discourse, the acts took on a different meaning. For instance, in May 2006, the UN body monitoring the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment called for several changes in US policy – among them, a call for an end, at any site under the United States’ “de facto effective control,” of water boarding and any other interrogation techniques constituting torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (Amann 2006). It also stated that it “regrets” the US contention that the laws of armed conflict precludes application of the Convention, and the Committee aruged for the contrary view “that the Convention applies at all times” to every State party “whether in peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory under its jurisdiction” (Amann 2006). In light of the acts of interpretation that they had previously undertaken, the Bush administration was also forced to retract their earlier claims that the Geneva Conventions were “quaint” and “obsolete” after the Abu Ghraib scandal. Once top officials acknowledged that some of the techniques being reviewed counted as violations of the Geneva Conventions, the Pentagon announced that the US military would not use certain prisoner interrogation procedures, including sleep and sensory deprivation. In 2006 President Bush issued a Presidential Executive, making it clear that the CIA would comply with the Geneva Conventions’ prohibitions. Confirming and defending the Central Intelligence Agency’s program of secret detentions, President Bush emphasized that “this program has been subject to multiple legal reviews by the Department of Justice and CIA lawyers; they’ve determined it complied with our laws” (Bush 2006b: September 6). The official position of the US as expressed in the report that they submitted to the Committee Against Torture on June 29, 2005, pursuant to Article 19 of the

134   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, contains the following relevant statements: In fighting terrorism, the U.S. remains committed to respecting the rule of law, including the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and international treaty obligations, including the Torture Convention. (UN 2005: Article 19 Outlining US obligations under the Torture conventions, President Bush stated, the United States reaffirms its commitment to the worldwide elimination of torture. The non-­negotiable demands of human dignity must be protected without reference to race, gender, creed, or nationality. Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right, and we are committed to building a world where human rights are respected and protected by the rule of law [. . .]. The United States also remains steadfastly committed to upholding the Geneva Conventions, which have been the bedrock of protection in armed conflict for more than 50 years. These Conventions provide important protections designed to reduce human suffering in armed conflict. We expect other nations to treat our service members and civilians in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Our Armed Forces are committed to complying with them and to holding accountable those in our military who do not. (Bush 2004g: June 26) These changes demonstrate that the Bush administration was placed in a position where they were forced to revise the way in which they spoke security and clarify what this language legitimated. Understanding how it was possible for the Bush administration’s language of security to transform from a position that stated America had the right to redefine existing rules in the name of security, to one where such redefinition was illegitimate, only becomes possible through a closer look at language as an interactive process. This draws attention to the relationship between words, discussed next.

Internal inconsistencies Apart from revealing an act of interpretation, Abu Ghraib problematized the Bush administration’s language game of security in another way. As shown, a dual agenda of security and democracy strands of argumentation were embedded in their response. The way in which these two structures of meaning were interwoven as a reply reveals that American soldiers had abused if not tortured Iraqi detainees and created an internal inconsistency in their language game of security. As mentioned, due to the way that they had built their arguments for war, democracy was part of the background against which Abu Ghraib was understood and given meaning. The potential for a tension between security and democracy had been present from the first defining moment when the Bush

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   135 administration united these concepts to justify the Iraq War. As noted in Chapter 1, the arguments and policies espoused by the President and his team oscillated between a position of rule-­following and rule-­making activities. Such internal inconsistencies ruptured the Bush administration’s overall justifications for the Iraq War. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, the different parts no longer consisted of or functioned as a whole. Evidence that the Bush administration’s language game was unravelling was that nobody, even themselves after a while, was willing to put it into use. Although the President and his advisors initially held fast to their claims that the use of enhanced interrogation techniques was legitimate within the boundaries of their language game of security and thus their security practices, this line of argument was revisited and even dropped later on. Two decisions by the Supreme Court in 2004 played an important role in ushering in this new line. In July 2004, by a vote of six to three, the Court rejected the President’s claims of absolute power to detain non-­Americans at Guantanamo Bay without any judicial review. Likewise, the Court overwhelmingly rejected the President’ denial of due process to Yaser Esam Hamdi, a United States citizen held virtually incommunicado for almost two years without seeing a lawyer (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 2004; Rasul v. Bush 2004; Strauss 2005: 1277–1279). The theoretical significance of observing these internal inconsistencies is that it depicts the Bush administration’s discursive response to Abu Ghraib as both a site of agency and structure. Notably, their recourse to the language of security gave them a certain space for maneuver as they answered harsh criticisms levelled at their door due to the Abu Ghraib scenario. For instance, it gave them agency to declare that their official security procedures and practices were lawful and that what had happened in the prison was deviant behavior. At a deeper level, the definition of security that the Bush administration constituted at the defining moment starts to unravel in light of evidence that torture was part of the rules of this game. The internal inconsistencies evidenced within the Bush administration’s response to Abu Ghraib reflect a shift in the relationship between words. As illustrated thus far, a multilayered language game of security was in play, one in which security and democracy were co-­constituted. However, these two discursive categories are constantly jostling and competing as the Bush administration puts their language of security into use. They are not fixed; nor do they carry equal weight. As seen in Abu Ghraib, the discursive categories transform from being complementary to conflicting. This represents a very consequential shift in the relationship between the two structures of meaning. While both discursive categories were part of the grammar of the Bush administration’s language game of security, they legitimated different actions and thus invoked different expectations. Speaking democracy is not the same as speaking security. Reflecting on the dialectical relationship between the terms security and democracy highlights how President Bush and his administration became constrained by the very linguistic categories they constituted to justify the Iraq War. The presence of multiple structures of meaning enabled the Bush administration

136   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game to be criticized on more than one level. The internal inconsistencies in the Bush administration’s discursive response to Abu Ghraib enabled them to be criticized for not upholding their self-­proclaimed promise to establish or create security in Iraq. The evidence that Americans had tortured Iraqi civilians undermined the Bush administration’s repetitive claims that the US was promoting democracy in this country. As Thomas L. Friedman noted we are in danger of losing something much more important than the Iraq War. We are in danger of losing America as an instrument of moral authority and inspiration in the world. I have never known a time in my life when America and its president were more hated around the world than today. (Friedman 2004) Two very interesting points are being made here. What Friedman touches upon is not only how America’s identity was being redefined as something other than good, but also how the meaning of America became inscribed with a new meaning after the Abu Ghraib photographs emerged. Once again we find that a change in the way in which the President and his team and others spoke security changed the rules of the game. Implementing the two-­level game of security meant that their response repeatedly ended up in a series of opposing positions without finding a way to decide between them. As the Bush administration worked to make their discursive categories of security and democracy seem sufficiently compatible to explain what happened in Abu Ghraib, this vocabulary could not, on its own discursive terms, consistently hold to its character. Rather, the Bush administration resorted to a confused account that constantly shifted between two opposing positions: that security justifies the use of torture but also creates democracy. The retreat to this position in the case of Abu Ghraib made it apparent that their justifications Iraq had lost almost all credibility, regardless of whether or not it had been in the name of security or democracy. The mismatch between the structures of meaning constituting the Bush administration’s overall language game of security and how they are put into practice does not just affect the legitimacy of the agent, or the securitizing actors, but also the legitimacy of words themselves. This is shown by the increased questioning of the Bush administration’s security practices. This had occurred before, but what was new was that they had no legitimate language with which to respond. Put more succinctly, their words were blatantly inadequate to justify the actions that had taken place in the name of security because they had become meaningless on more than one level.

The hidden dangers of speaking security: some conclusions Abu Ghraib encapsulates several hidden dangers of speaking security. On March 19 2002, reporter Bob Woodword encountered an ebullient Secretary Rumsfeld bragging about, “the war you don’t see” (Prados 2004: 10). Picking up on this

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   137 zone of invisibility, here we investigate several of the less obvious implications of speaking security. These reflections reaffirm the concerns raised in earlier chapters about the need to “look and see” exactly what the language of security has the power to legitimate. The example of Abu Ghraib illustrates that a securitized speech act has consequences that reach well beyond the simple speech act of security. Practices legitimated by the initial securitizing speech act may not be visible at that moment. To put this into context, Abu Ghraib was legitimated as part of the securitized language game that the Bush administration constructed after September 11, 2001. The enhanced interrogation techniques which were legitimated to fight the “curse of terrorism that is upon the face of the earth” (Ashcroft 2001b: September 15) were later transferred and implemented to conduct US operations in the Iraq War. While it was apparent from the outset that the Bush administration considered their enemies as evil and employed a de-­ humanizing language to categorize the kind of “parasites” they were fighting, the actual steps that they would take to pursue their security policies was not evident at the outset. There was no way to predict the outcome of this ongoing game. As events unfolded, alternative narratives became conceivable. Another hidden danger Abu Ghraib brings to the fore is that an entire language game can collapse, even when the agent still speaks security. As the Bush administration employed the language game of security that they created after September 11, 2001, and modified at the defining moment to justify the Iraq War, it propagated different meanings which elicited different responses. Such observations highlight that the relationship between language, agency and structure is one of constant negotiation. Moreover, Abu Ghraib encapsulates something equally unique, the disruption of a securitized game. It was not that the Bush administration abandoned the language of security. Security was still being spoken. Instead, this language became meaningless, at least in terms of how the Bush administration was putting the language of security into use. Put differently, their language game of security was disputed to the point where it was no longer accepted as legitimate. Proof of this is that an alternative narrative, that of torture, then emerged to directly challenge the arguments espoused by the Bush administration. Further evidence is the fact that the Bush administration had to put a different set of meanings into practice, ones which stated that the Geneva Conventions would be applied consistently rather than labelling them as simply being “quaint.” Again, this signifies a transformation in the power with which their language of security was invested. Originally, the Bush adminstration’s security speech acts had enabled them to legitimate the use of any means necessary in the name of security. However, when the administration spoke security as a way to respond to Abu Ghraib, this language was no longer able to fulfil this function. It was not simply this specific speech act that was challenged in their response to Abu Ghraib. The amalgamation of the Bush administration’s previous securitizing moves and utterances came under direct scrutiny. By drawing on the larger language game in responding to Abu Ghraib, the Bush administration drew

138   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game a­ uxiliary discourses into the realm of critique. The doctrine of pre-­emptive self-­ defenses they constructed post September 11, 2001 and then tailored as a pretext for invading Iraq are two examples. Rather than strengthening the Bush administration’s defense against what occurred in Abu Ghraib, others drew on their language of security to support suggestions that it had fuelled a context where clandestine procedures and torture were deemed acceptable. While their use of the language of security to justify the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and their reinterpretation of the Geneva and Torture Conventions may not have been surprising, the outcome it generated was unexpected: the erosion of their entire justifications for speaking security to undertake exceptional measures. Such hidden dangers for participants in the language game of security are worthy of deeper consideration than they are presently granted in the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework. The hidden nature of the Abu Ghraib abuses also raises nuanced questions about the role of the audience in the process of securitization. The appearance of the photographs thus created a space where outside audiences gained a more powerful voice, allowing a different kind of judgement to become possible. However, the audience still had a reactionary role in ascribing meaning to the Abu Ghraib scandal. They certainly were not consulted by the Bush administration when discussions about how to reinterpret the Geneva Conventions were being held. This raises new problems for the Copenhagen School to address. They argue that audience acceptance is prerequisite for securitization to occur. Yet Abu Ghraib speaks to the dilemma of when securitizing actors do not consult an audience, or withhold information that would influence whether or not the audience would accept their securitizing move. Had the Bush administration openly declared their security policies in full detail, it is less likely that the same would have received as much support. The audience would have appraised the security stakes in a different light. Such revelations demand an examination of how ethical and democratic considerations play out in a securitized framework. The issue of audiences and securitized environment is still another issue which is raised by Abu Ghraib. A problematic revelation is that the detainees held at the Iraq prison did not have a voice. Even when the pictures were released, those abused did not have the chance to recognize or pass judgement on the horrors that had been inflicted upon them. Rather, the language that informed debates about what took place inside the prison came from outside. The victims thus constituted a silent audience. When the Bush administration was uttering security to justify the war, they were not talking to them, at least not directly. Their refusal to allow military tribunals weakened any channels of appeal. Such hidden audiences and marginalized voices need to be spoken about more in relation to debate about how the Copenhagen School conceptualize the audience (see Hansen 2006). The Abu Ghraib abuses and the Bush administration’s response points to the instalment of a specific kind of exceptional politics: torture. Perhaps the kind of exceptionality here differs from the kind of exceptionality the Copenhagen

Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game   139 School address. Nonetheless, the treatment of detainees in this prison proposes the need for critical considerations about what sort of rules exist in securitized environments and how such standards should be defined. Whose definition should prevail? What happens when two competing definitions or speech acts conflict? In much the same way, another hidden danger that requires closer monitoring is how the meanings and rules surrounding what does and does not constitute legitimate and lawful behavior have become questionable. As noted, the Bush administration were not breaking rules, but actively substituting them with an alternative set in the name of security. Suggested therein is that a graver danger than merely breaking the rules lies in the ability of agents to redefine them through acts of interpretation. The implications of these reinterpretations are less immediate. In many cases, such subtle modifications to the shared and established rules are almost invisible. However, while they are harder to distinguish, their effect is often profound. Intersubjective rules that were once taken for granted are no longer followed blindly, but become subject to challenges. Again, the Bush administration’s interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, and even pre-­emption, spring to mind. Reprimanding the Bush administration on its illegal policies is one thing; preventing these policies from being put into practice is another. Taking stock of securitized environments such as Abu Ghraib should give us pause to reassess what the language of security can theoretically legitimate in principle and in practice. It reminds us to question what is acceptable. Here we need to follow Wittgenstein’s advice to vigilantly look and see how legitimate meanings are constantly being put in practice. This goes beyond the passivity of simply accepting or rejecting the securitized speech acts of the powerful. Greater onus must be placed on agents of all kinds to be more active in monitoring how agents are speaking security and to what ends. The accountability for wrong behaviors did not stop with those who were physically present. The working environment surrounding those enlisted soldiers was largely constituted by the language of security. In this light, the failure goes beyond the human rights violations in the prison itself. Audiences must listen more carefully to the way in which security is being spoken. The problem today is that the laws regulating the practices of war are only meaningful when they are put into practice. If they are ignored or redefined, their original meaning and legitimacy becomes more vulnerable to exploitation. Such an upheaval is particularly vivid in Abu Ghraib, where the usual balance between lawful and unlawful has been stood on its head. A more optimistic dimension that Wittgenstein’s language games approach brings to bear on the Bush administration’s interpretation of international law is that changing and replacing existing rules must be an intersubjective process. Presenting the language of security as a game rather than a speech act assumes that audiences can constantly hold the speaker to account. Because an act of interpretation is just one move in a much more complex language game, agents must constantly justify their actions in order for them to be accepted as meaningful. Moreover, their interpretation must also draw on existing rules to ensure a

140   Abu Ghraib: the limits of a language game level of continuity between the old and the new. Within this type of set-­up, agents are not absolved from the ethical considerations connected to the decisions to be made. The absence of either dimension threatens the identity of the players along with the rules that constitute the entire language game. As witnessed in the case of Abu Ghraib, people can reject the arguments presented by even the most powerful actors and under the most securitized circumstances. In fact, when the Bush administration spoke security in response to Abu Ghraib, it did not elicit the meaning they ascribed to the photographed acts. Not only did the legitimacy of this agent suffer as people rejected the argumentative strategies forwarded in response to Abu Ghraib; ultimately, so too did the legitimacy of the discursive categories and rules they employed in the process.

A different way of speaking security Conclusions and developments

Essentially this book has proposed a different way of thinking about language, and by extension, a different way of speaking security. At a basic level our theoretical endeavour represents a considered reply to the claim that talk is cheap and even irrelevant within the discipline of IR. Rather, it has sought to demonstrate just how important and costly language can be. It is imperative to note that the core argument advanced here does not suggest that language cannot be instrumentally manipulated to serve the interests of some agents more than others. The specific goal has been to demonstrate that the categories and justifications which are given by rational actors are constitutive of a social realm where particular identity, norms, rules and words are invested with meaning. Hence, agents cannot simply do what they please. Instead, they must constantly act and interact with others so as to put intersubjective meanings into use. This concluding chapter will draw out the broad cross-­cutting themes that have emerged in the course of this research. First we will revisit how much language matters, not just why. From what has been demonstrated throughout this project, the latter can be concluded, whereas the former must be constantly reflected upon. The next task is to review the important insights that are gleaned by reconfiguring the Copenhagen School’s speech act theory with language game approach. Overall it has been shown that incorporating Wittgenstein’s ideas provides a valuable contribution for ongoing theoretical debates within securitization theory in particular and IR in general. The final section outlines the more comprehensive reading of the Bush administration’s justifications for the 2003 Iraq War that emerged in the course of our study. The chapter will close not by ending the discussion, but rather by reflecting on whether Wittgenstein offers a new way to speak security in theory and in practice.

Examining how much language matters, not just why Much has been made of the point that language matters. Drawing on the so-­ called “constructivist turn” emphasizes a way of thinking about social action which challenges what can be fully known, observed or measured. The research agenda, in this case, is not to predict stability, but to explain how change becomes possible. Hence, this theoretical position was an essential starting point

142   A different way of speaking security for mapping the construction and reconstruction of a language game of security. Our turn to constructivism was also prompted by the methodological desire to conceptualize language as a constitutive and constraining device. The theoretical fissures between conventional constructivism, critical constructivism and post-­ structuralism were discussed at length in Chapter 1 in order to illuminate the different ways in which each approach engages with the linguistic paradox. As noted, Wendt and other conventional constructivists are ill-­equipped to capture the power of language due to their retention of a scientific epistemology. The book makes an attempt to overcome these limitations by employing a critical constructivist approach, furthered through Wittgenstein’s concept of a language game. Although the critical constructivist or Wittgensteinian analysis adopted throughout the book is squarely post-­positivist, it can be distinguished from the standpoint of post-­structuralism. Meanings are far less unstable and slippery in a critical constructivist perspective. Without denying the performativity of language, they highlight that we are only capable of communicating in words and actions because we are socialized into and share a range of intersubjective understandings. In contrast to the post-­structuralist project, the intention is not to deconstruct categories, but rather to analyze meaning in use and how the construction of identity shapes the practices and strategies of participants in a given context. It is this broader definition of language as a constitutive and constraining device that preoccupied us throughout the project.

