Scottish Presbyterians and the Act of Union 1707 9780748630783

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Scottish Presbyterians and the Act of Union 1707

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Scottish Presbyterians and the Act of Union 1707 Jeffrey Stephen

Edinburgh University Press

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Dedicated to Robert George Stephen Moira Elizabeth Stuart and Jessica

© Jeffrey Stephen, 2007 Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh Typeset in 10.5/13pt Sabon by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester, and printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn, Norfolk A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 0 7486 2505 5 (hardback) The right of Jeffrey Stephen to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Contents

Preface

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1. Union: The Religious and Political Background, 1689–1706

1

2. ‘And the Gates of Hell Shall Not Prevail Against Her’: Securing the Church in the Event of a Union

40

3. ‘Upon the Watchtower of This Church’: The Commission of the General Assembly

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4. Presbyteries and Parishes: Addressing Against Union

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5. The Church and Popular Protest

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6. Incorporating Union: The Search for an Alternative

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7. ‘That God may Mercifully Bring Good out of that Union’

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Appendix Bibliography Index

238 244 268

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Preface

If the historiographical debate over Anglo-Scottish union has at times been heated and controversial, the controversy has not involved the role of the church or other Presbyterian groups. The position of the church in the union debate has long been recognised as significant, and Scotland’s ecclesiastical politics as being central to the debates that preceded union. Historians have claimed of the church that it was the ‘bulwark of the opposition’ and that the ‘greatest threat to union lay in the church’. It has been described as the ‘most formidable opponent of the project’ and that it had ‘played such an important role in articulating anti-union feeling’. One claimed that it was ‘hardly too much to say that the decision lay rather in the hands of the church, than of the parliament’. Despite this recognition of its importance to the debate, the attitude and role of the church and other Presbyterian groups in relation to Anglo-Scottish union has never been the subject of a specific study. Consequently, treatment of the subject by historians, including church historians, has tended to be marked by brevity, generalisations and assumptions. It is a significant omission, which it is hoped this work will remedy.

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1 Union: The Religious and Political Background, 1689–1706

THE REVOLUTION SETTLEMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The Revolution Settlement of 1689–90 represented a Scottish desire for constitutional and ecclesiastional reform. Parliamentary power was reasserted at the expense of the crown, whose power was checked and limited as it had been during the covenanting revolution of 1640–41.1 The political tone of the revolution was set in the first act passed by the convention on 16 March 1689, when it declared itself a free and lawful meeting of the estates that would continue undissolved until it had settled and secured the Protestant religion, government, laws and liberties of the kingdom.2 A letter from King James VII lay unopened before the convention and the act was intended to pre-empt any instructions it might have contained to dissolve it.3 Two key constitutional documents provided the foundation for the settlement, the Claim of Right and the Articles of Grievances. The Claim of Right, enacted on 11 April 1689, outlined a number of key constitutional principles, including that no Roman Catholic could be monarch or hold public office; that supply could not be raised without parliamentary consent; that parliament should meet frequently and enjoy freedom of speech and debate; and that it was the right of subjects to petition the king and parliament. Royal prerogative could not override law, and prelacy was described as ‘an insupportable grievance and trouble to this nation and contrary to the inclinations of the generality of the people ever since the Reformation (they having reformed from Popery and Presbyters) and therefore ought to be abolished’. It underlined the contractual and limited nature of the Scottish monarchy by declaring that James VII, ‘without ever taking the oath required by law’, did ‘Invade the Fundamental Constitution of this Kingdom’, and had altered the monarchy from a legal limited one to ‘an arbitrary despotick power’, and had therefore ‘forfaulted the right to the crown’. John Paterson, Archbishop of Glasgow, questioned the

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convention’s right to declare the throne vacant. Sir John Dalrymple responded that Scotland’s monarchy had been elective by the people’s choice from the beginning and inheritance conditional; therefore it was a limited monarchy. The ideology was not new; nor was its application. It had roots in technical feudal law and had been developing within Scottish Presbyterianism since the reformation.4 It was despised by Stuart monarchs who frequently ordered the works in which it was expressed to be burned. The ideology had provided the basis for resistance to the Stuart regimes; their deposition was its logical conclusion.5 The Articles of Grievances enacted on 13 April 1689 demanded the abolition of the Lords of the Articles, a powerful committee through which the court had controlled parliamentary business. They were finally abolished on 8 May 1690.6 On 11 May 1689 the Scottish crown was offered jointly to William and Mary, according to the terms contained in the Claim of Right and the Articles of Grievances. The final settlement was delayed until July 1690, largely due to the influence of ‘the Club’, a radical parliamentary group made up mostly of members from the shires and burghs. The Club’s numerical strength (around 70 out of 125 members), high degree of organisation and definite goals enabled it to dominate proceedings in parliament.7 They wanted a settlement consistent with the requirements of the Claim of Right and the Articles of Grievances. THE RELIGIOUS SETTLEMENT

Taking its lead from the Claim of Right, the estates abolished Episcopalian church government on 22 July 1689.8 However, it could have been very different. William did not consider church government to be a fundamental and had a pragmatic approach to a settlement. He was as prepared to settle one model as the other and would have preferred uniformity between his kingdoms. It made practical sense, with an Anglican settlement in England, to maintain the Episcopalian settlement already in place in Scotland.9 For that reason, despite the support he had received from Presbyterians and the influence of Scots Presbyterian exiles who had accompanied him on his invasion, William’s first offer was made to Episcopalians at a meeting in London in December 1688. The refusal of Alexander Rose, Bishop of Edinburgh, to give William the support either of himself or the rest of the Scottish bishops effectively sealed their fate. All of the Scottish bishops and most of their clergy subsequently refused to acknowledge William and Mary as sovereigns and maintained a loyalty to the exiled James VII as their divinely ordained sovereign. These Jacobite clergy have been described as the ‘most significant

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single group of men creating and transmitting articulate Jacobite ideology in this period’.10 They upheld the doctrines of divine right, indefeasible hereditary succession, non-resistance and passive obedience. The majority of clergy in the Church of England modified these beliefs and adopted a new theology of kingship in order to justify and support the Revolution. However, English non-jurors and the majority of Scottish Episcopal clergy could not.11 The Jacobitism of the Episcopal clergy heavily influenced the direction of the settlement. Taking the principled rather than the pragmatic approach resulted in their disestablishment. Episcopalians were tainted with disloyalty and distrusted while the settlement enabled Presbyterians to promote themselves as loyal supporters and guardians of the Revolution.12 Following discussions with Scottish political elites, William introduced changes to the electoral process. Removing the previous requirement for electors and candidates to take the Test effectively extended the franchise, resulting in increased Presbyterian participation and electoral success, particularly in the burghs. The Convention of Estates that opened on 14 March 1689 was largely Presbyterian in composition.13 The estates had stated their intention to settle church government most agreeable to the inclinations of the people. However, the Club delayed the re-establishment of Presbyterianism. Fearing that some of their supporters might drift away if the church question was settled early, they kept the debate away from it until their wider political concerns had been addressed.14 On 25 April 1690, the Act of Supremacy of 1669 was rescinded as being inconsistent with the establishment of Presbyterian church government. Acts of Supremacy had been the foundation upon which Stuart erastianism had been built. They gave monarchs supreme authority over all ecclesiastical issues and persons within the kingdom. The church became an arm of the state and bishops servants of the crown. On the same day, an act was passed restoring to their former parishes those Presbyterian ministers ‘yet alive,’ who had been ejected since 1 January 1661 for their non-compliance with prelacy.15 The present incumbents were to leave the parishes immediately, giving the restored men free access to their churches and to exercise their ministry without the need for a new call.16 On 7 June 1690 the Westminster Confession of Faith was ratified and Presbyterian church government established as it had been in the Act of 1592. A series of acts previously passed for the erection and maintenance of prelacy in Scotland were rescinded and annulled along with all other laws and acts considered ‘contrary, or prejudicial to, inconsistent with or derogatory from the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian government now Established’.

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Church government was established in the hands of the ministers ejected since 1 January 1661, and those ministers and elders that they chose to admit and receive. Anyone tainted with episcopacy was effectively excluded from a role in church government. The act also addressed the question of conformists with the previous regime (Episcopalians) who had either deserted or been legally removed from their parishes. Parliament declared that Presbyterians presently in charge of these churches, with the consent of the parish, could keep possession of them. The first meeting of the General Assembly was appointed to meet in October 1690. The assembly was empowered to appoint commissions for the trial of ministers and to ‘purge out, all insufficient, negligent, scandalous and erroneous Ministers, by due course of Ecclesiastical Process and Censures’.17 The act not only established Presbyterianism but aimed at its continued security by ensuring that conformists with the previous regime, considered doctrinally, morally and politically suspect, were unable to influence church courts or were removed altogether.18 Patronage was abolished on 19 July 1690. Heretors and elders of a vacant parish were to nominate a minister and the congregation had the right to approve or disapprove of the nominee. Reasons for disapproval were to be submitted to the presbytery, which had the final decision.19 Anyone who refused to subscribe to the confession of faith, take the oath of allegiance and submit to Presbyterian church government was excluded from holding office in any educational establishment – a significant factor in shifting the ecclesiastical balance in favour of Presbyterians over the next twenty-five years. Episcopalians found it difficult to replace ministerial losses as the universities began producing a new generation of Presbyterian ministers.20 Significantly, the National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant were not renewed. They continued under the annulments of the Act Rescissory of 1661, which was not repealed. The settlement ended the Episcopal uniformity between the kingdoms established at the Restoration and opened up again the religious divide that had always been seen as a serious obstacle to union.21 PRESBYTERIAN SCHISM

Presbyterians belonging to the United Societies, also known as the Cameronians, rejected the settlement as a sinful compromise. Staunch upholders of the idea of a covenanted church and nation, they looked upon the government of both church and state established at the Revolution as unlawful.22 They refused to rejoin the national church

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because of its failure to renew the covenants. They complained that it was an erastian settlement implemented by parliament rather than the church. They objected to the fact that parliament had established presbytery, ratified the confession of faith and determined who should sit at the assembly before a general assembly had been held and without consulting the church. They objected to the settlement because it perpetuated the defects of the 1592 Act but omitted the reforms of the covenanting revolution. They argued that the church was not free to exercise its intrinsic power to call and dissolve assemblies and that Presbyterianism had been settled as agreeable to the inclinations of the people rather than because it was the divinely appointed form of church government.23 Their three ministers – Alexander Shields, Thomas Linning and William Boyd – submitted the complaints and grievances of the societies concerning the sins and defections of the church to the 1690 Assembly. The petition also set out the terms upon which they were prepared to rejoin.24 The assembly rejected the petition as mistaken, unreasonable and divisive.25 Nevertheless, the three ministers rejoined the church amid much criticism. The societies refused to follow because their grievances and complaints had been ignored. The Cameronians saw themselves then and thereafter as the ‘True Presbyterian Church of Scotland’.26 It was the refusal to renew the covenants or make the subscription to them a condition of accession to the throne that lay behind their rejection of the civil settlement. In declarations issued at Sanquhar in 1692, 1695 and 1703, William, Mary and Anne were all rejected as sovereigns. As upholders of the idea of a covenanted nation under a covenanted king, where the covenant was a test of loyalty to religion and liberty as well as an oath of office, the Cameronions were bound to reject any settlement that rejected the covenant. These monarchs were also rejected because they had sworn to maintain prelacy in England, which was contrary to the aims of the Solemn League and Covenant.27 They separated themselves as much as possible from church and state, no member was permitted to hold any civil post and they refused to pay taxes. Living in the south-west of Scotland, they organised themselves into societies whose meetings remained secret. After the departure of Shields, Linning and Boyd, they remained without an ordained minister until John Macmillan officially joined them in December 1706.28 Of the other groups to emerge from the United Societies the most significant was the Hebronites, who were led by John Hepburn, minister at Urr in Galloway. Hepburn came from a north-east Episcopalian family and was a graduate of King’s College in Aberdeen.29 The Hebronites aimed to acknowledge what was good in both church and state, a position they

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believed most closely followed the pattern of Scripture.30 They held six key principles: adherence to the Scriptures and confessions of the Church of Scotland; to its forms of worship; to Presbyterian church government; to the headship of Christ and the independence of the church from any foreign or civil power; approval of the reformation from prelacy and popery; and adherence to the National Covenants.31 With the exception of their adherence to the covenants, their principles were identical to those of the established church. For that reason, the Hebronites were not schismatics and, unlike the Cameronians, did not break entirely from the church.32 Nevertheless, they compiled a list of grievances against church and state that prevented full union. Hebronite willingness to acknowledge what was good in church and state prevented any union with the Cameronians. Unlike the Cameronians, Hebronites were permitted to use the legal system to redress grievances and take public office, provided they had the consent of the other members.33 The Cameronians thought the Hebronite position detestable and declared it loathsome to God. They accused them of ‘pretending to act separately from our enemies and antagonists, while yet really corporate with them and carrying on their designs effectually’.34 Hepburn spent much of his time protesting against what he saw as the sinful defections of church and state. His suspension by the Kirk in 1696 was followed by imprisonment in Edinburgh and Stirling castles. The Privy Council sentenced him to a period of exile in Brechin for not taking the Oath of Allegiance and he eventually returned to Urr in 1699. His activities, denunciations and defiance of the church led to further suspension. The church appointed a committee to meet with Hepburn at Sanquhar in February 1705 in an attempt to negotiate reconciliation. Despite the committee being made up of ministers largely sympathetic to Hepburn, no agreement could be reached and he was deposed again. He was restored a second time at the 1707 General Assembly.35 ERASTIANISM, DIVINE RIGHT AND THE STRUGGLE OVER INTRINSIC POWER

The Revolution Settlement was the cause of numerous long-running ecclesiastical disputes within Presbyterianism, and between Presbyterians and Episcopalians. Constant Cameronian accusations that the settlement was erastian eventually provoked the Commission of the General Assembly to publish a refutation. The document reasserted the headship of Christ over the church, the divine origin of presbytery and the intrinsic powers of the church.36 The commission had a point. The Church of

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England was erastian; the church in Scotland under the various acts of supremacy or under the ‘Black Acts’ of 1584 had been erastian. However, the Revolution Settlement had dismantled the building blocks of erastianism when it rescinded the Act of Supremacy and abolished patronage. Furthermore, the 1592 Act with which Presbyterianism was established, while imperfect, had in its time been the means of abolishing the erastian Black Acts. Moreover, in the Westminster Confession of Faith, parliament had ratified an anti-erastian confession. The Cameronians also complained that Presbyterianism had been settled as agreeable to the inclinations of the people rather than because it was the divinely appointed model of government. While the 1690 Act did not specifically declare the Jus Divinum of presbytery, it did describe Presbyterian church government as ‘the government of Christ’s church within this nation agreeable to the Word of God and most conducive to the advancement of true piety and godliness’37 Subsequent acts in 1700 and 1702 confirmed this position.38 The 1690 Assembly was unhappy with William’s declaration that the settlement ‘was judged to be most agreeable to the inclinations of our good subjects’ because it omitted reference to the Jus Divinum of presbytery.39 The assembly responded by producing a draft act declaring the Jus Divinum of presbytery, a copy of which was sent to William but rejected. The assembly was content to make its point in its letter to the king by stating that presbytery was not more agreeable to the inclinations of the people than it was acceptable to the will of god.40 Presbyterian irritation on this point was exacerbated by the fact that Episcopalians were readily exploiting the terminology of the Claim of Right and saw in it a glimmer of hope for a reversal in their fortunes. According to John Sage, the government had not abolished prelacy on the grounds that it was ‘antichristian, or contrary to reason, or scripture, or antiquity, or the universal opinion of Protestant churches abroad, or learned men in all ages, but only as contrary to the inclinations of the people’. They hoped that when presbytery became a grievance to the people, and contrary to their inclination, another parliament would restore episcopacy. As both presbytery and episcopacy had been abolished by parliaments in the past, there was no reason why presbytery could not be abolished in the future.41 The most contested area in the erastian debate was over who had the right to call and dissolve assemblies. William believed that power belonged to him and acted accordingly. The abrupt closure of the 1692 Assembly, and the refusal of the commissioner to set a date for the next, was greeted with loud protests. Moderator William Crichton responded by asserting

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the intrinsic power of the assembly to meet on church business and by setting a date for the next assembly.42 The church acknowledged the magistrate’s right and power to call assemblies. Nevertheless, it insisted that his power was not exclusive but complimentary to that of the church, which had its own intrinsic powers to call and dissolve its own assemblies.43 The point of conflict was crown attempts to deny the church these rights despite the fact that parliament had enshrined the church’s intrinsic powers in legislation when it ratified the confession of faith. While the church was united in its defence of its intrinsic powers, it was divided over how far it should insist on them. Some ministers pressed the assembly to pass an act asserting its powers and removing any ambiguity in the 1592 Act.44 Others claimed that their intrinsic powers were secure enough and that pressing the issue was ‘destructive to the solide securitie of our church’.45 Provoking conflict over the issue was thought likely to aggravate church–state relations and create in the minds of their people fear that the church was in danger.46 The issue came to a head when James Ogilvy, 1st Earl of Seafield, acting on instructions from Anne, dissolved the 1703 Assembly just as it was about to approve certain synod records that asserted the headship of Christ, Jus Divinum and intrinsic power.47 A private element in Seafield’s commission stated that if the assembly was to protest or to ‘sitt or act in opposition to our authority, you shall order the commander in Cheef of our Forces to dissipate them’.48 The sudden dissolution came like a ‘Thunder clap’ and produced a storm of protestations against it and for intrinsic power.49 The following year the assembly asserted its rights by reminding Anne that it met as a national assembly in the name of Christ, not in the name nor with the permission of the monarch.50 At subsequent assemblies moderators emphasised that the church met in the full enjoyment of its intrinsic powers.51 CHURCH UNION, COMPREHENSION AND TOLERATION

Before any church settlement had been decided either way, some Episcopalians were advocating church union or comprehension schemes with Presbyterians. On 24 December 1688 James’s Scottish Privy Council recommended that William summon a parliament and secure religion ‘in the most comprehensive terms for including and uniting all Protestants’.52 Presbyterians were urged to seize the opportunity of union based upon a moderate episcopacy while Episcopalian clergy ‘were of so reconciling inclinations’.53 On 2 July 1689 Episcopalian clergy from the diocese of Aberdeen presented an address to parliament containing

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expressions of loyalty to William and requesting a free general assembly. They urged a union of the two groups that would ensure toleration of their differences.54 George Mackenzie, Viscount Tarbat and later Earl of Cromarty, proposed a scheme in which both models of government would coexist within the church. Each parish and its minister would be responsible for choosing which model they adhered to but patronage would remain.55 At the same time Mackenzie was urging William to maintain episcopacy in Scotland on the grounds of the old Stuart maxim that it was the system most compatible with monarchy. Presbyterianism, he argued, was tainted with republicanism, inconsistent with monarchy, humane society and civil government, and would encroach upon the authority of the magistrate.56 Presbyterians understandably rejected Episcopalian overtures. They understood perfectly why Episcopalians who had manifested such persecuting tendencies before the Revolution should suddenly be of such ‘reconciling inclinations’ after it. They wanted Presbyterianism settled upon ‘the old and solid foundations’.57 However, William was keen to accommodate Episcopalians and wanted a moderate Presbyterian settlement. He wanted Episcopalians to enjoy the same indulgences that dissenters had in England, provided they took the Oath of Allegiance.58 William’s motivation was self-interest rather than a desire for tolerance. Peace, stability and ease of government within his kingdoms had priority over any dogmatic adherence to a particular form of church government. Aware that the Church of England expected its Scottish brethren to receive the same indulgences as English dissenters, William could not be seen to preside over a settlement in which Episcopalians were being persecuted.59 Financial, moral and political support was raised through effective lobbying of both the court and the English bishops.60 Presbyterians were aware that too rigorous action against Episcopalians would ‘irritate the Church of England’ but were confident that William’s interests would not be damaged.61 With the sufferings and persecution they had endured during the Restoration regimes still fresh in the memory, Presbyterians were unimpressed by Episcopalian complaints. Episcopalian hardships were but ‘flea bites to the scorpions wherewith they oppressed others.’62 William’s attempts met with limited success. In February 1691 his recommendation of union with Episcopalians who were described as well qualified for the ministry and who acknowledged his government was rejected by the church on the grounds that they had refused to acknowledge or submit to the established church government.63 His attempt to unite the two groups at the 1692 Assembly also failed, and the Act for

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Settling the Quiet and Peace of the Church in 1693 met with limited success. The 1694 General Assembly had acquiesced in William’s scheme and instructed the commission to receive into communion such of the ‘late conforming ministers’ as qualified themselves according to the law under the terms of the 1693 Act. Only about thirty qualified.64 Most Episcopalian clergy could not bring themselves to recognise Presbyterian church government according to the act or take the oaths requiring them to recognise William and Mary as de jure and de facto sovereigns.65 William’s final attempt at comprehension in 1695 allowed nonconforming clergy to remain in their churches under royal protection, provided they took the Oath of Allegiance. They were not required to subscribe to any doctrine on Presbyterian church government, did not have to apply for admittance to the church and would therefore not sit on church courts. Around 116 qualified.66 Episcopalian hopes of toleration or even restoration were raised on the accession of Anne in 1702. Not only was she a Stuart but a devout Anglican and considered to be ‘a Nursing Mother to the True Church of God’.67 Addresses to the Queen asked for relief from poverty and distress and that Episcopalian clergy be admitted to parishes where Episcopalians formed the majority. Anne was sympathetic to their plight and urged the general assembly to show meekness and charity towards them on the ground that it would encourage loyalty to the government and respect for the established church. Nevertheless, her orders that the Privy Council protect Episcopalians in the peaceful exercise of their religion extended only to those who had qualified themselves according to law.68 By the time the 1703 Assembly met, the question of toleration had found its way onto the political agenda.69 James Douglas, Duke of Queensberry, was instructed to pass an act allowing Episcopal ministers to preach in meeting houses in certain towns, provided they had qualified themselves by taking the oaths of allegiance and assurance.70 Neither Queensberry nor his party favoured toleration and when moderator George Meldrum denounced the move in a sermon before the assembled estates of parliament, he was largely preaching to the converted.71 Presbyterians saw toleration as the thin end of the Episcopal wedge that would ultimately lead to their overthrow. It was a widely held view that behind toleration was a prelatic and Jacobite design aimed at the ‘overthrow of the present Establishment, and the Restauration of Prelacy in this church in spite of the Claim of Right’.72 The issue was directly linked to that of union. If toleration was to be rejected because of the tendency of government by bishops in Scotland to ‘enslave us to England’, there were obvious dangers in a union with England – dangers that had recently been expressed by George Ridpath, whose work

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was commended to all readers.73 Presbyterian hostility, and a lack of political will, ended hopes of toleration for a time.74 PRESBYTERIAN PROGRESS

Episcopalians contested the assertion that prelacy was ‘contrary to the inclinations of the generality of the people’ and began a furious but ultimately pointless dispute over the respective numerical strengths of either side.75 They claimed that ‘both for number and quality’ the Episcopalian party ‘was predominant in this nation: The Nobles and Gentry are generally Episcopal and so the people, especially Northward’.76 So confident were Episcopalians of their case that they called for a national poll. They wanted to know how prelacy could be declared to be against the inclinations of the people when the people had never been asked how they were inclined on the matter.77 Their political supporters began promoting the idea at court but no poll ever took place. The Episcopalian case was strongest in the period immediately following the Revolution. Their strong presence, particularly in the north, could not be dismissed as readily as calls for a national poll. They presented the Kirk with a major obstacle to national establishment. From the outset of the Revolution, the newly re-established Church of Scotland, driven by missionary zeal and evangelistic fervour, was intent on spiritual conquest. Armed with the gospel of reformed Presbyterianism, allied to and supported by the state, it aimed to supplant its spiritual, ideological and political enemies and establish itself as the national church in which no part of national life and consciousness was to be without its presence and influence. The Revolution Settlement, while regarded as being far from perfect, was the foundation upon which the Church of Scotland intended to build a reformed church. This process of establishment was an attempt to create a common Presbyterian identity; Presbyterianism was to be a civilising and unifying factor in national life. Sharing a common aim of establishing and maintaining the Revolution against its enemies, the Kirk as the established church looked to parliament to support its work through legislation. That support was forthcoming on a wide range of issues such as the security of Presbyterian church government, national fasts, education, suppression of popery and profaneness, and for preventing of disorders in the supplying and planting of vacant churches – this last being designed to prevent Episcopalian intrusions and any attempts to hinder or prevent Presbyterians filling vacant churches.78 As permitted by the act of parliament establishing Presbyterianism, the 1690 Assembly appointed commissions for visitations for north and

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south of the Tay. The commissions had powers to plant vacant churches and for ‘trying and purging out of insufficient, negligent, scandalous and erroneous ministers, by due course of ecclesiastical process and censures’.79 The assembly gave instructions and assurances that none were to be removed on account of their preference for church government. For some Presbyterians, a preference for Episcopalian church government was as good a reason as any for removing a minister. However, despite the assurances, there were loud complaints from Episcopalians about the conduct of the commissions, prompting William to halt their work on two occasions.80 Nevertheless, the commissions’ work went unhindered, was renewed by subsequent assemblies and assisted by parliamentary legislation.81 In south and central Scotland, Presbyterianism was rapidly established. However, problems were encountered trying to supply the large number of vacancies in the north. Ministers from the south were sent on missions into the north on a rotational basis for three months at a time and disciplinary action was to be taken against anyone who refused to go.82 Despite the problems, the 1697 Assembly reported on the good progress being made planting churches in the north.83 In the Highlands, historically an area of restricted access to Presbyterianism, progress was even slower than it was in the north-east. It would take until the end of the eighteenth century before Presbyterianism was established across the Highlands.84 Gaelic-speaking clergy were encouraged to go north and after 1695 none were to be fixed in Lowland parishes.85 In 1704 half of the bursaries of southern presbyteries were to be given for the education of Gaelic speakers to be employed in the Highlands as ministers or schoolmasters.86 Ensuring that every parish had a school was a priority and, despite the desire to employ Gaelic speakers, every parish was to have English speakers for the instruction of that language.87 The assembly encouraged the production, dissemination and use of Gaelic translations of the Bible, metrical psalms and the shorter catechism.88 The bibles referred to as ‘Irish’ were probably those translated into classical Gaelic by Robert Kirk, the Episcopalian minister at Aberfoyle. Three thousand copies of Kirk’s translation were printed in 1690. Despite the willingness of the church to use these bibles, there were no moves from within the church to produce a translation in Scottish Gaelic. The medium of evangelism and education was to be English and it was not until 1766, after a shift in policy, that a Gaelic New Testament was finally produced.89 The goal of the church had been not simply to bring the Highlands within the fold of the established church but to bring a barbarous people into the king’s obedience.90 Presbyterianism was considered synonymous with loyalty and the Kirk

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saw itself as a civilising influence. The surest way of breaking down the ancient religious, cultural and linguistic barriers that existed between Highland and Lowland, and of bringing the Highlands into mainstream Scottish life, as well as counteracting the influence of Jacobitism, was to convert the Highlands to reformed Presbyterianism. It was difficult for Episcopalians to maintain their position, even in the north, and the Kirk gradually restored and extended a full Presbyterian organisation. Episcopalian landowners offered resistance but it only delayed rather than prevented the Presbyterian advance.91 Some of the dispossessed clergy set up meeting houses but many took up positions in England, or as chaplains and tutors to aristocratic patrons upon whom the clergy came increasingly to depend.92 Numbers were also depleted by death.93 Whatever the reason, the lost clergy were being replaced by Presbyterians.94 The Kirk was assisted in its aims by legislation, including the 1698 Act designed to prevent Episcopalian intrusions and discourage Episcopalian landowners from using mob violence to hinder or prevent Presbyterians filling vacant churches.95 Ironically, the legislation designed to help those Episcopalian clergy willing to comply left no hiding place for those who refused. When another Act of Council against Episcopal meeting houses in March 1706 brought renewed complaints about the zeal of Presbyterians in shutting them down, they fell on deaf ears. The Earl of Mar reminded the complainants that the ministers in question had not taken the oaths and were not qualified. The law was against them, and ‘if people will persew them, there’s no protecting them’.96 Furthermore, following their ministers to meeting houses was not always an option for the laity and many appeared content to remain in the parish with the new Presbyterian minister.97 Presbyterians accused landowners of forcing their tenants to leave parish churches and attend meeting houses when they were content to stay and join with the established worship.98 Further drift away from episcopacy by the laity was due to the increasing use of liturgy, in particular the use of the English prayer book that was being shipped north in large numbers around 1707–8.99 These changes proved unpopular with many laity who preferred the more traditional, simpler forms of worship.100 Further losses occurred as a result of internecine struggles amongst the clergy over liturgical usage and innovation.101 POST-REVOLUTION POLITICS OF UNION: 1689–1706

The political consequences of the Revolution were far-reaching.102 The impact of the settlement on the constitutional relationship between the

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kingdoms led to a series of crises that would culminate in an incorporating union in 1707.103 Proposals for a union during the Revolution were essentially an exercise in crisis management. John Hay, 2nd Earl and afterwards 1st Marquess of Tweeddale, had been a commissioner at the previous union negotiations in 1670. He saw union as the best means of containing extremism and violence while helping to create a moderate political and religious settlement, as well as reviving his own interests and those of his family.104 It has been argued that some of William’s ministers, such as Sir John Dalrymple and George Melville, 4th Lord Melville, strongly supported union as a means of preventing more radical reform.105 Jacobites promoted union in a failed attempt to delay a settlement and the proclamation of William as king.106 Former servants of the old regime, such as Sir James Dalrymple, saw union as a means of disassociating themselves from that regime and of maintaining political influence.107 Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun argued that only a union of parliaments and trade could rectify the troubled constitutional relationship between the kingdoms.108 Some, such as George Mackenzie, Viscount Tarbat, saw union as the means to obtaining a religious settlement favourable to Episcopalians whose prospects appeared much better in a united kingdom than in Revolution Scotland.109 Whatever their reasons, many of Scotland’s political elites believed that union would be advantageous to both nations.110 William agreed and urged the Convention of Estates to offer acceptable terms to the English parliament, promising to do everything in his power to secure a union.111 The convention in turn expressed its confidence in William’s ability to persuade a reluctant English parliament to embrace the idea.112 On 23 April 1689 the convention nominated commissioners for negotiations that never took place. Nevertheless, union served as one pretext for turning the convention into a parliament because only a parliament had powers to commission negotiations.113 The convention expressed the desire that the kingdoms already united in one head ‘may become one body Politick, one Nation to be represented in one Parliament’. The commissioners were empowered to negotiate ‘an entire and perpetual union betwixt the two kingdoms’.114 Trade, parliament and taxation were identified as the areas in which negotiations could take place. Initially, Presbyterians opposed the idea because of fears that it could prove ‘pernicious to their Kirk’.115 However, they had a change of heart brought on by the exclusion of religion from any negotiations and insecurities over the long-term prospects of the Revolution, at that time threatened by Viscount Dundee’s rising and an invasion from Ireland.116 The convention reserved to itself its church government ‘as it shall be establish’d at the time of the union’ and

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gave a specific commitment that Presbyterian church government would continue as the established form of church government after any union.117 With the Revolution Settlement in place, the idea was allowed to drop. William recommended union to the English parliament in March 1690 but negotiations never took place because there was little interest in the idea in England.118 For much of the rest of William’s reign the question of union was not a live political issue. William thought it was a commendable project but he was not prepared to devote the time and effort necessary to see it through. Efforts to secure a union at the Revolution may have been half-hearted but they were not without significance. During the debate over incorporating union, individuals on both sides identified the revolution as a lost opportunity to settle the constitutional relationship between the kingdoms.119 Sir John Clerk was convinced the Revolution offered Scotland its best chance ‘ever’ for an agreed union with England. The Scots had settled the succession too hastily when they offered the crown to William and Mary. Once offered, all talk of union was ended. Had they delayed the offer, ‘surely they would have won fair terms from the English’.120 Responding to claims that incorporating union was inconsistent with the Claim of Right, supporters of the treaty countered that the Claim of Right favoured union because it was with union in view that it had been approved. The estates’ letter to William was read out as evidence.121 Their claims were substantiated by the terminology used by the convention that strongly suggested it was proposing an incorporating union. As many of the supporters of incorporating union in 1702 and 1706 were members of the convention, there is no reason to believe that incorporating union was not what the convention had in mind. By the end of his reign, William’s experience of the problems and conflicts of interest posed by regal union had led to a stronger commitment to the idea. The problems were due in part to the Revolution Settlement that had shifted the balance of power from monarch to parliament. The ad-hoc committees that replaced the Lords of the Articles were not so easily influenced or controlled by the court. Furthermore, the problems of Scottish politics were exacerbated by divisions between rival magnate interest groups.122 In addition, the 1690s witnessed the development of a party structure in Scottish politics, with the emergence of the Country Party opposition championing patriotic causes such as constitutional reform, parliamentary sovereignty and that of the Company of Scotland after the Darien debacle.123 Much of the growing discontentment in Scotland and a major factor behind the emergence of the Country Party

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related to the perception that Scotland was suffering rather than benefiting from regal union. At the forefront of complaints were those associated with trade and commerce; commercial disagreements were not new but they intensified after the Revolution.124 Scottish trade was being hurt by William’s constant wars with France, one of Scotland’s more lucrative markets. Undefended Scottish merchant shipping was being lost to enemy privateers. English navigation laws kept more competitive Scottish boats out of the carrying trade and prevented the importation of colonial goods directly into Scotland. The Royal Navy’s attempt to enforce the navigation laws, prevented Scottish attempts to bypass them from ‘reaching very significant proportions’. English tariffs and restrictive legislation threatened the cattle and coarse-linen trade for which England was the major market. Furthermore, to add to Scotland’s economic difficulties, continental competition and tariffs were rising against almost all of the goods Scotland exported.125 A low point in Anglo-Scottish relations was reached as a result of the failure of the Scottish expedition to Darien. Darien had once again exposed William’s readiness to sacrifice the interests of Scotland to those of England. The ‘Company of Scotland tradeing to Affrica and the Indies’ was established by an act of parliament in 1695. It had a monopoly to trade with Africa, Asia and America, and powers to make treaties, plant colonies and raise capital in Scotland and England.126 Originally a joint commercial confederation involving Scottish, English, Dutch and Hanseatic interests, it was reduced to a purely Scottish venture after the withdrawal of William’s support. William was ‘furious that a measure so potentially damaging to English commercial interests should have been passed by one of his parliaments’.127 Parliamentary pressure applied in the interest of the East India Company forced English investors to withdraw. William needed supply and could not afford to alienate parliament. Nor could he afford to alienate Spain, who claimed the territory as its own and on whose support he was depending in his struggle against France. William disavowed the scheme and Scottish colonial enterprise was sacrificed in the interests of English trade and his foreign policy.128 Continental backers were similarly frightened off after being told that those who continued to support the scheme would be viewed with hostility.129 Scotland therefore went it alone; Darien was a national enterprise intended to revive the nation’s economic fortunes by providing the opportunity of economic growth, prosperity and modernisation and the chance to break free of economic dependence upon England.130 Darien’s failure meant that a considerable national investment of capital had been lost; it exacerbated the current economic plight of the country and con-

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firmed Scotland’s dependence upon access to English domestic and colonial markets.131 William and England were blamed for the failure; as Robert Wodrow commented, ‘their spleen must break upon somebody’.132 George Ridpath’s spleen broke upon the ‘pernicious counsellors against our Country and Colony’ whom he identified as ‘an English and Dutch Faction mixt with some Scotchmen who have little or no interest in their Country or Affection for it, as to betray it for Bread, or the Favour of the Court’.133 The affair appeared to threaten an irreparable rupture in relations. Paradoxically, it also brought incorporating union back onto the agenda. On 12 February 1700 William recommended a union to the House of Lords as a means of avoiding in the future the conflict of interests that Darien had exposed. 134 The subsequent bill got as far as a second reading in the Commons, where it fell on 5 March 1700. The Tory majority in the Commons was never favourable to the idea and saw it as a Whig attempt to deflect attention from their domestic political difficulties. The Tories had been attempting to remove Whig revenue officials from the Commons and suspected Whig moves for union as an attempt to replace the dismissed officials with Scottish members.135 In the Lords, where the Whigs had a majority, the Tories sabotaged the project after stirring up the Scoto-phobic tendencies in some members by reading inflammatory extracts about the English from a recently published work about Darien.136 UNION, 1702–6

William’s final attempt to initiate negotiations was made in an address to parliament on 28 February 1702, only days before he died.137 Anne maintained this initiative on her accession. William’s death should have led to elections for a new parliament but Queensberry persuaded Anne to reconvene the parliament that had sat since the Revolution.138 The opposition led by James Douglas, 4th Duke of Hamilton, protested that the parliament was illegal and withdrew. The walk-out helped force a general election but Queensberry took the opportunity to pass acts ratifying the Queen’s succession, securing the Church of Scotland and Presbyterian church government and nominating commissioners to negotiate a union.139 Union was seen as the most suitable solution to the succession issue, the constitutional problems highlighted by the Darien scheme and the economic problems that followed it. Queensberry also saw union as a means of overcoming his own political unpopularity. Negotiations began in October 1702, only to be concluded without agreement on 3 February 1703. The stumbling block proved to be

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Scottish insistence on compensation for Darien.140 For Queensberry and his supporters, failure of the negotiations was a lost opportunity. They at least, if not their English counterparts, had been serious about union. The failure was more frustrating because some Scots had been quietly confident that negotiations could end in a ‘happy conclusion’.141 However, the lack of enthusiasm, even sincerity, on the part of the English commissioners demonstrated that Scottish confidence had been misplaced.142 Elections in the autumn of 1702 changed the political balance of parliament. The Cavalier Party, consisting mainly of Jacobites and Episcopalians, was strengthened at the expense of both Court and Country parties, making future union attempts more problematic. The electoral success of their opponents was one of a number of reasons why the period following Anne’s accession proved to be an anxious one for Presbyterians: there were fears over their establishment despite the recent act of parliament confirming it; Anne was a committed Anglican sympathetic to Episcopalians, and there was talk of toleration; finally, they were concerned about the possible consequences of successful union negotiations in the winter of 1702–3.143 These concerns found expression in acts passed by synods in October and November 1702. The acts reaffirmed their commitment and adherence to the reformed religion, their covenanted reformation and Presbyterian church government. They engaged and resolved to defend, maintain and promote the Reformed Faith and to disown and resist all contrary principles. All ministers and elders within the synods were required to subscribe the acts and encouraged to fast and pray in order to achieve the required objective.144 Anticipating a strong and decisive meeting of his synod, Robert Wodrow wrote that the designed union was very much in their thoughts and prayers ‘that the Commissioners of our side may be directed of God to stand by our religiouse and civil rights and libertys, and approve themselves to God, the Government and their Country’.145 The Presbytery of Biggar urged prayer that God would conduct and guide the commissioners, and mercifully ‘preserve and maintain what he [God] hath graciously wrought for his church and people in this land’.146 The Synod of Galloway went so far as to subscribe the National and Solemn League and Covenants, leaving themselves open to charges of imprudence and folly in subscribing a document that required the consent of all three kingdoms.147 During the passage of the treaty through parliament in 1706, synods and presbyteries were urged to renew the resolutions and engagements made in 1702.148 The Kirk’s reaction was restrained but its views were well known and adequately articulated at the time by men like George Ridpath and James Hodges.149

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Nevertheless, it was surprising that there was no reaction to the act enabling the Queen to appoint commissioners because it did not exclude religion or church government from negotiations.150 In an accompanying letter addressed to the Queen, parliament reminded her that in 1689 the estates had ‘expressly reserved our church government as it should be established at the time of the union’. Parliament expressed its confidence that the Queen would have a ‘gracious and careful regard’ to the maintaining of the Presbyterian church government presently established.151 Nevertheless, like the act, the letter did not expressly reserve the issue of church government. The church had no specific protection in the forthcoming negotiations; it was simply a question of trust between parliament and the Queen. This issue led to serious disagreement between the Scottish commissioners over how to deal with the issue of the church. Negotiations had been delayed until 10 November and in the interim some of the commissioners met at the London lodgings of William Johnstone, the Marquis of Annandale. Annandale insisted that the letter to the Queen should be considered as part of their commission and that they were thereby precluded from discussing church government, other than declaring by a preliminary statement that it was not up for negotiation. He argued that their church government was part of the Claim of Right, and therefore unalterable. Others disagreed and argued that church government should be brought into the negotiations, specifically mentioned and secured in the treaty. On the one hand they agreed with Annandale that the issue was not up for negotiation, but only in the sense that the present establishment was not going to be changed. However, if there was to be a union, they wanted no ambiguity and insisted that the church be specifically secured in the treaty. The Earl of Seafield, while recognising the concerns about church government, objected to introducing the subject at the start of negotiations because it was such a contentious issue and likely to damage the project as a whole. He wanted them to begin negotiations with more ‘plausible arguments’. Viscount Tarbat insisted that the church issue was included in their commission, otherwise how could it be preserved? The parliament’s letter was not a prohibition, as it was addressed to the Queen, not to them. The letter was not their rule other than to influence their discretion and to remind them of parliament’s preference, which he had no doubt they would. To begin with a preliminary statement about the church would lead to counter-protestations from the English and would be ‘an ominous entrie’ to the negotiations. He added that it was preposterous to begin negotiations for union with the exceptions from it

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and that it was better to begin with and secure those articles of common advantage. Tarbat believed that this course of action was the most likely to secure concessions from the English on the church question. Annandale, however, insisted on his position and declared that they could not be answerable to parliament if they did otherwise. Tarbat responded that they would be more answerable if they treated for the advantage of presbytery than not at all. He argued that if they followed Annandale’s advice, and the treaty failed as a result, the blame would lie with Presbyterian government, which would ‘be the greatest disservice that could be done to presbyterie’.152 Tarbat’s position seems at odds with his hostility to Presbyterianism. Already on record as having stated that a Presbyterian establishment was inconsistent with union, he was not acting out of concern for the interests of presbytery. His chief concern was securing a union, and as he saw the issue of religion as the greatest obstacle to negotiations, he was not going to let it get in the way.153 Nevertheless, while he did not want church government being raised at the beginning and killing off negotiations, he did not want it excluded entirely. As an Episcopalian, and as one who acted in their interests, he hoped at the very least that English pressure and influence at the negotiations would secure toleration. Tarbat believed that there was an essential unity in the fundamentals of religion between the two nations and they differed only on the issue of government and forms. Unlike other commissioners, he did not believe that church government was a fundamental, and if these nonfundamentals were no barrier to union, they were not barriers to toleration.154 It is not surprising, therefore, that Tarbat should expect toleration for Episcopalians in a united kingdom. Episcopalian expectations were high and matched only by Presbyterian fears. Toleration was the subject of a bitter dispute in Scotland and of discussions among commissioners in London. William Nicholson, Bishop of Carlisle, recorded on 28 November 1702 that Sir James Stewart, the Lord Advocate, had agreed to a proposal for the toleration of episcopacy ‘instead of establishing it forthwith’.155 Some English commissioners, such as John Sharp, Archbishop of York, saw union as the opportunity for the complete restoration of episcopacy in Scotland. He claimed that ‘if that was not intended by the union both the nation and the church would be the losers by it’.156 Sharp’s view was not universally held and some of his colleagues doubted if there would ever be a right time to restore episcopacy in Scotland. Nevertheless, the Archbishop’s view had its supporters. Negotiations broke up in failure and the question of religion and church government was never officially raised.

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THE LEGISLATIVE WAR

Following the failure of the negotiations, a new session of parliament opened on 6 May 1703. The parliamentary session was set against a background of deteriorating Anglo-Scottish relations. At the heart of the problem lay a dynastic crisis caused by a dispute over the succession. The succession settlement of 1689 had favoured Anne and her heirs after the deaths of William and Mary. However, the death of the young Duke of Gloucester, her only remaining child, left Anne without an heir and both kingdoms without a settlement. The subsequent Act of Settlement, passed by the English parliament in 1701, settled the succession on the granddaughter of James VI, Sophia of Hanover and her heirs and successors. This unilateral move was resented in Scotland as an infringement of its national sovereignty and right to settle its own succession. The law of succession in Scotland was the Succession Act of 1681, as modified by the Claim of Right.157 Scotland refused to follow England and settle the succession on the House of Hanover. Another bone of contention had been the decision of the Privy Council on 30 May 1702 to declare war on France. The decision had been taken at the request of the ministry in London, before parliament had opened on 9 June and therefore without parliamentary consent. The decision brought Scotland into the War of the Spanish Succession alongside England. It was extremely unpopular, very costly, caused disruption to Scottish trade and further damaged what was already a weak economy.158 The issue of the succession and involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession, along with the Darien affair, served to focus minds on the constitutional relationship between the kingdoms. The belief that the Union of the Crowns had given England undue influence over Scottish affairs and that Scotland had fared badly under the relationship was near universal in the country.159 According to Sir John Clerk, throughout William’s reign ‘Anti-English feeling was so fierce and indignant that even chance occurrences were laid at their door’; following the failure of the union negotiations, ‘mutual hostility increased daily’.160 Few believed that maintaining the status quo was in Scotland’s interests. The experience and bitter recriminations of one hundred years of regal union underlined the need for a change in the constitutional relationship. The succession crisis offered the opportunity. If, as many believed, the Revolution Settlement was a lost opportunity for substantial constitutional reform, the succession issue offered a second chance. There was no dispute over the need for change; the dispute lay over the nature of the change.

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The initial attempt to settle the constitutional crisis and the succession by an incorporating union collapsed in February 1703. In the subsequent parliament, the Court Party had no overall majority and was forced to enter an alliance with the Cavaliers, who had been the main beneficiaries of the recent elections.161 The main aim of the Court was, with the support of the Cavaliers, to secure badly needed supply for the army.162 The Cavaliers hoped in return to secure toleration for Episcopalians. The aims of the Country Party were to attack the legality of the 1702 session of parliament, from which they had withdrawn in protest, and to secure legislation that placed the relationship between the countries on a more equal footing. They wanted to ensure that in the event of Anne dying before a successor was named, the choice of successor would be made without English influence. Furthermore, whoever was named, they wanted to ensure England could not prejudice Scottish interests as it had done so often since the Union of the Crowns. 163 The Earl of Home, leader of the Cavaliers, presented the Court’s draft act for supply on 19 May. It was immediately countered by a proposal from John Hay, 2nd Marquess of Tweeddale that, in preference to all other business, parliament should proceed to make such changes in the government and constitution of Scotland, to take place after the Queen’s death, as were necessary for the preservation of parliament’s religion and liberty.164 A further attempt to secure supply failed and on 28 May the ministry accepted Tweeddale’s motion and agreed to ‘proceed to make such acts as are necessary or fit for securing our religion, liberty and trade before any act of supply or any other business’, particularly an act for supply.165 The Court’s hand had been forced by a threatened defection of the Cavaliers and they agreed to Tweeddale’s motion in an effort to shore up the alliance. Of the draft acts submitted, which included a draft for an act for the security of the kingdom, priority was given to those of the Presbyterian, Revolution interest.166 The Court gave them priority in the hope of getting that particular faction’s support for supply. By keeping the prospect of toleration alive they were also able to persuade the Cavaliers to co-operate. However, the Court – Cavalier alliance split over an act of Argyll’s that ratified the act that turned the convention into a parliament and declared it to ‘be treason to impugn or endeavour by writing, malicious or advised speaking or other open act or deed to alter the Claim of Right’. The split was confirmed when their attempt to secure toleration for Episcopalians failed. The Cavaliers subsequently joined the Country Party in pursuing its policy of reducing English influence.167 According to the Jacobite George Lockhart, parliament proceeded to frame acts intended to secure their liberties and freedom from the oppres-

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sion they sustained through the influence of English ministers over Scottish affairs. According to Lockhart, despite Court opposition to all overtures, the Cavaliers and Country Party ‘at last prevailed and carried the parliament in these two valuable Acts, First, An Act anent Peace and War . . . Secondly, that Excellent and Wisely contriv’d Act of Security’.168 The Act of Security was justified by Andrew Fletcher on the grounds that Scottish affairs since the Union of the Crowns had been managed by the advice of English ministers to such an extent ‘that we have from that time appeared to the rest of the world more like a conquered province than a free independent people’.169 Fletcher complained that the principle offices of the kingdom had been filled with men the court of England knew would be subservient to their designs. He claimed that such dependence was at the root of bad government and the cause of all the misery within the country.170 John Hamilton, Lord Belhaven told parliament that Scotland had suffered a process of decay and consumption during the past one hundred years and had now become ‘so very weak and debilitated that it hath scarce strength to endure a cure’. The nation’s economic decline had taken place during what he called the ‘Century of Trade of the Trading Age’. While other nations had prospered, Scotland had declined. The reason, according to Belhaven, was that Scotland was labouring under some fundamental error in relation to its constitution since the Union of the Crowns; an error their forefathers were unaware of at the time but had several times unsuccessfully attempted to rectify because their ‘wise and prudent neighbours’ took steps to prevent it. He saw the task of parliament as rectifying the mistake made by their forefathers in 1603 when they failed to make ‘such conditions of Government, and Rectifications of their Constitution, as might have preserved the Sovereignty and Independency of their Nation’.171 Four draft acts of security were finally tabled on 23 June: one from John Leslie, the 8th Earl of Rothes; two from Sir James Stewart, the Lord Advocate; and one from Andrew Fletcher that included his limitations.172 According to George Ridpath, it was Fletcher’s act that caught the attention and came nearest to the act finally passed.173 Inserting limitations on a successor into the act was rejected on 7 July. During the debate, Fletcher insisted that accepting the limitations he had proposed would result in national security and increased wealth. The Court Party believed ‘they would have established a republict and left the successor but the empty name of a king.’174 Seafield acknowledged that while those who proposed limitations truly desired the well-being of the nation, he believed that limitations would ultimately exclude a successor and establish a commonwealth. He considered this to be inconsistent with the

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honour and interests of the kingdom. He reminded parliament that the similar government established by acts of parliament in 1641 had been promoted as likely to make the nation considerable, independent and prosperous. What actually happened was that it led to divisions, civil war and the restoration of a monarchy under Charles II, with increased powers. Furthermore, limitations were unnecessary because the monarchy as it was currently settled was limited by many laws.175 Although limitations were rejected, some of them were incorporated into the final act as well as the Act anent Peace and War. After lengthy debates, the Act of Security was finally approved on 13 August. In the event of the death of Queen Anne without a lawful heir or successor, parliament was authorised and empowered to declare a successor and settle the succession on his or her heirs. The successor should be ‘always of the Royal line of Scotland and of the True Protestant Religion’. The use of the word ‘True’ was open to the interpretation that not only was the successor to be Protestant, but Presbyterian. Furthermore, the successor was not to be the same as that to the crown of England, unless, there be such condicions of government settled and enacted, as may secure the honour and sovereignty of this crown and kingdom, the freedom, frequency and power of parliaments, the religion, liberty and trade of the nation from English or any foreign influence.176

Parliament was also empowered to add any further conditions of government it considered necessary. Importantly, the act stated that parliament did not have the power or authority to name the successor to the crown of England as the successor to the crown of Scotland, nor was that person entitled to succeed even if nominated by parliament, unless ‘a free communication of Trade, the freedom of Navigation and the liberty of the Plantations, be fully agreed to and established by the parliament and kingdom of England to the kingdom and subjects of Scotland’.177 Leaving the succession open gave Scotland an independent dynastic policy that threatened to end the Union of the Crowns at Anne’s death. Both kingdoms could have the same successor but only under the conditions set out in the act. The act offered the prospect of a different successor in Scotland to that in England, if England failed to meet those conditions. One commentator expressed the view that the act not only reflected the views of the majority in parliament but that the universal joy with which it was greeted ‘sufficiently proves it to be the sense of the nation’.178 The Jacobites were happy because leaving the succession open raised their hopes of a restoration of the exiled James Francis Edward Stuart, known to his supporters as James III. However, James’s

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Catholicism was a serious stumbling block to his succession and the act could be seen as an open invitation to him to convert to Protestantism. Nevertheless, for Presbyterian supporters of the act, the return of the Stuarts, converted or not, was an unlikely option. Unionists were not entirely disappointed because leaving the succession open could be used to encourage England to pursue union rather than settle the succession. Had the succession been settled on the House of Hanover, it would have killed off any thoughts of union. Supporters of Hanover who wanted the succession settled immediately were disappointed but at least Hanover had not been excluded. As that house was already settled in England, there was a strong presumption in its favour. There were alternatives but they were unrealistic. Ridpath, while not advocating the House of Savoy, believed they would convert for a crown because they were ‘too much addicted to [their] interest to refuse three crowns merely for the sake of religion’.179 Fletcher rejected the Pretender on the grounds that he would never be content with Scotland alone. He rejected the House of Hanover on the grounds that they were Lutheran and argued in favour of Frederick I, King of Prussia, as a successor to Anne on the grounds that he was the same religion as the Scots.180 Those most satisfied with the act were the Country Party, who had entered parliament intent on reducing English influence over Scottish affairs and had secured an act that, in theory at least, would make their aim a reality. They had an act insisting that if the Union of the Crowns was to continue, it was to continue under entirely new conditions. The act was attempting to rewrite the constitutional arrangement between the two kingdoms. Scottish interests were to be secured from English interference and the act made clear that any successor who was the same monarch as England’s would be subject to limitations. The act asserted Scottish independence and sovereignty; it anticipated a union that was not incorporating but confederal. The Act of Security was the Scottish parliament’s much anticipated response to the English Act of Settlement. More significantly, the act was a rejection of incorporating union. Hostile to the act, the ministry in London refused to allow it to pass. In response to the Privy Council’s declaration of war on 30 May 1702, without parliamentary consent, parliament passed the Act anent Peace and War, which stated that no monarch following Anne could declare war or make peace treaties without the consent of parliament.181 It was a further assertion of parliamentary sovereignty at the expense of prerogative power. Sidney Godolphin. 1st Earl Godolphin and Lord Treasurer of England, believed it would deprive the crown of one of its ‘chiefest flowers’ and wrote to the Earl of Stair urging a union.182 The

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Wine Act was a Court measure allowing trade in wine with France despite the fact that both countries were at war with France. The measure was intended to raise revenue to pay official salaries as well as demonstrate that the Court Party could act independently in parliament. The measure legitimised smuggling and, while supported by the Jacobites, was opposed by the Country Party.183 Tweeddale replaced Queensberry as commissioner for the 1704 session of parliament. He was instructed to secure the Hanoverian succession. If Tweeddale was successful, the Act of Security that he had helped create and was still un-ratified could be dropped. However, he failed to get enough support. The Country Party was never going to settle the succession because they favoured the Act of Security. Settling the succession would have dashed any hopes of getting the act ratified and the possibility of further constitutional reform. Jacobites were happy to leave the succession open, with or without the act, because it offered the prospect of a Stuart restoration. Finally, unionists, despite their support for a Hanoverian succession, resisted a settlement because it would have prevented the union they preferred and were holding out for. To counter this, the Duke of Hamilton moved on 13 July that parliament should not proceed to nominate a successor until a treaty with England was in place in relation to commerce and other concerns. To make matters worse for London, its failure to settle the succession was compounded when, in return for six months’ supply, they were finally forced on 5 August to ratify the Act of Security.184 From an English perspective, the legislation of 1703–4 was seen in as highly provocative and a threat to the nation’s security.185 The Act of Security intensified the dynastic crisis it had initiated when passing the Act of Settlement. This dynastic crisis, complicated as it was by involvement in the War of the Spanish Succession against France, became a crisis of security. The risk for England was the possibility of a Stuart succession. The restoration of the Stuarts, allied as they were to Louis XIV and France, meant that Scotland could become the base for a military attack by France. This Anglo-Scottish crisis threatened to turn the War of the Spanish Succession into a war of the British succession.186 Settling the Scottish succession on the House of Hanover, and thus securing its northern border, became an imperative for England. It countered with an act in February 1705 for ‘the effectual securing the kingdom of England from the apparent dangers that may arise from several acts lately passed in the Parliament of Scotland’.187 Anne was empowered to appoint commissioners to treat for union in the event of the Scottish parliament taking similar action. Unless the Hanoverian succession was accepted or

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a treaty under negotiation by Christmas Day 1705, all Scots, except those already residing in England, were to be treated as aliens and the cattle, linen and coal trades banned. The legislation was accompanied by military threat. Anne was urged to strengthen the garrisons at Carlisle and Berwick as well as fortify Newcastle. Troops were mobilised on the borders and in Ulster; Scots thought the possibility of conquest ‘real enough’.188 The Alien Act, as it became known, was a ‘formidable economic bludgeon’ because the Scottish economy was so heavily dependant upon trade with England.189 In the debate that followed, some, such as Glasgow merchant John Spreull, advocated retaliatory legislation and argued that Scotland should increase consumption of its own products as well as seeking markets elsewhere.190 However, the threat of heavy economic sanctions caused general concern and a desire for their speedy removal. The prospect they held for economic ruin was such that Burgh of Montrose felt obliged to urge its parliamentary commissioner in October 1706 to support the union because of the consequences to its trade if it failed and the Alien Act returned.191 John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, who replaced Tweeddale as commissioner for the parliamentary session of 1705, arrived in Scotland with instructions that allowed him to pursue either a succession or a treaty for union. Argyll was also instructed that should they decide to negotiate a treaty, he was to ensure that the nomination of commissioners and the appointment of the time and place of negotiations were to be left to the Queen.192 Anne urged parliament to settle the succession but indicated her willingness to accept an act appointing commissioners to negotiate a treaty with England.193 Upon his arrival in Scotland, Argyll had realised that settling the succession would prove too problematic, if not impossible. At some point early in the opening session of parliament he decided to pursue the alternative of an act allowing negotiations for a treaty with England.194 The 1705 session started well for the opposition when a resolve designed to thwart attempts to secure either a treaty or a succession was proposed by Hamilton and carried. The resolve stated that parliament would not nominate a successor until it had secured a treaty with England in relation to commercial and other issues. Furthermore, no successor would be nominated until parliament had agreed on a series of limitations and conditions of government that would secure its liberty, religion and the independence of the kingdom.195 Having resolved on a course of action, on 20 July the Court Party presented a draft act for appointing commissioners to negotiate a treaty with England. Essentially the same as the English act, it left the powers of

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nomination open. Discussions were delayed while the house dealt with trade and limitations. When they finally began, the opposition attempted to insert restrictions and provisions into the act in order to make negotiations extremely difficult, if not impossible.196 They narrowly failed to secure the insertion of a clause that would have prevented commissioners negotiating an incorporating union.197 The important question of who should nominate the commissioners had still to be decided. The opposition proposed that each of the estates appoint its own commissioners. Under such a system it was more likely that they would have a presence in the commission than if the commissioners were chosen by parliament as a whole, or by the Queen. However, choice of commissioners by each estate meant that the Duke of Hamilton, leader of the opposition, was unlikely to be chosen because the Court Party dominated the nobility. On the evening of 1 September, Hamilton, having dismissed his followers with assurances that no further action would be taken that day, moved that the Queen should nominate the commissioners. On a snap vote the motion was passed. Not surprisingly, many of the opposition saw Hamilton’s action as a base betrayal. Lockhart’s assessment of Hamilton’s action was that ‘this fatal act was the first successful step towards Scotland’s chains’.198 Why Hamilton acted as he did remains obscure. It was suggested that the Duke would have ‘complied with anything on a suitable encouragement.’199 However, many believed that Hamilton simply wanted to be a commissioner and, as he was unlikely to be chosen by the estates, would rely on being nominated by the Queen; also, that he had assurances from men like Mar and Argyll to that effect.200 The consequence of Hamilton’s action was the nomination of a group of commissioners that favoured an incorporating union (the exception was George Lockhart of Carnwath). From the outset, their negotiations on Scotland’s behalf would be undertaken within the framework of an incorporating union.201 Hamilton’s actions also served to forewarn both sides in the debate, if they did not already know it, that an unpredictable and unreliable man would be leading opposition to a treaty. The opposition’s mistake was to fail to take heed of the warning. On 21 September an Act for a Treaty of Union made provision for the appointment of commissioners. On the subject of the church, the act stated that the commissioners ‘shall not treat of, or concerning any Alteration of the Worship, Discipline and Government of the Church of this Kingdom as now by Law Established’.202 The prohibition extended only to making alterations in the worship, doctrine and government of the church. It did not forbid negotiations with the aim of securing the church in the event of a union.

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The English response to the act was to repeal certain clauses in the Alien Act of 1705. Negotiations began at Westminster on 16 April. By 25 April, agreement had been reached on three main principles: (a) incorporating union; (b) freedom of trade; (c) the Hanoverian succession. The English proposal for an incorporating union was countered by a Scottish proposal for a federal union The English response was that nothing but an incorporating union would satisfy them, and as the Scottish proposals did not tend to that end, they saw no point in further discussion. They urged the Scots to accept an incorporating union, which they did.203 There was no desire among the commissioners for a federal union and no intention of holding out for one. They were all for incorporation, that was why they were chosen. The brief stand for federal union was made in order to placate public opinion.204 Such token resistance was unlikely to fool anyone. The one issue over which the Scots offered resistance was that of the number of Scottish representatives to the British parliament. On 7 June the English proposed thirtyeight members to sit in the House of Commons. The Scots replied on 14 June and insisted that if the treaty were to be concluded, a greater number would have to be granted. They proposed abolishing the parliamentary structures of both kingdoms and creating a new one, distributing seats according to population and national dignity. An alternative was to combine in one parliament the entire memberships of both parliaments. The English commissioners rejected both proposals and responded with an offer of forty-five members in the Commons and sixteen peers in the House of Lords, to which the Scots agreed on 18 June.205 By 23 July, the twenty-five articles were agreed upon and a treaty drawn up. All that remained was for them to be ratified by the respective parliaments. NOTES 1. Young, ‘The Scottish Parliament and National Identity’, p. 122; Macinnes, ‘Politically Reactionary Brits?’, p. 53; Riley, King William and the Scottish Politicians, p. 1; Ferguson, Scotland 1689 to the Present, p. 7. 2. The Acts & Orders . . . 1689, pp. 2–3. 3. An Account of the Proceedings of the Estates, I, pp. 4–5. 4. The Acts & Orders of the Meeting of the Estates, pp. 16–20. For the composition and work of the committees that produced the documents, see Young, ‘The Scottish Parliament in the Seventeenth Century’, pp. 146–7; A Brief Account of the Reasons for which the Three Estates of Scotland Forfaulted the Late King, p. 6; Lenman, ‘The Poverty of Political Theory in the Scottish Revolution’, p. 255.

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5. For the Presbyterian expression of this political theory, see Works of John Knox, II, pp. 281–6; III, pp. 217–27; IV, pp. 276–86; Buchanan, De Jure Regni Apud Scotos; A Dialogue concerning The Rights of the Crown in Scotland (1579) (Buchanan’s work was written around 1567 specifically to justify the deposition of Mary); Rutherford, Lex Rex or The Law and the Prince (London, 1644); Stewart, Naphtali (1667); Stewart, Jus Populi Vindicatum (1669); Shields, A Hind Let Loose (1687). 6. APS, IX, p. 113. 7. Halliday, ‘The Club and the Revolution in Scotland,’ pp. 146–7. 8. The Laws and Acts Made in the First Parliament of Our Most High and Dread Soveraigns, William and Mary, p. 3. For further reading on the ecclesiastical settlement, see Cheyne, ‘The Ecclesiastical Significance of the Revolution Settlement’, pp. 55–78; Drummond and Bulloch, The Scottish Church 1688–1843; Burleigh, A Church History of Scotland. For a typically Presbyterian view, see Hetherington, History of the Church of Scotland. 9. Glassey, ‘William II and the Settlement of Religion in Scotland’, pp. 317–29. 10. Keith, Russel and Spottiswoode, An Historical catalogue of Scottish Bishops, pp. 65–72; Dunlop, William Carstares, p. 63–5; Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, II, Appendix, pp. 197–9; Lenman, ‘The Scottish Episcopal Clergy and the Ideology of Jacobitism’, p. 36. 11. Whiteford, ‘Jacobitism as a Factor in Presbyterian–Episcopalian Relationships’, I, pp. 143–9; Harris, ‘Incompatible Revolutions?’, pp. 204–25. 12. Not all Episcopalians were Jacobite. A smaller group welcomed the Revolution and gave William their support and loyalty, see Clarke, ‘The Williamite Episcopalians’, pp. 33–51. For examples of the Jacobitism of the Episcopalian clergy, see The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 1689, XIV, pp. 19, 127–49, 163–79, 182–224 and 466–7; HMC J. J. Hope Johnstone, pp. 140–2. 13. Balcarres, Memoirs touching the Revolution in Scotland, p. 24; Patrick, The Scottish Parliament in the Reign of William of Orange, pp. 379–80 and 143; Leven and Melville Papers, p. 125. ‘The Test’ was the name given to the ‘Act anent Religion and the Test’ passed by the Scottish parliament on 31 August 1681. It was part of a policy against the covenanters and followed the appointment of James, Duke of York and Albany (later James VII and II), as Lord High Commissioner. The act required all office bearers to accept the 1560 confession and royal supremacy in civil and religious affairs, as well as a renunciation of the covenant and allegiance ‘without any equivocation, mental reservation or any manner of evasion whatsoever’. 14. Halliday, ‘The Club and the Revolution in Scotland’, p. 147. 15. For details of the nature of the religious settlement at the Restoration, see Lee, ‘Retreat from Revolution’. Erastianism referred to a theory of church government that accorded to the state or crown some degree of influence

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22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

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or control over the church. In Scotland it was used to describe any interference by the civil power in the spiritual independence of the church. See Walker, Theology and Theologians of Scotland, pp. 127–56. APS, IX, p. 111. APS, IX, p. 133. Leven and Melville Papers, p. 221. APS, IX, pp. 196–7. APS, IX, pp. 163–4. On the issue of religious divisions as a stumbling block to union, see Levack, The Formation of the British State, pp. 105–6; ‘Our Desires concerning Unity in Religion’, in Hetherington, History of the Westminster Assembly, pp. 379–80. Cameron (ed.), Dictionary of Scottish Church History, pp. 399, 785. Hutchison, The Reformed Presbyterian Church, pp. 111–15. For more information on the Cameronians, see Kidd, ‘Conditional Britons’, English Historical Review; Couper, ‘The Reformed Presbyterian Church in Scotland’; ‘The Literature of the Reformed Presbyterian Church’; ‘Records of the Reformed Presbyterian Church’. An Account of a Paper, Presented to the General Assembly, October 1690. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 224. Hutchison, The Reformed Presbyterian Church, p. 116. Leslie, The wolf stript of his shepherd’s cloathing, pp. 4–9. Reid, A Cameronian Apostle, p. 267. McMillan, John Hepburn and the Hebronites; McMillan, ‘The Hebronites’, pp.157–74. Hepburn was the son of Major John Hepburn of Balnageith. For details of some of the smaller groups, see McMillan, ‘The Covenanters after the Revolution of 1688’, pp. 141–53. Gavin Mitchell, Humble Pleadings for the Good Old Ways (1713), Introduction; Kidd, ‘Conditional Britons’, p. 1157. McMillan, John Hepburn and the Hebronites, p. 44. Walker, Theology and Theologians of Scotland, p. 111. McMillan, John Hepburn and the Hebronites, p. 44. Ibid., p. 48. HMC Laing, II, pp. 101–9; McMillan, ‘The Hebronites’, pp. 164–6; NLS, Wodrow Folio XXVIII, fos 208–9: Robert Wylie, A Letter Concerning Union (1707). A Seasonable Admonition (Edinburgh, 1699), p. 18; Warrick, Moderators of the Church of Scotland, pp. 103, 120. APS, IX, p. 133–40 (emphasis added). APS, XI, p. 16. See Chapter 4. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 222. Ibid., p. 223; Cockburn, An Historical Relation of the Late General Assembly, p. 24. For a copy of the draft act, see Wodrow Octavo XII, fo. 9; Acts of the General Assembly, pp. 316–17, 321.

