Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada 9780773565470, 0773565477

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
Tables and Figures (page ix)
Abbreviations (page x)
Foreword (page xi)
Acknowledgments (page xiii)
Introduction (page 3)
PART ONE THE GRAND ALTERNATIVES (page 7)
1 Canada without Quebec (page 9)
2 Canada's Constitutional Options (page 14)
3 Economic Relations between Canada and Quebec (page 29)
4 The Currency and Monetary Policy (page 41)
5 Political Relations between Canada and Quebec (page 48)
6 Does Economic Integration Require Political Association? (page 60)
7 Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization (page 75)
PART TWO THE TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY (page 87)
8 Why the Transition Is Important (page 89)
9 Other Studies of the Transition to Quebec Sovereignty (page 93)
10 The Comparative Politics of Peaceful Secession (page 127)
PART THREE THE DYNAMICS OF QUEBEC SECESSION (page 137)
11 Getting to the Table (page 139)
12 The Negotiations (page 176)
13 The Rest of the Separation (page 213)
14 Reprise: Secession with Polarization (page 235)
15 The Long-term Outcomes (page 252)
PART FOUR FROM REFERENDUM TO REFERENDUM (page 263)
16 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes that Wasn't (page 265)
17 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign (page 291)
18 Had the Yes Side Won... (page 312)
19 The Fallout of the Referendum (page 324)
20 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum (page 339)
21 What Would Happen after a Yes in a Future Referendum? (page 375)
Appendix: Selected Characteristics of Canada, Quebec, and ROC (page 397)
Notes (page 403)
Bibliography (page 467)
Index (page 495)

Citation preview

The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada

BLANK PAGE

The Secession of Quebec

and the Future of Canada REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION

ROBERT A. YOUNG

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston ¢ London ® Buffalo

published with The Institute of Intergovernmental Relations Queen's University, Kingston

© Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1998 ISBN 0-7735-1530-5

Legal deposit second quarter 1998 Bibliothéque nationale du Québec

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper Publication of this book has been assisted by a grant from the J.B. Smallman and Spencer Memorial Fund, University of Western Ontario. McGill-Queen's University Press is grateful to the Canada Council for support of its publishing program.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Young, Robert Andrew The secession of Quebec and the future of Canada

Rev. and expanded ed. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-1530-5

1. Canada — Forecasting. 2. Canada — Economic

conditions-—1991- 3. Canada — Politics and government-1993- = 4. Quebec (Province) — Politics and government —-1985— —5. Quebec (Province) History - Autonomy and independence movements. 6. Economic forecasting — Canada. I. Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. II. Title. JL27.5.Y68 1998 971.064'8 C98-900494-5

For my parents, Katharine and Gordon Young and for J.R. Mallory

BLANK PAGE

Contents

Tables and Figures ix

Abbreviations x | Foreword xi Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction 3 PART ONE THE GRAND ALTERNATIVES 7

1 Canada without Quebec 9 2 Canada’s Constitutional Options 14 3 Economic Relations between Canada and Quebec 29 4 The Currency and Monetary Policy 41 5 Political Relations between Canada and Quebec 48 6 Does Economic Integration Require Political Association? 60

7 Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization 75

PART TWO THE TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY 87 8 Why the Transition Is Important 89 9 Other Studies of the Transition to Quebec Sovereignty 93 10 The Comparative Politics of Peaceful Secession 127 PART THREE THE DYNAMICS OF QUEBEC

SECESSION 137 11 Getting tothe Table 139 12 The Negotiations 176 13 The Rest of the Separation 213 14 Reprise: Secession with Polarization 235

15 The Long-term Outcomes 252 PART FOUR FROM REFERENDUM TO REFERENDUM 263 16 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t 265

17 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign 291 18 Had the Yes Side Won... 312

19 The Fallout of the Referendum 324 20 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum 339 21 What Would Happen after a Yes ina Future Referendum? 375 Appendix: Selected Characteristics of Canada,

Quebec, and ROC 397

Notes 403 Bibliography 467

Index 495

Tables

1 Distribution of Gross Provincial and Regional Output by Destination, Canada, 1989 12 2 Distribution of Provincial and Regional Manufacturing and Primary-Sector Output by Destination, Canada,

1989 12

3 Factors Conducive to Centralization and

Decentralization 78 4 Distribution of Senate Seats: Current and Excluding

Quebec 227 5 Distribution of House of Common Seats: Current and Excluding Quebec 229 Al Selected Characteristics of Canada, Quebec, and

ROC 399 A2 Selected Characteristics of ROC 400

Abbreviations

ADQ Action démocratique du Québec BCNI Business Council on National Issues

BO Bloc québécois CA1867 Constitution Act, 1867 CA1982 Constitution Act, 1982

CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service

CF Civic Forum

COR Confederation of Regions Party

EU European Union

FTA Canada — U.S. Free Trade Agreement GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP gross domestic product VC International Joint Commission IMF International Monetary Fund JCC-QS Joint Committee on Canada-Quebec Separation

MEN most favoured nation

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NORAD North American Aerospace Defence Command

NTB non-tariff barrier

PAV Public Against Violence

PQ Parti québécois

OLP Quebec Liberal Party ROC rest of Canada UDI unilateral declaration of independence

Foreword

The Institute of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen’s University has a mandate to undertake research and to stimulate debate about federalism in Canada and abroad. The events of recent years have shown that Quebec secession is an option that must be taken seriously in our research agenda. In our view a full discussion of scenarios about the future of Canada and Quebec can provide Canadians with the means of making more informed judgments about alternative options. We are pleased to co-publish Professor Robert A. Young’s study on the secession of Quebec and the future of Canada. The research for this study was undertaken partly through the auspices of the institute since 1991, and the institute's involvement was supported in part by the CRB Foundation. The publication of this work does not imply that Professor Young’s analysis or conclusions reflect the opinions of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, the CRB Foundation, or any of our sponsors. They are the responsibility of the author alone. This work is comprehensive. It provides a thorough review of the existing literature on potential Quebec independence; a fresh analysis of comparative cases of peaceful secession; and a comprehensive assessment of constitutional options for Canada without Quebec. Yet the greater part of the author’s work consists of his original contribution of the most detailed set of scenarios yet published on how the transition to sovereignty might occur and the implications of the separation for the long-term future of both Canada and Quebec.

xii Foreword

We both expect and welcome debate about this analysis and its conclusions. The institute is confident that the author’s work is balanced and scholarly, but we know that everyone will not agree with his findings. We trust that the study will provoke further examination of the assumptions of those who propose and those who oppose Quebec secession. In bringing this project to completion, the institute would like to acknowledge the valuable partnership of McGill-Queen’s University Press, and in particular of Philip Cercone and Joan McGilvray. We are grateful for the intitial support given to the institute by the CRB Foundation and its executive director, Tom Axworthy. I would like to thank the two external readers who provided editorial advice to the author, and the institute’s Executive Committee for its continued

support for this venture. For their role in moving the manuscript through the publication process with speed and efficiency, I wish to thank Patti Candido, Mary Kennedy, and Alice McLafferty at the institute and Mark Howes and Judy Burns at the publication unit of the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University. Finally and most importantly I would like to express our debt to Bob Young for this and other contributions to the institute’s work. Douglas M. Brown Executive Director Institute of Intergovernmental Relations Queen’s University November, 1994

Acknowledgments

This study has been some time in the making. It was begun when I was a visiting fellow at the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations and the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University. For extending the offer to spend this happy and interesting year, I am grateful to the Executive Committee of the institute and Tom Courchene, who was director of the school at the time. I also appreciated the friend-

ship and help of Doug Brown, now executive director of the institute. I would not have started on this work, or finished it, had it not been for encouragement by Doug Purvis. In writing this book, as ever, I have enjoyed the help of many colleagues and friends. They have engaged in discussions about its components, lent books, invited me to give papers, read sections, offered advice, and provided the support that is essential for completing such an endeavour. Some, as well, have been remarkably tolerant. I wish

to thank the following people: Don Abelson, Randy Ames, Tom Axworthy, Keith Banting, André Blais, Paul Boothe, David Cameron, Cris de Clercy, Edouard Cloutier, Andrew Cooper, Tom Courchene, Stéphane Dion, Philippe Faucher, Tom Flanagan, Alain-G. Gagnon,

Al Heinicke, Michael Keating, David Laidler, Peter Leslie, John McDougall, Rob Martin, John Meisel, Henry Milner, Peter Neary, Sid Noel, Al O’Brien, Andrew Sancton, Hugh Segal, Jan Trimble, Richard Vernon, Ronald Watts, Marty Westmacott, Ron Wintrobe, and Ron Wonnacott. I am especially grateful to those who read all or parts of the draft manuscript. For comments and criticism, I also thank par-

ticipants in sessions at the meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, the Public Choice Society, and the European Public

xiv Acknowledgments

Choice Society, as well as those who attended seminars or lectures sponsored by the University of Waterloo, McGill University, McMaster

University, the Alberta Treasury and the University of Alberta, 3-M Canada, the Centre de recherche en développement économique at l’Université de Montréal, and the Political Economy Research Group at the University of Western Ontario. I especially appreciate Peter Neary's steady help. All faults are mine, of course.

For research assistance, I am obliged to Daniel Bonin, Dwight Herperger, Cristine de Clercy, Allison Bramwell, and Andrew Goldstein. For secretarial help I thank Patti Candido and Helen Drokin;

as well, Yvonne Adams provided great support, and supervised a harried typist. I echo Doug Brown's thanks to the Queen's staff. Carlotta Lemieux did fine editing under unusually hard conditions. It was a pleasure to have her counsel and encouragement, and I am grateful for the many improvements she made in this book. I am also grateful to Philip Cercone and Joan McGilvray for their interest in this work and their efforts to expedite it. My research would not have been possible without the support of Queen’s University and the University of Western Ontario, and es-

pecially the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

ADDENDUM, 1997 | Since publication of the first edition, kind colleagues have afforded me many opportunities to discuss this work and the issues it raises. I thank those who organized sessions at universities, research institutes,

and meetings of political parties, governments, and firms. The happiest such occasion was during the Canadian Economics Association meetings in 1996, when I was privileged to give the Doug Purvis Memorial Lecture, having been awarded the prize bestowed in his name, for this book.

I am grateful for the research assistance provided by Andrew Goldstein, Richard Haigh, Laura Watton, and Mark Scott. I appreciate the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council

of Canada, and acknowledge the assistance of the J.B. Smallman Publication Fund, Faculty of Social Science, UWO.

This second edition has been encouraged by Philip Cercone and Joan McGilvray, and was much improved by the expert and sympathetic editing of Carlotta Lemieux. Val Jarus did excellent typesetting. For commenting on first drafts, I owe thanks to John McDougall, Tom Courchene, and Peter Neary. My greatest debt is to my dear wife, Louise Gadbois, who has sustained me through this and every other effort.

The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada

BLANK PAGE

Introduction

This is a revised and expanded edition of a book which, as the original introduction stated, “may be about Canada’s future, and Quebec’s.” The book was written on the assumption that a majority of Quebecers might vote for sovereignty, despite the risks associated with choosing this option. In 1994, at the time of writing, this was an assumption shared by very few people, but the huge stakes of a predictable referendum made it essential to analyse systematically what would follow a Yes vote, despite the apparently low probability that this would occur. In fact, there was a very narrow federalist victory in the October 1995 Quebec referendum, and since this has made all Canadians aware that Quebec might secede, it is now even more important to think about what a future Yes might bring. Prediction is — and was — difficult, for three main reasons. First, the

whole debate about Quebec sovereignty is charged with precisely such predictions, as partisans of both federalism and sovereignty construct and deploy alternative futures, aiming to influence the expectations and behaviour of citizens. This makes many extant analyses more suspect than is usual in the social sciences. As well, scenarios always depend on a host of assumptions about citizens’ and govern-

ments’ behaviour, and since the secession of Quebec would be a monumental and unprecedented event, there is much scope for disagreement about these assumptions, even among reasonable and dispassionate analysts. In the first edition of this book, I assumed that a clearly expressed Yes to sovereignty by Quebecers would be accepted by the rest of Canada, and that separation would then occur.

As the referendum approached, this view was hotly contested by

4 Introduction

reasoning. | some, though many others had confidence in my research and

Prediction is difficult, too, because all the central questions that must be addressed are interrelated, both conceptually and temporally. This study focuses on three main issues: the characteristics and constitutional structure of Canada after a Quebec secession, the longerterm future of the Canadian system in the absence of Quebec, and

the institutional relationships that might be established between Canada and an independent Quebec. In fact, these issues are all related. For example, a Canada that had become highly centralized would be unlikely to form close political links with Quebec; conversely,

proposals to create a close economic association with Quebec could cause Canada to fragment politically. It is feasible to lay out all the possible structural alternatives for Quebec and Canada, but these interactive effects bedevil predictions, even when one is guided by theories about how political and social forces, economic features, and political institutions are related. More seriously, such analyses are static. This is the third problem. A basic contention of this study is that the outcomes of secessions are path-dependent; that is, the long-term results depend on how events unfold. In part, this is because big decisions are taken in the course of secessions, which are searing and tumultuous events, and some decisions shift events onto paths from which no return is possible. As well, institutional structures are established during the separation process, both within and between the seceding state and the pre-existing (“predecessor”) state. These institutions have enduring consequences, but what exactly is established depends on how the separation takes place. Generally, political scientists agree that basic geographic, economic, and sociocultural factors shape political decisions, including those about institutional design. But there is no mechanistic determinism here. The underly-

ing conditions and the institutional and policy results are loosely coupled, or weakly correlated. So while the structural factors may set some bounds on the range of possible results, the outcomes actually reached are contingent on historical events. The study proceeds as follows. In part 1 are described the broad institutional outcomes that are possible after Quebec’s secession. First, there is a brief survey of what Canada would look like without Quebec, both as a whole and in its internal characteristics. Then the major alternatives are laid out for the constitution of Canada and for the political and economic institutions that could exist between Canada

and a sovereign Quebec. This is followed by an analysis of a fundamental issue in the debate about separation — the relationship between political and economic integration. Then there is a brief sur-

5 Introduction

vey of the structural forces conducive to centralization and decentralization in a new Canadian constitution, and to more or less integration between the two states of Canada and Quebec. Part 2 concerns the transition to sovereignty. Why this is important is the subject of the first chapter. The next one summarizes the existing studies (as of 1994) of the economic, legal, and political issues raised by Quebec secession. These show clearly that the process of the transition would largely determine the long-term outcomes of secession. But although politics would drive events and produce the important results, analysts disagree fundamentally about how separation would occur. So we turn to comparative experience, investigating other cases of peaceful secession. In this new edition, the treatment of other cases has been drastically compressed from that presented in the original book, but there is a description and explanation of the general pattern of politics that has characterized such cases. As well, there is an abbreviated discussion of the breakup of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, which differs in a few ways from the other cases because it was marked by political polarization between the Czechs and Slovaks; on the whole, however, the generalizations about the politics of peaceful secessions fit the Czech-Slovak case very well.

In part 3, all of this material is brought to bear on Canada and Quebec in anticipation of a referendum in 1995. The politics and strat-

egies involved in the referendum are analysed; then, assuming a sovereigntist victory, the process of the separation is described. This account is informed by studies of Canada and Quebec, with the guiding framework consisting of the generalizations that were derived from the comparative analysis. Here, the study concentrates on how the disengagement would take place, how negotiations would resolve the crucial issues, how Canada would reconstitute itself, and what institutional relationships would be established between the two states. Then another scenario is sketched, one that features a gradual polarization between Quebec and the rest of Canada, and the earlier predictions are modified appropriately. A short final chapter discusses the long-term results of the secession for both Canada and Quebec. In this second edition, all of the foregoing is unchanged, except for the compression of the comparative material. I have retained all this in 1997, two years after the referendum that this book was about, for several reasons: the passage of time has not altered the “grand alternatives” described in part 1; the general arguments about the transition to sovereignty are still relevant, as is the analysis of other studies of a Quebec secession and the comparative experience of other coun-

tries; and there is a lot of useful material in part 3 about the background of the referendum, the substantive issues to be negotiated,

6 Introduction

and the constitutional alternatives possible for a Canada without Quebec. Part 4 is new. Its six chapters were, in a sense, dictated by the 1995

referendum and its aftermath. The first is a bald history of the runup to the referendum and the campaign itself, culminating in a result very close to the Yes vote which the first edition of this book was

designed to anticipate. There follows an account of the competing arguments deployed by the two sides in the referendum campaign, with the objective of explaining why the sovereigntists gained ground and almost won. The third chapter predicts — or retrodicts — what would have happened had the Yes side won, taking into account the historical deviations from what was expected when the the first edition of this book was written. For all Canadians — and for others too —

the 1995 referendum was a momentous event, and chapter 19 presents an analysis of the impact it had. In this context, chapter 20 describes how the sovereigntists and federalists have adjusted their strategies and are manoeuvring towards the next referendum. Finally, because it is not feasible as it was in 1994 to lay out a single prediction about what would follow a Yes vote, the concluding chapter presents a set of six possible scenarios that could occur if Quebecers vote Yes in a future referendum. It is not possible now to attach a probability to the occurence of any of these, but foreseeing them clearly

may help us avoid the worst. In part 3 of this book, the tone of the study changed, and the separation of Quebec from Canada was described in definite terms and tenses. This was done because the predictions laid out there were the best that I could make about what would take place after a Yes vote in 1995. As the original introduction stated, “On the assumption that Quebec will separate — a possibility that I do not welcome now, having completed this study, but one that justifies this whole work — the transition, in my view, will take place as described.” But of course, as the new material in this edition shows, politics is always surprising.

Finally, the use of appellations should be clarified. If Quebec secedes and what is left of Canada continues as a sovereign country, that entity will surely be called Canada. At times in this book, “Canada”

means precisely that. However, since Canada currently includes Quebec, clarity demands that another term be available to describe Canada outside Quebec. Here this entity is called “ROC” (rest of Canada), an acronym that is as irritating as it is common, because the alternatives —- Canada without Quebec, English Canada — are hardly

less irritating and are more cumbersome. Also, as the reader will see, the results of my initial study buttressed, more or less, the connotations of coherence and stability that “ROC” carries with it. After the 1995 referendum, however, these connotations are far less secure.

The Grand Alternatives

BLANK PAGE

CHAPTER ONE

Canada without Quebec

At the outset, it is appropriate to grasp what Canada would be like without Quebec. Most Canadians have contemplated this possibility, though they would do so much more intensely if a Quebec referendum on sovereignty were to produce a Yes vote; their views of the rest of Canada (ROC), including their deepest metaphoric conceptions of it, would then be important in determining what Canada would become. Here, however, the analysis begins with ROC’s structural features. To make an initial assessment of whether Canada would

be viable after a Quebec secession, it is necessary to survey briefly the country’s demographic, economic, social, and political make-up. As well, some basic information about these features will later help in assessing how well various constitutional options would correspond with underlying cleavages or uniformities in the polity, and also in determining what characteristics would affect the ROC-Quebec

relationship. Table Al presents some selected characteristics of Canada, Quebec, and ROC (see appendix). This is a summary view of what Canada would look like after a Quebec secession. Ignoring any movement of people resulting from secession as well as any new arrangements about citizenship, Canada would lose 6.9 million citizens, leaving ROC with 74.7 per cent of the current population. The loss of territory would be far less substantial, since ROC would retain 84.5 per cent of the area over which Canada now possesses sovereignty. Of course, the table does not reveal one outstanding feature of ROC — the complete physical separation of the Atlantic provinces from the

10 The Grand Alternatives

rest of the territory.’ The Atlantic exclave would amount to 6.5 per cent of ROC’s territory (or 12.0 per cent of the land mass if one excludes the Yukon and Northwest Territories) and 11.3 per cent of the population. So one-tenth of ROC would be in noncontiguous territory, a feature perhaps more important psychologically than in other

respects. |

As with territory, the losses in most other dimensions would be less than the population loss. Gross domestic product (GDP), manufacturing output, and exports would all be higher on a per capita basis than they are in today’s Canada. At present, the major federal revenue flows are higher per capita in ROC than in Canada as a whole.

Only about one-tenth of chartered bank assets are not currently located in ROC, a consequence of the strength of Quebec’s credit union movement. And although public investment is more heavily concentrated in Quebec, ROC attracts 80 per cent of private investment. ROC also receives a disproportionate share of new immigrants. As a country, it would be massively anglophone: people with French as their mother

tongue would be outnumbered three to one by those with a “non-official” mother tongue, while the home language of 88 per cent of the population would be English. Finally, based on the last three

federal election results, there would be no great changes in the distribution of political party support; obviously, though, the prospects of the New Democratic Party and the Reform Party would be relatively better in ROC than in Canada as it now exists. Of at least equal significance is the internal composition of ROC, some dimensions of which are laid out in table A2 (see appendix). The central feature here is the relative weight of Ontario, which would

account for 49 per cent of the population and well over one-half of manufacturing, exports, federal revenues, and new immigrants. Across

the country, there are major differences in per capita GDP, with Alberta’s being almost twice that of Prince Edward Island. Economically, the provinces fall into two tiers, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia being the “have” provinces. This distinction would be clearer

in a future ROC than it is at present, since Quebec acts as a swing province (moderately “have not” but industrial). On the other hand, almost 78 per cent of ROC’s population would be concentrated in the wealthier provinces. Hence, the cost of federal transfer programs (if they were continued) would decrease.’ The major economic cleavage in today’s ROC is between Ontario’s concentration of manufacturing (about 70 per cent of the ROC total) and the concentration of primary production and exports in the West (76 per cent of primary-sector exports). But the West is hardly homogeneous. Alberta and British Columbia attract more than their population share of investment, while the reverse is true of Manitoba and

11 Canada without Quebec

Saskatchewan. British Columbia’s percentage of manufacturing approximates its population share and outweighs its primary exports, while Alberta and Saskatchewan are much more oriented towards exports of grains and hydrocarbons (though manufacturing in the West is more resource based than it is in Ontario). It is also noteworthy that the western provinces’ relative weight in the ROC economy is greater than in Canada’s. They account for 38.7 per cent of GDP in ROC, but only 29.7 per cent in Canada as a whole. In most other dimensions, provincial characteristics are roughly in line with population, though one potentially important exception is language. From Ontario westward, as a result of the location choices of immigrants and the large number of First Nations people, the proportion of those with “non-official” mother tongues is very much higher than in Atlantic Canada. Francophones are heavily concentrated in New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba: 81.4 per cent of the ROC inhabitants whose mother tongue is French live in these three provinces. Of those in ROC who speak only French in the home, 84.8 per cent are in Ontario and New Brunswick. In these two provinces there are about 718,000 people whose mother tongue is French (which compares with the 623,000 in Quebec whose mother tongue is English). Second, there are substantial interprovincial differences in political preferences. Third parties fare poorly in the Atlantic provinces, both federally and provincially. In recent federal elections, Alberta has been exceptional, first in its massive support for the Progressive Conservatives and then in the very heavy swing to the Reform Party. On the other hand, there are surprising political similarities across the provinces of ROC. Excluding Alberta and the northern territories, the PC share of the vote in 1984 ranged from 42 to 58 per cent, and it declined across the country in 1988 to a narrow range of 35 to 42 per cent. With the exception of Atlantic Canada, it ranged only between 11 and 18 per cent in 1993. Even the Reform vote in British Columbia was only 16 per cent higher than in Ontario. These are not large variations on general trends. In provincial elections, the same three major parties — the PC, Liberals, and NDP — have regularly cap-

tured almost 100 per cent of the vote (with the current exceptions of COR in New Brunswick and Social Credit in British Columbia), and nowhere is any one of them irrelevant. All the provincial systems are competitive, and the players are basically the same. It is always possible to focus on the differences between, say, two-party dominance in Atlantic Canada, the NDP’s strength in Saskatchewan and British Columbia, and Alberta’s history of one-party rule; but the similarities in ROC are at least as striking, especially when compared with other federations where long-standing regional parties are common,

12 The Grand Alternatives Table 1

Distribution of Gross Provincial and Regional Output by Destination, Canada, 1989 Origin of Output

Destination Atlantic Quebec Ontario West/North Canada

Foreign 15.3% 12.9% 16.4% 15.5%

Atlantic 75.071.9 2.0 5.6 1.8 1.7 0.3 Quebec 4.0 Ontario 3.71.99.7 5.0 West/North 3.570.3 6.0 77.5

Value ($ billions) 57.6 228.8 459.8 298.4 1044.6 Source: Statistics Canada Daily, cat. 11-001E, 24 August 1993.

Table 2

Distribution of Provincial and Regional Manufacturing and Primary-Sector Output by Destination, Canada, 1989 Origin of Output

Destination Atlantic Quebec Ontario West/North Canada

Foreign 37.5% 26.5% 33.6% 33.7%

Atlantic 46.646.4 3.5 8.3 2.4 2.6 0.4 Quebec 7.3 Ontario 6.12.5 17.7 8.8 West/North 5.947.6 8.0 54.4

Value ($ billions) 18.9 88.6 186.3 107.8 401.6 Source: Statistics Canada Daily, cat. 11-001E, 24 August 1993.

and also compared with Canada’s current political system, to which Quebec contributes a considerable degree of heterogeneity. It is also useful to consider briefly the economic linkages between the existing regions of Canada. Gross figures are laid out in tables 1 and 2. The former shows, for instance, that in 1989 some 15.3 per cent of total output in the Atlantic region was exported to foreign countries, while 75.0 per cent was consumed in the region. Focusing first on ROC, the overall image is one of loose interconnection. Ontario

sends only 7.8 per cent of total output to the Atlantic provinces and to the West and North, while the West/North region sends only 5.3 per cent to the rest of ROC. In every case, exports abroad outweigh sales to the rest of ROC. But the regional figures for Atlantic Canada and the West count shipments to other provinces as intraregional consumption, and a large proportion of gross regional product con-

13. Canada without Quebec

sists of services that are not exportable. Table 2 concentrates on the primary and secondary sectors, where interregional flows are much more significant. Once more, though, the total value of production exported is greater than the amount traded between regions. The tables also provide information about ROC-Quebec links. For each of the three regions of ROC, inter-ROC trade is greater than regional trade with Quebec. But the same pattern is not true of Quebec, which exports to ROC 15.2 per cent of its total output and 27.1

per cent of primary- and secondary-sector output, quantities that exceed its foreign exports. Some volumes of ROC-Quebec trade are very important, however. In 1989, Ontario made sales of $25.7 billion to Quebec, while the reverse flow was $22.2 billion, for a total of $47.9 billion. In the existing configuration of Canada, this is the most important regional trading nexus. Still, the total trade between Ontario and the West/North region, at $42.5 billion, is a very close second.° From this very brief survey, a few conclusions can be drawn. First, on paper it appears that Canada would be a viable economic entity without Quebec. As a nation, it would be considerably more homogeneous than it is now, culturally, linguistically, and politically. Although interregional economic linkages are outweighed in today’s ROC by each region’s foreign trade, the volume of business transacted across the country is very large and is considerably greater than it is with Quebec. Finally, Ontario would be economically dominant in the future ROC. On the other hand, the relative importance of the western provinces and of “outer Canada” generally would increase substantially compared with the situation today, in which Ontario and Quebec together comprise the central-Canadian bloc. All these

features, though, are only the skeleton on which a new Canadian constitution would be fitted in the event of a Quebec separation. They leave open many alternatives.

CHAPTER TWO

Canada’s Constitutional Options

If Quebec secedes, ROC could reconstitute itself in a variety of ways. Here, the major alternatives are described. These range from a much

more centralized structure right through to total fragmentation of the country. Even though all these possibilities have been the subject of some discussion, it is important to survey them briefly. While this

is a straightforward exercise, even a casual acquaintance with the existing literature shows that there is no consensus among analysts about what configuration is likely or what would be desirable.' The first constitutional alternative is the status quo. Canada — as it would continue to be called after Quebec’s secession — could retain a constitution very similar to its current one. This option will be analysed in much more detail later, because it is the most probable outcome; suffice it to say here that Quebec could be excised from the existing constitution rather neatly. The major objections to this alternative are procedural and substantive. Given that there is considerable discontent with the existing constitution (as shown by the demands made by a wide range of interests during the negotiation of the Charlottetown Accord), under many scenarios of Quebec secession there would be

strong pressure to make a variety of other amendments when the constitution was opened for review. Moreover, many observers believe that notions of popular sovereignty have so infused Canadian politics that no constitutional amendment would be possible without broad participation in the process and popular ratification of the result; hence, changes to the status quo would be essential. Depending on how the transition to Quebec sovereignty occurred, however, both these procedural considerations could be met or obviated.

15 Canada’s Constitutional Options

The major substantive objection to fitting ROC within the existing

constitution is that Ontario would dominate the truncated federation. This is a special problem for the West. As Archer put it long ago, “The bargaining over national policies of the new Canada would be

hard and sharp, [and] unless the West were sure of some means of countering Ontario’s economic, financial, and political power, it would

consider going its own way.”* This problem rests on the sense that Ontario and the western provinces have economic interests that conflict to some extent, and that westerners’ sense of regional solidarity has heightened even as their suspicions about central-Canadian domi-

nance have been reinforced by such measures as the National Energy Program and the awarding of the CF-18 maintenance contract to Quebec firms. These are genuine issues. But the absence of Quebec would alter the political dynamics that exist under the present constitution. In its decentralist pressures, Quebec has been an ally of Alberta and British Columbia, and has contributed to increasing provincial autonomy, in the sense of freedom from the policy constraints

and intrusions of Ottawa. But when western representatives have sought positive federal policies to advance their region’s interests — when the West Wants In —- Quebec, as a large element of central Canada,

has helped stymie them. It is also worth noting again that the West is not homogeneous. In particular, the governments of Manitoba and

Saskatchewan have traditionally supported a central government powerful enough to redistribute income to their citizens. As well, there are considerable differences in attitudes among citizens within and between the western provinces, as well as a substantial general affection for “Canada” as such. So the constitutional status quo might prevail, in the absence of Quebec, insofar as it can be maintained without that province. On the spectrum of possible constitutional alternatives, one extreme position is that ROC become a unitary state. Free of Quebec, English Canada would reconstitute itself in non-federal form. Advocates of this solution favour it as promoting a strong internal common market, eliminating administrative duplication, and providing economies of scale in service delivery.’ Moreover, the problem of Ontario’s dominance would be resolved, or, more precisely, dissolved. On the other

hand, there would still have to be an extensive, decentralized bureaucracy to deliver services. And many analysts argue that for most government functions, economies of scale are reached at the regional or provincial level, except in the smallest provinces.* The unitary solution also ignores the real diversity of preferences and sense of provincial identification that exists in ROC, even if this reality is to some extent the residue of past provincial policy. As well, in eliminating the negative effects of intergovernmental competition, both among

16 The Grand Alternatives

provinces and between provinces and Ottawa, the unitary solution - would also terminate the benefits of this competition, which include policy innovation, efficiency, responsiveness, and the opportunity for citizens and firms to participate in various political arenas.° Of course, a unitary state could be combined with a system of administrative regions, to which various powers could be delegated. But this alternative weakens the argument that unitarism would promote economic efficiency: small administrative units with any power at all could balkanize the economic union and fragment social policy rather effectively. In either form, this alternative also encounters a serious practical problem. Under the existing constitution, amendments require the approval of provincial governments. It is conceivable that Quebec’s separation could produce large shifts of public opinion in all provinces in favour of radical centralization or could result in alternative constitutional mechanisms, such as a constituent assembly, which could force through amendments to create a new,

unitary constitution; it is also possible that the constitutional order

could break down entirely, with only a central government re-emerging. Short of such events, however, eliminating federalism would depend on “the willingness of the provinces to acquiesce in their own demise,” and this is improbable.° The next alternative is that ROC would become more centralized. The federal structure would remain, but the central government would acquire greater powers. Often underlying this suggestion is the view that Quebec’s presence in the federation has impeded an outcome that is the natural consequence of ROC’s cultural, social, and economic coherence. As Kwavnick has argued, “Quebec nationalism is legitimate. Canadian nationalism is illegitimate. That, in a nutshell, is the price of satisfying Québécois nationalism within Confederation.”” Without Quebec, the central government would more accurately reflect, and more vigorously promote, English-Canadian unity.®

Which powers should be transferred? In some variants, Ottawa would acquire more control over social and cultural policy, the areas most subject in the past to Quebec’s decentralizing influence. Health, job training, higher education, and even social assistance might be transferred to the central government. Other analysts maintain that

Ottawa should be equipped with more substantial powers of economic management. Apart from the transfer of specific heads of power found in section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the central government might acquire new powers to prohibit provincial measures that

create barriers within the economic union, and also to act creatively to strengthen the economy and to make it more efficient. Finally, Ottawa might acquire more explicit powers to make international agreements.

17 Canada's Constitutional Options

After a Quebec secession, more centralization might well be the outcome in Canada. But these proposed constitutional changes raise several problems. First is the fact that transfers of jurisdiction would increase uncertainty. Shifting heads of powers and inscribing new powers in the constitution would entail substantial administrative rearrangements, and how the new powers would evolve when exercised in practice would be unpredictable. In the midst of a secession crisis, Canadians might not be willing to risk such changes. Second is the likely opposition of provincial governments: greater federal powers of economic management have been resisted, particularly in the West, because they could easily justify “integrative” measures such as the National Energy Program. Third, transfers to the centre make more acute the problem of representation at the centre: further changes would be necessary in order to reduce Ontario’s dominance in Ottawa. One possibility here would be to increase the number of units in the federation by creating the provinces of Labrador, Acadie, Metro Toronto, Niagara, Southwestern Ontario, and so on, and then limiting their sovereignty to a few matters such as education. This has theoretical attractions for those who see large units as impeding flexibility in federal systems, but the practical difficulties of drawing boundaries, negotiating the new division of powers, and securing provincial assent would be substantial. Submitting to division would also be risky for Ontarians, because it would not be evident that the new federation would be viable, whereas the province could be a viable country in its present form. A final problem with the centralization alternative is that it suggests stronger government at a time when Canadian public opinion has shifted to favour less state intervention than there was, say, in the 1960s, and when governments generally are perceived as less legitimate than they were. As shown by the support for the Reform Party and for expenditure restraint, this sentiment is particularly strong in the West. On the other hand, the momentous issues raised by Quebec

secession, and the immense uncertainty that would very likely prevail if Quebecers proceeded along this course, might produce support in ROC for a stronger government in Ottawa. Whether such support would culminate in a formal constitutional change to centralize power, given the difficulties with this option, is quite another matter. Moving past the constitutional status quo, the next alternative is that ROC would become more decentralized. This could occur, first, by involving the provincial governments more fully in decisions taken at the centre, so that what Ottawa does would better reflect regional preferences. One mechanism for increasing intrastate federalism along

these lines would involve a new body, whose members would be

18 The Grand Alternatives

appointed by the provincial governments (as described in the Quebec Liberal Party’s 1980 proposal for a Federal Council, or in Ottawa’s

1991 proposal to create a Council of the Federation to oversee the exercise of some central-government powers). But adding a third cham-

ber would be unwieldy, and as reaction to the 1991 federal proposal showed, it is an unpopular idea. Another possible device is Senate reform. Insofar as the public does not favour abolishing the Senate altogether, it aligns with the western demand for a triple-E Senate (elected, equal, and effective). Such a Senate would greatly increase the relative power of the Atlantic provinces as well as the West. More deeply, it raises the question of how senators would balance the representation of regional, provincial-government, and partisan policy preferences. In any case, while Senate reform would diminish Ontario’s representation in one chamber, it would not solve the problem of the

province’s predominance in the House of Commons.

The most likely form in which decentralization would occur is through the transfer of powers to the provincial order of government. This option has been extensively canvassed in recent years.’ The prov-

inces might gain exclusive or primary jurisdiction in job training, unemployment insurance, health, immigration, culture, tourism, for-

estry and mining, recreation, higher education, housing, the environment, energy, and municipal affairs. Tax bases could be transferred

- too, and the central government’s regulatory and spending powers in other policy areas could be constrained. Other transfers and checks

on central power might further increase the relative capacity of the provincial order of government. This decentralist option has the advantage that fewer decisions would be taken in Ottawa, so the issue of representation at the centre would be less salient. Arguably, decentralization would result in a closer matching of government services and policies with local preferences, and in greater accountability as well.’ The immediate disadvantages concern the costs of concentrating power in provincial governments. In some of the functions now delivered or coordinated by Ottawa, economies of scale could not be attained at the provincial level, and duplication in administration could impose extra costs on citizens. A more substantial danger is that provincial policies would tend over time to fragment the Canadian economy. Interprovincial competition can be creative and efficiency enhancing, but it can also reduce overall welfare when measures impede the free flow of goods, services, capital, and labour. There is also the possibility of competitive deregulation in areas such as the environment, and avoiding such

destructive competition might require a central authority that was capable of acting as an umpire or monitor. Conceivably, though, new mechanisms of interprovincial consultation could serve the same pur-

19 Canada's Constitutional Options

pose, as they did in the recent agreement to reduce interprovincial trade barriers. It is not only in the economic realm that such disadvantages emerge. Increasingly it is becoming clear that social policy is fundamental to economic success as well as to social justice. For example, without a sound set of programs in education, job training, social assistance, and unemployment insurance, not only will labour markets operate inefficiently but the overall tax burden will be excessive. There is a case to be made that such programs should be integrated at the provincial level. But without effective coordination, there is a lot of potential for inefficiency. First, population mobility might be reduced. Second, individual provincial governments would have little incentive to provide programs that had large externalities, such as higher education and support for research and development. Finally, if redistribution within the federation decreased along with the central government’s powers, there would be less money for social spending precisely where it was most needed and could be most productive — in the “have not” provinces. This leads to a final consideration about the decentralization alternative. If, in the medium term, it resulted in less interprovincial mo-

bility and redistribution through Ottawa, then it might represent a slippery slope towards fragmentation. Many scholars believe that there is a strong relationship between economic and political integration: the more integrated regional economies are, the more probable and necessary it is that common political mechanisms with a democratic base actually manage the economic space; conversely, economic disintegration entails a decreasing sense of community, less willingness to redistribute, and political fragmentation. As Harris and Purvis argue, “the alternative vision of Canada offered by many with

a substantially decentralized political system, and most important powers residing at the provincial level will result in an increasingly economically fragmented and balkanized economic situation, which will inevitably undermine most national institutions including the concept of national citizenship, and ultimately the political union we now think of as Canada.”" This is a proposition that is widely held. But the underlying theory — that levels of economic and political integration are highly correlated — requires further analysis. It is relevant in connection with both the long-term structure of Canada and Quebec-Canada relations, and is taken up below. Before proceeding further along the range of decentralist options, it is appropriate to consider a “rebalanced” ROC, in which a new division of powers would strengthen the central government in some respects and the provinces in others. In essence, Quebec’s secession would provide ROC with an opportunity to modernize the constitu-

20 The Grand Alternatives

tion. The nature of rebalancing, however, is open to question. Often, a large distinction is made between social and economic policy. Some would argue that “the main basis of unity in a Canada without Quebec is cultural and social, and that the real basis of diversity is eco-

nomic.” In this view, the federation should be rebalanced so that the central government maintains the Canada-wide social programs that bind all citizens into a “sharing community,” while the provincial governments acquire greater powers of economic management. The opposite rebalancing option is that Ottawa increase its economic powers while the provinces attain greater control over social programs. The rationale here is that the economic union requires central management, whereas social programs should be delivered by the

governments that most closely represent regional preferences in matters such as health, education, and social assistance. Some problems with both possibilities have already been traced in the above discussion of centralization and decentralization, but there are two practical difficulties that should be stressed. First, if social

powers were centralized and programs made more uniform, the wealthier provinces would have to be prepared to redistribute the fruits of their economic success, and they might not be willing to do so if the economic union tended to fragment over time. Second, if economic powers were centralized, the provincial governments would risk becoming mere administrative organs of Ottawa, unless tax bases also were transferred and there was provision for greater provincial participation in central-government policy making. In either case, rebalancing might reduce the extent to which economic and social policy could be coordinated. A variant on rebalancing is to allow for more constitutional flexibility in ROC. Several devices have been suggested. Provinces could be allowed to opt in to central-government programs, as provided for in section 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which allows the Parliament of Canada to legislate in the areas of property and civil rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick; such laws take effect in a province only when enacted by the provincial legislature. Another device would be to allow provinces to opt out of central-government laws or spending programs, with compensation. Provision could also be made for the interdelegation of powers between the provincial and central governments. And the range of concurrent powers could be broadened, so that bilateral federal-provincial agreements, or federal-regional agreements, could effectively determine policy in more areas. All such devices would have two advantages. They would allow for asymmetry in Canada, and they would provide for a measure of flexibility that could be desirable given the uncertainties attendant on Quebec’s secession. If it is unpredictable

21 Canada's Constitutional Options

how intergovernmental relations would evolve over the long term, such constitutional arrangements could be useful. The disadvantage of such devices, of course, is that they could lead to a “checkerboard federalism,” in which federal powers and programs would be quite different in the various provinces. Returning to the decentralist options, another alternative is that ROC would be reconstituted as a collection of regions rather than provinces. In one version, the regions would have powers roughly like those of the provinces; in another, their jurisdictional scope would

be considerably enlarged. A regional reconstitution has several advantages. The units would be more similar in size and resources, some

economies of scale in service provision could be realized, and the advantages of intergovernmental competition could be retained to some extent. But the difficulties are obvious. There would still be substantial variations in power: the population of Atlantic Canada is only 24 per cent of Ontario’s. More important, the regions are not homogeneous in interests or preferences. There is little community of interest between Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, for instance, and agricultural issues on the prairies are largely irrelevant to British Columbians. As two keen analysts of western Canada have concluded, “there is significant economic diversity among the four provinces. These intraregional differences are probably sufficiently

large that many of the problems that currently confound federal-provincial relations would remain and perhaps be even more serious” within a western region.’ Moreover, there is little evidence of major regional differences in Canadians’ sense of national identification or in their preference for particular constitutional outcomes.” As well, it would be difficult to determine the regional boundaries, especially in the West. Finally, regional governments would submerge some minorities, such as the Acadians and the residents of the Yukon and Northwest Territories. The decentralist variant of a regional reconfiguration involves very substantial transfers of power to the regions. All of the above practical problems remain, and in addition this solution possesses the gen-

eral advantages and disadvantages of a decentralization to the provincial governments. An issue that becomes more acute, though, is whether redistribution, which presumably would become greater within regions, would still occur across regional boundaries.” A more extreme solution would be confederation. Here, the provinces (or regions or some combination of the two) would attain sovereignty; then powers would be delegated to central authorities, whose functions would be very circumscribed. They might include defence, justice, some aspects of foreign relations, monetary policy, and some regulatory powers over the economy. Such a configuration would

22 The Grand Alternatives

probably follow failed attempts to reconstitute ROC in some more centralized form, and the secession of one or more units from the federation. In a confederal arrangement, “Canada” would cease to exist as a subject of international law. Much has been written about the erosion of state sovereignty through international agreements and the complex of forces commonly called globalization, and in practice these assessments have some validity. But sovereignty remains the fundamental organizing principle of the international community of states, and it must have a single legal locus. In a confederal reconstitution, that locus would be the provincial or regional governments. The advantages of confederation are similar to those often propounded by sovereigntists in Quebec. The central authority would be restricted to a very few essential functions. There would be an end to duplication and waste in the provision of government services. Policy making in the regions could be integrated across a much

wider range of social and economic programs. Rather than being subject to national policies that are inevitably the result of compromise and are often slow to be adapted to new conditions, their citizens and firms would enjoy policies tailored to their distinct interests and preferences, and they might be more successful competitors in the continental and global economies. As small sovereign states, these new units’ economic vulnerability would be limited by international agreements that secured access to foreign markets. But there are disadvantages to confederal outcomes. If the new states were admitted to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the North Ameri-

can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), their policy autonomy would be constrained by rules that currently do not apply to substate governments. Their international negotiating power would be less, even collectively, than Canada’s is today. Some units would be very weak economically, and in the absence of substantial redistribution, people’s

living standards would plummet. Moreover, since regions and provinces tend to be economically specialized, the economic performance of these new states would be more volatile and more vulnerable to economic shocks; and if regional policies fragmented the economic union, there would be welfare losses for all.’ These disadvantages could be circumvented, but the principal way of doing so would be by delegating power to the confederal authorities. This raises a central problem of confederations. They require a decision rule for making common policy, and the more policy is to be decided collectively, the more crucial are the rules through which it is made. There are three broad alternatives that would be available to a confederal Canada. The first is the population principle. Either through a directly elected legislative body or through proportional

23 Canada's Constitutional Options

voting, the constituent states would have power proportional to their populations. This raises the familiar problem of dominance by the larger provinces, especially Ontario, and it would be more acute in the confederal arrangement since there would probably not be a second legislative chamber based on equality of the states. On the other hand, since the common functions would be more limited than in a true federation, the problem would be diminished, and there could

be some mechanisms put in place to protect minorities, such as super-majority voting requirements. The opposite decision rule is that each constituent unit has equal weight. This is akin to many formal procedures in the international realm, such as voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The problem is that wealthy and populous states can be outvoted by coalitions of the smaller units. Somewhere between these alternatives lies the third possibility — sys-

tems of weighted voting, such as that employed in the Council of Ministers of the European Community. The problem here, of course, is deciding how to weight the various members’ votes. Whatever the decision rule, confederations are notoriously unstable. When constituent states are sovereign, collective decisions are not readily enforceable, and members often have recourse to retaliation or to negotiations that are likely to be seen as unfair because of the threat of retaliation. Neither of these is conducive to stability. Second, if the central authorities are delegated powers sufficient to overcome the disadvantages of independent policy making by the states, then, whatever the decision rule employed, it is very probable that a majority in some state will perceive itself to be permanently disadvantaged by the confederal arrangement and will withdraw its delegation of power. In short, the problem of confederations is secession. Finally, confederal arrangements must include transfers of funds or taxation powers. Assuming that the sovereign states emerging from ROC would be unwilling to alienate tax bases, the central authority

would be dependent on allocations. If Canada’s national debt had not been divided among the constituent units (a course that would cause immense difficulties for the fiscally weaker states) and if debt management therefore remained a function of the central authority, confidence in the confederation would be low: “A confederation that inherited the debits of Canada while depending for its assets on grants

from its members would have a very shaky financial and political basis.”"”

At the extreme of the decentralist possibilities for Canada is its complete fragmentation into provinces or regions. There would be

no common institutions or “national” policies short of the dispute-settlement mechanisms and provisions for policy harmonization that exist under GATT and NAFTA (assuming that the units

24 The Grand Alternatives

were admitted to these agreements), though provinces or groups of provinces could engage in treaties of various kinds. Overall, this alternative would entail very substantial welfare losses, until — and unless — the units could make bilateral and multilateral arrangements

between themselves or with other countries about defence, labour mobility, and the currency, to name only the most significant matters. On the other hand, some provinces or regions could make net gains as independent states; this might be true of Ontario and also of an Alberta—British Columbia union.” Calculations of such “gains,” however, tend to ignore the costs of the transition to independence. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the weaker provinces undoubtedly would suffer under any conceivable scenario of the fragmentation of ROC.

That is why this alternative is often coupled with the suggestion that a fragmented ROC would sooner or later join the United States. Some provinces or regions might be forced to opt for this course almost immediately; others might maintain their independence longer. Obviously, maintaining any degree of constitutional unity in ROC would become much more problematic if individual provinces or regions joined the United States. The only exception might be the defection of the Atlantic region, for a Canada stretching from the Ottawa River to Vancouver Island might be sustainable. Yet it seems likely that the psychological blow to people in the remaining provinces would be substantial; more seriously, if a large component of “outer Canada” left ROC, the problem of Ontario dominance in the remainder would be accentuated. This last scenario illustrates a difficulty about union with the United States, for the Atlantic region is arguably the least desirable potential addition to that country. Would the United States agree to absorb it or any other part of ROC? From official statements and from the opinions of experienced American observers of Canada, it is evident that the United States’ preferred option is that Canada remain intact. Were Quebec to secede, it is most likely that the U.S. government would be a force for stability and the quick resolution of uncertainty. American firms already have access to Canadian markets and investment opportunities under the FTA and NAFTA, so there is little to be gained by exercising direct control of this country. And ROC’s ab-

sorption would entail some evident disadvantages for the United States: the event would not be uncontested, for a significant proportion of Canadians harbour anti-American sentiments, and they would make unwilling citizens; the ROC debt would presumably have to be absorbed along with the territory; and, most significantly perhaps, the admission of another 21 million citizens in several new states could change the balance of political power in the republic (though

25 Canada's Constitutional Options

some Democrats might favour this tectonic change). On the other hand, it might be possible to extend to the provinces associate status such as Puerto Rico now has. In geopolitical terms, the United States would gain through a land link to Alaska, control of the Arctic, and ownership of unalienated crown land. So if ROC showed tendencies towards fragmentation, the uncertainties that would prevail might make Americans more willing to absorb the remnants of the country. (This would be especially disadvantageous for the citizens of some

provinces; for while none would have much influence within the American system, all, under the U.S. constitution, would lose control of their energy revenues.)’” Annexation by the United States would

of course end the separate existence of Canada, and many of its citizens would be dismayed to become Americans. But as Bill Lederman

has noted, “there are worse fates possible in the modern world.”” One other long-term constitutional option for Canada remains to be considered — a union, federal or confederal, between Ontario and Quebec. This possibility would emerge if Quebec seceded and ROC

was unable to reconstitute itself as a functioning state.** An Ontario-Quebec federation would have a population of 17 million

people and a gross domestic product almost two-thirds that of present-day Canada. It would be a powerful international actor. The two states are contiguous and share the Great Lakes-St Lawrence system. They are strongly integrated by flows of commerce and investment, and since the economies are relatively similar, it could be easier to agree on common trade and economic policies than it is in Canada now or would be between Canada and Quebec after secession. And since the positions of linguistic minorities in the two units are relatively symmetrical, a federation-wide language policy and system of minority rights might be agreed. Despite this community of interest, however, an Ontario-Quebec union would face, even more acutely, many of the problems discussed about ROC. First, economically, Ontario has a much larger stake in ROC than in Quebec, not only in terms of trade but also with respect to the ownership of firms.** More important, if a new constitution allocated substantial powers to a central government, this bipartite system would produce either dominance or immobilisme. Where interests were seen to conflict, Ontario would always predominate under the principle of representation by population; on the other hand, if equality was the decision rule, either in a common legislature or a second chamber, Ontario’s population could be frustrated by a minority within the new country.” As well, the extent of redistribution within the union would probably not be great. As the wealthier component, Ontario would face a continuing stream of transfers out of the province; and assuming that the new union was formed as a con-

26 The Grand Alternatives

sequence of Quebec’s original secession, Ontario citizens would not be likely to support much redistribution to Quebecers. Hence, some important advantages of integration, such as mutual insurance against economic shocks and the capture of social-policy externalities, would not accrue within this union. Indeed, the benefits of union for Ontario would be at least as great in most conceivable versions of a reconstituted ROC. To this point, our discussion of ROC’s constitution has focused exclusively on the division of powers and the degree of centralization that would obtain in the country. But these are not the only important issues that would arise in reconfiguring a Canada without Que-

bec, for the current constitution has provisions about many other matters. In all probability, many aspects of a ROC constitution would remain unchanged. For example, it is hard to imagine that the parliamentary system would be jettisoned by Canada if Quebec separated. But Canada would face three contentious issues: language rights (including minority-language education rights), Aboriginal rights, and

equalization and regional development. Of course, the occasion of creating anew constitution for ROC might elicit demands from many

quarters for all sorts of changes to other parts of the constitution, notably the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but the above three are likely to be the most pressing issues.“ The decisions about equalization would depend on how centralized ROC was. If a federal authority retained independent taxing power and the capacity to manage a national economy, then provisions committing Parliament and the provincial legislatures to promote equal opportunities, to reduce regional disparities, and to provide

services of reasonable quality to all Canadians would probably be maintained. But ROC would not be likely to remain a “sharing community” to the extent that Canada is now if most powers over economic and social policy were devolved to the provinces or regions. In today’s Canada, francophones make up about 25 per cent of the population; in ROC they would amount to less than 5 per cent, and

outside Quebec there is a significant trend towards their assimilation into the anglophone community. After a Quebec secession, it is doubtful that the full range of francophone language rights would survive in ROC as a whole, though these rights might remain unimpaired at the provincial level in New Brunswick and perhaps in Ontario. But like so much else about ROC’s reconstitution, the precise outcome would depend on how the process of Quebec secession took place, and also on the arrangements that would be negotiated with Quebec. As for Aboriginal rights, Quebec’s secession would provide another opportunity to inscribe in Canada’s constitution the inherent

27 Canada's Constitutional Options

right to self-government that First Nations leaders have sought for over a decade. There is considerable sympathy in English Canada for embedding this right, though sentiment is not unmixed and the land claims associated with self-government vary considerably across the country in scope and status. In a highly decentralized ROC, it is not obvious that rights for Aboriginal peoples would be clarified and strengthened even if they did remain uniform across the country. In

a confederal or fragmented ROC, both Aboriginal and other rights could differ significantly in the various component units; and if elements of Canada were absorbed into the United States, the American regime of limited tribal self-government presumably would apply here. In summary, if Quebec secedes, Canadians will face a long menu of constitutional options. Each has, and will have, its advocates. Moreover, the criteria of evaluation can differ. Here, the analysis has re-

lied on some standard foundations: whether governments could deliver services efficiently while being politically accountable; whether

they would be fiscally sustainable; whether decision making would be effective or stalemated; and whether citizens’ national, regional, and provincial loyalties could underpin particular distributions of power and redistributions of money. While other criteria could be deployed, these seem the most general. As well, this very preliminary analysis has begun to highlight some interregional and interprovincial cleavages. It is hard not to regard the Atlantic provinces as minor players in the great debates about Canada’s future which Quebec secession would unleash, even though their inhabitants could have most at stake. The region is economically vulnerable, and its governments have traditionally supported a central government sufficiently powerful to redistribute income towards it, as have governments in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. As for the West, no observer can ignore the historic sense of oppression and neglect which now, as economic and ideological differences continue to divide it from central Canada, has produced strong demands for both autonomy and a more powerful voice in national affairs. Much less attention has been devoted to Ontario, the invisible province, despite its fiscal problems, its position as paymaster of the federation, and its links with Quebec. In thinking about provinces and regions, it is easy to fall prey to anthropomorphic stereotypes and to regard whole units as distinct and homogeneous.” But these regional and interprovincial cleavages and characteristics will re-emerge later. Here, some attention was also paid to issues of process. This is crucial. It is one exercise to describe the grand alternative structures that Canada could adopt if Quebec separates; it is quite another matter to achieve any one of them. How Canadians try to “get there” —

28 The Grand Alternatives

how they choose collectively the form of a new country — may well

determine where they get. The same is even truer of the relationships that might be established between Canada and a sovereign Quebec, a subject to which we now turn.

CHAPTER THREE

Economic Relations

between Canada and Quebec |

At present, ROC and Quebec are joined in an economic union, one with a degree of integration that surpasses what has been achieved in the European Union and in some other federations. There is very broad agreement among analysts and political actors that maintaining a common economic space is desirable on efficiency grounds. Even among Quebec sovereigntists, there is very little opposition to this proposition.’ But if Quebec secedes, there will be several possible long-term economic relationships that could operate between Canada and Quebec. The degree of integration ranges from an economic union similar to that which currently exists, right through to zero — to the relationship between any two sovereign states. In addition, it should be remembered that Canada is a monetary union with a single currency and one central bank. Apart from economic integration — though related to it — are the options about currency and monetary policy that could be realized by Canada and a sovereign Quebec. (These are surveyed in the next chapter.) The degree of economic integration that would exist after a separation will be determined by four factors. First is the nature of ROC itself. If Canada fragments, for instance, the chances of re-establishing a full economic union will be reduced. The second factor is, as ever, the nature of the separation process. There may be broad agreement

that maintaining the economic union would be rational, in terms of minimizing dislocation and economic uncertainty, but this does not mean that this outcome is inevitable. The postsecession trading and economic regime might be linked in the separation negotiations to

30 The Grand Alternatives

thorny issues such as division of the debt and the treatment of minorities, with suboptimal outcomes. Or negotiators from either side might adopt a noncooperative stance, either because of domestic political considerations or as a part of a long-term strategy to win con-

cessions later, with the result that the economic arrangements established would fall far short of a full economic union. Third, out-

side actors and opportunities will play a role. There will be some pressure on both Canada and Quebec to maintain a high level of integration in order to avoid disrupting existing treaty structures or threatening the profitability of foreign investment here. For instance, one American observer has concluded that the United States might offer the two states continuing membership in the G-7, provided they maintained economic integration at the level of a customs union at least.” Finally, what long-term economic structures can be established

will be a function of what political and institutional arrangements are essential to make them work. There is a common view that higher

degrees of economic integration require closer political integration in order to be functional and stable. This proposition will be taken up in more detail below, but it is certainly relevant to a separation process that will fundamentally redefine political communities and produce new institutions of government. Since the various economic structures that could be established between Canada and a sovereign Quebec have been well canvassed,’ the review here will be brief, concentrating on the advantages and disadvantages, mainly economic, of each level of integration. It should

be noted at the outset that these structures are ideal types: they are nowhere found in pure form, and many variations upon them can be imagined. Still, they are the major structural alternatives. Second, this survey assumes, generally, that ROC itself would continue to operate as an integrated economy after Quebec’s secession. The fullest economic integration is found in an economic union. This is characterized by both negative and positive integration. The former refers to measures that prevent the erection of barriers to the movement of goods, services, and factors of production; rules prohibit states from discriminating against other states, mainly by establishing the principle of “national treatment.” Under this regime, governments cannot treat foreign products and services and factors of production — capital and labour ~ differently from their domestic counterparts. Positive integration, in contrast, refers to measures that actively facilitate the flow of factors in the economic space and promote the overall efficiency of the unit. They include a broad array of policies: common external barriers that encourage trade to take place within the economic space; a wide range of standard laws and regu-

31 Economic Relations between Canada and Quebec

lations, uniformly enforced, in areas such as taxation, competition, weights and measures, consumer protection and bankruptcy; efficient, large-scale provision of public services and growth-promoting infrastructure; and adjustment assistance. Many of these policies have the effect of homogenizing the framework within which competition occurs, or, more technically, of eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade (which include subsidies of various forms). Others enforce a uniform conduct of behaviour on firms and public authorities. While the economic union is integrated internally, of course it has a unique external commercial policy. Finally, economic unions normally have some programs for regional stabilization and redistribution, in part because

the common currency that usually characterizes them prevents the component states from devaluing a currency to absorb economic shocks. Some gains from an economic union arise from size and factor mobility. Firms can take advantage of scale economies and they can specialize, and there are also dynamic gains because of the competitive

environment and the flow of information and innovation. Some of these effects are present as well in less integrated arrangements, such as free trade areas. The unique gains of the union arise because the common regulatory environment minimizes the costs of making transactions and acquiring information. Not only does this make production more efficient and adjustment smoother, but it heightens the trade diversion effects that occur even within free trade areas, for there is a tendency to do business within the union. As well, the member states

individually have economies that are more specialized and volatile than the whole; hence, they pool risks in the union, with factor mobility and interregional transfers cushioning the adjustment to economic shocks. The stabilization and interregional transfer systems also protect the economy from making wasteful permanent adjustments to temporary shocks. At the same time, by allowing similar services to be provided by subnational units, these transfers provide a more homogeneous environment for business while allowing human capital to be developed in the poorer regions. A final advantage of an economic union is that it has greater bargaining power in international negotiations.* The Canadian economic union has many of these features.’ Goods, services, and factors of production flow relatively freely within it. The federal government has established a common regulatory framework for many sectors, and provides uniform enforcement of competition policy and many product standards. Tax systems are highly harmonized, especially on the corporate side. As Stanley Hartt has stressed, an elaborate network of provincial “comity” laws facilitates

32 The Grand Alternatives

the conduct of business across provincial borders.® So do provincial

regulatory regimes, which are fairly well harmonized (trucking, labour), or under which cooperation has been possible (securities). Although there are some substantial interprovincial barriers to the flow of some goods and services and people, and although the central government has caused large distortions in interregional prices through fiscal and regulatory policy, as well as impeding adjustment in the interregional labour market, the Canadian economic union is highly integrated. It clearly is a more homogeneous economic space than Europe, even after the Maastricht treaty.’ If the economic union could be preserved in the event of Quebec’s secession, there would be advantages to each side. Since the status quo would prevail, uncertainty about commerce and investment would be minimized. Transaction costs would remain at current levels, and learning costs would not rise. Opportunities for specialization and mobility would still exist, and adjustment would occur as at present. In the standard analysis, the major disadvantage for Quebec would be the amount of potential policy autonomy that would be forgone. One of the major thrusts of the sovereigntist argument is that an independent Quebec would control the levers of economic development and growth. In an economic union, however, vast areas of policy have to be standardized. This was highlighted by the secretariat of the Bélanger-Campeau Commission (the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec). The secretariat noted the desirability of uniformity or harmonization in the following areas: banking regulation, competition policy, patents, intellectual property, transportation regulation, taxation, telecommunications, postal services, weights and measures, standards, and bankruptcy.® Coordina-

tion with Canada in all these areas would minimize the losses

associated with sovereignty, but it would inhibit Quebec from making the economic gains the sovereigntists believe will be possible when Quebec achieves policy autonomy.

Another problem for Quebec is that federal transfers would end. The sovereign state would collect all taxes within its borders but would

receive no more payments from Canada. The estimates of the Economic Council, in a sanguine study of secession’s effects on government budgets, imply that even if an economic association were to be maintained with Canada, the Government of Quebec would have to raise the total tax burden on its citizens by 3.3 per cent of GDP in order to provide current levels of government services.’ (The other provinces would be able to reduce taxes.) More serious in the long run would be the elimination of one buffer — transfers — against external economic shocks. Finally, because there are no barriers to labour

, 33. Economic Relations between Canada and Quebec mobility in an economic union, in order to retain immigrants Quebec would, as currently, have to provide an environment at least as attractive as ROC’s. One of the great advantages of sovereignty is that Quebec could hold immigrants simply by being more attractive than the home country or other possible receiving countries, but labour

mobility in an economic union would eliminate this benefit. On the Canadian side, these problems would be mirrored. Both the federal and provincial governments would have their policy autonomy constrained by the decision-making rules necessary to operate a formal economic union. And any supranational body that had regulatory powers, let alone the capacity to spend, would be capable of introducing interregional price distortions, just as Ottawa has done in the past. A customs union is the next qualitative step down in the degree of economic integration, but somewhere between it and an economic union is a common market, the characteristics of which have often been taken from the European Community or other specific entities. A common market allows for relatively free factor flows within it, this being assured primarily by negative constraints against the erection of barriers between the component states. Core elements such as commercial law, competition policy, weights and measures, and

standards are uniform, but there is less regulation by a central decision-making authority than there is in an economic union. Instead, member states rely more heavily on “mutual recognition” of each others’ regulations; that is, they accept the other states’ regulatory frameworks as being equivalent to their own. There is some harmonization of taxation and social entitlements, but redistribution and regional transfers normally are far smaller than in an economic union, and indeed they may be nonexistent. A common market thus preserves many of the gains realized within an economic union. The difference is a matter of degree. There are larger transaction and information costs, and further economic losses because non-tariff bar-

riers cannot be authoritatively policed by a central authority or by mutual agreement between the states. A customs union is quite different. Here, the level of integration is substantially lower. The defining feature is that the states compris-

ing it have common external tariffs, along with a single system of quotas and other non-tariff border measures. Commercial policy, in the form of contingent protection against surging or unfairly subsidized imports (through safeguards, anti-dumping measures, and countervailing-duty measures) must be conducted jointly. Although the states may have very different domestic policy environments, they act as an economic unit vis-a-vis third parties.

34 The Grand Alternatives

The economic losses incurred through sinking to this level of integration are substantial. Transaction and information costs are much greater because the internal policy environment is not uniform. On

such matters as product standards there is some pressure towards standardization because of the uniform treatment of third-country products, but these effects are dwarfed by the lack of regulatory harmonization. Nothing in a customs union prevents the member states from erecting non-tariff barriers in the form of subsidies, discriminatory procurement practices, or uncoordinated taxation systems. These

can cause trade disputes and the application of protectionist measures within the customs union itself. There is no guarantee of capital mobility within a customs union, and labour mobility can be constricted severely, to become a privilege rather than a right. Because labour cannot move, trade in services is inhibited (as it can also be by regulation). Moreover, the economy’s capacity for adjustment through migration is much reduced, at the same time as interregional transfers are not available for temporary stabilization. The great advantage of a customs union over the next level of integration, a free trade area, is that there is no need to have border posts between the countries to monitor trade. Because of the common tar-

iff and commercial policy, there is no possibility that imports can enter a high-tariff country through the low-tariff partner; hence, there is no need for agreements about domestic value-added to imports, or for certificates of origin or other cumbersome border procedures that inhibit trade and economic efficiency. Of course, if labour mobility is restricted, or if immigration policy is not coordinated, border posts will still be necessary to verify personal identification, but costly constraints on the trade of goods need not exist. If, after separation, Canada and Quebec were to agree to integrate only at the level of a customs union, the economic losses on each side would be significant. Still, a customs union would be more advantageous than lesser forms of integration. Trade between the two countries would remain relatively free, without the application of border controls. As well, the unit would maintain its external weight in trade negotiations. However much less efficient the internal economy might be, it would be represented as a bloc internationally. A customs union also would ease a sovereign Quebec’s entry into GATT, because the existing structure of tariffs and quotas would not be changed. More

important, maintaining integration at this level would simplify renegotiation of the FTA and NAFTA, because tariff schedules would not be altered, there would be a single authority for commercial policy, and the entire market would remain open on the same terms to Ameri-

can and Mexican trading partners.

35 Economic Relations between Canada and Quebec

But a customs union would raise difficult issues. The current structure of protection in Canada represents a compromise between sectoral interests that are regionally based. Foreign trade in textiles, clothing, and footwear is diverted from Canada in favour of domestic producers that are disproportionately concentrated in Quebec, while Ontario benefits from the Quebec market for automotive and electrical equipment, to name only two examples. Trade protection also involves the

agricultural marketing boards and the internal division of production quotas. As well, Canada maintains quantitative restrictions on

certain products and commodities, notably under the Multifiber Agreement; their levels and allocations would have to be negotiated. The general problem of a customs union would be agreeing on a decision rule for setting external tariffs and quotas. In some respects,

Quebec would be better placed if the current trade-negotiation arrangements were maintained, because all the provinces are involved and there is opportunity for logrolling and coalition formation among them. But if a ROC trade position were to be decided before discussions with Quebec commenced, the alternative rules would again be parity (unacceptable to Canada) or proportionality (unacceptable to Quebec). Similar difficulties would arise in negotiations with third parties, when concessions and trade-offs have to be made. How would a joint delegation operate? Finally, to run a customs union, the two countries would require some bilateral authority to enforce the common commercial law. Designing this institution could prove difficult, and the differential regional effects of its decisions could bring its legitimacy into question. The next level of economic integration is the free trade area. Here, countries agree to eliminate barriers to trade in goods and perhaps

services, outlawing mutual tariffs, quotas, border taxes, and some trade-inhibiting regulations. But each maintains its independent commercial policies towards third parties. Hence, border controls remain

to enforce rules of origin and to police value-added requirements. Free trade areas allow firms to benefit from economies of scale and specialization, and they establish a more competitive environment, which may produce dynamic gains. There may also be positive benefits from trade diversion. But compared with an economic union, the remaining obstacles and the lack of regulatory harmonization increase costs and reduce productive efficiency. Moreover, since there

are no guarantees of factor mobility, the avenues of adjustment are limited. It is possible that Canada and Quebec could negotiate a free trade agreement after separation. But Canada is already a signatory of the FTA and NAFTA. The free trade option should be considered first in

36 The Grand Alternatives

this context, because it is possible that Quebec would be admitted to these agreements and that Canada would continue to adhere to them. If these conditions were met, a third trade agreement between Canada and Quebec might be superfluous. The FTA provides that tariffs between the United States and Canada will be phased out by 1998. Hence, tariff-free trade between Canada

and Quebec would be assured by then (and each side could agree not to impose any tariffs in the meantime). But the FTA is far more than a simple agreement to remove barriers. While the operative principle in multilateral trade, for instance, is most-favoured-nation (MEN)

status, meaning that all signatories must be granted the same tariff treatment as the most favoured one, the underlying principle of the FTA is national treatment; that is, goods from the other country (with some exceptions) must not be subject to rules or taxes that are not applied to domestic products. Beyond this, the FTA removes many barriers to trade in services, especially in banking and telecommunications, and facilitates service trade by allowing some labour mobility (temporary access to work is allowed for some occupations). It provides for capital mobility by guaranteeing foreign firms the right of establishment (and by restricting the screening of take-overs of domestic firms). It provides for energy sharing, and it incorporates the Auto Pact, a 1966 agreement that contains guarantees about the level of automobile production to be maintained in Canada. It also commits the signatories to some regulatory harmonization, especially about customs procedures, and to mutual recognition of some standards. It establishes special mechanisms for settling bilateral disputes, while maintaining intact each country’s trade laws. Finally, it envis-

ages closer integration through consultations about agriculture and subsidies, and ultimately about competition policy. NAFTA has not affected this basic structure. It builds upon it and extends it. There are some special provisions for each country, some new agreements about environmental and labour standards, and some modifications to the dispute-resolution mechanisms. In a few areas the FTA continues to prevail, but NAFTA has largely superseded the earlier treaty, incorporating its main provisions.”® Unlike the FTA, though, NAFTA does have explicit provisions about the accession of any new members

to the agreement: the existing signatories must agree to their joining the treaty. The advantages for Canada and Quebec of retaining this structure are considerable. Simply enough, it would preserve the status quo with respect to the most important foreign trading partner of each country, and it would provide mutual market access under familiar rules, so the business environment would be predictable. Beyond this, western Canada would keep its FTA gains, including lower tariffs

37 Economic Relations between Canada and Quebec

and the energy provisions, Ontario would retain the Auto Pact, and Quebec would maintain access to the U.S. market. There are disadvantages, however. Since the FTA has no explicit purchase on external tariffs, border controls would be necessary between Canada and Quebec. As well, trade between the two countries would be subject to domestic commercial law, and contingent protection measures could be applied to goods moving across the border. (It is worth noting that under the FTA there is little access to the courts for private parties: trade disputes are interstate disputes.) More important, economic integration would be profoundly weakened. If the provisions of the FTA, for example, were to become the operative rules between Canada and Quebec governing the financial services sector, massive readjustments would be necessary and the current integrated capital market would become much less efficient. Finally, the overall negotiating position of Canada as it now exists would be weakened vis-a-vis the United States and other partners, simply because each of the new countries would be smaller economically. Both Canada and Quebec would face risks in the free trade context, and these would exist whether or not they agreed to maintain between them a higher level of integration than the FTA represents. The risk for Canada is that the United States would consider the separation to represent a fundamental change in circumstances, such that bilateral trade agreements would have to be renegotiated. The United States could use this opportunity to open sections of the FTA that have been irritants in the past, including those on culture and agriculture. The risk for Quebec would be higher. If Quebec entered the FTA and the NAFTA as a sovereign signatory, it would no longer enjoy the protected status of a subnational unit." These trade agreements were designed to bind national governments, and their purchase on provincial governments has been much less. Government procurement provisions, for example, apply to national purchasing entities and not to provincial ones, and the chapter on financial services specifically excludes provincially constituted financial institutions. As a sovereign state, Quebec would become exposed to treaty disciplines in these and other important areas of policy, including culture, subsidies, agriculture, standards, and investment. The last might be particularly sensitive, for Quebec would have to pass new legislation to prevent some foreign take-overs. Even if the United States did not take the opportunity to negotiate new constraints, the existing treaty provisions would restrict Quebec’s policy autonomy much more than they currently do.” The final level of economic integration would be that existing under multilateral treaties, primarily GATT. It is possible that the separation would cause the FTA and NAFTA to cease to apply with their

38 The Grand Alternatives

current scope. This could occur if the U.S. administration or Congress refused to modify the agreements to admit Quebec, or if they insisted on renegotiating sections with Canada; it could also happen if anti-FTA sentiment in the truncated Canada was sufficient to cause the agreements to be abrogated. The treaties might then cease to apply to Canada, Quebec, or both countries. Hence, there could be no continental arrangement covering Canada-Quebec trade and economic relations. This result could also occur if Canada itself fragmented, or, more generally, if it proved impossible to negotiate any framework trade agreement between the separating countries. In this case, Canada-Quebec trade would be covered by multilateral accords, primarily GATT, to which both parties would be signa-

tories. This result would entail very substantial economic disintegration. Each country would have most-favoured-nation status vis-a-vis the other, but there would be tariff barriers to trade between them, at an average level (for all goods) of about 2 per cent.” As a result, the agricultural marketing system would break down, and the service trade could be much inhibited. Of course, GATT imposes some constraints on the member states — in such areas as procurement, intellectual property, and contingent protection measures — but there are many loopholes that allow trade-distorting policies to exist, and the procedures for settling disputes are weak and cumbersome relative to those in the FTA. Disintegrating the Canada-Quebec economy to the GATT level would entail very heavy losses.

To this point, the analysis has assumed that Canada-Quebec economic relations would be governed by a general framework agreement. That is, there would be a formal treaty like the FTA or the Treaty of Rome that would lay out the joint objectives of the two countries,

state the principles governing the various dimensions of the relationship (trade, investment, mobility, and so on), enumerate the rights

and obligations of the parties, and establish some mechanisms for consultation, management, joint decision making, and dispute resolution. Thus, the level of economic integration to be maintained would flow from a comprehensive and legally binding international treaty. But there are other ways to proceed. The first is to negotiate sepa-

rate treaties covering particular economic sectors or other dimensions of the relationship. For example, Canada and Quebec could reach agreements in transportation, banking and financial institutions, securities markets, or agriculture, and this could be accomplished without any comprehensive economic accord. Similarly, limited treaties could establish a regime for capital or labour mobility. There could be a free-standing treaty providing for a general dispute-resolution mechanism, perhaps in the form of arbitration procedures or a supranational judicial body.

39 Economic Relations between Canada and Quebec

There are some advantages to this approach. The two sides would not have to reach a comprehensive agreement that would lock each into a fixed level of integration; thorny issues could be set aside, in the short term at least, and sectoral accords might be reached more quickly than a global treaty; some economic losses through disintegration would be avoided; and, in theory, limited agreements could be reached with provinces or regions. But there are also disadvantages to this approach. While certain “islands” of integration would be maintained, considerable uncertainty would surround the rest of the economy; there would be costs to reducing integration in non-treaty

areas, and economic agents would have to adjust behaviour at the boundaries of particular sectors or dimensions of trade; furthermore, it is not evident how such agreements would be articulated with the FTA and NAFTA if Canada and Quebec stayed party to these trea-

ties; finally, there would remain the basic problem of establishing mechanisms and decision rules to govern change in the regulation of these sectors. The second noncomprehensive way to achieve some level of economic integration would involve no treaties whatsoever. It is volun-

tary harmonization. Presumably it would be done primarily by Quebec, the smaller economy. Harmonization could be accomplished

by Quebec simply adopting Canadian legislation as its own law. In bankruptcy or product labelling or corporate taxation, for example, the Quebec regulatory environment could be made identical to the Canadian one. When Canada changed regulations, so could Quebec. Beyond this, Quebec could simply abjure unilaterally from erecting other barriers to trade.* The advantage of such a policy is that much of the economic union could be maintained, simply because the business environment would be identical on each side of the border. As well, it would require little if any formal negotiation to achieve. Change in legislation by Quebec could be incremental as the economic situa-

tion evolved. For Canada, the disadvantage of this strategy would be that the existing arrangements would not be secure; Quebec could alter its legislation at any time, so creating new obstacles to trade. But there would be even greater disadvantages for Quebec. Simply enough, its government would have no control over Canadian policy, and its firms would have no avenues of participation in Canadian decisions. Canada could change policy according to domestic events and the impact of external shocks on its economy (including its trade relations with Quebec), and the alterations might not be appropriate for Quebec. Moreover, mirror legislation is not sufficient to maintain economic integration at the level of acommon market or economic union. For-

40 The Grand Alternatives

mal agreements are essential for government action to be effective across borders. Agricultural marketing arrangements and telecommunications regulation provide obvious examples. Similarly, in the securities industry, while it is possible that Quebec could mirror Ontario regulations about the content of prospectuses or the disclosure of insider trading, active cooperation would be necessary for clearing accounts between exchanges. In short, although unilateral harmonization could be an effective method of achieving uniformity in the regulatory environment in the two states, it is passive. It cannot provide for the positive action necessary to maintain high levels of economic integration. Hence, there would be substantial costs of disintegration without some Canada-Quebec treaties that would bind governments and require cooperation. There would also be costs associated with Quebec’s duplication of institutions, such as those necessary to enforce competition policy or register patents, though such costs would be incurred at any level of integration less than the current economic union.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Currency and Monetary Policy

Another aspect of Canada-Quebec economic relations concerns monetary policy and the currency. Here there is a very large set of possible arrangements, in theory.’ Generally speaking, currency matters are somewhat independent of the level of integration that exists in economic and commercial relations: it is possible to have a common

currency even without a free trade agreement. This can be done through a currency board or simply by the adoption of another currency, as in Panama’s use of the American dollar. Similarly, the European Union and NAFTA show that it is possible to have a common market or a free trade agreement without a common currency. Several core considerations would bear on Canada-Quebec currency arrangements. First are the basic macro- and microeconomic

functions of monetary policy. Monetary policy establishes the long-term rate of inflation. As well, a separate currency allows for

adjustment to economic shocks, such as a drop in demand for a country’s exports, because changes in the exchange rate alter real domestic prices, so adjustment need not be borne directly by decreases

in employment or nominal wages. Finally, monetary policy may affect economic growth; while the view that monetary expansion can reduce unemployment is now a minority one among experts, it certainly continues to be heard, and there is much more support for the argument that achieving perfect price stability rather than acceptable inflation rates can cause long-term economic damage.’ In short, control of a currency remains a policy tool, and this would be important to the governments of both Canada and Quebec.

42 The Grand Alternatives

A second consideration is the cost of having separate currencies. This creates transaction and accounting costs when trade or capital movements take place. There are also costs incurred for the risk associated with holding any currency. For users of money, this involves

efforts to hedge against inflation and devaluation; for citizens and governments, it involves paying interest rate premiums. If confidence in the currency declines, the perceived risk of holding it rises, and so do the premium costs. When governments attempt to implant a new currency, establishing its credibility is exceedingly difficult, and this

imposes large premium costs. Further costs can be incurred in the underlying economy if the central bank must prove itself to investors and demonstrate more discipline than would be expected of the managers of a long-accepted currency. Consequently, although the costs of establishing confidence in a new Quebec currency would be short term, they could be very large. The third general consideration is how monetary policy and currency issues mesh with other elements of the political and economic systems. Having a separate currency and an independent monetary policy allows governments to adopt a distinct stance on inflation. As for adjustment, ideally a common currency should be used within a relatively homogeneous economy. Otherwise, different regions will have different monetary-policy (and exchange-rate) needs, and this can cause regional tension, as it often has in Canada — for example, when inflationary pressures in Ontario are fought by an interest rate policy that impedes recovery in Atlantic Canada.° Generally speaking, there are many avenues of adjustment in an economy. They include fiscal policy, capital mobility, labour migration, protectionist measures, wage and price changes, unemployment, and transfers into a region for stabilization and structural adjustment. In a sovereign Quebec, however, some of these mechanisms would cease to exist, others could be prohibited by trade agreements, and some would simply be politically unpalatable for any government. It is possible that the adjustment possibilities offered by a separate currency would be attractive to Quebec.* This could be the case whether

or not monetary policy ultimately has any long-term purchase on any real economic factors other than the rate of inflation. As regional conflicts over monetary policy demonstrate, citizens believe these policy choices make a difference. Monetary policy is also related to fiscal policy. Government deficits affect expectations about inflation, because they increase the temptation of governments to increase the money supply so that inflation will increase revenues and reduce the real cost of debt repayment. Hence, lenders have less confidence in the currency’s value, and they

demand a premium rate of interest. At the same time, the cost of

43 The Currency and Monetary Policy

- government borrowing is affected by monetary policy, which may be set in part by exchange-rate considerations. For both reasons, there should ideally be some harmonization of monetary and fiscal policy within a currency area, including the fiscal policies of states or provinces. (An alternative view is that markets will enforce discipline on the borrowing practices of the various states, but this may take some time: coordination is more sure, if it is possible.) Finally, currency and monetary-policy issues mesh with the institutions of the financial system. If capital markets are well integrated

across an economic space, there need be less concern with the regional impact of monetary policy, because flows of funds through financial institutions help adjustment.° As well, it is within financial institutions that the transaction and accounting costs of separate currencies are registered. Beyond this, institutional failure can cause a

loss of confidence in a currency and lead to devaluation or higher interest rates; conversely, a severe loss of confidence can cause runs on a country’s banks. In these extreme circumstances, a country’s central bank can act as a lender of last resort to prop up the financial system; and if there is a serious flight of capital from a country, it is

through its power over financial institutions that the government can institute foreign-exchange controls. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Canada-Quebec currency options can be assessed. There are four basic possibilities: Quebec could (1) establish a separate currency with a floating exchange rate;

(2) establish a currency and peg the rate to the Canadian dollar or the U.S. dollar; (3) keep using the Canadian dollar, either without or with a voice in monetary policy; or (4) use the U.S. dollar.® A separate currency would provide a sovereign Quebec with policy autonomy and the opportunity for independent adjustment, once its credibility was established. But in the long term, there would be losses from greater transaction and accounting costs, caused by the need to convert accounts of commerical and financial transactions. It has been estimated that these costs would range from $0.5 billion to $1.0 billion per year.’ On the other hand, the Quebec Central Bank, which

would have to be established, would reap perhaps $0.5 billion per year in seigniorage: this is the financial benefit that authorities derive from issuing currency, largely in the form of not paying interest on the liability represented by notes and coins.® Such considerations would be dwarfed, however, by the short-term costs imposed by the lack of credibility of the new currency. Anticipating economic uncertainty in Quebec, and perhaps economic decline, many people and firms would avoid the new currency, seeking to keep their assets in harder money. International investors would have to be encouraged to hold it, through interest rate premiums, and this would take place,

44 The Grand Alternatives

probably, when the economic shocks of sovereignty would be dimin-

ishing the tax base, when federal transfers would end, and when Quebec would assume some new obligation for central-government debt. Not only would it be much more expensive for Quebec to borrow, but runs on financial institutions could also occur. Without special assistance from Canada or abroad, Quebec could be hard pressed to defend its financial system, even if it took its share of the $9 billion in Bank of Canada foreign-currency reserves. It is well understood in Quebec that the benefits of establishing a separate currency would

be long term, but the short-term costs of introducing it would be very large.’ There would be costs to Canada, too, if Quebec opted for a new, separate currency. These would include transaction and accounting costs on exchanges across the border and the loss of about one-quarter of the Bank of Canada’s seigniorage. More seriously, there could be speculative pressures against the Canadian dollar until it was clear that this currency would continue to be viable. These pressures would be fought with higher interest rates. As one alternative, Quebec could establish its own currency and

peg it to the Canadian dollar. This would entail many of the same long-term costs of maintaining a separate currency as well as the big up-front costs of establishing confidence in it. Yet this option has no benefits in the form of policy autonomy. Its currency fixed, Quebec

would have to accept whatever monetary policy the Canadian authorities chose, along with the consequent exchange rate vis-a-vis third

countries. This would only accentuate the problems of setting the initial exchange rate and maintaining its credibility. Unless the currency was backed fully with Canadian dollars, speculative pressures in either direction could force revaluation. It has been suggested that Quebec could manage an internal devaluation in conjunction with a

fully backed currency, and gain a competitive edge in exporting.” But this reduction in real wages and assets would demand a degree of popular support that a newly sovereign government might not command. If Quebec pegged a new currency to the Canadian dollar, Canada would experience specultative pressures as well, stemming from uncertainty about whether Quebec would maintain the arrange-

ment or whether it would move towards an independent, floating currency, with the implications this move would have for the survival of the Canadian dollar, the payment by Quebec of its share of the debt, and the Canadian financial system’s stability. Pegging a separate currency to the U.S. dollar is generally consid-

ered a less advantageous option for Quebec. The short-term costs would be at least as great, and transaction and accounting costs would be larger, given the relative volumes of Quebec’s trade with the two

45 The Currency and Monetary Policy

countries. It would also set up another obstacle to continuing an integrated Canada-Quebec financial system. Yet there could be some advantages for Quebec in this arrangement. Since debt considerations rather than trade convenience might be paramount, pegging to the U.S. dollar, which is more widely used in capital markets than the Canadian dollar, could seem desirable. Moreover, although the transaction and accounting costs of converting currency into American dollars would be onerous, at least the routines are familiar. Finally,

trade diversion away from Canada and towards the south would occur if the economic union was significantly weakened after secession, and linking the currency to the U.S. dollar would represent an acknowledgement of this fact, an anticipation of the trend, and a symbolic commitment to Quebec’s North American future. It should be recognized that this arrangement would impose large costs on Canada. These would consist, naturally, of transaction and accounting costs on exchanges with Quebec. More important would be the uncertainty about whether the Canadian dollar could continue to float independently. Some economists have argued that if Quebec were to make this choice, Canada might well have to do the same." And if Canada fragmented or decentralized radically, this is a likely outcome: either the country as a whole or each of the provinces or regions would become a “taker” of monetary policy set in Washington. Even if this political result did not occur, the costs of fixing the Canadian to the American currency would include a long-term loss of flexibility and autonomy and short-term speculative pressures against the arrangement. Economists tend to agree that the optimum resolution of the currency issue is that Quebec and Canada maintain the monetary union. This would allow the financial system to operate with minimal disruption, it would save costs on cross-border transactions, and Quebec would not have to bear the burden of establishing a new currency’s

credibility. In one version of this basic arrangement, the two countries would cooperate. Quebec would establish a central bank, and management of monetary policy would be vested either in the Bank of Canada — with representation from the Bank of Quebec — or ina new, joint, supranational authority. And Quebec would be entitled to a share of seigniorage. Even in this cooperative arrangement, how-

ever, there could be disadvantages for Quebec. If its government’s voice in monetary policy was proportional to its GDP or population, its representatives would be permanently in a minority. Essentially it would be a policy taker, while monetary policy would be set according to conditions in Canada. Consequently, Quebec’s particular adjustment needs would have to be accommodated by other policy instruments. On the other hand, Canada would be unlikely to accept

46 The Grand Alternatives

an arrangement by which representation in the monetary authority was based on national equality. Even proportionality would make the peripheral provinces regard the arrangement with distrust: the configuration of the monetary authority would raise old suspicions about a cabal of central-Canadian industrial and financial interests dictating interest and exchange rates.’? Another problem for Canada is that it would have no control over Quebec’s fiscal deficits, nor could

it affect Quebec’s response to balance-of-payments deficits with the United States. If Quebec were to run either type of deficit, Canadian foreign-exchange reserves could erode, or Canadian interest rates could rise, or both, because of Quebec’s trade and fiscal problems. Finally,

there could be speculation that the arrangement would not be stable and that Quebec, sooner or later, would have to introduce its own currency.” Such speculation could produce pressure on the Canadian dollar, runs on Quebec banks, and, ultimately, a decision by Quebec authorities to establish a new currency in order to stabilize the situation.”*

In the second variant of this arrangement, there would be no supranational monetary authority, nor would Quebec’s central bank have representation in the Bank of Canada. Quebec would use the Canadian dollar, and it would be a pure policy taker. This possibility is generally advanced as a default option should no agreement be possible about joint control of monetary policy. Even with a breakdown of relations, this would be a feasible option, because Canada would not be able to stop Quebec from using its currency, except through draconian measures to stifle the flow of banknotes into the country, and possibly by restricting Quebec firms’ access to the Canadian payments system — measures that would be very costly to Canada. This arrangement might satisfy post-separation sentiment in Canada, but Quebec’s lack of autonomy and even of influence in such an important policy area could prove politically uncomfortable for the government of the new country. Ultimately, the Bank of Canada

would be responsible to the minister of finance of Canada, and the minister would have no incentive, after secession, to take account of conditions in Quebec, except insofar as they might have second-order consequences for the Canadian economy. If Quebec encountered deficit

or balance-of-payments problems, there would be adverse consequences for Canada; more important, the domestic pressure in Quebec to withdraw from the arrangement and establish a separate currency could become overwhelming. Realizing this, holders and potential holders of Canadian-dollar assets would be even more likely to demand risk premiums and to speculate against the currency than they would if Quebec participated in setting monetary policy in the currency union.

47 The Currency and Monetary Policy

The final option is that Quebec simply adopt the U.S. currency as its own. This possibility has been little analysed relative to the others.’ Obviously, this alternative would increase transaction and accounting costs, but far less so than the imposition of a new Quebec currency pegged to the American dollar. It would strain the Canadian payments and financial systems, but these are well habituated to dealing in American currency. The credibility problems would be reduced almost to zero, because Quebec would be declaring itself to be permanently a policy taker, prepared to accept the American inflation rate and to adjust through other means to differential shocks. The Quebec authorities would encounter much less resistance by individuals and firms to a forced conversion of their accounts into the world’s most familiar currency than to a conversion into “dollards” or “quebucks.” It would be essential to secure a supply of dollars, of course, but this would require minimal cooperation from the United States. By using the U.S. dollar directly, rather than merely pegging a separate currency to it, Quebec would declare even more strongly a practical detachment from Canada and a symbolic commitment to

the continental future: “Toutefois, l’utilisation de la monnaie américaine par un Québec souverain pourrait étre envisagée compte tenu de la tendance a la hausse des échanges commerciaux et financiers entre le Québec et les Etats-Unis. En plus, I’utilisation de la

monnaie américaine éviterait des problémes conflictuels avec le Canada.”"° In short, using the U.S. dollar would be a viable and potentially attractive option for a sovereign Quebec. This alternative would be costly and awkward for Canada, however. Dealings with Quebec would involve new transaction and accounting costs, and Canada would lose the seigniorage on one-quarter of its currency. Much more seriously, the credibility of the Canadian dollar itself would be threatened. Could it continue to function as an independent, floating currency? There would be speculative pressure against it, risk premiums to be paid, and possibily a liquidity crisis.” This could force the Bank of Canada to fix the dollar in relation to the U.S. dollar or, in the longer term, to declare the U.S. currency to be legal tender (or even the sole legal tender) in the country. In that case, Canada would lose the benefits of seigniorage, of access to the Bank of Canada as a lender of last resort, and of the adjustment mechanism of a floating currency: it would also have to accept the U.S. inflation rate. Certainly, such a currency union with the United

States would have some offsetting benefits — prices could be more

stable, and the costs of doing business would be reduced. But Canadians would forfeit an important real and psychological degree of national autonomy at a time when their collective future was already uncertain enough.

CHAPTER FIVE

Political Relations between Canada and Quebec

If Quebec secedes, the event will represent a huge political rupture. There will be a fundamental schism in the political community that is now Canada, even — and perhaps especially — if ROC accepts the development and even if separation takes place constitutionally. Nevertheless, many prognosticators expect that some new set of

political institutions would be established between the sovereign countries of Canada and Quebec. As in the economic realm, in theory there is a wide range of possibilities open. The dimension along which

they vary is that of political integration. If the two states were to become highly integrated, joint political superstructures would be established between them. At the extreme, there could be legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in which substantial power would

reside, almost like the current federation. Weaker integration, by degrees, would see no legislatures, then no executive bodies, and

then no joint mechanisms to settle disputes. At the extreme of nonintegration, relations would be conducted by international negotiation, as between any two sovereign states, with no institutions governing the relationship other than those existing under general international law or the particular regimes to which both countries adhere (such as GATT and other treaties and conventions). What the result would be, after secession, depends on several factors. One is the internal composition of Canada; that is, how ROC reconstitutes itself. Paradoxically, a very decentralized or confederal Canada might accommodate itself more readily to political integration with Quebec than a centralized country would. Another factor

| 49 Political Relations between Canada and Quebec is the level of economic integration that is to obtain between the countries. A third is how the transition to Quebec sovereignty occurs. Not

only will the process of the separation establish precedents about interstate political relations, but decisions will be taken during the transition about the shape of Canada and about what supranational political institutions, if any, are to be established between ROC and Quebec. Over the long term, the political relationship between the two countries will also be determined by deeper social and economic forces that tend towards centralization or decentralization (though these will be acting on the structures established at the time of the separation). The most highly integrated arrangements would involve a central

authority with substantial functions. These would be laid out in a separate constitution, one that could take the form of a treaty between the two states. The areas of jurisdiction often suggested for common political control include defence, the currency and monetary policy, tariffs and commercial policy, the environment, interna-

tional relations, and some state enterprises; and sometimes it is proposed that all residents will have a common citizenship. Such an arrangement would require a jointly elected legislature, an executive, and a judiciary. One elaborate example of these proposals is Resnick’s “Canada-Quebec Union,” which would be an “ensemble” or “condominium” of the two states and peoples.’ The joint legislature would be composed of Canadian senators (who would be elected, and on the basis of greater provincial equality than now exists) and directly elected Quebec representatives. Quebec’s number of representatives would be proportional to its population share. Ministers would be members of Parliament or members of the National As-

sembly. The joint prime minister would be the prime minister of Canada or of Quebec, while the head of state would be chosen, ona rotating basis, by the Canadian Parliament or by both the National

Assembly and the directly elected Quebec representatives. The “Union” government would have some taxation powers; there would

be a constitutional court; the separate constitutions of Canada and Quebec would each recognize minority rights; and the central organs would function bilingually. With some variations, this scheme is representative of several proposals for sovereignty-association.? Such arrangements would have several benefits. Despite a separation, a good deal of the existing order would be retained. In particular,a Union government would be capable of managing an integrated economic space. The scheme would avoid disputes — potentially, very acrimonious ones — about difficult practical matters such as the debt

and about symbolically charged issues such as citizenship. At the

50 The Grand Alternatives

same time, there could be sufficient disengagement for the separate national projects of Quebec and Canada to be realized by the two communities.

But there are many drawbacks to such arrangements, for both Canada and Quebec. One is their sheer institutional complexity. If Canada did not entirely fragment in the process of secession but retained a central government similar to the current one, it would acquire yet another level of government, leaving its citizens to be served

by a minimum of four, and in most cases five, governments. Also, devising new, untried institutions would introduce an element of uncertainty into a political context that was already unstable. The structures of the European Union, often taken as a model for such proposals, have evolved gradually over a period of four decades. As well, the allocation of functions would raise problems, even if it could be agreed what core areas of jurisdiction should rest with the Union. It is impossible to divide jurisdiction cleanly. At the margin, programs and regulations in any functional area spill over into others. The en-

vironmental regulation of rivers, for example, intersects with control over timber harvesting and fishing. Similarly, even if there was clear Union authority to negotiate trade agreements, these would reach back into domestic policies about agriculture, investment, and even labour relations. This is a generic problem within federations, of course, but established federations have evolved administrative arrangements

and legal precedents that clarify responsibilities. In the case of Canada-Quebec, all this would have to develop, and there is much potential for friction, delay, and legal uncertainty. There are other practical problems with Union proposals. One is how policy would be implemented. Either the central state would command a substantial bureaucracy, or, more likely, it would depend on the separate Canadian and Quebec governments to enforce laws and regulations. In the latter case, there would be scope for opportunistic “slippage” — the lax implementation of unpopular or costly policies. Accountability would be a related problem in such an arrangement, since the responsibility for decisions could not be clearly attributed. As well, partisan conflict probably would hinder government effectiveness and also would cause animosity between the units. If Canada had a right-wing government, for instance, but the Union was dominated by a left-wing coalition anchored by a Quebec bloc, there would clearly be potential for conflict; and if either was a minority government, the system would be even less effective. Of course,

federations sometimes produce such results. The difference in sovereignty-association arrangements is that blame is targeted at the other national unit.

51 Political Relations between Canada and Quebec

But would the other state be “national”? Some union proposals are extremely vague about where sovereignty is located. Ultimately,

it must lie either in the central state or in the national units. If the centre was sovereign, Quebecers would be denied the symbolic attributes of independence such as citizenship and a distinct foreign presence, and they would be a permanent minority within the new state. But if the national states were sovereign, there would be no secure base for the central government; so when disagreement became sharp, representatives could be withdrawn, tax revenues withheld, debt payments stopped, and treaties broken. This raises the related issue of how a Union state would be established. Resnick proposes that a constituent assembly be held with representatives elected from ROC only, on the approval of the federal government and at least six of the nine provinces. This body would consider the constitution of Canada and also, in conjunction with its Quebec counterpart, the Union arrangements. Ratification would take place by a referendum. This, of course, entirely ignores the constitution’s existing procedures, which require amendments to be passed through Parliament and through most, perhaps all, provincial legislatures. More important, it seems to suppose that the Union

could emerge while Canada’s sovereignty and constitutional continuity remained intact. But this is simply to say that secession has not taken place; and this is to fudge the issue. Either constitutional amendment produces a Union government or Quebec becomes a sovereign

country (while the rest of Canada remains one). In the first case, the new system would simply be a change to a highly asymmetrical form of federalism, and there could be no significance to any “basic document” agreed by ROC and Quebec, because the constitution would remain the basic law.’ In the second case, the new complex of political institutions would result from negotiations between ROC and Quebec, either after separation or in anticipation of it. Then the arrangements would be enshrined in a treaty between sovereign states, after “Canada,” as it was, had ceased to exist. As has been clear in other cases, secession means that a sovereign political community is fractured. Future relations are conducted on an international basis, even if treaties establish new political institutions.‘ If a treaty created a highly integrated political union, a fundamental problem would be how to share power at the centre, in the common institutions. There are only two possible principles, and neither would be likely to produce satisfactory or stable results. In some proposals, representation in common legislatures or executive bodies would be on the basis of population. This is a basic democratic principle that rests ultimately on the proposition that people are equal;

52 The Grand Alternatives

hence, “one person, one vote.” With majority voting, however, the Quebec representatives would always face the prospect of being in the minority. In an integrated union, partisan and ideological considerations might allow for transnational governments, since divi-

sions on issues would cut across national lines. But Quebec representatives could always be outvoted by those from ROC, a possibility that would be likely to materialize precisely when the stakes

in some issue were very high and the national interests of the two communities were opposed. Even if matters never came to such a climax, the slow accretion of decisions that could be portrayed as unfavourable to Quebec would provide an incentive for politicians to contest the foundations of the system. The other possible decision rule is equality, or parity between the national communities. But if equality was the basis of representation, the citizens of Canada would face the prospect, on issues vital to them, of being immobilized by Quebec’s opposition.’ This would be intolerable, on both practical and democratic grounds. Possibly worse would be a series of decisions against the interests of an important component of ROC, which passed because a solid Quebec bloc combined with a minority of Canadian representatives. There are devices to prevent such outcomes — for example, supermajority voting — but they are complex and they inhibit decisive state action. The basic problem would remain. While a sovereign Quebec would

find the proportionality principle threatening and unacceptable, Canada would never submit to parity in decision making over important areas of policy. One simple illustration of this is the negative

reaction in ROC to the Charlottetown Accord’s relatively modest guarantee to Quebec of 25 per cent of the House of Commons seats.°®

Parity in a common legislature would be regarded as even more undemocratic. A lesser degree of political integration would find two independent states making joint decisions over a few policy fields through coordinated legislatures and executives. The basic model is that of joint parliamentary or ministerial delegations. In the East African Common Services Organization, for example, a legislative body was elected from the legislatures of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, and there was a small executive composed of the prime ministers and a few ministers from each country. The sovereign states cooperated in some specific matters: the post office, railways, a malaria institute, and so on. Most departments were self-financing, though the organization received 6 per cent of customs duties and 40 per cent of the profit tax. The common legislature passed laws that were not binding on the national parliaments but were recommendations.’

53 Political Relations between Canada and Quebec

Austria and Hungary also operated a system of parliamentary delegations between 1867 and 1917. Each parliament elected sixty representatives to yearly sessions that were held in alternating capitals. If the delegations approved the common budget, it was binding on the national parliaments. The delegations and parliaments negotiated decennial agreements covering tariffs, the central bank and the currency, the quota of common expenses to be paid by each country, and joint railroads; these required approval by each country’s parliament. There were three common ministers, responsible for foreign

relations, the military, and common finance; they reported to the emperor of Austria, who was also king of Hungary, and who therefore chose and coordinated the three separate ministries.® Similar proposals have been advanced for Canada and a sovereign

Quebec. Dauphin and Slosar, for example, have outlined a Canada-Quebec treaty on the economic union. According to this treaty, the union would be capped by a council composed of ministers from

the two countries. Assisted by committees of experts and a secretariat, the council would prepare legislation to be presented to the national parliaments. There would also be common management of such sectors as communications, the fisheries, and agricultural marketing, as well as an arbitration commission. This commission would

not be able to make binding decisions, however, and the decision rule in the council would be parity.’ A system of delegations would have some benefits. It would allow for joint control of common functions that have economies of scale, and also of those with large externalities. And because measures would be approved by elected representatives, policies would have the legitimacy of popular sanction, if only indirectly. But there are many drawbacks to a system that is essentially confederal. As noted above, even with carefully delimited areas of jurisdiction, the central policies inevitably would spill over into areas reserved for national gov-

ernments. The centre would remain dependent on national governments for implementation. More important, the centre would lack an independent financial base, relying ultimately on transfers from the constituent sovereign states. If the joint delegations could pass binding legislation, it would be difficult to hold any representatives responsible, and this is objectionable on democratic grounds." But if the measures were not binding, obstruction and delay would certainly occur. The Austria-Hungary arrangement was plagued by extended conflicts about tariff levels, the currency, relative numbers of military conscripts, and the language of the armed forces. Confederal

arrangements are unstable because in the areas of joint jurisdiction there is no central authority with an independent base of political

54 The Grand Alternatives

support. The East African Common Services Organization fell apart in discord, and the Austria-Hungary arrangement survived, shakily, only because of the personal authority of the emperor-king. Bipartite confederal arrangements are especially vulnerable. The principle of representation is national equality. This means that the larger unit must surrender authority over significant policy areas to the veto power of the smaller partner, an arrangement certain to cause disaffection in democracies." Financing the common activities raises analogous problems. Since power is divided, so, arguably, should the contributions be split equally.’* Such proposals are not well received by the smaller unit, because the benefits of common activities are said to flow disproportionately to the larger partner. These basic problems are less tractable in bipartite confederations because there is no room for coalition building and there is less opportunity for compromise. If there are more units, with multiple cleavages dividing them, shifting coalitions can form on different issues, and con-

flicts of interest are much less stark. Arguably, a confederal arrangement joining Quebec with sovereign Canadian provinces or regions would be more stable than a bipartite one, but even then the basic problems would remain: the centre cannot bind the sovereign parts; all parties have an effective veto on fundamental issues, so delay and conflict are inevitable; and at the same time, the units cannot fully enjoy the policy autonomy and symbolic independence of

sovereignty. For these reasons, confederations are notoriously

short-lived. A lower level of political integration is found where powers are delegated by sovereign states to bodies that have regulatory or administrative authority. These can be special-purpose agencies with narrow mandates, or ones equipped with substantial powers over a range of policy areas. An example of the latter is the European Commission as it operated before the recent movement towards a single market and greater political integration. An example of the former is the joint boards that operated facilities such as railways and airlines in Central Africa after the federation there failed.” Regulatory bodies and administrative agencies can have a variety of governance structures. Members can be politicians or not, they can be delegates of the national governments or they can be selected for their neutrality (sometimes by the other delegate-members), and representation can be equal or weighted. The defining feature is that the agencies have the power,

delegated jointly by the states involved, to make rules or to manage organizations delivering services. This device is a most flexible one. Such agencies can maintain common functions by providing services, and they can create harmonized

55 Political Relations between Canada and Quebec

policy in certain fields by issuing directives. Free to organize functions efficiently or to regulate according to the conditions and requirements of the sectors supervised, the agencies may transcend politics, or at least be shielded from national political pressures. Fi-

nally, these special-purpose agencies often can be largely self-supporting, especially since regulation as a governing instrument requires little expenditure; hence, the contentious flows of funds that

support supranational expenditure programs are avoided. But such authorities have their drawbacks and limitations. On the regulatory side, implementation typically depends entirely on national bureaucracies. In the end, sovereign states control the application of directives on their territory, and if rules are circumvented or ignored, there are no sanctions available beyond those at the disposal of any state in the international community, including retaliation and terminating the agreement. Second, there is the perennial problem of representation. To the extent that the agency’s functions are significant, this is an important matter to governments. There must be a decision rule within the agency, and this, as ever, can be parity or proportionality. “Neutral” members can moderate this problem, but when functions are important, governments generally are unwilling to confer much power on unaccountable delegates. A related difficulty is the lack of responsibility of special agencies, whose operations and decisions can affect firms and individuals deeply. They are obviously creatures of the state(s) and consequently cannot be depoliticized. Unfavourable decisions and unsatisfactory rules inevitably will be contested in the national political arenas. In Europe, for example, the Commission’s broad authority has given rise to the “democratic deficit” — the perceived inadequacy of popu-

lar control over regulatory decisions. Popular discontent with supranational agencies is a function of democratic expectations (or, inversely, of deference), of sensitivity to foreign control or influence, and of the scope and depth of regulatory intervention. When functions are limited or directives are not binding on national states, the

democratic-deficit problem is moderated, and when the agencies’ activities are narrowly focused and are accompanied by opportunities for participation and appeal, international political disputes are

less probable. But this suggests that the scope for common Canada-Quebec special agencies would be rather limited. They might operate in segmented, technical areas such as weights and measures,

or they might provide particular services such as ice breaking, but they could not handle the scope of regulation involved in maintaining a common market or controlling pollution, let alone the responsibility of managing foreign affairs or the military.

56 The Grand Alternatives

A lower level of integration involves judicial or quasi-judicial bodies

to resolve disputes. By treaty, countries commit to having disagreements over certain matters referred to a supranational body that holds

hearings and reaches decisions, which may be binding or not. This dispute-resolution device is essentially negative: the thrust of the _ judicial institutions is to determine whether existing obligations have been met rather than to create new ones. But these mechanisms do have the advantage of extricating disputes from normal political processes, if only for a time, and they can therefore deflect retaliation and escalation. Also, the quasi-judicial bodies can take on an “apolitical” mantle more convincingly than regulatory agencies that make positive decisions, and thus the democratic-deficit problem is less acute. In Canada, for example, citizens generally accept Supreme Court decisions with little protest, even when these sweepingly create new law; and the lack of much public pressure for even an indirect role in

appointing judges contrasts sharply with the strong demands to participate in constitutional negotiations or to have governments use instruments of direct democracy such as the referendum. However, the disadvantages of dispute-resolution mechanisms could outweigh the advantages. In the first place, decisions must be taken about whether the bodies will be permanent, like the World Court, or whether they will be set up as panels on an ad hoc basis to deal with particular disputes. There must also be agreement about the rules of procedure, such as standing, evidence, subpoena powers, and appeals. More substantially, there must be a definition of the matters over which the judicial bodies will have some jurisdiction. This presupposes that a set of rights and mutual obligations, in the form of a treaty, has already been agreed on by the countries involved. In general, governments are reluctant to alienate authority over such vital domestic matters as defence, policing, culture, minority rights, and research and development, and consequently dispute-resolution procedures are normally restricted to the economic realm. Governments are even more reluctant to surrender sovereign power and to establish judicial bodies that can reach binding decisions. Thus, appeals may be allowed to national courts. And since sovereignty cannot be alienated permanently, the parties can always disregard the decisions of the judicial bodies even if they have powers of binding arbitration, if the stakes are high enough. Retaliation is then the only recourse. In quasi-judicial bodies, the standard basis of representation is parity (often with the two sets of national representatives agreeing on further, neutral members). Parity on such bodies is less problematic than in legislatures, executives, or special agencies. Since the purpose of

57 Political Relations between Canada and Quebec

the bodies is to decide legal issues arising from existing obligations, their procedure is based on the adversarial presentation of cases, and

their argumentation is technical and jurisprudential. The underlying principle is to determine what is fair, not what is expedient. Nevertheless, some resistance to parity can generally be anticipated in the citizenry of the larger state, especially when binding decisions are taken about important matters. A similar qualification applies to the democratic-deficit argument: acceptance of judicial decisions is a function of their legitimacy, which in turn depends on their reputa-

tion for fairness, and this takes some time to establish. In Canada, Supreme Court decisions are accepted not only because of the court’s

long history (and its political perspicacity) but also because of its national character. But joint Canada-Quebec judicial institutions would

have neither an established reputation nor a national character. For all these reasons, judicial and quasi-judicial institutions would have a limited range of application in the case of a Quebec secession. Dispute-settlement mechanisms could only be established to oversee matters about which agreements had already been reached between Canada and Quebec. They would probably not be accorded the power to make binding decisions, and their legitimacy would be fragile. The scope of matters in their purview would be restricted, with the most likely field of application being the economy. And here itis worth noting that if Quebec were to accede to the FTA and NAFTA,

the dispute-settlement mechanisms already established under these treaties might well be adequate to deal with many economic disagreements between the two countries. A more tenuous level of political integration involves the creation of advisory and consultative mechanisms. Joint advisory bodies can be mandated to investigate developments and problems in some policy field, and to make recommendations about the appropriate national or joint responses. This is a flexible device that can serve as a neutral source of information and suggestions. Advisory bodies can be elaborate and permanent, like the International Joint Commission of Canada

and the United States, or they can be established as required. Although their policy recommendations are not binding, they can have considerable weight when they are based on credible research, expert analysis of problems, broad public participation, and a realistic appreciation of the constraints on national governments. There are few drawbacks to such bodies. One, of course, is that they have no power other than the force of analysis and suasion: this tends to cause their effects to be felt only in the longer term. They can also prove embarrassing to governments by highlighting flawed policy and neglected problems, and support can always be withdrawn

58 The Grand Alternatives

from them. Finally, there is the matter of cost, and of dividing it between two countries that have comparable interests in the policy area but different sized populations and revenues. Despite these difficulties, it is possible that Canada and Quebec would establish advisory bodies in some areas, such as securities regulation and the environment, if no higher level of political integration was reached, provided that common interests were recognized at the outset of the new relationship. An even weaker level of political integration is reached when national governments have no mutual obligations other than to consult each other regularly. Consultation can occur between ministers, legislatures, regulatory authorities, and even judiciaries. It can be required by treaties or arranged through official or quasi-governmental

organizations. Consultation forces decision makers from each state at least to confront the other’s agenda, and it can promote mutual understanding and informal cooperation, but it offers no certainty of joint or coordinated action. The final level of political integration is one in which integration is null: relations between Canada and Quebec would be like those obtaining between any two states in the international arena. There would be no bilateral institutions linking the two communities; instead, the “normal procedures of international law and diplomacy” would govern their relations.* These relations would be state-to-state. Of course, the two countries would share membership in existing international organizations. Each would participate in the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and many other organizations, and these regimes would impose constraints on the bilateral relationship. But there would be no bilateral political integration. The results of interstate negotiations could be pragmatic agreements to take particular actions, or they could be formal treaties establishing certain rights and obligations. But there would be no general decision rules, and cooperation would take place only when each side judged an arrangement to be in its national interest. The advantage of such an outcome is that full political autonomy would be attained. The disadvantage, of course, is that mechanisms to make collective, binding decisions about matters of common interest would not exist. Which level of political integration would exist between Canada and Quebec in the long run would depend on the relative strength of structural forces conducive to centralization and decentralization. It would also depend on Canada’s internal structure: a system of parliamentary delegations or a set of powerful executive agencies would be unlikely to emerge if the secession left a coherent ROC confront-

ing Quebec about whether parity or proportionality would be the

59 Political Relations between Canada and Quebec

rule in joint decision making. The process of the transition would also be crucial. Not only would the procedures for arranging the secession establish precedents about political relationships, but high levels of mutual hostility at the mass level would limit the degree of political integration that the leaders could arrange. The reason is simple: citizens of neither side would accept infringements on their autonomy imposed by the need to compromise with the other: “In the first place, giving the common institutions any degree of independent authority would be perceived by certain Québécois as giving the rest of Canada a veto power or at least avenues of intervention in fields vital to the building of the Quebec nation. In the rest of Canada, conversely, some might argue that to have Quebec leave is bad enough, but to see imposed on the remainder of the country yet another level

of bureaucracy through which Quebecers can meddle indirectly in its affairs, would be intolerable.”» On the other hand, there may be material benefits associated with different levels of political integration. These would arise if political integration was necessarily associated with economic integration. Less abstractly, although public sentiment in the two states might dictate that there should be little political integration between them, it might be that high levels of economic integration, with their attendant benefits, can only be achieved or sustained when a political superstruc-

ture of common institutions is in place, and this could moderate pressures towards political disengagement. Similarly, secession might produce a weak political superstructure, or none at all, and this might

place a ceiling on the level of economic integration that could be maintained in the long run, thereby increasing the costs of separation. This issue merits a short analysis.

CHAPTER SIX

Does Economic Integration Require Political Association?

The preceding chapters have laid out the various levels of economic and political integration that are possible between sovereign states. Whether there is a connection or correlation between these dimen-

sions is a highly abstract question, but one with a lot of practical significance. After a Quebec secession, many sovereigntists maintain,

economic integration between Canada and Quebec would continue at a high level, that of a common market or an economic union. So the economic disruption caused by the political act of achieving sovereignty would be minimal. Sovereigntists also often envisage that some joint institutions would be established to manage the common economic space, and generally these represent a low level of political integration — quasi-judicial bodies, special agencies, or executive councils of ministers.

Most English-Canadian analysts agree that the level of political integration would be at least this low, because the rupture of secession would make it unlikely that the two countries would agree to vest much power in common legislative or executive bodies. But they tend to assume that there is a close relationship between economic and political integration, and so the lack of joint institutions inevitably would limit the degree of economic integration that would be sustainable between the two countries. As a result, sovereignty would bring economic loss, compared to what would have been at-

tained in the present economic union. This is an important anti-sovereigntist argument. As the following quotations illustrate, it is also widespread:

61 Economic Integration Requires Political Association?

e “A customs union, a common market, or an economic union, let alone a monetary union, are impractical because they all require a significant degree of political integration.” e “However, to some extent there is a relationship between economic integration and political integration; as one moves from a free trade agreement to a customs union to a common market to an economic union, the required extent of political integration also increases. A free trade agreement, for example, requires only a dispute settlement mechanism, while a common market requires some policy coordination and an economic union requires more extensive policy coordination (especially if it is accompanied by a monetary union) as well as a central government with sufficient powers to enforce citizenship rights. This relationship between political and economic union will, for example, therefore constrain the options available under the banner of sovereignty-association; that banner misleadingly suggests that the degree of political integration (sovereignty) can be chosen independently of the degree of economic integration (association).”* e “The key point is that maintaining a customs union requires some minimal degree of political union, because of the divergence in regional interests. Conversely, the rupture of the Canadian political union seems to almost inevitably imply dismantling of the Cana-

dian customs union.”

e “The choices in the economic and political realms are not unrelated, however. The political institutions must be compatible with the chosen degree of economic interdependence.”* e “Indeed, one of the great lessons of recent European experience is that economic union cannot be achieved without a significant degree of political union, probably crossing the threshold from confederalism to federalism. It is utterly unrealistic to imagine that the even wider economic purposes envisioned for ‘economic association’ between Quebec and CWQ [Canada without Quebec] could be achieved while breaking apart the existing political union.”° e “As we shall see, each time one moves from a lesser to a greater degree of integration, an increasing proportion of the economic powers of the nation states must be delegated to supranational institutions.”° e “The existing Canadian customs union has evolved over years in response to the shifting balance of regional and sectoral economic and political forces. It would be highly unrealistic to expect it to persist if political ties between Quebec and Canada were ruptured. Its continuation requires a federal government for resolving

62 The Grand Alternatives

disputes. There can be no economic union without a political union.””

In the same vein, Courchene agrees that an economic union requires central institutions with enough power to compel member states to act in certain policy areas, and he asks, “Why would Quebec risk its economic future by becoming independent only to immediately hand

back to the confederal superstructure much of - and in some areas more than — the ‘sovereignty’ that it gained?” Once more, the assumption is that an economic and monetary union would require that substantial power reside in a joint “legal and administrative superstructure.”® Such propositions are denied by Quebec sovereigntists,

of course. In the words of the Parti québécois, “En accédant 4 la souveraineté, le Québec coupera bien entendu le lien politique avec le régime fédéral, mais dans l’intérét du Québec et du Canada, de nombreux liens a caractére économique seront maintenus.”? The conclusion that economic and political integration are correlated rests on several axioms. Four seem to be critical. First, only some

economic gains can be delivered through negative integration; that is, through rules against barriers to the movement of goods, services, labour, and capital. Further gains require positive integration — uniform regulations and active measures to facilitate the flow of factors in the economic space and to increase economic efficiency within it. second, positive integration is best assured through a central authority,

because there are few incentives for politicians governing separate states to reach cooperative agreements. Third, in democracies, citizens are reluctant to accept laws and regulations that emanate from authorities that are foreign or are otherwise impervious to democratic political control. Fourth, redistribution outside the boundaries of a “sharing community” is politically impossible. Apart from these general axioms, there is some tendency to overstate the economic benefits of greater political integration, because the policies of an ideal

central authority are sometimes contrasted with the costs imposed by noncooperation between real states. One argument for the link between political and economic integration is that higher levels of the latter, such as a free trade zone or a common market, require removing not only tariffs but also non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). To allow fair competition and greater efficiency, the economic space must be relatively homogeneous. Many NTBs are subtle. They include subsidies to domestic firms, discriminatory government procurement, and regulations about such matters as investment and product standards, as well as the regulatory frameworks of such sectors as transportation, communications, and

63 Economic Integration Requires Political Association?

banking. To remove NTBs, the argument runs, there must be an authoritative enforcement mechanism to settle disputes about unfair

trade and to determine whether national policies are acceptable. Naturally, this requires a framework treaty. More effective is a single central authority, such as the European Commission, that can enact

uniform regulations and codes of conduct so that the constitutent states’ practices become standardized. But levelling the competitive playing field may not require such a high degree of political integration. If national policies are broadly similar in effect, constituent governments can extend “mutual recognition” of each other’s policies, accepting them as equivalent. In the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, for example, each country agreed to provide for the accreditation of the other’s testing facilities and inspection agencies.’° When practices are not similar, one state may choose to harmonize regulations voluntarily, a choice that depends on how much inconvenience and economic loss is being caused by noncongruence. As well, unfair NTBs can be attacked, within the framework of an overarching treaty, by dispute-settlement mechanisms. As in the FTA and NAFTA, treaties can impose constraints in areas such as government procurement, agricultural regulations, and foreign investment controls, and disputes about whether regulations

have been unfairly applied or are in conflict with the goals of the treaty can be settled by quasi-judicial bodies. Such processes, however, are slow, are bound by precedent, and produce zero-sum decisions in favour of one side or the other. The constraints they impose are legalistic and administrative, and hence inflexible.” There is less scope for creative compromise than exists within an integrated political system. But such compromises can also be suggested by joint

advisory bodies, a very low level of political integration, and they can also be struck by politicians even when interstate consultations are infrequent. The question is whether those politicians have an incentive to compromise. Another argument focuses on trade policy. Any level of economic integration beyond a free trade zone requires a common commercial policy. Minimally, this means that the cooperating states must agree

on a tariff schedule and on common quotas in special sectors, for example, agriculture, textiles, and footwear. They must also be capable of joint action in trade disputes with third parties, and of negotiating multilateral agreements as a unit, one that is able to bargain

coherently and strategically within a complex set of international coalitions. Finally, commercial policy has spread from simple matters of tariffs and quotas to wider issues such as investment, subsidies, intellectual property, and the environment, so the domestic impact

64 The Grand Alternatives

of trade agreements also has broadened, along with its political ramifications.

The basic requirements of a common commercial policy may be met more effectively and at less cost by a single central authority that has executive and perhaps legislative powers. The large consultative apparatus associated with trade negotiations need not be duplicated. Decisions may be reached more quickly within a single government than when their implications must be gauged separately in two or more communities before being aggregated by negotiation into one common position. As the scope of commercial policy broadens, so does the complexity of the trade-offs to be made between domestic interests, and so too do these theoretical advantages of a single political authority. But of course much depends on how different the economic interests of the constituent states are, for the regional politics of trade arise from international agreements that create benefits and losses that are concentrated regionally. Two states could readily agree ona common commercial policy if their economies were identical — but they never are identical. A single authority also has the capacity to assuage the “losers” from the new policy; that is, it can extend assistance to those bearing costs, by means of regional funds, retraining programs, and adjustment subsidies. Thus, the losers are cross-subsidized by the beneficiaries of the new trade policy. These arguments are not watertight, however. The commercial policy of a customs union can be set by joint parliamentary delegations or through ministerial meetings. Intergovernmental negotiations may then be slower and more complex. But they can still result in a common position; indeed, the difficulty of agreeing can increase lever-

age in negotiations with others.”* Obviously, the decision rule is important. If policy is not set by a single authority, where the rule is consensus within a responsible executive and a majority vote in the legislature, it must be parity or proportionality. But both are unsatisfactory when the states differ considerably in size. If each state insisted on positions that benefited its interests at the expense of the other, nothing would result under parity, and the smaller side would always lose under proportionality. The problem is that interregional trade-offs cannot be made under a strict decision rule. But in a customs union, which always is also a free trade area, interests in each state are interdependent, in complex ways. So an alternative is for there to be no formal decision rules and for negotiations to continue

(including, informally, with trading partners) until agreement is reached. Relative power need not be formalized. While such processes would be complex and time consuming, they could moderate politi-

65 Economic Integration Requires Political Association?

cal resentment, because precise responsibility could not be assigned by the losers. What really counts in commercial policy is being able to implement or “sell” the new rules. At the extreme, in theory, one state could simply adopt the trade policies set by its partner(s) in the customs union, as long as domestic public opinion was willing to accept the outcome. This could depend on the cohesiveness of the citizenry, the organization of interests, and also the adjustment mechanisms available. In theory, again, it is possible that one state’s losses could be compensated by transfers from the other, even without much political integration. If not, the individual states could design adjustment programs; cross-subsidization across borders is not essential. Another argument holds that economic integration at the level of a common market or economic union requires a very high degree of regulatory harmonization. Some relevant regulations are purely domestic; others, such as competition policy, span the states in the union.

There must also be a standard system of commercial law, or agreements that circumvent legal gaps and incompatibilities. Tax structures should be comparable if not identical, especially on the corporate

side. Finally, for positive integration there must be provisions for infrastructural efficiency, either through regulation (as in telecommunications and transport) or through direct provision of installations. All of this is facilitated by a single authority. But can similar results be achieved by independent states at a low level of political integration? Clearly, a substantial part of the regulatory framework governing commerce can be made homogeneous by voluntary harmonization, which needs no contact whatsoever between states, let alone a common legislature and executive. All that is required is that the state which does most of the harmonizing has a government capable of resisting domestic pressures to legislate more favourable or suitable measures.

If economies are interdependent, governments have an incentive to negotiate changes to laws and regulations jointly. One problem in their doing so is delay, because of conflicting interests, and this can be costly in a period of rapid change. But single central authorities also can have difficulty in accommodating regional interests quickly. More serious is the argument that interstate agreements would represent the lowest common denominator — if agreements could be reached at all. Fundamentally, this argument for political integration distinguishes those who believe that sovereign states can and eventually will make mutually beneficial common policy from those who do not. The first position assumes that cooperation to enact economi-

66 The Grand Alternatives , cally efficient policies results from the pressure of people and firms who seek the gains that are not possible because of discordant policies. Along these lines, one analyst described Canada’s legislation facilitating commerce as “the reflection of a spontaneous order shaped by the requirements of trade and the needs of the economic agents, and this order exists whether or not Quebec remains part of the Canadian federation.” But of course there is much in history to warn that institutions providing mutual gains might not arise spontaneously. GATT, to name the most obvious example, has developed very

gradually, and it was established after a destructive period of beggar-thy-neighbour trade policies. One theoretical reason to expect low levels of international cooperation is that states may be motivated not by the prospect of making absolute gains but by considerations of relative gains: even though both sides might benefit from cooperation, this might be refused if one side would benefit

more." .

More generally, suboptimal outcomes can be attributed to political incentives, under conditions of intergovernmental competition. This competition can be horizontal, between states, or vertical, between states and the central authority. Some analysts see intergovernmental competition as fruitful, because it stimulates innovation and effi-

ciency; horizontally, this can occur because governments must be responsive when mobile factors are free to move to the other jurisdictions. Others see horizontal competition as potentially destructive, since governments can adopt policies that impose costs on other states, and they can fail to make agreements in the best interests of the whole union, simply because they are responsive only to domestic constituencies. For example, if some potential change in procurement rules or transport regulation would benefit 80 per cent of the people in one state but only 40 per cent in the other, it would not be adopted, because the second state would not agree. But if there was a central authority, under majority rule, the change would be made.

Further, the argument runs that governments tend to be more responsive to those threatened by change, because these groups havea stronger incentive to organize and lobby for protection than those who would benefit from a new, efficient policy.” So, for example, some regulatory change might benefit 80 per cent of the people in one state and only 60 per cent in the other, but if the losers were more powerfully organized in the second state, the change might still not be agreed. If there were common political institutions, all the potential “winners” would be more likely to prevail over the losers (and

there might be more opportunity for redistribution to mollify the

67 Economic Integration Requires Political Association?

losers). In this view, economic efficiency cannot be maximized with-

out a central “monitor.” But there are other monitors that exist besides a central government. For instance, there is currently little coordination of the provincial governments’ fiscal policy stances within the Canadian

federation, and arguably it is the financial markets that monitor these in the end. Moreover, there are costs to having a central authority, since it can be exercised at the expense of policy innovation and administrative efficiency. More important, there is no guarantee that a central authority will enact economically efficient policies. Certainly, in Canada, the federal government has legislated and spent in ways that have distorted interregional prices and thus tended to fragment the economic union.” In short, a central authority also has incentives to respond to regional constituencies. Still, the absence of a central monitor will sometimes lead to destructive competition between states, and potentially efficient agree-

ments will not be reached. But perhaps the central authority need not involve political integration at the level of a common executive or legislature. One obvious possibility is ajoint advisory body, which could gather information, investigate problems in the economic union,

and suggest policies to improve its operation. Another is a dispute-settlement mechanism, or a trade and regulatory tribunal. The latter has more power but faces several practical obstacles. First, with little legitimacy at the outset, quasi-judicial bodies must slowly build their credibility as impartial monitors. Second, to maintain high

levels of economic integration, their purview must be very broad: states have to agree on acomprehensive and detailed treaty, one reach-

ing far beyond a free trade agreement. If the judicial mechanism is not to be purely negative, but is to be empowered to require action as well as forbidding particular measures, then the treaty must also include common goals agreed by the states, goals that are amenable to judicial interpretation. Third, judicial bodies are not well equipped to act as program designers so as to provide positive direction when states fail to meet their commitments or adhere to the union’s goals.'® But they are capable of declaring regulations and policies to be inad-

equate and to need redesigning. Even so, judicial bodies must act with more reserve than a central political authority, for decisions requiring sweeping policy changes could make the democratic-deficit problem acute. In the end, without a positive central authority, there is no mechanism to compel states to reach agreements that strengthen the economic union. But this is also true whenever subnational governments have any areas of sovereign economic jurisdiction.