Exchanging a speech act for a language game of security Having established that language matters in the social construction of meanings and realities, the Copenhagen School’s securitization framework was chosen as a key for unlocking the power of language. It was argued that their representation of security as a speech act outlines an advanced portrayal of the power of language. A more nuanced purpose of engaging with their theory was to move securitization beyond the speech act to focus on ongoing practices, beyond the idea of securitizing speech acts and moves breaking rules to one in which the agents use and even attempt to redefine rules, and beyond a singular definition of security to a clustered linguistic constellation. As argued in Chapter 2, the goal is not to abolish the securitization approach or underestimate its success in bringing language onto the security agenda to an unprecedented extent. In fact, in many ways, a Wittgensteinian view of security as a language game complements the Copenhagen School’s aim to explore what security means. Indeed, it is possible to argue that their framework represents a language game which follows specific kinds of rules. This vantage point enables it to retain the analytical rigour it wishes, that is, not to widen the concept of securitization too far. Going a step further, the current field of securitization, old and new, can be conceptualized as an overlapping and multilayered language game. Taking this perspective enables participants and observers alike to see the points of continuity and change that are constantly at work in the evolving field of securitization

A different way of speaking security   143 studies more clearly. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s work can also provide the Copenhagen School with some rigorous tools for engaging with the growing number of criticisms levelled at them. Juxtaposing the concept of a speech act with a language game raises a provocative potential to provide a richer way of envisioning how agents not only speak security but how they put securitizing and securitized speech acts and moves into practice. As a result, it becomes a lot clearer that the way in which agents speak security at the start of the game is not necessarily the way they speak it at the end. On the contrary, the word security may lose the meaning it initially had. Paying attention to these modifications is significant, as different language games legitimate different kinds of actions and possibilities for securitization Against this backdrop it has also been suggested that the Copenhagen School’s speech act theory can be enhanced by bringing Wittgensteinian’s approach on board. In essence it provides a more enhanced conceptualization of multiplicity and rules. Multiplicity First, a language game approach shifts the analytical focus away from the speech act to a much longer and richer series of events. By emphasizing meaning in use, a language game perspective helps us to examine how agents speak security over time and at different stages of the securitization process during the course of play. Unlike the Copenhagen School’s speech act framework, Wittgenstein highlights a constant sphere of interaction. This carves out a more central role for the audience. Because there is no such thing as a private language game, agents must explain and justify their actions. Where Wittgenstein parts company with the Copenhagen School is in his claim that both sides must constantly partake in the language game in order for it to continue to exist. In order to remain meaningful, the securitizing actor and the audience must draw on this discourse as they interact. The role of an audience is implicit in Wittgenstein’s work. Instead of focusing on one specific kind of relationship, such as that between a speaker and an audience, he deals with intersubjectivity. His outlook is less divided into speaker and audience as two distinct entities. Rather, he is more interested in the whole, the language game. Action and interaction cannot exist without each other. In a language game approach, it is the process that needs to be understood. Adding and developing the concept of multiplicity revealed three important and interrelated elements. First, it highlighted that although the speech act is a powerful action, it is more often than not only one action in a larger sequence or process. Building on this insight, the securitizing move can also be reconceptualized as a series of moves that take place during the securitizing process itself. This argument has been well developed by several so-­called “second-­generation” securitization theorists. Indeed, the latter have paved the way to show the importance of carving out a space to examine contextual and procedural dimensions accompanying securitizing and securitized speech acts and moves. Many scholars

144   A different way of speaking security working in this remit have also highlighted that multiple speakers, audiences, moves and meanings may be in operation and operational when securitization takes place. Suggesting that speaking security is more than one singular action draws greater attention to the perlocutionary aspects of the speech act, or what it does. Talking about different moves in a securitization process also provides a way of uncovering why some securitized moves succeed and some fail depending on the context. Within the current literature a strong case has been made to improve the levels of argumentation between the speaker(s) and their audience(s). It is important to note that the Copenhagen School framework has introduced the terms macrosecuritization and institutionalization to deal with long-­term and multilevelled processes. Although these terms are good starting points to address multiplicity, they are unable to fully grasp that security may not be spoken the same way in each realm. In short, the meaning of security, and how it is spoken at different stages of the securitizing process, can be transformed. An argument has been made in Chapters 2 and parts of Chapter 3 that the Copenhagen School speech act theory does not cope well with this type of transformation. The Copenhagen School assumes the word security follows settled grammatical rules. As mentioned, this presentation conceals more than it reveals about the full constitutive potential of a security speech act. Conceptualizing the exchange between a speaker and an audience in this linear manner is problematic: it suggests control. However, assuming any speech act is a creative process reinforces that this discourse can be pieced together in a way that neither party intended. In this sense, the meaning of security lies beyond the way in which the speaker utters security and even how the audience interprets their speech act. While both sides have a role to play in constituting a language of security, their speech acts may take on a meaning that neither side considered thinkable at the outset. Moreover, if we move beyond the speech act, it becomes possible to think about instances wherein both parties may become embedded or fastened to a securitization narrative that they wish to leave behind but are unable to. The value of strengthening the dialectical relationship between the speaker and their audience with the Copenhagen School’s framework is that it reinforces that a securitization process is never complete. Tracing the evolution of security utterances acts as a point of departure for saying something about how the speaker and the audience are enabled and constrained in different ways, depending on the way in which security is being spoken and the stage of the securitizing process. A theory of transformation is embedded in the Copenhagen School theory but is not fully drawn out. Their framework provides essential tools for understanding how the transition from politicization to securitization takes place. However, there is a need to go further to examine when securitization can start to unravel as the speech act is put into use. The collapse of this discourse can surface before desecuritization occurs, and reinforces the ability of language to constrain as well as constitute agency. The final way this book has addressed and advanced the concept of multipli­ city is to draw greater attention to the relationship between words. Within the Copenhagen School’s account, the possibility that the securitized speech act can

A different way of speaking security   145 contain multiple meanings requires further attention. Although one speech act may prevail, it had been argued that it may consist of a web of interrelated and even competing discursive categories. These internal dynamics influence the construction of security and the agency available to the speaker. The relationship between these discursive groups and how they are arranged together is important for understanding the meaning ascribed to a given speech act. Much will depend on the particular way security is spoken – the composition of the speech act rather than the actual utterance. Acknowledging the relationship between words also offers insights into how alternative narratives emerge, either to complement or challenge the securitized speech acts. The availability of competing discourses has consequences for the kind of securitization that occurs at any given moment. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning in use offers new lines of inquiry into the dynamics of an evolving and unfolding language game. Put differently, it provides a more encompassing framework for examining the unfolding of a securitization process. Wittgenstein’s work reinforces that all languages are vulnerable to being questioned, even the most bewitching ones, such as security. Emphasizing multiplicity as an inherent feature of any language game, he claims that there are different ways to present an argument. This relaxes the Copenhagen School’s assertion that security must be spoken in a particular way. In a language game, security does not need to be spoken in one way or another. Instead, it can be spoken in several ways, by several agents and in several contexts. Importantly, this understanding provides important methodological tools for examining how it is possible for agents to transfer from one kind of game, such as politicization, to another, such as securitization. Beyond breaking rules A second major advantage that a language game approach brings to bear on a securitization process is that it addresses rules at a far deeper level. According to Wittgenstein, all language is inherently rule-­based. The two are mutually constitutive. Neither can exist without the other since rules are a necessary part of learning a language. By extension, agents cannot break free of rules because they cannot leave language behind. It is always there, influencing how agents know how to go on in acting one way as opposed to another. As shown in Chapter 3, even when agents break the rules they are still informed by them. They understand the rules and the consequences that will follow by going against them. On a theoretical level, this strengthens the power of language to both enable and constrain agency. While the Copenhagen School addresses a situation in which agents can break free of rules, they do not fully outline the consequences this has for the securitizing actor or their audiences. Their emphasis on following grammatical rules and mainly breaking intersubjective rules leaves them unable to address the rules that securitization can create and even redefine. Indeed, rather than fading away, rules can appear to be an inherent feature of functioning securitized environments. The second way in which a language game approach reconfigures the Copenhagen School’s treatment of rules is that it addresses how agents attempt to

146   A different way of speaking security r­ edefine existing intersubjective rules. In Chapter 3, Wittgenstein’s notion of an “act of interpretation” was advocated as a way to probe into how agents attempt to substitute one set of rules for another. This seemed to be an interesting parallel to the Copenhagen School’s claim that securitization suspends the rules of the everyday (politicization) with special and exceptional politics (securitization). Incorporating a Wittgensteinian approach adds depth to this part of the securitizing move. An act of interpretation is an attempt to bring a completely new set of rules into existence, rather than suspend them temporarily. Also, undertaking an act of interpretation is not an easy feat. As discussed in Chapter 3, interpretation does not preclude the possibility that an interpretation will become a rule or part of the rules if enough people change their patterns of life. However, the possibility of becoming a different kind of rule is structural. Any new language would have to be developed on the basis of the one already possessed. In this respect, the analysis is not just about language; it is about the construction of intersubjective realms. Scrutinizing such processes reasserts the need to look and see how security is being spoken during the securitizing move and in securitized environments. Wittgenstein also deals with the rules underpinning speech in a more robust way. According to his point of view, a change in language signifies a change in the rules of a given language game. Such modification will in turn transform the field on which securitization has to play. Wittgenstein’s work offers an important intellectual tool for unpacking a broader definition of the language of security and what it constructs. Within a language game, agents may have multiple identities because they may partake in multiple games simultaneously. This highlights the possibility of speech actions spilling over from one sphere to another. Analyzing these points of intersection is more nuanced in terms of showing how a language of security enables and constrains agents participating in this intersubjective sphere. Paying attention to the relationship between words and where they criss-­cross and overlap demonstrates how different structures of meaning, or speech acts, can be mobilized by different agents. We can see how these ambiguous associations often intrude on one another, such that the concept evokes a significance greater than that which is claimed for it. First, it has been shown that the Copenhagen School overlooks the ability of language itself to be a structural constraint on agents speaking security. As argued, this leads the Copenhagen School to overestimating the ease of creating change and encourages complacency in the knowledge that something is being done. However, fundamental changes within and to an established language game are rare. In addition, we are socialized into a language, including a political language such as security. Recognizing that securitized speech acts are spoken in a context which already has meaning highlights that while speaking security often empowers agents to break free of existing rules, it also constrains what the agent can say in a meaningful way. Second, the preceding discussions have amplified that the Copenhagen School does not have the theoretical reach to cope with instances when agents do not wish to break free of rules at all, but rather draw on existing rules to legitimize

A different way of speaking security   147 their securitizing move. Acknowledging that agents use rules to legitimate the implementation of exceptional measures complicates the sharp boundary that the Copenhagen School draws between politicization and securitization. Instead of one disappearing with the appearance of the other, they may simply co-­exist. We may also find situations in which securitizing actors and even audiences may move to redefine the rules of securitization while still speaking security. The Copenhagen School has little to say about cases where agents attempt to redefine existing rules rather than suspend them. However, the idea that agents engage with rules to alter them challenges the assumption that those speaking security are simply attempting to break free of rules that would otherwise bind. The third critique of the link the Copenhagen School provides between rules and securitized speech acts is that it overlooks the types of rules that exist in times of exceptionality. Such an oversight is part and parcel of coming to grips with how securitized environments actually function or what the outcomes of securitization actually are in specific cases. Realms of exceptionality are places where the laws and rules are not clear. As the Copenhagen School stipulate, agents are acting in a way that does not conform to normal sets of rules. “Extraordinary” in their account is a reference to a deviation from what is considered normal and thus acceptable. The supposition that existing rules are suspended in times of security is problematic, as mentioned earlier. It also fails to address the rules of speech. By speaking security, agents are undertaking an inherently rule-­ based activity. Extra steps are needed to examine what exactly is legitimate in the name of security when the intentions of individuals are rarely decisive and where the rules of international law are often under duress. If the Copenhagen School is to play a role in any of the complex shifts that could lead to political change, such as desecuritization, a deeper level of engagement with rules is a prerequisite. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s work highlights that these changes may occur simultaneously, attempts to sketch the theoretical complexity and nuances being advanced in securitization debates, and also to examine how securitizing moves and securitized speech acts are put into practice.

Linking language, security and the war in Iraq It was not the intention of this research project to provide a systematic account of the 2003 Iraq War or determine what caused the Bush administration to pursue this foreign policy. To address these issues would demand a much more intensive study beyond the purpose of this book. Our main point of departure was to analyze the evolution and transformation of the Bush administration’s language game of security as an illustrative backdrop to the different theoretical aspects and features addressed in each chapter. Notwithstanding the brevity of our discussions of the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War, the empirical analyses included in each chapter, combined with the use of new theoretical prisms, allowed this book to provide a number of conclusions that can be considered original contributions.

148   A different way of speaking security Why language matters The discussions of the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War capture why language matters. Importantly, the enormous controversy over this invasion increased rather than diminished the role of language in constructing a legitimate rationale for the US going to war with Iraq. This language was far from cheap. Instead, it has been shown that September 11, 2001 marks the origins of the Bush administration’s language game of security, founded on the principle of pre-­ emptive self-­defense. The latter asserted that America had the right to act on the possibility rather than certainty of imminent threats. This language provided an essential component for understanding how the Iraq War came to be understood not only as a war of choice, but as a war of necessity. This language game created an intersubjective realm of action, within which certain identities and norms were made meaningful and actions justifiable. In the case of Iraq, the lines of identification constructed in and by their language constituted Saddam Hussein and his regime as an evil, existential, threat. The worst-­case scenario of a direct link between Iraq and WMD firmly established itself in the Bush administration’s rhetoric and became the foundation for war against Iraq from 2002 onwards. This narrative or linguistic frame did not just classify Saddam as an outsider. It also involved a complex construction of the Bush administration as leaders in a fight against evil. The power of their language game to ascribe certain rules of engagement is further apparent in the Abu Ghraib case. Relying heavily on a language of security, the Bush administration stressed that the prisoners in Abu Ghraib would not be classified as prisoners of war, but as unlawful combatants. These classifications had serious ramifications for the way in which US detainees were treated and the rights to which they were legally entitled. How the Iraq War became possible After establishing that language mattered in the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War, this book grappled with the question of how this war became possible. An easy answer is that America acted unilaterally to invade the country to pursue their self-­interests. Such unilateral accounts stress that, as the only superpower in the world, the Bush administration had the military and financial resources to pursue their preferred course of action. Rationally, those with the most power set the agenda, and following this logic, the Iraq invasion was a way for America and the Bush administration to maximize their power. As a cost–benefit exercise, the odds of a superpower defeating a significantly weaker state were stacked in favour of America. Accepting this logic of inevitability is tempting, especially given America’s military prowess and the Bush administration’s policy of pre-­emptive self-­ defense. Here, however, different and perhaps more compelling arguments have been made. In essence, the importance of language in constituting the space in which the Iraq War became not just thinkable but also possible was documented. Taking this angle demonstrates that alternative options were certainly available.

A different way of speaking security   149 As shown, there was nothing inevitable about the invasion. On the contrary, the materiality of the war had to be inscribed with this particular meaning. Even after the Bush administration decided to go to war, there was no template ready to hand. The war, and putting countless American lives at risk, had to be constantly justified. As shown, the Bush administration constructed a language game of security to make such justifications appear legitimate. Defining moments Adopting a language game perspective enabled us to chart and trace complex cycles of interaction and sites of contestation. These have been termed defining moments. As the term suggests, these moments signify important incidents when the Bush administration had to rebuild their language game of security during the Iraq War. At each juncture, the problem turns on the justifiability of the assumptions. In this sense, we have analyzed situations in which, although challenged, a language game adapts and even prevails. We have also examined situations in which their language game was rendered meaningless. Exploring these instances of evolution and transformation acted as a point of departure to develop other critical security studies which focus on how the Iraq War was justified. Contributing to these works, our discussion has placed greater emphasis on how the Bush administration’s justifications were put into use. Doing so served to bring the constitutive and constraining dimensions of language into sharp relief. In particular, it provided a theoretical map to unpack not only how the Bush administration’s language game of security constantly evolved, but also how their justifications were constantly challenged and questioned. Again, this enabled us to gain a better view of the obvious and subtle processes of alteration at work as their language game unfolded. A language game approach offers substantive insights into the unexpected twists and turns that this foreign policy venture has taken. The first defining moment explored was when the Bush administration had to rebuild their arguments for war when no WMD were found in Iraq. Having premised the invasion on the grounds that Saddam Hussein possessed such nuclear capabilities, the legitimacy of their justifications for the Iraq War was severely jeopardized when the UN inspectors failed to find any WMD inside Iraq. Persisting questions still linger over the legality of the invasion in light of this evidence. In the aftermath of this discovery, we should have seen the collapse of a justification for war. Instead, we see its survival and continuation. It has been suggested the Bush administration were able to preserve their language game of security by drawing on a multilevel language game of security. Overall, the Bush administration side-­stepped the lack of material evidence in Iraq by denying that this was the sole reason for pursuing a forceful regime change in Iraq, if necessary. This was done on two levels. Apart from accusing Iraq of failing to “fully” comply with UN Resolution 1441, the Bush administration supplemented their justifications for the war on the grounds that they were going to democratize Iraq. As shown extensively in Chapters 1 and 2, security

150   A different way of speaking security was still being spoken, but in a different way. The way in which the Bush administration redefined their justifications for war at the first defining moment gave them some level of agency. Most noticeably the inclusion of democracy promotion enabled their dominant discourse of security to remain a legitimate reason for taking pre-­emptive action against Iraq. Security was not to be abandoned as the rationale for war. On the contrary, the President and his team argued that democracy would increase the level of security that could be achieved. Without abandoning the language of security, that is, the Bush administration rebuilt their justifications for the Iraq War to stand for more than the presence of WMD in this country In addition to showing how language enabled the Bush administration to justify a pre-­emptive war without the existence of a serious threat, it was illustrated how they were also constrained by their justifications for the Iraq invasion. This strengthens the significance of what occurred at the defining moment even further. The fact that the Bush administration had to rebuild their arguments for war shows that they were constrained by their language. Plainly, the way in which they justified the war limited how the administration could respond once it transpired that Iraq had no WMD. On its own, the absence of Saddam Hussein’s stockpiles is not problematic. In another context it could have been considered as a progressive development: there was no longer a need for the US to go to war. What was problematic for the Bush administration was that in order for their arguments for undertaking a military war against Iraq War to retain legitimacy, it was necessary for a link to exist between Iraq and WMD. This meant that the Bush administration could not veer too far from their original justifications when no WMD were found. As has been shown, they did not do so. Instead, a larger language game of security was brought into play, one which was multilevelled and multidimensional. The Bush administration’s shift to democracy as the epicentre of it foreign policy introduces a different kind of game. This also limited their actions because the Bush administration had to act in way that was consistent with established democratic principles. Marrying security and democracy turned out to be easier said than done. As the Bush administration put this linguistic cluster into practice, the complementary relationship between the two discursive categories of security and democracy that existed at the first defining moment incrementally began to transpire into a working contradiction within their language game of security. Chapter 4 examined a second defining moment, the Abu Ghraib abuses which came to light in April 2004, to show another stage of transformation. More specifically, it highlighted the limits if not the collapse of their language game of security. The multilevel language game of security that the Bush administration employed constituted – but predominantly constrained – the way in which they could respond to revelations that US soldiers had tortured detainees in their custody. At first glance, the abuse scandal appears to depict a completely separ­ ate type of crisis than the one they confronted at the defining moment when no WMD were found in Iraq. If understood as part of the overall grammar of the

A different way of speaking security   151 Bush administration’s language of security, however, the similarities and structural constraints of their security narrative become clearer. As shown in Chapter 4, the Bush administration did not abandon the language of security. Rather, they drew on their previous security utterances during their attempt to categorize what occurred in the prison as un-­American and thus undemocratic, while justifying the use of their “enhanced interrogation techniques” as an essential part of the grammar of this particular game. Analyzing the tensions and inconsistencies created by way in which the Bush administration spoke security in reply to the Abu Ghraib incident highlights how their overlapping and criss-­crossing language games enabled and constrained them. Indeed, disputes about the coercive practices they classified as legitimate in the name of security erupted in the wake of this scandal. While the issue of pre-­emptive self-­defense encoded in the Bush administration’s post-­September 11, 2001, security strategy had always been problematic, these rules of engagement became even more contested in the Abu Ghraib context. The language cracked at the defining moment in 2003, but it was able to be salvaged. In Abu Ghraib it cracked beyond repair. It was no longer possible for the Bush administration to speak security in a way that justified the use of pre-­ emptive self-­defense and any other means necessary to fight terrorism. Instead, it was replaced by an alternative set of meanings, ones which challenged the Bush administration’s entire language game of security. Outside of their securitized game, the abusive treatment of terrorist suspects and detainees in Abu Ghraib came to be referred to as what the ICRC classified as “tantamount to torture.” The limitations of the Copenhagen School: an empirical reflection In exploring the way in which the Bush administration’s language game of security unfolded, our discussions raised broader theoretical questions about the way in which agents speak security and what this discourse has the power to legitimate. As shown in Chapter 2, securitization can show us that this government was operating under an exceptional framework that aggressively designated existential threats. The sense of urgency and prioritization anticipated by the Copenhagen School during a securitizing move were also recurring themes underpinning the Bush administration’s discursive justifications of the Iraq War. Their absolute conviction that inaction was not an option elevated the survival of us against them as the foundation for action. However, the core tensions outlined in the securitization concept are replicated in the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War. First, focusing on the moment that the President and his administration spoke security to legitimate their securitizing moves at the outset of the Iraq invasion, and later in Abu Ghraib, illustrates that it was not a single utterance. Rather, the Bush administration constantly engaged in a number of securitized conversations as it justified their war. As mentioned, the Copenhagen School’s idea of macrosecuritization is an excellent springboard to explore the linkages between the different securitization undertaken by President Bush and his team to fight their war on terror.