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41. Sage, The Case of the Present Afflicted Clergy in Scotland, p. 1; Scotland’s Ruine, p. 8. 42. Cockburn, An Historical Relation of the Late General Assembly, p. 63; Leven and Melville Papers, p. 549: Lord Carmichael to Lord Melville, 17 October 1690; The Register of the Actings and Proceedings of the General Assembly . . . 1692, pp. 36–7; Warrick, Moderators of the Church of Scotland, p. 54. 43. A Seasonable Admonition, pp. 18–19; Westminster Confession of Faith, pp. 100–4, 121–3. 44. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXIII, fo. 264; Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, p. 135; Memoirs of the Life, Time and Writings of . . . Thomas Boston, p. 164. 45. MS Murray 650/651, Letters Addressed to Principal John Stirling, Vol. III, No. 2: William Carstares to Stirling, 21 April 1702. 46. Ibid., No. 5: Carstares to Stirling, 22 October 1702. 47. Works of John Willison, p. 899; NAS, CH2/98/1. Synod of Dumfries, 15 October 1702, p. 169; NAS, CH2/165/2. Synod of Galloway, 20 October, 1702, pp. 136–7; NAS, CH2/464/1. Synod of Glasgow and Ayr, 8 October 1702, pp. 318–19. 48. NAS, GD248/572/2/1. 49. Memoirs of the Life, Time and Writing of . . . Thomas Boston , p. 164; MS Gen 1135, Register of the Actings and Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1703, p. 111. 50. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 326. 51. MS Gen 1136, Actings and Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1706 and 1707, pp. 15 and 116. 52. Fraser, The Melvilles, III, p. 193. 53. The Divine Right of Episcopacy, p. 12. 54. APS, IX, pp. 129–30. 55. Leven and Melville Papers, p. 108; Tarbat’s Memorial in Relation to the Church, June 1689, pp. 126–7; see also A Letter from the west to a Member of the Meeting of the Estates of Scotland (1689). Not all Episcopalians were sudden converts to such schemes. James Gordon from Banchory, one of those presenting the Aberdeen address, had been deprived during the Restoration for publishing The Reformed Bishop (1679), in which he advocated a moderate episcopacy that would attempt to accommodate Presbyterian dissent. See James Gordon’s Diary, Henderson (ed.), pp. 25–6. 56. Memorial for His Highness the Prince of Orange, pp. 5–8; Rule, A True Representation of Presbyterian Government, pp. 7–8. See also Sir Alexander Bruce’s expulsion from parliament in 1702 for claiming that Presbyterianism was inconsistent with monarchy, APS, XI, p. 15; Scotland’s Ruine, p. 14. 57. Leven and Melville Papers, pp. 257–8: Alexander Pitcairn, Minister of Dron, to Lord Melville, 19 August 1689; Glassey, ‘William II and the Settlement of Religion’, p. 340.

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58. Leven and Melville Papers, pp. 2, 437–8; Robertson, ‘Notice of an Unpublished Letter from General Mackay to the Laird of Grant’, pp. 336–8; Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain, p. 190. 59. Maxwell, ‘The Church Union Attempt at the General Assembly of 1692’, p. 242. 60. Morer, Account of the Present Persecution of the Church in Scotland; Sage, The Case of the Present Afflicted Clergy in Scotland; Monro, An Apology for the Clergy of Scotland; James Gordon’s Diary, Henderson (ed.); Maxwell, ‘The Scotch Presbyterian Eloquence’; HMC Laing, II, p. 2. 61. Culloden Papers, p. 16. 62. Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, p. 252; A Brief and True Account of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, occasioned by the Episcopalians since the Year 1660. 63. Leven and Melville Papers, p. 595: Sir John Dalrymple to Earl of Melville, 13 February 1691; Clarke, ‘The Williamite Episcopalians’, p. 47. 64. The Register of the Assembly 1692, pp. 9–16, 35–6; Maxwell, ‘The Church Union Attempt at the General Assembly of 1692’; Acts of the General Assembly, pp. 239–40; Clarke, ‘The Williamite Episcopalians’, p. 49. 65. Whiteford, ‘Jacobitism as a Factor in Presbyterian–Episcopalian Relationships’, II, pp.185–7; Clarke, ‘The Williamite Episcopalians’, p. 49. 66. APS, IX, pp. 449–50; Clarke, ‘The Williamite Episcopalians’, p. 51. 67. To the Queen’s Most Excellent Majestie, The Humble Address and Supplication of the Suffering Episcopal Clergy; Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, pp. 250–1, 255, 258; Scotland’s Ruine, p. 9; Fraser, The Earls of Cromartie, I, p. 159. 68. To the Queen’s Most Excellent Majestie, The Humble Address and Supplication of the Suffering Episcopal Clergy; Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp. 190–1; Acts of the General Assembly, p. 317; Letters and Diplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne, p. 113. 69. Riley, ‘The Formation of the Scottish Ministry of 1703’, pp. 116, 125. Toleration was the subject of an intense pamphlet war. For some examples, see Wylie, A Speech without doors; Wylie, A Short answer to a Short Paper; Mackenzie, A few brief and modest reflections; Mackenzie, A continuation of a few brief and modest reflexions; Ramsay, Toleration’s fence removed; Meldrum, A Sermon Preached in the New Church of Edinburgh; A Brief Examination of some things in Mr Meldrum’s sermon; A Letter from a Presbyterian Minister in the Countrey to A Member of Parliament and also of the Commission of the Church concerning Toleration and patronages. 70. Letters and Diplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne, p. 119. 71. Meldrum, A Sermon Preached in the New Church of Edinburgh. 72. Hadow, A Survey of the Case of the Episcopal Clergy, p. 4. 73. A Letter from a Presbyterian Minister in the Countrey, pp. 7, 16. See discussion of Ridpath’s work in Chapter 6.

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74. For details of the Parliamentary debate on toleration, see Ridpath, An account of the proceedings of the Parliament of Scotland, which met at Edinburgh, May 6, 1703, pp. 38–128. 75. Maxwell, ‘Presbyterian and Episcopalian in 1688’, pp. 33–4. 76. Morer, Account of the Present Persecution of the Church in Scotland, p. 2. 77. Sage, The fundamental charter of Presbytery, pp. 314, 322; Morer, Account of the Present Persecution, p. 57; HMC Duke of Roxburgh, p. 118; Rule, A vindication of the Church of Scotland, p. 35. 78. APS, X, pp. 16, 63, 64, 65, 71, 148, 215 and Appendix, p. 47. 79. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 234. 80. Ibid., pp. 231–2; Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland, II, Appendix, p. 191; Clarke, ‘The Williamite Episcopalians’, p. 46; Leven and Melville Papers, pp. 586, 590–1; Gib, The Present Truth, I, p. 90; Acts of the General Assembly, p. 462. 81. APS, IX, pp. 415, 420–1. 82. Acts of the General Assembly, pp. 241–2, 260; APS, IX, p. 415. 83. Ibid., pp. 262–3; HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 113: Carstares to Robert Harley, 30 March 1703 – Presbyterian ministers in churches, 649; Episcopalian ministers continued in churches under protection of law, 154; vacant churches, 124; churches with Episcopal intruders, 10. There were 150 Presbyterian ministers ready to fill vacancies. 84. For details of the church’s progress in the Highlands, see Macinnes, The Evangelical Movement in the Highlands; Macdonald, Missions to the Gaels; Ferguson, ‘The Problems of the Established Church in the West Highlands in the Eighteenth Century’. For details of its progress in the north-east, see The Miscellany of the Spalding Club, II, p. 172; The Records of Elgin, I, p. 348; Young, Annals of the Parish and Burgh of Elgin, p. 163; Seafield Correspondence from 1685 to 1708, p. 228. 85. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 245. 86. Ibid., pp. 329–30. 87. Ibid., pp. 227, 282. 88. Ibid., p. 227. 89. Meek, ‘The Gaelic Bible’, pp. 13–16. 90. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 231. 91. The Correspondence of Robert Wodrow, I, pp. 216, 278. 92. James Gordon’s Diary, Henderson (ed.); Lenman, ‘The Scottish Episcopal Clergy’, pp. 41, 44–5. 93. To the Queen’s Most Excellent Majestie, The Humble Address and Supplication of the Suffering Episcopal Clergy. 94. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fos 30–41. Rev. John Bell of Gladsmuir, in the Presbytery of Haddington, gives an extensive account of efforts to replace a conforming Episcopalian who had died in Haddington in 1702 with a Presbyterian. 95. APS, X, p. 148. 30 August 1698.

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96. Act and Proclamation Anent Intruders into Churches (1706); HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 265–6, 260–1. 97. Drummond and Bulloch, The Scottish Church, pp. 23, 27. 98. Wylie, A Short Answer to a Large Paper, p. 3. 99. Drummond and Bulloch, The Scottish Church, p. 21; Butterworth, Episcopalians in Scotland, 1689–1745, p. 68. 100. The Correspondence of Robert Wodrow, I, p. 77, 211, 301. 101. Drummond and Bulloch, The Scottish Church, pp. 21–3, 27–9. 102. For a selection of the secondary literature dealing with union and the historiographical debate, see the Bibliography. 103. Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p. 166; Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 7. 104. Riley, King William and the Scottish Politicians, pp. 49–51. 105. Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p. 171. 106. Balcarres, Memoirs touching the Revolution, p. 33. 107. Macinnes, ‘Politically Reactionary Brits?’, p. 53. 108. Ferguson, Scotland, 1689 to the Present, p. 5. 109. Riley, King William and the Scottish Politicians, p. 53; A Memorial for His Highness the Prince of Orange, pp. 5–8. Tarbat’s views were shared by men like Bishop Paterson of Glasgow and the Marquis of Atholl: see Glassey, ‘William II and the Settlement of Religion in Scotland’, p. 323; Leven and Melville Papers, p. 12. 110. The Acts & Orders of the Meeting of the Estates, p. 2. 111. Leven and Melville Papers, p. 3: William to the Convention, 7 March 1689; Acts & Orders of the Meeting of the Estates, p. 2. 112. Acts & Orders of the Meeting of the Estates, p. 7; APS, IX, p. 20. 113. An Account of the Proceedings of the Estates of Scotland, I, p. 52; Macinnes, ‘Politically Reactionary Brits?’, p. 52. 114. The Acts & Orders of the Meeting of the Estates, p. 30; NAS, GD26/7/201 Draft Act for Union, recommended a Scottish representation of ten peers and twenty-seven commons. 115. Balcarres, Memoirs touching the Revolution, p. 33. 116. Riley, King William and the Scottish Politicians, p. 53; An Account of the Proceedings of the Estates, I, p. 46. 117. The Acts & Orders of the Meeting of the Estates, p. 30. 118. Journal of the House of Lords, XVI, p. 514. 119. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 81; A Seasonable Warning, p. 4; Hodges, The rights and interests of the two British monarchies . . . Treatise I. 120. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 81. 121. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 304; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 108; NAS, GD18/2092: Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708, 2 November 1706. Anti-unionists rejected this interpretation and argued that the convention sought some

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122.

123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139.

140. 141. 142. 143. 144.

145. 146. 147.

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scottish presbyterians and the act of union 1707 kind of federal union. See Vulpone: or Remarks on some Proceedings in Scotland, pp. 14–15; Ferguson, ‘Imperial Crowns’, p. 23; Scott, Andrew Fletcher and the Treaty of Union, pp. 44–5. Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 5; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 49, John Bell’s Memorial; Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, pp. 11–16; Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, pp. 174–9. Patrick, The Scottish Parliament in the Reign of William of Orange, pp. 382–4. Smout, ‘The Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707, The Economic Background’, p. 458. Ibid., p. 458. See also Whatley, ‘Economic Causes and Consequences of the Union of 1707’. APS, IX, pp. 377–81. Armitage, ‘The Scottish Vision of Empire’, p. 100. Ibid., p. 101; Macinnes, ‘Politically Reactionary Brits?’, p. 53. A Speech in Parliament on the 10th day of January 1701 by the Lord Belhaven, pp. 8–9; Ferguson, Scotland, 1689 to the Present, p. 28. Armitage, ‘The Scottish Vision of Empire’, p. 102. Macinnes, ‘Union Failed Union Accomplished’, p. 77. Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, p. 92. Ridpath, Scotland’s Grievances Relating to Darien (1700), pp. 7–8. Journals of the House of Lords, XVI, p. 512. Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, p. 24. HMC J. J. Hope Johnstone, p. 116; Ridpath, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Miscarriage of the Scots Colony at Darien (1700). Journals of the House of Commons, X, p. 764. APS, X, p. 59. APS, IX, pp. 19, 25–7; NLS, Wodrow Quarto XXVIII, fos 125–8, contains an account of the political consequences on the union negotiations of Hamilton’s walk-out, particularly in relation to the authority of commissioners. Boyer, History of the Life and Reign of Queen Anne, p. 26. HMC Duke of Roxburgh, p. 155: Seafield to Marchmont, 3 March 1702. Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, p. 178. A Testimony to the Free Grace of God, p. 47. See also ‘The Diary of the Rev. George Turnbull’, pp. 424–33; Scotland’s Ruine, p. 9. NAS, CH2/464/1. Synod of Glasgow and Ayr, p. 318–19; CH2/165/2. Synod of Galloway, p. 137; CH2/98/1. Synod of Dumfries, p. 174; CH2/35/5. Presbytery of Biggar in Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale, p. 29. Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, pp. 229–30; NAS. CH2/35/5. Presbytery of Biggar, p. 29. NAS. CH2/35/5. Presbytery of Biggar, p. 29. Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, p. 243.

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156. 157. 158. 159.

160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169.

170. 171. 172.

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Wylie, A Letter from a Member of the Commission, pp. 7–8. For discussion of their works, see Chapter 6. APS, XI, p. 26. Ibid., p. 27. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XXVIII, fos 131–2; MS Murray 650/651, Vol. III, No. 7: Hugh Montgomery to John Stirling, 12 December 1702. Mackenzie, Parainesis Pacifica, p. 7. Ibid., pp. 7, 18–19. The London Diaries of William Nicolson, p. 135. An interesting response from Stewart considering his covenanting roots and that he was author of the radical Presbyterian works Naphtali and Jus Populi Vindicatum. Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, p. 11. Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p. 199. Ibid., p.199. Clerk, ‘Observations on the present circumstances of Scotland’, p. 184; Ridpath, Scotland’s Grievances Relating to Darien, p. 8; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, pp. 186–7; A Speech in Parliament on the 10th day of January 1701; Rose, A Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, III, p. 275. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 83. Riley, ‘The Formation of the Scottish Ministry’, pp. 123–5. APS, XI, pp. 36–7. Riley, ‘The Scottish Parliament of 1703’, pp. 133–4; For the Court Party’s perspective on events of this parliament, see HMC Laing, II, pp. 7–45. APS, XI, p. 41. APS, XI, p. 45. APS, XI, p. 45; Minuts of the Proceedings in Parliament, Friday 28 May 1703, No. 9 (1703). APS, XI pp. 45–7; Riley, ‘The Scottish Parliament of 1703’, p. 139. Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, p. 55. Fletcher, Selected Political Writings, pp. 69–70; A Speech in Parliament on the 10th day of January 1701 by the Lord Belhaven, p. 7; APS, XI, p. 63; Ridpath, An Account of the Proceedings of the Parliament of Scotland, p. 132. Fletcher, Selected Political Writings, p. 80. The Lord Belhaven’s Speech in the Parliament of Scotland upon the ACT for Security of the Kingdom in case of the Queen’s Death (1703). For the limitations, of which there were twelve, and Fletcher’s defence of them, see Ridpath, An Account of the Proceedings of Parliament, pp. 134–50. The idea of limitations was not new and Fletcher was influenced by the covenanting revolution of the 1640s, and more recently by George Ridpath, who had published a list of limitations in an anti-union pamphlet only months before (see Ridpath, A Discourse upon the Union, pp. 119–35).

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173. APS, XI, p. 63; Ridpath, An Account of the Proceedings of Parliament, p. 132. 174. HMC Laing, II, pp. 25–6. 175. Ibid., pp. 26–7. 176. APS, XI, p. 136. 177. Act for Security of the Kingdom, pp. 5–6. 178. The Act of the parliament of Scotland for the security of the Kingdom, p. 8. 179. Ridpath, An Account of the Proceedings of Parliament, pp. 233–4. 180. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, pp. 214–15. 181. APS, XI, p. 107. 182. Graham, Annals and Correspondence of the Viscount . . . Stair, pp. 380–1; The Letters and Diplomatic Instruments of Queen Anne, pp. 118–19; HMC Duke of Roxburgh, p. 198. 183. Riley, ‘The Scottish Parliament of 1703’, p. 148; Ferguson, Scotland, 1689 to the Present, p. 40. 184. APS, XI, pp. 136–7. For the Earl of Seafield’s interpretation of the contents of the act and his memorial on its passage, see HMC Laing, II, pp. 88–92. For details of the 1704 session of parliament, see Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, Chapter 12. 185. HMC Duke of Roxburgh, p. 156: Lord Somers to Marchmont, 4 January 1705. 186. Macinnes, ‘The 1707 Union: Support and Opposition’, p. 151; Young, ‘The Parliamentary Incorporating Union’, pp. 39–45. 187. Abbot, The Statutes of the Realm, VIII, pp. 349–50. 188. Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, pp. 22, 24, 26; HMC Mar and Kellie, I, p. 233; Macinnes, ‘Politcally Reactionary Brits?’, p. 54. 189. Smout, ‘Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707’, p. 462; Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain, p. 80. 190. Spreull, An accompt current betwixt Scotland and England balanced . . . , pp. 7, 13. 191. Smout, ‘The Burgh of Montrose and the Union of 1707 – A Document’, pp. 183–4. 192. HMC Laing, II, pp. 114–16. 193. Ibid., pp. 116–17. 194. Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, pp. 227–8; Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, pp. 138–9. 195. Scotland’s Ruine, p. 92. 196. Ibid., p. 100. 197. Ibid., pp. 102–3. 198. Ibid., p. 109. 199. Memoirs of the Life of Sir John Clerk, p. 57. 200. Scotland’s Ruine, p. 108. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 50v; Campbell, Life of John Duke of Argyll, p. 110.

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Union: The Religious and Political Background 201. 202. 203. 204. 205.

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Young, ‘The Parliamentary Incorporating Union’, p. 26. APS, XI, Appendix, pp. 164–6. APS, XI, Appendix, pp. 165–6. Scotland’s Ruine, pp. 129–31. APS, XI, Appendix, pp. 178–80; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, pp. 85–9.

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2 ‘And the Gates of Hell Shall Not Prevail Against Her’: Securing the Church in the Event of a Union

The church had an obvious interest in the outcome of the negotiations. The general assembly instructed the church in its annual act for a fast, to pray that God would graciously direct the commissioners negotiating the union, and that all would be done to the glory of God, for the good of the church and the Queen’s dominions.1 News reaching Scotland about the negotiations was limited and the church held its counsel while awaiting developments. John Logan, minister at Alloa, attributed the silence to the reluctance of ministers to interfere with the state in civil matters.2 Previous attempts had collapsed and there had been a sense that the obstacles to union were so great that these negotiations would suffer a similar fate. Robert Wylie, minister at Hamilton, suggested that the ‘tepid unconcernedness’ across the country with respect to union was because nobody believed it would ever come to pass. It was only as negotiations progressed with some success that people began to ‘be awakened’.3 Despite their silence, ministers were well aware of the consequences and danger posed by union and a concerted effort had begun to convert that awareness into action. The Presbytery of Hamilton, which would figure prominently in the forthcoming debates, had entered into correspondence with other presbyteries in the hope and expectation that ‘all will take alarm and that nothing will divert any Presbyterians from opposing the union in their stations’.4 These efforts, combined with news from London that the treaty under negotiation was for an incorporating union, had the desired effect of creating ever-increasing alarm and discontent in parts of the church. It was claimed that across the nation and among ministers there was generally ‘ane aversione’ to an incorporating union.5 An incorporating union was said to be resented by ‘everybody as treachery and treason against the nation except a few merchants especially in Glasgow who promise themselves vast wealth by liberty of tradeing in the West Indies’.6 This widespread resentment lay behind Robert Wylie’s confidence that

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the dissolving of Scotland’s separate government and parliament would be vigorously and successfully opposed, and that ‘Whatever our Presbiterian treaters at London have had the confidence to promise in name of ministers and people of that perswasion they will find themselves mistaken.’7 At the heart of Presbyterian objections lay their hostility to episcopacy. George Ridpath expressed the commonly held view that in every reign since the Union of the Crowns their religion had been invaded or endangered by English influence and that religious differences had been at the root of all the oppressions the country had suffered in that time.8 Presbyterians did not trust a British parliament to safeguard and maintain the constitution of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, hence their concern over the resignation of sovereignty. They believed that in a union in which Scotland would be governed from London by a British parliament dominated by English Anglicans, including twenty-six bishops in the House of Lords, the Church of England would hold the advantage over them. They believed that the influence of the Church of England over matters of state was enough to secure her interests.9 They feared that a British parliament could at its pleasure subvert any fundamental in the constitution, and ‘that English members in the British Parliament might probably be tempted to judge it their interest that Britain should be under one church constitution’. Furthermore, it was short-sighted, considering recent history, to believe that securities offered at the time would be valid in the future.10 Having two legally recognised church governments in one nation was unprecedented and they believed not likely to last, to the detriment of presbytery.11 At the very least union made toleration inevitable and their success so far in preventing it would be undermined.12 The worst-case scenario, and one which, according to Sir John Clerk of Penicuik (senior), was widely held, was the complete overthrow of presbytery.13 As far as Presbyterians were concerned, union was nothing less than a ‘Black Treacherie designed for our church’ and an attempt to return to the days ‘when bishops ruled as Nero did the state’.14 The fact that there were Anglicans and Episcopalians who argued that union should lead to a restoration of episcopacy confirmed Presbyterian fears and their hostility.15 George Ridpath identified one pamphlet in particular as a warning of what to expect if they did not take care to secure their interests in any union.16 The Episcopalian author described Presbyterians as the church’s enemies, who would ‘do anything to ruin the Apostolical order of Bishops and destroy the use of publick liturgies’. He warned that, in order to preserve their Christian and civil rights, it was necessary to

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scottish presbyterians and the act of union 1707 guard against the Presbyterian party and to that end to form such articles in the Treaty of Union, as will restore Episcopacy in Scotland, if it be not before restored, and by God’s blessing preserve it in England unto the end of the world.

The writer expressed uncompromising views on the restoration of episcopacy. After union, when there is a single British parliament, no man should be suffered to sit in either house who did not entirely conform, if an Englishman to the church of England, as now by law established, and if a Scotsman, submit to all the rights of Episcopacy, which he must also agree, shall be re-established in Scotland.17

Stung by the hostile reaction to an incorporating union, Queensberry decided to suppress publication of the articles until parliament opened. The aim was to give the opposition nothing specific to attack.18 Sir John Clerk, Member of Parliament for Whitburn 1703–7, claimed that the policy had some success. However, suppression of the treaty proved counterproductive because it allowed the opposition to exploit the uncertainty that ignorance created by spreading rumours and misinformation that heightened anxiety and hostility. Suppression led to suspicion that the treaty was going to be hurried through before people had the chance to study and fully debate it.19 Daniel Defoe blamed the increasing hostility on the propaganda of the opposition.20 Defoe, described by the Jacobite George Lockhart as ‘that vile monster and wretch’, had arrived in Scotland in October as an agent employed by Robert Harley, Secretary of State for the Northern Department and member of the Privy Council.21 He was under instructions to provide Harley with information about the state of affairs in Scotland and the progress of the treaty through parliament. He was to assure those he spoke to that the Queen and her ministry were ‘sincere & hearty for the Union’. He was also to impress upon the Scots the necessity of seizing the present opportunity, which may never arise again.22 Rather than accept that there was genuine popular hostility to an incorporating union, Defoe asserted that the fears of the ‘honest presbyterian’ were being exploited and deliberately stirred up by Jacobite opponents of the union. He accused them of making much of the dangers to the church posed by union, despite being no friends of presbytery themselves. According to Defoe, the Jacobites ‘immediately raised a cry that the church was betrayed; that Episcopacy was coming in upon them’ and that ‘if the union ever went forward, they should be certainly suppressed by the prelates’.23 In one parish the minister, elders, deacons and members of the congregation signed an engagement to resist any articles

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in the proposed union that were likely to encourage ‘popery, heresy, error, prelacy, atheism, schismatism or profanity’.24 The opposition needed to capitalise on this hostility. Their hopes rested to a large extent upon the church and considerable efforts went into giving ministers a bad impression of the treaty and exploiting their concerns.25 They believed that the clergy would be more useful to the cause than any other social group and that if they used their influence against the treaty, it would never carry.26 There was recognition on both sides that the pulpit could be a powerful medium for articulating dissent. As early as July, ministers were reported to be ‘roaring and denouncing judgements on those that [are] for it’.27 Most of the ministers in Hamilton were said to be ‘bare faced against the union’ and praying heartily against it from their pulpits.28 Everyone John Logan had spoken with was of the opinion that incorporating union was not just sinful in itself, but had dangerous consequences for church government. He warned Mar that ‘on the first tabling of this transactione before the parliament there will be ane addresse given in by this church for the security of her religion and government’.29 Presbyterian polemicist James Hodges wanted the commission to recommend to ministers that they purchase a copy of his latest anti-union work because of its usefulness in informing them of the issues and arguments involved and because they ‘have so great an influence on the people’. He recommended to the Dukes of Hamilton and Atholl that the advice on fasting should be printed separately and copies sent to every parish in Scotland. Ministers were to read it to their congregations both on the fast day and on the day of preparation. Hodges assumed that there would be a national fast and was planning to exploit it.30 Turning the pulpit into a mouthpiece of the opposition was something William Carstares, Principal of Edinburgh University and the Kirk’s most influential minister, feared and had sought to avoid. He argued that on such an important issue as the union, the terms of the treaty ought to be well understood before pronouncing judgement upon it, ‘especiallie by their brethren in pulpits or by church judicatories’. Cartsares believed that it was necessary for the church to manage its affairs in relation to the debate with the greatest care in order to ensure that its interests were secured. Imprudent pronouncements from the pulpit would antagonise the government and hand the church’s enemies an opportunity to exploit. When parliament and the commission opened, the issue and their duty would become clearer. Until then he urged John Stirling, Principal of Glasgow University, to use all of his influence to prevent ministers expressing too hasty a judgement on the treaty.31

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EARLY DEBATES ON THE FIRST ADDRESS

It was against this background of increasing hostility that parliament opened on 3 October. The Commission of the General Assembly, acting in accordance with instructions from the General Assembly, to protect the interests of the church and present establishment, met on 9 October and remained in session thereafter.32 Both bodies were the focus of national attention and the significance of the moment was not lost on the participants in the debate in either parliament or commission.33 A wellattended commission was considered essential. A circular letter sent out to all presbyteries on 7 August, urging attendance upon all members, underlined the importance of its work. The business of former commissions meeting during parliamentary sessions had been ‘much slighted and retarded’ because of bad attendance.34 The first session was not particularly well attended. There were twenty-six commissioners present at the morning session, of which sixteen were ministers and ten ruling elders; they had just enough for a quorum of twenty-one, of which fifteen had to be ministers. As John Logan had predicted, they wasted no time in moving that they address parliament for securing the doctrine, discipline, worship and government of the church as established by law within the kingdom.35 A committee was appointed to prepare an overture, and when it reported back to the commission during the evening session a sharp division arose over what course of action was the most appropriate at that time.36 John Bannatyne and Thomas Linning, ministers from Lanark and Lesmahagow in the Presbytery of Lanark, opposed the draft of the address to parliament. Both men would be at the forefront of opposition to incorporating union. They were described as ‘two firebrands who deserve to be marked as incendiaries’.37 Only Bannatyne had been present at the morning session and had waited for Linning’s arrival before making their objections. The two men, with the support of others in the commission, alleged that an address of that Nature and Consequence diserved to be rypely advised by a more Numerous Commission, there having been scarce a quorum of the brethren mett at that time and that this being the first day of the meeting of the commission it was thought strange they made so large a step.38

Both were suspicious of the motives of some on the commission and objected to both its haste in pressing for security and in the composition of the committee. Their suspicions were not without foundation. Of the sixteen members of the committee, four of the five ruling elders were from the Court Party and eight of the eleven ministers were from

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Edinburgh. The opposition viewed the Edinburgh ministers as a suspect group who could not be relied upon to oppose the union and who might even persuade their brethren not to oppose it.39 Bannatyne and Linning proposed that ‘parliament should be also addressed for a solemn fast and humiliation’. Priority should be given to a national fast as ‘prefatory to all’, and no affair of such importance as union ought to be entered upon without a fast. They insisted that parliamentary consideration of the treaty should be delayed until after a fast had been observed and that they had instructions from the Synod of Glasgow to move that the commission apply to parliament for a fast.40 It was objected, mainly by ruling elders, that Bannatyne and Linning had taken too long in expressing the mind of their synod. They argued that the commission was well advanced on the question of security and, because parliament intended to proceed quickly with the treaty, it was considered inappropriate to delay any application for securing the interest of the church. They insinuated that those seeking a fast at this time did so in order to create strife and contention and to ‘amuse the nation’ by implying that union was some dreadful and dangerous thing to church and state.41 The ministers protested and expressed their suspicions of a parliament that would refuse to begin consultations on such an important affair without asking for guidance from God. It was decided, after further dispute, that the committee appointed to draft an address regarding the security of the church should re-consider the draft and ‘ripen the same’ for the commission. They were also to consider the expediency of a national fast. The decision marked a success for Bannatyne, Linning and their supporters, and the committee became the Committee for Public Affairs.42 The committee was made up largely of those already appointed to prepare the overture to parliament for the security of the church. Bannatyne, Linning and Walter Stewart of Pardovan, parliamentary commissioner for Linlithgow, also an opponent of union, were added to the committee. The committee’s meeting the following day was to be open to any member of the commission to attend and observe. Opening up its deliberations to the members of the commission served to ensure that the committee’s work would be influenced by the views of the commission as a whole, at least those who had arrived in Edinburgh. It would also serve to quieten any fears or suspicions of bias hinted at by Bannatyne and Linning. The commission discussed the draft address on 11 October. Reflecting the importance of the business, there was an abrupt rise in attendance, particularly among the ruling elders, as the court attempted to influence the outcome.43 The draft address was debated paragraph by paragraph

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as the ministers ‘disputed every inch of the prologue and epilogue’. They did not object to anything material in the petition, but complained that the address contained ‘too many strong innuendos’ that the church approved of the incorporating union as it then lay before the parliament, ‘which they thought was none of their business considering that many of their friends in parliament stood otherwise affected and they did not see it their interest or any part of their concern to side with any party’.44 Taking into account the arguments used by both sides in the debate, the Lord Advocate amended the address ‘so that it might be more acceptable to all parties’.45 The Lord Advocate, Sir James Stewart, had declared his opposition to the treaty but had told the court he would not openly oppose it. The amended address asked that parliament would be pleased to establish and confirm the doctrine, discipline, worship and church government presently established in accordance with previous acts of parliament and the Claim of Right. Consistent with the Queen’s promises to them, and the prohibition placed upon commissioners negotiating the treaty to alter nothing in relating to the worship, doctrine and government of the church, this establishment was to remain unalterable. Furthermore, Presbyterian church government was to be the only church government within the kingdom. The address insisted that ‘this provision shall be held and observed in all time coming as a fundamentall article and Essentiall condition of any treaty or Union that shall be concluded betwixt the two kingdoms’. The commission assured parliament of their prayers that God would guide them not only in securing their religion and church government, but that the result of their deliberations on the treaty would be to the glory of God, the good and advantage of the people in all things civil and religious, and their preservation against all enemies.46 Carefully avoiding expressions of support for or opposition to the union, the address focused upon the issue of immediate concern to the church; its security in the event of a union. However, by demanding that the security of the church be a fundamental article and essential condition of any treaty, the commission was sending Queensberry a clear warning that it could not accept and would resist any union in which such an article and essential condition was absent. The address raised no objections to incorporating union, but it was a criticism of the treaty as it stood. The treaty as it lay before parliament made no provision for the security of the church. The treaty therefore posed an unacceptable threat to the church. Only the removal of that threat by the inclusion of security for the church as a fundamental article and essential condition of any treaty could make it acceptable to the church. This was not an address against the union. It was an address against the treaty as it stood and a

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request for a significant amendment in favour of the church. That was how it was interpreted by unionists who welcomed the address as ‘modest, desiring only care may be taken to secure their Church government in that part of Britain’.47 Robert Harley believed it ‘contained several tacit declarations in favour of the union’.48 The commission’s stock had risen south of the border as a result of their wise and prudent behaviour over the address and the fast. It was said that no body of men had grown so much in the estimation of Englishmen, and the Queen was said to have expressed great satisfaction with their ‘admirable address’.49 A HOUSE DIVIDED: THE SECOND ADDRESS

The address was duly delivered to Queensberry and Seafield, who both received it ‘very kindly and told them they did not doubt but what was therein craved would be obtained’.50 It was read out before parliament on 17 October and assurances given that they would ‘do everything necessary’ before the treaty was concluded to secure the true Protestant religion and Presbyterian church government.51 While the commission welcomed Queensberry’s assurances, it had no intention of sitting back and waiting to see how things would develop or of leaving the details of that security up to parliament. The following day, which was observed in the city as a day of prayer and fasting, the committee met to discuss specific issues it wanted included in any act of security for the church, and to decide on what course of action it should take to obtain its goals. The committee drew up a list of fourteen issues of concern to the church. 1. The commission was concerned with the constitution of the parliament of Great Britain and the existence of twenty-six bishops in the House of Lords, which was inconsistent with the Kirk’s principles and covenants. 2. All acts of parliament passed in favour of the true Protestant religion and Presbyterian church government in pursuance of the Claim of Right were to be confirmed and declared unalterable and a fundamental article and essential condition of union. This was to be confirmed by a particular act of the present parliament. 3. An article was to be added, as the first article of the treaty, specifically relating to the foresaid act of parliament. Furthermore, any violation of that act was to be declared an ‘irritancie of the union’. The consequences of such a violation were not discussed, but the article, along with the others, was to be ratified by the parliament of England before union and the parliament of Great Britain after union.

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4. No oath was to be required of or imposed upon Presbyterian ministers of the Church of Scotland, except an oath of allegiance to the sovereign or any oath consented to by the general assembly. No oath contrary to or inconsistent with the confession of faith was to be required of any member of the church. 5. All subsequent monarchs of Great Britain were to be required to swear at their coronation to support and maintain the purity of doctrine, worship and discipline of the Church of Scotland and Presbyterian church government as presently established and further established at the time of union. All rights and privileges of ministers were to be maintained and the oath was to be administered by two ministers of the church. 6. The commission was concerned about the oaths taken by members of the British parliament in both houses as outlined in Article 22 of the treaty. These obliged members to maintain the limitation on the crown of England that the monarch must belong to the Church of England. The commission objected to such a limitation because it bound Scots and ministers of the Kirk to a sovereign of the communion of the Church of England as opposed to one of the Church of Scotland. They believed that such an oath would bar Presbyterians from sitting in a British parliament or from any other position in which the oaths might be required. 7. The commission wanted to abrogate the sacramental test. At the very least they wanted an article in the treaty preventing its operation within Scotland. Furthermore, they sought a Scottish alternative to the test. For any position in Scotland similar to those in England that required the holder to take the test, the holder in Scotland was to be required to subscribe to the confession of faith as a test of their being of the communion of the Kirk. 8. A commission appointed by parliament generally undertook consideration of the plantation of kirks and the valuation of teinds. With the possible demise of parliament, the commission wanted these powers to be handed over to the Lords of Session. 9. The continuation of the Privy Council was not guaranteed in the treaty. Article 19 stated that the queen or her successors might continue it after union. The commission wanted it to continue but anticipating, possibly sooner than Scotland’s politicians, the demise of that body, they asked that an equivalent body be set up for the execution of laws against popery and profaneness, for suppressing church irregularities and disorder (an anti-Episcopalian measure), and for the support of the established church government. 10. They wanted universities and colleges continued in the same funding and privileges, and that none hold office in any educational

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establishment but such as are of a pious life and subscribers of the confession of faith. Inspection of educational establishments in respect to life and doctrine was to belong to the church. 11. No toleration was to be granted by the Scottish parliament. Should toleration be granted after union, dissenters were to subscribe the confession of faith as their faith and all churches in possession of Episcopal clergy were to be declared vacant in order to be planted by ministers of the established church. They wanted equality with the Church of England, who refused to allow dissenters to hold church office or a benefice while requiring them to subscribe to thirty-five of the thirty-nine articles of the church. 12. They wanted parliament to fix a certain diet for the meeting of the general assembly. 13. They wanted the queen to establish a fund for the plantation of vacant congregations and for the church to promote religion in remote areas of Scotland such as the Highlands and islands. 14. Finally, they wanted to know how the church should react to the calling of fasts and days of thanksgiving, which in England was done by the civil authority without consulting the church.52 The committee agreed unanimously in the first place to lobby members of parliament about the issues and appointed several committee members for that purpose. The aim was to try and influence the composition of the act for securing the church. They also decided that, should the lobbying fail, they would recommend to the commission that it put its concerns to parliament in a further address.53 The committee’s preferred method of working was quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy rather than the public confrontation that followed. When the commission began discussing its second address, it was a sign that the lobbying had failed. The lobbying was just one element among many that increased the pressure on the government. Days of fasting and prayer were being held across the country and reports continued of ministers preaching against the union. The opposition was organising addresses against the union, which were beginning to arrive in Edinburgh. Pamphlets were appearing outlining the dangers to the church and raising religious objections to union. The position and attitude of the church was of the greatest concern to unionists and it was feared that unless the religious question was handled carefully and promptly, there was the immediate prospect of a breach between church and state that would prove detrimental to the treaty.54 It was reported that instructions from London urged the government to ‘take all possible means to satisfy the ministers’.55 There was

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certainly a strong desire to placate the church and some mistakenly believed that the court was ready to grant whatever the commission wanted, provided they agreed to go into an incorporating union.56 Daniel Defoe likened both the church and the commission to a mob and accused ministers of being ‘out of their wits’ preaching against the union. He complained that even those who had been persuaded of the benefits of union had returned to their former hostility. He accused one ‘country parson’ of preaching a ‘bald allegory against the union’ before Queensberry in the High Kirk of Edinburgh.57 The sermon by John Logan from Alloa is one of the few relating to union that has survived and was published in response to accusations like Defoe’s. Logan was no rabid anti-unionist; he was a correspondent of Mar’s and led efforts to prevent the Presbytery of Stirling from sending an address against the union. Logan’s point was that a church and people should maintain and defend the privileges and attainments that they had received and enjoyed from the Lord. He was referring to the sound doctrine, pure worship, discipline and church government currently established and held by the church and people of Scotland. Addressing Queensberry and other members of parliament, he urged them ‘to hold fast sound doctrine, pure worship, true and excellent government, and to follow all prudential methods for preventing invasion thereupon by Adversaries and to guard against everything that may Endanger the same’. This was absolutely necessary because ‘surely when there are motions and advances made towards an incorporation with England it is the duty and will be the wisdom of this Church of Scotland to hold fast her privileges and present enjoyments’. He reminded them of the Queen’s assurances to maintain the church settlement, and the opportunity parliament had to further secure the church, and declared that it depended upon them as parliamentarians to ensure the preservation of that settlement.58 As a further encouragement to the performance of their duty, he reminded parliament that the privileges and liberties the church currently enjoyed had been bought by a heavy price. Not only by Christ’s blood, but ‘our Noble and Worthy Ancestors have by many wrestlings recovered them out of the bowels of Antichrist’. Shall they, like young heirs, prodigally waste the estate? Shall they allow themselves and their posterity to be robbed of their privileges? God forbid! Referring to the words of his text, Behold I come quickly, Logan reminded them of their own mortality. Christ the judge was going to return and each will have to give an account of their works. That day would be a terrible and formidable day to those who betrayed the church. It was not only their duty, but in their own interest to ‘hold fast the precious things of God’.59 Logan’s sermon was not a bald

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allegory against union; but set against the background of the parliamentary debates, the commission’s recent address and current lobbying, and the national concern manifested in fasting and prayer, it was another strong reminder to the parliament to ensure the security of the church in event of a union. According to Logan, the universal church would never be overthrown. It was established upon the Rock of Ages and ‘the gates of hell shall never prevail against her’. Yet particular churches had no such promise and it was their duty to hold fast their privileges and attainments, and ensure they were never overthrown. The following day, 28 October, the Committee for Public Affairs reported to the commission. The issues raised on 18 October were still under consideration, but four points had been more fully discussed and were put forward for further debate. There was a general concern for the security of the Church of Scotland; a desire for a commission for plantation of kirks and valuation of teinds, and the supplying of the registers of that court burnt in Edinburgh in 1700; ministers wanted a court instead of a Privy Council for redressing the grievances of the church; and a commission for the visitation of schools and colleges. None of the points were controversial and members were confident that they would be included in any act for the church’s security, of which it was claimed there were already drafts. A small committee was appointed to seek an opportunity of examining any draft acts. If the issues were not sufficiently provided for, they were to urge their inclusion.60 The committee for public affairs was divided over which of the remaining, and more controversial concerns, should be brought forward to a debate in the commission. Eventually four were identified: the desire for a coronation oath; concerns about the wording of the oath of abjuration, in particular the qualification that the successor must belong to the Church of England; how a British parliament might be prevented from imposing oaths upon the ministry and people of Scotland that were inconsistent with their principles; and the application to Scots of the sacramental test. There were several issues still under discussion by the committee and it was instructed to continue those discussions in open session. Members of the commission were encouraged to attend and express their opinions on any of the matters. Open sessions would give the committee a clear idea of the issues members felt most strongly about. They would help the committee in making its recommendations to the commission – recommendations determined as much by the members of the commission as the committee. Membership of the committee was increased by the addition of five ministers and two ruling elders.61 On 1 November, the committee reported that as a result of its discussions, and after listening to

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the ‘scruples’ of commissioners, a fifth point was added to the list of concerns to be more fully debated by the commission. Commissioners were concerned that the constitution of the British parliament – with twentysix bishops sitting in the House of Lords – was considered to be inconsistent with the principles of Presbyterians and the covenants and engagements of the church and nation.62 By a process of consultation involving the whole commission, the Committee for Public Affairs had identified the five issues that would become the focus of a heated and protracted debate within the commission. The start of the debate was delayed for a couple of hours while they waited on the arrival of a number of ruling elders who were absent because parliament was still sitting.63 When it finally got under way, the commission quickly divided into two groups: one mostly ministers, the other mostly ruling elders. Because the ruling elders in question were generally affiliated to the Court Party and the Squadrone Volante, and thus pro-union, the view developed of the division as one between church and state. Carstares, as a supporter of union, was keen to avoid any conflict between church and state. He believed that the church should not meddle in politics but leave the civil administration to crown and parliament. Ministers should stick to the task of promoting religion and the spiritual concerns of those entrusted to their care.64 Generally speaking, most ministers would have agreed with him. As John Logan pointed out to Mar, ministers were reluctant to get involved with the state in civil matters. This was not a rule that Carstares applied to himself. He had been a close confident and advisor to William, maintained correspondence with politicians on either side of the border who were closely involved in securing union, and acted on the behalf of the court within the commission. The day before the debate, the Presbytery of Edinburgh had observed a fast. In a blatant attempt to influence the debate or even prevent it taking place, Carstares had prefaced his lecture on Psalm 85 by reminding ministers that the commission ‘had set it apart not to party themselves wt any of ye differing party’s in parliat yt was non of yr concern, far lesse to creat or indulge unaccountable jealousy’s in some peoples minds about this matter’.65 When the debate began, Carstares, David Blair and some Edinburgh ministers tried to halt it by arguing against raising the commission’s scruples at the present time. If these issues should be raised at all, it ought to be after parliament had debated and ratified the treaty.66 Carstares and the ruling elders were accused of inconsistency. They had argued on the opening day of the commission that the church was in danger and, as parliament was likely to proceed quickly with the treaty, urged the commission to present an address for

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security. Now they argued that the church should keep quiet until parliament had agreed on the nature of the union.67 Carstares did not want a debate because it was likely to be contentious, split the commission and antagonise the government. The ruling elders pitched in with ‘long harangues’ and insisted that parliament would give the church the security it sought before the treaty was concluded. Threats were directed at the church of the dire consequences that would follow upon their meddling with the treaty. The ‘odium’ of the court would fall upon the church if it attempted to hinder union. After union was concluded, the two would cease to be ‘fast friends’, and their establishment would be over. If the union fell through, the church’s appearance against it would ‘draw down the wrath of the court and bring in a toleration if not ane intire overthrow of our government’.68 The court tried to browbeat the commission into postponing the debate. In response, Lord Belhaven warned that waiting until after an incorporating union was concluded before making an application to parliament would be a mistake. It would be too late and their chances of success diminished because there would be no reason for the government to grant them any concessions. Ministers insisted that the church had a right and a duty according to the confession of faith to petition parliament in extraordinary cases. Furthermore, it was argued that their silence at this time would be sinful and would ‘show yt we may easily be cowed out of our best interests, and soe the court (who no doubt incline to our overthrow) may do it when they please’.69 After several hours’ debate, the ruling elders backed off and it was decided that the articles covering the coronation oath, oaths imposed by a British parliament and the sacramental test should be further prepared and a draft address drawn up that the commission might use if it thought necessary. After a vote it was decided that the articles concerning the oath of abjuration and the constitution of a British parliament should be subject to further discussion. Ministers voted by a majority of six to include them in the draft address, eighteen preferring to delay for further consideration. However, the ruling-elder vote tipped it in favour of a delay by six votes. The committee appointed to draw up the address was politically balanced between the two camps.70 The committee presented its draft address to the commission on 4 November.71 It was objected against the coronation oath that the sovereign swore to maintain the rights and privileges of the Church of England without any respect to the Church of Scotland. The commission was concerned that there was no provision in the treaty for the security of the Church of Scotland by a coronation oath and they asked that in the coronation oath to be taken by sovereigns of Great Britain they promise to

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maintain the doctrine, worship, discipline and government of the church as by law established.72 The commission was concerned that Presbyterians would be exposed to danger by the imposition of new oaths by a British parliament. They asked that no oath, bond or test that was inconsistent with their known principles be required of any minister or member of the Kirk. Objections were raised that the article in the address did not outline who was to judge the consistency or otherwise of any oath or test with the principles of the Kirk. Some felt that the article should have made clear that a lawfully called general assembly was to be the judge, whereas the article effectively left it open for ministers to decide each for himself. This could result in differences of interpretation and possibly division in the church over an oath. Some argued that, as a result of this omission, ministers should be completely free of all oaths, except an oath of allegiance.73 As a result of the Test and Corporation Acts, all holders of public office in England had to take the Anglican sacrament. In order to avoid these requirements, dissenters resorted to what was called occasional conformity. They occasionally took the Anglican sacrament in order to qualify for office and thereafter returned to their normal dissenting services. The practice infuriated Tories, who regarded it as sacrilege and accused dissenters of using the sacrament for political convenience. In order to prevent dissenters exploiting this practice, they attempted to introduce occasional-conformity bills that would exclude from office anyone who attended, at any time, a dissenting service. Three attempts were made between 1702 and 1704, but all failed.74 The sacramental test had serious implications for Presbyterians, and one observer considered it to be an ‘insuperable obstacle’ to union because it directly impinged upon Scottish rights.75 The address pointed out that because the sacramental test was a condition of access to public office and employment by the crown, members of the Church of Scotland would be excluded from such employments, if not in Scotland then throughout the rest of the Dominion of Britain. The commission foresaw dangerous consequences for the church because Presbyterians might be tempted to take the test in order to secure the positions.76 Despite assurances that no Scotsman would be affected by the test, ministers were unconvinced. They believed that, without exemption from the test, Scotsmen would suffer the fate of dissenters in Ulster, where recent legislation requiring holders of public office to take the sacrament after the Anglican form resulted in many loyal dissenters being turned out of office.77 The issue also had imperial implications. Alexander Stobo, one of the ministers who had been sent out to Darien, had settled in South Carolina after the failure of the

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expedition. Writing to the Presbytery of Edinburgh in May 1705, he warned that the introduction of a sacramental test by the provincial assembly in South Carolina was an attempt to prevent the further settling of Presbyterian ministers in the country.78 There was a fear that while incorporating union would give Scots access to English colonies, the sacramental test would exclude their ministers. Even if court assurances were true, many wanted the test removed otherwise their friends, dissenters in England, would continue to labour under its disadvantages.79 English dissenters wanted the Scots to press the issue in order that they might benefit from its removal.80 However, the Court Party could never allow the removal of the test to be part of any act for security or condition of union; to do so would be to wreck the treaty. No treaty would pass in England that allowed the test to be removed. High-church opposition would be too great. The ministers on the committee had drawn up the draft address by themselves because all attempts to arrange a meeting with the ruling elders had failed. The elders, not just the three on the committee, were accused of deliberately avoiding a meeting in an attempt to obstruct the committee’s work and prevent the preparation of an address.81 The commission was in the process of approving the address with some slight amendments when the ‘over-ruling elders’, delayed by parliamentary business, arrived. At their request the draft was read again and, after involving the commission in a further debate lasting more that two hours, they finally agreed to the address. At this point some members proposed that the two remaining articles should now be considered and added to the address.82 The proposal resulted in a heated and acrimonious debate. The oath of abjuration, which favoured the Protestant succession and abjured the Pretender, was to be sworn by holders of civil or military office, teachers, ministers and members of parliament. The commission argued that in the second part of the oath there were references made to some acts of the English parliament that Scotsmen obliged to take the oath may not be familiar with, and therefore could not swear with judgement. In the ensuing debate, Patrick Hume, 1st Earl of Marchmont, read the relevant English acts before the commission in an attempt to persuade ministers that there was nothing to fear from them. Ministers, ably led by James Ramsay of Eyemouth, reasoned that they were to swear to the entail of the crown as outlined in the second act of parliament contained in the oath, which stated that the successor should be of the Church of England. He argued that it was inconsistent with their principles to maintain such an entail. The ministers insisted that they could not swear an oath in which the successor is obliged to

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maintain prelacy and the office of bishops. Nor did they think it lawful for them to perpetuate by an oath an obligation upon their sovereign that they could not come under themselves. They argued that such a position would be ‘a virtual renunciation of our principles’.83 Even Carstares, anxious as he was to avoid debating those issues, hoped that Presbyterian scruples over the oath and the test, which he considered justified, would eventually be dealt with.84 The commission requested that in event of a union, the latter part of the oath be altered and put in plain language so that ‘we may see what we are to swear to without being obliged to turn over whole volumes of the English acts of parliament which perhaps shall not be to hand to every one who must swear the oath’.85 The most controversial of all the articles concerned the constitution of a British parliament, in which twenty-six bishops would sit in the House of Lords. The commission objected that if the proposed treaty were concluded, the constitution of Britain would be such that Scotland would be subjected in its civil interests to a British parliament that had twenty-six bishops as constituent members of the legislature. They could not approve of the civil places and power of churchmen, and lest their silence be interpreted as approbation, they felt it necessary to state that it was contrary to their known principles and covenants that any churchman should hold civil office or bear power in the commonwealth. The elders, in an attempt to intimidate the commission and force it to withdraw the articles, insisted that their inclusion would be considered as a plain addressing against an incorporating union. They accused the commission of going well beyond its sphere of influence and meddling in state matters. They warned that their request was certain to be denied.86 They argued that their objections to churchmen holding civil office exposed the church as weak and their ‘capricious humours’ would make them a laughing stock before continental divines.87 The ministers responded that, however great their inconvenience might be, they could not in all conscience consent, even by their silence, to what they considered to be sinful and a plain breach of the National Covenant. George Mair from Culross, in a direct riposte to Carstares’ call not to meddle in politics, stated that while as ministers they were mainly concerned to ensure the security of the church, as men and subjects they were not to be regardless of matters of state or issues of national interest. Nor was it officious meddling in state affairs for them to protest against what was sinful in the constitution of any court. He reiterated the position of many in the commission that the civil places and power of kirkmen was contrary to the word of God and incompatible with their spiritual function; that the

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covenants, especially the National Covenant, declared against ministers holding civil office; and that the commission was ready to own its obligations to the covenant upon all hazards. As for foreign divines, he said that they knew perfectly well the principles of the Church of Scotland on the matter and many of them agreed with the Kirk. In response to accusations that they would become a laughing stock, Mair insisted that they were not ashamed to own these as their principles.88 Marchmont predicted dire consequences for the church if the article was included. He foresaw that the article, which he claimed was against an incorporating union, would ruin the Church of Scotland. Francis Montgomery, Member of Parliament for Giffen, argued that by insisting on the article, the ministers were effectively accusing the commissioners who negotiated the treaty of committing a sin. He urged ministers to accept that those who disagreed with them had consciences as much as themselves. George Baillie of Jerviswood claimed his conscience was as good as any man’s and warned that if the commission insisted on adding the article to the address, he would be forced to enter his dissent. The Earl of Rothes declared his intention to do likewise. Questioning the motives of ministers, Jerviswood thought it strange that so much was now being made of the covenants when the church had not considered it necessary to renew them at the Revolution or at any time since. Sir David Hume of Crossrigg insisted that the aims of the National Covenant were restricted to Scotland. According to Hume, the assembly’s ruling against churchmen holding civil office applied only to the Kirk. While it was unlawful for a Scots minister to sit or vote in parliament, it did not apply to the English prelates.89 Robert Horsburgh, minister at Saltpreston in the Presbytery of Haddington, replied that while the covenants had not been renewed at the Revolution, the church had always walked in conformity to them. Failure to renew them did not imply that they had been rejected. Failure to protest at this time against churchmen holding civil places would be acting dishonestly and inconsistently with their oath. He insisted that the commission submit the article to parliament as a public testimony of their adherence to the oath of God. Allan Logan of Torryburn, in the Presbytery of Dunfermline, said that the assembly had proceeded upon scriptural grounds and therefore the restriction applied at all times and in all places in the world. Prelates in civil places in parliament or council were precisely what the covenant meant when it spoke of kirkmen in civil places. If it was unlawful for prelates to sit in our parliament, it was unlawful for this nation or the parliament that represents it to voluntarily agree, in event of a union, to receive or submit to a British parliament that had prelacy in its constitution and bishops sitting

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as our legislators. Choosing to receive the English parliament and their lords spiritual to be part of our parliament would be the same as allowing prelates to sit in the present Scottish parliament. Logan argued that in the event of union, the English parliament – with its lords spiritual, which is an essential part of it – should be as properly their parliament as the one that sat in Edinburgh at the present time. The spiritual lords would have as constant and as direct a dominion over them as the peers of Scotland now have in their own parliament. He insisted that this could never be, unless they voluntarily agreed that the present English parliament and part of the Scottish parliament should become a British parliament, and their parliament. He urged that the duty of ministers, and especially the commission, at this time was to give a prudent and faithful testimony to the parliament against a British parliament thus constituted, that they might not involve themselves and the nation in the guilt of perjury. It was also argued that to introduce prelacy and the office of bishop into the government and constitution of the kingdom was subversive to the Claim of Right.90 Despite the ferocity of the debate, and the strong defence of the covenants, not everyone in the church or commission believed that union was inconsistent with the National Covenant. The church had not renewed subscription of them at the Revolution and new ministers were not required to subscribe to them. For that reason it was argued that going into the union did not involve the nation in the guilt of perjury. It was reasoned that oaths only bound the person taking them and not their posterity. One cannot be guilty of breaking an oath one did not take. Because the covenants had not been renewed, and most Scots – indeed most ministers in the Kirk – had not subscribed to them, they cannot be guilty of breaking them or of perjury.91 While there were some in the church who would have preferred subscription to be reinstated, there was no widespread desire or pressure to do so. Individual presbyteries had been criticised for renewing them just prior to the negotiations in 1702. Carstares informed the commission that, in his judgement, the office of bishop was unlawful, as was their meddling with civil liberties. He acknowledged their obligation to the National Covenant, but believed that this should not prevent them from bettering their circumstances and uniting with a people where bishops existed before such a union.92 The issue of the bishops was not in their power to redress. The fact that they would sit in a British parliament did not make it unlawful for Scotland to unite with England and ought not to prevent them from seeking a union that would be to their benefit in terms of the common safety of religion and liberty.93 Patrick Simson of Renfrew expressed

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similar sentiments. Simson was ordained in 1653 to the parish of Renfrew and was ejected in 1662. Granted an indulgence in 1672, he was cited before the Privy Council in 1678 for preaching at conventicles. He failed to appear and was denounced as a rebel. He took advantage of the toleration of 1687 and was eventually restored to Renfrew in 1690. He was moderator in 1695 and died in 1715 as ‘Father of the Church’. Robert Wodrow described him as having ‘one of the clearest judgements and the most exact and tenacious memory’ he knew, and of being ‘the most digested and distinct master of the scriptures’ he had ever met.94 Simson argued that while their obligation to the covenant was to be maintained, he did not think this hindered a union. Their obligation to maintain and defend the honour of the king, privileges of parliament and liberties of the subject were not intended to debar the nation forever from making any alteration in our government tho it might be to the better; the design of the article being to vindicate our cause, that in the maintenance of religion we were not to do anything prejudicial to the civil state of the nation but were to carry on these interests jointlie.95

An incorporating union that secured their religious and civil liberties and that was prejudicial to neither was not inconsistent with the covenants. The covenants were not intended to prevent change, if change meant improvement. The advocates of incorporating union argued that Scotland would be immeasurably improved and secured in its religious and civil interests. These views had an impact on the debate as members of the commission increasingly became ‘generally satisfied with the consistency of it [union] with our national and solemn engagements’.96 Furthermore, the issue was dropped by the Committee for Public Affairs from its list of concerns to be discussed with the government after the passing of the act for the security of the church (see Chapter 3). At times the debate descended into farce as the two sides traded insults. Sir James Campbell, Laird of Auchinbreck and MP for Argyllshire, accused ministers of imprudence. John Bannatyne retorted that if ministers of age and experience were to be taught their principles by young men, they were unworthy of their character. To which Auchinbreck replied that ‘old men were sometimes twice bairns’.97 The Earl of Glasgow proposed that they delay submitting the articles until a more judicious time. This course of action was no more acceptable to the ministers than it had been when first proposed by Carstares. A delay could result in the articles never being submitted at all and, as Thomas Linning pointed out, a delay was effectively a rejection of the articles. Glasgow accused Linning of mocking him and said that such behaviour

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was unbecoming the gravity expected of ministers. The offended earl led a walk-out of ruling elders who believed the commission was unhappy with their presence and that they had been shouted at and ill-treated. Observers claimed the men left ‘in a great huffe’.98 The session was adjourned until the following day and the elders were invited to return. This further delay was considered unnecessary by some who felt that the elders had left the commission ‘soe groundlessly not to say hectoringly’. In the meantime, members were asked to meet together privately to discuss the issues among themselves, especially the issue of the British constitution. It was hoped that by the time the commission met again, the views of members on both heads would be more unanimous.99 The following day, before the commission resumed consideration of the two outstanding articles, a letter from the Presbytery of Hamilton was read out. The presbytery was one of those most hostile to incorporating union and its opposition was greatly encouraged from Edinburgh by the Duke of Hamilton and from within the presbytery by the Duke’s mother, the Duchess Anne. The letter outlined several of the difficulties that the presbytery had with union and urged the commission to apply to parliament to address those issues.100 The difficulties outlined were those currently under consideration by the commission. With the commission divided over the content of a second address, the letter proved to be a timely intervention and encouragement to those who wanted to add the articles on the abjuration oath and the British constitution to the address. The commission resolved to create yet another committee to consider the two articles and prepare an overture outlining what they thought was the most appropriate course of action to take.101 According to Wodrow, it was instructed to bring in the articles in the ‘smoothest termes yt may be’. The commission wanted to both present an address and minimise the divisions caused by its controversial topics.102 On 7 November, the commission met to discuss the committee’s overtures, only to have its proceedings disrupted once again by the ruling elders. An exasperated Wodrow recorded that they raised objections against the address that had been tabled and debated a hundred times already.103 In an attempt to humour the elders, the commission once again delayed a decision until the afternoon.104 However, the afternoon session began as the morning had ended. Marchmont and Jerviswood reminded the commission of the fatal consequences that followed the divisions between the Protestors and the Resolutioners. They expressed fears that a similar outcome would follow if they voted to add the articles to an address. They warned the commission that if it did not prevent these impending evils by setting aside a second address altogether, they would be obliged

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to exonerate their consciences by protesting against any vote. Ministers believed that Marchmont’s threat of a protest was a last-ditch attempt to split the commission and create a division sufficient to disrupt the presentation of an address. The aim of the elders throughout the debates had been to prevent the commission presenting an address altogether. At the very least, they wanted to dilute its contents and delay its presentation until after parliament had passed an act for the security of the church; or, better still, until after the whole treaty had been ratified. Thomas Linning, replying for the ministers, said they would be sorry if there were divisions in the church. They had hoped that there would have been unanimity in giving their public testimony in favour of Scotland’s covenanted work of reformation. If any of the commission wanted to enter a protest, they were free to do so and would not be criticised for it. It was nothing new to have men protesting against a vote in a church court, nor was it to be a ground of censure. Patrick Cumming added that they would rather displease all the men in the world than displease God.105 The commission was determined to present its address and the elders were unable to delay a vote any longer; but before it was taken, Jerviswood entered his protestation, to which six other elders adhered. He asked that the dissent be marked and that they may have the liberty to enter their reasons at a later date. The commission voted overwhelmingly by fiftynine to seventeen to add the articles to the address. Only three ministers voted against: William Carstares, David Blair (both royal chaplains) and Robert Bell, minister at Cavers in Jedburgh. They did not object to the content of the address, but the manner and timing. They insisted that they objected to churchmen holding civil office, but believed that in this case the commission was exceeding its role and meddling too much in civil affairs. They argued that bishops in a British parliament would only have a civil function and no power over the church. They considered the address inappropriate at this time because it was likely to alarm the English as appearing to be against an incorporating union. Finally, they believed that, should the union meet with insurmountable obstacles elsewhere, the blame for its failure was likely to fall upon Presbyterians because of their address.106 A sixth article was added to the address requesting a commission for the plantation of kirks and a court to take the place of the Privy Council, should it be abolished. The commission argued that in the event of union the church would be disadvantaged unless there was a commission for the plantation of kirks and the valuation of teinds and for making up the registers and decreets of locality of that court that had been destroyed in a fire in the parliament close in Edinburgh on 3 February 1700, while under the care of the clerk, John Buchan.

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THE REACTION

The address effectively summed up the major issues of concern to the church about union, but was by no means the commission’s last word on the matter. A Committee for Security was appointed with a remit to meet and consider what may be further necessary for the church’s security.107 Copies of the address were presented to Queensberry and Seafield on 8 November. Queensberry gave it ‘a very cold reception’ and it was reported that on the whole the address ‘does very much disgust our court Presbyterians’.108 If there were any doubts in government about securing the union, there was no doubt about whom to blame if it failed. The day the address was passed, Mar said of the Kirk ‘that if the Union fail it is oueing to them’.109 However, as Wodrow pointed out, the country’s opposition to union was evident in the addresses presented to parliament before the commission presented its second address, therefore the commission’s address could not have influenced the addresses arriving in Edinburgh. He claimed that the commission had merely represented its grievances and had not addressed against an incorporating union that was consistent with bishops having no civil power over north Britain.110 Apart from the court, the address was generally well received. Presbyteries responded with letters of approval praising the commission for their faithfulness to the principles of the church and encouraging them to continue to work for its further security in event of union.111 John Hepburn, leader of the Hebronites, was present at the commission on the day it approved the address and expressed his approval of the commission’s proceedings. The following day, three of his followers – Gavin Mitchell, John Thomson and James Mulligan – submitted a representation on behalf of the south and western shires, expressing joy at and concurrence with the commission’s ‘seasonable and faithfull testimony given to the principles and covenants of this church’.112 Gavin Mitchell later wrote that the address was considered by many to be ‘too faint, not improving the topicks, from whence the strongest arguments against it, [union] might have been drawn’.113 The commission was accused of hypocrisy by the Cameronians for addressing parliament in favour of covenants they had, to a man, broken and perjured.114 John Bell observed that ‘When the commission’s proceedings took air in the city of Edinburgh it made glad the hearts of all honest people’.115 The Jacobites were encouraged into believing that union had been ‘broken and a back door left yet open for their darling the Prince of Wales’. They praised the church as honest men and true patriots who stood for the liberties of the country.116 The Duke of Hamilton claimed the address was

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evidence of the church’s opposition to union. Writing to Godolphin on 14 November, he expressed the hope that the Queen and her council would not push ahead with an incorporating union in light of the fact that the ‘whole church, and most of the trading people, and the generality of the kingdom’ had expressed their sentiments against it. Hamilton argued that attempts to bring Presbyterians into the measure in favour of union had ‘totally failed’. Citing the commission’s second address as evidence, he assured Godolphin that the commission’s deliberations would have the ‘utmost influence upon the people’ and that the prevailing anti-union sentiments across the nation ought to be considered before pressing on with the union.117 Rejecting Hamilton’s assessment, Defoe claimed that there had been a widespread expectation that the commission would protest against union as destructive to the civil interests of the nation and the church. Contrary to expectations, while the address did some harm, it did not indicate church opposition to union; rather, all six heads of the address supposed the ‘union as real and certain’.118 Defoe attempted to vindicate the commission from aspersions raised against it in England ‘either of forming intrigues against the union in general, endeavours of clogging it with unreasonable demands, or encroaching designs upon the English church’.119 In London, while the church issue had been a cause for concern, there had been increasing confidence that it would be settled without trouble. The overture for an act for securing the church had been well received at court and the expectation was that it would be acceptable to the English parliament.120 However, news about the commission’s second address shook that confidence. There was greater concern about the commission’s address than any of the addresses pouring into Edinburgh.121 One of those who interpreted the second address as an assault on the union was John Shute Barrington. He expressed regret at having previously praised the church so highly over its fast and the commission’s first address, and wished he had not been so effusive in his praise.122 The address was interpreted as evidence that the church, albeit unwittingly, had joined with the known enemies of the government and church.123 THE ACT FOR SECURING THE PROTESTANT RELIGION AND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH GOVERNMENT

After presentation of the address, the focus of the debate passed from the commission to parliament. The opposition had been keenly anticipating its arrival and had unsuccessfully moved for a delay in consideration of the articles until the commission’s position on security was more clearly

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known.124 By the time the address was presented, the first article of the treaty had been approved and a draft act for the security of the church had been presented, published and given its first reading in parliament.125 On 8 November, the commission’s address was read before parliament and was followed by a number of parochial addresses against incorporating union. The draft act for church security was given a second reading, but debate was delayed while they passed an act for supply.126 It was thought that the act for supply passed without problems because the opposition believed that as a consequence of the commission’s address, there was a general impression that the ‘result of the union was marr’d’ and that the court had ‘lost heart’ and intended to adjourn parliament after securing supply.127 The opposition were happy to grant supply just to see the demise of the treaty. However, they were mistaken and debate on church security resumed on 9 November. The draft act had four points. 1. The true Protestant religion as expressed in the confession of faith and the worship, discipline and Presbyterian church government established by acts of parliament was to remain and continue without ‘any alteration to the people of this land in all succeeding generations’. Presbyterian church government was to be the only church government within Scotland. 2. For the further security of the worship, discipline and government of the church, all office bearers in any school, college or university must acknowledge the civil government as prescribed by acts of parliament, subscribe the confession of faith, conform to the worship of the established church and submit to its discipline and government. 3. No Scot shall be liable to but shall be free from any oath or test, within the kingdom of Scotland, contrary to the religion and church government established by the act. No oath or test shall be imposed upon anyone within the bounds of church and kingdom. 4. All sovereigns shall be required to swear and subscribe to maintain and preserve the settlement of the true Protestant religion and Presbyterian church government as established in the act. The overture stated that the act and the church establishment it contained ‘shall be held and observed, in all time coming, as a fundamental and Essential Condition of any Treaty or Union to be Concluded betwixt the two kingdoms, without any alteration thereof, or Derogation thereto in any sort forever’.128 Thus the overture dealt with the substance of the commission’s first address. However, the other concessions were few and minor. The commission’s major concerns, its lobbying of parliament and its second address, had largely been ignored.129

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Both government and opposition wanted an act for the security of the church, but for different reasons. The government wanted to pacify the church before moving on to the remainder of the treaty. The opposition wanted an act that would break the treaty. It did not help that members previously hostile to Presbyterians had suddenly become loud champions of church security. Sir Alexander Bruce, expelled from parliament in 1703 for claiming that Presbyterianism was inconsistent with monarchy, now claimed the act provided insufficient security. The court was aware that the church issue was one of its weakest points and one capable of breaking the treaty. They expected the opposition to secure amendments to the act and to ‘stuff it with such things that cannot pass in England’.130 However, opposition attempts to secure further amendments met with limited success.131 Debating the first clause, Hamilton moved that all acts of parliament that favoured the church and were to be ratified should be particularly mentioned within the act, a point initially raised by the Committee for Public Affairs. Some of the more important acts had been outlined in a document prepared before the debate. Some ministers had drawn up a list of particular acts they wanted mentioned, including all previous acts securing Presbyterianism; the 1690 Act against patronage; the 1693 Act for settling the peace of the church that was so offensive to Episcopalians; the 1695 Act against intruding into churches without a legal call; the 1698 Act for preventing disorders in the supply and planting of churches; the 1703 Act declaring it treason to impugn the Claim of Right; and the 1669 Act of Supremacy, which had been repealed at the Revolution, was to be repeated and rescinded in the new act. They asked that certain laws prejudicial to the church, including the annulments on the covenants, be rescinded. Episcopalians were the target of the request that no minister or preacher was to possess manse, church or benefice, or exercise a ministry, without the permission of the church courts. The 1690 Act for the visitation of schools and colleges was to be narrated and the 1662 Act stating that teachers must submit to the authority of archbishops was to be rescinded. The aim was to close any legal loopholes by which church security might be undermined. They also wanted to confirm Presbyterian hegemony in educational establishments and insure the church against the possible restoration of patronage and introduction of toleration.132 The ruling elders, who had opposed the second address in the commission, led the government response. They argued that it would be safer for the church if the acts were encompassed within a general clause. They reasoned that if the acts were listed individually, something of importance might be accidentally left out, to which it was quickly replied that a few particular acts might be named and then a

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general clause for the rest. The court succeeded in blocking any amendment, but the elders were accused of acting out of spite after their reversal in the commission. It was also suggested that they did not want the acts against patronage to be specifically outlined in the act and therefore stand in perpetuity.133 A clause securing the continuance of the universities of St Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Edinburgh as established by law, forever, was added to the one requiring office bearers within universities, schools and colleges to acknowledge the civil government and subscribe to the worship, doctrine, discipline and government of the Church of Scotland.134 An attempt to extend the non-imposition of oaths and tests to the whole of Great Britain, and thus bypass the sacramental test, failed. Nevertheless, the Test would not apply in Scotland. After some minor amendments to the last two clauses, which made no material difference to their meaning, the act was read along with the commission’s second address. Before the vote, Lord Belhaven entered a protestation in which he declared that the act as it stood held no valid security for the Church of Scotland in an incorporating union and that the church could have no security in any union in which the ‘Claim of Right is unhinged, our parliament incorporated and our distinct Sovereignty and Independency intirely abolished’.135 The government was surprised and not a little relieved that the act passed with so few amendments.136 The Earl of Stair claimed that they had done so without making any concessions to the second address. Strictly speaking, this was not the case, as the act contained two of the articles from the address.137 Stair possibly meant that the points conceded were conceded regardless of the address and as a result of the original lobbying.138 The church had gained its most important demand: security in the event of a union. It had also received a number of concessions, but most had been ignored. With the exception of a court for the plantation of kirks and the valuation of teinds, which was eventually granted on 21 February 1707, attempts to gain further amendments based upon the commission’s second address failed.139 THE ACT FOR SECURING THE CHURCH: MASTERSTROKE OR U-TURN?