68 The Grand Alternatives

Some aspects of positive economic integration are particularly difficult for politically independent states to achieve. In the first place, a common infrastructure requires joint action. This can involve regulation of common services and the direct provision of facilities that increase economic integration and efficiency. While many such mat-

ters can be delegated to special-purpose agencies, they cannot be depoliticized. How serious a problem this is depends on the sensitivities about decisions over which there is no direct democratic control. Such agencies also require agreement on decision rules, staffing, and funding responsibilities, and this may be difficult to achieve when only a few states are involved. Another area where simple harmonization is not enough is the legal framework of commerce. Parallel domestic rules about such mat-

ters as bankruptcy and competition policy and the enforcement of court orders will not suffice to maintain high levels of economic integration. There must be scope for the extraterritorial enforcement of

legislation. It is feasible, for instance, to have identical bankruptcy laws, but if a firm in one state goes bankrupt, there can be no authority over its assets in the other without some treaty providing for this. The same is true for taxation and many areas of corporate law. Similarly, in the securities industry, mirroring another state’s regulations does not guarantee active cooperation. Again, fully harmonized competition policy requires one state to submit the pricing practices of its domestically based transnational firms to the scrutiny of competition authorities that are based in the other jurisdiction. Although some of these problems can be circumvented by requiring that all corporate activity in the other states be conducted through subsidiaries, this reduces economic integration and increases transaction costs. It also raises the problem of transfer pricing in the case of unfair competition — or fraud in the case of bankruptcy — and therefore

simply pushes the extraterritoriality issue back one stage. Alternatively, authority over such matters can be allocated by treaty to a joint body, either regulatory or judicial. In this case, the states have to agree on a decision rule within the body, and its legitimacy will be contested to the extent that its decisions allocate costs and benefits differentially among the component units. Nevertheless, the rather arcane matters involved in competition policy and many other areas, and the uniform interests of dominant businesses in a legal system that integrates the economic space, might help insulate such bodies from domestic political forces. Finally, it is worth noting that the whole problem of cooperatively

achieving positive integration is reduced when governments favour less state management of the economy: “Economic integration is,

69 Economic Integration Requires Political Association?

however, not only the result of international agreements. It is also the spontaneous outcome of the market mechanism in the absence of obstacles to the movement of commodities, people, capital, and en-

terprise. But widespread government interference in the market mechanism has made it necessary to coordinate national policies if they are not to have a disintegrating effect on the economies on which

they operate.”” If market forces are allowed to prevail in the economic space, less coordinated policy will be required, and negative measures to restrict discrimination may suffice. Of course, if the governments of the states have different orientations towards this basic

issue, the probability of maintaining high levels of economic integration is much reduced. The whole framework of the economy will tend to differ in the two states, and the less interventionist government will constantly oppose the distortions introduced by the other state. Another case for the link between economic and political integra-

tion concerns social policy. One prong of this argument is that the traditional instruments of economic management — tariffs, subsidies, regulation, and public enterprises — have become constrained by international agreements or by the state’s fiscal incapacity. Growth now depends on human capital formation and rapid economic adjustment, which require sound and integrated social-policy design.”° Separate states may not achieve economies of scale in providing some social

and educational services, and if people are mobile the constituent units may undersupply some services, such as specialized job training. Hence, there must be a central authority with spending or regulatory powers in these areas. Another prong of this argument is that differences in social policy can produce unfair competition within a common economic space. If one state provides few social entitlements, for example, or has weak laws about workplace safety or the right to

unionize, its products are cheaper, unfairly. Furthermore, wide social-policy variations among the states in a union are inefficient, because firms move to less productive locations in order to access disadvantaged workers and lax regulations, and people are drawn to move by lower taxes or higher benefits (“net fiscal benefits”) rather

than by market wages.” At the extreme, some of these arguments favour a highly centralized or unitary state. But there can be advantages to social-policy differentiation, in the form of competitive efficiency and innovation, that offset the market distortions it creates. As well, much social-policy

harmonization can be achieved without a common political authority that has some jurisdiction in these fields or is capable of spending to enforce uniformity. Minimum standards can be agreed on through

70 The Grand Alternatives

treaties or through a basic charter of social entitlements, like the European Social Charter.” This would require only a dispute-resolution mechanism for enforcement.

Despite all these options, there are two areas of socio-economic policy in an economic union that appear unattainable without high levels of political integration. The first concerns personal mobility. One dimension of this is immigration into the economic space. National governments tend to guard jealously their right to control immigration into the community. It is possible that separate states could harmonize their immigration requirements and procedures or that immigration could be managed jointly under a treaty; but this is a highly sensitive issue in every country, one that is difficult to manage without the public being able to express its views democratically and to hold accountable the political executive that is responsible for the policy. Internal migration is at least as sensitive. An economic union can be most efficient when there is free movement within the economic space, but this means that individuals must receive the equivalent of “national treatment” status — the right to work and to receive social benefits and domestic constitutional protections in any jurisdiction. In theory, this status could be extended mutually by treaty, but the benefits expected to flow from it would then have to be com-

parable. More important, these are basic entitlements of citizenship itself. They help to define the community. It is unlikely that they could

be extended without some political expression of a common identity, particularly an elected legislature. The other policy area where high levels of political integration seem

imperative is redistribution. In integrated economies, interregional transfers are necessary for efficiency. They allow states to offer comparable social-policy packages and so reduce inefficient migration (though this involves no extra cost when migration is restricted anyway). They also ease structural adjustment to external economic shocks that distribute costs and benefits on a regional basis, and adjustment to common policies that have the same effect. Redistribution can prevent adjustment that is inefficient because the shocks are temporary (such as a trade war in grains). It acts as a mutual insurance system within the union. And when policies in the union create inequality or threaten to do so, the resistance of regional coalitions can be overcome when some of the net benefits of the policy change can be re-

distributed to them. So redistribution can increase the economic

efficiency of the union. Does this sharing require common political institutions? It would appear so. The notion that one citizenry should be taxed in order to provide transfers to another government is generally unacceptable.

71 Economic Integration Requires Political Association?

It is difficult enough to tax for foreign aid to desperately impoverished countries; governments could not tax in order to make transfers to the partners in the economic union. Redistribution on any significant scale can only take place within the confines of a political community and through a common government with an independent electoral base. Questions of redistribution are quintessentially political ones: they cannot be hived off to neutral commissions or groups of experts. Only politicians can make the necessary trade-offs, based on their own reading of public opinion and electoral accountability. If transfers were made without such a common government, the citizens in each state would certainly resist, not only on grounds of material self-interest but because transfers would violate basic demo-

cratic principles. As well, it is improbable that the separate states would be willing to compensate their own domestic losers from a common policy when they were numerous, perhaps a majority, and when the beneficiaries were beyond the reach of taxation; instead, the state’s government would have a strong incentive to oppose the policy.

The economic significance of these limitations depends, of course,

on the real contribution of interregional transfers to the economy. The basis of such allocative decisions is their political efficiency, which may not correspond with economic efficiency. Indeed, there are per-

sistent arguments that the Canadian economy has suffered from ex-

cessive interregional redistribution. Transfers have impeded adjustment, have added to the fiscal burden, and have reduced competitiveness.* Nevertheless, if redistribution can strengthen an economic union, and if common political institutions are essential for this function as well as for allowing individual mobility, then there clearly is a ceiling on the level of economic integration that can be achieved without them. A final consideration concerns monetary policy and currency. Based on the evolution of the European Union, it is sometimes argued that a common monetary authority cannot be sustained without deepening political integration. But the experience of currency boards and the existence of countries where the American dollar is used speak against this suggestion. In fact, many economists are persuaded that monetary policy affects nothing except inflation levels in the long run, and they use this to argue for isolating central banks from political influence. In any case, one state in an economic union obviously could be a pure monetary-policy taker. Equally obviously, if the population of that state did not believe in the neutrality of monetary policy, or if short-term shocks were not appropriately adjusted, there would have to be a strong political consensus that the costs of

72 The Grand Alternatives

accepting another state’s policy were outweighed by other benefits of the economic union or by other benefits of sovereignty. The overall conclusion here is that there is only a weak link between economic and political integration. Particular levels of economic integration can be achieved within a variety of institutional frameworks. Indeed, it is easy to neglect the full range of political institutions through which economic arrangements can be made and managed. These include voluntary harmonization, consultations and the use of expert advisory bodies, standard international negotiations that produce treaties, quasi-judicial mechanisms to settle disputes, special-purpose regulatory and administrative bodies, and joint delegations, as well as common legislatures and executives. Even this list omits non-official mechanisms that can promote harmonization,

such as the Scandinavian Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Uniform Law Movement in the United States. One can classify the broad functions of government with respect to economic integration. Judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have the

advantage of some insulation from normal political pressures and lend themselves to formal parity in representation. They can achieve negative integration by outlawing discrimination, and they may have some ability to promote positive integration by ruling against measures that are uncoordinated or are not in the spirit of treaties. Regulatory and special-purpose bodies can also achieve positive measures,

though if their activities are very intrusive, the problem of democratic accountability will arise. Allocative functions cannot be sus-

tained in the absence of a common political authority with an independent democratic base; this expresses the existence of an underlying sharing community that constitutes a political union. Without such central institutions, the highest levels of economic integration cannot be attained. To sum up, high degrees of economic integration can be achieved more quickly, flexibly, effectively, and efficiently by a central authority with an independent democratic base than by the separate or cooperative action of sovereign states — in principle. These advantages are not inevitably realized, because internal conflict and the political incentives in place may produce stasis or economically inefficient policies. It is not inconceivable that fairly high levels of economic integration could be maintained through voluntary harmonization, though this will require a government capable of resisting domestic pressures to establish a separate regulatory regime. Nor is it impossible that more positive measures could result from the joint action of the constituent states, though there is much to suggest that this will occur only when there are clear mutual gains to be realized and

73 Economic Integration Requires Political Association?

when functions can be hived off to quasi-judicial or regulatory bodies that can gradually establish their legitimacy. Generally, the political incentives within two states that do not share a common legislature

and executive are purely domestic, so the separate governmental calculations of costs and benefits are necessarily partial. This would inhibit some cooperative solutions, though there will still be incentives to promote economic integration when economic interests are interdependent. What does all this suggest about the effects of a sudden drop in the level of political integration? First, there would be an immediate decline in economic integration because cross-border mobility and redistribution would end. Positive integration brought about by a joint legislature’s spending throughout the economic space would also cease. The size of these losses to the whole economy or any part of it would depend on how important mobility had been as an avenue of adjustment and how economically efficient transfers and other expenditures had been. Beyond this, the effects are less certain. A drop in political integration is rather different from that normally contemplated in analyses of economic and political unions, most of which focus on increasing integration. Generally, economic integration is the desired end, and political nonintegration is an obstacle to it, largely because the separate constituencies of governments resist particular measures or a general surrender of authority. But this situation may not be symmetrical with a decrease in political integration.” For instance, if two governments tentatively agreed on a change of regulations that increased efficiency in the common economic space but created a set of losing interests in one state, these interests could block the change;

they could also stir resistance to laws derived from “outside” the democratic polity. But when the regulation is already in place, there exists a political and economic equilibrium. People and firms have already adjusted to it, and no losers are created by leaving it in place. Of course, some domestic interests might mobilize to promote a change

that would benefit them, or economic shocks might provide an incentive for change; and if some state(s) in the union made policy changes, the other governments would have to decide whether to follow suit or not. But these pressures are different from, and probably less powerful than, those that inhibit governments from departing from the status quo in order to enter new integrative arrangements. Over the longer run, the separate governments, responsive to different domestic constituencies and subject to different external eco-

nomic influences, would tend to enact distinct policies, thereby decreasing the level of economic integration. The propensity to do

74 The Grand Alternatives

this would be a function of the extent of economic interdependence, which would decline as political integration eroded, thus producing less incentive for cooperation, and so on. But much could depend on the institutions still in existence. We have seen that central political institutions can play a powerful role in maintaining an integrated economic space. Except for redistribution and mobility, a joint legislature and responsible executive are not, in theory, essential to maintain high levels of economic integration. Still, replacement mechanisms

would have to be established to substitute for the roles played by

central authorities. These could include, as described above, a dispute-settlement mechanism about economic regulation, an advisory body on the economic union, and agencies to manage common infrastructure and assure extraterritorial legal enforcement. Treaties also would be required to provide for mutual recognition of regulations, the general goals of the union, and social entitlements. In theory, such a framework could maintain economic integration at a relatively high level, but in fact its long-term effectiveness would depend on the willingness of citizens to accept rules over which they had no direct democratic control (or, conversely, on the ability of politicians to explain the rules as necessary). The initial question, of

course, is whether such a framework would be established in the first place. This would depend on the attitudes of citizens and the incentives facing governments at the time of the change. To return to Canada and Quebec, this implies that the process of the transition to sovereignty requires careful, detailed analysis. The political atmosphere of the time and the decisions taken during the event would have enduring consequences. How the secession took place would help determine the degree of political integration that would exist between Canada and Quebec and, not quite independently, the level of economic integration that would be maintained between them. This in turn would determine in part how costly the separation would be. Before proceeding to analyse the transition to sovereignty, however, it is necessary to examine briefly the underlying factors that are conducive to centralization and decentralization in a political system. These, too, would help determine the degree of integration that would obtain between Quebec and ROC, and also the long-term configuration of Canada itself.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization

If Quebec secedes, Canada could take on any one of a variety of constitutional forms. As discussed earlier, it could reconstitute itself anywhere along the continuum from highly centralized (or unitary) to highly decentralized (or fragmented). The alternatives are clear. Here, our subject is the underlying factors that help determine the degree of centralization in any political unit. The basic idea is that institutions are shaped by societal characteristics.’ In theory, constitutions should accommodate the socio-economic features of the polity; in practice, the structural characteristics give rise to currents of opinion and political forces that influence the creation of constitutions. These underlying factors are relevant both to the constitutional make-up of Canada and to the degree of economic and political integration that

would exist between Canada and an independent Quebec. For example, if ROC was more homogeneous culturally than Canada is now, then, other things remaining equal, this would be conducive to a constitution more centralized than the current one. Similarly, if Canada and Quebec had very different economic and trade interests, this would restrict the level of political integration of the post-secession institutions that the two countries would establish. Structural factors shape constitutions in two ways. First, they have an impact at the time of their creation, both because they help give rise to the political forces at play and because those engaged in writing constitutions take them into account. Second, the characteristics of the polity are always in flux, however gradually, and this evolution will create pressure for constitutional change. Our interest here

76 The Grand Alternatives

is in the first relationship rather than in long-term evolution. This is justified because in assessing ROC’s constitutional make-up and the level of integration between Canada and Quebec, the most important determinant will be the conditions at the time of the separation. In part, this is because secessions are such monumental events that some “underlying” characteristics can change during their course. As well, there is more room for disagreement about how these factors are evolving than about their current nature. Some analysts see global economic and technological change eroding Canada’s east-west economic links and integrating Canadian regions economically and culturally with the United States.’ All this is conducive to decentralization over the long run. But others focus on ROC’s prospects for cultural, ideological, and economic coherence.’ At the time of a separation, political actors would operate “in the shadow of the future,” as they see it, but this is indeterminate, and the first issue to settle is how structural characteristics would affect institutional design during the secession.* The analysis here will be brief. This is certainly not because of a shortage of factors. To explain the degree of centralization written into constitutions, scholars have invoked a very large number of geographic, social, economic, institutional, and political characteristics. Moreover, these elements are interrelated. As one analyst of stability in federal states put it, almost despairingly, “there is a complex interplay among all the variables.”° Theories of centralization and decentralization also differ in the relative emphasis placed on these factors and about the nature of their interrelationships. Nevertheless, there are several comprehensive surveys of the factors that shape the initial form of federal states and of those that determine their evolution and stability. This discussion relies on them,° but it treats the subject only briefly because structural characteristics would not strictly determine the constitutional outcome in Canada (or the degree of integration that would exist between Canada and Quebec). To anticipate, the analysis shows that there are few very strong pressures towards either centralization or decentralization in ROC and that those that do exist point in contradictory directions. Beyond this, analysts have shown that when institutions are being established, both structural and conjunctural factors are important in determining their form. If Quebec secedes, the conjunctural factors will be crucial. In short, the underlying characteristics of the polity would leave much latitude for political choice. The most comprehensive surveys of the determinants of federal structures have been made by Ronald Watts. These address the factors that promote more or less centralization when federal constitu-

tions are created and those determining their later evolution and

77 Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization

stability. The first set of factors is laid out in table 3.’ The top panel lists those conducive to a centralized union, while the bottom panel contains those that tend towards regional autonomy. For the most part, the second are mirror images of the first, but some deserve separate discussion. The table also scores the strength of each factor. Most of the factors are structural characteristics, relatively immutable, but others (denoted by “C”) are conjunctural, meaning that their force and direction depend on the events of the time. The factors are presented both for Canada (as it would exist without Quebec), and for Canada-Quebec integration after secession. The qualitative analysis here can be supplemented by reference to the data in tables Al and A2, as well as to the discussion of ROC’s characteristics in chapter 1. Taking the structural factors first, an important one is the prospect of economic advantage. In deciding, after secession, whether and how to maintain the Canadian federation, economic considerations would weigh heavily. In the Canadian economic union as it exists, there are large trade flows, considerable corporate integration, and much labour mobility. There is also scope for positive integration by the central government, through the judicial system, federal regulation and spending on infrastructure, and redistribution. These considerations would be a force for maintaining the economic union in Canada along with

a central government capable of managing it. On the other hand, regional economic interests are diverse, a factor conducive to decentralization. The Atlantic provinces are weakly linked by trade to the rest of Canada. But their residents and govern-

ments have an overwhelming interest in continued federal direct spending and transfers. In 1990 net federal transfers to these provinces ranged from 20 per cent of provincial GDP in New Brunswick to 36 per cent in Prince Edward Island.’ The major economic diver-

gence in ROC is between the West and Ontario. Insofar as their resource-based and manufacturing economies are complementary, much of the historical legacy is one of central-Canadian domination, through tariffs to protect manufacturing in Ontario and Quebec, and through “positively” integrating measures such as the Canadian Pacific Railway and the National Energy Program. Nevertheless, there is no inherent conflict of economic interest between these regions. Because of the extreme fluctuations of the resource-based western economy, it is recognized that the economic union provides substantial benefits in the form of mutual insurance, stabilization, and labour mobility; without these, price volatility would directly affect wages and employment. Also important is the power of Canada in international negotiations. The West alone probably could not have matched

Canada’s success in disputes with the United States about potash and lumber.’

78 The Grand Alternatives Table 3

Factors Conducive to Centralization and Decentralization

I UNION Canada Canada-Quebec C' 1 Desire for independence/external threat XX? OO° 2 Economic advantage:

(i) scale and complementarity X X

(ii) positive economic integration X -? C3(iii) unified interest groups XXOAdministrative efficiency

(i) (ii) defence diplomacyXXxxX O

4 External relations:

(iii) trade 6 Geographic contiguity OO X

5 Ethnic and cultural homogeneity X O

7 Historical political association X X 8 Similar political and social institutions X —

C109Successful Politicalmodels leadership X OO of federalism X O

C 11 American/international policy X X 12 Sense of common citizenship X OO I] AUTONOMY

C 1. Fear of domination after independence OO OO 2 Diverse economic interests:

(i) regional specialization (ii) inequality O O~-

3 Administrative convenience:

(i) regional homogeneity O (ii) effectiveness O- O

(i) defence XX X (ii) diplomacy (iii) trade O O-

4 Conflicting external relations:

9 Ethnic and cultural diversity X O

67 Geographic Historical dispersion identity -OO8 Dissimilarities:

(i) political and social institutions X = (ii) ideologies O O C 9 Regional political leadership O OO

10 Models of autonomy O O

C 11 American/international policy X X

12 Sense of regional identity O OO

Notes: ' Conjunctural factors, whose force and direction depend on the events of the time ? X signifies tendencies towards centralization > O signifies tendencies towards decentralization * A dash means neutral

79 Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization

Still on the decentralization side, it is true that considerable regional inequality would exist in ROC; in fact, without Quebec, disparities would be more obvious. This is normally a factor conducive to demands for autonomy, but in Canada these demands would not arise from poorer provinces concerned about economic domination or exploitation; on the contrary, the pressure for decentralization could emanate from wealthier provinces that were no longer prepared to subsidize the poorer regions. On the other hand, as noted above, the burden of redistributive programs would be lessened if Quebec had seceded. The next factor is administrative efficiency. There are obviously some gains to be realized when a central government has substantial powers with respect to defence, foreign affairs, taxation, justice, standards and patents, and other common services. This especially benefits the smaller provinces. But most provinces fully realize economies of scale in services such as elementary and secondary education, and

there are strong arguments for provincial administration of many other functions. More responsive to local interests and preferences and quicker in decision making, the provinces can also compete in program design and delivery, and this stimulates innovation and efficiency.

In foreign affairs, there are evident advantages to a strong federal

role. There is no interregional disagreement with the country’s well-defined role in North American and NATO defence or with its peacekeeping functions. The same is true of diplomacy. Trade is another matter. Although the major interprovincial disagreements about the FTA and NAFTA have now been decided, there remain substantial differences in the direction of trade flows. British Columbia is orienting towards the Pacific Rim economies, including that of the northwestern United States; Alberta’s major flow of output is into the United States, as is Ontario’s; and the Atlantic region is heavily dependent on foreign markets. In fact, every region sells more abroad than it sells within ROC. This produces some trade policy differences, as in the east-west split in the GATT negotiations about supply management in agriculture. Once more, though, the major divisive issues, both in North America and in GATT, have been settled, and there is a common structural interest in a central government that is capable of negotiating internationally and protecting domestic interests in trade disputes, especially when the provinces can still be integrated into international bargaining frameworks or left free to make international arrangements of their own.

There is no doubt that Canada without Quebec would be more homogeneous ethnically and culturally than at present. With respect

80 The Grand Alternatives

to language, the data in table Al make this clear. Beyond simple demographics are the cultural elements of a national character. According to Charles Taylor’s analysis, ROC would share several elements of a

common identity: the fact that English Canadians are united by a sense of being different and less violent than Americans; a commitment to the collective provision of public goods and to regional equal-

ity; an endorsement of multiculturalism; and a strong support for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." At present, these values conflict with some of those widely shared in Quebec. In particular, the desire to preserve Quebec’s autonomy and to ensure its cultural survival contradict ROC’s insistence on regional equality, multiculturalism, and the Charter. The removal of this conflict would

be conducive to a more centralized ROC constitution. ,

However, Canada would become geographically discontiguous, a

factor that normally works strongly in the opposite direction. In Canada’s case, though, this factor might be more psychological than real. As Watts points out, transportation and communications facilities can be more important than sheer geography. Moreover, the Atlantic provinces are economically dependent and have traditionally

supported a strong central government that is able to direct equalization and other transfers to the region.” Although Quebec seces-

sion would lead to greater intraregional cooperation in Atlantic Canada, as the threat of it already has done, it would not weaken the

region’s adherence to Canada.” Nor should discontiguity in itself lead other citizens or governments to advocate decentralization. More generally, though, the geographic dispersion of the country’s population is a factor against centralization, as it always has been. The Canadian provinces have a long historical association within

the present federation. This is an inertial force for continued unity, and it would especially be so in the absence of the province that has most resisted great national efforts —- in the two world wars — and also has most strenuously demanded structural changes in the federal association. On the other hand, the adherence of the western provinces to the federation is relatively recent and is still marked by their former neocolonial status, which was apparently reasserted by Ottawa’s resource policies in the 1970s and 1980s. The effects of these historical grievances cannot be ignored, even though they have been somewhat mitigated by the constitutional amendments of 1982 and by less interventionist central governments since 1984. The Canadian provinces also have very similar political and social institutions. The basic political institutions, administrative structures and traditions, and legal systems are all marked by only minor variations. Less formally, the political party systems are basically alike,

81 Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization

and the national party system remains an integrating force. On the other hand, it can be argued that there have emerged significant ideological cleavages between the West and the rest of Canada, focused on the populism and belief in direct democracy that have swept the West in the past and are now concentrated in, though not restricted to, the Reform Party. This ideology includes a mistrust of strong central government, and to the extent that it is a regional phenomenon, it must be counted as a force against centralization. For most Canadians, the present constitutional system represents a satisfactory model of federalism. Opinion has varied over time, affected by the incumbent government’s performance, but there is little evidence of the strong and pervasive dissatisfaction with the federal system that exists in Quebec.** However, there are also strong models of provincial autonomy and decentralization in Canada, particularly in the West. Governments in British Columbia and espe-

cially in Alberta have supported Quebec demands for greater provincial powers, and the core western requirement for constitutional change has become a triple-E Senate. While the pervasiveness

of decentralist “province building” has been overstated somewhat (though it obviously applies to Alberta), there are clear models of provincial autonomy that conflict with the existing distribution of powers. Some have argued that Ontario, traditionally supportive of a strong central government, could also take a more autonomist position as a consequence of fiscal restraint, shifting trade flows, and the failure to have its interests adequately represented in federal

policy. Finally, there is the underlying sense of common citizenship, a fac-

tor stressed not by Watts but by Hicks and others.” Undoubtedly, there is in the population a substantial reservoir of identification with Canada as such, though there is also a strong identification with re-

gions and provinces. Donna Dasko, summarizing a decade of Environics polls, notes a decline in the propensity to identify with Canada more than with one’s own province. Between 1980 and 1991,

the proportion who did so dropped from 62 to 53 per cent, the biggest drop being in Quebec. The percentages identifying most with Canada at the end of this period were 69 per cent in Ontario, 57 per cent in the West, and 49 per cent in the Atlantic region.*° Of course, this mixed loyalty is characteristic of federations.” It underpins a system where power is divided on a regional basis. These deep loyalties are enduring, but as the change noted by Environics shows, they do move with events. So this factor is conjunctural to some extent, and it would certainly be so if Quebec seceded, for the issue at the time of Canada’s reconstitution would be how strongly people

82 The Grand Alternatives

identified with Canada-without-Quebec, not with Canada as it exists today. How citizens actually felt would not become apparent until the event occurred. For example, some English Canadians take pride

in the cultural duality of the country: Quebec’s distinctiveness is a characteristic that strengthens their identification with Canada. So if Quebec separated, one of the foundations of their sense of community and citizenship would be lost. For others, Quebec’s distinctiveness is irritating and an impediment to their identification with the country as a whole, and therefore its “departure” would permit a greater attachment to ROC. The relative size of these two groups is impossible to estimate, but if irritation with Quebec is stronger in the West than elsewhere, that region’s identification with the country should increase with separation. Beyond this, the sense of common citizenship can be affected by momentous events. National solidarity during the crisis of war is an obvious example. This implies that the balance between national and regional identities, so important because it sets parameters to the actions of political élites, may be strongly influenced by how the process of Quebec secession occurs. A sense of crisis could lend support to centralizing forces. As Roger Gibbins put it, If Quebec remains in Canada, the likely drift of constitutional evolution will | be towards the concentration of the instruments of governance within Quebec and the fragmentation of the same outside Quebec. However, if Quebec should leave, there may be strong incentives for Canadians to reconstruct an effective national government for the rest of the country. In this case, the dynamics of reconstruction could result in a more centralized federal state in which Ottawa, and not the provinces, would be empowered to address the concerns of the new political agenda ... At the very least we should expect a period of assertive nationalism as Canadians try to redefine their new country and national community; the classic Canadian search for a national identity would come back with a vengeance."

Of course, if this search failed, the sense of crisis could lend support for decentralist or secessionist alternatives in Canada. Or this could happen earlier. In Gordon Gibson’s view, rallying to Ottawa would be to respond to the siren call of national solidarity. If English Cana-

dians gathered in a constituent assembly and contemplated where their interests and loyalties lay, the result could well be “a vastly pruned back central authority, amounting to little more than a vehicle for international continuity and a service bureau for the provinces.”"”

This leads to the more obviously conjunctural factors denoted in table 3. Historically, the desire for independence and the presence of

83 Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization

an external threat have often been critical in the decision to form federations and in determining the degree to which power is vested in the central authority. Centralization can be a response to an external threat. The obvious candidate, as in 1867, is the United States. While anti-Americanism has declined in Canada over the past two decades, there is strong public sentiment that Canada should remain independent of the United States, and thus the fear of fragmentation and absorption would support centralization. As Léon Dion, an astute observer of Canadians, put it, English Canada has been unable

to accept decentralization because of “la peur de son propre éclatement” [the fear of itself busting apart].”” But more important would be the immediate threat that Quebec secession would pose to Canadians in the form of economic loss and uncertainty. In the course of a separation, Quebec could come to be seen as a foreign, danger-

ous entity. Both dynamics could support resolute action from the centre. Consequently, the secession could leave a residue of centralism, one that might even be inscribed in the constitution of a reformed Canada. In opposition to this tendency, however, could be the decentralizing fear of domination within the federation. The cause would be the power of Ontario in the new Canada. The Atlantic region would have few options but to accept this, albeit grudgingly. The real concern would be in the West, where many citizens distrust central Canada and Ottawa, and would resist a federal government with strong powers

if it was dominated by Ontario. The relative balance of these forces would depend on the sense of crisis generated at the time of secession, as well as on the other conjunctural factors. When constitutions are created, organized interests play an important role. Thus, if Quebec seceded, many groups would seek constitutional changes, though only a few would be most concerned with the distribution of power within Canada. These groups would probably stress the advantages of continued economic union and the need for central power. Many business, labour, and other organizations are federal in structure, but most business associations are unitary.” Some of the most important business groups are organized primarily in English Canada, having only weak confederal links, if any, with their Quebec counterparts. The same is true of labour organizations, and their advocacy of strong central power, or at least of maintaining the economic union in ROC, would be buttressed by their declining ties to American unions and their concentration in the public and para-public sectors. Political leadership would be a crucial conjunctural factor. At the

creation of the federations surveyed by Watts and others, it is clear that politicians had considerable autonomy, within the complex of structural forces, to design institutional arrangements. Leadership

84 The Grand Alternatives

would also be important because structural characteristics are open to differing interpretations at any particular time, and so political discourse shapes, to some extent, the salience of factors such as regional economic specialization, ethnic homogeneity, and even geographic contiguity. Thomas Berger provides a good example of the “spin” that articulate leaders can apply to such factors: With Quebec gone, will Canada be a Pakistan of North America, with the Maritimes inevitably breaking away, as Bangladesh did from Pakistan? Such comparisons are trivial. A better one would be the United States, which is a Pakistan of North America: it has forty-eight contiguous states, and Alaska with Canada’s land mass in between (not to mention Hawaii). Alaska shows no sign of leaving the Union because of the distance it lies from the lower forty-eight. I lived in Alaska for two years in the mid-1980s. Alaskans, like Canadians, believe they have good reasons to remain where and as they are.”

In ROC, there are strong national parties focused on the central gov-

ernment, and with an interest in its perpetuation. In the event of a secession, there certainly would be leaders arguing for a federation at least as centralized as the current one. But there are also powerful regional spokesmen, especially in the West, who are prepared to articulate the vision of a decentralized Canada or one with stronger regional representation in central institutions, and who perhaps are even prepared to advocate secession. Similarly, there is Ontario leadership that is ready to protect the interests of the province, whether these are said to lie in a more or less centralized federalism or even

in some separate arrangement with Quebec. In the abstract, leadership’s effects are unpredictable, but at a time of profound uncertainty, constitutional and otherwise, it would be crucial in determining the constitutional make-up of a new Canada. Finally, there is the attitude of foreign powers. Most important by far is the United States. This country can be counted on to support a united Canada. It would also support a ROC at least as centralized as Canada is now, and the attitude of other foreign states and international organizations would be similar. The reason is simple: “If secession occurs, foreign governments have two unknowns to deal

with: the newly seceded government, and either a weakened old regime or an unpredictable new one which displaces it. All these possibilities portend disruption and instability in international relations and strengthen the inclination of foreign governments to support central regimes.”* The same holds true for foreign attitudes towards the integrity of the states that emerge from the separation.

85 Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization

This concludes the analysis of the factors conducive to centralization and decentralization in a new constitution for ROC. Table 3 also

displays the direction and strength of structural and conjunctural factors that would bear on the degree of centralization — or political integration, to adopt the terminology used earlier —- between Canada and Quebec. Each one need not be discussed here. But it is evident that there are far fewer characteristics conducive to integration than would be operative within ROC. Most notable among the structural factors are the more limited opportunities for positive economic integration, the diplomatic differences in foreign policy, the lack of so-

cial and political homogeneity, and the possible dissimilarities in political institutions and ideology; as well, there are few successful models of strong integration between two sovereign states, and the sense of “regional” identification in each unit would be very strong. The conjunctural factors are even more heavily weighted against close integration. With secession, the other unit would represent a poten-

tial threat, to autonomy on Quebec’s side and integrity on ROC’s, and to economic well-being on both sides. The act of separation, by definition, would fracture any existing sense of common citizenship. Political leadership might be oriented towards maintaining the existing degree of integration, but the strongest political incentives would

be towards safeguarding the interests of the respective states. The conjuncture — the process of the transition to sovereignty — needs closer investigation, but clearly the structural factors are not conducive to a high degree of political integration between Canada and an independent Quebec. The conclusions here are straightforward. The underlying characteristics of ROC alone are more compatible with centralization than are those of Canada as it is currently composed. One major structural problem would be the geographic isolation of the Atlantic provinces. Much more significant would be the incipient suspicion between the West, especially Alberta and British Columbia, and an Ontario that might be capable of dominating the federation. Geographic, economic, political, and ideological cleavages overlap to some extent along this divide. Of course, it is not entirely evident that if Quebec seceded, Ontarians or their leaders would support a federation centralized even to the existing extent. In any event, while most underlying factors are conducive to centralization, there are countervailing propensities towards regional autonomy along almost every dimension. So these factors in themselves could hardly determine the shape of the institutional arrangements that would be put in place if Quebec seceded. This means that the conjunctural factors would be crucial. The main ones are the exercise of political leadership and the

86 The Grand Alternatives

extent to which secession and the uncertainty it creates would be perceived as threats that could be countered only through the determined wielding of central power. This brief analysis suggests once again that the internal make-up of Canada, as well as the relations likely to obtain between Canada and an independent Quebec, can only be understood by a close study of the transition to Quebec sovereignty. The institutional outcomes of the secession will be shaped largely by the process through which

it occurs, by the events and decisions involved in this momentous development, rather than by the deeper geographic, economic, social, and cultural characteristics of the two countries.

PART TWO

The Transition to Sovereignty

For reasons suggested in the preceding part of this study, in order to predict the future of Canada and the shape of Canada-Quebec relations, one has to comprehend the process of separation. The first chapter of this part explains why this is so. Then the analysis turns to other studies of Quebec secession, surveying the existing literature in order to reach some tentative conclusions about what might take place in the course of a separation of Quebec from Canada. But these are inconclusive and contradictory. So we proceed to comparative analysis of other secessions. Here, the focus is almost exclusively on cases where secession has occurred peacefully. From the analysis of the few relevant cases, we draw some generalizations about how the process of separation takes place. The pattern of peaceful secession seems to hold true, uniformly. But it should be stressed now that the pattern is composed of mere empirical generalizations. They define a process that has occurred when peaceful secession has happened in the past — that is all. No claim can be made that this pattern constitutes a theory of peaceful secession, that any set of generalizations is more important than the others, that any one is a necessary or sufficient condition of peaceful secession, or that the pattern will be found in future separations. Still, the regularity is striking. Consequently, the generalizations are used in part 3 as the framework for analysing the Canada-Quebec case. Before that is done, the last part of the comparative chapter considers another case, the separation of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This is the

88 The Transition to Sovereignty

most recent instance of secession that could have much relevance for Canada. In the Czech-Slovak case, the generalizations reached from comparative analysis are, for the most part, borne out, but there are also some interesting variations, and these are analysed in some detail. The point of all this groundwork is to allow a detailed assessment of how the transition to Quebec sovereignty would occur. But why is this so crucial?

CHAPTER EIGHT

Why the Transition Is Important

One purpose of this study is to predict what ROC would become if Quebec secedes — but there is a wide range of institutional configurations that Canada could take on. Another purpose is to predict what economic and political relations would exist between Canada and a sovereign Quebec — but there are many alternative levels of integration that could be established. Each of these various arrangements has its advantages and disadvantages, theoretically, but each also has its partisans and predictors. There is a simple reason for this: no one knows what will happen if Quebec secedes. And yet no one can know what will become of Canada and Quebec unless they understand the

process of getting there. The transition to sovereignty would determine long-term outcomes. There are several good reasons to believe this. In the view of most scholars, there exist underlying structural char-

acteristics in any country that are conducive to creating a more or less centralized constitution. But these would not determine the outcomes of a Quebec-Canada separation, for they tend in contradic-

tory directions; geography, for example, dictates a decentralized Canada, while social and cultural homeogeneity would support a more centralized system. This means that there is no overwhelming pressure towards one or another option. Anyway, such factors are never quite determining of constitutional and institutional outcomes. Within the constraints they appear to impose, there still exists a range of alternatives. Even if the factors were unidirectional, so that they would appear to rule out extreme

90 The Transition to Sovereignty

outcomes such as a fragmented Canada or a Canada-Quebec federation, analysts could still imagine some trajectory of events that would produce the extremes. This is because the underlying factors are subject

to interpretation. Analysts disagree about their relative importance, so that some would regard a geographically divided Canada as quite unsustainable while others would portray noncontiguity as irrelevant. As well, the very nature of these factors is open to debate. In one theory, Canada-Quebec relations would depend mainly on the degree of cultural distinctiveness between the two states; but some analysts find little that separates the communities except for language, while others regard each as a “global society,” sharply defined by a distinctive and all-pervasive cultural viewpoint.’ When it is realized that all citizens of the two states are “analysts,” it becomes clear that interpreting and defining the underlying characteristics, their direction, and their relative influence is a matter of political debate. The outcome of that debate is not predetermined. This is all the more true because many factors are conjunctural. Geography may be eminently predictable, but public attitudes towards the other community, the position taken by organized interests, and the stance of foreign powers are far less certain. So is the process of the event. For instance, one possibility for a post-secession Canada is that existing provincial boundaries would be changed, to form regional units or many small provinces. One can identify forces conducive to each outcome, but as Maureen Covell has pointed out, the results would depend on how the transition was negotiated: “Sce-

narios that envisage the elimination of the provinces are less likely to emerge from a negotiation process dominated by provincial governments than from a process in which they are absent.”* To understand the outcome of the separation, it is essential to comprehend what form these conjunctural factors would assume and how they would evolve under the pressure of events. Secessions offer huge scope for political debate and leadership. It has long been recognized that political leaders and governments have some autonomy from socio-economic forces and their attendant political expressions, even in democracies. When these forces are contradictory, that autonomy increases.’ Beyond this, secessions are not times of normal politics. The system is changing, profoundly. There is a high degree of uncertainty about the future and about where people’s interests lie. The normally settled relationship between socio-economic interests and their political expression is much attenuated, if not quite eliminated. At least in the short term, this may open up more room for both public debate and the determined exercise of political leadership.

91 Why the Transition Is Important

Secession is not politics as usual. It is an historic event. In any soci-

ety, it is unprecedented, and in the Canadian case it would be doubly extraordinary because there has never been a secession in an advanced, industrial, capitalist democracy.* By definition, an historic event is one in which the past is a feeble guide, the future is radically uncertain, and decisions taken in the present have great consequences. As it unfolds, the event is sweeping enough to affect profoundly the economy, society, and polity in ways that are interrelated. Deep eco-

nomic uncertainty, for example, has political ramifications; social unrest or the creation of new political institutions has economic consequences. This means that the transition to sovereignty must be studied in close detail. The forces at play and the interrelations between them must be seized in their historical specificity. As Wood put it, secession “is less aptly understood as a condition than a process.”°

The long-term structure of Canada and the relations that would exist between Canada and a sovereign Quebec are a function of what happens in the transition. They are path-dependent. After a period of turbulence and uncertainty, a new equilibrium will be established, and this will depend on the choices made during the transition.® This

result is not merely a matter of normal historical change or evolution, in the sense that a particular condition would not exist without its antecedents, although it is true that big decisions are made when states are breaking up. During a secession, choices are also made about

institutional structures. This is inescapable, for the existing institutions have been challenged or demolished. Once established, structures have enduring effects. Institutions channel peoples’ interactions,

shape expectations, and embody, more or less explicitly, particular norms and values.’ So they have some independent weight in producing policy outcomes and determining the long-term evolution of the system. Institutions help shape the underlying societies from which

emanate future political demands.® This is another reason why the outcomes of a secession depend on the process through which it occurs. So the events marking the secession and the conditions within which it takes place set the atmosphere for taking crucial decisions. In mak-

ing these decisions, despite the constraints of cultural and socio-economic factors, there is considerable leeway for political debate and political leadership. The decisions set other events in train, sometimes momentously. They produce new institutions, ones that have concrete effects in themselves, as evolving complexes of political forces are channelled through them to produce new outcomes. In

the end, the system may settle into a relatively stable equilibrium, and underlying factors such as social homogeneity and geography

92 The Transition to Sovereignty

may exert their marginal pressures on its evolution. But the equilibrium that is reached after the secession is only one of many that are possible. Which one results is dependent on the transition, so this must be analysed closely, using the insights of other analysts and the experience of other countries.

CHAPTER NINE

Other Studies of the Transition

to Quebec Sovereignty ,

INTRODUCTION

This study is guided by the view that a Quebec secession would be peaceful. That is, there would be no state-sanctioned use of military force against the citizens or armed forces of other states. There might be violent unrest and armed forces might be deployed, but there would be no massive repression or civil war. These parameters apparently render inapplicable much comparative experience from cases where secession succeeded or failed only after long attempts to suppress it or through a civil war, as in Switzerland, the United States, Ireland, Katanga, Biafra, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and so on. We assume a peace-

ful separation in which the Quebec electorate expresses a clear preference for sovereignty, and Canada agrees that Quebec will become a sovereign state. Thus, it might not seem necessary to deal directly with some basic problems normally attendant on the formation of new states, such as the legitimacy of the secessionist claim and the matter of international recognition when sovereignty is contested.! Nor might it seem useful to consider the potential for military conflict between Canada and Quebec, or to contemplate possible Canadian efforts either to reassert control over the portions of the province that were added in 1898 and 1912 or to assist subsecessionist movements in Quebec, though these topics recently have attracted the attention of some commentators.*? Despite our guiding assumptions, however, these issues must be addressed. Any survey of other studies has to include them, and a comprehensive analysis of Quebec’s

94 The Transition to Sovereignty

secession and Canada’s future cannot ignore extreme possibilities. But this does not invalidate our assumptions. As will be shown, it is the very potential that extreme possibilities could materialize that would lead to our assumptions being met in reality. Yet it is essential to be aware of the conditions under which our guiding assumptions would be true. Existing analyses of the process of Quebec secession fall into four groups. First and most numerous are studies of the economic costs and benefits of independence. Some of these take into account the political climate surrounding the secession, but economists’ tools are not well suited to this task; nevertheless, the economic costs of separation would depend primarily on the politics of the process. A second group of studies explores the legal issues surrounding secession. These are helpful in laying out the alternative ways through which the transition to sovereignty can occur, in gauging the legal armaments at the disposal of the parties to the secession, and in highlight-

ing particularly difficult issues. Despite the complexity of legal argument, however, the critical matters are political in the end, and a third type of study lays out contrasting scenarios to which the course

of political events might correspond. These are useful in isolating the critical variables that would shape the broad course of the transi-

tion. Finally, there are studies of the detailed politicial processes through which secession might occur and of the institutional arrangements which might be established at the time. These help serve as a foundation for further predictions. ECONOMIC STUDIES

Most economic studies of Quebec secession make a sharp distinction between the province’s long-term prospects as a sovereign state and the economic impact of the transition to sovereignty. Debate about the long run hinges less on Quebec’s resource endowment and in-

dustrial base than on how the country would be inserted into the international economy, including its relations with Canada, and on whether government policy and the sociocultural fabric of the new state would more surely promote growth and facilitate adjustment than is possible at present within the federal system. In the optimistic view, a cohesive, flexible Quebec, with a loyal business class and state policies tailored to its needs, outward looking and with access to markets assured through international trade regimes, would fare better than it currently does.* In the pessimistic view, either Quebec would fail to gain adequate access to international markets, or its sociocultural endowment would fail to produce economic growth,

95 Other Studies of the Transition

or the effects of the transition to sovereignty would hobble its long-run

prospects. One study sensitive to both alternatives was conducted by the Economic Council of Canada before the last round of constitutional talks. The council explored five structural options: the status quo, moderate decentralization, extensive decentralization, a confederation of regions, and sovereignty-association. The last included an economic union, with Canada and Quebec coordinating external trade, transportation and communications, and monetary policy. It was assumed that equalization payments would end and that there would be no other transfers either explicit or through programs such as housing. As well, Quebec would assume 22 per cent of the federal debt. Using a sophisticated computer model of the interregional economy, the Economic Council found that Quebec’s GDP would decline under the sovereignty-association structure, by 1.4 to 3.5 per cent.* However, the council could not build into this model any estimate of the dynamic gains that it admitted might result in a sovereign Quebec from a “better business and political climate,” such as a possible social contract between economic partners.’ Equally important, the coun-

cil described a range of costs associated with the transition to a new constitutional order, but it could not quantify them: the results “do not take into consideration the path of adjustment or the transition costs that may be incurred in going from one situation to another.’””° Focusing on the transition, however, one finds unanimous agreement among economists that secession would impose short-term economic costs on both Canada and Quebec. Transition costs comprise three elements: transaction costs, fiscal costs, and uncertainty. Transaction costs include the governmental resources devoted to negoti-

ating new arrangements, and to transferring programs, revenue sources, and public servants, as well as the substantial costs to firms and citizens of learning about and accommodating themselves to the new arrangements. Not all transaction costs would show up as measurable losses in GDP. Grady assesses the cost of “institutional restructuring” as “large” for both Quebec and Canada (meaning over 1 per cent of GDP, or over $1.5 billion for Quebec and $5 billion for Canada).’ This loose estimate is probably high on the Canadian side, but not necessarily so. Fortin, in contrast, estimates the costs of reorganizing the Quebec state at only $600 million over two years.® Fiscal costs are the costs of higher taxes to provide the services that are now provided to Quebecers by the federal government (net of their current taxes paid to Ottawa). Much economic analysis of the transition has centred not on the economy per se but on government finances. This may have been caused by the provocative and

96 The Transition to Sovereignty

exhaustive study of the subject by the secretariat of the BélangerCampeau Commission.’ Or it may be that public finances are apparently more calculable (when assumptions about shocks to the tax base are restricted), since the largest part of the change would result from Quebec’s taking responsibility for some precisely measurable share of Canada’s national debt. In any case, under its sovereignty- asso-

ciation assumptions, the Economic Council estimated that the tax burden on Quebecers would rise by 3.3 per cent of GDP (to 41.8 per cent).° John McCallum has provided a useful compendium of such estimates, which shows the deficit of a sovereign Quebec as lying in the $10 billion to $22 billion range; he also updates the moderate $13 billion figure of Pierre Fortin to show that it would have reached $17 billion in 1992-93." Even ignoring other borrowing for Hydro-Quebec and for retiring some of Quebec’s share of the national debt, this deficit

would amount to 10 per cent of GDP and would require a severe austerity program starting right after the attainment of sovereignty.” Cété predicts that spending cuts of $8 billion would be necessary, which, combined with real shocks and uncertainty in financial markets, would cause an economic “implosion” beyond the experience of industrial countries.” Pierre Fortin, under far more optimistic assumptions, still finds that spending cuts of $3 billion would be necessary to get Quebec’s deficit /GDP ratio into line.“ The third set of transition costs is caused by uncertainty. This simply means that when conditions change, economic actors have less confidence in their expectations about the future. Doing what they have been doing appears more risky, so they are less likely to continue doing it. This applies to individuals deciding whether to move, firms deciding where to invest and to place orders, creditors deciding where to make loans, and all other economic activity. The Economic Council, for example, focused on financial markets and argued that borrowers would pay extra during the transition, because lenders would worry more about (1) political risk, or uncertainty over the impact of political and institutional change on public policies, (2) default risk, because of uncertainty about the creditworthiness of the emerging states, and (3) currency risk, arising from uncertainty about future exchange rates.” These premiums could impose significant increases in borrowing costs for governments, firms, and individuals. But the effects of uncertainty are potentially very much wider, involving migration, savings propensities, firms’ decisions about sources of inputs and market outlets, and investment decisions. Estimation of uncertainty costs is difficult. This problem confronted economists at the Royal Bank, who argued that “the things that can-

97 Other Studies of the Transition

not be measured accurately in the current debate are the things that will have the most important influence on the economic consequences of disunity.”’° Many assessments of the impact of uncertainty are frag-

mentary. André Raynauld provides data on head-office relocation and outmigration from Quebec, and these seem to suggest that a significant effect was caused by the 1980 referendum; actual secession would presumably have a larger impact.” McCallum and Green concentrate on the effects of the transition in Quebec. They assume that unemployment would be higher than its base level over a five-year

transition period by 1.0, 2.0, 2.0, 1.5, and 1.0 per cent: this would imply GDP drops of 1.5, 3.0, 3.0, 2.3, and 1.5 per cent below the base level.'® Moreover, outmigration of 2.7 per cent of the population would depress the tax base by perhaps 3.5 per cent. These authors also as-

sume an interest rate premium on government debt of between 0.8 and 1.6 per cent over the five-year period.” Were this to hold across the economy, the long-run effect of the premiums alone would be a loss of between 1.2 and 2.4 per cent of Quebec’s GDP.” In the Royal Bank study the major factor in the calculations was “the deterioration of the investment climate that would accompany a fragmented Canada.”*' The key assumption was that a 15 per cent decline in investment would occur over the two years following a breakup (in 1993). With investment growth at 2.5 per cent per year thereafter, real GDP growth over the 1990-2000 period would be 1 per cent per year, instead of 3 per cent in a united Canada. As a result, in 2000, per capita income would be $22,200 rather than $26,100,

real GDP would be 17.8 per cent less than it would have been, and the unemployment rate would be in the range of 10-15 per cent instead of 7-11 per cent.” The income gap between Canada and the United States would widen considerably, and the emigration rate could

double, with enduring effects. The study did not directly quantify several important parameters, such as breaking the monetary union, division of the national debt, and the repercussions of both on government finances, but its treatment of the investment climate appears

to have been based on the assumption of a currency breakup, disruptions in existing trade agreements, and a fragmented Canada in which fiscal policy could not be coordinated and interregional transfers would be much reduced if not ended. These are very strong as-

sumptions, but if such developments did occur, they would surely contribute to uncertainty and a big drop in investment. The Royal Bank “deliberately ignored” the regional distribution of economic costs, but it did warn that “the potential for economic disaster is real and it should not be ignored by assuming or hoping unrealistically

98 The Transition to Sovereignty

that a country can be dismantled without acrimony, dissent and economic antagonism.”” Patrick Grady has attempted the fullest accounting of the transition’s effects on GDP. Many of these depend on political arrangements, but even excluding the most questionable of these, the short-run costs to

Quebec arising from the loss of federal transfers, larger public debt charges, net outmigration, the “confidence-induced output loss,” and institutional restructuring add up to at least 7.4 per cent of GDP.** For Canada, the same factors produce a loss of at least 1.9 per cent of GDP. Under some assumptions about trade, the short-run costs could be 10 and 5 per cent of GDP respectively. These estimates have drawn polite fire from economists more sympathetic to sovereignty.” But the only counter-argument is that reason will prevail and the transition will be smooth; certainly, no one else has tried to compile a full accounting based on clearly stated assumptions. And Grady’s figures accord with the looser estimates of Marcel Cété, who examines real shocks as well as those consequent upon government negotiating positions and policy.”° Most analyses find that transition costs will be substantial. They are also likely to be significant over the long term, because they can have permanent effects. Using the concept of path-dependence, for example, McCallum and Green describe how initial shocks can lead to second-order consequences and to an “unraveling process” through which the economy of an independent Quebec might sink to a much lower long-run equilibrium position. Lower investment and higher taxes cause unemployment and outmigration, which cause lower tax bases, less investment, less employment, and so on.’ Similarly, the Royal Bank study suggested that decreased investment would result in obsolescent plants and skills, and a long-term lack of competitiveness. Such hypotheses are contested, largely on the grounds that in the long run secession would produce a more dynamic, cohesive, and flexible Quebec economy.”* Short of the event occurring, these competing theories cannot be tested. But if the second, optimistic view is correct, it could be quite rational for Quebecers to choose the short-term losses that produce long-term gains. Let us assume that a Quebec that became sovereign in 1996 could achieve, within three years, an extra 1 per cent per year growth in GDP beyond what it would have attained as part of Canada. Then, even if Quebec lost 8 per cent of potential GDP over these three transition years, all the loss would be recovered by about 2008, and real gains would be made subsequently. At normal discount rates, it would be quite sensible for Quebecers to choose sovereignty, accepting the transition costs in order to achieve long-term growth. However, if it

99 Other Studies of the Transition

took six years to get onto the faster-growth trajectory, and if 20 per cent of GDP growth was sacrificed in the interim, then Quebec would not recover lost ground until around 2023. Quebecers would have to value future income - or some non-economic benefits of sovereignty — very highly indeed to make such a choice. The longer and more severe the economic loss associated with the transition, the less attractive is the option, even assuming that the

fundamentals favouring higher growth - the features known as Quebec’s “atouts” — operate in the first place and do not erode in the interim.” Of course, the same applies to Canada. In the view of two leading Alberta economists, “instability and uncertainty are the enemies of investment. The Alberta economy is very capital intensive,

highly dependent on foreign capital, and very sensitive to interest rates. As a result, it could be seriously affected by higher interest rates or disruptions to capital flows that are almost a certainty, at least for a period of time, if Québec separated.”*° Moreover, such tran-

sitional phenomena could have enduring structural effects." The economic studies show that the transition is crucial. The economic costs could be large and enduring. What is most important, however, is that only a small proportion of the transition costs are fixed or inevitable. The rest are variable, in that they depend directly on the process of secession and the attitudes of the parties as expressed politically. The fixed transition costs include some minimum level of transaction costs, for negotiating, for restructuring the states, and for learning and adaptation by firms and individuals. For Quebec, they also include the fiscal pressure of assuming full program responsibilities and some portion of the national debt. In an event as remarkable and unpredictable as the secession of part of an advanced industrial country, some degree of uncertainty is inevitable — and costly. But the bulk

of the cost of transition is variable. Most costs depend on politics. They depend on whether, and how, the two sides could reach agreements about how to manage the secession and post-separation issues. Transaction costs would swell if there were no cooperation about

the transferring of public servants and programs and jurisdictions. Imagine, for example, how difficult it would be for Quebec to set up an unemployment insurance program if the names and work histories of current UI recipients were not made available by Canada. The costs would also rise if negotiations were prolonged. Second, arrange-

ments made about public finances could leave Quebec with higher or lower fiscal costs. And by far the largest impact of how the disengagement occurred would be on uncertainty, which is a function of the level of conflict, the gravity of the issues left unresolved, and the

100 The Transition to Sovereignty

time that passes without settlement. If Quebecers were to choose to secede, and if the two sides were noncooperative so that understandings were not soon reached about such fundamental matters as citizenship, the national debt, the currency and monetary policy, taxation, and trade treaties, then interest rates would have to rise sharply in order to stop capital flight, stock markets would decline, the dollar would come under pressure, and investment would drop. The financial system could be severely tested. But if these matters were settled quickly and definitively, uncertainty would soon be relieved and economic agents would adjust to the new order. If negotiations reached a stalemate or crumbled, transition costs could become very high indeed. However extreme it seems to be in the context of the suffering induced by the recent recession — a matter of a 2 per cent decline in GDP —- and however unlikely it appears in the light of sovereigntist

optimism that cooperation must prevail, Grady’s estimate of 10 and 5 per cent GDP drops in Quebec and Canada, respectively, is surely within the realm of possibility. The economic stakes are very high.** What counts in determining them is the level of variable transition costs, and this cannot be estimated economically, for it depends directly on the politics of the transition process. THE LEGALITIES OF QUEBEC SECESSION

The transition to Quebec sovereignty could happen quickly or slowly. It could be precipitated by a referendum vote in favour of sovereignty

or by the Quebec National Assembly adopting various resolutions. In either case, the event would represent a sharp break with the existing order, one from which no return would be likely. Once Quebecers authoritatively declared that they wished no longer to remain in Canada, they could no longer appeal to other Canadians as fellow citizens, as members of the same political community, and if Canadians accepted the decision to secede they would thenceforth seek arrangements that served only their own interests.* But it is essential to understand that until secession occurs in law, Quebec will remain within the constitutional order of Canada as a province. The basic law with all its obligations and rights will continue to apply on Quebec territory. At the level of constitutional law, a Quebec referendum result in favour of sovereignty would have no binding effect. However overwhelming and undeniable the expression of popular will, the instru-

ment for its formal pronouncement must be Quebec’s National Assembly.* Through actions of the assembly, secession can be accomplished in two ways — constitutionally and unconstitutionally.*

101 Other Studies of the Transition

This distinction is absolutely critical. The constitutional route would begin with the assembly passing a resolution stating Quebec’s intent to secede, probably within a specified time period. Separation would occur through making appropriate amendments to the Constitution

Acts (as is discussed in much greater detail in chapter 14, below). When these amendments had been properly ratified by the provincial legislatures and Parliament, and proclaimed by the governor general, Quebec would become a sovereign state. It would proclaim its own separate constitution, and the Constitution Acts of Canada would no longer apply to Quebec. This would be a constitutional secession.

An unconstitutional secession would begin with a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), passed by the National Assembly. This is a very serious act. A UDI would declare that only Quebec law prevails on Quebec territory. Since the Constitution Acts would not

have been amended, Canada’s constitution would conflict with the assembly’s declaration, and by so declaring independence Quebec would “step outside” the existing constitutional order. Some analysts suggest that in domestic Canadian law, even an outright decla-

ration of Quebec independence would have the legal status of a proposed constitutional amendment, which would then be disposed

of according to the amending procedures laid out in part 5 of the Constitution Act, 1982.°° But a UDI would be much more serious in reality. As Peter Leslie argues, it would represent a fundamental repudiation of the Canadian constitution and would create a sharp legal discontinuity, “of which the consequences are unknowable, but presumably vast, tumultuous, and economically devastating.”*” Ina situation of legal discontinuity, “all established rules and procedures no longer apply,” which is why a UDI could be so hazardous. It would throw the issue of secession into the arena of international law. This law is also relevant to discussions of Quebec’s “right” to secede, which

would colour the politics of the transition even were secession to occur constitutionally, and it therefore requires some exploration. There has now been considerable analysis of Quebec’s right to self-determination and secession, and of how a UDI would be received in the international community.** One immediate conclusion

that can be drawn from this literature is that there is no consensus about the fundamental legal principles at stake; nor is there much agreement about how certain principles would apply to the case of Quebec secession. On the one extreme is the position expressed by Daniel Turp — that a referendum result in favour of sovereignty is effectively determinative, since it would directly express the collective will of people to define themselves as Quebecers and sovereign.

102 The Transition to Sovereignty

On the other extreme is the firm rejection of such subjectivist definitions of nationhood and statehood, with the implication, drawn most severely by Stephen Scott, that a nonconstitutional secession subverts

Canadian law and is therefore a revolutionary act, one to be suppressed because it “is the duty of the Parliament and government of Canada to enforce and defend the constitution and laws — and therefore the territorial integrity — of Canada against its enemies, whether foreign or domestic.”” There is a kernel of truth in each of these views. There is some legality as well: international law, unfortunately, sup-

ports both views and settles no questions about Quebec secession. Those who assert that Quebec legally may secede unilaterally try to establish three propositions: Quebecers are a people, as a people they have the right to self-determination, and this right allows sovereign self-government, by secession if necessary. There is no agreement on the first proposition, because there is no legal consensus about what constitutes a “people.” One approach is to rely on objective definitions based on language, race, ethnicity, religion, or some other ascriptive characteristic. Brossard, for example, argues the case that French Canadians constitute a people and then manages to transfer the rights of “le peuple canadien-frangais” to the “peuple québécois.”” But when a definition of the people is based at least in part on ascriptive

criteria, like Brossard’s, it encounters the problem that the distribution of the people is not coterminous with existing borders.* If the Québécois are a people with collective rights, these rights can hardly be denied to other peoples living within the territory of Quebec, such as the First Nations. Another approach relies on subjective definitions, according to which

the people defines itself by its collective will. Turp, among others, argues for a subjectivist definition of Quebecers, beyond observable commonalities in language, culture, or religion: “Le vouloir-vivre collectif contribue davantage encore a l’affirmation de cette qualité de peuple.” This sort of definition appears to allow all inhabitants

of a bordered territory to constitute a people, thus avoiding subsecessionist movements by minorities. But the problem remains: there may be minorities within Quebec which are not only objectively different in terms of language, ethnicity, or race but which also may not share the “vouloir-vivre collectif.” Assuming nevertheless that the Québécois are a people, do they have a right to self-determination? Again, opinions diverge widely. In favour, one can cite declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations, along with international human rights covenants, to the effect that “all peoples have the right to self-determination.”* There is also the precedent of the 1980 referendum, which was to

103 Other Studies of the Transition

permit the Quebec government to negotiate sovereignty-association, along with numerous motions and Acts of the Quebec National As-

sembly which show that Quebecers have claimed the right to self-determination. For example, the preamble to Bill 150 authorizing the 1992 referendum stated that “Quebecers are free to assume their own destiny, to determine their political status and to assure their economic, social and cultural development.”“ These acts have |

not been resisted by the federal authorities. Indeed, the right was recognized implicitly by the Pepin-Robarts task force on Canadian unity and explicitly by the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada.*

Yet in terms of international law, the situation is not at all clear-cut. There are powerful arguments that self-determination is a right that generally has been accorded by the international community only to

peoples inhabiting existing states or to colonized peoples in “non-metropolitan” areas; hence, “there is simply no basis for a claim that Québec is a self-determination unit at international law.”*

Even if the inhabitants of Quebec do have the right of self-determination, whether they have the further right of secession is also contested. Some international human rights covenants prescribe that peoples have a right to “freely determine their political status and freely ensure their economic, social and cultural development.”*” On the other hand, metropolitan states have taken a dim view of the anarchic consequences that could flow from an unfettered translation of rights to self-determination into rights of secession. Apart from colonial non-self-governing countries undergoing a struggle for independence, states rely on the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which holds that “nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above, and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.”* What this means is that the question hinges on whether the “people” in question is so repressed within a state that the “principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” has been denied. If a government is repressive, the people may be justified in seceding. One sovereigntist line of reasoning on this point is to argue that Quebecers are colonized. Brossard admits that this would be a hard case to make legally, but he does try to present evidence that the proposi-

104 The Transition to Sovereignty

tion may be true, beyond the “décor juridique” (legal fagade) of equal rights, representative democracy, and so on.” Turp takes another line on this issue. He argues that the right to self-determination has been

violated domestically in Canada by the imposition of the Constitution Act in 1982 and the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord. He then relies on the precedents about Quebecers’ right to self-determination, and the convention that supposedly exists to this effect, to argue, in a logic breathtaking in its tautological compactness, that the refusal to recognize a UDI as valid would constitute an oppressive negation of the right to self-determination. The refusal would therefore license

that same self-determination to be exercised in secession through a UDI:

Qui plus est, le refus de donner effet 4 la convention constitutionnelle autorisant l’accession du Québec a la souveraineté s’avérerait une atteinte grave au principe démocratique et permettrait de conclure que l’Etat canadien ne se conduit dés lors pas en conformité avec le droit a l’autodétermination

de Québec et que le people québécois dispose dés lors d’un droit a l’autodétermination sur le plan international, y compris le droit de sécession,

et ce en conformité avec la Charte des Nations Unies telle qu’interpretée par la Déclaration sur les relations amicales.”

Contrary to this line of reasoning, other jurists cleave to the basic

position that a noncolonized people has no positive right to self-determination in the form of secession. As Williams puts it, “There

seemingly is no rule of international law which actually makes secession illegal, but neither is there a right to secede in a metropolitan context.”°?

The uncertainty of the law about secession is significant for three reasons. First, if Quebec has no broadly recognized right to secede in domestic or international law, it means that in the case of a UDI there can be no assertion of a fundamental right “which trumps any competing claims or entitlements.”** The legal issues are fundamentally contestable. Further, in the case of a nonconstitutional secession, if the law is not definitive, there must be recourse to two basic criteria for accession to statehood: recognition by other sovereign states, and the capacity to exert effective control over the territory claimed. These matters are worth examining briefly, despite the third conclusion — that in the case of Quebec secession, Canada’s position is the determining factor. Even though there is no clear legal obligation to do so, its acceptance of Quebec sovereignty would clear away most fundamental legal issues.

105 Other Studies of the Transition

The question of recognition of claims to sovereignty by a seceding state raises issues of both domestic and international law. Domestically, it is clear that only the Government of Canada has the author-

ity to grant or deny recognition to new states. Recognition is accomplished through an executive certificate, which the courts recognize as definitive.°’ Recognition is therefore a political act, one with the important consequence that any acts or proclamations of an unrecognized state will not be made effective by Canadian courts. To repeat, it is within the power of the Canadian federal government to grant or withhold recognition of other states. The international legal dimension would be critical if Quebec opted to secede through a UDI. Recognition by other countries would ad-

mit it to the international community of sovereign states. Legally, the requirements for recognition are straightforward — a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government, and so on. In practice, however, recognition is political, and whether the international community accepts secessionist claims has depended on a variety of factors. The probability of recognition is higher when (1) the seceding state is territorially anomalous within the existing state, as East Pakistan was; (2) the territory is well defined and the inhabitants homogeneous in objective characteristics such as language; (3) a strong and democratically expressed popular will supports secession; (4) the secessionists have attempted to work peacefully within the existing order to have their grievances resolved; (5) there is oppression to the extent of gross human rights violations and a lack of physical security; and (6) the impact of secession on the rest of the country is small.°* Magisterially, Buchheit reduces these factors to two: the internal merits of the claim (unity, oppression, and so on), and the degree of disruption secession would cause internationally.”

Recognition is acknowledged even by legal scholars to involve political decisions about national self-interest. This is why Morton has remarked that the United Nations’ doctrine on self-determination can be explained as “political expediency flavored with opportune moral outrage.”°° Recognition is a matter of power and realpolitik rather

than law. In the case of a Quebec UDI, the stance of major international actors, especially the United States, France, and the European Union, would be critical. The EU would be unlikely to grant quick recognition to Quebec, partly because of its experience with the former Yugoslovia. Sovereigntists, among them Louise Beaudoin of the Parti

québécois, often look towards France for recognition: “Par ailleurs, la France, leader historique du monde francophone et membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité, est l’Etat qui, plus qu’aucun autre,

106 The Transition to Sovereignty

aura la légitimité et le poids nécessaire pour enclencher, le moment

venu, le processus méme de la reconnaissance internationale du Québec et l’aider a devenir progressivement irréversible.”°’ While this statement acknowledges the political nature of recognition, it is somewhat optimistic about the French position. France fears its own internal secessionist movements; it has a large stake in Canada; and if Canada fragmented, the power of the United States could increase in absolute terms, a prospect that French governments have not recently tended to welcome.” The United States itself would have more weight in influencing other states to recognize Quebec or not. The U.S. position on Quebec sovereignty has been one of strict nonintervention, with a pronounced tilt in favour of Canadian unity: it would not encourage trends that could lead to the balkanization of Canada.°’ Were Quebecers clearly to opt for sovereignty, the United States would favour cooperation between Quebec and Canada, and, as discussed below, negotiations between the United States, Canada, and the seceding Quebec would be inevitable. Even so, a pro-sovereignty referendum vote (or, presumably, a legislative declaration of intent to secede) would find the United States reluctant to take precipitous action out of respect for Canadian sovereignty; it would await the onset if not the outcome of negotiations. Similarly, although a UDI, or a breakdown in negotiations followed by a UDI, would force the Americans to decide prag-

matically on an approach, there would probably be no quick recognition if the secession was contested. The United States has a “very conservative policy about the recognition of states based on the control of national territory.” Overall, other countries have more invested in Canada than in Quebec and more to lose (at least in the medium term) either by offending the Canadian government through recognizing Quebec or by acting in any way that might help precipitate the fragmentation of Canada. However, if Canada recognized Quebec’s sovereignty, even

in principle, other states could proceed to deal officially with the secessionist province. This could occur even before the full measure of sovereign power was transferred to Quebec.” The same is probably true with respect to arranging for a seat in the United Nations. Much would depend on how the two entities were conducting themselves at the time, as well as on the factors governing recognition discussed above. But Quebec’s rapid admission to the United Nations would be unlikely if the Canadian government firmly opposed it. What all this means is that the key to Quebec’s recognition internationally is in Canada’s hands. If Canada accepts Quebec sovereignty, so will other states. This is why Beaudoin and Vallée call Canada

107 Other Studies of the Transition

the “seul adversaire déterminant” (only determining adversary).” Its recognition of Quebec would be quickly and automatically followed by that of most other states. It is equally evident, though, that if Canada were to withhold this recognition determinedly, Quebec would not soon accede to membership in the international community. Eventually it could do so, but only by fulfilling the other criterion of statehood — effective control of the territory in question. Again,

Canada would be the critical actor: “As for effective control, the attainment of that control is measured by the emergent State’s ability to defeat its competitors. As the Canadian government is the only

contender claiming international personality over the territory of Québec, the issue resolves itself into which of the two, Québec or Canada, can be said to effectively control that territory.”” This is where a contested UDI leads ultimately, despite all the intervening thickets of legal argument — back to the kernel of empirical truth in Professor Scott’s extreme position.” A contested secession leads to a contest of national will, possibly through forceful means. All the legal arguments bend before force and will. As Turp proclaimed,

“Devant le désir de liberté des peuples, le Droit n’a jamais constitué un obstacle décisif.”© And as the Bélanger-Campeau Commission clearly put this alternative, in a remarkably calm fashion: “Failing such an agreement, Québec would have to secede unilaterally, on the basis of an unequivocal, clearly expressed will among Quebecers to do so. The success of such a procedure would reside in the ability of Québec’s political institutions to implement and maintain exclusive public authority over its territory. Under international law, other States would have to recognize Québec as a sovereign state.” So a UDI can lead right through the law to a contest of force. This prospect, ultimately, is why states negotiate secession and accomplish it through constitutional means. The abyss of repression or civil war is too awful to contemplate. But then so are the intermediate steps. If Canada and Quebec did not achieve a peaceful secession, one step towards conflict would be a UDI followed by a refusal to recognize Quebec’s sovereignty over its territory. Similarly, a refusal to accept a referendum result could push Quebec to declare a UDI. This would plunge the two parties into deep legal uncertainty, and there is no obvious point where disagreement need cease. On the other hand, if Canada recognized Quebec’s claim, an enormous amount

of legal dispute, political conflict, and economic uncertainty would be avoided. Acceptance of Quebec’s decision would immediately cut

through the entire legal morass that we have just traversed. Such acceptance is a rare event in history, and it would represent an enormous benefit for the fledgling state of Quebec. In the view of Quebec

108 The Transition to Sovereignty

sovereigntists flush with a pro-secession referendum vote, this might be a benefit that was only just and due, but it would be a major benefit nonetheless. Even with recognition, however, other legal problems would remain to be resolved. Undoubtedly, the thorniest issue concerns the Aboriginal population of Quebec. Natives insist that they are peoples with full rights to self-determination and a claim to sovereign rule over their lands. They too could be “contenders” with a claim to international personality over their historical lands in Quebec. The Grand Council of the Crees, for example, has declared repeatedly that the imposition of Quebec sovereignty over their nation would be resisted, precisely on this basis of competing sovereignty.* Quebec First Na-

tions have asserted that they have the right to choose whether to secede from Quebec and remain in Canada.” These Aboriginal peoples

might well hold referendums of their own to bolster their claim to self-determination and secession. There is also the special case of the James Bay Cree and the Inuit and Naskapi, who are signatories with Canada and Quebec to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agree-

ment and the Northeastern Quebec Agreement. Beyond their general claim to self-determination, the Cree argue that Quebec secession would abrogate an agreement through which Quebec committed it-

self “in perpetuity to a constitutionally-entrenched federalist relationship with the Crees and Canada concerning Cree territory and

Cree rights.” While there might be considerable public sympathy in Canada for this position, it will be shown below that the Government of Canada

would not be legally constrained to respond to such appeals; nor would Canada need to be bound by the Aboriginal peoples’ desires if it chose to amend the constitution so as to transfer authority over Quebec’s Native peoples to the government of the new state. (The

politics of such a move are, of course, another matter.) As for self-determination and secession by First Nations, Finkelstein and Vegh make short work of this claim. First, there is a rule of international law, stemming from the case of Southern Rhodesia, that prevents the creation of states where the principle of self-determination would be violated because internal minorities (or majorities) would be repressed. However, repression comparable to that suffered by black Africans in Rhodesia cannot, and presumably could not, be demonstrated in the case of Aboriginal peoples in Quebec.” Second, the Cree have no stronger claim to statehood against Quebec than they now have against Canada. Lastly, there is in international law no right of indigenous peoples to self-determination.”

109 Other Studies of the Transition

But this might be too quick. Buchanan argues that the status of the

northern Quebec agreements would be affected by secession. It is unclear whether they would be voided, but if they were, the Native territorial rights extinguished by them could be renewed. In any event, alteration of the agreements could lead Ottawa to insist that a satisfactory resolution of the status of Aboriginal peoples must be a condition of a negotiated secession.” The Aboriginal claims would be a legal lever to contest Quebec’s sovereignty over the northern territories appended to it in 1898 and 1912. This is a complex and explosive issue. There is some support

for the argument that the territories were appended to Quebec as a province and would revert to Canada if Quebec’s status was changed.” But a strong opinion by international jurists has supported the opinion that Quebec could secede with its borders intact and that no mi-

norities or inhabitants of border regions have a similar right.” This opinion is contestable, of course.” But the Aboriginal claim adds an extra dimension to the northern boundary question. Kent McNeil has presented the case that the border extensions are disputable be-

cause the Hudson’s Bay Company never had sovereignty over Aboriginals in the region and therefore could not legally have transferred the territory to Canada in the first place. But McNeil admits that Canada did control the territory and that it cleared up some jurisdictional problems in 1933 (even if these measures reflected a “colonial attitude”). More important, if this argument were to be accepted, it could equally apply to all the rest of the lands ceded by the Hudson’s

Bay Company.” This illustrates the general dilemma that accepting the broad Aboriginal claim to self-determination and secession in Quebec would open the rest of Canada to precisely the same claims. Still, even Turp admits that Quebec’s Native people have the right of self-determination under the same criteria he applies to Quebecers, and he suggests that competing territorial claims might require international arbitration.” Further, it is obvious that there is strong international public opinion in support of indigenous people’s rights, and that law in this area may evolve rapidly. Hence, Beaudoin and Vallée suggest that the Aboriginal people’s status might have to become the subject of a tripartite accord, the principles of which would apply uniformly to all of what is now Canada, even though Quebec would by then have become sovereign. This is one solution to what obviously would be a critical issue. And it is a political one. The legal rights of others are also an issue. Some anglophone com-

munities might claim the right of secession from an independent Quebec in order to preserve their Canadian rights and citizenship.”

110 The Transition to Sovereignty

But there is no right in international law for secession when minorities in metropolitan states have not been oppressed. The linguistic and other rights that Quebec would write into its own constitution would be relevant here, as they would be with respect to Aboriginal peoples. These might be more generous than the existing regime of rights in Quebec.” Another hard legal issue is citizenship. Here, it is clear that the domestic law of each state prevails. Therefore, the laws of a sovereign Quebec could extend Quebec citizenship to all residents, including

perhaps landed immigrants and people born in Quebec but resident elsewhere.* It could also allow dual citizenship for those wishing to retain their Canadian citizenship. In the context of Quebec secession, Canada could also allow dual citizenship; alternatively, it could legally force people to reject their Quebec citizenship as a condition of retaining their Canadian citizenship.® In extremis, the Canadian constitution and the Citizenship Act could be amended to require Quebecers who wished to remain Canadians to emigrate from the sovereign

state of Quebec and reside in Canada. The law here is quite open, and citizenship clearly is a delicate and potentially explosive matter. Another legal issue concerns the assets and liabilities of Canada. Here the law seems quite clear. As the seceding state, Quebec is entitled to all public property situated on its territory; Canada has the right to possess all assets on its territory and those under its control (which are generally movables, mainly financial assets but also items such as databases).® The issue of the national debt is complicated by the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and Debts. This would impose an obligation on Quebec to assume an “equitable proportion” of the debt in the absence of any agreement about its division. However, the convention has been ratified by no state, and it does not reflect customary international law, which holds that responsibility for national debts remains entirely with the predecessor state — in this case, Canada.* The last thorny legal issue is the right of Quebec to succeed to treaties of which Canada is a signatory (or, alternatively, to refuse to be

bound by them). Canada is a signatory to hundreds of multilateral treaties and conventions and to more than a thousand bilateral treaties, including more than two hundred with the United States alone. These cover a vast range of matters, from international trade to extradition and to North American defence. In general, treaty succes-

sion is still governed by customary international law, whereby obligations and rights do not automatically devolve to seceding states.®

_ The exceptions include boundary treaties, localized treaties governing matters such as fishing rights, and some multilateral conventions

111 Other Studies of the Transition

(where the new presence would be insufficiently disruptive to require formal agreement by the other parties). An important example of a localized treaty that would very likely survive is the St Lawrence

Seaway Agreement, whereby Quebec would have to offer navigation rights to the United States and Canada. Trade agreements would be particularly important for a sovereign Quebec. It could accede to GATT through negotiations, under article 33, though this is a long, complex, and expensive process.* Alternatively, Canada could sponsor Quebec’s membership, under article 26 (5)c, a process that is undoubtedly simpler and faster. In a short study for the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, Ivan Bernier argued that no declaration of sponsorship is now necessary, but he admitted that if Canada opposed secession, an uncertain legal situation would make the contracting parties unlikely to accept Quebec’s membership quickly.*” Even if Quebec were to accede to GATT, it is important to note that Canada could legally impose duties on imports from the new state (and vice versa), along with quotas on agricultural products. Each party would have to accord MEN status to the other’s products. But much room for discrimination would exist — as in government

procurement — and normal laws about countervail, anti-dumping, and safeguards would still be in force. The case of the Canada—U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is less clear-cut. Canada would automatically succeed to the treaty unless the United States maintained that the absence of Quebec materially changed the benefits it expected under the agreement and sought to reopen negotiations with Canada. Quebec’s accession to the FTA raises

several considerations. First, it would have no legal right to be admitted: this would be a political decision to be settled by negotiations between Canada, Quebec, and the United States. Second, the FTA has been very largely superseded by the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which includes Mexico. There is a great deal of overlap between the two agreements, but NAFTA takes priority over the FTA. In a few areas not covered by the trilateral treaty, such as the cultural industries, the FTA prevails, but the bulk of the benefits of market access now is assured by NAFTA.® And NAFTA, unlike the FTA, provides a legal mechanism for the entry of new members: they may be admitted into the agreement “if the NAFTA countries agree.”*’ More precisely, the agreement states that a country or group of countries may be admitted “subject to such terms and conditions as may be agreed between such country

or countries and the Commission.” The commission comprises cabinet-level representatives of the three parties, and implements and supervises the agreement. It establishes its own rules and procedures,

112 The Transition to Sovereignty

and it operates on the unanimity principle: “All decisions of the Commission shall be taken by consensus, except as the Commission may otherwise agree.”” De jure, this would appear to confer on Canadaa

veto power over the admission of Quebec to the treaty that guarantees favourable access to its most important foreign market. De facto,

of course, strong American desires to avoid economic distress and political unrest and to see Quebec remain part of the North American economic space could lead to pressure on Canada to approve terms for Quebec’s admission. Nevertheless, that admission would in no way be legally guaranteed or automatic, and the American response to a Quebec request would be conditioned by the attitude of Canada towards Quebec sovereignty in general and by Quebec-Canada economic relations in particular.

Although the legal questions surrounding Quebec sovereignty are many and complex, they can be succinctly summarized. First and most important, secession can be legally accomplished by amending Canada’s constitution so that it no longer applies to Quebec. Second,

a unilateral declaration of Quebec independence would be a nonconstitutional rupture in the basic law that would lead to fundamentally contestable arguments about Quebecers’ status as a people, their right to self-determination, and whether their political condition justifies secession. There is no legal stopping point on this path. Third, the international law about secession boils down to realpolitik. International recognition of the new state, ultimately, is decisive. Recognition is a political matter, and the crucial factor that would determine the position of other states, in the short and medium term, would be Canada’s stance. If Canada recognizes the secession, many fundamental legal issues will be settled. If Canada accepts Quebec’s borders and does not contest its territorial control, the matter will be decided, for all practical purposes. As for the other issues between the two states, neither side has an overwhelming legal advantage. In

law, Canada could seize all movable national assets and prevent Quebec from joining NAFTA; in law, Quebec could renounce its share

of the national debt and accede to GATT without Canada’s support. In reality, however, these issues could be settled efficiently only through

negotiations. If they were not so resolved, there is nothing in domestic or international law to prevent secession from entailing real conflict and immense costs of transition, costs far beyond the calculations,

if not the imaginations, of economists. , POLITICAL SCENARIOS

Political processes will determine the size of the economic costs of the transition to Quebec independence. Politics also will determine

113. Other Studies of the Transition

whether the process of secession is cast on the treacherous waters of international law. Realizing this, political scientists have proposed some contrasting scenarios of the politics of the transition. The strategy of depicting extreme alternatives is useful to define the outer limits of speculation and to isolate some of the factors that will shape the course of events.” In the case of Quebec’s secession, the classic statement of the grand alternatives was presented by Richard Simeon.” His optimistic scenario corresponds to the one often outlined by sovereigntists: “The decision to separate is made in an orderly, legitimate fashion; it is broadly accepted as fair by the governments and people of English Canada, as well as by Quebecers themselves; the referendum vote is followed by correct and polite discussion of how to carry out the transfer of sovereignty, convey to Quebec the required powers, draw up the plans for association, and place the final seal of legitimacy on the agreement.”” The pessimistic extreme contrasts with this on every front: it envisages “the refusal of English Canada to accept a referendum result, followed by increasing hostility and tension, strong appeals from federalist Quebecers to ‘save us,’ and a general pattern of mutually reinforcing tension leading to a spiral of escalation beyond anyone’s control, culminating either in official repression or in civil disorder of the type which has convulsed Northern Ireland. This scenario also contemplates armed intervention from outside, massive economic collapse, and indefinite chaos.””* This Manichean presentation depicts two scenarios which certainly are conceivable. However much sovereigntists may protest the contemplation of the pessimistic possibility, it exists, and it is simply incongruous, at best, that some nationalist scholars in Quebec cite precedents from the arbitration commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia to support claims for a sovereign Quebec’s territorial integrity, while others reject as terrorism and blackmail any suggestion that the Yugoslavian tragedy could in any way be relevant to Canada.” However repugnant the pessimistic scenario is, it is supported by a considerable body of comparative and historical experience.” Contested and violent secessions are far more common

than peaceful ones. Consequently, if Quebec is to secede, the important thing about the pessimistic scenario is understanding the conditions that could produce it so as to know how to act in order that it can be avoided. . According to Simeon, there are four basic conditions that would determine the broad political path of the transition. First, Quebec’s decision must be seen as legitimate, as corresponding to broadly held democratic norms. To be accepted by Canadians, a referendum re-

114 The Transition to Sovereignty

sult in favour of sovereignty must follow a fair campaign fought around an unbiased question, which produces a clear majority. Alternatively, a government passing a declaration of intent to secede through the National Assembly should have a clear and recent mandate, and strong support in the legislature. Second is the shock that secession would cause Canadians. However it was accomplished, the declaration of intent to secede would represent a sharp break. It would occur at a single instant — when the results of the referendum or the National Assembly vote were announced — and theoretically it would be preventable until that moment. Although English Canadians have become familiar with the possibility of Quebec secession, the actual event would have a huge symbolic impact. Canadians’ reaction to this would vary, according to each individual’s sense of national identification, but for most people

there would be a shock or, as Simeon put it, “a blow,” to their conception of Canada. It is this psychological shock that could trigger behaviour contrary to their immediate material interests. In essence, the problem of the sovereigntists, if they wish to avoid large transition costs, “is to arrange the birth of Québec without convincing English Canadians that their own country is doomed in the process.” As David Bell has insightfully shown, leadership in deploying symbols and metaphors would be important here. A metaphor of Canada as a family or a business partnership, for example, presages far less damage and acrimony than the metaphor of divorce.” Simeon’s third factor is the intentions and actions of the Quebec authorities. Animosity and resistance to secession would rise if Quebec pursued social and economic policies that threatened the funda-

mental values or interests of Canadians. These could include

oppression of linguistic or ethnic minorities and a determinedly statist

or autarkic economic stance. As well, Quebec élites, like those in Canada, would need sufficient unity and authority to “restrain their more extremist followers” if moderation was to prevail.” Finally, Canada’s actions would affect Quebecers. Threats of repression or of economic sanctions could produce greater militance and resentment in Quebec, especially in a hot referendum campaign that produced a close decision. A refusal to accept a decision that was Widely regarded in the province as legitimate would lead to a breakdown of relations. As well, intervention in aid of minorities could

produce severe conflict, and intransigence in negotiations could fuel radicalism in Quebec and a drift towards the pessimistic scenario. _ These political scenarios suggest once more that the costs of the transition to sovereignty could be very high indeed. The most important factor in mitigating those costs is that Canada accept the ba-

115 Other Studies of the Transition

sic premise that Quebec will become a sovereign, independent state.

For this to occur readily, Quebec’s intent to secede must be made through a legitimate and democratic process, the Canadian public must be led to accept that outcome, and Quebec’s economic and social policies must be moderate. If these conditions held, the politics of the transition would tend to be such that massive social and economic dislocations would be avoided. In the pessimistic scenario, costs would not be limited to Quebec. Indeed, the predominant view in ROC that Quebec’s losses would exceed those of Canada actually presumes a relatively smooth transition, or at least a Canada coherent enough to protect its own interests in the bilateral negotiations. But the pessimistic scenario could involve very large Canadian losses if a breakdown in political order occurred, or if ROC became ungovernable as political leadership and unity failed. Finally, scenario sketching is useful not only to specify the preconditions for a peaceful secession but also because political leaders and citizens must be conscious of these possibilities. Any pessimistic depictions of the dangers lurking down the path of secession are decried by sovereigntists as fear-mongering and blackmail. Yet their

own predictions that Canadian leaders will be cooperative in the project of secession depends entirely on the assumption that these same leaders will be aware of the dangers and will seek to avoid the damage that is a real possibility during the transition and beyond. STUDIES OF THE MECHANICS OF THE TRANSITION

Much has been written about the economic consequences of Quebec secession and about the legal issues surrounding the event. Both, in the end, boil down to politics. The analyses of political scenarios make this clear in an extreme fashion. Yet relatively little has been written about how the transition would be managed or about how the political dynamics of the event would unfold. There is a growing and use-

ful literature about some issues that would have to be dealt with

politically in the event of secession, such as division of the national debt and maintaining the St Lawrence Seaway." And there is a respectable body of work about the long-term implications of the various political and economic arrangements that might be adopted after or in the course of the separation. But there is little close analysis of the political modalities of the transition. Anoteworthy piece by Banting provides some insight into the problem. He points out that if there was a substantial vote for secession, Quebec would emerge with self-confidence, a sense of direction (based

116 The Transition to Sovereignty

on years of contemplating the option), and, most important, with its institutions intact and unquestioned. In Canada, however, the mood would combine resentment against Quebec with “collective psychological disorientation” as people realized that the national project was terminated.’ Canadians outside Quebec have not contemplated an alternative project to maintaining the existing system. More seriously, they would possess no stable political institutions. Banting envisages the formation of a multiparty coalition government in the event of a declaration by Quebec of its intent to secede. An election would be desirable, since the coalition would be “weak,” but obviously there would be no constitutional way to prevent Quebec from electing MPs. Even if a government was formed that was not dependent on Quebec support, it would face challenges to its legiti-

macy as the negotiator with Quebec. The provincial premiers, representing the “stable component” of the system, would “undoubtedly claim to speak for the country.” If the legitimacy of all established leaders were suspect, perhaps through their manifest failure to resolve a secessionist crisis or to win a referendum, demands would

arise for the convening of a constituent assembly to redesign the constitution. “A period of political instability would be inevitable.” In Banting’s view, Canada might hold together in the long run, or it could fragment. The outcome would depend on the politics of the transition. In a very different analysis, one that paints Quebec secession in a favourable light, Bercuson and Cooper assume that both Quebec and Canada would emerge “internally more united” from the decision to disengage.™ In their view, the Quebec National Assembly would declare itself the government of a sovereign Quebec. Then the Government of Canada would immediately grant de facto recognition. This would allow Canada to have “dealings” with the emergent state and would presage a period of negotiations. The interlocutor on the Canadian side would be the federal government. Somehow, a new

government would be formed, one presumably not dependent on the support of the seventy-five Quebec members of Parliament.’® No election would be held: calling one would not be “prudent.” Instead, the federal government would appoint negotiators to deal with Quebec, and it would consult closely with the provinces and other “interested parties.” After a set of negotiations through which Quebec would be stripped of what was Rupert’s Land and the entire South Shore of the St Lawrence, Canada would adopt a new constitution. This would make the federation indissoluble, enshrine a true economic union, recognize popular sovereignty over governments, abolish all collective rights, eliminate bilingualism and multiculturalism and

117 Other Studies of the Transition

support for separate schools, erase the notwithstanding clause, and institute a genuine triple-E Senate." How this reconstitution would take place is not explained by Bercuson and Cooper. Obviously, there is room for substantial disagreement about how the mechanics of the separation would occur. Some analysts are quite vague about what would happen. Jonathan Lemco, for example, has provided lengthy accounts of possible political developments and of

the issues surrounding the national debt and the currency, but he can make no precise predictions about outcomes: “There is no certainty that the rest of Canada will accept a sovereign Quebec. Nor is it clear that the rest of Canada will pursue relations with Quebec. Indeed, the rest of Canada might itself be restructured, forcing endless haggling with the resulting uncertainty. The negotiations for di-

viding Canada’s assets and liabilities could be especially complicated.”"” He does, however, list an abundance of important questions about how the politics of the transition would take place.'® To this emerging debate, Quebec sovereigntists have contributed very little. Although huge energies have been devoted to analysing the legal and economic issues around secession, there is little published work on how the transition might unfold. The Parti québécois has been almost mute. Its 1991 program committed a PQ government to pass through the National Assembly a declaration of Quebec’s

will to secede. Then the government would seek to negotiate (with the federal government) a timetable and mechanisms for the orderly transfer of powers to the province, along with a division of federal assets and debts, and an economic association that would establish, by treaty, some joint management bodies. At the same time, a commission would be preparing a new constitution for Quebec, through wide consultations, as well as proposing mechanisms for the legal shift from the federal constitutional regime to one of sovereignty. Then a referendum on both sovereignty and the constitution would be “l’acte de naissance du Québec souverain.” 0?

Other documents amplify this only slightly. One insists that Quebec seeks “une transition sans soubresauts” (a transition without jolts), and sketchily lays out favoured positions about citizenship, rights, immigration, assets and debts, crown corporations, a monetary union, and Quebec’s army and public servants."° The assumption remains that these will all be negotiated with the federal government. And Canada, it is claimed, cannot refuse to negotiate, because Quebec

will be proceeding democratically and, more important, because Canada has a clear interest in these matters. Not to negotiate would be “contre toute logique” (against all logic). If Canada refused nevertheless, a referendum could approve the declaration of sovereignty,

118 The Transition to Sovereignty

and then negotiations certainly would take place.“’ A more recent manifesto repeats the basic negotiation-referendum process but also suggests that Quebec would adopt a minimally changed constitution and would declare that all federal laws continue to apply until amended. The PQ advocates maintaining the economic and monetary union “as it now exists,” and suggests that a treaty of association could provide for a council of ministers, a secretariat, a tribunal, and specialized commissions. Once more, a harmony of interests is assumed to support the negotiations."* Once more, there is no consideration of what Canada’s position might be, of the timetable for the negotiations, of their economic and political context, or of the possibility that Ottawa alone might not be capable of negotiating the terms of separation. Much more work on secession has been done by official commissions in Quebec — the Bélanger-Campeau Commission (Commission

on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec) and the National Assembly’s Committee to Examine Matters Relating to the Accession of Quebec to Sovereignty. Each conducted hearings, received many briefs, and commissioned a lot of research. But the great bulk of this work concerns legal and economic issues about Quebec’s sovereignty and viability. It largely ignores the process of secession,

and it is blind to the political dynamics in ROC; in fact, it is studiously apolitical. As noted above, the Bélanger-Campeau Commission contemplated a constitutional or unilateral secession — in two paragraphs. Most of its report dealt with matters of substance, such as accession to treaties and the public finances, rather than questions of process. About the latter, the commission said only that “sovereignty poses the problem of managing in an orderly fashion a change implemented on the basis of free choice. Successfully managing any change hinges upon a thorough knowledge of the ins and outs of the issue at hand.”** In all of the commission’s voluminous background studies, there is no detailed analysis of how the transition would occur, of opinion in ROC, or of the politics of secession.™

The more recent National Assembly committee report followed much the same lines, albeit in greater detail. It discussed the legalities of the important issues — citizenship, Aboriginal peoples, and borders

— and it summarized much research about the transfer of public servants, currency, the financial sector, economic performance, and the

public finances. When agreements with Canada would be necessary

or desirable, this was mentioned, but there was no sustained

consideration of whether or how these could be reached. This issue surfaced only in connection with negotiating economic arrangements between Quebec and Canada, which could be difficult because of

119 Other Studies of the Transition

acrimony, Ottawa’s lack of negotiating capacity, and the limited time

available. Obviously, the committee was split about whether Quebec-Canada relations after a secession would preclude cooperation: Various observers have mentioned the possibility that Canada-Québec relations would be acrimonious when Québec acceded to sovereignty. Such a situation could very well hinder the conclusion of a treaty, although it has been suggested that reciprocal economic interests, especially those of Québec and Ontario, are such than [sic] an agreement to preserve the essence of the economic space would necessarily (and fairly promptly) be concluded. The Committee was unable to settle this issue.”

As for the process of secession itself, the committee was confused. Secession could occur with Canada’s consent. It seems this would involve a bilateral agreement that the separation would be “orderly,” followed by a constitutional amendment. But such an amendment is said to be “unlikely”; instead, were “the federal and provincial governments to consent to Quebec’s secession, the decision would probably be political in nature.” Somehow, this consent could be “formal and detailed,” or else in the form of a unilateral declaration, or simply “implicit”; all of this is terribly vague. Sovereignty could also be attained through a Quebec UDI. Here, at least, the report is quite clear in describing the legal difficulties that would ensue, principally that “uncertainty might persist among Quebecers about which body of law prevails.”""”

No such reticence and understatement mark one recent treatment of the politics of the transition. Lansing Lamont has presented a docu-drama account of a Quebec secession in some detail. Highly coloured, the prediction is based on an explosive combination of existing forces — the anglophone minority, Aboriginal peoples, and a variety of military units —- along with economic uncertainty and “fiercely contested negotiations” about debt, assets, territory, and the currency."® Here, Parliament rejects recommendations that the country be decentralized, and it also rejects asymmetrical federalism along the lines of the Meech Lake Accord. The National Assembly approves

a declaration of independence, to be ratified by a referendum that passes by a large majority. The assembly then takes five months to pass a new constitution. Two more months are needed to assemble Quebec and Canadian negotiating teams (their composition is unspecified), and after nine months of tedious and inconclusive meetings, negotiations break down over the currency issue. The provincial

governments begin to cut back services to francophones, and anglophone rights are restricted in Quebec. The federal government

120 The Transition to Sovereignty

moves to secure its assets in Quebec; then Quebec cuts off services to federal installations, and in turn Ottawa mobilizes army units to protect its property and Canadian citizens. Riots break out in Montreal and

in smaller centres. The Mohawks at Akwesasne erupt and are suppressed in serious fighting; in sympathy, the Cree sabotage the dam and generators at La Grande 2. Although the forces of order hold together, they are stretched too thinly, and the United States sends a division north to help restore calm. In the meantime, a meltdown takes place on currency and financial markets. Under these pressures, the two sides settle quickly. Canada recognizes Quebec’s sovereignty. Quebec assumes 25 per cent of the debt and uses the Canadian dol-

lar with no participation in making monetary policy, and Canada retains some vestigal control over transport facilities in the province. The First Nations settle for something less than full sovereignty. The U.S. refuses Quebec admission to NAFTA, and the economy shrinks. In the rest of Canada, central power weakens. ROC tries to reconstitute itself as a grouping of regions, but this fails. The country fragments as provinces opt to join the United States, which admits them, not without grave misgivings."”

This is lurid stuff, but it is detailed, and there is a logic to it.’”° Lamont’s account depends at every turn on questionable assumptions about public opinion, leadership, and the potential for escalation. As he admits, the study is “an informed surmise of what could happen in the worst circumstances.”’' But the author has some experience in Canadian affairs and has access to official and quasi-official

American thinking about Quebec separation. He reports that “in the autumn of Canada’s 125th year there was near consensus among knowledgeable American diplomats that Quebec would eventually go and that Canada’s odds for survival were poor.”"” Not all the pessimistic accounts are docu-dramas. Patrick Monahan, a veteran constitutional observer and adviser, has argued that separation from Canada could be “far more complicated and costly than Quebecers had been led to expect.”’” He argues at the outset that a

constitutional secession would require the unanimous consent of Parliament and all ten provinces. The other route is a UDI, which Canada could accept or challenge. Were a referendum to pass, Monahan believes that Canada might not negotiate with Quebec: it might not have the legitimacy to do so; the provinces and Aboriginal peoples and other groups would demand to participate; and there is no “authoritative, obvious or politically legitimate process that might lead to the creation of an interlocutor” for Quebec.'4 Stalemate would result. Even if there were negotiations, they would very likely fail.

First, Monahan claims that the “terms of any deal” would require

121 Other Studies of the Transition

unanimous provincial consent, which would not be forthcoming. Second, the secession negotiations would become entangled with ROC’s reconstitution and the demands of various provinces and special interests. Third, the issues are simply too complex and divisive — es-

pecially how to apportion the national debt. Canada would remain responsible for the whole liability during a long transition period, and neither side would agree on how to eliminate the risk of Quebec’s

defaulting or how to pay the extra risk premiums that would be incurred. If there were an agreement with Quebec, both it and the constitutional amendment would require ratification by referendum in every province and would in all probability be defeated somewhere, so Quebec would not be able to secede constitutionally. If Quebec were then to take the UDI option, Canada would resist until agreement on the debt was reached. Domestic opinion in ROC would favour forcing Quebec to return to negotiation. Then there “inevitably” would

ensue a “struggle for supremacy between the Canadian and Quebec governments over Quebec territory,” which would cause immense economic damage.” Another recent study also focuses on the relationship between ROC’s

post-referendum politics and the process of Quebec secession. Prepared by Gordon Gibson, a former leader of the B.C. Liberal Party, it is remarkable for its detailed account of some transition issues and its occasional strategic insight. An activist, Gibson has taken on the mission of organizing grassroots movements towards a constituent assembly to reform the constitution (“Plan C”) so as to avoid the adverse effects of secession that emerge from his own description of the event (“Plan B,” for Breakup).’° After a Yes victory, the leaders of Quebec and Canada would issue reassurances that external obligations would be met and that all Canadian laws would continue to apply in Quebec. If Canada accepted the result, a negotiating team would be established; this might be the existing Government of Canada, anew one formed after an election, or a federal-provincial committee (though there are difficulties with each alternative).’” The “deal” with Quebec might be ratified by Parliament or by Parliament and the provinces (under a version of the general constitutional amending formula), or by a referendum, for Gibson assumes that a negotiated settlement with Quebec would need “constitutional validation.”’*”? The stabilization and negotiation period would be one year. The major issues to be settled with Quebec are fivefold. First, Canada

would have an obligation to ensure that Quebec provide guarantees for rights for Aboriginal and anglophone minorities, which, he assumes, is in Quebec’s interest in any case. Then Quebec’s borders

122 The Transition to Sovereignty

would be accepted, including the Labrador boundary drawn in 1927. Some cooperative trade arrangments would be reached, along with one about currency (and in both matters, Gibson claims, ROC has bargaining leverage). Finally, the debt issue, critical for foreign confidence, would be resolved by ROC’s insisting that Quebec assume

about 25 per cent of the total, as justified by its proportion of the population. In Gibson’s view, the more important task for ROC would be its reconstitution. With the shock of a Yes vote, the whole country would

be “up for review,” as he believes it should be.’” He assumes that this process would take place at the same time as the negotiations with Quebec and that there would be both the time and the inclination to engage in fundamental questioning of all alternative structures. Much of Ottawa’s legitimacy would have been lost, and the role of the provinces would have become predominant: Alberta and British Columbia would insist on thorough change to ROC’s constitution. The mechanism for redefining ROC could be the First Ministers’ Conference, but since the governments in place would have no mandate to reconstitute the country and since any agreement would have to pass a referendum, it would be better to convoke a constituent assembly.’ This would include representatives of provincial governments, the “residual Ottawa,” and interest groups, but the voting members would be specially elected (ten per province). The assembly would pass constitutional provisions through provincial unanimity (a majority of the voting members from each province), and the new constitution would be ratified by a referendum in each province. In this whole process of negotiation, the richer provinces would be dominant, and they would favour radical decentralization. Thus, the out-

come could be a fragmented ROC, or one in which the central government retained very few powers, acting only as a “service organization” for the highly autonomous provinces.’ It is evident that the cost of this whole exercise would be great, even if it were to succeed. So to avoid the costs of a breakup, Gibson’s “Plan C” envisages a radically decentralized country, almost a confederation. This might be attractive enough to Quebecers for a secession to be avoided, but how it could be implemented before a Quebec referendum is prob-

lematic.!

Others have argued that such exercises in wholesale constitutional design are unlikely in the event of Quebec secession. Maureen Covell notes the bitterness, the crisis of legitimacy, and the deep constitutional uncertainty that would very likely exist in Canada. These phenomena could lead to demands for a constituent assembly, but this would be very difficult to arrange. Who would decide on the method

123 Other Studies of the Transition

of selection or election of the members of such a body? If the Consti-

tution Acts had not somehow been declared inoperative, what authority would the assembly possess? Such a constitutional conference

would function effectively “only under conditions of extreme disruption such that both the federal and provincial governments were unable to operate as they are supposed to.”** But would this happen? Covell maintains that the provincial governments’ relative position would be strengthened by a move towards secession by Quebec. Yet Ottawa would be able to retain some authority. First, a negotiator would be needed; second, issues would have to be settled quickly.

While the federal government might be discredited by its failure to prevent secession, a “unity backlash” could even lead Canadians to support its efforts in order to preserve “what remains of the nation.” The group involved in the York University Constitutional Reform Project have also published some reflections on the secession process. They suggest that Canada should recognize a clear and democratically expressed Quebec sentiment in favour of secession. The federal government, however, could not alone undertake negotiations, because the provinces, the territories, and the Aboriginal peoples

have a right to be consulted. So a negotiating authority should be established, with representation from all these parties, to “oversee” negotiations about Quebec’s secession.’ The negotiating authority would be briefed on the negotiations and consulted about them, but its role would be advisory only, because any agreement with Quebec would have to be ratified by Parliament and the provincial legislatures, “in accordance with the amending formula.”’*° (This assumes, of course, that arrangements negotiated with Quebec — economic, political, or both - would be constitutional matters, requiring formal constitutional amendment.) The negotiating authority should be consulted even about the recognition of Quebec’s claim to sovereignty, despite the time delays and the fact that recognition is a prerogative of the federal government. The reason, essentially, is to ensure that those affected by the decision are involved in making it, if only ina consultative manner: “We believe that some type of joint Negotiating Authority is required for political as well as strictly legal reasons. It will be essential that there be a high degree of public legitimacy and acceptance of the negotiating process. We believe that this legitimacy can only be assured if all the relevant actors and interests are involved in the process from the very beginning.”**’ . The York group also discussed several of the issues to be negotiated. Territory is the most problematic. Some members felt that opening

up the border question would immediately ruin any prospect of an amicable solution; however, the majority, who were concerned mostly

124 The Transition to Sovereignty

about the Aboriginal peoples and other geographically concentrated minorities, took the position that such groups must have the right to express democratically their choice of community and state.*** Inso-

far as the Aboriginals are concerned, one proposal was that a Canada-Quebec protocol should ensure that the same constitutional rights to self-government obtain in each country. As in the suggestion of Beaudoin and Vallée, this would remove the border issue from that of how this crucial minority is treated. With respect to the national debt, the York group favoured division on an equal per capita basis. Finally, there remains to be considered the most detailed and practical depiction of the secession process, as laid out by Hugh Thorburn in 1977.’ This analyst recognized that the transition to sovereignty would be much eased if talks could be opened before the event occurred, though he thought this improbable. Nevertheless, Thorburn presents an optimistic scenario, which envisages a disengagement that occurs “as quickly and harmoniously as possible.”'° The key to

this is an agreement on separation, which would be a framework document laying out the terms of the settlement, the timetable of events through the transition period, and the date for the proclamation of the separate existence of the two states. Like others, Thorburn expects that the federal authorities would be weakened by their failure to prevent secession. Since an election might centre on whether or not to recognize an independent Quebec, and since Quebecers could not be prevented from voting under the existing constitution, a “crisis coalition” government would be formed. This would include representatives of the opposition parties. Then, Thorburn presumes, negotiations would open at a conference that was attended also by provincial representatives, and the participants would agree here on the general terms of the separation agreement. In the transition period, the agreement would be implemented under the supervision of a “joint control commission” with equal representation from the governments of Canada and Quebec, under a neutral, presumably foreign, chair.“** This commission would function throughout the disengagement period, which could last one year. Thorburn surveys the issues to be dealt with in the separation agreement and the disengagement. In general, his solutions assume that there would be bilateral management of the secession by temporary or permanent joint agencies, on which Canada and Quebec would have equal representation. The first problem would be the boundary, though it would probably remain intact. Next would be the army. As in the case of federal civil servants, Thorburn favours allowing

125 Other Studies of the Transition

the members of the military free choice about which state to serve. Remustering should be done right at the start of the transition period, since the forces might be needed to maintain order. A joint Quebec-Canada army council, reporting to the joint control commission, would direct the forces of both countries. Next, citizens would require guarantees of their freedom and security, including civil, prop-

erty, and language rights. More generally, Thorburn assumes that existing federal laws would continue in force in Quebec until changed

by the National Assembly. The debt would be split on a per capita basis. Quebec would retain all immovable assets in the province, while

some other assets (including CN, Air Canada, the Seaway and the Port of Montreal) would be run by cooperative state organizations. Other issues about debt and assets would be determined by a joint financial settlement commission, again with equal representation and a neutral chair. Depending on longer-term prospects for economic cooperation, the common currency might be maintained, along with free access between Atlantic Canada and the rest of the country. If cooperation seemed unlikely, the agreement would provide for a transition to a new currency for Quebec, and for minimizing the border controls with Ontario and New Brunswick. Finally, Quebec Aboriginals

would require some guarantees, especially about the language of schooling; otherwise, Ottawa’s obligations would be transferred to the crown in right of Quebec. Last, and only after these negotiations had been concluded, Canada would design for itself a new constitution, from which Quebec would be absent. There is a good deal of calm sense in this analysis. Nevertheless, it is substantially at odds with the expectations of other scholars on

some important points. Indeed, this brief survey of studies of the politics of the transition shows a striking lack of consensus about questions that would critically determine the outcome of negotiations with Quebec and the way in which ROC would be reconstituted. There is profound uncertainty — or disagreement — about several

basic issues. When would negotiations begin? Who would negotiate with Quebec? What would the public mood be like? Would power flow to Ottawa or to the provinces in the event of a secession? Would an election be held? Would the Canadian constitution be amended, and how could this occur? How would the disengagement be managed, and how would particular issues be resolved? How long would the whole process take? It is clear that these are crucial questions. The economic costs and benefits of secession would depend mainly on how the process took place, and the law would only be a tool in the politics of the event. In order to guide our analysis of the transition, further work is needed. One fruitful way to proceed is through

126 The Transition to Sovereignty

comparative analysis, which might produce lessons applicable to the separation of Quebec from Canada. So it is to other cases of secession that we now turn.

CHAPTER TEN

The Comparative Politics of Peaceful Secession

This short chapter substitutes for two longer ones found in the first edition of this book. Both are now readily available elsewhere, so they have been cut to make room for the new part 4. The first chapter originally appeared as an article - “How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?” — which developed thirteen empirical generalizations about the politics of secession.’ The second was from a short monograph — The Breakup of Czechoslovakia — which was distilled into a chapter here.”

Both these studies were undertaken because comparative experience could shed light on how the politics of a transition to Quebec sovereignty might occur. THE PATTERN OF PEACEFUL SECESSIONS

Other cases were studied in order to seek common patterns in the process of secession — to develop empirical generalizations about the

pattern of politics during transitions to sovereignty. Of course, the secession of Quebec would be a unique event, shaped by particularities of geography, history, economic and social conditions, and political formations, but if there are general features in the political dynamics of secessions — if politicians and citizens tend to behave in certain regular ways — then these could help predict how the QuebecCanada case would unfold. These regularities do exist and are briefly described here. Two caveats should be noted, however. These gener-

alizations are derived from few cases, and mainly from three: the secession of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, of Hungary from Austria

128 The Transition to Sovereignty

in 1867, and of Norway from Sweden in 1905. Second, only peaceful secessions are surveyed; contested secessions are excluded. This is not because those cases are irrelevant; on the contrary, useful lessons have been drawn from them.’ Moreover, violent secessions are far more numerous than peaceful ones.* But contested secessions fall into a different class than the one that is of interest here. So how has peaceful

secession occurred in the past? What features have characterized the process? 1 Secession Follows Protracted Constitutional and Political Disputes

In 1867, Hungary and Austria were separated through the Ausgleich (Compromise), which was accepted by the Austrian Reichstat on 21 De-

cember. This arrangement provided for Hungarian sovereignty and for some integrative institutions, but it capped a struggle for Hungarian autonomy that had been intense since 1848, involving a re-

volt, repression, tax boycotts, and a set of formal proposals for independence made by a new Hungarian parliament in 1866. Norway and Sweden had been united in 1814 under the Swedish king, but friction grew about tariff policy, Swedish plans for greater integration, and Norwegian demands for a separate consular service. The last issue brought the nations near to war in 1895, and early in 1905 a new Norwegian ministry passed a consular bill and precipitated a constitutional crisis. Singapore seceded from Malaysia on9 August 1965 with remarkable speed. In some ways this was an expulsion,

for the federation had experienced serious discord not only about economic policy but also about racial relations and the deep ideology underpinning the federal system. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore continued to press for a noncommunal, egalitarian system by contesting elections on the mainland, race riots broke out in Singapore,

and the prime minister of Malaysia apparently concluded that singapore’s secession would be desirable for his country’s stability. 2 The Secessor State Declares Its Intent to Withdraw

This event happens abruptly. It is registered at a precise moment in time. For example, the Jamaican referendum of September 1961 was immediately followed by a declaration that Jamaica would quit the Federation of the West Indies. In the case of Singapore, the Malay-

sian leader conveyed his decision to the government of Singaporeon 5 August and the secession announcement was made in the legislature on 9 August. In Austria-Hungary, after the Austrian emperor’s stunning defeats by the Prussians in 1866, the leader of the Hungarian

129 Comparative Politics of Peaceful Secession

moderates presented him with the parliament’s program for independence at a meeting in July of that year. In Norway, a new coalition passed the consular bill, it was vetoed, the ministry resigned, and on 7 June the Storting unanimously passed a resolution that au-

thorized the ministry to continue and dissolved the union with Sweden. 3 The Predecessor State Accepts the Principle of Secession: Negotiations Follow

This reflects the most profound decision on the part of the leadership of the predecessor state — to accept that secession will occur. It is

always a bitter and difficult decision, but it marks the fundamental difference between peaceful secessions and those that are violent. This immense concession sets in train all that follows, and the first item is negotiations. When colonial federations broke up, it was the imperial power that had to accept that secession would occur. In late 1962, for example, Britain recognized that Nyasaland could secede from the Central African Federation, and this led to the Victoria Falls Conference in June 1963. In the Singapore-Malaysia case, it was Lee Kuan Yew who had to swallow the bitter pill delivered by Malaysia and to negotiate about the terms of secession that were presented to his government.

The acceptance in Austria-Hungary was by the emperor, who had concluded that placating the Magyars was essential to salvage his weakened realm. Acceptance was hardest in Sweden, where some ministers advocated war, but the cabinet and all party leaders decided to proceed peacefully because the Norwegians were united, war would be ruinous, and the Great Powers would isolate Sweden if it maintained the union forceably. Even Conservative newspapers concluded that the Storting vote had rendered the union “devoid of value for Sweden and therefore the use of force was unthinkable.”® 4 Secession Is a Momentous, Galvanizing Event

Even peaceful secessions are times of great disruption and uncertainty. They mark profound changes in the relations between peoples and states, and this is fully recognized at the time. New possibilities are opened and options are closed off, and this occurs during a compressed time period when collective choices are known to have big long-term consequences. There are always changes at the elite level, with new leadership emerging and new political coalitions forming. There is also considerable mass unrest and excitement, as when racial

conflict continued in Singapore, minorities in Austria agitated for

130 The Transition to Sovereignty

more autonomy, and huge public demonstrations took place in both Norway and Sweden while defensive forces were mobilized even as negotiations about disengagement were taking place. 5 The Government Is Broadened and Strengthened on Each Side: There Is a Premium on Solidarity

In order to undertake fundamental constitutional change, the governments of both the predecessor and the seceding state are strength-

ened. In Hungary, for example, the parliament’s program for sovereignty was forged by a special committee of 67 members, rep-

resenting all factions, and by a strong executive committee of 15 members. In Norway, solidarity grew stronger as the crisis developed. A special committee of the Storting was established, and anew coalition government was then formed with broad representation; it relied heavily on the committe. In Sweden, after the Norwegian vote, an extraordinary committee of the Riksdag was formed to help frame the national response, and a coalition cabinet of unprecedented breadth was assembled to deal with the situation. In short, the crisis of secession unites each side politically. And the two sides polarize. These

effects are less thoroughgoing than what happens in contested secessions, when war entirely divides the states and forces internal unity.

Nevertheless, those responsible for negotiations seek truly national support by submerging partisan and ideological differences during the crisis. This effect is not confined to political elites; the process of - secession, or the crisis of the transition, itself generates internal unity on each side. 6 The Negotiations Involve Few Participants

Historically, the teams negotiating secession have been very small —

the prime ministers and a few key cabinet ministers in SingaporeMalaysia, the foreign minister in the case of Austria, and Norwegian and Swedish delegations of only four members each at the Karlstad Conference, where the terms of Norway’s secession were negotiated. This fact seems paradoxical, but the teams incorporate the strongest

members of all factions, and the same solidarity that arises during the crisis permits the delegation of substantial power to a very few representatives. / The Separation Is Accomplished Quickly

Negotiations about secession are not protracted. The two sides disengage quickly. Lee Kuan Yew learned of the Malaysian position on

131 Comparative Politics of Peaceful Secession

5 August 1965, signed the separation agreement on 7 August, and saw the measure pass the legislature on 9 August, effective immediately. The Victoria Falls Conference took place in less than a week in June-July 1963, and the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was terminated in December of that year. The Karlstad Conference opened

on 31 August 1905, and the secession was accomplished by midNovember. Even in Austria-Hungary, where complex new institutions were also being established and where an Austrian election intervened, the whole process took less than a year. & Foreign Powers Play an Important Role

This generalization holds in every case. In that of Malaysia-Singapore, tension with Indonesia helped make precipitous action necessary, while

the allies in the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement insisted that Singapore continue to cooperate in defence. In Austria-Hungary, three foreign powers — Germany, Turkey, and Russia — each posed as a protector of some internal minorities and thereby countered the threats

of others. Norway undertook a vigorous public relations campaign among the Great Powers and continued a monarchical system to placate them, while fear of foreign intervention led both Norway and Sweden to compromise when each contemplated war. Foreign powers always have an interest when sovereignty is being altered. 9 The Settlement Involves a Relatively Short List of Items

In peaceful secessions, the negotiations centre on a few significant matters which are settled quickly in principle. Norway and Sweden agreed on only five major issues, one of which was a general arbitration treaty to govern future disputes. The Singapore separation agree-

ment contained only eight articles. In Austria-Hungary, the negotiations concerned not only the principles of disengagement but also some mechanisms for future coordination, but much of the latter was left to be fleshed out in subsequent discussions and practice. 10 The Secession Is Accomplished Constitutionally

Without exception, peaceful secessions are achieved through established legal processes. There is no legal rupture, and this is a direct consequence of the predecessor state accepting the principle that secession will occur. In Austria-Hungary, all measures were passed constitutionally. In Norway-Sweden, the Act of Union was abrogated by the two legislatures, the king abdicated from his Norwegian throne, and the new king was properly elected and crowned. The Malaysian

132 The Transition to Sovereignty

legislature passed constitutional amendments excising Singapore by the proper two-thirds majority. Even when Iceland separated from Denmark in 1944, in the midst of war, the unilateral termination of the Act of Union was confirmed, as required, by a national plebiscite. 11 There Are No Other Substantial Constitutional Changes in Either State

This somewhat surprising pattern occurs for two reasons. Both the precedessor and the seceding state seek stability, the former for damage

control and the latter for international credibility. Second, constitutional amendments are not required for the significant changes in policy that each state generally does undertake. 12 Policies in the Two States Soon Begin to Diverge

After the Ausgleich, Hungary moved towards social conservatism and a firm policy of Magyar supremacy in the linguistic and educational fields, while the Austrian Liberal Party introduced important social and economic reforms. Cooperation between the two countries continued under the monarch, but there was growing friction about economic policy and control over the army, and tariff negotiations broke down in 1879. After Norway became a sovereign country, it moved to become one of the most liberal states in Europe, unlike Sweden. There was some coordination between the two countries, as well as parallel foreign policies of isolation and neutrality, but they never signed a mutual defence treaty, and Norway enjoyed a Great Power guarantee of its borders. The kings did not meet until 1914, and truly cooperative institutions awaited the formation of the Nordic Council in 1951. In Malaysia, the communal system continued, but Singapore moved towards dirigisme, with compulsory national service and tight labour legislation. Within a week of the secession, Singapore restricted Malaysian imports, and each country established immigration controls. As a consequence of nation-building policies on both sides, economic integration was very much weakened and defence cooperation was minimal. 13 Secession Is Irrevocable

There has never been a reunification after a secession. This is not only because the whole project of the seceding state is to acquire more autonomy, which becomes enshrined in the new institutions of sovereignty, but also because of the effects of the transition itself. There

133 Comparative Politics of Peaceful Secession

is a psychic break, with the recognition that the community is fractured, along with the internal solidarity forged in the process of disengage-

ment. Unity on each side develops through a collective concentra-

tion on the “other,” and the crisis creates separate identities and interests that cannot subsequently be subsumed in a new union. This is a very bare account of how peaceful secessions take place. But these generalizations are quite robust; they hold true in circumstances separated by geography, time, culture, and degrees of democracy. During the transition, it is clear that political leaders have considerable scope for taking decisions that have lasting consequences; indeed, the process of the transition significantly determines the long-

term outcomes of the separation. By far the largest decision taken in the cases reviewed here was that the secession would not be contested. As well, choices were made about institutional arrangements, both domestically and between the two states, and these had lasting effects. Before applying this framework to the Quebec-Canada case, a brief examination of Czechoslovakia is warranted. THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 1 January 1993, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ceased to be, and the new sovereign states of Slovakia and the Czech Republic came into being. This is the only case of peaceful secession to have taken place in a modern, highly integrated, industrial economy where there was also a full democracy (albeit a recent and turbulent one).

The Czech-Slovak case has many unique features, yet most of the empirical generalizations listed above also hold true for Czechoslovakia. A few deviations occurred, essentially, because this separation was the climax of a gradual process of polarization. In this process,

partisan forces in each unit found it politically profitable to engage in mutual antagonism, to emphasize conflict and disagreement, and ultimately to effect the breakup of the federation.

In late 1989, anti-regime demonstrations culminated in Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution. This was led by large umbrella organizations — the Civic Forum (CF), led by Vaclav Havel, and its Slovak counterpart, the Public Against Violence (PAV). The first free elections in June 1990 produced a convincing victory for the CF-PAV coalition at the federal level, while CF also controlled the Czech National Council (at the republic level). PAV formed a coalition in the Slovak National Council with the Christian Democrats. The federal government set out to deal with the residue of Communism by overhauling the administrative and legal structures of the state and aiming

134 The Transition to Sovereignty

for a rapid transition to a market economy. The latter thrust sparked resistance from Slovak nationalists, who argued that some policies were unsuitable to Slovakia’s heavy industry; but rapid reform continued, despite polls showing less support for them among Slovaks than Czechs. Polarization is a process of growing mutual hostility between two communities, accompanied by a sense among members of each that their interests are distinct and can only be met through separation. The polls clearly show that between 1990 and late 1992, public opinion in both Slovakia and the Czech Republic moved from very substantial approval of a common state towards accepting separation as necessary and inevitable. This process was propelled by the leaders of political factions, who found that they could attract support by - taking more radical positions on the constitutional question. The radical Slovak National Party had some success in the 1990 election and was soon advocating sovereignty. It organized street dem-

onstrations, agitated for Slovak to become the sole official language in the republic, and published a Declaration of Sovereignty. Other radicals acted in ways offensive to the Czechs, by celebrating the fascist Tiso regime and shouting down President Havel. Under these pressures, along with those of governing, CF and PAV fragmented. Vaclav Klaus formed the Civic Democratic Party out of the right wing of the former, and Vladimir Meciar formed the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia with some other PAV deputies.

As negotiations about revising the federal constitution continued, Klaus and Meciar adopted positions more extreme than those of the embattled centrist parties that now led small and fragile coalitions. Meciar advocated both sovereignty and a vague, confederal form of association between the republics. Klaus and his party rejected the notion that the new federal constitution might be ratified by the republics, and demanded a “functional federation” that could settle pressing economic problems. Negotiations on a draft state treaty failed, and polarization increased during the period before the 1992 elections. The results of these elections confirmed the collapse of the centre. While the parties of Klaus and Meciar were both short of a majority,

they were dominant in the republic legislatures. They also led at the federal level, each with the power to block constitutional change. Moreover, it would be impossible to form a federal government with a positive and coherent program because it would have to consist of Czech rightists and Slovak leftists and nationalists. Still, public opinion was less extreme on the issue of separation than the positions taken by the politicians. Polarization proceeded as each leader attempted to move his domestic opinion towards the

135 Comparative Politics of Peaceful Secession

more extreme position he favoured. This involved interpreting the actions of the other as showing that there was no alternative that was as reasonable as the extreme one that he himself favoured. Meanwhile, difficult negotiations, insults, flat rejections, and threats all helped consolidate each leader’s domestic opinion while pushing the other’s domestic constituency towards the position he advocated. Antagonism between the leaders was thus beneficial to each of them as opinion polarized and consolidated. After the June 1992 elections, Klaus and Meciar met several times. Each reported that the other sought unrealistic options — republic sovereignty on the Slovak side and a “single, centralist state” on the Czech side. A political agreement was reached to form a weak, caretaker government at the federal level, while the republic legislatures were to work towards a constitutional resolution. But Klaus refused to participate in the federal government and stood for premier of the Czech republic instead. Polarization was increased when the Slovaks blocked Havel’s reelection as president and when their legislature passed the symbolic Declaration of Sovereignty. This reinforced the determination of the Czechs, who rejected new confederal proposals from the other side. Then the Slovak National Council adopted a constitution for Slovakia

in September, which made the Czech leadership more prepared to press for the federation to be wound up and which helped confirm in the public’s opinion that separation was inevitable. This whole process of polarization departed to some extent from the pattern that characterizes peaceful secessions. There was no sharp, authoritative declaration by either side of its intent to secede. Instead, the Slovaks moved by escalating demands, stonewalling negotiations, and giving symbolic affronts. Nor was there on the Czech side a corresponding clear acceptance of the principle of secession. It took some time for the Czechs to appreciate the depth of the Slovak nationalism that emerged once the revolution made free expression possible, and it took even longer for the Czech public to be led to believe that these forces posed a greater threat to them than their independence would, despite the costs of separation. Finally, broad coalitions were not cre-

ated on each side. After the 1992 elections, Klaus and Meciar both formed narrow coalitions that were just capable of dominating their respective legislatures. Essentially, this is because their positions were more extreme than those of their domestic constituencies, and fully representative coalitions would not have supported the decisive steps

towards separation that these leaders were prepared to take. As polarization proceeded, however, there was a tremendous premium on national solidarity. Politicians opposed to the breakup or its terms

136 The Transition to Sovereignty

found that resistance would be difficult, because their opposition would be read by the public as weakening the bargaining position of

their “own” national side. As the separation proceeded and public opinion grew to accept it, partisan leaders could not blemish the national mantle that Klaus and Meciar had assumed. All the other empirical generalizations hold in the Czech-Slovak case. There were long and difficult constitutional negotiations, involving some issues that dated back to the Dubcek government’s reforms of 1969. The critical negotiations in July 1992 involved only Klaus and Meciar and five leading party members on each side, though

full cabinets were engaged by late October when detailed treaties were being drafted. The process was fast. Critical decisions were taken within two weeks of the elections, the framework for separation was

set within another month, and it took only four more months to decide all post-separation arrangements, as well as to enact new republic constitutions and dissolve the federal state. Despite the very high level of social, economic, and political integration between the two republics, the settlement involved surprisingly few agreements —

a total of thirty-one separate treaties. Foreign powers were important. In particular, the European Community’s requirement for associate membership placed a floor beneath which economic integration could not sink, and this resulted directly in a treaty to maintain a customs union. The separation was effected constitutionally (though it took some last-minute brinkmanship to convince the Federal As-

sembly to dissolve the federation), and the new constitutions of Slovakia and the Czech Republic were very similar to the basic laws they superseded. Despite this continuity, the separation was a mo-

mentous event, marked by demonstrations, strikes, and mass petition campaigns, along with outpourings of nationalist celebration and substantial ill-feeling. Soon the policies of the new states diverged. Their foreign preoccupations differed, they treated minorities differ-

ently, the currency arrangement broke down, trade flows dropped precipitously, and controls went up at the border posts. Relations remained correct, but within a shrinking zone of mutual interest. Finally, the secession is irrevocable. Reunification of Slovakia and the Czech Republic as a single sovereign state with a common legislature and executive is inconceivable.