152   A different way of speaking security What Wittgenstein enables us to detect is that security was not being spoken in the same way within this larger framework. Whereas the Copenhagen School can provide certain insights into how the Bush administration spoke security at the outset, they do not take into consideration a situation where the meaning of security is contested to the point that it must be rebuilt. As argued in Chapter 2, securitization under-­specifies how securitizing actors reconstitute their arguments either during a securitizing move or in securitized environments thereafter. Ignoring these aspects was insufficient for explaining how it was possible for the Bush administration to legitimize the Iraq War even when the security-­ ness of the situation was so highly contested. Exploring the Bush administration’s language of security as a site of contestation forces us to rethink the way in which the Copenhagen School treat rules. As argued throughout, President Bush and his staff never claimed that they were acting in any way that was inconsistent with existing rules. Although they were speaking security, they were not attempting to break free of rules that would otherwise bind. The overall argument has not simply been that the Bush administration could have broken the rules if they wished, but that they chose not to. Nor has it been suggested that they acted in accordance with intersubjective and institutionalized rules. Making a much more substantive claim is to advocate that the Bush administration engaged with existing rules and attempted to redefine them. The idea of redefinition rather than suspension places greater emphasis on the creation of rules. Working from the assumption that the Bush administration reconstituted and thus redefined their justifications for the Iraq War in early 2003, it was shown that the Bush administration brought a two-­level process of securitization into being. Their overall language game of security was composed of two core speech acts, security and democracy. The relationship between these words complicates the boundary that the Copenhagen School draw between normal and exceptional politics. In the case of the Bush administration, we find these two speech acts criss-­cross and overlap to the point that they are co-­constitutive. The argument at the heart of securitization is that agents’ securitizing moves either succeed or they fail. Both of the defining moments investigated are an excellent example of the limitations of this either/or dichotomy to understand the construction of security. To capture the spaces that fall outside and inside these boundaries, we need sharper tools for analysis. Understanding the way in which the Bush administration spoke security at the defining moment, and how this language enabled and constrained them to justify the Iraq War, requires taking such additional factors into consideration. Examining this particular foreign policy as a language game of security paints a better understanding of how the Bush administration modified their justifications for the Iraq War through continuous processes of interaction and contestation. Wittgenstein’s notion of meaning in use is well suited to deal with the evolution and transformation in the Bush administration’s language of security as a short-­term as well as a long-­term process. From this view, their justifications for the Iraq War do not constitute a single securitizing move, or a single utterance.

A different way of speaking security   153 On the contrary, a language game approach explicates how the Bush administration justified the Iraq War through a series of linguistic moves. Exploring the contours of the Bush administration’s language game of security in this more complex way throws new light on how it was possible for them to modify their justifications for the invasion from an argument that initially centred predominantly on WMD to an argument ending up with democracy promotion as the reason for war. Bringing Wittgenstein’s thought to bear on this empirical case highlights the multiple layers of meaning that were in operation when this particular group spoke security, whether as part of their securitizing move or within the wider contexts in which this language game was being played out. Wittgenstein’s language game approach also illustrates the consequence of the Bush administration’s redefinition of their justifications at the first defining moment. By analyzing meaning in use, the introduction of a different kind of game becomes discernible. Whereas rationalist and positivist approaches would generally treat the Bush administration’s talk as cheap, Wittgenstein’s work draws attention to the importance of this linguistic shift. As revealed in Chapters 2 and 3, by changing their language, the Bush administration also changed the rules of their language game of security. Here it is not about the US simply breaking rules, but also constantly following them as they act in an intersubjective sphere. Even when the Bush administration attempted to break free of existing rules, such as the Geneva Conventions or the laws surrounding the legitimate use of pre-­emptive warfare, they had to engage with these same rules. It is here that Wittgenstein’s arguments about acts of interpretation represent a point of departure to examine the rules at play in the Bush administration’s language game of security. Underlying the whole book has been the argument that they attempted to substitute one set of rules with another in order to redefine them. In that sense, and if this argument stands, there is a whole new world to explore in regard to securitized environments and how rules function in times of exceptionality. The Bush administration’s interpretations of existing rules surrounding the use of pre-­emption and enhanced interrogation techniques reaffirms why it is necessary to be more reflexive about the existing way of thinking about security issues. Wittgenstein’s language game approach helps to update the Copenhagen School securitization framework in coming to grips with this particular topic. From a language games perspective, the manner in which the Bush administration responded at both defining moments reveals the layers of meaning that were in play. Incorporating Wittgenstein’s analyses of language games to the Bush administration’s justifications for the Iraq War, we can trace the various meanings, certain continuities and interruptions of use in the Bush administration’s language of security, and this also help us to understand the range of conceptual affiliates the term has picked up along the way. Their language takes many forms, as it is not simply the criteria, but also the very meaning of security that is contested. In much the same way, Wittgenstein’s notion of multiplicity allowed further explanation on the ability of the language of security to enable

154   A different way of speaking security and constrain the Bush administration. Addressing these issues is paramount to analyzing how their language of security changed at each of the defining moments as well as the consequences of those changes. Whereas the relationship between security and democracy was complementary at the first defining moment, the inclusion of democracy in the Bush administration’s response to Abu Ghraib pushed the limits of their language game to the extremes. In this sense, the Wittgensteinian constructivist approach developed throughout the book provides a methodological framework for pinpointing and explaining how the Bush administration’s language game eventually collapsed when they employed it to respond to Abu Ghraib. Within this context, their language of security evolved and ultimately transformed into a contradiction in terms. In short, they had reached the limits of their language game of security. This is evidenced by the fact that when they tried to argue that America had the right to employ “any means” necessary in the name of self-­defense, this line of justification was no longer accepted as legitimate or meaningful. Instead, the language they used to respond to the Abu Ghraib photos ends up being ascribed with the meaning that “any means” were not necessary. It was against this backdrop that the Bush administration’s security policies came to be classified as “tantamount to torture.” The appearance of the latter label threatened the entire language game that the Bush administration had constructed to legitimate the Iraq War, as well as their war on terror. The torture label also creates a tension derived from their acts of interpretation to redefine the rules as well as the discursive layers structuring their language game of security. It is extremely relevant to understand that the Bush administration’s language of security did not fade away, but became illegitimate. Put simply, they did not merely stop speaking security. Significantly, however, when they drew on this language, it came to mean something that contradicted the very structures of meaning underpinning their justifications of the Iraq War. Moreover, it destabilized the identities and rules that were held to be real within the intersubjective realms constituted by their securitized discourse. As shown in Chapter 4, their language of security left the Bush administration with no agency to respond to these photos in a meaningful way. They could no longer go on. The Bush administration’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” are only legitimate within their language game of security, not outside it. The limits of the Bush administration language game at the second defining moment demonstrates that even the most powerful, even a superpower, cannot determine the terms of a debate. All of the empirical examples that have been studied and presented lead to the conclusion that the Bush administration did not want their language of security or securitized speech acts to fail. What is fascinating in this particular case is that they were forced to act in a way they did not anticipate at both defining moments. While the language of security enabled them to make a very powerful set of claims to justify their principles of pre-­ emptive self-­defense and enhanced interrogation techniques, events did not unfold in the way they expected. On the contrary, their employment of the same

A different way of speaking security   155 language placed them in situations where they were forced to think about and reconsider how to respond. The language game approach integrated into this book offers an innovative and compelling argument for explaining this dramatic transformation. In sum, it allows for the possibility that rules and language may exist and function, and thus seem to retain their legitimacy even when they are collapsing. This can be seen when their constitutive nature begins to weaken, as occurred in Abu Ghraib.

A new way of speaking security? The Wittgensteinian approach advanced in this book is not the only way to speak security. His model is not without faults. However, what he does provide is a way to try to be more self-­reflexive when addressing the nexus between language and security. An important theme Wittgenstein addresses is the tendency to become blinded or bewitched by our own language use. To some extent we have reached this fork in the road when it comes to speaking security in IR. Security matters are a signifier of our time, and any discourse in its proximity gets pulled in and complicates our ability to think about security in innovative ways. Through a language game approach, we gain a critical angle to look and see what language game we are in, what the rules of engagement are and thus how this language will be put into practice. Moving towards an alternative way of theorizing the language of security beyond securitization also strengthens the ability for genuine conversation. Currently, the Copenhagen School securitization framework is based on a stance of talking and rather than listening. This is a real obstacle to encouraging genuine deliberation between those speaking security and the audiences with which they are trying to engage. It can also contribute to the silencing or marginalization of voices. A posture of listening as well as speaking appears more possible in the broader framework of a language game, for it constantly reaffirms a welcome association of the language of security as an ongoing process of argumentation. If there is to be real innovation in speaking security, it should involve negotiation and thus a constant possibility for change. This may well mean accepting the legitimacy of actors previously categorized as evil, and by extension, ­dehumanized. It will also involve listening and taking seriously voices and opinions that many securitizing actors and their audiences find troubling, or at best, difficult to understand. Nevertheless, including these extra dimensions reaffirms the importance of not becoming bewitched by the way we speak security. Simultaneously, it encourages us to acknowledge that one game does not have to stop for another to start. Agents speaking security must accept the limitations of their own power. There is not one finish line. Each language game of security, each speech act, will find its own path. Furthermore, they will also meet and interact, potentially overlap and interlock and even dispute other language games and speech acts along the way. Accommodating alternative viewpoints that arise in the course of play, or as securitization processes unfold, will ensure that the entire process of

156   A different way of speaking security securitization will not engender scepticism and hostility. Otherwise, issues and actors will never leave the discourse on security within which securitization is embedded. The way in which we speak security will reflect the kind of orders we are building, whether they be politicized, securitized or desecuritized. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, the limits of our language are the limits of our world.

Bibliography

Abrahamsen, Rita (2005): “Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear,” Alternatives 30 (1): 55–80. Adler, Emanuel (1992): “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” International Organization 46 (Winter): 367–390. —— (1997): “Seizing the Middle Ground,” European Journal of International Relations 3 (3): 319–363. —— (2002a): “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 3 (3): 319–365. —— (2002b): “Constructivism in International Relations.” In Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., and Simmons, A. (eds), Handbook of International Relations. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage: 95–118. —— (2005): Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations. New York: Routledge. Agamben, Georgio (2005): The State of Exception. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Agger, Ben (1991): “Critical Theory, Poststructuralism, Postmodernism: Their Sociological Relevance,” Annual Review of Sociology 17: 105–131. Alker, Hayward (1988): “The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue,” American Political Science Review 82 (September): 3–27. Alker, H. and D. Sylvan (1994): “Some Contributions of Discourse Analysis to Political Science,” Kosmopolis 24 (3): 5–25. Amann, Diane Marie (2006): “The Committee Against Torture Urges an End to Guantánamo Detention,” The American Society of International Law 10 (14), available at: www.asil.org/insights060608.cfm Amnesty International (1998): “AI Week: Discrimination: An Attack on All Our Rights: Appeal Leaflet”: AI Index: ACT 31/002/1998: November 1, 1998: Available at www. amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT31/002/1998/en/9c9c7781-d9e9–11dd-af2bb1f6023af0c5/act310021998en.pdf (accessed July 15, 2012). —— (2001): Amnesty International Report: Iraq: AI Index: Pl 10/001/2001: Available at www.atour.com/news/international/docs/Iraq.pdf (accessed May 6, 2013). —— (2006): Beyond Abu Ghraib: Detention and Torture in Iraq: March 6: Available at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE14/001/2006/en (accessed July 16, 2012). —— (2010): “New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detention and Torture in Iraq,” September 13: Available at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/ c7df062b-5d4c-4820–9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf (accessed July 12, 2012).

158   Bibliography Anderson, S., P. Bennis, and J. Cavanagh (2003): Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced? Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies. Annan, Kofi (2004): New York – Secretary-­General’s Encounter Following Lecture at 35th National Conference of Trinity Institute (unofficial transcript). Washington DC, May 2. Aradau, Claudia (2004): “Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation,” Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (3): 388–413. —— (2007): “Law Transformed: Guantanao and ‘Other’ Exceptions,” Third World Quarterly 28 (3): 489–501. Aradau, Claudia and Rens van Munster (2008): “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un)Knowing the Future,” European Journal of International Relations 14 (1): 161–185. —— (2013): Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown: Routledge. Arendt, Hannah (1970): On Violence. Orlando, FL: Harvest Books. Arend, Anthony Clark (2003): “International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,” The Washington Quarterly 26 (2): 89–103. Arrington, R.  L. and H.  J. Glock (1991): Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: Text and Context. London: Routledge. Artz, L. and Y. R. Kamalipour (2004): Bring ’em on: Media and Politics in the Iraq War. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Ashcroft, John (2001a): Press Briefing by Attorney General, Secretary of HHS, Secretary of Transportation, and FEMA Director, September 11. Available at: http:// georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911–10.html (accessed April 11, 2009). (2001b): “President Urges Readiness and Patience: Remarks by the President, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft,” Camp David, Thurmont, Maryland, September 15. Available at http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010915-4.html (accessed April 23, 2013). —— (2001c): Testimony Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, September 24. Available at: www.justice.gov/ag/testimony/2001/agcrisisremarks9_24.htm (accessed April 11, 2009). Ashley, Richard (1986): The Poverty of Neorealism. In Keohane, R. O. (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press: 255–300. —— (1989): Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War. In Der Derian, J. and Shapiro, M. (eds) International/Intertextual Relations. Basington: Lexington Books, Maxwell Macmillan International: 259–321. —— (1990): “Conclusions: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (3), Special Issue: 367–416. —— (1996): The Achievements of Post-­Structuralism. In Smith, S., Booth, K., and Zalewski, M. (eds) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 240–253. Ashley, R. and R. B. J. Walker (1990a): “Introduction: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (3): 259–268. —— (1990b): “Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (3): 367–416. Åtland, Kristian and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard (2009): “When Security Speech Acts Misfire: Russia and the Elektron Incident”: Security Dialogue 40 ( 3): 333–354.

Bibliography   159 Austin, John L. (1962): How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955. Oxford: Clarendon Press. —— (1975): How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Baker, G and P. Hacker (1983): Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning. Oxford: Wiley-­Blackwell Publishing. Baker, Howard, H. Jr., US Ambassador (2001): Japanese Observance Ceremony for Victims of Terrorism in the U.S. September 23, 2001, Tokyo. Baldwin, (1997): “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23 (1): 5–26. Balzacq, Thierry (2005): “The Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11 (2): 171–201. —— (2011): Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve. Abingdon: Routledge. Banusiewicz, John, D. (2004): Wolfowitz Disputes Notion Saddam “Just Another Bad Guy.” Washington, DC: American Forces Press Service. Barkawi, Tarak and Mark Laffey (1999): “The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization,” European Journal of International Relations 5 (4): 403–434. Barkin, J. Samuel (2003): “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review 5: 325–342. Barnett, Michael (1999): “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Journal of International Relations 5 (1): 5–36. —— (2005): “Social Constructivism.” In Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (eds), The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 162–318. Barrett, Ron (2004): “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Abu Ghraib Story Broke Out When We Saw Visual Proof of Torture. Why Not Sooner?,” Columbia Journalism Review: 6. Barry, J., M. Hirsh, and M. Isikoff (2004): “The Road to Abu Ghraib Began After 9/11, When Washington Wrote New Rules to Fight a New Kind of War,” Newsweek, May 24. Barstow, David and Robin Stein (2005): “Under Bush, A New Age of Prepackaged News,” New York Times, 13 March. Bassiouni, Cherif M. (2006): “The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (37): 390–425. Beer, F. and R. Hariman (1996): Post-­Realism: The Rhetorical Turn. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press. Beer, Francis A. and Robert Hariman (1996): Post-­Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press. Beeson, Mark and Richard Higgott (2005): “Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Third World Quarterly 26 (7): 1173–1188. Behnke, Andreas (2006): “No Way Out: Desecuritization, Emancipation and the Eternal Return of the Political. A Reply to Aradau,” Journal of International Relations and Development 9: 62–69. Bell, Duncan (2002): “Language, Legitimacy, and the Project of Critique,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27 (3): 327–350. Bennett, W. Lance, Regina G. Lawerence, and Steven Livingston (2007): When the Power of the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Berger, P. L. and T. Luckman (1966): The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

160   Bibliography Bernstein, J. and L. Dubose (2006): Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency. New York: Random House. Betts, Richard K. (2003): “Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities,” Ethics and International Affairs 17 (1): 17–24. Bialasiewicz, Luiza, David Campbell, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey, and Alison J. Williams (2007): “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy,” Political Geography 26 (4): 405–422. Bieler, Andreas (2001): “Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR Theory: Reflections on the Material Structure of Ideas,” Politics and Society 21 (2): 93–100. Bieler, A. and A.  D. Morton (2001): “The Gordian Knot of Agency-­Structure in International Relations: A Neo-­Gramscian Perspective,” European Journal of International Relations 7 (1): 5–35. Bigo, Didier (2000): “Introduction.” In La Fonction de Protection – CPGN. Paris: Rapport du Centre d’estudes sur les Conflicts pour la DAS, 7–32. —— (2002): “Security and Immigration: Towards a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” Alternatives 27 (1) (Special): 63–92. —— (2005): La mondialisation de l’ (in):sécurité. Réflexion sur le champ des professionnels de la gestion des inquiétudes et analytique de la transnationalisation des processus d’ (in):sécurisation” (The Globalization of (In):Security? Reflections on the Field of the Professionals of Unease Management and Analysis of the Transnationalization of the (In)Securitization Process). Cultures & Conflicts 58: 53–100. —— (2006a): Globalized (in)Security: The Field and the Ban-­opticon. In Bigo, D. and Tsoukala, A. (eds), Illiberal Practices in Liberal Regimes. Paris: L’Harmattan: 5–45. —— (2006b): “Protection: Security, Territory and Population.” In Huysmans, Jef, Dobson, Andrew, and Prokhovnik, Raia, The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency: London and New York: Routledge: 84–100. Bleiker, Ronald (2000): Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Blix, Hans (2003a): “No Illicit Weapons Found So Far But More ‘Credible’ Proof from Iraq Needed,” UN News Centre, February 14. Available at: www.un.org/apps/news/ storyAr.asp?NewsID=6169&Cr=iraq&Cr1=inspect (accessed May 1, 2013). —— (2003b) UN Inspectors Found no Evidence of Prohibited Weapons Programme as of 18 March Withdrawal, Hans Blix tells Security Council, May 6, 2003. Available at: www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7777.doc.htm (accessed June 21, 2007). Bloor, David (1983): Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge. New York: Columbia University Press. Booth, Ken (2005a): Beyond Critical Security Studies. In Booth, K. (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner: 259–279. —— (2005b): Critical Security Studies and World Politics. London: Lynne Rienner. Boston Globe Editorial (2004): “Rumsfeld Must Go,” May 7, 2004: Available at www. boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2004/05/07/rumsfeld_ must_go/ (accessed March 14, 2010). Bothe, Michael (2003): “Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-­emptive Self-­defence,” European Journal of International Law 14 (2): 227–240. Boyle, Michael (2008): “The War on Terror in America’s Grand Strategy,” International Affairs 84 (2): 191–209. Boyne, Walter J. (2003): Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why. New York: Forge.