Historians have generally regarded the passing of the Act of Security for the church as a triumph for the government, a ‘master-stroke’ by Queensberry and the Court Party through which church opposition to union was neutralised.140 However, the evidence suggests that, far from being a master-stroke, the act was the result of a government u-turn as

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they attempted to rectify the blunder of leaving the church’s security out of the original articles. The act was undoubtedly a response to Presbyterian hostility and an attempt to placate that hostility. Government concern was enough to ensure that the issue of security for the church was dealt with sooner rather than later; as Sir John Clerk explained, ‘It became all the more necessary to settle the church question quickly’.141 The hostility of the church to the incorporating union contained within the treaty could not have been unexpected. The reason for placing a prohibition upon any negotiations that might alter the worship, doctrine and government of the church in the first place was awareness of church sensibilities on the issue.142 If church opposition was not unexpected, it can be argued that much of it could have been avoided. Steps could have been taken during the treaty negotiations to minimise the hostility and neutralise opposition within the church. This was the view of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik (senior). As a member of the commission, Clerk was present during the stormy debates over the second address. He voted against it on the grounds that the act before parliament for securing the church provided a far greater security for their church government because it was declared a fundamental of the union. He stated that acts of the Scottish parliament had never provided such security because they had been liable to change.143 On 7 November, after the debate had finished, he recorded that if the security of the church had been provided for in the articles of the treaty in the same manner as in the act before parliament, the ‘ferment against the union had by all probability been prevented’.144 During the negotiations, Clerk had written to his son, who was a commissioner, and suggested that an article for the security of the church be included in the treaty. According to Clerk, such an article was proposed twice during negotiations and rejected on both occasions.145 After the passing of the act, the Earl of Stair told Robert Harley that he had foreseen during the negotiations in London that the lack of such an article in the treaty would cause problems and ‘might lose us the populace’. He had argued during negotiations that an article securing the church should be ‘a part of our treaty’.146 The issue of whether or not the church should be specifically secured by an article was the cause of a ‘great division’ amongst the Scots commissioners during the treaty negotiations.147 It was a repetition of the debate that took place during the previous negotiations in 1702–3. The question of reservations to the treaty had been raised and it was the opinion of some that ‘church-government, laws and judicatures, were to be continued for ever with us as they are now established’.148 Others argued that church government was sufficiently secured by the Claim of Right and by the act

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of parliament appointing the commissioners and their commission, ‘which they say makes the church government the basis of the Union, and, by consequence, sacred and inviolable’.149 Furthermore, the act restrained them from treating ‘of any alteration in the church government; therefore it is best to say nothing about it’. To this argument, the Earl of Stair and David Melville, 3rd Earl of Leven, commander in chief of the army in Scotland, replied that while the act and their commission prevented them from altering doctrine, worship and church government, it did not prevent them from discussing the issue altogether or from securing the church in the treaty.150 Leven and Stair argued that Presbyterian church government was a fundamental and should therefore be secured ‘by an express article in the union’. They argued that the Claim of Right provided insufficient security. After union, with Scottish affairs subject to a British parliament, there was nothing to prevent church government in Scotland being altered unless it was declared a fundamental.151 The act of parliament appointing commissioners to negotiate a treaty had been intended to protect the interests of the church during negotiations, but had instead become an obstacle to its security. Leven and Stair had accurately interpreted the act. It prevented them making alterations to the worship, doctrine and government of the church, but did not prevent them from negotiating with the aim of securing it in the treaty. However, those commissioners who argued against the inclusion of an article for the security of the church within the treaty ultimately prevailed. They were led by an un-named individual who dominated the commissioners and stifled the debate; as Leven explained to Carstares on 11 June, ‘I think there will be nothing spoken of the church, for your friend is wilful to the last degree, and it is not fit to disagree’.152 It is probable that this individual was Queensberry, and even if not, he acquiesced in this position. Had Queensberry agreed with Stair and Leven, the church would have been secured in the treaty. Queensberry was clearly against securing the church in the treaty and his actions in November 1706 represent a significant u-turn in policy. Not only was an article securing the church in the treaty rejected, there was no agreement to include one at a later date. The intention of the court was that ‘not one iota of the Articles were to be altered’.153 Leven was concerned that any attempt by the Scottish parliament to secure the church at a later date might be rejected by the English as an addition to the treaty that could result in its delay. An alternative to an article in the treaty was that church security might be included in the act that ratified and established the union. This may have been the further security referred to by Anne, Queensberry and Seafield in their addresses to parliament on

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3 October. However, this was not a fundamental and, as far as Leven was concerned, Presbyterian church government was a fundamental and should be included in the treaty. Only the inclusion of an article in the treaty could adequately secure the church.154 Writing from London on 27 April, George Ridpath informed Robert Wodrow of the divisions over church government and questioned whether the prevailing opinion among the commissioners was likely to secure the church. In a united parliament, Scots members would be outnumbered and powerless to obtain redress against any act they disliked. If the English were minded, they could easily end the ‘northern schism, and bring you all under the true Apostolical Government and Discipline’, then ‘what will the reservation of your union act signifie’? Without specific securities in the treaty, there was a prospect of religious uniformity in which Presbyterians would merely be tolerated.155 Stair sought the opinion of Carstares, who insisted ‘that one way or other something should be expresslie mentioned as to what may be for its securitie’. He did not believe that a clause in the treaty securing Presbyterian church government should be an obstacle to negotiations. He and other ministers expressed the hope that the commissioners managed the negotiations as much as they possibly could for the security of the church. He argued that the omission of an article on security would be exploited by the opponents of union, would create a storm of protest within the church and make selling the treaty much more difficult.156 He warned of ‘zealous speeches’ on behalf of the church when parliament opened, not only from the church but also from its enemies and opponents of union. Security for the church within the treaty, while unlikely to silence union’s most vociferous critics within the church, would go some way to addressing the fears of many.157 While the prevailing opinion among the commissioners was that the church was sufficiently secure and there was no need for a specific article in the treaty, the prevailing opinion back in Scotland was that only an express article in the treaty could sufficiently secure the church. Nevertheless, in a repetition of the events of 1702–3, it (see Chapter 1) was decided to follow a policy of silence on the question of the church. Church government was kept out of the negotiations and the treaty not just because, as some argued, it was already secure, but because they did not want to jeopardise any treaty by its inclusion. It was also excluded out of deference to the English commissioners who said privately that the issue of church government would give an opportunity to Tories and high churchmen to oppose the treaty in the English parliament.158 The Earl of Leven believed that the English did not want to include the church in the negotiations because they would be obliged, in order to

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satisfy the high-church party, to ask for toleration for Episcopalians in Scotland, and as a result the Scots would ask for the same for dissenters in England, something they could not do without further irritating the high-church party. According to Leven, the English commissioners received support from Adam Cockburn, the Lord Justice Clerk.159 The English position put pressure on Scottish negotiators not to press for security for the church. A few months later, in the face of intense Presbyterian hostility, these arguments were ignored in favour of an act for security. The fact that the act of security for the church did not present any significant stumbling block to the treaty in England indicates that the Scots need not have acted in deference to the English view and could have pressed for the security of the church to be included in the articles. If such security was conceded in November 1706, it could have been conceded in the negotiations. Of course, English negotiators would wish to concede as little as possible, and that would include religious issues. Religion was considered a real stumbling block to union, the most dangerous rock of difference upon which it could split. Leaving the issue out of the negotiations was considered a ‘master piece of policy’.160 Yet, as subsequent events were to prove, this policy was not a masterpiece but a mistake. What was meant to minimise opposition in England had the effect of increasing it in Scotland. Those commissioners who had argued for some form of security in the treaty correctly anticipated Presbyterian anxieties and objections and were vindicated by subsequent events. Stair’s comments to Harley when the act for securing the church was passed read like a diplomatic ‘I told you so’. The commissioners who argued for an article in the treaty understood their Presbyterian countrymen more clearly than Queensberry. Had security been included in the original treaty, a considerable amount of the hostility directed at it from the church could have been avoided. Much of that hostility was not directed at the idea of union, or even incorporating union; that was a debate the church had decided to keep out of. Their ire was directed at the terms of the treaty, which contained no specific security and therefore proposed a union that threatened the Kirk’s already established position. Far from being a master-stroke, the passing of the act of security for the church on 12 November was a u-turn forced upon the ministry by an aggressive church preaching up the danger to the Kirk from the proposed treaty. It was an attempt to rectify the major blunder made at the treaty negotiations when they should have included security for the church in the articles, were advised that security should be included, were warned of the possible consequences of not including it, but elected not to do so. There is no doubt that Queensberry had intended to secure the church.

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The question was how and when. At its opening on 3 October, parliament was urged to ratify the treaty on the grounds that a union was in the best interests of both nations. Union would be the solid foundation of lasting peace, security for religion, liberty and property, remove animosities and jealousies between them and it would increase their strength, riches and trade and resist the enemies of the Protestant interest. Because of the sensitivity of the issue of religion and church government, great pains were taken to give assurances about the security of the church within union. It was stressed that the limitations placed upon negotiators in relation to religion and church government had been adhered to. The fact that those limitations had not excluded the commissioners from taking the opportunity to secure the church by a specific article in the treaty, and that the such an opportunity had been dismissed, was not mentioned. Instead emphasis was laid on existing laws that secured the church, and the Queen’s repeated assurances to maintain that security. Promises were made to take any further measures necessary to secure the church ‘after the union within the limits of Scotland’.161 Given the reaction to the treaty, it is not surprising that such assurances were made. What was unclear was what measures the court had in mind. What seems certain is that, at this point, Queensberry did not have in mind the only thing that would satisfy the church and that for which it asked – that its security be held as a fundamental article of the treaty. If that had been his intention, why did he not secure the church with such an article during the treaty negotiations, particularly as there was a strong body of opinion amongst the commissioners for such action? On a practical level, it would have made life a lot easier by removing at least one source of hostility. However, they were overruled by those commissioners who argued that the church was secure enough.162 No such act was intended because they believed that it was unnecessary. It is possible that they intended to secure the church in the act that ratified and established the union. This was proposed during the discussions between the Scots commissioners at the negotiations. Queensberry and the ministry were being driven by events and they were reacting to pressure from the Kirk. According to Mar, danger to the Kirk was the principal reason for the increasing opposition to the treaty around the country. He believed that only when the church was secured would such hostility be turned around.163 Like any interest group (and the role of the commission was to ‘look after their own interests and those of the church’)164 faced with a situation it did not like, it took action until its objectives were achieved. In this case the commission acted not to kill off the treaty but to insist that if union should take place,

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an article in the treaty should specifically secure the church. Altering the treaty was considered ‘a most dangerous measure’, and while no alterations had been contemplated, circumstances dictated otherwise.165 On 7 November Seafield wrote to Godolphin stating that he hoped they would be allowed to make alterations that they considered crucial to the treaty’s passage.166 It seems certain at this point that the alterations he mentions refer to the act for securing the church and that such an alteration could not have been undertaken without English approval. William Carstares was convinced that the English parliament would agree to any security that could be ‘reasonably demanded’ by the church, and he was right.167 Although many argued that the fears of the church were groundless, the government was forced reluctantly into altering the treaty, and the initiative and pressure for that change came from the church. The church’s address was received and conceded. Seafield claimed the alterations were ‘necessarie to obtain the union to be past hier’.168 Sir John Clerk described it as an act of expediency, something they had to do to ‘bring over the ministers of the church of Scotland, to give the Articles of the union so much of a hearing’.169 They could no longer leave the issue until after the treaty had been ratified. The hostility was such that the government had to act in order to alleviate the pressure it was under. According to Marchmont, who had protested at the second address, the belief that union threatened the Church of Scotland posed one of the most dangerous threats to union; they were obliged to act to secure the church in order to secure the union, as ‘There was no possibility of getting this matter managed any other way.’170 This was also the view in England. Lord Wharton, writing to Marchmont, acknowledged ‘wee are convinced that it was impossible for you to hinder that zealous part of your church to rest satisfyed without the security given them by this Act’.171 The government acknowledged that if it wanted the treaty to survive, it would have to be amended and made acceptable to the church. The government believed its greatest difficulty would be over if it could please the church by securing it in the treaty.172 Passing the Act of Security proved to be a significant moment in the passage of the treaty. Securing the church secured the treaty. However, the administration did not pull off a master-stroke. Anti-union hostility and pressure from the church forced the government to bring the issue of church security forward in order to alleviate the pressure it was under. The act was a political necessity but also a demonstration of Queensberry’s pragmatism and willingness to make concessions to get the job done. The court had blundered by leaving church security out of the treaty at the negotiations in London. Calls by some commissioners

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that security be included because church government was a fundamental, and because leaving it out was likely to stir up Presbyterian hostility to the treaty, were overruled by Queensberry in deference to English sensibilities and because it was considered that the church was secure enough. The hostile reaction to the treaty forced Queensberry into a uturn. The act itself was a compromise; it was the most the government could give and the least the church could accept. However, it was no finely calculated compromise by the government because it had little room for manoeuvre. On the one hand, it had to placate the church; on the other hand, it was limited in what it could concede. There were demands made by the church that the government refused because it could not grant them even if it wanted to. It blamed ministers for the disorders across the country and used the disorders to justify its actions in not giving the church all the securities it asked for. It was argued that if ministers had been more for the union, and less active against it, the church would have received more concessions. The church rejected these suggestions, well aware that the government did not grant greater concessions because its masters in England would not let it.173 This suggests that some on the commission were aware they were asking for concessions they knew they were unlikely to get, and that they did so for conscience’ sake. While it continued to work for greater securities, it never made receiving them a condition for accepting union, as it had done initially with the act for security. The government was never going to insist upon the removal of the Test or the bishops in parliament because they knew it was not an option. Such requests would never be granted because they could have ‘ruptured’ the treaty.174 This was a situation an antiunion commission could have exploited. If this was an opportunity to rupture the treaty, then it was missed – or rather, not taken. It was a situation that was not exploited because, for most members of the commission and ministers generally, there was little desire to do so. The debates over the first and second addresses to parliament exposed divisions within the commission. The major conflict was not so much between moderates and radicals in the church as it was between those ruling elders who were affiliated to either the Court Party and Squadrone Volante and who supported union, and the rest of the commission, who were predominately ministers. The dispute was perceived at the time as a church – state or church – court controversy. The first address made it clear that the church would not accept a union that did not include security as a fundamental article and essential condition of any treaty. The second address dealt with specific issues relating to its security. The second address was not produced as an afterthought or as consequence

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of pressure from presbyteries and synods dissatisfied at the first address. It was the product of a process that began in the Committee for Public Affairs the day after the first address was read out in parliament. It had always been the intention of the commission to raise specific points that it wanted included in any act relating to its security. Initially they were content to draw up a list and lobby parliament privately. Only when that failed did they resort to a second public address. The six points in the second address were reduced from the original list drawn up on 18 October, but this did not represent a victory for moderate influence managing to reduce ‘strongly worded draft addresses to mild representations’.175 On the contrary, anti-incorporationists succeeded in toughening up the draft of the first address, of which they had ‘disputed every inch of the prologue and epilogue’. They complained that the address contained ‘too many strong innuendos’ that the church approved of the incorporating union as it then lay before the parliament and had it re-drafted in a manner acceptable to both sides. As for the second address, there was no strongly worded draft. The committee for public affairs had identified five issues it believed should be included in an address. The first of two committees appointed to draft the second address began its work on the three issues about which there was no dispute whatsoever. Only after heated debate were the other issues added. The document identified as having been a strongly worded draft was in fact no such thing.176 Robert Wylie, who was a member of both committees appointed to draw up the draft address, is believed to be the author. While the title does describe it as the humble representation of the commission, the document is far more wide-ranging in the issues it deals with than those occupying the minds of the committee drafting the address. There are issues in the document such as toleration, not covered in the second address or the instructions given to the committee. It is inconceivable that the committee drafting the address would have gone beyond those instructions by including issues not first debated and agreed upon by the commission. The document appears more likely to be a draft of Wylie’s pamphlet published in response to parliament’s overture for an act for securing the church.177 Far from being watered down, the address contained the three most controversial issues of concern to the church, while some of the least controversial ones were left out. Furthermore, the process by which the address was formulated worked against any attempt to dilute the content. The address was put to a vote and approved by a large majority, a majority, as one observer remarked, that included all but three of those considered to be of ‘moderate principles’. Such was the majority, they could have included more than six

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articles had they wanted to. The committee appointed to draft the commission’s response to the two most controversial articles, concerning the oath of abjuration and the constitution of a British parliament consisted of four ministers and three elders. The committee included Wylie and had a built in ministerial majority. It had the ideal opportunity to produce a strongly worded draft in relation to the two articles. Yet it did not. Its draft was accepted and was included in the address, with all four ministers voting in its favour. Despite government hostility and threats of dire consequences for the church should the address be presented, the commission stood firm and presented the address. In so doing, it believed it was acting out of principle in the interests of the church and for the exoneration of their consciences.178 NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Acts of the General Assembly, p. 398. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 274: John Logan to Mar, 27 August 1706. NAS, GD406/1/9747: Robert Wylie to Hamilton, 1 July 1706. NAS, GD406/1/9747. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 274: John Logan to Mar, 27 August 1706. NAS, GD406/1/9747: Wylie to Hamilton, 1 July 1706. NAS, GD406/1/9747. Ridpath, The Reducing of Scotland by arms, pp. 12, 20; Ridpath, Considerations upon the Union of the two Kingdoms, p. 42. See also Whole Works of the late Reverend Thomas Boston, IV, p. 327. Ridpath, Considerations upon the Union, pp. 43–4. Hodges, The rights and interests of two British monarchies . . . Treatise III, pp. 53–4; Ridpath, Considerations upon the Union, p. 43; ‘The Trimmer’, p. 245; A Voice from the North; NLS, Wodrow Folio XXVIII, fos 208–9: Robert Wylie, A Letter Concerning Union (1707), pp. 3–6. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 274; Miscellany of the Abbotsford Club, I, p. 384: Ridpath to Alexander Wodrow, 23 February 1706; NLS, Wodrow Folio XXVIII, fos 208–9: Robert Wylie, A Letter Concerning Union (1707), pp. 5–6. Wylie, A letter from a Member of the Commission of the Late General Assembly, p. 6. NAS, GD18/2092, Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708. A Voice from the North. Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, p. 11; The Restoration of Epsicopacy in Scotland, pp. 4, 7; The Queen an Empress, pp. 27–31. Ridpath, A Discourse upon the Union, pp. 56–8. The Restoration of Episcopacy in Scotland, pp. 4, 7.

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18. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 94; Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 221. 19. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 269: James Erskine to Mar, 11 July 1706; NAS, GD124/15/413/9: James Erskine to Mar, 20 July 1706. 20. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 220–3. 21. Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, p. 229. 22. Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 132. 23. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 226. 24. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 247. 25. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 281. 26. NAS, GD406/1/7251: Charles Earl of Selkirk to Hamilton, 2 September 1706; GD406/1/7138: Anne Duchess of Hamilton to Hamilton, 25 September 1706; GD406/1/9747: Wylie to Hamilton, 1 July 1706. 27. Letters of George Lockhart, p. 36: Lockhart to Hamilton, 1 August 1706; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 94. 28. NAS, GD406/1/7251: Earl of Selkirk to Duke of Hamilton, 2 September 1706. 29. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 274: John Logan to Mar, 27 August 1706. 30. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XXX, fo. 269: Hodges to Wylie, 21 September 1706. 31. MS Murray 650/651, Vol. I, No. 75: Carstares to Stirling, 23 April 1706. 32. NAS, CH1/3/8: Register of the Acts of the Commission of the General Assembly 1705–6, p. 161. 33. Scotland’s Ruine, p. 141; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and Ireland, p. 95. 34. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 211. 35. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 226. 36. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 226; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 52: Passages on life of John Bell, minister at Gladsmuir in the Presbytery of Haddington. 37. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 353. 38. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 52. 39. NAS, GD406/1/7251: Earl of Selkirk to Hamilton, 2 September 1706; A Speech in season against the Union, p. 7. 40. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 227; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 52. 41. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 52v; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 98. 42. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fos 52–3; NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 227. For a detailed discussion of the fasting question and the tradition of fasting in the Reformed Church in Scotland, see Stephen, ‘National Fasting and the Politics of Prayer’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History (forthcoming 2009). 43. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 230. Attendance was twenty-two ministers and twenty elders. Of the eleven new faces among the ruling elders, seven were in the Court Party. 44. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 231; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 53.

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‘And the Gates of Hell Shall Not Prevail Against Her’ 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

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NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 53. NAS, CH1/3/8, pp. 231–3. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 342, 24 October 1706. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, p. 757: Harley to Carstares, 7 January 1707. MS Murray 650/651, Vol. III, No. 20: J. Shute to Stirling, 18 November 1706. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 234. APS, XI, p. 307; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 99. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fos 236, 259. Ibid., fo. 259. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 120. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 102: Robert Wodrow to James Wodrow, 2 November 1706; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 298, 302. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 100: Wodrow to his father, 1 November 1706. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 343: Defoe to Harley, 29 October 1706. Logan, A Sermon preach’d before his Grace James Duke of Queensberry, pp. 11–12. Ibid., pp. 12–13. NAS, CH1/3/8, pp. 265, 258–9. For the committee, see Appendix to this volume; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 101. NAS, CH1/3/8, pp. 259–60. For additions to the committee, see Appendix to this volume. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 265. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 101. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, pp. 98–9. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 100; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 53. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 101. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 27. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 101; NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 27. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 101; NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 27. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 267; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 101. For the committee, see Appendix to this volume. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 267. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 274. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 274; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 59. Jones, Country and Court, pp. 322–4. NAS, GD406/1/5389: JB to Hamilton, 18 April 1706. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 274.

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77. Webster, Lawful prejudices against an incorporating union with England, p. 7. 78. Alexander Stobo to the Presbytery of Edinburgh, 3 May 1705, quoted in Scotland and the Americas, p. 254. 79. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 58. 80. NAS, GD406/1/5389: JB to Hamilton, 18 April 1706. 81. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 103. 82. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 267; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 103. 83. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 61r and v. See also NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 56, and Some Reasons by a Divine of the Kirk of Scotland, proving that their Clergy there cannot with a safe conscience Swear the English Oath of Abjuration (1707). 84. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, pp. 250–1. 85. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 61r and v. 86. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 103; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 62. 87. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 62; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 103. 88. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fos 62–3. 89. Ibid., fos 62–3; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 103. The assembly they were referring to was held in 1638. 90. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fos 62–3; NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 56. 91. An Answer to Some Queries &c., Relative to the Union, p. 4; Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 258–9; HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 395: Defoe to Harley, 18 March 1707; Defoe, Two great questions considered . . . Being a sixth essay at removing national prejudices against the union. See also the dispute between two Church of Scotland ministers, James Webster and William Adams. The dispute arose after the treaty had been ratified. Webster argued that union was inconsistent with the covenants and Adams argued that it was not and that the civil powers of churchmen were declared unlawful by the 1639 Assembly, some time after the signing of the Covenant. As there was no national signing of the Covenant after 1639, therefore there was no national subscription to a covenant abjuring churchmen holding civil office. Webster, Lawful prejudices against an incorporating union with England (1707); The author of the Lawful prejudices against an incorporating union with England, defended . . . (1707); A second defence of the lawful prejudices . . . (1707); Adams, A letter from the country containing some remarks concerning the National Covenant and Solemn League . . . (1707); A second letter from the country, in vindication of the former concerning the National Covenant and Solemn League . . . (1707). 92. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 130. 93. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, pp. 271–2.

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94. Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae, III, p. 186. 95. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fos 91–2. 96. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 160: James McDougall from Mearns, in the Presbytery of Paisley, to Robert Wodrow, 30 November 1706. 97. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 103. 98. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 103v. 99. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 267. 100. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 229. 101. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 269. See Appendix to this volume. 102. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 104v. 103. Ibid., fo. 105. 104. Ibid., fo. 105. 105. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 64. 106. Ibid., fo. 64; NAS, GD18/2092: Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708, 7 Nov 1706. 107. NAS, CH1/3/8, pp. 272–3; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fos 64–5; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 105. 108. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 65; NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 28: Newsletter, 11 November 1706. 109. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 315: Mar to Sir David Nairne, 7 November 1706 110. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 28. 111. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 228. Biggar; CH1/2/5/4, fo. 230. Dunfermline; CH1/2/5/4, fo. 233. Glasgow; CH1/2/5/4, fo. 252. Lanark; CH1/2/5/4, fo. 253. Stirling; CH1/2/5/4, fo. 255. Sanquhar; CH1/2/5/4, fo. 265. Hamilton; CH1/3/8, pp. 301–2. 112. NAS, CH1/3/8, pp. 276–7; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 64v, 65; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 106. For the representation, see NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 235. 113. Mitchell, Humble Pleadings for the Good Old Ways, p. 104. 114. The Smoaking Flax, pp. 2, 22. 115. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 64v. 116. Ibid., fos 65r and v. 117. Rose, A Selection from the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, III, pp. 423–6; The Lord Belhaven’s Speech in Parliament the 15th Day of November 1706 on the second article of the Treaty (1706). 118. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 346; Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 144. 119. Defoe’s Review, 30 November 1706. 120. NAS, GD220/5/101/16: Nairne to Rothes, 12 November 1706. 121. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 320: Nairne to Mar, 14 November 1706. 122. MS Murray 650/651, Vol. III, No. 21: J. Shute to Stirling, 17 December 1706. 123. Ibid.; NAS, GD220/101/17: Nairne to Rothes, 14 November 1706. 124. APS, XI, p. 312. 125. APS, XI, pp. 313–16.

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scottish presbyterians and the act of union 1707 APS, XI, p. 316. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 65. Overture for an Act for the Security of the Church (1706). NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 65v. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 314: Mar to Nairne, 5 November 1706; Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 149. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 314: Mar to Nairne, 5 November 1706; p.318: Mar to Nairne, 12 November 1706. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 62. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 66; NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 28; Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 110. APS, XI, p. 320. APS, XI, p. 320. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 319: Mar to Nairne, 12 November 1706. APS, XI, pp. 402–3. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 348: Stair to Harley, 12 November 1706. APS, XI, p. 433; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, pp. 120–1; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 110. Macinnes, ‘The 1707 Union: Support and Opposition’, p. 152; Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 12; Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p. 195. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 120. APS, XI, p. 295. NAS, GD18/2092: Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708, 7 November 1706. Ibid. Ibid. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 348. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, p. 751: Leven to Carstares, 27 April 1706. Ibid., p.750: Stair to Carstares, 26 April 1706. Miscellany of the Abbotsford Club, p. 302; M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, p. 750: Stair to Carstares, 26 April 1706. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, pp. 750–2: Stair to Carstares, 26 April 1706, and Leven to Carstares, 27 April 1706; Wylie, The Insecurity of a Printed Overture, pp. 1–2. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, pp. 750–2: Stair to Carstares, 26 April 1706, and Leven to Carstares, 27 April 1706. Ibid., p. 754: Leven to Carstares, 11 June 1706. Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, p. 167. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, p. 752: Leven to Carstares, 27 April 1706. Miscellany of the Abbotsford Club, p. 392. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, p. 752.

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157. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 250: Carstares to Harley, 24 October 1706. 158. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, p. 751: Stair to Carstares, 26 April 1706. 159. NAS, GD26/136/3: Leven to Earl of Melville, 30 April 1706. 160. Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 95. 161. APS, XI, pp. 305–6; Her Majesty’s most gracious Letter to the Parliament of Scotland. With the Lord High Commissioner and the Lord High Chancellor’s Speeches relating to the Union (1706). 162. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, pp. 750–1: Stair to Carstares, 26 April 1706. 163. HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 302: Mar to Godolphin, 26 October 1706; pp. 309–11: Mar to Nairne, 3 November 1706. 164. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 98. 165. Letters Relating to Scotland in the Reign of Queen Anne, p. 96; Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, p. 167. 166. Letters Relating to Scotland in the Reign of Queen Anne, p. 101. 167. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 250: Carstares to Harley, 24 October 1706. 168. Letters Relating to Scotland in the Reign of Queen Anne, p. 101; HMC Laing, II, p. 136. 169. Memoirs of the life of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik p. 65. 170. Rose, A Selection of Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, III, p. 313: Marchmont to Somers, 17 January 1707. 171. HMC Duke of Roxburgh, p. 158. 172. Letters relating to Scotland in the Reign of Queen Anne, p. 99; HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 309: Mar to Nairne, 3 November 1706. 173. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 76v; Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, p. 257. 174. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 259. 175. Bowie, ‘Public Opinion’, pp. 245–6. 176. Ibid., p. 246. 177. Compare NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fos 53–5, with Robert Wylie, The Insecurity of a Printed Overture. 178. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 76v.

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3 ‘Upon the Watchtower of This Church’: The Commission of the General Assembly

The act for the security of the church has generally been seen as something of a watershed. Its passing marked a falling away of the church hostility that had initially greeted the treaty. John Clerk claimed that ‘in the churches by and large the trumpets of sedition began to fall silent’. George Lockhart recorded that ministerial zeal quickly cooled ‘and many of them quite chang’d their Notes, and preach’d up, what not long before they had declar’d anathema’s against’.1 These reflections have greatly influenced the perspectives of historians who have described the act as Queensberry’s ‘master-stroke’ that ‘drew the teeth of the opposition’, and that after its passing the Kirk ‘ceased openly to oppose’ the union.2 The act is said to have neutralised the institutional leadership of the Kirk, leaving the presbyteries and parishes to articulate Presbyterian antiunionism.3 The observations of Clerk and Lockhart had an element of truth to them. However, complaints about ministers preaching against union continued after the act was passed; such preaching was not necessarily seditious and it should not be assumed that union was denounced from every pulpit (see Chapter 5). Nor should it come as a surprise that some of those pulpits where objections were raised to the treaty fell silent following the passing of the act. That was the point of the legislation. The church, unhappy at the lack of security in the treaty, insisted on it. The government passed the act in an attempt to placate the church. Pulpits began to fall silent because the act, while not containing every point the commission had asked for, went a long way to satisfying the concerns of many ministers. The church had the security it demanded in the event of a union and there was still time for the commission to press for and secure further concessions. As George Lockhart, one of the Kirk’s severest critics, acknowledged, ‘many of the well-meaning brethren were, or seemed satisfied with this act’. The observation of John Logan, minister at Alloa, that ‘much of the heat about and clamour against the union in this country is abated’ became widespread.4 The church’s enemies, not

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wanting to waste an opportunity to attack it, accused it of selling out. It was claimed that while the people stood firm in their opposition to union, ministers were guilty of a base betrayal of their country’s interests. They were described as time-servers who had no concern for their country’s or their people’s liberties, only for themselves and their stipends, and of having lost much of their reputation among their people. The church was accused of having willingly gone into union and that the commission had sought nothing more than an act for the church’s security.5 Despite this apparent abatement of hostility to the treaty, two crucial points need to be remembered. The commission as the representative and executive body of the church was not silenced or neutralised as a consequence of the act, and the focus of church opposition and activity did not pass from the commission to the presbyteries. The commission never saw its second address as the last word on the matter. After the address was approved on 7 November, and before it was presented to Queensberry, the commission created a new committee for the security of the church, with the remit to consider what further necessary measures might be proposed for the church’s security.6 One of its first tasks was to meet with members of parliament to discuss possible additions to the overture for the act for the security of the church prior to its passing.7 On 14 November, subsequent to the passing of the act, the committee informed the commission that it had met with members of parliament and that there were a number of additional issues about which it would prepare a report. By 18 November the report was still not ready and the following day the committee was merged with the Committee for Public Affairs.8 DEALING WITH DISSENT: THE THIRD ADDRESS AND RULING ELDERS

In the days immediately following the approval of the second address, the commission focused upon its response to the dissent of the ruling elders and concerns about Episcopal disorders and the spread of Catholicism in the north.9 Its concerns were expressed in an address presented to parliament on 15 November. The commission complained about the ‘lamentable increase of popery’, and the bold and unrestrained insolence of popish priests who kept public mass before multitudes who flocked to them as if they were in a popish country. It complained of the education of children at home or abroad in popish principles and the inter-marriage of papists with Protestants, both contrary to the laws of the nation.10 It was unhappy that despite efforts since the Revolution to suppress impiety and profaneness, both had increased to the scandal of

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the reformed religion. Finally, in a reference to the ongoing debate on the union, the commission complained that Episcopalians were introducing the forms of worship contained in the English service book, a form of worship hitherto unknown in Scotland even under Episcopal regimes. It hinted that this might have been as a result of interference from some in the Church of England, and that such interference had been attempted and resented in the past. It was a reminder to parliament of the commission’s already well-expressed fears about such influence in the event of a union and the need to be secured against it. It also complained that Episcopalians were intruding into vacant churches, performing irregular marriages and generally ignoring sentences of suspension by church courts or deprivation by the Privy Council and parliament. The commission suspected that both Catholics and Episcopalians were being supported and encouraged by the Jacobites. It insisted that the ‘lamentable’ circumstances of which it complained were not the result of the lack of good laws, but the failure to execute existing legislation. It asked for a stricter enforcement of existing laws and the enactment of new legislation. In particular it urged parliament ‘utterly to Extinguish the Hopes of a Popish Successor, and to Establish the Succession of the Crown in the Protestant Line’.11 The address was presented to parliament on the day it was debating the succession in the second article of the treaty (see Chapter 6). It seems unlikely that the address was an attempt to influence the debate either way. The church had frequently urged parliament to settle the succession in the Protestant line and eliminate the prospect of a Stuart restoration. The address was well received by the government and helped heal the rift caused by the second address. As Defoe put it, ‘This is a Healer but does not fully Recompense the folly of their last’.12 Meanwhile, it was claimed that the Jacobites, who had been given a lift by the second address and who had praised the church as ‘a company of honest men and true patriots for the liberty of their country’, were given a ‘deadly thrust’.13 On 15 November the ruling elders who had protested against the second address finally presented their written dissent to the commission. Considering their political affiliations, the views contained within the protestation might reasonably be seen as those of the court. The dissent contained five points. 1. The commission had already petitioned the parliament for the security of its doctrine, worship, discipline and church government and had received assurances from parliament that everything necessary for that security would be done before a treaty was concluded. They argued that the commission could rely upon this assurance because many members

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of the commission were also members of parliament and would certainly take great care of the church’s interests. To pursue that address further before they knew what steps parliament was likely to take may be interpreted as jealousy and diffidence on the part of the commission. 2. The parliament had voted on 15 October to proceed to the consideration of the articles. The elders believed that presenting a second address was likely to impede the house in its procedure and delay consideration of the first address by raising more questions and debates. They declared that presenting the second address was neither decent nor suitable to the prudence of the commission. 3. They argued that the sixth article of the address covered matters that were outwith the commission’s sphere of business prescribed to it by the general assembly, namely that it objected to the constitution of the English parliament. Furthermore, by reflecting upon and challenging the civil policy and government of England, it was effectively blaming and condemning the Scottish parliament for negotiating a union with a kingdom thus constituted. 4. The elders argued that, whatever the constitution of England was now or Britain was to be after union, bishops or not, the present legal establishment of the Church of Scotland was unalterable. The status of the church was outwith the bounds of the treaty, which covered civil affairs and government. Furthermore, the church would be further secured when the commission’s first address was taken into consideration. 5. Finally, on 4 November parliament voted through the first article approving of a union of Scotland and England with the provision that if any subsequent articles were rejected, that vote would not be binding. The elders argued that it would be of a dangerous consequence to table an address that ‘may admit of a construction opposite to that vote in parliament’, in other words one that could result in the rejection of any article or an amendment to an article that led to the rejection of the treaty in England.14 William Carstares and George Meldrum met the elders to find out if they would insist on recording their dissent, in which case the commission would be obliged to prepare a response.15 In anticipation of the dissent being recorded, four ministers were appointed to draw up a vindication of the commission.16 The commission recorded its disappointment that the elder’s original opposition to the sixth article had increased to the extent that they now dissented from the whole address. Critical of this shift, it reminded the elders that they previously agreed to the first three articles of the address. It added that, had the elders thought more carefully about the address, they would have realised that there were no

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grounds for them to have been so severe in their criticisms of it or the commission. As far as the commission was concerned, the first address was general while the second was a humble representation of some particulars they wanted parliament to consider when it resumed debate on the first address. While some of those issues had been addressed in the act securing the church, it hoped the others would be considered in due course. Turning to the sixth article, which had been the most contentious and the focus of the elders’ dissent, the commission rejected all of their accusations. It defended taking a vote on the grounds that after a lengthy debate there had been no unanimity; a vote was necessary to reach a decision. It rejected accusations that it had exceeded its sphere of business and had raised objections to the constitution of the English parliament. It reminded the elders that during the debate commissioners had insisted that while they could not agree with such a constitution, they did not intend meddling with the constitution of the parliament of England, as the parliament of England. It felt it had every right to discuss or object to such a constitution if it was the constitution of Britain, of which it was to be a part. Furthermore, it insisted that it had not objected to negotiating with the English parliament, nor did it blame the Scottish parliament for doing so. It finished by reiterating that it was inconsistent with its known principles and covenants that churchmen hold civil office, such as that held by the bishops in the House of Lords and to which it would be subjected should union take place.17 The response was not as forceful as some would have liked. Wodrow described it as an apology rather than an answer and that it was acquiesced in for the sake of peace within the commission.18 In the end, it was never needed. The elders declined the opportunity of officially recording their dissent.19 They offered no explanation, but it was probably due to the fact that tempers had been allowed to cool, that they had made their point and the act for securing the church had been passed, making their dissent unnecessary. LOBBYING PARLIAMENT: THE COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The Committee for Public Affairs had continued to identify issues of concern to the church and to lobby members of parliament in the hope of securing further concessions to those granted in the recent act. On 11 December it reported on its efforts thus far and recommended drawing up a list of specific issues that could be left with members of parliament after the committee had spoken to them. William Carstares, John Stirling, George Meldrum and Patrick Cumming were appointed to draw

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up a report.20 The following day the committee presented a draft memorandum for members of parliament. The document repeated four areas of concern already raised by the commission: 1. Its request for a fixed court to do the work of the commission for the plantation of kirks and valuation of teinds. 2. That the terms of any abjuration oath required of Scots should be plain and clear without reference to English statutes not known to them and that what was being sworn was to be expressly stated in the oath and agreeable to the principles of the church. 3. It repeated its request that Scotsmen ought to be capable of gaining places of power and trust in all places of Britain without any obligation to take the sacramental test. 4. It asked that, in the event of the union being concluded, for preserving the peace of the nation and redressing the grievances of the church, the Privy Council should either be continued or some other court established to judge causes previously done by the council and with which the church may correspond on issues such as national fasts and thanksgivings. The committee also raised the new issue of royal supremacy over the church. It stated that, in the past, sovereigns had claimed ecclesiastical supremacy, with sad consequences for the church, and that it was an encroachment upon the prerogatives of Christ the head and king of the church. Although now happily rescinded, it wanted legal assurances that no such supremacy would be resumed after union.21 This point was born out of the Kirk’s concern about the possible erastian consequences of union. Stuart monarchs had imposed royal supremacy on the church the previous century, but it had been abolished at the Revolution.22 However, the Church of England was still subject to an act of supremacy that made the reigning monarch its head and supreme governor. The raising of the issue of supremacy at this point suggests that the commission was already coming to terms with the reality of union. It expected union to take place and was seeking assurances that the royal supremacy over the Church of England would not be extended to the Church of Scotland. A notable point about the memorandum was the omission of the most controversial article in the second address: that of the twenty-six bishops sitting in the House of Lords being inconsistent with the covenants and principles of the church. No reason is given for the omission, but it seems likely that the commission wanted to avoid the divisions and disputes that surrounded the second address. It believed that, having made its point for the exoneration of commissioners’ consciences both in the address and in its response to the dissent of the ruling elders, it was unnecessary to make the point again. It may have concluded that there was no chance

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of securing such a concession and therefore leaving out the article may have been calculated to improve its chances of securing any or all of the other points by not antagonising the government. It may also reflect the composition of the committee. The draft was unanimously approved and copies were to be given to members of parliament. Commissioners were instructed to discuss the issues with members of parliament of their acquaintance. By continuing to pursue those unresolved issues, the commission was reflecting a general feeling within the church that while the act for the security of the church was welcome, there were issues yet to be resolved for the ‘further’ security of the church. The Presbytery of Dunfermline urged the commission to press for further securities and said if they could not be obtained, and union went ahead, the commission should protest in the name of the church that the security it had was insufficient. Lanark acknowledged the security granted in the act, but complained it did not go far enough and urged parliament to re-consider the commission’s second address. The church now had a degree of security but had not received all that it had asked for. Not all of the issues were about security; some were about the effective functioning of the church. The opposition, whether concerned for the church or not, tried to block the treaty by insisting that the act was insufficient and that the church had no security at all.23 Responding to the government’s publication of its overture for the security of the church, Robert Wylie had argued that there was an insufficient security in its provisions. He attacked it as a ‘parliamentary abdication, a frank surrender’, that would result in the ‘nation’s utter beggary’. According to Wylie, the Church of Scotland already had the best and strongest legal security in the Claim of Right and in the various acts of parliament passed since 1689. It had more security than ever before. Wylie argued that the limitations placed upon commissioners negotiating the treaty, with regard to the church, should not have prevented them from negotiating security as an article of the treaty. In this they had failed, and the treaty as it stood not only contained no security for the Kirk, it also provided security for the Church of England in the qualification upon successors to the crown that they must be of the Church of England. The implications of the commission’s address and parliament’s overture merely confirmed that the church was not secure; the church was in danger. If the solid foundations it currently enjoyed in an independent Scotland were to be replicated in a Great Britain, the utmost care had to be taken to ensure that a similar and substantial security replaced it. The purpose of the act was to rectify the omission of the commissioners. The point of the pamphlet was to examine whether or

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not the security being offered in the overture met such a requirement. As the final act was not substantially different from the overture, these criticisms can be applied to it. Wylie discussed issues pursued by the commission, such as the operation of the sacramental test, the application of oaths and a court for the plantation of churches. However, he also complained that union undermined Presbyterianism because it undermined the Claim of Right, which was the legal foundation of Presbyterian church government. Furthermore, the overture failed to confirm other acts of parliament relating to the church’s security and did not repeal laws that had remained on the statute books at the Revolution and that were inconsistent with its security. Wylie questioned what security the church would have in a union in which their parliament, constitution and the management of their civil and religious affairs were subject to the English parliament. It would be obliged to submit to whatever a British parliament decided and had no authoritative body to guarantee its separate rights or protect those rights when they were infringed. Wylie warned that union would inevitably lead to toleration within Scotland for Episcopalians. Worse still, he argued that the terms of the overture allowing the worship, discipline, doctrine and government to continue to the people of this kingdom in all succeeding generations was not inconsistent with the reduction of the legal establishment of Presbyterian church government in Scotland to a legal toleration in Britain. Furthermore, the obligation that Presbyterian church government would be the only church government within the kingdom of Scotland could end when Scotland ceased to be an independent kingdom after union. Wylie concluded by insisting that the fundamental constitution and privileges of parliament could not be abrogated or changed without the universal consent of members of parliament and of those from whom they received their commission, the electorate. Any parliament that enslaved its nation to a foreign power could have its actions overturned by the people in a subsequent election. Their commission did not empower them to ordain that there should be no further parliaments in which such an action could be taken. If they exceeded their commission, it rendered their actions null and void. Members could only administer power devolved upon them; if they went beyond their mandate, their acts are null and void. Wylie reiterated that no treaty or union should be concluded until the general assembly was called. The assembly had an unquestionable right to be consulted on the issue, especially in relation to church security. There should be no treaty until the reasonable part of the nation was convinced that it was honourable, advantageous and safe.24 The opposition, right

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to the end of the debate, used the arguments raised by Wylie. Among the further securities urged by James Webster was a requirement upon all members of a British parliament to swear that they shall not move nor vote in parliament for any alteration to presbytery. One writer claimed he would have been happy to have embraced union had the church been sufficiently secured. If that our church had fully been secured And if that we had finallie procur’d Establishment, we should not have gainstood The work, had it been for religious good. We say again had we been finallie Establish’t in this bond of unitie Had this but of these articles been one Which now this present treaty built upon That Scotland’s Kirk should evermore enjoy Her Presbyterie without the least annoy, Then should we rest contented and our cares Should banished have been and all our fears, But when we see that this do’s take no place, But that our church lyes open to disgrace, When it shall please a British Parliament, Her sorrows to renew and woes Fomment, How can we but suspect the worst when we All other things secured so well do see. 25

Claims that the church was insufficiently secured were firmly rejected. An exasperated Defoe complained that the ‘lenity of the government is taken as fear, and the kirk is stark mad that they have, as they say, no security and that their articles are rejected’.26 On 28 November he attacked the commission: ‘This terrible people the churchmen have not yet done, they have now in debate a protestation against the Act of Security as insufficient. God Almighty open their eyes.’27 There is no record of any debate in the commission at that time about protesting against the act as insufficient. On 28 November, the commission debated its response to the dissent of the ruling elders. Nevertheless, Defoe worked hard to persuade Presbyterians that they had sufficient security. English dissenters, who generally supported union, were encouraged to write to Presbyterians. They expressed surprise at the reaction of some Presbyterians whom they described as well meaning but ‘unenlightened and ill-informed’ about the union. They said of the union settlement, ‘we cannot see how all the policy of man could devise for you a more substantial security’. Presbyterians were reminded of their former precarious position and

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how their establishment had been overturned in previous regimes. Now the church’s security was such that it could not be touched because it was ‘Establisht upon a lasting, an Indissolvable, and an Unalterable Foundation’.28 Even within the church, the change among the ministry after the act suggested that many saw the security it offered as real enough and the consensus at the 1707 Assembly was that the church had never been so secure. Efforts to obtain further securities for the church had so far proved unsuccessful. Nevertheless, as the work of its committees and its memorial of 12 December demonstrate, the commission was at the forefront of efforts to have those issues redressed. Once again the commission focused upon behind-the-scenes lobbying of members of parliament. A memorandum for Thomas Linning, Robert Wodrow and William Thomson on 9 December instructed them to speak to the Earls of Glencairn, Hopetoun and Islay, Lords Cranston, Semple, Torpichen and Viscount Duplin. They were also instructed to lobby the shire and burgh representatives from their respective presbyteries and any other representatives with whom they were acquainted. They were to urge members to grant the church, as articles in the treaty, the concessions it sought for its further security.29 The lobbying gave Robert Wodrow little cause for hope. On 14 December he told his father, ‘I wish the commission had grounds to say ye ch of Scot are in no danger but I think our danger grows every day.’ On 19 December the commission urged the public affairs committee and the members of the commission to continue to lobby members of parliament about the issues contained within the memorial.30 The following day the committee outlined its efforts and reported that of those members of parliament targeted, four had been approached, all of whom had given the encouraging response that parliament may act on some of the articles but not the sacramental test. The committee expressed concern at the apparent lack of contact between commissioners and members of parliament. It was decided that committee members better known to the government should be appointed to make contact with them. It was hoped that this approach would open doors that seem to have been hitherto closed. The committee appointed the Edinburgh ministers William Carstares, David Blair, George Meldrum, William Wishart, Patrick Cumming, Thomas Wilkie and John Stirling of Glasgow University. All were leading figures in the church and well known to many members of parliament.31 Among those targeted by the committee were Queensberry, Seafield, Argyll, Rothes, Stair, Marchmont, Mar, Loudon, Glasgow, Jerviswood, the Lord President and Lord Justice Clerk, Annandale, Leven and Roxburgh – essentially, those

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in parliament who mattered and who had influence; predominately supporters of union and members of the Court Party and Squadrone Volante, but also leading opponents such as Annandale. This strategy proved to be more successful. The following Monday it was reported that several members of parliament had been contacted and had promised to do their utmost to secure the church’s interests. Subsequent committee meetings discussed these contacts, as well as identifying who had yet to be approached. By the end of December the committee took its lobbying a step further by appointing committee members to target specific members of parliament. Carstares was appointed to speak to Queensberry, Seafield and Mar. David Blair was given Montrose, Marchmont and Glasgow. Patrick Cumming was allocated the Lord Justice Clerk.32 On 31 December the committee reported that it had met with and discussed its concerns with various members of parliament, and had delivered copies of its memorial. It is clear that the commission was neither silent nor idle, but was involved in persistent lobbying at the highest level and that the lobbying was undertaken by some of its most influential members. The commission also read out letters received from the presbyteries of Stirling and Glasgow that contained several points both presbyteries felt ought to be pursued in relation to the church’s security.33 After some discussion, the commission agreed, as it had in relation to all similar letters from presbyteries, that they contained nothing materially new. All issues mentioned by Stirling and Glasgow had been and were currently being addressed by the commission.34 The letters also prompted a lengthy debate on the question of attendance at the commission. It was moved that the commission should write to the presbyteries urging them to take care, in obedience to the acts of assembly and the commission’s former letters, to ensure their representatives attend the commission. The aim was to impress upon the presbyteries the importance of the issues at stake in order that they may contribute advice and assistance to the commission’s efforts towards furthering the church’s security.35 Attendance had never been high and the commission had been forced on a number of occasions to remind presbyteries of their duty to send members to the commission at such a critical time. A total of 222 members had been appointed to the commission, 143 ministers and 79 ruling elders. The highest attendance of any session was 98 (60 ministers and 38 elders), which took place on 8 November when the commission approved the second address.36 Thereafter attendances fell away as ministers, for various reasons, went back to their parishes. Many took copies of the addresses with them. The problem for the commission was that they

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either failed to return or to be replaced by their presbyteries. The commission had to deal with frequent letters from ministers asking to be excused attendance and on 28 November expressed its annoyance at such absences.37 On 24 December, worried at the declining numbers, the commission insisted that ministers at the commission would not be allowed to leave until others from their presbytery had relieved them.38 One possible explanation for the absences may have been the particularly bad weather. It rained from the end of harvest to the beginning of December, and some of the ‘ancient farmers’ observed that they had not seen such bad weather since the time of the Engagement.39 Even those members in Edinburgh during that time did not always attend. Many of the ruling elders only attended crucial sessions in an attempt to swing the debate in favour of their political masters. The Duke of Atholl was a member of the commission, but as a leader of the opposition made no attempt through attendance or participation in its debates to influence the commission against the union. He failed to attend a single session. The declining numbers and the failure of presbyteries to send commissioners to Edinburgh could be attributed to the passing of the act securing the church. With the immediate and major concerns over security having been dealt with, presbyteries may have felt that those remaining at the commission would adequately deal with the issues for its further security. However, poor attendance could only damage the work of the commission. Its increasing efforts to secure concessions were being placed on an ever-decreasing number of commissioners. It was also likely to send out the wrong message. The government could interpret the failure of presbyteries to send commissioners to Edinburgh as a sign that they were happy with measures already taken to secure the church, and consequently use that as a reason for not granting further concessions. It could also claim that the views of the ‘firebrands’ from Hamilton and Lanark were unrepresentative of the church. As far as the government was concerned, a small commission was easier to deal with. It had less leverage and, if necessary, should anything controversial arise, the court could overwhelm the ministers by packing sessions with ruling elders. The failure of the presbyteries to ensure a well-attended commission, and their failure to heed the letters of the commission, may suggest a lack of concern at presbytery level about the church’s security now that it had an act of parliament for that purpose. It would seem that far from being at the forefront of agitation against the treaty or for further securities, presbyteries took a back seat. It could have been a lack of radicalism, possibly even a degree of apathy, but it was more likely because they were content to follow the lead of the commission and those already in

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Edinburgh. It was decided that, having written frequently to presbyteries with regard to attendance, another letter was unnecessary. They still had a quorum and there was nothing new to justify an extraordinary calling of members. There was also a feeling that writing to the presbyteries would be fruitless anyway and lead to disputes.40 Those who submitted the motion in the first place would have been disappointed because a wellattended commission would possibly have had greater influence. The motion was considered by some as an ill-natured attempt to ‘review the debates and, if possible, to bring the commission to protest and declare itself against the union.’41 The hope was that an influx of ministers from the country would influence the debates in favour of such a declaration. One of the issues about which the commission pressed the hardest was the sacramental test. It consistently urged, without success, an exemption from it for Scots outwith Scotland. On 31 December the opposition in parliament also failed to secure an exemption through a clause added to the eighteenth article. The article stated that the laws regulating trade, customs and excise would be the same in both countries after union. All Scottish laws not inconsistent with union would remain in force after union, but alterable by a British parliament. Laws of public right, policy and civil government would also be uniform across the kingdoms. The government rejected the clause on the grounds that parliament had voted on 12 November against adding a similar clause to the act for securing the church.42 During late December and early January, the commission was working on a Scottish alternative to the test. An oath and formula was devised by which no person could hold offices or places of public trust unless they adhered to the doctrine, discipline, worship and government of the Church of Scotland. The formula was to be held as a fundamental article and essential condition of any treaty and was to be offered to the government for its consideration. The opportunity came during the protracted debate on the twenty-second article that outlined Scotland’s representation in the House of Commons and House of Lords, and the oaths required of those who sit there. On 9 January an overture proposed adding the clause that as long as the sacramental test continued in force in England, ‘all persons in publick trust within the limits of Scotland shall swear and sign a formula thereto subjoined in manner and under the penalties therein mentioned’.43 The overture failed, as did an attempt to obtain an exemption from the abjuration oath contained in the article. The failure came as a bitter disappointment. Not only because the test could be a barrier to advancement for Presbyterians, but also because it meant that ‘the greatest Enemies to Presbytrie among the English Church, who deny the Lawfulness of our Ministers Ordination,

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should be capable to enjoy any place within Scotland’.44 The disappointment was made more acute because many on the commission believed that the court was drawing up its own test.45 On 7 January George Meldrum produced a letter from the Presbytery of Skye urging the necessity of having a court established for the plantation of kirks and valuation of teinds. Apart from its address, this was an issue the commission had raised in three private applications, as well as in its recent lobbying. A small committee was appointed to look at what further might be done.46 The committee reported that the Lord Advocate had offered to prepare overtures to present to parliament, which it considered the best means of furthering its ends.47 Stewart pressed the case of the commission with members of parliament, and very probably with Queensberry and Seafield.48 He told the commission of the ‘difficulties in obtaining the things desired’, but also offered to support them with advice. The quest for a court for the valuation of tiends and plantation of kirks finally proved successful and it was granted on 21 February 1707.49 Meanwhile, the commission nominated another committee to lobby the government about the outstanding issues of concern.50 The committee reported that, despite its efforts, it had been unable to speak to all those it would have liked. The commission urged members to continue their efforts with ‘all diligence’.51 Aware that parliament was drawing near to ratification of the treaty, and that they still had much to secure, the commission displayed an increasing sense of urgency in its repeated requests to members to be diligent in lobbying. PRESBYTERIAN PERSEVERANCE: ANOTHER ADDRESS?

Having expected some concessions, the commission was disappointed that it had so far secured nothing in addition to what had been conceded in the act for the security of the church. There were rumours that, before it ratified the treaty, parliament was going to set aside a day in which it would deal with church grievances and its further security but this was just wishful thinking.52 Their fruitless endeavours prompted some, on 14 January, to call for the commission to present another address to parliament upon the same particulars as those contained in the second address. In one of his last newsletters from Edinburgh, written on 13 and 14 January, Robert Wodrow reflected upon the work of the commission and lamented its lack of success. He believed that with the loss of the executive power of the Privy Council to a British parliament, the security it had was of little value because a British parliament could, if it chose, undermine it. Those favouring another address did so on the

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grounds that the second address had been insufficient. They argued that the court had slighted it, and that although private lobbying had been a proper means to procure their ends, its failure necessitated another address. Silence at this point might be interpreted as their having secured some satisfaction or that parliament had been reasonable and right in refusing it. A further address would counteract the rumours that the commission had retreated from its position on the second address and from the zeal it had displayed on that occasion. It was necessary for the exoneration of the commissioners’ consciences. Strictly speaking, only the sixth article of the second address (relating to bishops in parliament) had been included for the exoneration of their consciences because they did not expect to get satisfaction. However, the commission had expected the government to make concessions on the other five articles, which was why, in Wodrow’s opinion, the address had been largely ‘politery’. The commissioners now needed to exonerate their consciences in relation to those five articles, otherwise their silence might be interpreted as approbation of the parliament’s actions.53 Another address would enable the commission to deal with concerns not included in the second address, such as toleration and the conditions upon which it might to be granted. It would also enable the church, in the light of any ill consequences of union, to have a clear conscience that it had done its duty. It would also serve to ensure that no member of parliament could claim innocence on the grounds of ignorance. It was further argued that a final address should be made because it was not known what providence might yet work. As long as the commission was found in the path of duty, providence might yet turn in its favour and prevent the union from taking place. As all were agreed that the church was in danger by the union, it seemed only reasonable that they represent that danger in an address. Because many in the ministry saw the union as sinful, and as leading to the overturning of their religious and civil rights, it was necessary that they faithfully witness against it. An address would also serve to calm spirits and prevent any reappearance of the violence that had taken place. It would heal the breaches that had opened up among ministers and serve to unite ministers with their people. Finally, an address now from the commission would be less irritating to the government than one from the general assembly, and it would also serve to promote unity and harmony at the assembly, as well as validate its approval of the commission’s proceedings. As no one knew what was likely to happen between the present time and the next assembly, or even if the assembly would be allowed to sit, now was the opportune time to address. The Presbytery of Paisley advanced similar arguments to Wodrow, who was

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their commissioner. They believed that at this ‘critical juncture’ the church ought not to be silent. Another testimony was required at the very least for the exoneration of consciences.54 The arguments in favour of a further final address were strong. On the other hand, the arguments against were unconvincing and probably came from ministers like Carstatres and the elders. It was argued that the second address was a sufficient exoneration of consciences; a further address would fly in the face of the vote in parliament, and may be considered illegal. In response, those favouring another address argued that although the act for the security of the church had been passed, the treaty as a whole had not been ratified, and that when passing the first article, it was agreed that none of the articles were obligatory until all were passed. In such circumstances another address would be neither too late nor illegal. Those against addressing insisted that there was nothing new that warranted an address and threatened dire consequences for the church of presenting one. They warned that parliament would turn against the church to the extent of withdrawing the act securing the church, bring in supremacy, patronage and even prevent the general assembly from sitting. Those who feared that the church did not have sufficient security pointed out that these things might be imposed upon them anyway, from London. Finally, they argued that far from uniting the ministry, an address was likely to split it; with some church issues still being pressed upon the government, a further address would only lessen their chances of success.55 The commission debated the issues, and after ‘much reasoning anent the necessity expediencie and usefulness of such an application’, failed to reach an agreement, delaying its decision until the following day. On 15 January the debate was renewed and it was finally agreed not to submit another address on the grounds that having already given a free and faithful testimony to its principles, and having fully laid before parliament what it judged necessary for the further security and advantage of the church in the event of the intended union, it judged it both ‘unnecessary and highly inconvenient to lay anything by way of a new address before the parliament upon the heads of their former addresses’.56 Commissioners were urged to continue to lobby members of parliament to secure the church’s aims, and the motion was laid aside.57 The commission made its decision without a vote, which suggests a large degree of unanimity.58 The decision was surprising, considering the number and strength of arguments in favour of another address and the composition of the commission that day. The thirty-eight members were made up of thirty-three ministers and five ruling elders. A commission made up largely of ministers, even with a large Edinburgh

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contingent, might have been expected to approve of some kind of address. The composition also suggests that the court did not attempt to pack the commission with ruling elders, as it had done on previous important decisions. As the treaty was on the brink of ratification, the court appeared unconcerned; nothing the commission was likely to say or do was going to make any difference. The commission likewise seemed resigned to the situation. Two days later, on 16 January 1707, the commission felt compelled to respond to the ratification of the treaty with another address. It was hurriedly produced as a consequence of a clause added to the act ratifying the treaty. The clause allowed the English parliament to secure the Church of England without the necessity of having its actions ratified by the Scottish parliament.59 The clause also stated that nothing the English parliament provided for the Church of England would affect the securities already granted the Church of Scotland. The clause took the commission by surprise. It was said to have ‘roused our backward ministers’, and the moderator called an extraordinary meeting. It was unanimously decided that each of them should speak to at least five members of parliament to express the dismay of the commission and sinfulness of the clause. A letter to that effect was sent to Queensberry. A draft address was hastily drawn up and sent to the Lord Advocate for scrutiny before being presented to the commission by ten in the morning. The protestation was quickly approved and sent to parliament. The commission objected that the clause was a ‘blank’ with which the English parliament could do as it pleased in relation to the Church of England. Of greater concern to the commission was the Scottish parliament’s consent that such securities be an article and fundamental of the union. This implied an acknowledgement and acceptance of Episcopalian church government and ceremonies, all of which was inconsistent with the covenants and principles of the church and would involve them and the nation in guilt.60 Presented on the day the treaty was ratified, the address was a request that there be ‘no such stipulation or consent for the establishment of that hierarchy and ceremonies’. It was not an attempt to block the treaty or an address against union. The commission believed that the clause gave the Church of England such freedom that it was possible that it might include issues in its own security that were inconsistent with or invasive of the interests of the Church of Scotland. Parliament, who it was claimed had added the clause to prevent them sitting any longer, rejected the commission’s overtures and ratified the treaty.61 The instructions from the general assembly to the commission were that it was to protect the interests of the church and present establishment.

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An examination of its work suggests that, in terms of concessions granted, it was reasonably successful – a point acknowledged by moderator William Wishart in a sermon at the opening of the 1707 Assembly.62 In terms of the execution of its instructions, the commission acted faithfully and diligently. It was never silenced, neutralised, marginalised or bought off, and it never ceased to lobby parliament in one way or another as it sought to secure for the church what it thought necessary to its interests. Never at any time was the commission replaced as the voice of the church by the localities, whether synod, presbytery or parish. It was always the focal point of the church’s efforts at this time. Defoe’s claim that the proceedings of the Kirk – that is, the commission – were more calm and regular ‘but the presbyteries in the Country act with no manner of consideration’ gives the impression that it was the presbyteries and not the commission that was leading church action against the union. This was not the case. Defoe had in mind the three presbyteries that addressed against the union.63 These three were exceptions to the rule. While the three attempted to act independently of the commission by addressing, the rest were content to follow the commission’s lead and to allow the commission to act in the interests of the church. There was no concern in relation to the interests of the church expressed by a presbytery not already being dealt with by the commission.64 Furthermore, all the presbyteries that corresponded with the commission expressed approval of its work. Robert Wylie, a leading anti-unionist, found nothing in the work and witness of the commission to criticise but only to praise.65 Prior to the 1707 Assembly, he urged presbyteries to agree to give the commission a ‘special approbation’. This was considered particularly important because some had attacked the commission for exceeding its role, others for falling short in its testimony.66 The testimony of the entire church during and after the union debates was that the commission had acquitted itself admirably and that it had served the interests of the church well. While acting in the interests of the church, the commission was careful not to take sides with any of the political parties. The commission was composed of men who held different opinions on union, some of whom took sides and attempted to influence debates. However, as a church court the commission maintained a position on union that can be described as political neutrality and ecclesiastical self-interest. Regardless of the differing opinions within the commission, its overriding aim was always to serve the interests of the church. As supporters of the Revolution Settlement and the present establishment, the church was supportive of and allied to the government as it worked with it to establish

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reformed Presbyterianism on a national basis. However, the church was definitely not the Court Party at prayer; the emergence of the Country Party opposition, and its platform of championing patriotic causes such as constitutional reform and parliamentary sovereignty, appealed to and received support from Presbyterians. From the court’s point of view, a neutral commission was preferable to a hostile one, and its supporters within the commission, such as Carstares, encouraged that stance.67 However, those hostile to incorporating union also advocated neutrality on the grounds that the church had friends on either side of the debate and they did not see it as their interest or any part of their concern to side with any party.68 The commission’s neutrality was also the product of the balance of power within it. It could not take one side in the debate without offending the other. To take up a position either for or against union would have divided the commission and possibly the church to an extent far greater than the dispute over the second address. The commission was concerned to maintain unity and the best means to achieve it was neutrality. Nevertheless, neutrality did not mean passivity, and it did not prevent the commission making a stand on issues affecting its own interests, even if that meant offending the government. This was not the first time the church had taken up such a position. In the fall-out over Darien, and in the protests that followed, the reaction of the church was strangely muted and the commission had refused to side with either party.69 There were nearly thirty addresses to parliament relating to Darien, but none from the church.70 The national address organised by the Country Party received no support from the commission and the commission’s refusal to sign it was welcomed by the administration.71 At the suggestion of the Duke of Hamilton, the Presbytery of Hamilton petitioned the commission to call for a national day of fasting and prayer. The moderator of the commission refused to call a meeting but raised the letter at a meeting of the Presbytery of Edinburgh. Hamilton’s petition was rejected and they were warned that they had gone too far writing in such terms.72 The Kirk’s response led to accusations that it had ‘sadly abandoned the interest of our country’.73 The assembly’s annual act for a fast mentioned Darien only briefly and as one of a number of causes of the fast.74 The church had seen Darien as a missionary opportunity and as a pastoral responsibility. Prayers were offered that God would bless the venture to the advancement of trade and gospel.75 The failure was considered as a ‘manifestation of the displeasure of the righteous Lord, justly gone forth against them and us, for our and their iniquities’.76 The refusal to call a fast, join the national protests or to blame William and England for the debacle can be attributed to the

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fact that the church, aware that its political and religious opponents were exploiting the situation, saw the fall-out from Darien as a threat to the Revolution Settlement, and as such a threat to its own existence.77 Thomas Boston had intended to protest against the decision not to hold a particular day of fasting but ultimately did not. He saw the overruling providential hand of God in the outcome, ‘for it is thought that such a fast at this time would greatly weaken the King’s interest in Scotland’. Sadly for Boston, the outcome was evidence that church affairs, from a human perspective, were very much influenced by politics.78 By its muted response, its refusal to set apart a day of prayer and fasting specifically for Darien, its refusal to sign the national address or encourage others to do so, and by its professions of loyalty to William and its encouragement to its people to remain loyal to William, the Kirk was taking what action it thought necessary to counteract that threat. Considering the size of the disaster, the implications for the nation, the national mood and the Presbyterian practice of national public fasting and prayer in times of national and ecclesiastical crisis, the fact that the commission and the assembly deliberately avoided the issue is unusual. By its own criteria, the situation was a sufficient cause for a fast and the failure to hold one was a clear departure from reformed principle and practice. Darien demonstrated the church’s pragmatism and its willingness to depart from usual practice when it was in its interests to do so. Darien was still the subject of a fast, but not a specific national public fast. The court showed its appreciation in the following session of parliament by passing an act securing Presbyterian church government.79 According to John Bell, minister at Gladsmuir, both the Court and Country parties made considerable efforts to win the support of the church during the political crises of 1702–3. Great care was taken to maintain the authority of the church. Ministers elected to the assemblies of 1702 and 1703 were said to have been chosen because they were unlikely to divide into factions and follow one party or the other to the neglect of the public interest of the church. The election of ministers in this way indicates a sophisticated level of management within the church. Bell was convinced that nothing worked more for the church’s security and led to unity in their public resolutions than their not siding with either party. In his opinion, neither side was wholly complied with or neglected, and both sides complained about the church.80 While the church, and the commission in particular, was always going to act in the public interest of the church, there was a reluctance of ministers to interfere with the state in civil matters.81 Patrick Simson of Renfrew stated that the main task of the church was to watch over the ‘matters of God’.