PART THREE

The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

Let us summarize the argument to this point. First, Canada without Quebec would be a viable state. If Quebec seceded, the rest of Canada (ROC) could be reconstituted in many ways. The underlying features of the economy, society, and culture have both congruences and cleavages across provincial and regional boundaries, and so are not clearly conducive to either integration or fragmentation. The political process through which secession occurs and the structures established at that time would very much shape the long-term structure of ROC. So, too, would the kind of economic and political relationships established with the separated Quebec, and here again a wide variety of options is possible. Turning to other studies of the secession process, drawn from a variety of disciplines, several conclusions emerge. The separation into two sovereign states could entail very heavy economic costs for people and firms in both states. By far the largest component of these costs, potentially, is the cost of the transition itself, which would be mainly determined by the politics of the event. Second, the legal framework around the phenomenon of secession, especially in metropolitan states, is quite indeterminate. Secession, simply enough, is successful when the sub-unit seeking to withdraw from the larger state can establish physical control of the territory and also gain recognition from member states of the international community. In Quebec’s case, Canada is primordial on both counts: it is the only currently sovereign actor likely to

138 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

resist Quebec’s claims to territory, and if it does not do so, but instead recognizes Quebec’s independence, other states will follow. Finally, studies of the potential politics of Quebec secession are quite diverse in their findings, with general scenarios ranging from relatively smooth disengagement to extreme political turmoil. Even so, they clarify some of the preconditions for a peaceful secession, and they also suggest some of the major points of contention that would emerge in bargaining between Canada and Quebec over the terms of disengagement and post-secession relations. The political studies, however, generally have little to say about how the detailed process of separation would occur, or else their conclusions are conflicting. Hence, we turned to comparative experience. The focus here was on cases of peaceful secession, which, it should be stressed again, are far less numerous than instances of contested secession. Nevertheless, especially in democracies, there are a few cases of peaceful secession, and analysis of these reveals common patterns in the process. Our purpose now is to build on these empirical generalizations. In this part of the study, we assume that Quebec will secede, and our objective is to predict in some detail the process of the transition to an independent Quebec and a ROC of some form. Even this is filled with some uncertainty, however, because of the Czech-Slovak separation, which departed from the common pattern of peaceful secession: the process was gradual and political polarization was the main dynamic. After the application of the general pattern, therefore, the terrain of the transition will be revisited, briefly, to modify the initial depiction under conditions of polarization.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Getting to the Table

SECESSION FOLLOWS PROTRACTED CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DISPUTES

Canada’s constitution has been under negotiation for thirty years.’ After repeated failure to reach agreement on amendments, it finally underwent fundamental change in 1982, when the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the amending formula were added, without the approval of the Quebec National Assembly. To satisfy Quebec’s core demands for change, in 1987 further amendments were proposed in

the Meech Lake Accord, but this failed to pass in June 1990.” The Charlottetown Accord, agreed in 1992, broadened the scope of amend-

ments, but it too failed, after defeat in referendums held in Canada and Quebec.’ Thus, in the view of nationalist Quebecers, it has proved

impossible to change the Canadian constitution so as to accommodate the distinct nature of Quebec. This whole process has had several effects. First, having been exposed to “searing experience(s) of constitutional consciousness raising” and to the impact of the courts’ Charter decisions, the populace has become more aware of the stakes involved in altering the fundamental law of the land.* Along with this has developed the expectation that the public, at least as represented by interest organizations, will participate in negotiating major change, and there is now a wide-

spread presumption that amendments require popular approval. Third, existing institutions have been devalued. Thrown onto the bargaining table and almost replaced by negotiated alternatives, the

140 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

constitution has been declared inadequate, yet it has not been superseded by suitably renewed structures. Fourth, constitutional fatigue has set in. The Chrétien Liberals were able to capitalize on this sentiment by promising in the 1993 election campaign to set constitutional matters aside. But the issue cannot be laid to rest, because of the Bloc québécois (BQ), which took fifty-four seats in that election, and the victory of the Parti québécois (PQ) in the September 1994 Quebec election. National unity has re-emerged as a compelling national problem.°

In ROC, one result of this pressure is the desire for “closure” — for resolving constitutional disputes “once and for all.” Expressed most

fervently in the West, this sentiment is fuelled not only by fatigue with the issue and by deeper irritation with a Quebec that drives the

national agenda, but also by the evident costs to all Canadians of constitutional uncertainty. The perception of these costs at the personal level — higher interest rates, a weaker Canadian dollar — is also

strong at the governmental level, where the effects of uncertainty exacerbate a fiscal crisis that has forced all governments to reduce services and to run large operating surpluses in order to meet interest charges; indeed, accompanying the constitutional malaise is a disaffection with governments that extract more in taxes than they provide in services. (In every region of the country except Ontario, a majority of respondents to an Environics poll felt that their province did not receive its fair share of federal spending.)° Finally, in ROC, as intellectuals have come to recognize the impending threat posed by Quebec secession, there has developed an existential concern about its future. The perception that Canada will have to reconstitute itself if Quebec attains sovereignty, and the absence of a consensus about what arrangements would then be possible and desirable, add to the profound constitutional uncertainty that exists in the country because of protracted and fundamental disputes over its basic law. These factors operate in Quebec as well. The importance of the constitution has been driven home there not only by continual negotiations but also by the referendum of 1980, the constitutional “coup” of 1982, and by the Meech and Charlottetown attempts to provide wider powers to the provincial government, to recognize Quebec’s distinct status, and to protect its special interests through a constitutional veto and through guaranteed representation in central institutions. The Supreme Court decision overturning sections of the popular Charter of the French Language demonstrated constitutional vulnerability to the extent that the federalist Bourassa government felt compelled to override the ruling.’ At the same time, potential constitutional gains have not been realized. No constitutional expansion of provin-

141 Getting to the Table

cial powers has been won, nor has the province achieved special protection or guarantees. The constitutional status quo remains, at a time when opinion in ROC appears to be shifting from a dualist conception of Canada towards one based on individual rights and equality of the provinces. Constitutional fatigue is also evident in Quebec. On the one hand is the sense that negotiations have not achieved any result and cannot do so, and that in this impasse only a vote for secession can produce change and security and the opportunity for the global society

to develop; on the other is the sense that constitutional wrangling should cease because it wastes energy and exacerbates economic prob-

lems. Although the Bloc québécois won fifty-four seats in the 1993 election and although its core vote was sovereigntist, it is worth noting that the federal Liberal Party, which stood explicitly against reopening the constitution, still took 33.0 per cent of the Quebec vote (while the Progressive Conservatives took another 13.6 per cent). A particular constitutional fatigue exists, too, among sovereigntists, many

of whom came to the movement as young people in the late 1960s. Among many in this generation is the sense that the last chance for independence — their last chance — is imminent.

The constitutional debate in Quebec will occur in the context of a fiscal crisis that will exacerbate deep cleavages over the province’s options. Governments have been compelled to compress spending. In the 1992-93 fiscal year, Quebec government revenues were $35.5 billion, budgetary expenditures were $40.5 billion, and interest payments on the total debt reached $4.77 billion, or about 13.4 per cent of revenues.’ Meanwhile, unemployment has been stubbornly above the Canadian average. The burden of government has been alleviated only marginally by net inflows from Ottawa for equalization and unemployment insurance. These economic and budgetary conditions feed directly into the constitutional debate, for federalists

maintain that separation is too costly and risky an option, while sovereigntists argue that the inefficiencies of the federal system and the incapacity of Quebec to manage its own economy have created the crisis in government finances and slow economic growth. Public opinion about constitutional options has been thoroughly charted in Quebec,’ and several elements are clear. First, the electorate is rather evenly divided on the issue. Analysts often distinguish among committed sovereigntists, committed federalists, and moderate nationalists. The last occupy the centre of the constitutional dimension and are the “swing voters.” During the 1992 Charlottetown referendum campaign, for instance, one team of researchers found 39 per cent of the electorate to be “firm” sovereigntists, 8 per cent to

142 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

be “diffident” sovereigntists, and 15 per cent to be non-francophone

and federalist; the 38 per cent who were non-sovereigntist francophones were “clearly on the battleground.””° Another team used an eleven-category scale to categorize francophone Quebecers in 1991; they found 29 per cent firmly in favour of independence, 21 per cent

firm federalists, and 50 per cent ranging across the various shadings of support for sovereignty-association." Second, opinion on this issue is volatile. The clearest examples occurred when the Supreme Court ruled on Bill 101, the Quebec language law, and when the Meech

Lake Accord failed to pass. Support for sovereignty rose dramatically, to peak at 58 per cent, with only 30 per cent opposed.” It has since declined. This shows not only volatility but also its major cause — perceived threats to the security of the French language in Quebec. As Stéphane Dion concluded, “A linguistic crisis has been at the root

of each new outburst of nationalism in Quebec since the 1960s.” This volatility at the time of the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord also shows that opinion in Quebec is highly sensitive to perceived opinion in ROC, and especially to events that can be interpreted symbolically as rejection, contempt, or humiliation.”

There are other important features of polling data about support for separation. Many studies have shown that reported opinion is very sensitive to the question posed. For instance, there are substantial differences between support for “sovereignty,” “independence,” and “separation,” and there is good evidence that these concepts have different connotations in Quebec: in a straight question about them,

69 per cent of Quebecers agreed that “sovereignty” and “independence” meant different things.” This shows that the substance of a referendum question is very important at the margin, for when further information about the implications of sovereignty is provided to respondents, opinion shifts significantly. During the 1992 referendum campaign, for instance, respondents were randomly asked either for their opinion on Quebec sovereignty per se or on Quebec sovereignty, “that is, Quebec is no longer a part of Canada.” The pro-

portion that was very favourable was 47 per cent on the first question and only 39 per cent on the second.” This reveals the scope for political argument about the implications of sovereignty to move the Quebec electorate through the course of a referendum campaign. The perceived effects of sovereignty, including the substance of arrangements to be concluded between Quebec and Canada, would be a major determinant of how the moderate nationalists vote. Blais and Nadeau, for example, found that economic expectations strongly affected the propensity to opt for sovereignty: “Everything else being equal, support for sovereignty is 19 points lower among those who expect their

143 Getting to the Table , standard of living to go down.”” Similarly, Pinard concluded that support for independence drops 6 to 7 per cent when questions specify

that this means the absence of political and economic ties with the rest of Canada.” Finally, polls consistently overestimate support for sovereignty and for the PQ - or, rather, they have done so in the past.” This, along with other sources of error and the close balance between sovereigntists and federalists, means that the outcome of a referen-

dum campaign on sovereignty would very likely be in doubt until the votes were finally counted. Comparative experience shows that partisan considerations are vital in cases of secession, because political parties and their leaders are the vehicles for formulating, presenting, and defending the various constitutional options. While the partisan and personal character of constitutional negotiations is often overshadowed by a focus on the substantive issues and the “interests” of various states, Cairns’s comments about earlier negotiations would remain true both before and after a Quebec referendum on sovereignty: “Thus the constitutional

struggle of recent years in Canada cannot be understood without reference to the clashing wills, ambitions, and visions of that small group of political leaders who happened to be on the stage when the time came for Canadians to have that constitutional rendezvous with destiny which they had so long avoided.””° Of course, leaders are constrained by opinion within their parties and the general public, and constitutional debates also involve the media and organized interests; but in a system of representative parliamentary democracy, it is the elected members, organized into hierarchical parties, who make collectively binding decisions. Since leaders must make momentous and rapid decisions in cases of secession, and since the high degree of uncertainty that prevails in such unprecedented circumstances allows them considerable autonomy in their choices, it is important to analyse the partisan forces in the Canada-Quebec case. The firm position of the federal Liberal Party is that there should be no reopening of constitutional issues. The leader, Jean Chrétien, has a mandate to provide good government and economic growth. This is a recent and strong mandate: the Liberals have 176 seats in the House of Commons, enough to govern with a comfortable majority even if they lose the support of all their members from Quebec. The party does not, however, control the Senate. In any referendum

campaign about Quebec sovereignty, the Liberals would be the main

federal defenders of the constitutional status quo. And as the governing party, they would be most unlikely to split and lose control of the House of Commons, whatever the outcome of a referendum in Quebec.

144 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

The Progressive Conservative party is rebuilding after its massive defeat in the 1993 election. Its precise constitutional policy is unclear, but the interim leader, Jean Charest, is a credible defender of federalism and has a substantial incentive to improve his fortunes and those of his party by doing so. Initial indications are that Mr Charest will distinguish his party within the federalist camp by advocating some form of “third way” between the constitutional status quo and sovereignty, perhaps by proposing that new power-sharing agreements be entrenched in the constitution.”! The federal New Democratic Party is also rebuilding. Its current constitutional position has not been enunciated, and it will have difficulty formulating one because of internal divisions between the

Ontario and western memberships, between trade unionists and

members of social movements, and between centralists and

provincialists. It has never had electoral success in Quebec. On constitutional matters, the Reform Party occupies a strategic position. This is a classic populist party with a weak organizational structure and a dominant leader. Its platform generally favours less interventionist government, and on specific issues — bilingualism, social welfare, minority and group rights — its position is antithetical to traditional Liberal policies.* Constitutionally, Reform makes common cause with Quebec nationalists by supporting decentralization, but it threatens Quebecers with other policies, such as equality of the provinces, an equal and elected Senate, and weak commitment to bilingualism, group rights, and redistribution.”

Reform is a “movement-party” based on discontent and active participation at the grassroots level, so it must keep its momentum going and its members mobilized. The party has three options. First, it could continue to spread into Ontario, the Atlantic provinces, and Quebec, aiming at the next election, though this could not occupy the members for four years, and the party’s prospects in Quebec are dismal. Second, Reform could abandon its exclusively national focus and enter the provincial realm, especially in Ontario, aiming to occupy potential Progressive Conservative bases and to supplant the PC conclusively as the right-of-centre party in both orders of government. But this would create competing centres of power within the party, and in fact the option was defeated at the October 1994 Reform Party convention. Third, Reform could focus on the constitution, aiming to draw support by using the sovereigntists as a foil in a strategy of polarization. Quebec could be the keystone of other elements of the Reform philosophy too, because “it is seen as both the strategic key to demands made of the federal system by special interests, and as a continuing guarantee that attempts to downsize

145 Getting to the Table

the welfare state will be maximally difficult.”** So at the same time as he could criticize the governing Liberals for their inadequate de-

fence of federalism, Preston Manning could seek support through counterattacking the sovereigntists’ provocations. The Reform Party could thus gain support from both those favouring a functional fed-

eration in which Quebec was treated like any other province and those concerned, in the event of sovereignty, with retribution or with

safeguarding their interests by taking a hard line in dealings with Quebec.” Mr Manning, in short, could presume to act as the tribune of ROC.

On the Quebec side, three political formations are important. First is the provincial Liberal Party. While it lost power in September 1994, its strong showing confirmed Daniel Johnson’s leadership position. As the leading force in the No umbrella organization (assuming that Quebec referendum legislation is not amended), the party could find opportunities for reorganization and mobilization in the struggle to defend federalism. On the other hand, its constitutional position is ambiguous. Mr Johnson appears prepared to defend the existing federal constitution as supple enough to accommodate Quebec’s evolu-

tion; however, the party’s association with firm demands for constitutional change, through Meech, the Allaire Report, and Charlottetown, would make its position difficult and could possibly weaken its unity if no offers of renewed federalism were forthcoming before or during a referendum campaign.” The Parti québécois would of course be in power at the time of a referendum. This is a strongly institutionalized party, with a large membership base and established links with powerful organizations of workers, teachers, the cultural milieu, and small business. Its commitment to sovereignty has evolved from one contingent on contin-

ued association with Canada to an absolute drive towards independence, softened by the prediction that ROC, in its own ratio-

nal self-interest, would cooperate economically with a sovereign Quebec. So the economic costs to the citizens of each country would

be minimized. The party is more popular than its leader, Jacques Parizeau, who is regarded by many as somewhat antiquated and erratic. But barring a major gaffe or illness, Premier Parizeau and the highly centralized inner cabinet will lead a united party in a referendum campaign. Mr Parizeau’s entire political career has been devoted to the cause of sovereignty, and there is no evidence that he would stray from this course even if it were to impose large costs on the citizens of the province. The final Quebec party is the Bloc québécois, the federal counterpart of the PQ. Although the Bloc rests to some extent on the PQ

146 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

organizational base, it possesses some autonomy because of its status as official opposition in the House of Commons, because of its elected members, and above all because of its leader, Lucien Bouchard, the most popular politician in Quebec. After the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, Mr Bouchard resigned from the federal cabinet and cre-

ated the Bloc as the federal vehicle to facilitate Quebec’s evolution towards sovereignty. He is a charismatic leader with great rhetorical ability to blend logic and emotion. Compared with other provincial and federal politicians, he is seen by Quebecers as both strong and trustworthy; even among non-sovereigntist francophones, his overall approval rating has been as high as Mr Chrétien’s.*” Mr. Bouchard is acutely sensitive and, according to insiders, is sincere in all the positions he adopts. On the other hand, he is relatively new to the sovereigntist movement and may not share the core PQ leadership’s entire commitment to independence: there is some evidence of suspicion within that party about his dedication to it.** It is conceivable that the Bloc would stop short of sovereignty if the costs to Quebecers mounted or if a third option opened between outright independence and the constitutional status quo. Other partisan forces are found at the provincial level; the other premiers and opposition leaders would not be able to escape involvement in constitutional debates, however much the lead roles were played by Quebec and federal politicians. Particularly important would

be Clyde Wells of Newfoundland and Frank McKenna of New Brunswick — both Liberals experienced in these matters — and Roy Romanow of Saskatchewan. Ralph Klein of Alberta might enunciate a Reform-like position, while also attempting to solidify a western Canadian option in the event of a Quebec vote for sovereignty. The

premier with the most to gain from the constitutional issue is Bob Rae of Ontario. Leading an unpopular government, but personally credible, Mr Rae could run in the upcoming Ontario election as the

only leader experienced and capable enough to deal with the sovereigntist threat and with constitutional issues. Downplaying the social and economic issues that have divided the electorate and diminished NDP support, he could position himself as the guardian of Ontario’s collective interest. QUEBEC DECLARES ITS INTENT TO SECEDE

It must be assumed that Quebec’s claim to sovereignty can only be based on a positive referendum result after a campaign in which the major protagonists would be those described above. The sovereigntists

are absolutely committed to a referendum, although the PQ govern-

147 Getting to the Table

ment could do much to promote sovereignty before it is held. Two further issues concern the legitimacy of the result. The first is whether Quebecers have the right to decide to secede. Public opinion in Quebec, backed by many pronouncements of the National Assembly (some

made under Liberal governments), strongly supports the existence of this right, and while Canadian public opinion on this issue is not undivided, the preponderant view is that Quebecers do have this right. More important, by participating in the campaign, the protagonists implicitly accept the stakes. This seems unavoidable. Even the leader of the Reform Party is committed to fight in a Quebec referendum.” On the other hand, there certainly is no agreement in ROC about what the terms and mechanics of a separation will be if the Yes side carries the referendum.

The second issue is the question to be posed. For the referendum to be perceived as legitimate, the question must be clear and fair. This is an important matter, and one that is in the hands of the PQ government. It is likely that the question will be “Are you in favour of Quebec becoming a sovereign country?” The use of the term “sovereign” has been attacked as vague and deceptive by federalists who favour “separation” or “independence,” but in fact “sovereignty” has

a precise meaning in international law, whereas the other terms do not. The referendum campaign itself will focus on defining exactly what are the implications of this sovereignty. It is possible that the question could provide some information about these implications — for example, that the Quebec government would administer all taxes, have the right to sign international treaties, and pass all laws applicable to Quebecers. While these amplifications are true, they could justly be decried as selective, and the federalist forces will certainly make this argument. But, once more, participation in the campaign will tend to lock them in to accepting the outcome. On the other hand, if the question is heavily biased — by suggesting that tax savings or economic growth would result from sovereignty —- some ROC forma-

tions, notably Reform, might reserve judgment on the appropriate response to a Yes vote. Because of such considerations, and also because many party militants want a clear outcome, the PQ will pose a clear question, with little amplification.” The referendum campaign will be bitter. It will have three central elements. The first is constitutional. The sovereigntists’ claim will be

that constitutional amendment to meet Quebec’s aspirations has proved impossible. Since the existing arrangements are cumbersome and inefficient and provide neither special recognition of Quebec nor adequate protection of its distinctiveness against the weight of the majority, sovereignty is the only solution. The Quebec Liberals, asso-

148 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

ciated with demands for change in the past, have a strategic disadvantage on this front. For instance, their long-serving premier, Robert Bourassa, is on record as stating that “two avenues of action must be considered simultaneously: an in-depth reorganization of the existing federal system, or sovereignty for Québec. No other solution could meet the needs and aspirations of Québec society.”°*' Moreover,

unless the federal government’s policy against formal constitutional reform changes dramatically, there will be nothing on offer except a defence of the existing constitution, along with such proof of its flexibility and capacity to accommodate Quebec’s interests as can be mustered. Since the PQ, having been in office for several months, will have stymied constructive initiatives in the allocation of functions and joint programming, and since fiscal constraints will not allow many attractive new federal program initiatives, this proof will be difficult to demonstrate. In a sense, the constitutional dimension of the referendum debate is part of the larger constitutional game that has gone on since the 1980 Quebec referendum and has progressively entrenched the notion that Quebec and ROC are entities seeking some compromise, without success. In 1980, the question asked for a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association with Canada. The federalist side argued that a No vote would produce constitutional change; but although it did so, the 1982 amendments were rejected by the Quebec govern-

ment and by the National Assembly (by a vote of 70 to 38). Five years later, the Meech Lake Accord recognized the province’s distinctiveness and collective rights, but it failed, partly because of strong opposition in ROC to the distinct society clause.** Quebec’s strategic reaction was to threaten a referendum on sovereignty in order to win

the gains of Meech, and much argument was devoted to showing that sovereignty was a credible threat.** But Canadian negotiators in the Charlottetown process insisted on enlarging the scope of the proposed amendments, introducing elements threatening to Quebecers and watering down recognition of its distinctiveness. In Whitaker’s view, the threat of sovereignty was not taken seriously enough in the rest of Canada to produce proposals for asymmetrical federalism — for equality among the provinces in ROC and special status and powers

for Quebec.* And the Charlottetown Accord was defeated both in Quebec and in much of the rest of Canada. By holding a referendum after all these interactions, the PQ government will force Quebecers to choose between the constitutional status quo and sovereignty, pure and simple. The second element of the campaign will be emotional, involving notions of patriotism and national identity. Federalist forces will try

149 Getting to the Table

to tap Quebecers’ sense of affection for and identification with Canada — and there is considerable attachment. An extensive poll of Quebecers by CROP in 1992 found that 71 per cent affirmed that “being Ca-

nadian” was part of their identity, while 93 per cent identified with the beauty of the country; more important, 54 per cent wanted Quebec to remain a province of Canada.” According to Blais and Nadeau, the differential sense of attachment to Canada or Quebec is the stron-

gest single predictor of support for sovereignty.” For their part, the sovereigntists will appeal to Quebecers’ desire for autonomy, for constituting themselves finally as an independent nation. The electorate will be told that their language and culture are under constant threat

in the federation and in North America, and that the only way to ensure their survival is to create a state with the sovereign power to do so. Sovereigntists also will argue that the referendum represents the last chance for Quebecers to assert their independence.” If they do not act positively now, Quebec will be weakened for years and will eventually be submerged in the federal system. As Mr Bouchard showed in the 1993 election, he can be especially effective in striking emotional chords, and he will be ready to state that here is Quebec’s final chance to “get off its knees” at last. The importance of this emotional dimension will depend on how much polarization has taken place between the election of the PQ and the referendum. The critical battlefront is likely to be the economic one.” Here the debate will centre around the costs of sovereignty. As has been shown,

these are highly contestable, depending on assumptions about Quebec’s long-term growth potential and, more centrally, about transition costs. The latter are largely a function of the politics of the separation and the negotiations about sovereignty. The federalist strategy will be to accentuate the costs, and high estimates of those costs will be defended as valid. This position will be buttressed if real uncertainty causes interest rates to rise, the dollar to fall, and firms to leave

the province. Meanwhile, the sovereigntists will provide counter-estimates, and will argue that a Yes victory has already been discounted by the markets. Basically, though, the federalists will continue their current policy

of refusing to speculate about a Yes victory and the arrangements that would follow it. At the federal level, one reason is that the government cannot prepare for sovereignty: “In Canada-without-Quebec,

the federal government loses territory, citizens, a historic identity, some of its bureaucracy, and many of the political responsibilities that flowed from its former management of a linguistically dual people.

Little preparation by the federal government for such an unsought goal is likely.”* More deeply, refusal to discuss the aftermath of a Yes

150 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

vote will be part of a strategy to increase uncertainty. It is unlikely that the federal government would even state authoritatively what margin of victory, if any, it would accept. The constant position of the federalists will be that separation is risky and unnecessary, and that the electorate will reject it. Economically, the federalists will refuse

to admit that there would be any cooperation between a ROC and a sovereign Quebec. To do so would be to follow a two-track strategy, providing Quebecers with information about the secessionist future, reducing uncertainty, and — assuming an emotional preference for sovereignty among the electorate - making Yes votes more likely. Both sides will agree that there are mutual gains through maintaining the common Canadian economic space. But federalists will deny that the mutual gains would necessarily continue in the event of Quebec independence. Some will go further, employing a strategy of threats. They will predict that the variable costs of transition, which are partly under the control of ROC, will be high — that negotiations will be long, hard, and bitter, that fundamental issues such as borders and minority rights will be on the table, and that there will likely be temporary economic disruption and the erection of permanent barriers to trade. In the spring of 1994, for example, several premiers warned about the consequences of sovereignty. Mr Klein pointed out that the Seaway belongs to Canada, Mr Romanow explained that there was no provision in the constitution for secession, and Mr Harcourt spoke of the “terrible consequences for everybody .... They think it’s going to be logical and civilized. Forget it, it won’t be. There will be great bitterness and a nasty split. And they'll suffer, not just economically but they’ll suffer every which way, the people of Quebec.”* While there will be a range of threats emanating from ROC (and some offers of cooperation as well), the major federalist actors will be united

in predicting big economic costs of sovereignty and in making no commitments about the consequences of a Yes vote.

The sovereigntists will counter these predictions and threats by pointing to past cases when threats of economic damage proved unfounded, such as the 1976 election campaign and the 1980 and 1992 referendums. More important, they will aim to expose the language of threat as part of a transparent strategy that is not credible. Of course, they will argue, the federalists want to avoid the costs of independence. So, before Quebecers have made their choice, it makes sense for the federalists to emphasize these costs, and it is rational to inflate them by making threats about noncooperation; but Quebecers

could still choose independence, and at the precise moment when they do so, the federalist strategy will have failed. According to this line of reasoning, after it is clear that the federal strategy has failed,

151 Getting to the Table

ROC will immediately have to change its course in order to minimize its own economic losses. ROC is rational (and the argument is often presented in such anthropomorphic terms), so it must opt for cooperation, for the tranquil management of the transition, for joint assurances to diminish uncertainty, and for an economic association that would avoid the costs to its citizens of fragmenting the common economic space. As the PQ has stated the argument, “Par stratégie, les politiciens fédéraux peuvent étre tentés de déclarer maintenant

qu’ils ne négocieront pas, pour dissuader les Québécois et les Québécoises d’appuyer la souveraineté. Une fois devant le fait ac-

compli, cependant, par réalisme économique et politique, ils changeront d’attitude.”” Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, having adopted the position that the economic costs of separation would be high and that the negotiation of post-secession arrangements in advance is in-

conceivable, the federalists will have to maintain their stance until voting day. Since the referendum result will probably be close, the uncertainty and the prospect of economic loss must be kept constantly before the moderate nationalists in order to induce them to vote No. second, the economic debate will be infused with emotion. One reason is that the federalist strategy will be depicted as cynical and manipulative, and contemptuous of Quebecers. If Quebecers do discount the threats and opt for secession, the strategy will have raised the cost of their decision, in reality. This is because all the uncertainty about the constitutional and economic future that pre-negotiation would have reduced will hit Quebec and ROC as a sharp shock on the day after the referendum. So transition costs will be very much increased by the federalists; indeed, the sovereigntists will argue that it is hard to think of a more effective way of maximizing these costs than by refusing to cope with sovereignty until it occurs. Less subtly, threats of noncooperation may anger Quebecers when they are made by federalist leaders who point to ROC extremists and declare themselves bound to take such views into account. As well, some difficult transition issues about which threats of noncooperation will be made involve minorities, Native peoples, and the provincial borders. To all of these, Quebec public opinion is extraordinarily sensitive.* Finally, there is much truth in the sovereigntist analysis of threats of noncooperation. If, after a Yes result, the secession is to be peaceful, negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted, and at this point ROC will have an interest in minimizing uncertainty and in negotiating certain cooperative arrangements. But this is a superficial truth. It is based on depicting the federal strategy as one of “permanent retaliation,” meaning that noncooperation by Quebec in the form of a Yes

152 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

vote would be followed by permanent noncooperation on the part of ROC. This is not credible. Negotiations would certainly occur. But these negotiations need not be easy, nor need they produce cooperative out-

comes. Indeed, it would be entirely rational for ROC to be noncooperative if this stance could produce outcomes favourable to it in the long run — if it could force Quebec into compromises that are in ROC’s interest. For instance, if ROC and a sovereign Quebec are to cooperate

economically, decisions must be taken about the level of integration to be maintained and about what decision rules will settle future questions of economic management. ROC leaders might calculate that the losses consequent upon adopting anonconciliatory stance in the short term would be more than recompensed in the long run if it could obtain its preferred outcomes or a favourable compromise on these issues. Immutable geography and economic forces make it clear, as the Quebec sovereigntists recognize, that negotiations between ROC and Quebec will continue indefinitely, whatever the constitutional framework. But from this observation, one cannot draw the conclusion that cooperation is inevitable. The federalists might well make this argument in the referendum campaign. As Julius Grey put it, “The theory espoused by the separatists that Quebec will get whatever it asks for must be laid to rest.”* The federalists will also, somewhat contradictorily, appeal to Quebecers’ sense of attachment to Canada and to the successful functioning of the Canadian constitution. Here, however, it is assumed that all the federalist arguments have failed and that there is going to be a Yes majority in the Quebec referendum. CANADA WILL ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF SECESSION: NEGOTIATIONS WILL FOLLOW

The referendum campaign has been heated, and the result has been too close to call. Even if the Yes forces have had a substantial lead according to the polls, there has been no commitment by the federalists about the implications of a vote for sovereignty, the margin required to be decisive, or post-sovereignty arrangements. This, despite the fact that high levels of uncertainty are registering in all Canadian markets.

As the results come in, it is apparent that Quebecers have voted Yes. What is to be done? Who will speak for ROC? There is little doubt about the answer. The referendum result will be accepted, and it will

be the Government of Canada that does so. Accepting the result will be an agonizing decision, taken by politicians who are exhausted from the referendum campaign and who

153 Getting to the Table

are meeting under intense time pressure in an atmosphere where news

of the result will produce popular reactions ranging from jubilation to outrage. Yet the decision must be made. It will be taken by the federal cabinet after consultation with the opposition parties and the provincial premiers. The announcement will be made by the prime minister, accompanied by senior ministers and probably the leaders of the Reform Party, the Progressive Conservatives, and the NDP. The prime minister will state that Canadians accept the result and that Quebec will leave the federation. He will appeal for calm and will reassure both the citizenry and the international community that the process of separation will be peaceful, constitutional, and managed through negotiations. All international obligations will be met. There will be no change whatsoever in the constitution, existing law, government programs, or economic management until a settlement of outstanding issues has been reached with the Government of Quebec. Most of all, he will stress that Canada has not come to an end, that political leaders are unanimous in their determination to carry on, and that in this critical time all Canadians must be united as never before.

What are the alternatives to such a decision? First, the Canadian government could refuse to accept the popular verdict, particularly if the margin of the Yes victory was very thin. There are good arguments for requiring super-majorities to effect constitutional change, and recent secession referendums have carried by wide margins.” Yet the fundamental democratic principle is that the majority rules. Moreover, insofar as there are norms about referendum decisions in Canada, the operative decision rule is 50 per cent plus one of those voting. This was the rule understood to be operative in the referendum on the Charlottetown Accord. It is also the position of the Re-

form Party with respect to the referendums it favours on all constitutional amendments.” It is even the principle used by Scott Reid and others who have advocated local referendums in Quebec to allow secession from the province.* Apart from the principle, refusing the result would cause massive unrest in Quebec, as well as sympathetic and provocative demonstrations elsewhere in the country. It would implicitly support Aboriginal claims of the right of secession from Quebec, and it would create international concern about Canada’s commitment to democracy, since Quebecers would have decided the issue in a campaign where the options were clearly sovereignty or the status quo. If the question was legitimate and the campaign fair, ROC could not refuse to accept the result. A refusal, in any case, would have to be effected by force sooner or

later. But the repression of Quebec might not be within Canada’s

154 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

power; nor would this option command support in ROC. A 1992 Decima poll found that only 7 per cent of respondents in ROC found the use of military force to prevent Quebec seceding to be somewhat or very acceptable.” Apart from any propensity to pacifism among Canadians, there is the question of the goal of repression, either economic or political: “What would the objectives of such a declaration

of political war be? To restore federalism? To abolish the Québec National Assembly? To install a more ‘sensible’ provincial government? Would it indeed be in Canada’s self-interest to exact as high a price as possible before acquiescing to Quebec’s sovereignty? Would Canada benefit from a poor, unstable, and recriminatory neighbour?” Alternatively, the government could resign in favour of new leadership. But the confusion and delay that this would engender makes this option highly irresponsible. In any case, anew government would

still have to depend on the support of the Liberal majority in the House of Commons. The prime minister could resign, and this would be a possibility after a losing campaign, but it, too, would increase uncertainty and would be a neglect of duty.°* The opposition parties

could not force a resignation, and it is more likely that leadership within the government would become focused in a small number of senior ministers. The federal government could call an immediate election. Having lost the referendum battle, the Liberals might be disorganized and discredited. There certainly will be calls for a change of government

in order to choose an administration with a mandate to deal with Quebec and to manage the reconstitution of Canada.” But this course

of action would extend and deepen uncertainty, and it could promote profound divisions within ROC by making the response to Quebec a partisan rather than national matter. There is also the problem of what specific platforms the federal parties could present, especially on constitutional change in ROC. More seriously, no party would be likely to secure a working majority in the House of Commons, and the passions of an election campaign would make a collective ROC position very difficult to frame in these circumstances. There also remains the obvious problem that Quebecers could not be

excluded from participating in the election, even though they had just voted to exit from the Canadian community. (Amending the Elections Act to permit an election in ROC alone probably would be unconstitutional.) In the view of some, after the implications of the Yes vote have been registered by Quebecers, an election would allow them

a second chance to cast a vote for federalism. But such an election would be highly divisive in the province, where it might be boycotted or might simply result in the re-election of Bloc members. The

155 Getting to the Table

Quebec vote might well prevent the formation of a majority govern-

ment based in ROC and capable of coherently expressing a Canadian position about dealing with Quebec or reconstituting Canada. Another possibility is for Ottawa to organize its own referendum after the Yes vote in Quebec. There are several forms this could take. A referendum restricted to Quebec might pose a different question about sovereignty, perhaps specifying different implications of the choice. Or it could be the same question, but one that was presented

after some implications of the first vote had sunk in. Once more, though, this would prolong the process. By negating the first result, the gesture itself would promote demonstrations, a boycott, and violence at the polls. Alternatively, a referendum confined to the rest of Canada might ask whether the Quebec decision should be accepted. Again, this would

delay matters for at least the thirty-six days of campaigning specified in the Referendum Act, and it might not be conclusive. What would be the effect on national unity and Canada’s negotiating power if some provincial electorates agreed and others did not? If the popular

decision went against accepting the Quebec result, the federal government’s room to manoeuvre would be very restricted. It could not negotiate the terms of separation, and the PO government could be forced into a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). If Canadians accepted the Quebec Yes vote, then negotiations would begin, but only after a costly delay. Then again, rather than hold a referendum about accepting or rejecting Quebec sovereignty, the federal government could pose other questions in a referendum. It could ask whether Canadians favoured sovereignty or the constitutional status quo or negotiations to renew the federal system. Or it could put before the electorate specific constitutional proposals, perhaps the essence of the Meech Lake Accord or a package of generally decentralizing amendments. Such a referendum could be held in ROC alone or throughout Canada. Some Quebecers would favour this outcome, because in the larger constitutional game, a Yes vote can be seen as the final card that would force ROC to negotiate seriously. Two positions are blended here. In

the first, a vote for sovereignty would arm Quebec with sufficient power to negotiate post-separation arrangements that approximate

“special status,” the province’s traditional demand. Hence sovereigntists such as Mr Bouchard both advocate and predict that confederal structures join Quebec and Canada after sovereignty is achieved.* In the second and softer position, a Yes vote would force ROC to negotiate and to meet Quebec’s demands, but within the constitutional framework, so sovereignty might not be achieved -— or it

156 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

might be. Such ambiguity is expressed by Mario Dumont’s Parti action démocratique du Québec (ADQ), and it resembles the Slovak proposals for a “state treaty” — a way to achieve, as Mr Dumont puts it, sovereignty but not separation.” This position accords with many moderate nationalists’ desire to have sovereignty — or at least national autonomy — without breaking the attachment to Canada, and it cor-

responds with some popular expectations that “sovereignty” would permit this.’ If Canada held a referendum, the result might show that ROC finally understood how serious Quebecers’ disaffection was,

while in Quebec the moderate nationalists might swing away from sovereignty. The economic impact of the Yes vote might help produce these results. But it is unrealistic to think that Ottawa will seek a mandate to negotiate constitutional change after a Yes vote, or that it would receive one in a referendum. First, whether a referendum question presented broad constitutional options or a set of constitutional proposals,

uncertainty and confusion would be prolonged, not only during the referendum campaign but also while negotiations proceeded (if they did). If the federal government received only a mandate to renew federalism, this crude result would not dictate to the negotiators — the governments in place, with all their historical animosities ~ what should be the parameters of a settlement. In any case, public opinion in ROC probably would not endorse major constitutional changes in order to keep Quebec in the federation. A 1992 poll on this question found opinion evenly divided, and sentiment in favour of “closure” undoubtedly has hardened since then.*° There could be some support in ROC for a constitutional pack-

age that would decentralize powers in order to keep Quebecers in the federation, but there would be almost none for any form of special status.°’ Any referendum campaign would be enormously divisive in ROC.

Whatever the question posed, it is likely that some provincial electorates would be favourable while others would not be. MPs from these provinces and the provincial governments would be in an impossible situation, both during any negotiations and when any pro-

posed amendments resulting from them were submitted for ratification. Quite apart from the provincial dimension, any referendum would create sharp divisions of opinion in ROC. After all the delay and debate, Ottawa could emerge with only a slim mandate to take any course of action, and the degree of opposition to it would have been precisely measured in the voting booths. More practically, the campaign in ROC would be along party lines. If the federal government supported negotiations or a specific set of proposals but the

157 Getting to the Table

electorate did not, its legitimacy would be impaired. In any referendum the government would run the risk of having to resign after the vote. Moreover, whatever the outcome of a referendum held in ROC, there is no reason to expect that the Parti québécois government would

negotiate anything other than sovereignty, however much the moderate nationalists might support talks about constitutional renewal. Under a PQ government, the National Assembly would pass no constitutional resolution to renew federalism. If a federal referendum was conducted in Quebec, it would certainly be boycotted, and opposed physically at every polling station. The Quebec government would refuse to be bound by the result, and the National Assembly could pass a UDI, had it not done so already. Then the Quebec government, ready to negotiate the terms of sovereignty, would confront a ROC badly divided by a referendum campaign and led by a much weakened federal government. Given all of this, the referendum alternative is not a viable one. Finally, the federal government could do nothing. It could wait for the National Assembly to act, since referendum results have no legal, binding weight in a parliamentary system. But this would be a short delay only, for the PQ majority would ensure quick passage of a resolution accepting the results and demanding negotiations. Even then, Ottawa could continue to make no response, but this would be unsustainable in the atmosphere of uncertainty that would result. Foreign powers concerned about their military and diplomatic interests would soon press for some resolution of the issue. The deteriorating economic situation would be another spur, as it would be in every alternative where Ottawa failed to take fast, decisive action. A Yes referendum result would shake foreign confidence in Canada,

and a result that did not meet with a clear, fast response would produce even more downward pressure on the dollar and a sharper rise in short-term interest rates: “The inevitable question on the mind of the foreign investor would be: ‘Do I really want to play in the traffic while Canadians sort out these matters? Would it not be better to park, temporarily at least, my investments elsewhere?’”°® The financial consequences of any delay would be severe for individuals, firms, and governments, especially the last. As of January 1994, the federal government had $165.9 billion in outstanding treasury bills at terms of less than one year. It had another $193.3 billion in loans in the form of bonds, with an average time to maturity of less than five years. An increase in interest rates would make refinancing this debt much more expensive. For example, a 2 per cent rise in rates would cost an extra $4.32 billion in interest payments

158 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

over the course of a year.” The provincial governments would be similarly affected, except that because more of their borrowing is in foreign currencies, they would also bear the cost of a depreciating dollar.

An even stronger stimulus to determined action will be domestic uncertainty. In Canada, some have discounted the argument that Quebec secession will produce a crisis (and this propensity increases as one moves west across the land). But a Yes vote will cause profound uncertainty throughout the country. This is a term that is used so often that it can take on an air of meaninglessness or unreality, but uncertainty is all too tangible. It implies precisely the kind of changes in calculations and attitudes and lifestyle that individuals make when the company they work for is taken over and the probability of keep-

ing their jobs is reduced. A Yes vote in a Quebec referendum will dramatically reduce the probability of many things remaining unchanged — not only items that are normally volatile, such as the interest rate, but also much of the unquestioned background of everyday life: the currency in use, the security of bank deposits and pension-fund assets, and one’s citizenship. To start with, Quebec citizens and firms will not know where their taxes should be paid. People there will be unsure of their rights and of whether government services will con-

tinue. Anyone with links to the province will also face uncertainty. The whole legal structure of trade will be uncertain: firms will not know whether their customers and suppliers will be staying in the same country and whether they will be governed by existing law, and every contract with Quebec interests will become insecure. Uncertainty will affect behaviour in every sector of the economy. Firms in the direct-mail business will have to wonder about the future of the post office. Wheat farmers shipping by rail will not know whether

the CNR will serve them next year; they will not know what port their produce will move through and whether federal subsidies and stabilization plans will remain in effect. In the financial-services sector, there will be uncertainty about clearing trades on the stock exchanges, cashing cheques, and the nationality of assets and liabilities.

In oil, cars, and lumber, hundreds of thousands of people will not know whether the FTA and NAFTA will continue to govern international commerce. Meanwhile, the whole retail sector will be seized with the question of whether Canadians will continue to spend when interest rates are rising and the future is so murky. This is uncertainty. People will pay a lot to avoid it. (Consider how much most people would pay in order to know that their jobs were secure for a decade.) Consequently, after a Yes vote, Canadians will demand decisive action to reduce uncertainty, even at a price. And this price includes not only economic losses but also political costs —

159 Getting to the Table

the distaste of having matters handled by a government that one did not support, the frustration of having decisions made without participating in them, and the irritation of one’s leaders making deals with separatists. The whole force of uncertainty will be against any indecision and delay. Nevertheless, Ottawa might still resist this pressure and try to wait Quebec out. Then what? One possibility is that the PQ might crumble, and there might not be a majority in the National Assembly to support the next step — a unilateral declaration of independence. This seems unlikely, however, given the PQ government’s current composition and orientation, the widespread sentiment in Quebec that its citizens have a right to self-determination, and the basic principle of majority rule. If the National Assembly did pass a UDI, Canada

would then have the choice of recognizing the new state or not. If it did not do so, the result eventually would have to be either negotiations or a contest for control of the territory. On the other hand, if Canada recognized a Quebec UDI, two results follow. First, Quebec would no longer be part of the country, so both de facto and de jure the

constitution would no longer apply to it. This would be convenient,

in a way, since Canada would not have to proceed with constitutional amendments in order to eliminate Quebec from the country. However, it would then fall to the courts to interpret how the constitution would work in practice without Quebec, and the courts’ interpretation would be cautious. There would be no court-ordered changes

to language rights, the Senate, or the amending formula, yet these are amendments that the citizens and governments of ROC might want to make in order to fit the country’s basic law to its new circumstances. Hence, the constitutional outcome would be inferior to what would otherwise be possible. Second, after a recognized UDI, Canada and Quebec would have to start negotiations about various urgent issues. So there would be no advantage to Canada if it waited out the result and forced a UDI. It is clear, then, that all the alternatives would be unsatisfactory. The Yes verdict will therefore be accepted. And on referendum night,

the federal government will speak for Canada. | QUEBEC SECESSION WILL BE A MOMENTOUS AND GALVANIZING EVENT

Until the referendum result was in, Canadians and Quebecers did not know what their collective future would be. The Yes vote will produce a sudden, definitive answer: the future will be very different. This shock will create enormous anxiety (and some anger). There had, of course, been intense discussion, reflection, and contingency

160 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

planning about various options prior to the vote, but it was all hypothetical. Now, no one is at all certain how events will actually unfold. In this context, power, legitimacy, and initiative will flow to the federal order of government. Only it can take the lead in resolving the uncertainty; only it can embody the solidarity Canadians will seek to deploy against Quebec and to maintain against the possibil-

ity of fragmentation; and only it has the requisite powers to keep order. A Yes vote will plunge Canada into a crisis. Uncertainty will be felt by every citizen. There will be some variance in this, of course. The anxiety level of most federal employees in Kingston or Halifax will be much higher than that of most Vancouver real estate agents. But

the Yes vote will unsettle every Canadian. Quite apart from their material interests, they will be unsure about their citizenship, about what community they now belong to. They will need reassurances about these matters, and Ottawa will supply them. So will the provincial governments, and it would be most unlikely in the immediate crisis for these governments to send messages contradicting those that emanate from the centre. There will be a tremendous drive towards solidarity in ROC, and its only possible focus is the central government. Since the Yes vote will represent a profound rejection by Quebecers of the national community as it exists, there will be doubt about whether Canada can continue. Ottawa’s message will be that it can. As is well understood, ROC does not really exist, but the rejection of all other Canadians by Quebec will help create it. For one thing, Quebec will have to be dealt with on new terms, and it will be essential to have unity in order to conduct negotiations in ROC’s interest. An external threat is always highly conducive to internal solidarity, and as in wartime, the central government will be the agency that deals with the threat. Beyond this, there is every indication that the citizens of ROC will prefer to continue as a country.” One major alternative is integration with the United States, but while Canadians may have lost some affection for their country’s traditional symbols, the elements that do command support are touchstones of difference from that country, such as Canada’s lack of violence and its health-care system. In 1992 one straightforward poll question asked whether respondents would take the opportunity for their province to join the United States as a normal state with full political representation, and 79 per cent said no. These ex ante sentiments will be strengthened when the event occurs, because at a much deeper level internal solidarity is a predictable consequence of Canadians’ various senses of national iden-

tification. There is one identifiable group, among them the bon

161 Getting to the Table

voyagistes, for whom francophone and alien Quebec has always been

an anomaly in their essentially geographic conception of Canada; although they will be discomfited by noncontiguity, they will favour unity in order to deal — preferably harshly — with the “other.” A different sense of national identification stresses the regions and provinces of Canada, viewing the whole rather like a family; that family must unite in a crisis. Then there are those who understand Canada to be a constructed society, different from and superior to the United

States; they too will support a central leadership that promises to reconstruct and maintain their county.” These deep structures of national identification suggest that in accommodating the shock of Quebec secession, the citizens of ROC will

tend to support national leadership rather than provincial alternatives. Further evidence is available from survey research. It is true that the Environics data cited in Chapter 7 above showed declining levels of identification with Canada, as opposed to the provinces, over the 1980-91 period. But any questions about people’s underlying sense of identification are intrusive, and the results are sensitive to the question posed. Environics asked “Do you feel you are more a citizen of Canada or more a citizen of this province?” In 1991, the proportions answering “Canada” were still 49 per cent in the Atlantic region, 57 per cent in the West, and 69 per cent in Ontario.” Gallup asked a different question in 1991 — “Generally speaking, would you say your primary allegiance is to Canada, to this province, or to this particular local community?” Even with a third response option, those choosing “Canada” were 57 per cent in the Atlantic provinces, 74 per cent in Ontario, 64 per cent on the Prairies, and 69 per cent in British Columbia.® In late 1993, another Gallup poll asked, “Do you think

of yourself first as a Canadian or as a Newfoundlander?” (or “Albertan,” “Ontarian,” and so on). Respondents answering “Canadian” were 72 per cent in Atlantic Canada, 94 per cent in Ontario, 80 per cent on the Prairies, and 60 per cent in British Columbia.® An-

other survey asked a similar question and found that only 22 per cent of Canadians — including Quebecers — thought of themselves first as residents of a particular region or province, and in ROC, apart from respondents in the Atlantic region, the lowest “Canadian” identification was in Alberta, at 74 per cent.” One cannot know with certainty how this strong and widespread attachment to Canada as a whole would change under the impact of

a Yes vote, though comparative analysis suggests that it would strengthen. Moreover, there are some data concerning Canadians’ expectations about the outcome of a Quebec secession. If Quebec separates, most Canadians anticipate.that the rest of Canada would emerge

from the event as a “strong united country,” rather than breaking up

162 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

into smaller countries or having parts absorbed by the United States. The proportions of respondents expecting unity and continuity were 48 per cent in the Atlantic provinces, 66 per cent in Ontario, 62 per cent on the Prairies, and 61 per cent in British Columbia.” Of course, these responses are sensitive to the question asked, and they concern hypothetical events — but they strongly suggest that the citizens of

ROC would be prepared to accept the federal government’s lead during a secession crisis. Finally, only Ottawa has the power to maintain order. When secession is accepted, the use of force to maintain the existing state will be renounced simultaneously, but the Yes vote will undoubtedly cause unrest and sporadic outbreaks of violence. These will be concentrated in Quebec and on its borders, especially in Montreal, in anglophone regions, and wherever Aboriginal people choose to manifest their refusal to accept the result without their consent, but unrest and civil disobedience will not be limited to Quebec. The federal government controls the armed forces and the RCMP, and these agencies may well have to be deployed. Moreover, the central government can equip itself with extraordinary powers under the Emergencies Act, which ‘defines a “national emergency” as “an urgent and critical situation

of a temporary nature” that “seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and ter-

ritorial integrity of Canada.” If the government considered that threats of violence were being used for political objectives, it could declare a “public order emergency” in all or parts of Canada, and could equip itself with powers to prohibit public assemblies and control the use of specified property — which would allow, notably, the freezing

of bank accounts.” This would be an extreme measure, but if the crisis is serious it would be difficult for opposition parties or the provincial governments to oppose it. In Quebec, obviously, the Emer-

gencies Act would not be invoked without the approval of the provincial government; indeed, the Act could not legally be invoked

in Quebec alone without that approval,” but this would be forthcoming if Ottawa accepted the referendum result and the domestic situation was slipping into disorder.” This account of Ottawa taking the lead of an anxious public galvanized into unity by the reality of secession is supported by comparative experience and evidence from Canada, but it is contestable in theory. It will not be contestable in reality. Although one could argue that the federal government would be delegitimized by its failure to defeat the separatists, it seems unlikely that this would be the case. Since most Canadians regard secession as irrational, the blame for the Yes vote will be laid on Quebecers rather than on those who de-

163 Getting to the Table

fended Canada. Some Canadians, like some analysts, will see in the crisis an opportunity to create a Canada more to their liking than the country and system of government that now exist, and they will be suspicious of Ottawa because its initial actions will reduce the chance of later countering central power. But the issue of how ROC will reconstitute itself will not be at the top of the agenda yet. As Gibson shrewdly recognized, “the first matter is to secure and nail down the internal and external status quo, at least temporarily.””’ Only Ottawa can do this. In theory, the provincial governments could object to Ottawa’s taking the lead, but they will be able to offer no credible alternative. There is no mechanism for them to assume the initiative in dealing with Quebec, and they are divided by interest and ideology. In any case, some provincial governments will be immediately supportive of Ottawa, because not to do so would open the route to national disintegration. As the York study group advised, If Québec secedes, we recommend that Ontario take a leading role in resisting the pressures to decentralize by committing itself to the values of sharing and common citizenship which have characterized Ontario’s role in the past. It is essential that Ontario take this leading role, because a failure to do so would effectively subvert any attempt to maintain a political union among the remaining nine provinces. We believe that the disintegration of the remaining provinces into discrete political units would be contrary to the interests of these provinces, including Ontario. It would further complicate and increase the burden associated with Québec secession from Canada.”

In the short term at least, this support would leave other provinces open to criticism if they undermined a national response to the crisis. The same holds true for the opposition parties in Parliament, and especially for Reform, the critical actor. However uncomfortable some members might feel, these parties will have nothing to gain by strenu-

ously resisting the federal government’s attempts to deal with the grave threat posed by the Yes vote. In fact, both the provinces and the opposition parties will be brought into the negotiating process. THE GOVERNMENTS WILL BE BROADENED AND STRENGTHENED: THERE WILL BE A PREMIUM ON SOLIDARITY

The first step in the secession is to begin negotiating the separation of Quebec from Canada. This cannot be delayed. The politicians in place will have to take charge of the process immediately. They will then create structures to guide and shape the negotiations.

164 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

There will be differing views in Canada about the course of action

to be followed in the aftermath of the Yes vote, and about ROC’s negotiating positions and Canada’s optimal long-term relationship with Quebec. These differences will be submerged, temporarily, for their expression will be muted by the crisis and by the need for solidarity to frame a collective response to Quebec right away. Second, all political factions will become involved in the negotiations. This will be an indirect involvement for the most part, but it will be enough

to ensure that the participants are fully informed about the conduct of the negotiations and that they can debate the positions taken by the Canadian side. It will be difficult for any leader to refuse to become involved in this process; and in the short term, any minority making strong public criticism of it will risk being regarded as disloyal.

The negotiations will be led by the federal order of government, which will have taken the initiative immediately. It has the power to recognize other states, and it takes the lead in international diplomacy. Executing agreements with Quebec will mainly require changes in federal rather than provincial law, for most will involve matters falling within federal jurisdiction. But the government will be broadened and strengthened in order to represent Canada fully. This will be necessary to maintain Ottawa’s stock of legitimacy and support. The structures set up will evolve under the pressure of events, public opinion, special demands, and partisan incentives, and they will have many levels. The basic entity will be a large joint committee of the House of Commons and the Senate. It might be called the Joint Committee on

Canada-Quebec Separation (JCC-QS). This will resemble the Bélanger-Campeau Commission that was set up to inquire into Quebec’s constitutional future. There will be about fifty members, at least half coming from the House of Commons, and the parties will

be represented proportionately. The party leaderships, including members of the cabinet and the prime minister, will be members. Power, information, and responsibility will be concentrated in this large committee. The JCC-QS will be the parliamentary body to which negotiators report. Meetings initially will be for the negotiators to share information and receive direction. Later, draft agreements will flow into

the JCC-QS, to be debated in detail. Still later, some will take the form of bills that will be referred to the committee or to normal standing

committees, and these will proceed through the standard legislative process (with proclamation delayed appropriately). If the Emergencies Act is invoked, the JCC-QS could also serve as the parliamentary review committee that would oversee orders and

165 Getting to the Table

regulations under that Act. A difficulty here is that all parties with at least twelve MPs must be represented on the review committee, and this means that the Bloc québécois will be entitled to membership.

However, the Bloc might well withdraw its members from Parliament as soon as the referendum result has been accepted; alternatively, House of Commons rules and the Emergencies Act itself could

be quickly amended to exclude them: one way or another, the Bloc will play no part on the Canadian side. Its members certainly will not participate in the JCC-OS. The same is not true of the provinces. The provincial governments will have three interests in how the crisis is managed. First, their citizens and their treasuries will be affected by the prevailing economic uncertainty. Second, they have a direct stake in some of the matters to be negotiated with Quebec. Third, the separation will require constitutional amendments to effect it and to reconstitute anew Canada without Quebec. These amendments will require provincial assent, so it will be prudent to involve the provincial governments in the separation negotiations, even though these negotiations are independent of the constitutional amendment process. There are three avenues for provincial involvement. First, representatives will sit on the JCC-QS.” This will be the main body to which information about the negotiations is channelled, and every provincial government will have full access to it. These governments will then be able to take some responsibility for the Canada-Quebec arrangements. Second, a separate joint committee will be established to consider how to redraft the Canadian constitution, and this will have provincial representation, even though amendments will also be discussed in First Ministers’ Conferences. Finally, some premiers will take a direct part in the negotiations. The negotiating group will report to the JCC-OS. It will also report to cabinet, and probably to a special cabinet committee of the strongest ministers and those whose departments are most directly affected by the substance of the talks. Maintaining cabinet (and caucus)

solidarity will be imperative, for the government must continue to operate and to be seen to be in control. But as noted above, crises both elicit determined leadership and offer few incentives for publicly defying it. Would the government itself be broadened by taking opposition leaders into the cabinet? Probably not. The offer of a coalition was not made even during World War II. Moreover, it is unlikely that the only relevant potential partner, the Reform Party, would accept such an arrangement. Its western base is sceptical of Ottawa’s intentions and wary of the Liberals, and the party is ideologically more disposed to locate legitimacy in the legislature as a representative whole

166 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

rather than in the executive. So although Reformers will sit on the JCC-QS and Mr Manning will be part of the negotiating group, the Liberal majority will take responsibility for governing Canada during the transition. This raises the issue of Liberal MPs and ministers from Quebec. Their continuing participation in the government and even the House of Commons will be questioned in some quarters — there will be dis-

trust of “Quebec negotiating with itself.” These are real concerns. But they will be countered. In the first place, under the operative constitution, the Quebec members were legitimately elected. The Liberal MPs, along with Mr Charest, are federalists all, and other members will not reject them, thereby immediately denying representation to their constituents. In the aftermath of the Yes vote, the federal cabinet will be broadened, and Quebec ministers will be massively outnumbered by those from elsewhere in the country. Some will be shed. It will be essential, for example, to have a non-Quebecer as minister of finance. Further, the JCC-QS membership will be overwhelmingly, if

not exclusively, from ROC. Most important, apart from the prime minister (at the outset), the Canadian negotiating team will include no Quebecers. So the presence of Quebec representatives on the government side will not impede a solidaristic and collective ROC response to the Yes vote. On the other hand, the anomaly of there being any Quebec MPs at all in the House of Commons after a Yes vote,

and especially from the Bloc, is one reason why a federal election will have to be called after the immediate crisis has passed. In Quebec a parallel process will occur. The PQ government formed

after the 1994 election is organized around a tight cadre of senior ministers that will dominate a raucous National Assembly through firm party discipline. After the referendum result, however, this will change. The PQ will set up a broad legislative steering committee with Liberals included. As in Canada, the Quebec government will seek the legitimacy that comes from concentrating power in a broad and representative body. And when Canada has accepted the referendum verdict, at least some Liberal MNAs will be drawn into the separation process. How else could they protect the interests of their constituents? In fact, some Liberals probably will be included on the Quebec negotiating team. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL INVOLVE FEW PARTICIPANTS

Secessions are negotiated at the highest level, and consequently few actors are involved. Although increasing numbers of politicians and

civil servants come to participate in the process as it unfolds, the

167 Getting to the Table

difficult questions are always resolved by small groups of leaders from each side. Extensive powers are delegated to these few individuals. This is because the situation is unprecedented and the crisis has to be resolved in short order. But large amounts of information are conveyed back from the negotiators to the bodies to which they are responsible, and to the public; and as debate takes place, the parameters of settlements acceptable to the domestic constituencies become apparent. On the other hand, the negotiators have considerable autonomy, since only they deal directly with the other side. Because the matters discussed are complex and urgent, secessions offer much scope for leadership — for the shaping of legislative and public opinion through explanation of the issues, the stakes, and the positions of the other side.

The initial talks with Quebec will be by telephone on the day of the Yes referendum result. They will involve aides to the prime min-

ister and Mr Parizeau, who will agree on statements about the immediate situation and will arrange for a meeting to be held within two or three days. The leaders will speak briefly to confirm these matters. Subsequent negotiations will be conducted by a small delegation from each side. The prime minister and the premier of Quebec will probably not meet directly before this group is assembled, though their aides will certainly be in continual contact about the modalities of the negotiations. The Canadian side initially will be led by the prime minister, though he will delegate day-to-day responsibility for the negotiations to another cabinet minister. The Canadian delegation will also include the minister of finance and two or three senior ministers who have wide credibility and experience in federal-provincial matters. Some regional balance will be essential. A strong and respected senator could also

be included. But this is not sufficient. Even though the provincial governments will participate through the JCC-QS, it will be desirable to involve some provincial premiers directly in the negotiations. Their numbers must be limited, though. Negotiating a secession is not like negotiating a new GATT agreement. There are tight deadlines, and the same actors must confront each other repeatedly on tough issues. Large delegations consume time and inhibit agreement. It seems that three premiers at most could adequately represent the provinces: a set such as Mr Rae, Mr Klein, and Mr McKenna would

suffice. This group has regional and partisan balance, and includes the two provinces with the most at stake economically in the secession. If the other premiers resisted such a selection, an alternative structure would resemble that used in negotiating trade agreements. The federal team would conduct the negotiations and report to the

168 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

JCC-QS, but there would be a parallel set of provincial representatives — premiers, leading cabinet ministers, and key officials — to which

the primary negotiators, along with their supporting officials, would also report.”° A single premier, the chair of the group, could attend the negotiating sessions as an observer. Through this mechanism, all the provinces would have more sustained input into the negotiations, but it would be more cumbersome. Moreover, provincial participation is not strictly necessary to consummate the agreements that will be negotiated with Quebec. This point needs to be clarified. The provinces will certainly have to agree to the constitutional amendments that seal the secession, but this is a separate matter from negotiating the terms of Quebec’s exit. Most arrangements made with Quebec will not impinge on areas of provincial jurisdiction, and even if they did, treaties could still be signed by Ottawa under the “national concern” branch of the Peace, Order and Good Government power.” The constitution and the agreements could be linked politically, of course, by provincial governments that either were opposed to some terms of the separation or were determined to achieve some particular constitutional provisions. But none could stymie the separation deal. (And none will later be in a position to hold up Canada’s reconstitution in order to gain particular terms of separation.) As a matter of practicality, premiers will be included in the negotiations with Quebec because they have credibility and popular support. So, with Ottawa necessarily taking the

lead, some premiers will be integrated directly into the Canadian negotiating team, and all provinces will be represented on the JCC-QS.

Then there is Mr Manning. His position will be difficult. He leads a dynamic and growing party with a populist membership that opposes much of what “Ottawa” has done. When Bloc members resign from the House of Commons, or are expelled or become ineligible to sit, if not before, Mr Manning will be leader of the opposition. Since his party will have a very good chance of taking power at the next election, there will be incentives for it to resist federal —- and Liberal —

dominance of a process that would seem to offer opportunities for the fundamental changes demanded by many of his supporters. These pressures could keep Reform out of a coalition government. But Mr Manning would find it difficult not to take a direct part in the negotiations. He will be ineluctably involved, first by agreeing to accept the Yes verdict and by standing with other leaders as the representatives of Canada. Then, as the leader of the Loyal Opposition (and as champion of those most hostile to Quebec), could he refuse a public call to help negotiate on behalf of Canada? No. Moreover, although Reform, like the premiers, may feel increasingly uncomfortable with

169 Getting to the Table

the process and with some of its outcomes, and although the incentives for partisan opposition will re-emerge as the sense of crisis lessens,

Mr Manning will find it awkward to break with the Canadian position, because he will share responsibility for what it has accomplished.

The appropriate time for political contestation in ROC will be during an election campaign or a referendum. The price of Mr Manning’s

presence on the Canadian team may well be a commitment to hold such a popular consultation as soon as the immediate issues of the secession have been agreed. But this will be necessary in any case. The core Canadian negotiating group, then, will consist of about eight people. It will be supported initially by a few senior officials from Justice, Finance, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and from the Privy Council Office. There will be some pressure to expand this group, but the immediate resistance will have been co-opted

in the service of the national interest, and other pressures will take time to build. As this happens, they will be accommodated. Aboriginal peoples, for example, will be represented on the JCC-QS, and they will be involved in detailed negotiations about Aboriginal issues, most of which will already have been settled in principle. The same is true of special interests, other provinces, and the rest of the cabinet. Thus, while the negotiations will spread quickly as the sides engage, the negotiating parameters will be set by a small group that has the power to take the crucial initial decisions and later to resolve the most difficult and contentious issues. QUEBEC SEPARATION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY

There are three major tasks to be accomplished after a Yes vote in the referendum. First, Canada and Quebec have to negotiate the modali-

ties of the secession, including some transitional and long-term ar-

rangements. Second, each country must equip itself with a new constitution. Finally, in Canada at least, the new arrangements must be ratified by the public, through either an election or a referendum. There are good domestic reasons for all this to be done quickly. In the immediate aftermath of the Quebec referendum, Canadians will experience enormous uncertainty. Emotions will be running high, and there will be movements of people, demonstrations, and sporadic violence. The economic costs will be mounting. So there will be both a need and a demand for firm leadership and a rapid resolution of some big issues, and negotiations will have to begin at once. Then, as decisions are taken and as the realization spreads that the secession is irreversible, the prevailing public sentiment will favour set-

170 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

tling the separation as quickly as possible in order to minimize the costs of transition, to stabilize the country, and to leave the past behind. The issues to be settled will be unprecedented, and this, along with the sense of urgency and the solidarity among the negotiating leadership, will give politicians considerable latitude in their dealings with Quebec. But dissent and conflict along several dimensions will re-emerge, for it will be difficult to sustain unity as the crisis fades. The very success of the crisis management will permit partisan, ideological, and regional differences to become more sharply expressed. This is another argument for haste — to allow for a broadening public debate about what has been done, and then for the popular ratification that will legitimize it.

In the first phase after the Yes vote, simultaneous with its acceptance by Canadian leaders, immediate statements will be forthcoming from Ottawa, Quebec City, and other provincial capitals. The leaders will abjure the use of force and will pledge themselves to settle matters through constitutional means. They will promise to protect the security and rights of all citizens. And they will declare that all existing laws will remain in effect — in particular, that there will be no alteration in economic management and regulation. (This last commitment represents an “economic standstill.”) Finally, they will state to the world that Canada and Quebec will fully honour all international treaties and all obligations to foreigners. In the next stage, Canada and Quebec will reach agreements in principle on the most pressing issues of the separation. This must happen fast, and it will. Assuming that the Quebec referendum was held on 19 June 1995, the first formal meeting between leaders from the two sides could be held on 22 June. Subsequent top-level meetings could occur on 29 June, 6 July, and 20 July. These meetings should

suffice to settle most principles of the secession and to set up working groups of officials and politicians to work within frameworks as soon as they are agreed. Further meetings will certainly be necessary, including one or two in the autumn to resolve hard issues arising from the working groups, but the most crucial work will have been completed in about a month or six weeks. This should come as no surprise in light of the comparative experience of secession and the costs of delay and uncertainty in Canada. Some analysts, for example, foresee very long and hard negotiations about the division of the debt, but this issue could be settled in principle in ten minutes. One of the most important decisions will be to establish a schedule and a deadline for achieving the separation. Assuming a June 1995 referendum, the most likely date would be 1 January 1996. Although constitutional amendments and a Canadian referendum or election

171 Getting to the Table

would have to happen in the interim, this is a feasible schedule. An alternative would be 1 April 1996, a date that has the advantage of coinciding with the end of the fiscal year, but not much else to recommend it. Or the deadline could be set for the summer of 1996. In this case, one simple but symbolically important problem would be whether the date would be 24 June or 1 July. Only one date is possible. Far more important, though, this schedule would prolong the process for an entire year. Such a long delay would be improbable, given comparative experience, and it is not necessary. The essential tasks could be accomplished by 1 January 1996, with arrangements being made to tidy up outstanding details after that date. Speed will be essential in order to resolve economic uncertainty, and since a considerable proportion of this uncertainty will concern not the shape of Canada-Quebec relations but the continuity and structure of Canada itself, the Canadian reconstitution must start soon after the Yes vote and be occurring simultaneously with the Quebec negotiations. The Canadian side will insist on a firm and early deadline to drive the

talks forward. ,

The negotiations with Quebec, then, will be largely settled by the end of September 1995. Canadians will commence the process of constitutional amendment in July, and this should be completed by Sep-

tember, setting the stage for a referendum or an election in early November. This popular consultation would ratify both the provisional separation arrangements and the reconstitution of Canada — or it might fail to do so. Assuming that ratification is given, Quebec’s accession to sovereignty will take place at 12:01 am on 1 January 1996

at the same instant as the new Canada emerges. FOREIGN POWERS WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE SECESSION

The international community will watch the Canada-Quebec separation closely. In this larger context, Canada’s interest, shared in part with Quebec, is to achieve a quick transition and a stable outcome in order to avoid foreign interference and to secure international support where it is feasible. This should be possible. It will also be a strong incentive to negotiate quickly and efficiently. The major international organizations along

with the important foreign powers share a primary interest in stability. This should lead to supportive action in the short term, and as long as the transition is occurring smoothly there will be no cause for foreign actors to contemplate intervention. But if the processes of disengagement and the reconstitution of Canada are delayed or if

172 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

they collapse, the level of international anxiety will rise, simply because other states will have to make policy choices about what side to support, where to stand on “domestic” Canadian issues, and, ultimately, what to do in a situation in which government has broken down. The major actor, of course, will be the United States. With the end of the Cold War and the shift of the PQ from socialism to a pro-business

platform, the United States’ concern for stability will be less acute than it was.” Its “tilt” in favour of Canadian unity may also become less apparent. But even a Yes vote will not cause a fundamental reassessment of American policy. The United States will favour a peaceful, constitutional, and rapid transition to Quebec sovereignty, one in which the huge economic interests of American firms in Canada and Quebec are unimpaired and the transborder flows of trade and money are unimpeded. There are many American jobs that depend on this relationship. If uncertainty about ROC-Quebec relations persists, however, economic activity will be affected, and U.S. concern will deepen considerably if Canada itself appears unstable. A new, more active policy would then be required. One possible long-term outcome for Canada is that it fragments, with portions opting to join the United States. The reappraisal caused by a Yes vote will produce some thought of annexation in the Atlantic provinces, and British Columbians have become more conscious of their Pacific Rim position and the interests shared with Alaska, Washington, and Oregon. No country could fail to be attracted by this rich and strategically located province.” However, in the rapid events following the referendum, pro-annexationist sentiment will not swell enough to make provincial politicians impede the separation process and the reconstitution of Canada, let alone champion the notion of union with the United States. More important, if the transition is managed peacefully and rapidly, the American administration will be most unlikely to change that country’s basic policy of supporting a stable state — or two stable states — on its northern frontier. More generally, there are four critical areas where foreign powers

will play an important role. The first is economic, especially in the immediate aftermath of the Yes vote. Given the pledges by Canada and Quebec to maintain an economic standstill until negotiations are complete, the G-7 countries might stand ready to support the Canadian dollar, which will be under pressure. Along with the Bank of Canada, the central banks of these countries are powerful enough to protect the currency against massive devaluations. Their incentive to do so will be to avoid disruption in international financial mar-

173 Getting to the Table

kets, to maintain the value of their citizens’ and firms’ investments in Canada and Quebec, and to help avoid financial panic in Canada. But these motives will not persist long; nor will concerted action alter the expectations of investors about the long term. Only visible progress in accomplishing the separation and evident stability in Canada will be able to do that. Canada’s most pressing problem will be to prevent a sell-off of bonds and to secure the placement of new issues. Again, international actors will help. The International Monetary Fund will make credit available, and some of this will be passed through to the provinces and to Quebec. But this will help only in the very short term, and Canadian debt dwarfs the amount of assistance likely to be available. In theory, the G-7 governments could extend guarantees to their citizens about the payment of interest, at least, on Canadian debt. This would be unprecedented, but so would be the breakup of a G-7 country. Such a move seems improbable, however. The burden would

be unequally distributed across countries, the support levels and duration of the intervention would be hard to decide, and governments would risk criticism for taking on contingent liabilities and subsidizing those investors who held their Canadian bonds. So concerted international action to alleviate the financial crisis in Canada and Quebec will be unlikely. The only possible solution to this crisis will be firm assurances from politicians about future stability, followed by rapid and demonstrable progress towards a managed dis-

engagement, and clear evidence of normalization in Canada. In domestic politics both in Canada and Quebec, the precarious economic situation will be a powerful spur to the occurrence of these very same phenomena. The second international issue concerns the recognition of Quebec. Other countries and international agencies will not proceed toa sudden recognition. They will await evidence that the soon-to-be sovereign state will behave normally with respect to international obli-

gations and human rights. Foreign governments will wait for a Canadian signal. Time will need to pass before it is entirely evident

that the secession will not be contested by force. The agreements-in-principle, at a minimum, must be completed before other countries will deal formally with Quebec. Transitional arrangements enacted in the autumn of 1995 would permit Quebec to reach international agreements before it finally achieved sovereignty, and these agreements would constitute conditional recognition of the new country. But full sovereignty and its international recognition would await the constitutional separation of the two states on 1 January 1996.

174 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

The third concern of foreign states will be Canada’s various rights

and obligations under international treaties. Here there arises the possibility that the general interest of the international community in stability would be outweighed by specific advantages to be won through renegotiating treaties with a weakened partner or a fledgling state. And some modifications to existing treaties will have to be made. Generally, though, Canada’s position will be secure, so long as it does not fragment. There is no doubt that it would be the successor state to all relevant international agreements. So its position as a treaty signatory will be unchanged, except where separation could be interpreted as representing such a fundamental change in circumstances that treaties must be renegotiated. Military obligations will depend on arrangements about the Canadian Armed Forces. Doubtless, Canada will maintain membership in NORAD and NATO, and Quebec will probably enter these treaties. Some other bilateral and multilateral defence agreements might

be broadened to include Quebec. In the short term, these matters will not be pressing to Canada’s allies. Regional and bilateral trade treaties with the United States raise the most delicate issues. These include the Auto Pact, the Defence Production /Defence Sharing agreements, the FTA, and NAFTA. The Americans might demand that these treaties be reopened as a consequence of the separation.*' The likelihood of this depends on the secession process and the economic arrangements negotiated between Canada and Quebec. Whether Quebec accedes to the FTA and NAFTA

is a vital matter. If it does, these agreements will constitute a floor beneath which the level of Canada-Quebec economic integration can-

not fall. But Canada has the legal right to veto Quebec’s entry to NAFTA, and Canadian leaders will not provide any assurances not to use this veto power until negotiations are well advanced. While this move will probably not be countered by overt American pressures or statements to the contrary, the Canadian side cannot use this leverage indefinitely without stimulating general international concern about the country’s economic stability - and also arousing American displeasure about the potential ending of NAFTA guarantees of its trade and investment relations with Quebec.*?

The final international concern will be minority and Aboriginal rights. This will be deflected by the rights regime adopted by Quebec and the arrangements negotiated about First Nations. Fundamentally, the enforcement of human rights covenants is a matter of exposure

and suasion rather than sanctions. Quebec will adopt model legislation and will be prepared to sign treaties and covenants about minority rights, and if implementation later is flawed, the international

175 Getting to the Table

community (and perhaps Canada) will have the usual recourse. For the First Nations, the situation is similar. From the perspective of sovereign states, relations with indigenous peoples are de facto considered to be domestic issues. It is true that many citizens of countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom have great sympathy for Canadian First Nations, and they are capable of raising funds and putting pressure on their own governments on behalf of Aboriginal peoples. But if Aboriginal issues are successfully negotiated between Canada and Quebec, no official international action will be forthcoming. Even in the most extreme case — that some Quebec First

Nations declare their sovereignty and stand prepared to defend their claim by force — other states or international organizations will be unlikely to recognize the claim, and they certainly will not countenance violence to achieve it. To summarize, foreign powers will have great interest in the secession, but their stance generally will be benign. Their real interests lie in stability and therefore in a speedy and managed resolution of the crisis. Active policies or interventionist pressures will not be exerted by governments unless the separation process threatens to break down.

The sovereign Quebec that will emerge from secession will be admitted into the international community as a normal member. Foreign investors and firms are another matter. There will be a crisis of confidence in the Canadian currency and Canadian securities, and this will affect all governments and citizens. There will be some

international assistance, but the crisis can only be resolved when uncertainty about Canada is reduced by coherent leadership, clear and explicit goals, and rapid and successful negotiations. Foreign governmental and economic pressures may not be sufficient to produce such a separation, but they will form an environment highly conducive to it.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Negotiations

THE CANADA-QUEBEC NEGOTIATIONS WILL INVOLVE A RELATIVELY SHORT LIST OF ISSUES

Quebec secession will be accomplished when the Canadian constitu-

tion is amended to eliminate Quebec and the new constitution of Quebec becomes effective. Then relations between the two states will be conducted as is normal between sovereign entities. In the period between the referendum and the separation, the two sides will negotiate the modalities of the secession, along with agreements — which

will become international treaties - about some of their future relationships. These negotiations will happen quickly. In the course of a few weeks, the shape of the secession will clarify, and as negotiations begin to produce agreements, each side will become more sharply

defined, both as it will become legally and as it exists in the view of the public. Although the negotiations will be fast, they will not be easy. Both Canada and Quebec will have to make unwelcome concessions. They will do so in the first instance because reducing international and domestic uncertainty will be imperative. Since the occasion will be unprecedented and since interests and opinion will take time to mobilize, the negotiators will have considerable autonomy to shape the course of events, especially in the early stages. Later, they will become more constrained by domestic interests. The negotiations will be the focus of immense national attention, and each side will have to become increasingly sensitive to domestic opinion. Each will have

177 The Negotiations

a fragile legitimacy. In Quebec, the bitterness and divisions of the referendum battle will be fresh, and public anxiety and civil disorder will be greater. In Canada, the politicians in place will have to respond to the referendum result, and while national solidarity will

support them through the negotiations about separation and the longer-term issues that have to be settled quickly, this support will not endure for very long, nor will it be open-ended. In particular, the negotiators will be conscious of having no mandate to create permanent political structures joining Canada and Quebec. A danger during the negotiations is that public opinion could polarize. This would most probably happen if Quebecers interpreted the agreements struck as punitive, for many Yes voters will have expectations that there will be a high level of cooperation between the two countries after the separation.’ But this will not be the case, despite the fact that ROC’s positions will be based on self-interest rather than spite, just as the sovereigntists predict. In contrast to some optimistic views, rational self-interest is not identical with cooperation. Canada’s primary objective after a Yes vote will be national survival. In order of priority, this will require re-establishing stability, reconstituting the country, and making agreements with Quebec about the separation. This ordering immediately implies that suboptimal agreements with Quebec could well be tolerated for political reasons, especially for considerations of national unity. Beyond this, Canadian negotiators will be responsive only to domestic interests. After secession, Quebecers will no longer vote for

Canadian politicians, and the current incumbents managing the negotiations will respond only to Canadian problems. They will face a different configuration of interests and political demands than exists in Canada now. During the negotiations and after the separation, Canadian decision makers certainly will have to take Quebec into account, but only insofar as the effects on that country of their decisions will have negative second-order consequences for their own domestic constituency, and even these will be weighed against the offsetting Canadian benefits that would accrue. What is good for Quebec, in short, will not necessarily be good for Canada. And vice versa. In international relations, of course, it is perfectly normal to find noncooperation through self-interest.’ As is also common in international negotiations or in any strategic bargaining, countries adopt noncooperative positions in order to achieve long-term goals, or larger benefits in other areas if issues can be linked. So it is possible to categorize issues according to the sort of position that the Canadian side will adopt; and the same can be done for Quebec. First are cases where Canada’s interests are highly

178 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

congruent with Quebec’s. For example, in the financial-services sector, both sides will agree that stability absolutely must be assured. In other areas, some compromise will result easily because Canada’s immediate interest is bound up with the effects of outcomes on Quebec.

The incentives offered to public servants to work for the Quebec government will be a case in point. Then there are areas where Canada

will largely ignore the implications for Quebec and will act within its powers to achieve its interests as defined domestically. On citizenship, for example, Canadian negotiators will have to balance the pressures against allowing Quebecers to retain the right to move into Canada with those against abandoning its loyal nationals in Quebec. Similarly, companies with federal charters must by law maintain their head offices in Canada. Why would Canada change this legislation? The only motives would be to avoid imposing sudden costs on the firms and to maintain aggregate demand in Montreal for Canadian exports. It would be foolish to make firms move precipitously, but if the costs of lost markets would be outweighed by the benefits of gradually acquiring head offices, then the law might be amended to allow for a two-year adjustment period. Fourth, there are issues where Canada will refuse to cooperate in order to secure concessions elsewhere or in the future. Delaying Quebec’s accession to NAFTA is a case in point. Finally, there are dossiers where Canada’s

position would be dictated by retribution. In a democratic system, public sentiments cannot be ignored by politicians, and separation is a symbolic and emotionally charged event. But there should be few if any issues where revenge predominates. As Gibson recognized, the Canadian side must act “strictly on the basis of what is good for us, and most definitely not on the basis of what is bad for them.”° This will probably occur. The danger is that Quebecers will demand

radical counter-moves or retaliation by their government, because they will misinterpret Canadian noncooperation as malevolent when in fact it will simply be the rational exercise of self-interest, which

realists understand to motivate sovereign states. But the prospects for polarization during the negotiations appear limited, for between Canada and Quebec there is sufficient mutual interest to produce a number of agreements that will be tolerable if not entirely satisfactory to either side. Despite the high level of political, economic, and social integration that exists between Canada and Quebec, negotiations will centre on a small number of critical issues. The final statutes implementing

the separation arrangements will run into several volumes as treaties are passed and statutes are amended, but the core issues to be decided are few, and agreements-in-principle can be stated succinctly.

179 The Negotiations

The timing of agreements and the order in which they are reached are important. The first post-referendum announcements will embody the initial agreements: Canada accepts the result; force will not be used; only constitutional means will be employed by both sides; citizens’ rights and security will be assured; all laws and regulations will continue in effect throughout the country; and all international obligations will be met. Reaction to this initial announcement will shape the agenda for the first meeting between the two sides. Assuming that relative calm prevails, at that meeting the negotiators will inscribe these principles in a formal document. They will also briefly engage all the major issues, considering the options and as-

sessing the other side’s preferences. After the initial meeting, a communiqué will state that discussions took place about all these matters — and they will be listed —- but that the talks were limited to

an exchange of views. Thus would the agenda be set for the public and for subsequent negotiations. But the real substance of the first meeting will concern the most urgent matters, and it will be essential to reach agreement on them immediately. The Armed Forces and the Public Service

In sovereign states, the armed forces are the ultimate guarantor of national security and internal order. After a Yes vote, the single most pressing issue will be the conduct and future of members of the Canadian Armed Forces. There will be unrest to cope with, and the army may need to be deployed immediately. If deployed in Quebec, even at the request of the provincial government (to which Ottawa must respond), the army could provoke resistance. Another risk, if there is

much ill-will and sporadic violence between Canadians and Quebecers, is that members of the armed forces might disobey orders or comply only with reluctance.* In any event, their surnames and those of their commanders will suddenly become significant to the public in both Canada and Quebec. The long-term equilibrium outcome in this dossier is that Quebec will have its own armed forces. Otherwise it would be quite anoma-

lous among nation-states, with no independent means of ensuring its national security and internal order, and unable to play a constructive international role. The country will enter alliances for defence, but to leave a core state function to other nations is inconceivable.

It is also evident that the Canadian Armed Forces will divide. Quebec will receive some share of military assets and, more important, it will attract some proportion of the serving personnel. As in all similar issues, the operative principle of division in the separation will

180 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

be individual choice. Members of the military will be able to decide whether to serve Quebec or Canada. These principles will have to be agreed at the initial meeting, if not before. All members of the armed forces will be informed of them. They will be given long-term assurances that their choice will be free and that pensions and other conditions of service will be fully respected by both states. Beyond this, it should be clearly understood that existing units, their current deployments, and the structure of command will be maintained until the situation has stabilized. The Quebec government will agree entirely with this position. The army must maintain its professional discipline. And here it is interesting to note the role of the crown. Under section 15 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the command of all armed forces in Canada, including the

militia, is vested in “the Queen,” and this is reiterated in the National Defence Act, where it is stated that the “Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty.” Commissions of officers are granted

by the crown (at pleasure). More important, members of the Canadian Armed Forces swear an oath of loyalty, and that oath is made not to Canada but to the crown. Finally, persons enrolled in the military must continue to serve until they are “in accordance with regulations, lawfully released.”° All this implies that in the consciences of members of the forces, as well as in law, they are not the creatures of

the government of the day or even of Canada per se, and they must continue their service until they cease to be enrolled. Undoubtedly, military personnel will be reminded of this by both sides and by their commanders. Still, the military is under Canadian command through the minister of national defence. Given the situation likely to prevail right after the referendum, division of the forces would not be able to take place immediately. So if the army is required to maintain order, Canadian command will raise two problems: it could make Quebecers wary and defensive, and it could lead to international apprehensions of bias or oppression during the transition, particularly if deployment involves the First Nations. At this time in the separation, Canada will not accept any formal arrangements for sharing command with

Quebec authorities; nor will it place the forces under the command of a neutral power — unless civil order and military discipline break down entirely. But the two sides will quickly agree to invite foreign observers to any military operations. Rather than approaching the United Nations for this role, Canada and Quebec could turn to the - Scandinavian countries to send officers, who would be attached to headquarters and all active units.

181 The Negotiations

Following these basic decisions, one immediate task of the Quebec government will be to designate a minister responsible for defence and to begin to build a department. Once it has seized the military dossier, the Quebec government might also contemplate one advantage of retaining the monarchy. Like military personnel, members of the Canadian public service will be assured that they can continue in their posts under prevailing rules about termination. For those working in Quebec, obviously, some

relocation will be necessary. The Quebec government will desperately need to attract expert personnel who are experienced in the new functions it will take on, and it will offer attractive incentives. Ultimately, public servants will have to choose where their allegiance lies, at the same time as they make choices about citizenship. In the interim, faced with personnel surpluses, Ottawa will permit its pub-

lic servants to work for Quebec under normal provisions about unpaid leave of absence. At the higher levels of the federal administration, incumbents may be asked to declare their provisional citizenship preference. As well, adjustments of personnel will be made: Quebec francophones will not occupy many sensitive positions during the negotiations. Borders

This issue must be laid to rest immediately. Canada will agree that Quebec will become sovereign with its existing borders intact. No other outcome is feasible if the secession is to be rapid and peaceful. It is this issue, which is strictly associated with the position of Quebec’s

Aboriginal peoples and anglophone minority, that leads normally calm commentators to suspect that the secession could be contested: “The confrontation would not be over the right of French-speaking Quebeckers to form their own sovereign nation, but about their right to force ethnic minorities in Quebec, especially Aboriginal peoples, to be part of a sovereign Quebec. Such circumstances would pose a

tremendous challenge to Canada’s civilized ways; violence could supplant tedium as the central feature of our constitutional politics.”° Some of these issues are taken up below, but if the border question

remains unsettled, it will only encourage resistance to the Quebec government. Civil unrest would be fanned in the Outaouais, the Eastern Townships, and in the Aboriginal communities, and irredentist movements would become active in Canada. Having decided to ac-

cept the secession, destabilization of either government is not in Canada’s interest. Moreover, refusal to accept the border would solidify Quebecers behind their government, for there is massive pub-

182 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

lic opposition to any form of partition.’ This is bipartisan, as shown by then-premier Daniel Johnson’s reaction to the suggestion by the federal minister of Indian affairs that in the event of a secession, Quebec Aboriginals might choose to remain in Canada: “What I say to people

like Mr. Irwin and those who think like him or comment on hypothetical situations is that we, here, have a responsibility to defend the territorial integrity of Quebec ... The position of all those elected to the Quebec legislature, the premier, the government and obviously the opposition is to defend everywhere and forever the territorial integrity of Quebec.”®

Arguments have been advanced for border adjustments on both geopolitical and democratic grounds.’ But nothing would solve the basic Canadian problem of noncontiguity except massive changes — such as retaining the south shore of the St Lawrence — which have no justification in law or history and which could be accomplished only by force. There will be areas in Quebec whose citizens have voted massively against Quebec sovereignty, but they have no legal right to secede from Quebec. Moreover, opening the border issue could

require referendums in New Brunswick and Ontario, where francophones might demand to join Quebec. It would also raise enormous disputes about the criteria to be used for drawing boundaries according to people’s “expressed will.”” Aboriginal peoples raise special problems about the border. In the North, if secession materially changes the agreements between Native peoples, Quebec, and Canada, their extinguishment of land claims could be voided. These Aboriginals could then join the general argument made by many First Nations that as peoples they have the right to reject Quebec sovereignty and that their right of self-determination

extends to a right of secession which would allow them and their lands to remain in Canada. This argument is explosive in Quebec and could result in a damaging backlash against Aboriginal peoples. It also poses a threat to Canada’s own territorial integrity. There are no benefits in this issue for Canada: it has a responsibility towards Aboriginal peoples in Quebec and an obligation to protect their rights, but it has little interest in maintaining jurisdiction over them or their lands.

On this issue, therefore, Canada and Quebec will agree that the Quebec border will remain intact (including the disputed Labrador boundary that was set in 1927 by the Privy Council). The two sides will announce that in their joint view, Aboriginal rights do not extend to secession. They will then offer to open tripartite consultations immediately. One set will be with all Quebec Aboriginal peoples,

and another will involve the signatories to the northern agreements.

183 The Negotiations

Finally, both governments will pledge to maintain intact all existing Aboriginal rights of self-government and self-determination. One other issue that will have to be settled is Quebec’s maritime boundary. Drawing it in the Gulf of St Lawrence and Hudson Bay will not be a simple matter. As well, there may be isolated instances, as when the existing land border crosses through a town, where some

minor adjustment would be advisable. Having accepted the principle of Quebec’s territorial integrity, the negotiators will agree to establish a joint commission, with third-party representation, to make

recommendations about the maritime boundary and other border issues. This should report in the autumn of 1995. Access

The Quebec negotiators must give unequivocal guarantees that transport between the Atlantic provinces and the rest of Canada will be unimpeded. Obviously, full resolution of this matter will depend on

later decisions about trade and the economic union, but the principle of free access must be agreed now. The transit agreement will cover overflights, transport by train and highway, and shipping. It will extend to military passage, and it will also cover the movement of people — Canadian citizens and landed immigrants — subject to possible identity verification. Quebec will

further guarantee the right of Canadian firms to use the Port of Montreal (and perhaps others) along with associated train and truck facilities. Beyond this, Quebec will commit itself to maintaining unchanged the existing St Lawrence Seaway accords, with arrangements about ownership and management to be decided. (Talks with the Americans on this issue will begin soon.) The Debt

The final issue to be settled at the first meeting is how to divide the national debt. Undoubtedly, Quebec would prefer to settle the division of assets simultaneously, but that question is far more complicated and less pressing. The domestic and international investment communities will require a quick resolution of the debt question. The equilibrium position on the debt is that it will be divided ona per capita basis. Legally, Quebec might not have to assume any responsibility for the federal government’s debt, but this would be to-

tally unacceptable to Canada. If this were Quebec’s position, the negotiations would end abruptly, but it will not be. It is not in Quebec’s

interest to become a pariah in international capital markets by re-

184 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

nouncing its obligations. International investors would be dismayed by any complete renunciation. For dividing the debt, several formulae have been proposed. These include the Bélanger-Campeau mechanism, which is based on asset values, and the historic-benefits approach, based on the location of past federal expenditures. Other alternatives are division by ability to pay, as measured by shares of GDP or federal tax revenues, and the population principle, which allocates on a per capita basis." The differences in debt allocation that these formulae produce are huge.

Quebec’s share ranges from 18.50 per cent under the BélangerCampeau formula to 32.03 per cent under the historic-benefits approach, while division by GDP and population produce shares of 23.15 per cent and about 25 per cent, respectively. The differences amount to billions of dollars. All methods except the population principle have two defects: they are complex and contestable, and they have no obvious fairness. Using

the Bélanger-Campeau approach, it would be necessary to evaluate

all federal assets and allocate the portion of the debt incurred for each. The historic-benefits approach requires estimating net federal spending by province (and “spending” can include tax expenditures and price distortions caused by regulation). Even the GDP approach requires agreement on when and how to measure a province’s share.

By contrast, the population principle is simple and just, on communitarian principles. The national debt was accumulated by all Canadians, and funds were spent by a national government for purposes that benefited all members of the collectivity. So when a community is fractured, those who choose to separate take their fair share — an equal proportion per person. The per capita formula has the great advantage of being simple enough to be understood by the public, and it has international precedents, notably in the Czech-Slovak

case. Most analysts use it as a baseline, and so does Mr Parizeau, who has said, “We will, I suppose, haggle for a few weeks before we come to something like a quarter.”* This is what the negotiators will quickly decide.

One important question will be when to take the measure of the populations of Canada and Quebec. This is relevant not only for the debt division but for other matters as well. Some logic would dictate

that the date should be 1 January 1996, when the separation is effected; but this would disadvantage Canada, because outmigration from Quebec in the interim will exceed immigration. More important, without this essential figure, arrangements could not be finalized. One solution would be to take the Statistics Canada estimate as

185 The Negotiations

of 1 July 1995; another would be simply to agree on a figure of 25 per cent for the Quebec population and to use the 3:1 ratio in all calculations.

A greater problem than division will be how to accomplish the payment. Quebec cannot issue new debt to recompense Ottawa for one-quarter of its outstanding liabilities: the market would not absorb it, especially given the uncertainties attendant on separation. Quebec could perhaps guarantee that it would pay its share of interest and also its share of capital on maturity (which would mean taxing the population and issuing Quebec bonds as the federal issues came due), but Canada would have no guarantee that Quebec would not renege on its obligations if its economic position deteriorated, and particularly if its government blamed Canada for this. One solution would be for Quebec to issue new securities for its full portion of the debt and transfer them to Canada."* These would match the term structure, currency, and interest rate of the federal debt but would

be for one-quarter of the amount. (Other arrangements would have to be negotiated for particular liabilities, such as unfunded civil service and military pensions). In one scheme, Canada would exchange these Quebec bonds for cash as they matured; alternatively, they could

be used as a guarantee of the cash flow and would be marketable if the obligations to Canada were not met, thus exposing Quebec to the market’s disciplines for default.” But this would not provide perfect security, and neither would any guarantee that was offered by Quebec, and investors will realize this. Hence, after separation, Canada will inevitably pay a risk premium on its debt, because it will remain liable for 100 per cent of outstanding bonds but will be able to tax only 76.8 per cent of the former GDP to meet its obligations.’° Canada

might well demand that Quebec pay a share of this risk premium, the size of the share being determined by a panel of experts; alterna-

tively, Quebec could forgo its share of seigniorage from using the Canadian dollar as compensation for the added costs of borrowing

imposed on Canada. |

Whatever the method of payment ultimately decided on, the negotiators will agree on the basic principles at the initial meeting: Quebec

will assume its share of all existing federal debt and other liabilities; the basis of division will be population; and Canada will receive some form of guarantee that Quebec will meet its obligations. The two sides will also agree that subsidiary negotiations will be launched to investigate Canada’s liabilities and to find solutions to particular prob-

lems within this framework of principles; these negotiations will involve private-sector participants on both sides and also perhaps as

186 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

fact finders, and it may be decided to have them chaired by neutral parties. Canada and Quebec will later agree to establish a bipartite commission to deal with outstanding debt matters and unexpected developments, and the final arrangement will be embodied in a detailed formal treaty between the countries. But the core of the debt problem will be decided right away. At the end of the first negotiating session, then, the most critical issues will have been decided. Physical security will be assured, and some certainty will have been provided about economic matters. Since the package is broadly symmetrical, it can be defended as just. The session will demonstrate that progress can be made, and this will be its most significant result, one that will reassure the populace(s) and foreign powers. More subtly, the conclusion of agreements will demonstrate that the separation is really going to happen: people will be able to plan around this assumption, so uncertainty will be reduced substantially. The process will also show that the negotiating table is where big decisions are being made, even if they have to be provi-

sional until the whole process is complete. This will make the Canada-Quebec nexus absolutely central for a while, and the media barrage will reflect and reinforce this fact. At its core is the confrontation between the two entities, an inescapable symbolism that will strengthen the internal solidarity of each, for every citizen clearly now is on one side or the other. Finally, the first session will establish some fundamental principles: Quebec is a unit; populations are being divided and are the basis for division; people can choose which community they will join; and Quebec will extend special consideration to Canadians and Canadian commerce (or, more deeply, each side has some interest in the social and economic well-being of the other). The final communiqué will list the remaining items on the negotiating agenda, and these will be dealt with over the next few weeks. There are basically two sets of issues: economic ones (assets, treaties, commercial and economic relations, currency, and mobility), and others

(citizenship, immigration, social entitlements, Aboriginal rights, the environment, and minority rights). At the second and third meetings, all will be discussed intensively. The issues interlock, and the two sides will have different opinions about which need to be settled first, given their domestic situations and agendas and also the likely rhythm of concession, threat, and cooperation in the talks. They are taken up here in the order in which they could well be announced as two packages of agreements in principle.

187 The Negotiations Assets

The Canadian state possesses billions of dollars’ worth of assets, and

secession means that they must be divided between Canada and Quebec. Negotiations on this dossier will be difficult, not only because of the material stakes and the symbolism of some assets but also because of the diversity of federal holdings. Broadly speaking, they consist of financial assets (movables), fixed assets (immovables), and special cases. In general, the negotiations will be characterized by speed and disengagement, and by the application of simple principles that can be

readily understood, and that will be the case here: fixed assets will be allocated by location; financial assets, as with the debt, will be divided on a per capita basis. But the special cases will need to be handled differently, and there will be some exceptions. This is because the two sides share some common interests. They must be concerned with the other state’s viability and with moderating, if not minimizing, economic disruption. The financial assets include holdings of gold and foreign currencies, receivables (mostly taxes owed), and loans held by federal lending

agencies. Taxes pose no problem, since they will be paid solely to Quebec or Canada after the separation date (with adjustments to be made when the fiscal year is complete). Liquid holdings will be split on a per capita basis. They may be retained by Canada and deducted from Quebec’s share of the debt. Loans could continue to be administered jointly, but it is more likely that the location principle will intrude here, so that credit extended to Quebec firms and residents by agencies such as the Federal Business Development Bank and the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation will be administered

by Quebec agencies, with the assets so transferred being part of Quebec’s overall per capita share. A special problem concerns the cash flows to the federal government from the Bank of Canada, which consist mostly of seigniorage on the currency. Resolving this will await a decision about what currency Quebec will use.

The immovable assets are massive. In Quebec, they include national parks, bridges (both interprovincial and intraprovincial, including the Jacques Cartier and Champlain bridges), the major ports at Montreal and Quebec City, land holdings in the old areas around these ports, hundreds of small-craft harbours, over six thousand build-

ings, airports at Mirabel, Dorval, and Quebec City, and the major military bases at Bagotville, Montreal, St-Jean, and Valcartier.!” All this will become the property of Quebec, and that country will have no claim on fixed assets in Canada. There is no practical alternative

188 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

to the location principle. The only other procedure would be to evaluate

all property, not just in Quebec but in the entire country, and to divide the total according to some formula. But what is the market value of the Quebec Citadel, the federal land in the High Arctic, or the New Westminster Railway Bridge?’* This complex, contestable and time-consuming process would never substitute for the rough justice of location. A sovereign Quebec, therefore, will own all federal assets within its borders. However, efficiency and other considerations will dictate some exceptions to these basic principles. Crown corporations are one problem, especially those such as Via Rail, Air Canada, and Canada Post that provide common infrastructural services. In the long term, joint participation in their management and ownership is unlikely because

there would be disagreement over the location of investments and, more fundamentally, about whether control should be shared on the basis of equality, population, or the location of markets. In the short term, some will be fully privatized or will have their shares distributed between Canada and Quebec in the 3:1 ratio (Air Canada), and some will quickly be broken up (the CBC). Others, such as Canada Post, will be run for an interim period after separation by a joint board of directors (with one-third being neutral members chosen by the other appointees).

By treaty, Canada will have guaranteed access to the ports of Montreal and Quebec and to the St Lawrence Seaway. The Seaway Authority will be reconstituted after negotiations with the Americans to provide for joint Canada-Quebec management of Canada’s current responsibilities. Here the United States will be a moderating influence. It will be necessary to divide the cost of icebreaking and

other operations, and one solution would be to make the Seaway Authority operate on a full cost-recovery basis. Since the National Capital Region will cease to exist in its current form, the federal government will lose possession of dozens of buildings in and around Hull. On the other hand, two major office buildings are occupied through lease-purchase arrangements, and these buildings could continue to be used by federal public servants, regardless of what general labour-mobility provisions are negotiated by the two sides. Defence equipment is another special case. Here, the population principle will be applied, so Quebec will be entitled to one-quarter of all materiel, including planes and ships. Currently, on Quebec territory there are adequate army facilities, a surplus of aircraft (with no control system), and few naval vessels and facilities. In subsidiary negotiations, conducted under the aegis of NATO or the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the two sides will have to negotiate a

189 The Negotiations

rational division of these assets, one that provides for effective units. Neither side has an interest in any other outcome, and the principle of division will be settled in these initial negotiations. Many other assets will require special agreements. Difficult matters will include the holdings of museums in both Quebec and Canada, the National Archives, federal databases, and the files of the RCMP and CSIS. Some will be resolved through other treaties, such as one providing for cooperation between police and security forces. Oth-

ers will be solved by guaranteeing access, perhaps with user fees. Still other assets, especially culturally significant ones, will need special

arrangements, and the two sides will establish a bipartite commission, perhaps with a neutral chair, to reach proposals about them. This will be set up in the late summer of 1995, after negotiators have settled as many of the issues about assets as is possible. Environmental Issues.

Quebec and Canada will have many common environmental interests, including boundary rivers and waters, the St Lawrence Basin, and air quality. By their nature, many pollution issues transcend boundaries, and this area of policy will be a test of regulatory cooperation. Moreover, the environment is important to many Canadians and Quebecers, and for substantial numbers it is of primordial significance. So it would be appropriate to reach an accord on environmental matters early in the negotiations. Quebec, of course, will set its own environmental policy, though if it accedes to NAFTA it will be bound by the side agreement on the environment. But after consultation with the United States, the parties will announce that Quebec will become a member of the Interna-

tional Joint Commission (IJC), to be involved in research and recommendations where its interests are affected. As well, the negotiators could agree to establish a Canada-Quebec environmental commission, along the lines of the IJC, to work on bilateral pollution issues — though this might be too ambitious for the Canadian negotiators. In any case, the two sides will agree to a general framework treaty on environmental cooperation, one that provides for sharing information, consulting on standards, and undertaking collaborative re-

search. It will also commit the parties to common goals about the environment. Citizenship

This is a very difficult issue. It lies at the cutting edge of sovereignty, because states alone can define the composition of their national com-

190 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

munities. It also raises deep symbolic issues about community membership, and these are mixed with practical considerations because of the rights citizens enjoy and the benefits to which they are entitled (and the possibility that residence in a country will be necessary to secure these). In law, a sovereign Quebec is capable of extending citizenship to all residents of its territory (and perhaps even to people outside Quebec). It will do this. But one major concern of the government will be to retain its population: an exodus of anglophones, allophones, staunch federalists, and people afraid to become non-Canadians would greatly damage the economy. So Quebec would prefer a system of dual citi-

zenship.” It would be even better for Quebec if Canada decided to allow Canadian citizenship to be retained only by Canadians living in Quebec but not born there, and by people born in Quebec but now living in ROC. For Quebec, this would avoid the problem of having large numbers of residents who possessed another citizenship.” The federal government of Canada has the power to determine who will be a Canadian. Here it should be remembered that under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, citizens have the right to enter and remain in Canada, and also to move to any province and take up residence; as well, they have the right to vote and stand for office. Unless these provisions were changed, Canadians who acquired Quebec citizenship would continue to enjoy these rights. Second, the Canadian side will have no interest in the short term in promoting massive economic dislocation in Quebec, which it could do by requiring citizens to reside in Canada as a condition of keeping their status, for this would diminish foreign confidence in Canada itself and would disrupt its economy. Such a policy would be anomalous in any case, since Canadians have the right to leave the country and therefore to reside outside it. On the other hand, it is exceedingly improbable that public opinion in Canada will countenance any arrangement that would allow Quebecers en masse to maintain their Canadian citizenship and rights. It will be recognized that those who voted No should not be penalized by being stripped of their citizenship. But the Yes vote will represent a fracturing of the Canadian community, a rejection of it, and as Canadians come to accept this and begin to cohere around a new community, one defined in part through the absence of Quebec and through confrontation with that entity, there will be no support for the notion that Quebecers can stay Canadian while also being citizens of the new sovereign state. The Canadian position, then, will be that Quebecers will have some

period, perhaps two years, in which to make a choice about their citizenship. In order to retain their Canadian citizenship, they will

191 The Negotiations

have to make a formal renouncement of the Quebec citizenship extended by the new state. Dual citizenship will not be allowed in nor-

mal circumstances. As under current legislation, children of non-resident citizens will be entitled to choose to remain Canadian until they reach a certain age (though this right could later be restricted to the first post-separation generation).** Because landed immigrants and resident aliens currently living in Quebec already have been admitted to Canada under Canadian law, they will be able either to move out of Quebec or to remain there under Quebec’s citizenship laws. Even though these arrangements open the possibility of a future outmigration or of having a large population of resident non-citizens, the Quebec side will have no choice but to accept the position at this time. This solution settles the issue by following the principle of individual choice. It will also relieve uncertainty. Yet people will not need to make hurried decisions. They can continue their normal activities, secure in the knowledge that they will be able to make a fundamental choice later, in the light of future developments. Second, it allows for the reconstitution of Canada: constitutional amendment and elec-

tions must occur very soon, and it is essential that there be a clear understanding of the nature of the underlying community. (In connection with elections, it should be noted that most Quebec residents who retain Canadian citizenship will not be eligible to vote, because non-resident electors must have lived in, and must register in, a particular constituency in Canada — and Quebec will no longer be part of Canada.) Third, this solution is independent of any arrangements to be made about the economic union or mobility rights. These can be made in the context of the agreement on citizenship. Finally, the two-year period wins time for modifications later. These might be negotiated by a newly elected Canadian government with a fresh mandate, and it might also be possible for Quebec and Canada to moderate the citizenship regime at the regulatory level. At this stage of the secession, however, it will be made quite clear that Quebecers will not automatically remain Canadians. First Nations

The referendum result will bring Aboriginal issues to the forefront. Most Aboriginals on reserves will have boycotted the referendum,

arguing that it is an external imposition on their powers of self-government;” and some First Nations will have held their own referendums to legitimize the position that they have the right not to remain in a sovereign Quebec. In Quebec, there will be unrest on

192 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

Aboriginal lands. First Nations will refuse to accept the result, and they will initiate moves to adhere to Canada or will take the opportunity to declare sovereignty. They will be supported by Aboriginal people throughout Canada and will also attract moral, financial, and physical support from Aboriginals throughout the hemisphere. As at Oka and Kahnawake, tactics of public disturbance, civil disobedience, and armed resistance may require a military response. Although

foreign powers and international agencies will consider this matter largely to be an internal affair, appeals will be made to them by the First Nations, and they will watch the dossier closely. Meanwhile, the Native people will demand to be represented directly in the negotiations. All of these tactics are very rational manoeuvres to maximize their bargaining leverage. Their negotiating stance will be that they cannot be forced to stay in Quebec without their consent, and they will demand that their terms be met. But their position is precarious, as it has been ever since colonization, and they will have a considerable stake in the outcome of Quebec sovereignty. There are four basic issues of concern to Aboriginals. First is the status and continuity of existing treaties. Second is the process and outcome of negotiating land claims. Third is the recognition of the right to self-government, with its constitutional and practical implications. Fourth are the flows of money and programs to Native people, both on and off the reserves. In every case, the fear is that Aboriginals in Quebec will receive worse treatment than they would in Canada: that treaty provisions will be ignored by the government or narrowly

interpreted by Quebec courts; that land-claims negotiations will be more difficult and drawn out, and the results less generous; that the right to self-government will not be recognized either in the constitution or in its implications for language use, education, taxation, and policing; and that a sovereign Quebec government under fiscal pressure will reduce the funds and services received by Native people.

There is some justification for these apprehensions. The Parti québécois program envisages a new social contract with all Aborigi-

nal nations, through which they and Quebec would become “partners” in developing the sovereign state. The new constitution would define the right of Aboriginals to give themselves responsible governments, and powers would be transferred to these by negotiation. While these Native governments would at first be financed by taxes,

resource revenues, and subsidies, they would look forward to assuming their financial responsibilities fully. The self-government agreements would replace existing treaties, though they would not extinguish existing rights, which would be interpreted by Quebec courts according to the Quebec constitution. Under these agreements,

193 The Negotiations

there would be joint management of Aboriginals’ traditional territories.” This PQ program will be moderated, however, because this is a serious problem for Quebec sovereigntists. Civil unrest will mar the secession, and failure to settle Aboriginal issues could delay international recognition of the new state. The importance of the dossier is shown by Mr Parizeau’s retention of this portfolio, and the Quebec government clearly is ready to bargain. The premier’s parliamentary secretary and special negotiator has said that “we are just about open to anything” in the self-government agreements, and that there would be no “grey zone” in Quebec’s full recognition and protection of native rights.** On the other hand, sweeping concessions to First Nations, such as recognizing an uncircumscribed inherent right of

self-government, could reinforce their claims to sovereignty and threaten the territorial integrity of Quebec. This would not be acceptable. On the Canadian side, there will be considerable public sympathy for Native people in Quebec.” As well, one current of opinion holds that Canadian support for extreme Aboriginal demands could be used to punish Quebec for the decision to separate, perhaps by diminishing its territory as First Nations secede. This will not attract the Ca-

nadian negotiators, who will have accepted Quebec’s borders and will be anxious to proceed with more important issues, especially economic ones. Moreover, they will not support Aboriginal positions

that could be turned against Canada by First Nations living on Canada’s borders, for example, or those living in the West, where there are massive land claims pending. Essentially, there are two possible solutions here. Canada could simply turn over all its existing treaty obligations and program responsibilities to Quebec; or the two sides could reach agreements that would provide permanently for a single, uniform regime for Aboriginals, whatever their country of residence. By fully harmonizing their policies and law on Aboriginal matters, Canada and Quebec would, in effect, render the border and the secession itself irrelevant for Native people. Although the second option is attractive, it could not be realized. In the urgent post-referendum atmosphere, it would be impossible to settle the complexities of Aboriginal matters, including the status of treaties, the position of Métis, the land-claims policies, the meaning of an inherent right to self-government, and the full range of existing programs. Nor, politically, could such substantive matters be decided without full Aboriginal participation and consultation. More important, no mechanism could credibly commit the parties to har-

194 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

monization after the separation. A bipartite or tripartite commission,

for example, could hardly bind sovereign states even if its powers were inscribed in their constitutions (which are amendable). Moreover, were such a body established, Canada would not accept a decision rule based on equality, and Quebec would not place its whole Aboriginal policy under a Canadian majority. Similarly, neither side could commit to accept decisions of the other country’s Supreme Court.

Nor would either give up jurisdiction to international agencies or courts. There is no way, in short, to provide for permanent policy harmonization. Hence, Canada will have to transfer to Quebec its authority over Aboriginals living there and its obligations to them. Some of the constitutional implications of this are considered below. Here it suffices

to note that important treaty obligations already have passed from the British monarch to the crown in right of Canada, and further trans-

fers are possible.” Tripartite negotiations about how this will occur will be opened immediately by Canada, Quebec, and the First Nations. Quebec will provide strong guarantees to its Aboriginal population. This will be essential in order to obviate claims that the Native peoples’ right to self-determination has been violated. Some protections will be written into Quebec’s constitution. One provision could recognize the First Nations’ right of self-government. Another could embed existing treaties and self-government agreements in the constitution. There will also be a provision that any amendment affecting Aboriginals will require their consent. Further protection could involve language rights, as well as a provision that all past decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada concerning Aboriginals and treaties will continue to apply in Quebec.” Beyond this, Canada and Quebec will agree to guarantee the full and unimpeded mobility rights of Aboriginals, through a bilateral treaty. Further protection will be afforded by the citizenship arrangements. Native people, like others in Quebec, will be able to choose to remain Canadian citizens. Since this could lead to political as well as legal difficulties, the two sides might agree from the outset to allow all Aboriginal people in Quebec to maintain dual citizenship. Finally, Canada and Quebec will agree to establish a tripartite First Nations Commission, with a mandate to conduct research, provide advice to governments, and encourage harmony in law and policy in the two countries. All of this will not satisfy Quebec First Nations, however. They will pursue their interests in the courts, before international agencies, and by appealing to public opinion, and they may resort to civil

195 The Negotiations

disobedience and violence. But in law there is nothing to stop this outcome, and since there is so much else at stake in the separation, realpolitik dictates that Aboriginal people living in Quebec will pursue their struggles for justice and autonomy within the context of that sovereign state. This will prove to be a heavy responsibility for Quebec.

At this stage of the separation, many of the most important issues will have been settled. The second package of agreements-in-principle (covering assets, the environment, citizenship, and First Nations), is roughly symmetrical. It will demonstrate progress and will show that the secession is being managed. Most important, by dealing with citi-

zenship and assets, it will provide further evidence that the secession is inevitable. This will be reinforced, giving extra momentum to the whole process, by a joint announcement of the target date for the new constitutions to come into effect and the separation to occur. At this time, working groups of officials, led by ministers, will be

fleshing out the substance of the agreements so that they can take the form of treaties and bills. These groups will be reporting to cabinets and to the legislative committees. Meanwhile, other groups will

be preparing options and positions about the issues that remain to be settled. And Canadians and Quebecers will be reacting to the accords that have been reached. There will be great speculation and debate about how the matters still outstanding will and should be resolved, and governments and parties will be floating trial balloons to test opinion. Uncertainty will be eased to some extent because the

process is under control, yet some critical issues still remain to be settled.

These issues have been left unresolved not because they are the most difficult or important but because, before settling them, the negotiators need to gauge public reaction to the process, to consult foreign powers, and to assess the economic situation. As well, these issues require some articulation with the constitutional drafting processes that are underway. But now they must be settled. Minority Rights

The Canadian constitution contains sections protecting minorities and conferring particular rights on them. These apply principally to linguistic minorities. Hence, under the Constitution Act, 1867, there are

guarantees for denominational schools (s. 93) and the right to use English and French in Parliament and the courts, both in Quebec and federally (s. 133). Under the Constitution Act, 1982, the latter right is

196 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

reaffirmed and is extended to New Brunswick (ss. 17-19). As well, English and French are recognized as official languages, and the right

to communicate with government in either language is affirmed (s. 16, s. 20). Finally, there are provisions for minority-language educational rights, notably the right of citizens to move within Canada and to have their children educated in the official language of their own primary school instruction (s. 23). Minority rights will be an issue in both Canada and Quebec. It will be of most concern to the Government of Quebec, which will be anxious to show that the new state will adhere to international human rights norms, in order to attract immigrants and to reassure its anxious anglophone and allophone populations that secession will not threaten them. On the Canadian side, there will be public concern about the future of the Anglo-Quebec minority, and also debate about

whether to maintain special language rights in Canada. It is possible that these conditions could lead to a formal agreement between the sides that would establish a homogeneous rights regime across the two countries.” This, notably, would encourage labour mobility and therefore economic efficiency, and it would also assuage people’s concern about their relatives and compatriots living in the other state. But such a treaty is unlikely. The situations are

not symmetrical. Although the numbers of the respective minority-language communities are roughly equal, their proportions

are not: the anglophones are 10 per cent of Quebecers, while the francophones will be 3-4 per cent of Canadians after separation. Moreover, Quebec will be anxious to provide reassurances about strengthening minority rights, whereas the pressure of opinion in Canada will be towards reducing them.” Finally, rights beyond those in the Canadian constitution could not be negotiated by Ottawa, since even a treaty would involve matters that fall mainly within provincial jurisdiction. So no formal treaty can be envisaged. As well as signing international accords, Quebec undoubtedly will

embed in its constitution the rights now inscribed in its Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. With sovereignty providing the means to ensure the collective linguistic future, Quebec will add rights for using English in official dealings, rather like those in sections 133 and 20 of the Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982, respectively. It will also provide minority-language education guarantees for the exist-

ing population and for some immigrants. Stronger rights for other cultural minorities will be included in the Charter. Canadian constitutional redrafting is discussed below. The principles that will guide it are continuity and minimal change. These imply the continuation of existing minority-language rights, though

197 The Negotiations

there will be powerful political pressures to the contrary. If the citizenship arrangements are as envisaged, many francophone Quebec-

ers might choose to remain Canadian and to migrate to Canada. Maintaining the existing structure of minority-language rights would encourage this. But there will be no formal, detailed treaty about minority rights. Each side will deal with the matter according to domestic pressures

and external considerations. The two sides will, however, frame a general treaty about the treatment of citizens when they are resident in the other state. This will specify, for example, that such citizens will be accorded all the rights and privileges enjoyed by resident aliens

under the respective Charters of Rights, as well as under the normal statutes governing immigration and citizenship. While this is but a vague goodwill gesture, agreements beyond this are improbable. Quebec's Succession to Treaties

Canada has signed a great number of bilateral and multilateral treaties. There is no doubt that it will be the successor state after separation, retaining its rights and obligations under these agreements (as long as it does not fragment, and unless Quebec’s separation causes a fundamental change in the matters covered by a treaty). In many cases, Quebec will have a choice about succeeding to treaties, as will its potential partners. Quebec will apply for NATO membership, for example, and it will be free to negotiate a whole range of agreements about taxation, extradition, aviation, and so forth. On local border treaties, it will have no choice but to assume Canada’s existing rights and responsibilities. About these two classes of treaty, then, there is nothing for Canada and Quebec to negotiate. some other treaties will involve very little negotiation. Canada’s dues and rights in organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund will be split with Quebec according to formulae agreed with these agencies. Population, GDP, and export share are the obvious bases of division. The extent

of change will depend on the degree of economic integration that obtains between Canada and Quebec. If a customs union is maintained, for example, arrangements under various commodities regimes, and Canada’s European Community quotas, will not need to be renegotiated with third parties. Other treaties raise the possibility — or necessity — of joint action. This is especially true of economic agreements. Each party’s stance towards these agreements, and the nature of the joint action, will be determined largely by the level of economic integration to be main-

198 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

tained between Canada and Quebec. This is discussed in the following section. In essence, though, Canada and Quebec will maintain the FTA/NAFTA floor, will operate a temporary customs union, and will preserve some elements of the economic union by special agreement and voluntary harmonization. Under these arrangements, Canada will support Quebec’s entry into GATT. This will be straightforward if Quebec agrees to maintain the existing tariff schedule, along with other border measures negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Any other arrangement is difficult to

envisage, simply because Quebec would have to undertake long multilateral negotiations in order to accede to GATT with a different array of tariffs. This means that Canada and Quebec will maintain a de facto customs union, although Quebec will henceforth act independently in multilateral talks. The other agreements involve the United States. On the military side, Quebec will be admitted as a member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.” Since the Canadian defence industry is highly integrated and the Defence Production/ Defence Sharing agreements are flexible and relatively informal, it will be possible to incorporate Quebec as a participant. Until its defence purchases rise, however, Quebec producers will be vulnerable to truncated markets. The Auto

Pact will also be extended to Quebec. Canada has a large stake in this agreement and an interest in maintaining stability. If the Auto Pact did not apply to a sovereign Quebec, American manufacturers potentially would face restricted access to an important market, and the United States might seek to renegotiate the agreement. This might

occur in the medium term in any event, because Canadian production now far exceeds the safeguard levels of the Auto Pact. But there is little current pressure from the industry to reopen the agreement.

More important, the Pact can be abrogated on twelve months’ notice, and since renegotiation can be forced at any time, the United States is unlikely to seize the occasion of secession to do so. In general, the United States will be prepared to admit Quebec to the FTA and NAFTA. As long as the secession is being competently managed, there should be no fundamental reassessment of American policy towards Canada and Quebec. The primary U.S. concerns will be to protect American investment and to minimize the dislocation to trade flows (and their effects on American jobs and the profitability of subsidiaries in Canada and Quebec). This means that the United States will support extending the agreements to Quebec with as little modification as is necessary to incorporate another member.