Bibliography   161 Bradford, William C. (2003–2004): “ ‘The Duty to Protect Them’: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventative War,” Notre Dame Law Review 79 (4): 1365–1492. Brams, Steven, J. (2004): Game Theory and Politics. Mineola, NY: Courier Dover Publications. Bright, Jonathan (2012): “Securitization, Terror and Control: Towards a Theory of the Breaking Point,” Review of International Studies 1–19. Available at http://journals. cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8495754&fulltextType= RA&fileId=S0260210511000726 (accessed June 11, 2012). Brody, Reed (2004a): “The Bush administration ‘circumvented’ the Geneva Convention with the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison,” Human Rights Watch, June 9, 2004. Available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/09/prisoner.abuse/ index.html (accessed May 11, 2012). —— (2004b): “Human Rights Group Finds Abu Ghraib Cover Up,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June 10. Available at: www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/06/10/1086749819417. html# (accessed May 2, 2013). Browning, C. and M. McDonald (2007): “Securitization and Emancipation,” ISA Conference. Chicago, USA. Burke, Antony (2002): “Aporias of Security,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27 (1): 1–27. Bush, George W. (2001a): Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, September 11. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2001/09/20010911–16.html (accessed September 29, 2010). —— (2001b): Remarks by the President Upon Arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base, September 11. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2001/09/20010911–1.html (accessed August 26, 2011). —— (2001c): Press Briefing by Attorney General, Secretary of HHS, Secretary of Transportation, and FEMA Director, September 11. Available at: http://georgewbush-­ whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911–10.html (accessed March 18, 2012). —— (2001d): Remarks in Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team, September 12. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912–4.html (accessed August 26, 2012). —— (2001e): Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, September 13. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2001/09/20010913–6.html (accessed August 29, 2011). —— (2001f ): National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims Of the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, September 13. Available at: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913–7.html (accessed June 14, 2012). —— (2001g): President Bush Salutes Heroes in New York, September 14. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914–9.html (accessed June 16, 2012). —— (2001h): President’s Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, September 14. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914–2. html (accessed March 18, 2012). —— (2001i): Radio Address of the President to the Nation, September 15. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010915.html (accessed March 20, 2012). —— (2001j): Guard and Reserves “Define Spirit of America,” September 17. Available

162   Bibliography at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917–3.html (accessed September 15, 2006). —— (2001k): President Building Worldwide Campaign Against Terrorism, September 19. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 20010919–1.html (accessed June 27, 2012). —— (2001l): Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People: United States Capitol, Washington, DC, September 20. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010920–8.html (accessed September 15, 2006). —— (2001m): International Campaign Against Terror Grows, September 25. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010925–1. html (accessed January 23, 2012). —— (2001n): Presidential Address to the Nation, October 7. Available at: http:// georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007–8.html (accessed March 18, 2012). —— (2001o): President Holds Prime Time News Conference, October 11. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011–7.html (accessed May 19, 2012). —— (2001p): President Asks American Children to Help Afghan Children, October 12. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001 1012–4.html (accessed January 16, 2012). —— (2001q): President Pleased with Global Effort to Fight Terrorism, October 20. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001 1021–6.html (accessed May 19, 2012). —— (2001r): President Says Terrorists Tried to Disrupt World Economy, October 21. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001 1021–5.html (accessed May 24, 2011). —— (2001s): President Bush: “No Nation Can Be Neutral in This Conflict,” November 6. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/ 20011106–2.html (accessed May 19, 2012). —— (2001t): “President Shares Thanksgiving Meal with Troops,” November 21. ­Available at http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/2001 1121-3.html (accessed May 9, 2013). —— (2001u): President: “We’re Fighting to Win – And Win We Will,” December 7. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/2001 1207.html (accessed May 21, 2012). —— (2002a): President Delivers State of the Union Address, January 29. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129–11. html (accessed September 20, 2010). —— (2002b): Remarks by the President at Friends of Governor Pataki Reception, February 6. Available at: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 2002/02/20020206–8.html (accessed January 9, 2012). —— (2002c): President Bush, Prime Minister Sharon Discuss Middle East, February 7. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/2002 0207–15.html (accessed September 20, 2010). —— (2002d): Memorandum For: Vice President, The Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 7. Available at: www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/ bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf (accessed August 29, 2011).

Bibliography   163 —— (2002e): President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, June 1. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/2002 0601–3.html (accessed August 29, 2011). —— (2002f ): President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 12. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/ 20020912–1.html (accessed June 12, 2010). —— (2002g): Saddam Hussein’s Deception and Defiance, September 14. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020914.html (accessed June 22, 2012). —— (2002h): President Discusses Iraq, Domestic Agenda with Congressional Leaders, September 18. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020918–1. html (accessed November 30, 2010). —— (2002i): President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution, October 2. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/2002 1002–7.html (accessed March 12, 2012). —— (2002j): President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7. Available at: http:// georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007–8.html (accessed March 9, 2010). —— (2002k): President Signs Iraq Resolution, October 16. Available at: http:// georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021016–1.html (accessed December 20, 2011). —— (2002l): President Bush, Chinese President Jiang Zemin Discuss Iraq, N. Korea, October 25. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 2002/10/20021025.html (accessed September 15, 2010). —— (2002m): Remarks by the President at New Mexico Welcome, October 28. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021028–4. html (accessed January 9, 2012). —— (2002n): President Bush Recaps Important Week in Weekly Radio Address, November 9. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2002/11/20021109.html (accessed September 3, 2011). —— (2002o): President says Iraq Must Disarm Now, November 12. Available at: http:// georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021112–3.html (accessed November 30, 2010). —— (2002p): President Discusses Homeland Security and the Economy with Cabinet, November 13. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2002/11/20021113–1.html (accessed November 30, 2010). —— (2003a): President Rallies Troops at Fort Hood, January 3 2003. Available at: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030103.html (accessed May 24, 2012). —— (2003b): President Delivers “State of the Union,” January 28. Available at: http:// georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/2003012819.html (accessed June 17, 2012). —— (2003c): President Bush Meets with Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, January 30. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/2003 0130–10.html (accessed June 22, 2012). —— (2003d): President Bush Meets with Prime Minister Blair, January 31. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030131–23. html (accessed June 22, 2012). —— (2003e): President Bush: “World Can Rise to This Moment,” February 6. Available

164   Bibliography at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030206–17. html (accessed July 12, 2012). —— (2003f ): President Bush: “This is a Defining Moment for the U.N. Security Council,” February 7. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2003/02/20030207–3.html (accessed July 12, 2012). —— (2003g): “President Says ‘It is a Moment of Truth’ for the UN,” February 9. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/2003 0209-1.html (accessed May 1, 2013). —— (2003h): President Bush Speaks At AEI, Speech at the American Enterprise Institute’s annual dinner, February 26. Available at: http://article.nationalreview. com/268082/president-­bush-speaks-­at-aei/an-­nro-primary-­document (accessed June 22, 2012). —— (2003i): President Salutes the Military, March 8. Available at: http://georgewbush-­ whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030308–1.html (accessed May 23, 2012). —— (2003j): War on Terror, President’s Radio Address March 8. Available at: http:// georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030308–1.html (accessed11 April 2010). —— (2003k): Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People, March 16. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2003/03/20030316–1.html (accessed April 11, 2010). —— (2003l): President Bush: Monday “Moment of Truth” for World on Iraq, March 16. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2003 0316–3.html (accessed July 17, 2012). —— (2003m): President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq within 48 Hours,” March 17. Available at http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html (accessed May 1, 2013). —— (2003n): “President Discusses the Future of Iraq: Remarks by the President on Operation Iraqi Freedom,” April 28. http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2003/04/20030428-3.html (accessed May 1, 2013). —— (2003o): Remarks by the President at 2003 President’s Dinner, May 21. Available at: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030521–12. html (accessed May 23, 2012). —— (2003p): Remarks by the President at the 2003 Republican National Committee Presidential Gala, October 8. Available at http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives. gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031008–9.html (accessed June 22, 2011). —— (2004a): President, Mrs. Bush Mark Progress in Global Women’s Human Rights, March 12. Available at: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 2004/03/20040312–5.html (accessed January 30, 2011). —— (2004b): President Bush Welcomes Canadian Prime Minister Martin to White House, April 30. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2004/04/20040430–2.html (accessed November 28, 2011). —— (2004c): President Bush, Jordanian King Discuss Iraq, Middle East, May 6. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/2004 0506–9.html (accessed November 28, 2011). —— (2004d): “President Reaffirms Commitment to Iraq,” May 20. Available at: http:// georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040510-3.html (accessed May 3, 2013). —— (2004e): President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy and Freedom,

Bibliography   165 May 24. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2004/05/20040524–10.html (accessed January 30, 2011). —— (2004f ): President Bush Holds Press Conference Following the G8 Summit, June 10. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/ 06/20040610–36.html (accessed) April 11, 2010. —— (2004g): President’s Statement on the U.N. International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, June 26. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2004/05/20040506–9.html (accessed January 30, 2011). —— (2005a): State of the Union Address, February 2. Available at: http://georgewbush-­ whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202–11.html (accessed March 9, 2012). —— (2005b): Bush Administration Implements WMD Commission Recommendations, June 29. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/ 06/20050629–2.html (accessed March 9, 2012). —— (2006a): Press Conference by President, August 21. Available at: http:// georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060821.html (accessed June 12, 2012). —— (2006b): President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists, September 6. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2006/09/20060906–3.html (accessed March 9, 2012). —— (2009): President Bush Delivers Farewell Address to the Nation, January 15. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2009/01/2009 0115–17.html (accessed March 9, 2012). Butler, Judith (1990): Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London: Routledge. —— (1993): Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” London: Routledge. —— (1997): Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge. —— (2004): Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Trauma. London and New York: Verso. Buzan, Barry (1991): People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-­Cold War Era. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. —— (1993): “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,” International Organization 47 (3): 327–352. —— (1997): “Rethinking Security after the Cold War,” Cooperation and Conflict 31 (2): 5–28. —— (2006): “Will the ‘Global War on Terror’ Be the New Cold War?,” International Affairs 82 (6): 1101–1118. Buzan, Barry, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elziebta Tromer, and Ole Wæver (1990): The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-­Cold War Era. London: Pinter. Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen (2009): The Evolution of International Security Studies. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver (2003): Regions and Powers: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (2007): “Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School’s Replies,” Review of International Studies 23 (2): 241–250. —— (2009): “Macro-­Securitization and Security Constellations: Reconsidering the Scale in Securitization Theory,” Review of International Studies 35 (2): 253–276.

166   Bibliography Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998): Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, Co and London: Lynne Rienner. Byers, Michael (2004): “Agreeing to Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441 and International Ambiguity,” Global Governance 10: 165–186. Campbell, David (1992): Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press. —— (1993): Politics without Principles: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. —— (1996): “Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical World.” In Shapiro, M. and Alker, H. (eds), Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press: 7–32. —— (1998): Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. —— (1999): “Contra Wight: The Errors of Premature Writing,” Review of International Studies 25 (2): 317–322. Carlsnaes, Walter (1992): “The Agency-­structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 26 (3): 245–270. Carothers, Thomas (2007): U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush, Carnegie Endowment Report, September 2007: Carnegie Endowment. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/09/05/u.s.-democracy-­promotion-during-­and-after-­bush/1hyj (accessed June 11, 2008). Carter, Jimmy (2002): “The Troubling New Face of America,” Washington Post, September 5, 2002. Carter, Philip (2004): “The Road to Abu Ghraib,” Washington Monthly, November. Available at: www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0411.carter.html (June 12, 2012). Cavelty Dunn, Myriam (2008): Cyber-­security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age. London: Routledge. Ceyhan, Ayse and Anastassia Tsoukala (2002): “The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27 (1): 21. Chandrasekaran, Rajiv (2007): Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone. New York: Vintage Books. Checkel, Jeffrey, T. (1997): “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-­Constructivist Divide,” European Journal of International Relations 3 (4): 473–495. —— (1998): “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50: 324–348. —— (1999): “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1): 83–114. —— (2001): “From Meta- to Substantive Theory? Social Constructivism and the Study of Europe,” European Union Politics 2 (2): 219–226. Cheney, Dick (2001): The Vice President appears on Meet the Press with Tim Russert, September 16. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-­speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html (May 12, 2012). —— (2002a): Remarks by the Vice President to the Council on Foreign Relations, February 15. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/ news-­speeches/speeches/vp20020215.html (May 12, 2012). —— (2002b): The Vice President Appears on Late Edition (CNN), March 24. Available

Bibliography   167 at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-­speeches/speeches/ vp20020324–2.html (accessed January 21, 2011). —— (2002c): The Vice President Delivers Remarks to The Council of The Americas Conference, May 6. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-­speeches/speeches/vp20020506.html (accessed November 30, 2010). —— (2002d): Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention, August 26: Available at http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/08/2002 0826.html (accessed July 20, 2012). —— (2002e): Transcript of Interview with Vice-­President Dick Cheney on Meet the Press, September 8. Available at: www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm (accessed January 20, 2011). —— (2002f ): Transcript of Interview with Vice-­President Dick Cheney on NBC’s Meet the Press, September 14. Available at: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/ (accessed January 21, 2011). —— (2002g): The Vice President makes remarks at the NRCC Gala Salute to Dick Armey and J. C. Watts, October 2. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse. archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002–15.html (accessed November 30, 2010). —— (2003a): Vice President Cheney Salutes Troops, April 9. Available at: http:// georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030409–4.html (accessed December 4, 2011). —— (2003b): Vice President’s Remarks on War on Terror at AEI, July 24. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030724–6.html (accessed December 4, 2011). —— (2004): Telephonic Interview of the Vice President by Tony Snow, Fox News, May 11. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/ 20040511–10.html (accessed December 4, 2011). Ciuta, Felix (2009): “Security and The Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitization Theory,” Review of International Studies 35 (2): 301–326. Clarke, Richard (2004): Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War On Terror: New York, London, Toronto and Sydney: Free Press. Cody, Edward (2004): “Iraqis Put Contempt for Troops on Display,” Washington Post, June 12. Cohen, Stanley (2005): “Post-­Moral Torture: From Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib,” Index on Censorship 1: 24–30. Cohen, Tom (2001): Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Collins, Alan (2005): “Securitization, Frankenstein’s Monster and Malaysian Education,” The Pacific Review 14 (4): 567–599. Connolly, William E. (1974): The Terms of Political Discourse. Oxford: Martin Robertson. Constable, Marianne (2005): Just Silences: The Limits and Possibilities of Modern Law: Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Cook, Robin (2003): The Point of Departure: Diaries from the Front Bench: London: Simon and Schuster. Copeland, Dale C. (2000): “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism,” International Security, 25 (2): 187–212. Correa, Cristian (2007): “Waterboarding Prisoners and Justifying Torture: Lessons for the US from the Chilean Experience,” Human Rights Brief 14 (2): 21–25.

168   Bibliography Cox, Michael (2004): “Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine,” Review of International Studies 30 (4): 585–608. Cox, Michael and Doug Stoke (2008): US Foreign Policy: New York: Oxford University Press. Cox, Robert W. (1981): “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10 (2): 126–155. —— (1987): Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press. Crawford, Neta (2002): Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (2003): “The Slippery Slope to Preventive War,” Ethics & International Affairs 17 (1): 30–36. —— (2004): “The Road to Global Empire: The Logic of U.S. Foreign Policy After 9/11,” Orbis 48 (4): 685–703. —— (2008): “The Dangerous Leap: Preventive War.” In Pemberton, M. and Hartung, D., Lessons From Iraq: Avoiding the Next War. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers: 12–18. —— (2010): “The False Promise of Preventive War: The ‘New Security Consensus’ and a More Insecure World.” In Shue, Henry and Rodin, David, Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification: New York: Oxford University Press: 89–125. Croft, Stuart (2006): Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Daadler, Ivo H. and James Lindsay (2005): America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Oxford: Wiley-­Blackwell. Danner, Mark (2002): “Memo: Jay S. Bybee to Alberto Gonzales, August 1.” In Danner, Mark ed., Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror: New York Review of Books, esp. 144–156. —— (2004a): Abu Ghraib: The Politics of Torture. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books. —— (2004b): “Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror,” New York Review of Books, October 15. —— (2004c): “Abu Ghraib the Hidden Story”; The New York Review of Books, October 7. Available at www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/oct/07/abu-­ghraib-the-­ hidden-story/?pagination=false (accessed May 2, 2013). Davis, Charles (2005): “Pentagon Seeks to Hide More Abu Ghraib Photos,” Quill Magazine October/November: 36. Davis, Michael (2005): “The Moral Justifiability of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 161–178. Dayton, Mark (2004): “Armed Services Committee” May 19 2004. In Danner, Mark “The Logic of Torture”: The New York Review of Books, June 24: 1–17. De Young, Karen (2003): “US Escalates Rhetoric,” Washington Post, January 22. Debrix, Francois (2003): Language, Agency and Politics in a Constructed World. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Inc. Deleuze, Gilles (1992): “Postscript on the Societies of Control” October 59: 3–7. —— (2006): Nietzsche and Philosophy: London: Continuum International Publishing Group. Der Derian, James (1989): “The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations.” In Der Derian, J. and Michael, S. (eds) International/Intertextual Relations. New York: Lexington Books: 3–10. —— (1996): “A Reinterpretation of Realism Genealogy, Semiology, Dromology.” In

Bibliography   169 Beer, F.  A. and Hariman, R. (eds) Post-­Realism: The Rhetorical Turn. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press: 277–304. Derrida, Jacques (1967): Writing and Difference: London: Routledge. —— (1976): Of Grammatology. Translated by Spivak, G. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. —— (1988): Signature Event Context, translated by Graff, G. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. —— (1967): Writing and Difference: London: Routledge. Derrida, J. and J. D. Caputo (1997): Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press. Dessler, David (1989): “What is at Stake in the Agent-­Structure Debate,” International Organization 41: 441–473. De Torrente, Nicholas (2004): “Humanitarian Action under Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17: 1–29. Deudney, Daniel (1990): “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millennium 19 (3): 461–476. Devetak, Richard (2001): Postmodernism. In Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-­Smit, C., and True, J. (ed), Theories of International Relations, 2nd edn: Basingstoke: Palgrave: 161–187. Diez, Thomas and Vicki Squire (2008): “Traditions of Citizenship and the Securitization of Migration in Germany and Britain,” Citizenship Studies, 12 (6): 565–581. Diez, Thomas and Jill Steans (2005): “A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Relations,” Review of International Studies 31 (1): 127–140. Dillon, Michael (1996): Politics of Security. London: Routledge. Doig, A., J. P. Pfifner, M. Phythian, and R. Tiffen (2007): “Marching in Time: Alliance Politics, Synchrony and the Case for War in Iraq, 2002–2003,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61 (1): 23–40. Dombrowski, P. and R. Payne (2003): “Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine,” International Studies Perspective 4: 395–408. Dorf, Michael C. (2010): “Iqbal and Bad Apples,” Lewis and Clark Law Review 14 (1): 217–299. Doty, Roxanne (1993): “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-­Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly 37 (3): 297–320. —— (1996): Imperial Encounters: Patterns of Representation in North/South Relations. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. —— (1997): “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-­Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 3 (3): 365–392. —— (1998–1999): “Immigration and the Politics of Security,” Security Studies 8 (2–3): 71–93. Douzinas, Costas (2000): The End of Human Rights. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Doyle, Charles (2002): “The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis,” CRS Report to Congress 15 April 2002: Available at www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31377.pdf (accessed July 16, 2012). Druce, Georgina (2008): “Does WaterBoarding Constitute Torture?,” The Dartmouth Law Journal 6 (3): 351–367. Duffield, Mark (2006): “Racism, Migration and Development: The Foundations of Planet­ary Order,” Progress in Development Studies 6 (1): 68–79.