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What related to the civil constitution depended upon principles of law and right upon which the greatest and wisest of men could not agree. How far a nation or people may alter their constitution was not something that was properly an issue for the church, ‘being both out of our reach and undetermined by scripture, our lord having left the governments of this world as he found them and therefore without our sphere as ministers’.82 The political neutrality and ecclesiastical self-interest of the commission were evident in the four addresses it presented to parliament. None were addresses against the union or aggressive attempts to block the treaty.83 They were requests for church concerns to be addressed in the event of a union; they were requests for the amendment of the treaty. None of them expressed sentiments for or against union. They may not have been happy with certain implications the union had for the church, and they certainly tried to have those concerns addressed ‘in the event of a union’, but that is not the same thing as addressing against the union. It is simply not the case that the four addresses ‘reveal the ebb and flow of a battle between pro-union ministers and lay elders and zealous antiincorporationists’.84 There was complete unanimity within the commission on the third and fourth addresses and near unanimity on the second. The fierce debate had largely been between the ministers and the prounion elders. Only three ministers voted against the address and only on the grounds of timing rather than content. The rest of the ministers, including those described at the time as of ‘moderate principles’, those of whom Wylie and Bannatyne would have been most suspicious, voted for the address. It was acknowledged that while ministers on the commission, and in the church generally, held differing opinions on the union, ‘they always concurred in every public act of Commission and made no division for nor against it’.85 The commission, despite the differing views represented within it, was remarkably consistent in fulfilling the instructions it had received from the assembly. The opposition were disappointed that the commission was not at the head of the anti-union brigade and it was left to individual ministers to organise and act according to their conscience. Anyone arguing that the commission was opposed to union must address these points: why, if the church was the bulwark of the opposition, was the commission not leading opposition to union or at least taking a leading role in that opposition? Why was it not working with the opposition in parliament? Why did it not exploit the issue of a national fast? Why did it not from the outset categorically state in its addresses to parliament its opposition to union? Why was it not organising addresses, petitions and other anti-union activities? Not

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only did it not organise addresses, it rebuked those presbyteries that did address parliament and it used its influence to discourage anti-union riots (see Chapter 5). Not only was it not in the vanguard of the opposition, with the exception of the second address, everything else that the commission did was well received by the court (see Chapter 2). Robert Harley believed that the commission’s first address contained several tacit declarations in favour of union and that, by its third address and circular letters, it had been ‘eminently serviceable in promoting’ union. The first and third address and the circular letters had been such as to make ‘people believe the commission to be rather for the union than against it’. What Harley wanted from the commission was a declaration approving the union and approving what had been done for its security in response to its requests. Such a declaration would wipe out the stain of the unhappy conduct of the church over the second address.86 No such declaration was forthcoming. The commission’s role was not to speak for or against union but to act in the interests of the church and secure the best possible conditions for it ‘in event of an union’. It is understandable that unionists on the commission should have encouraged a neutral commission. What is surprising is that antiunionists should do likewise. On the surface it would appear that they had nothing to gain by following such a strategy; they certainly had most to lose. Neutrality served the interests of the court rather than the opposition. The court did not need the church’s support, but it feared the prospect of the church allied to the opposition. As long as that did not happen, the court was happy. Anti-unionists on the commission, such as Wylie, Bannatyne, Linning and Wodrow, appear to have been unwilling or unable to persuade the commission to take an anti-union stance. They may well have been acting out of a concern to maintain the unity of the commission. Nevertheless, by making a stand on issues of concern for the church, particularly on the second address, the commission at times appeared at loggerheads with the government. Their strategy appears to have been to ensure that nothing produced by the commission appeared to favour union; to insist on addressing rather than waiting until the treaty was ratified, and to insist on pressing the government on all of the issues of concern to the church. By pressing for concessions on issues they knew it was impossible for the government to grant, they could insist the church was not secure and therefore still in danger. If the church was still in danger, they could argue that it should not enter this union. If they could persuade the rest of the commission and the rest of the church that the church was not secure but endangered by the treaty, it might be enough to push the commission off the fence.

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Finally, it has been suggested that the anti-unionists were neutralised because moderates such as William Carstares successfully managed the commission and its committees; that they were responsible for calming the church and leading it away from taking any direct action against the union.87 There is no doubt that unionists like Carstares were influential and the opposition feared their influence. However, there is little to suggest that their influence was a decisive factor in the decisions taken by the commission. The limited nature of the influence of moderates was illustrated by Daniel Defoe’s frequent complaints about the attitude of the commission, which he described as a mob. He believed it was out of control, rather than being guided by the invisible hand of Carstares and his colleagues. Furthermore, Carstares and the so-called moderates did not dominate the commission, or its committees, and did not always get what they wanted. Despite his personal stature, when it came to the debate and vote on the most controversial issues in the second address, Carstares was powerless, and he and the ruling elders were defeated. The three men who sat on the highest number of committees appointed by the commission to deal with issues arising from the union were moderate academics from Edinburgh and Glasgow universities. Carstares sat on ten of the thirteen committees, while John Stirling and George Meldrum each sat on nine. Despite getting himself onto so many committees, there is no evidence to suggest that Carstares, or anyone else for that matter, was able to pack the committees with likeminded men. David Blair, for example, only sat on two. If anything, the committees tended to be balanced between the factions. The closest the commission came to having a packed committee was the Committee for Public Affairs that met during the first session of the commission on 9 October and produced the first draft of the address to parliament about the security of the church. It was made up largely of Edinburgh ministers, of whom the opposition were suspicious and whose influence they feared. They were criticised for their haste in forming an address and because the address appeared to favour union. Anti-unionists succeeded in increasing their presence on the committee and in having the address re-drafted in terms they were content to accept (see Chapter 2). The ability of moderates to influence the most significant committee, the Committee for Public Affairs, was further limited at crucial times because its deliberations were held in open session and all commissioners were invited to observe and give their opinions on the issues. Thus decisions were heavily influenced by the views of the commission as a whole. Furthermore, when a committee reported to the commission, its decisions were subject to a debate and final decision, with or without a vote, in open commission.

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Committee membership and the decision-making process made it very difficult for someone like Carstares to simply fix a decision. Whatever men like Carstares wanted, they were going to have to argue their case and persuade the commission like any other member. The moderate tone of the commission’s various addresses and letters was the result of its determination to remain politically neutral and not to favour one side before another. Significantly, if there was a committee that Carstares would have wanted to be a member of, it was the one drafting the two most controversial articles for the second address. However, he was not nominated and the ministers on it all favoured the address. The commission overwhelmingly voted, despite Carstares’ pleas, to approve the address. Carstares was unable to persuade other moderates and allies such as John Stirling or George Meldrum to vote with him. Interestingly, it was a committee of moderates that drew up the memorandum of issues of concern to the church to be presented to members of parliament, which was almost identical to those in the second address. John Bell commented that one of the most remarkable aspects of the debate on the second address was that those ministers who were known to be moderates, such as Stirling, Meldrum, Patrick Cumming and James Ramsay, were ‘most stiff in adhering to the truths of God’. Their actions ‘reached a conviction on many people that moderation differs widely from lukewarmness and that a man may in prudence yield a circumstance whilst he adheres to fundamental truths’.88 NOTES 1. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 121; Scotland’s Ruine, p. 135. 2. Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 12; Ferguson, Scotland, 1689 to the Present, p. 50. 3. Kidd, ‘Religious Realignment’, p. 166; Young, ‘The Parliamentary Incorporating Union of 1707’, p. 37; Bowie, ‘Public Opinion’, p. 246. 4. NAS, GD124/15/457/2: John Logan to Mar, 23 December 1706; Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, p. 258. 5. Robeson, Mene Tekel, p. 26; Scotland’s Ruine, pp. 135, 211, 284; Szechi, George Lockhart of Carnwath, p. 173. 6. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 273. See Appendix to this volume. 7. Ibid., p. 277. 8. Ibid., pp. 300–2. 9. NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 28–32. See NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fos 109–10; NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 18–28, Report on the Committee of the Highlands. 10. APS, X, pp. 63, 64, 65.

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106 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

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scottish presbyterians and the act of union 1707 NAS, CH1/3/8, pp. 290–3. Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 148. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 65r and v. NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 28–32. NAS, CH1/3/8, p. 293. Ibid., p. 299. For committee, see Appendix to this volume. NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 32–5. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 119: Wodrow to his father, 28 November 1706. For the dissent and the commission’s response, see NAS, CH1/3/9, Registers of the Acts of the Commission of the General Assembly, 1706–9, pp. 28–32, 32–5. NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 60–1. Ibid., pp. 70–2. See Chapter 1, ‘Religious Settlement’. APS, XI, p. 320; NAS, CH2/105/4, p. 94. Dunfermline; Unto his Grace Her Majesty’s high commissioner and the Right Honourable Estates of Parliament, The Humble Address of the Presbytrie of Lanerk (1706). Wylie, The Insecurity of a Printed Overture. Webster, Lawful Prejudices Against an Incorporating Union with England, p. 10; A Voice from the North. See also The Grounds of the Present Danger of the Church of Scotland (1707); Letter from a Member of the Commission of the late General Assembly, to a Minister in the Country (1707). HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 352: Defoe to Harley, 16 November 1706. Ibid., p. 360: Defoe to Harley, 28 November 1706. A Voice From The South; or, An Address from some Protestant Dissenters in England to the Kirk of Scotland (1707), pp. 4–6. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 64r and v. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 128; NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 79–80. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fos 242r and v, 243, 250. Ibid., fos 242r and v, 243, 250. NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 87–8. See Chapter 4 for discussion of letters. Ibid., pp. 90–1. Ibid., pp. 90–1. NAS, CH1/3/8, pp. 158–61, 271. NAS, CH1/3/9, p. 36. Ibid., p. 79. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 70v. Ibid., p. 92; Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 140v. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 260. APS, XI, p. 377. APS, XI, p. 395. For an early example of an overture to be presented to parliament asking for exemption from the test, see NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 73.

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44. Wylie, Letter from a Member of the Commission, pp. 2–4; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 73. 45. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fos 140v, 142; NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fos 239, 241, 248, 258, 259 contain various drafts of the oath. 46. NAS, CH1/3/9, p. 95. See Appendix to this volume. 47. NAS, CH1/3/9, p. 97. 48. Ibid., pp. 104–5. 49. APS, XI, p. 433. 50. NAS, CH1/3/9, p. 107. See Appendix to this volume. 51. NAS, CH1/3/9, p. 108. 52. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 143. 53. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fos 31–2. For a draft of a potential final address drawn up by those in favour of presenting one, see NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 67. 54. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fos 31–2; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 97. 55. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fos 31–2. 56. NAS, CH1/3/9. 57. Ibid., pp. 115–16. 58. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fos 31–2. 59. NAS, GD18/2092. Clerk’s Spiritual Journals, 15–16 January 1707. 60. NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 116–19; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 143v. 61. NAS, GD18/2092: Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708, 15–16 January 1707; Letters of Daniel Defoe, pp. 194–5; APS, XI, p. 415. 62. Wisheart, A Sermon Preached before his Grace, David, Earl of Glasgow, p. 17. 63. Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 187. 64. NAS, CH1/3/9, p. 68. See Chapter 4. 65. Wylie, A Letter from a Member of the Commission, p. 1. 66. NLS, Wodrow Folio XXVIII, fos 208–9: Robert Wylie, A Letter Concerning Union (1707). 67. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 100: Wodrow to his father, 1 November 1706. See Chapter 2. 68. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 53. See Chapter 2. 69. For discussion of Darien and its consequences, see Chapter 1. 70. Bowie, ‘Public Opinion’, pp. 232–3. 71. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, pp. 534, 578. 72. Ibid., pp. 500, 506. 73. HMC Duke of Athole, p. 59. 74. Acts of the General Assembly, pp. 290–1; Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, p. 59. 75. The Darien Papers, p. 254. 76. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 292.

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77. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, p. 578; Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, pp. 92–3. 78. Whole Works of the late Reverend Thomas Boston, p. 105. 79. APS, X, p. 215, and Appendix, pp. 47–8. 80. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fos 41v–43. 81. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 274. 82. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 91: Simson to Wodrow, 26 December 1706. 83. Bowie, ‘Public Opinion’, p. 245. 84. Ibid., p. 245. 85. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 262. 86. M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, p. 757: Harley to Carstares, 7 January 1707. 87. Dunlop, William Carstares, p. 115; Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p. 253; Bowie, ‘Public Opinion’, pp. 245–6; Kidd, ‘Religious Realignment’, p. 166. 88. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 69.

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4 Presbyteries and Parishes: Addressing Against Union

The use of addresses as part of popular opposition to government policy was not new. Petitions against the service book and book of canons formed an important part of the protests against the ecclesiastical reforms introduced into the Kirk by Charles I in 1637 and that culminated in the signing of the National Covenant in February 1638.1 The right of subjects to petition the king and parliament was enshrined in the Claim of Right, a point the addressees were at pains to make when framing them.2 The Country Party opposition exploited this right during the protests that followed the failure of the Darien expedition.3 Despite their lack of success on that occasion, the opposition saw addressing as a key component of its campaign against incorporating union and a total of eighty-eight addresses against union were presented to parliament in 1706.4 Historians have tended to emphasise the addresses against union by presbyteries and parishes as an indication of the strength of church opposition to union. Brief generalisations about this opposition have given the impression that it was widespread when in fact it was extremely limited and the numbers small. Of the sixty-eight presbyteries in the church, only three addressed parliament: Lanark, on 18 November, and Dunblane and Hamilton on 11 December. This amounted to 5 per cent of the total. Only sixty-three parishes addressed parliament, which represented about 5 per cent of all the parishes in Scotland. The total number of parochial addresses was thirty-five, nine of which were from more than one parish. The sixty-three parishes came from thirteen presbyteries and twenty of the addresses came from the three presbyteries that addressed parliament. Lanark sent seven addresses from eight parishes out of a total of twelve parishes; Hamilton sent twelve addresses from twelve parishes out of a total of fourteen; and Dunblane sent one address from one parish out of a total of twelve parishes.

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PRESBYTERY ADDRESSES

All three presbyteries emphasised their approval of the work and witness of the commission as expressing their known and covenanted principles. They acknowledged that in the light of the addresses from the commission, it might have been unnecessary for them to petition parliament. However, they felt obliged to do so for conscience’ sake and out of their sense of duty towards the Queen and parliament, and because they were alarmed at the scheme of union contained in the present articles, which had potentially fatal consequences for the church. They considered the union to be contrary to their known principles and covenants, by which they were engaged against churchmen holding public office as legislators in government. They could not enter this union without being guilty before God and of incurring the guilt of national perjury. They wanted to demonstrate that the mind of the commission was the mind of the church and not of a handful of delegates in Edinburgh. Hamilton expressed the view that there was ‘a full unanimity therein amongst the ministers of this National Church’, both as to their content and the desire that parliament would take the petitions into consideration and prevent their worst fears from becoming a reality. Lanark specifically presented its address to counter rumours that the commission that produced the second address was a ‘delegat and pact meeting’.5 It was hoped that by emphasising that the commission’s views were those of the church as a whole, they would be less readily dismissed. The presbyteries drew parliament’s attention to the ‘lamentable and distracted state of the kingdom’, particularly those under their pastoral care. Their people were extremely alarmed at the prospect of an incorporating union and of being represented by one parliament. They feared the ‘woeful’ effects and consequences upon their civil and religious liberties should they lose the guardianship of a Scottish parliament. The presbyteries insisted that they had done everything possible to ensure that the simmering discontent among their people was kept within just limits and did not break out into violent rioting. Nevertheless, despite their diligence, they were afraid they might not be able to constrain them much longer. They hoped to force a change of heart from the government by emphasising hostile public opinion and the possibility of widespread disorder. Acknowledging parliament as their protectors and patrons under God, the Presbytery of Hamilton urged parliament to listen compassionately, ‘as it were to their dying groans’. God had placed in parliament’s hands the power to allay their fears, avert the dangers and prevent the confusions that threatened the kingdom, by laying aside the

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incorporating union as expressed in the treaty. All three presbyteries stated that they were not ‘against all union with England’ as long as it was ‘honourable to the State, safe to the church, and beneficial to both’. All three urged settling the succession in the Protestant line as an alternative to the treaty. They did not specify which line, but the term generally applied to the House of Hanover. The Presbytery of Lanark went into the greatest detail. Influenced by the history of the constitutional relationship between the countries, and the general perception that Scotland had suffered in and by that relationship, it argued for a union in which Scotland’s monarchy, parliament and church were secure and free from English influence. They urged just and reasonable limitations or provisions as the circumstances of the kingdom required. They stated that, as ministers, Scotsmen and subjects of a free and independent kingdom, they could not but wish and pray that their civil government and monarchy would be rectified as to the good execution of laws without being extinguished; that the monarchy was regulated and limited without being suppressed; that parliament was secured from English influence without being extinguished; and that the just rights and liberties of the nation as to laws, trade and other concerns, be asserted without being resigned to the will and disposal of a British parliament who were strangers to their constitution and who may judge it in the interests of Britain to keep Scotland entirely in subjection. Acknowledging what had already been done for the security of the church, they asked that parliament may ‘consult the peace of the country’, consider further the articles of the address of the commission that had not been dealt with in the act, and prevent the aforementioned union from taking place. Hamilton insisted no incorporating union should be settled until the Queen had called a general assembly of the church. The national church, founded upon the Claim of Right, had an undoubted right to be consulted about its own securities before any union could be entered into with a government of another communion, particularly where that government was to become the sole master of the whole administration. This was a delaying tactic. The assembly had empowered the commission to act in the church’s interest during the debate, and therefore there was nothing that the assembly could or was likely to do that the commission was not already doing. Finally, Dunblane added that the growth in the public observance of the Mass, the increased used of the English service book and the ‘Illegal and Disorderly’ practices of Episcopal clergy was not being effectively dealt with by the government, despite the church’s frequent petitions. This gave them just cause to fear what they may expect from a British parliament following incorporating union. It has been

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argued that the addresses, particularly Lanark’s, contained all the ‘leitmotifs’ of Cameronian ideology.6 However, Cameronian ideology had gone down the road of a covenanted republic. Strictly speaking, the addresses did not conform to covenanting ideology. There was much in common with the Presbyterian nationalism of the seventeenth century, but crucially the addresses omitted mention of the Solemn League and Covenant, which had provided the basis for the confessional confederation of the 1640s. Presbyterians in the Kirk, despite their protestations that the union was inconsistent with the covenants and principles, did not seek to promote union upon that basis. Unlike the addresses from the commission, the presbytery addresses were unequivocally against an incorporating union. They represented the voice of the opposition rather than the voice of the church.7 PAROCHIAL ADDRESSES

Although described as parish addresses, there is no evidence to suggest that the church was in any way involved in an official capacity in their production. They were referred to as parish addresses in a geographical sense rather than in an ecclesiastical sense. They were not organised by the commission or the presbyteries. Only the presbyteries of Lanark and Hamilton appear to have been involved in their organisation. Parish addresses were organised within eleven other presbyteries. Had the presbyteries been involved in that work, a greater number might be expected. Indeed, one might have expected addresses from all the parishes in each of the respective presbyteries, whereas in most cases there are only a few, and in some, such as Dunblane, only one. Furthermore, if those eleven presbyteries did not think it appropriate to address parliament, it is unlikely that they would organise parish addresses within their bounds. The addresses were organised by the opposition and in most cases appear to have the support of the minister and elders within the parish. The small number of addresses and the limited geographical spread further suggests that the church was not directly and officially involved in their production at any level. A minister’s involvement in organising addresses was a question of personal choice. The ministers of Glasgow supported and approved of the city’s address, although they did not address as a presbytery nor did individuals organise in their parishes. Ministers from the presbyteries of Lanark and Hamilton actively supported the Duchess of Hamilton. Had the commission organised addresses, they would have been produced on a national scale instead of being geographically restricted to a diagonal strip stretching from Perthshire through central

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Scotland to the south-west. The heaviest concentrations lay in central Scotland, particularly around the presbyteries of Lanark and Hamilton. Elsewhere, the parishes from which addresses were gathered generally sit together in small clusters. There are no addresses from the north, northwest, north-east, from the east, Edinburgh or the south and south-east. The only address from Fife, a region with a strong tradition in petitioning, was sent from Burntisland.8 Dunfermline, despite its hostility to the treaty, neither addressed as a presbytery nor organised parochial addresses. The lack of a parochial response was primarily due to the absence of instructions or a lead from the commission to that effect. It may also have been a consequence of known Jacobite involvement in the organisation of addresses or pressure from court supporting nobility and landowners not to address. Each address was presented in accordance with the privileges outlined in the Claim of Right. They stated that they were not against a honourable union with England, provided it was consistent with the civil and religious liberties of the kingdom.9 They asked that no union be hastily entered into until it was known to be honourable and safe. All parishes stated that they did not think that the union contained in the printed articles was such a safe union. They argued that the treaty before parliament overturned the ancient constitution of the kingdom, suppressed the monarchy, extinguished their parliament, subverted their fundamental rights and liberties, destroyed the government of their church, the purity of the gospel and surrendered all that was dear to them as Christians and men to the power of the English in a British parliament. This they considered to be inconsistent with and contrary to the honour and laws of the nation, rendering it but a poor ‘pendicle’ to England. They insisted that union must be consistent with the sovereignty and independence of the kingdom and their covenanted work of reformation, for which their forefathers had fought and died and in the defence of which they resolved to sacrifice their own lives and all that was dear to them. The parishes of Culross, Saline, Carnock and Torry expressed concerns about the additional tax burdens they expected to suffer after union. They feared that the loss of their parliament would expose them to new sufferings on account of their religion and to bondage through heavy English taxes and having to serve in English wars both on sea and land. The addresses were at pains to express their loyalty to the crown and parliament, despite their objections to the treaty. They recognised and acknowledged the authority and government of Queen Anne, to whom they have and will continue to pay all due subjection, ‘in the lord’. They were ready to spend their ‘best blood’ in her defence. However, they added that they could

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not subject their consciences, nor the rights and privileges that belonged to them by the right of nature and that were established by law, to any mortal. The term ‘in the lord’ was reminiscent of the National Covenant. It appeared to imply, as it did then, that if there was a conflict of interest in terms of the obedience required by God and that required by the crown, it was better to obey God than man. The addresses claimed that the union was contrary to their solemn vows the covenants, and they could not sit silently while their nation faced a sad dissolution and impending ruin. They wanted the treaty agreed by the commissioners to be laid aside because it was destructive to the fundamental rights and liberties of church and nation. As they could not desert the nation’s interests to which they were obliged by the laws of God and their solemn oaths to adhere, they now appeared in defence of those interests. Some parishes urged the use of effectual means to defeat the designs and attempts of all popish pretenders and urged that parliament secure the nation against all encroachments made upon her sovereignty, laws, religion, liberties and trade. The parish of Glenkens pointed out that Scotland had a mere 61 representatives against nearly 700 English in a British parliament. They argued that the ‘mean representation’ allowed for Scotland could never effectually secure her interests, all of which were endangered. Glenkens believed they were uniting with a people and parliament that had broken their solemn engagements to reformation and that had as part of its legislature twenty-six bishops that were inconsistent with the principles of the church and would involve the nation in the same guilt of perjury. They urged that no union should be concluded based on the articles. Parliament was asked to secure their religion and maintain the sovereignty of the nation and parliament with its rights and privileges. Opponents in Parliament were described as noble and worthy patriots. The parish of Dunkeld, which also called itself Caledonia, argued that the treaty was inconsistent with the 30th Act of the 6th parliament of James VI. The act stated that no subject was to impugn the dignity and authority of the three estates of parliament or to seek or procure the innovation or diminution of the power and authority of the three estates or any of them under pain of treason. The parishes Airth, Larbert, Dunipace and Denny, from the Presbytery of Stirling, went so far as to state that they could agree to an incorporating union with England in theory. However, after considering the union contained in the printed articles, they gave the following reasons why they could not. 1. The great prejudice the nation had suffered in its sacred and civil concerns over the past hundred years in its relations with England.

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2. The present constitution of England authoritatively countenanced prelacy, despite the Solemn League and Covenant, which they judged to be a continuing act of perjury. The union proposed would therefore involve Scotland in similar guilt. 3. England had made shipwreck of her faith and fallen from her former purity. Arminianism and Socinianism prevailed, as well as other gross errors and superstitious ceremonies, making any union pernicious and dangerous to the church. 4. Union would ensnare Scotland in unlawful oaths and tests, as well as usher in toleration that would be prejudicial to church and nation. Furthermore, the nation would be subject to insupportable taxes. 5. Such had been the unfaithfulness of England in former unions that it would be unwise to trust an English parliament with all the privileges they currently enjoyed and had secured by the Claim of Right and other acts of parliament. They did not think that there was any article of the treaty that prevented a British parliament from altering that security. No advantage in trade can ever counterbalance the disadvantages that they were likely to suffer as a consequence of union. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

One of the most powerful arguments employed against union in the addresses was that Scotland had been preserved by the providence of God for nearly two thousand years, during which time other nations greater than Scotland had disappeared and their memory rendered extinct. Not only had the nation been providentially preserved, in itself a singular blessing, but it was a covenanted nation. Furthermore, no other nation had undergone such a comprehensive reformation as Scotland. Such blessings were surely evidence that Scotland had a special place in the purposes of God. To give away their sovereignty and independence would be to resist that purpose and slight God’s blessings. However, the unfolding of God’s purposes in providence was open to alternative interpretations and unionists employed it effectively to argue in favour of the treaty. The doctrine of providence was a fundamental of the faith; it was the means by which God executed his divine decrees.10 Providence was the unfolding of God’s purposes in history and reference to it was part of the common discourse of believers. Union was no exception and it was frequently argued that it had divine origins. In his pursuit of union, James VI and I exploited history, mythology and the idea that union was the providential work of God. He argued that what God had joined in his person, no man ought to separate; to resist union was to

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resist the will of God.11 Writers celebrating the Union of the Crowns in 1603 claimed it was contracted by ‘God’s especiall providence’. What made it so special was that God had given them ‘a farther and more forcible meanes of love and concord, not union onlie of the region but also of religion’.12 It was said that God had providentially raised James to be his particular instrument in this work and that the union of the kingdoms under him was the accomplishment and perfection of all the blessings of God on Britain over the previous sixteen hundred years. Under divine providence, regal union would end the history of hatred and division between the two nations.13 With the support of divine wisdom and providence, James would restore a golden age to Great Britain, which would continue for ever.14 Presbyterians also saw the providential hand of God behind the union of crowns. They believed that the kingdoms had been united in a common Protestantism at the reformation and that while there were still differences between them, they looked forward to the completion of that work in a more perfect union in both doctrine and discipline.15 Confessional union had a greater significance for Presbyterians than regal union. The covenanters had no desire to end the dynastic union and saw it, next to the Christian religion, as the greatest of God’s blessings upon the island. However, they believed that ‘undeniable evidences of divine providence’ had accompanied and blessed the cause of the National Covenant and had led them onwards to victory.16 They saw their invasion of England in 1640 as something to which they were providentially called of God.17 As a consequence of their successes, they believed a providential opportunity lay before them to improve ‘this rare blessing of heaven, for increasing their respect abroad or securing their own saftie at home’.18 Proposing uniformity of religion and church government, they urged Charles to promote the scheme on the grounds that he would accomplish what his father had only dreamed of.19 The covenanters’ desire for uniformity eventually found expression in the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643, which Alexander Henderson confidently declared was the outcome of the special providence of God. He could argue that God was on their side and that divine providence was maintaining and supporting this union because ‘The word of God is for it . . . our designs and ways are agreeable to the will of God.’20 The interpretation of providence was problematic and ministers were at pains to point out the pitfalls. James Clark, of the Tron Church in Glasgow, was accused of having incited the mob to protest against the union. Writing in his own defence, and in condemnation of the mob, he claimed that God in his sovereignty could overrule such sinful actions for

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good ends. He warned that ‘it is not casual events of Providence should be our Rule, but the Established Law and Word of God’.21 Scripture was the rule of faith and practice, and providence was to be interpreted in the light of it. Despite the problems, unionists like Daniel Defoe saw the hand of God at work promoting union. Reflecting on the favourable attitude towards union that existed in England, he reminded his Scottish readers that such a ‘happy temper’ had been no easy thing to procure: ‘Abundance of visible Providences have been remarkably Concurring to bring this Conjuncture to such a crisis.’ Defoe also wrote that ‘Victories of various sorts have contributed to the work and a connexion of wonders have brought it to pass.’ However the greatest providence was the effective silencing of those most opposed to union in England: a conquest at home, superior to Blenheim or Ramillies, has been made over the dividing spirits of the high party. Peace and Union has made large strides and rid over the Bellies of her vanquisht Enemies, Envy, Malice, Jealousy and party strife.22

Defoe was convinced that this providential conjunction augured well for the passage of the treaty.23 Of all the arguments that persuaded Francis Grant, Baron of Nova Scotia and later Lord Cullen, to support an incorporating union, the most significant was ‘the chain of providence concurring to point thereunto’.24 Grant was a staunch Presbyterian who had been present at the Convention of Estates in 1689 and had written a pamphlet in 1703 against the reintroduction of patronage.25 Grant maintained that for the first time since the Union of the Crowns there was a conjunction and agreement in favour of union between the monarch, the English ministry and the English parliament. He claimed that at the Revolution the estates had believed that nothing less than union could secure what they had done, but that it had been unattainable. Since the Revolution, many events had taken place that, on the face of it, appeared to work against union but had actually, providentially, served to promote it. He argued that the succession crisis and the Act of Security, coinciding with a change in ministry in England, had pushed forward the scheme. He believed that the treaty itself represented a success for the Scottish commissioners that helped to strengthen their hand in ratifying it. It also served to bring others less convinced about the project to support it. Furthermore, all efforts to promote their own security and economic improvement had providentially failed, either in the legislation or in the execution. Both at home and abroad, before as well as after the Revolution, Scotland’s balance of trade was everywhere in the negative, except with England. Grant claimed that even previous failures to secure union had providentially worked out for

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good. If union had taken effect under Charles II, prelacy ‘would have been riveted for ever’ in Scotland. A point reiterated by English dissenters.26 He warned that was what presbytery could expect at any other juncture than the present. Grant argued that events within Scotland and in its relations with England, especially since the Revolution, had been providentially working towards completing what the Convention of Estates had begun in 1689. Everything had conspired providentially to bring the two kingdoms to the point at which they sealed an incorporating union. Even the most contentious issues between the kingdoms, such as Darien and the succession crisis, which might have been expected to have driven an even greater wedge between them, had, in the providence of God, only served to draw them into a union.27 Sir John Clerk took a similar view. He argued that the extraordinary providences of recent years, such as Darien, famine, the great fire in Edinburgh and the various national divisions, were all manifestations of God’s displeasure that required national humiliation. Furthermore, failure to seek the direction of God on the question of union would be to put the capstone upon all of their former calamities. The nation was under a ‘providential necessity of doing for their country either the greatest things to their lasting honour or the meanest and smallest to their lasting shame’.28 Union was a providential opportunity to benefit the country and bring honour upon their names. In his spiritual journal, Clerk’s father recorded his spiritual exercises and details of current events. Everything was viewed and interpreted from the perspective of God’s providence. The journal records his frequent and lengthy periods of meditation upon, fasting for and praying about the union. He often wrote at length about God’s remarkable providential dealings with him and his family, one of which was his son’s ‘prudent behaviour’ as a commissioner at the treaty negotiations and his safe return home. The most remarkable providence of all was the ‘union yt is now projected between Scotland and England & which seems to be designed by so many’.29 On 10 October Clerk prayed that God, as the sovereign lord, would sit at the ‘helm of affairs’ and by his ‘favourable providence’ so order events that whether the union took place or not, they would continue to enjoy gospel ordinances and a Presbyterian ministry accompanied by peace, truth, power and plenty for His sake.30 On 29 October, while preparing for the fast, he reflected upon the providence of God in relation to himself, his family and the union. Clerk’s prayer concerning the union was that if it did not serve to advance ‘the mediators kingdom’, the ‘peace and prosperitie of Zion’ and the ‘securitie of our civil but especially of our sacred interests and privileges as they are established by law

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according to the will of God’, then God would hinder the efforts of its promoters and ‘dash it to pieces’.31 Presumably, after such a prayer, Clerk’s interpretation of events was that because God did not dash the planned union to pieces but allowed it to proceed, then it was for the glory of God, the good of his kingdom and the benefit of both nations. From the perspective of those opposed to union, its happening in the providence of God did not make it right or beneficial to either church or state. It could just as readily be interpreted as a judgement for national sins. The writer of The Smoaking Flax claimed that God’s providence always terminated in mercy and justice, mercy to His people and judgement towards His enemies, and ‘therefore it is to be expected (if repentance prevent not) that the day of the Lords Judgement shall be on this land’.32 However, even judgements could work for the benefit of the faithful. Of unionists and Jacobites, he said let them do as they will in all this, yet surely the Lord by the good hand of his Providence, will make all things work together for the building of his church and people, and for setting up a hedge of lawful government about his house.33

Union was taking place in the providence of God. It was a judgement of God but God’s judgements were not for ever, and in his gracious providence to his church and covenanted people, he would usher in the form of government that was pleasing and acceptable to him. In a similar vein, Robert Wylie and Robert Wodrow argued that God’s providential dealings with the church and nation and the dark days they were living through called them to consider their duty and determine what action they should take. They should wait and observe ‘dear providence’ to see what opportunity it offered for them to gain further securities for the church.34 On 10 November 1706, Thomas Boston, then minister at Simprin in the Presbytery of Selkirk, delivered a sermon on tribulation and providence. It was a direct reference to the union and delivered by way of warning, preparation and comfort. With the presbytery fast due to be held the following Wednesday, the sermon served as a suitable preparatory to that important event.35 Boston interpreted their present circumstances as a dark and gloomy day, in which there seems to be a black cloud of wrath hanging over our heads; which if mercy prevent not is like to fall heavy upon us, yet the storm never blows so hard, but the children of God may have peace.36

He argued that the Lord forewarned his people of forthcoming tribulations in two ways: Scripture and providence. Of their present circumstances, God was warning of trouble ahead through his providence.

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The divisions among our rulers in the important matter now in hand, and divisions among others on the same point, say that if God do not interpose by a miracle of providence for our help we may be in a sad case ere long 2 Kings 6: 27.37

Boston told his people that while some looked upon union as the way to make them happy, others saw it as the way to make them and their posterity miserable. Surely, he claimed, both could not be right and there was a sad infatuation on some side.38 Boston was among those who believed that nothing good would come of union. He reminded his people of what had been their bitter experience since the Union of the Crowns. But surely these hundred years bypast, the poverty this poor land has groaned under, and the troubles the Church of Scotland has had were much owing to the influence of our neighbours, and it will be next to a miracle, if our prosperity come from that quarter.39

Clearly, in light of the substance of the sermon, Boston believed that an incorporating union with England would bring tribulation. Of the tribulations that God’s people suffered in this world, one was that sometimes their enemies ruled over them. It is much the same whether it be violently put on, or they stoop tamely and receive it; but always the church of God is brought to a sad state, when the wolf gets Christ’s sheep to keep, and they are subjected to the professed enemies of the work of reformation.40

The enemy Boston was referring to was England, and unless God prevented it, they would soon be subjected to English rule. He urged his people to pray that God may direct the parliament in the matter of the union. They and we have to do with potent neighbours. Our rulers are wiser than we, to know what will be best for this poor land, unless the sins of the nation provoke God to make them blind.41

Addressing the question of why God sent such tribulations, Boston highlighted God’s own glory, which was the chief end of all His providences, His people’s well-being, and also a means of dealing with hypocrites and His enemies. Applying his doctrine, Boston urged his people to prepare for tribulation and in doing so to consider that God had a controversy with Scotland. God was angry, and when that happened, even His people could not escape the consequences. There were many national sins, including contempt for the gospel, worldly-mindedness, profanity, lukewarmness in the things of God. However, the greatest sin was covenant-breaking.

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This land lies under a double guilt here. The breach of the national covenant, which was first made early after our reformation from popery, and afterwards several times renewed, and much countenanced of God. The solemn league and covenant now buried in England and now much forgotten in Scotland, in both which, prelacy was abjured. But alas, the nation soon forgot his covenant.42

Boston warned them that anyone with half an eye could see that the present state of affairs was warning them all that a cloud was gathering.43 Boston’s remedy for the upcoming tribulations was that the believer would find peace in Christ: ‘Whatever storms blow in the world, in Jesus Christ we may have peace, in the midst of outward troubles.’44 Boston’s response and remedy to union was spiritual, not political or military. They were to turn to Christ, not to parliament, the opposition or to take up arms: ‘When providences are a dark cloud, which they cannot see through, faith goes to the promises.’ Like the writer of The Smoaking Flax, Boston reminded his hearers that, despite their tribulations, God providence always ends in mercy to His people, all things worked together for good to those called according to His purpose: ‘Let the web of providence be once woven out, and though there be many black threads in it, it shall appear a goodly mixture.’45 No one was disputing that if union took place, it did so in the providence of God. Differences arose over questions of interpretation. Unionists argued that union was a blessing of God to be welcomed and embraced; a providential opportunity not to be wasted. Opponents of union, such as Boston, interpreted union as a dark providence that was evidence of God’s judgements upon them for national sins. The response either way was to humbly submit and acquiesce in it as the will of God. Such was the advice of English dissenters: when men in societies agree to be ruled by the majority, they acquiesce in things which perhaps they voted against, so we hoped that all the Sober, Pious and Well-Meaning People would have seen themselves over-ruled as by Providence , and submitted.46

Even the commission, having done all it could for the church’s security and the exoneration of consciences, chose to ‘stand still and leave the consequences of things to Divine Providence’.47 THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Despite the small number of addresses, the opposition urged consideration of them as reflecting the attitude of the country as a whole. All the

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addresses were read out in parliament but were dismissed ‘disdainfully’. The government’s attitude was typified by Argyll’s comment that the addresses served no other use than to make kites.48 This summary treatment was justified on the grounds that they were produced and subscribed by those who had never been friendly to the government anyway.49 Opposition efforts to organise addresses was considered as a desperate last-ditch attempt to stop the union. It was even rumoured that an address against the union was being organised in Ireland as injurious to the interests of that kingdom and especially the linen industry.50 Unionists claimed the addresses exposed the opposition as frauds because they were all written in the ‘cant of the old times’. Despite their references to the security of the church and the Lord’s covenanted reformation, an examination of the signatories revealed them to be ‘known Jacobites and Episcopal men’.51 This was an exaggeration, as they were clearly also signed by Presbyterians. The addresses may have been organised and formulaic, but that does not mean that those who organised them or signed them did not agree with the sentiments they expressed – they clearly did. Nevertheless, it illustrates that the addresses were being closely examined to see who had signed them in the hope that some kind of propaganda advantage might be gained. If the ‘wrong’ kind of people organised them or signed them, then they could be more readily dismissed.52 Being involved in any way in petitioning made one guilty of belonging to one faction or another and Presbyterians were accused of allying themselves with the enemies of the Revolution.53 Sir John Clerk claimed that the addresses had no impact because ‘the will of parliament, strengthened by mature deliberation, was considered of more account than the voice of the people led astray by one faction or another’.54 Giving the government any kind of advantage or excuse to ignore or opportunity to discredit the addresses was a concern. The Duchess of Hamilton believed that those who had already signed a parochial address should not sign the shire address, as it was likely to weaken the cause and be used against them.55 In terms of the church, the figures for presbytery addresses were far from impressive and emphasis was placed upon the fact that only three had addressed.56 The Duchess of Hamilton felt that the parochial addresses were of greater consequence than those from the shires. They had the benefit of being more numerous, more easily despatched and of having variety: ‘different parishes have different sentiments, and so you would see by yr addresses, and it will be impossible almost to frame an address to suit all party’s’. In her view, getting more parishes to address, rather than organise a shire address, would be more effective.57 The government view was the reverse. If anything, they were

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‘glad to see the addresses dwindle unto the parishes’.58 The government accused the three presbyteries that addressed of going beyond their sphere and of interfering in what was the realm and role of parliament. They accused them of using inflammatory language designed to irritate and provoke the minds of the people to disturb the government.59 The presbyteries were accused of being influenced in their actions by the nobles leading the opposition. It was said that ‘the court parasites talk’d loud’ that the Duke of Hamilton had influenced Lanark and Hamilton, while the Duke of Atholl had influenced Dunblane.60 ORGANISING ADDRESSES

The opposition did not deny that they were trying to organise addresses across the country. They had even drawn up a template that was worded in such a way as to satisfy broad range of political and religious persuasions and could be adapted to suit a particular area or group. As George Lockhart pointed out, parishes in the west tended to add the point that the union was inconsistent with their covenants. Nevertheless, they were at pains to point out that those who signed were not forced, but did so willingly. The addresses may have been organised, but they genuinely reflected the views of the signatories.61 Generally speaking, the opposition were most active and most successful in those parts of the country where members of the opposition were the landowners. Nevertheless, they did not restrict their efforts to areas under their influence. Sir John Clerk (senior) recorded that on 30 October men had been in Penicuik seeking subscriptions to an address from his tenants.62 Lockhart insisted that they would have had greater success across the country had it not been for the influence of the nobility and landowners who supported the union. Some unionists with lands and interests in Argyllshire, Bute and Sutherland were accused of ruling their estates like ‘petty sovereigns’.63 According to Lockhart, the Earls of Loudon, Stair and Glasgow prevailed upon the gentlemen of their estates in Ayrshire to desist from addressing. Had it not been for their pressure, he insisted, they would have addressed.64 The Duke of Hamilton had instigated the organisation of addresses before parliament opened. On 3 October one of his tenants, John Cochrane, informed him of their progress. Cochrane reported that they had widespread support in the presbytery, that the ministers seemed to be against an incorporating union and that he would take whatever help was offered by them. One of the ministers was considered suspect and was said to be in Edinburgh, ‘consulting with Carstairs & likely preaching for

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a bishops hat’. However, despite his confidence in the clergy’s help and support, there was an element of doubt about their constancy in the cause. Cochrane insisted that if the clergy changed sides, which he must have considered a possibility, he would continue without them.65 Cochrane continued in his efforts to secure signatures among the freeholders and heritors within the jurisdiction of members of the opposition. Nevertheless, he faced opposition from unionists and the bad weather was causing problems and preventing him getting signatures. It was only with great difficulty that he reached Ayr, where the ministers meeting there were said to have approved of the address.66 Hamilton’s mother instructed ‘as many gentlemen as the short tyme will allow to meet Carnwath at Lanerk on Tuesday to concert an address and afterwards it may be sent about’.67 She kept Hamilton well informed of their progress in getting parish addresses from within the presbytery. By early November they were ready to be taken to Edinburgh, along with the hopes of those who prepared and signed them. ‘I wish they may doe good for both ministers and people hereabouts are all very hearty in it,’ she wrote. Referring to events in Edinburgh at the commission, and what she saw as the failings of the clergy, she complained that ‘if your ministers there were also zealous the lay elders would not have such influence’.68 In some areas there was no lack of zeal in addressing. One writer told Wodrow that ‘all pains are used for addressing, yy ryde, run and spare nothing’. He claimed he had never seen ‘scots blood begin so universall to boyll’. He wrote that ‘vast numbers’ round about had signed and almost the whole parish of Erskine. He wrote of the news from Hamilton that all the parishes in the presbytery had addressed, with their ministers taking the lead. Yet the zeal for addressing was by no means universal. The town of Paisley was accused of ‘indifferency’ and the presbytery divided on ‘uniformity of measures’. Patrick Simson was reported as having preached against an address and some of the presbytery had problems with addressing.69 Attempts to organise presbytery addresses was simply an extension of opposition efforts at parish level. Shortly after the commission had presented its second address, an overture ‘for putting of a stop more effectually to the parlts concluding of an incorporating wt England’ was prepared and circulated among the presbyteries within the Synod of Glasgow.70 The overture urged that, as the commission had addressed parliament not to enter an union upon such terms, ‘so each presbyterie by themselves may in like manner address the parlt: to the same effect’. Presbyteries were urged to address parliament in order to counter the charge from the government that ‘the address of the commission is but

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the deed of a packt club and not the general sense of the church of Scotland’.71 The overture urged frequent meetings among ministers and the laity to pray for light and direction for both parliament and themselves. Prayer was urged for harmony between ministers and that the church would be united in its testimony against any encroachments on its rights and privileges. The overture outlined the issues to be covered in any presbytery address, including the general dissatisfaction of the country towards the printed scheme of union and that parliament’s proceeding with the treaty despite the dissatisfaction could have dangerous consequences. In order to have a clear understanding of the mind of the nation on the union, and to highlight its dangers, it was suggested that a correspondence be carried on throughout the church, that they would know their duty in defending the church’s interests and thus act neither too rashly nor too timidly. The moderator of the synod was asked to write to the presbyteries within the synod to arrange a meeting of delegates from each, in order to organise and manage the correspondence. In the meantime, they urged the frequent rendezvous and exercise of fencible men in burghs and parishes throughout the country, in case they were required to defend the liberties and rights of church and nation.72 During late November an un-named presbytery, probably Hamilton, attempted to organise further addresses. The presbytery believed that the present state of affairs was loaded with danger for church and nation. They insisted that Lanark had set an example for other presbyteries to follow. The state of disquiet and unrest among their people and among those elsewhere rendered it incumbent upon them and all their brethren in the ministry to express their strong views and concerns and to intercede before parliament on behalf of their people. Apologising for their presumption in urging an address and in proposing a draft for others to follow, they excused their actions on the grounds of extreme urgency and necessity. They argued that ‘the joint position of several presbyteries will have much more weight than that of one alone’. They clearly felt that while Lanark’s address was commendable and well argued, it had been ineffective and needed to be followed and supported by addresses from other presbyteries, whether those presbyteries sent joint or individual addresses. They urged harmony, frankness and good understanding between the brethren in the common cause. It was suggested to the presbytery receiving the letter (possibly Glasgow) that they try to get the presbyteries of Paisley and Dumbarton to join in the same address, which would add weight to it. They were also urged to encourage the presbyteries of Ayr and Irvine, as well as those in Stirlingshire, to send addresses.73

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Despite these efforts, attempts to organise presbytery addresses were a complete failure the possible exception being the address from Dunblane. On 18 December the Presbytery of Stirling discussed sending an address but was persuaded not to on the grounds that it was ‘inconvenient’ at that time. Those against sending an address were led by John Logan, sometime correspondent of the Earl of Mar. The presbytery delayed consideration of an address until another meeting, by which time Logan was confident that with the help of others who would join him he ‘could obtain a totall diversion’.74 Logan and his allies appeared to have had little trouble persuading the rest of the Presbytery of Stirling not to submit an address. The fact that efforts to organise addresses failed, and that 95 per cent of all presbyteries chose not to address parliament, suggests a considerable reluctance right across the church to follow that particular course of action. THE CHURCH RESPONSE TO ADDRESSING

That the court should take ‘umbrage’ at the church because of the presbytery addresses was entirely to be expected. What was surprising was the considerable opposition within the church to the action taken by the three presbyteries. According to John Bell, the three presbyteries ‘stood alone and had none to concur with them in what they did . . . many of their brethren blam’d them also’.75 The ‘brethren’ insisted that the commission ‘had done what was sufficient’ in the church’s interests by its four addresses. Accusations from ‘many of all ranks and qualities’ were directed at ‘their otherwise worthy ministers’ that they had been motivated more by a factional and party spirit than by a spirit of ‘disinterested zeal’.76 In the commission William Carstares, supported by David Blair, objected to the claim of the Presbytery of Hamilton that there was full unanimity amongst ministers in the church. He also expressed his utter dislike of presbyteries addressing parliament independently on issues that the commission was settling. He said it was a dangerous practice and illustrated his point with the example of a presbytery addressing for the alteration of church government without consulting either synod or commission. John Bannatyne responded that the position advocated by Carstares limited presbyteries and that if the commission accepted Carstares’ position, it would be receding from its former address and the church’s known principles.77 Bell did not go as far as accusing those who had organised the addresses of being influenced by the Dukes of Hamilton and Atholl. Nevertheless, he believed their action had damaged the public interest of the church by giving the court an opportunity to ignore the

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commission and attack ministers as a ‘Company of pragmatical men, and unesie to live with’.78 The fact that the three presbyteries had ‘stood alone’ and were not representative of the church made it harder to bear. In a letter to a subscriber of one address, in which he ‘blamed that piece of conduct’, Bell insisted that none of the ministers in his presbytery were fond of the union and as few of the people. However, preaching publicly against it or addressing parliament as presbyteries was not the answer or the way to achieve success. The three presbyteries ought to have been satisfied with the zeal, fidelity and prudence of the commission in dealing with the issues. A further testimony to that already given by the commission against the proceedings of parliament was ‘needless and might irritate the government and give them a handle to wrong the common interests of Christianity’. As a consequence, he could not approve of what he considered ‘church destroying testimony’.79 Bell was critical of what he saw as extremism in the addressers. He thought that it was hard for men to avoid extremism because of the ‘narrowness of our minds which cannot look both ways at once’. In a reference to the commission who had taken up the middle ground in the debate, he said, ‘The most judicious old experienced Christians hold the middle ground in controversies anent too much or too little zeal.’ He argued that it could be reasonably concluded from their actions that the common people ‘were become masters of the ministers secrets’. Ministers, by their preaching and addressing, had filled their people’s heads with more notions than they would be able to quieten, whatever means they tried in the future. There was also concern that the actions of the three presbyteries gave the impression of a divided church. Avoiding division and maintaining unity was an obsession in the post-Revolution church. It was a case of united we stand, divided we fall. Whatever the nature of the debate at the next assembly, or its outcome, Bell emphasised the need to avoid protestations by either side so that ‘the ministry might not be openly seen to rent and divide among themselves in the face of their enemies’.80 The issue of Presbyteries addressing troubled Robert Wodrow, who had encouraged Glasgow to address. Despite having instructed his parish elders at Eastwood not to do so, because he thought it ‘needless at ys juncture’.81 Wodrow appears to have distinguished between a civil authority addressing and church courts addressing unilaterally. He asked Patrick Simson for his thoughts on the matter. Simson expressed disappointment that some of the brethren had ‘outrun’ the commission and ventured ‘their particular light in public’ by making ‘separate addresses to parliament with others whom they persuaded or by whom they were persuaded to join therein’.82 He argued that separate addressing was

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dangerous and could break the church as well as separate church and government. In his view, there was an enemy in the bosom of the church and those who had never been friends to the present establishment were exploiting the church during the union debate for their own ends. Referring to the Jacobites, he said they were stirring up disorders ‘that they may fish in muddy waters and are glad to get presbyteries to be their tools and to get the blame of all laid on us’. The consequence for the church was that those in government ‘not very steady to our interest’ were likely to use them as a reason to neglect giving the church ‘her necessary security’.83 Simson argued that in the past, when there was no commission, individual presbyteries sent representatives to Edinburgh when parliament was sitting in order to make their representations. Subsequently, when there were commissions, presbyteries sent instructions to join with them in addressing parliament. However, the present situation was not the same because the commission was a representative body of the church. Its membership contained commissioners chosen out of every presbytery and there was therefore no need for presbyteries to act independently.84 Simson reminded Wodrow that the commission was limited by and accountable to the court from which it received its commission. In the Presbyterian system of government the commission received its instructions from the general assembly. The commission was not entitled to go beyond the instructions it received, in which case, the commission may reasonably be considered to be a ‘sufficient representation’ of the church, and in terms of its decisions, ‘may have the sentiments of the whole church’.85 Simson claimed that, in his experience, while commissioners always carried the instructions and proposals from their presbyteries with them to an assembly or commission, they often had to yield in the commission’s deliberations to what was found at that particular time to be ‘convenient or practicable’.86 In other words, while the decisions and actions of the commission may not have exactly conformed to the instructions given by the presbyteries of Lanark, Hamilton and Dunblane to their representatives, those presbyteries ought to have accepted the decisions and acted in harmony with the rest of the church and not independently and in apparent defiance of the commission. Simson argued that because the representatives of the church met in the commission to watch over all the affairs that concern the church and to protect its interests, the presbyteries should have addressed their correspondence to the commission and not to parliament. That rule ought only to be broken when the commission is found negligent or unfaithful, and in his view that was not the case at the present time. He considered

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the commission to be acting diligently in its work and that it could not have done more than it already had.87 John Bell received a ‘thundering answer’ to his letter, which was described as having ‘many inconsistencies, much coldness and indifferency and signs of instability’. His correspondent rejected any suggestion that there should be no protestations at the next assembly, particularly if those opposed to the treaty should lose a vote (see Chapter 7). He insisted that preaching publicly against union or addressing parliament as the presbyteries had was legitimate action under the circumstances. He reminded Bell of the kind of preaching the present time required: Away with your carnal prudence, and pyping forth unsensible doctrine, when the state of the nation and church is in so much danger as ye suppose it to be, and calls for loud and plain trumpeting the duties and dangers of the day. 88

Bell was sorry his correspondent had so quickly dismissed his letter. He thought it unnatural for one Christian to afflict another and, more particularly, for one minister to censure another as void of true zeal because of an opinion regarding present duties. The practice ‘savoured of the spirit of party to damn all as carnal who were not as bigoted as themselves’. Warning his correspondent about the possible consequences for the church of their intervention, Bell pointed out that it was zealots that had brought about Jerusalem’s destruction.89 Bell had condemned the addresses from the presbyteries because he considered them ‘unseasonable and less needful considering what the reverend commission have done in that matter already’.90 Like Simson, he argued that it was the role of the commission to represent the church in such cases, and that acting independently as they had was inconsistent with Presbyterian practice. For Bell, the fact that out of more than sixty presbyteries in Scotland, only three thought it necessary to address parliament in an act of selfexoneration, was enough evidence to demonstrate that the majority of the church shared this view.91 All the presbyteries understood the significance and importance of the issues involved, and were equally concerned about them, but they all chose to work through the commission. The fact that there was a widespread belief that the addresses would do no good also served to confirm his argument that they had been unnecessary and counterproductive. Even those who signed them were far from convinced of their worth. One minister who brought two addresses to parliament was reported as having said that he had given ‘two guineas to the Lord Register to get them tabled in that house but I fear they do not two guineas worth of good’.92 Bell’s purpose had been to understand the extent of the divisions between ministers at a time when the peace

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and interests of the church were endangered by what he considered as the ‘Church destroying testimonies’ of the three presbyteries. As far as he was concerned, they ‘stood alone’. He believed the controversy was about whether or not duties such as addressing by presbyteries, which are not binding at all times, ought to be forborne for the sake of the church’s public advantage. He concluded that they should.93 Across the church, presbyteries would have shared some if not all of the views expressed by the three addresses. Nevertheless, they disagreed over the method employed in attempting to deal with them. In that sense the three addresses were not typical or representative of the church. The majority of the presbyteries did not address parliament because they looked to the commission to act on behalf of the church. It was the commission that dealt with parliament, not the presbyteries, unless otherwise instructed by the commission or if there was a consensus that the commission had failed in its duty of care for the church. The preferred method of action for presbyteries was to give instructions to their commissioners or to write letters to the commission expressing their encouragement and outlining the concerns they wanted the commission to deal with. The practice of writing letters was by no means widespread. Most presbyteries chose not to write; even those who also failed to send commissioners. The Presbytery of Paisley was asked by one of its ministers to write to the commission outlining its concerns, but the proposal was rejected, probably on the grounds that they were represented at the commission.94 Of those represented at the commission, few presbyteries recorded their instructions to commissioners. The Presbytery of Dumfries was concerned about the loss of the Scottish parliament and its consequences for their covenanted work of reformation, rights and privileges. Parliament was the protector of the church’s rights, privileges and establishment. The commissioners were to urge the commission to use whatever methods it thought appropriate in its capacity as a church court to prevent the passing of the article (the 3rd) that removed the parliament. They were to do nothing in the commission that might be interpreted as a compliance with the passing of such an article. Finally, if anything done by the commission may be concluded as compliance in passing such an article, or in any way endangered the present church establishment according to the Claim of Right, they were to protest against it in the name of the presbytery.95 The Presbytery of Lochmaben instructed its commissioners to move in the commission that it use all means proper as a church court to prevent the passing of the article that removed the Scottish parliament. The commission was urged to do everything in its power to preserve the Claim of Right in all parts and

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branches. They were to move that the commission do everything possible to exonerate their consciences before God and men as ‘faithful ministers and honest Scotch men’. The commission was to oppose the establishment of a British parliament not just because it meant the end of a Scottish parliament, but because members were required to take the sacramental test and because there were issues in the constitution of the English element of that parliament inconsistent with their church government and principles – bishops. Finally, they wanted the commission to give advice to all presbyteries about how ministers ought to carry themselves at the present juncture, so as not to offend either government or people. If the commission refused any of their requests, they were to have their instructions and their adherence to them recorded in the commission records. If necessary, they were to appeal to the next general assembly.96 Neither the commission nor any of its committees insisted on the maintenance of the Scottish parliament. They did not oppose the passage of the 3rd article of the treaty or the establishment of a British parliament. However, the commission did object to the constitution of the British parliament having bishops sitting in the House of Lords, and this was probably interpreted as having fulfilled the instructions. Eight presbyteries wrote to the commission outlining their concerns about the treaty. They all recorded their approval of the work and witness of the commission, particularly in the contents of its three addresses, and of their faithful testimony for the church by ‘seeking the legall securitie thereof in caice of ane union’. On 28 November the Presbytery of Biggar wrote that they were looking upon the commission as ‘sett upon the watch tower to give faithfull warning to all concerned in this dangerous and criticall time’. The presbytery had heard reports of the various troubles and the ‘different practices taken both by ministers and people with respect to the union’ and urged the commission to ensure the preservation of ‘unity and concord in this National Church’. This letter led to the commission’s circular regarding the suppression of disorders.97 The Presbytery of Skye wrote to George Meldrum urging the necessity of having a court established for the plantation of kirks and valuation of teinds.98 Because of the circumstances in their presbytery, they wanted a court to ensure the continuation and strengthening of Presbyterianism in an area dominated by Episcopalians and Catholics. The Presbytery of Dumbarton considered the articles agreed by the commissioners in England to contain several things prejudicial to the rights and liberties of the nation as well as endangering the national church and being contrary to its solemn engagements. As one of those targeted in the failed attempt to organise addresses, the presbytery stated that their letter

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was intended as a public testimony of their adherence to the principles of the church and against any encroachments made upon it by the union. The presbytery’s chosen method of making a public testimony of its adherence to the principles of the church and against all encroachments made on it by the union was not to address against it, as it had been encouraged to do. Rather, it chose to write to the commission to urge action to secure the interests of the church should union take place. They urged the commission to use all ‘prudent and faithfull measures’ to preserve the interests of religion in order that the doctrine, discipline, worship and government of the church may be safely transmitted to subsequent generations.99 The Presbytery of Penpont in the south-west wrote on 22 January, after the treaty had been ratified. Not exactly an indication of a sense of urgency. It expressed concern about the discontent in its area over the union and of the threat to the Kirk from the preaching of John Macmillan, whose ‘doctrine and practice of rejecting the authority both of church and state’ was winning over many people. They believed that the commission’s requests had not been fully granted and urged it to press for further security for the church before the close of parliament. If those securities were refused, it ought to submit a protestation and remonstrance in the name of the church.100 The Presbytery of Stirling judged it its indispensable duty to express its concerns about the security of the church in the event of a union. Nevertheless, it drew back from expressing those concerns in an address to parliament. The presbytery warned against the dangers of oaths imposed by a British parliament and of toleration. It urged the commission to ensure the continuation of annual assemblies, that the monarch’s representative at assemblies be Scottish and Presbyterian, and that only Presbyterians enjoy places of public trust within Scotland. Hoping to avoid the problems caused by ambiguities, it insisted that the church’s security be stated in as particular terms as possible. It also believed that the commission should specifically solicit the opinions of all presbyteries about union. In its view, issues of lesser importance had been remitted to the presbyteries for their particular judgement through the ‘Barrier Act’. It would be prejudicial to the church not to be consulted at this time.101 The Presbytery of Glasgow urged the commission to press for further securities in the event of a union similar to those urged by Stirling. It wanted the commission to ensure that the rights, liberties and privileges that the church and her courts had enjoyed since the ‘happie revolution’ would continue should a union be concluded between the kingdoms.102 The committee appointed by the commission to consider the letters from Stirling and

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Glasgow proposed writing to the presbyteries to urge the consideration of the matters in question, as well as urging attendance upon the commission. Both proposals were rejected. Nor was there any chance of calling an assembly, which was also considered by the committee.103 The Presbytery of Dunfermline declared its approval of the work and witness of the commission and promised to continue to uphold them in prayer. It asked the commission to urge all presbyteries and their people to continue in prayer in the hope that the ‘lord may be prevailed with to dissipat this formidable scheme which hangs above this church and kingdom’. The presbytery saw the conclusion of a union as the consequence of the Lord’s just displeasure against church and nation.104 The commission, while acknowledging the letter, took no such action. It never urged prayer for or against union, but always asked the church to pray that all things would tend to the glory of God and the good of church and nation. Urging prayer against the union was probably unnecessary because people would pray for or against it depending on their particular persuasion. One minister in the west prayed from the pulpit, ‘o lord convince and fall in upon ye consciences of these men who have sold yr country in such a manner as judas may return ye 30 pieces of silver’.105 The Presbytery of Ellon took a different approach. Its representative was too unwell to travel and it asked the commission to excuse both the presbytery and its brother for their absence. Nevertheless, it took the opportunity to offer to the commission its sentiments upon the union. It began by stating that because of its distance from events in Edinburgh, as well as other disadvantages, it could not pretend ‘to very distinct and particular conceptions of the intended union of the nations’. Nevertheless, it declared that our consciences cannot be obliged to consent unto or approve of an union with England unless our present church establishment in doctrine worship discipline and government be inviolably secured in the free and full exercise thereof against all attempts from the English and our enemies at home.

The manner and method by which this was to be done they left to ‘judges competent’. The presbytery reiterated its position that ‘we cannot in our consciences be for any kind of union except our sacred interests forsaid be duly and effectually secured’. It added that, by all accounts that it had so far seen and heard of the union, it was unable to discern any tolerable or competent security for the church. Nevertheless, it was confident that the commission would do its utmost to secure and preserve what the church had wrestled for so long to obtain.106 The letter was written on 6 November, at the time the commission was debating its second address

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and before any act for the security of the church had been passed. The presbytery intimated that it could not consent or approve of a union that subjected the church to the kind of interference from London it had suffered in the past. However, the implication of its statement, that it could not consent to union ‘unless our present church establishment in doctrine worship discipline and government be inviolably secured’, was that if the church was so secured, then it could consent to and approve of the union. This position was radically different from that taken by Lanark, Hamilton and Dunblane and probably more widespread considering the fact that the church ultimately acquiesced in the union. With the exception of the letter from Dunfermline, all the presbyteries urged the commission to work to secure the church as much as possible in the event of a union, rather than simply urge it to oppose union altogether. They took the position that whether union happened or not was a question for parliament. How secure the church was in any union was a legitimate issue for the commission to pursue. If anything characterises the presbytery records at this time it is their general lack of comment upon the union. The available records show that despite the fact that they met regularly throughout the months between September 1706 and May 1707, their time and deliberations were largely taken up by ordinary church business. They record the receipt of the various circular letters from the commission, such as those relating to the fasts and the suppression of disorders. They record their agreement with the sentiments contained in the letters, and when their presbytery fast was observed, but other than that they are generally silent about the union. Little is recorded relating to disorders and tumults, except to say that there are none or that they agree with the sentiments expressed by the commission. None of the presbyteries appear to have passed acts or subscribed to forms of engagement to defend and maintain the doctrine and government of the church and its covenanted reformation, something the synods and many presbyteries did in November 1702. None of the presbyteries took the opportunity to officially record in an act its position regarding union. Presbytery records suggest, along with other evidence, that they looked to the commission in Edinburgh to act on behalf of the church and to secure its interests. There is no suggestion in the presbytery records that there was any discontent at the role of the commission or that the commission was failing in its role in the period after the act for the security of the church had been passed. There is no suggestion from the records that the presbyteries were at the forefront of opposition or taking unilateral action. They refused to address against the union even when encouraged by the

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opposition to do so. With the exception of Lanark and Hamilton, the presbyteries did not at any time become the focal point of church discontent at the union. 107 NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

Peterkin, Records of the Kirk of Scotland, pp. 56–7. Acts & Orders . . . 1689, p. 20. Bowie, ‘Public Opinion’, pp. 232–3. NAS, PA7/28: 22 Shire addresses from 16 shires, 26 Burgh addresses, 3 Presbytery addresses; 35 addresses from 63 parishes; 1 from the Convention of Royal Burghs. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 252. Young, ‘The Parliamentary Incorporating Union’, p. 31. Unto his Grace Her Majesty’s high commissioner and the Right Honourable Estates of Parliament, The Humble Address of the Presbytrie of Lanerk (1706); Unto his Grace Her Majesty’s high commissioner and the Right Honourable Estates of Parliament, The Humble Address of the Presbytry of Hamilton (1706); To his Grace Her Majesty’s high commissioner and the Right Honourable Estates of Parliament, The Humble Address of the Presbytry of Dunblane (1706). The majority of petitions against the service book in 1637 that ultimately led to the National Covenant came from Fife. See Macinnes, Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement, p. 162. For full list of addresses consulted, see Bibliography. The Westminster Confession of Faith, pp. 33–8. Tanner, Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I, p. 26. Pont, Of the Union of Britayne, p. 30. John Gordon, England and Scotlands Happinesse, p. 1. Parry, The Seventeenth Century, pp. 9–27. The autobiography and diary of Mr James Melvill, p. 554. Kerr, Covenants and the Covenanters, p. 154. The Lawfulnesse of Our Expedition into England Manifested (1640). A Remonstrance Concerning the present Troubles (1640), p. 2. ‘Our Desires Concerning Unity in Religion’, p. 383. Kerr, Covenants and the Covenanters, pp. 154–7. Clark, Rabbles and Authors of Rabbles Condemned (1709); see Watson, A Body of Divinity, p. 123. Defoe, A fourth essay, at removing national prejudices, pp. 23–4. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 252–3. Grant, The Patriot Resolved, pp. 5–7. McLeod, Anglo-Scottish Tracts, pp. 156–7. A Voice from the South, p. 3. Grant, The patriot resolved, pp. 5–7.

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28. NAS, GD 18/6080: a copy of Lockhart’s Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland owned by Sir John Clerk, pp. 118–28. 29. NAS, GD18/2092: Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. The Smoaking Flax, p. 16. 33. Ibid., p. 23. 34. NLS, Wodrow Folio XXVIII, fos 208–9: Robert Wylie, A Letter Concerning Union (1707); NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 118v; The Correspondence of Robert Wodrow, I, p. 635. 35. NAS, CH2/327/2. Selkirk, p. 18. 36. Whole Works of the late Reverend Thomas Boston, IV, p. 323. 37. Ibid., p. 324. 38. Ibid., p. 324. 39. Ibid., p. 327. 40. Ibid., p. 327. 41. Ibid., p. 327. 42. Ibid., p. 337. 43. Ibid., pp. 337–8. 44. Ibid., p. 340. 45. Ibid., p. 348. 46. A Voice from the South, p. 7. 47. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 261. 48. Scotland’s Ruine, p. 150; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 139. 49. NAS, GD220/5/105/1: Earl of Rothes to Godolphin, 7 November 1706. 50. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 343: Defoe to Harley, 29 October 1706; HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, pp. 254–5: William Paterson to Erasmus Lewis, 29 October 1706, and Anonymous Newsletter, 29 October 1706. 51. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 345: Defoe to Harley, 5 November 1706. 52. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 323. 53. NAS, GD220/101/17: Nairne to Rothes, 14 November 1706; MS Murray 650/651, Vol. III, No. 21: J. Shute to Stirling, 17 December 1706. 54. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 107. 55. NAS, GD406/1/9744: Duchess Anne to Hamilton, 1706. 56. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 153; HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 323: Mar to Nairne, 16 November 1706. 57. NAS, GD406/1/9744: Duchess Anne to Hamilton, 1706. 58. NAS, GD220/5/101/16: Nairne to Rothes, 14 November 1706. 59. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 76v. 60. Ibid., fo. 77; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 153. 61. Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 229–30.

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62. NAS, GD18/2092: Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708. 63. Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, p. 231. 64. Ibid., p. 231. 65. NAS, GD406/1/5439: John Cochrane to Hamilton, 3 October 1706. 66. NAS, GD406/1/5370: John Cochrane to Hamilton, 9 October 1706. 67. NAS, GD406/1/9744: Duchess of Hamilton to Hamilton, undated 1706. 68. NAS, GD406/1/9732: Duchess Anne to Hamilton, 3 November 1706. 69. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 105. 70. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXIII, fo. 271. 71. Ibid., fo. 271. 72. Ibid., fo. 271. 73. Ibid., fo. 277. 74. NAS, GD124/15/457/2: John Logan to Mar, 23 December 1706. 75. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fos 76v–77. 76. Ibid., fos 76v–77. 77. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 130. 78. Ibid., fo.77. 79. Ibid., fo.77v. 80. Ibid., fo.77v. 81. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 115. 82. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fos 91–2: Simson to Wodrow, 26 December 1706. 83. Ibid., fos 91–2, 105. 84. Ibid., fos 93–5: Simson to Wodrow, 9 January 1707. 85. Ibid., fos 93–5. 86. Ibid., fos 91–2. 87. Ibid., fos 91–2. 88. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 79. 89. Ibid., fo. 79. 90. Ibid., fo. 80v. 91. Ibid., fo. 80v. 92. Ibid., fo. 80v. 93. Ibid., fo. 80v. 94. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 160. 95. NAS, CH2/1284/4. Dumfries, p. 250. 96. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 227. 97. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 228/2. See Chapter 5, ‘The Church and Popular Protest’, for the consequences of Biggar’s letter. 98. NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 94–5. 99. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 232. 100. Ibid., fo. 255/1. 101. Ibid., fo. 253/1. For the Barrier Act, properly known as Act anent the Method of passing Acts of Assembly of general concern to the Church, and

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102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

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scottish presbyterians and the act of union 1707 for preventing of Innovations, see Acts of the General Assembly, pp. 260–1. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 233/1. Ibid., fo. 251; CH1/3/9, pp. 90–1. See Appendix to this volume. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 230/2. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 155. Ibid., fo. 254. For a list of the Synod and Presbytery records consulted, see Bibliography.