Canada, too, has an interest in Quebec’s accession, because if this did not occur, the FTA/NAFTA regime might cease to apply to Canada

199 The Negotiations . itself. Some analysts have suggested that this might be acceptable to Canada, because ROC opinion is less supportive of continental free trade than is true of Canada-with-Quebec.*' But this is most improbable. Not only has the Canadian economy already adjusted to the FTA, but in the midst of the secession Canadian governments are unlikely to add yet another element of uncertainty. Instead, Canada will argue quite the opposite — that it is bound to the treaties by its status as the successor state. And it will support Quebec’s entry to the treaties, unless the negotiations come to an impasse on other issues. In this, Quebec will have little choice. The FTA/NAFTA regime will be the main vehicle for securing its access to markets in both Canada and the United States. By being exposed in the treaties as a sovereign entity rather than a subnational unit, Quebec’s policy autonomy will be constrained in new ways, but it will nevertheless be anxious to be admitted to the agreements. Commercial and Economic Relations

A crucial issue for the negotiators to decide will be the extent of eco-

nomic integration to be maintained after the separation. Until the separation occurs, all existing laws and regulations will continue to apply in Canada and Quebec. There will be an economic standstill (one that will become increasingly awkward as time passes and decisions are made in the shadow of the separation), and yet the two sides will have to agree on a framework for the longer term, because economic actors need a predictable environment. The negotiators will confront a menu of possibilities ranging from the GATT floor to the existing economic union. Their positions and choices will be shaped by domestic politics (as these evolve through the intense process of

separation), by outside pressures and opportunities, and by awareness of the economic losses that will be incurred if the economic union

disintegrates. The core problem here is that the two sides will be unable to establish a supranational locus of authority. A full economic union requires a legislature with the capacity for redistribution; positive integration requires institutions capable of promulgating some regulations across state borders and providing efficient common services and facilities; and negative integration is more certain with an authoritative adjudication mechanism to settle disputes. But Canada and Quebec will not be able to agree on a set of common institutions for economic management. In the first place, there is no obvious decision rule. The choice will be between making decisions on the basis of equality, which

will be unacceptable to Canada, or making them on proportionality,

200 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

which will be unacceptable to Quebec. Since the negotiators will be under considerable time pressure, it will be difficult to design new institutions.** Moreover, the Canadian side will be politically incapable of committing to new structures for economic management that are elaborate or powerful. The material interest in the Quebec economy

is very weak in western Canada, where there will be little support for institutions that would preserve the economic union at the cost of allowing Quebec a voice in managing the western economy.* Maintaining national unity will be the primary concern on the Canadian side. As well, the federal government alone is not constitutionally capable of implementing an agreement that would impinge on areas of provincial jurisdiction. In any event, the Canadian negotiators’ legitimacy will be weakening as partisan and regional forces gain prominence now that the immediate crisis has passed. Finally, the process of redrafting the Canadian constitution will be well underway, and there will be no question of providing for supranational authorities in this. Among the sovereigntists, Mr Parizeau at least is quite aware of this. In late 1993, when addressing proposals for complex supranational political institutions, he said sarcastically: “Tl ne faut pas réver et demander la lune... Et, déja pas trés contents que le Québec devienne souverain, ces Canadien-anglais, pour nos beaux yeux, pour nous faire plaisir, pour imiter vaguement ce que certains croient qu’il se passe, en Europe de l’Ouest, accepteraient ainsi de chambarder leur vie politique, eux, qui ont toujours refusé d’accorder le moindre pouvoir additionnel au Québec et pour qui l’égalité des provinces est un principe sacré.””* Still, both Canada and Quebec have an interest in providing a stable

and predictable environment right away. They also have a mutual interest in preserving the advantages of a common economic space, with the efficiency gains this allows, as well as some interest in the viability of each other’s economy, simply because it is an important market. On the other hand, these interests are not symmetrical. Canada

is the larger economy, and the extra efficiency gains accruing from access to Quebec are not as great as those realized in Quebec from access to Canada. And at the grossest level, Canada exports under 5 per cent of total GDP to Quebec, while Quebec exports 15.2 per cent of GDP to Canada; in manufactured and primary products, the respective proportions are 6.3 and 24.0 per cent. There are regions and sectors of much higher dependence and interdependence, of course, but the gross figures, along with the political considerations noted above, dictate which side will make the policy adjustments. Apart from the standstill announced by the two governments, which

will be maintained until the date of separation, the economic and

201 The Negotiations commercial arrangements will consist of five elements. Not all of these will take the form of treaties. First, Quebec will adopt the existing Canadian tariff structure. The

two countries will agree not to impose tariffs on each other’s products (and this will require GATT approval). This outcome will preserve the customs union, minimizing disruption and easing Quebec’s entry into GATT and other agreements. On the Canadian side, there will be less interest in maintaining the current levels of protection, especially in the West. But no precipitous action is likely, since the question will be put off until after the separation. Then, after full consultation with affected interests, Canada might choose to make such unilateral tariff reductions as appear beneficial. Quebec would have the choice of dropping its own tariffs or setting up border posts. Of course, if Quebec made unilateral reductions, Canada could also establish border controls. Second, Quebec will be admitted into the FTA and NAFTA. These agreements will set the basic level of Canada-Quebec economic integration. This is the equilibrium position on this issue, at least for this phase of the relationship; Canada and Quebec will not be able to negotiate formal arrangements to preserve higher levels of integration, yet neither party will have any interest in the short term in not maintaining FTA/NAFTA coverage of the common economy. The FTA/NAFTA solution is, in fact, very convenient. The rules of trade are known to many businesses; consultative and dispute-settlement mechanisms are provided for, with no extra requirements for institutional design; the federal-provincial implications have already been worked out; and the solution should be acceptable to the public. Quebecers, on average, might favour a higher level of integration, to be secured through a separate bilateral treaty, but the FTA/NAFTA agreements do provide some security. And although some Canadians will resist economic integration with Quebec, the arrangement can be presented as one that is necessary for Canada as well as offering continuity with what already exists. The third component of the economic arrangements will be voluntary harmonization of laws and regulations, and of tax structures and levels. At the time of the separation, economic integration between Canada and Quebec will be at 100 per cent of the current levels. There will have been a substantial economic evolution after the referendum, including outmigration, shifts in product sourcing and marketing, altered investment decisions, and changes in the pattern of government spending. After the separation, the economic union will be considerably weakened, despite the FTA/NAFTA floor. The interprovincial trade agreement signed in July 1994, for example, will

202 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

no longer extend to Quebec, nor will other reciprocal agreements between provinces. Labour mobility will be constrained by the citizenship provisions. There will be no common competition policy, and,

generally, the federal government as a force for positive economic integration will no longer reach into Quebec. The two states will be able to apply anti-dumping, countervailing-duty, and safeguards measures against each other’s products. Nevertheless, it will be possible to maintain integration above the FTA/NAFTA floor and to preserve important elements of the common market, simply by not changing much of the legal framework of commerce. The regulatory environment can be harmonized if the states adopt identical legislation or, more realistically, if Quebec enacts legislation that duplicates what now exists in Canada. If Canada makes changes to the legal and regulatory framework of commerce to suit its own purposes, Quebec can choose whether to modify its own laws accordingly. If it does not do so, interstate commerce will face new barriers and this will impose costs, but Quebec governments will take these decisions at a rhythm dictated by the country’s own economic evolution and political dynamics. The fourth element is consultation. There are provisions for regular ministerial-level meetings in the continental trade agreements, but the two sides will agree to a very general treaty about the desirability of regular consultation about economic, fiscal, and commercial matters. Specific commitments about timing, or engagements to consult in advance of introducing new measures, will not be contained in this. Lastly, the economic and commercial package will involve at least two specific agreements. One will cover the financial sector, where both sides will have a strong incentive to provide maximum stability.» Unless there is cooperation about deposit-taking institutions and insurance companies, several major institutions will be in violation of national ownership laws. At the FTA/NAFTA floor, this problem is avoided, but only because, under its national-treatment principle, firms have to incorporate subsidiaries to manage their operations in the other country. This could prove difficult and costly in the short term, and so would the adjustment of portfolio balances in a time of high uncertainty. The negotiators thus have an incentive to agree to supersede national treatment by extending mutual recognition of each other’s firms. This would reduce transition costs and impede operations far less. On the other hand, it would require regulatory coordination; otherwise, one country would be insuring depositors and policy holders for assets under the prudential regulation of the other.* Provision for this coordination will be made in a separate treaty, which

203 The Negotiations

will involve the Bank of Canada and the new state Bank of Quebec as joint overseers of national regulatory authorities. In the longer term it might be possible to establish a joint regulatory agency. Also in this sector, the parties will agree to maintain full access to the Canadian payments system. But both elements of this agreement are likely

to be temporary. Quebec’s regulatory regime is diverging from Canada’s, and payments-system arrangements in the longer term will depend on how currency issues are resolved. Hence, the agreement will have a two-year expiry period. The other area where some arrangement must be made is agriculture. This is a highly sensitive sector, because of the political power of farmers, the interregional differences in both farm specializations and ideological support for supply management, and uncertainties arising from the FTA/NAFTA and the Uruguay Round settlements. The immediate issue will be the allocation of production quotas in the supply-managed commodities of milk, eggs, and poultry. Industrial milk is the critical commodity because of the size of the market and the fact that Quebec farmers have over 47 per cent of Canada’s total market share quota. This has been estimated to provide a direct surplus on processed dairy products of $1 billion.” There will be no support in Canada for the current allocation of quota in this sector. As long as supply management and quotas or very high tariffs persist in agriculture, the implicit standard is national self-sufficiency,

and this will be applied in the Quebec-Canada separation. The long-term result in Canada may be that producers in other provinces lobby successfully to take up Quebec’s lost quota; or it may be that processors will be able to win access to cheaper foreign supplies. In

any case, the problem will be to achieve adjustment without any massive disruption to the farming and food-processing industries and without having to establish border controls. The two sides will agree to adjust domestic production levels to match final domestic consumption plus exports to third parties, perhaps over a three-year period. (It should be noted that the FTA contains provisions outlawing export subsidies and permitting the application of anti-dumping laws in this sector.) This will be embodied in a treaty (to apply also to eggs and poultry),°® which will be accompanied by whatever support programs each country is prepared to introduce to ease the tran-

sition. Inevitably, agricultural trade problems will add to the other factors tending in the long run towards the establishment of border controls. The net economic result of this entire package will be that much of

the economic union will be retained, though some will be lost. The FTA/NAFTA floor provides important guarantees about national treat-

204 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

ment, capital mobility, access to procurement, and many other features of the Canadian economic union. On the other hand, labour mobility will be restricted under this regime; there will be much scope for establishing new barriers to trade; and commercial relations fun-

damentally will take on a state-to-state form, because disputes will be managed on this basis and current universal access to the Canadian courts will end. The internal regulatory environment will remain largely harmonized, by voluntary action, into the medium term. The commercial arrangements alone do not require that border controls be established. On the other hand, the legal weakening of the union between the Canadian and Quebec economies, and the increase in obstacles to trade, will undoubtedly lead to some trade diversion in the future, and there will be further losses as positive economic integration between Canada and Quebec is much lessened. Politically, the package makes sense. It will help resolve the immediate uncertainty of economic actors. It will maintain the commercial and financial systems while postponing larger decisions about the latter, and it will retain the FTA/NAFTA status quo. As well, it embodies no new long-term commitments of the kind that would prove divisive and beyond the legitimacy of the Canadian negotiators to make; instead, it allows for flexibility and adjustment by firms and governments. Most important, it creates very few supranational political or regulatory institutions with binding authority. When sepa-

ration takes place, economic integration will be at 100 per cent of current levels, but political integration will be almost at zero. The Currency and Monetary Policy

This is an absolutely crucial issue. The stakes involved are very high. It may need to be settled before this point in the separation process if there is a crisis of confidence in the Canadian dollar. This is because, in normal circumstances, governments have little control over individual depositors or the activities of firms and investors, especially foreign ones. The Yes vote could produce a liquidity crisis as depositors withdraw funds, and also a currency crisis as investors shift to assets not denominated in Canadian dollars. In the most recent peaceful secession, the Czech-Slovak case, these possibilities were limited,

because the currency was not readily convertible and because foreign debt was both relatively small and mainly held by international organizations and governments. This is not true of Canada, where the economy is open, the dollar floats freely, foreign debt is very large,

trading in Canadian securities is international, and individuals can

205 The Negotiations

choose the currency in which many assets — certainly, their savings accounts — are denominated. A currency crisis would affect every

Canadian, through its implications for the value of pensions, savings, and wages, as well as interest rates and the cost of servicing government debt. If there is a crisis of confidence, the Canadian gov-

ernment could introduce foreign-exchange controls, and, possibly under the Emergencies Act, it could freeze deposits. But such disruptive measures could not be maintained for very long; moreover, their imposition would simply reduce confidence in the currency and the country’s capability of servicing its debt. Whatever arrangements

were announced before the controls were lifted would have to be extremely credible to withstand the renewed speculative pressure

caused by their very imposition. All this could force a quick and stable

resolution of the currency question at the first meeting of the negotiators. Alternatively, the issue could remain open. Because of the announced

economic standstill, the decisive and peaceful handling of the separation process, the debt agreement, and the firm action by the Bank of Canada with international support, a crisis of confidence in the currency might have been avoided. The negotiators will have discussed the several options open to them in this dossier. Central to these talks will not be the relatively minor issues of seigniorage and transaction costs, but how to produce an arrangement that will meet the core needs of each side while avoiding uncertainty and speculative attacks on the currency. Long-term seigniorage and transaction costs pale into irrelevance when set against the potential effects on government finances and the underlying economy of a sharp increase in the prime rate, a plunging Canadian dollar, or a liquidity crisis in the financial system — or all three simultaneously. Temporary controls and international coordination could only postpone such effects if the currency settlement was not certain, stable, and credible. Of the options available, there are only three that meet these criteria. One is that Quebec declares that it will introduce a separate, floating

currency. Another is that Quebec decides to use the U.S. dollar. The third is that the Canadian monetary union will be maintained, with full Quebec participation in setting policy. Quebec could introduce a separate currency pegged either to the American or the Canadian dollar, but there would be huge costs in establishing its credibility, as well as inevitable speculation against the level of the peg, and at the same time none of the benefits of the other options would be realized. The two sides will agree on the third option. This will not be the result of unacrimonious negotiation, because both sides have a

206 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

lot at stake and each option imposes asymmetrical costs and benefits. But in this crucial dossier the advantage lies with Quebec. If Quebec were to establish its own floating currency, the issue would be credibly settled. There would be costs for Canada in terms of specu-

lative pressures, transaction costs, and lost seigniorage, but these would not be crippling. Quebec would incur the very large costs of establishing confidence in its currency, and these would be taken up front. Afterwards, the situation would normalize, and the country would have the benefits of policy autonomy and a separate currency as a mechanism of adjustment. But while this is a credible outcome, the huge short-term costs of this option render it very unattractive. Canada’s preferred option will be to maintain the currency union, but without Quebec participation in setting policy. It would be difficult politically to extend formal decision-making power to the seceding country, let alone to make payments to it for seigniorage. But to be a pure taker of Canadian policy will be unacceptable to Que-

bec. If this is the only option, Quebec might choose to adopt the American dollar; it might be better off as a taker of Washington’s monetary policy. Although this choice could not be definitely made at the outset of the separation negotiations, before there were Ameri-

can assurances of admission to the FTA/NAFTA and before the Canada-Quebec economic and commercial framework had been agreed, it could be deployed early on as a threat, and it is a credible one. The option would cause great damage to Canada at little economic and political cost to Quebec, relative to that country’s other alternatives. Hence, Canada will concede to joint management of the currency union. This is a stable outcome and is more credible than maintaining the union without participation (because observers would expect Quebec to become dissatisfied with such an arrangement). Quebec

will establish a central bank, and representatives of this institution will sit on the board of the Bank of Canada, with full voting power. Quebec will also gain the power to appoint a member of the management committee of the bank or a senior vice-president. The two sides will conclude a treaty to this effect, which will also provide for seigniorage to be paid to Quebec according to its 25 per cent of the Bank of Canada’s equity, and for there to be a full exchange of information between the two institutions. As well, the agreement will provide for regular meetings of the two countries’ ministers of finance about fiscal and monetary issues. Finally, it will embody a joint commitment to price stability as a leading, though not exclusive, goal of the monetary union: this will both set a common purpose and reassure investors.

207 The Negotiations

This will be a very difficult concession for the Canadian side to make. It will create great suspicion in the Canadian West and will enrage all those who favour cutting relations with Quebec or punishing the “treasonous province.” But there is little choice. Quebec cannot be forced to establish an independent currency. Nor is it evident that Canada could prevent it from adopting the U.S. dollar without using measures that would be costly to itself. If Quebec chose the U.S. dollar, Canada might well be forced to peg to the U.S. dollar or to adopt it as well. If this alternative is even less politically palatable

than shared monetary management at a time when the unity and continuity of Canada itself are questionable, then the joint arrangement must be the outcome. This agreement will be supported by most of the Canadian business community and by all financial institutions. It could be made

more acceptable by some elaborations. For instance, the Bank of Canada Act could be amended to provide for more effective regional representation on the board and even for provincial or regional appointments. Alternatively, the bank’s structure could be regionalized through the creation of regional central banks to carry out some func-

tions that are now centralized in Ottawa.” The presidents of these banks — among them, the Central Bank of Quebec — would sit on the

Bank of Canada’s board, along with federal (and Quebec) appointees. Through such devices, Quebec’s participation in managing the monetary union could be rendered less extraordinary, while the suspicions of the West and Atlantic Canada could be allayed somewhat. Despite this, the agreement will erode support for the federal negotiators. But their role will be coming to an end. In any case, there is

no more agreeable choice open to them. Indeed, Quebec’s position on this issue seems strong enough that it could win concessions in other areas as well. The only comparable Canadian bargaining cards are citizenship and the veto over Quebec’s admission to NAFTA. Mobility and Immigration

The mobility of people within the Canada-Quebec economic space and the admission of people to it will be matters of concern in the negotiations. Under the FTA and NAFTA, individuals who are in certain occupational classes or performing certain functions have a limited right to enter the other countries for work. In the period before Quebecers have to choose a citizenship, they will of course be able to work in Canada, and those who decide to remain Canadians rather than becoming citizens of Quebec will have the right to enter the country and seek work anywhere. Other Quebecers seeking to

208 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

work in Canada will need employment authorization. Whether Quebec

decides to allow Canadians resident in Quebec to work there, and whether it will admit Canadians to work under easier terms than the FTA/NAFTA provisions will be an autonomous policy choice. It does not appear to be in Quebec’s interest to encourage residents to leave, though Canadian citizens will probably require work permits. As for non-work travel, there would seem to be no interest on either side in imposing visa requirements on people who aim to spend

money in the country. Hence, there will be no need for border controls. Of course, the lack of controls opens up the possibility of smuggling, should tax regimes come to vary widely. More seriously, people crossing the border could work “underground” in the other country. If these became widespread problems, controls would have to be established.

Immigration is a different matter. If admission policies vary substantially and there are no border checkpoints, then each country will be surrendering some control of its population base to the other. Since this issue, in the medium term, is the only possible cause of establishing highly inefficient border controls, there is a strong incentive to reach a treaty on immigration. Quebec certainly has a major interest in immigration, and not only to maintain population levels while

integrating newcomers into the French language and Quebec culture. One significant advantage of sovereignty is that the province will be better able to retain immigrants: it will no longer be competing with the attractions of the rest of Canada, but only with the immigrant’s home country or alternative destinations. An agreement on immigration would not impair this advantage much, because new Quebec citizens or permanent residents could not emigrate to Canada

to work without securing employment authorization, resident status, or landed-immigrant status from the Canadian authorities. Canada has a less substantial material interest in immigration, but it is a highly

sensitive symbolic issue, and there will be no support for a regime that would admit “undesirables” into Canada through Quebec. On the other hand, Canada has no interest in letting this issue be the sole cause of border posts coming into immediate operation. The solution will be a treaty similar to the agreements on immigration that Canada and Quebec have reached in the past. Under the 1978 Cullen-Couture agreement, Canada and Quebec each established

a set of criteria for admission, and either could veto an immigrant who failed to reach 30 per cent of the possible points on their scale. Admission to Quebec was, however, subject to the statutory requirements for admission to Canada.” Under the 1991 agreement, Canada sets national standards and defines the classes of immigrants, as well

209 The Negotiations

as those who are inadmissable. Within these constraints, Quebec has the power to select Quebec-bound immigrants and to veto unacceptable ones (except in the Family and Assisted Relative classes). There is provision for consultation over every refusal.* A treaty could provide that the two countries each establish whatever standards, classes, and objectives seem appropriate to it, along with admission procedures, with each having a veto over every case

according to its own standards. This might work well in practice, and it might be the long-run equilibrium position, but it will not be politically acceptable in the wake of the referendum, especially in Canada, where opinion will not countenance the reach of Quebec policy over domestic Canadian matters. Alternatively, the two sides could agree on common standards, with separate application. Despite the current harmonious working relationship, this would require a level of trust not likely to be present after secession; moreover, it will take Quebec some time to build up the organization necessary to administer a fully independent system. The solution therefore will be that the current agreement will be extended, with slight modifications. Quebec will set its own immigration targets, it will have a veto over all Quebec-bound immigrants and visitors, and Canada will be

able to define the “inadmissable” class, thus retaining the right to veto undesirable Quebec-bound immigrants. Those admitted to Que-

bec would have no right of later entry to Canada, and vice versa. Given the citizenship choices to be made in two years, the term of the treaty will also be two years. Social Entitlements

This is an area where scope exists for fruitful cooperation. In particular, maintaining a common “entitlement space” would promote labour

mobility. It would also avoid the transaction costs of splitting the administrative systems that provide benefits, and it would reduce the number of people who will resettle in order to retain benefits. But the negotiators will not agree to cooperation at this level. Social programs channelled through the federal government involve regional redistribution, and after Quebecers have voted to rupture the political community, there will be no support for any such redistribution towards Quebec. In Quebec, the provincial government will require

the autonomy to design an integrated and efficient social-welfare system. And given the fiscal situations of the two countries, neither side will be interested in committing to fixed regimes of benefits. There is one basic principle that can be agreed, however. This is that eligibility for social benefits will depend on residency rather than

210 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

citizenship. This principle is analogous to the “national treatment” of firms. If this were not agreed, rather severe complications would result. One is deciding what government would be responsible for benefits in the period before the definitive citizenship choice. Beyond this, tying benefits to citizenship could provide powerful incentives for people to migrate to the other country for non-economic reasons and for reasons possibly rooted in false expectations about the home country’s viability. Moreover, the citizenship criterion would restrict

labour mobility long after the secession, when there would already be the barrier that acquiring resident status would require the approval of immigration authorities. So Quebec, raising all taxes from residents, will be responsible for their social entitlements. And in Canada, the federal government will extend social programs to all residents, without discrimination. This will apply to social assistance (where the provinces also control access), to old age security and guaranteed income supplement payments (or their Quebec equivalents), and to unemployment insurance. In health care, provincial residency will be required, and the provinces will continue to establish rules about out-of-Canada coverage, which will apply to Quebec as well as other countries. The Canada and Quebec pension plans, by treaty, will be coordinated as they are now. Private pensions pose more difficult problems. It is likely that the pension funds of out-of-country employees of firms will have to become registered in the country or province where they work. This will apply also to Quebec-based employees of industries currently regulated by the federal government. As for individual pensions, in the form of registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs), there is potential for acrimony. Through allowing deductions for contributions to these plans, Ottawa has, in effect, deferred taxes on the income that will flow from them. There

is a case to be made that Canada should impose a tax on the Quebec-based assets in these funds and that Quebec should do the same.*? On the other hand, these deferred taxes are not carried as assets on the government’s books, and sophisticated financial management generally ensures that most taxes deferred from RRSPs are never collected anyway. So there will be no point in fighting this issue out in the autumn of 1995. Amore serious problem concerns the ceilings on non-national hold-

ings in private and individual pension funds. If the Canadian laws are applied immediately, fast and costly liquidations of Quebec assets would be required. Canada could introduce legislation providing for a transition period, perhaps of five years, for pension funds

211 The Negotiations

to adjust their Quebec holdings to comply with the ceiling. Quebec might prefer not to retain the existing requirement, or it might adopt mirror legislation. Finally, there are the pension entitlements of public servants, MPs and senators, an issue that overlaps to some extent with the settlement of the national debt. Canada will agree to pay normal pensions to all retirees in the period before citizenship choice, and to all who retain Canadian citizenship afterwards: Quebec will take responsibility for the others. As for incumbent public servants, Canada will maintain its normal commitments even if these individuals are seconded to the Quebec government; after the citizenship choice, those who opt not to remain Canadian will have transferred to the Quebec authorities their full pension entitlements until the date of departure from the public service. This will be costly, but there will be a strong _ incentive for Canada to do this, given its interest in reducing the size and changing the composition of the public service. Overall, these arrangements will involve substantial transition costs. There is much potential for acrimony here, but also much to be done to avoid instilling fear in the population and panic in some quarters. Although the principle of supplying benefits only to residents will inhibit labour mobility and weaken the economic union, there is no realistic alternative. As in the case of firms, “national treatment” will prevail in most social programs - after people have met the immigration and residence requirements established by the two countries. Other Matters

There will be many other issues about which the two sides will make agreements. These include cooperation at the border, cooperation in defence manoeuvres, cooperation between police forces, extradition, disaster planning, public health, higher education, fisheries, and taxation. Some of these matters will be highly complex, and they are all

important. But they are not unprecedented, and they need not be settled immediately by the primary negotiating teams. For the most part, they will be resolved according to standard international practice. Canada has many such treaties with other countries. So these matters can be safely delegated to working groups of officials, with draft treaties to be signed later (but before the separation). Officials in both countries will also be working furiously to change normal statutes and regulations so as to accommodate the separation, but the redrafting will follow the main principles to which the two sides have agreed.

212 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

At this point, the negotiating teams have completed the essential work that must be done for the secession to take place. They have reached agreement on these central issues under severe time constraints, and in a terribly difficult political and economic context. In so doing, they have established the shape of the new bilateral relationship, crystallizing it in a form that will endure for years. The transition has produced a new institutional order.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Rest of the Separation

SECESSION WILL OCCUR CONSTITUTIONALLY

At the same time as the negotiations with Quebec are being undertaken, Canada will also be creating new domestic institutions; it will be reconstituting itself. Even though this will be a separate process from dealing with Quebec, some of the leading actors will take part in both. Because of this and because of the sense of urgency that will infuse both processes, the negotiations and the constitutional debates will each shape the other. On the one hand, the solidarity necessary for effectively dealing with Quebec will help prevent dissension on constitutional issues, since profound constitutional disagreements obviously would impair the capacity of Canadian politicians to accomplish the separation. Conversely, because the constitutional de-

bates will be the more critical for ROC, they will constrain the agreements that can be made with Quebec. Quebec will also be finalizing a new constitution, and the substance of these reconstitutions will be discussed in the next section. Much redrafting will be necessary on the Canadian side — to excise Quebec, to ensure legal continuity, and to make the adjustments needed to have the fundamental law reflect the new shape of the federation. The guiding principles will be to write Quebec out of the basic law, to make minimal changes to the status quo, and to opt for flexibility where changes must be made. The issue here is how to accomplish the secession. It is clear that for separation to take place legally, the Constitution Acts must be

214 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

amended. Until this happens, Quebec will remain a part and a province of Canada. Most notably, this means that no federal election could

be held without Quebecers participating. And yet this election must occur to legitimize the principle of the separation, the agreements reached with Quebec, and the constitutional amendments themselves. It will also be necessary to choose a fresh government with a mandate to chart Canada’s future course. The Constitution Acts must of course be amended constitutionally. If this did not occur, there would be a fundamental discontinuity in the basic law, precisely analogous to a UDI by Quebec. At its core, Canada would be an illegal state, assuming that it continued to exist (and the illegality of its reconstitution would justify internal claims, and perhaps some external ones, that the authority of the state need not be respected). In order to accomplish the secession, many changes to the constitution will be required. The question is how these amendments must be made. In particular, will it be necessary to have the unanimous agreement of the provinces? In the Canadian constitution there are several amending formulae.' The most general procedure is for a proclamation to be issued by the governor general after resolutions assenting to the amendment have passed the Senate, the House of Commons, and the legislatures of at least two-thirds of the provinces that have at least 50 per cent of the population. This procedure — the general amending formula — is contained in sections 38 and 39 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (CA1982). According to section 42 of CA1982, the general formula must be used to effect amendments about certain matters, in-

cluding the Supreme Court, the powers of the Senate, and the enlargement or establishment of provinces. Some other amendments require the unanimous consent of the provinces and the federal government. Under section 41 of CA1982, unanimity is required to make

amendments to the constitution “in relation to the following matters”: (1) “the office of the Queen, the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor of a province” ;(2) the right of a province to have as many MPs as senators; (3) the use of the English or the French language; (4) the “composition” of the Supreme Court; and (5) the amending formulae themselves. Subject to these provisions, each province can amend its own constitution, and the federal Parliament can amend the constitution regarding the executive government of Canada, the Senate, and the House of Commons. As well, in matters that concern at least one province but not all of them, and involve interprovincial boundaries or the use of English or French within a province, amendments can be made under section 43, through proclamations authorized by Parliament and the legislatures of the provinces concerned.

215 The Rest of the Separation

Now, if Canadians proposed constitutional changes that required unanimity, Quebec would have to agree to the amendment. Since Quebec will retain its present status until the constitution is changed, a resolution would have to be approved by the National Assembly along with all the other provincial legislatures. This is an interesting problem overhanging Canada’s reconstitution. As for the specific issue of an election, it might seem possible to use the general formula to amend the constitution, and then amend the Elections Act, so as to exclude Quebecers from participating, but this would be questionable, since it arguably would derogate from the powers of the province (under section 38), and it could affect the right of the province to

have at least as many MPs as senators (section 41). Hence, either Quebec’s assent or provincial unanimity would be required to hold an election before the whole constitution is amended. Another relevant aspect of the amending procedure is that according to section 39, no amendment under the general formula can be made within one year of the resolution being initiated, unless every province's legislature has either consented or dissented. Hence, if unanimity is not required, Quebec or any other province could stall the process for a year, simply by not acting at all. If, on the other hand, reconstituting Canada requires some amendments that clearly fall under the unanimity provisions of section 41, there are no such time constraints: provinces could pass resolutions overnight, or never. Whether unanimity will be required to effect a constitutional separation, therefore, is an arcane but important point. It involves the bargaining relationship with Quebec and — more important — it will affect the political dynamic within Canada itself. Despite some arguments to the contrary, it seems that the amendments required to achieve the secession will indeed need unanimous provincial consent.” First, some amendments will affect “the office” of a lieutenant-governor “of a province,” namely Quebec. Where references to the powers and office of lieutenant-governors are written in general language, it might be possible to maintain the fiction that

since other amendments render Quebec a non-province, the offices of the lieutenant-governors in “Canada” will not have been affected, so the general amending formula will suffice. But other sections are more specific. Section 71 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (CA1867), for

example, provides explicitly for a lieutenant-governor to be part of the Quebec legislature, and it is hard to see how excising this section would not affect the office.°

Second, amendments must be made to provisions about the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Act currently states that “at least three of the judges” shall be appointed from among those on the Court

216 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

of Appeal or the Superior Court of Quebec, or from advocates at the Quebec bar. Some commentators have held that the federal Parliament can change the Supreme Court’s composition by ordinary statute, under its power to constitute, maintain, and organize a general appeals court (CA1867, s. 101).* This argument hinges mainly on the

proposition that the Supreme Court Act is not part of the constitution, and although this is debatable, there are strong indications that the constitution does indeed include this Act.” Moreover, there are the explicit references to the Supreme Court in sections 41 and 42 of CA1982. Given the short list in the former section of matters requiring unanimity, and given the gravity of placing anything in this category, changing the composition of the Supreme Court will require the unanimous agreement of the federal Parliament and all provincial legislatures. Of course, if the reconstitution of Canada involves amendments to the amending formulae or to language rights, then unanimity certainly will be required. To reconstitute Canada without Quebec, then, will require that reso-

lutions to amend the Constitution Acts be introduced in the House of Commons, the Senate, and the legislature of every province, and that they all be passed. Quebec will not impede this process. If the province is to become sovereign, the only way to do so constitutionally is by making these amendments. But the negotiations will be continuing until (and after) the separation, and the Quebec government might be tempted to obstruct Canada’s reconstitution in order to win concessions on other issues, delaying the separation until it gains better terms. Or it might seek modifications in the amendment package, aiming perhaps to constitutionalize some treaties or joint decision-making structures. However, because the process will have proceeded so far, the threat of obstruction would be an empty one. The entire momentum on the Canadian side will be towards accepting secession, negotiating arrangements in the national interest, and collectively setting up the framework of a country. Since there will be much resentment towards Quebec for having forced these events, there would be very little support for a Canadian government that did not meet the threat of obstruction with firm determination. So

Canada would counter with threats of its own — to effect a nonconstitutional separation or one based on the general amending formula. If this were subsequently found to be illegal (by Canadian courts), it would be too late for Quebec. In any case, since the constitutional amendment package was being designed for the continuity of Canada, there would be no international sympathy for a Quebec government that delayed this to win substantive concessions. Moreover, after a UDI, even a forced one, Quebec’s status as a successor state to treaties would be doubtful.

217 The Rest of the Separation

Of course, there will be a bitter fight in Quebec and in the National Assembly as federalists engage in the final battle to stop the separation. But if the secession process has unfolded as described here, and

if the economic situation is relatively stable, fighting the constitutional amendment will be to resist a fait accompli.

The question of the other provinces is much more pressing and delicate. Constitutional amendments will be debated in a joint Sen-

ate and House of Commons committee of Parliament and also in every provincial legislature. As has been the case in the past, albeit with much protest and little success, they will also be discussed in First Ministers’ Conferences. There will certainly be disagreement about what Canada’s new constitution should contain, and the negotiations with Quebec could spill over into the constitutional arena, with some provincial governments aiming to hold up constitutional change in order to force the Canadian negotiators into certain positions vis-a-vis Quebec. If unanimity is the requirement for recon-

stitution, any provincial government would appear to have tremendous leverage. Paradoxically, however, the unanimity requirement will make rapid passage of the constitutional changes more probable than would be the case if the consent of only seven provinces were required. If only seven were needed, any provincial government could refuse the amendment without bringing the whole reconstitution process to an end. But unanimity raises the stakes enormously, and so it makes consent more likely. Once the secession is taking place, it will acquire a momentum of its own. The whole chain of decisions, agreements, and commitments that makes up the separation process involves not only Canada-Quebec relations but also the future shape of Canada. Yet the internal debate about this will not be intense when the first principles of separation are being negotiated, for strong dissent would weaken the Canadian bargaining hand. Later, a fundamental challenge to the emerging constitution would destroy what the negotiators had accomplished, and the country would be plunged again into uncertainty. As the separation gathers momentum, the main order of business for Canadians will be to eliminate Quebec so that they can regain stability, make collective choices, and secure a national future. If most provincial governments are prepared to do this, others will not stand in the way by obstructing constitutional amendments. Consequently, the necessary amendments will be through all the provincial legislatures by October 1995 at the latest. How could this be? Some provinces have laws requiring extensive consultation or referendums about constitutional amendments. These are normal statutes, though; they cannot bind future legislatures (all of which will be in session during the crisis). Provincial legislators

218 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

can amend laws about constitutional amendments, and participatory exercises can be accelerated. But why should this be done? Inevitably, as the crisis fades and as the results of the negotiations are dis-

cussed, there will be growing dissatisfaction in Canada, and the legitimacy of those managing the process will decline. Disagreement about the future configuration of Canada will become more manifest. So why would the provincial governments in Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Newfoundland — to name only those least likely to be in accord with the process — agree to rapid constitutional amendments? There are three reasons. First, the amendments will be minimal.

Their whole thrust will be to accept and constitutionalize the fact that Quebec is no longer part of the Canadian community. Apart from this, the status quo will obtain. If there are any further amendments,

they will only be such as to make the status quo easier to change; hence, the constitutional proposals will embody continuity and flexibility. Second, it will be clear that a referendum, or more probably an election, will follow passage of the amendments. Canadians will then have an opportunity, free of Quebecers’ participation, to define their collective future; more concretely, the election campaign will allow parties to take competing positions about the agreements with Quebec and about how Canada should be reconstituted. For any prov-

ince to resist the amendments at this point would be to deny the opportunity for the first Canadian elections without Quebec. Third, there will be an enormous sense of urgency and a perception that the stakes are very high: both elements are conducive to successful constitutional change.° Non-passage of the amendments in any province would represent a fundamental break with the rest of Canada. It would probably force a UDI by either Quebec or Canada. The government of the recalcitrant province would have to be prepared to risk the whole federation — or to take its citizens out of Canada, to inflict further economic loss on them, to risk that treaties would no longer apply on its territory, and, following the Quebec precedent, to assume a share of the national debt proportional to its population. This is improbable. Canadian solidarity will have been heightened in the first phases of the secession process, and in no province will there have been time to establish a consensus in favour of an independent, non-Canadian alternative, either provincial or regional. The amendments will therefore pass through the provincial legislatures. Apart from the provinces, there are two other groups that will make claims about the constitutionality of the secession. These are the fed-

eralists in Quebec, particularly the anglophone minority, and the Aboriginal peoples. The Protestant minority in Quebec, as dissen-

219 The Rest of the Separation

tient school supporters, possesses educational rights under section 93 of CA1867 (as do Roman Catholics in Ontario), along with the right to appeal provincial legislation affecting them to the federal government and to have remedial federal legislation if necessary. The

existing Canadian constitution also guarantees the right to use English in the Quebec legislature and courts, and to be served by the federal government in English. Native peoples have rights under treaties with the crown in right of Canada, and they may have aclaim to

retain federal authority over themselves because they now fall under federal jurisdiction. Under recent court decisions, Ottawa also has a general fiduciary responsibility for Aboriginal peoples. These matters involve the morality of the separation; more precisely, the morality of Canada surrendering authority over citizens who wish to continue to be members of the polity.’ As well, there is the issue of whether these people have a right to participate in an amendment process that will result in Canada abandoning its authority over them and obligations to them. Morality will be a concern in the separation process. After a Yes vote, however, if secession is to occur peacefully, the moral question will be not whether Canada

can abandon these people, but whether Quebec is providing an adequate framework of rights for them; and if secession is to occur constitutionally, the legal question will be whether any claims on Canada

can be constitutionally extinguished so that Canada will have no specific obligations to people living within Quebec’s territory. There are no legal grounds to prevent the constitutional secession of Quebec.® The Constitution Acts contain no provision that the federation is immutable, indestructible, or indissoluble; hence, there is nothing to prohibit a constitutional amendment that arranges for the secession of part of the country.’ As well, there is no right for citizens

to insist, under the Charter, that some order of government must protect their rights.’° The dissentient schools arrangement, for example, was part of the historic compromise made in 1867, and when that compromise ends there will be no grounds to appeal to Ottawa, even assuming that Quebec would not be prepared to continue a system at least as generous. More generally, there is no existing constitutional provision that limits what amendments can be made: in law, any duty or obligation of the federal government can be revoked." This still leaves the issue of procedure, which involves the Aboriginal

peoples’ participation in the amendment process. The First Nations in Quebec have no general legal entitlement to retain federal jurisdiction over themselves. But, in fact, do First Nations have a special right to participate in making constitutional amendments that affect them, and do they have a right of veto over such amendments?

220 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

Section 35.1 of CA1982 commits the federal and provincial governments to the principle that the prime minister will convene a con-

stitutional conference with the provincial premiers and that representatives of the Aboriginal peoples “will” be invited to participate in discussions when amendments are contemplated to section 91(24) of CA1867 or sections 25 and 35 of CA1982. The first of these makes “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” a matter

of federal jurisdiction; the second protects Aboriginal rights from abrogation or derogation by the Charter; and the last recognizes and affirms “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights” of Native peoples. This would seem to imply that Aboriginal peoples must play a special role in the amendment process. But the reconstitution of Canada

need not involve any change whatsoever to the specified sections, which will continue to define the division of powers in Canada as it will come to exist, and thus there may be no constitutional obligation to consult with Aboriginal representatives. Moreover, the phrasing

commits the Canadian government only to the “principle” of the conference and to Aboriginal participation, and this may not be legally enforceable. Even were a conference held, as it will be, there is no implication that Native peoples’ views about the amendment must prevail.

Beyond these legalities is the general fiduciary responsibility of the crown to Native peoples. The government’s actions towards them are reviewable by the courts, and in the Sparrow case the Supreme Court set out conditions to be satisfied when the crown acts as “trustee” for Native peoples, including the requirement to consult the Aboriginal groups affected by the crown’s actions.” But the fiduciary relationship, by its nature, does not oblige the crown to act in accord with

Aboriginal peoples’ views. It does appear, though, that there is an obligation to ascertain these views, and this will require consultation.» Finally, there may exist a constitutional convention that Native peoples participate in constitutional discussions affecting them and that they have a veto over relevant amendments. This may have been established by the four conferences in the 1980s devoted to Aboriginal rights and by the participation of Aboriginal leaders in the 1992 constitutional negotiations. Moreover, the Charlottetown Accord provided that amendments affecting one or more of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples would be made only if these amendments had received their “substantial consent,” and this would buttress the convention. On the other hand, since the Accord did not pass, the strict constitutional requirement for consent is not in place. Beyond this, discerning consent in such disparate groups is not simple, and governments may not believe themselves bound by the conventional “rule” in any

221 The Rest of the Separation

case. Constitutional conventions are enforceable not by the courts but, ultimately, by public opinion and the political process. There will be considerable sympathy in Canada for Quebec’s Aboriginals, but not enough to derail the entire secession.’ The result is that there will be consultation with Aboriginals. They

will be incorporated into the Joint Committee on Canada-Quebec Separation, and their leaders will be invited to a formal First Ministers’ Conference. But the necessary amendments to the constitution can be made without the consent of Aboriginal peoples. As discussed earlier, however, the separation process would be considerably eased if the Quebec constitution contained clauses identical to sections 25 and 35 of CA1982, along with provisions about consultation and consent in future constitutional changes; in fact, Quebec will do far more than this to extend constitutional guarantees of self-government to

its Aboriginal peoples.

If the constitutional proposals are passed by late September or early October, a Canadian election can be held in November. Or a referen-

dum could be held. In the view of many observers, constitutional change can no longer be accomplished in Canada without this device, “at least for any significant package of constitutional proposals.” A referendum on the constitutional amendments, or on them and the principle of separation and the agreements with Quebec, would

very likely carry right across the country. It would seal the process with popular approval. Thus, depending on the public’s mood, the federal government might opt to hold one. On the other hand, referendum campaigns are unpredictable, and some question might fail to carry in some province, despite the enormous stakes involved. Given these high stakes, both federal and provincial politicians might well argue that an election is necessary in any event, that it will allow fuller debate, that the separation is inevitable, and that the constitutional changes are minimal departures. Thus, the referendum might be avoided. An election raises one more constitutional difficulty. If the entire package of amendments is passed, the separation will take effect when the governor general issues the proclamation. This would be premature, since the new Canadian constitution is to come into effect, along

with Quebec’s sovereign constitution, at midnight of 31 December 1995. Moreover, if the constitutional changes were made irrevocably,

the election debates would be artificial. On the other hand, if the amendments had not actually been made, the Canadian election could not be held constitutionally in ROC alone. There are two ways around this difficulty. One is to insert a new section in the constitution stating that it will become effective only on 1 January 1996, except for those amendments necessary to hold an election in Canada as it will

222 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

then be constituted (and the relevent sections could be specified or not). Another method, less constraining of the election debate, would be for the House of Commons to pass the entire package except for one section that does not affect the election. This could be an important section, perhaps the amending formula itself if it had become the focus of discord, or perhaps section 4 of CA1867: “Unless it is otherwise expressed or implied, the Name Canada shall be taken to mean Canada as constituted under this Act.” Then, in order to accomplish the secession and reconstitute Canada, the newly elected House of Commons would have to pass this final section. Assuming that this occurs, the governor general will proclaim the new Canadian constitution effective 1 January 1996. Quebec will follow the same process. And the separation will have been done constitutionally. THERE WILL BE NO OTHER SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN EITHER STATE

After the Quebec referendum, Canadians will experience a high degree of uncertainty, and they will begin a painful process of adjustment. Rather than relations with Quebec, what will soon preoccupy them most will be the make-up of Canada itself. Between the election of the PQ government and the referendum, the options open to

Canada will have been canvassed and debated at great length by think-tanks, academics in conferences, and the media. Depending on the strategies that political parties and governments adopt, and the degree of polarization that obtains, the debate will have extended into political parties and perhaps, in some provinces, into official bodies

such as task forces and legislative committees. Despite the array of alternatives that will have been assessed, after the event Canada will have a constitution that resembles the current one very closely. This conclusion is supported by comparative experience, though it flies in the face of some Canadian commentary. Focusing on Ontario’s predominance in federal institutions, for example, Roger Gibbins has claimed that “it would be naive to assume that Quebec could be plucked out of the existing system and that the federal arrangements now in place would remain more or less intact.”’® He suggests a num-

ber of potential reforms, including strict representation by population in the House of Commons, a reformed Senate to express regional

interests (as well as gender and ethnic differences), and an elected prime minister or president to “knit together” a disparate country: “If one thing is certain, it is that the institutional and constitutional status quo could not hold.””

223 The Rest of the Separation

But it will hold, for the most part. There are several reasons why. Post-separation constitutional arrangements will depend critically on how the transition actually takes place. In the immediate aftermath of the Yes vote, Canadians’ uncertainty will produce support

for stabilizing measures, not only in relation to Quebec and the economy but also with respect to the make-up of Canada. Just as Quebec will have an incentive to adopt a constitution with few alterations from the status quo, in order to reassure citizens and gain international credibility, so in Canada will there be pressure to make the immediate adjustments required to cope with the secession and

then quickly to find a new equilibrium. While there will be strong advocates of more profound constitutional changes, such as rearranging borders, abolishing the Senate, altering the distribution of powers, or inscribing new rights in the Charter, there will be no consensus on these proposals and little time to forge one. More important, no such change will be necessary, in the sense that excising Quebec from Canada will be regarded as absolutely essential: upon this, consensus will be reached easily. Nor is there any urgency to make some of the amendments that are likely to be proposed. They can be debated and adopted later, by the new Canadian community. After Quebec

has separated, the source of much constitutional stalemate will be eliminated, and appropriate amendments can be made when this has happened and the situation has become stable. It will not yet have been demonstrated that the current constitution cannot work for ROC; and as the proposed alterations would be untried, their effects could

not be predicted, and there would be little support for introducing yet more uncertainty into an unstable economic and political environment. Citizens, firms, and governments will face enough transition costs without having to discover and accommodate themselves to a new constitutional order. As well, the argument will be made that Canadian governments would remain free to make policy changes

without formal constitutional amendments. Given these reasons, and the transition process as described above, the main principles guiding the reconstitution of Canada will be simple. First, it will be an autonomous process in which Quebec rep-

resentatives will not participate, except to pass the amendments through the National Assembly. Second, the basic goal will be to eliminate Quebec entirely from the constitutional order. Canada will have

its own constitution in which there will be no reference to Quebec. Third, the minimal amendments necessary to accomplish this will be passed; there will be no sweeping institutional redesign. Finally, insofar as amendments will be made that do not involve Quebec, or when Quebec’s excision dictates that some choice will be made, the thrust of the changes will be towards maintaining flexibility. Cana-

224 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

dian governments and citizens will prefer to keep open their constitutional options once the immediate task is completed. Constitutional amendment will therefore be a process that starts from the status quo rather than de novo. This, despite the fact that analysts and advocates from both the left and right wings of the political spectrum have argued for a constitutional or constituent assembly that would throw open the whole constitution and allow for radical change to Canada’s institutions."* There will not be a constituent assembly. There is no procedure to set one up. And not only will the politicians and governments in power manage the process, but they will have popular support in doing so, given the anxieties of the time and the urgent need to accomplish the separation. So the existing Constitution Acts will form the baseline for change. Many provisions of the Constitution Acts lend themselves to a simple deletion of Quebec. This will be necessary to remove Canada’s power over Quebec — in the area of taxation, for example — and to remove claims of Quebecers upon Canada. When Quebec is no longer a “province,” for instance, it will lose the right, under section 121 of CA1867, to have its products “admitted free into each of the other provinces.” Deleting Quebec involves rewriting history. Section 5 of CA1867, for

example, defines the core entity that other provinces later joined; it will simply be rewritten to state that “Canada shall be divided into Three Provinces, named Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.” Other parts of the constitution refer only to Quebec, such as sections 71-80 of CA1867, which provide the legal underpinnings of the Quebec legislature; they can be eliminated. Simple deletions of references to Quebec and of provisions exclusively about Quebec can easily be made in twenty-five sections of CA1867 and one section of CA1982.

In fact, it is surprising how little excision is required to eliminate Quebec from the constitution. In other areas, it will be necessary to preserve continuity. The original

British North America Act which brought Canada into being divided “Canada” as it then existed into Ontario and Quebec. Many of the provisions of CA1867 were thus concerned with effecting the transformation of “Canada” into the two new provinces. Some of these

provisions are spent and can be repealed, and others can be safely deleted; but before references to Lower Canada and Quebec are eliminated from a few other sections, they will require either a new interpretive clause or some phrasing that allows for judicial discretion, in order to preserve continuity and prevent a vacuum of law. Another issue to be resolved concerns assets. Section 113 of CA1867 conferred the assets of the former Canada upon the new provinces of Ontario and Quebec conjointly. Most of these assets have probably

225 The Rest of the Separation

been divided, so the section can be eliminated. But section 108 transfers certain public works and property “of each Province” to the fed-

eral government. If a suitable agreement on the division of assets has been reached with Quebec, this section can stand unchanged, since other amendments will redefine “Province” so as not to include Quebec. A more difficult issue concerns the language rights enshrined in the existing constitution. There is a case to be made for maintaining these unchanged, because Quebec francophones will be able to remain Canadian citizens for two years — and longer, if they so choose — and because of the substantial francophone populations in New

Brunswick and Ontario. But these rights are unsustainable. Minority-language education rights have provoked much resentment among anglophone taxpayers and recent immigrants in Ontario and throughout the West. More important, the Yes vote will have destroyed two symbolic conceptions of Canada, views that have been in com-

petition but that have both sustained these rights. First, secession will end any remaining conception of Canada as essentially dualistic, as a partnership of two founding communities. Second, it will terminate the liberal conception that language rights inhere in individuals, who should be able to exercise them anywhere in the country, for there will not be enough francophone individuals in Canada _ to justify special treatment.’? People who speak “non-official” languages at home greatly outnumber French-speaking Canadians in every province except Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the disproportion is much larger where “mother tongue” is concerned. As a consequence, section 133 of CA1867 will be deleted, and so will sections 93(3), 93(4), and the parts of 93(2) that refer to Quebec. Alternatively, the whole of section 93 could be deleted, along with references to separate schools in the Acts and Orders-in-Council admitting the various other provinces to the federation; then amendments

to maintain francophone schools - in Prince Edward Island and Ontario, for example — could be made under section 43. In CA1982, sections 16-23 will be eliminated, except for those subsections concerning the use and status of English and French in New Brunswick. New Brunswick’s francophone majority is so large that the province would be ungovernable without linguistic guarantees. It is also pos-

sible that the Government of Ontario would entrench similar rights for the province’s francophone minority, but since this could be done at any time under section 43, it need not take place during this amend-

ment process. The result of these changes is that Canada will have no official language. Customary use will prevail.

226 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

Other changes will be even more contentious. One concerns representation. The provision in the Supreme Court Act guaranteeing three

Quebec judges will be eliminated, and it is unlikely that any other regional qualifications will be inserted. More important is the Senate. The minimalist approach is simply to shrink it. Hence, section 22 of CA1867 will be amended so that it simply specifies that there will be three divisions of the Senate and there is no mention of Quebec and its twenty-four senators. Section 21 will state that the Senate will consist of eighty members.” Table 4 lays out the new distribution of Senate seats by province, along with the existing distribution. It is worth noting, first, that the underlying disproportion between seats and populations will remain unchanged. Nova Scotia now has 1.12 Senate seats per 100,000 citizens while Ontario has 0.25, and this will continue. Second, all provinces will increase their relative weight in the Senate by the same proportion — about 30 per cent. What will change are the relative weights of provinces and regions. The Atlantic provinces will move from 28.8 per cent of the votes to 37.5 per cent, and the West (including the territories), will move from 25 per cent to 32.5 per cent. Ontario’s relative weight will also increase, to 30 per cent. This result will not prove popular in the West, where there is much support for an equal, elected, and effective Senate. However, one criticism of the current distribution is that the Senate does not adequately represent the regions outside central Canada, and this will be rectified to some extent; with Quebec eliminated, central Canadian seats will fall from 46.2 to 30 per cent. Second, there is nothing in the constitution to prevent Senators from being elected; the governor general has the power to summon any “fit and qualified” person to the chamber, and one such summons has already been extended to the winner of an election (though this was in anticipation of the Meech Lake Accord being passed). As well, the existing legislative powers of the Senate are fully equivalent to those of the House of Commons,

except that money bills must be introduced in the House. Finally, there is no evidence that Senators actually vote en bloc according to their province of origin. There has been no systematic analysis of Senate voting patterns, but in the crucial vote over the second set of constitutional proposals in December 1981, for example, the 23 Nays included members from every province except Manitoba and the territories, and the major cleavage was along party lines. One keen observer has argued that a triple-E Senate would be likely to vote on party lines; as such, it would be an “institution of little value.””! Another, from the West, rejects a triple-E Senate as “inherently centralizing” and prefers an expansion of provincial jurisdiction instead.”

227 The Rest of the Separation Table 4

Distribution of Senate Seats: Current and Excluding Quebec

Current Excluding Quebec Seats Percentage Seats Percentage

Newfoundland 6 5.8 647.5 Prince Edward Island 4 3.8 5.0 Nova Scotia 10 9.6 10 12.5 New Brunswick 10 9.6 10 12.5

Quebec 24 23.1 -Ontario 24 23.1 24 30.0 Manitoba 6 5.8 667.5 Saskatchewan 6 5.8 7.5 Alberta 6 5.8 6 7.5 British Columbia 6 5.8 6 7.9

Yukon/Northwest Territories 2 1.9 2 2.5

Totals 104 100.1 80 100.0

Note: The figures do not change significantly when provision is made for the extraordinary allocation of eight extra senators (currently) or six extra (in the new configuration)

These arguments and others will be heard in the reconstitution debate. But if there is a consensus to eliminate Quebec but no consensus on Senate reform, the minimally changed status quo will prevail.” Representation in the House of Commons raises similar issues in more acute form. Following the principle of minimal modification, the constitution will be amended to eliminate Quebec’s 75 members, and section 37 of CA1867 will specify that the House consist of 220 members. The formula for allocating seats among the provinces is contained in section 51, which was last amended by the Representation Act, 1985; there is no need to alter this, since the formula is no longer based on the Quebec seats. Once more, it is instructive to examine the new distribution of seats by province.” As table 5 shows, all provinces will increase their strength

in the House of Commons by roughly the same amount (32-38 per cent), but the relative power of provincial and regional blocs will change substantially. Ontario will come close to commanding a clear majority in the House, with 45.0 percent of the members; the weight of the Atlantic provinces will increase from 10.8 to 14.5 per cent; and |

the West, including the territories, will come to hold 40.5 per cent rather than 30.2 per cent. Again, under the assumption that central Canada is anow dominant bloc, its weight without Quebec will fall from 59 to 45 per cent.

228 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

Still, for the West, the make-up of the House of Commons will be seen as cause for apprehension, with respect to both policy and future constitutional change. On normal legislation, Ontario members will almost have the capacity to secure changes they desire and to block those they oppose. On the other hand, representation by population is a basic principle in democratic communities and is defensible as such. Moreover, Ontario’s dominance will be offset by the composition of the Senate. More practically, divisions in the House are along party lines rather than provincial ones. And pragmatically, the Reform Party, which is most inclined to champion western interests, might sense itself poised for a breakthrough in Ontario in the first election to be held without Quebec, so it might not oppose the new House of Commons. Nevertheless, it is the provincial governments that will have to agree to these constitutional amendments, and the threat of Ontario dominance in the Commons might be severe enough to force amendments to the Senate’s composition so that

provincial equality would prevail there. | A closely related issue concerns the amending formulae. The general formula need not be redrafted, but Quebec’s absence will have consequences. Currently, the general formula requires that Ottawa and seven provinces with 50 per cent of the population must approve

an amendment for it to pass; without Quebec, amendments would require the assent of Ottawa and six of the nine provinces having 50 per cent of the population. So the “blocking coalitions” would change. This is a term used by political scientists who have devised intricate

measures of the power of provinces and their citizens in constitutional amendment processes.” What often counts here are the coalitions capable of blocking amendments. Under the current general formula, the blocking coalitions are: 1 the federal Parliament, 2 any four provinces, 3 Ontario and Quebec, 4 Ontario and British Columbia and any province other than Prince Edward Island, and 5 Ontario and Alberta and Manitoba.”®

With Quebec out of the constitution, the blocking coalitions under the general formula would be: 1 the federal Parliament, 2 any four provinces, and 3 Ontario and any province other than Prince Edward Island.

229 The Rest of the Separation Table 5

Distribution of House of Commons Seats: Current and Excluding Quebec

Current Excluding Quebec Seats Percentage Seats — Percentage

Newfoundland 7 2.4 743.2 Prince Edward Island 4 1.4 1.8 Nova Scotia 11 3.7 11 5.0 New Brunswick 10 3.4 10 4.5

Quebec 25.4 -Ontario 9975 33.6 99 45.0

Manitoba 14144.7 14 6.4 Saskatchewan 4.7 14 6.4 Alberta 26 8.8 26 11.8 British Columbia 32 10.8 32 14.5 Yukon/Northwest Territories 3 1.0 3 1.4

Totals 295 99.9 220 100.0

Ontario’s capacity to block amendments, both as a province and through its members in the House of Commons, would increase substantially. (The Senate is less relevant because the seat distribution by province is more equal and the upper chamber can block amendments for only 180 days.) Because of the 50 per cent population requirement, the governments of Ontario and any other province except Prince Edward Island could defeat any amendment under the general formula, such as proposals to establish an elected Senate, to in-

clude property rights in the Charter, or to decentralize powers. Similarly, on the dubious assumption that members of Parliament vote as a bloc on constitutional amendments, Ontario MPs would need to find only ten other members in order to prevent passage of an amendment. For amendments that it proposed, the Ontario government would need to recruit among the provinces only five of eight potential allies (62.5 per cent) rather than six of nine (66.7 per cent),

and its MPs alone would almost suffice to pass them through the House of Commons. In theory, based on 1992 population figures, amendments could be passed against the wishes of provincial governments representing 34.0 per cent of the population (British Columbia, Alberta, and Manitoba). But this is the case now! In fact, the blocking power of the peripheral provinces would be much increased in the new House of Commons. On proposed amendments favourable to “central Canada,” they would have 70 per cent of the Senate and 55 per cent of the House, rather than the 54 per cent and 41 per cent

230 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

that they now control. Indeed, Ontario could be stymied in the new system, and it could easily be overwhelmed if the other provinces combined against it. Still, given its position in the House of Commons, Ontario’s power would be regarded as threatening. There are two solutions. One is to increase the veto capacity of provinces other than Ontario. This could

be accomplished by eliminating section 47 of CA1982, thereby allowing the Senate to block amendments permanently, or by amending it to provide that Senate vetoes could be overridden only by a two-thirds House majority, rather than a simple majority. The second solution is to change the formula by raising the population level

required under section 38 of CA1982 from 50 per cent to, say, two-thirds. This would enable Alberta and British Columbia, along with either Manitoba or Saskatchewan, to block amendments. But both of these devices would reduce constitutional flexibility at a time when Canada’s rapid evolution will require the capacity to adjust. The more probable solution will be to make amendments easier to accomplish. One device would be to include in the constitution provisions allowing for the interdelegation of powers and for cooperative federal-provincial contracts, as envisaged by the Beaudoin-Dobbie

Committee, and also to expand the areas of concurrent jurisdiction, where both Ottawa and the provinces can legislate.” Another would

be to reduce the population requirement in the general amending formula so as to remove Ontario’s near-veto. Amendments might require the assent of two-thirds of the provinces with 40 per cent of the population. In this case, to block an amendment, the Ontario government would have to ally with Alberta, with British Columbia, or with Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Of course, Ontario would still have

the power (if its MPs voted as a bloc) to stop amendments in the House of Commons by finding only a few allies. But Ontario could not impose its will without recruiting five other provincial governments. The amending formula issue is a critical and complex one. Its outcome will depend on the provincial premiers and their reading of public sentiment, especially in the West. If normal provincial procedures for ratifying proposed amendments are to be compressed or ignored in order to reconstitute the country quickly, then there certainly will be some extra resistance to a status quo constitution; and if suspicion of Ontario begins to match pro-Canadian solidarity as the immediate crisis fades, then the minimally changed status quo will not prevail. But it can be presumed that the Ontario government

will be accommodating, as in the past. The result will be that the amending formula will be changed to provide greater flexibility; as

231 The Rest of the Separation

well, there may be a consensus that the provinces should have equal representation in the Senate. Of course, changing the amending formula will definitely require unanimity among the provincial governments. At the same time as Canada is reconstituting itself, Quebec will be finalizing its constitution. There need be no coordination of these processes, nor will the substance of the constitutions be interrelated. The only requirements are that both become effective at the same time and that Quebec’s National Assembly pass the Canadian amendment package. The Quebec drafters will face a more difficult task than their Canadian counterparts, for they will have to design a whole new constitution, rather than simply making minimal changes like the Canadians.

There will be many tough issues for Quebecers to face, including whether to establish an upper chamber, how much to decentralize, how to make constitutional amendments, and what rights to inscribe in the document. Based on comparative experience, Quebecers will make as few changes as possible to the existing order. This raises again one issue of mutual interest - the Quebec head of state. It is widely presumed that Quebec will become a republic by stipulating in the constitution a method of selecting a president or other head of state. But there are good reasons for not doing so. Anew system would be untried and unpredictable in its effects, while retaining the monarchy would be a statement of continuity. As noted above, members of the military have sworn an oath to the crown. Equally significant

is the fact that early treaties made by Native peoples were agreements with the crown. As the courts have firmly decided, these rights and obligations have passed to the crown in right of Canada, and it would be much more difficult for the Aboriginals in Quebec to contest in the courts the transfer to Quebec of historic treaty rights and Canadian fiduciary responsibilities if these too pass to the crown in right of Quebec. As a consequence, it is quite possible that Quebec will continue as a constitutional monarchy, at least for some time. POLICIES IN THE TWO STATES WILL SOON BEGIN TO DIVERGE

As in any secession, policy divergence will result from the different social and economic forces bearing on politics in the two states, as well as the impact of the transition to sovereignty. The foreign policies of Quebec and Canada should not diverge much. For both, the principal preoccupation will be the United States and the hemisphere as a whole. Quebec’s military role will be muted for some time, but

232 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

the government will have to engage in a substantial diplomatic effort to forge treaties akin to the Canadian ones that no longer apply to the new country. Undoubtedly, Quebec will tilt towards France and La francophonie, while Canada’s orientation towards the Pacific Rim will become more developed. All of this need produce no discord between the two states. Domestically, there will be divergence in the treatment of minorities. Francophone privileges outside Quebec will be curtailed, ex-

cept in New Brunswick. Within Quebec, the treatment of the anglophone minority will very likely improve as Quebecers finally feel secure about their linguistic future and as the government seeks to retain skilled labour and capital. On the other hand, relations between Quebec and its Aboriginal population will be tense. Although programs and funding will be plentiful, negotiating self-government _ agreements will be very difficult: any sovereign Quebec government would be loath to reach the type of generous land-claims agreement that will continue to be made in Canada, or to accept an unconstrained Aboriginal right to self-government. There will be some continuing disagreements between Canada and

Quebec. These can be anticipated about the division of certain assets, the location of the maritime boundaries, environmental spillovers,

the fisheries, labour mobility, access from the Atlantic provinces through Quebec, and many other matters. Even so, there is no reason to expect such disputes to be so acrimonious that the governments will abrogate treaties. Some of the treaties will lapse, however. The immigration agreement will not long endure the different external and economic orientations of the two states. This alone would necessitate border controls, but they will go up in any case. While both countries will continue to adhere to NAFTA and the FTA, the customs union will not survive

beyond the next round of multilateral trade negotiations, in which Quebec will be a free agent. This means that commerce between the two countries will be encumbered by rules-of-origin requirements and other border measures. It is in economic policy that the policies of the two countries will diverge most, because their overall stances towards the role of the

state will inevitably differ. At the very least, there will be noncoincidental oscillations between dirigisme and laissez-faire in Canada and Quebec. This will pit state spending, economic regulation, and comprehensive social policies against restraint, deregulation, and targeted welfare programs. Initially, Canada will probably move towards the right, while the Quebec government will have a more interventionist philosophy. Voluntary harmonization will erode

233 The Rest of the Separation

over time, therefore, and there will be less cooperation in measures of positive economic integration. Beyond this predictable outcome will be the ideological difficulties of Quebec governments. Currently, the PQ melds a confident, business-oriented wing (which is interested in trade liberalization, competition, and supportive state policies) with a more traditional wing, based in the trade unions and social movements (which favours national solidarity and redistributive policies). To some extent this cleavage coincides with the regional division between Montreal and the periphery. With the national question finally settled, these divisions will continue to be submerged in the short term, as sovereigntist Quebecers, at least, make sacrifices to achieve the collective benefits of independence. Before long, however, differences will emerge about how best to generate in the long term the economic growth that benefits all. There is no evidence to show that easy solutions exist to this basic problem. Politically, the PQ will be unable to abandon the right wing to the opposition — assuming that the provincial Liberals have regrouped around the pro-business end of this dimension — which

means that after the rigours of the transition, if not during them, Quebec’s economic landscape will be punctuated with labour and social unrest. Even if the political system finds equilibrium in a stable

two-party arrangement, as will probably be the case in Canada, the governmental cycles in the two countries will be unlikely to coincide. At the very least, the two governments will have different responses to external economic shocks. Since economic interdependence will decline after the separation, the effects of this divergence in economic policy will become less serious over time; they will, however,

contribute independently to declining interdependence. It is also possible that conflicting orientations will fracture the currency agreement. In this case, Quebec could adopt the U.S. dollar; alternatively, having passed through the major adjustments of the transition, it could

more safely introduce an independent, floating currency. As for Canada, the threat posed by either of these alternatives will have been much reduced by a successful transition and new economic stability. Ending joint management of monetary policy would not threaten the viability of an independent, floating Canadian currency.

In sum, the two states will tend to drift apart on various policy fronts. This tendency will be moderated by their continuing integration into the North American, hemispheric, and world trading and security systems, and by a few enduring agreements between them. But in the absence of common political institutions, and within the range permitted by outside forces, policy in the two states will evolve independently.

234 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession QUEBEC SECESSION WILL BE IRREVOCABLE

After the tension of the immediate post-referendum period, the redrafting of the Canadian constitution, the writing of Quebec’s, the difficult negotiations, the signing of international treaties, the creation of barriers to mobility, the formal dissolution of the existing community and the end of redistribution, the transformation of the party systems, and the gradual development of different policy environments, it is inconceivable that Quebec and Canada would reunite. The process of peaceful secession has a momentum that has never been reversed and that will not be reversed in this case.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Reprise: Secession with Polarization

The depiction of Quebec secession presented above rests on a large number of assumptions. These are too numerous to list, but some of the most critical ones are the following: ¢ Before the referendum, there is no official, public contingency planning by Canada and no negotiations with the sovereigntists. e The referendum result is close and unpredictable. e There is a very high level of uncertainty after the Yes result is known; this is economically damaging but not disastrous. e There is a widespread sense of crisis in Canada, and Ottawa takes the lead in handling the situation. As it does so, allegiance, legitimacy, and power flow to the central government. e The Liberal Party is able to continue to govern more or less intact; it neither resigns nor fragments. e National solidarity is maintained in the transition process. In particular, no provincial government is prepared to impede Canada’s reconstitution. ¢ The stance of the United States and other foreign powers is to favour competent, rapid management of the crisis and the re-establishment of stability.

All these assumptions are contestable, of course. Whether they will hold cannot be known unless secession actually takes place. The purpose here is not to justify each of them any further or to relax individual assumptions in order to make variations on the basic scenario.

236 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

The assumptions form a package, based on analysis of Canada, comparative experience, and an historical sense of how the complex dynamics of the separation would play out. Nevertheless, the basic account of the transition to Quebec sovereignty may also rest on a more general assumption about the level of polarization that exists between Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC). By polarization is meant simply the degree of mutual hostility between the communities, and the uniformity and intensity of desires within each community for political separation. Generally, it has been assumed that opinion within each community is divided, with a sub-

stantial majority in ROC favouring the existing order and with a majority in Quebec (probably a narrow one) eventually opting for sovereignty. After the referendum, of course, polarization would increase as a consequence of the crisis and the collective solidarity that the bilateral negotiations would engender. But what if there is much polarization before the referendum takes place? This phenomenon was evident in the Czech-Slovak case. There were political incentives for Meciar and Klaus to foster polarization, because this increased their support, and after the 1992 elections they

were able to use state resources to move public opinion further in favour of separation. On both sides, the leaders induced people to re-evaluate and reinterpret the risks and benefits of profound political change, and opinion in each state consolidated around the view that separation was desirable and inevitable. In Canada, there is considerable potential for polarization. Our purpose here is to explore how this might occur and to assess whether a high degree of polarization could invalidate the assumptions underlying the separation scenario, thereby producing a substantially different outcome. UNDERLYING FACTORS

There are some basic elements of the Canadian landscape that allow for polarization. The first is the economic situation. Continuing high levels of unemployment in Quebec provide openings for sovereigntist politicians to claim that only radical constitutional change can bring improvement. In ROC, it is widely believed that constitutional uncertainty has decreased foreign investors’ confidence in the Canadian economy, causing the value of the Canadian dollar to decline and interest rates to rise. This slows the economic recovery and imposes costs on all debtors, including governments, and the blame for this is laid on the sovereigntist aspirations of Quebecers. The federal and provincial governments’ deficits are another cause of high interest rates, and efforts to correct them have led the governments to run

237 Secession with Polarization

surpluses on operating accounts. One result is that Canadians now are paying more in taxes than they are receiving in services, and this undoubtedly has contributed to both a general disaffection with government and critical scrutiny of redistributive spending. Another consequence has been continuing federal-provincial and interregional conflicts. All provincial governments have condemned Ottawa’s off-loading of responsibilities. Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta have been penalized financially by the federal cap on Canada Assistance Plan payments at the same time as these provinces are the paymasters of the equalization system. These tensions and others make for visible conflict in federal-provincial relations, heightening the public’s perception that the system is fragile and unfair.

In this context, too, sharp and suspicious attention is paid to the regional or provincial impact of federal expenditures and even regulatory measures such as pharmaceutical patent protection. It is common

to hear in Ontario, for example, that Ottawa funds 50 per cent of welfare costs in Quebec but only 30 per cent in Ontario. Regional economic differences coincide to some extent with an ideological cleavage about the role of the central government and governments in general. In some quarters, the view persists that Ottawa

is a creative force, capable of improving the economy, promoting necessary change, maintaining the social safety net for all Canadians while providing special programs for those who need them, and acting as trustee of the sharing community within which redistribution occurs. This confronts a view that big government is itself a major problem, that federal programs are often wasteful and dysfunctional, that individuals, groups, and provinces are fundamentally equal and should receive no special treatment, and that redistribution is excessive, at least until fiscal balance is restored. These ideological currents were evident during the public debates about the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords, and some of their conflicting elements provide scope for polarization.’ Finally, there is constitutional fatigue. In Quebec, most citizens may

be fundamentally ambiguous about their political identity and national allegiance, but the sovereigntists are not, and they want the past three decades of constitutional discussion to culminate, at long last, in an independent Quebec. Since no offers for constitutional change will be forthcoming from the federal Liberal government, the Parti québécois administration will settle the issue by forcing Quebecers to choose between the status quo and sovereignty. And a strong current of opinion in ROC wants just that. There is much support for “closure”— for settling the interminable, frustrating, and costly constitutional wrangling “once and for all.” As Jeffrey Simpson put it,

238 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

“The rest of the country, having rebuffed Meech Lake and Charlottetown, is insisting that Quebec take the current constitutional arrangements and put them to the test in the confrontation with secession.”? All of these conditions provide some opportunity for polarization. They establish incentives for political actors, and some will respond. THE ACTORS AND THE STRATEGIES

The Parti québécois has the strongest incentive to deepen divisions between Quebecers and other Canadians, and as the governing party it will have abundant resources to do so. For many in the organization, this term of government is the last chance to realize the goal that has animated their political lives. There can be little doubt that the party leadership will be determined enough to use the state instruments at its disposal in order to increase support for sovereignty. It will aim to polarize. In fact, it must do so: poll results consistently show that a majority of Quebecers would not choose sovereignty in a referendum. In a 1980-style referendum, in which people in the rest of Canada would be little involved except as concerned spectators and in which the debate, while heated, would be among Quebecers, it is most unlikely that the PQ’s option would carry. The 1994 vote for the PQ was not high enough to create a sense of momentum

towards an inevitable sovereignty, and polarization is therefore the sovereigntists’ main hope. What is needed are measures that do not seem unreasonable to a majority of Quebecers but are highly provocative to other Canadians. The hostile reactions that such measures elicit will make Quebecers feel insulted, frustrated, anxious, and insecure in the federation, and they will be more likely to vote for secession. Hence, the PQ will act as a gouvernement provocateur. This strategy requires great delicacy. It could backfire if Quebecers see particular initiatives as unjustified or unfair and if they lose trust

in the PQ government. But there are many tactics available for antagonizing Canada while consolidating domestic opinion behind the sovereignty option. Some are primarily symbolic, others are economically disruptive or threatening to Canada, and a third group involves putting in place what Vaclav Havel called “structures” — measures

that actually lay the groundwork for sovereignty, while making it seem more reasonable and probable. It is no surprise that Mr Parizeau has formed his government around a small, coherent, and dedicated inner cabinet, capable of strategic planning, while abolishing all other

cabinet committees and harnessing a number of backbenchers by making them regional delegates.* An extensive set of special National

239 Secession with Polarization

Assembly committees will probably keep many other backbenchers

active and involved as the core group assumes “la responsabilité d’enclencher le processus devant mener a la souveraineté.”* A first symbolic initiative of the PO government could be to introduce in the National Assembly a resolution affirming Quebec’s right to self-determination. In itself, this language would not be unprecedented, for the assembly used such terminology in the preambles

to various Acts under the former PQ government, and so did the Liberals in Bill 150. But a new resolution could go much further and

be more explicit. It could specify that a simple majority vote in a referendum would be taken as a definitive expression of Quebecers’ choice to secede, that Quebec’s borders are inviolable and will remain intact if the province secedes, and that sovereignty will be attained peacefully and constitutionally. Such a motion would place the provincial Liberals in an awkward position. They could abstain from voting on a resolution which presumed that sovereignty would occur; on the other hand, they might have to support it, simply because of their historical position about self-determination and because of the consensus in the electorate about Quebecers’ right to secede with their territory. Such a motion in itself would be highly

provocative in ROC, because it would be seen as an attempt to pre-empt the ground rules of separation. If the provincial Liberals also supported it, the perception in ROC of the other community as homogeneous would be reinforced, and Quebecers would be regarded as presumptuous — or, in common parlance, “uppity.” Another symbolic move would be to pass a declaration of Quebec’s intent to achieve sovereignty. This would not be legally binding, but it would be very provocative because of doubts that the government had an electoral mandate to proceed with it. Beyond this lies a whole range of actions. The PQ could establish a committee of the National Assembly to study federal operations and expenditures in Quebec. It could establish a committee to study the conditions of francophones outside Quebec and to plan for future relations with them; it also could start to fund these communities. It could make an offer to employ federal public servants and start attracting them from their current posts. It could decrease funding to voluntary associations with pan-Canadian operations and offer incentives to establish Quebec associations. It could restrict minority rights by reversing the recent liberalization of rules about signage in business premises or by tightening controls on access to English schools in the province. The PQ also could open the Aboriginal dossier, either by extending rights and programs superior to those available elsewhere or by constricting Native autonomy in areas such as policing and taxation. Con-

240 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

flicts with Ottawa over land claims and native rights would be highly provocative. Beyond this are economic initiatives. The PQ could en-

courage the Caisse de dépét to reduce investments in non-Quebec firms. Even more sensational would be a government-backed bid to take control of a flagship company such as Canadian Pacific or Bell Canada. Then there is the type of action that would be costly or threatening to Canadians. For instance, the PQ government could seek to impair the functioning of the federation. It has already refused to cooperate in major reforms to the social-policy framework, demanding full control over these areas of jurisdiction and denouncing federal interference.” It could also obstruct joint action in education, fishing, tax reform, the environment, and fiscal arrangements. It could challenge the Canada Health Act. It could systematically employ welfare recipients in order to make them eligible for unemployment insurance. Beyond this, it could break interprovincial agreements, especially about procurement and the construction industry. All of this would be done

with the purpose of demonstrating to the domestic constituency that federalism cannot work in Quebec’s interests, while at the same time increasing frustration in the rest of Canada. As Mr Parizeau has said, “After all, we are not there to make the system operate as smoothly as possible. We are there to get out of the system.” Another sensitive dossier is international. The PQ could establish a National Assembly committee on the foreign relations of a sovereign Quebec. It could invite foreign officials from abroad to address

this topic, and it could certainly hear from foreign experts about Quebec’s probable relations with the United States and the European Union, as well as about its accession to GATT, NAFTA, and the FTA. A very active foreign policy, with official visits and new “embassies,” would provoke Ottawa and irritate English Canadians while advancing the cause of secession. Another set of initiatives would lay the foundations of sovereignty. One obvious move is the creation of a National Assembly committee to prepare the constitution of a sovereign Quebec. At first, this committee might only explore options, but its debates and hearings could

be well publicized, with wide consultations, plenty of expert witnesses, and appearances by English Canadians and foreigners. The drafting of a constitution could deepen the sense that secession is inevitable. More concretely, the government could prepare a complete and formal set of negotiating positions for post-secession relations with Canada. These could be made to appear quite reasonable to Quebecers, and the government could demand that negotiations start before the referendum. It would point out that pre-referendum

241 Secession with Polarization

talks would serve to clarify the choice for Quebecers, reduce uncertainty, and avoid the costs to both Canada and Quebec of leaving matters unsettled until after the referendum. The National Assembly could vote on these proposals, and it could resolve that negotiations begin immediately. Finally, the PQ could directly challenge Ottawa’s constitutional authority. The ferry that Mr Parizeau has proposed to operate between the Magdalen Islands and the Gaspé is only one example.’ There are other initiatives that would be both popular in Quebec and

obviously unconstitutional. The government could encroach on Ottawa’s authority over telecommunications, especially with respect

to regulating data transmission and licensing radio and television operations. It could build lighthouses. It could even move to establish a militia. All such initiatives would have the same purpose. They would irritate Canadians outside Quebec, provoking hostile reactions from individuals, associations, the media, and perhaps governments. Quebecers would be exposed to this antagonistic reaction and would be pressed either to condemn their own government or to support it in

opposition to the rest of Canada. These measures would place the provincial Liberal Party in the same awkward position. If moderate nationalist support was flowing towards the PQ, the Liberals would be divided and would be less capable of fighting the referendum campaign. Moreover, some of the provocative measures would be constructive, in the sense of providing plans and structures that would prepare for the secession. At the same time, the PQ would be trying to force responses from the federal government. Ottawa would prefer to ignore some measures, waiting for the referendum, but others, especially the obstruction of its own initiatives, would require action. The PQ measures would also be aimed at the parliamentary opposition in Ottawa, especially the Reform Party, and would be designed to provoke its criticism, both directly and because of the Liberals’ inaction. The manifest groundwork for sovereignty being laid by the PQ would show strikingly that ROC had no such plans and preparations, so the pressure to contemplate its collective future would increase substantially. The PQ measures would also diminish ROC’s solidarity if they provoked regional or federal-provincial differences about how to respond to them. In the polarization scenario, the Bloc québécois will face difficult choices. Its members are in Ottawa and in the House of Commons, where there are some incentives to act in a moderate and collegial fashion. As well, there is a weakness in the logic of polarization. At

242 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

the same time as it promotes antagonism in ROC and more cohesiveness and solidarity among Quebecers, it undercuts the long-standing

argument that English Canadians, after secession, would be cooperative and rational, and that the economic costs of separation would therefore be modest.

So Mr Bouchard would focus his party’s attention at the federal level, rather than attempting to defend the Quebec government’s actions. His would be the high road. One thrust would be to emphasize the coherence of ROC, stressing its distinctiveness, common interest, and national character. Mr Bouchard would urge Canadians outside of Quebec to contemplate their collective future, and he would travel extensively for this purpose. Another line of attack would be to press the argument that the federation no longer works either for Quebecers or for other Canadians — that the system is conflict-ridden and inefficient, and the debt cripples the future of all, and that both Canadians and Quebecers have an interest in disentanglement and reform. Hence, the oft-repeated line, “At the core of the economic crisis is a political crisis ... The political problem with Canada is Quebec, and the problem of Quebec is Canada.”* At the same time, by

defending all social programs and protesting any spending cuts in Quebec while condemning as discriminatory any major federal expenditures elsewhere in the country, Mr Bouchard would convince more people in ROC that “Quebec” is indeed the problem.’ The BQ could also resolutely demand that the federal government prepare itself for the secession and that it begin negotiations with Quebec before the referendum takes place. The party would continually ask about the federal position on the debt, citizenship, and all the other issues raised by the separation. In the House of Commons it would keep the pressure directly on the federal Liberals in a way that the Government of Quebec cannot do. Amore critical actor at the federal level would be the Reform Party.

This party needs to regain and maintain momentum.” If the sovereigntist polarization strategy appeared to be successful in Quebec and ROC, then Reform’s temptation would be to focus fully on the Quebec issue, with Preston Manning playing Klaus to Parizeau’s Meciar. In the view of one shrewd observer, Reform has already benefited from polarization, in the 1993 election: “Although neither the Bloc nor Reform ran candidates in each other’s territory, and thus did not confront each other directly, they fed on each other’s growing strength in the polls throughout the campaign. All reports of growing Bloc strength were ammunition for the Reform thesis of the need for a strong uncompromising counter-presence of a take-it-or-leave-it voice from ROC in the House of Commons.””

243 Secession with Polarization

To polarize, Reform would draw attention to the Quebec government’s provocations, making them much more visible, and the party’s interpretation would make them appear more irritating and even dangerous. As well, the party would argue that the federal government’s preoccupation with Quebec and its constitutional chal-

lenges was deflecting attention and energy from Canada’s urgent problems, especially the deficit. Here, Reform could make common cause with the Bloc, driving home the message that coherent and determined federal action is not possible in the system as it is constituted. In opposition to Mr Bouchard, however, Reform would criti-

cize federal spending in Quebec on regional development, crown corporations, and infrastructure, as well as any other measure especially beneficial for the province. Beyond this, Mr Manning could urge the federal Liberals to prepare for separation. He would want to know the government’s position on all the critical issues. Indeed, he has already asked, formally and publicly, for the government’s response to twenty detailed questions about how Ottawa would react to a secession.'’* He would demand responses to the PQ’s negoti-

ating positions. He might advocate that English Canada’s post-separation policies be formulated through a grassroots consultative process or that they be the subject of a referendum. Finally, the Reform Party itself could advance a set of proposals for negotiating the separation, as well as a redesigned constitution for ROC. In doing this, Reform would articulate the views of its core supporters, who disproportionately tend to resent Quebec’s distinctiveness and the policies, such as bilingualism, that it has engendered. More important, the party could aim to accumulate the support of those ROC citizens who have been made angry, anxious, and impatient by Quebec’s initiatives. It could focus on these initiatives and seek to frame ROC’s response. Carried to its limit, the polarization strategy implicitly would represent an abandonment of Quebec and of Canada as it now exists. But as Roger Gibbins has noted, “the Reform Party is appealing to a kind of nationalism that makes sense if Quebec leaves — and makes no sense if Quebec stays.””* The Reform

Party would never make a statement in favour of separation; instead the general position would be that Quebecers need to make a clear and final choice about their adherence to Canada, under the constitutional status quo, and that the citizens of ROC must start preparing to cope with the separation because Quebecers might vote Yes. As Mr Manning said in 1989, after listing Reform’s constitutional principles, “If these principles of Confederation are rejected by Quebec, if the house cannot be united on such a basis, then Quebec and the rest of Canada should openly examine the feasibility of estab-

244 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

lishing a better but more separate relationship between them, on equitable and mutually acceptable terms.”** Reform would insist that it did not favour Quebec secession — it favoured a united Canada — but its underlying message would be that Quebecers must choose, that the issue must be settled once and for all, and that the choices were separation or the constitutional status quo —a country that was one nation, where all provinces were equal, where citizens had equal rights, the Charter was supreme, and majorities ruled; a nation where official bilingualism should be abolished and where Reform could well form the next federal government. All this would be provocative to Quebecers; it would provide fertile ground for the message that their future was threatened under the constitutional status quo and could be secured only through sovereignty. In the rest of Canada, this strategy would draw people’s attention to Quebec’s provocations, muster anti-Quebec sentiment, focus the growing anxieties and frustrations of English Canadians, and strengthen the coherence and self-consciousness of ROC. This is all part of polarization. The provincial governments form another set of important actors. They have many options and would be unlikely to adopt a coherent and unified position. At times, some governments would echo the PQ’s opposition to particular federal initiatives, but there would also be much criticism of an obstructionist and uncooperative Quebec government. While overt criticism of Ottawa’s position on the constitution and the Quebec referendum would be unlikely, some pro-

vincial governments might establish task forces or legislative committees to formulate new constitutional proposals or, more likely, to explore post-secession options and arrangements. Once more, these would reinforce the view that separation was imminent. Their delib-

erations and conclusions would be transmitted to Quebecers, with the same effect. Such exercises could lead some provincial governments to adopt particular stances on issues such as citizenship, currency, and trade with Quebec, or to favour certain constitutional provisions for ROC and the processes to secure them. These might be hard to abandon later. On the other hand, the period before the Quebec referendum will not be long enough for most provincial governments to reach firm conclusions to which they are publicly committed. More important, there is little incentive for most provincial politicians to contribute to polarization, and they will be reluctant to challenge overtly the view that the federal arena is the appropriate one for grappling with the Quebec government’s challenges. The last set of actors are nongovernmental. Individuals, firms, and associations could all contribute to increasing the degree of polarization between ROC and Quebec. It must be stressed that these actors

245 Secession with Polarization

are entirely beyond governments’ control. There is a wide range of opinion about Quebec sovereignty, and there would be some extreme reactions to both provocative acts by the PQ and the responses emanating from ROC. There would be demonstrations against the PQ’s provocations, and although these might be organized and spearheaded

by tiny groups, anti-Quebec symbolism has proven in the past its potency to attract media attention and to arouse Quebecers’ anger; flag burnings, effigies, and ugly slogans would certainly be offensive and threatening. Demonstrations against Quebec positions by Aboriginal organizations, either inside the province or without, would also be highly inflammatory. Of course, there would also be demonstrations in favour of federalism and in favour of Quebec remaining

in Canada, but these could be outnumbered by the negative ones and might well be less remarkable than them. Polarization would increase when extreme or threatening reactions were portrayed and interpreted as typical, as expressing the sentiments and inclinations of a whole mass of people. In polarization, members of each community come to see the stakes as high, the positions as irreconcilable, and the members of the other community as homogeneous, different, and hostile. There might also be boycotts of Quebec products. This would be very offensive to Quebecers and could cause counter-boycotts. But the normal activities of firms might be more provocative. Given rising uncertainty in Quebec, it would be rational for companies to diversify their sources of supply, so Quebec firms might lose Canadian markets. Head offices and other facilities could be moved from the province. And it is probable that private investment in Quebec would decline somewhat. All of these behaviours could be portrayed as conscious attempts to threaten Quebecers and impose costs upon them. In such circumstances, a public reaction in Quebec of greater support for sovereignty might seem irrational, insofar as these individual and corporate actions would be harbingers of the reaction to separation itself, but it is not unlikely. Moreover, the public might more staunchly support its provincial government’s efforts to compensate for the loss of markets and jobs. As well, the PQ might retaliate against

offending firms by denying them government business. Finally, associations, labour unions, academics, think-tanks, and the media will all engage in debates about separation. Activity will be feverish. Although extreme views and provocative positions will be advanced by both Quebecers and English Canadians, it is not likely that these debates will contribute directly to polarization between the two communities. What they will do is make the probability of separation seem greater. The debates will also make more obvious

246 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

and problematic the lack of preparation in ROC and the absence of a sound constitutional framework for it. So they will increase the pressure on the federal government to take positions on the issues surrounding secession and on the constitutional make-up of ROC. These

discussions might also produce powerful demands for a constitutional convention or an estates-general of ROC to be held. All of this suggests that there is a significant potential for polarization between ROC and Quebec, analogous to what took place between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. A PQ government in Quebec would have the resources of the state and a National Assembly majority at its command, and these could be used to provoke English Canadians, who would not only object to particular initiatives but would also deny the legitimacy of any movement at all towards separation without a prior referendum mandate. These reactions in turn could cause resentment in Quebec, the rallying of opinion in support of the provincial government, and increased support for sovereignty. At the federal level, both the Bloc and Reform could gain from polarization. As the process continued, Quebecers and citizens of ROC would increasingly come to see members of the other community as unreasonable, homogeneous, and distinct. They would perceive, correctly (as the polls would show), that the probability of separation was growing. This would only increase anxiety and the sense of threat in each community and the level of mutual hostility between them. CHECKS ON POLARIZATION IN CANADA

However realistic this polarization scenario may appear, it is essential to recall some basic differences between the Czech-Slovak and Canadian cases. In Canada, there has been no fundamental change in regime, with its attendant uncertainties in the social, economic, legal, and political spheres. Second, the economic situation is relatively stable: it will be improving, not deteriorating, and the hardships that do exist — and that provided a fertile ground for nationalist unrest in Slovakia — cannot be unambiguously attributed to the federal government's policies. Third, the system of proportional representation in Czechoslovakia and its republics, and also the rules of the legislatures, meant that power was shared within shifting coalitions. In Canada, the counterparts of Mr Klaus are relegated to the opposition. There are also four major factors that limit the potential for polarization in Canada. First, there would be several constraints on the polarization tactics available to the PQ government. One is provided by financial markets. The cost to the province of government bor-

247 Secession with Polarization

rowing — more precisely, the risk of credit downgrades — could limit the funds available for economic intervention, competition with Ottawa, and social-welfare spending to bolster popularity. As well, the sensitivity of private direct investment to the political climate could

restrain PQ brinkmanship. Over the short term, a truly determined government might be able to ignore these counterbalances, perhaps even trying to blame them on federalist fear-mongering, but this tactic would be limited by another basic check on the ability of the government to shift opinion — the fact that Quebec is a mature democracy.

The PQ confronts a viable opposition party that is capable of exposing and reinterpreting its tactics. The provincial Liberals, most notably, could refuse to cooperate or participate in National Assembly committees charged with preparing the ground for sovereignty. Rebuilding after a defeat, they would mobilize around the referendum to come. As well, the Quebec media are alert and are prone to criticize governments. Most important, the electorate is experienced and relatively sophisticated. Voters would not be unresponsive to the view that job losses were caused in part by the policies of the Quebec government and that federal-provincial initiatives were failing because of PQ obstruction. The electorate’s concern about the provincial deficit would help constrain provocative expenditures, such as hiring federal public servants or encroaching on federal jurisdic-

tion. As well, most Quebecers have a sense of democratic fairness

and pragmatism. Many would resent the government’s pre-referendum moves towards sovereignty on the grounds that no

clear mandate had been given to so proceed.” ,

The third major check on polarization is the federal government itself. The Liberals possess a majority strong enough to command the House of Commons, the party has broad regional representation, and the government has considerable depth and experience. The prime

minister is credible in both ROC and Quebec. Structurally, there is no competitive centre of power that could respond authoritatively to Quebec in the same way as the Czech Republic became the Slovak interlocutor. Indeed, if the Reform Party attempted to enunciate a ROC counter-position, the federal Parliament would become even more central to the debate in ROC. Despite provocation and polarization, the essence of the federal government’s strategy will remain unchanged. It will attempt to produce attractive programs and constructive reforms, both to improve the economy and to show that the federal system works. The government will count on continued economic growth that will improve the conditions of Canadians along with its own finances. And it will maintain its posture on the issue of separation. Difficulties with the

248 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

Quebec government, especially over noncooperation in reasonable reforms, will be blamed on sovereigntist obstruction. The polarizing

thrusts of the opposition parties will be condemned as partisan manoeuvres that are insulting and harmful to Canadians. Government leaders will appeal to Quebecers’ affinity for Canada at the same time as they stress the illogic of secession and the costs and dangers

it would involve. Ottawa will also counter erroneous information emitted by the PQ. Most emphatically, the government will insist that Quebecers do not want separation and that the option will definitely be rejected in any referendum. The federal Liberals have no mandate to reopen the constitutional dossier and, they will say, they have no intention of doing so. They will refuse all opposition demands for contingency planning or pre-negotiation with Quebec as hypothetical responses to an event that will not take place. No matter what pressures are mounted from Quebec and ROC, it is most improbable that Mr Chrétien’s Liberals would budge from this position. As the prime minister has said, “Iam not spending one minute on this impossible scenario.””* So although the federal government will help fight sovereignty in the referendum campaign, it will not contemplate it publicly in advance. This will diminish the impression that sovereignty is inevitable.

The final check on polarization will be the referendum itself. In contrast to the Czech-Slovak case, the separatist party is irrevocably committed to holding one; so the polarization that took place there as governments proceeded to negotiate, and the concomitant sense of the secession’s inevitability, are far less likely to occur in Canada. The negotiations were enormously important in Czechoslovakia, and they monopolized the public’s attention, as will the events unfolding after a Yes vote in Quebec. But in Quebec there has to be a refer-

endum, and until that event, citizens in the province can suspend judgment. They can safely abstain from involvement in all these dis-

putes, watching the politicians’ machinations with their usual degree of attentiveness. Meanwhile, they need not commit to either side of the struggle or even follow it very closely. The same is true in ROC, although the electorates’ positions are not symmetrical because En-

glish Canadians, to the frustration of many, will not be able to pronounce on the issue through a referendum. They must wait, and the sense of powerlessness and impatience this causes will feed support for polarizing responses to sovereigntist thrusts. But in ROC, too, there are moderating forces — the sense that separation is irrational, the somewhat contradictory view that the choice lies with Quebecers, and hesitation to follow the Reform Party on the constitution when its other policy positions are farther to the right than most Ca-

249 Secession with Polarization

nadians can accept. In any case, there will be some polarizing responses, and these will cause reactions in Quebec. But the citizens there will know that they have time to make up their minds, and a ballot to cast on referendum day. REPRISE

In the period between the election of a PQ government and the refer-

endum, there is potential for polarization between ROC and Quebec. But the checks in the system should hold it to moderate levels. Under conditions of moderate polarization, would the assumptions underlying the secession scenario be altered? Would the flow of events

change, and would the arrangements negotiated with Quebec be different? Few assumptions would be violated. The PQ government would call the referendum at the most opportune time; that is, when Quebec public opinion was most favourable to sovereignty, perhaps in reaction to threats and insults emanating from ROC. But the result of the referendum would still be unpredictable. In the last instance of polarization, after the Meech Lake Accord failed to pass, support levels in Quebec for “sovereignty” and “independence” rose to a range of 60-65 per cent. Under similar conditions, the No forces would face a difficult campaign, but the outcome would remain in doubt until the ballots were counted, and so there would be no pre-negotiation with

Quebec. In ROC, many more ideas would be circulating about post-secession strategies and arrangements with Quebec, but the federal government would not need to commit itself to a set of positions about borders, the debt, and other issues. After a Yes vote, as a consequence of polarization, there would be a higher level of unrest and a worse economic situation. There would be more emigration, boy-

cotts, demonstrations, Aboriginal unrest, and so on, and domestic and foreign economic actors would expect difficult negotiations and continued uncertainty. But Ottawa would still take the lead in managing the situation. There would be sharper resistance to this in some quarters because provincialist and decentralist opinion would have been primed in the period before the referendum. On the other hand, the major tribune of ROC’s opinion and interests, Mr Manning, operates in the federal arena. It is not clear whether the Liberal government could continue in office if it maintained its phlegmatic stance and then lost the referendum. The prime minister would probably have to resign in a polarized environment. This could lead to a government of national unity, a Reform-Liberal coalition. Alternatively, Mr Manning could be called

250 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

on to form a government if he could count on substantial Liberal support. Neither situation would be very stable, given the animosity that would have developed between the parties in the pre-referendum period. Reform would blame the Liberals for ROC’s lack of prepara-

tion and for losing the referendum about which they had been so overtly confident of victory, while the Liberals would hold Mr Man-

ning responsible for Quebecers’ alienation from Canada and their choice to secede. This means that it will remain very critical that an election be held in Canada, though it is conceivable that a union government could hold together until the separation was accomplished. National solidarity in ROC would be maintained. In fact, while polarization will have sharpened divisions within the country about its future constitutional make-up and about how to deal with Quebec, the same process, paradoxically, would have rendered more acute the public’s sense of ROC’s distinctness and collective interest. This would be reinforced through the confrontation to come with Quebec in post-referendum negotiations. So it is not likely that provincial governments would impede federal management of the crisis or block the process of reconstituting Canada. Finally, with few signs of ROC fragmentation but with more uncertainty because of polarization, foreign powers would be important moderators, seeking and supporting competent, fast management of the crisis. Overall, then, there is no major change in the basic scenario. The big imperative would still be to resolve uncertainty. It would be necessary to settle matters with Quebec as quickly as possible and to reconstitute Canada quickly too, and then to secure public ratification of what was done. Mr Manning’s greater influence could lead,

however, to some modifications. The constitutional amendments would very likely have to include Senate reforms congruent with Reform’s long-standing position on the issue. The amending formula itself might be changed to require ratification of amendments by referendum. The Reform Party and the much larger body of supporters it would have after polarization might require that the constitutional amendments that were made, and even the arrangements that were negotiated with Quebec, should be ratified by referendum. This would prolong uncertainty. On the other hand, polarization itself would make ratification very likely, and if the government was stable enough to see the separation through, a referendum could obviate the need for an election. Polarization would produce some change in the set of agreements negotiated with Quebec. There would be a somewhat different mix of political forces in ROC, and Mr Manning would play a more prominent role in the negotiations. Presumably, his party would be identi-

251 Secession with Polarization

fied with, if not entirely committed to, a set of negotiating positions, and presumably these would be hard-line.” On the other hand, Reform would be constrained by the great bulk of Liberals from Ontario

in the House of Commons. Nevertheless, polarization would reinforce the internal solidarity of the communities and raise the level of resentment directed towards the “other,” and both effects would increase people’s willingness to bear economic loss. As a consequence, the package of agreements would be a minimalist one. On symbolic issues there would be much less cooperation. There would be no environmental treaty, none about immigration, and much less flexibility about citizenship (with the period of choice being reduced). Border posts would be erected, and although the NAFTA/FTA floor of economic integration would be retained, special agreements on finan-

cial institutions and agriculture would be more difficult to reach. Quebec would want to use the American dollar as its currency, but a threatened veto of NAFTA membership or a tougher stance on citi-

zenship would make it a taker of Canadian monetary policy for a while. The basic parameters of debt and asset division would remain,

though there would be fewer joint management bodies and much more acrimony about lumpy assets that cannot be privatized. A taxation treaty would be signed, but cooperation in other matters, such as emergency planning, would be unlikely.

In short, moderate levels of polarization would make the transition more acrimonious and would increase the cost for each side, and the animosity accompanying the separation would not quickly fade. More important, the structures put in place between Canada and Quebec would be less conducive to economic and political integration over the long term. On the other hand, the core scenario re-

quires little modification. It holds. Hence, having described the transition to sovereignty, it is now possible to reach some conclusions about the longer-term future of Canada and Quebec.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

The Long-term Outcomes

CANADA

If the separation of Quebec unfolds as depicted here, Canada will undergo a transition period lasting three to five years as the immediate shocks of the secession continue to have repercussions through-

out the country. In the period between the referendum and the separation, the country will reconstitute itself and arrange for some continuity in its relations with Quebec, and the public will pronounce on the politicians’ handling of the secession by choosing a new federal government. In this period, citizens will be anxious, governments will be in a state of frenetic activity, and firms will be reassessing their plans and reorienting themselves to the new realities. After the separation, adjustment will continue, though the size of the changes necessary will vary by region, economic sector, and the personal circumstances of individuals. Adjustment costs will continue to be registered for some time. In the economy, all Canadians will bear the effects of higher interest rates and a depreciated Canadian dollar. These will not abate fully until well after the separation. More substantial will be the effects of a sharp decline in investment, particularly in central Canada, where the disruption of commerce will be seen as more probable. Provincial and federal government finances will be strained by these devel-

opments, and services will be further reduced. In some sectors, adjustment will be especially hard. These include the sectors directly

253 The Long-term Outcomes

affected by the separation agreements — for example, financial services, agriculture, transportation, and all public enterprises — as well

as those with the strongest linkages into Quebec, such as textiles, paper, chemicals, and oil and gas. There will also be a hard psychological adjustment to make. The first sense of deep shock in ROC will be followed by the gradual realization that the nature of the country has changed profoundly. In geographical conceptions, the “hole” in Canada where Quebec “was” will continue to be troubling; in terms of a community or family, the

whole will have lost an important if demanding member; and the more cosmopolitan view of Canada as a society consciously constructed around certain fundamental features, including francophone

Quebecers, will have been shaken to its foundations. Of course, a few Canadians will remain quite oblivious to all of this — life will go on — but for most the secession will represent a profound loss. At the same time, there will be no choice except to see it also as an opportunity, a chance to discover what anew Canada can be and what can be achieved by its people.

Canada will emerge from the transition with a constitution that closely resembles the existing one, though some of the minor changes

will be potentially decentralizing. These include provisions for the delegation of powers between the two orders of government and provisions for more concurrent powers; but such devices may also allow for centralization, in practice, or for a variety of arrangements in different provinces: they are flexible. Some changes will definitely create a more centralized system. The elimination of minority-language

rights will mean the end of dualism, enshrining a pan-Canadian homogeneity of individual rights, and the absence of Quebec will tend

to delegitimize collective rights generally, so there will be fewer grounds for the devolution of resources and power to other minorities, including the Aboriginal peoples. If a triple-E Senate is introduced, it might effectively reinforce the federal order of government. This will depend on how the party system evolves, but a new Senate might well provide more scope for the expression of regional interests and their incorporation into central-government policy. On the other hand, if the Senate is elected and if national parties are strong, divisions within it would be likely to occur around partisan cleavages as much as regional ones, and provincial governments would be less able than now to claim that they best represent the interests and preferences of their citizens. Beyond this, the strong centralizing elements of the current constitution will remain intact. If no areas of jurisdiction are transferred to the provincial order, Ottawa will retain

254 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

its important responsibilities, along with its spending power. The institutional structure, therefore, will be at least as conducive to central power as it is at present. Over the long term, many factors will affect how the new Canadian federation evolves. Other scholars have listed and analysed the factors conducive to stability and instability in federal systems, just as they have assessed those that determine the degree of centraliza-

tion written into constitutions when federations are first forming.’ The factors on which there is some agreement can thus readily be explored in the Canadian case. First is the continued sense of emergency and the struggle for independence. The sense of national emergency in ROC will support determined and rapid management of the immediate crisis, and a united focus on the need to deal with Quebec will help get Canada’s new constitution into operation. The uncertainty of the external environment, especially the country’s relations with the United States, will have a similar effect. But then the immediate perception of crisis will fade, and partisan, ideological, and regional cleavages will resurface. The sense of emergency will not be long sustained after the separation, particularly if an election produces a majority government. But although the crisis will have produced no massive centralization in Canada’s institutional framework, it will have renewed the perception that Ottawa is the active centre of the Canadian polity, and this will take much longer to erode. Moreover, since the new system will be untried and potentially fragile, there will be some pressure to allow it to work, to see what results it produces, and to avoid

the uncertainty that fundamental challenges to it would create. All these tendencies will promote stability. A second factor is the economic performance of the federation,and this should be positive. During the transition, of course, there will be losses, big ones, as investment drops and interest rates rise. The GDP of ROC could easily drop by more than it does in a normal recession. Firms and individuals will have to adjust to the end of the economic union, and they will make further adjustments through anticipation that Canada-Quebec links will become even weaker. Government finance will be more precarious since spending will undoubtedly increase during the crisis at the same time as the cost of borrowing rises. (Government borrowing will probably become concentrated in very short-term maturities during the transition, in anticipation that rates will later fall; Ottawa might also take advantage of increased patriotism by issuing special Canada Savings Bonds on the domestic market.) While not all of these costs will show up as measurable declines in GDP, there certainly will be a sharp recession.

255 The Long-term Outcomes

In Canada, however, the recession will be relatively short. First, the separation will take place at a time of general economic growth, especially in the United States, and expanding foreign markets will help growth resume. Second, separation will resolve the constitutional uncertainty that has lowered investors’ confidence in Canada for several years. Once it is clear that the country is politically stable, investment should resume and interest rates will be able to drop. Finally, although times of uncertainty and dramatic change in basic economic and institutional arrangements are costly, they shake up the policy environment and create new opportunities and alliances; in the view of some analysts, transformative change increases growth.?

So Canada’s economic performance should not create much disaffection — greater wealth is highly conducive to stability.” After the transition, though, there could be sharply uneven growth

rates within the federation, and deepening regional inequalities are widely held to be destabilizing. For long-term stability, it seems essential that the central government should have the capacity to offset short-term regional economic declines and to compensate for enduring disparities in tax revenues.* But Ottawa would still be able, constitutionally, to redistribute to those provinces that are currently receiving equalization; in fact, both the ability and the willingness to do so would be greater in the absence of Quebec. The only serious obstacle would be Ontario, if the disruption of its economic links with Quebec makes the transitional recession deeper and longer there. Generally, though, economic conditions will not tend to cause serious centrifugal forces in the new Canadian federation, at least in the

medium term. A third factor conducive to stability is constitutional flexibility. After the secession, this will be increased in Canada in two ways. First, the

constitution will become easier to amend formally as the population requirement under the general formula is reduced and provisions are made for interdelegation. Second, amendments will become more feasible politically. Since Quebec’s particular requirements will no longer dominate the agenda, centralizing changes will be made more easily, and decentralizing amendments will no longer raise the objection that they are easing the way to Quebec secession. As well, the peculiar position of the Atlantic provinces could induce still more constitutional flexibility by requiring asymmetrical arrangements to meet its unique circumstances. Long-term stability also depends on the balance of power within the federation. Persistent demands for regional autonomy are destabilizing, and they arise most strongly when central-government policies are not responsive to regional preferences and interests. In turn,

256 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

comparative experience shows that this is accentuated when the number of units is small and especially when one unit is preponderant in the federation. The latter factors are associated with both political instability and the potential for secession. Once again, this suggests

that the preponderant position of Ontario could make for interregional conflict, disaffection, and long-term instability in the federation.

There are some important countervailing factors, however. First, Canadians will resist the uncertainty of further structural changes and will allow the new system time to work. Having experienced the event of secession once — in fact, they will still be witnessing its effects on Quebec — they will not be interested in repeating the experience. The core of the constitution will remain a relatively centralized one, and this will be buttressed by the new attention and even loyalty focused on Ottawa.® Canadians’ community of outlook will be greater than in the existing federation. If a more equal and elected Senate is part of the new constitution, the West will have won a major concession, and one that might well reduce direct federal-provincial confrontation in the long run. Of at least equal importance is the system of political parties; competitive national parties are more influential than any other factor in reducing the potential for secession, because they help prevent an unequivocal expression of provincial

preferences, while ensuring the representation at the centre of regional interests.’ In post-secession Canada, a two-party system will probably emerge, with more political debate taking place along ideological lines than on regional ones. This might cause economic policy to be less consistent, but it would be a strong force for the stability of the federation. So, after a Quebec secession, into the medium term at least, it is predictable that Canada will cohere and that the constitutional struc-

ture will much resemble that of the present federation. The initial tendency will be towards rather more centralization than currently exists, even though federal governments might be much less activist than they have been since World War II. Over the longer term — that is, beyond two decades -— prediction fails. Canada would remain a somewhat artificial country, with a small market and a fragile culture, subject as ever to changing external forces and the continual integrating pressures of the continental and global systems. The country might fragment. It might dramatically change its constitution. Or, if the economy works well and there is sufficient public commitment to a distinct mix of national policies, then Canada might continue to persist in much the same form as it assumed after Quebec’s separation.

257 The Long-term Outcomes QUEBEC

The shape of relations between Canada and Quebec in the long term will, of course, depend on the decisions made and the structures established during the transition to sovereignty, but they will also be affected by the repercussions of secession in Quebec, both economic and political. Economically, Quebec’s situation will be difficult for some time. There will be substantial costs to bear in setting up a full government. After the referendum, although ROC will not have a constitution, the federal government will still be equipped with a complete administrative machine, but Quebec will have to create one. Even if some savings from eliminating duplication do accrue to the government, the fiscal position of the newly sovereign Quebec will worsen as it assumes responsibility for programs and for its share of the national debt. Moreover, the costs of uncertainty will be much higher in Quebec than in Canada, and they will be longer lasting, in part because of economic fundamentals such as greater adjustment costs but also because the policy environment will be less predictable. Investment will stay depressed until the province’s prospects have clarified, and this will take some time. Quebec’s big economic advantages, fundamentally, stem from its cultural homogeneity, its social solidarity, the fast transmission of information within the society and its businesses, the supportive stance

of government towards business, and the linkages between financial firms and other companies in manufacturing and commerce. Ina world

in which treaties provide secure market access and business is global, these features might allow Quebec to attain more rapid economic growth as a sovereign state than as part of the Canadian federation. Despite the direct losses that the separation causes, it could reinforce some of these long-term advantages. In particular, the urgency of the crisis, and the focus of the whole collectivity on the negotiations with

Canada, could strengthen the sense of national solidarity. So could the prospect of embarking on a new national project. Indeed, separation will bring a sense not only of autonomy but also of isolation, and there will be no choice for many Quebecers except to make their country work (or to leave). Further, as in Canada, structural transformation in the policy-making and economic arenas could create new opportunities and stimulate growth. But some factors will operate so as to weaken this solidarity and its concomitant advantages. There will be continued difficulties with ethnic minorities. Emigration will be an economic depressant. More important, during and after the transition, a substantial and bitter

258 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

federalist rump will hold the government responsible for the economic hardship brought on the province (an effect that will be absent in Canada, where the entire blame will be laid on Quebec). After

the transition, the Government of Quebec will also be more obviously accountable for economic conditions. In federations, responsibility is blurred, and disaffection can be directed towards the other order of government, an outlet that will no longer be available after Quebec achieves sovereignty; so domestic politics will acquire a greater salience there. This raises a most difficult problem — the alignment and realignment of political forces in the sovereign Quebec. Since 1970, politics in the province have come to be oriented around the national question. In particular, the quest for sovereignty has been the glue holding the Parti québécois together. Presumably, the PQ government could continue in office for at least two years after the

separation, but there would be much uncertainty about its economic-policy orientation, especially given the difficult conditions of the time. Its programmatic inclination would be towards a corporatist model of economic planning, involving the state, the private sector, public enterprises, unions, cooperatives, and social movements.®

The party’s left wing would expect the state to combine a neo-Keynesian full-employment policy with indicative industrial and regional planning, and with some protection for strategic firms. This would be accompanied by expanded social-welfare programs. But in the post-secession period, in view of the heavy losses of the transi-

tion and the fiscal position of the state, this role could not be fulfilled. As Mr Parizeau remarked during the 1994 provincial election campaign, when it was noted that the party was not emphasizing its commitments about more aid for the poor, more generous health programs, and universal day care, “We haven't got the money for that sort of thing at the present time. That’s why it’s not in the platform but it is in the program. And once the finances of Quebec will be in better shape, sure we’ll do that sort of thing.”® But the Quebec government will face decreasing revenues and rising social needs as a consequence of the separation, at the same time as investors will be more wary of the province because of the PQ’s social-democratic ori-

entation. And although a move towards corporatism and planning might create growth, this would be constrained by the country’s new exposure to FTA, NAFTA, and GATT disciplines on subsidies, foreign investment controls, public enterprises, and discriminatory procurement. As a consequence, it will be difficult for the government to form a coherent economic policy that builds on Quebec’s strengths. National solidarity might compensate for economic decline and the economically depressing effects of policy incoherence, and might carry

259 The Long-term Outcomes

the party through another election; or the government might call and win an election soon after the separation. In either case, though, there would be deep uncertainty about the framework of economic policy, dissension within the governing party, and, probably, unrest among its working-class and rural supporters. On the other hand, if the Liberal Party were to be elected after sovereignty was attained, some of these effects would be lessened. The Liberal Party is more firmly oriented towards fiscal restraint, liberalized trade, deregulation, and competition, though it is still committed toacatalytic role for government and its state enterprises. A Liberal regime would give the PQ time in opposition to reorient itself; but if the PQ regrouped on the left, the ideological distance between the two major parties would be greater than before, and there would be

sharp conflict over economic policy. Whatever the medium-term political outcome, Quebecers will face a harder transition, more costly

adjustments, and a slower re-emergence from the recession caused by the separation. CANADA-QUEBEC RELATIONS

Long-term relations between Canada and Quebec will be shaped by the agreements made at the time of the separation as well as by the political and economic developments that take place later within the two states. In a nonpolarized environment, the principal loci of political integration after the secession will be in the management of monetary policy and the financial sector, a few special-purpose agencies and joint systems, and consultation and cooperation about Aboriginal peoples, the environment, defence, policing, and other matters.

Economic integration at the level of a customs union will be maintained, but through no formal mechanism. If the political environment is polarized before the secession, political integration will be even less. Many of the agreements will lapse, however. Even if neither state reduces external tariffs unilaterally, the customs union will not survive the next round of multilateral trade talks. The immigration agree-

ment will not be renewed, voluntary regulatory harmonization will be reduced because of different domestic political pressures, and the currency agreement might break down after a relatively short time if the two governments have very different attitudes towards inflation or the exchange rate. Economic integration will erode as Quebec becomes a more autonomous state. There will be much less labour mobility, in part because of the decline of French-language education in Canada. Large Canadian firms based in Quebec will shift their

260 The Dynamics of Quebec Secession

head offices over time, and this, along with the diminution of Quebec’s anglophone community, the reduced number and scope of public en-

terprises operating transnationally, and some inevitable weakening of capital-market integration, will tend to divert trade away from crossing the Quebec-Canada border. At the margin, the flow of business will shift to the two internal markets and, more substantially, to the United States and other foreign markets. All this will entail economic losses for both countries. To the immediate and considerable costs of the transition will be added the burden of adjustment to a gradual decrease in positive integration between them. These costs will accrue slowly, but compared with the alternative of a full economic and political union, they will mount noticeably. The costs of the transition and of later adjustment will be greater for Quebec than for Canada. There will be more uncertainty about the new country, especially on the political front; as the smaller economy it will have to adjust more, proportionately; and there will

be the added costs caused by the end of redistribution, the mutual-insurance support provided by the federation, and the restriction of an important adjustment mechanism — labour mobility. The main question is whether Quebec’s particular social advantages could be brought into play to compensate for all this. The answer will depend on the degree of national solidarity and patriotism occasioned by sovereignty and how it was accomplished, the creativity of the government and business, and the success of partisan realignment. Over the longer term, more cooperation between the two countries will be possible. Inevitably, they will share common interests and problems, and costly irritants will provide incentives to reach new agreements. The countries’ joint position in the global and continental systems will encourage this. But even over the long term, cooperation is far less likely to occur if the secession is accomplished through polarization. Moreover, governments will always face political incentives to perpetuate conflictual relations with other states, because problems and failures can then be attributed to the “other.” But this is only to encounter once again a dynamic that had helped produce the separation in the first place; it could persist.

In the end, then, the original questions animating the study are answered. If the transition occurred as depicted here, Canada and Quebec would undergo a wrenching adjustment to the new political and economic order. Substantial costs would be incurred over the transition period, particularly in Quebec. Many lives would be greatly disrupted, and every person who is now a Canadian would have to make adjustments. But, for most, the change would not be catastrophic.

261 The Long-term Outcomes

Canada would emerge as a stable country, rather like what it is now but with a higher degree of centralization, at least temporarily. There would be few special political links with Quebec, and economic relations would erode as their policy framework gradually settled to the level of integration prevailing among the countries of North America. Within this framework, Quebecers would have their chance to fashion a more autonomous future, having taken the risk that the costs of the transition and the residue it left could be compensated either by their society’s special capacity to achieve economic growth or by the security of sovereignty.

BLANK PAGE

PART FOUR

From Referendum to Referendum

BLANK PAGE

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasnt

As the new Parti québécois government began its referendum planning in October 1994, public support for sovereignty stood at around 45 per cent. Despite Premier Parizeau’s “astute” tactics, including the deployment of regional commissions to spread the PQ vision, this figure budged little over the next six months. In the face of a probable No vote, the drive towards a June referendum stalled, and authority within the sovereigntist forces slid towards Lucien Bouchard,

the most popular and trusted politician in Quebec. His full engagement in the campaign would be essential to attract those marginal, “soft-nationalist” voters who were uncommitted to either federalism or sovereignty. In April 1995, Mr Bouchard made his virage — offering a post-secession economic and political association with Canada — and drew the government towards anew referendum strat-

egy. This position was cemented in a June alliance between Mr Bouchard, Mr Parizeau, and Mario Dumont, party leader of the Action démocratique du Québec (ADQ).

The campaign began in earnest in September. At the outset, the federalist forces seemed comfortably ahead, but their lead dwindled as the sovereigntists focused on the politics of identity, emphasized the federation’s inflexibility, and successfully attacked the credibility of threats about economic damage. The No leadership, panicked by the polls, finally offered constitutional change in the last week of the campaign and mobilized hard. The final result was 50.6 per cent No and 49.4 per cent Yes.

266 From Referendum to Referendum

The first section of this chapter describes the run-up to the referen-

dum. The second section is an account of how the campaign itself unfolded. The next chapter presents an explanation of why the Yes forces gained ground and almost won the referendum. PREPARING FOR THE REFERENDUM

The highly centralized PQ government began its referendum planning upon taking office. Most of its policy positions were subordinated to the goal of winning a June 1995 vote. For example, there were no unpopular actions taken to control the budget deficit, despite a downgrading of Quebec bonds.’ Other initiatives were specifically designed to prepare the ground for the referendum. Notably, the government aimed to defuse the Aboriginal issue. Cancelling the contentious Great Whale hydroelectric project helped this, and a special

assistant to the premier entered negotiations to reach comprehensive self-government agreements with separate First Nations.* These

ultimately failed.° The government also aimed to placate the anglophone community by pledging that a sovereign Quebec’s constitution would protect their rights.* As well, sovereigntist leaders quickly disciplined adherents who stressed ethnic divisions and the

obstacle posed to a Yes referendum result by the massively profederalist anglophone and allophone communities.’ Bernard Landry, the deputy premier, worked hard to emphasize the inclusive, modern, and pluralistic nature of the sovereignty movement, but this of-

ficial line continued to have little appeal among suspicious non-francophones. Externally, the PQ government aimed to secure commitments from the French about recognition, and it did achieve some success among the candidates in the presidential race.®° Mr Parizeau also tried to reassure American investors and political leaders about sovereignty, stressing the mutual economic interest of the United States and Quebec in NAFTA; politically, he hoped to ensure non-involvement in the coming campaign.’ With respect to ROC, the sovereigntist leaders eschewed the tactic of polarization — though Mr Parizeau pro-

voked considerable dismay when he declared, in his first speech outside Quebec as premier, that the sovereignty drive would continue whatever the referendum outcome. For ROC, he said, the Quebec problem was “like a never-ending visit to the dentist.”® But the fundamental message was that Quebec sovereignty was inevitable. Moreover, once Quebecers voted Yes, reason would prevail in ROC, so the hard issues would be settled and the costs of transition minimized, out of a logical appreciation of ROC’s self-interest.?

267 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

These same messages were consistently deployed within Quebec. The basic objective was to increase support for secession by appealing to the undecided “soft nationalists.” As Quebecers waited for the government’s referendum plans to be unveiled, the PQ stressed that the sovereignty project had momentum. Second, its leaders emphasized the frustrations of federalism — the resources wasted through duplication, the interference by Ottawa in the province’s affairs, and the lack of sufficient powers to realize Quebecers’ objectives. A third message was that secession would create no significant disruption. While the PQ made no explicit promises about formal economic or political cooperation after a Yes vote, its leaders maintained that the rational self-interest of ROC would inhibit any damage to existing relations of trade, investment, procurement, and labour mobility; as well, the Canadian dollar would remain Quebec’s currency. Finally, the government aimed to appeal positively to the bright future and new opportunities that sovereignty would bring. It was this vision that its initial referendum plan aimed to amplify and promulgate.” The PQ government had allies. The most powerful was Lucien Bouchard, who, on Wednesday, 30 November 1994, was diagnosed as infected with streptococcus A bacteria — the “flesh-eating disease” — which normally is fatal. As rumours swirled throughout the province and the country, and as anxiety mounted, most Quebecers went

to bed on Thursday night expecting to hear the next day that Mr Bouchard was dead. Instead, it was announced that he would recover (though much of one leg was amputated). His heroic struggle won sympathy throughout Canada. In Quebec, it reinforced the af-

fection and reverence he attracted, and his survival was discussed with divine undertones." It also had political overtones in the form of a highly publicized note which the stricken Bloc québécois leader had passed to his doctors: “Que l’on continue. Merci.” In fact, the Bloc had already been included in referendum planning, because the option of outright sovereignty remained low in the polls and victory would require the full commitment of Mr Bouchard to attract the soft nationalists. So the PO national council endorsed a “rainbow coalition” strategy that would not only include other parties in the Yes organization but would also be open to competing visions of what “sovereignty” meant. Soon after the initial referendum plans were released, the PQ and Bloc forces met to combine their organizations into “one big machine” for the referendum campaign.”*

On 6 December, Mr Parizeau unveiled the referendum strategy. There were three elements. First was a bill introduced into the National Assembly, An Act Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec.” Section 1

268 From Referendum to Referendum

declared, “Quebec is a sovereign country.” The remaining substantive sections provided for negotiating an economic association with Canada, agreeing on debt and asset division, and drafting a Quebec constitution. As well, there were provisions laying out the sovereigntist

position on other issues: the integrity of Quebec territory; Quebec citizenship (and dual citizenship); use of the Canadian currency; succeeding to treaties and acceding to alliances and treaties (including NAFTA); and maintaining the continuity of law (including pensions, the courts, and the public administration). The second element of the plan was the referendum question included in the bill. It was “Are you in favour of the Act passed by the National Assembly declaring the sovereignty of Quebec? Yes or No.” The timing of the event followed from this. As the bill provided, the act would be passed by the assembly after consultation, but it would not come into force until it was approved by a majority in a referen-

dum. Even then, only the sections providing for negotiation with Canada and the drawing up of a new constitution would come into effect immediately. The rest, including the statement of sovereignty,

would become effective after one year (unless accelerated by the assembly).

The third element was public consultation. The government was to establish a set of regional commissions to hold hearings throughout the province, as well as a national commission made up of the regional chairs. Each commission would consist of several MNAs and MPs, along with appointed members representing various interests within the region. The commissions would discuss the draft bill and the whole sovereignty project. They would also receive submissions to fill in the bill’s blank preamble, the Declaration of Sover-

eignty, which would set forth “the fundamental values and main objectives the Quebec nation wishes to make its own” once sovereignty was achieved. The strategy was transparent. The bill’s provisions about continu-

ity were clearly intended to reassure undecided voters, while the vast exercise in public participation would generate support for sovereignty, especially in Québec profond (outside metropolitan Montreal)."*

As the consensus grew during February 1995, the sovereigntists’ mo-

mentum would build, gaining further strength through meetings of the PQ and the Bloc’s first national congress in April, after which the bill would be passed, and the ground would be ready for a Yes victory in a June referendum. The federalist forces fought back, however. Of course, there had been intense activity throughout this period. One basic problem was how to reach a consensus on organization, strategy, and message when

269 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn't

so many disparate actors and partisan organizations were involved. Relations were especially strained between the federal Liberals and the Quebec Liberal Party. Mr Johnson, for example, aware of the demand for constitutional change within the province, continually argued that Canada must make such a commitment, because then a No vote was not a vote in favour of the status quo: “It is a statement for Canada and in favour of the Canadian union. It is also a state-

ment in favour of evolution.” In the run-up to the referendum, Prime Minister Chrétien and members of the federal cabinet adopted several core positions. The most

basic was that there was no danger that Quebecers would vote to secede. The polls confirmed that a majority of the public wanted to remain in Canada, and Mr Chrétien proclaimed, “I’m not scared. There’s no reason to be scared. I have the best product to offer — Canada.”'® Second, because most Quebecers were concerned about jobs and the economy rather than sovereignty or the constitution, it was not necessary to reopen the constitutional dossier. Third, the federal Liberals denounced the sovereigntists, sometimes in contemptuous and bitter terms (which were reciprocated). In particular, the PQ referendum strategy was denounced as undemocratic, manipulative and misleading — in the prime minister’s words, “a farce.” The real question, he said, was simple: “Do you want to separate from Canada? That is the only question.” Or, as Deputy Prime Minister Sheila Copps put it, “Are you in or out of Canada?’ The fourth consistent element was to keep options open. This fitted well with the position that any talk of a Yes majority was hypothetical, but at times it involved an awkward stonewalling of questions from the Reform Party, the Bloc, and the media. Asked whether Ottawa might organize its own referendum on sovereignty, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs Marcel Massé answered, “Si je ne vous réponds pas, c’est parce que je ne veux pas vous répondre, et si je ne veux pas vous répondre, c’est parce qu’actuellement ce n’est pas la question.”*' Finally, warnings were issued about the dangers of secession and especially about the degree of cooperation to be expected from ROC. Mr Massé suggested that Canada might prohibit dual citizenship, and the prime minister pointed out that separation was “nonconstitutional,” that Canada alone would decide on monetary policy and an economic union, and that the NAFTA partners could veto Quebec’s admission to the treaty.” The toughest reaction to the sovereignty plan was Mr Johnson’s. He flatly refused to have the Quebec Liberal Party take part in the

regional commissions. Calling the exercise a “parody of popular consultation,” he argued that participants would be “placed in the

270 From Referendum to Referendum

position of accepting separation in a tacit way.” On the other hand, the federalist arguments could not remain unvoiced before the commissions, so the No forces began to coalesce through organizations such as the Council for Canadian Unity, Alliance Québec (representing anglophones), and the Conseil du patronat du Québec (representing major business interests), as well as ad hoc groups like the Quebec Business Council for Canada and others.” Beyond this, the federalists adopted several tactics. The federal Liberals recruited new talent in the person of Lucienne Robillard, who was appointed minister of labour and was expected to be a powerful advocate of unity and a competent organizer of the No cam-

paign.” Throughout early 1995 they drastically expanded the bureaucratic power of the national unity group in the Privy Council Office. They aimed to reassure the provincial premiers and to deflect criticism by the Reform Party in order to reduce the chance of intemperate, polarizing rhetoric. As well, the government moderated several policies that might alienate Quebec voters; for example, national unity concerns dictated that social policy reform be scaled back and delayed.”° The 1995 federal budget contained relatively modest cuts in transfers to persons and provinces in the short term, and the distribution of block grants to provinces, which favoured Quebec somewhat, was not to be changed for one year.” Finally, the No side put its organization in place. The No campaign was to be led by Daniel Johnson, assisted by Michel Bélanger, head of the Quebec Liberal Party

referendum committee. They were to coordinate strategy with Mme Robillard — the Ottawa liaison — and Jean Charest of the federal Pro-

gressive Conservative Party.” By early March 1995, it was clear that Mr Parizeau’s strategy had borne no fruit. His commissions had begun their hearings in February, with a massive program planned.” But the sessions had generated little drama or passion for independence; they were not closely covered by the media, and they produced as many troubling questions as reassurances.” Quebecers demanded more information about the purpose and implications of sovereignty. The first commission report that was released, from La Chaudiére-Appalaches, stated, “La Commission croit avoir décelé ici la plus grande source d’inquiétudes

a l’égard du projet souverainiste: le pain et le beurre aprés un changement politique aussi important.”** Moreover, the polls showed no rise in support for sovereignty; the Yes was stalled below 45 per cent.” Given the widely shared expectation that the sovereigntists would lose support over the course of a campaign, along with the assumption that polls underreported federalist support, the prospect of a smashing defeat loomed.

271 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

In this context, divisions soon emerged in the sovereigntist ranks.

While some hardliners continued to follow the December script, others debated whether the referendum’s timing and the question to be posed were appropriate. The premier himself admitted early on that the question might have to be changed, though he was insistent that the referendum would be held in 1995.** But this barely preceded the return to public life of Lucien Bouchard, who cut short his recuperation because of the urgency of the situation. The Bloc leader insisted that a lost referendum would be ruinous: “if we ever said No to the societal project that is the sovereignty of Quebec, which would signify a Yes to the status quo, we would pay dearly for that. Ottawa would allow itself every temptation.”°° The debate about the referendum question concerned whether it should refer explicitly to economic association with Canada — or even

political association, as Mr Dumont demanded.” On timing, the issue was whether to defer the referendum to the autumn or even beyond. A great many strategic variations were under discussion.°’ Despite meeting a dispirited caucus in early March, the premier continued to insist that the referendum would be about sovereignty and that a June vote was possible.** Nevertheless, the confusion grew and

the pressure continued, not least when the deputy premier likened an early, losing vote to the Charge of the Light Brigade.” Finally, isolated, Mr Parizeau announced that the referendum would not be held

before the autumn.” This set the stage for more turmoil when Mr Bouchard made his virage at the first convention of the Bloc québécois. In his opening address, while insisting on the need for sovereignty, he referred at much greater length to the main concerns of the public as revealed by the PQ’s consultative exercise. One was to decentralize the governance of Quebec; another was to design a projet de société for a sovereign Quebec. Mr. Bouchard committed himself to the first but argued that the second depended on inclusiveness and solidarity, and that no specific guarantees could be provided in advance: “La souveraineté est d’abord et avant tout affaire de confiance.”* The core of his speech concerned a Yes vote. This would be an act of self-affirmation as a people, he said, and it would force ROC to recognize the fact. The two peoples would then discuss their mutual interests, the foremost of which was an economic union. Maintaining an economic union — un nouveau partenariat économique — through

a global treaty could require common political institutions along the lines of the European Union. These structures might include a parliamentary conference, a ministerial council, a secretariat, a court, and administrative commissions.” The new notion of partnership

272 From Referendum to Referendum

flowed ineluctably from Quebecers’ hesitations about sovereignty:

“Aussi, ne souhaitent-ils dire NON 4 la souveraineté, dans un référendum qui brusquerait leurs hésitations et ne répondrait pas a leurs interrogations. Ils sont préts 4 dire OUI a un projet rassembleur.

Le projet souverainiste doit prendre rapidement un virage qui le rapproche davantage des Québécois et des Québécoises et qui ouvre une voie d’avenir crédible 4 de nouveaux rapports Québec-Canada, répondant a leurs légitimes préoccupations.”* This bombshell was inscribed in a motion and pushed through the convention, though not without resistance.“ The task of preparing proposals about Canada-

Quebec institutions was conferred upon a committee headed by the lawyer Daniel Turp.* As the virage reverbrated, Mr Bouchard was attacked as a perennial quitter and as being self-aggrandizing.*° Others saw the move as a step in unblocking the sovereigntists’ impasse by opening a way for Mr Dumont and the soft nationalists to engage in the movement.” In any case, the Bloc leader threatened not to campaign in a losing effort.*® And Mr Parizeau eventually gave way. When it finally appeared, the report of the National Commission on the Future of Quebec proposed that the draft bill be amended to include an offer of Quebec-Canada political institutions, and the premier agreed.” The stage was now Set for an autumn referendum on a new question. This development provoked consternation among federalists, who had anticipated winning a June referendum on a fairly clear question about sovereignty. One reaction was ridicule. As Jean Paré, edi-

tor of L’Actualité, put it, Mr Bouchard had issued a “unilateral declaration of association.”” Less pithily, some premiers and Reform Party spokespeople were moved to declare that common institutions were unlikely to be negotiated after a separation and that there was no middle way between federalism and independence.” On the strategic front, federalists could take some comfort in the thought that if

common institutions were to be preserved, it would be harder for the sovereigntists to argue for the necessity of secession. However, the virage appealed to a conception of Canada widespread in Quebec — that the country is composed of two nations that must deal with each other égal-d-égal. A Yes vote could be depicted as forcing negotiations on this basis. Another source of anxiety for the federalists was that the new strategy put more pressure on them to define what would happen after a Yes. On the one hand, they were loath to admit that cooperation might be possible, for this could allay fears of economic loss and thus increase support for sovereignty. On the other

hand, to deny flatly that a partnership was conceivable could be

273 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

interpreted as an insulting rebuff, or at least as denying the history of accommodation and the sense of inclusion and respect in Canada to which the federalists appealed. In sum, the virage made the federalists’ campaign more difficult. The No side had raised enough doubts to stop Mr Parizeau’s drive towards sovereignty, but as one official later confided, “We did our job too well.” The new direction of the sovereignty movement was formalized in an agreement signed on 12 June 1995 by Mr Parizeau, Mr Bouchard, and Mr Dumont. This bound the PQ, the Bloc, and the ADQ to coor-

dinate their efforts in the referendum that would be held in the autumn of 1995. Its essence was to combine a vote for sovereignty with “a formal proposal for anew economic and political partnership with Canada.” Sovereignty was defined as the power of Quebec “to levy all of its taxes, pass all of its laws, [and] sign all of its treaties.” The partnership proposal was to reflect “the wish of Quebecers to maintain equitable and flexible ties with our Canadian neighbours so that we can manage our common economic space together, particularly by means of joint institutions, including institutions of a political nature.” A critical issue was what a positive referendum result would mean. The agreement specified that a Yes victory would empower the National Assembly to proclaim the sovereignty of Quebec; at the same time, the government would “be bound” to propose to Canada “a treaty on anew economic and political Partnership.” Should an agreement on the partnership treaty be reached, it stated, the assembly “will” declare the sovereignty of Quebec; then the treaty would be ratified. If the negotiations proved “fruitless,” the assembly “will be empowered to declare the sovereignty of Québec without further delay.” The negotiations were to take no more than one year, “unless the National Assembly decides otherwise.” The partnership was to take the form of a general framework treaty.