170   Bibliography Duffield, Mark and N. Waddell (2004): Human Security and Global Danger: Exploring a Governmental Assemblage. Lancaster: Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Lancaster. Duffy, G., B.  K. Frederking, and S.  A. Tucker (1998): “Language Games: Dialogical Analysis of INF Negotiations,” International Studies Quarterly 42 (2): 271–293. Dunn Cavelty, Myriam (2008): Cyber-­security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age: London: Routledge. Economist, The – North American Edition (2004): “Resign, Rumsfeld,” May 6, Available at www.economist.com/node/2647493 (accessed September 29, 2010). Edkins, Jenny (2002): “Forget Trauma? Responses to September 11,” International Relations 16 (2): 243–256. Edjus, Filip (2009): “Dangerous Liaisons: Securitization Theory and a Schmittian Logic,” Western Balkans Security Observer 13: 9–16. Eggen, Dan (2006a): “Cheney’s Remarks Fuel Torture Debate,” Washington Post, October 27. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­dyn/content/article/2006/10/26/ AR2006102601521.html —— (2006b): “CIA Acknowledges Two Interrogation Memo’s,” Washington Post 14 November at A29. Eichenberg, Richard C. (2005): “U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force,” International Security 30 (1): 140–177. Eisenman, Stephen (2007): The Abu Ghraib Effect. London: Reaktion Books. Elbe, Stefan (2002): “HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa,” International Security 27 (2): 159–177. —— (2006a): “Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized?: The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS and Security,” International Studies Quarterly 50 (1): 119–144. —— (2006b): “AIDS, Security, Biopolitics,” International Relations, 9 (4): 403–419. El Fadl, K. (2002): Shattered Illusions: Analysing the War on Terrorism. Bristol: Amal Press. Emmers, Ralf (2003): “ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review 16 (3): 419–438. Erikson, Johan (1999): “Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role of Security Analysts,” Cooperation and Conflict 34 (3): 311–333. Ertel, M. and M. Kraske (2007): “Tracking the Atrocities: UN Torture Investigator Slams Western Complacency,” The Spiegel International, October 29. Fairclough, N. (1992): Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fairclough, N. and R. Wodak (1997): “Critical Discourse Analysis.” In van Dijk, T. (ed.), Discourse as Social Interaction. London: Sage: 258–284. Farer, Tom J. (2003): “The Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq,” The American Journal of International Law 97 (3): 621–628. Farrell, Theo (2002): “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” International Studies Review, 4 (1): 49–72. Fawn, R. and R. Hinnebusch (2006): The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Fay, G. and A. Jones (2004): The Fay Jones Report: Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib. In Greenberg, K. and Dratel, J., The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (2005). New York: Cambridge University Press: 987–1131. Fierke, Karin (1996): “Multiple Identities, Interfacing Games: The Social Construction of Western Action in Bosnia,” European Journal of International Relations 2 (4): 467–497.

Bibliography   171 —— (1998): Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press and St. Martin’s Press. —— (1999): “Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement: NATO, Russia, and the CEECs,” Millennium Journal of International Studies 28 (1): 27–52. —— (2000): “Logics of Force and Dialogue: The Iraq/UNSCOM Crisis as Social Interaction,” European Journal of International Relations 6 (3): 335–371. —— (2002): “Links Across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 46: 331–354. —— (2003): “Breaking the Silence: Language and Method.” In Debrix, F. (ed.), Language, Agency and Politics in a Constructed World, M. E. Sharpe: 66–86. —— (2007a): Constructivism. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M., and Smith, S (eds) International Relations Theories: New York: Oxford University Press: 166–184. —— (2007b): Critical Approaches to International Security. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fierke, K. M. and K. Fattah (2009): “A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humilitation and Political Violence in the Middle East,” European Journal of International Relations 15 (1): 67–93. Fierke, K. M. and M. Nicholson (2001): “Divided by a Common Language: Formal and Constructivist Approaches to Games,” Global Society 1: 7–25. Fierke, K. M. and A. Wiener (1999): “Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement,” Journal of European Public Policy 6 (5): 721–742. Filkins, Dexter (2003): “The World: A Bedeviled Occupation; For a Bleak Horizon, Rose Tinted Glasses,” New York Times, September 7: 1–3. Floyd, Rita (2008): “The Environmental Security Debate and its Significance for Climate Change,” International Spectator 43 (3): 51–65. Finnemore, Martha (1996): “Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism,” International Organization 50 (2): 325–347. Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Reasearch Programme in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4: 391–416. Flibbert, Andrew (2006): “The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War,” Security Studies 15 (2): 310–352. —— (2007): “Who Lost in Iraq? Policy Entrepreneurs and the War Decision,” ISA Annual Conference. Chicago. Forsythe, David P. (2005): The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross: New York: Cambridge University Press. —— (2007): “The ICRC: A Unique Humanitarian Protagonist,” International Review of the Red Cross 89 (865): 63–96. —— (2011): The Politics of Prisoner Abuse: The United States and Enemy Prisoners after 9/11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Foucault, Michel (1970): The Order of Things. New York: Routledge. —— (1972): The Archeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books. —— (1995): Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd edn: Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Franck, Thomas M. (2001): “Terrorism and the Right to Self-­Defense,” The American Journal of International Law 95 (4): 839–843. —— (2002): Recourse to Force, State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frederking, Brian (2003): “Constructing Post-­Cold War Collective Security,” The American Political Science Review 97 (3): 363–378.

172   Bibliography Friedman, Thomas L. (2004): “Restoring their Honor,” New York Times, May 16. Available at www.nytimes.com/2004/05/06/opinion/restoring-­our-honor.html (accessed June 12, 2011). Fukuyama, Francis (2006a): America at the Crossroads: Democracy Power and the Neo-­ Conservative Legacy. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. —— (2006b): “The Neo-­Conservative Moment,” The National Interest (76): 57. Gad Pram, Ulrick and Karin Lund Petersen (2011): “Concepts of Politics in Securitization Studies,” Security Dialogue 42 (4–5): 315–328. Gaddis, John L. (2002): “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy 133: 50–57. Garamone, Jim (2002): “Geneva Conventions Applies to Taliban, Not Al Qaeda,” American Forces Press Services, February 7. Available at: www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43960 (accessed July 18, 2012). Gardner, Richard N. (2003): “Neither Bush nor the ‘Jurisprudes’ ,” The American Journal of International Law 97 (3): 585–590. Garfinkle, Adam (2006): “Alone in a Crowd,” The American Interest 1 (3): 132–140. Gellman, B. and J. Becker (2007): “A Different Understanding with the President,” Washington Post, June 24. George, Jim (1994): Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re): Introduction to International Relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Gershkoff, A. and S. Kushner (2005): “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (3): 525–537. Goldsmith, Jack L. (2007): The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgement Inside the Bush Administration: New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Gonzales, Alberto (2002): Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to the President, January 25. Available at: http://lawofwar.org/torture_memos_analysis.htm (accessed March 13, 2011). —— (2006): Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109 Congress. Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s Surveillance Authority: Washington, DC: BiblioGov. Gordon, Avery F. (2006): “Abu Ghraib: Imprisonment and the War on Terror,” Race and Class 48 (1): 42–59. Graham, David E. (2005–2006): “The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Detainees,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 37: 61–94. Gray, Christine (2000): International Law and the Use of Force. New York: Oxford University Press. Greenberg, Karen (2005): From Fear to Torture. In Greenberg, K. and Dratel, J. (eds) The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib: New York: Cambridge University Press. Greenberg, K. and J. Dratel (2005): The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. New York: Cambridge University Press. Grossman, Marc (2001): Interview of Under Secretary of State, Digital Video Conference, October 19, Available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ (accessed January 9, 2011). Grundberg, Andy (2005): “Point and Shoot: How the Abu Ghraib Images Redefine Photography,” ASX, January 1, 2005: Available at: www.americansuburbx.com/2011/04/ theory-­point-and-­shoot-how-­abu-ghraib.html (accessed July 22, 2012). Guzzini, Stefano (2000): “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 6 (2): 147–182.

Bibliography   173 —— (2011): “Securitization as a Causal Mechanism,” Security Dialogue 42 (4–5): 329–341. Guzzini, S. and D. Jung (2004): Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research. London: Routledge. Habermas, Jürgen (1984): Theory of Communication Action. Vol. 1: Reason and Rationalization of Society. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Hacking, Ian (1999): The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Haftendorn, Helga (1991): “The Security Puzzle: Theory-­Building and Discipline-­ Building in International Security,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (1): 3–17. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004): (03–6696) 542 U.S. 507: June 28 2004: Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute. Available at www.law.cornell.edu/supct/ html/03–6696.ZO.html (accessed April 16, 2012). Hammond, John L. (2005): “The Bush Doctrine, Preventive War, and International Law,” The Philosophical Forum xxxvi (1): 97–111. Hancock, Jan (2010): “Human Rights Narrative in the George W. Bush Administrations,” Review of International Studies 37 (2): 805–823. Hansen, Lene (1996): “Slovenian Identity: State-­Building on the Balkan Border,” Alternatives 21 (4): 473–496. —— (1997): “A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist Conceptualization of Security,” Cooperation and Conflict 32 (4): 369–397. —— (2000): “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” Millennium 29 (2): 285–306. —— (2006): Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnia War. London: Routledge. —— (2011): “Reconstructing Desecuritization: The Normative-­Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply it,” Review of International Studies 38 (3): 525–545. Hansen, Lene and Helen Nissenbaum (2009): “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,” International Studies Quarterly 53: 1155–1175. Hasting Dunn, David (2003): “Myths, Motivations and ‘Misunderestimations’: The Bush Administration and Iraq,” International Affairs 79(2): 279–297. Hayes, Jarrod (2009): “Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran’s Nuclear Programs,” International Studies Quarterly 53 (4): 977–999. Healy, Marilyn and Chad Perry (2000): “Comprehensive Criteria to Judge Validity and Reliability of Qualitative Research Within the Realism Paradigm,” Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal 3(3): 118–126. Heidegger, Martin (1977): Basic Writings. New York: Harper Row. Heisbourg, François (2003): “A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and its Consequences,” The Washington Quarterly 26 (2): 73–88. Hersh, Seymour (2004): “Torture at Abu Ghraib: How Far Does Responsibility Go?,” The New Yorker, May 10, www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact Holland, Jack (2009): “From September 11th 2001 to 9–11: From Void to Crisis,” International Political Sociology 3 (3): 275–292. —— (2012): Selling the War on Terror: Foreign Policy Discourses after 9/11. Abingdon: Routledge. Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith (1990): Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

174   Bibliography —— (1991): “Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 17 (4): 393–410. Hooks, G. and C. Mosher (2005): “Outrages against Personal Dignity: Rationalizing Abuses and Torture in the War on Terror,” Social Forces 83 (4): 1627–1645. Hopf, Ted (1998): “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23 (1): 171–120. Howard, Peter (2002): “Constructing Security: The Power of Language in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Ph.D. Dissertation, American University, Washington, DC. —— (2004): “Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language, Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 48 (4): 805–828. Human Rights Watch (2004): The Road to Abu Ghraib, June. Available at: www.trial-­ch. org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/trialwatch/HRW_the_road_to_abu_ghraib.pdf (accessed August 16, 2011). —— (2006a): Guantánamo Bay and Military Commissions, January. Available at: http:// hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/usdom12292.htm#Detainee%20Abuse (accessed January 22, 2012). —— (2006b): US Torture and Abuse of Detainees, September. Available at: www.hrw. org/campaigns/torture.htm (accessed July 4, 2011). —— (2006c): US: Bush should close Guantánamo now, May. Available at: http://hrw. org/english/docs/2006/05/09/usdom13332.htm (accessed March 29, 2011). Hurrell, A. (2002): “ ‘There are no Rules’ (George W. Bush): International Order after September 11,” International Relations 16 (2): 185–204. Husserl, Edmund (1962): Ideas General Introduction to Pure Pheno-­menology. New York: Collier. Huysmans, Jef (1998a): “The Question of the Limit: Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27 (3): 569–589. —— (1998b): “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,” European Journal of International Relations 4 (4): 479–505. —— (1998c): “Security, What do You Mean?,” European Journal of International Relations 4 (2): 226–255. —— (2000): Migration and the Politics of Security. In Body-­Gendrot, S. and Martiniello, M. (eds) The Dynamics of Social Integration and Social Exclusion at the Neighbourhood Level. London: Macmillan: 179–189. —— (2002): “Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security,” Alternatives 27: 41–62. —— (2004a): “A Foucauldian View on Spill-­Over: Freedom and Security in the EU,” Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (3): 294–318. —— (2004b): “Minding Exceptions: Politics of Insecurity and Liberal Democracy,” Contemporary Political Theory 3 (3): 321–334. —— (2006a): The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. London and New York: Routledge. —— (2006b): “International Politics of Exception: Competing Visions of International Political Order: Between Law and Politics,” Alternatives 31: 135–165. —— (2011): “What is an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings,” Security Dialogue 42 (4–5): 371–383. Huysmans, Jef, Andrew Dobson, and Raia Prokhovnik (2006): The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency. London and New York: Routledge.

Bibliography   175 Ibrahim, Maggie (2005): “The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse,” International Migration 43 (5): 163–187. ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) (1949): Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention). 12 August: Available at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36d2.html/ (accessed July 15, 2012). —— (2004): Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation, February. Available at: www.derechos.org/nizkor/us/doc/icrc-­prisoner-report-­feb-2004.pdf (accessed June 21, 2011). Isikoff, M. and M. Hosenball (2009): “Fresh Questions About the CIA’s Interrogation Tapes,” Newsweek, May 2. Jabri, Vivienne (1996): Discourses on Violence. Manchester: Manchester University Press. —— (2006): “War, Security and the Liberal State,” Security Dialogue 37 (1): 47–64. Jackson, Nichole J. (2006): “International Organizations, Security Dichotomies and the Trafficking of Persons and Narcotics in Post-­Soviet Central Asia: A Critique of the Securitization Framework,” Security Dialogue 37 (3): 299–318. Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus (2010): The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics (New International Relations series). London and New York: Routledge. Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Daniel H. Nexon (2004): “Constructivist Realism or Realist-­Constructivism?,” International Studies Review 6 (2): 337–341. Jackson, Richard (2005): Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter­terrorism. Manchester: Manchester University Press. —— (2006a): “Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-­Terrorism: Writing Wars on Terrorism from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush Jr.,” Studies in Language and Capitalism (1): 163–193. —— (2006b): “Security, Democracy and the Rhetoric of Counter-­Terrorism,” Democracy and Security 1 (2): 147–171. Jehl, D. and N. Lewis (2004): “US Disputed Protected Status of Iraq Inmates,” New York Times, May 23. Jepperson, R.  L., W. Alexander, and P.  J. Katzenstein (1996): “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security.” In Katzenstein, P.  J. (ed.), The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia University Press: 33–72. Jervis, Robert (2006): “The Remaking of a Unipolar Moment,” The Washington Quarterly 29 (3): 17–19. Johnsen, Dawn E. (2008): “What’s a President to Do?: Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of the Bush Administration’s Abuses,” Boston University Law Review 88: 395–420. Joseph, Jonathan and Colin Wight (2010): Scientific Realism and International Relations: Basingstoke and New york: Palgrave Macmillan. Kagan, Robert (2004): “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs 83 (2): 65–87. Katzenstein, Peter, J. (1996): The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Katzenstein, P. J., R. O. Keohane, and S. D. Krasner (1998): “Inter-­national Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52 (4): 625. Kaufmann, Chaim (2004): “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War,” International Security 29 (1): 5–48.

176   Bibliography Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (1993): “The Neo-­idealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities,” International Studies Quarterly 37 (2): 131–147. —— (1994): “How Did the Cold War Die?: Principles for an Autopsy,” Mershon International Studies Review 38 (1): 11–41. Kegley, C. and G. Raymond (2003): “Preventative War and Permissive Order,” International Studies Perspective 4: 385–394. Kennedy, Paul (2002): “The Eagle has Landed,” Financial Times, February 2. Kennedy, Rory (2007): Ghosts of Abu Ghraib. DVD, HBO Video. Kennedy-­Pipe, C. and N. Rengger (2006): “Apocalypse Now? Continuities or Disjunctions in World Politics after 9/11,” International Affairs 83 (2): 539–552. Keohane, Robert O. (1986): Neo Realism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press. —— (1988): “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32: 379–396. Kierpaul, Ian (2007–2008): “The Mad Scramble of Congress, Lawyers and Law Students after Abu Ghraib: The Rush to Bring Private Military Contractors to Justice,” University of Toledo Law Review 39 (Winter): 407–422. King, G., Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994): Designing Social Inquiry: Science Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kinsella, Helen M. (2005): “Discourses of Difference: Civilians, Combatants and Compliance with the Laws of War.” In Armstrong, David, Farrell, Theo, and Maiguashca, Bice (eds), Force and Legitimacy in World Politics: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 163–186. Klotz, Audie (1995): Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Klotz, A. and C. Lynch (2007): Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Koh, Harold H. (2006): “Setting the World Right,” The Yale Law Journal 115 (9): 2350–2379. Koskenniemi, Martti (2005): From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of Legal Argument, Reissue with Epilogue. New York: Cambridge University Press. —— (2011): The Politics of International Law: Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing. Koslowski, Rey and Freidrich V. Kratochwil (1994): “Understanding Change in the International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” International Organization 48 (2): 215–247. Krasner, Stephen D. (1999): Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kratochwil, Fredrich (1978): International Order and Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. —— (1987): “Norms and Values: Rethinking the Domestic Analogy,” Ethics and International Affairs 1: 135–159. —— (1989): Rules, Norms and Decisions, On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1993): “The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-­Realism as the Science of Realpolitik without Politics,” Review of International Studies 19 (1): 63–80. —— (2000a): “Constructing a New Orthodoxy?: Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International

Bibliography   177 Politics’ and the Constructivist Challenge,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29 (1): 73–101. —— (2000b): “How Do Rules Matter?” In Byers, M. (ed.), The Rules of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and international Law: Oxford: Oxford University Press: 35–68. —— (2001): “Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study.” In Fierke, K. M. and Joergensen, K. E. (eds), Constructing International Relations. Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe:13–35. —— (2006): Constructing a New Orthodoxy. In Guzzini, S. and Leander, A. (eds), Constructivism and International Relations. London: Routledge: 21–47. Kratochwil, F. and J. G. Ruggie (1986): “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (4): 753–775. Krause, K. and M. C. Williams (1996): “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” Mershon International Studies Review 40 (2): 229–254. —— (1997): Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases. London: UCL Press. Krauthammer, Charles (2001): “The New Unilateralism,” Washington Post 8 June: A. 29. —— (2002/2003): “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest (Winter): 5–12. —— (2005): “The Truth about Torture: It is Time to be Honest about Doing Terrible Things,” Weekly Standard 12 May 011 (12): 1–7. Krebs, R. and P. T. Jackson (2007): “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Relations 13 (1): 35–66. Krebs, R. and J. Lobasz (2007): “Fixing the Meaning of 9–11: Hegemony, Coercion and the Road to War in Iraq,” Security Studies 16 (3): 409–451. Kubalkova,Vendulka (2001): “The ‘Twenty Years’ Cartharsis.” In Fierke, Karin M. and Jorgenson, Knud Erik (eds) Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 37–69. Kull, S., C. Ramsay, and E. Lewis (2003/2004): “Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War,” Political Science Quarterly 118 (4): 569–598. Kurki, Milja and Colin Wight (2010): “International Relations and Social Science.”In Dunne, Tim, Milja, Kurki, and Smith, Steven (eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lacan, Jacques (1968): “The Mirror-­phase as Formative of the Function of the I,” New Left Review 1: 51. Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985): “Post-­Marxism without Apologies,” New Left Review 16 (2): 79–106. Laffey, M. and J. Weldes (1997): “Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 3 (2): 193–237. Lang, Anthony F. Jr (2007): “Crime and Punishment: Holding States Accountable,” Ethics & International Affairs 21 (2): 239–257. —— (2009): “Introduction: Rules and International Security Dilemmas of a New World Order.” In Lang, A. Jr and Beattie, A. (eds) War Torture and Terrorism: Rethinking the Rules of International Security. London and New York: Routledge: 1–22. Lang, A. F. and A. Beattie (2009): War, Torture and Terrorism: Rethinking the Rules of International Security. London and New York: Routledge. Lang, A. F., N. Rengger and W. Walker (2006): “The Role(s): of Rules: Some Conceptual Clarifications,” International Relations 20 (3): 274–294. Lapid, Yosef (1989): “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in the Post-­Positivist Era,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (3): 235–254.