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5 The Church and Popular Protest

MOB VIOLENCE

While the government was unmoved by the addresses arriving in Edinburgh, of greater concern was the public discontent that broke out in mob violence, the rendezvous of fencible men and rumours of armed risings. Discontent over the union first erupted into mob violence in Edinburgh on 23 October 1706, and when it came it was not unexpected. The government accused the opposition of turning to the mob to supplement their parliamentary weakness.1 They had been warned that they would be ‘mob’d’ and later that day parliament was informed that there was a ‘rable at the doors’ pressing to get in, and that they had attacked the Earl of Errol’s guards.2 Parliament was adjourned and when members left they found the parliament close filled by the mob, ‘emboldened’ by darkness.3 The Dukes of Hamilton and Atholl were cheered all the way to their lodgings, but at this point unionists had to put up with little more than verbal abuse. They shouted at James Graham, Duke of Montrose, God bless him if he opposed union or God curse him if he was for it. Mar claimed that he, Argyll and the Earls of Lothian and Loudon expected an attack at any minute while at Loudon’s lodgings. Retreating to the Abbey, they were spotted and followed all the way to the gate by a mob carrying stones and cursing them if they were for union. Mar added that ‘some, tho few, blessed us’.4 One newsletter reported that outside Holyrood the mob were ‘threatening to sacrifice all the dogs who had sold their country’.5 Elsewhere in the town the ferocity of the mob was such that Sir John Clerk described events as a ‘memorable day’, that seemed likely to end all further debate on the union as well as the authority of parliament and the lives of those who had negotiated the treaty.6 Of those commissioners, the mob singled out Sir Patrick Johnston for particular treatment. Johnston was one of the members of parliament for the Burgh of Edinburgh, a former Provost of the city and a member of

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the commission. He was described as a defenceless, harmless man, ‘well deserving in all other respects’, but that the ‘crowd decided to do away with him’.7 They turned up at his house with forehammers, smashed his windows and attempted to break in while calling out that ‘they wou’d massacre him for being a betrayer and seller of his country’.8 He may well have been singled out ‘as a visible and familiar figure of the Edinburgh elites on which the mob could express its anger’. Mob activity and fear of the mob may well have influenced the voting patterns of the Edinburgh MPs. Johnston voted for the first article, on the principle of an incorporating union, but was absent for the final vote ratifying the treaty as a whole. Robert Inglis, the other Edinburgh Burgh MP, identified as a court cross-voter, voted against the first article and against the ratification of the treaty.9 Initially it seemed as if the outbreak of violence was the start of some ‘long-planned outrage’. However, the mob was chaotic, confused and lacking in co-ordination. It soon became apparent that it was more of a spontaneous expression of hostility to the treaty than the first fruits of organised protest. The rioters were effectively leaderless and had hoped that the Duke of Hamilton, who they had cheered through the streets that night, would provide that leadership.10 The government response was swift and well organised. Queensberry consulted members of the town council before sending the militia into the town to restore order.11 When parliament resumed on 25 October, Chancellor Seafield announced that the Privy Council, which had met the previous day, had ordered regular forces to be brought into the town for the security of members of parliament and the peace of Edinburgh. Guards were placed in the parliament close, the Weigh House and the Netherbow Port. A large force was stationed near the town and remained there in readiness for the duration of the session of parliament.12 The council estimated the rioters at about one thousand strong and issued a proclamation against all such ‘tumultuary meetings’.13 The council’s actions provoked a debate after Andrew Fletcher argued that bringing in regular troops was an encroachment upon the privilege of parliament. Fears were expressed that such forces could be used to intimidate parliament. Queensberry was even accused of having raised the mob himself in order to justify bringing the troops into the town.14 A couple of weeks later, rioting broke out in Glasgow. According to Defoe, who had witnessed the Edinburgh mob and described a Scots rabble as ‘the worst of its kind’, the Glasgow riot began as a result of Jacobites, papists and Episcopalians stirring up the people to demand an address.15 With the people suitably inflamed, it fell to James Clark, one

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of the city’s Presbyterian ministers, to push them over the edge. Defoe claimed that it was Clark’s sermon on Thursday, 7 November that was instrumental, albeit unwittingly as he later conceded, in starting the riots. Clark told his congregation that Glasgow used to be at the forefront of the cause of church and nation. He was reported to have finished by adding that neither addresses nor prayers would do at this time, there must be other methods, implying direct action, ‘Wherefore up and be valiant for the city of our God.’16 After the sermon, the mob beat a drum through the streets and had the inscription ‘No Incorporating Union’ on their hats. They ignored the magistrates, who had told them not to gather, but when they were finished they dispersed without trouble.17 According to Defoe, the following day the deacons of the trades met with the Provost at the council house and demanded that he prepare and send an address. The Provost refused, and after the deacons had informed the crowd gathering outside, the rioting began.18 Clark rejected Defoe’s account and offered a spirited defence of his role in the affair. He admitted that he had been active in calling for an address to parliament, but added that all the town’s ministers had been consulted and favoured an address.19 Clark denied that he had spoken the words attributed to him by Defoe. He insisted that he never had nor could encourage or countenance mob activity. He considered it contrary to law and gospel, to reason and good order, and something to be abhorred by every good Christian.20 According to Clark, his preaching, far from being inflammatory, was intended to discourage any mob activity.21 One account of Clark’s sermon claimed that he urged addressing on the grounds that it was a shame that one of the biggest cities in Scotland had not yet done so. The sermon offended the magistrates, who claimed they could not address until the Provost gave permission.22 The lack of an address from Glasgow was of concern elsewhere. Robert Wodrow expressed the surprise of many that Glasgow had not yet addressed. The town was urged to do so, not only to signify the sentiments of the country as a whole, but also as a means of showing parliament that the commission had its support in remonstrating against the subjection of church and nation to the abjured English bishops.23 Two contemporary accounts of the rioting differ from Defoe’s. According to these accounts, the rioting broke out on the night of Monday, 11 November rather than on Friday. According to James Wodrow, the mob had heard that the Provost, John Aird, had returned from Edinburgh and had asked that an address be subscribed. The Provost refused the request and ‘after much reasoning, the mob fell to their work on Monday night, & removed all scruples, so yt on Tuesday the address was subscribed’.24

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Wodrow attributed the Provost’s refusal to a desire not to offend the Court Party: ‘I know ye plain strait of the magistrates who most depend upon their friends yt are in court for good offices to the toun in generall, and I do not wonder they are under great difficulty’s.’25 According to James Brown, Minister at St Mungo’s in Glasgow, the Provost was in the coffee house on Monday night when the deacons and some merchants approached him and asked that he and the magistrates join with them in addressing parliament. The Provost refused but told them that if they wanted to address then they could do so, he would not stop them. He would not join them, having been advised by friends in Edinburgh not to address. As a result of this refusal, the crowd gathering outside the coffee house began rioting. According to Brown, the mob, made up mostly of young lads and ‘loose’ women, began throwing stones, smashing windows and looking for the Provost, who had fled. They attacked the provost’s house and the house of the Laird of Blackhouse who had also been in the coffee house. Rioting broke out again on the Wednesday, when the Provost was spotted in the street and someone threatened to stab him. He was chased through the streets but escaped.26 The immediate response of the magistrates was to produce an act and rules for keeping the peace. A town guard was to be mounted daily at three and every head of household sufficiently armed was to attend. Anyone unable to attend for whatever reason had to send someone in their place to the satisfaction of the captain of the guard. Everyone on guard, whether merchants or tradesmen, were to be subject to their officers and observe their orders punctually. Should any rioting begin in the city, a certain number of every trade was to report to the guard in order to help restore peace. All women, boys, young men and servants ‘above the number of three together’ were forbidden to be on the streets after dark. Heads of families would be held responsible for anyone in their household found to have been involved in rioting and, along with public houses, they had to give any strangers’ names to the captain of the guard before 10 p.m.27 Swift action by the authorities in both Edinburgh and Glasgow, pre-dating parliamentary legislation, was enough to prevent any further large-scale outbreaks of rioting in either city. Outbreaks of violence still occurred but on a smaller scale. Stones were thrown at Queensberry, Seafield and Argyll as they went to the Abbey late at night after parliament had adjourned, and there were rumours that an attempt would be made to assassinate Queensberry.28 In Glasgow the magistrates had informed the Privy Council that they had lately been insulted by a mob ‘not so much by those of the town as those from the country demanding money and arms’. However, the actions taken by the

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magistrates on 18 November were clearly effective because the town itself had managed to suppress the mob and the council was hopeful it could keep the peace.29 ‘TUMULTUARY MEETINGS AND IRREGULAR CONVOCATIONS’

Apart from outbreaks of mob violence and rioting, the authorities were concerned about what they termed ‘tumultuary meetings and irregular convocations’. The government had information that groups of armed men were gathering in places like Glasgow, the Stewartry of Kirkcudbright, Dumfries and Lanarkshire, with the intention of marching on Edinburgh to halt the parliamentary proceedings and prevent the passing of the treaty.30 On 20 November a group of armed men rode into Dumfries in a protest against the union, and to loud cheers from the gathered crowd, publicly burned the articles that were held up on the points of picks at the town cross. The crowd had gathered in anticipation because letters had been sent out some days before informing people of what was going to happen. The word in Edinburgh was that ‘they will not halt there’.31 Before leaving, they fixed a paper to the cross in which they explained their action and their reasons for protesting, which was to Testifie our Dissent from, Discontent with, and Protestation against the Twenty five Articles of the said Union . . . as being inconsistent with, and altogether prejudicial to, and utterly destructive of this Nation’s Independency, Crown Rights, and our Constitute Laws, both Sacred and Civil.32

They accused the Scottish commissioners at the negotiations of being ‘either simple, Ignorant or Treacherous, if not all three’.33 They protested that whatever was ratified in parliament, if it was inconsistent with the fundamental laws, liberties and privileges of church and state, would not be binding upon the nation, ‘now nor at any time to come’.34 According to the magistrates of Dumfries, they numbered at just over 500, around 420 horse and 120 foot.35 The demonstration has been generally attributed to the Cameronians. However, the protest was the work of John Hepburn and the Hebronites, who were often confused by contemporaries with the Cameronians.36 Some Cameronians may have taken part but there is no evidence to suggest that they did and it is unlikely that they did because they would not co-operate with, and maintained a strict separation from, other groups. In his account, Gavin Mitchell, one of Hepburn’s ‘great managers’, attributes the event largely to Hepburn and his followers. The magistrates of Dumfries claimed that a man called

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Harries led the protest. This was William Harries, who was also a Hebronite and a signatory to the address from the South and Western shires, which had been organised and signed by Hepburn and his followers. Finally, the protestation fixed to the cross was not one that the Cameronians could have accepted because it acknowledged the authority of the monarch and the government. The protestation was very different in tone from the one they eventually issued at Sanquhar in October 1707.37 Only an agreement to send an address had prevented the articles being burned at Glasgow.38 In Stirling, on 4 December, a group of men described as ‘ruffians’, and led by Patrick Stevenson, burned the articles to several cheers. The men were part of a ‘sham guard’ kept since most of the dragoons had left the town. Captain William Holburn claimed that the guard was good for nothing but ‘to raise tumults, for the whole toun are every night drunk. I wish we had some of the forces to curb this seditious people.’39 The following day the magistrates wrote to Lieutenant Colonel John Erskine, deputy governor of Stirling Castle, disowning the actions of Stevenson.40 They considered it a manifest contempt of government and disclaimed and disowned the actions as done without the knowledge of the council. The council was ready and willing to punish the perpetrators, who they claimed were a few drunken people and boys ignorant of the late proclamation of parliament against unlawful meetings. The burgh had submitted an address against the union but, like most of the rest of the country, it intended to keep its opposition and protestations within the law.41 On 13 December Mar wrote to Holburn ordering the arrest of Stevenson, but he escaped.42 The government responded by passing legislation against meetings and armed mustering on 29 and 30 November. Seafield had reported to parliament that the government had received numerous reports about armed gatherings, particularly in the west of Scotland, and ‘that there were papers dropt inviting people to take up arms & to provide ammunition and provisions in order to their marching to disturb the Parliament’.43 In response, the government produced a draft ‘Proclamation against all Unlawful Convocations’. Hamilton and Annandale protested that there were no reports of unlawful meetings in some places mentioned in the proclamation, and there was no particular information of such meetings in any part of Lanarkshire other than Glasgow.44 They accused the government of deliberately exaggerating the extent to which such meetings were taking place in order to justify the measures they were taking to counteract them.45 Queensberry claimed that he had information not only from Glasgow and Dumfries, but also from ‘severall places in lanerkshire of tumultuary & irregular

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meetings of men under arms and of their giving out and publishing their designe of marching to disturb the Parliament’.46 He claimed that at Kirk of Shotts, Lesmahagow and Stenhouse, letters had been delivered requiring several parishes ‘to meet and rendezvous, and be ready on a call with 10 days provision’.47 He had recently received the news from Dumfries of the burning of the articles and word had just arrived that a ‘rable army’, as Mar called it, had left Glasgow that morning to march on Edinburgh.48 The proclamation required anyone who had unlawfully gathered and taken up arms to lay down their arms, disperse and go home. Officers of the law and regular forces were empowered to ‘disperse and subdue the said convocations by open force and all manner of violence as enemies and open rebels to us and our government’. If the use of force to disperse any armed group resulted in injury or even the death of any civilians, the proclamation provided full remit and pardon with immunity from prosecution for those law officers and soldiers involved.49 The proclamation had to be amended because it forbade all assemblies in arms during the session of parliament. This, it was argued, was effectively a suspension of the clause in the Act of Security of 1704 allowing for armed musters, and therefore required an act of parliament. Despite protestations, the proclamation against unlawful convocations was approved on 29 November and the ‘Act against all Musters & Rendevouzes during the present Session of Parliament without Her Majesties special command’ was passed on 30 November.50 The act suspended the relevant clauses in the 1704 Act for the duration of the session of parliament and prohibited any armed gathering after the publication of the act, ‘upon any pretence whatsoever’.51 Reports of a potential armed rising prompted the government to take further precautionary measures and request that English troops be sent to the border, in addition to those established there in 1705. As early as 26 October the Earl of Leven, commander in chief of the Queen’s forces in Scotland, suggested to Godolphin that he send troops to the border. The ministry in England promptly dispatched forces north, mobilised in the north of Ireland and assured Queensberry that there would be troops from Flanders if he needed them. It was also reported that ships of war were to be stationed off the Scottish coast.52 The government hoped that the mere presence of the forces would be enough to discourage any group from rising in armed rebellion.53 The forces were ready to move as soon as there was any appearance of an armed rising but were only to enter Scotland upon Queensberry’s orders. They were probably sent to Ireland ‘to discourage any sympathetic demonstrations there, which its proximity to the west of Scotland would have made uncomfortable’.54

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When it came, the expected rising was something of an anti-climax. The ringleaders were called Finlay and Montgomerie. Finlay, a former soldier with the Dumbartonshire Regiment, was described as a ‘mean, scandalous, scoundrel fellow’, and a Jacobite who boasted he would be in Edinburgh in two days.55 Their numbers, described by Mar as ‘very considerable’, amounted to a mere forty-nine men and a drum. However, they were confident that their numbers would grow as they marched towards Edinburgh. From the government’s perspective, the appearance of the Glasgow rabble ‘made the suspending of that clause in the Act of Security the more reasonable and necessary’.56 It was hoped the suspension of the act would deprive the rebels of the men they hoped to pick up along the way. With a party of men on the march, and rumours of men gathering elsewhere, government concern was understandable. In the end, the rabble army turned out to be nothing more than a party of apprentices who marched out of Glasgow for Kilsyth. Hearing that troops had been dispatched to Linlithgow, they headed for Hamilton.57 One correspondent of Wodrow’s wrote that the group were leaving Glasgow just as he arrived, but that, as far as he could see, they had no particular plan of action.58 The Presbytery of Hamilton appeared to have had the same opinion when it described the group as ‘rash youths’.59 According to Wodrow, the Glasgow men were said to have drunk ‘King James’s health’ and to have ‘cursers, swearers and adulterers as their leaders’.60 It appears that the Glasgow army was not the product of an organised rising but a group put together on the spur of the moment and marching off in hope and expectation, rather than in the certain knowledge that others would join them. Nevertheless, the perception was that an organised insurrection was under way. Rumours soon multiplied the numbers. Defoe thought that war was beginning and that the Glasgow men were a hundred strong, to be followed by two hundred more and joined by men from Stirling, Hamilton and Galloway.61 For the opposition, the rising was unwelcome. It was such an ‘insignificant appearance’ that it would easily be dealt with. It was the opinion of many that it was ‘the best step could have been made to gratify the interest of the Unitarians’. The government could and did use the action to justify its troop movements, and it was thought that the action damaged other opposition plans that may have been more effective.62 The troops dispatched to Linlithgow were to cut off the Glasgow army, should it get that far, although Mar doubted that they would unless their numbers increased. In an attempt to further destabilise the situation, rumours, possibly Jacobite propaganda, were spreading that the Pretender had landed or was about to land, in Scotland. He was

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reported to be landing somewhere in the highlands with about two hundred officers and funds to support a rising. He expected to be joined by large numbers of supporters. It was also being reported that he had turned Protestant and offered not only to establish Presbyterian church government but also to take the Solemn League and Covenant. The reports apparently frightened some and won over others, including Presbyterians.63 By the time the Glasgow army arrived in Hamilton late on Sunday, 1 December, it had increased to around eighty men. They asked for quarters, for which they would pay, and said they intended the town no harm but would fight ‘while their blood is warm for the independency, religion . . . of their country against England’. They planned to march on, confident that greater numbers would join them to enable them to defeat all the forces in the kingdom.64 According to the Duchess, the group left Hamilton for Rutherglen on 3 December. She had ordered the town to keep a constant guard over them during their stay to prevent any disorder. She claimed that their appearance came as a surprise to the people, which would substantiate the argument that the rising was more spontaneous than planned. However, the government was unconvinced. James Erskine, Mar’s brother, doubted her sincerity and the government accused her of presiding over disorders at the rendezvous held at Kirk of Shotts and Lesmahagow. The Duchess insisted that there had been no manner of ‘confusion, discontent or disorder’. The only complaints had been by the tenants of the Lairds of Blackwood and Auchtifordell, because their masters would not let them go to the rendezvous with everyone else. She believed the lairds in question were the source of Queensberry’s information, all of which she claimed was false. She insisted that had there been disturbances anywhere that she had an interest or concern, she would have known about it. She claimed that if it had not been for her actions, what had happened at Dumfries would have been repeated throughout the shire.65 Despite her strong anti-unionism, the Duchess refused to get involved in or give support to any armed rising. She was prepared to countenance the mustering of armed men consistent with the Act of Security, but not the actual use of force. A rendezvous of several parishes was due to take place at Hamilton on 4 December, but as soon as the Duchess became aware of the act against such gatherings, it was cancelled. A number of parishes stayed at home but others gathered at Avendale and Kilbryde before marching to a rendezvous at Clydeside and then returning ‘peacebly’ home again. Her compliance with the new law was unpopular, and she reported to the Duke that the people were complaining that he was no longer their friend.66

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The Glasgow army must have returned to the city after leaving Hamilton. The leaders were arrested on 5 December. Andrew Montgomerie was arrested in his own house. Montgomerie’s brother John travelled to Edinburgh, and Robert Wodrow and Principal John Stirling were urged to help him assist his brother, who was being held in the castle.67 This suggests that Montgomerie at least was no Jacobite. The two men were interrogated and while they gave the authorities some information, it was fairly insignificant. Some Glasgow youths were arrested but, according to Mar, they missed the principal ringleaders. If the rabble was a spontaneous movement, there was probably nothing much to divulge and no one of any significance to arrest.68 Among those arrested was a servant of the Duchess of Hamilton by the name of Porterfield and a gentleman named Weir, who was the town Treasurer of Hamilton. Porterfield was accused of having told the men mustering around Hamilton that it was necessary to exercise well ‘for it might be they might shortly goe to the fields’. Weir was accused of having given money to the Glasgow men, information the government received from Finlay.69 The Duchess protested the innocence of both men in the strongest terms. She insisted that Porterfield, who had been born and bred in their family service, was of excellent character. Weir was said to be a sober and substantial man who had never been guilty of any disorder, ‘But on the contrary when those Glasgow people came here, was one of those who keep’t guard in ye tollbooth by my order, to prevent any disturbance here, which he and the rest did very effectively.’70 The source of the government information were spies against whom Hamilton warned his mother, ‘I find all paines is taken by spies to find out if they can discover any in your graces or my conduct that they could make anything off soe wee ought to be the more on our guard.’71 The Duchess was confident that whatever the government hoped to get out of Finlay and Montgomerie, none of their people were involved. As for the spies, ‘I wish those that are spys amongst us were discovered and if they tell but truths it were little matter but that is not the design of such.’72 THE CHURCH AND POPULAR PROTEST

The government generally blamed the unrest upon the activities of the Jacobites and the preaching of ministers.73 According to Mar, ministers preaching up the danger to the Kirk were the principal cause of the increased hostility to union. He expressed fear that ministers were not going to behave as wisely or prudently as he had expected.74 Mar could hardly mention the church without claiming that ministers were wild or

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going mad. As far as he was concerned, the preaching of ministers inflamed the Glasgow mob.75 Defoe likewise blamed ministers for the hostility to union among the people. He accused them of ‘Knavery’ and described them as ‘Kirk Devills’. The country ministers in particular ‘enflame the people strangely’.76 Mar insisted that not only were ministers across the country preaching against union, some were calling their people to arms.77 One writer included ministers among those he described as ‘movers of sedition’. They ‘fear their insolence and infallibility will be in hazard and their stipends in danger, and, therefore, being the worst side of popery, by humouring the mob they lead them implicitly to their ruin’.78 They warned their people from the pulpit that ‘prayers are not sufficient; they must act’. Others gave notice from the pulpit that all the heritors must be in arms to support their friends who will join them within the week, and are not to be disappointed. Thus they instruct their auditory to murder for God’s sake, and to defend their religion upon presumption, which has equal influence on them all, with the best proofs.

The writer insisted that they should be silenced, if not banished, ‘for the whole Assembly, by their intermeddling with secular affairs, have forfeited their loyal establishment and deserve little favour’.79 Concerned about the volatile state of the country, Wodrow complained that there was no reasoning with the government. Anyone who asked them to consider the state of the nation, and to take action that would calm people’s fears, was accused of ‘acting beyond their sphere’. Any minister who made such a call was described as an incendiary. The government was in no mood to listen and knew who to blame.80 One correspondent of Principal Stirling shared his wishes that the debate in the country would be carried with less heat and passion, but feared it was unlikely. Shocked by some sermons around Glasgow, he wrote, ‘I could not have believed such expressions should drop from one man’s mouth, far less from a minister’s in the pulpit on the Sabbath.’ Ministers were exploiting people’s fears and claiming that as parliament sold the nation to such as ‘heretofore have shown but little kindness to us’, and pressed on with union, it would ‘prove the ruin of the nation’. He wondered if ministers could wash their hands in innocence if the consequence of their preaching was that people ‘rise in arms against authoritie, or private people be rabbled who differ in opinion’.81 The comments of contemporaries about ministers preaching against the union have led to the view that such preaching was widespread. However, it is clear that not every pulpit became a platform for the

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opposition and that anti-union preaching was far from universal, even among those opposed to it. One obvious reason for this is that not all ministers were opposed to union. The Earl of Leven rejected claims that all Presbyterians were against the union. They may not all have been supporters but he insisted ‘that there are ten times more Presbyterians for the union than there are of the Episcopall party’.82 The Hebronites directed their pamphlet at, among others, Presbyterian ministers who supported union.83 Sir John Clerk wrote that many ministers had a ‘very favourable Opinion of the Union’.84 The most high-profile supporters were Edinburgh ministers such as William Mitchell of the Canongate, David Blair and William Carstares.85 James Hart, Carstares’ colleague at Greyfriars, denounced him as a traitor to the church because he supported and promoted union.86 In fact, in the west of Scotland there was considerable suspicion over the position of ministers from the east in general.87 Nevertheless, even in the west, where opposition was strongest, union had its supporters. John Stirling, Principal of Glasgow University, was later described as being well affected to the present settlement (union).88 In the Presbytery of Paisley three ministers were named as favouring the union: Patrick Simson of Renfrew, James Brown from the Abbey church and William Fleming of Houston. These men managed to influence the actions of the presbytery in relation to not addressing and not writing to the commission.89 It was said of another minister that he ‘favours incorporation wonderfully’.90 In a pro-union sermon, one minister was reported as having said that ‘if Scotland could propose more advantage by an united parliament wt England, ye national covt did not bind us [not] to make for what was most profite’.91 Another factor that limited anti-union preaching and kept the issue out of the pulpit was the fact that there were ministers who had not made up their minds and were open to persuasion. As the reaction to the act securing the church demonstrated, there were ministers who, while hostile to the original treaty, were prepared to accept the treaty under the right conditions.92 Government efforts to explain the treaty and assure ministers that the church would be secured had some success.93 Some ministers were being won over before parliament or the commission opened, while others were ‘still in suspence and some will not be convinced’.94 The opposition had hoped that ministers would join with them against the treaty. There was concern as it became clear that this was unlikely to happen. Charles Douglas, 2nd Earl of Selkirk, was unsure how ministers would react when parliament opened, and expressed the view that they could hardly be trusted.95 His doubts and fears seemed to have been confirmed by the change in heart he encountered among them. His anger and

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frustration was evident in a letter to his brother: ‘I am extremely scandalized with the presbiterean ministers of this place for severall who prayed and preached against the union are now come over to the measure.’96 He had already complained that the ‘treaters’ were using all their arts to get proselytes, and it appeared they were having some success.97 As time passed, the number of ministers who favoured the union grew, especially as the church had an act in the treaty giving it the security it sought. Never one to miss an opportunity, Daniel Defoe was a frequent observer at commission sessions and was always trying to persuade ministers of the benefits of union. He was sympathetic to their concerns and tried to answer them. He encouraged English dissenters who supported the treaty to come to Edinburgh and meet with ministers. English Presbyterians had been in correspondence with their Scottish brethren for some time, encouraging them to support union. Two named Roswell and Taylor had spent September and October in Edinburgh for the same purpose.98 The outcome of all his efforts was encouraging, and he claimed some success in winning their support, as he explained to Robert Harley: ‘The union as such they are not against and some of them profess to be very willing to come into it.’99 Large numbers of ministers arrived in Edinburgh during October and November, many of whom, by the time they went home, because of their exposure to the debate and the persuasive arguments of unionists, were favourably disposed towards the treaty. James McDougall from Mearns, in the Presbytery of Paisley, told Robert Wodrow that he had been informed ‘that many brethren of the commission favour this union more than before’.100 Finally, the fact that many did not preach on the union can be attributed to the reluctance among ministers to interfere in civil affairs. As Defoe rightly pointed out, generally speaking ministers kept the debate out of the pulpit.101 In his dispute with another minister who had argued that the times called for strong preaching against the union, John Bell insisted that using the pulpit was not the way to achieve success. He claimed that the ministers in his area around Haddington, though not ‘fond’ of union, did not use the pulpit to preach against union.102 His reasoning was that such preaching was unnecessary because the church ought to rely on the commission to act in its interests. Furthermore, it was unwarranted because likely to inflame further the passions of their people already heightened and hostile to union. The irony was that while unionists accused ministers of inflaming the people by their preaching, there were ministers trying to keep the subject out of the pulpit for fear of inflaming the people. Like John Bell and other ministers, Patrick Simson believed the issue of the union should have been kept out of the

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pulpit. He did not think it was the duty of ministers to always make their views known unless it particularly related to issues of salvation and damnation and, ‘Where it may be to more hurt than advantage, feed distempers and cause mutual jealousies and wherein we are going down the stream of the general humour, we need not bid running men go fast.’103 He believed that such preaching would prove counterproductive. He argued that the Jacobites were glad to use the Presbyterians as their tools and were ready to stir up disorders and have the blame of it all placed upon Presbyterians. The dangerous consequences for the church were that the government might not act in the interest of the church. He greatly regretted that the trouble among the populace had been partly stirred up by ministers, either by preaching or by addressing.104 Commenting to Robert Harley about sermons against the union, Carstares said he could not justify them and considered them unsuitable to the present situation because likely to inflame the people. Nevertheless, he insisted that such sermons were not widespread and what Harley had heard about them ought not to be applied to the whole church. He believed Harley ‘too wise and just to impute the indiscretion of particular persons to the whole body’. Carstares’ explanation of such preaching was that ministers did so out of fear of their congregations, and felt obliged to go further in complying with their wishes than they were themselves inclined.105 George Lockhart also emphasised the differences between ministers and their congregations. He claimed that while the people stood firm in their opposition to union, many ministers changed their tune after the passing of the act for securing the church and ‘preached up what not long before they had declared anathemas against’. As a result of their behaviour, they lost much of their reputation among their people.106 Thomas Boston likewise recorded that the spirits of the people were embittered against the ministers of the church because of their support for or acceptance of the union, adding by way of a contrast between himself and those ministers, that he had never been for the union and had always been against it from the ‘beginning unto this day’.107 These differences are indicative of the fact that there were ministers who did not share and did not articulate the anti-unionism of their congregations. Furthermore, as Thomas Boston’s published sermons for the period demonstrate, even the opponents of union, if they said anything, were often restrained. The spiritual journal of Sir John Clerk contains comments on the preaching of various Edinburgh ministers that he heard at the time. Clerk heard James Webster on 3 November, and recorded that he never touched on state affairs.108 Webster only published his anti-

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union pamphlets after the treaty had been ratified. Until then he had ‘profess’t himself for the Union’, and was reported as having ‘Declared the Church Could Not be safe without it’.109 According to Clerk, many of the sermons and lectures he heard never touched on the union. Furthermore, many of the city ministers took the opportunity of the commission’s session to employ country ministers to preach for them, and they likewise did not touch on state affairs. Some ministers he heard, such as George Hamilton of the High Kirk, another of the ‘antediluvians’, preached against the union. Others, such as William Mitchell of the Canongate, preached in favour. Mitchell’s sermon, ‘excellently’ delivered on 10 November, was based upon Genesis 46 and Jacob’s moving down to Egypt with his family at the desire of his sons, under great fears of famine opposition & contagion & his seeking first ye counsel & conduct of G & his gracious answer yrto & favourable providence towards him and all that went down into Egypt . . . a place and discourse very suitable to our entering into a union wt England.110

Throughout the session of parliament, the commission appointed a different minister each week to preach before Queensberry and parliament. Despite this, no one seems to have used the opportunity to ‘roar’ against the union. Had any minister done so, writers like Defoe or William Paterson, and politicians like Mar, would have mentioned it. The ministers may well have suffered a collective loss of nerve, but it is more likely that they shared John Bell’s view that the pulpit was neither the time nor the place for expressing anti-union views. It is also possible that they were specifically chosen because they were unlikely to raise the issue, which also suggests they shared Bell’s view. According to the entrepreneur William Paterson, silence on the subject was as bad as preaching. He accused some ministers of stirring up their people ‘by their doubtful and diffident carriage about it’, which ‘enraged the mob more than if they had openly appeared against it’.111 Daniel Defoe frequently expressed the view that there was a direct link between the activities of the Kirk’s ministers and the mob. As far as he was concerned, the Kirk, including the commission, was a mob.112 He blamed James Clark, minister at the Tron church, for starting the Glasgow riots. While acknowledging the prudence of the Duchess of Hamilton in not allowing the Glasgow rabble to assemble at Hamilton, he accused the thirteen ministers in the Presbytery of Hamilton of having read from their pulpits letters calling upon the people to assemble in arms.113 Not only were they guilty of encouraging people to rendezvous, but also, according to Mar, the ministers joined with them. Robert Wylie was accused of

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meeting with the people at the appointed place, and another minister offered to be their captain. Wylie was reported as having rebuked the people for not turning out in greater numbers before appointing another day for their next meeting.114 That some ministers in the west of Scotland should get involved in mustering is no surprise, steeped as it was in the covenanting traditions of resistance. Intelligence that the government received about letters calling on the people to assemble in arms may have included an overture For putting a stop more effectually to the parlts concluding of an incorporating wt England, containing a number of points for action, including, That in the interim, yr be frequent rendezvous and exercise of the fencible men through all the Burghs and paroches of this countrey, yt in case yr service and assistance shall be required for the defence and maintainance of the liberties and rights of the church and nation they may be in all suitable readiness to answer the call.115

It was believed that some kind of armed appearance in the west would help to put pressure on the government. It was recommended that each parish exercise every day or week, as allowed by law, and that some or all of the parishes and burghs send deputies to Edinburgh with an address. The address was to express unease at parliament’s failure to respond to the addresses it had already received. They were to thank parliament for the legal right to exercise and that they were most unwilling to do anything that seemed to be against law. They feared extraordinary methods may provoke extraordinary measures, but they would continue in arms until they saw how the union would be resolved. They were to state that they felt obliged to address parliament in the hope that the unrest in the country might be ended by the ‘laying aside of this scheme, lest oppression make wise men mad with protestations’.116 Such concerted action never took place, but much of the activity was done openly because it was perfectly legal under the terms of the Act of Security of 1704. Only when that particular clause was suspended by an act of parliament on 30 November did it become illegal. When it continued in some places around Hamilton, where ministerial involvement was most suspected and reported, the Duchess of Hamilton ordered them to stop.117 All of which begs the question, what was the point of organising musters of armed men if they were not going to be used? Far from putting pressure on Queensberry, he simply outlawed their activities and called their bluff. All the talk of defending church and nation proved empty, little more than sabre rattling or, as Mar put it, ‘bragging’.118

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Despite the reports and accusations against ministers, the church as a whole rejected the activities of the mob. Anti-unionists rejected force as a means of preventing the union and saw it as counterproductive. The Glasgow riots, and the rising that began there, added to Robert Wodrow’s black mood because such an, ‘insignificant appearance’ would only hurt the anti-union cause and help the government. It was a ‘rash and foolish’ work that would effectually stop other plans that might have been more successful.119 What those other plans were, Wodrow does not say, but his comments underline the view that the Glasgow rising was a spontaneous, insignificant affair and not part of a plan for a widespread rising. He described the Glasgow mob as a ‘rabble of whores and scumen’ and a ‘pack of graceless rakes whom no man of religion can own’. He believed their actions had been responsible for the parliament’s proclamation against tumults and mustering during the session of parliament and added, ‘I doe think this ill managed matter has been one of ye best handles ever the court had under the colour of law and reason to crush all opposite measures to ye union, and to ye perpetual enslaving of ye nation.’120 Similar sentiments were expressed by James Clark, who had been accused of stirring up the riots with his preaching. 121 Much of the activity had been reported as having taken place in and around the presbyteries of Lanark and Hamilton where ministers had been accused of stirring up the people and organising musters. Yet in their addresses, both stated that they were doing everything possible to prevent hostility to union from breaking out into violence. Far from being instigators, they presented themselves as upholders of the peace who ‘by our unwearied diligence have hitherto prevented irregularities’.122 Where disturbances had taken place, some ministers, despite government accusations, had attempted to discourage them. George Meldrum was recorded as preaching against the rabble in Edinburgh on 31 October.123 The Presbytery of Biggar expressed concern at the unrest and urged the commission to preserve the unity and peace of the church, and prevent separate actions being taken in different parts of the church, ‘which we may unhappily fall into’.124 The letter was remitted to the Committee for Public Affairs on 5 December for further consideration. After discussing the disorders, three members were appointed to prepare a draft letter to be sent to presbyteries. The letter was to be discussed by the full committee and any member of the commission was allowed to be present. The draft was then presented to the commission, debated and accepted. The letter urged it as their duty that the brethren ‘discountenance and discourage all irregularities’ that tended to disturb the government.125 The commission’s point was that, in the light of its efforts to

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secure the interests of the church, such disturbances were only going to prove detrimental to those interests. They were likely to antagonise the government upon who, under God, the advantages they enjoyed, and hoped they would continue to enjoy, did ‘much depend’. Furthermore, the enemies of ‘our present Happy Establishment’ were ready to take advantage of the disorders ‘to the Disadvantage and Reproach of this Church’. By stating that the treaty was under deliberation by the ‘Representatives of our Nation’, they were reminding their people that, however unpopular the proposed treaty was, there was nothing unconstitutional or illegal in the proceedings. It was a legitimate debate in a legally constituted parliament. After agreeing the contents of the letter, a dispute arose about who should receive it. Because of the limited geographical spread of the disorders, some argued that the letter should only be sent to those presbyteries where trouble had been reported. In response, it was argued that the letter should be sent out to all presbyteries ‘without exception’. A vote was called and it was decided that all presbyteries should receive the letter.126 The commission’s letter received a stinging response from the Presbytery of Hamilton. Acknowledging the reports of disorders in Glasgow and other parts of Lanarkshire, it rejected as ‘grossly false’ reports of disorders within its presbytery, or that members of the presbytery had been involved. It insisted that it had acted at all times to calm and restrain its people and condemned as ‘utterly false and malicious’ suggestions that there had been the ‘least tumult or irregular practice among them since this union came in question’. It did not deny holding its ‘accustomed ordinary rendezvous, warranted by law’, but these had ceased since ‘the act forbidding the same’. It acknowledged that the Glasgow rabble passed through the presbytery, but insisted that they received no help or encouragement from ministers or people. As far as they were concerned, the presbytery was as quiet as any place in the kingdom.127 Despite the hysterical reaction of some commentators in Edinburgh, incidents of public disorder and rioting were limited. Most of the country was, as the Presbytery of Hamilton claimed, quiet. The Presbytery of Biggar, while expressing concern at the reports it had heard, made no mention of any disorders within its own bounds. The Presbytery of Penpont in the south-west had been deeply concerned at the discontent among the people about the treaty and the impact of the inflammatory preaching of John Macmillan. Nevertheless, it stated that ‘there have been no such tumults and disorders here’. The limited extent of the disorders is born out in the response of presbyteries to the commission’s letter to discourage disorders. Of the records available, none

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make any reference to disorders within their bounds. This does not mean there were no disorders; there were riots in Edinburgh, but the Edinburgh presbytery makes no mention of them. However, the response of the presbyteries to the letters is such as to indicate that, for most of them, it was not a problem. The Presbyteries of Haddington and Wigtown stated categorically that there had been no such disorders within their bounds.128 Most presbyteries simply recorded their receipt of the letter, in some cases without comment. Some presbyteries approved of its sentiments and some stated that they would act accordingly. Letters from the commission regarding the national fast prompted the moderators of the presbyteries to immediately call special presbytery meetings. However, the letter concerning disorders did not. This meant that most presbyteries did not officially read and discuss the letter until January 1707, by which time even the most troublesome areas had quietened down. The Presbytery of Strathbogie did not read and approve of the letter until 5 February 1707, over two weeks after the treaty was ratified. Delaying consideration of the letters until subsequent meetings demonstrated that, for most presbyteries, disorders were not a pressing issue.129 William Carstares and ‘Moderate kirkmanship’ are usually credited as being the driving force behind the commission’s letter. However, the commission’s action arose out of concerns initially expressed by the Presbytery of Biggar, but shared by the rest of the church. While Carstares signed the letter, it was only because he had taken over temporarily the role of moderator. William Wishart had gone home for a week because his mother-in-law was dangerously sick.130 Furthermore, the sentiments expressed by the commission were shared and supported by all shades of opinion in the church, not just by moderates. THE CAMERONIAN–JACOBITE ALLIANCE

Of the various reports and rumours of disorders and plots, the most intriguing of all is that of an armed rising involving the Cameronians and the Jacobites. According to accounts, these otherwise implacable enemies intended to join together, march on Edinburgh and prevent the parliament from concluding the union. Historians have generally accepted the accounts at face value, or at least with the attitude that there is no smoke without fire.131 However, there are a number of reasons for calling into question the existence of this alliance. First, an alliance seems unlikely, considering their theological and political differences. Second, the evidence is unreliable and contradictory. Evidence for the alliance rests predominately upon two accounts that were written some years later by

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John Ker of Kersland and George Lockhart of Carnwath, both of whom were Jacobites. Third, contemporaries confused the Cameronians and the Hebronites, and called them all Cameronians. Finally, insufficient attention has been given to the attitude of the Cameronians to their reported involvement. THE ACCOUNT OF JOHN KER OF KERSLAND

According to Ker, the aversion to union was universal and the ‘whole country’ took up arms and mustered in their parishes under the terms of the Act of Security more frequently than they had done before. In order to exploit the situation, the French king and the Jacobites at St Germain sent agents to Scotland to lay the foundations of a new revolution. Aware of Presbyterian hostility to union, the Jacobite agents wanted to secure their support against it. However, because the Presbyterians had no specific leader that they would all follow and that the Jacobites could approach, it was decided to approach the Cameronians. Knowing the Cameronian hostility to the Jacobites, it was decided to conceal from them the aim of the plan – the restoration of the Pretender. Arguments were employed against the union that were most likely to appeal to the Cameronians, who ‘swallowed the bait’. They joined forces with the Jacobites, although ignorant of their aims. John Ker claimed he had close associations with the Cameronians and it was not long before the plan and the real intentions of the Jacobites came to his attention. Furthermore, the government became aware that the Cameronians were to rise in the south, be joined by ‘most of the Presbyterians’ and also by Jacobites from the north, who would then march on Edinburgh to put an end to the parliament and the union. Queensberry, knowing Ker’s associations with the Cameronians, explained the situation to him and told him he believed it was in Ker’s power to prevent the plot from ever coming to pass by preventing the Cameronians from ‘going into such pernicious measures’. If the Cameronians pulled out, the Jacobites would never rise. Ker accepted the task and ‘heartily’ embarked on the work that he claimed later would give him much sorrow, although at the time he believed he was doing a great service to his country and the Protestant interest. Ker left Edinburgh for Killoch Side near Sanquhar at the end of November. The Cameronians were holding a general meeting to which he was admitted and allowed to address. The question he put to them was whether or not they should oppose the union and, if so, what form their opposition should take. He added that, as far as he was concerned,

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he was ready to follow their instructions and to share with them in life and death as his predecessors had done. According to Ker, the Cameronians then proceeded to debate the union, which they believed would be destructive to their principles, to the honour and interest of the country, and that it was their duty to oppose it. Ker pretended to join with them in all their measures and they proceeded to burn the articles at the cross in Dumfries. Ker informed Queensberry that, in order to keep up his front, it had been necessary for him to participate in the burning of the articles and that it may be necessary to burn the houses of some unionists. The Cameronians were in earnest, but he did it only to ensure they continued to put their confidence in him. The Jacobite agents returned and tried to persuade the Cameronians to march on Edinburgh with the assurance that the Highlanders would join them. Ker told the Cameronians that he suspected that the Jacobites, who had always been their enemies, were drawing them into a trap. By urging them to rise against the government, they would be glad to see them cut one another’s throats. While they had given a public demonstration of their opposition to union, the Jacobites had not, and therefore they had good reason to doubt their resolve and sincerity. Ker told the Cameronians that they could raise the parliament at any time without the help of the Jacobites. When that was done, it would be necessary to establish a new form of government. In this, it would be necessary to consult the rest of the nation because they were such a small part that it would not be so easy to set up a new government as to overthrow the old. They ought therefore to work with the rest of their countrymen, with whom they should enter into a correspondence in order to regulate their action and act unanimously. The Cameronians appeared satisfied with Ker’s advice and departed. The Highlanders, hearing that the Cameronians had gone home, did likewise and the plot was foiled.132 In his memoir, Ker portrays himself as the chief architect of the plot’s collapse, something he later regretted. By preventing the Cameronians from joining up with the Highlanders, he became the unhappy instrument of union.133 Ker’s account, while fascinating, is self-serving and full of errors and contradictions. The Cameronians, not surprisingly, denounced it as a fabrication. They rejected his claims that he had close associations with them and insisted that he had never been a member of their societies and had never been present at any of their general meetings.134 The minutes of the general meetings offer no evidence that Ker was ever present at any of their meetings and he is only mentioned in 1727 when a committee was appointed to respond to his memoirs. Furthermore, the general meeting he claimed to have attended at Killoch Side, near Sanquhar in

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late November 1706 never took place. The conclusions of the general meetings have no record of a meeting at this time. All general meetings were held in secrecy and minutes kept. Had one taken place, there was no reason for the societies not to record its deliberations. The pattern for the whole of 1706 was to hold meetings every two months. Meetings were held in February, April, June, August, October and December. At the October meeting, which was held on the ninth, the topic of discussion was the call and ordination of John Macmillan as their minister. Having agreed to call Macmillan, they urged him to begin his preaching work immediately. Macmillan declined, asking for more time to consider his response, ‘So that until the end of December that year we had no preaching.’135 It was not Cameronian preachers who were fomenting opposition to union in the west.136 Ker claimed that the meeting he attended took place at the end of November, after which they went to Dumfries, where they burned the articles. However, the protest at Dumfries took place on 20 November; had Ker’s meeting taken place, it would have had to be in the middle and not the end of the month. Furthermore, the protest at Dumfries was a Hebronite affair led by William Harries, yet Ker claims it was the action of the Cameronians, who were led by himself. The account given by the magistrates of Dumfries made no reference to Ker.137 It was not unusual for contemporaries to confuse the two groups, but such confusion would be impossible for someone who was a Cameronian.138 If Ker had the close associations with the Cameronians he claimed he had, he would never have confused them with the Hebronites, but in his description of the events at Dumfries he does. The public testimony against the union of burning the articles that Ker attributes to himself and the Cameronians was made by the Hebronites. It is difficult to say exactly the size of force any Cameronian – Jacobite alliance could raise, but that it should be such as to lead Queensberry to believe that it would raise parliament, cut the regular forces to pieces and turn Britain into a field of blood seems unlikely. Sir John Clerk believed there were more than enough regular troops to keep the Jacobites in order.139 Defoe did not share his confidence. The armed Highlanders walking the streets of Edinburgh appeared to him as ‘formidable fellows’ and made him feel uneasy. Should any insurrection take place, he feared the troops in Scotland were insufficient and ‘not to be depended upon’. The general consensus was that forces should be stationed at the border just in case.140 This lack of confidence may well have been occasioned by news that attempts were being made to get soldiers to address against the treaty, ‘gaining of the soldiery being a matter of the greatest consequence’.141 The aim was that

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each company on its own should address parliament and those companies joining together should in a ‘blunt’ way petition their commanders. Officers were seen as the greatest problem. This could be overcome if soldiers petitioned their officers to send an address. Even if this failed, it was expected that news of the soldiers’ actions would eventually reach parliament, and ‘will greatly animate the country’. There was confidence that the soldiers were not favourably disposed to the union, particularly as it was likely to result in them being ‘carried abroad, while English forces would be sent to ‘oppress and bridle Scotland’. Getting the support of the military was essential to breaking the treaty, and the writer claimed that many had already stated their support for the scheme. Nevertheless, he believed that the opposition in Edinburgh was ‘very slack and far behind’ in this business and needed to act quickly to take advantage of the opportunity before them.142 Just how far beyond wishful thinking these proposals went is difficult to say. Queensberry took the necessary precautions anyway and not only had the regular forces within Scotland at his disposal but could call upon English forces from just across the border and Ulster, if required. Clerk, a client of Queensberry and privy to much of the extra-parliamentary politics of the party, also rejected Ker’s account and his claim to have been employed by Queensberry. In his copy of George Lockhart’s Memoirs, Clerk recorded: ‘Car of Carsland in his memoirs pretends he was employed as Major Eckat was but I believe he had only a mind to be thought a greater knave than he was for I never heard either the Duke of Queensberry or Major Eckat mention him.’143 There are further inconsistencies in Ker’s account of his activities with the Jacobites in 1707. Ker again claimed he was working as a government agent. On this occasion, he promised the Jacobites that he could raise 8,000 disaffected Presbyterians, of which 5,000 were Cameronians. The Jacobite Duchess of Gordon believed that 13,000 Cameronians were available for the king’s service. These may have been the 5,000 Cameronians and 8,000 other Presbyterians Ker had promised the Jacobite agent, Colonel Nathaniel Hooke.144 Ker maintained his fiction of a close association with the Cameronians and described them as his party and the men the Cameronians would provide as his men.145 Ker also claimed that in return for their help, the Cameronians had asked the Jacobites that, the king would not declare for presbytery or episcopacy, but leave it to a free parliament to decide. Even more implausibly, they asked that a free parliament should secure liberty of conscience for Catholics. Considering their theological and ideological position, not only was it unlikely the Cameronians would help the Pretender, but they

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would never have made such requests. Clearly Ker was not speaking for the Cameronians and the Cameronians were not interested in an alliance with the Jacobites. Rather, Ker, as an agent, was using the Cameronian name to dupe the Jacobites.146 Ker also claimed that he had helped to write the Cameronian anti-union address delivered at Sanquhar on 2 October 1707. He claimed that the address was a response to Jacobite requests for evidence of Cameronian disaffection to union and their readiness to rise.147 According to Ker, the protest did not expressly mention the Pretender and was worded so as to ‘make the Jacobites hope that the Cameronians might soon be reconciled to that interest’.148 Not only had Ker not helped create the document, he had not even read it. Had he done so, he would have found that it emphatically rejected the Pretender. Furthermore, addressing the rumours about themselves and the Jacobites, they declared and whereas (as is reported) we are maliciously aspersed by these who profess themselves of the Presbyterian perswasion, especially the Laodicean preachers, that we should be accessory to the advancement of him whom they call the Prince of Wales to the throne of Britain: Therefore to let all concerned be fully assured of the contrary, We protest and testifie against all such so principled to have any right to rule in thir lands because we look upon all such to be standing in a stated opposition to God and our covenanted work of reformation.149

The Cameronians later claimed that the document was proof they were not involved in any alliance with the Jacobites, not only because of the sentiments expressed, but because it was published at a time when there were real fears of an invasion from France.150 It is clear that Ker had little knowledge of and no dealings with the Cameronians. One can understand why, as a government agent (in 1707), or at least while claiming to be one, he would make such exaggerated claims. He needed to ingratiate himself with the plotters to gain information he could relate to the government. He could make such claims, as he acknowledged, without the necessity of there being a shred of truth to them – he only had to appear believable. The correspondence of 1707 suggests that Ker was playing the Cameronian card for all it was worth and until he was exposed late in 1707, and denounced as a fool and a knave, the Jacobites believed him and his claims.151 Ker’s own account conveniently ignores the fact that he was exposed in 1707, and he continued to write of his work as an agent in 1708. The events of 1707, and his work as an agent at that time, raise further questions about his claims to have been working as an agent in late 1706. Why would the

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Jacobites trust him in the first place in 1707, if he had been responsible for breaking up an alliance in late 1706? Why would they believe his claims of being able to provide Cameronians to help the Pretender, if such an alliance had proved impossible in 1706? The fiasco of 1706, if true, would at least have made the Jacobites more circumspect when it came to Ker’s claims. Furthermore, the numbers of Cameronians that he claimed to be able to supply further undermines the authenticity of his account. The smaller amount of five thousand armed men appears to be more than the Cameronians could provide. One writer pointed out that, in 1715, warnings were given against their appearing at rendezvous in small numbers because it was likely to reveal their numerical weakness.152 Finally, despite its many flaws, Ker’s account does contain two points corroborated elsewhere. First, there were west-country Presbyterians prepared to take up arms against the union. Second, there was a belief that those Presbyterians were being encouraged and duped by Jacobites.153 The turbulent mood of the time was such that a rising in the west was considered a distinct possibility. Groups of armed men were mustering legally under the terms of the Act of Security; rumours persisted of the west-country men marching on Edinburgh and there were reports that the Duke of Atholl’s Highlanders were also holding armed musters and were ready to march. One report on 30 November claimed that Atholl’s men were in arms and that troops had been sent to secure the pass at Stirling. Argyll’s men were said to have moved in preparation to ‘fall in on Atholl or the west as need is’.154 James Cunningham of Aiket, who served as an agent of Queensberry, was reported as having attempted to encourage a rising in the west, before switching sides in a ‘remorse of conscience’.155 It was widely believed that the Jacobites unsuccessfully invested a great deal of time and effort into encouraging the west-country Presbyterians to march on Edinburgh. The term ‘westcountry people’ was used to describe all Presbyterians from the west, not just Cameronians. They refused to march for two reasons. First, the weather was bad, the worst in living memory, and had already hampered efforts to organise addresses.156 Second, ministers in Edinburgh warned ‘their brethren and friends in the west to dissuade them from so invidious an attempt’ because the Jacobites intended making the ‘cat’s foot’ of the Presbyterians. They intended exploiting the Presbyterians by getting them to rise first, while Atholl’s Highlanders waited on the outcome.157 The Duke of Atholl’s men had been mustering regularly in their parishes and a general rendezvous of all his men had taken place at Huntingtower on 19 June.158 This rendezvous may well have been the one referred to

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by Orain Iain Luim in his song against the union, and of which he claimed to be an eyewitness. The context seems to suggest that he is referring to Atholl’s men. Do not be in the least depressed, the men of Atholl still stand firm-the men with the sharp blue blades who would succour and serve you . . . On the day of the rendezvous on the moor, I myself was there and was an eye-witness to it. The troops of bridled steeds were there and hundreds were mustering.159

However, on 7 December, as a consequence of the act of parliament forbidding such gatherings, Atholl, like the Duke of Hamilton before him, ordered all armed musters by his men to stop until further notice.160 The desire of both men to stay within the law seems strange and inconsistent with plans to hold an armed rising. Armed insurrectionists are not generally bothered about the finer points of law. Their readiness to take up arms suggests a willingness to break the law. The fact that Hamilton and Atholl were unwilling to break the law suggests an unwillingness to plan and participate in an armed insurrection. It could be argued that Atholl ordered his men to stop because the plan had fallen through. However, contemporaries believed that there was no alliance between the Cameronians (or any Presbyterians) and the Jacobites, but rather that it was an attempt by Jacobites to exploit Presbyterian discontent by encouraging an armed rising. Presbyterians were not partners in an alliance; they were to be the sacrificial dupes in a Jacobite attempt to stop the union. This scenario is further substantiated by the activities of John Hepburn and the Hebronites. Writing in 1718, Hepburn confirmed the willingness of Presbyterians to resort to arms but that they were unwilling to join with Jacobites. According to Hepburn, his followers, along with many parishes in the south and west had once thought of appearing in a body yet when this project was dropped by all around us and none were to be joined with except Jacobites and malignants; as we saw it wholly improbable to do anything by ourselves, so we could not join in such a matter with known enemies and consequently were necessitate to forbear.161

Because of their anti-unionism, the Hebronites, like the Cameronians, faced accusations that they were sympathetic to Jacobitism. They were accused of ‘Beating the Bush that the Tories may catch the Hare’.162 Alexander Robeson, in a defence of the Church of Scotland’s conduct with regard to union and the abjuration oath, accused the Hebronites of reviving the hopes of the Jacobite party by their equal opposition to George I and the Pretender. He accused them of only rejecting the

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Pretender because he was popish and of giving no indication that he would be rejected if he took the covenant.163 However, Hepburn’s antiJacobite credentials were pretty strong. On 12 November an address was presented against the union from the people of the South and Western shires. This address has been widely considered by historians to be a Cameronian address. However, as the signatures reveal, it was produced by the Hebronites. Having disowned the civil government, the Cameronians would not have addressed ‘His Grace Her Majesties High Commissioner and Honourable Estates of Parliament’, otherwise it would have implied their acceptance of its legitimacy. The Hebronites had never disowned the civil government (see Chapter 1). The address expressed their rejection of the Pretender and their fears that the turmoil that the union was creating was more likely to assist than prevent his restoration.164 The address did not express the sentiments of a people ready to join in an alliance with the Jacobites in order to stop the union, or who would have wanted the restoration of the Stuarts. The most celebrated public display of dissent was the Hebronite burning of the articles at Dumfries. A week later, on 28 November, Robert Wodrow recorded that a deputation from those who had burned the articles at Dumfries had arrived in Edinburgh seeking advice about what to do next, and stating their willingness to come to Edinburgh if they were given provisions and leadership. Wodrow wrote that he saw no possibility of any appearance by those men because the weather was so bad, the nights long and they had nobody to ‘regulate and command them.’165 The fact that they were in Edinburgh with willingness to act, but lacking leadership, confirms Hepburn’s later statement that they did not act because they had nobody to join with and could not act alone.166 Furthermore, Hepburn’s men were in Edinburgh looking for guidance and leadership at the same time as the Glasgow men began their march. It would appear that they did not know about, and were not part of, the Glasgow affair and that the Glasgow march was not part of a larger organised rising. George Lockhart accused Hepburn of being a government spy, but there is no evidence to suggest that he was.167 Defoe sent an agent to negotiate with Hepburn, which would have been a waste of time had Hepburn been a government agent himself. Defoe’s actions were prompted by information he had received of the west-country men’s intentions, some of which would have come from the Hebronite deputation referred to by Wodrow and of which Defoe was also aware.168 According to Defoe, they brought in a protestation from the west, ‘where they burnt the Articles’. The protestation appears to have

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been the pamphlet burnt by order of parliament on 17 December. The pamphlet published in reply was directed at Hepburn. The fact that Defoe sent his agent, J. Pierce, to negotiate with Hepburn suggests that the men in Edinburgh were Hebronites and were the source of his information.169 According to Defoe, Pierce was known to the west-country folk and would merit a pardon for his actions, successful or not. What Pierce had done that needed pardoning is not known.170 Pierce reported back to Defoe in late December that he had spent some time with Hepburn and his followers down in Dumfries and Galloway. According to Pierce, he had listened to Hepburn preach for nearly seven hours without a break to a vast congregation, some of whom had travelled twenty-four miles on foot to hear him. Pierce informed Defoe that he had explained to Hepburn and his followers that the union had been misrepresented and that he had persuaded them not to rise in arms against it. The fact that Hepburn and his followers were prepared to take up arms, Defoe attributes in part to Jacobite activity; not a deliberate plan and plot between them to rise and march on Edinburgh, but to Jacobite subtlety and misinformation imposing upon ignorant people. Defoe also procured letters from dissenters in England to Hepburn urging him not to take military action.171 GEORGE LOCKHART OF CARNWATH

George Lockhart’s account stated that no group appeared against the union with as much zeal as the people of the western shires, where vast numbers of people, chiefly Cameronians, were willing to risk everything against it. They held several meetings in which they organised themselves into armed regiments and spoke of the restoration of the king as the most likely means to save their country. They were so reconciled to their erstwhile enemies, the Episcopalians from the north, that they were willing to enter an alliance in defence of their country. The Cameronians had agents across the country gathering and distributing intelligence, strengthening their supporters and sounding out the opinions of members of parliament. James Cunningham of Aiket, a supporter of the Revolution who had been on the Darien expedition, had fallen on hard times since his return, become disaffected with the government and opposed union. He became known to the people of the western shires and was trusted by them because he was a Presbyterian. Lockhart acknowledges the suspicions that Aiket was a spy, but felt he was sincere and believed that, had his plan been kept by others, he would have ‘raised the parliament with a vengeance’. Aiket explained his plan to John

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Brisbane, MP for Ayrshire. He believed he could ingratiate himself with the people of the western shires and persuade them to march on Edinburgh. The negotiators from the west were of the opinion that the only way to save the nation was to raise parliament and declare for King James. Brisbane told the plan to William Cochrane of Kilmarnock and Lockhart, who gave their encouragement to Cunningham. Before he went, Cunningham wanted to know what Hamilton and Atholl would do if he met with opposition before or after raising parliament: Atholl would secure the pass at Stirling and allow passage for people to come down from the north; Hamilton seemed to approve of the plan but was non-committal, other than to insinuate that he would do everything that an honest man could desire. Cunningham went west to organise. Having discovered John Hepburn had been won over by the court, he told John Macmillan of Hepburn’s villainy and that Hepburn’s people had left him for Macmillan. Cunningham prepared his plans and told the people to wait for his call, then returned to Edinburgh to inform his allies that everything was ready. They in turn informed their friends that something would be done soon. Cunningham went into the country to put the plan into action and agents were sent out with instructions that they were to march to Hamilton on a certain day. It was expected that between seven and eight thousand men would turn up. However, the Duke of Hamilton sent word a day or two before the planned rendezvous that they should not meet. As a consequence, only around five hundred determined individuals met at Hamilton. As a result of indistinct accounts of this affair, and accounts of other gatherings, the government took action and suspended the clause in the Act of Security allowing the gathering of fencible men. Lockhart did not know why Hamilton acted as he did. Possibly he was in the pocket of the court or possibly afraid to lose his estates in England. It was claimed on Hamilton’s behalf that he acted out of fear that the action would result in great bloodshed because the English troops on the border would be quickly called into action. Lockhart was convinced that, had Hamilton not acted as he did, the parliament would have been sent packing and the proposed union demolished.172 Lockhart’s account is based largely upon the testimony of James Cunningham of Aiket. It has little in common with Ker’s and on important details the two accounts are contradictory. In Ker’s account, it was Ker himself acting as a government agent who prevented the plot from coming to fruition. In Lockhart’s account, it is the Duke of Hamilton who called it off. Ker claimed the Cameronians were duped and unaware

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that they were in an alliance with the Jacobites or of the Jacobites’ true intentions. Lockhart reported that they willingly and knowingly entering into an alliance with the Jacobites and supported the restoration of the Pretender. Not surprisingly, neither Ker nor Cunningham mentions the other. Lockhart’s account is undermined by the fact that Cunningham was employed as an agent by Queensberry and gave a different version of events to Sir John Clerk of Penicuik.173 According to Clerk, Lockhart’s account of Cunningham’s support for the Revolution, his trip to Darien, subsequent poverty and disaffection, and his negotiations in the west with Presbyterians about a possible rising, was accurate. However, Clerk wrote that while Cunningham acknowledged that he had plotted with the west-country people to make a rebellion, he fell into ‘a remorse of conscience’ and had a change of heart. According to Clerk, Cunningham approached Queensberry and was employed by him ‘to go among these men & by pretending to be their friend to dissuade them from dangerous measures’.174 Cunningham was employed as Queensberry’s agent in the capacity that Ker of Kersland later claimed for himself. The suspicions mentioned and dismissed by Lockhart, that Cunningham was a government agent, were justified. For his services as an agent, Cunningham received £100 out of the £20,000 Queensberry distributed at the time. His name and the payment were included in the list published by Lockhart to substantiate his claim that Scotland had been bribed into the union.175 At the same time as he was employed to prevent a Cameronian rising, Cunningham was encouraged by Queensberry to make contact with the Jacobites and to use his knowledge of the Cameronians in order to ‘try their inclinations’. According to Clerk, Cunningham ‘was a great help to defeating all their projects’.176 After discussing his plan with the Jacobites and before he returned to the west, Cunningham acquainted Queensberry with his instructions from the Jacobites and was given fresh instructions from Queensberry about how to counteract them. Of the whole affair, Clerk wrote that the ‘wise tories were horribly gull’d’.177 According to this account, it was not the Cameronians who were duped but the Jacobites. Clerk wrote that it was better for them to be duped than to have to rise in arms with the west-country men as they had planned. Lockhart’s claim that seven to eight thousand well-armed men were to rendezvous at Hamilton was dismissed by Clerk as a mere fiction ‘for those poor men were meanly provided in arms & worse with hearts fit for such an enterprise’. He argued that ‘there was no set of men fit for making a civil war at this time, for 4 or 5000 of the regular troops from Flanders were more than sufficient to have kept all the Jacobites in Scotland in good order’.178 Lockhart’s

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contention that, had the enterprise taken place the parliament would have been sent packing and union prevented, was firmly rejected by Clerk.179 It was easy for Clerk to dismiss the size and strength of forces claimed by Lockhart, even if they were accurate, because they never materialised – just as their non-appearance made it easy for Lockhart to exaggerate. However, Lockhart’s account is cast in doubt by his claim that, despite the efforts of the Duke of Hamilton to prevent the rendezvous at Hamilton, around five hundred men turned up. There is no record of such a gathering, unless it is the rendezvous referred to by Orain Iain Luim. It seems more likely that he referred to the legitimate rendezvous held by Atholl on 19 June. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the rabble that marched out of Glasgow is the body of men Lockhart had in mind. They were only around fifty to eighty strong and the Glasgow action was not considered by observers to be part of a larger planned rising but the spontaneous unplanned action of a few youths. Their leaders, when captured, provided no information to suggest otherwise. Indeed, Finlay’s reported Jacobitism ‘was one reason the Cameronian people, though equally disaffected would not join him’, and further evidence that the Cameronians never contemplated an alliance with the Jacobites.180 Furthermore, they arrived in Hamilton late on 1 December, after parliament legislation was passed forbidding such gatherings. Lockhart claimed that the gathering of the five hundred was the main reason the act was passed and therefore it must have taken place before 29–30 November. If the rendezvous referred to by Lockhart had taken place, it would have been as large as the Dumfries burning, larger than the Glasgow rabble. As such, it would have brought a response from the government, but there is no record of government knowledge or response to such a gathering, and it seems unlikely that, had it taken place, the government would not have known about it.181 Lockhart has misinterpreted the Duke’s halting of the armed musterings around Hamilton in response to the act of parliament forbidding such gatherings, and for which the Duke suffered a loss of popularity, as calling off the rising. Finally, Lockhart claimed that during his preparations, Cunningham discovered that Hepburn had been won over by the court. By Lockhart’s timing this must have been mid to late November. However, according to Defoe, who sent Pierce to negotiate with Hepburn, it was a month later, in midDecember. Lockhart also stated that, as a consequence of Hepburn’s action, Cunningham approached John Macmillan. At this point in time, Macmillan had received his call to be the minister of the Cameronians but had as yet not accepted. He had gone away to consider the call and did not accept until December. Strictly speaking, he was not yet their leader.

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If the version of events given by Cunningham to Clerk is the true version, then there never was a Cameronian – Jacobite alliance, nor was there a plan to create one. The version of events related by Lockhart is a fiction created and fed to him by Cunningham merely to ingratiate himself into the confidence of the Jacobites to enable him to discover information that would benefit the government. Taking into consideration the many inconsistencies in Lockhart’s account, this would appear to be the case. Furthermore, as Cunningham acted with Queensberry’s knowledge and under his instruction, it is possible to argue that the whole scheme was one they concocted together. According to Clerk, the Jacobites were duped, ‘gull’d’ by Cunningham. What else could they have been duped about, if not the rising? Lockhart’s account shows that he was heavily dependent upon Cunningham for his information. In the fevered atmosphere of rumours and counter-rumours about armed risings, partly fuelled by the Jacobites themselves, Cunningham would appear plausible. The fact that the Cameronians were armed and disaffected towards the union was used by Cunningham to dupe the Jacobites into revealing their hand. The Cameronians were used unwittingly and unknowingly. THE CAMERONIANS

The Cameronians consistently denied that they were involved in any arrangement with the Jacobites. Their protestation against the union in October 1707 emphatically rejected the Pretender and accusations that they were in any way involved in trying to restore him.182 Their failure to recognise any of the post-Revolution monarchs, as well as their opposition to union, left them open to the charge of being sympathetic to the Jacobites. Writing a defence of their position against charges of Jacobitism, Hugh Clark argued that such charges were only levelled at them because they dissented from the established church and opposed union, not because there was any substance to the allegations.183 They argued that, as far as their opponents were concerned, because they believed union to be necessary for securing the Protestant succession and Presbyterian church government, ‘every one that was against the union, tho’ twere upon a far other account, was in these Men’s Compt books writ down for a Jacobite, and an enemy to Presbyterian Government, and the Protestant Succession’.184 There was no correlation between opposition to union and support for Jacobitism. Their differences were so great that an alliance was impossible. It was Cameronians that had blunted the Jacobite challenge at Dunkeld in 1689. They refused to

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recognise William and Mary, Anne or George I and the House of Hanover, primarily because they were un-covenanted monarchs. It seems highly unlikely that they would be prepared, at any price, to recognise the Pretender, who was not only un-covenanted but also ‘popish’ – a point Clark was at pains to make when rejecting the charge that, in order to blow up the union, they were content to advance the Pretender to the throne. no body that’s Master of Common Sense, would be content to hazard all the sad consequences of setting up a popish prince, bred in all the Maxims of French Tyranny for a meer Uncertainty. And every one that knows the principles of these Presbyterians will easily see, that how ill soever they like the union, they’ll never consent to such sinful means for dissolving it; ’tis not union with England simply, but the sinfulness of this present union that makes it unacceptable to them. And as ’tis a steady zeal for the Covenanted Reformation chiefly, that makes them to be against the union, the same reason will infallibly always influence them to be against the Popish Pretender.185

George I was subsequently described by them as a ‘pretended king’ and a ‘prelatic Pretender’. They stated in their testimony of 1715 that their refusal to recognise him was not due to any affection for the ‘Popish Pretender.’186 In 1712 the Cameronians renewed the covenants at Douglas, in which they swore to purge the land of all forms of popish idolatry and that they would ‘never make any conjunction with these abominable Popish idolaters, at home or abroad, in armies or otherwise’.187 The statement was a repudiation of accusations that they were involved in any alliance with the Jacobites. After Ker’s and Lockhart’s memoirs were published, the Cameronians once again felt compelled to vindicate themselves from the accusations.188 The obvious reason for the denials was that there was no substance to the accusations. The Cameronians were seen as Presbyterian extremists, extreme because of their principles, which were a firm adherence to the covenants and the ideals of a covenanted work of reformation. They saw themselves as the defenders of the faith and everyone else was a backslider. What did they have to gain with such an alliance? Stop the union? Possibly, but is it likely that in stopping the union they would also want to see the overthrow of the Revolution? They may have rejected elements of the Revolution Settlement, but they welcomed the Revolution and they were never going to enter any alliance that was going to overturn it.189 Is it likely that they would enter an alliance with a group at the opposite end of the political and theological spectrum

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from themselves, when they could never even bring themselves to be reconciled to Presbyterians, to whom they were obviously much closer? Is it likely that they would join in an alliance with or support the return of a dynasty that they were the first to disown, denounce and take up arms against? Is it likely that, considering their republicanism, and their own visions of union in terms of the Solemn League or outlined in The Smoaking Flax, they would countenance the return of a dynasty they despised and that under which they would never achieve their aims?190 They rejected alliances with Catholics, Episcopalians and uncovenanted Presbyterians as unlawful and forbidden in Scripture.191 They were anti-union, anti-prelacy, anti-popery, anti-Hanover and antiPretender; the only thing they were for was a covenanted, reformed Scotland. They were never going to find that at St Germain, and they did not look for it. The Cameronians were well aware that you did not have to choose Hanover or Stuart, you did not have to be against union and for the Pretender: one could – and they did – reject both because neither fitted into their theological and political framework. To have joined forces with other anti-union Presbyterians, or the Jacobites, would have been the pragmatic approach but pragmatism was not in their vocabulary. Pragmatism equalled compromise, and compromise was out of the question. Compromise would mean the unequal yoking of the righteous with the unrighteous. Their extremism and sense of ideological and theological purity rendered them impotent. They were unable to join forces with other elements of the opposition to create a more formidable opposition, and too small to do anything on their own. Much of the activity attributed to the Cameronians was undertaken by the Hebronites, who were commonly called Cameronians but were in fact a distinct group. They were responsible for the burning of the articles at Dumfries and for the address against the union from the south-west. The many rumours circulating of a threat from armed men in the west were a consequence of Hebronite, rather than Cameronian, activity. NOTES 1. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 296: Mar to Nairne, 23 October 1706. For the account of the riots by David Melville, 3rd Earl of Leven, commander in chief of Queen’s forces in Scotland, see Intimate Society Letters of the 18th Century, pp. 49–53. 2. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 298: Mar to Nairne, 26 October 1706; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 176.