The agreement declared that despite the fact that a sovereign Quebec would maintain access to markets and could keep the Canadian dollar, “given the volume of trade between Québec and Canada and the extent of their economic integration, it will be to the evident advantage of both States to sign a formal treaty of economic and political Partnership.” The treaty would cover a very wide range of economic

activity. As well as dividing assets and providing for the “management of the common debt,” it would permit the partnership to act with respect to a customs union (along with the free movement of goods, individuals, services and capital), monetary policy, labour mobility, and citizenship. Further provisions might concern internal

274 From Referendum to Referendum

trade, international trade, international representation, transportation, defence, financial institutions, fiscal and budgetary policies, environmental protection, crime, postal services, and other matters. To manage all of this, joint institutions were proposed. These bore a close resemblance to those of the European Union. There would be a council made up of an equal number of ministers from each state, who would have the power to make decisions about the implementation of the treaty. Each state would have a veto. There would also be a parliamentary assembly composed of delegates from the legislatures of each state, which could pass resolutions and hear reports from joint administrative commissions. Although funded equally, the assembly would be based on population, with Quebec having 25 per cent of the seats. Last would be a tribunal, which would have binding powers to settle disputes; its composition was unspecified, though the agreement suggested that it might work like the dispute resolution panels under NAFTA. Perhaps the most remarkable elements of the 12 June agreement were its provisions on how the Canada-Quebec negotiations would

be supervised. Obviously, there was some suspicion that the Government of Quebec, armed with a referendum mandate to declare sovereignty, might not negotiate in good faith to arrive at a partnership arrangement. Hence the agreement provided for an “orienta-

tion and supervision committee” made up of “independent personalities,” who would be agreed on by the PQ, the BQ, and the ADO. It would take part in the selection of the chief negotiator for Quebec, would have an observer at the negotiations, would advise

the government about the talks, and, most important, would “inform the public on the procedures and on the outcome of the negotiations.” Mr Bouchard, obviously aware of many Quebecers’ doubts about the PQ government’s commitment to the partnership (and per-

haps sharing them), declared that the agreement embodied “a sacred commitment of sovereigntists that good faith negotiations will be conducted to achieve the goal.”°? Altogether, this agreement melded the drive towards sovereignty with a set of partnership proposals designed to maintain very high

levels of economic and political integration between Canada and Quebec. Potentially, it could minimize economic disruption and transition costs (while, obviously, constraining Quebec’s policy autonomy and leaving vast areas of common policy open to veto and immobilisme).

More important, it was designed to reassure Quebecers that the many

areas of economic, political, and social life about which they had expressed concern before the regional commissions might continue undisturbed after a Yes vote. But of course the partnership was an

275 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn't

offer only. There were no guarantees that such a comprehensive arrangement could be reached. The 12 June agreement had even stated this: “We are convinced that this proposal is in the interests of both Québec and Canada, though we cannot of course presume to know what Canadians will decide in this regard.” The federalist response was played out throughout the course of the whole referendum debate. But the core of that response emanated immediately from prime minister Chrétien: “They are not changing the substance of the problem. They still want to separate but they don’t have the guts to say

so.”

With the stage set for the referendum, there was little overt activity during the summer of 1995. The one punctuation of the period occurred when Mr Parizeau, in an unguarded moment, suggested that a Yes vote would plunge Quebecers into sovereignty as inescapably as lobsters that found themselves in a pot of boiling water — or (the words reported vary) in a trap. This seemed to substantiate many people’s suspicions about the premier’s weak commitment to the partnership, but the impact of the event was lost in disputes about translation and, more important, in the summer vacation from public politics.*° Generally this was a period in which the two sides firmed

up their organizations and worked on financing. The parameters for these efforts were established by Quebec’s referendum law, which forced supporters of each side into one of two umbrella committees and strictly limited fundraising and spending.” The summer was also a time for setting strategy and preparing for its tactical implementation through decisions about advertising, campaign tours, the division of leaders’ responsibilities, the engagement of various groups, the mobilization of electors, and so on. The details of all of these matters are not public; they were manifest only as the campaign unfolded. Their most important strategic manifestation was the arguments deployed by the two sides. Politicians in critical

contests have many weapons, including money, organization, force, and loyalty, but the basic tool ina democracy remains words. It is the superior deployment of arguments that ultimately produces victory. The 1995 referendum campaign involved an exceedingly rich and complex array of discourse. As will be shown, the play of argument and counterargument tilted gradually towards the Yes side and almost produced victory for the sovereigntists. THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

In late August the federalists and the sovereigntists were almost tied in public support, according to a poll that asked, “If the referendum

276 From Referendum to Referendum

were being held today, would you vote for or against the sovereignty of Quebec with an offer of economic and political partnership with Canada?” Respondents answering No totalled 45.3 per cent, those answering Yes were 44.4 per cent, 6.5 per cent were undecided, and 3.8 per cent refused to answer.” However, the No voters were firmer in their intentions than those inclined to vote Yes. As well, on harder questions that asked about Quebec becoming an independent country or that failed to mention association, Yes support sank to around 40 per cent or even lower.°® On the other hand, large majorities of voters favoured federal offers of constitutional change, and the credibility of the three principal sovereigntist leaders was significantly higher than that of all the prominent federalists.°? Mr Bouchard was, __ by far, the leader perceived as most competent (32 per cent among francophones versus 9 per cent for Mr Chrétien and 6 per cent for Mr Johnson), even though a clear majority of the electorate (52 per cent)

identified the economy rather than sovereignty (6 per cent) as the main priority.” In this context, the federalist side stuck to its basic strategy, confi-

dent that the sovereigntists would lose ground over the campaign and that the undecided voters would split predominantly towards the status quo in the end.” The strategy involved placing on the sovereigntists the burden of showing that their option was superior, appealing to Quebecers’ sense of attachment to Canada, stressing the disruption that “separation” would cause, and showing that the federal system could provide good government while flexibly accom-

modating many voters’ desire for change without making constitutional amendments.” For their part, the sovereigntists aimed to appeal to Quebecers’ sense of national identification, to portray the existing order as inflexible and even threatening, and to show that sovereignty would bring gains on several fronts while the partnership would protect voters from short-term economic losses and eventual isolation from Canada. The PQ government recalled the National Assembly on 7 September 1995. This timing allowed for a 30 October referendum date after the mandatory thirty-five hours of debate on the question to be put to the electorate and after the eighteen days that had to elapse before the writ was issued (which actually occurred on 1 October). The official campaign would last four weeks from the dropping of the writ. Into the assembly, the government introduced Bill 1, An Act respecting the Future of Québec. The long preamble to the bill consisted of the Declaration of Sovereignty, which had been assembled by acommittee over the preceding months. The declaration appealed to history and common values, to future goals, and to the various

277 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

communities comprising modern Quebec. It also contained a litany of historic constitutional grievances (which might help legally to justify

secession), and it led to three declarations: 1 We, the people of Québec, declare that we are free to choose our future. 2 We, the people of Québec, declare it is our will to be in full possession of all the powers of a state: to vote all our laws, to levy all our taxes, to sign all our treaties, and to exercise the highest power of all, conceiving, and controlling, by ourselves, our fundamental law. 3 We, the people of Québec, through our National Assembly, proclaim: Québec is a sovereign country.

The actual substance of the bill closely followed the framework of the 12 June agreement (which was attached to it as a schedule). Section 1 authorized the National Assembly “within the scope of this Act, to proclaim the sovereignty of Québec.” But it also stipulated that “the proclamation must be preceded by a formal offer of economic and political partnership with Canada.” The partnership treaty to be proposed was to be as described in the 12 June agreement, and it was to require ratification by the National Assembly. However, the assembly was empowered by the bill to make effective the Declaration of Sovereignty, at which time, according to section 2, “Québec shall become a sovereign country.” This would take place after negotiations on the partnership treaty had been concluded (which had to be before 30 October 1996 “unless the National Assembly decides otherwise”). Then, according to section 26, “the proclamation of sover-

eignty may be made as soon as the partnership treaty has been approved by the National Assembly or as soon as the latter, after requesting the opinion of the orientation and supervision committee, has concluded that the negotiations have proved fruitless.” Bill 1, in short, provided for a unilateral declaration of independence. The rest of the bill provided for arrangements designed to appeal to various segments of the electorate. For example, the government

would endeavour to locate the partnership institutions in the Outaouais region, where many federal public servants resided. The new constitution would be drawn up by a commission with equal gender representation (and it would be submitted to a referendum). The constitution would state that Quebec “is a French-speaking coun-

try,” but it would “guarantee the English-speaking community that its identity and institutions will be preserved.” Aboriginal nations would have their existing constitutional and self-government rights protected (but “in a manner consistent with the territorial integrity of Québec”). Significantly, given the persistent complaints from the

278 From Referendum to Referendum

regions about overcentralization, Bill 1 provided that the constitution would allocate powers and fiscal resources to local and regional authorities. Beyond this, the bill made four central promises: Quebec would maintain its existing boundaries; Quebec citizenship would be acquired by all residents holding Canadian citizenship and by all born within Quebec, and this could be held concurrently with Canadian citizenship; Quebec would have the Canadian dollar as its legal currency; and Quebec would assume its treaty obligations and rights, particularly with respect to the North American Free Trade Agreement. The rest of the bill provided for the continuity of permits, contracts, courts, and laws (all existing Canadian laws would be deemed laws of Quebec until changed), of benefits (including unemployment insurance, child tax benefits, and pensions), and of public-service employment (for Quebec residents employed by Canada). The bill also

provided for an interim constitution, if necessary, to bridge the period between the declaration of sovereignty and the entry into force of the new constitution. It further authorized the government to conclude with Canada “any other agreement to facilitate the application of this Act,” especially about “the equitable apportionment of the assets and liabilities of the Government of Canada” — phrasing which suggested that the 12 June language about “management of the common debt” might be too constraining in the circumstances of a vote for sovereignty. The bill was not intended to be passed by the assembly before the

referendum. It was the referendum that would trigger its passage, negotiations with Canada, and all the rest. On 7 September the PQ government also unveiled the referendum question (which was eventually adopted by the assembly on 20 September). It read: Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for anew Economic and Political Partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995? YES or NO?®

A copy of the bill was sent to every household in the province. At the outset of the campaign, the federalist side was confident, almost to the point of complacency. In his first address on the issue, Mr Chrétien argued that the sovereigntists’ question was duplicitous because a Yes vote was really “a one-way ticket to separation,” but he was certain that Quebecers would choose Canada: “It’s the best country in the world, and you all know that Canada will win.” Even before the campaign began, the prime minister said, “I’m not

279 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

losing any sleep. I’m extremely confident. We’re way ahead of where we were two months before the referendum last time.”© Indeed, the sovereigntists appeared to be making little headway, despite the publicity surrounding the launch of the campaign. While some early polls showed the voters evenly divided, with the Yes support softer, others placed the No clearly ahead, a trend that seemed to grow slightly (although the difference was often within the polls’ margin of error, and much depended on how the undecided and non-respondents were

allocated). By the end of September there were rumours that the vote might be delayed, and Mr Bouchard admitted, “I’m not saying the campaign is going marvellously well. I say that we are in a tight spot, that we will have to brace ourselves for a tough fight.” One tactic of the Yes side that had failed was the release of economic studies of sovereignty, commissioned under the leadership of Restructuring Minister Richard Le Hir. On topics such as the division of the debt, a sovereign Quebec’s fiscal situation, and monetary policy, most of the more than forty studies produced little public reaction. A few failed to lend credibility to the sovereigntist position, all were assailed by competing experts, there were allegations of patronage in their commissioning, and the whole exercise collapsed rather

ignominiously.® Later in the campaign, Mr Bouchard declared that the studies were irrelevant. Another possibility for the sovereigntists was to provoke polarization between Quebecers and Canada. The Yes side made some early moves in this direction, and clearly there was deep animosity between some leaders in the two camps. In May 1995, as the virage was being consolidated, Mr Chrétien accused the sovereigntists of trying to “trick” Quebecers: “There is now a very cynical and very transparent attempt to confuse Quebecers, to mislead them, to suggest that you can separate from Canada and still be Canadian.” In contrast to the federalists’ frankness, he insisted, “the other way of governing shows — and I measure my words carefully — a contempt for democracy.” Mr Parizeau lashed back immediately, accusing the prime minister of betraying his fellow Quebecers: “This man is sabotaging the economy of Quebec, and in the exact way he sabotaged the powers of Quebec in 1981 ... One day we will have to understand this method of using Quebecers in Ottawa to carry out designs, to achieve things that anglophones would not dare try on their own. These affairs are nauseating.””° Apart from such personal attacks, polarization could be increased by focusing on how the federal system had failed Quebec and, more powerfully, by suggesting that a No vote would unleash upon Quebecers the centralizing tendencies of Ottawa and the homogenizing propensities of English Canada.

280 From Referendum to Referendum

These themes did persist in the discourse of the campaign,” but they were not major ones; the drive towards the referendum was not marked by the polarization described as possible in chapter 14. Along

with the structural constraints mentioned therein, other factors limited the capacity to polarize (or diminished the political rewards to be realized through this strategy). First was the fact that reaction in ROC to all such accusations — indeed, to the whole content of the campaign — was very muted. The provincial premiers largely kept quiet throughout the campaign, respecting it as an internal Quebec debate and remaining confident, until very near the end, in Ottawa’s lead. The media behaved similarly. Second, the Bloc had conducted itself responsibly in Ottawa. With few exceptions, it had not impeded federal business, and the governing Liberals had tended to reserve their nastiest attacks for the Reform Party.” Third, a polarizing strategy would have alienated those voters with strong attachments to Canada (who were presumably more numerous among the undecided voters, the real objects of the campaign), and it would have flown in the face of many Quebecers’ objective experiences of Canada.”

Further, polarization would have deeply contradicted the fact that the partnership was fundamentally positive in its attitude towards Canada — and indeed was designed to attract voters who felt that way. Finally, it would have sharply divided Quebecers, denying the position that sovereignty represented a projet rassemblateur, open and inclusive, with promise for all, and undermining the civility that char-

acterizes democratic politics in that province. Essentially, the great majority of Quebecers regarded both federalism and sovereignty as legitimate options; while one’s opponents could be misguided and uninformed, they were not treasonous. These features of the campaign, and the norms impeding polarization, were clearly shown in late September when a prominent federalist businessman addressing a No rally stated, “We can’t just win on October 30; we have to crush them.” This gaffe provoked a storm of outrage, and the federalist leaders were quick to distance themselves from such language. It was a gaffe not only because it appeared overconfident and arrogant, but more basically because it denied the other side a legitimate existence within the community. Mr Johnson reacted quickly, stating, “I’m asking everyone to lower the volume because it is everyone in Quebec who will still be here the morning after the vote.””* Neither the Yes nor the No forces faced a strong incentive to promote polarization, either within Quebec or between Quebec and ROC.

Another important element in the early campaign was Quebec business. Respected leaders of big business overwhelmingly were

281 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

staunch federalists, and they waded into the debate to argue that secession would have dire economic consequences. For example, Marcel Dutil, president of Canam Manac, warned voters that they would be using the “Quebec peso” after sovereignty, and Laurent Beaudoin, president of Bombardier, declared, “It’s out of the question that a state reduced to the size of an independent Quebec could adequately support the development of this type of business.””

For the Yes side, Mr Parizeau counterattacked, linking his communitarian sovereigntist project with a social-democratic conception of fairness and sharing. Addressing business people in the Beauce region, he declared, “I believe in the equality of chances and I want to build a society based on this principle.””° More strongly, as Mr Beaudoin and Power Corporation head Paul Desmarais warned of the disruptive dangers of sovereignty, Mr Parizeau not only accused them personally of taking federal grants and moving their assets out of the province, but he decried a neocolonial line of propaganda

designed to frighten ordinary voters: “What’s this idea of scaring people?” he asked. “This has been going on for what, 25 years now. saying: ‘Don’t move. You are never as beautiful as when you are on

your knees. And if you ever think of getting up from the ground, we'll leave.’ Well, I just don’t believe it.””” Perhaps pressed by his labour supporters, Mr Parizeau continued these attacks, even referring to “billionaires who spit on us” despite Quebecers’ loyalty and provincial tax concessions.” In a society proud of its economic leaders, however, this line of attack seemed to pay few dividends for the sovereigntists, and it simply testified to the disarray that permeated the Yes camp in the early stages of the official campaign. Yet another component was injected into the campaign by the Aboriginal peoples. Their negotiations with the PQ government had come

to naught, and native leaders were determined not be to caught defenceless by a Yes vote. They aimed to stake out a moral claim to autonomy. Hence the Northern Quebec Inuit (organized as Makavik) decided to hold their own referendum in order to affirm their right to remain in Canada as part of the whole Inuit nation, and the Cree announced similar plans at the same time as they released a lengthy defence of their right to self-determination.” “There is nothing you will do without our consent,” Grand Chief Matthew Coon-Come firmly

stated.”

While the Aboriginals’ position appeared to present an obstacle to sovereignty, so tending to reduce the Yes vote, it also had the potential to create a backlash against them. It certainly created problems for the Quebec federalists. Mr Johnson felt compelled to say that the Cree referendum concerned “by implication” whether Quebec territory

282 From Referendum to Referendum

was divisible or not. “My own view,” he said, “and that of my party, has always been consistent. The Quebec borders that we have today are Quebec’s borders.”*' In the end, the Cree voted No by 96.3 per

cent and the Inuit by 95 per cent.** While these results were very strong, and the turnouts were reported to be high, there were no international observers present at the polls. Nevertheless, the results

did compel the federal minister for Indian affairs to agree that Aboriginals were not “cattle” to be transferred from one jurisdiction

to another. They had said “quite clearly that they’re staying with Canada,” he observed, “and I think they have that right.”® In the end, though, the Aboriginals’ concerns constituted a minor theme in the campaign, and the results of their vote were overshadowed by other events as the day of the Quebec referendum approached. A striking feature of the campaign was the absence of involvement by political leaders from ROC. The provincial premiers left the battle to Ottawa and Mr Johnson’s forces, except for occasional warnings that English Canadians might be embittered by a Yes vote and that the economic status quo would not prevail after “separation.” Ontario was a partial exception. Mike Harris, the Progressive Conservative premier elected in June 1995, gave a major speech in Toronto during the campaign. “If Quebec separates,” he stated, “Ontario would trade with it on no different a basis than it trades with other foreign countries ... We would have no special obligations tied to history or com-

mon national interest ... If Quebec separates, there would be international borders between Ontario and Quebec. And borders do matter.”** As well, Mr Harris flatly rejected the prospect of negotiations, arguing that a political partnership would not be in Ontario’s interest. Finally, he stressed that his government sought a “major rebalancing of responsibilities” in Canada; hence, Ontario would be a “strong ally” of Quebecers seeking change in the federation. Mr Parizeau,

however, laughed off any attempt to reform the federation and accused the premier of bluffing about cutting off economic ties.” A second partial exception was Bob Rae, former premier of Ontario, who

actually went to Quebec to debate and make speeches, and did so increasingly towards the end of the campaign. Fluent in French, he was prepared to deride the sovereigntists’ partnership proposal and to show Quebecers how angry English Canadians would be if their beloved country was destroyed.” The Reform Party also sought to be involved in the campaign. Mr Manning was not prepared to accept without question the lead and strategy of the established federalist forces and to allow the No campaign to be defined largely by Quebecers — Mr Chrétien, Mr Johnson,

Mr Charest, and their close advisers. In June 1994 he had addressed

283 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

an open letter to the prime minister, declaring, “We cannot stand by passively and allow Quebec voters to make the decision — separation — without offering them a vigorous defence of Canada, including a

positive federalist alternative to the status quo. And we cannot let them make their decision without disputing the separatist contention that separation will be a relatively uncomplicated and painless process.”*’ The letter covered twenty very precise questions about secession.* Such questions, Mr Manning wrote, “have been dismissed

as ‘hypothetical’ or answered with the standard line that the best way to convince Quebecers to stay in Canada is to provide them with more of the same.” As the campaign got underway, the Reform Party pressed the gov-

ernment in the House of Commons about these matters and, more generally, about what the government would do in the event of a Yes vote. Mr Manning also predicted publicly that such a result would very likely entail an election, because the prime minister would have forfeited the confidence of the Canadian people.” But Reform made

little headway either in the House or in the media as the federalist side coalesced around its basic strategy, and when the House rose in September, Mr Manning was deprived of his platform. Still, Reform did attempt to insert itself into the campaign, notably by publishing a twenty-point plan for reforming the federation, which appeared in full-page newspaper advertisements in Quebec at the end of October.” This proposed a profound decentralization of powers, includ-

ing provincial jurisdiction over language, but no special status for Quebec; it probably had very little impact on the referendum results.

With four weeks left in the campaign, Chantal Hébert, a prominent Quebec columnist, declared that the odds were in favour of a “decisive federalist victory,” the only obstacles being arrogance on the No side and the possibility of strategic voting for the Yes in order to preserve Quebec’s bargaining power within the federation.”! Jeffrey Simpson, a leading ROC columnist, wrote that the chances of a Yes victory were “exceedingly slim” and were realizable only if the sovereigntists put Mr Bouchard at the head of the campaign, increased

appeals to ethnicity, and hinted at a second referendum on the outcome of the partnership negotiations; as well, the No side would have

to make egregious mistakes.” Not all of these things occurred, but momentum did swing to the sovereigntist side in mid-campaign. First, Mr Parizeau named five members of the committee that was to oversee negotiations with Canada about the partnership treaty.” Much more significantly, he announced that Mr Bouchard would be Quebec’s chief negotiator of the partnership treaty. In effect, this passed

the Yes leadership into the hands of a trusted politician who could

284 From Referendum to Referendum

attract moderate nationalists to the sovereigntist side while reasssuring

them that the promised partnership was viable. This move undoubtedly injected new life into the Yes forces on the ground,” and the poll results suggest that it was followed by some movement in public opinion. On 14 October, for example, the Globe and Mail headline blared, “Yes Side Narrows Gap in Latest Poll,” as it reported a Léger & Léger poll which found the No side at 50.8 per cent and the Yes at 49.2 per cent.” However, this may have been a matter of perception or the spin put onto the results by the media. From the outset of the campaign there was a considerable difference in the pattern of support registered by different polling firms, an artifact of slight variations in the questions posed and different methods of allocating those who refused to answer or were undecided. In most cases, the gap between the Yes and No support was within the margin of error, and had been so for most polls since the beginning of the campaign.” Nevertheless, many polls showed weaknesses in the federalist message and the rising credibility of Mr Bouchard’s partnership. Typical was a very large survey conducted in late September by SOM and Environics. Even though this poll placed the No forces firmly in the lead, it found that 62 per cent of Quebecers believed they would

use the Canadian dollar after sovereignty, 45 per cent thought they would retain their Canadian passports, 69 per cent anticipated an economic union, and almost 60 per cent believed there would be an economic and political partnership after a Yes result.” Another survey found that one-third of Yes voters were aiming “to give Lucien Bouchard a strong mandate to negotiate a new deal for Quebec within

Canada”; the other two-thirds wanted Quebec to become an independent country.” Such results were intensely frustrating for the federalist side. The leaders repeated the message that a Yes meant separation, and they stepped up their attacks on the economic front, warning of trade disruption, heavy job losses, increased government deficits, and a sharp drop in the value of the dollar.” In the context of a simmering debate about whether a sovereign Quebec would accede to NAFTA, the federal finance minister Paul Martin warned that admission would not be automatic and therefore, 90 per cent of Quebec exports would be at risk, involving almost one million jobs. While Mr Martin undoubtedly meant only that jobs in these export sectors would have some probability of being subject to protectionist measures, his remarks were scorned by the Yes side as desperate hyperbole. Mr Parizeau had an immediate riposte: “Last week for [Mr] Johnson, it was slightly below 100,000. Next week I suppose we’re aiming at ten million ...

285 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

There are only 3,200,000 jobs in Quebec — and past that point they’ll

have to import the unemployed.” As will be seen, this was a typical counter to the federalists’ dire predictions about the economic consequences of a Yes vote. In fact, the financial markets had been reacting to the sovereignty

threat and the referendum campaign, and they moved more in response to the shift in momentum towards the Yes. Even in late 1994, it was apparent that the PQ government’s reluctance to confront its budget deficit before the anticipated June referendum was causing some weakness in the Canadian dollar and also a growing interestrate spread between between Canada and the United States.’ Que-

bec debt was duly downgraded by Canadian and American bond-rating agencies, and so were the bonds issued by the federal government (largely because of parallel inaction on the deficit).""* In July mortgage rates were increased, an event that bank spokespeople

attributed to pre-referendum volatility." As the campaign began in earnest, there was downward pressure on the dollar — it lost 1.6 per cent of its value in less than a week — which provoked Bank of Canada

intervention and a widening spread between Canadian and U.S. interest rates.*°* Early October was marked by more volatility, driven by polls and rumours. On 20 October, in the wake of an Angus Reid poll showing the Yes ahead, the Canadian dollar dropped 72 basis points, and the Toronto stock exchange TSE index slipped 37 points: foreign investors were rumoured to be reducing their Canadian exposure.*® On 23 October, the TSE plummeted 123 points (or 2.8 per cent), and the dollar dropped another 88 basis points."”° These movements provided opportunities

for some speculators to buy in anticipation of a No, and some did, but the important fact is that the volatility reflected deep underlying uncertainty about the effects of a possible Yes result. Were there to be such an outcome, said an economist at a Canadian brokerage house,

we would be “in uncharted territory." There is some doubt about how markets process data about political events, particularly new public-opinion polls, as was shown by

their movement during the Charlottetown referendum, when the markets seem to have absorbed poll information in a relatively straight-

forward way.’ During the Quebec referendum campaign, according to an extensive empirical study, the volatility of TSE options held within the normal range until 23 October, when it increased by more than 30 per cent, and it peaked on the day of the referendum at levels

almost three times the norm.’ Uncertainty hit the Canadian dollar slightly earlier, as volatility began to rise on 17 October and broke upward sharply on the twentieth (the day the cover of the Economist

286 From Referendum to Referendum

carried a banner asking, “Will Canada Split?”). Like the TSE options,

the volatility of Canadian dollar options peaked on 30 October at over three times normal levels. These results suggest, interestingly, that foreign investors were quicker than domestic ones to take the prospect of a Yes victory seriously. More important, they attest to the very high levels of uncertainty caused by the close referendum race ~ and they provide a baseline for predicting what stock and dollar values would have been in the event of a Yes result.

Apart from traders in stocks and currency, other foreign actors played a minor role in the Quebec referendum. Foreign governments treated the struggle between federalists and sovereigntists as a domestic matter, for the most part. From the time of its election, of course, the PQ government was concerned to lay the groundwork for eventual international recognition of a sovereign Quebec.”® In an early

trip to Paris, Mr Parizeau received some encouragement from the candidates for the French presidency, but Mr Chirac returned to France’s traditional position of “non-indifference but non-interference”

after he was elected." Late in the referendum campaign, however, he was reported to have said in an American television interview that his government would recognize Quebec after a Yes vote." While an early recognition of Quebec sovereignty by France might have some symbolic weight, the Americans held much greater practical influence. Mr Parizeau’s first foreign trip was to New York, where

he argued that the United States should not become involved in the sovereignty debate.'* But President Clinton, speaking to the Canadian Parliament in February 1995, “sent an unambiguous signal that the United States would prefer that Canada remain intact.”"* The Americans were careful to provide no guarantees about Quebec’s accession to NAFTA; their official position was that “there are numerous and complicated legal issues and we have given no assurances to anyone.”*» During the campaign these thorny issues were highlighted in anew study which showed the difficulties for Quebec of acceding to the GATT, the Auto Pact, and NAFTA. The study em-

phasized that negotiations would be required in all cases, that Quebec would very likely have to make substantial concessions, and that

obstacles would be much reduced if Quebec and Canada had first reached “a close and mutually supportive economic agreement.” "” As the sovereigntist campaign gained support, the American position became even clearer. Former president George Bush urged unity, and Warren Christopher, the secretary of state, departed significantly

from the traditional formulation when he said, “I don’t want to intrude on what is rightfully an internal issue in Canada, but at the same time I want to emphasize how much we have benefited, here in

287 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

the United States, from an opportunity to have the kind of relationship that we do have at the present time with a strong and united Canada ... I think it is probably useful for me to say that we have very carefully cultivated our ties with Canada, and it has been very responsive in connection with all those ties, and I think we shouldn’t take for granted that a different kind of organization would obviously have exactly the same kind of ties.”"” The PQ government responded formally to this blunt statement by writing to Mr Christopher warning him that outside interference by Washington could sour relations with Quebec for decades; more centrally, Mr Bouchard dismissed the American statement as epiphenomenal: “La courtoisie qu’il doit aujourd’hui a la souveraineté canadienne, il la devra demain a la souveraineté québécoise.”"* Meanwhile, as referendum day approached and such arguments appeared to be winning voters’ support, the American media began to focus on the contest.” Indeed, the referendum in Quebec became a news item around the world. Towards the end of October, as polls confirmed the decline in No support, near-panic struck the federalist camp. The daily numbers showed the Yes ahead, and as a well-informed Montreal columnist put it on 21 October, “If something doesn’t start to happen very soon, probably by the end of this weekend, Canada is one done turkey.” Emergency changes were made to the basic No strategy: the prime

minister increased his presence in the campaign well beyond his planned three major speeches, organizers desperately threw together a giant pro-Canada rally in Montreal, and there was a major shift in the federalists’ constitutional position. Constitutional movement was pressed by Mr Johnson, who envisaged the Yes forces successfully attracting all those Quebecers who were disaffected with the status quo and were seeking change. So a No-side document promised increased control over provincial jurisdictions.”' Then, after Mr Chrétien stated in a Quebec City speech that the province formed a “distinct society,” Mr Johnson urged all Canadian federalists to “echo our view of what the future holds for Quebec as part of Canada.”’” This was a clear appeal to Ottawa and

perhaps the other provincial governments to put some positive constitutional proposals on the table before the referendum, a stance

which both responded to public opinion about the campaign and reflected the strong majority opinion in Quebec in favour of constitutionally recognizing the province’s distinctiveness.’ Initially rebuffed by Mr Chrétien, who stated, “There is no desire at this time to debate the constitution,” the Quebec federalists were enthusiastically and effectively derided by the Yes forces for believing that Canada could deliver constitutional renewal.’ Mr Johnson, however, managed

288 From Referendum to Referendum

to prod the prime minister to issue a joint declaration: “We state unequivocally that Quebec is a distinct society. We remind you that we have both supported the inclusion of this principle in the Canadian Constitution every time Quebec has demanded it.”** Pressed hard by the Quebec wing, the No forces went much further than this in promising constitutional change.’° At a huge federalist rally in Verdun on 24 October, Mr Chrétien embraced the distinct society concept and held out the promise of a Quebec constitutional veto. His government would keep open all the paths for change, he said, “including the administrative and constitutional paths.”’”” The next day, in an extraordinary televised address to the whole country, he repeated this position: “We must recognize that Quebec’s language, its culture and institutions make it a distinct society. And no constitutional change that affects the powers of Quebec should ever be made without the consent of Quebecers. And that all governments — federal and provincial — must respond to the desire of Canadians — every-

where — for greater decentralization.”'** Of course, these promises were denounced by the sovereigntists as insincere, desperate, and

too little - as only “vague allusions” to change.’” But they represented a major strategic shift by the No forces. Meanwhile, citizens were mobilized. Unity rallies were held in many Canadian cities, and pro-Quebec resolutions were passed by several municipalities and some provincial legislatures. But organizers concentrated on a massive demonstration in Montreal on the Friday before the referendum. Members of Parliament and many businesses arranged transport to the city, while the two major airlines and the railway offered drastically reduced fares. These preparations provoked scathingly sarcastic attacks from the Yes side, and outrage that they violated the strict regulations on referendum campaign expenditures.” But the rally drew well over 100,000 people to Place du Canada in downtown Montreal. There, as well as striking the familiar themes

about the uncertainties of a Yes result and the glories of Canada, Mr Chrétien promised to bring about all the changes necessary to maintain unity.“? And Jean Charest, leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, insisted that he would be a steady force pressing for constitutional renewal. Despite all this, the final published opinion polls were showing the Yes side to be clearly ahead among decided

voters.’

Given the various polls’ margins of error, as well as time lags, it is unclear what stemmed the sovereigntists’ momentum (if indeed the Yes was really in the lead). Perhaps it was the No side’s shift to embrace change in the federation. Or perhaps the pro-Canada rally weak-

ened commitment to the Yes side, despite the fact that it could be

289 The 1995 Referendum and the Yes That Wasn’t

interpreted not only as “an outpouring of abiding love” but also as “a tawdry closing-time seduction.”** Another possibility was the weather. On the day before the vote, the weather across Quebec was chilly and darkly autumnal, with brooding skies and steady, cold rain. Had this not been a Sunday, and one so much more conducive to sombre reflection than the crisp, sunny, Indian-summer alternative, then the Yes might have carried. Who knows? The final referendum result was 2,362,648 votes for the No option, and 2,308,360 votes for the Yes. If fewer than 30,000 people had voted

differently, the No victory would have been reversed. The turnout was a remarkable 93.52 per cent of eligible voters. But 1.82 per cent of the ballots were rejected as invalid. This was not above the norm in Quebec voting, but there were much higher levels in three Montreal-

area districts, and this left a bitter residue among No supporters, especially those who had endured very long waiting periods at some Montreal polling stations.” The general pattern of the results was clear enough. Ridings with large non-francophone populations tended towards the No side, as did voters in the Outaouais region. Throughout the great expanse of rural Quebec and in the Quebec City region, the Yes had a substantial lead, as it did in most of the francophone suburbs of Montreal. The west of the Island of Montreal went strongly No, but, much more surprisingly and perhaps decisively, the sovereigntists could not carry

the east end of the island: in these predominantly francophone, working-class neighbourhoods, the No side won overall.’ Reaction to the result was calm. There were very few minor disturbances on the streets as the exhausted leaders addressed their supporters. Mr Chrétien saluted the democratic nature of the decision and stated that the page should be turned and that Quebec and Ottawa should work together. He called on all Canadians not to forget their recent appeal to Quebecers, and he declared, “A mes concitoyens

et concitoyennes du Québec qui ont appuyé le Oui, je dis qui je comprends votre profonde volonté de changement.”'”’ For Mr Johnson,

it was also time for reconciliation and unity: “Si le camp du Non a

manifesté de facon concrete cette réticence a tourner le dos a l’expérience canadienne, il faut maintenant créer la plus grande coalition possible en faveur de changement, avec fierté et espoir, pour

les meilleures réalisations que nous pouvons anticiper.”*® | But the sovereigntists, with victory so close, were unyielding. Although Mr Bouchard told his partisans that it was necessary to accept the result, however narrow, and to be proud of the democratic exercise just ended, he cautioned vigilance against Ottawa and rallied

290 From Referendum to Referendum

his supporters once more: “Les Oui n’ont jamais été aussi nombreux

que ce soir et nous sommes encore tous la. Gardons espoir, car la prochaine fois sera la bonne. Et cette prochaine fois, elle pourrait venir plus rapidement qu l’on pense.”’” Mr Parizeau, profoundly disturbed

by the narrow loss, also exhorted sovereigntists to prepare for the next encounter, “for which we will not wait fifteen years this time.” But, in addition, he attributed blame for the defeat, and in a manner that shocked even his supporters. Pointing out that the Yes had attracted a clear majority of francophone voters, probably 60 per cent, he said, “C’est vrai qu’on a été battus, mais par quoi au fond? Par l’argent et par des votes ethniques.”"° This remark produced the first big outcome of the 1995 referendum. After uniformly unfavourable comment, and a night’s sleep, the premier announced that he would resign. Yet this was only the first manifestation of the changes which the historic 1995 referendum would bring — and which, by its searing campaign and razorthin result, it had brought already.

| CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

Major campaigns are fought with many tools, but in modern democracies they are fundamentally about language and argument. Given the structure of public opinion in Quebec, it was clear long before the referendum that there would be only a few key dimensions along

which the sovereigntist and federalist forces would fight for support. These were Quebecers’ sense of national identification (includ-

ing perceptions of rejection and confidence), their economic expectations, and their views of the Canadian constitutional system.’ The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the contending arguments that were deployed by the Yes and No sides throughout the course of the referendum campaign, in order to explain why the sovereigntists

gained support and came so close to victory. In some accounts of the campaign, it was national identification

that produced the rise in support for the Yes, especially after Mr Bouchard took centre stage when named as chief negotiator. As one commentator wrote, “He, more than the other secessionist leaders, can reach ordinary francophone Quebecers, summoning their Volksgeist

in a supreme collective act of ‘national affirmation’ that will, once and for all, enable Quebec to meet the rest of Canada equal to equal, face to face, people to people.”? Far more cautiously, some political scientists have agreed. Vincent Lemieux, for example, has argued that the replacement of Mr Parizeau by Mr Bouchard heightened the importance of the national-identification dimension and made it far more

difficult for voters to maintain a dual Canadian-Quebec sense of identity.°

292 From Referendum to Referendum

But this explanation encounters two problems. First, it is not evident that support for the Yes side showed a sharp increase coincident with Mr Bouchard’s assuming the leadership of the campaign. A straightforward reading of the published polls suggests that support for the No began to decline towards the end of September, well before the Bloc leader was named chief negotiator.* On the other hand, Maurice Pinard insists that there was a noticeable “Bouchard effect,” with the proportion of voters intending to vote Yes increasing by 4 or 5 per cent after the shift in leadership.” This is a moot point: the dif-

ferent polls asked respondents different questions; there is no universally accepted way of allocating the non-respondents (who ranged from 8 per cent to 31 per cent of the samples); some polls were outliers (in each direction); and in many cases the difference between Yes and No support was within the polls’ margin of error.® But assuming that there was a “Bouchard effect,” the important question is why it occurred. Here, the evidence is compelling that the shift of vote in-

tentions towards the Yes took place along the economic dimension rather than being driven by an increase in Quebecers’ sense of national identification. The political scientists Blais, Nadeau and Martin analysed two comparable Léger & Léger polls, one taken in June 1995 and the second

in the last week of the campaign.’ In the first, 52 per cent of francophones were intending to vote Yes; in the second, 62 per cent. Over this period, there was a slight increase in the reported propen-

sity of respondents to think of themselves as “Quebecers only” or “Quebecers first,” but this difference was not statistically significant. On the other hand, economic expectations about sovereignty became

much more positive (as did expectations about the situation of the

French language in Quebec). |

In a regression equation that included as variables the respondents’ sense of identification, economic and linguistic expectations, age, and domestic situation, it was found that the strongest predictor of voting intentions was the economic variable. A competing explanation might be that the salience of each factor changed in the interval be-

tween the two polls, so that national identification, while shifting little in absolute terms, came to have a greater bearing on the voting decision. But this did not occur: there was no significant interaction between the weight of each factor and the different polls. Further experimentation showed that the rise in Québécois identification accounted for a 1 per cent increase in Yes support, as did views about linguistic security. The shift in economic expectations, however, produced an increase of about 6 per cent in the Yes vote. So the rise in

sovereignty support took place along the economic dimension.

293 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

Substantively, when asked about the short-term economic consequences of sovereignty and the long-term effects, most respondents anticipated only a small short-term deterioration, and the majority envisaged a long-term economic improvement. Thus, it would seem that the sovereigntists’ arguments about the smooth transition to sovereignty and the benefits of the partnership were effective in lifting the Yes side to its near victory. Further evidence about the significance of the economic arguments is provided in a careful analysis of several polls by Guy Lachapelle, who shows that even in April 1995 the option of sovereignty, including an economic association with Canada, would have attracted almost 60 per cent of the electorate (though this was still less popular than the notion of transferring certain powers from Ottawa to Quebec).° Between April and October 1995, there was a strong increase

in the proportion of voters who felt that sovereignty was feasible (from 40 per cent to over 60 per cent), while the numbers believing that the federal system could be reformed fell from 50 per cent to about 42 per cent.’ More striking, a massive SOM-—Radio-Canada poll done in late September showed that if voters were certain that Canada

would negotiate an economic and political partnership, 56 per cent would vote for sovereignty and 34 per cent would vote No. If, however, they were certain that Canada would not negotiate the partnership, only 30 per cent would vote Yes and 57 per cent would vote against sovereignty.” Economic expectations certainly could shift votes.

Finally, it seems that the credibility of the partnership increased throughout the campaign period. A series of three CROP polls asked voters whether they believed that Canada would indeed agree to ne-

gotiate after a Yes vote, and the proportion answering Yes to this question rose from 46 per cent in late September to 51 per cent in late October, while those answering No fell from 39 to 29 per cent." Yet more evidence is provided by Pinard, who is most concerned with analysing the social and demographic correlates of support for sovereignty, along with underlying attitudinal factors, especially the

linguistic, economic, and political grievances of francophones.” In explaining the “Bouchard effect,” Pinard stresses the leader’s charisma and the confidence and trust he inspired, and presents some necessarily fragmentary evidence that some poll respondents had changed their voting intentions after the Bloc leader took centre stage in the Yes campaign.’* Undoubtedly, Mr Bouchard was a charismatic presence, but which of his messages was effective in shifting votes?

In Pinard’s analysis, it was the economic partnership. Through the course of the campaign, Quebecers’ sensitivity to historical grievances and their sense of insecurity seem not to have budged (although

294 From Referendum to Referendum

there may have been some increase in pride).’* What clearly did change

was the perception that the partnership was probable. Using some unpublished polls, Pinard shows that the proportion of voters who believed this increased steadily from 43 per cent in the first week of the campaign to 54 per cent in the last week.* Thus, Mr Bouchard’s impact, as shown in this analysis, was to diminish fears about the economic consequences of sovereignty: En assumant le rdle de négociateur en chef de ce nouveau partenariat, dont il avait été lui-méme l’instigateur lors du virage d’avril 1995, Lucien Bouchard

devint pour plusiers, grace a sa personnalité et 4 son message, le garant de la réussite de ces négotiations. I] se faisait fort, d’ailleurs, d’insister sur le fait que le reste du Canada ne pourrait refuser de négocier ce partenariat, qu'il était inévitable. C’était important, puisque sans accord préalable sur le partenariat, toute entente future demeurait aléatoire et constituait ainsi un point faible de l’option souverainiste.”®

This research, like the other studies, shows that the partnership proposal was attractive, that it helped make sovereignty seem realizable, that it weighed substantially on the voting decision, and that it gained credibility during the referendum campaign itself. But this was not the only element of the battle between the federalists and sovereigntists. Indeed, it may not have been the decisive one. Modern political campaigns are organized around a limited number of dimensions of discourse. On these, the partisan forces adopt positions strategically. The objective is not merely to develop arguments that are persuasive, in the sense that good political rhetoric can draw support, but to structure voters’ perceptions of the situation. In the words of William Riker, who coined the term “heresthetic”

to describe the structuring of discourse, people can be led strategically to find themselves on one side or the other “without any persuasion at all.”” The arguments deployed along these dimensions are crucial, even though they are filtered by the media and even though many voters may put little effort into understanding them. As one experienced strategist has written, “In a close race it comes down to the 3 to 7 per cent available undecided, and you’d better be there with your best at the exact moment they’re making up their minds. If you’re not, you might as well not even start.”’® Strategic discourse involves choosing dimensions and positions on them according to several considerations. One is winnability. The set of positions must have majority appeal, reaffirming the core supporters’ reasons for their choice while

also reaching voters who may occupy a rather different position.

295 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

Second is constancy: the positions must be consistently maintained over time in order to drive the message home and maintain credibility.” As well, the dimensions chosen and the positions taken on them must be logically coherent. This means that contradictory positions cannot be adopted about one theme; more important, taking certain positions on one dimension will preclude the adoption of some contradictory positions on another relevant dimension.” Finally, the campaign discourse should be tailored in anticipation of the opponents’ positions and arguments. Campaigns are competitive, and counterarguments must be foreseen, because the requirement of consistency will constrain the responses that can be made to them. If the opponents are making gains, an inability to respond effectively will leave open dangerous areas of vulnerability. In the Quebec referendum, the critical dimensions were those discussed in chapter 11 above, and the campaign unfolded much as predicted. The major difference was that the Yes forces did not propose a clear, straightforward question on sovereignty; instead, after Mr Bouchard’s virage, they fought on the twin proposals of sovereignty and the economic and political partnership. This rendered the argumentative strategy more complex for both sides, because the three main dimensions — national identification, the economic consequences of a Yes, and the existing constitutional system — became tightly interrelated. As well, the sovereigntists opened up anew, unanticipated

dimension of discourse — democracy. This one became the crucial underlying element in the campaign. It was because the No side was incapable of taking a position on this dimension that the sovereigntists

were able to make such headway with their arguments about the economy and the partnership, and almost to win the referendum.” THE CONSTITUTION

On the constitutional dimension, the No forces stood at zero — the status quo. This was consistent with the position that had helped Prime Minister Chrétien win the 1993 election, when he argued that the economy and jobs were the only matters of real concern to Canadians and Quebecers. After the sovereigntists opened the dimension by calling the referendum, the federalists continued to argue that the existing constitutional framework was adequate and was flexible enough to accommodate, in a cooperative fashion, any genuine demands from Quebec or other regions and groups. As Mr Chrétien put it during the referendum campaign, “The best way for Quebecers to assure positive change is to vote No. A No vote will allow Quebecers and other Canadians to work together to respond to new

296 From Referendum to Referendum

challenges.” Of course, this position made the Quebec wing of the No side increasingly uncomfortable, but it was maintained until the sudden shift during the final week of the campaign. The federalists argued consistently that the onus was on the sovereigntists to prove why their constitutional option - “separation” — was necessary for Quebecers. This was not an easy task for the Yes side. On the simple issue of political independence, the sovereigntists could not point to great advantages in having a seat in the United Nations, representation in the Olympics, and so on, and when sovereignty tout court was on the table they were often reduced to stating that sovereignty is “normal” for distinct peoples. But the shift to advocating a political and economic partnership brought the Yes side to focus on constitutional relationships with Canada itself. A Yes would bring about a new rapport de forces between the partners, as Mr Bouchard so often put it. And sovereigntists like Mario Dumont could argue that “separation” would not actually occur. “Will we be separate?” he asked. “The answer is No.” Instead, the system would resemble the European Union. “We look after our affairs without asking permission from others but

without being separated; we are united on things where we have a common interest. This is the inverse of separation.” Obviously, the partnership proposal allowed the Yes side to emphasize a range of positions along the constitutional dimension. In fact, as the campaign began, sovereigntists saw some advantages in emphasizing the differences among the Yes leaders, hoping they could

convince hesitant voters that Mr Dumont and Mr Bouchard could rein in the harder-line PQ under Mr Parizeau.” But the Quebec premier was always clear: “If some people want to vote Yes to change Quebec’s bargaining power and join the ranks, all the better. But let it be clear for everyone that by voting Yes they are voting for Quebec

sovereignty.” Meanwhile, Mr Bouchard also was consistent, especially on the political dimension of the partnership: “I want it clearly understood that the question is on sovereignty and partnership after, but they aren’t dependent. There is no hyphen between the two. The first will be achieved for all time, the second will come after as we think it will, but there’s no guarantee it will come. There’s no link of cause and effect. I have always been extremely clear: sovereignty

per se, on its own, as a solution.” The constitutional dimension was associated with two others. First, on the economic dimension, the federalists could and did argue that political separation would necessarily entail a costly long-term reduction in economic integration. On the other side, the Yes position favouring political association had some cost, because it weakened the economic argument that sovereignty would eliminate a lot of waste,

297 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

overlap, and duplication in the federation. It was logically hard to argue on the economic front that Quebec had un gouvernement de trop

(“one government too many”) when the constitutional position advocated a new set of common institutions. Here the sovereigntists were vulnerable. Less straightforward was the linkage with the national-identification dimension. One sovereigntist position was that a No vote would hurt Quebecers. As Mr Bouchard declared when the campaign was going poorly, “It’s not true that Quebecers are weak, that Quebec will say No to itself. They will say Yes because the consequences of saying No would be too serious.”” But this line of argument could not be pressed too hard, because it was the sovereigntists themselves who had chosen to hold the referendum, thus creating the very possibility of a damaging No. Yet they did argue that a No would ex-

pose Quebecers to Ottawa’s centralizing tendencies and to the spending cuts favoured by the Reform Party and several other provincial governments. As Pauline Marois, Treasury Board president, put it, “The Canada we know is disintegrating before our very eyes. The new Canada will be the one of Preston Manning, Ralph Klein, and Mike Harris — and we don’t want any part of it.””°

A much stronger positive effect was achieved by the partnership proposal, which, while allowing for a continued association with Canada, would finally provide for negotiations and policies to be decided on the basis of equality — égal-a-égal as it was constantly phrased. This theme had a strong nationalistic appeal, and when Mr Bouchard assumed the leadership of the Yes campaign, he continually stressed it, while emphasizing the solidarity that would result from a collective choice for change: “A Yes vote will lead to unity of all Quebecers. We will all be sovereigntists, so much so that people

will no longer refer to us as sovereigntists but simply as Quebecers.”” Again, typically: “The people of Quebec must take their place in the empty chair facing English Canada to make the changes that we both need ... We will no longer have to ask anyone to recognize us as being specific or as an asymmetrical society or anything else. We don’t want labels ... We just want one word — Québécois.” The relationship between the constitutional and national-identification dimensions was problematic for the federalist side. While the No leaders could point to some evidence of flexible federalism, they were not prepared at the outset to promise the symbolic recognition as a “distinct society” that many Quebecers desired. Further, despite strenuous efforts, they could not entirely silence leaders in ROC who argued that all provinces must be constitutionally equal. For example, Clyde Wells summarily rejected any notion of a partnership as “totally inconsistent with everything Canadians across the country have

298 From Referendum to Referendum

been saying for the last ten years.”*! Not only did such observations reinforce the sovereigntists’ arguments about the dire effects of a No vote, but outright rejection of Quebecers’ constitutional demands could also be portrayed as insulting and demeaning. Hence, Mr Chrétien’s preference that federalists in the rest of the country either stay out of the campaign or send messages of affection. As he told a Vancouver audience, “You all have said, ‘We want you to stay in Canada.’ You didn’t provoke them. Some were hoping for that. It’s easy to get mad.”””

It was strategically awkward for the No side to formally dismiss the offer of political partnership because this could drive away voters whose sense of community with Canada made them reluctant to vote

Yes.

Nevertheless, in his first major campaign speech, Mr Chrétien did make predictions that the partnership could not work: “The proposal for a political partnership flies in the face of the most elementary good sense ... It would be rejected because it would impose another level of government in Canada, with equal representation, even though

Canada is three times the size of Quebec, and a right of veto that would totally paralyze both those broken countries.”** Later, he pointed

out some practical difficulties: “Canada with Quebec forms a country. Nobody knows what would remain of Canada without Quebec. Who has a mandate to speak for the so-called rest of Canada?” Similarly, Mr Johnson warned, “Will Canada reach out to seven million Quebecers and say: ‘You just broke up our country, but here’s your passport?’ It’s unthinkable.”°*° And the prime minister declared at an early campaign rally that a Yes would bring independence, not anew partnership: “In that case, there will be no more Quebecers in the House of Commons, no more Quebecers running the government. Quebecers won’t be Canadian citizens or hold Canadian passports.”°” But this theme was muted in the federalist discourse on the constitutional dimension. The No side stuck to the initial, more positive position that the existing constitution was flexible and that whatever the question formally posed in the referendum, the real issue was separation. As Mme Robillard put it at the outset of the campaign, “Why did Mr Parizeau lack the political courage to state very clearly that if we vote Yes, Quebec will be an independent country separated from Canada? That’s the real referendum choice that Quebec-

ers will have to make.” NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION

On this dimension, the two sides lavished a great deal of discourse during the campaign, and the empirical studies suggest that the result was a standoff. Here, the federalists simply aimed to hold their

299 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

ground. They stressed that Canada was a wonderful country, the envy of the world. Within it, Quebecers had a proud and honourable his-

tory and a great deal of influence. Separation would end all this. It would bring an end to the country to which many Quebecers felt attached. The No side pressed this theme very hard at the end of the campaign. In his televised address to the nation, Mr Chrétien posed a long series of questions about Canada, concluding with the following: “Have you found one reason, one good reason, to destroy Canada? Do you really think it is worth abandoning the country we have built,

and which our ancestors have left us? Do you really think it makes any sense — any sense at all — to break up Canada?” As well, the federalists emphasized that there was no contradiction between being a Canadian and being a Quebecer. In what became a mantra towards the end of the campaign, they repeated that Canada was their country (pays) while Quebec was their homeland (patrie).* This dimension offered much scope to the sovereigntists, who devoted a lot of emotionally charged discourse to it. The core position was that Quebecers constitute a people, distinct from those in the rest of Canada. So sovereignty would represent a logical stage in Quebec’s evolution. In contrast, a No, in Mr. Parizeau’s words, “would

mean breaking away from what we are and what we have always wanted to become.”*' Part of the Yes position involved reciting the long series of humiliations and oppressions to which the Quebec people had been subjected, beginning with their conquest by the English, emphasizing their conscription in the wars, and peaking with the “imposition” of the 1982 constitution; as well, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord was characterized as a rejection of Quebec by

Canada. Always the emphasis was on unity and solidarity, and on the need of Quebecers to put the endless squabblings of Canadian federalism behind them. In a much misquoted remark, Mr Bouchard held out this vision: “A Yes has something magical about it. With a wave of a wand, it transforms the whole situation. It produces within us solidarity and unity.” At last, said the sovereigntists, a Yes result would end the historic doubts, the hesitation of Quebecers to declare themselves a people. At the final rally of the campaign, Mr Bouchard beseeched the voters, arguing that now was their best chance: “We

have no right to let it pass. God knows when it will present itself again. We have it before us. Seize it and vote Yes. Say Yes to ourselves. Say Yes to the people of Quebec.”* The national-identification dimension posed certain problems for the sovereigntists, however. One was that they had been unable to define a common social project for an independent Quebec. Hence, they spoke of unity and solidarity without being very precise about the common goals of the collectivity. As well, the Yes side was officially

300 From Referendum to Referendum

committed to the position that Quebec constituted a modern and plu-

ralist society. Quebec nationalism might have had its foundations among the vieille souche — descendants of the original settlers — but supposedly it was a shared social experience that would impel Que-

becers, whatever their ethnic origins, to decide for sovereignty. So stressing too emphatically a common history and ethnicity was logically awkward, and, practically, it would weaken the adherence of genuine pluralists, would further alienate minority-group voters, and would help legitimize the claims for self-determination that were being

advanced by the Aboriginal peoples. Nevertheless, the chord was struck often, notably by Mr Parizeau, who declared at the end that the choice was to decide to “no longer be a minority in the country of our anglophone neighbours but a majority in our own country. To affirm, once and for all, our language and our culture as American francophones.”** But however much the two sides contested on the national-identification dimension, it was not the crucial one. THE ECONOMY

On this dimension, the sovereigntist position was that secession would entail no economic losses and would in fact be economically advantageous in the long run. The discourse on the latter point was far less intense than on the former, but the Yes side did speak about how sovereignty would end wasteful federal-provincial duplication, allow taxes to be frozen if not reduced, and permit the formation of autonomous policy suited to the Quebec economy. As well, sometimes with rather muddy appeals to endogenous growth theory, the Yes side referred to the advantages enjoyed in the global economy by small, relatively homogeneous, and solidaristic polities. Yet the critical message concerned the prospect of economic disruption and loss in the transition period. Here, the sovereigntists dismissed every dire prediction as a threat or bluff. It was rational, they argued, for the federalists to make such predictions in the hope of dissuading Quebecers from voting Yes. But after an actual Yes it would

be irrational for ROC to retaliate economically, because this would impose losses on its own citizens. Indeed, economic rationality would

inevitably lead Canada into a partnership, because of the need to manage the common economic space and avoid losses. In short, rationality was equated with cooperation. This position meshed well with some traditional stereotypes — that

ROC is dominated by business interests (and business would not countenance disruption), and that English Canadians are cold and calculating (and would therefore be willing to cut their losses and

301 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

support cooperation with Quebec after a Yes). As one anglophone commentator put it, “The separatists portray ‘les anglais’ as dessicated calculating machines, ready to cut deals the day after the destruction of their country.”* As well, some aspects of the formal campaign were designed to provide reassurance about items of particular concern to the public; hence the provisions in Bill 1 about use of the Canadian dollar, accession to treaties, and so on. But on the economic dimension it was the logic of threat and bluff that was pushed relentlessly by the Yes side.* Early in the campaign, Mr Bouchard said, “All these stories we are being told that business people in Ontario, for example, will not want to do business with Quebec, we all know ... it doesn’t make any sense.” After a Yes vote, he went on, the typical Toronto businessman “will go to his office and sit at his desk, and he will examine his sales fig-

ures. And he will see that he conducts 25 percent of his business in Quebec. Sure he’ll be in a bad mood, but you know what he’ll do. He will pick up his phone and call his biggest buyer in Quebec. And you know what he will say to him. He'll say, ‘let’s not mix politics with business.’”* Mr Bouchard was equally dismissive of threats that governments would not cooperate after a Yes, asserting that “English Canada would run after Mr Parizeau to ask him, to beg him, to sit down” and discuss the national debt.* Here, the sovereigntists also stressed the international pressure that would be exerted on Canada. As Mr Parizeau put it, “People across the world will want to know

what the score is.” Again and again the sovereigntists hammered home their argu-

ment about where the self-interest of Canada lay. English Canadians, argued Bernard Landry, “need our help to pay their debt, and they need our market if they want to continue selling us wheat, beef, Western gas, cars and financial services from Ontario ... To put up a border and customs would compromise these jobs, and the first victim

would be Ontario.”” Sensing momentum after mid-October, Mr Parizeau put in a nutshell the logic of the Yes argument about the economy and the partnership: “For heaven’s sake, it’s perfectly understandable that before the 30th all of these guys in Ottawa will say no, no, no, no. Well, after the 30th, they might say Yes to a few things.” Obviously, this position helped fortify the pride and confidence to

which the Yes side appealed on the national-identification dimension. Mr Bouchard’s discourse often combined equality and the economy. He said, for example, that sovereignty was “a powerful springboard to go and get a partnership” that would “impose itself after an assessment of each other’s interests.”°* Again, towards the end of the campaign: “Those two peoples will talk to each other about

302 From Referendum to Referendum

their mutual interest and about what they want to deal with in common. The talk will be of commercial exchanges that are to be maintained and increased, of jobs to protect and to create.” Mr Parizeau even referred jokingly to the effect a Yes would have. Noting that

some provincial legislatures were passing motions favourable to Quebec merely because two polls had found the Yes ahead, he crowed,

“Imaginez, avec un Oui, a quel point ces gens vont devenir des partenaires volontaires du Québec!”** And summing up at the end of the campaign, Mr Bouchard reflected, “My worries are about the fact

that Quebecers have too often been impressed by the attempts to raise a scare in their minds ... But I trust, as we have been seeing in this campaign, that fear has been overcome by confidence. I’m happy to see Quebecers no longer take scare tactics seriously.”°° For their part, the federalists had little to say about Quebec’s longterm economic prospects, except to point out generally that Quebec would be a smaller, more vulnerable economic unit. It would not benefit, for example, from Canada’s weight in trade negotiations or membership in the G-7. But on the whole, the No side preferred to couch such matters in more positive terms, referring to the strength and prosperity of a united Canada. In fact, the basic federalist position on this dimension was to make no concrete predictions about the economic effect of a Yes vote. Federalist leaders consistently dismissed the entire issue as purely hypothetical: it would not happen, and there was no point in speculating about it. When pressed, the No forces emphasized the huge risk and uncertainty that “separation” would involve. Rather than say, for example, that Quebecers’ geographic mobility would be restricted under sovereignty, they simply insisted that peoples’ economic prospects after a Yes vote were entirely unknown. The concrete promises of the sovereigntists certainly were not to be believed, for they could guarantee nothing about the future, which would become radically uncertain after a Yes vote. It was this uncertainty, with its consequent risk of severe economic disruption and loss, that the federalists believed would dissuade Quebecers from supporting sovereignty. This position was exemplified _ by the prime minister when he stated, “What is immediately guaranteed after a No vote is that we will still have a sovereign country. A country that guarantees us Canadian citizenship, Canadian passports, and the Canadian dollar ...On the one hand stands separation, which

would hurtle us all into the unknown, with all the risks it would involve. It is an invitation to an adventure from which no one, including those who believe in it, would emerge a winner. On the other hand stands an economically and politically strong Quebec, continuing

its tremendous development in Canada.”

303 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

At times the federalists were more explicit. Mr Johnson especially stressed economic issues, arguing, for example, that “voting Yes is a risky adventure that will bring economic upheaval, affect the value of the dollar, mortgage rates, and raise interest rates on other things

we buy.”” He produced a sovereignty budget that showed a very large deficit and consequent tax increases, and he made precise predictions about job losses based on extant studies. But these predic-

tions were derided as blackmail and bluff by the sovereigntists, especially after Mr Martin’s comments about one million jobs being at risk. When Mr Johnson stated that a Quebec dollar would be worth sixty-three cents, he had to defend himself against accusations of fear-

mongering, and he showed the strain of trying to make headway against the Yes side’s position: “Iam utterly and personally convinced that separation means economic dire consequences for all Quebecers

and I certainly am not going to shut up before the referendum date

just because I’m being accused of being a fearmonger. I’m a realitymonger. I’m a truthmonger.”**

The federalist side also pointed out that many economic matters covered by the partnership proposal were strictly within the power of Canada to determine. At their annual meeting, for example, the provincial premiers indicated that interprovincial trade agreements could not be taken for granted by a sovereign Quebec.” Federalists also referred to Canada’s control of the currency, milk quotas, labour mobility, equalization payments and other transfers, and even the deployment of the military forces and the jobs they created. But consistent with their basic position that a sovereigntist victory would produce enormous uncertainty, they did not state what would actually happen after a Yes. With few exceptions, it was never clearly predicted that labour mobility would end, milk quotas be re-allocated,

military bases closed, and so on. The core position was to maintain uncertainty about ROC’s behaviour in the expectation that this would induce a No vote by risk-averse Quebecers.

There were strategic weaknesses in each side’s position. The sovereigntist argument that a Yes would bring no economic disrup-

tion was open to the counterargument that this demonstrated the acceptability of the status quo. What, then, was the purpose of sovereignty? As Mr Johnson said at the outset of the campaign, “I’m still waiting for the government to tell us why we should vote Yes. It’s voting Yes to Quebec’s departure from Canada with no guarantees — we close all the doors.”® But the federalists were more vulnerable. Their strategy of sustaining uncertainty led them to make no precise predictions about what a Yes would bring economically, including ROC’s response on those matters covered by the partnership proposal,

304 From Referendum to Referendum

and this left a gap into which the sovereigntists could spin their web of arguments about post-secession cooperation. In the absence of dec-

larations from the No side about what would happen on the economic front, the Yes side advanced with its arguments that ROC would need to negotiate out of its own self-interest, that the secession would

be tranquil, and that economic links would not be severed. There are several reasons why the federalists did not close off this line of argument by spelling out the economic effects of a Yes vote. At the outset of the campaign, the No side was feeling confident, and it probably appeared that stressing uncertainty alone would suffice to deter marginal voters from choosing sovereignty. To have been more definite would also have meant moving towards Reform’s position, which was unattractive for partisan reasons. Beyond this, there is no evidence that the federalist leaders and their advisers had spent much time or effort thinking about what a Yes actually would bring, so it would have been difficult, honestly, to make concrete predictions. More important, it was not evident who in the No camp had the legitimacy to lay out the terms of separation on such dossiers as the currency, trade arrangements, agricultural policy, and the division of the debt. Had any federalist leader taken a strong, clear position on these matters, the unity of the No side could have been gravely weakened. Moreover, such positions could have been portrayed by the Yes side as initial bargaining moves rather than a credible bottom line. And if the predictions or positions had been rather harsh towards Quebec’s interests, this would have contradicted the No side’s

position on the national-identification dimension, where the consistent theme was Canada’s civility, tolerance, and openness to Quebecers, as well as a long-standing sense of shared citizenship and community. These are all good reasons. But another one has to do with how positions on the economic dimension were associated with those taken on the final dimension of the campaign — democracy. DEMOCRACY

Democracy was the subject of much less explicit discourse (or commentary) during the referendum campaign, but it was nevertheless the most strategically significant dimension. The sovereigntists opened

this debate, and it provided them with an important degree of freedom. William Riker has shown how opening dimensions of discourse is an heresthetic device that can structure debate and produce differ-

ent outcomes, but he also argued that constraining dimensions, or “fixing dimensionality,” can deter counterattacks.*' In the Quebec referendum campaign, the federalists could not — or did not —- shut down

305 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

the democracy dimension. As a result, the Yes side’s position on the economic dimension nearly carried the sovereigntists to victory. The sovereigntists always insisted on the legitimacy of their démarche.

They assumed from the outset that Quebecers had the right to deter-

mine their collective future, and the process of deciding whether Quebec should become sovereign, they said, was a highly democratic one. It involved a major exercise in public consultation — the regional

commission hearings, at which, despite the boycott by the Quebec Liberal Party, thousands of people had appeared. So Mr Chrétien’s criticism of the sovereigntist virage as deceptive and contemptuous of democracy brought the sharpest possible rebuke from Mr Parizeau on the grounds that the government and the commissions had indeed listened to the concerns of the people.” Further, the entire referendum process was valid. The question had been debated in the National Assembly according to the referendum law. That law was itself highly democratic in that it provided a framework for organizing two sides around the issue and imposed strict spending limits on each while providing public funding for the competing organizations. Finally, since Quebec was a highly advanced and democratic society, all those involved would accept the outcome of the public consulta-

tion. In a parliamentary system, of course, referendums cannot be binding, but the sovereigntists had accepted the verdict of Quebecers in 1980. Similarly, the 1995 result would be accepted. These themes

were fundamental to the whole approach of the Yes side. On this dimension, the No side simply refused to take a position. A Yes was hypothetical, so there was no point in discussing what its consequences would be. While the federalist leaders condemned the process leading to the referendum as manipulative and attacked the question as ambiguous, they were carefully noncommital about the implications of any result other than a No vote. As one journalist put it, for the federalist side separation was “not so much an evil as a non sequitur.”® The federalists always refused any engagement to accept a Yes result as valid. Their discourse on this dimension of the debate was minimal — far less than on national identification or the economy or constitution — but their strategic choice here was highly significant. The No position was to insist that separation was an economically uncertain and costly adventure; yet the choice to be noncommital about the legitimacy of a Yes result left the No side vulnerable

to the economic counterarguments of the sovereigntists. The federalist ambiguity on the democracy dimension was shown well before the referendum campaign began. Ina year-end interview, Prime Minister Chrétien suggested that Ottawa would not be com-

pelled to negotiate sovereignty after a Yes vote: “It’s not in the

306 From Referendum to Referendum

constitution ... If you want to talk legality and constitutionality, there’s nobody who will argue that it is legal and constitutional.”™ Treading lightly, however, an aide to Mr Chrétien said this position should not be regarded as a threat or a refusal to accept a Yes result: “He’s just - pointing out that the separatists have tried to gloss over a lot of tough questions.”©

Undoubtedly the federalists’ frustration with their heresthetical situation grew when the sovereigntists adopted the partnership proposal and launched the campaign on a question which the federalists regarded as deceptive and ambiguous. But Mr Chrétien still remained noncommital about what a Yes vote would entail, dismissing all speculation about the matter as hypothetical. In his first public comments during the campaign, comments that set the tone for

all subsequent remarks, the prime minister refused to say whether he would accept a Yes victory: “You’re asking a hypothetical question. We have a referendum and they are proposing separation. We’re going to tell Quebecers that, and Quebecers will vote for Canada.” This position was briefly shaken when the same question was put to the federal minister who was formally in charge of the referendum, Mme Robillard. She replied, “We have always said that Quebecers have the right to express themselves about the future of Quebec in Canada, inside or outside Canada. We are in a democratic country, so we'll respect the vote.”*” Pressed immediately on this matter in Quebec, Mr Johnson took a similar line. “The people of Quebec will abide by the results — end of story,” he said. “We want a democratic vote — it is. The referendum process is acceptable; the law is clear for everyone — the campaign, financing, timing. It’s vox populi.”® But all this was reversed after Mme Robillard consulted with colleagues and

advisers to the prime minister. She amended her remarks to the effect that the government would respect “the democratic process” rather

than any particular outcome. In a damage-control news conference, Mr Chrétien reaffirmed his noncommital position: “There is a vote and, of course, we'll receive the result of the vote, but you’re asking me a hypothetical question. I’m standing here telling you we’re going to win.”” After the matter was the subject of heated questions in the House of Commons, Mr Johnson also reversed field, saying, “How can you break up a country on a judicial recount? It has to be clear either way if you want to go on to other things.”” That Commons exchange revealed how steadfast were the federalists in taking no position on the democracy dimension, despite the conflicting pressures on them to do so. First, the Bloc demanded that Mr Chrétien make a commitment to accept the result, and he refused

307 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

to do so. One reason was that the sovereigntist leaders had indicated they might call yet another referendum if they lost in 1995; hence, the Yes side was refusing to be bound by the results. More important, the question was ambiguous: “I have always said they had the right to have a referendum in Quebec,” stated Mr Chrétien. “Quebecers can be consulted and can explain their point of view. However, we on this side of the House are convinced that Quebecers, if they are asked an honest question about the separation of Quebec from Canada, not a trick question, no clever twists and turns but an honest question: Do you want to separate from Canada? If the leader of the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Parizeau, was truly intellectually honest, he would have asked Quebecers: Do you want to separate? And Quebecers would have answered: No, never.””! Through more than a dozen questions over two days about whether the federal government would recognize a Yes vote, the prime minister re-

mained noncommital, accusing the sovereigntists of posing a deceptively ambiguous question, arguing that Quebecers wanted to put the constitution aside and enjoy economic growth and good government, and predicting that Quebecers would never vote to separate. But there was also pressure on this dimension from the Reform Party, whose leaders argued that clarity was crucial. Mr Manning asked, “Will the Prime Minister make clear that a yes vote means Quebec is on its way out, that a no vote means Quebec is in the federation for the long haul, and that 50 per cent plus one is the dividing line between those two positions?” Mr Chrétien would not do so. “I have been asking them for a long time in this House of Commons to give us a real question, an honest, clear question on separation. They have clouded the issue talking about divorce and remarriage

at the same time. They want me on behalf of all Canadians to say that with a clouded question like that with one vote I will help them to destroy Canada. You might, I will not, Mr Manning.”” The following day, answering a question from Mr Bouchard, the prime minister reiterated the point: “Today, we have a confusing and ambiguous question, and I am asked whether we would recognize a vote with a majority of one. As Mr Johnson put it so well yesterday, we are not about to separate from Canada on the basis of a judicial recount.”” But the Reform Party continued to press, reasoning that if a Yes vote might not actually produce separation, then it would be less risky to cast one. As Mr Manning put it, “They think they can vote for separation and still enjoy the benefits of federalism. That is why we asked the Prime Minister to make clear that yes means sepa-

ration and only no means federalism. I will again ask the Prime

308 From Referendum to Referendum

Minister sincerely, as we are not playing games here, why he is so reluctant to make that distinction crystal clear.” After repeating that the referendum question was ambiguous, Mr Chrétien responded: In a country like ours to recognize that at one time a rule of majority plus one could break up the country would be irresponsible on my part. Even in the Reform Party, as a journalist wrote this morning, in order to change its constitution one has to ask for two-thirds of its membership. Therefore I will not break up the country with one vote. It is not real democracy. Real democracy is to convince the people they can express themselves clearly, which is what we are doing. This is why we are telling Quebecers these people want to separate but they will not succeed because it is our collective duty to tell all Quebecers the scheme they have, the virage, the mirage and so on will not work. They will not succeed in fooling the people of Quebec because the people of Quebec will know when they vote 39 days from now that they will not separate. They will stay in Canada because it is their destiny, their future and their desire.”

But the issue did not go away. During the campaign, Mr Bouchard continually spoke of the great democratic exercise in which Quebec-

ers were engaged, and in the final days before the referendum the democracy dimension re-emerged strongly. In his reply to the prime minister’s televised address to the nation, Mr Bouchard stated, “Quebecers will make a decision on Monday, a decision that they will have carefully reflected upon through a democratic process, the fairness

of which does not afford any challenge.” He continued: “One supreme and fundamental issue that Quebec and Canada share and cherish is democracy ... With respect to the decision that will be taken

by the majority of Quebecers next Monday, I expect this common value of democracy to prevail. Iam reassured by the citizens of Canada

that I have met who are saying that Quebecers can decide their own

future and that such a decision should be accepted by the rest of Canada. The voices of these people have been heard by political leaders, and I call upon all leaders and their sense of democracy to show the same respect for the will of the people of Quebec.””

Similarly, Mr Bouchard maintained that the result would be accepted in Quebec, “because we live in a democracy. We sovereigntists proved it in 1980 when we accepted the verdict.””° On the last day of

the campaign, he also predicted that Canadians would peacefully accept a Yes result. “There must be surprise because they have been put to sleep by Mr Chrétien who told them all the time that there was no problem.” However, he continued, “I fully expect the rest of Canada, as all Quebecers, whatever happens, to accept the verdict of

309 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign |

democracy.”” Meanwhile, Mr Parizeau, with victory in sight but Ottawa’s intentions unclear, insisted not only that the transition would be calm but that all Quebecers would have to show solidarity in accepting the result of the vote, and he singled out his main provincial

opponent: “The example comes from the top. Without misgiving, I say that the leader of the Quebec Liberal Party, Mr Daniel Johnson, fought fiercely, but always was a democrat.”” Mr Chrétien, however, never said he would accept a Yes result. He was noncomumital to the end. In a television interview, while striking the federalist chords of constitutional flexibility, patriotism, and the

economic uncertainty that a Yes would bring, he refused to agree that a 51 per cent sovereigntist victory would be decisive: “Non, je n’ai pas reconnu rien. Vous ne savez pas le résultat et moi non plus. Les gens auront exprimé leur point de vue. Les méchanismes, aprés, c’est tres nébuleux.”” In the end, these méchanismes were never tested. But the federalist decision not to take a position on the democratic dimension had been both risky and costly. The strategy was risky because it precluded a convincing reply to the sovereigntists’ position on the economic dimension — that cooperation between ROC and a sovereign Quebec would be inevitable because of each side’s self-interest in minimizing economic disruption. Moreover, the partnership idea advanced by the Yes side had a strong appeal: not only was it deeply congruent

with the pride and equality that were central to many Quebecers’ sense of national identification, but it promised a framework agreement for economic management that would minimize losses in the transition to sovereignty. This is where the sovereigntists made their gains in the summer and autumn of 1995. To shut down the progress of the Yes side on the economic dimension, the federalists would have had to state clearly that the partnership would never materialize. They would have had to declare that constitutional amendments would excise Quebec from Canada, that economic integration would drop sharply, that there would be border posts around Quebec, that agriculture would contract, that social

entitlements and labour mobility would end, and so on. All these outcomes would have been unattractive to the undecided, softnationalist voters. The No side did raise questions throughout the campaign about how a Yes vote would affect these substantive matters, but federalists never presented a coherent position about them. Some reasons for this were suggested above — complacency, the difficulty of integrating the No forces, and the unattractive air of harshness that such statements might have conveyed — but a deeper one was the linkage between the economic and democratic dimensions.

310 From Referendum to Referendum

On the economic dimension, the sovereigntists pressed the vision of a partnership that would protect Quebecers economically, while the federalists mainly predicted only economic uncertainty and risk. For the No side to be more precise about the negative economic implications of a Yes, its leaders would have had to be more than noncommital on the democratic dimension. They would have had to accept in principle that a Yes in the October referendum meant that Quebec would become a sovereign country. Only then could the sovereigntists’ eco-

nomic arguments - and their sanguine predictions of cooperation and partnership — be countered. This the federalists did not do. There are undoubtedly many reasons for this decision. Apart from those mentioned are calculations

of possible effects. The No side may have estimated, for instance, that accepting in principle that sovereignty could occur might make it appear more legitimate and easier to attain, thus adding to the Yes total; alternatively, such a position might reinforce the message of Canada’s flexibility and toleration, thus gaining more No votes. Similarly, one cost to the No forces of being ambiguous on the democracy

dimension was that they appeared inconsistent by participating in an exercise they condemned as deceptive.” Accepting that secession could occur would remove this liability. The No side may have weighed

these various costs and benefits and decided to remain noncommital about a Yes, but there was also the much larger cost of losing the

battle on the economic dimension as the partnership idea gained crediblility with voters. A final reason for not taking a position on the democratic dimension is more speculative. It is that the key strategists on the federalist side, most of whom had deep roots in Montreal, literally could not contemplate a Canada without Quebec.” The intensity of their discourse on the national-identification dimension is testimony to this (just as Mr Bouchard’s insistence on referring to Quebecers as nous attests to the ethnic nationalism which the cosmopolitan federalists so abhorred). The federalist leaders commonly spoke of Quebec as the “heart” or “soul” of Canada, and at the Montreal unity rally Mr Chrétien shouted, “We say No to those who would strip us of our Canada.” At the final No rally of the campaign, in Hull, the prime minister expressed his sentiments clearly: “For all of us, Canada without Quebec is unthinkable just as Quebec without Canada is unthinkable.”® Because of this deep attachment, the key strategists on the No side were not able to concede, even in principle and even to win a contest with enormous stakes for all Canadians, that Quebec could become a sovereign state. As a consequence, they almost lost.

311 The Logic of the Referendum Campaign

The effects of ambiguity on the democratic dimension were profound. The sovereigntists continued to advance in the polls as the disincentives to voting Yes diminished because of their winning economic arguments. The No side could not bring itself to move on the democracy dimension and block those arguments. Since there was a standoff on the identification dimension, there was only one possible axis along which the federalists could shift. They moved on the constitution. At the Verdun rally on 24 October and in the televised speech to the country the next day, Mr Chrétien committed the federalists to formal constitutional change — recognizing Quebec as a distinct society, decentralizing powers, and restoring Quebec’s constitutional veto. This major shift followed profound disagreement in the No campaign and was reported to be very much against the prime minister’s own instincts. But it did allow the No forces to portray themselves as agents of the change that most Quebecers wanted within

the Canada they enjoyed, and with no risk of economic loss. Given the fundamental refusal to countenance a Yes, this was all the federalists could do, and it may have produced the narrow No victory on 30 October. But there was a cost. This strategic move ensured that

the question of Quebec’s constitutional status has not been laid to rest.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Had the Yes Side Won...

Before moving on from the 1995 referendum to its effects and to the

future, it is worth turning to an important and intriguing question: What would have happened had the Yes side won? This, of course, raises a counterfactual proposition, and because the event did not actually occur, no definitive answer can be supplied here or anywhere else. But this is not a radical counterfactual of the sort that interests some historians (such as, What would Europe be like now had the Allies lost World War II?). In this case, the relevant event is not long past, and there are good indications about what pivotal actors would have done within the structural conditions that constrained them. The basic argument here is that the sovereigntists would have worked ferociously to consolidate a narrow Yes victory, but that this effort would have failed because of the transparent breaches of democratic practices that occurred during the counting of the referendum ballots. INEVITABILISTS AND IMPOSSIBILISTS

From the time the Parti québécois won the September 1994 election, debates across Canada had focused on what the implications of a Yes vote would be. In Quebec these debates became central to the referendum campaign. The issues were hotly contested by politicians, journalists, and editorialists, but they were also joined by academics and members of think tanks. In these discussions, especially as the refer-

endum approached, there was a natural tendency for prediction to slide into prescription, because predictions were deployed as tools by both sides in the campaign — intensely so, as the race sharpened.

313. Had the Yes Side Won ...

The academic studies were categorized by Professor Stéphane Dion, and his analysis provides a useful framework for thinking about what would have happened had the Yes side carried the referendum.* Dion divided the studies into two camps. In the first were the authors who predicted the scenario Dion called the “impossible secession.” Their argument was that a Yes vote would be of questionable legitimacy,

because Quebec has no clear right to self-determination and secession, the question posed can be attacked as ambiguous, and minorities may claim the right to remain in Canada. Hence, a Yes majority would be fiercely contested. Second, a Yes would cause the dollar to plummet and interest rates to rise, which would only deepen the political crisis. Negotiations between ROC and Quebec would not start quickly because of the shock and confusion in ROC and the absence of an interlocutor with a mandate to deal with Quebec. Even if talks did get underway, they would inevitably break down because the agenda would be too crowded, the players too numerous, and the issues too difficult. Then Quebec could be forced into a UDI, which

Canada probably would not recognize. The two sides could then enter a contest for authority over the territory, which would not only cause enormous economic damage but would raise the spectre of “the violence we must fear,” as Dion put it.2 In the view of one “impossibilist,” Quebecers in the end would not be able to “endure the kinds of costs and disruptions that seces-

sion from Canada would necessarily entail,” and as these costs mounted, there would be “little or no likelihood” that Quebec would actually secede from Canada.* Most probably, the Quebec government would withdraw the UDI and return to the bargaining table. In Dion’s own view, Quebec voters would have discovered before this that the promised smooth transition was not materializing, and support for sovereignty would have waned. This change would be registered through a new referendum or a federal election, in which a sovereigntist defeat would “nullify the referendum victory.”* So secession would not occur after a majority Yes vote.>

In contrast to this prediction is what Dion called the scenario of the “inevitable secession.” Among the analyses he placed in this camp

was the present book.® In this view, intense economic uncertainty would generate strong demands for some positive action to resolve it immediately, and only ROC’s acceptance in principle that secession would occur could achieve this. Negotiations would commence quickly, with the federal government taking the lead for ROC. The economic crisis and polarization between Canada and Quebec would help overcome internal divisions in the short run. The substantive issues of the separation would be settled quickly (though the negotiations would be very difficult, and the sovereigntists’ partnership

314 From Referendum to Referendum

would never materialize), and Canadians would turn to their main priority, simultaneously negotiating the reconstitution of Canada as a going concern. In this whole process, some interests would be ignored and some rights infringed, but that would be inescapable; the need to resolve uncertainty would dictate the first steps of the separation, and once the process was underway it would not be halted. As one columnist put it, “Self-interested survivalism would overwhelm any well-meaning attempts to reverse a Yes result.””

As Dion points out, the “impossibilists” tend to focus on the effects of political and economic uncertainty for Quebec, while the “inevitabilists” do the same for ROC.® Predicting what would have happened had the Yes won involves assessing the solidarity of each entity and the effects upon it of the economic and political uncertainty that would have followed such a vote. It also requires estimating what particular leaders would have done under the circumstances and pressures prevailing on 30 October 1995. Before proceeding to this analysis, it is worth noting how the actual referendum process differed from the one anticipated in the first edition of this book. First, the question posed was not as straightforward as expected. Second, the sovereigntists’ arguments about the implications of secession went beyond predicting that the common economic space would be preserved owing to the mutual self-interest of ROC and Quebec: the sovereigntists introduced the notion of economic and political partnership, arguing that common political institutions could be negotiated on a new basis of equality. Third, the margin of victory would have been exceedingly slim. Last, and most surprising, there were irregularities in the referendum process itself, with an extraordinary number of rejected ballots in three Montreal ridings. Each of these features would have affected the consequences of a Yes vote.

So would the economic situation. It is clear that the deep uncertainties about NAFTA, the currency, savings, pension funds, and so on would have materialized as predicted. More precise estimates about economic variables can also be made. In the days preceding the referendum, there was a strong expectation that a Yes vote would cause the stock market to decline sharply (one analyst anticipated a 25 per

cent drop), the dollar to reach record lows, and interest rates to rise by several percentage points.’ The one systematic retrospective study that has been done used implied volatility indexes and found that the TSE index would have declined by 7-10 per cent right after a Yes victory, while the Canadian dollar would have dropped to between 66 and 68 cents U.S." This study also examined the volatility of stock

315 Had the Yes Side Won...

prices by province and found no significant difference; that is, the referendum result would have affected firms’ market valuation wherever in Canada their head offices were located." With respect to bonds, a survey of Canadian money managers found

an almost unanimous expectation that Quebec securities would be

downgraded and that interest-rate spreads between Quebec and Canadian government bonds would widen by 100 to 150 basis points.”

The reaction of foreign investors was even more ominous. Money managers focused their attention on the referendum, and they showed a strong distaste for carrying Quebec debt. Stated one of them, “It’s of doubtful value — uncertain government, uncertain direction, not a

member of international organizations, it’s got a lot of debt, it’s arguing about how much to assume of federal government debt. Why would I want to get involved in a credit like that?” But these reactions were not restricted to Quebec. The Canadian money managers expected the spread between Canadian and American government securities to widen by another 100 to 150 basis points and for Ontario bonds to be downgraded. If foreign investors anticipated a long period of uncertainty or thought that Ottawa might have to assume the whole national debt, then federal government bonds would certainly

be downgraded, possibly to the point where many investors might be legally unable to hold them. Worse, the uncertainty of “uncharted territory” after a Yes vote could be such that rating agencies might declare it impossible to evaluate the risks of holding Canadian bonds, including corporate bonds, at which point these would not be down-

graded but unrated.” All of these effects would lead to enormous uncertainty, not only in Quebec but right across Canada. They would also be very costly, both directly as the value of investments plummeted and the cost of borrowing rose sharply, and indirectly as the markets anticipated decreases in investment and a sharp recession. These events would place enormous pressure on political leaders everywhere to resolve the crisis caused by a Yes result. It is pretty clear what the sovereigntist leadership would have done after a Yes vote, even a very narrow one. Mr Parizeau’s government would have acted swiftly to try to consolidate the victory and make it irreversible. Towards the end of the referendum campaign, the premier began to prepare the public for this, arguing that solidarity among all Quebecers would be essential after the Yes side won. Addressing a business audience, for example, he reassured people that nothing would change immediately in the wake of a Yes. But he also argued that solidarity would be essential to bring Ottawa to the bargaining

316 From Referendum to Referendum

table, to secure international recognition, and to prevent the growth of sub-secessionist movements among Aboriginal peoples and federalists; in short, to contain uncertainty to tolerable levels.® This resembles the remarkable speech, later made public, that Mr Parizeau had prepared for the event of a Yes victory. He began by declaring that “a simple and strong decision was made today: Quebec will become sovereign,” *® and he repeatedly emphasized that this

affirmation of nationhood had been achieved democratically: “You [Quebecers] have inscribed your name on the face of the world. You have done so in an exemplary fashion, with a democratic, transparent, fair, and enlightened process.” Then he reassured the anglophone community, Aboriginals, and immigrants that their rights and privileges would be respected; he emphasized that nothing would change in the short term — “it could take up to a year before the National Assembly makes the proclamation”; and he urged Canadians not to be bitter but to recognize the reasonableness of the partnership: “Our common responsibility is to ensure that our joint economic space is as profitable in the future as it is today.” Finally, he noted the “heavy responsibility” of Jean Chrétien — who, he stressed, had stated that Quebecers were making a “definitive” choice of a country — and concluded, “We agree. We can therefore turn the page, respect the democratic verdict and move to a new dialogue which must now begin between Canada and Quebec in the interests of all our citizens and

of stability.” The sovereigntists’ first priority would be to have as many promi-

nent Quebecers as possible declare that they accepted the result. Among them, no doubt, would be labour leaders, municipal officials, the heads of nationalist associations and other voluntary organizations, and business leaders. A substantial effort had been devoted to securing this acceptance through the organization RESPEQ (le Réseau solidarité pour l’économie du Québec), which had convinced a number of prominent people to sign a letter asking all Quebecers to recognize the democratic decision and to maintain solidarity towards the goal of economic stability and job creation.’® Lists of these people would probably have appeared in newspapers immediately after the vote. Mr Parizeau also intended to name further members to the negotiating oversight committee very shortly, after consultation with Mr Johnson.” In order to consolidate the result, obviously it would be important to get prominent federalists and members of the Quebec Liberal Party to accept it publicly. The position of Mr Johnson on

the legitimacy of the result would be absolutely crucial to the sovereigntists’ plans for consolidating the win. So would be the attitude of influential Quebec Liberals such as Claude Ryan and Claude

317 Had the Yes Side Won...

Castonguay, and so would be the views at the grassroots of the party. If the Quebec Liberal Party — or a large portion of it - accepted the Yes result, then the sovereigntists would be well on their way to making

it irreversible. The PQ government had been working on a detailed partnership proposal for some time. This contained specific provisions about all

the major dossiers to be negotiated, and it would be made public immediately.” In an atmosphere of grave economic uncertainty, the sovereigntists were hoping that federalists, especially in the business community, would be pressuring Ottawa to respond. Even be-

fore then, the Quebec government would be urging its federal counterpart to issue reassuring statements about the debt, which then could be presented as the definitive opening of substantive negotiations.”* Mr Bouchard, who would return to Ottawa right after the Yes victory, would use the platform provided by the Bloc in Parliament to present the offer and demand that talks begin.” There were other plans. The National Assembly would be called back into session earlier than anticipated, probably within forty-eight

hours. There, a motion would be passed accepting the referendum result and proposing that negotiations begin, and then debate on Bill 1 would continue, the measure being passed within weeks if not days.”

Meanwhile, the minister of finance and others would depart for the financial capitals of the world to reassure investors and to explain Quebec’s plans for the transition to sovereignty. The province had completed its borrowing program early, in anticipation of the referendum, and had no immediate funding needs. Indeed, the Caisse

de dépdt et placement, the Quebec government pension fund, had cash in place — billions of dollars —- to support the Canadian dollar in

the short term.” At the same time, the sovereigntists would attempt to get other countries to take notice of the referendum result. The PQ had worked hard to lay the groundwork for this, especially in France. There, it was anticipated, the National Assembly would pass a resolution of congratulations and support.” Recognition would follow later, but the motion would put some pressure on the United States, as well as possibly sparking immediate provisional recognition from some of the lesser states of La francophonie. Shortly before the vote, Quebec’s minister of international affairs, Bernard Landry, had sent letters to

foreign ambassadors in Ottawa asking that their governments be prepared to recognize the result — and also a unilateral declaration of sovereignty, should it later occur.” Letters were also sent by a Bloc member of Parliament to serving members of the Canadian military in Quebec. This letter invited them

318 From Referendum to Referendum

to prepare to transfer their allegiance in the event of a Yes vote. There is evidence that the sympathies of francophone members of the forces were divided, which would certainly have weakened the army’s capacity to enforce federal authority in Quebec, but it is most probable

that the command structure would have remained intact.” The sovereigntists were clearly prepared for a UDI. They anticipated that Ottawa would be brought to the bargaining table by financial uncertainty, especially about the debt, and by their early moves

to consolidate the Yes vote and make it irreversible. But they also suspected that the federalists might refuse to negotiate quickly. Ottawa might aim to hold a referendum or an election, in which case the sovereigntists hoped that the consensus in favour of accepting the Yes would simply make Quebecers reaffirm the original result as

a fait accompli. On the other hand, if Ottawa opted for a federalprovincial conference followed by the offer of a constitutional reform package, the sovereigntists were prepared to depict this as a refusal by ROC to accept Quebecers’ democratic decision. Even before such events, however, some sovereigntists were ready to use the authority conveyed by the Yes vote and Bill 1 to declare a UDIif Ottawa refused to negotiate. While predicting that ROC would indeed be forced to the table, Mr Bouchard made this position quite clear during the campaign: “If Ottawa says it will not negotiate, that it does nothing, then Mr Parizeau will be obligated to draw the con-

clusions of his mandate which will require him to proclaim sovereignty immediately, which would not be in the federal government’s interest.”*8 A UDI would have profoundly deepened economic and political uncertainty, and in fact the threat of such a declaration might

have served as the final weapon to force Ottawa to the negotiating table. Whether a UDI would have been declared cannot be known for sure. It would have depended on the success of the sovereigntists in generating solidarity and on the conditions prevailing after a Yes victory.” Had there been a Yes vote, the federalists in Ottawa would have confronted the set of alternatives described in pages 152-9 above. These include calling an election, holding a referendum of one kind or another, and doing nothing. None would be palatable. It seems very likely that Ottawa would have initially resisted a Yes vote. The justification would be as argued during the referendum campaign — that the question was not clear and that the sovereigntists had made duplicitous promises about the partnership to be negotiated with ROC.

It was deeply frustrating to the No side that these promises had not been countered successfully and that a substantial percentage of Quebecers believed that after a Yes they would retain Canadian citizenship,

319 Had the Yes Side Won...

send members of Parliament to Ottawa, use the Canadian dollar, and so forth. The “fact” that voters were misinformed could be used to

justify setting aside a Yes referendum result, but the logic here is dubious; and if most Quebecers were convinced that the referendum process had been transparent and fair, then rejecting the result could well create greater solidarity in support of it.*° The strategy of refusing to negotiate Quebec’s secession could involve assembling a new constitutional offer or holding a referendum

in which Quebecers could register their disillusionment with their leaders and their disaffection from a project that was proving very painful economically.*' Whether the sovereigntists’ efforts to consoli-

date their victory could be countered in this way would depend on several factors. First is the amount of economic damage, and this would have been very substantial as capital (and people) fled from Quebec and as uncertainty raised the economic losses there. But the effects of a declining Canadian dollar and rising interest rates would also be felt right across the country.** The second factor is solidarity in Quebec, which would be a function of who would be blamed by the average voter for the economic damage — Ottawa for refusing to negotiate and prolonging the uncertainty or the sovereigntists for leading Quebecers to the Yes result? There was some intense debate about this issue before the referendum, and the answer is not obvious.* It would depend largely on the perceived legitimacy of the result. A crucial factor for Ottawa would be the degree of solidarity in ROC behind the decision not to negotiate. On this, there would be division among political elites. There would certainly be some support for Ottawa’s position,™ but some well-informed and sympathetic observers of Quebec might argue that the Yes should be accepted.»

The president of the Canadian Labour Congress, for example, was on record as saying that Quebecers’ choice had to be respected,” and on the right wing of the ideological spectrum some powerful figures, including Conrad Black, were also arguing that a Yes had to be recognized.” They would be joined by the Reform Party, which, because of its democratic principles and pragmatic self-interest, was committed to accept a 50-per cent-plus-one referendum result. Reform would oppose any stopgap constitutional offer to Quebec that included distinct society recognition. Among the public, opinion would also be divided. Well before the vote, polls showed substantial sympathy in ROC for the demands of Aboriginals and others to remain in Canada, a disinclination to accept any Quebec right of secession, and support for a threshold higher

than 50 per cent. It was also widely expected that any negotiations

320 From Referendum to Referendum

about sovereignty would be protracted; and just before referendum day, a poll found that 53 per cent of ROC residents favoured a national referendum before the start of any such negotiations.” But other

polls gave different results. In the summer of 1995, one poll found that 17 per cent of respondents in ROC thought a Yes should mean that negotiations start, 33 per cent favoured “letting Quebec go,” 30 per cent wanted a referendum, and 12 per cent thought Ottawa should refuse to negotiate: so 50 per cent were prepared to allow secession.” These variations in results occur because of differences in the questions posed and the response categories. Moreover, the questions were hypothetical, because until the very end of the campaign, few people

in ROC believed that a Yes vote was at all possible.” More important, except on basic attitudes confirmed by many surveys, such as people’s sense of national or regional identification, poll results are not reliable indicators of what policies citizens would really have supported after a Yes. The respondents are not in the midst of a momentous event, where a deep sense of crisis provides scope for opinions to change. Further, questions in polls do not allow for the trade-offs

that would have to be made in such a context. There might be considerable support in the abstract for Aboriginals’ desire to remain in Canada, for example, but would this stand up if the value of people’s homes and savings were declining sharply? The answer would depend on the extent of economic damage, and the evidence is that it would be considerable, right across the country. Combined with regional variations in sympathy for Quebec, this means that there would be sharp regional differences in support for a federal government that attempted to hold out against a Yes. It seems

highly likely that the overall economic cost would create pressure within the caucus and cabinet to accept the result, and there might be statements to the same effect by one or more provincial premiers. This would make a holdout strategy very difficult to sustain. The conclusive factor in both ROC and Quebec, however, would be the legitimacy of a Yes result. One element in this is the margin of victory. With a 53 or 52 per cent Yes, the sovereigntists would probably be able to consolidate the result, and opinion in ROC would not

countenance a refusal by Ottawa to negotiate. But the logic of accepting a 53 or 52 per cent Yes leads to accepting 50 per cent plus one, and while the sovereigntists would have difficulty rallying Quebecers to accept this, Ottawa would encounter resistance in refusing it.*"

Legitimacy would also depend on the question. The federalists constantly attacked its ambiguity, while the sovereigntists defended its clarity. There is no doubt that the question could have been clearer

321 Had the Yes Side Won ...

and more straightforward. But among Quebec voters, it seems unlikely that the nature of the question could have legitimized a refusal by Ottawa to accept the result. It is true that at the beginning of the campaign, many Quebecers found the question ambiguous,” and different people may have been voting with very different expectations about what a Yes would bring, but after a long and intense cam-

paign fought in large part precisely over the implications of a Yes vote, it seems unlikely that objections to the question itself could have

rallied public support in Quebec against accepting the result. Most people seemed to feel that they knew what they were voting for. Objections based on the question would be even less persuasive in ROC, where many citizens, unsympathetically, would simply dismiss the Quebec electorate as uninformed. More important, the majority of the attentive public had seen a vigorous campaign by the federalists to the effect that a Yes vote — on this question — meant “separation.” In an economic crisis, it is improbable that public opinion in ROC would support a rejection of the result simply on the grounds that the question had been ambiguous.* But legitimacy would also depend on process, and this would have been the Achilles heel of the sovereigntists had the referendum produced a narrow Yes victory. They could not have consolidated the result, because there had been corrupt electoral practices. This is surprising, and to many people shameful, but it would have been decisive. In the referendum there were 4,757,509 ballots cast, and 86,501 were

rejected. This rejection rate of 1.82 per cent was lower than in the 1992 Quebec referendum on the Charlottetown Accord and lower than in the provincial elections of 1989 and 1994. However, the rates were extraordinarily high in three ridings: Chomedey (11.61 per cent), Margeurite-Bourgeoys (5.50 per cent), and Laurier-Dorion (3.60 per

cent), and these were antisovereignty ridings, where the No vote (among the valid ballots) amounted to 72.6 per cent in the first two and 62.8 per cent in the third. In some polls within these ridings, the proportion of rejected ballots was astounding. Poll 143 in Chomedey had 12 valid Yes votes, 67 No votes, and 50 rejected ballots for a 38.8 per cent rejection rate; poll 150b had 16 Yes, 45 No, and 77 rejected for a rate of 55.8 per cent.“ Such an extraordinary rejection rate suggested that a conspiracy existed within the sovereigntist (government) side to systematically eliminate No ballots. This hypothesis was later rejected by the chief electoral officer after a thorough investigation by his officers and by lawyers, academics, and a respected anglophone judge.* As well, a statistical analysis demonstrated that when these three extraordinary ridings were eliminated, there was no significant relationship across

322 From Referendum to Referendum

the province between the percentage of spoiled ballots and the level of the No vote.* Nevertheless, charges of electoral fraud eventually were laid against twenty-eight deputy returning officers, who had allegedly rejected valid ballot papers in a “patently unreasonable manner,” and against two official delegates for the Yes national committee in Chomedey and Marguerite-Bourgeoys, who had allegedly urged the officers to do so.” When ballot papers were later examined in 289 polling stations, it was determined that in the 89 Chomedey stations studied, between 10.6 and 50 per cent of the ballots had been

rejected in a “patently unreasonable” manner; the comparable figures in Marguerite-Bourgeoys were 32.8 per cent to 47 per cent.*® It was never revealed whether the rejected ballots were disproportionately No votes, but that is irrelevant to the political implications of the abnormal rejection rate. People could and certainly would have

assumed that valid No votes had been unfairly rejected. And they would have assumed this immediately. The official inquiries took a long time to be mounted and to reach their conclusions, but rejection rates were published in newspapers on 31 October, and the abnormalities were quite evident to Quebecers. Similarly, in the wake of the No victory, it took some time for indignation to mount in ROC about this issue and for investigations to be made by the press.” Had there been a narrow Yes victory, the questioning would have been immediate. In view of the glaring anomalies, every rejected ballot throughout the province would have been considered a potential No

vote, and the legitimacy of the result would have been deeply

contested. It is true that irregularities were also found on the No side, in connection with the funding of the pro-Canada rally in Montreal. But for the average citizen in Quebec or ROC, the fairness of this would be debatable. The rejection of valid ballots would not. Similarly, while neither Quebec federalists nor most citizens in the rest of the country would support a federal government objecting to a Yes vote on the obscure grounds that the question was not clear, there would be outrage were it suspected that the result was manipulated and the Yes vote achieved by deceit. This means that in order for a Yes to have had a chance of being regarded as legitimate, the sovereigntist margin would have had to be at least 50 per cent of the valid votes plus the total number of rejected ballots; that is, 51.85 per cent of the valid ballots. Even then, an odour of fraud would have lingered over the result. What if some of the Yes votes were not really valid? With such transparent irregularities in the democratic process and widespread suspicion of fraud, the sovereigntists would not have been able to consolidate their victory — unless the margin of victory

323 Had the Yes Side Won...

had been very substantial. Assuming that it was not, one could expect opposition on many fronts. There would be massive protests in the affected ridings and in the anglophone regions of Montreal. The federal government would seize on the voting irregularities to justify refusing to accept a Yes. Prominent Quebecers would hesitate before rallying to the Yes. The Quebec Liberal leadership would not accept a tainted result, and many on the Yes side would have qualms about taking decisive action when manifestly legitimate demands for recounts were mounting. International recognition would be slow in coming, from France or any other country.” It would be difficult to pass Bill 1, let alone a UDI, and this could not be done quickly with Quebecers deeply divided. If a UDI was passed, Ottawa could reserve or disallow the act, very probably with solid support in ROC. Even if the costs were very great, Canadians would not be prepared to countenance “letting Quebec go” by electoral fraud. All of this would allow those interests within Quebec that were opposed to sovereignty — the Aboriginals and the partitionists — to mobilize, and the arguments for their case would fall on fertile moral ground. There would perhaps be time for a reference to the Supreme Court on the legalities of secession, or to mount a federally organized referendum on a different question, or to call an election while the sovereigntists were still in disarray. But it is probable that, long before this, a weakened and divided PQ government facing political protests and an economic crisis would have withdrawn Bill 1, its victory stolen by its own fervent supporters. In short, the “inevitable secession” would not have come about. That scenario depended on a legitimate result and economic uncertainty forcing rapid acceptance of the principle that Quebec would secede, and on events then moving very quickly towards Quebec’s sovereignty and the reconstitution of ROC. Unless the Yes margin had been very substantial indeed, the electoral fraud would have delegitimized it and would have lent support to the leaders who were eager to resist it, despite the mounting economic losses. Canadians —

and Quebecers — would have been prepared to pay a high price to oppose a result that could convincingly be portrayed as undemocratic and illegitimate.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Fallout of the Referendum

The purpose of this book was to predict what would happen after a Yes vote in the 1995 Quebec referendum. Its projections were based on analyses of the Canadian economy and society and the political forces at play, as well as comparative studies of integration and the process of secession. One essential contention was that the politics of a secession would be fundamental. Legal arguments might be deployed as weapons by each side, and politicians and publics would also be influenced by economic changes and considerations, but the outcomes would be determined by the political events that would follow a Yes.

A second basic argument was that secessions are historic events. This means, first, that they have momentous consequences. It also means that “high politics” are important. In an atmosphere of crisis, decisions taken by a small number of political leaders are crucial; more technically, leaders have a great deal of autonomy when decisions must be made quickly and the degree of uncertainty is very large. As well, secessions are historic in that they are path-dependent. At any point, what happens next depends very much on the preced-

ing events, and in the course of secessions there are significant irreversibilities. Big decisions are taken that place events on a particular path, and there can be no going back to revisit options that have been discarded. Finally, all secessions are different. While there are important com-

monalities in the developments that bring the issue to the fore, and while the politics of secessions are marked by similar patterns, each

325 The Fallout of the Referendum

case has its distinct features that must be grasped.’ This last contention applies not only across countries but also within cases, over time. So it is essential to consider what has changed in Canada since the 1995 referendum. In examining the fallout of that episode, it becomes apparent that near-secessions are also historic events. The 1995 referendum capped a tough, searing campaign and produced an out-

come that few anticipated. What were the consequences? What changed in Canada and Quebec because of the referendum? Here, evidence suggests that a great deal has changed — players, expectations, opinions, organizations, and strategies. In line with the basic contentions of this study, it is clear that the 1995 referendum had consequences that render it unsound to transfer predictions made about it, in their totality, to any future Yes vote. When thinking about any future Quebec referendum, we must not avoid taking the recent past into account. One striking feature is the turnover in political leadership. In Que-. bec, after Mr Parizeau’s resignation, Mr Bouchard became leader of the PQ and consequently premier of the province. The Bloc leadership was assumed by Michel Gauthier and then, after some internal

dissension forced him to resign and issued in a hard-fought leadership contest, by Gilles Duceppe, the party’s former House leader. In

Ottawa, Brian Tobin, a principal organizer of the unity rally in Montreal, left the federal cabinet to assume the Liberal leadership in Newfoundland and become premier, replacing Clyde Wells, a determined opponent of special recognition for Quebec. In British Columbia,

Glen Clark took over the NDP leadership and won a narrow election victory: although this was not a direct consequence of the referendum, it has had important repercussions because the BC agenda is primarily a provincial one, just as the Ontario agenda is under Mike Harris, and both involve feuds with Ottawa about national standards and provincial powers. There have also been new premiers in Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. After the referendum, Mr Chrétien moved quickly to bolster his Quebec strength. Into the cabinet as minister of intergovernmental affairs he brought Stéphane Dion, an outspoken and provocative opponent of sovereignty, along with Pierre Pettigrew, a cerebral busi-

nessman who soon became minister of human resources development, charged with negotiating with the provinces a wide range of sensitive and expensive responsibilities, including employment training and federal transfers for social programs. Apart from these very considerable changes, there have been shifts in several factors relevant to any future referendum. The credibility of the Chrétien Liberals on constitutional matters was weakened in

326 From Referendum to Referendum

ROC by the near-victory of the Yes side. They were open to attack for

“almost losing the country,” as was demonstrated by Preston Manning during the campaign leading to the federal election of 2 June 1997. Reform argued then that the approach of the “old-line”, “Quebec-based” parties had failed to resolve the national unity problem and that Canada needed a new constitutional foundation — equality of the provinces and a massive decentralization of powers. As will be shown in the next chapter, this message helped solidify Reform’s western support.

Within Quebec the federalists appeared tired and dispirited because of the referendum experience. They had to operate in very close

cooperation with their Ottawa counterparts, which restricted their autonomy, and they were frustrated by the slow response of Mr Chrétien on the constitutional front. Mr Johnson easily survived a leadership review, but the Quebec Liberal Party has been left with the task of fashioning a constitutional position within a very limited range of manoeuvre. On the other hand, its main opponent, Mr Bouchard, is now charged with the responsibility of governing under very severe financial constraints, and public disaffection because of unpopular decisions provides hope for the Quebec Liberals about their prospects in a provincial election to be held before the end of 1999.

Then there are the shifts in public opinion. In Quebec, support for sovereignty actually rose after the referendum, and the Yes and No sides continued to be very evenly matched.” At the same time, although Quebecers consistently rated the economy and jobs as their principal concerns, substantial majorities continued to be dissatisfied with the operation of the federal system and to favour recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, the decentralization of powers, and a constitutional veto.’ Throughout 1996, the proportion of Quebecers expecting the province eventually to become sovereign fell by over

21 per cent (to 53 per cent),* but the principle of Quebec selfdetermination continued to be supported by a majority of the population.’ The prospect of the partnership also remained important; in polls asking how respondents would vote if there were no chance of negotiations with Canada being successful, the number inclined to vote Yes fell substantially.° All this suggests that the broad contours of public opinion in Quebec changed relatively little after the October 1995 referendum. However, one striking change caused by the referendum is the organization and radicalization of interests within Quebec that are opposed to secession. The Aboriginal peoples, especially the Inuit of northern Quebec, have steadfastly maintained their opposition to being

327 The Fallout of the Referendum

included within a seceding Quebec. Their view that Quebec should be partitioned and that their right of self-determination could be ex-

ercised has been well propagated and has attracted some support from the federal government.’ Notably, Ottawa changed a longestablished position and supported the “fundamental human right of self-determination” for “indigenous peoples” at a United Nations working group on indigenous rights. Despite qualifying statements, this could help lay a basis for contesting Quebec’s claim to all its territory.®

Much more dramatic was the changing mood in the anglophone community in Quebec. The referendum left many non-francophones in bitter despair, frustrated by the narrowness of the Yes defeat, the voting fraud, Mr Parizeau’s blaming of “money and the ethnic vote,” and their continuing economic losses caused by political uncertainty. Within weeks, many new grassroots organizations were forming, and pressures were building for more radical positions within established organizations such as Alliance Québec (which had atttempted to build mutual understanding across the ethnic divide). These new groups included Stability, the Citizens’ Committee for a New Province, the October 27 Group, the Quebec Committee for Canada, the Quebec

Political Action Committee, and the United Quebec Federalists.’ Spurred on by the hosts of radio talk-shows, by other journalists, and by more radical political leaders, anglophones mobilized at sev-

eral impressive demonstrations, including one at the McGill Law School in January 1996 that drew 1,200 people and one in June on Parliament Hill that attracted 7,000.*°

The anglophone groups had several objectives. First was some guarantee of federal government protection should a future sovereignty referendum carry. As embodied in a petition organized by a councillor for the municipality of Hampstead, for example, the request was for “public assurances that our rights as Canadians will be respected and that we will not be abandoned” after a Yes vote." A second thrust was for partition — that parts of the province where the federalists formed a majority should be excluded from the territory of a sovereign Quebec. Such a partition might involve much of the Ottawa Valley and large portions of Montreal. In the past, this idea had been confined to a tiny minority, but intense pressure to support the principle was exerted on politicians at all levels of government and especially on municipal councils. A coalition of eighteen groups pressed municipalities such as Dollard-des-Ormeaux to pass resolutions calling on “the Government of Canada to ensure that its terri-

tory remain part of Canada irrespective of the result of any future province-wide referendum ... in accordance with the legal, moral,

328 From Referendum to Referendum

political, constitutional, and territorial obligations of our nation.”” The partitionist movement received some encouragement from the federal government, though its corrosive effects on Quebec politics led many moderate anglophones to reject it, and commentators outside Quebec declared it unrealistic.» A third thrust was in the sensitive area of language. Anglophone groups pressed for the right to see English signs in stores, concentrating on the west island of Montreal. Several demonstrations were organized, along with boycotts of major retailers, most of whom acceded to their customers’ demands." Again, this initiative drew some support from the federal government while provoking harsh criticism from PQ ministers and causing more resources to be allocated to enforcing the language laws.” Like the other initiatives of the Quebec

anglophones, it placed the Quebec Liberal Party in a difficult position, because electoral success against the sovereigntists could only be achieved with solid support from both the anglophone community and the votes of a large minority of francophones. Upsetting the linguistic peace would make that coalition much harder to assemble.” In ROC, the referendum was accompanied by an upsurge in concern about national unity and a blip in public approval of measures to accommodate Quebec, such as distinct society recognition.” This was short-lived. By the end of 1995, there was consistent support in ROC for decentralizing functions to the provinces, but there was very little enthusiasm for any special consideration for Quebec. Fully 58

per cent were against recognizing Quebec in the constitution as a distinct society, and 72 per cent were against a Quebec constitutional veto; only a slim 54 per cent majority favoured making some accommodative response to Quebec in light of the referendum result.’* Even

right after the referendum, 38 per cent of British Columbians said they would rather have Quebec separate than recognize it as a distinct society.’’ Clearly, the majority ROC view rejected special status. At the end of 1995, only 22 per cent of people in ROC regarded Canada as a “pact between two founding groups,” while 75 per cent agreed that it is “a relationship between ten equal provinces.””° On the one hand, there appears to have developed in ROC a disinterest in the Quebec issue, especially in the western provinces. At the end of 1995, 67 per cent of British Columbians agreed that if Quebec-

ers voted to separate, Canada should “just let them go” rather than “do everything it can to convince them to stay.”*' One year later, with 42 per cent of all Canadians thinking it was likely or very likely that Quebec would separate within ten years, fully 47 per cent of people

in ROC favoured letting Quebec go.” On the other hand, attitudes towards Quebec hardened after the referendum. Just three months

329 The Fallout of the Referendum

afterwards, as Ottawa was attempting both to accommodate Quebec and to clarify the ground rules of secession, only 17 per cent favoured trying harder to find a compromise, while 46 per cent believed in taking a “tougher stand.”* A year later, 63 per cent in ROC approved

of emphasizing tough secession conditions, and only 13 per cent thought the federal government should “focus on giving Quebec some of the changes it wants.”*4 So there was considerable support for an uncompromising approach to the province, both in principle — because of provincial equality — and strategically, from the sense that a

harder line about the consequences of secession would deter Quebecers from voting Yes in the future.” In any case, there was no sign of change in the strong majorities in ROC against important elements of the sovereigntists’ partnership proposals, such as shared citizenship, a common currency, and the free movement of labour.”° On the surface, there seems to be little evidence that the referendum produced a shift in Canadians’ expectations that Quebecers will vote Yes in the future or that Quebec will separate sooner or later.’’ But poll results about these issues mask a profound change, one that has had — and will have — great effects on how the secession issue

unfolds. Simply enough, the very close result in the October 1995 referendum has forced Canadians to think about Quebec secession and what would happen in the case of a Yes vote. Before the referendum, very few Canadians took the prospect seriously or thought much about its consequences. They may have believed, vaguely, that Quebec would or would not separate, but few had firm expectations about the event itself. October 30 changed all that. It made Canadians real-

ize that Quebecers might vote Yes, and it made them think about what this would portend. Millions of Canadians, for the first time, contemplated these questions: What would a Yes vote mean for Canada? How would a Yes vote — and a Quebec secession — affect me? How would my governments react? Even more important, they asked, What should my governments do?

This change in expectations has profoundly altered the political landscape of Canada. As Alan Cairns put it, “Outside Quebec, there is a palpable change of mood. It is the ROC version of what happened in Quebec after Meech when, according to Charles Taylor, ‘some-

thing snapped.’ [Well,] ‘Something snapped’ outside Quebec after the razor-thin victory for the No in the recent referendum.”” Similarly, David Milne noted “a remarkable change” in Canadians outside Quebec: “Unlike the silence around such questions in the past, the people of ROC now accept that the terms of secession should be spelled out in a tough-minded and hardened spirit; they talk openly of force, of carving up Quebec’s territory, and of demanding higher

330 From Referendum to Referendum

thresholds of consent in any future referendum; on ‘track two’ they

now think about and plan for a Canada without Quebec; they toy with constituent assemblies and other previously radical options on process. Taboos around substance and process all fall before us.””

It is debateable whether most citizens in ROC failed to discuss Quebec secession in the past because of “taboos” or because they simply assumed it to be unlikely, but there is no doubt that the referendum had a profound impact on ordinary Canadians. In the wake of the vote, ordinary people as well as newspaper editorialists spoke of “Canada’s fate” hanging in the balance, of the country being “in crisis,” of watching “our beloved country come perilously close to

slipping away,” of Canada being at “the abyss,” and of the “nearfatal referendum.”* The polls may show that no greater numbers of Canadians expect Quebec to secede, but the expectations about secession are now embedded in the context of a highly visible game, in

which current and future moves are widely understood among the public as being designed to deter it.** These moves include measures to accommodate Quebec nationalists and also efforts to make sover-

eignty appear more difficult or costly to achieve. As a result of the 1995 referendum, the public in ROC has demanded such strategems and follows them closely. Essentially, the referendum has focused attention on three major issues. The first is the conduct of any future referendum on sovereignty and the process of secession itself. As will be shown, it is here that the federal government has concentrated much of its effort, and the referendum produced strong support for such initiatives. An Angus Reid poll at the end of 1995 found that 74 per cent of Canadians in ROC thought that the rest of the country should develop a “game plan” to deal with a possible Yes in a future referendum.” Beyond Ottawa and the public at large, issues of process have occupied business organizations, citizens’ groups, and think tanks. A notable example lays out ten rules that should govern secession, given that the 1995 referendum shattered the old “strategy of studied indifference,” as Canada suffered “a near-death experience.”* Political parties also have debated issues of process. Indeed, whether

to prepare for a future Yes and how to respond to it were major issues in the 1997 federal election campaign. Most significantly perhaps, process issues have been taken up by provincial governments; they will expect to be involved in devising pre-referendum strategies, in negotiating with Quebec, and, of course, in designing any reconstitution of Canada. One example is provided by Alberta, where Premier Klein has emphasized that citizens would be involved in determining the province’s position in any future constitutional talks.“

331 The Fallout of the Referendum

In Ontario, a legislative committee has recommended that referendums should be held to approve constitutional amendments (as well as tax increases). While some other provinces, notably British Columbia, have such provisions in place, it is clear that this kind of procedural requirement would further reduce the leaders’ room to manoeuvre in any future secession crisis. The referendum immediately focused attention on a second issue — the terms to be negotiated with Quebec. In part this was because the campaign centred on the various elements of the sovereigntists’ proposed partnership, but it was also a consequence of the shocking absence of government planning about the matters that secession would involve. After the referendum, issues such as the division of the debt, the army, Quebec’s borders, citizenship, Aboriginal and minority rights, international treaties, the currency, and economic arrangements with Quebec all received much more intense discussion in academe, think tanks, the media, business and citizens’ groups, and public discourse.*” One important strand of these debates has concerned Canadians’ obligations to Aboriginals and federalists in Quebec, and the legitimacy of partitioning a seceding Quebec. Issues of rights and morality have therefore come to impinge much more significantly upon the question of secession. Again, as some actors take predetermined positions, the fluidity that would have marked a post-Yes situation in 1995 has been reduced. The current premier of Newfoundland, for example, has supported partition of Quebec, stating, “I happen to believe the country is not divisible, any more than Quebec is divisible. But if Bouchard argues that Canada

is divisible by a vote, then so is Quebec.” Of course, the terms of secession also involve matters of realpolitik. It is hardly surprising that the close referendum result led some pro-

vincial governments to assess the consequences of secession. The Ontario Ministry of Finance, for example, was reported to possess eleven documents on the effects of secession. These included studies of agreements between Ontario and Quebec and their business communities, the possible economic consequences of Quebec independence, models for dividing the national debt, relations between Ontario and its creditors in the event of secession, and possible relations between the governments of Canada and Quebec.” Such a strategic col-

lection of information and its analysis is essential for contingency planning, and it was virtually absent before the 1995 referendum. Now it is not. In British Columbia, the premier appointed a special adviser on national unity matters. He commissioned studies about the province’s options in the event of a Quebec secession, because “B.C. has no game plan at all. There’s nothing that sets out a practical

332 From Referendum to Referendum

explanation of what the fallout would be, and nothing concerning what B.C.’s position would be. The lack of any studies is alarming.”” Obviously, this preparatory work can lead provincial administrations to reach firm conclusions about how the terms of any secession should be tailored to fit their interests. The principle used to divide the national debt, for example, could have strong repercussions for the finances of different provinces, and these have now been understood by all of them. Considering the terms of secession can also lead to public commitments, as when the premier of Newfoundland declared that secession would mean that the contentious Churchill Falls power contract with Quebec would be broken.* A retreat from such positions could be very difficult in the event of a future Yes vote. Finally, the 1995 referendum forced Canadians and their governments to think seriously about the shape of ROC after a future Yes vote and to consider how Canada would be reconstituted. In Atlantic Canada, apprehensions sharpened about the region’s geographic isolation and its dependence on federal transfers, and the old issue of Maritime union came back onto the agenda.* Ontarians weighed the relative importance of their economic links with Quebec and with

western Canada. And in the West, fears of domination by Ontario within a truncated Canada arose. Most notably, the special adviser in British Columbia was contemplating the possibility that his province might also become sovereign in the wake of a Quebec secession:

“It’s one option. We entered into Canada as a constitutional entity which includes Quebec. Without Quebec, there is no Canada. The Canadian constitution is invalid.”* While ideas about western separation might be attractive to only asmall minority, they have become part of the public debate simply because the 1995 referendum forced Canadians to consider seriously what their constitutional options would be if Quebecers voted Yes in the future.“ These changes in perceptions and expectations have profoundly altered the political landscape of ROC. What are their practical implications for the future and for any future Quebec secession? First, there is a somewhat greater chance of polarization between ROC and Quebec in the run-up to another referendum, in part because of the estrangement between the two communities — the very sense that they are two communities - which was noted by Alan Cairns in the wake of the 1995 referendum.® As well, actors in ROC will not leave

a referendum debate to the federal government and Quebec Liberals. They will be more vocal and also more diverse, and some of the positions advanced will have the potential to alienate moderate Quebec

nationalists. Moreover, issues such as Aboriginal rights and partition will be part of the debate, encouraged by extremists both within

333 The Fallout of the Referendum

and outside the province, and inevitably infused with the emotion and absolutism intrinsic to debates about rights and morality. More important, the whole element of surprise has been lost. In the “inevitable secession” scenario, it was posited that a Yes vote in 1995 would suddenly shock a largely unprepared ROC and that the prevailing economic uncertainty would impel leaders to accept secession in principle and move quickly to settle major issues. Although

Ottawa’s legitimacy would erode gradually, irreversible decisions would have set the secession on its course. There would not be time for opposition — from provinces, citizens’ groups, or business — to mobilize effectively. But organization and contingency planning have both taken place now, and political actors will have their demands prepared if another referendum is held. A critical demand will be for participation. After a Yes in the 1995 referendum, in the disarray that would have existed, it was probable that the federal government could have taken a leading role, with decisions being taken at the centre before other actors could demand involvement. This will be far less _ likely in the future, because citizens, provincial governments, the Aboriginal peoples, and political parties have all assessed their interests and will insist on participating to protect them. Not only will the negotiating arena be more crowded, but it will be less fluid, because the major actors will bring pre-established positions to the debate. The division of the national debt is a good example. While there are good reasons to settle on population as the principle for its division, a case can also be made for allocating it according to gross domestic product. This would require Quebec to take a slightly smaller share, and some provincial administrations

might prefer this - Ontario because it would weaken the Quebec economy less, and the Atlantic provinces because their future implicit obligations would be much lower than under the population principle. But Alberta and British Columbia would be strongly opposed; having assessed their situation and weighed scenarios, they would be most reluctant to accept a principle that would saddle them

with a much larger debt share if Canada fragmented and they became sovereign entities. Such pre-established positions are likely to be taken on all the major dossiers to be negotiated with a seceding Quebec. This means that decisions will be much harder to take because of the numerous actors involved. It also transforms the decision-

making process from one that was serial and open-ended (with the most critical issues being settled quickly and emerging problems dealt with next) to one that is simultaneous (with all issues on the table at once, subject to complex trade-offs and logrolling). Under these conditions, speedy and efficient agreements would be unlikely.

334 From Referendum to Referendum A final result of these changes renders a quick, clean secession even

less likely. This is the linkage of two separate sets of negotiations, those about the terms and conditions of Quebec sovereignty and those

about the reconstitution of ROC. In the pre-1995 scenario, Ottawa and the Government of Quebec would begin to deal with the issues surrounding secession immediately after a Yes vote, with participation widening gradually as the emergency faded. As this occurred, the attention of people in ROC would shift towards the reconstitution of Canada, and it was probable that the result would closely resemble the current constitution. This is because Quebec secession would largely be a fait accompli, because the very process of negotiating collectively with Quebec would heighten solidarity in ROC, and because no provincial government would be prepared to plunge the country into uncertainty again by withholding consent to the constitutional amendments necessary to excise Quebec and maintain Canada as a going concern.

Now, however, the secession issues and constitutional issues are linked. It is highly likely that Quebec secession can only be accomplished legally through amendments to the Constitution Acts, which will require the unanimous consent of Ottawa and all provinces, and that this will become widely understood. So every provincial government will be aware before a future referendum that, in theory, it can block secession (and also veto the reconstitution of ROC over matters such as representation in the House of Commons, the makeup of the Senate, and so on); and provincial governments may be more prepared to do so as a consequence of advance analysis and planning. More gravely, the whole set of Canada-Quebec issues about the terms of secession will be subject to provincial agreement. These sub-

stantive matters will be linked to Quebec’s exit through a constitutional amendment. Even though many of the issues to be resolved fall squarely within federal jurisdiction, any provincial administration determined to win its way on some substantive matter will be able to threaten to withhold constitutional approval, and this linkage means that the two sets of issues will be on the table simultaneously and that all governments will have to agree to a total package. Quebec’s sovereignty, the terms of secession, and the reconstitution

of ROC will all be inextricably linked.“ This was definitely not the case before the 1995 referendum when the almost universal lack of preparedness for the crisis of a Yes vote would have been conducive to a clean, rapid secession and a strong Canada outfitted with a familiar constitution. One other significant change was wrought by the 1995 referendum. This was the perception of the sovereignty issue held by foreign actors.

335 The Fallout of the Referendum

In any secession, the attitude of other countries is important, and not

only did the referendum campaign heighten worldwide interest in the Quebec case, but the close result appears to have induced other countries (especially the United States) to reappraise their policy on Canadian unity. Abroad, the run-up to the referendum was accompanied by increased academic interest in Quebec secession,” and the campaign itself drew a lot of attention from the international media.* This was especially true in the United States, to which Canadian politicians had carried their debate directly, as when Mr Parizeau and Mr Johnson contributed contending articles to the influential journal Foreign Policy.”