178   Bibliography Larsen, Henrik (1997): Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe. London: Routledge. —— (1999): “British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s: A Discourse Approach,” European Journal of International Relations 4: 451–483. Lawn, Chris (2004): Wittgenstein and Gadamer: Towards a Post-­Analytic Philosophy of Language. London: Continuum. Leiter, Brian (1998): “Realism, Hard Positivism, Conceptual Analysis,” Legal Theory 4: 533–547. Leonard, Sarah and Christian Kaunert (2011): “Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory.” In Balzacq, T., Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve: London and New York: Routledge: 57–76. Levinson, Sanford (2004): Contemplating Torture: An Introduction. In Levinson, S. (ed.), Torture: A Collection. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 23–46. Lewis, Anthony (2004): “Making Torture Legal,” The New York Review of Books, July 5. Available at: www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/jul/15/making-­torturelegal/?pagination=false (accessed May 20, 2010). Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (1995): On Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Loader, Ian (2002): “Policing, Securitization and Democratization in Europe,” Criminology and Criminal Justice 2 (2): 125–153. Lobel, J. and M. Ratner (1999): “Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorisations to Use Force, Cease-­fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime,” American Journal of International Law 124: 129. Luban, David (2007): “The Defense of Torture,” New York Review of Books 54 (4): March 15. Lyon, David (2006): Theorizing Surveillance: The Panoptican and Beyond: Abingdon: Willian Publishing. Malcolm, N. (1984): Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir with Biographical Sketch by G.H. von Wright: New York: Oxford University PRess Mann, James (2004): The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York: Viking Adult. March, J. G. and J. P. Olsen (1989): Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press. —— (1998): “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization 52 (4): 943–969. Mattern, Janice Bially (2001): “The Power Politics of Identity,” European Journal of International Relations 7 (3): 349–397. Mayer, Jane (2008): The Dark Side: The Inside Story of how the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals. New York: Doubleday. McDonald, Matt (2005): “Constructing Insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post-­2001,” International Relations 19 (3): 297–320. —— (2008): “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations 14 (4): 563–587. McDonald, Matt and Richard Jackson (2009): “Constructivism, US Foreign Policy and the ‘War on Terror’ .” In Parmar, Inderjeet, Miller, Linda B., and Ledwidge, Mark (eds) New Directions in US Foreign Policy: New York: Routledge: 18–31. McDonald, Matt and Alex J. Bellamy (2002): “The Utility of ‘Human Security’: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow,” Security Dialogue 33 (3): 373–377. McGeary, Johanna (2004): “The Scandal’s Growing Stain: Abuses by US Soldiers in Iraq

Bibliography   179 Shock the World and Roil the Bush administration: The Inside Story of What Went Wrong – And Who’s to Blame,” Time Magazine, May 17. McGinn, M. (1996): Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (Routledge Guides to Philosophy). London: Routledge. McLain, Patrick (2002): “Setting the Score with Saddam: Resolution 1441 and Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force Against Iraq,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 13: 233–292. McSweeney, Bill (1996): “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,” Review of International Studies 22 (1): 81–93. —— (1998): “Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: A Response to Buzan and Wæver,” Review of International Studies 24 (1): 137–140. —— (1999): Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mead, Walter Russell (2005): Power, Terror, Peace and War: America’s Grand Strategy in a World at Risk. New York: Vintage. Mearsheimer, John J. (1990): “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15 (1): 5–57. —— (1995): “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20 (1): 82–93. —— (1994/1995): “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (3): 5–49. Mearshimer, J. and S. Walt (2003): “An Unnecessary War,” Foreign Policy 134 (1): 50–59. Mearsheimer, J., S. Walt, G. Wheatcroft, W. Pfaff, D. Levy, J. Massad, N. Chomsky, and M. Mazower (2006): “The Israeli Lobby,” Journal of Palestine Studies 35 (3): 83–114. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Public Law 109–366—October 17, 2006. Available at: http://usiraq.procon.org/sourcefiles/2006MCA.pdf (accessed August 17, 2011). Miller, Steven E (2003): “After the 9/11 Disaster: Washington’s Struggle to Improve Homeland Security,” Axess 2 (March): 8–11. Milliken, Jennifer (1999): “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5 (2): 225–254. Monk, R. (1990): Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Duty of Genius. London: Vintage. Monten, Jonathan (2005): “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” International Security 29 (4): 112–156. Morrow, James D. (1994): Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Moyers, Bill (2008): “It was Oil, All Along,” Al-­Zaeera, July 6: 1–2. Mueller, John (2005): “The Iraq Syndrome,” Foreign Affairs 84 (6): 44–54. Mulligan, Shane (2004): “Questioning (the Question of ): Legitimacy in IR: A Reply to Jens Steffek,” European Journal of International Relations 10 (3): 475–484. —— (2006): “The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34 (2): 349–375. Mundis, Daryl A. (2002): “The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts,” The American Journal of International Law 96 (2): 320–338. Neal, Andrew (2006): “Foucault in Guantanamo: Towards an Archeology of the Exception,” Security Dialogue 37 (1): 31–46. —— (2009): “Securitization and Risk at the EU (Border: The Origins of FRONTEX,” Journal of Common Market Studies 47 (2): 333–356.

180   Bibliography Neocleous, Mark (2006): “The Problem with Normality, or, Taking Exception to ‘Permanent Emergency’,” Alternatives 31 (2): 191–213. Neufeld, Mark (1993): “Reflexivity and International Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 22 (1): 53–76. —— (1995): The Restructuring of International Relations Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. New Yorker, The (2004): “The Abu Ghraib Pictures”: Available at: www.newyorker.com/ archive/2004/05/03/slideshow_040503#slide=1 (accessed July 18, 2010). Newhouse, John (2003): Imperial America: The Bush Assault on World Order. New York: Knopf. Nicholson, M. (1996): Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study. London: Pinter. Nietzsche, Friedrich (2000): Basic Writings of Nietzsche: translated by Kaufmann, Walter and introduction by Gray, Peter, Modern Library edn: New York and Canada: Random House USA Inc. Nietzsche, F., D. Breazeale, and R. J. Hollingdale (1997): Untimely Mediations, 2nd edn: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Noreen, Erik and Roxanna Sjöstedt (2004): “Estonian Identity Formations and Threat Framing the Post-­Cold War Era,” Journal of Peace Research, 41 (6): 733–750. Nowak, Manfred (2006): “What Constitutes Torture?: US and UN Standards,” Human Rights Quarterly 28 (4): 809–841. O’Connell, Mary E. (2002): “The Myth of Pre-­emptive Self-­Defence,” The American Society of International Law. Task Force on Terrorism, available at: www.asil.org. —— (2005): “Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation,” Ohio State Law Journal 66: 1231–1268. O’Connor, B. and S. Vucetic (2010): “Another Mars–Venus Divide? Why Australia said ‘Yes’ and Canada said ‘Non’ to involvement in the 2003 Iraq War,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 64 (5): 526–548. O’Driscoll, Cian (2006): “Re-­negotiating the Just War: The Invasion of Iraq and Punitive War,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19 (3): 405–420. O’Reilly, Ciaran (2008) “Primetime Patriotism: New Media and the Securitization of Iraq,” Journal of Politics and Law 1 (3): 66–72. Onuf, Nicholas, G. (1985): “Do Rules Do What They Say They Do: From Ordinary Language to International Law,” Harvard International Law Journal 26 (2): 385–411. —— (1989): World of Our Making: Los Angeles, CA: University of South Carolina Press. —— (1998): “Constructivism: A User’s Manual.” In Kubalkova, Vendulka, Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood, and Kowert, Paul (eds), International Relations in a Constructed World: London: M. E. Sharpe, 58–78. —— (2002): “Worlds of Our Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism in International Relations.” In Puchala, Donald (ed.), Visions of International Relations: Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press: 119–141. —— (2003): Parsing Personal Identity: Self, Other Agent. In Debrix, F. (ed.), Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World: International Relations in a Constructed World. Armonk, NY: M. E Sharpe: 26–49. Ó Tuathail, Gearóid (2003): “Just Out Looking For a Fight: American Affect and the Invasion of Iraq,” Antipode 35 (5): 856–870. Pace, Peter, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (2004): General Pace Interview with Hannah Storm, CBS Early Show, May 5. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/ transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2977 (accessed April 10, 2012).

Bibliography   181 Palan, Ronen (2000): “A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 26 (4): 575–598. Palast, G. (2002): The Best Democracy Money Can Buy. London: Robinson. Parenti, Michael (1970): “The Possibility of Political Change,” Politics and Society, 1 (1): 79–90. Patomäki, H. and C. Wight (2000): “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism,” International Studies Quarterly 44 (2): 213–237. Pauly, R. J. and T. Lansford (2005): Strategic Pre-­emption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Pilkington, Ed. (2008): “ ‘I Think We’ve Done Pretty Well’: Dick Cheney has No Regrets about Eight Years in Office,” Guardian Wednesday 17 December. Popper, Karl (1959): The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Routledge. Posen, Barry R. (1993): “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35 (1): 27–47. Pouliot, Vincent (2007): “Subjectivism: Toward a Constructivist Methodology,” International Studies Quarterly 51: 359–384. Powell, Colin (2001): Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations, October 26. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/ secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5762.htm (accessed January 29, 2012). —— (2003): Remarks with Director General Dr. El Baradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency After Their Meeting, January 10. Available at: http://2001–2009.state. gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/16553.htm (accessed September 13, 2011). —— (2002): Remarks with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Jack Straw, Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, January 31. Available at: http://2001–2009.state. gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/7733.htm (accessed January 19, 2012). —— (2002): Powell and Rice Defend Bush’s “Axis of Evil” Speech, February 18. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2002–02–17/us/bush.axis_1_evil-­label-state-­colinpowell-­weapons-inspectors?_s=PM:US (accessed July 16, 2012). —— (2002): Interview by Sir David Frost of the BBC, April 12. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19581.htm (accessed January 29, 2012). —— (2002): Interview on the Diane Rehm Show, July 18. Available at: http://2001–2009. state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/11919.htm (accessed January 29, 2012). —— (2003): U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council, February 5. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ releases/2003/02/20030205–1.html#2#2FirefoxHTML\Shell\Open\Command (accessed September 13, 2011). —— (2003): “Interview on BBC’s Newsnight,” February 20. Available at http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17837.htm (accessed June 14, 2012). —— (2004a): On-­the-Record Briefing on U.S. Foreign Policy, May 28. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/32931.htm (accessed September 28, 2011). —— (2004b): Interview on CBS Face the Nation with Bob Schieffer and Doyle McManus, June 27. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/ remarks/33941.htm (accessed September 23, 2011). —— (2004c): Remarks at the 26th Annual Kennedy Center Honors Dinner, December 6. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/26987. htm (accessed March 13, 2012).

182   Bibliography —— (2006): “We were Wrong on Iraq,” Interview on BBC’s Newsnight,” January 15. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_4620000/newsid_4620000/ 4620054.stm?bw=bb&mp=wm&asb=1&news=1&bbcws=1 (accessed May 5, 2013). Prados, John (2004): Hoodwinked. New York: The New Press. Price, R. and C. Reus-­Smit (1998): “Dangerous Liaisons?: Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” European Journal of International Relations 4 (3): 259–294. Price, Richard and Nina Tannenwald (1996): “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention.” In Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.), The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia University Press: 114–143. Priest, D. and B. Gellman (2002): “US Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,” Washington Post, December 26. Puar, Jasbir K. (2004): “Abu Ghraib: Arguing against Exceptionalism,” Feminist Studies 30 (2): 522–534. Rajiva, Lila (2003): The Language of Empire: Abu Ghraib and the American Media. New York: Monthly Review Press. Rasul v. Bush (2004): (03–334) 542 US 466321 F.3d 1134, reversed and remanded: Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute. Available at www.law. cornell.edu/supct/html/03–334.ZS.html/ (accessed June 20, 2011). Rengger, N. and M. Hoffman (1992): Postmodernism and the Social Sciences. London: Macmillan. Reus-­Smith, Christian (2004): The Politics of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rice, Condoleezza (2002a): “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor,” February 21. Available at http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/2002 0221-11.html (accessed May 1, 2013). —— (2002b) A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom: Remarks by Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the Manhattan Institute’s Wriston Lecture: October 1. Available at: www.manhattan-­institute.org/html/ wl2002.htm (accessed May 24, 2012). —— (2003a): “Why We Know Iraq is Lying” A Column by Dr. Condoleezza Rice, January 23. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 2003/01/20030123–1.html (accessed April 11, 2011). —— (2003b): Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq in Chicago, October 8. Available at: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031008–4.html (accessed May 24, 2012). —— (2003c): National Security Advisor Dr. Rice Remarks to National Legal Center, October 31. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 2003/10/20031031–5.html (accessed September 19, 2011). —— (2004a): Dr. Rice Discusses the War on Terror on 60 Minutes, March 28. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2004/31105.htm (accessed January 27, 2012). —— (2004b): National Security Advisor Discusses the President’s Trip to Europe and the G8, June 14. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/33017.htm (accessed January 29, 2011). —— (2005a): Interview on ABC’s This Week With George Stephanopoulos and Peter Jennings, January 30. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/ 41375.htm (accessed June 14, 2012). —— (2005b): Remarks En Route to Germany, December 5. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57643.htm (accessed January 29, 2011). —— (2005c): Press Availability at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, December

Bibliography   183 8. Available at: http://2001–2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57805.htm (accessed January 29, 2011). Riely, John E. (2005–2006): “The Future of American Hegemony,” Vermont Law Review 30 (123): 123–154. Rigstad, Mark (2009): “The ‘Bush Doctrine’ as a Hegemonic Discourse Strategy,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 12 (3): 377–398. Ripley, Amanda (2004): “Redefining Torture,” Time Magazine World, June 13: 49–50. Risen, James, David Johnston and Neil A. Lewis (2004): “Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations,” New York Times, May 13. Risse, Thomas (2000): “ ‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54 (1): 1–39. —— (2002): “Transnational Actors and World Politics.” In Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., and Simmons, B. (eds) A Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage Publications: 255–274. —— (2004): “Social Construction of European Integration.” In Winer, A. and Diez, T., European Integration Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 144–158. Risse, T., S. C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink (1999): The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roberts, Adam (2005): “The War on Terror in Historical Perspective,” Survival 47 (2): 101–130. Roberts, A. and R. Guelff (2000): Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd edn: New York: Oxford University Press. Roe, Paul (2004): “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” Security Dialogue, 35 (3): 279–294. —— (2008): “Actor, Audience(s): and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq,” Security Dialogue 39: 615–635. —— (2012): “Is Securitization a ‘Negative’ Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate over Normal Versus Extraordinary Politics,” Security Dialogue 43 (3): 249–266. Rorty, Richard (1992): The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Ross, Brian and Richard Esposito (2005): “CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described,” ABC News, November 18. Available at: http://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/ government_information/CIA/CIA’s%20Harsh%20Interrogation%20Techniques%20 Described.pdf (accessed May 10, 2013). Roth, Kenneth (2006): “Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian Intervention?,” Journal of Military Ethics 5 (2): 84–92. Rothschild, Emma (1995): “What is Security?,” Daedalus 124 (3): 53–98. Rubenstein, Leonard S. and Stephen N. Xenakis (2009): “Detainees and the New Face of Torture.” In Levy, Barry S. and Sidel, Victor N. (eds), War and Public Health: Oxford University Press: 227–242. Ruggie, John G. (1998): Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. New York: Routledge. Rumsfeld, Donald (2001a): DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld, September 12. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1619 (accessed May 13, 2011). —— (2001b): DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld, September 27. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1939 (accessed May 13, 2011). —— (2001c): Rumsfeld and Myers Briefing on Enduring Freedom, October 7. Available

184   Bibliography at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2011 (accessed June 19, 2011). —— (2001d): Rumsfeld and Myers Briefing on Enduring Freedom, 7 October. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2011 (accessed June 19, 2011). —— (2001e): Remarks at a Memorial Service in Remembrance of Those Lost on September 11th, October 11. Available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ (accessed May 13, 2011). —— (2001f ): Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks at Stakeout Outside ABC TV, October 28. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2225 (accessed June 29, 2011). —— (2002a): DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myer, January 11. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031 (accessed June 29, 2011). —— (2002b): Secretary Rumsfeld Roundtable with Radio Media, January 15. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2132 (accessed July 20, 2012). —— (2002c): Memorandum for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Status of Taliban and Al-­Qaeda, January 19. Available at: www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/ d20040622doc1.pdf (accessed September 1, 2010). —— (2002d): DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, February 8. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2624 (accessed September 1, 2010). —— (2002e): DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, February 12. Available at: www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 (accessed September 1, 2010). —— (2002f ): Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability at Kuwait City International Airport, June 11. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx? transcriptid=3500 (accessed September 26, 2011). —— (2002g): Secretary Rumfeld Interview With Fox TV Prague, November 21. Available at: www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3314 (accessed September 26, 2011). —— (2002h): Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with CNN TV Prague, November 21. Available at www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3312 (accessed July 20, 2012). —— (2003a): Secretary Rumsfeld Address to the Munich Conference on European Security Policy, February 8. Available at: www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=1918 (accessed November 13, 2010). —— (2003b): DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, February 19. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1933 (accessed July 20, 2012). —— (2003c): Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Regis le Sumier, Paris Match Magazine, November 20. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid =2978 (accessed November 13, 2010). —— (2004a): Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Larry King Live, CNN TV, March 19. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2352 (accessed March 27, 2011). —— (2004b): Defense Department Operational Update Briefing, May 4. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2973 (accessed November 13, 2010).