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3. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 299; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 101. 4. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 299: Mar to Nairne, 26 October 1706. 5. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 256. 6. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 101. 7. Ibid., p. 102. 8. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 299; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 176; Lockhart, Memoirs, p. 223. 9. Young, ‘The Parliamentary Incorporating Union’, p. 37. 10. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 102. 11. Ibid., p. 103. 12. Lockhart, Memoirs, p. 224; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 176. 13. APS, XI, p. 309; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 176; HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, pp. 251–2. 14. Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 176; Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, p. 166; Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 137. 15. Letters of Daniel Defoe, pp. 133, 150; Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 267–9. 16. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 267–9. 17. Ibid., p. 268; HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 318: Mar to Nairne, 10 November 1706. 18. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 269. For Defoe’s response to the riots, see Defoe, A letter from Mr Reason, to the high and mighty Prince the Mob (1706); Defoe, The rabbler convicted: or a friendly advice to all turbulent and factious persons, from one of their own number (1706); Defoe, A Short Letter to the Glasgow Men (1706). 19. Clark, A Just Reprimand to Daniel Defoe, pp. 1–2. 20. Ibid., pp. 1, 3; Clark, Rabbles and Authors of Rabbles Condemned. 21. Clark, A Just Reprimand to Daniel Defoe, p. 3. 22. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 155: Unknown to Wodrow, 11 November 1706. 23. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 44. 12 November 1706; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 110. 24. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 157: James Wodrow to Robert Wodrow, 13 November 1706. 25. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 44. 12 November 1706. 26. MS Murray 650/651, Vol. II, No. 84: James Brown to Stirling, 15 November 1706. Both Provost John Aird and John Alexander the Laird of Blackhouse were members of the commission. Alexander became a member of the committee for public affairs on 29 October. See also Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 150; Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 267–9.

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27. Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1691–1717, IV, pp. 399–401. 28. Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 184; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 313: Mar to Nairne, 5 November 1706; p. 326: Mar to Nairne, 16 November 1706; Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 146. 29. Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 187; APS, XI, p. 341. 30. Defoe, A Collection of Original Papers, p. 41; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 187; APS, XI, p. 341. 31. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 113v; Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 250. For an alternative date (13 November), see Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 146; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 187. 32. An Account of the Burning of the Articles of Union at Dumfries (1706). 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid.; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 187; Scotland’s Ruine, p. 177. Lockhart wrote that there were between two and three thousand; Defoe tried to minimise the numbers and claimed around two hundred took part (Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 250; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 71). John Bell does not mention the size of the party but states that the watching crowd numbered several thousand. 36. Szechi, George Lockhart of Carnwath, p. 66; Davidson, Discovering the Scottish Revolution, p. 146. 37. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 106; NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 235; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 187; Scotland’s Ruine, pp. 177–9; McMillan, John Hepburn, pp. 130–1; Mitchell, Humble Pleadings for the Good Old Ways, pp. 249–50; PA7.28.22. Address from a considerable body of people in the South and Western shires. 38. Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 146. 39. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 347: Capt. William Holburn to Lt. Col. Erskine, 4 December 1706. 40. Lt. Col. Erskine, deputy Governor of Stirling Castle, supported union and is not to be confused with his namesake Col. John Erskine of Carnock, MP for Stirling Burgh, who, while also voting for union, was reported as having led the council ‘with his sword drawn in one hand and his pen in the other’ in signing an address against it. See Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 153. 41. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 348: J. Finlaysone to Lt. Col. Erskine, 5 December 1706; Extracts from the Records of the Royal Burgh of Stirling 1667–1752, pp. 109–10; PA7.28.48. Address of Burgh of Stirling against union.

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42. HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 355: Mar to Capt. Holburn, 13 December 1706; p. 357: Mar to Nairne, 18 December 1706. There were also rumours of some activity in Perth, see NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 128. 43. APS, XI, p. 341. Possibly the paper discussed in Chapter 4. See NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXIII, fo. 271. 44. APS, XI, p. 341; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 187. 45. Reports reaching Edinburgh were often exaggerated in terms of the numbers involved in armed activity. Defoe reported that an association was forming in the north and west involving 50,000 men. See Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 140. 46. APS, XI, p. 341; Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 187. See also Defoe, Collection of Original Papers, pp. 98–103. 47. Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 187. 48. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 339: Mar to Nairne, 30 November 1706. For another account of proceedings, see NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fos 120–1. 49. APS, XI, pp. 343–4. 50. Ibid., pp. 343–4; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 338–9: Mar to Nairne, 30 November 1706; Lockhart, A Speech in Parliament (1706). 51. APS, XI, pp. 343–4. 52. Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, p. 170; Intimate Society Letters of the 18th Century, pp. 52, 58. 53. Intimate Society Letters of the 18th Century, p. 58; Queensberry quoted in Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, p. 285. 54. Queensberry quoted in Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, p. 285; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 119; HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 268; The Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, III, pp. 246–7; Marlborough–Godolphin Correspondence, II, p. 727; HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 353: Nairne to Mar, 10 December 1706; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 112. 55. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 364: Defoe to Harley, 7 December 1706; HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 353. 56. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 339: Mar to Nairne, 30 November 1706. 57. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 162: James Wodrow to Robert Wodrow, 2 December 1706. 58. Ibid., fo. 161. 2 December 1706. 59. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 630–1. 60. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 120. 61. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 362: Defoe to Harley, 30 November 1706. 62. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fos 120, 127. 63. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 340: Mar to Nairne, 30 November 1706. 64. Ibid., p. 346: Mar to Nairne, 2 December 1706. 65. NAS, GD406/1/9735: Duchess Anne to Hamilton, 3 December 1706.

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66. NAS, GD406/1/9735: Duchess Anne to Hamilton, 5 December 1706; HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 364: Defoe to Harley, 7 December 1706. 67. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 163. 5 December 1706; HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 350: Mar to Nairne, 7 December 1706. 68. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 358: Mar to Nairne, 19 December 1706. 69. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 133. 70. NAS, GD406/1/9737: Duchess Anne to Hamilton, 17 December 1706. 71. NAS, GD406/1/8074: Hamilton to Duchess Anne, 9 December 1706. 72. NAS, GD406/1/9736: Duchess Anne to Hamilton, 10 December 1706. 73. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 220–3, 253; NAS, GD124/15/474: Mar to unknown, 16 November 1706; Scotland’s Ruine, p. 135; Letters of George Lockhart, p. 36. 74. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 302: Mar to Godolphin, 26 October 1706. 75. Ibid., pp. 310, 313, 322, 325: Mar to Nairne, 3, 5 and 16 November 1706. 76. Letters of Daniel Defoe, pp. 133, 140, 152, 158, 159. 77. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 335: Mar to Nairne, 26 November 1706. 78. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 258: Anonymous, October 1706. 79. Ibid., p. 258. 80. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 119. 81. MS Murray 650/651, Vol. I, No. 86: Unsigned to Stirling, 2 December 1706. 82. NAS, GD26/13/122: Leven to Melville, 4 April 1706. 83. Queries to the Presbyterian Noblemen, Barons, Burgesses, Ministers and Commons in Scotland (1706). 84. Clerk, A Letter giving an account how the Treaty of Union has been received here (1706), p. 7. See also Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 262–3. 85. NAS, GD18/2092: Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708; GD26/13/86/29: Major Coutts to unknown, 11 June 1706. 86. Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae, I, p. 40. 87. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 166v; A Copy of a Letter from a Country Farmer to His Laird a member of parliament; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 160. 88. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 401: D. Fearns to Harley, 15 April 1707. 89. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 152. 90. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 155. 91. Ibid., fo. 155. 92. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 254. See also Chapter 4. 93. HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 281: Mar to Harley, 21 September 1706; p. 283: Mar to Nairne, 28 September 1706. 94. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 278: Mar to Godolphin, 16 September 1706. 95. NAS, GD406/1/9108: Selkirk to Hamilton, 10 May 1706; NAS, GD406/1/9111: Selkirk to Hamilton, 29 May 1706.

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96. Selkirk to Hamilton, 4 September 1706, quoted in Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p. 253. 97. NAS, GD406/1/7263: Selkirk to Hamilton, 24 August 1706. 98. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 253. 99. Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 176. 100. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 160, 30 November 1706. 101. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 235, 263. 102. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 77r and v. 103. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fos 91–2: Simson to Wodrow, 26 December 1706; fos 93–5: Simson to Wodrow, 9 January 1707. 104. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fos 93–5: Simson to Wodrow, 9 January 1707. 105. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 272: Carstares to Harley, 5 December 1706; see also a similar explanation by John Bell (NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 77r and v). 106. Scotland’s Ruine, pp. 135, 211, 284. 107. Memoirs of the Life, Time and Writings of . . . Thomas Boston, p. 209. On the other hand, John Bell believed that the actions of ministers in the affair had proved acceptable to all ‘except the unioners’. See NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 76v. 108. NAS, GD18/2092: Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708. 109. Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 195. 110. NAS, GD18/2092: Spiritual Journals of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, Volume II, 1699–1708. 111. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 274: William Paterson to Harley, 10 December 1706. 112. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 339: Defoe to Harley, 24 October 1706. 113. Ibid., p. 364: Defoe to Harley, 7 December 1706; Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 268. 114. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 337: Mar to Nairne, 28 November 1706. 115. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXIII, fo. 271. 116. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 113v. 117. NAS, GD406/1/9735: Duchess Anne to Hamilton, 5 December 1706. 118. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 338: Mar to Nairne, 28 November 1706. 119. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 120: Robert Wodrow to James Wodrow, 30 November 1706. 120. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 29: Newsletter, 2 December 1706. 121. Clark, Rabbles and Authors of Rabbles Condemned (1708). 122. Selections from the Registers of the Presbytery of Lanark, p. 140; A Letter from the Commission of the General Assembly to the Presbytery of Hamilton with the Presbytery’s Answer (1706). 123. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 100. 124. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 228. See also CH2/35/5. Biggar, pp. 123–5.

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125. NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 57–61; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 124. 126. NAS, CH1/3/9, pp. 60–1. 127. A Letter from the Commission of the General Assembly to the Presbytery of Hamilton with the Presbytery’s Answer (1706); Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 630–1. See also NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 138. Wodrow wished the letter had not been printed and saw it as counterproductive. 128. NAS, CH1/2/5/4, fo. 255/1. Penpont; CH2/185/10. Haddington, p. 221; CH2/373/1. Wigtown, p. 343. 129. For some reactions to letters on tumults, see NAS, CH2/15/2. Arbroath, p. 63; CH2/106/2. Dunkeld, 31 December 1706; CH2/40/4. Brechin, pp. 24–5; CH2/118/1. Earlston, pp. 84–5; CH2/99/3. Dunbar, p. 83; CH2/342/3. Strathbogie, p. 129. 130. NAS, CH1/3/9, p. 47; Kidd, ‘Religious Realignment’, p. 166. 131. Szechi, George Lockhart of Carnwath, pp. 65–9; Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 10; Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, pp. 285–6; Macinnes, ‘The 1707 Union’, p. 152; Lang, ‘Ker of Kersland, Cameronian, Jacobite and Spy’, pp. 769–77; Davidson, Discovering the Scottish Revolution, pp. 147–54. 132. John Ker, Memoirs of John Ker of Kersland, pp. 27–39. 133. Ibid., p. 39. 134. Fleming, Critical Reviews Relating Chiefly to Scotland, pp. 405–11, 582–4; Hutchison, The Reformed Presbyterian Church, pp. 161–2; Plain Reasons for Presbyterians Dissenting from the Revolution Church in Scotland (1731), p. 275; Lang, History of Scotland, p. 124. 135. NAS, CH3/269/4. Minutes and conclusions of the general meeting, 1681–1743, pp. 71–4. 136. Riley, The Union of England and Scotland, pp. 282–5. 137. Hume, A diary of the proceedings in the Parliament, p. 187. 138. Memoirs of the life of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, pp. 54–5; Scotland’s Ruine, p. 182; HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 372: Defoe to Harley, 24 December 1706; Correspondence of Colonel N Hooke, II, p. 309. 139. NAS, GD18/6080: a copy of Lockhart’s Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland owned by Sir John Clerk, p. 284. 140. Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 147. 141. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXIII, fos 280–1. 142. Ibid., fos 280–1. 143. Ibid., p. 282. Major Eckat was the Cunningham of Aiket in Lockhart’s Account. 144. Correspondence of Colonel N Hooke, II, pp. 308–13. 145. Ibid., pp. 308–13. 146. Ibid., pp. 310–11; Ker, Memoirs of John Ker, pp. 46–53. 147. Ker, Memoirs of John Ker, p. 53. 148. Ibid., p. 53.

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The Church and Popular Protest 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154.

155. 156.

157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163.

164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169.

170. 171.

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The Protestation and testimony of the United Societies (1707). A Converse between Two Presbyterians (1714), p. 11. Correspondence of Colonel N Hooke, II, pp. 517–18, 523. Hutchison, The Reformed Presbyterian Church, p. 163. Ker, Memoirs of John Ker. The Chronicles of Atholl, I, pp. 56–7; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 76; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 120; Letters of Daniel Defoe, pp. 140, 163, 186. NAS, GD18/6080. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 119; Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 149; NAS, GD406/1/5370: John Cochrane to Hamilton, 9 October 1706; NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 70v. NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXXII, fo. 76. The Chronicles of Atholl, I, pp. 56, 68. Orain Iain Luim, Songs of John MacDonald Bard of Keppock, p. 225. The Chronicles of Atholl, I, p. 68. McMillan, John Hepburn, pp. 140–1. Counter Quiries to the Quiries burnt at the Cross of Edinburgh (1706). Kidd, ‘Conditional Britons’, pp. 1162–3; Robeson, Mene Tekel, p. 2. Such accusations were not new, and those who made them were described as ‘malicious traducers’. See Mitchell, Humble Pleadings for the Good Old Ways, pp. 118–20. NAS, PA7/28/22: Address of the South and Western shires. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 119. McMillan, John Hepburn, pp. 140–1. Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, p. 281. HMC Duke of Portland IV, pp. 360–2: Defoe to Harley, 28 and 30 November 1706. Ibid., pp. 360–2. The protestation appears to have been the pamphlet Queries to the Presbyterian Noblemen and Gentlemen, Barons, Burgesses, Ministers and Commons in Scotland (1706). On 12 December parliament ordered this pamphlet to be burned (APS, XI, p. 355). The burning took place on 17 December and the pamphlet published in reply to the Queries was directed at Hepburn (Counter Quiries to the Quiries burnt at the Cross of Edinburgh (1706)). That the author of the Queries was Archibald Foyer, minister of Stonehouse in Hamilton (see Bowie, ‘Public Opinion’, p. 246), seems highly unlikely. Mar thought the pamphlet was written by Robert Wylie (see HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 355). HMC Duke of Portland, IV, pp. 360–2: Defoe to Harley, 28 and 30 November 1706. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, pp. 372–4: Defoe to Harley, 24, 26 and 27 December 1706. Some writers have concluded that because Pierce was known to the west-country folk and persuaded them not to take up arms because they were being deceived by the Jacobites, he was in fact Ker of

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172. 173.

174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188.

189. 190. 191.

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scottish presbyterians and the act of union 1707 Kersland. This is unlikely, though. Defoe was not going to employ as an agent someone already supposedly employed for that purpose by Queensberry. Furthermore, Pierce was sent to talk to the Hebronites, while Ker claimed he went to the Cameronians. Defoe sent Pierce after the Dumfries burning and after the deputation arrived in Edinburgh on 28 November, while Ker claimed Queensberry sent him before the Dumfries protest at which he was present. If Ker was Pierce, why does his own account not mention that Defoe employed him? Why is there no mention of John Hepburn or of his use of the name Pierce? It seems uncharacteristically modest of Ker to omit these points. See Davidson, Discovering the Scottish Revolution, p. 153; Lang, A History of Scotland, IV, pp. 130–1. Scotland’s Ruine, pp. 180–4. NAS, GD18/6080: Clerk’s copy of Lockhart’s Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland. The second account, contained in the handwritten notes of Clerk’s copy of Lockhart’s memoir, is based upon his frequent discussions with Cunningham. Ibid., p. 279. Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 414–15. NAS, GD18/6080: Clerk’s copy of Lockhart’s Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, p. 280. Ibid., p. 283. Ibid., pp. 283–4. Ibid., p. 285. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 364: Defoe to Harley, 7 December 1706. NAS, GD18/6080: Clerk’s copy of Lockhart’s Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, p. 283. The Protestation and testimony of the United Societies (1707). A Converse between Two Presbyterians (1714), pp. 2–11. Ibid., pp. 3, 4, 11. Ibid., p. 12. The Declaration, Protestation and Testimony (1715), p. 25. Quoted in Fleming, Critical Reviews Relating Chiefly to Scotland, p. 408. Hutchison, The Reformed Presbyterian Church, p. 163; Plain Reasons for Presbyterians Dissenting from the Revolution Church in Scotland (1731), p. 275. A Converse between Two Presbyterians (1714), pp. 8–10. For the Cameronian alternative to union, see Chapter 6. The Smoaking Flax, pp. 10, 23.

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6 Incorporating Union: The Search for an Alternative

‘FAR FROM BEING AGAINST ALL UNION . . . ’

Opponents of the treaty, as their literature and addresses made clear, were not opposed to a union with England. They agreed that the status quo in the constitutional relationship was untenable, rejected incorporation as a solution and promoted alternatives generally referred to by contemporaries as federal. It would have been ‘impolitic’ for them to attack the treaty without offering an alternative.1 The search for a solution prompted a vigorous debate that reflected the diversity of interest groups hostile to incorporation. While unionists rejected the ‘federal’ alternatives as impracticable and unworkable, most Scots were less dismissive. They had expected their commissioners to negotiate a federal union. The church was no different and, as their letters demonstrate, was as concerned as its people about the loss of sovereignty and the loss of the parliament that protected the interests of the church. Generally speaking, they were content to allow the commission to speak for them and to act in the interests of the church. Despite this, some ministers, particularly those in the west, became actively involved in promoting alternative schemes, while the Hebronites and Cameronians proposed distinctive Presbyterian alternatives to incorporation. One of the first to enter the fray in defence of Scotland’s sovereignty was London-based Presbyterian polemicist, George Ridpath. The publication by English antiquary, Thomas Rymer, of a spurious form of homage supposedly performed by Malcolm III of Scotland to Edward the Confessor prompted Ridpath to respond by publishing a translation of Sir Thomas Craig’s manuscript on homage, in which Scotland’s sovereignty was asserted.2 Ridpath’s publication, and the failure of the Scottish parliament to settle the succession, prompted William Atwood and James Drake into print.3 Drake, a high Tory, published Historia Anglo-Scotica, a spoof history of Anglo-Scottish relations. The Scottish

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parliament ordered the book to be burnt because it contained ‘several injurious and false reflections on the soveraigntie and independency of the crown of Scotland.’4 Taken no less seriously by Presbyterians were Drake’s comments that Scottish Episcopalians hoped their restoration would be one of the consequences of a union of the kingdoms.5 William Atwood argued that there was only one imperial crown in the British Isles, and that it belonged to England. Scotland therefore owed, as it always had, homage to England.6 Atwood revived the ancient claim that the Scottish church was not an autonomous national church, but was subject to the jurisdiction of the Church of England, in particular the Metropolitan of York. Atwood’s work shared the same fate as Drake’s, and Scots of all persuasions emphatically rejected any suggestion of the dependence of either the Scottish crown or church on those of England.7 Set against a background of debate about union, a vindication of the Scottish position had been necessary, otherwise negotiations would not be perceived as taking place between equals. Furthermore, Scottish sovereignty could hardly be maintained in a federal union, if it never existed; nor was Presbyterianism likely to survive any union, if it was conceded that the church in Scotland was subordinate to the Church of England. Failure to defend Scottish sovereignty would inevitably result in Scottish civil and religious subordination.8 It was in an attempt to avoid such subordination that Ridpath returned to print just prior to the union negotiations in 1702. Ridpath developed some of the ideas he had expressed in the aftermath of the Darien affair.9 He warned the Scots to approach negotiations with care, lest Scotland be irrecoverably lost as a sovereign and independent nation, brought under the subjection of England without enjoying the benefits of subjects. He argued that Scotland had acted hastily at the Union of the Crowns and had suffered for it ever since because there had been a prevailing party at court intent on imposing conditions on Scotland rather than allowing participation as equals. Unless there was a shift in English attitudes, they could not expect anything good to come out of any treaty for union.10 According to Ridpath, England had offered fairer terms for union prior to 1603 and he identified those offered by Edward VI as preferable to all others. These amounted to a union of the crowns with free trade between the kingdoms, including equality of customs and excise payments, and both nations continuing to enjoy their own laws and customs. Ridpath argued that these terms, added to the articles agreed by commissioners negotiating union in 1605, would form a good basis for any treaty currently under negotiation. Crucially, prior to the 1605 negotiations, the Scottish parliament had placed important reservations on their commis-

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sioners. The Scots Act of Commission on 11 July 1604 declared that the fundamental laws were to be left out of negotiations. A further act was passed, ratifying and approving all former acts made favouring the Kirk.11 Commissioners negotiating the union were prevented from agreeing to anything that would be hurtful or prejudicial to its doctrine and discipline. Thus, claimed Ridpath, the Scots in 1604 were unanimous behind a desire to keep the constitution of the nation entire.12 According to Ridpath, the scheme fell through because England, either out of dislike for the union or because it felt it prejudiced them in some way, refused to ratify the treaty and dropped the issue. Terms as favourable as those tabled by Edward VI were never offered again, because the Union of the Crowns satisfied English concerns about their security by shutting up Scotland as a back door for invasion by France. Sharing the same monarch and succession, as well as having common interests, provided England with all the security it needed. Ridpath argued that Scotland had more to fear from a treaty and little to gain. The troubles and disasters that had been visited upon them during the previous five reigns were likely to continue. If the government of Scotland came under the control of the party that had, since the Union of the Crowns, attempted to undermine their constitution, they could only expect a repeat of ‘those rapes on our religious and civil liberties’ that they had suffered since 1603.13 The party in question was ‘our Courtiers and Prelates, and their Dependents and Adherents’, with the assistance of the high-church party. Ridpath argued that any union between the kingdoms must be secured. He believed that the treaty concluded at Westminster in 1641 would provide the basis for their security. The Conservators of the Peace, a joint committee created in 1641 to help maintain peace between the kingdoms, was to be revived as the Conservators of the Union, with similar powers.14 Prerequisites to a secure union included the consent of both parliaments in declaring war or peace and in concluding treaties with foreign powers; that the monarch and court should reside in Scotland one year in three; that there should be a restoration of parliamentary power to choose their own president, judges, officers of state and Privy Councillors, who would also be accountable to parliament; that parliament should be held every year and that members did not have absolute and unlimited power, but were obliged to act according to the instructions of those whom they represented. Before making any changes to the fundamental constitution, they were obliged to consult their constituents. Using the arguments of Sir John Nisbet, Ridpath argued that parliament had no power to alter any fundamental in church or state without the express authority from its electors.15

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As a Presbyterian, Ridpath was concerned about the consequences of union for the church. He believed it was likely that England would insist upon the surrender of Scotland’s religious constitution as one of the terms of a treaty. If not, he was sure they would try to subvert it after union. He insisted that prelacy must never be re-admitted to Scotland because ‘The experience of time past is sufficient to convince us that Prelatical Government will never suit the Genius of our people.’16 The experience to which he referred was Scotland’s mistreatment and suffering at the hands of the prelatic party in England; the loss of their religious liberties and the subversion of their Presbyterian constitution.17 In the light of their recent experiences, Ridpath urged Scots to consider a number of factors before proceeding to union. Did the Scots believe the disposition of the English had changed and had they considered whether or not their irreconcilable enemies in the Laudean faction had more or less power than formerly? Dissenters in England were stigmatised and treated as aliens by the sacramental test. What treatment were Presbyterians in Scotland likely to receive in the event of union? Highchurch attitudes towards Presbyterians had been recently revealed in the pamphlet Letter to Sir J.P. Baronet, and towards Englishmen not of highchurch principles in the pamphlet The Character of a Low Churchman. Ridpath insisted that the church must be danger if it was thought necessary to reserve religion and church government before negotiations. Finally, he believed that not having a treaty would strengthen their hand and that they could settle the succession in exchange for concessions from England on issues like trade and sovereignty.18 Ridpath was followed into print by James Hodges, another Londonbased Scot.19 Written in response to the negotiations but published after they broke down, Hodges issued a clarion call for Scotland to seize its opportunity to assert and protect her ancient rights and liberties and put an end to constitutional abuses from England. It was probably directed at the new parliamentary session that opened in May 1703. Hodges defined an incorporating union as one in which independent nations gave up their independence so as to become a part or province of the kingdom into which they were united. A federal union was one in which independent states united their separate interests into a common interest for their mutual benefit, but only so far as it related to any conditions agreed between them, ‘retaining in the meantime their several independencies, national distinctions and the different laws, customs and governments of each’.20 As far as Hodges was concerned, anyone with an unbiased and free choice was likely to conclude that a federal union was the most suitable to the civil and religious interests of both nations.21 Hodges insisted

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that Scotland had a distinct constitution and church government that made incorporation impracticable. England had nothing to offer Scotland in an incorporating union that was worth giving up independence for. Nevertheless, their geographical relationship made an alliance with Scotland useful to England, for which Scotland could expect good terms. He offered four fundamental rules upon which a federal union should be based. First, it must be grounded upon the interests of both kingdoms to the extent that neither had any reason to be jealous of the other. Second, it must be achieved by universal consent rather than by narrow party interest. Third, Scotland as the weaker kingdom was to be left in a condition to plead the observance of its articles as a free state. Finally, union under a single monarch was not to be fundamental to a federal union but only circumstantial: a federal union could exist with separate monarchies and monarchs in either kingdom.22 Hodges repeated Ridpath’s assertion that the most favourable terms for union had been offered under Edward VI. He also shared Ridpath’s analysis as to why such terms had never been offered since the Union of the Crowns. Hodges finished with a critique on incorporating union in which he outlined nine insuperable difficulties that made it inconsistent with the rights, liberties and interests of both nations.23 Parliament’s response to the constitutional crisis was the Act of Security, which, as a reassertion of Scottish sovereignty and independence, was a rejection of incorporating union.24 The act was the Country Party’s alternative to incorporating union. Supporters of the act claimed that it would secure Scotland’s independence and was the most legal method of supporting a sinking and impoverished nation that had for too long been influenced by the illegal direction of English councils. The act would preserve the constitution entire, set affairs in good order and Scotland upon an equal footing with England. England would be obliged to grant concessions, ‘tending to the honour and advantage of our nation’. And being freed from their undue influence, ‘an happy and lasting union might be established without civil dissention’.25 Defending the act and limitations against accusations that they tended ‘to take away that dependence which your nation ought always to have upon us, as a much greater and more powerful people’, Andrew Fletcher insisted that was the whole point of the act.26 Scotland was an independent nation whose sovereignty had been compromised since the Union of the Crowns by its failure to apply such limitations to their kings. No one could blame them if they now seized the opportunity to enact such conditions and limitations on a successor that would ‘secure the honour and sovereignty of our crown and kingdom, the freedom, frequency, and

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power of our parliaments, together with our religion, liberty and trade from either English or foreign influence’.27 Jacobite writer Patrick Abercromby also believed that the Act of Security provided the perfect foundation for determining the constitutional arrangements between the kingdoms. He rejected incorporating union on the grounds that the people were against it and that to conclude a treaty in opposition to the people was to do so in opposition to Revolution principles. Scotland had no guarantees that once a treaty was concluded, the English would abide by it. Settling the succession with limitations was similarly dismissed on the grounds that, under such an arrangement, Scotland was likely to suffer the same fate it had suffered for the past one hundred years. Limitations would not secure the nation from an ambitious monarch and a superior power. Even if limitations were safe, they could not promote Scotland’s trade or prevent a repeat of Darien. If Scotland were miserable now, it would be worse under incorporating union or settling the succession with limitations.28 Using the Act of Security as the basis of his scheme, he argued that Scotland should leave the succession open and wait. When Anne died, Scottish affairs would be in Scottish hands and the nation free from English or French influence. With the succession left open, the country could negotiate a union with England, and the Scots rather than the English sovereign would name their commissioners. He was confident England would negotiate and that Scotland would get better terms. England’s involvement in European wars made it in her interests to negotiate.29 If England tried to use force to unite the kingdoms, Scotland could confederate with foreign states such as Holland and France. It was in Holland’s interests to unite with Scotland on the grounds of its own animosities with England. Furthermore, Holland did not want an incorporating union to take place because it was likely to damage its fisheries. There was some substance to these claims. Robert Harley had received intelligence that the Dutch had sent money to Scotland to help obstruct the union because of their fears that union would adversely affect their trade and herring fisheries.30 Abercromby believed that Scotland and Holland had mutual interests in trade, and a common faith. He insisted there were even greater advantages to a league with France, especially in trade. The ancient alliance could be revived. The fact that France was Catholic was irrelevant. France had never attempted to impose popery on any other nation and would not attempt to impose it on Scotland. On the contrary, the French had entered into alliances with Protestant nations in opposition to Catholic powers that rivalled French interests. Self-interest would lead to a league with France and be the reason why France would be happy to have a league with Scotland.31

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Unionists seized on Abercromby’s proposals as providing a threat to Scotland, to Protestantism in general and the Kirk in particular. One writer rejected, with good reason, the prospect of a league with the Dutch on the grounds that the Dutch were not interested.32 William Seton of Pitmedden, MP for Aberdeenshire, insisted there was no advantage in an alliance with the Dutch because their main trade, fishing, was the same as Scotland’s, thus putting them in competition. Seton, an Episcopalian whose father was a Jacobite, had argued in 1704 that Scotland should negotiate a federal union with England but now described a federal union, whether with England or any other nation, as impracticable and, while fashionable, ‘handsomly fitted to delude unthinking people’.33 Federal union was rejected as unable to provide solid and lasting peace when it was in the power of either kingdom to break it. Federation would create instability; it was not worth the trouble, would be ‘ane Egyptian reed, and will be a mother of future dangers and discords’.34 Unionists insisted that such an arrangement would be little different from that which had existed between the countries in the past and that had been dominated by England for English interests.35 Scots were reminded that France had sought the auld alliance with Scotland for the purpose of helping themselves in their wars with England, and not for the benefit of Scotland. Following the Reformation, it was more appropriate for Scotland to seek closer ties with its Protestant neighbour rather than with ‘popish’ France, with whom an alliance now seemed inconsistent with Scottish interests.36 From an English perspective, the renewal of such an alliance was real enough, as their reaction to the Act of Security had demonstrated. There were fears that France could exploit the current strains in Anglo-Scottish relations to revive the auld alliance and strengthen its position in the current war, in which it had suffered recent setbacks. For England, union was ‘absolutely necessary for the safety of ourselves, and the defeating the designs of our enemy’.37 Writers insisted that a league with France would inevitably restore the Pretender. They rejected suggestions that religious differences would not be a factor.38 One writer drew attention to the persecution by Louis XIV of his Protestant subjects. He questioned if such a ruler could be considered as a ‘good defender of our faith’. Taking into consideration the ‘Tyrannical model of government’ Louis had established, was it likely that he could be the ‘patron of liberty and property’? If popery has been considered to be ‘inconsistent with the good of this nation, I am sure whoever looks this way cannot be thought its true friend’.39 Attacking the Act of Security, unionists argued that settling on a different successor to that in England had potentially dangerous consequences.

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The act’s proponents were mistakenly assuming that England would offer better terms than Scotland was being offered now. There was no such guarantee. Nor was there agreement about who that successor would be. The Pretender was unacceptable to Presbyterians, who, if pushed, ‘might propose a Geneva Model of Government’, and create a republic rather than suffer a Stuart restoration. The consequences could be a civil war. Nor could it be supposed that England would allow their enemy, supported by France, to be restored to the crown in Scotland.40 Seton likewise argued that French insistence on renewing the old alliance would threaten England and lead to civil war.41 A civil war would have devastating consequences for Scotland, whose circumstances would be no better than Ireland’s. War would not only endanger Presbyterianism in Scotland, but the reformed faith in general, as the Pope and his allies would be glad to see, and ready to exploit, Protestant countries at war. If there were no war, there would certainly be disruption to trade. The restrictions of the Alien Act were likely to be extended to all goods and trade.42 Unionist writers insisted that only an incorporating union would secure the Protestant interest against France, the Jacobites and popery. Union would give security of religion and make Britain the bulwark of the Protestant cause in Europe and the world. Union would bring with it a solid and lasting peace to the whole island, bringing the feuding between the kingdoms to an end and banishing the spectre of civil war. Britain would have greater security and strength against foreign powers that threatened it. Union would bring the benefits of free trade between the kingdoms and Scottish access to the plantations. Scotland’s economy was likely to prosper and everyone likely to feel the benefits. Importantly, each established church would continue. A stark choice confronted people: union with peace and plenty or disunion with popery and slavery. The Earl of Cromarty pressed for incorporation and observed, ‘I am old and in long experience of slavry, and now of poverty; and I wish to leave the nation free of the first, and at least in the road to leave the other.’43 Significantly, Seton argued that, far from losing their sovereignty and independence, it would ‘be more asserted in this union, and by the treaty about it intended, than we have had occasion to do for a long time’.44 Sovereignty would not be lost but transferred, as two equally free and independent nations became one. The loss of Scotland’s national sovereignty and parliament was a prospect that prompted ministers like Robert Wylie to enter the debate. Wylie recommended the printing and distribution of the pamphlet Essay upon the Union because it offered ‘the way of attaining and securing all the advantages they can pretend to by any union’.45 The

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writer attacked the proposed incorporating union by arguing that the subjects of England and Scotland had already been ‘in an absolute incorporated union’ ever since the Union of the Crowns.46 Since that time their separate allegiances had been incorporated in one person, the monarch. As they had a joint allegiance, so their monarchs had an obligation for joint protection of his or her people. The writer argued that if a free people incorporated in allegiance are to be regulated by the laws of God or man, they cannot violate, dismember, or diminish the allegiance which they jointly owe their sovereign. If a free people, thus incorporated, are resolved to perpetuate that state, they must share equally the national burdens and benefits. Since the Union of the Crowns, the kingdoms had been incorporated and bound by a common and joint allegiance in a state of mutual naturalisation in which they have been bound to the national duties and burdens, and consequently entitled to the national privileges and benefits, of both nations.47 These mutual rights had been acknowledged and established by both sides after 1603. The Scots were therefore entitled to the rights and privileges of natives in England, as the English courts had agreed in the Calvin case of 1608 and the recent Alien Act had implied. George Ridpath placed a similar emphasis upon the issue of joint allegiance. The Union of the Crowns was a simple union of allegiance. It was complete and entire and secured by a common allegiance to the same sovereign, and in which they shared the same benefits and burdens. Ridpath argued that the first step taken by governments towards uniting nations that lived under the same allegiance was a general act of naturalisation. Following the Union of the Crowns in 1603, the commission appointed to negotiate union between the kingdoms accepted the principle that those born after 24 March 1603, the Post Nati, were by law natural subjects in either kingdom. The commission agreed that the Post Nati had full rights of succession, inheritance and offices as natural subjects.48 James failed to secure legislation granting naturalisation, but was successful when he tested the status of the Post Nati in the courts. The outcome of ‘Calvin’s Case’ was that all those born in Britain since the Union of the Crowns shared a common nationality. Scots were not aliens but enjoyed the benefits of naturalisation. Ridpath insisted that Edward VI had offered these benefits to the Scots. Ridpath’s case was that the problems involved in uniting nations could be cut through by a simple act of extending naturalisation to all those subjects of the same sovereign, whether by marriage, conquest or treaty, without breaking in upon the particular constitutions or distinct forms of administration in the countries.49

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Both writers insisted that the problem did not lie in the nature of the present relationship but in its implementation. The failure to implement the process of naturalisation had led to the exclusion of Scots from the rights and privileges to which they were entitled by the common allegiance, as their experiences with Darien and the Navigation Acts had demonstrated. What was needed now was not a new treaty but a more faithful implementation of the relationship that has existed since the Union of the Crowns. As the anonymous writer put it, the subjects of both nations are ‘without any further treaty’ entitled to an unlimited free share of all manner of trade and other privileges belonging to both nations, by reason of their joint allegiance.50 Both writers also insisted that in such a union some things should be reserved from an absolute communication: there were issues that could be dealt with in common and some reserved. Areas that could be incorporated included the succession and allegiance. Natives would be incorporated and engaged in wars, alliances, treaties, purchases, burdens, trade, customs and drawbacks. Exceptions included municipal laws and that each nation would retain its own forms, customs, courts, councils and other establishments for keeping the peace and managing civil and military revenues.51 According to Ridpath, the greatest governments had united nations under one allegiance without depriving the lesser nations of their municipal laws, parliaments or any other fundamental part of their ecclesiastical or civil constitution. Scotland should keep its own parliament for the preservation of their church government and municipal laws; and it will be hard to assign such a security any other way, than by their own parliament, and allowing them liberty, according to their old constitution, to chuse their own Ministers of State, Privy Councellors and Judges; or in fewer words, to leave them their own government, to take care of their own particular affairs; but referring all things relating to the Articles of the union, to the Common Parliament of Great Britain.52

Parliament would be the guarantor for the people of Scotland, to ensure that the articles of the union were faithfully performed in their interest. It was Ridpath, more than any other writer, who highlighted and developed the arguments that became the focus of the opposition case against the treaty. Drawing on the work of Sir George Mackenzie, he argued that it was evident from Scotland’s history that those who governed held their power from the governed and that they could not give away any or all of that power without the consent of the people.53 Because the surrender of Scotland’s parliament was something that concerned the whole nation, it was the whole nation, and not some party interest, that

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ought to be consulted and who should make a decision. He confidently asserted that ‘if all the Freeholders in Scotland were poll’d upon this account, it would be found that the Majority will never agree to it’.54 Whatever the relationship with England, it would never be in Scotland’s interests to surrender its parliament. Drawing upon historical experience, especially the last hundred years, he warned that the Scots could have no ‘lasting Security for their separate concerns against the much greater power of England without having their own parliament as a Balance to that power’.55 Robert Wylie, while recommending the scheme for union proposed in the Essay, focused upon Ridpath’s arguments on popular sovereignty and Scottish insecurity when subjected to a British parliament. Publishing the opinions of Sir George Mackenzie and Sir John Nisbet, he argued that any treaty had to be subjected to popular scrutiny. Parliament did not have the power to ratify any treaty that may undermine the constitution, alter fundamentals and cut them off from being a nation as well as a church, without consulting the whole nation. After consultations, commissioners would return to parliament with ‘the fresh and deliberate sentiments of the nation about it’.56 Like Ridpath, he was confident that the instructions of constituents would be to reject incorporating union. He also argued that addresses might be produced to express this view and help stop the treaty.57 Other ministers followed Wylie’s lead. John Bannatyne questioned the right and power of parliament, or any legislative power, to dispose of or resign the sovereignty, independence and national rights and liberties of the nation, without the consent of every free-born Scotsman. He believed that parliament had no such power, nor was their decision binding on posterity. Like Wylie, he believed parliament should hold a recess and that members ought to consult with constituents.58 Pamphlets appealed to parliament as patriots, Scotsmen and Presbyterians. One writer concerned about the loss of sovereignty expressed the fear that even Scotland’s name would become extinct and ‘like the Jews we shall be Vagabonds over the whole Earth’.59 Parliament was warned of the consequences of the proposed union, not the least of which was that they must answer to God for their actions. James Clark personified Scotland as a mother delivering a patriotic speech to her sons. Scotland’s rights and claims had been neglected since the Union of the Crowns, partly caused by England, partly by the Scots themselves. Scotland is portrayed as appealing to her sons to secure her against the encroachments and injuries that have spoiled her independent sovereignty, to provide for her safety and honour, and to be faithful and true to their country.60

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Most of the ministers responsible for these pamphlets came from the west and belonged to the Synod of Glasgow and their ideas clearly carried weight in its counsels. The synod argued that parliament’s proceeding with union despite the general dissatisfaction of the country could have dangerous consequences and urged a general correspondence throughout the nation in order to more clearly understand the mind of the nation and act accordingly. A similar correspondence was to be encouraged throughout the church and the moderator of the synod was urged to organise a meeting of presbyters to that effect.61 In parliament, the opposition likewise were arguing that, because the constitution of the kingdom was going to be entirely altered by the treaty, there should be a delay in order for members to consult their constituents.62 The government were simply relieved that the opposition could not muster enough support to force it through.63 Wylie’s pamphlet brought a direct riposte from George Mackenzie, Earl of Cromarty, one of Scotland’s leading Episcopalians. Cromarty was a strong supporter of the union as being in Scotland’s best interest. Like all advocates of union, he believed it would bring peace between the kingdoms and end the traditional hostility that had characterised their relations; lead to economic prosperity and religious toleration. Prior to negotiations, he wrote to one commissioner: ‘God give all of yow prudence, wisdome and honesty and Brittish minds. May wee be Brittains, and down goe the old ignominious names of Scotland and England.’64 Cromarty believed religion was the greatest difficulty to union but church government, upon which they differed, was something indifferent and ‘no indifferent thing should hinder so uncontroverted a good’.65 Cromarty’s challenge to Wylie focused upon the principles of delegation and devolution. He identified two forms of government, in either of which there must be some power in which the last resort of authority resides. Within that supreme authority lay sovereignty. In one model, society establishes a form of government to rule over it that has supreme sovereignty and is not subject to any other power in the body politic or nation. He identified this government and power as devolved, and if society should devolve the supremacy on one ruler or group, as in a parliament, then it is in those chosen that sovereignty resides. Cromarty argued that such a government was vested with supreme authority, and if it altered in any way the nature and form of government, for better or worse, no one can challenge or change it. If they could, then that government would not be supreme.66 The second model he identified was when a society appointed a government whose actions were subject to, judged and overruled by some other power in the body politic or nation,

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namely the people who appointed it. In this case, those who governed did so by delegation, and supreme power and sovereignty lay with the governed rather than the government. The government must act according to the wishes of those who had appointed them. He argued that delegated power could not be a supreme power; supreme power would reside in those who delegated. Delegation and sovereignty are inconsistent because delegated power is subject to an account by those from whom power was given.67 Cromarty insisted that the present Scottish monarchy and government were supreme, and had authority by devolution and not delegation. They were not subject to the authority of the people. Sovereignty lay with the monarch and parliament. If any other authority had the power to change or annul decisions made by either, they would cease to be the supreme power. If the government made changes to itself, to its representatives, made laws over people or contracts and alliances with other nations, ‘what they do stands good de jure; and the obedience of the governed is duty’.68 Cromarty’s point was that parliament, in its deliberations on union, as the supreme authority whose members were not delegates, was not required to consult with the people, nor was it subject to their authority. It could proceed with the ratification of the treaty if it pleased, without consulting the people. Because of their ideological commitment to the Stuarts, the majority of Episcopalians opposed incorporating union. They were encouraged in their opposition by orders issued from the exiled court in 1706.69 They feared that union would forever bar the way to a restoration because of the guarantees the treaty gave to Presbyterians.70 However, the writings and speeches of Cromarty and Seton demonstrate that a significant and articulate minority of Episcopalians favoured union.71 Most expected that, at the very least, it would lead to toleration, while some hoped it would eventually lead to their restoration. Another significant Episcopalian contribution came from John Arbuthnott. Born in Kincardineshire, Arbuthnott ended up in London as a consequence of the Revolution. He became a physician to Queen Anne in 1705, and was probably encouraged into print by her support for union.72 Arbuthnott rejected federal union as unworkable and described Scotland’s independence as precarious and imaginary. Any loss of sovereignty would be a loss shared by England. Scotland, in lieu of its ‘titular sovereignty, and imaginary independency’, would acquire true and solid power and dominion. Religious objections to union and fears about the Church of England were considered unchristian, and one of the great benefits Scotland would get from union would be an end to ‘uncharitable and unreasonable Divisions about our trifling Differences in Religion’.73 In

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common with Cromarty and Seton, Arbuthnott believed that the religious divisions that had plagued Scotland had been over things indifferent. Union would bring these to an end; it would strengthen the Protestant interest and promote toleration of each other’s position. William Paterson, Bishop of Glasgow, had undergone a considerable shift in position from Jacobite conspirator to leader of the loyal Episcopalians and supporter of union. Paterson believed union would prove advantageous to Scotland and he expected parliament to ratify the treaty, despite the opposition. He expected Episcopalians to look upon union more favourably when they received toleration, which he believed could not be denied them because toleration for dissenters in England was established by law.74 In November 1706, at a meeting of his clergy, Paterson warned them not to attack the union because it ‘would certainly advance their way’. Despite this, several of the clergy declared themselves against it in their meeting houses.75 Nevertheless, an Episcopalian broadsheet welcomed the ‘Happy Unity’ between the nations as a ‘Great Work’ that accomplished what past ages had worked for in vain. Not only had union been accomplished, episcopacy had survived: ‘High Heaven has been its Guardian, fixt it on a Rock, and Discord with her Snaky-Scalp, or the Doctrine of Jus Divinum shall ne’er prevail against it, tho’ so much envy’d by the Mobile of Schism.’ The writer looked forward to better days in the new state where episcopacy would be free to ‘flourish with its Primitive Grandure, its Branches spread with Purity, and sprout like a young Fruitful Vine Great Britain over’.76 Echoes of Cromarty’s arguments were to be found within the church. They were closely related to Presbyterian attitudes to government and authority and help explain why they acquiesced in union rather than offer resistance. The reformed position was that there ought to be an alliance between church and state, ‘an alliance in which each of the contracting units recognised its own duty and that of the other, its own bounds and those of the other’.77 The relationship was one of mutual interest and co-operation, particularly in the maintenance of the present establishment. They advocated a legal establishment for the church, as well as state support, but resisted state control and interference. Presbyterians also held to the doctrine of lawful resistance to unlawful and tyrannical government, a doctrine that justified the Revolution and was outlined in the Claim of Right. The question for Presbyterians confronted with the prospect of incorporating union was whether or not it was a situation that justified resistance to the government. The universal response within the established church was that there were no grounds for the church to take any action in the form of resistance. They

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acknowledged and submitted to the government as the lawful authority, and the government was not in any way acting as a tyranny that might justify resistance. If unionists were correct, not only was the doctrine, discipline, worship and government of the Church of Scotland not under threat, it was in fact likely to be more secure in a union than otherwise.78 Not only was there no justification for resistance, no one in the church was advocating it and the church, generally speaking, went out of its way to suppress and discountenance any rioting or potential for risings. Breaking with the government was not an option. The overwhelming response within the church was to see it as their duty to submit and yield a passive subjection to the established constitution and that it would be sufficient to represent their grievances to parliament for consideration and satisfaction. Patrick Simson believed this would be a sufficient exoneration of our consciences while we must bear the grievances that we cannot get redressed and follo our work so far as we have access to it with all due respect to the government and governours that are set over us and to the publick peace of the nation, carefully avoiding what may breed further disturbance both in church and state on either hand.79

This was the course of action followed by the commission and the commission had the overwhelming support and approval of the church. Both in and out of the pulpit, actions were to be such as to avoid all occasion of a rupture either within the church or between the church and the government. Such a rupture would only satisfy their enemies. Simson argued that while they were not clear to actively consent to any change in government or constitution that had an immediate impact on religion, it was nevertheless their duty to go along with the change and submit to it. Simson explained his position in the light of what happened at the Revolution. He argued that even if he had not been clear to consent to the deposition of James, he submitted to it and saw it as his duty to support it because it was done in his eyes, by the representatives of the kingdom in a free convention and for the right reasons, civil and religious liberty. Applying this criteria to the union, he argued that while they may not approve of the union in the treaty and the change in government it proposed, if it was concluded, it would be concluded by the nation’s representatives in a free parliament to whom such matters belonged. Furthermore, if the liberties they enjoyed in a separate parliament were preserved in a union, they had no grounds for a revolt and could not avoid submitting to the change. Simson argued that this principle applied even if the treaty was concluded out of party interest, or from wrong motives on the part of their representatives. They could not ‘suppose all

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parliat members to be saints or not moved by interest or pensions nor disinterested whether on one hand or another’. If it was nevertheless done lawfully and after free debate, and with a majority of votes, they had no reason to dispute its legality or their submission to it, ‘if ye thing itself be lawful whereunto our obedience is required’.80 SETTLING THE SUCCESSION WITH LIMITATIONS

The opposition case was hampered by a number of problems. It was clear at the negotiations that neither the Court Party nor the ministry in London were interested in anything other than an incorporating union. Anne’s instructions to Queensberry before parliament opened were unequivocal. If in opposition to an entire and complete Union as is now treated by the Commissioners, a Federal Union, the settling the succession with limitations or any other measure shall be substitute and proposed, You are to let all Our servants know that We expect their joint and hearty concurrence with you for the throwing out thereof . . . If you find that in all probability, notwithstanding of your endeavours and Our servants, that a Federal Union or any other measure in opposition to an entire union will carry in parliament, you are in that case to adjourn the parliament.81

It was an all or nothing strategy. London had wanted to settle the succession on a number of occasions, but Scottish party politics had prevented all attempts. While the populace favoured a federal union, the political will, which ultimately mattered most, was behind incorporation. Attempts to promote a federal union were also hampered by the diversity of schemes proposed as alternatives to incorporation. There was no single scheme upon which they were agreed or could promote. The Act of Security, upon which they were agreed, had provoked the current crisis. There was no collective intellectual response from the opposition. They did not counter the treaty for an incorporating union with a cohesive scheme of their own. As events were to demonstrate, they were not capable of a collective response. It was left to individual writers to promote schemes of their own, schemes which, while they did not get lost in the plethora of pamphlets, were easily countered or ignored. The failure of the opposition to capitalise on the ideas produced as alternatives to incorporation reduced writers like Ridpath and Hodges to little more than voices crying in the wilderness.82 Even if they had managed to unite behind a particular alternative, it is clear from the instructions given to Queensberry that there was little chance of success. Despite the

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instructions, of which they were probably unaware anyway, and the problems among themselves, the opposition had not given up all hope of securing a federal union. On 4 November 1706, before parliament debated and voted on the first article, the Marquess of Annandale placed two resolutions before parliament as alternatives to proceeding with the treaty. The first proposed a union of interests in succession, wars, alliances and trade, while reserving the sovereignty and independence of crown and monarchy, and the constitution and government of church and state as presently established. The second was a straightforward resolve to settle the succession with limitations.83 After a lengthy and heated debate, and a protestation from the Duke of Atholl, parliament approved the first article and the principle of incorporation.84 Opposition options were narrowing and they began to focus upon settling the succession, which, combined with the general hostility to incorporation, appeared to be the most likely scheme to ‘break the court measures’.85 Initially there had been some concern that the opposition groups might manage to join under a policy of declaring for the succession without a union, and that such a policy would turn ministers against them. Mar suggested that dissenters in England should be encouraged to persuade ministers in the Kirk against such a policy.86 These concerns soon disappeared and unionists saw this shift in emphasis towards settling the succession, with or without limitations, as the last resort of a desperate opposition. In an attempt to derail the treaty, they had been forced to fall back on proposals they had rejected during Tweeddale’s ministry in 1704.87 On 15 November, during the parliamentary debate on the second article that settled the succession on the House of Hanover, Annandale moved that parliament should proceed to settle the succession with limitations according to the terms of the resolve he had entered on 4 November and not in the terms of the second article of the treaty. Unionists considered this a diversionary move intended to split their ranks. 88 However, even on this issue, the opposition could not unite. It took a lengthy debate to decide to proceed with the second article rather than the fourth. Some of the opposition argued that the succession was their trump card and should not be settled at that time as it would tend to limit any concession they might receive from the English.89 Supporting Annandale, Belhaven argued that the second article was inconsistent with the Act of Security, which had required certain conditions to be met before settling on the same successor as that in England. Hamilton likewise gave his support to Annandale’s motion, but his move caused consternation among the Cavaliers. As supporters of the exiled Stuarts, they were equally opposed to union or settling the succession. The lack of

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unity forced Hamilton to move that an address be sent to the Queen informing her of the state of the nation, the general aversion to an incorporating union and their willingness to settle the succession with limitations. He called for a parliamentary recess until she considered the matter.90 Both motions were rejected, Annandale’s on the grounds that the present treaty had been negotiated as a consequence of parliament’s failure to settle the succession, a failure that was laid at the door of the opposition.91 Despite his motion, Annandale voted to approve of the second article.92 The debate demonstrated what was to be a recurring problem for the opposition: their inability to unite behind a reasonable alternative to the treaty. Offering to settle the succession was their last remaining hope, but the Cavaliers were opposed to settling the succession because it would exclude the Stuarts. The division dismayed observers such as Robert Wodrow, who described the opposition as ‘a miserable mixture of Jacobites wt honest people’ who were ‘under very great differences among themselves’.93 Wodrow divided the opposition into three groups. The first were ‘plainly Jacobite and known to be such’. The second made no pretence to Jacobitism but nevertheless shared the same policy as Jacobites, of ‘leaving the succession undetermined till the queens demise’. The third group supported going into the succession with limitations. Wodrow complained that, unless some agreement was reached between them to ‘secure the succession and jointly oppose ye union’, the court would succeed in passing the treaty.94 His letters reveal increasing frustration and despair at the way events were unfolding in parliament, at the divisions within the opposition and the opposition’s inability to offer an alternative or exploit popular hostility to the treaty.95 He was disillusioned. Comparing the present session of parliament with that which had sat in 1703 and which had defended Scotland’s rights and liberties, he concluded that a Scottish parliament sitting longer than two or three years came under English influence to such an extent that it no longer represented the voice of the people.96 Charles, Earl of Selkirk, was similarly depressed. He saw no way of stopping the government and warned his mother to expect nothing of any good from the opposition because of the divisions over the succession. He was at a loss to know what, if anything, could be done about it.97 It had been suggested to Hamilton that if he would go into the succession upon good and reasonable limitations, a number of those currently supporting the government would join him. Apparently Hamilton agreed and was backed by Annandale and several others who were strong supporters of the church. Wodrow, aware that Hamilton had been suspected of favouring the Pretender, nevertheless believed that he was determined to break the

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union and set up the succession. Hamilton’s preference had been that both settling the succession and limitations would be better achieved after the death of the Queen but that, when compared to an incorporating union, settling the succession immediately, even upon less favourable limitations, was ‘by far the least evil’.98 There had been reports that the Jacobites were also prepared to settle the succession on the grounds that it was a lesser evil than union.99 One account claimed they had been instructed to do so by the exiled court.100 The rationale was that they could live with settling the succession if it prevented union in the hope of overturning the decision at the death of Anne. It would certainly be less problematic than trying to overturn the union. The reality was that the Duke of Atholl and others, including Andrew Fletcher, insisted that the succession be settled after the death of Anne. Furthermore, they would not propose any alternative to union that would also close the door on the Pretender.101 Fletcher’s position was a reflection of his desire to abide by the terms of the Act of Security. Those who had previously held out for limitations and terms on the succession that were considered too high were now willing to settle for much less rather than have an incorporating union.102 The opposition began to rue their missed opportunities. Reflecting on Hamilton’s efforts to stop the union, the Earl of Orkney wrote: I believe it is in vain he will not be able to alter anything. I believe people will see now that the settling the Succession with the limitations that was offered in Marquis Tweedale’s parliament had been the wisest thing that nation could have done but now it is too late.103

The opposition cause was not helped by the unreliability of its nominal leader. Reports from London in October had claimed that Hamilton had concluded a deal with the Whig lords to the effect that he would not oppose union.104 Some of his letters at the time reveal defeatism hardly in keeping with the important role of leadership.105 The vacillating nature of his leadership was perfectly revealed in the affair of the Barons, Freeholders and Heretors. The opposition agreed to invite the signatories to the various addresses against the union to Edinburgh, to press Queensberry for a response to their petitions. They wanted him to drop the treaty; at the very least hold a recess of parliament and inform the Queen of the state of the nation before calling a new parliament to settle the issue. If Queensberry ignored their requests, the opposition intended framing a national address similar to that written by the Country Party following Darien. The address would outline their grievances, seek redress and would be signed by the Barons, Freeholders and Heretors.106

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The idea was proposed by Atholl and Fletcher and had widespread support, including from Hamilton.107 An address was written and letters sent out inviting the Gentlemen to Edinburgh. Large numbers began arriving near the end of December.108 However, the entire enterprise was derailed by two events. The first was Hamilton’s belated insistence that the address should contain a clause indicating their willingness to settle the succession on the House of Hanover, otherwise he would not support it. There was widespread suspicion that Hamilton’s intervention was deliberately intended to split the opposition, many of whom, as Jacobites, could not accept such a clause.109 While the opposition argued, the government acted. On 27 December parliament was informed about the large numbers arriving in Edinburgh intent on securing a parliamentary response to their addresses.110 Argyll claimed that the parliamentary proclamation against tumults the previous month had made a positive impact and calmed the ‘commone sort’. He believed a further proclamation might calm the gentry gathering in Edinburgh and that there was an ‘absolute necessity’ to stop these things at their beginning, before they went too far.111 The government issued a proclamation ‘discharging unwarrantable and seditious convocations and meetings’. The gathering of the gentry in Edinburgh was said to have been likely to lead to dangerous consequences, if tolerated. The proclamation not only prohibited such meetings as unwarrantable and contrary to law, it also prohibited all attempts to organise, thus limiting opposition opportunities for action.112 Hamilton next suggested a parliamentary walk-out by the opposition. Annandale was asked to renew his motion to settle the succession on Hanover. Upon its expected rejection, they would enter a protestation, leave parliament and sign the national address that had been prepared for the Heretors to present. A similar tactic had been used in 1702, when Hamilton led the opposition out of the first parliament called after the accession of Anne. The opposition believed that the union negotiations that followed had failed because they were authorised by a rump parliament. The English believed they had no security in negotiating with commissioners whose authority came from a parliament against which so many had protested and separated. Hamilton claimed that a new protest would have a similar effect.113 The Jacobites only agreed to the plan because they expected Annandale’s motion to be rejected. Hamilton was persuasive; he was even reported as having stated that if their protest failed, they must resort to arms and call the king over from France.114 On the day appointed for the protest, Hamilton claimed to be suffering from toothache and refused to come to the House. Friends who complained of his conduct eventually persuaded him. They wanted him

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to propose the resolution settling the succession, he refused and the opportunity was lost. By 6 January 1707, Atholl believed the differences had been resolved and a national address was possible because Hamilton was no longer insisting on mentioning the succession.115 However, he was mistaken. The two men failed to agree on either the succession or an address to the Queen.116 It was very frustrating for Presbyterians to find themselves in an unholy alliance with Jacobites, and there was suspicion about the motives of the church’s new friends. Patrick Simson wrote: I think we have an enemy in our bosom who were never friends to our establishment Civil or Ecclesiastick who are but waiting their advantage & are seeking to stir up and entertain our disorders that they may fish in muddy waters & are glad to get Presbyterians to bee their tool & to get the blame of all laid on us & those that are not very steady in our interest in the government are apt to make these things a handle to neglect their giving the church her necessary security.117

Presbyterians were sensitive to accusations that opposition to union was serving the Jacobite interest by opening the door for a popish successor, and that they ‘should be so blinded to join with their known enemies’.118 Wodrow observed that ‘Its for a Lamentation that our road and yrs lyes now together, but I am persuaded we will not go far together.’119 Ministers were aware that the spectre of Jacobitism and the Pretender would be raised in an attempt to frighten Presbyterians into an incorporating union. The idea that to oppose the union was to serve the Jacobite interest was rejected as a ‘weak and foolish insinuation’.120 Nevertheless, it was recognised that Presbyterians were susceptible to such arguments; susceptible because the possibility of a popish successor was real enough. Union as the bulwark against Jacobitism, the bulwark of Protestantism and the foundation of Presbyterian security were powerful arguments in its favour. The single most important issue for the church was that of its security in the event of a union (see Chapter 2). However, the issue of security was not limited to the maintenance of the established church and its doctrine, discipline, worship and Presbyterian government in an incorporating union. The church was also concerned about its security should union fail, and in particular if the succession remain unsettled. Union had been described as the ‘surest bullwark against the Prince of Wales’, but with its failure came the risk ‘or rather certainty’ of his return.121 The crisis brought about by the succession question was as much a crisis of security for the church as it was for relations between the two kingdoms. Settling the succession in the Protestant line was a

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priority for the church, as the three presbytery addresses, letters to the commission and the commission’s third address to parliament had demonstrated.122 If union divided ‘revolutionists’, settling the succession was sure to unite them.123 Unionists argued that far from endangering the church, union would strengthen and secure it. Tyrannical and arbitrary government was far more likely to emerge under the present unsettled situation because it allowed the prospect of the return of the Stuarts. The insecurity of the church lay not in, but out of a union. At a stroke union would remove the Jacobite threat and provide the church with all the security it could wish for.124 William Carstares argued in the commission that union was in the church’s best interest because it would secure its religion, liberty and property, lead to the common good and safety of the Protestant interest and that the Church of Scotland was not endangered by it.125 Carstares acknowledged the fears of many ‘good men’ about the possible consequences of union but believed that far from being a threat to the church, it was instead the ‘most probable mean to preserve it’.126 He was convinced that England posed no threat to the church because the English parliament would agree to any security that was reasonably demanded of it.127 If anything, the church and Presbyterian government was safer in a union with England than if Scotland was to continue as an independent kingdom.128 Carstares saw the treaty as an opportunity not to be missed and was concerned about ‘the consequences of its miscarrying’.129 Settling the succession was the ‘gold’ between the alternatives of an incorporating union and the Pretender. However, settling the succession proved to be unobtainable. Had the union failed, and the succession remained unsettled, by common consent the likeliest outcome was thought to be a period of political and religious uncertainty and continued Presbyterian insecurity. On the other hand, incorporating union, with the act securing the church, offered Presbyterians a Protestant succession with the establishment of the Protestant religion and security for Presbyterian church government in Scotland. It offered to close the door forever on a popish successor. It offered precisely what a divided opposition could not, or would not, offer. It offered greater security than the status quo and was urged as the best means to kill off all Jacobite hopes.130 Union would let Scotland trade freely with England and her colonies, secure the church and ‘pluck up persecution and tyranny in both kingdoms by the roots’.131 Presbyterian hopes of avoiding incorporation by settling the succession were disappointed by a combination of an inept and divided opposition and a determined Court Party allied to an English interest. The failure of the opposition to unite behind an

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alternative policy that ruled out a popish successor was a significant factor in persuading the church to acquiesce in an incorporating union. In reality, there was no alternative to the treaty. Queensberry was to ratify the treaty, but under no circumstance was he to substitute it with a federal union or settle the succession. Failure to ratify the treaty would have returned the kingdoms to the constitutional crisis that predated negotiations. The Kirk was therefore caught between a rock and a hard place; union with prelatic England or the return of a popish successor and the overthrow of the Revolution Settlement. Fears over the return of the Stuarts were real enough. Indeed, England’s response to the Act of Security was prompted by those fears. One writer asked Presbyterian opponents of union whether or not their church government was more likely to be secure in a union with England – in which it was included as a fundamental article of the treaty and supported by English dissenters – or by uniting with the Jacobites and settling a popish successor?132 Confronted with the choice of a union in which the present settlement and establishment was secured or the uncertainty of the status quo and threat of a popish successor, they chose union and security. THE HEBRONITES AND CONFESSIONAL CONFEDERATION

Presbyterians outwith the Kirk were as ready to offer alternatives to the treaty as anyone else. Both the Hebronites and Cameronians offered distinctive Presbyterian alternatives, as opposed to alternatives favoured by Presbyterians. Both schemes strongly emphasised the centrality of the covenants, in particular the Solemn League and Covenant. The Hebronites argued in favour of confessional confederation and a restoration of the relationship based upon the Solemn League: ‘Should we not begin with England where we left in 1643?’133 Confessional confederation was the Presbyterian response to the anglicising tendencies of James VI and Charles I. Presbyterians had welcomed the Union of the Crowns in 1603 as the providential blessing of God and as an opportunity to reform the Church of England.134 However, the unionist vision of both monarchs had no place for Presbyterianism and the Kirk was subjected to a process of conformity to the government and practice of the Church of England. Presbyterian resistance to those changes found expression in the National Covenant of 1638, which ‘offered a radical Scottish corrective to imperial monarchy’.135 The covenant represented a rejection of the unionist vision of James and Charles, a rejection of the policy of British uniformity, of the Anglicisation of the Scottish Church. It was a

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rejection of religious innovations and a defence of the distinctive reformed doctrine of the regulative principle. It was a rejection of absentee monarchy and prerogative rule, and of the process of reducing Scotland to a province of England. The covenant heralded a religious and constitutional revolution that had a major impact on Anglo-Scottish relations. The religious policies of James and Charles were rejected, episcopacy abolished and Presbyterianism re-established. The constitutional settlement resulted in the curtailment of royal power and prerogative and the transfer of political power to parliament.136 In the interests of protecting their Revolution, the covenanters vigorously promoted confessional confederation between the kingdoms in the 1640s. Not only did they seek a union that maintained the sovereignty and independence of both kingdoms, they wanted one that involved closer co-operation with England through religious uniformity, economic, military and political links.137 The Solemn League and Covenant of 1643 formalised the relationship and represented ‘a British endeavour to achieve common spiritual and material aims while maintaining distinctive national structures in church and state’.138 This was the basis upon which the Hebronites wished to unite with England. If England refused, Scotland ought to protest against its neighbours’ breach of covenant and look to God to help it choose a King of its owns using scriptural principles (Deuteronomy 17: 14). An incorporating union was inconsistent with the covenants and to participate in that scheme would involve them in ‘National and unparalleled perjury’. Comparisons were drawn between the present parliament and the Engagement of 1647–8. The Engagement was a treaty negotiated between Charles I and some covenanters led by the Duke of Hamilton. Charles, then a prisoner of the New Model Army at Carrisbrook Castle on the Isle of Wight, promised to establish Presbyterianism for three years in return for military assistance from the Scots in his struggle against parliament. During that time an assembly, whose members were to be appointed by Charles, was to determine a settlement on church government and discipline. The new assembly implied a rejection of the work of the Westminster Assembly and raised the spectre of a religious compromise that would be unacceptable to mainstream covenanting opinion.139 The general assembly and the commission rejected the Engagement as an unlawful breach of the Solemn League and Covenant. It failed to satisfy the Kirk’s desire for the safety and security of religion and was considered to be destructive to its interests because it initiated an incorporating union.140 The engagers’ agreement to complete the union of the kingdoms according to the intention of James VI and I has been

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described as the ‘first Scottish instigated effort to promote incorporating union as prescribed by James VI & I’.141 The two sides of the covenanting movement had different visions of the nature of British union. Rejection of the engagement was another rejection of incorporation. It had become Presbyterian orthodoxy to condemn the Engagement because of its breach of covenant and its consequences. The Hebronites accused Presbyterian unionists of hypocrisy for condemning the Engagement as sinful because it was contrary to and inconsistent with the Solemn League and Covenant, while eagerly pleading for a union that by its very nature would forever bury the covenanted work of reformation.142 The aim of the covenant had been the overthrow of prelacy and the establishment of religious uniformity between the kingdoms, which, in Scottish eyes, was Presbyterian uniformity. Incorporating union would accomplish the opposite and forever establish prelacy in England. Furthermore, Presbyterians who supported the Hanoverian succession were guilty of renouncing the covenants because by the act of succession prelacy was legally established in England. It would also complete what the Engagement had initiated. Moreover, the successor to the crown was a Lutheran and no Presbyterian could expect a Lutheran to be concerned to maintain the doctrine, discipline and worship of the church consistent with Calvin’s reformation, as opposed to that favoured by the ‘Arminianised prelatists’ in the Church of England. Lest anyone should interpret their rejection of the Hanoverians as meaning that they were sympathetic to the Stuarts, they issued a call to all patriots to protest against the union and petition parliament to pass an act declaring it to be high treason to own and acknowledge the Pretender. Echoing their address from the South and Western shires, they argued that by cramming the union down people’s throats, the parliament could do no more to help restore the Pretender because he would be able to exploit the unrest the union was causing. The implication of their rejection of both houses was that the succession should be settled, if at all, on a Scottish, Presbyterian and covenanted monarch: ‘a king of their own’. If that was not possible, the obvious alternative was a covenanted republic.143 The Hebronites insisted that Scotland could have no security for its religion and liberties in any treaty because England could not be trusted. England had violated the most sacred covenant that men could devise and, as they were no more pious now than they had been in the 1640s, they were no more likely to keep their word. They argued that the prospect and promise of increased commercial activity and economic prosperity was uncertain and not worth quitting all that was dear to

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them as ‘Reformed Covenanted Presbyterians’. Presbyterian supporters of the treaty in parliament were condemned as sharing an even greater guilt than the members of parliament in 1661. Those members were largely Episcopalian and professed enemies to the church, whereas these Presbyterians now said ‘Haill to the Church, and betrays it with a kiss, as Judas did his Master’.144 The 1661 parliament of which they were so critical had overturned all of the reforms and legislation of the covenanting revolution.145 However, the Revolution in 1689 had not fully restored the legislation of the covenanters nor revoked some of the legislation of the Restoration regime they thought particularly objectionable. They therefore called for a reformation of the religion and liberties and of all legislation passed since 1660. They aimed at the restoration of Scotland to that state of religious and civil reform that existed in 1649. Consistent with that aim, they called for a renewal of the covenants and the calling of a general assembly for that end. They called for a day of humiliation and prayer for national sins. Parliament was to appoint a committee to consider economic and trading issues, though not necessarily with England, as well as how to advance the fisheries. Its remit was to include how to restrain all excess in dress, food, drink, rents and servants fees (wages). No new taxes were to be imposed until all grievances were redressed. Finally, any person who had any suggestions about how to rectify their present predicament was to be encouraged.146 In terms of expression, the pamphlet is rudimentary and lacks detail. Nevertheless, the aim and meaning are plain: incorporating union with England was dangerous and sinful, involving the nation in the guilt of national perjury. The covenant was their marriage contract with God, its breach, effectively their divorce from God, could only result in national misery: ‘Can any think that Scotland can be happy, if all the world should befriend us, unless we repent of National Perjury, Bloodshed and Oppressions, till we renew our Covenants and be more for God?’ Incorporating union would institutionalise their divorce, their perjury and their guilt. The foundation for any union between the kingdoms was the Solemn League and Covenant. They envisaged and called for the restoration of the confessional confederation of the 1640s and of the covenanting reforms and legislation. Should confessional confederation prove impossible, Scotland should choose its own successor; a distinct possibility because England, who had originally violated the covenant, could hardly be trusted. The new king would be Scottish, reformed and Presbyterian, thus excluding those ‘strangers’ the popish Stuarts and Lutheran Hanoverians.