The former sought to reassure Americans about Quebec’s commitment to democracy, free trade, financial responsibility, and minority rights, while the latter drew American attention to fundamental uncertainties that a Yes vote would bring in such matters as the internal economic union, citizenship, mobility, the currency, and the division of the debt. As the campaign tightened, the Quebec issue drew more attention in official circles.-° The Clinton administration revised its traditional mantra of “excellent relations with a strong and united Canada” and non-interference in Canadian affairs to a stance more supportive of unity, with hints that existing arrangements with Quebec would not continue in the event of a secession. This did not generate much domestic attention, but the very close result did. Editorialists across the United States drew from it implications for American policy about multiculturalism, and they stressed that important American interests were at stake in the referendum. A conclusion underlined by most of them was that the close vote had settled nothing and Canada’s future remained profoundly uncertain.” After the referendum, the international context of Quebec secession remained important. The prime minister of France visited the province to assure Quebecers “that tomorrow, regardless of the choice of your destiny, France will always be at your side” (and the publication of Mr Parizeau’s thoughts about French recognition of Quebec sovereignty stirred up the 1997 federal election campaign). In the United States, there was even more involvement, for Canadian issues were now squarely on the agenda, generating a new round of analysis and planning. Opinion pieces in the United States profoundly questioned both American indifference towards Canada and the accepted wisdom about national unity.* A more important sign of rethinking was a major article published in Foreign Affairs by Charles Doran, a leading Canada watcher and international relations specialist.’ Doran argued that the United States had to contemplate the possibility of Quebec

336 From Referendum to Referendum

secession because of its great implications for American interests. More provocatively, he argued that Canada might well fragment under the impact of this event, because there would be less incentive for interregional redistribution, a jarring geographic discontinuity between the parts of the Canada that were left, and deep suspicion in western Canada about Ontario dominance. In Doran’s view, the “unravelling” of Canada would inevitably mean greater responsibilities for the United States as “peacemaker, adjudicator, rule-maker, and police officer”; hence, “Washington must be prepared for all contingencies.”** In particular, the United States must

design plans for “a form of supranational affiliation with the remnants of Canada.”*” This arrangement would lie midway between accession to American statehood (which would be too disruptive domestically) and simple treaty arrangements (which would be too weak and would leave room for “overseas interests” to become involved). The new “political affiliation” would allow for the free move-

ment of goods, services, capital, and people, with the United States providing foreign security and a military (in which Canadians would serve).°° Accession to statehood might come eventually but, in the meantime, “North America could look more like the former Soviet Union, with one large state at the centre, the United States, edged by a series of small, isolated, weak entities along its northern border.” In any case, Doran called for more imaginative thinking in Washington about “how to manage the aftermath of Quebec separation, which should no longer seem impossible or remote.”” This piece drew some sharp responses, but it undoubtedly both reflected and helped crystallize American thinking about Quebec secession.” Further evidence of concern in the United States was pro_ vided during a brief hearing of a House of Representatives subcommittee in September 1996. Here, the legislators heard about the stakes of secession for the United States. While the strategic and military implications of secession were much reduced as a result of the end of the Cold War, there could be important ramifications for U.S. trade, direct investment in Canada, hydroelectric supplies, transportation on the St Lawrence, holders of Canadian bonds, and the flow of tourists and migrants.®' Also discussed at some length were the likeli-

hood of secession, how to send signals to Quebecers about what American policy would be in the event of a secession (especially with

respect to the difficulties of accession to the NAFTA), and the imperative of advance American planning for a Yes vote in a future referendum.” As one expert put it, “I really think that we need to be prepared should Quebec become independent. Not because it is likely, not because it is necessarily inevitable, but because we should never be caught as off guard as we have been in the past.”®

337 The Fallout of the Referendum

Some evidence not only of American concern but also of basic rethinking was provided when a senior foreign service officer published

an article arguing that “a cool-eyed appraisal of Quebec independence indicates that its dangers have been overstated.”™ The essen-

tial thrust of the piece was that Quebecers might well vote for sovereignty if their constitutional grievances were not resolved but that Quebec, as a democratic, rich, peaceful, trading nation, posed no threat to America’s essential interests. In consequence, while Canadian unity was definitely to be preferred, the United States “must be intellectually prepared for a sovereign Quebec,” and the administration should not provide “open-ended” support for a Canadian government desperate for some dissuasive American interventions in a future referendum campaign.® This stance was disavowed by the State Department, of course, but the article attests to the impact that the 1995 referendum had on American calculations about Quebec secession.

Apparently, there has been no comprehensive assessment of the effects that Quebec sovereignty would have on the United States since

one was conducted in 1977. There is no agreement now that a firm contingency plan should be prepared, because the situation remains fluid, a vote for sovereignty could still allow time for appropriate strategies to be devised, and public statements could actually increase

the chance of a Yes vote. But both in public and in private, American decision makers have confronted the issues of process and substance raised by the prospect of Quebec secession. These include

Whether to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the issue; whether to enter the Canadian debate by issuing statements about Quebec’s succession to treaties and admission to NAFTA, for example;

how to react to a UDI by Quebec, especially if Canada rejected it; whether to recognize Quebec’s existing boundaries; how to support the Canadian dollar and the Canadian economy in the event of severe economic turmoil; how much to encourage close economic cooperation between Canada and a sovereign Quebec; and whether to promote post-secession unity in Canada or to prepare for a new po-

litical structure in North America.” These issues have also been

plumbed in many conferences involving academics, journalists, and policy makers.” And ordinary Americans, in the wake of the referendum, have been exposed to a great deal more information about Canada and the Quebec issue, much of it pointing towards a future secession.”

The upshot of all of this is not clear to anyone outside the US. administration. No one should expect that some academic conferences and an hour-and-a-half hearing of a minor congressional subcommittee would either galvanize policy makers or accurately reflect

338 From Referendum to Referendum

their views. Canada remains low on the list of American priorities. It is unlikely that the State Department, the Treasury and the National

Security Council have produced some new master strategy about Quebec secession. But Americans’ estimate of the probability of secession has certainly been raised, as has their understanding of the substantive issues involved and their appreciation of the enormous stakes for their country’s well-being.” In the past, implicitly, Quebec secession was a Canadian domestic issue. It is so no longer. The United States will watch developments

with vigilance, and a future referendum campaign would quickly bring Canada right to the fore in Washington. The Americans will no longer accept bland assurances from Ottawa that the situation is in hand, and their government will be ready to protect American interests. It will not countenance the interference of other parties in a fu-

ture Quebec secession. Nor will it tolerate violence or prolonged economic disruption on its northern border.” There is no sign of a fundamental shift in U.S. policy towards favouring annexation of parts of Canada (which would entail tactics conducive to Quebec secession). The status quo is preferable to the disruption, both economic and political, that any secession would involve. Should Quebec secede, the United States would favour a united ROC and a rapid resolution of the crisis — as it would have if the Yes side had won in 1995. But in future the United States will be not only more vigilant but also more prepared to intervene to defend its vital interests. A central message of this book is that secessions are historic events. This is quite congruent with the basic conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis, because near-secessions are also historic events.

The October 1995 referendum in Quebec was a searing emotional experience for millions of Canadians, and the close result was remarked around the world. The event produced profound changes among political actors and citizens in Quebec and across ROC. Now, different expectations prevail about the probability of secession, different and more strongly defined attitudes are held about secession’s implications, and new strategies are in place both to promote it and to prevent it. Having contemplated Quebec secession, people are much

more prepared to react to it. The course of any future secession is much more difficult to predict than was the case before the 1995 referendum, and a Yes vote might never occur. But if it does, one thing is certain — its consequences will not resemble those that would have occurred in 1995. The 1995 referendum is history.

CHAPTER TWENTY

Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

Canada’s constitutional dilemma was paramount on the political agenda after the 1995 contest about sovereignty. The federal government moved rapidly to implement some of the promises made during the referendum campaign, but these were not fully realized. In anticipation of the next referendum promised by the sovereigntists, the Chrétien Liberals developed a bifurcated (“two-track”) strategy. One set of initiatives comprised Plan A, as this strand is commonly called —- measures to accommodate Quebec in the constitution and to

meet some of the province’s traditional demands. The other set of initiatives, Plan B, involved clarifying the process and the implications of Quebec secession, and challenging the sovereigntists’ assump-

tions about these matters. All these initiatives were controversial, as the course and results of the 1997 federal election demonstrated clearly.

On both fronts — accommodating Quebecers and confronting the sovereigntists — the federal government moved cautiously and incrementally. So too, in administering Quebec, did the PQ government led by Lucien Bouchard. THE QUEBEC GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGY

Three weeks after the referendum, Mr Bouchard announced his resignation as leader of the Bloc québécois and his intention to run for

the leadership of the PQ.' Other potential candidates stood aside, and Lucien Bouchard was sworn in as premier on 29 January 1996. He made it clear from the outset that he was committed to another

340 From Referendum to Referendum

referendum on sovereignty but that his government would not amend the prevailing legislation that prohibited holding two referendums on similar questions during the life of a legislature.* Hence, another sovereignty referendum had to follow a provincial election, which could be held as late as the autumn of 1999. Were the PQ to win that

election, another referendum on sovereignty could be held at any time during its mandate. The new premier seemed content to await an opportune time for a referendum. As he put it when declaring his candidacy for the PQ leadership, “Once our partner has drained the last dregs of its inability to recognize our reality as a people, another

referendum opportunity will open itself up.” On taking office, Mr Bouchard reconstructed the cabinet and focused his new government on Quebec’s economic and social problems.* The major target was the provincial deficit, which had been neglected by the Parizeau administration and its predecessors and was increasingly anomalous in view of other provinces’ efforts to balance their budgets. The approach taken was to forge a broad consensus among business, labour, and social groups about deficit reduction, government spending priorities, and economic growth. Mr Bouchard’s strategy was to emphasize solidarity and mutual responsibility. This reflected the messages delivered during the referendum campaign, of course, but it also forced the various segments of Quebec society to make tradeoffs within the framework established by the government.” The first step was to hold a major conference at which all organiza-

tions present accepted a zero-deficit target, proposed strategies to reach it, and established several major working groups.° In this, promi-

nent federalist businesspeople and even the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP) felt obliged to participate, because the government’s goals were

largely congruent with their own. This was followed by a budget that compressed spending, and by a balanced-budget bill setting out deficit levels through to the target of zero in 1999-2000.’ Then there was a four-day summit meeting on employment and the economy in October 1996. Here, business, labour, and government agreed on a sweeping package of measures aimed at deficit reduction, deregulation, and job creation. Although some groups representing students, the poor, and women left the summit over social-spending cuts, the broad consensus reached gave the impression of progress and provided the government with a mandate for future measures favourable

to business while permitting the premier to brandish his social-

democratic credentials.° The federalists hoped that the hard decisions necessary in Quebec would diminish the popularity of the PQ and of Mr Bouchard himself.’

341 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

For the first time in his career, the premier would assume general responsibiliby for governing, and his charismatic aura would become

tarnished.” In fact, there is some evidence that support for sovereignty declined slightly over this period, along with intentions to vote PQ, but Mr Bouchard retained his personal popularity throughout this difficult time of reorienting the Quebec state." In part, this may have been due to his commitment to governing the province and also to the deep ambiguity that he brought to many issues which were potentially divisive, especially in the wake of the referendum. The deficit-reduction measures were generally favoured by the public as long as the government maintained its concern about job creation and solidarity with the poor. On language matters and

relations with minority communities, the premier attempted to repair the damage caused by Mr Parizeau’s remarks on referendum night, notably by calling a meeting of prominent English-speaking Montrealers and reassuring them about their rights.” At the economic summit, the government tended to ally itself with business by indi-

cating that Montreal could be considered a “bilingual” city.’ And the PQ eased the enforcement of “francization” in smaller businesses." At the same time, however, it introduced legislation to reinstate the agency that enforced Quebec’s language laws, and, in the face of aggressive anglophone agitation and after hearings by a committee of the National Assembly, it tightened the rules about using French in the public service.” The language issue was linked with school-board reform, and this

was one of several areas where the PQ government managed some cooperation with Ottawa. Proposals to reorganize school boards along linguistic rather than confessional (Roman Catholic/ Protestant) lines

were supported by francophones aiming for more certain integration of immigrants into their community and by anglophones who desired to consolidate their resources. But constitutional obstacles prevented rationalization. The PQ government announced, therefore, that it would seek a constitutional amendment, and Ottawa was quick to respond positively.’° There were some demands by anglophones that their linguistic rights be constitutionalized as their religious rights had been, but Ottawa was not particularly receptive to the idea, even though the federal government promised to act only on a solid Quebec consensus in favour of the change.’”’ This was achieved, with a unanimous vote in the National Assembly, and in short order a resolution to amend section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867, was introduced in Parliament.” Its passage was delayed, however, and then stopped by the 1997 federal election. But after the Chrétien Liberals were returned to power, they were eager to introduce a measure that

342 From Referendum to Referendum

could demonstrate the flexibility of the federation, and the resolution passed a free vote in the House of Commons while surviving a vigorous debate in the Senate.” At the signing ceremony, Mr Dion noted with pleasure that this event showed that “the system of Canada works,” while Quebec’s minister of intergovernmental affairs acknowledged a “certain irony” in the PQ government using the amendment process of a constitution that it refused to accept.” There were various other instances of cooperation. These were in areas where the federal government’s desire to keep referendum commitments and to show that flexible federalism could help Quebecers

coincided with the sovereigntists’ need to demonstrate competent management and generate economic activity. At times, as when Mr Chrétien and Mr Bouchard met in mid-1996 to discuss economic issues, it was as though the two bitter opponents were prepared to make a bet on the effect of economic growth. The prime minister’s reasoning was that “a good economy will induce Quebecers to stay in Canada,” while the premier argued that “sovereignty will have to be built on a strong Quebec.”*' Mr Bouchard even took part ina Team Canada trade mission to Asia, stating, “I will never hesitate to spend all the time that is needed with a minister, a premier, the entire federal cabinet if I have to, to create jobs in Quebec.””

The two governments also agreed on many jointly funded infrastructure projects, and they cooperated with a wide range of organized interests in establishing a new agency, Montreal International, that was to revitalize the city’s economy.” Most significantly, Ottawa and Quebec City successfully negotiated the transfer of control over employment training programs to the province. This met a traditional demand of Quebec governments and followed a PQ-QLP consensus

favouring the transfer, along with a declaration by the new federal minister of human resources development that Ottawa would meet its commitment to withdraw from the delivery of training to the unemployed.” The federal offer was made to all the provinces, but it was especially well received in Quebec, and the PQ government came under considerable pressure to negotiate an agreement in good faith.”

An accord was eventually signed in April 1997, with Mr Chrétien using the pre-election event to declare that he was keeping his promises and that federalism works, while Mr Bouchard argued that the transfer had taken thirty-two years to achieve and was only accomplished after Quebecers had voted strongly for sovereignty.” Of course, there were also many areas of friction between Ottawa and Quebec City. These were most manifest in the area of social policy, where the Bouchard government aimed to innovate unilaterally — as in its $5-per-day child care initiative — rather than join with the other

343. Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

provinces to constrain the federal government. For example, its efforts to set up an extended family-leave program conflicted with Ottawa’s guidelines and expenditure priorities, as did its highly symbolic attempt to establish a provincial blood-bank system.” Similarly, it resisted central-government initiatives in funding university re-

search.”? But these skirmishes were not dramatized by the PQ government. Overall, the PO under Lucien Bouchard was oriented towards winning the next election rather than fighting a referendum on sovereignty. In fact, the whole sovereignty issue was downplayed. Although the government reacted sharply to the emerging elements of Ottawa’s Plan B strategy, no coherent and concerted counterattack was launched

against them. In the medium term, it was more important to demonstrate competence in government and to foster economic growth in order to win re-election and lay the groundwork for a Yes in a future referendum. Consequently, few resources were devoted to referendum strategy. Instead, Mr Bouchard’s dexterity kept the administration moving forward within its very limited room to manoeuvre. He was also able to keep command of his followers, which is difficult when a mass programmatic party like the PQ actually takes power and is unable to implement all aspects of its platform.” The premier certainly faced dissent within his party. PO militants objected to the government’s fixation on deficit reduction, which to the left wing of the party smacked of neoconservatism and which was strongly criticized by Mr Parizeau in an article published one year after the referendum.” Spending cuts threatened traditional party constituencies among women, students, and public-sector workers, and proposals to ease the use of English, especially in Montreal, were explosive. Finally, the premier’s insistence on changing the party’s program to embrace the post-sovereignty partnership with Canada aroused old suspicions among militants about his dedication to the core goal of the PQ.” At the first party convention held since he assumed the leadership, the government encountered grass-roots challenges, especially on language policy. More seriously, only 76.7 per cent of the delegates voted in favour of Mr Bouchard’s leadership, a result that caused him to walk out of the convention amidst rumours of a possible resignation. On his return, however, he and his ministers not only managed to swing the members to their position, but Mr Bouchard demanded that the party close ranks, show more discipline, and support the platform — otherwise, clearly, he would resign.”

So the premier’s position was formidable. This was shown after the economic summit when the government negotiated with the pub-

lic-service workers, demanding that they accept reductions in the

344 From Referendum to Referendum

work week and salaries as the only alternative to large-scale layoffs.” With the budget looming, the government was able to force through

a compromise involving early retirement, and it met its budgetreduction targets. These struggles, along with the spending cuts in social services, education, and health, certainly cost the PQ government some support among its key allies. Negotiations about cuts in transfers to municipalities were especially difficult, as Quebec City alienated both mayors and municipal workers. Typically, Mr Bouchard

isolated the intransigents, accusing them of attempting to escape the government’s fiscal framework “au détriment des citoyens.”” Yet in early 1997, almost 52 per cent of Quebecers were satisfied with the provincial government, and the PQ enjoyed a twelve-point lead over the QLP.** Support for sovereignty continued to hover at around 50 per cent.°”

The success of the sovereigntists on the provincial stage was further demonstrated in the 1997 federal election campaign. This came to be dominated by the national unity issue (or “la question nationale”). Going into the campaign, the Bloc québécois had a relatively inexpe-

rienced and weak leader, Gilles Duceppe, and it was still divided by the recent leadership contest. As well, it had lost the support of a major ally, the Quebec Federation of Labour, and the early campaign was so disorganized that the management team was replaced.** Further, the whole sovereigntist movement was thrown into disarray by the release of a book by Mr Parizeau in which he seemed to put the lie to commitments made in 1995 about negotiating the partnership with Canada in good faith. Despite all this, the sovereigntists united throughout the course of the campaign, based on the PQ organization, and in the end the Bloc took forty-four seats (down from fifty-four) and 38 per cent of the popular vote (down from 49.5 per cent). Clearly, the sovereigntists still constituted a potent political movement. Although there was disgruntlement within it and although important divisions remained — especially between the Parizeau hard-liners and the more inclusive nationalists led by the premier — it was dominated more than ever by Lucien Bouchard, whose presence had been vital during the campaign. In spite of the unpopular measures taken by the PQ government, Mr Bouchard had not stumbled. As one experienced observer

noted at the outset of the campaign, “There should be no wishful thinking that his government will fail because it can’t meet the chal-

lenges facing it and that the problem [of national unity] will solve itself.” Indeed, the sovereigntist strategy remained intact: govern well, win an election in 1998 or 1999, and then, at a propitious moment, call and win a referendum on sovereignty.

345 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum THE FEDERALIST STRATEGY

Necessarily, the federalist strategy was much more complex, because in the wake of the 1995 referendum shock, the Chrétien Liberals were faced with strong and conflicting pressures about how to handle national unity, and the QLP was weakened and dispirited. In Ottawa, the government moved incrementally in three ways. First, it aimed to continue its emphasis on good government. Thus, progress towards a balanced budget was continued (along with the substantial cuts in program spending and transfers to the provinces that this entailed), as were limited measures to create employment. Despite the latter and such high-profile initiatives as the Team Canada trade missions, Ottawa maintained its basic economic orientation — creating the conditions for private-sector growth through a shrinking deficit and low and stable interest rates. As Canadians (and Quebecers) continued

to be more concerned with the economy than with national unity and as the economy improved, this stance sustained support for the government. In February 1996 the Liberals were the party preferred by 53 per cent of Canadians; by year’s end they stood at 46 per cent, and heading into the election they still retained 41 per cent support.” On the other hand, Mr Chrétien’s personal popularity was slipping over this period, and this no doubt was a major reason for calling the election of June 1997, when the government had served just over three and one-half years of its mandate.*! But the economic strategy paid dividends. By mid-1997, the deficit stood at $1.5 billion, compared with $31.8 billion in the second quarter of 1995.* In June the prime rate on business loans stood at 4.75 per cent, rather than the 8.75 per cent of 1995.* The gross domestic product was growing at 4.9 per cent, rather than the 2.3 per cent it had achieved in 1995. Rates for a one-year mortgage had fallen from 8.0 per cent in June 1995 to 5.2 per cent in June 1997.® The one soft spot in the economy was job creation; the unemployment rate fell only 0.4 per cent over the period, to 9.1 per cent.*° Certainly, most Canadians were still no better off than they had been in the late 1980s, and deficit-reduction policies had strained their public services, but as the Chrétien government’s economic orientation bore fruit, the situation improved, and by 1997 it was considerably better than at the time of the 1995 referendum. Citizens were more confident about their economic prospects, and Ottawa was not about to deviate from its basic policies. While maintaining this economic course, the federal government moved on the national unity front in two directions. The first — the Plan A initiatives — involved meeting the commitments made on the

346 From Referendum to Referendum

eve of the referendum by recognizing Quebec’s distinctiveness, restoring the province’s constitutional veto, and decentralizing important functions to the provinces. It also involved other measures to assist Quebecers, to reaffirm the benevolent presence of the federal government, and to strengthen the links of identification with Canada. Plan B initiatives, on the other hand, were to counter the arguments and tactics used by the sovereigntists in the 1995 referendum and also to respond to those in ROC who demanded preparedness for the next referendum and believed that a tough stand on secession would help deter it. On this front, Ottawa moved more cautiously, with feints and sorties rather than a full-scale assault, as the government attempted to preserve its room to manoeuvre, to hold the middle ground in ROC, and to chip away at sovereignty support in Quebec. Plan B initiatives were timed carefully and were focused only on the process of secession. While highly provocative on occasion, the federal government trod carefully; it aimed to raise doubts among Quebecers about the ease of secession while avoiding both polarization and any impression that it regarded separation as probable, let alone inevitable. Plan A

In the aftermath of the referendum, there was enormous pressure on Ottawa for bold action to resolve the national unity issue by responding to whatever it was that had brought a clear majority of francophones

to vote Yes to sovereignty; that is, to answer their discontent with accommodative measures. Pressure for Plan A initiatives was maintained by editorialists, academics, and business leaders, who urged Ottawa to decentralize powers and recognize Quebec’s distinctiveness.*” Some of these proposals called for radical reform; others advocated asymmetrical arrangements for Quebec; still others sought

to broaden the agenda to include the West’s demands, Aboriginal issues, and other matters.* Amidst this fervour, Ottawa moved forward quickly on the Plan A agenda, in line with the commitments made at the close of the referendum campaign. Immediately after the referendum, the federal government canvassed provincial leaders to determine whether there was sufficient support for constitutional amendments to meet the promises made to Quebecers. The basic objective was to entrench a distinct society clause, or at least to have a constitutional resolution passed by six provinces and Ottawa, so that it would only need passage in Quebec to come into effect.” This would leave the PQ government in an awkward position and would provide a platform for the QLP’s campaign

347 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

in the next provincial election. But despite a flurry of activity, agreement proved impossible, for the premiers of Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario were cool to the idea.’ Each appeared more interested in decentralizing powers to Quebec (and their own administrations) than in a symbolic declaration that would flow against strong cur-

rents of opinion among their electorates. Mr Klein, for example, thought that “most people in this province recognize that there is a distinctiveness relative to Quebec,” but he added that if “it implies special status, or gives Quebec, through this resolution, any kind of powers that don’t exist anywhere else, then the people here would be very mad.”*' Since there was insufficient consensus among the provincial governments, Ottawa decided to move alone, and over three successive days the government introduced into Parliament a resolution about Quebec’s distinctiveness, a bill introducing regional constitutional vetoes, and substantial changes to the unemployment insurance and job-training systems. As the prime minister proclaimed, “Less than a month after the referendum, the government is keeping its word and fulfilling its commitments.”°?

The resolution was designed to bind the House of Commons and the executive branch to be guided by the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society.” It was attacked by both the BQ and the Reform Party.

Because the resolution was nonconstitutional, did not speak to the courts, and narrowly construed “distinct,” Mr Bouchard derided it as a “measly proposal” — a “minimalist effort” that “borders on surrealism.” The rest of Canada, he said, would never be able to offer a genuine recognition of the Quebec people because that would threaten their view of a single Canadian nation. In any case, Quebecers were past small symbols; they sought a partnership of equality. From the other side, Mr Manning condemned this “narrow backward-looking Quebec package,” arguing that Canada had to offer more fundamental change to the federation while also spelling out for Quebecers what would be the terms and conditions of any secession.” But the Liberal majority carried the resolution, of course. The veto proposal fared worse. Bill C-110 was to bind the federal government not to propose a constitutional amendment about some classes of matter unless it had been consented to by regional majorities; hence, Ottawa was “lending” its own veto to Quebec, Ontario,

two western provinces with 50 per cent of the regional population, and two Atlantic provinces with 50 per cent of the population. The bill would apply to a limited range of matters, and, intriguingly, it left Ottawa free to define provincial “consent,” a latitude that might allow it to undercut an obstructionist PQ government. Of course, the measure was dismissed by the Bloc as hopelessly inadequate,

348 From Referendum to Referendum

and also by the Reform Party because it did not provide for national referendums and provincial equality. But the real resistance came from

the West, where the proposal set off a firestorm of opposition because it treated provinces differently and took a cavalier attitude towards British Columbians’ regional aspirations.” In short order, the federal government amended the bill to make British Columbia a fifth “region,” thereby providing a veto to Alberta as well (by virtue of its percentage of the prairie population). This measure was widely misunderstood.” But any positive impact it had in Quebec was far outweighed by the alienation it caused in the West and by the effective criticism from the opposition that Ottawa was conferring a constitutional veto upon the “separatist government of Quebec.”°” These initiatives had been vetted by a cabinet committee on unity that was assembled immediately after the referendum.” Its difficulties may have led the prime minister to strengthen his Quebec team by promptly recruiting Pierre Pettigrew as minister responsible for international cooperation and la francophonie (though he moved to Human Resources Development within a year) and Stéphane Dion as minister of intergovernmental affairs and president of the Privy Council.” The latter had proved himself, during the referendum campaign, to be an aggressive and tenacious opponent of the sovereigntists, and his new weight within the cabinet was demonstrated at the swearing-in ceremony, when he issued an unusual written manifesto de-

claring that Quebec’s distinctiveness must be recognized in the constitution. Mr Chrétien agreed that “Mr Dion just said what is the policy of the Liberal Party.” The new minister soon embarked on a long and vigorous odyssey to persuade Canadians and their leaders that the constitutional recognition of Quebec was essential for national unity. The third main element of Plan A - “rebalancing” the roles and responsibilities of the two orders of government — was the highlight of the 1996 Speech from the Throne. The government committed itself to discussions that would lead to “the orderly withdrawal of federal

activity in training,” to withdrawals from forestry, mining, and recreation, and to new partnerships with the provinces in food inspection, environmental management, social housing, and tourism. Most significantly, Ottawa pledged to restrict its spending power. It would create no new shared-cost programs in areas of provincial jurisdiction without obtaining the “consent of a majority of the provinces.”® At the same time, however, the government sought provincial cooperation in reducing barriers to mobility and strengthening the social and economic union.” Negotiations about all these matters continued, with the major success occurring in job training, where Ottawa prepared to transfer over 2 billion dollars to provincial control.®©

349 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

Other Plan A initiatives followed, notably in the area of “communications,” reflecting the prime minister’s belief that “there is a lack of knowledge by a lot of people in Quebec.”® The government took out full-page newspaper advertisements to counter PQ claims that provincial spending cuts were caused by reduced federal transfers, and it distributed to every Quebec household a pamphlet about how Ottawa had met its referendum commitments.” Such efforts were to be coordinated by a new federal agency, the Canadian Information Office. Further good publicity was generated when the federal government provided emergency assistance and financial relief after the disastrous floods in the Saguenay region. Even Mr Bouchard was “completely satisfied” with Ottawa’s role.®*? As noted above, he took

part in the highly publicized Team Canada trade missions. And the federal government continued to provide assistance to Quebec firms, notably in the form of an $87 million loan to Bombardier, the aircraft manufacturer.” During the 1997 federal election campaign, Liberal politicians from Quebec could point to many such investments — evident benefits of being part of the federation and voting for the gov-

erning party.” Little progress was made on a constitutional package, however. One opening was provided by the obligation, under section 49 of the Constitution Act, 1982, for a first ministers’ conference to review the amending formulae within fifteen years; that is, by April 1997. After some confusion, the constitution was put on the agenda of a conference previously scheduled for June 1996 (which Mr Bouchard, unlike his predecessor, agreed to attend). In a bizarre episode, with the premier of Quebec absenting himself in the washroom, the issue was _ briefly raised and the point made that the Charlottetown Accord negotiations had fulfilled the section 49 requirement. “The obligation,” declared Mr Chrétien, “has been discharged.” Mr Bouchard took the opportunity to argue that No voters who had hoped for constitutional renewal would be “very disappointed today because there will never again be such an attempt,” and indeed Mr Johnson sought to ensure that the manoeuvre had not permanently blocked avenues to constitutional change.” In the wake of the conference, Mr Dion

continued his efforts to assemble a small package that might be attractive to Quebecers. At the provincial level, the main interest of many premiers was in decentralization. This, they argued, held at least as much appeal to Quebecers as any symbolic recognition of their distinctiveness. From

1995 on, the provincial governments aimed to reduce overlap and duplication, clarify the responsibilities of the two orders of government, and secure stable program funding, especially in the socialpolicy fields of health, postsecondary education, social services, and

350 From Referendum to Referendum

labour market programs.” Part of this effort was to replace federal guidelines and rules with pan-Canadian standards set cooperatively. At the 1996 premiers’ conference, attended by Mr Bouchard, premiers Klein and Harris advanced strongly decentralist proposals based on

the ACCESS models prepared by economist Thomas Courchene.” The more radical models of interprovincial control were rejected, mainly because the fiscally weaker governments feared an erosion of the subsidies built into the existing arrangements, but the premiers united to press Ottawa to negotiate new standards jointly. Part of the rationale for this was to show the federal system’s flexibility. As Mr Tobin said, “I think what we’re doing here is speaking to Quebec powerfully. We’re going to demonstrate over the next seven

or eight months that the federation is renewable, that the federal government will be accountable to the provinces.””° But there were other motives. The Alberta government sought more latitude under the Canada Health Act, and the Harris government, implementing cuts in both taxes and expenditures, was even more stridently demanding than its NDP predecessor had been, arguing that the pro-

portion of federal transfers it received consistently fell short of Ontario’s needs, population share, or contributions.” Bitterly, the Ontario government not only maintained that federal-provincial “rebalancing” was preferable to formal constitutional reform, but it suggested that its agreement to the latter was contingent on the former.”

Most of Mr Harris’s demands were not met, but Ottawa and the provinces did agree on the framework for employment training, on coordinating environmental inspections, and on a new national child benefit, much of this being accomplished by the accommodating Mr Pettigrew.” Moreover, in the pre-election period, the federal government introduced a youth employment plan that avoided interfering with areas of provincial jurisdiction, and it spent freely to eliminate several provincial irritants.” But Ottawa was not prepared to abandon its defence of the hugely popular Medicare system.*! Indeed, a powerful current within the Liberal Party and the country as a whole continued to believe that a strong federal presence in social programs was necessary to maintain Canadian unity and preserve Quebecers’

attachment to the country, so there was considerable resistance to the decentralizing trend, despite the premiers’ persistent pressure.™ As well, after the 1997 federal election, the Liberals increasingly came to believe that there was little political payoff in Quebec or elsewhere

from decentralization and accommodation.® But none of what was accomplished was sufficient for the Quebec Liberal Party and Mr Johnson, who continually stressed that for the

351 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

federalists the referendum result was “a reprieve rather than a victory.”** The QLP continued to insist on constitutional change — to

recognize Quebec’s distinctiveness, provide it with a veto, and limit federal action in areas of provincial jurisdiction. This long-standing position was designed to appeal to the soft-nationalist voters, who had to be integrated with non-francophone federalists if the party was to win an election.” Generally, the QLP position was supported by many prominent federalists and their organizations.®* But it was difficult to sustain in Quebec’s polarized environment, where partitionists and disillusioned anglophones wanted to maintain the constitutional status quo while vigorously confronting the sovereigntists, and where Mr Bouchard was successfully building a broad coalition

of organizations to confront the province’s social and economic problems.* There was also considerable mistrust between the OLP and the federal Liberals, fed by recriminations about the near-defeat in the ref-

erendum and by Mr Chrétien’s apparent lack of commitment to constitutionalizing distinct society status.” As well, Mr Johnson did not welcome the federal government’s Plan B sorties on matters such as partition and the legality of secession, asking, typically, “Why is the Prime Minister today worrying about something which isn’t about

to happen instead of working on the mandate for change that the referendum has given him?”® In these circumstances, the QLP leader turned directly to the provincial premiers, hoping that other legisla-

tures would move on the constitution so that his party could campaign in the next provincial election for a mandate to have Quebec finally sign on to a renewed 1982 constitution.” While these efforts continued, the party assembled its constitutional position, and Mr Johnson easily survived a leadership review.’ But there were no challengers to the QLP leader, and the federal Liberals maintained their reserve towards his party. Despite Mr Johnson’s hope that the PQ government would become vulnerable as its unpopular measures were implemented, many federalists considered Mr Bouchard unbeatable; hence, if Mr Johnson stayed on, they anticipated finding a new leader for the OLP after the election, one who could win a referendum battle.

Of course, Ottawa had not abandoned hope for constitutional change, especially for the recognition of Quebec. It could ignore neither the official position of the QLP nor the public opinion in Quebec to which it was responsive. Support for sovereignty remained stubbornly high, around 50 per cent, despite solid majorities favouring

renewal of the federation and continued adherence to Canada.”

352 From Referendum to Referendum

Clearly, the early post-referendum initiatives and subsequent changes in federal-provincial program responsibilities had not sufficed to alter the views of many Quebecers. Mr Dion continued a vigorous crusade in favour of distinct society

recognition, making many speeches to groups across the country, especially in the West.” But there was not sufficient support among the provincial premiers to proceed formally. This resistance sprang from several sources. No doubt there were genuine ideological barriers to any recognition that would violate the principle of equality of the provinces. Mr Klein, for example, was willing to accept that the National Assembly should “preserve and protect” the French language and culture, but he argued that recognizing a responsibility to “promote” these characteristics would confer unacceptable special powers on the province.” Other leaders thought that accommodating Quebec was an inappropriate strategy to deter the sovereigntists. Mr Harris, for example, insisted that concrete changes to the operation of Canadian federalism would be more effective in appealing to

Quebecers, and declared that distinct society “is an old-fashioned term for an old-fashioned policy that was a disaster.”” In the West, this view was bolstered by historic regional grievances and the confidence that if Quebecers voted to secede, the region was strong enough

to “survive.”

In other quarters, the fear of failure bred reluctance to embark ona new constitutional initiative: if agreement could not be secured, then the raised expectations of Quebecers would be dashed and another referendum would carry. (Failure had become more likely, in fact, because constitutional amendments would be governed by the new system of regional vetoes, which could well be exercised after referendums to be held under provincial legislation in British Columbia, Alberta, and perhaps Ontario.) As well, some premiers were with-

holding support for distinct society recognition in order to secure concessions from Ottawa on their own priorities. Finally, given public opinion in ROC, especially in the West, any special status for Quebec

would be difficult to sell, and partisan and electoral considerations made leaders reluctant to bind themselves to the concept, as was shown during the 1997 Alberta election campaign.” All these considerations

posed great obstacles to realizing an essential component of Plan A. They were all sharpened during the campaign leading to the June 1997 federal election, when national unity was the dominant issue, hotly debated across the country. Yet when the returns were in, there was an opening for further progress on Plan A, one that was taken by the provincial premiers when they hammered out their Calgary Declaration.

353 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum Plan B

The other major prong of the federal government’s post- and prereferendum strategy was Plan B. This comprised a series of initiatives to clarify the process of secession and some of its implications. After the shock of the 1995 referendum, there was a very strong demand for such an approach. Some advocates simply rejected accom-

modative Plan A initiatives, arguing that sovereignty was now inevitable, that further decentralization would be destructively balkanizing to Canada, or that concessions to Quebec nationalists were counterproductive.” For others, the whole referendum process had been unfair, and if another vote was to be held it was imperative that Ottawa insist on a clear question and an adequate mandate for secession.” Another ar-

gument was that the federal government had to clarify the issues around secession — such as those involving the rights of Aboriginal peoples — well before another referendum so that Quebecers would better understand the implications of their vote.’” Finally, there was a widespread view that ROC had to be prepared for a sovereigntist victory, as Ottawa manifestly had not been in October 1995. Out of self-interest, contingency plans had to be developed to maintain the rule of law, minimize economic losses, and ensure that Canada could reconstitute itself as a functioning national entity.’” For the federal Liberals, there were other advantages in proceding with Plan B. Its various initiatives helped channel the energies of the aroused minorities in Quebec. It responded to a powerful current of opinion in ROC that blamed the federal government for almost los-

ing the referendum and demanded concrete measures to ward off the sovereigntist threat. Also, it allowed the Liberals to steer between their major political opponents. On the one hand, the Reform Party issued a set of principles to serve as a guide for Ottawa in case of any secession: these were quite detailed with respect to both the process of secession and the terms and conditions that ROC should impose.*” On the other hand, the Progressive Conservative leader, Mr Charest, condemned any planning about secession as wasteful, counterpro-

ductive, and self-fulfilling.’ Thus, by focusing on the modalities of secession — the parameters of any future referendum and the legalities of secession — the Liberals could position themselves in the centre. Even then, partly from fear of alienating Quebecers and partly to preserve its room to manoeuvre, the federal government did not take a firm position on many elements of Plan B (such as the precise level of support needed in a future referendum); its stance was one of “studied ambiguity.” Nor,

354 From Referendum to Referendum

since Ottawa aimed to manage the constitutional crisis with a combination of strategies, was it yet prepared to embrace Plan B to the

extent of negotiating with the PQ about the process and terms of secession.’ Instead, its Plan B initiatives were designed to raise doubts

among the Quebec electorate about the ease of secession by challenging the sovereigntists and putting them on the defensive. In this, Ottawa moved cautiously and in stages, making intermittent sorties on the Plan B front while taking advantage of any opening for advance left by their opponents. Immediately after the referendum, the prime minister hinted that

a more robust stance would be taken towards the sovereigntists. Contemplating yet another referendum, he argued, “We’ve been extremely generous in Canada. We Canadians have done it twice and we cannot carry it on forever.”'° After the early Plan A initiatives, the cabinet was rebuilt in early 1996, and Mr Dion was teamed with Mr Massé and Mr Rock on a special cabinet committee — the G3 — to

set strategy about Quebec.’” Stéphane Dion, the former academic, was not hesitant in adding the weight of his new office to his past observations about the logic of secession. Mr Dion plunged right into the issue of partition and escalated Plan B enormously by taking the view that, just as it would be undemocratic to hold Quebecers in Canada against their will, so must the will of minorities within Quebec be respected. He stated, “You can’t consider Canada divisible but the territory of Quebec sacred. If there are native groups, municipalities or regional municipalities who

on an equally democratic basis decided they wanted to stay Canadian, you would have to talk to those people.”'® As he later put it, “The basic rule is if Canada is divisible, Quebec is divisible too. If I give myself a right, I can’t stop others from exercising the same right.”"”

This position drew a furious response from the sovereigntists, because it cut against their core assumption that Quebecers — all Quebecers — constitute a self-determining people. About to be sworn in as premier, Mr Bouchard fumed, “Canada is divisible because Canada

is not a real country. There are two peoples, two nations and two territories. And this one is ours.”"° But the prime minister supported Mr Dion, saying, “if Canada is divisible, Quebec is divisible too. It’s

the same logic.” This tough new stance triggered heated and divisive debate. Apparently, it was welcomed by Liberal MPs from ROC while those from Quebec found it dismaying."* Aboriginal peoples in Quebec demanded stronger affirmation of their right to remain in Canada while casting doubt on similar rights claimed by groups mainly representing anglophones and allophones.’” Although it was denounced

355 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

by most sovereigntists, some moderate nationalists were forced to concede the logic of Ottawa's position.“ And although Mr Dion’s principle was embraced by partitionist groups in Quebec, many moderate anglophones disputed both its efficacy as a deterrent to voting Yes and its practicality should the sovereigntists prevail, while the QLP remained staunchly opposed to it.” Within the province, it was hard to discern the debate’s impact on public opinion."®

Outside Quebec, elite opinion was divided. Some opposed the position as counterproductive, unrealistic, and, in its implication that force would be used to secure partitionists’ rights, undemocratic.” Others insisted that the issue of partition could deter voters from a

Yes and that there was a moral imperative to help fellow Canadians.'!8 In any case, the issue surfaced intermittently, notably in the summer of 1997 after the premier of New Brunswick apparently encouraged a partitionist group’s efforts to have municipalities in Quebec pass resolutions favouring Canadian unity. Mr Bouchard condemned.

this in a letter as supporting “a fundamentally antidemocratic position that international law and the history of peoples have rejected many times.”"” The fact that this letter was published in a newspaper provided an opportunity for rebuttal, and Mr Dion wrote back crisply, citing precedents and legal opinions about partition, and stating, “Neither you nor I nor anyone else can predict that the borders of an independent Quebec would be those now guaranteed by the Canadian Constitution.”*”° Mr Landry replied for the PO government,

condemning Ottawa’s “drift towards antidemocracy,” but Mr Dion restated his arguments and noted the possibility that “in the difficult circumstances of negotiating secession, an agreement on modifying borders would become the least unfavourable solution.” As usual, the federal government was quick to seize openings left by its sovereigntist opponents, and as with its other Plan B initiatives, Ottawa stuck to general principles, provided no detailed modalities (of how partition might occur), and sought to raise doubts among the voters. Joining the debate, Mr Chrétien insisted, “I don’t want partition. I want everyone to stay in Canada and the only way to have absolute insurance that Quebec stays as it is is to stay in Canada.”!* So Ottawa pressed upon the sovereigntists the onus to justify both the legitimacy of their position and their predictions about

how secession would occur. It questioned their assumptions — the “myths that have been developed in society,” as the prime minister put it - and forced them onto the defensive.'” But the Plan B strategy also raised the stakes of any future secession, because in the face of resistance by Quebecers or their provincial government, partition would, presumably, have to be accomplished by force."

356 From Referendum to Referendum

Some minor elements of Plan B involved prodding the PQ government in sensitive policy areas associated with secession. For example, Ottawa consistently attributed Quebec’s low levels of investment and relatively high unemployment rates to the political uncertainty associated with the prospect of another referendum.’” While the PQ blamed the situation on Ottawa’s cuts in transfer payments, Mr Chrétien in-

sisted that the political uncertainty was not created by the federal government. “We try to do what we can do,” he said, “but some elements are not under our control.”’”° Far more provocatively, Ottawa

supported anglophones boycotting stores in Montreal that had unilingual French signs, an explosive issue given the rising polarization between them and PQ militants seeking stiffer controls on English. The prime minister referred with distaste to Quebec’s “language

police,” and declared, “La lutte des minorités francophones, anglophones et amérindiennes n’arrétera jamais. C’est un des réles du gouvernement fédéral de s’assurer que les gens ont les moyens de défendre leurs droits en vertu de la constitution canadienne.”'”” To the Quebec government, such statements threw “oil on the fire” of the language debate, and it reaffirmed its commitment that official bilingualism would not return to the Montreal region.’ These destabilizing thrusts were much less central to Plan B than Ottawa’s position about the process of secession, especially about the question to be posed and the level of support necessary for Quebec to become sovereign. As the 1996 Speech from the Throne stated,

“As long as the prospect of another Quebec referendum exists, the Government will exercise its responsibility to ensure that the debate is conducted with all the facts on the table, that the rules of the process are fair, that the consequences are clear, and that Canadians, no matter where they live, will have their say in the future of the country.’”!? While the federal government now accepted that secession could take place, recognizing the democratic “convention” that people cannot

be held in Canada against their will, it insisted that there had to bea “clear mandate” supporting the choice.”° This meant, first, that the question put to Quebecers must be straightforward. As the minister of justice put it, “The question will be separation or not — nothing in between; not partnership or any such thing.

Separation or not is the clear and honest question that must be asked.”'*' Under fire from both sovereigntists and Quebec federalists for appearing to negate the province’s right to self-determination, Mr Dion stated that because the decision was momentous and the interests of all Canadians were involved, it was essential that the referendum question be clear. Initially, Ottawa’s position had been that since a confusing question would confer no mandate to secede,

357 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

negotiations simply would not commence.’ So either the PQ would

pose an acceptable question or it would have to proceed towards sovereignty after a Yes through an (illegal) UDI.** But the federal government also hinted that it might negotiate with the PQ the wording of a question, and it left open the possibility of holding a referendum on its own question if the ground rules could not be agreed in advance of a Quebec referendum.'* Of course, the clarity of referendum questions — let alone the plausibility of predictions made during a campaign — is a matter of debate and interpretation. But like

other elements of Plan B, questioning the question represented an insistence on the right of ROC to defend its interests and was a challenge to the sovereigntists’ assumption that they alone could legitimately establish the modalities of secession; it was designed to force them to defend and justify their procedure. Soon after the referendum, Ottawa also began to raise the issue of the level of support necessary for a mandate to achieve sovereignty. The prime minister declared that if a “real majority” of Quebecers “want to go, I’m a democrat,” but he also argued that the 1995 referendum had only been a plebiscite, and he reiterated that “at a 50.1 per cent vote, I would not let the country break.”**° Similarly, Mr Dion

mused that “for a very serious decision, that is hard to revisit, one can consider a qualified majority,” and he stated flatly that “the rest of Canada would consider a simple majority unacceptable.”’’° These views were hotly contested by the sovereigntists as undemocratic, and like other parts of Plan B they placed Quebec federalists in a difficult position. Mr Johnson said, for example, that trying to stop Quebec from seceding after a Yes vote would be like ordering a man who has jumped off a bridge to “fall back up.”*” In ROC, even some stauch anti-sovereigntists agreed with the Reform Party that the threshold should be 50 per cent of the vote, on grounds of precedent, legiti-

macy, practicality, and risk avoidance.*® But the federal Liberals consistently refused to commit to this or any other threshold, notably throughout the course of the 1997 election campaign. Leaving open the necessary level of support was an important part of Plan B, for it raised doubts about Ottawa’s response to any referendum result while preserving its room to manoeuvre — and negotiate — in the meantime. Over time, the main focus of the Plan B strategy became contesting

not the legitimacy but the legality of the sovereigntists’ plans. Ottawa sought to have the courts declare that a UDI would be illegal. The point of this thrust was to cast into question some cherished assumptions of Quebec nationalists — that Quebecers are a “people,” that they have a right of self-determination, and that this right extends

358 From Referendum to Referendum

to secession. Federal strategists believed that if a unilateral secession were held to be illegal, Quebecers might be less likely to vote Yes in any future referendum. As well, clarifying the legalities of secession

would set some ground rules for what should happen after a Yes, and a court decision could also provide some legal armaments with respect to foreign recognition of Quebec. Finally, if a UDI were ruled illegal, Ottawa might gain enough leverage to force the PQ to nego-

tiate the question to be asked and the required level of support. For these reasons, clarifying the legality of secession came to be the linchpin of Plan B.

Ottawa’s entry onto this terrain was precipitated by legal cases argued by a maverick Quebec lawyer both before and after the 1995 referendum. Before the campaign, Guy Bertrand, who had once run for the PQ leadership but had become a radical federalist, sought an injunction prohibiting the referendum on the grounds that it promised to violate his fundamental rights as a Canadian. This was contested by the Quebec government as simply beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, and when the court did not dismiss the application, deciding instead to hear arguments, Quebec withdrew. Mr Parizeau declared, “We can’t subjugate Quebecers’ right to vote to a decision of the courts. That would be contrary to our democratic system. Quebecers want to vote. They have the right to vote. And they will vote.” The federalist side, confident at the outset of the campaign and anxious about stirring up the voters, chose not to intervene in a matter

that was “political” rather than legal.’° But a judge of the Quebec Superior Court ruled that Mr Bertrand had a case. While not issuing an injunction against the referendum, he reviewed several matters critical to secessions and to the powers of the National Assembly; he

maintained that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to all government actions; and he held that “the constitutional change proposed by the Government of Quebec would result in a break in continuity in the legal order, which is manifestly contrary to the Constitution of Canada.”™' The sovereigntists’ reaction was to dismiss the ruling “because Quebec does not adhere to the 1982 Canadian constitution.” '* Other cases were also brought before the courts prior to the 1995 referendum,’ but Mr Bertrand carried on afterwards, aiming to have

the issues clarified in advance of any subsequent vote, and to prevent what he called a “constitutional coup d’état,” by seeking a ruling from the Quebec Superior Court that the constitutional amendment

process must be followed in order to accomplish secession." In the new spirit of Plan B, Ottawa contemplated intervening, but it did so

only after the Quebec government stated its arguments, which

359 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

included a denial that the court had jurisdiction over the matter.” It was against this claim, and to have the relevance of both the constitution and the judiciary affirmed, that the federal government acted: “This is a position with which the Attorney General of Canada disagrees. Neither international law nor Canadian constitutional law confer on the National Assembly of Quebec the right to unilateral secession. Disagreement on this important point itself demonstrates that there are substantive legal issues in this case that are justiciable

in the Superior Court.” The PQ government was outraged. It rejected any denial of Quebecers’ “sacred right” to determine their own future; it affirmed that “for us democracy rules over constitutional provisions”; and it considered a snap election on the issue, along with a boycott of federalprovincial meetings.'” Mr Bouchard attacked a status quo Canada “as a prison from which we cannot escape” and said, “The clear objective is to block the right of Quebecers to accede to sovereignty by affirming that Quebec’s neighbours have not only a say —- as Mr Chrétien likes to say — but that they have the final word.” Yet Ottawa continued to press, with the prime minister insisting “that the laws of Canada must be respected, that there won’t be a unilateral declaration of independence and that international law, also, must be respected.”'” Mr Dion emphasized the rule of law “because if we veer out of the law, we will find ourselves in an extremely dangerous situation.” He also raised, indirectly, the possibility of force being used in such a situation “against peaceful populations claiming their constitutional rights.”*° This tougher stance about the process of secession responded to public opinion in ROC and was thought to be strategically effective

in shifting Quebec public opinion.’ At the same time, however, moving to clarify the constitutional ambiguity about secession carried the message that secession could in fact be accomplished. In posing

the question of how secession should occur, the federalists had to accept that it could occur. So Mr Dion agreed that “Quebecers have the right to express themselves clearly on whether they want to remain in Canada or leave,” and he declared that “you cannot keep a population against its will.”*? Similarly, the attorney general said that he was not challenging “the right of Quebecers to express democratically” their desire to secede or to say in Canada. “The rule of law is not an obstacle to change,” he stated; “rather it provides the frame-

work within which change can occur in an orderly fashion.” The Superior Court denied Quebec’s motion to dismiss and allowed the case to proceed. It defined the substantive issues that would have

to be decided.’ But the federal government moved independently,

360 From Referendum to Referendum

using its reference power to place these issues directly before the Supreme Court. In September 1996 the attorney general posed three questions to the court: Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or Government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? Second, does international law give the National Assembly, the legislature or the Government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Que-

bec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, the legislature or the Government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? Third, in the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the National Assembly, legislature or Government of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would

take precedence in Canada?’

The minister argued that it was Ottawa’s duty to have these issues clarified, because a UDI would undermine political stability, create enormous uncertainty, divide Quebecers, and damage the province economically and politically. Moreover, he linked the substantive issues to be negotiated with ROC in the event of a secession with the constitutionality of the process. A UDI, he said, “would have been made in the absence of an agreement with the rest of Canada on such fundamental issues as recognition for Quebec internationally, trade and economic arrangements, the rights of citizens to move within the country, the sharing of public debt and assets, the use of currency and scores of other issues.” In short, it was a “formula for chaos,”

and “any government that suggests it would throw Quebec and all of Canada into the confusion of a unilateral declaration of independence is being profoundly irresponsible.” *®

The sovereigntist reaction took several forms. First, the PQ government announced that it would not participate in the proceedings because the fundamental issue was political. Said Mr Bouchard, “There

is only one tribunal to settle Quebec’s political future and that’s the Quebec people.”’” When the Supreme Court announced that an amicus curiae would be engaged to present Quebec’s position, PQ ministers branded any such person “an imposter and a false spokesperson.””®

(Despite considerable PQ pressure on the Quebec legal community, the court did in fact manage to recruit a credible sovereigntist to advise it.) Second, the sovereigntists argued that the reference showed Ottawa’s desperation. Unable to thwart the secessionist impulse by

361 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

political means, the federal government was reduced to throwing up legal obstacles.*® Further, they attacked the legitimacy of the court, because its members were all appointed by the federal government. “Like the Tower of Pisa”, said the deputy premier, the court “always leans the same way.”’” Finally, the Quebec government maintained that it would ignore any ruling. After a Yes vote —- on a question writ-

ten and adopted by the National Assembly —- there would be a period during which Quebec would attempt to negotiate a partnership with Canada, and should this fail, the assembly would unilaterally declare Quebec’s independence.'” The PQ government’s justification for this, apart from the fundamentally political nature of the exercise, was that the 1982 constitution had been imposed on Quebec and had never been accepted by the government or legislature of the province; so its amending formula could hardly be used to keep a province “captive.”’® As well, strong nationalists argued that Ottawa’s reference to the court showed how the constitution imposed in 1982 now held Quebecers in an “iron collar.”’** As the hearing approached, the Government of Quebec main-

tained its position: “No decree, no federal law, no decision from any court whatsoever can call into question or discredit this right of Quebecers to decide their future.”*© Meanwhile, the legal strategy had become the centrepiece of Plan

B. It was seen to have numerous advantages. It could force the sovereigntists to justify some of their core assumptions about selfdetermination and secession, and if a UDI were declared illegal, lawabiding Quebecers might hesitate to vote Yes.’ If a Yes vote did occur,

the court ruling could be used to hold off recognition of Quebec by foreign governments.’” Assuming the court held that a constitutional amendment would be required to effect secession, this might possibly deter a UDI after a Yes, thus depriving the sovereigntists of a major threat to ROC. In particular, there could be a linkage between passing an amendment and obtaining satisfactory results in substantive negotiations about the debt, assets, trade arrangements, and so on.'®

Finally, as Plan B unfolded, it appeared that a court ruling against a UDI might provide Ottawa with sufficient leverage to force the Quebec

government to negotiate about such matters as the question to be posed and the level of support required to achieve sovereignty. By denying the legality of unilateralism, such a ruling would insert Canada into the secession process and help legitimize its stand on the other elements of Plan B. As Mr Dion put it, “From the instant we know that Mr Bouchard’s claim to have a monopoly on control of the procedure, under international law, is false, the federal government

receives at that moment, in a way, the duty to propose to the

362 From Referendum to Referendum

government of Quebec a way to resolve this debate.”’” This could open the path to prenegotiating with the sovereigntists the ground rules of any future referendum.'” On the other hand, there were grave risks in this strategy. Most obviously, the Supreme Court could issue a judgment adverse to the federal government’s position. While it would be unlikely to deny that the constitution applies to secession, it could hold that a conflict between Canadian and international law has no clear resolution, and this would bolster the PQ’s position about a UDI. Second, clarifying the legalities around secession might not deter Quebecers from voting Yes. Persuaded of the unfairness of subjecting Quebec’s right of self-determination to the exigencies of Ottawa or any Canadian province, soft-nationalist voters might swing massively to the Yes side in order to avoid being “trapped” in Canada forever." If opinion shifted in this way after a judgment was issued, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court would be gravely undermined. Subsequent decisions — and they could be necessary before a referendum or afterwards, whichever side won — might carry little moral authority in Quebec.

There is also the fact that a court decision will constrain Ottawa’s room to manoeuvre. Assuming that the constitution is held to govern secession, then the federal government will be bound to respect this, just as it claims the sovereigntists should. This could mean that Ottawa would have to recognize the right of every province to veto Quebec’s secession; or that it would have to give full consideration to the intricate implications of its fiduciary responsibility to Aboriginal peoples in Quebec as well as to other Canadian citizens of the province. The federal government would become bound by a clear legal obligation to enforce the constitution in Quebec. If the modalities of a referendum had not been prenegotiated with the PQ government, this would mean, ultimately, that Ottawa would have to be prepared to deploy force in order to maintain the rule of law — however

much federal leaders might try to deny this implication.’” All in all, therefore, the legal initiative raised the stakes of any future referendum. If, after a Yes vote, a constitutional secession proves impossible because conditions imposed by Ottawa or the provinces about the process or substance of separation cannot be met, then the sovereigntists may see no choice but to proceed with a UDI, and Ottawa would have little choice but to resist it, with grave consequences. This raising of the stakes is an intrinsic part of the whole Plan B strategy, which is designed in part to reduce the probability of a Yes vote in a future referendum. But, ironically, the measures taken to accomplish this would greatly increase the costs of secession, for both Quebec and ROC, if the strategy failed and a Yes vote occurred.

363 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum THE 1997 FEDERAL ELECTION

Plan A, Plan B, and the whole national unity issue dominated the 1997 federal election campaign. This extraordinary development deserves some attention because the interplay of arguments made then may foreshadow how the issue will evolve in the future. Moreover, the results of the election both indicated the state of public opinion

in Quebec and ROC and determined for the next several years the strength of the political forces and formations in the federal arena. The major political parties had quite different core objectives in the election. The Reform Party aimed to hold its western base and also to prove itself a national contender by making a breakthrough in Ontario.’” For this, it would have to supplant the Progressive Conservatives, whose objective was to regain their position as the major

party of the right by returning to strength in Quebec and Ontario and perhaps in the Atlantic provinces, where disaffection with the Liberals could swing votes to their traditional opponents in the region.’”* The New Democratic Party aimed to regain official-party status

by concentrating its efforts on a few winnable seats across the country (but not in Quebec). The BQ’s goal was to maintain its dominant position in Quebec, preserving the momentum of the sovereigntist movement and securing resources for the next provincial election and referendum. The Liberals, vulnerable on a number of fronts — an unmet promise to scrap the national sales tax, the narrow referendum victory, and high unemployment — sought to hold their strength and win a new mandate to govern.'”” With these objectives, it was not inevitable that national unity would

figure large in the campaign. The Liberals in particular intended to downplay it, insisting that their referendum promises had been met as much as possible and that the initiative on constitutional change now rested with the provincial premiers.’ Never in recent Canadian history had national unity been a very significant issue in a federal campaign, let alone the dominant one. But the narrow referendum

win made the issue salient to voters everywhere, and of course the BO campaign would be based on it (to the irritation of many in ROC who resented the sovereigntists’ status as the official opposition). More important, every party — with the exception of the NDP, which

ran on a traditional platform of creating jobs and strengthening the welfare state — had an incentive to focus on national unity, because it

was the issue that most clearly differentiated them among critical portions of the electorate.’”? On the major national issues of taxation, unemployment, health care, and social programs, there was substantial overlap between pairs of parties, while other issues (gun control, child

364 From Referendum to Referendum ~

poverty, crime, and unemployment insurance) either failed to distinguish the parties or were mainly of regional concern. In the course of the contest, one of these matters might have emerged as the focus of struggle, but instead the major parties each discovered incentives, in the thrust and counterthrust of competition, to keep alive the issue of national unity. Even before the election was called on 27 April, the Bloc set out to campaign against federalism, headed by its new leader Gilles Duceppe.

In this, the PQ organization was fully engaged, and Mr Bouchard was set to play a big role.'’” The Bloc’s arguments were familiar — that Quebec’s fiscal problems were caused by federal cutbacks, that Quebecers had to maintain a strong voice in Ottawa to defend the province’s interests, and that sovereignty must be the goal because the Canadian federation was incapable of change.”° Mr Bouchard also warned against the Liberal government’s Plan B, describing it as a “putsch” designed to eradicate “the dream of Quebec having full responsibility over Quebec’s destiny,” and arguing that without Bloc victories, there would be “all kinds of deals done on the back of

Quebec,” as well as more federalists on the ground to fight sovereignty in the next referendum.’*’ Apart from fighting the Liberals, the BO aimed to counter the threatening rise of Mr Charest’s popularity in Quebec by identifying him with Mr Chrétien as another over-

bearing federalist.’ In fact, the Progressive Conservative Party was committed to enshrining Quebec’s distinct society status in the constitution, and Mr Charest eschewed any contemplation of the elements of Plan B, which he had consistently opposed as counterproductive.'® Other elements of the Charest platform, however, were initially given the most prominence. For his part, the prime minister was careful to campaign in favour of distinct society, especially in Ontario and the West, and the Liberal platform committed the party to work towards constitutional change, but Mr Chrétien did not emphasize the unity issue.'** Mr Manning did, however. Reform’s platform envisaged radical decentralization of the federation, insisted on the equality of individuals and of provinces, and included explicit principles that should govern a Quebec secession.'® Seeking a “wedge issue” to distinguish Reform from the “old-line federalist parties,” Mr Manning struck early

in the campaign by warning bluntly that British Columbia would separate if Ottawa continued to ignore its demands — which were for fair treatment, not special status, he contended. He went on to state, “British Columbians should understand that every Liberal candidate, every Conservative candidate, every NDP candidate standing for the

federal election in B.C. is tied by their party leader to the distinct

365 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

society concept. The federal Reform party is the only federal party committed to the equality of citizens and provinces.”'®**° This position

was designed not only to bloster support in British Columbia but to cut into the Liberals’ commanding lead in Ontario by appealing to the large number of uncommitted voters in that province.'®’ In Quebec, the federalist parties were downplaying the unity issue, and the diffuse and disorganized Bloc emitted few messages about sovereignty.'®® But the whole national campaign was brought to focus on secession when parts of Mr Parizeau’s memoirs were released

and the media reported that the PQ would have moved rapidly to declare sovereignty after a Yes vote in 1995. Leading sovereigntists quickly denied any knowledge of or support for such intentions, but the possibility that the Yes side had lied to Quebecers was a severe blow to the Bloc campaign. The story was quickly used by the Liberals to justify their Plan B initiatives, including the court reference, even in Quebec.**’ They seized the opportunity to insist on Ottawa’s “right” to establish a “clear question” in any future referendum.’” No doubt their intention was to claim a mandate for future Plan B initiatives from Quebec voters, as well as to attract hard-line support in ROC. But they were joined by Mr Manning, who criticized both his main opponents, deriding the Liberals’ unwillingness to thoroughly reform the federation and disparaging the Progressive Conservatives’ refusal to prepare for a possible secession.’”' The Reform leader claimed

that distinct society status was “not going to happen,” but he warned that if Quebecers voted for sovereignty, they would confront no politician from Quebec — since these would be disqualified from negotiating because of “conflict of interest.” Instead, Quebecers would find themselves dealing with “some steely-eyed, hard-nosed lawyer from Toronto or Calgary,” stated Mr Manning, “and he’s going to say to you ‘We want money. We want territory. And we want the date nailed down for the revoking of passports.’”"”* All this required a reaction by Mr Charest. He condemned the Reform Party for opposing distinct society, a stance that could lead to Canada’s destruction, and he attacked Reform’s principles about secession, declaring that “I will never propose to this country any formula to negotiate its breakup.”’” He also stressed, especially during the televised leaders’ debates, that the critical requirement for national unity was leadership, and that he was best suited not only to lead the federalist forces in any future referendum but also to reconcile Quebec and ROC. With his strong performance in the debates, it was useful for the Conservative leader

to keep the focus on the unity issue.’ His arguments were persuasive in Quebec, where polls showed that Bloc support continued to slide, with Mr Charest being the principal beneficiary.’”

366 From Referendum to Referendum

This forced the Bloc onto the offensive, and Mr Duceppe began to campaign against Plan B - “the negation of the existence of the Quebec people” — hoping to consolidate the soft-nationalist vote behind his party.’” The divided sovereigntist camp coalesced once more, Mr Parizeau having persuaded its leaders that his writings had been misinterpreted, and Mr Bouchard having understood that the Bloc faced a major defeat.’*” The new message was that Quebecers must defend their right of self-determination against hard-line federalist leaders

who had opposed national reconciliation through the Meech Lake Accord and who would refuse to accept a Yes vote in a future referendum: “Jean Charest and Jean Chrétien will be allies and our adversaries when the time will come to crush Quebec. The Bloc will always be there to guarantee our protection.”’”* But the Progressive Conservatives continued to gain in Quebec, despite a very weak organization.'’” Mr Charest also won support from the premier of Alberta

and a former premier of Ontario, who endorsed his stance on distinct society and lauded his national vision: the Tory leader continued to insist that he would not countenance Plan B, because “as far as Canada is concerned failure is not an option.”*” In this fluid situation, Mr Manning saw advantage in keeping his focus on national unity. He insisted on the need for clear rules about secession, including partition, and accused both his principal rivals — from the “traditional parties” that had “made careers out of thirty years of managing this issue” — of avoiding the hard questions.*”

Then he demanded a special debate on the issue, one that would include only himself, Jean Chrétien, and Jean Charest. Explosively, he likened this to the Lincoln-Douglas debates on slavery that took place in 1858.** The analogy drove the NDP leader to use words never

heard in a national campaign when she said “It’s absolutely clear that where Preston Manning’s policies would lead us in this country is straight into a civil war.”*” Undeterred, and seeking to make inroads among Ontario voters, Mr Manning continued to attack the “old-line federalists.” They were mistaken in offering distinct society status to Quebec, he maintained, and they had mishandled the 1995 referendum; so they were “as big a threat as separatists.”*°* To drive home this point, Reform ran a striking television advertisement showing Mr Chrétien and Mr Charest

along with Mr Bouchard and Mr Duceppe, and intoning that the national unity issue required “a voice for all Canadians, not just Quebec

politicians.” These tactics were condemned by their targets as “desperation” and “extremist,” but Reform held its position in order to consolidate its western support and dampen any Conservative momentum in Ontario, where Mr Manning campaigned intensively.”

367 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

The next thrust was made by the Liberals. In a Quebec television interview, the prime minister insisted on the need for a clear question in any future referendum, and he at last responded to questions about the level of support necessary for secession. “I would find it to be unreasonable,” he said, “if the answer was 50 per cent plus one in a third referendum.”*”° This widely reported statement was certainly a calculated reply. It could attract voters in Ontario and the West who agreed with a harder line towards Quebec but rejected the logic of Reform’s position — that “Yes means Yes,” so that even a narrow referendum result would lead to negotiations towards secession.””” More important, the statement could prove highly polarizing in Quebec, where the federalist vote could be pushed into the Liberal camp, while many soft nationalists would peel away from the Progressive Conservatives and rally to the Bloc.*”’ This was the accusation made after the election by Mr Charest and his campaign manager, and late polls did show that Progressive Conservative support had weakened

in Quebec.” In any event, the statement provoked a strong counterattack by the Bloc and its allies, who had begun to accent sovereignty more in their campaign and who now tried to associate all major federalist

leaders with an anti-Quebec position. For Mr Duceppe, the prime minister’s statement was not only “undemocratic,” but it showed that Mr Chrétien had lied before the 1995 referendum when he told Quebecers their decision was final: “The rules are good when he wins,

but they are not the same rules when he loses.”?"° He also claimed that “Jean Chrétien is doing what all federalist parties have done since the beginning of Canadian history, and that is to brag in Canada how they can put Quebec into its place.”*" Mr Bouchard, who sprang back into the campaign, challenged Mr Charest to dissociate himself

from the Liberal position and to affirm Quebec’s right to selfdetermination.*” And at the end of the campaign, the Quebec premier entreated sovereigntists to turn out and vote — to stop Reform from becoming the official opposition, to reject Plan B, and to affirm the existence of Quebecers as a people.** Meanwhile, the Liberals continued to campaign in ROC against divisive forces pandering to the “dark side” of voters, while the prime minister urged Canadians to elect a majority Liberal government, one that would have representation from across the country and would be tolerant, compassionate, inclusive, and strong enough to “keep our country together.” In the end, the electorate did so. The Liberals were returned to govern with a narrow majority of 155 seats (down from 177) as their share of the vote dropped only slightly, from 41 per cent to 38 per cent. They took 101 of 103 seats in Ontario, where the electorate appears to have

368 From Referendum to Referendum

rejected Reform’s anti-Quebec message, and they gained 7 seats in Quebec. There, the Bloc vote slipped by over 11 per cent, to 38 per cent, and the party took 44 seats, down 10 from 1993. The Reform Party won 60 seats and became the official opposition. But its support continued to be concentrated in the West, especially in British Columbia and Alberta; it attracted only 19 per cent of the vote in Ontario, the same as its national share, which did not increase over 1993. The Progressive Conservatives also took 19 per cent of the national vote but won only 20 seats, with gains in Atlantic Canada and also — 4 seats — in Quebec. The NDP also regained official-party status, winning 21 seats (on just 11 per cent of the vote), in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia.”»

Many observers read these results as ominous. They seemed to confirm that the party system was regionally fragmented, and to augur a fractious Parliament in which the Bloc would confront the Reform

Party’s hard-line position, each seeking to sharpen the polarization between ROC and Quebec.’’* In fact, the electorate was far less regionalized than the seat totals indicated. Only in Alberta did the leading party capture more than 50 per cent of the vote (and even there the Liberals took 24 per cent). Moreover, while regional caucuses in Parliament can focus the attention of party leaders on particular is-

sues, parties with supporters elsewhere and ambitions to expand cannot and do not merely reflect the views of their elected members. Beyond this, there are forces for moderation in the post-election make-up of the House of Commons. The Reform Party has been weakened by fundamental disagreements about whether it should remain

a western party or continue to broaden its geographic appeal, and whether it should continue to operate only at the national level.” It is also embroiled in a bitter battle with the Progressive Conservatives about which party can best “unite the right,” particularly in Ontario.*® The Bloc is weaker than before, but its showing was strong

enough that it is unlikely to jettison a relatively ineffective leader. The NDP will be in a position to defend Canadian social programs against the other federalist parties, so the Bloc will not be alone in doing so. The Progressive Conservatives had a disappointing result, but their gains were such that Mr Charest will likely stay on as leader:

this will help diffuse confrontation. And the Liberals are still in a position to govern — although with greater caution — and to continue their two-track strategy of advancing both Plan A and Plan B. Despite all this, there is considerable potential for bitter conflict on the national unity issue, for each federal party had perceived advan-

tages in making this the grounds of difference during the election campaign (and undoubtedly Mr Bouchard remains aware of his

369 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

capacity to polarize opinion). At the federal level, however, on balance the 1997 election produced a structure of representation conducive to flexible debate about national unity among shifting coalitions of political parties. But, of course, the House of Commons was not the only arena in which the politics of another Quebec referendum — or a Quebec secession — would be played out. THE CALGARY DECLARATION

After the 1997 election clarified public opinion and the party standings, there was an opening for movement on national unity, and enor-

mous pressure was brought to bear on the provincial premiers as they prepared for their annual meeting in August 1997. Former prime ministers Mulroney and Clark urged them to take some initiative, as did leaders such as Claude Castonguay.’*” The business community

also pressed for action, and these initiatives received cautious support from Ottawa.*” Just before the premiers’ meeting, the powerful Business Council on National Issues released a draft statement which the provincial leaders might consider supporting. This was carefully crafted to embody the ideals of provincial and individual equality, intergovernmental cooperation, and popular consultation, and it also recognized the “particular responsibility” of Quebec’s National Assembly to “preserve and promote the unique character of Quebec’s society.”**' This statement was not rejected by Mr Johnson or by the

Reform Party, though the PQ government condemned it as “pathetic.”* The premiers’ conference focused mainly on rebalancing federalprovincial responsibilities, an agenda pursued with determination by the governments of Ontario and Alberta.*” The goal was greater provincial control over social programs, whose parameters would be set jointly by Ottawa and the provinces.’ This raised apprehensions among the fiscally weaker provinces that Ottawa’s financing of these programs would be reduced. Another obstacle was Mr Bouchard’s pledge not to discuss social-policy reform, because this would legitimize a federal presence in areas of provincial jurisdiction; despite considerable pressure to join negotiations with Ottawa, Mr Bouchard maintained this position.*”° The other premiers, however, reached a measure of consensus on rebalancing and on an approach towards the federal government.

They also agreed to proceed on the national unity front (again, despite Mr Bouchard’s refusal to participate in the discussion). But there were cautions and conditions. Some premiers, notably Mr Harris, linked any new initiative with progress on rebalancing, which he

370 From Referendum to Referendum

maintained was far more important in generating support for the federation in Quebec and the West.*”” As well, premiers Klein and Harris insisted on a new approach to national unity, one involving grass-roots processes rather than elite negotiations. Mr Harris publicly condemned any “behind-closed-doors, big-business proposal that is going to be ratified by the premiers” and declared that “any discussions remotely connected to the constitution need to be quite different from the past, need to be from the ground up.”**? What form

this “ground-up” process might take was as yet unclear, though Mr Harris had suggested that in Ontario it might involve a legislative committee and public hearings.*” Ever since the referendum, federalists across the country had been seeking some procedure that would engage ordinary citizens in a mutual accommodation with Quebecers and would allow people in ROC to feel a sense of “ownership” of any proposals for constitutional change — the theory being that the

public would then not reject the proposals as having been negoti-

ated by elites, as was believed to have happened with the Charlottetown Accord.” In any event, with Ottawa anxiously hoping that the premiers would show some leadership on the issue as well as initiating some “open and transparent” process, and with considerable cynicism on the part of commentators about what public participation might produce, the premiers agreed to meet again shortly to discuss national unity (always without Mr Bouchard). They did so in Calgary in mid-September 1997. This meeting was preceded by intense consultations. These involved Prime Minister Chrétien, various combinations of the provincial premiers, Mr Dion, Mr Johnson, and even Mr Manning, who was pleased to detect movement towards accepting Reform’s principles of equality of citizens and provinces.*” Gradually, complications became evident. There was some opposition to “appeasing” Quebec with any special recognition.** There was insistence by Quebec federalists that the focus be kept on the province’s demands, and Mr Johnson was

adamant that any proposals had to have concrete implications for Quebec’s powers rather than being merely symbolic.*** And some premiers were clearly hesitant. Mr Clark, for instance, opposed all “arcane constitutional debate” about distinct society, along with elite negotiating processes.*” Nevertheless, there was substantial pressure to produce some gesture that would appeal to Quebecers and undercut support for sovereignty, and that would provide Mr Johnson with a constitutional plank in the Quebec election that might be held in 1998, while still being positive for all Canadians.” The premiers met for one very long day, mostly without advisers present, and produced the Calgary Declaration. This was accompa-

371 Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

nied by a set of guidelines about the consultative process that would be undertaken within each province and territory (the process was to be open to the general citizenry, with separate mechanisms but a coordinated time frame, and with governments acting as “catalysts” for consultation). The premiers also agreed to meet again in early 1998 and to press Ottawa for action on Aboriginal issues, which had been excluded from the agenda.*” The declaration itself consisted of seven principles: 1 All Canadians are equal and have rights protected by law. 2 All provinces, while diverse in their characteristics, have equality of status. 3 Canada is graced by a diversity, tolerance, compassion and an equality of opportunity that is without rival in the world. 4 Canada’s gift of diversity includes aboriginal peoples and cultures, the vitality of the English and French languages and a multicultural citizenry drawn from all parts of the world. 5 In Canada’s federal system, where respect for diversity and equality underlines unity, the unique character of Quebec society, including its Frenchspeaking majority, its culture and its tradition of civil law, is fundamental

to the well-being of Canada. Consequently, the legislature and government of Quebec have a role to protect and develop the unique character of Quebec society within Canada. 6 If any future constitutional amendment confers powers on one province, these powers must be available to all provinces. 7 Canada is a federal system where federal, provincial and territorial governments work in partnership while respecting each other’s jurisdictions. Canadians want their governments to work co-operatively and with flexibility to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the federation. Canadians want their governments to work together particularly in the delivery of their social programs. Provinces and territories renew their commitment to work in partnership with the government of Canada to best serve the needs of Canadians.

This short declaration attempted to square several circles drawn by

public opinion, governmental interests, and partisanship. It was greeted positively by the federal government and Mr Charest, and the Reform Party leadership did not condemn it. Indeed, Mr Manning claimed credit for having shifted the ground of debate towards the positions Reform had enunciated during the federal election campaign.*** Mr Johnson also welcomed the declaration, regarding it as a basis for negotiations to entrench some recognition of Quebec in the constitution and as an advantage to federalists in a Quebec election campaign.*”

372 From Referendum to Referendum

Commentators, however, were quick to note that the declaration conceded far less to Quebec than had been offered in the past, notably in the Meech Lake Accord, and that the premiers had made no firm

commitment to inscribing their principles formally in the constitution.” The sovereigntists, of course, derided the premiers’ work as

“pseudo-recognition,” as “another plunge into nothingness and insignificance,” and after some reflection, Mr Bouchard roundly condemned the declaration.*** Recognition of Quebec as “unique” was “insipid and banal,” he scoffed. “What a great discovery. Quebecers are unique ... ‘unique’ like the SkyDome, Cape Breton, Labatt Blue or Wayne Gretzky. This expression would render us both socially unique and a political eunuch.”** The premier insisted that no such description as “unique” or “distinct” was adequate: “We want to be recognized as a people able to assume our destiny and development.”**° After Calgary, the provincial and territorial governments proceeded with their public consultations. The objective was to complete these

by the end of the year and then to pass legislative resolutions — nonconstitutional ones — by the spring of 1998. An important component of the accommodative Plan A strategy, this would demonstrate the willingness of ROC to recognize symbolically Quebecers’ special place within Canada. In fact, there was considerable substance to this, as the initial polls showed that in every region at least 70 per cent of respondents agreed that the premiers’ unity initiative was “a positive step in the right direction.”*“ Strong majorities in ROC accepted the “unique society” formulation and agreed that the constitution should recognize this, as long as all powers received by Quebec were available to the other provinces.** In Quebec, the early indications were that the Calgary Declaration had an effect favourable to the federalist cause. Some 62 per cent of Quebecers agreed with the initiative, Yes voters were evenly split on it, and some Yes voters said they would shift to the No side if all the provinces passed resolutions about Quebec’s unique society.**° Meanwhile, the provincial consultative processes were getting under way. [hese were diverse, though all were focused on the items in the

Calgary Declaration. Manitoba set up a special task force to receive submissions. In Newfoundland, legislators convened meetings in their constituencies, and the government set up a toll-free telephone line to receive citizens’ views. Households in Ontario received a pamphlet and questionnaire, and voters could also register their opinions by telephone, fax, or through a web site. In Alberta, an important province with volatile opinion, the process started quickly, as newspaper advertisements informed citizens about the declaration and how to express their opinions about it. Each MLA held meetings in

373. Manoeuvring towards the Next Referendum

the constituencies, and every household received a pamphlet containing a six-item questionnaire.*” The exercise, which was supported

by all major political parties, drew three to four hundred submissions per constituency, while over 44,000 questionnaires were received.?* The opinions expressed were generally favourable, though there was some obvious unease with the “unique society” provision.*” Afterwards, the legislature was recalled for a special three-day de-

bate, at the end of which a motion approving the “Calgary framework” was passed unanimously.” Yet as the consultative processes unfolded across the country, the Calgary Declaration proved somewhat fragile. The leaders of Aboriginal groups sought substantial amendments and managed to extract promises from the premiers that changes would be made ora companion document issued.*? Mr Manning wanted the declaration bolstered by a commitment to reform the Senate.** And the federal government wrestled with the problem of whether, how, and when to consult Quebecers about the accord.** But the process continued,

and this despite considerable federal-provincial friction. This was caused in part by disagreements over issues such as the B.C. fishery and Ottawa’s unilateral commitment to large reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions. A more serious and sustained area of contention was social policy, where the premiers continued their efforts to establish mechanisms

that would constrain Ottawa’s spending power and allow them a role in setting national standards. Indeed, during their Calgary meet-

ing, they had extracted a promise from Mr Chrétien to hold a first ministers’ conference on the issue, and this took place in December 1997.** Here, there was sharp disagreement, not least because the Liberal strategists in Ottawa were concerned about further decentralization, an orientation evident in the autumn Throne Speech, when the Chrétien government announced several new initiatives in health

and education.** Nevertheless, it was announced that negotiations towards a framework agreement for social policy would continue.”® Once more, though, Mr Bouchard was isolated. The Government of Quebec would not participate in discussions that would ultimately license Ottawa’s intervention in areas of provincial jurisdiction, and this stance was generally supported by commentators in Quebec.*” CONCLUSION

By the end of 1997, the federal government had recovered from its post-referendum disarray on the unity issue. It had moved beyond the early, ill-conceived attempts to meet its referendum promises and

374 From Referendum to Referendum

had offered concrete demonstrations of the federation’s flexibility and of Ottawa’s solid management of the economy. The Plan A strategy had helped the Liberals win the 1997 election, after which it came to

include promises of constitutional change built around the Calgary Declaration. Ottawa had also moved steadily forward with Plan B, challenging the sovereigntists’ assumptions and tactics, most notably through the Supreme Court reference about the process and le-

galities of secession. In Quebec City, meanwhile, Mr Bouchard remained solidly entrenched. His fight against the provincial deficit was on track, and although this had cost his government some support, its popularity remained high. In 1998 or 1999, a Quebec election must be held. Then Plans A and B will converge for Quebec voters, forming much of the terrain over which the federalists and sovereigntists will fight. If the PQ wins that contest, then the initiative on the national question, which rested largely with ROC after October 1995, will shift back to the Quebec government as it begins to plan for another referendum on Quebec sovereignty.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

What Would Happen after a Yes in a Future Referendum?

The purpose of this chapter is to set out predictions about what would happen after a sovereigntist victory in a future referendum. It should

be clear from the outset, however, that this chapter’s central question is hypothetical in the extreme. There may not be another referendum on Quebec sovereignty at all. The current PQ government might lose a provincial election, and any future referendum on sovereignty would then take place under vastly different circumstances. Or the PQ might win an election but not hold a referendum, for a variety of reasons. Finally, the sovereigntists might lose a future referendum, so rendering the question moot. Predicting an outcome in the event of a Yes is very difficult - much

harder than it was in 1994. The approach taken here is to lay out a number of possible scenarios and to describe the preconditions and events that could bring each of them about. This is less satisfying than making a single prediction, but in the current circumstances it is the best that can be done. YES OR NOT?

Politics is fraught with vagaries, and anumber of developments could

obviate a referendum. One is the resignation of Lucien Bouchard. Like all provincial governments in Canada, the PQ in Quebec City has a momentum that is generated by a handful of individuals, and a huge responsibility rests with the premier. If Mr Bouchard were to tire of his role, become involved in some scandal, or have his health

376 From Referendum to Referendum

fail, there would be a leadership void that would be debilitating to the sovereigntists. No one else within the movement currently has the experience, charisma, and determination necessary to carry it forward into a referendum with any chance of winning. Of course, a new leader with such qualities might emerge, but in the medium term the absence of Mr Bouchard would derail any referendum planning.

Second, the PQ could lose the next election. One must be held be-

fore the end of 1999, and as matters stand, another referendum on sovereignty will take place only after a PQ victory in that contest. The Quebec government has had to take some very unpopular decisions, especially in cutting spending to meet its commitment to a zero deficit by the year 2000. While the PQ has consistently led the QLP in the polls, disaffection among its core supporters in the peripheral regions, in the broader public service, and in the trade union movement could lead to abstention or a shift in support to the ADQ of Mario Dumont or even to the Quebec Liberals. A credible and appealing Plan A initiative could help this shift, as could the effects of Plan B in undercutting some basic sovereigntist arguments. If the QLP took power, a referendum would probably be deferred for several years at least.’ Alternatively, the PQ might win an election in 1998 or 1999 but hesitate to hold a referendum on sovereignty. There are three periods of battle, after all — the provincial election, another referendum campaign, and (assuming the PQ wins the election), the whole pe-

riod before the referendum. A new Bouchard government would hesitate to hold a referendum that it could not win, and several factors might keep Quebecers’ support for sovereignty at insuffient levels to risk a vote. Continued economic growth might restore some voters’ faith in the federal system while sharpening the economic arguments against secession, because more citizens would have more to lose in the uncertainty it would bring. Or Plan A might achieve a rebalancing of the federation and a symbolic recognition of Quebec that was attractive enough to depress support for sovereignty so much

that the PQ would not risk a referendum. Finally, the elements of Ottawa’s Plan B might peel away some Quebecers from the Yes side.

Federal politicians at least seem persuaded that Plan B is working. Reflecting on the 1997 election results, Mr Chrétien noted the 10 per cent decline in Bloc support since 1993, declaring, “This is, for me, a big story. People don’t believe that the solution is separation — people are afraid of it.”* Of course, all three factors working together could

substantially dampen the Yes support and deter the sovereigntists from holding a third referendum. There is also the possibility that Mr Bouchard could make an his-

toric compromise by signing on to an agreement renewing the

377 What Would Happen after a Yes?

federation within the 1982 constitutional framework. Whatever the terms of an accord, this inevitably would split the sovereignty movement, but Mr Bouchard and his followers could rely on the opposi-

tion parties to carry it with the public and through the National Assembly. Such a huge partisan realignment seems improbable, but it is suggested by some analysts who point hopefully to the Quebec

premier’s apparently erratic career as a federalist Liberal, protosovereigntist, Progressive Conservative, Bloc founder, and PQ leader, and also to precedents when francophone (and anglophone) leaders broke sharply from their established positions to make constitutional compromises and resolve costly deadlocks.° There certainly is some suspicion among long-standing members of the PQ that Mr Bouchard’s commitment to sovereignty is not ab-

solute, because of his insistence on a partnership with Canada.’ Mr Bouchard explicitly denied this when announcing his candidacy for the PQ leadership, stating that he would accept no arrangement in which Quebec would remain within the federation. “No, it’s not possible,” he insisted, “I’m a sovereigntist.”° But there have been some

indications to the contrary from both the premier and the moderate wing of the PQ. After the referendum, for example, the party’s house leader said that his government would examine “serious” and “substantial” proposals for change from Ottawa and the other provinces.°®

Later, the deputy premier indicated that more detailed Quebec proposals on the partnership were being developed and that anew “Ca-

nadian union” might conceivably be negotiated before another referendum. The “core of the matter,” he said, “is dialogue between two equal nations. And from that cornerstone we can go very far.”” Similarly, Mr Bouchard reacted to the federal government’s postreferendum initiatives by saying, “I will not waste any time reading

constitutional proposals made by the Prime Minister if they look anything like this.”® The qualifying clause here suggests that he might

be ready to consider other, more satisfactory proposals. Finally, at the 1997 premiers’ conference, to the apparent surprise of his advisers, Mr Bouchard was almost prepared to participate in an interprovincial initiative to set national standards in social policy and to constrain — not eliminate — the federal spending power in this domain, one in which Quebec has traditionally rejected any federal presence.’ As Stéphane Dion put it soon after taking office, “He will not hold a referendum if he thinks he cannot win it. Therefore, if it will not be sovereignty, it could be something else. So we must hold out our hand and ask him: ‘Mr Bouchard, how far are you willing to go in Canada?’”*° Despite all this, it is highly unlikely that a constitutional compro-

mise can be reached between ROC and a PQ government before

378 From Referendum to Referendum

another referendum. From his record as a minister during the Meech Lake period and later as Bloc leader and PQ premier, Mr Bouchard’s bottom line has always been that Quebecers must be recognized as a “people” rather than as a province like the others — “one of the good little chicks around the federal hen.” Only as representing a people

could the Quebec government negotiate as an equal with Canada, and only then could it assure Quebec’s future development (albeit within the constraints, self-imposed, of a partnership with Canada). In Lucien Bouchard’s view, Quebecers must give themselves this status

of a people by voting for sovereignty, because English Canada will never concede it. Perhaps this fundamental position might change under the pressure of an economic crisis or a crippling constitutional impasse, but it is not obvious that the change would be in the direction of compromise. Conceivably, ROC might offer both this recognition and a very radical decentralization of powers, but given the contours of public opinion in ROC and their reflection in the 1997 federal election results, this is most improbable, and so is the prospect of some grand federal coalition negotiating a new partnership directly with Quebec political parties. So Mr Bouchard is correct. Without a Yes vote in a referendum, Quebecers will not achieve the status and powers that he and the sovereignty movement seek. Of course — and this cannot be emphasized too much — a Yes vote would not necessarily produce this result. After a Yes, there are several possibilities, one of which is that Mr Bouchard and the PQ would accept far less, constitutionally,

than their stated objectives. Others involve ROC negotiating radically different arrangements with Quebec. But in any case, it seems unrealistic to expect the sovereigntists or ROC to make such compromises without another referendum being held. If there is another referendum, the Yes side could lose. One cannot be certain about who the principal actors would be in another campaign or what specific issues would animate it. Nor are the parameters of the campaign established. Quebec could pass new legislation about referendums, and the question would certainly be different. It

is also possible that a PQ government and Ottawa might agree in advance about the question to be posed and the level of support necessary to achieve sovereignty, and this would alter the nature of the campaign. This sort of prenegotiation was not on the horizon in 1995.

But in a future campaign many arguments would be familiar, and the federalist side might carry the day by showing that Canada can accommodate Quebec constitutionally, that secession is illegal and risky, that separation would entail uncertainty and economic loss, and that there would be no cooperation from ROC. Against these

379 What Would Happen after a Yes?

arguments, the sovereigntists might make little headway, with the result that there would be another No victory. Even if they were leading at the outset, the Yes forces could falter, just as the federalists slipped in 1995.

On the other hand, the Yes side might win. Several factors could prove conducive to a federalist defeat. One is the way the economy evolves. Continued growth could reinforce adherence to a Canada that works; alternatively, as Stéphane Dion once argued, rising economic confidence could be conducive to support for sovereignty.’* A sharp economic downturn might also help the Yes side. Although it

would make some voters more risk-averse and less likely to take a chance by voting for sovereignty, an economic depression could lead others to act on the assumption that “things can’t get worse” and to vote against the status quo. While it was not widespread during the 1995 campaign, the latter sentiment was heard in Quebec.” A recession could cause the number of hopelessly disenchanted voters to outweigh those who become more cautious. Another factor is how Plan A develops. ROC’s initiatives on this front may raise Quebecers’ expectations that powers will be decentralized and their distinct status entrenched in the constitution. The principles of the Calgary Declaration are perhaps just minimally acceptable to Quebec federalists, and if efforts to constitutionalize even these cannot succeed, it could be interpreted in Quebec as a terrible rebuff, with support for sovereignty rising to the level reached after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. A PQ government could seize this occasion to call and win a referendum. Similarly, the development of Plan B could provide an opening for a Yes victory. The critical element here is the Supreme Court decision in the reference case on Quebec’s right to secede unilaterally. No doubt

this will be a carefully written and nuanced judgment, but it will very likely state that secession is illegal under domestic law unless accomplished through an amendment of the Canadian constitution. However supple the judges may be about the legitimacy of a vote triggering and justifying the amendment process, the sovereigntists could argue that the decision is a final denial of Quebecers’ status as a self-determining people, one that renders their future subject to the whims not only of the federal government but of all the other provinces too. How the public would receive these arguments is dif- _ficult to estimate, but the decision clearly will offer an opening for persuasive sovereigntist rhetoric. Another factor conducive to a Yes vote would be any perceived threat to the linguistic security of Quebecers. None is currently apparent. Indeed, calm has prevailed, despite the provocative tactics of

380 From Referendum to Referendum

the “anglo-rights” movement in Quebec. This is a consequence mainly

of Mr Bouchard’s insistence that the PQ not reopen the language

dossier (despite pressure to do so from constituency groups in Montreal). But a threat could be manufactured. And here lies another potential route to a Yes vote. Since taking office, Mr Bouchard has generally counselled calm and moderation in relations with Quebec anglophones and with English Canadians generally. Perhaps because he has believed that a Quebec-Canada partnership can in fact be re-

alized after a Yes vote in an atmosphere of rationality and mutual respect, the Quebec premier has eschewed aggression and provocation. But this could change. Towards the end of finally achieving sovereignty, Mr Bouchard and the PQ might adopt a strategy of polarization, even though this could raise secession’s costs to Quebecers both during the transition period and in the long term." So far, the sovereigntists have been restrained — notably, in the government’s

refraining from a sustained counterattack to Ottawa’s Plan B initiatives — but there is no doubt that Mr Bouchard is aware of his potential to inflame anti-Quebec sentiment, and this could become powerful enough to make francophone Quebecers coalesce behind the sovereignty option.” Events could conspire to persuade him to mount an apocalyptic campaign, one of whose themes — an idea already bruited publicly —- might be that the PQ would vow that the next referendum

would be the last and that Quebecers would never again have the chance to vote for sovereignty.’® This strategy would involve putting

“the knife at the throat” of one’s own potential supporters, but it might be effective. In any event, this is one way that a Yes vote could occur. Given the factors sketched here, there are others. POST-YES SCENARIOS

In the summer and autumn of 1994, with the PQ forming a government and Mr Parizeau driving towards an early referendum, it was relatively straightforward to make predictions about the campaign and what would happen if the Yes side won. Of course, these predictions were contestable — and were indeed contested — but one could discern a single path along which the politics of a secession would move. In the summer and autumn of 1997, this is not feasible. One reason is that the politics of secession have become much more complex. The issue is now high on the public and partisan agendas, it is intensely debated and analysed, and it is also the focus of many political initiatives that will create turbulence in the future. These include the Supreme Court's decision about the legality of a UDI, some coherent and vigorous response by the sovereigntists to Ottawa’s Plan

381 What Would Happen after a Yes?

B, the outcome of the consultative processes launched by the premiers at Calgary, continuing changes in federal-provincial program responsibilities, and policy initiatives by Ottawa and Quebec City as falling deficits provide more room for innovation. As well, there inevitably will be external shocks — a stock-market correction, a reces-

sion, foreign wars, American intransigence in fisheries or trade disputes, and so on. All of these predictable developments will affect public opinion in Quebec and ROC in ways that cannot now be foreseen, as will the strategies adopted by the protagonists of sovereignty and unity. Prediction is also harder because the time horizon is more extended. There may well be a provincial election in Quebec in 1998, but it could take place in 1999. Another referendum, therefore, could be called as

late as 2004. If a week is a long time in politics, seven years is an eternity. There is time for underlying economic and social conditions to evolve, the main political actors to change, strategies to be reworked, and unpredictable events to intervene. All that can be known for sure is that some significant aspects of the drama will be different. So it is not reasonable to try to trace a single path that events would follow after a Yes vote. Instead, we must contemplate a set of possible scenarios — six in all — representing the broad outcomes that a Yes could produce. Nor is it realistic to describe in detail how these outcomes would transpire. At best, it is feasible to work backwards in time to deduce the preconditions of each scenario and some of the steps that would produce (or avoid) it. Although political developments over the next few years are uncertain, some features of any Quebec secession remain constant. If it is to be triggered by a referendum, then the question posed, the support level achieved, and the tone and content of the campaign will all help shape the consequences. The grand alternatives open to ROC and Quebec essentially remain those analysed in chapters 2-5 above, and the basic forces conducive to decentralization and centralization are still those sketched in chapter 7, though some have become stronger or weaker since 1995, and they may shift further before another referendum. The important issues to be resolved during a secession will still be those presented in chapters 12 (the terms and conditions of secession) and 13 (the reconstitution of Canada). And as argued in chapter 9, although economic considerations and legal rights will be important in shaping what happens after a Yes vote, it is in the political arena that the outcome will be determined. If these elements are constant, some of the changes wrought by the 1995 referendum and subsequent events should be underscored. In ROC, expectations and attitudes have evolved so that there will be

382 From Referendum to Referendum

much more public pressure against accepting that a Yes result will necessarily entail secession. Paradoxically, though, because of constitutional fatigue, hostility towards Quebec nationalists, and more awareness of the cost of uncertainty, there will also be more pressure to accept a Yes and settle the matter. Consequently, it will be harder for any government to act quickly and coherently. Second, there will be a strong demand in ROC for broad participation in any negotiations with Quebec, and the actors involved — provincial governments, Aboriginal leaders, and minorities in Quebec, to name only the most obvious — are now prepared for a Yes vote and are aware of the interests they will aim to protect. Because of this, and the critical linkage now established between the substantive issues of secession and the

constitutional changes needed to achieve it, there is a much lower probability of rapid agreement on either the terms of Quebec sovereignty or the reconstitution of ROC. In Quebec, polarization and precommitment have much increased the likelihood that a secession will

be resisted with civil disobedience and violence, and Ottawa may have taken on obligations to partitionists in the province. Finally, external actors — particularly the United States — will be much more

vigilant about the whole process and more prepared to safeguard their interests in the wake of a Yes vote. Despite the perennial aspects of secession, then, all these developments and those that will occur before another referendum open up a wide range of possible outcomes. The first bears the closest resemblance to that depicted before the 1995 referendum in the first edition of this book. Clean Split

In this scenario, there is a Yes vote for sovereignty, and ROC accepts the result. Matters develop much as predicted by the “inevitabilists” before the 1995 referendum. There are immediate negotiations between ROC and Quebec about the crucial issues of the secession — the debt, the army, currency, borders, and so on —- and Canada reconstitutes itself quickly, excising Quebec from the Constitution Acts while

making only minimal and essential changes to its fundamental law. The secession involves a very sharp shock, but a relatively brief one, and it produces two functional and stable sovereign entities. How could such a result occur, given what has changed since 1995? One possibility is that there would be a very high Yes vote — on the order of 70 or 75 per cent. This could occur if the federalists in Quebec collapse, perhaps after some great shock comparable to the fail-

ure of the Meech Lake Accord, or if for some other reason there

383. What Would Happen after a Yes?

develops a strong polarization between ROC and Quebec. In this case, the polls would show well before the vote that a Yes was inevitable.

Each side would have time to prepare for the result. The financial markets would anticipate the event, and mounting costs could induce preparations for secession, such as the formation in ROC of a government of national unity. Measures like this taken in anticipation of a Yes vote, of course, would help make it materialize. In any case, Canada could not resist a Yes of this magnitude, and ROC would

have to negotiate the secession. Another possibility conducive to a clean split is that those issues most likely to cause uncertainty and turmoil in the wake of a Yes would be prenegotiated by the two sides. Ottawa would concede in principle that secession can occur, which the ruling Liberals and all other parties have now accepted. Beyond this, if the governments of Canada and Quebec agreed on the question posed and the level of support necessary for secession, then even a narrow Yes victory would be enough to trigger negotiations. As well, there would probably have

to be joint supervision of the campaign and the ballot counting, or perhaps there would be external observers. There might also be some agreement within ROC about its constitutional make-up should Quebec secede, perhaps in the form of a commitment to maintain the status quo as far as possible through a transition period of several years.” If all this occurred, even a narrow Yes could produce a clean split. Nevertheless, some other modifications of previous “inevitabilist”

scenarios would have to occur in order to make a clean split possible. One involves the Aboriginal peoples, who have received strong

indications from Ottawa about their right to remain in Canada and who may receive stronger guarantees from the Supreme Court. The Quebec government might simply concede their right of secession in order to prevent delay and severe civil unrest caused by well-organized

(and well-armed) native groups and their allies, even though this would potentially cause a substantial loss of territory in the north and several large enclaves in the rest of the province. Alternatively, Canada and Quebec could agree not only that all existing Aboriginal

rights continue to apply to native peoples in Quebec — including Canadian citizenship rights — but also that Quebec’s native people would enjoy rights identical to those that evolve in Canada in the future. A clean split would also require circumventing other minorities and staunch federalists organized in the partitionist movement. Firmly

entrenching rights in the new Quebec constitution would be essen-

tial, but this does not solve the issue of borders. There are two

384 From Referendum to Referendum

alternatives here. Either some process for partition could be prenegotiated, or the existing borders could be accepted in advance of the vote by both sides. Each solution could be accompanied by the commitment to provide relocation assistance and transitional aid, along

with a clear position on such people’s right to retain Canadian citizenship.” These are very awkward requirements, and having them in place beforehand might affect the referendum results significantly, but given the level of mobilization of minorities and hardline federalists within Quebec, it would be impossible to achieve a rapid, nonviolent secession without installing some such arrangements. Only these ones could both dampen unrest to manageable levels and legitimize joint action to contain it. Two further observations should be made about the clean split. First, it depends on solidarity being maintained in ROC. This would

be more likely if the Yes vote followed polarization rather than prenegotiation. The former route to an irresistible secession would heighten in ROC a sense of estrangement from Quebecers and a collective determination, so that the loyalty to Ottawa that was predicted to underpin its negotiating power after a 1995 referendum would do the same after a future Yes. Prenegotiation would be much more contentious in ROC, and differences about any agreements with the PQ would make it harder after a Yes to form a coherent negotiating body

or a government of national unity. |

Second, after a clean split, any economic and political arrangements negotiated between ROC and Quebec would fall far short of the level of integration inscribed in the PQ’s partnership proposals. Elaborate new institutions would not arise after polarization produced a clean

split, nor would they be prenegotiated. Even after a Yes vote that was accepted by both sides as legitimately leading to secession, there would be no more reason for ROC to contemplate joint institutions than there was in 1995.7! Renewed Federalism

This scenario, broadly speaking, resembles that depicted by the “impossibilists” before the 1995 referendum. Here, the sovereigntists win a referendum vote — but not overwhelmingly. In ROC there are no outstanding commitments about a Yes leading inevitably to secession or about the terms and conditions that would accompany it, and time is taken to broaden the central government or to empower it to deal with the crisis through an election or a referendum. Negotiations then commence with Quebec. The provincial governments participate fully in these, perhaps through representation on a special

385 What Would Happen after a Yes? } negotiating authority. Meanwhile, the legitimacy of the Quebec gov-

ernment and the sovereignty project begins to erode. Most of the Quebec federalists refuse to rally behind sovereignty, while opinion in the province about fundamental options remains deeply divided. Civil unrest is destabilizing. The economic costs of uncertainty mount, and the citizenry comes to blame Quebec City for its persistence more than Ottawa for its delay. The negotiations bog down because of the

number of interests involved and the difficult issues addressed, and their focus shifts from sovereignty and the partnership towards reforming the existing constitution. As a result of all this, the sovereignty movement splits. Most of the PQ leadership agrees to an historic

compromise, as do the ROC leaders, and agreement is reached on a set of amendments to the Constitution Acts. These achieve popular ratification, though they contain some dualistic or asymmetric elements. Sovereignty is avoided, and Canada stays intact. While the “impossibilists” thought this scenario likely in 1995 (plac-

ing more or less stress on constitutional change), getting to renewed federalism in the future could be even more difficult than it would have been then. First, the Yes might attain a majority so overwhelming as to sustain a drive straight to sovereignty. As well, there was no prospect in 1995 that Ottawa and a PQ government might prenegotiate (if only indirectly) issues about the question and support level, so that a Yes would legitimately trigger secession, but this is now possible. Hence, renewed federalism could be bypassed by a clean split.

Nevertheless, it should be recognized that renewed federalism would still be possible even if there had been some prenegotiation. In a future referendum, although the legal requirements for secession will be clearer and although the rules of the game may be accepted by both sides, the precise terms and conditions of a secession cannot be specified or agreed in advance of any vote. In negotiating these terms, ROC would retain considerable room to manoeuvre — scope for justified delay and resistance that eventually could result in a constitutional compromise. Also, ROC might be profoundly divided about these substantive matters and unable to negotiate coherently for some time. If there were no joint agreement about the referendum rules, negotiations would be slower to start and more protracted, for the governments of ROC (and especially Ottawa) would face the same range of alternatives to accepting a Yes as in 1995 — doing nothing, calling

an election, or holding a referendum (in ROC or Quebec or both).” All of these could slow the sovereigntists’ momentum and foster divisions among Quebecers. There is also the possibility that Ottawa

would move to exert its continued authority in Quebec. In these

386 From Referendum to Referendum

circumstances, the Quebec government might proceed towards a UDI. Then several things could happen. The threat of a UDI, the damage it would cause, and the countermeasures it could require might well

bring ROC to the bargaining table with attractive constitutional offers. Or a UDI might be passed, but with provision for a period of negotiations, which might then commence, bog down, and result in renewed federalism. Alternatively, a straightforward UDI might be passed after a Yes vote rejected by ROC and many Quebecers — in which case, this scenario ends and one of the remaining four occurs. However it is reached, renewed federalism would depend on some essential preconditions. One is that foreign powers are generally supportive. Another is that the economic damage, while painful (especially in Quebec), is manageable enough that governments are not stampeded into quick action but have the time to conclude complex negotiations successfully. A joint agreement, right after a Yes, that there will be an economic standstill might help bring this about. Most important is the degree of solidarity within each side. In ROC, there

must be enough so that coherent negotiating positions can be credibly advanced, if only after some delay. More difficult, renewed fed-

eralism requires in the end an agreement on how to reconstitute Canada — an agreement that must be widely acceptable in ROC yet still be attractive enough to Quebecers that some sovereigntist leaders will sign on to the amendments. This could be hard to achieve if the sovereigntist bottom line is recognition of Quebecers as a “people.”

In Quebec, there must be continuing division and very little solidarity after a Yes if renewed federalism is to be achieved. But as was pointed out by Stéphane Dion, the “impossibilist” analysts (who were primarily Quebecers) tended to assume that this would be the case.” Sensitive to the deep cleavages within Quebec about the advisability and morality of secession, they foresaw that political confusion and economic loss would erode support for the sovereignty adventure. This remains integral to the renewed-federalism scenario: there is no massive rallying to sovereignty in the wake of a Yes. Obviously, the Aboriginal peoples and most minority groups will be even less likely

to rally in the future than they were in 1995, but the scenario depends critically on francophone opinion remaining divided and fluid,

open to no persuasive arguments that attribute economic losses to ROC’s intransigence, and remaining prepared to countenance new constitutional proposals. The precise outcome of renewed federalism would depend on the circumstances of the campaign, the level of Yes support, and the extent and distribution of economic damage. Essentially, this scenario posits a Yes that causes enough of a shock in ROC to generate consti-

, 387 What Would Happen after a Yes?

tutional movement, which would appeal to Quebecers as the sovereigntist project loses momentum. The most doubtful element here may be the capacity of ROC to extend constitutional proposals that would be attractive enough to split the sovereigntists. This would appear to require a substantial Yes vote, along with considerable economic damage in ROC and much coherence in its position. A signifi-

cant alteration in any of these factors would tilt the precarious path leading to renewed federalism towards some other scenario. Another possibility is that ROC might be tempted simply to wait out a narrow Yes result, undertaking no negotiations and making no offers of constitutional change, in the expectation that a divided Quebec

would eventually crumble and accept the status quo. This outcome is improbable because mounting losses in Quebec could credibly be blamed on ROC’s inaction, and Quebecers might be moved to support a UDI. As well, most Quebec federalists are still committed to constitutional renewal, and if there were no such prospect after a Yes, many of them would rally to the sovereigntist side. The QLP would split. After this, even if economic losses ultimately led to the nationalists and the PO making a humiliating retreat and accepting the constitutional status quo, there would certainly be left in the province a sovereigntist movement ready to rise again, along with a disorganized and disillusioned rump of Quebec federalists. The renewed-federalism scenario would probably play out over a longer period than the clean split. Economic loss and the tension of negotiations would make it difficult to meet the complex preconditions for this result. If ROC held, however, and Quebec did not, then this certainly is one conceivable outcome of a Yes vote. ROC Caves

This scenario, essentially, is the obverse of renewed federalism. Here, one possibility is that the Yes vote is accepted as legitimate by ROC and negotiations begin. But these drag on because of confusion and

disagreement in ROC - among both the federal parties and the provincial governments — about the terms and conditions of secession. Coalitions of provinces block agreements about the terms because of

their power to stop the constitutional amendments that are necessary for Quebec to secede.** The Quebec government then issues a UDI.

Alternatively, the Yes vote is not accepted in ROC, and negotiations are delayed as politicians debate how to react. Despite the mount-

ing economic losses, it may prove essential to hold an election or a referendum, but whether opinion in ROC is expressed through such

388 From Referendum to Referendum

a popular consultation or not, it remains seriously divided. In Quebec, meanwhile, the Yes result is widely accepted, so if there is popular consultation, either the Bloc receives massive support or the original referendum vote is decisively reaffirmed. Alternatively, Quebecers

simply rally behind the government as their economic losses are blamed on ROC’s inaction or opposition. A UDI is declared. Faced with a UDI, the citizens and leaders of ROC face a terrible choice. Should they attempt to enforce the federal government’s authority over Quebec territory or not? Should they respond to the pleas for assistance of Aboriginals and partitionists, based on their rights as Canadians? About these matters there is profound disagreement,

both ideological and interregional, which is sharpened as interest rates rise, trade is disrupted, investment dries up, and unemployment increases across the country. As well, foreign countries begin to

deal with Quebec, so the UDI threatens to become a fait accompll. Under these conditions, there is insufficient support in ROC to resist the UDI. In this scenario, ROC caves and ultimately accepts that Quebec

will secede. Canada then comes to the bargaining table. The terms and conditions of secession are negotiated successfully, and the constitutional changes necessary to excise Quebec from Canada are passed.

Despite its internal discord, ROC remains united. Although embittered and divided, the governments and citizens of ROC nevertheless agree to maintain Canada as a going concern. For this scenario to occur, several preconditions have to be met. First, Quebecers must rally behind the Yes vote (however narrow it may have been), whether they do so immediately or as they gradually come to attribute disruption and economic costs to ineffectiveness or malevolence on the part of Ottawa and ROC as a whole. This scenario also requires that divisions within ROC remain substantial — that there is insufficient polarization between ROC and Quebec to overcome them. These divisions would concern whether to negotiate with Quebec and what ROC’s positions and priorities should be. After a future Yes, for example, many more British Columbians than Ontarians might favour “letting Quebec go.” Similarly, there would be sharp interprovincial differences about how to settle such matters as the national debt and the extent of Canada’s trade relationships with Quebec. There would also be nongeographic cleavages about the stance to take on citizenship issues and the extent of Canada’s obligations to Quebec’s minorities and Aboriginal peoples. In the ROC-

caves scenario, all these divisions lead to negotiations failing, and also to ROC’s inability to resist Quebec’s UDI. This scenario’s outcome also requires that the Quebec government is able to assert its authority over the territory it claims. This means

that the Canadian Armed Forces remain intact on their bases and

389 What Would Happen after a Yes?

that the provincial security forces — the municipal police and the Streté du Quebec ~ are united and reliable. It also implies that unrest among

those Quebecers opposed to secession is relatively limited and that civil disobedience is geographically confined. Aboriginal peoples, for example, might either exclude Quebec authorities from their territories or move more aggressively to blockade autoroutes and airports; in this scenario, they limit themselves to defensive tactics. That Quebec can maintain order is a critical requirement of ROC caves. If violence mounts or if ROC concretely contests Quebec’s authority, this scenario could quickly shift onto another path.

Two other factors are ROC’s solidarity and the stance of foreign governments. Here, the effect of other countries on the process is mixed. On the one hand, they do not impede Quebec’s progress towards sovereignty and may even encourage it. On the other hand, they may promote continued unity in Canada, as well as a reasonable final settlement between Canada and Quebec. The latter benign stance may be essential in this scenario, which depends on there being insufficient collective determination in ROC to oppose the UDI, but enough unity that Canada can continue as a sovereign state. Once again, these conflicting requirements imply that the path towards this scenario would be a narrow and tricky one. Further, the ROC-caves scenario could develop at various tempos. One can envisage an extended process in which opinion in Quebec consolidates slowly, elections or referendums are held in Canada, negotiations gradually bog down and break down, and so on. But the basic scenario could also develop very quickly. All that is required, essentially, is that division within ROC prevents a consensus on how

to deal with Quebec after a Yes, and that solidarity within Quebec behind a UDI far outweighs that within ROC against the UDI. Finally, this scenario would entail over the long term a low level of economic and political integration between Canada and a sovereign Quebec. This is because “losing” the contest with the sovereigntists would leave a bitter residue among Canadians, and because the same discord in ROC that made negotiations fail and the UDI succeed would

also prevail about the arrangements to govern the relations between the two states. Apart from particular agreements made with individual provinces, Quebec-Canada economic integration would fall to the NAFTA floor — and Quebec would be exposed to NAFTA provisions that discipline sovereign states but not provinces. Meltdown

This scenario is a dismal combination of the two preceding ones. Here, a Yes vote may be seen as legitimate or not in ROC, but it is definitely

390 From Referendum to Referendum

regarded as valid by most Quebecers, who rally towards sovereignty.

However, the result is contested aggressively by the Aboriginal peoples, minorities, and the partitionists. To produce meltdown, ROC must maintain its coherence. It might refuse to negotiate with Que-

bec, after which it would confront a UDI (which in turn would fuel the resistance within Quebec by the anti-sovereigntist hard core of perhaps 25 per cent of the population). Or, if the Yes is accepted conditionally and negotiations begin, they break down. This occurs be-

cause of differences of interest between ROC and Quebec about economic matters such as the division of the debt, agriculture, and trade relations, along with more serious conflicts about matters of principle and symbolic issues such as citizenship and the rights of Aboriginals and minorities. As well, the borders are not agreed; they

are contested on the ground by native peoples and partitionists. In the face of demonstrations, civil disobedience, and sporadic violence, the Quebec government breaks off negotiations and issues a UDI. As relations between ROC and Quebec become thoroughly polar-

ized, a contest ensues to exert control over the territory. This could begin with the deployment of forces to protect federal installations and citizens, but it rapidly escalates into violence and disorder. Of course, the economic damage caused by the meltdown is enormous, but this only increases the determination of each side to prevail. Civil disorder is ended by foreign intervention, led by the United States, perhaps under United Nations’ auspices. The two sides are forced into negotiations. Since the bitterness of the struggle makes any other result impossible, secession takes place. But Quebec cedes some territory, and very strained relations make economic cooperation difficult. Political relationships are hostile. Before the 1995 referendum, the meltdown scenario, while logical,

fitted the Quebec-ROC case so poorly that it could be quickly dismissed.” This is no longer true, because of the new radicalism among some federalist Quebecers, the Plan B commitments made by Ottawa, and the insistence on rights in ROC (while the Supreme Court is being delegitimized in Quebec). One cannot attach probabilities to the

likelihood of meltdown or to any of the other scenarios, but it is a possible outcome. Of course, certain requirements would have to be in place for it to be realized. One is that the Yes result and subsequent events increase solidarity within both ROC and Quebec (in contrast to the two preceding scenarios). This is possible because a Yes result could provide an incentive for politicians on each side to adopt increasingly radical positions, pulling moderates with them. In an intensely monitored situation with heavy media coverage, provocation — or, in the extreme,

391 What Would Happen after a Yes?

atrocities — by tiny minorities from either side could quickly move public opinion in the other side to support positions that shortly before were unthinkably extreme.*® Even the antagonism generated through negotiations about intractable matters of principle could in-

duce solidarity in each side and polarization between them if the positions taken by one’s negotiators were widely regarded as legitimate but were summarily rejected. As well as feeling that one’s fundamental rights were being threatened, heavy economic damage also could be blamed on one’s opponents as solidarity and polarization strengthened further. The meltdown scenario involves a level of disorder and violence that contradicts the normal view of Canada and Quebec as stable, tolerant societies. But unrest can escalate rapidly, and there are few agents of control. The operational ground forces of the Canadian military that are available to maintain order in this country could not fill Montreal’s Olympic Stadium. Also the military might fragment, given the substantial number of Yes voters among the armed forces in 1995. The municipal police forces also might be divided, especially in Montreal, and the loyalties of the Streté du Québec are

unclear, so there is an obvious possibility that order could not be maintained if there were large-scale protests, civil unrest, and vigilante activity. Radicals from ROC might well come to the aid of partitionists, and Aboriginal people from all over North America might

lend support to Quebec’s native peoples. On the other side, small groups of radical sovereigntists undoubtedly would be prepared for violent confrontations; indeed, threats have been made to this effect.”

So the severe disorder envisaged in the meltdown scenario cannot be denied, despite Canadian traditions of civility and peacefulness. The resolution of the crisis depends on foreign intervention. This may appear to be an unlikely conclusion, one depending on a deus ex machina, but this view is quite erroneous. First, mediation or intervention could be requested by one side or the other. This could occur if the rule of law broke down and existing institutions such as the courts and security forces became totally ineffective or discredited. Foreign powers would be hard put to deny such requests, but they also could decide to intervene in the crisis because of their own selfinterest. All too often, Canadian analysts treat secession as a domes-

tic matter and assume that ROC and Quebec will have sufficient latitude to reach whatever outcome they may jointly determine. But this is wrong. Foreign powers have an interest in stability. Despite the end of the Cold War, defence considerations remain important to Canada’s allies. Much more centrally, they have an enormous stake in the integrated North American economy. Americans, in particular,

392 From Referendum to Referendum

have billions of dollars invested in Canada and millions of jobs dependent on trade with this country. The United States simply will not tolerate prolonged and heavy losses throughout the process of secession. As has been shown, Washington will pay much more attention to a future referendum, and it certainly will be better prepared to defend its interests. Should matters ever lurch into meltdown

after a Yes vote, the United States will use its enormous economic leverage and deploy its military if necessary in order to force a negotiated end to the disorder and conflict. The American government, in fact, might well be the agent that prevents meltdown, because its determination to have a settlement reached would not permit any extended stand-off between ROC and Quebec. Indeed, the United States would be a significant actor in every scenario, aiming not to generate any particular outcome but to ensure that some equilibrium is quickly restored. Regardless of all of this, meltdown remains a possible scenario, even if all participants agree at the outset that it is unlikely, disturbing, and to be avoided at all costs. The preconditions for other outcomes involve delicate balances of factors, and events could swing out of control to produce meltdown. Reconfederation

This outcome is qualitatively different from the preceding four. In all of them, a Yes vote results either in alterations to the existing consti-

tution or in two sovereign states, with ROC having a constitution similar to today’s and with Canada and Quebec cooperating only minimally at the political level. In reconfederation, ROC fragments into several sovereign states, and together with Quebec these enter into anew confederation along the lines of the European Union, with certain powers delegated to a new central authority. In this scenario, a Yes vote triggers negotiations that quickly founder.

Ottawa’s legitimacy and power are gravely weakened and the provinces take the lead, but fundamental differences among them emerge.

As discord becomes evident and costs mount, one provincial government bolts, announcing that it too will contemplate sovereignty (probably by holding a referendum on the issue). British Columbia or Alberta are the obvious candidates here. Alternatively, one or more

provincial governments could declare their intention to enter into a new set of arrangements with Quebec, ones that would mean renounc-

ing the existing constitutional structure. Here, given its substantial economic linkages with Quebec, the foremost possibility is Ontario.” In reconfederation, then, ROC does not cave: it fragments and reunites.

393. What Would Happen after a Yes?

This might also occur after a UDI by Quebec. Intense disagreement

on whether to resist it could greatly erode Ottawa’s power, which also would be reduced if the UDI appeared to be succeeding. One or more provincial governments might then aim to bolt from a collapsing federation or to create new institutions to maintain a union with Quebec. The prospect of meltdown also could produce a movement towards reconfederation. At the most abstract level, reconfederation is one way to reconcile Quebec sovereignty with the continuation of Canada (or a “Canadian union”). Apart from renewed federalism, the other scenarios result in ROC becoming Canada, with few or no institutions integrating Quebec with Canada. In reconfederation, however, a central government continues, though its functions are reduced dramatically.” It would have far less capacity to engineer positive economic integration, and there would be much less interregional redistribution, if any.*° The central institutions would shrink in size and power, but along with a bureaucracy they could include a legislature. Because of the number of units involved, the problem of parity that would bedevil any dualistic ROC-Quebec political arrangements would be resolved in favour of proportionality. So Quebec would be formally sovereign, but there would be no equal-to-equal partnership in this scenario. Instead, Quebec would be one of a dozen sovereign entities in a confederation where, it has been suggested, it might play a rather limited role, “similar to Britain’s position in Europe.”*! Reconfederation has several preconditions. One is that the Yes vote is not massive enough to lead inevitably to a clean split, though it must be large and solid enough to produce negotiations, and perhaps to sustain a UDI. Moreover, the sovereigntists must be able to remain united and retain public support in the face of the offers for renewed federalism that would likely precede any definite movement towards reconfederation. Given the extent of unrest that would be generated by hard-core Quebec federalists, this balance would be very difficult to achieve. As well, reconfederation depends on divisions within ROC that would cause power to flow to the provinces. Ottawa would have to be gravely weakened. But this could occur, first, through its very failure

to win the referendum and, second, if it proved impossible to forma government of national unity because of basic disagreements about the strategy necessary to deal with the crisis. Next, the negotiations would reveal profound disagreements among the provinces. But governments do not readily go out of business. At least one provincial government would have to cross the Rubicon — to declare that its primordial responsibility to the interests of its citizens could not be

394 From Referendum to Referendum

met through ROC’s collective action. This would be an enormous step to take. But such assertions have become more likely because of the contingency planning that has taken place since the 1995 referendum. In British Columbia, according to a close commentator, seces-

sion is now recognized as an option: it is “on the public’s radar screen.” In Atlantic Canada, contemplation of a future without Quebec has forced thinking about Maritime union and new relationships with the United States, and recent Ontario governments have stridently expressed dissatisfaction with the existing federal arrangements. After the shock of a future Yes, it is not inconceivable that some provincial administration would make a radical departure if Ottawa faltered gravely. It would only take one such move to throw the course of events onto a new path. Finally, reconfederation requires that the provincial governments (and a weakened Ottawa) prove capable of negotiating a complex set of new institutions quickly and efficiently. This would be hard if the referendum campaign and the Yes result left a heavy residue of acrimony, one supplemented by bitterness and disorder within Quebec.*? Bargaining over financial arrangements would be especially difficult. Presumably, the central institutions would retain responsibility for Canada’s debt, and this would require either ironclad guarantees about transfers to it from the new entities or, more credibly, the maintenance of some taxation powers by Ottawa. The issue of foreign relations would also be thorny. If the confederal authorities were to retain control of tariffs and the customs union, they would need to be delegated considerable authority over trade negotiations. All of these difficulties would be harder to resolve without the encouragement of foreign powers, and a severe economic collapse could make the successful negotiation of re-confederation even less likely. Nevertheless, an outcome that allows for Quebec to become sovereign while preserving the Canadian union — however weakly at the centre — certainly is conceivable.

| Fragmentation If the centre did not hold and one or more provinces left the federation, fragmentation could occur — the last logically possible scenario. Here, Quebec’s UDI succeeds, or negotiations break down, and ina rapidly deteriorating economic situation the components of ROC adopt a sauve qui peut strategy, scrambling to secure their bilateral links with

the United States. The outcome would be rather like that sketched by Doran, with a band of impoverished mini-states straggling along the Americans’ northern border, joined to Washington and each other

only through NAFTA (perhaps) and through separately negotiated

395 What Would Happen after a Yes?

bilateral arrangements. This scenario would require some minimal cooperation among the remnants of Canada about debt repayment. It presupposes both severe economic loss and the absence among Canadians of a sense of national identification strong enough to underpin even a mere confederation. But after a future Yes, these are genuine

possibilities, and so is fragmentation. CONCLUSION

This chapter concludes the addendum to the first edition of The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada. That effort was driven by

the need to anticipate a Yes vote in a 1995 referendum and to think through its consequences, a task that required basic analysis of the long-term structural possibilities for Canada and Quebec, of the previous research on Quebec secession, and of the comparative politics of how secessions have occurred. Upon this foundation were constructed detailed predictions about what a Yes vote would produce, the terms and conditions of a Quebec secession, and how ROC would

reconstitute itself. ,

Here, three chapters have dealt with the 1995 referendum, while two have analysed subsequent developments — the deep changes wrought by the 1995 result, and the various strategies deployed since

then by the sovereigntist and federalist sides. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, prediction is much harder now than it was before. The political situation is more complex and contested, and the time horizon is more distant, so a range of possible scenarios has been put forward here. The six suggested above seem exhaustive, but creative readers may imagine other variations. In any case, the consequences for Quebecers of a Yes are not encouraging. In no scenario does the result resemble the political and economic partnership espoused by the PQ and its allies. The closest to this is the clean split, where acrimony is avoided and economic integration remains relatively high; but joint political institutions still would not emerge, because the disproportionate sizes of Canada and Quebec would make parity unacceptable as an operative decision rule (as opposed to the de jure equality that sovereignty would bring). So Quebec would adapt to the economic policies of Canada rather

than helping formulate them in any significant way. As for the reconfederation scenario, political institutions and economic cooperation would result after a Yes, but here Quebec’s influence would be proportional to its economic weight — undoubtedly less than it currently is —and pan-Canadian economic integration would be much

weaker and more fragile than at present. Even so, some Quebecers might find sovereignty a fair compensation for these costly defects.

396 From Referendum to Referendum

The other scenarios are much less attractive. Some forms of renewed federalism might represent what the average Quebecer genuinely desires, but they would be achieved only after heavy economic losses

had caused a crippling reversal of support for sovereignty. In the ROC-caves scenario, Quebec would be left with a bitter and uncooperative interlocutor; and meltdown and fragmentation would entail huge costs. These possibilities should give pause to any rational voter. For ROC, most post-Yes outcomes are at least as disquieting. Aclean split would leave Canada in operation as a going concern, but it certainly would not be costless in the short or long term; nor is it with-

out risks. Renewed federalism might appeal to those English Canadians who resent Quebecers and are eager to “call their bluff,” but it would either entail major constitutional concessions or leave Canada poisoned from within by Quebecers’ resentment. The scenario in which ROC caves would exact enormous economic and psychological costs, meltdown even more, and in the fragmentation scenario Canada would be lost, not only as we know it but altogether.

Reconfederation would preserve only the shell of a country as provincialism triumphs, but this outcome probably would be only temporary because confederations are notoriously unstable. All of these possibilities should sober those Canadians who believe that their country, as it stands, can readily cope with a Yes from Quebecers. No scenario has been assigned any particular probability of occurrence. There are two reasons for this. First, each depends on a particular combination of the relevant underlying political factors — the size of a Yes vote, its perceived legitimacy, the degree of solidarity in

Quebec and ROC and the extent of polarization between them, the negotiating strategies and objectives of political leaders, and the position of foreign countries. To the various combinations that these factors would take after a future referendum, no probabilities can at present be assigned. Second, as events unfold, each of the possible outcomes could shift towards one or more of the other results. ROC caves, for example, could easily slide into fragmentation; renewed federalism could deteriorate into meltdown, and so on. Given the delicate interplay of factors necessary to reach any outcome, none can be assured, even if political leaders on all sides were to seek to achieve it. So the future after a Yes in another referendum is radically uncertain. Many of the possibilities can have no appeal for reasonable citizens, wherever they live and whatever their position on the political spectrum. Yet Canadians may move and be moved ineluctably towards another referendum, and the Yes may then prevail. What exactly will happen after that, no one can now foresee.