Bibliography   185 —— (2004c): Transcript of Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, The Pentagon, Washington, DC, May 11. Available at: www.defense.gov/speeches/speech. aspx?speechid=126 (accessed March 27, 2011). —— (2004d): Secretary Rumsfeld’s Speech at the National Press Club, September 10. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2381 (accessed March 27, 2011). Russett, Bruce (2005): “Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace,” International Studies Perspective 6 (4): 395–408. Saletan, William (2004): Rape Rooms: A Chronology: What Bush Said as the Iraq Prison Scandal Unfolded. Available at: www.slate.com/id/2100014 (accessed February 12, 2010). Salter, Mark B. (2002): Barbarians and Civilisation in International Relations. London: Pluto Press. —— (2008): “Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority,” Journal of International Relations and Development 11: 321–349. Sands, Philippe (2005): Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules From FDR’s Atlantic Charter to George W. Bush’s Illegal War. New York: Viking Books. Sanford, Levinson (2004): Contemplating Torture: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sapiro, Miriam (2003): “Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-­Defense,” American Journal of International Law 97: 603–620. Sarkesian, Sam Charles, John Allen Williams, and Stephen J. Cimbala (2008): US National Security: Policy Makers, Processes and Politics: Boudler, CO: Lynne Rienner. Savage, Charlie (2005): “Rank and File Have Taken Heat for Abu Ghraib,” Boston Globe, April 28, A22. —— (2007): Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy: New York: Little, Brown and Company. Scheer, Christopher, Robert Scheer, and Lakshmi Chaudhry (2003): The Five Biggest Lies Bush Told Us About Iraq. Sydney: Allen & Uwin. Scheuerman, William E. (2006): “Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib,” Constellations 13 (1): 108–124. Schifferes, Steve (2003): US Names Coalition of the Willing. Available at: http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2862343.stm (accessed February 14, 2010). Schlesinger, Arthur Jr (2004): “The Making of a Mess,” The New York Review of Books 42, September 23. Available at: www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/sep/23/the-­ making-of-­a-mess/ Schlesinger, J., R. H. Brown, K. Tillie and C. A. Homer (2004): The Schlesinger Report: Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations. Office of the Secretary of Defense: Washington DC. Available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news. findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf (accessed May 3, 2013). Schmidt, Volker H. (2001): “Oversocialised Epistemology: A Critical Appraisal of Constructivism,” Sociology 35 (1): 135–157. Schmitt, Carl (1985): Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. London: MIT Press. —— (1996): On the Concept of the Political. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Schmitt, Eric (2002): “There Are Ways to Make Them Talk,” New York Times, June 16: D1.

186   Bibliography Scowcroft, Brent (2002): “Don’t Attack Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, August 15. Searle, John R. (1995): The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press. —— (2006): “Social Ontology: Some Basic Principles,” Anthropological Theory 6 (1): 12–29. Seeyle, Katharine Q. (2002): “A Nation Challenged: The Prisoners; First ‘Unlawful Combatants’ Seized in Afghanistan Arrive at U.S. Base in Cuba,” New York Times, January 12. Shannon, Vaughn P. and Jonathan W.Keller (2007): “Leadership Style and International Norm Violation: The Case of the Iraq War,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3: 79–104. Shapiro, I. and A. Wendt (1992): “The Difference That Realism Makes: Social Science and the Politics of Contest,” Politics and Society 20: 197–223. Shultz, R., R. Godson, and T. Greenwood (1993): Security Studies for the 1990s. Washington: Brassey’s. —— (1993): Security Studies for the 1990s. Washington: Brassey’s. Shue, Henry (2010): “What Would a Justified Preventive Military Attack Look Like?” In Shue, Henry and Rodin, David, Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification: New York: Oxford University Press: 222–246. Shue, Henry and David Rodin (2010) Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justifications. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sifry, Micah L. and C. Cerf (2003): The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions: New York: Touchstone Books. Silberstein, Sandra (2002): War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11: Abingdon: Routledge. Sikkink, Kathryn (1991): Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Singer, David J. (1961a): The Level-­of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. In Knorr, K. and Verba, S. (ed.), The International System: Theoretical Essays. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 77–92. —— (1961b): “The Level-­of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14 (1): 77–92. Sjöstedt, Roxanna (2008): “Exploring the Construction of Threats: The Securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia,” Security Dialogue 39 (1): 7–29. —— (2011): “Health Issues and Securitization: The Construction of HIV/AIDS as a US National Security Threat.” In Balzacq, T. (ed.), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve: London and New York: Routledge: 150–169. Sloss, David L. (2004): “Rasul v. Bush. 124 S.Ct. 2686,” The American Journal of International Law 98 (4): 788–798. Smith, Jeffrey, R. (2004): “Memo Gave Intelligence Bigger Role: Increased Pressure Sought on Prisoners,” Washington Post, May 21. Smith, Steve (1996): “Positivism and Beyond.” In Smith, S., Booth, K., and Zalewski, M. (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 11–46. —— (2000): “Wendt’s World,” Review of International Studies 26 (1): 151–163. Snidal, Duncan (1985): “Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes,” American Political Science Review 79: 923–942. Sofaer, Abraham, D. (2003): “On the Necessity of Pre-­emption,” European Journal of International Law 14 (2): 209–226. Sontag, Susan (2004a): “Regarding the Torture of Others,” New York Times Magazine, May 23.

Bibliography   187 —— (2004b): “The New Iraq Crisis; Donald Rumsfeld Should Go,” New York Times, May 7. Spiegel Online International (2006): “American’s Shame: Torture in the Name of Freedom”: February 20. Available at: www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/america-­sshame-­torture-in-­the-name-­of-freedom-­a-401899.html (accessed July 30, 2011). Steele, Brent J. (2008): “‘Ideas That Were Never Really In Our Possession’: Torture, Honour and the US Identity,” International Relations 22(2): 243–261. Stern, D. (2004): Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stiglitz, Joseph and Linda Bilmes (2008): The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict: London: Allen Lane. Strachan, Hew (2010): “Preemption and Prevention in Historical Perspective.” In Shue, Henry and Rodin, David, Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification: New York: Oxford University Press: 23–39. Strasser, Steven (2004): The Abu Ghraib Investigations: The Official Independent Panel and Pentagon Reports on the Shocking Prisoner Abuse in Iraq. New York: Public Affairs. Strauss, Marcy (2005): “The Lessons From Abu Ghraib,” Ohio State Law Journal 66: 1269–1310. Stritzel, Holger (2007): “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” European Journal of International Relations 13 (3): 357–383. —— (2011): “Security, the Translation,” Security Dialogue 42 (4–5): 343–355. Suganami, Hidemi (1999): “Agents, Structures, Narratives,” European Journal of International Relations 5 (3): 365–386. Taft, William H. IV and Todd F. Buchwald (2003): “Preemption, Iraq and International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 97 (3): 557–563. Taguba, A. (2004): Article 15–6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade. Available at: www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/taguba.pdf (accessed October 13, 2011). Tarry, Sarah (1999): “ ‘Deepening’ and ‘Widening’: An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 1990’s,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 2 (1): 1–13. Taureck, Rita (2006): “Securitisation Theory and Securitisation Studies,” Journal of International Relations and Development 9 (1): 53–61. —— (2007): “Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security-­Bringing together the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and the Welsh School of Security Studies,” Review of International Studies 33 (2): 327–350. Thomasson, Emma (2003): “Iraq War Illegal but Trial Unlikely, Lawyers Say,” Reuters, March 19. Thrall, Trevor A. (2007): “A Bear in the Woods? Threat Framing and the Marketplace of Values,” Security Studies 16 (3): 452–488. Thucydides (1993): History of the Peloponnesian War, new edn, translated by Richard Crawley. J. M. Dent, London; Charles E. Tuttle, Vermont. Trachtenberg, Marc (2010): “Preventive War and US Foreign Policy.” In Shue, Henry and Rodin, David, Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification: New York: Oxford University Press: 40–68. Trombetta, Maria Julia (2008): “Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Special Issue, 21 (4): 585–602. —— (2011): “Rethinking the Securitization of the Environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights.” In Balzacq T. (ed.), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve: London and New York: Routledge: 135–149.

188   Bibliography United Nations (1945): Charter of the United Nations and Statutes of the International Court of Justice. Available at: www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml (accessed January 29, 2011). —— (1984): Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Available at: http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails. aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-­9&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed April 11, 2010). —— (2002): United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441: Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on November 8, 2002. Available at www.un.org/depts/ unmovic/new/documents/resolutions/s-­res-1441.pdf (accessed January 29, 2013). —— (2005): U.N. Committee Against Torture: CAT: Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3. Available at: www.state.gov/documents/organization/62175.pdf (accessed June 27, 2012). USA Patriot Act (2001): Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT): Act of 2001: Available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-­107hr3162enr/pdf/BILLS-­ 107hr3162enr.pdf (accessed July 16, 2012). US Congress (2002): Joint Resolution to Authorize the use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq. New York Times, 11 October. US Military Order (2001): Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-­Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (November 13, 2001): (2001): In 66 Fed. Reg. Page: 57831, [November 16, 2001]. Van Munster, Rens (2004): “The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the Rule,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 17 (2): 141–153. Vaughan-­Williams, Nick and Columbia Peoples (2012): Critical Security Studies: Critical Concepts in Military, Strategic and Security Studies. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Vieira, Macro Antonio (2007): “The Securitization of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic as a Norm,” Brazilian Political Science Review 1 (2): 137–181. Vultee, Fred (2011): “Securitization as a Media Frame: What Happens When the Media ‘Speak Security’.” In Balzacq, T. (ed.), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve: London and New York: Routledge: 77–92. Vuori, Juha A. (2003): “Security as a Justification: An Analysis of Deng Xiaoping’s Speech on Martial Law Troops in Beijing on the Ninth of June 1989.” NACS Conference, Oslo. Available at: www.nacsorg.com/nacs2003_papers/nacs_papers_fulltext_ vuori.pdf —— (2008): “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization – Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-­Democratic Political Orders,” European Journal of International Relations 13 (1): 65–99. —— (2010): “A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves with a Global Referent Object,” Security Dialogue, 41 (3): 255–277. —— (2011): “Religion Bites: Falungong, securitization/desecuritization in the People’s Republic of China.” In Balzacq, T. (ed.), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve: London and New York: Routledge: 186–212. Wæver, Ole (1995): “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In Lipschutz, R. D. (ed.), On Security. New York: Columbia University Press: 46–86. —— (1999): “Securitizing Sectors? Reply to Eriksson,” Cooperation and Conflict 34 (3): 334–340. —— (2000): “The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist

Bibliography   189 on Post-­sovereign Security Orders.” In Kelstrup, M. and Williams, M. C. (eds), International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community. London: Routledge: 250–294. —— (2002): “Security: A Conceptual History for International Relations,” British International Studies Association Conference 17–19 December, London. —— (2004): “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery,” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, March 17–20, Montreal. —— (2008) “The Changing Agenda of Societal Security,” Globalization and Environmental Security and Peace 3: 581–593. —— (2011): “Politics, Security, Theory,” Security Dialogue 42 (4–5): 465–480. Walker, R.  B.  J. (1988): One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. —— (1990): “Security, Sovereignty and the Challenge of World Politics,” Alternatives 15 (1): 3–27. —— (1993): Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wallander, C.  A, and R.  O. Keohane (1999): Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions. In Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O. and Wallander, C. A. (eds), Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 21–47. Walt, Stephen M. (1991): “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35 (2): 211–239. —— (1998): “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110: 38. Waltz, Kenneth (1979): Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-­Wesley. Warner, Brooke (2004): Abu Ghraib and a New Generation of Soldiers. In Danner, M. (ed.), Abu Ghraib: The Politics of Torture. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books: 71–86. Watson, Scott D. (2012): “ ‘Framing’ the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on Threat Construction,” Millennium Journal of International Studies 40 (2): 279–301. Weiner, Myron (1992–1993): “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” International Security 17 (3): 95, 110–111. Wendt, Alexander (1987): “The Agent/Structure Problem in International Relations,” International Organisation 41 (2): 335–370. —— (1991): “Bridging the Theory/meta-­theory Gap In International Relations,” Review of International Studies 17: 383–392. —— (1992): “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organisation 46: 391–425. —— (1994): “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review 88 (2): 384–396. —— (1995): “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20 (1): 71–81. —— (1998): “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 24 (5): 101–118. —— (1999): Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shapiro, Ian and Alexander Wendt (1992): “The Difference that Realism Makes: Social Science and the Politics of Consent,” Politics & Society 20 (2): 197–223. Werner, Wouter G. (1998): “Securitization and Legal Theory,” COPRI Working Paper No. 27, Conference Paper.

190   Bibliography —— (2001): “Securitization and Judicial Review: A Semiotic Perspective on the Relationship between the Security Council and International Judicial Bodies,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 14 (4): 345–366. —— (2010). “The Changing Face of Enmity: Carl Schmitt´s International Theory and the Evolution of the Legal Concept of War,” International Theory 2 (3): 351–380. —— (2010): “The Use of Law in International Political Sociology,” International Political Sociology 3 (4): 304–307. Werner, Wouter G. and Oliver Kessler (2008): “Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management,” Security Dialogue 39 (2–3): 289–308. Western, Jon (2005): “The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American People,” Security Studies 14 (1): 106–139. White House, The (2002): The National Security Strategy of the United States. Available at: http://georgewbush-­whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html (accessed January 20, 2010). Whitehead, John W. and Steven H. Aden (2001–2002): “Forfeiting ‘Enduring Freedom’ For ‘Homeland Security’: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-­Terrorism Initiatives,” American University Law Review 51: 1081–1134. Whitelaw, Kevin (2003): “Saddam’s World: Inside a Sybaritic Inner Sanctum Rife with Decadence and Depravity,” U.S. News & World Report, April 20. Available at: www. usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/030428/28saddam.htm (accessed May 6, 2013). Widmaier, W.  W., M. Blyth, and L. Seabrooke (2007): “Exogenous Shocks or Endogenous Constructions? The Meanings of Wars and Crisies,” International Studies Quarterly 51 (4): 747–759. Wiener, Antje (2003): “Constructivism: The Limits of Bridging Gaps,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 6: 253–275. Wiener, A. and T. Diez (2003): Theories of European Integration: Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wight, Colin (1999): “They Shoot Dead Horses Don’t They?: Locating Agency in the Agent-­Structure Problematique,” European Journal of International Relations 5 (1): 109–142. —— (2007): “A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can Opener Won’t Work,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35 (2): 379–398. Wight, J. and C. Joseph (2010): Scientific Realism and International Relations, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Wilkinson, Claire (2007): “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?,” Security Dialogue 38 (1): 5–25. Williams, Michael (1994): “The Significance of Learning in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24: 173–204. —— (1998): “Modernity, Identity and Security: A Comment on the ‘Copenhagen Controversy’,” Review of International Studies 23 (3): 435–440. —— (1999): “The Practices of Security: Critical Contributions – Reply to Eriksson,” Cooperation and Conflict 34 (3): 341–344. —— (2003): “Words, Images and Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47 (4): 511–531. —— (2011a): “Securitization and the Liberalism of Fear,” Security Dialogue 42 (4–5): 453–463. —— (2011b): “The Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory.” In Balzacq, T. (ed.), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve: London and New York: Routledge, 212–222.

Bibliography   191 Williams, Paul (1999): “Contesting the Logic of Securitization: A Critical Security Perspective,” Paper presented at South African Political Studies Association Conference, , June 29–July 2, Saldanha South Africa. —— (2004): Critical Security Studies. In Bellamy, A. J. (ed.), International Society and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 135–150. Winch, Peter (1958): The Idea of a Social Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922): Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus. New York: Cosimo. —— (1958): The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations.” Oxford: Basil Blackwell. —— (1974): Philosophical Grammar. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. —— (1979a): Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edn. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. —— (1979b): On Certainty, edited by Anscombe, G. and von Wright, G.  H.: Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Wittkopf, Eugene R., Christopher Martin Jones, and Charles W. Kegley (2008): American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 7th edn: USA: Wadsworth Publishing Co Inc. Wohlforth, William C. (1994–1995): “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 19 (3): 91–129. Wolfowitz, Paul (2001): “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview,” London Sunday Telegraph, October 28. Available at: www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=2202 (July 16, 2012). —— (2002): “Building Coalitions of Common Values,” Speech at the International ­Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2. Available at: www.iiss.org/recent-­keyaddresses/wolfowitz-­address/ (accessed July 9, 2012). —— (2003): Speech on Iraq Disarmament, 23 January: Available at: www.defenselink. mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1335 (accessed July 16, 2012). Woodward, Bob (2002): Bush at War: New York: Simon and Schuster. —— (2004): Plan of Attack. New York: Simon and Schuster. —— (2006): State of Denial. New York: Simon and Schuster. —— (2009): The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006–2008. New York: Simon and Schuster. Wyn Jones, Richard (2005): On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity and Concrete Utopias. In Booth, K. (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics. London: Lynne Rienner: 215–234. Yoo, John (2002): “Memorandum for William J. Haynes II: General Counsel, Department of Defense,” US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Council: Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General: Washington, DC 20530, January 9. Available at http://lawofwar.org/Yoo_Memo_html.htm (accessed May 1, 2013). —— (2005): The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11: Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press. —— (2006): War by Other Means: An Insiders Account. New York: Atlantic Monthly. —— (2011): Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to the Present: New York: Kaplan Publishing. Zajac, Daniel L. (2003): The Best Offense is a Good Defense: Preemption, Ramifications for the Department of Defense. Strategy Research Project: Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania US War College, May 2003. Zehfuss, Maja (2002): Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (2006): Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison. In Guzzini, S. and

192   Bibliography Leander, A. (eds), Constructivism and International Relations. London: Routledge: 93–117. Zoller, Elisabeth (2004): “Congruence and Proportionality for Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution,” Indiana Law Journal 78: 543–557. —— (2004): “The Law Applicable to the Pre-­emption Doctrine,” American Society of International Law 333 (98): 333–337.