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THE CAMERONIANS AND THE SCOTTISH COVENANTED REPUBLIC

The Cameronians proposed the more radical alternative of a covenanted Scottish republic.147 Although anonymous, it is clear by the terminology employed and the criticisms within it of the established church that The Smoaking Flax was written by a Cameronian. Criticisms of the Kirk were typically Cameronian. They accused it of being an erastian, ‘indulged’ church that had sacrificed the doctrine, discipline and government of Christ into the hands of man. It was accused of defection from the covenants and of establishing and maintaining ungodly, malignant, corrupt and wicked rulers without covenant qualifications and engagements. None of the marks of the true church were to be found in the established Church of Scotland.148 They also referred approvingly to the actions and testimony of the radical covenanters of the 1670s and ’80s, and to themselves as the ‘true Subjects of the Covenanted Kingdom of Scotland.’149 It has been argued that the Presbyterian author expressed the widely held view that a Stuart Catholic king was a lesser evil, and a preferable alternative, to English and Hanoverian rule.150 It would be unlikely for a moderate Presbyterian to express such a view, unthinkable for a Cameronian. In the preface, the alternatives of union with England or restoring the Pretender were likened to Egypt and Assyria. In biblical terms, Israel was forbidden to enter alliances with either nation and when tempted to do so was reminded that both were unreliable. From the outset, the writer was stating that neither of those options, the Stuarts or the Hanoverians, was reliable or preferable. Both were as bad as the other and it was difficult working out which of them they had most cause to be ashamed of. Both were to be rejected and the alternative offered in the pamphlet was to be preferred.151 Not only did they not prefer the Stuarts, they were critical of those who would join with the French and the Pretender, both of whom were described as the ‘Citizens of darkness’. They were just as critical of those who preferred the House of Hanover, or Andrew Fletcher’s preferred choice of the Prince of Prussia, rather than establish a commonwealth.152 The idea of a Scottish commonwealth had its roots in the Protester – Resolutioner dispute of the 1650s. The division originally arose during the negotiations between the covenanters and Charles II over his accession to the throne following the execution of his father. Many had reservations about his trustworthiness and his worthiness to subscribe the covenants. After military defeat at Dunbar, the Committee of Estates wanted to reinforce the army by re-admitting former engagers

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previously purged from the army by the Act of Classes of 1649. On 14 December 1650, the Commission of the General Assembly passed two public resolutions allowing their re-admission upon certain conditions. The resolutions enabled parliament to pass an act rescinding the Act of Classes but they also formalised the divisions within the church into those who favoured the resolutions, ‘Resolutioners’, and those who objected, the ‘Protesters’. Both sides opposed Scotland’s incorporation into Cromwell’s Commonwealth, and from 1654 into the Protectorate, but could not agree on a response.153 The Resolutioners suspected the Protesters of ‘underhand dealing with the enemy, that they would be pleased to erect Scotland into an independent commonwealth by itself’.154 Such a change in government was considered criminal and a ‘breach of covenant and gross perjury.’155 However, support for an independent Scottish republic was not inconsistent with the covenant or with opposition to union. In May 1659, James Guthrie, a minister from Stirling and a leading Protester, opposed proposals for a union tabled in London by Archibald Campbell, 8th Earl of Argyll, and Archibald Johnston, Lord Wariston. According to Guthrie, England was, bound in conscience and honour to leave Scotland to itself, to be a distinct republick from England, to putt the power into the hands of the Godly party who would secure England as to any hurt or danger from Scotland and ease it of the charge of maintaining an English army in it.156

Guthrie had written to Colonel Charles Fleetwood, head of the army in England, and Major General John Lambert, member of the Army Council, urging them to ‘lett Scotland goe free both for Church and state in things religious and civil’.157 He hoped Wariston would support his request. Guthrie’s criticism of Cromwellian union had resulted in his being prevented from preaching for a time. He considered Cromwell, and his son Richard after him, to be a usurper.158 He had no track record as a republican and at his trial rejected accusations that he had sought to eradicate or subvert the king’s government and refused to recognise his authority. Guthrie stated that he did reject the civil magistrate or king as a judge of ministers’ doctrine, but acknowledged the authority of the king in all civil matters.159 However, Guthrie was the main author of The Causes of the Lord’s Wrath Against Scotland, the chief reason for his trial and execution in 1661. Guthrie argued that one of the greatest and most provoking of sins had been the nation’s backsliding and defection from the covenants. This was aggravated by a number of circumstances, one of which concerned the authorising of a commission to negotiate

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with Charles II for investing him with the government of the kingdom, upon his agreeing to certain conditions, despite the clear evidence of his disaffection from the cause. Furthermore, they went on to crown him king despite further revelations of his unworthiness, and in contravention of the guidelines set down by the general assembly in July 1649. These stated that no king or magistrate had unlimited power but ought to rule according to the will of God. No king was to be admitted to the exercise of his power until he acknowledged this rule. The Solemn League and Covenant bound them to defend and preserve the king’s person and authority, but that was joined and subordinate to their duty to preserve and defend the true religion and liberties of the kingdom. With the King standing in opposition to the desires of the people concerning their religion and liberties, it would be a manifest breach of the covenant to prefer the King’s interest before Christ’s. They considered arbitrary government to be the source of all corruptions in church and state, and they had taken the covenants in order to restrain such government. To admit the King to government without satisfaction would be to return such arbitrary power to him and betray the cause. In Guthrie’s eyes, the King was obviously hostile to reformation and surrounded by advisers who shared that hostility; to return him to power without satisfaction would also return those malignant and disaffected men.160 In the light of Guthrie’s views, it is possible that in the situation they faced in 1659, he was of the opinion that an independent Scottish republic, a commonwealth of the godly, allied to the English commonwealth through a confessional confederation, was preferable to the alternatives of union or the restoration of Charles II. The basis of Guthrie’s union, given his absolute commitment to the covenants, was the Solemn League and Covenant. Far from being a breach of covenant, a republic would be the best means of maintaining it. To repeat the mistakes of 1649–50 and restore an untrustworthy, uncovenanted monarch would be a breach of the covenant and lead to a repeat of the consequences. The restoration of Charles II was inconsistent with the interests of the covenanted reformation. A republic was the logical outcome of rejecting an uncovenanted monarch. The Cameronians had likewise rejected the un-covenanted William, Mary and Anne. As the heirs and successors of the Protestors, they also followed that road to its logical conclusion of a covenanted republic. The writer of The Smoaking Flax began his critique of incorporation by setting out the principles by which the treaty should be judged. In the body politic, whether kingdom or commonwealth, God being the God of order will have unity and harmony. The creation of such a society

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required good judgement, zeal and perseverance involving three principles of action. The first and moving principle must be love and not selfinterest. The second was the intended goal, which was the glory of God and the well-being of the kingdom. The third was that the means used to achieve the ends must be agreeable to Scripture and reason. Where all of these conditions are met, all the essential elements of a just society are in place. If the intended union and the treaty measured up to the principles, it was to be embraced, ‘seing that Union is so desirable, by reason the strength of the Kingdom lyes therein: and therefore to be wished by all, who desires to live in peace and Truth’.161 Applying the criteria to the Hanoverian succession, he insisted they had been chosen ‘without the lawful and free exercise of election’ and that the true and faithful subjects of Scotland are not inclined to monarchy because it had proved hurtful to the nation in the past.162 Emphasising the limited and contractual nature of monarchy, he argued that an individual or family is elected to rule according to God’s word and the fundamental laws of the land. Their hold on government depended upon their qualities as a ruler, qualities outlined in God’s word. If these qualities were absent, then that ruler may be rejected and replaced with someone from the same line or family. If that proved impossible, ‘then they may change either the familie or the government’.163 Not only could bad rulers be removed, forms of government could be changed. A monarchy could become a republic. These criteria had already been applied to the Stuarts at the Revolution. The writer argued that in the treaty the Hanoverians, who were Lutheran, were to succeed without conditions or qualifications, such as subscription to the covenants. Furthermore, in a direct breach of Scotland’s covenant engagements, popery, prelacy and sectarian groups were to remain without ‘extirpation’. This was a situation that the ‘Godly’ could not comply with, without participating in that breach. A Hanoverian succession was described as usurpation, not against the Stuarts but against the ‘Kingly government of Christ Jesus’. To admit an uncovenanted monarch who had not sworn to maintain Presbyterian church government or to reform England and Ireland from popery and prelacy, as Charles II had been required to do, was to admit a usurper. They could never recognise an uncovenanted monarch (see Chapter 1). The union was therefore unlawful and to be rejected and resisted. It was ‘intolerable that union can be where religion is not the object and end’.164 Union could only be pursued under the terms of the Solemn League and Covenant. Another writer similarly rejected both houses. Of the monarch’s qualifications, he wrote: ‘Let England be Protestant if they will, but Scotland is Presbyterian, and he must be such himself, One of

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our brethren both in Nation and Religion, or else we will have no King at all.’165 The writer insisted that no system of government was perfect: ‘Monarchy and Aristocracy are lyable to tyranny and oppression, Democracy to confusion.’166 The writer argued that their ‘worthy ancestors’ had cast off monarchy on account of its oppression and tyranny and had chosen a commonwealth in its place.167 The dominant theme of Restoration politics had been that of Presbyterian dissent. Between 1661 and 1679, Presbyterians had continued to acknowledge the authority of the king in civil affairs and directed their protests against his policies towards the church.168 The testimonies of executed covenanters continued to contain limited expressions of allegiance. However, by 1679 attitudes were changing. The Rutherglen Declaration of 29 May 1679 left the question of the king’s authority open; it was neither acknowledged nor disowned.169 Two weeks later, prior to the battle at Bothwell Brig, another declaration was issued that expressly acknowledged the authority of the king in civil affairs. The declaration was rejected by a more radical group of covenanters who refused to acknowledge the king’s authority and whose views were expressed in the Queensferry Paper.170 Addressing the question of their attitude to the government, the authors of the paper stated that they had no better way of showing their love for God than by rejecting the government that had so obviously rejected God. The Scottish government was described as unconstitutional and tyrannical. Its actions were such that it had no right to be called a government. The people of Scotland were under no obligation whatsoever to continue to submit to this government and there was nothing that stood in the way of their rejecting it. They addressed three issues. In terms of a constitutional argument, they insisted that they were not bound to accept any government that their ancestors had put in place and accepted. They were free to change any government that their ancestors had thought good for the commonwealth and people, if it ceased to be good. Nor were they unconditionally bound by the covenant because it only bound them to maintain their king in the maintenance of the true established and covenanted religion. Thus they rejected the mainstream covenanting opinion of the 1650s, that a republic was a manifest breach of the covenant. Nor could the present government require homage upon account of the covenant, if they had renounced it. The covenant was a coronation oath and Charles was an uncovenanted king. If he was rejected before for not subscribing the covenant, he can be rejected now for renouncing it. Finally, they believed that there was no hope of the Stuarts ever changing. They were therefore no longer bound in allegiance

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to rulers who had by their actions forfeited the right to rule or to any allegiance. As an alternative, they would set up a government and rulers according to the Word of God. Government would no longer be by a single person or family, or by lineal succession. Government of this kind was most liable to tyranny. Laws would principally be the civil and judicial laws of Scripture, and laws consistent with Christian liberty. A few weeks later, on 23 June 1680, a group led by Richard Cameron posted another declaration to the cross at Sanquhar in Dumfries, articulating similar sentiments. Both of these documents heavily influenced the writer of The Smoaking Flax. His interpretation of them was that by advocating the removal of the Stuarts, they were not just advocating the removal of a dynasty, they were advocating the removal of monarchy and replacing it with some form of godly commonwealth.171 Drawing their inspiration from Richard Cameron and the Queensferry Paper, the Cameronians announced, in relation to the union: Therefore we the true Subjects of the Covenanted Kingdom of Scotland do by vertue of the same Representative Power that our worthy Ancestors exercised, in casting off Tyranny and in abolishing and annulling all Acts made against Religion and Liberty (in the year 80 and 81) do by the same power annul the present unlawful union betwixt the kingdoms. And we hope that this act which is agreeable to scripture and reason shall be approven of God and ratified in heaven.172

The Cameronian ideal of a republic was further developed by Alexander Shields in his work A Hind Let Loose. Shields made no claim to originality for his work. He was at pains to point out that he was merely articulating views advocated by men such as John Knox, David Calderwood and Samuel Rutherford. His aim was to place his work within the theological and ideological tradition that had existed in the church since the Reformation, and therefore avoid accusations that he was peddling something new.173 Shields argued that government was a divine institution. The particular form it took was the result of a contract between the people and their rulers. Therefore, the power exercised by a ruler comes from the people, not from himself or even from God. The power of the people was greater than the power of any ruler they appointed. Rulers were the servants of the people delegated to oversee public affairs. Shields argued that ‘from the rise of government, and the interest people have in erecting it by consent and choice . . . if a king cannot be without the people’s making, then all the power he hath must either be by compact or gift’. There was, therefore, ‘a conditional reciprocally obliging covenant between the sovereign and the subjects’. The consent of the

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people was essential to the right of a ruler to rule. Crucially, if the ruler becomes a tyrant, as the Stuarts had in the eyes of the Cameronians, and later in the eyes of the political nation, the people had not just the right to withdraw their allegiance, but also to rebel and remove the tyrant. A tyrant may be brought to judgement because a king was not above the law but, like the people, subject to the law. As the servant of the people, a king could be brought to judgement for his tyranny and for breaking the contract between them. Furthermore, if, as Shields asserted, the particular form a government took was the result of a contract between the people and their rulers, the implication was that the contract could be re-negotiated and the form of government, not just who governed, could be changed. Shields stated that it was not his intention to discuss which form of government was preferable, whether monarchy, aristocracy or democracy. His dispute was not with monarchy but with the present monarch. In his opinion, the present monarchy was diametrically opposite to religion and liberty. Nevertheless, he writes enough to make it clear that monarchy would not be his government of choice because monarchy and tyranny had gone hand in hand. In his view, there was no divine original for monarchy, it was merely permitted.174 He expressed astonishment that people submitted to a form of government that tended to tyranny and wondered when the world would wake up and cast it off.175 Monarchy was not the preferred model of government and he appears to share the views expressed in the Queensferry Paper. As far as the writer of The Smoaking Flax was concerned, it was now their duty to begin where their ‘worthy ancestors’ had left off and choose the form of government most suitable for promoting religion and virtue and least liable to oppression and confusion. Scotland did not need the House of Hanover or the House of Stuart because Scotland did not need a monarchy. Using the Cromwellian government of the 1650s as his model, he argued that nothing could be better suited to their needs than a commonwealth with a lord protector and judges. Scotland should choose a commonwealth because it was less liable to the problems suffered by other forms of government. Despite describing Cromwell as a usurper, he also considered his government good and ‘full of Morality, Equity and Justice betwixt man and man; as that the Praise and Commendation thereof remains unto this day’.176 He argued that if a commonwealth was praiseworthy when unlawful, how much better a form of government it would be when lawfully constituted. Looking back at the 1650s and the commonwealth as some sort of golden age for the church and for Scotland was common among, but not exclusive to,

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Presbyterians.177 Gilbert Burnet, a Scottish Episcopalian who spent time in exile at the court of William of Orange and later became Bishop of Salisbury, wrote ‘There was good justice done and vice suppress’d and punished so that we always reckon those eight years of usurpation a time of great peace and prosperity.’178 With hindsight, he saw the commonwealth as a forerunner of incorporating union: ‘There was a sort of union of the three kingdoms in one parliament, where Scotland had its representative.’179 Presbyterian unionist Francis Grant argued that the commonwealth demonstrated that hopes of success from union were not imaginary. He argued that if union under the usurper Cromwell had its successes, how much more could they expect if attempted under lawful sovereigns?180 Rulers of a Scottish republic had to be the friends and professors of the true reformed religion: Christian, Calvinist and Presbyterian. They must be of godly character, of sound principles, have a due sense of the duties of office the needs of the times, and free from scandal. Rulers were to be chosen by lots (election) and the process was to be accompanied by fasting and prayer. It was argued that this method would eliminate envy, ambition and contention. The Smoking Flax rejected hereditary offices, either civil or military. A son could only follow his father in an office provided he possessed the qualities required of a ruler and was freely elected by the people. Rents and revenues given to those in public office were to be reduced to a level that was sufficient to ‘maintain an honest Christian life, as that Family and Children may be provided in a Christian way’. This was to encourage men to seek office out of conscience, love for God and a desire to serve his country, rather than out of ambition and the desire to use office for personal enrichment, to gratify pride and prodigality.181 The legal system was to be reformed. The present system was criticised as ‘tedious and expensive’. It favoured those who had money, while the poor received no justice. Using the commonwealth as his model, the college of justice was to be reduced to about four judges ‘as it was in the year 52 and 53 and downward’. Commonwealth justice was seen to be fair, without partiality and without respect towards rank or person. In a critique of both the Cromwellian regime and the militaryfiscal state since the 1690s, it was argued that all cesses and taxes upon the king’s customs were to be abolished. The cost of keeping an army was to be paid out of crown rents, castle rents and bishop rents. However, he argued that, despite soldiers, arms, castles and the security that comes from being an island, the greatest security of the nation lay in unity of religion. Religious unity and the faithful exercise of religion would bring them under the protection of God.182

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Addressing the economic aspects of the treaty, the writer described the equivalent, covered in the fifteenth article of the treaty, as ridiculous and unlawful, ‘seeing it is the price of the land, by which our Liberties and Nation are sold and we made the Footstool of England’. He complained that the article would be a reproach to their posterity because it implied that as a nation they had no substance of their own to set about and accomplish their trade. It also implied that they lacked the rationality to act for themselves and had to be ordered about by England, according to English desires. He insisted that, rightly managed, Scotland could prosper at foreign trade and that economically England needed Scotland as much as Scotland needed England. He accused merchants of greedily snatching at the bribe of English trade and argued that economic benefits from union were not to be expected anyway because religion and religious union, which ought to be the foundation of relations between the kingdoms, had not been given priority. Benefits would be limited because national sins would bring God’s judgement rather than his blessing and what benefits they did get would be lost through customs and excises placed upon goods from the plantations by a British parliament. Repeating a common complaint about the economic consequences of union, he warned that the most likely beneficiaries, the nobility, would end up living and spending their money in England.183 Undaunted by the Darien experience, the writer argued in favour of an independent colonial policy. Scotland as an island had the potential to navigate the world for trade. He claimed that it was a source of astonishment and reproach across Europe that it had so far failed to exploit that advantage. The consequences were that Scotland was unable to sustain its population and Scots were forced to work overseas. If Scotland had its own colonies, and there was no reason why it should not, it could better secure and defend its own rights and liberties. The nation had the men and the motivation to make such an enterprise succeed. God would be glorified by such enterprise, the nation would reap benefits and the souls and consciences of Scotsmen would not be debauched and endangered by having to work in other nations. There was no certainty that Scotland would reap such benefits in a union with England and therefore union was rejected.184 The economic case was similar to that pressed by anti-unionist writers in general and in particular those of Glasgow merchant John Spreull. Spreull had strong covenanting credentials. He was tortured and imprisoned on the Bass Rock for suspected involvement in the battle at Bothwell Brig and for attending conventicles. He was a fellow prisoner of Alexander Shields, with whom he formed a friendship, and was the last covenanter to be released from the Bass. Spreull wrote an important economic tract

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in response to the Alien Act, in which he examined Scotland’s resources and how the country could break its dependence upon England by increasing consumption of native products, improving exports to established markets and finding new global markets for Scottish goods.185 Despite being convinced that their scheme was the best available to Scotland, the Cameronians had no expectation of its immediate implementation. They anticipated the objection that it would be impossible to establish, not least because those in power would never accept it. They anticipated that Scotland’s present rulers would (in the first place) have full liberty ‘to play their game in order to set up their kings that they are contending for’. Union would be allowed in the providence of God to go ahead. However, it would not last because, by setting it up, they would drink of the cup of God’s judgement that Europe was drinking from; by the union, Scotland was agreeing to join with England in its wars. The writer of The Smoking Flax questioned whether such wars were agreeable to the word of God, and the consciences of the godly, and insisted that ‘we are not to espouse any battles but the Lords’, nor join in alliances with papists, idolaters or any who walk contrary to the command of God.186 When judgement came, so would the opportunity for God’s people to arise and set up a new government. He does not say how this would be accomplished, but states that it would not be difficult because such a government was the best form for obtaining religion and virtue and for freeing subjects from tyranny, and would therefore recommend itself to the people. Such a government would please God, who in turn would bless and favour it, ‘For certainly the Lord will not despise good and honest ends where his glory is sought as the ultimate end and the safety of the kingdom as the subordinat.’187 Success would lie in a combination of factors, including the scheme itself, the benefits envisaged and the blessing of God. He argued that God’s providence always ended in mercy towards his people and judgement upon his enemies, and for that reason the day of judgement would come upon the present rulers who were pressing for incorporating union, at which time ‘his people will not find any difficulty (through his strength) to set up that comely Form and Fabrick of State and Church in the land’.188 Anticipating the end of monarchical government and an unlawful and intolerable union, Scotland was to repent, wait upon God, receive instruction from His word and set up the government outlined in the pamphlet. To this end, several motives were offered for consideration. First, all things about this form of government were good and indispensable for propagating religion and virtue and delivering the people from oppression. As everything about it was consistent with Scripture and reason, he warned that to fight it was to fight against God. This form

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of government in no way encroached upon or wronged the interests of the subject, but was intended to advance God’s glory and the good of the nation, as well as bring blessing from God. His final word was one of encouragement. God would visit His enemies in judgement and His people with mercy, in which case God’s people ought not to be discouraged should providence frown against the church but ‘hold on and hold out’ because God intended to make the church victorious.189 By proposing a covenanted Scottish republic, the writer of The Smoaking Flax offered a distinctive Presbyterian alternative to incorporating union and rejected the various pretenders to the succession. The rejection of Hanover was also the rejection of succession with limitations, the alternative many within the established church preferred and upon which they placed their hopes. The rejection of succession with limitations was inevitable because the greatest condition and limitation, the covenants, were not included. There was no more chance of establishing a Scottish commonwealth than there was of establishing Fletcher’s scheme for a European federation of city-states. However, unlike Fletcher’s scheme, the idea of a commonwealth had as its base a system of government that had operated within Scotland within living memory. If it were not possible to have a covenanted Scottish monarch, then they would abolish monarchy and establish a covenanted republic. The ideology underpinning the covenanted republic had been developing within a branch of Presbyterianism since the 1650s. They had taken covenanting ideology and the resistance theory of the Revolution to its logical conclusion. While there was a strong emphasis upon the covenants and religion, a Scottish commonwealth would not be a theocracy. Such a government was the antithesis of the covenants and one of the main objections to the union was that clerics would have a role in government. There was a strong emphasis upon the common people, otherwise known as the ‘godly’. They were to be the main beneficiaries of this form of government. The main losers were the nobility, who would lose the perks and privileges of power and no longer be allowed to inherit office. A commonwealth was the best means to promote religion and a just and fair society in which people could prosper and be free from the tyranny and oppression they had suffered under the Stuarts. NOTES 1. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 231. 2. Ridpath, Scotland’s sovereignty asserted (1695); Robertson, ‘An Elusive Sovereignty’, pp. 198–9.

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3. For a discussion on the Imperial Crowns debate, see Ferguson, ‘Imperial Crowns: a neglected facet’, pp. 22–44; Ludington, ‘From Ancient Constitution to British Empire’, pp. 244–70. 4. APS, XI, p. 66. 5. Drake, Historia Anglo-Scotica (1703). 6. Atwood, The superiority and direct dominion of the imperial crown of England over the crown and kingdom of Scotland (1704). 7. Dalrymple, Collections concerning the Scottish History, preceding the death of King David the First, in the year 1153 (1705); Sibbald, The liberty and independency of the Kingdom and Church of Scotland, asserted from the antient records (1702); Sibbald, An answer to the second letter to the Right Reverend, the Lord Bishop of Carlile (1704). 8. Kidd, ‘Religious Realignment’, p. 165. 9. Ridpath, Scotland’s Grievances Relating to Darien (1700). 10. Ridpath, A Discourse upon the union of Scotland and England, pp. 1–2. 11. Ibid., pp. 3–8, 86–72; Calderwood, History of the Kirk of Scotland, VI, pp. 262–3; The autobiography and diary of Mr James Melvill, pp. 556–9; APS, IV, pp. 263–4. 12. Miscellany of the Abbotsford Club, p. 395. 13. Ridpath, A discourse upon the union of Scotland and England, p. 56. 14. Ibid., pp. 112–15. 15. Ibid., pp. 115–18. 16. Ibid., pp. 73–4. 17. Ibid., pp. 73–104. 18. Ibid., pp. 56–8. 19. Hodges, The rights and interests of the two British monarchies . . . Treatise I (1703). Neither Ridpath nor Hodges travelled to Edinburgh during the last session of parliament. Both remained in London. See Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, p. 170. 20. Hodges, The rights and interests of the two British monarchies . . . Treatise I (1703), pp. 2–4. 21. Ibid., pp. 6–7. 22. Ibid., p. 12. 23. Ibid., pp. 19–27, 28–68. The emphasis of his final work published in 1706 was upon attacking incorporation rather than proposing an alternative. See Hodges, The rights and interests of two British monarchies . . . Treatise III (1706). 24. See Chapter 1, section on ‘Legislative War’. 25. The Act of Security, Is the only Rational Method of Procuring Scotland a happy Constitution (1704). 26. Fletcher, Selected Political Writings and Speeches, p. 113. 27. Ibid., p. 113. For a fuller discussion of Fletcher’s vision for Europe-wide government that would prevent concentrations of power associated with

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31.

32.

33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

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an incorporating union, as well as act as an antidote to universal monarchy, see Robertson, ‘Andrew Fletcher’s Vision of Union’. Abercromby, The Advantages of the Act of Security (1706); see also The Act of Security, Is the only Rational Method (1704). Abercromby, The Advantages of the Act of Security, pp. 24–6. Public Record Office, SP 90/4: Raby to Harley, 25 December 1706. It was reported that the Dutch favoured a Protestant alliance with Sweden and Prussia against the union, to preserve its fisheries. See NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 129. Abercromby, The Advantages of the Act of Security, pp. 27–33. For further discussion and analysis of the Dutch and French connection, see Macinnes, ‘Union Failed, Union Accomplished’, p. 86. The advantages of Scotland by an incorporate union with England, compar’d with these of a coalition with the Dutch, or a league with France (1706), pp. 23–6. Defoe was in the process of responding to Abercromby when this pamphlet was published and because he agreed with its sentiments he limited his own comments. See Defoe, A fifth essay at removing national prejudices (1707). Daiches, Scotland and the Union, p. 96; Seton, A Speech in Parliament, pp. 8–12; Seton, Scotland’s great advantages by an union with England (1706). See Seton Gordon, The House of Seton, I, pp. 1, 8–9, 606–11. Fraser, The Earls of Cromartie, II, p. 15. A Seasonable Warning, p. 12; Defoe, The advantages of Scotland by an incorporate union, pp. 21–33; Seton, A Speech in Parliament, pp. 8–9. A Seasonable Warning, pp. 4, 6–7. Reasons for a Union Between the Kingdoms of England and Scotland (1706), pp. 32–4. Defoe, The advantages of Scotland by an incorporate union, pp. 27–30. A Seasonable Warning, pp. 6–7. Defoe, The advantages of Scotland by an incorporate union, p. 29. Seton, A Speech in Parliament, p. 7; Seton, Scotland’s great advantages by an union with England, p. 8. Defoe, The advantages of Scotland by an incorporate union, p. 31; A Seasonable Warning, pp. 5–7. Fraser, The Earls of Cromartie, II, p. 16. Seton, Scotland’s great advantages by an union with England, p. 11. A Letter Concerning Union, with Sir George MacKenzie’s Observations and Sir John Nisbet’s Opinion upon the same subject (1706), p. 7; Essay Upon the Union (1706). The pamphlet has been attributed to James Hodges but that he wrote it seems unlikely. There was no reason for Hodges to publish anonymously, particularly as he had attached his name to his other anti-union works. George Ridpath believed that it was written by a Cavalier and acknowledged that its views reflected almost exactly his own. As both men were in London at the time, it seems unlikely that

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46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57. 58.

59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70.

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scottish presbyterians and the act of union 1707 Ridpath would not have known if Hodges had been the author. See Robertson, ‘An Elusive Sovereignty’, p. 213; The Miscellany of the Abbotsford Club, p. 390. Essay Upon the Union, p. 18. Ibid., pp. 9–10. Ridpath, Considerations upon the Union of the two kingdoms (1706); Galloway, The Union of England and Scotland, p. 71. Ridpath, Considerations upon the Union of the two kingdoms; The Miscellany of the Abbotsford Club, p. 390: Ridpath to Robert Wodrow, 19 April 1706. Essay Upon the Union, p. 21 Ibid., pp. 21, 26. Ridpath, Considerations upon the Union of the two kingdoms, pp. 39–40. Ibid., p. 59. Ibid., p. 62. Ibid., p. 71. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 273: James Erskine to Mar, 20 August 1706; A Letter Concerning Union, p. 7; NAS, GD406/1/9747: Robert Wylie to Hamilton, 1 July 1706. NAS, GD406/1/9747: Wylie to Hamilton, 1 July 1706. Bannatyne, Some queries proposed to consideration, relative to the union now intended (1706). For the direct reply to Bannatyne’s queries, see An Answer to Some Queries &c., Relative to the Union: In a Conference Betwixt a Coffee-Master and a Countrey-Farmer (1706). See also Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, pp. 230–1. To the Loyal and Religious Hearts in Parliament (1706). Clark, Scotland’s Speech to her Sons (1706). For proposals on issues of representation, see NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 27; A Scheme for Uniting the two Kingdoms of England and Scotland, different from any that has been hitherto laid down (1706). NLS, Wodrow Quarto LXXIII, fo. 271. Letters Relating to Scotland in the Reign of Queen Anne, p. 95. NAS, GD124/15/462/4: Mar to Nairne, 14 October 1706. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 242: Cromarty to Mar, 1 January 1706; p. 238: Cromarty to Mar, 17 November 1705. Mackenzie, Parainesis Pacifica, p. 7. See NLS, Wodrow Quarto XXVIII, fos 131–2, and Chapter 1 for Cromarty’s views during negotiations in 1702–3. A friendly return to a letter concerning Sir George MacKenzies . . . (1706), pp. 8–9, 12–14; see also Sir George M’Kenzie’s Arguments Against and Incorporating Union Particularly Considered (1706). A friendly return to a letter concerning Sir George MacKenzies . . . , pp. 6–7. Ibid., pp. 15–17. Correspondence of Colonel N Hooke, II, p. 63. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 224.

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71. HMC Mar and Kellie. 273 James Erskine to Mar, 20 August 1706. 72. Arbuthnott, A Sermon Preach’d to the People at the Mercat Cross of Edinburgh (1706); McLeod, Anglo-Scottish Tracts, pp. 156–7. 73. Arbuthnott, A Sermon Preached to the People at the Mercat Cross of Edinburgh. 74. NAS, GD124/15/414/2: Paterson to Mar, 2 July 1706; HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 269: Paterson to Mar, 6 July 1706. 75. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 28. 76. I Know Nothing of it (Edinburgh, 1707). 77. Macleod, Scottish Theology in Relation to Church History, p. 46. 78. See also Counter Quiries to the Quiries burnt at the Cross of Edinburgh (1706). 79. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 93. 80. Ibid., fo. 93. 81. Letters and Diplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne, pp. 190–1. 82. In the historiographical debate that followed, historians initially dismissed the alternatives. See Lang, History of Scotland, p. 109; see also McKechnie, ‘The Constitutional Necessity for the Union of 1707’, pp. 61–2. More recently historians have been less dismissive as the constitutional debate and the political writings of participants have been subject to closer scrutiny. See, for example, Dickey, ‘Power, commerce and natural law in Daniel Defoe’s political writings 1698–1707’; Penovich, ‘From Revolution Principles to Union: Daniel Defoe’s intervention in the Scottish Debate’; Kidd, ‘Religious Realignment’; Robertson, ‘Andrew Fletcher’s Vision of Union’; Robertson, ‘An Elusive Sovereignty’; Devine, The Scottish Nation, pp. 4, 8; Macinnes, ‘Union Failed, Union Accomplished,’ p. 86; Whatley, Bought and Sold for English Gold. 83. APS, XI, p. 313; See also Defoe, A Collection of Original Papers, pp. 25–44; Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, p. 168. 84. APS, XI, p. 313; Mar and Kellie, pp. 308–10; Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 256–7. 85. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 104. 86. NAS, GD124/15/449/14: Mar to Nairne, 16 September 1706. 87. Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, p. 167. 88. APS, XI, p. 406; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 122; Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 258–61; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 323–5: Mar to Nairne, 16 November 1706. 89. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 107. 90. APS, XI, p. 325; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 111; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 323–5. See also Rose, A Selection of the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, III, pp. 423–6; Letters Relating to Scotland, pp. 105–7; The Lord Belhaven’s Speech in Parliament the 15th Day of November; Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, pp. 122–6; Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 258–61.

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91. Letters Relating to Scotland, pp. 105–7; Rose, A Selection of the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, III, pp. 427–9; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 323–6; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 116. 92. APS, XI, p. 326; Rose, A Selection of the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, III, p. 430. 93. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 120; NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 29. 94. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 29. 95. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 120. 96. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 27. 97. NAS, GD406/1/8122: Charles, Earl of Selkirk, to Duchess of Hamilton, 14 November 1706. 98. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fos 27v, 29. 99. Rose, A Selection of the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, III, p. 307. 100. Clerk, History of the Union of Scotland and England, p. 117. 101. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fos 27v, 29. 102. NLS, Wodrow Quarto XL, fo. 30. 103. NAS, GD406/1/6581: Earl of Orkney to Duchess of Hamilton, 10 December 1706. 104. Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, pp. 162–4. 105. NAS, GD406/1/7126; NAS, GD406/1/7868; NAS, GD406/1/8032. 106. Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 285–6; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 116. 107. For copy, see Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 286–8. 108. Ibid., pp. 288–9; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 363–4; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 133. 109. Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 288–9. 110. Ibid., pp. 288–9; APS, XI, p. 369; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 363–4. 111. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 137, 27 December 1706. 112. Ibid., fo. 137; APS, XI, pp. 371–2; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 363–4. For George Lockhart’s protestation, see A Speech in Parliament (1706). 113. Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 189; Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 294–5. 114. Lockhart, Memoirs concerning the Affairs of Scotland, pp. 322–3; Letters of Daniel Defoe, p. 189; NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto, IV, fo. 140. 115. The Chronicles of Atholl, I, p. 69. 116. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 140. 117. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fos 91–2. 118. NAS, GD220/101/17: Nairne to Rothes, 14 November 1706; Counter Quiries to the Quiries burnt at the Cross of Edinburgh (1706). 119. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 119. 120. NAS, GD406/1/9747: Wylie to Hamilton, 1 July 1706. See also NLS, Wodrow Folio XXVIII, fos 208–9: Robert Wylie, A Letter Concerning Union (1707), p. 20.

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121. Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood, pp. 137–8; MS Murray 650/651, Vol. III, No. 22: J. Shute to Stirling, 11 January 1707. 122. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 142: Monitary Letter from the Commission of the General Assembly, 8 August 1706; The Principal Acts of the General Assembly . . . 4th April 1706, p. 8; HMC Mar and Kellie, pp. 250–1: Carstares to Mar, 2 March 1706; p. 256: Carstares to Mar, 19 March 1706. 123. MS Murray 650/651, Vol. III, No. 22. J. Shute to Stirling, 11 January 1707. 124. Defoe, A fourth essay, at removing national prejudices, pp. 10, 14, 20, 25–6. 125. NLS, Wodrow Letters Quarto IV, fo. 130. 126. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 250: Carstares to Harley, 24 October 1706. 127. HMC Duke of Portland, VIII, p. 250: Carstares to Harley, 24 October 1706. 128. Ibid., p. 104: Carstares to Harley, July 1702. 129. Ibid., p. 250: Carstares to Harley, 24 October 1706. 130. MS Murray 650/651, Vol. III, No. 21, J. Shute to Stirling, 17 December 1706. 131. MS Murray 650/651, Vol. III, No. 21, J. Shute to Stirling, 17 December 1706. 132. Counter Quiries to the Quiries burnt at the Cross of Edinburgh (1706). 133. Queries to the Presbyterian Noblemen and Gentlemen, Barons, Burgesses, Ministers and Commons in Scotland (1706). 134. The autobiography and diary of Mr James Melvill, p. 554. 135. Macinnes, ‘Politically Reactionary Brits?’, p. 46. 136. Young, ‘The Scottish Parliament and National Identity’, p. 109. 137. Hamilton, ‘The Anglo-Scottish Negotiations of 1640–1’, pp. 84–6; Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1640–41, pp. 244–6, 485–6, 513–14. 138. Macinnes, ‘Politically Reactionary Brits?’, p. 48. The Solemn League and Covenant was one aspect of a desire for a wider Protestant union between European churches and nations across Europe. They sought to create a tripartite confederation that included England and the Estates General of the United Provinces. See Young, ‘The Scottish Parliament in the Seventeenth Century: European Perspectives’; Young, ‘The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy’. 139. His Majesties Declaration from Carisbrooke Castle in the Isle of Wight (1648). 140. Peterkin, Records of the Kirk of Scotland, pp. 500–1; The records of the commissioners of the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland holden in Edinburgh in the years 1646 and 1647, pp. 373–82. 141. Macinnes, ‘Politically Reactionary Brits?’, p. 49. 142. Queries to the Presbyterian Noblemen . . . (1706). 143. Ibid.

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149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160.

161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170.

171. 172. 173.

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scottish presbyterians and the act of union 1707 Ibid. Lee, ‘Retreat from Revolution’. Queries to the Presbyterian Noblemen . . . (1706). The Smoaking Flax (1706). Ibid., pp. 18–20. Wodrow attributed the authorship of The Smoaking Flax to the Harleys of Cottmuir. See ‘The Literature of the Reformed Presbyterian Church’, p. 229. The Smoaking Flax, p. 11. Pittock, The Invention of Scotland, p. 32; Goldie, ‘Divergence and Union’, p. 244. The Smoaking Flax, p. 2. Ibid., p. 23. For details of the Cromwellian union, see Dow, Cromwellian Scotland; The Cromwellian Union, Terry (ed.); Scotland and the Protectorate, Firth (ed.). Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, p. 39; Life of Mr Robert Blair, p. 293. Life of Mr Robert Blair, p. 294; Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, III, pp. 175–6. Register of the Consultations of the Ministers of Edinburgh, II, p. 185. Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston, p. 116. The Speeches of James Guthrie before the Parliament (1661), p. 3. Ibid., pp. 2, 7. Causes of the Lord’s Wrath Against Scotland Manifested in His Late Sad Dispensations (1653), pp. 52–61; Peterkin, Records of the Kirk of Scotland, pp. 546–7. The Smoaking Flax, pp. 3–4. Ibid., p. 5 Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 7. A Speech in Season against the Union (1706), p. 8. The Smoaking Flax, p. 11. Ibid., p. 11. Hutchison, The Reformed Presbyterian Church, pp. 37–8. For a copy of the declaration, see Wodrow, The History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, III, p. 66–7. Hutchison, The Reformed Presbyterian Church, pp. 35–6. For a copy of the declaration, and a copy of a similar declaration published at Glasgow on 13 June 1679 by John Welsh and David Hume, two leading moderates, see Wodrow, The History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, III, pp. 94–8. The Queensferry Paper was a draft document penned by Henry Hall of Haughhead and the field preacher Donald Cargill. Hall was captured at Queensferry with the document on him. The Smoaking Flax, p. 13. Ibid., p. 11. Shields, A Hind Let Loose, p. 273. See also Macpherson, The Cameronian

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174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189.

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Philosopher: Alexander Shields (1932); Macpherson, ‘Alexander Shields, 1660–1700’. Shields, A Hind Let Loose, p. 301. Ibid., pp. 271–2. Ibid., p. 12. Kirkton, History of the Church of Scotland, quoted in Robert Wodrow, The History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, I, pp. 63–4. Burnet, History of His Own Time, p. 40. Ibid., p. 40. Grant, The patriot resolved, p. 5. The Smoaking Flax, p. 13. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., pp. 7–9. Ibid., pp. 9–10. Spreull, An accompt current betwixt Scotland and England balanced; see also Chapter 1. The Smoaking Flax, pp. 10–11. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 25.

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7 ‘That God may Mercifully Bring Good out of that Union’

THE 1707 GENERAL ASSEMBLY

One of the major arguments of the opposition with respect to the church was that no union ought to be concluded until a general assembly, which had an undoubted right to be consulted on the issue, was called. The 1706 Assembly sat between 4 and 16 April, just prior to the start of treaty negotiations in London on 18 April. It is reasonable to expect that had the assembly believed it had an undoubted right to be consulted before the conclusion of a union, it would have made representations to that effect. But it did not. The commission had been instructed to act in the interests of the church and that was enough. In fact, considering the importance of the negotiations about to begin, the assembly was remarkably silent on the issue. The only time in which union was mentioned was in its annual act for a national fast and in the commission’s instructions.1 There were expectations prior to the 1707 assembly that the union would be raised and debated and possibly re-ignite the furious arguments of the previous months.2 A circular letter intended to be sent to all the presbyteries was prepared in March 1707. The aim was to create unity of purpose and prepare the minds of members of the forthcoming assembly in order that it might take appropriate action in response to the passing of the treaty. The letter outlined the fears currently exercising the church. It bemoaned national sins, particularly among their leaders and nobility, who, it was claimed, had let the church down badly during the recent debates and whose ‘unaccountable debauchery’ was the cause of all their fears. The nobility were accused of having abandoned the church and of failing to ‘put their shoulder to the church’ as their fathers had done. The writer attacked their anglicising tendencies and their inclination to educate their children at Oxford and Cambridge, where students were trained according to the ‘rubrick of the Church of England’. He criticised parliament for allowing the English parliament to secure the

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‘That God may Mercifully Bring Good out of that Union’ 227 Church of England, of failing to explain or alter the abjuration oath and for their refusal to allow a Scottish alternative to the sacramental test. The continuation of the test without any protection in Scotland exposed the church to the fate endured by French Protestants. Furthermore, they had no protection from the ‘natural inclinations’ the court and a British parliament had, for whatever reason, to create a uniformity of church government. He believed such uniformity would be quickly and easily obtained, and with Scottish help. He argued that if prelacy in England had, since the Union of the Crowns, been able to overturn presbytery, how much more easily will it be able to overturn it now with the kingdoms united and the civil power of English prelates secured by a fundamental article of the treaty? Several courses of action were suggested. All presbyteries were urged to meet frequently for prayer and mutual encouragement and to seek God’s blessing. It urged non-compliance with anything that was imposed by the government without the joint concurrence of the church. They were asked to study the history of the church since the Reformation and draw strength from its many struggles, from its defections and recoveries, sufferings and deliverances, from the zeal of ministers and the successes granted by God. Great effort was to be made in crushing profaneness, popery and the English service, as well as sin of all kinds. Correspondence between synods was to be encouraged in order to warn about such dangers and thereby more readily confront and stop them. Presbyteries were urged to consider the work and witness of the commission with regard to union and to agree to give it a ‘special approbation’. This was considered particularly important because some had attacked the commission for exceeding its role, others for falling short in its testimony. Presbyteries were also asked to consider whether it was proper at this time to renew or at least bear testimony to the covenant. Finally, each presbytery was urged to instruct its members to give John Hepburn a fair hearing and to consider his grievances in order to heal the division and present a united front against their common enemy.3 Within the letter there was an underlying acceptance that union was a reality, that the nobility and parliament were to blame for the church’s predicament, that there was little chance of reversing the situation but that the church ought to do its utmost to maintain and defend itself against the dangers to which it was exposed by the union. How many presbyteries received the letter is impossible to say. It is not certain it was sent and no presbytery or synod records having received it. Few presbyteries recorded the specific instructions given to their commissioners to the assembly. The commissioners from Hamilton were to

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approve the proceedings of the commission and to refuse their consent to ‘any letter, Act or instruction from the Generall Assembly, which may import an approbation of the union or be inconsistent with the testimonies given against the same by the commission in their forsaid addresses’.4 The Presbytery of Wigtown continued to be concerned about a number of difficulties that might arise in relation to oaths, especially the oath of abjuration. It shared the concerns expressed by the commission that terms within the oath were inconsistent with Presbyterian principles. It urged the assembly to avert any such problems by working for the removal of the offending terms or by securing exemptions for Presbyterians from taking the oaths altogether.5 Recognising how divisive the issue of taking oaths could be among ministers, the presbytery wanted the assembly to maintain harmony amongst ministers. There was an expectation that the new government would ordain a day of public worship and thanksgiving for the union. The presbytery was concerned that any act for that purpose might contain terms and phrases that were inconsistent with the address delivered to parliament in November by the commission. The presbytery was concerned that a day of thanksgiving for union was likely to split the ministry, with some observing it, even if only out of duty to the civil authority, while others would abstain. They wanted the assembly to give the church direction and a definitive response in order to ensure unity of action. The presbytery was not prepared to give up on the issue of bishops sitting in the British parliament and urged ‘that the assembly be not defective in what is further proper to be done in that affair’.6 Other presbyteries, such as Stirling, Lanark and Peebles instructed commissioners to indicate their presbytery’s approval of the commission’s actions in relation to union or that the assembly reassert its intrinsic power and principles, which they considered necessary in the light of the impending union.7 The Presbytery of Dunbar had nothing specific about union in its instructions but urged the assembly to maintain unity, prevent the enlargement of terms of communion and bring in an act against innovations.8 Despite the concerns expressed about its consequences, there was nevertheless an acceptance among presbyteries of the reality of union. It was never about calling on the assembly to stop the union, more a case of asking it to take whatever steps were necessary to prepare for it. While some commissioners wanted to raise unresolved issues about union, it was not on the agenda. It is possible that in an effort to avoid a repetition of the divisive debates that took place in the commission, the assembly business was managed in order to avoid debating the union.9 Those intent on continuing the debate were in a minority and were quickly silenced at their first attempt to raise the issue. According to one

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‘That God may Mercifully Bring Good out of that Union’ 229 account, when the assembly opened it looked as if it might degenerate into a series of disputes and divisions. A group of ministers of the ‘strict sort’ argued that the Protestant religion and their government established by law had not full security by the union and that they intended making remonstrances to that effect. However, they were strongly opposed by a majority in the assembly, led by the moderator John Stirling, who was described as well affected to the union. The overwhelming view, argued to some effect, was that Presbyterian government was never completely secure until now. William Wishart had reminded the assembly that they had great cause to bless the Lord ‘and be thankful to our Queen and parliament, for the security granted to this church, as it is now by law established, tho we have not gotten all that we desired and wished for’.10 The government may not have granted the commission everything it had asked for, but it had given the church security in the treaty. The effect was to silence the small group of protesters. Aware that they were unlikely to achieve anything, they acquiesced with the wishes of the majority ‘and made no further stir’.11 The assembly passed with little reference to the union. Queen Anne informed the assembly that in the light of the care she had taken to ensure that the doctrine, discipline, worship and government of the church ‘should have as firm a security as humane laws can establish’, she expected a suitable return of thankfulness and duty from them. The assembly thanked her for its security and promised loyalty and obedience.12 The legislation passed by the assembly was not entirely without reference to the union. On 21 April the assembly passed an Act against Innovations in the Worship of God, in which it enacted that the assembly ‘being moved with zeal for the glory of God, and the purity and uniformity of his worship, doth hereby discharge the practice of all such innovations in divine worship within this church’.13 The innovations the assembly had in mind were those practised by Episcopalians and Anglicans similar to those that provoked the covenanting revolution in 1638. Not only was the act passed with reference to the activities of Episcopalians across parts of the country, it also had one eye on the impending union with Anglican England. The quietness and calmness of the assembly was contrary to expectations and the near unanimity among ministers was welcomed. It was hoped that the calm and moderate proceedings would not only please the government, but calm people’s fears and quieten those areas where there had been disorder.14 Defoe remarked upon the change in temper among ministers, with whom he held numerous conversations. He did not talk much with those for union, ‘they need not the physician’, but singled out the ‘opposers’, claiming to be constantly in their clubs and

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cabals, persuading them towards favouring the union. He claimed that some of the clergy expressed shame at their former behaviour and urged him not to represent them negatively in England.15 He informed Harley, I am spending your money a little freer than ordinary on this occasion of the Assembly, but tis from my sense of the danger if it miscarries, and I have some engines at work among the ministers. In short money will do anything here.16

This statement has led some to conclude that Defoe had hopes of bribing members of the assembly.17 Such an explanation is possible; there is nothing to suggest that ministers were any less susceptible to being bribed than politicians. However, bribery seems an unlikely explanation. It is difficult to see what bribing ministers at this time would accomplish. Union was a reality and any further opposition, while it may exonerate the conscience of those involved, was not going to change anything. Those in opposition were in a minority, and with most of the assembly willing to accept the settlement and ready to end the debate, bribery seemed unnecessary. Furthermore, Defoe expressed surprise at the quietness and calmness of the assembly, which was so contrary to his expectations and apprehensions. This could hardly have been the case if he had bribed ministers. Who was there to bribe anyway? If most ministers were ready to accept the union, they needed no bribe, which leaves the minority of the ‘strict sort’ opposed to the union, who, like the ‘patriots’ in parliament, were surely beyond bribing. Management may have been intended to keep union off the assembly’s agenda, but the willingness of the majority of commissioners to accept the settlement and put the issue behind them made it unnecessary. Furthermore, the mood of the assembly was heavily influenced by the sermon preached on the opening day by William Wishart. Wishart’s theme was that ‘God will especially honour them that contend earnestly for him against the corruptions of the time, wherein they live’.18 They must contend for God with wisdom and prudence, and he warned the assembly that ‘We may greatly wrong our Master’s interests and work a great deal of mischief to the Church of God by imprudent management. I think I needed not to mind you that the welfare and Happiness of this Church was never more deeply concerned in the prudent conduct of a National Assembly than at this juncture.’19 Wishart also insisted on the necessity of holy unity and harmony. Divisions, especially among ministers, have proven fatal to the Work and Cause of God in this nation formerly. And nothing can at this juncture have a more formidable aspect upon this Church than divisions amongst ourselves. Our safety under God lyes in our unity and Harmony.20

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‘That God may Mercifully Bring Good out of that Union’ 231 The prevailing attitude at the assembly appears to have been that expressed by the Synod of Galloway in an act for a fast on 20 May 1707, that ‘God may mercifully bring good out of that union to the glory of his name, to the good of his church & the well of Brittain . . . ’.21 There was an acceptance of the reality of union and a readiness to live with it and make it work. This was also reflected in the instructions from the Presbytery of Brechin. Now that there was union, it wanted the assembly to open up a correspondence with their Presbyterian brethren in England. It was urged in the interests of the gospel, but forming alliances with English Presbyterians had historical precedents and can be seen as a step taken in the interests of the church’s security. Now that the church had equal legal securities as the Church of England, the assembly was urged to take steps to secure possession of all the churches in the kingdom ‘as fully and freely as the Church of England hath in yr kingdom’. The presbytery, which lay north of the Tay, where episcopacy was offering greater resistance to the Kirk, was probably motivated by local circumstances and saw in union an opportunity to dispossess Episcopalians. One of the major concerns the church had about union was the loss of the Scottish parliament. A British parliament was going to be much harder to lobby and influence than a Scottish parliament sympathetic to the church. Nevertheless, the presbytery wanted the assembly send a commission to London to look after the interests of the church at the first sitting of a British parliament. The presbytery’s attitude was that union was a reality and the church had to make it work in its interests.22 The assembly had the opportunity to protest against the union or to press for further security for the church. However, it had no desire to continue the arguments that had raged over the previous months and chose instead to draw a line under it. The important point, as far as it was concerned, was that the church had its establishment secured in the treaty. It may not have succeeded in securing everything it had asked for, but that did not prevent it seeking further concessions in the future. As Wishart reminded the assembly, they were stewards of Christ, watchmen, overseers and rulers in the house of God and under a great obligation to contend earnestly for his cause. He called upon them, as they entered a new era of union with England, to remain faithful to their covenant engagements and, as trustees for generations yet to come, to faithfully discharge their office. It was their solemn duty to ensure that the doctrine, worship, discipline and government of the church, so recently secured and established by law, was faithfully transmitted to their posterity.23 As it turned out, the church entered this new era with a security of sorts. Some of its fears were realised, but its worst fears were not. In

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a farewell sermon at Simprin, just before 1 May 1707, Thomas Boston told his congregation: ‘Mourn for this, that by the union, a nail is sent from Scotland to fix the Dagon of the English Hierarchy in its place in our country.’24 Despite the many problems that afflicted the church in his lifetime, Boston would have been aware that his prediction remained unfulfilled. The Kirk’s establishment was never really threatened. For Presbyterianism, the eighteenth century, despite the divisions, was one of continued establishment and expansion. The percentage of the population who were Presbyterian was higher at the end of the century that it had been at the start. However, some of the church’s deepest fears were quickly realised. In fairly rapid succession, the Privy Council was abolished, patronage re-introduced, toleration for Episcopalians established and an oath of abjuration imposed. Patronage became the most contentious issue of all, causing a number of significant splits in the church that finally resulted in the Disruption of 1843. These changes, coming as they did from London, were said by one writer in 1714 to justify their complaints and protestations at the time of union. Around the middle of the century, Evangelicals in particular identified the union as a source of much of the problems afflicting the church. John Willison of Dundee, who had been a commissioner in 1706, wrote of the church- ‘her degeneracy and defection have of late years become too visible; and our union with England, in 1707, may be looked upon as the chief source thereof’.25 Nevertheless, attitudes changed. In the summer of 1706, Episcopalian George Mackenzie welcomed the news that an incorporating union had been negotiated between the kingdoms. He wrote that ‘nothing shall alter me from being a Scotsman and a Brittain’.26 It is fairly safe to say that few of his contemporaries would have shared his sentiments. However, by the end of the century the situation was entirely reversed. The majority of Scots, who also just happened to be Presbyterians, thought of themselves in some way as Scots and Britons, and nothing it seemed could alter that view. Presbyterians had embraced the union. CONCLUSION

The idea that the church was the bulwark of the opposition, that it was the most formidable opponent of the project, that it played an important role in articulating anti-union feeling or that the greatest threat to union lay in the church, or even that the decision lay rather in the hands of the church than of the parliament, has to be rejected. That the church became the focal point for the struggle between the government and the

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‘That God may Mercifully Bring Good out of that Union’ 233 opposition was no surprise. It was steeped in covenanting tradition and Presbyterian nationalism. Since the Union of the Crowns, Presbyterians had bitter experiences of English interference in church affairs and had endured bloody persecutions under Episcopalian rule. These had left their mark. The Kirk was extremely protective of its establishment and intensely hostile to episcopacy and to any interference in its affairs from south of the border. On the face of it, the Kirk seemed the ideal ally for the opposition and the expectation was that it would be at the forefront of opposition to the treaty. However, while individual ministers in a handful of presbyteries actively allied themselves to the opposition, official church opposition to incorporating union never materialised. The commission, as the executive body and representative voice of the church, took up a position of political neutrality and ecclesiastical selfinterest. Its role was not to protest against union or support it. It was not to act in the interests of the opposition or the government. Its role was to act in the interests of the church and to secure those interests in the event of a union. The commission was concerned about the possible weakening of the church’s legal securities as a consequence of union. Rather than try to stop the union altogether, it aimed to ensure that, in the event of union, no such weakening took place. There is no doubt that the commission and the church would have vigorously opposed any treaty that did not include security for the church. In that sense, it was the greatest potential threat to the treaty. Recognition of this, and of his mistake in leaving such security out of the treaty at the negotiations when he had the opportunity to include it, forced Queensberry to pass an act securing the church. Efforts by the opposition to engineer conflict between the church and the government failed, as did the efforts of the government to browbeat the church into silent submission. They failed because the commission refused to allow its agenda to be dictated by either side. Rather, it followed the agenda set by the general assembly’s instructions. On the question of a national fast, the commission did not press the issue of a civil sanction; it did not support the opposition’s aim to exploit the fast in an attempt to hold up parliamentary proceedings. The opposition saw the fast as a tactical opportunity to hold up the treaty and as a means of causing a serious rift between the church and the court. The church and commission largely saw it as a necessary spiritual exercise to be undertaken at such a crucial moment in the nation’s history. The commission refused to be exploited. If anything, the affair of the fast demonstrated the commission’s willingness to compromise rather than any readiness for confrontation. While it did not seek confrontation, it demonstrated during the debates over the second address

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a readiness to make a stand on a point of principle, however unpopular it might have been with the government. The intention of the commission’s addresses was not to block the treaty but to secure amendments to it, and to ensure that, in the event of a union, the church was as secure as it possibly could be. With the exception of the usual suspects in and around the presbyteries of Lanark and Hamilton, there was a distinct lack of participation by the church in anti-union activity. The widely recognised and most active leaders of the anti-union brigade within the church all came from these presbyteries. The rest of the church is noticeable by its silence. Neither the commission nor the church at large was at the forefront of articulating anti-union sentiment. While three presbyteries addressed against the union, the majority refused, despite efforts to encourage and organise addressing. Furthermore, it was the opposition and not the church that organised and produced the parochial addresses. These can be considered as parish addresses only in a geographical rather than ecclesiastical sense. They simply were not church addresses against the union; they were not organised by the church at presbytery or synod level, or by the commission. They were organised by the opposition, in most cases with the support of the local kirk session. The church did not address because it was content to follow the lead of the commission. The commission did not organise anti-union addresses, nor did it encourage the rest of the church to address, but disapproved of those presbyteries that did so independently of the commission. The commission gave no such instruction because of its position of political neutrality. The commission was the key to the response of the church as a whole. The church took its lead from the commission: where it led, the church followed, whether on the issue of fasting, addressing or the suppression or disorders. The input from presbyteries had to be through their representation on the commission, not through independent action. There is no suggestion that the presbyteries were disappointed in the commission; rather, they all expressed approval of its work and witness. Nor is there any suggestion that, following the passing of the act securing the church, the commission was silenced or marginalised and that the focus of the church’s efforts shifted to the presbyteries. The commission continued to be the focal point of church efforts to secure further concession from the government. The presbyteries continued to place their confidence in the commission, whose work was hampered by the failure of presbyteries to ensure their representatives remained in Edinburgh. While individual ministers were actively involved on both sides of the debate, the commission was not. It did not ally itself to the opposition,

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‘That God may Mercifully Bring Good out of that Union’ 235 it did not cooperate with the opposition, it did not encourage the opposition and it did not promote any of the alternatives to incorporating union. The church’s position during the debate disappointed the opposition to such an extent that they accused it of putting it’s own interests before those of the nation.27 On the other hand, the commission’s actions often irritated the government and attracted threats of dire consequences for the church’s establishment. There was disappointment among leading unionists that the commission did not produce a statement supporting the treaty. Indeed, it is probably a good measure of the commission’s success in not taking sides but looking after the interests of the church that it was attacked from both sides: on the one hand, by some for exceeding its role and interfering in civil matters while on the other for falling short in its testimony. Considering its remit, taking sides would have been dangerous and would have split the church. It should not be underestimated how important it was to the church that it maintained a display of public unity and peace in its courts. It saw divisions as dangerous to its interests because its enemies could exploit them. In unity, there was strength. Siding with the government would have split the church without necessarily gaining it any more concessions. Siding with the opposition may have damaged its chances of securing concessions from the court. Despite the complaints of the government, the church as a whole and the commission in particular did not get involved in the various forms of popular protest, but did much to discourage them. The vast majority of presbyteries were quiet and no attempt was made to organise protests against union. Expressions of anti-unionism are largely absent from presbytery records. The pulpit was not widely used as an anti-union platform and attempts to encourage its use for that purpose failed. Some ministers preached against union and some preached for it, but generally the issue was kept out of the pulpit. Opposition within the church was limited and counterbalanced by support for union on the one hand and the fact that the bulk of the church, while hostile to the original treaty, was not entirely hostile to a union that guaranteed the church’s security. Furthermore, arguments that union would provide a bulwark against the Pretender, France and popery, that it would make Britain the bulwark of the Protestant cause and secure their rights, liberties and property, as well as bring economic prosperity, were persuasive. The prospect of an incorporating union with England, and the possible negative consequence that it held for the church, produced nothing like the response that the ecclesiastical reforms and attempted introduction into the Kirk of the service book did in 1637–8. The Anglicisation process attempted by Charles I

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galvanised the church and political nation and was halted by a covenanting revolution in church and state that led to the pursuit of confessional confederation as an alternative. In 1706 the commission made every effort to secure the church against a repetition of that process and against any attempt to undermine its constitution or re-establish Episcopalianism. However, it did not attempt to prevent or promote the passage of the treaty through parliament. The constitutional relationship between the kingdoms was something the church was concerned about as much as anyone else. However, the commission took the view that the politics of determining the nature of the relationship belonged to parliament. How that relationship affected the church was the concern of the commission. Throughout the debate, much of the church and the commission in particular were working to an entirely different agenda to that of the opposition or government. NOTES 1. Unto his Grace Her Majesty’s high commissioner and the Right Honourable Estates of Parliament, The Humble Address of the Presbytry of Hamilton (1706). 2. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 398; MS Gen 1135. Register of the Actings and Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1702–5; MS Gen 1136. Register of the Actings and Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1706–10; The Principal Acts of the General Assembly . . . 4th April 1706; NAS, CH1/2/25 fos 1–60. Commissions from presbyteries and burghs, 1706. These commissions are formulaic and do not refer to specific issues such as union. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 400: Defoe to Harley, 12 April 1707. 3. NLS, Wodrow Folio XXVIII, fos 208–9: Robert Wylie, A Letter Concerning Union (1707). 4. NAS, CH2/393/2. Hamilton, p. 314. 5. A pamphlet published the day before the treaty was ratified by parliament complained that there was no provision in it exempting members of the Church of Scotland from the oath of abjuration. See The Grounds of the Present Danger of the Church of Scotland (1707). 6. NAS, CH2/373/1. Wigtown, p. 352. 7. NAS, CH2/722/9. Stirling, p. 220; NAS, CH2/234/4. Lanark; NAS, CH2/295/7. Peebles, p. 160. 8. NAS, CH2/99/3. Dunbar, p. 84. 9. Dunlop, William Carstares, p. 117. 10. Wisheart, A Sermon Preached before his Grace, David, Earl of Glasgow, p. 17. 11. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 401: Fearns to Harley, 15 April 1707. 12. The Principal Acts of the General Assembly . . . 8th of April 1707, pp. 6–7.

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‘That God may Mercifully Bring Good out of that Union’ 237 13. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 418. 14. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 388: Carstares to Mar, 19 April 1707; p. 389: Stirling to Mar, 24 April 1707. 15. HMC Mar and Kellie, p. 401; M’Cormick, State Papers and Letters, p. 762. 16. HMC Duke of Portland, IV, p. 398: Defoe to Harley, 3 April 1707. 17. Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p. 252. 18. Wisheart, A Sermon Preached before his Grace, David, Earl of Glasgow, p. 12. 19. Ibid., p. 22. 20. Ibid., p. 23. 21. NAS, CH2/165/2. Synod of Galloway, p. 236. 22. NAS, CH2/40/4. Presbytery of Brechin, 20 March 1707, pp. 32–3. 23. Wisheart, A Sermon Preached before his Grace, David, Earl of Glasgow, p. 25. 24. Whole Works of the late Reverend Thomas Boston, IV, p. 465. 25. The Case of the Church of Scotland Stated (1715); Willison, A Fair and Impartial Testimony, in Works of John Willison, p. 899. 26. Fraser, The Earls of Cromartie, II, p. 21. 27. Defoe, History of the Union of England and Scotland, p. 322.