Selected Characteristics of Canada, Quebec, and ROC

BLANK PAGE

399 Appendix Table Al Selected Characteristics of Canada, Quebec, and ROC

Canada Quebec ROC ROC as % of Canada

1 Area (km?) 9,970,610 1,540,680 8,429,930 84.5 2 Population (000s) 1992 27,409 6,925 20,484 74.7 3 GDP

(a) at market prices ($ millions) 1991 671,668 155,864 515,804 76.8

(b) per capita ($ 1991) 24,505 22,507 25,180

4 Manufacturing shipments ($ millions) 1992 283,559 68,678 214,881 75.8 5 Manufacturing value-added

($ millions) 1989 127,407 34,160 93,247 73.2

6 Domestic exports ($ millions) 1992:

primary 34,025 3,132 30,893 90.1

secondary 119,730 22,423 97 307 81.3 total 153,755 25,555 128,200 83.4 7 Exports to the US ($ millions) 1992 118,677 19,328 99 349 83.7 8 Federal government revenues ($ millions):

PIT 1990 59,562 12,717 46,845 78.6 CIT 1987 45,655 10,703 34,952 76.6

9 Assets & liabilities of chartered banks

($ millions) 3rd quarter, 1992: assets 675,649 80,006 595,643 88.2

liabilities 675,649 70,734 604,915 89.5

10 (a)Investment ($ millions) , total public & private:

preliminary actual 1992 158,537 34,791 123,746 78.0 intentions 1993 163,181 34,578 128,603 78.8

(b) public: preliminary actual 1992 41,685 11,399 30,286 72.6

11 Immigrants from outside Canada (1988-91) 593,480 93,610 499,870 84.2 12 Mother tongue (single responses, %):

English 62.1 83.3 9.0 80.2 French 24.5 4.6

non-official 13.4 7.7 15.2 13 Home language (single responses, %): English French 68.7 23.510.7 83.988.3 3.1

non-official 7.8 5.4 8.6

14 Seats in House of Commons: 1984 282 75 207 73.4

1988 295 75 220 74.6

(proposed) 1996 301 75 226 75.1 15 Popular vote — federal election

(a) PC % 1984 50.3 50.2 49.7

1988 43.0 52.7 39.5 1993 16.0 13.6 17.0 (b) NDP % 1984 18.8 8.8 22.5 1988 20.4 14.0 22.7

1993 6.9 1.5 8.9

(c) Reform % 1993 18.7 0.0 25.8

Table A2 Selected Characteristics of ROC

Nfld PEI NS NB

Actual % ROC Actual % ROC Actual % ROC Actual % ROC

1 Area (km?) 405,720 4.8 5,660 0.1 55,490 0.7 73,440 0.9 2 Population (000s) 1992 975 2.8 130 0.6 907 4.4 728 3.5

3 GDP (a) at market prices

($ millions) 1991 9,312 1.8 2,078 0.4 17,605 3.4 13,689 2.6

(b) per capita (61991) 16,195 15,985 19,410 18,803 4 Manufacturing shipments

($ millions) 1992 1,366 0.6 407 0.2 4,989 2.3 5,590 2.6 ($ millions) 1989 810 0.8 156 0.2 1,935 2.1 2,145 2.3

5 Manufacturing value-added 6 Domestic exports

($ millions), 1992: primary 450 1.5 159 05 1,065 3.4 705 2.3 secondary 771 0.8 16 0.01 1,259 1.3 2,308 2.4 total 1,221 0.9 175 0.1 2,324 1.8 3,013 2.3 7 Exports to the U.S. ($ millions) 1992: total 616 0.6 102 0.1 1,577 1.6 1,935 1.9 8 Federal government revenues ($ millions): 1990 PIT 715 1.5 175 04 1,512 3.2 1,094 2.3

1987 CIT 404 1.2 115 0.3 839 2.4 711 2.0

9 Assets & liabilities of chartered banks ($ millions)

3rd quarter, 1992: assets 4,962 0.8 1,214 0.2 10,720 1.8 7,/14 1.3 liabilities 4,154 0.7 1,159 0.2 8,714 1.4 6,670 1.1

10 Investment ($ millions) (a) total public & private:

preliminary actual 1992 2,743 2.2 519 0.4 3,864 3.1 3,357 2.7 intentions 1993 3,123 2.4 503 0.4 3,837 3.0 3,156 2.4

(b) public:

preliminary actual 1992 783 2.6 171 0.6 1,207 4.0 1,445 4.8

11 Immigrants from outside

Canada (1988-91) 925 0.2 430 0.08 3,640 0.7 1,915 0.4

12 Mother tongue

(single responses, %) 1991:

English 94.033.4 65.4 French98.7 0.4 94.6 4.2 3.8

13 Home language

non-official 0.8 1.1 2.2 1.2

(single responses, %) 1991:

English 96.531.0 68.3 French99.3 0.2 97.4 2.3 2.4

non-official 0.5 0.3 1.1 0.6

14 Seats in House of Commons:

1984 77 3.4 19 11 11 5.0 5.3 10 10 4.5 4.8 1988 3.2 4418

(proposed) 1996 7 3.1 41.8 11 49 10 4.4

15 Popular vote — federal election:

(a) PC % 1984 58 52 5140 54 1988 42 41 41 1993 27 326 6241528 (b) NDP % 1984 1988 12 7 11 14 9 (c) Reform % 1993 1 1 13 9

1993 4 5 7 5

16 Popular vote — last two

provincial elections (%) Apr 20/89 May 29/89 = Sept 6/88 Oct 13/87

NDP 4 NDP 4 NDP 16 NDP 10

PC 48 PC 36 PC 43 PC 28

Lib 47 Lib 60 Lib 40 Lib 61 May 3/93 Mar 29/93 May 25/93 ~— Sept 23/91

NDP 7 NDP 5 NDP 18 NDP 11

PC 42 PC 40 PC 31 PC 21

Lib 49 Lib 55 Lib 51 Lib 47

Ont Man Sask Alta BC Yukon/NWT

Actual % ROC Actual % ROC Actual % ROC Actual % ROC Actual % ROC } Actual % ROC ROC

1,068,580 12.7 649,950 7.7 652,330 7.7 661,190 7.8 947,800 11.2 3,909,770 46.4 8,429,930

10,098 49.3 1,096 5.4 994 49 2,565 12.5 3,305 16.1 84 0.4 20,484

270,463 52.4 23,340 4.5 19,985 3.9 72,168 14.0 84,088 16.3 3,076 0.5 515,804

26,784 21,296 20,106 28,136 25,443 36,619 25,180

149,114 69.4 6,153 2.9 3,530 1.6 19,410 9.0 24,322 16.0 N/A NA 214,881

65,328 70.0 3,060 3.3 1,388 1.5 6,707 7.2 11,682 12.5 35 0.03 93,247 4,628 15.0 1,718 5.6 4460 14.4 13,488 43.6 3,844 12.4 376 1.2 30,893

72,783 74.8 1,800 1.8 1,734 1.8 4,202 4.3 12,435 12.8 1 0.0 97 307

77,411 60.4 3,518 2.7 6,194 4.8 17,690 13.8 16,279 12.7 377 0.2 128,200

68,424 68.9 2,102 2.1 2,/97 2.8 13,838 13.9 7,993 8.0 4 0.0 99 349 26,251 56.0 1,847 3.9 1,531 3.3 5,728 12.2 7,605 16.2 191 0.4 46,845 19,491 55.8 1,148 3.3 924 2.6 6,544 18.7 4,136 11.8 167 0.5 34,952 223,951 37.6 12,284 2.0 9,621 1.6 43,461 7.3 61,018 10.2 931 0.1 595,643 204,051 33.7 13,649 2.6 11,895 2.0 39,183 6.5 57,022 9.4 809 0.1 604,915 59,432 48.0 4,957 4.0 5,710 4.6 19,845 16.0 22,318 18.0 1,004 0.8 123,746 62,502 48.6 5,071 3.9 5.200 4.0 20,375 23.6 23,871 18.6 965 0.7 128,603

14,237 47.0 1,931 6.4 1,622 5.3 3,465 11.4 4,885 16.1 539 1.7 30,286 328,105 65.6 16,110 3.2 4,255 0.8 48,940 9.8 95,025 19.0 200 0.04 499,870

77.5 76.1 85.2 83.5 81.4 66.5 80.2 4.7 4.5 2.0 2.0 1.4 2.6 4.6 17.7 19.4 12.8 14.5 17.2 30.9 15.2 86.0 3.1 88.6 2.2 94.9 0.7 92.2 0.7 90.3 0.4 77.3 1.2 88.3 3.1

10.9 9.1 4.4 7.1 9.3 21.5 8.6

95 45.9 14 6.8 14 6.8 21 10.1 28 13.5 3 1.4 207 99 45.0 14 6.4 14 6.4 26 11.8 32 14.5 3 1.4 220 103 45.6 14 6.2 14 6.2 26 11.5 34 15.0 3.1.3 226

48 44 42 69 47 47 50 38 37 36 52 35 30 40 18 12 11 15 13 6 17 21 28 38 14 35 24 23 21 21 44 17 37 37 23 6 17 2/7 4 16 21 9 20 22 27 52 36 10 26

May 2/85 Mar18/86 Oct 20/86 Mar 20/89 Oct 22/86

NDP 24 NDP 41 NDP 39 NDP 26 NDP 42

PC 37 PC 41 PC 59 PC 45 SC 50 Lib 38 Lib 14 Lib 2 Lib 29 Lib 7

Sept 6/90 Sept 11/90 Oct 21/91 June 15/93 Oct 17/91

NDP 38 NDP 29 NDP 51 NDP 11 NDP 41

PC 24 PC 42 PC 25 PC 45 SC 24

Lib 32 Lib 28 Lib 23 Lib 40 Lib 33

402 Appendix Sources, tables Al and A2: (1) Statistics Canada, Canada Yearbook 1990, table 1.1; (2) Statistics Canada, Postcensual Annual Estimates of Population, table 2; (3) Statistics Canada,

Provincial Economic Accounts: Annual Estimates, 1981-1991, table 1 (Per capita figures are derived from the data in rows 2 and 3a); (4) Statistics Canada, Monthly Survey of Manufacturing, table 10; (5) Statistics Canada, Manufacturing Industries of Canada, tables 5-27; (6) Statistics Canada, Summary of Canadian International Trade, table x-4 (Pri-

mary exports comprise the categories of live animals, inedible crude materials, and food, feed, beverages, and tobacco. Secondary exports comprise inedible fabricated materials, inedible end products, and special transactions); (7) Statistics Canada, Exports: Merchandise Trade, table 3; (8) Revenue Canada, Taxation Statistics, 1992, table 11, and Statistics Canada, Corporation Taxation Statistics, 1987, table 11; (9) Bank of Canada, Bank of Canada Review, Spring 1993, tables C5 and C6 (Percentages do not

add to 100% because the remaining assets and liabilities are international or are attributed to head office); (10) Statistics Canada, Private and Public Investment in Canada: Intentions, tables 7 and 7D; (11) Statistics Canada, Immigration and Citizenship, table 6 (These statistics refer to 20% sample data from 1988-1991. Immigrants from outside Canada refers to persons who resided outside Canada after 1988 but in Canada on 1 June 1991); (12) Statistics Canada, Mother Tongue, table 1 (Mother tongue refers to the

first language used at home in childhood and still understood by the individual. Single responses were 97.3% of all responses in Canada: multiple responses were highest in Manitoba at 3.8%); (13) Statistics Canada, Home Language and Mother Tongue, table 1 (Home language is the language spoken most often at home by the individual.

Single responses were 98.2% of all responses in Canada: multiple responses were highest in the Yukon and NWT at 3.0%); (14) Statistics Canada, Canada Yearbook 1990, table 19.3, and Elections Canada, Redistribution, n.p., n.d., “Representation Formula: Detailed Calculation”; (15) Canada, Chief Electoral Officer, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1984, table 6, 1988, table 6, and Elections Canada, “Percentage of Popular Vote by Province,” unofficial results reported by Media Election Consortium, 28 October 1993; (16) (Newfoundland) Evening Telegram, St John’s, 21 April 1989 and 4 May 1993; (Prince Edward Island) Evening Telegram, 22 April 1986 and 30 May 1989; (Nova

Scotia), Halifax Chronicle Herald, 7 November 1984 and 7 September 1988; (New Brunswick), Halifax Chronicle Herald, 14 October 1987 and Globe and Mail, 24 September 1991; (Ontario), Globe and Mail, 3 May 1985 and 7 September 1990; (Manitoba), Winnipeg Free Press, 19 March 1986 and 12 September 1990; (Saskatchewan), Winnipeg Free Press, 21 October 1986 and 23 October 1991; (Alberta), Calgary Herald, 21 March 1989 and 16 June 1993; (British Columbia), Vancouver Sun, 23 October 1986 and 19 October 1991.

Notes

CHAPTER ONE

1 In fact, Canada would not be entirely discontiguous if Quebec were to separate with its borders intact. On Killinek Island, off the northern tip of Labrador, between Hudson Strait to the west and the Labrador Sea and Davis Strait to the east, the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador meets the Northwest Territories. These two components of Canada share a border on the island that is approximately 8 kilometres long. 2 See the figures in Reid and Snoddon, “Redistribution under Alternative Constitutional Arrangements,” 77-80. Major federal-provincial transfers in 1988 would have cost 5.7% less than they did. 3 Some weakness in these data should be noted. Dating from 1989, they do not reflect rising exports to the United States since the Canada-— U.S. Free Trade Agreement came into effect. As well, some Quebec “exports” to Ontario may be transshipments of goods actually destined for other markets. CHAPTER TWO

1 Some of this ground is covered by the contributions in Simeon and Janigan, Toolkits, 142-81. See also Covell, Thinking about the Rest of Canada.

2 Archer, “The Prairie Perspective,” 249. 3 Usher, “The Design of a Government.”

404 Notes to pages 15-25 4 Boothe, “Constitutional Change,” 40-5. 5 Young, “What Is Good about Provincial Governments?” 6 Covell, Thinking about the Rest of Canada, 13.

7 Kwavnick, “Québécois Nationalism,” 54. 8 Resnick, Toward a Canada-Quebec Union, 53; Resnick, Thinking English

Canada, 85: “What is crucial, however, in thinking English Canada (as opposed to Canada as a whole) is to free ourselves from the bane that Quebec, ever since the Quiet Revolution, has introduced into our political life, namely, the incessant demand for increased provincial power.” 9 See Canada, Shaping Canada’s Future Together, 33-9; Allaire Report, A Québec Free to Choose.

10 Boothe, “Constitutional Change,” 26-7, 42. 11 Harris and Purvis, “Some Economic Aspects of Political Restructuring,” 210. 12 Covell, Thinking about the Rest of Canada, 12.

13 Chambers and Percy, “Natural Resources and the Western Canadian Economy,” 85.

14 From survey results about attitudes towards the various elements of the Charlottetown Accord, Johnston et al. conclude that “the various regions outside Quebec were not at odds with each other” (“The People and the Charlottetown Accord,” 24; emphasis in the original). Another survey probed attitudes towards four central aspects of the Accord: the elected Senate, Native self-government, guaranteed seats for Quebec, and the transfer of power to the provinces. Taking the four regions of ROC - the Atlantic provinces, Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia - the maximum interregional difference in support for these elements was 13%, 14%, 10%, and 9%, respectively. The differences between support in ROC as a whole and in Quebec were 32%, 17%, 41%, and 32% respectively (Gallup, Gallup Report, 24 September 1994). On national identification, see the data reported in chapter 12, below. 15 Gibson, Plan B, 145-56. 16 There would also be the problem of internal regional governance. Chambers and Percy argue that only a unitary regional government would make sense in the West: it “would be unrealistic to presume that the residents of the West would want to replicate a central government with many of the functions held by the current federal government yet on a smaller economic base” (“Structural Characteristics,” 199). 17 Covell, Thinking about the Rest of Canada, 24. 18 For an analysis of various fragmentation possibilities, see Gibson, Plan B, 99-104, 145-56. 19 Whitaker, “Life after Separation,” 74.

405 Notes to pages 25-42 20 Lederman, “The British Parliamentary System,” 37-8. 21 Covell, Thinking about the Rest of Canada, 22. 22, Economic Council, A Joint Venture, table 3-3, and material supplied by

the council. In 1987 Ontario-controlled firms received $20.6 billion in revenues from Quebec and $39.5 billion in revenues from the rest of ROC, while Quebec-controlled firms received $30.3 billion in revenues from Ontario. 23 Leslie, “Options for the Future,” 137-8. 24 On other potential demands, see, for example, Day, “Speaking for Ourselves.” 25 See Young, Faucher, and Blais, “The Concept of Province-building.” CHAPTER THREE

1 Fora critique, on the grounds that this integration limits the scope of government intervention, see Miriam Smith, “Québec-Canada Association.” 2 Jockel, If Canada Breaks Up, 22.

3 Québec, Commission sur l’avenir, Secrétariat, “L’accés du Québec aux marchés extérieurs”; Hartt et al., Tangled Web; and Ritchie et al., Broken Links.

4 Maxwell and Pestieau, Economic Realities, 14. 5 For a good survey of these benefits and of the losses through decentralization and disintegration, see Royal Bank, Unity or Disunity, 9-13. 6 Hartt, “Sovereignty and the Economic Union,” 14-23. 7 Economic Council, A Joint Venture, fig. 3-2; de Mestral “Economic Integration,” 52-3. 8 Québec, Commission sur l’avenir, Secrétariat, “L’accés du Québec aux marchés extérieurs,” 48-50. 9 Economic Council, A Joint Venture, 84-5. 10 Lipsey, Schwanen, and Wonnacott, The NAFTA. 11 Jockel, If Canada Breaks Up, 26-7. 12 Courchene, In Praise of Renewed Federalism, 30-4. 13 Lipsey, “Comments,” 59. 14 The Bélanger-Campeau Commission put much stock in this possibility. See Québec, Commission sur l'avenir, Report, 56-8. CHAPTER FOUR

1 See Leroy, “Les options monétaires.” 2 On “hysteresis,” see Pierre Fortin, “La question de l’emploi,” 216-20, and Scarth, “A Note,” 70-2. 3 See Boothe, “Constitutional Change,” 41: “If economic conditions

406 Notes to pages 42-9 differ across regions, small regions such as western Canada generally get the ‘wrong’ macro policy.” 4 On the importance to sovereigntists of monetary policy as an adjustment mechanism and policy tool, see Leslie, “Equal to Equal,” 17-23.

5 In the Canadian case, see the data in Royal Bank, Unity or Disunity, 42-3. 6 The basic source is Bernard Fortin, “Les options monétaires.” 7 Ibid., 288; Laidler and Robson, Two Nations, One Money? 40-1. 8 Laidler and Robson, Two Nations, One Money? 41-5. 9 Rousseau, “L’intégration politique,” 139-41. 10 Courchene, In Praise of Renewed Federalism, 64-5. 11 Ibid., 61, 65; Lucas, “Comment,” 437. 12 Arguably, the countries’ representation on the bank’s board of directors would make little practical difference. In all likelihood, the governor of the bank would make the important decisions, and there is no reason in principle why this individual could not serve two governments, unless their policy preferences about inflation were widely divergent. Still, the appointment process would raise symbolic problems, as would the perceptions of the publics of Canada and Quebec about the distribution of power over monetary policy. 13 Royal Bank, Unity or Disunity, 14-16. 14 Laidler and Robson, Two Nations, One Money? 34-7. 15 In “The Case for a Single Currency,” for example, Donner and Lazar do not give it any consideration. 16 Québec, Assemblée nationale, Commission d’étude, Les options moneétaires d'un Québec souverain, 6. (“Still, the use of the American

currency by a sovereign Quebec could be contemplated, given the rising commercial and financial exchanges between Quebec and the United States. Moreover, using the American dollar would avoid conflicts with Canada.”) All translations by the author. 17 If the value of the Canadian dollar dropped sharply because of Quebec’s announcement, then Quebecers as well as all Canadians would see their assets shrink, because their Canadian-dollar holdings would take time to convert. Moreover, Canadians’ assets would recover in value if their currency was sustainable. Quebecers would incur a permanent loss. 18 Lucas and Reid, “The Choice of Efficient Monetary Arrangements.” CHAPTER FIVE

1 Resnick, Toward a Canada-Quebec Union, 77-89.

2 See Bergeron, “Projet d’un nouveau Commonwealth,” and Turp, “Réponses,” especially 1083-1115. The latter envisages a joint

407 Notes to pages 49-62 parliamentary conference (with parity in representation), a council of ministers, a secretariat, and a court, as well as a joint central bank. Turp also includes a draft treaty creating the Canada-Quebec economic union. 3. Resnick, Toward a Canada-Quebec Union, 100.

4 See the account of negotiations about the “state treaty” in Young, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia, 13-15.

5 Smiley, “The Association Dimension.” 6 Johnston et al., “The People and the Charlottetown Accord,” 24; Gallup, Gallup Report, 24 September 1992. The first places opposition to the guarantee in ROC at 78%, the second at 72%. 7 Franck, “East African Federation,” 18-19. 8 May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 38-41.

9 Dauphin and Slosar, “Etude des modalités,” 161-72. 10 Monahan and Covello, An Agenda for Constitutional Reform, 108:

“Democratic principles suggest than any common political legislative authority must derive its authority directly from a common electorate. In effect, the only common political legislative authority that is consistent with basic democratic norms is a legislative body which is elected directly by the residents of Québec and the rest of Canada.” 11 Soberman, “European Integration,” 202-3. 12 Courchene, In Praise of Renewed Federalism, 53.

13 Spiro, “The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,” 78. 14 Smiley, “As Options Narrow,” 6. 15 Pentland, “Association after Sovereignty?” 240. CHAPTER SIX

1 Monahan and Covello, An Agenda for Constitutional Reform, 110. 2 Boadway, Purvis, and Wen, “Economic Dimensions,” 18. 3 Murray Smith, “The Quebec Sovereignty Scenario,” 481. 4 Maxwell and Pestieau, Economic Realities, 26.

5 Leslie, “Options for the Future,” 137. 6 Canada, Federal-Provincial Relations Office, Sovereignty-Association, 1. 7 Grady, The Economic Consequences, 144. 8 Courchene, In Praise of Renewed Federalism, 40, 35. This relationship is

sometimes seen as so close that the two separate dimensions of economic and political integration are conflated. So Watts, for example, despite his sophisticated treatments of the whole set of issues, wrote that when federations break down, an “alternative consequence of federal disintegration is the attempt to establish, as a substitute for the federation, an economic union or confederacy” (“The Survival or Disintegration of Federations,” 70).

408 Notes to pages 62-76 9 Parti québécois, La souveraineté: Pourquoi? Comment? 36. (“In becoming sovereign, of course, Quebec will cut the political link with the

federal regime, but in the interest of Quebec and of Canada, many economic links will be maintained.”) 10 Canada, External Affairs, The Canada—U.S. Free Trade Agreement, art. 605.

11 Courchene, In Praise of Renewed Federalism, 35.

12 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.” 13. Loungnarath, “A Comment,” 65. 14 Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation.” See the application of these theories to post-secession Canada-Quebec relations in Pierre Martin,” Association after Sovereignty?” 15 Harris and Purvis, “Some Economic Aspects,” 205-7. Politicians also have short-time horizons, and if the costs are immediate and the benefits are long term, they have little incentive to agree on a more efficient common policy. 16 Breton, “Supplementary Statement,” 495-8. 17 Whalley, “The Impact of Federal Policies.” As Peter Leslie dryly remarked, political union is justified on economic grounds partly on the supposition “that an interventionist state, governed by people no wiser than those we have the habit of electing, is capable of achieving welfare gains beyond those attainable through market integration alone” (Federal State, National Economy, 144). 18 Monahan, Political and Economic Integration, 39-43. 19 Dehem, On the Meaning of “Economic Association,” 2. 20 Courchene, “Toward the Reintegration of Social and Economic Policy.”

21 Norrie, Boadway, and Osberg, “The Constitution and the Social Contract,” 247-8. 22 Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Approaches to National Standards; Monahan, Political and Economic Integration, 19-29.

23 Courchene, “Canada 1992,” 60-2. 24 Such an asymmetry informs Rousseau’s whole treatment of monetary and currency unions. See “L’intégration politique.” CHAPTER SEVEN

1 For federations, the classic source of this approach is Livingston, “A Note on the Nature of Federalism.” See also Stein, “Federal Political Systems and Federal Societies.” 2 Courchene and McDougall, “The Context for Future Constitutional Options”; Courchene, “Staatsnation vs Kulturnation,” 2-7. 3 Whitaker, “Life after Separation.” See also Ian Stewart’s remarks in

409 Notes to pages 76-84 Simeon and Janigan, Toolkits, 160-2: the former clerk of the privy council outlined a “prescriptive mythology” that would define factors supportive of a more centralized federation than many others envisage. 4 For an effort along these lines, see Gibbins, “Speculations on a Canada without Quebec.” In Courchene’s words, these are efforts to discern “the impact of the hole on the parts” (“Staatsnation vs Kulturnation,” 2). 5 Lemco, Political Stability, 17. 6 Watts, New Federations and “The Survival or Disintegration of Federations”; Hicks, Federalism; Lemco, Political Stability. 7 Watts, New Federations, 41-92, and “The Survival or Disintegration of Federations.” 8 Leslie, “The Fiscal Crisis,” table 7. 9 Chambers and Percy, Western Canada, 21-44, 69-72. 10 Taylor, “Shared and Divergent Values,” 54-8. See also McRoberts, English Canada and Quebec, 53.

11 May and Rowlands, “Atlantic Canada,” 16-34, 43-6. These authors present scenarios for Newfoundland of net transfers being eliminated; real GDP would drop 40% by the year 2000, and either unemployment or outmigration would be massive. 12 Bickerton, “Alternative Futures,” 16-21. 13 See McRoberts’s ingenious analysis of the 7 July 1992 constitutional agreement reached before the Quebec government entered the negotiations (“Disagreeing on Fundamentals,” 250-2). 14 Courchene, “What Does Ontario Want?” 15 Hicks, Federalism, 14; Franck, “Why Federations Fail,” 173-4. 16 Dasko, “The Ties That Bound,” 8. Direct questions about national and provincial identification are intrusive, and the responses vary with the form of the question posed. See the data reported in chapter 12. 17 Vernon, “The Federal Citizen.” 18 Gibbins, “Speculations on a Canada without Quebec,” 270. 19 Gibson, Plan B, 177-8. See also 204: “A central Parliament with real initiative is an appropriate instrument for a people who wish to do things together — a people who have an agenda, visions, and mutual goals that require proactive efforts by a centre that is larger than the constituent states. On the other hand, if our agendas, visions, and mutual goals as Canadians can be largely achieved in our own provinces, with the help of a central service organization, then a completely different structure is required.” 20 Léon Dion, “Pour sortir de l’impasse constitutionnelle,” 277. 21 Coleman, Business and Politics, 240-8. 22 Berger, “Quebec’s Rendezvous with Independence,” 318. 23 Wood, “Secession,” 132.

410 Notes to pages 90-6 CHAPTER EIGHT

1 Compare Stéphane Dion, “Why is Secession Rare?” with Léon Dion, Nationalismes et politique au Québec. 2 Covell, Thinking about the Rest of Canada, 8. 3 Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, especially 74-97.

4 Stéphane Dion, “Why Is Secession Rare?” 5 Wood, “Secession,” 109. 6 Bookman, The Economics of Secession, 37-41.

7 Michael Atkinson, “Public Policy and the New Institutionalism.” 8 For an application to federalism in Canada, see Cairns, “The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism”; more generally, see Young, “Tectonic Policies and Political Competition.” CHAPTER NINE

1 Buchanan, Secession; Buchheit, Secession.

2 McNaught, “A Ghost at the Banquet: Could Quebec Secede Peacefully?”; Morton, “The Canadian Security Dimension,” 69-75;

Remapped. ,

Bercuson and Cooper, Deconfederation, esp. 148-56; Reid, Canada

3 Latouche, “Le Québec est bien petit et le monde, bien grand”; Parti québécois, Le Québec dans un monde nouveau; Pierre Fortin, “How Economics Is Shaping the Constitutional Debate”; Proulx, “L’évolution de l’espace économique”; Young, “Does Globalization Make an Independent Quebec More Viable?” 4 Economic Council, A Joint Venture, 115-18.

5 Ibid., 90. 6 Ibid., 90-1. 7 Grady, The Economic Consequences, table 37, 160. 8 Pierre Fortin, “Le passage a la souveraineteée,” 452-3.

9 Québec, Commission sur l’avenir, Secrétariat, “Analyse pro forma des finances publiques,” 393-566. 10 Economic Council, A Joint Venture, 84—5. 11 McCallum, Canada’s Choice, app., 39-42.

12 Sucha program might consist of a 15% increase in all taxes, a 10% cut in all transfer payments, a 15% reduction in public- and para-public-sector salaries, and a 5% cut in government employment (McCallum and Green, Parting as Friends, 45-9). 13 Cété, “Souveraineté,” 28-33, 35. 14 Pierre Fortin, “Le passage a la souveraineté.” And the consequence is that “bref, le ‘party de l’indépendence’ devrait étre limité a une seule nuit et il faudrait avoir, au prélable, envoyé en détention préventive les politiciens patriotards portés sur la dépense somptuaire” (458).

411 Notes to pages 96-101 (In short, the independence celebration had better be limited to one night, and beforehand it would be best to send to preventative detention any super-patriotic politicians inclined to extravagant spending.) 15 Economic Council, A Joint Venture, 85-6. 16 Royal Bank, Unity or Disunity, 23. This study includes a useful chart of the factors taken into account in other analyses (table 8). 17 Raynauld, “Les enjeux économiques de la souveraineté,” 44-7. 18 McCallum and Green, Parting as Friends, app. A, 69. 19 Ibid., table A-2, 70. 20 The author’s calculations using Economic Council estimates from A Joint Venture, 85.

21 Royal Bank, Unity or Disunity, 23. 22 Ibid., table 6. 23 Ibid., 28. 24 Grady, The Economic Consequences, table 37, 160. 25 Pierre Fortin, “A Comment,” 87. Grady presents an “apocalypse scenario.” 26 Coété, “Souveraineté.” 27 McCallum and Green, Parting as Friends, 50-55 and app.B. 28 See the comments by Poleése, Fortin, Vaillancourt, and Proulx in ibid. 29 Courchene, In Praise of Renewed Federalism, 58; Bouchard, Un nouveau parti, 77-83. 30 Mansell and Schlenker, “Regional Analysis of Fiscal Balances,” 249. 31 Royal Bank, Unity or Disunity, 28. 32 See Association des économistes québécois, “Mémoire a la Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec,” 17-20. 33. Whitaker, “Quebec’s Right to National Self-Determination,” paper for the Community Membership Seminar, 12 September 1991, 10-13, as summarized in Monahan and Covello, An Agenda for Constitutional Reform, 90-1.

34 Turp argues, to the contrary, that a referendum could “in itself constitute a mechanism for amending the constitution” (“Quebec’s Democratic Right,” 107). Presumably, this would involve a popular consultation on a direct question such as “Are you in favour of Quebec becoming a sovereign state on 24 June 1996?” But whatever the question, to recognize the result as self-executing would require a decision by the Supreme Court that the constitution can be amended by unconstitutional means, which seems unlikely. 35 A brief synopsis of these options is found in Québec, Assemblée nationale, Commission d’étude, “La déclaration de souveraineté.” 36 Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 36.

37 Leslie, “Options for the Future of Canada,” 132. Leslie argues that probably the federal authorities would lose the capacity to govern,

412 Notes to pages 101-4 the constitution would sooner or later become inoperative, and the various “Humpty-Dumpty” options (of sovereignty-association, a confederacy, or reconfederation) would quickly prove to be impossible. However, this analysis drastically telescopes the process of the transition and conflates a UDI with any declaration of intent to secede: these are very different. 38 The basic sources are Brossard, L’accession a la souveraineté; Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 33-66; Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession; Beaudoin and Vallée, “La reconnaissance internationale”; Turp, “Le droit a la sécession”, Woehrling, “Les aspects juridiques”; and Bernier, “Le maintien de l’accés aux marchés.” 39 Scott, “Secession or Reform?” 156. 40 Brossard, L’accession a la souveraineté, 182-3.

41 Hence, Brossard contends that only Quebec francophones, bearers of the rights of the “people,” could participate in a decision to accede to sovereignty. He then suggests that Quebec francophones might expressly consent to non-members of the people participating in the collective decision (L’accession a la souveraineté, 182-5, 305). A further problem is that secession is difficult to justify when the criteria

defining the people are only linguistic and cultural (see Buchanan, Secession, 52-64, esp. 61).

42 Turp, “Le droit a la sécession,” 55. (“The will to live together contributes even more to affirming the status of a people.”) 43 Turp, “Quebec’s Democratic Right,” 108-9. 44 Quebec, National Assembly, Bill 150, 3. 45 Progressive Conservative Party, Resolution Guide, 59, resolution 244. Note that this resolution referred to the right to self-determination of Quebec men and women, not of “Quebec.” 46 Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession, 20.

47 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, cited in Turp, “Quebec’s Democratic Right,” 109. Note how Bill 150 echoed this phrasing. 48 Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession, 16-17. See also Turp, “Quebec’s Democratic Right,” 112-13. 49 Brossard, L’accession a la souveraineté, 225-6.

50 Turp, “Le droit a la sécession,” 58. (“What is more, a refusal to act according to the constitutional convention authorizing Quebec to accede to sovereignty would be a grave violation of democratic principles, and would permit the conclusion that the Canadian state was violating the right to self-determination of Quebec; as a result of this the Quebec people possess a right to self-determination in the international sphere, including the right to secession, and this would

413 Notes to pages 104-8 conform with the United Nations Charter as amplified by the Declaration concerning Friendly Relations.”) See also Turp, “Quebec’s Democratic Right,” 114. 51 Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession, 9. 52 Monahan and Costello, An Agenda for Constitutional Reform, 98. 53 Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession, 5-6; Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 43-5. Note, though, that while

recognition of other states is strictly an executive prerogative of the federal government, the implementation of treaties or agreements with any state requires provincial legislation when they require action in areas of provincial jurisdiction. As well, recognition of Quebec by Ottawa arguably would violate the common-law rule that government cannot override the constitution. Recognition could alter Quebec’s status as a province under the Constitution Acts. The federal government could, however, grant conditional recognition. 54 Islam, “Secessionist Self-Determination.” 55 Buchheit, Secession, 216-45 and app. 2. 56 Morton, “Reflections on the Breakup”, 97. 57 Beaudoin and Vallée, “La reconnaissance internationale,” 198. (“More than any other state, France, the historic leader of the francophone world and permanent member of the Security Council, would have the legitimacy and weight to begin, when the time comes, the process of international recognition of Quebec, and to help the process gain irreversible momentum.”) 58 Toy, “Vive le Canada uni.” 59 Lemco, “American interests,” 13-15. 60 Jockel, “The USA Reaction,” 144. 61 Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession, 45-6.

62 Beaudoin and Vallée, “La reconnaissance internationale,” 181. 63 Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 43. 64 The normative component of his argument — that Quebec's “revolution” should be suppressed — is a separate matter. 65 Turp, “Le droit a la sécession,” 59. (“Faced with the desire of peoples for freedom, the law has never been a decisive obstacle.”) 66 Quebec, Commission sur l’avenir, Report, 52-3.

67 McNaught, “A Ghost at the Banquet.” . 68 See, for instance, Coon-Come, “The Crees,” 11-12; Globe and Mail, 31 July 1991; and Globe and Mail, 12 February 1992, reporting the appearance of Ovide Mercredi, grand chief of the Assembly of First Nations, before the Quebec National Assembly Committee on accession to sovereignty. In a Washington speech Chief Coon-Come stated, “We Cree do intend to make our own choice, to assert a right of self-determination at least equal to that claimed by Quebec. The establishment of an independent Quebec through the process they

414 Notes to pages 108-13 describe will entail violations of our basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. Among these violations are denial of our nationality, denial of our right of self-determination as people, unilateral abrogation of our treaty rights, and the imposition of a new international border between us and our brethren in the rest of Canada” (London Free Press, 1 October 1994). 69 Globe and Mail, 15 October 1994. 70 Coon-Come, “The Crees,” 11.

71 Morse, “Comparative Assessments of Indigenous Peoples.” 72 Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 60-4.

73 Buchanan, “Quebec Secession and Native Territorial Rights,” 2-4. See also Turpel, “Does the Road to Quebec Sovereignty Run through Aboriginal Territory?” 99. 74 Bercuson and Cooper, Deconfederation, 147-56. 75 Franck et al., “L’intégrité territoriale,” 444-5. 76 Monahan, Cooler Heads Shall Prevail, 28-33. 77 McNeil, “Aboriginal Nations,” esp. 109, 115, 260-1n35, and 266-7n70. 78 Turp, “Quebec’s Democratic Right,” 116-21, esp. 120. 79 Reid, Canada Remapped. 80 Woehrling, “La protection des droits,” 144. But they might not (see Parti québécois, Programme, 163-6). 81 Emanueli, “L’accession du Québec,” 110-13. 82 Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession, 26-9. It should be

noted that under the existing section 6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, non-resident citizens, like others, have the right to enter, remain in, and leave Canada, and also to take up residence and pursue a livelihood in any province. 83 Ibid., 42-3. 84 Ibid., 44-8. See also Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 64-6.

85 Ibid., 33. 86 Bernier, “Le maintien de l’accés aux marchés,” 2-3. 87 Ibid., 4; Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession, 41-2. 88 Canada, North American Free Trade Agreement: An Overview, vi.

89 Ibid., 19. 90 Canada, North American Free Trade Agreement; art.2204(1), art.2001(4).

91 Scenario painting may also carry the implicit message that the truth can lie only between the two extremes (see Pierre Fortin, “The Threat of Quebec Sovereignty,” 388-9). 92 Simeon, “Scenarios for Separation.” 93 Ibid., 192. 94 Ibid., 189. 95 Turp, “Quebec’s Democratic Right,” 114-15, 120-1. 96 See Watts, “Survival or Disintegration,” 55: “In practice it has proved difficult to work out a peaceful and rationally negotiated secession or

415 Notes to pages 113-20 disengagement of a unit from a federation. A federation which has been in existence for any length of time builds up many internal links and with them vested interests which have a large and emotional stake in their continuation. In addition, the confrontations and controversies which lead to the contemplation of secession inevitably generate a mounting frenzy of emotional responses with a momentum of their own, stirring up resentments and hatreds which make a coolly negotiated separation very difficult.” 97 Young, “National Identification in English Canada,” 83. 98 Bell, “Getting to the Table,” 52-5. 99 Simeon, “Scenarios for Separation,” 197. 100 Boothe and Harris, “Alternative Divisions of Federal Assets,” 453-73; Jordan, “Sharing the Seaway System.” 101 Banting, “If Quebec Separates,” 167. 102 Ibid., 168. 103 Ibid., 169. 104 Bercuson and Cooper, Deconfederation, 141, 161-2. 105 Ibid., 147. The Quebec MPs would “immediately be eligible to receive their generous parliamentary pensions” (147). 106 Ibid., 147-56, 161-70. 107 Lemco, Turmoil in the Peaceable Kingdom, 55. 108 Ibid., 126, 131, 137, 168-9. 109 Parti québécois, Programme, 18. (“The act of birth of the sovereign Quebec.”) 110 Parti québécois, La Souwveraineté: Pourquoi? Comment?, 16, 19-33. 111 Ibid., 34. 112 Parti québécois, Le Québec dans un monde nouveau, 64-5, 79-84, 80:

“En ces matiéres, l’intérét du Québec et du Canada coincide tout a fait.” (In these matters, the interests of Quebec and Canada coincide perfectly.) 113 Quebec, Commission sur l'avenir, Report, 54. 114 This is not true of the whole exercise. Some members of the

commission refused to sign the report, or did so only with addenda attached (see especially those of Charles-Albert Poissant and André Ouellet). Neither is it true of all the experts consulted by the commission (see the presentations of Bernard, Courchene, Dion, Fortin, Latouche, Lemieux, Polése, Robertson, Taylor, and Watts, in Québec, Commission sur l’avenir, Les avis des spécialistes). 115 Quebec, National Assembly, Commission d’étude, Draft Report, 104-5. See also 7-8, 137. 116 Ibid., 63. 117 Ibid., 64. 118 Lamont, Breakup, 172. 119 Ibid., 149-225. 120 Granatstein, “Canada, Quebec and the World,” 103-6.

416 Notes to pages 120-9 121 Lamont, Breakup, 26.

122 Ibid., 244. It is worth noting that the initial hard-cover print run of this book was 14,000 copies. 123 Monahan, Cooler Heads Shall Prevail, 3. 124 Ibid., 20. 125 Ibid., 30.

126 Gibson, Plan B. In line with this effort, the author’s populist convictions are evident throughout the work. He claims, for example, that “the gatekeepers to reform are those in charge of our governments, and they are mostly against change,” and that “’Ottawa’ is a set of specific interests that are paid for by all Canadians, but really work for themselves” (ibid., 6, 22). 127 Ibid., 114-19.

| 128 Ibid., 181. 129 Ibid., 133. In this fundamental rethinking, citizens will appreciate that “Canada” is not “Ottawa” (191). For Gibson, the foe is precisely Ottawa, “the whole system of power and control and networks that has not only run this country but believes it is uniquely qualified to do so” (144n6) 130 Ibid., 167-70. 131 Ibid., 186. 132 Ibid., 196-204. 133 Covell, Thinking about the Rest of Canada, 10. 134 Ibid., 11. 135 Monahan and Covello, An Agenda for Constitutional Reform, 99. 136 Ibid., 100. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid., 100-4. 139 Thorburn, “Disengagement.” 140 Ibid., 208. 141 Ibid., 204. CHAPTER TEN

1 Young, “How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?” Canadian Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4 (1994): 773-92. 2 Young, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia, Research Paper no. 32 (Kingston:

Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1994). 3 Watts, “Survival or Disintegration,” and Nafziger and Richter, “Biafra and Bangladesh.” 4 Bookman, The Economics of Secession, 31-4, table 1.2. Only one-third of the secessionist movements analysed here were peaceful. 5 Lindgren, Norway-Sweden, 133-4.

417 Notes to pages 139-44 CHAPTER ELEVEN

1 The best general account is Russell, Constitutional Odyssey. 2 Monahan, Meech Lake. 3 McRoberts and Monahan, The Charlottetown Accord.

4 Cairns, “The Charter, Interest Groups, Executive Federalism,” 20. 5 In the wake of the PQ victory, a Southam—Angus Reid poll found 33% choosing national unity as the country’s most pressing problem, almost matching the proportion choosing “jobs” (London Free Press, 5 October 1994).

6 Adams and Lennon, “The Public’s View of the Canadian Federation,” fig. 5.3.

7 Stéphane Dion, “The Importance of the Language Issue.” 8 Quebec, Ministére des finances, 1993-94 Budget, tables B.a.3, c.13, and c.14.

9 Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche, Le Virage, 31-73. 10 Johnston, et al., “The People and the Charlottetown Accord,” 35. 11 Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche, Le Virage, 169. 12 Pinard, “The Secessionist Option,” 2. Between 1980 and 1989, support for sovereignty-association ranged between 36% and 42%, but it rose to 60% in 1990 (Pinard, “The Dramatic Reemergence,” table 2).

13 Stéphane Dion, “Why Is Secession Rare?” 12. 14 Pinard, “The Dramatic Reemergence,” 487-8; Nemni, Canada in Crisis, 15-18.

15 Pinard, “The Secessionist Option,” 2, reporting results from a CROP survey. See also Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche, Le virage, 45, and Pinard, “The Dramatic Reemergence,” 481-2. 16 Johnston et al., “The People and the Charlottetown Accord,” 42-3 n20.

17 Blais and Nadeau, “To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist,” 96. 18 Pinard, “The Secessionist Option,” 4. 19 Blais, Créte, and Lachapelle, “L’élection québécois de 1985,” table 3. Again, the form of the poll question can be important. Even thinking more concretely about casting a ballot can diminish support. Questions asking how people would vote in a referendum show about 5% less support for sovereignty than questions asking about general attitudes towards this constitutional option (Blais, “Will Quebec Secede?”). 20 Cairns, “The Politics of Constitutional Renewal in Canada,” 135. 21 Globe and Mail, 5 October 1994. 22 Reform Party of Canada, Blue Sheet. 23 Archer and Ellis, “Opinion Structure of Party Activists,” 297.

418 Notes to pages 145-51 24 Laycock, “Reforming Canadian Democracy,” 226. 25 Mr Manning’s initial speech in the House of Commons failed to mention the constitution at all (Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 19 January 1994, 45-7). In contrast, his speech to the Reform convention in October 1994 was built around the theme of a New Canada that would provide a “third option” between separatism and status quo federalism (Manning, “A New and Better Home for Canadians,” 4-11). See also Simpson Faultlines, 123-6. 26 Globe and Mail, 19 October 1994. 27 Blais, “Quebec: Raising the Stakes,” 10-12. 28 Fournier, Autopsie du lac Meech, 201-2; Bourgault, Now or Never! 58, 93-9. 29 Manning, “A New and Better Home for Canadians,” 9-10. 30 Bourgault, Now or Never! 127-32. 31 Quebec, Commission sur l’avenir, Report, 86. 32 Mr Bouchard has called this a “quasi-unanimous repudiation by the Quebec National Assembly” (Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 19 January 1994, 35).

compromis.” ,

33 Blais and Créte, “Pourquoi l’opinion publique au Canada.” 34 Fortin, “The Threat of Quebec Sovereignty”; Imbeau, “Le

35 Whitaker, “The Dog That Never Barked,” 109. 36 “Le Canada dans le peau,” 21-8. 37 Blais and Nadeau, “To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist,” 95-6. 38 See Simpson, Faultlines, 303-4. 39 The strategies and outcomes here have been explored more comprehensively in Young, “The Political Economy of Secession.” 40 Cairns, “Constitutional Change and the Three Equalities,” 95. 41 Globe and Mail, 26 and 27 May 1994, 17 May 1994. 42 Parti québécois, La Souveraineté: Pourquoi? Comment? 35. (“Asa strategy, federal politicians might be tempted to say now that they will not negotiate, in order to dissuade Quebecers from supporting sovereignty. But when the event occurs they will change their _ attitude, because of political and economic realities.”) See also Tremblay, “Constitutional Political Economy,” 77-8: “Here again, it is necessary to distinguish statements and actions before and after secession. It could indeed be good tactics for some politicians and opinion leaders in English Canada to engage in some posturing to influence the issue for an eventual sovereignty referendum in Quebec ... Threatened political empires always resort to intimidation to preserve their hegemony ... Yet since Toronto —- and Ontario in general — is the hub of interregional corporate, commercial, financial, and banking activities, east and west of the Ottawa River, sucha dismantling of the common market and monetary union would clearly be a case of shooting oneself in the foot!”

419 Notes to pages 151-6 43 André Blais has argued that any entry of Aboriginal issues into the referendum debate would increase support for sovereignty (“Will Quebec Secede?”). For an analysis of why Quebecers are so sensitive to this issue, see Young, “Aboriginal Inherent Rights,” 37-41. 44 Young, “Le Canada hors Québec: Voudrait-il cooperer?” More generally, see Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation.

45 Julius Grey, “Winning Quebec for Canada,” 21. 46 Referendums in Slovenia, Croatia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia found over 70% of voters favouring sovereignty. See Lukic, “Twilight of the Federations,” 581-2. 47 Reform Party of Canada, Blue Sheet, 3. 48 Reid, Canada Remapped, 67-100. 49 Maclean’s/Decima Poll, “Cross-Canada Opinions,” 66. When the question asked, however, was whether force by Canada was acceptable “to protect its interests in Quebec,” the figure then rose to 35%.

50 Latouche, “Canada: The New Country,” 332. 51 Preston Manning has stated that Mr Chrétien would have to resign after a Yes vote, because of his failure to defend the status quo successfully, and because he would be in a conflict of interest (Le Devoir, 26 May 1994).

52 Robertson, “The Atlantic Provinces,” 116-17; Gibson, Plan B, 117-19. 53 Bouchard, Un nouveau parti, 92-5, 117-20. 54 Globe and Mail, 16 September 1994. 55 Arecent poll found that “if Quebec became a sovereign state” 27% of Quebecers thought it would not issue passports, 20% thought they would still elect MPs, 31% thought Quebec would still be part of Canada, and 40% thought they would keep their Canadian citizenship (Globe and Mail, 3 June 1994). 56 The poll asked, “If Quebec decided to separate, do you think the rest of Canada should do everything it can to convince them to stay, or just let them go?” In ROC, 49% chose the first option, while 50% favoured letting “them” go (Maclean’s/Decima Poll, “Cross-Canada Opinions,” 65). 57 In 1994, 64% were in favour of transferring powers to all provinces in order to keep Quebec in the federation, but only 17% would extend special status to Quebec for the same end (Maclean’s/Decima Poll, “In Search of Unity,” 19). See also the Globe and Mail, 22 April 1991: 76% of respondents in ROC opposed special powers for Quebec, even “if that’s what it takes to keep Quebec within Canada.” As for the decentralization of powers, it should be noted that while 55% of people in ROC favoured the Charlottetown Accord proposal to transfer powers to the provinces, this was in the context of a much larger package, and 27% still opposed this very modest transfer of jurisdiction (Gallup Canada, Gallup Report, 24 September 1992).

420 Notes to pages 157-68 58 Lloyd Atkinson, “A Comment,” 53. 59 Bank of Canada, Bank of Canada Review, Winter 1993-1994, tables F1, F7, and G6. This assumes gross new bond issues of $50.04 billion, as they were in 1993. 60 Whitaker, “Life after Separation.” 61 Well over 90% of Canadians consider the U.S. health care system to be inferior: Gallup Canada, Gallup Report, 13 September 1993. 62 Maclean’s/CTV Poll, “Voices of Canada,” 44. See also Maclean’s/CTV Poll, “How We Differ,” 11: in late 1993 a survey question asked whether respondents agreed with the statement that “Canada would not be any worse off it became part of the United States.” In no province in ROC did more than 29% agree with the statement. The percentage agreeing was particularly low in the western provinces, where it ranged from 11% to 20% 63 Young, “National Identification in English Canada.” 64 Dasko, “The Ties That Bound,” 8. 65 Gallup Canada, Gallup Report, 13 August 1991. 66 Ibid., 2 December 1993. 67 Maclean’s/CTV poll, “How We Differ,” 11. 68 Maclean’s/Decima Poll, “In Search of Unity,” 18. 69 Canada, Statutes, 1988, ch. 29, s. 3. 70 Ibid., part 2. 71 Ibid., s. 25 (3). 72 Asa province of Canada still, Quebec could also avail itself of the “Aid of the Civil Power” provisions in the National Defence Act. When riot or disturbance occurs or is thought likely, this permits the attorney general of a province to “require” that the Canadian forces be called out on service. The Act leaves some discretion to the chief of the defence staff about the nature of the response, but stipulates that he “shall” call out the forces he thinks necessary to suppress or prevent riots or disturbances (Canada, Revised Statutes, ch. N-5, ss. 274-85). 73 Gibson, Plan B, 37. 74 Monahan and Covello, An Agenda for Constitutional Reform, 118. The

group took this position despite their erroneous view that Ontario’s economic links with Quebec outweigh those with the other eight provinces (116).

75 Non-MPs have served on parliamentary committees in the past as non-voting members but with full rights to speak and to question witnesses. Ministers have also sat on them, as voting members (See Fraser, Dawson, and Holtby, Beauchesne’s Rules, 224).

76 Brown, “The Evolving Role of the Provinces.” 77 Richards, “The Canadian Constitution and International Economic Relations.”

421 Notes to pages 172-82 78 As Fry puts it, the “strategic-military implications of an independent Quebec for the United States are presently quite minor, and the North American relationship would continue to be relatively secure with or without a new nation along the 49th parallel” (Canada’s Unity Crisis, 3).

79 Lamont, Breakup, 230-7. The author portrays American policy makers as torn by a request from some province to join the union. On the one hand, they would not want to fragment the rest of Canada, absorb people difficult to assimilate, upset the domestic political balance, or take on a financial burden; on the other hand, there are the defence benefits and the resources, especially water: they opt for admission. 80 Jockel notes that “the ability of the United States to substitute its forces for Canada’s, if need be, is very great”; that is, the United States could insist on access to Canada and Quebec if the Canadian Armed Forces could not fulfil their defence obligations (“The USA Reaction,” 146). 81 Wonnacott, “Reconstructing North American Free Trade,” especially 31-8 on the Auto Pact.

82 Jockel claims it would be “astonishing” if the USA did not favour extending the trade agreement to a sovereign Quebec (If Canada Breaks Up, 24). CHAPTER TWELVE

1 As the Parti québécois will repeat during the referendum campaign, “En ces matiéres, l’intérét du Québec et du Canada coincide tout a fait” (In these matters, the interests of Quebec and Canada coincide perfectly). See Parti québécois, Le Québec dans un monde nouveau, 80.

2 Sometimes this fact is ignored in English Canada too. Daniel Drache, for example, strictly identifies noncooperation between Canada and Quebec with revenge (“Negotiating with Québec,” 20).

3 Gibson, Plan B, 111 (Emphasis in original). | 4 Haydon, “General Security Analysis of the Scenarios,” 29. 5 Canada, Revised Statutes, chapter N-5, sections 14, 20, 23; Canada, Department of National Defence, The Queen’s Regulations and Orders, article 6.04.

6 Russell, “The End of Mega Constitutional Politics,” 218. 7 Reid, Canada Remapped, 3, citing a June 1991 Angus Reid poll that found 82% of Quebecers opposed to territorial partition. 8 Montreal Gazette, 19 May 1994. For Mr. Irwin’s comments, see the Globe and Mail, 18 May 1994. 9 Bercuson and Cooper, Deconfederation, 148-53; Reid, Canada Remapped, 37-66.

10 McRoberts, “Protecting the Rights,” 184-5.

422 Notes to pages 184-200 11 Boothe, Johnston, and Powys-Lybbe, “Dismantling Confederation,” 30-6. 12 Ibid., tables 3, 5, 6.

13 Parizeau, “What Does Sovereignty Association Mean?” Notes for a speech to a joint meeting of the Empire Club of Canada and the Canadian Club, Toronto, 11 December 1990, 10, cited in Grady, The National Debt, 8.

14 Boothe and Harris, “Alternative Divisions,” 462-6. 15 Chant, “Dividing the Debt,” 90. 16 Monahan, Cooler Heads Shall Prevail, 49-50. 17 Canada, Treasury Board, Directory of Federal Real Property; Canada, Task Force on Program Review, Real Property.

18 Some of the difficulties in this approach are described in Ip and Robson, “Liquidating the Federal Balance Sheet.” 19 Parti québécois, Le Québec dans un monde nouveau, 69-70, 83. 20 Quebec, Commission d’étude, Draft Report, 12. 21 Canada, Citizenship Act, ss. 3, 8. Note that under this legislation,

people born outside Canada to Canadian citizens can opt to remain Canadian, before reaching the age of 28, only upon making an application to do so and either residing in Canada for a year before applying or establishing “a substantial connection with Canada.” 22 Turpel, “The Charlottetown Discord,” 142. 23 Parti québécois, Programme, 29-33. 24 Globe and Mail, 19 October 1994.

25 ACOMPAS poll found 81% of ROC respondents agreeing that Quebec Aboriginals should have the right to determine their future by referendum (Financial Post, 26 June 1994). Generally, though, support for Aboriginal rights may be broad but shallow in English Canada. In ROC, the percentage endorsing the Charlottetown Accord provisions about Native self-government was lower, at 55%, than the proportions supporting an elected Senate (82%) and stronger economic ties within Canada (82%). See Gallup Canada, Gallup Report, 24 September 1992. 26 See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 216-17, on the divisibility of

the crown and the Alberta Indians case. 27 Parti québécois, Le Québec dans un monde nouveau, 67. 28 McRoberts, “Protecting the Rights,” 186-8.

29 In ROC there is much stronger mass support for anglophone rights in Quebec than for francophone rights elsewhere. See Sniderman et al., “Political Culture and the Problem of Double Standards,” 263-9. 30 Bland, “Defence North of the 49th Parallel,” 211. 31 Lemco, Turmoil in the Peaceable Kingdom, 159.

32 Dauphin and Slosar note these problems and conclude that a customs union is the most that could be negotiated during the transition (“Etude des modalités,” 172-6).

423 Notes to pages 200-16 33 This sentiment is not found only in the West. Pierre Martin has analysed polls that investigated attitudes towards post-secession economic association. The responses vary according to the precise question posed and the range of possible response options; generally, though, a consistent 21-24% in ROC opposed any association. About 50-60% favoured a close or loose association. An Angus Reid poll in June 1994, however, found 52% opposed to a formal economic union. These opinions are therefore volatile, and they are also strongly related to the view that Quebec would lose economically from sovereignty and that it would lose more than Canada. See Martin, “Association after Sovereignty?” tables 1, 2. 34 La Presse, 3 December 1993. (“One mustn’t dream and ask for the moon ... So, already not very happy that Quebec is becoming sovereign, these English Canadians, because of our pretty face, in order to make us happy, or to vaguely imitate what some people think is happening in Western Europe, would agree to turn their political system upside down — they, who have always refused to give Quebec the tiniest extra power, and who believe that the equality of the provinces is a sacred principle.”) See also the Globe and Mail, 20 May 1994. 35 Informetrica, Financial Sector: Deposit-Taking Institutions.

36 For a comprehensive treatment of legal problems in this sector and of the advantages of mutual recognition, see Coulombe, “La souveraineté du Québec et les institutions financiéres.” 37 Informetrica, Supply Management: Dairy, 15.

38 Quebec is a net exporter of poultry and an importer of eggs (Informetrica, Supply Management: Poultry and Eggs).

39 Howitt, “Constitutional Reform and the Bank of Canada,” 403-7. 40 Canada, Federal-Provincial Committee, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Gouvernement du Québec.

41 Canada, Employment and Immigration Canada, Canada-Québec Accord.

42 Informetrica, Registered Pension Plans, 11. CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1 See Hogg, Constitutional Law, 51-77. 2 For an argument to the contrary, see Hogg, Constitutional Law, 102-3 and note 109. 3 Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 6. 4 Hogg, Constitutional Law 66, 186. See also note 56 and references cited therein.

5 The argument turns on what is “an amendment to the Constitution of Canada,” the wording that introduces both sections 38 and 41 of CA1982. The constitution is defined in section 52(2) of CA1982 to

424 Notes to pages 216-21 include the Constitution Acts, the Acts and orders listed in the schedule to CA1982, and amendments to the above. Hogg considers this list to be exhaustive, despite the schedule not including many Acts and orders commonly thought to be part of the constitution, because there must be some defined limit on what is the supreme law of the land, entrenched in the constitution and alterable only through the amendment process. The Supreme Court Act is not listed in the schedule, so Hogg concludes that it is amendable by the federal Parliament alone. But this seems wrong. As Hogg recognizes, the definition of the constitution in section 52(2) uses the term “includes,” which implies non-exhaustiveness. As well, section 55, which provides for the translation of the instruments in the schedule, states that a “French version of the portions of the Constitution referred to in the schedule shall be prepared” (emphasis added). 6 Banting and Simeon, “Introduction,” 20. 7 These will be inflammatory matters. See Hodgins, “The Northern Boundary of Quebec,” 148: Quebec could not assume full jurisdiction over its northern lands and Aboriginal peoples without Canada’s “cowardly connivance.” 8 Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 8-32. 9 But see Hogg, Constitutional Law 102: there is no statement in the

constitution that the union cannot be dissolved, “but the absence of any provisions in the Constitution authorizing secession makes clear that no unilateral secession is possible.” 10 Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 11. 11 Ibid., 13. 12 Reesor, The Canadian Constitution, 382-5. 13 Finkelstein and Vegh, The Separation of Quebec, 26. If the amendments

were so sweeping as effectively to terminate the fiduciary relationship between the crown and some Aboriginal peoples, the courts might rule that this could not be accomplished without both consultation and consent. 14 Legal arguments on these matters have continued. The main case concerns the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC), which went to court during the consultations leading to the Charlottetown Accord, seeking an order to bar further federal-government disbursements to the four national Native organizations until NWAC received equal funding, and also to require that NWAC be admitted to the constitutional review process. The main grounds were freedom of speech and gender equality, under sections 2(b) and 28 of CA1982. The arguments were that the four major Aboriginal organizations discriminated against women and were advocating that the Charter not apply to Native governments, which argument, if successful, would allow for further discrimination against women by those governments. Without funding and participation in the consultative

425 Notes to pages 221-6 process, NWAC could not argue effectively that the Charter should apply to Native governments. In March 1992, this order was refused by the Federal Court (Canadian Native Law Reporter 4 [1992]: 59-70.) In August 1992, however, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld NWAC’s

appeal: the government had “accorded the advocates of male dominated Aboriginal self-governments a preferred position in the exercise of an expressive activity which had the effect of restricting the freedom of expression of Aboriginal women in a manner that was offensive to ss.2(b) and 28 of the Charter” (Canadian Native Law Reporter 4 [1992]:72). With respect to participation in conferences, however, the court held that no individual had the right to funding or to be present at constitutional conferences. More important, it reaffirmed earlier judgments about the courts’ lack of power to intervene in legislative processes. The Charter provides grounds for court intervention in consultation or policy development, but not in the process of amending the constitution. This process, “as a legislative process, begins not later than when First Ministers are convened to agree upon a constitutional resolution they will put to their legislatures.” In the words of Justice Mahoney, “I frankly cannot conceive of even Charter based circumstances in which a court could properly interfere, however indirectly, with the convening of a First Ministers’ Conference or any other purely intergovernmental meeting and dictate to them whom they ought to invite to their table” (Canadian Native Law Reporter 4[1992]:87-8). In late October 1994, the

Supreme Court unanimously overturned the main decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in favour of NWAC. On Native peoples’ participation generally, see Turpel, “The Charlottetown Discord,” 132-5.

15 Monahan, “The Sounds of Silence,” 243. 16 Gibbins, “Speculations on a Canada without Quebec,” 266. 17 Ibid., 267. 18 Gibson, Plan B; Cameron, “A Constitution for English Canada.” See also Russell, “Towards a New Constitutional Process.” On the alternative forms of such assemblies and the advantages and pitfalls of setting them up, see Fafard and Reid, Constituent Assemblies, esp. 44-7. 19 Gibbins, “Speculations on a Canada without Quebec,” 271: the official-languages sections of the Charter “would be repealed at the first opportunity.” 20 As for sitting senators from Quebec, under CA1867, section 31(5), they will “cease to be qualified” in respect of residence. Their places will become vacant: while the governor general “shall” summon some person to fill a vacancy, all questions concerning vacancies are settled by the Senate itself (according to section 33), and this should end the issue. Another matter is section 26, which deals with

426 Notes to pages 226-42 extraordinary additions to the Senate: it will be amended to provide for additions of three or six senators, representing equally the three divisions (with section 27 amended accordingly), and section 28 will read that the number of senators will never exceed 86. 21 Hogg, Is the Constitution of Canada Ready, 20. On the prospects for provincial bloc voting in the Senate, see also Richard Janda, Re-balancing the Federation.

22 Gibson, Plan B, 59. 23 On the intricacies of Senate reform, and, by extension, on the difficulty of reaching consensus on any specific amendments, see David Elton, “The Charlottetown Accord Senate.” 24 Unless the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act is amended so as to accelerate the one-year adjustment period to the new constituencies proposed in mid-1994 by provincial commissions under Canada’s chief electoral officer, a federal election in 1995 would be fought on the basis of the existing ridings, with the current distribution of seats. Were the Act to be changed or the election delayed, the new House of Commons would have 226 seats without Quebec; nevertheless, no percentage reported in table 6 would be altered by more than 0.6%. For an account of the 1985 changes to the Representation Act, see Sancton, “Eroding Representation by Population.” 25 See, for example, Kilgour and Levesque, “The Canadian Constitutional Amending Formula.” 26 This last combination is just at the cusp of having 50% of the population. 27 Canada, Senate and House of Commons, A Renewed Canada, 67-9. CHAPTER FOURTEEN

1 See Watts, “Canada in Question, Again.” 2 Simpson, “The Referendum and Its Aftermath,” 199. 3 Globe and Mail, 27 and 28 September 1994. This structure puts the core group Of six at the centre of fourteen other cabinet ministers and the fourteen regional delegates. 4 Parti québécois, La Souveraineté: Pourquoi? Comment? 3 (“the

responsibility of throwing into operation the process that must lead to sovereignty ’). 5 Globe and Mail, 6 October 1994. 6 Globe and Mail, 29 September 1994. 7 Toronto Star, 19 June 1994. 8 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 19 January 1994, 34.

9 Mr Bouchard often provokes an almost visceral negative reaction among English Canadians. The more calm and reasonable he attempts to be — as when he insists that the election of the Bloc and the prospect of sovereignty offer Canada and Quebec “a unique

427 Notes to pages 242-58 opportunity to seal a new relationship based on truth and respect” — the more irritation he seems to create (La Presse, 26 October 1994). A majority in ROC agrees that “there is no role for a separatist like Lucien Bouchard in the federal Parliament,” and only 22% thought that the Bloc should form the official opposition (Globe and Mail, 18 October 1993; Gallup Canada, Gallup Report, 18 November 1993). But antipathy in ROC towards the Bloc leader seems more widespread and intense than can be accounted for by disagreement with his goal of sovereignty or by rejection of the “two-nations” view of Canada that he powerfully articulates. 10 By mid-1994, Reform support had weakened considerably since the 1993 federal election. The party was less popular in British Columbia than the Liberals and was only marginally ahead of them in Alberta. By September 1994, its support had dropped to 10% nationally, as opposed to 19% in the election (Globe and Mail, 29 September 1994; London Free Press, 16 September 1994).

11 Cairns, “An Election to be Remembered,” 227. 12 Globe and Mail, 9 June 1994. 13 In Simeon and Janigan, Toolkits, 114.

14 Manning, “Leadership for Changing Times,” 80. 15 Before the 1994 election, 50% of Quebecers thought the PQ would “have the right to begin the process of sovereignty” if it won, but 37% disagreed (Globe and Mail, 15 July 1994). 16 London Free Press, 13 October 1994.

17 As Mr Manning has said about sovereignty-association, “There is no market for that outside Quebec. There is a greater market for straight independence” (Simpson, Faultlines, 140). CHAPTER FIFTEEN

1 Watts, New Federations, 103-10, and “Survival or Disintegration”; see also Hicks, Federalism, 171-96; Lemco, Political Stability, 16-18. 2 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations. 3 Lemco, Political Stability, 50.

4 Hicks, Federalism, 181-5; Watts, “Survival or Disintegration.” 5 Watts, New Federations, 106; Hicks, Federalism, 179; Lemco, Political Stability, 49, 53.

6 In the only quantitative analysis of federal stability, the relationship between secession potential and the number and size of units disappears when the degree of constitutional centralization is introduced into the equation (Lemco, Political Stability, 78-9). 7 Ibid., 150-1; Watts, “Survival or Disintegration.” 8 Parti québécois, Programme, 67-86. 9 Globe and Mail, 4 August 1994.

428 Notes to page 266 CHAPTER SIXTEEN

1 On 8 December 1994, Finance Minister Jean Campeau announced that the deficit would be $5.7 billion, rather than the $4.4 billion projected by the former Liberal government and the $5.5 billion estimated in November. Canadian Bond Rating Service reduced its rating on Quebec government and Hydro-Québec debt from single-A-plus to single-A (Globe and Mail, 17 December 1994).

2 David Cliche drove to reach agreements, and almost succeeded with the Atikamekw and Montagnais peoples (Globe and Mail, 15 and 16 December 1994).

3 The issues were too complex and mistrust too high, and provincial and national organizations condemned the initiative. The First Nations were concerned about losing sovereign title through these agreements, and they also did not want to countenance the notion that Quebec’s borders were inviolable, a concept rejected in October by the Assembly of First Nations of Quebec and Labrador. The position of the national Assembly of First Nations was that Quebec could not become sovereign without Aboriginal consent. As Matthew Coon-Come, grand chief of the Quebec Crees, put it, “My people are extremely wary of exchanging our place in a federal system, with all of the inherent checks and balances that we have been able to use to advance our status, for a precarious relationship with a unitary state” (Globe and Mail, 24 November 1994). He also said in Toronto on 13 March 1995, “There will be no annexation of ourselves or our territory to an independent Quebec without our consent” (Globe and Mail, 30 March 1995). The comprehensive self-government negotiations with Quebec were abandoned soon afterwards (Le Devoir, 19 March 1995). 4 Globe and Mail, 24 November 1994. 5 Globe and Mail, 19 January 1995; La Presse, 28 February 1995.

6 Globe and Mail, 27 January 1995. )

7 Globe and Mail, 13 December 1994. Quebec was also the first province to table legislation to implement NAFTA (Globe and Mail, 20 December 1994). 8 Globe and Mail, 23 November 1994. Mr Parizeau was certainly aware of the potential for polarization. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, he was optimistic about getting a majority Yes vote: “Give mea half-dozen Ontarians who put their feet to the Quebec flag, and I’ve got it” (Don MacPherson, “Parizeau Proves His Tongue Is Too Loose,” London Free Press, 15 December 1994). 9 These propositions were disputed, of course, by ROC leaders. One of the more outspoken premiers was Bob Rae, who warned about the emotions that a Yes vote would unleash: “To try to reduce it [the country] to some sort of an economic calculus, or some sad, miserable

429 Notes to pages 266-70 calculation about economics, is a huge, huge mistake” (Globe and Mail, 23 November 1994). 10 See the statements by the premier’s chief strategic adviser, JeanFrancois Lisée, London Free Press, 25 November 1994. 11 See Lise Bissonnette, “Continuer,” editorial, Le Devoir, 3-4 December 1994: “Soutenue ou non par la foi, une priére l’entourait dont on aime penser qu’elle peut l’avoir touché, avoir rencontré sa volonté” (“Rooted in faith or not, a prayer encompassed him, and one likes to think it could have touched him, meeting with his will”). See also Gilles Lesage, “La passion selon Lucien,” Le Devoir, 3-4 December 1994.

12 “Let us keep going. Thank you.” 13. Globe and Mail, 7 November 1994. In ROC, this early blurring of the PQ commitment to secession drew quick criticism, of a kind that later became more common and more heated: see Jeffrey Simpson, “Why the Separatist Argument Has Become Intellectually Cloudy,” Globe and Mail, 9 November 1994. 14 London Free Press, 17 December 1994, quoting Deputy Premier Bernard Landry. 15 Québec, Assemblée nationale, Avant-projet de loi, Loi sur la souveraineté du Québec. 16 See the strategy paper reported in the Globe and Mail, 21 January 1995. 17 Globe and Mail, 19 January 1995. 18 Montreal Gazette, 8 December 1994.

19 Ibid. 20 Montreal Gazette, 7 December 1994. 21 Le Devoir, 8 December 1994 (“If I don’t answer you, it’s because | don’t want to answer you, and if I don’t want to answer you, it’s because right now that’s not the question”). 22 Globe and Mail, 10 December 1994; London Free Press, 20 December 1994.

23 Montreal Gazette, 8 December 1994. 24 Globe and Mail, 10 and 16 December, 1994. 25 Globe and Mail, 9 January 1995. 26 Globe and Mail, 31 January 1995. 27 Globe and Mail, 25 March 1995; Le Devoir, 4—5 March 1995. 28 Globe and Mail, 8 April 1995.

29 Globe and Mail, 16 January and 4 February 1995. There were sixteen regional commissions, as well as one for youth and one for the elderly. They were to hold 304 sessions in 223 communities. 30 Lysiane Gagnon, “L’avenir avec un petit ‘a’,” La Presse, 18 February 1995.

31 La Presse, 16 March 1995 (“The Commission believes that it has discerned the greatest source of apprehension about the sovereignty

430 Notes to pages 270-2 project: bread and butter after such a major political change”). See also Globe and Mail, 17 March 1995. 32 La Presse, 10 March 1995. 33 Le Devoir, 12 March 1995, on the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal; La Presse, 18 February 1995, on the Confédération des

syndicats nationaux. 34 La Presse, 18 February and 9 March 1995. 35 Globe and Mail, 20 February 1995. In his re-entry to politics, through an interview on the Quebec current affairs program Le Point, Mr Bouchard strongly stated the need for a Yes in order to avoid a dominating federal government. If the sovereigntists were unsuccessful, he said, the Bloc would not return to Ottawa to “manger des claques de Jean Chrétien” (“eat the slaps of Jean Chrétien”). 36 Globe and Mail, 10 and 27 March 1995.

37 For a frank exposition, see Daniel Latouche, “Trois scenarios, quatre variantes: Faites vos choix,” Le Devoir, 4-5 March 1995. 38 La Presse and Le Devoir, 10 March 1995. 39 Globe and Mail, 28 March 1995. 40 London Free Press, 6 April 1995.

41 Canada, House of Commons, Office of the Leader of the Opposition, “Discours de l’honorable Lucien Bouchard,” 18 (“First and foremost, sovereignty is a matter of confidence”).

| 42 Ibid., 10-13.

43 Ibid., 8 (“They don’t want to say NO to sovereignty in a referendum that sweeps aside their anxieties and fails to answer their questions. They are ready to say YES to an inclusive approach. The sovereignty project must rapidly make a sharp turn that brings it closer to Quebecers and that responds to their legitimate concerns by opening a credible avenue towards new Quebec-Canada relations”). 44 Michel C. Auger, “Un peu de démocratie dirigée ...” Le Journal de Montréal, 10 April 1995. 45 Le Devoir, 10 April 1995. A Bloc policy adviser, Professor Turp, had

already written a draft treaty providing for common institutions, in _ his submission to the Bélanger-Campeau Committee; see Turp, “Réponses aux questions.” Compare Bloc québécois, Proposition pour un Partenariat. 46 Alain Dubuc, “Le lacheur,” editorial, La Presse, 15 April 1995. 47 Le Devoir, 15-16 April 1995. 48 Le Devoir, 11 April 1995. 49 Globe and Mail, 20 April 1995. Mr Parizeau stated, “The national

commission report gives us a strong hand in establishing the gradual progression between the unavoidable economic association, the desirable political association and the association that is conceivable. At first hand, it appears to me that this approach offers the possibility

431 Notes to pages 272-6 of a common agreement between all forces of change in Quebec.” See Québec, Conseil exécutif, Commission nationale sur l’avenir, Rapport, esp. 15, 34-6, 64-5. 50 This gibe was made in a speech at a conference organized by the Institute for Research on Public Policy, Montreal, 9 April 1995. 51 Le Devoir, 16 April 1995. 52 The agreement is found as the schedule to Québec, National Assembly, Bill 1, An Act respecting the Future of Québec. It arose from

the Bloc committee headed by Daniel Turp and from an ADQ position paper; see Rocher, “Les aléas de la stratégie,” 36-9. 53 Globe and Mail, 13 June 1995.

54 Ibid. 55 Globe and Mail, 12 July 1995; Maclean's, 24 July 1995. 56 See Québec, Directeur Général, Referendum Act, and, for the

composition of the Yes and No committees, Québec, Directeur Général, Rapport des résultats, 679-725. In September, Mr Parizeau and Mr Johnson were named head of the Yes and No committees, respectively. The internal rules of these committees differed considerably. For example, the executive committee of the No campaign included the president (Mr Johnson), five members of the National Assembly chosen from the QLP ranks, six QLP members chosen by the leader, five members of the Liberal Party of Canada, one member from the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, and three members chosen by the others. The Yes campaign had an executive committee (named by Mr Parizeau) and also a consultative committee on the referendum, which included Mr Parizeau, the leaders of the BQ and the ADQ, four PQ members of the assembly and four Bloc deputies, a representative of the Conseil de la souveraineté, the officers of the committee and members of the executive committee, and people working in different milieux of Quebec society (named by Mr Parizeau). Spending was fixed at $1 per elector, or (when the lists closed on 9 October) at $5,086,980 for each committee (of which one-half was supplied by the state). On the organization of the campaigns, see Le Devoir, 26-7 August 1995. 97 Globe and Mail, 25 August 1995. 58 Ibid.; Globe and Mail, 16 August 1995. 59 Globe and Mail, 26 August 1995. 60 Globe and Mail, 8 August 1995. 61 For an analysis incorporating these assumptions, see J.-H. Guay et al., “For Mr. Parizeau: The Courage to Say ‘Another Time’,” Globe and Mail, 29 August 1995. See also Lysiane Gagnon, “The Ghosts Who Haunt Our Nights: The Undecideds,” Globe and Mail, 7 October 1995. For a gripping account of the federalist campaign, see Greenspon and Wilson-Smith, Double Vision, 305-32.

432 Notes to pages 276-82 62 Montreal Gazette, 7 June 1995; Globe and Mail, 4 July 1995.

63 “Acceptez-vous que le Québec devienne souverain, aprés avoir offert formellement au Canada un nouveau partenariat économique et politique, dans le cadre du projet de loi sur l’avenir du Québec et de l’entente signée le 12 juin 1995? OUI ou NON?” 64 Globe and Mail, 12 September 1995. 65 Globe and Mail, 2 September 1995. 66 Globe and Mail, 9,11, 16, 26, and 30 September 1995; Le Devoir, 23-4 September 1995. 67 Globe and Mail, 26 September 1995. The official campaign did not

begin until the writ was issued on 1 October; until then the vote could have been delayed. 68 Globe and Mail, 17 and 19 May, 2 June, and 1, 19, and 30 September 1995.

69 Globe and Mail, 4 May 1995. 70 Globe and Mail, 5 May 1995.

71 See, for example, the remarks of Jean-Pierre Charbonneau, MNA, Globe and Mail, 26 September 1995.

72 One notable exception occurred when the BQ obstructed back-towork legislation to end a national rail strike. The Toronto Sun showed the potential for polarization when it ran a full-page, front-cover photograph of Mr Bouchard under the headline “Late for Work? Blame This Man” (21 March 1995).

73: Amidsummer poll revealed that 76% of Quebecers had visited at least one other province, and 82% of these said they had been “very well” or “generally well” received there (Globe and Mail, 15 July 1995). 74 Maclean’s, 9 October 1995, 18. 75 London Free Press, 25 September 1995. 76 Globe and Mail, 3 October 1995. 77 Globe and Mail, 4 October 1995. 78 Globe and Mail, 6 October 1995. 79 Globe and Mail, 22 August and 13 October 1995. Grand Council of the Crees, Sovereign Injustice. 80 Globe and Mail, 13 October 1995. See also Chief Coon-Come’s longer statement on the issue, in Globe and Mail, 26 September 1995. 81 Globe and Mail, 13 October 1995. 82 The votes were on 24 and 26 October, respectively. The Cree question

was “Do you agree as a people that the Quebec government will separate the James Bay Cree and the traditional Cree territory from Canada in the event of a Yes vote in the Quebec referendum?” The Inuit question was “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign?” (La Presse, 26 October 1995; Montreal Gazette, 27 October 1995). The Montagnais also organized a referendum, in which 99%

voted No to associating themselves and their territory with a

433 Notes to pages 282-5 sovereign Quebec (Montreal Gazette, 28 October 1995; Le Devoir, 28-9 October 1995). 83 Montreal Gazette, 28 October 1995. 84 Ontario, Office of the Premier, “Notes for an Address.” 85 Globe and Mail, 13 October 1995. 86 Mr Rae’s brother, John Rae, was the federal Liberals’ main representa-

tive in the No campaign’s Montreal headquarters. 87 E. Preston Manning, “Open Letter to the Prime Minister,” 8 June 1994, reprinted in the Globe and Mail, 9 June 1994.

88 For example, “What principles and procedures would the Government of Canada apply to securing ratification by the other provinces of the terms and conditions of any settlement between itself and a province that was seceding from the federation?” “What principles would guide the Government of Canada in determining any division of the federal debt and in seeking compensation for federal assets located on the territory of a seceding province?” “How would the Government of Canada respond to a formal request from a seceding province to enter into an economic union, free trade agreement, or any other ‘special association’ with Canada?” 89 Globe and Mail, 15 September 1995. 90 See, for instance, Le Journal de Montréal, 28 October 1995. 91 Chantal Hébert, “No Side‘’s Early Success Could Come Back to Haunt It,” London Free Press, 5 October 1995. 92 Jeffrey Simpson, “How the Strategists View the Battle for Quebec’s Hearts and Minds,” Globe and Mail, 4 October 1995. 93 Globe and Mail, 7 October 1995. They were Jean Allaire, former Liberal and founder of the ADQ, Jacynthe Simard, head of the Union of Regional Municipalities and Counties, Denise Venault, president of a

shipyard firm, Serge Racine, president of a furniture company, and Arthur Tremblay, a former Progressive Conservative senator and constitutional adviser. 94 Globe and Mail, 12 October 1995. 95 See also Globe and Mail, 18 October 1995, reporting a SOM poll that

placed the two sides almost even among decided voters. 96 For a comprehensive chart of poll results through the campaign, see the Montreal Gazette, 28 October 1995. See also Maurice Pinard, “Le cheminement de Il’opinion.” 97 Globe and Mail, 3 October 1995; London Free Press, 2 October 1995. 98 Montreal Gazette, 20 October 1995. 99 Globe and Mail, 11 October 1995; Montreal Gazette, 20 October 1995. 100 Globe and Mail, 18 October 1995. See also Globe and Mail, 19 October 1995.

101 Globe and Mail, 10 December 1994. 102 Globe and Mail, 17 December 1994, 16 June and 13 April 1995.

434 Notes to pages 285-8 103 Globe and Mail, 29 July 1995. 104 Globe and Mail, 14 and 15 September 1995. 105 Montreal Gazette, 21 October 1995. 106 Globe and Mail, 24 October 1995. 107 Montreal Gazette, 21 October 1995.

108 Shum, “Stock Market Response to Political Uncertainty.” 109 Poole and Westerterp, “Financial Markets and Instability,” 11-14, 1718. This paper uses an implied volatility index derived from the Black-Scholes pricing formula for options. 110 For background, see Globe and Mail, 5 November 1994. 111 Globe and Mail, 27 January and 17 June 1995. 112 Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995. 113 Globe and Mail, 13 December 1994.

114 Douglas Jehl, “Clinton, in Talk to Canadians, Opposes Quebec Separation,” New York Times, 24 February 1995. 115 Globe and Mail, 9 September 1995. 116 Roh, The Implications for U.S. Trade Policy of an Independent Quebec, 19. See also Globe and Mail, 17 October 1995. 117 Globe and Mail, 19 October 1995, and, for Bush, Globe and Mail, 10 October 1995. 118 La Presse, 27 October 1995 (“The respect that he owes today to

Canadian sovereignty will be owed tomorrow to Quebec’s sovereignty”). This did not end American commentary, however. Five days before the vote, President Clinton extolled the virtues of Canada, which, he said, “has been a great model for the rest of the world and a great partner for the United States and I hope that can continue” (Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995),

119 See, for example, William C. Symonds, “Would Quebec Survive Sovereignty?” Business Week, 30 October 1995, 54-5. This magazine had intended to make the referendum its next cover story if the Yes side won. 120 Norman Webster, “C’mon Canada, It’s Time to Do Something. NOW,” Montreal Gazette, 21 October 1995. 121 Globe and Mail, 18 October 1995. 122 Montreal Gazette, 20 October 1995; Globe and Mail, 23 October 1995. 123 For poll data, see Globe and Mail, 19 and 20 October 1995. 124 Globe and Mail, 23 October 1995. 125 Ibid. 126 Globe and Mail, 24 October 1995. 127 Globe and Mail, 25 October 1995. 128 Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995.

129 Ibid. 130 Globe and Mail, 26 and 27 October 1995. An Ontario resolution, for example, passed unanimously in the legislature, recognized Quebec’s

435 Notes to pages 288-92 “distinctive character” and stated, “The status quo is not acceptable. Ontario will be a strong ally for change within the Canadian federation. We agree that we need a more functional harmonious country and a more flexible and decentralized federation.” 131 La Presse, 27 and 28 October 1995. 132 Ibid. 133 Le Journal de Montréal, 28 October 1995. Following their techniques for

dividing the undecided voters and those who refused to answer, the pollsters put the two sides at 50% each, which was what the lurid cover of this newspaper blazoned. 134 André Picard, “A Nation United by a Seat Sale,” Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995. For a debate among pollsters about the rally’s effect on public opinion, see Globe and Mail, 11 and 15 November 1995. 135 Montreal Gazette, 31 October 1995. 136 See La Presse and Montreal Gazette, 31 October 1995, for the

preliminary results and useful maps. 137 Le Journal de Montréal, 31 October 1995 (“To my fellow citizens of

Quebec who supported the Yes, I say that I understand your profound desire for change”). 138 Ibid. (“Although the No side has shown concretely the reluctance to turn our back on the Canadian experience, it is now necessary to assemble the largest possible coalition for change, with pride and hope, to get the best results that we can”). 139 Ibid. (“The Yes supporters have never been so numerous as tonight, and we are all still here. Keep up your hopes, because the next time will be the right one. And this next time could well come more quickly than expected”). 140 Ibid. (“It’s true that we have been beaten, but by what in the end? By money and the ethnic vote”). CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

1 See above, 140-3, 147-51. 2 Jeffrey Simpson, “Bouchard Electrifies Yes Voters, Fulfilling an Old and Powerful Dream,” Globe and Mail, 12 October 1995. 3 Lemieux, “Le référendum de 1995.” The issue is more nuanced, of course. For a detailed analysis of the undecided francophone voters and how they might have responded during the campaign, see Lemieux and Bernier, “L’électorat flottant,” esp. 245. 4 Montreal Gazette, 28 October 1995. 5 Pinard, “Le cheminement de l’opinion.” 6 See ibid. Pinard divides non-respondents proportionally. He also uses rolling averages of Yes support that incorporate the results of three preceding polls, and he excludes for some purposes the polls by

436 Notes to pages 292-6 Léger & Léger that showed no sharp increase in Yes support (rather than eliminating the SOM and CREATEC polls of 3 and 5 October that found very low proportions of Yes voters). In any case, with the Léger & Léger polls included, Pinard’s own best-fitting polynomial function shows a fairly smooth, steady increase in Yes support between mid-September and the end of October: see fig. A. 7 Blais, Nadeau, and Martin, “Pourquoi le Oui a-t-il fait des gains.” 8 Lachapelle, “La souveraineté partenariat.” 9 Ibid., 60, fig. 1. 10 Ibid., 52, table 5. 11 Ibid., 58, table 8. 12 Pinard, “Le contexte politique” and “Les déterminants psychosociaux.” 13 Pinard, “Le contexte politique,” 287-8. 14 Ibid., tables 9.3 and 9.4. | 15 Ibid., table 9.2. 16 Ibid., 288-9 (“In assuming the role of the chief negotiator of this new partnership, of which he had been the instigator through the virage of April 1995, Lucien Bouchard became for many, thanks to his personality and message, the guarantor that the negotiations would be successful. He brought himself, moreover, to insist on the fact that the rest of Canada could not refuse to negotiate this partnership, that it was inevitable. This was important, because without a preliminary agreement on the partnership, any future accords remained uncertain and this constituted a weakness in the sovereigntist option”). 17 Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation, ix. Riker’s analysis of heresthetic — of “structuring the world so you can win” — is the classic work in this field. While many of his cases concern normal agenda control, several show how support can be amalgamated or the opposition split by opening up new dimensions of argument, by strategically linking dimensions, and by closing off potentially threatening ones. Riker’s brilliant analysis of Abraham Lincoln shows how he linked the dimension of agrarian/commercial expansion with the slavery/antislavery dimension by posing the question of whether American citizens in new territories could exclude slavery. This split the Democratic Party and produced Lincoln’s 1860 victory. See Young, “Secession, Games and Strategic Discourse.” 18 James Carville, in Matalin and Carville, All’s Fair, 19. 19 See Page, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections, 108-51.

20 As James Carville put it, “In politics you are on the record, and often the things you can say are limited by the things you’ve already said” (Matalin and Carville, All’s Fair, 134). 21 See Young, “’Maybe Yes, Maybe No.’” 22 Globe and Mail, 19 October 1995. 23 London Free Press, 5 October 1995.

437 Notes to pages 296-9 24 Rhéal Séguin, “Parizeau Remains Firm on Secession,” Globe and Mail, 8 September 1995. 25 Globe and Mail, 13 October 1995. 26 Montreal Gazette, 20 October 1995. 27 Globe and Mail, 25 September 1995. 28 Globe and Mail, 9 October 1995. On this general line of argument, see Gagnon and Lachapelle, “Québec Confronts Canada.”

29 Ibid. 30 Globe and Mail, 11 October 1995. See also Jeffrey Simpson, “The Most Powerful Voice for Secession Utters an Appealing Message,” Globe and Mail, 13 October 1995. 31 Globe and Mail, 14 October 1995. 32 London Free Press, 11 October 1995. This dilemma had bedevilled the federalist side since Mr Bouchard’s virage; see Anthony Wilson-Smith, “A New Can of Worms,” Maclean's, 24 April 1995, 18-19. See also the report on an internal Privy Council Office strategy document released by Mr Parizeau, which showed that one important federal objective was “to keep the focus on the issue of separation and to create doubts about the idea of an association, without provoking a feeling of being rejected” (Globe and Mail, 27 July 1995). There was some resistance to this general position, primarily from the Reform Party, and it found some echoes among westerners who felt excluded from the debate. When Mr Charest adhered to the No side’s strategy, for example, a popular Vancouver columnist wrote that he had joined “a political separatist-fighting blob. The blob makes no distinction for regions. B.C. is part of the mass out there that is everywhere-in-the-country-that-is-not-Quebec” (Barbara Yaffe, “West Has Little Use for Eastern Politicians,” London Free Press, 10 October 1995). 33 There was considerable attachment, even among those intending to vote Yes. See the poll results discussed in Jean Paré, “Noui au Canada, Non a Ottawa,” L’ Actualité, 15 March 1995, 51-8. 34 Globe and Mail, 7 October 1995. 35 London Free Press, 19 October 1995. 36 Globe and Mail, 13 September 1995. 37 London Free Press, 7 October 1995. 38 Globe and Mail, 8 September 1995. 39 Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995. 40 Montreal Gazette, 30 October 1995, reporting on the final No rally in Hull, Quebec. 41 Globe and Mail, 12 September 1995. 42 Globe and Mail, 19 October 1995. The federalists derided this as implying that the “magic wand” would solve all of Quebec’s problems, not just that of internal division. 43 Montreal Gazette, 30 October 1995.

438 Notes to pages 300-7 44 Le Devoir, 28-9 October 1995 (“de ne plus étre une minorité dans le pays de nos voisins anglophones mais une majorité dans notre propre pays. Affirmer, une fois pour toutes, notre langue et notre culture francophone d’Amérique”). According to the premier, the 1995 referendum might be the “last collective rendez-vous” of Québécois. If the No won, he said it would be possible that “our only difference will be to speak English with a French accent” (Globe and Mail, 2 October 1995). 45 Norman Webster, “C’mon Canada, It’s Time to Do Something. NOW,” Montreal Gazette, 21 October 1995. 46 This was predictable; see Young, “The Political Economy of Secession,” and 150-2 above. 47 Globe and Mail, 28 August 1995. 48 Maclean's, 9 October 1995, 19. 49 Globe and Mail, 7 October 1995. 50 London Free Press, 18 October 1995. 51 Montreal Gazette, 21 October 1995. 52 Globe and Mail, 20 October 1995. 53 Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995. 54 La Presse, 28 October 1995 (“Imagine, after a Yes, the extent to which these people will become voluntary partners with Quebec!”). 55 Montreal Gazette, 27 October 1995. 56 Montreal Gazette, 20 October 1995. 57 London Free Press, 11 September 1995. 58 Montreal Gazette, 20 October 1995. 59 This was dismissed by Mr Parizeau as evidence of a conspiracy to frighten Quebecers; see Globe and Mail, 24 and 26 August 1995. 60 London Free Press, 11 September 1995. 61 Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation, 66-77. 62 Globe and Mail, 5 May 1995. 63 Wells, “Be Vewy, Vewy Quiet,” 17. 64 London Free Press, 20 December 1994.

65 Ibid. 66 Globe and Mail, 12 September 1995. 67 Globe and Mail, 13 September 1995. 68 Ibid.; London Free Press, 13 September 1995. Earlier, Mr Johnson had

stressed the need to make Quebecers’ choice clear by emphasizing that a Yes would give the PQ government the power to declare Quebec sovereign, whether the negotiations with Canada produced a partnership or not (Globe and Mail, 3 August 1995).

69 Ibid. 70 Globe and Mail, 20 September 1995. 71 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 18 September, 1995, 14528. 72 Ibid., 14530.

439 Notes to pages 307-15 73 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 19 September 1995; 14608. 74 Ibid., 14610. 75 Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995. 76 Montreal Gazette, 27 October 1995. 77 Globe and Mail, 30 October 1995. 78 Globe and Mail, 25 October 1995. 79 La Presse, 27 October 1995 (“No, I haven't recognized anything. You don’t know the result and neither do I. People would have expressed their point of view. After that, the mechanics are very nebulous”). See also Le Devoir and the Globe and Mail, 27 October 1995.

80 For an analysis of this weakness in the No side’s position, see Lysiane Gagnon, “It’s Too Late for Chrétien to Change the Rules,” Globe and Mail, 23 September 1995. 81 See Guy Laforest, “L’establishment du nationalisme canadien,” Le Devoir, 5 May 1995, and Jane Taber, “Ministers Come and Go, but Kitchen Cabinet Stays,” Ottawa Citizen, 28 January 1996. 82 Montreal Gazette, 28 October 1995. 83 Montreal Gazette, 30 October 1995. 84 Globe and Mail, 23 October 1995. CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

1 Dion, “The Dynamic of Secessions.” (For later works not treated by Dion, see Valaskakis and Fournier, Le piége de l'indépendance; McRoberts, ed., Beyond Quebec; and the publications throughout 1995 in the “Referendum Papers” of the C.D. Howe Institute’s Commentary series and in Choix [Série Québec-Canada], published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy.) See also Brown, “Thinking the ‘Unthinkable.’” 2 Dion, “The Dynamic of Secessions,” 537. 3 Monahan, “Cooler Heads Shall Prevail,” 5. 4 Dion, “The Dynamic of Secessions,” 551.

5 Apart from Monahan, the other analyses in the “impossible secession” school were Coté, Le réve de la terre promise, and Derriennic, Nationalisme et démocratie.

6 Others were Gibson, Plan B, and Freeman and Grady, Dividing the House.

7 Richard Gwyn, “Robillard’s ‘Slip’ Was, in Fact, a Warning to Quebec,” Toronto Star, 17 September 1995.

8 Dion, “The Dynamic of Secessions,” 546. 9 Globe and Mail, 30 October 1995. 10 Poole and Westerterp, “Financial Markets and Instability,” 19-23. 11 Ibid., 27-36. 12 Globe and Mail, 25 October 1995.

440 Notes to pages 315-18 13 Globe and Mail, 26 October, 1995. 14 Montreal Gazette, 21 October 1995. 15 Globe and Mail, 25 October 1995. 16 Globe and Mail, 23 February 1996.

17 Ibid. In his televised speech to the country, Mr Chrétien had in fact said that the voters’ decision was “serious and irreversible,” and he had warned those thinking of voting Yes in order to bring change to Canada to beware: “Listen to the leaders of the separatist side. They are very clear. The country they want is not a better Canada, it is a separate Quebec. Don’t be fooled” (Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995). 18 Philip Authier, “The Yes Plan,” Ottawa Citizen, 3 March 1996. 19 Globe and Mail, 23 February 1996. 20 Globe and Mail, 13 September 1995. 21 Globe and Mail, 9 November 1995. 22 Globe and Mail, 19 October 1995. 23 Globe and Mail, 9 November 1995; La Presse, 28 October 1995. 24 Globe and Mail, 9 November 1995. Just before the referendum, the

Caisse and Hydro-Québec were reported to be heavy buyers of Canadian currency and bonds (Globe and Mail, 25 October 1995). Mr Parizeau later claimed that his finance minister had $17 billion in liquidities at his disposal (Parizeau, Pour un Québec souverain, 45). See also Globe and Mail, 3 and 18 November 1995. 25 Globe and Mail, 9 November 1995. 26 Ottawa Citizen, 3 March 1996, Globe and Mail, 9 November 1995. 27 Four major bases in Quebec are at Bagotville, Saint-Hubert, Valcartier, and Saint-Jean. Voting results are available for the first three. Taking only those polls located within the base perimeters, the Yes vote was 41.8%, 45.2%, and 45.0%. These figures must be interpreted with

caution because not all voters in the polls were military personnel, some military personnel lived off-base, and those posted outside Quebec could vote by mail. (The information on the precise polls located on bases was provided by the office of Quebec’s director general of elections.) 28 Globe and Mail, 19 October 1995. 29 See Parizeau, Pour un Québec souverain, 49, 283-8. These pages

demonstrate the premier’s preoccupation with international recognition and explain his “Grand Game” — getting a quick recognition from France in order to pressure the United States to accept the inevitability of Quebec sovereignty. This would require, within a week or ten days after the Yes, “qu’un geste solennel soit accompli par le Québec pour proclaimer sa souveraineté” (“that Quebec make a solemn act to proclaim its sovereignty”). During the 1997 election campaign, when Mr Parizeau’s book was released, these passages became a major issue because they were taken to imply that

441 Notes to pages 318-19 the PQ government would have issued a UDI soon after a Yes vote. There is no doubt that under certain conditions this would have been contemplated and even attempted — for instance, if Canada refused to negotiate and if opinion in Quebec, and in the Quebec Liberal Party, regarded the Yes as legitimate. But Mr Parizeau also writes (286) that the declaration could be suspended for six months or a year in order to pursue negotiations towards a partnership treaty and that it would still have the same effect on international recognition. If he believed this, then the existing language of Bill 1 might have sufficed as a “solemn declaration” when it was passed. Alternatively, his government might have amended the bill so that it declared sovereignty right away. This would not be uncharacteristic of a premier whose commitment to sovereignty was primarily intellectual and who deeply regretted the “nostalgia” felt about Canada even by some sovereigntists (47). But unless federalist Quebecers rallied strongly behind the Yes, it is difficult to believe that an amended bill could have passed the assembly within a week or two. 30 Arguments that a “misinformed” or “confused” Yes vote should not be accepted often rest on a very tight exercise in logic, one advanced by some analysts in the “impossible secession” school of prognostication. This argument reasons that because some Yes voters thought that a Yes would not actually bring “separation” but would lead to some new arrangement with Canada, either within the existing constitutional order or as two sovereign states, then their votes were misinformed and should be discounted. Not only does this impose a very high standard of information on the democratic voter - What question is put to the electorate in an election campaign? — and not only would it mask the failure of the No side to get across its message about “separation,” but it is also tautological. If Ottawa refused to enter negotiations, for example, and instead put some new constitutional proposals before the country in a referendum, then a Yes vote could very well have produced exactly the result that purportedly justified ignoring it! See, for instance, Monahan, “Cooler Heads Shall Prevail,” 6. His flow chart of options after a Yes result starts with Quebec setting a date for declaring independence, and this is followed by “Square 1,” “constitutional negotiations begin.” The subsequent alternatives include: (1) “Agreement reached whereby Quebec will remain within Canada; secession avoided”; (2) “Agreement reached on terms of Quebec’s secession from Canada” (some subpaths of which lead back to Square 1); and (3) “Negotiations reach impasse” (again with some subpaths leading back to Square 1). After a Yes is rejected by ROC, in fact, most paths lead to Quebec staying within Canada through some form of constitutional agreement. Some of these scenarios would

442 Notes to pages 319-21 involve heavy costs indeed, but it is hard to see how anyone believing in them could reject Yes voters as uninformed on the grounds that they thought their Yes would produce precisely the same results as those foreseen by Monahan. The agency problem makes this interpretation contestable, but the bottom line is that sophisticated antisovereigntists could not predict the outcome of a Yes vote, and some of the results they envisaged did coincide with those expected by the Yes voters whose ballots would be discounted on grounds of “ignorance.” 31 See, for example, the Globe and Mail editorial, “What Yes and No Might Bring,” 27 October 1995, and Jeffrey Simpson, “The Federalist Forces Seize the Magic Wand from the Secessionists,” Globe and Mail, 26 October 1995.

32 The notion that Quebec could prop up the Canadian dollar for very long with $17 billion is ludicrous. 33 See Young, “Maybe Yes, Maybe No,” 54-5. 34 See for example, Robert Sheppard, “A Loopy, Messy Federalism,” Globe and Mail, 25 October 1995, and Andrew Coyne, “How to Respond if Quebeckers Vote Yes: First Do Nothing,” Globe and Mail, 30 October 1995. 35 See, for example, McRoberts, “After the Referendum,” 414.

36 White, “Speech.” 37 Mr Black is an historian of Quebec and the owner of many Canadian newspapers. See his “Hope for a No, but See the Opportunities in a Yes,” Globe and Mail, 27 October 1995. In this piece he stated, “If Quebec votes Yes, it is voting for sovereignty. It is a sophisticated

electorate that knows perfectly well the implications of this vote.” 38 Dion, “The Dynamic of Secessions,” 548-50; Globe and Mail, 30 October 1995. 39 Maclean's, 1 July 1995, 14. 40 Ibid. 73% of people in ROC expected a No vote. 41 See above, 153. While several secession referendums elsewhere have carried by wide margins, very important decisions have been sanctioned by narrow ones. These include referendums in Sweden on entry into the EU (carried by 52.2%), the Irish referendum on divorce (decided by 50.2%), and the Newfoundland referendum on churchrun schools that led to a proposed constitutional amendment in 1996. This last vote, on a very obscure question, broke 54 to 46% ona turnout of only 52% of the eligible voters. 42 Le Devoir, 23-4 September 1995, reporting a Créatec poll done for the No committee. 43 One prominent commentator, for example, criticized Mr Chrétien’s insistence that the 1995 referendum question had been misleading, in very harsh terms. Barbara Amiel wrote that “his statement is wishful thinking and insulting to those who voted Yes. While there is no question that Lucien Bouchard and Jacques Parizeau attempted to

443 Notes to pages 321-6 ©

fudge the consequences of a vote for sovereignty, it is also true that a Yes vote would have clearly empowered them to negotiate it. By the day of the vote, any Quebecer who did not know this must have spent his life with his head in a paper bag” (Maclean’s, 20 November 1995).

44 Québec, Directeur général, Rapport des résultats officiels du scrutin, 193. 45 Quebec, Directeur général, Rejected Ballot Papers — Unity Rally, 2, and appendix 1: the Honourable Alan B. Gold to the Director General, 9 May 1996: “I confirm that my inquiry gave no reason to believe that there had been a nationally orchestrated conspiracy.”

46 Ibid., appendix 3. 47 Quebec, Chief Electoral Officer, press releases of 13 May and 7 June 1996.

48 Directeur général, Rejected Ballot Papers — Unity Rally, 32, 35.

49 See Globe and Mail, editorial, “Mysterious Doings on Referendum Night,” 9 November 1995, and Globe and Mail, 10 November 1995. The editorial raised the possibility that there had been a “deliberate attempt to reduce the No vote” and that this could have involved the “foot soldiers” on the ground or the “generals” of the campaign. 50 The voting irregularities were also noted abroad; see the editorial in the Washington Times, 7 November 1995. CHAPTER NINETEEN

1 This is very different from saying that every secession is unique. Stéphane Dion, in particular, has tried to argue that all other cases of peaceful secession are irrelevant to the Quebec-Canada situation because they involved bipartite federations, or were not welfare states, or were not fully democratic. Hence, “we are left with no precedent” (“The Dynamic of Secessions,” 549). Of course, every case is unique, but to insist too strongly on this is simply to deny all possibility of comparative study. In extremis we are told that one cannot compare apples and oranges. In reality, of course, apples and oranges are both spherical fruits; they roll when placed on an inclined plane; if they hit an object, they will both split (though in ways that vary with their different rinds and internal composition); and so on. If important commonalities are found in very different cases, this suggests that they should be taken into account when thinking about any comparable situation. Not to do so — to insist on the uniqueness of every case — is to demand a licence to make whatever predictions seem reasonable, congenial, or useful. 2 See Globe and Mail, 25 April 1997, for the trend over time. 3. The Gallup Poll, 27 November 1995; Globe and Mail, 24 February, 26 March, and 20 June 1996. 4 Globe and Mail, 1 February 1997.

444 Notes to pages 326-8 5 This is sensitive to the question posed, however. Throughout 1995, about 70% agreed that Quebec had the right to separate (Lachapelle, “La souveraineté partenariat,” 60, fig. 1). In 1996, 68% agreed with the proposition that Quebecers are “free to take charge of their own destiny” (Globe and Mail, 25 May 1996). However, only 46% thought the National Assembly could make a UDI, while 40% thought it could not (Globe and Mail, 23 October 1996). 6 Globe and Mail, 23 October 1996; the Yes vote would drop from 45 to 39%. Almost one-half of Yes supporters claimed that their vote would secure “a good deal” from Canada, while 53% sought a new country (Montreal Gazette, 12 May 1997). 7 See, for example, Globe and Mail, 4 December 1996. The federal minister responsible had stated that native territory is not Quebec territory; see Globe and Mail, 14 February 1996. 8 Globe and Mail, 2 November 1996. 9 Some of these groups and their activities are described in Trent, “Post-Referendum Citizen Group Activity.” 10 Globe and Mail, 5 February 1996; London Free Press, 10 June 1996. 11 Toronto Star, 31 December 1995. 12 Globe and Mail, 25 March 1997. See also Globe and Mail, 13 November 1996, and Robert Libman and Tommy Schnurmacher, “A Case for Partitioning Quebec,” London Free Press, 30 June 1996. 13 Tom Kierans, “Is Quebec Partition an Idea Worth Pursuing?” Globe and Mail, 25 March 1997. See also Don MacPherson, “Opening Up Partition’s Can of Worms,” London Free Press, 24 January 1996, and Jeffrey Simpson, “How Quebec’s English Population Views the Secessionists,” Globe and Mail, 13 September 1996. 14 William Johnson, “A New Anglo Leadership,” Montreal Gazette, 2 August 1996; Le Devoir, 2 August 1996. 15 Globe and Mail, 8 August 1996. 16 Montreal Gazette, 3 August 1996. 17 National unity, usually cited as “the most important problem facing this country today” by fewer than 10% of respondents between 1985 and 1995, rose to 25% after the referendum (The Gallup Poll, 20 November 1995). On support for distinct society recognition, see The Gallup Poll, 27 November 1995, and the Angus Reid poll reported in the London Free Press, 4 November 1995. 18 Globe and Mail, 2 December 1995. 19 Vancouver Sun, 13 November 1995. 20 Allan Gregg, “Can Canada Survive?” Maclean’s, 25 December 1995 — 1 January 1996, 17. Intriguingly, the proportions in Quebec were 45 and 46%. 21 Ibid., 17. 22 Anthony Wilson-Smith, “Future Imperfect,” Maclean's, 30 December 1996 — 6 January 1997, 46, 41.

445 Notes to pages 329-31 23 London Free Press, 28 December 1995. Another 35% supported Ottawa’s current (mixed) approach. 24 Globe and Mail, 16 November 1996. 25 Anthony Wilson-Smith, “Future Imperfect,” Maclean's, 30 December 1996 — 6 January 1997, 41. Outside Quebec, there was a narrow margin in favour of the view that a “tougher stand” would make Quebec more willing (32%) rather than less (25%) to negotiate a deal with ROC. But fully 39% thought it would make no difference;

presumably, this group includes many people who support the harder stand on principle. 26 See Globe and Mail, 19 September 1995, and the SOM/Environics poll reported in the London Free Press, 2 October 1995. 27 In early 1995, 67.6% in ROC thought Quebecers would not vote Yes, and during that summer 73% thought they would not (Globe and Mail, 8 February 1995; Anthony Wilson-Smith, “A Quiet Passion,” Maclean's, 1 July 1995, 13). At the end of 1995, only 33% in ROC thought Quebecers would vote Yes if another referendum were held within five years (calculated from data in Allan Gregg, “Can Canada survive?” Maclean's, 25 December 1995 — 1 January 1996, 14-33). 28 Cairns, “Looking Back from the Future,” 79. 29 Milne, “Past and Future: Reflections after the Referendum,” 83. 30 These expressions are found in the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 1 November 1995; Vancouver Sun, Calgary Herald, Toronto Star, and ot John’s Evening Telegram, all 3 November 1995. 31 Globe and Mail, 22 December 1995. In ROC, 46% of respondents to a Canadian Facts poll thought that Quebec would not separate, while 40% saw separation as inevitable; however, 81% thought it important for ROC to “establish its conditions for Quebec separation.” 32 London Free Press, 28 December 1995. 33 Monahan and Bryant, Coming to Terms with Plan B, 3. Apart from two “principles” concerning the substance of partition and Aboriginal rights, the authors concentrated on matters of process, including the need to clarify the legality of secession, maintain the rule of law, set the requirements for referendums, and establish the required majority. 34 Globe and Mail, 9 July 1996. 35 Globe and Mail, 5 July 1997. 36 See, for example, Jeffrey Simpson, “With No Clear Thinking, Canada _ Was Ill Prepared for Its Dismemberment,” Globe and Mail, 8 November 1995. 37 See, for example, Rowlands, “International Aspects of the Division of Debt Under Secession”. New rounds of studies are also forthcoming from various think tanks. 38 Globe and Mail, 26 February 1996. 39 Globe and Mail, 28 May 1997.

446 Notes to pages 332-5 40 Globe and Mail, 4 December 1996. See Gibson, Renewing the Federation: Options for British Columbia, esp. 9-42. 41 Globe and Mail, 20 November 1996.

42 Milne, “Past and Future,” 83. 43 London Free Press, 3 May 1997.

44 David Bercuson and Barry Cooper, “An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come: B.C. Separation,” Globe and Mail, 24 May 1997. 45 Cairns, “Looking Back from the Future.” 46 See, for example, Gibson, Renewing the Federation: Options for British Columbia, 33: “Any deal with Quebec that is implemented according to law will require a constitutional amendment, and therefore the consent of the provinces. It is obvious that the negotiating structure must fully involve the provincial level at every stage — not simply on an informational basis, but on a full decision-making basis.” Decisions to be taken would include the debt burden, “moral and practical questions,” and the shape and future of ROC. More generally on the linkage, see William Thorsell, “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Torch for Lucien Bouchard,” Globe and Mail, 23 March 1996, and Jeffrey Simpson, “Legal or Illegal, Canada Will Defend Its Interests with Quebec,” Globe and Mail, 15 May 1996. 47 See Jockel, “And If Quebec Secedes?”; Black, “Canada’s Continuing Identity Crisis.” 48 See, for example, Peter Brimelow, “Canadian Roulette,” Forbes, 25 September 1995; William C. Symonds, “Would Quebec Survive Sovereignty?” Business Week, 30 October 1995, and “Shaking Canada,” Economist, 21 October 1995.

49 Parizeau, “The Case for a Sovereign Quebec”; Johnson, “The Case for a United Canada.” 50 See Cooper, “Quebec Sovereignty.” Jockel, “And If Quebec Secedes?” 51 See, for example, the New Orleans Times-Picayune, 2 November 1995;

| San Francisco Chronicle, 1 November 1995; Tulsa World, 1 November 1995; Philadelphia Inquirer, 1 November 1995; and Washington Post, 1

November 1995. Occasionally, editorialists called for a more robust American approach to the issue, given the stakes for the United States; see, for example, the Newark Star-Ledger, 1 November 1995. 52 Globe and Mail, 11 June 1996. Mr Juppé reaffirmed France’s position of non-indifference but non-interference, and also acceptance of Quebecers’ right to self-determination. As he put it at a banquet for Mr Bouchard, “Our country has always been anxious to accompany Quebec on its path and it does so by scrupulously respecting your orientations, your decisions, because it is you who clearly hold your destiny in your hands” (Globe and Mail, 12 June 1996). 53 It is most unlikely that French recognition would have influenced the United States. As one State Department official exclaimed when the

447 Notes to pages 335-40 former premier’s book was released, “Just the notion! France? France! Come on!” (Globe and Mail, 22 May 1997).

54 James Reed, “Will Americans Finally Train Lenses on Canada?” Christian Science Monitor, 15 December 1995, and David R. Henderson, “If Quebec Separates, Almost Everybody Wins,” Wall Street Journal, 19 January 1996. 55 Doran, “Will Canada Unravel?” 56 Ibid., 104. 57 Ibid., 98. 58 Ibid., 107. 59 Ibid., 109. 60 Fora reply to a scenario that left him “almost at a loss for words,” see Thomas d’Aquino (president of the Business Council on National Issues), “The Case for Canada.” 61 Fry, “Quebec’s Sovereignty Movement”; Tom Campbell, “Statement.” 62 United States, Committee on International Relations, The Issue of Quebec's Sovereignty, 1-27.

63 Ibid., 11 (Christopher Sands). 64 Jones, “An Independent Quebec: Looking into the Abyss,” 21. 65 Ibid., 22, 35. 66 Ibid., 33. 67 Ibid., 33; United States, Committee on International Relations, The Issue of Quebec’s Sovereignty, 27; Jockel, “Prepared Statement,” 53.

68 See United States, Committee on International Relations, The Issue of Quebec's Sovereignty.

69 See, for example, S. Neil MacFarlane, Sovereignty and Stability.

70 See, for example, Lawson, “No Canada?” As well, the top-rated morning news show, Good Morning America, devoted a week of broadcasts to a cross-Canada tour in 1996, during which, interviews with Mr Chrétien and Mr Bouchard about the process of secession exposed their strong antipathy; see Globe and Mail, 14 May 1996, and Maclean's, 27 May 1996.

71 In the crudest form, this involves a bilateral trade flow of over $300 billion (U.S.) and direct investment in Canada of over $80 billion; see Fry, “Quebec’s Sovereignty Movement.” 72 See, for example, the “between the lines” interpretation of Charles Doran’s article by a seasoned observer: George F. Bain, “How to Prepare for Life Without Quebec,” Globe and Mail, 19 September 1996. CHAPTER TWENTY

1 Globe and Mail, 21 November 1995. 2 Globe and Mail, 22 November 1995 and 17 January 1996. 3 Globe and Mail, 22 November 1995.

448 Notes to pages 340-1 4 Globe and Mail, 27 and 29 January 1996; Ottawa Citizen, 28 January 1996. See also Québec, Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, 25 March 1996, 11. Mr Bouchard, in his “discours d’ouverture,” noted that Quebecers had voted in referendums and elections in every year since 1992, and he declared, “Cette année, nous allons gouverner a plein temps” (“This year, we will govern full time”). 5 As Mr Bouchard put it, “We need a reconciliation of all the components of Quebec society. We must embark together upon the path of recovery; business people with the unions; the public sector in concert with the private sector; women and men, academics and workers, the elderly and the young, anglophones, allophones and native people working side-by-side with francophones” (Barry Came, “Taking the Plunge,” Maclean's, 4 December 1995, 30). 6 Globe and Mail, 9,20, and 21 March 1996. The working groups were to examine “the economy and jobs,” “enterprises and jobs,” “the social economy,” and “the relance of Montreal.” With the exception of the third, they were led by prominent businesspeople. Also established was a commission to study taxation, with a view to eliminating the provincial debt, along with task forces on educational reform and income security. See Le Journal de Montréal, 4 May 1996, for a progress report. 7 See Québec, National Assembly, 2nd session, 35th Legislature, Bill 3, An Act Respecting the Elimination of the Deficit and a Balanced Budget.

The deficit was to be at a maximum of $3,275,000,000 in fiscal year 1996-97 and was to fall to zero by 1999-2000, after which “no deficit shall be incurred.” 8 Globe and Mail, 2 November 1996. At the close of the summit, Mr Bouchard declared, “No one can say we are doing nothing for social democracy.” For an analysis of representation at the summit and a critique of its decisions, see Belleau, “Le sommet de l’emploi et de l"économie.” Even stauchly federalist businessmen admitted that the government had “consolidated its relations with the business community” and that Mr Bouchard had demonstrated “the hand of a master” (Toronto Star, 2 November 1996). Most notably, the government decided to slow the implementation of pay equity, a major irritant for business (Globe and Mail, 9 October and 8 November 1996). It also began to warn that wage rollbacks for public-sector workers would be necessary to reach the deficit targets (Globe and Mail, 13 November 1996). Generally, see Tremblay, “Zero Deficit.” 9 See Cameron, “Does Ottawa Know It Is Part of the Problem?” 10 As Mr Johnson expressed this view, “He’s soon going to face a reality check. And once he gets around to the actual business of managing, I think the public’s perception of the man is going to change” (Barry Came, “Taking the Plunge,” Maclean's, 4 December 1995, 30).

449 Notes to pages 341-3 11 Globe and Mail, 22 November 1996. Over 43% felt that Mr Bouchard would be the best premier, as opposed to 21.4% for Mr Johnson. 12 The text of his speech is in the Globe and Mail, 13 March 1996. 13 Toronto Star, 31 October 1996, and Globe and Mail, 14 November 1996. 14 Globe and Mail, 23 January 1997. 15 Globe and Mail, 4 April, 8 August, and 14 November 1996. See also Desjardins, “Lucien Bouchard at the Helm,” 82-5. 16 Globe and Mail, 23 January 1997. 17 Le Devoir, 12 February 1997, and Globe and Mail, 13 February 1997. 18 Globe and Mail, 16 April 1997, and Government of Canada, Privy Council Office, News Release, 22 April 1997. See also Globe and Mail, 19 June 1997, on the restructuring bill. 19 Globe and Mail, 19 November and 16 December 1997. 20 Globe and Mail, 20 December 1997. The motion of the National Assembly stated, on the one hand, that the constitutional amendment in no way represented a recognition of the Constitution Act, 1982, and, on the other, that the assembly reaffirmed the established rights to publicly funded English-language instruction under the Charter of the French Language (see Quebec, Assemblée Nationale, Journal des débats, 15 April 1997, 6245-7). 21 London Free Press, 8 June 1996. 22 Globe and Mail, 20 June and 28 November 1996. 23 Globe and Mail, Report on Business Magazine, August 1997, 55-9. Mr Bouchard’s government had been restructured to create a minister responsible for “La métropole” who would coordinate initiatives affecting the Greater Montreal area. On the strategic importance of the Montreal economy for Canadian unity, see Cété, “Adapting or Breaking: Corporate Strategies for the Future of Canada,” 22-3. 24 Globe and Mail, 5 December 1995 and 1 March 1996. 25 La Presse, 31 May 1996. In this very complex field, the general offer made to the provinces had been designed to be salable in Quebec; see Globe and Mail, 29 May 1996, and Le Devoir, 31 May 1996 (the latter reporting that Mr Johnson had been consulted about the package). 26 Globe and Mail and London Free Press, 22 April 1997. The agreement paralleled others signed with New Brunswick, Alberta, Newfoundland, and Manitoba. 27 Globe and Mail, 6 August 1997 and 7 January 1998. 28 Globe and Mail, 10 December 1997. 29 Desjardins, “Lucien Bouchard at the Helm,” 84-5. 30 First, appearing in Le Devoir, the translated article was published in the Globe and Mail, 31 October 1996. 31 See Globe and Mail, 23 April 1996 (on the platform) and 9 and 23 November 1996. 32 Globe and Mail, 25 November 1996.

450 Notes to pages 344—7

33 Globe and Mail, 27 and 28 November, 10 and 17 December 1996. 34 Globe and Mail, 19 February, 7 and 19 March 1997. 35 La Presse, 23 August 1997 (“to the detriment of the citizens”). See also Globe and Mail, 6 December 1997. 36 Globe and Mail, 1 February 1997. Some 45.9% were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the government. 37 Globe and Mail, 1 and 29 March 1997. 38 Globe and Mail, 5,1, and 23 May 1997. 39 Claude Castonguay, “It’s Five Minutes to Midnight,” Globe and Mail, 2 May 1997. 40 London Free Press, 1 February and 20 December 1996, 3 April 1997. 41 See polls reported in Globe and Mail, 24 May 1996, 29 March and 12 April 1997. Mr Chrétien’s popularity was sliding sharply, and Mr Charest’s image was improving, especially in Quebec. 42 Bank of Canada Review, autumn 1997, table G-1. 43 Ibid., table F-1, and Bank of Canada Review, autumn 1995, table F-1. 44 Ibid., table A-1. The figures are in constant prices, the 1997 figures being for the second quarter. 45 Ibid., table F-1. 46 Ibid., table H-5. 47 See, for example, Thomas J. Courchene, “The Implications of the No Vote,” Globe and Mail, 31 October 1995; Group of 22, Making Canada Work Better; Business Council on National Issues, “Today and Tomorrow”; Conway, Debts to Pay, 238-54. 48 See, for example, Richards, Language Matters; Kenneth McRoberts, “What Do Canadians outside Quebec Want?” Globe and Mail, 31 October 1995; McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 245-76; Elton, “Canada 1996: The Reconfederation Challenge”; Burelle, “Pour un fédéralisme partenarial”; and Hawkes, “Reconfederating Canada.” 49 Globe and Mail, 2 November 1995.

50 Right after the referendum, the western premiers were meeting, and Mr Charest and Mr Chrétien met separately with Mr Harris, but to little avail (Globe and Mail, 2 and 3 November 1995). 51 Globe and Mail, 14 November 1995. 52 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 November 1995, 16971.

53 The text was “Whereas the People of Quebec have expressed the desire for recognition of Quebec’s distinct society; (1) the House recognize that Quebec is a distinct society within Canada; (2) the House recognize that Quebec’s distinct society includes its French-speaking majority, unique culture and civil law tradition; (3) the House undertake to be guided by this reality; (4) the House encourage all components of the legislative and executive branches of government to take note of this recognition and be guided in their conduct accordingly” (ibid.)

451 Notes to pages 347-8 54 Ibid., 16961, 16975, and 16980. 55 Ibid., 16962, 16982-4. Reform proposed three amendments to the effect that the resolution would not confer any new powers on Quebec, diminish the rights of Quebec residents, or be interpreted “as denying that Canada constitutes one nation.” 56 All provinces have a veto over those matters laid out in section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and matters affecting one or more but not all provinces require the consent of those affected. Amendments under the general amending formula (section 38) that diminish provincial powers do not apply where the provincial legislature has opposed them. Hence, the new veto would be used to block amendments that do not derogate from provincial powers but that fall under the general formula. Some of these matters are laid out in section 42, and they are important, especially those concerning the establishment of new provinces and the powers, selection, and distribution of members of the Senate. Recognition of Quebec as a distinct society would fall into this class of matter. As for “consent,” the minister, Allan Rock, stated that “it will be up to the federal government to determine what this phrase means every time a new situation arises.” This could mean an expression by a provincial government, a resolution of a legislative assembly, or “a direct expression of the population’s agreement through a referendum.” Ottawa’s pledge was “that we will use our veto to oppose any change that, in the opinion of Quebecers or people from any other region, goes against their best interests” (Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 30 November 30 1995, 17002, 17000). 57 Globe and Mail, 29 November 1995. An influential open-line radio host predicted that the measure would help ignite a B.C. separatist movement, and stated, “I don’t think there is any hope any more for British Columbia within the Canadian federation.” 58 See Canada, Statutes, 1996, c. 1 For a thorough analysis, see Heard and Schwartz, “The Regional Veto Formula.” In essence, the change makes constitutional amendments more difficult to achieve, and it widens the disparities in power among provincial governments while rendering the power of individual citizens more nearly equal. 59 Globe and Mail, 14 December 1995, reporting on a motion by the Reform Party to provide for the removal of a prime minister “who fails to uphold the Constitution of Canada or fails to protect the Canadian interest in any dealings with a provincial government committed to secession.” 60 Globe and Mail, 8 and 9 November 1995. The committee was led by Marcel Massé, minister of intergovernmental affairs. 61 Globe and Mail, 26 January 1996. Mr Massé moved to Treasury Board (but remained the “political minister” for Quebec), and

452 Notes to pages 348-50 Mme Robillard shifted to Citizenship and Immigration. See Greenspon and Wilson-Smith, Double Vision, 349-70.

62 Part of Mr Dion’s statement and Mr Chrétien’s remarks are in the Globe and Mail, 26 January 1996.

63 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 27 February 1996, 4. Provinces not participating in any new program would be compensated, “provided they establish equivalent or comparable initiatives.” 64 Hence, the initiatives were attacked by Quebec nationalists as centralizing. See the editorial by Michel Venne, “Un gouvernement central fort,” Le Devoir, 28 February 1996. For a thorough review of the social-policy framework, see Courchene, Social Canada in the Millennium and Redistributing Money and Power. 65 Globe and Mail, 31 May 1996; Bakvis, “Federalism, New Public Management, and Labour-Market Development”; Haddow, “Federalism and Training Policy in Canada.” 66 Maclean's, 11 March 1996. 67 As Mr Massé explained the pamphlet, “Our conclusion is that it is the role of the federal government to make sure that its message goes through and that it goes through with the real facts, and that the real story is given” (Globe and Mail, 19 January 1996). As well, federal departments cooperated to produce twelve one-hour “infomercials” to inform Quebecers about their services (London Free Press, 2 January 1997).

68 Globe and Mail, 3 and 10 July 1996.

. 69 Globe and Mail, 24 July 1996. 70 Globe and Mail, 19 and 22 October 1996. This type of initiative flowed from a Throne Speech commitment to assist the aerospace, biotechnology, and environmental technologies sectors. 71 Globe and Mail, 21 May 1997. These investments included $33 million for the Lachine Canal, $56 million for small- and medium-sized business, and $781 million for research and development in Quebec. 72 Globe and Mail, 22 June 1996; see also 11 and 14 June 1996.

73 Globe and Mail, 22 June 1996. } 74 Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal, Report to Premiers.

75 Globe and Mail, 20 August 1996, and Courchene, ACCESS. The Courchene paper proposed two models for setting social-policy principles and standards, one that was primarily federal-provincial and another that relied on interprovincial coordination. See also Biggs, Building Blocks for Canada’s New Social Union, and Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Assessing ACCESS. 76 Globe and Mail, 23 August 1996, The Quebec government refused to be associated with this initiative, because it would have implied acceptance of a federal role in areas of provincial jurisdiction.

453 Notes to pages 350-1 Nevertheless, the premiers pressed Ottawa to proceed without Quebec (Globe and Mail, 27 September 1996).

77 See the speech by the province’s minister of intergovernmental affairs, reported in the Globe and Mail, 31 October 1996. Ontario received a smaller share of retraining funds than its numbers of unemployed would dictate, less than its per capita entitlement of transfers for social programs, and less unemployment insurance money than its citizens contributed. 78 Ibid. The minister stated, “The time for the grand gesture of the past is long gone. Our government wants to see some non-constitutional successes before embarking on any constitutional changes.” Earlier, the minister had gone even further: “If the federal government doesn’t change the way we do business and recognize that the status

quo isn’t good enough they may have some other provinces that are , seriously considering doing business outside of Canada” (London Free Press, 29 August 1996). 79 Globe and Mail, 21 and 28 November 1996, and, on Mr Pettigrew’s approach, 1 February 1997. 80 Globe and Mail, 13 February 1997. Ottawa increased funding for immigrant settlement in Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario, compensated British Columbia for eliminating its social-assistance residency requirement, and finally signed an infrastructure costsharing agreement with Ontario (Globe and Mail, 24 February, 6 March, and 3 May 1997). 81 Globe and Mail, 16 and 31 May 1997. The minister of health objected to the opening of a for-profit hospital in Calgary. 82 See, for example, Rose, “Some Reflections on Social Entitlements,” Broadbent, “Post-referendum Canada,” Young, “Defending Decentralization,” and Whitaker, “Cruising at 30,000 Feet.” 83 Globe and Mail, 28 August 1997. 84 Globe and Mail, 27 November 1995. 85 Parisella, “Is the Quebec Liberal Party Still Relevant?” 86 See, for example, White, “The Political Future of Quebec Francophones.” 87 See Daniel Johnson’s statements in the Globe and Mail, 12 February 1996 (on a bitter exchange of letters between Mr Trudeau and Mr Bouchard), 11 March 1996 (on the partitionists), and 11 February 1997 (on a hard-line Quebec federalist challenge to distinct society proposals). 88 Globe and Mail, 16 December 1995, 6 January, 15 and 16 April 1996. 89 Globe and Mail, 16 May 1996. See also 28 and 30 September 1996 on the Supreme Court reference and the referendum question. 90 Globe and Mail, 30 September, 11 October, 7 and 9 December 1996. As a leading OQLP member put it, “The nail in the coffin of the Parti

454 Notes to pages 351-3 Québécois is the recognition of Quebec’s uniqueness in the Constitution. This would be the stake that we could drive through the heart of the separatists” (Globe and Mail, 11 October 1996). 99 Globe and Mail, 5 and 10 March 1997. This constitutional position is in Quebec Liberal Party, Recognition and Interdependence. 92 Globe and Mail, 20 June and 24 August 1996.