Index

Abu Ghraib 4, 6, 8, 11, 75, 98, 107–12, 116, 119–29, 131–40; abuses 8, 107, 122–3, 126, 129, 138, 148, 150–1, 154–5; images 107–8, 110; incident 122, 130, 151; photographs 6, 108, 110–11, 113, 116, 120–2, 125–6, 128–9, 131, 136, 154; prison 107, 109–10, 131–2; scandal 8, 11, 111–12, 133, 138 abuses 11, 107, 124, 128, 132; Abu Ghraib 8, 107, 122–3, 126, 129, 138, 150; gross 112; human rights 127; systemic 121 Adler, E. 12–13, 15, 18 allies 4, 62–4, 70; terrorist 28, 62 al-Qaeda 69, 116–17, 131; affiliations with 100; detainees 118; fighters 119; links 29, 40, 65; training camps 25 America 5–6, 21–2, 24–7, 32–3, 35, 37–8, 68, 93–4, 100, 103–4, 119–20, 123–5, 127, 130, 134, 148, 154; best defense 23; decisions 73; identity 111, 136; justifications for war 65; military prowess 148; mission in Iraq 7; national security 28; reliance on intelligence 101; right to interrogations 112; right to self-defense 95; securitizing language 99; shame 128 American 24; citizens 21, 23; civilians 116; compliance 117; court 119; diplomatic traditions 7; effort in Iraq 129; Enterprise Institute 96; foreign policy 4, 9, 66; government 23; lives at risk 149; people 22, 66, 70, 125; policies 110; power 35; public 91; security interests 41, 47; soldiers 110, 134; strength 5; values 27 Amnesty International 109 Annan, K. 64, 123 Aradau, C. 43, 49, 51, 53 Ashcroft, J. 23, 26–7, 137 Ashley, R. 13, 17 audience 3, 42, 45–6, 50–2, 54, 59–60, 63, 65, 67, 71–3, 76, 85, 87–8, 90, 105, 138–9, 143–5, 147, 155; acceptance 46, 51–2, 58–9, 64, 91, 100, 138; formal 64; international 61, 64; stunned 110; target 50, 58 Austin, J. 18, 44–5, 50 Balzacq, T. 3, 11, 42, 49–52, 59, 85, 87 Barnett, M. 14–15 Berger, P.L. 15, 79 Bigo, D. 49–50

Blix, H. 33–4 Boston Globe 129 Bright, J. 56–8 Brody, R. 120 Bush, G.W. 7, 21–2, 24–33, 39, 62–3, 96–7, 99–101, 104, 110–11, 118–19, 123–5, 127, 133–4; President 4, 12, 34–38, 40, 66, 69, 93–5, 98, 115–16, 126, 129, 135, 151–2 Bush administration 1, 4–7, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 21–30, 33–7, 39–41, 44, 46, 56, 61–8, 70–1, 73, 75–7, 80, 83, 91–104, 106–8, 110–16, 118, 120–40, 147–55; Doctrine 5, 27, 131; language game 9, 11, 93, 95, 98–100, 104, 107–8, 110, 114–15, 123, 127–30, 134–5, 147–9, 151, 153–4; language of security 8–9, 129, 131, 134, 151–4; self-interests 5, 148 Butler, J. 2, 19, 21 Buzan, B. 2, 42, 44–8, 56–7, 85, 94–5 Campbell, D. 2, 19 cheap 2, 79, 148; talk 5, 7, 10, 12, 27, 39, 69, 71, 100, 114, 129, 141, 153 Checkel, J. 12–13, 15 Cheney, D. 24–5, 29, 62, 68, 70, 93, 96, 112, 114–15, 130; Vice President 24–5, 29, 62, 68, 93, 96, 112, 114–15, 119 children 27, 66; abused 126; exposed to danger 118; prison cells 38, 70; tortured 97 civil liberties 68; advocates 120 coalition 26, 31, 34, 37, 65, 69–70, 98 Collins, A. 51–2 confessions 116; forced 97 Congress 29, 61, 65, 118–19, 123; Congressional reports 9; leaders 21; Library of 9 Connolly, W.E. 14, 17 constitution 1, 13–14, 19, 38; mutual 88 constructivist 14–15, 17, 141, 154; conventional 15–16, 142; critical 2, 10, 12, 16–20, 39, 142; framework 21; operational method 44; theory of language 42; tradition 13, 20 Copenhagen School 2–3, 10–11, 21, 42, 45–7, 53–6, 61, 66, 71–3, 76, 87–8, 104, 145–7; analytical outlook 51; conceptualization 52, 89, 138; discussion of rules 90; framework 11, 49–50, 53, 57–60, 68, 72, 86–7, 91, 105, 108, 144; limitations 151; macrosecuritization 55–6,

194   Index Copenhagen School continued 65, 72, 85, 88, 94–5, 144, 151; securitization framework 10, 42–4, 62–3, 92, 138, 142, 154–5; speech act theory 74, 84, 108, 141, 143–4; strict formulation 93 court-martialled 127 Cox, M. 4–5 Crawford, N. 2, 5, 14, 23–4, 27, 81 criminal prosecution 119, 129 critical constructivist 2, 10, 12, 16–20, 39, 142 critical security studies 2, 149 Croft, S. 6, 22 Danner, M. 107, 110, 115, 126, 128 defining moments 6–9, 11–12, 21, 33, 35–6, 39–41, 66, 70, 93, 95, 98–100, 102, 106, 135, 137, 149–51, 152–5; first 7–8, 12, 66, 92–3, 99, 106–7, 122, 134, 149–51, 153–4; second 8, 107, 150, 154 delegitimating 11; delegitimizing 3; delegitimization 130 democracy 7–8, 22, 33, 38, 43, 61, 77, 96, 100–1, 106–7, 112, 123, 125–7, 134–6, 151, 154; Arab 99; language of 124; promotion 37, 39, 41, 65, 95, 97, 150, 153; securitization of 3, 49, 54–6, 66, 72, 98–9, 122 democratization of security 3–4, 49, 60–1, 72, 90 Der Derian, J. 13, 19 Derrida, J. 19–20 detainees 25, 109–10, 112–14, 117–18, 120–2, 126, 130, 132–3, 138–9, 148, 150–1 Diez, T. 19, 42 discrepancies 6, 8, 120 doctrine 68; Bush 5, 27, 131; pre-emptive 23–4, 138 dominant 3–4, 48; discourse of security 150; meanings 131; role 67; speech act 65 Doty, R. 2, 14, 19, 52, 87 Economist – North American Edition 129 Elbe, S. 42, 48 enforcement 60, 99 enhanced interrogation techniques 8, 91, 100, 108, 110–12, 120–2, 127–8, 132, 135, 137–8, 151, 153, 154 ethical 4, 53; considerations 138, 140; issues 43 executions 109; mock 109 Farrell, T. 13, 15 Fay Report 110, 121–2 Fierke, K. 2, 13, 16, 20, 39, 59, 74–5, 80 Finnemore, M. 14–15 foreign policy 4–5, 9–10, 12, 39, 66, 73, 96, 149, 152; Bush administration 8, 21, 30, 37, 75, 80, 94, 147, 149–50 Forsythe, D. 81, 115 Foucault, M. 19 Friedman, T.L. 136 Garamone, J. 117 Gellman, B. 118, 126 Geneva Conventions 68, 81, 108, 110, 112–13, 115–23, 130–4, 137–9, 153 Gonzales, A. 115–16, 130

Greenberg, K. 107, 110, 115, 122 grounds for war 5, 40, 66, 102 Guantánamo Bay 113, 118, 135 Guzzini, S. 13, 43 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 135 Hansen, L. 2, 8–9, 19, 42, 44, 47, 53, 56, 61, 87, 128, 138 Holland, J. 6, 22 Hopf, T. 15–16, 39 Howard, P. 29, 95 humanitarian aid 7, 32 human rights 33, 44, 76, 122; abuses 127; advocates 120; conventions 115; international groups 97; respected 134; violations 109, 124, 139 Human Rights Watch 109; Report 120 human shields 118–19 Hussein, S. 4, 7, 21, 28–40, 44, 46, 62–3, 65–6, 68–73, 94, 96–7, 100–4, 109, 118, 148, 149, 150 Huysmans, J. 42–3, 46, 53–4, 185 institutionalization 3, 47–9, 54, 56, 86, 144 intelligence agencies 67, 114, 116; CIA 116, 132–3 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 81–2, 109, 121, 151 international law 3, 9, 23, 40, 62, 67–8, 80–2, 118, 129, 131; in accordance with 65, 105; breaking 103, 130; compliance with 117; established 108; framework for circumventing 119; interpretations of 132–3, 139; loopholes 120; remit 114; rules of 147 international relations 2, 13, 17–18, 39, 42, 74 interpretations 5, 11, 13, 22, 66, 74, 81–2, 84, 90, 104–6, 108, 129–32, 134, 146, 153–4; Bush administration’s 80–1, 132–3, 139, 153; existing 133; interpretative modes of analysis 14–15; interpretative strategies 80; narrower 115; new 83; reinterpretation 138–9; self-interpretation 79 interrogations 25, 101, 119, 121–2, 131, 133; abusive practices 115; coercive techniques 107; enhanced techniques 8, 91, 100, 108, 110–12, 120–2, 127–8, 132, 135, 137–8, 151, 153, 154; harsh 111–12; practices 113 intersubjective structures 2, 20, 39 interviews 9, 130 invasion 4, 7, 12, 14, 28, 32, 35, 37, 39, 63, 65, 67, 94, 148–50, 152–3; Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 31, 102; military 73, 99, 104, 123 Iraqi civilians 7, 32; non-Iraqi civilians 118; tortured 136 Iraq War 4–5, 13–14; build-up to 30, 62; classified 30, 64; during 6, 11, 149; giving meaning to 34; justification 1, 6–10, 21, 32–3, 37, 40, 56, 66, 68, 92, 95–6, 135, 137, 152–3; legitimation 12, 40, 66, 154 Jepperson, R.L. 14–15 justifications 4–8, 21, 30, 40, 63, 65, 70, 79, 97, 99, 103, 107, 136, 138, 141; Bush administration’s 10–12, 28, 32–3, 36, 44, 61, 65, 72–3, 80, 92–3, 98, 104, 106, 135, 141, 147–9, 151–4; initial 96; original 39–40, 66, 106, 150

Index   195 Kaufmann, C. 4, 64 Kegley, C. 4, 13 Kissinger, H. 35, 128 Kratochwil, F. 13–16, 18, 74, 79–80, 86 Krebs, R. 6, 58 Kubalkova, V. 14, 18 Kuwait 30–1, 102 Laffey, M. 14, 61 Lang, A.F. 80, 107, 115 language of security 1–4, 7, 11, 21, 28, 45, 51, 54, 59, 61, 86–7, 90, 100, 109–11, 139, 144, 146; Bush administration’s 8–9, 114, 122, 129, 131, 134–5, 137–8, 148, 150–4 leaders 64, 110, 127, 148; of Congress 21; European 36; leader of Iraq 28; political 46; world 21 leadership 93; global 5; lost 127 legitimacy 7–8, 39, 53, 57, 69, 71, 74–5, 78, 82, 91, 102, 106, 108, 122, 128, 131–3, 136, 139–40, 150, 155 legitimate 3, 7, 12, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 40, 45–6, 51, 53, 60–1, 63, 66–7, 69, 73, 94–5, 98–101, 104, 108, 112, 132–3, 135, 137, 139, 143, 147–55; language 136; legitimated 1, 8, 39, 60, 68, 72, 91, 103, 109–10, 132, 134–5, 137; legitimating 11–12, 93; legitimation 1, 46, 83–4, 130; legitimizing 3, 18 Leonard, S. 52, 87 Lewis, A. 113–14 linguistic paradox 1–2, 12, 17–18, 40, 84, 142 McDonald, M. 2, 6, 22, 46, 51–2, 64, 87, 91 meanings 1–3, 9, 17–20, 78–9, 81, 86, 105, 108, 144, 153; alternative 54, 127; change 1, 84; different 52, 137; dominant 131; intersubjective 81, 141; multiple 56, 77, 89, 145; new 132; normative 15; questionable 139; sedimented 92; social construction of 142; structures of 3, 19, 72; in use 74, 85, 100, 132; see also sets of meanings military action 4–5, 16, 18, 23, 32, 39, 64, 66, 73, 94, 102, 104; decisive 70; justification 67; offensive 33; pre-emptive 40 Military Commissions Act of 2006 119 Milliken, J. 2, 8 negotiations 1, 31, 34, 137, 155 neoconservatives 4, 9 New Yorker 110 normalization 3; of security 49, 55 Onuf, N. 15, 17, 74, 79–80 Operation Desert Shield 118 Operation Iraqi Freedom 5, 12–14, 65 Pace, P. 125 peace 31–2, 39, 62, 101, 104, 133; international 103; world 25, 28, 30, 36 peaceful 61, 69; disarmament 35 Powell, C. 32, 66, 69, 71, 94–5, 102, 113, 118–19, 123; Secretary Powell 31, 66, 69–70, 94, 102, 113, 118 Prados, J. 64, 136

pre-emption 23, 81, 139, 153; legitimate 24; principle 67–8, 98 pre-emptive action 4, 16, 33, 39, 62, 98, 103, 110, 150; decisions 104; doctrine 23–4; manner 12; measures 40, 66, 102; military action 40; selfdefense 4–5, 21, 26, 28, 40, 63, 77, 80, 95, 100, 104, 138, 148, 151, 154; strikes 72; war 24, 130, 150, 153 preventive 4, 24 Price, R. 12, 14, 16 prisoners 113, 115, 148; enemy 116, 130; interrogation 119, 133; Iraqi 110–11, 128, 131; photographed 111, 123; political 109; treatment of 108, 118–19, 132; of war 110, 114, 117–120, 148 prisons 108–11, 125, 127, 131, 135, 139, 151; Abu Ghraib 107, 109–10, 131–2; cells for children 38, 70; Iraqi 113, 121, 124, 129, 138 punishment 108, 124, 129, 133–4; court-martial 127 Rasul v. Bush 135 responsibility 3–4, 38, 60, 91, 111, 124–5 Rice, C. 26, 29, 62–3, 68, 97–8, 103–4, 112–13, 123–4; National Security Advisor Rice 38; Secretary Rice 97, 123 Risse, T. 2, 14, 17 Roberts, A. 27, 82 Roe, P. 51, 53, 63–4, 88 Ruggie, J.G. 14, 18–19 rule-following, rule-breaking 43, 57–8, 60, 67–74, 82, 89, 99–100, 102–3, 105 rules of engagement 1, 3, 8, 10–12, 20, 26, 40, 59–60, 66, 70–1, 74–5, 78, 86, 88, 90–2, 97, 105–6, 108, 127, 133, 148, 151, 155; breakdown of 107; original 58; specific 44, 46, 61, 72 rules of engagement and play 1, 8, 10–11, 58–60, 70, 78, 86, 90–2, 106–7, 127 Rumsfeld, D. 23–5, 29, 36, 38, 69, 71, 100–1, 113, 117, 124–5, 130, 135; Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 22, 119, 127; Secretary Rumsfeld 23–5, 27, 29, 36, 110–11, 113, 116–18, 125, 129, 136; Secretary of Defense 68 Saddam Hussein see Hussein, S. Salter, M. 3, 42, 50–2, 87 Savage, C. 119, 129 Schlesinger, A. 110, 122 Schlesinger, J. 108; Schlesinger Report 110, 121–2 Schmitt, C. 53 Searle, J.R. 15, 18, 75 securitization of democracy 3, 49, 54–6, 66, 72, 98–9, 122 securitization framework 2, 10–11, 42–4, 48, 59, 61–3, 85, 87, 138, 142, 153–5; original 54, 72; twin concept 55 self-defense 23–4, 27, 30, 39, 67–9, 95, 98, 154; pre-emptive 4–5, 21, 26, 28, 40, 63, 77, 80, 95, 100, 104, 138, 148–9, 151, 154 September 11 5–6, 8–9, 13–14, 16, 22–3, 26–8, 40, 47, 93–4, 148; aftermath 49; outcome 10; postSeptember 11 7, 12, 21, 25, 80, 94, 110–11, 114, 130, 137–8, 151

196   Index sets of meanings 2, 87, 95, 98, 137; alternative 94, 151; auxiliary 23; competing 20, 133; emerging 18, 85; intersubjective 91; multiple 56, 77; new 84–5; substituted 80, 104, 130, 132 Shue, H. 23, 66–7, 81 Silberstein, S. 6, 22 Sjöstedt, R. 42, 48 Smith, S. 13, 16 social construction 10–11, 21, 49, 60, 142 Sontag, S. 107, 128–9 speaking security 3, 43, 45–6, 48–9, 52, 56–60, 63, 65, 70–3, 85–6, 89–93, 95–6, 100–1, 108–9, 130, 135–9, 141, 144, 146–7, 152, 154–6 speech acts 2, 8, 11, 18, 42, 45–6, 49–50, 53–4, 58–9, 74, 85–6, 96, 99, 128, 137, 142, 152, 156; alternating 55–6; Bush administration’s 62–4, 68; different 48, 55, 73, 95; dominant 65; legitimacy 91; multiple 3, 55–6, 93; overlapping 10, 43; securitized 3, 46–7, 55–6, 59, 87–90, 93, 108, 127, 132, 137, 139, 143–7, 154; securitizing 51, 55, 61, 65–7, 70–3, 85, 92, 94, 137, 142; security 3, 47, 56, 66, 68–9, 73, 76, 137, 144; theory 42, 44, 51, 59, 62, 74, 84, 105, 141, 143–4 Spiegel Online International 128 Strauss, M. 122, 130, 135 Stritzel, H. 42, 46, 49–52, 87 structures of meaning 19, 65, 73, 86, 123, 127, 136, 154; alternative 95, 108; competing 72, 126; different 2–3, 86, 108, 146; existing 20, 89; interfacing 75, 93, 134; intersubjective 20; multifaceted 48; multiple 55, 72, 93, 135; overarching 82; subsidiary 56 superpower 6, 40, 128, 148, 154 Taft, W. 102–3 Taguba, A. 110, 121–2 Taliban 117, 119, 131; detainees 118; forces 116 terrorists 23, 26, 29, 35, 65–6, 93, 97–8, 112, 116, 124; allies 28, 62; attacks 21–2, 25, 47, 94, 99; crimes 119; groups 30; networks 27, 100, 117; organizations 48, 117; regime 62–3; suspects 111, 151 Thucydides 5, 120 torture 8, 81, 83, 107, 110, 115–16, 120–2, 124, 126–9, 132–8, 150–1, 154; chambers 37–8, 70, 97, 123; condoned 113, 125; institutionalized 114; physical or psychological 109; rape 97, 109, 122, 126; rape rooms 37–8, 123; United States denial 112–13, 131; waterboarding 83, 115 Torture Conventions 115, 120, 122, 130–4, 138 Trachtenberg, M. 24, 67 Trombetta, M.J. 42, 49 un-American 125, 131, 151; personnel 126; soldiers 108, 124, 132 unilateral 5, 10; action 148; claims 119 United Kingdom 65; Britain 35; Foreign Secretary 118; Parliament 64 United Nations 23, 32, 36, 38, 61–3, 65, 68, 71, 109, 115–16; approval 64; authorization 35;

Charter 64–5; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Acts 115, 130, 133–4; defiance of 70, 102; General Assembly 30; General Secretary 123; inspectors 7, 149; legislation 98; Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission 33; resolutions 29, 31–2, 34–6, 64, 71, 102–3; Security Council 30–1, 33, 64, 102; Special Rapporteur on torture 127 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Acts 108, 115, 133–4 United Nations Security Council Resolution 5, 73; Resolution 678 102; Resolution 687 31, 102; Resolution 1368 23; Resolution 1441 31, 34–6, 63, 70–1, 102–3, 149 United States 4, 21–4, 28, 34–5, 37–8, 62, 67, 69–70, 93, 99, 112–13, 115, 118–19, 124, 127–8, 133–5; Congress 118; Constitution 119, 134; military invasion of Iraq 4, 73; Military Order 119; sovereign authority claim 104 USA Patriot Act 2001 67 Van Munster, R. 49, 55 Vuori, J.A. 43, 46, 48, 51, 128 Wæver, O. 42, 44–8, 51, 95 Walker, R.B.J. 13, 17 war on terror 6–7, 22–3, 26–9, 38, 46–7, 66–7, 94–5, 97, 101, 105, 110, 114, 117, 120, 132, 151, 154; global 14, 48, 56, 65, 93–4, 113 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 6–8, 11, 28–32, 34–6, 38–41, 44, 47–8, 62–3, 65–7, 69–70, 77, 95–6, 100–3, 149–51, 153 Wendt, A. 13–16, 142 White House 23–4, 65, 104, 114, 119, 132 Wight, J. 13–15 Williams, M. 42–3, 52–4, 56, 61, 85, 87, 128 Wittgenstein, L. 11; act of interpretation 74, 80, 82–4, 90, 104–5, 108, 131–4, 139, 146; family resemblances 54, 77, 92, 94–5, 97, 106; form of life 74–5, 78, 86, 105; interpretation 80–2; lens 3, 40; language game approach 17–18, 49, 54, 74–6, 78, 83; meaning in use 11, 75–6, 85–7, 94, 105, 130, 142–3, 145, 147, 152; rule-breaking 82–3; rules 60, 79–80 Wittgensteinian 89, 142; approach 2–3, 20, 90, 146, 155; constructivist approach 154; language game 108; lens 11, 74, 99, 106; perspective 87, 131; view 142 Wolfowitz, P. 25, 27, 29, 94 women 118, 128; in Abu Ghraib 109; abused 126; of Iraq 66; rights of women 38; United States Armed Forces 98–9, 110, 125 Woodward, B. 9, 91, 104 World Trade Center 21 Yoo, J. 114, 116 Zehfuss, M. 16, 19