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Appendix

Committee for Public Affairs Appointed 9 October 1706 Ministers Parish William Wishart Leith John Law High Church 2nd Charge William Carstares Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars David Blair Old Kirk John Moncrieff Trinity Thomas Wilkie Canongate Patrick Cumming Ormiston James Ramsay Eyemouth Joseph Drew Markinch John Bannatyne Lanark Thomas Linning Lesmahagow George Meldrum Edinburgh University George Hamilton High Kirk Ruling Elders Office/Constituency David, Earl of Glasgow Adam Cockburn Lord Justice Clerk Francis Montgomery Giffen Lt. Col. Erskine Stirling Walter Stewart, Pardovan Linlithgow Sir James Stewart Lord Advocate

Presbytery Edinburgh Edinburgh Edinburgh Edinburgh Edinburgh Edinburgh Dalkeith Chirnside Kirkcaldy Lanark Lanark Edinburgh Edinburgh Party Court Court Court Court Country Anti/Abstainer

Added 11 October Ministers John Paisley Ruling Elders William Ross, Lord Ross John Leslie, Earl of Rothes George Baillie, Jerviswood

Presbytery Paisley Party Court Squadrone Squadrone

Added 14 October Ministers Robert Wylie Ruling Elders Patrick Hume, Marchmont

Parish Lochwinnoch Office/Constituency

Lanarkshire

Parish Hamilton Office/Constituency

Presbytery Hamilton Party Squadrone

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Appendix John Hamilton, Belhaven James, Lord Carmichael Sir David Hume, Crossrigg

Privy Council

Added 16 October Ministers John Stirling

Parish Glasgow University

Country

Added 29 October Ministers Parish Andrew Cameron Kirkcudbright Robert Horsburgh Saltpreston Robert Colvile Yetholm Robert Rouan Penningham George Chalmers Kilwinning Ruling Elders Office/Constituency Lord Minto John Alexander, Laird of Blackhouse Added 27 November Ministers George Mair George Turnbull John Flint John Buchanan Ruling Elders Walter Stewart, Advocate

239

Parish Culross Tyninghame Leswed Covington Office/Constituency

Presbytery Glasgow

Presbytery Kirkcudbright Haddington Kelso Wigtown Irvine Party

Presbytery Dunfermline Dunbar Dalkeith Biggar Party

Committee for Speaking to Members of Parliament about contents of draft Act of Security Appointed 28 October 1706 Ministers Parish Presbytery William Carstares Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars Edinburgh Thomas Linning Lesmahagow Lanark James Ramsay Eyemouth Chirnside Ruling Elders Office/Constituency Party Sir James Stewart Lord Advocate Anti/Abstainer Adam Cockburn Lord Justice Clerk Court Sir Hugh Dalrymple Lord President of Session Court Committee to Prepare First Three Heads of Second Address Appointed 1 November 1706 Ministers Parish Presbytery William Carstares Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars Edinburgh Thomas Linning Lesmahagow Lanark

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James Ramsay John Stirling Robert Wylie Allan Logan Ruling Elders Sir James Stewart Sir Hugh Dalrymple Sir David Hume, Crossrigg Committee to Consider the Appointed 5 November 1706 Ministers James Ramsay Robert Wylie George Meldrum John Currie Ruling Elders Sir Hugh Dalrymple Adam Cockburn Lord Pollock

Eyemouth Glasgow University Hamilton Toriesburn Office/Constituency Lord Advocate Lord President of Session Privy Council

Chirnside Glasgow Hamilton Dunfermline Party Anti/Abstainer Court

Abjuration Oath and Bishops in Parliament Parish Eyemouth Hamilton Edinburgh University Haddington Office/Constituency Lord President of Session Lord Justice Clerk

Committee for Security Appointed 7 November 1706 Ministers Parish James Ramsay Eyemouth John Stirling Glasgow University Robert Wylie Hamilton Patrick Cumming Ormiston Andrew Cameron Kirkudbright Ruling Elders Office/Constituency Sir David Hume, Crossrigg Privy Council John Hamilton, Belhaven Walter Stewart, Pardovan Linlithgow William Baillie Lanarkshire

Presbytery Chirnside Hamilton Edinburgh Haddington Party Court Court

Presbytery Chirnside Glasgow Hamilton Dalkeith Kirkudbright Party Country Country Country

Added 8 November Ministers Thomas Linning George Meldrum George Hamilton

Parish Lesmahagow Edinburgh University High Kirk

Presbytery Lanark Edinburgh Edinburgh

Added 14 November Ruling Elders Adam Cockburn

Office/Constituency Lord Justice Clerk

Party Court

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Appendix Added 18 November Ministers William Carstares Thomas Wilkie

Parish Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars Canongate

241

Presbytery Edinburgh Edinburgh

Committee for Drawing up Response to Ruling Elders’ Dissent Appointed 18 November 1706 Ministers Parish Presbytery James Ramsay Eyemouth Chirnside John Stirling Glasgow University Glasgow Patrick Cumming Ormiston Dalkeith George Meldrum Edinburgh University Edinburgh Members to Speak to a Parliamentary Committee about the Petition Against Popery, profanity and Irregularities Appointed 22 November 1706 Ministers Parish Presbytery John Stirling Glasgow University Glasgow George Meldrum Edinburgh University Edinburgh William Carstares Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars Edinburgh George Hamilton High Kirk Edinburgh William Wishart Leith Edinburgh James Grierson Wemyss Kirkcaldy Ruling Elders Office/Constituency Party Walter Stewart, Pardovan Linlithgow Country Lt. Col. Maxwell, Cardoness Kirkcudbright Court/ Cross-voter Committee to Consider and Deal with Absences Appointed 28 November 1706 Ministers Parish Presbytery George Hamilton High Kirk Edinburgh James Grierson Wemyss Kirkcaldy Thomas Linning Lesmahagow Lanark George Turnbull Tyninghame Dunbar John Kinnaird East Calder Edinburgh William Falconer Kelton Kirkcudbright Committee for Drawing up Church Concerns for Security Appointed 11 December 1706 Ministers Parish Presbytery John Stirling Glasgow University Glasgow George Meldrum Edinburgh University Edinburgh William Carstares Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars Edinburgh Patrick Cumming Ormiston Dalkeith

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Committee to Consider Letters from Stirling and Glasgow Appointed 31 December 1706 Ministers Parish Presbytery John Stirling Glasgow University Glasgow George Meldrum Edinburgh University Edinburgh William Carstares Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars Edinburgh Robert Wodrow Eastwood Paisley Allan Logan Toriesburn Dunfermline John Moncrieff Trinity Edinburgh Walter Campbell Dunoon Dunoon Ruling Elders Office/Constituency Party David, Earl of Glasgow Court Adam Cockburn Lord Justice Clerk Court James Gellie Alexander Abercrombie Clackmannan Court Committee to Consider Letter from Skye and Church Security Appointed 7 January 1707 Ministers Parish Presbytery John Stirling Glasgow University Glasgow William Carstares Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars Edinburgh Ruling Elders Office/Constituency Party Sir James Stewart Lord Advocate Anti/Abstainer Committee for Dealing with Members of Parliament Appointed 9 January 1707 Ministers Parish Presbytery John Stirling Glasgow University Glasgow George Meldrum Edinburgh University Edinburgh Patrick Cumming Ormiston Dalkeith George Hamilton High Kirk Edinburgh James Grierson Wemyss Kirkcaldy James Ramsay Eyemouth Chirnside Joseph Drew Markinch Kirkcaldy David Walker Temple Dalkeith Walter Campbell Dunoon Dunoon George Hamilton High Kirk Edinburgh John Currie Hoddam Annan Hugh Craig Galashiels Selkirk Robert Gourley Tillicoultry Dunblane Neil MacVicar Fort William Abertarff Ruling Elders Office/Constituency Party James Gellie John Campbell Argyllshire Court Sir David Stewart

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William Brodie Laird of Bruntsfield Alexander Abercrombie Walter Stewart, Pardovan Maxwell of Cardoness

Clackmannan Linlithgow Kirkcudbright

Court Country Court/ Cross-voter

Added 10 January Ministers William Carstares Robert Wodrow Matthew Reid

Parish Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars Eastwood North Berwick

Presbytery Edinburgh Paisley Haddington

Committee to Wait on Sub-committee of Parliament Appointed 13 January 1707 Ministers Parish Presbytery William Carstares Edinburgh Uni/Greyfriars Edinburgh Matthew Reid North Berwick Haddington George Meldrum Edinburgh University Edinburgh James Ramsay Eyemouth Chirnside

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Bibliography

1. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES NATIONAL ARCHIVE OF SCOTLAND Church Records CH1/2/5. f.209. Letter from William Wishart to presbyteries, 15 November 1706. CH1/2/5/4. fos 227–261. Documents regarding the security of the church in Act of Union, 1706–7. CH1/2/25. fos 1–60. Commissions from presbyteries and burghs, 1706. CH1/2/25. fos 288–9. Names of members of assembly committees. CH1/2/26. fos 1–77. Commissions from various presbyteries and burghs, 1707. CH1/3/8. Registers of the Acts of the Commission of the General Assembly, 1705–6. CH1/3/9. Registers of the Acts of the Commission of the General Assembly, 1706–9.

Presbytery Records CH2/15/2. Arbroath 1704–1713. CH2/35/5. Biggar 1701–1711. CH2/40/4. Brechin 1702–1706. CH2/40/5. Brechin 1706–1710. CH2/47/2. Caithness 1697–1710. CH2/66/1. Chanonry 1706–1716. CH2/82/2. Cupar 1693–1702. CH2/82/3. Cupar 1702–1702. CH2/89/3. Deer 1701–1710. CH2/99/3. Dunbar 1694–1704. CH2/99/4. Dunbar 1704–1720. CH2/103/3. Dundee 1700–1702. CH2/103/4. Dundee 1702–1703. CH2/103/5. Dundee 1703–1706.

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Bibliography CH2/103/6. Dundee 1706–1710. CH2/105/3. Dunfermline 1696–1704. CH2/105/4. Dunfermline 1704–1717. CH2/106/2. Dunkeld 1706–1712. CH2/111/3. Dunoon 1689–1707. CH2/113/3. Duns 1698–1707. CH2/118/1. Earlston 1691–1704. CH2/118/2. Earlston 1704–1716. CH2/121/4. Edinburgh 1701–1703. CH2/121/5. Edinburgh 1703–1705. CH2/121/6. Presbytery of Edinburgh 1705–1708. CH2/144/5. Elgin 1702–1716. CH2/146/6. Ellon 1701–1709. CH2/157/3. Fordoun 1700–1710. CH2/158/5. Fordyce 1707–1725. CH2/166/2. Gairloch 1697–1705. CH2/171/8. Glasgow 1707–1713. CH2/185/10. Haddington 1698–1716. CH2/190/1. Inveraray 1691–1702. CH2/198/6. Jedburgh 1692–1708. CH2/224/3. Kirkcaldy 1693–1704. CH2/224/4. Kirkcaldy 1704–1713. CH2/234/4. Lanark 1699–1709. CH2/242/9. Linlithgow 1701–1710. CH2/247/1. Lochmaben 1701–1706. CH2/263/2. Meigle 1703–1704. CH2/263/3. Meigle 1704–1708. CH2/267/1. Middlebie 1699–1703. CH2/267/2. Middlebie 1703–1717. CH2/294/6. Paisley 1699–1707. CH2/295/7. Peebles 1699–1716. CH2/298/1. Penpont 1690–1706. CH2/299/6. Perth 1700–1705. CH2/299/7. Perth 1705–1710. CH2/327/2. Selkirk 1690–1706. CH2/327/3. Selkirk 1706–1716. CH2/341/2. Stranraer 1702–1716. CH2/342/3. Strathbogie 1702–1713. CH2/348/2. Tain 1706–1711. CH2/373/1. Wigtown 1696–1709. CH2/393/2. Hamilton 1695–1719. CH2/424/8. Dalkeith 1700–1705. CH2/424/9. Dalkeith 1705–1711. CH2/516/1. Chirnside 1690–1702.

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CH2/516/2. Chirnside 1702–1721. CH2/526/1a. Kirkcudbright 1700–1707. CH2/526/1b. Kirkcudbright 1707–1707. CH2/532/2. Ayr 1687–1705. CH2/532/3. Ayr 1705–1719. CH2/546/5. Dumbarton 1695–1704. CH2/546/6. Dumbarton 1704–1714. CH2/553/3. Inverness and Forres 1702–1708. CH2/602/1. Kincardine o Neil 1700–1713. CH2/722/9. Stirling 1701–1712. CH2/723/5. Dunblane 1698–1709. CH2/1071/1. Shetland 1700–1715. CH2/1082/6. Orkney 1701–1716. CH2/1120/2. Turriff 1697–1706. CH2/1120/3. Turriff 1707–1723. CH2/1132/1. St Andrews 1705–1713. CH2/1284/4. Dumfries 1701–1710. CH2/1427. Melrose.

Synod Records CH2/12/1. Angus and the Mearns 1701–1706. CH2/98/1. Dumfries 1691–1717. CH2/154/5. Fife 1696–1705. CH2/154/6. Fife 1706–1718. CH2/165/2. Galloway 1689–1712. CH2/252/7. Lothian and Tweeddale 1698–1710. CH2/271/4. Moray 1702–1713. CH2/312/1. Ross 1707–1717. CH2/345/1. Sutherland and Caithness 1656–1729. CH2/449/3. Perth and Stirling 1691–1707. CH2/464/1. Clydesdale (Glasgow and Ayr) 1687–1704. CH2/464/2. Clydesdale (Glasgow and Ayr) 1705–1715. CH2/840/2. Aberdeen. CH2/557/4. Argyll 1701–1707. CH2/1080/1. Orkney 1704–1730.

Reformed Presbyterian Church CH3/269/1–4. Minutes and conclusions of the general meeting, 1681–1743. CH3/269/29. Notes of causes of fasts, 1706–1786.

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Supplementary Warrants and Parliamentary Papers PA7.20. Supplementary Parliamentary Papers, 1706–1707. PA7.28.22. Southern and Western shires.

Parish Addresses Against the Union PA7.28.35. Glasgow Barony Parish. PA7.28.48. Stirling. PA7.28.49. Airth, Larbert, Dunipace and Denny. PA7.28.50. Avondale. PA7.28.51. Biggar. PA7.28.52. Blantyre. PA7.28.53. Bothwell. PA7.28.54. Burntisland. PA7.28.55. Cadder. PA7.28.56. Cambuslang. PA7.28.57. Cambusnethan. PA7.28.58. Caputh, Lethendy, Alyth and Kinloch. PA7.28.59. Carmichael and Pettinain. PA7.28.60. Carnwath. PA7.28.61. Clackmannan. PA7.28.62. Covington, Carstairs and Symington. PA7.28.63. Crawford. PA7.28.64. Crawfordjohn. PA7.28.65. Culross, Saline, Carnock and Torry[burn]. PA7.28.66. Dalserf. PA7.28.67. Douglas. PA7.28.68. Dunkeld. PA7.28.69. Errol, Kilspindie, Kinnaird, Inchture, Longforgan, St Madoes and Kinfauns. PA7.28.70. Glenkens (Balmaclellan, Carsphairn, Dalry and Kells). PA7.28.71. Hamilton. PA7.28.72. Kilbride. PA7.28.73. Lesmahagow. PA7.28.74. Liberton, Quothquan and Dunsyre. PA7.28.75. Logie. PA7.28.76. Maybole, Kirkmichael, Girvan, Kirkoswald and Barr. PA7.28.77. Monkland, East. PA7.28.78. Monkland, Old. PA7.28.79. Paisley. PA7.28.80. St Ninians. PA7.28.81. Shotts.

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PA7.28.82. Stonehouse. PA7.28.83. Tulliallan.

GIFTS AND DEPOSITS GD18. Clerks of Penicuik. GD26. Leslie Family, Earls of Leven. GD28. Hay Family, Marquesses of Tweeddale. GD124/10. Earls of Mar and Kellie. GD204. Leslie family, Earls of Rothes. GD220. Graham Family, Dukes of Montrose. GD248. Ogilvy-Grant Family, Earls of Seafield. GD406. Hamilton Papers.

NATIONAL LIBRARY OF SCOTLAND Wodrow Folio XXVIII. Wodrow Quarto XXVIII. Papers on union 1702–3 and 1706. Wodrow Quarto XXX. Wodrow Quarto XXXI. Letters to R. Wylie from Duke of Hamilton, Lord Belhaven, George Ridpath and James Hodges. Wodrow Quarto XL. Papers concerning union 1706–7. Wodrow Quarto LXXIII. Papers concerning union 1706–7. Wodrow Quarto LXXXII. Passages on life of John Bell and a letter against union. Wodrow Letters Quarto IV. Wodrow Octavo XII. Anti-union material.

GLASGOW UNIVERSITY LIBRARY MS Murray 650/651. Letters to Principal John Stirling, 1701–26. MS Gen 204/206/207. Letters mainly to Principal John Stirling 1684–1726. MS Gen 1135. Register of the Actings and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 1702–5. MS Gen 1136. Register of the Actings and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 1706–10.

2. REFERENCE WORKS Bertie, David M., Scottish Episcopal Clergy 1689–2000 (Edinburgh, 2000). Cameron, Nigel M., de S., The Dictionary of Scottish Church History (Edinburgh, 1993). Scott, Hew, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae, The Succession of Ministers in the Church of Scotland from the Reformation, 8 vols (Edinburgh, 1915–50). The Dictionary of National Biography, Sir Sydney Lee (ed.), 66 vols (London, 1908–9).

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3. PRINTED MATERIAL An Account of the Proceedings of the Estates in Scotland 1689–1690, E. W. M. Balfour-Melville (ed.), 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1954). Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 1638–1842 (Edinburgh, 1843). The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, T. Thomson and C. Innes (eds), 12 vols (Edinburgh, 1814–75). Abbot, Charles, The Statutes of the Realm . . . from Original Records and Authentic Manuscripts, 9 vols (London, 1810–28). Atwood, William, The superiority and direct dominion of the imperial crown of England over the crown and kingdom of Scotland, and the divine right of succession to both crowns inseparable from the civil, asserted. In answer to Sir Thomas Craig’s treatises of homage and succession . . . (London, 1704). Atwood, William, The Scotch patriot unmask’d, in animadversions upon a seditious pamphlet, intituled, The reducing Scotland by arms, and annexing it to England as a province, considered . . . (London, 1705). The autobiography and diary of Mr James Melvill, minister of Kilrenny, in Fife, and professor of theology in the University of St Andrews. With a continuation of that diary, Robert Pitcairn (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1842). Balcarres, Colin, Earl of, Memoirs touching the Revolution in Scotland, MDCLXXXVIII–MDCXC (Edinburgh, 1841). Boyer, Abel, History of the Life and Reign of Queen Anne (London, 1722). Buchanan, George, De Jure Regni Apud Scotos; A Dialogue concerning The Rights of the Crown in Scotland (1579). Burnet, Gilbert, History of His Own Time, from the Restoration of Charles II to the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht in the Reign of Queen Anne (London, 1838). Calderwood, David, The History of the Kirk of Scotland, Thomas Thomson (ed.), 8 vols (Edinburgh, 1842–9). Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the reign of Charles I. 1640–41, William Douglas Hamilton (ed.) (London, 1882). Campbell, Robert, The Life of the Most Illustrious Prince John, Duke of Argyll and Greenwich (London, 1745). The Chronicles of Atholl and Tullibardine Families, 5 vols (Edinburgh, 1908). Clerk, John, A Letter giving an account how the Treaty of Union has been received here (Edinburgh, 1706). Clerk, Sir John, History of the Union of Scotland and England, D. Duncan (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1993). Clerk, Sir John, ‘Observations on the present circumstances of Scotland, 1730’, T. C. Smout (ed.), in Scottish History Society Miscellany, X (Edinburgh, 1965).

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Correspondence of Colonel N Hooke, agent from the Court of France to the Scottish Jacobites in the years 1703–1707, William D. Macray (ed.), 2 vols (London, 1870–1). Correspondence of George Baillie of Jerviswood 1702–1708 (Edinburgh, 1842). The Correspondence of Robert Wodrow, Thomas M’Crie (ed.), 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1842). The Cromwellian Union. Papers relating to the negotiations for an incorporating union between England and Scotland, 1651–52, C. S. Terry (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1902). Dalrymple, James, Collections concerning the Scottish History, preceding the death of King David the First, in the year 1153. Wherein the soveraignity of the crown and independency of the church are cleared; and an account given of the antiquity and purity of the Scottish-British church, and the noveltie of Popery in this kingdom. With an appendix, containing the copies of charters of foundation of some churches; with genealogical accounts of the donors and witnesses (Edinburgh, 1705). Dalrymple, Sir John, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland from the Dissolution of the Last Parliament of Charles II until the Sea Battle off La Hogue, 2 vols (London, 1771–88). The Darien Papers: being a selection of original letters and official documents relating to the establishment of a colony at Darien by the Company of Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies 1695–1700, John H. Burton (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1849). Darien Letters from the Spencer Collection Glasgow University Library (Glasgow College, 1971). Defoe, Daniel, A Collection of Original Papers and Material Transactions, concerning the late great affair of the Union between England and Scotland. Also an Exact Journal of the proceedings of the Treaty as well at London as in Edinburgh (London, 1712). Defoe, Daniel, The History of the Union of England and Scotland (1786). Defoe’s Review, A Review of the affairs of France and of all Europe, Arthur Wellesly Secord and William L. Payne (eds), 23 vols (New York, 1938–1948). Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston, 1655–1660, James D. Ogilvie (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1940). ‘The diary of the Rev. George Turnbull, minister of Alloa and Tyninghame, 1657–1704’, Robert Paul (ed.), in Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, I (Edinburgh, 1893). Drake, James, Historia Anglo-Scotica: or An impartial history of all that happened between the kings and kingdoms of England and Scotland, from the beginning of the reign of William the Conqueror to the reign of Queen Elizabeth (London, 1703). Early Letters of Robert Wodrow, 1698–1709, L. W. Sharp (ed.) (Edinburgh, 1937).

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respect to the certainty of its future honourable and advantageous establishment; demonstrated. Wherein is shew’d, that both the projected union, and a nomination of a successor to the crown, tho with limitations, cannot fail to compleat the miseries of this kingdom; but that the Act of security alone, if adheres to will infallibly retrive our lost happiness, and make us a rich and glorious people (Edinburgh, 1706). An Account of a Paper, Presented to the General Assembly, October 1690, Containing the Complaints of Many Presbyterian People, Living in Several Shyres of Scotland. And Now a Second Time with Additions Offered to their Consideration (1690). The Acts & Orders of the Meeting of the Estates of the Kingdom of Scotland Holden and begun at Edinburgh the 14th day of March 1689 (Edinburgh, 1690). Act and Proclamation Anent Intruders into Churches (1706). The Act of the parliament of Scotland for the security of the Kingdom. As it is Voted and past in this present Parliament, and lies ready for the Royal Assent, with a short account of it and some few remarks (London, 1703). Act for Security of the Kingdom as it was Voted and Approved by the Right Honourable Estates of Parliament at Edinburgh the 13th Day of August One Thousand Seven Hundred and Three (Edinburgh, 1704). The Act of Security, Is the only Rational Method of Procuring Scotland a happy Constitution, free from the Illegal Invasion of It’s Liberties and Laws, and the base Usurpation of it’s Ancient Sovereignty (1704). Adams, William, A letter from the country containing some remarks concerning the National Covenant and Solemn League. In answer to a late pamphlet, entituled, Lawful prejudices against an incorporating union with England (Edinburgh, 1707). Adams, William, A second letter from the country, in vindication of the former concerning the National Covenant and Solemn League: in answer to a pamphlet entituled Lawful prejudices against an incorporating union with England (1707). Anderson, James, An Historical essay, shewing that the crown and kingdom of Scotland is imperial and independent . . . (Edinburgh, 1705). An Account of the Burning of the Articles of Union at Dumfries, These are to notifie to all concerned, what are our reasons for, and designs in the Burning of the Printed Articles of the Proposed Union with England, with the Names of the Scots Commissioners, Subscribers thereof; together with the Minutes of the whole Treaty, betwixt them and the English Commissioners thereanant (1706). The advantages of Scotland by an incorporate union with England, compar’d with these of a coalition with the Dutch, or a league with France. In answer to a pamphlet, call’d, The advantages of the act of security, &c. To which is added, A Postscript in answer to The Letter concerning the Consequence of an Incorporating Union (1706).

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An Answer to Some Queries &c., Relative to the Union: In a Conference Betwixt a Coffee-Master and a Countrey-Farmer (1706). Arbuthnott, John, A Sermon Preach’d to the People at the Mercat Cross of Edinburgh on the Subject of Union (Edinburgh, 1706). Bannatyne, John, Some queries proposed to consideration, relative to the union now intended (Edinburgh, 1706). A Brief Account of the Reasons for which the Three Estates of Scotland Forfaulted the Late King James and settled K. William and Q. Mary upon the Throne Anno 1689 and some of the reasons induced them to abolish Episcopacy there (London, 1695). A Brief and True Account of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, occasioned by the Episcopalians since the Year 1660; Being a Vindication of their Majesties Government in that Kingdom, relating to the Proceedings against the Bishops and Clergy there, with some Animadversions upon a Libel intituled, The Present state and Condition of the Clergy and Church of Scotland (London, 1690). A Brief Examination of some things in Mr Meldrum’s sermon preach’d May 16. Against a Toleration to those of the Episcopal Perswasion, in a letter to a friend (1703). The Case of the Church of Scotland Stated with respect to some laws antecedent and consequent to the union with an humble inquiry into its influences upon our reformation, in a letter to a ruling elder of the General Assembly, from his friend in the country (Edinburgh, 1715). Causes of the Lord’s Wrath Against Scotland Manifested in his Late Sad Dispensations (Edinburgh, 1653). Clark, James, Scotland’s Speech to her Sons (Edinburgh, 1706). Clark, James, Rabbles and Authors of Rabbles Condemned, or some passages of a real letter sent to a gentleman at Edinburgh (1708). Clark, James, A Just Reprimand to Daniel de Foe. In a letter to a gentleman in South Britain (Edinburgh, 1709). Cockburn, John, A continuation of the historical relation of the late General Assembly in Scotland, with an account of the commissions of that Assembly, and other particulars concerning the present state of the Church in that kingdom (London, 1691). Cockburn, John, An Historical Relation of the Late General Assembly Held at Edinburgh, from Octob. 16. to Nov. 13. in the Year 1690, In a Letter from a Person in Edinburgh to his Friend in London (London, 1691). A Converse between Two Presbyterians of the Established Church An Elder and a Preacher. Wherein the Presbyterian Dissenters from the Established Church, are vindicate from the charge of Jacobitism (1714). A Copy of a Letter from a Country Farmer to His Laird, a member of parliament (1706). Counter Quiries to the Quiries burnt at the Cross of Edinburgh December 17 1706. which appear to be Writ by some of Mr. Hepburn’s folowers, or some body personating them (1706).

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Culloden Papers Comprising an Extensive and Interesting Correspondence from the year 1625 to 1748, H. R. Duff (ed.) (London, 1815). The Declaration, Protestation and Testimony of a poor wasted, desolate, misrepresented and reproached remnant of the True Presbyterian Church of Christ in Scotland; Published against the Proclamation, accession and establishment of George D of Hanover to be the King in these lands (1715). Defoe, Daniel, A letter from Mr Reason, to the high and mighty Prince the Mob (Edinburgh, 1706). Defoe, Daniel, An essay at removing national prejudices against a union with Scotland. To be continued during the treaty here. Part I (London, 1706). Defoe, Daniel, An essay, at removing national prejudices, against a union with England. Part III / by the author of the two first (Edinburgh, 1706). Defoe, Daniel, A fourth essay, at removing national prejudices; with some reply to Mr. H[o]dges and some other authors, who have printed their objections against an union with England (1706). Defoe, Daniel, A fifth essay at removing national prejudices : with a reply to some authors, who have printed their objections against an union with England (1707). Defoe, Daniel, Two great questions considered, I. What is the obligation of Parliament to the addresses or petitions of the people, and what the duty of the addressers? II. Whether the obligation of the Covenant or the other national engagements, is concern’d in the Treaty of Union? Being a sixth essay at removing national prejudices against the union (Edinburgh, 1707). Defoe, Daniel, A reproof to Mr Clark, and a brief vindication of Mr Defoe (Edinburgh, 1710). Defoe, Daniel, A Short Letter to the Glasgow Men (Edinburgh, 1706). Defoe, Daniel, The rabbler convicted: or a friendly advice to all turbulent and factious persons, from one of their own number (Edinburgh, 1706). The Divine Right of Episcopacy demonstrated from Calvin and Beza together with a letter to a Presbyterian Minister for Union (London, 1690). Essay Upon the Union (1706). A friendly return to a letter concerning Sir George MacKenzies and Sir John Nisbets Observation and response on the matter of the Union (1706). Gib, Adam, The Present Truth: A Display of the Secession-Testimony; in the Three Periods of the Rise, State and Maintenance of that Testimony, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1774). Gordon, John, England and Scotlands Happinesse: In being reduced to unitie of religion under our invincible Monarke King James (London, 1604). Grant, Francis, The patriot resolved, in a letter to an addresser, from his friend; of the same sentiments with himself; concerning the union (1707). The Grounds of the Present Danger of the Church of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1707). Hadow, James, A Survey of the Case of the Episcopal Clergy and of those of the Episcopal Perswasion (Edinburgh, 1703).

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Her Majesty’s most gracious Letter to the Parliament of Scotland. With the Lord High Commissioner and the Lord High Chancellor’s Speeches relating to the Union (1706). His Majesties Declaration from Carisbrooke Castle in the Isle of Wight . . . Together with the Answer and Resolution of the Commissioners of the General Assembly of the Kingdome of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1648). Hodges, James, The rights and interests of the two British monarchies, inquir’d into, and clear’d; with a special respect to an united or separate state. Treatise I. Shewing the different nature of an incorporating and federal union; the reasons why all designs of union have hitherto proved unsuccessful; and the inconsistency of an union by incorporation with the rights, liberties, national interest, and publick good of both kingdoms (London, 1703). Hodges, James, The rights and interests of two British monarchies, with a special respect to an united or separate state. Treatise III. Containing farther enquiries into the best means of procuring a happy union betwixt the two kingdoms; with a special regard to the argument, that the making both nations one people, must also make them of one interest (London, 1706). I Know Nothing of it (Edinburgh, 1707). The Lawfulnesse of Our Expedition into England Manifested (Edinburgh, 1640). Leslie, Charles, The wolf stript of his shepherd’s cloathing. In answer to a late celebrated book intituled Moderation a vertue; wherein the designs of the dissenters against the church; and their behaviour towards Her Majesty both in England and Scotland are laid open. With the case of ocassional conformity considered (London, 1704). A Letter Concerning Union, with Sir George MacKenzie’s Observations and Sir John Nisbet’s Opinion upon the same subject (Edinburgh, 1706). A Letter from a Presbyterian Minister in the Countrey to A Member of Parliament and also of the Commission of the Church concerning Toleration and patronages (1703). A Letter from the Commission of the General Assembly to the Presbytery of Hamilton with the Presbytery’s Answer (1706). A Letter from the west to a Member of the Meeting of the Estates of Scotland (1689). Lockhart, George, A Speech in Parliament (Edinburgh, 1706). Logan, John, A Sermon preach’d before his Grace James Duke of Queensberry, Her Majesty’s High Commissioner, And the Honourable Estates of Parliament In the New Church of Edinburgh, Upon the 27 October 1706 (Edinburgh, 1706). The Lord Belhaven’s Speech in the Parliament of Scotland upon the ACT for Security of the Kingdom in case of the Queen’s Death (1703). The Lord Belhaven’s Speech in Parliament the 15th Day of November 1706 on the second article of the Treaty (1706).

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Mackenzie, George Earl of Cromarty, A few brief and modest reflections persuading a just Indulgence to be granted to the Episcopal Clergy and people of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1703). Mackenzie, George Earl of Cromarty, A continuation of a few brief and modest reflexions perswading a just indulgence to be granted to the Episcopal Clergy and people in Scotland . . . (Edinburgh, 1703). Mackenzie, George Earl of Cromarty, Parainesis Pacifica or a Perswasive to the Union of Britain (Edinburgh, 1702). Meldrum, George, A Sermon Preached in the New Church of Edinburgh, on Sabbath May 16. 1703 (Edinburgh, 1703). A Memorial for His Highness the Prince of Orange, in Relation to the Affairs of Scotland: Together with the Address of the Presbyterian Party in that Kingdom to His Highness; and Some Observations on that Address. By two Persons of Quality (London, 1689). Minuts of the Proceedings in Parliament, Friday 28 May 1703, No. 9 (1703). Monro, An Apology for the Clergy of Scotland, Chiefly oppos’d to the Censures, Calumnies, and Accusations of a Late Presbyterian Vindicator, In a Letter to a Friend. Wherein His Vanity, Partiality and Sophistry are modestly Reproved, and the Legal Establishment of Episcopacy in that Kingdom, from the Beginning of the Reformation, is made evident from History and the records of Parliament (London, 1693). Morer, Thomas, An Account of the Present Persecution of the Church in Scotland in several letters (London, 1690). Overture for an Act for the Security of the Church (Edinburgh, 1706). Plain Reasons for Presbyterians Dissenting from the Revolution Church in Scotland (1731). Pont, Robert, Of the Union of Britayne, in, B. Galloway and B. Levack (eds), The Jacobean Union (Edinburgh, 1985). The Principal Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland; Conveened at Edinburgh, the 4th April 1706 (Edinburgh, 1706). The Principal Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland; Conveened at Edinburgh, the 8th of April 1707 (Edinburgh, 1707). The Protestation and testimony of the United Societies of the witnessing remnant of the anti–Popish, anti–Prelatic, anti–Erastian, anti–Sectarian, true Presbyterian Church in Scotland, against the sinful incorporating Union with England and their British Parliament, concluded and established, May, 1707 (Sanquhar, 1707). The Queen an Empress, And her Three Kingdoms one Empire (London, 1706). Queries to the Presbyterian Noblemen, Barons, Burgesses, Ministers and Commons in Scotland, who are for the Scheme of an Incorporating Union with England, according to the articles agreed by the Commissioners of both Nations (Edinburgh, 1706). Ramsay, James, Toleration’s fence removed, the thoughts concerning the present state of affairs in so far as they respect a toleration considered, and exposed;

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plain–dealing with the Presbyterians as it is not found, so not to be expected from prelatical pamphleteers. Or a vindication of a letter from a gentleman to a member of Parliament concerning Toleration (Edinburgh, 1703). Reasons for a Union Between the Kingdoms of England and Scotland (1706). The Register of the Actings and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, held at Edinburgh, January 15 1692 (Edinburgh, 1692). A Remonstrance Concerning the present Troubles, From the meeting of the Estates of the Kingdome of Scotland, Aprill 16. unto the Parliament of England (Edinburgh, 1640). The Restoration of Epsicopacy in Scotland the only sure Foundation for a lasting union with England, in a Letter to Sir J. P. Bart (London, 1705). Ridpath, George, An Enquiry into the Causes of the Miscarriage of the Scots Colony at Darien (Glasgow, 1700). Ridpath, George, Scotland’s Grievances Relating to Darien (1700). Robeson, Alexander, Mene Tekel: or Separation Weighed in the Ballance of the Sanctuary and found Wanting (1717). Rule, Gilbert, A vindication of the Church of Scotland; being an answer to a paper, intituled, Some questions concerning Episcopal and Presbyterial government in Scotland . . . by a minister of the Church of Scotland (1691). Rule, Gilbert, A second vindication of the Church of Scotland; being an answer to five pamphlets . . . (1691). Rule, Gilbert, A True Representation of Presbyterian Government, wherein a short and clear account is given of the principles of them that own it and the common objections against it answered (Edinburgh, 1690). Sage, John, An account of the late establishment of Presbyterian-government by the Parliament of Scotland anno 1690 (London, 1693). Sage, John, The fundamental charter of Presbytery, as it hath lately established in Scotland, examin’d and disprov’d, by the history, records, and publick transactions of our nation (London, 1695). Sage, John, The Case of the Present Afflicted Clergy in Scotland Truly Represented. To which is added for Probation the Attestation of many unexceptionable witnesses to every Particular; and all the Publick Acts and Proclamations of the Convention and Parliament relating to the Clergy (London, 1690). A Seasonable Admonition (Edinburgh, 1699). A Seasonable Warning or the Pope and King of France Unmasked (1706). Seton, William, A Speech in Parliament the second day of November 1706. By William Seton of Pitmedden Junior, on the first article of the Treaty of Union (Edinburgh, 1706). Seton, William, Scotland’s great advantages by an union with England: showen in a letter from the country, to a member of Parliament (1706). A Scheme for Uniting the two Kingdoms of England and Scotland, different from any that has been hitherto laid down (Edinburgh, 1706).

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Sibbald, Robert, The liberty and independency of the Kingdom and Church of Scotland, asserted from the antient records (Edinburgh, 1702). Sibbald, Robert, An answer to the second letter to the Right Reverend, the Lord Bishop of Carlile, occasioned by some passages in his late book of the Scotch Library, addressed to the same bishop. Wherein the Scots ancient possession in Britain is asserted; and answers are given to the objections against it, in the second letter, and in Mr Atwood’s late book; and our authors are vindicated (Edinburgh, 1704). The Smoaking Flax unquenchable; where the union betwixt the two kingdoms is dissecated, anatomized, confuted and annulled. Also that good form of fabrick of civil government, intended and espoused by the true subjects of the land, is illustrated and held out (1706). Some Reasons by a Divine of the Kirk of Scotland, proving that their Clergy there cannot with a safe conscience Swear the English Oath of Abjuration (1707). A Speech in Parliament on the 10th day of January 1701 by the Lord Belhaven On the affair of the Indian and African Company and its Colony of Caledonia (Edinburgh, 1701). A Speech in Season against the Union, or a smoaking furnace and a burning lamp, and for the land rights with an advice in end to turn to the Lord, and recover his rights that hath been rendered up; and Scotland’s cause of lamentation (Edinburgh, 1706). The Speeches of James Guthrie before the Parliament (1661). Spreull, John, An accompt current betwixt Scotland and England balanced: together with an essay of a scheme of the product of Scotland, and a few remarks on each. As also a view of the several products of the ports or nations we trade to, by comparing and holding forth how our products and manufactures may balance theirs, with returns (Edinburgh, 1705). Sir George M’kenzie’s Arguments Against and Incorporating Union Particularly Considered, As they are in his Observations upon James. 6. Parl. 17 (Edinburgh, 1706). To the Loyal and Religious Hearts in Parliament, some few effects of the union, proposed between Scotland and England. Except God will prevent will fall out (Edinburgh, 1706). To the Queen’s Most Excellent Majestie, the Humble Address and Supplication of the Suffering Episcopal Clergy in the Kingdom of Scotland, whose names and designations are underwritten (1702). Unto his Grace Her Majesty’s high commissioner and the Right Honourable Estates of Parliament, The Humble Address of the Presbytrie of Lanerk (1706). Unto his Grace Her Majesty’s high commissioner and the Right Honourable Estates of Parliament, The Humble Address of the Presbytry of Dunblane (1706). Unto his Grace Her Majesty’s high commissioner and the Right Honourable Estates of Parliament, The Humble Address of the Presbytry of Hamilton (1706).

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A Voice from the North or an answer to the voice from the south, writen by the Presbyterians of Scotland to the dissenters in England (Edinburgh, 1707). A Voice From The South; or, An Address from some Protestant Dissenters in England to the Kirk of Scotland (1707). Vulpone: or Remarks on some Proceedings in Scotland relating both to the Union and Protestant Succession since the Revolution (1707). Webster, James, Lawful Prejudices against an Incorporating Union with England; or some modest considerations on the sinfulness of the union, and the danger flowing from it to the Church of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1707). Webster, James, The author of the Lawful prejudices against an incorporating union with England, defended. In answer to a pamphlet entituled, The dissenters in England vindicated, from some reflexions, in a late pamphlet entituled, Lawful prejudices etc (Edinburgh, 1707). Webster, James, A second defence of the lawful prejudices, containing a vindication of the obligation of the National Covenant and Solemn League, in answer to a letter from the country (1707). Wisheart, William, A Sermon Preached before his Grace, David, Earl of Glasgow, Her Majesty’s High Commissioner, and the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland at the opening of the said Assembly on the 8th day of April 1707 (1707). Wylie Robert, The Insecurity of a Printed Overture for an Act for the Church’s Security (1706). Wylie Robert, A Letter from a Member of the Commission of the late General Assembly, to a Minister in the Country; Concerning Present Dangers (Edinburgh, 1707). Wylie, Robert, A Short Answer to a Large Paper (Edinburgh, 1703). Wylie, Robert, A Speech without doors concerning toleration (Edinburgh, 1703). Wylie, Robert, A Short answer to a short paper, intituled a few brief and modest reflections perswading a just indulgence to be granted to the Episcopal clergy and people in Scotland (1703).

4. THESES Butterworth, Ian Eric, Episcopalians in Scotland 1689–1745, with special reference to the North East and the Diocese of Aberdeen (Aberdeen University, M.Th. thesis, 1978). Patrick, Derek, The Scottish Parliament in the Reign of William of Orange (St Andrews University, Ph.D. thesis, 2002).

5. SECONDARY SOURCES Burleigh, J. H. S., A Church History of Scotland (Oxford, 1960). Daiches, David, Scotland and the Union (London, 1977).

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Pittock, Murray G. H., The Invention of Scotland: The Stuart Myth and the Scottish Identity, 1638 to the Present (London, 1991). Reid, H. M. B., A Cameronian Apostle being some account of John Macmillan of Balmaghie (Paisley, 1896). Riley, P. W. J., The Union of England and Scotland (Manchester, 1978). Riley, P. W. J., King William and the Scottish Politicians (Edinburgh, 1977). Scott, Paul H., Andrew Fletcher and the Treaty of Union (Edinburgh, 1992). Seton Gordon, Bruce, The House of Seton: A Study in Lost Causes, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1939–41). Story, R. H., William Carstares (London, 1874). Szechi, Daniel, George Lockhart of Carnwath, 1689–1727: A Study in Jacobitism (East Linton, 2002). Walker, James, The Theology and Theologians of Scotland 1560–1750 (Edinburgh, 1982). Warrick, John, The Moderators of the Church of Scotland from 1690 to 1740 (Edinburgh, 1913). Whatley, C. A., Bought and Sold for English Gold: Explaining the Union of 1707 (The Economic and Social History of Dundee, 1994). Young, Robert, Annals of the Parish and Burgh of Elgin (Elgin, 1879).

6. ARTICLES Armitage, David, ‘The Scottish Vision of Empire: The Intellectual Origins of the Darien Venture’, in John Robertson (ed.), A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the Union of 1707 (Cambridge, 1995). Bowie, Karin, ‘Public Opinion, Popular Politics and the Union of 1707’, The Scottish Historical Review, 82 (2003). Campbell, Roy H., ‘A Historical Perspective on the Union’, in Patrick S. Hodge (ed.), Scotland and the Union (Edinburgh, 1994). Cheyne, A. C., ‘The Ecclesiastical Significance of the Revolution Settlement’, in Studies in Scottish Church History (Edinburgh, 1999). Clarke, Tristram, ‘The Williamite Episcopalians and the Glorious Revolution in Scotland’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 24 (1990). Couper, Rev. W. J., ‘The Reformed Presbyterian Church in Scotland’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 2 (Edinburgh, 1925). Dickey, Laurence, ‘Power, commerce and natural law in Daniel Defoe’s political writings 1698–1707’, in John Robertson (ed.), A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the Union of 1707 (Cambridge, 1995). Ferguson, William, ‘The Problems of the Established Church in the West Highlands in the Eighteenth Century’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 17 (1969). Ferguson, William, ‘Imperial Crowns: A Neglected Facet of the Background to the Treaty of Union of 1707’, The Scottish Historical Review, 53 (Edinburgh, 1974).

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Macinnes, Allan I., ‘Union Failed, Union Accomplished’, in D. Keogh and Kevin Whelan (eds), Acts of Union (Dublin, 2001). Macinnes, Allan I., ‘Influencing the Vote: The Scottish Estates and the Treaty of Union, 1706–7’, History Microcomputer Review (1990). McKechnie, W. S., ‘The Constitutional Necessity for the Union of 1707’, The Scottish Historical Review, 5 (1907–8). McMillan, W., ‘The Covenanters after the Revolution of 1688’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 10 (1950). McMillan, W., ‘The Hebronites’, in Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 5 (1935). Macpherson, Hector, ‘Alexander Shields, 1660–1700’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 3 (1929). Maxwell, Thomas, ‘The Scotch Presbyterian Eloquence, A Post-Revolution Pamphlet’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 8 (1944). Maxwell, Thomas, ‘William III and the Scots Presbyterians’, part 1, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 15 (1966). Maxwell, Thomas, ‘William III and the Scots Presbyterians’, part 2, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 15 (1966). Maxwell, Thomas, ‘Presbyterian and Episcopalian in 1688’, The Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 13 (1959). Maxwell, Thomas, ‘The Church Union Attempt at the General Assembly of 1692’, in Duncan Shaw (ed.), Reformation and Revolution (Edinburgh, 1967). Meek, Donald, ‘The Gaelic Bible’, in David Wright (ed.), The Bible in Scottish Life and Literature (Edinburgh, 1988). Morrill, John, ‘The English, the Scots and the British’, in Patrick S. Hodge (ed.), Scotland and the Union (Edinburgh, 1994). Penovich, Katherine R, ‘From Revolution Principles to Union: Daniel Defoe’s Intervention in the Scottish Debate’, in John Robertson (ed.), A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the Union of 1707 (Cambridge, 1995). ‘Records of the Reformed Presbyterian Church’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 3 (1929). Riley, P. W. J., ‘The Formation of the Scottish Ministry of 1703’, Scottish Historical Review, 47 (1968). Riley, P. W. J., ‘The Scottish Parliament of 1703’, Scottish Historical Review, 47 (1968). Robertson, John, ‘An Elusive Sovereignty: The Course of the Union Debate in Scotland 1698–1707’, in John Robertson (ed.), A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the Union of 1707 (Cambridge, 1995). Robertson, John, ‘Andrew Fletcher’s Vision of Union’, in R. A. Mason (ed.), Scotland and England 1286–1815 (Edinburgh, 1987). Robertson, Joseph, ‘Notice of an Unpublished Letter from General Mackay to the Laird of Grant, dated at London, 4th December 1690, on the Comparative Strength of Ecclesiastical Parties in Scotland at the Revolution’, in Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, II (1851).

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Abercromby, Patrick, 186 acts Act against all Musters . . . (1704), 145 Act against Innovations in the Worship of God (1707), 229 Act anent Peace and War (1703), 23, 24, 25 Act for a Treaty of Union (1705), 28, 83 Act for Settling the Quiet and Peace of the Church (1693), 9–10 Act of Classes (1649), 208 Act of Council against Episcopal meeting houses (1706), 13 Act of Security (1704), 23–4, 25, 26, 66, 72, 90, 145, 146, 154, 167, 185, 186, 187–8, 196, 203 Act of Settlement (1701), 21, 25 Act of Supremacy (1669), 3, 7, 65 Act Rescissory (1661), 4 Alien Act (1705), 27, 29, 188, 216 ‘Barrier Act’, 132 ‘Black Acts’ (1584), 7 church security, 63–75, 95 Scots Act of Commission (1604), 183 for supply, 64 synods, 18 Test and Corporation Acts, 54 30th of the 6th parliament of James VI, 114 Wine Act (1703), 26 addresses to parliament, 95–105, 109–21, 123–35 First, 73, 74, 86, 103 Second, 47–63, 73–4, 86, 87, 96, 103, 105 Third, 83–4 Fourth, 95–8 government response to, 121–3 Aird, John, Provost of Glasgow, 141–2 Anglo-Scottish relations, 16–17, 21, 118 Annandale, William Johnstone, Marquis of, 19, 20, 91, 197, 198, 200 Anne, Queen, 196, 198, 209, 229 and religion, 10, 18

and succession, 21, 24, 27 and union, 17, 26, 47, 113, 198 anti-unionists, 103–4, 155, 234 Arbuthnott, John, 193–4 Argyll, Archibald Campbell, 8th Duke of, 208 Argyll, John Campbell, 2nd Duke of, 27, 91, 122, 142, 200 armed gatherings, 143–8 army, 160–1; see also Duke of Atholl’s Highlanders articles burning of, 160, 165, 172 for removal of Scottish parliament, 130–1 Articles of Grievances (1689), 1, 2 Assemblies see General Assembly Atholl, James Murray, 2nd Duke of, 93, 139, 164, 167, 197, 199, 200, 201; see also Duke of Atholl’s Highlanders Atwood, William, 181, 182 Auchinbreck, Sir James Campbell, Laird of, 59 Baillie, George see Jerviswood, George Baillie of Bannatyne, John, 44, 45, 59, 103, 126, 191 Barons, 199 ‘Barrier Act’, 132 Barrington, John Shute, 63 Belhaven, John Hamilton, 2nd Lord, 23, 53, 66, 197 Bell, John, 62, 101, 105, 126–7, 129–30, 151 Bell, Robert, 61 bibles, Gaelic, 12 Biggar, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Biggar bishops in House of Lords, 52, 56, 57–8, 131, 228 power of, 62 ‘Black Acts’ (1584), 7 Blair, David, 52, 61, 91, 92, 104, 126, 150 Boston, Thomas, 101, 119–21, 152, 232 Boyd, William, 5

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Index Boyle, David, Earl of Glasgow see Glasgow, David Boyle, 1st Earl of Brechin, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Brechin bribery: ministers, 230 Brisbane, John, MP, 167 Brown, James, 142, 150 Bruce, Sir Alexander, 65 Burnet, Gilbert, 214 Burntisland: addresses to parliament by, 113 Caledonia (parish) see Dunkeld ‘Calvin’s Case’, 189 Cameron, Richard, 212 Cameronians, 4–5, 6, 7, 62, 112, 143, 181 alliance with Jacobites, 157–72 and covenanted Scottish republic, 207–17 Campbell, Archibald, 8th Earl of Argyll see Argyll, John Campbell, 8th Earl of Campbell, Sir James, Laird of Auchinbreck see Auchinbreck, Sir James Campbell, Laird of Campbell, John, 2nd Duke of Argyll see Argyll, John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Carnock (parish), 113 Carstares, William, 43, 52, 53, 56, 58, 61, 69, 72, 85, 86, 91, 92, 100, 104, 105, 126, 150, 152, 157 Catholicism, 1, 83, 84 Causes of the Lord’s Wrath Against Scotland, The, 208 Cavalier Party, 18, 22, 23, 197, 198 Charles I, King, 203, 204, 235–6 Charles II, King, 207, 209, 211 church governments, 28, 41, 46, 64, 68, 69, 89, 98, 203 Church of England influence of, 41 and monarchy, 87 and security, 98, 231 Church of Scotland and addresses to parliament, 126–35 and conformity, 54 and covenants, 57 and monarchy, 48, 53, 87 and security, 66, 66–75, 82, 88, 89–90, 95–105, 111, 201–2, 231, 235 and union, 8–11, 14–15, 19–20, 40, 47–61, 109, 232–6 see also Kirk civil war, 188 Claim of Right (1689), 1, 2, 15, 21, 22, 46, 47, 58, 65, 66, 68, 88, 89, 109, 113, 115, 130–1, 194

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Clark, James, 116–17, 140–1, 153, 155, 171, 191 clergy Episcopalian, 10, 13 Gaelic-speaking, 12 Jacobite, 2–3 Presbyterian, 12 and union, 42, 43 see also bishops; ministers; prelates Clerk, Sir John, 15, 21, 67, 72, 82, 118–19, 122, 139, 150, 152, 160, 161 Clerk, Sir John, (Senior) of Penicuik, 41, 67, 123, 168–9 ‘Club, The’, 2, 3 Cochrane, John, 123–4 Cockburn, Adam, 70 colleges see educational establishments Commission of the General Assembly, 7, 12, 44, 60, 61, 62, 82–105, 110, 128, 129, 195, 208, 226, 234–5, 236 First Address to parliament by, 73, 74, 86, 103 Second Address to parliament by, 47–63, 73–4, 86, 87, 96, 103, 105 Third Address to parliament by, 83–4 Fourth Address to parliament by, 95–8 commissioners English, 20, 29, 69, 70 Scottish, 19, 28, 44, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72–3, 128, 130, 228–9, 230 committees, 104, 132–3 Committee for Public Affairs, 51–2, 53, 59, 74, 75, 86–95, 104, 155–6 Committee for Security, 62 Committee of Estates, 207–8 commonwealth, Scottish, 207–8 Company of Scotland, 15, 16 conformity see occasional conformity Conservators of the Peace (later Conservators of the Union), 183 constitution, civil, 102 Convention of Estates (1689), 3, 14 coronation oath, 53–4 Country Party, 15–16, 22, 23, 25, 26, 100, 109 Court Party, 22, 23, 27, 44, 55, 66, 196 covenanted Scottish republic: and Cameronians, 207–17 covenanting revolution (1640–1), 1 covenants and church, 57, 59, 112, 211 National Covenant (1638), 4, 58, 109, 203–4

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covenants (cont.) see also Solemn League and Covenant (1643) Cromarty, George Mackenzie, 1st Earl of see Mackenzie, George, Viscount Tarbat (later 1st Earl of Cromarty) Cromwell, Oliver, 208 Cullen, Francis Grant, Lord see Grant, Francis, Baron of Nova Scotia Culross (parish), 113 Cumming, Patrick, 61, 86, 91, 92, 105 Cunningham, James, of Aiket, 163, 166–8 Dalrymple, Sir John, 1st Earl of Stair see Stair, Sir John Dalrymple, 1st Earl of Darien scheme, 15, 16–17, 18, 21, 100–1, 109 Defoe, Daniel, 42, 50, 63, 84, 90, 99, 104, 117, 140, 141, 146, 149, 151, 153, 160, 165–6, 229–30 dissenters English, 90, 151 and occasional conformity, 54, 55 doctrine of lawful resistance see lawful resistance, doctrine of Douglas, Charles, 2nd Earl of Selkirk see Selkirk, Charles Douglas, 2nd Earl of Douglas, James, 4th Duke of Hamilton see Hamilton, James Douglas, 4th Duke of Douglas, James, 2nd Duke of Queensberry see Queensberry, James Douglas, 2nd Duke of Drake, James, 181–2 Duke of Atholl’s Highlanders, 163–4 Dumbarton, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Dumbarton Dumfries burning of articles at, 160, 165, 172 Presbytery of see Presbytery of Dumfries Dunblane, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Dunblane Dunfermline parish, 113 Dunfermline, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Dunfermline Dunkeld (parish), 114 economy, 16, 215; see also trade Edinburgh, 160–1, 165 Presbytery of see Presbytery of Edinburgh riots, 139–40, 142, 157 education: Gaelic, 12 educational establishments, 48; see also schools; universities Edward VI, King, 182, 189 elders, 60, 61, 92, 93

and dissent, 83–6 and Second Address to parliament, 55, 56, 65–6, 73, 82, 85 electoral process, 3 Ellon, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Ellon Engagement treaty (1647–8) see Treaty of Engagement (1647–8) England and Act of Security, 26 and succession see succession and union, 70, 185, 186, 187–8 see also Anglo-Scottish relations English language: education in, 12 episcopacy, 4, 9, 13, 20, 41, 231 Episcopalian church government: abolition of, 2 Episcopalians, 3, 4, 8–9, 13, 84, 140, 229 rights of, 65 and toleration, 89 and union, 41–2, 193 erastianism, 6–8 Erskine, James, 147 Erskine, John, 11th Earl of Mar see Mar, John Erskine, 11th Earl of Essay upon the Union (pamphlet), 188–9 estates, 3 fasting, 43, 45, 49, 101 federal union: idea of, 184–5, 196 Fife: addresses to parliament see Burntisland First Address to parliament, 44–7, 73, 74, 86, 103 Fleming, William, 150 Fletcher, Andrew, of Saltoun, 14, 23, 25, 140, 185, 199, 200 Fourth Address to parliament, 95–8 France, 187, 188 alliance with, 186 war with, 21, 26 Frederick I, King of Prussia, 25 Freeholders, 199 Gaelic language, 12 Galloway, Synod of see Synod of Galloway General Assemblies (1690), 4, 11–12 (1692), 7–8, 9 (1706), 226 (1707), 44, 226–32 see also Commission of the General Assembly George I, King, 171 Glasgow march, 165

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Index Presbytery of see Presbytery of Glasgow rabble army, 146–8 riots, 140–3, 153, 154, 156 Synod of, 18, 231 Glasgow, David Boyle, 1st Earl of, 59, 60, 91, 123 Glenkens (parish), 114 Godolphin, Sidney, 1st Earl, 25 Graham, James, 8th Duke of Montrose see Montrose, James Graham, Duke of Grant, Francis, Baron of Nova Scotia (later Lord Cullen), 117–18, 214 Guthrie, James, 208–9 Haddington, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Haddington Hamilton (town), 147 Hamilton, Anne, 3rd Duchess of, 122, 147, 154 Hamilton, George, 153 Hamilton, James Douglas, 4th Duke of, 17, 26, 28, 60, 62–3, 65, 123, 139, 164, 167, 169, 197–8, 198–9, 200–1 Hamilton, John, 2nd Lord Belhaven see Belhaven, John Hamilton, 2nd Lord Hamilton, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Hamilton Hanover, House of see House of Hanover Hanoverian succession, 210 Harley, Robert, 42, 47, 103, 152 Harries, William, 144, 160 Hart, James, 150 Hay, John, 2nd Earl and 1st Marquis of Tweeddale see Tweeddale, John Hay, 2nd Earl and 1st Marquis of Hebronites, 5–6, 150, 164, 165, 172, 181, 203–6 Henderson, Alexander, 116 Hepburn, John, 5, 6, 62, 143, 164, 165–6 Heretors, 199 Highlanders see Duke of Atholl’s Highlanders Highlands: establishment of Presbyterianism in, 12–13 Historia Anglo-Scotica, 181–2 Hodges, James, 18, 43, 184–5 Holburn, Captain William, 144 Holland: alliance with, 186, 187 Home, Earl of, 22 Horsburgh, Robert, 57 House of Commons: Scottish representation in, 29, 94, 114 House of Hanover: 21, 25, 26, 111, 197; see

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also George I, King; Hanoverian succession House of Lords constitution of, 52, 56, 87 Scottish representation in, 29, 47, 94 House of Savoy, 25 House of Stuart, 26, 87, 211–12; see also Anne, Queen; Charles I, King; James III, King; James VI and I, King; James VII, King; Mary II, Queen Hume, Patrick, 1st Earl of Marchmont see Marchmont, Patrick Hume, 1st Earl of Hume, Sir David, of Crossrigg, 57 incorporation, 197, 204–5 Inglis, Robert, MP, 140 Jacobites, 84, 140 alliance with Cameronians, 157–72 and succession, 24, 26, 200 and union, 14, 42, 127, 152, 198, 199 James III, King, 24–5 James VI and I, King, 115–16, 189, 203, 204, 205 James VII, King (The Pretender’), 1, 2, 146–7, 158, 171, 188, 205 Jerviswood, George Baillie of, 57, 60, 61, 91 Johnston, Archibald, Lord Wariston see Wariston, Archibald Johnston, Lord Johnston, Sir Patrick, 139–40 Johnstone, William, Marquis of Annandale see Annandale, William Johnstone, Marquis of Jus Divinum, 7, 8 Ker, John, of Kersland, 158–66, 167–8 kings see monarchy Kirk, 12–13, 18, 203, 232, 233 Cameronian criticism of, 207 and mob, 153 and oaths, 54 see also Church of Scotland Kirk, Robert, 12 kirks: plantation of, 48, 61, 66, 87, 95, 131 laity: and worship, 13 Lanark, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Lanark Lanarkshire: armed meetings, 144–5 lawful resistance, doctrine of, 194–5 legal system, 214 legislation: and succession, 84 legislative war, 21–9

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Leslie, John, 9th Earl of Rothes see Rothes, John Leslie, 9th Earl of Leven, David Melville, 3rd Earl of 14, 68, 69–70, 91, 145, 150 limitations to succession, 186, 196–203 Linning, Thomas, 5, 44, 45, 59, 61, 91, 103 lobbying, 49 Lochmaben, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Lochmaben Lockhart, George, of Carnwath, 22–3, 28, 42, 82, 123, 152, 158–66, 167, 168 Logan, Allan, of Torryburn, 57 Logan, John, 40, 43, 50–1, 52, 82, 126 Lords of the Articles, 2 Loudon, Earl of, 123, 139 Louis XIV, King of France, 187 Luim, Orain Iain, 164 McDougall, James, 151 Mackenzie, George, Viscount Tarbat (later 1st Earl of Cromarty), 9, 14, 19–20, 188, 190, 191, 192, 194, 232 Macmillan, John, 5, 132, 156, 160, 167, 169 Mair, George, 56–7 Mar, John Erskine, 11th Earl of, 13, 62, 71, 91, 139, 148–9, 197 Marchmont, Patrick Hume, 1st Earl of, 55, 57, 60, 72, 91 Mary II, Queen, 2, 209 meeting houses, 13 Meldrum, George, 10, 85, 86, 91, 104, 105, 155 Melville, David, 3rd Earl of Leven see Leven, David Melville, 3rd Earl of ministers and addresses to parliament, 102, 112 availability of, 13 election of, 101 and oaths, 55–6 and opposition to union, 82, 83, 148–57 removal of, 12 rights of, 48 Mitchell, Gavin, 62, 143 Mitchell, William, of the Canongate, 150, 153 mobs see riots moderates, 104, 105 monarchs see Anne, Queen; Charles I, King; Charles II, King; Frederick I, King of Prussia; George I, King; James III, King; James VI and I, King; James VII, King; Louis XIV, King of France; Mary II, Queen; William III, King

monarchy, 183, 185, 189 and Church of Scotland, 48 coronation oath, 53–4 powers of, 1, 3, 24, 111, 193, 209, 210, 211 and religion, 64, 87, 115–16, 210–11 see also Hanoverian succession; House of Hanover; House of Stuart Montgomerie, Andrew, 148 Montgomery, Francis, MP, 57 Montrose, James Graham, 8th Duke of, 139 Mulligan, James, 62 Murray, James, 2nd Duke of Atholl see Atholl, James Murray, 2nd Duke of National and Solemn League of Covenants, 18 National Covenant (1638), 4, 58, 109, 203–4 nationalism, 112 naturalisation, 189–90 navigation laws, 16 Nicholson, William, Bishop of Carlisle, 20 Nisbet, Sir John, 191 oaths, 51, 53, 54, 58, 64, 66, 132 oath of abjuration, 55–6, 87, 94, 228 occasional conformity, 54 Ogilvy, James, 1st Earl of Seafield see Seafield, James Ogilvy, 1st Earl of Orkney, Earl of, 199 Paisley, 124 Paisley, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Paisley parishes: addresses to parliament by, 109, 112–15, 122–3, 234 parliament, 183 articles for the removal of, 130–1 British, 131 and Committee for Public Affairs, 86–95 and draft act of security, 63–6 power, 1, 114 and riots, 139 Scottish, 131, 183, 190–1, 198, 231 Scottish representation in see House of Commons; House of Lords and Scottish rights, 111 see also addresses to parliament; House of Commons; House of Lords parties see Cavalier Party; Country Party; Court Party; Whig party party politics, 15–16 Paterson, John, Archbishop of Glasgow, 1–2, 194

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Index Paterson, William, 153 patronage, 4, 9 Peebles, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Peebles Penpont, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Penpont Pierce, J., 166 plantation of kirks see kirks, plantation of political parties see Cavalier Party; Country Party; Court Party; Whig party Porterfield (servant of the Duchess of Hamilton), 148 Post Nati, 189 prayer books: English, 13, 84, 111–12 prayers against union, 133 prelacy, 1, 3, 11 prelates: and parliaments, 57–8; see also bishops presbyteries addresses to parliament by, 99–112, 123, 124–35 and protest, 155–7, 227–8, 234, 235 Presbytery of Biggar, 18, 131, 155, 156, 157 Presbytery of Brechin, 231 Presbytery of Dumbarton, 131–2 Presbytery of Dumfries, 130 Presbytery of Dunblane, 109, 111, 112, 126 Presbytery of Dunfermline, 88, 133 Presbytery of Edinburgh, 52 Presbytery of Ellon, 133 Presbytery of Glasgow, 92, 132 Presbytery of Haddington, 157 Presbytery of Hamilton, 40, 60, 100, 109, 110–11, 112, 124, 126, 135, 146, 153, 155, 156, 227–8 Presbytery of Lanark, 109, 110, 111, 112, 125, 135, 155, 228 Presbytery of Lochmaben, 130 Presbytery of Paisley, 96–7, 130, 150 Presbytery of Peebles, 228 Presbytery of Penpont, 132, 156 Presbytery of Skye, 95, 131 Presbytery of Stirling, 92, 114, 126, 132, 228 Presbytery of Strathbogie, 157 Presbytery of Wigtown, 157, 228 Pretender, The see James VII, King (‘The Pretender’) Privy Council, 48, 87, 95, 140 ‘Proclamation against all Unlawful Convocations’, 144 Protesters, 208 protests, 139–72 providence, doctrine of, 115–21

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queens see monarchy Queensberry, James Douglas, 2nd Duke of, 3, 10, 17, 18, 42, 46, 47, 62, 66, 68, 70–1, 73, 91, 140, 142, 144–5, 154, 158, 168, 203, 233 Queensferry Paper, 211 Ramsay, James, 55, 105 reform see Revolution Settlement (1689–70) religion and succession, 24–5 and union, 70, 193–4 see also Catholicism; Episcopalians Religious settlement, 2–4 republicanism see covenanted Scottish republic Resolutioners, 208 Restoration, 209, 211 Revolution Settlement (1689-70), 1–2, 7, 15, 21 revolutions (1689), 13–17 covenanting revolution (1640–1), 1 Ridpath, George, 10–11, 17, 18, 23, 25, 41, 181, 182, 183–4, 189, 190 riots, 139–43, 153, 155, 156, 157 Robeson, Alexander, 164–5 Roman Catholics see Catholicism Rose, Alexander, Bishop of Edinburgh, 2 Rothes, John Leslie, 9th Earl of, 23, 57, 91 royal supremacy, 87 Rutherglen Declaration (1679), 211 sacramental test, 48, 51, 53, 54–5, 87, 94–5, 131 Saline (parish), 113 Sanquhar declarations, 5, 212 Savoy, House of see House of Savoy schism, 4–6 schools: visitation of, 65 Scots Act of Commission (1604), 183 Seafield, James Ogilvy, 1st Earl of, 7–8, 19, 23–4, 47, 62, 72, 91, 140, 142, 144 Second Address to parliament, 47–63, 73–4, 87, 96, 103, 105; see also First Address to parliament Selkirk, Charles Douglas, 2nd Earl of, 150–1, 198 service books see prayer books: English Seton, William, MP, 187, 188 Sharp, John, Archbishop of York, 20 Shields, Alexander, 5, 212–13 Simson, Patrick, of Renfrew, 58–9, 101, 124, 127–8, 150, 151–2, 195–6, 201

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Skye, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Skye Smoaking Flax, The (pamphlet), 119, 171, 172, 207, 209–11, 213–16 Solemn League and Covenant (1643), 4, 5, 112, 116, 203, 204, 205, 206, 209 Sophia, Electress of Hanover, 21 sovereigns see monarchs; monarchy sovereignty: Scottish, 21, 182, 188–9, 191, 192–3 Spreull, John, 27, 215–16 Stair, Sir John Dalrymple, 1st Earl of, 2, 14, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 91, 123 Stevenson, Patrick, 144 Stewart, Sir James, 20, 23, 46, 95 Stewart, Walter, of Pardovan, 45 Stirling, 144 Stirling, John, 43, 86, 91, 104, 105, 150, 229 Stirling, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Stirling Stobo, Alexander, 54–5 Strathbogie, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Strathbogie Stuart, House of see House of Stuart Stuart, James Francis Edward see James III, King (‘The Pretender’) succession, 21, 22, 24, 26, 84 and Cameronians, 207, 210 Hanoverian, 210 and Hebronites, 205 limitations to, 186, 196–203 see also Union of the Crowns (1603) Succession Act (1681), 21 synods, 18 Galloway, 18, 231 Glasgow, 192 Tarbat, George Mackenzie, Viscount see Mackenzie, George, Viscount Tarbat (later 1st Earl of Cromarty) taxation, 113, 115 teinds: valuation of, 48, 61, 66, 87, 95, 131 Test and Corporation Acts, 54, 66 Third Address to parliament, 83–4 Thomson, John, 62 Thomson, William, 91 toleration and Episcopalians, 10–11, 20, 22, 89 and union, 41, 49, 74, 132 Torry (parish), 113 Tory party, 17, 54

trade, 16–17, 23, 27, 117; see also Wine Act (1703) Treaty of Engagement (1647–8), 204–5 Treaty of London (1641), 183 Treaty of Union (1707), 42, 46, 72, 73, 117, 131, 181 Tweeddale, John Hay, 2nd Earl and 1st Marquis of, 14, 22, 26 union, 17–20 advantages of, 14, 71, 188 federal, 184–5, 187 opposition to, 62–3, 70, 72, 82–3, 109–35, 143, 158, 196–7; see also antiunionists; riots prayer against, 133 and toleration, 10–11 Union of the Crowns (1603), 24, 25, 116, 183, 189, 203 unionists: and succession, 26 United Societies see Cameronians universities, 66, 104 war see Act anent Peace and War (1703); civil war War of Spanish Succession, 21, 26 Wariston, Archibald Johnston, Lord, 208 Webster, James, 90, 152–3 Weir (Treasurer of Hamilton), 148 Westminster Assembly, 204 Westminster Confession of Faith (1690), 3, 7 Wharton, Thomas, 5th Baron, 72 Whig party, 17 Wigtown, Presbytery of see Presbytery of Wigtown William III, King, 209 and assemblies, 7 and church government, 2, 8–10 and electoral process, 3 and settlement, 7 and trade, 16–17 and union, 14, 15, 17 Willison, John, of Dundee, 232 Wine Act (1703), 26 Wishart, William, 91, 99, 157, 229, 230, 231 Wodrow, Robert, 17, 18, 59, 60, 62, 86, 91, 95, 103, 119, 127, 141, 149, 155, 165, 198, 201 Wylie, Robert, 40, 74, 75, 88, 89–90, 99, 103, 119, 153–4, 188–9, 191