93 See, for example, Dion, “Building Bridges to National Reconciliation” and “The Challenges of the Canadian Economic Union.” 94 Globe and Mail, 10 and 19 December 1996. 95 Globe and Mail, 5 April 1997. The premier continued on to say that “Liberals, Conservatives, the Toronto Star, all the elites, labour

' leaders, academics, all said the right policy was appeasement for Quebec and they were all wrong. They were proven wrong.” 96 Gordon Gibson, “Why B.C. Won’t Agree to a ‘Distinct Society’ Clause,” Globe and Mail, 24 June 1997. 97 See, for example, typical condemnations of distinct society recognition as “inherently nationalist, or racist” by Robert Mason Lee and Stephen Harper (Globe and Mail, 20 April 1996, and Montreal Gazette, 2 August 1996). Mr Manning intervened in the Alberta campaign to ask whether a Klein administration would accept distinct society (Globe and Mail, 27 February and 9 May 1997). 98 Conrad Black, “Abandon the National Effort to Accommodate Quebec,” Globe and Mail, 7 November 1995; Andrew Coyne, “The Case for Unapologetic Federalism,” Globe and Mail, 18 November 1995, and Breton, “A Minimalist Strategy.” For a more sustained analysis of the limitations of the incremental Plan A strategy, see Gibbins, Time Out. 99 William Johnson, “Ottawa Must Set Rules for Separation,” London Free Press, 15 November 1995. See also Andrew Coyne, “Suppose They Held a Referendum and Nobody Came,” Globe and Mail, 13 November 1995: “It is beyond belief that an entire generation of national leaders could have subscribed to the idea that a single question, posed only to the people of Quebec, worded to the maximum advantage of the Parti Québécois, proposing institutional arrangements that were known to be impossible, should have any force or validity.” 100 Thomas Berger, “What about Quebec’s Next Referendum?” Globe and Mail, 9 November 1995; Jeffrey Simpson, “Federalists Need a Plan B to Show to Secessionists in the Future,” Globe and Mail, 5 December 1995. In Simpson’s view, Plan B would prevent the sovereigntists “from arrogating unto themselves the right to interpret what the rest of Canada would think and do faced with its own dismemberment.” 101 Robertson, “Contingency Legislation for a Quebec Referendum”; Monahan and Bryant, Coming to Ternis with Plan B; Richard Gwyn,

455 Notes to pages 353-5 “Canadians Must Start Dealing with the Unthinkable,” Toronto Star, 18 February 1996. 102 Reform Party of Canada, Reform Responses to the Twenty Questions. See also Globe and Mail, 1 December 1995 and 18 January 1996. Among other principles, the party favoured partition and dividing the debt according to population, and it rejected joint citizenship and any special trade arrangements. 103 Globe and Mail, 20 January 1996. He said that “failure is not an option. Rather than contemplate how the country will fail, all our energy and time should be dedicated to finding answers on how we can change things.” 104 Whitaker, “Managing Quebec,” 8. 105 F.L. Morton, “Jean Chrétien Is Playing Constitutional ‘Chicken,’” Globe and Mail, 6 February 1996. 106 Globe and Mail, 2 November 1995. 107 Globe and Mail, 29 June 1996. This committee was later expanded to include Ms Copps and Mr Axworthy, both of whom were less

inclined to support decentralization and perhaps more willing to take a confrontational attitude towards the sovereigntists (Globe and Mail, 28 September 1996). 108 Globe and Mail, 30 January 1996. 109 London Free Press, 2 February 1996. 110 Ottawa Citizen, 28 January 1996. 111 Globe and Mail, 30 January 1996. 112 Globe and Mail, 30 January 1996; Lysiane Gagnon, “A Badly Coached Rookie Named Dion Takes to the Ice,” Globe and Mail, 3 February 1996.

113 London Free Press, 1 February 1996.

114 See the comments by José Woehrling, professor of law at l’Université de Montréal, in Le Devoir, 8-9 February 1996. 115 Montreal Gazette, 8 February 1996. 116 One poll found that francophone Quebecers were strongly opposed to partition but that the issue had little effect on how they would vote in a referendum on sovereignty (L’Actualité, 15 May 1996, 37-42). Another, later, using an unusual technique involving “discussion” throughout the interview, found that the issue did benefit the federalist side because awareness of it reduced the propensity of Yes voters to hold to their position (London Free Press, 14 May 1997). A later poll found that a majority of Quebecers believed there is “a real risk” of partition, and 60% agreed that regions that wished to remain in Canada should have the right to do so (Globe and Mail, 13 September 1997).

117 In a major speech in Quebec, the president of the C.D. Howe Institute warned partitionists that while their supporters in ROC “may be

456 Notes to pages 355-6 willing to hold your coat as you prepare to fight, they will not be there, or representative of anybody else outside of Quebec, in the event of a decision by Quebecers to separate” (Kierans, President's Digest, 1). See also Bashevkin, “Myths and Rebuttals.” As the editorialists of the Globe and Mail put it, “There is ample doubt that Canadians outside Quebec would materially support partitionists in the face of clear victory for independence, but the scope for conflict within Quebec over partition certainly exists” (13 August 1997). For an American view of the issue, see Sands, “Quebecium est dividae in partes tres,” 3: “For us the debate over Quebec’s borders is like the difference between a haircut and a lobotomy. Where you make the cut will have a decisive influence on the client’s ability to repay.” 118 Conrad Black, “Quebec Partition: The Critical Questions,” letter to the editor, Globe and Mail, 12 February 1997. 119 Globe and Mail, 7 August 1997. 120 The letter was reprinted in the Globe and Mail, 12 August 1997. 121 Globe and Mail, 13 and 28 August 1997. 122 London Free Press, 13 August 1997. Under section 43 of the Constitution Act, 1982, changes to “boundaries between provinces” require the consent of the legislative assemblies of the affected provinces. The

sovereigntists generally argue that this provision guarantees that Quebec’s borders would remain intact throughout a secession; the federalists reply that the provision holds only so long as Quebec remains a province within Canada, covered by the constitution. 123 London Free Press, 28 August 1997.

124 When the issue first surfaced, the federal minister of Indian affairs stated that the Quebec government should clarify whether “they would use force to keep the Mohawks or other aboriginal interests in Quebec” (Globe and Mail, 31 January 1996). Later, Quebec’s intergov-

ernmental affairs minister insisted that a Quebec becoming sovereign would “exercise effective control over all of the territory” and that if federalist municipalities refused to accept a majority decision, “the state would see to it that the laws be enforced” (Globe and Mail, 30 January 1997). Still later, in a typical thrust, Mr Dion suggested that the PQ government should renounce the use of force during a secession (Toronto Star, 20 November 1997). 125 Globe and Mail, 27 August 1996. 126 Globe and Mail, 30 August 1996. 127 Le Devoir, 2 August 1996. (“The struggle of francophone, anglophone,

and native minorities is unending. One of the functions of the federal government is to make certain that people have the means to defend their rights under the Canadian constitution.”) 128 Montreal Gazette, 2 August 1996. 129 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 27 February 1996, 5.

457 Notes to pages 356-8 130 Globe and Mail, 16 May and 1 October 1996. 131 Globe and Mail, 28 September 1996.

132 Mr Dion stated, “The National Assembly has a perfect right to ask any question it wants. But to accomplish secession requires a question on secession. If you pose a question that is confused and leads to other possibilities, you are not in a situation where you are able to negotiate secession” (Globe and Mail, 1 October 1996). 133 Globe and Mail, 21 December 1995. There were also suggestions that

an unclear question or a sovereignty bill based on one could be blocked through the lieutenant-governor’s powers of reservation and disallowance (London Free Press, 24 January 1997). 134 Montreal Gazette, 12 May 1997. Mr Dion stated, “We will not negotiate

secession if we do not have the certainty that it’s what people want. We do demand the right to have a clear question established. We hope to establish it in relation with Mr Bouchard, rather than in a unilateral manner.” See also London Free Press, 16 May 1996, reporting

Mr Chrétien: “If ever we have a referendum by any province I hope that there will be a discussion before to make sure that the rules are known by both sides.” 135 Globe and Mail, 11 and 21 December 1995, 31 January 1996. 136 Globe and Mail, 31 January 1996. 137 Globe and Mail, 16 May 1996. 138 Monahan and Bryant, Coming to Terms with Plan B, 29-31. See also Jeffrey Simpson, “Two Quebec Pen Pals Have Different Definitions of Democracy,” Globe and Mail, 15 August 1997. 139 London Free Press, 2 September 1995. 140 Globe and Mail, 6 September 1995. An official in the Prime Minister’s Office said, “I wouldn’t touch that with a 10-foot pole” (Globe and Mail, 9 September 1995). 141 Bertrand v. Québec (Procureur Général), 127 Dominion Law Reports, 408— 32, 428. He concluded by holding that “Bill 1, entitled an Act respecting the future of Québec, introduced by Prime Minister Jacques Parizeau in the National Assembly on September 7, 1995, which

would grant the National Assembly of Québec the power to proclaim that Québec will become a sovereign country without the need to follow the amending procedure provided for in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, constitutes a serious threat to the rights and freedoms of the plaintiff guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in particular in ss. 2, 3, 6, 7, 15, and 24(1)” (ibid., 432). The cited sections of the Charter refer to freedom of peaceful

assembly, the right to vote for federal representatives, mobility rights within Canada, “security of the Person,” equality rights, and the right to seek redress in the courts for rights violations. 142 Globe and Mail, 9 September 1995, quoting the Quebec justice minister.

458 Notes to pages 358-61 143 Montreal Gazette, 28 October 1995. 144 Guy Bertrand and Angeline Fournier, “The Rules of the Game,” Montreal Gazette, 25 January 1996.

145 Quebec’s lawyers argued that Mr Bertrand’s demand “est irrecevable parce qu'il concerne des questions non justiciables et sur lesquelles cette cour n’a pas juridiction”; and, referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that because “la volonté des peuples est le fondement de l’autorité des pouvoirs publics,” then “le processus d’accession du Québec a la souveraineté a pour fondement le principe démocratique et il s‘agit d’un question qui ne reléve pas de la juridiction des tribunaux” (Quebec, Attorney General, Regéte déclinatoire, sections 12, 14). (The request “cannot be entertained because it concerns questions that are nonjusticiable and over which this court has no jurisdiction”; and because “the will of peoples is the basis of governmental authority,” then “the process of Quebec’s accession to sovereignty is based on the democratic principle and involves a question that is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.”) 146 Canada, Attorney General, Synopsis of the Position of the Attorney General, section 16 (emphasis in original). The attorney general had

been named as a third party by Mr Bertrand. 147 Toronto Star, 10 May 1996; Globe and Mail, 11 May 1996. 148 Globe and Mail, 14 May 1996. 149 Globe and Mail, 15 May 1996. 150 Globe and Mail, 18 May 1996; Toronto Star, 17 May 1996. 151 Globe and Mail, 14 May 1996. 152 Globe and Mail, 18 May 1996; Toronto Star, 10 May 1996.

153 Canada, Attorney General, News Media Advisory, “Summary of the Argument of the Attorney General of Canada in the Bertrand Case (Quebec’s Motion to Dismiss),” 2. 154 Globe and Mail, 31 August 1996. 155 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 26 September 1996, 4709. 156 Ibid., 4708. 157 London Free Press, 27 September 1996. 158 Globe and Mail, 12 May 1997. 159 Globe and Mail, 15 and 16 July 1997. See also La Presse, 28 December 1996. The lawyer was André Joli-Coeur. 160 La Presse, 27 September 1996. 161 Globe and Mail, 12 May 1997. 162 La Presse, 27 September 1996; Toronto Star, 29 September 1996. 163 Globe and Mail, 27 September 1996; Toronto Star, 29 September 1996.

This argument, which has potential legal consequences as well as political implications, is a long-standing one, hotly debated among Quebec intellectuals. In brief, sovereigntists tend to maintain that the constitution was patriated without the consent of the National

459 Notes to pages 361-3 Assembly and that it both reduced the assembly’s powers, in part by making them subordinate to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and eliminated the province’s veto, which it traditionally possessed as the homeland of one of Canada’s two founding peoples. The federalist position, essentially, is that Quebec members of Parliament and many members of the National Assembly voted for the new constitution, and that Premier Lévesque negotiated away any conventional veto possessed by Quebec. For background, see Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream, 125-49, and McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 136-75; for an example of how the

“imposition” can legitimize sovereignty, see Les intellectuels pour la souveraineté, “Oui au changement”; for a debate on the issue, see Pierre Trudeau, “J’accuse,” Ottawa Citizen, 4 February 1996, and Lucien Bouchard, “Trudeau’s ‘I accuse’ Smacks of Déja Vu,” Globe and Mail, 12 February 1996; and for the critical exchange of letters on the matter between Mr Trudeau and Mr Lévesque in 1981-82, see Hurley, Amending Canada’s Constitution, appendices 11-16. 164 Lise Bissonnette, “Un an plus tard, la clarté,” editorial, Le Devoir, 17 September 1996 (“un carcan”). 165 London Free Press, 19 December 1997 (Jacques Brassard). 166 Lysiane Gagnon, “Court’s Friend Draws Anger of Sovereigntists,” Globe and Mail, 26 July 1997.

167 The minister of justice said, “Of course we'd use that, nationally and internationally” (Globe and Mail, 28 September 1996). 168 As the new minister of justice put it after the 1997 election, Canada can no longer be held “hostage” by the sovereigntists (London Free Press, 25 June 1997). 169 Montreal Gazette, 12 May 1997.

170 In his letter to Bernard Landry, Mr Dion insisted on a process that would be clear, legal, and fair for Quebecers and all Canadians: “If we are all to agree on such a procedure, we must discuss it calmly and in a level-headed manner, as our fellow citizens wish us to do” (Globe and Mail, 28 August 1997). 171 Lise Bissonnette, “Un an plus tard, la clarté,” editorial, Le Devoir, 17 September 1996. 172 London Free Press, 25 June 1997. 173 Globe and Mail, 10 June 1996. 174 Preston Manning, “An Open Letter to the Federal Tories,” Globe and Mail, 22 August 1996; Susan Delacourt, “A Pre-campaign Visit with the Boys in the Backrooms,” Globe and Mail, 1 March 1997; London Free

Press, 4 March 1997.

175 Globe and Mail, 28 April 1997. 176 Toronto Star, 8 February 1997, reporting an interview with Mr Chrétien. See also Le Devoir, 10 February 1997.

460 Notes to pages 363-6 177 See the Angus Reid poll reported in the London Free Press, 26 April 1997.

178 Jeffrey Simpson, “Like an Unwelcome Guest, the Issue of Unity Just Won't Go Away,” Globe and Mail, 2 April 1997; David Bercuson and Barry Cooper, “National Unity Will March onto the Agenda,” Globe and Mail, 3 May 1997. 179 Toronto Star, 26 January and 20 April 1997. 180 Globe and Mail, 29 and 30 April 1997. 181 Toronto Star, 2 May 1997. 182 Toronto Star, 20 April 1997. See the poll results reported in the Globe and Mail, 29 March, 12 and 29 April 1997. 183 London Free Press, 29 January 1997. 184 London Free Press, 26 April 1997; Globe and Mail, 1, 15, and 26 May 1997.

185 Reform Party of Canada, A Fresh Start for Canadians, 20-1. Reform supported negotiations to protect Canada’s interests, the right of dissident Quebecers to petition to remain in Canada, the requirement that Quebec assume its population share of the national debt, the revocation of passports from those remaining in Quebec, full rights of passage across Quebec, and approval of the terms of secession through a Canadian referendum. 186 Toronto Star, 2 May 1997. 187 Globe and Mail, 3 May 1997. 188 Globe and Mail and London Free Press, 5 May 1997. 189 Globe and Mail, 9 May 1997. Mr Dion argued that “if Quebecers want an additional demonstration of the reasons which led us to the Supreme Court, well, Mr Parizeau gave it to us.” 190 Globe and Mail, 12 May 1997. 191 Globe and Mail, 9 May 1997. 192 Globe and Mail, 15 May 1997. 193 Globe and Mail, 9 May 1997. 194 London Free Press, 9 May 1997; Globe and Mail, 17 and 19 May 1997. 195 See the polls by Léger & Léger and Environics reported in the Globe and Mail, 12,17, and 19 May 1997. Mr Charest was by far the most popular federal leader in the province, and vote intentions were divided almost equally among the Bloc, the Liberals, and the Progressive Conservatives. 196 Globe and Mail, 15 May 1997. 197 Globe and Mail, 9 and 17 May 1997. 198 Globe and Mail, 20 May 1997 (former leader Michel Gauthier). Along with Mr Duceppe and Mr Bouchard, the leading campaigners were Mr Parizeau and Yves Duhaime, a contender for the Bloc leadership, who waged a bitter campaign against Mr Chrétien in his home riding of Shawinigan.

461 Notes to pages 366-9 199 See the Léger & Léger poll reported in the Globe and Mail, 24 May 1997.

200 Globe and Mail, 21 May 1997; London Free Press, 23 May 1997. 201 London Free Press, 20 May 1997; Globe and Mail, 21 May 1997. 202 Globe and Mail, 21 May 1997. 203 London Free Press and Globe and Mail, 21 May 1997. 204 Globe and Mail, 23 May 1997. 205 London Free Press, 24 May 1997; Globe and Mail, 20 May 1997. 206 Globe and Mail, 26 May 1997. In the televised French-language leaders’

debate on 13 May, one journalist had just asked whether Mr Chrétien would accept a 50.4% Yes margin when the moderator slumped unconscious to the floor. In a subsequent special French-language debate on the national unity issue, the question was not explicitly posed. 207 London Free Press, 27 May 1997. 208 Globe and Mail, 28 May 1997. As the head of a Quebec polling firm put

it, “People vote for the Bloc because they are voting against something. Until now, the Bloc has failed to give them that. Now, the Bloc has been given a reason on a silver platter to vote against something.” 209 Globe and Mail, 5 June 1997. The campaign director said, “There was an instant polarization in that province and only room for one federalist side and one separatist side and that’s what he drove it to — total polarization and we paid the price for that.” On the polls, see Globe and Mail, 29 May 1997. 210 Globe and Mail, 27 May 1997.

211 Ibid. See also Michel Venne, “La majorité, c’est simple,” editorial, Le Devoir, 27 May 1997. 212 Globe and Mail, 28 May 1997. 213 Globe and Mail, 31 May 1997. 214 London Free Press, 20 and 30 May, 1997.

215 Complete results are in the Globe and Mail, 4 June 1997. 216 Jeffrey Simpson, “Vote Failed to Patch Fractured System,” Globe and Mail, 4 June 1997. For a pessimistic reflection on the party system, see Meisel, “An Echo,” 247-8. See also Marzolini, “The Regionalization of Canadian Electoral Politics.” 217 Globe and Mail, 3 May and 6 August 1997. 218 See, for example, Globe and Mail, 7 June 1997. 219 Globe and Mail, 15 May, 9 June, and 2 May 1997; Montreal Gazette, 2 March 1997. 220 Globe and Mail, 30 May, 8 and 10 July 1997. See also Maclean's, 28 July 1997.

221 Business Council on National Issues, “Memorandum for the Honourable Frank McKenna.” The statement is found in the Globe and

462 Notes to pages 369-71 Mail, 31 July 1997. The National Assembly was to “exercise the powers that fall within its jurisdiction,” and the unique character of Quebec was “expressed through its language, culture, institutions and civil law tradition.” The BCNI was careful also to state that “French-speaking Canadians” have been and are “essential partners” in creating the Canadian identity. 222 Globe and Mail, 31 July 1997. 223 See Globe and Mail, 30 July and 7 August 1997. 224 The discussion centred around a paper presented by the Provincial / Territorial Council on Social Policy Renewal, New Approaches to Canada’s Social Union.

225 Globe and Mail, 7 and 8 August 1997. 226 Globe and Mail, 8 August 1997. Mr Bouchard said, “Once again, it

seems to me there has been a demonstration here that there is no solution” (London Free Press, 8 August 1997). 227 Globe and Mail, 9 August 1997. 228 London Free Press, 31 July 1997, and Globe and Mail, 7 August 1997.

Mr Klein had suggested that Ottawa scrap its entire post-referendum approach, including the resolution about distinct society and the bill conferring regional vetoes (Globe and Mail, 23 July and 9 August 1997).

229 London Free Press, 31 July 1997. 230 Stein, Cameron, and Simeon, Citizen Engagement in Conflict Resolution;

Stein, “Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform.” 231 London Free Press, 9 August 1997; Jeffrey Simpson, “A Resolute Unwillingness to Tackle the Unity Issue,” Globe and Mail, 8 August 1997; Lysiane Gagnon, “Populist Ideology Reaches the Silly Stage,” Globe and Mail, 16 August 1997. 232 Calgary Herald, 30 August and 4 September 1997; Globe and Mail, 20 August, 5, 10, and 11 September 1997.

233 Tom Flanagan and Steven Harper, “Dear Premiers ... It’s Time to Oppose — Not Appease — Separatism,” Calgary Herald, 13 September 1997.

234 Le Soleil, 22 August 1997, reporting the remarks of Senator JeanClaude Rivest; Globe and Mail, 23 August 1997. Also, Mr Johnson insisted that recognition of Quebec’s distinct society was essential — it was “non-negotiable” (Le Devoir, 23-4 August 1997). 235 Globe and Mail, 13 September 1997. 236 See, for example, Gordon Gibson, “There’s No Time to Lose,” Globe and Mail, 9 September 1997; and Edmonton Journal, 11 September 1997, reporting a speech by the president of the BCNI. 237 Calgary Herald, 15 September 1997; Globe and Mail, 30 August 1997. 238 Globe and Mail, 16 September 1997; Preston Manning, “Solution to Unity Woes Is in Our Hands,” Calgary Herald, 27 December 1997. As

463 Notes to pages 371-3 the Reform Party leader put it, because any powers granted to Quebec would be available to all provinces, “at last, special status is dying, and the concept of equality is replacing it.” 239 Globe and Mail, 16 September 1997; Daniel Johnson, “The Separatists Are Truly Worried,” Globe and Mail, 11 December 1997. 240 Michel Auger, “No Thanks to Equality of the Provinces,” and Jeffrey Simpson, “The Ghost of ‘Distinct Society’ Is Still Clanking Its Chains,” Globe and Mail, 16 September 1997. 241 Globe and Mail, 16 September 1997 (Jacques Brassard). 242 Globe and Mail, 17 September 1997. 243 London Free Press, 17 September 1997. 244 Globe and Mail, 1 October 1997. 245 Globe and Mail, 15 October 1998. 246 Ibid. See also the poll results in Globe and Mail, 8 December 1997:

support for the declaration was higher than 60% in every province,

including Quebec. 247 Alberta, Dialogue on Unity, My Canada Is... 248 Alberta, Dialogue on Unity, My Canada Is ... Albertans Speak Out on Unity.

249 Ibid., 5. Overall, 76% supported the package. But whereas 47% particularly liked the provincial-equality provision and only 8% found it a matter of concern, a mere 12% especially liked the uniquesociety provision and 33% were concerned by it. Similarly, an Environics poll of Albertans found that 33% of respondents did not think Quebec is unique (Edmonton Journal, 8 December 1997). 250 The actual motion was carefully hedged, as were those passed by some other provincial legislatures. It resolved “that the Legislative Assembly of Alberta be guided by the input received from Albertans during the public consultation process, Dialogue on Unity, and on behalf of the people of Alberta concur with the principles embodied in the elements of the Calgary framework, recognizing that the Calgary framework is not an amendment to the Constitution Acts of 1867 to 1982 and that the specific wording of any amendment to those acts must be approved by Albertans in a referendum in accordance with the Constitution Referendum Act” (Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Alberta Hansard, 8 December 1997, 1313-14.) 251 Globe and Mail, 18 and 19 November 1997. 252 Ottawa Citizen, 21 November 1997. 253 Globe and Mail, 25 September and 26 November 1997. 254 Globe and Mail, 17 September 1997, and Joan Bryden, “Battle over Social Policy Threatens Unity Declaration,” Edmonton Journal, 8 December 1997. 255 Globe and Mail, 28 August and 9 December 1997. See Canada, House of Comons, Debates, 23 September 1997, 5-12.

464 Notes to pages 373-80 256 Globe and Mail, 13 December 1997. 257 Lysiane Gagnon, “Why Bouchard Was Wise to Refuse Ottawa,” Globe and Mail, 20 December 1997. CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

1 Note, however, that even this depends on the course of events. After the Meech Lake Accord failed to be ratified, the QLP was profoundly divided; and after the Bélanger-Campeau Commission reported, it was Robert Bourassa’s Liberal government that decided to hold a referendum. 2 Maclean’s, 16 June 1997, 20. 3 The most striking case is the Great Coalition of 1864 between George Brown’s Reformers and the Conservatives under John A. Macdonald

and George-Etienne Cartier. This powerful combination pressed for a federal solution to the deadlock in the united Canada. I am indebted to Peter Neary for consistently drawing this to my attention. 4 Globe and Mail, 29 October 1996: according to a prominent Quebec political scientist, some hard-line sovereigntists suspect that Mr Bouchard does not want independence, but rather a “new union with Canada where Quebec would be recognized as a nation.” 5 Globe and Mail, 22 November 1995. 6 Globe and Mail, 29 November 1995. 7 Globe and Mail, 1 February 1996. 8 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 November 1995, 16981. 9 Globe and Mail, 8 August 1997. 10 Globe and Mail, 11 March 1996. 11 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 November 1995, 16977. 12 “Explaining Quebec Nationalism,” 97-110. 13 Lemieux, “Le référendum de 1995,” 66. 14 As noted above, there is by no means universal support — even among francophones — for the view that Quebec has the right of self-

determination, and some poll results indicate that a large minority of Quebecers consider Quebec to be a province like the others. See 444n5 and 444n20 above. 15 See, for instance, his reply to the federal government'’s postreferendum initiatives: “My personal wish, in the interests of Quebec and of Canada, although I am aware that it is harder to convince Canada of this than Quebec, is that one day a premier of Quebec will find himself across the table from his federal counterpart, precisely for the purpose of discussing political systems ... But from now on, the situation will be different, because the Premiers [of Quebec] who come to talk about the Constitution and political arrangements will come with a mandate from the people of Quebec. They will not be out

465 Notes to pages 380-92 to retaliate, to be aggressive, to be negative. No. They will come with respect but confident, with the confidence of a prime minister, a head of state, who has received a mandate for sovereignty from the people. In other words, we will negotiate as equals, and then we will be able to agree, and only then. As long as Quebec comes here as a province like the others we will never be able to agree” (Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 29 November 1995, 16981). 16 See chapter 14 above. 17 After taking on the PQ leadership, Mr Bouchard remarked, “I’m provoking English Canada only by breathing, so I’m used to it” (Globe and Mail, 17 January 1996). 18 Pierre Bourgault advocated this strategy in order to eliminate the possibility of voting No while keeping the sovereignty option alive for the future. It was not dismissed by Quebec’s minister of intergovernmental affairs, who said, “It’s not an idea without interest. Are we going to say it as clearly as Mr Bourgault? That remains to be seen” (Toronto Star, 16 March 1997). 19 See Cairns, Looking into the Abyss.

20 See 189-91 above. 21 See 48-59 and 199-204 above. 22 See 152-9 above, and Monahan, “Cooler Heads Shall Prevail.” 23 Dion, “The Dynamic of Secessions,” 545-6. 24 For asensible treatment of many issues involved in the ratification of a sovereignty agreement, including constitutional amendments, see Russell and Ryder, Ratifying a Postreferendum Agreement. These authors suggest, notably, that the rules might be bent in extremis, but only when a referendum had carried in all five regions. The major provinces could still block ratification, of course. 25 See 119-20 above, treating Lamont’s Breakup. 26 Here it is worth recalling the massive public support within ROC for the imposition of the War Measures Act during the FLQ crisis of 1970. 27 See Diane Francis, “Mouvement Growing Much Bolder,” London Free Press, 4 December 1997. Raymond Villeneuve, leader of the Mouvement de libération nationale du Québec, whose adherents have been involved in scuffles with partitionists, has said, “On est préts a se battre jusqu’au bout pour l’indépendance” (“We are ready to fight to the end for independence”), Le Devoir, 12 December 1997. 28 Ontario sovereignty is also possible. For an account of the province’s shift in economic linkages towards the United States and of its governments’ growing alienation from the federal system of which traditionally it was the keystone, see Courchene, From Heartland to North American Region State. See also William Christian, “And now ... Ontario Separatism,” Globe and Mail, 2 October 1997.

29 The Economic Council’s Confederation of Regions model had Ottawa

466 Notes to pages 393-4 responsible for the debt, currency, defence, tariffs and the customs union, external trade, and international relations, with shared responsibility for the environment, transportation, communications, taxation, culture, and policing and justice (A Joint Venture, fig. 5-1). 30 Ibid., 83-4. See also Leslie, The European Community and The Maastricht Model. 31 McCallum, “The Canadian Economic Union after Breakup,” 79. 32 Gordon Gibson, “Largesse, He Says,” Globe and Mail, 7 October 1997.

33 This is why some commentators have written off the option. See Leslie, “Options for the Future of Canada,” 136-7.

Selected Bibliography

Adams, Michael, and Mary Jane Lennon. “The Public’s View of the Canadian Federation.” In Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation 1990, 97-108. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1990. Alberta, Dialogue on Unity. My Canada Is ... [pamphlet]. 2 October 1997. — My Canada Is... Albertans Speak Out on Unity [pamphlet]. December 1997. Allaire Report (Report of the Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party). A Québec Free to Choose. For submission to the 25th Convention, 28 January 1991. Archer, J.A. “The Prairie Perspective.” In R.M. Burns, ed., One Country or Two? 231-51. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1971.

Archer, Keith, and Faron Ellis. “Opinion Structure of Party Activists: The Reform Party of Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 27, no. 2 (1994): 277-308.

Association des économistes québécois. “Mémoire a la Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec,” November 1991. Atkinson, Lloyd C. “A Comment.” In David E.W. Laidler and William B.P. Robson, eds., Two Nations, One Money? Canada Round Series no. 3, 53-5. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. Atkinson, Michael. “Public Policy and the New Institutionalism.” In Atkinson, ed., Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy, 17-45. Toronto: Harcourt

Brace Jovanovich 1993. Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books 1984.

Bakvis, Herman. “Federalism, New Public Management, and Labour-Market Development.” In Patrick C. Fafard and Douglas M. Brown, eds.,

468 Bibliography Canada: The State of the Federation 1996, 135-65. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1996. Banting, Keith G. “Introduction: The Politics of Constitutional Change.” In

Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon, eds., Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change, 1-29. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1985.

— “Tf Quebec Separates: Restructuring Northern North America.” In R. Kent Weaver, ed., The Collapse of Canada? 159-78. Washington: The Brookings Institution 1992. Bashevkin, Sylvia. “Myths and Rebuttals.” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 35-9. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Beaudoin, Louise, and Jacques Vallée. “La reconnaissance internationale d’un Québec souverain.” In Alain-G. Gagnon and Francois Rocher, eds., Répliques aux détracteurs de la souveraineté du Québec, 181-205. Montreal: VLB éditeur 1992.

Bell, David. “Getting to the Table: The Prenegotiation of Deconfederation.” In Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, 47-57. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992. Belleau, Josée. “Le Sommet de l’emploi et de l’économie: A soleil trompeur, une participation sans illusions.” Société québécoise de science politique, bulletin 6, no. 1 (1996): 7-11.

Bellemare, Diane. “Réponses aux questions posées par la Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du Quebec.” In Quebec, Commission sur l’avenir, Les avis des spécialistes, Working Paper no. 4, 21-44. Quebec 1991. Bercuson, David Jay, and Barry Cooper. Deconfederation: Canada without Quebec.

Toronto: Key Porter 1991.

Berger, Thomas R. “Quebec’s Rendezvous with Independence.” In J.L. Granatstein and Kenneth McNaught, eds., “English Canada” Speaks Out, 309-21. Toronto: Doubleday 1991. Bergeron, Gérard. “Projet d'un nouveau Commonwealth canadien.” Journal of Canadian Studies 12, no. 3 July 1977): 8-17. Bernier, Ivan. “Le maintien de l’accés aux marchés extérieurs: Certaines questions juridiques soulevées dans l’hypothése de la souveraineté du

Québec.” In Quebec, Commission sur l’avenir, Eléments d’analyse économique, Working Paper no. 1, 1-17. Quebec 1991.

Bickerton, James. “Alternative Futures: Atlantic Canada and the Constitutional Crisis.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, Saint John, 25~7 October 1991. Biggs, Margaret. “Building Blocks for Canada’s New Social Union,” Canadian Policy Research Networks, Working Paper no. F[02], 1996. Black, Conrad. “Canada’s Continuing Identity Crisis.” Foreign Affairs 17, no. 2 (1995): 99-115.

469 Bibliography Blais, André. “The Quebec Referendum: Quebeckers Say No.” In Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick J. Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada, 200-7. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993.

— “Quebec: Raising the Stakes.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, 12 June 1994. — “Will Quebec Secede?” Panel discussion, McMaster University, 19 September 1994. Blais, André, and Jean Créte. “Pourquoi l’opinion publique au Canada anglais

a-t-elle rejeté l’Accord du lac Meech.” In Raymond Hudon and Réjean Pelletier, eds., L’engagement intellectuel: Mélanges en l'honneur de Léon Dion,

385-400. Ste-Foy: Presses de l’Université Laval 1991. Blais, André, and Richard Nadeau. “To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist: Quebeckers’ Perennial Dilemma.” Canadian Public Policy 18, no. 1 (1992): 89103.

Blais, André, Jean Créte, and Guy Lachapelle. “L’élection québécoise de 1985: Un bilan des sondages.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 19, no. 2 (1986): 323-36.

Blais, André, Richard Nadeau, and Pierre Martin. “Pourquoi le Oui a-t-il fait des gains pendant la campagne référendaire?” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 71-6. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Bland, Douglas. “Defence North of the 49th Parallel: What Happens to the Military?” In Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, 204-12. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992. Bloc québécois. Proposition pour un Partenariat économique et politique entre le Québec et le Canada. Rapport du Groupe de travail sur l’union économique et les institutions communes. Montreal: Bloc québécois, 8 June 1995. Boadway, Robin W., Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds. Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change. 2 vols. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991. Boadway, Robin W., Douglas D. Purvis, and Jean-Frangois Wen. “Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change: A Survey of the Issues.” In Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 1:12-44. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991. Bookman, Milica Zarkovic. The Economics of Secession. New York: St Martin’s Press 1993. Boothe, Paul, ed. Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change. Western

Studies in Economic Policy no. 3. Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research 1992.

- “Constitutional Change and the Provision of Government Goods and Services.” In Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change,

Western Studies in Economic Policy no. 3, 19-48. Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research 1992.

470 Bibliography Boothe, Paul, and Richard Harris. “Alternative Divisions of Federal Assets and Liabilities.” In Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 2:45373. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991.

Boothe, Paul, Barbara Johnston, and Karrin Powys-Lybbe. “Dismantling Confederation: The Divisive Question of the National Debt.” In Boothe et al., Closing the Books, Canada Round Series no. 8, 26-55. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. Boothe, Paul, et al. Closing the Books: Dividing Federal Assets and Debt if Canada

Breaks Up. Canada Round Series no.8. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. Bouchard, Lucien. Un nouveau parti pour l’étape décisive. Montreal: Fides 1993. Bourgault, Pierre. Now or Never! Manifesto for an Independent Quebec. Toronto: Key Porter Books 1991. Breton, Albert. “Supplementary Statement.” In Canada, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Report, 3:486-526. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1985. —- “A Minimalist Strategy to Deal with Quebec Secessionism.” Paper presented at the Seventh Villa Colombella Seminar, Rome, 6 September 1996. Brimelow, Peter, “Canadian Roulette.” Forbes, 25 September 1995, 46-8.

Broadbent, Edward. “Post-Referendum Canada.” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 271-80. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Brossard, Jacques. L’accession a la souveraineté et le cas du Québec: Conditions et modalités politico-juridiques. Montreal: Presses de |’Université de Montréal 1976.

Brown, Douglas M. “The Evolving Role of the Provinces in Canada-US. Trade Relations.” In Brown and Earl H. Fry, eds., States and Provinces in the International Economy, 93-144. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press 1993. - “Thinking the ‘Unthinkable.’” In Patrick C. Fafard and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation 1996, 23-44. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1996. Buchanan, Allen. Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter .to Lithuania and Quebec. Boulder: Westview Press 1991. — “Quebec Secession and Native Territorial Rights.” Network 2, no. 3 (March 1992): 2-4. Buchheit, Lee C. Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination. New Haven: Yale University Press 1978. Burelle, André. Le mal canadien. Montreal: Fides 1995.

- “Pour un fédéralisme partenarial a la canadienne.” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 283-92. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Burns, R.M., ed. One Country or Two? Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1971.

471 Bibliography Business Council on National Issues. “Today and Tomorrow: An Agenda for Action.” Ideas and recommendations of the Confederation 2000 Conference participants, 3-4 May 1996. — “Memorandum for the Honourable Frank McKenna, Premier of New Brunswick and Chairman-Designate, Council of Premiers.” 15 July 1997. Cairns, Alan C. “The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, no. 4 (1977): 695-725.

- “The Politics of Constitutional Renewal in Canada.” In Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon, eds., Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change, 95-145. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1985. — “The Charter, Interest Groups, Executive Federalism, and Constitutional Reform.” In David E. Smith, Peter MacKinnon, and John C. Courtney, eds., After Meech Lake: Lessons for the Future, 13-31. Saskatoon: Fifth House 1991.

- “Constitutional Change and the Three Equalities.” In Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada, 77-100. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991. - “An Election to Be Remembered: Canada 1993.” Canadian Public Policy 20, no. 3 (1994): 219-34. — “Looking Back from the Future.” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 77-80. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. — Looking into the Abyss: The Need for a Plan C. Commentary no. 96. Toronto:

C.D. Howe Institute 1997. Cameron, Barbara. “A Constitution for English Canada.” In Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, 230-43. Toronto:

James Lorimer 1992. Cameron, David. “Does Ottawa Know It Is Part of the Problem?” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 293-8. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Campbell, Tom. “Statement.” In United States, House of Representatives, The Issue of Quebec’s Sovereignty and Its Potential Impact on the United States,

29-31. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1996. Canada. Citizenship Act: Office Consolidation. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1990. — Shaping Canada’s Future Together: Proposals. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1991. - North American Free Trade Agreement. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1992. — North American Free Trade Agreement: An Overview and Description. Ottawa:

n.p., August 1992. - Attorney General. Synopsis of the Position of the Attorney General of Canada on the Motion to Dismiss, filed in Quebec Superior Court, Bertrand v. Bégin, case no: 200-05-002117-955, 22 May 1996.

472 Bibliography ~ Chief Electoral Officer. Report of the Chief Electoral Officer. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1984, 1988. — Department of Justice. A Consolidation of the Constitution Acts 1987-1982. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1983. — Department of National Defence. The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces. Vol. 1. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer 1968 (updated). — Employment and Immigration Canada. Canada-Québec Accord relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1991. ~ External Affairs Canada. The Canada—U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs n.d. — Federal-Provincial Committee. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Gouvernement du Québec. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer 1978. — Federal-Provincial Relations Office, Canadian Unity Information Office. Sovereignty-Association: The Contradictions. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1978.

- House of Commons, Office of the Leader of the Opposition. “Discours de l’honorable Lucien Bouchard, député de Lac-Saint-Jean, chef de l’opposition officielle et chef du Bloc québécois.” Prononcé lors de l’ouverture du Congrés national du Bloc québécois, Palais des Congres, Montreal, 7 April 1995. ~ Revenue Canada. Taxation Statistics 1992. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1993. — Senate and House of Commons. A Renewed Canada, report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, 28 February 1992.

— Task Force on Program Review. Real Property. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1986. ~ Treasury Board Secretariat. Directory of Federal Real Property. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1992.

Chambers, Edward J., and Michael B. Percy. “Natural Resources and the Western Canadian Economy: Implications for Constitutional Change.” In Norman Cameron et al. eds., From East and West. Canada Round Series no. 6, 59-85. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. — “Structural Characteristics of the Alberta Economy: Implications for Constitutional Scenarios.” In Paul Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change, Western Studies in Economic Policy no. 3, 163-204. Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research 1992. — Western Canada in the International Economy. Western Studies in Economic Policy, no. 2. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press 1992.

Chant, John. “Dividing the Debt: Avoiding the Burden.” In Paul Boothe et al., Closing the Books: Dividing Federal Assets and Debt if Canada Breaks

Up, Canada Round Series no. 8, 84-91. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991.

473 Bibliography —- “Financial Regulation under Alternative Constitutional Arrangements.” In Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 2:409-24. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991. Cloutier, Edouard, Jean H. Guay, and Daniel Latouche. Le virage: L’évolution de l’opinion publique au Québec depuis 1960. Montreal: Québec/ Amérique 1992.

Coleman, William D. Business and Politics: A Study of Collective Action. Montreal:

McGill-Queen’s University Press 1988. — “Standing Ready: Quebec’s Quasi-State and Interest Associations.” Paper presented to Conference on Nationalism, McMaster University, 2-4 May 1994. Conway, John F. Debts to Pay: A Fresh Approach to the Quebec Question, 2nd ed. Toronto: Lorimer 1997.

Coon-Come, Matthew. “The Crees, Self-Determination, Secession and the Territorial Integrity of Quebec.” Network 2, no. 5 (May 1992): 11-12. Cooper, Mary H. “Quebec Sovereignty.” The CQ Researcher 5, no. 37 (1995): 873-95.

Coté, Marcel. “Souveraineté: Les coats de transition.” Paper presented to conference Projet “90,” Module Administration, Université du Québec a Montréal, 24 March 1992. ~- La réve de la terre promise: Les cotits de l’indépendance. Montreal: Stanké 1995.

- “Adapting or Breaking: Corporate Strategies for the Future of Canada.” Unpublished manuscript, February 1996. Coté, Marcel, and David Johnston. If Québec Goes ... The Real Cost of Separation. Toronto: Stoddart 1995.

Coulombe, Gérard (Desjardins Ducharme). “La souveraineté du Québec et les institutions financiéres.” In Quebec, Assemblée nationale, Commission d’étude, Les implications de la mise en oeuvre de la souveraineté (deuxiéme

partie). Exposés et études, 4:371-559. Quebec 1992. Courchene, Thomas J. “Canada 1992: Political Denouement or Economic Renaissance.” In Robin W. Boadway, Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 1:45-76. Kingston: John

Deutsch Institute 1991. - In Praise of Renewed Federalism. Canada Round Series no. 2. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. - “Toward the Reintegration of Social and Economic Policy.” In G. Bruce Doern and Bryne Purchase, eds., Canada at Risk? Canadian Public Policy in the 1990s, 125-48. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. - “The Community of the Canadas.” In Courchene, Rearrangements: The Courchene Papers, 72-103. Toronto: Mosaic Press 1992. — “What Does Ontario Want?” In Courchene, Rearrangements, 1-42. Toronto: Mosaic Press 1992.

474 Bibliography — Social Canada in the Millennium, The Social Policy Challenge no. 4. Toronto:

C.D. Howe Institute 1994. — Redistributing Money and Power: A Guide to the Canada Health and Social Transfer. Observation no. 39. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1995. — “Staatsnation vs Kulturnation: The Future of ROC.” In Kenneth McRoberts, ed., Beyond Quebec: The Canada that Remains, 388-99. Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press 1995. - “ACCESS: A Convention on the Canadian Economic and Social Systems.” Working paper prepared for the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Government of Ontario, August 1996. Courchene, Thomas J., and John McDougall. “The Context for Future Con-

stitutional Options.” In Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada, 33-51. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991.

Courchene, Thomas J., with Colin R. Telmer. From Heartland to North American Region State: The Social, Fiscal and Federal Evolution of Ontario. Toronto:

Centre for Public Management, University of Toronto 1998. Covell, Maureen. Thinking about the Rest of Canada: Options for Canada without Quebec. Study no. 6, Background Studies of the York University Constitutional Reform Project. North York: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy 1992.

d’Aquino, Thomas. “The Case for Canada: A Perspective on Canada’s Political and Economic Future.” Address to the Paul H. Nitze School of

Advanced International Studies, Centre of Canadian Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, February 1997. Dasko, Donna. “The Ties That Bound: Canadians’ Changing Perceptions of the Federal System.” Network 2, nos. 6-7 (1992): 5-11. Dauphin, Roma, and Stanislas Slosar. “Etude des modalités de maintien de l’espace économique canadien actuel aprés l’accession du Québec a la souveraineté.” In Quebec, Assemblée nationale, Commission d’étude, Les implications de la mise en oeuvre de la souveraineté (premiére partie), Exposés

et études, 3:139-84. Quebec 1992. Day, Shelagh. “Speaking for Ourselves.” In Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick . J. Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada, 58-72. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993. Dehem, Roger. On the Meaning of “Economic Association.” Montreal: C.D. Howe

Research Institute 1978. de Mestral, A.L.C. “Economic Integration under the GATT, the FTA, the Treaty of Rome, and the Canadian Constitution.” In Stanley H. Hartt et al., Tangled Web, Canada Round Series no. 15, 31-53. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1992.

Derriennic, Jean-Pierre. Nationalisme et démocratie. Montreal: Boréal 1995.

Desjardins, Marc. “Lucien Bouchard at the Helm: An Assessment of the Premier’s First Six Months in Power.” In Patrick C. Fafard and Douglas

475 Bibliography M. Brown, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation 1996, 77-95. Kingston:

Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1996. Dion, Léon. Nationalismes et politique au Québec. Montreal: Hurtubise 1975. —- “Pour sortir de l’impasse constitutionelle.” In Quebec, Commission sur l’avenir, Les avis des spécialistes, Working Paper no. 4, 269-80. Quebec 1991.

Dion, Stéphane. “Explaining Quebec Nationalism.” In R. Kent Weaver, ed., The Collapse of Canada? 77-121. Washington: Brookings Institution 1992. — “The Importance of the Language Issue in the Constitutional Crisis.” In Douglas Brown and Robert Young, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation

1992, 77-88. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1992. - “Quebec Secession: What Are the Odds?” Paper presented at the Colloquium on Canadian Government and Politics, Bowling Green State University, 22 January 1994. - “The Dynamic of Secessions: Scenarios after a Pro-Separatist Vote in a Quebec Referendum.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 28, no. 3 (1995): 533-51. - “Why Is Secession Rare? Lessons from Quebec.” British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 2 (1996): 269-83.

- “Building Bridges to National Reconciliation.” Notes for an address to the Annual Social Studies Council Conference of the Alberta Teachers’ Association, Lethbridge, 18 October 1996. - “The Challenges of the Canadian Economic Union.” Notes for an address to the Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association, Ottawa, 20 November 1996.

Donner, Arthur, and Fred Lazar. “The Case for a Single Currency and a Reformed Central Bank.” In Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, 127-38. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992. Doran, Charles. “Will Canada Unravel?” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (1996): 97109.

Drache, Daniel. “Negotiating with Québec: A New Division of Powers or Secession?” In Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, 13-29. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992. Drache, Daniel, and Roberto Perin, eds. Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992. Economic Council of Canada. A Joint Venture: The Economics of Constitutional Options, Twenty-Eighth Annual Review. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 1991. Elton, David, “The Charlottetown Accord Senate: Effective or Emasculated?” In Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick J. Monahan, The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada, 37-55. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993. - “Canada 1996: The Reconfederation Challenge.” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 299-307. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1996.

476 Bibliography

Emanueli, Claude C. “L’accession du Québec a la souveraineté et la nationalité.” In Quebec, Assemblée nationale, Commission d’étude, Les attributs d'un Québec souverain, Exposés et études, 1:61-113. Quebec 1992.

Fafard, Patrick, and Darrel R. Reid. Constituent Assemblies: A Comparative Survey. Research Paper no. 30. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1991. Finkelstein, Neil, and George Vegh. The Separation of Quebec and the Constitution of Canada. Study no. 2, Background Studies of the York University Constitutional Reform Project. North York: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy 1992. Fortin, Bernard. “Les options monétaires d’un Québec souverain.” In Québec, Commission sur l’avenir, Eléments d’analyse économique, Working Paper no. 1, 283-302. Quebec 1991.

Fortin, Pierre. “How Economics Is Shaping the Constitutional Debate in Quebec.” In Robert Young, ed., Confederation in Crisis, 35-44. Toronto: James Lorimer 1991.

— “La question de l’emploi au Québec: La photo et le film.” In Québec, Commission sur l’avenir, Eléments d’analyse économique, Working Paper no. 1, 167-241. Quebec 1991. — “The Threat of Quebec Sovereignty: Meaning, Likelihood and Economic Consequences.” In Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 2:33544. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991.

- “A Comment.” In John McCallum and Chris Green, Parting as Friends, Canada Round Series no. 5, 87-90. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. - “Le passage a la souveraineté et le déficit budgétaire du Québec.” In Alain-

G. Gagnon and Francois Rocher, eds., Répliques au détracteurs de la souveraineté du Québec, 440-459. Montreal: VLB éditeur 1992. Fournier, Pierre. Autopsie du lac Meech: La souveraineté est-elle inévitable? Montreal: VLB éditeur 1990. Franck, Thomas M. “East African Federation.” In Franck, ed., Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federalism, 3-36. New York: New York University Press 1968. Franck, Thomas M., et al. “L’intégrité territoriale du Québec dans l’hypothése de l’accession a la souveraineté.” In Québec, Assemblée nationale, Commission d’étude, Les attributs d'un Québec souverain, Exposés et études, 1:377-445. Quebec 1992. Fraser, Alistair, W.F. Dawson, and John A. Holtby. Beauchesne’s Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada. 6th ed. Toronto: Carswell 1989.

Freeman, Alan, and Patrick Grady. Dividing the House: Planning for a Canada without Quebec. Toronto: HarperCollins 1995. Fry, Earl H. Canada’s Unity Crisis: Implications for U.S.-Canadian Economic Relations. New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1992.

477 Bibliography

- “Quebec’s Sovereignty Movement and Its Implications for the U.S. Economy.” In United States, House of Representatives, The Issue of Quebec’s Sovereignty and Its Potential Impact on the United States, 59-67. Washing-

ton: U.S. Government Printing Office 1996. Gagnon, Alain-G., and Guy Lachapelle. “Québec Confronts Canada: Two Competing Societal Projects Searching for Legitimacy.” Publius 26, no. 3 (1996): 177-91.

Gagnon, Alain-G., and Francois Rocher, eds. Répliques aux détracteurs de la souveraineté du Québec. VLB éditeur 1992.

Gibbins, Roger. “Speculations on a Canada without Quebec.” In Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick J. Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada, 264-73. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993.

— Time Out: Assessing Incremental Strategies for Enhancing the Canadian Political Union. Commentary no. 88. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1997. Gibson, Gordon. “What If the Wheels Fall Off the Constitutional Bus?” Canada West Foundation. Alternatives "92, May 1992. — Plan B: The Future of the Rest of Canada. Vancouver: Fraser Institute 1994. — Renewing the Federation: Options for British Columbia. Prepared for the National Unity Project, British Columbia. Vancouver: Queen’s Printer 1997.

Goldberg, Michael A., and Maurice D. Levi. “Growing Together or Apart: The Risks and Returns of Alternative Constitutions of Canada.” Canadian Public Policy 20, no.4 (1994): 341-52. Grady, Patrick. Economic Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty. Vancouver: Fraser

Institute 1991. — The National Debt and New Constitutional Arrangements. Economic Council of Canada Working Paper no. 26. Ottawa: Economic Council 1992. Granatstein, J.L. “Canada, Quebec and the World.” In Granatstein and Ken-

neth McNaught, eds., “English Canada” Speaks Out, 94-106. Toronto: Doubleday 1991. Granatstein, J.L., and Kenneth McNaught, eds. “English Canada” Speaks Out. Toronto: Doubleday 1991. Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec). Sovereign Injustice: Forcible Inclusion of the James Bay Crees and Cree Territory into a Sovereign Quebec. Nemaska,

Quebec: Grand Council of the Crees 1995. Grant, John. “A Comment.” In Daniel E.W. Laidler and William B.P. Robson, eds., Two Nations, One Money? 57-63. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. Greenspon, Edward, and Anthony Wilson-Smith. Double Vision: The Inside Story of the Liberals in Power. Toronto: Doubleday (Seal Books) 1997. Grey, Julius H. “Winning Quebec for Canada.” Policy Options 13, no.4 (May 1992): 20-1.

Grieco, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485-507.

478 Bibliography Group of 22. Making Canada Work Better. N.p. 1 May 1996.

Haddow, Rodney. “Federalism and Training Policy in Canada: Institutional Barriers to Economic Adjustment.” In Francois Rocher and Miriam Smith, eds., New Trends in Canadian Federalism, 338-68. Peterborough: Broadview Press 1995.

Harris, Richard G., and Douglas D. Purvis. “Some Economic Aspects of Political Restructuring.” In Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 1:189-

211. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991.

Hartt, Stanley H. “Sovereignty and the Economic Union.” In Hartt et al., Tangled Web, Canada Round Series no. 15, 3-30. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1992. Hartt, Stanley H.., et al. Tangled Web: Legal Aspects of Deconfederation. Canada

Round Series no. 15. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1992. Havel, Vaclav. Summer Meditations, trans. Paul Wilson. Toronto: Vintage Books

Canada 1993. Hawkes, David C. “Reconfederating Canada.” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 309-16. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Haydon, Peter. “General Security Analysis of the Scenarios.” In Alex Morrison, ed., Divided We Fall, 27-37. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies 1991.

Heard, Andrew, and Tim Swartz. “The Regional Veto Formula and Its Effects on Canada’s Constitutional Amendment Process.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 2 (1997): 339-56. Hicks, Ursula K. Federalism: Failure and Success. London: Macmillan 1978.

Hodgins, Bruce W. “The Northern Boundary of Quebec: The James Bay Crees as Self-Governing Canadians.” In J.L. Granatstein and Kenneth McNaught, eds., “English Canada” Speaks Out, 141-9. Toronto: Doubleday 1991. Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. Toronto: Carswell 1985. — Is the Constitution of Canada Ready for the 21st Century? Study no. 1, Background Studies of the York University Constitutional Reform Project. North York: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy 1992.

Howitt, Peter. “Constitutional Reform and the Bank of Canada.” In Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 2:383-408. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991. Hurley, James Ross. Amending Canada’s Constitution. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1996. Imbeau, Louis-M. “Le compromis est-il encore possible? La négotiation constitutionnelle de l’aprés-Meech 4 la lumiére de la théorie des jeux.” In Louis Balthazar, Guy Laforest, and Vincent Lemieux, eds., Le Québec et la

479 Bibliography

restructuration de Canada 1980-1992, 283-309. Sillery: Editions du Septentrion 1991. (English translation in University of Western Ontario, Political Economy Research Group, Papers in Political Economy, no. 23, May 1992.) Informetrica Ltd. Financial Sector: Deposit-Taking Institutions. Economics of

Confederation Study no. 6.0, Ottawa: Informetrica Limited 1991. - Financial Sector: Life and Health Insurance. Economics of Confederation Study no. 9.0, Ottawa: Informetrica Limited 1991. — Registered Pension Plans. Economics of Confederation Study no. 2.0, Ot-

tawa: Informetrica Limited 1991. — Supply Management: Dairy. Economics of Confederation Study no. 7.1, Ottawa: Informetrica Limited 1991. - Supply Management: Poultry and Eggs. Economics of Confederation Study no. 8.0, Ottawa: Informetrica Limited 1991. Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University. Approaches to National Standards in Federal Systems. Research report for the Government of Ontario, September 1991. -— Assessing ACCESS. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1997. Ip, Irene K., and William B.P. Robson. “Liquidating the Federal Balance Sheet:

some Additional Modest Proposals.” In Paul Boothe et al., Closing the Books, Canada Round Series no. 8, 69-83.Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991.

Islam, M. Rafiqul. “Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra and Bangladesh.” Journal of Peace Research 22, no. 3 (1985): 211-21. Janda, Richard. Re-balancing the Federation through Senate Reform: Another Look

at the Bundesrat. Study no. 11, Background Studies of the York University Constitutional Reform Project. North York: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy 1992. Jockel, Joseph. If Canada Breaks Up: Implications for U.S. Policy. Occasional Paper no. 7, Canadian-American Public Policy. Orono, Maine: University of Maine, Canadian-American Centre 1991. — “The USA Reaction.” In Alex Morrison, ed., Divided We Fall, 141-7. Toronto: . Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies 1991. — “And if Quebec Secedes? A View from The United States.” Current History 94, no. 590 (1995): 127-30. - “On Watching, from across the Border, the Canadian Game of Chicken.” In Charles F. Doran and Ellen Reisman Babby, eds., Being and Becoming Canadian. Vol. 538 of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 16-26. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Periodicals Press 1995.

- “Prepared Statement.” In United States, House of Representatives, The Issue of Quebec's Sovereignty and Its Potential Impact on the United States, 43-58. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1996.

480 Bibliography

78-88. |

Johnson, Daniel. “The Case for a United Canada.” Foreign Policy 99 (1995):

Johnston, Richard, et al. “The People and the Charlottetown Accord.” In Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation 1993, 19-43. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1993.

Jones, David T. “An Independent Quebec: Looking into the Abyss.” Washington Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1997): 21-36. Jordan, FJ.E. “Sharing the Seaway System.” In R.M. Burns, ed., One Country or Two? 95-120. McGill-Queen’s University Press 1971. Kierans, Tom. President's Digest. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1997 (March). Kilgour, D. Marc, and Terrence J. Levesque. “The Canadian Constitutional Amending Formula: Bargaining in the Past and the Future.” Public Choice 44 (1984): 457-80.

Kwavnick, David. “Québécois Nationalism and Canada’s National Interest.” Journal of Canadian Studies 12, no. 3 July 1977): 53-68. Lachapelle, Guy. “La souveraineté partenariat: Donnée essentielle du résultat référendaire et de l’avenir des relations Québec-Canada.” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 41-63. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Laforest, Guy. Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream. Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press 1995. Laidler, David E.W., and William B.P. Robson. “Two Nations, One Money?

Canada’s Monetary System following a Quebec Secession.” In Laidler and Robson, eds., Two Nations, One Money? Canada Round Series no. 3, 1-51. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. Lamont, Lansing. Breakup: The Coming End of Canada and the Stakes for America.

New York: W.W. Norton 1994.

Latouche, Daniel. “Canada: The New Country from Within the Old Dominion.” Queen’s Quarterly 98, no. 2 (1991): 319-37.

— “Le Québec est bien petit et le monde, bien grand.” In Alain-G. Gagnon and Francois Rocher, eds., Répliques aux détracteurs de la souveraineté du Québec, 345-72. Montreal: VLB éditeur 1992. Lawson, Guy. “No Canada?” Harper’s Magazine, April 1996: 67-78. Laycock, David. “Reforming Canadian Democracy? Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 27, no. 2 (1994): 213-47. “Le Canada dans le peau.” L’Actualité 17, no. 11 July 1992): 21-52.

Lederman, W.R., “The British Parliamentary System and Canadian Federalism.” In R.M. Burns, ed., One Country or Two? 17-39. Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press 1971. Lemco, Jonathan. Political Stability in Federal Governments. New York: Praeger 1991.

481 Bibliography —- “American Interests in Post-Sovereignty Quebec-Canada Relations: A View from Abroad.” Network 2, no. 4 (April 1992): 13-15. — Turmoil in the Peaceable Kingdom: The Quebec Sovereignty Movement and Its Implications for Canada and the United States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1994.

Lemieux, Vincent. “Le référendum de 1995: Quelques pistes d’explication.” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 65-9. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Lemieux, Vincent, and Robert Bernier. “L’électorat flottant francophone en aout 1995.” In Maurice Pinard, Robert Bernier, and Vincent Lemieux, Un combat inachevé, 215-57. Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l’Université du Québec 1997.

Leroy, Vély. “Les options monétaires d’un Québec souverain.” In Québec, Assemblée nationale, Commission d’étude, Les implications de la mise en oeuvre (deuxiéme partie), Exposés et études 4:289-326. Quebec 1992. Les intellectuels pour la souveraineté (IPSO). “Oui au changement.” In Michel Sarra-Bournet, ed., Manifeste des intellectuels pour la souveraineté, 15-21. Montreal: Fides 1995. Leslie, Peter. “Equal to Equal: Economic Association and the Canadian Common Market.” Discussion Paper no. 6. Kingston: Queen’s University, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1979. — Federal State, National Economy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1987.

— “Options for the Future of Canada: The Good, the Bad, and the Fantastic.” In Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada, 122-40. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991. - The European Community: A Political Model for Canada? Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1991. — “The Fiscal Crisis of Canadian Federalism.” In Leslie, Kenneth Norrie, and Irene K. Ip, A Partnership in Trouble: Renegotiating Fiscal Federalism, 186. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1993. ~ The Maastricht Model: A Canadian Perspective on the European Union. Research Paper no. 33. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1996.

Lindgren, Raymond E. Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1959.

Lipsey, Richard G. “Comments on the Bélanger-Campeau Commission’s Papers on Trade Relations.” In Gordon Ritchie et al. Broken Links, Canada Round Series no. 4, 58-69. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. Lipsey, Richard G., Daniel Schwanen, and Ronald J. Wonnacott. The NAFTA: What's In, What's Out, What's Next. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1994.

Livingston, W.S. “A Note on the Nature of Federalism.” In Aaron Wildavsky, ed., American Federalism in Perspective, 33-47. Boston: Little Brown 1967.

482 Bibliography Loungnarath, Vilaysoun. “A Comment on Hartt and de Mestral.” In Stanley H. Hartt et al., Tangled Web, Canada Round Series no. 15, 60-70. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1992. Lucas, Robert F. “Comment.” In Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds. Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 2:433-44. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991.

Lucas, R.F., and B. Reid. “The Choice of Efficient Monetary Arrangements in the Post Meech Lake Era.” Canadian Public Policy 17, no. 4 (1991): 41733.

Lukic, Reneo. “Twilight of the Federations in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union.” Journal of International Affairs 45, no. 2 (1992): 575-98.

McCallum, John. “An Economic Union or a Free Trade Agreement: What Difference Does It Make?” In Stanley H. Hartt et al., Tangled Web, Canada Round Series no. 15, 54-9. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1992. — Canada’s Choice: Crisis of Capital or Renewed Federalism. C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture, Toronto, 25 June 1992. — “The Canadian Economic Union after Breakup.” Inroads 1 (1992): 68-79. McCallum, John, and Chris Green. Parting as Friends: The Economic Consequences for Quebec. Canada Round Series no. 5. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. McDougall, John N. “North American Integration and Canadian Disunity.” Canadian Public Policy 17, no. 4 (1991): 395-408. MacFarlane, S. Neil. Sovereignty and Stability: The Domestic and Regional Security Implications of Québec Separation. Occasional paper. Hanover, New Hampshire: Dickey Center, Dartmouth College 1997. Maclean’s/CTV Poll. “Voices of Canada.” Maclean’s, 4 January 1993, 42-5. — “How We Differ.” Maclean's, 3 January 1994, 32-4. Maclean’s/Decima Poll. “Cross-Canada Opinions.” Maclean's, 6 January 1992, 62-7. — “In Search of Unity,” Maclean’s, 1 July 1994, 16-24. McNaught, Kenneth. “A Ghost at the Banquet: Could Quebec Secede Peacefully?” In J.L. Granatstein and McNaught, eds., “English Canada” Speaks Out, 80-93. Toronto: Doubleday 1991.

McNeil, Kent. “Aboriginal Nations and Québec’s Boundaries: Canada Couldn’t Give What It Didn’t Have.” In Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, 107-23. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992.

McRoberts, Kenneth. English Canada and Quebec: Avoiding the Issue. North York: Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies 1991. — “Protecting the Rights of Linguistic Minorities.” In Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, 172-88. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992.

- “Disagreeing on Fundamentals: English Canada and Quebec.” In McRoberts and Patrick J. Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the

483 Bibliography Referendum and the Future of Canada, 249-63. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993.

— “After the Referendum: Canada with or without Quebec.” In McRoberts, ed., Beyond Quebec, 403-32. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1995.

— Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity. Toronto: Oxford University Press 1997. — ed. Beyond Quebec: Taking Stock of Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Uni-

versity Press 1995. McRoberts, Kenneth, and Patrick J. Monahan, eds. The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993.

Manning, E. Preston. “Leadership for Changing Times.” Address, Reform Party of Canada, Annual Assembly, Edmonton, 1989. - “A New and Better Home for Canadians.” Keynote address, Reform Party of Canada, Party Assembly, Ottawa, 15 October 1994. Mansell, Robert L., and Ronald C. Schlenker. “A Regional Analysis of Fiscal Balances under Existing and Alternative Constitutional Arrangements.” In Paul Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change, Western Studies in Economic Policy no. 3, 210-66. Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research 1992. Martin, Pierre. “Association after Sovereignty? Canadian Views on Economic Association with a Sovereign Quebec.” Canadian Public Policy 21, no.1 (1995): 53-71.

Marzolini, Michael. “The Regionalization of Canadian Electoral Politics.” In Alan Frizzell and Jon H. Pammett, eds., The Canadian General Election of 1997, 193-205. Toronto: Dundurn Press 1997. Matalin, Mary, and James Carville, with Peter Knobler. All’s Fair. New York: Random House 1994. Maxwell, Judith, and Caroline Pestieau. Economic Realities of Contemporary Confederation. Montreal: C.D. Howe Research Institute 1980. May, Arthur J. The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867-1914. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1951.

May, Doug, and Dane Rowlands. “Atlantic Canada in Confederation: Uncharted Waters with Dangerous Shoals.” In Norman Cameron et al., From East and West, Canada Round Series no. 6, 1-56. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991.

Meisel, John. “An Echo of Ghita Ionescu’s Reading Notes: Travails of the Canadian State.” Government and Opposition 32, no. 2 (1997): 234-50. Milne, David. “Past and Future: Reflections after the Referendum.” In John E. Trent, Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds., Québec-Canada, 81-3. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Ministerial Council on Social Policy Reform and Renewal. “Report to Premiers.” December 1995.

484 Bibliography Monahan, Patrick J. Meech Lake: The Inside Story. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991. — Political and Economic Integration: The European Experience and Lessons for

Canada. Study no. 10. Background Studies of the York University Constitutional Reform Project. North York: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy 1992. — “The Sounds of Silence.” In Kenneth McRoberts and Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada, 222-48. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993. — “Cooler Heads Shall Prevail”: Assessing the Costs and Consequences of Quebec

Separation. Commentary no. 65. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1995. Monahan, Patrick, and Lynda Covello. An Agenda for Constitutional Reform. Final Report, York University Constitutional Reform Project. North York: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy 1992. Monahan, Patrick, and Michael J. Bryant, with Nancy C. Coté. Coming to Terms with Plan B: Ten Principles Governing Secession. Commentary no. 83.

Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1996. Morrison, Alex, ed. Divided We Fall: The National Security Implications of Canadian Constitutional Issues. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies 1991.

Morse, Bradford. “Comparative Assessments of Indigenous Peoples in Québec, Canada and Abroad.” In Québec, Assemblée nationale, Commission d’étude, Les implications de la mise en oeuvre (premiere partie), Exposés

et études, 3:307-45. Quebec 1992. Morton, Desmond. “The Canadian Security Dimension.” In Alex Morrison, ed., Divided We Fall, 69-75. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies 1991.

- “Reflections on the Breakup of Canada, Conflict, and Self-Determination.” In Stanley H. Hartt et al., Tangled Web, Canada Round Series no. 15, 86— 98. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1992. Nafziger, E. Wayne, and William L. Richter “Biafra and Bangladesh: The Political Economy of Secessionist Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 13, no. 2 (1976): 91-109. Nemni, Max. Canada in Crisis and the Destructive Power of Myth. Université Laval, Laboratoire d’études politiques et administratives. Cahier 92-10. November 1992. Nordlinger, Eric A. On the Autonomy of the Democratic State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1981. Norrie, Kenneth, Robin Boadway, and Lars Osberg. “The Constitution and the Social Contract.” In Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 1:225-53. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991. Olson, Mancur. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press 1982.

485 Bibliography Ontario, Office of the Premier. “Notes for an Address by the Honourable Mike Harris, Premier of Ontario.” The Canadian Club, Toronto, Ontario, 12 October 1995. Page, Benjamin J. Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1978.

Parisella, John. “Is the Quebec Liberal Party Still Relevant?” Unpublished manuscript. March 1996. Parizeau, Jacques. “The Case for a Sovereign Quebec.” Foreign Policy 99 (1995): 69-76. — Pour un Québec souverain. Montreal: VLB éditeur 1997. Parti québécois. La souveraineté: Pourquoi? Comment? Montreal: Parti québécois 1990.

— Programme du Parti québécois. Montreal: Parti québécois 1991.

— Le Québec dans un monde nouveau. Montreal: VLB éditeur et le Parti québécois 1993. Pentland, Charles. “Association after Sovereignty?” In Richard Simeon, ed.,

Must Canada Fail? 223-42. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1977.

Pinard, Maurice. “The Dramatic Reemergence of the Quebec Independence Movement.” Journal of International Affairs 45, no. 2 (1992): 471-97. — “The Secessionist Option and Quebec Public Opinion, 1988-1993.” Opinion Canada 2, no. 3 June 1994): 1-5.

- “Le cheminement de l’opinion publique.” In Maurice Pinard, Robert Bernier, and Vincent Lemieux, Un combat inachevé, 261-76. Sainte-Foy: Les

Presses de l’Université du Québec 1997. - “Le contexte politique et les dimensions sociodémographiques.” In Maurice Pinard, Robert Bernier, and Vincent Lemieux, Un combat inachevé, 277315. Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l’Université du Québec 1997. - “Les déterminants psychosociaux.” In Maurice Pinard, Robert Bernier, and Vincent Lemieux, Un combat inachevé, 317-53. Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l’Université du Québec 1997. Pinard, Maurice, Robert Bernier, and Vincent Lemieux. Un combat inachevé.

Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec 1997. Poole, Greg B., and David Westerterp. “Financial Markets and Instability: Market Response to the Quebec Referendum.” Unpublished fourth-year honours paper, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, April 1996. Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. Resolution Guide. General Meeting and National Policy Conference, Toronto, 6-10 August 1991. Proulx, Pierre-Paul. “L’évolution de l’espace économique du Québec, la

politique économique dans un monde de nationalismes et d’interdépendance, et les relations Québec-Ottawa.” In Québec, Commission sur l’avenir, Les avis des spécialistes, Working Paper no. 4, 867-902. Quebec 1991.

486 Bibliography Provincial/Territorial Council on Social Policy Renewal. New Approaches to Canada’s Social Union: An Options Paper. 29 April 1997.

— “Progress Report to Premiers.” Report no. 2. July 1997. Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games.” International Organization 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 42760.

Québec. Québec-Canada: A New Deal. Quebec: Editeur officiel 1979.

Québec. Commission sur l’avenir politique et constitutionnel du Québec (Bélanger-Campeau Commission). Report of the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec. Quebec, March 1991. — Eléments d’analyse économique pertinents la révision du statut politique et constitutionnel du Québec. Working Paper no. 1. Quebec 1991. — Eléments d’analyse institutionnelle, juridique et démolinguistique pertinents a la révision du statut politique et constitutionnel du Québec. Working Paper no. 2, Quebec 1991. — Les avis des spécialistes invités a répondre aux huit questions posées par la Commission. Working Paper no. 4. Quebec, 1991. — Secrétariat de la Commission. “L’accés du Québec aux marchés extérieurs et a l’espace économique canadien.” In Québec, Commission sur l’avenir, Eléments d’analyse économique, Working Paper no. 1, 19-54. Quebec 1991. ~— Secrétariat de la Commission. “Analyse pro forma des finances publiques

dans l’hypothése de la souveraineté du Québec.” In Québec, Commission sur l’avenir, Eléments d‘analyse économique, Working Paper no. 1, 393566. Quebec 1991. Québec, Assemblée nationale. Bill 150: An Act Respecting the Process for Determining the Political and Constitutional Future of Québec. Quebec: Quebec Official Publisher 1991. — Avant-projet de loi. Loi sur la souveraineté du Québec. Québec: Editeur officiel du Québec 1994. — Bill1 An Act respecting the Future of Québec. Québec: Québec Official Pub-

lisher 1995. .

— Bill 3 An Act respecting the Elimination of the Deficit and a Balanced Budget.

Quebec: Quebec Official Publisher 1996. Québec, Assemblée nationale. Commission d’étude des questions afférentes a l’accession du Québec a la souveraineté. Draft Report. Quebec 1992. — Lesattributs d'un Québec souverain. Exposés et études, vol. 1, Quebec 1992. — Les implications de la mise en oeuvre de la souveraineté: Les aspects économiques

et les finances publigues (premiére partie). Exposés et études, vol. 3, and (deuxiéme partie), vol. 4. Quebec 1992. — Les options monétaires d'un Québec souverain. Quebec 1992. — Les relations entre l'état et les nations autochtones. Quebec 1992. — La succession d’états: Les relations internationales d’un Québec souverain. Quebec 1992.

487 Bibliography Québec, Attorney General. Requéte déclinatoire et en irrecevabilité, filed in the Superior Court of Quebec, Bertrand v. Bégin, case no: 200-05-002117-955, 12 April 1996, by Saint-Laurent, Boucher, Gagnon, Martineau, Walker on behalf of the Attorney General of Quebec.

Québec, Conseil exécutif, Commission nationale sur l’avenir du Québec. Rapport. Quebec: Editeur officiel du Québec 1995. Québec, Directeur général des élections du Québec. Referendum Act: Special Version of the Election Act for the Holding of a Referendum. Quebec 1995. — Rapport des résultats officiels du scrutin: Référendum du 30 Octobre 1995. Quebec 1995. — Rejected Ballot Papers — Unity Rally: Report of the Chief Electoral Officer. Sainte-

Foy: Directeur général des élections du Québec 1996. Québec, Ministére des finances. 1993-94 Budget: Budget Speech and Additional Information. Quebec 1993.

Quebec Liberal Party, Committee on the Evolution of Canadian Federalism. Recognition and Interdependence: Quebec's Identity and Canadian Federalism.

Montreal: Quebec Liberal Party 1996. Rawlyk, G.A. “The Maritimes and the Problem of the Secession of Quebec.” In R.M. Burns, ed., One Country or Two? 205-30. Montreal: McGill University Press 1971.

Raynauld, André, with Jean-Pierre Vidal. “Les enjeux économiques de la souveraineté.” Memoir submitted to the Conseil du Patronat du Québec, October 1990. Reesor, Bayard. The Canadian Constitution in Historical Perspective. Scarborough:

Prentice-Hall 1992. Reform Party of Canada. Blue Sheet: Principles, Policies, and Election Platform. Reform Party of Canada 1993. — Reform Responses to the Twenty Questions Posed to the Prime Minister on June 8, 1994. Press release, December 1995. — AFresh Start for Canadians. Calgary: Reform Party 1997. Reid, Bradford, and Tracy Snoddon. “Redistribution under Alternative Constitutional Arrangements for Canada.” In Paul Boothe, ed., Alberta and the Economics of Constitutional Change, Western Studies in Economic Policy

no. 3, 65-110. Edmonton: Western Centre for Economic Research 1992. Reid, Scott. Canada Remapped: How the Partition of Quebec Will Reshape the Nation. Vancouver: Pulp Press 1992. Resnick, Philip. Toward a Canada-Quebec Union. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1991. — Thinking English Canada. Toronto: Stoddart 1994. Richards, John. Language Matters: Ensuring That the Sugar Not Dissolve in the Coffee. Commentary no. 84. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1996. Richards, Robert G. “The Canadian Constitution and International Economic Relations.” In Douglas M. Brown and Murray G. Smith, eds., Canadian

488 Bibliography Federalism: Meeting Global Economic Challenges, 57-63. Kingston: Institute

of Intergovernmental Relations 1991. Riker, William. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale Univer-

| sity Press 1986. Ritchie, Gordon, et al. Broken Links: Trade Relations after a Quebec Secession.

Canada Round Series no. 4. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. Robertson, Gordon. “Contingency Legislation for a Quebec Referendum.” Unpublished manuscript. 26 February 1996. Robertson, Ian Ross. “The Atlantic Provinces and the Territorial Question.” In J.L. Granatstein and Kenneth McNaught, eds., “English Canada” Speaks Out, 162-71. Toronto: Doubleday 1991. Rocher, Francois. “Les aléas de la stratégie pré-référendaire: Chronique d’une mort annoncée.” In Douglas M. Brown and Jonathan W. Rose, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation 1995, 19-45. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1995. Roh, Charles E. Jr. The Implications for U.S. Trade Policy of an Independent Que-

bec. Decision Quebec Series, Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Centre for Trade Policy and Law. Washington and Ottawa, 1995. Rose, Jeff. “Some Reflections on Social Entitlements, Social Cohesion and National Unity.” Occasional Paper, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 22 April 1996.

Rousseau, Henri-Paul. “L’intégration politique est-elle nécessaire a l’intégration monétaire?” In Claude Montmarquette et al., Economie du Québec et Choix Politiques, 125-48. Montreal: Presses de l’Université du Québec 1979.

Rowlands, Dane, “International Aspects of the Division of Debt under Secession: The Case of Canada and Quebec.” Canadian Public Policy 23, no.1 (1997): 40-54. Royal Bank of Canada. Unity or Disunity: An Economic Analysis of the Benefits and the Costs. Montreal: Royal Bank 1992. Russell, Peter H. “Towards a New Constitutional Process.” In Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada, 140-56. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991. — Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1992.

- “The End of Mega Constitutional Politics in Canada?” In Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick J. Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada, 211-21. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993. Russell, Peter, and Bruce Ryder. Ratifying a Postreferendum Agreement on Quebec

Sovereignty. Commentary no. 97. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1997. Sancton, Andrew. “Eroding Representation-by-Population in the Canadian House of Commons: The Representation Act, 1985.” Canadian Journal of

489 Bibliography Political Science 23, no. 3 (September 1990): 441-57.

Sands, Christopher. “Quebecium est dividae in partes tres.” Paper presented to the Conference on Sovereignty and Stability, Dartmouth College, 1-2 April 1996. Sarra-Bournet, Michel, ed. Manifeste des intellectuels pour la souveraineté. Montreal: Fides 1995. Scarth, William M. “A Note on the Desirability of a Separate Quebec Currency.” In David E.W. Laidler and William B.P. Robson, Two Nations, One Money? Canada Round Series no. 3, 65-76. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991.

Scott, Stephen A. “Secession or Reform? Mechanisms and Directions of Constitutional Change in Canada.” In A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk, eds., Federalism in Peril, 149-62. Vancouver: Fraser Institute 1992. Shum, Pauline M. “Stock Market Response to Political Uncertainty: Evidence from the 1992 Constitutional Referendum.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, special issue (1996): S213-18.

Simard, Pierre. “Compétition électorale et partage des pouvoirs dans un état fédéral.” Canadian Public Policy 15, no. 4 (December 1991): 409-16. Simeon, Richard, “Scenarios for Separation.” In Richard Simeon, ed., Must Canada Fail? 189-203. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1977. Simeon, Richard, and Mary Janigan, eds. Toolkits and Building Blocks: Constructing a New Canada. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991.

Simpson, Jeffrey. Faultlines: Struggling for a Canadian Vision. Toronto: HarperCollins 1993. — “The Referendum and Its Aftermath.” In Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick J. Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada, 193-9. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993.

Smiley, Donald. “As the Options Narrow: Notes on Post-November 15 Canada.” Journal of Canadian Studies 12, no. 3 July 1977): 3-7. — “The Association Dimension of Sovereignty-Association: A Response to the Quebec White Paper.” Discussion Paper no. 8. Kingston: Queen’s University, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1980. Smith, Miriam. “Québec-Canada Association: Divergent Paths to a Common Economic Agenda.” In Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, 61-70. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992. Smith, Murray G. “The Quebec Sovereignty Scenario: Implications for Canadian Trade Policies.” In Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis, eds. Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 2:475—

93. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute 1991.

Sniderman, Paul M., et al. “Political Culture and the Problem of Double Standards: Mass and Elite Attitudes toward Language Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 22, no. 2 (1989): 259-84.

490 Bibliography Soberman, Dan. “European Integration: Are There Lessons for Canada?” In Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada, 191-205. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991. Spiro, Herbert J. “The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.” In Thomas M. Franck, ed., Why Federations Fail, 37-89. New York: New York University Press 1968.

Stein, Janice Gross, David R. Cameron, and Richard Simeon, with Alan Alexandroff. Citizen Engagement in Conflict Resolution: Lessons for Canada in International Experience. Commentary no. 94. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1997.

Stein, Michael B. “Federal Political Systems and Federal Societies.” World Politics 20 (1968): 721-47.

~ “Canadian Constitutional Renewal, 1968-1981: A Case Study in Integrative Bargaining.” Research Paper no. 27. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1989. - “Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform in Canada: Lessons from the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Constitutional Rounds.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 2 (1997): 307-38. Symonds, William C. “Would Quebec Survive Sovereignty?” Business Week, 30 October 1995: 54-5.

Taylor, Charles. “Shared and Divergent Values.” In Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada, 53-76. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991. Thorburn, Hugh. “Disengagement.” In Richard Simeon, ed., Must Canada Fail? 205-22. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1977. Toy, Stewart, and Kathryn Leger. “Vive le Canada uni.” Financial Post Magazine June 1992, 14-18. Tremblay, Miville. “Zero Deficit by the Year 2000.” Inroads, 6 (1997): 7-18. Tremblay, Rodrigue. “Constitutional Political Economy and Trade Policies

between Quebec and Canada.” In Gordon Ritchie et al., Broken Links, Canada Round Series no. 4, 70-81. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. Trent, John E. “Post-Referendum Citizen Group Activity.” In Patrick C. Fafard and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation 1996, 45. 76. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1996. Trent, John E., Robert Young, and Guy Lachapelle, eds. Québec-Canada: What Is the Path Ahead? Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1996. Turp, Daniel. “Réponses aux questions posées par la commission sur l’avenir

politique et constitutionnel du Québec.” In Québec, Commission sur l'avenir, Les avis des spécialistes, Working Paper no. 4, 1057-1116. Quebec 1991.

—- “Le droit ala sécession: L’expression du principe démocratique.” In Alain-

G. Gagnon and Francois Rocher, eds., Répliques aux détracteurs de la souveraineté du Quebec, 49-68. Montreal: VLB éditeur 1992.

491 Bibliography — “Quebec’s Democratic Right to Self-Determination.” In Stanley Hartt et al., Tangled Web, Canada Round Series no. 15, 99-124. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1992.

Turpel, Mary Ellen. “Does the Road to Québec Sovereignty Run through Aboriginal Territory?” In Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negotiating with a Sovereign Québec, 93-106. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992.

— “The Charlottetown Discord and Aboriginal Peoples’ Struggle for Fundamental Political Change.” In Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick J. Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada, 117-51. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993. United States. House of Representatives. Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session. The Issue of Quebec's Sovereignty and Its Potential Impact on the United States, 25 September 1996. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1996.

Usher, Dan. “The Design of a Government for an English Canadian Country.” In Robin W. Boadway, Thomas J. Courchene, and Douglas D. Purvis,

1988.

eds., Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change, 1:91-116. Kingston: John

Deutsch Institute 1991.

Valaskakis, Kimon, and Angéline Fournier. Le piége de l’indépendance. Montreal: L’Etincelle 1995.

Vernon, Richard. “The Federal Citizen.” In R.D. Olling and M.W. Westmacott, eds., Perspectives on Canadian Federalism, 3-15. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Watts, Ronald, L. New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1966. —- “The Survival or Disintegration of Federations.” In R.M. Burns, ed., One Country or Two? 41-72. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1971.

— “Canada’s Constitutional Options: An Outline.” In Watts and Douglas M. Brown, eds., Options for a New Canada, 15-30. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991. —- “Canada in Question, Again.” Queen’s Quarterly 99, no. 4 (1992): 793-804. Watts, Ronald L., and Douglas M. Brown, eds. Options for a New Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991. Wells, Paul. “Be Vewy, Vewy Quiet.” Saturday Night, September 1995, 17-21. Whalley, John. “The Impact of Federal Policies on Interprovincial Activity.” In Michael J. Trebilcock et al., Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union,

201-42. Toronto: University of Toronto Press and the Ontario Economic Council 1983. Whitaker, Reg. “With or Without Quebec?” In J.L. Granatstein and Kenneth McNaught, eds., “English Canada” Speaks Out, 17-29. Toronto: Doubleday 1991.

— “Life after Separation.” In Daniel Drache and Roberto Perin, eds., Negoti-

492 Bibliography ating with a Sovereign Québec, 71-81. Toronto: James Lorimer 1992. -— “The Dog That Never Barked: Who Killed Asymmetrical Federalism?” In Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick J. Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada, 107-114. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993. - “Managing Quebec: The Mackenzie King Model.” Literary Review of Canada 6, no. 1 (1996).

- “Cruising at 30,000 Feet with a Missing Engine: The Chrétien Government in the Aftermath of the Quebec Referendum.” In Gene Swimmer, ed., How Ottawa Spends 1997-98, 51-83. Ottawa: Carleton University Press 1997.

White, Peter G. “The Political Future of Quebec Francophones.” Occasional paper, Council for Canadian Unity. Montreal 1996. White, Robert. “Speech by Robert White, President, Canadian Labour Congress, to the Québec Federation of Labour’s Special Meeting on the Québec Referendum.” Montreal, 21 February 1995. Williams, Sharon A. International Legal Effects of Secession by Quebec. Study no. 3, Background Studies of the York University Constitutional Reform Project. North York: York University Centre for Public Law and Public Policy 1992. Woehrling, José. “Les aspects juridiques de la rédefinition du statut politique

et constitutionnel du Québec.” In Quebec, Commission sur l’avenir, Eléments d’analyse institutionnelle, Working Paper no. 1,;1-110. Quebec 1991.

- “La protection des droits et libertés et le sort des minorités.” In Alain-G. Gagnon and Francois Rocher, eds., Répliques aux détracteurs de la souveraineté du Québec, 131-67. VLB éditeur 1992.

Wonnacott, Ronald J. “Reconstructing North American Free Trade following Quebec’s Separation: What Can Be Assumed?” In Gordon Ritchie et al., Broken Links, Canada Round Series no. 4, 20-44. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 1991. Wood, John R. “Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 14, no. 1 (1981): 107-34.

Young, Robert. “National Identification in English Canada: Implications for Quebec Independence.” Journal of Canadian Studies 12, no. 3 (1977): 6984.

- “Tectonic Policies and Political Competition.” In Albert Breton et al., The Competitive State, 129-45. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1991. - “Aboriginal Inherent Rights of Self-Government and the Constitutional Process.” In Douglas Brown, ed., Aboriginal Governments and Power Sharing in Canada, 31-44. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1992. — “Le Canada hors Québec: Voudra-t-il coopérer avec un Québec souverain?”

In Alain-G. Gagnon and Francois Rocher, eds., Répliques aux détracteurs de la souveraineté du Quebec: 392-407. VLB éditeur 1992.

493 Bibliography —- “Does Globalization Make an Independent Quebec More Viable?” In A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk, eds., Federalism in Peril, 121-34. Vancouver: Fraser Institute 1992. — The Breakup of Czechoslovakia. Research Paper no. 32, Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1994. - “The Political Economy of Secession: The Case of Quebec.” Constitutional Political Economy 5, no. 2 (1994): 221-45. — “How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?” Canadian Journal of Political Science 27, no. 4 (1994): 773-92.

— “What Is Good about Provincial Governments?” In Mark Charlton and Paul Barker, eds., Crosscurrents, 2nd ed., 124—33. Scarborough: Nelson 1994.

— “‘Maybe Yes, Maybe No’: The Rest of Canada and a Quebec ‘Oui.’” In Douglas M. Brown and Jonathan W. Rose, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation 1995, 47-62. Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1995.

— “Secession, Games and Strategic Discourse.” Paper presented to the Seventh Villa Colombella Seminar, Rome, 5 September 1996. - “Defending Decentralization.” Policy Options 18, no. 2 (1997): 42-4. Young, Robert, Philippe Faucher, and André Blais. “The Concept of Provincebuilding: A Critique.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 17, no. 4 (1984): 783-818.

BLANK PAGE

Index

Aboriginal peoples, 11, 123-4, 153, 175, 181-3; Allaire, Jean, 433n93

108, 118, 151, 253; and in secession Allaire Report, 145

Aboriginal rights, 26- negotiations, 120, 123, Alliance Québec, 270, 327 7,121, 124-5, 182-35, 169, 182, 191-5; in 1995 =—s amicus curiae, 360

192-4, 220, 231; referendum, 266, 281- Amiel, Barbara, 442n43 Canadian fiduciary 2; after a 1995 Yes Anglo-Malayan Defence obligations to, 220, ~-vote, 316, 319-20, 323 Agreement, 131

231, 362; and Acadians, 21 d’Aquino, Thomas,

Canadian opinion, Acadie, 17 447n60

193, 422n25; after a ACCESS proposals, 350 Archer, J.A., 15 future Yes vote, 382-3, Action démocratique du Armed forces, 93, 119-20,

386, 389-91; and Québec (ADQ), 156, 124-5, 154, 162; after a

impact of 1995 265, 273-4, 376, future Yes, 388-9, 391; referendum, 326-7, 431n52. See also in secession

331, 354; and Dumont, Mario negotiations, 174, 179international opinion, Act Respecting the 81, 189; vote in 1995

174-5, 180, 192-3; Sovereignty of referendum, 440n27; participation in Quebec, 267-8 after a 1995 Yes vote, reconstitution of ROC, Agricultural marketing, 317-18 120, 123-4, 218-21; in 35, 37, 40, 53, 79; in Assembly of First polarization scenario, secession negotiations, Nations, 428n3

239-40, 245, 249; and 38, 203, 251 Assets of Canada: legal

Quebec policies, 125, Air Canada, 125, 188 position of, 110; in

192-4, 232, 266; Akwesasne, 120 secession negotiations,

reaction to Quebec Alaska, 25, 84, 172 125, 179, 187-9, 224, secession, 108, 119-20, Alberta, 10, 11, 15, 24, 79, 251 162, 175, 181, 192; and 81, 99, 122, 161, 218, Atikamekw, 428n2. See

right of self- 228-30, 237, 330, 352; also Aboriginal

determination and and Calgary peoples

secession, 102, 108-9, Declaration, 372-3 Atlantic provinces, 11, 12,

496 Index 21, 24, 27, 42, 77, 79, Bill 101. See Charter of -As premier of Quebec:

144, 161, 207, 394; the French Language 325, 339-44; and access to ROC, 125, Bill 150, 103, 239, 412n47 Calgary Declaration,

183; dependence on Bill C-110, 347-8 372; and Plan A, 347;

transfers, 27, 77; Black, Conrad, 319 and Plan B, 354-5,

physical separation Blais, André, 142-3, 149, 360-2; and strategy

from ROC, 9-10, 80, 292-3, 419n43 about next

85, 182, 332, 403n1; Bloc québécois (BQ), 140- referendum, 339-44,

and ROC constitution, 1, 145-6, 154, 165-6, 375-80; in 1997

227-7, 255 168, 280; constitutional election, 364, 366-7. Attorney general of position of, 147, 271-2; See also Bloc québécois

Canada, 359 leadership of, 325; in Bourassa, Robert, 140, Ausgleich, 128, 132 polarization strategy, 148, 464n1

Austria-Hungary, 53; 241-2, 246; in 1995 Bourgault, Pierre, 465n18 separation of, 127-33 referendum, 267, 306; Brassard, Jacques, Auto Pact, 36-7, 198, 286 in 1997 election, 344, 456n124, 459n165

Axworthy, Lloyd, 363-8. See also Britain, 123, 393 455n107 Bouchard, Lucien British Columbia, 10, 11, Blocking coalitions, 228- 15, 24, 79, 81, 122, 161-

Bagotville, 187, 440n27 30 2,172, 218, 228-30,

Bangladesh, 84, 93 Bombardier, 281, 349 237, 325; and attitudes Banking. See Financial Boothe, Paul. See Rest of towards Quebec, 328;

services Canada (ROC) and contingency

Bank of Canada, 44-7, Borders of Quebec, 93, planning, 331-2; and

172, 187, 203, 205-7; 109, 113, 116, 118, 151, its secession, 332, 392,

governor of, 406n12 239; after a future Yes 394 Bank of Canada Act, 207 vote, 383-4; in Plan B, British North America

Bank of Quebec. See 354-5; in secession Act, 224

Quebec Central Bank negotiations, 121-4, Brossard, Jacques, 102-4 Banting, Keith, 115-16 181-3, 193; in 1995 Buchanan, Allen, 109

Beaudoin, Laurent, 281 referendum, 281-2. See Buchheit, Lee C., 105

Beaudoin, Louise, 105-6, also Aboriginal Bush, George, 286

109, 124 peoples; Partition Business Council on

Beaudoin-Dobbie Bouchard, Lucien: National Issues, 369 Committee, 229 —General: 146, 155, 265;

Bélanger, Michel, 270 in polarization Cairns, Alan C., 143, 329,

Bélanger-Campeau strategy, 242-4; 332

Commission, 32, 95-6, Quebec attitudes Caisse de dépot et 107, 111, 118, 164, 184, towards, 146, 267, 276; placement du Québec,

464n1 ROC attitudes 240, 317, 440n24

Bell, David, 114 towards, 426n9 Calgary Declaration, 352, Bell Canada, 240 —In 1995 referendum: 369-73, 379

Bercuson, David Jay, 116- 149, 265, 267, 271, 287, Campeau, Jean, 428n1

17 290; and campaign Canada: defined in

Berger, Thomas, 84 discourse, 295-311; as context of Quebec Bernard, Louis, 415n114 chief negotiator, 283-4, secession, 6, 393. See

Bernier, Ivan, 111 291-2; impact of, 291- Rest of Canada (ROC) Bertrand, Guy, 358 4; and partnership, Canada Assistance Plan,

Biafra, 93 271-5, 277; and virage, 237

Bill 1 (An Act Respecting 271-3, 295, 308 Canada Health Act, 240, the Future of Quebec), -—After a 1995 Yes vote: 350

276-8, 301, 317, 323 317-18 Canada Mortgage and

497 Index Housing Corporation, Centralization: forces Plan A, 339, 345-52,

187 conducive to, 77-84, 372; Plan B, 339, 346,

Canada Post Corpora- 89-90; and long-term 353-62, 376;

tion, 188 forces, 253-6; in ROC prenegotiation about,

Canada Pension Plan, constitution, 15-17, 357, 361-2;

210 122 referendum question,

Canada Savings Bonds, CF-18 maintenance 356-7; in 1997 election,

254 contract, 15 363-9. See also Liberal

Canada-—U.5S. Free Trade Chambers, Edward J., Party of Canada

Agreement (FTA), 22, 404n16 Christian Democratic 35-9, 57, 63, 79, 158, Champlain Bridge, 187 Movement in Slovakia, 203; Canada’s Charest, Jean, 144, 166; 133 succession to, 34, 37-8, and Calgary Christopher, Warren, 111, 198-9; Quebec’s Declaration, 371; and 286-7

accession to, 34, 37-8, Plan B, 353; in 1995 Churchill Falls power 111, 174, 198-9, 201, referendum, 270, 288, contract, 332

240; relation to 437n32; in 1997 Citizens’ Committee for a NAFTA, 36. See also election, 363-9 New Province, 327 NAFTA; United States Charlottetown Accord, Citizenship, 49, 70, 85,

Canadian Broadcasting 14, 52, 139-40, 145, 110, 118, 158, 207-8; Corporation (CBC), 148, 220, 237-8, 349, legal options about,

188 370, 404n14 110, 190; in secession

Canadian Charter of Charter of the French negotiations, 178, 181, Rights and Freedoms, Language (Bill 101), 189-91, 194, 209-11,

26, 80, 139, 190, 219, 140, 142 251; in 1995

229, 358, 414n82, Chief of the defence staff, referendum campaign,

424n14, 457n141 Canada, 420n32 278, 302

Canadian Information Chirac, Jacques, 286 Citizenship Act, 110

Office, 349 Chomedey, 321-2 Civic Democratic Party,

Canadian Labour Chrétien, Jean: 134

Congress, 319 —General: 143, 178, 196; Civic Forum (CF), 133-4 Canadian National constitutional position Clark, Glen, 325, 370

Railways (CNR), 125, of, 280 Clark, Joe, 369 158 —In 1995 referendum: Cliche, David, 428n2

Canadian Pacific Railway 269, 275-6, 289; Clinton, Bill, 286,

(CPR), 77, 240 campaign discourse, 434n118

Canadian Security 295-311; constitutional Closure of constitutional

Intelligence Service promises, 287-8; issues, 140, 156, 237

(CSIS), 189 democracy, 279; Comity laws, 31-2 ,

Canam Manac, 281 strategy; 269-70, 276 Commercial and

Castonguay, Claude, —After a 1995 Yes vote: economic relations,

316-17, 369 153-4, 166-7, 316, 318- Canada and Quebec:

C.D. Howe Institute, 21 options about, 29-40; 455n117 —Strategy about next in secession

Central African referendum: 325, 345— negotiations, 118-19, Federation. See 62; distinct society, 125, 186, 199-204; in

Rhodesia and 346-8, 370; economic 1995 referendum

Nyasaland policy, 345; job campaign, 282. See also

Central Canada, 13, 46, creation, 342; legality Economic integration

83, 252; power of in of UDI, 357-61; Committee to Examine

new ROC constitution, majority required, 357, Matters Relating to the

226-30 367; partition, 354-5; Accession of Quebec

498 Index

to Sovereignty, 118-19 Agreement, 208 UDI, 359. See also Confédération des Currency, 71-2, 158, 233; Chrétien, Jean syndicats nationaux, Quebec’s options Discourse, 275; in 1995

430n33 about, 41-7; in referendum campaign,

Confederation of Regions secession negotiations, 291-311

Party, 11 119, 122, 204-7, 251 Distinct society clause,

Conseil du patronat du Czech and Slovak 148, 287-8, 297-8, 326,

Québec, 270 Federal Republic, 5, 328-9, 346-7, 352, 364-

Constituent assembly, 16, 133 5

51, 82, 116, 121-2, 224, Czechoslovakia, 5; Dollard-des-Ormeaux,

246 Declaration of the 327

Constitution Acts, 16, 20, Sovereignty of Doran, Charles, 335-6,

104, 123, 139-40, 195, Slovakia, 134-5; 394, 447n72 213-16, 219, 224; polarization in, 133-6; Dorval, 187

amending formulae in, separation of Slovakia Drache, Daniel, 421n2

214-15; application to and the Czech Dubcek, Alexander, 136 Quebec, 358-61; Republic, 87-8, 133-6, Duceppe, Gilles, 325, 344, content of 184 364-8. See also Bloc

amendments in ROC’s québécois

reconstitution, 213-14, | Dasko, Donna, 81 Duhaime, Yves, 460n198

222-31, 250; new Dauphin, Roma, 53 Dumont, Mario, 156, 265, amending formula, © Debt. See National debt 271-3, 296, 376 228-31; process of Decentralization, 15, 17- Dutil, Marcel, 281 amending in ROC’s 19, 21-4, 45, 76-85, reconstitution, 100-1, 156; and Plan A, 348- East African Common 123, 153, 165, 168, 213— 50, 369, 373. See also Services Organization,

22; section 49 review, Centralization 52-3 349 Decima Research Ltd, Eastern Townships, 181

Constitution of Canada: 154 East Pakistan, 105

definition of, 216. See Defence Production/ Economic Council of

also Constitution Acts Defence Sharing Canada, 32, 95-6, Coon-Come, Chief agreements, 174, 198. 466n29 Matthew, 281, 413n68, See also United States Economic integration:

428n3 Democratic deficit, 55-7, determinants of, 29-

Cooper, Barry, 116-17 67-8, 74 30; negative Copps, Sheila, 269, Denmark, 132 integration, 30, 62, 69, 455n107 Desmarais, Paul, 281 72; positive

Cété, Marcel, 96, 98 Dion, Léon, 83, 415n114 integration, 30-1, 39Council for Canadian Dion, Stéphane, 142; and 40, 62, 72-3; relation to

Unity, 270 distinct society, 348, political integration, 62, 350, 415n114 required in ROC and Quebec, 13,

Courchene, Thomas J., 352, 370; and majority 19, 30, 60-74; between

Covell, Maureen, 90, referendum, 357; and 29-40, 118-19, 199-

122-3 partition, 354-5; and 204, 232-3, 259-61; in

Cree, 108, 120, 281. See prenegotiation about ROC, 12-13. See also

also Aboriginal next referendum, 361- Commercial and peoples; James Bay 2; and referendum economic relations

Cree question, 356-7; and Economist, 285-6

Croatia, 419n46 referendum scenarios, Election, federal of 1997,

CROP Inc., 149, 293 313-14, 379, 386, 363-9

Crown, 180, 194, 231 443n1; and school- Elections Act, 154, 215 Cullen-Couture board reform, 342; and _—_ Electoral Boundaries

499 Index Readjustment Act, recognition of Quebec, Hampstead, 327

426n24 105-6, 266, 286, 317, Harcourt, Michael, 150 Emergencies Act, 162, 323, 335, 440n29 Harris, Mike, 325; and 164-5, 205 Francophonie, La, 232, 317, distinct society, 352;

Employment training 348 and Ontario demands, programs, 342, 348 Franz Joseph, Emperor 350, 369-70; in 1995

Environics Research and King, 53-4 referendum, 282, 297 Group, Ltd, 81, 140, Fry, Earl H., 421n78 Harris, Richard G., 19

161 FTA. See Canada-US. Hartt, Stanley, 31

Environmental issues, 36, Free Trade Agreement Havel, Vaclav, 133-5, 238

50, 55, 58, 63; in Hawaii, 84

secession negotiations, G-7, 30, 172-3, 302 Hébert, Chantal, 283

189, 251 Gaspé peninsula, 241 Hicks, Ursula K., 81

Equalization, 10, 26, 95, Gauthier, Michel, 325, Hodgins, Bruce W.,

141, 237. See also 460n198 424n7

Redistribution General Agreement on Hogg, Peter, 423n5

Estonia, 419n46 Tariffs and Trade House of Commons, 18, European Commission, (GATT), 22-3, 37-8, 48, 143, 146, 164, 166, 214,

94, 63 66, 79; and Canada- 222, 241; composition

European Community Quebec customs of in new ROC (EC), 23, 33; and union, 34, 198, 201; constitution, 227-8 Czech-Slovak Quebec accession to, Hudson Bay, 183

separation, 136. See 34, 111, 198, 240 Hudson’s Bay Company,

also European Union Germany, 131, 175 109

European Social Charter, Gibbins, Roger, 82, 222, Hull, 188, 310

70 243 Hungary. See Austria-

European Union (EU), Gibson, Gordon, 82, 121- Hungary

29, 41, 50, 71, 197, 240, 2, 163, 178, 416n126, Hydro-Québec, 96,

274, 296, 392; and 416n129 440n24 recognition of Quebec, Globalization, 22, 76 105 Gold, Justice Alan B., Iceland, 132

443n45 Immigration, 32, 70, 232;

Federal Business Good Morning America, in secession

Development Bank, 447n70 negotiations, 207-91,

187 Governor general, 101, 251

Federal government. See 214, 221, 226 Independence: meaning Chrétien, Jean Grady, Patrick, 95, 98, 100 of in Quebec, 142-3, Federation of the West Grand Council of the 147. See also Quebec

Indies, 128 Crees, 108. See also secession

Financial services, 10, 37, Cree; Aboriginal Indonesia, 131

43, 158; in secession peoples Industrial milk, 203

negotiations, 38, 178, Great Coalition of 1864, Institute for Research on

202-3 464n3 Public Policy, 431n50 Finkelstein, Neil, 108 Great Whale hydroelec- Institutions, political. See First Ministers’ tric project, 266 Political institutions Conference, 122, 165, Green, Chris, 97—8 Intergovernmental 217, 424n14 Grey, Julius, 152 ‘ competition, 15-16,

First Nations. See Guaranteed income 18-19, 66-7

Aboriginal Peoples supplement, 210 International Joint

411n14, 415n114 189

Fortin, Pierre, 95-6, Gulf of St Lawrence, 183 Commission (IJC), 57,

France, 232; and Halifax, 160 International Monetary

500 Index

Fund (IMF), 58, 147, 167, 297, 330; and 366 173, 197 distinct society, 347, Linguistic minorities: in

Intrastate federalism, 17- 352 Quebec, 102, 109-10, 18 Kwavnick, David, 16 121, 124, 151, 266; and

Inuit, 108, 281, 326-7. See impact of 1995

also Aboriginal Labrador, 17, 182 referendum, 3278, 356;

peoples Lachapelle, Guy, 293 and Lucien Bouchard,

Ireland, 93, 442n41 La Chaudiére- 341; in ROC, 10-11, Irwin, Ronald, 182 Appalaches, 270 25-6, 114, 182, 225, L’ Actualité, 272 239; in secession

Jacques Cartier Bridge, La Grande 2, 120 negotiations, 181, 195-

187 Lamont, Lansing, 119-20 7, 218-19. See also

Jamaica, 128 Landry, Bernard, 266, Language rights

James Bay and Northern 301, 317, 355, 377, Lisée, Jean-Francois,

Quebec Agreement, 429n14 429n10

108-9, 182 Language rights: in Lithuania, 419n46

James Bay Cree, 108. See Canada, 195-6, 218-19; Lower Canada, 224 also Cree; Aboriginal in Quebec, 124, 174-5,

peoples 196, 232, 239, 277, 328, Maastricht Treaty, 32

Jockel, Joseph, 421n80 356; in ROC, 26, 225, McCallum, John, 96-8 Johnson, Daniel, 145, 232, 253; in secession McGill Law School, 327

181-2; and negotiations, 195-7, McKenna, Frank, 146, 167

constitutional renewal, 218-19. See also McNeil, Kent, 109

326, 349, 351, 370-1; Linguistic minorities Magdalen Islands, 241 and Plan B, 357; and Latouche, Daniel, Mahoney, Justice P.M.,

referendum campaign 415n114 424n14

discourse, 298, 303, Latvia, 419n46 Makavik, 281 306; in 1995 Laurier-Dorion, 321 Malaysia. See Singaporereferendum, 269-70, Lederman, W. R., 25 Malaysia 276, 281-2, 287-9, 335, Lee Kuan Yew, 128, 130 Manitoba, 10, 11, 15, 27, 438n68; after a 1995 Léger & Léger, 292, 435n6 226, 228-30, 372 Yes vote, 316. See also Le Hir, Richard, 279 Manning, Preston,

Quebec Liberal Party Lemco, Jonathan, 117 418n25; and Calgary Joint Committee on Lemieux, Vincent, 291, Declaration, 370-1;

Canada-Quebec 415n114 and Plan A, 347, 370;

Separation (JCC-QS), Le Point, 430n35 in polarization 164-9, 221 Leslie, Peter, 101, 407n17, scenario, 249-51; and

Joli-Coeur, André, 411n37 polarization strategy, 458n159 Liberal Party of Canada, 144-5, 242-4; in 5,277 165, 235; constitutional 165-6, 168-9; in 1995

June 12 agreement, 273- 11; coherence of, 143, secession negotiations,

Juppé, Alain, 446n52 position of, 140-1, 143, referendum, 282-3, 140-50; in polarization 297, 307-8; in 1997

Kahnawake, 192 scenario, 241, 247-51 election, 326, 363-9. Karlstad Conference, Liberal Party of Quebec. See also Reform Party

130-1 See Quebec Liberal of Canada Katanga, 93 Party Margeurite-Bourgeoys, Kenya, 52 Lieutenant governor, 321-2

Killinek Island, 403n1 office of, 214-15 Marois, Pauline, 297 Kingston, Ont., 160 Lincoln, Abraham, Martin, Paul, 284, 303

Klaus, Vaclav, 134-6, 236 436n17 Martin, Pierre, 292-3, Klein, Ralph, 146, 150, Lincoln-Douglas debates, 423n33

501 Index Massé, Marcel, 269, 354, American Free Trade Trade Agreement

451n60, 451n6l, Agreement (NAFTA), 22-4, 35-6, 452n67 Naskapi, 108. See also 39, 41, 57, 63, 79, 158;

Meciar, Vladimir, 134-6, Aboriginal peoples Canada’s succession

236 National Archives of to, 34, 37-8; Quebec’s

Meech Lake Accord, 104, Canada, 189 accession to, 34, 36-~8, 119, 139-40, 142, 145- National Capital Region, 111-12, 174, 178, 189,

6, 148, 155, 226, 237-8, 188 198-9, 201, 207, 240,

299, 372, 379, 382 National Commission on 284, 286-7; Quebec’s Mercredi, Ovide, 413n68 the Future of Quebec, exposure under, 37,

Métis, 193 268, 272 258, 389; relation to

Mexico, 111 National debt, 23-4, 30, FTA, 36, 111. See also Milne, David, 329 95-6, 157-8, 173, 242; United States Mirabel, 187 legal position of, 110, North Atlantic Treaty Mobility of population, 183; in secession Organization (NATO), 19, 34, 69: political negotiations, 44, 120- 79, 174, 188, 197 requirements for, 70, 2, 124-5, 170, 183-6, Northeastern Quebec

74; between ROC and 251, 333, 394-5 Agreement, 108-9,

Quebec, 38, 73; in National Defence Act, 182. See also James Bay

secession negotiations, 180, 420n72 and Northern Quebec

191, 207-9 National Energy Agreement

Mohawk, 120, 456n124. Program, 15, 17, 77 Northwest Territories, 10, See also Aboriginal National treatment, 30, 21, 226, 403n1

peoples 36, 70, 111, 202 Norway-Sweden,

Monahan, Patrick, 120 Native Women’s separation of, 128-33 Montagnais, 428n2. See Association of Canada Nova Scotia, 20, 224-6,

also Aboriginal (NWAC), 424n14 325 peoples Neary, Peter, 464n3 Nyasaland 129

Montreal, 162, 178, 187, New Brunswick, 11, 20,

233, 268, 289; and 26, 77, 182, 196, 224-5, October 27 Group, 327

language rights, 328, 325 Oka, 192

341, 343 New Democratic Party Old age security, 210 Montreal International, (NDP), 10, 11, 146, 153; Olympics, 296

342 constitutional position Olympic Stadium, 391

Morton, Desmond, 105 of, 176; in 1997 Ontario, 11, 12, 21, 27, 35, Most-favoured-nation election, 363, 366, 368 37, 47,77, 79, 144, 146, (MEN) status, 36, 38 Newfoundland and 161-2, 182, 218, 224-6, Mouvement de libération Labrador, 21, 218, 372, 237, 372; dominance of

nationale du Québec, 403n1, 442n41 in ROC, 10, 13, 15, 17,

465n27 New Westminster 18, 23-4, 83, 222, 226—-

Movement for a Railway Bridge, 188 31; interests of, 24, 26, Democratic Slovakia, New York, 286 81, 84, 163, 325, 331;

134 Niagara, 17 language rights in, 26,

Mulroney, Brian, 369 Non-tariff barriers to 225; secession of,

Multifiber Agreement, 35 trade (NTBs), 31, 34, 453n78; union with

Mutual recognition of 62-3 Quebec, 25-6, 392 _ regulations, 33, 63, 74, Nordic Council, 132 Oregon, 172

202 North American Ottawa River, 24

Aerospace Defence Outaouais, 181, 289 Nadeau, Richard, 142-3, Command (NORAD),

149, 292-3 174 Pacific Rim, 79, 232

NAFTA. See North North American Free Pakistan, 84

502 Index

Panama, 41 Plan A, 346-52; defined, See also Charest, Jean

Paré, Jean, 272 339 } Province building, 81 Parizeau, Jacques, 145, Plan B, 353-62; defined, Prussia, 128

193, 258, 265, 343; 339 Public Against Violence

constitutional position Polarization, political, (PAV), 133-4 of, 145; in negotiations 130, 236, 245; in Public order emergency, with ROC, 166-7, 184, Canada, 5, 177-8, 222, 162

200; in polarization 235-46, 260; Public service, 239;

strategy, 238, 240-1, constraints on in pensions of, 185, 211; 279-80, 428n8; Canada, 167, 246-9; in in secession referendum campaign Czechoslovakia, 5, negotiations, 124-5, discourse, 296, 299- 133-6; after a future 178, 181 302, 309; referendum referendum, 380, 390- Puerto Rico, 25 strategy, 267-8; in 1995 1; and impact of 1995 Purvis, Douglas D., 19

referendum, 265-6, referendum, 328-9,

271, 275, 279-81, 290, 332; in 1995 Quebec: characteristics

335; after a 1995 Yes referendum, 279-80; in of, 9,94, 141-2; vote, 315-18; in 1997 1997 election, 364-8 identification with

election, 344, 365-6. Polése, Mario, 415n114 Canada in, 81, 148-9, See also Parti québécois _ Political institutions: 237, 292-4, 298-300; Parti québécois, 62, 140, decision rule in, 22-3, public opinion about 159, 166, 172, 192; 25, 33, 45-6, 51-2, 54, sovereignty in, 141-3, constitutional fatigue 58, 64; enduring effects 147, 156; recent policy

in, 141, 237; of, 4, 74, 91; forces in 339-44; 1980

constitutional position shaping creation of, 4, referendum in, 103, of, 145, 148, 157, 343; 48-9, 58-9, 75-86; 140, 148, 150, 238; 1995

divisions within, 233, linking ROC and referendum in, 265-90. 258-9, 271, 343-4, 377; Quebec, post- See also Quebec and the mechanics of secession, 200-4, 259: secession secession, 117-18; and linking ROC and Quebec Business Council polarization strategy, Quebec, potential, 33, for Canada, 270 238-41, 245-9; in 48-59, 85. See also Quebec Central Bank, 43, referendum, 143, 148- Economic integration 45, 203 9,151; in 1995 Political integration. See Quebec Charter of

referendum, 265-90 Political institutions Human Rights and Partition (of Quebec), Port of Montreal, 125, Freedoms, 196

323, 327-8, 331, 354-5, 183, 188 Quebec Citadel, 188

383-4. See also Borders Port of Quebec, 188 Quebec Committee for

of Quebec Power Corporation, 281 Canada, 327

Peace, Order, and Good Prince Edward Island, 10, Quebec Federation of

Government power, 21,77, 225, 228-9, 325 Labour, 344

168 Privy Council Office, 169, | Quebec Liberal Party, 18, Pepin-Robarts task force, 270, 437n32 145; constitutional

103 Pro-Canada rally, 287-8, position of, 145, 147-8,

Percy, Michael, 404n16 322, 435n134 326, 350-1; and a

Permanent Joint Board Progressive Conservative future referendum,

on Defence, 188, 198 Party of Canada, 11, 376, 387; in

Pettigrew, Pierre, 325, 141, 144, 153; polarization scenario,

348, 350 constitutional position 239, 241, 247; post292-4 secession, 103; in 1997 166, 181-2, 233, 259; in

Pinard, Maurice, 143, of, 144; position on secession position of,

Place du Canada, 288 federal election, 363-9. 1995 referendum, 269-

503 Index

70; after 1995 recognition of, 104-7, divergence from ROC,

referendum, 326, 340, 112, 173, 334-8, 361; 73—4, 231-3; and 350-1; after a 1995 Yes political autonomy in, Quebec constitution, vote, 316-17, 323 See 4, 83-4, 143, 166, 170, 117, 119, 223, 231, 240,

also Johnson, Daniel 176-7; probable 277-8; and Quebec’s Quebec Pension Plan, 210 peaceful nature of, 93- long-term future, 257Quebec Political Action 4, 106-8, 113-15, 119- 9; and subsequent

Committee, 327 21, 153-4, 179, 181-2, political realignment

Quebec secession: 192, 313-14; provincial in Quebec, 233, 258-9;

~-Background and governments’ timetable for, 118, 124, possible effects of: response to, 116, 120- 169-71, 277 constitutional and 1, 163, 165, 168, 172, -A more polarized political background 217-18, 250; public secession: 235-51, 380

of, 139-46, 155, 236-7; support for (polls), ~The 1995 referendum constitutionality of, 141-3, 238, 249, 265, campaign: 265-90; Bill 101, 216, 219-21, 357- 270, 275-6, 284, 292-4, 1, 276-8; and business,

61; and currency and 326, 344, 351, 372; 280-1; and campaign monetary policy rationality in, 29-30, organizations, 431n56; options, 29, 41-7, 71-2; 66, 98, 113, 117, 150-2, Declaration of and determinants of 177-8, 266, 300-4; and Sovereignty, 268, 276-

relationship with referendum about, 7; and economic

ROC, 4, 48-9, 58-9, 85— 113-14, 142-3, 146-53, uncertainty, 285-6; and

6; economic studies of, 239, 248-9, 265-90; electoral fraud, 312, 32, 60-2, 94-100, 149- role of foreign powers 321-3; polarization in, 52; legal studies of, 94, in, 30, 84, 105-7, 153, 279-80; and public 100-12; and possible 157, 171-5, 334-8; consultation, 268, 270; economic relations uncertainty in, 17, 32, and referendum law, with ROC, 4, 29-40, 43-4, 50, 96-100, 143, 275-6; and referendum 150-1, 267, 273-5, 300- 150-1, 158-60, 169-70, question, 268, 278,

4; and possible 176, 186, 191, 223, 250, 307~9, 318-21, 356-7, political relations with 300-4; uniqueness of, 440n30; results, 289 ROC, 4, 48-59, 60-74, 127, 324-5, 443n1 —Discourse in the 1995

118, 144, 177, 271-5; —-The aftermath of referendum campaign:

and right of Quebec to secession: and 291-311; the

secede, 101-4, 147, Canadian reconstitu- constitution, 295-8; 356-61, 379; scenarios tion, 14-28, 51, 116-17, democracy, 304-11; of, 6, 94, 112-15, 313- 120, 122, 159, 165, 168, economic implications,

14, 380-95; studies of 213-31, 332, 383; 300-4; national

the mechanics of, 115— economic effects of, identification, 297-300;

26 199-207, 231-3, 257- the partnership, 273-5,

—The event of secession: 60; irrevocable nature 297

acceptance by ROC, 3- of, 234; and long-term ~After a 1995 Yes victory:

4, 105-7, 112, 114-15, relations with ROC, 312-23; economic

123, 147, 152-9; 259-61, 395-6; uncertainty, 314-15;

acrimony in, 49, 59, negotiations about electoral fraud, 321-3 97-8, 118-20, 151, 177—- with ROC, 117-18, —Impact of the 1995

8, 251; effects on 120-3, 150, 163-9, 240- referendum: 324-38;

opinion in ROC, 9, 47, 1, 332-4; outcomes of on foreign countries,

83, 114, 116, 159-63: negotiations about, 334-8; on future

federal response to, 65, 176-212, 250-1, 300-4, negotiations, 332-4; on 120, 124, 153-63, 250; 330-2 (see also subject the process of

international heads); and policy secession 330-1; on

504 Index

terms of secession, referendum, 270, 297, 252-6; and

331-2 307-8; after a 1995 Yes polarization vis-a-vis

—Post-referendum vote, 319; in 1997 Quebec, 235-51, 266, strategies about election, 363-9. See also 279-80, 390-1; process secession: 339-74 (see Manning, Preston of reconstitution of, also Chrétien, Jean, Registered retirement 14, 16, 51, 120-25, 159, and Bouchard, Lucien) Savings plans (RRSPs), 165, 168, 170, 213-22,

-A future secession: 375— 210 383; secession

96; the campaign, 378- _— Reid, Scott, 153 negotiations with 80; determining Representation Act, 1985, Quebec, 29-30, 116-25,

factors, 396; pre- 227 163-71, 176-212, 331-

negotiation about, 378, Resnick, Philip, 49, 51, 4: substance of

383-5; pre-referendum 404n8 reconstitution of, 14compromise, 376-8; RESPEQ, 316 28, 116-17, 196-7, 200, and ROC-Quebec Rest of Canada (ROC): 213, 218, 222-31, 255-

institutions, 384, 393, defined, 6 6, 332-4; in 1995

395-6; scenarios of, -Background and post- referendum, 280-3, 380-95; UDI in, 386- secession options: 287-8, 298-304; after a 95. See also Transition attitudes towards 1995 Yes vote, 318-23. to sovereignty; Rest of United States in, 24, See also Quebec

Canada 83, 160, 420n62; secession

Quebec Superior Court, characteristics of, 9- Rhodesia and Nyasaland,

358-9 13, 77-86; constitu- federation of, 54, 129, Québucks, 47 | tional options, 14-28; 131 currency and Riker, William, 294

Racine, Serge, 433n93 monetary policy of, 29, Rivest, Jean-Claude,

Rae, Bob, 146, 167, 282, 41-7, 71-2; economic 462n234

428n9 relations with Quebec, | Robertson, Gordon, Rae, John, 433n86 13, 29-40; forces for 415n114

Raynauld, André, 97 centralization and Robillard, Lucienne, 270, Redistribution, 25-6, 31- decentralization in, 27, 298, 306, 451n61 2, 64, 73, 209; political 75-86, 122, 253-6; Rock, Allan, 354, 451n56 requirements for, 62, national identification Romanow, Roy, 146, 150 70-1, 74; in ROC, 10, in, 15, 19, 21, 80-2, 114, Royal Bank of Canada,

15, 19-21, 79 160-1, 190, 253; 96-8

Referendum Act, 155 political relations with Royal Canadian Reform Party of Canada, Quebec, 30, 48-59, 177; Mounted Police

81, 147, 153; regional differences (RCMP), 162, 189 constitutional position within, 10-11, 15, 27, Rupert’s Land, 116

of, 144-5, 228; as a 42,77, 80-1, 85, 237, Russia, 131, 336

movement party, 1445; 388, 404n14 Ryan, Claude, 316 and Plan B, 353, 357; —Quebec secession and

in polarization ROC: election or St-Jean, 187, 440n27 scenario, 241-4, 246, referendum in, 51,116, St Lawrence Seaway, 111,

249-51; popular 121-2, 154-6, 166, 168- 115, 125, 150, 183, 188 support for, 10, 11, 17; 9, 214-15, 218, 221-2, Saguenay floods, 349

in secession 250; in a future Saskatchewan, 11, 15, 27,

negotiations, 153, 163, secession, 380-95; 230

165-6, 168-9; and impact of 1995 Scandinavian Inter-

strategy of referendum on, 328- Parliamentary Union,

polarization, 144-5, 34, 381-2; long-term 72 242-4; in 1995 future of, 5, 231-3, School board reform,

505 Index

341-2 Decentralization Tanganyika, 52

Scott, Stephen, 102, 107 Société Saint-Jean Taylor, Charles, 80, 329,

Secession: in bipartite Baptiste de Montréal, 415n114

states, 54; cases of, 430n33 Team Canada trade 127-36; and Southern Rhodesia, 108 missions, 342, 345

confederations, 23; Southwestern Ontario, 17 Thorburn, Hugh, 124-5 generalizations about, Sovereignty: alienation Tiso, Jozef, 134

5, 87-8, 128-36; of, 55-6; indivisibility Tobin, Brian, 325, 332,

peaceful or violent of, 22, 51, 156; 350

nature of, 107-8, 113, meaning of in Quebec, Toronto Stock Exchange,

128-9, 416n4; political 142-3, 147, 156, 273, 285, 314 autonomy in, 4, 83-4, 440n30. See also Toronto Sun, 432n72 90-1, 143; of Quebec, Quebec secession Transition to sovereignty, see Quebec secession. Sovereignty-association, 4-5, 24: conjunctural

See also Transition to 49-50, 103, 141, 148, factors in, 82-4;

sovereignty 427n17. See also importance of, 4, 49,

Seigniorage: defined, 43; Quebec secession; 59, 74, 89-92, 99-100,

in ROC-Quebec Economic integration; 112-15, 125, 324;

currency matters, 44— Political institutions structural factors in, 4, 5,47, 185, 187, 205-6 Soviet Union. See Russia 77-82 Senate, 144, 164, 214,229; Sparrow case, 220 Treaty of Rome, 38 bloc voting in, 18, 226; Special status of Quebec, Tremblay, Arthur, 433n93

composition of in 155 Tremblay, Rodrigue, ROC’s new Spending power, 348, 373 418n42 constitution, 226-7; Sri Lanka, 93 Triple-E Senate. See reform of, 18, 159, 222, Stability, 327 Senate

250, 373; triple-E, 18, State Department (USA), Trudeau, Pierre, 458n163

81, 117, 226, 253 337-8 Turkey, 131

Separation of Quebec: Statistics Canada, 184 Turp, Daniel, 101-2, 104, meaning of in Quebec, Stewart, Ian, 408n3 107, 109, 272, 430n45, 142-3, 147, 156. See Succession to treaties by 431n52 also Quebec secession Quebec, 110-12; in Simard, Jacynthe, 433n93 secession negotiations, Uganda, 52 Simeon, Richard, 113 174, 178, 188-9, 197-— Unemployment Simpson, Jeffrey, 238-9, 99, 206, 216; in 1995 Insurance, 99, 173, 210,

283 referendum campaign, 240

Singapore-Malaysia, 284 Uniform Law Movement, separation of, 127-33 Supreme Court Act, 226 72

Slovakia. See Supreme Court of Unilateral declaration of Czechoslovakia Canada, 56-7, 140, 142, independence (UDI):

Slovak National Party, 194, 214, 220, 412n34; after a future Yes vote,

134 composition of, 214— 386-93; legality of,

Slovenia, 419n46 16; in new ROC 357-61, 379-80; legal

Social Credit Party of constitution, 226; and meaning of, 101; in British Columbia, 11 reference re Quebec post-referendum Social entitlements, 69— secession, 323, 358-62, strategy, 357; by

70; in secession 379-80, 383 Quebec, 101-8, 112, negotiations, 209-11 Sdreté du Québec, 389, 119-21, 155, 157, 159, Social policy, 16, 20, 242; 391 218, 277, 313; in ROC, relation to economic Sweden 442n41. See also 214, 216, 218, 392-5;

policy, 19, 69. See also Norway-Sweden after a 1995 Yes vote,

Social entitlements; Switzerland, 93 318, 323

506 Index

United Kingdom, 175 Human Rights, 415n114 United Nations, 22, 58, 458n145 Wells, Clyde, 146, 297-8, 102-3, 106, 180, 197, Uruguay Round of 325

296, 390 GATT, 198, 203 Western provinces, 37,

United Quebec 80-1, 200; and Federalists, 327 Valcartier, 187, 440n27 constitutional veto,

United States, 46-7, 57, Vallée, Jacques, 106, 109, 348; non-homogeneity

76-7, 83, 93, 97, 231, 124 of, 10, 11, 15, 21;

254, 260; and Vancouver, 160 regional solidarity in, absorption of Canada, Vancouver Island, 24 15, 27, 161; and new

24-5, 27, 120, 161-2; Vegh, George, 108 ROC constitution, 172, 336-8; Canadian Vieille souche, 300 226-31, 256; and

attitudes towards, 24, Velvet Revolution, 133 suspicion of Ontario 83, 160; and Canadian Venault, Denise, 433n93 dominance, 15, 83, 85,

succession to treaties Verdun, 288, 311 207, 228, 230 with, 111, 174; Veto, constitutional, of Whitaker, Reg, 148

intervention after a Quebec, 347-8 Williams, Sharon A., 104 future Yes vote, 390-2; Via Rail, 188 Woehrling, José, 455n114

policy about Quebec Victoria Falls Conference, Wood, John R., 91

secession, 24, 30, 112, 129, 131 World Bank, 147, 197 120, 172, 235, 240, 286—- Vienna Convention, 110 World Court, 56

7, 335-8; policy about Villeneuve, Raymond, World War I, 142

recognition of Quebec, 465n27 World War II, 165 105-6, 317, 337, Voluntary harmonization

446n53; Quebec of regulations, 39-40, York University

accession to treaties 63, 65, 72, 201-2, 232-3 Constitutional Reform

with, 34, 36-8, 110-12, Project, 123-4, 163

120, 174, 188, 198-9, Washington State, 172 Yugoslovia, 105, 113 206, 240, 286-7, 336-7 Watts, Ronald, 76, 80-1, Yukon, 10, 21 Universal Declaration of 83, 144, 407n8, 414n96,